Transnational Crime and Global Security [1 ed.] 1440843171, 9781440843174

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Transnational Crime and Global Security

Advisory Board Peter Chalk RAND Corporation Vanda Felbab-Brown The Brookings Institution Heike Gramckow The World Bank Charles Katz Arizona State University William King Sam Houston State University Jean-Luc Lemahieu United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime Edward Maguire Arizona State University Ernesto Savona Transcrime, Joint Research Centre on Transnational Crime Russell G. Smith Australian Institute of Criminology

Transnational Crime and Global Security Volume One: Types of Transnational Crime PHILIP REICHEL AND RYAN RANDA, EDITORS

Praeger Security International

Copyright © 2018 by Philip Reichel and Ryan Randa All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, except for the inclusion of brief quotations in a review, without prior permission in writing from the publisher. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Names: Reichel, Philip L., editor. | Randa, Ryan, editor. Title: Transnational crime and global security / Philip Reichel and Ryan Randa, editors. Description: Santa Barbara : Praeger, [2018–] | Series: Praeger security international | Includes bibliographical references and index. Identifiers: LCCN 2017028739 (print) | LCCN 2017031055 (ebook) | ISBN 9781440843181 (ebook) | ISBN 9781440843174 (set : alk. paper) | ISBN 9781440848414 (vol.1) | ISBN 9781440848421 (vol.2) Subjects: LCSH: Transnational crime. | Organized crime. | Security, International. Classification: LCC HV6252 (ebook) | LCC HV6252 .T713 2018 (print) | DDC 364.1/35—dc23 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2017028739 ISBN: 978-1-4408-4317-4 (set) 978-1-4408-4841-4 (vol. 1) 978-1-4408-4842-1 (vol. 2) 978-1-4408-4318-1 (ebook) 22

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This book is also available as an eBook. Praeger An Imprint of ABC-CLIO, LLC ABC-CLIO, LLC 130 Cremona Drive, P.O. Box 1911 Santa Barbara, California 93116-1911 www.abc-clio.com This book is printed on acid-free paper Manufactured in the United States of America

Philip Reichel would like to dedicate this work to his wife, Eva M. Jewell, for her consistent love and support as he continues to take on projects—even in retirement—that sometimes delay activities in which she would prefer to be engaged. Ryan Randa would like to dedicate this work to wife Danielle, daughter Ruby, and son Ronald. They are the foundation of any success.

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Contents

Acknowledgments

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Introduction

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Part I: The Provision of Illicit Goods

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Illicit Drug Trafficking Matthew Phillips and Joseph B. Kuhns

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Maritime Piracy and Global Security Michael J. Struett

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Fraudulent Medicine Jay P. Kennedy

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Trafficking in Antiquities Blythe A. Bowman

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Wildlife Crime and Security Daan P. van Uhm

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The Impact of Intellectual Property Violations on Economic Security Domestically and Globally Hedi Nasheri

Part II: The Provision of Illicit Services 7

The Act of Cleaning Illegal Profits: What We Know and Don’t Know about Money Laundering Florian J. Hetzel

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8 Understanding Cybercrime Diana S. Dolliver and Kevin Poorman

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9 Identity-Related Crimes Bradford W. Reyns

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10 Transnational Environmental Crime and Global Security Rob White 11 Transnational Sex Trafficking: An Issue of State and Human Security Kristina Lugo

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12 Human Trafficking for Labor Exploitation Amy Farrell, Rebecca Pfeffer, Meredith Dank, and Colleen Owens

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Part III: Crimes Affecting Stability

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13 How the Transnational Crime of Corruption Impacts Global Security Adam Masters

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14 Understanding Terrorism in the Modern Era Galia Cohen and Robert W. Taylor

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15 Weaponization of Infectious Disease R. Alexander Hamilton

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About the Editors and Contributors

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Index

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Acknowledgments

We begin with heartfelt thanks and recognition for their efforts of all the contributors who authored chapters for these volumes. Each was writing in an area of his or her expertise, but we understand that a request for an original contribution always requires significant work, commitment, and time. We greatly appreciate their willingness to participate in this project. We also thank the members of the Advisory Board who provided such excellent suggestions for contributors and often provided introductions that were very helpful in our recruiting endeavors. Of the many challenges involved with the preparation of a work such as this, achieving consistency in citation and referencing style is among the most arduous. That task was eased by the efforts of Angela Collins, who worked competently and quickly to bring many of the chapters in line with the required style. Finally, we are especially grateful to Steve Catalano, acquisitions editor at Praeger Publishers/ABC-CLIO. Throughout the process, Steve provided helpful suggestions, encouragement, advice, and support. Thank you, Steve!

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Introduction

The spread of transnational crime is one of the most significant security challenges facing governments around the world today. As post-Cold War globalization took hold, its benefits were acclaimed but its dark side was too often ignored. Just as globalization has provided opportunities for unprecedented openness in trade, travel, and communication; so too has it created opportunities for criminals—and therein lies the dark side. Criminal groups have expanded across domestic borders as new corridors open to meet the demand for illegal products and services. The demand is met, in part, by creating commercial exchange zones where local criminal factions participate in the international market as the advantages of globalization are exploited (Garzón, Olinger, Rico, & Santamaria, 2013). As the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (2010, p. ii) points out, crime has gone global and individual national responses are ineffectual as they do little more than displace the problem. This inadequacy is exacerbated by the fact that globalization has outpaced the growth of mechanisms for global governance (Kemp, 2009). The result is a lack of effective international regulation—whether that be on the Internet, in banking systems, with free trade zones, or combatting transnational crime. Transnational crime has a global reach, penetration, and impact that threaten all countries. As a result, all countries have a shared responsibility to respond (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2010, p. iii). Not surprisingly, transnational crime is having an impact on domestic and global security. Conflict and post-conflict areas are especially

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vulnerable, but transnational crime clearly affects security everywhere. This two-volume set considers the global security and justice problems created by the variety of dangerous and unsettling transnational crimes that are growing in volume and severity around the world. These two volumes complement each other in a way that allows readers to use a single work to learn about specific transnational crimes (Volume 1) and about efforts to prevent and combat those crimes (Volume 2). This introduction to both volumes identifies the editors’ goals, the organization of the work, and provides suggestions for how, and by whom, the volumes might be used. GOALS OF THE VOLUMES The primary goal as we began this project was to provide students, scholars, professionals, consultants, and practitioners in the areas of criminal justice and security studies with information and analysis on the contemporary topics of transnational crime and global security. To accomplish that, we also had a goal of providing original works from as diverse a group of authors as possible. A global subject matter requires a global perspective. The “About the Contributors” section provides information about the more than 40 contributors writing from 10 different countries and the United Nations. The contributors include scholars from respected universities in Europe, North America, and Australia, professionals working at public policy research institutes, and researchers at several United Nations entities. We believe the contributors’ geographic diversity, varied backgrounds, and the resulting medley of perspectives results in a unique and important panorama of the crime and security topics. ORGANIZATION OF THE VOLUMES The two volumes reflect the work’s title with Volume 1 focused on transnational crime and Volume 2 on security. The chapters of each volume are divided into three parts. Chapter contributors were not restricted by requirements of a standard organization for all chapters to follow. Although standardization of chapters has the advantage of providing familiarity and consistency for the reader, it also restricts authors to a set of guidelines that may or may not be relevant to their topic or approach. Given the wide range of topics we have asked contributors to cover, it seemed inappropriate to place restriction on how they approached their topic. As a result, each chapter in each volume is presented in the way that the expert(s) preparing that chapter thinks can most effectively convey the material they deem most important. Further, each of the three parts in both volumes includes a Part Introduction that provides an overview of the chapters comprising that part.

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Volume 1: Types of Transnational Crime Determining the topics for Volume 1 was not easily accomplished. At least 50 activities fall under the broad umbrella of transnational crime (Council on Foreign Relations, 2013). They range from arms trafficking to video-game counterfeiting. Our approach was to narrow the field by determining the categories of transnational crime we wanted covered. Borrowing somewhat from Albanese (2011), we identified our three parts as: Provision of Illicit Goods, Provision of Illicit Services, and Crimes Affecting Stability. We then recruited authors known to have expertise in transnational crimes falling into each of the three categories. The result is six examples of crimes that are best described as providing illicit goods, six examples of crimes that provide illicit services, and three examples of crimes or criminal behavior that affect stability. In this way, we can cover transnational crimes that are more familiar (e.g., maritime piracy and human trafficking) and others that are less well known (e.g., wildlife crime and weaponization of infectious diseases). Volume 2: Security Implications of Transnational Crime Our approach to chapters for Volume 2 was also directed by three themes that we wanted to investigate: Understanding Transnational Crime, Consequences of Transnational Crime, and Responding to Transnational Crime. By using these categories to frame our coverage of the security implications of transnational crime, chapter contributors are able to offer contemporary insight and emerging perspectives on the confluence of transnational crime and security. The result is a fascinating grouping of chapter topics unique to this work. Ranging from suggestions for researching and measuring transnational crime, through such issues as dealing with returning foreign terrorist fighters, and concluding with descriptions of current and proposed responses to transnational crime, the chapters in Volume 2 make clear the need for attention to the global and domestic security implications of combatting and preventing this dark side of globalization. The interesting array of topics presented in this volume show the very serious consequences of transnational crime but also make clear that effective action is possible—especially when collaboration occurs. SUGGESTIONS FOR USE Security and transnational crime is a focus for individual nations, regions, and the global community. Whether attention is concentrated on a particular type of transnational crime such as human trafficking or illicit drugs, or on broader concerns of transnational crime generally, the security issues related to preventing and combatting transnational crime

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remain at the forefront. We believe the chapters in these two volumes can be useful to students, scholars, policy makers, practitioners, and researchers as they search for background information on a topic. The chapter titles are reasonably specific, but the subject index and especially the part introductions will help readers narrow the chapters to those of particular relevance to the information being sought. The reference section of each chapter can also be useful in finding additional material on the key ideas and concepts presented by the contributors. We hope these volumes will become a primary source of information for scholars and professionals working on transnational crime issues and the security implications of that crime. Philip Reichel and Ryan Randa REFERENCES Albanese, J. S. (2011). Transnational crime and the 21st century: Criminal enterprise, corruption, and opportunity. New York: Oxford University Press. Council on Foreign Relations. (2013). The global regime for transnational crime. Retrieved from http://www.cfr.org/transnational-crime/global-regime-trans national-crime/p28656#. Garzón, J. C., Olinger, M., Rico, D. M., & Santamaria, G. (2013). The criminal diaspora: The spread of transnational organized crime and how to contain its expansion. Retrieved from https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/the-criminaldiaspora-the-spread-transnational-organized-crime-and-how-to-contain-its. Kemp, W. (2009, June 25). Organized crime: A growing threat to security. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. Retrieved from https://www .sipri.org/commentary/essay/thu-06-25-2009-14-00/organized-crime-agrowing-threat-to-security. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. (2010). The globalization of crime: A transnational organized crime threat assessment. Retrieved from http:// www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-analysis/tocta-2010.html.

PART I

The Provision of Illicit Goods

Volume 1, Part I begins with what many consider to be the most widely known and publicly discussed type of transnational crime: the trafficking of illicit drugs. This crime is the subject of tremendous public, and scholarly, attention both on the North American continent and globally. Our authors navigate the process explaining that the process is growth, production, and finally transportation. Complicating matters, illicit drug source ingredient countries are geographically distanced from the primary consumers of the final product and the process is geographically demanding requiring a diverse selection of equipment, other products and chemicals, and often secure and remote environments. Chapter 2 continues the discussion of providing illicit goods with a thorough presentation of modern day maritime piracy. This chapter begins with a discussion of practical and legal definitions of piracy, then examines the scope of the international maritime piracy problem, and discusses the major trends in piracy over the last several decades. Finally, Chapter 2 concludes with a few basic suggestions for policy improvements to contain the security challenges posed by maritime piracy. In Chapter 3, readers will discover the world of fraudulent medicine. Across the globe, and particularly in developing nations were those in need struggle to afford medication, fraudulent versions of prescription medication is a serious concern. Kennedy explains the nature of fraudulent medicines, who is most effected, and the size and scope of the problem from production through distribution. The “gray markets” of trading in illicit antiquities is presented and discussed in Chapter 4. The illicit antiquities trade shares many elements similar to other transnational criminal markets in terms of structure and functioning. But it is also unique in that trading in antiquities is legal, but the means by which antiquities are usually procured are often illegal. Thus, many antiquities on the market today have undergone a transformation in status from illicit to licit, turning the matter from a clear-cut, black-and-white one to a murky shade of gray.

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Chapter 5 provides a global overview of the diverse market of wildlife crimes. Industrialization and globalization continue to influence this transnational black market significantly. The illicit market in rare and exotic wildlife has become very lucrative. Our author explains that wildlife crime is not only a serious transnational crime with a profound negative impact for endangered species, ecosystem stability, and local communities, but that it has also become an increasing threat to national and global security. Part I concludes with a presentation of the impact of intellectual property violations on global economic security. Chapter 6 asserts that the economic value of goods protected by copyrights, patents, and trademarks makes them attractive targets for criminal networks. Our authors cite INTERPOL, suggesting that trademark counterfeiting and copyright piracy are serious transnational crimes that defraud consumers, threaten the health of patients, cost society billions of dollars in lost government revenues, foreign investments or business profits, and violate the rights of trademark, patent and copyright owners. Implications and strategies for prevention are discussed.

CHAPTER 1

Illicit Drug Trafficking Matthew Phillips and Joseph B. Kuhns

OVERVIEW There are few transnational crimes that are as widely prevalent, and perhaps as historically and economically relevant, as illicit drug trafficking. Illicit (and licit) drug use and abuse has been an aspect of almost every society for thousands of years, and the illicit drug trafficking business involves transactions that exceed billions of dollars annually. In fact, drug trafficking routinely maintains the number one spot as the most profitable transnational crime (Al Jabal, 2010; Haken, 2011). Historically, numerous wars have been fought over and around the myriad of issues associated with legal and illegal drug use and trafficking. And drug trafficking has facilitated the creation and expansion of large law enforcement agencies within the United States (e.g., Drug Enforcement Agency) and abroad (e.g., INTERPOL). Transnational trafficking of illicit drugs has been a worldwide law enforcement challenge for many generations. Given that the source ingredients for some primary drugs of abuse are regionally grown (e.g., coca bush and poppy plants) and geographically constrained to specific parts of the globe, it naturally follows that growth and subsequent transportation of those source ingredients, and/or the illicit drugs that are processed/produced from the source ingredients, becomes a necessary aspect of the broader business model that is the illicit drug trade. Transnational trafficking, of course, is part of the business model, particularly when illicit drug source ingredient countries are geographically distanced from the primary consumers of the final product. In other words, drug traffickers need to first successfully grow the source ingredients (e.g., coca bush or poppy plants) required to produce an illicit drug (e.g., cocaine or heroin). Then they need to actually produce the drug using those raw ingredients, a process which requires some equipment,

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other products and chemicals, and often a secure and remote environment. Transnational drug traffickers also require an infrastructure and organization to move the final products to those countries and regions of the world where it is most likely to be purchased by local dealers/sellers and subsequently purchased and consumed by end users. In the case of some of the primary drugs of abuse, such as cocaine and heroin, the primary user base may be on another continent altogether. As such, transnational trafficking of illicit drugs is a fundamental strategy and a challenge for both the traffickers and for law enforcement. This chapter will closely examine transnational drug trafficking by first considering some of the primary drugs of abuse (cocaine, heroin, marijuana, and the broader category of synthetics/stimulants), exploring where these drugs are produced and trafficked from and to (including source countries, trafficking routes and transshipment zones, and consumer destinations), the various ways in which these drugs are trafficked (methods and strategies), and who traffics the drugs (organized crime groups to street-level dealers). We will also discuss the primary strategies used to disrupt transnational drug trafficking and provide some context for the relative effectiveness of these current efforts. MAJOR DRUGS OF INTEREST There is a wide range of licit and illicit substances that contribute to transnational trafficking challenges, although many of these substances have a lesser impact or beyond the scope of this chapter. For the immediate purposes, we will focus our attention on the four most problematic illicit drugs—cocaine, heroin, marijuana (which is not always illicit, of course), and methamphetamines and other amphetamine-type substances. Cocaine Cocaine remains one of the most widely used and abused illicit drugs in the world. Cocaine is a short-acting central nervous system stimulant that is derived from the leaves of coca plants. While historically and currently having some legitimate medical use, recreational use and abuse of cocaine, typically via snorting or smoking (e.g., crack or freebase), provides a powerful, short-term high that is appealing to many. Cocaine-induced highs are also powerfully reinforcing in many animal species and in humans, suggesting that persistent users will develop some level of tolerance, and potentially some psychological addiction, to the substance. Cocaine is extracted and produced from the leaves of the coca plant, which grows nearly exclusively in northern and western South America. In fact, most of the entire world supply of coca plants/bushes are grown and cultivated in the jungles and mountain areas of South America (DEA: Air, Land, & Sea, 2016). According to the most recent available

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data, Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia (in that order) produce most of the annual coca bush/leaf supply, although smaller, insignificant amounts are also grown and potentially cultivated in Chile, Ecuador, and Venezuela depending on the year (United Nations, 2010). However, in more recent years, the vast majority of coca bushes are grown in Colombia, and the majority of the refining of the coca leaves into usable cocaine powder (a process that involves multiple steps, various chemicals, and trained laborers) also occurs in Colombia (United Nations, 2010). Trafficking of cocaine, and other illicit drugs, is determined to some degree by geographic proximity, direction and distance to viable consumer markets, available methods of transportation (discussed later), ready access to transshipment zones (which serve as temporary conduits between source countries and end-user markets), and effectiveness of law enforcement interdiction efforts (discussed later). The largest proportion of cocaine (approximately 40%) is distributed and consumed in North America (Office of National Drug Control Strategy, 2016a) and estimates suggest that about 90 percent of cocaine seized by law enforcement as a part of the Cocaine Signature program originates in Columbia (Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, 2015). Therefore, a large proportion of cocaine is transported to the United States via Central America and Mexico and through a wide range of Caribbean transshipment countries (e.g., Trinidad and Tobago, Jamaica, the Dominican Republic, and Haiti) and uninhabited islands (Drug Enforcement Administration, 2016) where law enforcement and interdiction efforts are uneven or, in many cases, absent altogether. Western Europeans consume another quarter of the cocaine that is available in any given year, necessitating trafficking across the Atlantic Ocean. Much of the European cocaine is moved via shipping containers, and again, much of it derives from Colombia, but also Bolivia and Peru. Smaller amounts of cocaine are trafficked to Africa, again primarily across the Atlantic Ocean into western and southern African countries (United Nations, 2010). Heroin Heroin continues to serve as one of the primary drugs of abuse worldwide. There are an estimated 12.9 to 21 million opiate users (opiate use can include opium, morphine, heroin, and opiate-based prescription drugs) worldwide, many of whom are primarily heroin users or will become heroin users in the future (United Nations, 2012). More recent evidence suggests the extent of use, abuse, and damage is on the rise, in part because many prescription drugs are opioid-based, and many who become dependent on prescription painkillers will migrate to illegal heroin markets over time (Abuse of Prescription Pain Medications Risks Heroin Use, 2014). Heroin can be injected, inhaled, or smoked, and all three methods of use deliver a rapid surge of euphoria for users. Chronic use of heroin leads to

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the development of tolerance and physical dependence, and discontinued use can result in a painful withdrawal process. The probability of developing addiction, and the rates of addiction, among heroin users are among the highest of all known addictive substances (Gable, 2006). Given that many heroin addicts use the drug intravenously, risks of contracting and spreading a range of diseases create additional public health concerns. Heroin is synthesized from opium, a naturally occurring, milky substance that is manually extracted from the seed pods of the Asian opium poppy plant. Morphine, a highly effective pain medication that is used routinely within the legitimate medical field, is first extracted from raw, dried opium. The morphine base is then further processed into heroin (Zerell, Ahrens, & Gerz, 2015), which is far more potent than morphine, which in turn is far more potent than opium. Further, heroin is more compact, which makes trafficking and distribution easier. Historically, most of the world’s opium supply originated in the Golden Triangle of Southeast Asia (Myanmar and the Lao People’s Democratic Republic) or in southwestern Asia (predominantly Afghanistan). More recently, the majority of the world’s opium poppy plants are grown and harvested in Afghanistan (estimated to be producing nearly 80% of the overall market supply in 2010). Heroin production has also occurred in Colombia, Latin America, and Mexico, which tends to serve the North American market (Cannabis, Coca, & Poppy: Nature’s Addictive Plants, 2016; Office of National Drug Control Strategy, 2016a). While slightly different chemical and production processes are used in Afghanistan and Colombia/Mexico, the end product, heroin (white, brown, or black tar), remains a potent drug of abuse that is widely used. Heroin trafficking routes, of course, vary considerably depending on the source country and the destination market(s). Much of the Afghanistan heroin is transported and trafficked to either the Russian Federation (via the northern route through Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, or Turkmenistan) or Western Europe (via the Balkan route which traverses Iran, Pakistan, Turkey, Greece, and/or Bulgaria). Myanmar heroin primarily serves Chinese, Indian, and southeastern Asian markets. In recent years, most of the heroin in the United States comes from, or at least comes through, Mexico, in part because Colombian heroin production has dropped considerably (United Nations, 2010; Office of National Drug Control Strategy, 2016b). Heroin use prevalence rates and estimated numbers of users are routinely the highest in the United States, followed by Europe and Africa, although measurement processes vary considerably from one country to the next. Marijuana Marijuana (also referred to as cannabis herb) remains the most widely used illicit drug in the world. In 2012, between 125 million and 227 million

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people worldwide were estimated to have used cannabis, which represents between 2.7 percent and 4.9 percent of the population between the ages of 15 and 64 (United Nations, 2012). However, the true number of marijuana users (which would include legal and illegal users) is unknown, but probably increasing, in some countries (e.g., the United States, Canada, and Uruguay) more recently because some state and federal legislators and law enforcement agencies are transitioning from a historically criminalized model of marijuana prohibition and enforcement to a decriminalized, medicalized, and/or fully legalized policy and enforcement approach. Marijuana herb, a dry, shredded green and brown mixture of leaves, seeds, and stems, which is derived from the hemp plant Cannabis sativa, is most often smoked by users. In a more concentrated form, it is referred to as hashish and a sticky, black liquid, hash oil, or cannabis resin, is also produced and consumed in various ways. Recent legalization policies in some states in the United States, in Uruguay and perhaps elsewhere have resulted in the sale of cannabis-laced soft drinks, candies, cookies, and other edibles. In addition, legalization has resulted in a wider range of products with varied and increasing levels of THC (the primary psychoactive chemical, delta-9-tetrahydrocannabinol). Marijuana plants can grow naturally or domestically on almost every continent in the world and in most countries in the world, including in all 50 states within the United States. Production capacity is widely varied, from large-scale marijuana farms covering hundreds of acres to growth of a few small plants for individual users. Production of cannabis resin is restricted to a smaller number of countries in North Africa, the Middle East, and Southwest Asia. Indoor-growing processes (often using hydroponics, which involves growing plants without soil and relying instead on liquid solutions, which contain the necessary growing ingredients and minerals) allow anyone with the base raw materials, necessary space, and requisite energy sources required to grow healthy and productive marijuana plants. The recent efforts to medicalize, decriminalize, and fully legalize marijuana use in some states within the United States (Motel, 2015) is likely to increase both the overall production, THC levels, and the extent of recreational use in the future. Since cannabis plants are far more widely grown than coca bushes or poppy plants, assessing productivity capacity is correspondingly more difficult. One method used to estimate production and availability is by assessing seizure amounts year over year. Seizure activity is also an indicator of the capacity for moving marijuana from growth countries to enduser markets. The United States has the largest quantity of marijuana herb seizures in a typical year, but these figures likely reflect a combination of law enforcement capacity at the Mexican-U.S. border (Mexico produces a substantial amount of marijuana that serves the North American consumer market), marijuana availability, and a range of other factors. Another measurement method is to consider the number of acres of marijuana plants

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that are eradicated in a given year. The United States, Philippines, Guatemala, and Costa Rica all reported eradicating more than one million outdoor plants in 2013. Meanwhile, the United States reported eradicating in excess of 360,000 indoor plants as well (United Nations, 2016). Again, these estimates are likely impacted by many factors other than overall production capacity and the countries involved vary from year to year. Unlike heroin, marijuana is rather bulky when produced in large quantities, thereby making transport and shipping from one country to another more difficult. However, there is also a wide variation in the quality of marijuana that is produced from one country to the next. As such, while it is likely that a large portion of the worldwide production of marijuana ends up being used within the producing country, transnational shipment of marijuana remains a substantial law enforcement challenge. Recently, the highest marijuana use rates were being reported in Oceania (Australia and New Zealand), followed by North America, Western and Central Europe, and West and Central Africa respectively (United Nations, 2012). Again, however, the legalization efforts in the United States will certainly increase overall production and use rates in certain states but may simultaneously reduce transnational shipments of marijuana to the United States. Methamphetamine and Amphetamine-Type Stimulants Methamphetamine and other amphetamine-type stimulants (ATS) represent the fourth category of major drugs of abuse, and the production and abuse of these substances have increased dramatically in recent years. Between 2008 and 2012, worldwide seizures of ATS have quadrupled (United Nations, 2015). Part of the recent surge in ATS abuse is linked to the abuse of pharmaceuticals prescribed to treat disorders, such as attention-deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) and hyperactivity. Clandestine methamphetamine production is also a factor, and it continues to increase, particularly in North America. Methamphetamines and ATS are short-term, fast-acting, and powerful central nervous system stimulants that can produce a wide range of pharmacological effects. ATS drugs are also highly physically addictive. Methamphetamine and ATS can be consumed through smoking, snorting, taken orally in pills or tablets, or dissolved in liquids such as water or coffee (Methamphetamine, 2014). The bulk of methamphetamine and illicit ATS drugs are produced in clandestine laboratories. Such labs were previously much more prolific in the United States, but legal measures designed to control the availability of necessary precursor chemicals (and equipment) have resulted in a shift in production to Mexico. Here, more ready access to precursors enable Mexican trafficking groups to operate larger labs capable of producing vast quantities of high purity methamphetamine (U.S. Department of Justice, 2010). Production is also prevalent in Southeast Asia, including

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Thailand, Cambodia, Vietnam, Singapore, Myanmar, and Brunei. A notable exception is the drug methylenedioxymethamphetamine (MDMA, or “ecstasy”). Typically placed in the ATS category, this substance is known for having both stimulant and hallucinogenic effects. Illicit production of MDMA occurs in clandestine labs in Western and Central Europe (Lyman, 2011; United Nations, 2015). From the clandestine lab sources in North America, Southeast Asia, and Europe, methamphetamine and ATS drugs are moved to markets worldwide. Major markets include the United States, Western European nations, China, and Oceanic countries, notably Australia. In recent years, substantial rises in seizures have occurred in Western and Central Africa, as well as Southwest Asia, including Iran, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Pakistan (United Nations, 2015). These seizures are thought to indicate that these countries are being used for transshipment of ATS between source and market. The methods of transshipment of methamphetamine and ATS are similar to that of cocaine and heroin, given that it is relatively compact. However, the solubility of methamphetamine in liquids also gives traffickers the ability to conceal the drug in liquid form, such as in water bottles, soft drinks, or even in candles (U.S. Department of Justice, 2015). TRAFFICKING AND TRANSSHIPMENT METHODS Traffickers are known to use a variety of methods for moving illicit substances from their source to their ultimate markets. These transshipment methods can be highly tailored to the substance being transported, the quantity or size of the transshipment load, distance between source and market, and can vary by trafficking organization. In discussing the variety of transshipment methods, it may be useful to categorize such methods into maritime trafficking, overland trafficking, and air trafficking. This section of the chapter presents the most common methods of trafficking and transshipment in each of these categories. However, it should be noted that such methods and their prevalence are prone to change over time, as drug trafficking organizations have demonstrated flexibility and adaptability as circumstances dictate and as law enforcement pressures increase. Maritime Trafficking Maritime drug trafficking involves the shipment of illicit substances either concealed within legitimate cargo or clandestinely shipped in private vessels as the primary cargo (Aune, 1990). The movement of drugs through maritime channels reaches as far back as the smuggling of opium into the United States from China in the 19th century (DEA: Air, Land, & Sea, 2016) but has grown substantially in scope and sophistication. Today,

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maritime drug trafficking is used around the globe as a means of reaching the major drug markets and typically involves the movement of cocaine, heroin, and marijuana. The most common platforms for maritime drug smuggling are fishing vessels, commercial cargo ships, and small personal watercrafts, also known as “go-fasts” or “go-fast boats.” The exploitation of the fishing industry by drug traffickers is a longstanding concern to national and international authorities (United Nations, 2011). Persons connected with the organized drug trade are able to leverage the immense size of the fishing industry to conceal their activities from law enforcement by maintaining the appearance of legitimate business. Further, fishing vessels have the advantage of operating in a geographically enormous area with relatively low probability of interaction with law enforcement (and thus interdiction). As an example, the Caribbean Sea, a well-known vector of maritime drug trafficking, is roughly the same size as the continental United States (Lyman, 2011). Drug traffickers in fishing vessels have a marked advantage relative to counternarcotic operations. Interdiction in the maritime channels relies on a flag state with jurisdiction encountering a fishing vessel, correctly distinguishing between illicit activity and legitimate industry, boarding the vessel and locating drugs on that vessel. Fishing vessels are known to be used by drug trafficking organizations moving cocaine and heroin from South American countries (chiefly Colombia) toward the U.S. market. Such vessels may move through the eastern Pacific, Atlantic, or western Caribbean routes. According to United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) estimates, nearly two-thirds of the cocaine leaving Colombia moves through the eastern Pacific vector. These vessels may proceed directly to the United States, or traffickers may transship the cargo through any number of countries between the source and destination. As the Colombian trafficking organizations have shifted toward a model that relies on the use of Mexican drug trafficking organizations to move drugs into the United States (Lyman, 2011), larger proportions of fishing vessels leaving Colombia are headed for Mexico. Some estimates suggest this figure may be as high as 90 percent (United Nations, 2011). Colombian traffickers also rely on the use of fishing vessels for the movement of drugs, primarily cocaine, from South America to West Africa, en route to various markets in Europe. Large fishing vessels are used as “motherships,” which distribute their cargo offshore to smaller fishing vessels which, in turn, head for commercial ports in either West Africa or Europe. Fishing vessels are also a major maritime trafficking platform for drugs leaving Mexico, particularly large bales of marijuana. Mexican trafficking groups use fishing vessels in a variety of ways, including as transport vessels to move drugs to and from “motherships,” movement of illicit substances into commercial ports, and as mobile provision stations for go-fast boats. When moving shorter distances, such as from the Mexican state of

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Baja California into the U.S. state of California, smaller open air, outboard motor-powered fishing boats known as “pangas” are also used by Mexican traffickers (Hendricks, 2013). To move larger loads over shorter distances, Mexican traffickers also use “super pangas,” which are larger pangas featuring multiple outboard motors (Baxter, 2014). Pangas are used alongside “go-fasts,” which are long narrow planing vessels, with powerful engines capable of lifting the bulk of the hull out of the water. This enables the boat to reach high speeds, shortening the time from departure to destination and often allow traffickers to outrun pursuers. The transshipment of heroin is also facilitated through fishing vessels. The bulk of the world’s heroin is produced in Afghanistan. After production, the heroin can move toward port cities such as Karachi, Pakistan, where fishing vessels bring it to destinations around the world, including Southeast Asia, Japan, and Oceania. Smaller proportions of Southwest Asian heroin move via fishing vessels to the U.S. market, but as noted earlier in this chapter, a very small proportion of heroin in the United States comes from Southwest Asia. Compared to that of fishing vessels, a smaller proportion of international drug trafficking is facilitated through the use of commercial cargo shipments. Similar to the advantage gained by concealing illicit narcotics in the immense legitimate fishing industry, drug traffickers are able to conceal their products within commercial cargo on container ships (Full circle: An old route regains popularity with drugs gangs, 2014). Commercial container shipments are measured according to size, with the 20-foot and 40-foot units being most common, and cargo volume is measured in twenty-foot equivalent units (TEUs). According to the World Shipping Council (2016), there are over 34 million TEU shipments packed and shipped globally each year. Traffickers use global commercial shipping vectors to smuggle drugs through a variety of methods. Drugs may be concealed inside other cargo, behind false partitions in the containers, or in natural hiding places in the container, such as refrigeration units. Related fraudulent activities, involving falsification of importation duties or declarations of contents and values, are also common. A substantial proportion of trafficking through commercial maritime vectors is accomplished through “rip-offs” (European Commission, 2002). Rip-offs occur when traffickers select shipments made by legal shippers using legal routes, place drugs into the load prior to departure, and recover those drugs prior to inspection at the arrival port. Rip-off loads can be recovered at the terminal, during transportation, or even on the vessel if the container is accessible. The anonymity and seemingly random nature of rip-offs make them notoriously difficult to detect until after the shipment has occurred. Traffickers also take advantage of complicit dock workers and inspection officials to facilitate such movements. Common markers of rip-offs include shipment in coffee or bananas, and the alteration or manipulation of container-locking mechanisms and seals.

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A more recent concern in maritime drug trafficking is the potential for trafficking organizations to use custom-built submarines to move drugs from Colombia to the United States. These vessels can be placed into three categories: low-profile vessels (LPVs) and self-propelled semi-submersibles (SPSS), fully submersible vessels (FSVs), and narcotorpedoes, which are towed behind vessels traveling at the surface (Ramirez & Bunker, 2015). These vessels travel at or below the waterline, offering a high degree of concealment from authorities, and can theoretically allow for the movement of multiton loads of narcotics. Currently, the existing intelligence information has only documented the use of these vessels in the Caribbean and eastern Pacific. It is the aspiration of Colombian traffickers to use submarines to move narcotics to West Africa and Europe, but the unstable nature of the vessels make them unfeasible for transatlantic crossings. Nonetheless, media outlets have reported the seizure of such vessels carrying loads of cocaine off the coast of South America and the Caribbean Islands (Crilly, 2015) and have discovered vessels under construction in remote jungle locations. Although this method of transshipment has been attempted since the 1990s, debate continues as to the actual proportion of narcotics smuggled in this fashion. The DEA estimates as much as 30 percent of maritime drug flow is moved in this fashion (Ramirez & Bunker, 2014, p. 7). Many of the interdictions of these vessels concern estuary interdictions; that is, the vessel is discovered and seized during its construction before being put to sea, and the vast majority of interdictions are LPVs, rather than true submersibles. The sensitive nature of this information results in much of the documentation remaining classified, but sufficient open source documentation exists to suggest that the amount of drugs reaching the United States through narco-subs is considerable and nonnegligible. As the traffickers continue to develop this technology, maritime trafficking in this vector is likely to increase. Overland Trafficking Using drug seizures as a proxy for trafficking methods supports the conclusion that the overwhelming majority of illicit drugs are smuggled using overland trafficking methods (U.S. Department of Justice, 2010). Similar to the maritime flow, traffickers using overland methods are able to hide within the massive volume of legitimate commerce and travel that move through the same channels every day. Traffickers are able to utilize commercial trucks and personal vehicles to move drugs through recognized ports of entry and can use all-terrain vehicles and individual couriers carrying backpacks to facilitate trafficking across borders between the ports of entry. These overland methods of moving illicit substances are used when the source and markets are connected by land (as is the case when moving

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from South America or Mexico to the United States, or from Afghanistan to markets in Europe, Asia, and Russia) but are often used in conjunction with maritime smuggling methods. Exclusive reliance on land-based smuggling methods often is predicated on the crossing of international borders, and thus is easier to accomplish when those borders are more porous. The odds of interdiction also increase with the number of borders that must be crossed. As the distance from source to market increases, traffickers will combine smuggling methods to circumvent interdiction efforts. One example would be Colombian traffickers moving cocaine to Mexico through maritime means, and Mexican traffickers subsequently moving the cocaine into the United States in commercial or personal vehicles. Similarly, heroin from Afghanistan and Pakistan is moved by trucks toward port cities such as Karachi before being placed into container ships for maritime transshipment. Two land smuggling methods that have come to light more recently are drug trafficking using commercial railways and underground tunnels. International freight rail lines extend throughout North, Central, and South America, and provide additional opportunities for traffickers to conceal narcotics among massive volumes of licit cargo. As with smuggling in maritime containers, drugs are hidden behind false partitions and typically removed prior to inspection by authorities. Only a small fraction of the illicit drugs smuggled globally are moved by rail (Sherman, 2009), but the proportion is thought to be growing. The responsibility for interdiction in rail and commercial trucking in the United States falls to the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP). Currently, CBP is combating the co-opting of the systems of trade and commerce by subversive actors through an initiative called the Customs-Trade Partnership against Terrorism (C-TPAT). C-TPAT seeks to integrate trusted industry partners with CBP for the purpose of preventing breaches of security and the illegal shipment of contraband materials (U.S. Customs and Border Protection, 2017). Finally, Mexican traffickers seeking to move drugs into the United States have turned to a new approach. Rather than moving drugs through the border, subterranean constructed tunnels allow the movement to occur under the border. The size and technological sophistication of such tunnels vary widely. Some are narrow, unventilated, and short, while others are outfitted with lighting and ventilation, and rail systems for hauling cargo distances over a mile long (Martinez, 2015). Over 75 tunnels have been discovered between the United States and Mexico, with the overwhelming majority located in California or Arizona. Drug smuggling tunnels have not been documented as being used or built elsewhere in the world (although smuggling tunnels for other purposes, such as the movement of people or weapons, have been documented in places such as Bosnia and Gaza). The presence of drug smuggling tunnels may be due to the unique situation of having a major drug source country (Mexico)

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located next to a major drug consumer market (United States). By necessity, these tunnels must be relatively short and are therefore impractical in other world regions. Air Trafficking The third and final major category of drug trafficking methods includes those methods for moving illegal substances through the air. As with both maritime and overland trafficking, air trafficking includes a wide variety of techniques and tactics and may be combined with trafficking in other vectors. At its most basic level, air trafficking of illegal narcotics can leverage commercial air traffic. A low-cost method involves erstwhile ordinary airline passengers concealing small quantities of narcotics on their person, boarding the aircraft, and carrying the narcotics to their intended destination. This method of trafficking relies on scrutiny at essentially one point in the process, since interdiction efforts effectively cease once the carrier of the drugs (often known as a “mule”) evades detection by airport security. Traffickers can benefit from relatively weak security in source country airports, or may enhance their probability of success through offering bribes and hiring accomplices who are strategically placed at airports. Although only effective for limited quantities of drugs, this method has shown itself to be reliable and is used around the globe. Traffickers can also use commercial air to smuggle illegal substances by concealing those substances within commercial air cargo, rather than passenger aircraft. Commercial carriers screen for such substances as a matter of routine, but due to the immense volume of legitimate cargo, inevitably contraband will go undetected and will be moved unknowingly by the carrier. In the United States, CBP’s C-TPAT initiative also covers commercial air cargo, but these efforts are supplemented by international cargo firms such as the United Postal Service, FedEx, DHL, and others. Traffickers may choose to forego reliance on commercial air methods and instead charter private flights from source countries or intermediate transshipment locations to the ultimate destinations. Chartering private flights for the purpose of drug trafficking requires that the traffickers find a willing pilot with a suitable aircraft for the intended journey, although the larger trafficking groups have their own pilots within their organization. Because flight patterns are required to be filed in advance of the plane leaving its point of origin, certain protocols must be followed (which vary by country), and deviations from those protocols are typically perceived as indicators of potential criminal activity. For example, in the United States, the Federal Aviation Administration requires that flight plans be filed 24 hours in advance of departure. For particularly well-funded trafficking organizations, it is possible to own the infrastructure necessary to facilitate air trafficking, including pilots, aircraft, and even runways and airports. Airstrips for drug

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trafficking have been discovered in South American countries ranging from Colombia to Peru, while aircraft smuggling is also used by traffickers in South American source countries to move narcotics to West Africa (United Nations, 2007), where the growth in sophistication moving from propeller planes to commercial-grade jets is apparent. Similarly, traffickers in East Asia are using privately owned aircraft to move methamphetamines and heroin through the Pacific Region and China (United Nations, 2015). Finally, some traffickers have begun to experiment with trafficking by way of ultralight and small-scale drone aircraft to move smaller loads across borders. This method has been confirmed to be used in short distance flights between Mexico and the United States (Romero, 2015; U.S. Customs and Border Protection, 2015). Ultralight aircraft will fly over the border carrying drugs in detachable baskets, which will be released, and picked up by associates of the traffickers. Drones may be landed or intentionally crashed once across the border. Although only small loads can be moved in this manner, the obvious advantage is that the flights are difficult to detect and, even when detected, often leave no drugs to be interdicted and no one to be arrested. TRAFFICKING ORGANIZATIONS The industry of international trafficking of illicit substances is populated by a wide assortment of organizations and individuals, representing a broad spectrum of structure and sophistication. Individuals may move small amounts of drugs across international borders alone, or may act as part of a small group. However, the movement of any substantial amount of illicit drugs is perpetrated by larger organizations that possess the resources and manpower necessary to make the endeavor profitable. Next, attention is given to drug trafficking by cartels, organized crime groups, and subversive organizations. Cartels The bulk of international drug trafficking is facilitated by extensive networks of drug producers and smugglers who work collectively under a common banner of a drug cartel. Cartels tend to be territorial, controlling large swaths of many countries, and seek to control as much of the end-to-end process of drug trafficking as possible, from cultivation to destination, with a particular presence in drug source countries. Cartel members are known to exhibit fierce loyalty to the group and are quick to resort to violence, including lethal violence. Such violence can be directed against law enforcement, local military, politicians, the media, and civilians, or it may be directed against rival cartels to maintain or extend their influence. Present worldwide, cartels are the penultimate

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professionals in international drug trafficking, presiding over multibillion dollar a year businesses. By controlling the beginning of the drug trafficking cycle (cultivation, processing, and export), cartels can maximize their downstream profits. Accordingly, cartels are prevalent in drug source countries, chiefly those in South America. For example, cartels such as the Medellin and Cali cartels in Colombia operate the cocaine production in that region, with counterpart organizations in Bolivia and Peru. Because most cocaine is produced in only these three counties, the cartels responsible for production in this region effectively control the world’s cocaine supply. These same cartels, particularly those in Colombia, are also involved in the large-scale production of heroin. Formerly more powerful than they are today, Colombian cartels have ceded a great amount of control over international drug trafficking to Mexican cartels in recent years. Originally, the Colombian cartels would pay the Mexican cartels to move narcotics into the United States. Over time, the Mexican cartels shifted from a price-per-load arrangement to one that offered them payment in kind (Lyman, 2011). That is, the Mexican cartels began to demand to be paid in illegal drugs. This arrangement shifted the center of gravity for drug trafficking from Colombia to Mexico. Today, Mexican traffickers, using Colombian cartels as suppliers, operate vast cartels that move the drugs around the globe. The Mexican cartels are highly territorial, each controlling particular zones of Mexico. The number of cartels operating in Mexico has grown, as the larger groups have splintered into smaller factions in recent years. Currently, the largest Mexican cartels include the Sinaloa cartel, the Zetas, the Gulf cartel, the Beltran-Leyva Organization, the Arellano-Felix Organization, the Vicente Carillo Fuentes Organization, and Los Caballeros Templarios (the Knights Templar). Each of these groups is also involved in the production of marijuana, both for transnational shipment as well as for domestic Mexican consumption. The larger cartels maintain ties to South American cocaine suppliers and operate as major international brokers of the world’s cocaine supply, moving product not only to the North American market but to the Asian and Pacific markets (e.g., Japan, China, Australia) as well. The largest and most powerful cartels, such as the Sinaloa cartel, the Zetas, and the Beltran-Leyva Organization, control the limited territory in Mexico that cultivates heroin, notably the Golden Triangle region between Durango, Sinaloa, and Chihuahua states. Others, such as Los Caballeros Templarios, specialize in production of high-purity methamphetamine. Organized Crime In areas of the world more distant from the source countries, drug trafficking is typically facilitated by profit-motivated organized crime groups. Through the 1960s and 1970s, for example, groups like the Sicilian and

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American Mafia moved heroin from its sources in the eastern Mediterranean to markets in Europe and North America. Once the heroin arrived in its destination country, local Mafia affiliates were responsible for distribution and sales. Joint law enforcement efforts by the United States, Italy, and France resulted in the dismantling of these traditional mafia drug trafficking networks. Today, other organized crime groups have filled the void, typically in the form of smaller, less-monolithic structures, making operations more efficient and less susceptible to disruption by law enforcement. These organized crime groups would include outlaw motorcycle groups, such as the Hells Angels, the Outlaws, the Bandidos, and the Pagans, that distribute drugs in countries spanning from North America, Northern and Western Europe, Africa, the Pacific region, and Australia (Barker, 2010). Street gangs are also known to be significant organized crime groups and contributors to international drug trafficking. Although not responsible for cultivation, processing, or transshipment, street gangs assume the wholesale and retail functions of the supply chain. Street gangs include nationally and internationally recognized groups like the Crips and Bloods, MS-13, or the Mexican Mafia, but also include smaller gangs restricted to particular cities or local neighborhoods. Regardless of their size and notoriety, these groups are important inasmuch as they are responsible for a great deal of retail selling of narcotics in nearly every major city around the globe. Drug trafficking in Asia is similarly facilitated by organized crime groups. Formed on the basis of cultural and ethnic ties and traditions, Asian organized crime groups are a particular challenge to law enforcement due to the difficulty of infiltrating these networks. Triads, traditional Chinese organized crime families, operate around the world in the myriad enclaves of Chinese immigrants found in almost all developed nations. In addition to drug trafficking, the triads, and the affiliate Tongs, operate illicit businesses in extortion, illegal gambling, gun smuggling, prostitution, and human trafficking (Wang, 2013). Japanese Yakuza groups fill a similar function in their society, with drug trafficking and selling providing a major source of income (Lyman, 2011). A unique element to Asian organized crime groups is that these groups specialize in the trafficking of high-purity marijuana and MDMA (ecstasy), which are substances not commonly trafficked by other organized crime groups (U.S. Department of Justice, 2010). Still other organized crime groups specialize in drug trafficking in particular regions of the world. Russian organized crime groups have fueled the dramatic expansion of drug abuse in that country (United Nations, 2008). Eastern European groups move drugs in Albania, Serbia, Kazakhstan, and beyond. Caribbean trafficking is conducted by Cuban and Dominican crime groups. Nigerian traffickers take advantage of their county’s location on Africa’s west coast to import narcotics from sources in South America and in turn traffic those narcotics to the rest of Africa

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and Europe. The universality of drug use dictates that organized crime groups exist to meet the ever-growing demand for these illicit substances in every corner of the globe. Subversive Groups The high profitability of drug trafficking has resulted in its attractiveness not only to organizations that are motivated by economic profit but also to religious and/or political terrorists, insurgencies, and other subversive groups. The engagement of terrorist groups in drug trafficking activities is colloquially referred to as “narco-terrorism” (Lyman, 2011), but there are a variety of ways in which a subversive group may become involved in the international drug trade. Organized crime (including drug trafficking) and terror have been conceptualized as opposite ends of a spectrum (Makarenko, 2004), and along this spectrum exist possibilities for terrorists to form alliances with drug traffickers (whether temporary or long term), or to simply co-opt the tactics of drug traffickers as a means of generating revenue to support their operations. As an example, following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center, the idea was popularized that Al Qaeda had used funds derived from drug trafficking to finance its operations. While some of the profits derived from the heroin trade in Afghanistan were channeled to Al Qaeda, it was not the primary source of funding. On the other hand, the Taliban have been documented to be major overseers and beneficiaries of Afghanistan’s heroin production and trafficking (Phillips & Kamen, 2014), deriving proceeds from nearly every stage of the production process. Similarly, the offshoot Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) generates revenue from smuggling drugs from the Afghan-Pakistan border to the ports such as Karachi, as well as facilitating movement of heroin through the rest of Asia. Cocaine trafficking has been a financial boon to several terrorist organizations in South America. As the Taliban imposed taxes on opium farmers and controlled the processing of finished heroin, the Fuerzas armadas revolucionarias de Colombia (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, or FARC) impose taxes on coca farmers and control a great deal of processing and refinement of finished cocaine. The FARC uses the cocaine it produces to supply Colombian cartels. Other Colombian paramilitary terror groups such as the National Liberation Army (ELN) and United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC) are likewise engaged in the Colombian cocaine trade. A final notable South American terror group funding its operations through cocaine trafficking is the Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) of Peru. Espousing parallel populist and communist messages as those of the FARC, Shining Path controls a stronghold in Peru known for prolific coca production (Tabory, 2015). Less powerful than at earlier points in their history, Shining Path remains an active and dangerous subversive

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organization and a significant part of the drug trafficking landscape in South America. Drug trafficking in Southeast Asia can also be facilitated by subversive groups. Here, trafficking centers around marijuana and high-potency methamphetamine and to a lesser extent heroin. The separatist group, United Wa State Army, of Myanmar, funds its operations through the trafficking of methamphetamine and heroin. The Sri Lankan separatist group, Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) funded its operations through the smuggling of heroin from Southeast Asia to Western Europe and Canada, according to the Sri Lankan Ministry of Defense (Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam, 2015). A common theme in understanding the involvement of terrorist and subversive groups in the illicit drug trade is that such groups tend to be involved near the source and are active in source countries. This may be due to the fact that the majority of drug reduction strategies are focused on the demand side, rather than supply side, strategies, and thus involvement in creating supply generates less risk of exposure to law enforcement and other authorities for the terrorist groups. State governments in source countries also tend to be relatively weak, offering greater latitude for terrorist groups to operate. RESPONDING TO TRANSNATIONAL DRUG TRAFFICKING Law enforcement relies on a wide range of strategies to combat transnational drug trafficking. These efforts include crop eradication (via aerial spraying and manual eradication efforts), alternative crop development programs, precursor chemical control programs, source country institutional development, interdiction (at numerous points between source locations and end-user markets), purposeful disruption of trafficking organizations and money laundering operations (including extraditing organized crime and cartel leaders to the United States), and street-level enforcement efforts (Office of National Drug Control Strategy, 2016a). The effectiveness of these efforts varies considerably depending on the strategy involved, levels of cooperation from source countries and other law enforcement entities, and many other factors. For example, crop eradication and alternative crop development strategies have been helpful at times (Veillette & Navarrete-Frias, 2005), including having some measurable impact on cannabis production (Wilkins, Bhatta, & Casswell, 2002). Interdiction efforts can be helpful in some circumstances and at certain strategic locations (Federal drug interdiction efforts need strong central oversight, 1983). Street-level drug enforcement efforts have also been effective, particularly when enhanced with community policing and problemsolving strategies (Mazerolle, Rombouts, & Soole, 2007). However, when considered historically, economically, globally, and within the context of other transnational crimes, substantial and sustained cross-country

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investment and enhanced law enforcement effort and cooperation are required before international drug trafficking may be considered among the lesser transnational crime challenges. The international nature of drug trafficking demands a global effort to disrupt the enterprise. Currently, there are several international initiatives underway to curtail drug trafficking, many of which are coordinated by bodies such as the UNODC and INTERPOL. One such effort is the Container Control Programme, aimed at reducing the exploitation of commercial container shipping as a means of trafficking, headed by UNODC and the World Customs Organization. INTERPOL is working with member countries to identify new trafficking trends, to investigate criminal organizations, and to control the flow of drugs and the precursor chemicals. The control of precursor chemicals is a preeminent concern in global trafficking today, with participants ranging from national governments to the European Commission to the UN. While it may be too early to evaluate the success of these international responses, it is clear that global strategies will be necessary if progress is to be made. REFERENCES Abuse of prescription pain medications risks heroin use. (2014, January). Retrieved from https://www.drugabuse.gov/related-topics/trends-statistics/info graphics/abuse-prescription-pain-medications-risks-heroin-use. Al Jabal, A. (2010). Human trafficking: The Bahrain experience. Juridical Current, 13, 46–52. Aune, B. R. (1990, January 1). Maritime drug trafficking: An underrated problem (United States, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime). Retrieved from https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-analysis/bulletin/bulle tin_1990-01-01_1_page008.html. Barker, T. (2010). Biker gangs and organized crime. Waltham, MA: Routledge. Baxter, S. (2014, March 15). Surge in drug smuggling boats on central coast. Santa Cruz Sentinel. Retrieved from http://www.santacruzsentinel.com/article/ ZZ/20140315/NEWS/140317609. Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs. (2015). 2015 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR). Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State. Cannabis, coca, & poppy: Nature’s addictive plants. (2016). Retrieved from https://www.deamuseum.org/ccp/coca/history.html. Crilly, R. (2015, July 23). “Narco sub” seized with 8 tons of cocaine. The Telegraph. Retrieved from http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/ northamerica/usa/11757223/Narco-sub-seized-with-8-tons-of-cocaine .html. C-TPAT: Customs-Trade Partnership against Terrorism. (2017). Retrieved from http://www.cbp.gov/border-security/ports-entry/cargo-security/c-tpatcustoms-trade-partnership-against-terrorism. DEA: Air, land, & sea. (2016). Retrieved from https://www.deamuseum.org/als/ sea.html.

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Drug Enforcement Administration. (2016). Drug trafficking: Caribbean region. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice. Retrieved from https://www .dea.gov/divisions/international/caribbean.shtml. European Commission. (2002). Good practice guide for sea container control. Brussels, Belgium: European Commission—Customs. Federal drug interdiction efforts need strong central oversight. (Rep. No. GGD83–52). (1983). Washington, DC. Full circle: An old route regains popularity with drugs gangs. (2014, May 24). The Economist. Retrieved from http://www.economist.com/news/ameri cas/21602680-old-route-regains-popularity-drugs-gangs-full-circle. Gable, R. S. (2006). The toxicity of recreational drugs. American Scientist, 94(3), 206. Retrieved from http://www.americanscientist.org/issues/pub/thetoxicity-of-recreational-drugs/. Haken, J. (2011, February). Transnational crime in the developing world (Rep.). Retrieved from http://www.gfintegrity.org/storage/gfip/documents/reports/ transcrime/gfi_transnational_crime_web.pdf. Hendricks, J. (2013, March 13). The U.S. Border Patrol asks boaters to help catch smugglers. Boating. Retrieved from http://www.boatingmag.com/usborder-patrol-asks-boaters-to-help-catch-smugglers. Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam. (2015). Retrieved from https://web.stanford .edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/groups/view/225. Lyman, M. (2011). Drugs in society (6th ed.). Burlington, MA: Anderson Publishing. Makarenko, T. (2004). The crime-terror continuum. Global Crime, 6, 129–145. Martinez, M. (2015, October 24). Drug “super tunnel” with railway raided on Mexico border. Retrieved from http://www.cnn.com/2015/10/23/us/ drug-super-tunnel-tijuana-san-diego/. Mazerolle, L., Rombouts, S., & Soole, D. W. (2007). Street-level drug law enforcement: A meta-analytic review. Campbell Systematic Reviews, 2. doi: 10.4073/ csr.2007.2. Methamphetamine. (2014, January). Retrieved from https://www.drugabuse .gov/publications/drugfacts/methamphetamine. Motel, S. (2015, April 14). 6 facts about marijuana. Retrieved from http://www .pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2015/04/14/6-facts-about-marijuana/. Office of National Drug Control Strategy. (2016a). National drug control strategy, 2015. Washington, DC: The White House. Office of National Drug Control Strategy. (2016b). The international heroin market. Retrieved from https://www.whitehouse.gov/ondcp/global-heroin-market. Phillips, M., & Kamen, E. (2014). Entering the black hole: The Taliban, terrorism, and organised crime. Journal of Terrorism Research, 5, 39–48. Ramirez, B., & Bunker, R. (Eds.). (2015). Narco-submarines: Specially fabricated vessels used for drug smuggling purposes. Retrieved from http://fmso.leavenworth .army.mil/Collaboration/Interagency/Narco-Submarines.pdf. Romero, D. (2015, February 10). Drugs smuggled into Southern California via ultralight aircraft. LA Weekly. Retrieved from http://www.laweekly.com/news/ drugs-smuggled-into-southern-california-via-ultralight-aircraft-5379099. Sherman, C. (2009, August 25). Feds seek crackdown on drug smuggling trains. Associated Press. Retrieved from http://www.nbcnews.com/id/32555933/ ns/us_news-crime_and_courts/t/feds-seek-crackdown-drug-smugglingtrains/#.VuLj1ZwrLIV.

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Tabory, S. (2015, July 30). Peru declares premature victory in major coca producing region. Retrieved from http://www.insightcrime.org/news-briefs/ peru-declares-premature-victory-in-major-coca-producing-region. United Nations. (2007). World drug report. Office on Drugs and Crime. Vienna: United Nations Publications. United Nations. (2008). Illicit drug trends in the Russian Federation. Office on Drugs and Crime. Vienna: United Nations Publications. United Nations. (2010). World drug report. Office on Drugs and Crime. Vienna: United Nations Publications. United Nations. (2011). Transnational organized crime in the fishing industry. Office on Drugs and Crime. Vienna: United Nations Publications. United Nations. (2012). World drug report. Office on Drugs and Crime. Vienna: United Nations Publications. United Nations. (2015). World drug report. Office on Drugs and Crime. Vienna: United Nations Publications. United Nations. (2016). World drug report. Office on Drugs and Crime. Vienna: United Nations Publications. U.S. Customs and Border Protection. (2015, April 22). Ultra-light aircraft detected dropping drugs from the sky [Press release]. Retrieved from https:// www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-media-release/2015-04-22-000000/ ultra-light-aircraft-detected-dropping-drugs-sky. U.S. Department of Justice. (2010, February). National drug threat assessment 2010. Retrieved from https://www.justice.gov/archive/ndic/pubs38/38661/ movement.htm. Veillette, C., & Navarrete-Frias, C. (2005). Drug crop eradication and alternative development in the Andes. CRS Report for Congress. Congressional Research Service: Library of Congress. Wang, P. (2013). The increasing threat of Chinese organized crime. The RUSI Journal, 158, 6–18. Wilkins, C., Bhatta, K., & Casswell, S. (2002). The effectiveness of cannabis crop eradication operations in New Zealand. Drug and Alcohol Review, 21, 369–74. World Shipping Council. (2016). About the industry: Containers. Retrieved from http://www.worldshipping.org/about-the-industry/containers. Zerell, U., Ahrens, B., & Gerz, P. (2015). Documentation of a heroin manufacturing process in Afghanistan. Bulletin on Narcotics, 57, 11–31.

CHAPTER 2

Maritime Piracy and Global Security Michael J. Struett

Maritime piracy remains a significant threat to global security today. That basic fact is perhaps surprising to the trained eye of a 21st-century policy maker or even an informed citizen, but it remains the case that it is true. It is surprising first of all, because when we think of maritime piracy, our mind’s eye turns easily to the legendary tales of the villains from the age of sail, or their Hollywood recreation in blockbuster movies like Pirates of the Caribbean. But a pirate today is more than likely an underfed teenager with a fully automatic weapon, a small open boat, and a powerful outboard motor. He is working as part of a small group, at the behest of a locally powerful criminal gang. His life may be at risk from resistance offered by his would-be victims, but likely it is also at risk from the hands of the people who sent him if he fails in his efforts. It is also perhaps surprising that piracy remains a threat, because you might think that the world knows how to deal with maritime piracy. After all, international law developed rules for how to deal with pirates back in the 17th century. Between 2008 and 2013, piracy off the coast of Somalia grabbed international headlines with a sharp increase in the number of incidents. Hollywood made a major motion picture to capture this more modern version of piracy, Captain Phillips, this time, based on the true life story of the ship Maersk Alabama. While accurate in many respects, the film may have left viewers with the impression that the international community, or more specifically, the U.S. Navy knows how to deal with piracy. After all, in 2015, the number of reported piracy attacks off the coast of Somalia fell to zero, as reported in the International Chamber of Commerce—International Maritime Bureau database (ICC-IMB, 2016, p. 5). But in fact, the case of the Maersk Alabama was exceedingly unique,

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precisely because it involved a strong reaction by the U.S. Navy to rescue a U.S.-flagged vessel. This is not a model that applies to the vast majority of cases of maritime piracy. And though there were no new attacks attributed to Somali pirates in 2015, there were 246 attempted or actual attacks worldwide on shipping reported the ICC-IMB, and 29 crew members were still held hostage in Somalia as a result of attacks from prior years (ICC-IMB, 2016, pp. 5, 17). This chapter begins with a discussion of practical and legal definitions of piracy, which it turns out, are substantially more complex than might be hoped. Then we will examine the scope of the international maritime piracy problem and discuss the major trends in piracy over the last several decades. We will also review the international legal regimes and cooperative efforts that are in place for addressing maritime piracy, (there are several). Even though maritime piracy off the coast of Somalia has subsided, I will advance the case that the international community still lacks well developed institutions for responding to piracy on a consistent basis. Accordingly, it is likely that a period of increased piratical activity like we saw between 2008 and 2013 in the Gulf of Aden will recur and will continue to constitute a threat to international shipping. Indeed, within the last few years, we have already witnessed increasing reports of piracy off Africa’s Atlantic coast and in Southeast Asia. I conclude with a few basic suggestions for policy improvements to contain the security challenged posed by maritime piracy. DEFINING MARITIME PIRACY One leading scholar defines maritime piracy as “unlawful depredation at sea involving the use of threat of violence possibly, but not necessarily, involving robbery” (Murphy, 2009, p. 7). This of course goes along with our common sense notions of what we are talking about when we discuss piracy. But in fact, international law has a much more specific and limited understanding of maritime piracy. And while that legal definition of maritime piracy under international law is fairly constrained, as we will see next, the international community has other treaties, international organizations, and which deal with a wider range of violence in the maritime arena. Nevertheless, the complexity of the overall overlapping international institutions that play a role in addressing violence as sea has a tendency to muddle sustained efforts at international cooperation in this area (Nance & Struett, 2013). Definition of Piracy under International Law The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) 1982 is the most recent update to the international law rules that govern the world’s oceans. Colloquially, UNCLOS and the related customary rules

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of international law and other treaties related to the world’s oceans are referred to as the “Law of the Sea.” The UNCLOS defines piracy as “any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, committed for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft, and directed: (i) on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft.”1 There are several crucial limitations on this definition. First, and by far the most practically important, is the requirement that the acts take place on the high seas, or in a place outside the jurisdiction of any state. This means that many acts, which would fit our common sense understanding of piracy, as outlined in the aforementioned Murphy conceptualization, are not piracy from the perspective of international law because they occur in the territorial waters of a particular state. Piracy experts tend to refer to acts of common sense piracy that do not meet the geographical requirement of international law piracy as “armed robbery against ships.” It is important to note when attempting to measure the frequency of piracy attacks whether one is speaking only of international law piracy, or if one also means to include acts of armed robbery against ships, which occur in territorial waters. Most serious efforts to assess the dimensions of the problem these days are careful to count both acts of international law piracy and armed attacks against ships, which occur in territorial waters. This point will be discussed in more detail in the next section when we try to estimate the scope of the piracy problem. Freedom of the Seas, Maritime Jurisdiction, and the Crime of Piracy It is necessary to understand the piracy provisions of UNCLOS in the larger context of the basic international norms established by UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. Updated in 1982, the articles pertaining to piracy are copied from the earlier 1958 version of UNCLOS and older provisions of customary international law.2 The convention requires that states “cooperate” on piracy suppression (Article 100) and grants the right to seize pirate vessels, arrest pirates, seize property on board, and determine appropriate punishment in national courts of the seizing state (Article 105). Those obligations and rights, however, stand alongside the convention’s two most central norms. The first guarantees all vessels the right of free passage through straits used for international navigation and on the high seas, while granting states exclusive jurisdiction in their territorial waters. The second establishes the flag state system, which effectively extends a state’s legal jurisdiction to ships flying its flag on the oceans. According to UNCLOS, each vessel has a flag state (the state where the ship is registered), is subject to the regulations of only that state, and must maintain that flag for the duration of a cruise. Warships are granted two important exceptions to those norms: they may approach any commercial

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ship to determine its nationality and may board a ship in international waters in order to prevent or reverse serious international law crimes, including piracy (Kraska & Wilson, 2009). Those legal tools are important, because they give states the right to seize pirate vessels, and to expect cooperation from other parties to the Law of the Sea Convention in suppressing piracy. Article 105 is somewhat unusual in international law, because it expressly grants universal jurisdiction. This means that every state has legal jurisdiction to prosecute alleged cases of piracy, regardless of the flag state of the ship attacked, the nationalities of the perpetrators and victims, or the nationalities of the owners of any cargo. The only requirement is that the seizure and arrest must take place on the high seas, or a place not in the territory of any state. Importantly though, because piracy is defined so narrowly by the Law of the Sea Convention, there are many situations where these rights and duties don’t apply. For other types of crime that occur on the world’s oceans, such as smuggling, the Law of the Sea does not permit states to stop ships at sea unless they have permission from the flag state (Richardson, 2004, p. 100). Limitations of UNCLOS Piracy Provisions Of course, from the perspective of an international lawyer, the assumption was that if a ship and its crew or cargo were attacked within the territorial waters of a state, that state’s government would take action to repress the criminal activity. The purpose of the Law of the Sea treaty provisions on piracy was to create a right for states to capture and punish pirates who were not operating in the territorial waters of any state. This approach failed to deal with two practical problems. First, and most common, is relatively weak (or nonexistent) states that lack the ability (or desire) to effectively patrol their territorial waters, as occurred in Somalia from 2005 until recently. Lack of state capacity was also a major problem in Indonesian and Malaysian waters until around the year 2000, but since then both states have stepped up their efforts, aided by resources provided by allied states (Febrica, 2015). Ineffective coastal state police authority remains a serious problem in many parts of the world. The unfortunate result of the legal situation is that since attacks against ships within the territorial waters of states are not legally considered piracy, third party states do not have any legal rights to apprehend pirates if they attack within those areas. This is a particularly crucial problem when you consider that some of the world’s most vitally important shipping lanes, including the Straits of Malacca, Bab el-Mandeb, and the Strait of Hormuz, all pass through territorial waters of coastal states. The second problem is that even when piracy does occur in international waters, states often lack the resources or the willingness to exercise effective jurisdiction to capture and punish pirates. Seemingly, the universal jurisdiction provisions of the Law of the Sea treaty create a far-reaching

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authority for the rule of law, since any state that becomes aware of an act of piracy on the high seas has a legal right to prosecute, regardless of the alleged perpetrator’s nationality, the flag state of the ship that was attacked, or the nationalities of the victims. In practice, however, states are not in the habit of routinely prosecuting maritime piracy even when they encounter it. Many states, including many states that have ratified UNCLOS, lack specific provisions in their own domestic legal codes to allow the exercise of jurisdiction over acts of piracy where there is no direct connection to their state (Dutton, 2013). While there are cases of states, including leading maritime states like the United States, the Netherlands, and Germany, prosecuting acts of piracy in their own national courts in recent years, such cases almost always involve an attack that victimized citizens of the state that carries out the prosecution. It is rare that states with significant naval power are deployed nearby merchant ships flying that same state’s flag, because most commercial shipping uses so-called flags of convenience (Takei, 2012). Because it is generally unlikely that pirates will attack a vessel from a particular state, and that same state will have naval capacity near enough to respond, prosecutions that depend on a direct link to the victims are too infrequent to be an effective deterrent. Actual prosecutions of pirates that make use of universal jurisdiction authority are exceedingly rare. In 1999, the Indian Coast Guard stopped and detained the Alondra Rainbow, a ship that had been hijacked off Indonesia a few months earlier. That ship was Japanese owned, had been crewed by Filipinos, and had been flagged Panamanian, so it was remarkable that India got involved (Murphy, 2009, pp. 142–145). The Indian authorities took the case to trial in 2001. But that is one of very few documented cases of states actually punishing piracy under universal jurisdiction authority. There are several other important qualifiers in the Law of the Sea definition of maritime piracy. International law piracy is by definition for “private ends.” The legal history of this provision is complex but already was at work in the 17th-century writings of Alberico Gentili (1552–1608). Eventually, one of the main functions of the “private ends” requirement was to make clear that “privateering” or capture of other states shipping under license granted by a sovereign king, as was a common practice in the age of sail, was not international law piracy. This has had important contemporary implications, because it implies that if attacks on ships (or aircraft) are motivated by political ends, as in the case of terrorism, they are NOT piracy by the legal definition. In fact, the Palestine Liberation Front seized the passenger liner the Achille Lauro in 1985, whose passengers were taken hostage, and one of whom, an American citizen, was executed (Murphy, 2009, p. 186). In part because this act arguably failed the private ends test of UNCLOS definition of maritime piracy, the incident led the International Maritime Organization to sponsor the negotiation of a new treaty to deal with violence at sea that was not technically legal piracy. Those negotiations eventually resulted in the adoption and entry

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into force of the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (the SUA Convention),3 which we will examine next. A final legal limitation with the UNCLOS legal definition of piracy is the “two ship” requirement that the attack must be directed from one ship toward another. This also seems to exclude the possibility of criminal acts where a passenger or crew member already aboard a ship (or aircraft) initiates an attack to take control of that vessel. Of course, in such a case, the state whose flag the ship was flying would already have jurisdiction over the relevant crime, but the universal jurisdiction regime created by UNCLOS would not apply. The SUA Convention The SUA Convention4 addresses some of the holes in the Law of the Sea Convention, but it also creates potentially conflicting standards for what is required of states when they have evidence of violence at sea. According to the International Maritime Organization (IMO), the SUA Convention is designed to ensure appropriate consequences for aggression toward ships. The SUA Convention was the international legal response to the hijacking of the Achille Lauro, an Italian cruise ship. Two provisions of SUA are particularly relevant to piracy. The SUA makes it an offense when a person unlawfully and intentionally “seizes or exercises control over a ship by force or threat thereof or any other form of intimidation, or performs an act of violence against a person on board a ship if that act is likely to endanger the safe navigation of that ship.” Just as important, a signatory state agrees to cooperate in the arrest and prosecution of any individuals responsible for such acts if they enter into that state’s territory. Currently, 168 states are parties to the convention, but that number does not include the critical states of Indonesia or Malaysia.5 As its history suggests, the SUA Convention is designed primarily as a counterterrorism tool, not as a counter-piracy tool. The SUA Convention has a number of provisions that make it a potentially valuable tool in states’ efforts to combat maritime piracy. For example, SUA (Article 2) makes it an offense when a person unlawfully and intentionally: 1. Seizes or exercises control over a ship by force or threat thereof or any other form of intimidation. 2. Performs an act of violence against a person on board a ship if that act is likely to endanger the safe navigation of that ship (Beckman, 2002).

Substantially extending the territorial applicability that UNCLOS uses, SUA applies “if the ship is navigating or is scheduled to navigate into,

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through or from” international waters (Article 4[1]). Article 4(2) effectively extends the boundaries further by declaring that even if the act does not meet the standard of Article 4(1) just cited, the convention “nevertheless applies when the offender or alleged offender is found in the territory of a State Party” beyond the state in which the act was committed. The SUA also requires that a state establish jurisdiction over such crimes when committed by or against a national, against a ship flying its flag, or within its territory. Notice that this provision for state cooperation in prosecuting SUA crimes is much more demanding than the parallel language in the Law of the Sea Treaty regarding piracy, which merely authorizes states to punish piracy, but does not require them to do so. The United States pushed for this requirement in the SUA Convention, because it was unhappy with the reluctance of many states, including especially its own military ally Egypt, to take legal action against or to extradite the people believed to be behind the Achille Lauro attack. Internally, SUA has disadvantages as a guiding regime for anti-piracy. SUA’s use as an anti-piracy tool is also a largely unintended development. Nothing is a crime that is included within the scope of the SUA Treaty until it results in the actual seizure of the ship, or if it endangers safe navigation. In cases where there is not an actual seizure of the vessel, but merely an attempt, or where violence is threatened without endangering safe navigation, legal analysts have suggested that SUA does not apply. Finally, SUA also obligates states to pursue prosecution of acts of violence but makes no specific mention of the guilt of persons involved in attempted or nonviolent attacks. If naval forces respond to piratical attacks in progress and prevent them from occurring, SUA may not apply (Murphy, 2009, p. 192). The biggest obstacle to its relevance in counter-piracy, however, may be its tension with legal norms that are part of the international law of the sea (Nance & Struett, 2013). UNCLOS and SUA are the main legal frameworks for combating violence at sea, although some elements of the activity of piracy groups could fall under other international legal authorities, such as the International Convention against the Taking of Hostages, the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, and the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (Stepek, 2012). International law does not recognize a state of war between states and pirates. The use of force by states against pirates are actions of international criminal law enforcement under current international law, and they should not be understood as being governed by the law of armed conflict (Heinze, 2013). In others words, it is not permissible to wage war against pirate gangs, it is only permissible to attempt their arrest and to kill them in self-defense or if they pose an immediate threat to others (Harvard Research Committee, 1932). This is really the only plausible interpretation of existing law given 20th-century advances in understanding of human rights law.

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While in the 18th century, it might have been considered acceptable to convict a pirate before a captain’s mast and carry out the sentence immediately; today’s notions of due process and basic human rights would make it intolerable to use that procedure today. Of course, the need to gather evidence with a verifiable chain of custody, to bring the accused before a properly established land-based court, and for witnesses to the crime to testify, makes the process for criminal prosecution of pirates much more difficult. In practice, states are often reluctant to pursue criminal prosecutions of suspected pirates. This is unfortunate, as the best way to discourage piracy would be to have an effective criminal regime for ensuring punishment. When states do prosecute piracy at sea, it is almost always because the ship attacked was flying that state’s national flag, or because the victims or perpetrators were nationals of that state. There are several reasons why states rarely undertake piracy prosecutions on the grounds of universal jurisdiction. First, the costs of seizing and detaining a pirate vessel, conveying the alleged perpetrators to a port where either the capturing state or a third state are willing to conduct a trial, and carrying out an adequate investigation and gathering enough evidence to mount a successful prosecution are quite high. States, including prosecutors, investigatory agencies, and naval officers tend not to want to invest the necessary resources unless there is a direct national link to the attack (Dutton, 2013). SCOPE OF MARITIME PIRACY TODAY How big of an issue is maritime piracy really? First, it is important to recognize that it is difficult to count the actual number of piracy attacks. The best available single source database of piracy and armed robbery against ships is the ICC-IMB database which is based on voluntary reporting by ship masters to the Piracy Reporting Centre in Kuala Lumpur. Next, we will use that data to analyze trends over the last decade. Most observers assume that these officially reported numbers understate the actual number of attacks, largely because many vessels that are attacked choose not to report because they fear lengthy police investigations, dishonest police forces, and/or higher reputational and insurance costs. One estimate suggests that 40 to 60 percent of all attacks are not reported to the ICC-IMB (Twyman-Ghoshal & Pierce, 2014, p. 4). One of the reasons the ICC-IMB database is most complete is because, while the reports are public, it is a private sector effort so reports can be made without giving too much information to government authorities. A recent effort to combine unique reports of piracy and armed robbery of ships from other sources found that of all specific reports available from multiple sources, about two-thirds were in the ICC-IMB database (TwymanGhoshal & Pierce, 2014).

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Measuring the Costs of Piracy The total financial costs attributable to maritime piracy represent only a tiny fraction of all the profits earned from international shipping, which after all is an industry that earns over half of a trillion U.S. dollars per year in freight rates.6 Compared to the value of the shipping industry, some have argued that the cost of piracy is insignificant (Gottschalk & Flanagan, 2000). Yet that calculus is overly simplistic. In fact, the series of actions taken by states in response to the wave of piracy off the coast of Somalia, and American and Japanese cooperation with Indonesia, Singapore, and Malaysia in response to earlier waves of piracy demonstrate that states do take piracy very seriously. For a variety of reasons, private and public actors alike are interested in eradicating maritime piracy. Of course, the people most directly and heavily impacted by piracy are the crew members. Their lives are threatened, they may be held hostage, or killed. According to analysis of the IMO GISIS: Piracy and Armed Robbery database, there have been 506 incidents at sea that involved the taking of one or more hostages since 1995.7 Beyond the threat to life, there are real financial costs. While the dollar amount is impossible to know precisely, piracy creates high costs that affect the global shipping chain, including individual consumers, shipping concerns, insurance companies, and states.8 According to media reports, the premiums for insuring cargo transiting the Gulf of Aden rose 10 times in the space of a single year between 2007 and 2008 (Crilly, 2008). Shippers also increasingly rely on private security for individual ships, which is costly (Krahmann, 2012). Prices for most services are only available on request, but some authors estimate the cost of a three-person security detail at $21,000 per day (Chalk, Smallman, & Burger, 2009, p. 5). Increasing levels of piracy attacks mean merchant mariners bear greater risks to their lives, likely without increased compensation. All of the immediate costs related to piracy, including ransom, are still far less concerning than the costs that would be incurred if global shipping had to be rerouted to avoid piratical hot spots (Middleton, 2008). For states, there is also the high cost of current naval patrols, which some observers estimate at U.S. $50,000 a day per vessel (Chalk, Smallman, & Burger, 2009). These monies also represent an opportunity cost because potential development aid is forgone that could be more effective in preventing piracy than naval action is at deterring it.

Piracy as a Threat to World Order The direct costs attributable to piracy, however, are only part of the problem. Piracy undermines stability and at current levels threatens to unsettle order within the international system. It undermines the legitimacy of the state-based system by showing states’ collective inability to

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maintain basic order and security and reveals that weak or failed states can present major challenges to even the strongest of states. The goal of establishing order on the high seas represents an extension of the international legal order into a place that was once simply considered the ungovernable space beyond law. But in the shrinking 21st century world of global commerce, we are not likely to return to a situation where actors accept the high seas as ungovernable space. While thus far, we have not witnessed much in the way of direct links between maritime piracy and terrorism; it is certainly the case that a world in which maritime piracy is more common for criminal ends is also a world in which terrorists at sea are more likely to be able to operate without detection. In addition, successful piracy in one part of the world makes piracy elsewhere on the map more likely. Somali piracy clearly illustrates this pattern. The international response to piracy off the Horn of Africa was initially ineffective, and it took several years before there was a sustained reduction in the number of attacks. And the following evidence suggests that the reduction of piracy in the northwest Indian Ocean is being accompanied by increases in the Atlantic and Southeast Asia. While recorded pirate attacks off the coast of Somalia fell to zero in 2015, according to the IMO database, there were 8 attacks elsewhere in the world in 2015 that involved the taking of one or more hostages; and in 2016 through July, there were an additional 13, most of these occurred off the coast of West Africa or in Southeast Asia. Trends in Maritime Piracy Figure 2.1 shows all of the attempted and actual attacks on ships, whether they are piracy or armed robbery at sea, classified by region, reported to the ICC-IMB Piracy Reporting Center for the decade between 2006 and 2015. Though the reported statistics are known to be incomplete, the broad trends can tell us a few things about the changing nature of maritime piracy over the last decade. One immediate observation is that maritime piracy and armed robbery against ships remain a serious problem, with around 250 reported attacks per year in recent years. Second, the wave of attacks attributable to pirates based in Somalia is clearly visible in the chart. Between 2006 and 2008, we see the number of attacks in the East African region, including the Gulf of Aden, and Red Sea, waters off the coast of Somalia, beginning to rise. From 2009 until 2011, there are well over a hundred attacks per year in that region, and significant numbers of these attacks were far out in the Indian Ocean or even off the coast of Oman. It was of course this outburst of activity that captured the world’s attention and led to serious naval and policy responses, some unilateral, but most ultimately coordinated through informal international cooperative channels. Those international efforts to suppress piracy clearly did have an impact. In 2012, the reported number of attacks fell to 80 in the region off the coast of Somalia, and

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Figure 2.1. Actual and Attempted Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships Reported to ICC-IMB—2006–2015 (Author created from data in International Chamber of Commerce, International Maritime Bureau, 2011, pp. 5–6 and 2016, p. 6. The data in the ICC-IMB reports are by coastal country or ocean area; the regional groupings are the author’s own.)

as we noted earlier, they continued to fall until zero attacks attributed to Somali pirates were reported in 2015. Having said that, it is equally clear that the ad hoc international cooperation that succeeded in repressing piracy off the Horn of Africa did not lead to a decline in overall levels of piracy worldwide. In fact, maritime piracy and armed robbery of ships have clearly increased in recent years off the coast of West Africa, and in Southeast Asia, especially, in areas outside the now relatively well-patrolled Malacca Straits. Why was international cooperation so successful off the coast of Somalia, and yet it did not lead to persistent solutions in the rest of the world? Piracy Persists Outside of the East African Region As my coauthors and I argued in 2013, there are inherent tensions in the various international institutions that coordinate the reactions of states and other actors to maritime piracy (Struett, Nance, & Armstrong, 2013). States have discretion about whether or not to respond to acts of piracy, even in the rare cases that they have naval forces near the attack. Partly, this is because of the differences in the rules that apply under SUA Convention

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and UNCLOS. Of course, many merchant vessels prefer to avoid getting states involved at all in responding to particular pirate attacks, either because they do not want to confront the lengthy delays that could be involved with formal investigations, or because they fear outright corruption on the part of coastal state navies or police authorities. The various states and private actors that responded to Somali piracy were aware of all of these tensions. They developed some innovative but very case-specific techniques for maximizing the effectiveness of the anti-piracy response to the hot spot in Somalia. As we will examine in the next section, some combination of coordinated multilateral naval patrolling, increasing of ship board security measures on merchant marine vessels, and mostly clandestine attacks on the land bases of pirates, eventually succeeded in stopping the pirate threat in that region. But most of the cooperative efforts, especially on the naval front, were particularly adapted to the East Africa region, and so those strategies do not easily transfer to other regions of the world. It is also not the case that legal prosecutions of pirates were a major part of the solution. While trials occurred in a few high-profile cases, the more standard operating procedure was capture and release of suspected pirates. An effective, global anti-piracy regime will need to focus on redoubling efforts to encourage trials of pirates in national courts, or to develop some multilateral judicial institution that can specialize in piracy prosecutions when individual states are unwilling to bear the costs and burdens of prosecution. How important is maritime terrorism, as opposed to maritime violence more generally? Maritime terrorism was identified by the UN Secretary General as one of seven major threats to maritime security in a 2008 report (UN, 2008). According to analysis of the RAND terrorism database, only 136 out of 40,126 (0.34%) terrorists attacks between 1967 and 2007 were carried out against maritime-based targets (Nincic, 2012). Other studies have similarly estimated that maritime terrorism is 1 percent or less of terrorist attacks. Viewed from that perspective, it is not the case that maritime terrorism is a major mode for terrorist attacks. Press reports suggested that Al Qaeda directly controlled a “navy” of 15 or perhaps 30 or more vessels were eventually discredited (Murphy, 2009, pp. 347–349). Most observers who emphasize the threat posed by maritime piracy do so because of the overall importance of shipping to the international economy, not because it contributes to terrorism (Murphy, 2009; Nincic, 2012; Richardson, 2004). While the literature on maritime terrorism often feels alarmist, there are some real reasons for concern. While maritime piracy and maritime terrorism can be treated analytically as separate problems, and as we have seen, states have constructed different legal regimes for dealing with each, it is important to recognize that an increase in the number of pirate attacks, motivated by commercial ends, is likely to create conditions of lawlessness that would also make it easier for terrorists to operate on the world’s waterways undetected.

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COOPERATIVE EFFORTS TO REPRESS PIRACY On December 18, 2008, in response to a surge of hijackings of international shipping vessels transiting the Gulf of Aden, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1851, which amongst other things, called on “all States and regional organizations fighting piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia to establish an international cooperation mechanism to act as a common point of contact between and among states, regional and international organizations on all aspects of combating piracy and armed robbery at sea off Somalia’s coast.” The Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS) was formed in 2009 pursuant to the UN Security Council’s request, but it is deliberately an informal, apolitical, and task-oriented body that is not directly part of the United Nations Organization (Bueger, 2016). The contact group is designed to be a clearinghouse for information between states and other actors that are involved in trying to repress maritime piracy.

Multilateral Coordination This was an important diplomatic development, because efforts to repress maritime piracy have been undertaken by three separate international naval mechanisms, and by over 20 individual states acting unilaterally. On the naval side, NATO, the European Union, and a U.S.-led coalition of the willing separately coordinated multinational naval task forces. The NATO task force, known as operation Ocean Shield, included between three and eight frigates and destroyers at various points in time (Tulloch, 2012). The European Union (EU) controlled a second multinational naval task force consisting of a similar number of ships. The EU has been a major supporter of efforts to suppress maritime piracy off the coast of Somalia, both through its coordination of naval efforts in the area, and by funding efforts to rebuild the Somali state and to provide security there. One expert on African affairs, Alex de Waal, has noted that the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the EU will likely accelerate a shift in the EU’s attention away from the Horn of Africa and toward other regions (de Waal, 2016). Finally, the U.S.-led Combined Task Force 151 included a similar number of ships originating out of the U.S.-backed coalition of the willing. In 2016, it involved about 31 allied states from Asia, the Middle East, Europe, and North America. It is worth explaining why multilateral naval cooperation was important in building an effective piracy suppression action at sea. First, it is important to understand that the areas involved in the Gulf of Aden, and the much wider space in the open Indian Ocean off the coast of Somalia, are incredibly vast. Even if every naval vessel belonging to every state were deployed in that region, it would still be unlikely that a warship would be near enough to respond to an attempted piracy attack in a timely

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way. Some states, including Russia, China, India, and Japan, organized convoys consisting of multiple ships flying that state’s flags and sent a naval escort with them through the pirate-infested areas. The establishment of an Internationally Recognized Transit Corridor (IRTC) helped to ease the geographical problem by ensuring that merchant vessels would be protected in particular sea lanes. But still, it was necessary to coordinate the actions of the various naval powers and multinational task forces in order to increase their overall efficacy given limited resources. Toward that end, the various states deploying naval forces in the area conducted regular meetings for Shared Awareness and Deconfliction (SHADE) and they set up a secure Internet-based communication system to allow the coordination of naval assets in the area (Tulloch, 2012, p. 43). Importantly, the future of the ad hoc arrangements put in place by CGPCS are currently being considered (Bueger, 2016). On the one hand, it might be useful to institutionalize some of these cooperative efforts on a more global and permanent basis. It is clear that the ad hoc cooperation between many states and private actors that was facilitated through the CGPCS was largely responsible for the success in eliminating piracy attacks in the region. But piracy continues in other parts of the world. There are challenges to doing this however, as much of the efficacy of the Contact Group’s efforts came from its ability to get the correct relevant actors in the same room to discuss cooperative solutions. A more global approach, especially if it is institutionalized under the IMO or UN, might run the risk of politicizing the body and making pragmatic information sharing more difficult. That danger could be avoided through careful institutional design and flexible arrangements for representation and information sharing. If the Contact Group’s efforts were to be expanded to have a more global reach, it might be necessary to bring in different sets of actors for each regional piracy hot spot. Piracy hot spots in most parts of the world are unlikely to have the naval resources dedicated to them on the level that occurred in the Gulf of Aden, and in some areas, like much of Southeast Asia, the sovereignty concerns of coastal states would make it unlikely that active multilateral naval patrols would be accepted. UN Security Council and the Use of Force against Pirates The UN Security Council in Resolution 1851 and others gave states unique powers to pursue pirates into territorial waters. This permission was an explicit deviation from the terms of UNCLOS because it authorized UN member states to take military actions in the territorial waters of Somalia, and ultimately on land (Nance & Struett, 2013, p. 135). Many states, including especially Indonesia, made it clear in formal statements that they would normally never accept this level of Security Council involvement in the affairs of a coastal state. This case was considered an exception because in Somalia’s case there was a uniquely ineffective

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national government. The decision by the Security Council to give permission for states to use force in the territorial waters and ultimately on land in Somalia was likely an essential part of the overall international effort to end piracy in that region. Nevertheless, such a solution would not be appropriate in other regions of the world, and many states would object to such an approach. Criminal Trials for Pirates Western states, including especially the European naval powers, were extremely reluctant to prosecute captured pirates in their national courts. One concern was that it would be difficult to conduct trials quickly enough to meet European Human Rights standards, another was that convicted pirates might apply for asylum after serving terms in European prisons (Stepek, 2012, p. 357). These objections it seems could be worked out by states modifying their laws to find a workable balance for these issues. More could be done as well to harmonize procedures for investigating pirate attacks and maintaining control of evidence, so that states could cooperate in pursuing investigations. As an alternative to returning pirates to developed states for prosecution, the UN Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC) led efforts to increase the capacity for courts and trials in the region, especially in Kenya and the Seychelles (UNODC, 2009). This included significant financial investment by developed states to develop the prison and legal infrastructures that East African states would need to hold trials that met international human rights standards. These efforts ultimately collapsed because Kenya decided that costs it was incurring were not sufficiently offset by contributions from other states. Still there is promise in the idea of having national, hybrid, or international courts designed specifically for prosecuting maritime piracy. One solution might be to build a shipboard international courtroom that could go to the scene of the crime and take custody of evidence and the accused in a timely way. Piracy, Money Laundering, and Terrorism Pirates who seek to collect ransoms for hostages or cargoes that they have captured naturally will also have a plan to launder the money that is transferred to them. This means additionally that criminal groups with money laundering capabilities may be in proximate contact with groups of pirates. So far, states have not done a great deal to combat the ransom approach to maritime piracy by following the money. Some observers have documented initial steps taken by the Financial Action Task Force toward increasing the capacity for international cooperation on pursuing the finance side of piracy activities (Nance & Jakobi, 2012). There is particular merit in these approaches as following the money is more likely to

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lead to the organizational heads of piracy operations than efforts to capture pirate gang’s crew members at sea. Another major international cooperative effort that may have implications for maritime piracy is the effort to suppress the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Starting in 2003, the United States began pushing the Proliferation Security Initiative that sought to secure the support of as many states as possible to prevent the use of the world’s oceans to move weapons of mass destruction and also to reduce the likelihood that a ship could be used as a weapon the way airliners were used as weapons on September 11, 2001 (Richardson, 2004). While the multilateral cooperation to combat maritime piracy in the region of the Horn of Africa clearly had some success, piracy remains a problem in many of the world’s most crucial sea lanes. States should redouble their efforts to end the culture of impunity for maritime pirates and build more permanent cooperative institutions to combat piracy. They must do this with a clear-eyed view of the complexity surrounding the existing legal regimes that are relevant to dealing with this serious transnational crime. CONCLUSION The international community pieced together a series of ad hoc responses to the wave of Somalia-based maritime piracy that plagued international shipping between 2005 and 2015. Those efforts were locally successful but conflicting normative rules about how states should respond to violence against shipping mean that the world still lacks an overarching international regime for preventing maritime piracy. Indeed, the incidents of piracy and armed robbery against ships reported through the private sector’s International Chamber of Commerce, International Maritime Bureau suggest that piracy is on the rise in the waters of West Africa, Southeast Asia, and in the South China Sea. As Bueger (2016) has suggested in some detail, it would make sense to permanently institutionalize the Contact Group on a global basis. This could be done through Security Council action, or through a less formal diplomatic process, perhaps modeled after the Financial Action Task Force. Such a global anti-piracy coordinating body would still need to have regional working groups that could take a flexible approach to dealing with piracy in each region, given specific challenges. One of the key tasks for a global anti-piracy organization would be to encourage states to redouble their commitment to investigating and prosecuting piracy. Such efforts would need to standardize the gathering of evidence and legal processes for punishing piracy under national laws (Dutton, 2013). If states are unwilling to use national courts, perhaps a new international court could be developed that would have jurisdiction over piracy cases.

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NOTES 1. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS, 1982) was adopted December 10, 1982 and entered into force November 16, 1994 (Article 101, [a]). Note that while the United States is not a party to UNCLOS, 1982, every U.S. president since Ronald Reagan has announced the U.S. intention to comply with the navigation provisions of UNCLOS, and the United States still considers other states to be reciprocally bound to the piracy provisions and other provisions in the treaty that are unchanged since the convention on the high seas (UNCLOS, 1958). Moreover, those principles constitute part of customary international law. 2. These piracy provisions (UNCLOS, 1982) are restatements of the provisions in the 1958 Law of the Sea Convention (UNCLOS, 1958). 3. United Nations, “Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation,” Adopted March 10, 1988, entered into force March 1, 1992. 4. Ibid. 5. For updated information, see International Maritime Organization, “Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation,” Adopted March 10, 1988, entered into force March 1, 1992. Available at: http://www.imo.org/About/Conventions/ListOfConventions/Pages/SUA-Treat ies.aspx. 6. International Chamber of Shipping, Key Facts, 2015, available at http:// www.ics-shipping.org/shipping-facts/key-facts. 7. Author analysis of database available at: https://gisis.imo.org/Public/ PAR/Default.aspx. 8. Hanson (2010) cites unnamed “analysts” who estimate yearly costs between US$1 billion and 16 billion. Murphy (2009) points to analyses that put the cost as high as US$25 billion.

REFERENCES Beckman, Robert C. (2002). Combating piracy and armed robbery against ships in Southeast Asia: The way forward. Ocean Development and International Law, 33, 317–341. Bueger, C. (2016, March 2). What future for the Contact Group on Somali piracy? Options for reform. Piracy-studies.org: The research portal for maritime security. Retrieved from http://piracy-studies.org/what-future-for-the-contact-groupon-somali-piracy-options-for-reform/. Chalk, P., Smallman, L., & Burger, N. (2009). Countering piracy in the modern era: Notes from a RAND workshop to discuss the best approaches for dealing with piracy in the 21st century. RAND Conference Proceedings. Retrieved from http://www.rand.org/pubs/conf_proceedings/CF269.html. Crilly, R. (2008, September 20). Somalia: Only guns can get aid past the pirates into the gates of hell. The Times. Retrieved from http://www.thetimes.co.uk/ tto/news/world/asia/article2609113.ece. de Waal, A. (2016, June 27). Brexit is bad news for Africa. Period. Everything from the economy to peacekeeping missions will suffer. Foreign Policy. Retrieved from http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/06/27/brexit-is-bad-newsfor-africa-period/.

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Dutton, Y. (2013). Maritime piracy and the impunity gap: Domestic implementation of international treaty provisions. In M. Struett, J. Carlson, & M. Nance (Eds.), Maritime piracy and the construction of global governance (pp. 71–98). New York: Routledge. Febrica, S. (2015). Why cooperate? Indonesia and anti-maritime terrorism cooperation. Asian Politics and Policy, 7, 105–130. Gottschalk, J. A., & Flanagan, B. P. (2000). Jolly Roger with an Uzi: The rise and threat of modern piracy. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press. Hanson, Stephanie. (2010). Combating maritime piracy. Council on Foreign Relations. Retrieved from http://www.cfr.org/france/combating-maritimepiracy/p18376. Harvard Research Committee. (1932). Harvard research in international law draft convention and comment on piracy. American Journal of International Law Supplement, 26, 739–885. Heinze, E. (2013). A global war on piracy? International law and the use of force against sea pirates. In M. Struett, J. Carlson, & M. Nance (Eds.), Maritime piracy and the construction of global governance (pp. 47–70). New York: Routledge. International Chamber of Commerce—International Maritime Bureau. (2011). Piracy and armed robbery against ships—Report for the period from 1 January 2011–1 July 2011. London. Retrieved from https://icc-ccs.org. International Chamber of Commerce—International Maritime Bureau. (2016). Piracy and armed robbery against ships—Report for the period from January 1, 2015–December 31, 2015. Retrieved from https://icc-ccs.org. Krahmann, E. (2012). Commercial risk consulting and management in the maritime sector. In P. Cullen & C. Berube (Eds.), Maritime private security: Market response to piracy, terrorism and waterborne security risks in the 21st century (pp. 181–192). London: Routledge, 2012. Kraska, J., & Wilson, B. (2009). The pirates of the Gulf of Aden: The coalition is the strategy. Stanford Journal of International Law, 43, 243–286. Middleton, R. (2008). Piracy in Somalia: Threatening global trade, feeding local wars (Chatham House Briefing Paper AFP BP 08/02). Retrieved from https:// www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/public/Research/ Africa/1008piracysomalia.pdf. Murphy, M. N. (2009). Small boats, weak states, dirty money: Piracy and maritime terrorism in the modern world. New York: Columbia University Press. Nance, M. T., & Jakobi, A. P. (2012). Laundering pirates? The potential role of antimoney laundering in countering maritime piracy. Journal of International Criminal Justice, 10, 857–880. Nance, M. T., & Struett, M. J. (2013). Conflicting constructions: Maritime piracy and cooperation under regime complexes. In M. Struett, J. Carlson, & M. Nance (Eds.), Maritime piracy and the construction of global governance (pp. 125–148). New York: Routledge. Nincic, D. K. (2012). Maritime terrorism: How real is the threat. Fair Observer. Retrieved from http://www.fairobserver.com/region/north_america/mari time-terrorism-how-real-threat/. Richardson, Michael. (2004). A time bomb for global trade: Maritime-related terrorism in an age of weapons of mass destruction. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.

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Stepek, M. J. (2012). Challenges of jurisdiction and prosecution. In C. H. Norchi & G. Proutière-Maulion (Eds.), Piracy in comparative perspective: Problems, strategies, law (pp. 331–366). Oxford: A. Pedone & Hart. Struett, M. J., Nance, M. T., & Armstrong, D. (2013). Navigating the maritime piracy regime complex. Global Governance, 19, 93–104. Takei, Y. (2012). Institutional reactions to the flag state that has failed to discharge flag state responsibilities. Netherland International Law Review, LIX, 65–90. Tulloch, T. (2012). Plague of pirates: A primer. In C. H. Norchi & G. ProutièreMaulion (Eds.), Piracy in comparative perspective: Problems, strategies, law (pp. 41–45). Oxford: A. Pedone & Hart. Twyman-Ghoshal, A. A., & Pierce, G. (2014). The changing nature of contemporary maritime piracy: Results from the contemporary maritime piracy database 2001–10. British Journal of Criminology, 54, 652–672. UNCLOS. (1958). United Nations convention on the high seas. Retrieved from https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_ no=XXI-2&chapter=21&clang=_en. UNCLOS. (1982). United Nations convention on the law of the sea. Retrieved from http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/ unclos_e.pdf. United Nations. (2008, March 10). Report of the Secretary General on oceans and the law of the sea (UN Doc A/63/63, paras 54–71). Retrieved from http://www .un.org/depts/los/general_assembly/general_assembly_reports.htm. United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime. (2009, November). Counter piracy programme. Retrieved from www.unodc.org/unodc/en/piracy/index.html.

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CHAPTER 3

Fraudulent Medicine Jay P. Kennedy

Access to proper health care and lifesaving medicines is seen by many people to be a basic human right, and the World Health Organization (2005) has stated that a lack of access to affordable medication is a key global public health concern. This concern is particularly significant for people living in developing nations. The health and wellness challenges faced by the citizens of poor and developing nations places increased pressure on governments, pharmaceutical companies, and other stakeholders to provide greater amounts of lifesaving drugs at lower costs (Leisinger, 2012). At the same time, the wealth and prosperity of many developed nations hides the fact that the poor and working poor in many prosperous nations suffer from an inability to access health care and pharmaceutical products despite the high-quality health care systems that surround them. Making lifesaving pharmaceuticals such as AIDS medications, cancer drugs, and vaccinations available and affordable to the world’s population is a goal of many governmental and nongovernmental organizations and has the overall support of pharmaceutical manufacturers. However, existing gaps in access to legitimate medicines and pharmaceutical products provide opportunities for the purveyors of fraudulent medicines to bring illicit, counterfeit, and otherwise unsafe drugs into the marketplace where consumers can easily obtain and use them. Given the serious health consequences that come with the use of these illicit drugs, more scholarly attention needs to be given to understanding how best to combat the spread of fraudulent medicine. This chapter aims to support and promote this goal through a general discussion of fraudulent medicine, and more specific discussions of three types of fraudulent medicines: pharmaceutical counterfeiting, drug adulteration, and the illegal diversion of pharmaceutical products.

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UNDERSTANDING FRAUDULENT MEDICINES Fraudulent medicine schemes involve a wide variety of individuals and organizations. While some schemes are comprised solely of criminal individuals and criminal organizations, other schemes are perpetrated by licensed health care professionals who use the legitimate pharmaceutical distribution stream to obtain medicines, which are later made into fraudulent goods. The differences in the way these fraudulent schemes are orchestrated expose the variety of ways in which these crimes overlap with legitimate health care enterprises. Key to understanding these is to first understand the relevant terms and concepts. Defining Fraudulent Medicines In its report, Transnational Organized Crime in West Africa: A Threat Assessment, the United Nations (2013, p. 39) stated: In the absence of a universally accepted definition, various terms are used, sometimes interchangeably, to designate the same problem or some of its partly overlapping elements. The difficulty to reach a consensus on the matter was again recently illustrated by the decision of governments, gathered at the May 2012 World Health Assembly, to “use the term substandard/spurious/falsely-labeled/ falsified/counterfeit medical products until a definition has been endorsed by the governing bodies of WHO.” This report uses the term “fraudulent medicines.” . . . Pharmaceuticals are considered fraudulent if they differ substantially from what is indicated on the packaging.

The report went on to state that at the heart of the crime of fraudulent medicine is the commission of an act of fraud. However, as compared to other types of fraud, when it comes to the impact of fake medicines, the United Nations (UN) report stated that “the consequences are far more grave—rather than simply losing their money, the defrauded parties could lose their lives.” Through Resolution 20/6, the United Nations Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice (2013) defined fraudulent medicines to include “purported medicines whose contents are inert, are less than, more than or different from what is indicated, or have expired.” Accordingly, the production of counterfeit pharmaceuticals, adulteration of legitimate drugs including mislabeling and relabeling, and the diversion of legitimate pharmaceuticals away from legitimate supply/distribution channels are all acts that support fraudulent medicine schemes. Another international organization, INTERPOL, prefers to use the term “pharmaceutical crime” when discussing fraudulent medicines. They define pharmaceutical crime to be acts that involve the following: The manufacture, trade and distribution of fake, stolen or illicit medicines and medical devices. It encompasses the counterfeiting and falsification of medical

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products, their packaging and associated documentation, as well as theft, fraud, illicit diversion, smuggling, trafficking, the illegal trade of medical products and the money laundering associated with it. (INTERPOL, n.d.)

The INTERPOL classification is broad, capturing many of the peripheral activities needed to support the production of fraudulent medication, as well as the completion of these schemes. The U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) uses the term “counterfeit” to describe fraudulent medicines, a term that is most commonly used in academic discourse. According to the FDA’s definition, “counterfeit medicine is fake medicine. It may be contaminated or contain the wrong or no active ingredient. They could have the right active ingredient but at the wrong dose” (U.S. Food and Drug Administration, 2016). While the FDA does not include the word “fraud” in its definition of counterfeit medicine, it recognizes that defrauding consumers, the health care system, governments, and other stakeholders are essential to the completion of these crimes. The proportion of the pharmaceutical market that is made up of fraudulent medicines varies by country and while estimates of the extent of these illicit goods are far from concrete, it is clear that developing nations have the greatest exposure to this crime (Bale, 2015). These products are not typically manufactured in poorer nations, which are often plagued by ineffective health care infrastructures. The problem is particularly salient on the continent of Africa where many citizens lack access to health care facilities, and there is a lack of lifesaving medications to service those who can obtain medical services. In a five-year span (between 2005 and 2010), the value of pharmaceutical imports to West Africa more than doubled; yet, the quality of medications distributed in these countries often times fell far below what was found in other parts of the world, including that which is found in other developing nations (United Nations, 2013). Defining Product Counterfeiting Because fraudulent medicines are often times considered to be counterfeit goods, it is necessary that the term “product counterfeiting” be discussed as well. This is because product counterfeiting, and the related crime of pharmaceutical counterfeiting, have a rich and growing body of literature exploring many aspects of the crimes that include the production of fraudulent medicines. Understanding how the term “counterfeit pharmaceutical” has been used, what activities are involved in these crimes, and what is known about how pharmaceutical counterfeiting schemes operate will allow for a more comprehensive understanding of the problem of fraudulent medicine. Counterfeit goods are pervasive throughout the society. Some are conspicuous, such as when fake purses and watches are sold at corner stands

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and flea markets, or when counterfeit athletic shoes are sold through Internet auction sites. Other counterfeits are inconspicuous, hiding in plain sight and often times intermingled with legitimate goods. Wherever counterfeit goods are found within the market, they can be classified as either deceptive or nondeceptive fakes (Grossman & Shapiro, 1988). In the case of nondeceptive counterfeit goods, there is some clear indication that the products offered for sale are not genuine. Clues that an item is a nondeceptive counterfeit include a high-value athletic shoe that bears the trademarked logo of two different shoe manufacturers, or when a counterfeit uses a trademarked logo but misspells the brand name (e.g., a shoe bears Nike’s trademark “swoosh,” with the word “Nkie” printed above the logo). When producing deceptive counterfeits, criminals are attempting to mimic as closely as possible, and in every respect possible, some legitimate good with the intention that consumers will not be able to tell the difference between the fake good and the genuine article. There are markets for both nondeceptive and deceptive counterfeits, and some consumers will actively search for goods they know to be counterfeit. Consumer demand for known counterfeit goods is in some cases driven by a consumer’s self-perception of being a savvy shopper (e.g., acquiring an identical item as someone who purchases the legitimate good, yet only paying a fraction of the price), or the desire to purchase goods they could not otherwise afford (Han, Nunes, & Drèze, 2010; Wilcox, Kim, & Sen, 2009). However, most consumers would like to avoid receiving counterfeit goods in place of legitimate items, as this can create serious issues for them. Irrespective of whether the counterfeit is deceptive or nondeceptive, the unauthorized manufacturing, trafficking, or selling of items that bear a brand owner’s registered trademark are what constitute product counterfeiting under the U.S. law (Trademark Counterfeiting Act of 1984; Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006). Trademarks, such as logos and brand names, carry significant weight with consumers, and the impact of brand loyalty on consumer decision-making cannot be denied (Chaudhuri & Holbrook, 2001). Importantly, consumer trust and a record of satisfactory product performance have an important effect on customer loyalty and the decision to purchase the product again in the future (Bloemer & Kasper,1995; Delgado-Ballester & Luis Munuera-Alemán, 2001). Because brand loyalty is so essential to maintaining a stable customer base, brand owners spend a great deal of their resources on building a respected and well-recognized brand (Kremer & Viot, 2012). When counterfeiters illegally use a brand owner’s trademark, they are able to capitalize upon the brand loyalty and reputation the brand owner has worked so hard to develop. Counterfeiters then use these against the brand owner when they are able to take advantage of unsuspecting customers. Counterfeiting can have a serious impact on consumer perceptions of the brand, the company’s share of the market, and may even lead to

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declines in brand owner profitability (Bird & Steckel, 2011; Commuri, 2009). A serious decline in profitability is most likely to occur when counterfeit goods displace legitimate goods in the marketplace, the deception goes unnoticed, and consumers are in some way injured by the counterfeit goods. When this occurs, counterfeiters are able to effectively utilize a company’s success to steal customers and revenue from the business. Should this continue unabated, the financial and public relations impact to the company could be severe. Phony pharmaceuticals provide the clearest examples of the serious harms consumers can experience as a result of product counterfeiting, and this crime creates especially dire harms for the very young and the elderly (Trent, 2013). Additionally, populations most in need of lifesaving drugs, inoculations, and preventative medicines are also most vulnerable to experiencing harm at the hands of pharmaceutical counterfeiters. For example, it has been estimated that thousands of people in Africa die every year because they have been administered counterfeit malaria and tuberculosis vaccines (Harris, Stevens, & Morris, 2009). Counterfeit Pharmaceuticals Pharmaceutical counterfeiting is a type of product counterfeiting because it involves the unauthorized use of a legitimate pharmaceutical brand owner’s trademark, whether it be a logo, product name, or brand name. Pharmaceutical product counterfeiting occurs when an individual or organization manufactures an unauthorized pharmaceutical and illegally applies a protected trademark so that the illegitimate good mimics a legitimate product. Counterfeit pharmaceuticals will range in quality from products that have doses of active ingredients that are similar to their legitimate counterparts to phony goods that are composed of nothing more than filler chemicals and coloring dyes. Irrespective of how closely an illegitimate good matches a legitimate good, as mentioned earlier when a trademark is applied to a product without authorization of the brand owner, a counterfeiting violation has occurred. When counterfeit pharmaceutics are made using formulations that deviate from the legitimate product’s formulation, the counterfeit will likely not function as expected, creating harms for unsuspecting patients (Yar, 2008). If doctors are unaware that the pharmaceuticals they have distributed to patients are illegitimate, they are also likely to be unaware of the dangers they are presenting to their patients. Patients who consume counterfeit pharmaceuticals can suffer a range of serious health consequences, including death, as the pills they take can contain no active ingredients, so small an amount of active ingredient that the medication is ineffective, or an overabundance of a particular chemical, which itself can be harmful to the patient. Pharmaceutical counterfeiting is legally a crime against brand owners because it represents a trademark violation; however, it is also a

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crime against patients because of the harms that can result from negative side effects. In many cases, the negative side effects of counterfeit pharmaceuticals are attributed to the legitimate drug and can lead to civil lawsuits and a loss of trust in the legitimate pharmaceutical (Margolies & Campbell, 2002). It can also lead pharmaceutical companies to spend enormous sums of money addressing the public relations fallout that result from public concern over the extent of the counterfeit drug problem (Herper, 2004). It may be the case that growth in the counterfeit pharmaceutical trade is the result of global growth in consumerism and an increase in demand for lifestyle drugs, such as Viagra, Cialis, and Botox. Despite whatever increases in demand for lifestyle drugs have occurred in recent years to spur growth in counterfeit pharmaceuticals, the proliferation of fraudulent medicines is an international problem. Some of the factors beyond consumer demand that have most contributed to a rise in pharmaceutical counterfeiting schemes include increased access to sources of low-cost manufacturing (such as those found in Southeast Asia), the growth of international trade and the transnational shipping industry, and differences in the rate at which countries enact controls over drug manufacturing and distribution. As with other opportunistic and mercenary crimes (MacDougall, 1933), transnational trade in fraudulent medicines is undertaken by individuals and criminal organizations as a way to pursue profits. Unlike other crimes, including some white-collar crimes, there are no appeals to higher loyalty or ideological actors; counterfeiters and other producers of fraudulent medicine take advantage of opportunities to extract financial gain from victims. They engage in their crimes for the sole purpose of pecuniary gain, it does not matter how the money is spent (e.g., to fund terrorism) as the goal of the crime is to make money. The growing global demand for pharmaceutical goods and the large profit margins that many pharmaceutical manufacturers take in provides the motivation and opportunity needed to spur criminals to engage in this crime. As such, the most effective means of preventing the proliferation of transnational pharmaceutical counterfeiting may center on ways to make this crime as unprofitable as possible. At the same time, stakeholders (i.e., pharmaceutical companies, governments) have a responsibility to do all that they can to protect consumers from being harmed by these illicit goods. Drug Adulteration While many fraudulent medicines are manufactured with the intent of being fraudulent, such as counterfeit pharmaceuticals, some are produced by altering previously manufactured legitimate pharmaceutical products. The most common way to turn legitimate pharmaceuticals into illegitimate goods is through the adulteration of the product, typically through

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what is called tampering, which is the process of adding something to a product in order to change its original formulation (Bunker, 2007). Tampering includes making changes to the actual product through dilution, or through the mislabeling of a product. Dilution usually occurs with liquid or powered pharmaceutical products, as criminals will add filler ingredients like water, sugar, or some other chemical, in order to stretch the number of doses that can be obtained from the original pharmaceutical product. This is done so that more of a product can be sold to consumers, and typically co-occurs with the crime of relabeling; relabeling can also occur as a stand-alone offense. The type of material used to dilute a pharmaceutical varies and can sometimes include products that are unsafe for human consumption. The following example is taken from a counterfeiting scheme uncovered in the United States and prosecuted by the Department of Justice. While the individual involved did not dilute the drugs he dispensed with a harmful material, the act of dilution itself led directly to patient harm, including several deaths: In 2001 Robert Courtney, a pharmacist in Kansas City, Missouri, was charged with tampering, misbranding and adulterating a cancer drug he dispensed to patients. Over the course of his scheme, Courtney bought small quantities of an anti-cancer drug and diluted it in order to sell higher quantities to more patients, thereby making higher profits. The diluted products dispensed by Courtney reduced the effective potency of the drug from 39 percent to less than one percent of the recommended prescription strength. Courtney was arrested after an oncologist for whom Courtney mixed cancer drugs discovered that the drugs she had received were watered down. Courtney later confessed to federal agents that he had been actively diluting cancer drugs, as well as other medications he dispensed, since 1992. (United States v. Courtney, 240 F. Supp. 2d 1052, 1054, 2002)

Courtney’s actions included not only the adulteration of drugs he dispensed but also the relabeling of those drugs so that other health care providers and patients would be unaware of the counterfeit goods he was distributing to them. Relabeling is the act of altering the packaging or label of a legitimate pharmaceutical so that the dosage listed on the package is misrepresentative of the actual contents of the package. Relabeling occurs in situations where counterfeiters are seeking to deceive people into believing they are receiving a particular product, when in actuality they are receiving only partial amounts of the product, or a completely different product altogether. While dilution is more commonly found in domestic counterfeiting schemes, due to the fact that a legitimate product is taken from the legitimate supply stream and adulterated into a fraudulent good, it is also common for transnational schemes to use relabeling and mislabeling tactics. Mislabeling and relabeling pharmaceutical products can make it easier to move them across international borders because the false labels are

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used to hide the true nature of the products. For example, it is common for counterfeiters shipping drugs across the world to label shipping containers and declared items to foreign customs agencies as containing health supplements, vitamins, or nutritional goods. Because health supplements and nutritional aids are not regulated to the extent that pharmaceutical items are, counterfeiters label their goods as these items then relabel them with trademarked information once they have reached their final destination. The relabeling of counterfeit goods may occur many times as a product proceeds from its manufacturing origin to its point of final distribution. Another common tactic that counterfeiters use in moving their illicit goods across the globe is to falsely label their products at several points throughout the shipping process. Because counterfeiting is a violation of a brand owner’s trademark rights, savvy counterfeiters have found ways to relabel their goods multiple times, with the final relabeling occurring once the counterfeit has reached the country in which it will be distributed. This allows a counterfeiting organization to ship phony goods that are not technically a violation of intellectual property rights laws because they have not been illegally labeled with a trademark. Should the pills be inspected, no trademark will be found and the goods are unlikely to be seized. Should counterfeit packaging be seized before it is applied to the counterfeit pharmaceuticals, the counterfeiters incur a small cost of doing business and do not lose their main product. Diversion Diversion is classified as the unauthorized movement of a legitimate good from its intended destination to some other unauthorized market through either legitimate or illegitimate channels. The diversion of legitimate goods allows counterfeiters to access products that can then be diluted and distributed to consumers, while also allowing counterfeiters to leverage the legitimate pharmaceutical supply stream as a source for their illicit goods. In essence, diversion can both eliminate a counterfeiter’s need to manufacture an illicit good and aid the distribution of an illegally manufactured good by allowing a counterfeit item to replace a legitimate item in the distribution stream. In general, there are two different types of diversion: parallel importing and smuggling. Smuggling is quite simply the process of illegally moving drugs into or through a country using false paperwork, or by concealing the pharmaceutical among other cargo or in shipping containers. This occurs when criminals purchase or steal low-cost pharmaceuticals from one country only to sell them at a higher price in another country. Some pharmaceutical counterfeiters will buy smuggled goods because they cannot obtain from other sources within the country, or they may purchase these goods because they intend to dilute them prior to distribution. Parallel importing is the process of bringing unauthorized pharmaceuticals into

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a country through legitimate channels, such as when stolen or counterfeit drugs are sold into the legitimate secondary wholesale market in the United States. This is the type of diversion that has the potential to cause the greatest number of issues for health care patients. When fraudulent medicines find their way into legitimate distribution channels through parallel importation practices, they become more difficult to detect and have a greater likelihood of reaching consumers, the negative effects of these drugs are more likely to be attributed to the legitimate pharmaceutical, and perceptions of pharmaceutical supply chain security and integrity are threatened (Mackey, Liang, York, & Kubic, 2015). Threats to legitimate supply chain penetration posed by fraudulent medicines can be found in almost every country—including the United States. Swafford (2003) writes about an official at Serono, a company that makes a key drug for AIDS patients, who testified that the company isn’t sure how a fake version of the drug ended up on pharmacy shelves. Two batches of Serostim, a drug used to treat AIDS patients who experience excessive weight loss, were determined by the manufacturer to be counterfeit, but the batches surfaced a few months apart. The fact that counterfeit drugs were ending up on retail shelves was very alarming to the company. The counterfeiting problem is troubling since consumers typically trust their pharmacies, but patients who have been exposed to counterfeits have become afraid to take prescriptions even when they have access to legitimate products. Counterfeiters will also divert expired drugs out of the normal returned goods distribution stream; this provides them with a supply of once legitimate goods that need only be relabeled or repackaged and then distributed to consumers. These expired drugs can then be placed back into the legitimate distribution stream, or sold through networks of pharmaceutical counterfeiters to consumers around the globe. If tested, they will be found to have an identical product formulation as the legitimate good, and the counterfeit labeling and packaging will mirror that of the legitimate good. However, the drugs are likely to be ineffective and potentially harmful as they have exceeded their effective useful life. Diverting legitimate pharmaceuticals away from their intended destinations is a crime that the operators of fraudulent medicine schemes use in combination with other offenses. In many ways, it is necessary that additional activities associated with fraudulent medicines be undertaken as a way to mask the origins of the diverted goods. As the following case describes, individuals colluding to profit from a diversion scheme will utilize other nefarious activities, such as mislabeling products, in order to complete their criminal acts: Joseph Egbe, 44, of Gwynn Oak, Maryland, pleaded guilty today to misbranding of pharmaceuticals, announced United States Attorney for the District of Maryland Rod J. Rosenstein. According to his plea agreement and court documents,

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Egbe owned and operated “e-Meditech,” a charitable organization. e-Meditech requested and received drugs from other charitable organizations, including Catholic Medical Mission Board (“CMMB”), with the understanding that it would ship or transport the drugs to Africa for donation to the underprivileged. Egbe understood that he could not sell or transfer the drugs to any other person for any reason. Between 2007 and 2008, Egbe received shipments of prescription drugs from CMMB. Egbe removed the prescription drugs from the boxes and placed them in barrels. Egbe then created false labels, which he affixed to the barrels. Egbe sold the drugs to a pharmacist who owned and operated two pharmacies in Baltimore, Maryland. (U.S. Justice Department Press Release, October 19, 2009)

While Egbe’s behavior may not fit with the activities that most consider to be counterfeiting and on its face his conduct may not meet the standard for counterfeiting set out by the U.S. FDA, his acts to fit with what the UN deem to be fraudulent medicine, and what INTERPOL considers pharmaceutical crime. Furthermore, the aforementioned scheme highlights one of the ways counterfeiters and other criminals regularly take advantage of the legitimate pharmaceutical supply and distribution stream. A MODEL OF THE SUPPLY/MANUFACTURING/ DISTRIBUTION CHAIN Figure 3.1 displays a basic model of the pharmaceutical supply/manufacturing/distribution chain; however, this is only a basic model and may not capture unique country- or brand owner-specific nuances. Yet, for the purposes of the present discussion, this model is more than sufficient. The supply chain elements of the model are displayed using boxes with dashed lines. These components of the model are comprised of companies that supply the key ingredients needed to manufacture a pharmaceutical product (i.e., ingredient manufacturers) and the companies that manufacture and distribute related packaging materials, like the plastic used to produce blister packs, labels, and corrugated cartons.

Figure 3.1 Basic Model of Pharmaceutical Supply/Manufacturing/Distribution Chain

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The manufacturing component of the model is displayed using thicklined boxes. These elements of the model capture the production of the final pharmaceutical good and subsequent packaging of that good. Packaging can be done in bulk format, in which case a secondary packaging process (not displayed in the model) will take place, or medicines will be packaged for individual use. The final component of the model, the distribution stream, is displayed in boxes with thin lines. These elements, primary and secondary wholesale distribution, represent the avenues through which pharmaceuticals reach distribution outlets. In some cases, pharmaceuticals will pass back and forth between primary and secondary wholesalers, among primary wholesalers, or among a multitude of secondary wholesalers, before reaching distribution outlets. Distribution outlets (shown as an oval in the model) are the point of contact between the pharmaceutical distribution stream and the patient. These points of contact include sources like hospitals, pharmacies, doctors and nurses, and online pharmacies. What is most important to note about this model, and to keep in mind as discussion of the model proceeds, is that each element of this model (operations displayed in boxes as well as the interconnections between operations, displayed by lines) can be co-opted by criminals engaged in fraudulent medicine schemes. At the same time, there exist a multitude of parallel supply and distribution streams that allow counterfeiters and other criminal opportunities to move legitimate product away from, or to move illegitimate product into, the legitimate supply/distribution chain. In some countries, the elements of this model are heavily controlled and monitored by government agencies and pharmaceutical brand owners, while in other countries lax enforcement regimes create opportunities for fraudulent medicine schemes to proliferate. The production and distribution of pharmaceuticals, legal and fraudulent, is in almost all cases global as the operations needed to manufacture, package, and distribute pharmaceutical products span a number of different countries. For example, key ingredients used to manufacture pharmaceuticals (displayed by the column of boxes on the left side of Figure 3.1) can originate in one country, such as the United States. The manufacturing and packaging of the final finished product (displayed by the two boxes in the middle of Figure 3.1) can occur in another country, say China, while the packaging products and labels used are produced in yet another country. Finally, the finished goods are distributed through primary and secondary wholesalers (displayed by the two boxes on the right in Figure 3.1) in Africa, Europe, or North America. Regardless of whether a phony drug is classified as lifesaving or lifestyle, the illicit distribution streams used to move the product from its manufacturing source to the consumer often intermingle with and leverage the effective and efficient practices of the legitimate pharmaceutical distribution stream. This makes it easy and convenient for criminal

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organizations to take advantage of technological and commercial advances, such as the development of online pharmacies, to push their illicit medicines to consumers who then purchase and receive what they believe to be genuine pharmaceutical products. Once illicit pharmaceuticals have entered the country in which they will be distributed, they may pass through multiple legitimate and illegitimate wholesalers before reaching consumers. As previously mentioned, and detailed by the following case, the purveyors of fraudulent medicines will use the legitimate pharmaceutical wholesale market to their advantage as often as possible: Ronald Shaffer, a Pharmacist, recruited Sheryl Monbarren to manage the day to day operation of an illicit business that obtained prescription pharmaceuticals in Alabama and California, “laundered” them through a storefront warehouse in Colorado, and eventually sold the drugs to wholesalers nationwide. Donald Wyatt was recruited by Shafer and Monbarren to set up a “closed door pharmacy” in Mobile, Alabama, called Professional IV Services. That entity certified in written contracts with pharmaceutical manufacturers that all prescription pharmaceutical products purchased from the manufacturers at prices substantially below wholesale would be sold only to nursing home patients. However, at the direction of Monbarren, the drugs were shipped to a Colorado co-conspirator Ralph Kopald. Ralph Kopald operated a Fort Collins, Colorado warehouse known as Arjay Distributors. Kopald received the drugs from Professional IV Services and other “closed door pharmacy” operators and immediately shipped the drugs to wholesale operations designated by Ronald Shaffer and Sheryl Monbarren. By transshipping through the Colorado operation rather than directly from the pharmacy, Shaffer and Monbarren made certain the pharmacy owners did not become aware of the ultimate buyer. This eliminated the possibility that the “closed door” operator would cut Shaffer and Monbarren out of the business. It also gave the wholesale customer plausible deniability in that the wholesaler could deny knowledge of the fraudulent means used to obtain discounted pharmaceuticals. (U.S. Food and Drug Administration, 2002)

What is not displayed in Figure 3.1 is a series of arrows running in the opposite direction of those shown connecting elements of the model. These backward-flowing arrows would symbolize the flow of money among the elements in this chain. As products flow forward through the supply/manufacturing/distribution processes, money flows in the opposite direction. Just as counterfeiters and other criminals take advantage of the legitimate supply and distribution chain to perpetrate their schemes, they also take advantage of legitimate channels to move their illicit profits. In most cases, funds are moved between actors through bank-to-bank wire transfers, credit card payment processors, and money transfer networks (e.g., MoneyGram, Western Union). When the fraudulent medicines peddled to consumers are complete fakes (i.e., counterfeit pharmaceuticals), it is most often the case that key ingredients are sourced from, and the products manufactured by,

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companies operating within China or India. Once the finished goods are completed, a variety of distribution routes are used to send these fraudulent goods to wholesalers and consumers around the world. In fact, one business model used by pharmaceutical counterfeiters runs completely contrary to the legitimate pharmaceutical model displayed in Figure 3.1. Specifically, in some instances, the manufacturers of counterfeit pharmaceuticals will ship their products directly to consumers, bypassing what can become a complex system of wholesalers and distributors. There are certain cases where legitimately produced specialty drugs will be shipped directly to patients by the drug manufacturer. In these cases, physicians order unique drug combinations to combat specific patient illnesses. The low volume and unique nature of these goods does not support large-scale manufacturing and distribution, so certain pharmaceutical companies specialize in producing these customer-specific products. The fraudulent medicine equivalent to the direct-to-customer model varies greatly from this, as the counterfeit manufacturer is not filling a special customer need, but rather excluding the middlemen from the distribution process. When counterfeit pharmaceuticals are shipped direct to consumers, the volumes are small enough that scheme operators can use postal and air mail services, or package delivery companies such as FedEx or UPS to ship their products. For larger volume shipments, such as when a counterfeit pharmaceutical manufacturer is shipping a large quantity of product to a distributor in another country, cargo shipping companies are preferable alternatives to air mail and package delivery companies. Using transportation intermediaries like ocean-going cargo container shippers allows counterfeiters to move goods through heavily trafficked ports using a sometimes complex chain of custody that is intended to hide the illegitimate nature of their goods (Kennedy & Wilson, 2015). Using established shipping routes allows counterfeiters to hide their items among the billions of other legitimate goods that move around the world each day, and when it becomes necessary they have not been hesitant to create sophisticated counterfeit shipping documents and bills of lading (Kennedy & Wilson, 2015). The sophistication of fraudulent medicine supply and distribution chains is partially a result of the fact that criminals have mirrored the legitimate supply and distribution chains to meet increased demand. One of the primary advancements in the legitimate distribution chain has been the growth of online pharmacies. Counterfeiters in particular have taken full advantage of the Internet to advertise and sell their illicit goods to a population of consumers seeking to purchase drugs at a discounted price and with the least amount of effort possible. Combining an increased use of the Internet for pharmaceutical sales with global distribution networks can, as the following case details, produce an efficient and effective fraudulent medicine scheme. The following

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are excerpts from a U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement press release detailing the 2012 conviction of a Puerto Rican man who served as a major distributor of counterfeit drugs within the United States: A Puerto Rican man faces up to 10 years in prison after being found guilty on federal charges stemming from his role as a key operative for a drug ring that distributed large quantities of Chinese-made counterfeit pharmaceuticals throughout the United States and worldwide. Francis Ortiz Gonzalez, 36, was convicted on one count of conspiracy and seven counts of trafficking in counterfeit pharmaceuticals. The investigation revealed that Ortiz-Gonzalez had packaged and shipped more than 160,000 counterfeit tablets, including Viagra, Cialis, Valium, Xanax and Lipitor. “The burgeoning popularity of e-commerce has led to an explosion in the number of websites offering prescription drugs online,” said Claude Arnold, special agent in charge for HSI (Homeland Security Investigations) Los Angeles. The indictment alleges that Ortiz-Gonzalez acted as a U.S.-based distributor for a criminal enterprise, allegedly headed by Bo Jiang, 34, a Chinese national whose last known residence is New Zealand. According to the indictment, Jiang advertised the counterfeit medications over the Internet. As part of the scheme, he allegedly recruited individuals from around the world to act as distributors for the products. The U.S.-based distributors, including Ortiz-Gonzalez, were responsible for receiving the parcels of counterfeit pharmaceuticals from China, then repacking and shipping them to fill individual customer’s orders throughout the United States. (U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 2012)

Due to the growth of the Internet and the rise in legitimate online pharmacies, it is relatively easy for a patient to purchase pharmaceutical products online, and the growth of this method of distribution has made it easier for those who produce fraudulent medicines to get their illicit goods into the hands of consumers. This is one of the main reasons that the crime of pharmaceutical counterfeiting is considered to be such a troubling global problem, and a significant threat to the health and safety of the world’s population (Bunker, 2007; Cockburn et al., 2005; Forzley, 2003; Heinonen & Wilson, 2012; Hosseini et al., 2011). CONCLUSION The high prices charged by pharmaceutical companies for name brand drugs combined with demand for these drugs means that criminals have a lot to gain from dealing in fraudulent medicines. Using the reputation and brand image built by legitimate pharmaceutical companies, the operators of fraudulent medicine schemes capitalize upon many consumers’ desire to buy based upon price and convenience, while at the same time leveraging consumers’ growing use of the Internet to purchase pharmaceuticals. The Internet is just one reason that counterfeit pharmaceuticals have spread so quickly and effectively around the globe. From the standpoint of counterfeit pharmaceutical production, the proliferation of lowcost offshore manufacturing and increased stabilization of international

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trade routes provides the perfect conditions for counterfeiting to flourish as goods can be produced and shipped cheaply. Partly because of these factors fraudulent medicines directly compete with legitimate products, often times displacing them in the marketplace because their low cost makes them attractive to many consumers. The challenges posed by fraudulent medicines may seem daunting, however, there is much that can be done to respond to and prevent these crimes. Specifically, responses to the problem of fraudulent medicines must focus upon making these crimes as unprofitable as possible, keeping legitimate drugs in the supply/distribution streams, while keeping illegitimate drugs out, and disrupting the illegitimate online marketplace. Because fraudulent medicine schemes are perpetrated for the ultimate goal of financial gain, the most effective way to reduce the likelihood of its occurrence is to decrease the potential returns criminals will realize. In one respect reducing the profits that can be made from the sale of fraudulent medicines is tied to the profit potential found within the legitimate pharmaceutical industry. Drug prices are high in part due to the costs associated with drug research and testing, as well as the costs of manufacturing. According to the Tufts Center for the Study of Drug Development (2014), it takes a little more than a decade and nearly 1.3 billion U.S. dollars to bring a new drug through federal approvals and to the market. For pharmaceutical companies, these costs justify the high prices charged for drugs during the time they have patent protections over their drug formulations. The length of pharmaceutical patents in the United States is now 20 years, meaning that drug companies must pull in an average of $65 million each year to simply recoup the costs of drug research and development. In actuality, the average yearly take during a drug’s patented life needs to be greater than $65 million as the cost of capital and the costs of producing new drugs increase each year. Once the 20-year period has passed, less costly generic drugs will likely flood the market, particularly if the patented drug is effective and in demand. Without the promise of significant financial returns from drug sales, pharmaceutical companies would have little incentive to invest heavily in research and development. This is the risk-reward model that drives pharmaceutical innovation. Accordingly, criminals engaged in fraudulent medicine schemes are able to realize large profit margins, even when they sell their illicit goods below market price as they do not have the same sunk costs, nor the same fixed costs of operation to contend with. Making fraudulent medicine schemes less profitable without having a material impact on the financial returns of legitimate pharmaceutical companies is a difficult situation to sort out. One potential solution is to shift from the current capitalist model to one of a state-corporate partnership where governments underwrite the costs of new drug research and testing. Pharmaceutical companies can then set prices lower without sacrificing profitability, as the profits they would earn would be similar to what they earned when they bore the

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costs of research and development. However, this solution is not optimal and may be fraught with unintended consequences. A more practical approach to attacking the money sought by criminals engaged in fraudulent medicine schemes is to remove the tools and channels they use to funnel money from customers back into their organizations. By working with credit card companies, banks, and money transfer companies, governments and pharmaceutical companies can identify patterns of illicit activity and shut down the channels used to move illegal profits back to the criminals. This solution is more feasible than the previous suggestion and there is some evidence that money transfer companies are eager to work with law enforcement to stop the flow of illicit funds through their organization (P. Hopkins, personal communication, October 8, 2016). In addition to stemming the flow of illegal funds back to fraudsters, prevention efforts will benefit from an increased focus on guardianship of the legitimate supply and distribution streams. As Figure 3.1 showed, there are numerous opportunities for illicit goods to enter the legitimate pharmaceutical supply-distribution stream, as well as many opportunities for legitimate goods to be funneled out. Laws and regulations controlling the manufacture and distribution of pharmaceuticals vary by country and despite coordination among many nations, as well as the global influence of organizations like the World Health Organization and the UN, there still exists many important distinctions across national laws and processes. These distinctions create opportunities for pharmaceutical counterfeiters and other medical fraudsters to increase their criminal activities. At the same time, governments, brand owners, and consumers must continue to be vigilant in addressing the threats posed by illegal Internet pharmacies. The Internet allows people across the world to be connect and interact in ways that facilitate trade in fraudulent medicines. Resolutions to the problem of Internet pharmacies are likely to come from solutions to the larger issues inherent to cybercrime. However, consumers also play an important role in reducing the harms that come from fraudulent medicines obtained through the Internet, as it is their demand for cheap and easily obtained goods that helps to fuel this crime. As such, effective prevention mechanisms must leverage the efforts of governments and brand owners, while at the same time educating consumers about how they can protect themselves from victimization. REFERENCES Bale, H. (2015). Pharmaceutical counterfeiting: Issues, trends, measurement [PDF document]. Lecture presented at WIPO/OECD Workshop. Retrieved from http://www.oecd.org/sti/ind/35650404.pdf. Bird, R. C., & Steckel, J. H. (2011). The role of consumer surveys in trademark infringement: Empirical evidence from the federal courts. University of Pennsylvania Journal of Business Law, 14, 1013.

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Bloemer, J. M., & Kasper, H. D. (1995). The complex relationship between consumer satisfaction and brand loyalty. Journal of Economic Psychology, 16, 311–329. Bunker, A. M. (2007). Deadly dose: Counterfeit pharmaceuticals, intellectual property and human health. Journal of the Patent & Trademark Office Society, 89, 493. Chaudhuri, A., & Holbrook, M. B. (2001). The chain of effects from brand trust and brand affect to brand performance: The role of brand loyalty. Journal of Marketing, 65, 81–93. Cockburn, R., Newton, P. N., Agyarko, E. K., Akunyili, D., & White, N. J. (2005). The global threat of counterfeit drugs: Why industry and governments must communicate the dangers. PLoS Med, 2, Article e100. Retrieved from http:// www.plosmedicine.org/article/info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fjournal.pmed .0020100#pmed-0020100-g003. Commuri, S. (2009). The impact of counterfeiting on genuine-item consumers’ brand relationships. Journal of Marketing, 73, 86–98. Delgado-Ballester, E., & Luis Munuera-Alemán, J. (2001). Brand trust in the context of consumer loyalty. European Journal of Marketing, 35, 1238–1258. Forzley, M. (2003). Counterfeit goods and the public’s health and safety. Washington, DC: International Intellectual Property Institute. Grossman, G., & Shapiro, C. (1988). Counterfeit-product trade. American Economic Review, 78, 59–75. Han, Y. J., Nunes, J. C., & Drèze, X. (2010). Signaling status with luxury goods: The role of brand prominence. Journal of Marketing, 74, 15–30. Harris, J., Stevens, P., & Morris, J. (2009). Keeping it real: Combating the spread of fake drugs in poor countries. Washington, DC: International Policy Network. Heinonen, J. A., & Wilson, J. M. (2012). Product counterfeiting at the state level: An empirical examination of Michigan-related incidents. International Journal of Comparative and Applied Criminal Justice, 36, 273–290. Herper, M. (2004, July 1). Fighting fake viagra. Forbes. Retrieved from http:// www.forbes.com/2004/07/01/cx_mh_0701viagra.html. Hosseini, S.A.R., Darbooy, S., Tehrani Banihasemi, S. A., Naseri, S. M., & Dinarvand, R. (2011). Counterfeit medicines: Report of a cross-sectional retrospective study in Iran. Public Health, 125, 165–171. INTERPOL. (n.d.). Pharmaceutical crime. Retrieved from http://www.interpol.int/ Crime-areas/Pharmaceutical-crime/Pharmaceutical-crime. Kennedy, J. P., & Wilson, J. M. (2015). Charting the course: The roles and responsibilities of ocean-going transportation intermediaries in the distribution of counterfeit goods. East Lansing: Michigan State University, Center for Anti-Counterfeiting and Product Protection. Kremer, F., & Viot, C. (2012). How store brands build retailer brand image. International Journal of Retail & Distribution Management, 40, 528–543. Leisinger, K. M. (2012, October 31). Meeting the global health challenge: The role of the pharmaceutical industry. Retrieved from http://www.makingitmagazine .net/?p=6046. MacDougall, E. D. (1933). Crime for profit: A symposium on mercenary crime. Boston: The Stratford Company. Mackey, T. K., Liang, B. A., York, P., & Kubic, T. (2015). Counterfeit drug penetration into global legitimate medicine supply chains: A global assessment. American Journal of Tropical Medicine and Hygiene, 92(6 Suppl), 59–67.

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Margolies, D., & Campbell, M. (2002, October 9). Eli Lilly, Bristol-Myers Squibb settle lawsuits involving medication dilution. Kansas City Star. Retrieved from https://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1–92651147.html. Swafford, M. (2003, October 15). Officials try sorting out origin of fake AIDS drug. Las Vegas Sun. Retrieved from http://m.lasvegassun.com/news/2003/ oct/15/officials-try-sorting-out-origin-of-fake-aids-drug/. Trent, C. (2013, November). Assessing the risks of counterfeiting and illicit diversion for health care products. Retrieved from http://a-capp.msu.edu/sites/default/ files/HealthCareProductsRisk_Trent_PaperSeries_FINAL.pdf. Tufts Center for the Study of Drug Development. (2014, November 18). Cost to develop and win marketing approval for a new drug is $2.6 billion. Retrieved from http:// csdd.tufts.edu/news/complete_story/pr_tufts_csdd_2014_cost_study. United Nations. (2013, February). Transnational organized crime in West Africa: A threat assessment. Vienna: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. United Nations Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice. (2013). Countering fraudulent medicines, in particular their trafficking. General Assembly Resolution 20/6. Retrieved from https://www.unodc.org/documents/ organized-crime/FM/Resolution_20_EN.pdf. U.S. Food and Drug Administration. (2002). Five sentenced in Methamphetamine case investigation uncovers conspiracy to possess Methamphetamine with the intent to distribute. Retrieved from http://www.fda.gov/iceci/enforcementactions/ enforcementstory/enforcementstoryarchive/ucm106221.htm. U.S. Food and Drug Administration. (2016). Counterfeit medicine. Retrieved from http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/ResourcesForYou/Consumers/Buying UsingMedicineSafely/CounterfeitMedicine/. U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement. (2012, August 9). Man convicted for role in international counterfeit drug distribution scheme [News Release]. Retrieved from https://www.ice.gov/news/releases/man-convicted-roleinternational-counterfeit-drug-distribution-scheme. Wilcox, K., Kim, H. M., & Sen, S. (2009). Why do consumers buy counterfeit luxury brands? Journal of Marketing Research, 46, 247–259. World Health Organization. (2005). Access to medicines: Intellectual property protection: Impact on public health. WHO Drug Information, 19, 236–241. Yar, M. (2008). The other global drugs crisis: Assessing the scope, impacts and drivers of the trade in dangerous counterfeit pharmaceuticals. International Journal of Social Inquiry, 1, 151–166.

CHAPTER 4

Trafficking in Antiquities Blythe A. Bowman

In 1987, tomb raiders in Peru stole the largest gold object ever recovered from an ancient royal tomb in the archaeological site of Sipàn (Atwood, 2004; Passas & Proulx, 2011). The piece was a segment of ceremonial armor torn from the skeletal remains from the tomb of an important Moche warrior-priest. Ten years later, the piece was recovered in an FBI sting operation in Philadelphia, where undercover agents had been offered $1.6 million for it (Brodie, Doole, & Watson, 2000, p. 15; FBI, 2008). In the following year, the piece was finally returned to Peru and is now on display for the world to see in Lima’s Museo de la Nación (Rose, 1998). The looting1 at Sipàn—and subsequent smuggling of this culturally significant material from a source country to satisfy commercial demand for it generated in another country—represents a contemporary example of transnational crime (Alder & Polk, 2005). But in a world where more traditional transnational crimes—corruption, money laundering, drug and human trafficking, to name a few—remain pervasive, why would anyone, much less the FBI, prioritize the recovery of this Peruvian piece of gold (Passas & Proulx, 2011)? The men involved in trafficking the Peruvian ceremonial gold piece from Sipàn were eventually convicted of smuggling, conspiracy, and interstate transportation of stolen property (FBI, 2008). But the looting of archaeological sites and trafficking in antiquities is a transnational crime that engenders a spectrum of harm beyond what can legally be construed as simple tangible loss. Rather, the looting and trafficking of antiquities give rise to both material and intellectual consequences (Gill & Chippindale, 1993). When sites are looted, irreversible destruction occurs, and for every marketable object that a looter uncovers, many more objects and sites are destroyed in the process (Papa Sokal, 2006). In digging up the Peruvian gold at Sipàn, looters “destroyed hundreds . . . perhaps thousands,

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of copper and ceramic objects that they thought they couldn’t sell . . . . Like grave-robbers everywhere, they went straight for the best merchandise and trashed everything else along the way” (p. 77). Archaeological resources represent the physical remains of human history, and they are both irreplaceable and finite. When objects are looted and trafficked as collectible commodities, this results in not only the loss of physical objects from the human past but also the information and knowledge to be garnered from them. This problem is illustrated in the work of Chippindale and Gill (2000) who attempted to analyze the scientific significance of an undocumented bronze sculpture of an oxen with a wagon; the piece is now part of a well-known antiquities collection: The wagon and its team . . . are thought to have originated in Anatolia or northern Syria . . . . Because the wagon models lack an archaeological context, the exact date, origin, and function of these objects are uncertain . . . . At present, we have no idea if they come from funerary, domestic, or perhaps religious settings. (von Bothmer, 1990, p. 31, in Chippindale & Gill, 2000, p. 500)

Looted objects might be pretty to look at, but they say very little about the people or culture that produced them (Atwood, 2004). As such, they retain little if any scientific value, and thus we are at not only a material loss but also an intellectual one when items are looted from archaeological sites and subsequently trafficked. Moreover, the advent of globalization has meant that Western culture and its acquisitive nature have descended on every corner of the globe in an unprecedented manner, leaving no archaeological landscape immune to the risk of looting and trafficking. The global demand for antiquities continues to be largely fed by the looting of archaeological sites in source countries, and there is a substantial body of research that documents the dismal scope and frequency of looting (Proulx, 2013). Several archaeological surveys conducted around the world have documented the massive scale of on-the-ground damage2 (c.f., e.g., Brodie, Kersel, Luke, & Tubb, 2006; Coggins, 1969; Gilgan, 2001; Gutchen, 1983; Luke & Henderson, 2006; Paredes Maury, 1999; Roosevelt & Luke, 2006). Proulx (2013), for example, surveyed over 2,300 archaeologists active in fieldwork around the world and found that 78.5 percent of them had had personal experience with archaeological site looting at some point during their fieldwork careers. Nearly a quarter of those surveyed archaeologists reported having personally encountered looters on-site in the process of digging; others reported discovering unauthorized holes and pits, and other site damage including “ ‘bones and flakes scattered around’; ‘sieve screens set up at a site where no archaeological teams were working’; ‘stashes of hidden looted artifacts near the site’; ‘human burials disinterred, ruin walls collapsed or disassembled, broken pottery vessels, beer cans, cigarette wrappers, and other trash’ left behind by looters” (p. 119). Nearly half of the respondents also reported objects stolen from their sites.

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Other scholars have examined the demand end of the antiquities trade, focusing on auction catalogues and antiquities sales. Elia (2001), for example, found that as the collecting demand for ancient Apulian red-figure pottery increased in the 1960s and 1970s, so too did the scope and frequency of looting in the originating province of southern Italy. Elia concluded that “several thousands, even tens of thousands, of ancient tombs have been plundered to obtain the more than 13,600 Apulian red-figure vases that exist throughout the world and were recovered in a nonarchaeological manner” (p. 151). When scholarly interest in this pottery resurged in the 1980s and 1990s, a number of these undocumented pots then surfaced on the market and were acquired by private collectors and museums (Nørskov, 2002). Italian investigations into the matter confirmed those vases to have been looted, and today Apulian vases are among the top items requested by Italy to be returned from American museums (Brodie, 2011; Godart & De Caro, 2007). The market connection between the illicitly obtained supply of and demand for antiquities is not, however, limited to classical sites. Gilgan (2001) and Luke and Henderson (2006) showed that as popularity of and market demand for pre-Columbian antiquities fluctuated, so too did the looting of pre-Columbian archaeological sites. Taken together, in combination with Proulx’s work (2013), these varied studies confirm that archaeological site looting does in fact feed the antiquities trade, and that looting is not an isolated problem. Market demand fuels the illicit generation of the supply of antiquities, and as such archaeological site looting is “in every instance, a response to the skyrocketing demand for antiquities by moneyed consumers in the developed world” (Pendergast, 1991, p. 90). The transnational trafficking in illicitly obtained antiquities is thus shaped by the same supply-demand forces driving other types of transnational trafficking. LICIT-ILLICIT DYNAMICS OF THE “GRAY” ANTIQUITIES TRADE As discussed earlier, the illicit antiquities trade shares many elements similar to other transnational criminal markets in terms of structure and functioning. But it is also unique in that it represents an international “gray”3 or “licit-illicit” market—that is, a market with both licit and illicit dynamics that is neither definitively “black” nor “white” (Edwards & Gill, 2002; Proulx, 2011; Tijhuis, 2006). On the licit end of the spectrum, trading in antiquities is legal; but the means by which antiquities are usually procured—primarily through archaeological site looting—are illegal and must be disguised (Alder & Polk, 2005; Tijhuis, 2006). Thus, many antiquities on the market today have undergone a transformation in status from illicit to licit, turning the matter from a clear-cut, black-and-white one to a murky shade of gray (Bowman, 2008).

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Since owning an antiquity is in itself legal, the legal status of an antiquity thus depends on how it has been acquired or found its way to the legal market (Mackenzie, 2005). This means that most objects, which find their way to the legal antiquities market do so by three primary means. First, antiquities which were initially unearthed through authorized archaeological excavations and subsequently turned over to their rightful owner (depending on jurisdiction, the state or the landowner) and then arrive on the legal market. As Mackenzie (2005) notes, though, these are somewhat rare in that most countries, in an effort to preserve their cultural heritage, do not permit much material to circulate as such (Bowman, 2008). A second means by which antiquities may arrive on the legal market involves objects for which provenience or findspot information has long been lost, thus making it next to impossible to determine whether the objects were removed legally or illegally from their source (Brodie, 2002). Typically, these objects were unearthed and moved transnationally long before the source country had cultural patrimony laws in place to protect such heritage, and the objects have been in circulation so long that they are generally considered “licit” simply because of both ambiguity regarding their origins as well as the passage of time (Mackenzie, 2005). A final means by which antiquities arrive on the legal market is through archaeological site looting—that is, the unauthorized removal of culturally significant objects from archaeological sites for commercial gain, the act of which destroys context or evidence needed to learn from the site (Proulx, 2013). These objects are looted and then moved transnationally by a network of smugglers, which often requires the complicity and corruption of customs inspectors, law enforcement, or border patrol agents. Italy’s Cultural Patrimony Protection (Tutela Patrimonio Culturale [TPC]) squad, for example, recently uncovered an international antiquities smuggling network that involved government officials, gallery owners, art dealers, teachers, and even an Italian military policeman (Drake, 2008). By whatever means these illicit antiquities make it to the legal market, they are often masquerading as antiquities with ambiguous origins, forged export documentation, or even “accidental” finds of questionable ownership history (Mackenzie, 2005). In United States v. Schultz (2003), for example, an American antiquities dealer had disguised freshly looted Egyptian antiquities as those belonging to a fictitious old art collection exported from the country before Egypt’s 1983 patrimony law protecting such objects was implemented. Schultz copied early 20th-century pharmaceutical labels, stained them with teabags, and baked them in order to give them an antique look. Having moved them out of Egypt, Schultz then attempted to sell these antiquities on the American market (Gerstenblith, 2004). Because it is a “gray” market, antiquities become hopelessly mixed, with licit objects sold side by side with illicitly obtained ones. As Brodie

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and Tubb note (2002), without findspot or provenience information, “how can licit material be distinguished from illicit? ‘From an old European Collection’ is a common enough auction appellation, but one that might hide an old family heirloom or a recently looted (or fake) piece. Who is to know? The only cautious response is to regard all unprovenanced material as looted” (p. 3). Indeed, most antiquities on the market are sold without provenience documentation, which is a very strong indicator that the items have in fact been looted (Brodie, 2006; Chippindale & Gill, 2000). Often indistinguishable from licitly obtained items, the international antiquities market thus becomes a locus of licit-illicit interfacing. That the objects themselves represent a licit-illicit nexus is but one “gray” element of the global antiquities trade. A second “gray” dynamic of the trade involves its socially broad cast of characters both licit and illicit, ranging from local, small-scale looters and thieves to middlemen to upscale buyers, collectors, and institutions. The antiquities trade is, in fact, as Meyer (1973) observes, a “democratic demimonde,” comprised of both “rich and poor, highborn and lowborn . . . all [are] citizens within it” (p. 156). The fact that it is not always a distinct licit-illicit dichotomy among actors in the antiquities trade—no “us (the ‘goodies’) versus them (the ‘baddies’)” further turns the market a more ambiguous shade of gray (van Duyne, 2002, p. 2). Another factor that characterizes the antiquities market as a licit-illicit interfacing involves the ways in which the illicit dynamics or actors in the trade can “collide or collaborate” with the licit dynamics or actors in the trade (Tijhuis, 2006, p. 15). Passas (1998) calls these licit-illicit interfacings criminogenic asymmetries, or “structural disjunctions, mismatches and inequalities in the spheres of politics, culture, the economy, and the law; asymmetries are criminogenic in that they generate or strengthen the demand for illegal goods or services, they generate incentives for particular actors to participate in illegal transactions, and they reduce the ability of authorities to control illegal activities” (p. 23). One such example of a criminogenic asymmetry is illustrated by the common law nemo dat rule, by which a thief can neither convey good title nor can good title be claimed through a thief even if the property is transferred to a good faith purchaser (Gerstenblith, 2004). In countries following a continental European civil legal tradition, however, good title can be conveyed if the object was purchased in good faith. Practically speaking, this means that even if an antiquity was looted and illegally exported, if it was subsequently purchased in good faith, then the good faith purchase is favored and the object is no longer legally construed as stolen (Brodie, 2002). With “good” title now secured, an illegally obtained antiquity may be legally exported and circulated on the antiquities market (Alder & Polk, 2005). Such legal incongruencies further highlight the variability of “licit” and “illicit” as socially constructed legal characterizations that vary through both time and space (Carducci, 2006).

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A final, and perhaps most disturbing, factor which illustrates the “grayness” of the international antiquities trade is its increasing overlap with other transnational criminal activity. There now exists an abundance of evidence documenting the involvement of drug traffickers, arms smugglers, organized crime syndicates, and even terrorist groups in the looting, trafficking, and even destruction of antiquities and other objects of cultural significance (Luck, 2013; Baker, 2012; Becatoros, 2008; Bernick, 1998; Bogdanos, 2011; Brodie et al., 2000; de la Torre, 2006; Dietzler, 2013; Fidler, 2003; Kaplan, 2005; McCalister, 2005; McManamon & Morton, 2000; Proulx, 2011; Watson, 2006). In February 2015, for example, in recognition of illicitly obtained antiquities as an economic opportunity for the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 2199, which requires member states to take measures to prevent terrorist groups in Syria and Iraq from financially benefiting from trade in, among other goods, antiquities. In addition to economic and commercial incentives for looting and antiquities trafficking, there are increasingly ideological motivations that fuel these activities. Before the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center in September 2001, for example, one of the hijackers attempted to sell stolen Afghan antiquities in order to help finance the 9/11 attacks (de la Torre, 2006). Similarly, in Afghanistan, British officials reported that antiquities were being looted and sold in order to provide financial assistance to the Taliban regime (Fidler, 2003). And in August 2015, as part of their pledge to eradicate relics they feel represent both idolatry and paganism, ISIL militants bombed a Roman-era temple complex in the ancient Syrian city of Palmyra (Tomkiw, 2015). Generally, legislative attempts to curb the movement of illicitly obtained antiquities from archaeologically rich but poor source countries to wealthy, developed market countries have defined the issue as either theft or illicit export. Some countries have enacted national patrimony laws, which vest ownership of antiquities as belonging to the state, and as such when those items are removed from sites it constitutes theft. Egypt, for example, passed its Egyptian Law on the Protection of Antiquities in 1983, establishing antiquities to be the property of the state and their illicit removal a criminal offense. Other countries have taken a different approach by prohibiting the exportation of such objects from national borders (Alder & Polk, 2005). The 1970 UNESCO Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export, and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property, adopted by many countries, both developed and developing, provides that member states cooperate to make preventive efforts in hindering the illicit import and export of cultural property from their borders and provides a formal framework in which member countries can request the return of illicitly removed cultural property. In other words, the implementation of import regulations in market countries would help

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make up for the weakness in source countries’ export regulations (Efrat, 2009). The convention is not, however, retroactive, meaning that under its provisions member countries may only seek the recovery of illicitly removed cultural property after the convention was entered into force. The salient difference between these two legislative strategies lies in their enforceability—market nations, which generate the most demand for antiquities have been somewhat reticent to enforce other nations’ export laws, and source nations are typically more successful in recovering illicitly obtained antiquities when legally construed as stolen (Alder & Polk, 2005; DuBoff, Burr, & Murray, 2004). Regardless, archaeological site looting continues to provide illicitly obtained antiquities primarily because of on-the-ground law enforcement and bureaucratic inadequacies in source countries (Proulx, 2011). With motivations for trafficking in antiquities ranging from the commercial to the ideological, the nexus of illicit antiquities with other contemporary transnational threats have further raised the problem of antiquities to crisis proportions that undermine both domestic and international security. The past is no longer simply endangered—it is under siege. Cultural heritage is inextricably linked to its people; as such, when the preservation of cultural heritage is at risk so too are the people and culture that produced it. Archaeological resources play a critical part in a people’s self-image and national identity, and when those resources are threatened, so too is the culture and memory of its people, not to mention its tourist economy. Such is the case with the destruction of Palmyra in Syria. As Deknatel (2015) notes, “Cultural heritage is an integral part of Syrian national identity. It’s not for nothing that Palmyra is on the 500 Syrian-pound bank note . . . When the Islamic State destroys ruins, it is also trying to destroy some of that identity” (para. 14). Moreover, when ISIL militants capture and destroy archaeological sites, some of the looting and destruction may be done for commercial gain, but it is fundamentally done to gain the world’s attention. And capture the world’s attention they did when they razed the oldest Christian monastery in Iraq (2014), bulldozed ancient sites near Mosul (2015), and bombed ancient ruins at Palmyra (2015); the media coverage also allowed the Islamic State to spread further its ideological message (Almukhtar, 2016). But the loss of Palmyra, for example, is not simply a loss for Syria, it is a loss for everyone because archaeology is a testament to human history, and there is not only the welfare of the archaeological landscape at stake but also the welfare of the people and cultures to which they belong. Cole (2015) writes in his blog, “The destruction of a ruin is like the desecration of a body. It is a vengeance wreaked on the past in order to embitter the future . . .” (para. 2). When the last archaeological site is thus destroyed, life will most certainly go on, but as Meyer (1973, p. 218) writes, “[I]t will be a different kind of life.”

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NOTES 1. “Looting” is defined as the removal of culturally significant material from archaeological sites for commercial gain, the act of which destroys archaeological context or evidence needed to learn from the site (Proulx, 2013). 2. For example, holes, pits, or other damage to the site not part of systematic archaeological excavation. 3. Ruggiero (1997) uses the term “dirty” economy to identify this licit-illicit “gray” overlap in which transnational criminal activity and legitimate business share a common interest (p. 28).

REFERENCES Alder, C., & Polk, K. (2005). The illicit traffic in plundered antiquities. In P. Reichel (Ed.), Handbook of transnational crime and justice (pp. 98–113). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. Almukhtar, S. (2016, March 28). The strategy behind the Islamic state’s destruction of ancient sites. New York Times. Retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com/ interactive/2015/06/29/world/middleeast/isis-historic-sites-control .html?_r=0. Atwood, R. (2004). Stealing history: Tomb raiders, smugglers, and the looting of the ancient world. New York: St. Martin’s Press. Baker, A. (2012, September 12). Syria’s looted past: How ancient artifacts are being traded for guns. Time. Retrieved from http://world.time.com/2012/09/12/ syrias-looted-past-how-ancient-artifacts-are-being-traded-for-guns/. Becatoros, E. (2008, March 19). Smuggled antiquities funding Iraq extremists, U.S. says. National Geographic News. Retrieved from http://news.nationalgeo graphic.com/news/2008/03/080319-AP-iraq-insurg.html. Bernick, L. (1998). Art and antiquities theft. Transnational Organized Crime, 4, 91–116. Bogdanos, M. (2011, July 7). Illegal antiquities trade funs terrorism. Retrieved from http://www.cnn.com/2011/WORLD/meast/07/07/iraq.looting.bogdanos/. Bowman, B. A. (2008). Transnational crimes against culture: Looting at archaeological sites and the “grey” market in antiquities. Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice, 24, 225–242. Brodie, N. (2011). Congenial bedfellows? The academy and the antiquities trade. Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice, 27, 411–440. Brodie, N., Doole, J., & Watson, P. (2000). Stealing history: The illicit trade in cultural material. Cambridge, MA: The McDonald Institute for Archaeological Research. Brodie, N., Kersel, M., Luke, C., & Tubb, K. (Eds.). (2006). Archaeology, cultural heritage, and the antiquities trade. Gainesville, FL: University Press of Florida. Brodie, N., & Tubb, K. (Eds.). (2002). Illicit antiquities: The theft of culture and the extinction of archaeology. London: Routledge. Carducci, G. (2006). The growing complexity of international art law: Conflict of laws, uniform law, mandatory rules, UNSC resolutions and EU regulations. In B. Hoffman (Ed.), Art & cultural heritage: Law, policy & practice (pp. 68–86). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Chippindale, C., & Gill, D. (2000). Material consequences of contemporary classical collecting. American Journal of Archaeology, 104, 463–511.

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Coggins, C. (1969). Illicit traffic in pre-Columbian antiquities. Art Journal, 29, 94–114. Cole, T. (2015, August 25). Room 406. The New Inquiry. Retrieved from http://the newinquiry.com/blogs/dtake/room-406-2/. Deknatel, F. (2015, August 31). The Islamic state is destroying more than Syria’s past in Palmyra. World Politics Review. Retrieved from http://www.worldpoli ticsreview.com/trend-lines/16578/the-islamic-state-is-destroying-morethan-syrias-past-in-palmyra. de la Torre, L. (2006, February 20). Terrorists raise cash by selling antiquities. Government Security News, 4. Retrieved from http://www.gsnmagazine.com/ pdfs/38_Feb_06.pdf. Dietzler, J. (2013). On “organized crime” in the illicit antiquities trade: Moving beyond the definitional debate. Trends in Organized Crime, 16, 329–342. Drake, C. (2008, January 28). Italy awaits biggest ever trial of tomb robbers. Art Newspaper. Retrieved from http://www.theartnewspaper.com/article.asp? id=7375. DuBoff, L., Burr, S., & Murray, M. (2004). Art law: Cases and materials. Buffalo, NY: William Hein Publishing. Edwards, A., & Gill, P. (2002). Crime as enterprise? The case of transnational organised crime. Crime, Law & Social Change, 37, 203–223. Efrat, A. (2009). Protecting against plunder: The United States and the international efforts against looting of antiquities. Cornell Law Faculty Working Papers, Paper 47. Retrieved from http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/clsops_papers/47. Elia, R. (2001). Analysis of the looting, selling, and collecting of Apulian red figure vases: A quantitative approach. In N. Brodie, J. Doole, & C. Renfrew (Eds.), Trade in illicit antiquities: The destruction of the world’s archaeological heritage (pp. 145–153). Cambridge, UK: McDonald Institute for Archaeological Research. Federal Bureau of Investigation. (2008). Theft notices & recoveries. Retrieved from https://www2.fbi.gov/hq/cid/arttheft/noticerecov.htm. Fidler, S. (2003, May 24). A black art: How the trade in stolen artifacts aids money laundering, organized crime, and terrorism. Financial Times. Retrieved from http://search.ft.com/ftArticle?queryText=fidler+a+black+art&aje=true&id= 030523006091&ct=0&nclick_check=1. Gerstenblith, P. (2004). Art, cultural heritage, and the law: Cases & materials. Durham, NC: Carolina Academic Press. Gilgan, E. (2001). Looting and the market for Maya objects: A Belizean perspective. In N. Brodie, J. Doole, & C. Renfrew (Eds.), Trade in illicit antiquities: The destruction of the world’s archaeological heritage (pp. 73–87). Cambridge, UK: McDonald Institute for Archaeological Research. Gill, D., & Chippindale, C. (1993). Material and intellectual consequences of esteem for Cycladic figures. American Journal of Archaeology, 97, 602–673. Godart, L., & De Caro, S. (Eds.). (2007). Nostoi: Capolavori ritrovati. Roma: Segretariato Generale della Presidenza della Repubblica. Gutchen, M. (1983). The destruction of archaeological resources in Belize, Central America. Journal of Field Archaeology, 10, 217–227. Kaplan, D. (2005, November 27). How jihadist groups are using organized-crime tactics—and profits—to finance attacks on targets around the globe. US News & World Report. Retrieved from http://www.usnews.com/usnews/ news/articles/051205/5terror_4.htm.

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Luck, T. (2013, February 12). Syrian rebels loot artifacts to raise money for fight against Assad. Washington Post. Retrieved from https://www.washington post.com/world/middle_east/syrian-rebels-loot-artifacts-to-raise-moneyfor-fight-against-assad/2013/02/12/ae0cf01e-6ede-11e2-8b8d-e0b59a1b 8e2a_story.html. Luke, C., & Henderson, J. (2006). The plunder of the Ulua valley, Honduras, and a market analysis for its antiquities. In N. Brodie, M. Kersel, C. Luke, & K. Tubb (Eds.), Archaeology, cultural heritage, and the antiquities trade (pp. 147–172). Gainesville, FL: University Press of Florida. Mackenzie, S. R. M. (2005). Going, going, gone: Regulating the market in illicit antiquities. Leicester: Institute of Art and Law. McCalister, A. (2005). Organized crime and the theft of Iraqi antiquities. Trends in Organized Crime, 9, 24–37. McManamon, F., & Morton, S. (2000). Reducing illegal trafficking in antiquities. In F. McManamon & A. Hatton (Eds.), Cultural resource management in contemporary society: Perspectives on managing and presenting the past (pp. 247–341). Abingdon, UK: Taylor & Francis. Meyer, K. (1973). The plundered past. New York: Atheneum. Nørskov, V. (2002). Greek vases for sale: Some statistical evidence. In N. Brodie & K. Tubb (Eds.), Illicit antiquities: The theft of culture and the extinction of archaeology (pp. 23–37). London: Routledge. Papa Sokal, M. (2006). Antiquities collecting and the looting of archaeological sites. Retrieved from http://www.savingantiquities.org/pdf/PapaSokal_Antiqui ties.pdf. Paredes Maury, S. (1999). Surviving in the rainforest: The realities of looting in the rural villages of el Peten, Guatemala. Foundation for the Advancement of MesoAmerican Studies (FAMSI). Retrieved from http://www.famsi.org/reports/ 95096/index.html. Passas, N. (1998). Globalization and transnational organized crime: The effects of criminogenic asymmetries. Transnational Organized Crime, 4, 22-56. Passas, N., & Proulx, B. B. (2011). Overview of crimes and antiquities. In S. Manacorda & D. Chappell (Eds.), Crime in the art and antiquities world: Illegal activities in cultural property and criminal policy responses (pp. 51–67). New York: Springer. Pendergast, D. (1991). And the loot goes on: Winning some battles but not the war. Journal of Field Archaeology, 18, 89–96. Proulx, B. B. (2011). Drugs, arms, and arrowheads: Theft from archaeological sites and the dangers of fieldwork. Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice, 27(4), 500–522. Proulx, B. B. (2013). Looting at archaeological sites in “global” perspective: Nature, scope, & frequency of the problem. American Journal of Archaeology, 117, 111–125. Roosevelt, C., & Luke, C. (2006). Looting Lydia: The destruction of an archaeological landscape in western Turkey. In N. Brodie, M. Kersel, C. Luke, & K. Tubb (Eds.), Archaeology, cultural heritage, and the antiquities trade (pp. 173–187). Gainesville, FL: University Press of Florida. Rose, M. (1998). Backflap sting. Archaeology, 51. Retrieved from http://www.archae ology.org/9809/news-briefs/backflap/html.

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Ruggiero, V. (1997). Criminals and service providers: Cross-national dirty economies. Crime, Law and Social Change, 28(1), 27-38. Tijhuis, E. (2006). Transnational crime and the interface between legal and illegal factors: The case of the illicit art and antiquities trade. Nijmegen, The Netherlands: Wolf Legal Publishers. Tomkiw, L. (2015, August 31). Islamic state Palmyra attack: All the cultural heritage sites SIS has destroyed in Iraq and Syria. International Business Times. Retrieved from http://www.ibtimes.com/islamic-state-palmyra-attack-allcultural-heritage-sites-isis-has-destroyed-iraq-2076059. van Duyne, P., von Lampe, K., & Passas, N. (Eds.) (2002). Upperworld and underworld in cross-border crime. Nijmegen, The Netherlands: Wolf Legal Publishers. Watson, P. (2006). The Medici conspiracy: The illicit journey of looted antiquities from Italy’s tomb raiders to the world’s greatest museums. New York: Public Affairs.

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CHAPTER 5

Wildlife Crime and Security Daan P. van Uhm

“Organized crime networks behind ivory and rhino horn trafficking,” headlined a recent announcement from Interpol1; Wildlife trafficking is organized crime on a “massive scale,” warns UNODC head2; It’s time to get serious about wildlife crime, UN proclaims on World Wildlife Day.3

Today, everyone is aware of the worldwide destruction of the environment. The global deforestation, oil dumping, global warming, and the mass extinction of species have become much-discussed environmental issues in the 21st century. The heavy impact of poaching on iconic species such as elephants, tigers, and rhinoceros is broadly highlighted by global concerns of the international community. The destructiveness of wildlife crimes is reflected by increased poaching levels of rhinoceros in South Africa from 13 animals in 2007 to 1,215 in 2014 (9,000%). The horns of these animals are highly valuable and smuggled by transnational criminal groups to fuel the demand market in Asia. This example illustrates that illegal wildlife trade involves the movement of wildlife species across borders and is therefore a typical form of transnational crime. The illegal wildlife trade as used here refers to the illegal trade, smuggling, poaching, capture, or collection of endangered species, or products thereof. As a transnational crime, the illegal wildlife market involves multiple source, transit, and destination countries. This chapter4 provides contemporary insight in wildlife crime as worldwide transnational crime and concludes with a discussion about related harms and global security issues. GLOBALIZATION AND DEFAUNATION The wildlife trade is not a new phenomenon, as there has always been a market for animals as sources for food and clothing, as companions or

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pets, or as strange and curious objects (Alexander, 1979). The earliest civilizations are linked to trade in live animals and parts thereof, from the Egyptian pharaohs to aristocrats in the modern era. While animal populations declined already in times of the Roman and Greek Empires, the situation changed significantly in the “age of exploration” where in the context of imperialism and colonialism wildlife populations substantially reduced in Africa and Asia (Van Uhm, 2016a). The technological innovation as an outcome of the Industrial Revolution made an extremely large structural trade in wildlife products possible from the 19th century on. Simultaneously, due to the overall growth of the economy and prosperity in the Global North, large demand markets for exotic animals and products thereof emerged and this was met by trade based on technological innovations in transportation (e.g., rapid airline travel) and communication (e.g., the Internet) (Collard, 2014; Van Uhm, 2016a). In other words, the globalization of world’s economy with the reduction of borders, improved infrastructure, and advanced technological developments has provided opportunities for wildlife trafficking (Haken, 2011). The current size and scale of the trade seems to be more immense than ever before (Nellemann et al., 2014). After the five mass extinctions on Earth that were caused by meteorite impacts, volcanic activity, and largescale climate change, several scientists predict that we are currently at the beginning of the sixth mass extinction of species (e.g., Barnosky et al., 2011; Butchart et al., 2010; Dirzo et al., 2014; Leakey & Lewin, 1995; May, Lawton, & Stork, 1995; Pimm, Russell, Gittleman, & Brooks, 1995).5 It has been estimated that between 17,000 and 100,000 species vanish from our planet each year (Dirzo et al., 2014; Leakey & Lewin, 1995; Wilson, 1993). The global defaunation6 is illustrated by as much as 16 to 33 percent of all vertebrate species that are threatened or endangered (Hoffmann et al., 2010). For instance, numbers as high as 26–37 percent of mammals, 17 percent of birds, 38 percent of chameleons, 31 percent of sharks and rays, 33 percent of reef-forming corals, and 41–56 percent of amphibians experience threat levels (IUCN, 2014). While habitat loss and defragmentation is the main threat, the trade in wildlife has become the second hazard to biodiversity (Zimmerman, 2003). Unfortunately, the more a species is threatened with extinction, the higher its value (Courchamp et al., 2006). That the current economic value of rhino horn on the black market exceeds the price of gold and cocaine confirms this assumption (Van Uhm, 2012). This is especially true since the “originality” of wildlife products also plays a role in the determination of their value. The value of an object is not an inherent quality but a valuation of the object (Simmel, 1978). The idea has taken hold that wildlife products from wild animals are more “pure and natural” than products from captive-bred species (e.g., Zhang & Chin, 2008). For instance, the value of rhino horn, tiger bones, and caviar from species from the wild is

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higher due to the belief that the taste would be more exquisite or the healing qualities more profound (Van Uhm, 2016a). Therefore, thousands of wild animals are traded to both local and global markets (Petrossian, Pires, & Van Uhm, 2016; Sollund & Maher, 2015; Van Uhm, 2016b). Generally, the source countries for the trade in wildlife include some of the poorest countries with the richest sources of biodiversity. Several studies identified African and Southeast Asian countries as the main source countries for the wildlife trade (Rosen & Smith, 2010; UNODC, 2010; World Bank, 2008; Lawson & Vines, 2014). Confiscation data of more than 20,000 seizures in the European Union (EU) confirmed that illegal wildlife shipments originated mainly from African and Southeast Asian countries (Van Uhm, 2016b). Indeed, the process of globalization provides not only opportunities for legal corporations but also for criminal activities (Aas, 2007). Imperialism and Criminalization In the 19th and 20th centuries, the criminalization process of wildlife trafficking emerged when the extinction of increasing numbers of animal species was well noted, (e.g., Harper, 1942). In this period of time, several organizations were developed for the conservation of species and nature, including the Sierra Club in North America and the National Trust in the United Kingdom (Van der Heijden, 2004).7 These members were fascinated by the relationship between humans and nature, and conservation was strongly linked to European exploration, trade and expansion in the world to gain power and access to exclusive exotic products as privileged domains of the aristocracy. According to several authors, imperialism and wildlife conservation were strongly interconnected (e.g., Grove, 1995; MacKenzie, 1988). For instance, MacKenzie (1988) underlined that conservation efforts were developed, because it was important to maintain animals for hunting in the colonies by Western elites (MacKenzie, 1988). Within that context, the first environmental protection agreements were developed to reduce environmental degradation and control overhunting and poaching (Roe et al., 2002). Despite the efforts of these conservation organizations, measures to reduce the trade in endangered species were obstructed for a long time by strong economic and industrial interests (Nadelmann, 1990). However, in 1948, governments, international organizations, and national conservation organizations came together to launch the first global conservation network, called the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) (Christoffersen, 1994). Public awareness seriously increased due to the international wave of environmental protest movements in the 1960s and 1970s. These were strengthened by authoritative groups (e.g., the Club of Rome) that warned against the impact that economic growth would have on the environment (Benton, 1998). Due to growing concerns

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regarding the scale of species extinction, in 1973, the multilateral treaty, the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES), has been developed after an adopted resolution by the IUCN. CITES has become the major international legal framework that regulates the trade in more than 35,000 animals and plants through CITES permits. In the convention, 183 countries agreed to participate and to establish legislation and regulations to adhering to the rules laid down in the convention. This licensing system consists of three appendices that define the number of allowed wildlife trade of specific species and the required permits for the trade: • Appendix I species cannot be traded internationally, with the exception of the trade for scientific exchange, breeding or educational programmes, and in these cases, the trade must be accompanied by both an import and export permit. • Appendix II species can be traded with an export permit, but are subject to quotas so that the trade will not be detrimental to the survival of the species in the wild. • Appendix III species can be traded when accompanied by an export permit and a certificate of origin (Petrossian et al., 2016).

The effect of CITES has been discussed as several CITES II species have become more endangered, resulting in this species being elevated in CITES (from CITES II to I). Moreover, each year the lists of CITES increase, because more species become threatened with extinction due to the harmful trade (Jenkins, 2000).8 In addition to increasing numbers of species on CITES, the UN Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice agreed recently that illegal wildlife trade should be treated as a “serious crime” (Article 2b), an offence punishable by a maximum deprivation of liberty of at least four years or a more serious penalty. Estimates place the global wildlife crime at US$10–25 billion annually (Gagnier, 2013; INTERPOL, 2012; Liddick, 2011; McMurray, 2008), and it is believed that the illegal wildlife industry has become one of the most profitable black markets worldwide, third only to the drug trade and trade in arms in profit (Liddick, 2011; UNODC, 2012; Wyatt, 2013). The UN countries are currently encouraged to ensure that they adapt their sentences so that a custodial sentence of four years or more can be imposed in the context of the illegal trade in wildlife.9 Thus, the wildlife trade has become criminalized in a relatively short period of time. Wildlife Mafia and Green-Collar Corporations Different types of offenders have been identified in the illegal trade in wildlife, from perpetrators operating individually to highly organized

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networks that control some or all facets of a particular trade. A range of offenders could be involved along the illicit chain of the trade in wildlife, from local poachers, middlemen, and smugglers to state or private corporations and corrupt officials (Kazmar, 2000; Sollund, 2013; Wyatt, 2013; Zimmerman, 2003). There are subsistence poachers who rely on natural resources for food or small income or opportunistic poachers who are active in poaching because the opportunity is available. There are smugglers who move wildlife across the borders but also those people who are overseeing and coordinating parts of wildlife trafficking. There are corporations involved in the illegal trade that use their legal infrastructure to transfer wildlife and there are criminal organizations that use corrupt officials, helicopters, and AK-47s to protect their business (Van Uhm, 2016a). In other words, some offenders might be considered relatively “blameless” local people who kill endangered species for food or low profits, while organized criminal groups dominate the entire process and make really high profits (Wyatt, 2013). There appear to be three types of illegal traders that have been regularly found: 1. Small-scale illegal traders 2. Legal traders involved in illegal trade 3. Criminal organizations

Confiscations of wildlife illustrate that incidents vary from one single product to high numbers of illegal wildlife in cargo. On the one hand, tourists can unknowingly bring illegal wildlife souvenirs, such as one or two shells or coral, from their holiday destination or small-scale illegal opportunists may bring a relatively small amount of wildlife illegally across the borders to reduce their holiday costs; on the other hand, legal enterprises and crime groups can transfer substantial amounts of highly profitable wildlife across the borders (Van Uhm, 2016a). Analyses of 10 years of seizures in the EU revealed that jobs of the offenders often consisted of animal traders, zoo- and wildlife park owners, wildlife breeders, and liberal professionals (Van Uhm, 2016b). Crimes committed by business entities or individuals within the company are defined respectively as corporate crime and white-collar crime (Braithwaite, 1984; Hoefnagels, 1981; Sutherland, 1949). The term “dirty-collar crimes” or “green-collar crimes” has been introduced to underline the role of legally registered companies in the illegal activities of environmental crime (Barrett, 1997; O’Hear, 2004; Ruggiero & South, 2010; Wolf, 2011). Indeed, a large proportion of the recorded wildlife offenders (> 30%) trade legally in wildlife, which seems to confirm the backgrounds of these “green-collar crime” offenders (Van Uhm, 2016b). The involvement of organized crime, such as Chinese, Japanese, Italian, and Russian organized crime groups in the wildlife trade, has been

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put forward already in the early 2000s by several UN reports. Chinese Triads, such as the Wo Shing Wo group and 14K, were connected to smuggling ivory, rhino horn, and shark fin. The Neapolitan Mafia was said to be behind the illegal trading of endangered parrots and Russian organized crime seemed to be involved in the illegal trade in caviar as well as tiger and bear poaching (ECOSOC, 2002, 2003; Søyland, 2000; Van Uhm, 2012; Wyler & Sheikh, 2008). Furthermore, the Yakuza was linked to the illicit trade in whale meat, the Colombian Medellin cartel was involved in the business of illegal parrots and reptiles, while the Cali drug cartel in Colombia smuggled combined shipments of wildlife and drugs (ECOSOC, 2002; Kazmar, 2000). In recent years, evidence of the involvement of organized crime in the wildlife trade has increased. A few examples include Chinese organized crime groups in Hong Kong that were involved in the trade in traditional Chines medicine based on illegal species to several companies across the EU (Europol, 2011), highly organized crime groups in Africa would exchange illegally poached ivory for weapons (Wyler & Sheikh, 2008), and an Irish mobile organized crime group (the Rathkeale Rovers) has been active in stealing many rhino horns from European museums and sell those horns to Southeast Asian middlemen (Ayling, 2013; Van Uhm, 2012). According to police organizations, the involvement of transnational organized crime in wildlife trafficking is increasing due to the high prices paid for endangered species that are on the brink of extinction, the low risk and the ability to incorporate this type of trade with other types of contraband (Europol, 2013; Zimmerman, 2003). Smuggling and Laundering Wildlife traffickers are very creative illustrated by a large variety of modus operandi being used to get endangered species to their final destination: from body packing to smuggling eggs in underwear, iguanas hidden in prosthetic legs, and birds in leg bags to containers used for large-scale imports of ivory in hidden compartments, frogs in film canisters, and smoked monkeys hidden under declared food imports. Other examples include parrots that have been smuggled behind the backseats of personal vehicles, pangolins as cargo, and caviar hidden in the tyre well of a vehicle. In order to disguise the wildlife contraband, seahorses were declared as plant material, stony coral camouflaged with spray paint, rhino horns disguised as wood products, and reptiles declared to be didgeridoos (INTERPOL, 2010; Van Uhm, 2016a). Wildlife crime networks not only use sophisticated methods similar to that of drug traffickers (Elliott, 2011; South & Wyatt, 2011; Warchol, Zupan, & Clack, 2003), wildlife is also smuggled along with other contraband (e.g., Speart, 1993; Wyler & Sheikh, 2008).10 Dead animals are used to conceal drugs, live animals are used as drug carriers, or animals

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or products thereof are used as barter (Renctas, 2001; Sollund & Maher, 2015; South & Wyatt, 2011; Zimmerman, 2003). Criminal groups smuggled cocaine wrapped in condoms and stuffed into boa constrictors (ECOSOC, 2002), elephant tusks have been confiscated with hashish inside, and exotic birds have been seized in shipments of methamphetamine pills (Wyler & Sheikh, 2008). In addition, the same routes are used as those that are used in the drugs, human and weapons trade (e.g., Nellemann et al., 2014; Zimmerman, 2003). Besides smuggling wildlife, a substantial amount of reports underline possibilities to launder wildlife. Laundering generally refers to the process by which money obtained from illegal business activities is transformed into legitimate money (Levi & Reuter, 2006). In other words, “money laundering is the conversion of criminal incomes into assets that cannot be traced back to the underlying crime” (Reuter, 2004, p. 1). Therefore, the origin of money obtained from illegal activities needs to be disguised as deriving from legal activities so that financial institutions accept it without suspicion. During the process of laundering wildlife, the illegal origin of an animal or animal product is concealed as well. For example, wildlife is declared as being a legally obtained product in order to obtain documents that prove its legality. Globally, increasing numbers of investigations indicate that for many species, this may very well be the case (e.g., Engler & Parry-Jones, 2007; Nijman, Shepherd, & van Balen, 2009; Vinke & Vinke, 2010). For instance, many species may have been captured as juvenile wild animals and misdeclared as captive-bred as it is extremely difficult to differentiate between captive-bred and wild animals. Nijman and Shepherd (2009) and Lyons and Natusch (2011) described substantial discrepancies between the annual exported number of reptiles and the number of reptiles capable of being produced by Indonesian breeding farms from Indonesia to illustrate the opportunities for wildlife laundering by those farms. A similar issue has been put forward by Knapp, Kitschke, and Meibom (2006); Sellar (2014); and Van Uhm and Siegel (2016) in relation to animal products. These authors highlight the possibility to launder illegally sourced caviar through aquaculture operations of sturgeons. For instance, wild-caught sturgeons for breeding purposes are not released or caviar from wild sturgeons will be sold as produced in fish farms (Jahrl, 2013; Kecse-Nagy, 2011; Sellar, 2014). FLOWS OF ILLEGAL WILDLIFE The demand for endangered species reflects the illegal trade in a large variety of wildlife species. Live birds and reptiles are illegally traded to fuel the demand of the pet industry in the West, animal products such as rhino horns and tiger bones are widely used in traditional Chinese medicine in Asia, reptile skins are destined to the leather industry, caviar is

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illegally traded as a delicacy both in Europe and the United States, and animal skins are used as fashion accessories (Sollund & Maher, 2015; Van Uhm, 2016a; Wyatt, 2013). The illegal wildlife trade appears to flow from developing to developed countries (Duffy, 2010; Roe et al., 2002).11 Europe and the United States are recognized as being the major outlets and transit regions (Haken, 2011).12 Although a large part of the illegal trade in wildlife remains hidden, the dark number,13 due to low priority in law enforcement, seizures of major outlets in the United States and the EU can provide a general overview of the visible illegal trade. Based on two studies that analyzed more than 40,000 seizures (N = 40,113) in the United States (Petrossian et al., 2016) and over 20,000 seizures (N = 22,204) in the EU (Van Uhm, 2016b), general flows of illegal wildlife trade can be identified. In particular, Southeast Asia appears to be a very important source area, with China within the top three as source country of illegal wildlife (Petrossian et al., 2016; Van Uhm, 2016b). In these studies, the following six major groups were categorized: mammals, birds, reptiles, fish, coral, and mollusks (Figure 5.1), because they represented around 95 percent of the incidents.14 Both studies revealed that reptiles dominate the figures (U.S.: 29%, EU: 33% of the seizures) and not live animals but animal products are responsible for the majority of confiscations (U.S.: 95%, EU: 81% of the seizures) (Petrossian et al., 2016; Van Uhm, 2016b).

Figure 5.1 Proportion (%) of Animal Groups in Seizures in the EU (2001–2010) and the United States (2003–2012) (Personal analyses based on Van Uhm, 2016b and Petrossian et al., 2016)

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The majority of the illegal reptile products consist of leather products from crocodiles and pythons, the mammal products were regularly linked to elephant ivory and big cat, bear and hoofed mammal products to be used in traditional Asian medicine. Bird products were mainly based on feathers from parrots and eagles, while fish products were clearly dominated by illegal caviar. The category coral included primarily stoney and hard corals and mollusks referred to clams and conchs (Petrossian et al., 2016; Van Uhm, 2016b). Seizures of live animals were dominated by confiscations of live reptiles, including tortoises, chameleons, turtles, and snakes and live birds consisted of parrots, songbirds, and birds of prey. Noteworthy is that most seized corals in the United States were recorded as live specimen, while in the EU those were recorded as dead specimen (Petrossian et al., 2016; Van Uhm, 2016b).15 The unique characteristics of specific wildlife products would make them suitable targets. For example, a transporter will be more interested in a parrot when the animal is concealable (Moreto & Lemieux, 2014). These figures show that a large variety of species represent the illegal trade in wildlife. The next sections present three case studies of wildlife crime to illustrate how the criminal networks operate to fuel the demand. Case Study 1: Crime to Cure The use of traditional Chinese medicine (TCM) has existed for thousands of years and is deeply rooted in Chinese society. In the context of Chinese migration and growing markets from the West, the TCM market has developed into a lucrative drug industry (Schroeder, 2002). However, not all medicines are legal; some illegal medicines contain sinister components, such as tiger bone, rhino horn, bear bile, pangolin scales, or saiga antelope horn. Many of those endangered species are illegally imported and because of the increased economic prosperity in China, more people can afford these wildlife products (e.g., Von Moltke & Spaninks, 2000; Van Uhm, 2014). However, due to increased demand, the species become rarer and the prices reach extremely high; the price of rhino horn is nowadays worth more than US$35,000 on the black market (Van Uhm, 2012). It’s believed that powder of the horn lowers fever and the recent peak in rhino horn poaching was connected to recent claims that rhino horn cures cancer (Traffic, 2011). These high prices also attracted organized criminal groups; helicopters, tranquilizers, gun silencers, night vision equipment are used by professional poaching groups that do not shrink back to shoot down rangers. Then the horns are smuggled to Hong Kong or Myanmar by “mules” or in containers by ships; rhino horn shipments are sometimes

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combined with drugs, weapons, or illegal timber. In Asia, the horns are then transferred to the final destination (Van Uhm, 2016a). The involvement of legally registered companies in the TCM business is noteworthy. Regularly, pharmacies and TCM doctors are connected to illegal entrepreneurs that arrange forbidden ingredients from endangered species (Van Uhm, 2016a). Another example is the Groenewald syndicate that alleged to have kept rhinos for conservation purposes for years, while actually the real purpose was the dehorning and killing of rhinos to make profits from the sale of their horns (Ayling, 2013; Rademeyer, 2012). There is also misuse of permits issued for hunting white rhinos. According to Rademeyer (2012), an international wildlife trafficking syndicate hired Thai prostitutes and strippers from clubs in Pretoria and Midrand to pose as “hunters” in sham rhino trophy hunts. Several authors (e.g., Hübschle, 2010; Montesh, 2013; Rademeyer, 2012) highlight that rhino crime syndicates are typically multinational operations that include other criminal activities such as trade in drugs, diamonds, humans, and other wildlife products, such as elephant ivory and abalone. Case Study 2: Monkey Business Keeping animals as pets is a worldwide phenomenon and another driver of the wildlife trade. A significant number of these animals are caught in the wild and a part thereof consists of illegal endangered species. While one of the most famous examples is the illegal trade in Great Apes (e.g., chimpanzees and orangutans), the most seized endangered mammal in the EU consist of a lesser-known monkey species, the Barbary macaque, that is at least as threatened with an estimated wild population of several thousand individuals (Majolo et al., 2013; Van Uhm, 2016c). From this relatively small population, hundreds of baby monkeys are estimated to be smuggled from Morocco to the pet industry in the EU (Van Uhm, 2016c). The poachers operate anywhere for between €50 and €100 per monkey for additional earnings. They target young monkeys because they get used to people better than older ones and are easier to smuggle in suitcases or bags. Then the monkeys are smuggled from Morocco across the Strait of Gibraltar into Europe (Van Uhm, 2016c). To hide live monkeys and to keep them alive during the smuggling process requires systematic planning and logistics (Stiles et al., 2013). In order to keep the macaque quiet and to decrease the macaque’s stress levels, the monkeys are anesthetized with a sleeping aid for children (Van Uhm, 2016c). Although it was formally believed that the trade was loosely based on the tourist industry, even in this form of wildlife trade a relatively high degree of (criminal) organization was found. The organized traders have a network with several legal and illegal actors to transfer the Barbary macaques various times a year as a financial business. Certain

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networks can even deliver more than 50 monkeys to Europe each year where they earn around 2,000 euro per animal. In order to carry out this opportunistic trade, these networks use their contacts with legal actors such as truck drivers and corrupt officials to transfer the wildlife (Van Uhm, 2016c). Case Study 3: Black Caviar Wildlife is also traded as luxury food. The demand for caviar has a long and rich history, from the food of the poor to a delicacy for the upper classes in Europe. Historically, the symbolic value of caviar—unfertilized sturgeon roe—is determined in the context of changing social, political, and environmental circumstances. The poaching exploded in the 1990s with the dissolution of the Soviet Union, due to which poor local people became unemployed and resorted to poaching (Birstein, Bemis, & Waldman, 1997; Shadrina, 2007). Consequently, the sturgeon, as one of the oldest families of fish, have become the most endangered group of animals on the Red List of endangered species (IUCN, 2010). The low standard of living in Dagestan in Russia, a major source of illegal caviar, makes the business attractive for organized crime. Senior government officials, fishery inspectors, police services, and other agencies would all have a stake in the business (Van Uhm & Siegel, 2016). Militias of the republics or criminal groups sometimes even protect the poachers during conflicts with the federal authorities; they use “security vessels” to escort the poachers and to distract the police. Every illegal boat trip supposedly costs around US$800–1,500 in bribes to officials in Dagestan (Nellemann et al., 2014; Van Uhm & Siegel, 2016). The smugglers hide the caviar in special compartments in their cars, in refrigerated trucks, or with the help of corrupt airport employees. A well-known smuggling route from the Caspian Sea by surface to Europe is by road through Moscow and mostly via Poland to Hamburg in Germany (Van Uhm & Siegel, 2016). The interrelationship between the police and the poachers has resulted in numerous conflicts. The use of violence and counterstrategies are not uncommon in the caviar business illustrated by numerous reports of gunfights between fishery inspectors, border guards, and poachers in Dagestan and Kazakhstan (Lagutov, 2007). For instance, at the end of the 1990s, an apartment building that was occupied by members of the fishery police was bombed in Kaspiysk, a town in Dagestan, and kidnappings and killings took place in the 2000s. Not only in Russia but also in European countries, violence and counterstrategies are being used by criminal groups. After confiscations of large volumes of illegal caviar from Russia in the Netherlands, more than once Russians threatened and intimidated law enforcers and claimed their caviar (Van Uhm & Siegel, 2016). These criminal networks manifest themselves at all levels of the trade: from

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the poaching areas where organized criminal groups cooperate with law enforcers and possess top-notch equipment to major smuggling operations in the hands of sophisticated criminal networks. Poverty, Corruption, and Priority The previous case studies illustrate that the market for wildlife consist of a diverse and transnational market that attracts criminal groups. It is known that organized crime thrives well in weak states and in regions where the government fails to effectively apply the monopoly of violence (Bovenkerk, 2001). For example, endangered species used in traditional Chinese medicine are smuggled through the Golden Triangle in Southeast Asia, one of the most underdeveloped areas in the region, sturgeon fishing takes place in Dagestan in the Caucasus, which has a high rate of conflict and unemployment, while live monkeys are smuggled through the Rif Mountains in northern Morocco that is traditionally known as “smugglers’ paradise” in the context of poverty. It is not strange that in such areas criminal groups are active and overlaps with other forms of crime occur (Van Uhm, 2016a). The Caucasus is an important region for weapons, drugs and human trafficking (e.g., Arasli, 2007), the Rif Mountains is known as the gateway of Europe in relation to the smuggling of hashish and immigrants (e.g., Lehtinen, 2008; Soddu, 2006), and the Golden Triangle is notorious for the booming opium trade (e.g., Zhang & Chin, 2011). For instance, more priority on drugs in the Golden Triangle resulted in a shift to the wildlife trade (Van Uhm, 2016a). Additionally, source countries with rich biodiversity density on average experience lower development levels and higher levels of corruption; “the presence of many natural resources correlates with crime and violence,” fittingly named as “the resource curse” (Boekhout van Solinge, 2014, p. 501). Corruption seems to play a major role in wildlife trafficking (Van Uhm & Moreto, 2017). Bribing officials to poach illegally on sturgeons appears to be a common practice, while corrupt border officials in Morocco play a role in passing illegal wildlife trade into the EU (Van Uhm, 2016c; Van Uhm & Siegel, 2016). However, according to Siegel (2011, p. 207) “corruption, which in the Western world is commonly considered an abuse of public office for private gains, has elusive meanings in the non-Western world and it is often difficult to achieve moral clarity.” For example, in China, the cultural practice of gua¯nxì is the basic dynamic in Chinese personalized networks of influence and refers to favours gained from social connections. This provides a familiar framework for illegal businesses with low penetrability as it creates an effective insider-outsider system (Myers, 1995; Van Uhm, 2016a). Finally, the markets for wildlife are attractive because of the high profits and low priority and sentences. For this reason, the wildlife trade has become professionalized in a relatively short period of time and criminal

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networks shift to wildlife trafficking (Van Uhm, 2016a). A lack of deterrent effect, poor expertise, under-resourcing, corruption, minimal international cooperation, and the lack of seriousness with which such crimes are viewed contribute to this lucrative black market (Nurse, 2015; Wellsmith, 2011; Wyatt, 2013). Thus, poverty has been a breeding ground for corruption and wildlife crime remains far from priority in comparison to other serious forms of crime. The next paragraph will discuss the impact of wildlife crime in relation to harms and security. DISCUSSION: CRIMES, HARMS, AND SECURITY Traditionally, the question of what is crime has challenged many criminologists. “Would there be any crime tomorrow if the criminal law was repealed today?” (Jeffery, 1956, p. 658). The answer is ambiguous as the social construction of crime is dependent on the legal definitions of criminal behavior defined by lawmakers and politicians (Hulsman, 1986). Definitions of crime may change over the course of time in the context of changing norms and morals (Becker, 1963). Consequently, there are harmful human activities that are not registered by law as being criminal in nature, while certain registered crimes are disputed (Brants, 2013). In the trade in wildlife many harmful activities, such as the global destruction of the environment and violent activities regarding animals, are not criminalized. Generally, natural resources are exploited without any regulation (Sollund & Maher, 2015; White, 2011; Wyatt, 2013). For this reason, green criminologists focus on environmental harm in general and the symbiosis between man and nature in particular (South, 1998). First, from an anthropocentric perspective the biological, mental, and moral superiority of humans are central. Because the poaching often takes place in underdeveloped regions where poor local people live from the natural resources in the forests, the wildlife trade can be harmful for these local communities (e.g., Duffy, 2010; Martin & Martin, 2006). They are indirect victims of a decline of natural resources (Wyatt, 2013). For example, local poachers of sturgeons in Russia complain that mafia groups use grenades to fish on sturgeons for caviar and therefore the entire ecosystem will be damaged (Van Uhm & Siegel, 2016). Additionally, the militarization of the wildlife trade can result in direct human victims on both sides during conflicts. Each year, dozens of rangers are killed during attacks by poachers worldwide (Wyler & Sheikh, 2008). Second, from an ecocentric perspective humans are not at the top of the food chain but rather a part of the global ecosystem and subject to ecological laws, though these ecosystems are rarely conceptualized or considered as victims of human activities (White, 2008, 2011). From this nature-centred perspective, the illegal trade can be harmful for the biodiversity and the balance in an ecosystem due to the complex symbiotic interaction between plants and animals (Kellert & Wilson, 1993; Mills, Soule, & Doak, 1993;

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Power et al., 1996). Especially the poaching of specific sexes of species or young animals can have disastrous effects on the population. For instance, the ratio of saiga antelope, due to poaching for the horns of male antelopes for TCM, is in certain populations as low as 5.7 percent males (Van Uhm, 2016a). Poachers of Barbary macaques focus on youngsters and this may explain the substantial decline in the numbers of juvenile macaques and females in the Middle Atlas between 2007 and 2009 (Van Uhm, 2016c). The poaching of female sturgeons with eggs for caviar results in female sturgeons making up only 15–17 percent of the total population in Russia (Van Uhm & Siegel, 2016). Moreover, small populations are especially vulnerable because of mate shortage or a limited genetic variety (Courchamp et al., 2006). The disappearance of those species may lead to reduction of other species and ecosystem instability (Lindsey, Masterson, Beck, & Romanach, 2012; Myers et al., 2007). Third, while animals are generally seen as human property (White, 2011), from a biocentric perspective human beings are simply “another species” that should be attributed similar moral worth (Sollund, 2008; Wyatt, 2013). Sollund (2013) highlights that nonhuman animals in the wildlife trade are kidnapped from their natural environment by methods that can cause injury and stress to the animal. Indeed, most endangered animals that are poached for the wildlife trade are killed to be traded as products. During poaching, certain activities may also be harmful; traps can cause injury and the saiga antelopes and rhinos are sometimes alive when their horns are removed. At the final destination, live animals often suffer in captivity (e.g., Agnew, 1998). From this biocentric perspective, at all stages harm to individual animals occurs; victimization within the illegal wildlife trade is illustrated starting with the poaching process and ending up with the final destination. The impact can also be illustrated in the context of several security issues in relation to wildlife trafficking. During the last century, the rate at which species became extinct was about 50–500 times higher than the “normal” extinction rate as can be derived based on the dating of fossils from the previous mass extinctions (Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, 2005). The complexity of the current decline of biodiversity and the effect of defaunation can be demonstrated by the sensibility of ecological interaction between animals and plants (Tudge, 2005; Wilson, 1993). As a result of the global defaunation, ecosystems may become unbalanced or could even collapse (Lindsey et al., 2012; Myers et al., 2007). Thus, these can threat ecosystems and ecosystem services and therefore environmental security. In addition, the growing volume of the global wildlife trade with rapid and cheap transportation, temporary storage facilities, and common network nodes increase the risk of transmitting infectious diseases (Burgos & Burgos, 2007). Examples of threats to health security include the outbreak of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) coronavirus that could be traced back to the relatively small trade in carnivores and bats. Ultimately,

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about 10,000 people were infected with 1,000 people dying and major global economic damage being caused (Smith, 2006). Another example is the global spread of the highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI bird flu) H5N1. Since 2003, 240 people, millions of poultry, and an unknown number of wild birds and mammals have been infected and died, including endangered species (Brooks-Moizer, Roberton, Edmunds, & Bell, 2008). Recently, the distribution of the Ebola virus in West Africa in 2014 is traced back to the trade in meat from infected fruit bats and monkeys with a total of 23,860 suspected cases and 9,675 deaths (WHO, 2015). Besides human health security, biosecurity is also threatened by transmission of zoonotic diseases in crops and livestock, native wildlife populations, and invasive alien species (Karesh, Cook, Bennett, & Newcomb, 2005). Furthermore, the wildlife trade contributes to issues in the area of livelihoods; in other words, economic security that refers to an assured basic income (Cao & Wyatt, 2016). Globalization provides opportunities for crime and produces new international inequalities, primarily between the Global South and the industrialized countries (Passas, 1999, 2000). For example, the exploitation of natural resources takes place in relatively poor source countries (e.g., in the last primeval forests of the Amazon and Congo basin). In these developing regions, rainforests are inhabited by millions of people who are dependent on wildlife resources of the rainforest, which disappear partly as a result of the wildlife trade (Roe, 2002; Boekhout van Solinge, 2010). Damaged ecosystems in a social sense are worthless when the habitat has disappeared and have a lower value in an economic sense because the natural resources are gone. Finally, the threat wildlife trade poses to the national security in countries worldwide. Currently, organized crime, terrorism, and corruption are linked to the illegal wildlife trade (Van Uhm, 2016a). According to Castells (1998), these aspects can threat state sovereignty and therefore a state can lose its legitimacy. As mentioned earlier, countries with rich biodiversity density on average experience higher levels of corruption and lower development levels that attract criminal groups. Moreover, organized crime has taken advantage of opportunities provided by the opening of borders worldwide (Aas, 2007). Furthermore, various reports highlighted to the possible involvement of “terrorist” groups, such as the Sudanese Janjaweed, the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), and the Somali Al Shabaab (Wyler & Sheikh, 2013). Thus, both the harms (anthropocentric, ecocentric, and biocentric harms) and security issues (environmental, health, bio, economic, and national security) show the significant social and environmental impact of the transnational crime of wildlife trafficking. CONCLUSION This chapter has provided a global overview of the diverse market of wildlife crimes. From tiger bone and rhino horn used in traditional medicine to live monkeys destined for the pet industry and black caviar

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consumed by the upper classes of society. Under the influence of industrialization, globalization, and criminalization, this transnational black market increased significantly. Moreover, the illegal market in wildlife has become a very lucrative underground market in the context of low priority, poor expertise, under-resourcing, and corruption. While increasing numbers of species becoming threatened with extinction, criminal groups emerge to target on these high-valued survivors. Wildlife crime is not only a serious transnational form of crime with profoundly negative impacts for endangered species, ecosystem stability, and local communities, but it has also become an increasing threat to national and global security. NOTES 1. INTERPOL, Organized crime networks behind ivory and rhino horn trafficking, May 4, 2016. 2. UNODC, Wildlife trafficking is organized crime on a “massive scale,” warns UNODC head, September 27, 2013. 3. United Nations, “It’s time to get serious about wildlife crime,” UN proclaims on World Wildlife Day, March 3, 2015. 4. The research results are part of the doctoral research by Daan van Uhm (2016a). 5. Previous extinction waves include generally one half of all animal species when at least one quarter and occasionally even all animal species disappeared (Myers, 1990). Contrary to the previous mass extinctions, in the current scenario humans seem to be causing the mass extinction by unbalancing nature (Barnosky et al., 2011). 6. “Defaunation” is the equivalent of deforestation and the term is used to refer to the loss of species, populations, and local declines in the abundance of individuals of wildlife (Dirzo et al., 2014). 7. Membership of those organizations was regularly restricted to hunters, fishermen, and a few social elite (Van der Heijden, 2004). 8. Other critics include that the convention was implemented without taking into account background problems in poor source countries to maintain their natural resources (Dickson, 2003). They pointed that CITES was an initiative by the Western world, while developing countries hardly realized what was going on (Van Spaandonk, 2000). 9. “CITES Secretary-General welcomes adoption of UN Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice draft resolution recognizing wildlife crime as a serious crime,” CITES, April 26, 2013. 10. In Brazil, around 40 percent of the wildlife smuggling rings (350–400) are suspected of being involved in other illegal businesses (e.g., drugs and precious stones) (Renctas, 2001), while in 1993 in the United States one-third of the cocaine confiscations were reported to be associated with wildlife imports (Alacs, Georges, FitzSimmons, & Robertson, 2010). 11. A well-known phenomenon occurs: while their finger is pointed at “those” corrupt source countries (Boekhout van Solinge, 2010), the illegal trade is actually driven by demand from the rich Northern countries (Passas, 2000).

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12. For instance, the EU appears to be one of the most important demand markets and facilitates transit of ivory, rhino horn, and pangolins from Africa to Asia and the Middle and Far East (IFAW, 2013; European Commission, 2014). 13. Law enforcement experts estimate that no more than 10 percent of all contraband wildlife is seized (Stiles et al., 2013). 14. United States: reptiles (29%), mammals (26%), molluscs (12%), birds (11%), coral (8%), and fish (8%) of the total number of seizure incidents, while in the EU: reptiles (33%), coral (20%), mammals (17%), molluscs (13%), fish (9%), and birds (7%) of the total number of seizure incidents. 15. The reliability of the data is entirely dependent on the accuracy at which the states report these data (Blundell & Mascia, 2005).

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Bovenkerk, F. (2001). Organized crime and ethnic minorities: Is there a link? In P. Williams & D. Vlassis (Eds.), Combating transnational crime: Concepts, activities and responses (pp. 109–126). London: Frank Cass. Braithwaite, J. (1984). Corporate crime in the pharmaceutical industry (Routledge Revivals). London: Routledge. Brants, C. (2013). De sociale constructive van criminaliteit. In M. Boone & C. Brants (Eds.), Criminologie en strafrecht (pp. 27–56). The Hague: Boom Lemma uitgevers. Brooks-Moizer, F., Roberton, S. I., Edmunds, K., & Bell, D. (2008). Avian influenza H5N1 and the wild bird trade in Hanoi, Vietnam. Ecology and Society, 14(1), 28. Burgos, S., & Burgos, S. A. (2007). Influence of exotic bird and wildlife trade on avian influenza transmission dynamics: Animal-Human interface. International Journal of Poultry Science, 6(7), 535–538. Butchart, S. H., Walpole, M., Collen, B., Van Strien, A., Scharlemann, J. P., Almond, R. E., . . . & Watson, R. (2010). Global biodiversity: Indicators of recent declines. Science, 328(5982), 1164–1168. Cao, A. N., & Wyatt, T. (2016). The conceptual compatibility between green criminology and human security: A proposed interdisciplinary framework for examinations into green victimisation. Critical Criminology, 24(3), 413–430. Castells, M. (1998). End of millennium: The information age: Economy, society, and culture. Oxford: Blackwell. Christoffersen, L. E. (1994). IUCN: A bridge-builder for nature conservation. In Green Globe YearBook 1997 (pp. 59–70). Oslo: Fridtjof Nansen Institute. Collard, R. C. M. S. (2014). Animal traffic: Making, remaking and unmaking commodities in global live wildlife trade. Vancouver: University of British Columbia. Courchamp, F., Angulo, E., Rivalan, P., Hall, R. J., Signoret, L., Bull, L., & Meinard, Y. (2006). Rarity value and species extinction: The anthropogenic Allee effect. PLoS Biology, 4(12), 2405–2510. Dickson, B. (2003). What is the goal of regulating wildlife trade? Is regulation a good way to achieve this goal? In S. Oldfiels (Ed.), The trade in wildlife: Regulation for conservation (pp. 23–32). London: Earthscan. Dirzo, R., Young, H. S., Galetti, M., Ceballos, G., Isaac, N. J., & Collen, B. (2014). Defaunation in the anthropocene. Science, 345(6195), 401–406. Duffy, R. (2010). Nature crime: How we’re getting conservation wrong. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Economic and Social Council United Nations. (2002). Progress made in the implementation of Economic and Social Council Resolution 2001/12 on illicit trafficking in protected species of wild flora and fauna. Retrieved from https://www.unodc .org/documents/commissions/CCPCJ/CCPCJ_Sessions/CCPCJ_11/ E-CN15–2002–07/E-CN15–2002–7_E.pdf. Economic and Social Council United Nations. (2003). Illicit trafficking in protected species of wild flora and fauna and illicit access to genetic resources, report of the Secretary-General (E/ CN.15/2003/8). Retrieved from https://www.unodc .org/pdf/crime/commissions/12_commission/8e.pdf. Elliott, L. (2011). Transnational environmental crime: Applying network theory to an investigation of illegal trade, criminal activity and law enforcement responses. Canberra: The Australian National University.

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Schroeder, T. (2002). Chinese regulation of traditional Chinese medicine in the modern world: Can the Chinese effectively profit from one of their most valuable cultural resources. Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal, 11, 687–716. Sellar, J. M. (2014). The UN’S lone ranger: Combating international wildlife crime. Dunbeath: Whittles. Shadrina, E. (2007). The great Caspian caviar game. Security Index: A Russian Journal on International Security, 13(1), 55–78. Siegel, D. (2011). Trafficking of conflict diamonds. In C. Smith, S. Zhang, & R. Barberet (Eds.), Routledge handbook of criminology (pp. 200–210). London: Routledge. Simmel, G. (1978). The philosophy of money. London: Routledge. Smith, R. D. (2006). Responding to global infectious disease outbreaks: Lessons from SARS on the role of risk perception, communication and management. Social Science & Medicine, 63, 3113–3123. Soddu, P. (2006). Ceuta and melilla: Security, human rights and frontier control. In Institut Europeu de la Mediterrània (Eds.), IEMED Mediterranean Yearbook Med (pp. 212–214). Barcelona: European Institute of the Mediterranean. Sollund, R. A. (Eds.). (2008). Global harms; ecological crime and speciesism. New York: Nova Science Publishers. Sollund, R. (2013). Animal trafficking and trade: Abuse and species injustice. In D. S. Westerhuis, R. Walters, & T. Wyatt (Eds.), Emerging issues in green criminology: Exploring power, justice and harm (pp. 72–92). Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Sollund, R., & Maher, J. (2015). The illegal wildlife trade: A case study report on the illegal wildlife trade in the United Kingdom, Norway, Colombia and Brazil. Oslo and Wales: University of Oslo and University of South Wales. South, N. (1998). A green field for criminology: A proposal for a perspective. Theoretical Criminology, 2(2), 211–233. South, N., & Wyatt, T. (2011). Comparing illicit trades in wildlife and drugs: An exploratory study. Deviant Behavior, 32(6), 538–561. Søyland, S. (2000). Criminal organisations and crimes against the environment—a desktop study. Turin: United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute. Speart, J. (1993). War within. Buzzworm, 5(4), 36–45. Stiles, D., Redmond, I., Cress, D., Nellemann, C., & Formo, R. K. (Eds.). (2013). Stolen apes—the illicit trade in chimpanzees, gorillas, bonobos and orangutans. A Rapid Response Assessment. United Nations Environment Programme. Arendal: GRID-Arendal. Sutherland, E. (1949). White collar crime. New York: Dryden Press. Traffic. (2011). Creative experts meeting on messaging to reduce consumer demand for tigers and other endangered wildlife species in Vietnam and China. Hong Kong: Traffic. Tudge, C. (2005). The tree: A natural history of what trees are, how they live, and why they matter. New York: Crown Publishers. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. (2010). The globalization of crime: A transnational organized crime threat assessment. Vienna: UNODC. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. (2012). Wildlife and forest crime analytic toolkit. New York: United Nations.

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CHAPTER 6

The Impact of Intellectual Property Violations on Economic Security Domestically and Globally Hedi Nasheri1

Intellectual property2 (IP) plays a significant role in today’s global economy, and it accounts for a major portion of our economy in the United States. As a society, we are surrounded by intellectual property in our daily lives, but yet the majority of people are unaware of the intellectual property they encounter minute to minute and hour by hour. They, in fact, for most part, don’t even understand its value and lack familiarity with the concept altogether. Owning property is a fundamental right that people are entitled to under most legal regimes around the world; however, when it comes to intellectual property, there is a lack of uniformity in laws and regulations across the world. In fact, some legal regimes do not have any laws or regulation in place to address intellectual property violations. In some countries, when there are statutory provisions, the rules are so outdated that they do not apply to ongoing current issues that arise in this area of the law. Often times even in more advanced legal systems, the existing legislation cannot keep up with the technological changes and the growing problem of IP theft. Another challenge in countries like the United States that do have somewhat an adequate legislation, the public perception of IP is at odds with the existing legal framework. For example, purchase of replica designer handbags or jewelry or articles of clothing is an acceptable practice and in fact often praised. From the public perception, switching logos, brand names, or copying trademarks are not considered as a

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criminal activity nor is the theft of information considered as a crime even though the existing legislation states otherwise. In reality, intellectual property theft should not be treated any differently than the theft of physical property, but yet it is. Countries, corporations, and private entities around the world devote tremendous resources, time, money, and energy toward research and development of products and proprietary economic information, which is the backbone of their businesses and in turn their economies. Misappropriation of proprietary information has a devastating impact on well-being of any economy that heavily relies on such information for their economic sustainability. This chapter provides the reader with a basic understanding of the role of intellectual property and its value in today’s global market. It further highlights why IP crimes have a major impact on economic security and sustainability of a nation-state and how it threatens national and global security. It is intended to provide an overview of the nature of the problem and make a recommendation for a set of necessary actions that can facilitate combating this criminal activity across the globe. COMPLEXITIES OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CRIMES United States is the number one producer of intellectual property, ideas, and products, and it has adopted relevant legislation and an established legal framework to address intellectual property crimes. Unfortunately, the same cannot be said about other advanced nations. Generally, the area of intellectual property law and policy is in a constant state of flux. Even in the United States with most legislative action and rules in place, still the legislative bodies, courts, and policy makers are constantly grappling with this area of law. Often times the existing laws and legislation lags behind the speed with which technological changes are taking place, not only in our society but globally as well, which complicates matters more for legislatives bodies and enforcement agencies. While violations of patents, copyrights, and trademarks are easier concepts to understand, detect, investigate, and prosecute, misappropriation of trade secrets3 is far more complicated and challenging. Trade secrets encompass manufacturing or industrial secrets and commercial secrets. The unauthorized use of such information by persons other than the right holder is regarded as an unfair practice and a violation of the trade secret.4 With the technological advances for the past several decades, protection of intellectual property from criminal groups and organizations has become a challenging task for all law enforcement agencies worldwide. It is beyond dispute that intellectual property theft provides a disincentive for new ideas that result in innovation in a given economy and puts businesses at risk and creates a disadvantage in maintaining their

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competitiveness on the global markets. In recent years, we have witnessed criminal networks, terrorist organizations, and organized criminal groups switch to intellectual property theft as a mechanism to finance their operations and activities around the globe. Again the task of investigation and prosecution of those who commit these crimes has become a major challenge for law enforcement agencies. At times, it is even near impossible to be able to identify the responsible parties for the theft and misappropriation. As a result, the legislative bodies, courts, and policy makers across the globe are continuously confronted with these challenges. Traditionally, intellectual property crimes have not received the same attention or resources that have been allocated to more traditional types of crimes. However, in today’s global economy, there has been an increased awareness among more advanced industrialized nations with respect to intellectual property crimes and its impact as a major threat to a nation’s economic and national security. Protection of these rights remains as a top priority for law enforcement authorities and is critically important to all stakeholders whether the owner is a business entity, an individual, or a nation-state. The theft of intellectual property often does not involve tangible goods and for most part does not require physical contact with the owner; in fact, in most instances, the party that is a victim is unaware of the theft or the extent of the misappropriation of their assets. Most intellectual property theft does not get reported to law enforcement. Concerns about the adverse impact of a public investigation on a company’s stocks and/or a negative reflection on the board of directors and shareholders often is enough incentive to want to deal with the breach internally or simply accept the losses and write it off as the cost of doing business. Another major obstacle is a deeprooted distrust among the private sector and the public sector; businesses simply do not want the government poking around in their business and prefer to keep it out of the public domain. THREAT TO ECONOMIC SECURITY AND COMPETITIVENESS As stated earlier, intellectual property accounts for a large part of today’s global economy. Protecting the rights of intellectual property owners and prevention of intellectual property theft, American companies are using international trade law as part of a broad-based legal strategy to protect their global commercial and investment interests. Among the most important interests are trade secrets,5 which encompass proprietary information that companies use to conduct their business. The protection of trade secrets is of critical importance not only to American companies but to all businesses that conduct their operations globally. As stated earlier, the loss of trade secrets poses a substantial threat to staying competitive in a global market. While protection of all types of intellectual property

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is imperative, the protection of trade secrets, which forms the core of our economic security,6 is the most complicated and challenging task for businesses, governments, and law enforcement agencies.7 LEGISLATIVE ACTIONS TAKEN BY THE UNITED STATES As indicated earlier, United States is currently the biggest stakeholder with respect to trade secrets. Whether it is an adhesive formula owned by a U.S. company or proprietary information on nuclear technology owned by the government, the theft of such information has major consequences to economic prosperity, which in turn impacts national security. Trade secrets are a form of intellectual property that are of increasing importance to many manufacturers for a variety of reasons. A trade secret can be any information that is (1) valuable to a company, (2) not generally known, and (3) not readily ascertainable through lawful means, as long as the trade secret holder has taken reasonable precautions to protect it. A classic example of a trade secret is the formula for Coca-Cola. The formula has maintained its secrecy and to this day the secret formula is what makes this product a unique product in the world. In contrast to other types of intellectual property, which are primarily protected under federal law, trade secrets have previously been protected under a patchwork of federal and state laws. Historically, there were no criminal provisions in the law in United States to make the theft of proprietary information a crime. Theft of trade secrets usually was addressed by the civil law system and at the state level each state had its own set of laws to address this. In 1996, the legal landscape changed with the passage of the Economic Espionage Act (EEA)8 under President Clinton’s administration. For the first time in the history of U.S. law, interstate or international trade secret theft became a federal crime. Congress enacted the EEA9 in October 1996 in response to the growing efforts by foreign governments to misappropriate the trade secrets of U.S. companies. The statute is not limited to prosecuting the theft of trade secrets by foreign governments or foreign companies. The EEA established two prosecutable offenses regarding the theft of trade secrets. The first offense, “economic espionage” (§ 1831), arises only when the theft benefits a foreign government and carries higher penalties than the second offense. The second, “theft of trade secrets” (§ 1832), concerns theft benefiting any person who is not the true owner. Over the years, under the new legislation, the Department of Justice prosecuted hundreds of cases against companies, individuals, foreign national, and nation-states. Both the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) as international treaties require national standards for trade secret

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protection. However, the United States did not have a federal statute to protect trade secrets until May 2016. In 2016, under President Obama, new legislation was introduced as an amendment to the 1996 passage of the EEA; the Defend Trade Secrets Act10 was passed in 2016 to further help protect companies from theft and make them more competitive in today’s global economy.11 In today’s information age, stealing trade secrets can be as easy as clicking a button or touching a screen or as simple as downloading to a thump drive or simply attaching to an e-mail and transmit at the speed of light. While the United States has played a unique role in implementing legislation and putting laws into place to better protect American businesses, the rest of the industrialized world have not been as proactive to implement similar legislation as the EEA in the United States. While some European countries do have some provisions in their existing laws and of course there are treaties and international agreements that indirectly focuses on some protection of trade secrets, to this date we lack a uniform international legislation against trade secret theft. Protecting intellectual property in the 21st century requires 21st-century legislative actions, laws, regulations, and treaties that directly address this growing criminal activity. The current patchwork of legislation is far from sufficient to address this ongoing global problem. Even in United States the current federal criminal law is insufficient to address this monumental problem. ECONOMIC COMPETITIVENESS VERSUS COOPERATION The advent of the Internet brought about a societal transformation that created an information society. As part of this transformation, e-commerce came into existence that permanently changed the nature of business transactions worldwide. Thus, creating an environment in which technology was at the core of all business operations in the private sector. This facilitated mobility among employees, it promoted remote work environment followed by virtual offices. The speed with which this transformation took place, industries across the world continue to make appropriate adjustments in order to be able to function under the current global environment. While groundbreaking rapid progress was made with connectivity of networks and communications technologies, the existing laws and regulations did not and still unable to catch up with the rapid technological changes. Globalization has had tremendous impact on businesses worldwide; with loosening restrictions and trade barriers on capital markets, it perpetuated acceleration of movement of markets and people around the world. With rapid changes taking place in communication and transportation sectors, corporation and businesses expanded their operations creating multinational companies around the world, making it more difficult

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to distinguish between an American company and a foreign company. Most corporations have subsidiaries around the world and hire foreign nationals to operate businesses in foreign countries. This rapid transformation makes it harder for countries and companies to protect their intellectual property in particular when it comes to trade secrets and proprietary information. As a result for businesses in more industrialized advanced nations around the world including the United States, competition is fierce. Research and development for new products and technologies requires tremendous time and resources. While stealing propriety information is nothing new and dates back centuries from the beginning of civilization, the tools for stealing has changed. The same technological development that has helped nation-states to obtain a certain economic status worldwide has created an environment in which theft of propriety information can be achieved with speed and little effort. While much cooperation among nations takes place on many fronts, the same does not apply when it comes to trade secrets. Governments and corporations alike do not share common grounds on this topic in fear of losing their trade secrets. The more competitive the nations are there seems to be more distrust and a lack of a desire to collaborate and cooperate with one another. TECHNOLOGICAL ADVANCES AND ACCELERATION IN THEFT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY Over the last several decades, the acceleration in technological advances has facilitated easy access to propriety information, that is, trade secrets which businesses heavily relies on to maintain their competitiveness in the global markets. Proprietary information has become a growing object of economic espionage. As a mechanism to improve business performance and efficiency, companies across the globe engaged in comprehensive automation of all their business operations to enhance and maximize their profitability. The wide range of automation ranged from secretarial and clerical tasks such as contact logs, telephone operations, calendar update, bookkeeping, accounting and other financial tasks to name a few. Also, automation took place in among a wide range of industries and sectors, from manufacturing, trade, mining, utilities, construction, travel, banking and finance, automotive, technology, software, biotechnology, pharmaceuticals and health care, again these are just some examples. What is imperative in this process is that most data, whether design, research and development, formulas, business processes, customer lists and product information were all computerized from hard copy to electronic data files stored on systems networks and via cloud computing. Businesses aside from mom and pop all turned into technological solution for their data storage and retrieval. Retrieving information no longer required sifting through boxes of documents.

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These revolutionary advances in technological solutions provided so many advantages to businesses worldwide. Many businesses expanded their operation globally and increased their productivity and output. The impact of automation efforts like these, multiplied many times across different sectors of the economy. As a result, the consumer has a better and faster access to goods and products. The overall economic pie got bigger for the majority of industries worldwide. These technological advances created new opportunities for those who target propriety information. Historically, to steal proprietary information, one would have to physically access the documents and physically remove boxes of documents and would probably need a truck to move the boxes to a different location. With the acceleration of information technology, all you need is a computer, or a thump drive. If the theft is being carried out by someone who is acting as an agent and has inside access, the thump drive alone is sufficient to steal thousands of electronic data file. If the theft is being carried by an outside group, all is required is a computer. Nation-states, criminal groups and organizations that steal intellectual property often times possess all the necessary tools to carry out these attacks. The organizations depend on highly skilled and computer-savvy individuals as part of their organizational network or they contract out to obtain the skills needed to steal the desired data. The Dark Web through its dark net markets provides a host of resources to these groups, anything from malware, specific software for configuration to contracting individuals with the desired skills. As we have witnessed in the recent past, criminal organizations have effectively used technology to further their objectives. SOCIETY’S PERCEPTION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CRIMES In each society, public’s perception of intellectual property as phenomena differs drastically depending on a set of complex cultural, economic, and social factors that make up those societies. Generally, societies in less developed countries tend to focus more on accessibility and dissemination of all forms of intellectual property in the absence of the ability to produce and create them. The less developed societies operate with no legal framework that incentivizes creation of IP or the protection of IP right and there is lack of legislation that would addresses IP theft in these societies. Furthermore, IP theft would not be considered as a criminal action and of course there is no legislation that would apply to this type of theft. Obtaining intellectual property through illegal means is not considered as a criminal act. In sharp contrast, in more advanced nations, the attitudes toward intellectual property are different; they value IP and respect IP rights. The more output in new ideas and products that a

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particular county has the more efforts are made to protect the IP rights. Even among advanced nations, perception and attitudes toward intellectual property crimes differ. It is well established that the United States currently is the largest producer of products and ideas worldwide; as a result, the United States has made more progress in adopting legislations to protect its intellectual property rights and prevent violations of those rights. While the existing laws are far from perfect to address the complexities of IP theft, nevertheless, appropriate legislation to prosecute IP theft exists. However, even with a sophisticated legal framework, the American society in general has little knowledge about the value of IP and the role of IP in American economy. In fact using a college student as an example, while the student would not consider walking out of store with a DVD, the same student has no problem downloading songs or movies illegally. The perception is that downloading of that song or movie is not theft and he or she has every right to download or copy. The same applies with bargain hunters with respect to luxury goods. If one can buy a great replica of a Gucci handbag that cost them less than a $100, why should they spend more than a $1,000 for the real thing? If this is the attitude and perception in the United States, what can it expect from its rival China? Given all the existing challenges and complexities of intellectual property crimes, can we really expect that criminal groups and organizations or nation-states would behave any differently? Of course, the scale and magnitude of theft significantly varies when we discuss the activities of criminal groups and organizations or state-sponsored theft of IP as opposed to an individual simply purchasing a fake designer handbag. ENFORCEMENT CHALLENGES DOMESTICALLY AND INTERNATIONALLY Current laws do not provide a full range of tools for law enforcement agencies to protect against theft of trade secrets, and the Department of Justice lacks the resources to prosecute many trade secrets cases. As mentioned earlier, the digital era that we live in has transformed how the business sector shares information, stores data, develop products, and how consumers make purchases. This phenomenon requires law enforcement agencies to exceed in training and information technology knowledge than the criminals that steal proprietary information. Unfortunately, for most part, law enforcement agencies lack the expertise or the resources that they need to investigate these criminal activities. The majority of intellectual property crimes are committed via cyberspace, and cybercrimes by far are the most challenging crimes to investigate. Again, lack of borders and jurisdictions in cyberspace is the most complicated component of cybercrime and cyber espionage. We have seen the past several decades’ intrusions against high-profile companies

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and institutions such as JPMorgan, Sony, Target, and Home Depot in the private sector and against numerous government agencies including the State Department and the Department of Defense and the IRS just to name a few. While the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in the United States has made steady progress to train and hire skilled agents with technological skills, the scale and the speed of theft of propriety information and trade secrets remain a major challenge not only for the FBI but for the other major enforcement agencies around the world. Allocation of resources for investigation and prosecution of intellectual property crimes has been scarce. Historically, priorities have always focused on more traditional crimes, or sexier crimes such as terrorisms. More recently, in light of numerous large-scale hackings, cyber espionage, and intrusions, more attention is being directed on the theft of trade secrets and propriety information. The law enforcement agencies are making progress in coordinating and collaborating with their counterpart agencies in more advanced industrialized nations. While there have been some instances of success where the FBI in collaboration with their counterpart agencies have been successful in investigating criminal groups with counterfeiting and piracy activities, the same does not apply to theft of trade secrets. In the long term, whether these collaborations will actually result in successful investigation and prosecution of these offences in the borderless world of cyberspace remains to be seen.

WHY CRIMINAL ORGANIZATIONS ENGAGE IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY THEFT Technology has not only increased the importance of intellectual property rights, but at the same time has created an enabling environment for criminal groups and organizations. Mobility is not an issue, since they only need to have access to technology, physical contact is not necessary and profits are extremely high. Elements of low risks and high profits are the motivating factors for transnational organized crime groups and terrorist organizations to engage in intellectual property crimes.12 According to a recent report, intellectual property violation is the biggest single transnational criminal activity, likely exceeding US$1 trillion in retail value.13 Although it is very difficult to come up with an exact figure, as criminal groups and organizations do not file financial statements or tax returns, therefore, there is a lack of financial data that we normally have access to for legitimate businesses. The existing patchwork of laws, regulations, and policies or a lack thereof in many parts of the world, has created a playground for criminal groups across the world that want to target intellectual property. With the anonymity of the Internet, lack of legislation and jurisdiction, and no enforcement challenges, there is nothing preventing these groups not to

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take advantage of a perfect scenario to maximize their profits. The bottom line is that engaging in IP theft is a very low-risk operation, which does not require any contact and a minimum risk of prosecution; therefore, the end results are achieved rapidly and the profit margins outweigh any potential risks. The technological innovations and the impact of globalizations on the business sector worldwide have created a platform of interdependence through connectivity of global social networks. The nature of entrepreneurship changed forever and adapted to a new set of rules in a borderless cyberspace of commerce. At the same time, businesses across the world are making the necessary adjustments to be able to operate on global scale; the criminal enterprises are also making the same adjustments in order to conduct their operations on global platforms. They have successfully been able to rely on theft of IP as their main income source to fund and support their clandestine operations. Due to the fact, the criminal enterprises are not bound by the same rules and regulation and trade barriers or agreements that the legitimate businesses are; they have made gains in their revenue streams in an accelerated fashion and have been able to put legitimate businesses at a disadvantage by creating an unfair competition in the global markets. Furthermore, the inability of law enforcement agencies to be able to catch up with the criminal groups and organizations has further put these groups ahead of the curve. These groups best operate in a chaotic environment, which lacks legal boundaries and an infrastructure for enforcement measures. LEGISLATIVE CHALLENGES AND INEFFECTIVE LAWS As illustrated earlier, there are no international uniform laws with respect to trade secret theft. While some countries such as the United States has made progress in implementing relevant legislation to address the theft of propriety information and trade secrets, much work still remains to be done. Intellectual property protections are essential for the global trade to thrive, for without them, there would be little incentive to take on the risk and expense of innovation. There are several international agreements in place that have limited enforcement power with respect to theft of propriety information. There are two main organizations worldwide with some enforcement power that addresses intellectual property policies, regulation, and legislation. The World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) and the World Trade Organization (WTO) are the two key organizations. The WIPO provides a global policy forum, where governments, intergovernmental organizations, industry groups, and civil society come together to address evolving intellectual property issues.14 The WIPO is one of the oldest specialized agencies of the United Nations.

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The WTO15 is the only global international organization dealing with the rules of trade between nations. At its heart are the WTO agreements, negotiated and signed by the bulk of the world’s trading nations and ratified in their parliaments. The goal is to ensure that trade flows as smoothly, predictably, and freely as possible. The Paris Convention,16 adopted in 1883, applies to industrial property in the widest sense, including patents, trademarks, industrial designs, utility models, service marks, trade names, geographical indications, and the repression of unfair competition. This international agreement was the first major step taken to help creators ensure that their intellectual works were protected in other countries. There are no provisions addressing trade secrets in the Paris Convention. While the conditions for trade secret protection vary from country to country as indicated earlier, some general standards on trade secret law are found in Article 3917 of the TRIPS Agreement.18 While some countries have enacted laws related to the theft of IP, there is no comprehensive legislation relating to the theft of trade secrets. Lack of a uniform international legal framework as a guiding principle has created a nightmare for law enforcement and prosecutorial bodies. With jurisdictional challenges in cyberspace, and the fact that a particular country’s law applies only in that country alone and does not extend to other jurisdictions, has opened a gateway for criminal organizations, groups, and nation-states to engage in economic espionage. WHY THEFT OF TRADE SECRETS THREATENS NATIONAL SECURITY We live in a complex world, surrounded by technological advances that have drastically changed our daily lives and interactions with our surroundings. From a societal perspective, this acceleration in technology has prompted an open information society, in which it has facilitated communication among people, industries, and governmental bodies across the globe. We as a society have to constantly make adjustments to keep up with our own technological advances. For example, each time we get comfortable with the networks at our work places, a change comes along with new technological advances and we have to adapt and learn new skills to be able to function at work. Whether it is a new software, or an e-mail system, or our handheld device, we continuously are in the process of updating our technological devices that we rely heavily on to communicate and conduct our daily life. Imagine the constant speed with which technological developments are resulting in new invocations, new products, and the impact of these advances on our productivity and economic output, which in turn has made us into an economic power on the global markets. Intellectual property is one of the most valuable assets for any competing nation on across the

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world markets including the United States. Trade secrets are the groundbreaking ideas that give businesses a competitive advantage. This critical form of intellectual property is not only invaluable to individual business owners but it’s also directly responsible for creating millions of jobs. When trade secrets are stolen or trade in counterfeit goods occurs on the global markets along the side of authentic goods, it threatens legitimate markets and goods and any country’s innovation-based economy. It also threatens the competitiveness of global markets. The theft of trade secrets and propriety information weakens nations’ economic power and sustainability; it directly impacts a nation’s national security by creating an adverse effect on jobs and the work force, on the critical infrastructure, and poses a serious risk to health and safety of our consumers around the world. When more advance nations such as the U.S. national security is threatened, it creates a serious threat to the geopolitical landscape around the world and provides limitless opportunities for criminal groups and organization to carry out their agenda. WHAT IMMEDIATE ACTIONS ARE NECESSARY A Uniform International Legislation Any single effort to develop legislation, while might be effective in a particular nation-state, will not provide a solution to this broader problem that can be characterized as a global problem. A holistic approach is imperative for a problem of this international scale. Of course, the first logical step for a nation-state is to develop appropriate legislation and/or to amend its existing laws appropriately for investigative and prosecutorial bodies that have to operate in the 21st-century environment. However, regardless of what actions a particular nation-state takes legislatively, it will not resolve the ongoing current problems outlined above. In the absence of establishing a uniform international legislation, which all member states would adhere to, it will become impossible to prosecute theft of trade secrets on a global scale. Public and Private Sectors Must Together Be the Architect of New Legislation That Brings about Harmonization of Laws Legislative and executive bodies must work in conjunction with the private sector to devise effective legislation. Anything short of getting the private sector, that are the biggest stakeholders of trade secrets, to work closely with the governmental bodies in their respective countries will not be effective and will end up being a useless exercise. In fact, the private sector is in a much better positon to guide the legislative bodies as to what rules, regulations must be enacted to prevent the theft of propriety information.

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Fostering International Cooperation Is Mandatory Fostering international cooperation is a mandatory component for a holistic approach. This is a tricky area since most private sector businesses are competing with each other on a global scale, and historically there is an element of distrust among these competing parties. For example, why would executives from Boeing and Airbus sit around the same table and have a transparent conversation that is focused on trade secrets and theft of proprietary information. The spirit of cooperation is a necessary element for a successful development of international laws and agreements in this area. While companies may not trust their competitors, the one thing they all have in common is that they don’t want their assets to walk out the door and they don’t want their propriety information be stolen. That common objective is sufficient enough to get the key players at the same table. For example, again since China has been one of the biggest culprits in committing economic espionage against U.S. businesses, it would make sense for governmental bodies to facilitate frequent dialogues between Chinese companies and their U.S. counterparts. It is a more effective approach than the United States constantly reprimanding China in this regard. As Chinese output of products increases, they will have enough at stake to also want to protect their propriety information. Building Public Awareness Public awareness and education is another fundamental aspect of development of effective rules and regulations. The general public in any society must understand the value of intellectual property and its impact on economic sustainability and the national security. The general population must understand what role trade secrets play in the larger scheme of geopolitical power and the opportunities that the IP theft provides for criminal organizations and groups. Educational seminars and incorporation of this subject into academic curriculums in high schools and colleges would work best in educating the younger generation on risks associated with intellectual property theft and prepare them for the challenges that they will face once they enter the workforce. The public perception that intellectual property in general is not like physical property since it is based on ideas and initially not in a physical form, that is, not tangible, must change. Enhancing and Expanding Investigative Collaboration among Law Enforcement Agencies Globally Information sharing across law enforcement agencies is a key to any successful enforcement and prosecution initiatives. While in recent years we have seen some information sharing with respect to terrorism, the

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same does not apply to intellectual property theft. Information sharing and interagency relationship is imperative for adoption of a uniform legislation and harmonization of domestic and international law to take place. Drafting and adopting uniform legislation is not enough if the enforcement agencies do not collaborate or share critical information with each other. Having legislation alone will not result in prosecution and enforcement; it will merely create a mechanism for enforcement agencies to investigate the criminal activities. Creating a platform of partnership among law enforcement agencies is imperative. Create a Platform for the Global Key Players in International Markets to Work Closely with International Law Enforcement Agencies The key industries and business in the e-commerce economies of today have the best knowledge about their products and technologies. They are the best to work closely with law enforcement agencies to devise effective plans that assist them to protect their trade secrets and assets. Law enforcement agencies by direct contact and collaboration with the private sector are better able to prevent and defend those industries when they have a better understanding of how these industries operates and what threats they face. Of course, no one is suggesting that the private sector disclose any propriety information or trade secret information but to help build a better defense system internally and externally to avoid asset loss to theft of intellectual property. After all, the private sector is the largest stakeholder when it comes to theft of intellectual property, and of course the best plan of action is to work closely with enforcement agencies before a breach occurs. Creating a working platform for domestic and international stakeholders to work together will facilitate the detection of deceptive tactics used to steal proprietary information.

NOTES 1. This work is an extension of the author’s prior research and work in the field over the last decade and half. Author’s prior work was based on a number research grants by the U.S. Department of Justice and the U.S. Department of State, hundreds of interviews with public officials at the federal and state levels, as well as law enforcement agencies domestically and internationally. Over the years, the author’s research findings resulted in numerous articles and the first published book on the topic (Nasheri, 2005), in addition to numerous invited key note speeches in Asia, Europe, North America, and South America. 2. The World Intellectual Property Organization defines IP as creations of the mind, such as inventions; literary and artistic works; designs; and symbols, names, and images used in commerce.

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3. The World Intellectual Property Organization broadly defines trade secrets as any confidential business information, which provides an enterprise a competitive edge. 4. See World Intellectual Property Organization. (n.d.). What is a trade secret? Trade Secrets. Retrieved from http://www.wipo.int/sme/en/ip_business/trade_ secrets/trade_secrets.htm 5. For additional information, see Pagnattaro and Park (2015). 6. See Center for Responsible Enterprise and Trade (2014). 7. See, Nasheri (2005). 8. U.S. Code › Title 18 › Part I › Chapter 90 › § 1831. 9. Ibid. 10. S.1890—Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016, 114th Congress (2015–2016). 11. The DTSA is an amendment to the Economic Espionage Act of 1996, which, until now, was limited to trade secrets related to products and services used in, or intended for, foreign commerce; it provided only for criminal sanctions. The DTSA expands this law to cover goods and services used in, or intended for, interstate commerce and provides for various civil remedies. 12. See Shelley (2003). 13. Channing May, Transnational Crime and the Developing World, March 2017. 14. See World Intellectual Property Organization. (n.d.). Policy. Retrieved from http://www.wipo.int/policy/en/. 15. See World Intellectual Property Organization. (n.d.). The WTO. Retrieved from https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/thewto_e.htm. 16. See World Intellectual Property Organization. (n.d.). Paris convention for the protection of industrial property. Retrieved from http://www.wipo.int/treaties/ en/text.jsp?file_id=288514. 17. According to that article, trade secret protection is available if the following conditions are met: The information must be secret in the sense that it is not, as a body or in the precise configuration and assembly of its components, generally known among or readily accessible to persons within the circles that normally deal with the kind of information in question; It must have commercial value because it is secret; and It must have been subject to reasonable steps under the circumstances, by the person lawfully in control of the information, to keep it secret.

18. The TRIPS Agreement requires undisclosed information—trade secrets or know-how—to benefit from protection. According to Article 39.2, the protection must apply to information that is secret that has commercial value because it is secret and that has been subject to reasonable steps to keep it a secret. The agreement does not require undisclosed information to be treated as a form of property, but it does require that a person lawfully in control of such information must have the possibility of preventing it from being disclosed to, acquired by, or used by others without his or her consent in a manner contrary to honest commercial practices. “Manner contrary to honest commercial practices” includes breach of contract, breach of confidence, and inducement to breach, as well as the acquisition of undisclosed information by third parties who knew, or were grossly negligent in failing to know, that such practices were involved in the acquisition.

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REFERENCES Center for Responsible Enterprise and Trade. (2014). Economic impact of trade secret theft: A framework for companies to safeguard trade secrets and mitigate potential threats. Retrieved from https://www.pwc.com/us/en/ forensic-services/publications/assets/economic-impact.pdf. Nasheri, H. (2005). Economic espionage and industrial spying. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Pagnattaro, M. A., & Park, S. K. (2015). The long arm of section 337: International trade law as a global business remedy. American Business Law Journal, 52(4), 621–671. doi:10.1111/ablj.12053 Shelley, L. I. (2003). Organized crime, terrorism and cybercrime. In A. Bryden & P. Fluri (Eds.), Security sector reform: Institutions, society and good governance (pp. 303–312). Baden-Baden, Germany: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft.

PART II

The Provision of Illicit Services

Part II of Volume 1 moves the conversation to the provision of illicit services. Such services range from human trafficking to cybercrimes and cover a wide variety of other topics in-between. Chapter 7 introduces the reader to money laundering, a process by which criminal organizations make illicit profits appear legitimate. International money laundering is a result of a global economy and accessible international markets for criminal organizations. Chapter 8 broadly approaches cybercrime. As the authors explain, cybercrime is a very broad heading. They present the reader with articulation of exactly what constitutes cybercrime, followed by a detailed description of the evolution of cybercrimes, and finally a discussion of the complex diversity of this criminal phenomenon. Chapter 9 delves into identity theft and identity-related crime. Like cybercrime, identity crimes are seemingly straightforward. Upon closer inspection, however, both the definition and the crimes that fall under that definition are complex and nuanced. Reyns takes the reader through a number of means and mechanisms for illicit use of identities, the types of offenders, victim characteristics and behaviors, and criminological theory that applies to identity crime. Chapter 10 considers transnational environmental crime from the point of view of harm, insecurity and justice. Examples of transnational environmental issues presented in Chapter 10 include disposal and congregation of plastic waste in the ocean, and the migration of toxic substances from producer countries. Both of these acts have severe consequences for both human and wildlife populations, even though these detrimental acts may not be considered “crimes” by international law. Chapter 11 gives readers insight into the world of transnational sex trafficking. While international sex trafficking is a crime that has received a

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good deal of popular attention in film and television, many readers will gain an appreciation for the complete presentation provided here. Chapter 11 thoroughly explains a range of definitions, applicable theory, security implications, and mechanisms available to reduce and eliminate international sex trafficking. Finally, Part II concludes with a presentation of international labor trafficking. Interestingly, these authors present a great deal of information about the flow of laborers into the United States. In addition to the context and process of victimization, these authors present and discuss the potential for policies that may combat labor trafficking in the United States as well as some directions they see for fellow researchers in the future.

CHAPTER 7

The Act of Cleaning Illegal Profits: What We Know and Don’t Know about Money Laundering Florian J. Hetzel

Transnational crime is a business. In other words, the primary objective of a large number of illegal enterprises like drug trafficking, fraud, or firearms trafficking is to generate profits (UNODC, 2016). And similar to most legitimate businesses, the individuals or groups involved in criminal enterprises want to spend and invest their proceeds (Levi & Reuter, 2006). However, unlike legal companies, making use of their profits is dangerous for the criminal entrepreneurs. In short, handling illegal profits puts criminals at risk to unfold the true source of their funds (Kumar, 2012), which, ultimately, can result in prosecution, conviction, and confiscation of assets (Commonwealth Secretariat, 2006). Take, for instance, the car service station owner in a small European village, who made a deposit of $14,000 into a night deposit at his local bank. Claiming to be business revenues, the owner raised suspicion about the unrealistic turnovers and the bank informed the police. The subsequent investigations revealed that the owner had stored over $700,000 from fraud, embezzlement, and tax evasion at different locations. In the end, the police seized the money and the car service station owner was imprisoned (Egmont Group, 2007). To make use of the ill-gotten revenues and at the same time avoid prosecution, criminals have to take additional precautions, generally known as “money laundering” (Money Laundering, 2016a; Levi, 2002; Reuter & Truman, 2004; Unger et al., 2006; UNODC, 2016). The term is a metaphor

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for cleaning the “dirty” illegal revenues (Schroeder, 2001, p. 2) and covers any economic advantages from the commission of crimes (Durrieu, 2013). Money laundering is not a transnational crime by default (Levi & Reuter, 2006), because it includes activities ranging from criminals putting their money onto their mother’s bank account (R v Worth [Trevor], 2014) to Mexican cartels recycling dirty money through European and American banks (Hanning & Connett, 2015). Put differently, money laundering is a multifaceted phenomenon. Current research on money laundering covers a wide range of topics such as the negative impact of money laundering on economies and societies, or estimations of how much money is being laundered (Unger, 2013a). Yet, today’s perception of money laundering is to a large extent related to question of how criminals launder their illegal proceeds. The often articulated image of crime money being laundered in complex schemes around the world (Levi & Reuter, 2011) is nothing else then a statement about techniques or methods criminals use to clean their dirty money. At its heart, the discussion is about the act of cleaning illegal proceeds. This chapter introduces the reader to the crime of money laundering by discussing the current state of research with regard to the question how criminals launder their illegal proceeds. In other words, this chapter reviews what we know and do not know about the act of money laundering. To that end, the following sections explain why money laundering became a problem for the international community, introduce a definition of money laundering, discuss the difference between national and transnational laundering operations, describe the act of laundering by discussing current attempts to conceptualize money laundering, and conclude by highlighting why the different types of crime generating the illicit revenues holds the key to increasing our understanding about different use of money laundering methods. MONEY LAUNDERING—A GLOBAL THREAT? The phenomenon of criminals trying to clean their crime profits is nothing new and has been around for thousands of years (Sullivan, 2015). Yet, money laundering was not considered to be a huge problem for national states and the international community until the second half of the 20th century. In fact, it was not until 1986 when money laundering became a criminal offence (Unger, 2013b). Considering its potential negative effects for a country’s economy, political system, and society (Ferwerda, 2013), it is surprising that it took policy makers so long to start combating money laundering. Today, anti–money laundering regulations have a key role in the fight against organized crime and terrorism.1 This section focuses on identifying reasons why money laundering became so important so quickly for the international community. Or put differently: How did money laundering become a global threat?

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To understand why money laundering suddenly was considered to be a problem on a global scale, it is essential to understand the developments in the United States, which was the driving force behind recognizing money laundering as a global threat (Unger, 2013b). Though there have been parallel developments in the United Kingdom to criminalize money laundering (Leslie, 2014), this section focuses exclusively on the United States and its pivotal role in putting money laundering on the international agenda.2 The foundation for all anti–money laundering measures to come in the United States was laid in the 1970s (Ciment, 2006): Passing the Currency and Foreign Transactions Reporting Act, better known as the Bank Secrecy Act (BSA) in 1970 (Richards, 1999), was the first serious attempt by the United States to tackle the profits of crime. BSA’s initial objective was twofold: first, improving detection and investigation of tax violations; second, disrupting large currency transactions across the U.S. borders by organized crime groups. This should be achieved by directing financial institutions to create a paper trail of large transactions (Ciment, 2006). Financial institutions within the United States were now required to keep records of cash purchases of negotiable instruments, file reports of daily cash transactions over $10,000, and report behavior indicating tax evasion, or other criminal activities (FinCEN’s Mandate from Congress, 2016). Unfortunately, the BSA was unsuccessful in compelling banks to report the required information (Richards, 1999). In fact, many financial institutions in the United States did not approve of their reporting duties and a couple of banks from California even took legal actions against the BSA, which were later dismissed (Leslie, 2014). The situation changed when towns and cities in the United States suffered from major fallouts caused by drugs (Platt, 2015). By the mid-1980s, hard drugs moved into the suburbs resulting in a terrified general public. Asked about their opinion on the most serious problem in the U.S. society at that time, 42 percent of the polled Americans named drugs, especially all forms of cocaine (Robison, 2002). The U.S. response was the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, which led to a substantial modification of the BSA in the form of the Money Laundering Control Act of 1986 (MLCA) (Holst, 2005). These modifications involved introducing money laundering as a criminal offence covering all financial transactions of illegal proceeds (Cassella, 2007). Furthermore, new regulations were introduced to enable prosecution of banks failing to report suspicious financial transactions (Platt, 2015). From the U.S. perspective, laundering the revenues from drug trafficking has always been viewed as an issue of transnational scale. In fact, by ratifying the MLCA, the U.S. Secretary of the Treasury was given the task to discuss the creation of an information exchange system with foreign central banks and government authorities in order “to eliminate the international flow of money derived from illicit drug operations and other

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criminal activities” (The Anti-Drug Act of 1986, 31 USC 5315). It was, therefore, the next step to push for international cooperation on this matter (Unger, 2013b). In 1988, the United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (United Nations, 1988), also known as the Vienna Convention (Leslie, 2014), put money laundering on the international agenda. More precisely, the signatory states agreed on making money laundering a criminal offence within their jurisdictions (United Nations, 1988). For the United States, this was a huge step forward in combating drug trade and its revenues, since the MLCA had proven to have only little impact on the criminals (Platt, 2015). For example, in 1987, only 17 people were charged with money laundering and only 1 was convicted (Richards, 1999). The Vienna Convention was only the beginning for the United States and its fight against drug trade. In order to attack the illegal funds of drug traffickers more effectively, the United States kept pushing for additional coordinating efforts among states with regard to money laundering (Unger, 2013b). In 1989, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) was created by an initiative of the Group of Seven (G-7) countries as an intergovernmental body to facilitate harmonization of national money laundering policies (Roberge, 2011). To provide a benchmark for a country’s anti–money laundering policy, FATF soon published 40 recommendations covering the standards for national criminal justice systems, law enforcement, financial systems, and international cooperation (FATF, 2003). Although the creation of the FATF was a joint effort of the G-7, critics have argued that FATF was nothing else but an instrument of the United States to implement its policy against drug profits internationally. At the turn of the millennium, it seemed like the United States would reconsider its plan to combat drug trafficking by targeting its profits. Concerns about privacy rights in the context of anti–money laundering measures led the United States to question its own policy (Roberge, 2011). However, after the terror attacks of September 11, 2001, the United States abandoned its concern and increased its efforts targeting the financial aspects of terrorism nationally and internationally. On a national level, the International Money Laundering Abatement and Anti-Terrorist Financing Act of 2001 was passed as a part of the USA PATRIOT Act in October, 2001. Its main objective was to prevent terrorists and criminals from moving funds within the U.S. financial system anonymously (Murphy, 2001). The Act included several controlling and enforcement provisions affecting the operations of financial industry. For example, the reporting requirements for suspicious activities were extended from banks to brokers and dealers. On an international level, the United States signed two international agreements in order to extend the international cooperation against money laundering to incorporate terrorist financing (Northrup, 2003). The first signature was put on the UN Security Council Resolution 1373 (UN

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Security Council, 2001). Member states were called to implement several measures such as to criminalize financing of terrorism in order to increase their ability to counter terrorism (United Nations Security Council Counter Terrorism Committee, 2016). Furthermore, the United States pushed the FATF to expand its mandate to combat terrorist financing, in addition to its initial objective toward money laundering (Rosand & von Einsiedel, 2012). As a result, the FATF (2010) published Special Recommendations on Terrorist Financing, which subsequently were ratified by the United States and other FATF members (Unger, 2013b). Again, with the United States as a key player, the international community extended its interest in money laundering by adding terrorist financing to its agenda. So how did money laundering become a global threat? Given this history of its criminalization, it is safe to say that money laundering itself has never been considered to be a global threat. Instead, money laundering was perceived as a useful instrument for the U.S. fight against drug trafficking, which represented the primary reason behind the criminalization of money laundering. The same applies to the phase when money laundering became an issue of the international community, which was primarily pushed by the United States to make the fight against drug money and terrorist financing more effective. These developments clearly indicate that money laundering was first and foremost a means to the end of fighting the drug epidemic in the United States and at a later date, terrorism. THE TRANSNATIONAL DIMENSION OF MONEY LAUNDERING For many authors, money laundering is a global phenomenon, transnational by nature usually justified with a reference to new opportunities provided by globalization. And there are good reasons to believe that the globalized world has equipped criminals with new tools to send annually trillions of U.S. dollars around the globe for laundering purposes (Kar & Spanjers, 2015). For instance, Williams (2001) explained in detail that developments such as free trade, or new communication and information systems have facilitated criminals to operate across borders. Yet, there are only few studies trying to scale the transnational dimension of money laundering empirically (Levi & Reuter, 2011). It is important, therefore, to ask how “transnational” the phenomenon money laundering actually is. To answer this question, this section begins by defining what it means to launder illegal profits and concludes with a discussion of its transnational dimension. So what does it mean to “wash,” or “clean” the “dirty” profits of illegitimate business? Depending on who you ask, the answer can vary a lot. Most definitions differ with regard to what is being laundered and the criminal act (Unger et al., 2006). Accordingly, there are numerous money

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laundering definitions available (Platt, 2015) but no universal understanding. For present purposes, this chapter draws on the official definition provided by FATF (Who We Are, 2016), the international organization with the objective to harmonize anti–money laundering policies. As such, the FATF (Money Laundering, 2016a) defines money laundering as the “processing of . . . criminal proceeds to disguise their illegal origin.” In its role as an agenda setter for 37 member states (Members and Observers, 2016), the FATF’s definition comes very close to a universally accepted understanding of money laundering. Hence, FATF’s definition will be used as starting point and anchor for the following discussions. What makes money laundering a transnational phenomenon? Broadly speaking, transnational crimes can be described as an illegal act involving two or more countries with regards to its (1) planning, (2) execution, or (3) impact (Albanese, 2012). In the context of money laundering, the word “transnational” commonly refers to its execution. Take, for instance, the discussions about offshore centers like the Cayman Islands, which have been constantly blamed for attracting foreign criminal capital by offering favorable financial services to customers (Platt, 2015). Similar arguments have been made about deregulations of financial markets allowing capital to move freely around the world providing new opportunities for criminals to launder their crime profits (Unger, 2013b). At its heart, discussions about the transnational dimension of money laundering are discussions about how criminals exploit opportunities abroad to launder their illegal assets (Carr & Goldby, 2011). Considering the importance of the topic, it is quite surprising that there are only few studies trying to determine how many criminals actually make use of the opportunities overseas (e.g., van Duyne, 2003; Levi & van Duyne, 2005; van Duyne, 2013). In line with the common understanding of money laundering being transnational by nature is the study conducted by van Duyne (2013) who analyzed data from Dutch authorities. In most observations, criminals simply exported cash out of the country (van Koningsveld, 2013). As opposed to this is the study conducted by Levi and Reuter (2011) who analyzed the behavior of convicted drug wholesalers in the Netherlands. Transnational money laundering appeared to be far less sophisticated, because the criminals in the sample did not utilize financial centers like Panama, Gibraltar, Liechtenstein, or Dubai. Instead, drug dealers either laundered their money inside the Netherlands or made use of foreign jurisdictions in close proximity such as Belgium or Germany. The study does not provide any information allowing to quantify the transnational dimension of money laundering; yet, it raises doubts about the common notion of criminals exploiting opportunities abroad to launder their illegal proceeds. To get an idea of how many criminals actually launder their illegal proceeds transnationally, a unique data set including information on money laundering cases related to the United Kingdom has been analyzed. By

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drawing a sample of full judgement transcripts of the United Kingdom’s Court of Appeal for the period of 2008 and 2015, the data set covers information on 186 money laundering offences and their geographical location (Hetzel, 2015). However, by implication, the results cover only money laundering cases of the United Kingdom and only money laundering cases that were uncovered by law enforcement. Hence, it is not a basis for arguments about transnational money laundering in general. The typology provided by Goredema (2003) was used to differentiate between different manifestations of money laundering regarding its domestic or transnational dimension, hereinafter simply referred to as money laundering dimension.3 Following this, domestic, or “internal money laundering” (Goredema, 2003, p. 3) is to generate and launder illegal profits in the United Kingdom. In addition, there are two forms of transnational money laundering: “Incoming money laundering” (Goredema, 2003, p. 3) is to launder illegitimate assets in the United Kingdom, which were generated abroad. “Outgoing money laundering” (Goredema, 2003, p. 3) refers to crime assets generated in the United Kingdom, which are sent abroad for money laundering. Table 7.1 shows the frequency of different money laundering dimensions for U.K.-related money laundering activities. From 167 observations,4 110 observations were domestic money laundering. In other words, the illegal proceeds from different crimes were both generated and laundered within the United Kingdom. Incoming money laundering could be observed in 17 of the 167 observations. In contrast, 40 laundering activities were classified as outgoing money laundering. So how transnational is money laundering? The analysis provides some valuable insights about the transnational dimension of U.K.-related money laundering cases. For one thing, in around 65.87 percent of the observations, criminal assets were generated and laundered within the United Kingdom. Put differently, in almost two-thirds of the observed money laundering operations, the crime profits never left the country. By implication, this also means that transnational money laundering was less frequent. In fact, only 34.13 percent of the analyzed money laundering cases involved more than one jurisdiction. Here, around 10.18 percent of

Table 7.1 Frequency Money Laundering Dimensions in U.K. Cases Money Laundering Dimension

N (%)

Domestic money laundering Transnational money laundering Source: Hetzel (2015).

110 (65.87) Incoming

17 (10.18)

Outgoing

40 (23.95)

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illegal proceeds were generated abroad and imported to the United Kingdom for laundering purposes. In 23.95 percent of the cases, crime profits generated in the United Kingdom were sent abroad for laundering. In short, according to the findings, the minority of the U.K.-related money laundering operations were transnational. For another thing, only little crime money from abroad was laundered within the United Kingdom. This is interesting for two reasons: (1) It contradicts the common notion of the United Kingdom, especially London as a “money-laundering centre of the world’s drug trade” (Hanning & Connett, 2015), (2) it supports the results by Levi and Reuter (2011) that financial secrecy havens like London are less frequently used to launder the illegal proceeds of crime. While the results raise doubts about the common notion of money laundering as a crime which is transnational by nature, the findings should not be taken as an image of money laundering in general. The use of different money laundering methods is highly dependent on country-specific features like its economy or anti–money laundering measures in place, which can affect the act of laundering illegal proceeds (Schott, 2006). This being said, U.K. findings give rise to doubt the current ideas of money laundering and its transnational dimension.

THE ACT OF MONEY LAUNDERING IN THREE STAGES Identifying the techniques to launder criminal proceeds in real life is quite difficult. For one thing, the number of tools to clean illegal profits is virtually infinite (Money Laundering, 2016b) due to its diversity with regard to form, participants, and settings (Reuter & Truman, 2004). For another thing, money laundering methods are constantly evolving alongside technological innovations such as virtual currencies5 (Sullivan, 2015) creating more opportunities for criminals to launder their ill-gotten profits (Bryans, 2014). In short, the act of money laundering covers a wide range of activities. To keep track with the developments within money laundering, contemporary analyses are based on the concept of money laundering involving the stages of placement, layering, and integration (e.g., Durrieu, 2013; Money Laundering, 2016a; Platt, 2015; Sullivan, 2015). Although very popular among researchers and practicioners, the concept has been criticised for being inaccurate (van Koningsveld, 2013) and generally misleading (Platt, 2015). Accordingly, this section will introduce the reader to the standard practice of simplifying the act of money laundering named the “three-stage model” (van Koningsveld, 2013, p. 437), discuss the shortcomings of that approach, and identify its implications for the fight against money laundering.

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Money Laundering as a “Three-Stage Model” Present ideas of how criminals launder their ill-gotten profits date back to the mid-1980s when money laundering was criminalized in the United States. Because money laundering was primarily a means to the end of fighting drug trade, it was up to the investigators of the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) to deal with lots of cash from Colombian drug traffickers (van Koningsveld, 2013). However, DEA agents had no experience with the financial side of the crime and, as a result, the agency created a guideline called the three-stage model to simplify the money laundering practice of drug traffickers for its agents. The FATF later adopted the guideline to make it an international standard (van Koningsveld, 2013). The guideline describes national and transnational money laundering as a three-stage process including (1) placement, (2) layering, and (3) integration (Levi, 2014, p. 422). Within each stage, criminals make use of different techniques to launder their illegitimate profits (Reuter & Truman, 2004), commonly referred to as “methods or typologies” (Schott, 2006, pp. 1–10). (1) Placement refers to actions to introduce the cash from illegal activities into the legal financial system (Sullivan, 2015). This can be achieved by simple means such as cash deposits (Levi & Reuter, 2006), or by purchasing checks, money orders, and so forth (Money Laundering, 2016a). (2) Layering is the attempt to bring “distance” between the illegal funds and the criminals by causing confusion about where the money went (Sullivan, 2015, p. 9). At this stage, a wide range of techniques to move or convert illegal cash is being used like a series of wire transfers (Money Laundering, 2016a), or shell companies and trusts in various countries (Levi, 2014). (3) Integration stage is the final phase where the previously layered money is invested into the legal economy. This includes either spending the ill-gotten revenues for, for example, high-value goods (Platt, 2015), or additional precautions such as false invoices to make the crime money look legitimate (Sullivan, 2015). A real-world example for transnational money laundering in three stages was uncovered by the U.S. Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force. As shown in Figure 7.1, drug money was handed over to a courier, who then smuggled the money from Spain to the United States. In the United States, the courier put the money on his account (placement) and transferred it to a co-offender’s account in Florida. After receiving the drug money from the courier, the co-offender transferred the profits to a third party bank account outside of the United States, from where the funds were first transferred to front companies in Spain owned by the drug trafficker and then transferred to traffickers account (layering). Subsequently, the money has been primarily invested into real estate and cars (integration) (International Drug Money Laundering Conviction, 2014).

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Figure 7.1 Transnational Money Laundering in Three Stages (Author developed figure based on press release by FBI, 2014)

Limitation: Proceeds of Non-Cash-Generative Crimes There are good reasons to doubt the universal applicability of the threestage model (van Koningsveld, 2013). Put differently, the reality of money laundering is to some extent very different from the ideal of placement, layering, and integration. The most prominent limitation of the threestage model, which has been constantly mentioned within the literature, is its incapability to incorporate the proceeds from non-cash-generative crimes (e.g., van Duyne, 2013; van Koningsveld, 2013, Platt, 2015).6 According to the three-stage model, money laundering starts off by placing illegal cash into the financial system. However, the initial conditions for laundering illegitimate funds vary between cash-generative and non-cash-generative crimes. Unlike drug trafficking, which involves cash (Platt, 2015), most frauds and economic crimes start by wiring money through bank accounts (van Duyne, 2013). Accordingly, profits from

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non-cash-generative crimes do not need to be placed into the financial system, because they are already inside the legal financial structure (van Duyne, 2003). How likely is money laundering without placing the illegal assets into the financial system? In general, there is only little empirical research regarding the use of money laundering methods (Durrieu, 2013). Fortunately, there are few studies including data, which allow to discuss the problem based on real-world observations. According to these studies, placement is much less common than the three-stage model would make us to believe. For instance, van Duyne (2007) analyzed data provided by the Financial Intelligence Unite in the Netherlands. From 199 observed attempts to disguise the illegal origin of funds, only 10 included actions to introduce money into the banking system. Put differently, placement was observed only in around 5 percent of the recorded money laundering operations. Less definite observations were made by Irwin, Choo, and Lui (2012), who analyzed the techniques employed by criminals to launder their assets. By studying data from anti–money laundering and counterterrorism financing bodies, the authors observed actions to place ill-gotten revenues in the legal financial system in 50 percent of the 147 analyzed laundering activities. Both studies produced varying results, and their findings do not necessarily have to do with the three-stage model’s problem to incorporate proceeds of non-cash-generative crimes. Yet, the results highlight that the model bears the potential to exclude a considerable number of laundering activities raising serious doubts about its ability to simplify the reality of the crime of money laundering. Conceptual Flaws, Real-World Consequences Unlike many scientific concepts, which are primarily being discussed within academia, the three-stage model has been equally popular among researchers and practitioners. As such, it has become a guideline for policy makers and law enforcement agencies (Platt, 2015). For example, the recently published National Money Laundering Risk Assessment for the United States is based on the understanding that laundering illegal proceeds involves three stages (National money laundering risk assessment, 2015). Considering the controversy around the accuracy of the three-stage model, there are reasons to believe that conceptual flaws have real-world consequences for the fight against money laundering. Today, many anti–money laundering measures are built around the idea that placement is a key component in combating money laundering, because it is usually described as the “riskiest part of the [money laundering] process” (AUSTRAC, 2007, p. 5). Consequently, anti–money laundering measures have been designed to alarm authorities as soon as illegal cash enters the financial system. Take, for example, current measures such as the suspicious activity reports, currency transaction reports, and

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cross-border declaration rules, which are supposed to raise alarm as soon as illegal cash enters the financial system (Sullivan, 2015). Yet, as the previous discussion suggests, there are good reasons to believe that the act of laundering money does not always involve methods to place money into the legal financial system. By implication, this means that measures particularly designed to alarm law enforcement agencies during the placement stage are rather ineffective for money laundering operations not utilizing any placement methods. Current trends in the behavior of criminals indicate that the situation is about to get worse: Criminals are supposed to adapt their money laundering methods to current anti–money laundering regulations. For example, the regulatory efforts by policy makers to control financial institutions have led criminals to identify new methods in sectors outside of the financial system like trade or real estate (Unger & den Hertog, 2012). In other words, not only do current anti–money laundering measures exclude specific money laundering methods, criminals have started to utilize less regulated sectors to launder crime profits too. The trend toward less regulated sectors bears the potential to reinforce the current issues of law enforcement in tackling the act of laundering. CRIME-METHOD NEXUS Lots of things have been said about what we know and do not know about money laundering, its transnational dimension, and how illegal proceeds are being laundered. Regardless of all the uncertainties, money laundering is a downstream activity to crimes generating illegal property (Platt, 2015). Put another way, there are no proceeds to launder without an initial criminal offence, which is also known as “predicate offence” (Schott, 2006, pp. 1–3). The concept is pivotal for today’s understanding of money laundering, since the predicate offence is seen to affect the choice for and against certain money laundering methods, hereinafter simply referred to as the crime-method nexus. To introduce the reader to crimemethod nexus, this section begins by explaining the concept’s origin and then discusses the actual relationship. Predicate Offences and Money Laundering Methods First and foremost, the predicate offence is a legal concept and, as such, it has its origin in the period of making money laundering a criminal offence. By introducing the Money Laundering Control Act of 1986, the United States not only criminalized money laundering but also introduced the concept of predicate offences.7 From a legal perspective, committing a money laundering offence not only requires the laundering activities but also needs evidence that the profits were actually the result of a crime, the predicate offence (Bell, 2002). Simply put, you cannot be prosecuted for money laundering if there is no proof that the revenues were illegally

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obtained. Yet, it is important note that not every criminal activity is a predicate offence to money laundering. Right at the start, there were only few crimes categorized as a predicate offence, primarily the ones related to drug trade, such as bribery or racketeering (U.S. Department of Justice, 2006). Currently, the United States lists over 130 criminal activities as a predicate offence (Unger, 2013b). On an international level, the first and only predicate offence was drug trafficking (Unger et al., 2006). The 1988 Vienna Convention recommended to prohibit the laundering of any profits related to “narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances” (United Nations, 1988, p. 3). With the formation of the FATF in 1989, the list of predicate offences started to increase beyond drug money (Unger et al., 2006). Following the FATF (2012) recommendations in its current version, member states should expand their anti– money laundering policies to “all serious offences” (p. 12). Many countries have extended their laws against money laundering from specific predicate offences to the whole range of crimes. Notwithstanding, there are still variations across countries in terms of what constitutes a predicate offence for money laundering and what does not (Levi, 2014). Analytically, the predicate offence has proven to offer some valuable insights. In doing so, the predicate offence is seen to provide insights into patterns with regard to the use of different money laundering methods. For example, based on the analysis of 223 cases, Reuter and Truman (2004) concluded that, unlike other criminals, drug traffickers appeared to utilize a large set of different money laundering methods. Furthermore, van Duyne’s (2003) analysis of files on money laundering offences revealed amongst other things that fraudsters primarily laundered their profits by getting them out of the financial system, which was different to observed drug traders trying to place their money into the financial system. Finally, Irwin, Choo, and Lui (2012), who studied 142 money laundering schemes, found evidence suggesting that human traffickers primarily used tradebased money laundering to disguise the illegal origin of their profits. Accordingly, the way to launder ill-gotten revenues seems to be associated with the type of crime generating the proceeds. It is important to note that, so far, there is no general theory which would explain the mechanisms behind the crime-method nexus. Instead, the relationship between types of crime and methods has been justified by observations and its standing as a “reasonable conjecture” (Reuter & Truman, 2004, p. 32). Case Study: Crime-Method Nexus in the United Kingdom To discuss the crime-method nexus in detail, this section will put its basic assumptions to the test by utilizing the data set including information of U.K.-related money laundering operations. As previously stated, the sample was drawn from full judgement transcripts of the U.K. Court of Appeal for the period of 2008 and 2015 and covers information on 186 money laundering offence including details about the predicate offence

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and money laundering methods (Hetzel, 2015). Again, the data covers only money laundering operations related to the United Kingdom and only those schemes, which have been uncovered by law enforcement. Thus, the analysis does not provide the basis for generalizations beyond the United Kingdom. In order to uncover the crime-method nexus, it is necessary to identify (1) the predicate offence, (2) the utilized money laundering methods, and (3) measure the association between predicate offence and money laundering. Predicate Offences Table 7.2 shows the frequency of the observed predicate offence in the data set. Here, almost half of the observed money laundering operations was related to the predicate offence of fraud and as such it was the most frequently observed crime. Fraud was followed by the predicate offence drug trafficking, representing one-third of the observations. Laundering the proceeds of robbery/theft was observed in 7 percent of the cases. Human trafficking and the crime category “others” only constituted the predicate offence of 3.3 percent of the money laundering cases in the sample. The observations for the U.K. case are in line with findings of other studies suggesting that fraud and drug trafficking are predominate predicate offences to money laundering. For instance, in Reuter and Truman’s (2004) analysis of 223 money laundering cases, over 70 percent of methods were either utilized to clean the profits of fraud or drug trafficking. Similarly, fraud and drug trafficking together represented the predicate offence to 65.8 percent of the observed money laundering offences in the analysis from Irwin, Choo, and Lui (2012).

Table 7.2 Frequency Predicate Offence Predicate Offence1

N (%)2

Fraud

85 (45.7)

Drug trafficking

62 (33.3)

Robbery/theft

13 (7)

Human trafficking

2 (1.1)

Others

4 (2.2)

Source: Hetzel (2015). 1 Predicate offence type “others” covers crimes that have been observed only once. 2 Twenty of 186 cases in the data set did not include any information on the predicate crime and were counted as missing value.

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Methods Table 7.3 shows the frequency of money laundering methods,8 which have been used in more than 10 cases.9 By far the most popular money laundering method was wire transfers.10 In 42.47 percent of the observed money laundering operations, wire transfers were utilized to launder ill-gotten revenues from various crimes. Third party bank accounts of a co-offender11 were used to launder the proceeds in 29.03 percent of the U.K. cases. Within the literature on money laundering, studies vary with regard to the most prevalent money laundering methods. For instance, Reuter and Truman (2004) describe wire transfer as the “primary tool” (p. 30) for money laundering. And for van Duyne (2013), utilizing third party bank accounts was one of the most “prevalent ways of disguising ownership” (p. 38). In contrast, for Irwin, Choo, and Lui (2012), neither wire transfer nor third party bank accounts were among the methods with the highest frequency. Instead the authors observed the use of structuring (22 %), shell/front companies (22%), and real estate acquisition (17%) as those methods with the highest frequency. There are many potential explanations for the observed variations such as different research designs, or variations within the data set. However, the study of Irwin, Choo, and Lui (2012) made use of a certain predefined typology in order to classify money laundering methods, which might have caused this variations. The authors themselves acknowledge the fact that there are more then one way to distinguish between different methods (Irwin et al., 2012). Since there is no general definition of what qualifies as money laundering methods, it is likely that different concept lead to different results.

Table 7.3 Frequency Money Laundering Methods (N ≥ 10) Methods

N (%)

Wire transfers

79 (42.47)

Third party bank account (co-offender)

54 (29.03)

Front company/organization

36 (19.35)

Purchasing high-value goods

33 (17.74)

Currency exchange bureaus

17 (9.14)

False invoices/receipts

17 (9.14)

False accounting

12 (6.45)

Deposits

11 (594

Cash withdrawal

10 (5.38)

Source: Hetzel (2015).

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Crime-Method Nexus To identify associations between the predicate offence and money laundering methods, a Pearson chi-square was conducted to test the independency of the two categorical variables: predicate offence and money laundering methods. When there were any expected counts below five, which violates the assumptions of Pearson chi-square, a Fisher’s exact test was conducted. Both tests can determine whether two variables are significant or not. Put differently, the tests allow us to say whether there is a (significant) relationship between crime and methods, or if the variables are independent. However, what the data analysis methods do not test is whether there is a positive or a negative relationship between the variables. This will require further statistical analysis. Table 7.4 shows the p-values for the predicate crimes and the money laundering methods in use for every crime that has been observed more Table 7.4 P-value for Predicate Offences and Money Laundering Methods Money Laundering Methods

Predicate Offences Fraud (p-value)

Drug Robbery/Theft Trafficking (p-value) (p-value)

Human Trafficking (p-value)

Cash withdrawal

0.011

0.059

–

–

Check alteration

–

–

0.078

–

Currency exchange bureaus

0.059

0.033

–

–

Deposits

0.027

–

–

0.094

False accounting

0.036

0.039

–

–

False invoices

0.019

0.044

–

–

Front company

0.047

0.082

–

–

Purchasing highvalue goods

0.034

0.014

–

–

–

0.093

0.003

–

Selling criminal assets Structured deposits

0.026

0.007

–

–

Ticket machine

–

–

0.078

–

Third party bank account (victim)

–

0.069

–

–

0.01

0.02

–

–

Wire transfer Source: Hetzel (2015). – = nonsignificance.

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than once. The results indicate an association between the predicate offence and the methods that have been chosen to disguise the illegal origin of profits. From 27 observed money laundering methods covered in the U.K. data, 13 were actually related to the predicate offence indicating a crime-method nexus. While the table contains many interesting observations, we want to highlight a remarkable finding, which appeared to be contradictory to common understanding, of how drug traders handle their illegal proceeds. In particular, the observation that the link between deposits and drug traders was not significant was highly unexpected. Drug trade is a cash-based crime, which is why placing illegal cash into the financial system has been seen as an essential aspect of laundering drug money, a feature that became the starting point for the three-stage model (van Duyne, 2003). However, in the U.K. data this could not be observed, which might indicate a U.K.-specific trend or point to a serious flaw in the three-stage model. Identifying the root cause behind this observation is therefore crucial for further discussion. Explaining the Crime-Method Nexus Regardless of the fact that the crime-method nexus could be observed many times, there have been only minor attempts to explain the underlying cause for this relationship. Van Duyne (2003) relates the crime-method nexus to the “administrative requirements” (p. 79) of the predicate offence. The author does not explain his argument more fully. Yet, similar arguments have been expressed by the FATF and MENAFATF (2015). In their attempt to explain why criminals launder their crime profits by smuggling cash across borders, FATF and MENAFATF provide a general framework to illustrate the decision-making of criminals with regard to money laundering methods. According to this framework, tasks related to the predicate offence like paying off suppliers or specific demands of partners like distinct currencies can affect the choice for and against a money laundering method. In other words, the environment enabling the predicate offence also affects the way how criminals launder their illegal revenues. A promising starting point for tracking down the root cause of the crime-method nexus are studies referring to the volume of illegal proceeds as a potential underlying factor. Hancock and Laycock (2010), who analyzed criminal groups in the United Kingdom, observed that small amounts of cash were spent on a day-to-day basis. However, once the group started making more proceeds than they could actually spend, they started laundering their money. Stessens (2004) goes one step further by arguing that the immense profits generated by organized crime groups result in a need for sophisticated money laundering schemes distinguishing them from traditional offenders, who are capable of handling

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their smaller profits more easily. Moreover, Irwin, Choo, and Lui (2012) have suggested that immense profits as described by Stessens (2004) not only made it necessary to launder crime assets more elaborately but also enabled them to choose from a larger set of methods. For instance, fraudsters who appeared to have the biggest turnovers made use of 10 different money laundering methods. In contrast, thieves with the lowest average volume of illegal proceeds only utilized two methods. Generally, by putting their emphasis on the volume of illegal proceeds, each author suggests a rather indirect relationship between predicate offence and money laundering methods. CONCLUSION What do we know about the act of cleaning illegal profits? We know that the criminalization of money laundering has never been a response to its potential fallouts for a country’s economy, political system, and society. Instead the escalating drug epidemic in the United States initiated a process in which the United States made money laundering a problem of the international community. Money laundering has, therefore, always been a means to the end of combating drugs and subsequently terrorism. Yet, we do not know whether our vague perception of money laundering overlaps with the reality of criminals disguising the true source of their turnovers. For one thing, the theoretical background of current money laundering research remains fuzzy. There is no common ground when it comes to defining money laundering, its methods, or providing theoretical arguments for the observed crime-method nexus. Moreover, the fact that the highly flawed three-stage model is still used within research and practice is more than surprising. With its place in law enforcement agencies around the world, it bears the potential to sabotage current anti– money laundering attempts on the national and international level. For another thing, current research on money laundering lacks the necessary evidence to back up its assumptions about the reality of money laundering. The hard truth is that the best theoretical arguments mean nothing if research cannot put them to the test. This being said, the few empirical studies, which have been extensively cited in this chapter, provide interesting starting points for further research. In particular, the work of Levi and Reuters (2011) with regard to the transnational dimension of money laundering raised doubts about our current perception of criminals exploiting every loophole provided by globalization. Van Duyne (2013) and van Koningsveld (2013) highlighted theoretical weaknesses of the three-stage model providing an excellent foundation for new concepts. Finally, there is good reason to believe that the crime-method nexus is more complex than previously expected.

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Several authors have emphasized the volume of illegal proceeds as a potential underlying factor for the crime-methods nexus, which would justify additional research. In the end, the quality of research on money laundering depends on both clear theoretical arguments and comprehensive data enabling researchers and practitioners to identify patterns with regard to the act of cleaning illegal profits. NOTES 1. Money laundering and terrorism finances are usually regulated by the same institutions. However, both crimes remain different phenomena, since terrorist financing involves actions different from money laundering (Unger, 2013b, p. 21). Accordingly, this chapter only focuses on money laundering as an activity to clean dirty money from predicate crimes other than terrorism. 2. To trace back the phenomenon’s evolution from a domestic issue to a global threat, the following description will put its emphasis on certain milestones in the developments of money laundering. The section should, therefore, not be seen as an exhaustive record of all money laundering related policy decisions made by the United States and the international community. 3. To simplify the money laundering activities across member states of the East and Southern African Anti-Money Laundering Group, Goredema (2003, p. 3) distinguishes between different types of money laundering according to the locations of the predicate offence and money laundering activity. Although the typology’s primary purpose is not to distinguish between domestic and transnational money laundering, it enables such determinations in an easily comprehensible way. 4. The data set provides information about 186 money laundering schemes. Yet, in 19 cases, it was not possible to determine the money laundering dimension. 5. “A virtual currency can be defined as a type of unregulated, digital money, which is issued and usually controlled by its developers, and used and accepted among the members of a specific virtual community” (Virtual Currency Schemes, 2012, p. 5). 6. Another shortcoming of the three-stage model is its inability to incorporate actions to equip ill-gotten revenues with a legitimate origin systematically (van Duyne, 2013, p. 237). 7. Within the Money Laundering Control Act of 1986, a predicate offence is actually called a “Specified Unlawful Activity” (SUA) (Bell, 2002, p. 137). However, the term “SUA” and “predicate offence” are usually used interchangeably (Doyle, 2012). To avoid confusions, this chapter simply refers to generally accepted term “predicate offence.” 8. In this chapter, money laundering methods are defined as “characteristics of financial acts” (van Koningsveld, 2013, p. 442) in the context of money laundering. 9. The goal of this subsection is to provide a short overview and not to give the reader a complete list of all observed methods. Therefore, it was decided to exclude money laundering methods which have been utilized in less than 10 cases.

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10. Wire transfers simply refers to the exchange of money between financial institutions (Reuter & Truman, 2004, p. 30). 11. Third party bank accounts as a means to launder includes putting crime money onto an account from a co-offender of the money laundering scheme which have not been part of the predicate offence. This is different to third party bank accounts of victims not knowing that they have crime profits on their balance sheet.

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Levi, M., & van Duyne, P. C. (2005). Drugs and money: Managing the drug trade and crime-money in Europe. London, UK: Routledge. Members and observers. (2016). Retrieved from http://www.fatf-gafi.org/about/ membersandobservers/. Money laundering. (2016a). Retrieved from http://www.fatf-gafi.org/faq/money laundering/. Money laundering. (2016b). Retrieved from https://www.fbi.gov/about-us/ investigate/white_collar/money-laundering. Murphy, M. (2001, December). International Money Laundering Abatement and Anti-Terrorist Financing Act of 2001, Title III of P.L. 107–56. CRS Report For Congress, Washington, 4, 107–156. National money laundering risk assessment 2015. (2015). Retrieved from https:// www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/jl0072.aspx. Northrup, C. C. (2003). The American economy: A historical encyclopedia. Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO. Platt, S. (2015). Criminal capital: How the finance industry facilitates crime. London, UK: Palgrave Macmillan. R v Worth (Trevor), 1304639 A7 (Court of Appeal of England and Wales February 27, 2014). Reuter, P., & Truman, E. M. (2004). Chasing dirty money: The fight against money laundering. Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics. Richards, J. R. (1999). Transnational criminal organizations, cybercrime, and money laundering: A handbook for law enforcement officers, auditors, and financial investigators. Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press LLC. Roberge, I. (2011). Financial action task force. In T. Hale & D. Held (Eds.), The handbook of transnational governance: Institutions and innovations (pp. 47–50). Cambridge: Polity Press. Robison, J. (2002). Decades of drug use: The ’80s and ’90s. Retrieved from http:// www.gallup.com/poll/6352/decades-drug-use-80s-90s.aspx. Rosand, E., & von Einsiedel, S. (2012). 9/11, the war on terror, and the evolution of multilateral instututions. In B. D. Jones, S. Forman, & R. Gowan (Eds.), Cooperating for peace and security: Evolving institutions and arrangement in a context of changing U.S. security policy (pp. 143–165). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Schott, P. A. (2006). Reference guide to anti-money laundering and combating the financing of terrorism: Second edition and supplement on special recommendation IX. Washington, DC: The World Bank. Schroeder, W. R. (2001). Money laundering; A global threat and the international community’s response. FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin, 70, 1–12. Stessens, G. (2004). Money laundering: A new international law enforcement model. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Sullivan, K. (2015). Anti–money laundering in a nutshell: Awareness and compliance for financial personnel and business managers. New York: Apress. Unger, B. (2013a). Introduction. In B. Unger & D. van der Linde (Eds.), Research handbook on money laundering (pp. 3–16). Northampton: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited. Unger, B. (2013b). Money laundering regulations: From Al Capone to Al Qaeda. In B. Unger & D. van der Linde (Eds.), Research handbook on money laundering (pp. 19–32). Northampton: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited.

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CHAPTER 8

Understanding Cybercrime Diana S. Dolliver and Kevin Poorman

With each passing year, “cybercrime,” “cyber threats,” “cyber war,” and “cyber security” are terms more commonly surfacing in general media discussions worldwide and are on the forefront of concerns for academics, policy makers, private industry, politicians, militaries, and law enforcement agencies across the globe. Yet, what do these terms mean? Are they interchangeable? These are questions posited not only by the general population but are continuously debated by cyber experts. Scholars have described cyberspace as a “weird” and “unnatural domain” (Betz & Stevens, 2012, p. 104) in which virtual boundaries do not exist, allowing millions of people around the world to become connected and share information at the touch of a button. This enables local cultural elements to be diffused globally but similarly facilitates criminal activities. In 2009, cyberspace was recognized by the former executive director of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) to be one of “humanity’s biggest assets,” yet also a “weapon of mass destruction” in the hands of criminals (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2013, p. 3). This chapter introduces readers to “cybercrime” and its inherent transnational features by first tackling the definition of this elusive term. The evolution of cybercrimes is then discussed, followed by a detailed discussion of the diversity of this particular criminal phenomenon. DEFINITIONS OF CYBERCRIME Currently (and historically), there does not exist a single, internationally adopted definition of “cybercrime” (Yar, 2005). Indeed, the global community has not even agreed upon whether this term constitutes one single word (i.e., cybercrime), two words (i.e., cyber crime), or is hyphenated (i.e., cyber-crime). Betz and Stevens (2012) noted this lack of general

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consensus regarding the definition of cyberspace itself, claiming “where you find cyberspace and what it looks like depend a lot on the reason you are looking for it in the first place” (p. 106). The same sentiment translates to “cybercrime”; how this criminal phenomenon is defined depends much on “the way that you are looking at it and why” (Betz & Stevens, 2012, p. 116). In 2000, scholars Thomas and Loader offered a working definition of cybercrime, conceptualizing it as “computer-mediated activities which are either illegal or considered illicit by certain parties and which can be conducted through global electronic networks” (p. 3). This definition, however, omits crimes committed via cellular phones or gaming systems (for instance). From a military perspective, definitions of “cybercrime” have often been derived from the stance of “cyberpower and national security” (Kramer, Starr, & Wentz, 2009), while other experts define “cybercrime” in terms of the actors themselves (e.g., hackers, organized crime syndicates, terrorists, bored teenagers) (Bucci, 2012). More recently, the core of cybercrime definitions has generally encompassed a limited number of acts “against the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of computer data or systems” (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2013, p. XVII). For instance, the European Commission (2015) defines cybercrime as a “borderless problem,” stating that “cybercrime consists of criminal acts that are committed online by using electronic communications networks and information systems” and are classified in three broad categories: crimes specific to the Internet (e.g., attacks against information systems), online fraud and forgery, and illegal online content. However, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime points out that aside from legal purposes, specifically defining “cybercrime” is “not as relevant” and only produces an “artificial ‘cybercrime’ construct” (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2013, p. XVII) that is less useful to the general population, law enforcement, and academics alike. In the spirit of the UNODC, this chapter will take an all-encompassing approach to conceptualizing “cybercrime” rather than providing a specific definition. That is, cybercrimes are considered here in two broad categories that consider both human agency and technology (Dolliver & Dolliver, 2014): traditional illegal or deviant acts that utilize a digital medium (e.g., identity theft, cyberbullying and harassment, cyber espionage, cyber trespassing), and illegal or deviant acts that were created by (i.e., could not exist without) a digital medium (e.g., hacking, Distributed Denial of Service [DDoS] attacks against computer systems, malware development). The good news (if it can be posited as such) is that cyberspace “always touches the ground somewhere” (Goodman, Kirk, & Kirk, 2007, p. 193). That is to say, people must “enter” and “exit” cyberspace at some point—the “virtual world” has not replaced the physical world. Human agency still sets in motion any nefarious activities that take place in cyberspace, and as such, the cyber domain can be conceptualized as simply a new medium in which criminals traverse and illicit activities

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occur. However, the cyber domain does provide new opportunities for criminals to conduct and engage in illicit behaviors that are not bound or restricted by geography or equivalence (the latter is known as an “asymmetrical advantage”—no longer do armies need equal or greater numbers of “boots on the ground” to defeat their opponents; one person can now wield enormous power over large adversaries in cyberspace from thousands of miles away). This in turn creates deep layers of complexity that hinder law enforcement investigations (from digital evidence collection, extraction, and analysis to international extradition of indicted suspects) and challenge effective policy creation. Consider the following scenario: Fred Sullivan is a tech savvy 24-year-old U.S. citizen who recently graduated from an American university with a degree in computer science. During his senior year, Fred’s roommate was arrested for engaging in “revenge porn” and sexual harassment that targeted his ex-girlfriend, posting nude photos of her on social media and private messaging her thousands of sexually explicit pictures over the course of two months. Law enforcement officials obtained a search warrant for Fred’s dorm room and seized his and his roommate’s computers, citing Fred’s roommate often used Fred’s computer while Fred was in class without his knowledge. Fred grew increasingly upset; with his computer seized, he lost access to his course papers, notes, and e-readings, causing him to do poorly on exams and receiving a failing grade for missing a paper deadline. With his GPA suffering, Fred was turned away from employment opportunities he was previously lined up for following graduation. Fred became further angered and disillusioned upon learning of Edward Snowden’s accusations against the U.S. government of using extensive surveillance measures that targeted U.S. citizens. In his final semester, Fred began reading propaganda by Middle Eastern violent extremists and decided to move to Sweden, seeking to avoid monitoring by U.S. officials, and apply his cyber skills to recruit and raise funds online for one such terrorist organization. Once in Sweden, Fred ensures his cyber-tracks are covered by using anonymizing software (e.g., the Tor Network) to connect with members of the organization and potential recruits.

In this anger-frustration example, Fred has already complicated any law enforcement investigation by crossing national jurisdictions physically (by moving from the United States to Sweden) and virtually (by using cyberspace to communicate with and provide aid to a Middle Eastern terrorist network). Further, Fred has a myriad of options by which to recruit (e.g., social media, anonymous hidden forums) and fund-raise (e.g., identity theft, virtual drug trade, malware development) via cyberspace, each with its own challenges of law enforcement detection and attribution. THE EVOLUTION OF CYBERCRIMES Fred’s cybercrime options in 2016 have greatly evolved since the development of the Internet in the late 1960s. The Internet can be thought of as the world’s largest computer network and was conceptualized in the 1950s and 1960s through research conducted by the governments of the United States, France, and the United Kingdom. The aim of this research

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was to increase the ability to communicate and disseminate information in the event of a nuclear attack or other disaster, as well as enable scholars to harness computing power to aid their research endeavors (Griffith, 2005). By the public release of the Internet in 1971 (originally called the ARPANET [the Advanced Research Projects Agency Network]), computers could connect to the network as long as the computer could “speak” the right language. This language is called TCP/IP (Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol); TCP allows messages to be broken down, passed through phone lines, and reconstructed at the message’s destination, while IP identifies the address of the destination (Griffith, 2005). The importance of originally implementing TCP/IP as the network’s “language” was that it was free and easy to use (Sterling, 1993), with no central hierarchical structure (i.e., if one computer were disconnected from the network, it did not cause the disruption of the entire network). While personal computers began to develop in the early and late 1970s, they were significantly expensive and large in size. As such, computers and network access were largely limited to government and educational institutions. Nonetheless, the 1970s experienced the inauguration of cybercrimes, in which people illegally targeted and manipulated information systems to their own benefit. Marijuana was reportedly one of the first items to be ever sold on the ARPANET in the early 1970s (Markoff, 2005; Walsh, 2011). Later in this decade, phone phreaks, or “phreakers” were a group of technology enthusiasts who learned to manipulate the large commercially run telephone communication networks (Gold, 2011). In the 1980s, still rather early in the hacker culture transition, individuals of the cyber-underground primarily consisted of youths who were more interested in trading pirated video games and circumventing paying for phone calls. Once computers and the Internet became more available, breaching secure computer networks became the work of thrill and notoriety. Individuals who were capable of accessing the most protected information systems and compromising the most sensitive information gained the most reputation and notoriety among the hacker subculture. Information theft, disruption, and destruction were regarded as work for criminals, not hackers (Skibell, 2002). The early 1990s experienced the birth of the World Wide Web (WWW), which can be thought of as the most popular application on the Internet. The WWW is essentially a database of websites that use hypertext transfer protocol (http; structured text that utilizes links between text) to communicate with other computers. This new form of communication spurred e-commerce and greatly increased the number of people connecting to the Internet around the world (even though less than 1% of the world’s population had Internet access by 1995—compared with 46% in 2015) and also created a unique environment rife with opportunities for low-risk, highreturn criminality. However, the majority of cybercrimes were still being

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committed without profit motive. As businesses increasingly moved records and business interactions online, society has become more susceptible to crimes. Some scholars argue that these are traditional crimes that should not bear the “cyber” prefix (Erlin, 2015). Authorities were also more capable of investigating and prosecuting serious cybercrime perpetrators during the 1990s, as a majority of the Internet population were both residing within the United States and were U.S. citizens. The change of the millennium saw a rapid advancement in the scope and depth of cybercrimes, creating many cyber tools of which Fred (in our example) might find useful to fulfill his criminal goals. Crimes shifted from being caused by individual thrill-seeking perpetrators to highly profit-motivated groups and organizations. Since 2000, malware production has exponentially increased; malicious coding such as keystroke loggers and viruses have been developed to attack personal computers in order to glean personal information, usually regarding financial or identity information of a sensitive nature. Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks have been conducted on large scales taking down corporate and government websites (e.g., Chirgwin, 2015). Internet activists, or “hacktivists” (e.g., Anonymous) use this technique often to take down the websites of those they are protesting. Large-scale phishing operations make use of services such as e-mail, texting (“smishing”), and calling (“vishing”). (More information on these forms of crimes and cyber tools will be provided later in this chapter.) These are the cybercrimes that we conventionally think of today that target all electronic devices (e.g., computers, cell phones, gaming devices, tablets, cars, home security systems) and networks. THE DIVERSITY OF CYBERCRIMES Elements of the cybercrime phenomenon are best conceptualized by better understanding the “how” (i.e., the cyber tools available to criminals to accomplish their goals) and the “what” (i.e., the end goal or target of the criminals). In other words, cybercrimes are differentially driven by the purpose of each crime and the means by which the crime is committed. Importantly, many cybercrimes are accomplished by individuals with very low or minimal technical abilities (Dolliver & Dolliver, 2014). Moreover, disgruntled employees (one example of “insider threats”) will have very different goals than drug trafficking organizations or typical hackers (two examples of “external threats”). As such, the diversity of cybercrimes is examined here in the context of crime-types and associated cyber tools and criminal objectives. Within some of these crime-types are included crimes that societies have traditionally experienced outside of the virtual world, such as trespassing, harassment, and theft. These types of crimes generally rely on social engineering using the vehicle of cyberspace to achieve their criminal

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goals. Criminals use social engineering methods (connected with various cyber tools) to manipulate a victim into providing important information such as passwords, credit card numbers, and other sensitive information (Greavu-S¸erban & S¸erban, 2014). Other cybercrimes may involve very low-tech means of achieving their criminal purpose and may be as easy as logging on to a social media platform. In Fred Sullivan’s position, a number of these cyber offensives provide effective options for achieving his criminal goals. Cyber Theft and Fraud One of the most visible cybercrimes today involves the theft of personal information from online systems that include personal computers, business networks, and point-of-sale (POS) machines at retail stores. Although there are currently no federal policies that require a business or corporation to report cyber breaches, several major corporations have had no choice other than to admit major losses of customer personal information. In 2011, Sony was the victim of a cyber breach that resulted in the shutdown of the PlayStation Network (PSN) for the PlayStation game console. For several days Sony did not release the nature of the shutdown, later revealing that personal information including names, addresses, e-mails, birth dates, passwords, login information, and credit card numbers were stolen from individuals who have accounts on the PSN (Bonner, 2012). JPMorgan, the largest U.S. bank in terms of assets, admitted to losing personal information that consisted of names, addresses, phone numbers, and e-mail address due to a phishing-style cyber attack (see next section on phishing). Using fraudulent e-mails, the attackers were able to install malicious software on JPMorgan customers’ computers after a victim clicked a link to a fraudulent website. The attacks were successful to the extent that several company servers became infected, releasing large amounts of sensitive personal information (Shields, 2015). Perhaps one of the most wellknown cyber breaches to date was on Target in 2013, which saw the loss of millions of customers’ sensitive information. Attackers were capable of breaching securities in the Target network by accessing the security system of a contractor that worked for Target. Using this third party access, the perpetrators installed malware on the Target network system, which enabled the theft of credit cards, debit cards, as well as personal information (Shields, 2015). Large corporate breaches such as these have become all too commonplace. Types of stolen information include date of births, social security numbers, credit card or banking information, passwords, and health records. This type of cybercrime may prove lucrative to Fred in different ways: Fred may steal banking information from financial institutions in the United States, draining money from unsuspecting citizens into offshore accounts. Fred might also steal large amounts of data from international

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companies like Target and sell the data in batches on illicit black markets, such as the Tor Network (see the section on Tor for more information). Stolen personal information may also be used by Fred to create new identities for terrorists traveling globally. Other motives, less relevant to Fred’s mission, for stealing personal information are broad. For instance, a few credit and debit card numbers can simply be used to purchase items at the victim’s expense. Offenders may also be motivated to commit mortgage and credit card fraud; often the financial losses are left for the banking institutions to account for while also destroying a victim’s credit (Kramer et al., 2009). Alternatively, attackers may rather use a false identity in order to engage in illicit activity anonymously. With the advent and popularity of social media, fraudulently portraying oneself on the Internet adds a legitimizing effect to a fraudulent identity (Wall, 2013). Keystroke loggers may be effective cyber tools used to steal personal information. Keystroke loggers are relatively cheap and easy to find and can come disguised as hardware (e.g., thumb drive) or software programs that record an individual’s every keystroke. This kind of attack is effective in obtaining sensitive information like passwords. A hardware-based keystroke logger contains software that is saved on an external device (e.g., thumb drive, external hard drive); the external device must be directly connected to the device being monitored for the software to be activated and capture the user’s keystrokes. This is often used when the attacker is in the same general vicinity as the victim—the attacker must retrieve the device at a later time. Alternatively, keystroke-logging software can also be sent electronically to the victim who then must unknowingly download and install the file, which is typically hidden or embedded in a seemingly legitimate link within an e-mail. This is optimal for offenders who are targeting victims in various countries and also reduces the risk of detection by either the victim or law enforcement. Fred may not find keystroke loggers to be as beneficial for his purposes as phishing operations. Phishing (including spear phishing, vishing, and smishing) is also an effective tool in stealing vital information to be used for theft and fraud purposes. Phishing is primarily conducted using e-mailing and instant messaging services, often posing as a legitimate bank or other online payment service requesting that the user login to update their information. Once the user clicks on the link embedded in the e-mail or instant message, the link takes the user to a website that appears to be legitimate, but is in fact a false website created by the attacker. Once the user inputs their username and password, the information is captured by the false website and exploited by the offender. Spear phishing refers to a phishing technique in which a specific “vulnerable” or “target” population or person is singled out by attackers (e.g., the elderly, government employees, teenagers) (Hong, 2012). In order to increase the success rate of a spear-phishing attack, a perpetrator may learn intimate or sensitive information one would not normally know in order to gain trust with the

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victim. This can include identifying information, Internet shopping history, and family names (Jagatic, Johnson, Jakobsson, & Menczer, 2007). Phishing on a large scale with no specific intended target increases the chance of a successful attack occurring (which may be of interest to Fred). Whaling is a specific form of spear phishing that targets upper-level executives in various corporations and industries. Although most phishing attacks are committed using e-mail and instant messaging services, other forms do exist. Vishing is a phishing style attack that utilizes the phone system. Using social engineering, much like a phishing attack, a perpetrator poses as a legitimate source in order to obtain sensitive information through a phone call. Smishing is another phishing style attack that uses the SMS-texting abilities of cell phones. Password-attacking tools offer “brute force” or “password-hashing” options to breaking into various networks or computer workstations. Constructing secure passwords to accounts on the Internet are essential to online security. Generally, the longer the password is, the more difficult it is for one to fraudulently gain access to the account in question. However, there exist free downloadable cyber tools that enable a perpetrator to attempt to gain access to private computer systems and networks. One example is Hydra, which uses a “brute force” approach—this approach uses a trial and error method of trying to exhaustively “guess” the password for a given account. Lists of common passwords (which are all too easy to find in multiple languages, as well as default passwords for a variety of software and hardware [Andress & Winterfield, 2014]) are uploaded to Hydra, and the software will attempt to correctly guess the password and gain unauthorized access to the account. Another free password cracking program is John the Ripper, which takes a “password-hashing” approach. That is, John the Ripper attempts to reverse engineer passwords to gain unauthorized access. Each company or website uses a specific type password-hashing algorithm (i.e., encryption) to protect their customers’ passwords (Andress & Winterfield, 2014). John the Ripper attempts to uncover the company or website’s algorithm to begin attempting to decrypt the password. Unless Fred had specific targets (either a person or network) in mind, these passwordattacking tools may not be in his arsenal. Ransomware is a unique form of malware that extorts money from citizens by essentially holding their files or computer system at ransom. Once infected with ransomware, the malware will encrypt all or some of the content on a single computer or an entire computer network until a specified amount of money has been paid to the malware operator(s). Once the money (most often in the form of Bitcoins—see Bitcoin for more information) has been paid via a series of online transactions, the user’s files and access to the computer system are unlocked (i.e., decrypted). Users often become infected with ransomware following successful spear-phishing attempts, in which the malware is embedded in a link or attachment. Anyone

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can become the victim of ransomware, but in recent years hospitals and corporations have been targeted, and police departments in at least seven U.S. states have been infected—all often forced to pay the ransom because they failed to have adequate data backups (Francescani, 2016). Common strains of ransomware include CryptoLocker, Locky, KeRangers, Powerware, and TeslaCrypt. Mobile devices are not immune from ransomware attacks (Manel, 2016). One concerning trend is the commercialization of ransomware—thieves packaging “ransomware kits” and selling them on anonymous networks (e.g., the Tor Network) to individuals interested in conducting a ransomware attack but lack coding skills (Ward, 2013). This may be a key cyber tool used by Fred—it allows him to not only target the American university he once attended and the police department that investigated him but also allows Fred to profit from the ransomware attacks. Cyber Harassment, Stalking, and Bullying Much less technical cybercrimes include cyber harassment, cyberstalking, and cyberbullying. These crimes require very little technical ability due to the ease of access to social media, e-mail, and instant messaging services on the Internet. Offender motives for these offenses differ substantially from many other cybercrimes discussed in this chapter. Offenders who engage in harassment, stalking, and bullying in cyberspace are most often not intending to (for instance) steal personal information for monetary gain, hold data at ransom, or steal corporate secrets. Instead, these cybercrimes are predatory in a different way—cyber criminals seek to cause annoyance, fear, embarrassment, and even suicidal thoughts or actions in their victims. Most often studied as victims and offenders of cyber-based harassment, stalking, and bullying are youth, though these crimes can impact anyone of any age (Beran, Rinaldi, Bickham, & Rich, 2012; Ngo & Paternoster, 2011; Zhang & Leidner, 2014). Specifically, cyber harassment refers to the use of the Internet, e-mail, or other technologically based communication service to annoy, attack, alarm, or otherwise bother a person. In Canada, approximately 21 percent of middle schoolaged children were found to be the victims of cyber harassment, while rates in the United States were similar (19%) (Beran et al., 2012; Ybarra & Mitchell, 2004). When targeted cyber-based communication becomes repetitive and the same individual is pursued through the use of the Internet, involving a degree of perceived danger or fear, the offense becomes cyberstalking (Dreßing, Bailer, Anders, Wagner, & Gallas, 2014). In 1998, cyberstalking was predicted to be the “next Internet-related moral panic” (Ellison & Akdeniz, 1998, p. 29). Whether or not that prediction came to fruition, studies since the late 1990s on the dangers related to cyberstalking have raised awareness among not only parents and law enforcement but among lawmakers as well (Basu & Jones, 2007; Pittaro, 2007). Cyberstalkers may monitor

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their victims through the use of mobile devices, hidden cameras and listening devices, and even in some instances the perpetrator will install spyware on the victim’s computer to more closely observe his or her online behavior (Reyns, Henson, & Fisher, 2011) (see below for spyware discussion). Women report higher victimization rates of cyberstalking than men (Reyns, Henson, & Fisher, 2012). Cyberbullying, also referred to as “e-bullying,” “sms bullying,” and “mobile bullying,” is a related phenomenon, defined as “willful and repeated harm inflicted through the medium of electronic text” (Patchin & Hinduja, 2006, p. 152). “Cyberbullying” is a term that has been spread throughout the media, highlighting the crime as an issue that needs to be taken seriously by law enforcement and addressed by professionals as children become connected to the Internet at an increasingly younger age. Cyberbullying shares many similarities with that of cyber harassment; however, both the perpetrator and the victim must be a minor at the time of incident. Research on cyberbullying has uncovered links between online and offline bullying—youth who are bullied at school (offline) are also likely to become victims of cyberbullying (Patchin & Hinduja, 2006). Further, students who are cyberbullied become fearful of future victimizations (Randa, 2013). Drs. Hinduja and Patchin founded The Cyberbullying Research Center in the mid-2000s to promote research on the subject and are some of the field’s leading experts (visit the center at www.cyber bullying.org to learn more). Cyber Espionage and Trespassing Cyber espionage is the unauthorized probing of a computer network in order to analyze traffic flow, cyber defenses, and view or disrupt data files (Kramer et al., 2009). The purpose of these types of malicious software is simply spying and obtaining as much information as possible without being detected. Fred Sullivan, from our example, may find these methods lucrative in terms of intelligence gathering to support the terrorist organization. Some cyber tools that are more commonly used to infiltrate and trespass include various forms of spyware that target networks. Spyware essentially allows a perpetrator to secretly monitor a private computer or computer system remotely, as well as provide information on specific details of information systems (Thompson, 2005). One type of spyware that is designed specifically for network analysis is a packet sniffer (Rupam, Atul, & Ankita, 2013). These programs analyze traffic and data flow within computer networks—this means this software monitors (for instance) incoming and outgoing messages that may contain username and password information. Aforementioned keystroke loggers (preferably softwarebased) and spear-phishing attacks are also effective at stealing key passwords that may provide access to networks that house industry secrets.

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Often, these tools are used together in a coordinated effort to virtually trespass on computers and networks. Cyber Vandalism and Disruption Cyber vandalism is a type of cybercrime that often involves website defacement and temporary denial of access to websites or networks. This crime type is commonly accomplished through Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks. These attacks attempt to make a targeted website or computer network temporarily unavailable to the intended users by bombarding it with voluminous network traffic and consuming a large amount of a systems computational resources (Chen et al., 2012). This type of attack can be conducted on a large scale involving many perpetrators or through one individual who has control of a botnet. A botnet is network of computers connected through malware and is controlled by a single user (known as the bot-herder) (Silva, Silva, Pinto, & Salles, 2013). DDoS attacks have been used for many different purposes, including simple acts of protest. The hacktivist group, Anonymous, has used this method of attack in protest in multiple occasions. For example, Anonymous declared war on the church of Scientology, launching DDoS attacks to deny access to the church’s website (Ferrada & Lindgren, 2014). Instances such as these garner much controversy as some see these attacks as acts of protest, while others see them as criminal. Moreover, these attacks are seen as largely nuisances that cause temporary problems for website and/or network operators; to overcome a DDoS attack, the administrator simply can wait for the attack to end (which may be 10 minutes or an hour) or temporarily take down the website or turn off the affected network. Other forms of malware (i.e., malicious software/programming code), such as Trojan horses, are designed to disrupt computer operations, gather sensitive data, or gain access to private computer systems. A Trojan horse is a type of malware that portrays a legitimate purpose but has hidden features that creates backdoor access for attackers into private computer systems. Logic bombs, camouflaged segments of downloadable software programs, destroy data when certain conditions are met (Reveron, 2012). Viruses are also extremely disruptive malicious code that self-replicates by infecting other files in order to reproduce; viruses require a user to download and run the file. Once activated, a virus will disrupt the computer and potentially infiltrate the network. Depending on how the offender programs the virus, viruses can delete information, alter the directory structure to run certain programs, and infect aspects of the computer’s operating system (OS) (Reveron, 2012). Finally, worms act in very similar disruptive ways to viruses, except a worm does not require user interaction and is able to self-replicate without infecting other files (i.e., this is the

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more “undercover” version of a virus). Worms have developed encryption techniques and polymorphic coding in order to increase difficulty of detection (Bowles, 2012). A Word about Spam Spam, one of the most prevalent cyber occurrences, is largely considered to be more of a nuisance than a credible cyber threat or crime. Spam is a method of excessive advertisement or bombardment of messages in which an individual floods the Internet with many copies of the same message in order to reach a much larger viewing audience. The Internet offers many services by which these types of attacks can be conducted. Although spam primarily affects e-mail services, others such as instant messaging, social networks, mobile phones, and even online gaming have become victims of different spamming attacks (Hong, 2012). However, the content of spam messages (in most cases) does not often contain criminal or otherwise illegal content. Experts estimated that spam accounted for over 70 percent of global Internet e-mail traffic in 2012 (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2013). Hacking and Its Evolution The term “hacking” or “hackers” is often used in the media to portray an individual who commits a large scope of cybercrimes. Generally, when referring to hackers, it is in response to a cybercrime that has been committed through the Internet. But this has not always been the case. Historically the word “hack” had no negative connotation or stigmatization; rather the term meant a novel method of solving a problem (Grand, 2006). The term “hacker” has evolved since the 1960s and 1970s, and now encompasses “black hat” hackers (i.e., hackers who hack for criminal purposes) and “white hat” hackers (i.e., hackers who consider themselves “ethical hackers,” hacking for the “good of the community” and are typically not seen as lawbreakers) (Gold, 2014). The first members of the hacker culture were individuals of the Tech Model Railroad Club at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT). Specifically, a group of members who referred to themselves as the Signals and Power Subcommittee began what is described as “modern hacking.” This group would consistently improve and perfect “The System” in order to increase efficiency. Members of the train club began a fascination with the increasing complexity of The System, especially with regards to how changing one aspect of the network would affect another part. In the late 1970s, personal computers and networking systems began to rapidly develop due to the nature of open source sharing, as traditionally started with the MIT Model Train Club (Levy, 2014). Technology enthusiasts began to crave new technology

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and quickly wanted to learn about the hardware and software of each new device. Although personal computers did exist at the time, they were very expensive and very large by modern standards. Because of these limitations, enthusiasts were required to look at other technologies to better understand programming and networking. The first networking systems that were targeted and manipulated by hackers were large communication networks run by major commercial corporations. Hackers would manipulate the communication system in order to send free long distance calls. These individuals were labeled “phreakers” and were the beginning of the hacking revolution as we know it today (Gold, 2011). Phreakers were able to create a machine that would emit a tone to bypass the normal network mechanisms in order to make free long distance calls to anywhere in the world. This machine came to be known as the “blue box.” However, by the 1980s, personal computers were beginning to become more accessible to the general public and as such, the hacker culture almost entirely focused on manipulating computer systems (Seebruck, 2015). Like-minded individuals had already begun to create social hacking groups, both in person and online through the bulletin board system (BBS). These bulletin boards acted as the very first information-sharing portion of the digital world. Individuals with a common purpose would share information with one another in order to foster rapid development and knowledge of computing and networking. Competition among hacking groups was instrumental in rapid advancement of computing and computer systems. By the 1990s, hacker groups became interested in understanding how new technology worked as it became available. Each group wanted to have their own innovative solutions to computing issues as well as create their own programs and efficient computers. The contemporary meaning of “hacker” became the dominant definition in the mid-1990s with public fear surrounding the Kevin Mitnick trial (Gold, 2014). Mitnick was arrested and charged with disrupting and attacking numerous corporate and communication systems in several states across the United States. The rhetoric used by the judge in the Kevin Mitnick case created fear and panic among the general population that computer hacking was a major threat to U.S. security, and that destruction could be brought upon them by the strokes of a few keys. Today, the term “hacking” generally holds a negative connotation. However, there are two separate subcategories in which hackers should now be considered. Black hat hackers, also known as crackers, are those that adhere to the conventional definition of hackers. These individuals illegally break into computer networks and information systems in order to steal information or disrupt computer and information systems (Ablon & Libicki, 2015). Members of the black hat group are responsible for creating malware, conducting major DDoS attacks or other large-scale cyber

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attacks. In general, these individuals do not care about breaking the law and have no remorse for harm and injury. The motives behind these individuals differ; some are out for financial gain, while others simply like the adrenaline, thrill, and reputation (Gold, 2014). White hat hackers are often security professionals and vulnerability specialists who develop security programs and services to protect information systems from being attacked by an outside threat. Professionals use techniques in order to assess the risk that an organization faces and create a security system capable of protecting essential information and possibly keeping confidential information secure (Bowles, 2012). CRIMINAL EVOLUTIONS IN CYBERSPACE Technologies have continued to develop at ever-increasing speeds, particularly with the help of crowdfunding (i.e., the practice of funding innovative projects by asking for donations from the public via websites [e.g., “Kickstarter campaigns”]). However, research and development in cyberspace continues in the government and private sectors as well and has reached into the depths of the cyber domain (often referred to as the “dark web”). The dark web constitutes the unindexed corners of the WWW (in other words, these are networks and websites of the WWW that are not accessible or located by traditional search engines like Google Chrome) and contains both small and large networks—much like those on the standard WWW. However, these networks require specific software to gain access to them. Smaller peer-to-peer networks do exist, but the most well-known network that features a darknet is the Tor Network. “Tor” originally stood for “the onion router” and was conceptualized by researchers in the early 2000s. By 2010, the U.S. Naval Research Laboratory and the National Science Foundation (among others) funded the concept and launched the Tor Network to the public, advertising it as an ultimate privacy network; Tor’s anonymizing software ensures that users IP addresses remain anonymous by routing the actual IP address through a series of nodal relays (see Dolliver, 2015 and Dolliver & Love, 2015). Essentially, once the user enters the Tor Network after downloading the free Tor software from TorProject. org, the IP address connected with your browsing habits on Tor no longer accurately reflects your location or device. This keeps your cyber fingerprints from being identified by law enforcement (or any other interested party), and your Tor browsing habits cannot be tracked or traced. Thus, the Tor Project (the 503c nonprofit organization based in Cambridge, Massachusetts, that operates and maintains the Tor Network) touts that Tor allows governments to communicate with their employees in a secured environment, whistle-blowers are able to alert the media without fear of being identified, and law enforcement agencies can use Tor to enable truly anonymous crime tip-lines (TorProject, 2016). However, the promise

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of anonymity has fostered a community of crime (van Hout & Bingham, 2014), and the culture has indeed flourished. Tor utilizes the .onion domain (whereas the WWW uses the .com, for instance). Once the user is logged on to the Tor Network, they are able to access any and all websites available on the “clearnet” (i.e., the open, indexed WWW; this includes Facebook, Google, the New York Times, etc.). However, Tor also provides access to .onion sites that are not able to be accessed from standard clearnet web browsers (e.g., Google Chrome). Since Tor is unindexed, users are unable to “search” for Tor sites; herein lies additional motivation for criminals—a user must already know what they are looking for in order to access it on Tor. In other words, law enforcement officials (for instance) cannot “search” Tor for “weapons markets” and receive a list of URLs specific to those search terms. Thus, Fred (in our example) would be able to create his own Tor site (i.e., a website hosted on the Tor’s .onion domain) using a nondescript URL (e.g., xsdoijt8934.onion) that serves as a recruiting forum for violent extremist groups, without worrying that law enforcement would stumble across xsdoijt8934.onion. One year after the public launch of the Tor Network was the launch of one Tor site named Silk Road that somewhat mimicked eBay or Craigslist. Silk Road (located at the Tor URL http://silkroadvb5piz3r.onion prior to being shut down by law enforcement officials) became known as an international virtual marketplace for all things criminal: drugs, weapons, stolen credit card information, malware products for sale, to name a few (e.g., Christin, 2012; Grossman & Newton-Small, 2013). The Tor site grew to be one of the largest by trade volume on the Tor Network by early 2013. In October 2013, law enforcement officials in the United States shut down Silk Road, seizing its servers and arresting the site’s now convicted operator, Ross Ulbricht (FBI, 2015). However, since Silk Road involuntarily shut its virtual doors following international media attention (Dolliver, 2015), hundreds of similar international marketplaces were launched to fill the void (to name a few: Silk Road 2, Silk Road 3 [which launched four days after the demise of Silk Road 2], Pandora, Agora, Evolution, Cloud 9, The Armory, AlphaBay, Outlaw Market, Aflao). More recently, countryspecific Tor marketplaces housing criminal goods and services for sale have launched, including RuTor (Russian), IDC (Italian), and ToRepublic (Polish). It is on the Tor platform and similar darknet outlets that criminal innovations thrive. Within these marketplaces, one can locate large “data dumps” for sale—databases of stolen personal information usually sold in blocks of ten thousand—for under 5 USD. This would be a potentially lucrative option for Fred Sullivan (in our example) in his quest to raise funds for the violent extremist group he associates with; using some of the cyber tools available for theft and fraud purposes (e.g., passwordattacking tools, hacking methods, spear phishing), Fred might be able to access customer records from a corporate account, stealing thousands

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of credit card numbers and selling them to the highest bidder on Tor. Ransomware software may prove another lucrative outlet for Fred; if he were to “blanket attack” many (i.e., embed the ransomware into a generic e-mail and send it to tens of thousands of individuals), he may be able to raise a large number of funds in a short period of time. In December 2015, security experts became aware of a new type of ransomware, called Ransom32 (BBC, 2016); generally, criminal organizations that develop various types of ransomware code (e.g., CryptoLocker) keep the code to themselves. However, one criminal organization developed ransomware code (dubbed Ransom32) that is freely downloadable from Tor. This “point and click” malware is designed for users who lack the technological skills to develop their own code, and the organization offering this service for sale receive 25 percent of any ransom collected from each attack. “Dark markets” such as those housed on Tor contain a myriad of criminal offenses discussed in this chapter within each website, complicating any coordinated law enforcement investigation. For instance, browsing items and services for sale on Evolution and Agora (two of the largest marketplaces in operation in 2014–2015) that were advertised from 51 distinct countries revealed potential drug-related offenses (possession, transporting, advertising, manufacturing), weapons offenses (illegally modified firearms), child pornography possession and distribution, possession and distribution of stolen personal information (credit card numbers, social security numbers, etc.), distribution of malware, illegal tobacco sales (a major element of transnational organized crime), and counterfeit money and document offenses (e.g., manufacturing and distributing counterfeit U.S. currency, services to create fake passports and drivers licenses) (Dolliver & Kenney, 2016; Dolliver & Love, 2015). Without being able to easily identify the cyber fingerprints of the vendors and buyers on these Tor marketplaces, accompanied by the complications related to tracing payments on these sites (conducted solely in Bitcoin, a somewhat anonymous, unregulated or nationally recognized virtual currency or “cryptocurrency”), the method of international shipment for illegal items (parcel services become the “front lines” of parcel detection and interception), and the challenge of decrypting encrypted communications, investigators are presented with seemingly insurmountable hurdles. However, through international cooperation between federal law enforcement agencies in over 16 countries, well over 400 .onion sites, including dozens of marketplaces, have been shut down and individuals tied to cybercrimes on these sites (including operators of the websites, vendors, and customers) have been arrested (e.g., FBI, 2015; NakedSecurity, 2015). To explore Tor Network criminality further, see the work conducted by Dolliver and colleagues (Dolliver, 2015; Dolliver & Kenney, 2016; Dolliver & Love, 2015), van Hout and Bingham (2013a, 2013b), and

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others (Aldridge & Decary-Hetu, 2014; Barratt, Ferris, & Winstock, 2014; Martin, 2014). CONCLUSION While this chapter covered the most common and frequently occurring forms of cybercrime and related tools, new cyber tools used for criminal purposes are being engineered and introduced to the international market every day. Law enforcement remains one step behind (perhaps 20 steps behind) cybercriminals, as local agencies in the United States struggle with funding and resources to train officers on what constitutes cybercrimes and how to handle digital evidence, and also with equipping police departments with the technical means and expertise to extract and analyze digital forensic evidence. One successful police endeavor to do just this is the Joint Electronic Crimes Task Force (JECTF) located in Tuscaloosa, Alabama. The JECTF partners with the University of Alabama and is operated by the University of Alabama Police Department (UAPD). The task force is staffed with officers from the Tuscaloosa metro area and is the largest police-run lab in the state with only four full-time digital forensic examiners. While the task force is expected to grow in numbers in the coming years, it is evident that law enforcement in general has quite a way to go before local departments can adequately investigate many crimes that cross into the virtual world (visit http://cybercrime.as.ua.edu/ resources/jectf for more information on the JECTF). Further complicating the law enforcement effort is the high percentage of underreported cybercrimes—recent estimates by the UNODC (2013) approximated that only a dismal 1 percent of cybercrimes are reported to police. Perhaps victims assume that the police will not be able to help, or (as is often the case in cyber-fraud cases) their financial institutions reimbursed them for any stolen funds. Indeed, in many U.S. counties and towns, local law enforcement may not have the capacity to investigate certain cybercrimes—in which case, many victims are encouraged to report the crime to the FBI’s IC3 (Internet Crime Complaint Center) (www.ic3.gov). Outside of the United States, many countries face similar, and sometimes more complex, challenges—only 82 countries in the world have any laws regarding crimes in cyberspace (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2013). Prosecutors around the world remain undertrained, and even law enforcement agencies in developed, Western countries struggle with training officers on electronic evidence collection, preservation, extraction, and analysis (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2013). Law enforcement in developed countries face fragmentation problems— federal agencies tend to have the most resources and training, while local and state agencies do not. Law enforcement in developing countries face

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far greater challenges related to infrastructure; electricity and Internet connectivity are low, personnel are largely untrained and receive low wages, and political corruption undermines any honest enforcement efforts (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2013). Cybercrimes are also not an “equal opportunity” offense. It is not possible to be a cyber offender without having access to cyberspace; however, one can become a victim of cybercrime without ever logging on to the Internet. Moreover, Internet connectivity rates internationally remain unevenly distributed; while the United States has nearly 90 percent of its population connected to the Internet, only 52 percent of Chinese citizens and 10 percent of Pakistanis have access to the Internet (for instance). A mere 9.8 percent of all inhabitants on the African continent are connected to the Internet (InternetLiveStats, 2016). This not only creates differential opportunities (or blocked opportunities) for would-be cyber offenders but also creates differential degrees of motivation for countries to address cyber offenses within their own borders or work together with other countries to overcome the transnational nature of cybercrimes. While societies around the world are in various stages of adapting to online communication, information storage, and virtual fingerprints, it is the global policy challenge to increase awareness of the risks and benefits of “cyber” and remain on the forefront of cybercrime-related research. Cyberspace is “weird,” and perhaps even “unnatural” (Betz & Stevens, 2012, p. 104), but the challenges posed by this domain are not insurmountable.

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Bonner, L. (2012). Cyber risk: How the 2011 Sony data breach and the need for cyber risk insurance policies should direct the federal response to rising data breaches. Washington University Journal of Law & Policy, 40, 257–277. Bowles, M. (2012). The business of hacking and birth of an industry. Bell Labs Technical Journal, 17, 5–16. Bucci, S. (2012). Joining cybercrime and cyberterrorism: A likely scenario. In D. Reveron’s (Ed.), Cyberspace and national security: Threats, opportunities, and power in a virtual world (pp. 57–70). Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press. Chen, Z., Roussopoulos, M., Liang, Z., Zhang, Y., Chen, Z., & Delis, A. (2012). Malware characteristics and threats on the internet ecosystem. The Journal of Systems & Software, 8, 1650–1672. Chirgwin, R. (2015). Canadian government websites hosed, Anonymous takes credit. Retrieved from http://www.theregister.co.uk/2015/06/17/canadian_ government_sites_hosed_anons_take_credit/. Christin, N. (2012). Traveling the Silk Road: A measurement analysis of a large anonymous online marketplace. The 22nd International Conference on World Wide Web. International World Wide Web Conferences Steering Committee. Dolliver, D. S. (2015). Evaluating drug trafficking on the Tor Network: Silk Road 2, the sequel. The International Journal of Drug Policy, 26, 1113–1123. Dolliver, D. S., & Kenney, J. (2016). Characteristics of drug vendors on the Tor Network: A cryptomarket comparison. Victims and Offenders: An International Journal of Evidence-Based Research, Policy, and Practice, 11(4), 600–620. Dolliver, D. S., & Love, K. L. (2015). Criminogenic asymmetries in cyberspace: A comparative analysis of two online marketplaces. Journal of Globalization Studies, 5, 3–24. Dolliver, M., & Dolliver, D. (Eds.). (2014). Policing cyberspace: Law enforcement and forensics in the digital age. San Diego, CA: Cognella Academic Publishing. Dreßing, H., Bailer, J., Anders, A., Wagner, H., & Gallas, C. (2014). Cyberstalking in a large sample of social network users: Prevalence, characteristics, and impact upon victims. Cyberpsychology, Behavior & Social Networking, 17, 61–67. Ellison, L., & Akdeniz, Y. (1998). Cyber-stalking: The regulation of harassment on the Internet. Criminal Law Review, 4, 29–48. Erlin, T. (2015). Why it’s time to take the ‘cyber’ out of cybercrime and respond to it as crime. Engineering & Technology, 10, 29. European Commission. (2015). Cybercrime. Retrieved from https://ec.europa.eu/ home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/organized-crime-and-human-trafficking/ cybercrime_en. FBI. (2015). Ross Ulbricht, aka Dread Pirate Roberts, sentenced in Manhattan Federal Court to life in prison. New York: New York Field Office [Press release]. Retrieved from https://www.fbi.gov/newyork/press-releases/2015/rossulbricht-aka-dread-pirate-roberts-sentenced-in-manhattan-federal-courtto-life-in-prison. Ferrada Stoehrel, R., & Lindgren, S. (2014). For the lulz: Anonymous, aesthetics, and affect. Triplec (Cognition, Communication, Co-Operation): Open Access Journal for a Global Sustainable Information Society, 12, 238–264. Francescani, C. (2016, April 26). Ransomware hackers blackmail U.S. Police departments. NBC News. Retrieved from http://www.nbcnews.com/news/ us-news/ransomware-hackers-blackmail-u-s-police-departments-n561746.

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Gold, S. (2011). Feature: The rebirth of phreaking. Network Security, 2011, 15–17. Gold, S. (2014). Get your head around hacker psychology. Engineering & Technology, 9, 76–80. Goodman, S., Kirk, J., & Kirk, M. (2007). Cyberspace as a medium for terrorists. Technological Forecasting and Social Change, 74, 193–210. Grand, J. (2006). A brief history of hardware hacking. Communications of the ACM, 49, 49. Greavu-S¸ erban, V., & S¸ erban, O. (2014). Social engineering a general approach. Informatica Economica, 18, 5–14. Griffith, R. (2005). How criminal justice agencies use the Internet. In A. Pattavina’s (Ed.), Information technology and the criminal justice system (pp. 59–76). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. Grossman, L., & Newton-Small, J. (2013, November 11). The secret web: Where drugs, porn, and murder hide online. TIME, 182, 26–33. Hong, J. (2012). The state of phishing attacks. Communications of the ACM, 55, 74–81. InternetLiveStats. (2016). Internet users. Retrieved from http://www.internetlives tats.com/internet users/. Jagatic, T. N., Johnson, N. A., Jakobsson, M., & Menczer, F. (2007). Social phishing. Communications of the ACM, 50, 94–100. Kramer, F., Starr, S. H., & Wentz, L. K. (Eds.). (2009). Cyberpower and national security. Washington, DC: National Defense University Press. Levy, S. (2014). The Tech Model Railroad Club. Wired. Retrieved from https:// www.wired.com/2014/11/the-tech-model-railroad-club/. Manel, J. (2016, March 4). The cyber kidnappers: The day hackers hijacked my phone. BBC. Retrieved from http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-35720073. Markoff, J. (2005). What the dormouse said: How the sixties counterculture shaped the personal computer industry. New York: Penguin. Martin, J. (2014). Lost on the Silk Road: Online drug distribution and 660 the “cryptomarket.” Criminology and Criminal Justice, 14, 351–367. doi:10.1177/ 1748895813505234. NakedSecurity. (2015, July). FBI again thwarts Tor to unmask visitors to a dark web child sex abuse site. Retrieved from https://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/ 2015/07/22/fbi-again-thwarts-tor-to-unmask-visitors-to-a-dark-web-childsex-abuse-site/. Ngo, F. T., & Paternoster, R. (2011). Cybercrime victimization: An examination of individual and situational level factors. International Journal of Cyber Criminology, 5, 773–793. Patchin, J. W., & Hinduja, S. (2006). Bullies move beyond the schoolyard: A preliminary look at cyberbullying. Youth Violence and Juvenile Justice, 4, 148–169. Pittaro, M. L. (2007). Cyber stalking: An analysis of online harassment and intimidation. International Journal of Cyber Criminology, 1, 180–197. Randa, R. (2013). The influence of the cyber-social environment on fear of victimization: Cyberbullying and school. Security Journal, 26, 331–348. Reveron, D. (2012). Cyberspace and national security: Threats, opportunities, and power in a virtual world. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press. Reyns, B., Henson, B., & Fisher, B. (2011). Being pursued online: Applying cyberlifestyle-routine activities theory to cyberstalking victimization. Criminal Justice and Behavior, 38, 1149–1169.

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CHAPTER 9

Identity-Related Crimes Bradford W. Reyns

Conceptually, identity is a complex notion and carries philosophical, cultural, sociological, psychological, and legal meanings. Social scientists generally view identity, though, as comprising those characteristics that make a person or a group of people distinct (e.g., Leary & Tangney, 2012). However, interpretations of identity in the context of criminality are largely grounded in legal perspectives—defining the specifics of how offenders acquire and misuse identity for criminal purposes. Scholars studying the extent and nature of identity-related crimes have often operationalized the concept in practical terms, treating identity as the personal attributes or pieces of information that are identified with a particular individual, such as one’s name, social security number, or credit card account. Therefore, identity-related crimes occur when this personal identity information is illegally obtained, and/or used to perpetrate a crime. This chapter reviews the definitions, extent, nature, theory, and prevention of identityrelated crimes from a social science perspective, with a particular focus on the crime of identity theft. DEFINING IDENTITY-RELATED CRIMES “Identity-related crime” is an umbrella term under which offenses involving identity as either a target or a tool can be categorized (Koops & Leenes, 2006). It should be pointed out, however, that definitions of identityrelated crimes vary across jurisdictions and are still evolving. These crimes can vary in complexity from high-profile incidents of data theft, such as cyber attacks perpetrated against the U.S. government to phishing e-mails that convince users to disclose their personal information. Both of these examples illustrate a method or modus operandi to obtain information;

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in some jurisdictions, this acquisition would be viewed as an identityrelated crime, whereas in others it is how this information is unlawfully used that delineates a crime as identity related. Although several criminal activities are considered to be identity related (e.g., identity obstruction, identity creation, identity exchange, identity delegation), the reality is that the majority of research into identity-related crimes has focused on identity theft (Koops et al., 2009). Identity Theft There is no universal definition of identity theft, and as such, definitions of identity theft vary from country to country, creating some conceptual ambiguity surrounding the crime in its transnational context. According to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (2015), “identity theft occurs when someone unlawfully obtains another’s personal information and uses it to commit theft or fraud.” While seemingly straightforward, there are three important features to this definition. First, the information being misused belongs to an actual person. In other words, fictitious identities would not be considered identity theft because the identity in question has been manufactured rather than stolen. This scenario would actually be an example of unlawful identity creation (Koops et al., 2009). Second, the personal information that is involved in the identity theft is obtained fraudulently or otherwise illegally and used without the owner’s consent. For example, perhaps an identity thief uses a keylogger to obtain the victim’s information without his or her knowledge. Likewise, the offender could convince the victim to reveal sensitive information through fraudulent tactics. Third, the stolen identity is then used to perpetrate a crime, such as credit card fraud, bank account fraud, or other frauds involving existing or newly created accounts (e.g., Harrell, 2015). In the United States, these definitional criteria also appear in the Identity Theft and Assumption Deterrence Act, which was passed in 1998 and criminalized identity theft. According to Title 18 U.S. Code, Section 1028, it is a federal crime to: knowingly transfer or use, without lawful authority, a means of identification of another person with the intent to commit, or to aid or abet, any unlawful activity that constitutes a violation of federal law, or that constitutes a felony under any applicable or local law.

Other countries define identity theft somewhat differently from the United States. For example, in Canada, Criminal Code Section 402.2 and Criminal Code Section 403 define “identity theft” as the acquisition an individual’s information for criminal purposes, whereas “identity fraud” is the label given to the actual deceptive use of the information.

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Identity fraud is also discussed in forthcoming sections of this chapter. The United Kingdom makes a similar distinction between acquisition and use of the victim’s personal information through several laws criminalizing identity-related crimes (Wall, 2013). The French Criminal Code also recognizes these two phases of identity theft and obliges organizations that hold information to protect it from being obtained and misused (CIPPIC, 2007). These few examples illustrate some similarities and also some differences in conceptualization of identity theft across countries, and further demonstrate that identity-related crimes can overlap in their definitions. Definitions of Other Identity-Related Crimes Illustrating the complexity of identity-related crimes, Koops and colleagues (2009) explained that there are seven types of identity-related crimes. To begin with, identity theft, identity delegation, identity exchange, and identity creation are all forms of identity fraud. “Identity fraud,” like “identity-related crime,” is an umbrella term describing crimes that involve the use of false identification (e.g., Finklea, 2010; Newman & McNally, 2005). These four types of crime are most closely aligned with common conceptions of what constitutes an identity-related crime, but identity restoration, identification obstruction, and identifier erasure also are part of the identity-related crime panoply (for more on these latter offenses, see Koops et al., 2009). Unlawful identity delegation, identity exchange, and identity creation each involve some form of identity change for criminal purposes. It should be pointed out that there are also lawful forms of each of these behaviors. For instance, identity delegation can simply be described as using someone else’s identity with their consent. Using someone else’s passport with their consent would be criminal, whereas using someone else’s gym membership card with their consent would not be illegal, but both would be examples of identity delegation. Identity exchange occurs when two individuals mutually agree to use each other’s identity, essentially “switching places.” An example of this would be if two individuals in prison switch places to allow one of them to commit a crime, such as attack another inmate or escape, unnoticed. Finally, identity creation involves creating an identity that is not already associated with another individual. For example, creating a fictitious credit card number and “owner” would effectively involve creating a new identity—in addition to being credit card fraud. Conversely, creating a new identity on Twitter or Xbox Live as an alter ego is not illegal. Aside from these types of identity-related crimes, though, identity takeover—or identity theft—is potentially the most serious and prevalent. At the least, it is the identity-related crime that has received the most attention

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from researchers, policy makers, law enforcement, and the media (e.g., Allison, Schuck, & Lersch, 2005; Copes, Kerley, Kane, & Huff, 2010; Holt & Lampke, 2010; Rebovich, 2009; Reyns, 2013; White & Fisher, 2008). EXTENT OF IDENTITY-RELATED CRIMES Based on the data that are available, identity theft appears to have grown in scope over the last decade. For example, data from the United States indicate that identity theft affected 5.5 percent of households in 2005, but 7 percent of households in 2010 (Langton, 2011). Yet, rigorous estimates of the extent of the problem—as with other identity-related crimes—are in short supply. According to the most recent estimates from the National Crime Victimization Survey,1 7 percent of all U.S. residents aged 16 or older were victims of at least one incident of identity theft in 2014, which equates to 17.6 million persons (Harrell, 2015). In Canada, estimates suggest that of cybercrime incidents substantiated by police, 5 percent involved identity fraud and 1 percent involved identity theft (Mazowita & Vézina, 2014). In addition, 2014 estimates show that identity fraud occurred at a rate of 36 per 100,000 population—an 8 percent increase over the previous year (Boyce, 2015). However, these figures should be considered in light of the fact that not all crimes will be reported to police. In Australia, the Australian Institute of Criminology reported that 20 percent of respondents to a recent national survey disclosed some type of misuse of their personal identity information in their lifetime, and 9 percent reported such misuse in the 12 months prior to the survey (Smith & Hutchings, 2014). In contrast to the estimates from the United States and Canada, the Crime Survey for England and Wales reported a decrease in the extent of plastic card fraud (i.e., bank, debit, credit or store cards) in recent years. Specifically, the 2010-2011 survey reported that 5.2 percent of card holders were victims of plastic card fraud, whereas this estimate dropped to 4.7 percent for 2011-2012 (Office for National Statistics, 2013). Further, a recent development to the Crime Survey for England and Wales included a field trial to collect more extensive information on cybercrime and fraud in the United Kingdom. Preliminary results suggested that there were 5.1 million incidents of fraud and 2.5 million incidents of crimes involving misuse of the victims’ computer or Internet-enabled device—presumably a substantial portion of both of these incidents could be identity related (Office for National Statistics, 2015). Estimates from these four countries are incomplete in that they do not include all types of identity-related crimes, but they are among the best and most methodologically rigorous that are available. Aside from estimates of the scope of these crimes, these data sources also provide information related to the nature of identity-related crimes. That is, they provide evidence regarding how these offenses are perpetrated, the characteristics of

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offenders, the characteristics of victims, victim reporting behaviors, and the costs of identity-related crimes.

NATURE OF IDENTITY-RELATED CRIMES Patterns in Identity-Related Crimes The methods used by identity offenders to perpetrate identity-related crimes are varied, as are the ways in which the identity is used to perpetrate a crime. Victimization data reveal that the most frequent use of the victim’s identity is to commit credit card fraud or bank fraud using an existing account (Harrell, 2015; Harrell & Langton, 2013). Based on National Crime Victimization Survey data, 3 percent of persons that took the survey experienced at least one incident involving an existing credit card or bank account. Collectively, these victims accounted for 86 percent of all identity theft victims identified in the survey (Harrell, 2015). Further, among victims of identity theft, less than 1 percent had other existing account information (e.g., phone, online, insurance) misused or had their information used to open a new account (e.g., loan, checking, phone). The National Crime Victimization Survey also reveals how victims discovered that they had become victims of identity theft. About 45 percent of victims became aware of the misuse of their information when contacted by a financial institution (e.g., bank, credit card company) about activity on the account. Other common ways that victims discovered the identity theft included noticing fraudulent charges on the account (18%), noticing money missing from the account (9%), contacting the financial institution to report a theft (7%), and having a card or check declined due to insufficient funds (5%). Interestingly, however, only 32 percent of victims knew how their personal information was obtained (Harrell, 2015). Uncovering similar patterns to those identified in the United States, the Australian Institute of Criminology reported that of the individuals who experienced misuse of personal information in the last 12 months, the top three types of misused information were credit and debit card information (52%), name (40%), and bank account information (31%). Further, study participants were also asked how they believed their information was obtained; frequent responses included theft or hacking of a computer or device (e.g., smartphone) (20%), from an online banking transaction (19.5%), by e-mail (18%), and by placing information on a website (15%) (Smith & Hutchings, 2014). This demonstrates the sophisticated and diverse ways in which identity crimes—particularly identity theft—can be perpetrated. The results of the Australian Institute of Criminology’s survey regarding how the misuse of personal information was detected by the victim in many ways mirror those from the United States. That is, a large portion of victims received notification from a financial institution such as a credit card company or a bank (43%). For others, the misuse was

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discovered when reviewing suspicious transactions on accounts or bank statements (33%), or when they received an unexpected bill from a business or company (13%) (Smith & Hutchings, 2014). Similar findings have also been reported for victims in England and Wales (Office for National Statistics, 2013). It is important to understand the nature of the criminal act when it comes to identity-related crimes to answer “what” questions. However, to answer the “why” questions, it is also necessary to focus upon the perpetrators of identity-related offenses. In doing so, researchers have studied the characteristics of offenders and developed offender typologies to categorize offenders according to traits, such as the sophistication of their techniques and their motivations for committing the crime.

Identity-Related Crime Offenders Offender Characteristics Since comprehensive data on identity-related crimes are not systematically collected by law enforcement agencies or through victimization surveys, it is somewhat difficult to describe the typical perpetrator of these crimes. However, researchers who have investigated this issue have utilized alternatives to these large national data sources in exploring the nature of identity theft perpetrators. For example, Allison, Schuck, and Lersch (2005) used data from a large municipal police department in Florida to investigate, among other things, the characteristics of offenders and victims involved in identity theft. Their results suggested that the average offender was African American, female, unemployed, working alone, and unknown to victims. This study also suggested that clearance rates for identity theft are low relative to other crimes, and that detectives provided reasons such as “jurisdictional problems, problems with allocation of department resources, and obtaining cooperation from affected financial institutions” for the low clearance rates (Allison et al., 2005, p. 27). In a more recent study, the Center for Identity Management and Information Protection reviewed data contained in over 500 U.S. Secret Service case files involving identity theft to investigate identity fraud trends and patterns (Gordon, Choo, Rebovich, & Gordon, 2007). Results from this study suggested that the average identity offender was relatively young (42% were 25–34 years old), had no official arrest history, and did not perpetrate the crime in the course of their employment. This study also reported that most offenders were motivated by personal gain, utilized technology of some kind (e.g., Internet) only half the time, and that 42 percent of cases involved two or more offenders (see also Rebovich, 2009). In a similar study, Copes and Vieraitis (2009b) interviewed 59 identityrelated crime offenders incarcerated in federal prisons in the United

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States, with a focus on offender characteristics as well as the techniques used to perpetrate their crimes. In terms of offender characteristics, Copes and Vieraitis reported that offenders were primarily female and African American with an average age of 38 years.2 Further, a majority of offenders had been employed at the time they perpetrated the identity-related crime, although for most this employment did not facilitate the crime. It is also noteworthy that 63 percent of study participants had prior arrests. This study also found that the most common methods for obtaining the personal information of others were to purchase it from other thieves or to steal it from trash cans or mailboxes, and that the most common tactic for profiting from the stolen information was to apply for credit cards (Copes & Vieraitis, 2009b). Offender Typologies Beyond simply describing the characteristics of individuals who perpetrate identity-related crimes, researchers have also begun to develop typologies of offenders. Typologies provide a means of organizing or classifying types, and typologies of identity-related offenders have been based upon the sophistication of their techniques as well as their frequency and motivations for offending. For example, Newman and McNally (2005) suggested that a four category typology of white-collar offenders based on the frequency of criminal behavior was also appropriate for describing identity offenders (see Weisburd, Waring, & Chayet, 2001). Two of these offender types—“crisis responders” and “opportunity takers”—were classified as low-frequency offenders. Conversely, the high-frequency offenders were described as “opportunity seekers” and “stereotypical criminals.” These labels are fairly explanatory, with the exception of “crisis responders,” who commit identity crimes in response to some perceived crisis in their lives. Similarly, Rebovich (2009) reviewed results from two studies of identitycrime offenders and developed a typology of identity thieves with three categories: situational, routine, and professional. Rebovich explained that situational offenders take advantage of opportunities as they come along (e.g., at work), while routine offenders are those who continuously have access to such information through their employment and thus make identity crime a routine activity. Finally, professional identity offenders are those who are sophisticated career criminals, often acting alone, and “taking on multiple criminal roles” (Rebovich, 2009, p. 362). A compatible typology developed by Morris (2010) categorized identity theft based on the offender’s level of sophistication. Based on a content analysis of a nationally representative sample of U.S. newspapers articles (1995–2005), Morris explained that there are four levels of identity theft sophistication: circumstantial (i.e., based on circumstance, opportunity), general identity (i.e., nontechnical, premeditated), sophisticated ID

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(i.e., use of computer technology, increased planning), and highly sophisticated (i.e., complex organization, many victims, national or global operations). Overall, these typologies are useful because they aid researchers in conceptualization, measurement, and potentially in theory development (Collier, LaPorte, & Seawright, 2012). While fully developed theories of identity-related crimes have not yet been conceived, these typologies are necessary first steps in understanding the nature of identity-related crime perpetration. Identity-Related Crime Victims Due to the growing use of victimization surveys in several countries, there is comparatively more information available regarding the victims of identity-related crimes, including their characteristics, reporting behaviors, and harm suffered as a result of the crime. According to the National Crime Victimization Survey, individuals with certain characteristics were victimized at higher rates than other persons, including females, whites and persons of two or more races, individuals 35–49 years old, and those with annual household incomes of $75,000 or more. These patterns in victimization were fairly consistent across types of identity theft (e.g., credit card, bank account), but there was also some variation according to these types. For example, males had slightly higher rates of victimization for misuse of an existing credit card but lower rates than females for misuse of an existing bank account (Harrell, 2015). Data from the Australian Institute of Criminology’s survey found that there were few significant differences between victims and non-victims of identity crime with respect to their demographic characteristics (e.g., age, gender). However, statistically significant relationships were found between Indigenous status, income, language spoken in the home, place of residence, and victimization status, with Indigenous persons, those with incomes above $37,000, English speakers, and those living outside the capital city having higher victimization rates than their counterparts without these characteristics (Smith & Hutchings, 2014). In England and Wales, individuals with higher incomes (£50,000 or more) had higher rates of plastic card fraud compared to those with incomes lower than £50,000. Further, those who were employed were more likely to experience plastic card fraud than their unemployed counterparts. However, other attributes did not differentiate victims from nonvictims according to survey data. For instance, individuals living in rural areas were equally at risk for victimization when compared to those living in urban areas. Additionally, while persons over 75 years old were at lower risk for victimization than younger persons, the risk of victimization did not vary significantly among persons in other age groups (Office for National Statistics, 2015). Interestingly, victimization risk can also vary

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according to combinations of demographic characteristics. For example, the Crime Survey for England and Wales reported that females aged 25–34 had higher rates of victimization than males of the same age, but males 35–44 had higher rates of victimization than females in this age group (Office for National Statistics, 2013). The correlates of victimization have also been examined at the macrolevel. For example, Higgins and his colleagues (2008) used data from the U.S. Census and the Federal Trade Commission to identify the state-level characteristics associated with rates of identity theft. Specifically, they found that the age and gender composition of the state impacted identity theft complaints, with states with more males having more complaints, and states with larger populations under the age of 15 having fewer complaints. The findings also suggested that states with more entertainment establishments and higher residential mobility were more likely to have more complaints for identity theft (Higgins, Hughes, Ricketts, & Wolfe, 2008). Reporting of Identity-Related Crimes The previously discussed victimization surveys also provide information on the reporting behaviors of victims of identity-related crimes. Generally, the victim’s decision to report the crime to law enforcement often determines whether the criminal justice system will be called upon to respond to criminal behavior (e.g., Skogan, 1984). This is likely even more so the case in instances of identity-related crimes because the possibilities for third parties such as bystanders to report the crime are substantially reduced. However, it is also possible that organizations such as banks will ultimately contact law enforcement when victims do not, but the reporting practices of these organizations have yet to be studied systematically. Regardless, the research that has been undertaken to date suggests that identity-related crimes such as identity theft are severely underreported by victims. The most recently published National Crime Victimization Survey data found that only 8 percent of all victims of identity theft reported the incident to police or another law enforcement agency. Victim reporting differed by type of identity theft, however, with 35 percent of victims of personal information fraud contacting law enforcement, followed by 20 percent of those whose information was used to create a new account. Reporting was lowest among victims of existing credit card (3%) and bank account fraud (8%) (Harrell, 2015). In Australia, victim reporting of identity crime is reportedly higher (around 13%), but methodological differences in the two surveys make it difficult to make direct comparisons (Smith & Hutchings, 2014). Although victim reporting seems to be fairly low based on the available evidence, those who do contact the authorities following identity-related victimization seem to be relatively satisfied with the results (e.g., Smith & Hutchings, 2014). Further, many victims

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decide to contact other organizations for help in resolving the issue, especially credit card companies, banks, and credit bureaus (Harrell, 2015). Although criminologists have been slow to investigate the dynamics of victim reporting of identity-related crimes, a recent study by Reyns and Randa (2017) is informative. This study examined National Crime Victimization Survey data to explain the predictors of the victim’s decision to report credit card fraud, bank fraud, any existing account fraud, and new account fraud. Reyns and Randa found support for two notable criminal justice theories (see Gottfredson & Gottfredson, 1988; Steffensmeier, Ulmer, & Kramer, 1998) and identified several factors that influenced victim reporting, particularly the seriousness of the offense, practical considerations, and victim characteristics (i.e., income). Specifically, individuals who were emotionally distressed, who personally lost money, who knew how the offender obtained their information, and who also contacted another institution (e.g., a bank) were more likely than others to notify the police of the crime (Reyns & Randa, 2017). As stated, victim reporting impacts the ability of law enforcement and the criminal justice system to effectively respond to identity-related crimes. Although there is little research into clearance rates for these types of offenses, data from Canada indicate that over 97 percent of identity thefts and 81 percent of identity frauds were not cleared in 2012 (Mazowita & Vézina, 2014). Presumably, these low clearance rates could be linked to low rates of reporting, but firm conclusions are difficult to reach. These surveys also suggest possible reasons why victims do not contact law enforcement agencies following identity-related criminal events. Often, this is because victims do not believe that the police or other authorities will be able to do anything, that they reported it to some other organization, such as the bank, or that they did not lose any money as a result of the crime (see Reyns & Randa, 2017). Costs of Identity-Related Crimes Identity-related crimes are somewhat unique in the context of other property-based crimes because many times the individual whose property is misused does not ultimately incur any financial costs as a result of the crime. This is in contrast to other, more traditional, forms of property crime such as burglary, larceny theft, and motor vehicle theft that involve the taking, damaging, or destroying of property without the permission of the owner. Estimates from the Uniform Crime Reports specify average costs for these crimes to be $2,230, $987, and $6,019, respectively (FBI, 2014). On the other hand, although individuals who have their information misused often suffer a direct monetary loss (i.e., the amount obtained by the offender), these losses are often reimbursed (e.g., by credit card companies). For example, the National Crime Victimization Survey found that 64 percent of victims of identity theft experienced a direct loss in 2014.

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Yet, the percentage that experienced a direct out-of-pocket loss was 9.4 percent, suggesting that most victims of identity theft eventually were reimbursed for their losses. Further, of victims who suffered a personal outof-pocket loss, a majority lost less than $99 (Harrell, 2015). Similarly, small losses were also reported among victims of identity-related crimes in Australia, England, and Wales (Office for National Statistics, 2013; Smith & Hutchings, 2014). Aside from its financial impact on victims, identityrelated crimes can also affect individuals emotionally, with an estimated 36 percent of U.S. victims of identity theft reporting moderate or severe emotional distress following the incident (Harrell, 2015). THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES Criminology, victimology, and other social science disciplines have no shortage of theories that might explain identity-related crimes either as an offense or as a victimization experience. However, very few empirical examinations of identity crimes have been theoretically grounded. In spite of this, the opportunity perspective, which spans both criminology and victimology, has emerged as a primary theoretical framework for understanding both criminality and victimization in the context of identityrelated offenses. Neutralization theory and the general theory of crime from criminology have also been used toward this end. Opportunity Perspective The opportunity perspective, which is grounded in routine activity theory, rational choice theory, and crime pattern theory, is based on the principle that opportunities are ultimately the cause of criminal events (Felson & Clarke, 1998). To elaborate, opportunities are circumstances that are favorable to some outcome. Thus, opportunities are generated when certain factors related to time, place, and targets culminate to produce these favorable circumstances. Further, opportunity theories posit that crime opportunities are very specific (Felson & Clarke, 1998). For example, the circumstances favorable to a crime such as identity theft are necessarily different than those favorable to motor vehicle theft. In addition, the opportunity perspective suggests that crime opportunities can contribute to criminal motivation, but that the sources of criminal motivation do not necessarily need to be explained in order to understand why criminal events occur (Felson & Clarke, 1998). A number of studies of identity-related crimes, especially identity theft, have utilized the opportunity perspective to identity predictors of victimization (e.g., Holtfreter, Reisig, Pratt, & Holtfreter, 2015; Newman, 2009; Pratt, Holtfreter, & Reisig, 2010; Reyns, 2013; Reyns & Henson, 2016; Williams, 2015). Many of these have tested the routine activity approach— an opportunity theory—to identify the situational factors that lead to

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opportunities for victimization. Briefly, the routine activity approach argues that opportunities for victimization are created when motivated offenders and suitable targets converge in environments lacking sufficient guardianship to prevent a crime from occurring (see e.g., Cohen, Kluegel, & Land, 1981). Therefore, behaviors that facilitate this convergence are considered to be opportunity-based risk factors for victimization. In one such test of the routine activity approach, Pratt and colleagues (2010) examined the relationship between online routine activities and Internet fraud targeting among residents of Florida. In particular, the results indicated that remote purchasing behaviors were significantly related to the likelihood of becoming a target for Internet fraud. In a similar study, Reyns (2013) used the British Crime Survey3 to investigate the relationship between specific online routine activities (e.g., banking, shopping) and identity theft victimization. Here, the results suggested that four online routine activities significantly increased the risks of becoming a victim of identity theft: banking, shopping, e-mailing or instant messaging, and downloading (e.g., music, films, podcasts). Relatedly, utilizing Eurobarometer survey data, Williams (2015) found that public Internet access and online auction selling are especially high-risk behaviors in terms of creating opportunities for identity theft victimization among Europeans. Likewise, Reyns and Henson (2016) used the Canadian General Social Survey to explore the relationships between several routine activity theory concepts and online identity theft victimization against residents of Canada. They found that online exposure/proximity to motivated offenders (i.e., banking, purchasing, being a target of phishing or hacking) and online target suitability (e.g., having one’s information posted online) were the strongest predictors of victimization. Neutralization Theory Although it has not been employed to explain identity-related crimes to the degree that the opportunity perspective has, neutralization theory from criminology provides insights into how offenders justify their criminal behavior. In brief, neutralization theory argues that offenders consciously decide to perpetrate criminal acts but justify their behavior by neutralizing the wrongfulness of their offending (Sykes & Matza, 1957). In all, there are five techniques of neutralization employed by offenders: denial of responsibility, denial of injury, denying the victim, condemnation of the condemner, and appeal to higher loyalties (Sykes & Matza, 1957). Using the same interview data as the previously discussed study by Copes and Vieraitis (2009b), Copes, Vieraitis, and Jochum (2007) reported that nearly 60 percent of identity thieves in their sample used at least one technique of neutralization, and several used multiple techniques. The most frequently used technique by identity thieves in the study was denial of injury, with many of the perpetrators believing that there was no

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real harm done to the victim. Identity thieves also noted in interviews that the only true victims of their behavior were banks, corporations, and other organizations that deserved to be targeted. Copes and colleagues (2007) also argued that based on their results, law enforcement could conduct more effective interrogations of suspected identity thieves by recognizing how criminals use neutralizations to justify their behavior. The General Theory of Crime Gottfredson and Hirschi’s (1990) general theory of crime has also been used to explain identity-related crimes, which views low self-control as the key causal factor in understanding both offending behaviors and victimization experiences. Self-control is a multifaceted personality trait that represents a criminal propensity to act on situations that provide easy or immediate gratification (e.g., criminal opportunities) (Gottfredson & Hirschi, 1990). Gottfredson and Hirschi (1990, p. 90) described individuals with this trait as being “impulsive, insensitive, physical (as opposed to mental), risk-taking, short-sighted, and non-verbal.” In terms of criminality, then, the theory argues that individuals with low self-control are more likely than others to act upon criminal opportunities. These same features of low self-control are also hypothesized to make individuals more susceptible to victimization by creating a vulnerability to crime (see e.g., Schreck, 1999). Overall, the research examining the connection between low self-control and the perpetration of, or victimization by, identity-related crimes has largely supported the theory (e.g., Holtfreter, Beaver, Reisig, & Pratt, 2010; Holtfreter, Reisig, & Pratt, 2008). For example, research by Holtfreter and colleagues (2010) reported that among their sample of young adults, those identified as having low self-control were at an increased likelihood to engage in check and credit card frauds. On the other hand, further research by Holtfreter, Reisig, and Pratt (2008) explored the effect of low selfcontrol on self-identified consumer fraud victimization among residents of Florida. The results suggested that individuals with low self-control were at a significantly increased likelihood of fraud victimization compared to those with high self-control. Subsequent research by these authors examining individuals over the age of 60 from Florida and Arizona also identified low self-control as a significant risk factor for victimization, with these persons being more likely to make risky remote purchases that in turn led to identity theft victimization (Holtfreter et al., 2015). Underscoring the complex nature of self-control, Holtfreter, Reisig, Piquero, and Piquero (2010) examined the possible overlapping effects of low self-control, fraud offending, and fraud victimization among undergraduate college students. The results were twofold—low self-control was associated with fraud offending and those with low self-control had an increased vulnerability to fraud victimization.

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Aside from these few applications of criminological theory involving the opportunity perspective, neutralization theory, and the general theory of crime, the study of identity-related crimes has been largely atheoretical. However, identifying predictors of criminality and victimization using theories is essential in developing policies and practices to respond to and prevent identity-related crimes. PREVENTION OF IDENTITY-RELATED CRIMES Responses to identity-related crimes have varied from legislative action to the development of crime prevention strategies to the rise of subscription services that monitor individuals’ accounts for suspicious activity. Within the field of criminology in particular, ideas for prevention strategies targeting identity-related crimes have often been based on opportunity-reducing techniques grounded in situational crime prevention (e.g., Berg, 2009; Copes & Vieraitis, 2009a; Cradduck & McCullagh, 2007; Newman, 2004; White & Fisher, 2008). Situational crime prevention is a scientific crime-specific approach to reducing opportunities for crime within the immediate situation in which they occur (Clarke, 1980). It is noteworthy that situational crime prevention relies on assumptions from rational choice theory that potential offenders weigh the risks and rewards of criminal behavior before acting on opportunities. Therefore, altering criminal opportunity structures seem less palatable to would-be offenders will theoretically reduce identity-related victimizations. Situational crime prevention has undergone a good deal of theoretical refinement since it was originally developed by Clarke (1980), and currently there are five general categories of techniques for reducing criminal opportunities: increase the effort, increase the risks, reduce the rewards, reduce provocations, and remove excuses (Cornish & Clarke, 2003). In order to utilize these strategies to prevent identity-related crimes, more research is needed in these five areas to identify those situational factors involving effort, risk, rewards, provocations, and excuses. Early research in this area has identified several promising prevention strategies aimed at reducing opportunities for identity theft. For instance, Copes and Vieraitis (2009a) have argued that strategies such as advertising the consequences of the crime (e.g., publicity campaigns), stimulating the offender’s conscience (e.g., removing neutralizations), restorative justice programs, and rehabilitation efforts would be effective means of preventing identity theft. As another example, White and Fisher (2008) applied situational crime prevention to identity theft and generated several specific strategies for prevention. For instance, they advocated the elimination of blind mailings, new security for opening accounts, focusing efforts on online identity theft, and public education by the police. White and Fisher also noted recommendations for intervention efforts by law enforcement, such as a national uniform reporting

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system, task forces, quick response and proper police training, and private industry notification procedures. The President’s Identity Theft Task Force (2007) crafted a strategy for responding to identity theft in the United States, and while it was not developed based upon situational crime prevention, it does possess several compatible ideas. The main argument presented by the task force is that identity theft has a life cycle occurring in three stages and must therefore be addressed at each stage. These three stages include: when the offender attempts to obtain the victim’s information, when the offender attempts to misuse the victim’s information, and after the criminal event when the victim is harmed by the offender’s actions. Toward these ends, the task force suggested several tactics across stages of the crime, such as decreasing the unnecessary use of social security numbers, better educating the public sector on safeguarding data, initiating a public awareness campaign, holding workshops on authentication, and providing specialized training for victim recovery, among others (President’s Identity Theft Task Force, 2007). There have also been coordinated efforts to combat these crimes on a global scale and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) has been at the forefront of this fight. Notably, the UNODC recently produced a handbook on identity-related crime to be used by policy makers and practitioners—both governmental and nongovernmental—in addressing the shared challenge of identity-related crime. This handbook includes valuable information related to legal approaches to criminalizing identity theft, a typology of criminalization approaches for identity-related crimes, victim issues, a discussion of best practices in prevention, and a guide to international cooperation in combating identity-related crimes (UNODC, 2011). Regarding the prevention of identity crimes, the handbook suggests a three-pronged approach based on strategies for individuals, organizations, and policy makers. For individuals, changing daily personal habits to include data privacy, such as protecting personal information, being vigilant with financial information, and learning about protection services are recommended. Organizations can also join the fight against identity-related crimes by raising awareness, reviewing security reports, and end-user training (i.e., training of consumers). Among policy makers, recommendations included pursuing common policies and encouraging international cooperation (UNODC, 2011). Regardless of national boundaries, as identity-related crimes continue to plague individuals, businesses, and other organizations throughout the world, it will be necessary for researchers and practitioners to develop new and innovative ways to stay ahead of identity-related criminals. Research suggests that situational crime prevention offers promising strategies. A few such ideas have been reviewed, but as criminal methods change, so too must prevention efforts. Additionally, it appears that legislation can effectively combat some forms of identity theft (e.g., Holtfreter &

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Holtfreter, 2006; Romanosky, Telang, & Acquisti, 2011). Ultimately, though, responding to identity-related offenses will require a targeted, multifaceted response that involves individuals, law enforcement agencies, policy makers, and businesses working together toward that end. NOTES 1. The National Crime Victimization Survey includes a nationally representative sample of residents of the United States, excluding children (i.e., under the age of 12), the homeless, persons living in institutional settings (e.g., hospitals, correctional facilities), and individuals living in military barracks. The survey, along with the Identity Theft Supplement, used to collect these data were administered by the Bureau of Justice Statistics. 2. The authors noted that some of the characteristics of their sample may have been more an artifact of their sampling strategy than the actual composition of identity offenders. 3. The British Crime Survey is the predecessor to the Crime Survey for England and Wales.

REFERENCES Allison, S., Schuck, A., & Lersch, K. M. (2005). Exploring the crime of identity theft: Prevalence, clearance rates, and victim/offender characteristics. Journal of Criminal Justice, 33, 19–29. Berg, S. (2009). Preventing identity theft through information technology. In M. McNally & G. Newman (Eds.), Perspectives on identity theft (pp. 151–168). Monsey, NY: Criminal Justice Press. Boyce, J. (2015). Police-reported crime statistics in Canada, 2014. Ottawa: Statistics Canada. Retrieved from http://www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/85-002-x/2015001/ article/14211-eng.pdf. CIPPIC. (2007). Australian, French, and United Kingdom legislation relevant to identity theft: An annotated review (CIPPIC Working Paper No. 3C [ID Theft Series]). Ottawa: Canadian Internet Policy and Public Interest Clinic. Retrieved from https://cippic.ca/sites/default/files/bulletins/Leg_3C.pdf. Clarke, R.V.G. (1980). Situational crime prevention: Theory and practice. British Journal of Criminology, 20, 136–147. Cohen, L. E., Kluegel, J. R., & Land, K. C. (1981). Social inequality and predatory criminal victimization: An exposition and test of a formal theory. American Sociological Review, 46, 505–524. Collier, D., LaPorte, J., & Seawright, J. (2012). Putting typologies to work: Concept formation, measurement, and analytic rigor. Political Research Quarterly, 65, 217–232. Copes, H., Kerley, K., Kane, J., & Huff, R. (2010). An exploratory study of identity theft victims using a national victimization survey. Journal of Criminal Justice, 38, 1045–1052. Copes, H., & Vieraitis, L. M. (2009a). Bounded rationality of identity thieves: Using offender-based research to inform policy. Criminology and Public Policy, 8, 237–262.

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Copes, H., & Vieraitis, L. M. (2009b). Understanding identity theft: Offenders’ accounts of their lives and crimes. Criminal Justice Review, 34, 329–349. Copes, H., Vieraitis, L., & Jochum, J. M. (2007). Bridging the gap between research and practice: How neutralization theory can inform Reid interrogations of identity thieves. Journal of Criminal Justice Education, 18, 444–459. Cornish, D., & Clarke, R. V. (2003). Opportunities, precipitators and criminal decisions: A reply to Wortley’s critique of situational crime prevention. In M. J. Smith & D. B. Cornish (Eds.), Crime prevention studies (Vol. 16, pp. 41–96). Monsey, NY: Criminal Justice Press. Cradduck, L., & McCullagh, A. (2007). Identifying the identity thief: Is it time for a (smart) Australia card? International Journal of Law and Information Technology, 16, 125–158. Federal Bureau of Investigation. (2014). Uniform crime reports. Retrieved from https://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-the-u.s/2012/crime-inthe-u.s.-2012/cius_home. Federal Bureau of Investigation. (2015). Identity theft overview. Retrieved from https://www.fbi.gov/about-us/investigate/cyber/identity_theft/identitytheft-overview. Felson, M., & Clarke, R. V. (1998). Opportunity makes the thief. London: Home Office. Finklea, K. M. (2010). Identity theft: Trends and issues. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service. Gordon, G., Rebovich, D., Choo, K., & Gordon, J. (2007). Identity fraud trends and patterns: Building a data-based foundation for proactive enforcement. Utica, NY: Center for Identity Management and Information Protection. Gottfredson, M. R., & Gottfredson, D. M. (1988). Decision making in criminal justice: Toward the rational exercise of discretion (2nd ed.). New York: Plenum. Gottfredson, M. R., & Hirschi, T. (1990). A general theory of crime. Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press. Harrell, E. (2015). Victims of identity theft, 2014 (NCJ 248991). Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice. Harrell, E., & Langton, L. (2013). Victims of identity theft, 2012 (NCJ 243779). Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice. Higgins, G. E., Hughes, T., Ricketts, M. L., & Wolfe, S. E. (2008). Identity theft complaints: Exploring state-level correlates. Journal of Financial Crime, 15, 295–307. Holt, T. J., & Lampke, E. (2010). Exploring stolen data markets online: Products and market forces. Criminal Justice Studies, 23, 33–50. Holtfreter, K., Beaver, K. M., Reisig, M. D., & Pratt, T. C. (2010). Low self-control and fraud offending. Journal of Financial Crime, 17, 295–307. Holtfreter, K., Reisig, M. D., Piquero, N. L., & Piquero, A. R. (2010). Low self-control and fraud: Offending, victimization, and their overlap. Criminal Justice and Behavior, 37, 188–203. Holtfreter, K., Reisig, M. D., & Pratt, T. C. (2008). Low self-control, routine activities, and fraud victimization. Criminology, 46, 189–220. Holtfreter, K., Reisig, M. D., Pratt, T. C., & Holtfreter, R. E. (2015). Risky remote purchasing and identity theft victimization among older Internet users. Psychology, Crime and Law, 21, 681–698. Holtfreter, R. E., & Holtfreter, K. (2006). Gauging the effectiveness of US identity theft legislation. Journal of Financial Crime, 13, 56–64.

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Koops, B. J., & Leenes, R. (2006). ID theft, ID fraud and/or ID-related crime: Definitions matter. Datenschutz und Datensicherheit, 9, 553–556. Koops, B. J., Leenes, R., Meints, M., van der Meulen, N., & Jaquet-Chiffelee, D. O. (2009). A typology of identity-related crime. Information, Communication and Society, 12, 1–24. Langton, L. (2011). Identity theft reported by households, 2005–2010 (NCJ 236245). Washington, DC: Bureau of Justice Statistics. Leary, M. R., & Tangney, J. P. (2012). Handbook of self and identity (2nd ed.). New York: Guilford Press. Mazowita, B., & Vézina, M. (2014). Police-reported cybercrime in Canada, 2012. Ottawa: Statistics Canada. Retrieved December 28, 2015, from http://www .statcan.gc.ca/pub/85–002-x/2014001/article/14093-eng.pdf. Morris, R. G. (2010). Identity thieves and levels of sophistication: Findings from a national probability sample of American newspaper articles 1995–2005. Deviant Behavior, 31, 187–207. Newman, G. R. (2004). Identity theft (Problem-Specific Guides, Series 24). Washington, DC: Office of Community Oriented Policing Services. Newman, G. R. (2009). Identity theft and opportunity. In M. McNally & G. Newman (Eds.), Perspectives on identity theft (pp. 9–32). Monsey, NY: Criminal Justice Press. Newman, G. R., & McNally, M. M. (2005). Identity theft literature review. Washington, DC: National Institute of Justice. Office for National Statistics. (2013). Chapter 3: Plastic card fraud. London: Office for National Statistics. Retrieved from http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/dcp 171776_309774.pdf. Office for National Statistics. (2015). Statistical bulletin: Focus on property crime, 2014–2015. London: Office for National Statistics. Retrieved from http:// www.ons.gov.uk/ons/dcp171778_425348.pdf. Pratt, T. C., Holtfreter, K., & Reisig, M. D. (2010). Routine online activity and Internet fraud targeting: Extending the generality of routine activity theory. Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency, 47, 267–296. President’s Identity Theft Task Force. (2007). Combating identity theft: A strategic plan. Retrieved from https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/ reports/combating-identity-theft-strategic-plan/strategicplan.pdf. Rebovich, D. J. (2009). Examining identity theft: Empirical explorations of the offense and the offender. Victims and Offenders, 4, 357–364. Reyns, B. W. (2013). Online routines and identity theft victimization: Further expanding routine activity theory beyond direct-contact offenses. Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency, 50, 216–238. Reyns, B. W., & Henson, B. (2016). The thief with a thousand faces and the victim with none: Identifying determinants for online identity theft victimization with routine activity theory. International Journal of Offender Therapy and Comparative Criminology, 60, 1119–1139. doi:10.1177/0306624X15572861. Reyns, B. W., & Randa, R. (2017). Victim reporting behaviors following identity theft victimization: Results from the National Crime Victimization Survey. Crime and Delinquency, 63(7), 814–838. Romanosky, S., Telang, R., & Acquisti, A. (2011). Do data breach disclosure laws reduce identity theft? Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, 30, 256–286.

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Schreck, C. J. (1999). Criminal victimization and low self-control: An extension and test of a general theory of crime. Justice Quarterly, 16, 633–654. Skogan, W. G. (1984). Reporting crimes to the police: The status of world research. Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency, 21, 113–137. Smith, R. G., & Hutchings, A. (2014). Identity crime and misuse in Australia: Results of the 2013 online survey. Canberra, Australia: Australian Institute of Criminology. Steffensmeier, D., Ulmer, J., & Kramer, J. (1998). The interaction of race, gender, and age in criminal sentencing: The punishment cost of being young, black, and male. Criminology, 36, 763–796. Sykes, G., & Matza, D. (1957). Techniques of neutralization. American Sociological Review, 22, 664–670. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. (2011). Handbook on identity-related crime. New York: United Nations. Retrieved from http://www.unodc .org/documents/treaties/UNCAC/Publications/Handbook_on_ID_ Crime/10–57802_ebooke.pdf. Wall, D. S. (2013). Future identities: Changing identities in the UK—The next 10 years. London: Government Office for Science. Retrieved from https://www .gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/ file/275784/13–521-identity-related-crime-uk.pdf. Weisburd, D., Waring, E., & Chayet, E. F. (2001). White-collar crime and criminal careers. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. White, M., & Fisher, C. (2008). Assessing our knowledge of identity theft: The challenges to effective prevention and control efforts. Criminal Justice Policy Review, 19, 3–24. Williams, M. L. (2015). Guardians upon high: An application of routine activities theory to online identity theft in Europe at the country and individual level. British Journal of Criminology, 56, 21–48.

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CHAPTER 10

Transnational Environmental Crime and Global Security Rob White

This chapter considers the nature and dynamics of transnational environmental crime in relation to matters of global security. One of the characteristics of the contemporary world is the interconnectedness of people, systems and networks, a concept that is captured in the notion of the ‘butterfly effect’. What happens in one part of the world, no matter how small or seemingly trivial will have an impact, and sometimes a very large impact in another part of the world. Thus, so the story goes, the fluttering of butterfly wings in the Southern Hemisphere can translate into hurricane force winds in the Northern. We are all interconnected, in complex ways, for better and for worse. The local is indeed global in this worldwide system of networks and flows. This is much the same when it comes to the causes and consequences of transnational environmental crime. The primary lens for analysis of transnational environmental crime is green criminology, itself a relatively new area of substantive and theoretical endeavor within criminology (Hall, 2015; Lynch & Stretesky, 2014; South & Brisman, 2013; White & Heckenberg, 2014). “Green criminology” refers to the study by criminologists of environmental harms (that may incorporate wider definitions of crime than are provided by strictly legal definitions); environmental laws (including enforcement, prosecution and sentencing practices); and environmental regulation (systems of criminal, civil, and administrative law designed to manage, protect, and preserve specified environments and species, and to manage the negative consequences of particular industrial processes) (White, 2008, 2011). For present purposes, this chapter primarily considers transnational environmental crime from the point of view of harm, insecurity, and justice.

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The chapter begins by defining and describing transnational environmental crime. It then elaborates on this by outlining different types of environmental harm (“green,” “brown,” and “white”), and the geography of such harms. The next section provides conceptual background to the study of transnational environmental harm. This involves a brief summary of conventional, ecological and green criminological approaches to environmental harm, and examples of direct and associated environmental crimes. The third section considers the extent of environmental crime by providing empirical indicators of the occurrence and costs of particular sorts of environmental crime. The final section links the preceding discussions to matters of security and insecurity, particularly as these pertain to destruction of the environment and issues surrounding scarcity. TRANSNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL CRIME For purposes of this chapter, the notion of transnational crime evokes at least two different conceptual concerns (White, 2011). First, the crime must involve the movement of people, objects, or decisions across borders. Second, the harm must be recognized internationally as a crime. There are limitations with each of these considerations. For example, genocide is universally acknowledged as an evil (even if there are disputes in practice as to whether or not genocide is in fact occurring; witness the debates over Sudan and how to interpret the tremendous loss of life in its southern regions due to systematic military interventions by various parties), but it may occur within a particular country’s borders. In addition, transnational harms may happen (such as disposal and congregation of plastic waste in the ocean, or the migration of toxic substances from producer countries to formerly pristine wilderness areas, thereby affecting humans and animals in the latter even though they have no connection whatsoever with the former), but these may not be considered “crimes” in international law. In other words, the study of transnational harm or crime always involves contested definitions (restrictive or expansive, depending upon the place of formal legality in the definition) and complexities related to scale (since it may manifest in specific local or regional contexts, as well as across regions). To speak of environmental crime or eco-crime is to acknowledge some kind of specificity in the act or omission that makes it distinctly relevant to environmental considerations. Yet, as with crime generally, there is much dispute over what gets defined as environmentally harmful and what ends up with the legal status as “crime” per se. Transnational environmental crime, as defined in conventional legal terms, refers to: • unauthorized acts or omissions that are against the law and therefore subject to criminal prosecution and criminal sanctions; • crimes that involve some kind of cross-border transference and an international or global dimension; and

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• crimes related to pollution (of air, water, and land) and crimes against wildlife (including illegal trade in ivory as well as live animals).

These are the key focus of national and international laws relating to environmental matters and are the main task areas of agencies, such as Interpol. In its more expansive definition, as used by green criminologists for example, transnational environmental crime also extends to harms (White, 2011). It therefore includes: • transgressions that are harmful to humans, environments, and nonhuman animals, regardless of legality per se; and • environmental-related harms that are facilitated by the state, as well as corporations and other powerful actors, insofar as these institutions have the capacity to shape official definitions of environmental crime in ways that allow or condone environmentally harmful practices.

The definition of transnational environmental crime is, therefore, contentious and ambiguous. Much depends upon who is defining the harm, and what criteria is used in assessing the nature of the activities so described (e.g., legal versus ecological, criminal justice versus environmental justice) (see Beirne & South, 2007; Situ & Emmons, 2000; White, 2008). In many instances, the harms identified by green criminology include not only explicitly recognized illegal activity affecting the environment but also ordinary crimes, such as violence and corruption, that may accompany specific eco-crimes (e.g., eco-mafia engagement in waste disposal).

Types of Environmental Harms Environmental harms can also be categorized in terms of so-called green, brown, and white types of crime (White, 2008; White & Heckenberg, 2014). “Green” Types of Environmental Crime This is essentially “natural resource crime, in which the color green signals idealized notions of nature. Relevant examples of this research include: • Deforestation and the devastation to plant, animal, and human welfare and rights that has accompanied this process (Boekhout van Solinge, 2008a, 2008b, 2010a, 2010b; Green et al., 2007); • The illegal theft and trade in reptiles in South Africa (Herbig, 2010); • Fishing-related crimes, such as the poaching of abalone and of lobster (McMullan & Perrier, 2002; Tailby & Gant, 2002);

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• The illegal wildlife market in Africa, in particular the trade in elephant ivory (Lemieux & Clarke, 2009) and the illegal wildlife trade in Russia and globally (South & Wyatt, 2011; Wyatt, 2013).

“Brown” Types of Environmental Crime This is essentially “pollution” crime, in which the color brown makes reference to refuse and waste associated with production and consumption. Relevant examples of this research include: • the role of organized criminal syndicates in the dumping of waste, including toxic waste (Block, 2002; Ruggierro, 1996); • inequalities associated with the location of disadvantaged and minority communities near toxic waste sites (Bullard, 2005; Pellow, 2007; Saha & Mohai, 2005); • the global trade in electronic waste as a form of environmental crime that is of particular concern at the present time (Bisschop, 2015; Gibbs, McGarrell, & Axelrod, 2010; Interpol, 2009); • specific incidents where toxic materials have been dumped into developing countries by unscrupulous companies (White, 2009).

“White” Types of Environmental Crime This is essentially “science-based” crime, where the color white is associated with laboratories and application of new technologies. Particular attention is paid to analysis and critique of genetically modified organisms (GMOs). Relevant examples of this research include: • The abrogation of human rights and United Nations agreements in attempts to impose GMO crops on reluctant nation-states (Walters, 2004, 2005, 2011); • The implications of reliance upon GMO crops for biodiversity and the resilience of ecosystems to climate change (White, 2011); the use of animals for medical testing and experimentation, which has been criticized as a form of speciesism (Sollund, 2012; White, 2013a); • The introduction and reliance upon toxic substances in the manufacture of objects such as children’s toys that are then distributed globally (Heckenberg, 2013).

This typology of environmental crime provides insight into diverse activities that can be grouped or categorized on the basis of the specific type of harm under scrutiny. Geography of Transnational Environmental Crime Examination of transnational environmental harm also needs to take into account the geographical locations of environmentally harmful practices. This might include analysis of production (toxic materials), transit

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points (illegal trade—at sea, on land, in particular regions), and end points (waste dumping). A global mapping of harmful practices can serve to provide useful insights into how harm is transferred around the planet, and ultimately who or what is responsible for which kinds of harm. Simultaneously, the combined effects of human transformations of nature are having repercussions well beyond the local and regional. Most countries of the world have borders with another country. Rivers flow, air currents weave their way through the atmosphere, ocean currents traverse the planet, and plants and animals cross artificial boundaries that, for them, do not exist. Nonetheless, there are issues that are specific to particular regions of the world. Huge tropical forests are found in the Amazon, an area that encompasses several different countries such as Brazil, Colombia, and Peru. Such forests also cover parts of Southeast Asia, spanning Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, and Myanmar (Burma), amongst other countries. Africa is home to elephants, reptiles, giraffe, and other creatures that are unique to particular parts of that continent and not the preserve of any one country. Desertification and drought are phenomena associated with the dry lands of Northern Africa and the island continent of Australia. Meanwhile, cross-border pollution in Europe, and between China and Russia, are matters that demand a regional rather than simply national response. Acid rain ignores provincial and state demarcations and can affect environments, animals, and humans many kilometers away. A nuclear accident in the Ukraine makes its presence felt in Britain, as well as the immediate vicinity of Chernobyl. Nuclear radiation released in Japan flows across the waters and is detected in the United States. Environmental harm travels. Other environmental issues are intrinsically global in scope. The world’s oceans are filled with garbage, and huge gyres spin round and round collecting plastic from all over the planet and killing marine life in the process. Satellites proliferate in the upper reaches of the atmosphere and a new junkyard is fast being created above our heads. Subterranean spaces are repositories for radioactive waste, and potentially for carbon emissions (as if these spaces are not alive too). Genetically modified organisms are distributed worldwide, with major potential to further diminish biodiversity through concentration of production into smaller number of species and products. Environmental harm comes in many different forms and is sold to us in many different guises including that of economic development. The production of global environmental harm is partly determined through complex processes of transference (Heckenberg, 2010). Harm can move from one place to another. Harm can be externalized from producers and consumers in ways that make it disappear from their sight and oversight. The global trade in toxic waste (often under the cover of recycling), the illegal dumping of radioactive waste, carbon emission trading, and the shifting of dirty industries to developing countries constitute

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some of the worst aspects of the “not in my backyard” syndrome. The result is a massive movement of environmentally harmful products, processes, and wastes to the most vulnerable places and most exploited peoples of the world (White, 2011). CONCEPTUAL OVERVIEW Differing conceptions of harm give rise to different understandings and interpretations of the nature and dynamics of transnational environmental crime. One result of this is that contemporary discussions of transnational environmental crime engage with a wide range of issues (Elliot, 2007; Hayman & Brack, 2002; White, 2008). Environmental harm can be conceptualized in relation to legal, ecological, and justice criteria. Its definition is in fact associated with quite diverse approaches to environmental issues, stemming from different conceptual starting points. Conventional Criminological Conceptions Over the past four decades, issues of pollution and illegal disposal of toxic waste, among others, have generated various legal and law enforcement responses, including the development of environmental protection agencies. Local and national interest in environmental issues, including specific incidents and harms, have further led researchers to undertake specifically criminological investigations of such harms (Situ & Emmons, 2000). Recent years have also seen a major growth in international agreements of various kinds relating to environmental issues such as the Convention for Prevention of Maritime Pollution by Dumping Wastes and Other Matters, the Convention on International Trade of Endangered Species of Wildlife Fauna and Flora (CITES), and the Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal (Forni, 2010). In accordance with these developments, conventional criminological conceptions of environmental harm tend to be based upon legal conceptions of harm as informed by such laws, rules and international conventions. The key issue is one of legality and the division of activities into legal and illegal categories. Typically, from this perspective, environmental crimes include such matters as: • Illegal taking of flora and fauna, including such activities as illegal, unregulated, and unreported fishing, illegal logging and trade in timber, and illegal trade in wildlife. • Pollution offences, which relates to issues such as flytipping (illegal dumping), through to air, water, and land pollution associated with industry. • Transportation of banned substances, which refers to illegal transport of radioactive materials and the illegal transfer of hazardous waste.

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Many such offences are acknowledged in both domestic legislation and via international agreements. What makes these activities problematic is that they are deemed illegal. It is breaking the law that is at the center of conventional criminological concern. Ecological Conceptions of Harm By contrast, we can explore a different kind of approach to environmental harm. In this instance, the main focus and interpretative lens is that of ecology. The United Nations Environment Programme provides a classic illustration of this approach (Outlook, 2007). In this framework, harm is conceived in terms of ecological well-being and holistic understandings of interrelationships between species and environments. The key issue is that of sustainability, and the division of social practices into benign and destructive, from the point of view of ecological sustainability. The last four decades or so have seen much greater international cooperation and sharing of knowledge among scientists from many different areas of scientific endeavor. One result of these efforts at collaboration and synthesis is a better sense of global ecological health. This is well documented, and baseline data are now available with which to measure the impact of human activity on all types of life on the planet. Basically, the message is that the human ecological footprint is too big to sustain us, and everything else, for much longer into the foreseeable future. In succinct terms, an ecological perspective, as demonstrated by the UN Environment Programme, sees the world in terms of three areas of harm, risk, or threat. These are: • The problem of climate change, in which the concern is to investigate activities that contribute to global warming, such as the replacement of forests with cropland. • The problem of biodiversity, in which the concern is to stem the tide of species extinction and the overall reduction in species through application of certain forms of human production, including use of genetically modified organisms. • The problem of waste and pollution, in which the concern is with activities that defile the environment, leading to such phenomena as the diminishment of clean water.

As with the earlier criminological approach, ecological understandings of harm view these matters in essentially trans-boundary terms; there is worldwide transference of harms. The bottom line is that, regardless of legal status, action must be taken now to prevent harms associated with global warming, threats to biodiversity, and further pollution and waste generation. The imperative is ecological, not legal, and the goal is human survival.

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Green Criminological Conceptions The advent of green criminology was signaled by work undertaken in the early 1990s that highlighted environmental issues as being of significance to criminology (Lynch, 1990). A growing band of criminologists have formed an increasingly coherent international network of researchers, scholars, and activists whose brief is to think critically about environmentally related issues (see, e.g., White, 2013b). From this perspective, environmental harm is best seen in terms of justice, based upon notions of human, ecological and animal rights, and egalitarian concerns. The key issue is weighing up of different kinds of harm and violation of rights within a broad eco-justice framework, and stretching the boundaries of conventional criminology to include other kinds of harm than those already deemed illegal. Within green criminology, three broad approaches to justice have been identified, each with its specific conceptions of what is harmful (White, 2008, 2013a, 2013b). They are: • Environment rights and environmental justice, in which environmental rights are seen as an extension of human, or social, rights, so as to enhance the quality of human life, now and into the future—the victim is humans. • Ecological citizenship and ecological justice, in which ecological citizenship acknowledges that human beings are merely one component of complex ecosystems that should be preserved for their own sake via the notion of the rights of the environment—the victim is specific ecosystems. • Animal rights and species justice, in which environmental harm is constructed in relation to the place of nonhuman animals within environments and with their intrinsic right to not suffer abuse, whether this be one-on-one harm, institutionalized harm, or harm arising from human actions that affect climates and environments on a global scale, the degradation of habitat to the extent that threatens biodiversity loss—the victim is animals and plants.

Acknowledging “victim” status is crucial to understanding the ways in which environmental harm affects both human and nonhuman, as well as assessments of insecurity and potential risks. There are important areas of overlap and synergy between the three approaches to environmental issues. Activity such as illegal fishing, for example, is of concern to the conventional criminologist as it would be to the marine scientist and the green criminologist. But, for the latter two perspectives, so too would be the harms associated with fish farms, such as spread of infections and use of carcinogenic substances to ward off fungi among penned fish populations. Indeed, the distinction between sustainable and non-sustainable is increasingly important in terms of how harm is being framed and conceived. Yet, as green criminology in its various strands indicates, the notions of legal/illegal and sustainable/nonsustainable themselves need to be interrogated from the point of view of eco-justice. This takes us into the realm of eco-philosophy and the value of

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living and nonliving entities, as much as into the practical determination of how best to conceptualize harm (see White, 2008). The phenomenon of “crime convergence” or “cross-over crime” is also particularly relevant to the study of transnational environmental crime. This refers to the intersection of environmental crime with other serious crimes (Interpol, 2015). For instance, a summit of International Chiefs of Environmental Compliance and Enforcement pointed out that “Particular concern was expressed from many delegates on the scale of environmental crime and the connection with organized transnational crime, including issues of smuggling, corruption, fraud, tax evasion, money laundering, and murder” (Interpol & UNEP, 2012, p. 2). Recent news reports of human trafficking (and outright murder) along the Myanmar and Thailand borders, and of Thai nationals being forced into virtual slavery on illegal fishing boats, further indicate the kinds of cross-over crimes occurring in the region. Likewise, recent land grabs in Cambodia and Laos by Vietnamese companies and the subsequent clear-felling of intact forests for the purposes of rubber plantations appears to combine corrupt decision-making processes at elite levels and systematic contravention of existing environmental laws (Global Witness, 2013). Table 10.1 provides an indication of the overlap between both the ecological and social dimensions of transnational environmental crime and the convergence of particular kinds of environmental and associated crimes. The United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI) recently observed that there has been a considerable expansion of transnational environmental crimes in recent years due to the involvement of organized criminal groups acting across borders. Led by vast financial gains and facilitated by a low risk of detection and scarce conviction rates, criminal networks and organized criminal groups are becoming increasingly interested in such illicit transnational activities. These phenomena fuel corruption and money-laundering, and undermine the rule of law, ultimately affecting the public twice: first, by putting at risk citizens’ health and safety; and second, by diverting resources that would otherwise be allocated to services other than crime. The level of organization needed for these crimes indicates a link with other serious offences, including theft, fraud, corruption, drugs and human trafficking, counterfeiting, firearms smuggling, and money laundering, several of which have been substantiated by investigations. (United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute, 2013)

Organizations such as the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, the European Union, and INTERPOL, have likewise each signaled the crossconnections between environmental crime and other crimes such as corruption, money laundering, human trafficking, and murder (see, e.g., de Coning, 2011; INTERPOL, 2013). Criminologists have also pointed out the linkages between illicit markets involving trade in wildlife and drugs

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Table 10.1 Ecological and Social Dimensions of Transnational Environmental Crime Ecological Concern

Subject of Offence

Nature of Offence

Climate change Examples of environmental offences Industrial pollution

unlicensed pollution

Illegal land clearance

destruction of habitat and forests

Examples of associated offences Public order offences

food riots

Trafficking

migration and people smuggling

Biodiversity Examples of environmental offences Forestry

illegal felling of trees

Wildlife crime

trade in endangered species

Examples of associated offences Corruption

bribing of government officials

Money laundering

illegal financial transactions

Pollution/waste Examples of environmental offences Contaminated land

failure to comply with remediation notice

Waste management

illegal waste disposal

Examples of associated offences Threats of harm Public order offences

protection rackets, stand-over tactics conflicts over local land use

Source: Rob White. (2011). Transnational environmental crime: Toward an eco-global criminology. London: Routledge, reproduced by permission of Taylor & Francis Books UK.

(South & Wyatt, 2011) and a recent Europol report highlighted that those involved in high-level drugs trafficking in Brazil, Columbia, and Mexico have established a notable role in the illegal supply of endangered species (Europol, 2011). Wildlife and pollution crimes pay well, and this has not been lost on organized criminal networks of many different persuasions. It is not only traditional criminal networks and syndicates that are implicated in transnational environmental crimes. There are also links between terrorist groups and engagement in environmental crime (Boister & Currie, 2014).

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Extent of Transnational Environmental Crime According to the Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission (2017), the most common environmental crimes fall into four categories: • biodiversity crime—such as illegal trade in endangered species of flora and fauna • natural resource-related crime—such as illegal fishing or logging • illegal movement and disposal of hazardous wastes—such as illegal movement of nuclear waste or dumping of oil • banned substances crime—such as illegal trade in ozone-depleting substances

Some of these crimes are explored further in this section. Every year some 10 million hectares of forest are destroyed, industrial timber exports total around US$150 billion per year, and estimates of illegal logging account for about 25 percent of removals worldwide (Setiono, 2007). Much of this illegal logging occurs with the involvement of corrupt government officials, including law enforcement officers, financial institutions and backers, and business people who import timber or wood-based products. Bribery and “goodwill” payments, smuggling, illicit trafficking, money laundering, and forging of documents are all part of the illegal logging industry (Setiono, 2007; see also Bisschop, 2015). Deforestation and species reduction are not only solely the outcome of logging. Land clearance is also due to agricultural exploitation, cattle farming, mining, oil and gas installations, and hydroelectric dams (see Boekhout van Solinge, 2008a, 2008b, 2010a; Khagram, 2004; Boekhout van Solinge & Kuijpers, 2013). There is also the phenomenon of “conflict timber,” associated with West Africa, for example, in which deforestation is linked to the funding of civil wars and armed conflicts (Boekhout van Solinge, 2008a; Brisman & South, 2013; Brisman, South, & White, 2015). In these contexts, the ecological impact of logging and land clearance transcends the legal-illegal divide insofar as vast amounts of forest are destroyed in many different locations—from Peru and Brazil, Liberia, and Sierra Leone to Indonesia and Australia. The motivations, objectives, and practices may vary depending upon the social context and specific industry interests, but the result is further depletion of many different kinds of trees and variety of forests. Another reason for deforestation and biodiversity reduction is the increasing reliance on energy from organic sources, especially in the Global North (see Burrell, Gay, & Kavallari, 2012; Charles et al., 2013). For example, global vegetable oil supplies used for biodiesel production are on the increase because of European and North American demand, with Indonesia and Malaysia major producers in the Asian region. This translates into massive shifts in land use, where the profitability of biofuel production is leading to large-scale plantations in places such as Indonesia. Transforming land uses for private profit is a problem worldwide (Brisman,

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South, & White, 2015), including in countries like Indonesia in the Asia Pacific (Boekhout van Solinge, 2008b), and can involve forced takeovers of communal land and violence perpetrated against local communities who resist such uses and takeovers by armed groups (Global Witness, 2015; Robin, 2010). Moreover, deforestation associated with the planting of flex crops and the subsequent smoke haze now regularly negatively affects people living in Malaysia, Singapore, Brunei, Cambodia, the Philippines, Vietnam, and Thailand (Varkkey, 2013). The profitability of biofuel production is leading to large-scale plantations in places such as Indonesia, Brazil, and Colombia. This has resulted in the clearing of rainforests and in some instances forcing Indigenous people off their lands. Mol (2013) critically observes that in Colombia: The gift of palm oil to the world leaves the people and the environment of the tropics with contaminated soils, groundwater, and rivers; habitat destruction; ecosystem disturbances; the loss of flora and aquatic and animal species; and processes of displacement and emplacement that inflect a whole range of physical, psychological, social, and cultural consequences upon local communities. (p. 254)

Cutting down trees also has a direct bearing on global warming. For instance, it has been estimated that by 2022, biofuel plantations could destroy 98 percent of Indonesia’s rainforests and that “Every ton of palm oil used as biofuel releases 30 tons of CO2 into the atmosphere, ten times as much as petroleum does” (Shiva, 2008, p. 79). Overall, it has been estimated that deforestation accounts globally for about 12 percent of total human-caused greenhouse gas emissions (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2013; Greenpeace, 2014). This deforestation not only involves the cutting down of trees but also frequently the burning of forests as part of converting land for other uses such as agriculture and biofuel plantations. The legal and ecological importance of threatened and endangered species is evident in the sheer scale of this environmental crime. For example, it has been estimated that in the early 1990s “the value of legally traded wildlife products was US$160 billion per annum, legal wood exports were worth US$132 billion, and legal seafood exports were valued at US$50 billion. The value of the illegal trade in wildlife products is harder to estimate, but is likely to be worth between US$10 and US$20 billion per year, second only to the international drugs trade in the ranks of illegal exchange” (Duffy, 2010). The illegal harvest, shipment, and sale of protected animals and plants have been estimated to trail behind only the illicit drug and arms trades in overall commercial value. In the specific area of illegal wildlife trade, it has been noted that the extent of exploitation is driving many species to the brink of extinction (see, e.g., the websites for the International Union for Conservation of Nature, Traffic, the International Fund for Animal Welfare, World Wildlife Fund, Humane Society International, and similar

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organizations). There is lots of money to be made, but the consequences are devastating from the point of view of biodiversity and overall ecological resilience on a world scale. Recent information about transnational environmental crime provide a snapshot summary of the worth, and damage, caused by illegal trade and trafficking (drawing from OneWorld South Asia, 2013): • Wildlife Crime US$15–20 billion annually Examples: birds, ivory and rhino horn, reptiles and insects, tigers, and wild game • Illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing US$10–23.5 billion annually Estimated 20 percent of world catches Examples: abalone, caviar, shark fin, sturgeon • Illegal logging US$30–100 billion annually Accounts for 15–30 percent of the overall global trade Examples: timber production, land clearing, and crop substitution

Resource extraction of this kind is obviously worth big dollars and has a major impact economically, ecologically, and socially. Again, this is reflected in specific studies and analyses of things such as wildlife poaching and theft. For instance, the trafficking in birds and other animals (alive or dead) constitutes one of the world’s largest illegal trade with an estimated value of 18 to 26 billion Euro per year (Ayling, 2013a). The birds and other animals are traded for medicine, gourmet foods, clothing, ornamentation, exotic pets, sport, and trophies (Sollund, 2011, 2013). It is also notable that the number of rhinoceros poached in South Africa has increased every year from 2007 until 2012, with the total in 2012 almost a 50 percent increase on the 2011 figure: given the current rates of decline, the probable date for total extinction of wild rhinos in Africa is estimated to be 2025 (Ayling, 2013b). Specific countries and specific regions experience different types of wildlife crime (see, e.g., Pires, 2012; Ngoc & Wyatt, 2012; Pires & Clarke, 2011). For instance, in Australia, the commonly smuggled species include reptiles, birds, insects and spiders, as well as sugar gliders. Of cases prosecuted, reptiles (such as snakes and lizards) were targeted most, followed by birds (such as parrots). Regular illegal imports into Australia include avian and reptilian species, as well as exotic fish (for the aquarium trade) and body parts from endangered species (for traditional Chinese or complementary medicines) (Bricknell, 2010). Species taken in southern Africa, India, Russia, and Indonesia will vary according to local conditions and

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animal prevalence. Similarly, the parrot trade is highly linked to South American locations such as Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru, while wildlife poaching in the United States and Canada include deer, moose, bears, turkeys, and lobsters. In 2008, it was observed that “the combined global value of legally traded commodities derived from wild plants and animals was approximately US$24.5 billion” (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2013). By contrast, the illegal gains are estimated, just in the East Asia and Pacific regions alone, to be: • Illegal wildlife trade in East Asia and the Pacific (China, Vietnam, Cambodia, Myanmar, Lao PDR, Thailand, Malaysia, Solomon Islands, Papua New Guinea, Indonesia, the Philippines) US$2.5 billion (excludes illegal timber and off-shore fishing) • Illicit trade in wood-based products from the region to the world US$17 billion (second only to counterfeit goods sent to Europe and the United States) (30–40% of the total quantity and export value of wood-based products exported from the region in 2010 derived from illegal sources) (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2013).

Various laws and agreements are in place to prevent the illegal trade in endangered species. Ironically, the focus on protection can in some situations make the threatened species even more attractive to criminal syndicates or private collectors, since it confirms the scarcity (and thus “value”) of the species in question. Illegal trade is not the only threat to particular “wild” animal species. The intense competition for food worldwide is also evident in the ways in which commercial fishing takes place. The issue here is not only that of biodiversity but of wholesale destruction of major breeding grounds and fishing beds. The greatest negative impact to the long-term sustainable management of global fisheries is a combination of illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing (Petrossian & Clarke, 2014; Wilson & Tomkins, 2007). IUU fishing may involve huge factory ships that operate on the high seas and which process thousands of tons of fish at any one time. Alternatively, it may be organized around dozens of smaller vessels, each of which is contracted to provide a catch that ultimately brings reward to the originating contractor. In other words, such production can be organized according to the economies of scale (e.g., factory ships) or the economies of scope (e.g., small independent fishers). In each case, however, there is a link to legitimate markets (e.g., for abalone, for lobsters, for Patagonian toothfish) for the value of the commodity to be realized in dollar terms. In each case, as well, the damage is manifest in phenomenon such as overfishing and destruction of habitat that, in turn, affect subsequent

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market prices for the commodity in question. Scarcity is a major motivator for illegal as well as legal forays into particular kinds of harvesting and production activity. The pollution of air, land, and water constitutes another major area of interest for green criminologists studying transnational environmental crime (see Mesko, Dimitrijevic, & Fields, 2010). Pollution is now reaching every part of the planet and is evident across many different types of terrain. The problem of air pollution, for example, basically impacts upon humans in ways that fundamentally undermine their health and wellbeing, and is associated with millions of premature deaths worldwide each year (Walters, 2010). Land (or soil) pollution occurs when chemicals are released into the soil, including heavy metals such as lead and cadmium and pesticides, which can kill living bacteria in the earth or contaminate all life within the soil (including plants and non-plant creatures). Agriculture and mining stand out as two of the most polluting activities here, along with the burgeoning extractive and resources industries and the use of chemicals. Corporations are increasingly mining ever deeper into the earth to extract mineral reserves and burying some of the world’s most hazardous waste deep in the ground (e.g., radioactive waste) (White & Heckenberg, 2014; see also Stretesky, Long, & Lynch, 2014). Water pollution occurs when contaminants, such as untreated sewerage waste and agricultural runoff containing chemical fertilizers, poison, and alter existing surface and ground waters. Surface runoff transfers contaminants from one place to another and harmful chemicals, which are suspended in the air get dissolved in rainwater and pollute the soil when they come to the Earth’s surface in the form of acid rain (Naik, 2010). The scope of water pollution extends from small-scale ponds to inland waterways, estuaries to lakes and rivers to the world’s oceans. Sea currents transfer pollutants and wastes around the globe. Of particular concern is the accumulation of plastics in the world’s oceans (see White, 2013a). Chemicals and other toxic waste such as persistent organic pollutants (POPs) have proliferated over the past 60 years (Pellow, 2007). Specifically, the rise of the chemical industries means that many different types of toxic waste are produced, gathered up, and put together into the same dump sites (e.g., rivers and lakes and ocean outlets, landfills). This has been accompanied by new problems and complexities in waste disposal, especially in relation to toxicity as well as the extent of waste (Field, 1998). The emergence of e-waste (computers, mobile phones, etc.) has only added further to existing waste management problems, among which has included criminal engagement in the waste industry (Bisschop, 2012, 2015; Gibbs, McGarrell, & Axelrod, 2010; Gibbs, McGarrell, Axelrod, & Rivers, 2011; Interpol, 2009). For example, of the e-waste in developed countries that is sent for recycling, 80 percent ends up being shipped (often illegally) to developing countries such as China, India, Ghana, and Nigeria for recycling (Lundgren, 2012).

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Social and environmental harm is being caused by both legal and illegal transfers of hazardous waste, and it is the poor and vulnerable of the world’s population who are paying the price (Clapp, 2001). Particular environments are being denuded and human and animal health is suffering, as toxic materials permeate specific areas and become embedded in local landscapes. The specific mechanisms for the transfer of hazardous waste from the North to the South vary and are ostensibly governed by international conventions and protocols (Boister & Currie, 2014; White, 2011). However, the dynamic nature of hazard transfer is enabled both by the inbuilt limitations of domestic or national laws (Collins, 2010) and through the sidestepping of existing international regulation through strategies such as the renaming of the process as recycling (Clapp, 2001; Van Daele, Vander Beken, & Dorn, 2007). This has made waste disposal attractive to organized criminal syndicates, while simultaneously opening the door for some legitimate waste management companies to increase their profits by utilizing illegal practices (Dorn, Van Daele, & Vander Beken, 2007). Criminality is in many ways built into the dynamics and structures associated with waste as an industry and as a multi-jurisdictional problem. These present a prime opportunity for overlap between legitimate companies and criminal syndicates, with substantial implications for state corruption as well. From New York to Naples, the traditional mafia-type involvement of organized crime groups in waste management, and more recently the alternative energy field, is an important area of criminological study (see, e.g., Block, 2002; Caneppele, Riccardi, & Standridge, 2013; Liddick, 2010). Environmental Insecurity The impact of this illegal and legal environmental harm is not inconsequential. Shortages of food, water, and nonrenewable energy sources can trigger nefarious activities involving organized criminal networks, transnational corporations, and governments at varying political levels. Illegal and overfishing, sidestepping of hazardous waste disposal regulations, water and land theft, rorting (dishonest) of alternative energy subsidies and policies, and transference of toxicity and contaminated products across national borders are driven by different motivations and involve a wide range of actors. Yet, the consequence of such activities contributes to even more ruthless exploitation of rapidly vanishing natural resources, as well as the further diminishment of air, soil, and water quality, thereby exacerbating the competition by individuals, groups, and nations for what is left (White, 2014, p. 835). The notion of insecurity as this pertains to the environment is usually tied to actions and conditions that undermine the ability to exploit or use nature sufficiently to meet human needs. Hall (2013) observes that definitions of “environmental security” differ, but generally the concept tends to

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link environmental degradation and associated scarcity of resources with human conflict at individual, group, and state levels. Scarcity is tied to the overexploitation of natural resources. It is also increasingly linked to the consequences of global warming, which is putting increasing pressure on water resources and capacity for food production. The mainstream or generic sense of environmental insecurity speaks to issues such as “food security” and related social ills, such as riots and social conflict and/or the illegal harvesting of fish, animals, and plants. Insecurity relates to the biophysical and socioeconomic consequences of various sources of threat and damage to the environment including pollution, resource degradation, biodiversity loss, and climate change (South, 2012). In the midst of these insecurities, a range of new and old crimes is apparent. For example, drought-induced food scarcity is associated with the rise of illicit markets, climate-induced migration with exploitation of children by gangs and militias, as well as human trafficking, and fraud with carbon emissions trading schemes. Security is substantially constructed around the notion of control over resources, enforced by the viewpoint that “Might makes Right.” For example, South observes that “A new world of hydropolitics emerges in situations where water sources are currently accessed by several nations but could potentially be controlled—or indeed monopolised—by one nation or by private water and power consortia” (South, 2012, p. 100). Environmental security is basically defined in relation to specific corporate and national interests and threats to these interests. This is reflected in the literature dealing with these issues. Hall (2013), for example, also makes the point that as natural resources become restricted by various impacts of climate change and wider environmental degradation, such resources will become increasingly precious to states and therefore increasingly attractive to terrorist groups seeking to achieve symbolic victories. Similar sentiments are expressed by Wyatt (2013), who argues that the illegal wildlife trade “can threaten national security because wildlife trafficking is carried out through corruption at various levels, organised crime and possibly terrorists and insurgents” (p. 51). National security is conceptualized here as being more than just military, but encompassing territorial inviolability, and economic and political interests that protect the value and stability of the state. According to Wyatt (2013), there are three major problems that states and the international community have to come to grips with in relation to national security: corruption (that entails the “corruption of the officials in origin, transit and destination countries as well as corruption of the employees of transportation agencies involved along the smuggling chain”); organized crime (that involves wildlife trafficking in conjunction with weapons, drug and human trafficking; and that includes criminal enclaves which, in some circumstances, supersede the state’s monopoly on use of force); and terrorism and insurgency (which involves natural resource theft like wildlife trafficking and engagement of

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black markets for blood ivory/blood diamonds). Wyatt also makes mention of the possible use of the illegal wildlife trade as a vector for transferring disease, that is, a form of environmental terrorism. Security, in the light of an international reconfiguration of wealth and resources, power and dominance, can increasingly be understood in geopolitical terms as containment and exclusion. This is reflected, as well, in the so-called climate divide associated with global warming. Climate change is producing a new set of global dividing lines, now between those at most risk and those at least risk. This “climate divide” is recognised in many ways but arguably not on a widespread basis or with full appreciation of what it really means. In essence, the climate divide represents a further extension of the inequitable state of the affairs of humanity, one in which the conditions producing climate change are contributed to most overwhelmingly by rich consumer societies but which will impose the greatest costs and resultant miseries on the already poor and newly developing nations. (South, 2012, p. 109)

Environmental security is thus basically about security for very specific and particular social interests. To put it differently, the “national interest” usually reflects specific sectoral business interests, not universal interests. This is evidenced in the manner in which climate change contrarianism is pushed by particular industries and acceded to by dominant nation-states such as the United States (Brisman, 2013). Humanity has certain shared interests—universal human interests—such as the survival of the human race in the face of things like global warming and climate change. These common human interests need to take priority over any other kind of interests if we are, as a species, to survive. Yet, this is not occurring. This failure to act forms part of the conundrum of environmental insecurity and the fortress mentality that sustains it (see White, 2014). Environmental crimes are rising on a world scale in terms of variety, volume, and value, mainly due to issues of scarcity and conflict (Brisman & South, 2013). This directly affects access to essentials, such as safe drinking water, food sources, and shelter. The scramble for what’s left in terms of both renewable and nonrenewable resources (i.e., minerals, fish, water, trees), in the context of climate-related scarcity and the accelerating limits to ecology, heightens the sense of public foreboding and insecurity in many societies. It also means that unscrupulous methods may be used in order to satisfy immediate (rather than long term) self-interests— as in the case of illegal fishing and the use of horsemeat as a substitute for beef for human consumption. Environmental crimes such as these are, in effect, generated by global systemic pressures on the world’s ecology. These pressures include global warming via carbon emissions, super exploitation of natural resources via global systems of transportation and worldwide chains of production and consumption, and substitution of ecologically benign practices by those that reduce resilience and biodiversity such as standardized mass agricultural and pastoral production.

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CONCLUSION This chapter has provided an overview of transnational environmental crime. The sheer extent of such crime, and its short- and long-term consequences, have major implications for global security. The ramifications of transnational environmental harm are also felt in other ways as well. For instance, the fallout from resource depletion is, in turn, generating additional threats to overall world security. This is illustrated in recent geopolitical trends. For example, demand is escalating worldwide for commodities of all types (energy, consumer goods, food), accompanied by huge population growth and rising affluence via economic expansion in places such as China and India (Klare, 2012; Lee et al., 2012). Increasingly, there are scarcities of specific resources (e.g., forest cover, marine fisheries, freshwater systems, and fossil fuels) leading to a proliferation of ownership contests (e.g., disputed islands involving China, Vietnam, the Philippines, and Japan; redrawing of boundaries in the Arctic among border states such as Russia, Canada, Norway, and the United States) (see Brisman, South, & White, 2015). Climate change continues to present as the most significant and urgent matter of our time, with massive implications for peace and social order (Agnew, 2011; Kramer & Michalowski, 2012). The global picture is thus looking pretty grim and will most certainly continue to generate considerable social conflict (around resources, and around movement of people). It will also be associated with varying types and levels of criminality, ranging from corporate illegality in shipping contaminated products through to the role of organized criminals in disposing of toxic waste, illegal fishing, and trafficking of persons. It may well be that “security” (for some) will be built upon a platform of state-level wrongdoing (plundering of other people’s lands and resources), corporate wrongdoing (cutting corners to ensure product delivery at affordable costs), and organized criminal wrongdoing (that still guarantees a “result” for those who subcontract out or who purchase the fruits of the criminal endeavor) (White, 2014). Study of environmental crime and the plundering of the natural environment cannot be extricated from wider social, economic, and political processes and structures. It thus requires critical sociological analysis of the present era as much as the continued development of a distinctive green criminology. REFERENCES Agnew, R. (2011). Dire forecast: A theoretical model of the impact of climate change on crime. Theoretical Criminology, 16, 21–42. Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission. (2017). Environmental crime. Retrieved from https://www.acic.gov.au/about-crime/crime-types/environmental. Ayling, J. (2013a). Harnessing third parties for transnational environmental crime prevention. Transnational Environmental Law, 2, 339–362.

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Ayling, J. (2013b).What sustains wildlife crime? Rhino horn trading and the resilience of criminal networks. Journal of International Wildlife Law & Policy, 16, 57–80. Beirne, P., & South, N. (Eds.). (2007). Issues in green criminology: Confronting harms against environments, humanity and other animals. Cullompton, UK: Willan Publishing. Bisschop, L. (2012). Is it all going to waste? Illegal transports of e-waste in a European trade hub. Crime, Law and Social Change, 58, 221–249. Bisschop, L. (2015). Governance of the illegal trade in e-waste and tropical timber: Case studies on transnational environmental crime. Farnham, Surrey: Ashgate. Block, A. (2002). Environmental crime and pollution: Wasteful reflections. Social Justice, 29, 61–81. Boekhout van Solinge, T. (2008a). Crime, conflicts and ecology in Africa. In R. Sullund (Ed.), Global harms: Ecological crime and speciesism (pp. 13–34). New York: Nova Science Publishers. Boekhout van Solinge, T. (2008b). The land of the orangutan and the bird of paradise under threat. In R. Sullund (Ed.), Global harms: Ecological crime and speciesism (pp. 51–70). New York: Nova Science Publishers. Boekhout van Solinge, T. (2010a). Deforestation crimes and conflicts in the Amazon. Critical Criminology, 18, 263–277. Boekhout van Solinge, T. (2010b). Equatorial deforestation as a harmful practice and a criminological issue. In R. White (Ed.), Global environmental harm: Criminological perspectives (pp. 20–36). Cullompton, UK: Willan Publishing. Boekhout van Solinge, T., & Kuijpers, K. (2013). The Amazon rainforest: A green criminological perspective. In N. South & A. Brisman (Eds.), Routledge international handbook of green criminology (pp. 199–213). New York: Routledge. Boister, N., & Currie, R. (Eds.). (2014). Routledge handbook of transnational criminal law. London: Routledge. Bricknell, S. (2010). Environmental crime in Australia. Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology. Retrieved from http://www.aic.gov.au/media_library/ publications/rpp/109/rpp109.pdf. Brisman, A. (2013). The violence of silence: Some reflections on access to information, public participation in decision-making, and access to justice in matters concerning the environment. Crime Law and Social Change, 59, 291–303. Brisman, A., & South, N. (2013). Resources, wealth, power, crime and conflict. In R. Walters, D. Westerhuis, & T. Wyatt (Eds.), Emerging issues in green criminology: Exploring power, justice and harm (pp. 57–71). Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Brisman, A., South, N., & White, R. (Eds.). (2015). Environmental crime and social conflict: Contemporary and emerging issues. Farnham, Surrey: Ashgate. Bullard, R. (Ed.). (2005). The quest for environmental justice: Human rights and the politics of pollution. San Francisco, CA: Sierra Club Books. Burrell, A., Gay, S., & Kavallari, A. (2012). The compatability of EU biofuel policies with global sustainability and the WTO. The World Economy, 35, 784–798. Caneppele, S., Riccardi, M., & Standridge, P. (2013). Green energy and black economy: Mafia investments in the wind power sector in Italy. Crime, Law and Social Change, 59, 319–339.

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Charles, C., Gerasimchuk, I., Birdle, R., Moerenhout, T., Asmelash, E., & Laan, T. (2013). Biofuels—At what cost? A review of costs and benefits of EU biofuels policies. Manitoba: International Institute for Sustainable Development. Clapp, J. (2001). Toxic exports: The transfer of hazardous wastes from rich to poor countries. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press. Collins, C. (2010). Toxic loopholes: Failures and future prospects for environmental law. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. de Coning, E. (2011). Transnational organized crime in the fishing industry. Vienna: UNODC. Retrieved from www.unodc.org/documents/human-traffick ing/IssuePaper-TOCintheFishingIndustry.pdf. Dorn, N., Van Daele, S., & Vander Beken, T. (2007). Reducing vulnerabilities to crime of the European waste management industry: The research base and the prospects for policy. European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice, 15, 23–36. Duffy, R. (2010). Nature crime: How we’re getting conservation wrong. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Elliot, L. (Ed.). (2007). Transnational environmental crime in the Asia-Pacific: A workshop report. Canberra: Australian National University. Retrieved from http://portal.kopertis3.or.id/bitstream/123456789/1661/1/bsetiono%20 Transnational_environmental_crime_Asia_Pacific_workshop_report_ TEC_Workshop_Report_2007.pdf. European Police Office. (2011). OCTA 2011: EU organised crime threat assessment. Retrieved from https://www.europol.europa.eu/sites/default/files/publi cations/octa2011.pdf. Field, R. (1998). Risk and justice: Capitalist production and the environment. In D. Faber (Ed.), The struggle for ecological democracy: Environmental justice movements in the US (pp. 81–103). New York: Guilford Press. Forni, O. (2010, March). Mapping environmental crimes. Freedom from Fear Magazine, 34–37. Gibbs, C., McGarrell, E., & Axelrod, M. (2010). Transnational white-collar crime and risk: Lessons from the global trade in electronic waste. Criminology & Public Policy, 9, 543–560. Gibbs, C., McGarrell, E. F., Axelrod, M., & Rivers, L. (2011). Conservation criminology and the global trade in electronic waste: Applying a multi-disciplinary research framework. International Journal of Comparative and Applied Criminal Justice, 35, 269–291. Global Witness. (2013). Rubber barons. Retrieved from https://www.globalwit ness.org/en/campaigns/land-deals/rubberbarons/. Global Witness. (2015). How many more? Retrieved from https://www.globalwit ness.org/en/campaigns/environmental-activists/how-many-more/. Green, P., Ward, T. and McConnachie, K. 2007. Logging and legality: Environmental crime, civil society, and the state. Social Justice, 34(2), 94–110. Greenpeace. (2014, March 31). What does the IPCC WGII report say on forests? Greenpeace Briefing. Retrieved from http://www.greenpeace.org/international/ Global/international/briefings/climate/2014/IPCC-WGII-Forests.pdf. Hall, M. (2013). Victims of environmental harm: Rights, recognition and redress under national and international law. London: Routledge. Hall, M. (2015). Exploring green crime: Introducing the legal, social & criminological contexts of environmental harm. London: Palgrave Macmillan.

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Hayman, G., & Brack, D. (2002). International environmental crime: The nature and control of environmental black markets. Retrieved from http://ec.europa.eu/ environment/archives/docum/pdf/02544_environmental_crime_workshop.pdf. Heckenberg, D. (2010). The global transference of toxic harms. In R. White (Ed.), Global environmental harm: Criminological perspectives (pp. 37–61). Devon: Willan Publishing. Heckenberg, D. (2013). Global transference of environmental harm: The case of toxic toys. CRIMSOC: The Journal of Social Criminology, Green Criminology Special Issue, 1, 159–184. Herbig, J. (2010). The illegal reptile trade as a form of conservation crime: A South African criminological investigation. In R. White (Ed.), Global environmental harm: Criminological perspectives (pp. 110–131). Devon: Willan Publishing. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. (2013). Summary for policymakers. Climate change 2013: The physical science basis. Contribution of Working Group I to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Retrieved from http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessmentreport/ar5/wg1/WG1AR5_SPM_FINAL.pdf. International chiefs of environmental compliance and enforcement summit report. (2012). Retrieved from http://www.interpol.int/Crime-areas/Environmentalcrime/Events/Meetings/International-Chiefs-of-Environmental-Compli ance-and-Enforcement. Interpol. (2009, May). Electronic waste and organised crime: Assessing the links. Phase II Report for the Interpol Pollution Crime Working Group. Retrieved from http://www.interpol.int/content/download/5367/45070/version/3/ file/Wastereport.pdf. Interpol. (2013, June 3). INTERPOL meeting aims to strengthen cooperation on environmental crime activities [Press release]. INTERPOL. Retrieved from http://www.interpol.int/News-and-media/News/2013/N20130603. Interpol. (2015, October 30). Environmental crime and its convergence with other serious crimes. Retrieved from https://www.interpol.int/content/download/ 30447/395898/version/2/file/INTERPOL%20Strategic%. Khagram, S. (2004). Dams and development: Transnational struggles for water and power. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Klare, M. (2012). The race for what’s left: The global scramble for the world’s last resources. New York: Metropolitan Books, Henry Holt and Company. Kramer, R., & Michalowski, R. (2012). Is global warming a state-corporate crime? In R. White (Ed.), Climate change from a criminological perspective (pp. 71–88). New York: Springer. Lee, B., Preston, F., Kooroshy, J., Bailey, R., & Lahn, G. (2012). Resources futures: A Chatham House Report. London: The Royal Institute of International Affairs. Retrieved from https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chatham house/public/Research/Energy,%20Environment%20and%20Develop ment/1212r_resourcesfutures.pdf. Lemieux, A., & Clarke, R. (2009). The international ban on ivory sales and its effects on elephant poaching in Africa. The British Journal of Criminology, 49, 451–471.

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Liddick, D. (2010). The traffic in garbage and hazardous wastes: An overview. Trends in Organized Crime, 13, 134–146. Lundgren, K. (2012). The global impact of e-waste: Addressing the challenge. Geneva: International Labour Organization. Retrieved from http://www.ilo.org/ wcmsp5/groups/public/—ed_dialogue/—sector/documents/publica tion/wcms_196105.pdf. Lynch, M. (1990). The greening of criminology: A perspective on the 1990s. The Critical Criminologist, 2, 1–4; 11–12. Lynch, M., & Stretesky, P. (2014). Exploring green criminology: Toward a green criminological revolution. Farnham, Surrey: Ashgate. McMullan, J., & Perrier, D. (2002). Lobster poaching and the ironies of law enforcement. Law & Society Review, 36, 679–720. Mesko, G., Dimitrijevic, D., & Fields, C. (Eds.). (2010). Understanding and managing threats to the environment in south eastern Europe. Dordrecht: Springer. Mol, H. (2013). “A gift from the tropics to the world”: Power, harm, and palm oil. In R. Walters, D. Westerhuis, & Wyatt, T. (Eds.), Emerging issues in green criminology (pp. 242–260). Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Naik, A. (2010, October 22). Causes of pollution. Retrieved from http://www.buz zle.com/articles/causes-of-pollution.html. Ngoc, A. C., & Wyatt, T. (2012). A green criminological exploration of illegal wildlife trade in Vietnam. Journal of Asian Criminology, 8, 129–142. OneWorld South Asia. (2013, November 7). Theft of natural resources is a new challenge: UNEP. Retrieved from http://southasia.oneworld.net/news/ theft-of-natural-resources-is-a-new-challenge-unep. Outlook, G. E. (2007). Environment for development. Nairobi: United Nations Environment Programme. Pellow, D. (2007). Resisting global toxics: Transnational movements for environmental justice. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Petrossian, G., & Clarke, R. (2014). Explaining and controlling illegal commercial fishing: An application of the CRAAVED theft model. British Journal of Criminology, 54, 73–90. Pires, S. F. (2012). The illegal parrot trade: A literature review. Global Crime, 13, 176–190. Pires, S., & Clarke, R. (2011). Sequential foraging, itinerant fences and parrot poaching in Bolivia. The British Journal of Criminology, 51, 314–335. Robin, M. M. (2010). The world according to Monsanto: Pollution, corruption and the control of our food supply. New York: The New Press. Ruggiero, V. (1996). Organized and corporate crime in Europe: Offers that can’t be refused. Aldershot: Dartmouth. Saha, R., & Mohai, P. (2005). Historical context and hazardous waste facility siting: Understanding temporal patterns in Michigan. Social Problems, 52, 618–648. Setiono, B. (2007). Fighting illegal logging and forest-related financial crimes: The anti-money laundering approach. Transnational environmental crime in the Asia-Pacific: A workshop report. Canberra: Australian National University. Shiva, V. (2008). Soil not oil: Environmental justice in an age of climate crisis. Brooklyn, NY: South End Press. Situ, Y., & Emmons, D. (2000). Environmental crime: The criminal justice system’s role in protecting the environment. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

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Sollund, R. (2011). Expressions of specieism: The effects of keeping companion animals on animal abuse, animal trafficking and species decline. Crime, Law & Social Change, 55, 437–451. Sollund, R. (2012). Speciesism as doxic practice versus valuing difference and plurality. In R. Ellefsen, R. Sollund, & G. Larsen (Eds.), Eco-global crimes: Contemporary problems and future challenges (pp. 91–114). Farnham, Surrey: Ashgate. Sollund, R. (2013). Animal trafficking and trade: Abuse and species injustice. In R. Walters, D. S. Westerhuis, & T. Wyatt (Eds.), Emerging issues in green criminology (pp. 72–92). Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. South, N. (2012). Climate change, environmental (in)security, conflict and crime. In S. Farrell, T. Ahmed, & D. French (Eds.), Criminological and legal consequences of climate change (pp. 97–112). Oxford, UK: Hart Publishing. South, N., & Brisman, A. (Eds.). (2013). The Routledge international handbook of green criminology. London: Routledge. South, N., & Wyatt, T. (2011). Comparing illicit trades in wildlife and drugs: An exploratory study. Deviant Behaviour, 32, 538–561. Stretesky, P., Long, M., & Lynch, M. (2014). The treadmill of crime: Political economy and green criminology. London: Routledge. Tailby, R., & Gant, F. (2002). The illegal market in Australian abalone. Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology. United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute. (2013). Transnational threat of environment crimes. Topics: Environmental Crimes. Retrieved from http://www.unicri.it/print.php. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. (2013, April). Transnational organized crime in East Asia and the Pacific: A threat assessment. Vienna: UNODC. Retrieved from https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/ Studies/TOCTA_EAP_web.pdf. Van Daele, S., Vander Beken, T., & Dorn, N. (2007). Waste management and crime: Regulatory, business and product vulnerabilities. Environmental Policy and Law, 37, 34–38. Varkkey, H. (2013). Oil palm plantations and transboundary haze: Patronage networks and land licensing in Indonesia’s peatlands. Wetland, 33, 679–690. Walters, R. (2004). Criminology and genetically modified food. British Journal of Criminology, 44, 151–167. Walters, R. (2005). Crime, bio-agriculture and the exploitation of hunger. British Journal of Criminology, 46, 26–45. Walters, R. (2010). Toxic atmospheres: Air pollution, trade and the politics of regulation. Critical Criminology, 18, 307–323. Walters, R. (2011). Eco crime and genetically modified food. New York: Routledge. White, R. (2008). Crimes against nature: Environmental criminology and ecological justice. Cullompton, UK: Willan Publishing. White, R. (2009). Toxic cities: Globalising the problem of waste. Social Justice, 35, 107–119. White, R. (2011). Transnational environmental crime: Toward an eco-global criminology. London: Routledge. White, R. (2013a). Environmental harm: An eco-justice perspective. Bristol: Policy Press.

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CHAPTER 11

Transnational Sex Trafficking: An Issue of State and Human Security Kristina Lugo

Nadia1 grew up in a poor town with few economic opportunities, and where recent political instability rendered it unsafe to remain at home. When she was 17, a friend told her she could get a well-paid job as a hairdresser in Europe, and she was introduced to an agent who paid for her passport and arranged her travel. She arrived at a German airport and was met by a stranger who took her passport and brought her to a house occupied by two other women. Soon she discovered that her “job” was to provide sex for men. When she objected, she was beaten and raped. Her controller warned her that she was in the country illegally and that he had her passport, reminded her that she owed him €4,000 to cover her travel, and said that her family at home would suffer if she did not earn it quickly. The other women advised her that if she went to the authorities, she would be sent back to home and the €4,000 would then be demanded from her family. Nadia felt she had no choice, but she was sure that one of her customers would listen to her story and help her. However, she soon found that she was not allowed to stay long enough in any one city to learn her way around or get to know people; each week she had to move to a new location. Further, her customers had no interest in her story. Whenever she failed to give them what they wanted, her controller beat her. Some customers were also violent and she was seriously injured several times. Nadia was given a mobile phone, which she had hoped to use to call for help, but she found that it could only receive calls from clients or from her controller. When she was allowed out, she was too scared of her controller to talk or to seek help from community members or from law enforcement, and she was also afraid of being deported.

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Nadia had been trafficked for sex. Sex trafficking, the legal definition of which is provided in the next section, is part of the larger human trafficking phenomenon that also includes trafficking for forced labor, forced marriage, human organs, false adoptions, state labor, and other forms. Sex trafficking is also a subset of the larger phenomenon of commercial sex, or prostitution, which includes the exchange of sexual services for anything of value, but where participation is not necessarily coerced. A couple of other clarifications are important to note. First, human trafficking is different from human smuggling or illegal immigration, which are different security issues; these distinctions are discussed later. Additionally, this chapter focuses on sex trafficking across international borders, but it has been estimated that 34 percent of sex trafficking globally occurs within national borders (UNODC, 2014). This article proceeds as follows: first, sex trafficking and human trafficking are defined. Some of the debates about these definitions are briefly discussed, as is the prevalence of the crime. A theoretical overview of some of the explanations for why and how sex trafficking occurs is next, with emphasis on political science and international relations approaches, as well as a discussion of different sex trafficking network types. Security issues around sex trafficking are elaborated upon, and several recommendations are made, with a focus on how law enforcement fits into a larger societal response to this grave violation of human rights and threat to human security. HUMAN TRAFFICKING AND SEX TRAFFICKING DEFINED A crucial prerequisite to developing effective responses to human trafficking is to agree upon a definition of what, exactly, is included. There is still considerable debate about this between different schools of academics and among practitioners (see discussions in Agustin, 2007; Weitzer, 2013). However, there are now a couple of generally accepted definitions in the international community that are being used for legal purposes. The United Nations, in the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Person, Especially Women and Children (adopted in 2000) defines human trafficking as: The recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation. Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs. (UNODC, 2011b)

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This definition followed the passage of the U.S. Trafficking Victims Protection Act in 2000, which additionally specifies that “a victim need not be physically transported from one location to another in order for the crime to fall within these definitions,” and which especially emphasizes the use of force, fraud, or coercion unless the purpose of the trafficking is for sexual exploitation of a victim under 18 years of age—in which case, trafficking is considered to have occurred regardless because a person under the age of 18 cannot legally consent to engage in commercial sex (U.S. Congress, 2000; USDOS, 2011).2 It is the “threat or use of force, coercion, abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of power or vulnerability” and the fact that it is done “for the purpose of exploitation” that makes human trafficking distinct from human smuggling (UNODC, 2011b). These two are often confused, with human trafficking conflated as part of the larger illegal immigration phenomenon (Van Impe, 2000; Wheaton, Schauer, & Galli, 2010). Existing definitions of human trafficking tend to focus on three basic elements—the movement/ trade/sale of a person, the methods used to bring that about, and the purpose of the act—but these definitions do not clearly address the underlying socioeconomic and political conditions that create a hospitable environment for trafficking to occur in the first place (Ali, 2005; Bales, 2007). A security approach to understanding sex trafficking across international borders must examine these circumstances, and the legal and political frameworks under which they occur, and must also differentiate clearly between different issues and crime types within the larger phenomenon of migration (e.g. trafficking, smuggling, and legal visa abuses of various sorts). The journey may begin the same way, by voluntarily engaging the migration services of a smuggler, but once they arrive, trafficked persons often find themselves forced or coerced into positions or working conditions to which they did not consent (Chacon, 2006; Chu, 2011). For example, an individual may consent to go with a smuggler to a new country for a restaurant job, and on arrival discover that she has been sold into a brothel. Or, she may indeed consent to travel for sex work in order to provide for family or better her economic situation (Chin & Finckenauer, 2012) but find that she is confined or debt-bonded into different working conditions than she agreed to after she arrives. This second scenario demands that one important myth about sex trafficking victims be addressed—the belief that victims lack—control over their situations at any point in the experience. VICTIM AGENCY IN SEX TRAFFICKING: A MYTH THAT IMPACTS RESPONSES Appreciating one prominent sex trafficking myth is important in understanding why there is such a variety present in definitions and approaches: that sex trafficking victims lack any control. In truth, while the

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exercise of force, fraud, or coercion (psychological, economic, or any other sort) are present in all sex trafficking cases, actual levels of agency among trafficked persons vary widely and lie more on a continuum than within a dichotomy (Chin & Finckenauer, 2012). There are concerns about whether the image of the extremely brutalized, powerless victim is truly representative enough to undergird all current policy responses, particularly those initiated by the abolitionist movement that believes all prostitution is violent and seeks to end all sex work, overtly coerced or not (Chuang, 2010). Others express concern that the aforementioned image of the “perfect victim,” who could never have wanted any part of the situation, is simply good marketing (Weitzer, 2014). As Zimmermann and Watts (2004) note, “It should not be assumed . . . that all who have been trafficked are traumatized, consider themselves victims, detest their captors, or wish to escape or go home.” These concerns illustrate the importance of studying trafficking victims more broadly (Brunovskis & Surtees, 2010), because this myth distorts sex trafficking responses; the “rescue” process carried out by some nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and law enforcement may be coercive in itself if the services offered do not allow victims to leave the aftercare shelter or if service provision is conditioned on cooperation with law enforcement (Soderlund, 2005; Steiner, 2006; Weitzer, 2013). While rescue stories that abolitionists tell focus on brothel raids and successful delivery of victims to safe houses, reports from sex worker rights organizations and shelter managers suggest that some survivors perceive the rehabilitation process as another form of imprisonment. These individuals report feeling forced into it, being given no opportunity to voice their individual needs and stories, and/or given no choice about what the process will entail under the guise of being “educated” about what happened to them (Arnstein, 2014; Soderlund, 2005). Indeed, creating savior ideologies around rescuers actually empowered traffickers by allowing them to frame rescuers as another group that will force victims into situations they do not want (Amar, 2009). Instead, trafficking survivors come from a wide variety of backgrounds and often have mixed feelings about their situations and about what services would best meet their needs. Their abusers may have recruited them through the “lover-boy model,” in which a trafficker involves the victim in a romantic relationship; traffickers may have made threats against victims’ children, friends, or families if they cooperate with authorities; or victims may resist leaving because the alternatives or their homes are even worse than the trafficking situation. In sum, many victims fail to fit into the “perfect victim” boxes that fit the “savior” narrative (Soderlund, 2005). This leads not only to public misinformation but to victims remaining unidentified or being denied services because they do not fit the expected profile (Srikantiah, 2007).

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Conversely, some sex workers get labeled as trafficking victims who actually are not. For example, Chin and Finckenauer (2012) interviewed numerous participants in the China-to-America smuggling operation, who were subsequently involved in the sex trade, and came across only one woman who claimed to be involved under duress and who could be defined, legally, as trafficked. The rest of those they interviewed entered the trade voluntarily as a way to a better life, were not unhappy with the result, and did not feel duped. The 19th-century abolitionist language that surrounds much anti-trafficking work misses this nuance, and in fact crowds out more pragmatic solutions for victims of trafficking that might meet their actual needs, rather than the service provision and legal needs that others tell them they have, but which leave their real needs unmet (Amar, 2009; Bruch, 2004). PREVALENCE OF SEX TRAFFICKING Also a challenge, partially because international definitions of what constitutes sex trafficking were negotiated between countries with different views, is measuring prevalence of the crime—definitions affect what is included when cases are counted. In fact, a number of data issues have plagued trafficking research. For example, the United Nations estimated in 2006 that there were approximately 27 million slaves in the world (UNODC, 2014). These numbers are difficult to confirm, however, due to the hidden nature of the populations, the reliance on official statistics to create estimates, and the inherent difficulties in obtaining a sampling frame and of accessing potential respondents (Feingold, 2011; Weitzer, 2013). More recent attempts have been made to provide better estimates, such as the Global Slavery Index (Walk Free Foundation, 2014), but they fall prey to similar criticisms about opaque and inconsistent methodologies (Gallagher, 2014). Presently, the most transparent attempt to estimate prevalence comes from the International Labour Organization (ILO), which estimates that there are 20.9 million forced laborers worldwide, with 4.5 million of those being trafficked for sex—both numbers reported with a 68 percent confidence interval (ILO, 2012). The average reported period of exploitation for sex was 17 months. In their report, the ILO noted earlier issues with its 2005 capture-recapture method, which ran into problems due to violations of statistical assumptions, and its solutions to those problems were still vague but involved triangulation with media accounts, NGO reports, government and law enforcement data, academic studies, ILO country reports, and union reports (for forced labor). The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) notes that sex trafficking is more common than labor trafficking in Europe, Central Asia, and the Americas, though it is present in all regions (UNODC, 2014). They

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identified over 460 different trafficking flows between 2007 and 2010, and most victims detected had crossed international borders but stayed within their region. East Asia was the largest origin region, while Western and Central Europe were the largest destination regions with the widest variety of origin countries reported and the longest distance spanned to reach them. The number of convictions for trafficking globally was very low in proportion to the number of victims estimated, with 16 countries reporting none at all. The UNODC’s data come from national institutions and NGOs responding to questionnaires and data requests, combined with publicly available crime statistics and national level reports; the validity and reliability of such data vary widely (Feingold, 2011; Gozdziak & Collett, 2005; Tyldum, 2010; Weitzer, 2013; Zhang, 2012). For the present purpose, it is enough to say that researchers generally agree that prevalence estimates for human and sex trafficking contain numerous problems, but trafficking is a significant issue requiring attention by all nations and from the international community. In other words, even if we cannot know the true prevalence rates outside of some carefully caveated estimates, we can at least know what we are dealing with, how it works, and who is involved. There are lives that depend on it. SEX TRAFFICKING: THEORETICAL OVERVIEW I turn now to an overview of approaches from political science, international relations, and gender studies that contribute to our understanding of why sex trafficking happens and how it works. Some of these might be applied to human trafficking more broadly as well. They are presented for consideration in reimagining criminal justice and prosecution responses as part of a larger, cooperative effort rather than as a standalone, selfcontained, or even primary set of actions in the international sphere. I follow this with a couple of organized crime theoretical frameworks. General Explanations for Sex Trafficking Mary Buckley presents an interesting synthesis of political science theories about push factors driving human trafficking in Russia and Eastern Europe that can be applied to many different regions. She identifies contributory factors enabling trafficking that include “state collapse, resultant economic and social trends, personal aspirations, market demand, the growth of lawlessness, crime and corruption and weak state capacities to tackle a complex of issues” (Buckley, 2009, p. 215). She acknowledges globalization as an integral facilitator both of the modern human trafficking enterprise and of any response. Fast communications technology, speedy travel, and holes in governance from conflict, political repression, and state and/or economic collapse, are credited for much of the

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market growth and opportunity for sex trafficking and for human trafficking more generally (Buckley, 2009; Jonsson, 2009b; Williams, 2008). Other political scientists have looked at sex trafficking as both a security and humanitarian problem (Jonsson, 2009b), a dichotomy consistent with the militarization of international development aid in the past 20 years. Claudia Aradau (2004) calls these the “politics of pity” and the “politics of risk.” Under the politics of risk fall the threats that illegal migration, organized crime, and human trafficking pose to the state (Aradau, 2004). The politics of pity incorporate the “humanitarian discourse, spanning efforts to salvage migrants . . . asylum-seekers or trafficked women” (Aradau, 2004, p. 254). Others add in what might be called the “politics of morality,” which entails the white slavery-esque moral panic against all prostitution (Agustin, 2007; Amar, 2009; Steiner, 2006). Together, these three political emphases have led to confusion in policy (do we protect victims or control immigration?) and to treatments that can sometimes do more harm than good for survivors or sweep in voluntary sex workers who want no part of it. A number of gender studies scholars, surprisingly, join the moral panic discussion and focus on the relevance of “a more sexualized world, the role played by a global political economy of sex, and persisting forms of patriarchy ready to view women and girls primarily as objects” (Buckley, 2008, p. 216; Corrin, 2005; Pettman, 1996). This is important when addressing demand for commercial sex, as well as law enforcement’s and civil society’s treatment of survivors and recognition of their rights. Anthropologists have examined local patterns of general migration streams, their deleterious effect on family as a protective institution, and on differential gender role hierarchies left behind from home or newly developed elsewhere (Brennan, 2005; Dudwick, 1997; Fayzullaeva, 2009). Patterns of dislocation, especially after a state or economic collapse, combined with cultural variations in gender norms and expectations are helpful for understanding how families come to a point where they will give up a child, spouse, or go themselves with traffickers who know how to exploit these vulnerabilities. The example of Russia’s chaotic post-Communism transition is illustrative here. After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, numerous planned towns throughout Russia were decimated by unemployment when their local industry failed in the new market (Jonsson, 2009b; Orlova & Baglay, 2006). Economic displacement led to social dislocation and family collapse, leaving many women to fend for themselves within limited, gendered market opportunities (see Zhang, Chin, & Jody, 2007) and creating artificial orphans that wound up in state orphanages or on the streets. Still others were forced to migrate in search of work, and enterprising criminals prey on the opportunities created by the confluence of economic desperation and weakened political institutions (Rathbone-Bradley, 2006), easily exploiting these circumstances to supply sex markets in Europe and

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elsewhere (Leman & Janssens, 2008; Orlova, 2004). Variations of this scenario play out around the world, and macro-level forces like these complicate the effectiveness of any localized or cooperative criminal justice response within them, especially when dealing with network operations that cross international borders. Theories Underlying Trafficking Networks While most sex trafficking is perpetrated by individuals or small groups (UNODC, 2014), networks become more prominent when trafficking takes on a transnational dimension, because the operation becomes vastly more complicated with border crossings and longer distances between origin and destination. This section briefly examines some of the theoretical underpinnings behind sex trafficking network operations, which tend to have a political economy emphasis, while the next section looks at dominant sex trafficking network types around the world. Phil Williams’s work on organized crime incorporates a sophisticated economic and political appreciation of commodity market operations (in this case the commodification of women), the opportunities these markets create for traffickers, and traffickers’ resulting cost–benefit and risk calculations in conducting business. He deems a market perspective crucial to the analysis along with an understanding of regional, national, and global breakdown of governance that permits these markets to operate (Williams, 2008); but as recommended above, he does not look at crime and economics alone. For example, in an age of horizontal network structures that span borders, he proposes that “states have become almost outmoded organizations: the world is attempting to deal with a twenty-first century phenomenon using structures, mechanisms and instruments that are still rooted in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century concepts and organizational forms” (Godson & Williams, 1998, p. 66). Put simply, Godson and Williams propose that states as they are currently organized are not flexible or nimble enough to do it alone—and trafficking networks exploit this. Leman and Janssens (2008) outline a straight entrepreneurial model, sometimes called the enterprise model (see also Albanese, 2007), of human trafficking organizations that employs social networks to partially explain how they work. In their view of criminal networks, “offenders work together on the basis of a reciprocal dependency relationship in which associates are interchangeable” (Leman & Janssens, 2008, p. 435). Offenders are viewed as employers seeking profit and their trade is based on market principles (see also Albanese, 2011; Block, 1991; Shelley, 2007). Social relationships and social networks, as loose organizations and bases of trust, provide the structure within which business structures are built and within which mechanisms of social control form and keep order (Klerks & Kop, 2004; Leman & Janssens, 2008; Lupsha, 1983). Similar to approaches used

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in attacking terrorist networks, infiltrating and understanding trafficking network operations will be important in any strategy to combat them; the network as a unit of analysis seems to have an adaptive, shape-shifting life of its own, independent of any one actor (Morselli, 2013; Zhang, 2014). This has serious implications for the effectiveness of traditional deterrence strategies that typically focus on the individual. Monzini (2001) distinguishes sex trafficking networks by size. She first describes small, loosely connected criminal groups in which recruitment, transport, and exploitation are all undertaken by the same individuals, normally friends or acquaintances of the victims. These are local groups that might be found in a country with corruption, weak governance, and few financial resources—such as Nepal—and who traffic individuals from rural villages into the cities. Mid-sized groups begin to supply foreign markets and function as more sophisticated mid-sized mobile prostitution international supply chains, such as Middle Eastern networks (Calandruccio, 2005; Icduygu & Toktas, 2002) composed of smaller ethnic, kinship, and friendship-based networks interacting with each other and spanning borders. These begin to develop more complex division of labor, few individuals know everyone involved, but there is still little in the way of hierarchy. This allows operations to remain nimble and adaptable to changing circumstances. Transnational criminal networks are largest in size and each portion has a clearly defined job function, from recruitment to exploitation, such as the Chinese “snakehead” network (Zhang, 2014). In each case, it is important to note that these are adaptive, learning networks and not static, tightly controlled organizations with any single “head” (Leman & Janssens, 2008; Mancuso, 2014; Surtees, 2008; Williams, 2008). Sex Trafficking Network Typologies Nevertheless, by the time a sex trafficking network becomes transnational, it runs a fairly well-oiled machine because it understands its market(s) and how to supply them. Individual traffickers, or smaller groups within larger networks, can also profit at various points in the supply chain by selling victims to higher-level traffickers or to end users (Chu, 2011), but these organizations rarely manifest as hierarchical mafiastyle crime groups. Shelley (2003, 2007) identifies a global typology of six major sex trafficking network types with different characteristics and frames traffickers as economic actors that capitalize on opportunity. The first model she identifies is the violent entrepreneur, exemplified by the Balkan-Albanian model. They are often family-based, borne of war, violent during transport of victims, and often recruit through the “lover-boy” model. These victims work the greatest number of hours, suffer the most violence during exploitation, and the traffickers focus on conspicuous consumption and sending money home to family rather than reinvesting in the business. This type

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of network has low recruitment costs and can afford rough treatment of victims as long as there is no interruption of supply (Shelley, 2010). Related, but more sophisticated, is the post-Soviet Russian model mentioned earlier. This model is more organized, recruiting through legitimate and illegitimate employment agencies, with participants taking on more specialized functions. These traffickers are often more educated, former military, and use proceeds to fund gangs, terrorist groups, and sometimes reinvest in the business (see also Leman & Janssens, 2008). Both of these types are shifting from ethnically based, family relationships to more transnational, interethnic ties as the increase in business and need to outsource demands it (e.g., using the Camorra Family in Italy for money laundering and moving operatives as needed throughout Europe). The third model identified by Shelley is the trade and development model exemplified by the Chinese mentioned earlier, which Shelley describes as being highly organized, concerned with long-term investment, and less violent than other models (Shelley, 2003, 2007). Zhang (2013) clarifies the highly organized descriptor and depicts a horizontally based network of individuals and small groups that organize around the transaction based on skills needed, and Zhang and Chin (2003) further describe how old, hierarchical forms of Chinese organized crime (e.g., triads) simply don’t work for this new, more fluid form of organization. Fourth, the Mexico-U.S. coyote networks represent the “supermarket model” (low cost-high volume—Shelley, 2003, 2010); they operate smuggling networks that contain some human trafficking within the larger, more voluntary smuggling operation. These networks can be violent and have been known to abandon people in the desert en route to destination. Heil (2012), in her ethnography of Immokalee, Florida, goes into further detail about this in her examination of forced labor and forced prostitution in U.S. agricultural communities, describing how women may be trafficked for sex to serve the male migrants who were smuggled, or may have been trafficked for both sex and labor themselves. She, too, describes a chainlike network of interconnected gangs, and means of control throughout include violence, misrepresenting work and living conditions, confiscating identification documents, threatening families at home, threatening deportation, and so on. Fifth, Shelley (2003, 2007) describes the “American Pimp” model, whose means of control also include violence and controlling victims’ money, documents, and access to drugs and alcohol, although many are starting to get away from providing drugs because they can render victims more difficult to control (Dank et al., 2014). Recruitment costs in this model are low, consisting mostly of the “lover-boy” approach, and proceeds are spent on conspicuous consumption with the exception of some larger gangs that are beginning to reinvest profits into the drug business and other enterprises. Sixth and finally, Shelley describes the Dutch attempt to regulate the legitimate prostitution market as a way to reduce trafficking,

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which is still illegal, but a more recent Huisman and Nelen (2014) study notes that trafficking still occurs despite legalizing prostitution, and that cheaper prices for sex acts from trafficked individuals and higher operational costs from complying with regulations are driving down wages and simply causing displacement, not reduction of illegal trafficking. Despite these differences, several roles can be found in varying forms within most transnational trafficking networks; although in smaller networks, individual people may play multiple roles or trade off tasks as needed. These roles include “arrangers/investors” who oversee the overall running of the operation: “recruiters” who work between the arranger and the client; the local-initiating trafficker who sources persons to be trafficked and facilitates their departure; “cashiers” who receive and pay out money between the trafficked person and/or his or her family; “transporters” who manage transit out of the country/town of origin; corrupt public officials who protect the criminal organization in exchange for payments; “informers” who manage information flow and have access to sophisticated communications technology; guides and crew members who manage transit in the destination country or city; “enforcers” who ensure compliance through any means necessary; support staff and specialists stationed at transit points who manage safe houses or provide other services; debt/fee collectors, and money launderers (Icduygu & Toktas, 2002; Leman & Janssens, 2007). SECURITY ISSUES: BORDER, STATE, AND HUMAN There are several types of security issues to be considered when thinking about how to combat transnational sex trafficking. Border security was addressed in the discussion of overlaps with immigration enforcement. Current refugee crises and tightening national immigration policies are at the forefront of national and international security policy arenas, and assistance for trafficking victims can get wrapped up in this milieu, causing victims to get caught in attempts to “stem the tide.” State security, and law enforcement as an agent for ensuring state security, has also been discussed. Sex trafficking is an affront to most value systems, and failure to at least be seen working to contain it threatens state legitimacy—this, in fact, is the logic behind the U.S. Department of State’s yearly ranking of countries on their compliance with the United Nations Protocol on Trafficking in Persons (USDOS, 2015) with its foci on prevention, protection, and prosecution (the “3 P’s”) (Cho, 2015; UNODC, 2014). States in the worst tier in the list (Tier 3), but that seek legitimacy in the international community, work to get off it. Boko Haram, ISIS, and other terror groups are becoming known for sex trafficking as a part of their tactics; rape has long been a weapon of war, as has the selling of women or the pressing of women into sexual service, and these groups are no exception—they also subjugate women via forced marriage, sexual

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servitude, or forced prostitution as an activity to fund terrorist operations (Healy, 2015; Jacoby, 2015; Kartusch & Reiter, 2006; Kohn, 1994; Manjoo & McRaith, 2011). Not yet discussed, however, is human insecurity, in terms of risk factors that make individuals vulnerable to trafficking victimization. For human security, the United Nations require that individuals have security in their daily lives from constant threats such as mass population movements, infectious disease, and long-term oppression and deprivation (Shelley, 2009, 2010). Jonsson (2009a) describes societal peace, rule of law, and a state that provides a basic social safety net as necessary conditions for meeting these needs and reducing the spaces in which organized crime and trafficking networks can operate. Looking at the aforementioned security issues, plus additional security issues from the perspective of potential victims rather than that of the state, Durgana (2015) maps human insecurity as consisting of seven vulnerabilities: personal insecurity (personal experience of abuse or a lack of hope for legitimate opportunities due to prior personal life events), community insecurity (physical safety and disengaged community that cannot be relied upon for help), health insecurity (lack of access to preventive or responsive care), natural environmental insecurity (sustained environmental issues or conflicts over scarce natural resources), political insecurity (of state or of personal legal status), economic insecurity, and food insecurity (Durgana, 2015, p. 34). In addition to being concerns for the personal safety of victims and those at risk, who tend to disproportionately represent marginalized groups (Jonsson, 2009b), having great numbers of individuals experiencing human insecurity is also a threat to the state. Understanding how these various types of human insecurity may make a person vulnerable to the enticements of a trafficker offering a better life in a new country is important when identifying victims, knowing what questions to ask, better comprehending their needs, and understanding the hooks and angles that traffickers may be using to press victims into service. For a comprehensive tool that has been validated for victim identification in the United States, see the Trafficking Victim Identification Tool, publicly available and created by the Vera Institute of Justice (Simich, Goyen, Powell, & Mallozzi, 2014). While developed for the United States, it could be adapted culturally and tested for use in other countries as well. Aside from better serving victims, understanding human insecurity is also informative for state policy that seeks to reduce human and sex trafficking, whether inbound, outbound, or internally, because it can illuminate systemic issues contributing to the problem. POLICY RESPONSES TO SEX TRAFFICKING Discussion now turns to policy approaches concerning sex trafficking, the implementation of which have required some level of law enforcement

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participation, and calls for a more collaborative human trafficking strategy in which law enforcement engages others as full partners in these arenas. These arenas include securitization, economics, legislation, demandside interventions, survivor-centered prevention, and protection and rehabilitation, with a heavy emphasis on the role played by criminal justice systems. The other areas are addressed as they relate to the environment in which criminal justice systems operate, in order to highlight both strengths and shortcomings of relying so heavily on criminal justice to stem the problem of transnational sex trafficking. Securitization Policy: Concerns and Possibilities The “politics of risk” mentioned earlier have played a large part in the overall politics of trafficking and are the underlying rationale for reliance on criminal justice to curb the problem. Since the 1990s, broader approaches in international security studies began examining threats beyond state and military security to include individual, social, and global concerns (Jackson, 2006), including the concept of human security described earlier. The security framework is useful for identifying the “ ‘securitizing actor(s)’ and the ‘referent object’ (whose existence is threatened)” (Jackson, 2006, p. 301). The “referent object” here is traditionally the state, even while it refers to protecting victims, and the “securitizing actors” in transnational sex trafficking include organizations like the UNODC, the International Organization on Migration (IOM) and others who, due to their mandates, necessarily frame their involvement in security language but depend on cooperation with criminal justice and human rights actors. Their policies and referenda define all types of trafficking as threats to global human security and nation-building, and as violations of human rights, encouraging states to treat human trafficking as a “part of the larger phenomenon of illegal migration, crime and state security” (Jackson, 2006, p. 303), which removes the nuances between sex trafficking and the larger commercial sex market, and downplays concerns regarding the needs of vulnerable, marginalized communities—justifying containment over solving the underlying problems, which is the opposite of the approach advocated through much of this chapter. The root causes that create a hospitable environment for sex trafficking in recruitment and destination countries are thus left largely untouched when policy is focused disproportionately on enforcement. Additionally, some of the intergovernmental organizations that propagate anti-trafficking policies out of one subagency, such as the UNODC, are complicit in covering up trafficking enterprises that popped up to serve other subagencies, such as deployed U.N. Peacekeeping Forces (Allred, 2006). Measures have been taken by the United Nations, NATO, and other state governments to remedy this conflict of interest after extensive public outcry, but it shows how any effort to combat human trafficking must be

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not only coordinated, but consistent, or else it will be undercut and serve only to increase social costs. Law enforcement approaches to controlling human trafficking organizations to date have been plagued by a variety of problems. Among these are local police attitudes that human trafficking is still “an addition to everyday police work” (Lebov, 2010, p. 85), sparse actionable intelligence, language barriers in migrant communities, problems identifying trafficked persons, limited survivor services available, and the disproportionate focus on sex trafficking to the marginalization of other, more pervasive forms of trafficking (Bruch, 2004; ILO, 2012; Lebov, 2010). Within sex trafficking itself, complications affecting successful law enforcement approaches across national borders include differences in the legality of prostitution in the home country regarding purchasing sex abroad (Allred, 2006; Bruch, 2004) and as a “pull” factor for trafficking “product” into those countries (O’Brien, 2011). On the local level, some police are also well-known customers, offering not to arrest individuals in exchange for sexual services (Levitt & Venkatesh, 2007), or taking bribes from traffickers (Haugen & Boutros, 2010). Police, prosecutors, and judges have also been known to discount the stories of victims with troubled pasts, presenting attitudinal challenges to taking sex trafficking cases seriously (Farrell, Owens, & McDevitt, 2014). For sanctions of any kind against transnational sex trafficking and human trafficking networks to work, basic deterrence theory states that they must be severe and certain (Kennedy, 1996). While a severe sanction with high publicity can be effective (Forst, Greene, & Lynch, 2011), application of sanctions generally is uncertain, and in fact not believed by perpetrators to be a serious risk (Dank et al., 2014), due to difficulty in carrying out prosecutions and obtaining convictions, corruption, the hidden nature of the crime, and the adaptability of networks that respond to visible sanctions by watching, waiting, and then ramping up activities again after adjusting for new enforcement strategies. Finally, crime control success in reducing transnational sex trafficking will be unsuccessful if network-specific theories are not incorporated into strategy. For example, disruption of an organized crime network may not end the criminal enterprise but lead instead to less-centralized operations (Bright, Greenhill, & Levenkova, 2014; Morselli, 2013). Like terrorist networks, “unorganized” crime may more efficiently accomplish the same work as a more tightly controlled organization because of reduced bureaucracy. Network disruption can also lead to greater levels of violence, at least in the short term, as other groups “vie for position and influence” (Surtees, 2008). This special character of crime organizations exposes the limits of traditional deterrence theories. However, it also exposes the possibilities for research examining trafficking network adaptation patterns. These complexities are also relevant when analyzing what will deter a sex

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trafficking network within which individual members are replaceable unless they possess unique skills or coveted business contacts. Economic Policy Concerns Impact Other Approaches Lindstrom (2007), writing about the Balkans, classifies international responses to trafficking as a combination of migration, law enforcement, human rights, and environmental economic approaches. The environmental economic approach is close to the human rights approach but “emphasizes the economic causes of trafficking and looks at alternative routes out of poverty for potential victims and those who have been trafficked” (Lindstrom, 2007, cited in Goodey, 2008, p. 431). Creating economic, social, and educational opportunities is crucial for reducing the vulnerability of poor populations to trafficking (Bales, Trodd, & Williamson, 2009; Jonsson, 2009a) and to reducing the lure of organized crime as a path out of poverty for would-be traffickers. Local law enforcement can assist by engaging in community policing not only for intelligence gathering, but to strengthen community ties and social capital to reduce vulnerability (Pope, 2010). Working against this, though, is the world’s growing population and ever-increasing competition for scarce resources—particularly in the world’s poorest countries (Bales et al., 2009), and continuing political instability in many countries resulting in weak social and political institutions that cannot credibly provide for society’s needs (Jonsson, 2009a). While criminal justice actors cannot control those larger forces, those working to reduce sex trafficking must be mindful of them and creatively engage in countering them by rooting out corruption, helping build cohesive communities, and taking seriously legislation that is enacted to reduce sex trafficking and help victims. Legislative Policy Takes a While to Grow Teeth While the Palermo Protocol has become more widely accepted and more countries now have antihuman trafficking laws, the content of these laws still needs more work to address victims’ rights, and their short- and long-term needs once they have exited their situations (Goodey, 2008). For example, in 2004, the European Union’s Justice and Home Affairs Council adopted a directive on residence permits for foreign victims of trafficking, requiring that they cooperate with authorities in order to receive such a permit, much like the TVPA in the United States and its stipulations for T and U visas, exemplifying how legislation that “purports to be ‘for’ trafficking victims is sometimes more focused on the needs of law enforcement in acquiring victim testimonies” (Goodey, 2008, p. 423). Another dynamic that complicates legal strategies, mentioned earlier, is the question of victim agency and consent related to their work situations,

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migration statuses, and what legislation dictates happens to them if removed from their trafficking situations (Andrikasevec, 2010; Bruch, 2004). Legislative interventions also presuppose impartial and functional judiciaries in participating countries that will treat victims as victims (Androff, 2011; Haugen & Boutros, 2010). Every government in the world has outlawed slavery, but it remains a crime that is rarely prosecuted, and corruption in enforcement is a major obstacle. “Prosecution of these crimes is essential to creating a [legitimate] legal and moral climate where perpetrators cannot engage in slavery with impunity” (Androff, 2011, p. 218). Finally, in some countries, the concept of human rights is a foreign construct; in many countries, it is associated instead with elitist foreign interference that is oblivious to their realities (Androff, 2011). Police in training in Brazil “roll their eyes when human rights are mentioned, grumbling that human rights organizations are made up of the ‘usual suspects’— homosexuals, feminists, and blacks sympathetic with narcotraffickers” (Amar, 2009, p. 522). Further illustrating this cultural divide, several countries have used the new anti-trafficking laws they adopted due to international pressure to intensify internal repressive victimization, to extra-legally detain women for vice crimes, to increase deportations of undesirable populations generally, and to harass single women traveling while virtually no traffickers are brought to justice (Amar, 2009; Kinney, 2013). Women in these countries can “become defined as an intersection of vulnerabilities and dishonors . . . rather than as bearers of rights” (Amar, 2009, p. 519). It cannot be expected that simple transplantation of Western criminal justice procedures will be effective. However, even in the global North, it has been very difficult to translate new legislation into increased prosecutions and victim services in practice. For example, despite passage of Safe Harbor laws in many states that direct victims out of the criminal justice system and into services, Farrell et al. (2014) highlight issues regarding misidentification of cases, training gaps within law enforcement, prosecution offices and judiciaries that prevent prosecutors from bringing cases they think they might lose, victim attrition, biases against victims that seem less credible due to their challenging personal histories, and other issues that plague practice even when stronger laws are passed. Demand-Side Policy Has Achieved Mixed Results This is the most under-addressed and yet critical area. If people were not buying sex, then sex trafficking (and indeed all commercial sex) would stop. This is an objective under much dispute from sex worker rights organizations, and human rights organizations like Amnesty International that call for decriminalization of sex work, and thus the challenge becomes how to address the subset of the commercial sex industry that is supplied by sex trafficking.

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From the criminal justice perspective, Sweden has gone after prostitution by prosecuting the customers. Under a Swedish law enacted in 2004, prostitution is viewed as a form of sexual violence committed against prostitutes by customers (Kleemans & Smit, 2014). Men are prosecuted and women are provided with services to exit the profession. Prostitution as a whole initially appeared to go down since enactment of this law, but results are now deemed mixed as unintended consequences have been identified—namely, the Swedish model assumes that voluntary prostitution does not exist, and that all prostitution is violence by men against women. In practice, criminalizing demand has hurt non-trafficked sex workers who count on the work to make ends meet, and the effect of driving commercial sex into hiding on violence committed against prostitutes is also unknown (Kleemans & Smit, 2014). The Swedish law is also extraterritorial, similar to the “Operation Predator” statute in the United States, meaning that citizens can be prosecuted at home if they engage in these behaviors abroad. The colloquially known “Operation Predator” statute, officially the Protect Act of 2003, targets demand for child sex tourism. Under this statute, U.S. citizens may be prosecuted at home for purchasing sex from a child while overseas (Cutts, 2007; Newman et al., 2011). The Council of Europe likewise enacted its convention on the Protection of Children against Sexual Exploitation and Abuse, which has similar provisions, but an evaluation of this statute declared it unlikely to reduce prevalence much without increasing the number of prosecutions that utilize it, and without equal enforcement of sex trafficking laws against traffickers in destination countries (Fredette, 2009). But, these statutes could have a great impact on civilian demand abroad (Hodge, 2008), and could reinforce the abovementioned corrective measures implemented by the United Nations, the U.S. Department of Defense, and NATO to rein in the behavior of their deployed forces (Allred, 2006), if they could be made more reflective of the realities of the commercial sex market by recognizing the difference between those who have been trafficked and live and work under coercion, and those who are not. Survivor-Centered Prevention, Protection, and Rehabilitation Can Improve Conviction Rates Outside of the legal and criminal justice spheres, Tsutsumi et al. (2008) recommended in their Kathmandu, Nepal, report that U.N. and NGO programs should include psychosocial support to improve survivors’ mental health (Androff, 2011; Hodge, 2008). Further, an understanding of commercial sex and sex work that avoids objectifying victims and grants survivors autonomy over their decisions could actually improve the conviction rate for perpetrators and thus improve deterrent effects. Drawing on criminal and domestic violence law as well as immigration legal

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history, this approach “stems from concerns about differentiating victims from other undocumented migrants and mandating victim participation in the prosecution of traffickers” (Srikantiah, 2007, p. 158). In Belgium and the Netherlands, as trafficking survivors begin to recover with the assistance of social service agencies, they are granted a reflection period from 45 days to 3 months in which to make an informed decision about cooperation, and during which they are granted temporary immigration status. In both countries, “more victims report their traffickers now than did before there was a reflection period . . . [and] trauma victims may actually be more stable witnesses” if they are empowered to choose how they participate and are given time to stabilize their lives and psychological health first (Srikantiah, 2007, p. 208). One might hypothesize that survivors may also be better able to provide actionable intelligence about trafficking operations if they have been given enough time and space to feel in control, safe, and secure. Policy communities that can be adversarial with regard to a multitude of issues in some countries (e.g., victim-focused NGOs and law enforcement) might do well to cooperate jointly, for example, by making legal and social services available without being conditional on cooperating with law enforcement (Van Dijk, 2012). RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS: A BROADER IDEA OF SECURITY IS NEEDED Because there is a shortage of empirical analysis of which societal phenomena have the greatest influence in creating environments hospitable to sex trafficking and a failure to maximize inclusion of other governmental and civil society organizations as full partners with law enforcement in a coordinated strategy, rather than both types of groups eyeing each other suspiciously (Kennedy, 1996; UNODC, 2011a; Williams & Godson, 2002), we have yet to identify exactly which cross-border criminal activities are deterrable by criminal justice tactics and international agreements. So far, international agreements between nations consist largely of extradition pacts. Stronger intra-country and international partnerships are necessary to reduce this transnational and human security problem. Addressing sex trafficking requires the refinement, implementation, and enforcement of existing laws and treaties, “changing economic structures, improving social services, harnessing the powers of the media and . . . civil society” (Androff, 2011, p. 219). Within such a coordinated strategy, criminal justice actors should focus beyond enforcement on reducing the auxiliary lawlessness and corruption that enable human trafficking enterprises. Strengthened commitment and coordination of efforts are needed to make the environment in which human trafficking operates inhospitable (Androff, 2011).

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Williams and Godson (2002) point out that global governance is still using 18th- and 19th-centuries finite state structures to combat 21st-c entury transnational networks. It is possible that looser international and interagency alliances with flattened hierarchies of relatively autonomous actors may work better to combat similarly structured organized trafficking networks than enormous, bureaucratic structures, if issues of national sovereignty, security, and jurisdiction could be addressed. Creating such a shift in thinking and political structuring would take ingenuity, solid research, and incredible powers of diplomacy and negotiation. But, it would a be tremendously exciting prospect that could have a lot of potential and could be tried first on a pilot basis and evaluated to determine whether it reduces trafficking and whether it would be applicable in multiple settings. Other activities that could be useful to uncovering and breaking up networks, keeping mindful of the cautions made earlier, include improving efforts to “follow the money”—tracing financial transactions for networks that use electronic funds transfer mechanisms, as is done for other types of organized crime and terrorist activity. But, following the money in sex trafficking networks is as challenging as it is for other forms of organized crime, especially if fund transfers do not occur through normal, legitimate channels (Petrunov, 2011). Newer and better methodologies to facilitate this must be found, particularly those being developed to follow financial transactions on the dark web, although not all networks use such sophisticated funds transfer mechanisms; many still operate via cash (Petrunov, 2011; Shelley, 2003). Current criminal justice strategies, when successful, do make for good press; successful operations resulting in prosecutions send signals to the public that the sale of human beings will not be tolerated (Haugen & Boutros, 2010). But, if other sectors of society or even other parts of the criminal justice system send opposite signals, any positive effect is diluted. However, the traditional criminal justice sanctions of arrest, trial, and imprisonment are only one variety of sanction at society’s disposal. Other types of sanctions should include impediments to trafficking business processes such as forensic financial investigation and freezing of accounts, interruption of transit routes at border crossings or on transport vehicles, and demand-side interventions that reduce profit incentives for traffickers to continue in business, as described earlier. Broader human security concerns such as poverty, education, discrimination, and dislocation must also be dealt with but are beyond the scope of the criminal justice system acting alone. Criminal justice sanctions must be designed to fit within a larger, coordinated framework. For example, if victims’ mobility and access to social rights were not denied by their traffickers, they would be denied to them by the state due to immigration status (Andrikasevec, 2010); measures must be taken to provide alternatives to victims because removal from their trafficking situation will not take away the push factors that made them vulnerable in the first place.

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NOTES 1. Story adapted from one posted on the Act to Prevent Trafficking website, with other details provided from others’ accounts. The original full-length story can be found at http://www.aptireland.org/anyas-story/. 2. The term “modern-day slavery” has also been used by some scholars and advocates to describe many types of trafficking, including sex trafficking (Bales, Trodd, & Williamson, 2009).

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CHAPTER 12

Human Trafficking for Labor Exploitation Amy Farrell, Rebecca Pfeffer, Meredith Dank, and Colleen Owens1

INTRODUCTION According to the International Labour Organization (ILO), approximately 20.9 million people worldwide are victims of forced labor, 22 percent of whom are victims of forced sexual exploitation, 68 percent of whom are victims of forced labor exploitation, and 10 percent of whom are victims of state-imposed forced labor (ILO, 2014). According to the ILO, forced labor refers to those situations where people are coerced to work through violence or through other more subtle means such as psychological coercion, manipulation of debt, or the threat of law (ILO, 2014). These victims are forced to work in many different industries including agriculture, mining, domestic work, hospitality, construction, logging, and manufacturing. Just over 100 million children are estimated to be laboring full time and subjected to “the worst forms of child labor,” including slavery, forced labor, commercial sexual exploitation, drug trafficking, and forced participation in armed conflict as child soldiers (ILO, 2005). The true prevalence of labor trafficking within the United States remains unknown, but research examining labor trafficking experiences among specific population groups suggests the number of victims may be quite large. For example, Zhang and colleagues estimated as many as 2.5 million unauthorized Mexican immigrants may be victims of labor trafficking in the United States (Zhang, 2012). This chapter defines labor trafficking and discusses what we know about the recruitment, movement, and exploitation of labor trafficking victims based on data collected in the United States. Additionally, the chapter describes the challenges that labor trafficking victims face

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following their removal or escape from situations of exploitation and victimization. Recommendations are provided at the close of the chapter about legal and policy changes that would improve the identification and response to labor trafficking victims and reduce risks for victimization in the future. DEFINITIONS OF LABOR TRAFFICKING Labor trafficking was first criminalized in the United States in 2000 with the passage of the victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act (TVPA) of 2000. Labor trafficking is defined in the act as the “recruitment, harboring, transportation, provision, or obtaining of a person for labor or services, through the use of force, fraud, or coercion for the purpose of subjection to involuntary servitude, peonage, debt bondage, or slavery” (TVPA, 2000). Now, more than a decade later, all states have passed laws criminalizing human trafficking, and most states include specific provisions for the criminalization of labor trafficking (Polaris, n.d.). Despite the passage of laws, little is known as to who is most at risk and under what conditions labor trafficking occurs. Compared to sex trafficking, which is an area of interest to public policy researchers, studies of human trafficking have only begun to explore trafficking in the formal and informal labor force. The general public (Bouche, Farrell, & Wittmer, 2015), law enforcement (Newton, Mulcahy, & Martin, 2008) and local nongovernmental organizations (Chuang, 2010) focus on the problem of sexual exploitation, generally defining human trafficking as sex trafficking or the commercial sexual exploitation of minors. Lost in the myopic focus on sex trafficking are the brutalities faced by men, women, and children trafficked in domestic work, agriculture, hospitality industries, mining and fishing, to name just a few venues. DISTINCTION BETWEEN LABOR TRAFFICKING AND LABOR EXPLOITATION Labor trafficking always includes conditions that violate labor law and could be classified as labor exploitation. However, not all situations of labor exploitation are labor trafficking. Labor exploitation occurs when employers deny workers their rights under federal and state labor law, such as the right to fair compensation, working hours, and working conditions. Similarly, state and federal laws regulate and protect child workers. In most states, child labor laws prevent employment of very young children (usually minors under the age of 14 to 16). Although labor trafficking may include elements of labor exploitation (e.g., wage theft, poor working conditions, and other labor law violations) and exploitive child labor, if the exploitation and or child labor does not occur through the use of force, fraud, or coercion, it is not considered labor trafficking.

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Empirical research confirms the link between labor exploitation and labor trafficking. In a study of unauthorized migrant laborers in San Diego County, Zhang and colleagues found that a majority of workers experienced at least one form of labor exploitation or labor trafficking. Specially, they estimated that 31 percent of unauthorized workers in San Diego experienced incidents that meet the federal definition of labor trafficking and 55 percent of workers experienced abuses that would be classified as labor exploitation (Zhang, 2012). STUDYING LABOR TRAFFICKING IN THE UNITED STATES To better understand the nature of labor trafficking victimization in the United States, the authors of this chapter, collected data from 122 closed victim records from service providers focused on aiding labor trafficking victims in four U.S. locations (Owens et al., 2014). These data were supplemented with interviews with 86 individuals who experienced labor trafficking, service providers, legal advocates, and local and federal law enforcement officials to gather systematic information about the nature and characteristics of labor trafficking victimization among identified victims in the four U.S. locations. The study represents the first comprehensive examination of labor trafficking experiences across the United States. Findings from this study inform the discussion about the characteristics and experiences of labor trafficking that follow. Significant research has documented the variation in labor trafficking experiences in other cultural contexts (e.g., see Bales, 1999; Belanger, 2014; Howard, 2014; Urbina, 2015); but in this chapter, we focus on labor trafficking as experienced in the United States. GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF LABOR TRAFFICKING IN THE UNITED STATES Victims Although information about labor trafficking in the United States is relatively scarce, we know something about the populations that may be most at risk of being taken advantage of by traffickers. Chief among these groups are immigrants. It is estimated that approximately half of all international migrants move for the purpose of finding employment (ILO, 2010). In 2014, there were 11.3 unauthorized immigrants in the United States, making up 5 percent of the U.S. labor force (Pew Research Center, 2015). Immigrants from Mexico make up roughly half of all immigrants who come to the United States without authorization (Pew Research Center, 2015). An additional 477,000 immigrants come to the United States annually on nonimmigrant visa that allows them to work temporarily in the

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United States (U.S. Department of State, n.d.) and annually nearly 1 million immigrants become lawful permanent residents of the United States (Monger & Yankey, 2014). Immigrants, particularly those without authorization or with temporary authorization, are at great risk of exploitation due to a variety of factors. Numerous reports have documented abuses in existing temporary work visa programs such as the H-2A and H-2B guest worker programs (Bauer & Stewart, 2013; GAO, 2013). Although immigrant farmworkers in the United States are likely victims of labor trafficking, most are never identified by law enforcement (Barrick et al., 2013). The majority of labor trafficking victims identified in our 2014 study (71%) entered the United States on a lawful visa. The most common were H-2A visas for work in agriculture and H-2B visas for jobs in hospitality, construction, and restaurants. Victims in agricultural work were less likely to have had lawful immigration status upon entry to the United States. Labor trafficking victims in our study came from all around the world with the top four countries of origin being Mexico, the Philippines, India, and Thailand. Although none of the victims identified in our study were U.S. citizens, in large part due to the sampling mechanisms we employed, which relied on gathering data on victims from service providers who largely serve immigrant populations, previous research confirms that both adult and child U.S. workers can be victims of labor trafficking. For example, investigations of traveling work crews have uncovered abuse and exploitation that in some cases rises to the level of human trafficking (Cunha, 2015; Pelly, 2015). These sales, peddling, and begging crews target disadvantaged U.S. citizens, often moving them away from their home and forcing or coercing victims to sell magazine subscriptions, cleaning products, candy, and small trinkets for minimal compensation. The National Human Trafficking Resource Center has documented over 400 cases of sale crew workers being abandoned far from home, beaten, or threatened with violence (Polaris, 2015). U.S. citizens are also vulnerable to victimization when working through subcontractors. Similar to more widely recognized situations of U.S. contractors utilizing subcontractors who engage in labor trafficking for work conducted abroad (GAO, 2014), U.S. citizens, particularly low-wage workers and nonunionized or unorganized workers, can fall victim to labor trafficking when subcontractors set up exploitative arrangements within the United States. Although the dominant narrative about human trafficking focuses on young female victims (Jones, 2010), labor trafficking situations are anticipated to include more male victims than female victims or be more evenly split between men and women compared to sex trafficking. Roughly half (48%) the victims identified in our study were male, but the gender of victims varied by work venue. For example, almost all the agricultural workers (91%) in our sample were male, and nearly all the domestic service workers (96%) were female. Unlike sex trafficking victims, who are on

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average quite young (Norton-Hawk, 2004), labor trafficking victims were on average 33 years old at the time they began receiving services for their victimization. Labor trafficking victims in our 2014 study were victimized across various work venues. The most common venues of labor trafficking were domestic service in private residences (37%), agriculture (19%), hospitality (10%), and restaurants (14%). A smaller proportion of sampled cases were found in construction, carnivals or fairs, factories, and nursing/assisted living facilities. Next we discuss known sector-specific risk factors for labor trafficking. Domestic workers are employed within private residences and typically perform household-related tasks, such as cooking, cleaning, and child care. Domestic workers share a number of characteristics that place them at high risk of victimization. For example, in a survey of 244 domestic workers in San Francisco, workers were mainly Latina (94%), female (98%), and born outside the United States (99%). Other research suggests that domestic workers face significant threats of abuse. Surveying over 2,000 domestic workers across 14 metropolitan cities, Burnham and Theodore (2012) found 19 percent of domestic workers reported being threatened, bullied, or verbally abused within the past year. Nearly 85 percent of these workers did not seek assistance for their abuse because of their immigration status. Survey responses from domestic workers who lived in the same household as their employers indicated that live-in employees may be particularly at risk of exploitation: 36 percent of these workers reported abuse, 25 percent indicated they had less than five hours of sleep a night, and 31 percent indicated they lacked any means of communicating privately with family or friends (Burnham & Theodore, 2012). Agriculture is another industry where there are significant risks for labor trafficking in the United States. Nearly 300,000 workers in the United States are brought to farms through special visa programs that recruit immigrant laborers. Labor exploitation within the agriculture industry has been well documented (Baker, 2004; Bauer, 2013), but there is little research documenting the prevalence of labor trafficking within the agriculture industry. A recent study of the prevalence of labor trafficking among farmworkers in North Carolina found that a quarter of workers had experienced situations that reached the threshold of trafficking, and 39 percent had experienced other forms of abuse, including denial of pay and wage deception (Barrick, Lattimore, Pitts, & Zhang, 2013). There are limitations with the methodology used by Barrick and colleagues that prevent generalization of findings beyond the sampled population, but the study suggests agricultural workers are at heightened risk for human trafficking. Other industries such as hotels and hospitality and restaurants are ripe for labor trafficking victimization. In 2012, the hotel industry employed 1.8 million workers at more than 52,000 lodging properties nationwide (American Hotel and Lodging Association, 2013). Similarly, restaurants are a

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primary source of employment for low-skill workers and the second-largest employer of immigrants in the United States (U.S. Human Rights Network, 2013). Widespread workplace violations have been reported in both industries as competition increases and regulation decreases. Although the extent of trafficking within these sectors is unknown, industry-specific factors such as the need for round-the-clock labor and the heavy utilization of foreign national workers increase the likelihood of trafficking in these sectors. Perpetrators While there is a significant and growing body of research on perpetrators of sex trafficking, particularly pimps, we know little about the characteristics of labor trafficking offenders (Dank et al., 2014; Gotch, 2016). In the 2014 study, we were also able to gather information about the perpetrators who were connected to 104 of the 122 studied labor trafficking victims. A total of 169 individuals (excluding corporations and businesses) suspected of engaging in labor trafficking were identified. Two-thirds of labor trafficking perpetrators were male, most of whom were in their thirties or forties. These findings are similar to the patterns identified by Arhin (2016) in her examination of perpetrators of adult labor trafficking victims, where two-thirds of identified perpetrators were male. In our study, perpetrators were both foreign nationals and U.S. citizens, though great variation was found across work sectors.2 An overwhelming majority of suspects identified in agricultural cases (82%) were U.S. citizens. Conversely, the majority of suspects in hospitality (74%), restaurant (60%), and domestic servitude (76%) cases were noncitizens. Suspects in hospitality cases were disproportionately from Central Asia, and suspects in domestic servitude cases came from Southeast Asia, East Asia, the Middle East, and Africa. In hospitality cases, the foreign national suspects tended to be labor contractors or subcontractors hired to recruit victims abroad and facilitate their transport to work at U.S. hotels and clubs. In the domestic servitude cases, the foreign national suspects were generally the employers directly responsible for the exploitation. Only half of the identified perpetrators were confirmed as being arrested. Various factors led to low arrest rates, including lack of investigative resources to build a strong labor trafficking case, prosecutorial declinations, and suspects absconding. Victims’ fear of the police, fear of being deported, and reticence to provide information about their exploiters out of fear of retribution further inhibited labor trafficking investigations. As has been documented elsewhere (see Barrick et al., 2014), labor trafficking investigations were not prioritized by local law enforcement agencies. Interviews with local and federal law enforcement revealed the challenges these agents face defining labor trafficking and separating it from other forms of labor exploitation and workplace violations. When local law enforcement was involved in the identification of labor

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trafficking victimization, usually through victim self-disclosure or a tip from a service provider, they were reluctant to pursue immigration relief and faced challenges working collaboratively with federal partners such as the U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Intersections between Traffickers, Victims, and Criminal Networks Research on human trafficking more broadly suggests the need to understand diaspora networks, or the interconnection between people who share the same nationality or ethnicity (Arhin, 2016; Denton, 2016; Turner & Kelly, 2009). Diasporas are anticipated to increase co-ethnic trust, which could both help immigrants find employment and also create situations of vulnerability when abuse and exploitation are hidden within ethnic communities. Immigrants may be more likely to unsuspectingly trust someone from their own country or ethnicity and that trust might decrease willingness to report abuses when they occur. Some groups of perpetrators identified in our study preyed on victims from their own region, while others did not. For example, a majority of the suspects who were identified as foreign nationals from countries in Africa (n = 14) trafficked persons who were also from Africa, mostly in domestic servitude situations. Similarly, foreign national perpetrators in the United States from East Asia and Latin America were primarily connected to co-ethnic victims. Conversely, people labor trafficked by foreign national Middle Eastern perpetrators in the United States, were primarily from Southeast Asia, thus not co-ethnics. U.S. citizen perpetrators labor trafficked persons from various regions. For example, of the persons victimized by U.S. citizen perpetrators, 48 percent were from Latin America and 26 percent were from Southeast Asia. Despite concern that human trafficking is connected to or facilitated through organized crime networks, we found few formal connections between labor trafficking perpetrators and other criminal networks such as drug trafficking, weapons trafficking, or money laundering. Some perpetrators were involved in smuggling, document fraud, and sexual abuse. It is important to note that our ability to identify connections to other criminal networks was constrained by the limits of information known by victims and law enforcement. PROCESS OF VICTIMIZATION Recruitment and Movement Many survivors of labor trafficking come to the United States in search of an opportunity to better their lives and, often, the lives of their family members. Traffickers take advantage of the willingness of individuals to travel far from home in an effort to provide a better life for their families.

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Research finds that workers are at increased risk for exploitation when they are moved to work away from their home communities, and that this risk is further heightened by the use of labor brokers or middlemen who facilitate a connection between workers and their eventual employers (Verite, 2010). Recruitment pathways into labor trafficking vary depending on a variety of factors, including the location of the recruitment, the type of employment industry, the recruiter’s characteristics, and the strategies employed to manipulate, deceive, and coerce the victim into accepting the position. Some victims of labor trafficking are misled directly by traffickers who disguise themselves as benevolent employers (Smith, 1997). Others seek the assistance of recruitment agencies in their home countries. While recruitment agencies often provide legitimate job opportunities for workers around the world and are considered indispensable in terms of balancing the supply and demand of the international labor market, they also allow for abusive recruitment practices that have been linked to labor exploitation and trafficking (UNODC, 2015). There is great variation in the size, scope, and legitimacy of these recruitment agencies. Such recruitment agencies can range in size from an individual recruiter to an unstructured network of intermediaries to a multinational enterprise. Furthermore, these agencies may recruit workers for employment in settings ranging from private households to large corporations (UNODC, 2015). During the recruitment process, there is sometimes doubt as to whether consent of the worker is obtained and honored, in terms of both the migration plan and the conditions of employment once in the United States (Dewhurst, 2007). In situations in which victim recruitment happens through second-, third-, or fourth parties, the moral culpability for betraying victim consent dissipates as distance between recruiter and victim grows. In our sample, exploitation began with initial recruitment in their native countries for 77 percent of victims. Many victims were first introduced to the job opportunities that became labor trafficking situations through their social networks, usually by someone of their country of origin. These network contacts connected victims to recruiters or recruiting agents or agencies that were working in a victim’s home county, sometimes on behalf of traffickers in the United States. Recruiters engaged in fraud and coercion during the recruitment process, using a combination of false promises and high-pressure, coercive tactics to get victims to commit to employment offers. Despite an American regulation forbidding charging workers a recruitment fee, employers, recruiters, and their agents typically charge illegal recruitment fees and fail to reimburse visa, travel, and recruitment-related expenses (Center for Migrant Rights, 2013). In our study, victims identified between 2000 and 2012, on average, paid $6,150 in recruitment fees to recruitment agencies for jobs in the United States. This figure was higher than the annual per capita income of the top six countries of origin for victims in our sample.

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During the recruitment process, some victims came into contact with authority figures such as staff member of a U.S. embassy or consulate during the visa application process. Many victims reported that recruiters and/or traffickers had provided training or coaching about how to successfully navigate the interview process with embassy or consulate staff. Indeed, some victims were even provided with fake employment contracts that they were instructed to provide the embassy staff as proof of legitimate employment. Sometimes labor trafficking victimization does not begin until a victim has already begun a voluntary migration to the United States. A smaller number of victims in our sample were smuggled into the United States but then found themselves coerced into a situation of labor trafficking. Research on organized crime offers insight into the initiation of labor trafficking in circumstances involving third parties such as labor brokers or smugglers (Väyrynen, 2003). These workers may have their immigration documents stolen, forged, withheld, or otherwise used to manipulate them to work longer, or for lower wages. Labor trafficking can also occur long after the initial migration process if employers threaten to call immigration authorities and take advantage of a victim’s pervasive fear deportation. Some traffickers purposefully allowed a victim’s valid visa to expire before coercing them into exploitive employment. In these cases, traffickers took advantage of victims’ lack of knowledge of their rights under U.S. law and their fear of law enforcement generally. Because the majority of labor trafficking victims in our sample had acquired legal visas to enter the United States prior to their movement here, victims were primarily transported by plane. Few victims in the sample used fraudulent documents, and approximately 29 percent of individuals entered the United States without authorization. Journeys that involved crossing the U.S. border unauthorized were more likely than others to rely on multiple methods of transportation, such as walking and using cars or vans. In line with previous research suggesting co-ethnics facilitate the transportation of victims, gaining victim trust through their indispensable knowledge of the local landscape (Arhin, 2016), we found that throughout the recruitment and movement phases of labor trafficking, fraud and coercion were used by people often known to the victim or connected to the victim’s social network as opposed to force. When force was present, it often took place in domestic servitude cases and cases involving immigrants who were unauthorized before their labor trafficking. Trafficking Experience Although labor trafficking victims have been identified by service providers and labor trafficking cases have been investigated and prosecuted,

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there is surprisingly little systematic information about the labor trafficking experience. Trafficking victims in our sample all experienced elements of force, fraud, and coercion necessary to substantiate labor trafficking. These elements included document fraud, withholding documents, extortion, sexual abuse and rape, discrimination, psychological manipulation and coercion, torture, attempted murder, and violence, and threats against victims and their family members. Although physical abuse and violence constituted the extreme forms of victimization, more subtle, nuanced forms of coercion and fraud were prevalent in nearly all studied cases. Victims who worked in private residences, such as domestic workers had a higher likelihood (93%) of being physically abused. These victims often had little contact with anyone outside of the family where they were employed and as a result, violence was more common. Horrific physical abuse and violence were documented in our interviews with survivors. These abuses ranged from being slapped in the face, head, and body to being stabbed and cut with knives and other sharp objects. Sexual abuse and attempted sexual abuse were documented in 18 percent of the cases we studied. Service providers we interviewed confirmed that it was rare for labor trafficking victims to be sexually abused by their trafficker, but that when sexual abuse did happen, it was often directed toward domestic workers. The most common form of victimization that we found across all types of labor trafficking cases was traffickers disorienting and depriving victims from seeking alternatives (84%). Traffickers physically isolated victims, restricted their communications and subjected them to extreme monitoring and surveillance. Victims also commonly (82% of cases) faced methods that demeaned and demoralized them such as verbal abuse and humiliation. For many of the labor trafficking victims, the verbal insults and shaming they were forced to endure from their abusers were enough to stop them from trying to seek help or escape their situation. Many victims interacted with individuals other than their traffickers, such as members of law enforcement, staff working for the trafficker (e.g., gardeners, secretaries, maintenance workers), or other coworkers. Although these encounters sometimes played a critical role in victims’ escapes, many of these interactions resulted in an unrealized opportunity for rescue. Traffickers used this exposure and the failure of authority figures or bystanders to help as a mechanism to further their dehumanization. For example, some perpetrators told victims that no one would want to help them because of their immigration status. Control over a worker’s immigration status was a powerful mechanisms used to control workers. Traffickers threatened workers with arrest or deportation if they tried to leave the worksite. For workers in the United

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States on a temporary work visa, the visa was tied to the employer. This meant that if the worker left the employer/trafficker, the worker would lose his or her immigration status. This fear of being unauthorized combined with a lack of knowledge of their rights in the United States, isolation and restricted movement and communication, and in some cases, language barriers, and high levels of shame resulted in low levels of selfreport to the police (7%). In addition to the criminal forms of abuse used to dehumanize victims, labor trafficking victims faced high rates of civil labor exploitation. These forms of exploitation included being paid less than minimum wage, being paid less than promised, wage theft, and illegal deductions. A majority of the victims in our study (94%) realized at some point they were being abused, but none were aware they were being labor trafficked and were afforded rights under law regardless of immigration status. Some victims reached out for help while being trafficked, but individuals failed to identify and help them, resulting in further demoralization. Whether or not a victim was left with physical scars, the labor trafficking victimization experience lead to severe forms of posttraumatic stress disorder, anxiety, and depression Escape and Outcomes after Escape Labor trafficking victims mostly escaped on their own and lived for several months or years before being connected to a specialized service provider. Physical barriers, psychological abuse, and law enforcement shortcomings (e.g., lack of familiarity with different ethnic groups and language barriers) created challenges in escaping. Escape experiences varied by the industry or venue a person was trafficked in. Individuals trafficked in domestic work, agriculture, and some types of construction were trafficked in more isolated locations, on average, than individuals trafficked in industries such as hospitality or restaurants. The physical isolation and restricted communication traffickers used against victims meant that for some, they were completely unaware of their surroundings and without a social network in the United States—in some cases having never left the worksite during the time they were trafficked (which may have been up to several years). Most victims (59%) escaped by running away usually after a breaking point. This breaking point may have been after enduring a certain elevated or prolonged level of abuse or after realizing promises to extend visas, pay workers, and/or improve working and living conditions were false. In other cases, survivors were assisted in their escape by the support of community members, friends, and less often by law enforcement. After they escaped, survivors in our sample commonly went for several months or years until they were properly identified and connected to specialized

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service providers. By the time they were connected to a specialized service provider with the knowledge and expertise to identify labor trafficking and provide assistance, 69 percent of the sample was unauthorized. As a consequence of being unauthorized, some individuals (14%) were placed in deportation proceedings, threatened by immigration officials, and/or arrested and placed in detention centers. In some cases, traffickers continued to contact victims after escape and expanded threats and harassment to the victims’ families in their home countries. Given the fact that more than half of all traffickers in our sample had no evidence of arrest, traffickers had a real ability to expand threats and harassment of victims and their families after escape. Survivors in our sample shared stories of traffickers following them to domestic violence shelters, harassing them through the use of technology and inflicting violence and threats against their family members in their home countries. Secure emergency shelter and long-term transitional housing were the greatest needs and the greatest challenges reported by service providers, survivors, and law enforcement. Shelter is a well-cited challenge for human trafficking survivors and one that is particularly acute for labor trafficking victims, with no dedicated bed space for labor trafficking victims across the United States (Polaris, 2012). Our study found that the difficulty in obtaining housing for labor trafficking victims, the majority of whom were unauthorized immigrants by the time they escaped their trafficker/s, was exacerbated by federal law enforcement officials’ reluctance to grant temporary immigration relief (continued presence) and work authorization. It was rare for labor trafficking survivors to receive continued presence across all of our study sites. What this meant was that survivors were prevented from having lawful immigration status that would allow them to work, obtain shelter and move on with their lives, while waiting for their T visa to be adjudicated (which could take months or years). The need to begin working again to relieve the debt they had assumed in recruitment fees and the lost time and stolen wages was severe for our sample. Service providers reported losing some clients who had experienced labor trafficking because the need to begin working again was so great they could not take the chance of waiting an unknown period of time for a T visa. Despite fairly high levels of education (33% of our sample had some college or higher), labor trafficking survivors remained steady in low-wage work in the same industries in which they had been trafficked. Commonly, survivors remained in situations where they were at risk for further exploitation owing to a lack of work history, references, and job-training programs (see also Brennan, 2014). Further compounding their financial situation, criminal restitution was rarely awarded to labor trafficking survivors. If labor trafficking cases are not pursued criminally, civil damages may be a survivor’s only option to receive remuneration. However, civil litigation is rare primarily due to limited and restricted use of funding

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streams and a lack of attorneys and other resources needed to bring these cases forward. Attorneys cited funding for affirmative civil litigation as a need to better serve their clients. As has been documented with sex trafficking victimization (see Zimmerman et al., 2008), labor trafficking victims face severe mental and physical health consequences as a result of their victimization. Labor trafficking victims in our study suffered from posttraumatic stress disorder, anxiety, depression, psychosis, suicidal ideation and attempts, and fear and difficulty forming trusting relationships. Some victims had chronic health conditions (e.g., asthma, diabetes, and heart disease) before the trafficking that were worsened by their lack of access to medical care during the labor trafficking victimization. Others sustained physical injuries on the job (e.g., burns, broken bones, chemical exposure) that were never treated properly. When victims received T visas they had access to Medicaid and Medicare to help meet their physical and mental health needs, but those who never received a T visa or were disconnected from service providers relied on free clinics or remained untreated. Many victims suffered for years from physical and mental health problems as a result of their victimization. In addition to challenges accessing medical care and mental health services, labor trafficking victims reported challenges accessing social benefits they qualified for through their T visa (e.g., driver’s licenses, Social Security cards) because of a lack of program administrator awareness of human trafficking or T visa benefits. There was no single story of life after escape from labor trafficking. Some labor trafficking victims moved on with their lives, got further education or job training and joined advocacy groups, while others struggled for years with the physical and mental health effects of labor trafficking victimization. POLICIES NEEDED TO COMBAT LABOR TRAFFICKING IN THE UNITED STATES AND AREAS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH The human desire to make a better life for oneself and one’s family, coupled with a lack of local economic opportunities, the necessity for people to migrate for work, and insufficient protections for these groups and enforcement of our laws creates the conditions for labor trafficking. Labor trafficking victims in our study sample often mortgaged family land for collateral or took out high-interest rate loans to pay fees, which would facilitate their movement to the United States and their entry into a promised job. Despite the fact that a majority of the victims we studied immigrated to the United States on lawful visas, met with U.S. officials at a U.S. consulate or embassy to obtain their visa, and commonly came into contract with bystanders during the course of their victimization, victims remained trapped in labor trafficking—in many cases hidden in plain sight.

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Control over a victim’s immigration status, whether authorized or unauthorized, was one of the most powerful mechanisms used to keep workers in forced labor. Victims continued to labor in abusive conditions because they were told their visas would be extended or that if they were unauthorized and tried to leave the job the trafficker would alert immigration officials of their presence and have them deported. As a result, immigration reform is needed to remove the lack of visa portability associated with the commonly abused visas, such as temporary work visas. The Department of State, Department of Labor, and local and federal law enforcement should also track and monitor workers coming into the United States on temporary work visas to ensure employer compliance with the regulations that accompany visa sponsorship. Finally, awareness raising and outreach efforts are needed to help immigrant workers understand their rights under U.S. labor law and criminal law. All individuals obtaining visas to the United States should be given information regarding human trafficking and resources such as the National Human Trafficking Resource Center to call for assistance if they encounter abuses. This information should be provided in multiple languages and include storyboards with pictures for people who have lower levels of literacy. State laws should also be amended to require posting of labor trafficking awareness materials in workplaces. Because we found that fraud and coercion were common in the labor trafficking recruitment process, steps should be taken to reduce recruitment practices such as the use of recruiting fees, which are coercive. U.S. company representatives recruiting temporary labor abroad should be directly involved in the recruitment process and held liable for recruiting practices to ensure there are no abuses by local third parties that may engage in local recruitment. Additionally, legislation is necessary to ensure all companies identify and remove slavery or forced labor in their supply chains. The California Transparency in Supply Chains Act of 2010 or the United Kingdom’s recently enacted Modern Slavery Act are examples of the type of legislation necessary to ensure companies are not engaged in or benefitting from labor trafficking. We found the mental, physical, and economic impact of labor trafficking on survivors was severe. Trauma-informed, culturally and linguistically appropriate services were limited. Housing was the most immediate and pressing need identified across all study sites, particularly for male victims. Few victims received back wages or restitution and many remained mired in low-wage work that put them at risk for future labor trafficking victimization. As a result, funding is needed for specialized labor trafficking services nationwide, both before and after an individual receives T visa certification. We recommend that funding be specifically dedicated to support civil litigation for trafficking survivors so they can collect back wages and damages. Additionally, vocational training opportunities are needed for individuals who experienced labor trafficking, and

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funds should be made available to assist them in pursuing higher education or training. Some individuals who were trafficked may face difficulty finding work after leaving a trafficking situation because of a record of arrest for crimes committed during their labor trafficking victimization. These might include operating as a food vendor without a license, quality of life crimes, stop and frisk violations, nonpayment of child support, or for being unauthorized immigrants. U.S. state laws should be amended to allow criminal record expungement and vacatur, if the crimes committed were a direct result of being labor trafficked. Despite recent research on labor trafficking, our understanding of mechanisms that facilitate victimization in the United States and across the globe is narrow. Research that examines how labor trafficking victims and perpetrators are connected through existing social and criminal networks is needed (see Denton, 2016 for an example of the potential of social networking analysis to help us understand human trafficking operations). This information would inform the development of targeted public awareness and prevention programs aimed at protecting vulnerable citizens and immigrants from labor trafficking situations. Additionally, little is known about the motivations and tactics of labor traffickers operating in both legal and shadow economies. Without better information on perpetrators, efforts to deter trafficking will remain limited. Although gaps in our knowledge base remain, research is clear that labor trafficking exists across various economic sectors in the United States, immigration and workplace regulation policies impede identification and in some cases facilitate labor trafficking, government and nongovernment agencies are doing little to proactively identify labor trafficking victimization, and identified labor trafficking victims have significant unmet needs. A decade and a half after the passage of the TVPA, there is much to be learned about human trafficking and much more to be done to create lasting and meaningful responses to labor trafficking in the United States. NOTES 1. We would like to acknowledge the contributions of Justin Breaux, Isela Banuelos, Katherine Bright, Ryan Heitsmith, and Jack McDevitt who contributed to the original study report (see Owens et al., 2014) upon which this chapter draws. 2. We were able to confirm the immigration status of roughly 60 percent (98 of 169) of the identified suspects.

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Baker, A. J. (2004). Agricultural guestworker programs in the United States. Texas Hispanic Journal of Law and Policy, 10(79), 79–114. Bales, K. (1999). Disposable people: New slavery in the global economy. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. Barrick, K., Lattimore, P. K., Pitts, W. J., & Zhang, S. X. (2013). Indicators of labor trafficking among North Carolina migrant farmworkers. Research Triangle Park, NC: RTI International. Barrick, K., Lattimore, P. K., Pitts, W. J., & Zhang, S. X. (2014). When farmworkers and advocates see trafficking but law enforcement does not: Challenges in identifying labor trafficking in North Carolina. Crime, Law and Social Change, 61, 205–214. Bauer, M., & Stewart, M. (2013). Close to slavery: Guestworkers programs in the United States. Montgomery, AL: Southern Poverty Law Center. Belanger, D. (2014). Labor migration and trafficking among Vietnamese migrants in Asia. The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 653, 87–106. Bouché, V., Farrell, A., & Wittmer, D. (2015). Identifying effective counter-trafficking programs and practices in the U.S.: Legislative, legal, and public opinion strategies that work. Washington, DC: United State Department of Justice, National Institute of Justice (NCJ- 249670). Brennan, D. (2014). Life interrupted: Trafficked into forced labor in the United States. Durham, NC: Duke University Press. Burnham, L., & Theodore, N. (2012). Home economics: The invisible and unregulated world of domestic work. New York: National Domestic Workers Alliance, Center for Urban Economic Development and University of Illinois at Chicago Data Center. Center for Migrant Rights. (2013). Recruitment revealed: Fundamental flaws in the H-2 temporary worker program and recommendations for change. Baltimore, MD: Center for Migrant Rights. Chuang, J. (2010). Rescuing trafficking from ideological capture: Prostitution reform and anti-trafficking law and policy. University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 158, 1655–1728. Cunha, D. (2015, April 20). Trapped into selling magazines door-to-door. The Atlantic. Retrieved from http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2015/ 04/trapped-into-selling-magazines-door-to-door/388601/. Dank, M., Khan, B., Downey, P. M., Kotonias, C., Mayer, D., Owens, C., & Yu, L. (2014). Estimating the size and structure of the underground commercial sex economy in eight major US cities. Washington, DC: Urban Institute. Denton, E. (2016). Anatomy of offending: Human trafficking in the United States, 2006–2011. Journal of Human Trafficking, 2, 32–62. Dewhurst. E. (2017). Agencies of slavery: The exploitation of migrant workers by recruitment agencies. Texas Wesleyan Law Review, 13, 377–410. GAO. (2013). H-2B visa program: Closed civil and criminal cases illustrate instances of H-2B workers being targets of fraud and abuse (Report number GAO-10-1053). Washington, DC: U.S. Government Accountability Office. GAO. (2014, November). Human trafficking: Oversight of contractors’ use of foreign workers in high risk environments needs to be strengthened. Washington, DC: Government Accountability Office.

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UNODC. (2015). The role of recruitment fees and abusive and fraudulent recruitment practices of recruitment agencies in trafficking in persons. Vienna: United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime. Retrieved from https://www.unodc.org/ documents/human-trafficking/2015/Recruitment_Fees_Report-Final-22_ June_2015_AG_Final.pdf. Urbina, I. (2015, July 27). “Sea slaves”: The human misery that feeds pets and livestock. Retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/27/world/out law-ocean-thailand-fishing-sea-slaves-pets.html. U.S. Department of State. (n.d.). Classes of non-immigrant visa issued 2011–2015. Retrieved from https://travel.state.gov/content/dam/visas/Statistics/An nualReports/FY2015AnnualReport/FY15AnnualReport-TableXVIA.pdf. U.S. Human Rights Network. (2013, November 12). Spotlight: Restaurant opportunities centers (ROC). Retrieved from http://www.ushrnetwork.org/newsupdates/udhr-campaign-2013-spotlight-restaurant-opportunities-centersroc-united. Väyrynen, R. (2003). Illegal immigration, human trafficking and organized crime. United Nations University, World Institute for Development Economics Research. Verité. (2010). Help wanted: Hiring, human trafficking & modern-day slavery in the global economy. Retrieved from https://www.verite.org/wp-content/up loads/2016/11/Help_Wanted_2010.pdf. Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act, Public Law 106–386, 22 U.S.C. 7101 Et. Seq. (2000). Zhang, S. X. (2012). Trafficking of migrant laborers in San Diego County: Looking for a hidden population. San Diego, CA: San Diego State University. Zimmerman, C., Hossain, M., Yun, K., Gajdadziev, V., Guzun, N., Tchomarova, M., . . . Motus, M. N. (2008). The health of trafficked women: A survey of women entering post-trafficking services in Europe. American Journal of Public Health, 98, 55–59.

PART III

Crimes Affecting Stability

In the final part of this volume on the types of transnational crime, we present the reader with three chapters that address the impact of transnational crime on stability. Chapter 13 explores the role of corruption in the facilitation of transnational, international, and organized crime. Masters suggests that corruption is a key enabler of transnational crime, if for no other reason than it is often simpler to bribe a border official than to undertake complex measures to circumvent state control. Masters further explains that corruption is also a transnational crime in its own right as the collateral consequences of corruption can undermine international security. Chapter 14 is titled “Understanding Terrorism in the Modern Era,” and as the title might suggest, readers will be presented with a discourse on the history and evolution of terrorism. Chapter 14 presents an encyclopedic coverage of terrorism and terrorist groups in the modern landscape. Over the course of their presentation the authors review how terrorism, and its occasionally nebulous definition, has been treated by both the public and government agencies. They continue to describe how terrorism has even stimulated changes to the U.S. Constitution. Our authors conclude with conjecture on the future of global terrorism and counterterrorism efforts. Chapter 15 more specifically explores the weaponization of infectious disease. A succession of biological weapons programs during the 20th century, demonstrate that it is possible to produce (and even enhance) a wide variety of disease agents, ranging from plague bacteria to the smallpox virus. Chapter 15 highlights growing concerns about an emerging “nonstate threat” and the risk of “bioterrorism.” Yet, to date, there have been relatively few instances of bioterrorism, and none of these events have approached the “worst-case scenarios” anticipated by some, but it is nonetheless possible for non-state actors—especially scientific “insiders”—to develop and deploy biological agents that can cause great harm.

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CHAPTER 13

How the Transnational Crime of Corruption Impacts Global Security Adam Masters

Walk into the courtroom of the U.S. Supreme Court, turn around and look up. What you will see is the West Wall Frieze in marble facing the Bench, an allegorical representation of good versus evil. The artist, Cass Gilbert, represented crime and corruption as separate evils—neither subservient to the other. Corruption stands fourth from the right, next to Vice and Crime, with a bag of coin at the ready, garnering information from Slander. Corruption differs from the other transnational crimes examined in this volume; corruption often enables the other crimes, yet is also a separate transnational crime in itself. In either guise, corruption can adversely impact on global and regional security. This chapter discusses some of the conceptual problems of transnational, organized, and international crime before analyzing corruption as an enabler of transnational crime detrimental to the global/regional security framework. It then uses a series of cases to illustrate how the crime of corruption also destabilizes the security framework. CONCEIVING TRANSNATIONAL, INTERNATIONAL, AND ORGANIZED CRIME Whilst often conflated, the concepts of transnational crime, organized crime, and international crime need to be considered separately and together. Transnational crimes are defined as “crimes that in one of several ways involve two or more sovereign jurisdictions and are codified in the laws of these jurisdictions” (Madsen, 2009, p. 9), whereas international

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crimes are “crimes criminalized under international criminal law” (Madsen, 2009, p. 9). Organized crime is harder to define (see von Lampe, 2015 for a collection of definitions), but under international law the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (CATOC) (United Nations, 2000) implied organized crime is the activities involved in, and preparatory to, the commission of serious crime by an organized crime group.1 The definition derived from the CATOC is therefore appropriate as the chapter is focused on corruption framed by the transnational criminal offences defined by the UN Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) (United Nations, 2003). Concepts of Transnational, International, and Organized Crime in Practice In practice, transnational crime, international crime, and organized crime can occur independently and or interact with each other. Madsen (2009, pp. 8–9) described the relationship between these concepts using these examples: (1) transnational crimes can breach international law, yet not be part of organized crime, for example, where a parent involved in a custodial dispute takes a child from one country to another in breach of court orders; (2) international crime can also be an organized crime, yet not be transnational, for example, slave trading committed within a single state; (3) organized crime can be transnational yet not necessarily violate international law, for example, when an organized crime group smuggles genuine alcohol or tobacco from low-tax to high-tax countries; (4) conceptually, the transnational trafficking of illicit drugs by organized crime groups is a transnational crime, an international crime, and an organized crime. Corruption can be a crime in each singular concept, transnational, international, or organized crime, or conceptually interrelated. In any guise, as the examples throughout this chapter demonstrates, corruption can adversely affect international security. CONCEIVING INTERNATIONAL SECURITY When considering the impact of transnational crime on global and regional security, it is necessary to use a broader definitional frame than that of traditional International Relations theory.2 The traditional approach to studying international relations takes a Hobbesian view of the world, where life in the natural state outside a sovereign territory is “solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short” (Hobbes, 1968, p. 186). Hobbes further claimed, “When the Soveraign Power ceaseth, Crime also ceaseth” (Hobbes, 1968, p. 337). The Hobbesian perspective tends to favor the military as the framework for security issues in this sphere, the military being the arm of governments for exercising the legitimate use of force externally to the state.

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The logic of Hobbes’s claim that “crime also ceaseth” no longer applies in the 21st century. The transport and communication revolutions of the 19th and 20th centuries put paid to this notion. Furthermore, the diplomatic efforts to create the international conventions against crime, international criminal law, and the mechanisms for mutual legal assistance in criminal matters and criminal extradition, are also evidence of this. Consequently, a form of cooperative sovereignty now exists in the international sphere. In the early 1990s, the Copenhagen School approach to International Relations argued security should also be analyzed from other perspectives including the economic, societal, political, and environmental sectors (Buzan, Wæver, & De Wilde, 1998).3 By considering corruption as a transnational crime in each of these security sectors, a deeper picture of the negative impacts upon global and regional security becomes apparent. THE TWO ROLES OF CORRUPTION Corruption plays two major roles with transnational crime. The first is as an enabler for other criminal activity and the second is when it is the crime. Corruption as an enabler is briefly addressed, but corruption’s major role, and the focus of this chapter, is on corruption as a crime. Conceiving Corruption as an Enabler of Other Transnational Crimes As an enabler, corruption is typically conceived as bribing officials to allow other criminality to occur without interference from state authorities (Gounev, Dzhekova, & Bezlov, 2012). Corruption can also operate as a prophylactic measure, securing protection over the longer term by placing politicians and officials “on the books” to provide warnings of forthcoming actions or to manipulate policy development to create or maintain an environment favorable for criminal enterprise (Nuzzi & Antonelli, 2010/2012). The former is effectively corruption in the implementation of policy; the latter is the corruption of making policy. In terms of policy implementation, the transnational element of transnational crime further complicates matters. A policy created in one state can promote criminality in other states. An example of this is the variance in tax regimes related to tobacco. Transnational criminal groups in Europe make large profits trafficking cigarettes and other tobacco products from low tax to high tax jurisdictions. Gounev and colleagues (2012) reported how the illicit tobacco trade has a corrupting effect on border guards who either accept bribes to allow the trade, or in some cases, organize and facilitate their own trafficking networks. With border security undermined, regional security is thus diminished.

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Conceiving Corruption as a Transnational Crime Internationally, the UN criminalized corruption under the CATOC in 2000. The activities within the scope of Article 8 of the CATOC fall well short of the broader ambit outlined three years later in the UNCAC (United Nations, 2003). While the UNCAC contains no singular definition of corruption, it is clear what activities are considered corrupt. The UNCAC lists the offences to be criminalized by state parties (United Nations, 2003, Chapter 3). The following section examines corruption as an enabler of other transnational crimes, and the section after that examines each international corruption offence created by the UNCAC.

CORRUPTION ENABLING TRANSNATIONAL CRIME AS A THREAT TO SECURITY The issue inherent in the dichotomy between corruption as an enabler and corruption as the crime is that whenever corruption is the enabler, it is also a crime. In these instances, corruption tends to fade into the analytical background as the prima facie crime takes precedence. For example, the UN Office of Drugs and Crimes takes great care to estimate the quantity of illicit drugs globally produced and trafficked. When corruption has enabled this to occur, the same care is not necessarily taken to quantify the corruption that has occurred along the way. To illustrate, illicit drug seizures may result from bribes being insufficient or nonexistent (Sabatelle, 2011), and law enforcement agencies tend to avoid publicizing any internal corruption problems. Data gathering and recording is thus problematic and cannot be resolved easily. Despite this, case vignettes provide insight into the problem of corruption. Table 13.1 illustrates how corruption can be an enabler for any of the transnational crimes discussed in this volume. In most instances, the short summaries have been selected to also illustrate the impact on international security. State-Sponsored Corruption and Its Effect on International Relations Historically, states operating in the international sphere—famously anarchic according to Bull (1977)—have worked to corrupt the legitimate agents of other states to gain an advantage. During the ideological confrontation of the Cold War, this approach became habitual as smaller corrupt actions were weighed against the larger picture—with the consequences of mutually assured destruction or equivalently unacceptable alternatives. This period saw not just agents of states as participants but criminal organizations taking part. Examples from the Cold War include the U.S. sponsorship of Mujahidin in Afghanistan who supplemented their income with illicit drug trafficking (Graduate Institute of International

Table 13.1 Corruption as an Enabler of Other Transnational Crimes Transnational Crime

Examples Where Corruption Was an Enabler

UNCAC Offence

Cybercrime

A former FBI employee accessed databases to obtain information about law enforcement targets (Choo & Grabosky, 2014).1

Art. 15

Drug trafficking

A North Korean official was arrested on board the freighter Pong Su, which had trafficked 125kg of heroin to Australia. This could not have occurred without the corrupt approval of the North Korean regime (British Broadcasting Corporation [BBC], 2004).

Art. 18, Art. 19

Environmental crime

Italian organized crime groups have used corruption to obtain waste management contracts and then engaged in illegal disposal at sea through sinking ships containing nuclear waste (Special Broadcasting Service [SBS], 2009).

Art. 15

Fraudulent medicine

Investigators have been unable to rule out corruption in national purchasing processes as a factor in the spread of counterfeit anti-malarial drugs manufactured in China throughout Asia and Africa (Newton et al., 2006).2

Art. 19

Human trafficking for labor exploitation

With information supplied by a corrupt official in the local chamber of commerce, Chinese organized crime and the ‘Ndrangheta trafficked Chinese nationals to work as cheap labour in legitimate businesses taken over by the crime groups (Nuzzi & Antonelli, 2010/2012, p. 100).

Art. 18

Human trafficking for sex exploitation

Traffickers in Australia paid a local government inspector over A$100,000 to warn of impending raids by state or federal police on brothels (Masters & Graycar, 2017).

Art. 15

Trafficking in human organs

Offered US$3000 per kidney, coerced organ donors are trafficked from Eastern Europe to Turkey with the complicity of police and customs officials (Bos, 2015).

Art. 15, Art. 17

(Continued)

Table 13.1 (Continued) Transnational Crime

Examples Where Corruption Was an Enabler

UNCAC Offence

Human smuggling

Authorities from 10 European nations reported between 2007 and 2010, border guards were known to be involved in trafficking persons (Gounev et al., 2012, p. 138).

Art. 19

Identity-related crimes

The 9/11 hijackers obtained fake drivers’ licenses from Virginia, which they used to board the planes (Shelley, 2014, p. 32).

Art. 15

Illegal sports betting and match-fixing

The Bochum case investigated how fixers paid players and officials to manipulate the results in hundreds of games in various European football leagues (Masters, 2015).

Art. 21

Illicit arms trafficking

Officials in the collapsed Soviet Union trafficked huge quantities of weapons through European organized crime groups in the early 1990s (Nuzzi & Antonelli, 2010/2012, pp. 170–171).

Art. 15

Intellectual property crimes

Senior members of the Palestinian authority profit from counterfeit merchandise by imposing a tax on the retailers of illicit goods (Shelley, 2014, p. 275).

Art. 20

Maritime piracy

The Sea Shepherd organization justifies its acts of maritime piracy as an equitable response to transnational corruption in the fishing and whaling industries (Watson, 1988, p. 84).

Art. 18

Money laundering

FIFA officials are accused of using the organizations facilities to launder illicit payments received to influence how they voted on the allocation of the World Cup (United States Department of Justice, 2015, also see below for how this is corruption in its own right).

Art. 22Art. 23

Terrorism

Chechen extremists paid bribes to police officers so they could traverse checkpoints on their way to attacking the primary school in Beslan, Russia (Shelley, 2014, p. 42).

Art. 15

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Table 13.1 (Continued) Examples Where Corruption Was an Enabler

UNCAC Offence

Trafficking in art and cultural property

Officials in Turkey are suspected to have replaced genuine antiquities from the Lydian horde, repatriated from the New York Metropolitan Museum, with fakes (Waxman, 2008, pp. 155–163).

Art. 17, Art. 19

Weaponization of infectious diseases

The Aum Supreme Truth cult facilitated its sarin attacks on Tokyo subway through corruptly purchasing equipment from Russia. The cult also experimented with weaponizing Ebola and anthrax (Shelley, 2014, p. 290).

Art. 16

Wildlife and forest crime

President Charles Taylor of Liberia sold logging rights for the majority of the country and retained over US$100 million (Global Witness, 2012).

Art. 20

Transnational movement of super street gangs, prison gangs, and Outlaw Motorcycle Gangs

Whist transnational movement of gang members in itself is not a crime, gangs use corruption to facilitate transnational crimes. In 2003, associates of the Hell’s Angels with Chinese and Australian organized crime groups corrupted a financial officer to commit Australia’s largest fraud. The group diverted A$150 million into offshore account (McClymont, 2012).2

Art. 16

Transnational Crime

1 Although a former employee, oaths of secrecy remain legally binding post-employment, thus this can be considered corruption of a national public official. 2 These cases do not explicitly have a negative impact on international security.

Studies [GIIS], 2001). In a recent case, Australian government authorities were accused of paying people smugglers to return to Indonesia— effectively outbidding refugee and asylum seekers who had already paid the criminal organizations. The allegation has created further tension between Australia and Indonesia. The examples illustrate the damage to global security caused by state authorized corruption. This type of corruption provides opportunity for future exploitation by criminal groups, who gain leverage over governments. The Italian Mafias—the Sicilian Cosa Nostra, the Calabrian ‘Ndrangheta, the Neapolitan Camorra, and the Sacra Corona Unita in Puglia—are well practiced at playing the long game with politics and

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Transnational Crime and Global Security

government, subtly (or blatantly) subverting political figures (Dickie, 2005, 2013; Nuzzi & Antonelli, 2010/2012; Sergi, 2015). Corruption and Crime as Threats to the Military and Economic Security Sectors Corrupt international corporations and organized criminal enterprises engaging in corrupt conduct do not, in general, have sufficient gravitas to be of significance in the realist perspective of International Relations. Yet, these actors often have greater economic, and sometimes military power, than many states as listed in Table 13.2. It is therefore necessary to adopt a more critical approach to security threats in accord with the sectors described by the Copenhagen School (Buzan et al., 1998). Table 13.2 begins this process using the military and economic sectors. It is important to note a number of critical facts when interpreting the power comparisons outlined in Table 13.2. First, any estimation of figures attributable to organized crime groups with any degree of accuracy is problematic to say the least. Organized crime groups do not register company returns or reports to shareholders. Calderoni (2014) unpacked the issues of criminal proceeds and provided possibly the most accurate estimates for the three groups listed in Table 13.2. Calderoni’s figures for mafia profits fell well short of the estimates of other think tanks. Research conducted by Eurispices (2008) claim the ‘Ndrangheta had a turnover of approximately €44 billion, equivalent to US$55.9 billion at that time. Both Calderoni and Eurispices confirm that transnational crime remains a multibillion dollar enterprise. The second critical fact focuses how states, militarily, have greater manpower than organized crime groups as reported in Table 13.2. Even G4S, the world’s largest private security corporation, is many times larger than the combined membership and affiliates of the three mafias. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (2015) estimates a total global membership of 25,000 and 250,000 affiliates for all Italian Mafias. Organized crime groups are decentralized and have cell-like structures, which disproportionately empower criminal organizations. This is problematic to state security as organized crime groups corrupt politicians, public servants, corporate officers, and others in power (Dickie, 2005, 2013; Sergi, 2015). Critical facts aside, Calderoni’s (2014) lower estimates for the Camorra (US$3.9 billion) and ‘Ndrangheta (US$3.1 billion) indicate they are more profitable than Unicredit, Italy’s most profitable listed corporation. Furthermore, the Camorra’s maximum estimated income places it within the same profit range of the top 100 corporations globally. The Camorra profits approximately equate to the gross domestic product (GDP) of Somalia, ranked 169th of 230 states listed by the CIA (2015). The ‘Ndrangheta and Cosa Nostra profits place both in the range of the top 250 corporations,

5.9

4.6

2.9

0.3

Somalia

Guam

Belize

Palau

2.9

2

G4S

1,760 public corporations with profits under $2.9 billion

0.3

5.0

‘Ndrangheta2

Cosa Nostra

5.9

Camorra2

2.7 6.7

Unicredit

Profit $bn

Siemens

1

Non-State Italy

68 states with military below 5,000

Latvia

Estonia

Malawi

Turkey

1

State

5.3

5.7

7.0

612.8

359.5

Force ’000 –

Cosa Nostra

3

‘Ndrangheta3

Camorra3

G4S

Non-State

Military

–

5.5

6.0

7.0

623

Force ’000

Note: Gross domestic product (GDP) figures for states are drawn from the World Factbook (Central Intelligence Agency [CIA], 2015) and military numbers from the World Bank (2013). Data for corporations are drawn from Forbes (2015) list of the 2000 biggest public companies and the G4S website. 1 Italian data has been included for direct comparison with mafia organizations. 2 Maximum revenue estimates for Italy in euros by Calderoni (2014) and converted to $US at 2014 exchange rate. Cosa Nostra estimates are for Italy only. 3 Estimates for organized crime group membership are sourced from the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2015). Figures for Cosa Nostra include both the United States (3,000) and Sicily (2,500). Totals do not include affiliates.

44 other microstates with a GDP under 2.9 billion

6.8

2066

GDP $bn

Monaco

Italy

1

State

Economic

Table 13.2 Power Comparison of Sample State and Non-State Actors

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Transnational Crime and Global Security

with criminal income similar to the GDPs of Guam and Belize ranked 175th and 185th respectively. The 45 microstates reported in Table 13.2 have GDPs smaller than Cosa Nostra. The criminal profits of the three mafias represent approximately 0.7 percent of the host state Italy’s GDP, ranked 13th (Calderoni, 2014). In essence, organized crime groups and corrupt corporations have the force capability and economic leverage to destabilize international security. The Influences of Corruption on the Political Security Sector Corruption destabilizes political security in many nations. “Political security” can be defined as a state of affairs where political institutions such as government, the judiciary, the executive, and the rule of law are established, relatively stable and enjoy legitimacy through the democratic will of the people (Buzan et al., 1998). Johnston (2005, 2014) classified four syndromes of corruption applicable to states: (1) influence markets, (2) elite cartels, (3) oligarchs and clans, and (4) official moguls. Influence markets describe the corruption typically found in well-developed market economies with mature political institutions, such as Australia, Sweden, and the United States. Johnston (2005, p. 42) reports that influence markets “deal in access to, and influence within, strong political institutions; often politicians serve as middlemen, putting their connections out for rent in exchange for [political] contributions both legal and otherwise.” In well-developed market economies with mature political institutions, the corrupting influence of transnational crime is less likely to directly affect regional or global security.4 Elite cartels exist when political and economic markets with moderately effective institutions undergo periods of reform. Johnston (2014, Chapter 5) lists Italy, South Korea, and Botswana as examples of elite cartel corruption. Of these three cases, Italy has a long association with transnational crime, and experienced internal political instability fueled by the various mafias. As part of their strategy to control territory and protect their organizations, Italian Mafia members have historically held elected positions, or invested in candidates to secure political protection (Dickie, 2013; Nuzzi & Antonelli, 2010/2012). The Cosa Nostra, Camorra, ‘Ndrangheta, and Sacra Corona Unita have been described as the Italian “shadow government” or “shadow state” (Dickie, 2005, p. 2). Shadow governments or states refer to how the mafias in effect have hijacked services that should be provided to citizens by the state. These descriptors may attribute too much influence to criminal organizations; however, this author considers these terms as describing the state as substantial, and the criminal organization as an unseen but inseparable element of society. Corruption in states controlled by oligarchs and clans is deeper and more pervasive than influence markets and elite cartels. Oligarchs and clans

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are elites, their families and associates who “pursue power in a climate of very weak institutions, rapidly expanding opportunities, and pervasive insecurity, using bribes and connections when they can and violence when they must” (Johnston, 2014, pp. 16–17). Johnston provides the examples of Russia, the Philippines, and Mexico as states controlled by oligarchies or clans (2014, p. 17). Transnational crime associated with oligarchies and clans negatively impacts upon international security. Corruption on both sides of the U.S.-Mexican border facilitates the trafficking of drugs and people. In U.S. territory, predominantly low-level officials are corrupted (Becker, 2012). However, in Mexico, politicians and officials of all ranks are often unwillingly corrupted by criminal organizations that offer the promise of plomo o plata (lead or silver) in exchange for their cooperation or lack thereof (Miraglia, Ochoa, & Briscoe, 2012). Official moguls comprise individuals or groups running undemocratic regimes and illicitly enriching themselves in the process. States under these regimes have involved themselves in organized crime directly for profit, political motives, or both. Activities of official moguls reverse organized crime infiltrating the state, that is, the state effectively infiltrates organized crime. In 2003, Australian authorities boarded and seized the North Korean freighter Pong Su. Investigations revealed the Pong Su had trafficked approximately 125 kilograms of heroin to Australia, and the crew included a senior official of the North Korean government. This case confirmed Western suspicions that the North Korean political regime had bolstered its foreign currency holdings through drug trafficking. One of the crew further alleged the North Korean government was involved in large-scale poppy production (BBC, 2004). Forensic analysis of the seized drugs supported the crewman’s allegation and indicated the heroin had come from a previously unrecorded source (Quinn, 2008). This example exemplifies how organized crime and corruption became tools for this regime to maintain itself despite international sanctions. The Corruption Threat to Societal and Environmental Security Corruption and transnational crime facilitate the overexploitation of natural resources, damaging both societal and environmental security. In West Africa, the trade in conflict diamonds undermined the governance of states such as Sierra Leone, Zimbabwe, and Liberia (Global Witness, 2012). The former Liberian president Charles Taylor led a rebel faction in the Liberian civil war (1989–2003) and was elected president of Liberia in 1997. As president, he accepted conflict diamonds from rebels in neighboring Sierra Leone as payment for arms and ammunition, thereby fueling ongoing instability in the region (Global Witness, 2012). International sanctions

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on the trade in conflict diamonds forced Taylor to find other corrupt revenue streams. Taylor sold timber concessions to a Russian arms dealer and a Dutch-run timber corporation, which also trafficked arms into Liberia and Sierra Leone. By the end of the Liberian civil war, nearly half the country was allocated for logging, yet evidence suggests hundreds of millions in state revenue were being corruptly siphoned off (Global Witness, 2012). The corruption and instability created by conflict diamond trade gained greater public attention when the supermodel Naomi Campbell testified at Charles Taylor’s war crimes’ trial. She claimed that the former Liberian president had offered her conflict diamonds as a gift (Waterfield & Bloxham, 2010). The threat to environmental security by transnational crime and corruption is not limited to the developing world. The Camorra and ‘Ndrangheta in Italy and La Cosa Nostra in the United States have infiltrated the waste management sector (Dickie, 2013; Liddick, 2010). The criminal motivation stemmed from the large profit margins created by dumping waste, as opposed to properly recycling or safely housing hazardous chemical, biological, and/or nuclear by-products. The ongoing security risk is heightened because these organizations operate with a pathological disdain for everyone else; one former member recently stated “ndrangheta don’t see other people as people. We ignore them, we think they’re all losers, fools . . .” (Nuzzi & Antonelli, 2010/2012, p. 31). This antisocial attitude also manifests in organized crime groups with little compunction about dealing with terrorist organizations, selling them arms or hazardous material with dual-use potential (Shelley, 2014). Another manifestation of the environmental security threats includes the practice of sinking ships loaded with hazardous waste in the Mediterranean Sea, and these ships pose an international environmental hazard (SBS, 2009). Whilst reports fail to refer to specific instances of corruption, the established mode of operation for the ‘Ndrangheta and other mafia groups includes corruption (Dickie, 2013, pp. 437–443; Liddick, 2010). CORRUPTION AS A TRANSNATIONAL CRIME IMPACTING GLOBAL AND REGIONAL SECURITY This section completes the analysis of corruption as a threat to security with a series of cases, which match the offences criminalized by the UNCAC. The UNCAC criminalizes nine offences, eight of which are described in the following subsections with a case example. Money laundering, the ninth offence, is described in detail in Chapter 7 of this volume. Each subsection begins with the text of the relevant UNCAC article, followed by a case example, and then a description of how the offence impacted on one or more of the security sectors.

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Boeing’s Bribery and the Military Industrial Complex

BOX 1: UNCAC ARTICLE 15. BRIBERY OF NATIONAL PUBLIC OFFICIALS Each State Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to establish as criminal offences, when committed intentionally: (a) The promise, offering or giving, to a public official, directly or indirectly, of an undue advantage, for the official himself or herself or another person or entity, in order that the official act or refrain from acting in the exercise of his or her official duties; (b) The solicitation or acceptance by a public official, directly or indirectly, of an undue advantage, for the official himself or herself or another person or entity, in order that the official act or refrain from acting in the exercise of his or her official duties.

Boeing, one of the world’s largest aircraft manufacturers became embroiled in a costly corruption scandal in the early years of the 21st century. The company secretly recruited the Pentagon official in charge of U.S. Air Force procurement contracts, who managed a $23 billion deal for the government to lease refueling aircraft from Boeing (United States Department of Justice, 2006). The official became vice-president of Boeing’s missile defense systems in 2003. Before taking the post, she arranged for the USAF to lease 100 aircraft from Boeing (Anonymous, 2006; Markon & Merle, 2004). The deal was controversial not least because the lease arrangements were costlier than the outright purchase of the aircraft (Chandler, 2003; Pfleger, 2003). Additionally, a Boeing executive purchased the official’s Washington residence at above market value and the corporation recruited the official’s daughter three years previously (Chandler, 2003). At the end of judicial proceedings, Boeing was fined $US615 million, the official received nine months imprisonment, and the Boeing official who managed the deal was also convicted and fined (Anonymous, 2006; Chandler, 2003; Markon & Merle, 2004). Crucial to security in this case is the integral role Boeing has in U.S. defense. Debarring Boeing from defense contracting—an option under U.S. law—could not be pursued. Boeing, and other defense industry giants have consolidated to the point where only a limited number (Boeing, Lockheed Martin, EADS) of companies can bid for major aircraft contracts (Zucker, 2004).

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Transnational Crime and Global Security

Siemens’ Systemic Corruption as a Way of Doing Business

BOX 2: UNCAC ARTICLE 16. BRIBERY OF FOREIGN PUBLIC OFFICIALS AND OFFICIALS OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 1 1. Each State Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to establish as a criminal offence, when committed intentionally, the promise, offering or giving to a foreign public official or an official of a public international organization, directly or indirectly, of an undue advantage, for the official himself or herself or another person or entity, in order that the official act or refrain from acting in the exercise of his or her official duties, in order to obtain or retain business or other undue advantage in relation to the conduct of international business. 2. Each State Party shall consider adopting such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to establish as a criminal offence, when committed intentionally, the solicitation or acceptance by a foreign public official or an official of a public international organization, directly or indirectly, of an undue advantage, for the official himself or herself or another person or entity, in order that the official act or refrain from acting in the exercise of his or her official duties. 1 While the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development earlier issued its Convention on Combatting Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 1997), the UNCAC has broader scope covering bribery of all public officials in any type of transactions.

In 2008, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) indicted Siemens, one of the world’s largest industrial and consumer product manufacturers for thousands of acts of foreign bribery. Table 13.3 provides a summary of the scale of the corporate sanctioned bribery. How such a prominent firm became embroiled in corruption on an industrial scale is rooted in history. Following World War II, Siemens found it difficult to operate having had much of its infrastructure destroyed and patent seized by occupying forces. They began operating in developing countries and it was there that bribery became an embedded business method. Up until 1999, German law allowed overseas bribes and in fact

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Table 13.3 Overview of Siemens’ Payments Siemens Business Group

Bribes to Foreign Officials Number of Payments

Communications Industrial solutions

2,505

Millions $813.9

89

$22.5

Medical solutions

705

$92.6

Power generation

353

$208.7

Power transmission

356

$148.2

Transport systems

154

$70.0

Other

121

$44.8

4,283

$1,400.7

Total

Source: SEC indictment (United States Security and Exchange Commission, 2008, p. 14).

they were tax deductible as legitimate business expenses. Schubert and Miller (2008) explained that “inside Siemens, bribes were referred to as ‘NA’—a German abbreviation for the phrase ‘nutzliche Aufwendungen’ which means ‘useful money.’ ” Foreign bribery continued to be a business practice in Siemens until at least 2007. Even in 2010-2011, over 500 reports of corruption were made to an internal Siemens anti-corruption hotline. The chain of events surrounding the SEC indictment is as follows: • 1999—Germany ratified the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development Convention on Combatting Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions • 2000—Austrian and Swiss officials became suspicious of cash flows from Siemens to offshore accounts • 2002—Senior Siemens executives discussed concealing illicit payments by using secrecy jurisdictions—Austria, Liechtenstein, Switzerland, the British Virgin Islands, and Dubai. Siemens accountants budgeted for $40–50 million annually for bribes. Greece, for example, was budgeted $10–15 million. Bribes ranged between 5 and 40 percent of the contract costs. Siemens ran a system of more than 2,700 business consultancy agreements to funnel money to government officials. • 2004—An Italian investigation of officials in the partially state-owned ENEL energy company described Siemens’ bribes as “at least a possible business strategy.” Following conviction, Siemens paid €6.2 million in fines and received a 12 month ban on business in Italy. The corporation gave guilty executives generous severance packages, which reinforced a corporate belief that the company approved and would support those involved.

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Transnational Crime and Global Security

• 2005—Following requests from other jurisdictions, German prosecutors opened a case against Siemens. The case had over 300 suspects. • November 2006—A senior accountant who had left Siemens but still worked for them as a consultant was arrested and rolled over as a witness. After the accountant’s arrest, $27.5 million in bribes was still paid out. • December 2008—The SEC file charges under the Foreign and Corrupt Practices Act 1977 alleging offences for the period 2001–2007 (see Tables 13.4 and 13.5). Siemens did not dispute the charges and paid more than $2.6 billion to clear its name: $1.6 billion in German and U.S. fines and $1 billion for corporate reforms (Summarized from United States Security and Exchange Commission, 2008).

The transaction with the greatest impact on global security was the provision of power stations to Iraq between 1991 and 2000. Siemens was one of more than 2,000 companies that paid bribes to the Hussein regime in breach of the UN sanctions under Security Council Resolutions 661 and 986. Most corporations investigated by Volcker Commission investigation into the UN Oil for Food Program (OFFP) refused to testify (Volcker,

Table 13.4 Select Examples of Siemens Bribery Worldwide Years

Country

Service/Product Contract

Bribes Paid (,000)

Contract Value (,000)

1998–2004

Argentina

ID Card Services

40,000

1,000,000

2002–2003

China

Power lines

25,000

838,000

2002–2007

China

Urban trains

22,000

1,000,000

2002–2005

Israel

Power plants construction

20,000

786,000

2001–2007

Venezuela

Urban rail lines

16,700

642,000

2003–2007

China

Medical equipment

14,400

295,000

2000–2001

Nigeria

Various government contracts

12,700

130,000

2004–2006

Bangladesh

Mobile phone provision

5,000

40,900

1991–2000

Iraq

Power stations

1,700

124,000

2004–2006

Russia

Traffic control

740

27,000

2002

Vietnam

Mobile Phones

140

35,000

Source: Author summary of indictment (United States Security and Exchange Commission, 2008).

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Goldstone, & Pieth, 2005). The impact on global security arising from these breaches is discussed in a separate section next.

The Post-Cold War Arms Trade

BOX 3: UNCAC ARTICLE 17. EMBEZZLEMENT, MISAPPROPRIATION OR OTHER DIVERSION OF PROPERTY BY A PUBLIC OFFICIAL Each State Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to establish as criminal offences, when committed intentionally, the embezzlement, misappropriation or other diversion by a public official for his or her benefit or for the benefit of another person or entity, of any property, public or private funds or securities or any other thing of value entrusted to the public official by virtue of his or her position.

In the years immediately following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the world became awash with weapons and hardware from Russia and the other former Soviet republics. According to the Small Arms Survey (GIIS 2001): . . . the Russian black market in arms has a strong economic component, appearing to be primarily driven by two factors: 1) economic hardship that encourages the Russian military to illicitly sell military weapons stocks; and 2) an unprecedented demand for weapons resulting from the wave of organized crime in the region. (p. 177)

The durability of weapons, which if stored and maintained properly retain their ability to kill and maim, is an important factor to recall when considering the size of the arsenal put into conflict zones throughout the world during and after the Cold War. The same Small Arms Survey documents Vietnam War era M16s supplied to insurgents in South America by the Cuban regime as still being in use decades after the war for which they were originally produced had finished (GIIS, 2001, p. 169). Furthermore, Kalashnikov rifles were selling for as little as US$25 each (p. 177). While corruption has been an ongoing enabler in these cases to the illicit arms trade, it was corruption in the misappropriation and diversion of these weapons in the first place that fueled the trade.

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Ireland’s “Golden Circle” of Influence

BOX 4: UNCAC ARTICLE 18. TRADING IN INFLUENCE Each State Party shall consider adopting such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to establish as criminal offences, when committed intentionally: (a) The promise, offering or giving to a public official or any other person, directly or indirectly, of an undue advantage in order that the public official or the person abuse his or her real or supposed influence with a view to obtaining from an administration or public authority of the State Party an undue advantage for the original instigator of the act or for any other person; (b) The solicitation or acceptance by a public official or any other person, directly or indirectly, of an undue advantage for himself or herself or for another person in order that the public official or the person abuse his or her real or supposed influence with a view to obtaining from an administration or public authority of the State Party an undue advantage.

In her book Political Corruption in Ireland 1922–2010, Byrne (2012) describes how the Irish state has been rife with influence trading throughout its history. In late 1991, the financial beneficiaries of these practices earned a new name—the Golden Circle. At this time, an overwhelming majority of the Irish people believed “there is a Golden Circle of people in Ireland who are using power to make money for themselves” (Byrne, 2012, p. 107). Political donations tended to coincide with political decisions that benefitted the donors, financial investments were made in businesses owned by politicians and their relatives and many became wealthy as the Irish economy opened up during the “Celtic Tiger” years. The cronyism inherent in the Golden Circle became a threat to global economic security during the early stages of what became known as the global financial crisis (GFC). Following the subprime mortgage crisis in the United States, the Irish economy—then heavily reliant on its financial and housing sectors—entered into a crisis phase as the property bubble burst. In September 2009, to stem a run on the banks the Irish government guaranteed bank deposits. Within weeks, this move forced the hand of governments around the world to do likewise to prevent an outflow of capital to Ireland. (For a comparative overview of the

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early days of the GFC in eight nations and the EU, see ‘t Hart & Tindall, 2009.) What was later revealed was that some of the bankers who later benefitted from the guarantee had played golf and dined with the Irish prime minister and a director of the Central Bank two months prior to the guarantee being made. On the day they played golf, the bank share price was on the verge of collapse (Byrne, 2012, p. 206). Thus, global economic security was undermined by long-standing corrupt practices in Ireland.

Historic Abuse of Functions in the Bank of International Settlements

BOX 5: UNCAC ARTICLE 19. ABUSE OF FUNCTIONS 1 Each State Party shall consider adopting such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to establish as a criminal offence, when committed intentionally, the abuse of functions or position, that is, the performance of or failure to perform an act, in violation of laws, by a public official in the discharge of his or her functions, for the purpose of obtaining an undue advantage for himself or herself or for another person or entity. 1

In many cases, corruption involves the abuse of function or discretion. A customs official may have to assess the value of a consignment of goods or decide which of several similar categories should be used to assess duty. An official responsible for government contracting may exercise discretion to purchase goods or services from a company in which he or she holds a personal interest. Another may propose real estate developments that will increase the value of his or her own property. Such abuses are often associated with bureaucracies in which there are broad individual discretions and inadequate oversight and accountability structures. They also flourish where decision-making rules are so complex that they neutralize the effectiveness of any accountability mechanisms that do exist. Many anti-corruption strategies involve a reassessment of all areas of discretion and attempt to limit these to a minimum.

The Bank of International Settlements (BIS) originated on the interwar period to manage German reparations from World War I. Established in Switzerland, the BIS has a mission to “serve central banks in their pursuit of monetary and financial stability, to foster international cooperation

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in those areas and to act as a bank for central banks” (BIS, 2015). During World War II, the bank pursued a policy to ensure the German financial structure would continue to function efficiently and effectively both during and after the cessation of hostilities. In effect, the bank (ab)used its functional discretion to enable transactions, which allowed the Nazi regime to prosecute its war effort far longer had such transactions been unavailable to them. To illustrate, Lebor (2013) detailed how the BIS exchange mechanism was used to enable the purchase of strategic material from South America. The Germans needed a steady supply of Portuguese escudos to pay for vital war materials such as tungsten. The Portuguese escudo was then a hard currency accepted by the Allies, the Axis powers, and of course, South American countries . . . The key players were the Bank of Portugal, the Reichsbank, the Swiss National Bank, and the BIS. The Bank of Portugal bought gold bullion from the Reichsbank, which was delivered to the Swiss National Bank and credited to the Bank of Portugal’s account. The Bank of Portugal then credited the requiste amount of escudos to German accounts in Lisbon, allowing German purchases to take place there. (p. 114)

This was but one of numerous services the bank provided under its discretion to the Nazi regime. The activities of the BIS during the war did not go unnoticed, in fact, the Bretton Woods meeting of 1944 recommended the BIS be liquidated and its functions be assumed by the International Monetary Fund. Then bank only survived by transferring looted Nazi gold to the Allied Tripartite Commission (BIS, 2013; Lebor, 2013, Chapter 8). While this case predates the international criminalization of “abuse of functions,” it has salient lessons for today. First, bank directors from the Nazi regime were charged with war crimes at Nuremburg for their role in sustaining the Nazi war economy. These trials are famous for quashing the defense of “just following orders” in respect of war crimes—which in this case extended to the functioning of the state. Second, the actions were carried out as a part of the functions of an international government organization that had developed from a banking culture of secrecy, customer service, and disinterest in the bigger picture. While these are laudable characteristics, they are open to abuse. Furthermore, it illustrates how the discretion of international government organizations, if abused, can have a deleterious effect on global and regional security. The more recent example of the abuses within the UN OFFP discussed further below, also illustrated the destabilization of security caused by the abuse of function. Coincidentally, the OFFP was investigated by Paul Volcker (Volcker et al., 2005), who, when chairman of the Federal Reserve (1979–1987), was a director of the BIS.

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The OFFP Providing Illicit Wealth for a Favored Few

BOX 6: UNCAC ARTICLE 20. ILLICIT ENRICHMENT Subject to its constitution and the fundamental principles of its legal system, each State Party shall consider adopting such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to establish as a criminal offence, when committed intentionally, illicit enrichment, that is, a significant increase in the assets of a public official that he or she cannot reasonably explain in relation to his or her lawful income.

Following the defeat of the Hussein regime in Iraq in 2003, documents from Iraqi ministries became available which implicated thousands of foreign companies and officials of acting corruptly in the administration of the aforementioned UN OFFP. In total, nearly 1.8 billion dollars in kickbacks had been paid to the regime in exchange for oil allocations by the Iraqi government or to allow the provision of humanitarian services within Iraq (Volcker et al., 2005). In total, over 2,000 firms were implicated in the kickbacks, which were designed to circumvent the UN sanctions placed upon the regime. In most instances, the kickbacks were simply to enable corporations to do business; however, in the early days of the scheme, the system was exploited by politicians, diplomats, UN personnel, and others as a means simply to enrich themselves. UN Security Council Resolution 986 (1995) was designed to prevent the Hussein regime from enriching itself through the sale of oil and to create pressure for a change of regime in Iraq. However, the resolution allowed for the sale of oil, with proceeds placed in a UN escrow account to allow for the purchase of food and other humanitarian requirements. There was, however, a fatal flaw in the scheme in that the Iraqi administration was allowed to select who they sold the oil to. Oil allocations, mostly measured in millions of barrels, were made to people considered friendly to the regime. Once allocated the oil, it was usually on-sold to an oil company. The resale price would cover the true price of the oil paid to the UN escrow account, a surcharge paid into Iraqi government bank accounts or in cash by the original beneficiary as a kickback to the Iraqi government and a substantial profit for the original beneficiary. The Volcker inquiry revealed that $228.8 million was paid in surcharges directly to Iraqi authorities over a two year period, bypassing UN sanction controls (Volcker et al., 2005, p. 221). While the profits for the beneficiaries were substantially less than the surcharges paid to the Iraqi government, the profits for the individuals were still substantial in their own right.

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Table 13.5 Sample of Beneficiaries Who Profited from Illicit Enrichment under the OFFP Beneficiary and Office

Oil Allocation

Profit

Vladimir Zhirinovsky, head of the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia

73 million barrels

$1,681,875 paid to Zhirinovsky’s son

Jean-Bernard Mérimée, special advisor to the UN secretary general with the rank of undersecretary general

2 million barrels

$165,725 deposited into Mr. Mérimée’s bank account in Morocco.

Bernard Guillett, diplomatic adviser to Charles Pasqua, the former minister of interior in France

11 million barrels in the name of Pasqua

At least $234,000 received by Guillett

Marco Mazarino de Petro, former mayor and parliamentarian working as a consultant for Roberto Formigoni, the president of the Lombardy Region in Italy

27 million barrels in the name of Formigoni

At least $800,000 received by de Petro

Summarized from (Volcker et al., 2005, pp. 28–31, 49–60, 89–98).

The Iraqi regime used the oil allocations as a means to ensure payment of the surcharges and as a reward for its political allies. The Volcker inquiry showed those mentioned in table two and many others were well aware the surcharge payments were made in avoidance of UN sanctions. They used their own names, or those whom they were close to, to secure the oil and illicitly enrich themselves. The result was the Iraqi regime found a means to bypass the Security Council Resolutions thus contributing to ongoing instability in the region.

Private Sector Bribes and the Fédération Internationale De Football Association BOX 7: UNCAC ARTICLE 21. BRIBERY IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR Each State Party shall consider adopting such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to establish as criminal offences, when

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committed intentionally in the course of economic, financial or commercial activities: (a) The promise, offering or giving, directly or indirectly, of an undue advantage to any person who directs or works, in any capacity, for a private sector entity, for the person himself or herself or for another person, in order that he or she, in breach of his or her duties, act or refrain from acting; (b) The solicitation or acceptance, directly or indirectly, of an undue advantage by any person who directs or works, in any capacity, for a private sector entity, for the person himself or herself or for another person, in order that he or she, in breach of his or her duties, act or refrain from acting.

In June 2015, the U.S. Department of Justice charged a number of senior officials from the Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act 19705— RICO. According to the indictments, FIFA is a private enterprise, which was corrupted by senior executives soliciting and receiving bribes from sport marketing companies (United States Department of Justice, 2015). The U.S. investigation triggered an angry response from Russian president Vladimir Putin, who claimed: This is yet another blatant attempt to extend its jurisdiction to other states . . . Unfortunately our American partners are using these methods in order to achieve their own selfish gains and it is illegal to persecute people. I would not rule out that in regards to FIFA, the same thing could be happening, though I do not know how it will end. (Putin quoted in Doré, 2015)

Putin made this statement in response to allegations against the FIFA executives. Although the indictment only directly refers to votes for the 1998 and 2010 tournaments, by implication it also includes the vote that secured the 2018 rights for Russia (United States of America v. Webb et al., 2015). The Russian president’s response and damage to Russian national pride has created further tensions between the United States and Russia. A “Golden Circle” Member and the Irish Banking Crisis

BOX 8: UNCAC ARTICLE 22. EMBEZZLEMENT OF PROPERTY IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR Each State Party shall consider adopting such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to establish as a criminal offence,

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when committed intentionally in the course of economic, financial or commercial activities, embezzlement by a person who directs or works, in any capacity, in a private sector entity of any property, private funds or securities or any other thing of value entrusted to him or her by virtue of his or her position.

Single cases of private sector embezzlement rarely impact on global security. The reason for this is twofold. First, even the largest transnational or national corporations and financial institutions are dwarfed by the size of global markets. Second, the larger actors are usually based in free market economies, which often allow such actors to collapse as part of the Darwinian market processes, although governments may intervene. This was the case with many financial institutions worldwide following the collapse of Lehmann Brothers in 2007. In most instances during the following GFC, private institutions were victims of poor practice and greed, rather than criminal fraud and embezzlement. However, in one case, fraudulent practice had a direct impact and contributed to the escalation of the GFC. Seán Fitzpatrick, the chairman of the Anglo-Irish Bank spent nearly a decade concealing his loan of over €87 million from auditors of the bank. In collusion with other financial institutions, he would temporarily transfer the loan outside the AIB before the end of each fiscal year to conceal it from shareholders (Masters, 2009). The exposure of the loans led to the collapse of the Anglo-Irish share price and triggered the Irish government’s banking guarantee, which in turn forced the hands of other governments to prevent capital outflow to Ireland—thus contributing to the escalation of the GFC. The Irish government subsequently nationalized AIB. Fitzpatrick was tried over these matters, but was acquitted in 2017 of misleading auditors about multimillion-euro loans (McDonald, 2017). In addition to the aforementioned corruption offences, Article 23 of the UNCAC also criminalizes money laundering, which is considered elsewhere in this volume, and therefore not discussed in this chapter. CONCLUSION Corruption is a key enabler of transnational crime, if for no other reason than it is often simpler to bribe a border official than to undertake complex measures to circumvent state control. However, as this chapter has demonstrated, corruption is also a transnational crime in its own right. The deliberate or collateral consequences of corruption can and does undermine international security. Direct threats such as Charles Taylor’s

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multitude of offences undermine the social, political, economic, environmental, and military securities both domestically and internationally. The sociopathic tendencies of the ‘Ndrangheta, Camorra, and other organized crime groups and including corporations like Siemens manifest as corruption, are negatively impacting on all sectors of security. The consequential damage is irrelevant in the criminal pursuit of power and profits. NOTES 1. The CATOC is actually silent on what constitutes organized crime. However, it defines an “organized criminal group” as “a structured group of three or more persons, existing for a period of time and acting in concert with the aim of committing one or more serious crimes or offences established in accordance with this Convention, in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit” (CATOC, art. 2[a]). Thus, the implication can be drawn that organized crime is the activities involved in, and preparatory to, the commission of serious crime by an organized crime group. 2. The term “International Relations” is capitalized when referring to the academic study of the interactions between nations and the body of literature associated with this study. In lower case, the term refers to the practices carried out between nations (see George, 1994, p. 34). 3. For more on how a critical international relations approach can apply to transnational organized crime as a security concept see Carrapiço (2011). 4. This is not to say that criminal organizations do not have a corrupting influence. Recent media in Australia demonstrated how individuals affiliated with the ‘Ndrangheta worked hard to influence the immigration minister to prevent a known member of their organization from being deported to Italy (Sergi, 2015). 5. USC, Title 18, §1961 et seq.

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CHAPTER 14

Understanding Terrorism in the Modern Era Galia Cohen and Robert W. Taylor

In a post-9/11 American society, when “terrorism” has become an everyday phrase, understanding the idea of terrorism is more important than ever. The concept of “terrorism” emerged during the late 18th century in France. However, in the United States, earlier incidents of what would today be called terrorism were usually racial, labor, or anarchist related. For example, in 1856, John Brown, a slavery opponent, murdered and mutilated five slave owners in Kansas (Lee, 1997). Several years later, he also took over a federal armory trying to provoke an uprising against slavery. In 1867, the Knights of the White Camellia, a secret racist Southern society that gave rise to the Ku Klux Klan, terrorized Louisiana voters with murders and raids in order to get their candidate elected (Haworth, 1920). And in 1910, radical union representatives detonated a bomb in the offices of the Los Angeles Times, killing 21 people (Brookhiser, 2013) in protest of the newspaper’s anti-union stand. While many other examples of such earlier terrorism attacks exist, interestingly, America’s concern about terrorism is a relatively new phenomenon. In fact, until the early 1960s terrorism was a phenomenon that received very little attention in American policy. It was perceived as a distant event, which only occurred oceans away, in far-off lands like the Middle East or Europe, and that was rarely targeted directly toward America. A prominent example is Israel, where citizens have been consistently the targets of terrorist attacks since its formation in 1948. Until 1960, U.S. policy was much more occupied with landing a man on the moon, the American Civil Rights Movement, and the Vietnam War than in terrorism. However, since the 1960s, several major terrorist attacks

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occurring within or directly against the United States have shifted America’s attention toward the issue of terrorism. OLD AND NEW TERRORISM In 1970, the Black Panther Party, a militant group that sought to overthrow the federal government in order to establish a socialist nonracist society, bombed the Capitol building. A year later, in 1971, they also bombed the Pentagon. Several years later, in 1979, a group of Iranian Muslim extremists took over the U.S. embassy in Tehran, holding Americans hostage for more than a year. Almost a decade later, in 1988, a Pan Am Flight 103 from London to New York City exploded over Lockerbie, Scotland, killing all 259 passengers and creating one of the largest crime scenes ever processed (over 845 square miles) (A byte out of history: Solving a complex case of international terrorism, 2003). The attack was attributed to the former leader of Libya, Muammar Gaddafi. Furthermore, in 1998, suicide bombers exploded while driving a truck near the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, killing 224 and injuring thousands more. In only three short years, “terrorism” became the most important word in America’s political vocabulary as the attacks on September 11, 2001, completely transformed our national security policy. The new American policy singularly focused on blocking terrorism from reaching the homeland. This chronological overview of terrorist attacks against the United States exemplifies an important distinction between “old” and “new” terrorism. Scholars describe “old terrorism” as acts motivated by specific political, social, and economic goals (Lesser et al., 1999). “Old terrorism” movements targeted governmental symbols and societal structures, such as embassies, national airlines, banks, and kidnappings and assassinations of military and diplomatic officials (Lesser et al., 1999). After they attack, they will usually issue some kind of an announcement, taking responsibility for the action. In other words, although inexcusable, “old terrorism” had comprehensible objectives, which, to some extent, had the potential of being met through negotiation between the terrorists and their government. On the other hand, the “new terrorism” goal is to inflict mass casualties by intentionally targeting unarmed civilians. For new terrorists, the number of people killed is a key factor in their operation as it generates panic in the general population. Scholars usually mark the early 1990s as the starting period of the “new terrorism” pointing to two significant terrorist attacks. The first attack occurred in 1993, when radical Muslims detonated a Ryder truck with 1,200 pounds of explosives in the underground parking garage of the World Trade Center’s north tower (1993 World Trade Center bombing fast facts, 2016). The second attack occurred in 1995 with the Aum Shinrikyo, a religious cult in Japan that advocated the end of the

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world, released the nerve agent, Sarin, in the Tokyo subway system, killing 6 and injuring 6,000 people (Seto, 2001). Interestingly, “new terrorism” evolved as terrorists’ motives began shifting from predominately secular, nonreligious causes to religion-based causes. These movements are based on radical religious interpretation in which terrorists are voluntarily becoming suicide bombers for the right to carry out the will of God or to enter paradise after they die. They are less likely to claim responsibility for their attacks or to be interested in any kind of negotiation (Seto, 2001). However, while this distinction of “old” and “new” terrorism is important for understanding how terrorism began and how it has changed, one should not mistake “old” for disappearing. As Laqueur (1999) wrote: “A new age of terrorism is dawning, but the old terrorism is far from dead” (p. 32). ISSUES IN CONCEPTUALIZING TERRORISM Despite decades of efforts to conceptualize terrorism, the concept of terrorism still evades a widely agreed-upon definition for several reasons. First, terrorism is a nonnatural phenomenon that cannot be quantified with scientific measures. Therefore, there is no unified definition for terrorism and government agencies and researchers will usually develop their own definitions to meet their needs. The surplus of terrorism definitions confuses us from understanding the meaning of this concept. Second, the body of research studying terrorism is weak and not sufficient for understanding the different dimensions of terrorism such as, planning, strategic thinking, and policy making. More than 50 percent of the studies written about terrorism since 1980 were written in 2001 and 2002, immediately following 9/11 (Lum, Kennedy, & Sherley, 2008). In addition, most articles about terrorism are opinion pieces while empiricalbased studies and case studies are rare (Lum et al., 2008). Third, following the work of Gallie and Connolly, terrorism has become an “essentially contested concept.” For example, the hotly contested question of “who is the terrorist?” lends itself to endless dispute with no resolution. Where does terrorism end and other forms of legitimate political violence begin? The radical fundamentalist Muslim Middle East organizations, Hezbollah (Arabic for the “Party of God”), and Hamas (the Palestinian Islamic Resistance Movement) demonstrate a good example for this point. These groups are simultaneously viewed as terrorist organizations—by the United States and Israel—and as legitimate political organizations—by Latin America and the Arab world. To make matters even more confusing, in 2006, Hamas won a majority of seats in the Palestinian Parliament, which made it a legitimate ruling power in the Palestinian territories; forcing the United States and Israel to now negotiate with “former terrorists.” Fourth, it is governments who have the political authority to apply labels such as, “mentally ill,” “poverty level,” “child molester,” as well as

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“terrorist.” These labels carry significant consequences to their holders, as they may give them certain privileges or deny them of certain rights. In the context of terrorism, labeling a group as “guerrilla” or “terrorist” might have to do less with their actual acts and more with the government’s national policy agendas. This was the case of the Chechen rebels who were “relabeled” by Russian president, Vladimir Putin, as terrorists following 9/11 (Trenin, 2003). In 2004, Chechen terrorists took over 1,300 hostages in a school in Beslan, Russia, trying to negotiate school children and teachers in exchange to the release of Chechen prisoners. Rejecting any negotiation attempts, Russian armed forces stormed into the school in a military operation that resulted in 700 hostages wounded and 186 children and 145 adults were killed (Ramsey, 2005). Interestingly, the West turned a blind eye on this failed operation. Relabeling Chechen rebels as “terrorists” seemed to have helped Russia avoid a severe international criticism. Fifth, “terrorism” is an evocative word, which is often used figuratively and therefore, imprecisely in our daily speech. As an evocative term, the word “terrorism” appeals to emotion rather than intellect and it has the power to stir deep feelings and fear within individuals by forcing them recall potent images and painful memories (Taylor & Vanden, 1982). The American public reaction to the 9/11 attacks, for example, was evocative and instructive. A 2011 Pew research poll conducted on the 10th anniversary of 9/11, sampled individuals in the United States and found that 97 percent remembered exactly where they were and what they were doing on that day (Clark, 2011). Frequently, nations will use the “terrorism” label to describe violent attacks that are committed against them but would not use the same label to describe their own violent retaliations in response to those attacks (Long, 1990). The reason being, because terrorism is so evocative and loaded with negative meanings, we simply cannot entertain the thought that our own country or allies would commit terroristic acts. For example, while the United States considers the use of armed drones to attack targets as an effective military use of technology in the war against terrorism, the attacked side and their allies view it as an act of terrorism because it also causes the unintentional deaths of innocent civilians. POLITICAL IDEOLOGY AND TERRORISM To better understand terrorism, we must identify the political ideology and theory that motivate terroristic groups and its historical significance to the development of modern terrorism (see Marx & Engels, 1848). Political ideology can be defined in two levels: on the individual level, it is the set of beliefs regarding the proper order of society and how that order can be achieved (Erikson & Tedin, 2003). On the group level, political ideology is the shared framework of mental models, which groups of individuals

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possess, providing both an interpretation of the environment and a prescription as to how it should be structured (Denzau & North, 1994). Although terrorism today is perceived more as a religious rather than a political phenomenon, it is important to acknowledge that the establishment of many other terroristic groups is rooted in political and ideological motivations. In fact, even terrorist groups like Al Qaeda, that seem to be primarily based on religious ideology, have historical roots that are embedded in political movements from mid-19th-century Europe. The political ideologies that have had the most impact on modern terrorism are labeled as left-wing extremism, or, “leftist.” These are theories that focus on revolution and anarchy to achieve governmental change and that are deeply rooted in the work of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels during the 1800s (see Marx & Engels, 1848). Marx’s theory (also called Marxism) posits that the capitalists, who own the means of production and hold society’s power and wealth, exploit the working class (i.e., proletariat) who are the true creators of society’s wealth. In their essay, The Communist Manifesto, Marx and Engels (1848) call the working class to violently revolt against capitalism and owners of private property and to overthrow the existing monarchies of Europe and Russia that allow such corruption. Communism reflects the total elimination of private ownership of property as well as government. According to Marx, under the communist state, all people will be equal in the social order as all property and services are owned in common and available to all people as needed. Marxism’s relevancy to terrorism is reflected in the transition from capitalism to communism. In this stage, individuals refuse to give up their private property to the state and terrorism occurs. In fact, Marx’s theory is grounded in a constant violent struggle between classes of society. As the following examples will show, Marxist principles have clearly influenced the philosophy and tactics of the different factions of terrorism—from leftist to Islamic terror. Latin American Leftist Groups In Latin America, several groups fostered Marxist ideology, the most infamous being the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). The FARC was established in 1964 as the military wing of the Colombian Communist Party. It claims to protect the land interests of the rural peasant class in Colombia from the Colombian affluent classes and global cooperation. Funded primarily by the Colombian drug cartel, FARC is heavily armed and consists of nearly 20,000 members (Hanson, 2008). Their main operations include: kidnappings of foreign tourists and government officials, assassinations of hostages, and political figures, and extortion and illegal “taxes” levied on those FARC claims to defend. A serious concern posed to the Colombian government today is the merger of FARC with

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the National Liberation Army (ELN)—another guerilla Marxist group that operates in the Colombian countryside (Isacson, 2013). Other infamous leftist groups are the Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA) in Peru and Argentina (better known as the Tupamaros) and the notorious leftist Sendero Luminoso or Shining Path in Peru. Both groups, steeped in Marxist principles, claiming to create a reformed society in which power and property are equally shared (Nunez, 1970). Surprisingly, the Tupamaros, unlike their other Marxist counterparts, actually allocated some of their funds to the poor people living around Montevideo. European Leftist Groups On the other hand, European leftist terror groups considered themselves as “revolutionary thinkers.” They perceived the residents of underdeveloped countries as the “working class,” who is being exploited by imperialist powers, such as European countries and the United States, and took it upon themselves to be advocators of a global class war between the capitalist countries and their victims. Among the most active leftist groups in Europe was the Italian-based Red Brigades, established in 1969. Their Marxist plan to overthrow the government involved multiple three phases of urban terror, such as, destroying property with bombings and arson as well as kidnappings and assassinations (Bendle, 2006). In its nearly 20 years of existence, the Red Brigades were responsible for almost 14,000 terrorist attacks (Martin, 2013). Other groups include the notorious Red Army Faction (RAF) (also known as the Baader-Meinhof Gang) in Germany, which considered terrorism to be the only practical solution for helping the oppressed third world. And the Revolutionary Cells that were responsible for the hijacking of Air France Flight 139 en route from Tel Aviv to Paris in 1976. In a famous rescue operation, the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) raided Entebbe airport in Uganda, rescuing the 102 hostages and killing the hijackers (Revolutionary cells, 2016). To this day, the “Raid on Entebbe” operation is perceived as a significant world event as it marks the beginning of development of counterterrorism units by countries around the world. Middle Eastern Leftist Groups The Marxist political ideology also formed the theoretical base for terrorism in the Middle East. The problem of Palestine and the Palestinian struggle became an extension of the world battle against colonialism and capitalism supported by Western European countries and America (see Van Hieu, 1966). Arab uprisings first began in 1920 as a result of the Mandate System, which gave the British control over the area of TransJordan,

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the area known today as the Palestinian Territory, Israel, and Jordon. Some scholars claim that these initial uprising against the colonial powers of Europe via the post-World War I mandate manifest the beginning of a sustained Arab resistance against the West (see Lewis, 1995). Several Palestinian groups became the forerunners of modern Middle East terrorist organizations. The first, and perhaps the least radical, was Al-Fatah, under the leadership of Yasser Arafat. Getting strong support from Jordan and Saudi Arabia, Al-Fatah had become a large and proficient guerrilla force carrying out a variety of underground commando raids and attacks against Israeli military and its general population. Other, more radical groups, include the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), a Christian-led organization grounded in a strong Christian Marxist ideology and founded by the late George Habash (see Cobban, 1984; Lang, 1981). Interestingly, this group not only advocated for the need to eliminate Israel but also asserted that it was their Christian duty to free the oppressed people of Palestine (see Yodfat & Arnon-Ohanna, 1981). The PFLP is infamously known for its successful skyjackings that shocked the world stage, forcing terrorism expert Brian M. Jenkins to coin the phrase that “terrorism was grand theater” (Jenkins, 1974). Finally, the Black September Organization (BSO) is perhaps the most disreputable, though short lived, of the Marxist Palestinian terrorist organizations. The BSO was primarily composed of former radical PFLP members and actively used terrorism as its primary strategy. The organization carried out a multiple number of extremely violent attacks against Israel and Jordan, among them, the assassination of Jordan’s prime minister, Wasfi al-Tal, in 1971; the hijacking of a Belgian airliner in 1972; and the bombing of bus terminal in Tel Aviv (see Yodfat & Arnon-Ohanna, 1981). However, no attack during this time was more outrageous than the BSO’s actions at the 1972 Olympics in Munich, when Black September guerrillas entered the Olympic Village in Munich and murdered 11 Israeli athletes (see Friedman, 1989; Lang, 1981). Notably, these Palestinian terrorist groups were secular—meaning that their ideology was based in the political principles of Karl Marx’s theory and not in religion. However, such left-wing terror groups certainly paved the way for the rise of more contemporary Islamic fundamentalism terrorist groups that replaces political ideology with a more radical religious one. RELIGIOUS IDEOLOGY AND TERRORISM The nature of the relationship between religion and terrorism is highly controversial. While many scholars argue that religion plays a critical role in terrorism (see Juergensmeyer, 1997, 2000; Laqueur, 1987; Rapport, 1984; White, 2003), only a few have tried to address the complex relationship between worshiping god and the decision to commit a suicide

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bombing or an act of violence against other human beings. It may be that religion is not the cause for terrorism, but rather the means to understanding, and even accepting, political and social catastrophes. According to Juergensmeyer (2000), no human will become a suicide bomber without first experiencing crisis, such as living in poverty, in disease, or in suppression. Similar to crime and revolution, acts of terrorism may be more of a product of social condition versus religious doctrine. Hence, when people lose hope for the future, the cosmic states of the afterlife (i.e., heaven, hell, paradise) become a significant factor in rationalizing the extreme actions often seen in terrorism and suicide bombing spawned by social condition. The Rise of Radical Islam A genuine understanding of radical Islamic terrorism requires a basic understanding of Islam. Islam is more than just a religion; it is a “how to” guide for living life, both individually and collectively (Copinger-Symes, 2003). The world of Islam has a unique history, culture, and perspective that is often in sharp contrast to Western, secular countries like the United States. In fact, the word “Islam” comes from the Arabic word “aslam,” which means “total submission to the will of Allah (i.e., God).” “Islam” is also firmly rooted in the Arabic word “salaam”—which means “peace” (Okon, 2013). The latter might come as a surprise to most Americans, whose perceptions of Islam have been corrupted by radical Muslim terrorists committing to “jihad” against the West. In fact, the word “jihad” has a significant positive meaning in the Muslim tradition. Jihad expresses the struggle that one faces when trying to surrender to the will of God—a spiritual struggle, not an earthly struggle. This struggle has two dimensions: an internal and an external dimension. The internal struggle, also known as “the struggle for greater jihad,” happens within the soul (Handwerk, 2003). It represents the struggle of living a life of worship within the wisdom of Islam and it acts as a spiritual cleansing (see Al-Saidat & Al-Khawalda, 2012). The external struggle, also perceived as the lesser jihad, is a more materialistic process, which describes the physical acts needed to strengthen the overall Muslim believers community, such as acts of mercy and faith (Schmidt, 2005). Therefore, while the word “jihad” means a “holy war” in Arabic, its true meaning was never meant to be associated with physical violence. The war that jihad refers to is an internal war—one that is fought within the spiritual context. According to Islam, winning this war does not mean becoming suicide bombers, but rather reaching spiritual fulfillment and helping others to do the same (Gulen, 1993; Kashif al Ghita, 1979). Today, sadly, the spiritual and historical context of this concept is often overlooked and dismissed, particularly in the West, where understanding of cultural and religious aspects of Islam is relatively weak.

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The word “jihad” has become highly associated with Islamic terrorism due to radical Islamic clerics who have misinterpreted this concept for the last several centuries in an effort to elicit an emotional response and encourage Muslims to protect their religion by fighting the United States and the West. The nature of the relationship between religion and terrorism is highly controversial. While many scholars argue that religion plays a critical role in terrorism (see Juergensmeyer, 1997, 2000; Laqueur, 1987; Rapport, 1984; White, 2003), only a few have tried to address the complex relationship between worshiping god and the decision to commit a suicide or an act of violence against other human beings. It may be that religion is not the cause for terrorism but rather the means to understanding, and even accepting, political and social catastrophes. According to Juergensmeyer (2000), no human will become a suicide bomber without experiencing crisis, such as living in poverty, in disease, or in suppression. Essentially, when people lose hope for the future, the cosmic states of the afterlife (i.e., heaven, hell, paradise) become a significant factor in rationalizing the extreme actions often seen in terrorism and suicide bombing. Fundamentalism is defined as a strategy (or set of strategies) wherein a people or group, who feel their distinctive identity is at risk, try to fortify this identity by a selective retrieval of doctrines, beliefs, and practices from a sacred past (Maddy-Weitzman & Inbar, 1997). The development of Islamic fundamentalist movements is typically attributed to several factors: the resistance to state authority, economic hardship, and the opposition to foreign occupation (colonization) in the Middle East (Murphy, 2002). It is common for fundamentalists and radicals from all religions to justify the use of violence by viewing it as “God’s work.” According to them, God is calling upon his true believers to violently fight the unworthy nonbelievers. Also, since these actions are not optional but rather required by God, these “believers” are exempted from assuming any responsibility for their actions. Islamic fundamentalists interpret words like “jihad” to serve their own violent purposes. They portray their struggle as a war between the “pure” Islam that existed centuries ago and today’s sinner world. Their goal is to “re-Islamize” secular societies ruled by governments that are allied with Western powers, such as the United States (Maddy-Weitzman & Inbar, 1997). In the Middle East, people who live in poverty, with no education, limited freedom of movement, and no political power might be attracted to the radical and extremist causes presented by fundamentalists. In fact, most Arabs argue that the desperation and the lack of hope for a better future for Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza is what drive them to embrace fundamental Islam. Faced with no hope in this world, dying as a suicide bomber, at least offers hope in the next world.

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According to Maddy-Weitzman and Inbar (1997), Islamic radicalism and fundamentalism is rooted in the assumption that centuries of failure to respect and to properly practice the Muslim religion have led to political and moral decay of the Muslim world. In addition, Islamic fundamentalists believe immoral, secularist Western values and ideas, such as gender equality, sexual inhibition, capitalism, and globalization have infected the Muslim society and are posing a direct threat to Islam and to the culture of the Middle East. Therefore, the only way to fight the corruptive influence of “adulterous nations” of the West is by re-politicizing Islam and re-Islamizing the Muslim world. This can be achieved by strict enforcement of the Sharia (Muslim law) and by a violent elimination of the Western cultural and political influence. Most radical movements in Muslim countries today operate based on these assumptions, while at the same time, trying to initiate some positive changes within the Muslim community. The Muslim Brotherhood is a good illustration for such movement. The Muslim Brotherhood is a political-religious movement created in Egypt by Hassan al-Banna (1906–1949). Al-Banna’s goals were to free Egypt from Western powers and to form a strict Islamic-oriented state. The organization began accumulating power through violence, political murders, riots, and the bombing of public places. The Muslim Brotherhood rapidly became the most powerful Islamic movement in the world, operating a network of businesses, schools, hospitals, military and social welfare projects in Egypt, and gathering followers from all over the Middle East. Until, in the mid1960s, it was officially banned in Egypt, its members were arrested and imprisoned (Maddy-Weitzman & Inbar, 1997). Today, Muslim Brotherhood plays a key role in Middle Eastern politics in general, and Egyptian politics in particular, as it maintains active parliamentary seats in the Egyptian government. Additionally, it continues to serve as a catalyst for Islamic fundamentalism and radicalism in many parts of the Muslim world and even in the United States. The FBI reports that the organization has established cells in the American Islamic community. Focusing mainly on students, the leaders of these cells urge their supporters to “await an order to attack” (Benjamin & Simon, 2002, p. 124) The Muslim Brotherhood represents the beginning of Salafism, an Islamic philosophy originated in the late 19th century by Muslim reformers (Murphy, 2002). The word “Salaf” in Arabic means “the first,” and Salafism pertains to the escorts of the Prophet Muhammad. Salafis consider themselves to be the first generation of companions of the Prophet Muhammad. Today, scholars use the label Jihadist Salafism to describe the second generation of Salafism (Murphy, 2002). A radical Muslim group that rose during the 1980s and which continues to dictate Middle Eastern and Islamic radical thought. Unlike first generation Salafis, jihadists Salafis

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believe that violence is the only way to return to the original “purity” of Islam. Although the Quran does not allow using the concept of jihad to justify physical violence, jihadists Salafis use it to inspire the creation of “an army of God” to fight a “holy war” against all those that threaten the religious existence of Islam in the Middle East. The main enemy for these movements (i.e., Al Qaeda) is the United States because of its support for Israel and other Middle Eastern regimes that do not side with the “true Muslims.” Fundamentalist groups, such as the jihadists Salafis Movement and the Muslim Brotherhood, have misinterpreted the classical Islamic meaning of jihad and created a vicious cycle of violence, which has shaped the perceptions of modern day terrorism. The situation has become much more acute as the movement spreads throughout the Middle East under the banner of the Islamic State (IS) (also known as ISIS—Islamic State in Iraq and Syria). The Islamic State is no longer a group but rather a movement of some eight million people believing to be the next Muslim caliphate, or country where Islamic dominance is merged with political will and leadership. ISIS represents an entity that is fighting a medieval war in the modern age, justified by the barbaric use of violence and savagery in the form of beheadings, mass assassinations, stonings, and even rape as justified by misinterpreted passages in Quran. TERRORISM AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION The 9/11 attack reinforced the idea that the United States is vulnerable and its citizens are not safe from domestic threats. This aligns with one of the major goals of terrorism mentioned earlier in this essay—to instill distrust and social disorder by appealing to people’s emotions rather than to their intellect. The 9/11 tragedy created a ripe environment for intelligence reform and other law enforcement and military operations that would help prevent future terrorist attacks on American soil. Many of these new measures have proven vital to the government’s ability to fight terrorism. However, they have also raised a host of questions regarding the balance between the public’s constitutional rights and its safety. Individual Rights versus Public Security The USA PATRIOT Act (Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act) was the result of such initiatives to strengthen the powers of domestic law enforcement and improve the collection of intelligence information by federal agencies. The law focused on terrorism and intelligence issues along with more traditional issues, such as money laundering, cybercrime, immigration procedures, and fraud. However, the most controversial part of the act is related to the balance between individual rights and public

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security and safety, as it significantly increased the surveillance tools used by federal agencies, while significantly reducing checks and balances. Still, the USA PATRIOT Act was quickly reauthorized by Congress in 2006 and extended for another four years by President Barack Obama in 2011 (Moore, 2004). As mentioned earlier, the increased need for intelligence efforts often conflicts with the need to protect constitutional rights. In the case of the PATRIOT Act, critics argue that provisions of the law tend to clash with the constitutional rights guaranteed to all American citizens (EFF analysis of the provisions of the USA PATRIOT Act, 2001).For example, the PATRIOT Act challenges several clauses within the First Amendment. First, it conflicts with the right to freedom of association as a result of the extensiveness of the “Material Support” clause in the Act (18 U.S. Code § 2339A). It also conflicts with the freedom of religion because of the legalization of religious profiling under its authority (FBI’s new surveillance plan chills religious and political activity, Bay Area civil rights groups warn, 2004), and with the freedom of speech as it allows the prosecution of those who support jihadist material (Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project). In addition, the PATRIOT Act also challenges the Fourth Amendment guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures because it permits broad searches that are not based on individual suspicion, as well as the houses raids without a “knock and announce” warning (Herman, 2011). Intelligence and Torture Another example of the difficulty of finding a constitutional balance between homeland security and individual rights is illustrated is the issue of intelligence and torture. The use of “enhanced interrogation techniques” (EITs) in U.S. intelligence functions not only conflicts with the American Constitution and law but also with the Third Geneva Convention (1949) that requires humane treatment for prisoners of war (UN General Assembly, 1984). However, these stipulations were quickly overlooked in the pursuit of terrorists. The use of EITs is not simply a case of isolated incidents. On the contrary, EITs were formally approved by both the U.S. attorney general’s office and the secretary of defense and the White House supported their implementation (Warrick & Eggen, 2007). Several reports have described the involvement of the U.S. government with the practicing of EITs. In 2004, the Taguba Report1 produced by the U.S. Army exposed the abuses and at the Abu Ghraib Prison in Iraq. The report concluded that “numerous incidents of sadistic, blatant, and wanton criminal abuses were inflicted on several detainees” (Taguba, 2004, p. 17). In 2013, the Task Force on Detainee Treatment (TFODT) released its findings that after 9/11, the U.S. government had engaged in an excessive use of torture techniques of

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detainees and suspected terrorists at Guantanamo Bay and other detention facilities controlled by the CIA (The Constitution project’s task force on detainee treatment, 2013). These techniques included severe sleep deprivation, waterboarding, binding of detainees to walls naked and in painful and humiliating positions, banging detainees into walls, beating, and other psychological torture methods. The use of torture in intelligence functions violates several key constitutional provisions. First, torture directly breaches the Eighth Amendment, which specifically prohibiting the use of cruel and unusual punishment, including torture, as well as excessive fines and bail. Additionally, it conflicts with the Fifth Amendment, which guarantees the right to a grand jury, due process, and protects against self-incrimination and double jeopardy for the same crime. Laws such as the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 and the Military Commissions Act (MCA) of 2006 provide exceptions to giving terror suspects their constitutional protections as it allows the president to declare them “enemy combatants.” An enemy combatant “detainee,” foreign and domestic, can be subjected to EITs and can be held indefinitely without being charged (Yoo & Haynes, 2003).

TERRORISM: THE FUTURE As our perceptions of terrorism and related intelligence evolve and adapt, so too are the terrorists themselves. A relatively new trend in terrorist attacks have been spotted in the past decade, posing new challenges for the U.S. agencies responsible for preventing and countering such attacks. Homegrown and Lone-Wolf Terrorists One relatively easy to spot trend is the increase in homegrown and lonewolf terrorists. The term “homegrown terrorists” describe extremists who are legal citizens or permanent residents of the United States and who are connected to domestic or international terror groups (Pregulman & Burke, 2012). Lone wolves are individuals who seemingly attack out of nowhere, with no warning, usually acting either alone or in a small group (Simon, 2013). A lone-wolf attack may be inspired by devotion to a specific group or terrorist organization. A good example of a combined homegrown and lone-wolf attack occurred in San Bernardino, California. The primary planner and gunmen in the attack was Syed Rizwan Farook, a 28-year-old native American citizen (born in Chicago, Illinois) and working as an environmental health specialist for the San Bernardino County Health Department. He was an honor graduate from California State University, San Bernardino, and had no prior history as a terrorist or criminal. Neighbors and friends described Farook as a “normal guy” (Ahmed, 2015). Farook

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was married to a native Pakistani, Tashfeen Malik, who had immigrated to the United States legally (legal permanent resident) over eight years prior to the attack. They had a six-month-old little girl, good credit, and lived with Farook’s mother in a townhouse in Redlands, California. However, on December 2, 2015, the couple, dressed in dark clothing and tactical gear, armed with several rifles and semiautomatic handguns (legally purchased by Farook), entered the Inland Regional Center and massacred 14 people and seriously wounded another 22 individuals attending a holiday party for the disabled. Farook and Malik were later killed in a shootout with the police that evening. The FBI’s investigation revealed that Farook and Malik had posted their allegiance to Abu Bakr Bashir, the current leader of the Islamic State (ISIS) online. FBI Director James B. Comey called Farook and Malik “homegrown violent extremists” who were inspired by a foreign terrorist group (Ryan, Berman, & Achenbach, 2015). While they were not directed by a terrorist group (ISIS) or part of a terrorist cell or network, both Farook and Malik had been devoted to radicalized Islam, traveling to Saudi Arabia and meeting with radical cleric several years earlier. The couple had made several pipe bombs in their townhouse and had stockpiled ammunition. Without warning or direction from ISIS (or any other terrorist group), but still planning the attack themselves, Farook and Malik, unexpectedly and with relatively unsophisticated weapons, conducted a bloody attack aimed at mass carnage that marked the worst terrorist attack to occur in the United States since 9/11. Homegrown terrorists are often inspired and guided by an intolerant ideology; however, they do not receive any material or financial support from the original terror group. Additionally, most of them have no criminal records and they come from a broad variety of educational and socioeconomic statuses, which makes it very difficult for intelligence and law enforcement services to detect them. Other examples of this type of terrorist are Major Nidal Hasan, the 2009 Fort Hood shooter and the Tsarnaev brothers, the perpetrators of the 2013 Boston Marathon bombing. Before his attack, Hasan, a psychiatrist in the U.S. Army, corresponded with several radical Muslims via e-mail. He expressed his opposition to the American wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, believing that these were wars against the Muslim faith. He carried out his attack, in which 13 people died and more than 30 others wounded, several weeks before he was scheduled to be deployed to Afghanistan. Similarly, the Tsarnaev brothers were first generation foreign nationals living in the United States. While there was no evidence of direct connections between them and any specific terrorist group prior to the attack, it was found that the brothers had been viewing Al Qaeda training videos online and embraced the doctrine of perceived injustices against the Muslim faith, that is common among Al Qaeda followers (Cooper, Schmidt, & Schmitt, 2013). Today, as the United States continues to successfully block physical access of homegrown terrorists to terror groups by intensifying

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surveillance/intelligence operations and scrutinizing travel, such individuals heavily rely on the Internet and social media platforms to connect with terror groups for purposes of recruiting and training (like Farook and Malik). One platform that is particularly utilized is the “deep web,” a secretive and untraceable online world, which can only be accessed using anonymous communication software, such as, Tor. The deep web uses innocent-looking gaming sites as platforms that enable terrorists to have encrypted conversations (Gardner, 2013), particularly clever worldwide terrorists sharing a jihadi Salafist philosophy (Taylor, Fritsch, & Liederbach, 2014). New War Terrorism Another trend of terrorist activity that poses a serious challenge to counterterrorism agencies pertains to the shift toward a “New War terrorism,” which is directed at infrastructures rather than on weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) (see Robb, 2008, for the extension of this and related arguments). The main goal of New War terrorists is to make the United States economically impotent in order to enable it from throwing its weight on the Middle East (Robb, 2008, p. 9). Adopting a “system disruption” strategy, these new terrorist movements target infrastructural elements, such as oil pipelines and factories, and communication, transportation, electrical, and water systems (Robb, 2008, p. 28). The 9/11 attacks are a good illustration for this kind of warfare. It is estimated that Al Qaeda spent over $250,000 on the operation; however, America has spent an estimated $16 billion annually on counterterrorism since the attack (Robb, 2008, p. 77; see also DeSilver, 2013). Another example is the anthrax-tainted mail in 2001 that killed five U.S. citizens but led the U.S. Postal Service to spend almost $5 billion (or $1 billion per fatality) in the development of countermeasures (Robb, 2007). This is not to say that conventional terror tactics are no longer being used. Scholars argue that terror attacks using “old” tactics such as improvised explosive devices (IEDs), suicide bombers, and attacks on specific targets will keep occurring. However, New War terrorism will feature attacks that are very different from what we know, more threatening and difficult to predict (Robb, 2007). COUNTERTERRORISM: THE FUTURE To conclude, given the history of terrorism described here, it is clear that there is no one-size-fits-all approach to terrorism prevention. In its counterterror efforts, the United States has systematically focused on attacking and destroying Al Qaeda targets. While somewhat effective in preventing large-scale attacks, this strategy has also contributed to the development of smaller and crueler groups that are much harder to detect.

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In order to address threats posed by future generations of terrorists, more long-term policies and strategies should be implemented in the U.S. counterterrorism efforts. First, there is a need to reevaluate intelligence programs that collect mass amounts of data. A report released in 2014 confirms that the National Security Agency’s excessive data analysis of phone records and other types of mass data have no apparent impact on terrorism prevention (Nakashima, 2014). Intelligence and other clandestine operations need to be specific in nature and focus on individuals that have connections to radical ideologies, whether domestic or international. Second, the United States needs to follow more globally accepted human rights practices for investigations, interrogations, and operations. Americans need to realize that counterterrorism strategies such as drone strikes that kill civilians, the indefinite holding of suspected terrorists without legal standing, and the torturing of prisoners not only undermines core values of the American society such as fundamental fairness, innocent until proven guilty, and justice but also strengthen extremist hatred toward the United States. This is not to say that counterterrorism efforts should be abandoned. Indeed, counterterrorism groups within the U.S. intelligence, military, and law enforcement arenas are necessary to successfully thwart planned attacks against the homeland. Counterterrorism necessarily involves direct actions (usually military) that prevent, deter, and respond to terrorist threats. A key component of counterterrorism is identifying, locating, and taking action against high-value human targets that are known terrorists, in an effort to disrupt the terrorist’s intentions, capabilities, and operations. To be effective, counterterrorism requires excellent intelligence that confirms individual participation and/or allegiance to a specific terrorist group or radical ideology that threatens the safety and security of the United States and/or its citizenry. Third, it is important that the United States focus on identifying and tracking at-risk individuals who may act as lone wolves. Fourth, initiatives to engage the public in reporting suspicious behavior should be developed as these can be helpful in preventing terror attacks. One example is adopting smartphone applications that allow users to easily report suspicious activities. Last, the stability of Middle East nations should be carefully and constantly monitored, especially within problematic countries like Iran. The tenor of leadership in this country has historically been aggressive against U.S. interests and its involvement in nuclear power, and hence weapons of mass destructions pose a serious threat to long-term stability in the region. CONCLUSION As we have discussed earlier, terrorism attacks the very fabric of society, destroying the mutual trust, respect, and security on which we all rely on to communicate with each other, conduct business and commerce, and

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most important, understand and respect cultural, social, and religious differences. Terrorism is emotive, and it strikes at the very heart of who we are as people, replacing trust and respect with insecurity and fear. Fear is the most primal and powerful of human emotions and often results in negative reactions that pit one group of people against another, often based on elements of personal identity like race, religion, sexual preference, and culture. Indeed, the most troubling perspective associated with terrorism is not the next attack, but rather how we as a society react to the next major incident. Will we be more willing to give up individual liberties and personal safeguards that define the American way of life to the folly of additional security? Will our fear be so gripping that we will no longer venture outside the confinement of our own homes and cities? Will we be so afraid as to not congregate in mass for fear of another bombing? Will we band together in armed groups of people that look just like us; share only our goals and our culture, for fear of those who are different? Will we disregard the beauty of diversity for the false hope of security? Or will we be strong enough to embrace those tenets of our nation that have endured the test of time? Remembering that terrorism often targets innocent civilians in an overt attempt to create fear and change government policy, it will be the manner in which we cope with the next major attack that will define whether or not terrorism succeeds. NOTE 1. This common name for the report is derived from Major General Taguba, who directed the military investigation. It is formerly identified as the “Article 15–5 Investigation of the 800th Military Police Brigade.”

REFERENCES Ahmed, S. (2015, December 4). Who were Syed Rizwan Farook and Tashfeen Malik? Retrieved from http://www.cnn.com/2015/12/03/us/syed-farook-tashfeenmalik-mass-shooting-profile/. al Ghita, A. K. (1979). The Ja’fari sect and its essentials. Istanbul, Turkey: Addulkbaki Golpinarli. Al-Saidat, E. M., & Al-Khawalda, M. (2012). Jihad: A victim of policy and misinterpretations. Asian Social Science, 8, 202–207. Bendle, M. F. (2006). Terrorism and the new left in the “sixties.” National Observer, 71, 8–28. Benjamin, D., & Simon, S. (2002). The age of sacred terror. New York: Random House. Brookhiser, R. (2013). Domestic terrorism: The killers next door. American History, 48, 7–18. A byte out of history: Solving a complex case of international terrorism. (2003, Decem ber 19). Retrieved from http://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/2003/december/ panam121903. Clark, M. P. (2011, September 1). United in remembrance, divided over policies. Retrieved from http://www.pewresearch.org/pubs/2095/911-september-11attacks-terrorism-islamic-extremism-civil-liberties-iraq-afghanistan.

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Cobban, H. (1984). The Palestinian Liberation Organisation: People, power and politics. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press. The Constitution project’s task force on detainee treatment. (2013). Retrieved from http://detaineetaskforce.org/. Cooper, M., Schmidt, M. S., & Schmitt, E. (2013, April 23). Boston suspects are seen as self-taught and fueled by web. Retrieved from http://www.nytimes .com/2013/04/24/us/boston-marathon-bombing-developments.html?hp. Copinger-Symes, T. R. (2006). Is Osama bin Laden’s fatwa urging jihad against Americans justified by Islamic law? Defence Studies, 3(1) 44-65. Denzau, A. D., & North, D. C. (1994). Shared mental models: Ideologies and institutions. In A. Lupia, M. D. McCubbins, & S. L. Popkin (Eds.), Elements of reason: Cognition, choice and the bounds of rationality (pp. 23–46). New York: Cambridge University Press. DeSilver, D. (2013, September 11). U.S. spends over $16 billion annually on counterterrorism. Retrieved from http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2013/ 09/11/u-s-spends-over-16-billion-annually-on-counter-terrorism/. EFF analysis of the provisions of The USA PATRIOT Act. (2001, October 31). Retrieved from http://w2.eff.org/Privacy/Surveillance/Terrorism/20011031_eff_usa_ patriot_analysis.php. 18 U.S. Code § 2339A—Providing material support to terrorists. (n.d.). Retrieved from http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/18/2339A. Erikson, R. S., & Tedin, K. L. (2003). American public opinion. New York: Longman. FBI’s new surveillance plan chills religious and political activity, Bay Area civil rights groups warn. (2004, October 5). Retrieved from https://www.aclu.org/ news/fbis-new-surveillance-plan-chills-religious-and-political-activitybay-area-civil-rights-groups. Friedman, T. L. (1989). From Beirut to Jerusalem. New York: Farrar Straus Giroux. Gardner, F. (2013, November 2). How do terrorists communicate? Retrieved from http://www.bbc.com/news/world-24784756. Gülen, F. (1993). Questions this modern age puts to Islam. London: Truestar. Handwerk, B. (2003, October 24). What does “jihad” really mean to Muslims? Retrieved from http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2003/10/1023_031023_ jihad.html. Hanson, S. (2008, March 12). FARC, ELN: Colombia’s Left-wing guerillas. Washington Post. Retrieved from http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/ content/article/2008/03/12/AR2008031202036.html. Haworth, P. L. (1920). The United States in our own time. New York: C. Scribner’ Sons. Herman, S. (2011). Taking liberties: The war on terror and the erosion of American democracy. New York: Oxford University Press. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1 (2010), 130 S.Ct. 2705. Isacson, A. (2013, July 16). Colombia peace process update (July 16, 2013)—WOLA. Retrieved from https://www.wola.org/analysis/colombia-peace-processupdate-july-16-2013/. Jenkins, B. M. (1974). International terrorism: A new kind of warfare (No. P-5261). Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation. Retrieved from http://www.rand .org/pubs/papers/2008/P5261.pdf. Juergensmeyer, M. (1997). Terror mandated by God. Terrorism and Political Violence, 9(2), 16–23.

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Juergensmeyer, M. (2000). Terror in the mind of God: The global rise of religious terrorism. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. Lang, B. (1981). Sklaven und Unfreie im Buch Amos (ii 6, viii 6). Vetus Testamentum, 31(Fasc. 4), 482–488. Laqueur, W. (1987). The age of terrorism. Boston, MA: Little, Brown, Inc. Laqueur, W. (1999). The new terrorism. New York: Oxford University Press. Lee, W. C. (1997). Deadly days in Kansas. Caldwell, ID: Caldwell Well Press. Lesser, I. O., Hoffman, B., Arquilla, J., Ronfoldt, D., & Zanini, M. (1999). Countering the new terrorism. Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation. Lewis, B. (1995). The Middle East: A short history of the last 2000 years. New York: Touchstone. Long, K. J. (1990). Understanding and teaching the semantics of terrorism: An alternative perspective. Perspectives on Political Science, 19, 203. Lum, C., Kennedy, W., & Sherley, A. (2008). Is counter-terrorism policy evidencebased? What works, what harms, and what is unknown. Psicothema, 20, 35–42. Maddy-Weitzman, B., & Inbar, E. (1997). Religious radicalism in the Greater Middle East (Vol. 4). Portland, OR: F. Cass. Martin, C. (2013). Understanding terrorism: Challenges, perspectives and issues. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. Marx, K., & Engels, F. (1848). The communist manifesto (S. Moore, Trans). London: Penguin. Moore, M. (Producer and Director). (2004). Fahrenheit 9/11 [Motion picture]. Santa Monica, CA: Lionsgate Films. Murphy, J. F. (2002). Sword of Islam: Muslim extremism from the Arab conquests to the attack on America. Amherst, MA: Prometheus Books. Nakashima, E. (2014, January 12). NSA phone record collection does little to prevent terrorist attacks, group says. Retrieved from http://www.washingtonpost .com/world/national-security/nsa-phone-record-collection-does-little-toprevent-terrorist-attacks-group-says/2014/01/12/8aa860aa-77dd-11e38963-b4b654bcc9b2_story.html. 1993 World Trade Center bombing fast facts. (2016, March 2). Retrieved from http://www .cnn.com/2013/11/05/us/1993-world-trade-center-bombing-fast-facts/. Nunez, C. (1970). The Tupamaros: Urban guerrillas of Uruguay. New York: Times Change Press. Okon, E. E. (2013). Jihad: Warfare and territorial expansion in Islam. Asian Social Sciences, 9, 171. Pregulman, A., & Burke, E. (2012). Homegrown terrorism. Center for Strategic and International Studies. Retrieved from http://csis.org/files/publication/ 120425_Pregulman_AQAMCaseStudy7_web.pdf. Ramsey, N. (2005, September 1). The horror of Beslan, through its youngest survivors. New York Times. Retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com/2005/09/01/ arts/television/the-horror-of-beslan-through-its-youngest-survivors .html?_r=0. Rapport, D. C. (1984). Fear and trembling: Terrorism in three religious traditions. American Political Science Review, 78. Revolutionary cells. (2016). Retrieved from http://www.stanford.edu/group/ mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/groups/view/353.

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Robb, J. (2007). Brave new war: The next stage of terrorism and the end of globalization. Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons. Ryan, M., Berman, M., & Achenbach, J. (2015, December 3). Motive elusive in deadly San Bernardino rampage as FBI takes over probe. Washington Post. Retrieved from https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/ wp/2015/12/03/fbi-takes-over-san-bernardino-investigation-as-authori ties-seek-motive-for-attack-that-killed-14-people/?utm_term=.fe9a27aa3e28. Schmidt, G. (2005). The transnational umma: Myth or reality? Examples of western diasporas. Muslim World, 95, 575. Seto, Y. (2001, June 1). The sarin gas attack in Japan and the related forensic investigation. Retrieved from https://www.opcw.org/news/article/the-sarin-gas-attackin-Japan-and-the-related-forensic-investigation/. Simon, J. D. (2013). Lone wolf terrorism: Understanding the growing threat. Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books. Taguba, A. M. (2004). Article 15–6 Investigation of the 800th Military Police Brigade. Retrieved from http://gwdspace.wrlc.org:8180/jspui/bitstream/2041/ 78644/1/01962_040527_001.pdf. Taylor, R. W., Fritsch, E. J., & Liederbach, J. (2014). Digital crime and digital terrorism. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson. Taylor, R. W., & Vanden, H. E. (1982). Defining terrorism in El Salvador: “La Matanza”. The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 463, 106–118. Trenin, D. (2003). The forgotten war: Chechnya and Russia’s future. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. UN General Assembly. (1984, December 10). Convention against torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. United Nations, Treaty Series, 1465, 85. Retrieved from http://www.refworld.org/ docid/3ae6b3a94.html. Van Hieu, N. (1966). Special war—an outgrowth of neo-colonialism. Forest Grove, OR: Normount Armament Co. Warrick, J., & Eggen, D. (2007, December 9). Hill briefed on waterboarding in 2002. Retrieved from http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/arti cle/2007/12/08/AR2007120801664.html. White, J. (2003). Terrorism: An introduction. Belmont, CA: West/Wadsworth Publishing. Yodfat, A. Y., & Arnon-Ohanna, Y. (1981). PLO strategy and tactics. New York: St. Martin’s Press. Yoo, J. C., & Haynes, W. J. (2003). Memorandum for William J. Haynes II, General Counsel of the Department of Defense: Re military interrogation of alien unlawful combatants held outside the United States. U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Legal Counsel, Office of the Deputy Assistant Attorney General.

CHAPTER 15

Weaponization of Infectious Disease R. Alexander Hamilton1

For some, it is not a matter of “if” but “when” the world will be confronted by a large-scale act of “bioterrorism”—broadly defined as a criminal or terrorist act involving the deliberate release of a “biological agent” (a diseasecausing organism or “pathogen” capable of causing harm to humans, animals, or plants).2 For these commentators, ranging from military officials and intelligence chiefs3 to popular authors (Preston, 1998) and journalists (Miller, Engelberg, & Broad, 2001), biological weapons (weapons derived from pathogens) represent “the poor man’s nuclear bomb,”4 offering a technology that is comparably destructive, yet easier to realize than other so-called weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Citing the events of 9/11, and the subsequent anthrax letter attacks (“Amerithrax”), it is often argued that an escalation in political violence by non-state actors (criminals and terrorist groups), coupled with growing access to advanced life science knowledge, will inevitably lead to a deliberate release event resulting in “catastrophic harm.” In the worst-case scenario, some speculate that a terrorist group (perhaps aided by a “rogue scientist”) will clandestinely release a highly contagious human pathogen (or even a genetically engineered “superbug”), triggering a wave of infections that spreads silently between victims, crossing continents and oceans, aided by global transportation networks. In the worst-case scenario, it is foreseen that an event of this kind could match the destructive impact of a naturally occurring pandemic (a disease event affecting multiple countries or regions simultaneously). Yet, to date, this “worst-case scenario” has not happened, and there is little evidence to suggest a future of this kind is imminent. Although the

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motivation to cause serious harm to populations has been demonstrated by multiple criminal and terrorist groups, the necessary capabilities to produce biological weapons—or at least ones capable of generating a “human-made pandemic”—has not. Contrary to the most worrying accounts of non-state actors pursuing biological weapons, there have been relatively few instances of criminals or terrorist groups attempting to weaponize5 infectious disease (illness caused by exposure to pathogenic organisms). Moreover, the consequences of these attempts have fallen far short of our collective worst fears. The most common instances of non-state actors using pathogens as weapons have involved isolated poisoning events (“biocrimes”)6 using relatively crude preparations of infectious bacteria or failed attempts at producing more sophisticated biological weapons. In the case of “Amerithrax,” the most publicized bioterrorism attack to date, although a high-quality preparation of anthrax was “successfully” deployed through the U.S. postal system (resulting in five deaths and far-reaching economic costs), the perpetrator of this attack is suspected to have been a biodefense scientist (an “insider”), who had ready access to the materials and know-how needed to produce an effective biological weapon, rather than a criminal or terrorist “outsider.” The relative lack of historical precedent for bioterrorism, however, should not be taken to mean that “worst-case scenarios” are not possible, much less that efforts should not be taken to prevent and prepare for them. Since the origins of human history, individuals and communities have proven resourceful at producing weapons to inflict harm on perceived enemies. Moreover, since the late 19th century, at a time when the causal relationship between germs and infectious disease (“germ theory”) was first scientifically elucidated, microbiology has been used as another tool in the arsenal of military weaponry. Epitomized by the biological weapons programs that emerged during the two world wars, nations have proven it is possible to weaponize infectious disease, and some regimes have been willing to use weapons of this kind to cause significant illness and death. Consequently, it would be ill-advised to assume that human ingenuity will not yield a biological weapon that could cause large-scale harm in the future. It is, however, important to recognize that sensational accounts that depict “terrorists” or “criminals” easily producing “superbugs” that result in global calamity do much to distract from the practical lessons that can be drawn from the history of biological weapons. Notably, by taking a closer look at the history of weaponizing infectious disease and the underlying motivations and capabilities that have characterized more recent cases of bioterrorism (the primary aim of this chapter), we can develop a clearer picture of the “non-state threat” we face. We can also more fully appreciate the critical role life scientists (individuals who possess the necessary capabilities to use biology

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for both beneficial and destructive ends) must play in protecting against the deliberate misuse of modern biology. HISTORICAL PRECEDENTS: BIOWARFARE Throughout recorded history, there have been numerous accounts of infectious disease being used as a weapon. Common examples include deliberate contamination events during armed conflicts, land disputes, and colonization. Dating back to antiquity and the Middle Ages, stories have been told of animal carcasses, human cadavers, and excrement being used to poison water sources (Frischknecht, 2008). Infected corpses have also been described as being used as vectors to spread infectious disease in enemy-held territory. Notably, during the Tartar attack on the city of Caffa in 1346, multiple accounts suggest that corpses infected with plague (caused by the bacterium, Yersinia pestis) were catapulted over the walls of the besieged city, triggering an epidemic (a localized disease event) that contributed to the city’s collapse (Dando & Nixdorff, 2009; Frischknecht, 2008; Riedel, 2004).7 During the British and French colonization of North America, further accounts point to the use of smallpox (one of the most devastating diseases in human history; caused by the Variola virus) as a weapon. Notably, in 1763, in perhaps the most well-documented case of this kind, evidence suggests British officers at Fort Pitt ordered smallpox-contaminated blankets to be distributed to members of a local Native American tribe with the aim of triggering an outbreak and preventing the fort from being overrun (Dando & Nixdorff, 2009; Frischknecht, 2008; Riedel, 2004). Based on accounts of this kind, it is clear that humans have known for some time how to make use of infectious disease as a weapon. At the very least, it was reasonably understood, for example, that placing (or catapulting) an infected corpse in (into) enemy-held territory increased the likelihood of spreading disease within that territory. However, for much of this history, the “cause and effect” relationship between “disease agent” (commonly known today as “pathogens”) and “disease” (an abnormal condition resulting from exposure to a specific pathogen) remained opaque. This is because it was not clear what caused infectious diseases in the first place, and how precisely these could be transmitted. According to the “miasma theory,” a theory of disease transmission that dominated throughout much of human history, diseases were taken to be the result of exposure to “pollution” or “bad air,” associated with foul odors arising from decaying organic matter and human waste. Under this theory, diseases were not understood as the product of direct or indirect exposure to microscopic organisms but as spontaneously emanating from matter that was itself a source of sickness and death. Thus, while a plague-contaminated corpse could be exploited as a weapon (as a disease vector), plague bacteria (Yersinia pestis) remained obscured from science, including the science of weaponry.

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With the emergence of microbiology in the late 1800s, a deeper understanding of infectious disease and disease transmission became possible, not only enabling new possibilities for public health and medicine but also future avenues for the manufacture of biological weapons (Riedel, 2004). In relation to public health and medicine, the early work of Louis Pasteur and Robert Koch is often credited with scientifically elucidating “germ theory,” providing a rational basis for the prevention and control of infectious disease. Although earlier scientists had postulated that diseases could be acquired from invisible “seed-like” entities, laying the conceptual foundation for Pasteur and Koch’s work, it was not until their controlled experiments in the late 1800s that scientists were able to conclusively demonstrate that specific diseases were caused by exposure to specific microorganisms. Moreover, it was during this period that new techniques for isolating and culturing microorganisms—first bacteria (advancing the science of bacteriology) and then viruses (advancing the science of virology)—were first developed, enabling the systematic investigation of infectious disease. In turn, this work enabled new therapies and treatments (notably, antibiotics and vaccines) that revolutionized medicine and public health in the 20th century. Yet, advances in microbiology, as in other fields of science and technology (e.g., nuclear physics), also enabled darker possibilities. By drawing on the knowledge and techniques elucidated by Pasteur and Koch (among others), by the early 20th century it was possible for nation-states to isolate and produce large stocks of specific pathogens that could be used as weapons, ushering in the modern era of biological warfare (Frischknecht, 2008; Riedel, 2004). Notably, during World War I, Germany exploited advances in bacteriology to produce animal pathogens (including the causative agents for anthrax, Bacillus anthracis, and glanders, Pseudomonas pseudomallei) that were used to target draft animals essential to the Allied war effort (Dando & Nixdorff, 2009; Riedel, 2004). During this period, there is also evidence to suggest that France made “limited use of animal pathogens to infect German animals,” including cattle and pigs (Dando & Nixdorff, 2009, p. 2).8 These “biological sabotage” activities, although limited in scope and relying on relatively simple delivery systems (e.g., “painting” cultures of anthrax bacteria on the nostrils of draft animals), demonstrated a growing capacity to weaponize infectious disease (Dando & Nixdorff, 2009). By World War II (despite the signing of the 1925 Geneva Protocol, which banned the “first use” of chemical and biological agents during armed conflicts), a number of other countries, including Japan, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, the United States, and Canada, had begun to explore the possible strategic value of “germ warfare,” as well as developing military countermeasures (“biodefense”) that could be used to prepare for possible attacks by enemy forces. Japan, in particular, “pursued a huge offensive biological warfare programme” from 1931 to 1945 (Dando & Nixdorff,

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2009, p. 3), offering the most powerful and enduring demonstration of the willingness of nations to use pathogens as weapons. Spearheaded by the army medical doctor and radical nationalist, Shiro¯ Ishii, Japan’s program employed at its peak as many as 15,000 people (Dando & Nixdorff, 2009), developed more than 25 different biological agents (Frischknecht, 2008), and produced “kilogram quantities of bacteria that cause plague, anthrax, typhoid, cholera, dysentery and other diseases” (Dando & Nixdorff, 2009, p. 3). With operations centered in Japanese-occupied Manchuria, a region in northeast China, many of these agents were “field-tested” in Chinese cities and villages, employing delivery systems ranging from dropping plague-infected fleas from airplanes to contaminating wells with cholera (Frischknecht, 2008). In addition, Japan’s notorious “Unit 731” conducted thousands of experiments on human subjects, most of them Han Chinese, to test the efficacy of biological agents (Dando & Nixdorff, 2009; Guillemin, 2006). In total, Japan’s biological weapons program is estimated to have resulted in as many as 200,000 deaths among Chinese civilians (Guillemin, 2006), representing the highest death toll in the history of (modern) biological warfare. While the use of biological weapons in warfare reached a high-water mark with Japan’s offensive activities during World War II, it was not until the latter part of the Cold War that the “art” of biological weapons development was perfected. Notably, during this period, the Soviet Union (despite having renounced biological weapons under the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention, BWC) developed a clandestine program that “incorporated both advanced biology and new military delivery systems” (Guillemin, 2006, p. S48) to produce the most extensive and sophisticated biological weapons arsenal in history. Employing as many as 50,000 people (Frischknecht, 2008), the Soviet program not only produced many thousands of kilograms of “well known biological weapons agents such as those causing anthrax, tularemia and glanders” but also conducted work “on highly lethal viruses including Ebola virus, Marburg virus and the smallpox virus” (Dando & Nixdorff, 2009, p. 7). In addition, genetic engineering techniques were used to make familiar biological warfare agents, including plague bacteria, resistant to available countermeasures, such as antibiotics (Dando & Nixdorff, 2009). Taken together, these activities— until the Soviet Union dismantled its biological weapons program in the early 1990s—demonstrated what is technically possible, given the political, financial, and human resources available to nation-states committed to harnessing (and enhancing) pathogens as weapons. GROWING CONCERNS: THE NON-STATE THREAT Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, and in parallel with growing concerns about transnational crime and international terrorism, the 1990s marked a turning point in the narrative surrounding the weaponization of

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infectious disease. Specifically, during this period, the biological weapons threat came to be framed increasingly as a problem related to the activities of non-state actors seeking to develop “WMD” (Wright, 2004). For many observers, the dissolution of the Soviet Union seemed to offer an ideal environment for the international proliferation of biological weapons capabilities—in the form of newly unemployed biological weapons scientists seeking employment in their field of expertise (Collier, Lakoff, & Rabinow, 2004). High-profile terrorist attacks, including the Tokyo subway sarin attack in 1995 (Wright, 2004), were equally sighted as lending credibility to the belief that terrorist groups were intent on pursuing increasingly destructive attack options. Since 9/11, and the subsequent anthrax letter attacks, this belief has, for the most part, only become more entrenched in political discourses related to national and international security. So much so, that today, the “non-state threat” largely overshadows earlier concerns about state-level biological warfare programs, especially in the U.S. context (McLeish & Nightingale, 2007). Coupled with these concerns, advances in biotechnology, including “synthetic biology”—an emerging branch of genetic engineering that promises to make the design and construction of (novel) biological systems easier and more widely accessible (Endy, 2005)—have come to be increasingly viewed as offering new avenues for the acquisition of biological agents, and, in turn, bioterrorism. In particular, some experts argue that rapid advances in “synthetic genomics” (a subdiscipline of synthetic biology) could enable non-state actors to gain access to high-risk pathogens through the de novo synthesis of biological agents that are presently confined to secure lab settings (National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity, 2006). In the future, it is even suggested that individuals may be able to exploit these advances to produce “novel” pathogens—biological entities that are “taxonomically unclassified” and potentially more dangerous than microorganisms found in nature (National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity, 2006, p. 8). In brief, advances in biotechnology are credited with enabling a more widespread and sophisticated bioterrorism threat, supporting the claim that biological weapons could (perhaps) rival the destructive potential of nuclear weapons. Yet, despite growing concerns of this kind, as well as increased spending on counter-bioterrorism (Wright, 2004), the deliberate misuse of biology by non-state actors remains a relatively uncommon event. According to arms control scientist Milton Leitenberg (2005, p. 22), during the 20th century there have, in fact, been only four instances (including the 2001 anthrax letter attacks, and excluding events involving ricin, a plant toxin that is relatively easy to produce) involving “the preparation or attempted preparation of pathogens in a private laboratory by a nonstate actor.” Moreover, none of these events have culminated in the large-scale loss of human, animal, or plant life (Leitenberg, 2005). While this is not to say that fears about bioterrorism are ungrounded, by taking a closer

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look at several real case studies, it is possible to discern a general pattern. Namely, for criminal and terrorist groups, the motivation to perpetrate a large-scale bioterrorism attack does not in itself ensure “success.” Instead, a motivated individual or group must also possess the necessary capabilities to produce a biological weapon capable of causing large-scale harm. As we will see from the following case studies, the latter element is generally in limited supply. Aum Shinrikyo’s Failed Biological Weapons Program (1990–1995) The case of Aum Shinrikyo (or “Aum”)—the Japanese millenarian cult responsible for the “successful” release of sarin (a chemical weapon) in the Tokyo subway system on the morning of 20 March, 1995, resulting in 13 deaths and 4,000 injuries—is often used to highlight the capacity of non-state actors to acquire and deploy WMD, including biological weapons. However, the case of Aum equally highlights the many difficulties encountered by criminal or terrorist groups seeking to achieve this goal. Notably, prior to developing chemical weapons (an achievement that was itself a formidable challenge),9 Shoko Asahara, Aum’s spiritual guru, favored biological weapons, believing that weapons of this kind possessed the greatest destructive potential and were relatively easy to produce (desirable characteristics for a terrorist group holding apocalyptic world views and aspiring to trigger Armageddon). The fact that Aum failed to produce biological weapons, despite being highly motivated and having access to considerable financial resources, technical infrastructure, equipment and (at least some) expertise, is revealing of the obstacles that confront would-be bioterrorists. From the outset, Aum’s “biological weapons program” (launched in the early 1990s) encountered numerous obstacles. Notably, Aum’s first foray into producing biological weapons began with botulinum (a toxin produced by the anaerobic bacteria Clostridium botulinum). The most lethal toxin known, botulinum seemed to offer a promising weapon, whether to poison political rivals or to perpetrate a large-scale attack. Yet, repeated attempts to produce the toxin failed, despite the best efforts of Aum’s leading biologist, and despite having access to key equipment such as fermentation vessels capable of producing large quantities of the toxin. Later attempts at producing anthrax, another potentially lethal biological weapon, similarly failed. A number of reasons have been attributed to these failed attempts. Notably, it is believed that Aum failed to acquire virulent strains of either microorganism to begin with, despite multiple field excursions to isolate the desired microbes from the soil (a natural reservoir for both bacteria). In the case of anthrax, efforts to acquire and genetically modify two vaccine strains of the bacteria—in an effort to produce a single infectious

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strain—also failed. Moreover, and of no less significance, irrespective of the viability of the starting material, the “downstream” skills (as members of Aum later testified) needed to “weaponize”—a multistep process involving techniques that must be learned through mentorship and handson experience (Tucker, 2011)—the biological agents eluded cult members. In particular, they were unable to purify and dry the final batches of the biological products, frustrating their attempts at releasing the material into the environment. Instead, their production methods tended to result in impure, liquid slurries—a mixture of water, growth medium, and biological product—which clogged the high-pressure sprayers used to disseminate the material, prohibiting the aerosolization and widespread diffusion of the material and preventing airborne infection. In light of these repeated failures, Asahara chose to abandon Aum’s biological weapons program, shifting his attention to chemical weapons. The Rajneeshee Bioterror Attack (1984) In contrast to Aum Shinrikyo, the case of the “Rajneeshee bioterror attack” highlights that less sophisticated biological weapons can be produced with far more success. Among the most well-known and “successful” bioterrorism attacks to date, the Rajneeshee bioterror attack was a deliberate contamination event that occurred in the Dalles, Oregon, in late September 1984.10 Perpetrated by followers of the Indian mystic, Bhagwan Shree Rajneesh, it involved the contamination of salad bars at 10 restaurants with Salmonella typhimurium (a common strain of the food-borne pathogen that causes salmonella poisoning). In total, this event resulted in 751 cases of severe food poisoning and 45 hospitalizations. It also motivated widespread fear in the community, depleted the local economy, and sparked a lengthy investigation conducted by multiple state and federal agencies. Prior to “Amerithrax,” it was unquestionably the most significant bioterrorism attack in the history of the United States. The motivation for this attack stemmed from a decisively political aim. Specifically, the Rajneeshee, who had recently arrived in the thousands to Wasco County in rural Oregon to join their spiritual leader, sought to solidify their legal presence in the area to ensure the continued expansion of their compound (“Rajneeshpuram”). To achieve this goal, Rajneeshee officials sought to win seats in the county election, thereby bolstering their political influence. However, amid increased hostilities with local residents over land claim disputes and concerns about the growing influx of Rajneesh’s followers, it was evident that the Rajneeshee would likely lose the election. In turn, a small group of Rajneeshee (with the blessing of Bhagwan Shree Rajneesh) decided to take fate into their own hands. It is within this context that they sought to influence the outcome of the November 1984 county election by plotting to sicken rival voters with salmonella bacteria. The Dalles, the largest town in the county, was their

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primary target. The belief being, if enough rival voters were incapacitated on Election Day, the Rajneeshee candidates might come out on top (an outcome that was ultimately not achieved, despite the relative success of the attack). In terms of capabilities, the perpetrators of the Rajneeshee bioterror attack, in stark contrast to the case of Aum Shinrikyo, opted for a relatively straightforward approach to bioterrorism, as evidenced by their choice of pathogen and the method of delivery. In the first instance, by choosing to use a relatively common pathogen—one that has not historically been used by biological weapons programs—the Rajneeshee were able to gain access to the biological agent with relative ease. Specifically, under the guise of the “Rajneesh Medical Corporation,” the Rajneeshee were able to purchase the bacteria from a medical supply company in Seattle, Washington, without raising red flags. Moreover, as salmonella is relatively easy to culture and poses a relatively low risk to those working with it, the Rajneeshee were able to safely culture the bacteria in medical labs located within their commune. In the second instance, the Rajneeshee relied on a far more modest means of delivery than Aum. Namely, the perpetrators chose to directly apply a liquid slurry containing the bacteria (a solution the perpetrators euphemistically referred to as “salsa”) to food in restaurants. While considerably more can be said about the Rajneeshee bioterror attack, including details on the lengthy investigation that eventually resulted in the deportation of Bhagwan Shree Rajneesh and the imprisonment of several of his followers, the overall message to be taken away from this case study is that relatively “simple” bioterrorism attacks can be achieved by non-state actors. At the same time, in opting to develop relatively unsophisticated biological weapons, non-state actors face a clear trade-off. Namely, biological weapons relying on relatively crude production techniques and delivery systems, although viable, are unlikely to result in “mass casualties.” Yet, this does not mean that events of this kind should not be taken seriously. As case studies of this kind suggest, even “unsophisticated” biological weapons can result in significant injury or death. This, in turn, requires the mobilization of scarce medical and health care resources. Moreover, suspected attacks, or even credible hoaxes, demand the attention of police investigators and forensic scientists (among others) to discern the cause of the incident, evaluate the potential for further harm, and determine the identity (and ultimately prosecute) the perpetrator(s). Events of this kind are also likely to generate considerable fear, which is a key motivator for terrorism in general. Amerithrax (2001) The final case study we will look at considers the most publicized, and arguably most significant, bioterrorism attack to date. Coined “Amerithrax”

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by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI),11 the 2001 anthrax letter attacks involved the dissemination of at least five envelopes containing high-quality “Ames” strain anthrax (a potent variety of Bacillus anthracis bacteria) through the U.S. postal system. In addition to causing 5 deaths and sickening 17 others, this event (coming within weeks of 9/11) received worldwide media attention, generated widespread fear, and motivated thousands of so-called worried well (individuals who fear they may be ill, but are not) to seek precautionary medical treatment. In addition, dozens of federal facilities, including post offices and government buildings in the U.S. capital, had to be closed to perform cleanup and decontamination operations, costing, by some estimates (Schmitt & Zacchi, 2012), US$320 million. In some instances, these facilities remained closed for as long as three years to ensure they were completely free of contamination. Beyond the immediate consequences of “Amerithrax,” this event, as I have suggested already, also played a critical role in shaping perceptions of the non-state threat. Specifically, in the wake of “Amerithrax,” governments around the world were motivated to (re)consider bioterrorism as a significant emerging risk, potentially meriting (further) investment in counter-bioterrorism and (new) policies aimed at mitigating the risk of non-state actors acquiring high-risk biological agents. Assuming (as many did in 2001) a terrorist group perpetrated the attack, it seemed possible that the “worst-case scenarios” anticipated by some analysts were not entirely fictional. Moreover, “what if” a non-state actor successfully produced and released a more dangerous biological weapon in the future, such as a highly contagious human pathogen or even a genetically engineered “superbug”? In the United States, the response to questions of this kind was decisive, evidenced by unprecedented spending (Wright, 2004) in “biosecurity” (a set of practices that can be broadly defined as “measures aimed at preventing the theft and deliberate misuse of biological agents”) and the introduction of new federal policies affecting who is eligible to work with potentially dangerous biological materials, technologies, and information (McLeish & Nightingale, 2007). Yet, after a seven-year investigation by the FBI, and considerable reflection on the part of law enforcement agencies, science policy makers and biological weapons experts (among others), the preliminary picture (conceived in the wake of 9/11) of “Amerithrax” has become more complex. This is because it is now believed that a trusted biodefense scientist, who possessed privileged access to the material and know-how needed to perpetrate the attacks, was responsible for instigating the most significant bioterrorism incident in history. In light of this information, familiar concerns about criminal and terrorist “outsiders” have (at least to some extent) made way for concerns about the possible actions of scientific “insiders”—individuals who are, by the nature of their work, entrusted with protecting both themselves and others from exposure to harmful biological materials. Whether motivated by mental illness, substance abuse, or

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simply the daily demands of a high-pressure work environment, Dr. Bruce E. Ivins (identified in the Amerithrax Investigative Summary, 2010, as the most likely perpetrator of the attack) chose to abandon this responsibility. There are two primary observations that stand out in relation to “Amerithrax” (a case study that is admittedly not easily condensed into a short discussion). First, in relation to the subject of capabilities, it should not be entirely surprising that a biodefense scientist perpetrated the attack. This is because, as we have seen, the challenge of adapting pathogens into highly potent weapons (in this instance, a high-quality preparation of infectious anthrax spores that was easily aerosolized, caused inhalational anthrax, and persisted in the environment over an extended period of time) has confounded even well-funded and highly motivated terrorist groups (e.g., Aum Shinrikyo) in the past. Described by some biological weapons experts as an “art,” the techniques needed to effectively “weaponize” pathogens require considerable experience and “tacit knowledge” (Tucker, 2011), attributes that are not easily developed on the basis of the open-source literature. In other words, there is truth to the adage (sometimes referenced in discussions concerning bioterrorism), “it is easier for a biologist to become a terrorist, than a terrorist to become a biologist.” In recent years, terrorist groups, such as Al Qaeda, have indeed sought to develop anthrax as a weapon (Mowatt-Larssen, 2010). To date, they have not succeeded. Second, “Amerithrax” has called into question the effectiveness of biosecurity policies that focus on enacting increasingly restrictive controls on biological agents and (increasingly) so-called dual-use research of concern (DURC) (National Research Council, 2004).12 This approach to biosecurity, although playing an important role in preventing criminal and terrorist “outsiders” from gaining access to high-risk pathogens, does not account for the so-called insider threat. This is because “insiders” (scientists) cannot be barred from interacting with potentially dangerous biological materials and knowledge if they are to conduct their work. Therefore, preventive controls on science are not sufficient. Instead, as a growing number of observers have pointed out, scientists must be engaged to become active participants in guarding against the possibility of bioterrorism—an objective that requires raising awareness among scientists and fostering a sense of shared responsibility for biosecurity. Ultimately, to prevent the “insider threat” (increasingly viewed as one of the most worrying scenarios in relation to the weaponization of infectious diseases), “insiders” (scientists) must themselves be motivated to play an active role in preventing deliberate misuse. CONCLUSION In this chapter, we have seen that the weaponization of infectious disease is not a new phenomenon. Indeed, since antiquity, humans have made use

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of pathogens as weapons. Furthermore, with an increased understanding of microbiology and genetics, contributing to the advancement of modern biology, humans have become increasingly adept at harnessing the destructive capacities of infectious disease. Demonstrated by a succession of biological weapons programs during the 20th century, it has been proven that it is possible to produce (and even enhance) a wide variety of disease agents, ranging from plague bacteria to the smallpox virus. At the same time, this very capacity to produce increasingly sophisticated biological weapons, in combination with the legacy of their use during the world wars, has equally shed light on the specter of “germ warfare,” motivating the clear majority of states (beginning with the signing of the BWC in 1972) to formally renounce a form of armed conflict that has rightly been described as repugnant to the conscience of mankind (United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, 1972). Today, although concerns about biological warfare remain no less a fixture of national and international security efforts, growing concerns also exist about an emerging “non-state threat” and the risk of “bioterrorism.” Yet, as we have seen in this chapter, unlike the state-level programs of the 20th century, it is far less certain that criminal and terrorist groups currently possess the necessary capabilities to produce highly sophisticated biological weapons. To date, there have been relatively few instances of bioterrorism, and none of these events have approached the “worst-case scenarios” anticipated by some. However, as “Amerithrax” demonstrated, it is nonetheless possible for non-state actors—especially scientific “insiders” (individuals who possess the skills needed to both use and misuse modern biology)—to develop and deploy biological agents that can cause great harm. In this light, it is increasingly recognized that, for counterbioterrorism measures to be effective, they cannot only focus on restricting access to dangerous pathogens. They must also focus on raising awareness, encouraging responsibility, and enlisting the support of scientists to play an active role in guarding against deliberate misuse. NOTES 1. “Weaponization of Infectious Disease,” by R. Alexander Hamilton, © 2016 United Nations. The opinions expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the United Nations. 2. Biological agents are generally taken to include bacteria, viruses, fungi, parasites, or biological toxins that are conducive to being used as a weapon. 3. See Leitenburg (2005, pp. 43–64), Section IV, Framing “The Threat” and Setting the Agenda of Public Perception and Policy Prescription. 4. Characteristic of this view, see Rifkin (2001). 5. On a technical level, “weaponization” (in the context of biological weapons) refers to a series of steps undertaken to adapt an infectious biological agent for use as a weapon, including “(1) growing the agent in the needed quantity,

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(2) formulating the agent with chemical additives to enhance its stability and shelf life, (3) processing the agent into a concentrated slurry or a dry powder, and (4) devising a delivery system that can disseminate the agent as a fine-particle aerosol that infects through the lungs” (Tucker, 2011, p. 73). More generally, the term “weaponization” is often used to refer to any activity aimed at harnessing the destructive potential of a biological agent. 6. “Biocrime,” in contrast to “bioterrorism,” generally “implies the use of a biological agent to kill or make ill a single individual or small group of individuals, motivated by revenge or the desire for monetary gain by extortion, rather than by political, ideological, religious or other beliefs” (Jansen, Breeveld, Stijnis, & Grobusch, 2014, p. 488). 7. It has also been suggested that those fleeing the city of Caffa may have inadvertently contributed to the “Black Death”—the plague pandemic that swept across Europe in the 14th century (Frischknecht, 2008). “However,” as Riedel (2004, p. 400) notes, given the “complex ecology and epidemiology of plague,” it would be an oversimplification to attribute causation to this single event. There is also no way of knowing with certainty whether the plague epidemic in Caffa was primarily the result of deliberate military action or the unintended consequence of the cramped and unsanitary conditions that typically accompany armed conflicts (Dando & Nixdorff, 2009). 8. As Dando and Nixdorff (2009, p. 2) note: “It is SIGNIFICANT that the first countries to apply the new knowledge gained about bacterial infections to investigate the potential of biological warfare were Germany and France, whose scientists had contributed most to the establishment of microbiology as a science.” 9. For a detailed overview of Aum’s attempts at developing chemical and biological weapons, see Aum Shinrikyo: Insights into How Terrorists Develop Biological and Chemical Weapons (Danzig et al., 2012). 10. See Carus (2001, pp. 50–59) for further details on this case study. 11. For a detailed overview of this event and the subsequent investigation, see Amerithrax Investigative Summary (Department of Justice, 2010). 12. DURC has been broadly defined as encompassing “biological research with legitimate scientific purpose, the results of which may be misused to pose a biologic threat to public health and/or national security” (National Research Council, 2007, p. 57).

REFERENCES Carus, W S. (2001). Bioterrorism and biocrimes: The illicit use of biological agents since 1900. Working Paper. Washington, DC: Center for Counterproliferation Research National Defense University. Retrieved from https://fas.org/ irp/threat/cbw/carus.pdf. Collier, S. J., Lakoff, A., & Rabinow, P. (2004). Biosecurity: Towards an anthropology of the contemporary. Anthropology Today, 20(5), 3–7. Dando, M., & Nixdorff, K. (2009). A brief history of biological warfare. In K. McLaughlin & K. Nixdorff (Eds.), BWPP biological weapons reader, (pp. 1–12). Geneva: Biological Weapons Prevention Project. Danzig, R., Sageman, M., Leighton, T., Hough, L., Yuki, H., Kotani, R., & Hosford, Z. M. (2012). Aum Shinrikyo: Insights into how terrorists develop biological and

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chemical weapons (2nd ed.). Washington, DC: Center for New American Security. Retrieved from http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publica tions/CNAS_AumShinrikyo_SecondEdition_English.pdf. Department of Justice. (2010). Amerithrax investigative summary. Retrieved from http://www.justice.gov/archive/amerithrax/docs/amx-investigativesummary.pdf. Endy, D. (2005). Foundations for engineering biology. Nature, 438(24), 449–453. Frischknecht, F. (2008). The history of biological warfare. In A. Richardt & M. Blum (Eds.), Decontamination of warfare agents: Enzymatic methods for the removal of B/C weapons (pp. 1–10). Weinheim, Germany: Wiley-VCH Verlag. Guillemin, J. (2006). Scientists and the history of biological weapons. Science and Society, 7(special issue), S45-S49. Hasan, R. (2014, September). Biological weapons: Covert threats to global health security. International Journal of Public Health Research and Management, 1(2), 30–40. Jansen, H. J., Breeveld, F. J., Stijnis, C., & Grobusch, M. P. (2014). Biological warfare, bioterrorism, and biocrime. Clinical Microbiology and Infection, 20(6), 488–496. Leitenberg, M. (2005, December). Assessing the biological weapons and bioterrorism threat. Retrieved from http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdf files/pub639.pdf. McLeish, C., & Nightingale, P. (2007). Biosecurity, bioterrorism and the governance of science: The increasing convergence of science and security policy. Research Policy, 36, 1635–1654. Miller, J., Engelberg, S., & Broad, W. J. (2001). Germs: The ultimate weapon. New York: Simon & Schuster. Mowatt-Larssen, R. (2010). Al Qaeda weapons of mass destruction threat: Hype or reality? Cambridge, MA: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School. National Research Council. (2004). Biotechnology research in an age of terrorism: Confronting the dual use dilemma. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. National Research Council. (2007). Science and security in a post 9/11 world: A report based on regional discussions between the science and security communities. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity. (2006). Addressing biosecurity concerns related to the synthesis of Select Agents. Report of the National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity. Retrieved from http://osp.od.nih .gov/office-biotechnology-activities/national-science-advisory-board-bio security-nsabb-nsabb-reports-and-recommendations/addressing-bio security-concerns-related-synthesis-select-agents. Preston, R. (1998). The cobra event. New York: Random House. Riedel, S. (2004). Biological warfare and bioterrorism: A historical review. BUMC Proceedings, 17, 400–406. Rifkin, J. (2001, October 7). Biological agents, poor man’s nuclear bomb. Baltimore Sun. Retrieved from http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2001-10-07/ topic/0110050346_1_biological-warfare-biological-agents-biologicalweapons.

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Schmitt, K., & Zacchi, N. A. (2012). The total decontamination costs of the anthrax letter attacks. Biosecurity and Bioterrorism: Biodefense Strategy, Practice, and Science, 10(1), 98–107. Tucker, J. B. (2011). Could terrorists exploit synthetic biology? The New Atlantis, 31(Spring), 69–81. United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (1978). Biological Weapons Convention. Retrieved from https://www.un.org/disarmament/geneva/bwc/. Wright, S. (2004). Taking biodefense too far. Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, 60(6), 58–66.

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About the Editors and Contributors

EDITORS RYAN RANDA, PhD, is an assistant professor in the College of Criminal Justice at Sam Houston State University. Research interests include fear of crime, victimization, influences on victim adaptive behaviors, and cross-cultural comparisons of crime and victimization. His recent work in this area has appeared in Crime and Delinquency, Journal of Criminal Justice, Youth Violence and Juvenile Justice, Victims and Offenders, and Security Journal. PHILIP REICHEL, PhD, is professor emeritus at the University of Northern Colorado, adjunct professor at the University of New Hampshire Law School, and visiting professor at the University for Peace in Costa Rica. During his more than 40 years in academia, he has received awards for teaching, advising, service, and scholarship. He is the author of Comparative Criminal Justice Systems: A Topical Approach, coauthor of Corrections (Justice Series), coeditor of the Handbook of Transnational Crime and Justice, and has authored or coauthored more than 40 articles and book chapters. His areas of expertise include corrections, comparative justice systems, and transnational crime. He has lectured at colleges and universities in Austria, China, Germany, and Poland and has presented papers at sideevents during the United Nations Congress on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice (Brazil) and the United Nations Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice (Vienna). He currently serves as the Academy of Criminal Justice Sciences’ NGO Alternate Representative to the United Nations.

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CONTRIBUTORS BLYTHE A. BOWMAN, PhD, is an associate professor of criminal justice in the L. Douglas Wilder School of Government and Public Affairs at Virginia Commonwealth University. She has conducted extensive qualitative and quantitative research and published widely on the transnational trafficking of art and antiquities. Only recently having become an area of research interest among criminologists, antiquities smuggling represents a peculiar example of a transnational “gray” market in that illicit means by which the licit international antiquities trade is supplied must be disguised in order to be profitable. It is this unique transformation in legal status that antiquities must undergo, which distinguishes among other forms of trafficking. Toward this end, Bowman also helped put together an international conference on organized crime in art and antiquities while serving as a key member on the planning committee of the International Scientific and Professional Advisory Council to the United Nations. She has also participated in numerous closed-door roundtable discussions on antiquities trafficking at various foreign embassies in Washington, D.C. While still a junior faculty member at VCU, she was selected to serve as guest editor on two special editions on art crime and the transnational trafficking of antiquities for the Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice and Crime, Law, and Social Change. Bowman is a member of the Division of International Criminology in the American Society of Criminology, the Lawyers’ Committee for Cultural Heritage Preservation, and the United States Committee of the Blue Shield and the Archaeological Institute of America. GALIA COHEN, PhD, is the Justice Administration and Leadership (JAL) program associate director and a senior lecturer in the nonprofit and public management (NPM) program at the University of Texas at Dallas. She received her BA in psychology and her MA in organizational sociology from Bar-Ilan University, Israel. She holds a PhD in public affairs from the University of Texas at Dallas. Dr. Cohen specializes in human resource management and organizational behavior and has more than 10 years of experience in teaching and consulting in the public sector. She has published in several public administration outlets. Her scholarly interests include public human resource management, public sector leadership, public safety collaboration, and other topics in public and justice administration. MEREDITH DANK, PhD, is a research professor at John Jay College of Criminal Justice in New York City. A well-known authority on human trafficking, Dank has conducted research in 10 countries and has taken part in an Obama White House stakeholder meeting on victim services for

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survivors. Before joining John Jay, Dank spent seven years as a researcher with the Urban Institute, where she was the principal investigator on more than a dozen studies overseen by the U.S. Department of Justice and the U.S. Department of State. She is the author of The Commercial Sexual Exploitation of Children, and has her PhD in criminal justice from John Jay College of Criminal Justice. DIANA S. DOLLIVER, PhD, is a cyber criminologist and assistant professor in the Department of Criminology and Criminal Justice at the University of Alabama. She also serves as the academic director for the Joint Electronic Crimes Task Force (JECTF). Dr. Dolliver’s areas of expertise include Tor-based criminality, drug trafficking, law enforcement (use of force, community policing, active shooter preparedness, and technology), and digital forensics. Her current research projects involve studying cybersecurity risks, drug trafficking, and weapons markets on the Tor Network. More broadly, Dr. Dolliver also examines sociocultural aspects of cybercrime, transnational organized crime and drug trafficking, and the existing links between these criminal phenomena. In addition to her research, Dr. Dolliver teaches graduate-level and undergraduate-level classes in digital forensics, cybersecurity and warfare, drugs and crime, and policing. She has presented her research internationally, to include conferences in Poland and China. AMY FARRELL, PhD, is an associate professor of criminology and criminal justice at Northeastern University. Her scholarship seeks to understand arrest, adjudication, and criminal case disposition practices. Professor Farrell also conducts research on police legitimacy and law enforcement responses to new crimes such as hate crime and human trafficking. Her recent research examines how changes in state human trafficking laws impact the identification and prosecution of human trafficking offenders. Professor Farrell has testified about police identification of human trafficking before the U.S. House of Representatives Judiciary Committee. Professor Farrell was a corecipient of NIJ’s W.E.B. DuBois Fellowship on crime justice and culture in 2006. R. ALEXANDER HAMILTON, PhD, is a senior analyst with the United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI). Originally trained in biology, he holds a doctorate from the London School of Economics and Political Science specializing in risk governance and biosecurity. Focusing on the intersection of public health, the life sciences and national security, his work at UNICRI has contributed to strengthening engagement between science and security communities and raising awareness about emerging biological risks, ranging from bioterrorism and

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agroterrorism to the potential unintended consequences of advances in biotechnology. Most recently, he has assisted countries developing Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) National Action Plans as part of the European Union’s CBRN Centers of Excellence Initiative. In this capacity, he has worked with local health and security authorities in North, East and West Africa, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia to identify actions to strengthen national and regional capacity to prevent, detect, and respond to biological emergencies. FLORIAN J. HETZEL is a research assistant and PhD candidate at University College London (UCL), Department of Security and Crime Science. He holds a BA in political sciences, an MA in comparative politics, and an MRes in security science. Before joining UCL, Florian was involved in analyzing language patterns in party manifestos at the University of Bamberg, Germany. His current research focuses on the empirical analysis of money laundering patterns and its implications for policing. Additionally, he has a special interest in the situational prevention of organized crime. For this reason, Florian is among the founding members of the UCL Organized Crime Research Network (OCRN), a platform to promote applicable research among academics, practitioners, and stakeholders with an interest in fighting organized crime. JAY P. KENNEDY is an assistant professor at Michigan State University, jointly appointed to the School of Criminal Justice and the Center for AntiCounterfeiting and Product Protection. In this role, he is actively involved in research, outreach, and education efforts that focus on external partners, including corporations, industry associations, and law enforcement agencies. His current research explores managerial and organizational responses to employee theft within small and medium enterprises, the incarceration and post-incarceration experiences of white-collar offenders, the sale of counterfeit goods on the Internet, and the structure of occupational pharmaceutical counterfeiting schemes. Jay’s work is interdisciplinary in nature, and his published research has appeared in a number of outlets, including Criminal Justice Review, Global Crime, Journal of Crime and Justice, Maritime Economics and Logistics, Organization Management Journal, Security Journal, and Victims and Offenders. Prior to graduate school, Jay spent a number of years working in industry, spending time with a major international nonprofit organization, a small family-owned firm, and a large Fortune 100 company. JOSEPH B. KUHNS, PhD, is a full professor in the Department of Criminal Justice and Criminology at University of North Carolina, Charlotte, where he teaches courses in policing, research methods, and community

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policing and problem solving, including crime and problem analysis. Joe previously served as a senior policy analyst at the Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, where he designed and managed nationallevel evaluation projects, worked directly with law enforcement agencies, and trained police officers in community policing. Joe has worked on dozens of research and evaluation projects across a range of law enforcement agencies, within and outside of the United States, and many of these have included substantial crime analysis and technology components. Dr. Kuhns routinely serves as a law enforcement substantive expert reviewer for www.crimesolutions.gov. KRISTINA LUGO is a research associate at the Justice Research and Statistics Association in Washington, D.C., where she specializes in research on human trafficking and other crime policy issues. Her previous research includes a social network analysis titled “The Ties That Bind: A Social Network Analysis of a Large Gang Sex Trafficking Network in the United States,” methodological evaluation of research designs that attempt to measure human trafficking prevalence, survey design and execution in a study of the Occupy movement’s interactions with police, and large survey data analysis of publicly available and agency data sets. She previously worked for the National Institute of Justice as a fellow in the Office of Research and Evaluation’s Program on Transnational Issues, as an advocate on the National Human Trafficking Hotline at Polaris, and for clients as diverse as the Dutch Rapporteur, International Justice Mission, and the COPS Office at the Department of Justice. Her work has previously been published in Policing & Society, Emory International Law Review, among others. ADAM MASTERS, PhD, is a postdoctoral fellow at the Transnational Research Institute on Corruption (TRIC) at the Australian National University (ANU), where he convenes and teaches CRIM2009/6009—Corruption in Our World; CRIM2002/6002—Organized Crime; CRIM3002—Corruption in Sport. Adam came to the ANU in 2009 following a 24-year career with the Australian government and has worked at TRIC since 2010. He has published on corruption in local government, sport, and the private sector. His other publications have comparatively analyzed the use of crisis rhetoric by public leaders. His public sector career included time at the Australian Department of Defence, the Australian Taxation Office and 18 years with the Australian Federal Police, which included a decade with the Australian National Central Bureau of Interpol. Dr. Masters’s current research focuses on corruption and anti-corruption in sport and trade unions; transnational organized crime; and the influence of culture on international organizations.

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About the Editors and Contributors

HEDI NASHERI is a professor of criminology and justice studies in the Department of Sociology at Kent State University and a visiting professor at the University of Turku Law School in Finland. Professor Nasheri has held a number of fellowship and visiting scholar appointments at New York University School of Law’s Center for Research in Crime and Justice, Columbia University’s National Center on Addiction and Substance Abuse, at Spangenberg Center for Law, Technology & the Arts at Case Western Reserve University School of Law, University of London’s Institute of Advanced Legal Studies, and at Business Executives for National Security in Washington, D.C. She has written and lectured extensively in the areas of law and transnational crimes and has given a number of invited keynote lectures nationally and internationally on a wide range of policy and intellectual property-related topics. Professor Nasheri is the author of five books, including Economic Espionage and Industrial Spying, Crime and Justice in the Age of Court TV, and Betrayal of Due Process, as well as numerous articles and monographs. Professor Nasheri serves on the Scientific Committee of Technology against Crime Forum and serves on the International Working Group on the Cyber Security and the Law, under the patronage of the Interpol and the French Minister of the Interior. She is a recipient of several international awards and grants, from the U.S. Department of Justice and State Department of the United States. COLLEEN OWENS is a senior research associate in the Justice Policy Center at the Urban Institute, where she is codirector of a diverse portfolio of research on human trafficking in the United States and abroad. She has over a decade of experience. Owens is coprincipal investigator for a project examining labor trafficking in the United States. She also leads a study on forced marriage, intimate partner violence, and sexual violence among South Asian immigrants in the Washington, D.C., metropolitan area in partnership with Tahirih Justice Center. She helped design and operate the national Human Trafficking Reporting System, a collaborative project with Northeastern University to design the first national data collection and reporting system on human trafficking victims and offenders. Owens also directs several international anti-trafficking research efforts. REBECCA PFEFFER, PhD, is an assistant professor of criminal justice at the University of Houston—Downtown. Her research focuses generally on the victimization of vulnerable populations, including victims with special needs and victims of human trafficking. Her current research focuses on public policies addressing prostitution, both in terms of the buying and selling of sex, and specifically investigates effective law enforcement response to the problem of prostitution.

About the Editors and Contributors

323

MATTHEW PHILLIPS, PhD, is assistant professor in the Department of Criminal Justice and Criminology at the University of North Carolina at Charlotte. His principal research interests include data science, transnational organized crime, terrorism, drug trafficking, drug offending and violence, life course criminology and interactional theory, and quantitative and statistical methods. He is also researching the application of big data initiatives to the analysis of crime, particularly within the realm of national security. His published works have appeared in Journal of Quantitative Criminology, Intelligence & National Security, Journal of Terrorism Research, Journal of Drug Issues, Crime & Delinquency, and others. KEVIN POORMAN is a graduate student in the Department of Criminology and Criminal Justice at the University of Alabama. His research areas largely consist of theoretical explanations for cybercrime, which is currently the focus of his graduate thesis. Mr. Poorman has also worked on research focusing on substance abuse and sex-offender status. His current projects concern illicit drugs and weapons markets on the Tor Network, as well as drug use and criminal justice system involvement. BRADFORD W. REYNS, PhD, is an associate professor in the Department of Criminal Justice at Weber State University. His research focuses on different dimensions of criminal victimization, particularly victimological theory, victim decision-making, and the relationship between technology use and victimization. Reyns’s recent work on these topics has appeared in Justice Quarterly, Journal of Criminal Justice, and Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency. He also coauthored the textbook Introduction to Victimology: Theory, Research, and Practice. MICHAEL J. STRUETT is associate professor of political science in the School of Public and International Affairs at North Carolina State University. His main area of research is on the role of international law and international institutions in shaping outcomes in world politics. He is coeditor of Maritime Piracy and the Construction of Global Governance (2013) and has also written about the regime complex governing maritime piracy for Global Governance, with Mark Nance and Diane Armstrong. He is the author of The Politics of Constructing the International Criminal Court (2008). He holds a PhD from the University of California, Irvine, an MA from George Washington University, and a BA from the University of California, Berkeley. ROBERT W. TAYLOR, PhD, has for the past 40 years studied policing, police administration, and police responses to crime and terrorism. Much of

324

About the Editors and Contributors

his work on terrorism focuses on issues in the Middle East. He has acted as a consultant to numerous federal, state, and local agencies and has authored or coauthored over 200 articles, books, and manuscripts. His articles appear in Defense Analysis, the ANNALS, Police Quarterly, and Crime and Delinquency. In 2008, Dr. Taylor was the founding executive director of the W.W. Caruth Jr. Police Institute at Dallas (CPI). The Institute was embedded inside the Dallas Police Department and was established through a $9.5 million grant from the Communities Foundation of Texas. From 1996 to 2008, Dr. Taylor was professor and chair of the Department of Criminal Justice at the University of North Texas. In 2016, Dr. Taylor was retained to evaluate one of the most celebrated cases in history and was featured in the A&E two-hour documentary titled “The Killing of JonBenet Ramsey: The Truth Uncovered,” which aired on A&E nationally. Dr. Taylor is a former chair of the Academy of Criminal Justice Sciences Police Section (2002), and in March 2008, he was presented with the prestigious O.W. Wilson Award “in recognition of his outstanding contribution to police education, research and practice.” In 2003, he was awarded the University of North Texas, Regent’s Lecture Award for his work in the Middle East. Dr. Taylor is author on two landmark textbooks: Criminal Investigation, 12th edition (2017) and Police Administration: Structures, Processes, and Behavior, 9th edition (2017). He is also the lead author on Terrorism, Intelligence and Homeland Security (2015), Juvenile Justice: Policies, Practices and Programs, 4th edition (2014), and Digital Crime and Digital Terrorism, 3rd edition (2014). Dr. Taylor is a graduate of Michigan State University (MS, 1973) and Portland State University (PhD, 1981). DAAN P. VAN UHM, PhD, is assistant professor in criminology at the Willem Pompe Institute for Criminal Law and Criminology. He conducted research on various forms of environmental crime, such as transnational illegal wildlife trafficking, deforestation, and timber trade in Southeast Asia, the illegal trade in dogs in Europe, and has assisted in several lawsuits. Daan van Uhm obtained his PhD in criminology at Utrecht University in 2016 (The Illegal Wildlife Trade: Inside the World of Poachers, Smugglers and Traders). Van Uhm primarily focuses on research in the context of green crimes and harms. ROB WHITE is professor of criminology in the School of Social Sciences at the University of Tasmania, Australia. Among his recent publications are Transnational Environmental Crime (2011), Environmental Harm: An EcoJustice Perspective (2013), Green Criminology (with Diane Heckenbert, 2014), and Environmental Crime and Collaborative State Intervention (with Grant Pink, Eds., 2016).

Index

Achille Lauro (passenger liner), 27, 28, 29 Advanced Research Projects Agency Network (ARPANET), 142 Afghanistan heroin production, 6 Africa: cocaine trafficking and, 5; heroin use in, 6; marijuana use rates, 8 Agora, 154 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), 100, 107 Air drug trafficking, 14–15 Airstrips for drugtrafficking, 14–15 Al-Banna, H., 290 Al-Fatah, 287 Allied Tripartite Commission, 272 Allison, S., 166 Alondra Rainbow (ship), 27 Al Qaeda, 18, 34, 285, 311 American Mafia, 16–17 American Pimp model, sex trafficking network type, 216 Amerithrax bioterrorism attack, 301, 302, 309–11 Amphetamine-type stimulants (ATS), trafficking of, 8–9

Anonymous, 149 Anthrax letter attacks (“Amerithrax”), 301, 302, 309–11 Anti-Drug Abuse Act, 117 Antiquities, trafficking in, 61–67; Apulian vases, 63; demand end of, 63; gray antiquities trade, 63–67; legal status of, 64; licit-illicit market of, 63–67; looting of archaeological sites and, 61–62, 64; losses from, 62; pre-Columbian archaeological sites, looting of, 63; Sipàn looting example, 61–62 Aradau, C., 213 Arafat, Y., 287 Archaeological site looting, 61–62, 64 Arellano-Felix Organization, 16 Arhin, A., 238 Armed robbery against ships, 25 Arnold, C., 56 ARPANET (Advanced Research Projects Agency Network), 142 Asian organized crime groups, 17 Asymmetrical advantage, 141 Aum Shinrikyo, 307–8 Australia, identity theft reported cases, 164

326 Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission, 191 Australian Institute of Criminology, 164, 165, 168 Avian influenza (HPAI bird flu) H5N1, wildlife trade and, 87 Baader-Meinhof Gang, 286 Balkan-Albanian model, sex trafficking network type, 215–16 Bandidos, 17 Bank of International Settlements (BIS) corruption case study, 271–72 Bank Secrecy Act (BSA), 117 Banned substances crime, 191 Barbary macaque trade, 82–83 Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal, 186 Bashir, A. B., 294 Beltran-Leyva Organization, 16 Betz, D., 139–40 Biodiversity crime, 187, 191 Biological agent, 301 Biological weapons, 301 Bioterrorism, 301–12; Amerithrax attack, 309–11; Aum Shinrikyo and, 307–8; defined, 301; history of biowarfare, 303–5; non-state threat and, 305–7; overview of, 301–3; Rajneeshee bioterror attack, 308–9 Biowarfare, history of, 303–5 Bitcoins, 146, 154 Black caviar case study, 83–84 Black hat hackers, 150, 151–52 Black Panther Party, 282 Black September Organization (BSO), 287 Bloods, 17 Blue box, 151 Boeing corruption case study, 265 Boko Haram, sex trafficking and, 217 Bolivia cocaine trafficking, 5 Bot-herder, 149 Botnet, 149 British Crime Survey, 172 Brodie, N., 64–65 Brown, J., 281

Index Brown types of environmental crime, 184 Brute force approach to password hacking, 146 Buckley, M., 212–13 Bueger, C., 38 Bull, H., 256 Bulletin board system (BBS), 151 Burnham, L., 237 Butterfly effect, 181 Byrne, E. A., 270 Calderoni, F., 260 Cali drug cartel, 16; wildlife trade and, 78 California Transparency in Supply Chains Act, 246 Campbell, N., 264 Canada: identity theft defined, 162; identity theft reported cases, 164 Canadian General Social Survey, 172 Cannabis herb, 6. See also Marijuana trafficking Captain Phillips (film), 23 Cartels, 15–16 Castells, M., 87 Center for Identity Management and Information Protection, 166 Chin, K. L., 211, 216 Chippindale, C., 62 Choo, K.-K. R., 125, 127, 128, 129, 132 Circumstantial identity theft sophistication, 167 CITES. See Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) Clarke, R. V. G., 174 Climate change, 187 Cocaine Signature program, 5 Cocaine trafficking, 4–5 Cole, T., 67 Colombia: cocaine and, 5; heroin production and, 6 Colombian Medellin cartel, wildlife trade and, 78 Combined Task Force 151 (United States), 35 Comey, J. B., 294

Index Commercial cargo ships, maritime drug smuggling and, 10, 11 Commercial railways, drug trafficking using, 13 Common sense piracy, 25 Communist Manifesto, The (Marx and Engels), 285 Conflict timber, 191 Consumer fraud victimization, low self-control and, 173 Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS), 35; ad hoc arrangements of, 36, 38 Container Control Programme, 20 Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (CATOC), 254, 256 Convention for Prevention of Maritime Pollution by Dumping Wastes and Other Matters, 186 Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES), 76, 186 Copes, H., 166–67, 172–73, 174 Corruption, 197, 253–77; Bank of International Settlements and, 271–72; Boeing and, 265; and crime, as threat to military/economic security sectors, 260–62; as enabler for other criminal activity, 255, 257–59; Fédération Internationale de Football Association and, 274–75; global/regional security and, 264–69; Golden Circle in Ireland and, 270–71; international crimes, defined, 253–54; international security and, 254–55; Irish banking crisis and, 275–76; OFFP and, 273–74; organized crimes, defined, 254; overview of, 253; policy implementation and, 255; political security sector and, 262–63; post-Cold War arms trade and, 269; Siemens and, 266–69; societal/environmental security and, 263–64; state-sponsored, international relations and, 256–60; as threat to international security, 256–64; as transnational crime, 256;

327 transnational crimes, defined, 253; wildlife crimes and, 84 Costs: of identity-related crimes, 170–71; measuring piracy, 31 Counterfeiting pharmaceuticals, 47–48 Counterfeit medicine, defined, 45 Counterterrorism, 295–96 Crackers, 151 Crime convergence, 189 Crime-method nexus, money laundering and, 126–32; explaining, 131–32; overview of, 126; predicate offence and, 126–27, 128; United Kingdom case study, 127–31 Crime prevention strategies, for identity-related crimes, 174–76 Crime Survey for England and Wales, 164, 169 Criminal trials for pirates, 37 Criminogenic asymmetry, 65 Criminological conceptions of environmental crime, 186–90 Crips, 17 Crisis responders offender types, 167 Cross-over crime, 189 Cryptocurrency, 154 CryptoLocker, 147 Cultural Patrimony Protection, Italy’s, 64 Currency and Foreign Transactions Reporting Act, 117 Customs-Trade Partnership against Terrorism (C-TPAT), 13, 14 Cyberbullying, 147–48; defined, 148 Cyberbullying Research Center, 148 Cybercrime, 104–5, 139–56; cyberbullying, 147–48; cyberspace, criminal evolution in, 152–55; cyberstalking, 147–48; definitions of, 139–41; disruption, 149–50; diversity of, 143–52; espionage, 148–49; evolution of, 141–43; fraud, 144–47; hacking, 150–52; harassment, 147; Internet connectivity rates and, 156; overview of, 139; spam, 150; theft, 144–47; trespassing, 148–49; vandalism, 149–50

328 Cyber disruption, 149–50 Cyber espionage, 104–5, 148–49 Cyber fraud, 144–47 Cyber harassment, 147 Cyberspace, criminal evolutions in, 152–55 Cyberstalking, 147–48 Cyber theft, 144–47 Cyber trespassing, 148–49 Cyber vandalism, 149–50 Dark markets, 154 Dark web, 103, 152 Data dumps, 153 Deceptive counterfeits, 46 Deep web, 295 Defaunation, globalization and, 73–75 Defend Trade Secrets Act, 101 Deforestation, 191–92 De Waal, A., 35 DHL, 14 Dilution, 49 Dirty-collar crimes, 77 Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS), 143, 149 Diversion, 50–52; in combination with other offenses, 51–52; defined, 50; of expired drugs, 51; parallel importing type of, 50–51; smuggling type of, 50 Dolliver, D. S., 154 Drones, 15 Drug adulteration, 48–50 Drug cartels, 15–16 Dual-use research of concern (DURC), 311 Durgana, D. P., 218 Dutch model, sex trafficking network type, 216–17 East African region, piracy outside, 33–34 Ebola virus, wildlife trade and, 87 E-bullying, 148 Eco-crime, 182. See also Environmental crime, transnational Ecological conceptions of harm, 187 Economic espionage, 100 Economic Espionage Act (EEA), 100

Index Economic security sector, corruption/ crime as threat to, 260–62 Ecstasy, 9 Egbe, J., 51–52 Egyptian Law on the Protection of Antiquities, 66 Elia, R., 63 Elite cartel corruption, 262 Engels, F., 285 Enhanced interrogation techniques (EITs), 292 Environmental crime, transnational, 181–99; conceptual overview of, 186; criminological conceptions of, 186–90; defined, 182–83; described, 182; ecological conceptions of harm, 187; ecological/social dimensions of, 190; environmental harms, types of, 183–84; environmental insecurity and, 196–98; extent of, 191–96; geographical locations of, 184–86; green criminological conceptions of, 188–90; overview of, 181–82; worth/damage caused by, 193–94 Environmental harms, 181–82; brown types of, 184; ecological conceptions of, 187; green types of, 183–84; types of, 183–84; white types of, 184 Environmental insecurity, 196–98 Environmental laws, 181 Environmental regulation, 181 Environmental security, corruption and, 263–64 Eurispices, 260 Europe: heroin use in, 6; marijuana use rates, 8 European Commission, cybercrime defined by, 140 European leftist groups, 286 European Union (EU), 189; maritime piracy and, 35 Evolution, 154 Farook, S. R., 293–94 Farrell, A., 222 FDA. See Food and Drug Administration (FDA), fraudulent medicine and

Index Federal Aviation Administration, 14 Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), 105, 260, 310; identity theft defined, 162 Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) corruption case study, 274–75 FedEx, 14 Financial Action Task Force (FATF), 38, 118, 119, 127, 131; money laundering defined by, 120 Finckenauer, J. O. F., 211 Fisher, C., 174–75 Fishing vessels, maritime drug smuggling and, 10–11 Fitzpatrick, S., 276 Flag state system, piracy and, 25–26 Food and Drug Administration (FDA), fraudulent medicine and, 45 Forced labor, defined, 233 14K, 78 Fraudulent medicines, 43–58; defining, 44–45; diversion of, 50–52; drug adulteration, 48–50; drug prices and, 57; FDA definition of, 45; Internet and, 56–57; INTERPOL classification of, 44–45; overview of, 43; pharmaceutical counterfeiting, 47–48; pharmaceutical supply/ manufacturing/distribution chain model, 52–56; prevention measures, 57–58; product counterfeiting, defining, 45–47; profit margins and, 57–58; schemes, understanding, 44–52; United Nations report on, 44 French Criminal Code, identity theft defined, 163 Fully submersible vessels (FSVs), 12 Fundamentalism, defined, 289 Gaddafi, M., 282 Gender, labor trafficking in United States and, 236–37 General identity theft sophistication, 167 General theory of crime, identityrelated crimes and, 173–74 Gentili, A., 27

329 Geography of transnational environmental crime, 184–86 Gilbert, C., 253 Gilgan, E., 63 Gill, D., 62 Global defaunation, 73–75 Global Slavery Index (Walk Free Foundation), 211 Global warming, 198 Godson, R., 214, 225 Go-fasts (boats), 10, 11 Golden Circle in Ireland corruption case study, 270–71 Golden Triangle, opium supply in, 6 Goredema, C., 121 Gottfredson, M. R., 173 Gounev, P., 255 Gray antiquities trade, 63–67 Green-collar crimes, 77 Green criminology, 181, 183, 188 Green types of environmental crime, 183–84 Groenewald syndicate, 82 Group of Seven (G-7) countries, 118 Gulf cartel, 16 Habash, G., 287 Hackers, 150–52 Hacking, 150–52 Hacktivists, 143, 149 Hall, M., 196–97 Hamas, 283 Hancock, G., 131 Hasan, N., 294 Hashish, 7 Hazardous wastes, illegal movement/ disposal of, 191 Heil, E. C., 216 Hells Angels, 17 Henderson, J., 63 Henson, B., 172 Heroin trafficking, 5–6; fishing vessels for, 11; routes, 6 Hezbollah, 283 Higgins, G. E., 169 Hinduja, S., 148 Hirschi, T., 173 Hobbes, T., 254–55 Holtfreter, K., 173

330 Homegrown terrorists, 293–95 H-2A/H-2B visas, 236 Huisman, W., 217 Human trafficking: defined, 208–9; vs. human smuggling, 209. See also Sex trafficking, transnational Hydra, 146 Hydroponics, 7 IC3 (Internet Crime Complaint Center), 155 IDC, 153 Identity: concept of, 161; creation, 162, 163; delegation, 163; exchange, 163; takeover, 163–64 Identity fraud, 163 Identity-related crime offenders, 166–68; characteristics of, 166–67; typologies of, 167–68 Identity-related crimes, 161–76; costs of, 170–71; defining, 161–64; extent of, 164–65; general theory of crime and, 173–74; identity creation as, 163; identity delegation as, 163; identity exchange as, 163; identity fraud as, 163; identity takeover as, 163–64; identity theft as, 162–63; nature of, 165–71; neutralization theory of, 172–73; offenders, 166–68; opportunity perspective and, 171–72; overview of, 161; patterns in, 165–66; prevention of, 174–76; reporting of, 169–70; theoretical perspectives of, 171–74; victims, 168–69 Identity-related crime victims, 168–69 Identity theft, 162–63, 164 Identity Theft and Assumption Deterrence Act, 162 Identity theft sophistication, 167–68 Identity Theft Task Force, 175 Illegal logging, 191 Illegal wildlife trade, 73; dark number, 80; flows of, 79–81; types of traders, 77. See also Wildlife crimes Illicit drugs, trafficking of, 3–20; air, 14–15; amphetamine-type stimulants (ATS), 8–9; cartels and, 15–16; cocaine, 4–5; heroin, 5–6;

Index marijuana, 6–8; maritime, 9–12; methamphetamine, 8–9; methods used in, 9–15; organizations involved in, 15–19; organized crime groups and, 16–18; overland, 12–14; overview of, 3–4; responding to, 19–20; subversive groups and, 18–19 Illicit services, crimes providing: cybercrime, 139–56; environmental crime, transnational, 181–99; identity-related crimes, 161–76; labor trafficking, in United States, 233–47; money laundering, 115–33; overview of, 113–14; sex trafficking, transnational, 207–25. See also individual crimes Imperialism, wildlife conservation and, 75–76 Inbar, E., 290 Indian Coast Guard, 27 Individual rights vs. public security, terrorism and, 291–92 Infectious disease, weaponizing, 302–3. See also Bioterrorism Influence market corruption, 262 Insurgency, 197–98 Integration stage, national/ transnational money laundering, 123 Intellectual property (IP) violations, 97–110; competitiveness vs. cooperation, 101–2; complexities of, 98–99; criminal organizations engagement in, 105–6; economic security threat from, 99–100; enforcement challenges for, 104–5; fostering international cooperation for, 109; holistic approach to legislate, 108–10; international market/law enforcement platform, 110; investigative collaboration among law enforcement agencies globally and, 109–10; legislative challenges for, 106–7; national security threat from, 107–8; overview of, 97–98; public awareness building and, 109; public/private sector legislation for,

Index 108; society’s perception of, 103–4; technology and acceleration in IP theft, 102–3; uniform international legislation for, 108; United States legislative actions taken, 100–101 Intelligence/torture issue, terrorism and, 292–93 International Chamber of CommerceInternational Maritime Bureau database (ICC-IMB), 23–24, 30; maritime piracy reported to, 32–33 International Chiefs of Environmental Compliance and Enforcement, 189 International Convention against the Taking of Hostages, 29 International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, 29 International crimes: concept of, 254; defined, 253–54 International Labour Organization (ILO), 211, 233 International law piracy, defined, 27 Internationally Recognized Transit Corridor (IRTC), 36 International Maritime Organization (IMO), 27–28 International Monetary Fund, 272 International Money Laundering Abatement and Anti-Terrorist Financing Act of 2001, 118 International Organization on Migration (IOM), 219 International Relations theory, 254–55 International security concept, 254–55 International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN), 75 Internet, development of, 141–42 Internet Crime Complaint Center (IC3), 155 INTERPOL, 20, 189; fraudulent medicines and, 44–45 Irish banking crisis corruption case study, 275–76 Irwin, A. S., 125, 127, 128, 129, 132 ISIS, sex trafficking and, 217 Islamic State (IS), 291 Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), 66, 67

331 Israeli Defense Force (IDF), 286 Ivins, B. E., 311 Janssens, S., 214 Japanese Yakuza groups, 17 Jenkins, B. M., 287 Jiang, B., 56 Jihad, 288–89 Jihadist Salafism, 290–91 Jochum, J. M., 172–73 Johnston, M., 262, 263 John the Ripper, 146 Joint Electronic Crimes Task Force (JECTF), 155 Jonsson, A., 218 JPMorgan cyber attack, 144 Juergensmeyer, M., 288, 289 KeRangers, 147 Keystroke loggers, 145, 148 Kitschke, C., 79 Knapp, A., 79 Knights of the White Camellia, 281 Koch, R., 304 Koops, B. J., 163 Kopald, R., 54 Ku Klux Klan, 281 Labor exploitation vs. labor trafficking, 234–35 Labor trafficking, in United States, 233–47; characteristics of, in United States, 235–39; countries of origin for, 236; definitions of, 234; diaspora networks of, 239; escape/outcomes after escape from, 243–45; future research for, 247; gender and, 236–37; introduction to, 233–34; vs. labor exploitation, 234–35; perpetrators of, in United States, 238–39; policies needed to combat, 245–47; sector-specific risk factors for, 237–38; shelters for, 244; studying, 235; trafficking experience and, 241–43; victim recruitment/movement, 239–41; victims of, 235–38; work venues of, 237 Laqueur, W., 283

332 Latin America, heroin production and, 6 Latin American leftist groups, 285–86 Laundering wildlife, 79 Law of the Sea Convention, 25, 26; United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS); SUA Convention and, 28. See also Maritime piracy Laycock, G., 131 Layering stage, national/ transnational money laundering, 123 Lebor, A., 272 Leitenberg, M., 306 Leman, J., 214 Lersch, K. M., 166 Levi, M., 120, 122, 132 Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), Sri Lanka, 19 Licit-illicit market of antiquities trafficking, 63–67 Lifestyle drugs, counterfeit pharmaceutical trade and, 48 Lindstrom, N., 221 Locky, 147 Logic bombs, 149 Lone-wolf terrorists, 293–95 Los Angeles Times, 281 Los Caballeros Templarios (the Knights Templar), 16 Lover-boy model, sex trafficking, 210 Low-profile vessels (LPVs), 12 Lui, L., 125, 127, 128, 129, 132 Luke, C., 63 Lyons, J. A., 79 MacKenzie, J., 75 Mackenzie, S. R. M., 64 Maddy-Weitzman, B., 290 Madsen, F. G., 254 Maersk Alabama (ship), 23–24 Mafia drug trafficking networks, 16–17 Malik, T., 294 Malware production, 143, 149 Marijuana plants eradicated, 7–8 Marijuana trafficking, 6–8; fishing vessels for, 10–11

Index Marijuana use rates, 8 Maritime drug trafficking, 9–12 Maritime piracy, 23–38; combating, 35–38; costs of, measuring, 31; criminal trials for pirates, 37; defining, 24–30; global security and, 23–24; international law definition of, 24–25; money laundering and, 37–38; multilateral naval cooperation and, 35–36; outside East African region, 33–34; overview of, 23–24; scope of, 30–34; SUA Convention and, 28–30; terrorism and, 38; as threat to world order, 31–32; trends in, 32–33; UNCLOS provisions, 25–28; use of force against, UN Security Council and, 36–37 Maritime terrorism, 34 Marx, K., 285, 287 Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), 150 Mass extinctions, 74 McNally, M. M., 167 Medellin cartel, 16 Meibom, S. von, 79 MENAFATF, 131 Methamphetamine trafficking, 8–9; transshipment methods of, 9 Methylenedioxymethamphetamine (MDMA), 9 Mexican cartels, 16 Mexican Mafia, 17 Mexico: heroin production and, 6; marijuana production, 7 Mexico-U.S. coyote, sex trafficking network type, 216 Meyer, K., 65, 67 Miasma theory, 303 Middle Eastern leftist groups, 286–87 Military Commissions Act (MCA), 293 Military security sector, corruption/ crime as threat to, 260–62 Miller, T. C., 267 Mislabeling, product, 49–50 Mitnick, K., 151 Mobile bullying, 148 Modern hacking, 150 Modern Slavery Act, UK, 246

Index Mol, H., 192 Monbarren, S., 54 Money laundering, 115–33; crimemethod nexus and, 126–32; defined, 115–16, 120; dimensions, frequency of UK, 121–22; as global threat, 116–19; maritime piracy and, 37–38; overview of, 115–16; three-stage model of, 122–26; transnational dimension of, 119–22; United States legislation, 117–19 Money laundering, three-stage model of, 122–26; conceptual flaws and real-world consequences for, 125–26; described, 123–24; integration stage, 123; layering stage, 123; non-cash-generative crimes and, 124–25; overview of, 122; placement stage, 123 Money Laundering Control Act (MLCA), 117–18, 126 Monkey species case study, 82–83 Monzini, P., 215 Morphine, 6 Morris, R. G., 167–68 Motherships, 10 MS-13, 17 Muhammad, Prophet, 290 Mule, 14 Multilateral naval cooperation, maritime piracy and, 35–36 Muslim Brotherhood, 290 Myanmar heroin production, 6 Narco-terrorism, 18 Narco-torpedoes, 12 National Crime Victimization Survey, 164, 165, 168, 170 National Human Trafficking Resource Center, 236, 246 National Liberation Army (ELN), 18, 286 National Money Laundering Risk Assessment, 125 National Science Foundation, 152 National Trust, 75 NATO operation Ocean Shield, 35 Natural resource-related crime, 191 Natusch, D. J., 79

333 Neapolitan Mafia, wildlife trade and, 78 Nelen, H., 217 Neutralization theory of identityrelated crimes, 172–73 Newman, G. R., 167 New terrorism, described, 282–83 New War terrorism, 295 Nijman, V., 79 Non-cash-generative crimes, 124–25 Nondeceptive counterfeits, 46 North America: cocaine distribution/ consumption in, 5; marijuana use rates, 8 North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), 100 Obama, B., 292 Oceania, marijuana use rates, 8 Offenders, identity-related crime, 166–68; characteristics of, 166–67; typologies of, 167–68 Official moguls, corruption and, 263 Oil for Food Program (OFFP), 268–69, 272; corruption case study, 273–74 Old terrorism, described, 282 Oligarchs and clans, corruption and, 262–63 .onion domain, 153 Operation Ocean Shield, 35 Operation Predator statute, 223 Opiate use, defined, 5 Opportunity perspective, identityrelated crimes and, 171–72 Opportunity seekers offender types, 167 Opportunity takers offender types, 167 Organizations, drug trafficking, 15–19; cartels, 15–16; organized crime groups, 16–18; subversive groups, 18–19 Organized crime, 197; concept of, 254; defined, 254; groups, drug trafficking and, 16–18; wildlife trade and, 77–78 Ortiz-Gonzalez, F., 56 Outlaw motorcycle groups, 17 Outlaws, 17 Overland drug trafficking, 12–14

334 Packet sniffer, 148 Pagans, 17 Palermo Protocol, 221 Palestine Liberation Front, 27 Pangas, 11 Parallel importing, 50–51 Paris Convention, 107 Passas, N., 65 Password-attacking tools, 146 Password cracking programs, 146 Password-hashing, 146 Pasteur, L., 304 Patchin, J. W., 148 Perpetrators of labor trafficking, in United States, 238–39 Peru cocaine trafficking, 5 Pharmaceutical crime, defined, 44–45 Pharmaceutical product counterfeiting, 47–48 Pharmaceutical supply/ manufacturing/distribution chain model, 52–56 Phishing operations, 143, 145–46 Phone phreaks, 142 Phreakers, 142, 151 Piquero, A. R., 173 Piquero, N. L., 173 Piracy. See Maritime piracy Piracy Reporting Centre, 30 Pirates of the Caribbean (film), 23 Placement stage, national/ transnational money laundering, 123 Poaching, 73, 75 Political Corruption in Ireland 1922–2010 (Byrne), 270 Political ideology: defined, 284–85; on group level, 284–85; on individual level, 284; terrorism and, 284–87 Political security sector, corruption and, 262–63 Politics: of morality, 213; of pity, 213; of risk, 213, 219 Pollution, 195 Pong Su (freighter), 263 Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), 287 Post-Cold War arms trade, corruption case study, 269

Index Post-Soviet Russian model, sex trafficking network type, 216 Poverty, wildlife crimes and, 84 Powerware, 147 Pratt, T. C., 172, 173 Predicate offence, 126–27, 128 Private ends requirement, 27 Product counterfeiting: defining, 45–47; impact of, 46–47; pharmaceuticals and, 47–48; trademarks and, 46 Professional offenders, 167 Proliferation Security Initiative, 38 Proprietary information theft, 102–3 Protection of Children against Sexual Exploitation and Abuse, 223 Proulx, B. B., 62, 63 Putin, V., 275, 284 Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 275 Rademeyer, J., 82 Radical Islamic terrorism, 288–91 Raid on Entebbe operation, 286 Rajneesh, B. S., 308 Rajneeshee bioterror attack, 308–9 Randa, R., 170 RAND terrorism database, 34 Ransom32, 154 Ransomware, 146–47 Ransomware kits, 147 Rathkeale Rovers, wildlife trade and, 78 Rebovich, D. J., 167 Red Army Faction (RAF), 286 Red Brigades, 286 Reisig, M. D., 173 Relabeling, product, 49–50 Religious ideology, terrorism and, 287–91 Reporting of identity-related crimes, 169–70 Reuter, P., 120, 122, 127, 128, 129, 132 Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), 18, 285–86 Revolutionary Cells, 286 Reyns, B. W., 170, 172 Rhino horns, 81–82 Right of free passage, piracy and, 25

Index Rip offs, maritime drug smuggling and, 11 Routine offenders, 167 Russian organized crime groups, 17; wildlife trade and, 78 RuTor, 153 Salafism, 290 Schubert, S., 267 Schuck, A., 166 Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), 266, 267 Security, sex trafficking issues with, 217–18 Self-propelled semi-submersibles (SPSS), 12 Sellar, J. M., 79 Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path), Peru, 18–19, 286 Serono, 51 Severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS), wildlife trade and, 86–87 Sex trafficking, transnational, 207–25; demand-side policy, 222–23; economic policy, 221; explanations for, 212–14; global typologies, 215–17; human trafficking, defined, 208–9; legislative policy, 221–22; Nadia case example of, 207–8; policy responses to, 218–24; prevalence of, 211–12; research recommendations, 224–25; securitization policy, 219–21; security issues, 217–18; survivor-centered policy, 223–24; theoretical overview of, 212; trafficking networks, theories underlying, 214–15; victim agency in, 209–11 Sex trafficking networks, 214–15 Shaffer, R., 54 Shared Awareness and Deconfliction (SHADE), 36 Shelley, L., 215, 216 Shepherd, C. R., 79 Shining Path, Peru, 18–19, 286 Shoko Asahara, 307 Sicilian Mafia, 16–17 Siegel, D., 79, 84

335 Siemens corruption case study, 266–69 Sierra Club, 75 Signals and Power Subcommittee, 150 Silk Road, 153 Sinaloa cartel, 16 Situational crime prevention, 174 Situational offenders, 167 Small Arms Survey, 269 Smishing, 143, 145, 146 Sms bullying, 148 Smugglers, wildlife, 77, 78–79 Smuggling, 50 Societal security, corruption and, 263–64 Sollund, R., 86 Somalia, piracy and, 23, 24, 26, 32 Sony cyber breach, 144 Sophisticated ID theft sophistication, 167–68 South America, cocaine and, 4–5 Spam, 150 Spear phishing, 145–46, 148 Special Recommendations on Terrorist Financing (FATF), 119 Spyware, 148 Stability, crimes/criminal behavior affecting: bioterrorism, 301–12; corruption, 253–77; overview of, 251; terrorism/terrorist groups, 281–97. See also individual crimes State-based system, piracy and, 31–32 State-sponsored corruption, international relations and, 256–60 Stereotypical criminals offender types, 167 Stessens, G., 131–32 Stevens, T., 139–40 Street gangs, 17 Sturgeon roe poaching, 83–84 SUA Convention. See Suppression of Unlawful Acts Convention (SUA Convention) Submarines, maritime drug smuggling and, 12 Subsistence poachers, 77 Subversive groups, drug trafficking and, 18–19 Supermarket model, sex trafficking network type, 216

336 Super pangas, 11 Supply/manufacturing/distribution chain model, pharmaceutical, 52–56 Suppression of Unlawful Acts Convention (SUA Convention), 28–30; Achille Lauro hijacking and, 28; as counterterrorism tool, 28; disadvantages of, 29; maritime piracy provisions in, 28–29 Swafford, M., 51 Synthetic genomics, 306 Taguba Report, 292 Taliban, 18 Tampering, 49 Target cyber breach, 144 Task Force on Detainee Treatment (TFODT), 292–93 Taylor, C., 263–64, 276–77 TCP/IP (Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol), 142 Tech Model Railroad Club (MIT), 150 Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), 18 Terrorism/terrorist groups, 197–98, 281–97; conceptualizing, issues in, 283–84; counterterrorism and, 295–96; drug trafficking and, 18; European leftist groups, 286; future of, 293–95; homegrown terrorists, 293–95; individual rights vs. public security and, 291–92; intelligence/ torture issue and, 292–93; as label, 284; Latin American leftist groups, 285–86; lone-wolf terrorists, 293–95; maritime piracy and, 38; Middle Eastern leftist groups, 286–87; New War terrorism, 295; old and new, 282–83; overview of, 281–82; political ideology and, 284–87; radical Islamic, 288–91; religious ideology and, 287–91; U.S. Constitution and, 291–93; wildlife trade and, 87 TeslaCrypt, 147 THC, 7 Theft of trade secrets, 100 Theodore, N., 237 Third Geneva Convention, 292 Tongs, 17 ToRepublic, 153

Index Tor (the onion router) Network, 145, 152–54 TorProject, 152–53 Trade and development model, sex trafficking network type, 216 Trademarks, 46 Trade secrets, 98, 99–100. See also Intellectual property (IP) violations Traditional Chinese medicine (TCM) case study, 81–82 Trafficking and Violence Protection Act (TVPA), 234 Trafficking Victim Identification Tool, 218 Transmission Control Protocol/ Internet Protocol (TCP/IP), 142 Transnational crimes: antiquities, trafficking in, 61–67; concept of, 254; corruption as, 256; corruption as enabler for other, 255, 257–59; defined, 253; fraudulent medicines, 43–58; illicit drug trafficking, 3–20; illicit services (See Illicit services, crimes providing); intellectual property violations, 97–110; maritime piracy, 23–38; overview of, 1–2, 113–14; wildlife crimes, 73–88. See also individual crimes Transnational Organized Crime in West Africa: A Threat Assessment (UN), 44 Transshipment methods, 9–15; air trafficking, 14–15; maritime trafficking, 9–12; overland trafficking, 12–14 Transshipment zones, 5 Triads, 17; wildlife trade and, 78 Trojan horses, 149 Truman, E. M., 127, 128, 129 Tsutsumi, A., 223 Tubb, K., 64–65 Tufts Center for the Study of Drug Development, 57 Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA), 286 T visas, 244, 245 Ulbricht, R., 153 UNCLOS. See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)

Index UN Convention against Corruption (UNCAC), 254, 256; article 15, bribery of national public officials, 265; article 16, bribery of foreign public officials and officials of public international organizations, 266; article 17, embezzlement, misappropriation or diversion of property by public officials, 269; article 18, trading in influence, 270; article 19, abuse of functions, 271; article 20, illicit enrichment, 273; article 21, bribery in private sector, 274–75; article 22, embezzlement of private property in private sector, 275–76 Underground tunnels, drug trafficking using, 13 UNESCO Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export, and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property, 66 Uniform Crime Reports, 170 United Kingdom: crime-method nexus case study, 127–31; identity theft defined, 163; money laundering dimensions, frequency of, 121–22 United Nations (UN), 58; Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice, 44; Convention against Corruption (UNCAC), 254, 256; Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, 118; Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, 29; Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (CATOC), 254; fraudulent medicines report, 44; human trafficking, defined, 208; Oil for Food Program (OFFP), 268–69; Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Person, Especially Women and Children, 208 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS): flag state system, 25–26, 27; piracy defined by, 24–25; piracy

337 provisions, limitations of, 26–28; right of free passage, 25; two ship requirement, 28 United Nations Environment Programme, 187 United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI), 189 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), 10, 20, 37, 139, 175, 189, 211–12; cybercrime defined by, 140 United Nations Protocol on Trafficking in Persons, 217 UN Security Council: Resolution 1373, 118–19; Resolution 1851, 35; Resolution 1851, use of force against pirates, 36–37 United Postal Service, 14 United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC), 18 United States: Customs and Border Protection (CBP), 13; Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), 123; heroin use in, 6; identity theft reported cases, 164; marijuana herb seizures, 7, 8; marijuana legalization efforts in, 8; money laundering legislation, 117–19; Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force, 123; trade secrets legislative actions taken, 100–101; Trafficking Victims Protection Act, 209 U.S. Constitution, terrorism/terrorist groups and, 291–93 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 239 U.S. Naval Research Laboratory, 152 U.S. Navy, piracy and, 23–24 United States v. Schultz, 64 United Wa State Army, Myanmar, 19 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act (USA PATRIOT Act), 118, 291–92, 293 USA PATRIOT Act, 118, 291–92, 293

338 Van Duyne, P. C., 120, 125, 127, 129, 131, 132 Van Koningsveld, J., 132 Van Uhm, D. P., 79 Vera Institute of Justice, 218 Vicente Carillo Fuentes Organization, 16 Victims: escape/outcomes after escape for, of Labor trafficking, 243–45; identity-related crime, 165, 168–69; of labor trafficking, 235–38; recruitment/movement of labor trafficking, 239–41; trafficking experience of labor trafficking, 241–43 Vienna Convention, 118, 127 Vieraitis, L. M., 166–67, 172–73, 174 Violent entrepreneur sex trafficking network type, 215–16 Viruses, 149 Vishing, 143, 145, 146 Volcker, P., 272, 273 Volcker Commission, 268–69 Waste and pollution, 187 Watts, C., 210 Whaling, 146 White, M., 174–75 White hat hackers, 150, 152 White types of environmental crime, 184 Wildlife conservation, imperialism and, 75–76 Wildlife crimes, 73–88; anthropocentric perspective of, 85; biocentric perspective of, 86; black caviar case study, 83–84;

Index corruption and, 84; ecocentric perspective of, 85–86; global defaunation and, 73–75; illegal wildlife flows, 79–81; imperialism, criminalization and, 75–76; infectious disease spread and, 86–87; laundering wildlife, 79; low priority/high profits and, 84–85; monkey species case study, 82–83; offender types in, 76–78; overview of, 73; poverty stricken areas and, 84; security issues with, 86–87; smuggling techniques used, 78–79; traditional Chinese medicine case study, 81–82 Williams, M. L., 172 Williams, P., 119, 214, 225 World Customs Organization, 20 World Health Organization, 43, 58 World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), 106 World order, piracy as threat to, 31–32 World Shipping Council, 11 World Trade Organization (WTO), 106, 107 World Wide Web (WWW), 142–43 Worms, 149–50 Wo Shing Wo group, 78 Wyatt, D., 54 Wyatt, T., 197 Yakuza, wildlife trade and, 78 Zetas, 16 Zhang, S. X., 216, 233, 235 Zimmermann, C., 210

Transnational Crime and Global Security

Advisory Board Peter Chalk RAND Corporation Vanda Felbab-Brown The Brookings Institution Heike Gramckow The World Bank Charles Katz Arizona State University William King Sam Houston State University Jean-Luc Lemahieu United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime Edward Maguire Arizona State University Ernesto Savona Transcrime, Joint Research Centre on Transnational Crime Russell G. Smith Australian Institute of Criminology

Transnational Crime and Global Security Volume Two: Security Implications of Transnational Crime PHILIP REICHEL AND RYAN RANDA, EDITORS

Praeger Security International

Copyright © 2018 by Philip Reichel and Ryan Randa All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, except for the inclusion of brief quotations in a review, without prior permission in writing from the publisher. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Names: Reichel, Philip L., editor. | Randa, Ryan, editor. Title: Transnational crime and global security / Philip Reichel and Ryan Randa, editors. Description: Santa Barbara : Praeger, [2018–] | Series: Praeger security international | Includes bibliographical references and index. Identifiers: LCCN 2017028739 (print) | LCCN 2017031055 (ebook) | ISBN 9781440843181 (ebook) | ISBN 9781440843174 (set : alk. paper) | ISBN 9781440848414 (vol.1) | ISBN 9781440848421 (vol.2) Subjects: LCSH: Transnational crime. | Organized crime. | Security, International. Classification: LCC HV6252 (ebook) | LCC HV6252 .T713 2018 (print) | DDC 364.1/35—dc23 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2017028739 ISBN: 978-1-4408-4317-4 (set) 978-1-4408-4841-4 (vol. 1) 978-1-4408-4842-1 (vol. 2) 978-1-4408-4318-1 (ebook) 22

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This book is also available as an eBook. Praeger An Imprint of ABC-CLIO, LLC ABC-CLIO, LLC 130 Cremona Drive, P.O. Box 1911 Santa Barbara, California 93116-1911 www.abc-clio.com This book is printed on acid-free paper Manufactured in the United States of America

Philip Reichel would like to dedicate this work to his wife, Eva M. Jewell, for her consistent love and support as he continues to take on projects—even in retirement—that sometimes delay activities in which she would prefer to be engaged. Ryan Randa would like to dedicate this work to wife Danielle, daughter Ruby, and son Ronald. They are the foundation of any success.

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Contents

Acknowledgments

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Introduction

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Part I: Understanding Transnational Crime 1

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Researching Transnational Crime with Open Access Online Resources Lyda Fontes McCartin International Efforts to Measure Transnational Crime and Their Implications for Criminologists Alejandra Gómez-Céspedes and Salomé Flores Sierra Franzoni

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Victimology and Transnational Crime Jana Arsovska and Sara Cronqvist

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Part II: Consequences of Transnational Crime

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Crime Displacement as a Result of Transnational Organized Crime Control Measures Yuliya Zabyelina

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Policy and Practice of Dealing with Returning Foreign Terrorist Fighters Manuela Brunero and Madleen Scatena

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Cyber Attacks: Cybercrime or Cyber War? Albert Scherr

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7 Disaster Risk Reduction and the Sendai Framework: Conflict and Insecurity as Risk Drivers Jaclyn T. San Antonio and Adam Bouloukos

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8 The Financing of Terrorism and Insurgency through Drug Trafficking Colin P. Clarke

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9 Pollution Crimes and Global Security Elise Vermeersch

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Part III: Responding to Transnational Crime

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10 Fostering International Cooperation in Criminal Matters: The UNODC Mutual Legal Assistance Request Writer Tool Dimosthenis Chrysikos

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11 International Mutual Assistance to Ensure Safety and Security at Sports Competitions and Other Major Events Miriam Amoros Bas and Duccio Mazarese

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12 Using Big Data Analytics to Reinforce Security Francesca Bosco, Francesco Marelli, and Jayant Sangwan

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13 The Role of Multilateral Development Donors in Stimulating Criminal Justice Reform in Developing Countries Erik Alda

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14 Combatting Transnational Crime Takes a Public-Private Partnership Gary Hill and Matti Joutsen

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15 Stakeholder Convergence: Public-Private Responses to Transnational Crime Nate Olson and Brian Finlay

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16 The Globalized Reach of U.S. Crime Policy Matti Joutsen

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About the Editors and Contributors

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Index

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Acknowledgments

We begin with heartfelt thanks and recognition for their efforts of all the contributors who authored chapters for these volumes. Each was writing in an area of his or her expertise, but we understand that a request for an original contribution always requires significant work, commitment, and time. We greatly appreciate their willingness to participate in this project. We also thank the members of the advisory board who provided such excellent suggestions for contributors and often provided introductions that were very helpful in our recruiting endeavors. Of the many challenges involved with the preparation of a work such as this, achieving consistency in citation and referencing style is among the most arduous. That task was eased by the efforts of Angela Collins, who worked competently and quickly to bring many of the chapters in line with the required style. Finally, we are especially grateful to Steve Catalano, acquisitions editor at Praeger Publishers/ABC CLIO. Throughout the process, Steve provided helpful suggestions, encouragement, advice, and support. Thank you, Steve!

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Introduction

The spread of transnational crime is one of the most significant security challenges facing governments around the world today. As post-Cold War globalization took hold, its benefits were acclaimed but its dark side was too often ignored. Just as globalization has provided opportunities for unprecedented openness in trade, travel, and communication, so too has it created opportunities for criminals—and therein lies the dark side. Criminal groups have expanded across domestic borders as new corridors open to meet the demand for illegal products and services. The demand is met, in part, by creating commercial exchange zones where local criminal factions participate in the international market as the advantages of globalization are exploited (Garzón, Olinger, Rico, & Santamaria, 2013). As the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (2010, p. II) points out, crime has gone global and individual national responses are ineffectual as they do little more than displace the problem. This inadequacy is exacerbated by the fact that globalization has outpaced the growth of mechanisms for global governance (Kemp, 2009). The result is a lack of effective international regulation—whether that be on the Internet, in banking systems, with free trade zones, or combatting transnational crime. Transnational crime has a global reach, penetration, and impact that threatens all countries. As a result, all countries have a shared responsibility to respond (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2010, p. III). Not surprisingly, transnational crime is having an impact on domestic and global security. Conflict and post-conflict areas are especially

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vulnerable, but transnational crime clearly affects security everywhere. This two-volume set considers the global security and justice problems created by the variety of dangerous and unsettling transnational crimes that are growing in volume and severity around the world. These two volumes complement each other in a way that allows readers to use a single work to learn about specific transnational crimes (Volume 1) and about efforts to prevent and combat those crimes (Volume 2). This introduction to both volumes identifies the editors’ goals, the organization of the work, and provides suggestions for how, and by whom, the volumes might be used. GOALS OF THE VOLUMES The primary goal as we began this project was to provide students, scholars, professionals, consultants, and practitioners in the areas of criminal justice and security studies with information and analysis on the contemporary topics of transnational crime and global security. To accomplish that, we also had a goal of providing original works from as diverse a group of authors as possible. A global subject matter requires a global perspective. The “About the Contributors” section provides information about the more than 40 contributors writing from 10 different countries and the United Nations. The contributors include scholars from respected universities in Europe, North America, and Australia, professionals working at public policy research institutes, and researchers at several United Nations entities. We believe the contributors’ geographic diversity, varied backgrounds, and the resulting medley of perspectives results in a unique and important panorama of the crime and security topics. ORGANIZATION OF THE VOLUMES The two volumes reflect the work’s title with Volume 1 focused on transnational crime and Volume 2 on security. The chapters of each volume are divided into three parts. Chapter contributors were not restricted by requirements of a standard organization for all chapters to follow. Although standardization of chapters has the advantage of providing familiarity and consistency for the reader, it also restricts authors to a set of guidelines that may or may not be relevant to their topic or approach. Given the wide-range of topics we have asked contributors to cover, it seemed inappropriate to place restriction on how they approached their topic. As a result, each chapter in each volume is presented in the way that the expert(s) preparing that chapter thinks can most effectively convey the material they deem most important. Further, each of the three parts in both volumes includes a part introduction that provides an overview of the chapters comprising that part.

Introduction

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Volume 1: Types of Transnational Crime Determining the topics for Volume 1 was not easily accomplished. At least 50 activities fall under the broad umbrella of transnational crime (Council on Foreign Relations, 2013). They range from arms trafficking to video-game counterfeiting. Our approach was to narrow the field by determining the categories of transnational crime we wanted covered. Borrowing somewhat from Albanese (2011), we identified our three parts as: Provision of Illicit Goods, Provision of Illicit Services, and Crimes Affecting Stability. We then recruited authors known to have expertise in transnational crimes falling into each of the three categories. The result is six examples of crimes that are best described as providing illicit goods, six examples of crimes that provide illicit services, and three examples of crimes or criminal behavior that affect stability. In this way, we can cover transnational crimes that are more familiar (e.g., maritime piracy and human trafficking) and others that are less well known (e.g., wildlife crime and weaponization of infectious diseases). Volume 2: Security Implications of Transnational Crime Our approach to chapters for Volume 2 was also directed by three themes that we wanted to investigate: Understanding Transnational Crime, Consequences of Transnational Crime, and Responding to Transnational Crime. By using these categories to frame our coverage of the security implications of transnational crime, chapter contributors are able to offer contemporary insight and emerging perspectives on the confluence of transnational crime and security. The result is a fascinating grouping of chapter topics unique to this work. Ranging from suggestions for researching and measuring transnational crime, through such issues as dealing with returning foreign terrorist fighters, and concluding with descriptions of current and proposed responses to transnational crime, the chapters in Volume 2 make clear the need for attention to the global and domestic security implications of combatting and preventing this dark side of globalization. The interesting array of topics presented in this volume show the very serious consequences of transnational crime but also make clear that effective action is possible—especially when collaboration occurs.

SUGGESTIONS FOR USE Security and transnational crime is a focus for individual nations, regions, and the global community. Whether attention is concentrated on a particular type of transnational crime such as human trafficking or illicit drugs, or on broader concerns of transnational crime generally, the security issues related to preventing and combatting transnational crime

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remain at the forefront. We believe the chapters in these two volumes can be useful to students, scholars, policy makers, practitioners, and researchers as they search for background information on a topic. The chapter titles are reasonably specific, but the subject index and especially the part introductions will help readers narrow the chapters to those of particular relevance to the information being sought. The reference section of each chapter can also be useful in finding additional material on the key ideas and concepts presented by the contributors. We hope these volumes will become a primary source of information for scholars and professionals working on transnational crime issues and the security implications of that crime. Philip Reichel and Ryan Randa REFERENCES Albanese, J. S. (2011). Transnational crime and the 21st century: Criminal enterprise, corruption, and opportunity. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. Council on Foreign Relations. (2013). The global regime for transnational crime. Retrieved from http://www.cfr.org/transnational-crime/global-regime-trans national-crime/p28656#. Garzón, J. C., Olinger, M., Rico, D. M., & Santamaria, G. (2013). The criminal diaspora: The spread of transnational organized crime and how to contain its expansion. Retrieved from https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/the-criminaldiaspora-the-spread-transnational-organized-crime-and-how-to-contain-its. Kemp, W. (2009, June 25). Organized crime: A growing threat to security. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. Retrieved from https://www .sipri.org/commentary/essay/thu-06–25–2009–14–00/organized-crimea-growing-threat-to-security. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. (2010). The globalization of crime: A transnational organized crime threat assessment. Retrieved from http:// www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-analysis/tocta-2010.html.

PART I

Understanding Transnational Crime

To understand the security implications of transnational crime is necessary to first appreciate the breadth, depth, and scope of the problem. Part I of Volume 2 of this work begins by introducing the reader to the task of researching transnational crime. This process can have an eye-opening effect on the uninitiated reader by quickly exposing them to an overwhelming amount of information. In Chapter 1, McCartin aides the reader in understanding how to navigate the increasingly complex task of using open access online resources to begin a research journey on transnational crime. This chapter provides the reader with a number of resources and instructions on how to begin a rewarding research process. McCartin delivers this information such that both the fluent academician and a novice searcher will be informed. She achieves this by presenting resources that will be accessible to a wide range of globally located readers who are eager to find credible information on transnational crime. Chapter 2, “International Efforts to Measure Transnational Crime and Their Implications for Criminologists,” further illustrates the complexity of measuring transnational crime. More specifically, our reader will learn how criminologists conduct their research in collaboration with multinational agencies and collaborate with researchers from around the globe. Our authors present traditional and alternative data sources used by criminologists to measure transnational crime and address some difficulties. The chapter describes international efforts to improve official crime statistics. In particular, it examines current methodological issues, showing the potential of certain tools such as the recently approved International Crime Classification for Statistical Purposes (ICCS). The chapter concludes with a highlight of specific benefits for future research on transnational crime.

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Transnational Crime and Global Security

Finally, Chapter 3, “Victimology and Transnational Crime,” introduces the reader to the victims of transnational crime. This chapter provides the reader an overview of the profiles of victims affected by various transnational crimes around the world and discusses the relationship between globalization and the development of new international agreements to protect and empower victims. Additionally, this third chapter briefly touches upon various dimensions of victimization, though the focus remains on cross-border victimization. This chapter concludes Part I of Volume 2 and primes readers to discover the complex nature of victimization as it relates to transnational crime and will get a sense of the scope of the problem it presents.

CHAPTER 1

Researching Transnational Crime with Open Access Online Resources Lyda Fontes McCartin

A search for transnational crime in Google brings back over two million results (over one million in Bing). Sifting through this amount of information can be overwhelming and not always fruitful. The purpose of this chapter is to provide you with some credible online resources for researching transnational crime; there are some hidden gems online that can connect you to research on the transnational crime topics discussed in these volumes. Knowing that not everyone reading these two volumes will be affiliated with an academic library, I’ve done my best to curate a collection of sources that are open access, meaning that you don’t need to be an academic to access them and they’re free. While I set out to include only open access materials, I found some academic journals on transnational crime topics that I felt were so new or niche that I’ve included them to spread the word. Throughout the chapter, you will find indications of the social media maintained by the source being highlighted. This lets you know that additional information such as short films and documentaries, lecture series’, and instructional videos are available via the source’s webpage. You will also find photo collections in Flickr and Instagram, as well as content through LinkedIn, Google+, Tumblr, and Flipboard. I have purposefully excluded personal webpages in this discussion, even those from university faculty members because these tend to be updated irregularly. That said, you will find a number of personal webpages linked from within the sources presented.

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Transnational Crime and Global Security

For each resource discussed, I provide an overview of the content and guidance on how to access the best content on each website. I hope this chapter introduces you to some new online resources for researching transnational crime. LIBRARY RESEARCH GUIDES Librarians are constantly creating research guides that provide a onestop shop for researchers. The librarians at Peace Palace Library and the United Nations (UN) Library are no different. This section provides an overview of the online research guides developed at these two libraries. The research guides cover various transnational crime topics and include bibliographies, current news, academic journal lists, and link to outside organizations. The breadth of content in these guides has allowed me to be selective in what I include in the rest of this chapter. I recommend spending some time in these guides since there is so much information, and so many links to click! Peace Palace Library: The International Law Library The Peace Palace Library (http://www.peacepalacelibrary.nl/), located in the Netherlands, was established in 1913 as the library for the Permanent Court of Arbitration. Specializing in international law, the library now serves all of the institutions of Peace Palace—the International Court of Justice, the Permanent Court of Arbitration, and The Hague Academy of International Law. I’ve started this chapter with the Peace Palace Library (PPL) because PPL librarians have provided extensive links to open access sources on transnational crime topics. Additionally, you can search through their online catalog without a library card to access to a great bibliography for transnational crime sources. Although you must be in the Netherlands to obtain a library card for access to e-books and articles (N. van Tol, personal communication, April 19, 2016), you will find the online research guides created by the PPL librarians very useful; the guide that will most interest the transnational crime researcher is the International Criminal Law set, which includes Human Trafficking, International Criminal Law, Terrorism, and Transnational Crime. Each research guide includes the following sections: • Introduction: Each guide starts with a brief introduction to the topic. I recommend scrolling down to the news section, where you will find recent news articles about the specific topic. • Bibliography: This is a bibliography of reference works, books, journal articles, white papers and other documents, and a list of related periodicals. • New Titles: This list includes new titles acquired by PPL and is updated every Friday morning.

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• Librarian’s Choice: PPL librarians compile a list of recent titles with a short summary of the source. Keep in mind that you will need to check with your local public or academic library (or Amazon) to obtain the book. • Databases: These are lists of great open access resources for the transnational crime researcher. Examples of the resources listed on the transnational crime research guide include Organized Crime Research, a personal website presented by Klaus von Lampe, associate professor at John Jay College of Criminal Justice (http://www.organized-crime.de/) and the Wildlife Trafficking and Poaching report database from the Library of Congress (http://www.loc.gov/ law/help/wildlife-poaching/). • Blogs: PPL librarians write blog posts about international law topics. Within the research guide are links to blog posts about topics specific to that guide. Each blog post then lists full citations for related books and articles on the topic. • Links: For the transnational crime researcher, the list of links provided in the research guides are invaluable. Each guide links to international organizations, other online research guides, research tools, other academic research centers, and both personal and professional blogs. • See Also: There is one useful link in the see also section, under PPL keywords. This will link you to a keyword search in the library catalog, showing you a list of books relevant to the topic.

Other cool things from Peace Palace Library include the International Law News section, giving you the most current international law and international affairs news feed I’ve found online. I also recommend taking a look at the Images Collection, which is a beautiful online collection of historical images that are worth checking out. Tips for Using Peace Palace Library While you cannot get access to the online databases, journals, or the book collection if you are not in the Netherlands, PPL does participate in Interlibrary Loan. There will be costs associated, but it may be worthwhile (N. van Tol, Personal Communication, April 20, 2016). You also have unlimited access to the online catalog so you can find books in the PPL catalog and then contact your local public or academic library to obtain copies. I recommend using PPL’s catalog because of the library’s focus on international law; their collection of transnational crime titles is extensive. Peace Palace Library social media include Facebook, LinkedIn, Twitter, and YouTube. UN Library The UN Library in Vienna, Austria (http://www.unvienna.org/unov/ library.html), is part of the network of UN Libraries. While each UN library provides research guides, the guides from Vienna’s UN library are focused on transnational crime. This library has guides on drug trafficking,

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human trafficking and smuggling, piracy and maritime crime, money laundering, organized crime, and wildlife and forest crime. Each guide includes a list of books, UN Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC) publications on the topic (these are freely available online), and a list of academic journals useful for finding articles and research on the topic (you will need a library card to access these, which can only be obtained in person). In addition, each guide discusses the Office on Drugs and Crime program related to the guide topic; for example, the Piracy guide links you to the UNODC Maritime Crime Program website (http://www.unodc.org/ unodc/en/piracy/index.html?ref=menuside). Tips for Using the UN Library, Vienna This library is a wonderful tool for finding UN programs and published reports about transnational crime. You cannot get access to the journals or book, so consider this another great bibliography. You might be able to get materials sent to you as a photocopy; the librarians “try to assist provided that the requests are of a limited nature” (E. Wandzilak, Personal Communication, April 20, 2016). I recommend talking to your local public or academic librarian to obtain the sources. The other UN Library I recommend is the UN Library in Geneva. The online research guides on transnational crime are limited, but the Statistics Research Guide is worth checking out (http://libraryresources.unog .ch/statistics). This guide will link you to UN statistical resources, published reports, statistics by region, and statistics by theme (which includes crime). RESEARCH CENTERS AND INSTITUTES The centers and institutes presented in this section all provide research and programming aimed at preventing and understanding transnational crime. Each organization provides information on completed research, research in progress, published reports, and any programming they provide, such as lecture series. Unlike the libraries discussed earlier, these sites focus only on what the specific organizations offer and rarely link to outside information. Jack & Mae Nathanson Centre on Transnational Human Rights, Crime and Security The Nathanson Centre (http://nathanson.osgoode.yorku.ca/) is located in Toronto, Canada, at York University’s Osgood Hall Law School. Research at the Centre looks at the transnational phenomenon and the effects on society, law, and governance. If you are researching organized crime, then this is the place for you! The growing annotated bibliography

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on organized crime is searchable, making it easy to find new sources on the topic. This is not a full-text database, so you will need to contact your local librarian to find full text documents. Additionally, through the web links portal, you can link to various open access online resources on organized crime, such as the International Association for the Study of Organized Crime, the Centre for Information and Research on Organized Crime, and the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime. The Nathanson Centre social media include Twitter and YouTube. Terrorism, Transnational Crime, and Corruption Center (TraCCC) TraCCC (http://traccc.gmu.edu/) is a research center at George Mason University in Virginia. It is part of the School of Policy, Government, and International Affairs. The center focuses on research about the political, societal, and economic conditions that contribute to transnational crime. If you visit the events section of the website, you’ll find videos from the speaker series. For example, in January 2016, Dr. Campbell Fraser discussed human organ trafficking, and there’s a video of his talk. This may be a great resource for connecting with research partners in your own area of transnational crime. Additionally, you’ll want to check out the resources section, specifically the thematic databases of TraCCC publications. This includes publications on corruption, money laundering, transnational organized crime, human trafficking, terrorism, illicit trade, drug trafficking, and environmental crime. The list of external resources (same topics) will link you to open access resources, such as nonprofit websites and personal blogs, as well as published reports from the UN, UNICEF, and other organizations. Transcrime: Joint Research Centre on Transnational Crime Transcrime (http://www.transcrime.it/en) is a research center in Milan focused on transnational crime with a European focus. There are two places on the website useful for the transnational crime researcher— Publications and Research. Under the Publications section, you definitely want to check out the Transcrime Research in Brief publications (there are currently four). These provide short reports of transnational topics (such as counterfeit markets) using infographics. The Transcrime Reports are much longer reports on transnational crime topics and include reference lists and survey instruments if a study is presented. There are other reports in the Publications section available in full text as well. The search function isn’t the most sophisticated, so it is easier to search the list of publications by year; the center has publications back to 1999. Note: you’ll want to check the language selection after

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each search; it seems that each time you switch years in the search box, you revert from English to Italian! Under the Research section, you’ll find current or completed research projects from Transcrime. There isn’t information listed for each project, so for some you will be linked to an outside organization, for some you’ll see a completed report (or more) along with events associated with the research, and for some you will simply see the project title. Transcrime social media include Facebook, Twitter, and LinkedIn. UN Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI) There is a lot going on in the UNICRI (http://www.unicri.it/)! The first place you’ll want to visit is the Main Issues and Special Issues sections of the website (left sidebar). When you select a topic, such as Environmental Crimes, you’re taken to an overview of the topic, and then linked to specific research and publications on the topic. There may also be special databases for the topic, such as the database of court decisions related to piracy on the Somali coast or the database on trafficking in persons. The other place to visit is the Documentation and Information Centre. Here you can search the library catalog using the unique UNICRI thesaurus, you can access the World Criminological Directory to find research centers around the globe, and you can search the different bibliographies, such as the bibliography on cyber threat or organized crime and corruption. You can also find the UNICRI Series in the Publications section of the Documentation and Information Centre, along with the Freedom from Fear magazine, and the International Crime Victims Survey (this survey is discussed more in depth later in this chapter). UNICRI social media include Twitter, Facebook, LinkedIn, Flickr, and YouTube. INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS The organizations presented in this section are not affiliated with any one country but are in partnerships with many countries. While the bulk of this section discusses different programs and agencies within the UN, you’ll also find unique items such as INTERPOL’s Database of Stolen Art and the International Maritime Bureau’s Live Piracy Map. The United Nations Beyond the main organs, such as the General Assembly and the Security Council, the UN system (http://www.un.org/en/index.html) is made up of many programs, funds, and specialized agencies. There are a number

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of UN programs, funds, and agencies that are useful to the transnational crime researcher, so I’m providing a brief discussion of each. The UN social media include Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, Pinterest, Google+, Flickr, Tumbler, and Instagram. UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) When you arrive at the UNODC website (http://www.unodc.org/), take a look at the list of transnational crime topics on the left. When you select a topic from this list, you’ll be taken to an overview of the topic with the option to select different subtopics. For example, Drug Trafficking provides an introduction and then specific information about UNODC’s regional programs (e.g., Central Asia is the Regional Program for Afghanistan and Neighboring Countries). Topics include drug trafficking, firearms, fraudulent medicines, money laundering, organized crime, maritime crime and piracy, terrorism prevention, and wildlife and forest crime. If you keep going down the links on the left side of the website, you’ll find the Resources section. The Research link is what you want from this list. Here, you’ll find the World Drug Report, which “presents a comprehensive annual overview of the latest developments in the world’s illicit drug markets” (http://www.unodc.org/wdr2016/). You’ll also find the most recent Global Report on Trafficking in Persons as well as country profiles for the 128 countries covered in the report. Additionally, in the Transnational Organized Crime section (http://www.unodc.org/unodc/ en/data-and-analysis/toc.html), you’ll discover regional threat assessments; the most recent (as of April 2016) is the Afghan Opiate Trade and Africa—A Baseline Assessment. UNODC social media include Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, Pinterest, Google+, and Flickr. UN Environment Program (UNEP) The UNEP (http://www.unep.org/) has a Division of Environmental Law and Convention (DELC), which is something to check out if you’re researching any kind of transnational environmental crime. This isn’t an easy division to find, but I’m going to walk you through the steps. You want to go into the About link (top left) and then click into Structure. Scroll down to UNEP Divisions, and you’ll find DELC! The publications section includes titles I have not come across before, so it is definitely something to check out. UNEP also offers the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) (https://cites.org/). There’s some interesting data here on international trade in wild animals and plants that is worth looking at if this is your area of interest.

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UNEP social media include Facebook, Twitter, Google+, YouTube, and LinkedIn. The World Bank At first glance you might be inclined to overlook the World Bank (http://www.worldbank.org/) for transnational crime topics. To be sure, you won’t find the topics crime, transnational crime, or trafficking as main topics on any of the webpages. But there is some good data about world development that you might be interested in getting your hands on if you’re researching global crimes. And the data is free, so it’s worth a look! When you arrive at the World Bank website, click on the Data link, which you’ll find across the top of the page. You can browse the data by country, topic, or indicators. For example, if you are researching crimes about wildlife, and you want to know the percentage of a country’s land that is forested, you can find that information through the World Bank indicator search for every country from Afghanistan (2.1% forested) to Zimbabwe (36.4% forested). You might also be interested in the World Development Indicator Report, which is an open data set providing cross-country comparable statistics about development and people. Instead of visiting the Publications section, I recommend just searching in the main search box at the top of the screen for “transnational crime.” This will get you a list of reports, such as Elephant Crime Intelligence System Assessment, as well as blog posts such as the Fight to End Wildlife Crime is a Fight for Humanity (Hickey, 2013) from the World Bank’s Voices: Perspectives on Development Blog. On the left side of the search results you can narrow down by country, region, topic, and date for a more focused search. You can also search by specific crimes in this search box to find World Bank reports on environmental crime, wildlife crime, trafficking, and other topics. Finally, if you want information about a specific country, the World Bank is where I’d go for the information. The World Bank country information is updated more regularly than something like the Country Studies Report from the Library of Congress; as of this writing, the information about the countries was from 2014 to 2015. World Bank social media include Twitter, YouTube, Flickr, Tumbler, Instagram, LinkedIn, and Flipboard. The UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) UNESCO (http://en.unesco.org/) is another good resource for country information and provides detailed country profiles focused on each country’s education, literacy, science, technology and innovation, and culture. This data is a nice complement to the country profile that you’ll find at the

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World Bank. You can find these profiles by hovering over the Resources tab on the top of the page and then selecting statistics. From that page you’ll see a View Profiles section where you can access the countries by region. You may also want to check out the UNESCO Institute of Statistics where you can create your own data sets. Note that there is no crime data; this is really to get a better understanding of a country you may be researching. You can get to this by selecting Create a Data set on the same page. UNESCO social media include Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, Google+, and Instagram. International Maritime Organization (IMO) If you are researching maritime piracy, then the IMO (http://www .imo.org/) cannot be overlooked! To access the information specific to piracy, select the Our Work link from the navigation at the top of the page, then select Maritime Security and Piracy from the list on the left sidebar. Here you will find the full text of the IMO’s strategies in West and Central Africa as well as the Djibouti Code of Conduct. For each subsection of the Maritime Security and Piracy, you will find related documents. For example, if you are looking at the Piracy subsection, you’ll find definitions, texts of resolutions, piracy reports, and information by region. Probably the coolest part of this website is the IMO’s Piracy and Maritime Security database, located in the Global Integrated Shipping Information System. To save time, I would just Google that title, and then select Piracy and Armed Robbery. You’ll have to create a free account to access the data (it took less than 3 minutes, and it’s worth it!). Once you’re in the database, you’ll find up-to-date reports of piracy incidents. The reports include the ship name, flag, type of ship, date and time of incident, exact latitude and longitude, and a description of the incident. IMO social media include Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, and Flickr. World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) If you are researching intellectual property crime, it would be remiss to skip a trip to the WIPO website (http://www.wipo.int). Now, the WIPO has limited information on Intellectual Property (IP) crime as its mission is to develop an effective IP system that enables innovation. It does not act as the IP police. That does not mean the WIPO can’t help you with your research in this area. You’ll want to go into the Reference section, by selecting the Reference tab at the top of the homepage. Here, you will find a series of databases; Patentscope contains over 51 million patent documents, while Global Brand Database provides information on national and international trademarks (among other things).

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The Reference section provides the full text of international IP treaties and national laws. If you keep scrolling down the page, you’ll find IP statistics, official documents, country profiles, and case studies. The case study database is searchable by Instrument of Protection (e.g., copyright) and Focus (e.g., enforcement/infringement). The case studies may be useful in your research. Note that the WIPO does have its own library in Geneva, Switzerland; unfortunately, you cannot get full text access online. If you happen to be in the Geneva area, you can request permission to visit the library (a PDF request form is on the website). Don’t despair—there are thousands of freely available WIPO documents available through the Reference section, including the annual World Intellectual Property Report. WIPO social media include Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, Flickr, and Scribd. INTERPOL INTERPOL (http://www.interpol.int/en) is the world’s largest international police organization whose mission is to prevent and fight crime through cooperation. As soon as you get to the website, make your way to the Crime Areas section where you’ll find specific types of crime, from corruption to works of art. If you are researching crimes in works of art, or the illicit traffic in cultural heritage, INTERPOL’s Database of Stolen Works of Art will probably interest you. For each type of crime, you’ll find a discussion of the crime, international data, INTERPOL’s response, news related to the crime, and other resources such as resolutions and reports. And just for fun, if you’re looking for some light entertainment, head over to the INTERPOL Student Zone where you can become a junior INTERPOL agent! This interactive game has you searching for clues, putting together images, and working with the Chinese police to find a shipment of illegal medicines. Or you can help Tanzanian police search a crashed plane for clues about the large amount of cocaine found on board. Have fun! INTERPOL social media include Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, and Instagram. Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE; http://www.osce.org/) is a security organization with 57 participating states, including the United States and Kazakhstan. OSCE addresses a wide range of security-related concerns, including arms control, human rights, policing strategies, counterterrorism, and economic and environmental activities. For in-depth information on the work of OSCE, visit the What We Do section. The OSCE has policing initiatives that focus on the challenges posed by transnational crime. In the Policing section you’ll find a news section, highlights of OSCE policing operations, and resources

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on policing, such as the Guidebook on Democratic Policing. Each section here also includes information on upcoming events, such as conferences, related to the issues. The Resources section also has good information, including a documents library providing access to OSCE documents since 1975 and a publication section that includes annual reports and handbooks. This section will also get you to the OSCE E-Libraries, which is a variety of digital collections. The two most interesting collections are the Hate Crime Reporting E-Library and the Illicit Drugs Trafficking E-library. OSCE social media include Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, LinkedIn, Google+, SoundCloud, and Instagram. International Maritime Bureau (IMB) The IMB (https://www.icc-ccs.org/icc/imb) is a part of the International Chamber of Commerce whose focus is fighting maritime crime and malpractice. If you’re researching maritime piracy, then you’ll want to visit IMB’s Piracy Reporting Centre (PRC). You can access the PRC from the About Us tab. Once you’re in the reporting center, look to the left sidebar and you’ll see the Live Piracy Map and the Live Piracy Report. If you check out the Live Piracy Map, you’ll be able to see recent reports of piracy incidents. The Live Piracy Report gives narratives of recent attacks. As of this writing, there have been 56 reported maritime piracy attacks in 2016! IMB also breaks down piracy prone areas and warning by regions and provides a 24-hour hotline to report attacks. You can order free quarterly and annual reports by filling out the online request form. Human Rights Watch Through its accurate reporting of human rights issues, Human Rights Watch (https://www.hrw.org/) regularly works with the UN and governments to press for change in policy and practice. There is a lot of news about human rights issues on the Watch’s website. The three places on the website you’ll probably be most interested in are Countries, Topics, and Reports. If you are giving a research presentation, you might also consider the Video and Photos section, which provides media that you can embed (unfortunately, the video keyword search isn’t very effective). Human Rights Watch social media include Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube. Countries The Countries section provides a breakdown of Regions and then countries within the region (note the United States is broken out by itself,

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it is not presented as part of the Americas). The individual country page provides an overview of human rights concerns for the country, specific news items about the country, relevant videos, and relevant reports. Topics The topics section breaks down larger topics, providing news, videos, and reports from the different regions and countries. For example, if you select Environment from the Topics list, you will find an overview of environment as it relates to human rights, along with news, videos, and reports about climate change, toxic substances, and arsenic-laced water (to name a few). Reports Human Rights Watch publishes around 100 reports per year on different topics. The search box in the Reports section is useful; I recommend searching in the Topic box, not the Keyword box. You’ll find a prefilled list of topics (e.g., exploitation, forced labor, and trafficking), which will make your searching faster. International Organization for Migration: Missing Migrant Project The Missing Migrant Project (MMP; http://missingmigrants.iom.int/) tracks deaths of migrants worldwide using statistical data from governments, NGOs, and other media. I include the MMP in this chapter because of the amazing data available here that may be useful if you’re researching migrant policy or trafficking. Currently, the project has data going back to 2014. The world map provides information on individual incidents, including location, number reported dead or missing, and a link to an article about the incident if that’s available (note some of the article links are broken and others go to international news articles not written in English). There are also links to news stories, an updated table with monthly worldwide migrant death statistics, and infographics created by the project. MMP social media include Twitter. SURVEYS AND DATA SETS In contrast to the availability of international statistics on education, infant mortality, and agriculture, “international statistics on crime and criminal justice are few and far between” (Van Dijk, 2008, p. 5). This section presents the available international surveys, datasets, and collections that may be helpful for the transnational crime researcher.

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UN Surveys on Crime Trends and the Operations of Criminal Justice Systems (UN-CTS) The major goal of the UN-CTS (https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/ data-and-analysis/United-Nations-Surveys-on-Crime-Trends-and-theOperations-of-Criminal-Justice-Systems.html) is to collect data on the incidence of reported crime and the operations of criminal justice systems with a view to improving the analysis and dissemination of that information globally. Sorry for the long URL, but there is no easy way to get to the overview of the UN-CTS. To be honest, it took me awhile to find this on the UNODC website as it isn’t accessible from a quick link. Data from the survey are used in the World Crime Trend Reports, which can be found via this URL: https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-analysis/statis tics/reports-on-world-crime-trends.html. If you visit the Resources section on the left sidebar, select Research, and then select Statistics, you will find the link in the Data Sources section. You’ll find reports about world crime trends since 2011, although there are some other reports using international data from 2003. International Crime Victim Survey (ICVS) The ICVS (http://www.unicri.it/services/library_documentation/pub lications/icvs/) is a survey distributed by the UNICRI, and it can be accessed from the UNICRI website discussed earlier. The survey compares levels of victimization across the EU and measures how citizens feel about their security and safety. It analyses the relationships between the EU citizens’ views on their quality of life and the levels of neighborhood crime across the EU. You can access reports that use the ICVS data or, if you are skilled in statistics, you can access the ICVS data for further analysis. If you wish to publish secondary analysis using ICVS data, UNICRI requests that you seek permission. International Self-Report Delinquency Study (ISRD) The International Self-Report Delinquency Study (ISRD; http://www .northeastern.edu/isrd/) looks at delinquency and victimization among youth. The study started with a focus on Europe but has now expanded and includes 35 countries, including China and the United States. Preliminary results from ISRD-3 were reported in September 2015. You can find publications related to all three versions of the study online (http:// www.northeastern.edu/isrd/publications/). While the ISRD may not report transnational crime, it’s been suggested that self-report data will be useful for researching transnational crime (Barberet, 2013, p. 52) so I’ve included it.

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The Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR) ICPSR (http://www.icpsr.umich.edu) is the world’s largest archive of computer-readable social science data. In addition to archiving collections from disciplines such as sociology, political science, history, and economics, ICPSR has seven special emphases in gerontology, substance abuse and mental health, criminal justice, child care, health and medical care, education, and demography. You’ll want to check with your local academic library about institutional access to ICPSR as there is a substantial subscription fee for accessing all of the data. You can create an account that will allow you to access notifications, but you won’t be able to download all of the data in ICPSR if you are not affiliated with a member institution. There is a resource called Open ICPSR (https://www.openicpsr.org/) where you can share and store your research data. “Open” simply means that anyone can access the data in Open ICPSR regardless of affiliation with an ICPSR member institution. You do have to pay a $600 deposit fee to store your data (unless you are affiliated with a member institution, then it is free). I recommend checking out the ICPSR YouTube channel for videos on Open ICPSR, as well as user support videos for ICPSR (https://www .youtube.com/user/ICPSRWeb). ICPSR social media include Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, Google+, LinkedIn, and Slide Share. THE LIBRARIAN’S FAVORITES This is the section for everything that doesn’t have a section. It’s an eclectic mix of resources that might interest the transnational crime researcher, from databases to crowdsourced data. Rutgers Gray Literature Database Gray literature includes materials and research produced by organizations outside of commercial or academic publishing venues. This includes, but is not limited to, technical reports, memoranda, conference proceedings, and government publications. The Rutgers Gray Literature Database (http://njlaw.rutgers.edu/cj/gray/search.php) is one of my favorite criminal justice resources because it brings these nonconventional materials together. To find transnational crime information in this database, you’ll want to search by either topic, country, and/or crime type as a keyword. I recommend using the drop-down menu to search by Subject Keyword so that you don’t limit your searching to titles only. Some links are provided to documents within the databases; but in many cases, you’ll need to copy/paste the document title into a search engine such as Google.

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Database of Worldwide Terrorism Incidents The Rand National Defense Research Institute has created an amazing database for the terrorism researcher (http://smapp.rand.org/rwtid/ search_form.php). Currently, the database includes data from 1972 to 2009 (Rand is still collecting data, it just hasn’t been added yet). What I like most about the database is how many facets are available to focus search. While you can search by an incident description and/or date, the more unique searches are “perpetrator” (e.g., Zero Point—People’s Revolutionary Army or Liberia Peace Council), tactic (e.g., arson or kidnapping), weapon (e.g., firearms or remote-detonated explosive), and target (e.g., abortion related or telecommunication). You can also select the output format, either a list, pie chart, or chronological graph (by day, month, or year). Ted Talks I like Ted Talks (http://www.ted.com) because the talks are relatively short yet packed with information. The website also provides a transcript that makes the talks easy to cite. If you simply search for transnational crime, you won’t find anything (at least not as of late 2016). I recommend clicking into the topics, where you can select Crime or Criminal Justice. Currently, the Crime section has the most talks, with transnational crime covered through talks on terrorism, global crime networks, and human trafficking. You’ll also want to search through the alphabetical list of topics to see if anything is interesting; you’ll find more videos about trafficking in the Trafficking section than the Crime section. I’m not quite sure how they’ve chosen the topic headings, so you’ll want to do some digging. Ted Talks social media include Facebook, Twitter, Google+, Pinterest, Instagram, and YouTube. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) To access information on FBI investigations into transnational crime, select What We Investigate from the About Us section of the FBI website (http://www.fbi.gov). Here, you can click into more information on transnational crime topics, such as terrorism, corruption, human rights, money laundering, organized crime, and art theft. When you select a specific topic, you’ll be taken to an overview of FBI operations and partners. You may also find recent news articles about the topic and more specific, in-depth information about operations, major cases, and training. FBI social media include Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube. Havocscope: Global Black Market Information Did you know it costs $30,000 to buy a kidney in the United States? I guess it’s better than the $47,000 you’d pay in China. This is according

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to Havocscope: Global Black Market Information, which truTV called a “consumer report for the underworld” (see http://www.havocscope .com/about/). I know it isn’t very academic or scholarly, but it has some interesting information that is taken from open-source documents such as newspapers and government reports. All data sources are listed on each post, so you track down the information. If nothing else, you might want to spice up your next lecture with the knowledge that it costs $10,500 to be smuggled from Iraq to the UK! Havocscope social media include Facebook and Twitter. I Paid a Bribe I Paid a Bribe (http://www.ipaidabribe.com) is brought to you by Janaagraha, which is a nonprofit organization focused on strengthening democracy in India by supporting participation in local government. This website aims to tackle corruption though the collective by allowing people to report on corrupt acts happening in the country. The reports section of the website is the most interesting. It is broken down by region for number of bribes, number of honest officers, and other information. You can also see percentages in major cities, departments, such as the police, and can also get this in table view. If you are researching corruption and bribes, this is a must-see. It is a great example of citizen reporting to collect crime data. Additionally, if you are ever asked to pay a bribe in India, there is a bribe hotline you can call for advice! I Paid a Bribe social media include Facebook, Twitter, Google+, and YouTube. ACADEMIC JOURNALS While I wanted to present a collection of open access online materials, there are a number of academic journal titles that I believe are worth mentioning. I’m not going to list every possible academic journal that could be used to research transnational crime; these titles stood out to me as titles you might not know about, or ones that were more specialized to transnational crime topics. For more academic journals, visit the UN Library research guides discussed earlier. None of the titles discussed here are open access, meaning that they all have a subscription fee. I recommend talking with your local academic library about access, including interlibrary loan options. Global Crime (Formally Transnational Organized Crime) Global crime focuses on the study of crime across international settings. Volume 17, Issues 2 (2016) covers topics about illegal wildlife entering the United States, organized crime, port security, and the mafia.

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Journal of Art Crime The Journal of Art Crime is a peer-reviewed publication of the Association for Research into Crimes against the Arts. The journal includes academic papers, research reports, and reviews about specific pieces of art and also pieces that discuss impact and implications of art crime. Journal of Human Trafficking Journal of Human Trafficking began in 2015 and publishes scholarship about trafficking in persons and contemporary slavery, focusing on gaining an understanding of the global dimensions of human trafficking. Maritime Policy & Management Maritime Policy & Management provides an international perspective on the maritime industry. Research and analysis on transnational crime and piracy are published in this journal, but the journal is not focused on crime. I recommend searching within the journal to discover the articles focused on piracy. Studies in Conflict and Terrorism Addressing security challenges that develop from natural resources disputes, transnational organized crime, and other topics, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism publishes theoretical and empirical studies that provide an understanding of the cause of terrorism and insurgency. Trends in Organized Crime Trends in Organized Crime presents analysis on organized crime issues. The April 2016 issue discussed the illicit tobacco industry in Greece, Italy, and Sweden. The March 2016 issue was a special issue on wildlife crime. CONCLUSION I’d like to wrap-up this chapter by saying, “There you go, transnational crime research online in a nutshell,” but there is simply no way that this is an exhaustive list of online sources for researching transnational crime. I encourage you to spend as much time as you can in the online research guides from Peace Palace Library and the UN Library, as I believe these are invaluable resources for discovering more! I hope this chapter has introduced you to some new online resources for researching transnational crime. But, remember, one chapter can never replace the expertise of a real-life librarian, so I recommend visiting your local library early and often!

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REFERENCES Barberet, R. (2013). Measuring and researching transnational crime. In P. Reichel & J. Albanese (Eds.), Handbook of transnational crime and justice (pp. 47–62). Los Angeles, CA: Sage. Hickey, V. (2013, March 11). The fight to end wildlife crime is a fight for humanity [blog post]. Retrieved from http://blogs.worldbank.org//voices/Fightto-End-Wildlife-Crime-Is-Fight-for-Humanity. Van Dijk, J. (2008). The world of crime: Breaking the silence on problems of security, justice, and development across the world. Los Angeles, CA: Sage.

CHAPTER 2

International Efforts to Measure Transnational Crime and Their Implications for Criminologists Alejandra Gómez-Céspedes and Salomé Flores Sierra Franzoni1

The concept of transnational crime was first introduced by the United Nations Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Branch in 1974, to guide the discussion for the Fifth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders that took place in Toronto, Canada, in 1975 (Madsen, 2007; Roth, 2014). The agenda included nine topics that were selected due to their transnational or comparative international significance. The working paper prepared by the secretariat concluded with possible areas of crime control that would be problematic and would require the attention of the United Nations within the following 10 years, but more specifically it concluded that if the trend of crime went from national to transnational, it then should encounter international action and reaction. However, it was not until 1988 that the international community adopted the UN Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (known as the Vienna Convention), as a result of concern caused by the transnational nature of drugs, crime, and money laundering (Madsen, 2007). Years later, in December 2000, came the adoption of the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (UNODC, 2004) with its supplementing protocols (the Palermo Convention) and last, but not the least, in 2003, came the adoption of the UN Convention against Corruption (the Merida Convention). Thus, gradually the international community consolidated a holistic response to contain the crimes of transnational nature.

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After all these years, national and international cooperation to suppress transnational crime has made significant achievements and has reduced the power of some large-scale criminal organizations such as the Colombian cartels, the Italian Mafias, or the Japanese Yakuza. However, transnational organized crime remains a concern for many governments. Nevertheless, the political interest in transnational crime has been the competition between international bodies over control mechanisms (Levi, 2005). One of the unintended and undesirable consequences of international political concern is the overlap of programs and mandates from different international agencies. To mention just a few, one may look at the mandates of the Council of Europe, the European Union, the Financial Action Task Force, the International Monetary Fund, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, the United Nations (namely UNODC), the World Bank with another country (e.g., the U.S. Department of State) or other regional organizations (e.g., OAS). Before going any further, we need to clarify what we mean by transnational crime. According to the Palermo Convention (Art. 3.2), an offence should be considered transnational if it meets any of these four requirements: • It is committed in more than one state. • It is committed in one state but a substantial part of its preparation, planning, direction, or control takes place in another state. • It is committed in one state but involves an organized criminal group that engages in criminal activities in more than one state. • It is committed in one state but has substantial effects in another state.

Furthermore, if the offense also includes the involvement of an organized criminal group2 operating transnationally, then the phenomenon begins to become more complex, especially for measurement. In the last 40 years, research into transnational crime has contributed much to the field of criminology and other disciplines. Scholars and academics have written thousands of articles and books on this or related topics. It is enough just to get a close look at ad hoc databases such as the one kept by the Jack & Mae Nathanson Centre on Transnational Human Rights, Crime and Security (http://nathanson.osgoode.yorku .ca/) or to ad hoc journals like Global Crime (http://www.tandfonline .com/loi/fglc20), Trends in Organized Crime (http://link.springer.com/ journal/12117), or even Crime, Law and Social Change (http://link.springer .com/journal/10611). Also in recent years, there have been substantial initiatives within the criminal justice systems around the world. Large budgets have been earmarked for the establishment of intelligence centers, asset recovery offices, law enforcement special units, judicial and law enforcement cooperation, special prosecution offices, or financial intelligence units.

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Furthermore, criminal codes have been updated in most countries, and both national and international agencies produce situational reports describing the problem. And despite all those efforts, we are not yet close to producing valid estimates of the total transnational crime taking place. One of the pending subjects of the Palermo Convention has to do with the discussion, analysis, and generation of reliable data on transnational organized crime. Clearly, the Palermo Convention stipulates (Art. 28) that: i. Each State Party shall consider analyzing, in consultation with the scientific and academic communities, trends in organized crime in its territory, the circumstances in which organized crime operates, as well as the professional groups and technologies involved. ii. States Parties shall consider developing and sharing analytical expertise concerning organized criminal activities with each other and through international and regional organizations. For that purpose, common definitions, standards and methodologies should be developed and applied as appropriate. iii. Each State Party shall consider monitoring its policies and actual measures to combat organized crime and making assessments of their effectiveness and efficiency.

THE MEASURING OF TRANSNATIONAL CRIME There are certain elements to be taken into account before embarking on the measurement of transnational crime. The first and probably the most obvious is that the term “organized crime” is often used synonymously with transnational crime (Hill, 2005). However, this is not always the case. While it is true that many transnational crimes are perpetrated by organized criminal groups, there are also organized criminal groups that engage in exploiting local criminal markets. That is the case, for example, of some organized crime syndicates operating in Japan, Canada, Mexico, the United Kingdom, or the United States. In this chapter, we will be considering transnational crime as that committed by organized criminal groups that operate transnationally. A major setback for measuring transnational crime refers to a lack of data availability and reliability. If the measurement of traditional crime is already complicated due to a large number of variables, measuring transnational organized crime is even more complex. First of all, the majority of criminal statistical systems operate on a national level, and we rarely know whether a crime originates in the country in which it is reported or whether it originates elsewhere. Following on that, recorded criminal statistics collect only the offenses known to the police or other similar competent authority. Considering the dark figure of crime (i.e., those crimes that go unreported), there have been major efforts to improve the measurement

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of crime by complementing police-recorded crime with victimization and self-report offender surveys. The problem with transnational organized crime measurement is that usually when it comes to the attention of law enforcement entities and these succeed in persecuting and arresting the perpetrators, that particular crime is recorded as a specific offence (i.e., drug trafficking, vehicle theft, fraud, child pornography, human smuggling, cybercrime, human trafficking). Ideally, there should be a tag indicating that a specific criminal activity (or activities) were committed by an organized criminal group.3 Another complication is that we cannot resort to conventional victimization surveys because since ordinary households are not directly victimized by organized crime, these surveys cannot be used as a vehicle to measure this phenomenon (van Dijk, 2007). Most victimization surveys, including the International Crime Victim Survey (ICVS), and the Latin America and the Caribbean Crime Victimization Survey Initiative (LACSI-VICLAC), measure only a limited number of crimes, which are not transnational in nature. Or perhaps they are, but it is unlikely that the informant would know this (Barberet, 2014; Jan van Dijk, 2008). In all, traditional criminal statistics do not provide data on the extent of transnational organized crime but more on the performance of law enforcement and judicial entities. Certainly, many countries have specialized agencies responsible for monitoring exclusively transnational organized crime activities, and these agencies have valuable databases. However, these institutions pose two major problems for the researcher. The first one has to do with the negotiation of research access with many times reluctant gatekeepers. The second one refers to the fact that these agencies may only have reliable information on transnational organized crime that has failed and has come to the attention of law enforcement entities. In fact, Póczik (2011) notes that only wrong organized crime is visible because successful organized crime is always invisible and thus, visibility determines the limits of our knowledge of the phenomenon. This issue was also referred as an obstacle in the discussion of the Expert Working Group Report on International Organized Crime (Picarelli, 2010). In general terms, today there are only a handful of countries that collect data on (national or) transnational organized crime. Some other countries can provide interesting proxies. But the fact is that most countries do not collect transnational organized crime data due in part to a lack of expertise or resources, or both (Hill, 2005). One thing to bear in mind though is that transnational organized crime measurement may take many different paths depending on the starting point. That is, even carefully collected results can be misleading if the underlying context of assumptions is not the same. For this reason, any measurement of transnational organized crime must be attached to a conceptual framework that provides a system of concepts, assumptions, expectations, and theories that support and light the way.

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Before starting any exercise linked to the measurement of transnational crime one must clearly define what specific aspect will one be measuring because it is not the same to aim for measurements of organized criminal groups, or measurements of illegal markets or measurements of legal markets exploited by organized criminal groups operating transnationally. Collecting data for measuring organized crime poses some challenges for the researcher. First, systematic data on organized criminal groups is scant, not only about its presence but also about those the people that are part of these groups and about the illegal activities in which they are engaged. Also, depending on the features of transnational organized crime one specifies, measurements will rarely be the same as we are looking into a very dynamic phenomenon moving according to specific local and transnational contexts. It is not as if there have not been prominent measurements of transnational crime but in most cases, these efforts have not been very successful, or they have provided only a part of the whole, which often remains unknown. In this chapter, we would like to refer and assess three major studies that have attempted to quantify different aspects of transnational organized crime by showing their strengths and weaknesses. The studies are as follows: • Assessing transnational organized crime: Results of a pilot survey;4 • Mafia markers: Assessing organized crime and its impact upon societies;5 • Measuring Organized Crime in Latin America: A methodology for developing and validating scores and composite indicators for measuring Organized Crime at national and subnational levels.6

Assessing Transnational Organized Crime: Results of a Pilot Survey This study was conducted by the then United Nations Centre for International Crime Prevention7 under its Global Programme against Transnational Organized Crime in an attempt to build the knowledge base for organized crime groups and develop a comparative framework that could provide reliable information on organized crime trends to monitor the Palermo Convention. The project conducted a survey in 16 selected countries and one region, collecting information on 40 organized criminal groups. A detailed questionnaire was sent out to each country and in each country, a focal point was identified. The questionnaire in itself consisted of approximately 50 variables, under the following general themes: Name, structure and activities of the group in question; law enforcement responses; ethnic and gender dimensions; the community and social context of the group’s activities; the use of violence by the group; its level of professionalism

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based on information about its modus operandi and activities; the use of corruption to facilitate illegal activities; the ability to influence the political process; the group’s transnational links, including with other organized crime groups; and finally the role of the group in the legitimate economy. (United Nations Centre for International Crime Prevention, 2000, p. 54)

The national focal points, that is, the informants who filled out the questionnaires came from a variety of institutions including academic research institutes, law enforcement entities, intelligence bodies, or state research agencies. The sample was not representative, and the selection of countries depended largely on the belief that there was sufficient technical capacity and data availability. Admittedly, this was an imperfect method but it certainly was a first step in the right direction, and the results of the study shed light on how an overall system of data collection and analysis could be scaled-up in a second phase.

Contributions to the Project (Benefits and Added Value) Undoubtedly, one of the most important findings of this project is that data collected at the international level gave way to developing a detailed and comparative analysis on transnational organized crime groups. While it is true that there are aspects that can be improved, the survey found a diversity of groups engaging in transnational organized crime, suggesting that when one talks of transnational organized crime in a variety of countries, one is often referring to very different phenomena. From the data collected, the experts were able to identify five different typologies of transnational organized crime groups8: • Standard hierarchy: A single hierarchical group with a strong internal system of discipline. • Regional hierarchy: Hierarchically structured groups, with strong internal lines of control and discipline but with relative autonomy for regional components. • Clustered hierarchy: A set of criminal groups, which had established a system of coordination/control, ranging from weak to strong, overall their various activities. • Core group: A relatively tightly organized but unstructured group, surrounded in some cases by a network of individuals engaged in criminal activities. • Criminal network: A loose and fluid network of persons, often drawing on individuals with particular skills, who constituted themselves around an ongoing series of criminal projects.

Obstacles Data on organized crime groups across the world are uneven and often dominated by information coming from developed countries. Furthermore,

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informants tend to report data on organized crime groups that have a high public profile and are many times enhanced by the media. And as it has already been said repeatedly, media-induced imagery does a disservice to the seriousness with which to approach the study of this phenomenon (von Lampe, 2004; Levi, 1998). Thus, data collected on organized crime groups will be biased toward more visible groups in detriment of less visible, unconventional, and smaller criminal networks. Data Flaws Certainly, 40 groups do not constitute a sample large enough to draw any statistical inference but the data collected do, in fact, contribute to the construction of broader conclusions about the nature and structural typology of organized crime groups. We have no intention of being repetitive, but perhaps one of the major limitations of the information regarding accuracy refers to the fact that the survey relied on the subjective judgement of those completing the survey and they in turn selected the groups in which there were more available information and more visibility. The last point has to do with data comprehensiveness. The questionnaire did not collect information on the social and cultural contexts in which organized crime groups developed and conducted their activities and thus isolated them and portrayed them as static entities. Although the exercise of collecting information on organized criminal groups is important, it is certainly not enough. Information on (transnational) criminal markets is essential to any understanding of transnational organized crime groups and the level of harm they both entail. The last point on this issue has to do with timeliness. Data on organized crime groups were not homogenous in temporal terms and some cases; the data were a little outdated. This raises questions on the use of data for policy making as for monitoring trends in transnational organized crime one requires up-to-date data. Recommendations The Palermo Convention stipulates that member states should consider collecting and analyzing data on organized crime and that this should be achieved in consultation with the scientific and academic communities. Thus, two things are recommended on this issue. First, those antiorganized crime agencies consider having a special trend analysis unit; and second, that such unit employs expert researchers or agree to a partnership with the research community to help practitioners see the larger picture and identify emerging and nontraditional threats from transnational organized crime. The exercise of an international organization like UNODC conducting a survey on transnational organized crime groups is possible if some

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improvements are achieved. First, the questionnaire should be upgraded by adding perhaps more variables on the political and social contexts and on the criminal markets. Furthermore, the questionnaire should set up a reference period (e.g., the 12 previous months) and the data collection should be systematic and collected on an annual or biannual basis. Finally, national focal points or informants in each country should come from specialized anti-organized crime units. Mafia Markers: Assessing Organized Crime and Its Impact upon Societies Drawing from the World Economic Forum (WEF) surveys, the Merchant International Group (MIG) risk assessment reports, studies by the World Bank Institute and official crime statistics, this study attempted to construct a Composite Organized Crime Index (COCI) by combining data on the perceived prevalence of organized crime, money laundering, unsolved homicides, grand corruption, and the extent of the underground economy. The COCI drew data from the WEF annual surveys among CEO’s of larger companies, conducted across 102 countries from 1997 to 2003. The questionnaire contains a question on the perceived prevalence of organized crime defined as “mafia-oriented racketeering extortion.” These results were later compared to the MIG database, which assesses investment risks (including different types of organized crime) in over 150 countries. These two sources were combined in order to construct an Organized Crime Perception Index (OCPI). Then the OCPI was cross-compared to other sources of data, thus throwing interesting correlations. Main Contributions of the Project (Benefits and Added Value) The study presents an attempt to develop an alternative measurement of organized crime that can be used for statistical analyses of its correlates and impact. It emphasizes that both official criminal statistics and household victimization surveys are not sufficient to generate data on transnational organized crime and thus, develops an alternative model of measurement through a COCI, which in turn contains another composite index on Organized Crime Perception (OCPI). The first statistical marker of organized crime resulted from the perception among business executives and risk consultants that organized crime activities were common in one country. Other proxy indicators included instrumental violence, corruption of public officials, and money laundering activities. The study developed a proxy to measure “mob-related violence,” which included the rate of unsolved homicides,9 per 100,000 population. Similarly, by drawing data from the World Bank Institute’s databases, the study

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developed a proxy indicator for “high levels of corruption” and by drawing data from the World Economic Forum surveys among business executives, the study developed proxy indicators for money laundering and the extent of the underground economy. All three proxy indicators showed strong correlation to the OCPI, thus providing a baseline for further enquiry. Main Obstacles Perhaps one of the main obstacles of the study is that it has the potential to conduct analyses of the macro correlates of organized crime, but it is unable to provide data in order to make country assessments that can serve public policy purposes. Main Data Flaws There are various concerns regarding the quality of the data behind the COCI. The first concern refers to the selection of business executives, their knowledge about the topic, and their real understanding of transnational organized crime. The results of the business surveys are based predominantly on perceptions and thus, the results must be viewed with caution because they may shed imprecise results subject to a high degree of subjective interpretation. The second drawback has to do with the composite index per se. Usually, the goal of composite indices is to combine a variety of statistical data into one single indicator representing a powerful way to draw attention on difficult-to-measure crimes and thus conveying the message that measurement is possible. However, at the same time, indices present some weaknesses that should be borne in mind: • Data are drawn from various different sources that collect information with distinct methodologies; • Different multidimensional concepts (e.g., perceived prevalence of organized crime, money laundering, unsolved homicides, grand corruption, and the extent of the underground economy) are lumped together, and it frequently becomes unclear what is exactly being measured; • The person constructing the index will introduce several elements of subjectivity by selecting what and what not should be introduced in the index; • The results usually provide a ranking of countries but this may not constitute an actual measurement of the given phenomenon and will not provide direct data that may be used for policy purposes.

Recommendations The study provides very interesting correlations; but certainly, they should be corroborated to a more micro level and observe similarities and

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differences across countries. Nevertheless, the index may play a very important role at an initial phase. Measuring Organized Crime in Latin America: A Methodology for Developing and Validating Scores and Composite Indicators for Measuring Organized Crime at National and Subnational Levels This study was conducted by the Transcrime Joint Research Centre on Transnational Crime with the active support and funding of the Center of Excellence (CoE) in Statistical Information on Government, Crime, Victimization and Justice10 with the aim of creating a solid framework for measuring organized crime in order to generate valid indicators that may improve the effectiveness of government and law enforcement actions. Main Contributions of the Project (Benefits and Added Value) The study proposes a methodology for assessing the characteristics of organized crime in Latin American countries taking as a starting point the available data in administrative records other than homicides. Moreover, the study proposes a two-level methodology. On LEVEL I, scores are calculated at the national level. They are mainly based on qualitative data that can be calculated even if data are of poor quality. LEVEL II generates a composite indicator for countries in which there is available information at the subnational level. Both levels collect information on five different dimensions, which are as following: (1) the presence of organized crime groups, (2) activities, (3) state response to the organized crime, (4) the factors that enable the presence of organized crime, and (5) the response of civil society through media, activism, and research on organized crime. In practice, these dimensions contained a set of subdimensions and specific variables that prove hard to collect, especially at the subnational level and considering that one of the criteria for collecting data was that it had to be official data. Main Obstacles The study identified different levels of data quality and data availability across the different countries in Latin America. More specifically, three different categories of countries were identified: • Countries with very few or no information; especially on the state response and civil society dimensions. • Countries with good qualitative data at the national level; particularly, data on illegal markets and other criminal activities. • Countries with available and reliable data, both qualitative and quantitative at national and subnational levels.

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Unfortunately, only three countries of the Latin America region were able to provide more than 70 percent of the 44 indicators required by the study and only 1 country provided both qualitative and quantitative, reliable data at the national and subnational level. Main Data Flaws One of the main findings was precisely the lack of available data to conduct the study. The kind of data required by the authors of this study resided in more than one administrative data source. It was observed that there were some limitations, including the quality of the data, coverage problems or levels of disaggregation, missing records, and timeliness of the data (i.e., not always updated). Therefore, one of the main flaws was not the methodological model per se but the fact that there was no available data to feed the model. Recommendations By the conclusions reached on this study, no reliable assessment can be produced in the absence of reliable data. Thereby, the authors urge countries to start improving their data collection to have a greater precision of analysis and orient efficient policies. Undoubtedly, one of the most important recommendations is to support better collection practices, uses and analysis of data across countries of Latin America and the Caribbean to improve their administrative records and consequently use them to monitor organized crime. Moreover, having accurate data are crucial for developing robust analysis that may guide policy making oriented to confront organized crime. IMPROVING DATA QUALITY AND AVAILABILITY The international community is well aware of the growing necessity of producing a broader range of statistics covering the full spectrum of criminal events. A comprehensive understanding of crime entails collecting data at different stages and from different sources; thus data are needed from all the stages investigation, arrest, prosecution, conviction, and imprisonment; from different sources—administrative records, population and business surveys and even from alternative systems, such as geographical information surveys and big data. In 2013, the United Nations Statistical Commission (UNSC) and the UN Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice (CCPCJ) jointly approved the report named “Road map to improve the quality and availability of crime statistics at the national and international levels.” The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and the National Institute of Statistics and Geography (INEGI) of Mexico developed this

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report, which includes some specific activities for improving crime statistics at the global level around three pillars: • Developing new standards and methodologies • Improving institutional capacity to produce data on crime and justice • Improving international data collection and analysis

DEVELOPING NEW STANDARDS AND METHODOLOGIES In order to improve the statistical systems of crime and justice from a methodological point of view, the roadmap proposes to work on specific aspects such as the development of an International Crime Classification for Statistical Purposes (ICCS). The ICCS is a methodological tool that allows grouping crimes in a meaningful, systematic, and comparable manner in order to facilitate its recording, counting, and further analysis. This tool was developed to address the challenges posed by recording and counting crimes gathered from different data sources, between institutions of the criminal justice system, between jurisdictions and even between different legal systems. The rationale behind the ICCS is that it contains precise descriptions rather than legal definitions and that all conducts that constitute a crime in any given country and that are sanctioned should be included in this classification in order to provide a more precise count of all crimes. The relevance of this methodological tool goes beyond crime counting as it was developed to gather not only crime counts but additional elements to characterize crimes and its context, which is extremely useful for analytical purposes. Namely, this classification proposes to collect attributes about the context of the crime, its motivation, the victim, the perpetrator, their relationship, and the location in which the crime occurred, among others. The ICCS is based on the principles of mutual exclusivity, exhaustiveness, statistical feasibility, and precise description, and it was developed after three years of consultations and testing rounds with the participation of around 70 different countries. In 2015, this classification was endorsed by both the statistical community by the UN Statistical Commission and by the policy makers in the UN CCPCJ. Currently, UNODC as the custodian agency of the ICCS leads the activities required for its implementation and also coordinates a Technical Advisory Group (TAG) that will ensure its consistency and completeness over time. This roadmap focuses on strengthening the capacities to produce statistics on common crimes, but it also contains a section on the demand for developing methodologies to measure nonconventional crimes such as transnational organized crime, cybercrime, corruption, money

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laundering, smuggling of migrants, human trafficking, and environmental crimes. Traditional crime statistical systems were not conceptualized to capture these emerging crime issues. Thus, the roadmap proposes to collect and disseminate good practices to measure these types of crimes. Other sources of unconventional data could be explored for producing information on crime, such as geographical information systems, real estate databases, and financial information systems. There is a continuous request from countries to international organizations for developing guidelines on the use of alternative data sources that can provide an overview of criminal activities and its emerging dynamics at the national, regional, and transnational level. Administrative records have been so far the traditional source of data on crime; however, its coverage is insufficient. For this reason, complementary data sources, such as population surveys designed to explore the perception and experience of victims of crime are required. UNODC as responsible for producing research and crime estimates at the global level is decisively promoting the development of victimization surveys in different regions and especially in Latin America and the Caribbean, through its Center of Excellence for Statistical Information on Government, Crime, Victimization and Justice in alliance with the Mexican Statistical Office (INEGI). Another necessary step is to assimilate the gender perspective into crime statistics, as it is key to identifying differences and inequalities in the situation facing men and women in matters of crime and criminal justice. In this sense, it is central to identify those crimes that are mainly targeted at women and require special consideration to formulate appropriate policies to prevent and reduce them effectively. IMPROVING INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY TO PRODUCE DATA ON CRIME AND JUSTICE In most countries, crime statistics are not part of the regular data production within its statistical systems. Achieve the integration of crime statistics within statistical systems demands capacity building for articulating a comprehensive program that can produce relevant information for the majority of its users, policy makers, researchers, and the society in general. The institutional arrangements for producing crime statistics may vary from country to country; however, regardless, the responsible institution should be capable of following the best practices in order to ensure quality and fostering coordination in order to avoid overlapping. Although in some countries there are specialized bodies that produce crime statistics, for example, the U.S. Bureau of Justice Statistics or the National Centre for Crime and Justice Statistics in Australia, in other countries, these capacities are outsourced, for example, in the United Kingdom, where the Office

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for National Statistics is responsible for crime statistics but collects them with support from external contractors. The role of National Statistical Offices in producing or helping in producing crime statistics is promoted extensively at the global level as these offices can contribute technically and methodologically to ensure the quality and impartiality of statistical data. The UN roadmap proposes to strengthen the role of National Statistical Offices in generating, analyzing, and disseminating statistics on crime and justice, either independently or jointly with other criminal justice authorities. Improving International Data Collection and Analysis UNODC has the mandate to collect statistics on crime worldwide to produce relevant research that is useful for formulating policies on prevention and reduction of crime and also to evaluate the performance of the criminal justice system. In recent years, data on homicide have been widely used as a reference for analyzing violent crime. UNODC has produced a number of Global Studies on Homicide using data provided by the UN member states. Other reports on relevant issues such as drugs, human trafficking, and smuggling of migrants and wildlife have been produced using the data that this UN agency collects every year. These reports are an obligated reference on crime issues not only at the national level but mainly at the regional and global level. Analyzing crime trends across countries is effective for identifying criminal phenomena that affect more than one country and is extremely useful for finding shared solutions to shared problems. Hence, it is essential to continue improving the quality of crime statistics considering basic elements such as accuracy, timeliness, accessibility, and comparability. However, it is required to collect data with greater disaggregation levels to characterize and provide more elements on the context in which crimes occur. Furthermore, expanding the coverage of international repositories of crime data should be a priority, as collecting data at the national level is insufficient to feed crime prevention policies that have proven to be effective for solving crime problems nationally and locally. SETTING UP NEW PRIORITIES: THE SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT GOALS In 2015, the global community endorsed a new post-2015 development agenda, establishing the well-known Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). For the first time, the discussions ended with a common perspective of considering security and the rule of law as a critical element for sustainable development across the world. This agenda includes 17 goals aimed to promote actions by all UN member states to

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end poverty and hunger, ensure better health services, education, availability of water, access to energy, promote sustainable economic growth, promote gender equality, ensure inclusiveness and safety in cities, take actions to alleviate climate change, and finally, to promote peaceful and inclusive societies. In this context, Goal 16 states that the UN member states should promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable, and inclusive institutions at all levels. The global community has established a set of targets and indicators to monitor the activities undertaken to achieve this international commitment. These cover extremely relevant issues such as violence and related deaths, human and endangered species trafficking and torture, the rule of law and equal access to justice, illicit financial flows, corruption, accountability of government institutions, and nondiscrimination, among others. The agreement reached by the international community through this development agenda is historic and monitoring its progress represents a huge challenge for crime and criminal justice statistics. On the one hand, it will have a positive influence on crime statistics regular production as it demands precise figures on agreed-upon topics. On the other hand, this agenda is challenging the existing methodologies and traditional crime data sources and forcing them to move forward and find creative ways to capture criminal activities that are currently hidden from any statistical radar. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS To make decisions based on intuition, ideology, or conventional wisdom would probably scandalize any scientist (regardless of the discipline); but curiously enough, it does not seem to bother decision or policy makers. Certainly, not all decisions are the same, and probably there will be times where it is worth flipping a coin. But many other times, and especially when public funds are at stake, decisions should be rational and based on the best possible evidence that exists at the time. Unfortunately, this is not always the case. In fact, Welsh and Farrington (2007) have pointed out various programs (and policies) that continue to exist despite accumulated evidence of their ineffectiveness or even harm. In the case of transnational organized crime, this is even more serious. Policy or program evaluations are rarely conducted and no one knows for sure the extent and nature of the phenomenon at the national or international level. The knowledge we have today about transnational organized crime in the international context is fragmented and full of inconsistencies. Even though the international community has made significant progress particularly in terms of regulation through international legal instruments and political concern, much remains to be done especially in the area of meaningful metrics. On the one hand, transnational organized

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crime measurement is a pending issue to be resolved. On the other, we cannot continue to endorse far-reaching and costly anti-transnational organized crime interventions and policies without any way of knowing, and to what extent, they are having the desired result. In this chapter, we selected three case studies to highlight some of the difficulties inherent in the measurement of transnational organized crime. The common thread that ran throughout the discussions focused primarily on the lack of reliable data, but there are other points that should be taken into account in order to set a benchmark for the data-generating process. First and foremost, we must consider the issue of comprehensive and quality data. A major failing of most governments worldwide has been in not generating data for (transnational) organized crime in official crime statistics. Today, when one looks at a homicide database, it is practically impossible to disaggregate the homicides that have been perpetrated by organized criminal groups or in the course of transnational organized criminal activities. The same goes for other types of crimes. Moreover, little or no effort has been made to collect data on other important dimensions of organized crime, other than the presence of organized criminal groups. Thus, police-recorded criminal statistics tell us very little about transnational organized crime. There are some other records though that could shed some light on the phenomenon. However, that takes us to the next point, that of transparency. “Transparency” ideally means opening the books in terms of data, analyses, and methodologies. Unfortunately, much anti-transnational organized crime law enforcement work occurs behind closed doors and it becomes very difficult for criminologists to have access to anti-organized crime databases. One last point in this area is that specialized databases will show only the transnational organized crime that is known to law enforcement agencies leaving out a dark figure, which we are unable to estimate at this time. Another essential issue has to do with sound methodology. Whatever analytical approach is chosen, it should be subjected to a scientific method. Failure to do so is one of the most common causes of measurement failure. Certainly, in the case of transnational organized crime, there are complex forces that prevent proper metrics, but sometimes it seems to have more to do with a wish for governments to take action regardless of the evidence. The fourth point of relevance is capability and expertise. One cannot have good evidence without good experts. People skilled in quantitative methods and intelligence analysis are remarkably valuable. It is therefore ironic that the statistical departments of government institutions, especially those within the criminal justice system are usually understaffed and with very low budgets. In conclusion, the goal for transnational organized crime metrics is unquestionably important, and it is encouraging that it has received vocal

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support at the highest international political levels. However, measured against the various issues for an effective approach, it seems that current practices continue to fall short. As our claims of knowledge about transnational organized crime are now quite modest, we should embark on a set of analytical tools and methodologies to collect data about crimes, criminals, and the exploitation of illegal markets. NOTE S 1. “International Efforts to Measure Transnational Crime and Their Implications for Criminologists,” by Alejandra Gómez-Céspedes and Salomé Flores Sierra Franzoni, © 2016, United Nations. The opinions expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the United Nations. 2. Art. 2 (a) states that “Organized criminal group” shall mean a structured group of three or more persons, existing for a period of time and acting in concert with the aim of committing one or more serious crimes or offences established in accordance with this convention, in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit. And “structured group” shall mean a group that is not randomly formed for the immediate commission of an offence and that does not need to have formally defined roles for its members, continuity of its membership, or a developed structure. 3. As recommended by the International Crime Classification for Statistical Purposes (ICCS). The ICCS will be addressed later in this chapter. 4. See, United Nations Centre for International Crime Prevention (2000). 5. See, van Dijk (2007 & 2008). 6. See, Dugato, De Simone, and Savona (2014). 7. The Centre for International Crime Prevention (CICP) along with the United Nations Drug Control Programme (UNDCP) were UN bodies dealing with drugs and crime headquartered in Vienna (Austria), which later merged into the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) in 2003. 8. Ibid., p. 75. 9. This rate was calculated by deducting the total number of convictions for homicide from the total number of police-recorded homicides. Both types of data were drawn from the UNODC Crime Trend Survey. 10. The Center of Excellence is a joint project between the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and the National Institute of Statistics and Geography in Mexico (INEGI). It is based in Mexico City and it started operating in 2011.

REFERENCES Barberet, R. (2014). Measuring and researching transnational crime. In P. Reichel & J. Albanese (Eds.), Handbook of transnational crime and justice (2nd ed., pp. 47–62). Los Angeles, CA: Sage. Dugato, M., De Simone, M., & Savona, E. U. (2014). Measuring organized crime in Latin America: A methodology for developing and validating scores and composite indicators for measuring organized crime at national and subnational levels.

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Unedited. Retrieved from http://www.cdeunodc.inegi.org.mx/articulos/ doc/measuringfinalTRANSCRIME.pdf. Hill, C. (2005). Measuring transnational crime. In P. Reichel (Ed.), Handbook of transnational crime and justice (pp. 47–65). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. Levi, M. (1998). Perspectives on “organised crime”: An overview. The Howard Journal, 37(4), 335–345. Levi, M. (2005). Foreword. In P. Reichel (Ed.), Handbook of transnational crime and justice (pp. IX-XI). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. Madsen, F. G. (2007). Organized Crime. In T. G. Weiss & S. Daws (Eds.), The Oxford handbook on the United Nations (pp. 611–619). Oxford: Oxford University Press. Picarelli, J. T. (2010). Expert working group report on international organized crime. Discussion Paper (NCJ 230846). Washington, DC: National Institute of Justice. Póczik, S. (2011). Crime research, organised crime and social consequences in Hungary. In U. Töttel & H. Büchler (Eds.), Research conferences on organised crime at the Bundeskriminalamt in Germany: 2008–2010 (pp. 111–129). Köln: Luchterhand. Reichel, P. (2005). Handbook of transnational crime and justice. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. Roth, M. P. (2014). Historical overview of transnational crime. In P. Reichel & J. Albanese (Eds.), Handbook of transnational crime and justice (2nd ed., pp. 5–22). Los Angeles, CA: Sage. United Nations Centre for International Crime Prevention. (2000). Assessing transnational organized crime: Results of a pilot study of 40 selected organized criminal groups in 16 countries. Trends in Organized Crime, 6(2), 44–92. United Nations Economic and Social Council Statistical Commission (UNSC). (2013). Report of the National Institute of Statistics and Geography of Mexico and the United Nations Office on drugs and crime on a road map to improve the quality and availability of crime statistics at the national and international levels. New York: United Nations. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). (2004). United Nations convention against transnational organized crime and the protocols thereto. New York: United Nations. van Dijk, J. (2007). Mafia markers: Assessing organized crime and its impact upon societies. Trends in Organized Crime, 10, 39–56. van Dijk, J. (2008). The world of crime: Breaking the silence on problems of security, justice, and development across the world. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. van Duyne, P. C., Jager, M., von Lampe, K., & Newell, J. L. (2004). Threats and phantoms of organised crime, corruption and terrorism: Critical European perspectives. Nijmegen: Wolf Legal Publishers. Welsh, B. C., & Farrington, D. P. (Eds.). (2007). Preventing crime: What works for children, offenders, victims and places. Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Springer.

CHAPTER 3

Victimology and Transnational Crime Jana Arsovska and Sara Cronqvist

Although writings with a focus on victims appeared in some early criminological works, transnational crime and victimization have been neglected topics for a long time. Today, victimological challenges are increasingly being posed within the context of collective conflicts as well as crossborder crimes. The general “crime problem” is composed of both old and new forms of crimes, including environmental crimes, human and drug trafficking, and cybercrimes, among others. These, often cross-border, crimes create new types of victims and a compelling need for better international responses to the needs of those victims. This chapter discusses existing research on victims of various transnational crimes and elaborates on the existing international standards for treatment of victims of such crimes. INTRODUCTION Transnational crime and the victimization it causes is a topic that has been neglected in both victimology and criminology for a long time. Identifying the victims of transnational crimes is not always easy, because it requires taking both geographical and temporal dimensions of victimization into consideration; also, the victim often remains hidden. Since the mid-1970s, countries around the world have come to realize that their criminal justice systems place little attention to victims’ needs and do not have proper victim assistance and identification programs. Also, there were no national or international professional standards. A landmark for the global reform movement in the area of victimology was the United Nations Declaration on the Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power adopted by the UN General Assembly

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in 1985. The UN Declaration addressed the rights of victims of abuse of power, although only marginally. This omission was corrected by the subsequent Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law adopted in 2005 by the UN Commission on Human Rights. Together, these documents have set some basic international standards for the treatment of victims. Meanwhile, globalization has led to the rise of new forms of crossborder crimes, which pose challenges to national criminal justice systems around the world. Inadequate arrangements for law enforcement cooperation allow perpetrators of transnational and international crimes to escape prosecution and leave victims without legal recourse. Consequently, people have become more vulnerable to new forms of victimization, while some states have started challenging existing (domestic-oriented) arrangements for victim support. However, although international criminal law has been expanding over the years, it still remains a challenge to prosecute offenders in jurisdictions outside their country of residence and to provide proper support for victims of cross-border crimes and serious human rights violations (Letschert & van Dijk, 2011). This chapter provides an overview of the profiles of victims affected by various transnational crimes, and discusses, albeit briefly, the relationship between globalization, emerging threats to human security, and the development of new international agreements to protect and empower victims. It briefly touches upon various dimensions of victimization such as, for example, the source of victimization, legal framework, intentionality of the perpetrator, victim vulnerability, the victim’s perception of victimization, type of victimization, the severity of victimization/harm, the victimoffender relationship, the victim’s contribution to the event, and so on. Although in the academic literature, victimizations are often divided in cross-border and collective victimizations (see, Letschert & Groenhuijsen, 2011), this chapter will focus mainly on cross-border victimization, which often occurs when the victim becomes victimized in a foreign country. Collective victimization, on the other hand, occurs when the crimes affect entire communities; it mainly refers to cases of international crimes such as genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. METHODOLOGY The chapter is based on systematic literature review. Using a combination of keywords related to transnational crimes and victimology1 and databases such as EBSCOhost, GoogleScholar, OneSearch, and JSTOR, we managed to collect a number of scholarly articles that we then screened for their relevance. The general searches produced a large number of articles, however, only a small number of articles were based on empirical research and focused on victims of transnational crime rather than

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offenders. More specifically, we considered articles to be relevant for our analysis if those were empirical studies on victims of transnational crimes (i.e., discussed who are the victims and what are their characteristics) or articles that were evaluating policies that are designed to protect the victims of transnational crimes and to address their specific needs. Since there are numerous transnational crimes, we limited our search to several important traditional and emerging categories: terrorism, environmental crime (with a focus on trafficking of wildlife and waste), cybercrime (with a focus on online identity theft and phishing), and human trafficking (with a focus on sexual exploitation). After going through the available literature, we identified on average 10–20 relevant scholarly articles per crime category that focused on victim profiles and transnational crime victimization. In our analysis, we summarized the findings of the scholarly literature, and we discussed reports on transnational crimes and victimization published by major organizations, such as INTERPOL, the UNODC, Europol, RAND, the U.S. Department of State, and so on. THE GLOBAL STANDARD FOR THE TREATMENT OF VICTIMS: AN OVERVIEW The word “victimology,” the study of victimization and victims of crime, had its origin in the writings of Beniamin Mendelsohn (1956, 1976) whose work led to the creation of the World Society of Victimology (WSV) in 1979; an organization dedicated to serving victim needs across the world. The efforts of the WSV and other similar organizations led to the 1985 United Nations Declaration on the Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power, which covers a broad range of topics, from respect for dignity and fair treatment to trainings for law enforcement officials and restitution. This declaration is a remarkable achievement for everyone concerned with victims’ rights because it obliges states to address the needs of traditional victims of crime as well as victims of abuse of power, including victims who have suffered “substantial impairment of their fundamental rights, through acts or omissions that do not yet constitute violations of national criminal laws but of internationally recognized norms relating to human rights” (United Nations, 1985). However, the rights of victims of international crimes such as genocide were not aptly addressed in this declaration, which led to the development of the UN Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law (United Nations, 2005). The discussion on global victims’ rights, however, did not end with the adaption of the UN guidelines. Since the UN Declaration is not legally binding, victimology experts argued that the implementation of the

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principles of justice for victims should be made the subject of a welldeveloped UN Convention, similar to the UN conventions against transnational organized crime and corruption. The WSV and the International Victimology Institute of Tilburg University (INTERVICT) organized a meeting in 2005 to discuss the content of this convention, which resulted in a draft UN Convention on Justice and Support for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power. The long-term goal was to have UN member states propose a formal consideration of the draft text (Letschert & Groenhuijsen, 2011). Moreover, the European Union and the Council of Europe have also drafted binding and nonbinding instruments offering protection to victims of crime. These include the EU Council Framework Decision on the Standing of Victims in Criminal Proceedings (2001) and the EU Directive on Compensation to Crime Victims (Letschert & Groenhuijsen, 2011). Lastly, a historical landmark in the promotion of global victims’ rights is the establishment of the International Criminal Court (ICC), which prosecutes international crimes, including genocide. The growing attention for international humanitarian law has led to the inclusion of procedural victim rights in the court’s statute and rules of procedure. Victims have been given the right to participate in the proceedings, in accordance with the UN Victims Declaration of 1985 and the 2005 guidelines. In summary, over the last decades, states have made some progress in raising awareness of victims’ rights and establishing mechanisms for providing protection, access to justice, and reparation to victims of various crimes (Letschert & van Dijk, 2011). Victims’ rights policies have been developed, although mostly in the more developed countries of the world. Yet, whether future criminal trials against perpetrators of international and transnational crimes will be more victim-centered than in the past remains to be seen since it is not yet the reality. Existing victim protection schemes have remained largely domestic in scope. Also, although there are financial and economic crime victims, victims of corruption and fraud, and victims of transnational organized crimes, including human trafficking, empirical research that focuses on transnational crime victims is still scattered and lacking, particularly when compared to existing research that focuses on offenders of transnational crimes (see Table 3.1). As indicated in Table 3.1, approximately 5–10 percent of the literature on major forms of transnational crimes focuses on victims and about 90–95 percent on offenders. Next, we will summarize the state of affairs of victims of transnational crimes, as presented by limited scholarly articles and government reports. Various forms of cross-border victimizations will be discussed. Basically, who are the victims of some major forms of transnational crime? What makes them vulnerable? How are they treated by the criminal justice system?

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Table 3.1 Google Scholar Results Replacing Victim/Victimology with Offender Transnational crime AND victim AND victimology [journal]

Transnational crime AND offender [journal]

Transnational terrorism AND victim AND victimology [journal] (# = 1,120)

Transnational terrorism AND offender [journal] (# = 19,600)

Transnational environmental crime AND victim AND victimology [journal] (# = 1,320)

Transnational environmental crime AND offender [journal] (# = 19,800)

Transnational wildlife trafficking AND victim AND victimology [journal] (# = 289)

Transnational wildlife trafficking AND offender [journal] (# = 7,280)

Transnational waste trafficking AND victim AND victimology [journal] (# = 174)

Transnational waste trafficking AND offender [journal] (# = 2,790)

Transnational cybercrime AND victim AND victimology [journal] (# = 202)

Transnational cybercrime AND offender [journal] (# = 2,590)

Transnational online identity theft AND victim AND victimology [journal] (# = 450)

Transnational online identity theft AND offender [journal] (# = 8,470)

Transnational phishing AND victim AND victimology [journal] (# = 54)

Transnational phishing AND offender [journal] (# = 536)

Transnational human trafficking AND victim AND victimology [journal] (# = 831)

Transnational human trafficking AND offender [journal] (# = 12,700)

Search date: July 15, 2016.

VICTIMS OF TRANSNATIONAL CRIMES Terrorism Defining terrorism is not easy because there is no single internationally accepted definition. The Global Terrorism Database (GTD), for example, defines it as “the threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence by a non-state actor to attain a political, economic, religious, or social goal through fear, coercion, or intimidation” (GTD, 2014; Institute for Economics and Peace, 2015). According to a report prepared by the Institute for Economics and Peace and based on the data from the GTD, crimes committed by terrorists have increased approximately 80 percent in 2014 (from 18,111 in 2013 to

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32,685 in 2014), and the number of people who have died from terrorist activity has increased nine times since 2000. Research shows that 57 percent of all attacks and 78 percent of all deaths occurred in five countries: Iraq, Nigeria, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Syria. Between 2000 and 2014, excluding the attack in New York City on September 11, 2001, only 0.5 percent of deaths from terrorism have occurred in the West. Including the 9/11 attack, the percentage reaches 2.6 (GTD, 2014; Institute for Economics and Peace, 2015), yet research often focuses on terrorism activity in the West. Research demonstrates that the civilian population constitutes up to 90 percent of all terrorist-related deaths worldwide (Albrecht & Kilchling, 2010). Also, there is an indication that victims of terrorism are not random targets but are selected (Institute for Economics and Peace, 2015), so the question is, who are these victims and what made them vulnerable? Research has identified two main forms of terrorism target selections: focused and indiscriminate. In the former, targets are purposely chosen (e.g., high-level political figures), while in the latter the target is the civilian population (Kratcoski, 2001). Both forms produce two types of terrorist victimization: primary and secondary. Primary victims are, for example, those who are killed or tortured by terrorists or hostage-takers; are wounded or die in a counterterrorist operation at the hands of terrorists; and so on. Secondary victims are those persons close to primary victims such as family and friends, first responders who become traumatized, people who experience income loss, and so on (Letschert & Staiger, 2009). In general, ideology can affect target selection because it identifies enemies of the group and legitimizes the use of violence by dehumanizing the victims. Target selection is often determined by the level of security and presence of capable guardians in the area, the resources of the group, the potential for public attention, and the desired reaction from society (Drake, 1998). Today, targets that involve public places used by the civilian population have replaced targets with economic, political, or religious symbolism. Public areas are attractive because they are a part of victims’ daily routine activities such as being a place of employment, commute to or from work, are difficult to protect, and have a likelihood of producing media coverage and destruction, while providing anonymity for offenders (Letschert & Staiger, 2009; Shichor, 2007). One can identify commonalities in victim selection and means used by examining previous terrorist attacks. In the 1980s, Italy experienced several terrorist attacks involving bomb explosions on trains. The attacks strategically occurred at selected times and days, such as during the morning rush hour in Bologna, or the day before Christmas in Val di Sambro. Both attacks targeted civilians, primarily working people and those traveling for the Christmas holiday (Tota, 2005). Additional terrorist attacks using similar methods include the bomb explosion on the Pan Am flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland, killing 270 people on December 21, 1988; the

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September 11 terrorist attacks in 2001, which killed nearly 3,000 people; the Bali bombings on October 12, 2002, that killed 202 people and injured 209 people; the 10 bombs that exploded on 4 different trains in Madrid, Spain, on March 11, 2004, killing 191 people and injuring 1,800; and the four bombs that exploded on London underground trains and one doubledecker bus in the United Kingdom on July 7, 2005, killing 52 people and injuring 700 (Letschert & Staiger, 2009; Tota, 2005). Canetti-Nisim, Mesch, and Pedahzur (2006) empirically tested the randomness and the lifestyle-exposure theories to explore risk factors of terrorism victimization. Their findings refute that the risk of terrorism victimization is random and found that risk factors are related to a person’s lifestyle exposure. They created a database featuring all terrorist events in Israel between 1993 and 2002. Similar to cases previously discussed, the suicide attacks were mostly carried out in public places with a presence of a lot of people and low security, such as on public transportation (32.2%), in shopping centers (25.2%), and restaurants (15.1%). The research population consisted of 738 terrorism victims with 54.9 percent (405) being victims of suicide bombs (Canetti-Nisim et al., 2006). The method of suicide attacks gives the offender an ability to close in on selected targets, while killing and injuring a large number of victims at once (Letschert & Staiger, 2009). The authors concluded that (in descending order) nonsettlers, university and school students, women, unmarried, individuals passing by the area, who are less religious, and older, were significantly more likely of becoming victims of suicide bomb terrorism. Interestingly, women were more likely to be victims of suicide bomb attacks (46.20%) than non-suicide (23.10%), while men were more likely to be victims of non-suicide attacks (76.9% versus 53.8%). According to Canetti-Nisim et al. (2006), this can possibly be explained by women’s dependence on public transportation and presence in markets for household purposes. Occupation was not an indicator of victimization risk because both blue-collar and whitecollar occupations were found to have similar likelihood of becoming victimized in various types of attacks (Canetti-Nisim et al., 2006). Similarly, Weinberg, Pedahzur, and Canetti-Nisim’s study (2003) using data on suicide bombers and victims in Israel found that 63.6 percent of the victims were from Israel, 20.4 percent were students, 16.1 percent pupils, 12.5 percent retirees, and 46.2 percent women. Interestingly, the authors suggest that both the suicide bombers and victims tended to share social background, with both being from the lower strata of their respective societies with a lot in common. As seen in other attacks, the working class of the civilian population is often targeted, as well as children, young people, and women. In addition, Weinberg et al. (2003) suggest that those Israelis, who travel in private automobiles, dine at home or at small, upscale restaurants stand a better chance of avoiding terrorism victimization.

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Shichor (2007) found previous attacks to be an additional risk factor for a future attack. For example, the World Trade Center in New York, Bali, and Sharm El Sheikh in Egypt are among the locations that have been targeted more than once. He also suggests that victims of terrorism, and victims of other crimes such as hate crimes, are experiencing many of the same psychological and physical effects, yet are treated differently by the public and government agencies. In general, since 2000, the fight against global crime has been overshadowed by the “war on terrorism.” An increasing number of attacks in the West, like 9/11, have forced governments to make counterterrorism their first security priority. Over the years, there have been concerns that the fight against terrorism will result in expansion of the powers of the state at the expense of civil liberties, which could subsequently lead to more victimization and more terrorist attacks. Even though the Council of Europe has, for example, drafted guidelines on the Protection of Victims of Terrorist Acts (Albrecht & Kilchling, 2010), the unintended consequences of the war on terrorism need to be studied more carefully. More qualitative, cross-national and systematic research is needed in this area to bring solid conclusions about the effectiveness of policies. Finally, terrorist attacks are often financed through committing other transnational crimes. It has been reported, although not confirmed, that Al Qaeda’s East Africa branch, Al-Shabaab, uses ivory sales to fund terrorist attacks like the one in Nairobi’s Westgate mall in 2013. Some also claim that Boko Haram, the Islamic State’s West Africa affiliate, is in part underwritten by ivory. Although such links were never proven, the former U.S. secretary of state Hillary Clinton and other politicians have made repeated assertions that ivory funds terrorism and thus leads to another level of victimization as it is a crime against the environment (McConnel, 2015; Kalron, 2011). Environmental Crimes All societies are facing environmental crime as one among many modern threats to the environment and human/animal life and this is due to the unlimited exploitation of natural resources and pollution. Since its inception in 1984, the Environmental Investigation Agency has been exposing environmental crime around the globe and has sought greater political support for strong enforcement action against these crimes. With stricter regulations in the developed world, environmental victimization has gone from national to international. Yet, despite the growing prevalence of “green” issues in the 21st century, the study of environmental victimization has been notably absent from policy discussions. It is only in the last decade that more attention has been placed on environmental crimes (White, 2008; UNODC, 2008). Environmental crimes can be broadly defined as illegal acts, which directly harm the environment. They include illegal trade in wildlife;

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smuggling of ozone-depleting substances (ODS); illicit trade in hazardous waste; illegal, unregulated, and unreported fishing; and illegal logging and the associated trade in stolen timber (UNODC, 2008). Perceived as “victimless,” such crimes often fail to prompt the required response from governments. In reality, as we will see in the examples of wildlife and waste trafficking, environmental crime is certainly not a victimless crime. The harmful effects impact the quality of water, soil, and air, the survival of endangered species and climate change, and so on (UNODC, 2008). Wildlife Trafficking In the past decade, according to U.S. Fish and Wildlife Services (2016), the wildlife trafficking, including the poaching of protected species and the illegal trade in wildlife, has escalated into “an international crisis.” Analysis of empirical studies illustrates identifiable trends in sought out victims of this crime. Alacs and Georges (2008) conducted a study based on data of wildlife seizures by the Australian Customs between 2000 and 2008, along with case prosecutions from 1994 to 2007. In this study, the most trafficked animals were reptiles (43%) such as snakes, lizards, turtles, frogs, and crocodiles. The biggest seizure of reptiles in Australia occurred in 2003, with the attempted smuggling of 219 reptiles and frogs. Reptiles are sought out victims because they can be sold for a high price on black pet markets, are easy to conceal and transport alive (Alacs & Georges, 2008). They are also used for exotic food dishes in Asia, are desired by international collectors in Europe and the United States, and are believed to be cheaper than traditional household pets (Warchol, Zupan, & Clack, 2003). The second most trafficked wildlife in Australia was birds (26%). Live birds have been replaced with bird eggs as they are easier to conceal and are believed to have a lower mortality rate during transportation (Alacs & Georges, 2008). Other studies have found bird markets to be highly profitable, specialized, and organized and dominated by international collectors, breeders, and dealers (Warchol, Zupan, & Clack, 2003). One Australian parrot egg can, for example, be sold for $30,000 on the international black pet market. One of the largest seizures of birds reported involved the attempted export of 31 native bird eggs in 1995 with an estimated worth of at least $300,000 (Alacs & Georges, 2008). The third most seized wildlife were native plants (11%) such as cutoff parts, tree ferns, and orchids. In addition, the Australian Customs detected two shipping containers in 2003, containing 160 kg of wildlife products and body parts of endangered tigers, snakes, rhinoceros, and pangolins and bile from bears. Unfortunately, however, the authors found that less than 1 percent of the seizures led to prosecution. Seventy percent of those prosecutions resulted in a fine with the maximum value of $30,000; 22 percent of the prosecutions resulted in a prison sentence (Alacs & Georges, 2008).

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Moreover, Rosen and Smith (2010) conducted a study based on 967 internationally recorded wildlife seizures by TRAFFIC (the wildlife trade monitoring network) from 1996 to 2008. In accordance with the previous study, the primary victims found among recorded wildlife seizures of living animals were 127,643 reptiles (69%). The majority (51%) of the seizures consisted of massive quantities of mammals and mammal derivatives such as animal skins, pelts, and furs, primarily from leopards and tigers, but also of pandas and pangolins. Twenty-five percent of seized mammal derivatives were ivory. Over the period of 12 years, more than 42,401.38 kg of elephant ivory was seized that was computed to represent more than 5,367 elephants. Sollund conducted a study in 2013 on environmental crime in Norway based on interviews with Norwegian police officers, customs officers, environmental crime coordinators, and individuals who have smuggled illegal reptiles into Norway, and verdicts on breaches of CITES regulations and customs laws. Sollund found that in 2008, 112 animals were confiscated of which 23 were reptiles, 51 birds, and 27 live mammals. In 2009, 541 live animals were confiscated on 40 occasions, of which 397 were reptiles, 24 birds, 22 eggs, and 88 mammals (Sollund, 2013). Warchol, Zupan, and Clack (2003) conducted a study examining wildlife trafficking in South Africa and Namibia. They collected data through interviews with U.S. law enforcement and intelligence officials (U.S. customs, DEA, FBI, CIA), local law enforcement (customs officials, park managers, and police), and representatives from nonprofit conservation organizations. South Africa was identified as a major transshipment center, with warehouses filled with hundreds of confiscated ivory tusks and rhino horns originating from other countries. Once again, these two countries were also dominated by the trafficking of reptiles, birds, mammals, and plants, all for specific reasons. This study found that African cats are targeted and victimized for primarily three reasons: protecting local livestock, for the international demand for pets and hunting, and body parts usage in “muti” or traditional African medicine (Warchol, Zupan, & Clack, 2003). According to the UNODC (2016), there is a market for almost every part of tigers and big cats. Visitations to African markets, display body parts such as leopard paws against bad luck, pelts, and bones from leopards and African cats for holistic remedies, and clothing for healers. Mothers are killed, and cheetah cubs are found to be especially targeted, trafficked, and sold internationally, especially to the Middle East for collection purposes as a symbol of status and wealth (Warchol, Zupan, & Clack, 2003). Wildlife trafficking is truly a global phenomenon occurring in both developed and developing countries. According to UNODC (2016), every country in the world plays a role, either as a source, transit, or destination country. Recorded seizures in Rosen and Smith’s study (2010) originated

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from more than 101 countries. India accounted for 20 percent of all seizures, 11 percent in China, 10 percent in the United Kingdom, 6 percent in the United States, 6 percent in Belgium, 6 percent in Australia, and 6 percent in Malaysia. South and Southeast Asia was identified as a hotspot for wildlife trafficking (Rosen & Smith, 2010). Southeast Asia is also identified as a so-called hotspot in a study using data of recorded wildlife seizures made at ports of entry in the United States. According to Petrossian, Pires, and van Uhm (2016), during the period between 2003 and 2012, the United States recorded 37,445 imports of illegal wildlife trafficking originating from 192 nations. Over half (52%) came from six countries: China, Indonesia, Thailand, the Philippines, Mexico, and Canada. Sixty-nine percent of all seizures used methods of air cargo and personal baggage. Almost one million specimens were seized using air cargo, approximately 300,000 from personal baggage, and more than 200,000 from mail shipments. Ninety-five percent of all the seizures contained dead animals. It also follows the wildlife specimen trends previously discussed; 29 percent reptiles (150,000), 26 percent mammals (750,000), followed by mollusks (800,000), birds (330,000), corals (152,000), and fish (172,000) (Petrossian et al., 2016). As demonstrated, trafficking of wildlife is not a victimless crime. The methods used are very harmful to the animals that are trafficked under horrific conditions. Wyatt’s study (2009) focuses on the illegal fur and illegal falcon trades in the Russian Far East and found that smuggling occurs via every route possible; air, water, rail, and road. Falcons were often found wrapped in cloth, taped and closed inserted into tubes where temperatures can reach 40 degrees Celsius. Their eyes being sewn shut to reduce nervousness. Birds, reptiles, and eggs are also often found being smuggled on individuals in specially designed vests, underwear, pockets, prosthetic legs, suitcases, cargo, or in mail packages (Wyatt, 2009). Reptiles have also been smuggled and found inside ornaments, books, computer hardware, socks, stockings, toys, and in cigarette packets (Alacs & Georges, 2008). These horrific conditions lead to high mortality rates, and many of them are dying from the stress and lack of food and water, or are found in very poor conditions. Incidents of animals eating their offspring while in transit have been recorded (Wyatt, 2009). According to Rosen and Smith (2010), some of the trafficked animals are sick, and rarely diagnosed, and this may have or will result in a much bigger pool of potential victims including other animals and humans falling ill from global spreads of viruses, bacteria, or diseases, noted in recent years such as SARS, or Ebola (Rosen & Smith, 2010; Wyatt, 2009). Countries should indeed be doing more to prevent and control this ever-increasing crime (Sollund, 2013). The UNODC made an important first step in tackling the crime of wildlife trafficking by publishing its first global assessment report of world wildlife crime in 2016, but

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there is still much more that needs to be done in order to prevent further victimization. Waste Trafficking Waste trafficking is another significant environmental crime, highly related to environmental injustice often neglected by policy makers. With globalization, the handling of waste has gone from national to transnational, and the most vulnerable populations become victims of the hazardous effects. In attempts to demonstrate the transnational nature of waste trafficking, Bisschop (2012) published a study based on governmental sources, research reports, corporate documents and documents by civil society actors. In addition, 50 interviews were conducted with the government, the private sector, and civil society actors. Field visits were conducted to Antwerp, Belgium, and the port of Tema in Ghana, and the Agbogbloshie dumpsite. She found that the victims of waste trafficking consist mainly of humans, and the surrounding environment in countries of destination such as Nigeria, Ghana, Cameroon, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Togo, and Senegal in Africa, along with Hong Kong in Asia. Countries that have weaker governments, regulations, and socioeconomic situations, often due to wars or conflicts, are sought out and victimized. Importing waste is a way of increasing revenue through taxation, but the waste is often wrongly declared as second-hand goods. Without the knowledge or equipment to handle waste properly, hazardous and deadly effects follow both on the environment as well as human health (Bisschop, 2012). Bisschop and Vande Walle (2013) conducted a follow-up case study analyzing the illegal transports of electronic waste (e-waste) from the port of Antwerp in Belgium to Ghana. Their study shows that the primary victims are the workers at the recycling—and dumpsites, who are participating in their own victimization. Workers consist of both adults and children, who often are working 3–5 years before illness takes over and they go home to die (Bisschop & Vande Walle, 2013). Additional victims are the ones who are living nearby and use the contaminated water, inhale the toxic smoke from the burning of waste, and eating the crops. Victims often belong to the most vulnerable groups working or living near polluting factories or landfills, which are often strategically located in the poorest areas and nations such as Africa and Southeast Asia. There are additional victims across borders as well since this crime toxifies the air, water, and soil that vegetables and fruits are grown on prior to being exported. The victims are, therefore, often unaware of their victimization. Since the hazardous waste is negatively affecting the world’s ecosystems and contributing to climate change, significant long-term permanent effects will unfold in the future and contribute to additional victims (Bisschop & Vande Walle, 2013).

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Furthermore, Martuzzi, Mitis, and Forastiere (2010) examine environmental injustice by reviewing a total of 47 studies on the management of waste from the United States and Europe. The authors found that waste facilities (waste incinerators, landfills, and hazardous waste sites) are often disproportionally located in areas with minorities. There was a correlation between a person’s race, income, residence, and their likelihood of being exposed to environmental hazards. Ethnicity was identified as a strong predictor of the presence of toxins. In France, hazardous sites were more common in towns with high proportions of immigrants. In Italy, and the United Kingdom, a direct relationship between a person’s social status and residence’s proximity to waste management sites was identified. In Hungary, waste sites and illegal disposals of hazardous material such as asbestos was disproportionally located in working-class areas and communities with high proportions of ethnic minorities, predominately the Roma population, who also were found to live in contaminated areas. In Campania, Italy, an association between mortality due to cancer, socioeconomic status, and waste site exposure was identified. In New York, an additional association between birth defects and residence located close to NPL hazardous waste sites was also identified, with the strongest association found among the American Indian/Alaska Native population (Martuzzi et al., 2010). A study of illegal waste transportation in the Czech Republic identified 26 illegal dumpings of waste, amounting to about 30,000 tons, appearing to have originated in Germany. It was dumped illegally on open fields, lots, farms, airfield, warehouses, and even legal landfills. In January 2006, the Czech authorities discovered 4,000 tons of municipal waste, some of which was contaminated, and hazardous, once again, appeared to have originated from Germany and dumped near the village of Libcˇeves in North Bohemia. The dumps were set fire on three occasions, releasing additional hazardous smoke into the air (Vail, 2007). Similarly, White (2008) conducted a case study of a toxic dumping that occurred in Abidjan, Ivory Coast, in August 2006. Based on media reports, the population suffered the hazardous effects of the toxic waste for a long time after the event. Similarly, the waste was dumped in the poorest parts of the city, where legal landfill sites and garbage dumps could be found as well. As a result of the toxic dumping, 16 people died, over 100,000 people sought medical attention, and 75 people were hospitalized for nosebleeds, vomiting, and nausea (White, 2008). Overall, the limited research illustrate how environmental crime is a crime of the powerful and that victims are often the most vulnerable people in society; the poor, ethnic minorities, individuals with lower socioeconomic status, children, workers at polluted sites, and both humans and animals living close by waste sites, who are the ones being seriously affected by the longterm health consequences of hazardous waste trafficking (Bisschop, 2012; Marconato et al., 2009; Martuzzi, Mitis, & Forastiere, 2010). Environmental crime should be a policy priority and more research is required.

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Cybercrimes Broadly stated, the term “cybercrime” refers to crimes committed or facilitated via the Internet; it involves the use of computers and other electronic networks and can range from stealing millions of dollars from private bank accounts to unsolicited e-mails and downloading illegal music. Although it is impossible to place cybercrime into one crime category, cybercrime at an individual level, often includes identity theft, sexual solicitation, fraud and phishing, while large-scale cyber attacks can include the theft of government or corporate secrets through criminal trespass (NSPC, 2012). For example, in a Wolak et al.’s (2006) study, 4 percent of young American respondents reported having been a victim of aggressive sexual solicitation online. Furthermore, U.S. statistics from 2012 indicate that roughly 10 percent of Internet users reported being a victim of online scams or phishing. Today, one common form of malware is “ransomware.” The cybercriminals in these cases target vulnerable victims and try to extort money from them either by locking their devices and demanding money to release them, or by accusing them of crimes (Dredge, 2014). On an institutional level, a pilot Computer Security Survey of U.S. businesses found that nearly 75 percent of responding companies had detected at least one incident of cybercrime in 2001 (Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2004). In the same survey, 68 percent of the companies reported financial effects due to cybercrime, resulting in $61 million in losses and recovery costs. Estimated recovery costs for computer viruses were near $22 million. Costs from computer fraud were an estimated $18 million (Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2004). Moreover, active online users have been found to be more likely victims of cybercrimes than less active users (Oksanen & Keipi, 2013). It has also been noted that young people tend to be more active users of new technologies, and as a result, they are more likely to become victims online compared to older users (Ngo & Paternoster, 2011; Ybarra, 2004). The FBI, for example, reported that more than 50 percent of victims of online sexual exploitation are 12–15 years old and most of the sexual advances take place in Internet chat rooms and through instant messaging (Kempf, 2012). Lastly, experts predict that cybercriminals will start targeting more often bigger companies in the private and public sector rather than home users in order to maximize profits. The health care industry is also expected to be a target because of the amount and variety of personal data health care companies manage (Dredge, 2014).

Cybercrime Fraud (Identity Theft and Phishing) “Identity theft” and “identity fraud” are terms used to refer to all types of crime in which someone wrongfully obtains and uses another person’s

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personal data in some way that involves fraud or deception, typically for economic gain (U.S. Department of Justice, 2017). With globalization and developed technology, identity thefts no longer require direct physical contact between victim and offender. Instead, identity theft has increasingly become a transnational and virtual crime. According to the 2015 National Crime Victimization Survey an estimated 17.6 million Americans, or about 7 percent of U.S. residents age 16 or older, were victims of identity theft in 2014. Most identity theft victims (86%) experienced the fraudulent use of existing account information, such as credit card or bank account information. The number of elderly victims of identity theft increased from 2.1 million in 2012 to 2.6 million in 2014 (Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2015). Although more research in this area is needed, some scholars provide useful insights on victimization and target selection related to online identity theft and phishing. For example, Leukfeldt (2014) and Leukfeldt and Yar (2016) tested routine activity theory in the context of cybercrime in the Netherlands, with a follow-up study on phishing victimization. A sample of 9,163 respondents, 15 years or older who used the Internet, were ultimately selected from a cybercrime victim survey in the Netherlands. The questionnaires were administered in 2011, using random sampling. Both studies found that financial characteristics do not play a significant role in increasing or decreasing the risk of cybercrime victimization. In addition, none of the personal background factors tested were found to play a significant role in increasing risk. Instead, their studies found that both men and women, all ages, all education, and income levels all had an equal chance of being a victim of online identity theft and phishing. In contrast, the U.S. NCVS found that more females (9.2 million) than males (8.3 million) were victimized between 2012 and 2014, and persons in households with an annual income of $75,000 or more had the highest chance of becoming victims of identity theft. Among racial groups, whites experienced identity theft at higher rates. In the United States, victims ages 25 to 64 (8%) had the highest rate of identity theft, compared to all age groups (Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2015). Reyns (2013) conducted a study using a sample of 5,985 respondents from the 2008 to 2009 British Crime Survey in England and Wales and found that males, older individuals, and those with higher income and employment are more likely to be victims of online identity theft. Individuals with a higher income than £50,000 were 60 percent more likely to be victims of online identity theft than those making less than £50,000. Employed individuals (25%) and married individuals (25%) were also more likely to be victimized (Reyns, 2013). Williams (2015) conducted a study based on data from 26,593 interviews in 27 European countries and found that there are significant variations in online identity theft victimization across Europe. He identified risk factors that increase one’s vulnerability to become victimized. In fact, countries

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that are richer economically report the highest levels of online identity theft victimizations. In addition, the people who reported the highest levels of online identity theft victimization, and thereby are the most vulnerable, were those who reported themselves belonging to a low social status, while living in an economically rich country. The second most vulnerable group of individuals in richer countries were those who reported themselves belonging to a higher social status. The people least vulnerable to become victims of online identity theft were individuals who reported themselves belonging to an average social status. Those who reported themselves as belonging to average and high social status living in rich countries had lower victimization levels, compared to their equivalents living in poorer countries. Williams also identified online behaviors that increase the risk of victimizations in Europe such as being a frequent user of public computers such as university libraries or cafes, for example, the frequency of Internet usage, and selling goods on online websites such as eBay (Williams, 2015). Similarly, the only online behavior found to increase an individual’s risk of phishing and online identity theft in the Netherlands was targeted browsing (Leukfeldt & Yar, 2016). Moreover, Reyns (2013) also looked at online routines and identity theft victimization in England and Wales in an attempt to further expand the routine activity theory. Online behaviors such as banking, e-mailing, and instant messaging were found to increase the risk of online identity theft victimization by 50 percent. Online shopping and downloading music, movies or other media from the Internet increased the risk with approximately 30 percent (Reyns, 2013). Similarly, Umarhathab, Rao, and Jaishankar (2009) conducted a micro level study in India and found that 50 percent of the victims of identity theft surveyed had left personal information in Internet café’s while browsing, and 47 percent had shared personal information on social networking sites. Reyns and Henson (2015) conducted a study in 2009, using the Canadian General Social Survey with a sample of 11, 192 respondents, over the age of 15. Like previous studies, behaviors that significantly increased the likelihood of identity theft victimization are online banking, purchasing, and having personal information shared online. In addition, experiencing hacking, and phishing increased one’s risk of experiencing identity theft as well. Interestingly, strategies to prevent and reduce the risk of identity theft victimization such as changing passwords, or having anti-virus software was found to be ineffective (Reyns & Henson, 2015). Consumer fraud such as buying products online that are never delivered was more likely to happen to people who do online shopping and make purchases on online auction sites. For this form of cybercrime, less educated, those without paid work, and those who use the Internet more frequently, were more likely to become victims (Leukfeldt & Yar, 2016).

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Lastly, Reyns and Randa (2015) conducted a study in the United States based on data collected by the Bureau of the Census in partnership with the Bureau of Justice Statistics in 2012. The sample consists of individuals who were identified as victims of identity-related fraud in the National Crime Victimization Survey. The authors found that victims’ decision to contact the authorities following identity-related fraud victimization is based on the seriousness of the offense, how the crime was committed, individual victim’s characteristics, practical considerations, and the victim’s knowledge of who committed the crime. It is interesting since cybercrime offenses can often be transnational, and one’s knowledge of who committed the crime may very often be unknown. This may be a contributing factor as to why little is known about the amount of cybercrime occurring, and who the victims are. According to this study, specifically, a victim’s gender, age, and race did not influence their likelihood of reporting their victimization. Instead, people with lower income were more likely to contact the police. In addition, the victims who had knowledge of who the offender was were also more likely to report the crime. Emotional distress, personal and the financial loss, also affected their decision. Most victims did not report due to practical reasons (Reyns & Randa, 2015). Overall, there are very few empirical studies on victims of cybercrime. Studies on cyber victimology are conducted mainly in developed countries and not in developing countries. In particular, research on cybercrime victimology in Africa, Asia, or Latin America is lacking and is needed. Human Trafficking “Human trafficking” is an umbrella term for a variety of crimes associated with the recruitment, movement, and sale of people (including body parts) into a range of exploitative conditions around the world. Article 3 of the UN Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime and its Protocols defines it as “the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation” (United Nations, 2004, p. 42). While the true prevalence of human trafficking is unknown, the International Labour Organization (ILO) estimates that 20.9 million people are victims of forced labor around the world. This estimate includes both victims of labor and sex trafficking. Of this group, approximately 4.5 million people are victims of forced sexual exploitation, including approximately 945,000 children (ILO, 2012). According to the UNODC (2014), between 2010 and 2012, victims with 152 different citizenships were identified in 124 countries across

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the globe. Human trafficking is most commonly associated with the trafficking of women and girls for sexual exploitation; however, trafficking for forced labor—a category which includes, for example, manufacturing, cleaning, construction, catering, domestic work, and textile production—has increased in recent years. Some 40 percent of the victims detected between 2010 and 2012 were trafficked for forced labor (UNODC, 2014). Trafficking for exploitation that is neither sexual nor forced labor is also increasing. For example, trafficking of children for armed combat, or for forced begging, can be significant problems in some locations, although they are still relatively limited (UNODC, 2014). Also, while the trafficking of women for sexual exploitation has been explored at length, the trafficking of men and boys for both sexual and labor exploitation and the sale of body parts has received less attention. Females remain the majority of the victims detected globally. More specifically, 49 percent of detected victims are adult women; and 33 percent of detected victims are children (UNODC, 2014). In fact, estimates of the number of sex-trafficked minors vary widely. One organization provides estimates ranging from 1,400 to 2.4 million, although it acknowledges that credible numbers do not exist yet (Stransky & Finkelhor, 2008). During the 2010–2012 period, the share of males among the total number of victims detected globally ranged between 25 and 30 percent. The trend of victimizing underage boys has increased since 2004. Overall, however, the numbers of trafficked males for sexual exploitation remains relatively low, ranging between 2 and 5 percent (UNODC, 2014). Trafficking for Sexual Exploitation Trafficking for sexual exploitation is the major detected form of trafficking in persons in Europe and Central Asia. More than 65 percent of the victims detected in this region are trafficked for sexual exploitation. In the subregion of Eastern Europe and Central Asia in particular, sexual exploitation accounts for 71 percent of the victims (UNODC, 2014). The profiles of trafficking victims of sexual exploitation vary significantly since human trafficking spans all demographics. Research indicates that victims come from different socioeconomic and educational backgrounds and could be either undocumented or documented. The victims provide commercial sex, often against their will; some victims are kept behind locked doors, while others frequently interact with people, but the lack of understanding of human trafficking leads to an inability to identify them (Polaris, 2015). In general, human trafficking is difficult to recognize for many reasons. Since human trafficking is a transnational crime, victims tend to travel across jurisdictions, leaving no time for law enforcement to react. Also, they are often traumatized and “in some instances develop survival or

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coping mechanisms that manifest as distrust, deceptiveness and an unwillingness to accept assistance” (Polaris, 2015). Despite differences between trafficking victims, there are some shared vulnerabilities that lead to a greater chance of victimization. Research indicates that homeless youth lack supportive networks and are continuously exposed to new environments, which make them vulnerable to trafficking. According to one study conducted in Chicago, 56 percent of prostituted women were runaway youth approached by traffickers at shelters and transportation areas (Polaris, 2015). Also, foreign nationals in the United States are reported to be more vulnerable to trafficking. Traffickers situated in home countries make victims pay inflated travel fees, which frequently leads to debt bondage. This debt bondage subsequently creates economic dependency on the trafficker. Combined with a lack of knowledge of local languages and familiarity with the host country’s laws, this situation often leads to increased victimization among foreign nationals. Finally, research indicates that individuals who have suffered trauma in the past, in particular victims of sexual abuse, domestic violence, or war, are more vulnerable to trafficking for sexual exploitation (Polaris, 2015). According to Mandisa Lutya and Lanier (2012), additional important factors for understanding trafficking for sexual exploitation include victim-offender interactions, repeat victimization, and the victim’s lifestyle. The argument the authors make is that by interacting with offenders some individuals could be seen as precipitating their own victimization. For example, the victimizations may be affected by the daily activities of the potential victim, such as walking alone in the dark. Lifestyle activities such as drug abuse and frequent Internet use are important factors for explaining human trafficking of young women for sexual exploitation as well (Van den Hoven & Maree, 2005). Also, some women are prone to victimization because they act in ways that could be seen as provocative by offenders (Van den Hoven & Maree, 2005). In some situations of repeat victimization, victims become abusers themselves by copying the actions committed against them by the traffickers. They become violent and tend to recruit other women to involuntary prostitution (Mandisa Lutya & Lanier, 2012). Trafficking of children differs to some degree from that of adults in that family involvement in recruitment is more common. Young people trafficked for sex are not homogenous; all classes, races, genders and sexualities are represented (Finkelhor & Ormrod, 2004; Estes & Weiner, 2005; Gibbs et al., 2015). The most frequently described trafficking scenario include trading sex for basic needs (Adler, 2003); engaging in pimp-controlled sex trades; performing in pornographic films; and, among girls, servicing gang members (Estes & Weiner, 2005). A random sample of minor prostitution arrests found that most (57%) involved a third-party exploiter, 31 percent involved no third-party exploiter, and the remaining 12 percent involved familial exploitation (Mitchell, Finkelhor, & Wolak, 2010).

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Sex trafficked minors are frequently involved in foster care and child welfare services, as well as the juvenile justice system (Gibbs et al., 2015). It has been estimated that 85 percent of girls involved in sex trades come from homes involved with the child welfare system (Kotrla, 2010). These minors have frequently experienced physical and sexual abuse within their families (Alvarez, 2010; Brawn & Roe-Sepowitz, 2008). Gozdziak and Bump (2008) researched U.S. child survivors of sexual and labor trafficking and found that parents or grandparents were involved in 52 of the 56 cases researched. Child fostering is also common in many parts of the world, and it is not rare for children to be sent away to work for a relative or family friend. In Gozdziak and Bump’s study, all of the children worked in their home countries prior to being trafficked, which may have prevented the children from viewing themselves as victims when they were trafficked to the United States. Neglect and emotional abuse are also commonly reported in child trafficking cases (Alvarez, 2010; Harris, Scott, & Skidmore, 2006). Other factors include parental alcohol and drug use problems and chaotic parenting (Brawn & Roe-Sepowitz, 2008). A survey of 97 New York agencies that encounter young people in the sex trade found that 48 percent of the young people identified as commercially sexually exploited had involvement in both the child welfare and juvenile justice systems (Gibbs et al., 2015). Additionally, young people are at particular risk for trafficking if they run away from home or are pushed out of their homes for reasons that may include sexual orientation (Brawn & Roe-Sepowitz, 2008; Kotrla, 2010). In summary, more than 90 percent of countries have legislation criminalizing human trafficking since the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, under the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, came into force. Nevertheless, this legislation does not always comply with the protocol or does not cover all forms of trafficking and their victims, leaving far too many children, women, and men vulnerable. Even where legislation is enacted, implementation often falls short. The number of convictions globally has remained extremely low. Between 2010 and 2012, some 40 percent of countries reported less than 10 convictions per year. Some 15 percent of the 128 countries covered in this report did not record a single conviction (UNODC, 2014). Only 4 in 10 countries reported having 10 or more yearly convictions, with nearly 15 percent having no convictions at all. According to Gibbs et al. (2015), also little is known about public agency workers’ awareness and ability to identify human trafficking victims. Misidentification is a critical barrier to providing appropriate intervention to victims. For example, many law enforcement and service providers lack knowledge about sex trafficking of minors and they identify youth exploited in prostitution as juvenile offenders rather than as crime victims

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(Gibbs et al., 2015). An analysis of the National Incident-Based Reporting System (NIBRS) for 1997–2000 also found police officers being more likely to identify youth as juvenile delinquents or offenders than as trafficking victims (Finkelhor & Ormrod, 2004). THE FUTURE OF VICTIMOLOGY ON A GLOBAL LEVEL In terms of the geographic scope of the victimological research that has been produced over recent years, it would appear that victimology has become international. Some progress has certainly been made in this respect, but more comparative work is needed as well as work that focuses specifically on transnational crime victimization. Over the last three decades, victimology has evolved from a subject studied by only a few researchers in developed countries to one that generates worldwide interest but despite some progress, victimological research is only slowly emerging, and examples of international cooperation remain few and far between. The international community is still trying to understand who the victims of various new forms of crime are and what makes them vulnerable to victimization and is searching for programs and laws that fulfill the fundamental aims of the United National Declaration “. . . to be treated with compassion and respect for their dignity . . . to be provided with access to the mechanisms of justice and to prompt redress . . . to be informed of their rights . . . to be informed of their role and the scope, timing and progress of the proceedings and of the disposition of their cases . . . to be provided with proper assistance throughout the legal process . . . to have their privacy protected and insure their safety . . . to be considered for receipt of restitution . . . to be informed about receiving compensation . . .” (United Nations, 1985). However, it is unclear how many of the UN basic principles are followed by governments around the world in order to ensure that victims have access to justice and fair treatment. Lawmakers and those responsible for executing policy can only hope to achieve real progress when their actions are closely monitored by critical and comparative researchers. Therefore, research in the field of transnational crime victimization is greatly needed as well as continuous evaluation of the UN criteria that determine the value of programs and laws around the world. NOTE 1. For example, of key words used: environmental crime victims, environmental justice, environmental injustice, environmental racism, environmental victim*, environmental victimology, environmental victimization, illegal wildlife trafficking, transnational waste trafficking victims, victim of illegal dumping. Cyber* victim*, cybercrime victims, cybercrime victimization, cybercrime victimology,

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international cybercrime victims, transnational cybercrime, empirical cybercrime victimology, online fraud, identity theft victims, online identity theft victims, international identity theft, cybercrime victim profile, and phishing.

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Global Terrorism Database (GTD). (2014). Measuring and understanding the impact of terrorism. New York: Institute for Economics and Peace. Gozdziak, E., & Bump, N. M. (2008). Victims no longer: Research on child survivors of trafficking for sexual and labor exploitation in the United States (NIJ Grant 2005IJ-CX-0051). Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice. Harris, J., Scott, S., & Skidmore, P. (2006). Child sexual exploitation: A Barnardo’s teaching case on the integration of practice, research, and policy. Barkingside, UK: Barnardo’s. Institute for Economics and Peace (2015). Global terrorism index. New York: Institute for Economics and Peace. International Labour Organization. (2012). ILO global estimate of forced labour 2012: Results and methodology. Switzerland: ILO. Kalron, N. (2011). Africa’s white gold of jihad: Al-Shabaab and conflict ivory. Elephant Action League. Retrieved from http://elephantleague.org/project/ africas-white-gold-of-jihad-al-shabaab-and-conflict-ivory/. Kempf, V. (2012, March 12). Stats about online predators and precautions parents should take. Patch.com. Retrieved from https://patch.com/massachusetts/ sudbury/bp—stats-about-online-predators-and-precautions-parec 47b01a336. Kotrla, K. (2010). Domestic minor sex trafficking in the United States. Social Work, 55(2), 181–187. Kratcoski, P. C. (2001). Terrorist victimization: Prevention, control, and recovery. Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 24(6), 467–473. Letschert, R., & Groenhuijsen, M. (2011). Global governance and global crime. In R. Letschert & J. van Dijk (Eds.), The new faces of victimhood: Globalization, transnational crimes and victims’ rights (pp. 15–40). The Netherlands: Springer. Letschert, R., & Staiger, I. (2009). Introduction and definitions. In R. Letschert, I. Staiger, & A. Pemberton (Eds.), Assisting victims of terrorism: Towards a European standard of justice (pp. 1–30). New York: Springer. Letschert, R., & van Dijk, J. (Eds.). (2011). The new faces of victimhood: Globalization, transnational crimes and victims’ rights. The Netherlands: Springer. Leukfeldt, E. R. (2014). Phishing for suitable targets in the Netherlands: Routine activity theory and phishing victimization. Cyberpsychology, Behavior, and Social Networking, 17(8), 551–555. Leukfeldt, E. R., & Yar, M. (2016). Applying routine activity theory to cybercrime: A theoretical and empirical analysis. Deviant Behavior, 37(3), 1–18. Mandisa, Lutya T., & Lanier, M. (2012). An integrated theoretical framework to describe human trafficking of young women and girls for involuntary prostitution. In Jay Maddock (Ed.), Public Health—Social and Behavioral Health (pp. 555–570). Croatia: InTechOpen. Marconato, L., Leo, C., Girelli, R., Salvi, S., Abramo, F., Bettini, G., & Zini, E. (2009). Association between waste management and cancer in companion animals. Journal of Veterinary Internal Medicine, 23(3), 564–569. Martuzzi, M., Mitis, F., & Forastiere, F. (2010). Inequalities, inequities, environmental justice in waste management and health. The European Journal of Public Health, 20(1), 20–26. McConnell, T. (2015). The ivory-funded terrorism myth. The New York Times. Retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/30/opinion/the-ivoryfunded-terrorism-myth.html?_r=0.

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Mendelsohn B. (1956). Une nouvelle branche de la science bio-psychosociale: La victimologie. Revue International de Criminologie et de Police Technique, 10, 95. Mendelsohn, B. (1976). The Origin of the Doctrine of Victimology. In I. Drapkin & E. Viano (Eds.), Victimology (pp. 3–12). Lexington, MA: Lexington Books. Mitchell, J.K., Finkelhor, D. & Wolak, J. (2010). Conceptualizing Juvenile Prostitution as Child Maltreatment: Findings from the National Juvenile Prostitution Study, Child Maltreatment, 15(1), 18–36. National Crime Prevention Center (NSPC). (2012). Cybercrimes. Retrieved from www.ncpc.org/resources/files/pdf/internet-safety/13020-CybercrimesrevSPR.pdf. Ngo, F. T., & Paternoster, R. (2011). Cybercrime victimization: An examination of individual and situational level factors. International Journal of Cyber Criminology, 5(1), 773–793. Oksanen, A., & Keipi, T. (2013). Young people as victims of crime on the internet: A population-based study in Finland. Vulnerable Children and Youth Studies, 8, 298–309. Petrossian, G. A., Pires, S. F., & van Uhm, D. P. (2016). An overview of seized illegal wildlife entering the United States. Global Crime, 17(2), 181–201. doi:10.108 0/17440572.2016.1152548. Polaris. (2015). National human trafficking hotline. Retrieved from https://hu mantraffickinghotline.org/what-human-trafficking/human-trafficking/ victims. Reyns, B. W. (2013). Online routines and identity theft victimization: Further expanding routine activity theory beyond direct-contact offenses. Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency, 50(2), 216–238. Reyns, B. W., & Henson, B. (2015). The thief with a thousand faces and the victim with none: Identifying determinants for online identity theft victimization with routine activity theory. International Journal of Offender Therapy and Comparative Criminology, 60(10), 1119–1139. Reyns, B. W., & Randa, R. (2015). Victim reporting behaviors following identity theft victimization: Results from the national crime victimization survey. Crime & Delinquency, 63(7), 814–838. Rosen, G. E., & Smith, K. F. (2010). Summarizing the evidence on the international trade in illegal wildlife. EcoHealth, 7(1), 24–32. Shichor, D. (2007). Thinking about terrorism and its victims. Victims and Offenders, 2(3), 269–287. Sollund, R. (2013). Animal trafficking and trade: Abuse and species injustice. In R. Walters, D. S. Westerhuis, & T. Wyatt (Eds.), Emerging issues in green criminology (pp. 72–92). New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Stransky, M., & Finkelhor, D. (2008). How many juveniles are involved in prostitution in the U.S.? Crimes Against Children Research Center. Retrieved from www.unh.edu/ccrc/prostitution/Juvenile_Prostitution_factsheet.pdf. Tota, A. L. (2005, March 11). Terrorism and collective memories comparing Bologna, Naples and Madrid. International Journal of Comparative Sociology, 46(1–2), 55–78. Umarhathab, S., Rao, G.D.R., & Jaishankar, K. (2009). Cyber crimes in India: A study of emerging patterns of perpetration and victimization in Chennai City. Pakistan Journal of Criminology, 1(1), 51–66.

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United Nations. (1985). Declaration of basic principles of justice for victims of crime and abuse of power. Adopted by General Assembly resolution 40/34 of 29 November 1985. Retrieved from http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/40/ a40r034.htm. United Nations. (2004). UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and the Protocols Thereto. New York: United Nations. United Nations. (2005). UN basic principles and guidelines on the right to a remedy and reparation for victims of gross violations of International Human Rights Law and serious violations of International Humanitarian Law. Retrieved from http:// www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/RemedyAndReparation .aspx. UNODC. (2008). Environmental crime: A threat to our future. Vienna: UNODC. UNODC. (2014). Global report on trafficking in persons. Vienna: UNODC. UNODC. (2016). World wildlife crime report: Trafficking in protected species. Vienna: UNODC. U.S. Department of Justice. (2017). What are identity theft and identity fraud? Retrieved from www.justice.gov/criminal-fraud/identity-theft/identity-theft-andidentity-fraud. U.S. Fish and Wildlife Services. (2016). Wildlife trafficking. Retrieved from https:// www.fws.gov/international/wildlife-trafficking/. Vail, B. J. (2007). Illegal waste transport and the Czech Republic: An environmental sociological perspective. Sociologický c˘ asopis/Czech Sociological Review, 43(6), 1195–1211. Van den Hoven, A. & Maree, A. (2005). Victimization risk factors, repeat victimization and victim profiling. In L. Davis & R. Snyman (Eds.), Victimology in South Africa (pp. 55–78). Pretoria: Van Schaik. Warchol, G. L., Zupan, L. L., & Clack, W. (2003). Transnational criminality: An analysis of the illegal wildlife market in Southern Africa. International Criminal Justice Review, 13(1), 1–27. Weinberg, L., Pedahzur, A., & Canetti-Nisim, D. (2003). The social and religious characteristics of suicide bombers and their victims. Terrorism and Political Violence, 15(3), 139–153. White, R. (2008). Toxic cities: Globalizing the problem of waste. Social Justice, 35(3), 107–119. Williams, M. L. (2015). Guardians upon high: An application of routine activities theory to online identity theft in Europe at the country and individual level. British Journal of Criminology, 56(1), 21–48. Wolak, J., Mitchell, K. J., & Finkelhor, D. (2006). Online victimization of youth: Five years later. National Center for Missing & Exploited Children Bulletin #07-06-025. Alexandria, VA. Wyatt, T. (2009). Exploring the organization of Russia Far East’s illegal wildlife trade: Two case studies of the illegal fur and illegal falcon trades. Global Crime, 10(1–2), 144–154. Ybarra, M. L. (2004). Linkages between depressive symptomatology and Internet harassment among young regular Internet users. Cyberpsychology & Behavior, 7, 247–257.

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PART II

Consequences of Transnational Crime

The second part of this volume on the security implications for transnational crime concentrates on end results. In some cases, the end result being presented is that of the consequences of the crimes themselves, whereas other chapters present a more complex picture of unintended consequences and the nuanced struggles of governments and multinational agencies to disrupt and prevent transnational crime. Chapter 4 presents the delicate and complicated issues surrounding crime and criminal organization displacement. Yuliya Zabyelina, suggests that one of the most difficult issues in combating transnational crime is that the result of effective prevention measures in one country can potentially push crime and criminals across borders, an unintended consequence that can threaten peace among nations. The chapter skillfully reflects on the juxtaposition of the successes of situational crime prevention (SCP) and the reality of applying these techniques in a fragmented world where national boarders can mean a fresh start. Chapter 5 explores the role of foreign terrorist fighters in conflicts abroad and in terrorist activities in the home country. The chapter discusses what types of individuals are drawn to foreign conflicts, and which types of individuals are most likely to return home. Yet, the heart of the chapter is the presentation and discussion of the how their respective governments will deal with returning foreign terrorist fighters. Brunero and Scatena conclude with a presentation of the “hard approach” and the “soft approach.” In Chapter 6, Albert Scherr begins to present the threats of transnational crime as they move on-line. Specifically, this chapter discusses the possible role of governments in cybercrime. The question that emerges is that of whether or not some cyber attacks are not as simple as crimes, but state sponsored terrorism, even acts of war. The social and legal implications of these distinctions are discussed.

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Chapter 7 discusses the role of United Nations disaster planning in helping countries to be better prepared to handle the crime and disorder that can stem from experiencing a natural disaster. Specifically these authors discuss how the Sendai framework for disaster planning and risk management expands on and betters its predecessor the Hyogo framework. Chapter 8 moves the discussion toward the financing of terrorists, insurgents, warlords, and militias. As Clarke states early in the chapter that in the post–Cold War era, these groups often rely on illicit means to fund their activities. And, criminal activity serves the purpose of generating revenue for the organization. The chapter offers analysis of the process and provides examples ranging from the Islamic State’s sale of black market oil, to the Afghan Taliban’s involvement in the opium trade. After drug trafficking, counterfeiting and human trafficking, crimes against the environment have become the fourth-largest source of profit for organized crime. Chapter 9 presents an overview of the impact and enforcement of crimes against the environment. This chapter demonstrates the multiple risks and impacts of transnational environmental crimes, and presents how offenders involved in environmental crimes spoil the economy and distort fair competition. In Part II, readers will experience a wide range of transnational crimes and their consequences. These consequences are both directly and indirectly related to the crimes themselves and our efforts to inhibit them. Finally, readers of these chapters will be exposed to a number of analyses and government strategies to combat transnational crime that is not just limited to individuals, but includes criminal organizations, as well as terrorist groups, militias, and the complexity of state sponsorship.

CHAPTER 4

Crime Displacement as a Result of Transnational Organized Crime Control Measures Yuliya Zabyelina

Our collective goal must be to end the “era of displacement,” which sees crime simply move elsewhere when challenged, and to begin a time of interconnected cooperation, coordination and communication against crime. —Yuri Fedotov, Executive Director of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime1

The concern with the role of weak and conflict-torn states as incubators of transnational organized crime was the predominant research paradigm in the early 1990s. Because of deep-seated institutional failures, instability, and impoverishment, weak states were understood as crime-facilitative systems, in which criminal organizations were provided with rewarding crime opportunities and a high degree of immunity (Rotberg, 2007; Williams, 2002; Zartman, 1995). Lacking the capacity and determination for good governance and economic development, the post-9/11 paradigm posited weak states as hotbeds of threats, spilling over national borders into supposedly “crime-free” states. Such “spillovers” have since then been considered one of the most urgent threats to international peace and security (Finklea, 2013). Despite providing useful insights into the relationship between failed states and transnational organized crime, this body of literature largely neglected the role of developed states as indispensable contributors to the formation of crime opportunities. The post-9/11 paradigm has thus developed a myopic view on transnational organized crime, positioning developed states that exercise a fair control over the territory,

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develop resilient bureaucratic structures, and demonstrate steady economic growth as unlikely providers of opportunities for transnational organized crime. While criminal organizations unquestionably flourish in weak states, their overall performance is usually a result of a complex set of factors, most of which go far beyond failed statehood. A small and highly fragmented body of literature that focused on the study of the effectiveness of anti-crime policies, mainly those targeting drug trafficking, emerged in the late 2000s (Costa, 2008; Greenfield & Paoli, 2012; Reuter, 2014). Much of this literature attempted to explain the reasons why the existing efforts against drug trafficking or, for that matter, any other type of illicit trafficking, have not resulted in lessening the frequency of crime and often led to geographical displacement or other forms of criminal adaptation. It highlights the fallacies of policy making— ineffective decision-making, policy miscalculations, or poor performance of policies—that may, regardless of their initial aims, create counterproductive effects, such as crime displacement. While situational crime prevention, in which the crime displacement literature originated, has received wide recognition in Western societies as a cost-effective tool to respond to “shallow”2 crime, such as shoplifting, burglary, robberies, and vehicle theft, the possibility of applying situational approaches to restrain transnational organized crime has become one of the key subjects of contemporary scientific and policy debates. This chapter examines the extent to which crime displacement can be used as a way to understand the dynamics of transnational organized crime and the effectiveness of countermeasures developed to restrain it. The chapter starts with a summary of the SCP literature and the niche the concept of crime displacement occupies in it. It then discusses the different types of displacement and elaborates on the consequences of crime displacement, ranging from malevolent to benign outcomes. Empirical examples of crime displacement as it relates to transnational organized crime are provided. They shed light on important dimensions of the crime displacement patterns that may be extremely detrimental but may also take less extensive or harmful forms. In the end, the chapter discusses the possibility of the diffusion of crime control benefits that could be achieved through the advancement of international law enforcement cooperation and “translation”3 of scientific discoveries into policy and practice. THEORETICAL ORIGINS OF CRIME DISPLACEMENT Interest in crime displacement arose in the 1970s and continued to grow in the 1980s, when mainstream criminological research shifted toward the understanding of crime as a situational phenomenon, that is, occurrence created by a particular environmental composition of physical and social

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characteristics (Clarke, 1983). The “situational” interpretation of causes of deviance laid the foundations for a pragmatic crime prevention approach that became known as SCP. From the perspective of SCP developers, a criminal act is the result of convergence of three components in time and space: (1) a motivated offender, (2) a suitable target, and (3) absence of a suitable guardian, that is, either a person or security device that can intervene, directly or indirectly, in the crime scene (Clarke, 1995; Clarke & Eck, 2003). The SCP approach embraces the rational choice theory that sees criminal behavior to be largely driven not by some sort of pathology but by a pure calculation of rewards and risks of committing a criminal act. For example, perpetrators choose crimes that offer immediate gratification, require little effort, and expose them to a scant risk of detection or arrest. Therefore, it is argued that “law-violating behavior occurs when an offender decides to risk breaking the law after considering both personal factors and the situational factors” (Siegel, 2012, p. 105). In addition to the rational choice theory, SCP criminologists have borrowed from the routine activity theory that posits that criminal motivation is the outcome of the offenders’ encounters with crime opportunities in the course of their day-to-day activities (Cohen & Felson, 1979). Grounded on these two theories, the SCP framework focuses on changing the situational circumstances in a way that increases the costs of crime and decreases the rewards. In particular, the SCP approach seeks to create less favorable conditions for crime, such as target hardening and reducing the anticipated gains and excuses of committing a criminal act. Due to their relative simplicity and inexpensiveness, SCP tools have received wide support among law enforcement practitioners. Despite a range of successful applications of situational prevention reported in the literature (Clarke, 1997; Clarke et al., 2012), researchers have determined that it may produce a false positive benefit, or, in other words, cause relocation of crime and/or criminals rather than solve the crime problem. Reppetto (1976) introduced the term “crime displacement” into the criminological vocabulary in the 1970s to refer to this phenomenon that since then has been one of the most contentious features of SCP programs. TYPES OF CRIME DISPLACEMENT The concept of crime displacement is predicated on the assumption that tighter controls that “squeeze” crimes produce a “swelling” in a different location or cause a modification of criminal structures and/or modus operandi. According to Guerette (2008), spatial displacement is by far the most commonly recognized and measured form of crime displacement. Crime displacement, however, is not simply a geographic shift of crime to another location. It involves a variety of behavioral changes resulting from the blocking of crime opportunities (Gabor, 1990). In particular, six conventional forms of crime displacement can be identified:

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1. Spatial displacement: a criminal activity is moved from one area to another 2. Temporal displacement: a criminal activity is moved from one time to another including time of day, day of week, and even season 3. Target displacement: a shift of preference from one victim/target to a more lucrative or more vulnerable victim/target occurs 4. Tactical displacement: one method of committing crime is substituted for another 5. Crime type displacement: offenders switch from one form of crime to another 6. Offender displacement: new offenders attracted by lucrative rewards of illegal markets replace old offenders removed by the law enforcement

These types of crime displacement are rarely static and could merge (Hesseling, 1994). For instance, tactical, functional, or target displacement may also have spatial or temporal alternations (Morgan, 2014). According to SCP critics, removing the opportunity to commit a crime does not impact the underlying motivation of offenders to engage in crime (Hakim & Rengert, 1981; Reppetto, 1976). Therefore, SCP is sometimes seen as a “mechanic approach” to crime prevention that may be effective in blocking crime opportunities but fails to stop offenders that are “driven by needs or desires” and will “maintain a certain level of offending regardless of the cost” (Leong, 2014, p. 24). Such offenders nearly always respond to the blocking of one crime opportunity with engaging in an alternative illegal act (Barr & Pease, 1990; Clarke, 1995). Therefore, despite some pragmatic benefits, the SCP approach is often criticized for failing to address complex economic, social, and psychological factors because they are not only difficult to tackle but also difficult to determine (Reppetto, 1976). These critics call for social or corrective prevention, which they have argued to be a more effective, albeit more costly and laborious, alternative to the use of SCP methods. Conversely, there is another group of scholars (Barr & Pease, 1990; Guerette, 2008, 2009; Johnson, Guerette, & Bowers, 2014) who suggest that crime displacement is not always unavoidable. Weisburd et al. (2006), for instance, suggest that crime is strongly “coupled” to place. In other words, although offender motivations may have some weight on the incidence of crime, the environment in which crime occurs offers varied crime opportunities. Therefore, transferring a criminal activity to another place, where the original crime opportunities are altered or unavailable, may either be impossible or at least very difficult. Therefore, crime displacement does not occur automatically and depends on a range of factors, such as offenders’ familiarity with areas outside the original crime location and their ability to use alternative crime tactics. Therefore, offenders are likely to relocate their behavior to targets, places, times, and tactics they are most familiar with. The familiarity decay hypothesis suggests that crime displacement is likely to decrease as the distance from the original crime location, and consequently offenders’ familiarity with the environment, increases (Guerette, 2008).

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Even if crime displacement occurs, it is not necessarily malevolent. In connection to this point, scholars have offered a spectrum of possible crime displacement outcomes. On the one end of the spectrum, there is malign displacement, whereby crime displacement has an adverse effect that is greater than the original crime pattern. For example, a situation when cocaine dealers move away from streets and decide to target schools as a result of law enforcement interventions. On the spectrum’s other side is benign displacement that occurs in situations when crimes prevented by law enforcement are displaced with one of the types discussed earlier, but the overall result is better than the original crime situation. Wholesale drug dealers, for instance, switch to gambling that is usually regarded as a less serious offence. Finally, the opposite phenomenon to crime displacement is known as the diffusion of benefits. It occurs when crime is reduced in other places, at other times, against other targets and offenders as a result of law enforcement interventions. The idea behind the diffusion of benefits is that law enforcement interventions (when properly designed) permeate into areas not specifically targeted by the law enforcement, generating crime reduction in non-treated areas. Research on benign displacement and the diffusion of benefits of SCP interventions against street crime and local place-based crime control initiatives presents empirical evidence that crime does not simply “move around the corner” in response to prevention efforts (Clarke & Weisburd, 1994; Johnson, Guerette, & Bowers, 2014; Weisburd et al., 2006). For instance, in a meta-analysis study that reviewed 102 SCP interventions against vehicle theft, burglary, vandalism, homicide, shoplifting, and other street crimes, Guerette and Bowers (2009) discovered that only 26 percent of cases produced crime displacement, while 27 percent demonstrated the diffusion of benefits effect. MEASURING CRIME DISPLACEMENT One of the most common problems discussed in the literature on crime displacement is the difficulty of accurately measuring displacement and developing standardized measurement techniques that could be applied to diverse forms of crime and different national contexts. Empirical studies on spatial crime displacement usually compare areas where law enforcement interventions were implemented (response areas) to areas where displacement is predicted (Guerette, 2008; Weisburd & Green, 1995). Scholars have also suggested a variety of methods of data collection, including crime counts or crime rates, citizen fears, attitudes, or perceptions, observations or arrest reports of specific offenders used to determine whether offenders in one area would be observed or arrested in the displacement area (Guerette, 2008). Weisburd et al. (2006), for instance, conducted a comprehensive analysis of crime displacement (or diffusion) in Jersey City, New Jersey. The study focused on two sites with

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substantial levels of drug dealing and prostitution and two surrounding areas that were expected to experience displacement. The methodology was grounded on social observations and recordings of crime events in both the original crime sites and displacement areas. In addition, the data set was supplemented with interview data and ethnographic fieldwork. Emphasizing the need to increase the statistical robustness of crime displacement methodologies, Bowers and Johnson (2003) approached the measurement of spatial displacement with creating the weighted displacement quotient (WDQ). Unlike previous measures, the WDQ methodology estimates the amount of displacement (or diffusion) from a place-based intervention using three concentric zones. In the response zone (Zone A), researchers measure the amount of crime in a specific geographical area before and after a targeted law enforcement intervention. The next zone (Zone B) surrounds the response area and is the area where crime is expected to be spatially displaced by the intervention. The third zone, Zone C, serves as the control area that completely surrounds Zone B. Measuring the WDQ is suggested in the form of the following equation: WDQ = (Bt1/ Ct1 − Bt0/Ct0)/(At1/Ct1 − At0/Ct0), where A is the count of crime occurrences in the response area, B is the count of crime occurrences in the displacement area, C is the count of crime occurrences in the control area, t1 is the time of the intervention, and t0 is the pre-intervention time period (Ratcliffe & Breen, 2011). Although this methodology is a recognized empirical approach to measuring spatial crime displacement, there are several validity concerns, such as those related to the identification of areas where crime will be displaced (displacement areas). Wrongfully selecting the area where displacement is expected to occur may result in false conclusions. It also remains unclear how much time should pass for crime displacement to transpire so that it could be observed. In addition, the change of crime volume and patterns may not be the result of crime displacement but the outcome of general variability of crime over time. Finally, the applicability of the existing methodology to measure transnational crime displacement remains unknown and will require data sharing across national jurisdictions. APPLYING THE SITUATIONAL CRIME PREVENTION FRAMEWORK TO ORGANIZED CRIME Early on in the research on SCP intervention, including studies on crime displacement, scholars focused predominantly on street crime and local crime prevention responses in residential areas, parking lots, public parks, and shops. Building on these studies, scholars of more serious offenses have attempted to transfer the SCP framework to the realm of organized crime studies (Clarke et al., 2012). One of the main advantages of the SCP framework for the study of organized crime is its suitability for a detailed analysis of criminal events and criminal activities rather than

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organizational structures and ideologies behind criminal conspiracies (Kleemans, Soudijn, & Weenink, 2012). “By focusing on specific crimes rather than on the nature of criminal organizations . . . we are reversing the focus of much traditional academic interest. We aim in this way to avoid two potential pitfalls: (1) that of paying more attention to the characteristics of criminal organizations than to those of organized crime; and (2) that of treating ‘organized crime’ as a blanket term without paying due attention to the varied phenomena that it covers” (Cornish & Clarke, 2002, p. 42). Organized crime, like any other crime, is context-dependent, that is, different social, temporal, and physical configurations generate different forms, levels, and patterns of organized crime. Edwards and Levi (2008, p. 368) acknowledge that applying “relatively narrow analytical foci,” such as those prescribed by the SCP framework, could reduce the complexity of organized criminal activities and their perpetration. In order to achieve this outcome, Cornish and Clarke (2002) recommend unpacking complex criminal activities into sets of criminal events or the so-called crime scripts. The crime script analysis developed by Cornish (1994) has been embraced by many criminologists as a method that can be used to produce a detailed account of the crime commission process of complex and sophisticated criminal acts, such as those committed by organized crime groups (Leclerc, 2014). According to its developers, this methodology can be used to understand the modus operandi of serious offenders and generate and systematize knowledge about crime commission patterns. Importantly, crime scripting disentangles complex criminal activities into separate but related phases—as single scenes in a theater play script—that can help identify potential entry points for law enforcement intervention. While using crime scripts could indeed constitute a useful methodological tool for the study of organized crime (e.g., Chiu, Leclerc, & Townsley, 2011; Moreto & Clarke, 2013; Tompson & Chainey, 2011), the SCP approach has not been fully embraced by organized crime scholars. One of the major challenges in applying the SCP approach against organized crime is the latter being “more resourceful” and “less dependent on any given opportunity structure” (von Lampe, 2011a, p. 157). By making this point, von Lampe elaborates on the resourcefulness of “organized criminals” compared to “traditional” offenders who can deploy law-neutralization strategies and change initially unfavorable conditions for committing crime into functional crime opportunities (von Lampe, 2011a). Sparrow (2008, p. 209) refers to such criminal actors as “conscious opponents” stressing that they “seek novelty, and . . . deliberately circumnavigate controls and detection systems once they know about them. For these reasons, what you have seen in the past provides no reliable indication of what you might see in the future. Opponents will develop new tactics, and they will also deliberately select methods that defeat existing detection and reporting systems” [emphasis in the original]. With regards to the latter point, Grabosky (1995)

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notes that one of the dangers of ill-created or ill-managed criminal justice policies is that they may inspire adaptive behavior on the part of offenders who develop more inventive, devious, or violent activities: With a view to remaining one step ahead of the law, entrepreneurial criminals may engage in increasingly refined avoidance behavior. The ingenuity and adaptability of crime prevention targets may be enhanced by new challenges and, with repeated strengthening, may constitute a more formidable threat than was initially the case. (Grabosky, 1995, p. 349)

In connection to the resilience of organized crime groups to law enforcement interventions, it could be argued that criminal markets undergo changes not only as a result of social conditions and intervention policies but also in connection with proactive criminal behavior. Klaus von Lampe (2011b, p. 189) observes that “[t]he image of offenders more or less accidently stumbling into crime opportunities in the course of routine activities does not . . . exhaustively explain complex criminal activities such as transnational organised crime.” In an attempt to survive law enforcement interventions or when faced with competition in illicit markets, organized offenders may choose to “forage” or, in other words, take the initiative and seek new crime opportunities. Originally developed by Felson (2006), the concept of criminal foraging relates to the ability of sophisticated offenders to broaden access to existing crime opportunities or even create new ones. In light of the advent of new technologies, sophisticated offenders may capitalize on new opportunities for crime and change initially “unfavourable conditions for committing crime into functional crime opportunities” (Zabyelina, 2017, p. 3). Criminal foraging and law enforcement neutralization by organized crime groups is particularly likely in weak states or states in transition that offer ample opportunities for infiltrating politics and business. Systemic corruption of law enforcement cadres, for instance, creates the situation of “incapable” guardianship, in reference to the crime triangle, whereby unhelpful law enforcement officers collaborate with organized crime groups, leaving the suitable target unprotected. Additionally, organized crime may be deeply intertwined with legitimate social and business organizations (Van Duyne, 2006) that, instead of reporting to the police, choose a collusive relationship with criminal organizations. Moreover, whereas the relationship between organized crime and the wider public has been conventionally depicted as adversarial, organized crime is often part and parcel of the social fabric. The very profitability of criminal markets depends on consumer demand and public acceptance of certain illicit goods and services (e.g., prostitution, gambling, corruption, drug offenses). Responding to demand-driven crimes is therefore difficult due to the lack of direct, easily identifiable victims. As there are often no immediate complaining parties (other than the police or the government) among

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consumers of illicit goods and services, SCP approaches, while certainly useful in reducing everyday property and street crimes, may be less effective against organized crime. CRIME DISPLACEMENT OF TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME Because crime displacement has traditionally been understood as the relocation of crime or criminals as a result of crime-prevention efforts, a large chunk of the literature related to crime displacement of organized crime has been formulated along the lines of counterproductive consequences of criminal laws and anti-crime responses. In the heart of this scholarship lies the question of whether criminal justice and law enforcement policies, predominantly enacted by developed democracies, produce unanticipated and undesirable outcomes—the so-called unintended consequences (Beare, 2003; Bowling, 2011; Daase & Friesendorf, 2012). This group of studies focuses on fallacies of policy making— miscalculated from the planning state or poorly performed policies— that, regardless of their initial aims, create the environment in which crime flourishes. This literature sheds light on some of the reasons why, despite a robust combination of criminal and regulatory enforcement, affluent democracies have experienced vulnerability to transnational organized crime. Focusing on harm production, Bowling (2011), for instance, studies the perverse effects of inaccurate and contradictory policies. Having made parallels to the medical field and clinical studies, he applies Illich’s concept of iatrogenesis—undesirable effects or complications resulting from medical treatment and/or medical errors—to the criminological context, arguing that “the applications of criminology and the end-products of ‘criminal justice’ are often suffering, insecurity and injustice” (Bowling, 2011, p. 374). Broude and Teichman (2009, p. 9) point out that profit-generating crimes, such as drug trafficking, arms trafficking or gambling, move across national borders according to the level of regulatory aggressiveness in the originating nation: “. . . if the expected sanction in one jurisdiction rises, some crime from that jurisdiction will shift to areas in which the sanction is lower.” In other words, if organized crime groups move to different countries, they often do so not upon their own will but in response to state repression and law enforcement activities. Varese (2011) cites an interesting example of unintentional crime mobility related to Georgian thieves-in-law: Georgian vory-v-zakone (a type of mafia boss in the Soviet Union) “migrated” to Russia whenever there was a change at the top of the Georgian Soviet republic’s political elite, since whenever a new first secretary came to office he would try to impress Moscow by conducting purges as well as cracking down on corruption

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and crime. Following the Rose Revolution of 2003–2005, the new Georgian president launched a harsh repression of what was left of the Georgian vory, referred to now by their Georgian-language equivalent of kanonieri kurdebi. A direct consequence of the repression was the escape of several leaders to Moscow (again), Spain and other countries. (Varese, 2011, p. 223)

Turning to the Italian context, Varese mentions a particular Italian policy of forced resettlement, soggiorno obbligato, practiced in southern Italian provinces in the 1950s. Predicated on the idea that residence in northern Italy and full immersion into its law-abiding culture would rehabilitate former offenders from the south, Italian authorities forced convicted mafiosi to reside in Lombardy, Piedmont, and Emilia-Romagna (Varese, 2006). By relocating experienced offenders with specific mafia skills to these northern regions of Italy, this policy unintentionally allowed them to expand criminal networks and discover new criminal opportunities, such as in the case of the relocation of the Calabrese ‘Ndrangheta to the town of Bardonecchia, near Turin in Piedmont. Drug law enforcement is a good example of such iatrogenic outcomes of crime control interventions. Kenney’s (2009, p. 110) analysis of Columbian drug-trafficking organizations reveals that some criminals manage to outsmart the criminal justice system and progressively learn to adapt to law enforcement by “gathering information about alternative routes and transshipment methods, experimenting with certain alternatives that proved capable of transporting large quantities.” Drug trafficking organizations constantly change routes and methods of drug transportation in order to keep one step ahead of law enforcement. If law enforcement “hardens,” criminal organizations upgrade immediately (Ayling, 2009; Greenfield & Paoli, 2012). Vijlbrief (2012, p. 200) acknowledges that any government policy aimed at cutting the supply in drugs (or any other controlled goods or services) will “send prices soaring” and is likely to lure new offenders. “It can . . . be assumed that after the introduction of new measures, the criminal entrepreneur is more likely than the opportunist to try and find criminal alternatives.” He reveals that although the drug control measures by the Netherlands police against the production of synthetic drugs were significant, they have produced some displacement effects. For instance, rather than importing precursors and glass instruments from China, perpetrators either produced them locally or arranged procurement from countries of the European Union (e.g., Poland). In a recent study on human trafficking for sexual exploitation in South Korea, Choo and Rebovich (2014) discovered that the 2004 Act on the Punishment and Intermediating in the Sex Trade and Associated Acts that toughened anti-trafficking efforts nationwide produced the transnational crime displacement effect. Despite the noteworthy reduction of brothels and sex workers, the authors identified a shift of the sex trade in South Korea from open activities in red-light districts to more clandestine

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locations, such as barbershops, karaoke parlors, massage parlors, and even cyberspace. The analysis of secondary data of a survey of 1,079 Korean sex workers in 11 major red-light districts in 7 cities throughout South Korea also indicated that the 2004 act could be linked to the unexpected increase in sex workers in the United States. Criminal adaptation to regulation and law enforcement intervention may also bring violence and destabilization. The U.S. approach to solving its domestic gang problem with mass deportation of foreign-born members, notably those of MS-13, has been frequently discussed as one of the factors that not only transformed Central America’s preexisting gang problem but also increased gang violence in the region (mainly in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras) (Boraz & Bruneau, 2006; Wolf, 2010). Shifting the focus to the outcomes of gang activities and drug trafficking, Cantor (2014) emphasizes that US-led counter-drug trafficking responses have not wiped out drug cartels but have led to increased criminal violence and forced displacement of population. He describes serious humanitarian concerns related to the activities of transportistas, smuggling groups of varying sizes in Central America, and drug trafficking cartels that have run land expropriation of rural areas in Mexico and Northern Triangle. In Honduras and Guatemala, transportistas have, for instance, forced landowners to sell lands of strategic importance for cross-border smuggling, and, in situations of refusal or resistance, have exercised brutal force to succeed in the illegal land seizure. In Mexico, cartels have used violence and intimidation to displace whole communities from rural areas where natural resources (e.g., oil needed for cocaine production) are concentrated and through which drug are trafficked (plazas). Such negative externalities of the war on drugs, emphasizes Cantor (2014), are important caveats of criminal justice responses to drug trafficking and should not be ignored. THE DIFFUSION OF CRIME CONTROL BENEFITS While the literature on displacement of transnational organized crime is predominantly concerned with the production of harm as a result of law enforcement activities, arguing in favor of, if not universal, but frequent balloon effect, a small group of scholars suggests that such an approach simplifies the outcomes of policy interventions (Reuter, 2014; Windle & Farrell, 2012). Friesendorf (2005, p. 39) acknowledges that researchers “frequently refer to displacement without actually studying it in depth.” Chouvy (2013) argues that one needs to distinguish between the two main types of unintended consequences: the unintended consequences of an action (direct consequences) and the unintended consequences of the intended consequence of the action (collateral consequences). Direct and collateral unintended consequences can not only be harmful but also neutral, or even beneficial (for actors, institutions, and the environment). They, however,

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can also be unforeseen and perverse. Perverse unintended consequences are outcomes of an action, both direct and collateral, that contradict the initial goal of policies. While this study certainly reveals policy outcomes that lead to inefficiency or even counter-productivity of interventions, it calls for drug control policies and interventions that are more efficient, less harmful, and certainly less counterproductive. With regards to the latter, Windle and Farrell (2012) recommend that a diffusion of crime control benefits could “pop” the balloon effect. While displacement is a possible reaction of perpetrators to law enforcement interventions, it is reasonable to anticipate that illicit markets would be considerably larger without police crackdowns. For instance, perpetrators may discontinue their activities when it becomes impossible for them to twist route choices or meet the increased smuggling costs. Low familiarity with other locations, absence of shared culture and language among traffickers, and inability to use corruption in certain countries or agencies, among other things, may reduce trafficking volumes. In addition, rotation of law enforcement activities and resources from one place to another can be used to maximize uncertainty among offenders. The increased risk of interception may also halt criminal activities or even discourage offenders from engaging in them. Similar effects may be expected in response to publicity about performed or intended anti-drug policies and law enforcement interventions. Although not supported by empirical findings, some researchers propose that in order to maximize the potential diffusion of benefits effects related to SCP interventions, levels and types of prevention and enforcement should be randomly applied (Morgan, 2014; Windle & Farrell, 2012). In sum, while displacement may occur, it preferably should be used as a policy tool to delay illicit trafficking and deter it to less harmful locations and forms. Although criminal organizations are likely to attempt to exercise law enforcement neutralization strategies, organizational learning is true for both trafficking organizations and the law enforcement. While crime reduction in place may inflate production elsewhere, the successful experience in the country from which displacement occurred can be used to learn about the nature of problems, making crime displacement an important policy effectiveness measurement tool. Coordinating decision-making internationally is difficult both institutionally and operationally, but without such coordination negative outcomes may be much more harmful. CONCLUSION This chapter sought to synthesize the existing knowledge base regarding the relevance and applicability of the situational crime prevention (SCP) framework to transnational organized crime with a focus on crime displacement. It provided a summary of the conventional criminological

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literature on crime displacement, touching upon the policies that may cause displacement of transnational organized crime. It is contended that the greater resourcefulness of organized crime groups neutralizes law enforcement responses and increases the chances of crime displacement. This is particularly true in states with governance gaps and low accountability of state institutions. Crime displacement of organized crime groups, however, is far more complex than state failure. By utilizing alternative smuggling methods and techniques, organized crime groups often succeed in adjusting their modus operandi to most sophisticated and well-designed law enforcement interventions. Transnational criminal organizations may also possess a unique capacity to neutralize law enforcement and exercise a negative impact on the integrity of institutions even in developed states. Recognizing at the forefront that there are no “silver bullets” in the fight against transnational organized crime may allow policy makers to harness expectations and focus on designing realistic anti-crime policies. Given that there remains no collective scientific evidence that displacement happens as easily and universally as critics frequently claim, crime displacement can also be seen as an opportunity. A country that has ceased opium production with the help of a decades-long, politically challenging, and financially expensive strategy, might argue to be better off without opium production than with it, even if that production has shifted elsewhere. In addition, a better understanding of crime displacement patterns can be used for policy evaluation and, eventually, improvement of crime control policies. Although the net consequences of the international regime against transnational organized crime are not yet fully understood, sharing best practices and successful law enforcement interventions may improve the general ability of existing approaches. Practitioners should be mindful of the possibility for displacement when formulating crime prevention strategies and ensure that anti-crime tools used are based upon a sound and complete understanding of the problem and potential outcomes of policy interventions. NOTES 1. Opening Statement at the Conference of the Parties to the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime on October 15, 2012, Vienna, Austria. 2. “Shallow crime” is conventionally used by criminologists to refer to everyday property and street crimes. 3. The goal of “translational criminology” is to eliminate the barriers between the research community and practitioners. It is based on the idea that research findings could improve the existing tools of prevention, reduction, and management of crime. In turn, practitioners could facilitate evidence-based research by sharing observations and data with the scholarly community. For further details about translational criminology see Rojek, Martin, & Alpert (2014) and Kennedy, Irvin-Erickson, & Kennedy (2014).

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CHAPTER 5

Policy and Practice of Dealing with Returning Foreign Terrorist Fighters Manuela Brunero and Madleen Scatena1

When the news of the attacks in Paris on Friday November 13, 2015, broke many were shocked by the fact and realization that the threat posed by ISIL (Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant) was real and reached the heart of Europe. Although long suspected by experts and officials, the attacks came, nevertheless, as a surprise to many. Citizens all over the West were shocked; in particular, by the notion that the perpetrators were European citizens, radicalized in the midst of European society, and that there might be other European extremist fighters returning from the conflict zone posing an ever-growing risk. ISIL has claimed responsibility for the six coordinated terror attacks that left 130 dead and dozens critically wounded, raising the topic even higher in the political agenda of many states. The attacks were the deadliest in the European Union (EU) since the Madrid train bombings in 2004 and shocked France, which had been on high alert since the January 2015 attacks on Charlie Hebdo offices. All of the known Paris attackers were EU citizens, some having been radicalized in Syria, crossing borders without difficulty, albeit being registered as terrorism suspects. Abdelhamid Abaaoud, the suspected leader of the group, for example, was known to security forces after appearing in an ISIL video transporting mutilated bodies to a mass grave in a dehumanizing manner. He had escaped to Syria after having already been suspected in other terrorism plots in Belgium and France and in an interview with the ISIL magazine Dabiq, claimed that he was able to plan attacks against the West right under the nose of Belgian intelligence agencies (Halliday & Bucks, 2015).

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There is a growing concern among the international community about the threat posed by so-called foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs), individuals who voluntarily leave their home countries and join foreign conflicts. Although, clashes in the past have seen a similar influx from foreign fighters joining the battle ground fighting on both sides of the conflict, the scale in which the fightings in Syria and Iraq are attracting foreign individuals to join the fightings is unprecedented in various aspects. Especially the number of “Western” individuals joining terror organizations, such as ISIL, puts government authorities in the home countries in new security relevant situations. Not all of the fighters will remain in the conflict zone or die, some will return; and with the increase in the number of individuals leaving, there is likewise increase in the persons returning from these battle grounds. States have found various answers to combat this issue, and in all attempts one thing has become most apparent, as diverse as the motivations and reasons for joining such an organization are, as varied and individual are the reasons for returning. Likewise, policies and practices on how to deal with returning FTFs cannot follow a general one-size-fitsall approach but assorted strategies have to be taken into account. In what follows, the difference between past and present FTFs will be analyzed, some general characteristics of returning FTFs will be highlighted and various approaches applied by states, the EU, and the United Nations (UN) to combat the risk and security challenges attached to the returning FTFs will be introduced. But first a closer look is drawn to the threat posed by returning FTFs to understand why finding the right policies and practices to deal with these individuals is so crucial on many national, regional, and international levels. WHAT ARE THE THREATS POSED BY RETURNING FOREIGN TERRORIST FIGHTERS? Although the attacks in Paris on November 13, 2015, were a horrible display of ISIL aggressive policies and resonated with thousands of people all over the world, these weren’t the first attacks Europe has witnessed carried out by fellow citizens. Belgium, for example, experienced an attack in 2014 when the 29-year-old French national Mehdi Nemmouche, who is believed to have spent 14 months in Syria between December 2012 and March 2014 before reentering Europe via Germany, attacked the Jewish Museum of Brussels on May 24, 2014. The attack, which killed four persons, is another tragic example of the degree of threat that foreign fighters may pose. On the other hand, the fact remains that most FTFs will not carry out an attack to their home countries or pose a main security risk. So, what is the real threat posed by returning foreign fighters? Why is it important to address this issue? The first point to highlight is that the phenomenon is not new, but the number of FTFs traveling to Syria and Iraq is unprecedented

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in comparison to other recent conflicts. Empirical evidence from previous conflicts (such as Bosnia, Somalia, Iraq, and Afghanistan) shows that only a small minority of foreign fighters may be engaged in terrorist activities when returning home. Hegghammer (2013) found that no more than one in nine foreign fighters returned to perpetrate attacks in the West. However, because of the significantly higher number of FTFs traveling to Syria and Iraq, even if the same proportion applies, the risk is more critical. Byman and Shapiro (2014) underline a number of factors that explain why the threat to the West from these individuals is often limited. These “mitigating effects” include the fact that many foreign fighters will die, blowing themselves up in suicide attacks or dying during combat. Many of them will never return home but will continue to fight in Syria or on the next battlefield for jihad, such as has been experienced in past conflicts where, for example, Chechen fighters moved on to join the battle in Afghanistan. Indeed, the majority of foreign fighters—especially the ones ideologically driven—reportedly have no intention of leaving Syria at this point or at all. During this conflict, the establishment of the selfproclaimed caliphate will continue to have a strong ideological appeal and serve as magnet for those who want to live in, what they believe is, a true Islamic state and society. Moreover, many foreign fighters have become or will become quickly disillusioned and when returning to their home countries and will often not be violent, while some others will of course be arrested or disrupted by intelligence services. It is clear that all these effects reduce the potential terrorist threat, but as the recent tragic events in Europe demonstrate, the threat is still real and requires a comprehensive set of measures and efforts by countries and the international community as a whole. Moreover, there are other indicators that show that the case of Syria and Iraq appears to be somehow different from past conflicts: among them, the larger number of FTFs, the ease of travel and the role played by social media. FOREIGN TERRORIST FIGHTERS OF THE PAST AND PRESENT Although the phenomenon of individuals joining a foreign conflict is not new, a few differences from past foreign terrorist fighters can be highlighted in comparison to those in recent conflicts. The foreign fighter problem in Syria and Iraq is simply bigger than in past cases. If one looks at Afghanistan in the 1980s or Bosnia in the 1990s, just two examples of many past conflicts with foreign fighter’s involvement, it becomes apparent that the number of individuals prepared to join the conflicts has risen dramatically. Malet (2013) speaks of approximately 4,000 foreign fighters in Afghanistan, whereas the total number of foreign fighters in Bosnia was estimated between 1,000 and 3,000 (Schmid & Brief, 2015). Although significant, these numbers are nothing compared to the 30,000 people from

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more than 100 countries who have traveled to Syria, estimated in October 2015 by UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon. The flow, despite the sustained international resources and the efforts to tackle it, continued to increase: from 700–1,400 in mid-2012 to 6,000 in August 2013 (Lister, 2015) to 12,000 in May 2014 (Barrett, 2014) and finally an estimated 30,000 in October 2015. As the conflicts continue, the flow is likely to increase. According to Byman and Shapiro (2014), “the Syria conflict saw the fastest mobilization of foreign fighters in the history of the modern jihadist movement, suggesting that these numbers may increase dramatically in the coming years” (p. 9). Similar to past conflicts, the vast majority of FTFs come from the Arab and broader Muslim world (mainly Tunisia, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Morocco); however, according to the director of Europol, in a statement from January 2015, around 3,000 to 5,000 fighters have traveled from Europe to conflict zones (Wainwright, 2015). France, United Kingdom, Belgium, and Germany have the largest numbers of citizens in the fight. Over 100 U.S. citizens and over 2,000 Russian citizens are estimated to have traveled to Syria and Iraq. These figures are also motivated by the relative ease of travel to Syria and Iraq, especially if compared to former destinations of foreign fighters such as Afghanistan, Yemen, or Somalia. Turkey, the most common gateway to enter Syria for FTFs, is an accessible travel destination for millions of international visitors and it has a 560-milelong border with Syria, with numerous crossing points, that cannot be effectively closed. The travel is even easier for European citizens, since they do not require a visa to enter Turkey. A real facilitation network is not even necessary until reaching the Turkish-Syrian border; however, there are now well-established networks that assist foreign fighters and facilitate their travel. Another significant difference with past conflicts is the tremendously influential role played by social media and is not by chance that the Syrian conflict has been called “the most socially mediated civil conflict in history” (Lynch, Freelon, & Aday, 2014). The power of Islamic State’s social media outreach is well known and it is undeniable that groups like ISIL are particularly skilled at using these tools. As Vidino (2014) pointed out, they tend to use video rather than text, take full advantage of the linguistic skills of members (sometimes even translating suras into Western languages), make good use of music and resonate with Western youth culture. Moreover, social media enables the rapid dissemination of jihadist ideas through a wide range of contacts and allows playing the conflict out in real time. More important, social media has been used not only for propaganda but also as a critical source of information: many potential foreign fighters can find information with relative ease through Twitter and Facebook, as well as Ask.fm, Twitter, Snapchat to learn about the conflict, to make direct contact with peers already fighting in Syria, and to ask them questions and make suggestions. Compared to the past, when

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the main sources of information were in Arabic, nowadays there is a huge availability of information in English and in several other European languages. This understandably helps in reaching a significantly wider pool of possible recruits. Even if there is a wide consensus among experts that Internet and social media are not the only and main tools for radicalization, they are certainly a point of information, inspiration, and communication that helps to connect people and ideas. Lastly, what is also important to highlight is that the motivations of foreign fighters going to Syria are somehow different from what motivated jihadists in the past. Put in a very simplistic way, in the past, Western foreign terrorist fighters were motivated to join the fight by an idealistic desire to defend Islam and Muslims under threat, since historically most cases involved Muslim countries that suffered from invasion or attacks by non-Muslim countries. Instead, in the case of Syria, the fight is more of a sectarian nature and does not involve a non-Muslim invader or enemy. As motivations on joining the fighting vary, so do the reasons to return home. Some of these reasons are highlighted and explained in the next section. WHO IS COMING BACK AND WHY? The average rate of European FTFs who return from Syria and Iraq to their home countries stands at around 20–30 percent (De Kerchove, 2015). Fewer data are available for returning FTFs to other regions of the world. Clearly, these returning FTFs are posing a considerable challenge to security and law enforcement agencies. In order to efficiently deal with returning FTFs, it is essential to know as much as possible about their motivations for going in the first place. Just as there is no single profile of violent extremists, there is no single profile of foreign fighters. Scholars do not agree on a single pathway and from research conducted in the past years, it not possible to identify a common profile, a common socioeconomic background (for instance, some had been long-term unemployed, while others were from privileged background; some lacked basic education, while other were university graduated) or a common religious upbringing. Some of the individuals joining ISIL or other terrorist groups could be militants looking for combat and martyrdom; some others decided to leave, especially at the beginning of the conflict, for humanitarian reasons; for some others the search for greater meaning in life, for adventure, for a sense of belonging or revenge could represent the main factors. As Barret (2014) points out, the description of foreign fighter as disaffected, aimless, and lacking a sense of identity or belonging, seems to be common across most nationalities. Lack of social inclusion, engagement and satisfaction, especially for youth, can encourage feelings of isolation and alienation, which in turn can lead to anger and to seeking revenge. It is also important to highlight the financial motivations that, especially in some region of the

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world, can play an important factor. In other cases, especially from 2014 onward, the opportunity to live in what is supposed to be a ‘true Islamic society’ has played a larger role. In this case, many fighters also brought family members, including women and children, to live with them in the Caliphate. If these persons will ever return to their home countries, they will need dedicated approaches, since they probably have not had any fighting role but lived in a strong radicalized environment and have been exposed to all aspects of a violent lifestyle. Moreover, for many, the concept of “5-star jihad” has a strong appeal: this war is “cool,” is exciting, is an adventure and the propaganda includes pictures and stories of fighters who live in villas with pools, videogame rooms, and nice cars. It is also undeniable that some of the fighters join groups like ISIL out of a simple desire for violence. However, these motivations are extremely personal and somehow vary from region to region. The reasons of foreign fighters to return from Syria and Iraq are as individual and personal as the reasons for going in the first place. How to address the returnees issue is more and more pressing for their respective countries and a lot depends on the reasons why the foreign fighter decided to join terrorist groups, on his or her actions while in Syria, and on the motivations that pushed him or her to come back. Despite the importance to understand that reasons for radicalization, motivations to leave and join a terrorist group in a foreign conflict zone, and drivers behind deciding to return vary greatly from person to person and from country to country; some general observations and a typology attempt can be made. It is vital, to treat these categories as open-ended and by no means limited and to deal with returning foreign fighters on a case-by-case basis rather than applying a one-size-fits-all approach. Despite the individuality of the FTF phenomenon, it is possible to abstract three types of returnees within the large number of individuals returning. However, in reality, the distinction between these groups is not clear-cut and personal circumstances and experiences can result in an individual falling from one group into another at any time. Therefore, it is important to keep in mind that the following typology is very simplistic and does not fully reflect the complexity of the issue. Nevertheless, the first group that can be identified contains some fighters, coming back with a clear intention of perpetrating an attack in their home countries, carrying out the so-called domestic jihad. Mehdi Nemmouche and Bilal Hadfi (one of the suicide bombers at the Stade de France on November 13, 2015) represent clear examples of these tendencies. Both attackers were EU citizens, both grew up in European cities, enjoyed European education, lived regular lives, and had no connection to any religion before being radicalized in Europe. Both spent several months in Syria and took part in and witnessed atrocities. The hardship life and cruel experiences did not drive them away from ISIL but encouraged them to continue fighting. Both returned to Europe with the sole and clear purpose to

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bring the jihad from Syria to their home country and already started planning their attacks in Syria with the help of the global ISIL network. In the case of the individuals falling in the second group, the returnees have no intention to commit an attack, but they are actively involved in and support the terrorist cause: they can promote violence, radicalize and recruit new members, raise funds, or more broadly support terrorist networks and groups. In this regard, for many persons, returning foreign fighters are inspirational figures, a sort of modern day heroes, who gave up the comforts of their lives to fight for their beliefs. For these reasons, returnees are often effective in recruiting, inspiring, and guiding others to fight overseas. Although, these individuals do not pose a direct security threat to their home countries, their influence is nevertheless immense and can have far-reaching consequences. As ISIL drives on ever new recruits to join their deadly fights, returning FTFs have a major influence on the radicalization process and the decision of individuals to travel to Syria. This second group is still infiltrated with the narrative of ISIL and, therefore, pose an immediate risk for radicalizing other individuals. A third group of returnee is made up of individuals who—for several and diverse reasons—are disillusioned by the conflict, or by their personal experience, and decide to leave and come back home. The majority of them probably want to return to a pacific and ordinary life. Common reasons include the brutality and the extreme violence used by ISIL or other jihadist groups against other Muslims; a quality of life and a daily reality that are far different from what they were led to believe; a sense of fear and homesick (several are encouraged to return by their families). What is important to underline is that not every returning FTF will pose a threat, but the main challenge is to identify and detect the ones who might present a potential security risk. Moreover, not every returnee to his or her home country will be a candidate for rule-of-law prosecution, but almost all returning fighters will require appropriate attention in order to ensure their reintegration into society. Even individuals who return disillusioned and want to come back to a ‘pacific’ life will be radicalized, shocked, and traumatized and will be in need of some kind of rehabilitation and assistance to reintegrate back into the mainstream society. Indeed, all returning foreign fighters have been exposed to an environment of sustained radicalization and violence, they have seen or even participated in atrocities, they fear reprisal from jihadist groups, and they will be facing posttraumatic stress, mental health issues similar or worse than well-trained army soldiers, depression, and so on. Effective strategies and approaches to respond to this phenomenon have to be targeted to the different profiles of returnees and to take into consideration the main reasons that drove them to leave as well as the motivations that pushed them to return. A “one-size-fits-all approach” cannot work.

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HOW TO DEAL WITH RETURNING FOREIGN TERRORIST FIGHTERS? With several FTFs returning home, their respective governments have to determine the best strategy to deal with them. Most Western states have adopted approaches, which can be described as “hard” and “soft,” with hard being prosecution and detention and soft focusing on rehabilitation and reintegration. These policy decisions have direct influence on the immediate-term security objectives but also long-term implications for the individual, integration, and society at large. Both approaches naturally have their advantages and disadvantages, and ideally states should apply a diverse and individualized strategy for each returning FTFs (Lister, 2015).

Hard Approach Governments are mostly concerned that returning FTFs will have significant effect on the security of the country, either by plotting and carrying out terrorist attacks in groups, lone wolf-type attacks, or recruiting more citizens to join terrorist organizations. Additionally, returning FTFs often suffer psychologically from traumatic experiences and therefore are in need for help and support on various levels (Briggs & Silverman, 2014). This combination of potential threat and unpredictable behavior has encouraged many Western countries to adopt the so-called hard approach toward returning FTFs, including significant changes to their criminal codes, enhancing enforcement powers, and enhancing the scope of intelligence services (Lister, 2015). Many European states have reacted to the phenomenon of returning FTFs with restricting or removing the use of personal travel documents. The Netherlands, for example, retains the legal right to revoke the citizenship of individuals with dual nationality regardless of conviction, when nationals voluntarily enlisted in the armed forces of a terrorist militia (Dutch Ministry of Security and Justice, 2014). Likewise, the German government has the capacity to revoke any travel documents should an individual be suspected of posing a national security threat (Global Center on Cooperative Security, Human Security Collective and International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, 2014). The policy of revoking passports is extensively used in Australia where 100 passports were revoked by the foreign ministry between 2011 and 2014 (Australia, 2015). Additionally, as in many other countries, the Australian Parliament passed an amended “Foreign Fighters” Bill in 2014, which includes the creation of new offences such as “advocating terrorism” and of entering or remaining in a “declared area” of a foreign country in which a terrorist organization is engaging in hostile activity, making Australia one of the few countries, which has made traveling to a conflict illegal (Vidino, 2014).

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Likewise, the British prime minister has called for new laws to provide authorities with greater powers to prevent individuals suspected of being terrorists from traveling overseas. One aim of these debated new laws is to refuse the return of British citizens who are suspected of terrorism overseas (Cascian, 2014). Maher and Neumann (2014) are referring to the blanket approach when discussing the hard stance toward returning FTFs some governments take such as the United Kingdom, Australia, and others. The so-called blanket approach—threatening all returnees with draconian prison sentences—is, according to Maher and Neumann (2014), the least favorable options for governments to deal with the phenomenon. It is likely to deter the FTFs who regret their decision to have joined a terrorist organization from coming home, as they feel their only choice is between continuing to fight or to face prison back home. Maher and Neumann (2014) also claim that this approach was used before and failed when dealing with Arab-Afghan fighters, following the defeat of the Soviet Union in the 1980s. The individuals’ citizenship was equally taken away and threatened with prosecution, leading to a regrouping in Sudan and the beginning of Al Qaeda, according to Maher and Neumann (2014). Next to the general criminal sanctions for leaving or attempting to leave Canada for the aim to join a terrorist group, the government introduced the so-called peace bond in 2015. If a person is reasonably suspected to be in risk of leaving to join a terrorist group or rejoin such a group, a judge can order the individual to wear electronic monitoring, impose travel limitation, and other reasonable conditions for up to 12 months (Canadian Criminal Code). However, in the case of Michael Zehaf-Bibeau, a LibyanCanadian, this travel restriction led to his attack at Parliament Hill, where he killed a Canadian soldier on October 22, 2014. Significantly, ZehafBibeau had served time in prison before, and his attack seemed to be unorganized and not mapped out to be highly lethal. Moreover, he never had traveled to the Middle East before or received specific training, and as a result was not in the top 90 focus group of Canadian authorities to monitor for potential extremist ties. Lastly, although correlation cannot be proven, it becomes apparent that travel restriction or limitation can lead to attacks being carried out at home and it appears do not add to deterrence from violence. Additionally, Canada and various other countries like the Netherlands and the United States have relied in parts on international cooperation and tools in order to combat the risks associated with returning foreign fighters. Canada, for example, has since 2010, invested more than $17 million in INTERPOL as well as supported many regional operations in various parts of the world. A special focus of Canada are the CounterTerrorism Capacity Building Programs, intended to help states around the globe to prevent and respond to terrorism issues, by providing training, equipment, and assistance. These efforts are based on the belief that

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well-equipped and trained states will be able to reduce the risk for Canada’s security on a larger scale. Another country focusing on international efforts are the United States, by sending out interagency delegations to countries around the world, and partnerships with the EU, OSCE, and Europol, as well as the UN and the Global Counterterrorism Forum, which is discussed in greater detail later in the chapter (Bradtke, 2014). As mentioned before, social media channels play a decisive role in the recruitment of FTFs, and countries such as Australia and Germany have recognized this factor and made certain actions carried out in social media illegal. In particular, the Australian government highlighted in its 2015 Review of Counter-Terrorism Machinery the need to strengthen crossagency coordination and leadership, developing a strategy for managing returning foreign fighters, and building partnerships with private sector organizations such as Facebook, Google, and Twitter (Australia, 2015). Additionally, Germany adopted new legislation, criminalizing incitement via social media in September 2014 (Global Center on Cooperative Security, Human Security Collective and International Centre for CounterTerrorism, 2014). Although Lister (2015) highlights that measuring the impact of restrictive legislation and the “hard” approach is nearly impossible, especially on a short-term scale, he suggested that these policies haven’t had the hoped for effect yet as the stream of individuals departing from the United Kingdom, United States, and Australia hasn’t stopped significantly in recent times. Moreover, these policies often imply that the returning FTFs are guilty without any consideration for their individual motives or circumstances. This mind-set was mirrored by a statement of the London mayor Boris Johnson when asserting that all the fighters from the United Kingdom shall be presumed guilty unless proven innocent (“Boris Johnson calls for ‘guilty until proven innocent’ for suspected terrorists,” 2014). Such statements ultimately affect the society and especially the family of FTFs, which are often the key to successfully detecting, monitoring, and persuading FTFs to return home. Therefore, one should keep in mind that families are hardly willing to cooperate greatly with national authorities when the result would automatically be the imprisonment of their loved ones, and the policies and strategies to deal with returning FTFs should also be developed to foster trust and cooperation not only deterrence. It becomes apparent from these assertions that the right strategy or set of strategy when dealing with returning FTFs is crucial for not only imminent security considerations but have more far-reaching implications for long-term stability. Soft Approach The presumption of innocence, the difficulty in convicting a FTF due to a lack of evidence and the realization that time in prison is only delaying not

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decreasing the potential security risk of the returning individuals, some countries such as Denmark and Germany decided to opt for the so-called soft approach and focus on rehabilitation and reintegration. The degrees to which states are committed to this approach vary greatly, and variations of soft instruments are used more and more in each Western state facing the issue of returning FTFs. Of course, the countries are united in taking legal action against any retuning FTF who has committed a crime, when evidence allows it under rule of law. However, keeping the obstacle of lack of evidence in mind it becomes apparent that most of the returning fighters can and will not be prosecuted and convicted in societies based on the rule of law. Therefore, the first instinctive reaction of imprisoning cannot be the only solution countries establish in order to take actions against these individuals. Another obvious shortcoming is the fact that countries do not have the means and resources to survey all returning individuals 24 hours a day and therefore other solutions have to be found for the returning FTFs who are not imprisoned. The Netherlands, for example, has convicted the first person who has traveled to Syria and returned in late 2014. This was a rare case where evidence was available and sufficient to prosecute the returned individual. In other cases, the Netherlands is currently focusing on surveillance of the returnees by law enforcement and intelligence agencies, although it can be only achieved to a certain degree and for a limited number of persons. Other tools include the mandatory acceptance of education and employment opportunities, which follow after a prior characteristic assessment of each individual to find tailored measures to meet the needs and threat level of the person. In general, the Dutch approach can be characterized by a mix of various “soft” and “hard” measures, while simultaneously trying to removing him or her from militant circles and reintegrating him or her into society (Vidino, 2014). Focused on rehabilitation and reintegration is the new exit facility to be set up by the Netherlands in which returning FTFs will receive counselling, such as psychological support but also close supervision under strict conditions. In Denmark, Aarhus was known for some time for producing the most FTFs in the country; nowadays, Aarhus serves as a model for successful reintegration and rehabilitation. The attention shifted to Aarhus when in 2013, 22 young people, all associated to the Grimhojvej Mosque in Aarhus, had left to fight in Syria, in contrast to 2014 when only one individual left. The secret behind the change in these numbers is the Aarhus models cooperation with the mosques leadership, individual counselling of returnees, assistance in finding employment, housing and education, and lastly, psychological counselling, while not challenging nonviolent conservative Islamic beliefs (Naik, Shubert, & Thompson, 2014). This stems from the realization that access to the returnees cannot be forced, needs experts, trust persons, members of religious society, and the support of the family. Initiator of the model, psychology professor Preben Bertelsen, says it is

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all about inclusion and that the message has to be that if someone hasn’t done anything criminal, there is a chance for them to find a way back into society (Henley, 2014). He further highlights that such an inclusionary approach can have a positive spin-off effect on other FTFs still in the conflict zone, as communication is still upheld between returnees and remaining FTFs (Lister, 2015). In general, the Aarhus model is described as a cooperative process featuring a panel of experts, counselling, health care, and assistance in almost all aspects of life as any returning FTF as a Danish citizen is eligible for help getting a job, a house, an education, and psychological counselling (Naik, 2014). Moreover, crucial are also good contacts with parents and family, which are often the first to report a young person missing. Hereby, the 24-hour staffed hotline, proved to be most vital in the process of creating trust within the community and the families. For the mayor of Aarhus, unity is the key to success and the active involvement and commitment of every agency and person involved in the reintegration and rehabilitation program. As the mayor put it, we can’t pass laws to legislate on how people think or feel or what they believe, but we can be sincere about dialogue and integration (Henley, 2014). Although the longterm effects of the Aarhus models are not yet assessable, local officials already see it as their only alternative as otherwise returning FTFs, which cannot be prosecuted simply, are left on their own and disappear back into their old circles. In Germany, a project known as HAYAT, which has partnered with the Federal Office for Immigration since January 2012, is a family counselling program available to family members or friends of individuals who are seeking to go to, have gone to, or have returned from Syria. Run by an independent foundation, the Berlin-based Centre for Democratic Culture, with the support of the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (BAMF), HAYAT works as a bridge between families and the authorities. Moreover, after helping families coping with the loss and supporting them in persuading the FTFs to return, HAYAT tries to individually assess returning FTFs and, when possible, channel them through a process of counselling and reintegration in Berlin and eastern Germany. HAYAT has been dealing with approximately 130 cases so far, and base their methodology on three key areas. First, counsellors try to initiate ideological discussion to understand the individual’s viewpoint and offer a counternarrative and help the individuals to come to terms with their actions and what lead to their departure. Similar to the Aarhus model, also HAYAT tries to give active help in finding employment, education, and housing. Lastly, the group is actively involving the family of the FTF and in a joint effort try to change the individuals’ reference group to avoid further or renewed radicalization (Lister, 2015). The family is the main focus of HAYAT, not only in helping families to cope and to reinforce a positive support network for returning FTFs but also to encourage families, especially women to report departed and

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returned FTFs. The majority of the 130 cases dealt with by HAYAT were reported by female family members, underlining once again the crucial role of women in the process of detecting and monitoring FTFs (Lister, 2015). HAYAT focus is mainly on persuading aspiring foreign fighters to not leave, to not engage in violence if they do leave, or to return home with support and under supervision of the authorities. The goal is to help families to create an environment around the radicalized individual that is likely to direct him away from violence and back home. In addition to a 24-hour hotline equally effective as in Aarhus, HAYAT sees great success in bringing together families in order to share experiences. As HAYAT counsellor Berczyk puts it, “we have to differentiate between types of returnees and realize that putting all of them in jail might actually promote radicalization. We need to open some doors in order to enable exits” (Berczyk, 2015). Although HAYAT is currently only operating in parts of Germany, other facilities have been established such as the “Initiative Sicherheitspartnerschaft,” which is a partnership between security agencies, representatives of the Muslim community, and the “Beratungsstelle Radikalisierung,” which are also supported by BAMF. Cities like Bonn, Bochum, and Düsseldorf implemented the so-called Wegweiser (guideposts), which provides individuals with experts from the local Muslim community and social workers who serve as liaison for young adults, parents, teachers, and other affected persons in order to detect returned FTFs and help the rehabilitation and reintegration process. In addition to Denmark and Germany, Belgium has adopted a more liberal or soft approach to FTFs. The national Coordinating Body for Threat Analysis meets and assesses every detected returning FTF in order to determine their criminal liability for prosecution and also their potential for rehabilitation and reintegration. A multilateral approach, featuring over 20 national agencies task force, coordinate these interventions and the reintegration of the returned FTFs (Vidino, 2014). Other countries such as the United Kingdom and Canada are currently looking into establishing organizations and programs such as the Aarhus model and HAYAT. In general, an effective approach needs to feature several key points and has to meet the security issues of the respective country, whereas an indepth risk assessment is needed. Next to involving the usual experts such as psychologist into the process, the cooperation with the civil society is crucial as well. Countries such as Australia and their “LivingSafeTogether” initiative aim at involving every member of the society to keep said society safe. Especially the environment in which a returning FTF is most likely to engage in is vital to include in the process. Many of the radicalized persons are still connected to religion and need help in counter-narrating the extremist beliefs without losing their connection to the religion. In the case of radicalized Muslims, especially Imams and local religious association can have a huge impact on the returning FTFs. By engaging these religious leaders into

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the process of rehabilitation, the outlook of success not only increases but the state has insight in the development of the person and can establish trust between religious leaders and the government that is crucial to avoid repetition, help to monitor radicalized individuals in risk of leaving or returning, and increase the rate of successful reintegration. The Netherlands, for example, has close contact and cooperation with the Imams and mosque administrators in order to combat extremisms and help reintegrating the returning FTFs. Periodical meetings between government officials, religious leaders, and other stakeholders address issues such as early detection, alternative narrative, as well as Islamophobia and national racism, and ensure a continuous dialogue, cooperation, and trust building. Currently, a national radicalization point is being set up for all forms of extremism where everyone can anonymously report incidents and individuals can get information and guidance. As mentioned earlier, another crucial part of a successful reintegration and rehabilitation program is the family. Often the last persons with whom the individual keeps contact during his time abroad, the family can have a vital influence on the individual and pose an incentive to return in the first place. For this reason, it is critical to develop and implement strategies and programs that focus on families of radicalized individuals who have left and joined a terrorist group and helps families to understand the situation, react to the individual in the best way when contact is established, and builds a network of support among affected families. The role of families in the process is threefold, next to being the incentive for returning, families can help the state detect and monitor individuals as well as help to reintegrate the FTFs back into society. Projects such as HAYAT are an important step to support families, guide them and build trust between them and the national authorities, in order to facilitate cooperation among them and the wider environment of the returning FTF. Furthermore, even if it is extremely difficult to vet them, some returning FTFs could be credible and powerful voices of experience to be used in counter-narrative initiatives, to challenge and undermine the narratives of violent extremism. Disillusioned returnees are also important sources for investigations and for gaining insight into the strategies, targets, resources, and weaknesses of terrorist groups. INTERNATIONAL AND REGIONAL RESPONSES—UNITED NATIONS, EUROPEAN UNION, AND INTERPOL The primary responsibility to tackle the possible threat posed by returning FTFs lies ultimately with states, but due to the cross-border nature of the threat, without a strong international coordination and cooperation, an efficient response is hardly possible. As the tragic events in Paris showed, the EU with its free movement area appears to be particularly vulnerable.

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A report on preventing the radicalization and recruitment of Europeans by terrorist organizations was adopted by the civil liberties committee on October 19, 2015 (European Parliament, 2015). Europol director general Rob Wainwright mentions “3,000 to 5,000 EU nationals” (Wainwright, 2015) as potential foreign fighters. Within the EU, counterterrorism matters generally fall into the member states responsibility but nevertheless the EU has coordinated activities regarding the prevention, detection, criminal justice, and international cooperation. Most of the EU response activity and documentation focuses on the key areas of prevent, protect, pursue, and respond, and the EU is currently discussing regional and joint steps, trying to overcome the difficulties of combining various strategies and approaches, while preserving the sovereign powers of states (Council of the European Union, 2005). As outlined earlier, most action taken is on a member state level and the different responses and approaches to the phenomenon will be challenging to harmonize. The Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) Council, in cooperation with the counterterrorism coordinator, is responsible for all matters relating to FTFs and since June 2013 has called for increased cooperation in this area. The European Council reiterated this urgency in June and August 2014 and more recently the JHA called for renewed and improved border checks. As early as 2013, the EU counterterrorism coordinator (Gilles de Kerchove) proposed 22 measures to deal with the issue of FTFs in 6 specific priority areas, which are the better understanding of the issue, prevention of radicalization, detection of suspicious travel, investigation as well as prosecution, cooperation with third countries, and returning FTFs (Bakowski & Puccio, 2015, p. 4). In his note to the European Council, de Kerchove (2014) emphasized the need to address the foreign fighter phenomenon, issuing a discussion paper that included five main areas of action he identified as crucial and which mirrored his proposed 22 measures from 2013. In June of that year, the European Council mapped out strategic guidelines for legislative and operational planning in the traditional areas of freedom, security, and justice, including stressing the need to attempt a multilateral, multiagency approach to combat the issue of foreign fighters. More recently, the Council of the European Union has approved a EU Passenger Name Record directive that is designed to increase external border control facilitate monitoring (European Parliament, 2016). Moreover, the EU counterterrorism coordinator note to the European Council pointed out several challenges and suggested several leverage points to tackle the issues: first, the judicial response has to improve as by the time only around 10 of roughly 3,000 individuals involved in the foreign fighter phenomenon had been convicted (de Kerchove, 2014). Moreover, it is highlighted that member states need to enhance the list of terrorist offences as well as the need for a common minimum standard at EU level to have a common denominator to counter the problem as well as sending a strong political statement. Additionally, the note urges the ministers to

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facilitate roundtable meetings to share best practices in collecting evidence and to establish dialogue for further international assistance. Lastly, and crucially, the note calls for disengagement and rehabilitation programs as either an alternative to criminal prosecution, as a condition to be released from pretrial detention or in case an individual cannot be prosecuted. Overall the EU counterterrorism coordinator is calling for dialogue, cooperation, and harmonization at the EU level. Steps in this direction still have to be taken but could be facilitated as the UN Security Council issued Resolution 2178 (United Nations Security Council, 2014), which has to be implemented by all member states, including the EU member countries, which could ideally facilitate harmonization along those lines (de Kerchove, 2014). The crucial UN Security Council Resolution 2178 of September 2014 creates a new policy and legal framework for an international response to the threat of FTFs. It obliges countries to take concrete steps to address the FTF issue, including laws to prosecute FTFs, prevent traveling and financing of these individuals and the groups to which they are affiliated with. The resolution makes reference to international cooperation as the key point to effectively address the border-crossing phenomenon of FTFs and it calls states to share information on all channels and underlines for the first time that Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) is an essential element of any strategy to combat the FTF problem. However, the resolution does not define or lay out specific objectives to be followed in this respect. Ultimately, Resolution 2178 focuses on calling states to immediate action, highlights the importance of existing UN counterterrorism bodies, and on providing a long-term monitoring and assistance system to address the threat. Moreover, besides calling for the prosecution of FTFs when possible, the resolution reminds countries to do so under the umbrella of their human rights obligations. Although conflicting definitions of FTFs exist in various countries, the resolution introduces a definition of the term and states that FTFs are “individuals who travel to a state other than their States of residence or nationality for the purpose of the perpetration, planning, or preparation of, or participation in, terrorist acts or the providing or receiving of terrorist training, including in connection with armed conflict” (United Nations Security Council, 2014, p. 2). In summary, Resolution 2178 calls all UN members to make travels, financing of travels, and organization of travels for the purpose of terrorist activities illegal and punish offenders respectively. Resolution 2178 also recognizes the efforts of INTERPOL against the FTF threat, fostering cooperation between member states and conducting several activities in this respect. Through information sharing, secure communications network, and global databases, INTERPOL is actively involved in counterterrorism activities and has procedures in place to track stolen and forged identity papers and travel documents in order to combat travels of FTFs. Its database currently holds records of approximately

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5,000 suspected FTFs and more than 52 million records from 169 countries on stolen and lost travel documents (INTERPOL, 2015). INTERPOL efforts mainly aim at identifying FTFs, preventing them from crossing borders and detecting and monitoring returning individuals. The success of these activities and the cross-border cooperation becomes apparent when looking at the success INTERPOL had so far. In December 2014, for example, INTERPOL issued an international alert and three individuals, allegedly on their way to Syria and wanted in Spain for terrorism-related activities, were arrested in Bulgaria hours later at a border checkpoint with Turkey (INTERPOL, 2015). Additionally, INTERPOL addresses radicalized individuals who are planning to undertake terror plots in their home states and through the Counterterrorism Fusion Centre, a global hub for intelligence on transnational terrorist networks, information is shared by and with member states worldwide. Moreover, in July 2013, a special project on FTFs was established, in order to foster cooperation in this specific field and to exchange information on ongoing investigations. The designated FTF group is comprised by member countries from all regions as well as other international organizations (INTERPOL, 2015) and aims at all stages of the FTF process: from radicalization to recruitment, individuals leaving the country, and the ones returning. CONCLUSIONS The main challenge in dealing with the potential threat by returning FTFs is to detect and identify the individuals who have traveled to Syria and are coming back to their countries of origin. In this regard, a stronger and enhanced international cooperation and exchange of information is critical. Moreover, it is extremely difficult to assess the role the returnee played in Syria and Iraq, since not all returnees have been combatants and fighters. As discussed earlier, to collect evidence demonstrating that militants have committed crimes and can be prosecuted is another challenge. Despite the great work done by intelligence and security services, the required resources for continuous monitoring of returnees is frequently beyond what most countries can afford. As Byman and Shapiro (2014) noted, the problem is particularly acute for small countries like Belgium that has one of the highest per capita number of foreign fighters to Syria (among European states) but relatively small security services and little history of militancy. Furthermore, to deal with returnees, it is crucial to gather as much information as possible in order to understand the individual’s reasons and drivers both for leaving to join terrorist groups, and for coming back to his or her home country. Taking into considerations all these challenges and constraints, the core question for states to address is if punishment can be the only solution.

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Certainly, if there is reason to believe that a returning foreign fighter has committed a crime, he or she should be taken to court and a strong punitive response should be pursued for those found guilty. But as discussed, not all returnees will pose a significant national security threat. In these cases, punishment cannot be the only solution for a number of reasons: it is widely recognized that prisons are major incubators of radicalization and several FTFs have been radicalized in prison before leaving for Syria. An interesting example is again Mehdi Nemmouche, who from 2004 to 2012 has been incarcerated five times in France on increasingly serious charges and has been radicalized during the last prison stay. He left for Syria few weeks after his release from jail. Moreover, a strong punitive approach may discourage foreign fighters to come back to their home country. This could be also a possible approach, but it will probably imply that they will continue to fight in Syria or in the next conflict zone; they will probably become further radicalized and might develop a strong desire of revenge against their home countries. As described, some countries decided to adopt in addition to the punitive approach, policies and practices focused on the disengagement, rehabilitation, and reintegration of returning FTFs. Indeed, even if not all FTFs committed crimes, they have lived in a strong radicalized and violent environment, and in order to return to the society without presenting a significant long-term risk, they need a comprehensive and holistic rehabilitation approach that support them in disengaging from violence and rejecting violent extremist views. These strategies require a multidimensional process, involving a wide range of stakeholders: from law enforcement agencies to civil society actors, from intelligence to families and communities, from social services to religious leaders. This in turn requires a strong coordination and division of responsibilities but can provide the returnee with a full package of support to successfully reintegrate into society.

NOTE 1. “Policy and Practice of Dealing with Returning Foreign Terrorist Fighters,” by Manuela Brunero and Madleen Scatena, © 2016, United Nations. The opinions expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the United Nations.

REFERENCES Australia. (2015). Review of Australia’s counter-terrorism machinery. Retrieved from https://www.dpmc.gov.au/sites/default/files/publications/190215_CT_ Review_1.pdf. Bakowski, P., & Puccio, L. (2015, February). Foreign fighter: Member states’ responses and EU action in an international context. EPRS Briefing, 1–12. Retrieved from

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http://www.europarl.europa.eu/EPRS/EPRS-Briefing-548980-Foreignfighters-FINAL.pdf. Barrett, R. (2014). Foreign fighters in Syria. The Soufan Group. Retrieved from http://soufangroup.com/wpcontent/uploads/2014/06/TSG-ForeignFighters-in-Syria.pdf. Berczyk, J. (2015). Returning from the “IS”—Experiences from the counseling service HAYAT-Germany. Retrieved from http://www.sicherheitspolitik-blog .de/2015/03/20/returning-from-the-is-experiences-from-the-counselingservice-hayat-germany/. Boris Johnson calls for “guilty until proven innocent” for suspected terrorists. (2014, August 26). Guardian. Retrieved from http://www.theguardian .com/politics/2014/aug/25/boris-johnson-britons-visiting-iraq-syria-pre sumed-terrorists. Bradtke, R. A. (2014). Statement for the record for the Foreign Affairs Subcommittees on terrorism, nonproliferation and trade, and the Middle East and North Africa: Foreign terrorists fighters. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/rm/2014/234641.htm. Briggs, R., & Silverman, T. (2014). Western foreign fighters: Innovations in responding to the threat. London: Institute for Strategic Dialogue. Byman, D., & Shapiro, J. (2014). Be afraid, be a little afraid: The threat of terrorism from western foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq. Policy Paper No. 34. Foreign Policy at Brookings. Retrieved from https://www.brookings.edu/research/ be-afraid-be-a-little-afraid-the-threat-of-terrorism-from-western-foreignfighters-in-syria-and-iraq/. Casciani, D. (2014, September 1). Why new anti-terror powers aim to disrupt not prosecute. Retrieved from http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-29012812. Council of the European Union. (2005). Note: The European Union counter-terrorism strategy. Retrieved from http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l= EN&f=ST%2014469%202005%20REV%204. De Kerchove, G. (2014). Note from the EU Counter-Terrorism coordinator to the European council on the foreign fighter and returnees: Discussion paper. Brussel: The Council of the European Union. Retrieved from http://data.consilium.eu ropa.eu/doc/document/ST-15715–2014-REV-2/en/pdf. De Kerchove, G. (2015). Rehabilitation and reintegration of returning foreign terrorist fighters. Speech presented at Policy Forum. Retrieved from http:// www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/rehabilitationand-reintegration-of-returning-foreign-terrorist-fighters. Dutch Ministry for Security and Justice. (2014). The Netherlands comprehensive action program to combat jihadism: Overview of measures and actions. Retrieved from https://english.nctv.nl/binaries/def-a5-nctvjihadismuk-03-lr_tcm32– 83910.pdf. European Parliament. (2015, October 19). Rachida Dati on the radicalisation of EU citizens: A truly European response is needed. European Parliament News. Retrieved from http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/newsroom/20151016STO98139/Dati-on-the-radicalisation-of-EU-citizensA-truly-European-response-is-needed. European Parliament. (2016, January 6). EU passenger name record (PNR) directive: An overview. European Parliament News. Retrieved from http:// www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/news-room/20150123BKG12902/ eu-passenger-name-record-(pnr)-directive-an-overview.

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Global Center on Cooperative Security, Human Security Collective and International Centre for Counter-Terrorism. (2014). Addressing the foreign terrorist fighters phenomenon from a European Union perspective. Retrieved from http://www.globalcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/Dec2014_ EU-FTFS_GCCS_HSC_ICCT.pdf. Halliday, J., & Bucks, J. (2015, November 18). Abdelhamid Abaaoud: What we know about the Paris attacks “mastermind.” Guardian. Retrieved from http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/nov/16/abdelhamidabaaoud-suspected-mastermind-of-paris-terror-attacks. Hegghammer, T. (2013). Should I stay or should I go? Explaining variation in western jihadists’ choice between domestic and foreign fighting. American Political Science Review, 107, 1–15. Henley, J. (2014, November 12). How do you deradicalise returning Isis fighters? Guardian. Retrieved from http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/ nov/12/deradicalise-isis-fighters-jihadists-denmark-syria. INTERPOL. (2015). Activities against the foreign terrorist fighter threat. Retrieved from http://www.interpol.int/Crime-areas/Terrorism/Foreign-terroristfighters. Lister, C. (2015). Returning foreign fighters: Criminalization or reintegration? Retrieved from https://www.brookings.edu/research/returning-foreign-fighterscriminalization-or-reintegration/. Lynch, M., Freelon, D., & Aday, S. (2014). Syria’s socially mediated civil war. Retrieved from https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/PW91-Syrias%20 Socially%20Mediated%20Civil%20War.pdf. Maher, S., & Neumann, P. (2014, August 27). ICSR insight—Offering foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq a way out / ICSR. Retrieved from http://icsr.info/2014/08/ icsr-insight-offering-foreign-fighters-syria-iraq-way/. Malet, D. (2013). Foreign fighters: Transnational identities in foreign conflicts. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Naik, B., Shubert, A., & Thompson, N. (2014, October 28). Denmark offers some foreign fighters rehab without jail time—but will it work? CNN. Retrieved from http://www.cnn.com/2014/10/28/world/europe/denmark-syriaderadicalization-program/. Schmid, A. P., & Brief, I. P. (2015). Foreign (terrorist) fighter estimates: Conceptual and data issues: Terrorism. Retrieved from http://www.interpol.int/ Crime-areas/Terrorism/Terrorism. United Nations Security Council. (2014). Resolution 2178. Retrieved from http:// www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2178(2014). Vidino, L. (2014). Foreign fighters: An overview of responses in eleven countries. Retrieved from http://www.css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/ gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/pdfs/Foreign_Fighters_2014.pdf. Wainwright, R. (2015, January 13). Oral evidence: Counter-terrorism in Europe. Home Affairs Committee. Retrieved from http://data.parliament.uk/ writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/homeaffairs-committee/counterterrorism-in-europe/oral/17575.html.

CHAPTER 6

Cyber Attacks: Cybercrime or Cyber War? Albert Scherr

Examples of publicly known or suspected state-sponsored cyber attacks abound. Those include: • In 2013, a hacker affiliated with the Iranian government allegedly tried to access the controls of a small dam north of New York City. Though unsuccessful, the event provoked concerns about the vulnerability of other, larger infrastructure in the United State—pipelines, mass transit, or power grids (Kutner, 2016). • Also in 2013, an unauthorized user from China hacked into the Corps of Engineers’ National Inventory of Dams, a database of information on the vulnerabilities of major dams in the United States. The database contained categories of dams based on the number of people that would be killed if the particular dam failed. No public evidence exists that the Chinese government was involved (Gertz, 2013). • In 2014, British-owned BAE Systems reported that a “cyber espionage toolkit” known as Snake or Ouroboros had been found in the government computer networks of the Ukraine. The malware gave the hackers full remote access to the system, thereby enabling surveillance and data theft.

Based on some evidence, the suspicion was that the hackers were Russian. Similar evidence had been found in Lithuania, Britain, and Georgia. Again, no public information exists that the Russian government was involved though the hacking became known as what appeared to be Russian-inspired unrest in the Ukraine was growing (Sanger & Erlanger, 2014). • In his first term, President Obama authorized a cyber attack on the Iran’s computer systems, which run Iranian nuclear enrichment facilities. The operation,

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called Olympic Games, used a program named Stuxnet, developed in conjunction with Israel. The claim was that the computer worm temporarily disabled 1,000 of Iran’s 5,000 nuclear centrifuges. The head of Iran’s Passive Defense Organization is quoted as saying that Iran “was prepared ‘to fight our enemies’ in ‘cyberspace and Internet warfare’ ” (Sanger, 2015a). • More broadly, Sanger writes: “American cyberattacks are not limited to Iran, but the focus of attention, as one administration official put it, ‘has been overwhelmingly on one country.’ There is no reason to believe that will remain the case for long. Some officials question why the same techniques have not been used more aggressively against North Korea. Others see chances to disrupt Chinese military plans, forces in Syria on the way to suppress the uprising there, and Qaeda operations around the world” (Sanger, 2015a). • In January 2016, the Nuclear Threat Initiative (2016) released its index identifying countries that have weapons-usable nuclear material or with nuclear facilities but no weapons-usable nuclear material. Twenty of these countries are deemed to not yet have the laws and regulations needed to provide effective cyber security. Those 20 include several that are expanding their use of nuclear power.

A complete list of known or suspected state-sponsored cyber attacks on government operations would be much longer than those shown earlier. This chapter considers events of that type in the context of warfare. After introducing more fully the concept of cyber attacks, we examine what measure of cyber attacks can be dealt with in the criminal justice system, domestically and internationally. It will then examine what, if any, are the standards and criteria, independent of the adequacy of alternative measures, for going to war. INTRODUCTION The list of publicly known or suspected state-sponsored cyber attacks on government operations, if not limitless, is quite a bit longer than the aforementioned list. For example, the government or military of China has been indirectly implicated in an attack on the Office of Personnel Management and in the theft of intellectual property from companies such that the United State and China have tentatively reached an understanding regarding cyber theft of intellectual property and cyber targeting of critical infrastructure (Editorial Board, 2015; Sanger, 2015a). Additional attacks fall into a number of categories: (1) non-state-sponsored cyber attacks on government entities or infrastructure; (2) non-statesponsored cyber attacks on private companies; (3) state-sponsored attacks on private companies; and (4) quasi-state cyber attacks on government entities and private companies. In reality, this list is even longer. To no surprise, these various events over the last 10+ years have dramatically heightened government’s and private industry’s concerns about cyber security. The Pentagon has been aggressively developing a cyber arsenal. It has issued public cyber strategies in 2011 and in 2016. These

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strategies are increasingly specific about the possible U.S. response to cyber attacks (Sanger, 2015b). For example, the latest Department of Defense (DOD) strategy publicly named North Korea and the People’s Liberation Army in China as sources of cyber attacks. The Defense Department also identified Russian hackers as the source of cyber attacks on the White House and the State Department (Sanger, 2015b). Ashton Carter, the DOD secretary, explicitly stated that: There may be times when the president or the secretary of defense may determine that it would be appropriate for the U.S. military to conduct cyber operations to disrupt an adversary’s military related networks or infrastructure so that the U.S. military can protect U.S. interests in an area of operations. For example, the United States military might use cyber operations to terminate an ongoing conflict on U.S. terms, or to disrupt an adversary’s military systems to prevent the use of force against U.S. interests. (quoted in Sanger, 2015b)

The United States has only begun to introduce the idea of cyber attacks into the public discourse. It has sketched out publicly some circumstances under which the United State might act defensively or even proactively with a cyber attack of its own. In an historical context, these developments are the latest in an almost century-long arc toward a more antiseptic style of attack—antiseptic in the diminishing number of human lives committed to an attack and the diminishing quality of the physical invasion of another state’s territorial space. World War II saw a dramatic increase in aerial attacks—a classic example of a mode of attack that minimally invades the territorial space of a country by air and risks the lives of relatively few pilots. Such attacks, though much more antiseptic than earlier ground attacks, still caused a large loss of life and property damage. Of course, the most powerful example of a more antiseptic style of attack was the nuclear bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, which killed over 150,000 people and leveled two cities. The attacks themselves risked the lives of the crews of only two bombers and associated aircraft. Passing over the development of intercontinental ballistic missiles and the use of napalm in Vietnam and other chemical weaponry after World War II, the most recent dramatic development in antiseptic attacks has been the 21st-century use of drones. The CIA’s Special Activities Division has conducted hundreds of drone attacks in Pakistan over the last 10–12 years, killing an estimated 2,500-4,000 people, some combatants, and some civilians (The Bureau of Investigative Journalism, 2016). The antiseptic-ness of the attacks is startling in relation to their effectiveness and lethality. A state’s territorial space is invaded by a sophisticated mechanical device. The lives of no attackers are at risk. The attacks themselves are more targeted than World War II style bombing raids. Through

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the use of a variety of intelligence sources, only specific “targets of interest” are attacked. Fewer civilians are killed. The moral debate about the use of drone warfare is quite alive. Some are understandably concerned that the very antiseptic-ness and efficiency of such attacks have devalued considerations about the loss of life—the easier it is to destroy a threat without risking any injury to the attacker, the easier it is to continue to kill without regard to the civilian loss of life known as collateral damage, at least by some. Others contend that the end result is less loss of life by the very efficiency of the attacks. Importantly, it seems that the more antiseptic the attack, the less need for any formal or informal declaration of war. Cyber attacks are thus the latest development in antiseptic-attack technology. Cyber attacks by one state upon another involve no invasion of a state’s territorial space as contemplated in historical terms. These attacks have the potential for destroying massive amounts of property; wreaking havoc upon a state’s infrastructure and causing dramatic loss of life, depending upon the nature of the attack. The focus of this chapter is on one facet of the antiseptic-ness of cyber attacks. Because such attacks are so profoundly different from the classic attacks that have been treated as warfare in history, the question quickly becomes which cyber attacks “count” as warfare and which do not. Rather than focus on how to wage cyber war, the chapter will focus on when, if ever, to wage cyber war, be it an antiseptic one or a physical invasion.1 The chapter also does not seek to assess the quality of the U.S. government’s cyber security. It will address only tangentially cyber attacks by non-state actors and the more difficult topic of cyber attacks by quasi-state actors. It will focus only on state-on-state cyber attacks. The chapter posits that current domestic and international laws are ineffective in holding cyber attackers responsible, particularly when they are state-sponsored attackers. The resulting vacuum in formal allocation of responsibility and accompanying punishment increases the likelihood of war, cyber or otherwise. That vacuum is further exacerbated by the lack of public discourse/ rule-making about what kind of cyber attack merits a war response rather than a prosecution. And so, we are left with informal, political-defined models like the “war on terrorism” or the war on drugs, wars that have been ill-defined and ill-prosecuted. WHAT STATE-SPONSORED CYBER ATTACKS CAN THE U.S. CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM MANAGE EFFECTIVELY? State-sponsored cyber attacks come in a variety of shapes and sizes with a similar diversity in targets. As a result, potential statutory approaches within the U.S. criminal justice system abound. Those approaches may depend on:

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• The locus of the attack: where the “victim” is located. • Who the “victim” is: a private or public company or a governmental agency. • The nature of the harm: theft of information, intellectual property piracy; trespassing; destruction of property, disruption of services, instigation of terror, serious injury, or death. • The locus of the attacker: a country with whom the United States has a cybercrime treaty, a country with whom the United States has an extradition treaty, a country with whom the United States has a mutual legal assistance treaty or an executive agreement facilitating access to witnesses and evidence or a country with whom the United States has only some or none of the above. • Who the attacker is: an independent individual operating with the authority of the state, an identifiable individual who is an employee of the state and is acting within the state’s chain of authority; and a state employee acting without state authority.

In theory, the instigators of a cyber attack might be charged with any number of crimes ranging from theft, intellectual property piracy, identity theft, wire fraud, espionage as well as criminal mischief and cyber trespassing under domestic criminal laws. These charges could be at the state or, more often, at the federal level. Federal law is the most developed area of criminal laws targeted at cyber attacks. The most common possibilities include: the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA), the Electronic Espionage Act (EEA), the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA), the Federal Wire Fraud Act, and the Identity Theft and Assumption Deterrence Act (ITADA). Many federal statutes—for example, the wire fraud statute—came into being well before cyber attacks occurred with any frequency. They nonetheless have been useful in addressing such unanticipated behavior. Newer statutes designed for other purposes have also come into use such as terrorism statutes of various sorts. Next is a brief review of the more significant statutes. Electronic Communications Privacy Act The ECPA, which includes the Stored Wire Electronic Communications Act (see 18 U.S.C. 1510 et seq), is the omnibus federal wiretapping statute. It was passed well before the occurrence of cyber attacks, primarily to define the limits of intrusion on electronic privacy. Now, its coverage includes e-mails, telephone conversations, and data stored electronically, that is, wire oral and electronic communications and stored communications. ECPA bans the interception, acquisition, and disclosure of electronic communications and has both criminal and civil penalties. It focuses on communications in interstate and foreign commerce by corporations and individuals. For example, those who obtained access for WikiLeaks to protected e-mails and their substance may well have violated ECPA. The Stored Communications Act focuses on surreptitious access to communications

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“at rest” in electronic storage. Those who hacked Sony Pictures and accessed personnel information would be vulnerable to prosecution. Electronic Espionage Act The EEA (see 18 U.S.C. 1831 et seq.) is a criminal statute concerning corporate espionage designed to protect the intellectual capital of private companies from cyber theft. One provision of the EEA punishes those who knowingly misappropriate trade secrets with the intent or knowledge that their offense will benefit a foreign government. The legislative history of that provision suggests that it is designed to apply only when there is “evidence of foreign government sponsored or coordinated intelligence activity.” Computer Fraud and Abuse Act The CFAA (see 18 U.S.C. 1030) focuses less on communications and more on computers themselves, effectively operating in part as an antihacking statute. The language states that only “protected computers” are covered. However, given the definition of “protected computer,” which includes any computer that affects interstate or foreign commerce. Therefore, most computers, including cell phones, are covered (see 18 U.S.C. 1030(e)(2)). The covered conduct includes computer trespassing, cyber espionage, including using viruses and worms, fraud, password trafficking to damage computers and certain kinds of cyber threats (see 18 U.S.C. 1030(a)(1)–(7)). Identity Theft and Assumption Deterrence Act The ITADA focuses on identity theft and makes it a federal crime (see 18 U.S.C. 1208). It is a broad statute that covers other types of identity theft in addition to cyber identity theft, including the misuse of a broad array of information. It was passed in 1998 as the first federal statute to address the then growing phenomenon of identity theft. Interestingly, the “victims” are identified as banks, credit card companies, and merchants who suffered a direct economic loss rather than those whose identities have been hijacked. Federal and state legislation has been evolving in the 21st century to address the various issues surrounding cyber attacks. The evolution has included, as seen earlier, amendments to preexisting statutes and the passage of new statutes. Though one might prosecute a foreign agent or employee of a foreign state under one or more of these statutes, none of them contemplate prosecution of a foreign government engaged in a state-onstate cyber attack.

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More recent terrorism statutes have begun to contemplate versions of such an approach at last indirectly. The growth of anti-terrorism legislation has accompanied a much-increased focus on at least quasi-state conduct that seems more “war-like” conduct than criminal conduct. Cyber conduct may be chargeable as terrorism, either domestic or extraterritorial, depending on where the “acts” are said to have occurred and their purpose. Domestic terrorism requires a violation of a state or federal law and, in addition, a danger to human life. The USA Patriot Act defines domestic terrorism, that is, terrorism occurring on U.S. ground, as conducts which (Public Law 107–56 Title VIII, Sec. 802): (A) involve acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the criminal laws of the United States or of any state; (B) appear to be intended; (i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; (ii) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or (iii) to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping; and (C) occur primarily within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.

Extraterritorial terrorism prosecutions in the United States have taken two strikingly different approaches—the use of military commissions and the use of domestic criminal statutes. The use of military commissions has been both controversial and very slow in unfolding (see Solow, 2011). The prosecution of crimes under domestic statues, by contrast, has progressed apace. For example, the 2010 Terrorist Trial Report Card (The Center on Law and Security, 2010) reported 998 criminal indictments involving a number of terrorism statutes as well as criminal conspiracies. Many of these prosecutions have involved prosecutions of individuals who have engaged in conduct overseas (Solow, 2011). None has involved a state-on-state cyber attack. Notably, Congress expanded the definition of “protected computer” under the CFAA to include “a computer . . . (B) which is used in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce or communication, including a computer located outside the United States that is used in a manner that affects interstate or foreign commerce or communication of the United States” (18 U.S.C. 1030(e)). The use of the domestic criminal justice system to prosecute cyber attacks as criminal acts also poses several significant procedural difficulties— jurisdiction, extradition, evidence, and witness “collection and immunity. Jurisdictionally, the question is deceptively simple: the extent of the reach of domestic criminal statutes abroad, particularly when all the

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defendant’s actions occurred abroad and when the defendant is not a U.S. citizen and has never entered the U.S. territory. Some statutes treat this circumstance explicitly, like the USA Patriot Act’s amendment to the CFAA that included a computer located outside the United States. This expansion enables the charging of a hacker in another country. Other statutes effectively allow for such extraterritorial reach via judicial interpretation. For example, courts have held that the use of the term “foreign commerce” in a statute logically means that the statute is intended to apply extraterritorially (U.S. v. Braverman, 376 F.2d. 249; 2d. Cir. 1967). The U.S. Supreme Court has stated broadly that the application of a criminal statute that does not explicitly state it applies to extraterritorial conduct depends on the purpose of Congress as revealed by the description and nature of the crime (U.S. v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94; 1922). Nothing in international law absolutely prohibits a country from charging extraterritorial conduct. That body of law recognizes that as long as the charged conduct fits within one of five jurisdictional principles under which the law of nations permits the exercise of criminal jurisdiction by a nation, it is appropriate: Territorial jurisdiction based on the location where the alleged crime was committed, and including “objective” territorial jurisdiction, which allows countries to reach acts committed outside territorial limits but intended to produce, and producing, detrimental effects within the nation; nationality jurisdiction based on the nationality of the offender; protective jurisdiction based on the protection of the interests and the integrity of the nation; universality jurisdiction for certain crimes where custody of the offender is sufficient; and passive personality jurisdiction based on the nationality of the victim. (U.S. v. Layton, 855 F. 2d 1388; 9th Cir. 1988)

Thus, charges for cyber attacks based on extraterritorial conduct are possible, assuming the cyber attacker and that person’s location can be identified. The bigger problem often lies in bringing the attacker to the United States. Once an individual who lives outside the United States is charged, that attacker must be brought to the United State for trial. Short of kidnapping the individual, the United States and the resident country must have an extradition treaty that provides procedurally for the resident country’s legal system to enable the arrest and transfer of the individual to the United States. Many countries—Russia, the Ukraine, North Korea, China—do not have extradition treaties with the United States. So, for example, Edward Snowden remains in Russia. Further, to prosecute a criminal case effectively, one needs witnesses and other evidence. To do so in the context of a prosecution of extraterritorial conduct, the prosecuting authority needs evidence from the resident and possibly other countries. Without voluntary cooperation by witnesses or by resident country police, it is important that the two

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countries have mutual legal assistance treaty or an executive agreement facilitating access to witnesses and evidence through agreed-upon legal processes. In many ways, the biggest problem in prosecuting cyber conduct is the most fundamental one: identifying who the cyber attacker is, particularly when the attacker is in a foreign state. Whether state-sponsored or an individual, the attacker is almost always very adept at disguising any presence. This veil of cyber anonymity is difficult to pierce. It is a veil much more sophisticated than any veil of a non-cyber attacker. And, difficulty in piercing the veil is exacerbated when the attacker is tracked to a foreign state unsympathetic to the United States. In sum, it is possible to charge a cyber attack from abroad under federal criminal statutes. Appropriate substantive statutes exist; they can be used extraterritorially; and, though often difficult, individual attackers may be brought to justice in the United States. No doubt, the coverage of domestic criminal statutes as to cyber attacks is still developing and likely remains behind the developments in cyber attack innovation. Yet, the use of this patchwork quilt of principles and statutes to prosecute state-sponsored cyber attacks in the criminal justice system would be particularly challenging and likely wholly ineffective. None of the statutes described earlier allow for the charging of another state. Even if individuals within the government could be identified, substantial problems would remain. Assuming the unlikely existence of an extradition treaty, gaining the cooperation of the government that employs the individual sought would be difficult. For example, England, with whom the United States has an extradition treaty, refused to extradite a cyber hacker, Gary McKinnon, in 2012 after a long and very involved set of challenges to his extradition (BBC News, 2012). The same difficulties apply to obtaining witness and evidence from a state whose employee was the cyber attacker. Beyond these substantial difficulties, another significant issue lurks. A body of law exists domestically and internationally as to the immunity of a foreign leader from prosecution in a domestic court of another country. For example, Belgium sought to prosecute the foreign minister of the Democratic Republic of Congo for speeches inciting racial hatred. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) found that he had immunity from prosecution (International Court of Justice, 2002). In the United States, the most common, albeit infrequent, application of a similar immunity doctrine is infrequently litigated in other than the domestic immunity of diplomatic representatives (for an unusual example, see U.S. v. Noriega, 117 F.3d. 1206; 11th Cir. 1997). In many ways, the extremely difficult nature of prosecuting statesponsored cyber attacks in the U.S. criminal justice system in lieu of a declaration of war is not a surprise. No criminal justice system is designed for such a broad purpose. Its utility as a substitute for obtaining at least

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partial accountability for serious cyber attacks is compromised both by the formal legal/procedural difficulties and by the transparent political and diplomatic difficulties of prosecuting another state’s employees without its cooperation. From a domestic political perspective, the use of the criminal justice system has value from another perspective. The desire to hold cyber wrongdoers accountable for bad deeds will often be palpable. When those bad deeds are cyber attacks and when those cyber attacks cause, at the least, great inconvenience and expensive disruption, the desire for some version of public accountability increases. The larger the disruption—serious property damage, serious bodily injury or death—the deeper the desire for public accountability. When a state-sponsored cyber attack from outside the country takes place, the criminal justice system is less able to feed the understandable desire for accountability.

WHAT STATE-SPONSORED CYBER ATTACKS CAN THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM MANAGE EFFECTIVELY? A comprehensive international criminal justice system does not exist. Though the international community has labored mightily over several centuries to bring itself to a point where such a system is in operation, it remains only an aspiration in most circumstances. The differences in criminal justice systems around the world and the varieties of foundational principles underlying such systems are starting points for the difficulties in devising such a system. The political impossibility of bringing over 200 countries into agreement on any comprehensive system is apparent. Several incomplete international justice “systems,” formal and informal, exist that one might look to for some measure of accountability for state-sponsored cyber attacks—the ICJ, the International Criminal Court, and existing conventions.

International Court of Justice The ICJ is the primary judicial organ of the United Nations. It exists “to settle, in accordance with international law, legal disputes submitted to it by States and to give advisory opinions on legal questions referred to it by authorized United Nations organs and specialized agencies” (International Court of Justice, 2016). The ICJ is not a court with criminal jurisdiction nor does it resolve disputes between a private entity and a nation that involves criminal conduct. That said, it can resolve disputes between nations such as that between Belgium and the Democratic Republic of Congo described earlier.

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The ICJ only has jurisdiction based on consent (Article 36, International Court of Justice). This dramatically limits its applicability. Parties will offer up a dispute and ask for the ICJ to resolve one or more legal issues. The court itself does not look for disputes nor does it have any compulsory jurisdiction. As such, it would be very unlikely that a state actor viewed by the United States as the source of a cyber attack would agree to the jurisdiction of the court. Even if such were the case, enforcement of such an order would effectively be impossible. The ICJ’s ultimate authority is limited to a referral of the aggrieved party to the UN.2 International Criminal Court The International Criminal Court (ICC) is the only formal internal mechanism for the prosecution of individuals for criminal conduct that violates certain international norms. It is an independent international organization governed by what is called the Rome Statute. It is not part of the United Nations system. It is a permanent, treaty-based court “established to help end impunity for the perpetrators of the most serious crimes of concern to the international community” (International Criminal Court, 2014). Those crimes are identified as genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes. The ICC is not a viable international forum for seeking public accountability for state-sponsored cyber attacks within the United States. No ICC cases exist that suggest that cyber attacks would come within those categories. The United States is not a signatory to the Rome Statute and so the court’s jurisdiction is not available to it. Finally, the ICC only prosecutes individuals, not states. Even if a prosecution were possible, the extent of public accountability would be limited. Conventions Few international conventions or treaties exist, which address directly the issue of cyber warfare, because cyber conduct itself is a very new phenomenon. The most developed international agreement is the Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime, which entered into force in 2004. Its goal is “to pursue a common criminal policy aimed at the protection of society against cybercrime, especially by asking countries to adopt appropriate legislation and by fostering international cooperation” (Council of Europe, 2004). Forty-eight countries have signed the convention as of March 2016. The convention requires signatory countries to implement standardized laws and measures to combat the threat of cybercrime. That process is a slow one. As with domestic cybercrime, the approach operates through those signatory countries’ criminal justice systems and with their attendant limits.

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Other Treaties As noted earlier, a number of countries have extradition and mutual legal assistance treaties with the United States that facilitate the prosecution of those outside the United States by providing processes for bringing those charged to the United States and for collecting evidence. The likelihood of a state-sponsored cyber attack reaching a level of satisfactory accountability in the public’s eyes within the sphere of international law is small. Though cyber attacks are very often fundamentally an offense to the international community in that they cross any number of state borders, they are difficult to “process” in a judicial system in any one country. This difficulty was also very much the case with the 20th-century effort to manage drug enforcement. But, over the course of almost a century, starting with the Opium Wars in the early 20th century, the international community, admittedly at great length and with much difficulty, developed a set of conventions, bilateral and multilateral treaties and other agreements. Those efforts created an informal and complex system that still mediates the overarching problem. Whatever one’s sense of the quality and effectiveness of that system, it operates much more effectively at a diplomatic, political, and legal level than does the paucity of available resources for prosecuting cyber attacks, let alone state-sponsored cyber attacks.

WHAT ARE THE RULES FOR WHEN THE UNITED STATES DECLARES OR GOES TO WAR? If the current status of domestic and international criminal justice “systems” are not developed enough as of yet to provide for adequate accountability for cyber attacks in the public’s eyes, then the risk increases that the unpredictability of superficial and untethered political decision-making will rule the day. History suggests that such reactive decision-making may lead to war in response to deeply felt but perhaps irrational instincts for some kind of accountability. That decision point is the critical juncture at which thoughtful decisions about what constitutes grounds for war are most important. Look back at the real examples of cyber attacks at the beginning of this chapter. What if the United States were to think of the North Korean conduct as a cyber attack rather than cyber vandalism or as cyber war rather than cybercrime, understanding that such terms are ill-defined, if at all? The options for a response expand and are not dependent on the process due from the criminal justice system or even necessarily on congressional approval. Alternatively, what if a private company seeks to retaliate against a foreign country for a perceived cyber attack? It would likely create a domestic and international firestorm. Would this constitute a private company

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conducting a version of foreign policy? The lines limiting the use of a cyber arsenal of a private company are murky, primarily because our domestic laws do not directly address this issue. We know the United States has been developing a cyber arsenal though we know little about its extent. More generally, the United States has been attentive to developing military capacity in the area of cyber security through federal law, executive orders, and presidential directives. This capacity is located in a number of federal agencies, both military and investigatory. Of course, this begs the essential question of whether a cyber attack can ever “count” as war. One can imagine circumstances when a cyber attack on the government disables the computer systems of our armed forces; or, an attack that immobilizes and makes more vulnerable our nuclear capabilities. One can imagine cyber attacks on private corporations of greater magnitude than the Sony Pictures’ attack such as disabling of the entire electrical grid in California or the Northeast. As noted earlier, a number of government agencies are focusing on cyber security in a variety of ways. The fast-developing nature of the cyber weapons means that we will always be racing to keep up with the quality of our response. This continues to be a substantial challenge. The problem is less what the government is doing at an operational level to make the country more cyber-secure. The real problem is that we have yet to begin the policy discussion of what is cybercrime and what is cyber war. Domestic, international criminal law, and international humanitarian law have not taken on this critical issue directly. No U.S. statute defines what constitutes warfare in the cyber context. One can only imagine the difficulty of the policy discussion if Congress chooses to define what constitutes cyber war. The same holds true if the president decides to launch a response to another country’s cyber attack that he or she characterizes as war, particularly if others disagree. For example, the lack of definition of the term “war” raises the question of whether a cyber invasion will ever count as what historically is viewed as war—being invaded by another country’s soldiers or invading another country in that way. The nuances of drawing that line by means of a clear set of words implicates concerns about separation of powers, terrorism as war, and concerns with unintended consequences. Historically, the body of doctrine known as the law of armed conflict has helped define conceptually what constitutes an attack worthy of the response of “war.” That doctrine has two categories: jus ad bellum and jus in bello. Jus ad bellum refers to doctrine as to the permissible recourse to war and jus in bello to doctrine as to the just conduct of war. The concern here is jus ad bellum doctrine, which, ultimately, concerns political decisionmaking (Department of Defense, 2015, Sec. 16.3.3.4), that is, decisions made primarily by the president and Congress—political entities—rather than primarily by the military.

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Domestically, the Law of War Manual (Department of Defense, 2015) is the most developed operational version of the doctrine of the law of war. It draws the lines upon which the military relies. Though by no means binding on the president or the Congress, it is a useful guide to much of the body of war doctrine as of 2015, its date of issue. The Law of War Manual (war manual) devotes 15 of its 1,200 pages to cyber warfare, noting that this area is a fast-developing one and thus hard to capture with certainty or specificity. The two most important areas of definition for our purposes are (1) what constitutes a “cyber operation,” and (2) when does a cyber operation constitute the use of forces for purposes of validating a use of force response. The war manual discusses cyber operations as follows: “Cyberspace operations may be understood to be those operations that involve [t]he employment of cyberspace capabilities where the primary purpose is to achieve objectives in or through cyberspace.” Cyber operations: (1) use cyber capabilities, such as computers, software tools, or networks; and (2) have a primary purpose of achieving objectives or effects in or through cyberspace. (Department of Defense, 2015, Sec. 16.1.2)3

The war manual identifies examples of cyber operations as the use of “computers to disrupt, deny, degrade or destroy information resident in computers and computer networks, or the computers and networks themselves” (Sec. 16.1.2.1). It also gives examples of that which are not cyber operations, including “activities that merely use computers or cyberspace without a primary purpose of achieving objectives or effects in or through cyberspace” (Sec. 16.1.2.2). The essence of the war manual’s characterization is its effort to distinguish between cyber operations that constitute a use of force and those that do not. In a jus ad bellum context, a use of force allows for a use-offorce response, effectively the beginning of a war. The manual states that: Cyber operations may in certain circumstances constitute uses of force within the meaning of Article 2(4) of the Charter of the United Nations and customary international law. For example, if cyber operations cause effects that, if caused by traditional physical means, would be regarded as a use of force under jus ad bellum, then such cyber operations would likely also be regarded as a use of force. Such operations may include cyber operations that: (1) trigger a nuclear plant meltdown; (2) open a dam above a populated area, causing destruction; or (3) disable air traffic control services, resulting in airplane crashes. Similarly, cyber operations that cripple a military’s logistics systems, and thus its ability to conduct and sustain military operations, might also be considered a use of force under jus ad bellum. Other factors, besides the effects of the cyber

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operation, may also be relevant to whether the cyber operation constitutes a use of force under jus ad bellum. (Sec. 16.3.1)

This definition is a good starting point, recognizing that it does not control the decision-making of the executive or legislative branches of the U.S. government. It sketches out some general concerns and provides examples based on analogies to the kinds of effects seen in what are, historically, physical or kinetic attacks. But, it is only a starting point. Its weakness lies in its technique of using definition by analogy. The universe of possible effects caused by cyber operations is much larger than those that we have seen in kinetic attacks. Harold Koh, a distinguished legal scholar and State Department legal advisor, has said as much: I have also noted some clear-cut cases where the physical effects of a hostile cyber action would be comparable to what a kinetic action could achieve: for example, a bomb might break a dam and flood a civilian population, but insertion of a line of malicious code from a distant computer might just as easily achieve that same result. As you all know, however, there are other types of cyber actions that do not have a clear kinetic parallel, which raise profound questions about exactly what we mean by “force.” (Koh, 2012, p. 7)

Similarly, the Department of Defense expressed concern with the use of definition by analogy: In the process of reasoning by analogy to the law applicable to traditional weapons, it must always be kept in mind that computer network attacks are likely to present implications that are quite different from the implications presented by attacks with traditional weapons. These different implications may well yield different conclusions. (Department of Defense, 2002, p. 490)

So, for example, a cyber attack that shuts down the air traffic control system of a region of the country or even the entire country without causing any loss of life is a cyber operation that causes more than significant inconvenience. It is a kind of disruption that has no particularly apt analogy to an already contemplated kinetic attack. The disabling of Iranian nuclear enrichment capabilities via a cyber attack may or may not be a cyber operation that constitutes a use of force under the war manual’s approach. The antiseptic-ness of cyber attacks then often leaves us to contemplate circumstances that have no particular valuable kinetic analog. In attempting to define cyber war, we are at a risk of over-politicizing and thereby engaging in more irrational thinking when the doctrines that we have as guides leave us with an incomplete or ill-formed frame of reference. Such ungrounded responses to cyber attacks can often run the risk of flowing from an instinct for retaliation or revenge, notoriously uncertain bases for war.

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The European international community has also struggled with a set of principles to ground thinking about when a cyber attack may merit the use of force. The traditional go-to source of international law in this area, the Geneva Conventions, were written at a time when cyber war was not contemplated, that is, a war in which people may not die; territorial boundaries are not violated and the offenders are not soldiers, as history has understood those terms. The language of the Geneva Convention as to “war” uses a term like “armed conflict” but the treaties, which countries have signed to implement the convention do not define the term. The custodian of the Geneva Convention, the International Committee of the Red Cross, has produced commentary on the convention. Their comments as to what constitutes wartime or peacetime hostilities consider: • The intensity of hostilities • The regularity of armed clashes • The degree to which opposing forces are organized

In addition, the role of political motivation can be important. For example, organized crime and drug trafficking traditionally do not “count” as wartime hostilities even though some of the aforementioned informal criteria may apply. Though the concept of a cyber war is not excluded by virtue of the lack of explicit inclusion, the conventions simply do not contemplate a single, foreign state-empowered hacker wreaking havoc on the critical infrastructure of another foreign state. No international conventions or treaties exist, which address directly the issue of cyber warfare, as cyber conduct itself is a very new phenomenon. In 2007, a “three-week wave” of cyber attacks crippled Estonia’s Internet infrastructure. The principal targets were the websites of the Estonian presidency and its parliament, many of the country’s government ministries and political parties, three of the country’s biggest news organizations and two of the biggest banks and firms specializing in communications (Traynor, 2007). Russia was suspected as the source of these attacks, a seeming exacerbation of tensions between the two countries. Estonia, a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) member, formally requested that NATO intervene under Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty which provides that: An armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area. (North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 1949)

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However, NATO chose not to treat this attack as an “armed attack” under the language of Article 5. It concluded that these attacks were more in the vein of cybercrimes or cyber terrorism (Korns & Kastenberg, 2009). The conclusion was the same as to a cyber attack in Georgia in 2009, with the added conclusion that sufficient evidence did not exist as to the source of the attack (Schaap, 2009). As a consequence of these attacks and other issues, NATO did, however, establish the Cooperative Cyber Defense Centre of Excellence (CCD COE) in Tallinn, Estonia, and the Cyber Defense Management Authority in Brussels. Most significantly, the CCD COE established a project on cyber issues, which led to the seminal Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare (Tallinn Manual). The authors of the Tallinn Manual (identified here as Schmitt, 2013), a group of 20 international law practitioners and scholars (the Experts), sought to provide a guide to the law of cyber warfare. The Tallinn Manual (Schmitt, 2013) is by far the best effort to date to identify and fill out a legal regime within which cyber attacks can be evaluated as armed attacks or not. That said, it only reflects consensus among experts as to the law currently governing cyber conflict (lex locata). It does not set forth best practice or preferred policy (lex ferenda). The Tallinn Manual recognizes that a cyber attack can constitute an armed attack for Article 5 purposes as a common-sense interpretation of current international law rather than as a statement of new law. Rule 10 states that: A cyber operation that constitutes a threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or that is in any other manner inconsistent with the purpose of the United Nations, is unlawful. (Schmitt, 2013, pp. 42–43)

More importantly, it adds meat to the bones of what kind of cyber attack constitutes a use of force in the context of Article 5. Rule 11 states that “[a] cyber operation constitutes a use of force when its scale and effects are comparable to non-cyber operations rising to the level of a use of force” (Schmitt, 2013, p. 45). Rule 13 makes clear that an armed attack, not a use of force, is the precondition for self-defense response: A State that is the target of a cyber operation that rises to the level of an armed attack may exercise its inherent right of self-defense. Whether a cyber operation constitutes an armed attack depends on its scale and effects. (Schmitt, 2013, p. 54)

The central issue is when does a cyber use of force rise to the level of an armed attack, thereby allowing for a response?4 The first part of the answer is the scale-and-effects standard. In its commentary to the rules, the Tallinn Manual identifies a number of factors involved in this evaluation:

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severity, immediacy, directness, invasiveness, measurability of effects, military character, state involvement, and presumptive legality (Schmitt, 2013, pp. 48–51). These criteria add much needed specificity to the Tallinn Manual’s rules. They go beyond what the DOD Law of War Manual offered up as discriminators for “actionable” cyber operations. As such, they offer the beginnings of a foundation for broader political decisions about selfdefense, revenge, and retaliation. The second part of the question is whether the extent of the scale-andeffects violation is so large that it merits an aggressive response. That answer is more difficult and fraught with both a lack of examples and ready outcomes. The commentary to the Rule 13 reflects those difficulties in a number of places. It notes that the law is unclear as to how much death, injury, damage, destruction, or suffering “qualifies” a cyber operation as an armed attack (Schmitt, 2013, p. 56). It finds “unsettled” the question of whether some cyber actions that do not involve death, destruction and so forth but involve extensive negative effects (e.g., significant interruption or crash of a stock market exchange) may constitute an armed attack. Some of the experts felt harm to persons or damage to property was required and others felt the extent of the ensuing effects was a better focus than the nature of the harm (Schmitt, 2013, p. 56). The experts also were split over whether the effects at issue needed to be intended to meet the threshold. A majority believed that intentionality was not necessary for qualifying as an armed attack, only scale and effects. Interestingly, the group of experts noted that, at least as of 2012, no cyber operations have been “unambiguously and publicly characterized by the international community as reaching the threshold of an armed attack” (Schmitt, 2013, pp. 57–58). The experts agreed that neither the 2007 Estonia cyber attack nor the 2010 Stuxnet operation so qualified. The Tallinn Manual is a specific and focused an effort at sorting out what constitutes a cyber attack, the use of force, and armed attack. It is, however, a preliminary effort with substantial work remaining. It is binding on no country, NATO or otherwise. And, it is a very new entrant in the public political discourse about cybercrime and cyber war. CONCLUSION Domestic U.S. criminal law is currently ineffective in the prosecution of state-sponsored cyber attacks. International criminal law is even less effective in prosecuting such state-sponsored attacks. If one turns to domestic or international standards for going to war, binding criteria are nonexistent. Some very general standards are developing but they are neither binding nor robust enough to be valuable yet in a post-cyber-attack environment of

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loss of life, extensive damage, or expensive and inconvenient disruption. The resulting vacuum in formal allocation of responsibility and accompanying punishment increases the likelihood of war, cyber or otherwise based on instincts like revenge and retribution. That vacuum is further exacerbated by the lack of public discourse about our understanding of state-sponsored cyber attacks, cyber war, and the desire for and responsible limits on a response further exacerbate the danger of the vacuum. Thus, we are left with informal models like the “war on terrorism” or the war on drugs, wars that have been ill-defined and ill-prosecuted. We are left with transitory, if often inaccurate, instincts about what countries are our enemies and our friends. And, we are left with a political system often at war with itself as to who has power and who makes the decisions about war. NOTES 1. The chapter then is only partially about level of response and how to fight a war born of a cyber attack and only to the extent the level of response measures whether to go to war. 2. See, for example, Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491 (2008) in which the Supreme Court acknowledged that the ICJ had violated the Vienna Convention in its failure to inform 51 Mexican nationals of their Vienna Convention rights. However, it found that the ICJ ruling was not automatically enforceable domestic law in a state court. Medellin and others sought to enjoin the state of Texas from imposing the death penalty. 3. The manual expresses a preference for the term “cyber operations” over the term “cyber attack” as it adds clarity to a later distinction between cyber operations that either do or do not constitute a “use of force.” 4. Note that the Tallinn Manual also delves into what the nature and extent of such a response would be appropriate. While a significant topic in and of itself, that topic is beyond the scope of this chapter.

REFERENCES BBC News. (2012, October 16). Gary McKinnon extradition to US blocked by Theresa May. News UK. Retrieved from http://www.bbc.com/news/ uk-19957138. The Bureau of Investigative Journalism. (2016). Get the data: Drone wars. Covert drone war. Retrieved from https://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/ category/projects/drones/drones-graphs/. The Center on Law and Security. (2010). Terrorist trial report card: September 2001-September 2010. Terrorism trial report card. Retrieved from http:// www.lawandsecurity.org/Publications/Terrorism-Trial-Report-Card. Council of Europe. (2004). Convention on cybercrime. Details of Treaty No.185. Retrieved from http://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/search-on-trea ties/-/conventions/treaty/185.

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Department of Defense. (2002). Appendix: An assessment of international legal issues in information operations. In M. N. Schmitt & B. T. O’Donnell (Eds.), International law studies—Volume 76: Computer network attack and international law (pp. 459–430). Retrieved from https://www.usnwc.edu/Research—Gaming/International-Law/New-International-Law-Studies-(Blue-Book)Series/International-Law-Blue-Book-Articles.aspx?Volume=76. Department of Defense. (2015). Law of war manual. Retrieved from http://www .defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/law_war_manual15.pdf. Editorial Board. (2015, September 25). Finding common ground with China. New York Times. Retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com. Gertz, B. (2013, May 1). Dam! Sensitive Army database of U.S. dams compromised; Chinese hackers suspected. Washington Times. Retrieved from http://www .washingtontimes.com/news/2013/may/1/sensitive-army-database-usdams-compromised-chines/. International Court of Justice. (2002). Arrest warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Belgium). Summary of the summary of the judgment of 14 February 2002. Retrieved from http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index .php?sum=591&p1=3&p2=3&case=121&p3=5. International Court of Justice. (2016). The court. Retrieved from http://www.icj-cij .org/court/index.php?p1=1. International Criminal Court. (2014). ICC permanent premises celebrates reaching its highest point. Press Release. Retrieved from https://www.icc-cpi.int/ Pages/item.aspx?name=pr1068. Koh, H. H. (2012, December 13). International law in cyberspace. Harvard International Law Journal Online, 54, 1–12. Retrieved from http://www.harvardilj .org/2012/12/online_54_koh/. Korns, S. W., & Kastenberg, J. E. (2009). Georgia’s cyber left hook. The US Army War College Quarterly Parameters, 38(4), 60–76. Retrieved from http://strategic studiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/parameters/articles/08winter/korns.pdf. Kutner, M. (2016, March 30). Alleged dam hacking raises fears of cyber threats to infrastructure. Newsweek. Retrieved from http://www.newsweek.com/ cyber-attack-rye-dam-iran-441940. North Atlantic Treaty Organization. (1949). The North Atlantic treaty. Official texts. Retrieved from http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17120 .htm. Nuclear Threat Initiative. (2016). 2016 Findings. Nuclear security index. Retrieved from http://www.ntiindex.org/findings-recommendations/findings/. Sanger, D. E. (2015a, September 15). Cyberthreat posed by China and Iran confounds White House. New York Times. Retrieved from http://www.nytimes .com. Sanger, D. E. (2015b, April 23). Pentagon announces new strategy for cyberwarfare. New York Times. Retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com. Sanger, D. E., & Erlanger, S. (2014, March 8). Suspicion falls on Russia as “snake” cyberattacks target Ukraine’s government. New York Times. Retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com. Schaap, A. J. (2009). Cyber warfare operations: Development and use under international law. Air Force Law Review, 64, 121–148.

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Schmitt, M. N. (2013). Tallinn manual on the international law applicable to cyber warfare. New York: Cambridge University Press. Solow, S. A. (2011). Prosecuting terrorists as criminals and the limits of extraterritorial jurisdiction. St. John’s Law Review, 85(4), 1483–1556. Traynor, I. (2007, May 16). Russia accused of unleashing cyberwar to disable Estonia. Guardian. Retrieved from http://www.theguardian.com/world/2007/ may/17/topstories3.russia.

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CHAPTER 7

Disaster Risk Reduction and the Sendai Framework: Conflict and Insecurity as Risk Drivers Jaclyn T. San Antonio and Adam Bouloukos1

INTRODUCTION Disasters are often defined in numbers. When we look at major events in the last decade, for example, we know that the Indian Ocean tsunami in 2004 killed over 200,000 people across 12 countries; that the 2010 Haiti earthquake in Port-au-Prince also killed over 200,000 people in that country alone; and that the 2011 Tohoku earthquake and tsunami in Japan killed over 19,000 people and cost $210 billion in damages (the most expensive in recorded history), while triggering the nuclear meltdown of a power plant (Guha-Sapir, Vos, Below, & Ponserre, 2011, 2012; Vos, Rodriguez, Below, & Guha-Sapir, 2010). These statistics represent the typical measures of a disaster’s impact. But if we think of disasters as isolated, sudden onset, and extreme physical events with consequences that can be tallied at one moment in time, then we miss the totality of the disaster experience, its comprehensiveness as well as its complexities. Indeed, there is an element of longevity to disasters that make their impacts endure long after the hazard itself and are perhaps even revealed through risks long before. Communities endure various conflicts and insecurities such as poverty, environmental degradation, political instability, and civil violence before, during, and after hazards. Therefore, to meaningfully understand and address the totality of disasters, these issues need to be accounted for. Understood in this way, the purpose of this chapter is twofold: (1) to illuminate the dynamic relationship among disasters, conflict, and insecurity; revealing them as intersecting and mutually reinforcing challenges

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in disaster governance; and (2) to explore the role of the international community in responding to such challenges—with a particular emphasis on the relevance and utility of the newly adopted Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015–2030 (hereafter referred to as the Sendai Framework). Ultimately, we advance a more comprehensive understanding of natural disasters and look to the Sendai Framework as a promising mechanism for ingraining this understanding in the policies and practices of the international community. This chapter is organized in five parts. Part I begins with a statistical overview of recent trends in the frequency and intensity of natural disasters in order to assert the importance of studying this phenomenon. In Part II, a conceptual and analytical framework will identify and define key terms guiding the discussion. Specifically, a reconceptualization of disasters as processual occurrences will be emphasized to highlight the relationship among disasters, conflicts, and insecurities, according to what has been termed the disaster/conflict nexus (Omelicheva, 2011). In Part III, a case study focusing on the aforementioned mega-disaster in Haiti will be analyzed in order to illuminate the realities of the disaster/conflict nexus. In Part IV, the Sendai Framework will be discussed as an international instrument that adopts the more expansive understanding of natural disasters. While acknowledging some of the limitations of this framework, its explicit priority of disaster risk reduction is marked as a significant development for the international community’s efforts in disaster governance. Finally, Part V will feature recommendations for advancing the utility of the Sendai Framework in the global community. PART I: STATISTICAL OVERVIEW Recent trends in the frequency and intensity of natural disasters substantiate the need for a closer understanding of this phenomenon. Current knowledge of natural disasters is informed by the World Collaborating Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED), a coordinating body for information on natural disasters that maintains the International Emergency Events Database (EM-DAT). For a disaster to be included in the database, it must satisfy at least one of the following four criteria: (1) 10 or more persons killed; (2) 100 or more people reported affected; (3) a declaration of a state of emergency; and (4) a call for international assistance. The number of people killed refers to those confirmed dead, missing, and/or presumed dead (Guha-Sapir, Hoyois, & Below, 2015). The number of people affected includes those requiring immediate assistance during a period of emergency (Guha-Sapir et al., 2015). According to the CRED (2015), there were a total of 6,873 natural disasters around the world in the last two decades, with an increased frequency toward the second half of this period amounting to an average of

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369 disasters per year between 2004 and 2013. The increased frequency of disasters also coincided with an increase in human impacts. Between 1994 and 2013, disasters killed 1.35 million people at an average death rate of 68,000 per year. Between 2004 and 2013, this average increased to 99,700 deaths per year. In addition to these figures, trends indicate an increase in recorded “mega-disasters.” While there is no clear agreed definition of the term, “common usage” refers to disasters that have a massive impact on normal social and economic life and/or have a significant impact on more than one location, often in more than one country. Statistically, mega-disasters are defined as those disasters that kill over 100,000 people (CRED, 2015). This includes the aforementioned 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami, which killed 226,408 people across 12 countries (Vos et al., 2010) and the 2010 Haiti earthquake, which “officially” killed 222,570 people (GuhaSapir et al., 2011). The year 2008 was also significant with Cyclone Nargis, which killed over 138,366 people in Myanmar and the Sichuan earthquake, which killed 87,476 people in China—both amounting to $89 billion in damages (Rodriguez, Vos, Below, & Guha-Sapir, 2009). As these facts reveal, the severity of disasters is becoming as much a cause for concern as their frequency. Overall, these statistics underscore the suffering caused by natural disasters—thereby marking this phenomenon as one of the most pressing humanitarian concerns in contemporary global society. In presenting these statistics, a disclaimer is warranted to caution against uncritical subscriptions to numerical data. Although these figures offer a preliminary understanding of natural disasters, it is important to restate that the full nature, scope, and impact of natural disasters should not be limited to quantification. Not only do methodological constraints abound—from conceptual ambiguities in defining disasters to the logistical constraints of counting people who are displaced, missing or unidentifiable, to the lack of consistent standards on data collection methods—but statistics also have the effect of concealing the qualitative experience of disasters in their specific contexts. Thus, quantitative research must be appreciated in light of its limitations and can only offer a starting point of analysis (Eshghi & Larson, 2008; Guha-Sapir & Below, 2006). This chapter aims to provide and advance a more comprehensive understanding of disasters beyond the numbers, beginning with a more expansive conceptualization of natural disasters. PART II: CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK For the purpose of this chapter, our discussion is confined to natural disasters as opposed to technological (or “man-made”) disasters. Although we recognize that traditional distinctions between the two are less useful today at a time when human technologies increasingly interact with the environment in ways that engage hazards, this discussion is beyond the

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scope of this chapter and has been addressed elsewhere with the detailed attention it deserves (Ali, 2009; Picou & Marshall, 2007; Williams, 2008). Moving forward, then, any conversation about so-called natural disasters must begin with a clear conceptual understanding of what they are and in what context they emerge (Quarantelli, 1998a, 1998b). As alluded to at the outset of this chapter, disasters tend to be construed with a type of environmental determinism (Hewitt, 1983; Wisner, Blaikie, Cannon, & Davis, 2004). They come in various forms as earthquakes, tornadoes, volcanoes, hurricanes, and tsunamis, among others, and, as such, are depicted as violent forces of nature (or, for others, as acts of God). The reality, however, is that environmental hazards only become disasters when they interact with vulnerable human populations. According to Pelling (2003): Whilst physical phenomena are necessary for the production of natural hazard, their translation into risk and potential for disaster is contingent upon human exposure and a lack of capacity to cope with the negative impacts that exposure might bring to individuals or human systems. (p. 4)

In accordance with this explanation, Strömberg (2007) identifies three components to a disaster: (1) the triggering natural hazard; (2) the population exposed to the event; and (3) the vulnerability of that population. Given these components, it is necessary to problematize the notion of natural disasters since the term “natural” suggests that hazards are acts of nature beyond human control. This has the effect of concealing a dialectic interaction between hazards and human society. Humans are not only passive victims but can also play active roles in affecting natural disaster outcomes based on their capacity to avoid, cope with, or recover from such events. Stallings (1991) notes that natural disasters must be treated as “both products of as well as contributors to ongoing social arrangements rather than assuming that they are politically neutral ‘acts of nature’ ” (p. 583). A more appropriate definition for disasters, therefore, can be taken from disaster scholars Oliver-Smith and Hoffman (2002) as: A process/event combining a potentially destructive agent/force from the natural, modified, or built environment and a population in a socially and economically produced condition of vulnerability, resulting in a perceived disruption of customary relative satisfactions of individual and social needs for physical survival, social order, and meaning. (p. 4)

This definition is consistent with disaster scholarship that emphasizes the social, economic, and political conditions that shape human vulnerabilities to disaster, known as the vulnerability paradigm (Blaikie, Cannon, Davis, & Wisner, 1994; Cannon, 1994; Furedi, 2007; Lewis, 1999; Tierney, 2014). Cannon (1994) specifies that vulnerability is less about physical exposure to a natural hazard and more about how risks differentially engage and affect the life circumstances of individuals, groups of people, and

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society as a whole. This idea is central to Blaikie and colleague’s (1994) seminal text, At Risk, where vulnerability is defined as: The characteristics of a person or group in terms of their capacity to anticipate, cope with, resist, and recover from the impact of a natural hazard. It involves a combination of factors that determine the degree to which someone’s life and livelihood is put at risk by a discrete and identifiable event in nature or in society. (pp. 8–9)

It is precisely this element of vulnerability that can help us appreciate the reality of insecurities and conflicts within the experience of disasters— otherwise known as the disaster/conflict nexus (Omelicheva, 2011). Disaster/Conflict Nexus At the core of this concept of a disaster/conflict nexus is the idea that disasters can emerge from preexisting conflicts and/or create new conflicts in their aftermath along with all of the insecurities they entail. There are many ways to understand this relationship. Most commonly, we know that conflicts and insecurities emerge as consequences of disasters. In 2005, for example, Hurricane Katrina brought to light the vulnerabilities of women to sexual violence with numerous incidents of “disaster rape” taking place in the absence of government and due to the breakdown of law and order in New Orleans (Thornton & Voight, 2007). Additionally, the disproportionate victimization of poor African American populations by the hurricane exposed and reengaged racial and class cleavages in America (Elliott & Pais, 2006; Hartman & Squires, 2006; Potter, 2007; Ransby, 2006). In other contexts, disasters have been linked to terrorism. When an earthquake hit Pakistan in 2010, reports surfaced of various suicide bombings against police and aid recipients (Hasan, 2010; Shakir, 2010; Waraich, 2010, cited in Berrebi & Ostwald, 2011). In Sri Lanka following the Indian Ocean tsunami, child abduction became a method of recruitment for militant rebel groups (Weinstein, 2005). Berrebi and Ostwald (2011) explain that disasters create vulnerabilities that terrorist groups exploit. Such vulnerabilities stem from diverted government resources (i.e., toward recovery and away from security), unequal aid distribution and relief, political discontent spurring collective action, and an overall weakened state capacity. Related to these points, a study on the earthquake and tsunami in Chile in 2010 found that the damages inflicted upon the population led to the erosion of public confidence in the legitimacy of political leaders and institutions, creating a discontented citizenry and the threat of collective action against the Chilean government (Carlin, Love, & Zechmeister, 2014). The ongoing Syrian refugee crisis also has some links to a series of severe droughts, which affected the country between 2006 and 2011 and resulted in increased poverty and internal displacement (Marktanner, Mienie, & Noiset, 2013).

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Somewhat less understood are the ways in which conflicts and insecurities precipitate disasters (i.e., as opposed to being a consequence of them). In these scenarios, disasters or disaster vulnerabilities emerge from already volatile conditions and circumstances. In the case of the Philippines— one of the most disaster-prone countries in the world—floods and landslides are commonly linked to the widespread practice of deforestation and the failures of government to curb excessive and illegal logging practices. These governmental failures come at the expense of farming and fishing communities, whose livelihoods are lost due to the environmental degradation that coincides with deforestation, thus pushing them into poverty. This was certainly the case in 2004 in the Central Luzon region of the country where four successive tropical depressions and cyclones caused landslides that pushed thousands of logs down deforested mountains into the impoverished communities below—killing 868 people and damaging 10,000 houses (Gaillard, 2015). Were it not for deforestation, such disaster impacts could have been mitigated if not prevented altogether. Elsewhere, comparable patterns can be found in Haiti, infamously known as the poorest country in the Western Hemisphere. Here the combination of poverty, political strife, and lack of compliance with building codes contributed to the increased vulnerability of Haitians to the 2010 earthquake. This case will be discussed in greater detail in the following section. For now, it is essential to understand that the factors shaping human vulnerabilities also constitute disaster risks. Indeed, as Omelicheva (2011) suggests, the communities or countries that are already prone to conflict prior to any disaster are the same ones most likely to experience it in an exacerbated form in the aftermath of catastrophe. Specifically, she states that “When a natural disaster strikes, it simply actualizes potential instability that is already present in the governing regime and determined by the limitations or adaptive capacity of political institutions [emphasis added] (Omelicheva, 2011, p. 445). These are just a few examples that illustrate the complicated and dynamic relationship between conflicts and disasters.2 To summarize our conceptualization of the disaster/conflict nexus here, a few main patterns should be noted. First, conflicts and insecurities can manifest in a variety of forms—both in more explicit forms of violence, warfare, or rebellion to more subtle forms of poverty, inequality, and ecological crises. There is no singular form of conflict or insecurity; their connection to disasters lies in the way they create preexisting disaster vulnerabilities and/or exacerbate these in new ways. Second, the central role of the state and corresponding political actors and institutions in disaster governance is clear. The examples above highlight the implications of the government’s capacity to maintain the well-being of citizens through both actions and inactions. Our final and main point of emphasis is the totality of disasters. To be clear, separating examples of disasters that cause conflict from disasters that follow from preexisting conflicts should not lead to interpretations

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of these as distinct processes. The point to be taken from this discussion is that disasters are not singular isolated events; instead, they are part of the context of the affected society wherein conflicts and disasters can have mutually reinforcing (as opposed to mutually exclusive) effects on one another. To illuminate this point further, the next section is dedicated to an examination of the 2010 Haiti earthquake. PART III: THE 2010 HAITI EARTHQUAKE On January 12, 2010, a 7.3-magniutde earthquake struck the Haitian capital of Port-au-Prince. Within hours after the earthquake, the death toll was estimated at 100,000 people (Elliott, 2010). More recently, the CRED reports a death toll of 222,570 (Guha-Sapir et al., 2011). Meanwhile, early estimates from Haitian authorities suggested that up to 300,000 people were killed by the immediate impact of the earthquake or buried under its rubble (Government of the Republic of Haiti, 2010). Despite all figures, the true magnitude of suffering can never be adequately quantified. This section details the totality of the disaster experience in Haiti. Aftershocks: Internal Displacement, Sexual Violence, and Electoral Fraud In the aftermath of the destruction caused by the earthquake, between 1.5 and 1.7 million Haitians were rendered homeless and forced to seek shelter (Ferris & Ferro-Ribeiro, 2012; Schuller, 2010b). This resulted in the development of 1,555 makeshift camps in the country—famously known as the “tent cities” (Beaubien, 2010; Ferris & Ferro-Ribeiro, 2012). Of the 1,555 camps that emerged in Haiti, a majority of 1,200 were located in the metropolitan area of Port-au-Prince with almost half of the city’s population of 3 million people (1.2 million) displaced and living in camps (Ferris & Ferro-Ribeiro, 2012). Not surprisingly, one of the significant problems encountered by camp residents was overcrowding. Schuller (2010b) provides the example of the Solino camp, which was positioned on a soccer field and contained 6,800 people in tents that were only eight inches apart—a clear violation of international standards for shelter structures. Other camps such as Champsde-Mars had over 35,000 residents (Schuller, 2010b). It should also be noted that the existence of actual tents was a rarity among camp residents. Only 10 percent of families lived in tents, while the majority used tarps or bed sheets—none of which provided adequate shelter since they ripped easily (Schuller, 2010a). Spatial constraints were compounded by a scarcity of essentials such as water and sanitation. Estimates suggest that 40 percent of all camps did not have access to water and 30 percent did not have access to waste disposal systems (Schuller, 2010b). Of the 450 camps still remaining, 427 do not have on-site access to water, which affects over

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300,000 camp residents (Amnesty International, 2013). Amnesty International cautions that even where water is available the quality cannot be guaranteed, referencing one community where 78 percent of outlets are not chlorinated. For these reasons, camp conditions have caused serious public health concerns as residents are increasingly placed at risk of multiple infectious diseases. Camp conditions have also increased the vulnerability of residents to violence, particularly for girls and women. According to one women’s organization, the Commission of Women for Victims (KOFAVIV), there were 640 reported incidents of rape (Nolan, 2011). Another group, Haitian Women’s Solidarity, documented 718 cases and Refugees International reported that the number of sexual assaults tripled in the year since the earthquake (Nolan, 2011). Given the reluctance of victims to engage with the criminal justice system, these figures are likely gross underestimates of the problem. Nevertheless, it remains a problem post-earthquake. The prevalence of sexual assault in Haiti is attributed to camp conditions of overcrowding, lack of lighting, lack of policing, and lack of livelihood (Amnesty International, 2011). The method of aid distribution also contributed to women’s vulnerability by requiring that residents acquire ration cards to receive food-relief packages. However, men designated with the responsibility to distribute these cards were known to take advantage of their powers by propositioning girls for sex in exchange for food. In an interview with KOFAVIV, the gravity of the situation was described as follows: Even a young girl in need is forced to sleep with the person for a little card. What does she get with this card? A little rice . . . So now [the man who distributes the cards] has a monopoly . . . That is, he will just give out the cards to whomever he wants . . . In order to get a card you need to sleep with them. (Schuller, 2010b, p. 25)

Aggravating camp residents’ insecurity even further is the constant threat of eviction. As Ferris and Ferro-Ribeiro (2012) explain, 74 percent of the camps are located on private land. Therefore, as landowners decide to reclaim their land, residents face immediate eviction. Some landowners have gone so far as to refuse services from nongovernmental organizations in an effort to starve people out and force them to leave the camp (Schuller, 2010a). Between 2010 and 2011, residents of over 348 camps were either threatened with eviction or actually evicted (Ferris & FerroRibeiro, 2012). Those evicted are doubly displaced—first by the earthquake, second by shelter—while the other camp residents live with the constant threat and permanent insecurity of potential eviction and deprivation of services. For those aiming to move back to their homes, houses designated as inhabitable by inspectors have gone up in rent by 300 percent, thus leaving displaced persons—70–85 percent of whom did not

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officially own their home before the earthquake—with a remote chance of getting resettled (Schuller, 2010a). In the midst of these humanitarian emergencies and the inability of the Haitian government to address them, the inadequacy of the Préval administration came under attack and led to the decision for a new presidential election. The 2010 presidential election was regarded as an opportunity to seek the type of political leadership that could adequately address the consequences of the disaster (Brake, 2011). The degree to which an election would become problematic, however, was well known before the election process even started. In the first place, Haiti did not have the infrastructure or facilities to support a fair election. As Annis and Ives (2011) clarify, the post-earthquake circumstances of the country meant that it was impossible to develop an “accurate voters’ list, adequate mechanisms for voter registration, facilities for casting votes, [or] security at polling stations” (p. 23). Simply put, the country did not have the capacity to hold a legitimate and fair election. Nevertheless, the election proceeded on November 28, 2010, with Michel Joseph Martelly coming into power. Instead of producing new Haitian leadership, however, election results revealed the undemocratic character of Haiti’s political landscape. The choice of presidential candidates was limited to the Provincial Electoral Council, the members of which were appointed by President Préval. Not only did this represent a form of political patronage, but it also meant the exclusion of 14 other political parties, including Haiti’s most representative party, the Fanmi Lavalas (Annis & Ives, 2011). Given the limited and undemocratic selection of candidates, citizens boycotted the election with 4.7 million eligible voters opting not to cast a ballot in what they perceived to be a corrupt process (Annis & Ives, 2011). This sentiment was heightened by incidents of intimidation and violence. In the end, an independent review of 11,181 tally sheets collected during the electoral process revealed “massive irregularities, errors, and missing vote totals” (Doucet, 2011, p. 5). The codirector of the Center for Economic and Policy Research sums up the elections by concluding that it is impossible to: Salvage an election that was fundamentally illegitimate, where nearly threequarters of the electorate didn’t vote, where the most popular political party was excluded from the ballot and the vote count of the minority that did vote was severely compromised. (Doucet, 2011, p. 5)

Ultimately, while the election gave Haitians a new president in Martelly, it also served to reaffirm long-standing perceptions of the Haitian government as an incapable entity. As Fatton (2011) ominously commented, “this presidential political season is unlikely to heal [the] severe fracture

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[caused by the earthquake]; it is prone to signal continuity with, rather than a major departure from, past and failed policies” (p. 170). Root Causes: Poverty, Gender Inequality, and Political Turmoil While it is easy to think of these problems as aftershocks of the 2010 Haiti earthquake, the reality is that these are symptoms of long-standing conflicts and insecurities that existed in the country long before the 7.3-magnitude earthquake hit Port-au-Prince. Specifically, all of these problems can be variously linked to structural insecurities and conflicts of poverty, gender inequality, and political turmoil, which themselves are better understood as part of the “historical construction of disaster vulnerability” (Oliver-Smith, 2010, p. 32). First, to revisit the problem of displacement, one needs to understand the context of poverty in which the majority of Haitians lived. Consider the following statistics. Before the earthquake, more than half of Haiti’s population lived in extreme poverty (less than $1/day), while threefourths lived on less than $2/day (Helwege & Birch, 2007; World Bank, 2006, cited in Padgett & Warnecke, 2011). As of 2008, Haiti had the secondlargest income gap in the world between rich and poor (Maguire, 2010, cited in Padgett & Warnecke, 2011). An estimated 70 percent of Haitians are unemployed, with the majority of these being women. Furthermore, only 34 percent of Haitians had access to electricity compared to 87 percent of the rest of Latin American countries. Taking these statistics into account, Buss and Gardner (2008) provide an apt description of the average Haitian as someone who “survives on $1 a day; is unemployed and has no prospects of a job; is unable to read, access potable water, or turn on the lights; and will die prematurely” (pp. 1–2). Given these circumstances, poverty manifested itself in heightened migration, urban concentration and high population densities (leading to increased competition for scarce resources and jobs); and poorly constructed and unregulated buildings (Marshall, Lang, Baldridge, & Popp, 2011; Tobin, 2013). Haitians did not suddenly find themselves living in tents without food or electricity; for many, this was already the case and their circumstances were exacerbated by the earthquake. The same can be said about the sexual violence that emerged after the earthquake. As anthropology professor, Gina Ulysse of Wesleyan University argues, sexual violence and rape is symptomatic of broader issues of gender inequality in Haiti. Nolan (2011) further explains, “rape has been committed with astonishing impunity for decades . . . a common method of political leverage during the country’s frequent periods of upheaval.” Reference is made to the Duvalier regime under both Papa Doc and Baby Doc where militia regularly used rape as a political tactic of intimidation by violating the wives, daughters, sisters, and cousins of

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opponents (Nolan, 2011). The norm of sexual violence is clearly reflected in Haitian policy. For example, until 2005, rape was not even defined in the law and, therefore, not considered a criminal act (Padgett & Warnecke, 2011). When penalties were enforced, this sometimes included the order for an attacker to marry his victim (Nolan, 2011). In addition to sexual violence, gender inequality is evident in the prioritization of boys’ education over girls when parents send their sons to school, while keeping daughters at home; the feminization of HIV/AIDS with women having a higher prevalence (2.3% versus 2.0% for men) and higher likelihood of contracting the disease; and women’s exclusion from the formal job sector (58.2% for females versus 82.6% for males) (Padgett & Warnecke, 2011). All things considered, these issues foreground the second-class status of women in Haiti and the need to account for these social norms in understanding the disaster vulnerabilities and risks faced by women. Finally, the issue of electoral irregularities in the 2010 presidential election can be linked to the rich history of political turbulence in Haiti. The country has been variously labeled as “collapsed, failed, failing, parasitic, kleptocratic, phantom, virtual, pariah state, or orphan democracy” (Buss & Gardner, 2008, p. 2) owed to the turmoil that has characterized its development dating back to its enslavement and colonization and continuing through its subjection to “political manipulation and foreign military occupation.” Key historical moments include Haiti’s successful slave revolution in 1804, for which they were penalized through a diplomatic quarantine by the United States and an indemnity of 150 million francs to France (or the equivalent of $21 billion today)—both of which had the effect of isolating Haiti in the world community, while also debilitating its economic development. Following this event, a military occupation by the United States between 1915 and 1934 made Haiti subservient to Americans—a level of foreign influence that some scholars find comparable to the heavy presence of NGO’s in Haiti today (Edmonds, 2011). There were also the dictatorships during the reign of Francois Duvalier and son Jean-Claude Duvalier, which included the formation of the Tonton Macoutes—a paramilitary force used to guard the Duvaliers’ power against oppositional forces. A detailed history of Haiti’s development is beyond the scope of this paper but has been analyzed extensively by prominent Haitian scholars elsewhere.3 For our purposes, and as these historical moments illustrate, Haiti’s development has been defined by all manner of political conflict at national and international levels. To reiterate Fatton’s (2011) sentiments, the illegitimate election of 2010 represents continuity with the country’s troubled past of political instability. Overall, our discussion here is not meant to compartmentalize the consequences of the 2010 earthquake, but rather to reveal that there are historical precedents in the conflicts and insecurities present before the earthquake that must be recognized as disaster risks. This is as true of Haiti as it is of other countries around the world that have experienced

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major disasters. As such, the broader understanding of natural disasters that we advance holds relevance for the international community. Accordingly, the remainder of this paper highlights the potential of the internationally adopted Sendai Framework and its priority of disaster risk reduction to address the complexity and totality of natural disasters. PART IV: INTERNATIONAL MOBILIZATION AND THE SENDAI FRAMEWORK Adopted by the Third UN World Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction in March 2015 in Sendai, Japan—a city in the Tohoku region, which was devastated by the 2011 Great East Japan earthquake and tsunami—the Sendai Framework agreement was endorsed formally in June the same year by the UN General Assembly (United Nations, 2015). The Sendai Framework is the latest in a series of international commitments to reduce disaster impacts over the course of the past quarter century, with the issue of risk (and risk reduction) having gained importance each step of the way. The global drive began with the International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction, launched in 1990 (United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction, 2015a). Prior to this, the 1985 Mexico City earthquake triggered a greater international focus on curbing the threat of disasters. The cornerstone of the International Decade was the first ever World Conference on Disaster Reduction, held in Yokohama, Japan, in 1994. Governments endorsed the Yokohama Strategy for a Safer World and Plan of Action, providing major momentum for efforts to rein in risk. There was also a new focus on linking disaster reduction and climate change issues given that the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change had been adopted in 1992. Such linkage has remained a key feature of international disaster risk reduction, with subsequent agreements tied strongly to the Millennium Development Goals, in place from 2000 to 2015, and the post-2015 development agreements. The Sendai Framework was one of four international accords adopted in 2015, along with the Addis Ababa Action Agenda on financing for development, the 2030 Agenda on Sustainable Development, and the Paris Agreement on climate change, all of which reference the importance of reducing disaster risk as an element of their success. As the International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction closed in 1999, the UN General Assembly endorsed the plan by Secretary General Kofi Annan to establish a formal body to support the implementation of disaster reduction efforts, leading to the formation of UNISDR, the United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction. UNISDR’s mandate, defined by a number of UN General Assembly Resolutions, is to “serve as the focal point in the United Nations system for the coordination of disaster reduction and to ensure synergies among the disaster reduction activities of the United Nations system and regional organizations and activities in socioeconomic and humanitarian fields” (United Nations, 2002). A key task for

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UNISDR was to assist the international community in developing a successor for the Yokohama Strategy, to be approved at the second formal global conference on the theme. Additional impetus came from the fact that the World Conference for Disaster Reduction, held in Kobe, Japan, in January 2005, took place just weeks after the Indian Ocean tsunami had offered a tragic reminder of the need for risk reduction measures such as early warning systems and underlined the devastating consequences of huge gaps in preparedness and risk knowledge. The 2005 conference approved the Hyogo Framework for Action 2005–2015: Building the Resilience of Nations and Communities to Disasters (hereafter referred to as the Hyogo Framework) (United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction, 2015b). It was the first global plan to explain, describe, and detail the work required from all different sectors and actors to reduce disaster losses. It was developed and agreed on with the many partners needed to reduce disaster risk—governments, international agencies, disaster experts, and many others—bringing them into a common system of coordination. The goal of the Hyogo Framework was to substantially reduce disaster losses by 2015, by building the resilience of nations and communities to disasters; thereby reducing loss of lives and social, economic, and environmental assets when hazards strike. The Hyogo Framework offered guiding principles and practical means for achieving disaster resilience and outlined five priorities for action under paragraph 13 (c) including: (1) ensuring that disaster risk reduction is a national and a local priority with a strong institutional basis for implementation; (2) identifying, assessing, and monitoring disaster risks and enhancing early warning; (3) using knowledge, innovation, and education to build a culture of safety and resilience at all levels; (4) reducing the underlying risk factors; and, (5) strengthening disaster preparedness for effective response at all levels. The Hyogo Framework text also contained an explicit reference to the need to address the links between disasters and conflict, noting that an “integrated, multi-hazard approach to disaster risk reduction should be factored into policies, planning and programming related to sustainable development, relief, rehabilitation, and recovery activities in post-disaster and post-conflict situations in disaster-prone countries” (United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction, 2015b, p. 4). The Hyogo Framework played a leading role in placing the issue of risk on the international, regional, and national agenda, generating tangible progress. But that progress was uneven. The greatest advances were seen in areas of disaster risk reduction including institutional improvements, passing national legislation, setting up early warning systems, and strengthening disaster preparedness and response. The Hyogo Framework stock-tacking flagged a number of concerns: a lack of systematic multi-hazard risk assessments and early warning systems that factor in social and economic vulnerabilities; the inadequate

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integration of disaster risk reduction into planning of sustainable development policies at national and international levels; and insufficient local level of implementation of the Hyogo Framework. There were also difficulties in increasing resilience to hazards, especially of the most vulnerable segments of society. Compartmentalization of actions, according to the framework’s five priorities, was also a challenge. To boost local-level implementation, it became clear that there was a need for actions such as decentralizing authority; empowering local communities, including at the grass-roots level; creating social demand for disaster risk reduction so that individuals realize their own share of responsibility in increasing their resilience; and, holding governments accountable for the development and implementation of coherent disaster risk reduction plans and investments. Given the need to craft a successor to the Hyogo Framework, a series of stakeholder consultations initiated in March 2012 and intergovernmental negotiations held from July 2014 to March 2015 were supported by the UNISDR upon the request of the UN General Assembly. This resulted in the Sendai Framework. As a 15-year, voluntary, nonbinding agreement, the Sendai Framework aims for the “substantial reduction of disaster risk and losses in lives, livelihoods and health and in the economic, physical, social, cultural and environmental assets of persons, businesses, communities and countries.” To attain that outcome, the Sendai Framework sets out its goal to: Prevent new and reduce existing disaster risk through the implementation of integrated and inclusive economic, structural, legal, social, health, cultural, educational, environmental, technological, political and institutional measures that prevent and reduce hazard exposure and vulnerability to disaster, increase preparedness for response and recovery, and thus strengthen resilience.

In order to give a sharp focus, negotiators set seven targets within the Sendai Framework and four overarching priorities. The targets focus on substantial reductions in (1) disaster mortality, (2) number of affected people, (3) direct economic losses and (4) reducing damage to critical infrastructure and disruption of basic services. The Sendai Framework also seeks a substantial increase in (5) national and local disaster risk reduction strategies by 2020, (6) enhanced cooperation to developing countries, and (7) multi-hazard early warning systems, disaster risk information and assessments. The four priorities, meanwhile, are understanding disaster risk; strengthening disaster risk governance to manage disaster risk; investing in disaster risk reduction for resilience; and enhancing disaster preparedness for effective response and to “Build Back Better” in recovery, rehabilitation, and reconstruction. Furthermore, the Sendai Framework underlines that while the state has the primary role to reduce disaster risk, responsibilities are to be shared with other stakeholders including local government and the private sector through an all-of-society approach. The novelty of the Sendai Framework is that it marks a clear shift in focus from disaster management to integrated and anticipatory disaster

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risk management based on trends and losses, and from managing events to managing the processes that create risk. It also underlines that disaster risk management should not to be considered a sector in itself, but rather a practice to be applied across sectors including those related to stability, social cohesion, and conflict mitigation. In addition, it widens the scope of disaster risk reduction to include the risk of small-scale and slow-onset disasters as well as man-made, technological, environmental, and bio hazards, while its expected outcome is focused on curbing disaster risk and not only on reducing losses. Taking all of these into account, it should be clear how the Sendai Framework is grounded in an understanding of the complexity of disasters, targeting risk reduction in a way that speaks to the reality of vulnerability that precedes and conditions the occurrence, impact, and consequences of hazard. In this way, the Sendai Framework not only contributes to target and goal-setting but also advances an important conceptual understanding of disasters that facilitates knowledge production and consciousness raising. To celebrate these strengths, however, is not to dismiss some limitations— with one of the main concerns being the absence of language dedicated to conflict. The two-fold challenge of conflict—as a man-made disaster and how to address risk reduction in conflict zones—did arise during the process that led to the creation of the Sendai Framework. Regional negotiating groups discussed it, but at the global level it was stripped out. The underlying reason for removing it was a concern among governments that the negotiations would become hostage to debates about rights and obligations in situations of conflict, occupation, and humanitarian response. This omission is precisely why it is necessary to understand conflict as risk. Cutting the issue—at least explicitly—from the Sendai Framework is not necessarily negative if we can appreciate its preservation in the consistent emphasis on risk and disaster risk reduction. Furthermore, given that disaster risk reduction is now seen chiefly as a development matter rather than as a reactive matter, a recognition of the structural vulnerabilities that contribute to risk may allow for a more detailed understanding of the roots of conflicts and insecurities as they take shape in their particular social, economic, cultural, and political environments. Ultimately, although the Sendai Framework does not refer to conflict per se, this does not exclude that disaster risk needs to be managed even in conflict situations; for example, if a population needs to flee or relocate due to displacement (United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction, 2015c). PART V: FINAL THOUGHTS ON THE SENDAI FRAMEWORK The wide formulation of the Sendai Framework’s scope reinforces the need for coherence in managing disaster risk across sectors. It also suggests that a fragmentation of disaster risk management systems based on types of hazards and sector instruments may create gaps that would

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render each state’s disaster risk strategy and action ineffective. This scope implies that disaster risk reduction needs to be part of a broader and coherent national and, as appropriate, international disaster risk management system, which integrates security-related hazards. To speak of national and/or international disaster governance, however, should not be confused with an understanding of disaster risk reduction as the exclusive responsibility of nation-states and their respective governmental bodies. While recognizing the essential and primary responsibility of the state, the Sendai Framework contextualizes this in what is referred to as “all-of-society” approach. To this point, it is necessary to end this chapter on the role of the academic community as those engaged in research, policy, and scholarship that shape our understanding and thinking about disasters. It is here that the criminological research community in particular can step in and help legislators make those cognitive leaps. For example, if we move one step higher in the UN legal context to the level of the overarching Sustainable Development Goals, Transforming Our World: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, (United Nations, 2016) we will see that, while disaster risk reduction is directly relevant for all goals, it is particularly linked to Goals 11 and 16. Those goals state the following: • Goal 11: Make cities and human settlements inclusive, safe, resilient, and sustainable. • Goal 16: Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable, and inclusive institutions at all levels.

As for the Goal 11, as urbanization grows at a rapid rate, how we manage our cities and urban settlements will be crucial to meeting this goal. Criminologists have long been discussing need for such things as wise urban planning, fair and equal access to social services, job creation, improving the conditions of living for slum-dwellers, and so on. Those types of interventions need to be made in the context of reducing risk. Goal 16 clearly articulates the direct linkage between justice and development. This is an argument that criminologists have been making for years in terms of advocating for equitable treatment of marginalized populations, protecting human rights, addressing structural vulnerabilities related to poverty, conflict, and violence and promoting all facets of social, economic, and environmental justice. It is time, perhaps, for these scholars and activists to be more assertive in these claims and more steadfast in their efforts to act upon them. Given the crosscutting nature of disaster risk reduction, the Sendai Framework transcends traditional dichotomies between development and humanitarian relief, developed and developing countries, or situations of conflict, fragility, and peace. As a universal agreement, it applies

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to all countries without any distinction. It underlines that disaster risk reduction and its connection to conflict and security cannot be neglected. What may need to be adapted is the approach, the way the work is carried out, and the actors involved in doing that work. At this point in time, it is too early to measure the tangible impacts of the Sendai Framework. But suffice to say that it solidifies a strengthened international commitment to disaster risk reduction in a way that reflects an understanding of the totality of the disaster experience. In this chapter, it has been our aim to advance this conceptualization of disasters in line with momentum behind the development of the Sendai Framework. We hope this paper has helped to elucidate the linkage between disasters, conflict, and insecurities to encourage more expansive research and stimulate further dialogue on this complex nexus. NOTES 1. “Disaster Risk Reduction and the Sendai Framework: Conflict and Insecurity as Risk Drivers,” by Jaclyn T. San Antonio and Adam Bouloukos, © 2016, United Nations. The opinions expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the United Nations. 2. For a fuller discussion of the disaster/conflict nexus and additional examples, readers are encouraged to consult When Disasters and Conflicts Collide: Improving Links between Disaster Resilience and Conflict Prevention (Harris, Keen, & Mitchell, 2013). 3. For a detailed discussion and analysis of Haitian history, see Paul Farmer’s The Uses of Haiti (2006) and Laurent Dubois’s Haiti: The Aftershocks of History (2012).

REFERENCES Ali, S. H. (2009). Analyzing environmental disasters. In A. S. Gupta (Ed.), Understanding the global environment (pp. 245–264). New Delhi: Pearson Press. Amnesty International. (2011, January 6). Aftershocks: Women speak out against sexual violence in Haiti’s camps. Retrieved from https://www.amnesty .org/en/documents/AMR36/001/2011/en/. Amnesty International. (2013, April 23). Nowhere to go: Forced evictions in Haiti’s displacement camps. Retrieved from http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/ info/AMR36/001/2013/en. Annis, R., & Ives, K. (2011). Haiti’s election debacle: A coup legacy. NACLA Report on the Americas, 44, 22–24. Beaubien, J. (2010, September 22). Amid slow recovery, Haiti’s tent cities remain. Retrieved from http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=130047763. Berrebi, C., & Ostwald, J. (2011). Earthquakes, hurricanes, and terrorism: Do natural disasters incite terror? Public Choice, 149, 383–403. Blaikie, P., Cannon, T., Davis, I., & Wisner, B. (1994). At risk: Natural hazards, people’s vulnerability, and disasters (1st ed.). New York: Routledge. Brake, J. (Producer). (2011, January 11). The agenda with Steve Paikin [Television broadcast.] Retrieved from http://www.tvo.or/TV/WebObjects/TVO.woa? videoid?747535129001.

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Buss, T. F., & Gardner, A. (2008). Haiti in the balance: Why foreign aid has failed and what we can do about it. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press. Cannon, T. (1994). Vulnerability analysis and the explanation of “natural” disasters. In A. Varley (Ed.), Disasters, development and environment (pp. 13–30). Chichester, UK: John Wiley & Sons. Carlin, R. E., Love, G. J., & Zechmeister, E. J. (2014). Natural disaster and democratic legitimacy: The public opinion consequences of Chile’s 2010 earthquake and tsunami. Political Research Quarterly, 67(1), 3–15. Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters. (2015). The human cost of natural disasters: A global perspective. Retrieved from http://www.cred.be/ publications. Doucet, I. (2011, January 12). One year later, Haiti hasn’t built back better. Retrieved from http://www.thenation.com/article/one-year-later-haiti-hasnt-builtback-better/. Dubois, L. (2012). Haiti: The aftershocks of history. New York: Metropolitan Books. Edmonds, K. (2011). The denial of self-determination: Haiti and the international community. Retrieved from http://www.canadianhaitiaction.ca/publications. Elliott, J. R., & Pais, J. (2006). Race, class, and Hurricane Katrina: Social differences in human responses to disaster. Social Science Research, 35, 295–321. Elliott, M. (2010, January 14). Haiti’s agony: What it will take to rebuild. Retrieved from http://content.time.com/time/specials/packages/article/0,28804,1953379_ 1953494_1953499,00.html. Eshghi, K., & Larson, R. C. (2008). Disaster: Lessons from the past 105 years. Disaster Prevention and Management, 17, 62–82. Farmer, P. (2006). The uses of Haiti (3rd ed.). Monroe: Common Courage Press. Fatton, R. (2011). Haiti in the aftermath of the earthquake: The politics of catastrophe. Journal of Black Studies, 42, 158–185. Ferris, E., & Ferro-Ribeiro, S. (2012). Protecting people in cities: The disturbing case of Haiti. Disasters, 36, S43-S63. Furedi, F. (2007). The changing meaning of disaster. Area, 39, 482–489. doi:10.1111/ j.1475–4762.2007.00764.x. Gaillard, J. C. (2015). People’s response to disasters in the Philippines: Vulnerability, capacities, and resilience. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Government of the Republic of Haiti. (2010). Action plan for national recovery and development of Haiti: Immediate key initiatives for the future. Retrieved from http://www.haiticonference.org/index_shtml. Guha-Sapir, D., & Below, R. (2006). Collecting data on disasters: Easier said than done. Asian Disaster Management News, 12, 9–10. Guha-Sapir, D., Hoyois, P., & Below, R. (2015). Annual statistical review 2014: The numbers and trends. Retrieved from http://www.emdat.be/publications. Guha-Sapir, D., Vos, F., Below, R., & Ponserre, S. (2011). Annual statistical review 2010: The numbers and trends. Retrieved from http://www.emdat.be/publications. Guha-Sapir, D., Vos, F., Below, R., & Ponserre, S. (2012). Annual statistical review 2011: The numbers and trends. Retrieved from http://www.emdat.be/publications. Harris, K., Keen, D., & Mitchell, T. (2013). When disasters and conflicts collide: Improving links between disaster resilience and conflict prevention. Retrieved from https:// www.odi.org/publications/7257-disasters-conflicts-collide-improvinglinks-between-disaster-resilience-conflict-prevention.

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Hartman, C., & Squires, G. D. (2006). There is no such thing as a disaster: Race, class and Hurricane Katrina. New York: Routledge. Hasan, S. S. (2010). Pakistan suicide bomb on police, children among dead. Retrieved from ttp://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-11195797. Helwege, A., & Birch, M. B. L. (2007). Declining poverty in Latin America? A critical analysis of new estimates by international institutions. GDAE working paper no. 07-02. Medford, MA: Global Development and Environmental Institute, Tufts University. Retrieved from http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/ bitstream/37279/2/07-02LatinAmPoverty.pdf. Hewitt, K. (Ed.). (1983). Interpretations of calamity. Boston, MA: Allen & Unwin Inc. Lewis, J. (1999). Development in disaster-prone places: Studies of vulnerability. London, UK: Intermediate Technology Publications Ltd. Maguire, R. (2010). In the aftermath of the earthquake: Rebuilding to rebalance Haiti. Retrieved from http://forums.ssrc.org/haiti/2010/02/16/in-the-after math-of-the-earthquake-rebuilding-to-rebalance-haiti/. Marktanner, M., Mienie, E., & Noiset, L. (2013). From armed conflict to disaster vulnerability. Disaster Prevention and Management, 24, 53–69. Marshall, J. D., Lang, A. F., Baldridge, S. M., & Popp, D. R. (2011). Recipe for disaster: Construction methods, materials, and building performance in the January 2010 Haiti earthquake. Earthquake Spectra, 27, S323–S343. Nolan, C. (2011). Haiti, violated. World Policy Journal, 28, 93–102. Oliver-Smith, A. (2010). Haiti and the historical construction of disasters. North American Congress on Latin America (NACLA) Report on the Americas, 43, 32–36. Oliver-Smith, A., & Hoffman, S. M. (2002). Introduction: Why anthropologists should study disasters. In S. M. Hoffman & A. Oliver-Smith (Eds.), Catastrophe and culture: The anthropology of disaster (pp. 3–22). Sante Fe, NM: School of American Research Press. Omelicheva, M. Y. (2011). Natural disasters: Triggers of political instability. International Interactions, 37, 441–465. Padgett, A., & Warnecke, T. (2011). Diamonds in the rubble: The women of Haiti— institutions, gender equity and human development in Haiti. Journal of Economic Issues, 14, 527–557. Pelling, M. (2003). Paradigms of risk. In M. Pelling (Ed.), Natural disasters and development in a globalizing world (pp. 3–16). New York: Routledge. Picou, J. S., & Marshall, B. K. (2007). Introduction: Katrina as paradigm shift: Reflections on disaster research in the twenty-first century. In D. L. Brunsma, D. Overfelt, & J. S. Picou (Eds.), The sociology of Katrina: Perspectives on a modern catastrophe (pp. 1–22). Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield. Potter, H. (2007). Racing the storm: Racial implications and lessons learned from Hurricane Katrina. Lanham: Lexington Books. Quarantelli, E. L. (Ed.). (1998a). What is a disaster? Perspectives on the question. New York: Routledge. Quarantelli, E. L. (Ed.). (1998b). Introduction: The basic question, its importance, and how it is addressed in this volume. In E. L. Quarantelli (Ed.), What is a disaster? Perspectives on-the question (pp. xii–xviii). New York: Routledge. Ransby, B. (2006). Katrina, black women, and the deadly discourse on black poverty in America. Du Bois Review, 3, 215–222.

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Rodriguez, J., Vos, F., Below, R., & Guha-Sapir, D. (2009). Annual disaster statistical review 2008: The number and trends. Brussels: Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters. Retrieved from http:/cred.be/publications. Schuller, M. (2010a). Haiti’s disaster after the disaster: The IDP camps and cholera. The Journal of Humanitarian Assistance. Retrieved from http://sites.tufts .edu/jha/archives/869. Schuller, M. (2010b). Shattered and scattered: Haiti’s quake through the lens of human rights. NACLA Report on the Americas, 43, 20–27. Shakir, A. (2010). UN halts aid distribution after female suicide bomber kills 46 in Pakistan. Online article. Bloomberg. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/ 2010-12-25/pakistan-blast-kills-38-people-edhi-ambulance-service-spokes man-reports.html. Accessed 15 July, 2011. Stallings, R. A. (1991). Conflict in natural disasters: A codification of consensus and conflict theories. Social Science Quarterly, 69, 569–586. Strömberg, D. (2007). Natural disasters, economic development, and humanitarian aid. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 21, 199–222. Thornton, W. E., & Voight, L. (2007). Disaster rape: Vulnerability of women to sexual assaults during Hurricane Katrina. Journal of Public Management and Social Policy, 13, 23–49. Tierney, K. (2014). The social roots of risk: Producing disasters, promoting resilience. Stanford: Stanford University Press. Tobin, K. A. (2013). Population density and housing in Port-au-Prince: Historical construction of vulnerability. Journal of Urban History, 39, 1045–1061. United Nations. (2002). International strategy for disaster reduction. Retrieved from http://www.unisdr.org/files/resolutions/N0149261.pdf. United Nations. (2015). Sendai framework for disaster risk reduction 2015–2030. Retrieved from http://www.unisdr.org/files/resolutions/N1516716.pdf. United Nations. (2016). Sustainable development goals. Retrieved from https:// sustainabledevelopment.un.org/sdgs. United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction. (2015a). History. Retrieved from https://www.unisdr.org/who-we-are/history#idndr. United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction. (2015b). Hyogo Framework for Action (HFA). Retrieved from https://www.unisdr.org/we/coordinate/ hfa. United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction. (2015c). Reading the Sendai framework for disaster risk reduction 2015–2030. Retrieved from http://www .preventionweb.net/files/46694_readingsendaiframeworkfordisasterri .pdf. Vos, F., Rodriguez, J., Below, R., & Guha-Sapir, D. (2010). Annual disaster statistical review 2009: The number and trends. Brussels: Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters. Retrieved from http://cred.be/publications. Waraich, O. (2010, September 3). Religious minorities suffering worst in Pakistan floods. Retrieved from http://www.time.com/time/world/article/ 0,8599,2015849,00.html. Weinstein, H. (2005). Sri Lanka. In L. E. Fletcher, E. Stover, & H. M. Weinstein (Eds.), After the tsunami: Human rights of vulnerable populations (pp. 57–73). Berkeley, CA: Human Rights Centre University of California Berkeley.

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Williams, S. (2008). Rethinking the nature of disaster: From failed instruments of learning to a post-social understanding. Social Forces, 87, 1115–1138. Wisner, B., Blaikie, P., Cannon, T., & Davis, I. (2004). At risk: Natural hazards, people’s vulnerability and disasters (2nd ed.). New York: Routledge. World Bank (2006). World development indicators 2006. Washington, DC: World Bank. Retrieved from https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/109 86/8151.

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CHAPTER 8

The Financing of Terrorism and Insurgency through Drug Trafficking Colin P. Clarke

INTRODUCTION The lifeblood of any violent non-state organization is its ability to generate funds. In an irregular warfare environment, the importance of funding is magnified because unlike nation-states, terrorists and insurgents do not possess the ability to legally tax citizens in order to raise a standing military. On the contrary, terrorists, insurgents, warlords, and militias rely on both licit and illicit means to generate funds. These funds are then applied to build, consolidate, and sustain the group’s operational and organizational capabilities. The former augments a group’s ability to successfully execute attacks, while the latter contributes to group cohesion. In turn, states and international organizations, those entities primarily tasked with countering these groups and their funding streams, rely on a range of kinetic and non-kinetic operations to disrupt and when possible, dismantle a malevolent group’s ability to generate funds (Clarke, 2015). To be sure, many insurgents rely on criminality for financing. After the Cold War ended, the two major superpowers—the United States and the Soviet Union—withdrew funding from many of their respective proxies, forcing terrorist and insurgent groups to fend for themselves. Some were able to adapt by adopting criminal means to finance their organizations but many groups were not, contributing to their ultimate demise. Almost every active terrorist and insurgent group has, at some point, relied on illicit gains to fund their operations and organizations. Al Qaeda

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received donations from wealthy sheiks in the Gulf, which was a boon to the group but also a point of vulnerability. Both the Abu Sayyaf Group and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) have relied on crime to fund their respective organizations in the Philippines, effectively blurring the line between terrorism and crime (Sanderson, 2004, p. 52). Terrorist groups have proven, time and again, to be highly adaptive organizations possessing both the will and capability to engage in myriad revenue generating schemes to fund diverse financial portfolios. As the coalition battling the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) began making progress in attacking the group’s vast oil infrastructure, it responded by branching out into a wide range of activities designed to help the group rebound financially from the loss of profits generated by oil and oil-related products, including trafficking antiquities, managing fish farms, and running car dealerships (Kalin, 2016). This chapter will analyze the financing of terrorism and insurgency through drug trafficking, beginning with a focus terrorist groups that raise funds through transnational criminal activities. Next, the chapter homes in on the drug trade more specifically, reviewing several important historical examples that illustrate a growing nexus between terrorism and crime, before delving into an in-depth analysis of the Afghan Taliban and its involvement in the opium trade in Afghanistan. Finally, the chapter concludes with a discussion of the debate over whether or not there is a convergence or divergence between terrorism and transnational organized crime, before offering modest policy prescriptions for dealing with this threat. Transnational Organized Crime and Terrorism Within the growing literature on transnational organized crime and terrorism, there is often confusion over the use of smuggling on the one hand, and trafficking, on the other. But these activities are not synonymous and thus deserve clarification. Smuggling is, in essence, about cross-border movement, while “trafficking” is a more comprehensive term meant to encompass the broader process or activity. Counterfeiting, while tangentially related to trafficking and smuggling, is clearly a separate category. The range of commodities that can be trafficked, smuggled, and/or counterfeited is broad. However, the most commonly smuggled and trafficked commodities are arms (weapons), drugs, humans, and natural resources. More recently, there have been reports that insurgents have profited from the smuggling of less traditional “commodities” like antiquities, human organs, and endangered animals. To be sure, legal commodities like cigarettes are also commonly smuggled, primarily to evade taxes in one state or country and obtain profits by evading these taxes by selling the cigarettes somewhere else.

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Each year, hundreds of thousands of women and children are trafficked and forced into prostitution, many of them traveling along the “pipeline of people and contraband” coming from Eastern Europe, Central Asia, the Middle East, Russia, and North Africa destined for Western Europe (Sanderson, 2004). Indeed, prominent human trafficking routes from China and Nigeria into Europe are a cause for serious concern (Lee, 2011; von Lampe, 2014, p. 77). Human trafficking can include alien smuggling and it should be noted that although the global sex trade is a major driver in this regard, humans are trafficked for many reasons, include labor exploitation, which is increasingly common in agriculture, construction, and forced domestic servitude (Aas, 2013, p. 38). The trafficking of humans not only provides funding for criminal and terrorist organizations but also fuels worries of lone wolves and sleeper cells infiltrating states undetected and blending into everyday society before attacking. With the collapse of Libya during the Arab Spring, the countries flanking Europe’s southern borders remain on high alert, especially Italy. In what have come to be known as resource insurgencies, insurgents do not seek so much to win control of the state or establish their own government as they fight to eliminate state interference with their exploitation of natural resources (e.g., diamonds, timber). During the brutal civil wars in West Africa throughout the 1990s, the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) acquired weapons either by raiding Sierra Leonean army forward supply posts or by trading diamonds with Liberian warlord Charles Taylor. As a border sanctuary, the insurgents relied on a forested boundary enclave near the Liberian side, which provided them with an ungoverned area to smuggle diamonds and engage in illegal logging (Abdullah & Muana, 1998, p. 179). Where precious gems or stones are unavailable, like in Somalia, non-state actors fighting to control territory throughout the Horn of Africa, including the Al Qaeda linked AlShabaab militant group, rely on a range of other criminal activities linked to the exploitation of natural resources, from the illicit ivory trade to the booming market for smuggled charcoal (Gettleman & Kulish, 2013). More recently, Al-Shabaab has sought to finance its activities by trading in contraband sugar (Keatinge, 2015). With the end of the Cold War, weaponry flooded the global arms market. AK-47s, rocket-propelled grenades, mines, and even nuclear components were bought and sold illicitly (Albanese, 2011, pp. 27–28). With the collapse of the Soviet Union, Eastern Bloc countries flooded the market with everything from small arms to missiles. Over time, different cities throughout the world have grown renowned for open air arms and weapons bazaars (Martin & Romano, 1992, pp. 67–68). The Bakara Market in Mogadishu has been one of the world’s busiest bazaars for the exchange in arms, weapons, and ammunition for more than two decades. Other cities include Bangkok in Thailand and Peshawar in Pakistan,

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during the 1970s and 1980s, respectively. In Colombia, post-Cold War arms stockpiles (along with demilitarized zones and state interference) contributed directly to the influx of arms into the country (Cragin & Hoffman, 2003). African civil wars in the 1990s, while parochial in fighting, were global in scope—international arms traffickers from the former Soviet Union, Israel, and South Africa comingled with warlords, diamond merchants, and mercenaries. Due in part to ineffective arms embargos and regulations, as well as a growing black market, a large percentage of the population in this region has been heavily armed. Around this same time, the disintegration of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was driving demand on the global arms market. Reverting to its role as a clearinghouse for trafficked weapons during the Iran-Iraq War (1980–1988), the Balkans once again became a crossroads for smuggled weaponry, including assault rifles, machine guns, small-arms rounds, anti-tank weapons, anti-tank rounds, mortar rounds, grenades, landmines, and an array of equipment, from boots to medical supplies and flak jackets (A. J. Rubin, 2001). Old networks were reinvigorated in an attempt to satisfy market shortages (Bacon, 2007, p. 80). Weapons and ammunition were smuggled into the region using both traditional means, such as tunnels, and more ingenious methods, including empty metal cylinders of oxygen and in false bottoms of humanitarian aid containers (Andreas, 2008).

INVOLVEMENT IN THE DRUG TRADE Drugs and narcotics are an attractive product to traffic because they are generally easy to conceal (even in large quantities) and bring extremely lucrative returns in the form of profits. Moreover, there are multiple nodes along the value chain for terrorists to become involved in, from taxing farmers to extorting smugglers to controlling the trade and sale of the precursor chemicals needed to manufacture highly potent drugs like heroin. But beyond just profits, terrorist involvement in the drug trade can assist groups with recruiting new members and gaining popular support and sympathy from the local population, including “impoverished, neglected, isolated farmers” who might also serve as a source of intelligence on counterinsurgent activity in the area where they are based (Felbab-Brown, 2010; Rollins & Sun Wyler, 2013, p. 10). An array of violent non-state actors operate within the same milieu when active in the drug trade—warlords, militias, terrorists, insurgents, and criminal networks, to name a few (Dishman, 2005, p. 246). When organizations primarily focused on drug trafficking are successfully attenuated by the state, it can open up new market opportunities for terrorists and insurgents take their place. This was evident in Colombia

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after the demise of major drug trafficking organizations, including both the Cali and Medellin cartels, when the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) responded by becoming more deeply involved in the narcotics trade to fund its organization. In other cases, the result can be violent competition. During the 1990s, the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) attempted to move in on long-standing Kurdish drug trafficking groups in Western Europe, which resulted in an increase in violence as the PKK attempted to consolidate control over the market (Williams, 2012, p. 32). Lastly, as we have witnessed in the 1990s in Peru, Sendero Luminoso assumed a less assertive role in trafficking drugs in the valley of the Apurimac and Ene Rivers (VRAE), where the insurgents ceded a leading role to drug traffickers, while growing more cognizant of the need to maintain support among Peru’s peasant population (Williams, 2012, p. 33). Compared to other forms of criminality, including human trafficking and weapons smuggling, involvement in narcotics still remains the most popular form of criminal activity for terrorist groups. The vast profit margins generated through the narcotics trade allow terrorist groups to acquire cutting edge technology and a diverse supply of weaponry (Sanderson, 2004, p. 51). Still, while the barriers to entry into this market may seem low, achieving success in the drug trade is difficult. The cultivation of crops is often labor-intensive and a source of great consternation for counterinsurgents and the security forces seeking to cut off the insurgency’s funding. Moreover, involvement in the drug trade is a source of employment to large swaths of the population in countries like Afghanistan, Colombia, Burma, Peru, Mexico, and elsewhere (FelbabBrown, 2012, p. 5).

HISTORICAL EXAMPLES History is rife with examples of terrorist and insurgent groups’ deepening involvement in the drug trade to finance their activities. No specific ideological group has cornered the market on narcotics trafficking. Leftist groups, ethno-nationalist terrorists, and even groups motivated by religion have all been involved to one degree or another in the drug trade. The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) was perhaps the most entrepreneurial terrorist group when it came to raising funds. The LTTE became involved in drug trafficking in the early to mid-1980s and were responsible for vast quantities of heroin being smuggled into and sold throughout Western Europe (Weiss, 2011, p. 89). Geographic proximity to Asia’s Golden Triangle (Thailand, Laos, and Burma) was a boon for the Tamil Tigers, who were aided by a vast maritime infrastructure that

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allowed the group to transport large quantities of drugs, especially heroin, between countries. The LTTE was also active closer to home, including in Pakistan, where it managed to forge a relationship with the international crime kingpin Dawood Ibrahim, head of the notorious “D-Company” gang. Working out of the port city of Karachi, the LTTE ultimately evolved its smuggling operations to include humans, in addition to narcotics (Williams, 2008, p. 139). In Sri Lanka, traffickers of illicit commodities brought drugs and other contraband into the country through LTTE-controlled territory (Williams, 2012, p. 56). This allowed the group to extort the traffickers by demanding they pay a “tax” or “donation” for moving ahead unmolested. LTTE protection rackets in the émigré communities of Toronto raised an estimated $1million a month (Shelley & Picarelli, 2002, p. 314). The mid1980s were probably the apex of Tamil drug trafficking arrests. In 1984, 317 drug traffickers were arrested. The next year, that number increased to 374, only to drop by 1986 to 218 arrests and flat-lined in 1990 at around 37 (Peiris, 2001). Although the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) always denied involvement with the drug trade, there were credible allegations that the PIRA profited from the trade nonetheless, even if its members were not necessarily selling drugs. In some areas under PIRA control, drug traffickers were tacitly allowed to operate so long as they paid “revolutionary” taxes to the Provos, who decided which dealers could remain in business and which could not. Indeed, to keep up with the myth that the PIRA abhorred any dealings with narcotics (which was in some way an attempt to curry favor with the Catholic population which served as its primary base of support), vigilante groups operating under the umbrella of Direct Action against Drugs (DAAD) carried out killings of well-known drug dealers in order to make an example of them.1 Furthermore, the PIRA was known to “ride shotgun,” or provide armed escort on international drug shipments in order to fund its organization. In the Middle East, both Hamas and Hezbollah have had limited, yet important, involvement with the drug trade during certain periods. The Farhat brothers, Ali and Hassan, were Hezbollah sympathizers who trafficked narcotics in collaboration with a Nigerian drug dealer who possessed a Canadian immigration document (Levitt, 2013, p. 320). More recently, there have been credible allegations of Hezbollah’s involvement with Mexican drug cartels dealing in the production and distribution of methamphetamine. Hezbollah operates a truly global network with members spread out across the globe and involved in a diverse cross-section of criminality (Levitt, 2013, p. 227). Another Hezbollah hangout and criminal hotbed is Margarita Island, located off the coast of Venezuela. The Lebanese Canadian Bank (LCB) has been accused of helping the Shiite terrorist group launder its profits

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from cocaine trafficking by mixing drug proceeds from money earned through the sale of used cars, purchased in the United States, and resold in Africa (Becker, 2011). In 2011, the Obama administration accused the LCB with laundering money in connection to a complex smuggling ring that involved narcotics shipped from Latin America through West Africa and to Europe. In an effort to capitalize upon the Muslim diaspora in South America, Hamas has extended its activities to the semi-lawless tri-border area wedged between Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay and known for a bevy of illicit activity, from money laundering to drug trafficking and beyond (Sanderson, 2004, p. 53). Amongst the illicit actors operating in the tri-border area, Hamas, like Hezbollah, has forged ties with various drug trafficking organizations (Seelke, Sun Wyler, Beittel, & Sullivan, 2011). In the United States, Hamas has been implicated in a pseudoephedrine smuggling scam in the midwestern United States with bank accounts tied to the group (Levitt, 2013, p. 10). After 9/11, the United States began to clamp down on Al Qaeda’s ability to raise funds, forcing its leadership to make the tactical decision to diversify its revenue sources. This included forging an alliance with the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) in Central Asia, as well as with traffickers in North Africa working with one of its affiliates, Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). While there has been widespread speculation that AQIM has been linked to Colombian cocaine traffickers, this remains a contested point amongst scholars and journalists. What is not questioned, however, is that AQIM has profited from smuggling hashish and cigarettes, while also providing armed protection to gangs of smugglers moving various illicit products across Algeria, Mauritania, Mali, and other parts of northern and western Africa and on toward Europe. In 2004, the train bombings in Madrid that were responsible for the death of 191 people were perpetrated by a criminal gang with ties to Islamic radicals. The gang trafficked in hashish and ecstasy and grew radicalized over time before launching the attack in response to Spain’s participation in the Iraq War (Williams, 2010).2

A BRIEF NOTE ON TERRORISM VERSUS INSURGENCY While there is usually a clear distinction between terrorism and insurgency—the former is a tactic, while the latter is a movement—this distinction is not always recognized in the literature. Furthermore, literature on civil wars also bleeds into the insurgency literature, with distinctions between civil war, guerilla warfare, and insurgency occasionally hinging on a body count threshold (per year or throughout the

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duration of the conflict), tactics employed (low intensity versus conventional military), the actors involved (state versus non-state, indigenous versus foreign), or other categorical variables, which classify conflicts as coups, countercoups, mutinies, insurrections, or other “revolutionary” activities. For the purposes of this chapter, insurgency is an armed political campaign, while terrorism is a form of armed political communication. Insurgency uses mass mobilization by substate actors of a counterstate to challenge a national government for political power. Terrorism, on the other hand, is characterized by the use of violence by substate actors to attack innocent civilians in order to garner attention for their cause.3 This “propaganda by deed” was first popularized by Russian anarchists in the 19th century who hoped that their attacks would transform them from “a small conspiratorial club into a massive revolutionary movement” (Chaliand & Blin, 2007, p. 33; see also, Eltzbacher, 2004). Byman et al. (2001) believe that the tactics used to gain and control territory is instead a more appropriate indication of whether the group is a terrorist or an insurgent group.4 O’Neill finds that terrorism is merely a form of warfare in which violence is used primarily on civilians, while insurgent terrorism has a purpose. Unlike the former, the latter is used in the pursuance of a range of objectives, from short-term goals to intermediate and long term (O’Neill, 1990).

NEXUS WITH TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME There is a growing and somewhat caustic debate within the community of scholars and practitioners who study transnational organized crime and terrorism. At the heart of this debate is the question of whether or not a nexus between the two entities exists, if it does how strong is it, and what can be done about it. The discussion in the academic and policy communities over the very existence of a nexus between crime and terrorism has been playing out for over a decade. Whether referred to as a “nexus,” or framed in terms of related issues of convergence, transformation, and hybridity, one thing remains clear—there is no consensus, and a tendency for scholars to be dismissive of alternative viewpoints, especially those that starkly contrast with their own understanding of the relationship between terrorism and crime. Those terrorist groups that do engage in rampant criminality often operate across illicit sectors. And while drug trafficking might be one group’s specialty, there are often a host of accompanying activities in the black market, from human smuggling to illegal gold mining. In Syria, ISIS has profited from looting and selling antiquities, while in several

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African conflicts, gemstones and diamonds have been the preferred currency of warlords and terrorists. During the 1990s and early 2000s, the insurgent group most associated with the international drug trade was the FARC in Colombia. But post-2001, following the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan, the Afghan Taliban has eclipsed and supplanted FARC as the most notorious insurgent group funding itself through drugs. There is little doubt that the Taliban has staked its claim as one of the most important cogs in the intricate supply chain, which supplies the majority of the global heroin trade.

AFGHANISTAN: THE CENTER OF THE NEXUS Throughout nearly two decades of continuous conflict in Afghanistan, the Taliban has primarily relied on the twin income sources of narcotics trafficking and donations from external supporters in the Gulf, although at various points throughout the insurgency the group has also engaged frequently in kidnapping for ransom (Collins & Ali, 2010). Over the years, however, the Taliban has changed its position on cultivating poppy, even banning the plant at one point although many suggest that this was a deliberate move designed to drive up the price to ultimately capitalize on the stockpiles Taliban militants had been hoarding (Felbab-Brown, 2006). Since the beginning of the U.S. invasion in 2001, however, the Taliban has largely remained consistent, and the militants have recognized the value of promoting the opium trade, both in terms of revenue for the group but also as a source of popular support among the rural farmers who the Taliban maintain a part-protector, part-predatory relationship with. (Peters, 2009). The Taliban are keenly aware of the necessity to win “hearts and minds,” and as a result, now actively promote the poppy trade and offer promises of protection to any farmers involved in growing, processing, or transporting the crop (Brahimi, 2010). Establishing a consistent estimate for the value of the opium trade in Afghanistan has proved difficult, with figures related to its market share margin ranging from $70 million to $500 million per year, just for the Taliban alone.5 A much more narrow range has been provided by Antonio Giustozzi (2010) whose assessment is an annual profit margin of between $110 and $130 million. Once the costs of maintaining an insurgent organization are subtracted, that still leaves the Taliban with an extensive amount of money to pay its fighters, purchase weapons and munitions, bribe security officials and border guards, and carry out the day-to-day functions of waging asymmetric warfare. The means by which an insurgent group secures funding often has a direct impact on the nature and ideology of the organization.6 Perhaps cognizant of the impact of being known only as an insurgent group that

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runs drugs, the Taliban has diversified its funding stream to include a broader network offering various levels of passive and active support (Paul, 2010). Another major element of the Taliban’s financing is the trade in goods smuggled between Pakistan and Dubai, which is a multibillion business (B. R. Rubin, 2000). Taliban members also engage in tradebased money laundering and other schemes along the Afghan-Pakistani border. The Taliban has steadily increased its foray into the drug trade in Afghanistan, becoming more and more entrenched in each state of the value chain, from taxation to cultivation to the importation of precursor chemicals. While initially content with just protecting those cultivating opium, the militants have graduated to operating mobile laboratories to process the opium into heroin before it is smuggled abroad into Iran, Pakistan, and beyond (Peters, 2009, pp. 116, 123). In 2006 and 2007, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (2009, p. 2) provided an assessment that pegged Taliban profits at between $200 million and $400 million a year during the mid-2000s, to include revenue generated from a tax on the importation of precursor chemicals. Some estimates suggest that the Taliban earns approximately $250/kg (Peters, 2009, p. 14) for each kilogram of opium that gets refined into morphine base and heroin. If the UN assessment is accurate, then approximately 500 metric tons of morphine base and heroin were produced in 2008 alone, providing a windfall of $125 million that calendar year. Still, the process and export of drugs are more lucrative and by 2010, the Taliban had moved into this sector of the trade. With dozens of smuggling operations back and forth across the AfPak border, Taliban militants, at times working with other groups like the Haqqani network, dominated the drug trade throughout South Asia (Peters, 2010, p. 24). In the continuing battle for “hearts and minds,” the Taliban effectively positions itself as the local defender of Pashtuns in southern and eastern Afghanistan, while coalition forces are merely an occupying force determined to destroy the livelihoods of poor Afghan farmers by disrupting the poppy economy. The political capital that the Taliban derives from sponsoring the drug trade in Afghanistan cannot be overlooked; these benefits are perhaps just as valuable as the financial gains accrued by involvement in the opium business (Felbab-Brown, 2012, p. 13). At each step in the value chain, there are opportunities for illicit transactions available to an array of actors, including warlords, economic power brokers, Afghan government officials and hawaladars, or money changers. In this sense, the market has become “well adapted to the characteristics of the product and to the nature and intensity of risks. Markets extend from the farm gate to the frontier and beyond, and there is working capital financing available at all stages, as well as credit and other inputs for producers” (quoted in Felbab-Brown, 2012, p. 11). In Afghanistan, the opium economy is a consistent source of employment where few other options exist, especially in the formal sector.

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Involvement in the drug trade and other nefarious activities like kidnapping for ransom has had the added benefit of allowing the Afghan Taliban to grow its network, putting its members in contact with other insurgents, terrorists, and criminals. At one point, a quid pro quo existed between the Afghan Taliban and high-ranking members of Tehrik-i-Taliban (TTP), or the Pakistani Taliban (Acharya, Bukhari, & Sulaiman, 2009). In some cases, there have even been reports that Taliban fighters have traded heroin for weapons with Russian criminals though this is not thought to be a regularly occurring activity (Williams, 2012). The Taliban also works from time to time with its occasional ally the Haqqani network, especially with respect to fund-raising schemes. The Haqqani network is more akin to a mafia or organized criminal outfit than a true insurgent group, but its status as a hybrid means that it is an increasingly dangerous adversary and functions as something of a force multiplier for the Taliban. Pakistan’s Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI) has been widely reported as a conduit for the provision of precursor chemicals (hydrochloric acid, lime, and acetic anhydride) to the Haqqani network, often accomplished through seemingly legitimate front operations (Peters, 2012, p. 46). High levels of violence in parts of eastern Afghanistan, coupled with insidious criminality and draconian tactics could hint at the Haqqani network’s devolution into more of a criminal network than a terrorist group. The Taliban could most aptly be characterized as “a loose alliance in which each region was responsible for raising its own funds” (Peters, 2009, p. 110). Never content to operate as a monolithic entity, the Taliban deliberately atomized control among regional commanders and allowed for some commanders, particularly non-Pashtun Taliban fighters, to exert more autonomy when it comes to raising and spending funds (Raghavan, 2015). Ashraf Ghani’s administration is struggling to make progress where his predecessor, the mercurial Hamid Karzai, failed—countering corruption and attenuating Afghanistan’s vast criminal patronage network, with its explicit ties to the insurgency. Ghani is very much a pragmatist and most likely recognizes that completely eradicating the drug trade is unrealistic, so instead he is seeking to mitigate its effects, while reducing its stranglehold on the Afghan economy. To be sure, unlike in some countries where the state co-opts the drug trade, the situation in Afghanistan is “less overtly the business of political leaders and more the province of an emerging criminal underworld with strong political connections” (Raghavan, 2015). CONCLUSION: THE FUTURE OF THE NEXUS In the debate over the existence of a nexus between transnational organized crime and terrorism, what has been lost is a focus on the more parochial element—petty crime, low-level theft, and small-time drug

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dealing. So while authorities do not often associate selling hash and stealing Apple iPhones (or “apple picking” as it is sometimes referred to) with terrorism, it is important to realize that over time, what appears to be banal criminality or poor fiscal management (defaulting on an SMS loan) could actually be deliberate attempts to finance an attack in the West against soft targets. Indeed, some terrorist plots in Europe have been funded, at least in part, through various types of fraud (mortgage, credit card, value added tax, or VAT), petty theft, low-level criminality, and defaulting on loans (Braw, 2015). When the attackers are determined to die in the first place, there is little concern for accruing bad credit. Where previously the nexus could be characterized as largely operational, with terrorists appropriating criminal methods to fund their organizations, and the nexus of the present is small-time criminals who have “found religion,” either in prison or via a charismatic Imam, what will the future hold? It is unlikely that the future will be like the past, especially in places like Europe, which currently has only five groups remaining on the U.S. Department of State’s list of designated foreign terrorist organizations (FTOs) and most of these are largely dormant.7 And in parts of the world where insurgent groups are inexorably linked to the drug trade, especially at significant levels like the Taliban in Afghanistan, the situation will likely remain static. There could be some changes in individual cases, particularly as the FARC engages in peace overtures with the Colombian government, although FARC exiting the market does nothing to stop the demand for cocaine, thus opening the door for a new organization to enter the market or for already established players, including drug trafficking organizations from Mexico, to take over a larger share of the cocaine trade, which has tentacles stretching from South America across the globe. It is thus more likely that in the short to medium term, the future of the nexus, at the tactical level, will look a lot like the present, especially with the return of foreign fighters from Iraq and Syria to their countries of origin. In terms of the ongoing wave of anarchy emanating from failed states in the Middle East, including Syria, Libya and others, the flow of foreign fighters is a major issue of concern for Western governments. FBI director James Comey has warned of a “terrorist diaspora,” which he believes will occur when scores of foreign fighters leave the Middle East and attempt to return to the West (Gerstein & Scholtes, 2016). ISIS may have deployed hundreds of operatives abroad already, according to some reports, ensuring an effective “international terrorist strike capability” for the better part of the next decade (Clarke & Amarasingam, 2017). The post-ISIS diaspora is likely to have more connections to the illicit underworld and black market than ever and be networked through

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the group’s continued reliance on spreading its propaganda through social media (Callimachi, 2016). As has been well documented already, many criminals turned jihadis have connections to the drug trade on the streets of Europe. On the other hand, the longer-term could be something totally different— a black swan that countries are totally unprepared for and mostly unable to currently conceptualize due to the unpredictable variation across several critical factors, including climate change, migration, and technological development. The future of the nexus will be complicated by technological advancements, including but not limited to, encryption, virtual currencies, the evolution of 3-D printing and the dark web. If synthetic drugs become more readily available, or 3-D printing leads to the proliferation of new ways to “get high,” terrorists and criminals will undoubtedly take advantage. In addition to the threat of returning foreign fighters, the current wave of migration has the potential to be far more relevant to future configurations of a TOC-terrorism nexus. The response to the movement of people from Africa and the Middle East to Europe has been the emergence of a vast, sprawling network of transnational criminal networks used to smuggle and traffic migrants that involve different kinds of groups and individuals and, according to director of Europol Rob Wainwright, could number as many as 30,000 people (Tinti & Reitano, 2017; Deutsch, 2015). While smugglers have yet to have been seen to crossover or integrate crime and terrorist groups in any substantial way, there is the possibility that networks and associations built and strengthened through people smuggling may turn to other illicit commodities, including narcotics, or criminal acts. More pertinent, however, is that unless new migrants are better integrated than their predecessors, they could become the recruiting pool for tomorrow’s transnational criminal and extremist organizations. Although migrants are usually eager to start anew in their adopted countries, a small proportion may be members of criminal organizations, or have a history of low-level criminality, and bring with them criminal skills and knowledge as well as criminal affiliations and contacts.8 Some migrants, particularly those who fail to gain asylum and remain illegally, will not be adequately assimilated into their host countries, despite renewed attention to public policies designed specifically to address this immense challenge. For criminals looking to expand their bases of operations, recently arrived migrants who are not well integrated into society or the licit economy and who exist on the fringes of the black market, are the ideal type of recruits. Furthermore, while diaspora communities are typically a force for positive development, resilience and support for their home countries, an expansive diaspora network can also provide cover and logistical functions that facilitate illicit activities.

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NOTES 1. There is a fierce debate in the literature over whether or not the PIRA engaged in drug trafficking. Because a consensus has never been reached, this chapter eschews further analysis of the issue. For a thoughtful and balanced analysis of the debate, see Horgan and Taylor (1999). 2. For a more in-depth analysis of the Madrid bombings, see Williams (2011). 3. The author is thankful to Dr. Thomas A. Marks for this observation. 4. Byman et al. (2001) note that the LTTE and Hezbollah could be considered both terrorists and insurgents because of their relentless use of terrorism in addition to a host of other tactics used to control territory. The authors go on to note that size can also be a useful distinguishing characteristic, commenting, “terrorist groups often consist of a small number of individuals, sometimes no more than a handful. Insurgent organizations, like Hizballah or the LTTE, in contrast, number in the thousands” (Byman et al., 2001, p. 5). Also, in his research on proto-insurgencies, Byman (2007) notes that “many of the most important ‘terrorist’ groups in the world— including the Lebanese Hizballah, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)—are better described as insurgencies that use terrorism than as typical terrorist movements” (p. 1). 5. The CIA and the DIA estimate that the Taliban receives $70 million a year from the drug trade. According to the former U.S. director of national intelligence Dennis Blair, the Taliban made $100 million from the drug trade in 2008. The DEA puts the number at around $300 million, while Gretchen Peters asserts that the number is much higher, probably $500 million. For more on the role of narcotics in Afghanistan’s economy, see Goodhand (2004, 2005); Anderson (2007); Sedra and Hodes (2007); Felbab-Brown (2006); van Ham and Kamminga (2007); Goodhand and Mansfield (2010); Goodhand (2008); and B. R. Rubin (2004). 6. See the considerable body of literature devoted to the effect of resources on conflict, for example: Collier and Hoeffler (2004); Snyder (2006); and Ross (2004a, 2004b). 7. The five groups currently listed include ETA, the Continuity IRA, the Real IRA, the Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party/Front (DHKP/C), and Revolutionary Struggle in Greece. See https://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/other/ des/123085.htm, last updated May 2016. 8. Sometimes, ethnic diasporas have a reputation for criminality that inhibits integration and job opportunities.

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Anderson, J. L. (2007, July 9). The Taliban’s opium war: The difficulties and dangers of the eradication program. The New Yorker. Andreas, P. (2008). Blue helmets and black markets: The business of survival in the siege of Sarajevo. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Bacon, E. (2007). Balkan trafficking in historical perspective. In K. Thachuk (Ed.), Transnational threats: Smuggling and trafficking in arms, drugs, and human life (pp. 79–93). Westport, CT: Praeger Security International. Becker, J. (2011, December 13). Beirut bank seen as a hub of Hezbollah’s financing. New York Times, A1. Brahimi, A. (2010, July). The Taliban’s evolving ideology. LSE Global Governance, Working Paper WP 02/2010. Retrieved from http://www.lse.ac.uk/global Governance/publications/workingPapers/WP022010.pdf. Braw, E. (2015, October). Foreign fighters financing: The very non-halal ways potential jihadists are funding their work. Foreign Affairs. Retrieved from https:// www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/syria/2015–10–25/foreign-fightersfinancing. Byman, D. (2007). Understanding proto-insurgencies. Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation. Byman, D., Chalk, P., Hoffman, B., Rosenau, W., & Brannan, D. (2001). Trends in outside support for insurgent movements. Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation. Callimachi, R. (2016, August 3). How a secretive branch of ISIS built a global network of killers. New York Times. Chaliand, G. R, & Blin, A. (2007). The history of terrorism: From antiquity to al Qaeda. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. Clarke, C. P. (2015). Terrorism, Inc.: The financing of terrorism, insurgency, and irregular warfare. Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger. Clarke, C. P., & Amarasingam, A. (2017, March 6). Where do ISIS fighters go when the caliphate falls? The Atlantic. Collier, P., & Hoeffler, A. (2004). Greed and grievance in civil war. Oxford Economic Papers, 56(4), 563–595. Collins, C., & Ali, A. (2010, April). Financing the Taliban: Tracing the dollars behind the insurgencies in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Counterterrorism Strategy Initiative Policy Paper. Washington, DC: New America Foundation. Cragin, K., & Hoffman, B. (2003). Arms trafficking and Colombia. Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation. Deutsch, A. (2015, September 16). Europol tracking 30,000 suspected people smugglers. Reuters. Dishman, C. (2005). The leaderless nexus: When crime and terror converge. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 28(3), 237–252. Eltzbacher, P. (2004). The great anarchists: Ideas and teachings of seven major thinkers. Mineola, NY: Dover. Felbab-Brown, V. (2006). Kicking the opium habit? Afghanistan’s drug economy and politics since the 1980s. Conflict, Security, and Development, 6(2), 127–149. Felbab-Brown, V. (2010). Shooting up: Counterinsurgency and the war on drugs. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press. Felbab-Brown, V. (2012). Fighting the nexus of organized crime and violent conflict while enhancing human security. In P. Williams & V. Felbab-Brown (Eds.),

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Drug trafficking, violence, and instability (pp. 1–26). Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute. Gerstein, J., & Scholtes, J. (2016, September 27). Comey warns of post-ISIL terrorist “diaspora.” Politico. Gettleman, J., & Kulish, N. (2013, September 30). Somali militants mixing business and terror. New York Times. Retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com. Giustozzi, A. (2010). Negotiating with the Taliban: Issues and prospects. Retrieved from https://tcf.org/content/commentary/negotiating-with-the-talibanissues-and-prospects/. Goodhand, J. (2004). From war economy to peace economy? Reconstruction and state building in Afghanistan. Journal of International Affairs, 58(1), 155–174. Goodhand, J. (2005). Frontiers and wars: The opium economy in Afghanistan. Journal of Agrarian Change, 5(2), 191–216. Goodhand, J. (2008). Corrupting or consolidating the peace? The drugs economy and post-conflict peacebuilding in Afghanistan. International Peacekeeping, 15(3), 405–423. Goodhand, J., & Mansfield, D. (2010). Drugs and (dis)order: A study of the opium trade, political settlements and state-making in Afghanistan. London School of Economics Crisis States Working Papers Series, 2(83), 1–48. Horgan, J., & Taylor, M. (1999). Playing the “green card”-financing the provisional IRA: Part 1. Terrorism and Political Violence, 11(2), 1–38. Kalin, S. (2016, April 28). Islamic State turns to selling fish, cars to offset oil losses: Report. Reuters. Retrieved from http://www.reuters.com/article/ us-mideast-crisis-islamicstate-finances-idUSKCN0XP2CV. Keatinge, T. (2015, December 13). Gimme some sugar: The real source of AlShabab’s income. Foreign Affairs. Retrieved from https://www.foreignaf fairs.com/articles/2015-12-03/gimme-some-sugar. Lee, M. (2011). Trafficking and global crime control. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. Levitt, M. (2013). Hezbollah: The global footprint of Lebanon’s party of God. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press. Martin, J. M., & Romano, A. T. (1992). Multinational crime: Terrorism, espionage, drug & arms trafficking. Newbury Park, CA: Sage. Oftedal, E. (2015). The financing of jihadi terrorist cells in Europe. Retrieved from http://www.ffi.no/no/Rapporter/14–02234.pdf. O’Neill, B. E. (1990). Insurgency and terrorism: Inside modern revolutionary warfare. Washington, DC: Brassey’s Inc. Paul, C. (2010). As a fish swims in the sea: Relationships between factors contributing to support for terrorist or insurgent groups. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 33(6), 488–510. Peiris, G. (2001). Clandestine transactions of the LTTE and the secessionist campaign in Sri Lanka. Ethnic Studies Report, 19(1), 1–38. Peters, G. (2009). Seeds of terror: How heroin is bankrolling the Taliban and al Qaeda. New York: St. Martin’s Press. Peters, G. (2010). Crime and insurgency in the tribal areas of Afghanistan and Pakistan. Retrieved from https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/crime-and-insurgency-inthe-tribal-areas-of-afghanistan-and-pakistan. Peters, G. (2012). Haqqani network financing: The evolution of an industry. Retrieved from https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/haqqani-network-financing.

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Raghavan, S. (2015, February 13). As the U.S. mission winds down, Afghan insurgency grows more complex. Washington Post. Retrieved from https:// www.washingtonpost.com. Rollins, J., & Sun Wyler, L. (2013, June 11). Terrorism and transnational crime: Foreign policy issues for Congress. Congressional Research Service. Retrieved from https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/R41004.pdf. Ross, M. L. (2004a). How do natural resources influence civil war? Evidence from thirteen cases. International Organization, 58(1), 35–67. Ross, M. L. (2004b). What do we know about natural resources and civil war? Journal of Peace Research, 41(3), 337–356. Rubin, A. J. (2001, August 20). U.S. patrols smuggling routes to Macedonia: Balkans: American peacekeepers in Kosovo intercept weapons on way to rebels. Los Angeles Times. Retrieved from http://articles.latimes.com/2001/ aug/20/news/mn-36311. Rubin, B. R. (2000). The political economy of war and peace in Afghanistan. World Development, 28(10), 1789–1803. Rubin, B. R. (2004, October). Road to ruin: Afghanistan’s booming opium industry. New York: Center on International Cooperation. Sanderson, T. M. (2004). Transnational terror and organized crime: Blurring the lines. The SAIS Review of International Affairs, 24(1), 49–61. Sedra, M., & Hodes, C. (2007). The opium trade. The Adelphi Series, 35–42. Retrieved from https://www.iiss.org/en/publications/adelphi/by%20year/2007-d5f5/ the-search-for-security-in-post-taliban-afghanistan-3a05/ap391-05chapter-3-400d. Seelke, C. R., Sun Wyler, L., Beittel, J. S., & Sullivan, M. P. (2011, May 12). Latin America and the Caribbean: Illicit drug trafficking and U.S. counterdrug programs. Congressional Research Service. Retrieved from https://www.fas .org/sgp/crs/row/R41215.pdf. Shelley, L. I., & Picarelli, J. T. (2002). Methods not motives: Implications of the convergence of international organized crime and terrorism. Police Practice and Research, 3(4), 305–318. Snyder, R. (2006). Does lootable wealth breed disorder? A political economy of extraction framework. Comparative Political Studies, 39(8), 943–968. Tinti, P., & Reitano, T. (2017). Migrant, refugee, smuggler, savior. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. (2009). Addiction, crime and insurgency: The transnational threat of Afghan opium. Retrieved from http://www.unodc .org/unodc/en/data-and-analysis/addiction-crime-and-insurgency. html. van Ham, P., & Kamminga, J. (2007). Poppies for peace: Reforming Afghanistan’s opium industry. The Washington Quarterly, 30(1), 69–81. von Lampe, K. (2014). Transnational organized crime in Europe. In J. S. Albanese & P. L. Reichel (Eds.), Transnational organized crime: An overview from six continents (pp. 75–92). Los Angeles, CA: Sage. Weiss, G. (2011). The cage: The fight for Sri Lanka and the last days of the Tamil Tigers. London: Bodley Head. Williams, P. (2008). Terrorist financing and organized crime: Nexus, appropriation, or transformation? In T. J. Biersteker & S. E. Eckert (Eds.), Countering the financing of terrorism (pp. 126–149). London: Routledge.

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Williams, P. (2010). In cold blood: The Madrid bombings. Perspectives on Terrorism, 2(9), 19–24. Williams, P. (2011). The Madrid train bombings. In P. Shemella (Ed.), Fighting back: What governments can do about terrorism (pp. 298–316). Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press. Retrieved from http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/ pt/index.php/pot/article/view/50/html. Williams, P. (2012). Insurgencies and organized crime. In P. Williams & V. FelbabBrown (Eds.), Drug trafficking, violence, and instability (pp. XII, 72). Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute.

CHAPTER 9

Pollution Crimes and Global Security Elise Vermeersch1

The 21st Conference of the Parties to the United Nations (UN) Framework Convention on Climate Change (COP21), held in Paris in December 2015, placed the climate and the protection of the environment at the center of international attention, showcasing the expectations of the public, civil society, and governments in environmental matters. Indicators of environmental crime are evident in many areas of international development activities. Significant global threats, including the challenges addressed through the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) are connected to and exacerbated by environmental crimes that affect development, peace, security, and human rights (Rice, 2008). However, environmental crimes, representing a major threat not just to the environment but also to human health, security, and economy are missing from the COP21 agenda. As clearly stated by the INTERPOL, “The effect of pollution crime on the natural environment can be global, and in some cases contributes directly to the worldwide issue of climate change” (INTERPOL, 2016a). In particular, pollution crime, which encompasses, among others, the trade and disposal of waste and hazardous substances (including chemicals and pesticides) in contravention of national and international laws (INTERPOL, 2016b) requires stronger attention from governments, policy makers, law enforcement agencies (LEAs), prosecution, and judiciary in order to prevent and counter the risks related to those crimes. In fact, as well as being harmful to health and environment, the illegal disposal of waste or hazardous substances into waterways, the air, and the ground can significantly damage a community’s livelihood, undercut legitimate treatment facilities, and permit the loss of recoverable raw materials, thereby

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threatening long-term economic sustainability and national stability. The effect of pollution crime on the natural environment can be global, and in some cases contributes directly to the worldwide issue of climate change (INTERPOL, 2016a). In addition, after drug trafficking, counterfeiting, and human trafficking, crimes against the environment have become the fourth-largest source of profit for organized crime, generating between $70 billion and $213 billion per year, according to recent estimates (United Nations Environment Programme, 2014). Githu Muigai, attorney general of the Republic of Kenya, stated that the illegal trade in environmental commodities poses a threat to environmental and human health, contributes to species extinction, leads to revenue loss, and undermines environmental agreements, while providing important resources to criminal syndicates who in turn undermine international peace and security (United Nations Environment Programme, 2015). Pieces of evidence accumulate on the involvement of organized crime groups (OCGs) in the environment and its negative impacts for the sustainability of biodiversity and the ecosystems (Global Initiative, 2015). As mentioned by Kaveh Zahedi, United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) regional director for Asia and the Pacific, “Sustainable development cannot be realized without ending illegal trade, poaching and ultimately securing peace and security for all.” (United Nations Environment Programme, 2015). The final document “Transforming our world: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development,” adopted at the United Nations Sustainable Development Summit in September 2015 takes into consideration the risks poses by pollution and hazardous substances. In particular, the Goal 6.3 requires to “by 2030, improve water quality by reducing pollution, eliminating dumping and minimizing release of hazardous chemicals and materials, halving the proportion of untreated wastewater, and increasing recycling and safe reuse by x% globally” and the Goal 3.9 asks to “by 2030 substantially reduce the number of deaths and illnesses from hazardous chemicals and air, water, and soil pollution and contamination” (United Nations General Assembly, 2015). Since 1991, the United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI) is actively contributing to the fight against the trafficking and trade of illegal goods and hazardous substances, through applied program research, capacity-building activities and developing networks, and enhanced collaboration among actors. This chapter focuses on the threat of transnational environmental crimes to global security, using the illegal trafficking and management of hazardous waste, illicit pesticides, and precious metals and gemstones— which are the current research topics of UNICRI’s environmental crime program—as concrete case examples. Environmental crimes have an impact at local, regional, and global levels by threatening the human health

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and the environment, jeopardizing the socioeconomic stability of a country or a region, and fueling conflicts and inequalities, globally. HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENTAL SECURITY The management and disposal of chemicals and wastes is a complex issue because of the variety of sources and products, life cycles, and actors involved (Corcoran, 2010). Environmental-related criminal activities take advantage of the weaknesses of the supply chain and jeopardize the efforts made to monitor the recycling and elimination process of the hazardous products and substances to the detriment of human health and environmental safety. The damages caused to ecosystems and the environment pose the risk to trigger disease, environmental disasters, irreversible climate change, contamination of the food chain, reduced life expectancy and ultimately the death of human beings (Europol, 2015b). The close link between environmental crimes and health has been at the core of the attention for many decades and a high number of reports from various institutions discussed the health and environmental risks caused by wastes and hazardous substances, such as UNEP (Barra, Portas, & Watkinson, 2012; United Nations Environment Programme, 2010), International Labour Organization (ILO) (Lundgren, 2012), World Health Organization (WHO),2 Europol (Europol, 2012), Pure Earth Blacksmith Institute.3 Illicit Pesticides Pesticide is a mixture of active and inert ingredients composed of chemicals, compounds, and other substances (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 2016). Given the high risks involved in the manipulation of such hazardous substances, strict European Union (EU) rules have been developed in order to regulate their composition, production, packaging, placing on the market and use. With the objective of saving of making money, offenders and criminals are circumventing those rules by trading and using illicit pesticides. The term “illicit pesticides” describes an array of illegal, obsolete or banned substances, unauthorized imports, and counterfeit labelling for fake, inactive, or inappropriate ingredients as applicable in the country of use. They are composed of imports and sales of five types of products: (1) obsolete or banned non-authorized pesticides and substances; (2) unauthorized pesticide imports; (3) counterfeit or fake pesticides; (4) re- or up-labeled pesticides; and (5) refilled pesticide containers (UNICRI, 2016a). Because illicit pesticides are untested and/or not approved substances, they can amplify the negative effects of the hazardous substances by complicating treatment protocols due to unknown or untested compounds. In particular, exposure to pesticides’ effects on human health can range from mild skin irritation to blood and nerve disorders,

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endocrine disruption, genetic changes, respiratory and tissue failure, coma, and death. In addition, toxic ingredients, inadequate storage, and disposal of illicit pesticides introduce potentially hazardous waste streams into the food chain, farm animals, and waterways. Improperly managed, pesticides jeopardize the biodiversity, with the destruction of non-targeted plants, birds, animals, and marine life (particularly sensitive species) and with the risk of pesticide resistance in pests (UNICRI, 2016a). The Environmental Crime Court in Guatemala has, for the first time, convicted an African palm oil corporation for Ecocide, ruling that has been upheld by the Court of Appeal. The release of chemicals, being supposedly mainly the pesticide “Malathion,” into the La Pasión River has resulted in significant die-off of fish, birds, reptiles, and mammals in and around the river. Besides the damage to wildlife and the environment, the contamination also violated the food security and created a risk for the health’s population who used to get the food from the river (Guatemalan Court Upholds Ruling on Ecocide, 2016). Hazardous Waste As for pesticides, hazardous waste poses a greater risk to the environment and human health than non-hazardous wastes and thus require a stricter control regime, as laid down in Articles 17 to 20 of Directive 2008/98/EC, which provide additional labelling, record keeping, monitoring, and control obligations from the “cradle to the grave” (European Commission, 2008). Hazardous wastes are dumped in illegal landfill sites, buried, or dispersed into the sea. “Illegal” does not only refer to the dumping of the waste but also to its transportation, or management of landfills in violation of international or domestic legal provisions (Baiamonte, 2013). Hazardous wastes can take many different forms (such as electronic waste, medical waste, batteries, paints, etc.) and are defined in legal instruments on the basis of the pollutants they contain, such as lead, mercury, cadmium, chromium, and arsenics.4 Illegal management and trade of hazardous waste contribute to atmospheric pollution, long-time contamination of soil, surface water, and riparian system that endanger the food chain. They can cause wide range of health effects, including cancer, damage to the central nervous system and vital organs, breathing difficulties, respiratory irritation, skin diseases, neuropsychiatric problems, coma, and even death (Lundgren, 2012; Rushton, 2003; United Nations Environment Programme, 2010). The increasing quantity of waste and hazardous waste generated makes it a commodity particularly subject to illicit management and trade. Taking the example of electronic waste (e-waste), the CWIT project5 estimated the European generation to be around 9.450 million tons in 2012, with only 3.3 million tons officially collected (Huisman et al., 2015). At global level, these amounts increase to 41.8 million ton generated and 6.5 officially collected (Baldé, 2015).

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Precious Metals and Gemstones The problem is somewhat different as regards precious metals and gemstones, as the product in itself is not dangerous but the way it is extracted can severely damage the human health and the environment. Hazardous chemicals, in particular mercury, are often used in the extraction phase in illegal mining. Mercury is highly toxic and very difficult to eliminate as it does not degrade naturally and accumulates within the tissues of contaminated organisms and will eventually attack the nervous system producing symptoms such as hair loss, memory impairment, and loss of muscle coordination (UNICRI, 2016; U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 2008). As demonstrated and explained by a U.S. Department of Energy laboratory, “Atmospheric mercury emissions thus pose significant health and environmental concerns, including occupational health effects to gold shop operators, exposure to the communities in the area of the gold shops, long range transport to other regions, and ultimately deposition to land and water” (Habegger et al., 2008). Detriment to the environment can also derive from various direct and indirect causes, such as deforestation, erosion, loss of biodiversity, contamination of soil and water, or pollution linked to the trade of the material (especially marine trade) (Financial Action Task Force, 2015; International Council on Mining and Metals, 2015; United Nations Department of Public Information, 2013). Despite the numerous scientific researches and publications on the risks posed by chemicals and wastes-related illegal activities to the health and the environment, they remain a critical issue, extremely complicated to identify and quantify. Such activities also impact the social and economic development of a country and jeopardize the whole supply chains. SOCIOECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND SUPPLY CHAIN SECURITY According to the UNEP’s environmental crisis report (Nellemann et al., 2014), “Ecosystems play a crucial role and especially for developing economies by supporting revenues, future development opportunities, livelihoods and sustainable harvest sectors relying heavily on natural resources, such as in agriculture, forestry and fisheries.” Indeed, ecosystems support tourism and supply vital services, such as the distribution of safe water to cities or reducing the effects of extreme weather such as floods, drought, and cyclones. Healthy ecosystems provide the platform upon which future food production and economies are ultimately based. A previous UNEP’s report estimated the global value of ecosystems at up to US$72 trillion (Corcoran, 2010). As for other illegal trafficking, the major drivers behind environmental crimes are the financial gain, coupled to the lower risk of being prosecuted and sanctioned. Indeed, combined estimates from the Organisation

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for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), UNEP, and INTERPOL evaluate the monetary value of all environmental crimes at between US$70 and US$213 billion each year (United Nations Environment Programme, 2014). Such profits are being diverted from legal channels and negatively impact the states, companies, communities, and individuals’ economies. Costs for the State The cost of transnational environmental crime for the states is high and encompasses several different aspects. First, the cost of tackling environmental crime, including the human resources and means necessary to detect, investigate, prosecute, and sentence the crimes. As an example, to respond to the global electronic waste dumping ground in Guiyu, China, the Chinese government ordered that all work on e-waste was to be moved and confined to a large industrial park, the Guiyu Circular Economy industrial park, which coasted ¥1.5 billion (equivalent to US$233 million) (Basel Action Network, 2015). In a different perspective, in England, the Environment Agency spends approximately £17 million (around US$24.9 million) on enforcement against waste crime in England (Eunomia Research & Consulting, 2014). Second, losses for governments, such as loss of taxes, evasion of landfill tax, and money laundering. For example, based on the intrinsic value of e-waste, the EFFACE project6 estimated the global economic value lost for the EU member states as a result of all illegal exports out of the EU at €892 million for 2012 (around US$994 million), from which €348 million (around US$428 million) are due to the illegal export to China (Geeraerts, Mutafoglu, & Illes, 2015). In the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), according to a group of experts of the UN, the value of gold smuggled out of Uganda in 2013 reached about US$271 million with an estimated loss of US$2.7 million in tax revenue for the government (United Nations Security Council, 2014). In the pesticide market, the European Crop Protection Association (ECPA) estimates the loss in tax revenue for the European government between €21 million and €30 million annually (around US$23.4 to 33.4 million), based on an annual market of counterfeit and illegal plant protection products (PPPs) of €360–510 million (around US$401– 568 million) and average 6 percent VAT rate on the sale of PPPs (ECPA position paper, 2006). Another report from the Institute of Food and Agricultural Sciences of the University of Florida estimate the lost taxes and levies at about US$15 million to US$22 million annually across Europe (Fishel, 2009). Third, environmental crimes also involve social and health costs for the state, such as the necessity to support medical treatments or to build safe infrastructures. Numerous scientific studies have demonstrated that the illicit disposal of waste in the so-called Land of Fires (see section 3.1)

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was responsible for an increase in cancer diseases and congenital malformations in the Italian region of Campania (Green corruption more than “victimless” crimes, 2015). Likewise, establishing a piped water supply in Guiyu (China) from other regions due to local contamination of soils and water resources cost annually around €1.6 million (around US$1.78 million) (Geeraerts et al., 2015). Finally, environmental crime is frequently associated with corruption, which has also a price for the state and the society. “From the embezzlement of funds for environmental protection programmes to major corruption in the issuing of permits and licences for natural resource exploitation, corruption occurs at every level, often leaving environment safeguards ignored or bypassed” (UNIS, 2013). It is estimated that the economic loss caused by green corruption in Italy is about 10 billion euro (around US$11.14 billion) per year in terms of gross domestic product and more than 6 percent in terms of productivity (Green corruption more than “victimless” crimes, 2015). Corruption also affects the credibility of the state and market economy. Investigations on illicit pesticides in India resulted in arrests of several officials who have been charged of corruption, cheating, criminal breach of trust, and criminal conspiracy. In particular, the agriculture director is accused of having overcharged the government for subsidized pesticides and renewing contracts for product licensing without proper tendering for bids (Gopal, 2015; Haq, 2015; UNICRI, 2016a). COSTS FOR COMPANIES, COMMUNITIES, AND INDIVIDUALS Primary companies and individuals and secondary industries (e.g., vessels, shipping companies) are also affected by environmental crimes, which ultimately limit the development of local communities. As an example, in 2015 in India, members of the Bharatiya Kisan Union (an Indian farmers’ representative organization) launched a strike and blocked a road to demand a judicial probe into the sale of substandard seeds and pesticides to cotton growers. Though the farmers had planned to protest outside the residence of chief minister, but the police foiled their plans and disallowed them to march toward the residence. Later the same year, several farmers in Punjab decided to hold another agitation in the state in the first week of November to press for their demands, which included appropriate compensation for crop damage (Singh, 2015; Yet again, Punjab farmers to hold agitation from November 4 to 6, 2015). The Federation of Indian Chamber of Commerce and Industry estimated that the overall food production of the country can be reduced by 4–7 percent in case of 25 percent of illicit pesticide, which would represent around 10.6 million tons of food in 2015 (Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry, 2015). Talking about illegal resource extraction, land dispossession is a recurrent issue with cases in many places around the globe. For example, in

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Western Australia, a big Australian iron-ore company funded an alternative Aboriginal advocacy group to contest the legitimacy of another group’s rights claim on land that the company wanted to mine. As explained by Brisman et al., “The global mining corporations involved have no long-term commitment to any state or society. Strategic investment decisions are often made a hemisphere away from the operations and societies affected, but their power overwhelms the voices and interests of local communities, whether in Africa or Australia. Although power imbalances, lack of regulation and transparency and their malign effects are more extreme in the ‘developing’ world, these problems are manifest wherever corporate miners operate” (Brisman, South, & White, 2015). Currently, the waste industry is one of the biggest European business areas in which it is particularly easy for criminals to undercut honest competitors (Europol, 2015b). The environmental impacts of the activities in the informal waste refurbishment and recycling sector lead to economic losses and additional costs. The EFFACE project estimated that the 2.98 million tons of illegally exported e-waste caused a loss in profits for the EU e-waste recycling industry from €31.2 million to €37.5 million (around US$34.77 to 41.8 million) in 2012. Especially, the 1.16 million tons of illegally exported e-waste to China deprive the EU recycling industry of about €12.2 million to €14.6 million (around US$13.6 to 16.3 million) in profits in 2012. Such illegal activities also impact the labor market with a potential loss of about 38,000 full-time equivalent direct jobs lost in the EU e-waste recycling sector and the same number of indirect and induced jobs, for a total of 76,000 jobs (Geeraerts et al., 2015). As for the state, legitimate companies might also suffer additional costs when asked to prevent or repair the damages caused by criminals. For example, in the case of seizure of counterfeit pesticides, the legitimate intellectual property right (IPR) owner must bear the costs of illicit pesticide detection, storage after seizure, product disposal, or destruction. This constitutes what may be considered a perverse penalty. Special disposal procedures may, in fact, cost more than production, and some companies have reportedly asked enforcement agencies to stop seizing infringing products, resulting in the release of product into markets (Europol, 2015a; UNICRI, 2016a). If the health, environmental, and economic risks of environmental crimes are relatively well-studied areas, other worrisome trends remain little known or under-recognized. The following section gives an overview of the use and impact of environmental crimes in conflict situations, as well as the increasing involvement of violent and organized illegal actors in those criminal activities. NATIONAL AND REGIONAL STABILITY AND SECURITY Within a few decades, when researchers have developed more comprehensive analyses of many of the world’s conflicts, the relation between the environment,

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resources and conflict may seem almost as obvious as the connection we see today between human rights, democracy and peace. (Award Ceremony Speech. Presentation Speech by Professor Ole Danbolt Mjøs, Chairman of the Norwegian Nobel Committee, Oslo, December 10, 2004)

The environment is a subject and a source of conflict among populations and nations aiming at controlling key resources (water sources, arable lands, forest, mines, etc.), putting at risk the security and stability of a region or a country. Environmental crimes are also linked with other serious crimes, such as corruption, illegal trafficking, child labor, and forced labor. In addition, the potential of economic value arising from environmental crimes is attracting a growing number of illegal players, ranging from individual, company to more organized and dangerous actors, such as organized crimes groups and terrorist groups. ENVIRONMENTAL CRIME IN CONFLICTS Environmental crime in conflicts situation can take several forms and can be a cause of human right violations, political tension or even war and also used as a tool in the conflict, as demonstrated next. The mining sector is particularly subject to violence and armed conflict. The high profits generated from the illicit mineral resource sector has perpetuated or directly funded numerous humanitarian and human rights violations, including the use of child soldiers in violent conflict, forced labor, and sexual and gender-based violence (Stimson Center, 2015). The sadly notorious “conflict diamonds” crises, which involved several countries in West Africa is probably the most striking example. In this context, it has been recognized that natural resources were the “raison d’être” of conflict, and/or its main financial resource by providing rebel groups with an illicit source of funding (Koh, 2003; Manusama, 2006). Civilians were targeted both by the army and rebel groups, which have continuously perpetrated massive violations of human rights and humanitarian law: summary executions; sexual violence including rape and sexual slavery; kidnapping, illegal detention, torture, forced recruitment and forced labor, and so on (Norwegian Refugee Council/Global IDP Project, 2005; Human Rights Watch, 2001, 2003). The Kimberley Process was set up to stop the trade in conflict diamonds but its effectiveness after several years if implementation is questioned (Global Witness, 2006, 2007; Global Witness leaves Kimberley process, calls for diamond trade to be held accountable, 2011; Koh, 2003). More recently, researches carried out in several mining place in Peru found evidence of child and juvenile labor, female workers being subjected to sexual threats, violence, human trafficking for labor and sexual exploitation of adults and minors (Novak & Namihas, 2009; Shahinian, 2011; Verité, 2014). Those researches also highlight that victims are reportedly recruited by labor intermediaries, friends, family members, which shows how much illegal

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activities in developing countries can destructure or even break down familial and societal links. More recently, the ambition of another Australian company to set up a titanium mine in South Africa’s Eastern Cape triggered strong protests from the local community, supported by civil society even outside South Africa. The conflict is indicative of the increasing tensions between a powerful mining industry and civil society increasingly concerned about the social and environmental consequences of mining projects. It is also creating division among the community between the “anti,” concerned about the respect of their land, health, and environment, and the “pro,” who see in the project an opportunity to develop the economy of the region. The Australian company has been accused of attempted corruption, violence, and intimidation against community’s members. The conflict reached its peak when a leading anti-mining activist was murdered outside his home in March 2016, by men claiming to be police officers. The company denied any responsibility for violence and killings in the area (Bond, 2016; Gaia Foundation, 2016; Hervieu, 2016). In order to prevent new conflicts and bring transparency and best practice to the extraction and trade of minerals, a number of certification schemes, mechanisms, and acts have been put in place at national, regional, and international levels, such as the Kimberley Process previously mentioned. These initiatives involve international actors, the private sector and national institutions. UNICRI’s technical report lists a number of initiatives in place to combat the illicit trade in precious metals in different countries and the challenges they face (for more information, see UNICRI, 2016). Besides fueling conflicts, environmental crimes can also deteriorate the relation between countries. This is illustrated by a case of waste disposal between Lebanon and Sierra Leone. As reported by the Basel Action Network (BAN), the government of Lebanon, alleging he received clearance from the government of Sierra Leone, planned to export tons of household trash and contracted two international companies in this purpose. However, following nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and experts’ claim, the office of the president of Sierra Leone issued a statement denying the existence of such agreement. The BAN feared that because of the African Union’s Bamako Convention prohibiting the import of hazardous waste, Lebanon will just turn to neighboring countries such as Yemen, Unit Arab Emirates, or Jordan (Basel Action Network, 2016). States can also become an illegal actor in ecological crisis during war time. Within the framework of the war in Darfur, started in 2003 and which resulted in the deaths of hundreds of thousands of civilians and the displacement of millions of refugees (Ki-moon, 2007; United Nations Department of Public Information, 2007), Sudanese officials have been accused of environmental crime by victims, pressure groups, and legal experts. As reported by the Institute for War and Peace Reporting (IPWR), “in addition

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to ordering their campaign of terror and mass killings, the government instructed its allied Arab Janjaweed militia to drive out mainly black farmers and civilians by burning fields and contaminating water supplies” (Glassborow, 2007). Even if not qualified as “environmental crime” as of now, another worrying issue is the use of chemical and biological weapons (Chemical attack fact sheet, 2004; U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2004a, 2004b) in warfare, which could critically affects the environment if they were to be used, even erratically. Already, several events in the past century revealed the devastating power of such weapons. In particular, the Agent Orange, an herbicide used by the U.S. Army in Vietnam and neighboring countries between 1962 and 1971 resulted in significant adverse environmental impact. The forest was defoliate, chemicals contaminated soils, water supply, the food chain, with effect still visible four decades after the spraying (Hatfield, 2009; King, 2010). More recently, in Syria, Bashar AlAssad regime has been suspected of using chemical and biological weapons against rebel soldiers and civilians (Goodenough, 2013; Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, 2015). Following major conflicts and increasing risks arising from the use and deterioration of the environment in wartime, several international laws and conventions have been designed to control and reduce these risks (for more information, see Schwabach, 2006; Yuzon, 1996). To deal with environmental conflicts, some have urged the establishment of an International Environment Court, to operate under UN Conventions in the same way as the International Criminal Court (Brisman et al., 2015) or to expand the authority of the court to include environmental crimes (Freeland, 2015; Sills et al., 2001). Article 8 of the Rome Statute on “war crimes” already states that the court shall have jurisdiction in respect of war crimes, including “Intentionally launching an attack in the knowledge that such attack will cause incidental loss of life or injury to civilians or damage to civilian objects or widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural environment which would be clearly excessive in relation to the concrete and direct overall military advantage anticipated” (Brisman et al., 2015). INVOLVEMENT OF ORGANIZED CRIME AND TERRORIST GROUPS The transnational nature of environmental crime, the low risks, and potential high profits makes it a particularly attractive area for OCGs. Indeed, criminal proceeds from environmental crimes can reach those of illegal drugs trafficking with a much lower detection rate and sanctions (sanctions legally applicable and effectively applied by the court). This enables criminal groups and networks to further infiltrate the legal economy (Europol, 2015b).

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One of the most famous cases of OCG involvement in waste crime is the illegal burning of waste by the Italian Mafia group Camorra, taking place from the 1970s in the so-called Land of Fires, in Campania, South of Italy and resulting in dramatic consequences for human health and the environment (D’Alisa et al., 2015; Legambiente, 2003). EFFACE reported that the free masonry, state’s officials, and Camorra, build together a powerful network able to dispose millions of tons of waste per year, which took in more than €7.5 billion per year (around US$8.4 billion) and caused a loss for the treasury of €1 billion every year (around US$1.12 billion). The impact of this business has been disastrous and has distorted the political, economic, and ecological life of the entire region (D’Alisa et al., 2015). Recent research by UNICRI indicates environmental crimes (including infiltration into the cement cycle, waste cycle, and the food processing sector as one of the main sources of illicit proceeds for organized crime in Italy (D’Angelo & Musumeci, 2016). The Italian NGO Legambiente, in its 2015 Annual Report states that OCG infiltration in the waste sector increased by 26 percent compared to the previous year (Legambiente, 2015). INTERPOL reported that “Today, organised crime groups transcend conventional categories of crime, influenced by the globalisation of trade and travel, as well as advancements in technology and information sharing.” In particular, they resort to other form of serious crimes, such as corruption of officials, fraud, and money laundering, in order to facilitate their illegal activities. They also make use of trade routes and modus operandi established to traffic environmental products to smuggle other illicit products, such as drugs, firearms, and people (INTERPOL, 2015, 2016). Verité7 explains that “workers in Peruvian mines reported that criminal gangs directed by Chinese, South Korean, and Colombian nationals were involved in exploiting Ecuadorians and Peruvians in gold mines in Cusco” and that national media and U.S. Department of State have reported criminal networks’ involvement in minors trafficking into mining camps (Verité, 2014). This phenomenon of “crime convergence” (or “threat convergence”) is described by INTERPOL as “one of the greatest challenges cited by officers from environment and policing agencies” and raises a number of complexities and challenges in all phases of enforcement (INTERPOL, 2015). In particular, polices forces in one country are frequently divided between areas and jurisdictions, and environmental offences are typically treated in isolation from other types of serious crimes. According to INTERPOL, “the separation of enforcement responses to environmental crime and conventional crime need to adapt to today’s more sophisticated and transnational operating environment” (INTERPOL, 2015). Evidence shows that global trade in precious metals and gemstones has become a significant source of financing for both organized crime

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and terrorist groups. As the demand for materials bearing precious metals and stones continues to grow and the price of some minerals fetch more than other crimes (as an example, the price of some minerals fetch 19 times the price of cocaine), illicit mineral resource sector has attracted involvement from some of the world’s most unscrupulous actors. Organized crime and terrorist groups are exploiting the weaknesses in the national and international monitoring of the trade to finance activities that threaten citizens (Perelygin, Selin, & Ivanov, 2008 Stimson Center, 2015). The Mexican drug cartel “Knights Templar” started investing in iron trafficking, which seemed to be a safer and less competitive activity than drug. The Economist (H. T., 2014) reported that they have made millions of dollars by extorting local mines bosses and sending iron ore and other minerals to China in exchange of chemical precursors to make synthetic drugs. In Rwanda, the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) obtained up to 75 percent of its profits from the illegal gold industry in 2008 (Stimson Center, 2015). In Democratic Republic of the Congo, illegal mining would be the primary source of terrorism financing with militias earning around US$1 billion in 2013 (Stimson Center, 2015). A UN report on DRC explains that armed group (militias) are involved in the illicit management of mineral resources in different ways, acting as “security providers,” “robbers,” or “producers.” In the first case, mining operations are controlled by other actors and the militia are used and/ or paid to provide security. In the second case, the militias just steal the mining production and in the last case, they effectively control the supply chain from extraction to the sale of minerals to local or regional buyers (UNEP-MONUSCO-OSESG, 2015). In the Middle East region, a UN Security Council report on Afghanistan collected information on the Taliban’s involvement in illegal mining (in particular lapis lazuli and gold) and related extortion. By controlling several access roads to mine sites and intimidating legitimate local business community, Taliban would earn several dozen million U.S. dollar annually, according to Afghan official, making illicit mining activity the second revenue of Taliban after narcotic (United Nations Security Council, 2015). The aforementioned demonstrates that the potential economic value of the environment and environmental crimes is attracting organized crime and terrorist groups. Recent researches highlight the growing convergence of organized crime and terrorist groups in their illegal activities. Those groups might, to a certain extent, cooperate or act together to reach a common interest. A study by the European Parliament Directorate General for Internal Policies concludes that “the contemporary international security environment creates opportunities for linkages between OC and terrorism to develop. Although many such linkages predominantly originate and exist in unstable environments outside of the EU, they impact security developments in the EU and have thus contributed

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to creating European vulnerabilities to the nexus” (Makarenko, 2012). Environmental crimes are no exception as cases of such convergence have been reported in the illicit precious metal activities. In Colombia, the police asserted that the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) worked with the Mexican Sinaloa drug cartel to illegally exploit coltan mines (Bunker, 2015; Otis, 2014; Sinaloa cartel expands influence in Colombia, 2011). According to an NGO working on the field, illicit mineral resource gold continues to finance armed groups and corrupt army officers and officials in Congo and the region (Bafilemba & Lezhnev, 2015). In DRC, a UN’s expert report points out that the government and UN peacekeeping forces “are increasingly facing criminal groups with links to transnational organized criminal networks involved in large scale smuggling and laundering operations.” Such groups and networks grow in influence in the region, both at political and economic levels. The report also evaluated the profits of the main illicit resources extraction in eastern DRC (including gold, 3Ts, diamonds, minerals, timber, and charcoal) to transnational OCGs to be about US$77-426 million per year from which armed groups would retain around US$13.2 million per year. Finally, the report mentions that the illegal exploitation and trafficking in natural resources in DRC would provide at least US$136–391 million to transnational organized criminal groups outside the DRC8 (UNEPMONUSCO-OSESG, 2015). Facing new threats resulting from the involvement of OCG into the mining sector, authorities have to adapt their legal and practical response. As an example, following an accident in a disused section of a mine in June 2009, which cost the life of 91 illegal miners, the South African courts recognized illegal mining as organized crime and not only as trespassing (Van der Merwe, 2009). CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS This chapter demonstrates the multiple risks and impacts of transnational environmental crimes, and the correlation between those elements. Environmental crimes must be fully considered a serious issue, with grave implications for environment and human safety, economic integrity, as well as global security. Pollution crimes, among which the illegal trafficking and management of hazardous waste, illicit pesticides, and precious metals and gemstones— can dramatically harm the environment and biodiversity and cause irreversible health effects, which can pass on to future generations. Offenders involved in environmental crimes spoil the economy and distort fair competition, representing a significant shortfall for the states, companies, communities, and individuals. Finally, environmental resources can be a cause, but also a tool in conflicts situations, that may result in social conflict, rebellion, or even war. Such crises can be aggravated and complicated

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by the involvement of illegal armed groups such as organized crime and terrorist groups. This chapter illustrates the various actors—from individual to state— involved in and affected by transnational environmental crimes. It also evidences that the main incentive is financial with individuals and companies trying to make money by circumventing legal channels, states, and armed groups attempting to take control over what is considered a strategic asset and organized crime and terrorist groups intending to get funds to finance other illegal activities. But environmental crimes can also become a tool in conflict situations in order to gain a strategic advantage over rivals, leading to adverse health and environmental effects on the region. Countering transnational environmental crimes thus requires a global approach and international strategy and cannot be solved solely at national level. It is necessary to get commitment and collaboration from all actors, including public authorities, policy makers, the private sector, and the civil society, as well as legal and technical improvement. International cooperation, exchange of information and best practices is one of the key pillars in the fight against transnational environmental crimes. This chapter also gave a few examples of measures that have been undertaken or recommended in order to counter or punish those crimes, from new legislation, international initiatives, court decision to the establishment of specialized court. Such responses must be harmonized at regional and international levels, in order to prevent the shift of illegal activities to less reliable area.

NOTES 1. “Pollution Crimes and Global Security,” by Elise Vermeersch, © 2016, United Nations. The opinions expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the United Nations. 2. See World Health Organization reports and publications at: http://www .who.int/publications/en/. 3. See Pure Earth reports and publications at: http://www.pureearth.org/ learn-more/publications/. 4. See in particular the Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Waste (Basel Convention, 1992) and the Council Directive 91/689/EEC of December 12, 1991, on hazardous waste (Council Directive, 1991). 5. Countering WEEE Illegal Trade (CWIT) project. For more information, see project website: http://www.cwitproject.eu/. 6. European Union Action to Fight Environmental Crime (EFFACE) project. For more information, see project website: http://efface.eu/. 7. For more information, see Verité website: http://www.verite.org. 8. Annual net profits to organized crime is conservatively estimated to derive from: (1) gold (US$40–120 million); (2) timber (US$16–48 million); (3) charcoal

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(US$12–35 million); (4) 3T minerals (US$7.5–22.6 million); (5) diamonds sourced mainly from outside the conflict zone (US$16–48 million); and (6) wildlife, including ivory and fisheries, local taxation schemes, cannabis and other resources (US$14.3–28 million). For more detailed figures, see UNEP-MONUSCO-OSESG (2015, pp. 25, 30–31).

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PART III

Responding to Transnational Crime

In Part III of Volume 2, our principal organizing theme is that of official responses to transnational crime. In some cases, readers will see that official response is in the form of law enforcement, in others it is the development and application of international law. However, increasingly the official responses to transnational crime are multinational cooperative efforts that extend well beyond traditional law enforcement efforts. Chapter 10 exposes the reader to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime’s mutual legal assistance (MLA) request writer tool. A tool developed by the office to improve upon and streamline the existing mechanisms for requesting international cooperation in the investigation and pursuit of transnational organized crime, corruption, and terrorism. Our author presents the reader with the history of international cooperation facilitated by the UN and the criminal developments over time that ultimately required the development of the MLA tool. With specific attention to major events, Chapter 11 describes to the reader the security rigors, and required international cooperation, of hosting major events. Major events have a wide range of subjective interpretation but one commonly accepted example of a major international event is the hosting of the Olympic Games. Our authors use the example of hosting any Olympic Games and describe how the United Nations Interregional Crime and Research Institute (UNICRI) provided pioneering work in launching the International Permanent Observatory on Major Events Security in 2003. More than ever, the importance of data, and “big data,” are critical to international security and intelligence operations. Chapter 12 provides the reader with a historical overview and an outline of the role of Big Data Analytics. Here, we discover a great deal of potential that big data has to offer as well as a number of the challenges associated with analyzing big

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data. Moreover, based on the scope and scale of processing big data, just who can participate is a serious question. Chapter 13 examines the effect of the Investment Multilateral Development Bank’s assistance to developing countries on criminal justice reform issues. The links between well-functioning criminal justice systems, lower levels of violence, and economic growth and social development are strong. Multilateral development institutions have provided significant amounts of assistance to develop and strengthen criminal justice institutions, but the evidence of its impact is scarce. The findings of this chapter explore whether investment in criminal justice reform can affect levels of violence in developing countries. Interestingly, Chapter 14 brings attention to the public-private partnership in combatting transnational crime. More specifically, Hill and Jousten discuss the potential of nongovernmental organizations to contribute in the fight against transnational crime. These authors present the reader with a number of examples of the how NGOs have initiated or contributed to crime prevention and crime detection, as well as victim aide and victim advocacy. Furthering the discussion of the public-private partnership, Olsen and Finlay discuss several public-private partnerships that serve to counter transnational crime through solutions designed by industry, enforced by governments, and adopted by responsible businesses everywhere are the logical next step in global counter-trafficking efforts. Ultimately, readers will find that Chapter 15 suggests such combined efforts stand to go far toward global counter-trafficking objectives, while also expanding market opportunities for law-abiding companies. Finally, Part III of Volume 2 concludes with a presentation of the global reach of U.S. crime policy. Matti Jousten, of the Finnish Ministry of Justice, examines how the United States has used in treaties, “naming and shaming” and economic sanctions in order to get other countries to change their laws and policies, and compares the success of the United State in doing so with that of the European Union. Readers of Part III will have experienced a wide range of discussion on the response to transnational crime with particular attention to enabling necessary partnerships and fostering easy cooperation between governments as well as the public and private sectors.

CHAPTER 10

Fostering International Cooperation in Criminal Matters: The UNODC Mutual Legal Assistance Request Writer Tool Dimosthenis Chrysikos1

INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN CRIMINAL MATTERS AS A KEY ISSUE FOR COMBATING CRIME: POLICY-MAKING PERSPECTIVE The globalization of criminal activities has created a need for strengthened forms and mechanisms of international cooperation. The realization that the investigation, prosecution, and control of crime can no longer be confined within national boundaries has led to constant refining, improving, and streamlining of existing forms and mechanisms of international cooperation, in order to keep pace with contemporary manifestations of crime, including transnational organized crime, corruption, and terrorism. Over the years, UN forums and intergovernmental processes in the field of crime prevention and criminal justice have generated knowledge, accumulated expertise, and delineated policy priorities pertaining to international cooperation in criminal matters. For example, practical approaches to strengthening international cooperation in fighting crime-related problems were given a prominent place in the agenda of the 11th (Bangkok, Thailand, 2005), 12th (Salvador, Brazil, 2010), and 13th (Doha, Qatar, 2015) UN congresses on crime prevention and criminal justice and were further highlighted with emphasis in their outcome documents-declarations. Similarly, the promotion of international cooperation to combat transnational organized crime, corruption, and terrorism has been consistently

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considered in the annual sessions of the Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice, especially with regard to the use for this purpose of the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime— hereinafter referred to as Organized Crime Convention (United Nations, 2000), the United Nations Convention against Corruption—hereinafter referred to as Convention against Corruption (United Nations, 2003) and the universal counterterrorism conventions and protocols. The Working Group on International Cooperation of the Conference of the Parties to the Organized Crime Convention2 and the open-ended intergovernmental expert meetings to enhance international cooperation under the Convention against Corruption3 have been used as platforms for the exchange of views and experience among practitioners with a view to assisting the Conference of the Parties to the Organized Crime Convention and the Conference of the States Parties to the Convention against Corruption in identifying challenges, disseminating information on good practices, and further advancing the effective implementation of the provisions of the two conventions on international cooperation, with special emphasis, inter alia, on MLA. Moreover, the completed reviews of the first cycle of the Mechanism for the Review of Implementation of the Convention against Corruption, which have focused, inter alia, on the review of implementation of Chapter IV (International cooperation) of the convention, have been conducive to mapping national approaches to international cooperation and developing cumulative knowledge on obstacles to cooperation and on practical means to overcome them.4 ENHANCING MECHANISMS OF INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION: THE MULTILATERAL LEGAL/ NORMATIVE FRAMEWORK International cooperation in criminal matters is the cornerstone of coordinated efforts to prevent and combat crime in its transnational manifestations. For international cooperation practitioners, the legal basis employed, including the terms of the relevant bilateral or multilateral instrument, can have a significant impact on the success of individual requests for cooperation. Even where a state can provide assistance without a treaty, reliance on the agreed terms of a bilateral or multilateral instrument can assist in bridging diverse legal traditions and cultures and national differences in procedural law. In addition, the existence of legal rights and obligations within the bilateral or multilateral instrument provides a clear framework governing the way the requested state should respond to requests. The provisions of multilateral conventions such as the aforementioned Organized Crime Convention and Convention against Corruption, as well as the United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances of 1988—hereinafter referred to as 1988 Drug

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Trafficking Convention (United Nations, 1988), can play a key role in harmonizing obligations and addressing legal gaps in the field of international cooperation in criminal matters. Focusing on the basic modalities of such cooperation in particular, those instruments provide a basis for extradition and MLA in and of themselves, in addition to obligations resulting from other bilateral or multilateral agreements related to international cooperation in criminal matters into which states parties have entered. Thus, the conventions offer both a way of filling possible legal gaps, where no bilateral or multilateral agreement exists between countries seeking to cooperate, and a means for the increased convergence of such bilateral and multilateral agreements. In addition, all aforementioned instruments are coming close to universal adherence5 and encompass state-of-the-art standards. As a result, the possibility of directly using any of these conventions as the legal basis for international cooperation in criminal matters is particularly high, thus providing a greater degree of stability and consistency to international cooperation. Another advantage of the universal crime-related conventions is the extended scope of application of their international cooperation provisions. For example, Articles 16 and 18 of the Organized Crime Convention, on extradition and MLA respectively, extend the scope of their application. In particular, under Article 18 of the convention, states parties are required to afford one another the widest measure of MLA in investigations, prosecutions, and judicial proceedings in relation to the offences covered by the convention, including serious crimes, where the requesting state party has reasonable grounds to suspect that the offence is transnational in nature and that it involves an organized criminal group. This allows for assistance to be provided in the early phases of investigations, when the evidentiary basis of the commission of an offence covered by the convention (and its supplementary protocols) may still be weak. The comprehensiveness of the international cooperation provisions of the aforementioned instruments provides further added value. Particularly with regard to MLA, Article 18 of the Organized Crime Convention and Article 46 of the Convention against Corruption are typical examples of what may be called a “mini mutual legal assistance treaty.” Experience under those articles has led to the recognition that a substantial contribution by central authorities is the most direct avenue to improving mutual assistance practices. The conventions require the designation of a central authority with the responsibility and power to execute mutual assistance requests or to transmit them for execution to the competent authorities. Furthermore, Chapter V (Asset recovery) of the Convention against Corruption contains comprehensive provisions laying down specific measures and mechanisms for cooperation in asset recovery. The role of the UN multilateral instruments as catalysts for the expansion of treaty networks in the field of international cooperation should

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also be noted: the universal crime-related conventions encourage states parties to seek to conclude bilateral and multilateral agreements or arrangements to carry out or to enhance the effectiveness of international cooperation, including MLA (see Organized Crime Convention [United Nations, 2000], Article 18, paragraph 30; and Convention against Corruption [United Nations, 2003], Article 46, paragraph 30). ENHANCING MECHANISMS OF INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION: TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE FRAMEWORK AND THE ROLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME The plethora of bilateral and multilateral instruments, and thus the availability of multiple provisions on international cooperation, is not a panacea for overcoming the problems and difficulties encountered in daily practice. International instruments may provide a sufficient legal basis for cooperation, given that they, as well as existing regional and bilateral treaties or agreements, lay down a detailed and well-articulated framework for such cooperation. However, the existence of international cooperation instruments does not, as such, provide assurances and guarantees that such cooperation will be provided. Most of the difficulties encountered in the field of international cooperation appear to be of an operational nature and mostly relate to the adequacy, or lack thereof, of the practical measures in place to effectively implement the existing legal instruments. A sufficient number of well-trained personnel, who are able to use the legal tools in an appropriate manner, have access to information and contacts, and have the necessary trust and confidence in the operation of the law enforcement and criminal justice system of the cooperating state, are also needed. To ensure effectiveness of international cooperation, technical assistance to upgrade the capacities of competent national authorities is critical. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) has been active in the provision of technical assistance to competent authorities of member states. In the legal sphere, technical assistance activities can support the drafting and promulgation of national laws on extradition and MLA based on legal tools and international good practices. The UNODC model laws on extradition (see, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2004) and mutual assistance in criminal matters (see, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2007) represent important tools in that respect, having been used extensively as a resource for the development of national legislation, most recently in countries in South and Southeast Asia. The model laws include a range of options in areas such as definitions, the grounds for refusal of a request, and documentary requirements for requests. At the treaty level, the Model Treaty on Extradition (United Nations, 1990/1997) and the Model Treaty on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters (United

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Nations, 1990/1998) also represent key technical assistance tools for states seeking to conclude bilateral agreements to enhance the effectiveness of extradition or MLA. In the institutional sphere, technical assistance programs delivered by UNODC may focus on the establishment of effective central authorities and the building of their capacity. That may include support to the creation and delineation of the work of units responsible for preparing requests, centralizing all information about incoming and outgoing requests, and monitoring their implementation. It may also involve the development of standard operating procedures and memorandums of understanding between the central authority and other relevant national authorities and institutions, or the development of guidelines for the preparation of requests. UNODC has also been active in the development of tools for facilitating practical aspects of international cooperation. For example, the online directories of competent national authorities under the 1988 Drug Trafficking Convention, the Organized Crime Convention and the Convention against Corruption enable simple access to the contact information for authorities designated to receive, respond to, and process requests under the provisions of those conventions. In addition, guiding tools have been developed for use by member states, such as the practical guide to international cooperation to combat identity-related crime, as contained in the Handbook on Identity-Related Crime (2011), the Manual on International Cooperation for the Purposes of Confiscation of Proceeds of Crime (2012), the Manual on Mutual Legal Assistance and Extradition (2012), the Handbook on the International Transfer of Sentenced Persons (2012), and the Digest of Organized Crime Cases: A compilation of cases with commentaries and lessons learned (2012), which also includes cases of international cooperation.

THE UNODC MUTUAL LEGAL ASSISTANCE REQUEST WRITER TOOL Early Version of the Tool—Rationale and Objective As part of its technical assistance services in the field of developing tools for use by member states and in an effort to help practitioners draft effective and accurate MLA requests, receive more useful responses and streamline the relevant process, UNODC has developed a Mutual Legal Assistance Request Writer Tool (hereinafter referred to as MLA Tool). At its early version, the MLA Tool was a software application that had been designed by the secretariat to assist criminal justice practitioners in drafting expeditiously MLA requests and guide them accordingly through each step of the drafting process, thereby enhancing cooperation between states and accelerating responses to international cooperation requests

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from requesting countries. In doing so, the software used checklists to prompt the entry of the information necessary for the requested state to execute the request. The advantage offered by the tool was that the necessary information was saved in order to generate, at the final stage, the draft request in a format ready for signature and submission. The software also contained Internet links to a wide range of information on treaties, national legislation, and contact particulars of central authorities and contact persons for direct communication. The rationale behind the development of the tool was based on the acknowledgement that the expeditious transmission/execution of requests is a prerequisite for the efficiency of MLA mechanisms. MLA requests often need to be generated at very short notice and in such a way that avoids legal pitfalls and obstacles when different legal systems are trying to lend each other support. Effective assistance requires requests to be submitted “right the first time.” This means that such requests need to be communicated and executed promptly and, further, contain all critical information to facilitate affirmative decision on, and follow-up action toward, their execution; and to avoid legal pitfalls and obstacles in both the requested and the requesting states when different legal systems and practices are involved. The MLA Tool included guidance on drafting requests in relation to a wide array of types of assistance, as reflected in provisions of existing multilateral instruments and domestic laws of member states. Thus, the practitioners were able, by using the tool, to generate MLA requests for obtaining evidence, effecting service of criminal process-related documents, executing searches and seizures and freezing, obtaining confiscations orders, taking evidence from witnesses, or obtaining confiscation orders.6 The tool was made available to member states free of charge and could be downloaded from the UNODC website. It was also made available in different languages (English, French, Spanish, Russian, Portuguese, and Serbo-Croatian). It was running on a Windows-based system and was used in training courses and technical assistance programs conducted by UNODC.

EXPANSION AND REDEVELOPMENT OF THE TOOL Asset Recovery Features The first thoughts for the expansion of the MLA Tool revolved around the necessity to capture the developments pertaining to the adoption and entry into force of the Convention against Corruption and the emergence of asset recovery as an autonomous and self-standing form of international cooperation in corruption-related cases. It should be recalled that, in what has been recognized as a major breakthrough, the Convention against Corruption contains a comprehensive

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chapter on asset recovery (Chapter V). Beginning with stating that the return of assets pursuant to that chapter is a “fundamental principle” and that states parties shall afford one another the widest measure of cooperation and assistance in that regard (Article 51), the convention includes substantive provisions laying down specific measures and mechanisms for cooperation with a view to asset recovery, while maintaining the flexibility in recovery action that might be warranted by particular circumstances. With regard to the return and disposition of assets, Chapter V of the convention contains a series of provisions that favor return to the requesting state party, depending on how closely the assets were linked to it in the first place. Moreover, Chapters V and IV of the Convention against Corruption on asset recovery and international cooperation respectively are interdependent. The effective implementation of the provisions of the convention on MLA could further enhance the efficiency of asset recovery mechanisms and foster cooperation for purposes of freezing, seizure, and confiscation of assets related to corruption. In the asset recovery process, in particular, MLA is crucial when evidence, including financial information, is requested from foreign jurisdictions, when assets must be seized or restrained or when their final confiscation is requested, and when domestic confiscation orders must be enforced abroad. In terms of policy guidance and mandates provided to UNODC, it should be mentioned that the Working Group on Asset Recovery, convened under the authority of the Conference of States Parties to the Convention against Corruption and with the task to assist its work on the implementation of its Chapter V, agreed, at its first meeting, held in Vienna on August 27–28, 2007, that more guidance was needed on how to “operationalize” the asset recovery provisions of the Convention against Corruption and recommended the expansion of the MLA Tool to include ways of appropriately formulating requests for asset recovery.7 At its second meeting, held in Vienna on September 25–26, 2008, the Working Group reconfirmed the recommendation to develop practical tools for asset recovery and gave priority to exploring the expansion of the MLA Tool and the further development of similar products. At its third meeting, held in Vienna on May 14–15, 2009, the Working Group emphasized the importance of providing technical assistance in the field of MLA, including asset recovery, to officials and practitioners to enable them to draft requests and responses to requests. With regard to the development of cumulative knowledge, the Working Group requested the secretariat at its fourth meeting, held in Vienna on December 16–17, 2010, to continue its work to expand the MLA Tool. At its fifth meeting, held in Vienna on August 25–26, 2011, the Working Group reaffirmed the relevance of its previous recommendations and took note of progress with regard to their implementation. In view of the above, UNODC organized an expert group meeting on the development of an expanded MLA Tool with added features on asset

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recovery, which was held in Vienna from December 14 to 15, 2011. The group brought together experts from different regions with the aim to redesign the structure of the tool and enable the provision of additional guidance for drafting requests on asset recovery, based on Chapters IV and V of the Convention against Corruption.

Further Redevelopment and Expansion to Include Other Forms of Assistance In the course of substantive work to update the MLA Tool, and in line with guidance received from other intergovernmental bodies, in addition to those related to the Convention against Corruption, it was deemed appropriate to further expand the scope of the redevelopment process for the MLA Tool, so that it does not only focus on specific asset recovery features but also encompasses guidance on different forms of MLA, which had not been included in its initial version. The reason behind that was the acknowledgement that the MLA Tool would need to echo and take into account the variety of practical aspects and needs that have emerged—or gained further importance—over the last years in the field of international cooperation in criminal matters. From a policy perspective, the Conference of the Parties to the Organized Crime Convention, in its resolution 7/4, acknowledged the efforts made by UNODC to further strengthen international cooperation tools, including the directory of central authorities and the MLA Tool, and mandated UNODC to continue the further development of tools for international cooperation in criminal matters, including the MLA Tool, with a view to supporting central authorities in strengthening communication channels and, as appropriate, in exchanging information at both the regional and international levels. Thus, UNODC, and specifically the Conference Support Section of the Organized Crime and Illicit Trafficking Branch within the Division for Treaty Affairs, has continued its work to address in practice the need for further development of the tool and implement the aforementioned mandate to revise and update it. In this context, additional expert group meetings were convened under the auspices of UNODC to receive feedback and guidance on the substantive and technical aspects of the revision of the tool: one in 2014 (May 8–9) and two in 2015 (May 13–14 and October 22–23, 2015, respectively). In consultation with experts attending the expert group meetings, the redeveloped content and structure of the MLA Tool were finalized in June 2016, thus enabling the launching of a pilot phase to test its use in practice. The first countries where the redeveloped tool was tested were Ethiopia, Uganda, and Kenya (July 2016).

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Main Directions and Substantive Innovations of the Redeveloped Tool The MLA Tool, as finally redeveloped, is designed to support the drafting of MLA requests in relation to all offences, not just those established in accordance with international treaties or conventions. However, the tool reminds the user that MLA requests of de minimis nature may be rejected by the authorities of many requested states. Except for proceedings related to criminal matters, requests for assistance in civil and administrative matters do not fall within the concept of “mutual assistance in criminal matters.” The user can draft a request for assistance using as legal basis any of the multilateral instruments listed in the MLA Tool, if applicable, or provisions of the domestic legislation of the requesting state. Seeking assistance on the basis of the principle of reciprocity is also foreseen. The MLA Tool also supports a “reminder-function” to indicate to the user that some states do not require an MLA request for noncoercive measures and it may be possible to obtain assistance and evidence/information without resorting to MLA at all. Thus, the tool encourages the practitioner to consider using informal channels to obtain the requested information, where the requested state permits so; and if there is any doubt as to whether the requested state requires an MLA request, consult directly and in advance with its competent authorities.8 The MLA Tool further includes, as new substantive features, the following guiding elements: Integration of Distinct Guiding Components for Assistance in Asset Recovery Cases Based on work conducted in the initial phases of its redevelopment, the MLA Tool contains separate asset recovery features. The content and the structure of the tool were redesigned to offer a variety of different and clearly defined options in terms of types of assistance to be sought. The main objective was to avoid substantive overlaps and conflict with “traditional” MLA features already contained in the tool and related to assistance for purposes of confiscation in general (not in connection with the requirements of Chapter V of the Convention against Corruption). Integration of Additional Specific Forms or Means of International Cooperation in Criminal Matters An additional form of international cooperation in criminal matters included in the redeveloped MLA Tool is that of the transfer of criminal proceedings. This form of cooperation, whereby a requesting state seeks the assistance of another state, in which adequate criminal proceedings are

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possible, to take over the proceedings at stake, was deemed as a necessary “supplement” in the “menu” of types of assistance offered through the tool. That was due to two basic reasons: first, the importance of such transfer of proceedings for the proper administration of justice across borders; and, second, the similar “MLA avenues” needed for requesting the transfer at different stages of the criminal proceedings. Numerous reasons may exist for such transfer: difficulties in proving a charge or in reaching a decision in the requesting state; or challenges associated with the enforcement of the sentence in the requesting state. The transfer of criminal proceedings may be a practical alternative in cases where the latter state appears to be in a better position to conduct the proceedings or the defendant has closer ties to it, for example, as a citizen or resident. It may also be used as an appropriate procedural tool to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of domestic prosecutions initiated and conducted in lieu of extradition. Moreover, it was decided to integrate in the MLA tool separate guidance on requesting the provision of assistance in criminal proceedings through modern means such as videoconferencing. “Videoconferencing” refers to the use of interactive telecommunications technologies for witness testimony via simultaneous two-way video and audio transmissions if it is not possible or desirable for the individual in question to appear in person in the territory of the requesting state.9 The MLA Tool provides guidance on how to request the obtaining of evidence through videoconferencing and also reminds the user of a variety of practical and legal issues that may specifically arise in related cases. These may refer to matters such as whether judges must be present on both sides of the cooperating jurisdictions, whose law should apply to the taking of the testimony, the actual conduct of the examination, and so forth. Inclusion of Guidance in Relation to Joint Investigations and International Cooperation to Conduct Controlled Deliveries There was also a decision to include in the MLA Tool, in its part titled “Any Other Form of Assistance,” under certain conditions and limitations and subject to specific reminders, guiding features on joint investigations10 and international cooperation in conducting controlled deliveries.11 Joint investigative teams (JITs) generally operate for extended periods of time and include more extensive investigative activity shared or divided by agreement between or among cooperating counterparts. The duration and composition of the JIT is often specified in an agreement. Depending on the states concerned and the nature of the facts under investigation, membership is likely to include prosecutors, judges, law enforcement officers, and experts. Where agreement is achieved on the setting up of a JIT,

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the JIT is normally established in the state in which the main part of the investigations is expected to be carried out. The MLA Tool contains reminders for the user pertaining to essential considerations while planning joint investigations, such as the criteria for deciding on a joint investigation; the criteria for choosing the location of a joint investigation; the use of a coordination body to steer the investigation, if a number of different jurisdictions are involved; the designation of a lead investigator to direct and monitor the investigation; the liability of officers from a foreign agency who work under the auspices of a joint investigation; the level of control exerted by judges or investigators; and the identification of the legal rules, regulations, and procedures to determine the emerging legal and practical matters relating to a joint investigation, including pooling, storage and sharing information, confidentiality of the activities, the integrity and admissibility of evidence, disclosure issues, implications of the use of undercover operations, appropriate charges, and the issue of retention of traffic data for law enforcement purposes. It should be noted, however, that in some countries, JITs are associated exclusively with law enforcement cooperation, while for others, with judicial cooperation. In some cases, they are associated with both. In most of states, the submission of an MLA request is not a legal requirement for creating a JIT, though a State’s domestic law could require an MLA request as a prerequisite to create a JIT. Regardless of the approach, JITs, once established and operational, are intended to function outside the MLA framework and this is a key reminder offered to the practitioner who will use the MLA Tool. Moreover, controlled delivery across international borders is also supported by the MLA Tool (in terms of requesting pertinent assistance). “Controlled delivery” basically refers to the mutual agreement of all participating jurisdictions to detect and allow to go forward, under the control and surveillance of law enforcement officers, illicit consignments of currency, illicit drugs, precursor chemicals, weapons, or other contraband, with a view to securing evidence and identifying persons involved in criminal offences of transnational nature, and taking appropriate legal action against them. The MLA Tool further contains a reminder that controlled delivery operations do not normally require a MLA request. The legal systems of most states permit controlled delivery operations at least for law enforcement information-gathering purposes. For evidence acquired in the course of controlled deliveries to be used in judicial proceedings, many states require specific legal authority in their own domestic legal frameworks, and sometimes in those of other states participating in those operations. These requirements should be carefully checked before authorizing or participating in a controlled delivery. Normally, this will be done directly between law enforcement authorities.

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Integration of a New “Electronic Evidence Module” Crimes involving electronic evidence pose unique challenges for international cooperation. Traditional criminal procedural laws typically contain provisions on the gathering and admissibility of evidence. However, evidence in electronic form such as computer data and electronic records can be altered easily. Thus, the gathering and handling of electronic evidence should guarantee its integrity, authenticity, and continuity during the entire time period between its seizure and its use in trial. Owing to the volatile nature of electronic evidence, international cooperation to combat cybercrime requires a timely response and the ability to request specialized investigative actions, including the preservation and production of data by private sector providers. Taking into account all pertinent developments in the field of international cooperation to conduct investigations involving electronic evidence and to combat cybercrime, including the provisions of the Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime (2001), the MLA Tool provides specific guidance to the user in relation to the following forms of cooperation: (1) expedited preservation of stored computer data; (2) searching or similarly ensuring access, seizing or similarly securing subscriber information,12 as well as data stored by means of a computer system located within the territory of the requested state, including data that have been preserved; and (3) real-time collection of traffic data.13 Technical Aspects In its final redeveloped form, the MLA Tool retains, and further improves, the basic function of its initial version. Thus, it guides practitioners step-by-step through the drafting process, using screen templates. The drafter selects drop-down menus in each template and fills in the various data fields provided. These fields can be easily adjusted to meet the legal and procedural requirements of the requesting state. The tool requires drafters to complete each screen sequentially to avoid incomplete requests and minimize risks of delay or refusal. The tool also allows the selection of multiple forms of assistance. Once the drafter finishes entering the data, the tool consolidates all data, and generates a draft request for final editing and approval. The added value of the new version of the tool, from a technical point of view, is that it supports all major operating platforms, including 32bit/64bit Microsoft Windows (XP+), 32bit/64bit Mac OSx, 32bit/64bit Linux, and iOS/Android/Windows phone. The tool does not require Internet connection to function. It is an HTML-based stand-alone simple application, features of which can be used by the drafter in isolated or secure environments. All requests written with the tool can be saved into a database and accessed at any later time. The user can save the draft request, share it with

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coworkers for further feedback and, upon finalization of the request, submit it for signature by the duly authorized officer. In the course of the drafting process, the MLA Tool provides a progress bar and green indicators when modules have been completed. In that way, the user can reliably keep track of whether the MLA request has been completed. In its final form, the MLA Tool will further contain a tutorial-containing guidance for the practitioner on its use through each stage of the drafting process. The tool will be linked to the UNODC Directories of Competent National Authorities (CNA Directories) to enable retrieving contact information of competent foreign authorities for use in the preparation of MLA requests. It will also be linked to the knowledge management portal run by UNODC and widely known as Sharing Electronic Resources and Laws on Crime (SHERLOC), in order to assist the practitioner in getting easy access to a variety of constantly updated information such as national guides, legal provisions applicable in foreign jurisdictions, and other supplementary resources such as manuals, checklists of legal requirements, and external links with custom templates and formats of other countries. In view of these linkages with other information-gathering tools and despite the offline function and practical use of the MLA Tool, it is recommended that practitioners should be able to utilize Internet connection when drafting the request with the assistance of the tool in order to make full use of the practical benefits offered by it. The tool will further enable the user to generate—on a personal basis— statistical data on completed MLA requests. The ability to keep records of such statistical data on an institutional basis within the central authority will depend on the organizational structure of the body and the available resources to ensure “connectivity” of statistics kept by the individuals involved in the drafting of the requests. The Way Forward The MLA Tool is to be used by practitioners working in central authorities of member states who are very often called to draft MLA requests under time pressure. The tool provides a guiding framework to accelerate the drafting process and, from this perspective, it is designed to cover and address practical needs in day-to-day casework. In addition, the tool is envisaged to support the drafting of requests in a form acceptable by the authorities of the requested state. This is considered as an important first step to facilitate the prompt execution of relevant requests. As of January 2017, the tool is at the last stage of its technical finalization. In the long run, it is envisaged that efforts will focus on making the tool widely accessible to practitioners. In this regard, the tool, similarly to its early version, will be made available free of charge and can be downloaded from the UNODC website. In addition, it is planned that the tool will be used in future training courses and technical assistance activities

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conducted by UNODC. The existing language versions of the early version will be updated to reflect the new structure and content of the tool. The success of the revised tool will depend to a large extent on effective training, awareness-raising and dissemination at the national, regional, and international levels and therefore UNODC stands ready to work closely with national authorities, as well as with partner organizations active in the field of international cooperation in criminal matters, to strengthen its significance and added value for capacity building purposes. NOTES 1. “Fostering International Cooperation in Criminal Matters: The UNODC Mutual Legal Assistance Request Writer Tool,” by Dimosthenis Chrysikos, © 2016, United Nations. The opinions expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the United Nations. 2. For more information see the working groups shown at http://www .unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CTOC/working-groups.html. 3. Various related documents are available at http://www.unodc.org/ unodc/en/treaties/CAC/em-internationalcooperation.html. 4. For an overview of the Mechanism for the Review of Implementation of the Convention against Corruption, see https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/trea ties/CAC/IRG.html. 5. As of January 13, 2017: 189 states parties to the 1988 Drug Trafficking Convention; 187 states parties to the Organized Crime Convention; and 181 states parties to the Convention against Corruption. 6. For an indicative list of types of assistance for which mutual legal assistance can be afforded, see the Organized Crime Convention (United Nations, 2000, Article 18, paragraph 3). 7. On the work and sessions of the Working Group, see https://www.unodc .org/unodc/en/treaties/CAC/working-group2.html. 8. For the transmittal of information without prior request, also known as “spontaneous transmission of information,” which may include both publicly and non-publicly available information, see the Organized Crime Convention (United Nations, 2000, Article 18, paragraph 4), and the Convention against Corruption (United Nations, 2003, Article 46, paragraphs 4 and 5). 9. Also foreseen in multilateral instruments such as the Organized Crime Convention (United Nations, 2000, Article 18, paragraph 18) and the Convention against Corruption (United Nations, 2003, Article 46, paragraph 18). 10. Also foreseen in the Organized Crime Convention (United Nations, 2000, Article 19) and the Convention against Corruption (United Nations, 2003, Article 49). See also the 1988 Drug Trafficking Convention (United Nations, 1988, Article 8, paragraph 1[c]). 11. Also foreseen in the Organized Crime Convention (United Nations, 2000, Article 20) and the Convention against Corruption (United Nations, 2003, Article 50). See also the 1988 Drug Trafficking Convention (United Nations, 1988, Article 11). 12. The term “subscriber information” means any information contained in the form of computer data or any other form that is held by a service provider, relating

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to subscribers of its services other than traffic or content data and by which the following can be established: the type of communication service used, the technical provisions taken thereto and the period of service; the subscriber’s identity, postal or geographic address, telephone and other access number, billing and payment information, available on the basis of the service agreement or arrangement; and any other information on the site of the installation of communication equipment, available on the basis of the service agreement or arrangement. See the Convention on Cybercrime (Council of Europe, 2001, Article 18, paragraph 3). 13. Any computer data relating to a communication by means of a computer system, generated by a computer system that formed a part in the chain of communication, indicating the communication’s origin, destination, route, time, date, size, duration, or type of underlying service. See also the Convention on Cybercrime (Council of Europe, 2001, Article 1[d] and Article 33, paragraph 2).

REFERENCES Council of Europe. (2001). Convention on cybercrime. Retrieved from https:// www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list/-/conventions/rms/0900001 680081561. United Nations. (1988). United Nations convention against illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, 1988. Retrieved from http://www.unodc .org/documents/commissions/CND/Int_Drug_Control_Conventions/ Ebook/The_International_Drug_Control_Conventions_E.pdf. United Nations. (1990/1997). Model treaty on extradition (including the 1997 amendment). Retrieved from https://www.unodc.org/tldb/pdf/Model-treatyextradition.pdf. United Nations. (1990/1998). Model treaty on mutual assistance in criminal matters (including the 1998 amendment). Retrieved from https://www.unodc .org/pdf/model_treaty_mutual_assistance_criminal_matters.pdf. United Nations. (2000). United Nations convention against transnational organized crime. Retrieved from http://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/UNTOC/Pub lications/TOC%20Convention/TOCebook-e.pdf. United Nations. (2003). Convention against corruption. Retrieved from http://www .unodc.org/documents/treaties/UNCAC/Publications/Convention/0850026_E.pdf. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. (2004). Model law on extradition. Retrieved from http://www.unodc.org/pdf/model_law_extradition.pdf. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. (2007). Model law on mutual assistance in criminal matters. Retrieved from http://www.unodc.org/pdf/legal_ advisory/Model%20Law%20on%20MLA%202007.pdf.

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CHAPTER 11

International Mutual Assistance to Ensure Safety and Security at Sports Competitions and Other Major Events Miriam Amoros Bas and Duccio Mazarese1

The organization of a major event may require preparing for extraordinary measures in order to ensure safety and security. The design and delivery of such a response is based on the available intelligence and information, with consideration to quantifiable constraints and the available capacity. The plan or set of complementary plans for the response should be designed to protect life and property at the event itself and in the surrounding community. In addition, the plan should include contingencies designed to counter emerging threats and respond to unexpected situations. Hosting worldwide major events has a long-standing tradition, but much has changed over the years. What were once major exhibitions of technological advancement are now a regular aspect of international life, providing a platform for the presentation of all kinds of global achievements, including athletic, religious, technological, cultural, and political. Events such as the Olympics, vibrant national festivals, and influential Group of Eight and World Trade Organization summits involve not only the hosting organization, nation or government, and participants but also the surrounding community and a global audience. The impact of global events has undoubtedly expanded. Consequently, the attention that we devote to ensuring safety and security at such events must develop with similar momentum.

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Major events offer high visibility and media coverage, public attention, a dense concentration of individuals and the presence of VIPs. These are circumstances, which may attract criminals and terrorists who want to exploit the situation. The increased vulnerability of major events has forced the governments and organizers to develop security and contingency plans and exchange of best practices at the international level. This has significantly contributed to allowing such major events to unfold under very safe and secure measures. However, new risks have emerged and may accompany each new event, and so the work on ongoing assessments for new security plans and updates of already existing plans must continue. In this regard, the United Nations Interregional Crime and Research Institute (UNICRI) provided pioneering work in launching the International Permanent Observatory on Major Events Security in 2003. The program, backed by Resolution 2006/28 of the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations (UN Economic and Social Council, 2006), is aimed at providing technical assistance to policy makers and practitioners in planning the security of major events, with a specific focus on coordination methodologies and standards. This chapter assesses the present magnitude of such events, using as the basis the International Permanent Observatory (IPO) Model. The chapter presents the tools and mechanism that have been developed internationally and the way in which they have been implemented. It also highlights the importance of mutual assistance and the exchange of information among different states and organizations in the elaboration and implementation of security plans. Finally, the chapter proposes the way forward to further enhance security at major events. INTRODUCTION The organization of major events worldwide has a long history. Nevertheless, even today there is no universally accepted definition of what is a “major event.” In general, they are viewed as an opportunity for the hosting and the neighboring countries, but at the same time as posing a threat that must be addressed in order to guarantee security for all participants involved. A discussion of security matters therefore requires defining, what is meant by a “major event.” As already noted, major events are windows of opportunity for hosting countries. The organization of such events is often accompanied by substantial increases in the financial, human, technological, and other resources that are available to national security planners. Thus, major events offer the availability of financial and other resources for the expansion of a modern and efficient security infrastructure, which allows for increased security, while requiring decreased levels of policing. Additionally, major events allow for the introduction of systems and practices, procurement of equipment and expertise, development of training and expansion of

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Figure 11.1 Identifying a Major Event (International Permanent Observatory. 2007. IPO Security Planning Model, p. 8. Turin, Italy. United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute. Retrieved from http://www.unicri.it/top ics/major_events_security/the_house/IPO_Model.pdf)

capacity in a manner that is innovative and meaningful. In this way, they provide a legacy of development in national security planning practices and structures, as well as new forms of thinking in response to emerging threats to national security, and the furtherance of international cooperation among security planners. To develop a specific definition of “major events,” the IPO programme launched by UNICRI engaged the assistance of international experts. To explore the concept, participating countries offered a considerable amount of detailed information about security measures that they had designed and employed, while hosting major events in the past. Overall, some 30 major events were taken into consideration. As shown in Figure 11.1, the participating countries enumerated some characteristics that identify major events, including the large presence of VIPs, extensive media coverage, large number of people in attendance, the risk of crowd disorders, and the historical or political significance of the event. Based on this information, the following common definition of a major event was proposed by the EU-SEC project (United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute, 2004–2008).2 A major event can be defined as a foreseeable event that should have at least one of the following characteristics: • Historical, political significance, or popularity • Large media coverage and/or international media attendance • Participation of citizens from different countries and/or possible target group • Participation of VIPs and/or dignitaries • High numbers of persons

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• Poses the potential of threats and therefore may require international cooperation and assistance

Other factors, however, should be considered when defining the elements of a major event, such as the cost and the economic impact that these events may have. In this sense, what emerged from the work that has been carried out is that planning security for a major event is a very complex exercise that requires a range of measures and activities beyond those normally encountered. Therefore, a common definition of a “major event” might include all events that, due to the quality or nature of persons or public they mobilize, or due to the time and place they occur, involve threats or risks that need to be documented in security plans and which require international cooperation for their implementation (International Permanent Observatory, 2005). On the other hand, it must be stressed that the risks and threats that major events face have changed over the years, as has the way to structure security programs. In the past, the security operations for major events were organized according to a decentralized model. The philosophy for this was based on the absence of a central or unified command and control system in which each law enforcement agency performed its tasks autonomously, with minimal coordination with other agencies. This was, for example, the case in the Atlanta model for the 1996 Summer Olympic Games. However, history has clearly shown how security at major events has not been sufficiently effective. Examples are the tragic attacks during the 1972 Olympics and the 1996 Olympics in Atlanta. Major events have drastically increased the risk of terrorist attacks. Also, other risks have arisen through the years. This has obliged countries and governments to move forward toward a more precise and unified security model that is backed by high levels of international and national cooperation among all stakeholders. In the light of the above, the following points in this chapter intend to show the importance of designing effective security plans for major events, and how to implement them in order to anticipate such risks and avoid future tragedies. THE UNICRI MAJOR EVENTS SECURITY PROGRAM: A REGIONAL APPROACH The UNICRI methodology to promote security at major events is based on the establishment of regional cooperation platforms to ensure better coordination of security planning and responses in security at major events, particularly in terms of more effective use of resources. Throughout UNICRI’s work, a common thread is the focus on activities at the regional level. This stems from the recognition that programs

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and projects implemented among countries with a similar social, political, and economic background and institutional framework can be carried out more effectively, and the legacy of success can be seen throughout the region. Based on this approach, the EU-SEC project was initiated by UNICRI in 2004, as the first regional platform for the coordination of security during major events in Europe. Subsequently, in 2007, UNICRI launched a similar regional platform for the coordination of major events security in the Americas. Established Regional Platforms for Major Events Security Having identified major events as an area in need of international coordination, UNICRI launched its global program on major events in 2002. This program has subsequently received express backing from the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations, in the form of Resolution 2006/28, in which the council invited UNICRI to continue and expand its work in this area and invited member states to request UNICRI’s assistance for the security planning of major events. This section offers an overview of the two regional platforms established by UNICRI, one in Europe and one in the Americas, with the respective products/outputs and the respective major achievements as mechanisms for mutual international assistance. EU-SEC and EU-SEC II EU-SEC, which involved 10 EU member states,3 was funded by the European Commission’s Sixth Framework Programme, DG Enterprise and Industry (see International Permanent Observatory, 2005). It was aimed at supporting and coordinating national research activities related to security during major events. EU-SEC pioneered a common methodology for the coordination of national research programs on security during major events at the European level. In addition, the project developed research on police ethics and public-private partnerships during the planning of major events, and identified thematic priorities for future research activities. Based on the success of the initial project, the follow-up project, EUSEC II, was launched in 2008, now involving 22 member states.4 EU-SEC II identified key areas of security planning for major events, which required further coordination. On this basis, many standards and priorities for future research were defined and/or elaborated (see United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute, 2011). The final output of EU-SEC II was the manual “Foundations of the European House of Major Events Security” and with this “the House Project” was brought into being.

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The House Project The House Project ran from March 2012 to February 2014 and was funded by the European Commission’s Seventh Framework Programme— DG Enterprise and Industry (see United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute, 2012–2014). It aimed at testing the standards, which had been outlined in EU-SEC II as common EU standards. As with the predecessor project, the House Project has seen an expansion in the consortium of 24 EU member states.5 The process of testing these standards as common EU standards involved the project partners attending the associated events and discussing the standards of the House Project in relation to accepted national practice. After a consultation process with the project partners, during which over 30 major events were considered, 8 major events were chosen. Importance was attached to achieving a balance between sports competitions, mass gatherings, and political summits, since the challenge presented to security planners by each of these events differs greatly. The association of an event to the project involved project partners meeting with the security planners of the chosen major events to present the House Project standards. The subsequent discussion/consultation process helped to determine gaps and/or overlaps between the House Project standards and those applied nationally. The dual goals of this process are on the one hand to assess the impact of the standards as common European planning and evaluation standards, and on the other hand, to assess their potential impact on the main EU security priorities (the Stockholm Program and the EU Internal Security Strategy). The results of the consultation with national security planners were recorded in order to form the basis of the final project reports. Based on these reports, a set of user guidelines is being drafted to complement the manual published at the end of EU-SEC II. These guidelines contain practical information for major events security planners and other security practitioners. A unique aspect of the House Project as a research project is that national end users from 24 EU member states are the main actors/researchers in the project. This method of policy development, which involves the security planners at all stages ensured that they and their countries have real ownership over the output.

IPO Americas The project was launched in 2007 by UNICRI and the Organization of American States (OAS) to improve the cooperation of OAS member states in the field of major events security. Within five years since its beginning, 30 governments out of the 34 OAS member states officially appointed a National Focal Point (NFP), which was responsible for representing them,

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facilitating access to relevant information and expertise at national level, and identifying possible needs of their countries within the framework of the project. Having initially been funded by the Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, IPO Americas has been funded since 2010 by the government of Canada. Its main objectives and achievements are (United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute, 2007): • The provision of training and advisory services to security planners in preparation of major events to be hosted in the Americas • Supporting the sharing of information and best practices among member states • Development of a Knowledge Management System (KMS) on major events security and a regional training manual • Definition of planning standards within the American subregions • Dissemination and adoption of best practices for public-private partnerships for security at major events • Enhancement of crime prevention capacity in the member states involved

A proliferation of major events in the region (the Pan American Games 2011, the 2013 Central American Games, the 2014 South American Games, the 2014 FIFA World Cup, and the 2016 Olympic Games), which attract worldwide audiences underlines the importance of achieving a common regional approach. THE IPO SECURITY PLANNING MODEL Introduction to the IPO Security Planning Model The IPO on security measures during major events was launched by UNICRI in 2003. IPO was the first worldwide mentoring service created specifically to enhance the capability of national authorities to maintain security during major events, to promote international cooperation in the field, and to bring together experts from national public authorities whose core business involves security. Within this program, UNICRI developed the IPO Security Planning Model, which offers a pragmatic and sensible planning framework that identifies, describes, and simplifies the main tools that policy makers and security planners have used to plan and implement security at major events in the past (United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute, 2007). It introduces the main planning considerations and explains why security planning will become an exceptional undertaking. It also comprehensively highlights the strategies, questions, linkages, and other challenges that security planners should consider. The IPO Model is available to public bodies responsible for, or otherwise involved in, planning the provision of security at a major event.

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Its proper functioning was addressed by UNICRI, grounded on international experience and best practice gathered and collated from different stakeholders. Although it has not been envisaged as a technical manual, it is considered a valid document to guide and support the management of major event security planning. The planning model is divided into six chapters. The first introduces UNICRI’s International Permanent Observatory Program and its remit to share best practice and strengthen international cooperation in major event security matters. The second chapter explores how to define a major event and introduces a list of steps that policy makers and security planners should consider at the complex earlier stages of planning. This chapter concludes by offering a model that conceptualizes these steps. The third, fourth, and fifth chapters describe the main components of this model. Chapter VI expands on how member states can obtain IPO advisory services from a comprehensive menu of options (United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute, 2007). Finally, it should be noted that the program was built up around three main considerations in the shape of a global security and counter terrorism programme. The first consideration was that planning and implementing security for major events is a challenging exercise that should not be underestimated. The scale and complexity of planning an appropriate response to diminish potential risks will be extremely challenging. The cost, in both financial and staffing terms, will be very large. The event may involve several venues, in one or more cities with a high population density, high levels of traffic, and a range of vulnerable targets. The major event will also bring disruption to “normal business,” will generate scrutiny and criticism from internal and external bodies, and will arouse significant pressure to satisfy the widest imaginable range of stakeholders. Moreover, large numbers of people and infrastructures will be exposed to different threats ranging from terrorism to hooliganism to natural disaster. The second consideration was that a major event often offers the finance and the availability of resources to expand infrastructure, introduce systems and practices, procure equipment and expertise, develop training, and expand capacity. All these elements help to instil more sustainable practices, ways of thinking, and longer-term security governance. In other words, the effective management of security at major events not only represents a crucial factor in the overall success of a world-class event but also creates opportunities for an innovative, meaningful, and lasting security governance legacy. The third consideration was that the knowledge and expertise necessary to successfully deal with security at a major event are not easily accessible and there is neither a blueprint nor an international security manual applicable to any kind of major event. Policies, strategies, and tactical

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operations need to be adapted to current threat levels, human resource capacity, and technology. The Structure of the IPO Security Planning Model Due to their complexity, major events are likely to demand the creation of an extraordinary and possibly temporary response. Existing structures and procedures may not be sufficient and may even require the creation of a new organizational set-up, the planning of a wide range of tactical options to address problems that may affect the course of the event, the involvement of new staff and logistics, the coordination and amalgamation of different forces, and other extraordinary efforts. Starting with a very basic schematic representation, the model includes three main components: a system that produces deliverables to address existing and potential risks (see Figure 11.2). The System The “system” is an entity/organization involving a group of people who are brought together for a common purpose. The system encompasses four main constituents: capacity, constraint, intelligence, and governance. As shown in Figure 11.3, the first three are defined as follows: i. Capacity can be defined as the human, physical, and technological resources that security planners have at their disposal. ii. Constraints can be defined as the quantifiable factors that restrict and regulate the extent of the capacity that can be applied. Constraints can include financial, time-related, legal, political, and other factors. iii. Intelligence describes the process of gathering and analyzing information through which security planners can establish and design measures to diminish the threats, vulnerabilities, and risks that have been identified.

Figure 11.2 Three Components of the IPO Security Planning Model (International Permanent Observatory. 2007. IPO Security Planning Model, p. 17. Turin, Italy. United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute. Retrieved from http://www.unicri.it/topics/major_events_security/the_house/IPO_Model.pdf)

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Figure 11.3 Three of the System Constituents (International Permanent Observatory. 2007. IPO Security Planning Model, p. 18. Turin, Italy. United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute. Retrieved from http://www.unicri .it/topics/major_events_security/the_house/IPO_Model.pdf)

Capacity, constraints, and intelligence represent the “ingredients of the recipe” that the system can bring together to create a product. The system, however, needs a “chef” and therefore the fourth key constituent for setting this strategic direction and delivering the product, that is, the security plan, is governance (see Figure 11.4). iv. Coordinating and selecting the best options available to produce deliverables in a timely and effective fashion. Governance is the heart of the organization that leads, plans, and implements effective, sensible, and pragmatic security measures for major events.

The Deliverables Deliverables make up the second component of the IPO Model (see Figure 11.5). They are the complementary plans and responses that the system designs and delivers to: • Save life, protect property, and prevent crime inside the designated secure area (inside) • Save life, protect property, and prevent crime outside the designated secure area (outside) • Be prepared in contingency planning terms

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Figure 11.4 The Role of Governance (International Permanent Observatory. 2007. IPO Security Planning Model, p. 18. Turin, Italy. United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute. Retrieved from http://www.unicri.it/top ics/major_events_security/the_house/IPO_Model.pdf)

INSIDE: Plans inside a designated secure area should principally aim to protect: • Participants: persons taking part in the event. These may include athletes, celebrities, and politicians. • Spectators: persons attending the event. • Security and non-security staff: people working at the event including representatives from public and private organisations and agencies involved in the preparation, staging and delivery of the major event. This category includes sponsors, journalists, and volunteers for instance.

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Figure 11.5 The Deliverables (International Permanent Observatory. 2007. IPO Security Planning Model, p. 20. Turin, Italy. United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute. Retrieved from http://www.unicri.it/topics/major_ events_security/the_house/IPO_Model.pdf)

OUTSIDE: Plans outside a designated secure area should principally aim to protect: • The community • The aforesaid participants, spectators, and staff when outside the designated secure area

Contingency plans should aim to both counter emerging threats and have prepared a response if unexpected situations arise. The Risks The third component of the IPO Security Planning Model is risk. Risk is the presence of any element that may adversely challenge the security plan(s). Risks may arise from:

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• Acts of terrorism • Public disorder incidents • Occurrence of crime • Acts designed to cause embarrassment such as media disclosures, single-issue demonstrations, and staff strikes • Accidents, emergencies, and disasters

In summary, to set up a proper major event security programme all these components must be taken into account. Planning and delivering security at a major event is a dynamic exercise in which strong leadership and effective management are required for optimal effectiveness. The process of planning and implementing security has an evolutionary and cyclical nature, characterised constantly by the formulation of detailed plans, the delivery of efficient solutions, the monitoring of day-to-day operations, and an ongoing review. As shown in Figure 11.6, at every stage in the process, security commanders should consider: • Analyzing all information and intelligence at their disposal to assess the risk • Their available capacity and quantifiable constraints • Identifying tactical options to diminish the assessed risk • Evaluating each tactical option to determine both advantages and disadvantages • Selecting the best tactical option(s), recording reasons for selecting these options, and reasons for rejecting others • Introducing effective mechanisms for regular review

Finally, the assimilation of the IPO Security Planning Model needs to be highlighted. Having broken down and examined the component parts of

Figure 11.6 Points to Consider (International Permanent Observatory. 2007. IPO Security Planning Model, p. 21. Turin, Italy. United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute. Retrieved from http://www.unicri.it/topics/ major_events_security/the_house/IPO_Model.pdf)

Figure 11.7 Assimilating the IPO Model (International Permanent Observatory. 2007. IPO Security Planning Model, p. 22. Turin, Italy. United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute. Retrieved from http://www.unicri.it/topics/ major_events_security/the_house/IPO_Model.pdf)

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the model (system, deliverables, and risks), and introduced the concept of ongoing review, it is now possible, as shown in Figure 11.7, to assimilate the IPO Model. It can now function as a guide for planners who, on the basis of available intelligence and information and working within quantifiable constraints and available capacity, want to develop a plan or set of complementary plans to effectively secure a major event. The Main Elements of the Planning of Security at Major Events The IPO Planning Model enumerates the main elements to be considered when planning the security of major events. These elements were identified precisely as a guide to help security planners in the development of an effective strategy. The first 12 constitute the backbone of the IPO Planning Model, as originally designed in 2007. However, during the implementation of the UNICRI Major Events Security Program, other important security elements arose and were included in the overall Planning Model structure. Leadership The appointment of a planning director, an individual with the leadership qualities, skills, and experience required for planning and implementing security of the major event, is extremely important. Command protocols or contracts can articulate exactly who has responsibility for planning and delivering what, where, and when. The way in which security responsibilities are divided up should be formalized in detail and agreed upon by the authority in charge of the security. All security agencies involved should properly understand the chain of command and their specific responsibilities. Planning Structure and Management The design of the planning structure is also important. The design process could commence with research on the policing of previous major events from a critical perspective. The research might include, for instance, the identification of best practice for policing major events and an analysis of tactics used by protesters. After that, the planning director may want to identify and appoint a very limited number of senior planning staff members to conduct an exploratory but thorough scoping exercise to determine, as best they can, the extent of the operation. This exercise should help establish a broad concept of operations to start to transform a “vision” into a meaningful, productive, and cost-effective planning structure. The team should seek to identify the main branches such as intelligence, venue security, traffic management, public order, logistics, human

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resources, command, and control. These branches will become elements of the ultimate master plan. Work within each branch could be supported by a working group. The leadership challenge is to ensure that these branches, and the twigs that will emerge from them, are properly cultivated, trained, pruned, and nurtured in order to ensure the growth is controlled to produce a tree that is of the right size, shape, form, appearance, and strength. Intelligence Inevitably, the structure will involve representation from a wide range of relevant agencies on local, national, and international levels, all meaningfully contributing to a comprehensive intelligence system for gathering, analyzing, and disseminating intelligence and information to help security planners and others (such as border control officials) in countering threats, vulnerabilities, and risks. The system includes threat assessment, vulnerability assessment, and risk assessment. Media and Public Relations (PR) Strategy The external provision of coordinated, accurate, and timely information is a very important element in any crime prevention or reduction strategy. It is essential to provide security-related information and public reassurance, as well as to keep the media informed. Media monitoring is a key element as is the contingency planning of media responses in the event of any major incident. With this aim, it is important to: • Design a public information strategy that provides the community, participants, and spectators with a range of security-related advice and information about items such as recommended routes, road closures, and access restrictions. • Offer public reassurance to explain to the community in simple terms why certain short-term restrictions may be necessary in order for it to be possible to deliver a safe and secure event for everyone involved. Several instruments can assist this awareness campaign, including television programs, information leaflets, and banners. • During the event, a robust media and PR strategy needs to be executed effectively. The basic premise of online and offline PR is about getting an engaging message in front of target customer groups.

Venue Security The next step is to design the security plan for the controlled venue area. The objectives of this step include:

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• Identifying and hardening the designated secure area. • Searching, sealing, securing, and keeping secure the area from any kinds of risks such as improvised explosive devices, firearms, CBRN materials, or other weapons of attack. • Public safety maintenance in order to protect life and property and deliver a safe, secure, and uninterrupted event. • Designing systems in order to prevent infiltration of the venue event by persons who are not entitled to be there, through a process of vetting, validation, and accreditation. • Access control for different categories of persons, including principles, delegates, media, participants, athletes, and spectators. • Designing additional security arrangements for designated categories of participants such as dignitaries and VIPs (dignitary/personal protection).

Border Control During the designated period of a major event, consideration could be given to strengthening routine border control activities in order to provide an early and effective intelligence-led response, prevent the entry of troublemaker people or prevent illegal activities. Traffic Management The main aims of this element are to: • Maintain and secure access routes to and from venues and other designated places for delegates, media, police resources and others, which includes the management of road closures and other tactics involving, for instance, the saturation and securing of critical and alternative routes. • Maintain and secure a viable road network throughout the security areas and beyond. • Design a public transportation system that is capable of handling expected volumes of people at given times and places in a safe and secure way. • Prepare contingency plans to deal with incidents that may occur on the national and local road network.

Nonevent and Event-Related Security At this stage, security planners should consider extending the security blanket outward from the designated secure venue site(s) and design a range of strategic and tactical options to further enhance the likelihood of meeting the key objectives for the security operation. Such plans should include appropriate measures to prevent crime and protect people and property. Possible targets include event-related sites such as hotels, sponsor

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villages, and media centers, and critical infrastructures such as nuclear and chemical industry and installations, utilities, communications, and key transportation links. The protection of soft targets such as shopping centers, tourist sites, and historical monuments should also be considered. Human Resources and Logistical Support Having identified operational requirements, security planners must consider allotting the necessary human, physical, and technological resources for the implementation of the security plan. The aims would include: • Supporting the strategic objectives of the plan with adequate personnel who are properly trained, equipped, and experienced in terms of the role they are expected to fulfill and comprehensively briefed in this regard prior to deployment. • Providing adequate logistical support in terms of matters such as catering, accommodation, and transport. • Enhancing the human aspects of the response with reliable equipment and technological solutions such as CCTV, sensors, detectors, and means of communications.

Consideration also should be given to plans for after the event in order to withdraw all personnel, equipment, and security measures and return to normal operations. Information Technology (IT) and Communication This step aims at establishing communication strategies capable of satisfying the needs of the policing operation. Objectives include: • Communication and IT design: establishing effective and secure radio, telephone, and other means of communications to all organizations and agencies involved in the security of the major event, and other technological and IT solutions to enhance or support the human and physical elements of the plan. • Communication and IT controls: ensuring that power supplies can be maintained, command centers and incident rooms are appropriately located, and that systems and IT security solutions are comprehensively tested prior to the event to ensure that everything is fit for the purpose. • Communication and IT procedures: establishing a clear framework of information flow procedures so that all actors involved will know who should inform whom of what and when. Consideration may also need to be given to the management of data produced by systems, including elements such as the CCTV product. • Communication and IT protection: designing and implementing plans to protect core communication infrastructures and preparing plans to maintain communications in case of emergency situations.

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Integration and Coordination The next step involves an ongoing process to confirm that all the different branches of planning are integrated, complementary, and coordinated. The aims of this step are to: • Test the integration, complementarity, and flexibility of plans and their effectiveness. • Test the competence of the individuals and teams. • Test safety and security procedures to ensure that they are aligned with standard operation procedures. • Test that equipment is fit for purpose against prevailing conditions.

Contingency Planning and Crisis Management The consequences of an incident caused by a terrorist attack, public disorder, natural disaster, accident, man-made emergencies, or any other factor could be catastrophic and, therefore, it is necessary to develop contingency plan for such occurrences. Contingency plans are designed to assist in activities for: • Saving and protecting life and property • Treating, rescuing, and transporting casualties • Containing the emergency and the casualties • Managing evacuation • Cancelling or interrupting the event • Safeguarding the environment • Maintaining critical services • Providing the media with information • Restoring normality as soon as possible • Ensuring crime scenes and evidence are preserved • Facilitating investigations and inquiries

Legacy Legacy appears as a key element for planning and implementing effective and pragmatic security measures. Indeed, by inculcating legacy into the planning of major events from the beginning, by creating a planning culture and climate that seeks to derive longer term, tangible, and meaningful benefits, by introducing an element of creativity and resourcefulness, by acknowledging and perhaps even rewarding good ideas and, most important, by remaining objective, professional, and pragmatic throughout, overall costs can be reduced and significant, long-term and sustainable benefits can be secured.

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Legacy benefits and rewards can be counted in much more than just simple financial terms, for instance, gaining and enhancing the trust, respect and confidence that the community has in the police. Also, there are tangible legacy benefits that come about through training staff, procuring equipment, and developing practice for security solutions and situations, both actual and contingency, that are either new or have not been experienced or addressed for some time, as a result of which the prevailing response is incomplete or redundant. Examples are the renovating of outdated accommodation instead of incurring the costs of renting temporary facilities, moving from the concept of multiskilled individual members of staff in order to produce a more widespread and resilient skill base, enhancing LAN, WAN, computer and telephony infrastructures, testing the personnel prior to their appointment as security planners, considering locating planning activities or carrying out training exercises in higher crime areas, or taking advantage of the major event community-based education programs, in order to introduce the longer-term, less event-oriented, and more general concepts of crime prevention, designing out crime, community involvement, and public safety. On the other hand, the impact on the environment of a security operation cannot, and should not, be ignored. There are many ways to ensure that the security plan is ecologically and environmentally suitable, such as by planting “defensive” shrubs, bushes, and trees in order to create cordons and “lines in the sand,” as opposed to the much more expensive temporary installations that could be classified as very environmentally unfriendly. Another example, for aerial surveillance, is the utilization of tethered blimps instead of helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft. Further examples are the management of rubbish, waste, and water effectively, or the careful monitoring of the health of staff and attendees in order to prevent the spread of disease. Communication Effective internal communication within and across organizations and agencies involved in the security of the major event is paramount and a key element in coordination. It allows authorities to disperse information, keep everyone up to date and help in terms of understanding what is expected in operational terms. Similarly external communication is very important, bearing in mind that major events attract a great deal of media attention. An effective external communication strategy has the potential to enhance public confidence and minimize potential harm to the reputation of the event security organizers. Public-Private Partnership When considering the nature and the scale of today’s major events and the threats that they face, a combined effort involving governments, civil

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society, and the private sector is essential in developing effective coordinated countermeasures. Action on the part of state and public authorities will often not be sufficient. Moreover, although the host state is primarily responsible for providing security and counterterrorism protection for the event, given its international character, other states have a responsibility to assist and support the provision of such security. The value of involving representatives from the private sector is increasingly being recognized. This, however, requires the alignment of private sector interests and its engagement in the development of counterterrorism strategies, along with the adoption of guidelines and mechanism to make such a form of partnership both possible and effective. The public-private partnership (PPP) development model proposed by UNICRI6 establishes 10 elements considered essential in establishing a PPP, with a focus on protecting vulnerable targets: • Determine the extent. Clarifying the scope of a PPP project will help identify an appropriate level of stakeholders to participate in the partnership. • Determine the sites in which the cooperation needs to take place. • Identify the stakeholders in order to define needs and priorities and to prevent duplication of efforts. • Build trust among all stakeholders to work effectively together. • Identify objects (protection of life, properties, customers, business, etc.). • Determine the decision-making process to consider the different preventive and response security strategies. • Agree on a communication strategy for the partnership. • Define appropriate threat or alert levels to determine what security measures should be taken as circumstances change. • Test and train to check the effectiveness of the developed model and measures. • Develop and implement the model.

Legislation on Major Events: Brief Overview As referred to earlier, major sports, political, and cultural events have become increasingly international, which has brought a corresponding need for greater levels of international law enforcement and security cooperation in order to ensure their smooth operation. Thus, having both international and national consolidated legislation and tools to manage the organization of major events and cooperation among all the agencies involved is vital (Statewatch, 2012). Within the European Union, this has been formalized since the late 1990s by numerous initiatives,7 including various “handbooks” that seek to provide guidelines and inspiration for law enforcement authorities (Council of the European Union, 2004, p. 4). These provide frameworks for law enforcement policy and practice during major events, with regard

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to general security preparations as well as more specialized counterterrorist and public order work. In addition, the Stockholm Program adopted by the European Council in December 2009, which provides a framework for EU action on the issues of citizenship, justice, security, asylum, immigration, and visa policy for the period 2010–2014 (Council of the European Union, 2009). In the program, there are also plans for a new European security architecture through the extension of cooperation in the areas of police, military, and secret services and measures in the area of border-crossing data exchange between state authorities and surveillance of the Internet. Finally, the Internal Security Strategy was adopted in 2010 (Council of the European Union, 2010) by the council to help drive Europe forward, bringing together existing activities, and setting out the principles and guidelines for future action. A set of guidelines published by the EU in 2011 makes up part of this work (Council of the European Union, 2011). All these initiatives are an attempt to encourage uniformity in the approach of authorities to securing major events—an effort that may lead to a high level of safety—and are part of a growing list of EU documents concerning security at large-scale events. Nonetheless, it must be recalled that the recommendations made in the guidelines are not binding upon any EU member states, and they are not obliged to make any use of them or of support available from EU institutions. The United Kingdom, for example, declined to ask for any EU support in its security preparations for the London Olympics. However, given that they have been debated amongst delegates of most of the member states, they can be taken to represent a consensus of the authorities toward how to approach major events. On the other hand, official decisions need to be taken at the national level. As major events may involve extraordinary decisions, additional legislation is often needed to support decisions that may have to be taken prior to or during an event. Thus, new legislation may be required to enable authorities to take decisions. It is possible to distinguish between the following types of legislation (United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute, 2005). First, special legislation may be needed for the organization and coordination of the major event. For instance, Utah created a new agency for the Salt Lake Games. This type of legislation specifies the division of tasks and responsibilities between public and private partners and also defines the mandate of public authorities. Second, there may be a need for temporary provisions that apply only to the extraordinary circumstances of the event. At Lillehammer, temporary provisions were taken that in effect closed the city and disrupted ordinary life. These provisions were applicable in designated periods before, during, and after the event. Third, special legal judicial arrangements may be necessary. This is often the case with major sporting events that may involve sports violence. An

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example concerns the legislation related to the organization and operation of summary courts, such as a system of penalties for different types of offences during the event or the use of summary proceedings to speed up the legal process, among others. And fourth, sites and equipment are usually licensed by competent authorities prior to the event. The aim of licensing is to ensure compliance with safety and security standards. The required legal framework at both the international and national level needs to be identified as early as possible, taking into account that the scope and detail of the legislation depends to a large extent on the legal provisions that already exist in the host country. Furthermore, the competent authorities should consider the fact that the necessary scope of the additional legislation could extend to a period after the end of the major event, since many supporters travel to the host country days prior to the start of the event and some supporters stay longer. Several legal topics may also need to be addressed by the competent authorities in the preparation for major events. Bearing in mind all kinds of threats that may endanger the security of major events, other international legislation and crime prevention strategies must be considered when defining the legal framework that will guide the organization of the event and its security measures. Likewise the different tools that have been adopted in the fight against terrorism such as the United Nations Global Counter Terrorism Strategy (Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force, 2006), the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (United Nations, 2005), and the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (United Nations, 2009). In terms of prevention, the Compendium of United Nations standards and norms in crime prevention and criminal justice is an essential tool that may help in identifying new strategies for facing either new or traditional threats (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2006). The Way Forward Considering the progress that has so far been achieved in security matters regarding major events, there is a considerable desire to finally convert the theoretical basis of research into a product that could offer concrete practical assistance to security planners. In this sense, the consortium of practitioners participating in UNICRI projects agreed on the way this vision could be realized, that is, through an electronic security planning tool that will offer in one place all the services provided by these projects. Over the years 2004–2013, member states contributed to the development, testing, and application of planning and evaluation standards for major event security. Therefore, the development of a web-based planning tool founded on the standards developed and tested so far, would be a very cost-effective and user-friendly practical support to their daily

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activities. Also, such a tool is perceived as the ideal platform to provide the benefit of the European collective experience in this field to relevant security practitioners, providing them with shared guidelines for integrated security planning and crime prevention at large and will be tested and improved in connection with selected major events taking place worldwide, allowing the tailoring of the specific contents to match the specific needs that have emerged in the specific context. In addition, a clear thread throughout the consultation process on the establishment of such a tool was that it should not be prescriptive but instead allow for security planners to pick and choose the relevant elements based on the peculiarities of the individual major event. In this sense, the structure of the electronic planning tool is based on an updated version of the IPO Security Planning Model that would allow security planners to choose between the elements and sub-elements, which are relevant to the security planning of each individual major event, in order to build up a plan that fits their necessities. Therefore, it allows a great deal of flexibility as the elements contained therein should be taken as soft/nonformal guidelines. The version of the structure presented by UNICRI looks as shown in Figure 11.8.8 This structure is useful for a theoretical understanding of the breakdown of the security planning for major events. For the electronic model itself, the real planning starts with the consideration of all the elements, which the electronic tool deals with on a multilayered basis. Furthermore, other elements of the tool that were considered by UNICRI are: • Its security: bearing in mind its electronic character, the cyber security of such a tool was seen as paramount. • Its funding: it was envisioned that in order to become a sustainable platform for coordination, the electronic tool could either be funded by regional organizations or by donations from participating member states. • Its supporting databases containing: • The Major Event Registry as a database where hosting authorities can register their major events in order to access the services of UNICRI. • The Special Technical Equipment Pool (STEP) specialist technical equipment where partners can share information to support planning and procurement decision-making processes. • Relevant legislation concerning or affecting the security planning procedure and practice at both the regional and national level. • PPP References databases that would contain a number of useful case studies of PPP at major events in order to guide security planners in the successful application of PPP as to their particular set of circumstances. • A roster of international experts in areas relevant to the planning of major security event.

Figure created by authors

Figure 11.8 Security Planning for a Major Event

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• A training/workshop database that will contain a calendar of all training events concerning security at major events and related fields on national, subregional, regional, and international bases. • The Knowledge Management System (KMS) or an online community of security planners who can interact with one another and share information on a purely optional basis. • Finally, the tool will offer different supporting activities such as training or conferences in order to improve and strengthen international cooperation among national authorities in research and planning on the security at major events.

Although the version presented by UNICRI received great support, there is still a long way to go, as it was widely suggested by the consortium of practitioners that a methodology needed to be developed soon to identify how to fill the gaps in the web version. In summary, the ideal way forward appears in the shape of the electronicbased security planning tool mentioned earlier, which security planners shall use as a repository of information to guide them in the strategic decision, while planning for a major event. While the law enforcement agencies will retain the responsibility for the implementation of the security plan, the electronic-based planning tool will offer them a collection of best practices, legislation, interagency, and public-private cooperation models, as well as databases that bring together global expertise, training, and technology available worldwide, in order to support them (to the extent considered by them to be appropriate) in the design of the security plan. NOTES 1. “International Mutual Assistance to Ensure Safety and Security at Sports Competitions and Other Major Events,” by Miriam Amoros Bas and Duccio Mazarese, © 2016, United Nations. The opinions expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the United Nations. 2. The EU-SEC project 2004–2008, called “Coordinating National Research Programmes on Security During Major Events in Europe,” was funded by the European Commission—DG Research and Technological Development and was aimed at supporting and coordinating national research activities related to security during major events and facilitating the implementation of the provisions contained in relevant EU tools. 3. The member states of EU-SEC were Austria, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. 4. The member states of EU-SEC II were Austria, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Malta, the Netherlands, Portugal, Romania, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. 5. Austria, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania Malta, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.

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6. In the framework of the UN Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force (CTITF), UNICRI’s Centre on Public Private Security Policies in Lisbon created the “Handbook to Assist the Establishment of Public-Private Partnerships to Protect Vulnerable Targets” (2010) in order to enhance and promote public-private partnerships to protect vulnerable targets around the world from terrorist attacks and other major security threats (available at www.unicri.it). 7. Joint Action of May 26, 1997, with regard to cooperation on law and order and security (OJ L 147, June 5, 1997); 2001 Security Handbook (Council “conclusions”) (doc. 12637/3/02 ENFOPOL 123 REV 3); 2004 Handbook for the cooperation between member states to avoid terrorist acts at the Olympic Games and comparable sporting events (Council Recommendation) (doc. 5744/1/04 ENFOPOL 14); “Football Council Decision” (OJ L 121, May 8, 2002) and “Football Handbook” (OJ C 22, January 24, 2002); Handbook for police and security authorities concerning cooperation at major events with an international dimension (doc. 10589/1/07 ENFOPOL 119 REV 1); Handbook with recommendations for international police cooperation and measures to prevent and control violence and disturbances in connection with football matches with an international dimension, in which at least one member states is involved, Annex to doc. 13119/06, October 16, 2006. 8. The model illustrated breaks down the security planning for a major event from left to right. It starts with the system (which contains “the capacity of the security planners” and the “governance or how the capacity is used”) and the deliverables (security outputs). The third level breaks capacity, governance, and security down into the elements, which they encompass. The elements highlighted in green are core values of the IPO Security Planning Model. Those highlighted in orange are Elements of the IPO Security Planning Model. Those in yellow are referred to by the IPO Security Planning Model and those in red are new elements, which will be added in the next edition of the IPO Security Planning Model.

REFERENCES Council of the European Union. (2004). Council recommendation concerning a handbook for the co-operation between member states to avoid terrorist acts at the Olympic games and other comparable sporting events. Retrieved from http://register .consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&f=ST%205744%202004%20REV%201. Council of the European Union. (2009). The Stockholm Programme—An open and secure Europe serving and protecting the citizens. Retrieved from https:// ec.europa.eu/anti-trafficking/sites/antitrafficking/files/the_stockholm_ programme_-_an_open_and_secure_europe_en_1.pdf. Council of the European Union. (2010). Draft internal security strategy for the European Union: Towards a European security model. Retrieved from http://reg ister.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&f=ST%207120%202010%20INIT. Council of the European Union. (2011). Protection of mass sports events with an international dimension from terrorist attacks. Retrieved from http://www .statewatch.org/news/2012/jan/eu-council-handbook-security-interna tional-events-16933-rev1–11.pdf. Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force. (2006). UN global counter-terrorism strategy. United Nations. Retrieved from https://www.un.org/counterter rorism/ctitf/un-global-counter-terrorism-strategy.

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International Permanent Observatory. (2005). Security of major events—Toolkit for policymakers and security planners. Turin, Italy: United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute. International Permanent Observatory. (2007). IPO security planning model. Retrieved from http://www.unicri.it/topics/major_events_security/the_ house/IPO_Model.pdf. Statewatch. (2012). Security of the spectacle: The EU’s guidelines for security at major events. Retrieved from http://www.statewatch.org/analyses/no-207-majorevents-public-order.pdf. UN Economic and Social Council. (2006). International permanent observatory on security measures during major events: Resolution 2006/28. Retrieved from http://www.un.org/en/ecosoc/docs/2006/resolution%202006–28.pdf. United Nations. (2005). International convention for the suppression of acts of nuclear terrorism. Retrieved from https://treaties.un.org/doc/db/Terrorism/en glish-18-15.pdf. United Nations. (2009). International convention for the suppression of the financing of terrorism. Retrieved from http://legal.un.org/avl/pdf/ha/icsft/icsft_ e.pdf. United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute. (2004–2008). Coordinating national research programmes on security during major events in Europe. Major events security. Retrieved from http://www.unicri .it/topics/major_events_security/eu_sec/. United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute. (2005). Security of major events—Toolkit for policymakers and security planners. IPO Americas. Retrieved from http://web.oas.org/ipoamericas/ EN/Pages/KMS/Legislations-and-Tools/ToolsMES_IntOrg-Detail1 .aspx?CODE=UNICRI&nId=679#.WA5wB3kzWpp. United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute. (2007). IPO Americas. Major events security. Retrieved from http://unicri.it/topics/ major_events_security/ipo_americas/. United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute. (2011). Foundations of the European house of major events security: A manual for the international coordination of major events security research in Europe. Turin, Italy: UNICRI. United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute. (2012–2014). Enhancing European coordination for national research programmes in the area of security at major events—The House. Major events security. Retrieved from http://unicri.it/topics/major_events_security/the_house/. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. (2006). Compendium of United Nations standards and norms in crime prevention and criminal justice. Retrieved from http://www.unodc.org/pdf/compendium/compendium_2006.pdf.

CHAPTER 12

Using Big Data Analytics to Reinforce Security Francesca Bosco, Francesco Marelli, and Jayant Sangwan1

In the past decade, the variety, volume, and velocity at which data are generated have increased remarkably. Today, an extremely large quantity of data are produced in real time or near real time from different sources— such as social media, cloud-sharing, mobile applications, and so forth. Data are also regularly collected through a number of sensor technologies that are embedded in different devices and is stored in a variety of databases covering areas such as environment, economics, medical, and social statistics. This has resulted in the availability of huge amount of data. According to some estimates, by 2020, the digital data available in the world would amount to 44 Zettabytes (i.e., 44 followed by 21 zeros). This phenomenon, where such large quantity of data are available, has come to be referred to as Big Data. In parallel, on account of technological advancements, the process of examining large data sets containing a variety of data types has also improved. Increased computational power along with the diversification of data analysis has enabled experts to visualize the huge amount of data in innovative ways, leading to the revelation of useful patterns that could have otherwise remained hidden. This process is referred to as Big Data Analytics. Big Data Analytics can be done with the software tools commonly used as a part of advanced analytics disciplines such as predictive analytics and data mining. But traditional data warehouses may not be able to handle the processing demands posed by Big Data. As a result, a new class of Big Data technology has emerged and is being used in many Big Data Analytics environments. There are various companies developing commercial

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products, but many Big Data open source efforts, such as HADOOP, Cassandra, and Lucene are also being promoted. The International Data Corporation (IDC) describes Big Data technologies as “a new generation of technologies and architectures, designed to economically extract value from very large volumes of a wide variety of data, by enabling high-velocity capture, discovery, and/or analysis” (Gantz & Reinsel, 2011, p. 6). Big Data is not something new but derives from a long evolution of the capabilities of data analysis using computer resources. This chapter seeks to understand how “Big Data” and “Big Data Analytics” can be leveraged to improve the security of individuals and the society at large. With this objective, the chapter will try to inquire how Big Data Analytics can help address the problems faced by policy makers and experts in key security areas. The chapter will also consider the security implications related to the use of Big Data Analytics, offering some thoughts about future challenges and actions. However, it must be clarified at the very outset that this chapter is not intended to provide authoritative definitions of the various terms used herein. The aim of the chapter is to provide the readers with an overview of the topic and facilitate a better understanding about the possibilities and limitations of using Big Data Analytics in the field of security. In this context, before proceeding to discuss the usage of Big Data Analytics in the different areas of security, the first part of the chapter will provide an outline that would help the readers appreciate the main differences between Big Data Analytics and Classical Data Analysis and place them on a more solid footing as regard the aspects discussed later in the chapter. BIG DATA AND BIG DATA ANALYTICS Collection of data, its analysis, and usage for the betterment of sciences, industry, and society are not new. The mature discipline of statistics has been in use since the 18th century and has helped solve problems in the industrial, scientific, and social fields. One of the examples frequently cited to indicate the early usage of data analysis is the work of Dr. John Snow who, in the 1800s, mapped the cholera clusters in London to point out that the disease was germ based. Another example, also from the 1800s, is the use of data analysis by Henry Furnese who was a banker who collected and used data in a structured manner in order to gain an edge over his competitors in business. However, the traditional form of data analysis has always involved making deductions about the behavior and patterns of a large group by studying the data from a smaller manageable subset of this large group. For example, in statistics, usually samples from a large group are collected at random and then deductions about the behaviors and patterns of the

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larger group are made after studying the small amount of randomly collected samples. It would not be wrong to say that the traditional methods of data analysis, though very helpful, were the products of the technological constraints of their times, as there were limited resources to collect, store, and process data. Overtime, with the advent of new technologies such as computers, Internet, search engines, powerful handheld devices and sensors, things have changed drastically. These technologies enable people to upload information and facilitate collection of data at an unprecedented scale. There is no longer a need to confine data collection to a smaller subset of a larger group, since a lot more information about the larger group is now available through a variety of different means. Additionally, information that hitherto before could not be converted into data can now also be converted into usable data sets, for example, emotions and thoughts expressed on social media, through words or through “emoticons” can very easily be converted into usable data. Similarly, professional networks can also be converted into data by online services related to employment and jobs. However, it must be noted that unlike the conventional means of data analysis, the data available through the present technologies is not precise; it is unstructured and can be unreliable. But data scientists believe that given the vast amount of data available, its scale can compensate for its messiness and result in accurate analysis. These developments have resulted in a change of perspective in different fields, leading people to rethink how data can be used. Big Data Analytics is thus becoming an important field that is helping people working in different sectors to optimize their work and results. A recent report prepared by American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) in conjunction with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute describes Big Data Analytics as “a process in which knowledge is extracted from data using non-trivial tools developed from mathematics and high-performance computing or very large data processing clusters. Analytic technologies include data integration, data mining, data fusion, image and speech recognition, natural language processing, machine learning, social media analysis, and Bayesian analysis” (American Association for the Advancement of Science, 2014, p. 22). Different types of data analytic technologies and ways they can be used with Big Data can be described as follows (American Association for the Advancement of Science, 2014, p. 22, used by permission): • Data Mining • Identify relationships, but not causality, among information. • Mathematics, computer science, AI, and machine learning.

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• Examples: classification algorithms; clustering algorithms; regression algorithms; association tools; anomaly-detection algorithms; summarization tools. • Data Fusion • Integrate heterogeneous data sets. • Requires systems to communicate and exchange data. • Examples: sensor networks; video/image processing; robotics and intelligent systems. • Data Integration • Broadly combine data repositories and keep a larger set of information. • Image and Speech Recognition • Extract information from large amounts of images, videos, and recorded or broadcast speech. • Examples: scene extractions; facial-recognition technologies; automated speech recognition. • Natural Language Processing • Understand natural human language of input data. • Machine Learning • Learn from input data. • Bayesian Analysis • Combine information about a population parameter with information contained in a sample. • Social-Network Analysis • Extract information from interconnecting units with the assumption that their relationships are important and that the units do not behave autonomously. • Use different technologies, such as clustering association and data fusion.

Big Data Analytics has found diverse application in different fields, from business to basic services management at national and transnational level. For example, the retail industry is using Big Data Analytics to optimize their staffing, preventing fraud, and conducting timely analysis of their inventories. Similarly, the manufacturing industry uses Big Data Analytics to enhance their supply chains and maximize productivity. Transportation and delivery services use it to save fuel and time in travel arrangements by discovering best possible routes in real time, based on traffic flows.

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The scientific community also relies on Big Data Analytics to make important scientific discoveries. The European Organization for Nuclear Research (CERN) relies heavily on Big Data Analytics to study the data collected through the collision of fundamental particles that constitute matter. Also, in some countries, Big Data Analytics is being used by the governments for the purposes of improving health care and study food-related diseases. Some cities are also using it to better manage the flow of people and traffic to avoid peak hour rushes and jams. Although still in limited use, Big Data Analytics is also opening new frontiers in the area of security, the European Union Agency for Network and Information Security (ENISA) indicates that security is one of the most promising domains for the application of Big Data Analytics. They identify the most promising domains of applications for Big Data as being (Naydenov et al., 2015, p. 10): • Security information and event management for many domains (cloud infrastructure, network security, IT infrastructures, Internet security, data centers, etc.) • Financial transaction monitoring (to reduce risk, analyze fraud patterns, identify rogue traders, etc.) • Scientific analytics of large volume of data applications (bioinformatics, geodata, etc.) • Analytics for cyber security (monitoring of spam, botnets, phishing attacks, threat model validation, etc.) • Sales and marketing (CRM, product recommendation, segmentation of customers, etc.) • Industrial plants and control systems-related tasks based on sensor data characterizing behavior and usage (grid, electrical plants, transport systems, etc.) • Web analytic (e-commerce, etc.)

The next section will look into some of the solutions that emerging technologies such as Big Data Analytics can offer in order to reinforce security. The chapter will try to explore both existing practices as well as any future possibilities.

THE USE OF BIG DATA ANALYTICS TO IMPROVE SECURITY: AN OVERVIEW OF DIFFERENT PRACTICES The use of Big Data Analytics in the area of national and international security is growing slowly but firmly. An area where police and security agencies are already gaining advantage is the monitoring of organized crime and terrorism. A good example is the monitoring of foreign

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terrorist fighters, who are violent extremists traveling to places such as Syria and Iraq to join and fight alongside the Islamic State of Iraq and AlSham (ISIS). As is well known, members of ISIS largely use social media to publicize their cause (including the release of violent video clips of terrorist attacks and beheadings) and radicalize and indoctrinate new followers (which often happens through Internet). These data uploaded on various forums all over the world, together with other data such as photographic imagery produced by drones and other sophisticated tools, offers a very large amount of information to the intelligence agencies. This information is categorized either as Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) (i.e., information available from open media and academic sources, including Facebook, Twitter, Local news, and other Internet sources) or as Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) (i.e., the communication intelligence, the electronic intelligence, and the telemetry intelligence). Through the analysis of this data, intelligence agencies of different countries are able to track foreign terrorist fighters who go to Syria and Iraq and monitor their actions, especially when they return home. The analysis of social media websites such as Twitter seems to be very useful in this process. According to a recent report of the Brookings Institution within the Project on U.S. Relations with the Islamic World from September through December 2014, at least 46,000 Twitter accounts were used by ISIS supporters (Berger & Morgan, 2015). This and other similar studies suggest that the analysis of data from social media can help understand the nature of support for ISIS and even develop algorithms to classify users as pro or anti-ISIS. Another area where Big Data Analytics can offer better solutions is international criminal justice. For example, in cases where an international crime (such as genocide) occurs, analysis of data produced by mobile phones and social media may help reveal facts that can facilitate the prosecution in building their case against the perpetrators of such crimes. Facts such as—the mass movement of people, the various routes taken to escape the atrocity, and the number of people killed or injured during such attacks, if revealed through Big Data Analytics, can be very helpful in the trial. This can prove to be particularly beneficial in the context of the limitations within which the prosecutors of such crimes have to function. Often the investigation of such crimes is dependent on the assistance of the local authorities, who may not be very supportive due to various political considerations. Added to this, are the considerations for the safety and security of persons who are used as witnesses during the trials of such crimes. Reliance on technological solutions offered by Big Data Analytics can help address these limitations and it can be extremely helpful as an investigation resource. Beyond the investigation of international crimes, Big Data Analytics can also find its use in domestic and transnational criminal investigations.

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It is widely known that the combination of the time taken to undertake an investigation, the volume of data to be analyzed, and the number of cases to be processed, is increasing significantly, resulting in an ever-growing backlog of investigations and mounting costs. Investigations of domestic crimes (i.e., crimes committed within the border of one country) and transnational crimes (i.e., crimes committed across the borders of several countries) can also profit from sophisticated analysis of different data sets, such as social network structures and data on people’s movement. However, it must be acknowledged that the usage of Big Data Analytics for such purposes would require that some of the specific challenges, such as—analyzing vast amounts of data in a timely manner, while preserving the forensic principles in order for the results to be capable for being presented in a court of law, should first be overcome. All these examples, however, are not “big data” in its full extent. If we consider the “three Vs” (variety, volume, and velocity), the monitoring of crime and terrorism would involve maximum two “Vs” (variety and volume). A more challenging use of Big Data is represented by attempts to predict and anticipate crimes. The main idea behind this is that the police collect large amounts of data on crimes that present elements of regularity, for example, crimes like burglary, street violence, theft from vehicles, and anti-social behavior. These data are usually stored in police databases as structured data (i.e., crime reports, DNA profiles, personal details of arrested or charged individuals) and unstructured data (i.e., police and witness statements). The analysis of this Big Data can help police to clearly identify these elements of regularity and predict where future crimes are likely to happen. An example of this technique can be found in the software PredPol (www.predpol.com), developed originally by UCLA and Santa Clara University researchers in close collaboration with the Los Angeles and Santa Cruz Police Departments. The main idea behind the software is to inform law enforcement agencies about the places where and the times when certain crimes are most likely to occur. Using an algorithm based on criminal behavior patterns, PredPol visualizes on detailed maps (depicted in 500 feet by 500 feet boxes) the areas where the probability for the occurrence of a crime is relatively more and, in this way, provides guidance on where and when to patrol. Technologies similar to PredPol have been used by several police forces in the United States and the United Kingdom with apparently positive results. The Los Angeles Police Department’s Foothill Division saw a 20 percent drop in predicted crimes year over year from January 2013 to January 2014 and experienced a day without crime on February 13, 2014. Another positive experience was witnessed by the Reading Police Department in Pennsylvania. After introducing PredPol in October 2013, the Reading

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Police Department claimed that burglaries have dropped by 23 percent, despite reductions in the force (City of Reading, 2014). West Yorkshire Police have also introduced their own predictive policing model (Operations OPTIMAL) for the reduction of burglaries in the northwestern part of Leeds in 2012 and, after four years, the recorded Burglary Dwelling offences dropped by 53 percent. Another area where Big Data Analytics may be utilized to its full extent is its use to detect financial crimes. One example is the tax agency of the United Kingdom (HM Revenue & Customs), which has invested massively in Big Data technology to tackle fraud and evasion. They have created what is referred to as Connect, a strategic risking tool that crossmatches over one billion internal data and third-party data items to find connections and uncover hidden relationships across organizations, customers, and their associated data links. According to their designers, the advantage of Connect is that it can quickly analyze billions of units of data (including all information about all taxpayers) and help statisticians to produce risk assessments and target profiles (Capgemini, 2012). Similarly, the credit card processing company, Visa, has announced the introduction of a new analytics engine and 16 different models to detect credit card fraud (Rosenbush, 2013). Another area that can benefit from Big Data Analytics is strategic planning. A good example to highlight this is the project Early Pursuit against Organized Crime Using Environmental Scanning, the Law and Intelligence Systems (ePoolice, https://www.epoolice.eu), which is funded by the European Commission under the Seventh Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development (FP7). ePOOLICE is a prototype of an environmental scanning system to provide a systematic overview of the surrounding environment to better assess and anticipate an emerging crime, by monitoring the environment and capturing in real-time relevant information present in heterogeneous sources, including law enforcement analysis reports, governmental information, web, social media, news, academia, nongovernmental and international organizations, and subject matter experts. Monitoring and predicting crime, detecting financial crime, and optimizing police resources are impressive achievements, but this is nothing compared to what Big Data Analytics can bring in the near future. Security agencies can potentially use Big Data Analytics not only to monitor but also to react effectively in real time. A good example can be the security during major events. The protection of thousands of people gathered to attend a sport event, a rock concert, or a political rally is not an easy task, especially when the event can be the target of a terrorist group or when a natural disaster, such as earthquake, occurs. During the major events, a key resource for the agencies responsible for the security is to know where people are. Big Data Analytics can offer interesting solutions in this regard. Smartphones can record the location of

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users and, by aggregating all information, the agency responsible for the security of the major event can have an accurate idea of how many people are attending and where they are located at any moment. In case of emergency, this information can be essential to take decisions as well as inform people what to do (i.e., which exit to use, where to go). There are police forces that are already exploring this possibility. For example, the City of London Police and the London School of Economics have developed Socionical Crowd Sourcing app (http://connectedcops .net/tag/socionical-crowd-source/) that offers real-time information to users about the police such as maps that indicates services (police stations, tube stations, hospitals etc.) or instructs how to reach the nearest police station. When users download and opt-in the Socionical Crowd Sourcing app, the police can trace back the position of users within a certain geographical area. In this way, this software can help security experts to study crowd dynamics, analyze their movements following a major disaster, and contact them through specific messages to better coordinate emergency plans. Big Data Analytics could also help security agencies, in particular first responders, to have accurate information in case of incidents or accidents related to chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear substances (CBRN). By aggregating data from mobile applications, crowdsourcing, cloud-sharing with reports from social media, news websites, and public health officials, security experts can get specific information about the nature of the risk (which CBRN agent has been released), the movement of potential victims and the consequent health risks posed by these movements. For example, HealthMap (http://www.healthmap.org/en/) is an infectious disease surveillance tool that uses Big Data Analytics, it identified the Ebola outbreak in 2014 before the official announcement of the epidemic by the World Health Organization (Associated Press, 2014b). Computer bots were able to give early warning of Ebola outbreak (Associated Press, 2014a). Big Data Analytics can also change radically the conception of research and analysis on crime. Current academic research on crime is often conducted with static data. Scholars collect and store data (using often Excel or similar tools) and then analyze them trying to identify patterns and trends. Big Data Analytics can completely modify this. Scholars can perform research and analysis on dynamic and 24/7 public data coming in real time from different sources—data that are constantly provided in parallel by different sources. This is opening unprecedented possibilities to extrapolate knowledge from Big Data. Complex algorithms can help us to better understand the interconnection between different risks by juxtaposing state security with economics, health, food, and social and environmental needs. They could help us to untangle the chains of causation of risks and predict the long-term consequences of policy decisions. As Cukier and Mayer-Schoenberger (2013) suggest, future research will be

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not about the cause of things but to find correlations between things that will enhance our capacity to predict future dynamics and events. What will be the next frontier? A possible answer is the convergence between Artificial Intelligence (AI) and Big Data Analytics. For the moment, AI is considered to be just machines mimicking human behavior. However, AI is growing at a very fast rate; experts believe that in a period of about 20–30 years, it will be possible to design autonomous AI. This means that machines will be able to perform specific intellectual tasks that are presently being done by human beings, but they will be better as they will not get tired and will not have to sleep. With the convergence of AI with Big Data Analytics, machines could potentially also provide security services with a larger degree of independence from human beings. The “technical ingredients” are already in front of our eyes: facial recognition technology, which is presently being experimented with to study what attracts the attention of costumers looking at windows of shops, could be used to sift through faces in large crowds; image, audio, and thermal sensors could help more accurately and autonomously detect presence of harmful devices; tools to monitor movements of people (i.e., swipe card entry system, CCTV camera, GPS locators) including when they drive cars (think about Google Map System that uses smartphones to read the speed of positions of millions of cars and, therefore, determine traffic conditions) and many others could help better guide people out of a disaster struck area. If all these technological tools will be assembled together with an autonomous artificial brain, “machines” will be potentially able to replace humans in offering many security services and solutions. This is just the beginning of the revolution. The next session will try to understand what will be the future security implications of these revolutionary changes. THE SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF BIG DATA ANALYTICS So far, we have seen the huge potential that Big Data Analytics holds for the future. Yet, it is not easy to realize these benefits and some challenges ought to be overcome before Big Data Analytics can help in reinforcing security. The collection, storage, and the extrapolation of knowledge from the “four Vs” of Big Data (volume, variety, veracity, and velocity) is a complex and problematic task. When Big Data Analytics reach the volume of petabyte, experts need large-scale resources like supercomputers, largescale experimental facilities, and very complex systems that store and harmonize different structured and unstructured data. In other words, the effective use of Big Data Analytics is very complex and, more important, very expensive. This brings us to our first consideration: who will have sufficient knowledge and resources to use Big Data Analytics to secure citizens? Who will

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own and control Big Data? The answer is very easy: it will not be the citizens and consumers. We as citizens or consumers are progressively losing control of our own data. With the arrival of cloud computing, the data stored on our computers is becoming less by the day, while the data stored on external servers owned by different companies is on the rise. Moreover, we have little if no control at all over the computing environment, when we use devices, such as smartphones, smart televisions, tablets, Kindle, and Google. So, if it is not us, who could control Big Data to protect our societies? With the exceptions of a few governments that can invest large funds and human resources on security and defence, the main candidate for this job are private companies and corporations. However, this is not something new, considering that governments in recent times have more regularly been relying on the assistance of non-state organizations for the purposes of dispensing services in key areas such as policing, justice system, social security, and armed forces. Security is no longer a monopoly of “traditional security agencies” but rather security is achieved through involvement of relevant stakeholders from various disciplines—including science and security communities, international organizations, industry, and civil society. Yet, the issue of Big Data Analytics brings us to a second consideration: what if the security agencies will abuse the power coming from Big Data Analytics? What is it that security agencies will use to spy on citizens and try to change their social behaviors? Experts like Bruce Schneier (2015) are warning us about this risk. We are entering in what he describes as “mass surveillance society,” whose main peculiarity is that we are cooperating to its creation by constantly producing and sending personal information through our mobile phones (including our location), online purchases, Internet navigation, online chats with friends, and so on. The problem is that the government (or the agencies responsible for security) can use this information to check our social, religious, or political behavior, that is, our participation to an anti-government demonstration or a religious event. This can be a powerful weapon for intimidation and social control. The case of the contractor Edward Snowden’s leaks about the National Security Agency’s surveillance activities clearly shows the risk of violating people’s privacy and rights. The leaks from Snowden made the relationship between governments and the technological community of Silicon Valley even more complex. To ensure global customer expectations of strict privacy, companies such as Apple and Facebook have had to encrypt the data of their customers (Harman, 2015). But private companies may themselves risk abusing the power they hold. Schneier (2015) warns us that today corporations use mass surveillance to personalize advertisements, profiting from our data without our knowledge and consent. Big Data Analytics itself, like all technology, is ethically neutral, but the use of data is not. Hence, it is legitimate to ask

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what can happen if these corporations will have a bigger role in the security field. The issue of the abuse of power brings us to a third consideration: what if Big Data Analytics is misused by organized crime or criminal minds? We know that terrorists are already using open source data to organize terrorist attacks. For example, the terrorist attack in Mumbai in 2007 relied on technologies such as Google Earth as well as real-time news and social media feeds in order to maximize damage at key locations and avoid being caught by the police. But the security implication of the misuse of Big Data can be much larger when we look at organized crime and what they can do to generate illegal benefits from Big Data. Let’s take the example of health care records. In a few countries, starting from the United States, health care records have been stored electronically with the aim to offer patients the best coordinated service. This is a real big source of information. However, since 2009, “more than 900 major breaches of protected health information have occurred affecting an estimated 30.1 million people and costing the health care industry about $5.6 billion each year.” In an example of a recent data breach from August 2014, nonmedical patient data from 4.5 million individuals was stolen when the network of the second-largest for-profit health system in the United States was attacked (American Association for the Advancement of Science, 2014, p. 20). The list of risk scenarios can be very long when we speculate about theft and use of Big Data Analytics by criminals: cyber intrusion to national resources, spying and blackmailing citizens, or even the design of biological weapons derived from the integration and analysis of Big Data in the life sciences. Big Data systems are complex and heterogeneous and the integration of different technologies introduces new security issues that must be properly addressed. According to the European Union Agency for Network and Information Security (2015), Big Data is considered as a valuable asset and as such is being targeted by cyber attacks. This is a very gloomy picture. But we should also consider a fourth possible security implication: what if Big Data Analytics are misused by the computer or, better say, by the autonomous AI? The idea of the machine that takes control over human species has been described by science fiction for many years (think about the movie 2001: A Space Odyssey, in which the supercomputer HAL 9000 is able to collect, analyze, and process big data, gets “crazy” and tries to kill the crew of the spacecraft). Yet, this risk now seems much more credible. Recently, scientists like Stephen Hawking or extremely innovative managers like Bill Gates of Microsoft and Elon Musk (CEO of Tesla Motors) have openly expressed their concern over the potential dangers of artificial AI, fearing that it could even cause the end of human race. We are still far (but not very) from the creation of autonomous AI. The more we get closer to this reality, the better we should think about security implications.

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CONCLUSIONS Big Data Analytics offers complex solutions to solve extremely complex problems. However, history teaches us that social development and technological solutions (developed to address big problems or risks) can also pose unforeseen challenges, sometimes even bigger than the initial problems. To be sure that Big Data Analytics become an opportunity to advance human society and not a risk, some challenges must be addressed. The first challenge is to clearly understand and define what benefits and risks Big Data Analytics can bring. To do so, it would be important to find the way to engage the science and technology communities in evaluating all security aspects related to the use of Big Data Analytics. Considering the essential role played by private companies, this task could be better coordinated among private, public, government, and international organizations. The second challenge is to clarify the role of the providers of Big Data Analytics in the area of security. Any decision in this regard should start from the consideration that modern states function under the principle that security is a right of the citizen, not a commodity. The state legitimacy, its reason to exist, is connected to its ability to protect its citizens. Big Data Analytics may accelerate the process that see an increasing role of the private sector (and the decreasing role of the state) in the citizens’ protection, but this may also change the constitutional nature of the state, especially if security will be considered by its providers as a business. A third challenge is the regulation of Big Data Analytics. This is a slippery issue because it implies legitimate concern about freedom of research and industry competitiveness. To avoid the trap of these criticisms, it would be helpful to explore ways to better manage technological resources at national and international level and even study a system through which Big Data can be best orchestrated to guide our responses to future security risks. NOTE 1. “Using Big Data Analytics to Reinforce Security,” by Francesca Bosco, Francesco Marelli, and Jayant Sangwan, © 2016, United Nations. Disclaimer: The views expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the United Nations or the organizations with which the authors are affiliated. The designation employed and presentation of the material in this publication do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the Secretariat of the United Nations concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area of its authorities, or concerning the delimitations of its frontiers or boundaries.

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REFERENCES American Association for the Advancement of Science. (2014). National and transnational security implications of big data in the life sciences. In conjunction with Federal Bureau of Investigation and the United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute. Retrieved from https://mcmprodaaas.s3.amazonaws .com/s3fs-public/AAAS-FBI-UNICRI_Big_Data_Report_111014.pdf. Associated Press. (2014a, August 11). Computer bot gave early warning of Ebola outbreak. CBS News. Retrieved from http://www.cbsnews.com/news/ computer-bot-gave-early-warning-of-ebola-outbreak/. Associated Press. (2014b, August 10). HealthMap software flagged Ebola 9 days before outbreak announced. CBCNews. Retrieved from http://www.cbc .ca/news/health/healthmap-software-flagged-ebola-9-days-before-out break-announced-1.2732464. Berger, J. M., & Morgan, J. (2015). The ISIS Twitter census: Defining and describing the population of ISIS supporters on Twitter. Retrieved from https://www.brook ings.edu/research/the-isis-twitter-census-defining-and-describing-thepopulation-of-isis-supporters-on-twitter/. Capgemini. (2012). Business intelligence technology helps HMRC increase yield. Retrieved from https://www.nl.capgemini.com/resource-file-access/resource/ pdf/ss_Business_Intelligence_Technology_helps_HMRC_Increase_Yield_1. pdf. City of Reading. (2014, December 16). New predictive policing strategies in Reading: Reducing crime & increasing community engagement. Latest News. Retrieved from http://www.readingpa.gov/content/new-predictive-polic ing-strategies-reading-reducing-crime-increasing-community-engagement. Cukier, K., & Mayer-Schoenberger, V. (2013). Rise of big data: How it’s changing the way we think about the world. Foreign Affairs, 92(3), 28–40. European Union Agency for Network and Information Security. (2015). ENISA threat landscape 2014. Retrieved from https://www.enisa.europa.eu/publications/ enisa-threat-landscape-2014. Gantz, J., & Reinsel, D. (2011, June). Extracting value from chaos. IDC View. Retrieved from http://www.emc.com/collateral/analyst-reports/idc-extract ing-value-from-chaos-ar.pdf. Harman, J. (2015). Disrupting the intelligence community: America’s spy agencies need an upgrade. Foreign Affairs. Retrieved from https://www.foreignaffairs .com/articles/united-states/2015–03–01/disrupting-intelligencecommunity. Naydenov, R., Liveri, D., Dupre, L., Chalvatzi, E., & Skouloudi, C. (2015). Big data security: Good practices and recommendations on the security of big data systems. Retrieved from https://www.enisa.europa.eu/publications/big-datasecurity. Rosenbush, S. (2013, March 11). Visa says big data identifies billions of dollars in fraud. The Wall Street Journal. Retrieved from http://blogs.wsj.com/ cio/2013/03/11/visa-says-big-data-identifies-billions-of-dollars-in-fraud/. Schneier, B. (2015). Data and Goliath: The hidden battles to collect your data and control your world. New York: W.W. Norton.

CHAPTER 13

The Role of Multilateral Development Donors in Stimulating Criminal Justice Reform in Developing Countries Erik Alda

The effective application of rule of law and equal access to justice to all citizens is a basic human right (Huang, 2005). The development and strengthening of institutions in developing countries has been a growing issue of concern for multilateral development organizations. Multilateral development organizations or institutions provide credits and technical assistance to developing countries in order to promote economic growth, reduce poverty, and strengthen institutions. The most well-known multilateral development organization is the World Bank, but there are regional institutions such as the Inter-American Development Bank or the African Development Bank (Shahidullah, 2012). One of the areas in which multilateral development institutions assist development countries is the criminal justice system. This chapter provides an overview of the role of multilateral development institutions in stimulating criminal justice reform in developing countries. Moreover, the chapter goes beyond describing the processes through which multilateral development institutions justify investments in criminal justice reforms. Significantly, the chapter presents quantifiable measurements of the impact of such investments on the levels of violence.1 The results indicate that multilateral efforts to promote criminal justice reform in developing countries have had distinct, albeit moderate, positive impacts in reducing violence.

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We begin the chapter with a discussion of the link between development and criminal justice and explains the rationale for multilateral development institutions for promoting criminal justice reform. The chapter continues with a comprehensive overview of the types of multilateral investment programs and activities, which are designed to promote criminal justice reform. In addition, that part of the chapter provides a basic analysis of the aid provided through these organizations and viewed as a percentage of overall aid. Attention then turns to an examination of the impact of multilateral development aid on this sector, by analyzing the actual impact of criminal justice reform on violence. A conclusion summarizes the findings and presents recommendations for further improving this important sector in society. LINK BETWEEN DEVELOPMENT AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORM Establishing a link between development and criminal justice system reform has been well documented in recent years.2 Since the early 1990s, multilateral institutions such as the World Bank and regional development banks like the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) and the African Development Bank (AfDB) have initiated activities to work with developing countries that have focused specifically on criminal justice reform. The rationale for these investments is the awareness that high levels of crime and violence impede economic development as adversely affect citizens’ everyday life. For example, the world bank criminal justice guidance note states that “weak institutions are a common factor in explaining repeated cycles of violence, and the development of effective criminal justice procedures and systems bolsters trust in state institutions” (World Bank, 2012, p. 4). There is a prevailing argument that economic development has the potential to reduce the probability of repeated cycles of violence. This argument has led the World Bank and other multilateral development institutions to assist client countries to ensure there are in their efforts to have wellfunctioning criminal justice institutions. There is a strong evidence that countries affected by ongoing conflict, or countries emerging from post conflict struggles, experience high levels of crime and violence. In these countries, criminal justice systems often do not have the capacity to deal with these issues, thus exacerbating social unrest and unease. Criminal justice systems encompass a wide range of actors and sectors, including the penal justice system, the police, and civil society organizations concerned with improving the existing system (World Bank, 2012). Consequently, it is important to recognize this multisectoral nature of criminal justice reform because reforms, changes, and improvements impact many institutions and levels of society (World Bank, 2012). Thus, the

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activities of multilateral development institutions frequently link immediate criminal justice reform activities with activities directed toward the long-term prevention of crime and violence. In fact, from the perspective of citizen security continuum, the link between crime and violence prevention and a well-functioning criminal justice system is necessary and essential (Simon Campaña, 2010). Therefore, these institutions recognize the imperative of using a multisectoral approach, emphasizing interventions that include both long-term crime and violence prevention activities and reform of the criminal justice system. Because the reality of crime and insecurity differ substantially by country, the nature of criminal justice reform involves different approaches and strategies even though there is a common goal. This also means that there are differences in the nature and extent of the investments made. For example, some investment may require short-term interventions to provide institutional stability, while other investment may require more medium/ long-term interventions to achieve institutional change to improve institutional capacity and service delivery (Sherman, 2011). Short-term interventions are frequently geared toward stabilizing postconflict environments or controlling endemic levels of crime and violence. These efforts include, for example, implementation of community policing or the creation of mobile and hybrid courts to facilitate access to the justice system (Sherman, 2011). Although of short duration, such efforts can set the basis for broader institutional reforms required, which are necessary to control crime and violence in the long run. On the other hand, longer-term interventions seek to (1) promote structural reforms in criminal justice institutions in terms of organizational structures, (2) develop managerial capacity, (3) implement comprehensive information systems, and (4) professionalization of the public service sector (Sherman, 2011). These interventions frequently require multiyear loans and comprehensive technical assistance to create the basis for sustainable reforms to the criminal justice system. A detailed examination of the interventions needed to address the shortcomings of the criminal justice system is beyond the scope of the current chapter; but, it is worth specifying some of the key issues identified by multilateral donors working in this area. Primary among these is the lack of consensus among donors about which approach is likely to be most effective. This can occur when those planning programs and interventions lack a thorough understanding of the local context and the political economy needed to implement certain types of criminal justice reform. For example, the tendency to implement “ideal” reforms often exceeds the actual capacity of governments to undertake and implement such reforms, and this may have more deleterious impact on the criminal justice system. This has been described as a “capability trap” in which developing countries try to implement reforms that are beyond their installed capacity (Pritchett & de Weijer, 2011).

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“Funding gaps” also impose a limitation on the efficacy of these programs (Sherman, 2011). For example, despite significant engagement since the 1990s, the criminal justice sector still suffers from chronic underfunding (Sherman, 2011). In some instances, when funding from multilateral donors ends, local entities are expected to maintain the same levels of commitment, even though, realistically, that is fiscally impossible. Another important issue is the difficulty of measuring results; unfortunately, the lack of comparable indicators across countries limits effective comparisons. Sherman (2011) argues, for example, that short-term indicators suggested that police reforms in Haiti and Bosnia were positive and had the intended results. He acknowledges, however, that these findings cannot be verified over time (Sherman, 2011). Without clear indicators and measurements, local capacity to collect, systematize, measure, and track the performance of these projects is severely limited. The final issue that needs to be considered is the extent to which multilateral donors can or should engage in such reforms. For example, the World Bank has institutional policy limitations about engaging in activities that are blatantly political or which have the potential of causing human rights abuses (World Bank, 2012). Consequently, the options available to multilateral donor are reduced, sometimes significantly. Despite these limitations, however, the volume of investment has been substantial. For example, according to available data, since 1990, the World Bank has loaned over US$1 billion for activities related to criminal justice reforms, with evidence that the monetary commitment will continue to increase (World Bank, 2012). In reality, however, although multilateral donor support for criminal justice reform activities has grown substantially in recent years, it represents only a small proportion of overall multilateral aid to developing countries. Such growing support for criminal justice reform programs indicates that both multilateral donors and client countries recognize the importance of having effective criminal justice institutions because its impact is felt across so many aspects of society. The following section describes the nature and extent of investments in this area, and presents a methodology to estimate the impact of criminal justice reform projects on a single—but vital—indicator, homicide rates, a measurement that can be compared across countries. MULTILATERAL DEVELOPMENT INSTITUTIONS INVESTMENT IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORM As noted earlier, multilateral development institutions investment in criminal justice reform has been small in comparison to other areas of development, which have been directed to poverty reduction and economic growth. Nevertheless, investments in criminal justice reform can

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be viewed as a part of broad initiatives to reduce poverty and promote institutional development and economic growth. It is useful to examine the actual investment in criminal justice reform from 2005 to 2013, the years with which the most complete and accurate data exist. These data come from the OECD Creditor Reporting System3 where multilateral development institutions report total aid invested in developing countries. To provide a comprehensive overview of the multisectoral nature of criminal justice reform, the author processed the reported data to incorporate both specific criminal justice initiatives and activities targeted more broadly to long-term crime and violence prevention. The author’s analysis indicated that the mean investment in criminal justice issues was US$3 million per year (see Figure 13.1). As Figure 13.1 illustrates, there is an increasing trend in the overall investment in criminal justice reform to reach a maximum of US$6 million in 2010, and then declined significantly from 2011 to 2012. In 2013, the mean investment in this area increased again levels close to those of 2010. The data indicate that countries in the South Asia region4 have received the most amount of aid for criminal justice reform (see Figures 13.2a and 13.2b) with an average of close to US$30 million per year, followed by countries in sub-Saharan Africa with less than US$5million per year.

Figure 13.1 Mean Investment in Criminal Justice (by year) (Author analysis using OECD/CRS data on multilateral investment from 2005 to 2013 [2016])

Figure 13.2a Mean Investment by Region (% of total investment) (Author analysis using OECD/CRS data on multilateral investment from 2005 to 2013 [2016])

Figure 13.2b Mean Investment by Region (total amount of investment) (Author analysis using OECD/CRS data on multilateral investment from 2005 to 2013 [2016])

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Figure 13.3 delineates the mean amount of investment in criminal justice reform by country. Although the mean investment for the entire period was US$3 million per year (and the maximum investment was in 2010 with an average of US$6 million), it is useful to disaggregate the numbers because such great disparities exist. For example, Afghanistan, which was in the middle of a post-conflict reconstruction period, received close to US$300 million to work on this area, but Uruguay received less than US$1 million in the same year. Inevitably, then, a few countries received the bulk of the investments in criminal justice reform, and these were located in sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia, and Latin America. However, when investments in criminal justice are calculated as a percentage of total multilateral development aid, it shows a slightly different picture. As Figure 13.4 shows that, on average, countries like Libya received more than any other country as a percentage of multilateral aid toward criminal justice reform issues during the 2005–2013 period. Still, countries in sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia were the largest recipients toward criminal justice reform issues. In Latin America, Colombia is the country that received the largest percentage of the total aid to work on criminal justice reform issues with 10 percent of all the aid. Overall, these data confirm the assertion that investment in criminal justice reform comprise an important component of development activities and confirm a fundamental theoretical pillar of multilateral development institutions: having a well-functioning criminal justice system is both critical in controlling and reducing crime and violence and also accelerates promote economic growth and social and democratic development.

Figure 13.3 Mean Investment in Criminal Justice by Region (Author analysis using OECD/CRS data on multilateral investment from 2005 to 2013 [2016])

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Figure 13.4 Mean Investment in Criminal Justice Reform as a Percentage of Total Multilateral Investment Aid (Author analysis using OECD/CRS data on multilateral investment from 2005 to 2013 [2016])

It is not feasible to disaggregate the types of activities included in the OECD/CRS data. However, it is easily observable that most multilateral donor aid to developing countries includes a range of activities including mechanisms to support policy dialogue, such as public expenditure reviews, technical assistance and knowledge products, and actions that support policy reform through Development Policy Loans (DPLs). Depending on the institutional context, fiscal space, and the type of program to be implemented, it will require different types of instruments that multilateral institutions can provide. The following section moves beyond previous studies by attempting to delineate and measure the impact investments in criminal justice reform in one area of vital importance: an analysis of the homicide rate per 100,000 inhabitants, considered by many researchers to be a highly reliable measure criminal activity (UNODC, 2014). IMPACT OF MULTILATERAL INVESTMENT IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORM ON VIOLENCE An overarching question in this research is: given the multiple, overlapping agencies and organizations which have provided funding, have the investments in criminal justice reform achieved the impact intended? As noted earlier, criminal justice reform projects frequently specify two objectives: • To support the establishment of accountable and responsive criminal justice institutions that are conducive to economic growth and accountability. • To reduce and prevent conflict and crime as demonstrated through quantifiable measures.

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The underlying hypothesis of this chapter is that investments in criminal justice reform should lead to an “efficacy model,” namely that investments in criminal justice reform should result in lower levels of violence. However, there is scant evidence of studies that attempted to measure the actual impact of investment in this area on the reduction of violence. To date, there have been no cross-country analyses measuring the impact of criminal justice reform projects on violence. It is worth noting, however, that there have been some informative impact evaluation studies of criminal justice reform projects. This chapter attempts to test this basic hypothesis by employing quasiexperimental methods to examine the causal impact of higher levels of multilateral investment in criminal justice reform on violence. To examine causal impact, one must find a credible counterfactual (Stuart & Rubin, 2008). A credible counterfactual can be defined as a comparison (or control) group that is statistically similar to the treatment group in all characteristics except (1) being a recipient of the intervention or (2) being a participant in the course, such as experimental studies, in which households or individuals are randomly assigned to the treatment and control groups in order to measure the difference between the group receiving the treatment and the group not receiving the treatment. In this chapter, the treatment is defined as the level of multilateral investment in criminal justice reform and the outcome is the homicide rate per 100,000 inhabitants. If the sample size is sufficiently large and the random assignment is properly constituted, it can be assumed that the treatment and control groups are statistically equivalent and the only difference between them is the intervention. If randomization has not taken place before program implementation, as occurred in the current study, random assignment is not possible. In such instances, nonexperimental methods should be employed to examine impact because the comparison group is unlikely to be similar to the treatment group. In this research, the author addressed the issue by assuming that the source of the bias is based on observational characteristics (Rosenbaum, 1995, 2005; Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1983) in the sample and then addressed potential bias using propensity score matching (Peikes, Moreno, & Orzol, 2008; Dehejia & Wahba, 2002). To create the treatment and control groups, the author preprocessed the data by matching countries based on a range of factors that affect the outcome measure, such as homicide rates. Furthermore, because this is a country analysis, it was necessary to employ factors affecting violence at the country level. To accomplish this, the author examined previous literature on the socioeconomic and demographic factors influencing violence at the country level. These findings are consistent in explaining factors that drive violence within and across countries. For example, one of the most important drivers

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of violence across countries is the degree of inequality (Baremboim & Campante, 2008; Fajnzlber, Lederman, & Loayza, 2002b; Savolainen, 2000; World Bank, 2011b). Another key socioeconomic variable that is likely to contribute to increases in violence is the levels of poverty. Another important socioeconomic factor that may lead to higher levels of violence is the level of economic growth per capita. That is, countries with higher levels of economic growth appear to have lower levels of violence; it is also true that higher levels of violence can also inhibit a country’s economic growth (Detotto & Otranto, 2010; World Bank, 2007, 2011a, 2011b). Demographic factors can also influence levels of violence, particularly the size of the youth cohort and rapid population growth in urban centers. For example, both in Latin America and the Caribbean and sub-Saharan Africa, the size of the youth cohort is strongly associated with higher levels of violence (Sommers, 2011; World Bank, 2006, 2010). A factor related to higher levels of violence within the youth cohort is the proportion of that cohort who are unemployed (UNODC, 2014). Rapid population growth in urban centers frequently results in expansion of unplanned living areas and this can be correlated with an increase in of criminal activities and networks. The following section describes some of the observable characteristics employed to conduct the matching exercise. Data In this analysis, the outcome variable of interest is the level of violence as captured by both the homicide rate per 100,000 inhabitants and the count measure of homicides. The treatment variable is a continuous variable captured by the percentage of multilateral aid that is directed toward criminal justice reform projects and programs. The following sets of observable characteristics were used to examine the treatment and control groups to assess the causal impact of criminal justice reform investments on violence: (1) Gini coefficient, (2) GDP growth per capita, (3) poverty, (4) urban population growth, (5) percentage of males aged 15 to 29, (6) overall and youth unemployment rates, and (7) criminal justice aid. Gini Coefficient The Gini coefficient of income inequality captures the difference in income between the richest and the poorest groups in each of the countries in the sample. It is noteworthy that highly unequal societies tend to have higher levels of violence than societies with a more equal distribution. For example, Brazil, one of the most unequal societies in the world, has very high levels of violence. In this analysis, a value of zero would indicate that

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there is no inequality and a value of 1 would indicate that a single individual owns all the wealth in the country. As noted earlier, cross-country research has found that income inequality is one of the strongest explanatory factors for higher levels of violence (Fajnzlber, Lederman, & Loayza, 2002a; World Bank, 2011a). GDP Growth Per Capita Annual GDP growth per capita measures a country’s economic growth in per capita terms. Research indicates that countries with faster rates of growth have lower levels of violence (World Bank, 2006). Evidence indicates that the effect of lower levels of violence on economic growth can be substantial. For example, the World Bank found that higher levels of growth per capita could, on average, reduce violence by 1 percent on average (World Bank, 2006). These estimates, however, conceal high levels of variation at the country level in terms of increases in per capita economic growth. Jamaica, for instance, could boost its economic growth by 5.4 percent if it reduced violence by 1 percent. In other countries, such as the Dominican Republic, the potential impact in countries would be smaller, but still sizeable (1.4%) (World Bank, 2006). Poverty The poverty rate captures the percentage of citizens living below the poverty line, currently estimated to be US$3.10 per day (PPP5) (World Bank, 2016). It is well established that poverty drives violence in both developed and developing countries. The findings of some studies, however, appear to be ambiguous. That is, Pridemore (2011) found that poverty is positively associated with higher levels of violence, while others (Crutchfield & Wadsworth, 2003) found that poverty alone does not necessarily explain violence; rather, the underlying social mechanisms contributing to poverty contribute to higher levels of violence. Urban Population Growth Rapid, unplanned urbanization has been a significant and enduring problem in developing countries. Rapid migration patterns into large cities for those seeking better employment and quality of life during the second half of the 20th century led to a rapid expansion of cities, which were unprepared for such influxes (Briceño-León, 2002; Fox, 2008). Consequently, many slums were created, characterized by poor infrastructure and a noticeable lack of government presence. The result was that many poor urban areas were essentially ungoverned. The increase in urban population growth has slowed in recent years, and, in some countries, has declined, and urban migration patterns have been reversed. Despite

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a slowing of urban growth in some countries and regions, urban areas remain dangerous. Recent research indicates that urban areas that have experienced a growth of 2 percent or more continue to experience higher homicide rates (UNDP, 2013). Percentage of Males Aged 15 to 29 Extensive empirical evidence indicates that young males are simultaneously the main perpetrators and victims of violence (UNDP, 2013, 2014). Global reports on the drivers of violence often identify the youth cohort of 15 to 29 males as being at the highest risk of being victims and perpetrators. Unemployment Rate and Youth Unemployment Rate Unemployment and youth unemployment rates measure the share of the population who are out of work but are available for and are seeking employment. Research corroborates that unemployment, particularly youth unemployment, is strongly associated with higher levels of violence (Busso, Bassi, Urzúa, & Vargas, 2012; Urdal, 2006). Criminal Justice Aid This variable encompasses the total multilateral donor aid for criminal justice reform. In the developing world, criminal justice reform is broadly construed and includes many offices, agencies, and actors. This criminal justice variable is constructed from sector data for the following areas: legal and judicial development, anti-corruption organizations and institutions, security systems and reform, civilian peacebuilding, and conflict prevention and resolution (OECD, 2016). These data, selected from the available menu of sectors in the OECD-CRS data, were chosen because they more accurately reflect actual investment in criminal justice reform. In the following section, descriptive statistics of the data and the methodology employed are used to measure the impact of activities in this sector on levels of violence. Descriptive Statistics As Table 13.1 illustrates, the mean homicide rate for the years in the sample, 2005 to 2013, was 11.90 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants. It must be noted that for purposes of the analyses undertaken for this study, a logarithmic transformation of the homicide rate was employed to smooth out the outliers. The result of doing so was that the mean of the logarithmic transformation of the homicide rate equaled 2.42 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants.

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This confirmed the hypothesis that levels of violent crime in Latin America and the Caribbean are more than twice the global average, followed by countries in sub-Saharan Africa. Despite some measurable reductions in homicide levels in recent years, these statistics reveal crime levels that are unacceptably high by international standards. As can be viewed in Table 13.1, the minimum value in the mean homicide rate is less than 1 homicide per 100,000 inhabitants, and the maximum value is 80 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants (for Honduras). Overall, the data show that 28 percent of the population were between 15 and 29. The findings for the period of the study are the mean urban growth as a percentage of the total population was about 2.6 percent; the mean Gini coefficient was 41; and, the mean growth in GDP per capita was about 4 percent per year. Finally, the variable measuring the youth unemployment rate had a mean of 16.5 percent, with a minimum of 0.6 percent and a maximum of 63.5 percent. Criminal justice aid to developing countries, the treatment variable of interest in this research, is about US$5 million, with a minimum of 0 and a maximum of about US$204 million. The percentage of criminal justice reform over all the multilateral donor aid had a mean value of about 5 percent and the maximum percentage of criminal justice aid was over 40 percent.

Table 13.1 Descriptive Statistics Variable Homicide rate Criminal justice aid (percentage of multilateral aid) Criminal justice aid

Mean

Standard Deviation

Minimum

Maximum

11.90

12.29

0.57

80.07

4.63

6.81

0.00

41.86

4.69

18.79

0.00

203.86

98.55

169.43

0.03

1197.59

846.96

1098.56

89.38

6219.37

4.37

3.12

−12.53

13.75

Poverty rate

14.22

7.57

0.00

36.31

GINI

41.09

7.59

21.85

64.34

Youth 15–29

28.62

3.06

18.99

39.42

2.56

1.66

−1.24

6.71

16.50

12.24

0.60

63.53

Multilateral aid (no criminal justice) All aid no criminal justice GDP growth per capita

Urban growth Youth unemployment

Source: Author analysis using OECD/CRS data on multilateral investment from 2005 to 2013 (2016) and World Bank World Development Indicators.

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Methods The aforementioned variables were used to conduct the matching exercise. As previously noted, the treatment in this study is measured by the level of multilateral investment in criminal justice. Because the treatment variable is not binary (0/1), it was necessary to use an extension of propensity score matching that can accommodate continuous treatments called generalized propensity score (GPS) (Hirano & Imbens, 2004; Imbens, 2000). This extension of the original propensity score matching allows estimating the causal effect of interventions if the treatment does not take place once, but, instead, may take continuous values (Bia & Mattei, 2007, 2008). The procedure was implemented using the econometric software, Stata, and the statistical package, Doseresponse (Bia & Mattei, 2008). Bia and Mattei (2008) describe the GPS procedure as follows: Let r(t, x) be the density treatment based on the set of observable characteristics described in the methods section. The equation can be written as follows and essentially: r (t, x) = fT|X (t|x) Then the GPS is as follows R = r (T, X)

As mentioned earlier, when conducting propensity score matching, it is essential to ensure that the balancing property is satisfied; that is, that the generated treatment and control groups based on the observed characteristics are sufficiently similar for the group receiving the treatment and the one that that does not (Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1983). In GPS, the balancing property is accomplished in a similar manner to the traditional propensity score matching. However, instead of matching whether the country receives the intervention (1) or does not (0), the matching exercise is done within strata. Based on the available data, the treatment variable was divided into three categories, which were then used to create treatment and control groups within each category. Therefore, each category captured a percentage range of the multilateral investment in criminal justice reform over the total multilateral aid to a particular country. Hence, with the same value of r (t, x) the probability that T = t is not dependent on the value of the covariates X is as follows: X⊥I (T = t) | r (t, x) (Bia & Mattei, 2008)

The aforementioned equation does not require the unconfoundedness condition; however, if combined with the unconfoundedness condition, the assignment to the treatment group is unconfounded given the GPS, which can be employed to eliminate the biases related to differences in the covariates (Hirano & Imbens, 2004, p. 2). The estimation of the causal effects is done in three stages. First, the score r (t, x) is estimated. Second, the conditional expectation of the outcome

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of interest is estimated based on the treatment interval and the GPS. Finally, the dose-response function is calculated by taking the average of the conditional expectation over the GPS at each of the levels of interest (Bia & Mattei, 2008, pp. 355–357). Findings To estimate the impact of the investment in criminal justice, the author employed a propensity score-matching technique, which evaluated the effects of one unit6 increase in the investment in criminal justice reform, controlling for factors that influence violence, and investment in other areas of development. To estimate the level of the continuous treatment (“dose-response”) and the treatment effect, the author estimated the conditional distribution of the investment in criminal justice reform given the observable variables described in previous paragraphs using the Stata program Doseresponse (Bia & Mattei, 2008). In line with Hirano and Imbens (2004) and Bia and Mattei (2007), the author assumed that the treatment values have a normal distributions given the explanatory variables and then estimated the propensity score to match the countries based on the observable covariates from which the treatment and control groups were created. The program utilized by the author also tests whether the distribution of the treatment variable is normal based on the explanatory variables and, therefore, the balancing property is satisfied.7 The author determined that the normality test was satisfied at the 99 percent confidence level (p < 0.01), and there was moderate evidence against the balancing property.8 Figures 13.5 and 13.7 illustrate the results of the propensity score analysis. Figures 13.5 and 13.6 capture the results using the log of homicide rates per 100,000 inhabitants as the outcome variable of interest. In contrast, Figures 13.7 and 13.8 illustrate the results using the raw number of homicides. Figures 13.6 and 13.8 illustrate the impact of each 10-unit9 increase of the treatment variable on the homicide rate and on homicides. Figures 13.5 (plot on the left) and 13.7 (plot on the left) illustrate the distribution of the treatment variable (mean percentage investment in criminal justice reform) without the conditional effect of the observable variables employed to do the matching. It appears that investments in criminal justice reform follow a nonlinear distribution that appear to decline at higher values of the treatment variable. This was expected since there are fewer countries with higher investment in criminal justice reform. For example, a country with an investment in criminal justice reform of 10 would experience a reduction of approximately 0.5 in the log of homicide rate. This probability would increase slightly as higher values of investment begin to decline to less than 2 in the logarithm of homicide rate.

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Thus, it appears that such investments would have a small impact in reducing the homicide rate. Figure 13.5 (plot on the right) presents the predicted treatment effect function, and estimates the change in the expected outcome (homicide rates) for a 10 percentage point increase in investment in criminal justice reform. This is illustrated better in Figure 13.6, which graphs the impact presented in Figure 13.5 (plot on the right). For example, if a country received an average of 10 percent of the multilateral investment in criminal justice reform, it would experience in logarithm of homicide rates of a 0.04. By contrast, countries receiving a larger percentage of aid to work on criminal justice reform (25% or larger amounts) it would experience reductions in the homicide rate ranging from 0.011 to 0.09. The results for the count measure of homicides can be interpreted in a similar way. For example, a country receiving 40 percent of the aid to reform the criminal justice system, the decline in the number of homicides would be 147; and for a country that received 45 percent of criminal justice reform aid, the decline in homicides would be 164 homicides. While the results may not appear substantial, they indicate that the estimates correspond to the average treatment effect of investments in

Figure 13.5 Dose Response and Treatment Effect (Author analysis using OECD/ CRS data on multilateral investment from 2005 to 2013 [2016])

Figure 13.6 Impact on Homicide Rates (log) (Author analysis using OECD/CRS data on multilateral investment from 2005 to 2013 [2016])

Figure 13.7 Dose Response and Treatment Effect (Author analysis using OECD/ CRS data on multilateral investment from 2005 to 2013 [2016])

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Figure 13.8 Impact on Homicides (count) (Author analysis using OECD/CRS data on multilateral investment from 2005 to 2013 [2016])

criminal justice reform programs. Thus, it can be argued that this program, after controlling for all the potential observable characteristics that affect the outcome, can have an impact in reducing violence. Of course, one could speculate that other factors might exist that could contribute to reducing levels of violence. However, the author attempted to control for many of the observable characteristics that could contribute to increased levels of violence as well as to controlling for all development aid and multilateral development aid after subtracting the investment in criminal justice. Because of these efforts, it is unlikely that other factors related to reducing violence have not been taken into account in this analysis. It is worth noting that the results presented in Figures 13.5 to 13.8 are estimates of the average for the years 2005-2013, the time frame with the most available for this type of analysis. To test for robustness, the author also conducted the same analysis creating three-year periods to compensate for the number of missing data in the analysis.10 The results of the analysis are shown in Figures 13.9 to 13.12. The results follow a pattern similar to the results for the averaged data for the entire period, but the average impact is more modest. As Figures 13.10 and 13.12 show that the reduction in the logarithm of homicide rate is less significant but still shows reductions. To compare this result with

Figure 13.9 Dose Response and Treatment Effect (Author analysis using OECD/ CRS data on multilateral investment from 2005 to 2013 [2016])

Figure 13.10 Impact on Homicide Rates (log) (Author analysis using OECD/CRS data on multilateral investment from 2005 to 2013 [2016])

Figure 13.11 Dose Response and Treatment Effect (Author analysis using OECD/ CRS data on multilateral investment from 2005 to 2013 [2016])

Figure 13.12 Impact on Homicides (count) (Author analysis using OECD/CRS data on multilateral investment from 2005 to 2013 [2016])

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the graphs above, investing from 10 to 40 percent of the multilateral donor aid in criminal justice reform would increase the logarithm of homicide rate between 0.008 and 0.0014. This increase is nonlinear; therefore, at higher percentages of investment, the logarithm of homicide rate begins to decline, and at investment levels larger than 40 percent, the logarithm of homicide rate begins to decline from −0.0028 to −0.0329. Similarly, the results for the count data on homicides also follow a nonlinear trend but with small differences. For example, the number of homicides follow an increasing, but nonlinear, trend and begin to decline when countries at the level of investment of 25 percent in criminal justice reform; homicides then drop from 8 homicides to almost 140 for the period of study. Limitations As noted throughout, readers must recognize that these findings are preliminary, and further work is necessary to confirm the potential validity of these assertions. In conducting the research, the author followed the relevant literature on the driving factors of violence such as poverty, inequality, youth unemployment, the percentage of youth in the population, and levels of urban growth in order to generate the treatment and control group. According to the literature discussed earlier, these variables consistently explain higher levels of violence. However, it is possible that other key variables were not included in the matching exercise, which could change the results. Another potential limitation is that these results indicate a natural decline in the levels of violence, like a regression to the mean issue (Langbein, 2012). In fact, some countries may have higher than average levels of violence for either exogenous reasons or as a result of measurement error in the recording of the homicide rate. That is, it is possible to speculate that in some countries levels of violence may decline naturally. However, a natural decline, one uninfluenced by investments of criminal justice reform, is probably unlikely because countries with weak criminal justice systems are likely to benefit from the investment in this area. A third limitation concerns deficiencies in the data collected for this analysis that may not fully capture the extent to which multilateral development donors invest in criminal justice reform. Despite these limitations, in the analyses, some important findings emerge and some important areas for further research are identified to ascertain with greater clarity what types of interventions may be beneficial in reducing violence. CONCLUSION The purpose of this chapter was to examine the effect of multilateral development on criminal justice reform on the levels of violence. The

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linkages between a well-functioning criminal justice system, lower levels of violence, and economic and social development in developing countries are unequivocally strong. The local realities of violence and insecurity and the capacity of criminal justice systems may require short-term stabilization approaches or medium- to long-term interventions to strengthen the capacity of these institutions. To date, the effect of multilateral development institutions’ investments in criminal justice reform on violence has been largely unstudied. Overall, the findings of the research and analysis conducted suggest there is a positive impact of criminal justice reform projects, particularly in reductions of homicide rates in developing countries receiving developmental support. It is worth explaining some interesting findings that emerge from the analysis. One is that the effects are nonlinear and, therefore, it suggests that, in addition to other areas of development, it would require higher levels of investment in criminal justice reform in order to start seeing meaningful reductions in the levels of violence. Stronger treatment effects are seen in higher levels of investment. Most development project is client driven in that it is the client countries that decide whether they want or have the necessary fiscal space to borrow resources from a multilateral organization to embark on a multiyear project to reform the criminal justice system. Thus, higher levels of investment in criminal justice reform would suggest an interest of client countries in working toward a well-functioning criminal justice system. Several of the finding presented suggest areas where further investigations could prove useful. First, and not surprisingly, the findings show that a higher percentage of multilateral aid for criminal justice reform results in lower levels of violence. Fundamentally, the more a country invests in modernizing key institutions in the criminal justice system, the more likely it will be that those investments will results in lower levels of violence. Second, the results indicate a nonlinear effect since, at smaller percentages of investments, violence actually increases, but at higher percentages of investment in criminal justice reform, levels of violence begin to decline significantly. Therefore, greater investment in criminal justice reform will achieve greater reductions in violence. Third and final, there are differences in the reduction of violence levels depending on whether the sample is averaged for the whole period or is divided by three-year periods. Both indicate significant reductions in levels of violence, but the effects are more modest in the sample with threeyear periods. Finally, it is worth noting the critical role of multilateral development institutions in promoting criminal justice reforms in developing countries in order to have a well-functioning criminal justice system that can effectively apply the rule of law and protect its citizens. To date, these institutions have

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provided significant amounts of financial and technical assistance to developing countries to develop the institutional infrastructure of the criminal justice system. The results of this chapter show that the assistance provided to date seems to have an effect in reducing the levels of violence, albeit a modest one; but, they also provide evidence to continue assisting developing countries to strengthen the criminal justice system. Continued assistance, however, should be adequately assessed and targeted to the local needs and institutional capacity in order to maximize the impact of the investment. NOTES 1. Violence here is captured as the homicide rate per 100,000 inhabitants, which is the only measure of violent crime that is more comparable across countries. 2. See Jodoin and Segger (2013) for a thorough review on the topic. 3. For data source, see: https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=CRS1. 4. World Bank regions. For more information, please refer to the following website: http://www.worldbank.org/en/about/annual-report/regions. 5. PPP indicates purchase parity power. It’s a measure used worldwide to compare the income levels in different countries. 6. For the purposes of this chapter, units are measured as the increase in criminal justice reform aid as a percentage of the total multilateral development aid. 7. The balancing property tests whether the matching exercised is well balanced with no significant differences in the observable characteristics. In order words, we test whether the potential bias between the treatment and the control groups is reduced so that we could find a credible counterfactual to assess causality from the treatment variable. 8. There are two ways to test whether the balancing test and the normality test are satisfied. The first one, reported here, is a two-sided standard t-test. In addition, as a robustness test, the author also examined the balancing and normality properties of the matching exercise using a Bayes factor test model (Jeffreys, 1998; Rouder et al., 2009). The results of the Bayes factor test model suggest that there is very slight evidence against the balancing property. Therefore, it can be argued that there is a credible counterfactual to examine causality. 9. The author followed previous literature employing this methodology to categorize the treatment variable. 10. This is done because the command in Stata does not work with missing observations (Bia & Mattei, 2008).

REFERENCES Baremboim, I., & Campante, F. (2008). Does crime breed inequality? Evidence from the Favelas in Rio de Janeiro (unpublished). Bia, M., & Mattei, A. (2007). Application of the generalized propensity score: Evaluation of public contributions to Piedmont enterprises. POLIS Working Paper No. 80. Alessandria, Italy. Bia, M., & Mattei, A. (2008). A Stata package for the estimation of the dose– response function through adjustment for the generalized propensity score. The Stata Journal, 8(3), 354–373.

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Briceño-León, R. (2002). La nueva violencia urbana de América Latina. Sociologías, 4(8), 34–51. Busso, M., Bassi, M., Urzúa, S., & Vargas, J. (2012). Disconnected: Skills, education, and employment in Latin America. Washington, DC: Inter-American Development Bank. Crutchfield, R. D., & Wadsworth, T. (2003). Poverty and violence. In W. Heitmeyer & J. Hagan, International handbook of violence research (pp. 67–82). New York: Springer. Dehejia, R. H., & Wahba, S. (2002). Propensity score-matching methods for nonexperimental causal studies. The Review of Economics and Statistics, 84(1), 151–161. Detotto, C., & Otranto, E. (2010). Does crime affect economic growth? Kyklos, 63(3), 330–345. Fajnzlber, P., Lederman, D., & Loayza, N. (2002a). Inequality and violent crime. Journal of Law & Economics, 45, 1. Fajnzlber, P., Lederman, D., & Loayza, N. (2002b). Inequality and violent crime. Journal of Law & Economics, 45, 1. Fox, S. (2008). On the origins and consequences of slums. Retrieved from https:// www.csae.ox.ac.uk/conferences/2008-EdiA/papers/155-Fox.pdf. Hirano, K., & Imbens, G. W. (2004). The propensity score with continuous treatments. Applied Bayesian modeling and causal inference from incomplete-data perspectives, 226164, 73–84. Huang, R. (2005). Securing the rule of law: Assessing international strategies for postconflict criminal justice. New York: International Peace Academy. Imbens, G. W. (2000). The role of the propensity score in estimating dose-response functions. Biometrika, 87(3), 706–710. Jeffreys, H. (1998). The theory of probability. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. Jodoin, S. B., & Segger, M.C.C. (2013). Sustainable development, international criminal justice, and treaty implementation. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Langbein, L. (2012). Public program evaluation: A statistical guide. New York: ME Sharpe. OECD. (2017). International Development Statistics (IDS) online databases. Retrieved from https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=CRS1. Peikes, D. N., Moreno, L., & Orzol, S. M. (2008). Propensity score matching: A note of caution for evaluators of social programs. The American Statistician, 62(3), 222–231. Pridemore, W. A. (2011). Poverty matters: A reassessment of the inequality– homicide relationship in cross-national studies. The British Journal of Criminology, 51(5), 739–772. Pritchett, L., & de Weijer, F. (2011). Fragile states: Stuck in a capability trap? Retrieved from https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/9109. Rosenbaum, P. R. (1995). Observational studies. New York: Springer. Rosenbaum, P. R. (2005). Sensitivity analysis in observational studies. In B. S. Everitt & D. C. Howell (Eds.), Encyclopedia of statistics in behavioral science (pp. 1809–1814). Chichester, UK: Wiley & Sons. Rosenbaum, P. R., & Rubin, D. B. (1983). The central role of the propensity score in observational studies for causal effects. Biometrika, 70(1), 41–55.

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Rouder, J. N., Speckman, P. L., Sun, D., Morey, R. D., & Iverson, G. (2009). Bayesian t tests for accepting and rejecting the null hypothesis. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 16(2), 225–237. Savolainen, J. (2000). Inequality, welfare state, and homicide: Further support for the institutional anomie theory*. Criminology, 38(4), 1021–1042. doi:10.1111/j.1745–9125.2000.tb01413.x. Shahidullah, S. M. (2012). Comparative criminal justice systems. Burlington, MA: Jones & Bartlett. Sherman, J. (2011). Criminal justice: Security and justice thematic paper. Retrieved from https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/9074. Simon Campaña, F. (2010). Administración de Justicia y Seguridad Ciudadana: la ley del más débil. Retrieved from http://67.192.84.248:8080/bitstream/ 10469/2478/1/BFLACSO-CS6-04-Simon.pdf. Sommers, M. (2011). Governance, security and culture: Assessing Africa’s youth bulge. International Journal of Conflict and Violence, 5(2), 292. Stuart, E. A., & Rubin, D. B. (2008). Best practices in quasi-experimental designs. In, J.W. Osborne (Ed.), Best Practices in Quantitative Methods (pp. 155–176). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. UNDP. (2013). Human development report for Latin America 2013–2014: Citizen security with a human face: Evidence and proposals for Latin America. New York. Retrieved from http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/librarypage/hdr/ human-development-report-for-latin-america-2013–2014/. UNDP. (2014). Citizen security with a human face: Evidence and proposals for Latin America. Retrieved from. http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/citizen-securityhuman-face. UNODC. (2014). Global study on homicide 2013. Retrieved from. https://www .unodc.org/gsh/. Urdal, H. (2006). A clash of generations? Youth bulges and political violence. International Studies Quarterly, 50(3), 607–629. World Bank. (2006). Crime, violence and economic development in Brazil: Elements for effective public policy. Washington, DC. Retrieved from http://pdba.george town.edu/Security/citizensecurity/brazil/documents/docworldbank.pdf. World Bank. (2007). Crime, violence, and development: Trends, costs, and policy options in the Caribbean. Caribbean: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime Latin America and the Caribbean Region of the World Bank. World Bank. (2010). Violence in the City. Washington, DC: The World Bank Group. World Bank. (2011a). Crime and violence in Central America: A development challenge. Retrieved from http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTLAC/Resources/ FINAL_VOLUME_I_ENGLISH_CrimeAndViolence.pdf. World Bank. (2011b). Making Brazilians safer: Building evidence about the decline in violent crime. Retrieved from http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/ 252761468015010162/Making-Brazilians-safer-analyzing-the-dynamics-ofviolent-crime. World Bank. (2012). Staff guidance note: World Bank support for criminal justice activities. Washington, DC. Retrieved from http://siteresources.worldbank.org/ INTLAWJUSTINST/Resources/CriminalJusticeGuidanceNote_Feb2012.pdf. World Bank. (2016). World Bank development indicators. Washington, DC. Retrieved from http://data.worldbank.org.

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CHAPTER 14

Combatting Transnational Crime Takes a Public-Private Partnership Gary Hill and Matti Joutsen

Truck driver Kevin Kimmel had just finished making his overnight deliveries when he noticed something odd at the Virginia truck stop where he had stopped to sleep. A man knocked on the door of a battered recreational vehicle, went inside, and before long the whole vehicle started rocking. A few minutes later, what seemed to be the face of a distraught girl appeared at the vehicle’s window but was quickly jerked away. The vehicle’s movement and the look on the girl’s face convinced Kimmel that this wasn’t a family vacation. His call to the local sheriff confirmed his suspicions. Inside the recreational vehicle was a young woman who had been held captive for 18 days by a couple who had made her perform sex acts for money (Wulfhorst, 2015). Kimmel’s story testifies to the power and reach of average citizens playing a key role in combatting crime. In this instance, Kimmel was part of a group of some 170,000 drivers and truck stop workers who had been trained by Truckers against Trafficking, a nationwide U.S. organization, to be on the alert for possible instances of sex trafficking. Truckers can be an important group in this endeavor not only at truck stops. They also visit rest areas, hotels and motels, gas stations, busy city streets, and loading docks. When trained to be vigilant and observant in the course of their everyday jobs, truckers become an excellent group in the broad effort to combat human trafficking. When one thinks of transnational crime and how to fight it, the most obvious images that come to mind are those of sophisticated intelligence gathering operations conducted by large national and international police

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organizations. Undercover police infiltrating crime syndicates and surreptitious sting operations tease the imagination of policy makers, law enforcement, and the public. Other than the occasional reference to a tip from an informant or a complaint from a victim, nongovernmental players are normally not considered an important part of the complex, difficult, and often dangerous fight against transnational crime. It is the intent of this chapter to show some of the ways in which the resources and skills available to nongovernmental players can and should be used in cooperative approaches to combat transnational crime. Specifically, we consider the role played by nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in global and regional security issues related to preventing and responding to transnational crime. DEFINING KEY TERMS The term “nongovernmental organization” (NGO) refers to voluntary groups of individuals or organizations, usually not affiliated with any government, that are formed to provide services or to advocate a public policy (Karns, 2007; Nonprofit Expert, n.d.). NGOs are part of a wider concept, civil society, which encompasses everyone who are acting in their personal capacity in some matter. Another term for civil society is the “third sector,” which is intended to differentiate it from those acting as a part of government (the “first sector”) or business (the “private sector” or the “second sector”). What distinguishes NGOs from civil society at large is that they have been formed for a specific purpose. This purpose may have to do specifically with crime prevention and criminal justice (whether national or transnational), but many NGOs have a broader social, cultural, or legal purpose, and the prevention of or response to transnational crime may be incidental to this. The legal status and structure of NGOs vary considerably from case to case and country to country. The discussion in this chapter is largely limited to NGOs that have a clear legal identity. This legal identity is generally obtained through registration and requires a statement of purpose, an outline of what activities the NGO conducts, criteria of membership, and a statement of how decisions are made. Since we are speaking about how NGOs can help in the response to transnational crime, it should be emphasized that the laws of different countries vary in respect of how NGOs can acquire a legal identity. As discussed later on in this chapter, some governments have become increasingly critical if not indeed hostile to the activity of certain (primarily foreign-based) NGOs in general and not only in crime prevention and criminal justice. NGOs may be local, national, or international. An international nongovernmental organization (INGO) is an umbrella organization that consists of national organizations. For example, the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies is an INGO that consists of some 150 national societies.

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In this connection, the parallel term “intergovernmental organization” (IGO) may be mentioned. The members of these organizations are national governments. As a result, decisions taken by IGOs can be seen to have the approval of the governments involved, and thus also their political commitment to the implementation of the decisions. The nongovernmental actors that contribute to the prevention of and response to transnational crime are not limited to NGOs. Also, businesses may engage in the provision of services or advocate for policy choices that are not directly related to their primary business activities but do have an impact on the prevention of, and response to, transnational crime. An example is that Microsoft Corporation has announced that it would be cooperating with the Organization of American States, Europol, and the global banking service provider FIS, in combatting cybercrime (Europol, 2014). Other nongovernmental actors involved in providing services related to the criminal justice system, or in advocating for certain policies, include religious organizations which, through their teachings and programs, provide alternatives to individuals who might otherwise enter into criminal activities. Furthermore, many religious groups provide support services to both victims of crime and ex-offenders. Immigrants are helped by religiousbased groups to find shelter, employment, and education along with advocates who can help them escape criminal activities. Trafficked individuals and victims of sexual abuse are just two examples of people who may be reluctant to seek out law enforcement, but may well contact a church, synagogue, or mosque for help. Research institutions and think tanks often become actively involved in advocating for certain policies and may work together with other nongovernmental actors (as well as governmental actors) to evaluate the impact of various policy options. Taking all of this together, and when compared to the 193 governments working within the framework of the United Nations (UN), the sheer number of NGOs, corporations, and other nongovernmental entities that are engaged or potentially engaged in responding to transnational crime is enormous. According to one estimate (Willetts, 2001), there are approximately: • 60,000 major transnational companies, such as Shell, Barclays Bank, Coca-Cola, Ford, Microsoft, or Nestlé, and these parent companies have more than 500,000 foreign affiliates; • 10,000 single-country nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), such as Freedom House (United States), Médecins sans Frontières (France), Population Concern (United Kingdom), Sierra Club (United States), or the Women’s Environmental Network (United Kingdom), which have significant international activities; • 5,800 international nongovernmental organizations (INGOs), such as Amnesty International, the Baptist World Alliance, or the International Chamber of

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Shipping, plus a similar number of less-well-established international caucuses and networks of NGOs; and • 250 intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), ranging from the UN, NATO, and the European Union to the International Coffee Organization.

In addition, innumerable NGOs working on a local level have a role of their own in responding to transnational crime. EXAMPLES OF THE CONTRIBUTION OF NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS As noted, NGOs are generally formed to provide certain services or advocate a certain policy. In respect of transnational crime, this may be connected with the prevention of transnational crime, the detection of crime, and the identification of suspects, assistance to victims, and helping in the tracing and repatriation of the proceeds of crime. As has been made abundantly clear by the other chapters in this book, transnational crime covers a broad range of activities. A straightforward itemization of what NGOs contribute in different respects to the different types of transnational crime would prove exhausting.1 For this reason, only some examples are provided in the following, in order to show the innovative ways in which NGOs around the world help in the prevention of, and response to, transnational crime. Prevention of Crime The most effective response to crime is to prevent it from happening. Many potential victims are unaware of the risks of crime, or of what they can do to decrease these risks. For this reason, a number of NGOs seek to raise awareness among the public, or among specific target groups. Programs aimed at youth may be the best known examples of crime prevention programs and they are found in every corner of the world. African Youths Initiatives on Crime Prevention (AYICRIP) mission is to reduce crime in Africa through preventive mechanism. Through its programs (Youth Leadership and Crime Prevention Summit, Campus Marathon, Drop That Habit), they have been able to touch the lives of thousands of young Nigerians, as well as establishing a working relationship with government agencies, civil society organizations as well as international organizations. The National Association for the Prevention of Drug Abuse (PEMADAM) is a Malaysian organization working through counselling, education, prevention, rehabilitation, research, training, and drug treatment. South Africa’s National Institute for Crime Prevention and the Reintegration of Offenders (NICRO) is a national nonprofit organization that regards crime as a threat to democracy and individual rights. Through people-centered development and services to victims, offenders,

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and communities, NICRO strengthens a human rights culture and a safer South Africa. NICRO provides comprehensive crime reduction and prevention services. It has pioneered many services that have been integrated into mainstream practice, incorporated into legislation, and is a leader in the field of criminal justice, victim empowerment, and violence against women. Positive choice is to develop civil society in the Republic of Georgia, promote healthy lifestyle, engage in educational activities, and following issues dealing with drug users: protecting their rights, treatment, psycho-rehabilitation, prevention, and advocacy. To take the example of the prevention of cybercrime, a number of NGOs have been set up around the world to alert users of the Internet to its dangers and to promote safe practice in the use of computer networks. Examples include the Cyber Crime Awareness Society in India, and the Together against Cybercrime initiative established in France. Such local, national, and international NGOs are designed to mobilize the expertise of their members in order to provide information and expert advice on the risks and on risk avoidance. Another rapidly emerging crime—in this case a resurgence from centuries past—is maritime piracy. The International Maritime Bureau (IMB) was one of the first to show that piracy has become a threat to navigational safety, maritime trade, energy security, and a potential source of terrorism. This leads to better regional military cooperation, such as the patrols in the Malacca Straits-coordinated patrols by Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia. In 1992, the IMB established the Piracy Reporting Centre, a 24-hour and free service for shipmasters to report any piracy, armed robbery, or stowaway incidents. The World Shipping Council (WSC) and its 25 member companies, in turn, work with the International Chamber of Shipping as well as with the International Maritime Organization to monitor piracy in the Indian Ocean. The WSC helped revise the Best Management Practices for ships, calling on vessels to communicate their intentions to transit a high-risk area to naval forces in the region, and to employ vessel self-protection measures based on vessel-specific assessment. A prominent source of concern in recent years has been terrorism. As part of the response to terrorism, considerable attention has been paid to the prevention of radicalization. “Radicalization” is defined differently in various nations but for the purpose of the few examples given here, the working definition will be “the process through which an individual changes from passiveness or activism to become more revolutionary, militant or extremist, especially where there is intent towards, or support for, violence” (Institute for Strategic Dialogue, 2010, p. 2). Examples of NGOs involved in radicalization reduction projects, often in conjunction with government or law enforcement, are normally location-specific. However, groups tend to learn from each other so the following examples can be and often are copied by other groups in other nations.

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EXIT is a Swedish program that works with individuals to help them leave white supremacy groups and provide support for them afterward. In addition to providing counselling and support to young people who are members of or influenced by white supremacist groups, they also support family members and help educate frontline youth workers. They use a long-term cognitive treatment approach. The UK-based STREET (Strategy to Reach, Empower, and Educate) program works with young Muslims who are outside mainstream institutions, including mosques, to provide alternative and safe environments and, where necessary, targeted interventions. This Muslim community initiative is designed to counter the adverse impact of extremist and terrorist propaganda using outreach (including sports, recreation, and educational trips), counselling, and counter-propaganda. This latter activity includes media work, deconstruction of messages, and Internet work. STREET also works with recently released prisoners who might be vulnerable to recruitment by extremist organizations. SAVE (Sisters against Violent Extremism) is an Austrian-based NGO that is seeking to work with women around the world in countering violent extremism. The NGO works by encouraging critical thinking, reflection, and action in order to challenge extremist thinking. It has established 15 national chapters, in countries such as Afghanistan, Indonesia, Israel, Northern Ireland, Palestine, and Yemen. The German Violence Prevention Network works with individuals in prison convicted of violent crimes linked to far-right extremism. The project includes a 23 week in prison program, 1 year dedicated support once the individual has been released from prison, and support for the individual’s family before and after release. The Detection of Crime and the Identification of Suspects Crime Stoppers International provides a mechanism via phone or Internet to allow citizens of any nation to provide law enforcement with information about criminal activity. Though Crime Stopper organizations are primarily local, the international organization website provides a secure reporting form, which allows individuals to anonymously report suspected criminal activity to law enforcement officials around the world. The international organization and its local affiliates from 1976 through 2015 helped police with the arrests of more than 965,000 individuals, cleared over 1,500,000 cases, and recovered property in excess of $2 billion. Communities Inc. of Nottingham, United Kingdom, operates a project called “Hate Crime, Communities in Control.” This project is designed to strengthen and increase hate crime reporting mechanisms through community-based organizations. As a result, when local people experience hate crime, they are more likely to have a connection with these organizations and therefore a greater likelihood of reporting their incident.

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The International Police Training Institute (IPTI) provides leadership training and mentoring services for the international law enforcement community. Recognized, for example, by the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation National Academy Association, IPTI provides law enforcement bodies around the world with specialized training and, at times, political and diplomatic contacts. In detecting crime and identifying suspects, NGOs and businesses can be of assistance in their own special fields of expertise and activity, where they may be in a position to see when laws and regulations have been circumvented. Examples can be provided of such activity in respect of trafficking in cultural property, trafficking in endangered species of flora and fauna, and trafficking in weapons. In respect of cultural property, the Antiquities Coalition unites a diverse group of experts in the global fight against trafficking in cultural property: the illicit trade in antiquities that to a large extent involves organized criminals and terrorist organizations. It works through advocacy and research. The International Council of Museums (ICOM) Code of Ethics is specific in insisting members comply fully with international, regional, national, or local legislation and treaty obligations. Its website fosters compliance by its members with the UNESCO Convention on the Means of Protecting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export, and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property, the UNIDROIT Convention on Stolen and Illegally Exported Cultural Objects, and the UNESCO Convention for the Safeguarding of Intangible Cultural Heritage among others. ICOM emphasizes that when a museum has reason to believe that a cultural object has been illegally exported from its country of origin, it is prevented from buying it. If a cultural object has been stolen, it must be returned, and restitution is an absolute duty. ICOM publishes a Red List of stolen items. Others involved in trying to prevent trafficking in stolen cultural objects and helping with their recovery include AFRICOM (International Council of African Museums) and SAFE (Saving Antiquities for Everyone). Trafficking in flora and fauna is an area of crime of which most people are not aware, and many law enforcement agencies may not consider a top priority. It is for this reason that NGOs can be most helpful in raising awareness, for example, about the provisions of the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES). The International Network for Environmental Compliance and Enforcement is a partnership of government and nongovernmental enforcement and compliance practitioners from more than 150 countries. The members of the International Council of Museums, referred to earlier, must abide also by the CITES Convention. Traffic monitors and reports on trade in wild animals and plants. The World Wildlife Fund provides public education, supports regulations, and works with a variety of organizations to protect against wildlife crime. The International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN), works with

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more than 200 governments and has over 900 NGOs as members. IUCN works with CITES to minimize the illegal killing of elephants and other species on the endangered list. Examples of national NGOs working to protect endangered species and stop illegal trafficking include Renctas, a Brazilian conservation organization that has projects to discourage the illegal transport of wildlife with the bus company and to mobilize society against animal trafficking. Renctas has also created a database on wild animal trafficking activities in large sectors of Brazil. The African Wildlife Foundation has organized a large number of projects in many African countries for wildlife conservation, land and habitat protection, and community empowerment. They have also worked with volunteer experts to help train scouts and rangers to protect themselves and wildlife. Greenpeace and Blackfish are but two NGOs that have tackled the problem of illegal fishing in Antarctica. According to Greenpeace, illegal fishing is a global problem. Between 9 and 23 billion is lost every year to illegal fishing and often as a result of international organized crime. In order to prevent trafficking in weapons and, more broadly, to prevent proliferation of weapons, the NGO Committee on Disarmament, Peace, and Security works to facilitate the participation of NGOs in formal disarmament meetings at the UN. The Mines Advisory Group, in addition to clearing landmines, locates and destroys small arms and light weapons to keep them out of the hands of traffickers. Their work is supported by a number of corporations, nonprofit organizations, and governments. The International Action Network on Small Arms helps coordinate the activities of 265 NGOs working to stop the proliferation and misuse of small arms. These NGOs are located in 98 nations. The work varies with each NGO but can include crime prevention activities, help with investigations, research, community training, and advocacy. Helping Victims Perhaps, the most visible area where NGOs are active in transnational crime is in the fight against human trafficking. Several thousand international, national, and local NGOs have significant programs to respond to this crime and to help victims. Reference has already been made to the work of Truckers against Trafficking, a United States NGO that trains truck drivers to recognize and report instances of human trafficking. La Strada International is a network of NGOs in eight primarily Eastern European countries that seeks to increase the awareness of potential target groups of trafficking in persons and facilitates the access of trafficked persons to protection and assistance. Largely because of the extent to which trafficking persons are subjected to violence, La Strada International has recently expanded its activities to also encompass the victims of domestic violence. Anti-Slavery International was founded in 1839 and is arguably the oldest international NGO involved in fighting slavery and human trafficking.

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The focus of its work is in increasing public awareness and lobbying governments. End Child Prostitution, Child Pornography, and Trafficking of Children for Sexual Purposes (ECPAT) is both an NGO and a global network of organizations dedicated to ending the commercial sexual exploitation of children. ECPAT prepares and publishes country monitoring reports and country fact sheets. It produces publications such as A Handbook for Better Police Investigation Techniques to Combat Crimes against Children, Child Protection Policies & Procedures, Child Safe Organization: Toolkit, and others. Helping in the Tracing and Repatriation of the Proceeds of Crime A major involvement of many international NGOs is in drafting and implementing money laundering rules and in helping ensure transparency. Global Integrity is involved in efforts to increase transparency and accountability at government levels. Global Witness campaigns for increased transparency and against corruption of economic players. The Financial Transparency Coalition is a global network of governments, experts on illicit financial flows, and NGOs that helps influence global norms and standards for financial transparency. Some NGOs and other nongovernmental actors work in particular in tracing and repatriating the proceeds of certain types of crime. For example, the Thomas Reuters Foundation in 2013, working with the Manhattan, New York district attorney’s office hosted a meeting with representatives of some of the world’s leading financial institutions to assist corporations in identifying irregularities in financial transactions by potential traffickers, share financial and technical expertise, and discuss cross-border solutions to combatting this global human trafficking. As for corruption, Transparency International is one of the most widely known NGOs responding to transnational crime. Although its main focus is on corruption, Transparency International has also produced publications, toolkits, and reports that are designed to help governments trace, identify, seize, and repatriate the proceeds of corruption. Also, the U-4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre works with donor agencies and governments to help them identify potential for corruption and to develop strategies to fight it, including for repatriating the proceeds of corruption. U-4 provides training, publications, and works in partnership with the Transparency International Helpdesk. Research and Policy Advocacy The academic community provides research, interns, volunteers, and educational services that have direct impact on the reduction of all crime, including transnational crime. Societies of criminology exist in nations,

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regions of the world, and internationally. They provide publications, seminars, websites, and forums used by government, NGOs, academics, and the general public to understand crime and to be able to analyze various approaches to combatting it. The nongovernmental world has the advantage over government organizations of being able to explore different approaches, including controversial ones, in the fight against transnational crime. NGOs and individuals can look at solutions attempted in other nations and suggest where they may, or may not, be an appropriate approach for another nation. Public agencies are not always afforded that privilege due to domestic cultural, political, economic, and social realities. The Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime consists of nearly 100 individuals engaged in law enforcement, human rights, government, and NGOs. Headquartered in Geneva, Switzerland, they conduct and share research, produce reports, and provide analysis in the field of organized crime. CONCERNS REGARDING THE ACTIVITIES OF NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS IN RESPONDING TO TRANSNATIONAL CRIME According to Articles 20 and 23 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, everyone should have the right to join groups of one’s own choosing, and these groups should have the right to take collective action to pursue the interests of its members. This “freedom of association” is widely enshrined in national constitutions. The freedom of association, however, is not without limits. Restrictions on the right to form an NGO, and on its activities, can be justified, for example, in order to protect national security, public safety, and public order. An obvious example would be that governments could take action in order to shut down an organization that has been set up for a criminal purpose; transnational examples include Al Qaeda and Cosa Nostra. Another example of grounds for a legitimate restriction is that an NGO or its members generally may not engage in activities that would violate the rights and freedoms of others; for example, private individuals generally may not engage in electronic surveillance, question suspects, and make arrests.2 Beyond these rather clear examples, it is considerably more difficult to find a balance between the freedom of association and the protection of national security, public safety, and public order. What is generally at issue here is the most appropriate way in which the public can cooperate with the government in preventing and controlling crime. A basic example is provided by “citizen patrol” programs, in which citizens organize themselves to patrol their residential area. The concept is recognized

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and supported by a number of governments around the world, but there has also been concern regarding the emergence of vigilantism, of citizens “taking the law into their own hands” when they regard the government as having failed to provide the level of safety and security that they expect. Should public participation (and NGO involvement) in criminal justice be encouraged? A dichotomy appears to be emerging in the response of governments around the world to this question. Most governments have adopted the view that nongovernmental activity in preventing and controlling crime (including transnational crime) should be encouraged as widely as possible, since the involvement of all relevant stakeholders strengthens the response. These governments argue, essentially, that no government has the resources or the ability to prevent and respond to all crime (national and transnational), and by joining with nongovernmental actors, they can extend their reach and improve their work. On the other hand, some governments have taken the view that nongovernmental activity has a dangerous potential for acting against the interests of the government, for example, by importing foreign (and undesirable) social and cultural values. While these governments recognize the potential value of NGOs, they have a clear preference for local groups that are based in the country in question, on the grounds that such groups understand and respect the social and cultural values of the country. As a result, this latter group of governments emphasizes the importance of supervising NGO activity in order to ensure that it accords with laws and regulations. Such supervision is often coupled with restrictions on the right to register and incorporate an organization (including burdensome procedures for registration and incorporation), direct prohibitions against certain spheres of activity, invasive supervisory oversight, prior restraints and censorship of speech and NGO publications, and barriers to the collection of resources (including direct prohibition of funding, and the requirement that funding be approved by or routed through the government). Often, some of these governments establish their own NGOs and give these preference in the allocation of resources and in the provision of access (Ponce Silén, 2010). Trivunovic, Taxell, Johnson, & de Cassia Biason (2013), while noting that NGOs have experienced difficulties in operating in some countries, emphasize that these difficulties may not be due to deliberate obstruction by governments, but more to such technical issues as lack of access to information. This dichotomy of views has become quite noticeable within the work of the UN. According to the UN Non-Governmental Liaison Service,3 NGOs have been active with the UN since its establishment in 1945. They interact with the UN Secretariat and UN agencies, and they consult with the member states. A formal process has been established for this, in that NGOs may obtain consultative status with the UN Economic and Social

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Council. Such a status allows NGOs to officially participate in and contribute to the work of the UN in the economic and social development fields. NGO work that is related to the UN comprises a number of activities including the dissemination of information, awareness raising, the development of education, policy advocacy, joint operational projects, and the provision of technical expertise and collaborating with UN agencies, programs, and funds. This work is undertaken in formal and informal ways at the national level and at the UN. In relation to most of its crime prevention and criminal justice activities, the UN works through the Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice, which was established in 1992.4 The commission is charged with developing, monitoring, and reviewing the UN crime prevention and criminal justice program. The commission meets annually and is composed of 40 government members elected to three-year term. At these meetings, several professional or technical workshops, known as side events, are held to provide background information and input from the NGO community. In addition, the UN organizes, every five years, major global congresses on crime prevention and criminal justice. A vibrant part of these Congresses consists of the so-called ancillary meetings, which are generally organized by NGOs and deal with a very wide variety of issues. At the beginning of the millennium, the UN adopted two conventions on transnational crime, the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (adopted in 2000), and the UN Convention against Corruption (adopted in 2003). The implementation of these two UN conventions is overseen by bodies known as Conferences of the States Parties. As is the case with the sessions of the UN Commission, the NGO community organizes professional or technical workshops also at sessions of these conferences. Furthermore, the right of NGOs to participate at these sessions is formally recognized by Rule 17 of the Rules of Procedure (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2017), which reads as follows: Rule 17 Participation of nongovernmental organizations 1. Relevant nongovernmental organizations having consultative status with the Economic and Social Council may apply to the bureau for observer status, which should be accorded unless otherwise decided by the conference. 2. Other relevant nongovernmental organizations may also apply to the bureau for observer status. The secretariat shall circulate as a document a list of such organizations with sufficient information at least 30 days prior to the conference. If there is no objection to a nongovernmental organization, observer status should be accorded unless otherwise decided by the conference. If there is an objection, the matter will be referred to the conference for a decision. 3. Without taking part in the adoption of decisions on substantive and procedural matters, whether by consensus or by vote, at the conference, such nongovernmental organizations may:

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(a) Attend plenary meetings of the conference; (b) Upon the invitation of the president and subject to the approval of the conference, make oral statements at such meetings through a limited number of representatives on questions relating to their activities; and (c) Receive the documents of the conference.

In 2009, the Conference of the States Parties to the UN Convention against Corruption decided on the establishment of a special mechanism for the review of implementation, involving an extensive process of peer review under the guidance of an Implementation Review Group (IRG). To the surprise of many, once the IRG began its work, a small number of governments objected to the involvement of NGOs in its work. These governments were of the view that, in order to protect confidentiality and an orderly process of deliberation, only governments should be allowed to attend sessions of the IRG. The majority of governments, on the other hand, were of the view that the Rules of Procedure also applied to sessions of the IRG, and that NGOs could provide considerable substantive contribution to the work on implementation. Because the UN generally works on the principle of consensus—all governments must agree to decisions— the minority has been able to block NGO access to the meetings.5 Since the IRG does not in fact discuss implementation in any individual country, many are of the view that issues of confidentiality do not arise. A more likely cause for concern to certain states appears to be that some NGOs have actively criticized the ability and willingness of governments to respond effectively to corruption. In addition, some NGOs have published their own reports on the prevalence of corruption in various countries. According to some governments, these reports have been based on faulty sources of information and provide a distorted image of corruption of reality. These reports have also been regarded as malicious to the extent that they question the commitment of the respective governments to anti-corruption efforts. Also, at the most recent UN Congress on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice, held in Doha, Qatar, in April 2015, criticism of NGO involvement in crime prevention and criminal justice emerged in a wider context. According to the official report of the Congress: A number of speakers noted that the engagement of civil society organizations should take place within the appropriate regulatory framework, in line with national legislation and in coordination with relevant oversight bodies, for example crime prevention councils, while also ensuring that organizations had the skills and knowledge for their functions. One speaker noted that any civil society activities should be framed and moderated by Governments, that non-local nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) could propagate ideas or value systems that were foreign to some countries, and that those NGOs should respect the economic, cultural, social and religious values of societies. Some speakers referred to the need to build trust and transparency in that regard. (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2015b, p. 4, paragraph 15)

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This debate between the two sides appears to be growing and is of course a concern for those who would like to see closer cooperation between governments and nongovernmental actors in preventing and responding to transnational crime, and more widely to crime in general. The inability to resolve the debate does weaken the ability of governments, working through the UN, to rely on the widest possible expertise, to explore different policy options, and to form partnerships that will have the greatest impact “on the ground,” where it matters most. At the same time, the significance of the debate should not be over-emphasized. Even if NGOs have thus far found their access barred to meetings of the Implementation Review Group and other UN working parties reviewing implementation of the UN Convention against Corruption, governments around the world continue to be free to work with NGOs, the private sector, religious organizations, research institutions, and think tanks in order to improve their response—and the vast majority of governments have shown their readiness to do so. This chapter began with the premise that there really is not a separation between civil society and government agencies in the work on the reduction of transnational crime. Though government agencies are officially charged with law enforcement, intelligence, and protecting the public, it is their partnership with a variety of nongovernment players that makes their work effective. The aforementioned groups are merely a very small taste of the diversity and competency of NGOs involved. The prevention of and response to transnational crime is not a question of either governmental or nongovernmental actors. It is both public and private working, arguing, planning, and dreaming of solutions together that will have the most effective impact on reducing transnational crime. NOTES 1. Information on all the NGOs listed in this chapter is readily available by searching the Internet. 2. An exception is “citizen’s arrests,” which are possible, under certain restricted conditions, in several countries. 3. Read more about NGOs at http://www.un-ngls.org/orf/ngorelations.htm. 4. The UN Commission continues the work of the UN Committee on Crime Prevention and Control. For an overview of the evolution of this work, see Clark (1994). 5. The background and development of this now long-festering debate is described in a conference paper at the Sixth Session of the Conference of the States Parties to the United Nations Convention against Corruption (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2015a). The inability of the Conference of the State Parties to resolve this debate to the satisfaction of all states parties has also served to slow progress on the development of a comparable mechanism for review of the implementation of the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime.

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REFERENCES Clark, R. S. (1994). The United Nations crime prevention and criminal justice program: Formulation of standards and efforts at their implementation. Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press. Europol. (2014, February 12). Europol and Microsoft enter into new global partnerships in fight against cybercrime. Newsroom. Retrieved from https://www .europol.europa.eu/newsroom/news/europol-and-microsoft-enters-newglobal-partnerships-in-fight-against-cybercrime. Institute for Strategic Dialogue. (2010). The role of civil society in counter radicalization and de-radicalization: A working paper of the European policy planners’ network on countering radicalization and polarization. Retrieved from https://www.coun terextremism.org/resources/details/id/6/ppn-working-paper-the-roleof-civil-society-in-counter-radicalisation-and-de-radicalisation. Karns, M. (2007). Nongovernmental organization (NGO). Encyclopaedia Britannica. Retrieved from https://www.britannica.com/topic/nongovernmentalorganization. Nonprofit Expert. (n.d.). NGOs—Non Governmental Organizations. Retrieved from http://www.nonprofitexpert.com/ngos-non-govermental-organizations/. Ponce Silén, C. E. (2010). Limitations to freedom of association of civil society organizations in Latin America: Comparative view and special case study of Nicaragua, Bolivia, Ecuador, Cuba and Venezuela. Retrieved from http://www.ohchr.org/ Documents/Issues/FAssociation/Responses2012/other_contributions/ World-Report_of_Sr.Ponce_on_Free_Asociation_in_Latin_Am.pdf. Trivunovic, M., Taxell, N., Johnsøn, J., & de Cássia Biason, R. (2013). The role of civil society in the UNCAC review process: Moving beyond compliance? Retrieved from http://www.u4.no/publications/the-role-of-civil-society-in-the-uncacreview-process-moving-beyond-compliance/. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. (2015a). CAC/COSP/2015/CRP.3. Conference Room Papers. Retrieved from http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/ treaties/CAC/CAC-COSP-session6.html. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. (2015b). Report of committee II: Workshop 4 (A/CONF.222/L.4/Add.1). Thirteenth United Nations Congress on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice. Retrieved from http://www.unodc .org/documents/congress//Documentation/IN_SESSION/ACONF222_ L4Add1_e_V1502578.pdf. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. (2017). Participation of non-governmental organizations. Conference of the parties to the United Nations Convention against transnational organized crime and the protocols thereto. Retrieved from https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CTOC/participationngos.html. Willetts, P. (2001). Transnational actors and international organizations in global politics. In J. Baylis & S. Smith (Eds.), The globalization of world politics: An introduction to international relations (2nd ed., pp. 356–383). New York: Oxford University Press. Wulfhorst, E. (2015, November 17). Truckers join drive on U.S. highways to tackle sex trafficking. Reuters. Retrieved from http://www.reuters.com/article/ women-conference-truckers-idUSL1N12U2RA20151118.

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CHAPTER 15

Stakeholder Convergence: Public-Private Responses to Transnational Crime Nate Olson and Brian Finlay

The port of Antwerp is massively important to international trade. In 2013, almost 8.6 million shipping containers passed through, making it the world’s 16th busiest port; 4th beyond East Asia (Eurostat, 2015; World Shipping Council, 2016). However, Antwerp’s extensive logistics infrastructure not only supports legitimate trade but attracts transnational criminal organizations seeking profitable routes for illicit trafficking. This allure was all too apparent in 2012, when workers at the port noticed that shipping containers would occasionally go missing (Pasternak, 2013). Further investigation led to the discovery of an extensive drug smuggling ring and culminated in a major joint operation by Belgian and Dutch police. Raids of over 20 homes and businesses resulted in 15 arrests and the seizure of firearms, bullet-proof vests, and €1.3 million in a suitcase. Police intercepted shipments of almost a metric ton each of cocaine and heroin (Bateman, 2013; Expatica, 2013). In terms of scale, the bust was not especially notable. But an important twist makes the episode emblematic of the increasingly complex transnational criminal threats of the modern era. Belgian and Dutch authorities reported that a Netherlands-based crime ring had hired at least two ICT specialists in Belgium to hack the port’s IT systems to facilitate the import of cocaine and heroin (Bateman, 2013). Drugs were hidden in shipments of legitimate cargo, such as bananas and timber, from South America (Bateman, 2013). Hackers first launched a “spear phishing” attack, sending e-mails that would install malware on employees’ computers (Pasternak, 2013). The breach

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was discovered, and the targeted shipping companies installed a firewall to prevent future attacks. Undeterred, the hackers broke into offices and installed equipment such as key-logging devices, allowing them to access and manipulate IT systems at the port (Bateman, 2013). They changed delivery locations and times for drug-holding containers and stole shipment receipt ID codes, allowing gang members to pose as the legitimate recipients and drive off with the shipments (Dunn, 2013; Leyden, 2013). When another truck unwittingly picked up a container with drugs inside, the smugglers brazenly attempted a hijacking, shooting at but failing to kill the driver, who they thought was operating on behalf of a rival criminal organization (Bateman, 2013; Pasternak, 2013). The explosion of global trade and the modernization of the facilitative processes behind industrial activity are yielding undeniable benefit to millions around the world. Globalization has touched virtually every corner of the globe, connecting citizens to newfound productivity and providing new access to heretofore isolated sectors of the world’s population. Yet, this same access has also opened the door to all manner of illicit activity. The aforementioned incident demonstrates graphically that transnational organized criminals and terrorist organizations are adapting wisely to use the tools of globalization to their advantage. Just as the licit economy has gone global, so too have drug smugglers, traffickers, counterfeiters, and money launderers found new avenues to diversify their business enterprises and reach global markets. Although their interest in growth and expansion is not new, what is novel is the degree of unchallenged access transnational criminal organizations have to modern commerce. No longer are the modalities of trade, commerce, and communication controlled much less held by governmental authorities. Rather, a growing array of private companies, increasingly spread around the globe, have become essential nodes supporting modern commerce—and unfortunately, modern criminality. A producer in Malaysia, a freight forwarder in South Africa, a marine terminal operator in Dubai, a financial institution in the United Kingdom, and an insurance firm in Canada—these and the tens of thousands of similar nodes on the global supply chain have both the potential to drive legitimate productive commerce and the opportunity to facilitate criminal activity. This chapter examines evolving security threats and the facilitation that even well-meaning businesses can have offer transnational terrorist and criminal actors. It traces governmental efforts to combat terrorism and criminality both through national policy and through concerted action with like-minded governments around the globe. Ultimately, we find these efforts wanting, not due to political unwillingness, but as a result of the practical limitations of government action to combat illicit activities in a globalized economy. Finally, the chapter looks to other problem spaces to highlight models that have shown results in forging common cause between industry and government—and that could offer complementary

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pathways to cooperation with the private sector to combat transnational criminal activity. CHANGES IN THE THREAT ENVIRONMENT The global threat environment and the global economy have coevolved in instructive ways. New forms of transnational economic activity have opened new pathways for terrorism and transnational organized crime (TOC)—among the chief beneficiaries of globalization. Rise of Global Terrorism International terrorism is not new, but the nature and threat of terrorism is global as never before. The rise and spread of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) defines and best manifests this trend and represents international terrorism. It has come to replace Al Qaeda and its reach may well soon come to surpass that of the international Al Qaeda network at the peak of its power. While primarily active in Iraq and Syria, ISIS has affiliates and declared allies from West Africa to Southeast Asia. It has attracted hundreds, even thousands, of foreign fighters, including unprecedented numbers from Europe. Other groups such as Boko Haram in Nigeria and Al-Shabaab in Somalia have also proliferated, engaging in attacks at home and abroad. They have developed links to ISIS and Al Qaeda, forming truly international terrorist networks and facilitating the coordination of planning and flow of fighters and supplies. This adaptive realignment of global terrorist networks poses a heightened threat to many countries. ISIS’ propaganda and success facilitates the radicalization of especially young people around the world, creating the risk that they will seek to travel and fight with ISIS or plot attacks domestically. ISIS’ expansive control and resources enable it to train members into hardened and veteran fighters, who are much more capable of executing deadly attacks abroad. The grim evidence abounds. Just within a two-week stretch of late 2015, ISIS affiliates snuck a bomb aboard a Russian airliner bound for St. Petersburg, killing all 224 people on board (Aboulenein & Noueihed, 2015); staged a double suicide bombing in southern Beirut, killing 43 people and wounding over 200 (Barnard & Saad, 2015); and coordinated a series of shootings and other attacks in Paris that killed 132 people and wounded over 300 more (Callimachi, 2015). The reach of ISIS and aligned groups is a key threat to international security. Rise of Transnational Organized Crime Contemporary criminal organizations interact with other groups through fluid and dynamic transnational networks. These networks

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facilitate illicit trade in myriad products, including arms, drugs, people, natural resources, and animal parts. It was no longer novel, for instance, when U.S. law enforcement recently uncovered a Sinaloa cocaine trafficking network linking Latin America, Spain and then wider Europe, and the U.S. eastern seaboard (U.S. Attorney’s Office, District of New Hampshire, 2015). TOC and other illicit trafficking present several serious threats to the international community. For one, they undermine legitimate economies. As technological access widens, cybercrime in particular is growing in terms of both prevalence and concern among public and private stakeholders. Intellectual property (IP) theft from American companies is estimated to cost the U.S. economy hundreds of billions of dollars each year, dampening incentives for innovation (Commission on the Theft of American Intellectual Property, 2013). The flow of illicit products in criminal networks can also serve as a significantly destabilizing force. Violence linked to drug-trafficking cartels has been rampant, playing a role in 164,000 deaths between 2007 and 2014 (Breslow, 2015). TOC groups seize on such breakdowns in security and political authority, fostering corruption government officials and further crowding out the legitimate economy. In the interest of continued global economic growth and international security, TOC is a challenge that must be addressed. Terror-TOC Nexus? An additional trend is the increasing link between terrorism and transnational organized crime, representing a dangerous convergence of threats. Terrorist groups often engage in criminal activities such as trafficking, kidnapping, cybercrime, and more. The U.S. Department of Justice notes that one of the strategic threats posed by TOC groups is their logistical or other support to terrorist groups (U.S. Department of Justice, 2008). Trafficking in drugs, arms, and even human beings—done in conjunction with TOC groups—provides a steady stream of financing to terrorist and insurgent groups. ISIS has been known to turn to oil smuggling and antiquities trafficking to acquire funds (Federal Bureau of Investigations, 2015). Hezbollah has developed ties with the brutal Los Zetas drug cartel to facilitate cocaine trafficking, secure arms, and earn profits. TOC also provides terrorist groups with additional avenues for targeting governments. The United States is currently seeking the extradition from Malaysia of a Kosovar citizen who allegedly led an Internet hacking group in targeting computer systems in the United States and provided confidential personally identifiable information (PII) of hundreds of American military personnel and federal employees to ISIS (U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Public Affairs, 2015b). Thus, criminal networks are limited neither by geography nor by type of illicit

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activity. Indeed, they are experts at taking advantage of global interconnection and computerization in order to fund and facilitate other nefarious activities. THREAT EVOLUTION AT THE SPEED OF COMMERCE The increasingly transnational nature of security threats is strongly tied to economic globalization. Several decades of cascading liberalization in trade and capital markets have greatly expanded the availability of sophisticated materials, technologies, and expertise. The global development community has joined economists and state development agencies in coming to the consensus that foreign direct investment (FDI) yields not only short-term financial gains but also long-term economic benefits and promotes to developing countries models of growth jumpstarted by foreign investment. FDI has risen from $14 billion in 1970 to $1.46 trillion by 2013 (Olson, 2014). Companies in the developed world have pursued profits and growth through outsourcing, off-shoring, and other changes to business models that brought their intellectual and manufacturing capacity overseas. The corresponding transfer of technologies and information has led to local enterprises, including subsidiary operations, competing for global market share. States once thought to lack sufficient indigenous expertise to engage in R&D and manufacturing operations have begun to develop competitive industrial sectors. The Global Innovation Index shows that knowledge and wealth creation continue to be led by developed nations, but other indicators suggest an emerging innovation capacity among newly industrialized and developing world economies (Olson, 2014). Reduced tariff barriers and communication and transportation technologies allow companies to ship products and information around the world quickly. Supplementing the increased trade in goods has been an increase in international services, in transport, telecommunications, energy, finance, insurance, and tourism. These developments have provided greater prosperity for billions of people and enabled development of a global physical and informational infrastructure that has further reinforced economic integration. But global economic connections have empowered criminals and terrorists on an entirely different scale. Global flows of products, technology, and knowledge provide illicit actors and criminal groups with unprecedented access to the items and expertise they desire, whether that be firearms, drugs to sell for funds, or malware for conducting cyber attacks. In particular, global supply chains have become key enablers for a range of illicit activities. While illicit economic flows often circumvent the formal economy, a large share intersects at some point with the legitimate supply chain. Enjoying access to and embedded across worldwide production, trade

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and investment networks, illicit trafficking in high-tech data and equipment, narcotics, arms, and other illicit items goods encourages TOC development and provides revenues sources to support terrorist activities. Limited transparency and rapid development in areas of the global economy facilitate the emergence of criminal networks. The sheer volume of trade and international economic activity helps to conceal TOC and terrorist involvement. Transnational threats are taking root in, and spreading through, the same infrastructure that powers legitimate trade and communication. That infrastructure is both a physical and, increasingly, an informational one. Indeed, one area that has emerged in recent years as a major economic and security challenge is trade secret theft. The FBI notes that “U.S.-based businesses, academic institutions, cleared defense contractors, and government agencies are increasingly targeted for economic espionage and theft of trade secrets by foreign entities, often with state sponsorship and backing” (Coleman, 2014). The U.S. Department of Commerce estimates that IP theft in all forms and from all sources costs U.S. companies between $200 and $250 billion annually (U.S. Department of Commerce, 2011). Cyberspace is becoming the primary medium for such activity: a 2011 report by the Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive (ONCIX) notes that “increasingly, economic collection and industrial espionage occur in cyberspace, reflecting dramatic technological, economic, and social changes that have taken place in recent years in the ways that economic, scientific, and other sensitive information is created, used, and stored” (Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive, 2011). Many sources in the United States cite China as a particularly active player in economic espionage and trade secret theft. In particular, the U.S. government accuses China of engaging in threatening cyber activities. The 2011 ONCIX report asserts that “Chinese actors are the world’s most active and persistent perpetrators of economic espionage. U.S. private sector firms and cyber security specialists have reported an onslaught of computer network intrusions that have originated in China . . .” (Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive, 2011). A 2012 report to Congress by the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission claims that China “depends on industrial espionage, forced technology transfers, and piracy and counterfeiting of foreign technology as part of a system of innovation mercantilism” (Coleman, 2014). In the face of these two trends—rising cyber-enabled IP theft, and an increasingly wide belief in China’s central role—the U.S. government has moved to respond. More effectively mitigating these transnational threats without hampering commerce requires a multilayered approach that better integrates the expertise and capabilities of the private sector. That in turn requires a

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careful and creative assessment of potential non-regulatory tools. These cases again show that the complexities of today’s transnational trafficking threats are interconnected and cannot be solved within the traditional policy approaches and state-centric thinking that have dominated policy making in the past. GOVERNMENT RESPONSES: STRUGGLING TO ADAPT Over the course of the last decade, the U.S. government rhetoric regarding the need to build a cadre of business partners to promote American interests around the world has proliferated. Recognizing the limitations of government’s reach in the modern era, the president’s National Security Strategy explicitly calls upon the executive branch to work with industry in developing new so-called public–private partnerships—a voluntary interaction between governments and nongovernment entities where one or both parties draw upon the expertise of the other. Yet, while the influence of the private sector has grown, and the need for industry to play a key role in meeting global challenges has increased, despite these efforts, the relationship between the private and public sectors have become more distant and contentious. This is a very different narrative compared to the Cold War era during which American industry tailored business models to support key U.S. strategic objectives. For example, following World War II, the aerospace, defense and security sector, as well as other segments of private industry intensified their relationships with government clients to jointly identify national security needs and design profitable operational plans to address them. These innovative partnerships not only built up the U.S. military to global supremacy, they helped to put a man on the moon, and they generated game-changing technological spin-offs to the civilian sector by connecting the world through the Internet, promoting the development of semiconductors, and introducing GPS technologies. Project Apollo, carried out by the U.S. National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) is a case in point. The enormous scale of this national initiative, as well as the novel technological challenges associated with it, meant that the government had to rely heavily on the private sector innovation for its implementation from 1969 to 1972. The result was that with few exceptions, much of the flight hardware was built by private sector companies. Private companies would even operate missions. The government’s role was geared toward planning the program, preparing guidelines for execution, and overseeing the work accomplished. In short, the public and the private sector leveraged one another’s strength as NASA’s relationship with industry was oriented toward a mutually beneficial partnership serving the greater public interest

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(Dethloff, 2012, p. 137). At least in the case of space exploration, the need for a renewed public-private partnership was recognized (NASA Office of the Chief Technologist, 2014). Today, although the United States and indeed global political rhetoric has called upon greater collusion between the public and private sectors to promote common interests in countering transnational organized crime, regrettably, governments and multilateral institutions have struggled to operationalize this cooperation with industry in a way that cuts across common interests and is therefore sustainable. The United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime The UN provides an important platform for multilateral action against transnational organized crime. The basis for such efforts is the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and three supplementary protocols. These agreements reflect a growing recognition of the magnitude of the issues surrounding transnational organized crime and the need for coordinated and concerted international efforts against TOC. Development of the convention and its protocols originated in the General Assembly resolutions in 1998 calling for an international agreement to tackle TOC (U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime, 2004). The convention and its protocols draw attention to TOC as an international issue, mandate domestic measures for signatory states, and urge interstate cooperation and coordination in anti-transnational organized crime efforts. Signatories to the convention must take certain measures, namely amending legal codes to criminalize and sanction “participation in an organized criminal group” as well as “money laundering, corruption and obstruction of justice” related to transnational criminal activities (U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime, 2004). They are to implement procedures for seizing illicit assets and proceeds, create capacity-building and training programs to meet personnel needs, and share information with partners. The convention also urges interstate cooperation and proposes frameworks for “extradition, mutual legal assistance and law enforcement cooperation” as well as capacity building and training assistance efforts (U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime, 2004). Notably, the convention never explicitly defines “transnational organized crime.” Instead, the document defines “organized criminal group” as a “structured group” acting in concert to commit “serious crimes” to obtain a “financial or other material benefit” (U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime, 2004). Even as the convention aims for a convergence of international efforts, this ambiguity of terms introduces inconsistency in practice. “Serious crimes” are defined by sentence length, which varies between legal systems, and refers to offences that signatory states are to legislate in accordance with the convention—leaving different countries to pursue

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different approaches even if they make genuine efforts to uphold the convention (U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime, 2004). Beyond stipulating mandatory measures and best practices, the convention and its protocols established a Conference of the Parties (COP), convening signatory states to “promote and review the implementation of th[e] Convention” (U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime, 2004). The COP’s original aims were to facilitate implementation of the convention and coordination of anti-TOC efforts, and promoting cooperation with multilateral, regional, and nongovernmental organizations (U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime, 2004). Signatory states meet biennially to assess the effectiveness of the convention, to trace new trends in transnational organized crime, and to consider amendments to the convention (U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime, 2016a). The COP has established six working groups to address specific issues relating to transnational organized crime and addressed in the convention: smuggling of migrants, firearms, review of implementation, trafficking in persons, international cooperation, and technical assistance (U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime, 2016b). Feedback on the convention is mixed. State Department officials have credited the convention with facilitating the investigation and prosecution of transnational crimes, arguing that the convention has a “real concrete [e]ffect on people’s lives” (Nichols, 2012). Some scholars criticize the convention for several reasons, such as its failure to propose measures for preventing crime and the ambiguity it creates on how to define transnational organized crime: according to the document’s terms, a group of three “regular” shoplifters in the Netherlands who plan a day trip to shoplift in Germany or Belgium could qualify as conducting transnational organized crime by the convention’s definitions (Pereira, 2013). Others emphasize that the convention does not promote capacity-building mechanisms or account for the intensifying nexus of various threats alongside modern technologies (Council on Foreign Relations, 2013). Strategic Approaches by the United States to Counter TOC Codified efforts to curb transnational organized crime have emerged not just at the multilateral level but also from specific states. The United States, for one, has a strong interest and is in a better position than many countries to take on transnational organized crime. Compared to the UN, the United States has been somewhat slow to do so. In July 2011, the Obama administration released the Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime, a policy document expressing an approach to TOC as an issue of national security. The strategy, which notes the development of “criminal networks” precipitating a “convergence of transnational threats” to U.S. interests, sets out intensifying domestic efforts (such as investigation, interdiction, and intelligence sharing,) and cultivating international partnerships as strategic priorities for U.S. government efforts (The White House, 2011). The

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strategy also advocates public-private partnerships and building ties with “industry, finance, academia, civil society and non-governmental organizations” to combat transnational organized crime networks and encourages empowering the press to publicize the harm generated by transnational criminal organizations (The White House, 2011). Economic Sanctions by the United States to Counter TOC In July 2011, U.S. president Barack Obama signed an executive order designating four groups as transnational criminal organizations and cutting off their access to the U.S. financial system (The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, 2011). While there were many differences among these groups—the Brothers’ Circle (Russia and Europe), the Camorra (Italy), Los Zetas (Mexico), and the Yakuza (Japan)—the July 2011 directive signaled the U.S. government’s new emphasis on targeted financial sanctions as a globally relevant countermeasure against crime (Cohen, 2012). Strategic Approaches by the United States to Counter IP Theft Protecting intellectual property and trade secrets is a transnational security issue of increasing importance to the United States. In February 2013, the Obama administration released its Administration Strategy on Mitigating the Theft of U.S. Trade Secrets, outlining a plan for government approaches (The White House, 2013). The strategy outlines several initiatives. The U.S. government will work to enhance law enforcement and prevention, both by bolstering domestic legislation and law enforcement agencies, and through diplomatic efforts engaging other countries. In addition to these more public sector-focused efforts, the U.S. government will conduct outreach to stakeholders to raise awareness of the issue, and promote the adoption of self-initiated, voluntary action and measures by companies to protect their intellectual property (The White House, 2013). The U.S. Intellectual Property Enforcement Coordinator, responsible for implementing administration plans for IP protection, is to engage the private sector and facilitate companies’ adoption of effective voluntary measures against trade secret theft (The White House, 2013). The coordinator also solicits private sector input to inform future U.S. IP protection policy and measures (Office of the U.S. Intellectual Property Enforcement Coordinator, 2013, and Marti, 2015). Economic Sanctions by the United States to Counter Cyber-Enabled IP Theft In April 2015, President Obama issued another executive order declaring “malicious cyber-enabled activities” originating abroad to be a major

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threat to U.S. national security, foreign policy, and economic interests (Executive Order 13694, 2015). The directive again blocks designated entities from access to the U.S. financial system (Executive Order 13694, 2015). Notably, designated entities can be not only those determined to hold direct responsibility for relevant cybercrime but also those who support or sponsor such activities.

Diplomatic Efforts by the United States to Counter Cyber-Enabled IP Theft In September 2015, U.S. president Barack Obama and Chinese president Xi Jinping announced a bilateral agreement not to conduct or support “cyber-enabled theft of intellectual property” for commercial gain (White House, Office of the Press Secretary, 2015b). The two leaders also declared a commitment to cooperate against cybercrime, stating that the United States and China would “step up” the prosecution of cybercrime and increase “investigation assistance and information-sharing” (White House, Office of the Press Secretary, 2015b). The U.S. Department of Justice subsequently released a statement announcing that the U.S. representation in the dialogue would be cochaired by Attorney General Loretta Lynch and Secretary of Homeland Security Jeh Johnson and also include officials from the FBI, intelligence community, and other agencies (U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Public Affairs, 2015a). The Chinese representation will be led by a ministerial-level official and include personnel from the Ministries of Public Security, State Security, and Justice, and from the State Internet and Information office (U.S. Department of State, Office of Public Affairs, 2015a). In his remarks, President Obama also emphasized the importance of developing guidelines for “behavior in cyberspace,” noting that the United States and China would work together with the UN, other countries, and the private sector to develop such a framework (White House, Office of the Press Secretary, 2015b). Similarly, President Xi argued that making cyber a matter of cooperation, not confrontation, was all the more important because the United States was the strongest country “in terms of cyber strength,” while China ranked first globally in number of Internet users (White House, Office of the Press Secretary, 2015b). Reaction to this announcement in the United States predominantly focused on whether and how China would uphold President Xi’s pledge. Many analyses approved of the agreement but were skeptical of its potential impact (Bejtlich, 2015; Collinson, 2015; Hufbauer & Jung, 2015; Tiezzi, 2015). U.S. director of National Intelligence James Clapper told the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee that the agreement was a “good first step” but unlikely to eliminate “pervasive” cyber attacks and economic espionage by China (Shalal, 2015).

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PUBLIC-PRIVATE SOLUTIONS TO COUNTER TOC Our common failure to develop such sustainable public-private partnerships to meet evolving threats to the United States and global security is neither the result of unenlightened thinking nor a lack of effort on the part of government or industry. Political leaders have called for the development of public-private partnerships (White House, Office of the Press Secretary, 2014). Business leaders have recognized the shared concern over the growing phenomenon of TOC. And at least in the case of the U.S. government, tentative efforts have been made to develop cooperative approaches that leverage mutual interests even beyond immediate security imperatives. A 2014 Task Force convened by the Stimson Center identified numerous cases where government-industry cooperation would have been mutually beneficial but failed to materialize for reasons related to legal prohibitions, competitive risks, or an unconvincing cost-benefit calculus. The impediments to public-private cooperation in general are numerous—and in the case of security cooperation, particularly plagued by a lack of understanding between government and industry around their respective capabilities, resources and interests; a lack of a joint decision-making and operational capacity between government and industry that would otherwise ensure mutual benefit; lack of clarity on regulatory regimes and enforcement practices; and a lack of a regulatory environment that promotes innovation in service of both security and economic competitiveness (Cohen & Blechman, 2014). Perhaps, most important, the national security community has systematically failed to comprehend and design against the motivating incentives that yield sustained industry engagement of nonproliferation. Any future public-private partnership must correct for these previous shortcomings and essential requirements. While public-private solutions to counter TOC must be innovative, they need not be unprecedented or unique. Here, we cite instructive cases from several diverse domains where partnerships are advancing both private and public interests. Health Energize the Chain Energize the Chain (EtC) is a nonprofit organization seeking to expand vaccine distribution to remote, rural, and impoverished areas around the world (Energize the Chain, 2016). To retain potency and effectiveness, vaccines require refrigeration from manufacture to administration—a “cold chain” at all stages of transport and storage. This requirement prevents distribution of vaccines to remote regions where reliable energy is not available. EtC aims to create “economically and technologically sustainable energy infrastructure for the effective transportation and storage of vaccines”

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in underdeveloped and remote communities (Energize the Chain, 2016). The founders of EtC noted that private companies were building cell towers to spread phone coverage to these remote areas and has the resources and incentive to maintain constant power (Rubin, 2015). Recognizing the additional value inherent in preexisting infrastructure, EtC harnesses the “power, connectivity and information processing” available from remote cell towers “to power and monitor vaccine refrigerators,” providing a “cost-effective, sustainable, scalable and locally owned solution to the cold chain problem” (Rubin, 2015). EtC arranges public-private partnerships between ministries of health and telecommunications firms to implement communications infrastructure in vaccine distribution and monitoring programs (Energize the Chain, 2016). EtC currently has programs comprising dozens of sites and hundreds of cell towers in Ghana, India, and Zimbabwe. By identifying market opportunities and leveraging public interests, EtC is pioneering an innovative, less costly, and sustainable approach to the promotion of public health. Climate Change Global Forest Watch Global Forest Watch (GFW) is an “interactive online forest monitoring and alert system” that uses “cutting edge technology and science to provide the timeliest and most precise information about the status of forest landscapes worldwide” (Global Forest Watch, 2016). The platforms is the product of an extensive partnership “convened by the World Resources Institute” that comprises companies, government agencies, research and educational institutions, nonprofits and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and other organizations, who contribute “data, technology, funding, and expertise” (Global Forest Watch, 2016). Free to use, GFW offers open access and provides a variety of tools and crowdsourcing mechanisms to help users study forest landscape trends. Users include “governments, the private sector, NGOs, journalists, universities, and the general public” (Global Forest Watch, 2016). Again, by aligning corporate motivations for sales and profit from technology with government and NGO interest in a wider public space, GFW has established a new paradigm for cooperation between the public and private sectors by capitalizing on where respective interests overlap. Climate Services for Resilient Development Similarly, Climate Services for Resilient Development is a public-private partnership launched by the Obama administration to “resilience efforts” by developing nations to counter climate change (White House, Office of the Press Secretary, 2015a). The initiative includes several U.S. government

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agencies and seven other partner institutions, including the U.K. government, Google, the American Red Cross, and other organizations, that have pledged to contribute over $34 million of financial and in-kind support. The partnership will provide developing countries with a range of climate services, including “actionable science, data, information, tools, and training” (White House, Office of the Press Secretary, 2015a). The intent is to foster collaboration between partners and local stakeholders, resulting in a long-term, sustainable impact (White House, Office of the Press Secretary, 2015a). Advanced Manufacturing Capabilities National Network for Manufacturing Innovation The National Network for Manufacturing Innovation (NNMI) is an initiative by the U.S. government to advance development of “cuttingedge manufacturing technologies” (Advanced Manufacturing National Program Office, 2016). The initiative reflects U.S. government aspirations to widen American companies’ access to, and use of, more advanced capabilities in domains ranging from data analytics to computation methods to materials science (Advanced Manufacturing National Program Office, 2016; White House, National Economic Council and Office of Science and Technology Policy, 2015). The NNMI’s Manufacturing Innovation Institutes are managed through partnerships of large and small companies, academia, nonprofit organizations, and state and federal government agencies. Each institute takes a specific focus—such as digital design, innovative materials, or electronics—selected to match the “industrial, research, and institutional strengths” of the institute’s location region (Advanced Manufacturing National Program Office, 2016). Despite this regional structure, the institutes collaborate on challenges that span issues related to intellectual property, contract research, and performance metrics (Advanced Manufacturing National Program Office, 2016). The NNMI currently comprises seven operating institutes, with two more pending (Advanced Manufacturing National Program Office, 2016). The Advanced Manufacturing National Program Office (AMNPO), an interagency collaboration between the Department of Energy, the Department of Defense, the Department of Commerce, and others government agencies, manages the NNMI program (Advanced Manufacturing National Program Office, 2016). MForesight MForesight is a partnership established in September 2015 by the National Science Foundation (NSF), the National Institute of Standards

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(NIST), and the University of Michigan (MForesight, 2015). MForesight serves as a think tank for contemporary challenges facing American manufacturers and seeks to promote solutions that advance manufacturing in the U.S. partnering with companies, business leaders, scholars, and subject-matter experts (SMEs), MForesight identifies important emerging technologies and produces “roadmap” recommendation reports for the future of manufacturing in America (MForesight, 2015). MForesight comprises a Leadership Council of 30 representatives from industry, academic institutions, and relevant nonprofits, The Leadership Council oversees research and itself provides input on emerging technologies and their applications (MForesight, 2015). The Leadership Council plans to convene teams of SMEs to study prioritized technology areas and produce recommendations for manufacturing research and technology investment. Two working groups, one on technology, maturation, and commercialization and one on education and workforce development will supplement the Leadership Council’s efforts and study best practices in manufacturing (MForesight, 2015). NIST Advanced Manufacturing Technology Consortia (AMTech) Program AMTech is a grant program that aims to catalyze the growth of advanced manufacturing capabilities in the United States (National Institute of Standards and Technology, 2016b). The program provides funding on a competitive basis to promote partnerships that engage “companies of all sizes, universities and government agencies” in research on critical issues for U.S. manufacturing. AMTech was launched in 2013, and awarded a first round of 19 grants, totaling $9 million, in May 2014 (National Institute of Standards and Technology, 2014). In May 2015, a second set of 16 planning awards, totaling $7.8 million, were allocated for grantees to “identify critical gaps in advanced manufacturing technology infrastructure, and create industrydrive technology roadmaps” for solutions (National Institute of Standards and Technology, 2016b). Grants, generally just under $500,000, have mostly gone to academic institutions (such as Purdue University and Rochester Institute of Technology) or industrial technology research initiatives (such as the Ohio Aerospace Institute and ASM International) (National Institute of Standards and Technology, 2016a). While current grants focus on studying technological challenges for advanced manufacturing, AMTech anticipates future awards to support research into and the development of applied solutions for the manufacturing sector—subject to continued funding by the U.S. Federal budget (National Institute of Standards and Technology, 2016b). These examples in parallel but not unrelated spheres suggest that an intersection of interests can be found between the public and private sectors

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that goes beyond simplistic conceptions of corporate social responsibility and instead meaningfully leverage the core motivations of respective partners. Business interests in public health, in deforestation and climate change, and in design innovation are as central to their interests as they are in the public’s (governments’) wider interest. Identifying and exploiting these intersections in the field of transnational organized crime should be our central objective.

STAKEHOLDER CONVERGENCE: POTENTIAL LEVERS TO TURN BACK TOC Central to building durable partnerships between the public and private sectors is a better understanding of and appreciation for the limitations and motivations of respective partners. In a global economy based driven by the rapid and efficient movement of goods, overzealous new regulation would be unwelcome and potentially unproductive in terms of efficiency and governmental ability to enforce these mandates. It falls upon the private sector—whose interests are equally threatened—to take a greater role in tackling illicit trafficking. Utilizing the force of the market to squeeze out transnational criminal actors, rather than relying upon greater government intervention alone, could provide a balanced and sustainable solution.

Cyber Security The National Cyber-Forensics & Training Alliance (NCFTA) is a nonprofit organization based in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, that works to identify, analyze, and counter cybercrime (National Cyber-Forensics & Training Alliance, 2016). Established in 1997, the NCFTA functions as a publicprivate partnership that engages the FBI with banks, companies, academic institutions, and other private sector stakeholders. Interested groups can partner with the NCFTA intensively or infrequently and can place staff onsite at the NCFTA facility or cooperate remotely (National CyberForensics & Training Alliance, 2016). The NCFTA fights cybercrime adaptively, establishing a focused initiative for each major trend that it identifies, such as phishing, financial cybercrime, cyber-enabled counterfeit merchandising, and illicit online pharmaceutical sales (National Cyber-Forensics & Training Alliance, 2016). In the face of unfamiliar forms of cybercrime, the NCFTA leverages expertise from the private sector and academia (National Cyber-Forensics & Training Alliance, 2016). It also disseminates information on cybercrime trends to the private sector on a “real-time” basis. Additionally, the NCFTA serves as a conduit for international cooperation against cybercrime. It has provided training to foreign cyber investigators and facilitates closer

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contact between the FBI and foreign law enforcement agencies (National Cyber-Forensics & Training Alliance, 2016). The NCFTA reports that its activities to date have aided in the “successful prosecutions of more than 300 cyber criminals worldwide” (National Cyber-Forensics & Training Alliance, 2016). Other achievements include taking down the hacking forum Darkode, dismantling the GameOver Zeus botnet, identifying the source of online bomb threats against the University of Pittsburgh (Hong, 2015). Both FBI personnel and privatesector participants have praised the NCFTA model’s advantages. The FBI benefits from freer access to private sector information and technical expertise, while private sector participants are able to cooperate with law enforcement without making vulnerabilities public (Hong, 2015). Moreover, the FBI’s authority to conduct investigations enhances the ability of private stakeholders to address cybercrime. The NCFTA argues that the partnership lends an unmatched ability to act proactively and effectively to prevent cybercrime and its harmful effects. A “Code of Conduct” for Transport/Logistics Providers The impacts of illicit trafficking perpetrated by transnational criminal actors are devastating—fomenting violent civil conflicts, financing terrorism, facilitating addiction, or promoting modern day slavery. In aggregate, these seemingly disparate issues pose a direct threat to international security by weakening state institutions, suborning democratic governments, spawning violence, and often creating a need for foreign military intervention. Governments around the globe are recognizing that halting the corrosion of legitimate economies, and by extension nations’ security, may prove to be one of the greatest challenges of our era. The case of Viktor Bout is telling. Today, the notorious international arms dealer sits in an American prison after a career of selling weapons illicitly to some of the most nefarious strongmen and terrorist actors of modern times—including Jonas Savimbi, Charles Taylor, and Mullah Omar (Schmidle, 2012). But while Bout’s arrest in Thailand in 2008 and subsequent incarceration in America was a win for law enforcement, his capture was at best an anecdotal episode in a much larger narrative. Bout’s network was only one portion of an uncontrolled global gray market that continues to support the trafficking of narcotics, small arms, humans, dual-use nuclear items, and all manner of contraband. Bout’s case points to the larger challenge of illicit private actors operating within the licit commercial marketplace—often below the radar of state-driven regulatory efforts. Warlords and terrorists were not Victor Bout’s only customers. The U.S. government had itself been a client, using Bout to ship American military materiel to Baghdad in the wake of Operation Iraqi Freedom (Spiegel Online, 2010). Bout’s firm underbid and outcompeted legitimate private companies, despite the reality that it not

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only engaged in the illegal marketing of weapons but routinely carried all manner of profitable contraband around the globe, while flouting common safety and security standards (Stimson Center, 2012). The inability of the U.S. government to prevent subcontracting to a known outlaw suggests that traditional law-and-order approaches to combatting trafficking and transnational organized crime may be reaching their practical limitations. Moreover, the inability of legitimate firms to compete with these illicit enterprises creates potentially powerful market incentives for new public-private partnerships that protect legitimate private actors, while punishing illicit activities. While enhanced government intervention is necessary in vulnerable environments, the global transportation infrastructure remains largely in private hands. Domestic and international efforts to clean the global supply chain, including AEO standards and CTPAT, may be necessary, but the continued trafficking of contraband around the globe suggests that they are ultimately insufficient in stemming the inexorable growth of illicit trade as reported by Interpol and other international agencies (Interpol, Office of Legal Affairs, 2014). In this regard, the private logistics industry has a compelling commercial interest to ensure the “cleanliness” of their cargo. Capitalizing upon this confluence of interests and leveraging market access could form the foundation of a new public-private cooperation in combatting TOC in the global logistics space. Consider this: In real terms, the U.S. government is one of the largest single clients of the global transportation industry. The Army alone procures over $5 billion annually in transportation services to move equipment and service-member property (Military Surface Deployment and Distribution Command, 2012). In addition, the Defense Department reported transportation services contract obligations of almost $10 billion for FY14 (Under Secretary of Defense, Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, 2015). Together, governments the world over represent a significant portion of supply chain industry profits. Exclusion from this market would clearly be detrimental for large and small transport companies alike—whether legitimately operated or illicitly run. The private sector could ease the prospective problem of increased regulation by developing voluntary security standards designed to enhance scrutiny of cargo and filter out a greater proportion of contraband from the legitimate supply chain. The effort could become tantamount to a “Good Housekeeping Seal of Approval” among industry actors and governments alike. At present, such activities are contrary to industry interests, since additional scrutiny slows shipments and degrades the competitiveness of individual companies. As Victor Bout’s competitors learned, those willing to cut corners profit in the cutthroat industry of global commerce. By using their market position, committed governments could help reinforce positive behavior up and down the supply chain by recognizing (but not mandating) these voluntary standards and dealing only with

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“white listed” companies who choose to adopt them. A consortium of like-minded governments could leverage their purchasing power in identifying and ultimately squeezing bad actors out of the industry. Doing so would be beneficial not only for governments seeking to address pressing transnational threats but also for legitimate shipping companies seeking to do legitimate business. Over time, the standards could expand beyond government procurement to other commercial actors, including multinational corporations whose business models rely upon the safe and efficient movement of goods worldwide. Legal and Regulatory Vehicles Standardized Information Request/Reporting Tools The U.S. Department of Homeland Security oversees a network of Fusion Centers that each serve as focal points for the “receipt, analysis, gathering, and sharing of threat-related information” between all levels of government and private-sector partners (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of Intelligence and Analysis, 2016). Located in metropolitan areas, Fusion Centers “conduct analysis and facilitate information sharing” and assist the U.S. law enforcement and homeland security communities “in preventing, protecting against, and responding to crime and terrorism” (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of Intelligence and Analysis, 2016). The primary tool that Fusion Centers use to obtain and distribute information is the request for information (RFI). There is currently no standard format for issuing RFIs, making oversight and study of information sharing and service provision by Fusion Centers difficult. Moreover, each Fusion Center focuses on different operational goals within its local region and has different needs. Recognizing these challenges, Fusion Centers are working toward a “unified RFI tracking and analysis tool” (Costigan, 2015). Progress has been gradual. So far Fusion Centers have agreed on a standard RFI format, which aims to ease making and processing requests for information. Fusion Centers also utilize the Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN), a platform for secure information exchange and resource sharing. Implementation of HSIN is still underway, but Fusion Centers envision utilizing the network to support a future RFI analysis tool, which they hope will not only improve accountability but also “strengthen” the Fusion Center network and enable centers better to meet their “operational goals” (Costigan, 2015). The Reimbursable Services Program The Reimbursable Services Program is an initiative by U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) that seeks to address the impact of transborder cargo and passenger volumes “outpacing CBP’s appropriated funding

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for personnel and infrastructure resources” (U.S. Customs and Border Protection, 2016). Estimated CBP needs for increased funding and staffing to meet demand exceed increases in CBP funding from Congress and planned new hiring (Homeland Security Committee, 2015). Moreover, the CBP has identified a pressing need to renovate and update the infrastructure of the U.S. point-of-entry facilities (U.S. House of Representatives, 2015). As more goods and people flow across U.S. borders than ever before, CBP faces a heightened challenge in ensuring smooth yet secure travel and trade. Under the Reimbursable Services Program, private sector or government stakeholders such as airports and logistics companies can directly reimburse the CBP for additional inspection services at ports of entry— essentially providing private funding that cover CBP operating costs or providing new equipment (such as computers, scanning equipment, etc.) to support CBP activities, and so enabling to CBP to field more personnel, speeding up the border-crossing inspection process. For instance, partners such as Dallas/Fort Worth International Airport and Miami International Airport have additional customs lanes open, while terminals at the port of Philadelphia have additional inspectors on hand (U.S. Customs and Border Protection, 2016). At participating airports, the program and other processing initiatives have cut average wait times by almost 30 percent and have increased traveler volume by about 7 percent (U.S. Customs and Border Protection, 2016). The Standards Alliance While often quite specialized or banal, standards are an important “connective tissue” that in many cases allow more robust collaboration to flourish. Announced in November 2012, the Standards Alliance is a public-private partnership between USAID and the American National Standards Institute (ANSI), which provides standards-related capacitybuilding assistance to developing countries (Standards Alliance, 2016). In particular, the Standards Alliance focuses on facilitating implementation of the WTO Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) Agreement. Other objectives include promoting greater transparency in technical regulation and more extensive engagement by governments with the private sector in the development and use of standards. The Standards Alliance operates in 10 countries and market regions around the world, such as Mexico, Yemen, Colombia, East Africa, and ASEAN. Activities include hosting conferences and workshops at which industry representatives and government officials from the United States and partner countries discuss regulatory practices, professional experiences and perspectives, and other standards-related topics. The first official Standards Alliance event was held in Indonesia in June 2013 (ANSI News and Publications, 2013).

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These cases demonstrate how the interests of private industry and those of the public sector converge in pragmatic ways in the global struggle against transnational organized crime. By identifying shared value in a set of practical activities, industry can and has become a critical tool in our global strategy to meet this growing challenge. CONCLUSION In an era of diminished government resources to combat transnational threats, the solutions to these challenges must go beyond pursuing and incarcerating individual criminals like Victor Bout—whose market niche will always be quickly backfilled by the next unscrupulous profiteer. Solutions designed by industry, enforced by governments, and adopted by responsible businesses everywhere are the logical next step in global counter-trafficking efforts. Preventing future Victor Bouts from flourishing in the 21st-century economy will remain a moving target, demanding a more diverse set of countermeasures deployed in more agile ways. Let there be no illusion: Creating positive inducements for legitimate companies to more strenuously screen cargo, while using the force of the market to squeeze out illegitimate actors, will never obviate the need for more traditional regulation. But such efforts stand to go far toward global countertrafficking objectives, while expanding market opportunities for lawabiding companies. REFERENCES Aboulenein, A., & Noueihed, L. (2015, November 19). Islamic State says “Schweppes bomb” used to bring down Russian plane. Reuters. Retrieved from http://www .reuters.com/article/2015/11/19/us-egypt-crash-islamicstate-photo-idUSK CN0T725Q20151119#jVFzKeOyfemZh2I6.97. Advanced Manufacturing National Program Office. (2016). National network for manufacturing innovation. Retrieved from https://www.manufacturing .gov/nnmi/. ANSI News and Publications. (2013, June 24). USAID and ANSI announce Standards Alliance, new public-private partnership to assist developing countries with WTO TBT compliance. Retrieved from https://www.ansi.org/news_ publications/news_story.aspx?menuid=7&articleid=2bc2d116-462e-475fbfd7-50fb6783ebd3. Barnard, A., & Saad, H. (2015, November 12). ISIS claims responsibility for blasts that killed dozens in Beirut. New York Times. Retrieved from http:// www.nytimes.com/2015/11/13/world/middleeast/lebanon-explosionssouthern-beirut-hezbollah.html?ref=topics. Bateman, T. (2013, October 16). Police warning after drug traffickers’ cyber-attack. BBC. Retrieved from http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-24539417.

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Bejtlich, R. (2015, September 28). To hack, or not to hack? Brookings. Retrieved from http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/up-front/posts/2015/09/28-us-chinahacking-agreement-bejtlich. Breslow, J. M. (2015, July 27). The staggering death toll of Mexico’s drug war. Frontline. Retrieved from http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/ foreign-affairs-defense/drug-lord/the-staggering-death-toll-of-mexicosdrug-war/. Callimachi, R. (2015, November 14). ISIS claims responsibility, calling Paris attacks ‘First of the Storm’. New York Times. Retrieved from http://www.nytimes .com/2015/11/15/world/europe/isis-claims-responsibility-for-parisattacks-calling-them-miracles.html. Cohen, D. (2012, February 24). Combating transnational organized crime. Treasury Notes blog. Retrieved from https://www.treasury.gov/connect/blog/ Pages/Combating-Transnational-Organized-Crime.aspx. Cohen, J., & Blechman, B. (2014, May). Partners in prevention: Making public-private security cooperation more efficient, effective and sustainable: Recommendations of the task force. Retrieved from http://www.stimson.org/sites/default/files/ file-attachments/pip_public-private_security_task_force_recs.pdf. Coleman, R. C. (2014, May 13). Combating economic espionage and trade secret theft. Statement before the Senate Judiciary Committee, Subcommittee on Crime and Terrorism. Retrieved from https://www.fbi.gov/news/testimony/ combating-economic-espionage-and-trade-secret-theft. Collinson, S. (2015, September 25). U.S. and China make progress, but differences lurk. CNN. Retrieved from http://www.cnn.com/2015/09/25/politics/ obama-xi-jinping-white-house/. The Commission on the Theft of American Intellectual Property. (2013, May). The IP commission report. The National Bureau of Asian Research. Retrieved from http://www.ipcommission.org/. Costigan, B. (2015, October 30). Providing accountability for fusion centers through a shared RFI solution. Information sharing environment blog. Retrieved from https://www.ise.gov/blog/bryan-costigan/providing-accountabilityfusion-centers-through-shared-rfi-solution. Council on Foreign Relations. (2013, June 25). The global regime for transnational crime. Retrieved from http://www.cfr.org/transnational-crime/global-regimetransnational-crime/p28656. Dethloff, H. C. (2012). Suddenly, tomorrow came: The NASA history of the Johnson Space Center Mineola, NY: Dover. Dunn, J. E. (2013, October 16). Hackers planted remote devices to smuggle drugs through Antwerp port, Europol reveals. TechWorld. Energize the Chain. (2016). Our mission. Retrieved from http://www.energizethe chain.org/mission/. Eurostat. (2015, February 2). Top 20 container ports in 201n the basis of volume of containers handled in (1000 TEUs(1)). Retrieved from http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/ statistics-explained/index.php/File:Top_20_container_ports_in_2013_-_on_ the_basis_of_volume_of_containers_handled_in_(1000_TEUs(1)).png. Executive Order 13694 of April 1, 2015. (2015). Blocking the property of certain persons engaging in significant malicious cyber-enabled activities. Federal Register, 80(63), 18077–18079. Retrieved from https://www.gpo.gov/ fdsys/pkg/FR-2015-04-02/pdf/2015-07788.pdf.

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Expatica. (2013, June 17). Belgian police seize huge drug haul as hackers tracked down. Retrieved from http://www.expatica.com/be/news/country-news/ Belgian-police-seize-huge-drug-haul-as-hackers-tracked-down_379300 .html. Federal Bureau of Investigations. (2015, August 26). ISIL and antiquities trafficking: FBI warns dealers, collectors about terrorist loot. Retrieved from https://www .fbi.gov/news/stories/isil-and-antiquities-trafficking. Global Forest Watch. (2016). About. Retrieved from http://www.globalforestwatch .org/about. Homeland Security Committee. (2015, November 4). Statement of Subcommittee Chairman Candice Miller (R-MI), Border and Maritime Security Subcommittee House Homeland Security Committee. Retrieved from https:// homeland.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/11-04-15-MillerOpen.pdf. Hong, N. (2015, August 13). Private-public collaboration puts Pittsburgh at fore of cybercrime fight. The Wall Street Journal. Retrieved from http://www .wsj.com/articles/private-public-collaboration-puts-pittsburgh-at-fore-ofcybercrime-fight-1439508624. Hufbauer, G. C., & Jung, E. (2015, September 29). What Obama did and did not accomplish in cyber-espionage talks with Xi. Peterson Institute for International Economics. Retrieved from https://piie.com/blogs/china-economic-watch/ what-obama-did-and-did-not-accomplish-cyber-espionage-talks-xi. Interpol, Office of Legal Affairs. (2014, June). Countering illicit trade in goods: A guide for policy-makers. Retrieved from http://www.interpol.int/Newsand-media/Publications2/Guides-manuals/Countering-Illicit-Trade-inGoods-A-Guide-for-Policy-Makers-June-2014. Leyden, J. (2013, June 18). Drug gang hacks into Belgian seaport, cops seize TONNE of smack. The Register. Retrieved from http://www.theregister .co.uk/2013/06/18/drug_smugglers_using_hackers/. Marti, D. (2015, September 1). Developing the 2016–2019 Joint Strategic Plan on intellectual property enforcement. White House blog. Retrieved from https:// www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2015/09/01/developing-2016-2019-jointstrategic-plan-intellectual-property-enforcement. Mforesight. (2015). About us. Retrieved from http://mforesight.org/about-us/. Military Surface Deployment and Distribution Command. (2012). SDDC almanac 2012. Translog. Retrieved from https://www.army.mil/e2/c/downloads/ 253618.pdf. NASA Office of the Chief Technologist. (2014). Emerging space: The evolving landscape of 21st century American spaceflight. Retrieved from http://www.nasa .gov/sites/default/files/files/Emerging_Space_Report.pdf. National Cyber-Forensics & Training Alliance. (2016). Who we are. Retrieved from http://www.ncfta.net/. National Institute of Standards and Technology. (2014, May 8). NIST Awards 19 advanced manufacturing technology planning grants. Retrieved from https:// www.nist.gov/news-events/news/2014/05/nist-awards-19-advancedmanufacturing-technology-planning-grants. National Institute of Standards and Technology. (2016a, May 4). Funded awards. Retrieved from https://www.nist.gov/advanced-manufacturing-office/ funded-awards.

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National Institute of Standards and Technology. (2016b, August 25). Advanced manufacturing technology consortia (Amtech) program. Retrieved from https:// www.nist.gov/nist-advanced-manufacturing-office-amo/programs/ advanced-manufacturing-technology-consortia-amtech. Nichols, B. A. (2012, October 24). The impact of the UN convention against transnational organized crime and its protocols in combating crime around the world. U.S. Department of State, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement. Retrieved from https://www.state.gov/j/inl/video/202840.htm. Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive. (2011, October). Foreign spies steal US economic secrets in cyberspace. Retrieved from https://www .ncsc.gov/publications/reports/fecie_all/Foreign_Economic_Collec tion_2011.pdf. Office of the U.S. Intellectual Property Enforcement Coordinator. (2015, September 1). Request of the U.S. intellectual property enforcement coordinator for public comments: Development of the joint strategic plan on intellectual property enforcement. Federal Register, 80(169), 52800–52801. Retrieved from https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2015-09-01/pdf/ 2015-21289.pdf. Olson, N. (2014, December). Partners in prevention: Making public-private security cooperation more efficient, effective and sustainable: Staff report. The Stimson Center. Retrieved from http://www.stimson.org/sites/default/ files/file-attachments/PIP_Staff_Report_FINAL.pdf. Partnership for Public Service. (2015, January 22). Linking NASA and the private sector to further space exploration. Washington Post. Retrieved from https:// www.washingtonpost.com/politics/federal_government/linking-nasaand-the-private-sector-to-further-space-exploration/2015/01/22/d022 b34e-a24b-11e4-9f89-561284a573f8_story.html. Pasternak, A. (2013, October 21). To move drugs, traffickers are hacking shipping containers. Motherboard. Retrieved from http://motherboard.vice.com/ blog/how-traffickers-hack-shipping-containers-to-move-drugs. Pereira, P. (2013, October 25). The un convention against transnational organized crime and its ambiguities. E-International Relations. Retrieved from http:// www.e-ir.info/2013/10/25/the-un-convention-against-transnationalorganized-crime-and-its-ambiguities/. Rubin, H. (2015, November 26). Preventing pandemic through public-private partnerships. Brink News. Retrieved from http://www.brinknews.com/ preventing-pandemic-through-public-private-partnerships/. Schmidle, N. (2012, March 5). Disarming Viktor Bout: The rise and fall of the world’s most notorious weapons trafficker. The New Yorker. Retrieved from http:// www.newyorker.com/magazine/2012/03/05/disarming-viktor-bout. Shalal, A. (2015, September 30). Top U.S. spy says skeptical about U.S.-China cyber agreement. Reuters. Retrieved from http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/ 09/30/us-usa-cybersecurity-idUSKCN0RT1Q820150930. Spiegel Online. (2010, October 6). Trapping the Lord of War: The rise and fall of Viktor Bout. Retrieved from http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/ trapping-the-lord-of-war-the-rise-and-fall-of-viktor-bout-a-721532.html. Standards Alliance. (Accessed 2016). About Standards Alliance: A public-private partnership between ANSI and USAID. Retrieved from https://standard salliance.ansi.org/Default.aspx.

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The Stimson Center. (2012, May 21). Conference report: The Turtle Bay security roundtable: Opportunities to prevent the proliferation of conventional weapons. Retrieved from http://www.stimson.org/sites/default/files/Turtle_Bay_ Summary_.pdf. Tiezzi, S. (2015, September 26). 6 takeaways from Xi Jinping’s US visit. The Diplomat. Retrieved from http://thediplomat.com/2015/09/6-takeawaysfrom-xi-jinping-us-visit/. Under Secretary of Defense, Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics. (2015, September 16). Performance of the defense acquisition system: 2015 annual report. Retrieved from http://www.acq.osd.mil/fo/docs/Performance-of-Defense-Acquisi tion-System-2015.pdf. United Nations Secretary-General, Statements and Messages. (2015, July 14). Publicprivate partnerships hold key to advancing inclusive, sustainable growth, Secretary-General tells United Nations Forum on industrial development. Retrieved from http://www.un.org/press/en/2015/sgsm16942.doc.htm. U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime. (2004). United Nations convention against transnational organized crime and the protocols thereto. Retrieved from http://www .unodc.org/unodc/treaties/CTOC/. U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime. (2016a). Conference of the parties to the United Nations convention against transnational organized crime and the protocols thereto. Retrieved from http://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/UNTOC/ Publications/TOC%20Convention/TOCebook-e.pdf. U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime. (2016b). Working groups established by the conference of the parties. Retrieved from http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/ treaties/CTOC/working-groups.html. U.S. Attorney’s Office, District of New Hampshire. (2015, August 28). Sinaloa Cartel member sentenced to 16 years in federal prison for cocaine drug conspiracy. Federal Bureau of Investigations. Retrieved from https://www .fbi.gov/contact-us/field-offices/boston/news/press-releases/sinaloacartel-member-sentenced-to-16-years-in-federal-prison-for-cocaine-drugconspiracy. U.S. Customs and Border Protection. (2016, July 8). Reimbursable services program. Retrieved from https://www.cbp.gov/border-security/ports-entry/resourceopt-strategy/public-private-partnerships/reimbursable-services-program. U.S. Department of Commerce. (2011, November 29). Stolen intellectual property harms American businesses says acting deputy secretary blank. The Commerce blog. Retrieved from http://2010-2014.commerce.gov/blog/2011/11/29/ stolen-intellectual-property-harms-american-businesses-says-actingdeputy-secretary-.html. U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of Intelligence and Analysis. (2016, June 17). State and major urban area fusion centers. Retrieved from https:// www.dhs.gov/state-and-major-urban-area-fusion-centers. U.S. Department of Justice. (2008, April). Overview of the law enforcement strategy to combat international organized crime. Retrieved from https://www.justice .gov/sites/default/files/ag/legacy/2008/04/23/ioc-strategy-publicoverview.pdf. U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Public Affairs. (2015a, September 25). Joint statement by Attorney General Loretta E. Lynch and Secretary of Homeland Security Jeh Johnson. Retrieved from https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/

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joint-statement-attorney-general-loretta-e-lynch-and-secretary-homelandsecurity-jeh-johnson. U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Public Affairs. (2015b, October 15). ISILlinked hacker arrested in Malaysia on U.S. charges. Federal Bureau of Investigations. Retrieved from https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/isil-linkedhacker-arrested-malaysia-us-charges. U.S. House of Representatives. (2015, November 4). Testimony of John Wagner, Deputy Assistant Commissioner Office of Field Operations U.S. Customs and Border Protection U.S. Department of Homeland Security, before House Committee on Homeland Security Subcommittee on Border and Maritime Security on ‘A new approach to increase trade and security: An examination of CBP’s public private partnerships’. Retrieved from http://docs.house.gov/meetings/ HM/HM11/20151104/104132/HHRG-114-HM11-Wstate-WagnerJ-2015 1104.pdf. The White House. (2011, July). Strategy to combat transnational organized crime. Retrieved from https://www.whitehouse.gov/administration/eop/nsc/ transnational-crime. The White House. (2013, February). Administration strategy on mitigating the theft of U.S. trade secrets. Retrieved from https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/ default/files/omb/IPEC/admin_strategy_on_mitigating_the_theft_of_u.s._ trade_secrets.pdf. The White House, National Economic Council and Office of Science and Technology Policy. (2015, October). A strategy for American innovation. Retrieved from https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/strategy_ for_american_innovation_october_2015.pdf. The White House, Office of the Press Secretary. (2011, July 25). Executive Order 13581 - Blocking property of transnational criminal organizations. Retrieved from https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/07/25/executiveorder-13581-blocking-property-transnational-criminal-organizat. The White House, Office of the Press Secretary. (2014, July 17). Presidential Memorandum—Expanding public-private collaboration on infrastructure development and financing. Retrieved from https://www.whitehouse.gov/ the-press-office/2014/07/17/presidential-memorandum-expandingpublic-private-collaboration-infrastru. The White House, Office of the Press Secretary. (2015a, June 9). Fact sheet: Launching a public-private partnership to empower climate-resilient developing nations. Retrieved from https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/06/09/ fact-sheet-launching-public-private-partnership-empower-climate-resilien. The White House, Office of the Press Secretary. (2015b, September 25). Remarks by President Obama and President Xi of the people’s Republic of China in joint press conference. Retrieved from https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/ 2015/09/25/remarks-president-obama-and-president-xi-peoples-republicchina-joint. World Shipping Council. (2016). Top 50 world container ports. Retrieved from http://www.worldshipping.org/about-the-industry/global-trade/top50-world-container-ports.

CHAPTER 16

The Globalized Reach of U.S. Crime Policy Matti Joutsen1

The United States has become an energetic actor in transnational criminal justice. It has done so through formal bilateral and multilateral agreements, but to a surprising extent also through unilateral action, encouraging and at times pressuring other countries to adopt U.S. concepts and models of criminal justice. The chapter examines how the United States has used in treaties “naming and shaming” and economic sanctions in order to get other countries to change their laws and policies and compares the success of the United States in doing so with that of the European Union (EU). INTRODUCTION Criminal law, and by extension criminal justice, is inherently territorial. States have been concerned primarily with acts committed in their territory and have not taken action when crime occurs elsewhere. And indeed, for a long time, there was not even a particular reason to extend the reach of criminal law beyond one’s borders. Societies were predominantly static and agricultural, and people did not travel far from their place of birth. Whatever crimes were committed tended to be local. This territorial principle was enhanced by the evolution of the concept of sovereignty.2 According to this concept, the head of state exercises supreme authority within his or her territory. Other states may not intervene in the internal affairs of a state, a “hands off” principle which extends to crime and criminal justice. The United States, as a common law country, has traditionally been seen to respect the principle of territoriality. This has been evident, for example,

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in the willingness of the United States to extradite its own citizens abroad to stand trial, an attitude which is distinctly at odds with the position of many continental law jurisdictions, some of which have even incorporated into their Constitution a prohibition against extradition of their nationals (e.g., see Boister, 2012, pp. 335, 240ff.). For this reason, the development over the last decades has been remarkable. The United States has, for better or worse, become an energetic actor in transnational criminal law and criminal policy. Not that international activism in criminal justice on the part of the United States is unprecedented. For example, Andreas and Nadelmann (2006, pp. 107–119) have documented how already during the early years of American independence, some U.S. authorities have turned their attention beyond national borders, in order to capture pirates and escaped slaves. During the 1800s, the need to gather political intelligence abroad and to thwart counterfeiters served to maintain U.S. interest in what crimes were being planned or committed abroad; and at the beginning of the 1900s, the scope of interest widened to include illegal drugs and, during prohibition, alcohol. The remarkable expansion of U.S. interest in transnational criminal justice that is the focus of this paper can be traced back to the 1970s. Barry Goldwater and Lyndon Johnson made the war on drugs a political issue, but it was Richard Nixon who, on becoming president, identified drugs as “America’s public enemy number one.”3 In 1973, he declared an “all-out global war” on drugs. The use of the word “global” in this context is significant. Although the United States could (and did) try to tighten the control of its borders, make illegal drugs a law enforcement priority, and raise the level of punishment for drug offences, the cooperation of other countries in the war on drugs was regarded as vital. Drug-producing countries needed to be convinced of the importance of helping to cut the flow of drugs into the United States, and those responsible for financial centers abroad needed to be convinced of the importance of tracing, freezing, seizing, and confiscating the proceeds of drug crimes. The recognition of international threats soon led to a widening of the scope from drugs to organized crime in general and—notably—to terrorism in particular.4 The international efforts of the United States in this respect have had two elements: criminal law (including cross-border policing) and police and judicial cooperation. The United States has considerably expanded the powers of the courts to apply U.S. criminal law extraterritorially (see, in particular, Doyle, 2012a), and U.S. law enforcement and judicial processes have made their presence felt far beyond the borders of the country. Bank of Nova Scotia subpoenas (subpoenas directed at U.S. branch of foreign banks and corporations for records stored in other countries)5 and Ghidoni waivers (United States v. Ghidoni, 732 F.2d 814; 11th Cir. 1984), by which defendants are forced to “consent” to third party disclosure of documents protected by

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foreign secrecy laws have been developed. The effect often places foreign nationals in conflict with the legal obligations of their state of citizenship. U.S. agents have seized suspects in foreign countries and brought them back to the United States to stand trial. In one notable case, a sovereign country was invaded so that the head of state—President Manual Noriega of Panama—could be detained. He was then brought before a court in the United States and found guilty of drug trafficking, racketeering, and money laundering.6 This paper looks at a parallel development, the growing extent to which the United States has been promoting wider international and transnational cooperation by seeking to get other countries to change their laws and policies. In the process, the United States has used the negotiation of treaties, “naming and shaming,” and even economic leverage. Brief reference will also be made to the use of technical assistance and “outsourcing.” The EU is taken as a point of comparison. Although the EU has achieved remarkable innovations in police and judicial cooperation among its 28 member states and has used its leverage with candidate countries to encourage them to overhaul their laws and policies, it has been markedly less interested (or successful) in influencing the criminal justice systems or criminal policy of countries elsewhere in the world. THE NEGOTIATION OF TREATIES Bilateral and multilateral treaties are used to agree on the rules of international cooperation. Police investigation and criminal procedure are promoted through treaties on mutual legal assistance (assistance can be requested and how such requests are to be considered) and on extradition. Since the beginning of the 1900s, a growing number of treaties have dealt with what conduct is to be criminalized. More recent treaties have expanded the subject matter to include general criminal policy matters, such as how crime should be prevented, what technical assistance is to be provided, and the exchange of general information on trends in and responses to crime. The United States has been considerably active in the development of mutual legal assistance (MLAT) and extradition treaties. As a common law country, the United States has had difficulties in working with jurisdictions with a different legal tradition. Evidence obtained in different procedures may not be admissible in U.S. courts, or conversely certain measures or formalities that U.S. courts may request or require may be unknown to practitioners working according to quite different laws and procedures. After protracted negotiations, the United States signed its first MLAT in 1977, with Switzerland. Since then, the United States has negotiated a total of some 60 treaties, generally with countries with which the United States has traditionally had strong ties (foremost among which are the United

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Kingdom, Canada, and Mexico) but also with several jurisdictions that became of interest primarily because of their insistence on bank secrecy, and thus their suspected role as centers for money laundering.7,8 One factor in the rapid growth of U.S. bilateral MLATs was the adoption of the1959 European Convention on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters, negotiated within the framework of the Council of Europe. This multilateral convention considerably simplified international cooperation among European countries adhering to two distinct legal traditions, common law, and continental law. The United States was able to use it as a point of reference in negotiations with different countries.9 A second factor was U.S. promotion of a new tool against drug trafficking and, more widely, organized crime: the criminalization of money laundering. In 1970, as part of the Nixon administration war on drugs, Congress enacted the Bank Secrecy Act,10 which called, among others, for the forfeiture of laundered proceeds and required that information on financial transactions be made available to the authorities. Criminalization of money laundering as a specific form of conduct followed in 1986 with the Money Laundering Control Act.11 At that time, money laundering was an “invented offence,” and there were obvious difficulties in getting other jurisdictions to understand the concept, let alone agree to change their laws to deal with it. The United States approached these difficulties both bilaterally, in negotiating the bilateral MLATs, and multilaterally. In the bilateral negotiations, the United States called for its negotiating partners not only to criminalize money laundering but also to provide assistance in the restraint and forfeiture of the proceeds of crime, as well as in the repatriation of assets to the country where the illegal assets originated, issues that were markedly absent from the 1959 Council of Europe convention on mutual assistance in criminal matters. While the Money Laundering Control Act was wending its way through Congress, negotiations were underway within the framework of the United Nations on a multilateral convention on drug crimes. This provided a good opportunity to insert provisions on money laundering into text that would have a global effect, and the U.S. negotiators were active. The result, the 1988 United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (1988 UN Drug Convention) requires states parties to criminalize the laundering of the proceeds of drug offences and adopt legislation that provides for the freezing, seizure, and forfeiture of such proceeds.12 The 1988 UN Drug Convention also marked a departure from earlier international conventions calling for the criminalization of conduct, in that it also contained extensive provisions on mutual legal assistance and extradition. One measure of the success of the 1988 Drug Convention is the fact that it has been ratified by some 190 countries, almost every country in the world.

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The 1988 UN Drug Convention was followed in remarkably short order by two more international instruments, the 1990 Council of Europe Convention on Laundering, Seizure, and Confiscation of the Proceeds of Crime, and the Model Regulations on Money Laundering Offences Related to Drug Trafficking and Other Criminal Offences, adopted in 1992 by the Organization of American States.13 Of the two, the Council of Europe Convention was significant in that it expanded the scope of the predicate offences for money laundering beyond drug offences. At the time of ratification, only Ireland, Luxembourg, and Monaco declared that they would limit application of the convention to drug offences.14 For all other states parties, the scope of predicate offences has remained quite wide. The success of the United States in getting other countries to understand the concept of money laundering, and to criminalize it, is paralleled by another success story: the role of the United States in getting countries to understand the importance of responding to corruption. The United States was the first country to adopt extensive legislation criminalizing the international aspects of corruption, in the form of the 1977 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA). The FCPA was a clear departure from U.S. adherence to the territoriality principle, referred to above. Certainly, the territoriality principle continues to apply: conduct by any natural person and corporate body (U.S. or foreign) while in the United States is covered. However, the FCPA also applies to U.S. citizens, residents, and corporate bodies, as well as foreign corporations that trade securities in the United States, regardless of where they were at the time of the conduct (the active personality principle of jurisdiction, aka as the nationality principle). Although the FCPA was an important step toward decreasing commercial corruption in the United States, and the extent to which U.S. businesses engaged in corruption abroad, it did place U.S. businesses on an unequal footing with other companies, which could generally continue to pay bribes with impunity. The reduction in trade barriers during the 1980s and the 1990s increased the amount of competition in the search for business abroad (Vargas Carreño, 2000, p. 4). The U.S. disadvantage was compounded not only by the refusal of other countries to criminalize commercial bribery but also by the fact that several countries condoned such bribery by allowing companies to make tax deductions for any bribes paid to foreign officials. The United States first worked for international measures against commercial bribery through the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), an organization in which the United States has traditionally played a leading role. In 1994, the OECD adopted a recommendation on the criminalization of foreign bribery. This was followed in 1996 by the OECD recommendation on tax deductibility of bribes to foreign public officials.

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At the same time, major political corruption scandals in a number of Latin American countries15 led to considerable discussion on the need to improve public ethics, also through legislative action. In this, the United States was an “interested observer” and sought to facilitate action by the Organization of American States, in which it was a member. The result was the first multilateral convention on corruption, the 1996 Inter-American Convention against Corruption of the Organization of American States (see Vargas Carreño, 2000, pp. 6–9 for an overview of the steps leading to the adoption of the OAS Convention). Only one year later, in 1997, this was followed by the adoption of the Convention on Combatting Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions. This convention was prepared within the framework of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), in which the United States has been an active member. In remarkably short order, these two conventions were following by several others: • The 1998 Convention on the Fight against Corruption Involving Officials of the European Communities or Officials of Member States of the European Union • The 1999 Criminal Law Convention on Corruption and the 1999 Civil Law Convention on Corruption of the Council of Europe • The 2001 Southern African Development Community Protocol against Corruption • The 2003 African Union Convention on Preventing and Combatting Corruption

The culmination of the series was the 2003 United Nations Convention against Corruption, which was based on the 2000 United Nation Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. Once again, the U.S. delegation was quite active in its negotiation. NAMING AND SHAMING In international diplomacy, a great value is placed on tact. Considerable training is given to future diplomats to enable them to make their points delicately. Accusing another government of mismanaging its affairs will generally result in angry retorts that the accuser is interfering in matters that are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of the state, which is seen as a violation of Article 2.7 of the United Nations Charter. “Naming and shaming” is the term used to describe public statements that a person, corporation, or country has done something wrong, conduct which is at odds with tactfulness. It is, nonetheless, used in international criminal justice by some intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations. It is more unusual for individual countries to publicly take up criminal justice concerns about another country. In this, the United States has again been an exception.

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The use of “naming and shaming” by intergovernmental organizations in a criminal justice context appears to have been initiated by the Financial Action Task Force, a body created very much as a result of efforts by the United States.16 In 1999, it began to identify countries and territories beyond its membership that it viewed as noncooperative. The first list of “Non-Cooperative Countries and Territories” was made public in 2000.17 Naming and shaming is also used in the United Nations but primarily within two contexts: the Security Council and the human rights programme. It is markedly absent in connection with the United Nations crime prevention and criminal justice programme.18 Indeed, the discussions on review of the implementation of the United Nations Convention against Corruption show how sensitive some states parties are to public criticism. It has become quite clear that the review cannot involve, for example, the “ranking” of states parties in any way. Reports on implementation in individual states parties are confidential, with publication of the report left to the discretion of the state party under review. The secretariat reports avoid mentioning individual states parties by name. Nongovernmental organizations use “naming and shaming” much more than intergovernmental organizations. Amnesty International, with its “Urgent action” notices, is perhaps the best-known example (see Meernik, Aloisi, Sowell, & Nichols, 2012). With nongovernmental organizations, however, it may be difficult to distinguish between deliberate attempts to publicize wrongdoing (the essence of “naming and shaming”) and attempts to identify difficulties and suggest remedial measures (which is arguably the essence of civic-minded public participation). Although many individual countries do go on record to criticize, for example, the human rights records of others, it is unusual for a country to draw attention to alleged deficiencies in criminal justice elsewhere, where internationally recognized human rights standards are not at issue.19 In this respect, the United States is exceptional. In three areas, the Department of State is mandated to report to Congress on the criminal justice situation in countries around the world: on drug trafficking (together with money laundering and corruption),20 on trafficking in persons,21 and on terrorism.22 To take the annual reports on trafficking in persons as an example, the bulk of the reports consist of overviews of the situation in each country covered. Following a description of the nature of trafficking in the country in question, each national overview assesses the extent to which the country complies with “minimum standards,” which have been defined by the U.S. Congress in §108 of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act (TVPA). This is followed by an analysis of what the country is doing in respect to prosecution, protection, and prevention, as well as specific recommendations to the country. Perhaps more significantly, the annual report ranks the countries into different tiers.23 Tier 1 countries are those that are deemed to “fully comply with the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking.” Tier

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2 countries are those that, while not fully complying with the minimum standards, are deemed to be making “significant efforts.” A subset of the Tier 2 contains countries that are placed on a “watch list,” for example, because they have not provided evidence that they are doing enough to respond to trafficking. Tier 3 contains those countries that “do not fully comply with the TVPA’s minimum standards and are not making significant efforts to do so” (addressed in the next section).24 These reports on drug trafficking, trafficking in persons, and terrorism are not issued just for their own sake. They are also used in further bilateral negotiations with the countries concerned, in which the United States may offer technical assistance (such as training for key practitioners) so that the target country can “fully comply with the minimum standards.” There is additional leverage beyond the “naming and shaming” and the negotiations. Countries on Tier 3 may be subjected to certain economic sanctions or restrictions (which are dealt with in the next section). The United States may withhold or withdraw non-humanitarian, nontrade-related foreign assistance, and officials of the governments in question may be refused funding to participate in U.S. educational and cultural exchange programs. Perhaps most bitingly, the United States may threaten to oppose requests that Tier 3 countries make to the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, as well as other international financial institutions, except in respect of humanitarian, trade-related, and certain development-related assistance. 25 Such sanctions are not automatic; the president may waive them if the assistance in question would promote the purposes of the TVPA, the assistance would otherwise be in the U.S. national interest, or the waiver is necessary “to avoid significant adverse effects on vulnerable populations, including women and children.” ECONOMIC AND OTHER SANCTIONS Economic and financial sanctions (embargos, the restriction of investment, and the freezing of assets) and related sanctions (travel bans) are usually associated with international politics, and the attempts of individual nations or international organizations to influence the actions or policies of the target regime.26 Economic sanctions have long been a part of warfare, but their use in attempting to influence specific policies in another country is not new: already during the early 1800s, England imposed sanctions on countries that refused to abolish the slave trade. Sanctions may be country-wide (such as the prohibition of the transfer of funds to the country in question, and the freezing of the assets of the government), or they may be directed against corporate entities or against individuals (so-called targeted sanctions). The preeminent example of targeted sanctions is the freezing of assets of corporate entities or individuals suspected of involvement in terrorism, on the basis of Security Council resolution 1373, which was adopted soon after 9/11, on September 28, 2001.

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Up to the 1990s, economic sanctions had not been used very often, in part because they have been seen to generally be ineffective. During the early 1800s, Continental Europe placed an embargo on England, which ultimately proved very costly for the continent. The U.S. embargos on North Korea and Cuba have lasted over 50 years without the desired “regime change.” On the other hand, some economic sanctions—when combined with other factors—have been markedly successful, such as the embargo on the Apartheid regime of South Africa, or the measures directed against Liberia under President Charles Taylor.27 Over the past two decades, the use of economic sanctions has been increasing, with sanctions imposed, for example, on Syria in response to alleged massive human rights violations, and on Iran in response to its alleged nuclear programme. Targeted sanctions have been in the news most recently in connection with the conflict in eastern Ukraine, in which Russia, breakaway Crimea, and the separatists have been targeted. All in all, the United Nations has imposed some 20 country-wide sanctions since the 1990s, usually in response to armed conflicts, but also to deter the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The European Union has similarly used sanctions to respond to armed conflicts. The European Union has also used sanctions in an attempt to get regimes to improve their human rights record, as in the cases of Burma and Zimbabwe. The African Union, in turn, has imposed sanctions as a response to military coups (Madagascar and Burkina Faso). It is, however, the United States that has been the most prolific user of country-wide sanctions, with the aforementioned sanctions against North Korea dating back to the 1950s, and the embargo on Cuba dating from 1963. Currently, Burma, Iran, Sudan, and Syria are subject to U.S. economic sanctions. According to one assessment, the United States imposed some 60 economic sanctions between 1993 and 1998, and “In 1998, at least forty-two separate federal laws prohibited approximately three billion people in at least twenty-nine countries, comprising almost two-thirds of the world’s population, from conducting business with the United States” (quoted in Duncan, 2005, p. 974). The United States has also been the one that makes the greatest use of economic sanctions that are targeted at individual people, organizations, or industries (such as the banking sector in the target country). The most common targeted sanction involves the freezing of assets. This prohibits anyone from “dealing with the funds or economic resources belonging to or owned, held or controlled by a designated person” or from “making funds or economic resources available, directly or indirectly, to, or for the benefit of, a designated person.” In addition, an economic sanction may “prohibit providing or performing other financial services, such as insurance, to designated individuals or governments” (GOV.UK., 2016). With the notable exception of Security Council resolution 1373 and terrorism, in which (in the immediate aftermath of 9/11), the member states

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of the United Nations agreed to cooperate in directing financial sanctions against terrorist groups and individual terrorists; the United States is the only country that uses financial sanctions in response to criminal activity: not only terrorists and persons or entities involved in the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, but also narcotics traffickers and others deemed threats to the United States.28 It is perhaps not surprising that the United States, and no other government, routinely uses targeted economic sanctions against individual and entities believed to be engaged in criminal activity. No other country has the international economic clout that the United States does. The world’s economy may be globalized, but it continues to be U.S.-dominated, for example, in the sense that international financial transactions often have a point of contact with U.S. money markets, and international trade as well as technological services often have a point of contact with U.S. businesses. It is not just U.S. citizens and permanent residents, as well as corporate bodies (such as banks and corporations) active in the United States that must comply with financial sanctions imposed by the United States. The compliance obligation extends also to the foreign branches of entities incorporated in the United States. Some U.S.-imposed sanctions (as in the case of those imposed on Cuba and North Korea) also apply by U.S. law to all foreign subsidiaries owned or controlled by U.S. companies, and some sanctions apply even to foreign persons in possession of U.S. origin goods. As a result of this wide U.S. use of targeted sanctions, banks, companies, and individuals around the world have unilaterally been subjected by the United States to a “due diligence” requirement. They are themselves responsible for ensuring that the company or individual they trade with, or the vessel they ship their goods on, or the bank they use for their transactions, is not on the extensive list maintained by the U.S. Office of Foreign Assets Control (see https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanc tions/Pages/default.aspx). Failure to do so may lead to fines or secondary sanctions being imposed on such banks, companies, and individuals. OTHER MEASURES: TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE AND OUTSOURCING Congress has allocated billions of dollars to be used in helping other countries to improve the ability of their police and, more generally, their criminal justice system to respond to crime (e.g., see Andreas & Nadelmann, 2006, pp. 130–131, 171–172). Between 2008 and 2014, U.S. assistance to Mexico alone (the “Merida Initiative”) amounted to over $2.4 billion (Seelke & Finklea, 2010, p. 7).29 Technical assistance is provided in many forms. Several U.S. law enforcement bodies send liaison officers abroad to help in promoting cooperation in individual cases; at the same time, these liaison officers have been able to acquaint their foreign colleagues with modern investigation

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techniques such as buy-and-bust tactics, electronic surveillance, and undercover operations. So-called International Law Enforcement Academies (ILEAs) have been established, with generous U.S. funding, in Budapest, Gaborone, San Salvador, and Bangkok, and various U.S. law enforcement bodies provide training in the United States itself (U.S. Department of State, n.d.).30 Technical assistance can also take the form of military and other hardware (as notably in the cases of Colombia and Mexico), and hands-on assistance in its use in law enforcement. The United States has also, to a remarkable degree, succeeded in “outsourcing” its security and crime prevention concerns in a number of ways. Working multilaterally through the Financial Action Task Force, the United States has been able to get banks and other financial institutions around the world to adopt a broad range of anti–money laundering measures. The so-called 40 recommendations adopted in 1990, which were followed by the Eight Special Recommendations on Terrorist Financing, have broadly been incorporated into law and practice in most jurisdictions around the world. Airlines began to collate so-called passenger name records largely to manage the passenger lists and avoid double bookings. Soon after 9/11, the United States began requesting passenger name records from airlines flying to or over the United States. After extensive negotiations (where the most difficult issue was the question of privacy), the United States and the EU agreed on the transfer of such data.31 As a result of this agreement, airlines are required to submit passenger data within 15 minutes of the departure of the flight to the United States. Similar concerns on the part of the United States regarding the risk of terrorism in shipping has led the United States, through its Container Security Initiative, to require that shipping companies and ports undertake measures to ensure the security of cargo (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2015). In 2000, global standards for shipping containers were adopted, again at the initiative of the United States. In all of these cases, lack of cooperation may lead to the United States taking countermeasures: the ability of foreign banks to engage in financial transactions with the United States can be cut off, airlines may be prohibited from entering U.S. air space, foreign nationals will be required to apply for U.S. visas if they wish to enter the country, and shipping originating from unsecured ports, or otherwise with insufficient security precautions, may not dock in the United States. CAN THE EUROPEAN UNION COMPARE? Since 1995, the European Union has been extremely active in the development of national and transnational criminal justice. The focus has been almost entirely on EU member states and on candidate countries. Within this confine, the European Union has been quite successful. Individual

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member states have been required to align themselves with EU instruments, under threat that noncompliance may lead to measures taken by the commission. Candidate countries have even more extensively overhauled their criminal and procedural laws and the structure and operation of their criminal justice system, in order to align themselves with the acquis commnautaire, and be accepted for EU membership (e.g., see Bergström & Cornell, 2014; Joutsen, 2006; and Mitsilegas, 2009, pp. 281–287). Bulgaria and Romania, which became member states in 2007, continue even today to be subject to the so-called Cooperation and Verification Mechanism, under which the European Commission conducts inspections in particular of their progress in the protection of human rights, the prevention of corruption and organized crime, the independence of the courts and the treatment of minorities (see Mitsilegas, 2009, pp. 286–287).32 Outside of the scope of EU enlargement, however, the EU has had less of an impact. When the EU assumed competence in crime prevention and criminal justice matters (“home and justice matters”) in 2005, the driver of EU policies, including its external policy, became the holder of the rotating presidency of the EU. Since the presidency rotates every six months, this has hindered the development of priorities. Various country-specific “action plans” were formulated almost on an ad hoc basis. Moreover, these covered a broad range of issues, from trade and the environment to “home and justice” matters (Mitsilegas, 2009, pp. 288–289). The individual “home and justice” matters that were incorporated into these action plans (if at all) varied: terrorism, the smuggling of migrants, and drugs are examples. Over time, various regional priorities began to emerge. These were the “transatlantic partnership” with the United States and Canada (and with a clear focus on the former), the Russian Federation, the Western Balkans, the “Eastern Dimension,”33 the “Southern Dimension” with the Northern African countries,34 and Central Asia. China, India, and Japan have routinely been mentioned as individual priorities, but the discussions have tended to be trade-oriented, with “home and justice” issues receiving very little attention.35 EU cooperation in this respect may be undergoing change as a result of the growing importance of the EU’s External Action Service (EAS), which was created as of January 1, 2011, after the Treaty of Lisbon had entered into force. The EAS coordinates the foreign relations of the EU itself and works in cooperation with the foreign service of the individual member states. The EAS, if nothing else, will provide for greater coherence than “external action” that tended to vary from one six-month presidency to the next. The EU has seldom used three of the tactics reviewed above, naming and shaming, economic sanctions, and outsourcing. In naming and shaming, the EU has not been particularly active in criminal justice connections, although it, and its individual member states, has often taken a position related to alleged violations of internationally recognized human rights.36

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As noted in section 3, the EU has also used sanctions in an attempt to get regimes to improve their human rights record, as in the cases of Burma and Zimbabwe, and has been increasingly active in imposing sanctions for political purposes, most notably against the Russian Federation. However, the EU, or individual EU member states, has not used sanctions in purely criminal justice contexts, much less against individuals or corporations accused of offences.37 Nor has the EU been particularly active in “outsourcing” its criminal justice concerns. It has, of course, benefitted from U.S. initiatives in, for example, transfers of passenger name records and the improvement of the security of shipping. In respect of bilateral and multilateral agreements with third countries in criminal justice matters, the list is short. The EU has signed a MLAT with the United States (2009) and with Japan (2006), and a framework extradition agreement with the United States (2009). However, the EU has arguably been influential in the negotiation of multilateral agreements such as the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, and the United Nations Convention against Corruption. In these negotiations, the national delegations in particular of Austria, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, and the United Kingdom often presented proposals that flowed from Council of Europe agreements or from other agreements to which EU member states were parties. These delegations were able to argue that since the proposals in question were already in use among countries with different legal traditions, they would presumably also be workable in a global context. It is in respect of technical assistance that the EU can point to a reasonably extensive record. This is largely a continuation of the extensive technical assistance in which some individual European member states have been engaged: Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden, and the United Kingdom in particular. The major crime prevention and criminal justice issue covered is drugs, in line with the EU Drugs Strategy 2013–2020. CONCLUSIONS Ever since President Nixon declared a “global war on drugs” in 1973, the United States has sought to promote transnational cooperation in preventing crime. The war was declared for clear U.S. interests, in order to stop the flow of drugs entering into the country, and to trace, freeze, seize, and repatriate the proceeds of drug sales that flowed out from the country. From the outset, the United States has actively advocated for a shared global interest in this goal, a goal which has widened to encompass many other forms of crime, such as corruption and terrorism. No other country has been as effective—or could be. The United States has been the most energetic in negotiating bilateral mutual assistance treaties and extradition treaties. The United States has

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also been perhaps the most influential in the negotiation of multilateral treaties on crime and criminal justice, as shown by the insertion of references to money laundering and corruption offences into UN and OECD conventions. The United States has been the only country to consistently use “naming and shaming” in order to get other governments to change their policies in crime prevention and criminal justice, as shown by the examples of the State Department reports to Congress on how countries around the world respond to drug trafficking, trafficking in persons, and terrorism. The United States has used economic sanctions also to target narcotics traffickers and other organized crime group members; no other country uses targeted sanctions in the same way. The United States has placed considerable resources into technical assistance; $2.4 billion in the Merida Initiative alone. Individual EU countries and the EU as a whole provide extensive technical assistance to their target countries, but the amounts devoted to drugs, crime, and criminal justice issues have been considerably smaller. (In this respect, however, special reference should be made to technical assistance given to EU candidate countries.) The United Nations has even been innovative and successful in “outsourcing” its security concerns to private sector actors abroad, such as financial institutions, airports and airlines, and seaports and shipping companies. The success of the United States in doing so has been due in no small part to the unique ability and willingness of the U.S. government to supplement negotiations with the threat of unilateral measures. The United States has been able to demonstrate that many of the measures it proposes—the criminalization of money laundering and corruption, the use of modern investigative means in law enforcement, the improvement of the protection of the victims of trafficking in persons—are noble and worthwhile, and should be adopted on these grounds alone. And yet the threat of U.S. action has presumably helped to provide the needed political impetus. No other country or international actor has had, or currently has, the same combination of vision and toolkit of measures to bring about similar results. It is not clear if such a combination could ever emerge. What will be next? The United States will continue to exert considerable influence, but a combination of factors may diminish U.S. global influence in crime prevention and criminal justice. One factor is the need for innovation. It may be that the United States, together with other actors, has already created the basis for transnational cooperation, which can now be strengthened in an incremental manner. It is possible—but not probable—that nothing truly innovative is needed, now that law enforcement and other agencies have the basic tools they need. The response to this point is that even today, transnational cooperation

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remains weak, especially (in respect of certain regions, certain offences, and certain forms of assistance). Cybercrime, for example, still requires a more coherent international response; the present heated debate on security versus privacy, the need to prevent cybercrime versus the need to enhance the protection of national security, shows that much remains to be done. A second factor is the envisaged rise of multipolarity also in criminal justice. The EU may have a growing role; this is already clear in respect of technical assistance. The establishment of the EU’s External Action Service may contribute to a growing coherence in EU’s external action in respect of “home and justice affairs.” Multipolarity can also be seen in the politicization of many debates on crime prevention and criminal justice, most clearly seen within the work of the United Nations on drugs and crime. Also here cybercrime is an example; the question of conditionality in technical assistance, the issue of the review of the implementation of United Nations “crime conventions,” and the heated debate on the role of nongovernmental organizations (and civic society) in crime prevention and criminal justice are further examples. The U.S. global reach in criminal policy has been undeniable. The time may have come to find better ways of cooperating in transnational criminal policy without the use of unilateral measures. NOTES 1. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Academy of Criminal Justice Sciences, Orlando, Florida, March 2–7, 2015. 2. The concept of sovereignty is generally seen to have become crystallized in the Treaty of Westphalia (1648). See Kissinger (2014, p. 23ff.) and Philpott (2014). 3. This statement was first made publicly at Nixon’s press conference on June 17, 1971. 4. Tsui (2014) has drawn attention to how, already before September 11, 2001, both the Reagan and the Clinton administration had sought to promote an international “war on terrorism.” 5. In re Grand Jury Proceedings v. Bank of Nova Scotia, 691 F.2d 1384 (11th Cir. 1982), 740 F. 2d 817 (11th Cir 1984), cert denied, 469 US 1106 (1985). See Pell (2012, p. 253), Plato-Shinar (2014, p. 7), and Andreas and Nadelmann (2006, p. 146). 6. Many other examples of U.S. involvement in arrests abroad can be mentioned, such as the cases of “Carlos the Jackal” in Sudan (1994), Pablo Escobar in Colombia (1992–1993), Ramzi Yousef (who had planned the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center) in Pakistan (1995), and Joaquin “El Chapo” Guzman in Mexico (2014). 7. Examples of the latter include the MLATs signed with Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Saint Kitts and Nevis, and Saint Lucia. Over the past few years, the United States has been markedly successful in paring back Swiss bank secrecy and, subsequently, bank secrecy more widely. See, for example, Carvajal (2014) and “Thrown to the Dogs” (2014).

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8. See Ellis and Pisani (1985) for an analysis of the development and scope of U.S. MLATs. A listing is available at http://www.passportsusa.com/law/info/ judicial/judicial_690.html. See also Boister (2012, pp. 315–316). Boister (2012, p. 335) also notes that the United States has been very active in negotiating extradition treaties, with the tally over 100. 9. The 1959 convention is also open to nonmember states of the Council of Europe, and thus also to the United States. However, the United States decided not to sign or ratify it and began the more laborious process of negotiating bilateral MLATs. 10. The Currency and Foreign Transactions Reporting Act (31 U.S.C. §5311–5324). See, for example, Boister (2012, p. 302ff). 11. 18 U.S.C. §1956. See Boister (2012, pp. 202–204) and Doyle (2012b). 12. The 1988 UN Drug Convention supplements the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs of 1961 as amended by the 1972 Protocol, and the Convention on Psychotropic Substances of 1971. 13. The OAS model regulations on money laundering were largely based not only on the 1988 UN Drug Convention but also on the recommendations of the Financial Action Task Force (which is dealt with later in this chapter). As model regulations, they are not binding. However, their implementation has been strengthened by the work of the regional FATF affiliate, the Financial Action Task Force of Latin America, which was established in 2000. The OAS and the regional FATF do not have the same membership. The Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Haiti, and Venezuela, as well as the Caribbean states are members of the OAS but are not members of the regional FATF. 14. For a list of declarations regarding the scope of application (Article 2 of the Convention), see http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ListeDeclara tions.asp?NT=141&CM=&DF=&CL=ENG&VL=1. 15. For example, President Collor de Mello of Brazil was impeached in 1992 and President Carlos Andres Perez of Venezuela was impeached in 1993, both in the wake of corruption scandals. Several corruption scandals occurred also in Argentina, involving ministers and senior presidential aides. 16. The FATF was established by the Group of Seven Industrialized Countries in 1989, with the goal of promoting anti-money laundering regimes. 17. See Tsingou (2014). These were widely referred to as “FATF blacklists.” Since 2007, however, the FATF has moved to a softer approach, identifying “High Risk and Non-Cooperative Jurisdictions” (Tsingou, 2014, p. 172). Now, very few countries (currently Iran and North Korea) are subjected to FATF “countermeasures,” whereas in a few other cases, FATF members are alerted to “jurisdictions with strategic deficiencies.” 18. See Joutsen and Graycar (2013), which deals with the lengthy discussions on the review of implementation by states parties of the United Nations Convention on Corruption. 19. Examples of criminal justice issues where human rights standards are involved are capital punishment and corporal punishment. 20. Section 489 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended (22 U.S.C. § 2291). See Boister (2012, pp. 397–398). 21. Section 104 of the Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, amending section 116(f) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. § 2151(f)).

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22. Section 140 of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989, as amended (22 U.S.C. § 2656f). 23. The placement on tiers is explained in United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (2014, pp. 40–44). 24. The 2017 report lists 23 countries on this tier: Belarus, Belize, Burundi, the Central African Republic, China (PRC), Comoros, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Iran, Mali, Mauritania, North Korea, Republic of Congo, the Russian Federation, South Sudan, Sudan, Syria, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Venezuela. 25. Boister (2012, pp. 397–398) makes the point that when governments withhold technical assistance, they are not acting in contrary to general international law. They are simply “withdrawing a donation,” which can be described as “engaging in retorsion, non-forcible retaliatory measures of an unfriendly kind.” 26. According to the United Kingdom Department for Business, Innovation & Skills (GOV.UK. (2016), “the most frequently applied measures are: • embargoes on exporting or supplying arms and associated technical assistance, training and financing • a ban on exporting equipment that might be used for internal repression • financial sanctions on individuals in government, government bodies and associated companies, or terrorist groups and individuals associated with those groups • travel bans on named individuals • bans on imports of raw materials or goods from the sanctions target Other measures may be applied according to individual circumstances.” 27. Other examples that have been cited include the sanctions imposed on Gaddafi in 2011 and the sanctions against the Ivory Coast (see, for example, Wallensteen & Grusell, 2012). This is not to say that economic sanctions on their own can be successful. Much depends on the extent to which those implementing the sanctions can prevent the target country from finding ways to circumvent sanctions. Moreover, success generally requires a combination of factors, in particular, the mobilization of internal opposition to the policies of the target country. 28. So-called specially designated nationals. There is a considerable literature on the Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act from 1999, under which several thousand individuals have been subjected to economic sanctions; see Duncan (2005) and the sources cited therein. Reference should also be made to the 1977 International Economic Emergency Power Act, which allows measures against transnational criminal organizations that threaten the national security, foreign policy, or economy of the United States. 29. Gunnlaugsson (2014) provides more recent illustrations, showing how U.S. policing methods have been introduced into Iceland through technical assistance. 30. It is telling that the State Department website describes one of the main functions of the training at the ILEAs to be to “[i]mprove coordination, foster cooperation, and, as appropriate, facilitate harmonization of law enforcement activities within regions, in a manner compatible with U.S. interests” (emphasis added). 31. The original agreement was signed in 2004. However, it was overturned by the European Court of Justice, and was replaced by a second agreement in 2007. When also this one was subjected to extensive criticism, yet a third EU-U.S.

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agreement was drafted, and this was finally approved by the European Parliament in 2011. 32. The most recent annual reports by the Commission on Bulgaria and Romania were issued on January 28, 2015. 33. Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine. 34. Together, the Eastern and Southern Dimensions are incorporated into the “European Neighbourhood Policy.” 35. Since 2009, discussions on EU cooperation with third countries on home and justice issues have been discussed in a working group called JAIEX. 36. It may be noted that the European Commission does use naming and shaming to some extent within the European Union. 37. Boister (2012, p. 397) states that the EU has made tacit linkages between technical assistance and the suppression of drugs. This is not, however, official policy. For example, the EU Drugs Strategy (Council of the European Union, 2012) explicitly states that “When providing financial and technical support to source countries, the EU and Member States shall ensure, in particular, that alternative development programmes are non-conditional” (30.9).

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GOV.UK. (2016, March 31). Sanctions, embargoes and restrictions: Business and enterprise—guidance. Retrieved from https://www.gov.uk/guidance/ sanctions-embargoes-and-restrictions. Gunnlaugsson, H. (2014). Internationalization of US control methods: Secret drug policing in Iceland. Paper presented at the annual conference of the European Society of Criminology, Prague. Joutsen, M. (2006). The European Union and cooperation in criminal matters: The search for balance (Vol. 25). Helsinki: European Institute for Crime Prevention and Control, affiliated with the United Nations. Joutsen, M., & Graycar, A. (2013). When experts and diplomats agree: Negotiating peer review of the UN convention against corruption. Journal of Global Governance, 18, 425–439. Kissinger, H. (2014). World order: Reflections on the character of nations and the course of history. New York: Penguin Books. Meernik, J., Aloisi, R., Sowell, M., & Nichols, A. (2012). The impact of human rights organizations on naming and shaming campaigns. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 56, 233–256. Mitsilegas, V. (2009). EU criminal law. Portland, OR: Hart Publishing. Pell, S. (2012). Systematic government access to private-sector data in the United States. International Data Privacy Law, 2, 245–254. Retrieved from http:// idpl.oxfordjournals.org/content/2/4/245.full. Philpott, D. (2014). Sovereignty. In E. N. Zalta, U. Nodelman, C. Allen, & J. Perry (Eds.), The Stanford encyclopaedia of philosophy. Retrieved from http:// plato.stanford.edu/entries/sovereignty/. Plato-Shinar, R. (2014). Cross border banking: Reconceptualizing bank secrecy. In D. Arner, R. Buckley, & E. Avgouleas (Eds.), Rethinking global finance and its regulation. Retrieved from http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers .cfm?abstract_id=2479891. Seelke, C. R., & Finklea, K. M. (2010, August). US-Mexican security cooperation: The Mérida initiative and beyond. Library of Congress, Washington DC: Congressional Research Service. Retrieved from https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/ R41349.pdf. Thrown to the dogs. The Economist, March 1, 2014. Retrieved from http://www .economist.com/blogs/schumpeter/2014/02/swiss-banks. Tsingou, E. (2014). The governance of money laundering. In A. Payne & N. Phillips (Eds.), Handbook of the international political governance of economy (pp. 168–183). Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar. Tsui, C. K. (2014). Tracing the discursive origins of the war on terror: President Clinton and the construction of new terrorism in the post-Cold War era (Unpublished doctoral dissertation). University of Otago. Retrieved from http://hdl.han dle.net/10523/4771. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. (2014). Trafficking in persons report. Retrieved from http://www.state.gov/j/tip/rls/tiprpt/2014/?utm_source= NEWRESOURCE: Trafficking in Persons. U.S. Department of Homeland Security. (2015, July 19). Cargo screening: Transportation security. Retrieved from https://www.dhs.gov/cargo-screening. U.S. Department of State. (n.d.). Statement of purpose. International Law Enforcement Academies (ILEA). Retrieved from http://www.state.gov/j/inl/c/ crime/ilea/c11242.htm.

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About the Editors and Contributors

EDITORS RYAN RANDA, PhD, is an assistant professor in the College of Criminal Justice at Sam Houston State University. Research interests include fear of crime, victimization, influences on victim adaptive behaviors, and cross-cultural comparisons of crime and victimization. His recent work in this area has appeared in Crime and Delinquency, Journal of Criminal Justice, Youth Violence and Juvenile Justice, Victims and Offenders and Security Journal. PHILIP REICHEL, PhD, is professor emeritus at the University of Northern Colorado, adjunct professor at the University of New Hampshire Law School, and visiting professor at the University for Peace in Costa Rica. During his more than 40 years in academia, he has received awards for teaching, advising, service, and scholarship. He is the author of Comparative Criminal Justice Systems: A Topical Approach, coauthor of Corrections (Justice Series), coeditor of the Handbook of Transnational Crime and Justice, and has authored or coauthored more than 40 articles and book chapters. His areas of expertise include corrections, comparative justice systems, and transnational crime. He has lectured at colleges and universities in Austria, China, Germany, and Poland and has presented papers at sideevents during the United Nations Congress on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice (Brazil) and the United Nations Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice (Vienna). He currently serves as the Academy of Criminal Justice Sciences’ NGO Alternate Representative to the United Nations.

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CONTRIBUTORS ERIK ALDA is a PhD in criminology and public policy at American University. He has extensive experience working on crime and violence, citizen security, and development issues. From 2001 to 2003, he lived in the slums of Fortaleza (Ceará), Brazil, where he worked with communitybased organizations on issues related to crime, violence, and safety. In the past 15 years, Erik has conducted extensive research and published peerreviewed articles on Latin America, the Caribbean, and sub-Saharan Africa on issues related to crime and violence. He has also helped design and implement programs for the IADB and World Bank. Erik’s main interest lies in the differences in crime and security in different countries in Latin America and sub-Saharan Africa; the drivers and obstacles to institutional performance in developing countries; and how to improve the efficiency of criminal justice organizations. His dissertation examines police performance and its impact in Mexico’s municipalities. MIRIAM AMOROS BAS works as a criminal lawyer in Spain, as well as a lecturer of different universities, such as the International University of Catalonia, or the Kennedy University of Buenos Aires (Argentina), where she teaches in a master’s degree in international criminal law and justice organized by the UN Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI). She also worked as a researcher for UNICRI in 2015–2016, in the Major Event Security Unit, where she had the opportunity to contribute to this book. Her career as a researcher started some years ago when she was studying the bachelor’s degree in criminology at the International University of Catalonia (2011)—the first bachelor’s degree she got was in law (2006)—and from then on she has participated in the edition of various papers, also translating them from English to Spanish (her native language). JANA ARSOVSKA, PhD, is an associate professor of sociology at John Jay College of Criminal Justice, the City University of New York. She is also the director of the Master of Arts degree program in international crime and justice at John Jay College. Her PhD is in international criminology from Leuven University in Belgium. Dr. Arsovska has published extensively on organized crime, human trafficking, and female offenders in scholarly journals and is the coeditor of the book Restoring Justice after Large-Scale Conflict: Kosovo, Congo and the Israeli-Palestinian Case (2008). Her most recent award-winning book Decoding Albanian Organized Crime: Culture, Politics, and Globalization (2015) examines some of the most widespread myths about the so-called Albanian Mafia. Dr. Arsovska is the recipient of the National Institute of Justice’s 2012 W.E.B. Du Bois Fellowship for research examining the relation between migration, culture, and transnational organized crime.

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FRANCESCA BOSCO is program officer in the United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI). She earned a law degree in international law and joined UNICRI in 2006. In her capacity, Francesca is responsible for capacity building and technical assistance projects in the field of crime prevention and human rights protection. She has been working extensively in the past 10 years on cybercrime- and cybersecurity-related projects, both at the European and at international level. More recently, Francesca has been researching and developing programs to counter the involvement of organized crime within the field of cybercrime, as well as examining the legal implications and future scenarios of terrorist use of the Internet and cyberterrorism. She is also working extensively on countering hate speech online and violent extremism. Furthermore, she is researching and developing projects on the misuse of technology, encompassing current and future challenging areas such as supply chain security, big data, ICS/SCADA security and robotics. She has as well a solid knowledge of the impact of technology on human rights and she worked on automated profiling and the impact on data protection and fundamental rights. She is member of the Advisory Groups on Internet Security Expert Group of the EC3. She is member of the Internet & Human Rights Centre of the European University Viadrina and she is cofounder of the Tech and Law Center. ADAM BOULOUKOS is senior change management advisor in the United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS). He is a development professional with over 20 years of experience in the United Nations in both headquarters and in post-conflict locations focusing on humanitarian and post-natural disaster environments. Adam has held senior positions in the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), United Nations Office for Project Services, the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) for Palestine refugees, the United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (UNISDR). For the latter, as director, Adam’s team helped negotiate the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015–2030, the first pillar in the agenda of the Sustainable Development Goals. Adam earned a master’s degree and doctorate in criminal justice from the University at Albany, New York, with a focus on the human rights of those incarcerated. Adam also holds a postgraduate certificate in management from Edinburgh Business School, United Kingdom. He is a visiting lecturer at the University at Albany where he recently taught a course on Policing Terrorism with colleague and mentor Graeme Newman. Adam is also a senior advisor in the Canadian Partnership for Reconstruction and Development. MANUELA BRUNERO works as program officer in the CounterTerrorism Unit at the UNICRI, where she is responsible for developing

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and managing projects and capacity-building activities related to rehabilitation and reintegration of violent extremist offenders, countering violent extremism, and rule of law-based approaches to counterterrorism. Before joining UNICRI in 2010, she worked in the field of social and economic inclusion in the Balkans at the United Nations Development Programme— UNDP office in Albania, where she was responsible for the capacity development component of a program on empowerment of vulnerable communities. In 2007–2008, Manuela worked at the International Labour Organization (ILO), where she developed training modules and organized capacity development activities in the field of youth employment. Manuela holds a MA in international relations and human rights from the University of Turin, where she graduated summa cum laude in 2006. DIMOSTHENIS CHRYSIKOS, PhD, is an attorney-at-law and has been working since 2003 at the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) as crime prevention and criminal justice officer. His professional background experience includes, among others, the elaboration of the Travaux Préparatoires of the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (UNTOC) and the Protocols thereto and the United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC); the elaboration of model legislation on extradition and mutual assistance in criminal matters; the provision of technical assistance to member states; work in relation to new and emerging forms of crime such as identity-related crime, cybercrime, environmental crime, and match-fixing; and networking and development of tools to promote international cooperation. He has accumulated extensive experience in promoting the ratification and implementation of the UNTOC and its Protocols and the UNCAC. Twenty country reviews within the framework of the Mechanism for the Review of Implementation of the UNCAC have been conducted under his responsibility. He holds a PhD in international criminal law (University of Athens, Law Faculty) for his dissertation on human rights protection in the context of extradition proceedings (Academy of Athens egregia cum laude, 2002). COLIN P. CLARKE is a political scientist at the RAND Corporation, where his research focuses on insurgency, political violence, transnational terrorism, criminal networks and a range of other international security issues. At the Matthew B. Ridgway Center for International Security Studies, he is an affiliated scholar with research interests related to transnational terrorism and violent non-state actors. At New York University’s Center for Global Affairs, Clarke is an associate of the Initiative on the Study of Emerging Threats (ISET). He is an associate fellow at the International Center for Counter-Terrorism (ICCT)—The Hague. At Carnegie Mellon University, Clarke is a lecturer and teaches courses on U.S. Grand Strategy and Terrorism & Insurgency. In 2011, he spent three months embedded

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with Combined Joint Inter-Agency Task Force Shafafiyat in Kabul, Afghanistan, working on anti-corruption efforts and analyzing the nexus between terrorists, drug traffickers, and a range of political and economic power brokers. CJIATF Shafafiyat was commanded by Lieutenant General H. R. McMaster. Clarke is the author of Terrorism, Inc.: The Financing of Terrorism, Insurgency, and Irregular Warfare, published in 2015 by Praeger Security International. Clarke received his PhD in international security policy from the University of Pittsburgh. SARA CRONQVIST is a Swedish native and holds a Master of Arts degree in international crime and justice and an advanced certificate in transnational organized crime studies from John Jay College of Criminal Justice, the City University of New York. She has worked as a research assistant for Dr. Jana Arsovska. Sara was an investigative intern in the Investigation Division of the United Nations Office of Internal Oversight Services. She is currently specializing in investigating transnational organized crime. BRIAN FINLAY is the president and CEO at the Stimson Center in Washington, D.C. His areas of expertise include nonproliferation, transnational crime, counter-trafficking, supply chain security, and private sector engagement. Finlay is also an adjunct instructor in the School of International Service at American University in Washington. Finlay previously served as an executive director of a Washington-based lobbying initiative focused on counterterrorism issues, a researcher at the Brookings Institution, and a program officer at the Century Foundation. He was a project manager for the Laboratory Center for Disease Control/Health Canada, and worked with the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade. He chairs the Board of Directors of iMMAP, an information management and data analytics organization focused on improving humanitarian relief and development coordination. He also serves on the Advisory Board of Black Market Watch, a Geneva-based NGO that works to raise awareness around illicit global trade. Finlay also sits on the Editorial Board of Global Security, a journal of health, science and policy published by Routledge, Taylor & Francis. Finlay has authored and coauthored numerous books, monographs, and reports and is widely published in academic and policy journals and magazines. He is frequently asked to provide expert analysis and commentary on transnational and development challenges to media outlets around the world. SALOMÉ FLORES SIERRA FRANZONI is coordinator of the Center of Excellence for Statistical Information of Government, Public Security, Victimization and Justice, joint project of the National Institute of Statistics and Geography of Mexico and the United Nations Office on Drugs and

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Crime. Prior to this position, she served as an advisor to the vice-presidency of public security, justice and controller affairs at INEGI dealing with issues related to victimization surveys and public security statistics. Previously held several positions in the Secretariat of Public Administration. She holds a degree in international relations from the University of the Americas—Puebla, a Law Studies from the National Autonomous University of Mexico, a master’s in public administration from the University of Canberra and graduate diplomas on applied statistics and strategic management from the Instituto Tecnológico Autonomous of Mexico. Internationally, she has participated in several programs on public security, corruption, and government reform as International Leadership Visitors Program of the U.S. Department of State and she has been Chevening Fellow at the University of Bradford in the United Kingdom. ALEJANDRA GÓMEZ-CÉSPEDES, PhD, MSc Econ, is a senior project coordinator at the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Liaison and Partnership Office in Mexico. Her knowledge and expertise lie in the areas of crime statistics and economic and organized crime. She has worked at the UNODC Headquarters in Vienna under the Global Programme against Transnational Organized Crime; the Andalusian Institute of Criminology at the University of Malaga, Spain; and at the UNODCINEGI Center of Excellence on Statistics on Governance, Public Safety, Victimization and Justice. She has been an evaluator of the 7th Framework Programme (FP7) of the European Commission and has served as a consultant for the European Commission, the European Parliament, and the National Institute of Justice (NIJ) at the United States Department of Justice. Also, she has been a Spanish national correspondent for the Global Integrity Report (based in Washington, D.C.), and for the Center for the Study of Democracy (CDS) based in Sophia, Bulgaria. Her academic work has been published by Routledge, Luchterhand, Springer, Ashgate, WODC, Tirant lo Blanch, La Ley, and the State Official Bulletin (BOE) from the government of Spain. She has also published in peer-reviewed academic journals from Sage and Springer. Her current project is taking place in the Mexican state of Chihuahua and focuses on the implementation of anti-corruption and citizen security policies across various cities. GARY HILL is the chief executive officer of CEGA Services, which works internationally in providing secretariat, consulting and editorial services, and president of Contact Center, Inc., a private, nonprofit, international information and referral clearinghouse working in the areas of human services, criminal justice, and illiteracy. Gary serves as the director of Staff Training and Development of the International Prison and Corrections Association. In cooperation with the Arab Security Studies and Training Center in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, Gary wrote the handbook on the “Religious

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Rights, Duties and Customs of Muslim Prisoners.” He has produced more than 40 draft training manuals for the United Nations or specific nations. Gary’s assignment with the Best Practices Unit of the United Nations Office of Peacekeeping Operations resulted in a Lessons Learned document and a Guidance Manual for use by UN personnel and consultants who may be asked to serve in Peacekeeping Operations. He served on the Committee of Experts with the review and updating of the UN Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Offenders (Mandela Rules) and for the development of the rules on the treatment of women offenders (Bangkok Rules). MATTI JOUTSEN, PhD, is the director of the European Institute for Crime Prevention and Control, affiliated with the United Nations (HEUNI). He has earlier served, among other positions, as lower court judge in Finland, as a criminologist at Finland’s Research Institute of Legal Policy, and as interregional advisor for the United Nations crime prevention and criminal justice program. His many publications and papers deal among other issues with victim policy, prosecutorial decision-making, corruption, economic crime, organized crime, juvenile delinquency, and noncustodial sanctions. His focus since the 1990s has been on transnational police and judicial cooperation, in particular within the context of the United Nations, the European Union, and other international structures. He continues to be active in the work of the United Nations in this field and has served for example as vice-chairperson at the three most recent quinquennial UN Crime Congresses, in 2005, 2010, and 2015. FRANCESCO MARELLI, PhD, has worked for the United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI) since 2003. As the Head of Unit, he is responsible for the advocacy and promotion of innovative international strategies to combat organized crime and terrorism, including the implementation of the European Union CBRN Centres of Excellence, a network of regional initiatives that promote and support the development and implementation of a national chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear policy. He received a PhD from the School of History of the University of Leeds in 2002. He is author of several UNICRI publications. DUCCIO MAZARESE is program officer of the Major Events Security Programme at the United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI). Since 2004, he has been working for UNICRI within the Security Governance/Counterterrorism Unit. Prior to that, he joined as a consultant other international and nongovernmental organizations as well as private companies. Mr. Mazarese received his LLB degree from the University of Turin (Italy) in 2001, a master’s degree in

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About the Editors and Contributors

management of development from the International Labour Organization (ILO) in 2003 and an LLM degree from the University of California, Hastings College of Law (USA) in 2007. As part of University exchange programs, he took courses at the University of the Basque Country (Spain) in 1998 and at the University of Buenos Aires (Argentina) in 2000. LYDA FONTES MCCARTIN is a professor at the University of Northern Colorado’s James A. Michener Library. As Head of Information Literacy & Undergraduate Support, she leads a team of innovative librarians recognized as a Best Practices Exemplary Program in Pedagogy by the Association of College and Research Libraries. Since 2008, she has served as the liaison to Criminology and Criminal Justice (CCJ) at the University of Northern Colorado. In this role, she advocates for funding and resources for students and faculty, provides research consultation for undergraduate and graduate students, and teaches LIB 160: Criminal Justice Library Research. She also conducts research with CCJ faculty; the most recent published in Journal of Academic Librarianship titled Student Perceptions of a Required Information Literacy Course on Their Success in Research & Writing Intensive Criminal Justice Courses. Her research interests include assessment of student learning, critical pedagogy, and information literacy in criminal justice. NATE OLSON is director of the Trade in the 21st Century program (Trade21) at the Stimson Center. He leads a number of research and outreach efforts that aim to better align the global economy’s regulatory frameworks, private sector business models, and the public interest agenda. He is a member of several public-private initiatives to address issues spanning trade policy, transnational crime, and private sector compliance and due diligence frameworks. He writes and comments frequently on trade and public policy issues in a wide range of media. His current areas of interest include the substantive and institutional scope of trade regimes; cyber governance and the digital economy; international tax issues; the “responsible business conduct” agenda; and medium- and long-term strategies of global firms. Olson led a landmark Stimson collaboration on trade issues with hundreds of senior industry leaders and practitioners from the manufacturing, financial services, and transport/ logistics sectors. Together they identified targeted steps for businesses and policy makers to enhance both economic competitiveness and the security and resilience of global value chains. Olson previously served as director of government relations for the Project on National Security Reform. JACLYN T. SAN ANTONIO is a PhD candidate at the University of Toronto in Canada, pursuing a collaborative degree with the Department of Social Justice Education and the Comparative International and

About the Editors and Contributors

345

Development Education Centre. Her research interests are in natural disasters in the Global South, state crime, social justice, environmental justice, and international development. Her doctoral work focuses on natural disasters in the Philippines and explores issues of global inequality, poverty, structural violence, and state crime. Jaclyn also has a background in community development, previously working in the nonprofit sector to lead frontline service providers in developing policies, programs, and services for marginalized populations affected by violence and poverty. She is currently conducting fieldwork with disaster survivors in Tacloban, Leyte, the epicenter of one of the worst natural disasters in Philippine history—Super Typhoon Haiyan/Yolanda. JAYANT SANGWAN is an associate program officer who has been working with United Nations for more than six years in areas such as CBRN risk mitigation and security governance. He holds a law degree and a master’s degree in international crime and justice. He has been involved in the implementation of several projects that focus on understanding the security risks associated with technological advancements and the convergence of technologies, as well as how emerging technologies can be used for the purposes of reinforcing security. MADLEEN SCATENA is a young professional with a background in international criminal, human rights and humanitarian law, and international relations with a special focus on counterterrorism and security issues in general. She also has expertise in refugee law, migration, and statelessness. Madleen successfully completed two bachelor studies at the University of Groningen with a thesis on the classification of Hezbollah, and another on insurgency groups under the Geneva conventions. She then earned a LLM at University of Turin in International Crime and Justice with academic work on the voluntary destruction of cultural heritage. She engaged in extensive research about foreign terrorist fighters during a six-month UN internship and afterward analyzed challenges refugees are facing in Europe especially in the context of security measures, public opinion, and topics such as sexual and gender-based violence, unaccompanied and separated children, reception centers and LGBTI at the UN refugee agency and as a research assistant at the Global Health Law institute in a project analyzing the term of vulnerability in terms of refugees and migrants. Currently, she is looking into the nexus of terrorism/ radicalization and refugees especially in camps and plans a research stay in Myanmar. ALBERT SCHERR is a professor of law at University of New Hampshire School of Law. He chairs the school’s International Criminal Law & Justice

346

About the Editors and Contributors

Program, an online master’s and LLM program focused on transnational law. He is a frequent presenter at the annual conference of the European Society of Criminology on issues surrounding both transnational law and online pedagogy. ELISE VERMEERSCH is graduated in law; she holds a double master’s degree in new technologies law (Lille University, France/Murcia University, Spain) and received a diploma in intellectual property law (Lille University, France). She is currently working as a project associate within the Emerging Crimes Unit of the United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI) and as a visiting fellow at the United Nations University Sustainable Cycles Programme (UNU-ViE SCYCLE). Ms. Vermeersch is specifically involved in numerous applied research programs and capacity-building activities related to environmental crime, illegal trafficking of goods and products, supply chain security, organized crime, and other issues such as cybersecurity and counterterrorism. She has contributed to various books, articles, and reports and is currently working on several European and international projects. YULIYA ZABYELINA, PhD, is an assistant professor in the Department of Political Science at John Jay College of Criminal Justice, City University of New York (CUNY). Before moving to the United States, she held a postdoctoral position at the University of Edinburgh School of Law and lectured at Masaryk University in the Czech Republic. Throughout these appointments, she has taught a diverse curriculum both at undergraduate and graduate levels and developed interdisciplinary interests in transnational organized crime and corruption with a regional focus on countries of the former Soviet Union. She has been recognized with several professional awards, including the Newton Fellowship (2013), Sage Junior Faculty Teaching Award (2015), Aleksanteri Institute Visiting Scholars Fellowship (2015), and Donald EJ MacNamara Junior Faculty Award (2016).

Index

Aarhus model, 95–96 Abaaoud, A., 85 Abu Sayyaf Group, funding for, 150 Academic journals, transnational crime research, 18–19; Global Crime, 18; Journal of Art Crime, 19; Journal of Human Trafficking, 19; Maritime Policy & Management, 19; Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 19; Trends in Organized Crime, 19 Administration Strategy on Mitigating the Theft of U.S. Trade Secrets, 300 Advanced Manufacturing National Program Office (AMNPO), 304 Afghanistan, opium trade and Taliban financing, 157–61 African Development Bank (AfDB), 249, 250 African Wildlife Foundation, 282 African Youths Initiatives on Crime Prevention (AYICRIP), 278 AFRICOM (International Council of African Museums), 281 Agent Orange, 177 Alacs, E., 47 All-of-society approach, 142

Al Qaeda, 93, 284, 293; funding for, 149–50, 155 Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), 155 Al-Shabaab, 293 American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS), 237 American National Standards Institute (ANSI), 310 American Red Cross, 304 Amnesty International, 134, 323 AMTech, 305–6 Andreas, P., 318 Annan, K., 138 Annis, R., 135 Antiquities Coalition, 281 Antiseptic-attack technology, 107–8 Anti-Slavery International, 282–83 Apple, 245 Ask.fm, 88 Assessing transnational organized crime: results of a pilot survey (study), 25–28; contributions of, 26; data flaws with, 27; obstacles of, 26–27; overview of, 25–26; recommendations, 27–28

348 Australia: “Foreign Fighters” Bill, 92; “LivingSafeTogether” initiative, 97; returning FTFs and, 92; social media and FTFs in, 94; wildlife trafficking in, 47, 49 Autonomous AI, Big Data Analytics and, 246 Bakara Market, 151 Bank Secrecy Act, 320 Barrett, R., 89 Basel Action Network (BAN), 176 Bayesian analysis, 237, 238 Belgium: Coordinating Body for Threat Analysis, 97; waste trafficking and, 50; wildlife trafficking in, 49 Benign crime displacement, 71 Berrebi, C., 131 Bertelsen, P., 95–96 Bharatiya Kisan Union, 173 Bia, M., 262, 263 Big Data: Big Data Analytics, 236–39; defined, 235; four Vs of, 244; ownership/control of, 244–45; to predict and anticipate crimes, 241–42; security applications for, 239; technologies, 236–37 Big Data Analytics, 235–47; abuse of, 245–46; applications for, 238; Artificial Intelligence and, 244; autonomous AI and, 246; Big Data and, 236–39; CBRN agents and, 243; challenges, 247; crime research/analysis concept and, 243–44; defined, 235; to detect financial crimes, 242; for domestic/transnational criminal investigations, 240–41; international criminal justice and, 240; major events security and, 242–43; to monitor organized crime/terrorism, 239–40; organized crime/terrorism misuse of, 246; overview of, 235–36; to predict and anticipate crimes, 241–42; scientific community use of, 239; security implications of, 244– 46; for strategic planning, 242;

Index technologies, 237–38; use of, to improve security, 239–44 Bisschop, L., 50 Blackfish, 282 Blaikie, P., 131 Boko Haram, 293 Bout, V., 307–8, 311 Bowers, K. J., 71, 72 Bowling, B., 75 Britain, returning FTFs and, 93 Brookings Institution, 240 Brothers’ Circle, 300 Broude, T., 75 Bump, N. M., 58 Buss, T. F., 136 Byman, D., 87, 88, 101, 156 Cameroon, waste trafficking and, 50 Camorra, 300 Canada: Counter-Terrorism Capacity Building Programs, 93–94; cybercrime in, 52–53, 54; peace bond, 93; wildlife trafficking in, 49 Canetti-Nisim, D., 45 Cannon, T., 130–31 Cantor, J. D., 77 Capability trap, 251 Carter, A., 107 Cassandra, 236 CBRN. See Chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear substances (CBRN) Central Asia, sexual exploitation trafficking in, 56 Centre for Democratic Culture, 96 Centre for Information and Research on Organized Crime, 7 Charlie Hebdo attacks, 85 Chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear substances (CBRN), 243 Children, sexual exploitation trafficking of, 57–58 China, wildlife trafficking in, 49 Choo, K., 76–77 Chouvy, R. A., 77 Citizen patrol programs, 284–85 Civil society, 276 Clack, W., 48

Index Clapper, J., 301 Clarke, R. V., 73 Climate Services for Resilient Development, 303–4 Clinton, H., 46 Collateral unintended consequences, 77–78 Comey, J., 160 Commission of Women for Victims (KOFAVIV), 134 Communities Inc., Nottingham, United Kingdom, 280 Composite Organized Crime Index (COCI), 28–30 Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA), 110; protected computer, defined, 111 Conference of the Parties (COP), 299 Conference of the Parties to the United Nations (UN) Framework Convention on Climate Change (COP21), 167 Conferences of the States Parties, 286–87 Conflict diamonds crises, 175 Conflicts, environmental crimes in, 175–77 Connect, 242 Controlled delivery, 201 Convention on Combatting Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions, 322 Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES), 9, 281 Cooperative Cyber Defense Centre of Excellence (CCD COE), 121 Cornish, D. B., 73 Cosa Nostra, 284 Costs: companies/individuals, for environmental crimes, 173–74; state, for environmental crimes, 172–73 Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime, 115, 202 Countering Violent Extremism (CVE), 100

349 Counterterrorism Fusion Centre, 101 CRED. See World Collaborating Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED) Crime, Law and Social Change (journal), 22 Crime convergence, 178 Crime/criminal organization displacement, 67–79; crime control benefits, diffusion of, 77–78; crime type displacement as, 70; described, 69; familiarity decay hypothesis and, 70; measuring, 71–72; offender displacement as, 70; origins of, 68–69; outcomes, 71; overview of, 67–68; SCP framework, applying to organized crime, 72–75; spatial displacement as, 69, 70; tactical displacement as, 70; target displacement as, 70; temporal displacement as, 70; of transnational organized crime, 75–77; types of, 69–71 Crime prevention programs, NGOs and, 278–80 Crime scripts, 73 Crime Stoppers International, 280 Crime type displacement, as crime displacement type, 70 Criminal foraging concept, 74 Criminal justice reform, multilateral development institutions investment in, 252–56; by country, 255; objectives of, 256; as percentage of total multilateral investment aid, 256; by region, 254; by year, 253 Criminal justice systems: actors and sectors of, 250; development link with, 250–52; funding gaps and efficacy of, 252; longer-term interventions in, 251; short-term interventions in, 251 Crowdsourced data, transnational crime research, 16–18; database of worldwide terrorism incidents, 17; Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), 17; Havocscope: Global Black Market Information, 17–18; I Paid a

350 Bribe, 18; Rutgers Gray Literature Database, 16; Ted Talks, 17 Cukier, K., 243–44 Customs and Border Protection (CBP), 309–10 Cyber attacks, 105–23; state-sponsored cyber attacks, U.S. criminal justice system and; as antiseptic-attack technology, 107–8; categories of, 106; chargeable as terrorism, 111; examples of, 105–6; Federal Wire Fraud Act, 109; historical context of, 107; international criminal justice system and, 114–16; introduction to, 106–8; United States declaration of war, rules for, 116–22; U.S. criminal justice system and state-sponsored, 108–14; use of force and, 119–20. See also State-sponsored cyber attacks, international criminal justice system and Cybercrime: defined, 52; identity theft/fraud, 52–55; victims, treatment of, 52–55 Cyber Crime Awareness Society, India, 279 Cyber Defense Management Authority, 121 Cyber operations, 118; use of force and, 118–19 Cyber war, defining, 119 Cyclone Nargis, 129 Czech Republic, waste transportation in, 51 Dabiq (ISIL magazine), 85 Darkode, 307 Database of worldwide terrorism incidents, 17 Databases/crowdsourced data, transnational crime research, 16–18; database of worldwide terrorism incidents, 17; Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), 17; Havocscope: Global Black Market Information, 17–18; I Paid a Bribe, 18; Rutgers Gray Literature Database, 16; Ted Talks, 17 Data fusion, 237, 238

Index Data integration, 237, 238 Data mining, 237–38 D-Company gang, 154 De Cássia Biason, R., 285 De Kerchove, G., 99 Democratic Republic of the Congo, waste trafficking and, 50 Denmark: Aarhus model in, 95–96; returning FTFs and, 95 Development/criminal justice system reform link, 250–52 Development Policy Loans (DPLs), 256 Diffusion of benefits, crime displacement and, 71 Digest of Organized Crime Cases, 195 Direct Action against Drugs (DAAD), 154 Direct unintended consequences, 77–78 Disaster/conflict nexus, 131–33 Disaster rape, 131 Disaster risk reduction, 127–43; conceptual framework, 129–31; disaster/conflict nexus, 131–33; Haiti earthquake, 2010, 133–38; introduction to, 127–28; Sendai Framework, 138–43; statistical overview, 128–29 Disasters: components to, 130; criteria for, 128; definition for, 130; forms of, 130; human vulnerabilities to, 130–31 Division of Environmental Law and Convention (DELC), UNEP, 9 Domestic/transnational criminal investigations, Big Data Analytics for, 240–41 Doseresponse, 262 Drone warfare, 108 Duvalier, F., 137 Duvalier, J-C., 137 Dynamic and 24/7 public data, 243–44 Early Pursuit against Organized Crime Using Environmental Scanning, the Law and Intelligence Systems (ePoolice), 242 Eastern Europe, sexual exploitation trafficking in, 56

Index EBSCOhost, 40 Economic globalization, TOC and, 295–97 Economic sanctions, 324–26 Economist, The, 179 Edwards, A., 73 EFFACE project, 172, 174, 178 Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA), 109–10 Electronic Espionage Act (EEA), 110 Electronic Evidence Module, 202 End Child Prostitution, Child Pornography, and Trafficking of Children for Sexual Purposes (ECPAT), 283 Energize the Chain (EtC), 302–3 England and Wales: cybercrime in, 52–53, 54 Environmental crimes, 167–81; companies/individuals costs for, 173–74; in conflicts, 175–77; defined, 46; hazardous waste, 170; health and, 169–71; national/ regional stability and security, 174–75; organized crime/terrorist group involvement in, 177–80; overview of, 167–69; pesticides, 169–70; precious metals and gemstones, 171; socioeconomic development, supply chain security and, 171–73; state costs for, 172–73; study recommendations, 180–81; types of, 46–47; victims, treatment of, 46–51; wildlife trafficking as, 47–50 Environmental Investigation Agency, 46 EPoolice (Early Pursuit against Organized Crime Using Environmental Scanning, the Law and Intelligence Systems), 242 Europe, cybercrime in, 53–54 European Convention on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters, 320 European Crop Protection Association (ECPA), 172 European Organization for Nuclear Research (CERN), 239

351 European Union (EU): bilateral and multilateral agreements, 329; Cooperation and Verification Mechanism, 328; counterterrorism matters in, 99; EU Passenger Name Record, 99; External Action Service (EAS), 328; Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) Council, 99; national/ transnational criminal justice, 327–29; protection to victims of crime, 42; response to FTFs, 98–100; technical assistance, 329 European Union Agency for Network and Information Security (ENISA), 239, 246 Europol, 277 EU-SEC, 211 EU-SEC II, 211 EXIT (Swedish program), 280 Extradition treaties, 319 Facebook, 5, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 16, 17, 18, 88, 94, 245 Familiarity decay hypothesis, crime displacement and, 70 Farhat, A., 154 Farhat, H., 154 Farrell, G., 78 Farrington, D. P., 35 Fatton, R., 135–36, 137 Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), 17, 237 Felson, M., 74 Ferris, E., 134 Ferro-Ribeiro, S., 134 Financial Action Task Force, 323, 327 Financial crimes, Big Data Analytics to detect, 242 Financial sanctions, 324–26 Financial Transparency Coalition, 283 First sector, 276 FIS, 277 Flickr, 3, 8, 9, 11, 12 Flipboard, 3, 10 Focused terrorism target selections, 44 Forastiere, F., 51 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), 321

352 Foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs), 86; past and present, 87–89; social media and, 88–89, 94. See also Returning foreign terrorist fighters France, waste management in, 51 Fraser, C., 7 Freedom from Fear (magazine), 8 Freedom of association, 284 Friesendorf, C., 77 FTFs. See Foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs) Furnese, H., 236 Fusion Centers, 309 GameOver Zeus botnet, 307 Gardner, A., 136 Gates, B., 246 Geneva Convention, war definition of, 120 Georges, A., 47 German Violence Prevention Network, 280 Germany: HAYAT project in, 96–97; returning FTFs and, 92, 95; social media and FTFs in, 94; waste trafficking and, 51 Ghana, waste trafficking and, 50 Ghani, A., 159 Gibbs, A. D., 58–59 Giustozzi, A., 157 Global Crime (journal), 18, 22 Global Forest Watch (GFW), 303 Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime, 7, 284 Global Innovation Index, 295 Global Integrity, 283 Global terrorism, rise in, 293 Global Witness campaigns, 283 Goldwater, B., 318 Google, 94, 304 Google+, 3, 9, 10, 11, 13, 16, 17, 18 Google Earth, 246 GoogleScholar, 40 Gozdziak, E., 58 Grabosky, P. N., 73–74 Great East Japan earthquake and tsunami, 2011, 138 Greenpeace, 282 Guerette, R. T., 69, 71

Index Hadfi, B., 90 HADOOP, 236 Haitian Women’s Solidarity, 134 Haiti earthquake, 2010, 127, 129, 133–38; aftermath effects of, 133–36; electoral fraud following, 135–36; eviction fears following, 134–35; gender inequality as aftermath cause, 136–37; internal displacement from, 133–34; overview of, 133; political turmoil as aftermath cause, 137; poverty as aftermath cause, 136; sexual violence following, 134, 136–37 Hamas, 154–55 Handbook on Identity-Related Crime, 195 Handbook on the International Transfer of Sentenced Persons, 195 Haqqani network, 158–59 Hard approach to dealing with returning FTFs, 92–94 Harm production, 75 “Hate Crime, Communities in Control” project, 280 Havocscope: Global Black Market Information, 17–18 Hawking, S., 246 HAYAT project, Germany, 96–97 Hazardous waste, 170 Health, environmental security and, 169–71 HealthMap, 243 Hegghammer, T., 87 Henson, B., 54 Hezbollah, 154–55 Hirano, K., 263 Hoffman, S. M., 130 Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN), 309 Hong Kong, waste trafficking and, 50 House Project, 212 Human Rights Watch, 13–14 Human trafficking: defined, 55; for sexual exploitation, 56–59; victims, treatment of, 55–59 Hungary, waste management in, 51 Hurricane Katrina, 131 Hyogo Framework, 139–40

Index Iatrogenesis concept, 75–76 Ibrahim, D., 154 ICPSR. See Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR) ICVS. See International Crime Victim Survey (ICVS) Identity Theft and Assumption Deterrence Act (ITADA), 110–14 Identity theft/fraud victims, 52–55 Illicit pesticides, 169–70 Image recognition, 237, 238 IMB. See International Maritime Bureau (IMB) Imbens, G. W., 263 IMO. See International Maritime Organization (IMO) India: cybercrime in, 52–53, 54; wildlife trafficking in, 49 Indian Ocean tsunami, 127, 129, 131, 139 Indiscriminate terrorism target selections, 44 Indonesia, wildlife trafficking in, 49 Instagram, 3, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 17 Institute for Economics and Peace, 43 Institute for War and Peace Reporting (IPWR), 176–77 Insurgency: defined, 155; vs. terrorism, 155–56 Intellectual Property (IP) crime, 11 Inter-American Convention against Corruption of the Organization of American States, 322 Inter-American Development Bank (IADP), 249, 250 Intergovernmental organization (IGO), defined, 277 International Action Network on Small Arms, 282 International Association for the Study of Organized Crime, 7 International Chamber of Shipping, 279 International Committee of the Red Cross, wartime or peacetime hostilities and, 120 International Council of Museums (ICOM) Code of Ethics, 281

353 International Court of Justice (ICJ), 113, 114–15 International Crime Classification for Statistical Purposes (ICCS), 32 International Crime Victim Survey (ICVS), 8, 15 International Criminal Court (ICC), 42, 115 International criminal justice, Big Data Analytics and, 240 International Data Corporation (IDC), 236 International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction, 138 International Emergency Events Database (EM-DAT), 128 International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, 276 International Labour Organization (ILO), 55 International Law Enforcement Academies (ILEAs), 327 International Maritime Bureau (IMB), 13, 279 International Maritime Organization (IMO), 11, 279 International Network for Environmental Compliance and Enforcement, 281 International nongovernmental organization (INGO), defined, 276 International organizations, with open access online resources, 8–14; Human Rights Watch, 13–14; International Maritime Bureau (IMB), 13; INTERPOL, 12; Missing Migrant Project (MMP), 14; Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), 12–13; United Nations, 8–12 International Permanent Observatory (IPO) Model, 208, 213–32; border control, 223; contingency planning, 225; deliverables, 216–18; human resources and logistical support, 224; information technology and communication, 224; integration/ coordination, 225; intelligence system, 222; internal/external

354 communication, 226; introduction to, 213–15; leadership of, 221; legacy, 225–26; legislation on major events, 227–29; media/public relations strategy, 222; non-event and event-related security, 223–24; planning structure of, 221–22; public-private partnership, 226–27; risks, 218–21; structure of, 215–21; system, 215–16, 217; traffic management, 223; venue security, 222–23 International Permanent Observatory on Major Events Security, 208 International Police Training Institute (IPTI), 281 International Self-Report Delinquency Study (ISRD), 15 International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN), 281–82 International Victimology Institute of Tilburg University (INTERVICT), 42 INTERPOL, 12; Counterterrorism Fusion Centre, 101; crime convergence described by, 178; Resolution 2178 and, 100–101; response to FTFs, 100–101 Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR), 16 I Paid a Bribe, 18 IPO. See International Permanent Observatory (IPO) Model IPO Americas, 212–13 ISIL (Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant), 85; social media use by, 88–89 Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), 155 Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), 150; Big Data Analytics and, 240; rise and spread of, 293 ISRD. See International Self-Report Delinquency Study (ISRD) Italy, waste management in, 51 Ives, K., 135 Ivory Coast, waste trafficking and, 51

Index Jack & Mae Nathanson Centre on Transnational Human Rights, Crime and Security, 6–7, 22 Jaishankar, K., 54 Janaagraha, 18 Jewish Museum of Brussels attack, 86 Johnson, B., 94 Johnson, J., 301 Johnsøn, J., 285 Johnson, L., 318 Johnson, S. D., 72 Joint investigative teams (JITs), 200–201 Journal of Art Crime, 19 Journal of Human Trafficking, 19 JSTOR, 40 Jus ad bellum, 117, 118–19 Jus in bello, 117 Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) Council, EU, 99 Karzai, H., 159 Kenney, M., 76 Kimberley Process, 175, 176 Kimmel, K., 275 Ki-moon, B., 88 Knights Templar, 179 Koh, H., 118 Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), 153 Land of Fires, 172–73, 178 Lanier, M., 57 La Strada International, 282 Law of armed conflict, 117 Law of War Manual (Department of Defense), 118 Lebanese Canadian Bank (LCB), 154–55 Legambiente (Italian NGO), 178 Leukfeldt, E. R., 53 Levi, M., 73 Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), 153–54 Library research guides, 4–6; Peace Palace Library, 4–5; UN Library, 5–6 LinkedIn, 3, 5, 8, 10, 13, 16 Lister, C., 94 Los Zetas, 300

Index Lucene, 236 Lynch, L., 301 Machine learning, 237, 238 Mafia markers: assessing organized crime and its impact upon societies (study), 28–30; contributions of, 28–29; data flaws with, 29; obstacles of, 29; overview of, 28; recommendations, 29–30 Maher, S., 93 Major events: Big Data Analytics and security at, 242–43; characteristics of, 209–10; defining, 208–10 Major events hosting, safety/security at, 207–32; elements of, 221–27; future for, 229–32; introduction to, 208–10; IPO Security Planning Model, 213–32; overview of, 207–8; UNICRI major events security program, 210–13. See also International Permanent Observatory (IPO) Model Malaysia, wildlife trafficking in, 49 Malet, D., 87 Malign crime displacement, 71 Mandisa, Lutya T., 57 Manual on International Cooperation for the Purposes of Confiscation of Proceeds of Crime, 195 Manual on Mutual Legal Assistance and Extradition, 195 Maritime Policy & Management, 19 Martelly, M. J., 135 Martuzzi, M., 51 Mattei, A., 262, 263 Mayer-Schoenberger, V., 243–44 McKinnon, G., 113 Measuring Organized Crime in Latin America (study), 30–31; contributions of, 30; data flaws with, 31; obstacles of, 30–31; overview of, 30; recommendations, 31 Measuring transnational crime, implications of, 21–37; assessing Transnational Organized Crime survey, 25–28; capability and expertise, 36; Composite Organized

355 Crime Index, 28–30; data quality/ availability, improving, 31–32, 36; elements of, 23–25; institutional capacity, improving, 33–34; in Latin America, 30–31; overview of, 21–23; sound methodology and, 36; standards/methodologies, developing new, 32–33; study recommendations, 35–37; Sustainable Development Goals, 34–35; transparency and, 36 Mega-disasters, 129 Mendelsohn, B., 41 Merchant International Group (MIG), 28 Mesch, G., 45 Mexico, wildlife trafficking in, 49 Mexico City earthquake, 1985, 138 MForesight, 304–5 Microsoft Corporation, 277 Mines Advisory Group, 282 Missing Migrant Project (MMP), 14 Mitis, F., 51 Model Treaty on Extradition, 194 Model Treaty on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, 194–95 Money Laundering Control Act, 320 Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), funding for, 150 Muigai, G., 168 Multilateral development organizations, 249–71; capability trap and, 251; development/ criminal justice link, 250–52; funding gaps and efficacy of, 252; impact of, on violence, 256–69; investment in criminal justice reform, 252–56; measuring results and, 252; overview of, 249–50. See also Violence, multilateral development donors and Musk, E., 246 Mutual legal assistance (MLA) tool, UNODC, 191–204; asset recovery features, 196–98; early version of, 195–96; expansion/redevelopment of, 196–204; future for, 203–4; main directions/innovations to, 199–203; multilateral legal/normative

356 framework, 192–94; policy making, 191–92; technical assistance framework, 194–95; updates to, 198 Mutual legal assistance treaties (MLAT), 319–20 Nadelmann, E., 318 Namibia, wildlife trafficking in, 48 Naming and shaming, 322–24 Nathanson Centre, 6–7 National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), 297–98 National Association for the Prevention of Drug Abuse (PEMADAM), 278 National Crime Victimization Survey, 53, 55 National Cyber-Forensics & Training Alliance (NCFTA), 306–7 National Incident-Based Reporting System (NIBRS), 59 National Institute for Crime Prevention and the Reintegration of Offenders (NICRO), 278–79 National Institute of Standards (NIST), 304–5; AMTech program, 305–6 National Institute of Statistics and Geography (INEGI), Mexico, 31, 33 National Network for Manufacturing Innovation (NNMI), 304 National Science Foundation (NSF), 304 National Statistical Offices, 33–34 Natural disasters, 128–29. See also Disasters Natural language processing, 237, 238 Nemmouche, M., 86, 90, 102 Netherlands: cybercrime in, 53; returning FTFs and, 92, 93, 95 Neumann, P., 93 NGO. See Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) NGO Committee on Disarmament, Peace, and Security, 282 Nigeria, waste trafficking and, 50 Nixon, R., 318

Index Nolan, C., 136–37 Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), 275–88; concerns regarding, in responding to transnational crime, 284–88; contributions of, 278–84; defined, 276; detection of crime and, 280–82; intergovernmental organization, defined, 277; international, defined, 276; legal status and structure of, 276; overview of, 275–76; prevention of crime and, 278–80; prevention/response to transnational crime, 277–78; research/policy advocacy and, 283–84; suspect identification and, 280–82; tracing/repatriation of crime proceeds and, 283; victim aide and, 282–83 Noriega, M., 319 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 120–21 Norway, environmental crime in, 48 Obama, B., 300, 301 Offender displacement, as crime displacement type, 70 Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive (ONCIX), 296 Oliver-Smith, A., 130 Omar, M., 307 Omelicheva, M. Y., 132 O’Neill, B. E., 156 OneSearch, 40 Open access online resources, researching transnational crime with, 3–19; academic journals, 18–19; databases/crowdsourced data, 16–18; international organizations, 8–14; library research guides, 4–6; overview of, 3–4; research centers and institutes, 6–8; surveys and data sets, 14–16. See also individual resources Open Source Intelligence (OSINT), 240 Operations OPTIMAL (predictive policing model), 242

Index Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), 171–72, 321, 322 Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), 12–13 Organization of American States (OAS), 212, 277 Organized crime: applying SCP framework to, 72–75; criminal foraging and, 74; transnational, crime displacement of, 75–77 Organized Crime Perception Index (OCPI), 28–29 Organized crime/terrorism, monitoring with Big Data Analytics, 239–40 Organized crime/terrorist group involvement in environmental crimes, 177–80 OSCE. See Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Ostwald, J., 131 Outsourcing, 327 Palermo Convention, 23 Peace Palace Library (PPL), 4–5 Pedahzur, A., 45 Pelling, M., 130 Perverse unintended consequences, 78 Pesticides, 169–70 Petrossian, G. A., 49 Philippines, wildlife trafficking in, 49 Pinterest, 9, 17 Piracy Reporting Centre, IMB, 279 Pires, S. F., 49 Precious metals and gemstones, human health/environment and, 171 PredPol, 241–42 Pridemore, W. A., 259 Primary terrorist victimization, 44 Project Apollo, 297 Project on U.S. Relations with the Islamic World from September through December 2014, 240 Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA), 154

357 Public-private partnership: concerns of NGO activities towards transnational crime, 284–88; contributing to prevention/ response to transnational crime, 277–78; intergovernmental organization, defined, 277; international nongovernmental organization, defined, 276; NGO contributions, 278–84; nongovernmental organization, defined, 276. See also Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) Public-private responses to transnational crime, 291–311; Administration Strategy on Mitigating the Theft of U.S. Trade Secrets, 300; convergence to turn back TOC, 306–11; diplomatic efforts, United States, to counter cyber-enabled IP theft, 301; economic globalization, 295–97; economic sanctions, United States, 300; economic sanctions, United States, to counter cyber-enabled IP theft, 300–301; Fusion Centers, 309; global threat environment, changes in, 293–95; government/ nongovernment interaction, 297–98; National Cyber-Forensics & Training Alliance (NCFTA), 306–7; overview of, 291–93; Reimbursable Services Program, 309–10; solutions to counter TOC, 302–6; Standards Alliance, 310–11; Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime, 299–300; transport/logistics code of conduct, 307–9; UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, 298–99 Public-private solutions to counter TOC, 302–6; climate change, 303–4; health, 302–3; manufacturing capabilities, 304–6 Punishment and Intermediating in the Sex Trade and Associated Acts, 76–77

358 Radicalization, defined, 279 Randa, R., 55 Rand National Defense Research Institute, 17 Rao, G. D. R., 54 Rational choice theory, criminal behavior and, 69 Rebovich, D., 76–77 Refugees International, 134 Reimbursable Services Program, 309–10 Reppetto, T. A., 69 Research centers and institutes, 6–8; Nathanson Centre, 6–7; Terrorism, Transnational Crime, and Corruption Center (TraCCC), 7; Transcrime, 7–8; UN Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI), 8 Resource insurgencies, 151 Returning foreign terrorist fighters, 85–102; hard approach to dealing with, 92–94; international/regional responses to, 98–101; motivations for, 89–91; overview of, 85–86; past and present, 87–89; soft approach to dealing with, 94–98; threats posed by, 86–87 Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), 153 Revolutionary United Front (RUF), 151 Reyns, B. W., 53, 54, 55 Rome Statute, 115 Rosen, G. E., 48–49 Routine activity theory, criminal motivation and, 69 Russia, wildlife trafficking in, 49 Rutgers Gray Literature Database, 16 SAFE (Saving Antiquities for Everyone), 281 SAVE (Sisters against Violent Extremism), 280 Savimbi, J., 307 Schneier, B., 245 Schuller, M., 133 SCP. See Situational crime prevention (SCP)

Index Scribd, 12 Secondary terrorist victimization, 44 Second sector, 276 Sendai Framework, 128, 138–43; disaster risk reduction and, 138–41; Hyogo Framework and, 139–40; overview of, 138; priorities of, 140; scope of, 141–42; Sustainable Development Goals, Transforming Our World and, 142–43; targets within, 140; UNISDR and, 138–39 Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015–2030. See Sendai Framework Sendero Luminoso, 153 Senegal, waste trafficking and, 50 Sexual exploitation, trafficking for, 56–59 Shapiro, J., 87, 88, 101 Sharing Electronic Resources and Laws on Crime (SHERLOC), 202 Sherman, J., 252 Shichor, D., 46 Sichuan earthquake, 129 Signals Intelligence (SIGINT), 240 Situational crime prevention (SCP): applying, to organized crime, 72–75; criminal act, components of, 69; critics of, 70; origins of, 68–69 Slide Share, 16 Smith, K. F., 48–49 Smuggling, defined, 150 Snapchat, 88 Snow, J., 236 Snowden, E., 112, 245 Social media analysis, 237, 238 Socioeconomic development, supply chain security and, 171–73 Socionical Crowd Sourcing app, 243 Soft approach to dealing with returning FTFs, 94–98 Sollund, R., 48 Sony Pictures hack, 110 SoundCloud, 13 South Africa, wildlife trafficking in, 48 South/Southeast Asia, wildlife trafficking in, 49 Sparrow, M. K., 73

Index Spatial displacement, as crime displacement type, 69, 70 Special Activities Division, CIA, 107 Speech recognition, 237, 238 Stallings, R. A., 130 Standards Alliance, 310–11 Stata, 262 State-sponsored cyber attacks, international criminal justice system and, 114–16; Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime and, 115; Geneva Convention and, 120; International Committee of the Red Cross and, 120; international conventions for, 115; International Court of Justice and, 114–15; International Criminal Court and, 115; international treaties for, 116; NATO and, 120–21; overview of, 114; Tallinn Manual and, 121–22 State-sponsored cyber attacks, U.S. criminal justice system and, 108–14; approaches to, 108–9; charges for, 109; Computer Fraud and Abuse Act and, 110; Electronic Communications Privacy Act and, 109–10; Electronic Espionage Act and, 110; extradition treaties and, 112; extraterritorial terrorism prosecutions and, 111–12; Identity Theft and Assumption Deterrence Act and, 110–14; prosecuting, 112–13 Stored Wire Electronic Communications Act, 109 Strategic planning, Big Data Analytics for, 242 Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime, 299–300 STREET (Strategy to Reach, Empower, and Educate) program, 280 Strömberg, D., 130 Structured data, 241 Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 19 Surveys/data sets, transnational crime research, 14–16; International Crime Victim Survey (ICVS), 15; International Self-Report Delinquency Study (ISRD), 15;

359 Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR), 16; UN Surveys on Crime Trends and the Operations of Criminal Justice Systems (UN-CTS), 15 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), 34–35 Tactical displacement, as crime displacement type, 70 Taliban opium trade, 157–61 Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare (Tallinn Manual), 121 Target displacement, as crime displacement type, 70 Taxell, N., 285 Taylor, C., 151, 307, 325 Technical assistance, 326–27 Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) Agreement, 310 Ted Talks, 17 Tehrik-i-Taliban (TTP), 159 Teichman, D., 75 Temporal displacement, as crime displacement type, 70 Terrorism: defined, 155; defining, 43; financing of, 46; vs. insurgency, 155–56; rise in global, 293; target selections, 44; TOC link with, 294–95; transnational organized crime and, 150–52, 156, 157; victims, treatment of, 43–46 Terrorism, Transnational Crime, and Corruption Center (TraCCC), 7 Terrorism/insurgency, financing of, 149–62; Afghanistan opium trade and, 157–61; arms traffickers and, 151–52; drug trade and, 152–53, 157; future of nexus, 159–61; Hamas and, 154–55; Hezbollah and, 154–55; historical examples of, 153–55; human trafficking and, 150–51; introduction to, 149–50; Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam and, 153–54; nexus with transnational organized crime, 156, 157; Provisional Irish Republican Army and, 154;

360 resource insurgencies and, 151; terrorism vs. insurgency, 155–56; transnational organized crime and terrorism, 150–52 Terrorist diaspora, 160–61 Terrorist Trial Report Card (Center on Law and Security), 111 Thailand, wildlife trafficking in, 49 Thieves-in-law, Georgian, 75–76 Third sector, 276 Thomas Reuters Foundation, 283 Threat environment, changes in global, 293–95; terrorism, 293; terror-TOC nexis, 294–95; transnational organized crime, 293–94 TOC. See Transnational organized crime (TOC) Together against Cybercrime initiative, France, 279 Togo, waste trafficking and, 50 Tohoku earthquake and tsunami, 127 TraCCC. See Terrorism, Transnational Crime, and Corruption Center (TraCCC) TRAFFIC, 48 Trafficking, defined, 150 Transcrime, 7–8 Transcrime Joint Research Centre on Transnational Crime, 30 Transnational crime: concept of, 21; measuring of, 23–25; requirements for, offense, 22; typologies of, 26 Transnational crime, consequences of: crime/criminal organization displacement, 67–79; cyber attacks, 105–23; disaster risk reduction, 127–43; environmental crimes, 167–81; overview of, 65–66; returning foreign terrorist fighters, 85–102; terrorism/insurgency, financing of, 149–61. See also individual headings Transnational crime, official responses to: Big Data Analytics, 235–47; major events hosting, safety/ security at, 207–32; multilateral development organizations,

Index 249–71; mutual legal assistance (MLA) tool, UNODC, 191–204; nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), 275–88; overview of, 189–90; public-private responses, 291–311; U.S. crime policy, global reach of, 317–31. See also individual responses Transnational crime, understanding: measuring transnational crime, implications of, 21–37; open access online resources, researching with, 3–19; overview of, 1–2; victimology and, 39–59. See also individual headings Transnational crime displacement, measuring, 72 Transnational organized crime: crime displacement of, 75–77; terrorism and, 150–52, 156, 157 Transnational Organized Crime (journal), 18 Transnational organized crime (TOC): public-private solutions to counter, 302–6; rise of, 293–94; stakeholder convergence to turn back, 306–11; terrorism link with, 294–95 Transparency International, 283 Transportistas, 77 Transport/logistics providers code of conduct, 307–9 Travel bans, 324 Treaty negotiations, U.S. crime policy and, 319–22 Trends in Organized Crime (journal), 19, 22 Trivunovic, M., 285 Truckers against Trafficking, 275, 282 TruTV, 18 Tumblr, 3, 9, 10 Twitter, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 16, 17, 18, 88, 94, 240 U-4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre, 283 Ulysse, G., 136 Umarhathab, S., 54 UNEP. See United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP)

Index UNESCO. See UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) UNICRI. See United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI) UNICRI major events security program, 210–13; EU-SEC/EUSEC II, 211; House Project, 212; IPO Americas, 212–13; public-private partnership (PPP) development model, 227; regional platforms, 211 UNIDROIT Convention on Stolen and Illegally Exported Cultural Objects, 281 Unintended consequences, 75–76; of an action (direct consequences), 77–78; of the intended consequence of the action (collateral consequences), 77–78 UNISDR. See United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNISDR) United Kingdom (UK): returning FTFs and, 93, 94; waste management in, 51; wildlife trafficking in, 49 United Nations (UN): Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law, 41; Centre for International Crime Prevention, 25; Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice (CCPCJ), 31, 32; Convention against Corruption, 21, 192, 286; Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, 21, 192–93, 320–21; Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, 21, 192, 193, 286, 298–99; Countering Violent Extremism (CVE), 100; Declaration on the Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power, 41, 59–60; Economic and Social Council, 285–86; Global

361 Counterterrorism Forum, 94; NonGovernmental Liaison Service, 285; Resolution 2178, 100; response to FTFs, 100; Surveys on Crime Trends and the Operations of Criminal Justice Systems (UN-CTS), 15; victims’ rights and, 41–42 United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), 168, 172 United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI), 8, 15, 168, 176, 208, 237 United Nations (UN) Library, 5–6 United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNISDR), 138–39 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), 6, 9, 31, 32, 33, 34, 48, 55–56, 158, 172, 194–95 United Nations open access online resources, 8–12; Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), 10–11; Environment Program (UNEP), 9–10; International Maritime Organization (IMO), 11; Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), 9; World Bank, 10; World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), 11–12 United Nations Statistical Commission (UNSC), 31 UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), 10–11; Convention for the Safeguarding of Intangible Cultural Heritage, 281 UN Environment Program (UNEP), 9–10 United States: cybercrime in, 52–53; declaration of cyber war, rules for, 116–22; identity theft/fraud victims in, 53, 55; returning FTFs and, 93; sexual exploitation trafficking in, 57; waste management in, 51; wildlife trafficking in, 49 U.S. crime policy, global reach of, 317–31; economic/financial

362 sanctions, 324–26; European Union comparisons, 327–29; introduction to, 317–19; naming and shaming, 322–24; outsourcing, 327; principle of territoriality and, 317–18; technical assistance, 326–27; treaty negotiations, 319–22 U.S. Intellectual Property Enforcement Coordinator, 300 University of Michigan, 305 UNODC. See United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) UNODC Directories of Competent National Authorities (CNA Directories), 202 Unstructured data, 241 “Urgent action” notices, Amnesty International, 323 USAID, 310 USA Patriot Act, domestic terrorism defined, 111 U.S. Fish and Wildlife Services, 47 Vande Walle, G., 50 Van Uhm, D. P., 49 Varese, F., 75–76 Verité, 178 Victimology, transnational crime and, 39–59; cybercrimes, 52–55; environmental crimes, 46–51; future of, on global level, 59; human trafficking, 55–59; introduction to, 39–40; overview of, 39; research methodology used, 40–41; sexual exploitation, trafficking for, 56–59; terrorism, 43–46; treatment of victims, 41–73; waste trafficking, 50–51; word origin, 41 Vidino, L., 88 Vienna Convention, 21 Vigilantism, 285 Vijlbrief, M. F. J., 76 Violence, multilateral development donors and, 256–69; causal impact, 257, 258; data used, 258–60; descriptive statistics, 260–61; factors influencing

Index levels of violence, 258; GDP growth per capita, 259; Gini coefficient of income inequality, 258–59; limitations of findings, 269; outcome defined, 257, 258; overview of, 256–58; poverty rate, 259; study findings, 263–69; study methods used, 262–63; treatment and control groups of research, 257; treatment defined, 257, 258; urban population growth, 259–60 Visa, 242 Von Lampe, K., 73, 74 Vulnerability, defined, 131 Wainwright, R., 99, 161 Warchol, G. L., 48 Waste trafficking victims, treatment of, 50–51 Weighted displacement quotient (WDQ), 72 Weinberg, L., 45 Weisburd, D., 70, 71–72 Welsh, B. C., 35 White, R., 51 WikiLeaks, 109 Wildlife trafficking victims, treatment of, 47–50 Williams, M. L., 53–54 Windle, J., 78 WIPO. See World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) Wolak, J., 52 World Bank, 10, 249, 250, 252 World Bank Institute, 28 World Collaborating Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED), 128–29 World Conference on Disaster Reduction, 138–39 World Economic Forum (WEF), 28 World Health Organization, 243 World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), 11–12 World Resources Institute, 303 World Shipping Council (WSC), 279

Index World Society of Victimology (WSV), 41–42 World Wildlife Fund, 281 Wyatt, T., 49

363 Yokohama Strategy for a Safer World and Plan of Action, 138 YouTube, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 16, 17, 18

Xi J., 301 Yakuza, 300 Yar, M., 53

Zahedi, K., 168 Zehaf-Bibeau, M., 93 Zupan, L. L., 48