Towards A Voice in The Public Sphere?: Deliberation with Muslim Civil Society in Berlin 9783828205888, 9783110511604

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Jennifer Eschweiler Towards A Voice in The Public Sphere?

Maecenata Schriften

herausgegeben von Rupert Graf Strachwitz und Christian Schreier

Band 10

Jennifer Eschweiler

Towards A Voice in The Public Sphere? Deliberation with Muslim Civil Society in Berlin

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Lucius et Lucius • Stuttgart • 2013

Anschrift der Autorin: Jennifer Eschweiler Oderberger Str. 56 10435 Berlin [email protected]

Diese Arbeit ist eine Dissertation, erworben am Center for Social Entrepreneurship und der Graduate School of Lifelong Learning an der Universität Roskilde, Dänemark.

Bibliografische Information der Deutschen Nationalbibliothek Die Deutsche Nationalbibliothek verzeichnet diese Publikation in der Deutschen Nationalbibliografie; detaillierte bibliografische Daten sind im Internet über http://dnb.d-nb.de abrufbar

ISSN 1866-122X ISBN 978-3-8282-0588-8 ® Lucius Et Lucius Verlagsgesellschaft mbH Stuttgart 2013 Gerokstraße 51 • D-70184 Stuttgart www.luciusverlag.com Das Werk einschließlich aller seiner Teile ist urheberrechtlich geschützt. Jede Verwertung außerhalb der engen Grenzen des Urheberrechtsgesetzes ist ohne Zustimmung des Verlags unzulässig und strafbar. Das gilt insbesondere für Vervielfältigungen, Übersetzungen, Mikroverfilmungen und die Einspeicherung und Verarbeitung in elektronischen Systemen.

Umschlaggestaltung: I. Devaux, Stuttgart Druck und Bindung: Rosch-Buch, Scheßlitz

Table of Contents Acknowledgements Abstract Foreword by Professor Lars Hulgard

VII EX XII

1. Introduction 1.1. Aim of this thesis 1.2. Why deliberative democracy theory? 1.3. Why Muslim civil society in Berlin? 1.4. Methodology and analytical framework 1.5. In defence of Habermas' notion of consensus 1.6. Definition of terms 1.7. Literature Review

1 1 6 9 16 21 24 32

2. Methodology 2.1. Defining and Making Sense of Social Reality 2.2. Method

49 50 65

3. Analytical Framework 3.1. Defining the Democratic Challenge in Pluralist Societies 3.2. Deliberative democracy 3.3. Civil Society 3.4. Citizenship 3.5. Insights from Social Movement Theory 3.6. How the theoretical framework informs analysis

77 79 85 102 105 109 111

4. Muslims and Muslim civil society in Berlin 4.1. Facts and figures 4.2. Social and economic life 4.3. Muslim civil society in Berlin

115 115 118 121

5. Political Opportunity Structures and Public Discourse 5.1. Development of political opportunities at federal level 5.2. Depiction of Muslims in media and political discourse 5.3. Muslim integration via participation agenda: Berlin

127 128 134 144

6. Exemplary Cases 6.1. Participation on Senate level — the Berlin Islamforum 6.2. Participation in the Neighbourhood - Haci Bayram 6.3. Impact of Integration Philosophy on Deliberation - Neukölln and Kreuzberg

157 158 167

7. Analysis: Muslim civil society entering the public sphere? 7.1. Political Opportunities and Muslim Civil Society

189 193

174

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7.2. Deliberative Processes and Muslim Civil Society Participation 7.3. Joining the public sphere 7.4. Legitimacy, structure and agency 7.5. Societal Integration and Democratic Representation

195 217 228 235

8. Conclusion 8.1. Overview of knowledge gained 8.2. How structure and agency can work towards legitimacy 8.3. Consolidating practical wisdom and the general public sphere 8.4. Concluding remarks

243 243 244 248 250

Annex 1 - Bibliography Annex 2 - Online Resources Annex 3 — List of Interviewees

253 265 272

Acknowledgements I would like to express my gratitude to my supervisor Professor Lars Hulgard for his support. He made it possible for me to continue this thesis at Roskilde University and was always ready to discuss all those major and minor questions and decisions that accompany a PhD project. He also introduced me to a number of inspirational sources that were of much value for this thesis. I would also like to highlight the positive affirmation he was always ready to share. It was a pleasure to work with him. In this context I would also like to thank the Doctoral School of Lifelong Learning and Social Psychology of Everyday Life at Roskilde University for giving me the opportunity to continue my thesis there. My research endeavour started at the University of Kent in the UK at the Department for Politics and International Relations under the supervision of Professor Thomas Saalfeld. His guidance during the early stages of this dissertation fed my determination to see this project through. I would also like to thank the EMES Research network for their inspiring PhD summer schools and conferences, giving young scholars a chance to present and improve their work through access to a network of researchers who are more than willing to share their experiences - and who appreciate socialising. For editing support I'd like to thank my friends Diani Barreto, Andrew Bulkeley, Joanna Reece and Mark Worth. I am indebted to the people who were willing to be interviewed for this research. My particular thanks go out to the representatives of Muslim organisations who gave me their time and provided me with insight in their work. My family and friends were great throughout those years and particularly during the last six months of this journey. I would like to thank my godfather and his family to enable autumn and winter writing retreats on the then quiet island Fohr, surrounded by smells reminding of childhood holidays. A big merci to my father-in-law, Misi Robert, for his hospitality and French dinners in Santeny as well as the countless hours spent in front of the computer editing bibliography and footnotes. Another danke schon to my mother and stepfather, Gabriele and Wolfgang Plucker, for accommodating more writing retreats with a semi-seaside view at the Baltic Sea, and one with a view across Wuppertal. My family has trusted me to see this through in many ways. I'd like to express my gratitude to my mother for her love and encouragement and long train-rides to Berlin to help out and my father Walter for political briefings and animated discussions. A little special thanks goes to my brother Falk for babysitting ser-

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vices and convincing me to stop writing. Also to many friends for moral support, not complaining about me never calling. Thank you to my children Emilia and Marlene for their patience with a sometimes very impatient mother. Finally I want to thank Pierre Robert for his support in every sense of the meaning: with time, philosophical mind-games and listening to theoretical monologues, editing, great patience with emotional crises, letting me sleep in the morning, a thousand school runs and just being my great husband.

Abstract This thesis seeks to analyse how involvement in deliberative processes contributes to Muslim civil society organisations in Berlin gaining a voice in the public sphere. The empirical investigation is guided by an interest in Muslim civil society organisations as agents of social change, although they are confronted with negative and largely exclusive public discourse, and their emancipatory potential in terms of active citizenship. Inspired by Jiirgen Habermas and his elaborations on discourse ethics and deliberative democracy theory it also assumes the structural conditions to play a decisive role in supporting civil society to enter their grievances and problem solutions to public discourse. Participation in deliberative process following certain procedural requirements can strengthen Muslim civil society in their advocacy skills and networking, helping them to gain voice in public discourse on integration. Voice is gained via deliberative mini-publics that promote learning about political process, enhance understanding about different lifeworld experiences, offer new networking opportunities and promote a sense of citizenship as moral equal worth based on equality in deliberation, the nurturing of trust relationships and outcomes on issues that are of vested interest for the participating social actors. This can inform new approaches to democratic representation and promote integration in diverse and pluralist societies. Interpretative case studies, based on in-depth interviews with Muslim civil society activists and stakeholders of the Berlin administration about different participatory processes in Berlin, reflected against a counter example of blocking Muslim participation in one of Berlin's districts with a large number of Muslim residents, help assess processes and outcomes of civil society participation by Muslims in the German capital. The research methodology is inspired by discourse ethics, the potential for blending different horizons described in hermeneutics, and a lifeworld perspective that takes the structural conditions into account that inform social actors about their scope of action. Combining Habermas' discourse ethics and Flyvbjerg's phronesis in the sense of practical wisdom brings civil society actors in their specific contexts and normative demands of democracy together. The theoretical foundation of this research is deeply vested in the deliberative democracy model developed by Habermas. According to him the legitimacy of political decisions depends on genuine representation of different views and worldviews generated from the public sphere. According to Habermas the public sphere must be open to the questioning of dominant cultural expressions and

X

values, based on rational arguments and normative foundations for different claims. The institutionalisation of deliberative procedures allows the interplay among different worldviews and opinions, informally constituted in lifeworldbased civil society groups, supporting societal integration. Chambers contributed the perspective of communicative action generated in deliberative mini-publics overcoming plebiscitary rhetoric in public discourse. Deliberative democracy theory informs new models of democratic representation based on issues and identity, as described by Urbinati and Warren. On the actor level Flyvbjerg points to engagement in communication based on rationality rather than on power as decisive element for human action. The Habermasian notion of lifeworld is thus as important in the theoretical model informing analysis as is the concept of civil society transmitting lifeworld interpretations to the public sphere. Deliberative procedures are supposed to enhance inter subjective understanding, on the one hand turning policy makers into deliberative advocates inside the system, on the other hand strengthening civil society actors in their sense as equal citizens as described by Somers. The model is complemented with the social movement sector model developed by Rucht et al., giving Muslim voices in public discourses a future perspective as access to the public sphere of a diverse range of Muslim associations is institutionalized. Three case studies are offered. The first describes a deliberative forum at the state level, bringing together representatives of large Muslim umbrella organisations and different strands of Islam, key representatives of the city administration, and other faith or issue based civil society. The second case is the cooperation of a mosque association with a large welfare organization in an educational project, supported by local neighbourhood management and district administration. This process triggered the engagement of the mosque in the wider community. The third case is an example that demonstrates the role of structural support, contrasting two districts in Berlin with very different philosophies of Muslim participation. The analysis based on interview evidence and the theoretical framework demonstrates how structure and agency work together in establishing access of Muslim organisations in Berlin to the general public sphere. It highlights the different procedural requirements of deliberation and their outcomes in practice, in terms of sense of citizenship and how they contribute to the formation of a social movement sector. The strengthening of Muslim civil society helps to legitimize their concerns in the public sphere and allows representatives of the system to pick up on them in representation. Although mini-publics may segment the general public sphere, Habermas argues that they remain porous and can build hermeneutical bridges within the larger public sphere that is connected to the political sphere. The analysis of Muslim participation in deliberative processes in

XI Berlin indicates that different points of view can be included through mini-publics supporting civil society participation in general public discourse. The thesis concludes that deliberating with Muslim civil society instead of debating or polemicizing about them might develop their inclusion in public discourse and set an example in democratic practice reflecting the diversity of contemporary societies. It also shows how Habermas' normative theory is informative for a local study of actors in their specific contexts, bringing insights from the study of a real life context into perspective with a new theory of representation based on identity as well as constituency. This mixing of normative concepts and practical wisdom is fair, as the latter informs how people act. Deliberative politics can help people find the best ways to inform political process, thus speaking in favour of a normative foundation of politics.

Foreword This thesis deserves to be read by all people who are concerned with the conditions for civil society and social movements to influence policy making by engaging in public deliberation for the sake of impacting local policy making and even policy making on a larger scale. First of all the thesis at hand is a study of Muslim civil society in Berlin as a case to generate a wider understanding of the structural conditions for marginalised groups to gain recognition for their concerns in the public sphere. Here the aim is to analyse how deliberative processes contribute to advance the impact of Muslim civil society organizations on policy making in Berlin. Through case studies of three specific cases of civil society participation by Muslims in Berlin it is the aim to analyse how Muslim interest organizations are established as actors in the public sphere and the political process. The thesis is guided by a strictly Habermasian perspective on deliberative democracy and the possibility for civil society participation to channel issues of concern through the public sphere into politics and hereby influence the democratic process. Deliberative democracy is chosen as an overall theoretical perspective because it offers a role to actors that do not usually appear in policy making and the public sphere. Thus, it takes a different position towards democracy and politics as liberal and republican democratic theory. It is argued that a deliberative understanding of politics is needed in pluralist societies, since it holds up the prospect of mediation or resolution of conflicts aimed at finding agreement or at least compromise. The thesis provides a thorough contribution to the discussion of democratic challenges in pluralist societies for the sake of placing the role of deliberative democracy as a specific way of realizing the agency dimension in civil society and social movements. Thus in a convincing way it is argued that the democratic challenges in pluralist societies relate as much to the possibility of influencing directly the political decision-making as they relate to representation. The process of deliberation is analysed through three case studies of Muslim civil society participation and the process of deliberation between Muslim interest organizations and public officials. The analysis displays how participants in civil society are performing political agency, which according to the Habermasian perspective in turn lends legitimacy to political decision-making through the use of deliberative inputs from interest organizations and social movements in the civil society. The three cases are very different in scope and size, but they are all

XIII

analysed according to deliberative process and outcome and focus on changes in Muslim voice generated through the public sphere. The empirical evidence concerns both a case study analysis and an outline of federal and local integration policies. The institutional analysis of integration policies is used as a background to understand the changes in political opportunity structures for immigrants with a Muslim background. The three cases provide detailed insights in the variations of processes and outcomes of civil society deliberation, both experiences of successful impact and more challenging situations are presented and discussed in an enlightened manner. Based upon the case study analysis it is argued that the overall theoretical approach, Habermas' discourse ethics and normative model of deliberative democracy, needs to be completed with insights from other theoretical traditions and positions such as social movement theory, migration research and theories of power. The thesis is an important contribution to the on-going process of learning how to collaborate with civil society organizations, but also an illustration of how the prevailing negative integration discourse in the public sphere is shaping the social reality of Muslims. Accordingly the thesis deals with a difficult and yet actual and highly relevant issue. Thus the thesis could be regarded as a kind of pioneer work, especially due to the interesting empirical material and the analysis of possibilities and barriers for deliberation. Lars Hulgard The Graduate School of Lifelong Learning, Roskilde University, Denmark

1. Introduction 'While deliberation is now happily married to democracy and Habermas deserves much of the credit for making the match — the bond that holds the partners together is not proceduralism. What makes deliberative democracy democratic is an expansive definition of who is included in the process of deliberation.' Gutmann/Thompson 2004: 9

I.1. Aim of this thesis At the end of February 2012 the German tabloid BILD published an article on their website subtitled 'Young Muslims refuse integration', referring to a study carried out for the Federal German Ministry for the Interior on Muslim lifeworlds.1 This is the message that Minister of the Interior Hans-Peter Friedrich sends to the German public, despite the fact that the study actually highlights issues like discrimination affecting young Muslims.2 There is a lot of misinformation in this society. If you look at it, there are three or four subjects [that dominate public discourse], not more. There is the issue of women's rights. Then forced marriages and honour killings. What else? They talk about jihad and holy war.'3 Public stereotyping of Islam affects attitudes towards Islam and Muslims in Germany, which have deteriorated since Muslims were discovered in the midst of German towns and cities in the wake of September II, 2001. 4

'BILD: 'Innenminister warnt radikale Muslime' (February 29, 2012). www.bild.de/politik/inland/muslime/schock-studie-muslime-verweigern-integration22901072.bild.html (accessed April 20, 2012). 2 See Frindte, W., K. Boehnke, H. Kreikenbom, and W. Wagner (2012) Lebenswelten junger Muslime. Bundesministerium des Innern. www.bmi.bund.de/SharedDocs /Kurzmeldungen/DE/2012/02/junge_muslime.html (accessed April 20, 2012). 3 Interview Salhi. All interviewees, their affiliation and date of interviews are listed under Annex 3. 4 Decker et al (2010) Die Mitte in der Krise. Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung. http: //www.fes-gegen-rechtsextremismus.de/inhalte/studien_Gutachten.php (accessed March 8, 2012).

2

Introduction

Since then Muslims and Islam have been dominating German integration discourses. Muslim children are not doing well in school, they are more often unemployed, they pose a security threat - the public image of the backwardness of Islam and its incompatibility with German values might explain the popular support for former Berlin-Senator Thilo Sarrazin's book Deutschland schaßt sich ab (Germany does itself in) where he implies the inability of Muslims to integrate.5 What exacdy constitutes integration remains a matter of perspective. It can be interpreted either as the assimilation of ethnic and religious minorities to German mainstream society or be read as the need to acquire higher education and market competency (Rauer 2008: 10). It is also linked to values that somehow qualify as Western' or 'German' and suggests that Muslims have a migration background. Meanwhile the third generation of Turkish guest worker's offspring is growing up in Berlin. Despite the fact that the public definition of 'migration background' only extends to the second generation of immigrants, this Turkish-German youth is subject of Muslim integration discourse.6 The use of the term Muslims for all immigrants with origins in predominantly Muslim countries and their offspring, regardless of their religious identity, manifests their 'otherness'. Together with the fact that a majority of Muslims in Germany that are not eligible to vote this excludes them from participation in the public sphere and thus, in democratic representation. As much as public discourse excludes Muslim voices it is ignorant of the multitude of Muslim civil society organisations in German cities, that are actively engaging with public officials and faith-based or non-religious civil society, that are effectively working towards intercultural- and interreligious understanding, or cooperating in educational or re-creational projects. Young Muslims, bilingual and fluent in German, stand up for identity as German Muslims and are tired of being pointed at as different. 'Let us even stop talking about Islamophobia, maybe we just speak about differences in our daily lives. Our aim is normality.'7 This research sheds light on Muslim civil society in Berlin and shows their efforts to gain recognition for their concerns in the public sphere. It is guided by an interest in civil society as agents of social change and its emancipatory potential in terms of active citizenship. Muslim civil society organisations make an interesting case to understand the structural conditions for this potential to blos-

5 Spiegel Online: The Man Who Divided Germany. Why Germany's Integration Demagoguery Has Many Followers (June 9, 2010) www.spiegel.de/intemational/germany/0,1518,715876,00.html (accessed April 20, 2012). 6 For a definition of immigration background refer to: B G B l : Verordnung zur Erhebung der Merkmale des Migrationshintergrundes, § 6 Satz 2 (September 28, 2010). www.gesetze-im-intemet.de/bundesrecht/mighev/gesamt.pdf (accessed April 20, 2012). 7 Interview El-Naggar.

3 som, particularly for marginalised groups in society with little representative voice. Muslim voices have left the realm of lifeworld, where they rested quietly for a long time, in the backyard mosques of Berlin.8 A second interest lies in the democratic function of civil society participation, as derived from the outlook on democracy developed by Jiirgen Habermas. According to him the legitimacy of political decisions depends on genuine representation of different views and worldviews generated from the public sphere. The Muslim population in Berlin has long been ignored as citi2ens and voters. Is there a way to represent their various concerns? Deliberating with them instead of debating or polemicizing about them might further their inclusion in public discourse and set an example in democratic practice reflecting the diversity of contemporary societies. Overview This thesis seeks to analyse how deliberative processes contribute to Muslim civil society organisations in Berlin gaining a voice in the public sphere. Case studies help assess the extent to which civil society participation by Muslims in the German capital contributed to establishing them as actors in political process, in a context of generally hostile public discourse. It pays particular attention to outcomes of participation in deliberation, based on the assumption that active citizenship resulting from a sense of equal moral worth, together with networking, may support Muslim civil society actors in strengthening their advocacy efforts in the public sphere. Through case studies on Muslim civil society participation in deliberation with public officials and other civil society organisations, the analysis identifies how minority civil society organisations can be included in the public sphere, which informs and lends legitimacy to political decision-making through the use of deliberative processes. The institutionalization of deliberative procedures nurtures legitimacy in the public sphere, thus providing tools for citizens to be heard. But it is the interplay of structure and agency that results in deliberative democracy complementing representative democracy and furthering societal integration. Political challenges: Inclusion and representation Contemporary democracies face core political challenges. These include the achievement of societal integration in pluralist and ethnically diverse societies and the legitimacy of democratic representation in the face of reduced trust in

8

The concept of lifeworld, like some other key theoretical concepts used in this thesis, is defined in the 'Definition of Terms' section of this chapter.

4

Introduction

politics, lower voter turnouts and the existence of communities whose members are not eligible to vote. A recent surge of literature has considered different approaches to make more participatory democracy, highlighting the democratising potential of civil society (e.g. Cohen 1996; Gutmann/Thompson 2004; Chambers 2009). A growing number of experiments with participation is emerging, largely inspired by Jiirgen Habermas and his normative model of deliberative democracy (Habermas 1996). A particularly contentious issue and subject of intense public discourse has been the integration of Europe's large Muslim populations. Migrants and their communities are often excluded or marginalized in decisions concerning them in traditional institutionalized politics (e.g. Smith 2005) despite the fact that their inclusion is essential to societal integration. At the same time the revival of the principle of public deliberation, as an element of democratic legitimacy, is another challenge facing increasingly diverse and complex societies. Studies on migration and integration show that Europe's migrant communities face obstacles in political participation and in obtaining formal citizenship. Their children often struggle to do well in school. According to the Migration Integration Policy Index (MIPEX) integration policies create as many new hurdles as opportunities.9 Compared to other countries Germany scores low on policies promoting equality and on citizenship conditions for long-term residents. The social background of individuals is highly decisive for educational success and work integration, to the detriment of second-generation migrants who are left behind in education and employment. Anti-discrimination legislation and its application are weak.' 0 Many Muslims in Germany have a history of migration and are more affected than other immigrant communities by political decisions in areas such as education and integration (Open Society Foundations 2010). A new approach in theory of representation inspired by Habermas and Young suggests that an inclusive discourse in the public sphere, together with the awareness that constituencies may be based on issues and identities in addition to territory, allows for a more legitimate representation of difference (e.g. Urbinati/Warren 2008), beyond that achieved through the ballot box. According to that theory, communicative action generated in deliberative mini-publics or participatory processes promotes minority voices being heard in the public sphere. The public sphere in turn must be open to the questioning of dominant cultural expressions and values, based on rational arguments and normative foundations for different claims. The institutionalisation of deliberative procedures allows

MIPEX is a comparative study assessing and comparing integration policies of 33 countries in Europe, Canada, the United States, Australia and Japan, www.mipex.eu/ 10 www.mipex.eu/germany (accessed 4 April 2012). 9

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interplay among different worldviews and opinions, informally constituted in lifeworld-based civil society groups. The general public sphere, structured by power struggles over public opinion and political opinions, strongly influenced by the media and organised interests, must integrate many different publics, all struggling to get their voices heard. Habermas has been criticised for his notion of public sphere by post-modern thinkers, for whom the modernist perception of a universal public sphere excludes all powerless groups in society, including Muslims (Fraser 1992; Benhabib 1992; Young 2000). In view of representations of Muslims in public discourse, such as images of Islam and Muslim integration conveyed by mainstream media, this criticism seems justified. On the other hand, in his later work Habermas acknowledged the existence of parallel, weak publics (or public spheres), situated in civil society organisations and social movements, which try to enter public discourse with their lifeworldbased grievances and ideas for solutions. These civil society organisations intervene in the general public sphere of opinion-formation, and raise issues that must be dealt with through political processes. In that sense Muslim participation in the general public sphere is a requisite for the legitimisation of discourse on integration. Habermas sticks to the modernist conception of public sphere without ignoring the criticism. But with his focus on inter subjectivity in discourse ethics as the underlying normative principle in his theory of deliberative democracy, he concludes that a universal rational norm founds democratic institutions. According to Habermas, ethics has the ability to blend different horkons, expressed in worldviews and identities, through discourse in the public sphere, with a view to finding agreement - or more realistically compromise — based on rational arguments. In his vision a unified, overarching general public sphere is a necessary precondition for societal integration. In other words, people must work together to identify solutions to problems; it does not matter so much who puts an issue on the public agenda. Muslim integration, for instance, is primarily a concern for the non-Muslim majority, resulting in additional expectations towards Muslim communities, which tend to feel that they are already integrated — thus also showing discrepancies in the definition of the term. Habermas, with his model of deliberative democracy, has largely inspired the notion of democracy as a problem-solving mechanism, and has triggered many models of participation that seek to make democracy more inclusive and legitimate. How to include all voices representing groups with a stake in a matter of public concern? This is the focus of this research. This thesis centres on deliberative democracy theory, which offers a different form of political division of labour

6

Introduction

from representative democracy, to consider the scope for improved representative democracy. Representative democracy in which citizen's participation would be feasible and desirable and in which their engagement would form part of an on-going critical dialogue upon which more legitimate forms of political authority could be grounded. Inclusion, participation and enlightened understanding would be the main criteria guiding the democratic process in deliberative terms, which would make for a more lively democracy. Deliberative democracy is as much concerned with practical solutions as it is with normative questions. The research literature epitomises this by the attention it pays to participatory innovations like citizen juries or participatory budgeting, deliberative polling and mini-publics as places to exchange ideas and opinions. In order for deliberation to work as an extension of representative democracy in a normative sense, however, participatory and deliberating venues must be integrated in the broader democratic context (Chambers 2009: 331). In other words, deliberation in mini-publics can put citizens on their way to overcoming plebiscitary rhetoric in the public sphere. This thesis therefore has a normative democratic theory as well as an empirical focus: it investigates the potential capacity of deliberative processes that include Muslim civil society to contribute to social integration and enhanced legitimacy of democratic representation; and it examines the scope for the promotion of Muslim civil society's voice in the public sphere by strengthening active citizenship and civil society networking. According to Habermas' model of deliberative democracy, inclusion and promotion can both be achieved by acting communicatively in a deliberative process, involving civil society and social movements in an attempt to harmonise different lifeworlds with the system. I assume that structural factors inherent to system and agency play together, and that the establishment of Muslim civil society actors in a social movement sector contributes to the institutionalisation of Muslim voices in the public sphere. In this sense, the further development of public discourse on integration in Germany can be interpreted in relation to the basic principles of our understanding of democracy and on which basis we decide about equal membership in society. We can cling to old models of democracy that are based on territory and the idea of a nation as imagined communities (Anderson 1983) or we can move on and adjust to the new complexity and plurality of society, which includes constituencies based on issues and identities.

1.2. Why deliberative democracy theory? Deliberative democracy holds up the prospect of the mediation or resolution of conflicts in pluralist societies with the help of deliberative processes, aimed at

7

finding agreement or at least compromise. It seems to offer the tools necessary to enhance the legitimacy of democratic representation, thanks to its inherent potential of discursive inclusion of different world-views. This is based on Habermas' insight that democracies today are lacking a critical public sphere where people can form a coherent public opinion that both guides and criticises the governmental apparatus (Habermas 1992). Habermas' theory of communicative action signals a way to address the lack of a critical public sphere. It concerns itself mainly with the political decision-making process in which it should still be political institutions that resolve conflict, but they should do so in a process of engagement where preferences and value orientations can be transformed. Deliberative is opposed to either strategic or instrumental; a process is deliberatively rational to the extent that its interactions are egalitarian, un-coerced, competent, and free from delusion, deception, power and strategy. Deliberative democracy puts focus on a context in which preferences can be altered by taking different and informed views into account. What matters most is 'that public opinion be formed on the basis of adequate information and relevant reasons and that those whose interests are involved have an equal and effective opportunity to make their own interests (and the reasons for them) known' (Baynes 2002: 127). The deliberative process explains why certain ideas fail or succeed. It feeds a plurality of views, generated in the lifeworld of communities to decision-makers in the state sphere through discourse within the public sphere. Ideas must be conveyed from civil society situated in the lifeworld to the state or system sphere through a deliberative process in the general public sphere, where they add to the legitimacy of political representation. Gutmann and Thompson highlight the advantages that deliberative democracy holds over a purely aggregative model of democracy, manifested in the institutions of society that do not allow fairness as far as power distribution in decision-making is concerned. They describe deliberative democracy theory as a second-order theory that is trying to deal with the moral conflicts induced by the competition of first-order theories like liberalism, republicanism and communitarianism, which all take preferences as given (Gutmann/ Thompson 2004: 13). Deliberative democracy theory had a big impact on public policy research in that it moved citizens' involvement towards centre stage, beginning in the 1980s in the United States and spilling over to Europe. The research field can be broadly divided into two partly overlapping areas. The first looks into procedures and the design of deliberative venues from citizens' initiatives to large advocacy organisations. Taking procedural requirements into account it is in the field of policy initiative and analysis that deliberative democratic theory is most precise. 'One often hears the complaint that deliberative democratic theory is very abstract, lacking a clear institutional core or agenda. But even the briefest foray into

8

Introduction

policy initiative literature indicates that deliberative initiatives are springing up all over' (Chambers 2003: 316). Habermas' model of deliberative democracy focuses on procedural and substantive principles to guarantee the conditions for fair procedures based on communicative rationality inherent to constitutional norms like freedom of expression, association or religion. Institutionalised deliberative procedures promote a sense of moral equal worth through inclusion and thus the moral content of politics itself. Gutmann and Thompson argue that 'the idea of free and equal personhood itself provides substantive moral content for principles that would reject an unjust decision even it had been reached by procedurally just means' (Gutmann/ Thompson 2004: 24). A normative model of democracy is essential to societal integration. Habermas criticised postmodern notions that divide society in separate public spheres where people come with their own interpretations, unable to cut across. This conceptualisation might facilitate the study of local level activity, but theoretically it cannot account for social change with a view to integrating broader society as stated in the hermeneutic tradition. Integration and migration policy and discourse in Germany of the past half century demonstrate the lack of merging horizons expressed in different public spheres. Inherent to the principle of deliberation in the general public sphere is the promise of inclusion. Deliberative democracy theory investigates how deliberation can 'shape preferences, moderate self-interest, empower the marginalized, mediate difference, further integration and solidarity, enhance recognition, produce reasonable opinion and policy, and possibly lead to consensus' (Chambers 2003: 309). It is also a popular concept in the light of diminishing voter turnout and a certain degree of disillusionment with politics in Western democracies. In deliberative democracy models, democratic legitimacy may be restored through the representation of difference. The Western concept of politics is based on a notion of politics as an endless struggle for power. Weber and Schumpeter spoke in favour of political decisions by democratically elected elites. Aggregative democracy is another model based on the aggregation of voter preferences. Dahl was in favour of the majority of votes deciding on legitimate decision-making power. But in pluralist societies not every individual is eligible to vote and majorities do not necessarily transmit the best ideas (Eriksen/Weigard 2003: 7). The element of citizen participation through civil society is an 'attractive and less elitist basis for political legitimation sitting alongside traditional democratic representation' (Silver et al 2010: 453). Even if the result of public deliberation still reflects the views of the majority, a fair process matters for the legitimacy of the outcome (Gutmann/Thompson 2004: 20).

9

The result of deliberation should influence a political decision or at least a process that will lead to further deliberations. This instrumental value thus sets the ground for future decisions revealing the dynamic process of deliberation. In other words, it is important for deliberation to result in some impact, but further reasoning must be possible. 'Those citizens and representatives who disagreed with the original decision are more likely to accept it if they believe they have a chance to reverse or modify it in the future.' (Gutmann/Thompson 2004: 6-7) However, Habermas' normative model of democracy cannot be readily applied to specific real life contexts without specifications. The question remains under what conditions civil society participation in deliberation is successful. The biggest challenge in pluralist and fragmented societies is voice of minorities in power-structured public spheres. When examining participation, cities are the spaces to turn to. The polis of Athens serves as an ancient model of citizen deliberation. Cities were described as the anchor points of civil society even before national states existed. 'On this view, the quality of democracy at the national level is in no small part dependent upon the quality of democracy at the urban level' (Silver et al. 2010: 456). In order to gain more insight in the conditions for the integrative and legitimising potential of deliberative democracy to work I decided for a study of Muslim civil society participation in Berlin, which is largely the result of top-down policy initiatives. Due to limited scope for formal participation in democratic process and prevailingly negative public discourse about them deliberation with Muslim civil society is a critical case (Flyvbjerg 2001: 78). If Muslim voices can be heard through deliberative democratic process, so will be others.

1.3. Why Muslim civil society in Berlin? 'Things cannot become any worse than they are at the moment in Germany. Islam is not recognised; Islam is also not a religion like Christianity: we need no mosque; Islam is in the heart. There is no structured thinking. But Islamic organisations have become stronger.'11 Ismet Misirlioglu, Islamic Relief

A practice of rational public discourse is needed when searching for the moral foundation of a political problem (Habermas 1990: 40). This argument is relevant in relation to the emotional and moral baggage related to integration of

11 All translations from German throughout this thesis, including interview evidence, German research literature and public documents listed in the bibliography, are the author's.

10

Introduction

Muslim communities. Public discourse on Muslim integration is dominated by normative arguments. Muslim communities have had little input in integration policy debates over the past 50 years. In Habermas' terms this adds up to a large legitimacy deficit in both integration policy and in democratic representation in general. An estimated 4 to 4.5 million Muslims live in Germany. 12 In Berlin about 220,000 to 300,000 have a background in predominantly Muslim countries, about 6.5 per cent of the city's population. 13 Many are not actually politically represented. There are two reasons for that: A large number does not have German citizenship and hence no voting rights in Germany, not even in local elections if their country of origin is outside the European Union. Secondly, few elected officials have a background in predominantly Muslim countries or knowledge about Islamic culture and concerns. Berlin's few elected representatives who have a Turkish or Arab background tend to be secular, which can create tensions with religious Muslims. Public discourse and political processes in Germany are less secular than for example in neighbouring France. Christian values and beliefs have large political impact reflected in the conservative parties who refer to Christianity in their name. Germany is one of the few countries collecting a church tax from every citi2en who does not specifically opt out. The city-state of Berlin, like other federal states in Germany, bans religious symbols in the realm of public service. At the same time Muslims are framed as a religious group in public discourse, forcing them to represent their concerns along that part of their identity. In this context researcher Riem Spielhaus refers to the 'ethnicisation of religion'. Bridging this contradiction is another challenge that needs addressing in deliberation between system deliberators, including parliamentary, government and administrative representatives at all levels, and Muslim civil society.

12 This is a 2009 estimate by the Federal Ministry for Migration and Integration (BAMF). It is difficult to know the exact number of Muslims who identify themselves as such. In Germany no data can be collected on religious affiliation, as this violates the principle of religious freedom as codified in the German constitution. The proportion of Muslims among immigrants from countries with majority Muslim populations is calculated according to the ethnic background reported by the immigrants themselves. For statistics on the development of Muslim population in Germany see: de.statista.com/statistik/daten/studie/72321 / umfrage/entwicklung-der-anzahl-dermuslime-in-deutschland-seit-1945/ (accessed April 4, 2012). 13 The large majority has origins in Turkey (approximately 170,000, about 120,000 of which do not hold a German passport), followed by countries in the Middle East like Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Afghanistan (about 34,000). Smaller communities have roots in Iran, Bosnia, Pakistan, Indonesia and African countries (approximately another 12,000). See: www.berlin.de/lb/intmig/statistik/ (accessed April 4, 2012).

11

The largely negative public discourse, in relation to Islam and Muslim integration in Germany and Berlin, is mainly focused on radical Islam, headscarves, prayer in schools, honour k i l l i n g s , bad performance in education, and crime among Muslim youth. This discourse restricts Muslim's access to the public sphere more severely than negative discourse about other minorities affects theirs. Muslims often belong to socially and economically excluded groups. Language barriers, cultural differences and lack of education mean that many children of Turkish or Arab origin are under-achieving in education and subsequently fail to perform successfully in the labour market. The public discourse is mostly problemfocused and blames Muslim parents, while discrimination is hardly publicly discussed (Open Society Foundations 2010: 82). At federal level, conservative politicians made it publicly clear that migrants from the predominantly Muslim world are not desired. Reacting to the speech by former German President Christian Wulff, where he described Islam as part of Germany,14 the head of the conservative Christian Social Union party in Bavaria countered: 'It is obvious that migrants from other cultures like Turkey or the Arab peninsula generally find it harder. Hence my conclusion is that we do not need further migration from other cultures.'15 Shortly after that German Chancellor Angela Merkel announced 'the end of multiculturalism'.16 German sociologist Heinz Bude remarks that statements about the end of multiculturalism are not new, but that they ignore social realities (Bude 2007: 33). German governments, he maintains, either have nightmares about migration and integration or 'they do not dream at all, but simply have a dreamless sleep' (Bude 2007: 33).17 Away from populist statements there is a new way of thinking ahead. Federal, state-level and local integration plans understand that integration is a two-way process for which migrant communities and majority society share responsibility. New forms of dialogue with Muslim communities were established at the federal level, such as Chancellor Angela Merkel's Integrationsgipjel (Integration Summit) as part of the national integration plan or the Islamkonferen^

14 Fokus: Christian Wulff: „Der Islam gehört 2u Deutschland' (October 3, 2010) www.focus.de/poHtik/deutscUand/20-jahre-wende/christian-wulff-der-islarn-gehoert-zu deutschland_aid_558481.html (accessed December 2, 2011). 15 Focus: Seehofer: Zuwanderungsstopp für Türken und Araber (October 9, 2010) www.focus.de/poHtik/deutschland/migration-seehofer-2uwanderungsstopp-fuer-tuerken-und-araber_aid_560603.html (accessed December 2, 2011). 16 Spiegel-Online: Merkel erklärt Multikulti für Gescheitert (October 16, 2010). www.spiegel.de/poHtik/deutschland/0,1518,723532,00.html (accessed December 2011). 17 Author's translation, as in the case of all subsequent quotes in this thesis that were originally in German.

12

Introduction

(Conference of Islamic Organisations), both established in 2006. 18 In Berlin the contentious debates surrounding Islam and Muslim integration since September 11th 2001 offered a vehicle for participation in deliberation. Slowly, a more differentiated view of Muslim life is emerging in Berlin. Integration policy in Berlin turned towards an agenda of strengthening civil society participation, connecting communities and opening the Berlin administration to cultural difference. Despite the move towards embracing difference, integration policy and discourse still fail to offer a discursively legitimised definition of the term. Religious Muslim associations remain largely excluded from public funding, but parts of the city administration at the (city-state) Senate and district levels started engaging with Muslim civil society organisations in deliberative processes. On the other hand, 'Muslims identify to a great extent with the district they live in and feel able to influence political decisions at the local level to a much greater extent than on the city or national level' (Open Society Foundations 2010: 126). This is the reason for this thesis to select Muslim organisations and integration discourse in Berlin, which is both a state with its own parliament (the Senate) and a city made up of elected local councils. If integration is a process that must start locally, it is quite promising when Muslims feel they can influence local political decisions. Forms of political participation, organisation and representation other than the electoral process have always played an important role in this policy area. The largest influx of migrants from so-called 'Muslim countries' came as a result of the Gastarbeitervertrag (Guest Worker Treaty) with Turkey in 1961, followed by similar treaties with Morocco (1963) and Tunisia (1965).19 The recruitment of workers from other countries was a response to the economic growth of the 1950s and 1960s in Germany. A total of 14 million guest workers came to Germany between 1955 and 1973, but only 11 million returned home. In 1973, work recruitment from abroad ended; the borders officially closed. Knowing they would not be able to come back to Germany again, many guest workers decided to stay. They became regular employees, joined trade unions and were elected in workers councils. They were integrated in the social welfare system but enjoyed

18 For

more information see: www.bundesregierung.de/Webs/Breg/DE/ Bundesregierung/Beauftragtefuerlntegration/ThemenNeu/Nationalerlntegrationsplan/nationalerintegrationsplan.html and www.deutsche-islam-konferenz.de (both accessed December 2, 2011). 19 The term 'guest worker' was based on a rotation system whereby workers were recruited for a period of two years, mostly young men.

13

no political rights. Their families moved to Germany to join them. By 1980, 33 per cent of foreign nationals living in Germany were from Turkey.20 'This sliding into a real migration process was not recognised by many migrant workers who had come since the mid 1950s. It explains the absence of behaviour patterns typical for migrants who climb the social and professional ladder in their chosen country of immigration' (Bade 2007: 39). Bade describes the typical stages of migration as the aspiration of migrants to obtain citizenship, learning the local language, and striving for the further educational success of their children that allows them to move on from low-skilled jobs typical of the first generation of work migrants. Muslims in Berlin are not a homogeneous group, as public discourse tends to suggest. They make up a very diverse minority from various ethnic, cultural and religious backgrounds, struggling to find common ground. They have in common that they are targeted by largely hostile public attitudes towards Islam. These attitudes shape Muslims' lifeworld experiences and even influence their self-perception: according to a study on Muslims in Berlin, discrimination is perceived as normal (Open Society Foundations 2010). September 11th increased public awareness about the presence of Muslim communities in the city. At the same time, Muslim activists and political actors became aware that something had to change. All this makes Muslim civil society an interesting test case to understand how deliberative processes initiated top-down in the democratic representative system and agency in civil society are interlinked and feed back on each other. According to deliberative democracy theory, the inclusion of Muslim voices in the public sphere is necessary for the legitimisation of political discourse. Strengthening Muslim civil society could foster networks and generate sustainable institutional input, contributing to a sense of citizenship among Muslim actors. Even hierarchically structured ethnic organisations have a deliberative culture because of the permanent option of exit that enables participation in democratic deliberation (Fennema/ Tillie 2005: 223). From that point of view even Islamic organisations holding anti-constitutional values could arguably be included in a cautious dialogue (Schiffauer 2010). The Berlin case shows that without system support Muslim associations and organisations have no advocacy power and are less able to broaden their social 20 For more information on the history of work migration and related policy see Eschweiler 2011; Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung 2005 www.kinofenster.de/film-des-monats/archiv-film-des-monats/kfl 103/vom-gastarbeiterzum-staatsbuerger/ www.bpb.de/popup/popup_druckversion.html?guid=6XDUPY (both accessed December 2011).

14

Introduction

network, both with civil society sharing aspects of their identity or in issue-based cooperation. This promotes withdrawal in closely-knit communities. Without a strong civil society base the political system has less leeway to legitimise policy aimed at minority inclusion locally, and as a matter of generally enhancing the problem solving potential of democracy based on a collective search for better answers. According to German researcher on migration Klaus Bade the field of Muslim integration is one of those areas where politicians and governments spent decades passing the blame. He refers to migration and integration as a political field that contributes to the lack of trust in politics and legitimacy crisis of political decisions (Bade 2007: 48). A study of Muslim civil society participation in deliberative processes in the geographically and politically confined context of Berlin in Germany can outline the development of Muslim civil society in quite some detail and demonstrates the interplay of structure and agency towards voice in the public sphere. Differences in the situation of Muslim participation in different administrative areas in Berlin allow to draw conclusions about the legitimacy of new and old forms of democratic representation and give an indication of the potential for fragmented society to move closer. Following Jiirgen Habermas, the legitimacy of political decisions through genuine representation of different world views seems of utmost importance to prevent people from turning their back on the democratic project in times of international, demographic and political tension. Democratic innovations must win the people back. The Muslim population in Berlin has long been ignored as citizens and voters. Is there a way to represent their various concerns? Deliberating with them instead of debating or polemicizing about them might further efficient integration policy approaches and introduce new democratic practices reflecting the diversity of societies today, resting on a normative discursive foundation that gives policy decisions a legitimate dimension. It is therefore relevant, from the structure and actor perspectives, to choose Muslim organisations as subjects of research — particularly as both the communities and the policy field are under pressure. A mostly negative public discourse dominated by national interests and cultural stereotypes must be combined with the real challenge of integrating a minority that is extremely diverse but is mostly longing for recognition. Integration and migration policy approaches of the last decades are largely deemed inefficient. Policy makers in Berlin are beginning to learn and turn towards more inclusionary models of deliberation with Muslim civil society actors. Focussing on Muslim civil society participation and the public sphere is an interesting test case for both the huge expectations directed at civil society to contribute to all good things - societal integration, active citizenship, a revival of popular democracy - and new democratic concepts of representation that focus

15

on identities rather than geographic constituencies and that seem more appropriate in times of globalisation and European politics without risking disintegrated societies on national level. Berlin happens to contain a small microcosm of democratic possibilities.

How to define 'Muslim' civil society? It should be stated right at the beginning that even though the focus of integration policy discourse is geared towards immigrants and their offspring it is obvious that not all Muslims — whose organisations are at the centre of this research — have a migration background and are indeed in need of integration in the popular sense. It was not until the 1990s that academia, politics and broader public first noted the religious affiliation of immigrants. Until then research on guest workers and refugees living in Germany focused on living conditions, schooling, memories of the homeland, and immigration experience. Religious affiliation was rarely considered (Spielhaus 2006: 17/18). The description of immigrants and refugees from countries with predominantly Islamic culture and religion as 'Muslim' became a sort of shorthand ascribed to them as a result of public discourse (Spielhaus 2010; 2011). Spielhaus calls for caution in academic research on Muslims, as it contributes to manifesting difference while ignoring characteristics that Muslims share with other groups in society. She warns that scientific studies also tend to stereotype Muslims as 'a category, as the cultural other that is referred to as displaced, as disconnected from its territorial space (The Muslim or Islamic world) and as socially underprivileged' (Spielhaus 2010: 197). Assuming religious practice as marker of Muslim identity is not enough, as Islamic culture also weighs strong, especially in response to stereotyping in public discourse. Spielhaus and Färber proposed to use the terms 'Islamic' and 'Muslim' to describe two different aspects of identity: 'Islamic, an adjective that for our understanding characterises a theological reference or context, and the adjective Muslim, another linguistic derivation of Islam following the pattern of the Arabic participle active and therefore referring to the actor rather than to his or her religion' (Spielhaus 2010: 184).21

'Muslims from different national and religious understandings, who meet in political discussions or formal communication settings, might build and find short or long term, implicit and overt alliances and still not pray together. Muslim in this context is understood and practiced as a group with similar political interest but not as a group that shares religious practice like a religious parish or community' (Spielhaus 2010: 195). 21

16

Introduction

The series of reports on Muslims in Europe by the Open Society Foundations rely on the self-identification of participants in the surveys as Muslim. 'This term includes Muslims who view themselves in a cultural rather than a religious context' (Open Society Foundations 2010: 17). This definition based on self-identification, either in religious, cultural or both terms, is used in this thesis. Not all civil society actors interviewed fit this definition, but all Muslim organisations participating in deliberative processes described do. This definition allows also political representation based on identity related to different worldviews. Despite the danger of perpetuating 'otherness' or exclusion it is also true that representing difference is only possible based on identities. While one must be careful to not push people into constructed identities, there are those who do self-define first of all as Muslim. While the democratic goal should be equality regardless of religious affiliation or cultural identification the task of societal integration calls for the inclusion of identity- and issue-based constituencies in democratic representation.^ My research topic, inspired by Habermas' discourse ethics and deliberative democracy theory, brings together a large body of research literature spanning democratic theory, civil society and social movements, citkenship and participation. It also informs the methodology and theoretical model proposed for empirical research and interpretive analysis.

1.4. Methodology and analytical framework The deliberation and discourse literature inspired by Habermas generally acknowledges the importance of institutional settings and political opportunities for minority views to become part of public discourse and deliberation. The Berlin case demonstrates the role of structural settings quite clearly, as different models of democratic representation are practised in relation to its Muslim populations in the city's administrative districts. The methodological approach of this research combines a focus on normative theory and on the practical wisdom of actors in the sense of phronesis as proposed by Flyvbjerg (2001). On the actor level, civil society has been similarly praised for its emancipating, participatory and legitimising potential ever since the peaceful revolutions in Eastern Europe during the late 1980s and early 1990s.

Identity has two dimensions: one dimension is inclusion of difference in a society still defined by a dominant culture based on nationality; the other dimension is that of identity that is shared by ethnic, cultural and religious communities beyond national borders (Soysal 1994). 22

17

However, certain conditions must apply for civil society to unfold this potential. Even though participation in civil society itself creates a sense of belonging and empowerment it does not automatically behold advocacy power. As social movement theory suggests, civil society organisations depend as much on political opportunity structures as on agency, networking and resources in order to establish their own structure of influence or voice. Habermas' model of deliberation is anchored in the hermeneutic tradition that allows us to justify taking the positions of subjects in a qualitative study, as it legitimises meaning ascribed by actors. A view of social reality expressed in hermeneutics refers to a theory of comprehension of the relevant symbols and signs by means of interpretation. 'This requires an ethic of openness to the unfamiliar, and a willingness to talk or work out differences so that they become shareable familiarities that can guide us into the future' (Lock/Strong 2011: 81). This is a suitable approach to examining processes taking on the challenge of integrating diversity, offering justification for a qualitative interpretive case study approach with empirical focus on the particular to draw conclusions affecting normative reflections. Discourse ethics allows solving disagreement based on a shared meaning system acquired through dialogue and interactions with those who do not share views and understandings, negotiating changes in interpretative systems. A research activity rooted in Habermas' theory must understand the reasons of social actors as well as the social context that shapes their actions. The methodological implication of this focus on lived experience is that an individual's interpretation of an experience in an essential part of the experience itself (Cope 2005: 168). It is Habermas who points to the system requirements to accommodate deliberation. Despite the focus on civil society and social movements as agents of change deliberative democracy and social movement theory make it perfectly clear that structures affect social actors. In tune with hermeneutics is the focus on the structures surrounding actors. Structures refer to dominating discourse in the public sphere as well as to the political and social institutions shaping expectations and interpretations. Taking structures around actors into account is essential for research to be informative and to help people build a better world. In this critical theory sense, research has the purpose to support less powerful people, combining material, historical, and cultural context of people with the assumption that people can shape their own destiny (Neuman 2010: 69-70). As critics have pointed out, Habermas' model of deliberative democracy based on discourse ethic is an ideal, a normative theoretical frame not easily applied to local level participation (Lock/Strong 2010). This requires an additional analytical approach appropriate to understand the phenomena at hand, Muslim civil society participation in Berlin, provided by Flyvbjerg's approach based on phronesis. Both the ideal of participatory democracy and phronesis go back to

18

Introduction

Aristotle. Phronesis, or practical wisdom, refers to a more practical focus on participation in politics (Flyvbjerg 2001: 132). It functions on the basis of practical rationality and judgement of actors, paying tribute to structure and agency levels, as deliberative process alone does not necessarily lead to presence in public sphere without sustained agency and networking. Flyvbjerg's focus on power is translated to civil society and active citi2enship as moral equal worth. (Flyvbjerg 2001: 132). Bringing practical wisdom to the methodological framework, combined with the communicative model at the foundation of Habermas' account of deliberative democracy, means studying phenomena from the perspective of social actors involved. This is best achieved in the form if interpretive case studies. Interpretive research assumes the social construction of reality. The researcher becomes the vehicle to reveal, 'how practices and meanings are formed and informed by the language and tacit norms shared by humans working towards some shared goal' (Orlikowsy/Baroudi in Andrade 2009: 44/ It does not necessarily have predictive or generalizability power, but has its own value of understanding a particular phenomenon that is useful for guiding action, especially in a critical case like Muslim civil society participation. The empirical data, presented in exemplary descriptive case studies and interpretive analysis, was gathered through semi-structured in-depth interviews with organisations that participate in a public venue or initiative in Berlin, as well as with stakeholders from within the system.23 The first case is the Islamforum, a venue for Muslim civil society, representatives of the administration, other faithbased interest organisations and secular migrant civil society who have been meeting regularly since 2005 to discuss issues of concern to the Muslim communities in Berlin. The second case concerns the involvement of a mosque association in a neighbourhood involved in an educational project in tandem with a large German welfare organisation and the subsequent engagement of the mosque in other activities. The third case, describing the district Neukölln in Berlin that keeps a distance from Muslim organisations, serves as a counter-example, designed to underline the beneficial effects of engagement. As it does not focus on a particular venue but rather reflects on the effect of a certain dominating philosophy of integration, the district is briefly compared to the neighbouring district Berlin-Kreuzberg that follows the opposite approach. Muslim civil society actors interviewed either represent organisations predominantly Muslim in their organisational identity, e.g. mosque associations, religious

All Interviewees, their organisations or positions are listed in Annex 3 - List of Interviewees.

23

19

umbrella organisations and youth organisations highlighting Muslim identity, or they work with predominantly Muslim ethnic groups. The feeling of marginalization is shared, just as much as the wish for participation and acknowledgement as equal. Further interviews with stakeholders from institutional level and other experts provide insight in the system side of deliberation, supported by official documents and other relevant publications and academic literature. The original intention was a deeply rooted qualitative study to uncover both the input of established Muslim organisations and the grassroots associations who do not have direct access to the administration due to lack of recognition. Uncovering their channels of communication and how grassroots views are carried into deliberative fora at different administrative levels would have opened a much more actor-focussed window on civil society participation. However, this was not possible due to lack of access. Habermas' model of deliberative democracy based on discourse ethics offers a complete normative model for democracy that can claim legitimacy and is inclusive, based on a discursively mediated normative foundation in form of the constitution and law. According to Habermas this is all that is needed for rational arguments and agreements, even in pluralist societies with contradicting values and worldviews. The central aspect in his model of democracy is the public sphere. Civil society anchored in the lifeworld and engaged in an autonomous public sphere guarantees voice for diversity, supported by institutionalised deliberative procedures within the system to guarantee rational debate. This thesis uses discourse ethics and deliberative democracy theory as developed by Habermas as an ideal-type, as a normative measure for empirical analysis that allows conclusions from a specific local context to the broad level of democratic representation and societal integration. The theoretical framework is a toolbox for analysis, showing that basic normative principles - claims rooted in lifeworld, the attempt for consensus through deliberative procedures in conflict, enhanced legitimacy of system decisions if rooted in civil society deliberation in the public sphere - are informative for civil society participation, as they show the importance of process, shaped by opportunities for participation, for stronger selforganisation of social actors. Deliberative democracy gives civil society an enlightening function in public discourse, provided it has a voice in that discourse. Therefore the focus is on deliberative process in mini-publics and participatory venues. My theoretical model suggests that deliberative structures and procedures provide actors with resources they need to improve their agency skills while informing political decision-makers about needs and views of a particular constituency. If Muslim civil society participation results in the formation of a social movement sector, the ground is prepared for more voice in the general public sphere. If so, the social movement sector as described by Rucht et al., supported by deliberative

20

Introduction

procedures initiated in the system, could provide an additional step in the democratising model of civil society as public sphere and provide 'a framework of democratization in the contexts of elite politics, without falling into the traps of fundamentalist theories of participation' (Cohen/Arato 1999: xviii). Thus structural factors and active agents play together in furthering societal integration and legitimacy of the representative democratic process. However, Habermas' model has been criticised for excluding minorities who do not have the same communicative power in the public sphere, which is itself structured by elite interests and dominant public discourse shaped by mainstream media with a tendency to exclude minority views. Hence I extended focus on both process and outcome of deliberation. There is a link from normative democratic theory to middle-range civil society and social movement theory that can more easily integrate theory and empirical research (Merton 1968). When looking at the bigger picture of democratic deliberation and representation, two levels of deliberation must go hand in hand. First, deliberations between actors situated within civil society who want change and can freely discuss possible solutions and desires here, influenced by their identities. Linked to change are ideas and discourse (Habermas 1989; 1996). Second, deliberation with political actors who as representatives deliberate within the policy sphere and act as advocates of ideas themselves, determining political opportunity structures. Important on both levels, and source of contention in pluralist societies, is the normative dimension of public philosophies, worldviews and political culture that undergird policies and programmes with organizing ideas and values (Schmidt 2008: 306). Deliberative democracy theory brings together lifeworld and constitution as discursive normative foundations for deliberative procedures initiated by the system, informed by civil society and the public sphere. Civil society is the interface for both citizen participation and democratic legitimacy alike. The public sphere is where lifeworld views and system can meet and both structures and agency take pivotal function, as in the practical context of Muslim civil society participation in Berlin. For the purpose of illuminating the sphere of practical wisdom that informs actors I also bring in citizenship and the model of a social movement sector as elements of empowerment. 'Because there is no single principle of transformation, it is not possible to determine, in abstract, the articulations as hierarchies among the different social experiences and their conceptions of social transformation. Only by means of the mutual intelligibility of practices is it possible to evaluate them and identify possible alliances between them' (Santos et al 2009: xxxi). This should allow to demonstrate in detail how and to what extent a deliberative process involving civil society actors can give voice to minority groups in the public sphere and what role agency plays in this context.

21

The two levels of deliberation, within civil society and between civil society and the state, bring together the structural and agency perspectives (e.g. Kitschelt 1989) that originate in social movement theory. Even with an initial inside access model, as in top-down deliberative innovations as the Islamforum, it is finally social actors who must rally the public behind their course. Again, structure and agency play together. The political opportunity structures influenced the development of the movement sector structure (Rucht et al 1997: 188), comparable to the institutionally defined conditions for Muslim participation in Berlin. On agency's side ideologically close movements form the infrastructural basis. Mobilization and action are permanent on a low level; formal organisations are part of this infrastructure, which becomes institutionalized as it guarantees continuous political input. In accordance with the methodological approach the analytical framework presented does not claim theoretical universality. It is suited to illuminate the specific social context of Muslim civil society participation in Berlin and supports analysis of their arrival in the public sphere, in the broader context of theories of deliberative democracy and reflections on legitimate representation in democratic theory. It might be possible to apply to other social contexts but it does not seek abstract or generalised theorising.

1.5. In defence of Habermas' notion of consensus '[Habermas"] scheme can be used as an abstract ideal for justification and application in relation to legislation, institutional development, and procedural planning. The problem, however, is that Habermas is idealistic.' Bent Flyvbjerg 2001: 107

In Habermas' school of thought, consensus allows the inclusion of views of the powerless, based on a deliberative process, resting on a basic legal framework defining the norms necessary for deliberation. Many have criticised his ideal of consensus, arguing that it is too far removed from reality and ignorant of power relations. Foucault, for example, believed that power is inherent to all social relations and thus always part of communication. Communication is thus rather 'characterised by rhetoric and maintenance of interests than by freedom from domination and consensus seeking' (Flyvbjerg 2001: 94). Diversity theorists like C. Gould have questioned whether agreement can be achieved through deliberation: 'The telos of discourse, what characterizes its aim and method, is agreement. Difference is something to be gotten past. And the reciprocal recognition is for the sake of common agreement rather than also for the sake of enhancing and articulating diversity' (Gould 1996: 172). There is a

22

Introduction

worry that reasons put forward by minorities or disadvantaged groups will not be heard in the same way (Young 1996). This worry is related to equality in discourse. Keane also challenges Habermas' communicative action model in relation to the claims of truth both on the religious as well as the secular side of the argument for ethical behaviour, which he calls a Law of Unending Controversy: 'This practical rule (...) underlines the implausibility of practical attempts to generate ethical consensus through communication (...) It points as well to the improbability of efforts at harmonising competing ethical claims, let alone of crafting something like a meta-language which could satisfy all disputants(...) (Keane 2003: 194-5). In other words, there are some issues where the better argument will never be found or agreed on. Even among deliberative democracy theorists, there is disagreement on consensus versus pluralism, related to the problem of defining a public common good. It mirrors the conflict between seeing difference as an irreconcilable problem or as part of human nature. According to Gutmann and Thompson deliberative democrats can find minimal consensus on a thin conception of the common good, that must be negotiated again and again in public deliberation, as deliberative democracy aims for the justification of political decisions and laws, rather than republican or communitarian traditions focused on consensus based on shared world views and values (Gutmann/Thompson 2004: 27). In fact, Habermas himself acknowledged power relations in the public sphere, which might explain the surge of studies in deliberative experiments and innovations away from general public discourse. He also proposes democratic procedures that guarantee the inclusion of all citizens in order to reach consensus or at least temporary agreement on an issue in the public sphere. The fact that different groups in society have different weight in terms of voice might be a deplorable aspect of social life that even deliberative procedure won't be able to rectify completely. However, 'participation may be an instrument to manage the disadvantaged, but even limited opportunities for the involvement by the powerless may be an improvement on the status quo' and is potentially empowering (Silver et al 2010: 458). At the core of the dynamic feature of deliberative democracy lies the principle of mutual respect, trying to reduce the level of disagreement by finding justifications for their positions that can be accepted by their opponents, even if joint agreement is impossible (Gutmann/Thompson 2004: 7). This mutual respect is sometimes described as the expressive value of deliberative democracy, a value that is indeed not always easy to develop in pluralist mass-democratic societies. It can be formed in civil society, where usually distinct issue or identity groups enter into communication or collaboration with each other, forming new discursive communities and working towards inclusion, as will be explored be-

23

low. Habermas knows there is no ideal speech situation in reality, but it is a model that serves to measure participation (Flyvbjerg 2001: 102), as communicative action may be strong or weak. Strong refers to action coordinated through the agreement of actors on the basis for the cooperation, on shared values; weak action means that actors merely recognise each other's perspective (Eriksen/Weigard 2003: 41). Without ignoring the criticism Simone Chambers challenges the view that mass publics cannot be deliberative and explores the idea of deliberative rhetoric. She refers to rhetoric as problematic in a Platonian sense when regarded from the structural level of communication, as questions that are posed without any expectation of a reply. According to Plato, democratic politics always turn away from the truth and towards rhetoric and power, and democracy by its nature prefers quantity to quality. This is what Chambers terms plebiscitary rhetoric (Chambers 2009: 328). Plebiscitary rhetoric of course is the opposite of discourse and nurturing citizenship; it amounts to muzzling other points of view, like German Chancellor Angela Merkel's reference to a certain political decision as 'without alternative' (alternativlos) — a term which online readers of Germany's Der Spiegel voted as one of the 'worst words' (Unwort) of the year 2010.24 But too much focus on critical and rational arguments contains another danger, as Young reminds us: they can exclude minorities from talking with decision-makers. The perspectives of those less skilled in such type of argument, for reasons of lack of education and training, language fluency or other resources, are reduced (Young 2000). Thus they remain objects of arguments, a situation deplored by Muslim and ethnic organisations in Berlin. Chambers' answer to this dilemma is to frame mass-democratic discourse as deliberative rhetoric. Deliberative dialogue happens between citizens in the public sphere away from power, generated in informal opinion building in civil society, situated in complex and multi-layered public spheres. Mini-publics and institutionalised deliberation between Muslim civil society and other civil society and state actors facilitate deliberative rhetoric in order to solve a particular political problem. They also facilitate „the process in the sense of 'thinking through' one's options for future action as opposed to impulsively charging ahead' (Chambers 2009: 335), in other words deliberation in the sense of considered reflection about one's actions. Without rhetoric there can be no public reflection. Coming together in mini-publics helps citizens learn the skills needed to critically evaluate. This skill is similar to the value of democratic education attributed to

24 Spiegel-Online: "Alternativlos' ist das Unwort des Jahres', January 18, 2011 www.spiegel.de/kultur/gesellschaft/0,1518,740096,00.html (accessed April 13, 2012).

24

Introduction

associations (e.g. Warren 2001) or to the social glue provided by social capital (Putnam 2000). However, according to Silver et al, the theoretical divide of consensus versus conflict and top-down versus bottom-up does not hold up in real democratic processes, as there is a certain dynamic of participation prevalent in most political decisions that involves both conflict and consensus. 25 Most of all successful participation in deliberative fora requires visible results; otherwise people will turn their backs on them (Ryfe 2005, Barnes et al 2007).

1.6. Definition of terms Every study must explain its own key concepts to break large bodies of research into manageable dimensions for analysis. In this section I will briefly clarify key concepts as filtered out of the larger bodies of research related to this topic of investigation. These concepts help clarifying key questions guiding the empirical study and set the parameters for the analysis. All concepts will be explained in more detail as part of the theoretical framework.

Lifeworld Habermas argued that rationalization of the modernisation process split society in system and lifeworld. The concept of lifeworld (Lebensmlt) was first developed by Husserl and further developed by Schiitz in a sociological sense: it provides the cultural backdrop of individuals' lives and thus relates the individual to society by shaping the identity of both individual and community. It helps individuals to agree on interpretations, which are conditional for coordinated action based on rationality (Eriksen/Weigard 2003: 46-7). 'The lifeworld can be thought as the source of enabling conditions for communicative action, through whose medium, in turn, the lifeworld itself must be reproduced' (Habermas 2000: 152). In social modernisation lifeworlds undergo a course of rationalization, which encompasses three components: cultural traditions, socialisation of individuals, and social integration. Modern discourse opens cultural traditions to criticism; traditions must be confirmed again and again reflexively over time. Socialisation increasingly equips individuals with abstract self-identity in response to 'individualised life projects', making social integration increasingly independent of tradi-

*We see opposing normative conceptions of democracy as different 'moments' in the democratic process. Bottom-up mobilization may coincide and complement top-down initiatives. Each dominating different political phases, and different conceptions of participatory democracy may apply to varying degrees at distinct stages in the process' (Silver et al 2010: 454). 25

25

tions. This makes the 'political regulation of collective life increasingly dependent of the deliberative bodies of constitutionalised states, as well as the communicative processes of civil society and political public spheres' (Habermas 2000: 152), thus colonising lifeworlds. Cohen and Arato identify emancipatory potential in the structural differentiation of the lifeworld, expressed through the emergence of institutions that specialise in the reproduction of tradition, solidarity and identity, referring to institutions other than money and power based on inter-subjectivity: 'It is here, on the institutional level of the lifeworld, that one can root a hermeneutically accessible, because socially integrated, concept of civil society' (Cohen/Arato 1992: 429), giving lifeworld a private and a public dimension. This allows different lifeworld validities to enter the public sphere, where they must engage in deliberation with the aim of settling conflicts. The concept is relevant here as political legitimacy depends on the integration of very different worldviews. This in part determines if immigrant communities withdraw in diaspora mentalities or try to engage in public deliberation. Civil society The concept of civil society used in this research belongs in a public sphere altered by modernisation processes and the rise of an opinion-shaping press. In this sense participation in civil society is a form of political participation. Civil society is frequently conceptualised as a sphere between the state, market and private spheres. Habermas ascribes to it the role of social and system integration via 'the participation of private people in a process of formal communication conducted through intra-organi2ational public spheres' (Habermas 1990: 357), with the potential to encourage a politics that does not judge opponents as enemies but allows democratic discussion. Its most important aspect in the context of Muslim participation is that of plurality, inherent to civil society (Keane 1998: 57) with the ability to expand social equality and liberty and to democratise the structures of the state (Keane 1988: 14). As conceptualised by Cohen and Arato, lifeworlds are represented in civil society organisations that overlap directly with private and market spheres, as the following figure illuminates.

26

Introduction

Fig. 1: Conceptual diagram of the public and private spheres that locate civil society

Police

Executive Judiciary

State Sphere

Military Secret police

Bureaucracy

Espionage Political ^parties

Public

Sphere

Public welfi state, media. education & t&D

Private media, education, health

Market

Voluntary associations: welfare, public k interest, religious Social movements Self-help groups People's private lives disclosed in the media & courts

Family

Private

Sphere

Firms

Unions Markets

Family firms & elite club networks

Sphere

Friends & acquaintances

Love and affection Sexual relations

Source: Janoski 1998: 13

A key question is how much system support civil society needs to build the common good in the sense of generating political legitimacy through voice in the public sphere. While some voices claim that as much associational freedom as possible is enough (e.g. Warren 2001) others insist the institutions of the system must promote participation in deliberation of civil society associations that would not find their voice in the public sphere, but show a commitment to tackle exclusion and injustice (Edwards 2004; Gutmann/Thompson 2004; Habermas 1996).

27

Assisting Muslim civil society in Berlin through deliberative mini-publics and participatory process can stimulate interaction and be an additional driving-force for societal integration. This is impossible without an inclusive public sphere that provides the space for associations to operate and define 'the good society's ends and means' (Edwards 2004: 91). In my theoretical framework I am mostly reflecting on Habermas' notion of civil society and the public sphere, which allows distinguishing weak and strong publics, and keeps a focus on the role of lifeworld communication and dominating public discourse.

Public sphere The term 'public sphere' is inextricably linked to the work of Habermas. His definition of the concept has influenced most contemporary writing on the public sphere. Public sphere is a liberal concept, as it sees the individual having an impact on general will formation. 'The public sphere can best be described as a network of communicating information and points of view (e.g. opinions expressing affirmative or negative attitudes); the streams of communication are, in the process, filtered and synthesi2ed in such a way that they coalesce into bundles of topically specified public opinions' (Habermas 1996: 360). Deliberative democracy refers to the public sphere as the place of political opinion building in informal circles of political communication (Habermas 1996: 275). According to Habermas the political sphere today is split between a socially integrated (the public sphere) and a system-integrated (decision-making administrative) sphere (Habermas 1981). This split symbolises the challenge of societal integration today. Habermas criticised the loss of effective public spheres in modern societies. Without such critical public spheres, he argued, norms lose their legitimacy. Through this same process, authorities and political elites also lose legitimacy. The political order is only understandable and legitimate in the eyes of the members of society if each new step on the road to greater system autonomy is institutionally anchored in the lifeworld via deliberation in the public sphere (Eriksen/Weigard 2003: 93-4). Public life is full of disagreements for which resolutions must be sought in deliberation in the general or strong public sphere of opinion-formation, where political parties close to system and state sphere are located, just as mainstream media and broadcasting organisations, including those privately owned Qanoski 1998: 15). The public sphere also entails weak publics expressed in civil society, close to the lifeworld or private sphere that provide a check against state power if allowed autonomy. All issues of public concern call for public principles recognised through discourse, legitimising policy. The relationship between public sphere and the polity is of argumentative rather than participatory nature (Cohen 1999: 70). Some weak publics, this thesis argues, need nurturing by the system to be able to participate in public argumentation.

Introduction

28

Public sphere is also where normative theory and phronesis meet. The many publics constituted through civil society seem to scatter the general public sphere, but Habermas argues they remain porous and can build hermeneutical bridges within the larger public sphere that is connected to the political sphere. 'Segmented public spheres are constituted with the help of exclusion mechanisms; however, because publics cannot harden into organisations or systems, there is no exclusion rule without a proviso for its abolishment' (Habermas 1996: 374). This permeability is an important assumption with a view to voice in the general public sphere, supported by deliberative procedures.

Public discourse Public discourse generates public opinion. It expresses the opinion of dominating groups in society and correlates with political and social power. Habermas reminds us that a public opinion is fictional (Habermas 1990: 351), but the plebiscitary deformation of parliamentary publicity', transmitted by the media, dominates public discourse (Habermas 1990: 309). Public opinion should be formed through a process of reciprocal enlightenment, generated through critical challenging of political power, necessary for the normative foundation of political legitimacy (Habermas 1990: 291). However, according to Habermas, public discourse is dominated by a manipulative publicity generated by private interests expressed in associations, who engage with representatives of the system behind closed doors, shaping power structures in the public sphere (Habermas 1990: 346). In The Transformation of the Public Sphere Habermas speaks of the 'refeudalisation' of publicity, no longer in line with the liberal ideal of publicity directed at the common good (Habermas 1990: 293). The rising power of bureaucracy and administration led to the increase of deliberative venues outside parliaments that lost their function as mediator between state and society. Organised interests now seek to transform private interests into public interests, trying to legitimise claims with the public through the steering media and political parties based on mass membership and ideologies, thus 'producing' publicity, which largely reflects plebiscitary public opinions held by the democratically elected governing parties, excluding minority views (Habermas 1990: 297-302, 346). Even though trends are arguably changing again today through more opinion pluralism through the Internet, the loss of political ideologies and shrinking party membership, access to opinion-shaping circles remains competitive and depending on resources, no longer reflecting 'the people'. With his model of deliberative democracy Habermas wants to strengthen critical publicity again, as it provides the only legitimation of political power. Private people must participate in a communicative process in intra-organisational publics, to bring a balance of perspectives to public discourse, integrating informal opinions in quasi-public

29

opinions expressed in the public sphere (Habermas 1990: 355-7). Based on respect, arguments and lifeworld justification 'proponents of competing positions must communicate — not just to those who already share their views, but to those who don't: they must be part of a public conversation.'26

Citizenship Citizenship has a formal dimension of rights and obligations, expressed in citizen regimes, as well as a normative one visible in social and political action, in citizenship in practice. Hannah Arendt maintained that individuals only enjoy rights when they are socially and politically embedded in a society. Recognition as a moral equal is hence a precondition not only for full citizenship but also for the entidement to rights (Somers 2008: 126), granted in democratic constitutions. Citizenship in this sense is strongly linked to identities, shaped by narratives of the struggle for belonging generated through the right of personhood expressed in the recognition of individuals as moral equals, and for citizenship rights. Such rights can only be protected when belonging to a political body (Somers 2008: 26). The concept of citizenship employed in this work refers to citizenship in the sense of personhood and moral equal worth described by Somers (2008), generated through equality and respect gained in deliberative process that provides learning through lifeworld accounts and outcomes that benefit the communities represented by civil society activists. Somers observes a contractualisation process of citizenship, related to loss of autonomy of the public sphere due to transgression of state and market. Families and communities are turned into social capital and increasingly distinguished in terms of their utility — a counterproductive move to integration and inclusion (Somers 2008: 42), mirrored in public discourse on Muslim integration in Germany, which circles around lack of educational and professional achievement, dependence on the welfare state and crime rates among Muslim youth. Participation in a deliberative process seems most promising in terms of outcome, particularly for minorities, who often lack democratic representation, a sense of social integration and the exercise of active citizenship. Participation in civil society is an act of social inclusion and citizenship. Both individual and structural factors influence the formation of the social movement sector that manifests Muslim representation in the public sphere. The formation process is an important part of the empirical research, as it illuminates the process of deliberation and the level of democratic representation and legitimacy gained through Muslim civil society participation in the public sphere. Tollefsen (2009) What is Public Discourse? www.thepublicdiscourse.com/2009/10/945 (accessed April 6, 2012).

26

30

Introduction

Legitimacy According to Geissel legitimacy is divided in input and output legitimacy, thus focussing both on process and outcome of political decision-making processes. Input-legitimacy focuses on the reflection of citizen preferences in a political system or by the inclusion of citizens in the decision-making process in terms of outcome. Proponents of participatory innovations argue 'that participatory innovations would attract a multitude of citizens who do not take part in traditional participation, whereas critics stress that only already politically active social strata would get involved' (Geissel 2009: 63). Output-legitimacy refers to the capacity of a political system to solve collective problems. In Habermas' terms legitimate problem solving depends on inclusive deliberation in the public sphere in which all groups with a stake in the matter offer their definitions and worldviews in order to find a solution based on rational arguments (Eriksen/Weigard 2003: 41). In this process, collective objectives must first be identified and negotiated before they can be 'translated' into policies. This demand of legitimacy applies to mini-publics just as much as to political decision-making based on discourse in the general public sphere. It contains two aspects of output-legitimacy related to process and outcome. Deliberation and participation must help to identify the collective objectives of a community, and foster the completion of these objectives (Geissel 2009: 64). From a deliberative democracy perspective the quality of deliberation also matters, which in turn depends on the linguistic capacities of participants to represent their communities in public deliberation, an objection brought forward by Young (2000) in relation to migrant communities. In the context of this study most Muslim civil society activists who participate in deliberative venues in Berlin are middle-class or at least second generation migrants, if not ethnic German who share the linguistic capacities of other participants, thus going 'hand-in-hand with the well-known social bias of political participation' (Geissel 2009: 66).

Integration versus Participation Integration is a rather elusive concept, certainly in relation to immigrants and other minorities. From a societal integration point of view, taking value pluralism and diverging individual interests into account it can be defined as the stability and legitimacy of a political system 'by rebuilding bonds of civility and tolerance — a moral social order - across conflicts and divisions' (Favell 2001: 2). German public discourse on migration for the past 10 years has been dominated by the term integration, without offering a unified definition (Rauer 2008). Also on immigrant side there are different interpretations, ranging from legal definitions in terms of respecting the law to learning German as the most important re-

31

quirement. There is general weariness about assimilation, which is perceived to be the real expectation in integration discourse.27 Public discourse on integration is furthermore strongly dominated by the expectation that it is the 'others' — migrants, foreigners, people with migration background, Muslims, to list some of the labels used — who must make the effort and take the blame for lack of displaying interest in adopting a somewhat undefined mainstream sort of life and culture. The fact that these groups often lack resources of participating in German social life (social, economic, verbal, educational) is easily overlooked. 'Considering the precarious social situation of many migrants it is fair to put the question why we expect the marginalized to display the most dedication' (Kast 2008: 9). The 'othering' of Muslims in public discourse is an additional obstacle for developing a sense of belonging.28 Focus on integration policy in Berlin makes sense only if looking at it as the locus of Muslim participation in Berlin. „Participation, by contrast, is a specific term that means taking part in every aspect of society: culture, education, economy. (...) The goal of participation is to become a full member of society, which then is integration' (Kolat 2011: 96). I hence consider participation in social, economic, political and cultural life a form of both Muslim and societal integration. Political participation goes beyond taking part in traditional forms like casting votes. In fact, voting could be considered a passive act of participation, as people only respond to options given to them rather than bringing forward ideas themselves (Wilson 1985). This is why Habermas highlights civil society participation in public discussion. Some scholars suggest, in the spirit of new institutionalism, that one needs to focus on the norms and institutional rules that structure public bodies. Such rules will influence participatory processes and thus determine who participates and how the process is designed (Barnes et al 2007). In the case of Berlin, the district mayors are supposed to implement city/ state policy guidelines, but are free to offer their own interpretations and opinions. How personal philosophies of interpretation can affect Muslim participation will become evident in one of the case studies.

27 From reactions in interviews with Muslim activists on the definition of the term integration. 28 Interview Spielhaus.

Introduction

32

1.7. Literature Review Deliberative Democracy Over the last decade a myriad of studies have been carried out that look into the role of citizens, civil society and the public sphere in re-instating a healthy democracy that takes the views of citizens into account. Hardly any other thinker has influenced this theoretical discussion as strongly as Jiirgen Habermas and his model of deliberative democracy. Inherent to the concept is a place for agency 'with the assumption that behaviour is always constrained to some extend, but not completely determined, so there is always some room for choice' (Steiner et al 2004: 6). His model has inspired theoretical and empirical research on citizen participation, how to make better democracy, nurture civic culture and enhance the legitimacy of democratic institutions (e.g. Dryzek 2000), usually focusing on institutions and the policy process. That a democratic model based on talk has higher value than the simple act of voting for representatives has long been accepted as valid theoretical claim. Deliberation is broadly seen as extension of representative democracy. The specifics of deliberative democracy, on the other hand, have sparked much debate, e.g. around the definition of deliberation and how it is different from rhetoric (e.g. Remer 2000) or bargaining (e.g. Elster 1997). Chambers contributed to this debate with the concept of deliberative rhetoric, which refers to the right kind of action to solve a particular political problem and „to the process in the sense of 'thinking through' one's options for future action as opposed to impulsively charging ahead' (Chambers 2009: 335). Deliberative democracy theorists from Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson (2004) to Graham Smith (2003) argue in favour of new designs of our democratic institutions, demanding the incorporation of mutual respect based on morality or a general turn towards associative democracy to incorporate deliberation. Paul Hirst developed a model of democracy in which state institutions support the empowerment of associations, regardless of what they stand for, by offering a set of rules and regulating institutions that can accommodate differences (Hirst 1994: 14). More in the spirit of direct democracy Joshua Cohen conceives of free public deliberation as the foundation of legitimate use of power. The members of a community, bound by a principle of deliberative inclusion, agree to be governed by collectively made decisions generated through acceptable reasons and justifications (Cohen 1996). As deliberative democratic theory has moved beyond the theorizing stage the literature is increasingly dominated by empirical investigations on deliberative innovations informing policy process (Chambers 2009). 'Does deliberative democracy work? The empirical literature answers this question with a qualified

33

yes' (Ryfe 2005: 62). There are, however, certain conditions attached. It appears that deliberation can produce more sophisticated, tolerant, and participative citizens (Fung 2003, Fishkin 1997), but these outcomes are not automatic. Research points to many structural conditions for successful and sustainable deliberation like accountability to others, high stakes, a diversity of views and outcomes (Gastil & Levine 2005; Ryfe 2005; Silver 2008; Schmidt 2008). Tasks should be realistic and the discussion must be well organised to ensure equality. Another question is how to make deliberation and participation inclusive. Steiner et al. studied how outcomes depend on talk culture of deliberation and how the level of deliberation depends on institutional settings, making their dependent variable political outcome in terms of social justice. In their quantitative study they focus on discourse in public democratic fora like national parliaments to measure discourse quality (Steiner et al 2004: 55). However, concerns of certain groups hardly make it to this level, supporting doubts about the inclusiveness of deliberation itself, as political argument is never detached from its social and cultural circumstances (Young 1996; Silver et al 2010). 'To the extent that deliberation combines cognition (the act of making sense) with culture (the act of making meaning), it probably looks more like storytelling than argumentation' (Ryfe 2005: 58). This perspective should be taken into account when designing deliberative process. This links to research on scale and aims of practical deliberation. Much normative theoretical literature looks at enhanced policy process, whereas in practice, Levine et al. argue, there is mostly 'no serious effort to change public policy to match the result of public conversation. The goal of a meeting may be to build networks of citizens, to develop new ideas, to teach people skills and knowledge, to change attitudes, but not to influence government' (Levine et al. 2005: 278). Scale matters for deliberative democracy, as it should enhance legitimacy of political decisions through participation. Deliberation must reach beyond dialogue or deliberation in mini-publics (Levine et al. 2005; Chambers 2009) into the public sphere. But how?

Civil Society: Enhancing Democratic Value and Citizenship Deliberation behind closed doors with informal publics constituted in civil society rather than in the general public sphere is one step in Habermas' model. The term civil society is not exacdy defined. 'Most writers on civil society agree, however, that civil society has an institutional core constituted by voluntary associations outside the sphere of the state and the economy' (Flyvbjerg 1998: 210). Civil society lives off voluntary engagement and is directed at social change. Democratic theory and political sociology describe it as the connective element between the individual and the state, as a function of social and system integration of individuals, as the social glue of a society, maintaining and redefining 'the

34

Introduction

boundaries between civil society and the state through two interdependent and simultaneous processes: the expansion of social equality and liberty, and the restructuring and democratization of the state' (Keane 1988: 14). Civil society institutions have been referred to as households, community associations, and the media, but also shared norms like friendships, trust and cooperation. The role of civil society organisations in the demise of state socialism in Eastern Europe triggered new interest in the concept, which was then quickly related to changes in institutional politics in response to the crisis of legitimacy of representative democracy and the limits of aggregative policy effects. Cohen and Arato described civil society as the slogan of the 1990s: 'Apparently, neither the centralized state nor the magic of the marketplace can offer effective, liberal, and democratic solutions to the problems of 'post-industrial' civil societies in a context of globalization' (Cohen 1999: 55). Historically, the notion of civil society has its roots mainly in the 17th and 18th centuries and denotes a new distinction between the private and the public, the individual and the social, always keeping a balance between state and citizens where identities, morality and personal autonomy can be preserved (Locke, Hegel, Smith and Durkheim). Marx and other communist thinkers, on the other hand, regarded civil society as a moment of overcoming bourgeois rule. The relationship between civil society and democracy was conceptually reformed by Gramsci, who emphasised the cultural and symbolic dimensions of civil society and their role in generating consent, or hegemony (for a historic overview see Seligman 1992). As the separation of market and private sphere was unstoppable in the wake of modernisation, the focus on the democratic value of civil society rose. French sociologist Alain Touraine picked up on the importance of the cultural and dynamic aspect of civil society. He understood society as 'the changing, unstable, loosely coherent product of social relations, cultural innovation, and political processes. (...) The focus turns to fields of alterable, but nonetheless structured social relations rather than development, the state, or the market' (Arato/Cohen 1991: 512). In his Structuranransformation of the 'Public Sphere (1990) Habermas was still not overly optimistic about the emancipating potential of civil society, as he could not see autonomous public opinion in society, which provides the foundation of legitimate political power (Habermas 1990: 344). German sociologist Claus Offe saw civil society in a radical democratic function as resolution of this conflict - the revitalization of civil and political society through social movements and citizen initiatives outside an institutional framework that threatens independent social life and collective identities, as electoral politics has descended into crisis, together with the welfare state (Cohen/ Arato 1999: 45). However, he did not explain how to diffuse this potential, as not all civil society associations are of political nature but are identity or interest based

35

(Cohen 1992: 46). Civil society theory pays attention to this aspect and looks at the input as well as at the output of civil society organizations, in other words the influence of politics exercised on organizations, but also vice versa. If political institutions are supportive of civil society, non-profit organizations show the ability of a society to organize itself. A lively non-profit landscape supposedly contributes to institutional diversity and can have a positive impact on innovations in civil society (Klein 2000). Michael Edwards provides an overview of three dominating models of civil society and argues they can be combined in a mutually supportive framework that supports both a normative idea of a better society and offers a framework for action. The associative school sees civil society as distinct from state and market and refers to networks and associations between the family and the state (e.g. Warren 2001). Voluntary associations act as microclimates for developing civic values like tolerance and cooperation, and the skills required for living a democratic life based on trust and reciprocity, independent of a shared normative foundation (e.g. Putnam 2000). Indeed, in associational tradition Fennema and Tillie (2005) found in their study of different migrant groups in Belgium and Holland that networks of ethnic association do form civic communities that generate democratic attitude based on trust, related to accountability within voluntary associations and by organizing horizontal and vertical relationships. 'Civic competence is an unintended result of their existence. This is even true for associations with an uncivic mission such as sectarian or extremist organizations' (Fennema/Tillie 2005: 234). Secondly, they argue, all voluntary associations have a deliberative culture, even the most hierarchic ones, because of the permanent exit option, which teaches members civic competence. 'Nothing adds more to a process of de-radicalization than participation in democratic institutions' (Fennema/Tillie 2005: 223). However, civil society in this line of thinking has been blamed for being essentially driven by self-interest, missing an overriding normative orientation towards a common good as in the civic culture and public sphere schools of civil society. Jean Cohen criticized the way in which Putnam's social capital concept omitted the public sphere from political renewal through associations. She warned that it could fall in the hands of social conservatives: 'When combined with the discourse of civil and moral decline [this concept of civil society] undermines democracy instead of making it work' (Cohen 1999: 56). As Seligman points out, for many civil society refers to 'an ethical idea of social order, one that, if not overcomes, at least harmonizes, the conflicting demands of individual interest and social good' (Seligman 1992: x). The conception of civil society as 'good society' in the civic culture school has a normative foundation, striving towards 'a different way of being and living in the world' (Edwards 2004: viii). It goes back to the idea of a social contract between

36

Introduction

state, economy and citizens. In this context researchers like Theda Skocpol (2003) draw attention to the civic virtues of big advocacy groups and service providers who are less specific interest and identity based and thus promote a broader base in society. On the other hand, big social movements like the women's movement or the peace movement containing ideas about the good society were either constituency or issue based (Edwards 2004). As a matter of fact, 'grassroots participation of 'ordinary' citizens is not necessarily inclusive, empowering or egalitarian' (Silver et al 2010: 455). Thus civil society theory must combine personal, social and democratic dimensions and focus on the interrelation of structure and agency. Many scholars regard civil society as the source of both civic virtue and good governance (Almond/ Verba 1963; Van Deth 2000; Warren 2001). The public sphere approach, strongly influenced by Habermas, adds a democratic dimension that actually allows self-interest or purposive rationality driving action. Civil society is not part of the administrative system, but impacts politics through publicity, either because civil society organisations participate directly in public discourse or because their programmatic activities provide an example that implicitly contributes to public discussion (Habermas 1990: 46). Habermas sees civic commitment located in the variety of associations rather than in the identification with the larger political community (Baynes 2002: 134), but in its role as the 'public sphere', civil society becomes the arena for argument and deliberation as well as for association and institutional collaboration, and the extent to which such spaces thrive is crucial to democracy (Edwards 2004: 57).

Civil society and the Public Sphere: Strengthening Democracy, the Social and the Individual Arato and Cohen (1999) pointed out that even though every model of democracy includes models of society, there was no answer as to what type of civil society would work best in a modern democracy. They argue that it is both dominated by institutions and the basis for emancipation, explaining 'why civil society is the target as well as the terrain of contemporary collective action' (Arato/Cohen 1991: 524). They see the colonization threat described by Habermas, but also define civil society as political society because of its dualistic character as a major sphere of democratic influence in which the political movement needs the non-political associational sphere of social life groups to address the issues and needs they pursue in the public sphere (Arato/ Cohen 1999: 558). Both Edwards and Cohen/Arato highlight the inclusion of new actors and public deliberation about needs, norms and identities. Keane sees the potential capacity of civil society to encourage a politics that does not judge opponents as enemies, thus allowing democratic discussion. A central thesis in his work is the notion that 'the public suspicion of power in its various

37

forms is an essential ingredient of our early modern democratic heritage' (Keane 1998: 10). Power should be publicly controlled by the democratic order, institutionally separating state and civil society, and hence sharing power between state and civilian institutions. Democracy is 'a fractured and self-reflexive system of power in which there are daily reminders to governors and governed alike that those who exercise power over others cannot do whatever they want' (Keane 1998: 11). Thus, civil society maintains the boundaries between itself and the state, while expanding social equality and liberty and democratising the structures of the state (Keane 1988: 14). As mentioned earlier, critical reflections on deliberative democracy theory and the public sphere maintain that more disadvantaged people are at risk of being excluded from public deliberation 'through practical barriers of time, money, culture and information' (Perrin/ McFarland 2008: 1234), and even the betterpositioned advocates of minority groups might still be dismissed in public discourse by more powerful groups on grounds of culture, language or religion (Fraser 1992, Young 1996, Mouffe 2000). To approach this issue of exclusion Briggs describes the notion of democracy as problem solving in the face of 'social diversity, more complex issues demanding public attention and decision, tensions between the global and the local' (Briggs 2008: 9). He highlights the civic capacities of a community to solve problems, which is similar to Habermas' account of inclusive and rational discourse in the public sphere. This requires voice for all groups in society. In this light states and institutional procedures enable and support citizens and civil society through dialogue in deliberative process. Dialogue is bridging linguistic, social and epistemological differences between groups. It can further understanding and prepare for participation in wider public discourse (Fraser 1990: 72; Levine et al. 2005: 282). From a postmodern democratic point of view democratic inclusiveness depends on drawing a line in defining similarity and difference in the public sphere. Calhoun refers to the authoritativeness of a single public discourse, which automatically disadvantages certain forms of speech and certain speakers. The public discourse, mostly in form of the media, needs influx from many different voices. 'While it is clearly a matter of stratification and boundaries (for example openness to the propertyless, the uneducated, women and immigrants) it is also a matter of how the public sphere incorporates and recognizes the diversity of identities which people bring in from their manifold involvements in civil society' (Calhoun 1992: 45-7). Cohen counters that differences do not alter the normative core if public sphere remains tied to democratic decision-making process. 'Democratic legitimacy and the ideal of the public sphere as the central context of participation are tied up with the potential for inclusion' (Cohen 1999: 72). Many publics constituted

38

Introduction

through civil society seem to scatter the general public sphere, but Habermas argues in a modern tradition that they remain porous and can build hermeneutical bridges within the larger public sphere that is connected to the political sphere (Habermas 1996: 374). Thoughts on inclusion are linked to the question if states should actively involve citizens and their various organisations in order to re-instate an autonomous public sphere (e.g. Gutman 2004).

Citizenship Involving minority civil society organisations in deliberative mini-publics as a first step to prepare activists for participation in public discourse can also foster a sense of active citizenship, inherent to all conceptions of civil society. The lack of citizenship rights of immigrants (denizens) has surged a new interest both in formal conditions of citizenship (Brubaker 1992; Soysal 1994; Joppke 1998; Koopmans/ Statham 2000) and in multicultural citizenship, vested with specific notions of the good life rooted in lifeworld culture (Benhabib 2004; Kymlicka 1995; Walzer 2005). Keane adds national self-determination as important factor for a sense of citizenship. When citizens are denied access to this shared sense of nationhood — and many German Muslims report they never feel accepted as Germans, no matter what they do (e.g. Open Society Foundations 2010) — they are 'less capable of living democratically' (Keane 1998: 89). In a civil society context it makes conceptual sense to disassociate citizenship from national identity, thus enabling participation and empowerment and avoiding suppression of pluralism and diversity of views. What is citizenship? For a long time citizenship theory has not been a central aspect of social sciences. There is a difference between substantive and formal citizenship. Bottomore describes the first as the struggle for membership in a national community; the second describes rights and obligations that come with this membership (Bottomore 1992: 66-73). Inspired by Durkheim, a number of citizenship theories locate citizenship not only in law but also in the public sphere, which represents civic virtue generated from volunteerism in civil society (for a review see Janoski 1998: 7). Citizenship involves passive rights of existence and active rights of influencing politics (Thompson 1970). Formal citizenship should be universally valid guaranteed by law (Janoski 1998: 9). 'Cosmopolitan citizenship and human rights are the ideal, but they are yet unrealizable in an international global universe still driven by the nation-states' (Somers 2008: 132). However, the fact that citizenship is not just a matter of rights and obligations was demonstrated by Hannah Arendt in her account of statelessness in response to the stateless left behind by the Nazi regime and their dehumanization in The Origins of Totalitarianism (Arendt 1979). Arendt argued that human rights depend on the significance of one's opinion and the effectiveness of action. Without the

39

right to membership in a political community there can be no sense of human personhood. The right to have rights qua citizenship in that sense is prerequisite to claiming rights granted by legal frameworks. The fact that legal protection of minorities, first introduced by the League of Nations after World War I, was necessary in the first place, points to the priority of national interest over the rule of law (Somers 2008: 123). 'In Arendt's schemata, statelessness invoked not only righdessness, but more profoundly it made people indistinguishable from the scum of the earth' (Somers 2008: 126). Somers applies Hannah Arendt's account of statelessness to socially excluded Americans "who hold de jure citizenship but who nonetheless are being expelled from the rights-bearing terrain of rule of law, from protection by the social state (usually called the welfare state), and from access to the public sphere' (Somers 2008: 118). She links this to the degradation of the public sphere to market fundamentalism, turning the foundations of citizenship from non-contractual to market-driven. At the same time the nation state no longer unifies ethnicity and demos (people eligible to vote), depriving parts of the population the social membership necessary to claim rights (Somers 2008: 119). She refers to white working-class Americans who compensate their loss of social citizenship due to neoliberalism with a new identity of cultural, rather than social, inclusion. The German discourse on parallel societies, 'othering' Muslim communities, divides mainstream and Muslim communities further, both sides withdrawing in cultural identity. Social, economical and political deprivation furthers exclusion due to lack of 'worthiness' (e.g. Somers 2008: 213-253 and Cohen 1999 on social capital). Mediating cultural divisions based on 'vertical lines of descend' that impact lifeworld knowledge is responsibility of the state beyond legal provisions for equality (Somers 2008: 129) by supporting inclusive citizenship in civil society. 'Citizenship is a concept born of the republican tradition, thus constitutively of the public sphere — governmental institutions as well as those of civil society' (Somers 2008: 151). Janoski, working on an empirical theory that places citizenship in the context of civil society, demonstrates that the concept of citizenship contains both normative and action level. He describes civil society as providing the independent variable that explains citizenship, as it pressures for political and legislative choices, including in relation to citizenship. Citizenship at group level refers to the ideologies and beliefs upon which groups make claims for rights, whereas on personal level it is the sense of self in relation to the state which defines citizenship in relation to attitudes and behaviour (Janoski 1998: 11). 'Consequently, strong civil societies produce particular institutional structures that bolder citizenship, and civil society constructs much of the citizen-society discourse in terms of rights and obligations' (Janoski 1998: 17). This locating of citizenship in civil society is in line with Habermas' conception of deliberative democracy.

40

Introduction

Together with Somers' focus on citizenship as moral equal worth derived from Hannah Arendt it informs the theoretical framework of this thesis.

Social movements Another benefit of bringing civil society organisations together in deliberative process offers new opportunities for networking among social actors. A look at social movement theory and research offers useful insights as it offers another focus relevant to démocratisation and citizen participation in policy process, which is the domain of deliberation and part of civil society literature. It examines how to keep discourse alive and productive and looks at relationships between institutionalized structures, different types of movement organisations and mobilisation. Many sociologists and political scientists believe that social movements seldom have much impact. Opinion diverges whether this is because democracy works poorly or well (Burstein 1999: 3), drawing attention to political opportunities for social actors to pursue their agenda of change. The key to successful mobilization in the political opportunity tradition in social movement research, originating in political protest research, is the political context (e.g. Kitschelt 1986; Tarrow 1994; Kriesi 1995; Meyer 2004; Koopmans 2004). Important variables are openness or closeness of the formal political process, the degree of stability or instability of political alignments, the availability and strategies of potential alliance partners and the level of political conflict between elites. The political opportunity framework is mostly used in crossnational comparisons, as real differences in structures are most visible there, but an analysis of national opportunity structures, even on local level, demonstrates the conditions for protest and participation by organisations (e.g. Schaefer Caniglia/Carmin 2005). Objections to a pure opportunity structure approach are numerous and highlight different types of movements (Koopmans 1992), movement strategies (e.g. Diani 1996; Gamson/Meyer 1996), and relations between movements (Diani 1995; Rucht 1996). Cultural factors seem to be especially important for minority participation. Gamson and Meyer (1994) have criticised the excessive focus on structural and institutional aspects and prefer to refer to political opportunity rather than political opportunity structure. They stress the importance of cultural factors in addition to context and locate political opportunity in structural factors and related levels of stability as well as in national belief systems, class-consciousness and the prevailing national mood. Also the media decides which actors are important and silences the others. Such cultural factors add additional constraints on political opportunities for ethnic minority political participation (Geddes 1998: 148). Koopmans concedes that political opportunity structures might explain the cause for collective action but not the further development or outcome of it

41

(Koopmans 2004). The framework on migrant participation he developed with Statham picked up on cultural aspects to examine the exact conditions for immigrant organisations to enter into discourse with the political system (Koopmans/Statham 2000). They add discourses among social actors, which refer to identities and culture deeply rooted in collective actors (Koopmans 2004: 67- 69), but leave this aspect underdeveloped. However, the actor-dimension of communication, networking and action after gaining access to the political sphere is important to draw conclusions about voice in the public sphere, legitimacy and representation of claims. In other words, political opportunity structures turn a blind eye to democratic theory, which is more of a focus in the new social movements and political process approaches. Key thinkers in the new social movement tradition are J urge n Habermas, Alan Touraine and Alberto Melucci, who all argued that new social movements represented a new era (for a summary see Arato/Cohen 1991: 508-16). New social movement theory focuses on change brought about in cultural, symbolic or subpolitical domains such as self-change and on changes affecting political culture. Habermas saw potential in new social movements to re-juvenile the public sphere and revitalize the normative structures of society by generating new solidarities, creating new public spaces and revitalizing institutionalized ones (Arato/Cohen 1991: 498). One positive aspect Habermas saw in the post-materialist movements of the 1960s and 70s was a rather conservative element - the defence and restoration of endangered ways of life (Habermas 1987: 392). His hopes were for new social movements to demonstrate the emancipatory potential of critical rationality, one that truly questions institutions from outside, in response to the colonization of the lifeworld. However, he described the German student movement as reactionary, employing too much confrontational means and violence to be able to analyse the situation and contribute to emancipating enlightenment (Habermas 1968: 11). Cohen and Arato describe the double political task of new social movements: first they create the subject of collective action and collective identity. Then action shifts from the expressive to the instrumental, where formal organisation occurs and collective action focuses on political inclusion, which measures success. 'Full institutionalisation would involve recognition of the (demobilised) group represented by the new political insiders as a legitimate special interest whose claims become susceptible to negotiation and political exchange' (Arato/ Cohen 1999: 557). This model mirrors Habermas' depiction of the public sphere with civil society as antenna of the lifeworld in deliberative democracy theory. However, the dual organisational logic that movements are usually facing negates a linear development, as they respond to a variety of problems, not all of them can be answered by government intervention, but require self-help groups as

42

Introduction

well as advocacy (Cohen/ Arato 1999: 558-9). The concept of a social movement sector described by Rucht et al (1997) pays tribute to the complexity on actor level. It allows institutionalised access of some organizations in a particular field of activism, which makes them part of political opportunity structures and is likely to change their strategies (Meyer 2005). Rational actors and collective behaviour are important as grassroots try to find ways to influence political process through their insider ally. Gamson suggested regarding social movement organisations as part of the democratic political process (Gamson 1990), establishing them as constant actors in the policy process. They can draw from their grassroots background, thus informing the system about lifeworld views formed through communication.

Representation Assuming social actors active in civil society, encouraged and supported by deliberative process, gain voice in the public sphere, how to translate claims and opinions in the public sphere into political decisions? In Habermas' model opinions and views generated in the public sphere are communicated back to the system via the existing institutions of the liberal state. This contentment with liberal institutions is criticised by Dryzeck, who regards them as limited in their democratic potential and doubts the effects of direct cooperation between state institutions and civil society associations. As an advocate of discursive democracy he would like to see stronger focus on discourses within the public sphere where 'insurgent discourses and identities can first establish themselves' Pryzeck 2000: 79). Urbinati and Warren focus on the nature of democratic representation instead. They argue that the social and political exclusion and the resulting legitimacy deficit in modern liberal states is linked to the exclusive representation based on geographical constituencies, while ignoring identities shaped by race, gender or religion (Urbinati/Warren 2008). Plurality of identities and views are essential facts of democracy today. The question of how democratic representation can take emerging political issues into account in permanently changing new realities is linked to public deliberation. Castiglione and Warren conclude that the basic norm of democracy is 'empowered inclusion of those affected in collective decisions and actions' (Castiglione/Warren 2006: 4). New reflections of democratic representation see the demand of bringing together complex relationships beyond elections by unifying and connecting the various forms of association within civil society and broadening people's perspectives (Urbinati/Warren 2006: 391). 'Non-electoral forms of representation, we believe, are increasingly important to expanding and deepening democracy' (Urbinati/Warren 2008: 388). Habermas account of deliberative democracy allows the inclusion of non-electoral forms of representation through discussions within the public sphere, in

43

which judgement based on informed deliberation is achieved, thus making representation 'incomplete without the deliberative attentiveness of citi2ens mediated by public spheres, and the reflective transmission of public deliberations into the domain of representative institutions' (Urbinati/Warren 2006: 392). At the same time new actors in the public sphere can claim inclusion in representation. The interplay of structure and agency is also visible in this body of research, enhancing democratic legitimacy and social and political inclusion. Together they inform a theoretical discussion, hiding behind political terminology of social cohesion or consensus on values.

Societal Integration Societal integration is a field of research in sociology that looks at the challenge of integration in pluralist, highly functional differentiated societies that no longer share a homogenous national or cultural identity. It is related to the guiding question for classical sociology: what makes society possible? For centuries the unity of society was assumed to correspond with the nation state (Imbusch/Rucht 2005: 13). Ferdinand Tonnies (1887) distinguished society from community: the latter refers to the actual face-to-face relationships based on shared identities that provide social integration, which might be in a worldwide community. Society, on the other hand, is an entity defined by functionality. Groups and individuals participate in markets, education, and administrative activities and have certain legal obligations, which functionally tie them to the system world (Habermas 1973). This is combined with and reinforced by macroidentities like ethnicity, race or culture, which bestow trust and legitimacy. Social and system integration go hand in hand, otherwise system integration fails (Imbusch/Rucht 2005: 15). It is easy to blame newcomers for societal fragmentation, despite the fact that differentiation goes deeper than to the basic conflict lines like religious and secular or ethnic and linguistic communities, capital and work (e.g. Habermas 1990; Honneth 1994; Heitmeyer 1997). As Imbusch and Rucht point out, societies influence themselves, rather than being influenced by outside forces: 'Societies can generate their own fabric, but they can also fall apart in a process of self-destruction' (Imbusch/Rucht 2005: 16). Participation in civil society and the public sphere is a fundamental condition for societal integration that according to Habermas' colonkation thesis does no longer coincide with the realities of life. As lifeworld is perceived as simply another system sphere formal organisation demarcates from the symbolic structures of the lifeworld. By turning a blind eye to culture, society and personality, the multiple identities that exist in the lifeworld can no longer be integrated. System organisation also functions without these symbolic foundations, evident in the existence of states independent of legitimising world views

Introduction

44

based in religion through secularization (Habermas 1981II: 457). However, they lose legitimacy and integrative power based on communicative rationality.

Locating the research topic in the literature An overview of the state of the art locates my research right in the literature and points out its contribution. It shows where the different areas of research are interconnected and intertwined, which helps defining the research questions guiding this thesis and informs the theoretical framework for the analysis of Muslim participation in deliberative processes in Berlin. It also shows why this research topic is of academic value. The literature on deliberation focuses either on the policy process or concerns itself with normative questions in relation to enhanced democratic legitimacy, e.g. through institutionalising deliberative procedures as proposed by Habermas (1996) or Gutmann/Thompson (1997). Levine (2005) argues that deliberation has less impact on policy than on attitudes and skills among participants in deliberation. Fraser (1990) mentions the impact of deliberation on identities. Keeping the normative potential of deliberative democracy theory in mind this research is foremost looking at the impact of participation in deliberative processes on actor level. The social movement literature reminds us that structural arrangements always interact with social actors. Hence it is important to examine the effect of deliberation in mini-publics on civil society actors, particularly those representing minorities without voice in the general public sphere. Habermas has been blamed for manifesting their exclusion with his discourse ethics defining rational discourse in the public sphere. However, taking a two-step approach using his model might have a different effect. As Chambers points out, learning deliberative rhetoric in a process of deliberation in mini-publics or behind closed doors can be a useful skill for participation in public discourse. Connecting civil society organisations as part of public policy can equally support voice in the public sphere indirectly. Koopmans et al. suggest that national self-understanding and citizenship policies, conceptualised as institutional and discursive opportunities and constraints for immigrants and their Germany-born offspring, determine resources for mobilisation and institutional channels of access to decision-making. 'On the discursive side, cultural notions of citizenship and national identity determine which points of view on the relation between immigrants and the majority society are considered sensible, which constructions of reality are considered realistic, and which claims and collective actors are held as legitimate within the polity' (Koopmans et al. 2005: 6). They claim that certain types of collective identity and demands facilitate mobilization of actors while others constrain it. Germany's reform of citizenship law for instance hugely changed conditions for the acquisition of formal citizenship.

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In the context of interplay of structures and agency, however, the question remains how easier access to formal citizenship translates in substantive citizenship, which includes a sense of belonging and moral equal worth, inherent to civil society participation if acknowledged in the public sphere, which contains a normative democratic element. Civil society participation and deliberation has been studied with a special focus on excluded groups (e.g. Fennema/Tillie 2005; Taylor 2007). However, there is a lack of detailed studies of political participation of specific marginalised groups against the backdrop of participatory models of representative democracy, highlighting the role of identity visible in the public sphere. Studying Muslim civil society participation in the local context of Berlin reinforces new thinking of democratic representation in terms of deliberation and identity (e.g. Urbinati/Warren 2008). Specificity of context applies even more at the actor level. A study by Koopmans and Statham on refugee organisations' lobbying efforts in the UK suggests that rather than forming networks they tend to lobby independently (Koopmans/Statham 1999). This demonstrates once more the importance of fleshing out the specifics that apply to different minority groups. The Muslim communities in Germany are made up of'old' migrants who arrived in the 1950s or 1960s as Gastarbeiter (guest workers) or refugees from predominandy Muslim countries who arrived in different waves (e.g. Lebanon in the 1980s, Bosnia in the 1990s, or Afghanistan a decade ago) and more recently of indigenous converts to Islam, even though their number is small. Interviews with Muslim organisations in Berlin suggest that organisations do their own lobbying, but there is also extensive networking and communication between Muslim actors, both physically and online. This is partly result of the framing of people of certain origin as Muslim. Compared to other German cities like Hamburg, Muslim communities in Berlin, mostly of Turkish origin, are generally less educated and network less. In Hamburg, where more Muslims are of Arab descent, they formed a Shura council already years ago to represent Muslim interests in the city. Muslim civil society infrastructure in Berlin needs building.29 As it happens, strengthening migrant civil society is part of the 2007 Berlin Integration Plan {Abgeordnetenhaus 2007). At the same time, learning also happens on system side, turning public officials into deliberating advocates who learn to represent issues and identities outside elections (Urbinati 2000). Advocates of political opportunity approaches in migrant participation research like Koopmans and Statham do not place their empirical findings in a normative democratic context, despite the fact that policy makers can gain procedural insight from such investigation. Despite the prevalence of certain structural characteristics defined by national legislation and 29

Interview Körting.

46

Introduction

practice local politicians can respond to particular demands circumventing legal restrictions to some extent. The 2003-2008 Berlin government coalition, bound by a citizenship regime that, even though reformed, still did not persuade a majority of Turks living in Germany to give up their old nationality, and forcing their children to choose between two nationalities at the age of 18, turned towards other forms citizenship by implementing integration policy that seeks to further civil society participation. Deliberative democracy literature usually focuses on influencing political outcomes, so research is often carried out at large scale level. There is litde interest in procedures that gather just a few citizens (Gavine et al. 2005: 280). However, studying Muslim participation in a local setting in a qualitative, interpretive embedded case study design allows to illustrate the particular demands and outcomes of deliberative process that further Muslim civil society participation. It also illuminates the conditions for giving Muslim communities voice in the public sphere, reflected against public integration discourse that so far excludes Muslim voices and at the same time forces them to rally along religious identity lines, marking differences even further. At the same time political process can legitimately include Muslim claims that are based on deliberation in the public sphere. The deliberation and discourse literature inspired by Habermas generally acknowledges the importance of institutional settings and political opportunities for minority views to become part of public discourse and deliberation. The legitimacy of democratic decisions in Habermas' view is secured through a deliberative process where all parties concerned have the same right to voice their point of view. The Berlin case demonstrates the role of structural settings quite clearly, as different models of democratic culture are practised in relation to its Muslim populations in the city's administrative districts. An objection to Habermas' conceptualization of representation as an open, informal realization process is brought forward by Thaa. He criticises the reduction of legislative institutions to the institutional centre of a sovereignty of the people diluted in the discursive structure of public communication. In such a democratic model, decisions based on a multitude of deliberative processes come at the cost of transparency. They can no longer be tied to certain members of government who cannot be held accountable (Thaa 2007). There are two reactions to this concern in relation to this particular research. The transparency deficit is addressed in a two-step model of public discourse that allows the inclusion of more voices in public discourse after going through informal deliberation in mini-publics that informs political makers who can make a point of including new perspectives in future political programmes. Secondly, Muslims in Berlin have few other ways of holding representatives accountable at all.

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An autonomous public sphere in Habermas' sense is not set up by government, but guaranteed by it. It mediates between society and the state 'by holding the state accountable to 'society" (Fraser 1990: 57-8). However, as Habermas argued, the public sphere must be safeguarded by a political system that wants to lay claims to democratic legitimacy as much as it must be demanded by collective claims from civil society. It mediates in that it differs from the private sphere. As such 'public representations of groups that we belong to are not the same as our own personal experience of ourselves' (McKee 2005: 11), which re-affirms the approach to think of public deliberation of minorities as a two-stage model, starting with small-scale deliberation to prepare the ground for participation in general problem-oriented public discourse. There is furthermore the idea that collective life contains more than the formal instruments of government. 'The political project and not the substantive task of changing 'the state of the world' with learning and tinkering along the way, is the focus for the analyst, and this obscures vital civic lessons about producing change in the state of the world' (Briggs 2008: 8). This thesis tries to bridge democratic theory as political theory, which must keep an eye on the bigger picture, with the practical action of change agents who must gain legitimacy for the project in the public sphere, following Habermas model. As mentioned earlier, three aspects are of concern. Structure/ agency factors and political legitimacy are subject of investigation both in the public discourse and deliberation literature, as well as in civil society research. The former also partly predicts that discourse and deliberation success depends on the third aspect of institutional procedures (Ryfe 2005), as the Berlin case will demonstrate. Studies on participation by minority groups exist for national and local contexts. They question access, the democratic gain, the types of participation, but rarely make the link between participation, democracy theory and social movement theory, which seems to provide the final building block in a theoretical approach for minority participation to become a permanent feature, like other established interest groups. The concept of a social movement sector model is proposed as a tool in this context.

Further outline of this thesis After a detailed insight in my methodological approach, complete with ontological and epistemological departure point and outline of methods used (chapter 2), I describe the theoretical framework that guides interpretive analysis, introducing elements such as the political opportunity structures enabling Muslim participation in the first place; conditions for successful deliberative process; citizenship as moral equal worth and sustained civil society networking in a social movement sector model that promotes voice in the public sphere. Finally, the combination of normative and more practically guided concepts allows bringing

48

Introduction

insights from the study of a real life context in perspective with the challenge of societal integration and new theory of representation based on identity and issues in addition to constituency (chapter 3). Chapters 4,5, and 6 comprise the descriptive part of the empirical investigation. Before embarking on exemplary case study narrative I provide background information on the field of investigation. Migration sociologist Klaus Bade points to the blurring of boundaries in public discourse between different generations of Muslims with migration background (Bade 2007: 58). Hence chapter 4 offers insight in some of the important differences between generations and inter-generational conflicts that are important to be aware of for fostering Muslim participation in public life. It describes relevant Muslim civil society engagement in Berlin and outlines internal conflict lines, as well as facts on social and economic conditions, and identity. Muslim participation in the public sphere and the public controversies related to Islam and integrating Muslim communities cannot be understood without a short journey through time back to the beginning of Muslim immigration, outlining the changing political opportunity structures for participation on federal level in the first part of chapter 5. An outline of dominating public discourse on Muslims, largely shaped by the image of ,failed integration' (Bade 2007: 21), follows. In a final step I outline Berlin integration policy and institutional arrangements on city level, shaping opportunities in the city. Chapter 6 provides detailed insights in three exemplary cases situated at different administrative levels to show how variation in deliberative process and outcome is sometimes related to structural differences while other elements of deliberative process apply in each context, even with variation of outcome. Two cases, the city-level Islamforum and Haci Bayram mosque on neighbourhood level, serve as positive examples, whereas the stance of the Neukölln district administration, contrasted with neighbouring district Kreuzberg, shows the negative implications of an approach characterised by exclusion. Each case is analysed according to deliberative process and outcome, sense of citizenship and implications for Muslim civil society networking. Cross-case analysis focuses on changes in Muslim voice in the public sphere, supported by deliberative process; the interplay of structure and agency to enhance legitimacy of democratic process and the implications for wider societal integration and representation based on issues an identities.

2. Methodology

'In democratic theory there are two broad camps; those who highlight the vote and those who highlight deliberation and participation as the core characteristic of democracy.' Eriksen/Weigard 2003: 111

This study is interested in civil society representing Muslims engaging in deliberative processes with representatives of the political system. Jiirgen Habermas' model of deliberative democracy has been especially inspiring in this discussion. The challenge with Habermas' model is to include all voices in an autonomous public sphere. Focussing on Muslim civil society participation increases the generalizability of the phenomena, as Muslim civil society participation arguably presents a critical case, which 'can be defined as having strategic importance in relation to the general problem' (Flyvbjerg 2001: 78). If Muslim voices can be heard through deliberative democratic processes, so can others. As Muslims must make claims against a lot of prejudice and negative discourse, they must also form strong ties to institutionalise their claims in the public sphere. Because of their perceived difference from mainstream society, expressed in largely undifferentiated public discourse, Muslim civil society presents also a most likely case to reveal the explanatory power of the theoretical framework informing analysis in this thesis (Flyvbjerg 2001: 79). When examining participation, cities are the spaces to turn to. The ancient model of citi2en participation, the polis of Athens, is as suggestive of this fact as is the focus of social theory on cities as locus of free association. Cities were described as the anchor points of civil society even before national states existed. 'In this view, the quality of democracy at the national level is in no small part dependent upon the quality of democracy at the urban level' (Silver et al. 2010: 456). From a democratic theory point of view Berlin is made up of old and new forms of democratic representation that could inform similar settings. After a presentation of my ontological and epistemological points of view, which justify a qualitative approach, I will present the research questions guiding the thesis. The method proposed to answer them is based on interpretative case study design.

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Methodology

2.1. Defining and Making Sense of Social Reality Ontology Ontology is concerned with the view of social reality. The term ontology originates in philosophy and refers to the science of being — in itself, not in its appearance to rational subjects (Beier/Heuer 2010: 9). Ontology was considered philosophy of the highest order all the way from antiquity through the Christian Middle Ages to the German idealism of Fichte, Schelling and Hegel, a metaphysical inquiry for its own sake. A new awareness of history, as described by Hegel, divided the world in modern and old, which obliged philosophy to reflect its own temporal position. Ontology split in via antiqua and via modernav>, preparing the ground for rationalism and empiricism and splitting ontology from metaphysics. Kant transformed metaphysics from the science of being to the science of knowledge, thus eradicating ontology, and turned metaphysical categories into ways of thinking independent of universal principles, leaving behind the formal conditions of the rationality of cognition, of linguistic communication and of action (Habermas 2000: 132). Reality became a matter of what subjects make of it, making epistemology, logic and linguistics the dominating principles of science (Beier/Heuer 2010: 14-16). Ontology was rediscovered in the 20th century with Edmund Husserl who argued that phenomena behind the physically observable can only be discovered by asking about being (Beier/Heuer 2010: 18). The following describes developments of ontology in social science relevant to this thesis. 31 Its ontological foundation rests on two pillars sharing a focus on active agents firmly grounded in lifeworld phenomenology while influenced by different disciplines: communicative action and phronesis. One is more rooted in philosophy trying to uncover a

30 This split influenced social sciences as well as theology. The latter broke with Aristotelian tradition and replaced it with nominalism 'which first shaped protestant, and in particular Calvinist education, and then secular academic philosophy up until this day with its implications sceptical of metaphysics' (Beier/Heuer 2010: 14). 31 More distinctions can be made, e.g. foundationalist (the belief the world exists independent of our knowledge of it) or 'anti-foundationalist' ontology, assuming that not all social phenomena are directly observable, structures exist that cannot be observed and those that can may not present the social and political world as it actually is (Grix 2002: 183). Flat ontology refers to a limited social perspective, like a homogenous society. Objectivism is 'an ontological position that asserts that social phenomena and their meanings have an existence that is independent of social actors' (Grix 2002: 177). Deleuze on the other hand introduced the open ontology, taking into account gradual complexification of social phenomena. This corresponds with a structuralist view on social reality, which recognises structuring factors like the economy and the political world.

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normative foundation with a claim to truth; the other is more influenced by modern social science with a practical approach to action. Together they form an account of social reality that branches out to the wider context of the foundations of democracy and the precise context of human activity. Related to being is reason, the way to make sense of the world that constitutes reality. Martin Heidegger introduced external and internal structures of the world, expressed in syntax and vocabulary of the dominant language in a given context that pre-determine understanding. 'For each linguistic community, such grammatical structures in the broadest sense pre-determine which expressions can count as well-formed, meaningful or valid' (Habermas 2000: 144). The concept of reason as 'symbolically embodied, culturally contextualised, historically situated' in inter subjective communication is the foundation of shared norms, values or processes of understanding (Habermas 2000: 143). It informs hermeneutics, social constructionism and democratic theory in social theory to come. If we assume that reason is the product of a socio-cultural process we must focus on the concept of lifeworld as developed by Edmund Husserl and Alfred Schütz as an essential element of this process. lifeworld consists of family history, culture and traditions. It forms the subjective sense of reality and common sense, influenced by experiences with the social and political world, which influences patterns of behaviour (e.g. systems and conventions that exclude minorities). This is a process rooted in history, knowledge and social action developed together, shaped by political, social and psychological components, constructing 'facts' in fields of activities (Lock/Strong 2011: 2). The most important ontological feature of lifeworld is that it generates meaning. Schütz identified intersubjectivity as fundamental ontological category of existence. The world is from the outset not the private world of individuals, but an inter subjective world, common to all of us, in which we have not a theoretical but an imminently practical interest' (in Lock/Strong 2011: 34). Subjects' own ontologies, as it were, depend on their particular perspectives that make sense of their experiences, helped by pre-existent building blocks and methods that exist due to pre-structuralisation of the world through language and syntax.32 Lifeworld thus constitutes objective facticity and 'socially generated problems can be assessed in terms of one's own life history' (Habermas 1996: 365).

The institutional world is objectivated human activity, and so is every single institution. In other words despite the objectivity that marks the social world in human experience, it does not thereby acquire an ontological status apart from the human activity that produced it (Luckmann/Berger 2010: 66). 32

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Methodology

In his theory of communicative action Habermas draws on inter-subjectivity as a universal principle of rationality.33 Rationality expresses itself in subjects with the ability to communicate and to act and who can acquire and use knowledge. Knowledge expresses itself in language; action expresses the ability to use knowledge (Habermas 19951: 25). This action-theoretical claim, attempting to reintroduce a universalist element, a kind of common denominator holding integrative power34, forms one of the ontological pillars of this thesis. It is supported by social constructionism, which implies that social phenomena and categories are not only accomplished by social actors through social interaction, but also that they are in a state of constant revision (Grix 2002). Flyvbjerg is critical of Habermas' normative account of deliberatively achieved consensus.35 Instead, he stresses the role of phronesis or practical wisdom for human action, defined by Aristotle as a 'true state, reasoned, and capable of action with regard to things that are good or bad for man' (Flyvbjerg 2001: 2). It focuses on the daily practices that constitute a field of interest, the purposive or instrumental rationality informing the political ability of subjects. Phronesis is thinking rationally about human actions to achieve certain ends. Flyvbjerg includes the concept of power as constitutive phenomena in modern society (Flyvbjerg 2001: 3). The concept of phronesis forms the second ontological pillar of this thesis, which places individuals and their actions in their precise context,

Habermas and Karl-Otto Apel developed discourse ethics in response to failing attempts of formal analysis of the conditions of rationality (Habermas 1995/1: 16). They argued that Kant's attempt to develop universal rational foundations for democratic institutions failed due to his focus on a subject-centred rationality. Social science theories of knowledge like critical rationalism or methodological constructivism on the other hand were blamed for making normative and universalist demands that lack an ontological foundation, leaving only falsification and interpretation as founded epistemology (Habermas 1995/1: 17). 34 Habermas distanced himself from postmodernism, criticising that it stresses fragmentation, otherness, particularities of the individual and the local and thus strengthens the resistance to universalist accounts. 'Postmodernism approaches take every universalistic claim per se as a further sign of the imperialism of a disguised particularity pretending to stand for the whole (Habermas 2000: 147). It demands the decentralisation of limited perspectives, thus introducing the notion that the criteria of reason are completely context-dependent. Hence, reason does not hold integrative power (Habermas 2000: 148). 35 Flyvbjerg criticised Habermas' view of power solely as the force of the better argument, granted by law, seeing too much of a gap between ideal and reality which he relates to Habermas' misconception of power: 'He describes to us the Utopia of communicative rationality but not how to get closer to it' (Flyvbjerg 2001: 93), essentially criticising the a priori assumption that power is only exercised through rational deliberation and absent from communication. 33

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encompassing structures and dominating discourses, with a practical focus to improving their lives, embedded in a democratic process carried by normative considerations. Do we believe that social actors can influence social reality? There are different interpretations of social realities, which may lead to aporias — the inability to resolve a dilemma, to find a way out. 'According to the more hermeneutically oriented tradition, we could seek to fix them, to point them out as flaws, or, more in line with the post-structuralist tradition, we could make sense of the aporias in terms of the intrinsic characteristics of the object of study' (Jezierska 2011: 36). Both traditions can be blended together to some extent. Aristotle described instrumental rationality as crucial for the happiness of citizens of any society. According to him, the highest pursuit of wisdom and happiness requires both phronesis as practical wisdom, and theoretical wisdom based on valuerationality, as the first facilitates the latter (Flyvbjerg 2001: 4). Practical wisdom conditions actions at individual level. Assuming that human action gives meaning to social life, ontology should be related to the view of social reality of the subjects of scientific research, in this case the representatives of Muslim civil society organisations in Berlin. 'Persons are actors who take an active role in responding to problematic situations' (Strauss/Corbin 1998: 9). Meaning is defined and redefined through interaction in a process characterised by 'interrelationships between conditions (structure), action (process), and consequences (Strauss/Corbin 1998: 10). Structures like democratic institutions and dominant discourses must be taken into account as the social, political and discursive context of social action, pointing to the structure and agency dimensions and their interrelatedness, a central analytical focus of this research. Theoretical wisdom gives validity to Muslim claims, expressed in a local policy process that includes deliberative processes. 'The pragmatics of speech proceeds from the question of how communication participants - in the context of a shared lifeworld (or sufficiently overlapping lifeworlds) - can achieve an understanding about something in the world' (Habermas 2000: 151). Resulting issues relating to transcendental truth claims, for instance, could be brokered discursively, equipping the hermeneutical tradition with a tool to match the expectation that seemingly incommensurable claims can in principle be bridged (Habermas 2000: 151). The action-theoretic approach they share also contains two time dimensions pointing to structure and agency: a view of what exists and an idea of where to go, which informs the motivation of change agents (Moulaert 2009). This is related to lifeworld action as reflected by Schütz. He defined action as forms of conduct, devised in advance with a focus away from being to becoming. Actions are triggered by 'in-order-to' or 'because' motives. The first are goal-directed and

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Methodology

project action in the future. The latter anchor in the past and serve as reasons for action based on a stock of knowledge.36 In his reflections on social innovation analysis Frank Moulaert furthermore points out that 'within a concern of analysing social innovation it is epistemologically coherent to state that a relevant meta-theory should include an ontology and ontogenesis that involve relational complexity as well as the types of agency that are involved in making or seeking social innovation' (Moulaert et al 2009: 12). This combination of structure and agency is an essential theoretical and analytical assumption in the study of Muslim civil society participation grounded in ontology. The TIES study, for example, comparing the second generation of migrants across Europe, produced findings that suggest that migrant participation in social organisations and their sense of belonging in local communities are strongly dependent on the integration context.37 Context refers to institutional arrangements in education, labour market, housing, religion and legislation, but also to the social and political context, shaped by citizenship regimes and public discourse. Second generation Turks in Germany, for instance, make only 3 per cent of higher education graduates in 2008, compared to nearly 40 per cent in Sweden and France. The large difference in outcome is independent from educational background of the fathers (Crul/Schneider 2010: 1258). They explain the difference with different systems of educational institutions. The structure and agency-divide also lies at the bottom of deliberative democracy theory, which provides the normative theoretical frame for this research. It provides a path through the undergrowth of complex societies, inspired by discourse ethics and communicative action in lifeworld and the public sphere.

Epistemology Epistemology refers to the theory of knowledge and 'the possible ways of gaining knowledge of social reality, whatever it is understood to be. In short, claims about how what is assumed to exist can be known' (Blaikie 2000: 8). It defines what it means to know, what counts as knowledge, and how this knowledge is produced. But what constitutes an explanation or theory of social 36 'Our conscious interface with the world 'goes on' as an ever-changing active agent. This going on is conducted by (...) a momentary tension (...) between how the past has currently shaped the surrounding points at this interface, and the strivings that our consciousness is spontaneously aiming towards' (Lock/Strong 2011: 41). 37 TIES — The Integration of Europe's Second Generation is an international survey on the descendants of immigrants from Turkey, Ex-Yugoslavia, and Morocco in fifteen European cities in eight countries. For more information see: www.tiesproject.eu (accessed April 15, 2012).

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reality? How do people construct social meaning, what sort of action results from it and what can be achieved? Conceptions are very diverse. For instance, the study of social reality can be inspired by natural science methods, fuelled by the believe that quantitative data deliver more accurate results on theoretical propositions. Opposite to this positivist approach stands interpretivism, which acknowledges differences between people and contexts, and serves to grasp subjective meanings of social phenomena (Santos 2008: xxi). Derived from the ontological positioning a set of theories of knowledge inspired the choice of analytical framework and method: hermeneutics, communicative rationality, social constructionism and phronetics^. The main elements of those theories will be presented after a brief discussion of the context dependence of epistemology itself, which is a logical intervention when using an action-theoretic approach. A researcher is as much engaged in accomplishing social reality as the subjects she studies and influenced by own lifeworld experiences. In a final step this section summarises the essential elements of presented theories of knowledge to justify the choice of research method.

Epistemological imperialism? Husserl pointed out that science itself is part of human accomplishment generated from inter subjectivity in the lifeworld (Lock/Strong 2011: 46). Apart from explaining different empirical choices epistemology also reflects deeper worldviews and convictions. The divide can be motivated by cultural, historical, religious, political positions or a combination of them. Such positions will influence questions about how to connect social change to scientific interrogation, the choice of path to knowledge and how to decide on the validity of the answers. Santos, for instance, speaks of a confrontation of 'rival knowledges' about how to tackle scientific, technological and industrial questions, bringing forward the recognition of cultural differences and epistemological diversity. His point of departure is scientific interest in social inclusion in the global south. He argues that globally, different knowledge systems apply that reflect the diversity of social groups. He proposes an epistemological foundation of intercultural politics of rights rather than just a Northern knowledge system based on human rights discourse. He goes as far as accusing the North of imposing its epistemological foundation on the South, thus indirectly bearing responsibility for colonizing Southern cultures (Santos 2008: ix). The argument makes sense when thinking of reality as communicatively transmitted social construction. It puts those excluded from communicative processes

38

Based on Flyvbjerg 2001, see below.

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in a difficult position while growing diversity and complexity challenge institutionalised values. Socially constructed realities are always in danger of developing into ideologies that benefit some while excluding others. Globalisation and migration movements intensify this dynamic (Lock/Strong 2011: 3). Interestingly, this reminds of Habermas' criticism of lifeworld colonization through capitalist mass media and elite interests. By using lifeworld phenomenology he counts on knowledge gained through the phenomenon itself, which involves the historical, subjective, social and political context of the objects of investigation. It is interesting to have a brief look at the level of agreement between him and Santos. Habermas is also aware of the potentially colonizing force inherent to epistemology based on modernism discourse. However, by submitting oneself to selfreflective standards, he argues, one can both discover and criticise exclusions. This self-monitoring and self-correction is both a strength and a form of discursive force 'which is exercised in the mode of an occluded (because implicit) violation of the explicit promise of inclusion', concealing social, political or epistemic violence. But he maintains that this discursive practice contains the criteria and means necessary to keep the promise of inclusion - if based on communicative rationality (Habermas 2000: 148). Santos aims at introducing 'an ecology of knowledges', bringing in more equality among epistemologies that try to contribute to a more democratic and just society and that seek decolonising knowledge and power (Santos 2008: xx). He explains his rejection of merely employing Northern knowledge systems with the contradiction inherent to them: 'Eurocentric legal and political models, such as the neoliberal economic order, representative democracy, individualism or the equation between state and law often rests ... on forms of domination based on class, ethnic, territorial, racial, or sexual differences and on the denial of collective identities and rights considered incompatible with Eurocentric definitions of the modern social order' (Santos 2008: xx-i). He employs the example of multiculturalism, which, according to Santos, is a European concept that spread to the South despite a lack of concrete content relevant for societies there (Santos 2008: xxii). The hypocrisy of concepts he identified here has been criticised in Europe as well. Meanings are equally contested. In order to avoid contradicting definitions Habermas offers an epistemological approach to the phenomena that is based on linguistic philosophy and hermeneutics. In his study of the transformation of the public sphere and his lifeworld and system distinction he clarifies and criticises the dualistic character of modernisation, which later informed his theory of communicative action and of deliberative democracy (Habermas 1981; 1998). However, his early depiction of the public sphere, a concept central to this research, has come under epistemological criticism itself, supporting Santos in his complaint about taking dominating conceptual tools for granted. Criticism

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comes from a historical rather than geographical perspective. Margaret Somers argues that 'our very reasoning practices are marked indelibly (although often obscurely) with the signature of time, normativity and institution building' (Somers 2008: 173) and applies this observation to the epistemology of the concept of Habermas' public sphere: even though referring to the political world, Somers sets out to prove, the concept is rooted in the private sphere of social life.39 Habermas helps us to understand how communication can basically help societal integration in complex, pluralistic societies. It seems that his epistemological foundation is applicable to any social setting around the globe as 'science itself can be seen in hermeneutic ways, as situated ways of understanding evaluating and acting' (Lock/Strong 2011: 82), which puts Santos claim of 'epistemicide' into question (Santos 2008: ix). However, "to know a language' means to know how to use if (Lock/Strong 2011: 37). Muslim activists in Berlin are often still strangers who bring in their own conceptions of society that collide with mainstream society history and biography. They need support in learning the dominating 'language'. By being invited to deliberate they not only learn the rules of the game, they also learn the symbols of language. 'Encounters with others who do not share the same notions of relevance or motivation can relate to these notions as novel and possibly worth reflecting upon.'40 Habermas' discourse ethics offers an epistemological model based on optimism consistent with the concept of participatory democracy as the purest form after the Athenian polls.

39 In the 17th century the political culture or public sphere concept served to guard the boundaries between public and private, the realm of civil society and later society, the site of market exchange. 'Once it was embedded in such a deeply naturalized metanarrative, it could not be destabilized easily by competing evidence or routine empirical investigation' (Somers 2008: 175). Thus, Somers continues, the concept was reduced to 'a functional requisite of private market society'. Habermas later solved this contradiction with focus on discourse-ethics and the lifeworld. Habermas' early public sphere concept was influenced by the Frankfurt School and served for both normative theory and analysis of democratic political culture, also depicting it as central principle of liberal political order, linked to market and state on the one side and to civil society on the other (Somers 2008: 187). Somers argues that Habermas would like to locate public sphere as a third sphere between state and market, and this is what helped the popularity of the civil society concept but it is essentially derived from a concept of a public sphere in which private people wanted to further their interests (Somers 2008: 190). 40 According to Schiitz motivational relevance stems from particular interests of actors at a particular time that alert the actor to the particular elements of the situation (Lock/ Strong 2011: 37).

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Arguably, without the belief in the possibility of change there would be no social struggle. This appears to be another global phenomenon, which renders acrossthe-board rejection of Northern epistemology too rash. Many societies around the world today appear to be in disintegrated turmoil, as social institutions no longer provide congruent identities. The integrative frame has inflated from local, to regional, to national, to global scope. A new form of understanding is necessary. This leads straight to hermeneutics and Hans-Georg Gadamer's theory of understanding, generated in lifeworld contexts.

Hermeneutics The hermeneutical position allows social change based on intersubjective understanding that acknowledges different realities.41 Like the ancient Greek god Hermes it is named after, hermeneutics serves as interpreter of realities of life through experience, expression and understanding (as in a deliberative process). Hermeneutics is the science of meaning. As such hermeneutics is about understanding others the way they want to be understood (Lock/Strong 2011: 81). While Heidegger took an ontological approach to hermeneutics42, Gadamer's and Habermas' is epistemological, recognizing that the making of meaning is a cultural and social process. While Gadamer highlights dialogue as a means of listening to others, Habermas proposes to construct cultural institutions towards discourse ethics. Understanding the meanings of others requires three assumptions. First, there is no underlying objective reality constructing a language all must agree with. Time and place influence the way we construct meaning. Secondly, we can use language to understand a variety of experiences by acknowledging that our understanding is not the only one possible. Third, hermeneutics makes us aware that we cannot embrace our own cultural reality as unique if we want to understand and act with others (Lock/Strong 2011: 81). Gadamer points out that interpretation must include historical and cultural lore, as people think, learn, are aware of themselves and the past and possess motives and reasons. He sees acknowledgement and reduction of prejudice derived from

'Once we relinquish a sense that our words and symbols are the things we ask them to represent to ourselves and others, then we are in a place where we can acknowledge our role in the meanings we live by' (Lock/Strong 2011: 80). 42 Heidegger used a phenomenological approach to study 'the most taken-for-granted' aspects of human engagements with social and physical reality', by seeing experience as so rooted in lifeworld or horizons of understanding that we do not even notice it (Lock/Strong 2011: pp58). 41

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our effective histories as important factor for understanding others.43 Gadamer opens language to understanding difference through dialogue. Change occurs through meaningful events in a tradition. 'Events created a tension between articulations of the past being brought to bear on the present. This focus on 'events' relates to notions of how meaning is performed in ways that go beyond what was already known or articulated' (Lock/Strong 2011: 69). New possibilities emerge when we relax commitments to prior meanings.

Communicative Rationality The conditions of socialisation produce forms of interpretation that help individuals find their way but that do not uncover the real structures. This view was the prominent conclusion expressed in the works of Max Weber and the critical theory of Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno. Max Weber, who with his description of the Protestant work ethic admittedly focussed on a specifically Northern phenomenon, saw a natural loss of freedom as result of the modernisation process, driven by administrative and capitalist economy, both achievements of social modernity. Modernization in Weber's understanding means institutionalisation of instrumental rational action, rooted in Protestant work ethics. The resulting spirit of capitalism, resting on Protestant demands for a rational conduct of life and thus providing a normative foundation, led to a collapse of traditional worldviews and a separation of system and motivational religious values (Habermas 2000: 139). This development tied the individual and collective actors to the ups and downs of state and economic system, thus penetrating the lifeworld and leading to loss of meaning and freedom alike (ibid.153). Weber saw no way out of social disintegration. Similarly, Habermas' teachers Horkheimer and Adorno saw no way out of the traps of enlightenment, as they regarded the social sphere as an ambivalent sphere that requires interpretation based on the perspective of the dialectic qualities of Enlightenment. The new focus on reason to explain reality also introduced the notion of subjectivity44, which soon took on a quality of repression: the self-reflection of knowing subjects turns into purposive rationality, a process that Hegel described as 'transforming all into possible objects of manipulation' through objectification (Habermas 2000: 136). Horkheimer and Adorno maintained that culture industry and mass culture deliver complete worldviews, liberating subjects from the task of ascribing meaning, materialising culture in the

Effective histories make some understanding evident while precluding others (Lock/Strong 2011: 65). 44 'Each person deserves the equal respect of all. At the same time, each person should be recognized as the source and the final judge of her own particular claims to happiness' (Habermas 2000: 133). 43

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world of gadgets. Socialisation transmits the functional imperatives of state and economy and renders the self unnecessary. In their Dialectic of Enlightenment they conclude that 'subjective rationality, instrumentalising both inner and outer nature as a whole, has ultimately usurped the place of reason, so that reason itself vanishes without a trace into 'instrumental reason" (Habermas 2000: 141). Enlightenment ended in a state of objectification. 'Objectification of the mind bewitched human relations, including the one of the individual to the self (Horkheimer/Adorno 1969: 34). Alienation of the self is inextricably linked to constitution of the self. In this context Herbert Marcuse spoke of one-dimensional conscience in social science, as theories like behaviourism have social practice as reference frame.45 Ideology is embodied in goods and services, keeping up the wrong image of a good life. Thus the system has unlimited access to the individual (Gmiinder 1985: 56-8). Habermas rejected the negative outlook on social modernization and social pathologies. In his view hermeneutics breaks through the cycle of total modernization crisis 'based upon the abstract opposition between a disciplinary society and the fragile subjectivity of individuals' (Habermas 2000: 153), through a turn towards linguistic intersubjectivity. In his early work also Habermas drew attention to power structures disguised as ideology in interpretation, which led to his critique of ideology and turn towards discourse ethics: societies are structured by language but communicating as independent individuals allows identification with others as well as non-identification with others, which allows to question verbally transmitted meaning, as speech can be an expression of collectivisation that dominates codes of interpretation (Lock/Strong 2011: 72). Turning away from theoretical concepts as the foundation of gaining knowledge he proposed a way out of pessimistic analysis of social change. Despite the irreversibility of the modern fragmentation process and growing complexity he maintains that social integration is still possible: 'It can just as well expand the range of options and learning capacities - provided the division of labour between system and lifeworld remains intact' (Habermas 2000: 153). Habermas separates lifeworld from system.46 And yet, the system needs the lifeworld, as

Adorno, Horkheimer and Marcuse saw reason embodied in the gadgets provided by the (capitalist) system consisting of technical production and social distribution of goods. In One-dimensional Man Marcuse described the resulting alienation of the subject from its existence, which occurs unnoticed, a process he termed 'repressive desublimation' (Marcuse 2002, chapter 3). 46 He argues that this decoupling was essential for the development of modern life in the first place. On the downside there is the threat of system colonization of symbolic structures in the lifeworld by turning them into subsystems dominated by money and power, taking control of private and public sphere (Habermas 1995/2: 420). 45

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norms are legitimised there through ideas and interests. Only institutions that represent such interests can be deemed stable and legitimate. If factors that characterise the lifeworld are ignored und subsumed under economic and administrative rationality there is a threat of societal disintegration and institutional legitimacy crisis (Habermas 1995/2). He sees an imbalance of solidarity in the lifeworld up against the system, equipped with money and administrative power, which affects the dynamic of social integration. Underlying norms must be based on communicative rationality, which enables non-restrictive understanding even in a society where worldviews and related validity claims are contradictory. This insight departs from the linguistic assumption that people may not share beliefs but the ability to think (Habermas 1998: 27). Communicative rationality describes the subject-subject communication between individuals in order to maintain a society sharing norms, institutions and conventions that still allows all individuals to thrive: norms can be agreed on or else put up for debate, all knowledge is in principle fallible and revisable. According to Habermas any meaningful human expression can be approached from two angles: an event or phenomenon that can be observed externally, or as an understandable objectification of meaning concerning its purpose, what it is made for (Eriksen/Weigard 2003: 19). The hermeneutic approach means we must enter into a communicative relationship with another actor to understand the meaning of something. Habermas points out that the criteria in hermeneutics should serve as criteria for empirical investigation of what is just in the study of the political. Scientific theory is mostly related to application, it 'must now also be evaluated in terms of its ability to create, shape, and control objects in the material or social world' (Pedersen 2009: 184), thus losing any normative foundation.47 According to Habermas the basic concepts of research ought to aim for rational reconstruction of context and problem solving (Habermas 1995: 17), trying to get to intuitive knowledge, the deep 'rules for the production of meaningful symbolic expressions', trying to uncover a universal knowhow (Pedersen 2009: 386). This would be a very ambitious endeavour, trying to bridge the gap between empirical and normative approaches by reconstructing 'the change in what is considered to be the object of study for politics' (Pedersen 2009: 383).

According to Habermas, 'the insights of the ancient Greeks on how to live a good and virtuous life based on just actions are replaced by scientifically based social theory, which may open up for desirable actions on the basis of a knowledge of laws. In other words, the modern understanding of theory emerges at the expense of an access to practice' (Pedersen 2009: 385). 47

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In all of Habermas' work the intuitive competence of subjects is assumed crucial either for arriving at agreement (lifeworld), for regulating human coexistence through norms (discourse ethics), or for regulating modern societies through law (deliberative democracy). The reconstruction of communicative rationality, a normative concept, could be applied to the evaluation of a political process/* As Pedersen points out, however, it would be difficult to operationalize preconditions to communicative rationality, like when is a process understood as legitimate, how significant is the learning process through argumentation, how much compromise is involved. Such operationalizing criteria are missing in Habermas' work (Pedersen 2009: 398). The fundamental tension in the approach is that rational reconstruction can formulate 'empirical hypothesis which cannot be tested by empirical means' (Pedersen 2009: 383). By attempting to combine the normative and the scientific Habermas pays credit to the specificity of a polity rooted in lifeworlds. Hence all attempts to develop rational reconstruction are difficult. Borrowing from constructionism though we can keep a lifeworld and reason perspective, acknowledging that pre-theoretical knowledge is dependent on the context that must be reflected. Habermas is aiming at shared rationality as foundation of democracy on macro level. Intersubjectivity is oriented towards helping rational discourse in the public sphere, based on a universal principle of communicative rationality. Objectivity is impossible, understanding and action receive a normative foundation with discourse ethics. He combined hermeneutics with critical theory. People are socialised in ways of communication that allow them to take different views into account (see theory chapter). Democratic discourse provides the legitimation for understanding and action. As idealization, 'his hermeneutic views are based on the big and small picture politics of our lives. His proposals are meant to turn us back to our communications with each other to come up with the best understandings and actions to live by' (Lock/ Strong 2011: 77-8).

Social Construction of Reality Turning towards empirical theory of knowledge instead of philosophy, Berger and Luckmann spoke of 'the social construction of reality' rather than 'the construction of social reality'. Their basic building block of their sociology of knowledge rests on the assumption that all-day life or pre-scientific knowledge defines meaning, as defined by German phenomenologists Edmund Husserl and

48 'This is based on the assumption that the degree of communicative rationality is closely related to the legitimacy of the result' (Pedersen 2009: 397).

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Alfred Schütz.^ Knowledge is defined as certitude that phenomena are real and contain determinable characteristics (Berger/Luckmann 2010: 1). Without ontological justification, common sense world knowledge based on language legitimises validity claims in their particular context, used to construct social reality and social order. 50 How does knowledge become common sense reality? How far is human thought independent, when does it start being determined by history, psychology or biology? Husserl argued that knowledge is constructed through intersubjective experience, a pre-scientific consciousness. He developed phenomenology as a way to study contents of consciousness 'to lead us back to 'the things themselves' as we apprehend them prior to 'objectifying' them via conceptual judgement' (Lock/Strong 2011: 32). Thus, there is no independent objective reality that can be discovered by rational methods. 'For the phenomenologist, the only 'real' world that can be described with adequacy is that which is pre-scientifically and subjectively experienced (Cope 2005 166).51 Schütz defined typologies derived from every-day life thinking as integrative elements of historically and socio-culturally precise lifeworld, experienced as safe and socially proven and tested (Berger/Luckmann 2010: 17) Berger and Luckmann argue that this is the result of 'habitualisation'. Actions are still meaningful to the individual as routines embedded in her stock of knowledge. 'In other words, the background of habitualised activity opens up a foreground for deliberation and innovation' (Berger/Luckmann 2010: 56). According to them, social reality based on experience is disrupted when unfamiliar problems arise. At this instant we realise that other potentially disruptive 'provinces of meaning' surround common sense reality (Berger/Luckmann 2010: 28). Common sense world typologies construct social reality in interaction with others. Also language originates here and integrates different areas of every day life into a meaningful whole.

49 "Being guided by the use of meanings of words as visible in every day understanding of words is characteristic of phenomenology' (Plessner in Berger/Luckmann 2010: XIII). 50 Social order exists only as a product of human activity. N o other ontological status may be ascribed to it without hopelessly obfuscating its empirical manifestations. Both in its genesis (social order is the result of past human activity) and its existence in any instant of time (social order exists only and insofar as human activity continues to produce it) it is a human product. 51 Existential phenomenologists Martin Heidegger and Jean-Paul Sartre also used the lifeworld concept. The aim of phenomenology is to bring out the 'essences' of experiences or appearances (phenomena), to describe their underlying 'reason' (Cope 2005: 164).

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There is a difference between vis-à-vis interactions and more abstract ones away from direct experience. This includes others one does not see and know personally, those who lived before, who affect one less, shading transparency of meaning (Berger/Luckmann 2010: 36). Over time the objects of human activity are objectified. 'Only at this point does it become possible to speak of a social world at all, in the sense of a comprehensive and given reality confronting the individual in a manner analogous to the reality of the natural world. The institutions, as historical and objective facticity, confront the individual as undeniable facts' (Berger/Luckmann 2010: 66). Presuppositions make people vote, engage in civil society, or make legal claims. It is the presupposition of change, based on an idealised circulation of power that transforms communicative power in administrative power. This power is not only expressed in deliberative procedures but also in civil society and the sense of citizenship. Only together can the circulation work and claim legitimacy. Hence epistemology is defining lifeworld in hermeneutic terms. How far it contributes to social integration will be part of empirical analysis when looking at Muslim civil society in Berlin seeking a place in the public sphere.

Phronetics Habermas' model of deliberative democracy based on discourse ethics is compelling to use as guideline when examining Muslim civil society participation locally, as 'the notion that people can optimise their communications and deliberations into a local version of discourse ethics is intriguing' (Lock/Strong 2011: 78). Habermas' work is normative in the sense that his theories of deliberative democracy or communicative action are ideals. They reflect on existing social processes and relations that are only 'intermittently, partially or potentially' present (Young 2000: 10). Lock and Strong remind us, however, that living by the normative standards necessary is a challenge, even not regarding concerns about deliberative resources of minorities mentioned above. His ideas are useful in 'sustaining conversations in cultural understanding and action but not so much to the smaller-scale conversations in spheres of shared social interaction' (Lock/Strong 2011: 78). Apart from democratic procedures working with civil society in the public sphere one must also turn to the action-level of civil society and citizen participation, as it does not automatically reach into the public sphere. It makes a difference if there are merely deliberative mini-publics behind closed doors or if groups in society represented by civil society organisations have a continuous presence in public discourses in the public sphere. Epistemological departure point for this aspect of civil society participation in deliberative processes is Bent Flyvbjerg's work on the role of phronesis in scientific research and the concept of power at its core. He does this with the aim to arrive at a social science 'which

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effectively deals with public deliberation and praxis, rather than being stranded with a social science that vainly attempts to emulate natural science' (Flyvbjerg 2001: 129). He is drawing on post-modernism rather than modernism. In an attempt 'to balance instrumental rationality with value-rationality by increasing the capacity of individuals, organisations, and society to act and think', phronetic researchers focus on context to avoid positioning themselves (Flyvbjerg 2001: 130). They still focus on common views held by specific groups held to be valid values. Flyvbjerg argues that apart from value-rational questions phronesis is furthermore concerned with power in participatory process and outcome. Power here takes on a positive rather than negative quality, as it points to a dynamic process during which learning happens and knowledge is gained (Flyvbjerg 2001: 131-2).

2.2. Method To summarise epistemological reflections above I propose a path to knowledge that combines hermeneutics and phronesis, which combines structure and agency perspectives and hence reflections on the normative as well as on the specific. The hermeneutic tradition allows to justify taking the positions of subjects in a qualitative study, as it legitimises meaning ascribed by actors. A view of social reality expressed in hermeneutics refers to a theory of comprehension of the relevant symbols and signs by means of interpretation. 'This requires an ethic of openness to the unfamiliar, and a willingness to talk or work out differences so that they become shareable familiarities that can guide us into the future' (Lock/Strong 2011: 81). To me this is a suitable approach to examining processes designed to take on the challenge of integrating diversity. As a reminder, hermeneutics help to uncover non-identification and disagreement between individuals. They can solve disagreement based on a shared meaning system, acquired through dialogue and interactions with those who do not share views and understandings, pointing towards change in interpretative systems. 'These interactions afford opportunities aplenty for conflicts, disengagement or efforts at domination. But they also offer opportunities to recognise and transcend the situatedness of our understandings and ways of being in encounters with differently situated actors' (Lock/Strong 2011: 72). It also means integrating different traditions and worldviews. Interaction with others helps us to orient action and change, if we reduce our prejudices and engage in discourse. This view allows cultural diversity when voiced in the public sphere. The nature of self is important in pluralist societies characterised by multiple and sometimes contradictory or contentious identities. In line with the ontological positioning it is therefore necessary to know how people perceive their social

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Methodology

world in order to understand social action. A research activity must understand the reasons of social actors as well as the social context that shapes their actions. The methodological implication of this focus on lived experience is that an individual's interpretation of an experience is essential part o f the experience itself (Cope 2005: 168). In tune with hermeneutics the focus is also on the structures surrounding actors. Structures refer to dominating discourse in the public sphere as well as to the system in Habermas' sense, the political and social institutions shaping expectations and interpretations. Taking structures around actors into account is essential for research to be informative and to help people build a better world. In this critical theory sense, research has the purpose to support less powerful people, combining material and historical conditions and cultural context of people with the assumption that people can shape their own destiny (Neuman 2010: 69-70). Habermas' theory o f communicative action, rooted in the hermeneutic tradition, is relevant when examining the social and democratic value of Muslim participation in Berlin, integrating them into the public sphere of the polity. As critics have pointed out, Habermas' model of deliberative democracy based on discourse ethic is an ideal, a normative theoretical frame not easily applied to local level participation (Lock/Strong 2010). This requires an additional analytical level approach appropriate to understand the phenomena at hand, Muslim civil society participation in Berlin. Here Flyvbjerg's approach based on phronesis proves useful. Both the ideal o f participatory democracy and phronesis go back to Aristotle. Phronesis, meaning practical wisdom, refers to a more practical focus on participation in politics (Flyvbjerg 2001: 132). It functions on the basis of practical rationality and judgement o f actors, paying tribute to structure and agency levels, as deliberative process alone does not necessarily lead to presence in the public sphere. It needs sustained agency and networking. Flyvbjerg's focus on power is translated to civil society and active citizenship as empowerment. Validity is achieved by staying close to reality, offering a 'hermeneutic 'fusion of horizons" (Flyvbjerg 2001: 132). The communicative model at the foundation o f Habermas' account of deliberative democracy provides for society's larger context, the system and system-end part o f the public sphere, rooted in the lifeworld with regard to action. The lifeworld-end part o f public sphere, home o f civil society activity that is not necessarily directed at the state, comes in focus from a more action-focussed perspective inspired by phronesis. The process o f communication is important for the result of communication, as laid out in the theory o f communicative action. Bringing practical wisdom in form o f phronesis into the methodological framework means studying the context of the subject of study, both structure

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and action-oriented. This is best achieved in the form if interpretative case studies.

Interpretative Case Study Research Design Starting from an ontology and epistemology based on lifeworld communication, which can grasp subjective meanings and values that form social reality, I use an interpretative case study design. A case study is an empirical inquiry that 'investigates a contemporary phenomena within real life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident' (Yin 2009: 18). Case studies allow to come close to the individuals and their motivations, helping to place the inquiry both in their view of the world while keeping an eye on the researcher's own rationality, also undergoing a process of learning and understanding. Case studies emphasise the 'little things' and local micro-practices instead of generalisations unable to explain difference (Flyvbjerg 2001: 133-4). With their focus on actual practices of everyday people, on particular circumstances, which are the main ingredient of phronesis, they function 'on the basis of practical rationality and judgement' (Flyvbjerg 2001: 135). Robert Yin offers an important defence of the method. He attempts to lift case study research on equal level with quantitative inquiry, trying to approach a comprehensive view of contemporary processes with an 'all-encompassing method' that spans design logic, data collection and specified data analysis techniques (Yin 2009: 11). He employs a positivist vocabulary and proposes case study research designs with a small number of cases to construct validity, reliability and replication to introduce systematic procedures comparable to other quantitative or qualitative methods to refute the blame that case studies lack rigour (Yin 2009: 54). In order to make the case for a particular proposition, Yin recommends formulating a set of variables, based in literature review and theoretical propositions, demonstrating 'a good grasp of the issue before embarking on data collection' (Yin 2009: 72). In his design variables define the only interpretative frame, supposed to protect the case study from being blamed for subjectivity. Form there he embarks on case selection and the definition of measures for research and data collection (Yin 2009: 56), thus creating causality that contributes to the internal validity of the case study (Yin 2009: 40). Replication design is supposed to verify significant findings from one case to make the evidence more robust (Yin 2009: 54). However, Yin's case study design with its focus on variables and replicability is not actually informative for an interpretative design (Andrade 2009: 42), where the quality of outcome is determined by the quality of specific interactions that cannot be reproduced, reflected in interpretative analysis. However, some research design tools described by Yin, like how to choose units of analysis, are

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Methodology

useful in an interpretative design that uses case studies as examples that are not replicable but informative for other contexts. The interpretative approach, largely developed by Max Weber in his studies of social action, emphasises the role of both agents and structures. It holds the view that one cannot seek predictions of social life. Positivism, on the other hand, sees human action constrained by external factors, paying less attention to agency and the way people are shaping opportunities. Interpretative research assumes the social construction of reality. The researcher becomes the vehicle to reveal this reality, keeping in mind that also the researchers' own worldview lies behind her theoretical perspective, reflected in ontology referring to lifeworld and hermeneutic theory. Hence the interpreter creates findings during the course of investigation while 'understanding how practices and meanings are formed and informed by the language and tacit norms shared by humans working towards some shared goal' (Orlikowsy/Baroudi in Andrade 2009: 44). Hermeneutic interpretative approach intersects with case study design. Case study design informs the empirical research whereas interpretivism serves for data analysis. It is aimed at 'understanding the complex world of lived experience from the point of view of those who live it' (Schwandt 1994: 118), in which understanding actors impact on their social reality. It is based in the traditions of hermeneutics and phenomenology. It does not necessarily have predictive or generalkability power but has its own value of understanding a particular phenomenon that is useful for guiding action. 'Actors and their practices are analysed in relation to structures and structures in terms of agency', thus understanding phenomena from within and without (Flyvbjerg 2001: 137). Interpretative case studies have some advantages: the researcher is directly involved in data collection and analysis. Ideally, the researcher becomes a 'passionate participant' as it 'provides an opportunity to get a deep insight into the problem under study' (Andrade 2009: 45). The aim is to understand the point of views of the subjects under study. Due to limitations in access this thesis relies on in-depth qualitative interviews to gain as much insight as possible about processes of participation as well as the way the subjects feel about it — hence passionate. Interviewing different participants in deliberative processes different Muslim actors, participating public officials - completes the picture and makes it more persuasive (ibid.). The field of Muslim integration is highly emotionalised in public discourse, normative terms like 'values, 'culture' or 'unwillingness to integrate' dominate the debate, generalising difference in the face of complexity and overlapping factors

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of identities.This discourse separates further rather than integrates different communities. A new realism seems appropriate, 'a culture of closer attention' (Schiffauer 2008: 15). The challenge of integrating culturally diverse societies calls for studies with a focus on the interrelatedness of different factors and interests, rather than putting the blame on a group in society. Case studies, just like anthropological studies, uncover complex relationships that together explain certain phenomena in a specific context. They cannot produce generalizable knowledge, but some plausibility to argue that similar cases might be comparable and also require detailed attention/3 They can also be interpreted with regard to the macro-level of democratic representation and societal integration. Employed as examples, case studies only claim validity based on the fact that they include different voices, without being able to claim final authority. However, with interpretation guided by a theoretical framework they do allow to draw specific implications and provide rich insight in particular contexts. Furthermore, dispute about methods in social science suggest that ultimate validity claims about reality are impossible to make, which does not mean that knowledge 'cannot enter into the collective process of knowledge accumulation in a given field or society' (Flyvbjerg 2001: 76). Even a purely descriptive case study without any attempt to generate, Flyvbjerg argues, can make a valuable contribution to this process. This study of Muslim civil society participation is embedded in democratic theory as much as in theories of civil society, social movement and citizenship. A more narrowly defined theoretical framework, presented in the following chapter, informs the analysis of empirical accounts in case studies as examples embedded in a description of the structural context. In a positivist tradition King and colleagues urge us to select one or more dependent variables 'that represent the variation we wish to explain' (King et al 1994: 108). This study works with key elements derived from the theoretical framework. It helps to understand different aspects of Muslim participation in practice. An investigation of how deliberative processes help Muslim civil society to enter the public sphere demands a special focus on agency and structure. Social movement literature dominantly refers to political opportunities opening avenues for making claims. Deliberative democracy and civil society theory based on

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E.g. questioning generalisation like 'Islamic culture of immigrants' (Schiffauer 2008:

15). Anthropology shares a cognitive focus with social philosophy. Instead of a theoretical approach it relies on empirical investigation with a focus to develop grounded theory. 'This is no less conceptual work than in social philosophy - but it is process that defines terms in direct interaction with the subject of study, aimed at building grounded theory' (Schiffauer 2008: 17). 53

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Methodology

Habermas, on the other hand, also underline the creative force of social movements and civil society organisations. Agency is essential to take part in deliberation in the first place. Agency is assumed to be enforced by the sense of citizenship accrued through participation in discursive settings, respecting certain deliberative standards. Citizenship is expressed in increasing self-confidence to have valid claims, but also in increased competences among civil society actors. This new agency power is assumed to be vital for entering the public sphere, bringing in the social movement sector concept. Referring back to the normative foundation resting in communicative rationality it blends different accounts of reality back into the larger context of democratic theory, thus searching for 'the Great within the Small' (Flyvbjerg 2001: 134). According to Flyvbjerg the awareness gained through the narrative of a case study is in fact comparative to a deliberative experiment, granting increased expertise in political and social affairs (Flyvbjerg 2001: 86).

Research Questions This thesis seeks to address several issues that need clarification in research on civil society participation in relation to democratic theory. As mentioned in the literature review there is a lack of detailed studies of political participation of specific marginalised groups in relation to democratic practice, to new theories of representation, and in the face of the challenge of societal integration. Habermas' suggestion that democratic procedures following the ideal of uncoerced communication provides more legitimate democracy requires representation of groups with claims generated from their lifeworld context in the public sphere. The question is if inviting civil society to participate in deliberative consultations is enough if claims are not thoroughly established in the public sphere. Iris Young reminds us that minorities lack voice and often struggle with dominating discourse directed against them. Can mini-publics overcome plebiscitary rhetoric in public discourse, as proposed by Simone Chambers? I am starting from the assumption that studying participation on local level can inform the broader discussion in democratic theory on representation and political legitimacy. A detailed study can shed light on the complex relationship between structure and agency and how top-down approaches blend in with bottom-up efforts, when they facilitate and how they might possibly constrain them. Social movement research offers useful insights on this relationship, especially in the work of Rucht et al. on social movement sectors, which in principle allow constant input by diverse formal and grassroots organisations. This body of research does not reflect on the public sphere as the place that generates the plurality of views necessary to integrate complex modern societies and helps legitimising democratic institutions and decisions. Therefore this thesis brings together democracy, civil society and social movement theories in a theoretical

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framework in order to conduct a study guided by the following main research question: How can deliberative processes and Muslim civil society participation establish Muslims as actors in the public sphere ? Habermas suggests that the liberal era mostly reflected a bourgeois public sphere where public reasoning was still possible (Habermas 1990). The revival of the principle of public deliberation is one of the big challenges in increasingly pluralistic and complex societies today. Chambers reminds us that deliberative democracy theory investigates how deliberation can 'shape preferences, moderate self-interest, empower the marginalized, mediate difference, further integration and solidarity, enhance recognition, produce reasonable opinion and policy, and possibly lead to consensus' (Chambers 2003: 309). This interlinks with recent theoretical reviews of democratic representation questioning representation based exclusively on geographical constituencies, while ignoring identities shaped by race, gender or religion. Plurality of identities and views are essential facts of democracy today. Civil society and social movements are ascribed an important role in communicating this diversity. However, while Habermas sees the struggle over access to the public sphere as a matter of rational discourse, dominating discourse in the public sphere makes access for excluded groups difficult. The Muslim population of Europe's large cities has been publicly framed as different, unwilling to integrate and even as a concern for national security. A similar discourse prevails in Berlin. At the same time political institutions are reaching out to this group that is in itself complex and diverse. On the one hand active agents are constrained by the complexity of structures around them. Hence agency cannot be represented without a view to the structures that influence lifeworld experiences and in fact shape action decisions and establish practice. On the other hand, offering deliberative process from top-down must be met bottom-up, which together generates power in the sense of active citizenship. Participation in civil society is an act of active citizenship. Participation in deliberative processes following certain procedural requirements can further this sense of citizenship as moral equal worth, which is an important factor of societal integration. In a next step bottom-up input should be institutionalised to promote voice in the public sphere. The following set of extended questions emerges from the further review of existing research: What role does the democratic process play in nurturing a sense of active citizenship and in the formation of a Muslim social movement sectorfirmly situated in the public sphere? What conclusions can be drawn for representation?

societal integration and legitimate democratic

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Methodology

These questions are appropriate when trying to uncover the complex structure and agency relationship in a specific context (Flyvbjerg 2001: 138). To answer them the study employs a qualitative approach that apart from giving a detailed picture also allows for respect of the diversity of Muslim activists and political approaches to participation in Berlin. Embedded in a descriptive account of the structural environment of Muslim civil society organisations in Berlin, three cases are presented to provide detailed insight in the role of deliberative process in Muslim civil society participation. This allows the presentation of both structure and agency aspects of civil society participation in political process and access to the public sphere. Ultimately, only Muslim civil society actors themselves can describe their perception of deliberation outcomes and sense of citizenship through participatory processes. Interpretative case study design allows for conclusions about institutional democratic practice with reference to societal integration and legitimate representation. Subjects of research are Muslim civil society organisations in the German city of Berlin.

Units of analysis I chose three exemplary cases situated at different administrative levels to show how variation in deliberative process and outcome is sometimes related to structural differences while other elements of deliberative process apply in each context, even with variation of outcome. The same variation is valid for actors, who always play a decisive role in process of deliberation. However, the motivation of actors seems to determine the outcome, independent of the administrative level. Each exemplary case is different in terms of inclusion in the public sphere and formation of a social movement sector. This design can be applied without replication logic. Even though I am neither testing hypotheses nor theoretical framework it is useful to help understanding the research problem.

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Table 1: Embedded multiple-case study with cross-case analysis in terms of meta-frame and results Unit of analysis 2005-2011

Primary data collection

Other data collection

City level: Islamforum

Inssan IZDB IBMUS DITiB IFB

Expert interviews: - Former Senator for Interior Affairs - Consultant Muslim Academy

Neighbourhood level: tandem project Haci Bayram-AWO

Haci Bayram Mosque

Experts from the Office of the Senate Commissioner for Integration and Immigration Other: - Muslimisches Seelsorgetelefon - Evidence from other interviews - Public documents and academic literature Expert Interviews: - District Commissioner for Integration - AWO - former and current Neighbourhood Managers Other: - Evidence from other interviews - Public documents and online resources

District level: Neukölln, with cross reference to Kreuzberg

Inssan IFB Islamic Relief MJD DAUG AKI M.A.H.D.I.

Expert Interviews: - Commissioner for Immigration Neukölln - Commissioner for Integration and Immigration KreuzbergFriedrichshain Other: - Public documents, academic literature and online resources

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Methodology

A case study is embedded if it contains more than one unit of analysis in either single or multiple case studies. Data generated in embedded case studies will not be pooled but used together with other information to interpret the outcome for each case, which highlights slightly different aspects of the theory proposed (Yin 2009: 59-60). Units of analysis in case studies should be a 'real-life phenomenon' (Yin 2009: 32). The research question How do deliberative process and Muslim civil society participation establish Muslims as actors in the public sphere? allows a clear selection of units of analysis: a selection of participative fora or processes in Berlin that involve Muslim organisations over time. Each unit of analysis consists of several participants, even though they vary in number. The focus is on Muslim participants. According to Yin interviews with just one individual are not enough, when units of analysis are a collective, a group of people or organisations (Yin 2009: 88). This is even more important considering that Muslim participants represent a multitude of different interests and backgrounds. They can hardly speak on behalf of the entire community. At the same time, it is mostly individuals that play decisive roles in Muslim participation, both on administrative/ political level as on civil society level. Despite the focus on Muslim organisations it is therefore important to get some detailed insight into administrative and political views represented there, adding perspectives and information about the structural context. The preferred hermeneutic method is field research and interview analysis, in this case to examine how deliberation and Muslim civil society participation contribute to Muslim inclusion in the public sphere. In a next step it addresses the more normative question of how such deliberative practice contributes to societal integration and more legitimate representation. Asking such macro-level questions is justified considering that Habermas himself based his theory of uncoerced communicative action in the hermeneutic tradition. It provides the core of the deliberative democracy model. Interviews carried out as part of this research were in-depth but semi-structured, giving interviewees a lot of scope to talk freely while directing them along a certain line of inquiry related to the participatory processes they are engaged in and how they evaluate this process. Two sets of questions were assembled for either representatives of Muslim organisations or other relevant stakeholders from administration. All interviews were conducted in the participants' natural environments, either their workplace or their home. I first conducted a series of background interviews as a form of pilot test case. I started with an academic researcher in the Berlin field (Riem Spielhaus) and approached key administrative personnel like the Commissioners for Integration and Migration in three different districts (Maryam Stibenz, Regina Reinauer, Arthur Mengelkoch), the Officer formerly in charge of organising the city-level Islamforum (Doris Nahawandi) in the office of the acting Commissioner for

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Integration and Migration of the Berlin Senate, and his predecessor, who occupied this position for over ten years (Barbara John), thus providing testimony for the historical background of Muslim integration and participation discourse in Berlin. These stakeholder interviews pointed to key Muslim actors and various deliberative venues and processes in Berlin. Interviewees were theoretically sampled, meaning they were selected on the assumption that each has 'the knowledge and experience the researcher requires, has the ability to reflect, is articulate, has the time to be interviewed, and is willing to participate in the study' (Morse in Andrade 2009: 51). Some participants needed more convincing than others, based on negative experiences with journalists or even intelligence personnel pretending to be academic researchers. Generally activists from Muslim organisations were very open to being interviewed, usually reporting that they get more and more requests as public interest in Muslims, usually in relation to integration, is on the rise. They comprised first and second generation migrants, as well as converts, speaking German as their mother tongue, some growing up bilingual and the others with many years of residence in Berlin and high level of fluency. District Commissioners for Integration and other stakeholders on senate level were equally open-minded to be interviewed. Twelve interviews with Muslim actors representing civil society organisations in Berlin provide the primary, narrative-based evidence for the three examples on neighbourhood, district and city-levels presented. The example of Kreuzberg and Neukölln, designed to show the different realities of participation and their causes, builds on four interviews with civil society activists Neukölln and four in Kreuzberg. Interviewees in Neukölln represent associations who are members of the local Integration and Immigration Advisory Board or are otherwise in touch with the district on a regular basis. None of them are religious organisations. All interviewees are listed in Table 1 below. Each example consists of a whole study, embedded in a descriptive account of the political opportunity structures, from which convergent evidence can be extracted for analysis and conclusion. The analysis is guided by considerations of process and outcome, both in terms of sense of citizenship and legitimacy in the public sphere. The theoretical framework provides analytical support with its elements of deliberative democracy and the public sphere, civil society, social movements and citizenship theory. The deliberative process and Muslim civil society impact on outcomes is generated with help of the descriptive specification of the participatory venue or process and further illuminated by participant and stakeholder feedback. Conclusions about the formation process of a social movement sector follow the cross-case analysis and evidence from interviews. The new approach to democratic representation and reflections on societal integration outlined above provides the reference frame for analysis and conclusions.

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Methodology

Bias is reduced by only interviewing representatives of Muslim organisations and other relevant stakeholders who actually do engage in participatory action on either neighbourhood, district or city level, and by a variety of sources of evidence, following a clear pattern of questions (Yin 2009: 41-2). A description of a counter-example strengthens the choice of key elements for the analysis. Carrying out fieldwork offers new perspectives on the issue at hand, helping to understand different types of participatory processes and motivations for civil society engagement, which lead to rephrasing and refining the research questions. Thus is seems fair to state that 'the case study contains no greater bias toward verification of the researcher's preconceived notions than other methods of inquiry' (Flyvbjerg 2001: 84).

3. Analytical Framework 'Representation, when intertwined with citizens' reflexivity and participation, evokes and focuses the natality of politics, through which individuals transcend the immediacy of their interests, biographical experience, and social and cultural attachments, and enlarge their political judgement of their own and others' opinions.' Urbinati/Warren 2008: 401

Societal integration of pluralist societies and representation of diversity to ensure democratic legitimacy is one of the core challenges for western democracies today, manifested in the surge of literature on different models of more participatory democracy and the democratising and empowerment potential of civil society, hugely inspired by Jiirgen Habermas' normative model of deliberative democracy. It promotes different voices and interests in the public sphere, carried by civil society and communicative action in the context of institutionalised deliberative procedures. However, his model has been criticised for excluding minorities who do not have the same communicative power in the public sphere, which is itself structured by elite interests and dominant public discourse shaped by mainstream media with a tendency to exclude minority views. Civil society itself, hailed as some sort of cure for all miseries related to exclusion and loss of democratic legitimacy, does neither necessarily hold normative characteristics like orientation towards the common good nor the power of transformation independent of support by institutional arrangements and procedures. Baynes observed that the concept of civil society is somewhere between a normative and an empirical interpretation: 'It is described both as an already existing reality and as an ideal to be pursued' (Baynes 2002: 124). Let us wait with a judgement on that until after the empirical analysis and wonder with the young Habermas, if it can be heard in a society dominated by mainstream media. Public debate in Germany on Muslim integration shows how public opinion can be dominated by prejudice and empty phrases without allowing much critical debate based on facts and different views. Driven by purposive rationality and identity issues it still provides the vehicle for different views in society that can be picked up by the political system. Inspired by Santos account of translation (Santos 1998), I examine civil society participation in deliberative process as a potential act of social transformation crucial for the reproduction of societal integration, supported by top-down initiated deliberative processes. Santos sees the foundation for translation in the mutual

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Analytical Framework

intelligibility between actors.54 Habermas would call it communicative rationality. I focus on deliberative democracy theory, which brings together the specificities of lifeworlds and the constitution as general normative foundation for deliberation initiated by the system, informed by civil society and carried back to the public sphere. Translation occurs on two levels: on action level, when social actors realise their common ground; and on epistemological level, when a specific context can inform knowledge and democratic action. Civil society is the interface for both citizen empowerment and democratic legitimacy alike, the public sphere is where lifeworld views and system can meet, where normative theory and practical wisdom as phronesis are at work, and both structures and agency take pivotal function, as in the practical context of Muslim civil society participation in Berlin. For the purpose of illuminating the context of practical wisdom that informs actors I also bring in citizenship in the sense of moral equal worth and the model of a social movement sector as elements of empowerment. This should allow to demonstrate in detail how and to what extent a deliberative process involving civil society actors can give voice to minority groups in the public sphere and what role the interplay between structure and agency plays in this context. My theoretical model suggests that deliberative structures and procedures provide actors with resources they need to improve their agency skills while informing political decision-makers about needs and views of a particular constituency. If Muslim civil society participation results in the formation of a social movement sector, the ground is prepared for more voice in the general public sphere. If so, the social movement sector, supported by deliberative procedures initiated in the system, could provide an additional step in the democratising model of civil society as public sphere and provide 'a framework of democratization in the contexts of elite politics, without falling into the traps of fundamentalist theories of participation' (Cohen/Arato 1999: xviii). Thus structural factors and active agents play together in furthering societal integration and legitimacy of the representative democratic process. The analytical framework presented does not claim theoretical universality. It is suited to illuminate the specific social context of Muslim civil society participation in Berlin and supports analysis of their arrival in the public sphere, in the broader context of theories of deliberative democracy and reflections on

'Mutual intelligibility is a prerequisite of what I would call the internal, self-reflexive mix of politics of equality and politics of difference among movements, initiatives, campaigns, networks. (...) The theory of translation is the procedure that allows for mutual intelligibility. (...) To render mutually intelligible means to identify what unites and is common to entities that are separate by their reciprocal differences' (Santos 1998: 14-5). 54

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legitimate representation in democratic theory. It might be possible to translate to other social contexts but it does not seek abstract or generalised theorising.

3.1. Defining the Democratic Challenge in Pluralist Societies "We have arrived at a paradoxical historical moment when nearly everyone favours democracy, but apparendy few believe that democratic governance can do anything'. Iris Marion Young 2000: 4

Representation is a necessary element of democracy. However, in permanently changing new realities 'the degree to which a representative relationship is 'democratic' would depend upon the degree to which it enables the following norm: every individual potentially affected by a decision should have an equal opportunity to influence the decision' (Castiglione/ Warren 2006: 4). Representation today must rely more on informal negotiation and deliberation in order to generate political legitimacy. This requires inclusive and deliberative processes, including all of those affected in collective decisions. As this section will show, the challenge of political legitimacy of democratic representation in western democracies today is closely related to the struggle for societal integration of pluralism. Both require the representation of public spheres of different interests and identities through deliberative processes, thus forming new constituencies that enable representatives to function as deliberators in their own right.

Legitimacy of Democratic Representation Influenced by Habermas' theory of deliberative democracy and Young's politics of inclusion, recent debates of representation in democratic theory question representation based on territory rather than issues, such as class, race, gender, ethnicity etc. As Habermas observed, the European nation states and democracy 'are twins born of the French Revolution. From a cultural point of view, they both stand under the shadow of nationalism' (Habermas 1996: 493). This understanding of statehood has changed with EU-integration and more than 50 years of work migration and global movements of refugees. Communities clustered around particular ethnicities, ways of life and value systems give way to pluralistic societies that can only claim universalistic norms guaranteed by the constitution as common reference framework, also framing the challenge of societal integration. One branch of theorists of democracy favouring the ideal of participatory democracy of ancient Athens has long scorned representation as undemocratic, or at least as weakening self-government (Urbinati/ Warren 2006: 392). One major

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Analytical Framework

issue of concern is the variation in strength o f people's voices, depending on how mainstream the issues o f subgroups are: 'Interest groups will likely ignore targeted issues affecting numerically small subgroups—whether weak or strong—in favour of issues that have a wide impact and that affect their median member' (Strolovich 2006: 895). The more pragmatic branch defends representation as the best way to establish democracy in large territorial states or as a useful means o f division o f labour (Urbinati 2000: 758). The standard account o f representation entails four main aspects. First, constituencies formed on a territorial basis elect agents to act on their behalf, thus separating the source of legitimate power, the electorate, from those exercising this power. Public spheres and civil society seek to shape public opinion with the help of the media and larger interest organisations set political agendas, forming relationships with principal agents. Second, the sovereignty of the people is identified with state power within a certain territory. Third, regular elections ensure responsiveness to the people by elected representatives. Four, this process enjoys the label of political equality through universal voting rights in a homogenous society (Urbinati/ Warren 2008: 389). The relationship between voters and principal agents is increasingly difficult to maintain or does not exist in the first place. A definition o f the people based on territory does no longer hold, as new extraterritorial issues, such as migration, the environment or global trade or non-territorial issues like religion, ethnicity and identity issues and social movements entered the political stage. Constitutional democracies represent individuals on the basis of residence, thus excluding nonresidents and their communities, deepening inequalities in citizenship and between citizens. Those excluded must rely on nongovernmental organisations and social networks situated in civil society (Urbinati/ Warren 2008: 389-90). Electoral representation based on territory cannot legitimately address collective issues but still serves as the main argument in favour of state power. The pressing question is how democratic representation can work in pluralist polities under threat of societal disintegration. Inspired by Habermas' theory of deliberative democracy Urbinati and other democratic theorists defend the principle o f representation. Habermas combined the communicative power of civil society and social movements rooted in different lifeworlds within society with democratic legitimacy through public deliberation in the public sphere, making a plurality o f voices heard (Habermas 1996). Urbinati sees an inherent value for democratic deliberation: the 'focus on deliberation allows us to perceive participation and representation not as two alternative forms o f democracy, but as related forms constituting the continuum of political action in modern democracy' (Urbinati 2000: 759). She argues that the indirectness of representation is a major tool in forging discourse in demo-

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cratic politics, because it encourages a distinction between deliberating and voting.55 Second, the future-perspective that representation projects citizens into, adds an ideological dimension that gives ideas 'full residence' in politics. Political deliberation and political decision-making do not happen simultaneously in representative democracy, except for the representatives themselves. Citizens take two time-levels into account when voting: past promises of elected representatives and their outcomes; and the promises made by candidates for the future (Urbinati 2000: 766). This means citizens and representatives must bridge that time gap with communication, which requires advocacy in parliament as much as advocacy in society. This 'makes representation a 'course of action' rather than a 'simple act' — a practice of political interaction among citizens that goes well beyond voting' (Urbinati 2000: 767). It gives citizens the chance to deliberate with both their political representatives and their own communities. Gerhard Gohler reminds us that representation contains both symbol and action elements. Symbolic representation expresses the values of a polity. Political representation is supposed to express the will of the people. It is a mandate to represent all individual and collective interests. Common values in the form of symbolic representation are important in moments of conflicting interests and opinions, as they constitute a polity in its unity as well as its diversity. This common ground enables citizens to accept political decisions that are adverse to their interests (Gohler 2007: 110-2). As symbols develop an integrative dimension through interpretation, they can always carry multiple meanings for different people and groups. This allows for a representation of pluralism, when the meaning of symbols can be discussed and negotiated (Gohler 2007: 116). However, the issue at stake is not only to bring disillusioned citizens back on board but also the inclusion of minority interpretations in this deliberative process, one that allows for the inclusion of different interests at the level of symbolic politics and that results in factual action. The general theoretical consequence for Urbinati and Warren is rethinking constituency representation based on territory, which really only defines citizens as sharing a geographic interest. Constituencies emerging from race, class, ethnicity or gender, on the other hand are only represented if they intersect with 'the circumstances of location, producing only an accidental relationship between democratic autonomy (...) and forms of representation' (Urbinati/Warren 2006: 396).

„The spatial and temporal gap opened by representation buttresses trust, control, and accountability if it is filled with speech (an articulated public sphere). Representation can also encourage political participation insofar as its deliberative character expands politics beyond the narrow limits of decision and administration' (Urbinati 2000: 761). 55

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Analytical Framework

Representation goes hand in hand with the selection of constituencies, which is crucial in pluralistic, multi-national societies. According to Urbinati and Warren 'constituency definition, long ignored in theories of representation, is among the most fundamental of first things because it establishes the frame - the inclusions and exclusions- within which issues are decided' (Urbinati/ Warren 2008: 388). There are three main elements to allow a democratic process that is centred on 'the communicative relation of broad social sectors in the pubic spheres of civil society and representative bodies whose diversity responds to the structural differentiations of society' (Young 2000: 10): Inclusive representation requires identities and interests recognized in the public sphere; the channels of participation, that allow making the voice of the represented heard, must follow inclusive and deliberative principles; and any vision of representation based on deliberation and inclusion requires active citizens (Castiglione/ Warren 2006: 11-13; Young 2000). Will Kymlicka, referring to first nation and indigenous people in the new world, but extending to work migrants and their offspring, was the first thinker to argue in favour of group representation within democratic institutions. 56 He describes group relationships as essential for self-identity and determination (Kymlicka 1995). Melissa Williams argued, that 'by treating individuals as individuals rather than as situated members of groups, liberal accounts of representation fail to conceptualize patterns of disadvantage that are based in group situations, and are often replicated in representative institutions' (Urbinati/Warren 2006: 394). From a global southern perspective Santos et al. conclude the aim should be to develop multiple local public spheres recognizing both the principle of recognition of equality and the principle of recognition of cultural difference that translates into a politics of multicultural collective rights (Santos et al 2009: xxvii). Iris Marion Young highlights the role of active citizens and civil society for inclusionary identity representation, pointing out both actor and structural dimension: civil society enables the expression of differentiated views in public spheres and allows citizens to influence and legitimise political action. It is therefore in the interest of representative democracy to encourage participation in associational life. 'Though civil society stands in tension with state institutions, a strengthening of both is necessary to deepen democracy and undermine injustice, especially that deriving from private and economic power' (Young 2000: 156). Measuring the democratic impact of self-representing actors is difficult, as 'the

56 'Immigrants

insist that they should be free to maintain some of their old customs relating to food, dress, recreation, religion, and to associate with each other to maintain these practices. This should not be seen as unpatriotic (...).' Institutions of larger society like schools etc. should accommodate ethnic identities (Kymlicka 2002: 354).

83 arena o f self-authorized representatives offers no discrete domain o f institutional processes (Urbinati/Warren 2008: 404). On the other hand, letting citizens speak up in official venues, even when they are self-selected, is an act of discursively representing other citizens, who do not otherwise manage to make claims within the public sphere. As far as deliberative principles are concerned, already John Stuart Mill declared it ideal to consider each citizen's voice, in the name o f liberty: 'If all individuals have an equal claim to representation, their representatives should have presence in representative institutions in proportion to the numbers of individuals who hold interests they wish to be represented' (Urbinati/ Warren 2006: 394). Thus minorities can remind majorities that other opinions exist and might have to be taken into account in further discussion, as in systems with proportional representation. In today's democratic theory this translates into representation based on discursive inclusion, inspired by the spirit of deliberative as opposed to aggregative democracy. Democratic institutions should realize the norms that define democracy, 'that all affected by collective decisions should have an opportunity to influence the outcome... Collective decisions affecting self-determination should include those affected' (Urbinati/Warren 2006: 395). Such democratic autonomy avoids reducing democracy to particular institutions, but centres around morally and legally equal and self-determining individuals. Urbinati proposes to see representatives as deliberating advocates57. Only then can they give minorities a voice. Territorial constituencies are unlikely to disappear though, and the stability o f electoral institutions means that they are slow to respond to new, marginalized communities who demand a voice. Representatives themselves should respond also to their marginalised constituents' interests. A deliberative approach, as the empirical analysis will show, is an important step, for instance in relation to building trust relationships. Trust strongly matters as a democratic element o f control. It provides some accountability on the side o f the representatives and gives a sanction tool to the represented (Castiglione/Warren 2006: 9). Advocacy and interest groups, civil society organisations, social movements, and individuals all claim to represent constituencies, but also become objectified in the process o f organizing into groups. This in turn allows representatives 'to 57 She maintains that advocacy and deliberation are by no means mutually exclusive, as suggested by critics of advocacy. 'Without deliberation, there would be no reason for advocacy. Advocacy is not blind partisanship; advocates are expected to be passionate and intelligent defenders' (Urbinati 2000: 775) and with Mill: 'Representatives function as advocates insofar as they can judge the condition o f their constituency from the point of view of the 'real interest' of the whole country' (ibid. 778).

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Analytical Framework

represent positions in public discourse and argument, in this way serving as both conduit and structure of public spheres. Without this detachment from specific persons and interests, politics would fail to have a discursive locus, and would be reduced to the aggregation and bargaining of interests and identities' (Castiglione/Warren 2006: 13).

Societal integration The need for discursive inclusion of diverse identities and worldviews in democratic political processes corresponds with the challenge of societal integration, which has political implications. It is the question of the social glue, of the binding force that keeps societies together. Today, research in this field looks at the challenge of integration in pluralist, highly functional differentiated societies that no longer share a homogenous national or cultural identity. Societal integration is best regarded as a constant process of reproduction. The process itself as well as the result of this process defines integration into a specific society. For centuries the unity of society was assumed to correspond with the nation state (Imbusch/ Rucht 2005: 13). Today, the growing complexity of societies, relationships and identities results in tendencies of disintegration (Imbusch/ Rucht 2005: 64). Economic integration is in danger, as more and more people must make a living in precarious work arrangements, undermining historical principles of solidarity. The shrinking power of the nation state in the global landscape undermines identification with a specific state power. Global migration has diluted the cultural unity of 'the people' and excludes whole segments of society from political participation. Civil society and deliberation can make a contribution to societal integration by overcoming fragmentation and social exclusion. As Imbusch and Rucht point out, societies influence themselves, rather than being influenced by outside forces. 'This influence is the result of conflicting interests and forces, of historical experiences and varying blueprints for the future, of different problem assessments and identity constructions, which all manifest themselves in reality.' (Imbusch/ Rucht 2005: 16). Collectively negotiated principles and procedures provide the social glue, the public notion of the common good. In the next sections several concepts need clarification, first of all those of deliberative democracy and the public sphere. Both are inextricably linked to the work of Jiirgen Habermas but have received much attention and development by other theorists. After that I will outline the concept of civil society and its relevance in democratic theory applied here. As active citizens are equally central to both democratic and civil society theory, central reflections on citizenship follow. I will only mention those thinkers and writers whose additions are of relevance to my analytical framework. Some others who made valuable contributions are referred to in the literature review in the introduction, but this is by no means

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exhaustive. In a final step this chapter outlines the concept of the social movement sector as a framework for analysing Muslim civil society participation in the public spheres of Berlin.

3.2. Deliberative democracy 'Deliberative democratic theory is a normative theory that suggests ways in which we can enhance democracy and criticize institutions that do not live up to the normative standard. In particular, it claims to be a more just and indeed democratic way of dealing with pluralism than aggregative or realist models of democracy.' Simone Chambers 2003: 308

Democracy is attractive as a concept because its normative foundation is the promise of a good life for each individual living in society. From this derives the 'norm of moral equality in collective rule: because each individuals' life is an end in itself, collective decisions ought to recognke, respect, and benefit individuals' interests and values equally, insofar as possible' (Castiglione/Warren 2006: 4). As far as delivery of this norm of equality is concerned democratic theory divides in two broad camps: those who highlight the vote and those who highlight deliberation and participation as the core characteristic of democracy. An important aspect of deliberation is the reconciliation of democracy and rights (Chambers 2003: 309). The problem lies in the conflict between the views that the will of the majority is violating individual rights and the communitarian position that too much focus on individual rights poses a threat to the common good (see above). Deliberative democracy theory is seeking a balance. Especially Habermas developed a theory based on legitimacy that brings together rights and the democratic process by insisting on the co-originality of rights and popular sovereignty (Habermas 1996). 'Political power is bound and limited by the law, which serves the rights of the individual, while at the same time it is politics that authorises the law' (Eriksen/Weigard 2003: 9). Personal autonomy is guaranteed through legal provisions and democratic society, which constitute each other: citi2ens can make use of their legal rights to decide on the rules of their intercourse (Eriksen/Weigard 2003: 9). In the liberal and pluralist tradition democracy is linked to majority-rule based on the free choices of individuals expressed in votes. Liberal government defines the interests of society and protects the negative liberties of individuals. In this notion the state refers to public administration. Society encompasses market and labour relations among private persons, with politics taking on the 'function of clustering together and pushing through private interests against an administration specialised in the employment of power for collective goals' (Habermas

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Analytical Framework

1996: 269). Habermas criticises the political process in a liberal system as being characterised by a structural hierarchy o f administrative decision-making power and individual self-interest. The only function o f democratic decision-making and voting is the legitimisation o f the use o f political power (Habermas 1998: 363). Republicanism, on the other hand, regards politics as constituting the social process as a whole 'in which the members of more or less naturally emergent solidary communities become aware of their dependence on one another and, acting with full deliberation, further shape and develop existing relations o f reciprocal recognition into an association o f free and equal citizens' (Habermas 1996: 269). It thus adds solidarity and a focus on the common good to state power and the market, introducing a communicative and deliberative dimension that relies on civil society associations to oblige governments to respect the demands and need of the political community they represent — in homogenous nation states where all citizens enjoy positive rights that make them autonomous creators o f free and equal society, sources of sovereignty that cannot be delegated to representatives (Habermas 1998: 328-9 and 364). Communitarians like the discursive element o f republican democratic theory but insist on the strong connection with a particular collective. 'In this view, the individual can get a clear sense of commonalities and differences, and hence a sense o f who he is and would like to be, only in the public exchange with others who owe their identities to the same traditions and similar socialization processes' (Habermas 1996: 280). This renders societal integration today even more impossible. Political discourse that must always keep in mind the culturally and traditionally generated self-understanding of a collective cannot produce legal norms that are good for all (Habermas 1998: 343). Habermas developed his alternative democratic model in reflection o f the insufficiencies o f liberal and republican accounts, but not without borrowing from them. Deliberative democracy stresses the old Athenian principle of debating citizens and seeks to re-integrate this ideal into modern pluralist and representative democracy, resting on the foundations of communicative rationality and the rule of law as the expression of common practice o f the community (Baynes 2002: 126). Deliberative democracy is not an alternative, but an extension to representative democracy, that guarantees democratic practices through an institutionalised discursive process based on the ideal o f popular sovereignty and the public common good: 'Only the principles of the guaranteed autonomy o f public spheres and competition between different political parties, together with the parliamentary principle, exhaust the content o f the principle of popular sovereignty' (Habermas 1996: 171). Liberal rights and popular sovereignty are regarded as mutually supportive dimensions o f communicative

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freedom, thus moving on from classical democratic theory to a deliberative model of democracy based on un-coerced, informed debate.58 In Democracy and its Critics, R.A. Dahl defined the common good as the goods and interests we share with others that consist of 'the practices, arrangements, institutions, and processes that ... promote the well-being of ourselves and of others' (Dahl 1989: 307). It requires the inclusion all of those affected by a decision, equal chances of participation in the political process, equal voting rights, equal rights to control and to put topics on the political agenda and finally a situation in which all participants have the resources to be able to access all relevant information for opinion-formation (Habermas 1998: 383). In order to include minority views Habermas' model is generated from discourse ethics that ultimately points to the constitution as common normative denominator and on the institutionalisation of procedures and conditions of communication that allow deliberative processes with informally constituted public opinions (Habermas 1996: 275). The principles of communicative action and autonomous public spheres are clearly the core elements for legitimate democratic deliberative procedures. They help expressing the sovereignty of the people and defining the common good in pluralist societies, thus promoting societal integration. It is an attempt to reverse the threat of system colonization of the lifeworld. These principles inform the analysis of Muslim civil society representation in the public sphere in Berlin in both a normative and empirical way. It provides the theoretical normative validity of their claims and helps to identify their current positions in the participatory process.

Habermas' discourse ethics and theory of communicative action 'Communicative rationality recalls older ideas of logos, inasmuch as it brings along with it the connotations of a noncoercively unifying, consensus-building force of a discourse in which participants overcome their at first subjectively biased views in favour of a rationally motivated agreement.' Jürgen Habermas 1987: 315

The exchange of rational arguments between all actors with a stake in a certain matter and decision-making based on this exchange is central to deliberative

Adherents of discursive democracy like J.S. Dry2eck are critical of the link in deliberative democracy to liberal constitutionalism. He tried to develop a theory that keeps a more critical distance to the institutions of the liberal state by focusing on deliberation within civil society and social movements, because he doubts the possibilities of deliberative institutions (Dryzeck 2000). 58

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Analytical Framework

democracy. Hence the first step is to investigate Habermas' definition of rationality. As elucidated in the epistemological statement above Habermas starts from a critical theory and hermeneutics tradition in his approach to rationality, which define the ordering principles that help us understand observations of reality. In this tradition rationality is related to the relationships of actors with the world. There is a conceptual connection between rationality and action, as actors might know the grounds for their behaviour. 'The key to understanding social reality can be found by studying people in their capacity as agents who act according to how they are defining their situation' (Eriksen/Weigard 2003: 18). One has to understand the meaning that actors put into their actions, try to see things from their perspective. The hermeneutic approach means we must enter into a communicative relationship with another actor to understand the meaning of something that constitutes reason for the actors involved. Such reason is based on validity claims 'that their hearers will accept, or that could, if necessary, be redeemed with good reasons' (Rehg 1998: xiv), constituting communicative rationality. Truth claims go beyond a particular community, while moral claims are based on norms that stem from interpersonal relationships, which can always be put up for debate again. These two different categories of validity claims point to the conceptual tension between facts and norms that constitute reality. Validity claims must be mutually agreed on in a process of communicative action. There are two central elements in communicative rationality: communicative action and lifeworld validity. On the one hand, the possibility of renewed deliberation of norms allows all individuals to thrive, as they are not based on some sort of pre-determined practical rationality but on communicative rationality 'inscribed in the linguistic telos of mutual understanding as a mechanism of action coordination' (Habermas 1996: 17), based on the linguistic assumption that people may not share beliefs but the ability to think. On the other hand, communicatively achieved agreements must be more than socially acceptable. Communicative rationality must be 'expressed in a decentred complex of pervasive, transcendentally enabling structuring conditions' (ibid.); otherwise it cannot contribute to societal integration. In order to accept a claim as reasonable it must be able to demand validity based on justification that is unproblematic for participants (Habermas 1998: 36-7). These are justifications generated from the lifeworld, fusing normative validity claims with 'the facticity of a given cultural background' (Rehg 1996: xvi). Thoughts and facts are only accessible when they are states of affairs. 'The important point is that we thoughts from the structure of sentences; sentences ponents of a grammatical language that can be

linguistically represented as can read the structure of are those elementary comtrue or false'. Linguistic

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expressions have identical meanings for different users within a language community. 'They assume that like expressions keep the same meaning in the diverse situations and speech acts in which they are employed' (Habermas 1998: 11). In addition to that each completed thought contains a proposition which must be confirmed or rejected as a linguistic code: 'Thinking and speaking subjects can take a position on each thought with a 'yes' or 'no'; hence the mere having of a thought is complemented by an act of judgement (Habermas 1996: 12). Thus sentences take on an ideal status furnished with recognizable and generalizable content. This ideality, according to Habermas, approaches the idea of truth or universality. However, the unconditional meaning of truth claims (Habermas 1996: 13) is reserved for 'an interpretation community whose members engage, before the background of an inter subjectively shared lifeworld, in processes of reaching understanding with one another about things in the world' (Habermas 1998: 14). The object of interpretation will be situated in one of three worlds of reality.59 It might take time and negotiation to reach such agreement, which the ideal speech situation will finally result in by force of the better argument. The resulting communicative action may be strong or weak, strong referring to action coordinated through the agreement of actors on the basis for the cooperation, on shared values; weak action means that actors merely recognise each other's perspective (Eriksen/Weigard 2003: 41). The interpretative community, idealised as capable of increasing knowledge through reasoning, must recognise a proposition as a true statement before it can claim validity (Geltung) (Habermas 1998: 15). According to Habermas, language is actually the primary source of social integration. However, the idealizations inherent to language60 only take on actiontheoretic meaning if the 'illocutionary binding forces of speech acts'61 are used to

In the objective world intentional interventions are carried out to reach a purpose. It requires strategic action that is planned by the individual without communicating with others. The social world determines which types of action are legitimate. Actions apply to values shared. Actors either comply or break with a norm with their action. This is generalised behaviour, it shapes expectations of behaviour based on norms that are morally valid to most members of the social world. The subjective world is the inner experience of an actor, demonstrated to others only through self-presentations (Eriksen/Weigird 2003: 28-30). 60 'The ideal character of conceptual and semantic generality is accessible to a semantic analysis of language, whereas the idealization connected with validity claims is accessible to a pragmatic analysis of the use of language oriented to reaching understanding' (Habermas 1996: 17). 61 „An illocutionary act is a complete speech act, made in a typical utterance, that consists of the delivery of the propositional content of the utterance (including references and a 59

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Analytical Framework

coordinate action plans of different actors (Habermas 1996: 17). 'In such action, actors in the roles of speaker and hearer attempt to negotiate interpretations of the situation at hand and to harmonize their respective plans with one another through the unrestrained pursuit of illocutionary goals' (Habermas 1996: 18). This can only work if speakers want to reach an understanding about something, not if the primary interest is personal success. It is thus the manner in which we arrive at conclusions that counts or the procedure to arrive at rationality. The use of language with the aim of mutual comprehension is essential to communicative action and requires participants to either agree on the validity of their speech action or state their disagreement, which they must keep in mind during the subsequent process of action (Habermas 1998: 34).62 By maintaining openness it is ensured that only the best argument can support a claim, thus making communication 'a medium of a rationally binding character' (Eriksen/Weigard 2003: 4). However, actors involved must assume that they ascribe the same meaning to expressions based on a common language (Habermas 1998: 34-5). By agreeing they recognise normative validity claims constructing and preserving social order. 'This means that the tension between facticity and validity built into language and its use turns up again in the dynamic of the integration of communicatively socialised individuals.' Validity claims must transcend time and space and be raised and accepted here and now. Habermas calls this the Janus face of validity claims (Habermas 1996: 17).

Lifeworld Due to the tension between facticity and validity the risk of disagreement and distorted or end of communication is high if it is not rooted in the lifeworld. According to Habermas the lifeworld offers a basic consensus on interpretative models: 'The lifeworld forms both the horizon for speech situations and the source for interpretations, while it in turn reproduces itself only through ongoing communicative actions. (...) As we engage in communicative action the predicate), and a particular illocutionary force, whereby the speaker asserts, suggests, demands, promises, or vows.' www.sil.org/Hnguistics/GlossaryOfLinguisticTerms/WhatlsAnlllocutionaryAct.htm (accessed 10/12/2012). 62 Two idealizing assumptions can be drawn from this confirmation of linguistic codes that determines social reality: 1. 'The interacting participants must consider themselves mutually accountable, hence they must presuppose that they can orient their action according to validity claims.' 2. 'That every communicatively achieved agreement - which makes possible the coordination of actions, the complex build-up of interactions, and the weaving together of action sequences - takes as its yardstick the intersubjective recognition of criticisable validity claims' (Habermas 1996: 20).

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lifeworld embraces us as unmediated certainty, out of whose immediate proximity we live and speak' (Habermas 1996: 22). The lifeworld consists of direct symbolic interaction, based on mutual understanding through shared norms, the space where identity and culture are reproduced. Lifeworld knowledge is a form of latendy present knowledge and ability that cannot be raised to the level of criticism and challenge without turning it into a topic of debate. From there it decomposes. Lifeworld knowledge owes its stability to its mediating power between facticity and validity: idealization is extinguished in the validity dimension. 'At the same time, the validity dimension, from which implicit knowledge acquires the intuitive force of conviction, remains intact' (Habermas 1996: 23). This way the one survives in the other. The tension is further remedied by interpenetrating institutions like cultural traditions, social orders and personal identities, especially in societies based on kinship. Those authority-claiming institutions reaching into the lifeworld are available based on knowledge that has already been through communicative action (Habermas 1996: 23). With increasingly diverse and differentiated societies, however, the challenge of social integration rises and lifeworld institutions loose their binding power. In case of disagreement on how to resolve a certain conflict, members of the deliberative party can try to negotiate, increasingly driven by self-interest as a result of differentiation, shifting from communicative to strategic action, which according to Habermas dominates capitalist market economies. The domain of communicative rationality tends to be colonized by other logics of rationality, like purposive rationality, defining means to an end.63 The consequence is that relations which should be based on personal commitment, common understanding and involvement, are instead regulated on an impersonal basis, with alienation, disintegration of social responsibility and decline of legitimacy as results' (Eriksen/Weigard 2003: 6). In the face of the complexity of functionally differentiated societies Habermas described the concept of society as one big association as obsolete. Economy and state were systemically integrated spheres of action that can no longer be democratically altered towards integration. 'Ideas that used to be taken for granted because they sprang from a religious lifeworld context, are questioned as a result of the advance of rationalisation, and need to be justified. But as more and more aspects of our lives are problematized this way, there is growing uncertainty, which can in principle be removed only through argumentative

63 Strategic versions of purposive rationality like game theory, rational choice, public choice etc. have introduced other actors and their motivations as dynamic elements, but it is not always clear why certain ways of acting are better than others (Eriksen/Weigard

2003: 6).

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Analytical Framework

conviction.' (Eriksen/Weigard 2003: 96) But there are too many questions to be solved. The solution is to separate certain areas of action, which become normatively neutralised and can therefore be relieved from the demands of justification, which applies in the sphere of the lifeworld. The steering media take the place of arguments. The lifeworld fusion of facticity and validity dissolves. According to Habermas 'the burden of integration shifts more and more to communicative achievements of actors for whom validity and facticity (...) have parted company as incompatible'. 64 The lifeworld must be communicatively integrated and establish the symbolic foundations of the system world. Human agency is as much responsible for actions as traditions and other external forces, the only path left to social integration is communicative action supported by law, the only factitious framework that can exercise authority today if conceptualised as norms that put socially integrating constraints on interactions driven by strategic selfinterest while protecting individual liberties (Habermas 1996: 27).

Normative foundations: Law and Constitution Law is connected to the justification of coercion in order to defend freedom and is based on subjects' affirmation of its validity. This affirmation rests on participation in a legislative process that satisfies legal statutes. In this process subjects must leave private interests behind and assume the role of citizens, a role in which 'agreement on the normative principles for regulating social life either has already been secured through tradition or can be brought about deliberatively in accordance with normatively recognised procedures' (Habermas 1996: 32). Modern law based on a constitution should express a will that gives certain norms validity generated from communicative action and is thus changeable yet binding, related to its claim of legitimacy (Habermas 2996: 39). Every citizen should in principle be able to agree to the underlying principles of the constitution, as they benefit all.65 Habermas moves on to argue that respect for universalistic norms of a constitution requires a shared political culture and the political acculturation of immigrants66, but not a joint ethnic, linguistic or cultural heritage, as multicultural

64 Validity and facticity refer to ' the binding force of rationally motivated beliefs and the imposed force of external sanctions' (Habermas 1996: 26). 65 Recognition of every person as free and equal is threefold: 'They should receive equal protection and equal respect in their integrity as irreplaceable individuals, as members of ethnic or cultural groups, and as citizens, that is, as members of the political community' (Habermas 1996: 496). 66 'The identity of the political community, which also must not be violated by immigration, depends primarily on the legal principle anchored in the political culture and not in

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countries based on migration like the United States or Canada demonstrate (Habermas 1998: 643). This requires first of all a clear distinction between norms and values. Norms should apply to everybody equally; values can be more or less agreed with. Norms cannot contradict each other if they are to represent the same addressees; values can compete for validity and are more flexible (Habermas 1998: 311).« Discourse theory upholds the principle of liberalism of giving first priority to the individual without forgetting the republican demand of legitimacy of decisions through the deliberation of citizen tied to a collective. This, according to Habermas, is possible in constitutional democracy. In a pluralist society, which must integrate different and sometimes conflicting beliefs and value systems, the constitution is a frame for political institutions to refer to. 'Constitutional democracy can be understood as a procedure of problem solving and conflict resolution', it ensures a process that enables rationality and the discussion of basic principals (Eriksen/Weigârd 2003: 124). A constitution defines political procedures 'according to which citizens can, in the exercise of their right to self-determination, successfully pursue the cooperative project of establishing just (e.g. relatively more just) conditions of life' (Habermas 1996: 263). This justice is expressed in the democratic procedure of law generation. Inequality among groups that should enjoy equality suffers from a political process that does not follow procedures allowing for fairness. This is why norms are supposed to foremost concentrate on the democratic genesis of laws, the rights of communication and participation. This incudes the examination of communication structures of the public sphere influenced by mass media, 'the actual chances that divergent and marginal voices will be heard and that formally equal rights of participation will be effectively exercised', and equal representation of views and opinions in parliament (Habermas 1998: 322). The legitimacy of democratic decisions in Habermas' view is secured through a deliberative process where all parties concerned have the same right to voice their point of view. Habermas speaks in favour of the institutionalization of argumentative procedures. Those can be captured in the public sphere, even an ethical-cultural form of life as a whole. It follows that one must expect only that immigrants willingly engage in the political culture of their new home, without necessarily abandoning the cultural life specific to their country of origin' (Habermas 1996: 513-4). 61 'Valid norms of action obligate their addressees equally and without exception to satisfy generalized behavioural expectations, whereas values are to be understood as intersubjectively shared preferences. Shared values express the preferability of goods that, in specific collectives, are considered worth striving for and can be acquired or realizes through goal-directed action. Norms of action appear with a binary validity claim and are either valid or invalid' (Habermas 1996: 255; highlight by J.E.).

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though such a critical public sphere is endangered by interest and propaganda politics. Democratic institutions should be structured in a way that allows discourse when shared understanding is ruptured and needs resolution. Habermas' model of deliberative politics is thus bridging the gap between life and system world. In Between Facts and Norms (1998) he points to the dual normative foundation of politics. Strategically motivated decisions are kept within the institutional framework of the law, which in itself should be based on a normative and morally acceptable discourse and provide institutionalised democratic procedures following the same principles of deliberation. 'A consistent proceduralist understanding of the constitution relies on the intrinsically rational character of a democratic process that grounds the presumption of rational outcomes. Under this description, reason is embodied solely in the formal-pragmatic conditions that facilitate deliberative politics' (Habermas 1996: 285). Another normative basis of politics is public discussion within public spheres and representative assemblies, where different options and solutions are discussed. Input from such deliberative fora provides at least a certain degree of legitimacy of political decisions. The sovereignty of the people is located in the public sphere and takes the form of communicative power. 'Strictly speaking, this power springs from the interactions among legally institutionalised willformation and culturally mobilized publics. The latter, for their part, find a basis in the associations of a civil society quite distinct from both state and economy alike' (Habermas 1996: 301). Lifeworld-generated norms and truths must find their way into the public sphere.

Public sphere In order to understand the concept properly this section begins with a brief overview of the historical development of the public sphere in order to understand Habermas' conception and to stress its importance in the deliberative democracy model. It ties in with the previous section explaining communicative action in the lifeworld and clarifies the difference between lifeworld and system. Habermas situates the public sphere in the lifeworld next to the family. The social space of the public sphere is divided in a cultural and a political sphere. Situated here are the consumer and the citizen who are both less related to the system world than the employee or the client (Eriksen/Weigard 2003: 100). Habermas' public sphere is a normative concept as much as 'a sociological analysis of democratic political cultures' (Somers 2008: 187), as publics form public opinion in the social space between the state and the private, informing institutionalised political culture. In his Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere (first published in 1961) Habermas provides a historical overview of the development of the public sphere over time.

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Over the course of the 19th century, the public sphere transformed from a bourgeois public sphere where well-educated private people came together in public meetings to reason with politicians (Habermas 1990: 86), to a sphere made up of many competing publics, accompanied by splitting the market off the private sphere. With equal rights, political parties transformed into more centralized and bureaucratic mass movements led by professional politicians. This coincided with the development of commercial mass media. Political propaganda became essential for political parties, thus separating power from sovereignty. Today, 'political parties are instruments of will formation, but in the hands of those who control the party apparatus, not in the hands of the audience' (Habermas 1990: 303). They must represent a system of multiple interests organized in public associations, thus reducing the legitimising role of the parliament and pushing it to the edge of the public sphere.68 Critical publicity, Habermas analysed, now only manipulates (Habermas 1990: 270). 'The public sphere, pre-structured and dominated by mass media, grew into a power-driven arena, in which the struggle is not only about influence via the selection of topics and reports, but also about the direction of communication streams, whose strategic intention is kept in the dark.' (Habermas 1990: 28) Habermas saw this as the end of a liberal public sphere and the beginning of lifeworld colonisation by the system. In The Theory of Communicative Action (1981) Habermas concluded that the political sphere today is split between a socially integrated (the public sphere) and a system-integrated (decision-making administrative) sphere. In the public sphere, where we create our cultural and political identifications, communicative action prevails. Situated in the system sphere are bureaucracy, political parties and interest groups, where strategic action as a medium of power is dominating. System integration is a result of coordinating interests uncoupled from norms, as it is purely functional.69

By legitimizing corporatist decisions in the assembly, long agreed on behind closed doors, they are merely demonstrating the will of the party. The public sphere itself structurally changed: citizens can merely follow snippets of parliamentary debate in the media; the public cannot play a critical role, as it is no longer participating. 'The functional transformation of parliament demonstrates the doubtfulness of publicity as organizing principle of the state; the principle of publicity as criticism (by the public) became a principle of publicity as controlled integration (by entities of demonstrationadministration, organized interests and, most of all, political parties)' (Habermas 1990: 307). 69 Habermas is drawing on Parson's systems theory that describes society as consisting of a series of self-regulating sub-systems. These sub-systems regulate each other and are mutually recognised as their respective environment. As functional division it does not draw connections between intentions and consequences of actions (Parsons 1977). 68

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Habermas described how the system world colonises increasing parts of the lifeworld, which has just become another sub-system such as the state and the economy. However, strategic processes in the system world can, according to Habermas, only be legitimised with an underlying consensus based on communicative rationality in the lifeworld. 'The point is that each new step on the road to greater system autonomy must be institutionally anchored in the lifeworld. This must make the new order understandable and legitimate in the eyes of the members of society (Eriksen/Weigárd 2003: 93-4). Lifeworld is colonised, for instance, by the welfare state through which state and bureaucracy penetrate increasing parts of the private lifeworld. 'The cultural narratives and symbolic forms which give existential meaning and ethical direction to our lives are increasingly trampled into the ground by bureaucratic procedures which offer no comparable vision or comfort and which simultaneously reduce our room to choose and manoeuver' (Crossley 2004: 158). This development impinges on the public sphere, which happens unnoticed, as already Max Weber observed in his conclusions on bureaucratisation. 70 Despite being aware of the danger of purposive-rational attitudes penetrating the lifeworld Habermas sought a way out of the colonisation scenario by proposing a radical-democratic solution to overthrow the functional merger of state and society: by reviving the normative foundation of liberal states based on rational discourse and the rule of law respecting 'a politically functioning public sphere' (Habermas 1990: 33). Source of optimism were post-materialist social movements of the 1970s and 1980s. Habermas observed the transformation of merely economically active citizens into active political citizenship, turning state power into means of societal self-organisation (Habermas 1990: 22). He developed high hopes for the emancipatory power of civil society and social movements to reverse the trend of system-colonization of the lifeworld in order to instate a modern version of an autonomous public sphere. Complaining about 'the idealistic content of normative theories ...evaporating under the sun of social science' in between Facts and Norms (1996: 329), he developed a model of the public sphere ready to shoulder responsibilities of emancipation and democratic legitimacy by circulating power from the lifeworld to the political system through resonant, autonomous public spheres rooted in the lifeworld through civil society (Habermas 1996: 330). Habermas distin-

He saw an inevitable development increasingly moving towards success-oriented action in society, giving too much weight to economic life and bureaucracy and losing all meaning, e.g. the rule-abiding bureaucrat denying responsibility for the content and consequences of his/ her action (Weber 1978). 70

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guished between weak (civil society) and strong publics (formal political institutions). Weak publics should be involved in identifying social needs and shaping public opinions, generated within civil society, in response to them. Habermas himself described weak publics as 'wild', 'anarchic' and 'unrestricted' (Habermas 1996: 307-8). They are close to the locale where the audience is physically present. Final decision-making responsibilities, taking different reasoning into account, should remain with strong publics (Baynes 2002: 128), picking up problems in the political public sphere, where problems must be thematized, furnished with possible solutions and dramatized enough to attract the attention of the political system (Habermas 1996: 359). 'The more they {author's note: public spheres) detach themselves from the audience's physical presence and extend to the virtual presence of scattered readers, listeners, or viewers linked by public media, the clearer becomes the abstraction that enters when the spatial structure of simple (author's note: lifeworld) interactions is expanded into a public sphere' (Habermas 1996: 361). The relationship between public sphere and the polity is of argumentative rather than participatory nature (Cohen 1999: 70). Lifeworld issues only influence public opinion if they become subject of 'more or less exhaustive controversy in which proposals, information, and reasons can be more or less rationally dealt with' (Habermas 1996: 362). They thus leave the purposive domain of weak publics and become a normative issue of legitimacy when politically dealt with as a matter of public opinion. Habermas has been criticised for turning a blind eye to marginalised groups in society who have trouble influencing public opinion.71 This is where deliberative procedures come in to help groups finding voice in public discourse because 'the political public sphere can fulfil its function of perceiving and thematising encompassing social problems only insofar as it develops out of the communication taking place among those who are potentially affected (Habermas 1996: 365).

Habermas' public sphere in the model of deliberative democracy Habermas holds on to a modernist account of the public sphere, trying to provide a transcending principle with his communicative rationality and focus on law. Constitutions allow value pluralism, thus meeting postmodern arguments

Habermas says 'the political influence that actors gain through public communication must ultimately rest on the resonance and indeed the approval of a lay public whose composition is egalitarian' (Habermas 1996: 364). 71

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half way. 72 'On-going modernity must be carried on with political will and awareness. And for this form of democratic self-direction, the construction of procedures of discursive opinion- and will-formation is crucial' (Habermas 2000: 155). This requires a unified public sphere where identity issues are left behind. At the same time, groups in pluralist societies increasingly push for recognition of cultural difference (Fraser/ Honneth 2003), raising questions of drawing a line in defining similarity and difference. In the case of Muslim civil society in Berlin the picture is quite complex. Some activists and groups define their identities foremost shaped by religion and are aiming at rights and symbols that publicly acknowledge this identity. Others are striving to be accepted simply as equal citizens, feeling that difference is mostly created in public discourse (Spielhaus 2010). Arguably, participation in' deliberative mini-publics helps minorities to pre-mediate identity-related issues. This might help them to navigate and participate in the public sphere without giving up lifeworld identities and to slowly introduce new perspectives to the public sphere that allow for society to change over time. This is the decisive turn in Habermas account of the public sphere. After clarifying the importance of communicative action in the lifeworld, expressed in an autonomous public sphere, I turn to deliberative democracy as a procedural model for more legitimate representative democracy.

A normative theory The promise of deliberative democracy is the mediation or resolution of conflicts in pluralist society with the help of deliberative processes aimed at finding agreement or at least compromise. A public common good is difficult to define pluralist societies. It is even more difficult to say how and which ideas inform a public philosophy, defined as 'the ideas of the powerful who dominate society' by Bourdieu, Foucault and Gramsci (Schmidt 2008: 308). The deliberative democracy model opens a path for ideas generated in all groups of society, including minorities, to make their voices heard and possibly impact on political culture. Discourse ethics highlight the importance of institutionalized discourse. In between Facts and Norms, Habermas is picking up on pre-mass media forms of communication and proposes a new model of democratic will-formation: 'Discourse theory has the success of deliberative politics depend not on a collectively acting citizenry but on the institutionalisation of the corresponding procedures and conditions of communication, as on the interplay of institutionalised

The postmodern camp does not insist on a unified public sphere based on some universal ordering principle of society but sees 'the emergence of different publics, public spheres and public spaces, each with their own forms of communicative organization' (Lee in Calhoun 1992: 416). 72

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deliberative processes with informally constituted public opinions' (Habermas 1996: 275). Deliberation is an answer to the question how agents can arrive at a common plan of action when there is disagreement and differing opinions. Hannah Arendt spoke of the human 'ability to tell right from wrong, beautiful from ugly' (Arendt 1971: 446). This must be achieved through deliberation, e.g. in a political assembly or the public sphere, based on free will. Discourse theory adds an action-theoretical basis to the concept of deliberation when actors not only choose the most efficient means to obtain their goals, but also Svhen they are able to justify their choices and defend their actions against criticism' (Eriksen/Weigard 2003: 122). In this situation personal interest is not enough to pull people over to your side, one must convince others by referring to norms, values or principles that others can choose to agree or disagree with. Justified norms can achieve legitimacy through reflective and responsible reasoning.73 Deliberative discourses will differ depending on the problem at stake. They can be of pragmatic, ethical or moral nature. Theoretical discourse about how things are is held in a scientific fashion and sees reality as objective, hence delivering descriptions. Pragmatic discourse (what is useful) is about right action and the individual's preferences in the subjective world. How can personal preferences best be realised? 'In the effort to find such solutions the world is seen as an objectively existing relationship between various phenomena, where the most efficient means can and must be chosen to realise the given ends', trying to single out the most rational choice in the purposive rationality tradition (Eriksen/Weigard 2003: 76). Ethical-existential discourse (what is good) requires other individuals in the lifeworld to take on the role of objective, critical observers, involving the individual's social world to sort out the right principles to guide one's life by. The moral discourse (what is right) reflects awareness of the social world, of the underlying norms, and is directed at what can be justifiably expected from other individuals.74 The norms in question must live up to universal assessments of

As a reminder: Resolutions to conflicts can be found on the basis of reasoned agreement when three idealizing assumptions are fulfilled: the parties 'must assume they mean the same thing by the same words and expressions; they must consider themselves rationally accountable; and they must suppose that ... the supporting arguments sufficiently justify a (defeasible) confidence that any claims to truth, justice ... will not subsequently prove false or mistaken' (Rehg 1998: xv). This account of communicative rationality forms integral part of deliberative democracy. 74 Norms must become universal after being discussed in equal discourse, which means morality must also apply outside cultural structures. Habermas and his colleague Apel say that the validity of a moral principle can be tested through a performative contradiction: 73

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validity, assume that it applies to every person who was socialised in any kind of communicative form of life (Eriksen/Weigard 2003: 77). Finally norms must be tested either to their universalizability or according to their appropriateness in a given situation. Voting is just one act of democratic participation, but preferences expressed in this act must take into account wide-ranging factors that led to this opinion, including allowing the transformation of preferences through hearing the considered views of others. Likewise, political institutions must allow a process of informed debate. The main purpose, however, is 'that public opinion be formed on the basis of adequate information and relevant reasons and that those whose interests are involved have an equal and effective opportunity to make their own interests (and the reasons for them) known' (Baynes 2002: 127). This model is also supposed to liberate the citizen from either being a client of the welfare state or a consumer whose interests must be met by politicians (Baynes 2002: 133), hence overcoming passivity. When public opinion can make itself heard in the strong public of the political system without undermining the separation of powers one can speak of radical democracy, bringing people back into politics (Baynes 2002: 128). 'Informal public opinion-formation generates 'influence'; influence is transformed into 'communicative power' through the channels of political elections; and communicative power is again transformed into administrative power' through legislation' (Habermas 1996: 28). Thus, opinions communicated and formed within the public sphere contribute to the common good, or to the social integration of society, as Habermas puts it. The tool of agency in the public sphere is discourse. It should generate ideas related to a certain context, influenced by structure and agency (Schmidt 2008: 305). Context are civil society organisations or political institutions engaging with the public sphere, where human actors bring their lifeworld experiences that might offer a solution, or at least a hint of solution that can contribute to further understanding between communicating actors. Such ideas then come to influence politics at three levels: the specific policies or policy solutions proposed by policy makers; the programmes underpinning policy ideas; the public philosophies, worldviews and political culture that undergird policies and programmes with organizing ideas and values (Schmidt 2008: 306). Two types of ideas underlie policies, programmes and philosophies: cognitive and normative

'the argumentative practice based on communication oriented at reaching understanding itself presupposes that there is equality and symmetry between the parties.' (Eriksen/Weigard 2003: 70) All parties must be in principle able to agree on a claimed norm in practical discourse.

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ideas. Cognitive ideas provide guidelines for political action and serve to justify policies and programmes. Normative ideas attach values to policies and programmes and help legitimising them (Schmidt 2008: 306). Hence, ideas generated through deliberative procedures can claim a normative foundation: they are legitimate to discuss in the public sphere and in political process. Deliberation rarely happens in public discourse but in deliberative fora or so called mini-publics where representatives of those with a stake in the issue get a chance to present and discuss their opinions. Outcomes are rarely predictable. There are, however, a number of procedural requirements to approach consensus or compromise and legitimacy, as deliberation might be a human talent, but it must be cultivated and maintained (Ryfe 2005: 60). Several indicators for deliberation success have been identified in relation to process. First, the promotion of mutual respect between parties through communication on equal level: 'Rules of equality, civility, and inclusivity may prompt deliberation even when our first impulse is to avoid it. (...) Once institutionalized, they ensure that deliberation continues over time (Ryfe 2005: 64). Second important aspect is the accountability of participants to their constituencies by providing a lifeworld account of the issues at stake, underlining the importance of deliberation outcomes.75 Third, participants are more invested in deliberation outcomes when they have been included in the process from the beginning. It raises the stakes higher, thus strongly determining the motivation of citizens to participate in deliberative events (Ryfe 2005: 65). Due to informed and substantive debate outcomes can be of higher quality (Gutman & Thompson 1997). Deliberative democracy theory has given a lot of attention to mini publics as places to exchange ideas and opinions. In this sense deliberative democracy theory took an institutional turn away from philosophical and theoretical questions. 'The growing enthusiasm for these experiments is troubling, however. If we begin to think that these venues are the only place that,genuine' deliberation can take place then we risk falling into the Platonic position of turning our backs on the broader democratic public sphere as a place to pursue reasonable politics' (Chambers 2009: 229). The broader democratic context must be structured to encompass such mini-publics; otherwise they lose their value (Chambers 2009: 331). In other words, deliberation in mini publics can put citizens on their way to overcome plebiscitary rhetoric in the public sphere.76 Plebiscitary rhetoric arguably dominates Muslim integration discourse in Germany and in Berlin,

75 'Successful deliberation seems to require a form of talk that combines the act of making sense (cognition) with the act of making meaning (culture)' (Ryfe 2005: 64). 76 For a definition of plebiscitary rhetoric Chambers refers to Plato who maintained that democratic politics always turns away from the truth and towards rhetoric and power. Democracy by its nature prefers quantity to quality (Chambers 2009: 328).

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muzzling other points of view. Despite some improvement Muslims largely remain objects of public discussion rather than participating in it, a situation deplored by some Muslim and ethnic organisations in Berlin (see empirical part). Mini-publics can cultivate deliberative rhetoric. Coming together in mini-publics helps citizens learn the skills needed to critically evaluate and to learn the rules of the game. Deliberative rhetoric is about choosing the right kind of action in order to solve a particular political problem as well as the right process, 'in the sense of 'thinking through' one's options for future action as opposed to impulsively charging ahead' (Chambers 2009: 335). This turn to deliberative rhetoric also pays tribute to Iris Marion Young's intervention suggesting that attempts to identify a mode of speech that is non-rhetorical or neutral often has the effect of excluding those who speak in a different idiom or with a different cadence. The groups regularly identified as lacking sufficient neutrality in speech have been overwhelmingly drawn from the marginalized or less powerful in society. She also argues that rhetoric can be a very positive force in dialogue when trying to persuade a particular audience, as opposed to detached, 'neutral' speech (Chambers 2009: 326). However, deliberation success also depends on the way in which individuals are prepared to collectively account for problems. 'It is as likely that groups will talk their way out of deliberating as it is that they will hunker down to do the difficult work of sifting through the choices that lie before them. Successful deliberation not only helps groups evaluate choices but also provides the cultural glue that keeps them engaged in the task' (Ryfe 2005: 60). This points to the double role of civil society: It serves as a mediator between private interests and the state, transmitting grievances in a deliberative process. Not surprisingly, civil society plays a decisive role in deliberative democracy theory.

3.3. Civil Society According to Habermas civil society is the place to detect the will of the people. 'Political power can only justify itself by referring to the fact that it is in agreement with an open communication process, which makes it dependent on resources outside its control' (Eriksen/Weigard 2003: 158). It must also turn rationality into deliberation and action. Civil society organisations can concern themselves with universal social questions, but even in the more likely case of following self-interest and attempting to further identity issues, engagement in communication is a legitimate source of power, providing the normative foundations of democracy. Like deliberative process certain factors must be fulfilled. The focus in this thesis lies on public sphere notions of civil society largely influenced by Habermas (Edwards 2004). As mentioned earlier the concept of

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civil society always comprises of a community and an individual dimension. It is the individuals that constitute civil society, through which they enter the public sphere. For "where there is no private sphere, there is, concomitandy, no public one: both must exist in dialectic unity for sense to be made of either one' (Seligman 1992: 5). Hence, civil society organisations can claim to represent and express sovereignty (Seligman 1992: 5). It should inform legislation processes. Community is expressed in the nongovernmental organisations and voluntary associations anchored in 'the society component of the lifeworld' (Habermas 1996: 367), indicating a motivation for inclusion in the public sphere.

Lifeworld accounts in civil society In Habermas' conceptualization, civil society has an action-oriented function and a normative democratic function. It emerges from the lifeworld where subjects seek to make sense of their social context. Attempts to push their interpretations into the general public sphere display the wish of actors to change dominating practice, encouraged by democratic constitutional norms that protect freedom of association, freedom of speech, and institutions that guarantee free opinionformation.77 Actors must interpret and defend their normative content through conflict, rational discourse and deliberation in the general public sphere (Habermas 1996: 369). In reality, the general public sphere is 'more vulnerable to the repressive and exclusionary effects of unequally distributed power, structural violence, and systematically distorted communication than are the institutionalized public spheres of parliamentary bodies' (Habermas 1996: 307-8), which leads to unequal access to communicative power. The democratic function of civil society lies in the diverse issues and views it can raise to public discourse and political process. 'A decision of the majority can only be achieved under the assumption that its content is a rationally motivated, but fallible result of a temporarily ended discussion of the right solution to a problem, taken under decision-making pressure' (Habermas 1990: 42). Communication of civil society organisations, which are more problem than decision oriented, must be taken into account in institutional decision-making processes (Habermas 1990: 43). The many publics constituted through civil society seem to scatter the general public sphere, but Habermas argues they remain porous and can build hermeneutical bridges within the larger public sphere that is connected to the political

'The constitutional protection of 'privacy' promotes the integrity of private life spheres: rights of personality, freedom of belief and conscience (....) circumscribe an untouchable zone of personal integrity and independent judgement' (Habermas 1996: 368).

77

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Analytical Framework

sphere. 'Segmented public spheres are constituted with the help of exclusion mechanisms; however, because publics cannot harden into organisations or systems, there is no exclusion rule without a proviso for its abolishment' (Habermas 1996: 374). This permeability, supported by deliberative procedures, is subject of this thesis with a view to giving voice in the general public sphere. However, Habermas does not claim that discourses of civil society associations in the public sphere form a new base of political life. Civil society actors can only gain influence, not political power. 'Public influence is transformed into communicative power only after it passes through the filters of the institutionalised procedures of democratic opinion-and will-formation and enters through parliamentary debates into legitimate law making' (Habermas 1996: 371). Civil society cannot replace the state but it can mobilise counter-knowledge and offer new interpretations based on lifeworld forms of expertise (Habermas 1996: 372). Also Keane's main concern with civil society is its role in guaranteeing democratic pluralism. He insists that it must accept even undemocratic views. Hence one of the most important questions is the institutional set-up to provide for freedom from ideology that could endanger democracy. Civil society (...) is either an actual or anticipated a priori of the struggle for egalitarian diversity, and those who practically deny this a priori are monists — and most likely bigots, tyrants or totalitarians' (Keane 1998: 64). A well functioning state is the guarantor of civil society, thus criticising Ernest Gellner's liberal view of civil society for contrasting it too much with a state that always carries a 'pejorative connotation' (Keane 1998: 79). Jean Cohen and Andrew Arato highlight political society. They describe civil society as 'a sphere of social interaction between economy and state, composed above all of the intimate sphere (especially the family), the sphere of associations (especially voluntary associations), social movements, and forms of public communication' (Cohen/ Arato 1992: ix), constituted through self-mobilization, protected and institutionalized through laws and subjective rights. The political role of civil society is 'the generation of influence through the life of democratic associations and unconstrained discussion in the cultural public sphere' (Cohen/Arato 1992: x). Like deliberative process, civil society in the public sphere depends on certain conditions, more or less normative and with both structure and agency dimension. Inclusive deliberation is only possible when regulative frameworks imposed by governments allow for it, e.g. the provision for associational life, but also deliberative channels and fora. On actor level there must be 'tolerance for dissent, a willingness to argue without quitting the debate when other, more persuasive, voices take the stage, and a commitment to 'truth telling" (Edwards 2004: 58).

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Organisations and associations in civil society do not necessarily work towards the common good. In fact they often form around their own identity as special interests (Edwards 2004: 63). Civil society perspectives are necessarily restricted in outreach and complexity, but they are not set in stone due to the discursive character of lifeworlds (Habermas 1998: 382). From a discursive point of view, traditions and norms that are based in this sphere are potentially up for discussion, if the cultural and personal context is oriented towards learning (Habermas 1998: 394-5). Hence, purposive rationality in the weak public spheres does not diminish the democratic value of civil society, if embedded in deliberative procedures. A sense of equality generated by government through the promotion of different voices in the public sphere builds the trust needed for people to reach and connect with others (Edwards 2004: 88). This gives civil society a normative function, as it reflects the relationship of the state to its citizens (Janoski 1998: 12). It is the interplay of individual organisations and factors in their external context that need consideration in evaluation of the democratic legitimacy gained, the next step taken on the way to voice in the public sphere, and the implications for societal integration. Habermas builds his notion of empowering civil society and democracy on the concept of consensus and agreement. When talking of excluded groups, like those defining themselves on the basis of religion or ethnicity, one must keep in mind the notions of discrimination, diversity and identity. Not only can ideas generated in civil society find entry to public discussion, there is, under the condition of related results, also an element of civic empowerment inherent to civil society participation. 'For the process of deliberation and accountability to work as it should, participants need to be on equal footing' (Chambers 2003: 322). Even without, legal citizen rights groups and individuals can still feel a sense of citizenship through civil society participation.

3.4. Citizenship Citizenship has a formal dimension of rights and obligations, expressed in citizen regimes, as well as a normative one visible in social and political action, in citizenship in practice. This thesis beholds Muslim civil society participation in deliberative processes based on equal footing, joint willingness to learn and accountability for outcomes to further a sense of citizenship based on personhood and moral equal worth (Somers 2008). Epistemologically it is situated at practical level, which contains an element of power. Indeed: 'The lack of political success of marginalized groups does not stem from a lack of deliberative competency, but rather from a lack of power' (Gutmann/ Thompson 2004: 50). Citizenship as participatory practice can remedy this disadvantaged position.

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Erosion of formal conditions of citizenship and of moral equal worth What rights can individuals expect to enjoy? According to human rights and natural rights theory, individuals are still rights bearers even when stripped of political and social rights. Hannah Arendt, on the other hand, maintained in her reflections on the Eichmann trial in Jerusalem and in 'The Decline of the Nation State and the Rights of Man', that a sense of common humanity and general justice vanished with World War II. On the contrary, in practice individuals can only enjoy rights when they are socially and politically embedded in a society (Matzkin 2000: 180). Recognition as a moral equal is hence a precondition not only for full citizenship but also for the entitlement to rights (Somers 2008: 126), granted in democratic constitutions. Civil society is central to egalitarian citizenship. Somers distinguishes between citizenship and citizenship rights. Citizenship, she argues, is strongly linked to identities, shaped by narratives of the struggle for belonging and for citizenship rights. A feeling of belonging can be achieved through the right of personhood, which is the recognition of individuals as moral equals, in combination with civil and political rights. Such rights can only be protected when belonging to a political body (Somers 2008: 26). This approach is in line with my focus on Habermas and his elaboration on constitutional patriotism and procedural deliberative democracy to develop the importance of a critical public sphere situated in civil society. Habermas as well as Somers see this sphere under constant threat, as public deliberation must share this space with private property exchange and individual freedoms. This makes it vulnerable to a neo-liberal style market-colonization under the mask of individual rights and social justice (Somers 2008: 30). Somers' approach sees civil society as a space where both, solidarity and exclusion is possible. First, it is important to say that Somers builds a triadic concept because citizenship as a status granted to an individual by the state does not explain how citizenship works, it ignores the fact that the market and civil society are both inherent to the state, just as well as state and market are inherent to civil society (Somers 2008: 36). This statement is obvious when looking at the German context where citizenship does not automatically mean social or political inclusion (unemployment, education, religion = security threat). It is 'at once a product and productive of cultural codes and normative binaries' (Somers 2008: 30). The normative ideals combine solidarity, rights, freedom and equality, but it can turn into exclusion and inequality if market and state are not kept at bay. Social life within civil society, according to Somers, is essential to furthering the rights and norms of civil life.

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The liberal account of citizenship that marks membership in a given society diminishes in pluralist societies. Citizenship discourse is essentially a rights discourse about the question who is entitled to which rights and obligations. It also examines 'how citizenship serves as a mechanism to distribute people among political entities, as well as on how the criteria are established for these rules and practices of distribution and exclusion' (Somers 2008: 21). In this context Margaret Somers highlights the negative impact of the markets on citizenship. She uses the events around Hurricane Katrina to argue that citizenship today has a new meaning: it is no longer linked to contractual and non-contractual rights enjoyed by individuals who are members of a society and hence enjoy a moral worth, but subjected to new logics of inclusion and exclusion, regulated by markets as a result of the collapsing boundaries between market and the state, public sphere and civil society respectively (Somers 2008: 3). The right to social inclusion in civil society is the first likely victim of market colonisation of the political and public spheres, undermining the right of recognition as moral equals, which Somers describes as a primary right (Somers 2008: 6). Rights like civil freedoms, equal access to justice (constitutional rights), participation and social conclusion are conceived as individual possessions, but at the same time they are public goods that must be protected by 'public powers, political membership and social practices of equal moral recognition' (Somers 2008: 5). According to Somers, the public goods dimension is shrinking as states face economic uncertainty, and the notion of citizenship as the right to have rights turns into a conditional privilege. With the encroachment of civil society by market and state she also sees a visible contractualization process of citizenship; rights are increasingly tied to conditions other than personhood. Families and communities are turned into social capital and increasingly distinguished in terms of their utility — a counter productive move to integration and inclusion. In an attack on civil society theory as social capital, Somers argues that such conceptualisation leaves little scope for democratic participation (Somers 2008: 42). Koopmans and Statham refer to cemented understanding of citizenship in the state sphere determining discursive opportunities and constraints, especially disadvantaging immigrants and minorities: „The specific national integration paradigms that are evident in the different ways in which European countries label migrants and minorities (...) are so strongly entrenched in the perceptions of actors and reproduced in social relationships, that this leads to a myopia toward alternative scenarios by politicians and social scientists alike' (Koopmans/ Statham 2000: 17). A conceptualisation of citizenship located in civil society, where groups struggle for voice and recognition in line with Habermas' model of public deliberation, turns away from colonizing effects of markets and states and brings actors back in.

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Analytical Framework

Citizenship as practice Margaret Somers maintains that citizenship, as a status granted to an individual by the state, does not explain how citizenship works (Somers 2008: 36). She looks at citizenship as practice, a practice shaped by the interplay of the market, state and public sphere. The latter is rooted in the private sphere, where this practice impacts on identity and on standing in relation to others in society. The marginalization of citizens and their lack of voice can improve through deliberation in civil society and the public sphere (Somers 2008: 19). She argues that civil society is central to egalitarian citizenship. It reflects the struggle for belonging and for citizenship rights. A feeling of belonging can be achieved through the right of personhood, which is the recognition of individuals as moral equals in combination with civil and political rights. Somers describes social inclusion in civil society is the precondition for membership in a political body — and thus for the entitlement to rights (Somers 2008: 26-8). While demands for social inclusion have traditionally been made in the name of the principle of redistribution, many new social movements have mobilized under the right to recognition - the right to be acknowledged by others as a moral equal — despite group differences' (Somers 2008: 17). 'Citizenship (as a moral choice rather than a legal status) is possible only if there are other groups than the state within the state, and it is fully accepted only by joining other groups along with the state' (Walzer 1970: 227). People engaged in civil society organisations with a focus on the public sphere are working towards change. If broached in the public sphere or expressed in action it can have a powerful impact on their self-confidence and sense of citizenship. Civil society organisations have been described as schools of democracy. Fennema and Tillie are convinced that individuals who are engaged in voluntary association show more democratic attitude and political interest - including ethnic organisations that might not be particularly politically minded or even antidemocratic (Fennema/Tillie 2005: 234). Active members of voluntary association form networks, as they know each other. This is an important democratising aspect, as they thus do not only contribute to better governance, but also provide collective goods for themselves independent of the state. Community elites, those with the highest number of acquaintance relations, are at the centre of such networks. They can create and maintain the social capital of the community, based on trust related to accountability within voluntary associations, by organizing horizontal and vertical relationships (Fennema/Tillie 2005: 221). A civic community, as they understand it, is defined as the number of voluntary associations and the overlap between them, in particular when they form a network either through a large membership or share members on elite level as on

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boards (Fennema/Tillie 2005: 221). This comes very close to the concept of a social movement sector, just that it involves both horizontal and vertical relationships and comes with the additional feature of mobilizing power.

3.5. Insights from Social Movement Theory Social movement theory is of interest for this thesis for several reasons: the political opportunity structure concept is informative for the empirical investigation, as political opportunities shape realities of Muslim civil society in Berlin and set the scope for action; the fact that new social movements inspired Jürgen Habermas' work; and it offers a framework to locate Muslim civil society establishment in the public sphere in Berlin. Those aspects are in line with the three important mechanisms of social action identified by McAdam, Tilly and Tarrow: the external factors affecting actors and capacities to participate in social change; the cognitive mechanisms which alter identity perceptions, interests and notions of possibilities; network mobilisation and leadership which affect connections between actors and their networks which enable them to cause change (Campbell 2005: 43). Koopmans and Statham added dominating public discourse and discourses among social actors as specifications of opportunity structures for migrant participation (Koopmans/ Statham 2000).

Social movement sector I propose the concept of a social movement sector (Rucht et al 1997) as a suitable model for Muslim civil society organisations to aim for in order to institutionalise voice in the public sphere. As a concept it follows more in the footsteps of social movement theory focussing on political opportunities, highlighting the context-dependence of prospects for mobilization. This makes sense for empirical reasons, as opportunity structures help define the context of Muslim civil society participation, which is informative for the prospects of establishing a Muslim social movement sector in Berlin. Once established, it is less dependent on political opportunities, bridging structures and agency, but the way there requires a lot of agency and overcoming internal conflicts. In this respect the movement sector model links back to resource mobilisation in social movement research, which highlight the role of movement organisations for mobilisation (e.g. McCarthy/Zald 1996). Developed in a mid-1990s study focussing on structural change of social movements as they undergo institutionalisation, Rucht, Blättert and Rink came up with the movement sector model to describe what they labelled the 'alternative'

Analytical Framework

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movement (human rights, women's, peace and disarmament, environmental and humanitarian aid organisations) in West Berlin and former opposition movements and their successors in the eastern part of the city. In this model ideologically close movements form the infrastructural basis, which changes but is not subject to waves of mobilization. Mobilization and action are permanent on a low level. Formal organisations are part of this infrastructure, which becomes institutionalized itself as it guarantees continuous political input (Rucht et al 1997). This sector exists for the left-libertarian movements in Germany, where they are regarded as a legitimate political actor, most notably through the Green party, with informal groups and networks increasingly employing means of protest, which used to be the domain of large, hierarchical organisations, and with a focus that has shifted from overthrowing a system of oppression to gradual reform (Rucht 1997: 169-171).

Infrastructure The institutionalization of some organizations in a particular field of activism makes them part of the political opportunity structures which is likely to impact their strategies (Meyer 2005). Rational actors and collective behaviour remain important for grassroots as they can try to influence public discourse through their insider allies. The sector model only applies to consolidated, low level protest, organised and carried by ideologically related grassroots networks, which guarantee movement input and protect from oligarchy and fossilization tendencies that accompany institutionalisation. 'Organisational solidification does not imply that the end of social movements is near. Neither does a necessary change of movement aims' (Rucht et al 1997: 47). However, grassroots organisations and formal organisations remain distinct entities, grassroots remain independent members of a larger network. Movements have lifeworld bases that form part of the movement sector infrastructure, in this case mosques or Muslim youth clubs. In sociological terms this infrastructure of formal and grassroots organisations with their lifeworld localities forms an institution itself, independent of institutions in the system (Rucht et al 1997: 47). Institutionalisation is not understood as the end of movement, as older social movement literature suggested, but as a social system with informal or formal mechanisms of interaction, the movement infrastructure (Rucht et al 1997: 54). Organisations and associations are of diverse character and follow different logics and goals. Mosque associations are more concerned with the spiritual life of their congregations, but may take on self-help and service provision by organising language or parenting courses or networking with other organisations to improve the neighbourhood. Some single organisations or umbrella organisations take a more political role and form movement organisations at the centre of the movement sector (Rucht et al 1997: 48).

Ill The members of the movement family, organisations, associations, initiatives, can change their infrastructure over time (Rucht et al. 1997: 52), building hierarchies and/ or functional work sharing. Certain segments of movement sectors become more professional, looking at problems with new knowledge and competences. Formalised procedures are introduced to coordinate action and communication. "We understand institutionalisation of a movement as a process of continuous differentiation (including professionalization) and a formalisation of movement infrastructure, both on the level of member groups of a movement and on the level of group networking' (Rucht et al 1997: 55). This notion of institutionalisation is free of negative connotations like bureaucratisation, concentration of power or oligarchy and stays in line with Habermas notion of an autonomous public sphere inhabited by civil society organisations rooted in discursively generated lifeworlds. The institutionalisation process is influenced by the political context. The institutionalised access of the sector model would form yet another step from lifeworld needs and claims to public discourse and political process, reminding of Cohen and Arato's view on social movements providing the link between civil and political society, securing 'the movement form as a normal component of self-democratizing civil societies' (Arato/Cohen 1999: 162).

Structure and agency Both individual and structural factors influence the formation of a social movement sector. Political opportunity structures that enable participation are crucial (Koopmans/ Statham 1999; 2000). The decision to start dialogue with Muslim organisations and even active cooperation fostered by officials in Berlin initiated deliberative fora and processes that opened access. The theoretical approach used in this thesis suggests that civil society participation leading to active citizenship and inclusion in the public sphere first of all depends on deliberative process. At the same time, it is individuals that make the important moves. They come together in the public sphere to communicate lifeworld experiences to the political system. A social movement sector helps unleashing the transformative potentials of civil society.

3.6. How the theoretical framework informs analysis Habermas' model of deliberative democracy based on discourse ethics offers a complete normative model for democracy that can claim legitimacy and is inclusive, based on a discursively mediated normative foundation in form of the constitution and law. According to Habermas this is all that is needed for rational arguments and agreements, even in pluralist societies with contradicting values and worldviews. Central aspect in his model of democracy is the public sphere.

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Analytical Framework

Civil society anchored in the lifeworld and engaged in an autonomous public sphere guarantees voice for diversity, supported by institutionalised deliberative procedures within the system to guarantee rational debate. Despite their ideal character Habermas' elaborations on discourse ethics and law, lifeworld and system, civil society, the public sphere and democratic legitimacy remain informative for the analysis of real life deliberation with Muslim civil society in Berlin and how it promotes their voice in the public sphere, which is essential for societal integration as for legitimate representation of all groups in society. The public sphere has been criticised for not being the right venue to allow broad deliberation, as it is not dialogical. Large-scale deliberation 'will often be asymmetrical, highly mediated, and distorted by the structural inequalities in society' (Chambers 2009: 340). Habermas concept of a democratizing public sphere does not seem to comply with reality, a reality which is 'one of continued, entrenched inequality in voice and access, which legitimizes ideas through raw power instead of through the power of rational argument between different equal actors' (Edwards 2004: 69). On the other hand, unreflected emotions in the public sphere can lead political decision-makers to invite civil society participation, which then in turn again informs political debate. In the case of Muslim participation in Berlin, this happened in the wake of September 11th in 2001 and the London bombings in July 2005, which lead to a number of new policies, ranging from restrictive policies such as heightening homeland security to opening up to a new public by inviting dialogue with Muslim organisations on national, federal and local levels. As the Berlin case shows, not only political actors were interested in change, it coincided with Muslim actors actively seeking to improve their lives. Thus, they were ready to take the invitation, comparable to the mobilization model in social movement theory: an initiative starts inside the political system, but proponents of the issue must mobilise the public sphere because they need the support of certain groups to obtain consideration or implementation (Habermas 1996: 37980).

Habermas developed a complete normative model of democracy that cannot be applied to specific real life contexts without specifications. First, there is the question of power structures within the public sphere. According to Habermas, they should be removed by equal and rational discourse, but in reality minority groups have a hard time finding voice in the public sphere, especially if the dominating public discourse is against them rather than neutral and open for claims of that particular minority. In practice, they need support and mobilisation to gain voice.

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Habermas does not spell out the conditions for successful deliberative outcome, except the virtue of rationality and the force of the better argument. A review of attempts to put deliberation into practice has produced several proposals for conditions related to process: the promotion of mutual respect between parties through communication on equal level; the accountability of participants to their constituencies by providing a lifeworld account of the issues at stake, promoting learning among all participants; and involvement in agenda-setting, as it raises the stakes for participants to see deliberation through to the end (Ryfe 2005). Outcomes are an important motivation for civil society actors to stay involved. These conditions will be employed in the analysis of Muslim civil society participation in Berlin. One of the possible outcomes of civil society participation and deliberative engagement is a sense of citizenship as moral equal, a quality of recognition that many Muslim activists in Berlin reported as missing. An increased sense of citizenship, in combination with other resources acquired through deliberative process, can stimulate further action and the formation of a social movement sector. Outcomes of dispersed deliberative processes behind closed doors cannot provide legitimacy for political decisions. They need justification through discourse in the public sphere. This is where practical wisdom of actors comes in strongest, providing democratic theory with its normative foundation. Analysis will focus on proposed indicators for a movement sector. The movement model illuminates the relationship between deliberation initiated by state actors and Muslim civil society participation in the public sphere. Together analysis so far will show the potential gained for Muslim voices in the public sphere, from which conclusions for the roles of structures and agency to enhance democratic legitimacy can be drawn. A practice of rational public discourse is needed when searching for the moral foundation of a political problem (Habermas 1990: 40). This argument is of weight in relation to the emotional and moralising baggage related to integration of Muslim communities. Public discourse on Muslim integration is dominated by normative arguments and Muslim communities have little voice neither here nor in integration policy discourse of the past 50 years. In Habermas' terms, this adds up to a large legitimacy deficit in both integration policy and in democratic representation in general. 'Looking at policy ideas at the level of underpinning programmes, the presence of complementary normative ideas capable of satisfying policy makers and citizens alike would legitimise policy solutions that can claim to serve the underlying values of the polity' (Schmidt 2008: 308). According to Habermas, such ideas can be generated in deliberative arguments in the public sphere, with legitimising direct links to lifeworlds. There is, however, a legitimacy crisis of Muslim claims in the public sphere that needs addressing through deliberation and participation. In a normative fashion,

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Analytical Framework

Habermas highlights the ethical aspect of a politically guaranteed civil society to support the legitimacy argument. But also empirically, it contributes to legitimacy, as it fosters relationships between social and political forces (Keane 1998: 36-7). Finally, the combination of normative and more practically guided concepts allows bringing insights from the study of a real life context in perspective with the challenge of societal integration and new theory of representation based on identity and issue in addition to constituency. The principle of communicative rationality extracted from discourse ethics is central to societal integration in terms of inclusive opportunities for participation. Discourse ethics and constitutional norms based on communicative rationality enhance the validity of claims, while maintaining difference and distinctly other aspects of identity based in value-producing lifeworlds, communicated in public spheres with the help of civil society. Everything must be tested in discursive processes, where legally institutionalised discourse arrangements and culturally mobilised public spheres work together (Eriksen/Weigard 2003: 126), promoting societal integration. Habermas regards representation as the result of judgements achieved through discourse, partly formalized through elections but equally through advocacy, the media and civil society. It actually guarantees the anarchic character of the public sphere. In his model, citizens and representatives feed information to each other, allowing representation of plurality. Hence, deliberative politics can claim normative foundations without ignoring particularities. The theoretical model outlined in this chapter will help to situate Muslim civil society in the process towards establishment in the public sphere in Berlin. Theoretically it provides the key elements of a framework respecting the roles of structures and agency, process, and legitimacy of political activity expressing sovereignty.

4. Muslims and Muslim civil society in Berlin 'Many guest worker families had invested their savings in houses and apartments in the old country and dreamed of an eventual return. Only slowly did they realise that for their children who had grown up in Germany this was hardly a viable option. This second generation does not feel at home anywhere else than in Germany. Yet the society in which they live largely rejects them and places them within the Muslim group, which is regarded as a homogeneous entity.' Riem Spielhaus 2 0 0 6 : 1 8

4.1. Facts and figures Berlin has a history of encouraging immigration. It was the symbolic centre of the Cold War, which led to a decline in population in its Western part after the building of the Berlin Wall. During the 1960s and 1970s, many guest workers and their families from Turkey settled in West Berlin. During the 1980s, most immigrants who came to Berlin were refugees, followed by family members of resident immigrants (Kapphan 2006: 20). After the fall of the Wall in 1989, immigration was dominated by asylum seekers from Eastern Europe, especially former Yugoslavia, Afghanistan and the Palestinian Occupied Territories. 'A combination of policies pursued by city planning, cheaper rents and the growing structures of ethnic economies (supplying specific food as well as religious and cultural infrastructure) facilitated the settlement of immigrants in West Berlin. This was particularly so in the inner-city districts of Kreuzberg, Wedding and Neukölln' (Open Society Foundations 2010: 35-6), where migrants account for an average 30 per cent of the population (Kapphan 2006: 20). Statistically it is difficult to know the number of Muslims in Berlin, as census data is not collected on the basis of religious affiliation. Figures can only be assumed based on country of origin, but this does not reveal the number of people who would refer to Muslim as the most important aspect of their identity. In 2006, Turks represented the largest community of migrants in Berlin from countries dominated by Islamic culture and religion (an estimated 120,000), followed by migrants from Lebanon as well as Palestinians, who mostly came as refugees and together make up about 20,000 out of around 50,000 migrants from the Middle East. There are around 5,000 immigrants from Iran and smaller numbers of people from other predominantly Muslim countries (Senatsverwaltung fur Bildung 2010: 2).

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A diverse Islamic infrastructure exists in Berlin with around 80 mosques. Although most are in the western parts of the city, the eastern district of BerlinPankow is home to one. They represent the dominant Sunni and Shia Islamic groups, but Alevi and Ahmadi also have a number of mosques (Spielhaus/ Färber 2006: 70). Congregations form along lines of country of origin or religious interpretation. Only about half of Berlin mosques are members of a larger umbrella organisation. The larger organisations (IFB, DITIB and VIKZ) have mostly Turkish-speaking member associations. 78 However, IBMUS, a relatively loose network, brings together mosques and Muslim associations of different language groups. 79 During the early years of formal organisation (roughly 19701985), different ethnic groups and congregations tended to keep separate, a situation that is slowly changing now among the larger umbrella organisations. Although most mosque associations are Turkish-speaking, some Arab mosques are starting to offer activities in German. Mosque associations are still mostly run by the older generation but started restructuring due to pressure from younger generations. Two German-speaking Muslim associations, Inssan and the Muslimische Jugend Deutschland (MJD), are breaking new ground in worship practice to attract young Muslims born in Germany. 80 Younger people are organising in order to participate in society as Muslims, making Islam more of a public than a private matter, and are building bridges across ethnic borders. This generation often feels German but does not think they are perceived as such (Open Society Foundations 2010: 58-60). Muslim associations like Inssan and MJD want to

The Islamische Föderation Berlin - IFB (Islamic Federation Berlin) was founded in 1980 and represents 12 mosque associations in Berlin. Since 2001 the IFB has been teaching Islamic Education in Berlin primary schools. For more information see: if-berlin.de/. The Türkisch-Islamische Union der Anstalt für Religion e.V. - DITIB (Turkish-Islamic Union for Religious Affairs, one of the largest Islamic organisations in Germany. It was founded in 1984 as a branch of the Presidency of Religious Affairs in Turkey and is deemed dependent on the Turkish State. DITIB has more than 800 member mosques. Imams are usually sent from Turkey. For more information on DITIB Berlin see: berlin.DITIB -landesverband.de/ . The Verband der Islamischen Kulturzentren - VIKZ (Association of Islamic Cultural Centres) is one of the oldest Muslim associations in Germany. Founded in 1973 in Cologne it has 300 independent member mosque or educational centres across Germany, of which seven are located in Berlin. For more information see: www.vikz.de/. 79 The Initiative Berliner Muslime - IBMUS (Initiative of Berlin Muslims), is a loose network of currently eight member associations, including Inssan and Muslimische Jugend. Founded in 1994 it seeks to foster dialogue between Muslims and the rest of society. IBMUS organizes the annual events like the Week of Islam, The Muslim Cup and the Day of the Open Mosque. For more information see: www.ibmus.de. 80 For more information on Inssan and MJD refer to www.inssan-ev.de and www.mjdnet.de/. 78

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convey to the second and third generations that one doesn't have to choose between Germany and the country of origin of their parents or grandparents, but that religion functions as a bridge between both, independent of ethnic origin (Färber/ Spielhaus 2006: 62). The self-perception of Muslims as a community in Berlin is new and largely related to public discourse, which tends to refer to Muslims as a homogenous group. Older Muslims and Islamic organisations are increasing their efforts to joindy represent their interests to state and society. City and district administrations encourage a closer network of Muslim organisations, urging them to speak with one voice to facilitate communication (Spielhaus/Färber 2006: 14).

Muslim-German identity Second-generation Muslims seem to fear sometimes that self-identification as German stands in opposition with their Muslim identity: 'It points to a growing polarisation of these two possible aspects of identity within public discourse, which tends to pressure people to publicly claim their belonging, or notbelonging, to Islam, even if they had never thought about this issue' (Open Society Foundations 2010: 60). A group of young people in Neukölln aim to defy prejudice and affirm their Muslim identity. Their name Muslime aller Herkunft deutscher Identität — M.A.H.D.I. (Muslims of all origins of German identity), clarifies their self-identification as both Muslim and German. 81 They understand themselves as mediators between cultures, which sometimes provokes conflict with traditional orientations in families. 'The father has sleepless nights, but the problem does not lie with his son, it's his problem.'82 M.A.H.D.I. seeks the political acknowledgement of Muslims' arrival in society. This positive affirmation is still missing. Renate EL Gezawi of Neukölln community support organisation DeutschArabische Unabhängige Gemeinde — DAUG (Independent German-Arab Community) summarises: 'Young people should open up and stop saying that it's all no use. But politics must meet them half way with a right of residence to enable the kid to study or learn a profession. They should acknowledge that these children are also a chance for Germany: they are bilingual; they know two cultures. We must overcome mistrust.'83

mahdi-ev.de/ (accessed August 2010). Interview Salhi. 83 Interview EL Ge2awi. daug-berlin.de/ (accessed August 2010). 81

82

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4.2. Social and economic life There is no data on the number of Muslim pupils in Berlin. An estimate suggests that a fifth of all school children have a mother tongue other than German and that between half and two-thirds of pupils without German citizenship in Berlin have a Muslim background (Open Society Foundations 2010: 66). The gap in educational progress between children with migration backgrounds and indigenous children is still large. In Germany, educational success is tied to social background - more so than in other countries (Bade 2007: 40). Many Turkish guest workers were low-skilled or unskilled labour. Refugees from Lebanon and Palestine spent a lifetime in refugee camps and are poorly educated, many are not sufficiently equipped to support their children in school. 84 Unemployment rates, particularly among young people of all ethnic backgrounds in Berlin, are highChildren who come from immigrant families are disproportionately represented in school forms with lower educational ranking and are more likely to leave school without qualifications. 85 The TIES-study on second-generation Turks attributes poorer educational achievement to Germany's three-tier schooling system that segregates children at a fairly young age (10 or 12 years, varying between Bundesländer) into different school types according to educational status. 86 33% of all second-generation Turks from parents with little education ended up in Haupt- or Realschule. 62% moved on to Abitur level or into vocational training. Only 5% went on to a university or polytechnic school. Figures like this have not gone unnoticed. In recent years, Berlin's education policy has introduced free childcare facilities from the age of three to help migrant children enter the German educational system as early as possible. The goal 84

85

Interviews Salhi and El-Gezawi.

Migration und Bevölkerung: PISA-Siudie: Erhebliche migrationsbedingte heistungsunterschiede von

Schülern (January 2002). www.migration-info.de/mub_artikel.php?Id=020103 (accessed March 13, 2012) 86 'Primary education in Berlin is different from other federal states and encompasses six grades of Grundschule. Secondary education is divided into two levels: Sekundarstufe I and II. The first level (Sekundarstufe I) embraces all types of school up to the tenth form, excluding vocational schools. The school types of this level are mainly Hauptschule (Basic Education School), Realschule (Middle-tier school for (general education) and Gymnasium (High School) until the tenth form. This level can be finished after the ninth form with the certificate, Hauptschule 9th form, and after the tenth form with different certificates. These entitle the student to start an apprenticeship, a higher qualified education at a professional school, or to pass onto level II at a Gymnasium or Gesamtschule (comprehensive school). Sekundarstufe II generally embraces the years 11, 12 and 13 (this differs in other federal states) and finishes with the Abitur (university entrance diploma)' (Open Society Foundations 2010: 65).

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is to give them as much exposure to the German language as possible before entering school (Berliner Integrationskonyepi). The three-tier school system was also abandoned in Berlin in 2010, but it is too early to assess policy impacts. Expectations of children from Turkish background are often low. Secondgeneration Turks frequendy report that teachers recommended them for the lowest educational tier, the Hauptschule (TIES 2009). According to the study by the Open Society Foundations there is also a cultural factor that might contribute to lower educational attainment. Parents in Turkey solely rely on schools and teachers for the education of their children (Open Society Foundations 2010: 77). Intercultural training for teachers to become aware of such cultural issues is another focus of Berlin integration policy. In addition to systemic segregation, schools in districts with large migrant communities also show high levels of ethnic segregation. According to the Open Society Foundations' study on Muslims in Berlin, Muslim parents would rather see a better ethnic mix in local schools. 'The OSI survey suggests that schools are an important place for interactions between people with different ethnic and religious backgrounds. Analysis of the questionnaires reveals that many Muslim respondents favoured a greater ethnic mix within their district and regretted the decision of ethnic Germans to send their children to schools outside the district' (Open Society Foundations 2010: 66). The number of teachers from immigrant families remains low. Muslim women wearing veils cannot find work as teachers due to the Berlin Neutra/itatsgeset^ (Law on Neutrality), which was introduced in 2005. It forbids the wearing of all religious symbols in civil service.87 It also affects public childcare institutions, which must respect possible parental concerns about staff wearing expressions of religiosity.88 It was argued that the ban is necessary to ensure state neutrality and the religious freedom of school children. The Muslim veil has also become an issue of discussion in relation to pupils. While teachers want to support diversity, they also see more girls wearing headscarves in Berlin schools and fewer of them participating in class trips and physical education classes (Beaujtragter des Senats fir Integration undMigration 2004).

'My wife is a social education worker. She speaks fluent German. On the phone she got the job already. Once she arrives in person: 'no, we are not allowed to employ you. We'd like to but we can't.' They closed many doors for women wearing a headscarf.' (Interview Misirboglu) 87

88

Geset% W Schaffung eines Gesetzes

Artikel 29 der Verfassung von Berlin und %ur Änderung

des Kindertagesbetreuungsgeset^es vom 27. Januar 2005, Berlin (Law to Create a Law on Art. 29 of the Berlin Constitution and on Changing the Law on Child Care, January 27, 2005) www.berlin.de/imperia/md/content/senatsverwaltungen/justi2/gvbl2005/seiten_81 96_heft_nr._4_vom_08.02.2005.pdf (accessed April 14, 2012).

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The headscarf has become a marker of difference that sometimes also hinders access to the wider labour market. 'Girls wearing headscarves have difficulty getting into vocational training, often in reference to the law on Neutrality. This law does not cover vocational training. According to the AGG this is discrimination.'89 Former Senator of Internal Affairs Ehrhart Körting wonders if he would support the Law on Neutrality again. In reference to young Muslim women aspiring to become teachers, he suggests: 'It is a question of whether such a law is still up to date.'90 Berlin has a fairly high unemployment rate compared to other German cities. Migrants and their families are disproportionately affected. In 2006, the unemployment rate among migrants was 41.9% compared to 17.7% of the ethnic German population {sAbgeordnetenhaus 2007: 2). Discrimination is an issue. The ADNB of the TBB, an NGO documenting and working on anti-discrimination, reports a high number of cases of discrimination in the labour market, particularly in the search for an apprenticeship (ADNB 2010: 13). 'Many young people tell us 'why send in an application? They just have to read our names and that's it'. ... Names should not matter anymore.'91 Well-educated children of guest workers born in Germany increasingly consider returning to the home countries of their parents or grandparents. W e had around 50 young people here recently, most of them doing A-levels, vocational training or university. A majority said they would like to return to their countries of ethnic origin. People who could function as mediators want to return. This is a reaction to the permanent pressure of justification'.92 In 2008, some 34 800 people with Turkish background left Germany, compared to 26 600 new Turkish immigrants.93 But also a lack of information on vocational training and employment opportunities remains a significant barrier to improved labour market participation, according to KUMULUS, a project founded in 1993 to advise young people from immigrant families in Berlin about different employment and training opportunities.94 Kumulus offers training for Imams to equip them 'with a detailed understanding of the various institutions and agencies in Berlin in general,

89 Interview Nofal. Allgemeines Gleichbehandlungsgeset^ — AGG (Anti-Discrimination Legislation). 90 Interview Körting. 91 Interview Nazar. 92 Interview Chahrour. 93 'Und der Verlierer ist: Deutschland, Süddeutsche Zeitung, 22.10.2010 www.sueddeutsche.de/karriere/auswandemng-deutsch-merkischer-akademiker-und-derverlierer-ist-deutschland-1.1014005 (accessed March 13, 2012). 94 www.aub-berlin.de/fuer-jugendliche/kumulus (accessed March 13, 2012).

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and about the different possibilities for educational careers for young people in particular' (Open Society Foundations 2010: 85). One of the concerns in integration policy is a positive identification of immigrants and their children with the country they live in. The Open Society Foundations' study on Muslim integration in Berlin found that there might be a connection between identification and employment: those in low-skilled manual jobs rarely refer to themselves as German while those in higher paid jobs in management or administration find it less difficult to identify with the country (Open Society Foundations 2010: 59). The lack of social recognition as a result of exclusion from the labour market decreases the power to enforce cultural, religious or other concerns (Hàussermann/Kapphahn 2000: 210).

4.3. Muslim civil society in Berlin The idea of civil society participation, including religious organisations, is increasingly popular within the Senate administration and in some districts and neighbourhoods, but action still depends largely on the personal motivation of officials. Visiting mosques was a first symbolic step, deliberating with Muslim organisations in semi-public arenas on issues of concern is the next. A glimpse back to deliberative democracy theory reminds us of the power of ideas generated in discursive communities or civil society, where social actors communicate lifeworld needs through deliberation. Discourse and deliberation must happen on civil society level, in the public sphere and with representatives of political and social institutions. Muslim organisations are starting to fulfil those functions but still need strengthening. Migrants and their offspring, including Muslims from immigrant families, are less likely to participate in educational institutions, local activities, politics and other initiatives. In the public sphere this is often interpreted as a lack of interest or a rejection of mainstream society. The fact that many Muslims face multiple inclusion barriers such as lack of language skills, citizenship rights and financial resources is often ignored (Kast 2008: 2). Social exclusion and lack of citizenship are bad for active participation and citizenship, which contributes to societal disintegration. It is important to highlight that this is much more a social problem than one of religion, ethnicity or culture. The same lack of participation applies to indigenous Germans with low social status (Kast 2008: 3). The Change Institute conducted a study on Muslim civil society involvement in policies aimed at preventing radicalisation mostly among Muslim youth. The study found that Muslim civil society in Europe is generally still in the early stages of development. This is particularly the case for countries with first generation immigrants but also true in countries with longer histories of immi-

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gration (Change Institute 2008: 33). Muslim civil society in Berlin has been highly localised and 'grassroots' in character for quite some time. Mosque associations are mostly focused on faith and cultural services and hence most obviously linked to a Muslim identity. Many of them still have no relationship with authorities, are homeland-oriented or nurture affiliations with cultural, political or faith organisations from their countries of heritage.95 Associations following more Diaspora politics still exist in great numbers. They focus on activities in their countries of origin, preserve an ethnic solidarity and identity and have little participative potential (Fijalkowski 2001; Diehl 2002). Participation is also linked to duration of stay in Germany. Willingness to volunteer is high, but practical difficulties reported by activists scare many people away. In this context the Freimlligensurvey 2009 (Survey on Voluntary Work) refers to the importance of supporting immigrants to become engaged, as reflected in the Berlin Integration Plan (Freimlligensurvey 2010a: 22). There is also low participation in protest and political mobilisation, due to the same structural weaknesses. During the 1980s and 1990s, protest focused on restrictive legislation on immigrants and immigration and reached its peak on issues of asylum laws, racism and naturalisation. 'However, the ethnic, political and social diversity of immigrants usually prevents a broad mobilisation following objectively common interests' (Roth 2009: 200). Due to the long history of separation between different strands of Islam and ethnic origins, coordinating and networking among Muslim organisations only started during the late 1990s. Lydia Nofal of Inssan recalls a first roundtable meeting of Muslim organisations in 1998 where many activists, who are now key figures in Muslim civil society in Berlin, met for the first time. 96 An increasingly distinct Muslim identity to civil society organisations in Berlin is linked to September 11th and the 2005 London bombings. 'They realised that a new form of publicity developed and, with it, the chance to participate.' 97 However, smaller Muslim organisations like mosque associations must first identify their needs. 'What is a matter of concern? They want to be left alone, earn more money; they would like to be less affected by unemployment. 'How about our premises? We need a social worker and our youth must be kept away from drugs.' But what is it that they want precisely?' 98 Answers can possibly be found in deliberative processes. It is important to add that Muslims do not only participate in civil society along religious lines. The project Mutter ohne Gren^en (Mothers without Borders) in the

95 96 97 98

E.g. DlTiB (Interviews Alboga and others). Interview Nofal. Interview Spielhaus. Interview Spielhaus.

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Berlin district of Kreuzberg patrolled streets at night to fight drug trafficking. Stadtteilmütter (District Mothers) is a project that provides education and training for ethnic-minority women to enable them to advise other residents on important aspects of everyday life in the district." Immigrant organisations, particularly religious associations, require active participation as a precondition for the granting of formal membership. Yet, ethnic associations are still seen with ambivalence (Cyrus 2005: 38). A 2007 survey of Turkish immigrants in Germany suggests that religion is the strongest community-binding element of civic engagement. Two fifths of all interviewees are active in purely Turkish associations, even though participation in German or both German and Turkish associations is at 16 and 30 per cent respectively (Roth 2009: 206). 'Also, ethnocentric engagement is citizen engagement if it opens up, furthers and shapes participation opportunities in politics, employment or in the areas of neighbourhood, children, youth, women and the elderly' (Huth 2006: 24). As the empirical evidence will show, contacts and relationships between individuals inside and outside political structures are key to deliberation and social action. An example helps to clarify this. A few years ago Inssan was part of a project proposal for federal funding which the Ministry for Families and Education rejected. The District Commissioner for Integration in BerlinKreuzberg, Regina Reinke, asked for an explanation. The Ministry's response referred to the fact that the Office for the Protection of the Constitution listed Inssan in its 2008 Report.100 They are listed as a contact for the Islamische Gemeinschaft in Deutschland — IDG (Islamic Community in Germany), an organisation linked to the Muslim Brotherhood {Senatsverwaltung jiir Inneres und Sport 2008: 175). The Kreuzberg district administration and stakeholders within the city administration, including former Senator for Interior Affairs Ehrhart Körting, whose department is responsible for the Office for the Protection of the Constitution, know Inssan well and have always cooperated with them due to relationships based on trust that have been nurtured over years. 'This is true for Inssan but it doesn't mean it's true for others and that it's satisfactory. I see how other Arab associations in Neukölln do not have this access.'101 According to the Commissioner for Integration in Berlin-Mitte, some politicians do not wish to work on an equal level with Muslim organisations.102 In their evaluation report on immigrant civil society participation, Hunger and Metzger recommend the positive affirmation of civil society organisations, conwww.stadtteilmuetter.de/ (accessed November 23,2011). Interviews Nofal, Reinke, El Naggar. 101 Interview Nofal. 102 Interview Stibenz.

99

100

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sisting of both symbolic recognition based on respect and on access to resources like public funding, qualifications and information (Hunger/ Metzger 2011: 82).

The role of religion and ideologies Religion works as a bridge between civil society organisations, but also between civil society and administration. Former neighbourhood manager Reinhard Fischer recounts the effort it took to establish contacts with mosque associations and activate some of them to get locally involved in his area of responsibility. 103 He visited all mosque associations in the neighbourhood. The fact that he is a specialist on Islam might have helped him as much as his own open religiosity. Community organising, by now operating in three districts in Berlin, has been increasingly popular with religious Muslim organisations over the past few years, which goes back to the initiative of a religious foundation. There is a range of projects between church and Muslim associations across town. 104 Another important aspect in relation to Muslim civil society participation in the public sphere is the background in the country of origin, which can lead to conflicts and competition within immigrant communities. In a study of Muslim elites in Europe, Jette Klausen concludes that those who have been politically engaged in their country of origin are likely to engage again in their new home (Klausen 2006). According to Riem Spielhaus, this applies to the Berlin context, where secular and anti-religious immigrants joined the Social Democrats and Green Parties. Religious Muslims started joining the Conservative and Liberal Parties.105 Ismet Misirlioglu of Islamic Relief refers to the different ideological currents of Islam represented in Berlin's Muslim communities and the different strategies institutions follow to position themselves in Germany. He described how Muslim communities and politicians passed the blame but also how secular Turks hindered efforts of recognition of Islamic organisations and the faith community. Secular Turks with links to Berlin's political parties have a better lobby, despite the majority of Turks in Berlin being religious and traditionalist. 'It didn't just happen that Germans are hostile towards Islam. We left-wing Turks also supported this.' 106 According to him, Muslim and immigrant civil societies in Berlin are still very divided. Turkish Muslims and Turkish Kemalists need to extend their dialogue. At the same time, he criticises the rigid structure of some

A definition of (neighbourhood management) is offered in the next chapter. E.g. Religion auf dem Tempelhofer Feld. www.adas-religioeser-lernorte.de/files/materialien/Flyer_Religion.pdf (accessed March

103

104

13, 2012) 105 106

Interview Spielhaus. Interview Misirlioglu.

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large Islamic organisations consolidation efforts.

that alienates liberal Muslims and

hinders

To conclude, there is increased interest within the Berlin administration to meet with Muslim organisations and to involve them in local projects and initiatives. Muslim civil society also shows an interest in participation. However, due to its religious, ethnic and generational diversity, it has trouble speaking with a unified voice. Also, it is forced to mobilise around Muslim identity, perpetuating difference, while especially the younger generation is seeking normalisation. Before embarking on case studies of deliberation and participation, I will provide a detailed outline of the federal- and city-level political opportunity structures that determine Muslim civil society participation in deliberation and the public sphere. This entails also a closer look at dominating public discourse on Islam and integration.

5. Political Opportunity Structures and Public Discourse The journey towards Muslim participation in the public sphere cannot be understood without a look at the political opportunity structures and dominating public discourse in relation to Islam that shape the reality of Muslims and Muslim civil society action in Berlin. Most Muslims in Germany are immigrants or descendants of immigrants who came as Gastarbeiter (guest workers), asylum seekers or refugees. There are a relatively small number of ethnic Germans who adopted Islam as their religion. The term 'Muslim' to describe this heterogeneous group is relatively new. Because of the dominating immigration background within this group the policy area mostly concerned with Muslims is integration policy. Integration is increasingly understood as cross-sectional task, intersecting with employment, education, security and social welfare policies. Migration and integration policy in Berlin is neither the districts' nor the city's area of responsibility alone. Districts must implement integration policy directives decided on city level and communicate back. Berlin both as a municipality and a city state must follow national legal specifications, even though integration is in many ways a local process, as cities and their districts are at the frontline and face the administrative and social challenges of integration (Bommes 2009: 94). This chapter first outlines federal integration policy and how political opportunities for Muslim civil society participation have changed from virtual ignorance of the issue, over exaggerated problem-awareness, to a more participation-oriented approach, following opportunity structure specifications developed by Tarrow and Koopmans/Statham. Apart from showing the opening and closure of windows of opportunity over time with shifts in ruling alignments, cleavages among elites and opening of access to participation (Tarrow 1994: 84) I will also refer to the formal conceptions of citizenship as a specification of political opportunity structure (Koopmans/Statham 2000: 38). After that I will outline public discourse as part of political opportunity structures, as it constrains Muslim voices and rational debate in the public sphere. Dominating discourse on Muslims also centres on the term integration. Arguing that the public sphere tends to favour elites over movements, Koopmans and Statham explain that 'the political discourse will already have a dominant way of defining a contentious issue-field that again is likely to be biased toward established elite views' (Koopmans/Statham 2000: 35). Facing such constraints, Muslim civil society will have to find their own voice to promote their

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definitions of the situation and gain legitimacy for their claims. Political opportunities provide support if policy insiders acknowledge, 'that something has to be done about the problem' (Koopmans/Statham 2000: 37). In a final step I will summarise recent integration policy development in Berlin, showing the official turn towards participation in integration policy. Dialogue and cooperation with Muslim organisations though remain controversial.

5.1. Development of political opportunities at federal level 'Fifty years after signing the Guest Worker Treaty with Turkey political leaders reflect on the lack of a long-term vision at the time: 'Did we know at the time what work migration, to the extent as we witnessed it, really meant? (...) We in Germany believed far too long: this is only an interim arrangement. (...) Already the linguistic usage was perfidious: the guest worker is only a guest. He remained a stranger and was not an equal part of society.' Frank-Walter Steinmeier, Deutscher Bundestag 11/2011

First windows of opportunities Policy consolidation on immigration slowly started during the 1970s, opening a first window of opportunity for migrant interests to enter the political agenda. Until then, the Ministry of Work was responsible for thousands of guest workers from Spain, Turkey, Greece or Italy, many of whom started to build a life for themselves in Germany, largely following demands of German industries for less turnover in the migrant work force. Several issues needed addressing: putting an end to further work migration; supporting the return of work migrants to their countries of origin; and the social integration of work migrants and their families. In 1979 the first Federal Commissioner for Foreigners, a Social Democrat, demanded the formulation of sustainable integration policy. In a memorandum he proposed voting rights in local elections for migrant residents and the option of German citizenship for all children born in the country. He asked for active support for immigrant families, arguing that money not spent on supporting foreign workers and their families today might result in high costs for socialisation programmes and policing in later years. 107 At the time his proposal met little popular support as elite interests in the issue were aligned behind eco-

107

www.rnigration-info.de/mub_artikel.php?Id=090705 (accessed December 2, 2011).

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nomic interest and the decision to turn a blind eye to the consequences of work migration. It was only in 1986 that Axsldnderpolitik (foreigner policy) gave its debut on the political agenda under conservative-liberal rule. At this point, some five million immigrants and their families were living in Germany and West Berlin, about 8 per cent of the overall population. After re-unification in 1990 numbers grew with an influx of so-called Spataussiedler; people of German descent from the former Soviet Union, and a growing number of asylum seekers. In the years to come, right wing and conservative politicians were competing for votes with campaigns warning of Xjberfremdung (foreign infiltration). Burning hostels for asylum seekers and arson attacks on Turkish families woke up the public and divided political positions into moderate and hardliner.108 Immigration turned into a major political topic. A new window of opportunity for work immigrants opened in 1990 with the new Auslandergeset.^ (Law on Foreigners), which for the first time issued the right of naturalisation to work immigrants. Until then, a strict citizenship regime based on the ius sanguinis principle denied non-ethnic Germans access to nationality. At the same time opportunities remained closed to asylum seekers and refugees as the Asylkompromiss (compromise on asylum) made access to Germany harder, remaining in step with EU policy on immigration.109

Citizenship Only with a shift in ruling alignment in 1998 did a real window of opportunity for formal participation appear. In 2000 the Staatsangehdrigkeitsrecht (law on citizenship) changed under the new coalition of Social Democrats and Green party. It introduced an ius solis element that grants dual citizenship to children born in Germany to one or two non-German parents who have lived there for at least eight years. Between the age of 18 and 23 they have to decide on one nationality. This obligation does not apply to most EU citizens, who can usually keep both passports. Eventually, the introduction of permanent dual citizenship was envisaged, but a campaign in Hessen confounded this change of law and closed

Hoyerswerda 1991, Rostock 1992, (burning asylum seeker homes in eastern parts of Germany); Solingen 1993 (arson attack on a house inhabited by Turkish families). Largescale demonstrations and public condemnations of racism and right-wing extremism followed. 109 Guest workers were granted the unlimited right to apply for naturalization; the definition of Aussiedler became narrower and was restricted. An amendment of the German constitution limited the chance of asylum (Bommes 2009: 98). 108

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another window of opportunity. 110 With government responsibility back in conservative hands, supported by Social Democrats in a coalition-government, the plan collapsed in 2008 (Open Society Foundations 2010: 125). The fierce public debate preceding the new citizenship law already showed the entrenchment also visible in ~Leitkultur and parallel societies discourse, which I will return to later. It outlines the cleavage roughly along conservative and left wing lines. While left and green parties (SPD, Die Linke, Bündnis 90/Die Grünen) were willing to grant citizenship and thus participation rights to nonEU nationals simply on the basis of length of stay and ius solis, the conservative camp (CDU/CSU) is not ready to give away citizenship rights without conditions: it should only be awarded as a result of the integration process (Ole Schröder, CDU, Deutscher bundestag 11/2011: 31). 'The almost ten-year debate on new regulations in the German citizenship and immigration laws was distinguished by the search for new integrating factors. A general consensus on values could be capable of integrating each and every individual irrespective of creed, descent, native tongue, gender or sexual orientation' (Spielhaus 2006: 22). A new initiative by Social Democrats, Green Party and the Left in November 2011 to abolish the obligation to opt for one nationality and to accept dual citizenship expresses a different philosophy of integration: one that views citizenship as an incentive for immigrants and their children to engage in society. 'The people concerned are welcomed to German society with all rights and obligations, including voting rights, without asking them to give up their old nationality, which is important and symbolic for them. ... The necessity to opt for one nationality just does not fit our time and the real living conditions of the people' (Aydan Özogöuz, SPD, Deutscher Bundestag 11/2011: 34). The Conservative and Liberal majority in Parliament defeated the proposal (MuB 2011: 2). However, the new law on citizenship marked a big step forward towards accepting migration as a fact of modern life and participation. It led to an initial increase of naturalisations in 2000, followed by a steady decline until 2006 111 , possibly owed to factors like the length of the naturalisation process or a growing feeling of hostility towards Muslims after September 11 (Open Society Foundations 2010: 123). 'Still, 700,000 out of 2.4 million Turks in Germany decided on German citizenship, more than a million migrants from predominantly

110 The referendum that formed part of the election campaign in Hessen was misunderstood by many citizens a campaign against foreigners with participants notoriously asking where they could sign up against foreigners (Bade 2007: 56). 111 Statistisches Bundesamt Deutschland - Einbürgerungen - Fachserie 1 Bleibe 2.1 - 2008 www.destatis.de/jetspeed/portal/cms/Sites/destatis/Intemet/DE/Content/Publikationen/I;achverocffentlichungen/Bevoelkerung/MigrationIntegration/Einbuergerungen)te mplateId=renderPrint.psml (accessed December 2, 2011).

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Muslim countries were naturalised by 2005. This happened at a time of public stigmatisation of Muslims' (Spielhaus 2010: 188). One condition for naturalisation is passing the citizenship tests introduced by federal states. In early 2006 a fierce debate hit the public sphere around the socalled Muslimtest in the state of Baden Wuerttemberg, once more exposing the cleavages among elites.112 As a response to the controversy, the federal government came up with a federal naturalisation test in September 2008. A further barrier to German citizenship was introduced with a revision of the Migration and Citizenship Laws in 2007, demanding proof of economic independence from applicants from the age of 16. 'Given the socio-economic circumstances in which many Turks in Germany live, the regulation is perceived as a barrier to naturalisation for those who are not wealthy enough', contributing to the feeling of not being welcome (Open Society Foundations 2010: 126). Structural changes that would go along with easier access to citizenship, like opening public services and parliaments to immigrants, are met with reluctance (Roth 2009: 210). And so the debate continues. Somers reminds us that citizenship is essentially a rights discourse, but it also serves as a mechanism to establish the rules and practices of distribution and exclusion' (Somers 2008: 21). She argues that citizenship today is subject to new logics of inclusion and exclusion regulated by markets as a result of the collapsing boundaries between market and the state, as well as public sphere and civil society. Citizenship, the right to have rights, thus turns into a conditional privilege (Somers 2008: 3). This reflection somehow resonates with the German immigration history that happened largely without state control in a response to market needs. The debate on dual citizenship is also a proxy debate for defending certain worldviews.

Germany - a country of immigration Any discussion related to plurality and welcoming culture is an important window of opportunity, first of all expressed in an official statement on immigration. A 2001 commission on immigration ended the myth of Germany not being a country that needs immigration.113 However, after the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001, the spectre of Islamism has been going round in Germany.

The test contained questions stereotyping Muslim culture, like W h a t do you think about homosexuals holding a public office in Germany'. 'It contains two basic assumptions that have been apparent for some time in German debates about Muslims: 1) Islamic values are opposed to those of the German constitution, and only a distancing of Muslims from Islam would enable them to adopt those values; and 2) even if they pledge the oath to the constitution the loyalty of Muslims in general is doubtful and has to be verified otherwise' (Spielhaus 2006: 22). 1 1 3 www.migration-info.de/mub_artikel.php?Id=010401 (accessed December 2, 2011). 112

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Suddenly the religious affiliation of immigrants and their offspring from Turkey, the Arab peninsula and even Bosnia, took on importance (Spielhaus 2006), closing opportunities for participation, as integration discourse turned into security discourse for a while, to protect Germany from Islamist terrorism. Open Society Foundations' research on Muslim integration in Berlin suggests a connection between a feeling of belonging and the decision to take German nationality. 114 The experience of exclusion and discrimination triggered by public distrust towards Muslims makes German citizenship less attractive for them. 115 In fact, in the case of Muslim participation discrimination is part of the social reality informing decisions and actions of Muslim civil society actors. Not tackling discrimination on a political level is, strictly speaking, a limitation of opportunity. First proposed by the red-green coalition government in 2005, antidiscrimination legislation was adopted by the next government, in a slighdy amended version, in 2006. The Zuwanderungsgeset£ (Law on Immigration), still adopted under Social Democrat and Green government following much controversial debate in January 2005, for the first time declared integration a responsibility of the state. A new Federal Agency for Immigration and Refugees (Bundesamt fir Migration und Flüchtlinge, BAMF) was created, to deal with all affairs related to migration. The Law on Immigration provided for the introduction of 'integration' classes for all new migrants and those living long-term in Germany, funded by the Federal Agency for Immigration and Refugees, teaching German language and facts about the

The Open Society Foundations' Muslims in Berlin report examines the political, social, and economic participation of Muslim communities living in the district of Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg. Based on interviews with policymakers and communities it outlines and examines the experiences of Muslims in the areas of education, employment, health, housing and social protection, citizenship and political participation, policing and security, media, belonging, identity and interactions. It offers a series of recommendations for local and federal authorities and organizations. The report is available online: www.soros.org/initiatives/home/articles_publications/publications/berlin-muslimsreport-20100427 (accessed December 3, 2011). 115 The Open Society Foundations' reports one older Turkish man: 'They offered me German nationality, but I didn't want it. Our nationality is Turkish. And we are Muslim, and can never become German. In fact, even if we had German passports, I'm afraid that we would always be foreigners for Germans.' (Open Society Foundations 2010: 123) Some Muslims with German citizenship mentioned regretting taking on German nationality during the empirical research for this thesis. A man of Syrian origin said: 'I decided in favor of German nationality, but I'm regretting it now. ... I could have chosen something else, somewhere where people are not classified. ... I hope this will change.' 114

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country, also preparing for naturalisation procedures.116 The focus on German language skills is a late reversal of earlier approaches between the 1970s and 1990s, when federal states paid for mother tongue tuition in order to prepare migrant children for their eventual return.

Immigrant organisations For a long time immigrant organisations were off the political radar. If anything they were rather considered a hindrance to the integration process.117 By now national integration discourse has started to embrace the idea of immigrant organisation participation. The 2002 Enquete Commission of the German Parliament Zukunft des Biirgerschafilichen Engagements (Future of Civic Engagement) states that the potential of immigrant organisations has been underestimated (EnqueteKommission 2002: 222). The participation agenda widened further with the 2007 Nationaler Integrationsplan (National Integration Plan), the first all-encompassing integration policy document for Germany, formulated after consultation of immigrant organisations and numerous other stakeholders. It highlights the role of civic engagement and the training of immigrants as multipliers in local contexts (Nationaler Integrationsplan 2007: 173-182). Away from populist statements there is a new way of thinking ahead. Today there is more focus on the possible benefits of authorities working with Muslim civil society organisations: they are assumed to provide the link to hard-to-reach communities; they are 'more likely to understand 'what will work' and be able to target interventions at a micro level based on grassroots social intelligence' (Change Institute 2008: 134). National, state and local integration plans acknowledge integration as a two-way process for which both immigrant communities and majority society share responsibility. New forms of dialogue with Muslim communities were established on federal level, like Merkel's Jntegrationsgipfel (integration summit) as part of the National Integration Plan or the Islamkonjeren^ (Islam Conference), both established in 2006.118 The Islam

For more information refer to: \vv^.bamf.de/DE/Wil]kommen/DeutschLemen/Integrationskurse/integrationskursenode.html (accessed June 2011). 117 Scientific debate since the 1980s focussed on the question if immigrant organisations further or hinder integration. One side argued that ethnic networks further segregation (Esser 1986), while the other underlined the positive aspects of integration within ethnic associations (Elwert 1982). Research on other functions of immigrant organisations as independent actors is a relatively new development in German migration and integration research (for a review see Hunger/ Metzger 2008: 3). 118 For more information see: www.bundesregierung.de/Webs/Breg/DE/Bundesregierung/Beauftragtefuerlntegration /ThemenNeu/Nationalerlntegrationsplan/nationaler-integrationsplan.html 116

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Conference is the first formalised dialogue between representatives of Muslim organisations, not all of them religious, and government officials on Federal level. A result of this annual meeting was the unification of four of the biggest mosque associations and umbrella organisations in Germany in 2007. 119 Interestingly, one of the largest national networks representing Turkish Muslims, DITIB, only agreed to join after a change of government in Turkey, demonstrating how shifts in ruling alignments abroad impact Muslim civil society participation in Germany. Until then, DITIB had claimed to represent all Turks living in Germany, as it questioned the religious legitimacy of other Turkish Islamic associations in Germany like Milli Gôrûs (IGMG). 'The coming of power of a different political party in Turkey seems to have paved the way to unification for Islamic organisations with a Turkish background in Germany (Spielhaus 2010: 187). Presumably, also the current revolutions and restructuring in many countries of the Middle East will impact on Muslim interest organisations in Germany. This section has demonstrated how political opportunities initially slightly opened and then closed the scope for Muslim participation. A greater influx of migrants, reaction to xenophobic sentiment, the taking over of a new government with new migration philosophy leading to reform of citizenship and finally September 11 and the rising fear of Islam, all contributed to political cleavages that finally invited immigrant and Muslim participation into cautious political dialogue. At the same time a clear statement of equality and inclusion is missing. This is also due to a public discourse that is conservative in its emotionality rather than rational.

5.2. Depiction of Muslims in media and political discourse Manifesting difference Islam has increasingly become the focus of German integration discourse. The religion of immigrants has not been an issue in Germany until recently. According to Spielhaus it was only after September 11th that people started to position themselves as Muslims: headscarf debates in Germany, the bombing of and www.deutsche-islam-konferenz.de (both accessed December 2, 2011). 119 The Kßordinierungsrat der Muslime in Deutschland (Council for Coordination of Muslims in Germany) consists of Zentralrat der Muslime in Deutschland (Central Council of Muslims in Germany) ZMD, the Türkisch-Islamische Union (Turkish-Islamic Union) DITIB, the Islamrat (Islamic Council of Germany) IR, and the Verband Islamischer Kulturzentren (Association of Islamic Cultural Centers) VIKZ (Spielhaus 2010: 187).

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the Madrid subway, the assassination of Dutch film maker Theo van Gogh, the citizenship test in Baden Wuerttemberg etc. led to the formation of Muslim organisations and public outings of politicians avowing to Muslim culture and identity (Spielhaus 2011; Klausen 2005: 25).120 Schiffauer speaks of the 'Muslimisation' of migration issues since the terrorist attacks in September 2001, which led to deep public distrust of Muslims.121 Public Discourse frequendy confuses Islam and Islamism. Fundamentalist interpretations are presented as majority Muslim views, Muslim culture and security concerns came to symbolise the lack of Muslim integration in a liberal democratic state (Bade 2007: 29). The general image of Muslims presented in public discourse is primarily negative: 'they are immigrants from socio-economically deprived strata, have a high rate of unemployment, a low level of education, and a patriarchal structure that impedes the self-realisation of women, and poses a danger with respect to terrorism and extremism' (Spielhaus 2006: 21). Forced marriages, honour killings, violence against women, as well as undemocratic attitudes certainly clash with German legal norms, but are frequently attributed to Islam rather than tradition (Kapphan 2006: 22). The fact that many Muslims themselves reject such traditions and views, engage in civil society and collaborate in numerous projects and initiatives goes largely unnoticed. At the same time the discussion is characterised by a lack of indicators of integration and, as Bade points out, hence wrongly measured along categories of assimilation (Bade 2007: 21). It ignores the fact that 'religion is neither the only nor the most important identity for the majority of Muslims, and it is certainly not the only reason for their actions' (Spielhaus 2006: 18). Islam is regarded as a foreign religion, not part of German culture, as the Minister for Interior, Hans-Peter Friedrich (CSU) maintained during his first public appearance in front of journalists.122 Researcher on Islamic Thought Riem Spielhaus suggests that the frequent usage of Islamic terms in public discourse partly hinders normalisation. It 'falls in the backs of Muslims who use those

E.g. Green politician Cem Özdemir. FAZ: 'Gehen Sie eigentlich öfter in die Moschee?' (October 5, 2011) www.faz.net/akmen/feuiUeton/buecher/riem-spielhaus-wer-ist-hier-muslim-gehen-sieeigentlich-oefter-in-die-moschee-11483644.html (accessed March 2012). 121 Panel discussion after presentation of Open Society Foundations' report Muslims in Berlin, April 27, 2010, Haus der Kulturen der Welt, by Tasnim El-Naggar, Muslimische Jugend in: Islamische Zeitung: Licht und Schatten (May 3, 2010) www.islamische-zeitung.de/?id=13296 (accessed November 22, 2011). 122 Welt-Online: Innenminister - Islam gehört nicht 3» Deutschland' (March 3, 2011) www.welt.de/poKtik/deutscUand/arOclel2691814/Innenminister-Islam-gehoert-nichtzu-Deutschland.html (accessed 5 May 2011). 120

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terms in a non-extremist way, be it Islamic mainstream or reformism, where sharia might be understood as Islamic ethics or corpus of juridical tradition and jihad as endeavour' (Spielhaus 2010: 192). Highlighting cultural difference suggests that Islam is incompatible with some sort of unified German culture. The ~Leitkultur (leading culture) debate was expression of that, even though it failed to provide a definition of typically German assets other than vague references to Judeo-Christian values, the constitution and 'every-day culture'.123 Within this position there are different conceptions of fundamental values. Is it western values like gender equality, freedom of science, art and culture, or freedom of religion that dominate the German culture? Tolerance is an important value, but certain limits must be upheld and adaptation be requested. 'That Islam did not experience enlightenment and is therefore not compatible with western values of individualism and self-fulfilment is an argument frequently proposed' (Schiffauer 2008: 11). A more ethnocentric faction refers to values raised from traditions and national symbols that mostly define what is not German, like headscarves or representative mosques. Schiffauer argues that this discussion is highly abstract from life in migrant communities where values are equally contested (Schiffauer 2008: 15).

Parallel societies The buzzword Parallelgesellschaften (parallel societies) has been floating around the German public sphere a lot over the past years. The fact that immigrants concentrate in certain neighbourhoods is interpreted as deliberate withdrawal into encapsulated life worlds. It goes hand in hand with the assumption that norms and values of mainstream society, and thus integration, are rejected (Kapphan 2006: 20). Crime and violence among ethnic youth are quickly linked to a closed culture such as Islam, generally assumed to survive and to be constantly reproduced in the parallel societies of migrant neighbourhoods in Berlin and elsewhere.124 Anthropologist Werner Schiffauer, who refuses the simplification of connecting violence with a particular culture shaped by a certain religion, identified three main positions in this discourse, depending on how much the 'assessment of the situation in migrant neighbourhoods depends on the importance of 'culture' in societal integration' (Schiffauer 2008: 9).

123 Spiegel-Online: Seehofer und Merkel befeuern die Leitkultur-Debatte (October 15, 2010). www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/0,1518,723466,00.html (accessed March 8, 2012). 124 Bestselling author Neda Kelec, for instance, who described her personal story in a generalizing fashion, describes attributes like respect, honor and shame as compulsory commandments of the Islamic community (Kelec 2006: 23).

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The first position is linked to proponents of the leading culture argument. They maintain that integration has failed. Immigrant neighbourhoods follow archaic laws, 'the girls are forced into marriages, and the boys are raised to be macho. (...) Mosques produce Islamic worlds that reject western culture and society. (...) Hate preachers deliver anti-Semitic inflammatory speeches and announce Islamic revolutions to come' (Schiffauer 2008: 7). Culture is key in the sense that consensus on basic values is an essential building block of a society, thus overemphasising the role of values compared to other issues like economic integration. The second position maintains that parallel societies are normal for immigrantreceiving societies and a necessary step, even a 'continuous-flow heater' on the way to integration.125 It regards multiculturalism as an economic resource, and part of the attraction of a location. Values play a minimal role and integration is reduced to economic aspects like integration in the labour market or the educational system. Schiffauer warns that this position ignores culture to the extent that it fails to notice, 'that cultural identity can be a strong impulse for action, for instance when individuals or collectives realise they live away from real life despite economic success' (Schiffauer 2008: 14). The third position highlights the role of both immigrant and majority communities in integration, and points to issues like discrimination in the housing market before putting all the blame on immigrants and their families. 'The formation of neighbourhoods with a high percentage of non-German inhabitants is related to their social positioning and their limited competition power in the housing market. Using the term 'parallel societies' makes people in deprived neighbourhoods unduly responsible for their poor chances in job and housing markets' (Kapphan 2006: 20-2). Respect is more important than tolerance. This position criticises the social blindness of the second camp, while being blamed by the first position for ignoring cultural factors contributing to the formation of parallel societies (Schiffauer 2008: 8-9). Schiffauer concludes that culture is only a problem 'if difference is manifested and exaggerated, thus exaggerating the Otherness of the other' (Schiffauer 2008: 13). This is what Spielhaus refers to when she speaks of turning Turks into Muslims and the ethnicisation of religion. The first position replaced the multiculturalism agenda with policies focussing on breaking up immigrant ghettos and opening communities through participation, thus opening a new window of

125 Bade refers the model of immigrant colonies in migration research. Over the course of two to three generations closed social and spatial immigrant structures develop into integration in the host society. The colony serves as a protection against real or perceived assimilation pressures and only presents a problem only if people stay in there for too long (Bade 2007: 37).

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opportunity. At the same time migration research, away from public noise, starts to focus on a 'culture of diversity' instead of multiculturalism.126

The Sarrazin debate A new shade of grey entered public discourse with the publication of the controversial book Deutschland schaffi sich ab (Germany Abolishes Itself) by former Senator for Finance in Berlin, Thilo Sarrazin, in 2010. He describes the negative demographic development and thus the decline in German culture as being due to three main explanatory factors: the heterogeneity of society; reduced productive efficiency; and the increase of poorly educated social environments. Muslims and Muslim neighbourhoods are discussed at length. Turkish communities especially come under fire. Their willingness to integrate, for instance, is measured by the number of marriages with poorly educated spouses 'imported' from the Turkish countryside. He does not explicitly say that Muslims or certain ethnic groups are genetically less intelligent than others, but his reference to Turks intermarrying within clans and the higher number of disabilities within Turkish and Kurdish suggests as much.127 Already on page two of his foreword he complains: 'The social costs of unregulated migration were always a taboo, and it was even worse to maintain that people are different — more or less intellectually able, lazy or hard-working, more or less morally bound - and that even more education and equality of opportunity will not make a difference' (Sarrazin 2010: 9). Statements like this became a big issue in the media. Known for degrading remarks like references to 'headscarf girls' he quickly became the face of Islamophobia.128 Media and public figures commented extensively on Sarrazin's claims, acknowledging largely that immigration and integration policy of the past four decades was a failure, calling for new approaches. Commentators picked up on his generalisations about Muslims and his turn towards biologism129. Others warned, 'an overdue discussion is contaminated with terms like racism and popA culture of diversity would also pay respect to minorities within ethnic culture, e.g. Turkish homosexual culture (Schiffauer 2008: 14). 127 „Entire Clans maintain a long tradition of incest and show a range of disabilities accordingly. It is well known that the number of Turkish and Kurdish babies born with disabilities is well above average. It is preferred to hush up facts like this. One could get the idea that hereditary factors are responsible for parts of the Turkish population failing in German schools' (Sarrazin 2010: 31). 128Spiegel-Online: Der Westentaschen-Wilders (August 26, 2010). www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/0,1518,713878,00.html (accessed March 8, 2012). 129 E.g. Schirmmacher of the FAZ, who traced it back to the controversial research by Charles Murray and Richard Herrnstein The Bell Curve, which suggests that intelligence is genetic and independent of social factors (Schirrmacher 2010). 126

139

ulism' (Kelek 2010). His own party started a procedure to exclude him from the SPD, an unsuccessful attempt, which triggered another public debate on freedom of expression. The Spiegel, who printed excerpts of the book before publication, rejected allegations of indirectly supporting Sarrazin's views by leaving the advance publication uncommented, arguing it was their duty to publish different views. 130 Sarrazin eventually stepped down as a board member of German Bundesbank.

Media and public discourse: consequences of stereotyping Media reporting on Islam and Muslims in Berlin follows the same one-sidedness as the national media (e.g. Schiffer 2005). The Open Society Foundations' Berlin study on Muslim integration in Berlin suggests a certain dilemma of the press: 'On the one hand, large parts of the media reflect a certain atmosphere within society while reinforcing it at the same time. On the other hand, journalists are themselves sometimes under significant pressure. Not only do they lack the knowledge to make sense of the very diverse reality of Muslims and Muslim organisations, but they may also be criticised for positive coverage of an organisation or a person who has been under surveillance of the Veifassungsschut¡j, or has been exposed as Islamist by other journalists' (Open Society Foundations 2010: 139). Schiffauer describes this as 'a fear of possible 'infection' of people from Islamist ideas through the slightest contact with any person or organisation that appeared in the reports of the Office for the Protection of the Constitution (Open Society Foundations 2010: 138). A recent example of the vicious circle of public suspicion and media reporting happened recently in relation to the arrest of three terror suspects in Berlin. In September 2011 police searched the facilities of a mosque association in relation to the arrest of three suspects who sometimes visit this association. Despite the fact that the association itself was not a target of the investigation the article mentioned the street name, making it quite easy to identify the association in question.131 Muslims perceive their negative portrayal in the media as problematic. In relation to the search of mosque facilities, Muslim organisations reacted with anger. "We don't agree when TV teams show up in a tiny mosque that doesn't have any proper structure and it goes all around the world because two people were

130

Matthias Müller von Blumencron, editor in chief of the Spiegel, with Steffen Grimberg

from die tages^eitung, 28.08.2010: 'Ich habe lange mit mir gerungeti (Deutschlandstiftung Integration 2010: 16). 131

Spiegel-Online: Berliner Polizei nimmt Terrorverdächtigefest (August 08, 2011)

www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/0,1518,785076,00.html (accessed March 8, 2012)

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Political Opportunity Structures and Discourse

arrested.'132 Reporting like this appears to confirm the general prevailing suspicion of Islam. On the other hand Muslims are aware that they take some of the blame: 'It's also the mosque's fault, they should be transparent and be aware of what people are doing.'133 A young woman interviewed for the Open Society Foundations' report complained about stereotyping in the media. 'She felt that when discussing integration, they tended to show Muslim women with headscarves — mostly elderly women shopping in Turkish markets — thus giving the impression that on the one hand these women represented Muslims, while simultaneously offering this as an image of failure by this group to integrate' (Open Society Foundation 2010: 136). Muslims and Muslim organisations themselves have little voice. They are run by volunteers and only slowly become more professional, also in public appearances, but the local press does not yet react to them very much.134 This can become another source of alienation of Muslims from German society (Open Society Foundations 2010: 136). However, changes in post-Sarrazin media discourse are visible. Voices trying to defend the Muslim population from generalisation and stereotyping finally made it out into the public sphere (Deutschlandstiftung Integration 2010). Hostility towards Islam slowly becomes an issue of public attention reflected in the press.135 Negative depictions of Muslims in the press affect public opinion. Studies and surveys suggest that public attitudes towards Islam and Muslims in Germany have deteriorated. The recent 2010 study of the Friedrich Ebert foundation shows that more than half of German participants agree with statements like 'I understand why some people find Arabs unpleasant (55.4 per cent) or 'Muslims in Germany should be drastically restricted in their religious freedom' (58.4 per cent in west, 75.7 per cent in east Germany). 'Modern right wing extremism

Interview Razzaque. Interview Razzaque. 134 Interview Spielhaus. 135 Deutsche Welle: Das Islambild in den Medien (October 02, 2011). www.dw.de/dw/article/0„15429038,00.html (accessed March 8, 2012). Berlin Commissioner on Integration and Immigration and former journalist Günter Piening also suggests that the differences in the representation of Muslims in different sections of the local media may reflect the different audiences. While Berlin-based newspaper BZ often provides positive coverage of Muslim issues, the other daily Der Tagesspiegel prefers negative reporting. While the readership of BZ consists mainly of workers and those in the lower socio-economic classes (and includes large numbers of Muslims) the readership of Der Tagesspiegel is found among the middle classes. Piening suggests that its coverage therefore satisfies — and reproduces — a certain reservation towards Muslims and Muslim organisations that seems to be growing (Open Society Foundations 2010). 132 133

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expresses itself in culturist justifications, following traditional justifications based on biologism' (Decker et al 2010).136 Xenophobic tendencies and convictions are growing among ethnic German youth as a response.137 Muslim activists suggest that it is not surprising that the consequence of public display of negative attitudes is rejection of Germany among some Muslim youth. 'They demand integration and at the same time you remain a second class citken — this is a problem.'138 Identity-based claims by Muslim groups are usually related to contention and controversy that does not apply to other migrant or minority groups. Despite low demands for special cultural rights by Muslim groups in Germany (Koopmans et al. 2005: 5) public opinion shows low support for claims made around headscarves, separate sports and swimming classes and customs based in Islam. The building of places of worship outside backyards is equally likely to stir public emotions. In Berlin this was reflected in the debate about the mosque proposal of the Muslim organisation Inssan in the district of Charlottenburg-Wilmersdorf after a previous planning permission in the district of Neukölln had been withdrawn. They entered into an open discussion process with the local council and people in the neighbourhood. The district council initially supported their endeavour and even agreed to change some building regulations. Planning permission was granted despite public criticism, but mostly middle-class opposition to the mosque in this area was ultimately successful. 139 Opposition to a proposal for another mosque in the outer-city district of Pankow-Heinersdorf was led by the

136 Decker et al (2010) Die Mitte in der Krise. Study, overview and other related document available under www.fes-gegen-rechtsextremismus.de/inhalte/studien_Gutachten.php (accessed March 8, 2012). 137 Kriminologisches Forschungsinstitut Niedersachsen (2010) jugendliche in Deutschland als Opfer und Täter von Gewalt. Erster Forschungsbericht %um gemeinsamen Forschungsprojekt des Bundesministeriums des Innern und des KFN. www.kfn.de/versions/kfn/assets/fbl07.pdf (accessed November 21, 2011). 138 Interview Kesici. 139 Interview Nofal. See also Tagesspiegel: Rätselraten um die Moschee (April 15, 2008) at www.tagesspiegel.de/berlin/raetselraten-um-die-moschee/1211490.html (accessed December 20, 2011). This article reports that the City Council for Construction withdrew building permission to the surprise even of his own party faction, the CDU (conservatives). It assumes that pressure came from higher ranks in the conservative party. Senator of Internal Affairs, Ehrhart Körting, had endorsed Inssan and their mosque-building plan towards the Berlin parliament [Abgeordnetenhaus Berlin 2008: Drucksache 16/20253).

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Political Opportunity Structures and Discourse

far right and failed, also after the Senator of Internal Affairs, Ehrhart Kórting, threw in his weight.140 Public discourse and images of religious and cultural aspects of Islam dominating the media do not foster trust between immigrant and Muslim communities and majority society. Former Berlin Commissioner for Integration and Immigration Günther Piening (2004-2012) warned that anti-Islamic discourse facilitates resignation, passiveness and victim mentalities among Muslims. 'This is a very dangerous development that ultimately furthers withdrawal and finally resentment against a state based on the rule of law that is perceived as one-sided' {Senatsverwaltung for Integration, Arbeit und Sociales 2010). In this context religion can play an important role in transmitting a feeling of safety, even though many Muslims of the second or third generation are influenced by two lifeworlds: values derived from Islam shape identities together with western norms like those stipulated in the German constitution, as Werner Schiffauer found in an ethnographic study of the Turkish organisation Milli Górüs, generally criticised for anti-constitutional attitudes (Schiffauer 2010). A stronger orientation towards Islam among immigrants might as well be a sign of a Muslim's experience of crisis pertaining to the integration processes, rather than a crisis meaning danger for the rest of society, as Bade suggests (Bade 2007: 42). Negative public images and the resulting lack of trust and withdrawal are not conducive to participation. Researcher Riem Spielhaus points to public and political criticism of politicians in Berlin visiting mosques, usually with reference to the fact that they are mentioned in the Berlin intelligence reports. She misses a debate on the possible alternatives to communication.141 Sükran Altunkaynak of the neighbourhood management (QM) office Pankstrasse in Berlin-Mitte reports that when they financially supported projects involving a couple of Muslim and migrant associations, a headline in a local newspaper quickly read, 'QM supports Nationalists'. She attributes the difficulty of finding access to local mosque associations at least partly to the lack of trust as a reaction to negative reporting like this. 142

140 Former CDU deputy for Pankow-Heinersdorf Rene Stadtkewitz spearheaded citizen resistance against the mosque-building project by the Ahmadi congregation in Berlin. After publication of Thilo Sarrazin's book he founded the party Die Freiheit. Main subject of the party is the danger of Islam. See also Spiegel Online: Der deutsche Geert, (January 3, 2011). www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-76121052.html (accessed December 20, 2011). 141 Interview Spielhaus. 142 Interview Altunkaynak.

143

It also discredits immigrant and Muslim organisations in immigrant neighbourhoods. In the context of parallel society debates public discourse quickly turns them into institutions resistant to integration. While mosque associations describe themselves as part of the city landscape, public discourse frequently makes connections between them and Islamic fundamentalism that they are asked to comment on' (Farber/Spielhaus 2006: 9). Migration and integration researcher Andreas Kapphahn observes: 'This hinders the mobilisation of social forces in the neighbourhoods that are necessary for their development' (Kapphan 2006: 22). Spielhaus agrees that immigrant organisations, religious or not, are rarely perceived as making positive contributions towards integration in German society. She maintains they are predominantly seen as both immigrant self-organisations and religious organisations, which in this mix seems to radiate even more danger of segregation and disintegration (Spielhaus 2010: 186). Commissioner for Integration in Mitte, Maryam Stibenz, adds structural discrimination as a farther obstacle, generally underestimated in public discourse.143 Public discourse in Germany has a tendency to either portray immigrants in general as criminals, unwilling to integrate, or as victims of a split identity. As such they are both 'foreign' and 'deviant', establishing a sublimely racist discourse (Rauer 2008: 24). At the same time, depictions of immigrants in the media tend to improve as a result of public debates. This was the case after the fierce discussion around dual citizenship in 1998/99, triggered by the campaign 'Yes to integration — no to dual citizenship' initiated by the Conservative politician Roland Koch in the state of Hessen (Rauer 2008: 25). The same differentiation occurred in the wake of the publication of Thilo Sarrazin's book. It is not yet clear how long-term the effects of a period of more balanced reporting are (Geissler 2000: 139). 'Muslims are increasingly becoming an active part of the discourse about themselves; they are eager to shape the image that society has of them. At the same time, they perceive the power of German society to define who Muslims are' (Spielhaus 2006: 17). Schiffauer strongly argues in favour of a new culture of careful observation rather than the reproduction of stereotypes of 'Islamic culture' as opposed to German in public discourse (Schiffauer 2008: 15). The dominantly negative public discourse only stresses the importance of deliberative institutional channels to invite participation, encourage getting to know each other, to help shape preferences and develop joint plans of action. These could not only help Muslim communities but also contribute to a less one-sided public discussion. Even though different voices are slowly heard, at least in mainstream media, Muslims themselves, just like many other minorities, have hardly any

143

Interview Stibenz.

144

Political Opportunity Structures and Discourse

voice at all. The question is how to turn from object of discourse to participating subject in discourse. A new project against Islamophobia run by the Anti-Discrimination Body of the TBB and Inssan shows the impact of research and publications that offer a balanced perspective on Muslims. Piening, who already signalled an interest in work against Islamophobia a few years earlier, made funding available after the publication of the Open Society Foundations' report on Muslim in Berlin in 2010.144

5.3. Muslim integration via participation agenda: Berlin 'There is no doubt about the need to protect the democratic system. Still, the greatest challenge is to bring Islamic organisations to democracy, and the greatest failure would be if those Muslims who try to participate turn their backs on democracy because they feel excluded.' Riem Spielhaus 2006: 22

In the absence of a long-term strategy for the settlement of guest workers or a federal political framework to deal with immigrating family members during the first decades of work immigration, cities and communes were uncertain about their responsibilities. Faced with the every day problems of immigrants a wide range of different municipal practices and approaches developed in areas like social housing, programmes for children and youth, support for immigrant organisations etc., generally ranging below or next to social and educational policies (Bommes 2009: 95-6). Cities with high immigration already explored participatory practices back in the 1970s in 'foreigner advisory boards' (Auslànderbeiràttj and other forms of interest representation. Today city administration and districts must solve local concerns related to immigration and integration in accordance with relevant federal or national legislation while facing sole responsibility for social welfare and work integration. They also take on financial responsibility for asylum seekers (Bommes 2009: 96). In that sense cities and districts are at the forefront of integration. At the same time Muslims tend to identify more with their local environment than with the country they live in, which makes cities and lower administrative units the appropriate place for integration and participation efforts. The same is true for

Beauftragter fur Integration und Migration des Berliner Senats, Press Release December 8, 2010 www.berlin.de/lb/intmig/presse/archiv/20101208.1000.322307.html (accessed March 10, 2012). 144

145

Berlin, where affiliation to ethnically mixed districts and neighbourhoods like Kreuzberg is strong, regardless of negative images in public discourse. 'Interestingly the Kie^denken (loosely translated as identification with the local area) here does not refer to a culturally homogenous area, but to an ethnically and culturally diverse one, where the cohabitation with ethnic Germans is appreciated and separation is regretted' (Open Society Foundations 2010: 51). The 16 federal states in Germany have their own constitutions and federal institutions, and are governed by parliamentary governments. Normally the head of state is a prime minister. In a city-state like Berlin the Mayor fulfils this role. Highest authorities in Berlin are the Senators (heads of departments), the Ministry for Federal Affairs and the independent Court of Auditors. Berlin is the capital of the Federal Republic of Germany. Shortly after German reunification in 1990 it became a so-called Stadtstaat (city-state). This means the administrative set-up is slightly different from the other federal states, except the two other citystates Bremen and Hamburg. City-states are simultaneously a Gemeinde (Commune), a Stadt (town) and a Bundesland (Federal State). The administration of Berlin is divided between the administrative centre of Senate (government), Abgeordnetenhaus (parliament), and 12 district administrations. The mayor appoints senators.145 The elected Berliner Abgeordnetenhaus (House of Representatives) passes legislation and elects the mayor. German and EU-citi2ens over the age of 16 living in the district elect members of the Bevgrksverordnetenversammlung (district level parliament — B W ) . District administrations are strongly dependent on the Berlin Senate and its subordinated Senatsverwaltungen (Senatorial Administrations) (Open Society Foundations 2010: 48). The first Commissioner for Foreigners, as the position was still called at the time, was Barbara John (1982-2003). She recalls that in 1981, in line with official national migration discourse, the term 'integration' stood for a subversive way of thinking.'146 A year later the work of the Commissioner for Foreigners was formalised by the Berlin Senate, introducing regular reports on integration, hearing procedures for immigrant organisations and participation in advisory committees on integration reports, opening first windows of opportunity for migrant participation.

There are eight different senate administrations: Stadtentwicklung (Urban Development); Wirtschaft, Technologie und Frauen (Economy, Technology and Women); 145

Bildung, Wissenschaft und Forschung (Education, Science and Research); Finanzen (Finances); Gesundheit, Umwelt und Verbraucherschut£ (Health, Environment and Consumer Protection);

Inneres und Sport (Inner Affairs and Sports); Integration, Arbeit und Soziales (Integration, Labour and Social Issues); and Justi% (Law). 146 Interview John.

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Political Opportunity Structures and Discourse

From 2003-2012 Günter Piening held the position of Commissioner for Immigration and Integration of the Senate, situated within the Senate Department for Integration, Work and Social Affairs. The main responsibility is the implementation of integration policy in coordination with other administrative units, other stakeholder institutions and relevant civil society actors.147 Despite the aim of furthering integration efforts and responsibilities across departments most initiatives and support come from the Commissioner's Office (Hunger/Metzger 2011: 79). Bommes described the practice of cities and communes to institutionalise integration policy next to or below social policy and its administration as a mismatch of political urgency and administrative reality (Bommes 2009: 96). Today, most district administrations of Berlin also have a District Commissioner for Migration and Integration. They serve as the first point of contact for local organisations and work towards the implementation of integration policy in the districts. Their city-level representation is the lMndesarbeitsgemeinschaft der Integrationsbeauftragten der Bezirke (State Working Group of Commissioners for Integration of the Districts). Apart from monitoring and initiating project work they make recommendations on integration and migration policy. They work under the district mayors but liaise with all parts of the district administration. Their function is, as one district commissioner described it, to solve a certain problem. As such, the aim is 'to render their position useless'.148 Political outreach to Muslim communities in Berlin as a strategy for integration goes back to the initiative of a few individuals inside the institutional structures, who lobbied for more inclusive approaches. During the 1990s the first Berlin Commissioner for Foreigners, as the position was called at the time, Barbara John, visited every mosque association and prayer room in Berlin, sending an important signal of interest to the Muslim community. Under her auspices a first study on mosque associations in Berlin was published in 1999 (Jonker/Kapphan 1999). Until then, mosques had hardly made an appearance in the public sphere. The public reaction to this study was mosdy critical. 'The study was mostly criticised for its naivety in dealing with mosques. The opinion prevailed to rather not look at them at all.'149 Since 2001 district mayors, Commissioners for Integration on city and district level and, important to mention, Senator of Internal Affairs and Sports Ehrhart Körting (2001-2011), have been visiting mosque associations on a regular basis. For a long time Körting was the only high ranking politician to approach Mus-

147 148 149

www.berHn.de/lb/intmig/aufgaben/ (accessed December 3, 2011). Interview Stibenz. Interview Spielhaus.

147

lims in Berlin150 and to foster a participatory agenda: W e . . . must accept the mosques in our city as normal religious facilities. We must approach them and reduce our reservations. Mosque congregations themselves must leave their 'back yard situation' and open their doors to everyone, not only Muslims, on a daily basis. There are enormous chances for cooperation' (Körting in Färber/ Spielhaus 2006: 33-4). His visits were often accompanied by journalists, and despite criticism of contact with certain Muslim groups this contributed to their first appearance in the public sphere of Berlin.151 Though not specifically directed at Muslim communities the Berliner Integrationskonyept (Berlin Integration Plan) proposes participatory elements as part of the integration policy programme, which affects all administrative levels and includes Muslim organisations. Even though Muslims do not only organise along ethnic lines and religious affiliation and are not necessarily immigrants, the ethnicisation of religion makes them a target group for integration policy (Spielhaus 2006). District administrations are expected to support the implementation of the Berlin Integration Plan. The Council of Mayors supports policy initiatives aiming at the intercultural opening of the administration and highlight different aspects of integration efforts like extended support in German language acquisition and the role of Job Centres {Abgeordnetenhaus 2007: 4). The district administration in Berlin Mitte explicitly criticises public discourse and the public perception of immigrants and their children, particularly Muslims, pointing to ethnicisation of social and economic disadvantage and difficulties in education. The administration sees this expressed in the interest in statistics on proportions of children and youth with migration background in day care facilities and schools. 'Holding on to such deficit oriented views suits as pattern of explanation, as it unburdens individuals and exonerates structural and institutional insufficiency. At the same time it stabilises discrimination, deprives individuals of developmental scope and hinders public discourse on much needed resource-oriented process of change' ('Integrationsprogramm Mitte 2011/12: 90). However, district integration and participation approaches heavily carry the handwriting of District Mayors, as empirical examples and analysis will show.

Interview John. Critics of dialogue with religious Muslim organisations came from all parties, including secular deputies of Turkish descent. Spielhaus mentions Öczan Mutlu, deputy for the Green Party in Berlin who used to be very critical of cooperation with Muslim organisations, but recognises the need for signals from both sides. He spoke, for instance, in favour of a representative mosque in Berlin (Färber/ Spielhaus 2006: 37). Generally the Conservative Party is wearier of dialogue and cooperation, but also Social Democrats are careful and refer to the reports of the Office for the Protection of the Constitution, as demonstrated throughout this research. 150 151

148

Political Opportunity Structures and Discourse

Berlin's integration policy Despite being formulated without much participation of immigrant organisations152 the Berlin Integration Plan of 2007 has been described as 'a progressive new approach to social inclusion' (Open Society Foundations 2010: 19). Under the title Vielfaltfdrdern — Zusammenhalt starken (Supporting Diversity Strengthening Cohesion) it 'challenges the traditional concept of integration in which minorities have to adapt to the perceived majority culture' (Open Society Foundations 2010: 19). The first Integration Plan presented in summer 2005 by the Berlin Senate sought to end improvised integration policy approaches and deliver a strategic concept with mid-term objectives. The Plan formulated guiding Principles of Berlin integration policy, including broad participation. A revised integration plan was drafted and published in 2007. It explicitly mentions the shortcomings of federal integration and migration policy, including a lack of definition of integration and integration policy (Abgeordnetenhaus 2007: 1). It formulates action areas like education, employment, underlines the importance of intercultural opening and training of Berlin's administrative units and social services, and highlights cooperation between administrative levels and departments. 153 Action areas central to this research are the promotion of diversity as a strength rather than a problem; the focus on fostering and enabling civil society participation in the neighbourhoods on connecting communities, and tackling discrimination (Abgeordnetenhaus 2007: 6).

Affirmation of diversity In line with Schiffauer's depiction of the third position in parallel societies discourse, the Integration Plan portrays diversity in Berlin as positive: 'Berlin benefits from a placid tolerance for different social and cultural lifeworlds. (...) Affirming and meeting diversity in a relaxed way furthers intercultural compe-

Berlin parliament invited stakeholders from districts, academia, welfare organisations and immigrant organisations represented in the Landesbeirat für Integrations- und Migrationsfragen. According to Doris Nahawandi, Agency of the State Advisory Board for Immigration and Integration in the Office of the Integration and Immigration Commissioner for Berlin, input was marginal due to administrational regulations (Interview Nahawandi). 153 The lack of intercultural competences is visible in the city's job centres: 'We have a lot of trouble in job centres. If one of us doesn't come along it won't work out. Those who work there are not necessarily chosen for their competence.' Efforts to improve the situation are praised in areas like policing, where bilingual officers have been recruited. The police force in Neukölln is perceived as increasingly sensitised for cultural difference (Interview El-Gezawi). 152

149

tence, the city's liveliness and mobility as well as advantages in international competition' (.Abgeordnetenhaus 2007: 9). Highlighting the benefits of diversity is a logical consequence of the conclusion of the Federal Commission on Immigration (Sussmuth-Kommission) that Germany is a country of immigration. It also contradicts dominating public opinion and is hence an important political statement. Nourishing and nurturing cultural diversity is defined as a two-way process: 'Both people with an immigration background as well as the German host society must develop more willingness to embrace cultural differences' {Abgeordnetenhaus 2007: 9). The Integration Plan highlights that ethnic segregation of neighbourhoods is a result of social exclusion (.Abgeordnetenhaus 2007: 47) and appeals for a kind of public discourse that does not exclusively verbalise the deficits of areas with high numbers of Muslim or migrant inhabitants. Their histories, their cultural habits and religious rituals enrich life in the neighbourhood. Furthermore: many of them want active participation and involvement in the community' {Abgeordnetenhaus 2007: 48).

Civil society participation and connecting communities The Plan distinguishes Muslim civil society participation from general immigrant participation and indicates a critique of past integration policy. 'The implementation of structures enabling discourse with religious and ethnic communities rather than discourses about those concerned, as practised over the past decades, presents a central condition for sustainable, education-oriented integration policy' {Abgeordnetenhaus 2007: 72). This turn towards deliberation goes hand in hand with the declared belief that participation leads to growing identification with German society. As further acknowledgement of this position the integration plan also proposes the introduction of voting rights for non-EU-citizens in local elections, while broadening the pro-naturalisation campaign.154 However, Muslims born in Germany and with German citizenship often feel as alienated from politics as people without citizenship. Inviting and supporting participation of those German citizens is equally important.155 154 To date there is no progress on voting-rights for non-EU citizens, which affects many Muslims in Berlin (Open Society Foundations 2010: 48), but several district administrations supported the Jede Stimme %ählt (Every Vote Counts) campaign in cooperation with Citizens for Europe. See jedestimme2011.de/ (accessed November 18,

2011). 155 Katja Niggemeyer of the QM Soldiner Kiez reports conversations with Muslim of Turkish Origin who stood for election in Berlin in September member of the BIG part. Despite BIG being a party representing mostly interests he apparendy highlighted the feeling of being a German citizen Niggemeyer).

a German 2011 as a immigrant (Interview

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Political Opportunity Structures and Discourse

So far, the Office of the Commissioner for Integration and Immigration of the Berlin Senate initiated three nine-month long special action programmes on integration (Aktionsprogramm „Vielfaltfördern — Zusammenhalt stärken). Each focussed on different aspects of integration and participation. The 2006 programme's objective was the deepening and accommodation of participation of migrant parents and youth in their neighbourhoods, as formulated in the 2005 Berlin Integration Plan (Beer 2007: 11). An important aspect was asking immigrants themselves for their needs and interests and looking at the structures needed to support participation, activism and competence (Beer 2007: 24). It nurtured cooperation in tandem projects and new networks between more established actors, local institutions and immigrant organisations or groups (Beer 2007: 32). After the pilot programme and the positive results of an accompanying evaluation process (Beer 2007) a second action programme started in 2008, focussing on work with young males from immigration backgrounds.156 A third programme starting in 2010 focussed on youth and work integration.157 By now some 50 cooperations have been funded in Berlin. However, only very few projects involved religious Muslim organisations or those who see their identity as predominantly Muslim. The first action programme involved one mosque association and an Islamic cultural association run by the Alevite community in Berlin.158 The second action programme involved a tandem between a mosque association and a large German welfare organisation, which will be presented as a case study in the analysis. Most of the projects, funded as part of the action programme Vielfalt fördern Zusammenhalt stärken, fell under the social cities objectives, aiming at stronger contacts between immigrant and indigenous population and improving participation in neighbourhood and wider society (Beer 2007: 31). Quartiersmanagement (neighbourhood management - QM) is part of the Social Cities Programme, an initiative initially funded by federal and state governments to support disadvantaged inner city areas. Berlin has 34 specially funded areas, a local management structure is supposed to connect citizens with the local administrative level. It cooperates with local actors to build sustainable networking structures. Citizen participation and empowerment is a special focus of the pro156 www.berlin.de/lb/intmig/themen/aktion/index.html (accessed 23.08.2011). 157 Press Release of the Berlin Senate: Aktionsprogramm 'Integration und Ausbildung' des Berliner Senats gestartet (December 13, 2010) www.berlin.de/sen/ias/presse/archiv/20101213.1255.322819.html (accessed December 3, 2011). 158 The mosque and its tandem partner carried out parenting classes in Berlin-Mitte and the Alevi community got involved in conflict mediation in secondary schools in BerlinMoabit (Beer 2007: 58 and 66).

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gramme.159 Each district does a yearly review and evaluation of goal achievement that influences QM planning for the following year. Integration is the central field of action across local endeavours. Important aspects are intercultural dialogue and the establishment of participatory negotiation processes. However, including Muslim civil society organisations in QM-activities is not easy if they do not demonstrate an interest in participation themselves. The QM Pankstrasse in Berlin-Mitte, for instance, made several attempts to establish relationships with the five mosque associations in the neighbourhood. The idea was to use them as a platform to disperse information about neighbourhood management projects and possibilities for participation in the neighbourhood. According to a local QM manager communication failed mostly because of language barriers, but also due to structural issues like lack of time and the fact that often worshippers do not live locally and hence have no stake on the local area.160

Discrimination Anti-discrimination strategies are equally mentioned as a condition for successful integration: 'Active anti-discrimination policy increases the legitimacy of the state in the eyes of groups faced with exclusion' (Abgeordnetenhaus 2007: 69). A federal plan to fight racism and right-wing extremism is described as an important pillar in Berlin integration policy. Acknowledgement of Islamophobia is expressed in the recent establishment of the Network against Discrimination of Muslims by one Muslim and one immigrant organisation, the latter representing people of Turkish descent in Berlin and Brandenburg, supported by the Senate Commissioner for Integration.161 However, representatives of Muslim organisa-

159 For more details refer to www.quartiersmanagement-berlin.de/ (accessed May 2011). For the remainder of this thesis I will refer to neighbourhood management as QM, the established German acronym for Quartiersmanagement. 160 Mosque board members act and plan without consultation of the community, according to area manager Altunkaynak, it is not clear if they pass on information. Also, it proves difficult to establish one particular contact person. Even after some mosque association boards agreed to participate in discussions on public space design, nobody turned up. One reason presented was lack of time, as they all work as volunteers. Another structural reason is the fact (Interview Altunkaynak). 161 See Chapter 6. www.berlinerratschlagfuerdemokratie.de/index.php/478.110/1 (accessed November 18,

2011).

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Political Opportunity Structures and Discourse

tions in Berlin report that the issue of Islamophobia is still difficult to put on the public agenda. 162 The Regional Office Against Discrimination works on the basis of the Allgemeines Gleichbehandlungsgeset^es (AGG - Equal Treatment Act). It coordinates anti-discrimination efforts of the Senate and offers advise to citi2ens. 163 The Senate also developed a programme to further democracy and to fight right-wing extremism, racism and anti-Semitism. Part of this forms the berliner Ratschlag für Demokratie (Advice for Democracy), established in 2008. It is supposed to initiate and support dialogue aiming at bringing communities together in democratic communication and cooperation and seeks to further respect for diversity. It is an attempt to lift diversity, discrimination and racism to the awareness of the public sphere level and offers a public platform for initiative in Berlin. 164

Further initiatives of the Berlin Senate involving Muslim participation In December 2010 Berlin adopted a new Geset^flir Integration und Participation (Law on Participation and Integration). It is an attempt to legally perpetuate the integration policy goals of participation and intercultural opening of administrative levels and social services, formulated in the Berlin Integration and Action Plans. 165 Less than a year after passage of the law more than a hundred immigrant organisations registered to be eligible to participate in elections for the Immigration and Integration Advisory Board on Senate level, among them several Muslim organisations. 166 Further effects of the law are not yet clear. The district mayor of Kreuzberg/Friedrichshain, Franz Schulz, criticised the nonconsideration of Immigration and Integration Advisory Boards of the districts. 167

162 Burhan Kesici, Islamische Föderation, and Ender Cetin, DITIB Berlin-Brandenburg, both report that raising Islamophobia to public discourse level is met with hesitation on the part of politicians (Interviews Kesici and Cetin). 163 l^andesstelle für Gleichbehandlung — gegen Diskriminierung (Regional Office for Equal Treatment — Against Discrimination) at www.berlin.de/lb/ads/ (accessed December 3,

2011).

www.berlinerratschlagfuerdemokratie.de/ (accessed November 18, 2011). www.berlin.de/lb/intmig/partizipationsgesetz_berlin.html (accessed November 25, 2011). 166 Press Release of the Berlin Senate: Neue Beteiligungsrechte des Parti^patìonsgeset^es werden genutzt: Starker Wunsch nach Teilhabe (October 7, 2011) at: www.berlin.de/landespressestelle/archiv/20111007.0830.360770.html (accessed November 3, 2011), Interview Reinke. 167 Protokoll Sitzung Beirat Integration Kreuzberg 11. Juni 2011, www.berlin.de/imperia/md/content/bafriedrichshainkreuzberg/beauftragtedesbezirks/juni_ll.pdf (accessed November 15, 2001). 164 165

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The Berlin education programme wants to foster acquisition of the German language to a level that allows a successful career in school. This measure appears prudential, considering the lack of language proficiency among immigrant children. A test in the district Mitte in 2007 found that 39.8% of children starting school that year did not know enough German to follow class, many of them from families with origins in predominantiy Muslim countries. Another 29.7% need additional language support {Integrationsprogramm Mitte 2011/12: 15). Since summer 2009 the last three years of pre-school have been free of charge. Pre-school teachers keep language diaries for each child to monitor progress and identify needs for further support. Children now enter primary school at a slightly earlier age than before (5 Vz years upwards instead of 6 years of age) and since the introduction of all-day school they theoretically spend more time in a German-speaking environment. Still, the resources and skills for appropriate language support in school are missing {Integrationsprogramm Mitte 2011/12: 16). In addition, there are religious and cultural needs that contradict the secular orientation of public schools in Berlin. Conflicts arise in relation to prayer times, Ramadan, headscarves and sports lessons, as well as religious education.168 In order to help schools in conflicts like this the Senate Department for Education, Science and Research issued a guideline for teachers on Islam und Scbule (Islam and School). The guidelines inform about relevant legal frameworks and offer conflict resolution strategies aiming at mutual respect for religion, worldviews and ethnic origins.169 The department also issued guidelines on intercultural education.170

168 The case of a Muslim student who filed a lawsuit at the Administrative Court in late 2009 for instance, hit the headlines and caused some public discussion. After the court ruled his claim was legal the Higher Administrative Court in Berlin overturned this decision in May 2010.

Press Release of the Berlin Senate: Neue Beteiligungsrechte des Partiigpationsgeset^es werden genutzt: Starker Wunsch nach Teilhabe (October 7, 2011). www.stern.de/panorama/urteü-in-berlin-gericht-strekht-schueler-mittagsgebet1569681.html (accessed December 3, 2011) 169

Bildungsklick: Handreichung Islam und Schule' geht an die Schulen (September 16, 2009).

bildungsklick.de/pm/75078/handreichung-islam-und-schule-geht-an-die-schulen/

and Senatsverwaltungfür Bildung Jugend und Wissenschaft: Politische Bildung (political education)

www.berlin.de/sen/bildung/politische_bildiing/index.html (both accessed November 14,2011). A public discussion around this publication centred around the involvement of a contro-

versial Imam. See: Tagesspiegel: Umstrittener Imam agiert online (September 16, 2010)

www.tagesspiegel.de/berUn/umstrittener-imam-agitiert-online/1935574.html (accessed April 13, 2012) 170 The Open Society Foundations' report suggests that the acknowledgement of Muslims' presence in German society is crucial. 'History classes about the role and

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Political Opportunity Structures and Discourse

One example of Muslim participation in schools is tuition in Islamic education in more than 30 Berlin schools by the Islamische Föderation (IF). Islamic religious education as a due discipline does not exist in Germany because Islam is not a legally recognised religious community. In Berlin, however, religious education is the exclusive responsibility of religious communities. After a long legal battle the Federal Administrative Court finally declared the Islamic Federation eligible to provide religious instruction in Berlin in February 2000. A controversy followed because of the Federation's connection to Milli Görüs, a Turkish organisation under surveillance of the Office for the Protection of the Constitution (Kraft 2007). Other organisations are interested in recognition as a legal religious community, most prominently DITIB, one of the oldest Turkish associations operating in the whole of Germany. According to Robin Schneider from the Office of the Commissioner for Integration and Migration of the Berlin Senate they could have achieved this by now with the help of legal advice. This would have important symbolic value in the public sphere.17'

The Office for the Protection of the Constitution Finally, the political opportunity structures for Muslim civil society participation are incomplete without short reference to the role of the Berlin Office for the Protection of the Constitution. Under responsibility of the Senate Department for Inner Affairs and Sports it collects and evaluates information. Anthropologist Schiffauer suggests: 'Secret service methods are increasingly used for the surveillance of Muslim citi2ens. It plays a leading role in shaping opportunities for the public participation of Muslim individuals and organisations' (Open Society Foundations 2010: 120). Once mentioned in the annual reports of the Office for the Protection of the Constitution an organisation can lose its nonfor-profit status and is no longer eligible to public funding. In response to dialogue with Muslim organisations in Berlin Senator Körting introduced more detailed distinctions in the intelligence reports. W e used to have right wing extremism, left wing extremism and foreigner extremism. In addition to PKK and ETA essentially all Islamist associations were listed in this last section.'172 Now reports distinguish between Islamist organisations like Milli

contributions of Muslim societies to the development of Western culture, arts and sciences would be important steps towards enabling the positive self-identification of Germany's Muslim pupils. This would help counter negative stereotypes and one-sided images of Islam and Muslims among other members of the school community' (Open Society Foundations 2010: 75). 171 Interview Schneider. 172 Interview Kòrting.

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Görüs or the Muslim Brotherhood who are not ready to use violence and those who are (e.g. Al Qaida, Hamas and He2bollah). Still, media reporting and public discourse tend to ignore this distinction. Being listed can have the effect of public officials being unwilling to sustain dialogue. It tends to generate negative media representation. In Neukölln the district administration draws a clear line and stops all contact with organisations listed in the intelligence reports. In other districts like Kreuzberg-Friedrichshain and Mitte cooperation continues. Of the Muslim organisations represented in the Islamforum nearly all participating members have been listed one or more times. This inconsistent practice can be confusing for Muslim civil society actors who receive warnings to not cooperate with certain actors in one district while in other parts of the city administration openly communicates or works with them.173 However, "withdrawals of public funding have become a common way to prevent these co-operations. This results in severe structural discrimination' (Open Society Foundations 2010: 121), leading to the impression among Muslim actors that there is a lack of political will for effective participation of Muslims. The Open Society Foundations' report recommends more clarification on behalf of the Office for the Protection of the Constitution on how to read their reports (Open Society Foundations 2010: 132). In his study of the Milli Görüs organisation, Schiffauer suggests that actions of the Office for the Protection of the Constitution result in many Muslim organisations turning away from participation and public debate (Open Society Foundations 2010: 119). Former Commissioner for Foreigners Barbara John, on the other hand, simply questions the existence of the whole institution.174 Despite progress in inclusive and participatory integration policy formulation in Berlin, the path to Muslim public participation is still long. As Barbara John analyses, the two-way integration dynamic formulated in the Berlin integration plan does not reflect the reality of dominant discourse and of formal participation.175 Muslim organisations have few resources both in terms of finance and professionalization. Most of them rely on volunteers. They are mostly unable to position their concerns in the media, dominated by security concerns in relation to integration.176 On the other hand, the idea of Muslim civil participation has broad political support in principle, in order to normalise relationships between Muslims and

173 All

information extracted from interviews with Muslim and other stakeholders. Interview John. 175 Interview John. 176 Interview Nahawandi.

174

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Political Opportunity Structures and Discourse

mainstream society.177 There is also growing interest in participation on Muslim side.178 'I am generally happy with the political landscape, I can see some real movement on the political side towards opening up the public sphere for Muslims.'179 Lydia Nofal of Inssan concludes: 'In the past nobody knew 'Muslims'. There was a lot of 'Muslims want this' or 'Muslims think that', but without really knowing 'Muslims'. Now, and this is true for all levels, now we know each other.'180 However, the conditions for participation still largely depend on individuals inside the political system and on the motivation of a few civil society actors.

177

Interview Interview 179 Interview 180 Interview 178

Kôrting. Spielhaus. Misirhoglu. Nofal.

6. Exemplary Cases Three case studies will be presented: the city-level Islamforum, the cooperation in a tandem project by Haci Bayram mosque at the neighbourhood level in the Mitte district of Berlin, and a description of Muslim integration approach in the Neukölln district, which is marked by a significant absence of deliberation in contrast to the district of Kreuzberg-Friedrichshain. Thus, the empirical work covers different administrative levels and outcome orientations. It is important to be aware of the different administrative responsibilities across city levels when evaluating the views of participants. Expectations can be unrealistic. Participation in mini-publics on Senate level is less focussed on project work, but is more informative in character. Deliberation at this level can also affect legislation. Districts are supposed to implement policy with little formal decision-making power, but shape opportunities for local participation: they can interpret their role in policy implementation and supervise projects funded by the district or as part of the Social City programme. At the neighbourhood level, the QMs work in accordance with the district administration but are otherwise at the forefront of coordination and communication with people, organisations and initiatives in the neighbourhood. They support the practical implementation of projects funded through the administration. Each case gives a detailed account of the historical and institutional background to participation in deliberation, a narrative of process and outcomes, and future outlook. The study of Neukölln is more focussed on the contradiction between district administration and civil society views and perceptions. Though drawing both from documents and interview evidence, this section remains largely descriptive.

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Exemplary Cases

6.1. Participation on Senate level: the Berlin Islamforum 'People went through an incredible process of learning — all participants. We would have different politics without the Islamforum today. I am sure, thinking and perceptions changed. I think people have a more realistic perception today.' Lydia Nofal, Inssan

Case history and institutional background 'The Islamforum stands for a new approach in a more binding interexchange. Achieving its goals will finally depend on the willingness of participants to engage in critical discourse on equal level'.181 The Berlin Islamforum, established in 2005, aims at deliberation between representatives of Muslim organisations, city administration, and other civil society organisations. The joint hosts are the Commissioner for Integration and Immigration of the Berlin Senate and the Muslimische A.kademie (Muslim Academy), a body specifically designed to further knowledge about Islam in Berlin.182 After September 11 th Berlin's large Muslim population moved into the focus of public and political attention. The left-left Berlin coalition of Social Democrats (SPD) and Socialists (PDS) agreed to further dialogue with Muslim communities in the city, with the aim to normalise relations. Interreligious dialogue seemed to be as important as exchange with politicians and administration.183 The Islamforum brings together 12 representatives of Muslim organisations184, members of the city administration including the Minister for Inner Affairs, the

181 Founding principles of the Berlin Islamforum www.berlin.de/lb/inttnig/islamforum/index.html (accessed March 15, 2012). 182 Former Commissioner for Foreigners Barbara John and Researcher on Islam Riem Spielhaus considered the academy as appropriate vehicle for Muslim participation at the time, as it aims to be inclusive of the different strands of Islam and as a research and educational institution was eligible to public funding, two criteria that the structure of Muslim organisations in Berlin was unable to provide (Interview Schneider). See also www.muslimische-akademie.de/ (accessed March 14, 2012). 183 Interview Körting. mAhmadijyah - Muslimische Gemeinde Berlin (Muslim Ahmadi Community Berlin), Förderverein alevitisches Gedächtnis (Promotion Association Alevi Memory), Forum Muslime Tempelhof (Muslim Forum Tempelhof), Haus der Weisheit e. V. (House of Wisdom), Initiative 'berliner Muslime - IBMUS (Initiative of Berlin Muslims), Inssan für kulturelle Interaktion (Inssan for Cultural Interaction), Interkulturelles Zentrum für Dialog und Bildung e.V. - IZDB (Intercultural Center for Dialog and Education), Islamische Föderation in Berlin (Islamic Federation Berlin), Islamisches Kultur- und FLr%iehmgs%entrum e. V. - IKEZ (Islamic Cultural and Educational Center Berlin), Islamisches Kulturzentrum der Bosniaken in Berlin e. V. (Is-

159

mayors of districts with large Muslim populations (Kreuzberg-Friedrichshain, Mitte and Neukölln), the State Working Group of Commissioners for Integration, deputies from senate departments in charge of education and religious affairs, and other faith communities.185 Also represented are the police, the Office for the Protection on the Constitution, three neighbourhood management offices (QMs), and three members of immigrant civil society organisations.186 'I supported the project from the beginning because I care for tolerance in Eving together. I went with police and Office for the Protection of the Constitution because it felt that we could reduce fears, meeting with organisations with a different understanding of the state from ours.'187 Sessions are held four times a year in the city hall. The hosts, the Muslim Academy and the Office of the Commissioner for Integration and Immigration of the Senate, carefully selected participants. The objective was to represent the heterogeneity of the Muslim community in Berlin and include organisations with large memberships. This led to the invitation of both individual mosque associations and most of the larger Muslim umbrella organisations. Milli Görüs, the largest Turkish umbrella organisation in the city, is at least indirecdy represented through the Islamic Federation Berlin.188 'While their direct involvement in the forum remained problematic, Islamist groups were consulted during the set-up of the forum in order to gain their tacit support, and through the membership of the forum Islamist groups continue to be consulted on its work' (Change Institute 2008: 78). The search was also determined by the attempt to find people who speak enough German to be able to fully participate during sessions.189 Representatives of Alevite and Ahmadi were also invited. Sunni and Shiite Muslims do not recognise them as part of Islam and described their participation initially as lamic Cultural Center of Bosniacs in Berlin), Kulturzentrum Anatolischer Aleviten e.V. (Cultural Center of Anatolian Alevi), Türkisch-Islamische Anstalt fiir Religion e.V. — DITIB (Turkish-Islamic Union of the Institution for Religion), Verband der Islamischen Kulturzentren e.V. — VIKZ (Association of Islamic Cultural Centers). 185 Jewish Community Berlin, Catholic and Protestant Churches of Berlin. 186 Karame e.V. (Arab youth center), Türkische Gemeinde Berlin e.V. (Turkish Community in Berlin), Türkischer Bund Berlin-Brandenburg - TBB (Turkish Association Berlin-Brandenburg). 187 Interview Körting. 188 The Senator of Internal Affairs was reluctant about including Shiite organisations like Milli Görüs (IGMG) who themselves were equally reluctant about participation (Interview Spielhaus). IGMG is under observation by the Office for the Protection of the Constitution for representing anti-constitutional values, but not considered to encourage the use of violence {Senatsverwaltung fiir Innern und Sport 2010: 32-38). A number of Arab mosque associations under observation are represented through IBMUS. 189 Interview Spielhaus.

Exemplary Cases

160

'major headache'. The interest in having this representative platform was higher than ideological concerns, however. 190 The presence of two Turkish and one Arab non-religious civil society organisation is meant to represent Muslims who are not members of a mosque association or Muslim umbrella organisation (.Abgeordnetenhaus 2009).

Process and Outcomes Today the Islamforum is the most important body in Berlin for contact and deliberation between Muslim organisations and high-level representatives of the Berlin administration. It is described as a model project for participation by and strengthening of civil society in the 2007 Berlin integration plan (Abgeordnetenhaus Berlin 2007a: 84). One of the basic principles of the Islamforum points to the improvement of 'communication between Muslim and non-Muslim publics', characterised as 'massively distorted' at the time of its constitution. 191 This distortion goes back to public discourse and communication structures in Berlin.192 Despite the hope that the Islamforum will eventually contribute to improved discourse between Muslims and majority society in the public sphere, sessions are closed to the public (Islamforum Berlin 2005: 1). This is not considered a deviation from the principle of enhancing public discourse, it rather is seen as an indirect contribution to public discourse. From the beginning, the Islamforum hoped to facilitate cooperation between Muslim associations and public bodies and other civil society organisations in city and districts through the generation of trust and new networks (Humboldt-Universität 2007: 142). Creating a nonpublic 'protected space' was the first step to foster an open exchange of views, criticism and self-critique. As a closed mini-public, it is protected from the Berlin media, which has a tendency to misrepresent Muslim issues (HumboldtUniversität 2007: 150). Not only does it facilitate Muslim participation in deliberation, it also allows high-level representatives from authorities such as the Senator for Interior and the President of the Office for the Protection of the Constitution to speak freely. One of the first publicly visible initiatives of the Islamforum were public Friday prayers in 40 mosques across Berlin on September

Interview Spielhaus, email. Islamforum Berlin (2005) Grundsätze, available at www.berlin.de/lb/intmig/islamforum/index.html (accessed March 14, 2012). 192 Co-initiator of Islamforum Riem Spielhaus points to the development of immigrationrelated power structures in the city, where secular immigrant actors used to reject communicating with Muslim associations and organisations. This prevented the establishment of communication and allowed secular actors to maintain their privilege of interpretation and existing structures of representation that excluded religious Muslim voices (Humboldt-Universität 2007: 142). 190 191

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8, 2006 to mark the fifth anniversary in memory of the victims of the terrorist attacks of September 11^.193 Abdul Hadi Hoffmann of the Muslim Academy underlines that the Islamforum is not a platform for dialogue but an operational body that describes and discusses practical problems in everyday life in the city with the aim to look for solutions, 'without another round of wasting time' and 'ideological self-reflections' (Humboldt-Universität 2007: 144). The focus is not religious but political communication, a platform to deal with conflicts, relevant to societal integration. 'The Islamforum always helped me to find out about particular sensitivities and to see if we can accommodate such sensitivities in political or administrative terms.'194 The first three sessions during the pilot phase 2005/ 2006 still focussed on general issues related to Islam in practical discourse and day-to-day living. They covered the topic of security and how security discourse affects both majority society and Muslim communities. The next meeting focussed on the role that mosque associations can play in their neighbourhoods and which potentials they have in improving educational performance of Muslim children and youth. This resulted in the publication of a declaration by mosque associations, Alevite Communities and other Muslim organisation of their willingness to contribute to life in their neighbourhoods. It spells out areas of possible cooperation between Muslims and majority society. This declaration was distributed to other Muslim associations, non-organised Muslims, Berlin's state administrative institutions and the majority civil society organisations (Handlungsfelder 2007: 6). It is in line with the conceptualisation of the Islamforum as a discursive body that offers advise and suggestions rather than specific projects. The third session revolved around different ideas of representing Muslim concerns in relation to public institutions.195 After the pilot phase of the Islamforum, participants issued a declaration stating that conflicts in living together in the city are mostly unrelated to religious issues but to problems such as levels of education and a precarious social status that conflicts with demands for participation (Färber/ Spielhaus 2006: 26). Participation is major concern of the Islamforum. The ultimate aim, in the understanding of co-host Muslim Academy, is to empower people to participate. 'Participation through empowerment is not far-off from the focus of the Berlin integration plan on 'integration through participation" (Humboldt-Universität 2007: 147). During the first two years, the Islamforum mosdy addressed getting to know each other and the development of trust in communication. It initiated 193 194 195

www.berlin.de/lb/intrnig/islamforum/index.html (accessed March 14, 2012). Interview Körting. See www.berlin.de/lb/intmig/islamforum/index.htrnl (accessed March 14, 2012).

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Exemplary Cases

bilateral communication between individual Muslim organisations and highranking officials, such as the Minister for the Interior, opening new channels of access. Contact with the Commissioner for Integration and Immigration of the Senate is on going.196 Agenda-setting initially was the responsibility of the Commissioner for Integration and Immigration and the Muslim Academy. In 2006 the Academy organised a meeting of all Muslim participants of the Islamforum, where they indicated a strong interest to be more involved in placing topics for discussion, which was agreed upon by the Islamforum organisers. Another extension of the original format of Islamforum meetings was the introduction of a current affairs section, where each participant can voice an issue or a desired topic of conversation (Humboldt-Universität 2007: 153). Further topics discussed during several meetings of the Islamforum were training for Imams, Islamophobia, reactions to mosque building plans, discrimination against women wearing the veil, and Muslim burials and burial grounds, which triggered various activities.197 Following discussions with Muslim organisations in the Islamforum, the Muslim Academy began a yearlong training programme for Imams recruited from outside Germany in 2008. In order to strengthen Imams in the practical support of their congregations, they learned about the institutional structures of Germany and visited political institutions - from the German parliament to the mayor of a district. According to Robin Schneider of the Office of the Commissioner for Integration and Immigration, Muslim organisations in the Islamforum did not reject this but were reluctant in their support. 'They realised that it doesn't hurt them and actually benefits their Imams. This is why we would like to continue the programme.'198 The fact that the organisers of the Islamforum cared for the support of Muslim participants indicates the wish to find solutions based on mutual agreement. In 2009 the Islamforum established a working group on Islamophobia and discrimination against women wearing a headscarf (Abgeordnetenhaus Berlin 2009). In 2011 the Commissioner for Integration and Immigration and the Open Society Foundations began funding a joint project of Inssan and the anti-discrimination body of the Turkish Community Berlin-Brandenburg (TBB) against the dis-

Interview Spielhaus. See www.berlin.de/lb/intmig/islamforum/index.html (accessed March 14, 2012). 198 Interview Schneider and Beauftragter für Migration und Integration des Berliner Senats, Press Release October 15, 2008. 196 197

Auflaktveranstaltung Weiterbildung für Imame und Seelsorgerinnen und Seelsorger' am 22.10.2008. www.berHn.de/lb/intrnig/presse/archiv/20081015.1000.111733.htrnl (accessed December 16, 2011)

163

crimination of Muslims.199 'This is great. I would never have thought this to be possible at the time the Islamforum was founded.'200

Islamforum contributions to Muslim participation: Muslim prison counselling Currently only few Berlin prisons offer spiritual services for Muslim prisoners. One prison offers a range of services such as monthly Friday prayers, Ramadan and Iftar services, carried out by the Turkish consulate and mainly provided for Turkish inmates. In another prison, the berliner Strafgefangene und Krankenhilfe (Berlin Support for Prison Inmates and the Sick), an association with mostly Turkish members, offers biweekly discussion groups for Turkish people and Muslims of different ethnic origin. Four other prisons offer either Muslim faith discussion groups or a visit by an Imam once a month. The remaining five Berlin prisons provide no spiritual services for Muslims (Abgeordnetenhaus Berlin 2009b). A few Muslim civil society organisations have offered spiritual guidance on a voluntary basis in Berlin prisons, most prominently Uchtjugend e. V., a group of Muslim academics.201 The Berlin Senate Department for Justice asked the Round Table for Foreign Prisoners, an initiative begun in 2000202, to contact Muslim organisations to discuss the shortage of spiritual counselling for Muslims in Berlin prisons. They approached three Muslim organisations represented in the Islamforum (DITIB, Islamic Federation Berlin, IBMUS) and three other Muslim associations individually to get their input and ideas on how to organise services for Muslim inmates. To save time, the six associations agreed to look into the issue independently and began a work group that, a year and a half later, resulted in the formation of a new association, Muslimische Gefängnisseelsorge e. V. (Muslim Prison Counselling).203 According to Imran Sagir, one of the initiators of this new association, it has a direct link to the Islamforum. He describes membership in the Islamforum as a 'sign of quality assurance' for cooperation. The Senate Department for Justice followed the advice of the Office of the Commissioner for Integration and

199Beauftragter für Migration und Integration des Berliner Senats: Aktiv gegen die Diskriminierung von Muslimen. Press Release December 8, 2010 ww.berlin.de/lb/intmig/presse/archiv/20101208.1000.322307.html (accessed March 14, 2012). 200 Interview Nofal. 201 www.lichtjugend.de/verein/ (accessed March 14, 2012). 202 www.freiabos.de/rundertisch.html (accessed March 14, 2012). 203 consisting of IBMUS, IFB, DITIB , Uchtjugend, a mosque association in Berlin Schöneberg and Muslim Counselling Hotline (Interview Sagir).

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Exemplary Cases

Immigration of the Senate regarding whom to contact on Muslim side. It shows the springboard character of the Islamforum.

Sending signals to the public sphere: Muslim burials and Muslim cemetery In reaction to the 2010 Berlin Law on Participation and Integration, the law on burials in Berlin was amended in March 2011, introducing burials without coffins and conducted in less than 48 hours, which is in accordance with Islamic burial requirements. Burials had also been under discussion in the Islamforum, one that former Senator of Internal Affairs Körting said is pleased to be resolved.204 'I appreciate the fact that we were invited to give input to the new law, I really think this is great. I think in this respect Berlin is much further than other German states.'205 A related topic that has been frequently discussed is the question of enlarging or opening a new Muslim cemetery. Currently there are two Muslim cemeteries. One in a central location in Neukölln next to Sehitlik mosque, which is full; the other is in Gatow, a suburb in the southwest of Berlin. Many Muslims are buried in Turkey, if relatives can afford it. This is an issue that needs to be addressed.206 For many years DITIB and the Islamic Federation have expressed the wish for a Muslim cemetery, for example in the Immigrant Advisory Board of the Senate. The Senate Department for Urban Planning and the Environment, aware of the lack of space, encouraged deliberation on this issue. The Berlin parliament also discussed the issue. Muslim civil society organisations found themselves unable to respond to this invitation to participation, constrained by a lack of resources, both in terms of time to look into the issue and in terms of finances. As volunteer-run organisations, they struggle prioritising issues. Complicating things further, none of the Muslim umbrella organisations can shoulder the maintenance costs of another cemetery by themselves. 207 The issue has been on Islamforum's agenda on several occasions, which has helped working towards an agreement. This is a complex challenge for Muslim organisations in Berlin, as it requires a level of coordination that has not yet been practiced. While the Office of the Commissioner for Integration and Immigration supports the extension of the more central Muslim cemetery and deems Muslim activists to be too hesitant on this issue, Muslim organisations must look into the issue of being recognised as a

204 205 206 207

Interview Körting. Interview Nofal. Interview Cetin. Interviews Nofal, Cetin, Sagir.

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religious community in order to get permission to run a cemetery.208 This requires agreement among several large Muslim umbrella associations with different religious and ethnic backgrounds. Without the Islamforum, where Muslim organisations have agreed to cooperate on several issues, there would be hardly any basis for this kind of internal decision-making process.

Signs of building bridges among Muslim civil society organisations Despite internal differences, Muslim associations and organisations represented in the Islamforum built symbolic bridges early on. Populist protests against the Ahmadi congregation's plans to build a mosque in the Eastern district of Pankow-Heinersdorf in 2006 led to a joint declaration that put religious disagreements aside. Participants in the Islamforum issued a statement highlighting freedom of religion as an important constitutional norm, deriving the right of any religion to erect places of worship and expressing their worries about public protests against a mosque. "We see dialogue as the only way to solve this conflict. The Islamforum feels obliged to dialogue and offers its support' (Färber/ Spielhaus 2006: 26). On this occasion, the Islamforum served as a political rather than a religious deliberative forum. 'In the session on the mosque building conflict I remember Burhan Kesici (of the Islamische Föderation) saying that this forum was not a theological event and that theological conflicts are hence less important.'209 He went on to say that Ahmadis were attacked because they are perceived as Muslims, and that his congregation would face the same public hostility. The cemetery offers a new incentive for stronger cooperation. Five Muslim umbrella organisations are forming a larger joint umbrella association, bringing together more Turkish and Arab organisations in Berlin than ever before. IBMUS, Islamic Federation Berlin and IZDB are Islamforum members that form part of this new coalition, in addition to IGMG Milli Görüs and a mosque association in the district of Neukölln. The fact that Milli Görüs is a member does not pose a problem in terms of dialogue. 'They were never a problem for us. Senator Körting agrees. The Office for the Protection of the Constitution is still checking them but this does not imply prohibition of communication.'210 This new umbrella structure would not replace deliberation with individual members in the Islamforum.211 If the merger were successful, it would complement the communicative structure in Berlin. However, important organisations such as

Interview Schneider. Interview Spielhaus, email. 210 Interview Schneider. 211 At the time of interviews there was not yet a name decided for this new umbrella association, hence I will simply refer to 'new' umbrella organization.

208 209

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DITIB and VIKZ have not yet signalled the willingness to join, which is a disadvantage - e.g. if the new structure wanted to push the cemetery agenda. Muslim activists have expressed the need for patience. 'First we get organised and then we bring in the others.'212 The fact that an extended Muslim cemetery has been discussed in the Islamforum, the new association planning to provide counselling for Muslim prison inmates leads to Muslim activist reflection like: W e should have done this years ago, but we didn't manage.'213 According to Schneider, a council of Muslim organisations in Berlin would have another public dimension than the Islamforum — but it could still claim to have been the trigger.214

Outlook Organisers and participants want to continue the Islamforum. After the change in government in September 2011, the Senator of Internal Affairs, Ehrhart Körting stepped down. At the time of writing it was not clear if his conservative successor would continue to participate in the sessions of the Islamforum. In March 2012 Commissioner for Integration and Immigration Günter Piening also announced his departure. The Islamforum thus lost two staunch supporters of the deliberation process. Due to changes in personnel, the Muslim Academy's future involvement in the Islamforum is unclear. The Office of the Commissioner for Integration and Immigration is subordinate to the Senate Department for Integration, Work and Social Affairs. The Islamforum could be chaired by the new Social Democrat Senator for Integration Dilek Kolat.215 The participants have drafted a position paper on the future of the Islamforum, proposing a review of the initial working principles.216 Former Senator Körting points out that actors always come and go. This is not the end of the world. 'Opening structures for participation was a general concern in Berlin that was supported by many. Something hit the road, I hope it is catching.'217

Interview Razzaque. Interview Razzaque. 214 Interview Schneider. 215 Interview Schneider. 216 Session 17, October 2011: Further development of the Islamforum www.berlin.de/lb/intmig/islamforum/islamforum_sitzungl7.html (accessed March 15, 212 213

2012). 217

Interview Körting.

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6.2. Participation in the Neighbourhood: Haci Bayram W e discovered new ways. Integration means participation, participation means recognition. When I meet people in the district administration, they know me now — we are no longer strangers. They say: Haci Bayram is on the right path.' Selcuk Saydam, Haci Bayram mosque

Institutional background and case history The district of Mitte, where Haci Bayram mosque is located, is the most densely populated area of Berlin. Immigrants (27.8%) and people with migration background make up 45% of the Mitte's population (Jntegrationsprogramm Mitte 2011/12: 6). The proportion of children and young people is higher than other parts of the city. The district is marked by structural poverty, unemployment (unemployment is 26.7%, compared to 18.1% across Berlin) and poor educational achievement, which is on the rise (Jntegrationsprogramm Mitte 2011/12: 7). 'Such problems lead to a systematic and growing relation between social inequality (education, income, standard of living, etc.) and ethnic belonging (ethnic stratification)' {Jntegrationsprogramm Mitte 2011 /12: 8). In accordance with the Berlin Integration Plan, the Commissioner for Integration of the district administration assembled a local integration programme, directed at all administrative departments of the district (Abgeordnetenhaus Berlin 2007: 91-95). Areas of action identified in Mitte include: learning German, the intercultural opening of the district administration, schools, and participation through the district's Immigrant Advisory Board. The focus of integration policy for the coming years is described as 'supporting communication, respect, participation, and equal treatment' (Jntegrationsprogramm Mitte 2011/12: 9), which is in line with requirements for communicative action defined by Habermas. The vague term 'integration' has been replaced by the more precise goal of equal participation in central areas of social life, such as education, upbringing, cultural life, the economy and employment (Jntegrationsprogramm Mitte 2011/12: 10). Furthermore, the Integration Programme refers to the negative nature of public discourse on immigration and integration. 'In educational discussions, as well as in the press and the public, children with migration background usually stand for 'problems" {Jntegrationsprogramm Mitte 2011/12: 30). The programme remarks that such a homogenous conception of migration backgrounds does not reflect the diversity of the district. It moves on to demand a common understanding of terms such as integration and equal opportunities beyond simplifications (Jntegrationsprogramm Mitte 2011/12: 31). The focus is much more on the role of the administration to listen to civil society organisations to tell it about issues and concerns that need tackling, rather than

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on placing demands on immigrant communities to adapt to certain ways of life. The Mitte Immigrant Advisory Board, for instance, is supposed to advise the steering group in charge of intercultural opening of the administration {Integrationsprogramm Mitte 2011/12: 25). It consists of different representatives of immigrant organisations or those working for immigrants, the Commissioner of Integration for the district Berlin-Mitte, members of the district parliament (Be^irksverordnetenversammlung) and guests representing different areas of action.218 The different sections of the district administration are called upon to take measures to work towards integration goals that concern Muslim communities in the district as defined in the Berlin Integration Plan, and to support individuals, particularly children and youth, in their ability to communicate, in order to get involved without giving up their various identities.219 A focus on integration is also part of the office of the Commissioner for European Affairs, who is in charge of monitoring progress of EU-funded projects. Since 2010 the EU has funded half of the neighbourhood management budget, as well as many other projects looking at building local social capital, economic growth and labour market integration (Integrationsprogramm Mitte 2011 /12: 49). Neighbourhood management (QM) is working towards integrating different communities in local areas that usually consist only of a few streets at a time. In areas such as Wedding, which is part of the Berlin-Mitte district, this means working with people and initiatives representing a wide range of ethnic, religious and social groups in the neighbourhood, trying to connect them in order to ultimately enhance their living conditions and opportunities locally. The deliberative mini-public at QM level is called Quartiersrat (neighbourhood council), an elected forum of residents of the neighbourhood, local institutions, associations and initiatives such as schools, child-care facilities, citizens' groups, religious associations, youth clubs and local businesses elected for two years.220 It is designed to deepen communication and the understanding of different positions (Integrationsprogramm Mitte 2011/12: 48). However, participants are usually white and better educated. Representatives of immigrant or Muslim groups either do

218 see Geschäftsordnung des Ausländerbeirates (Rules of Order of the Foreigner Advisory Board) on the homepage of the Commissioner for Integration in Berlin-Mitte www.berlin.de/ba-mitte/org/integrationsreferent/index.htrnl (accessed 15 November 2011). 219 The Commissioner for Equality, the Department for Health, Social Services, the Department for Youth, Schools and Sport all run special programmes aiming at social equality, participation and empowerment for immigrant and minority groups, who among young people in some local areas actually form the majority (Integrationsprogramm

Mitte 2011). 220

www.deinkiez.de/Quartiersrat.4846.0.html (accessed November 16, 2011)

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not stand for elections or tend not to speak up. The same is true for the regular area conferences.221 Haci Bayram is one of the oldest mosque associations in Berlin, founded in 1976 and frequented by Muslims of Turkish origin, who make up some 30% of the population in the neighbourhood Soldiner Kie% This Kie% (neighbourhood) has one of the highest concentrations of Muslim associations in Berlin.222 Among them are cultural organisations, which are mostly disguised pubs where citizen engagement is not at all on the agenda. Religious associations include a cultural organisation of the Alevite community. Between 2000 and 2008 several new mosque associations were established, among them IZDB, which was interviewed for this research. In line with the district mayor's office, the neighbourhood management (QM) Soldiner Kiez decided to seek working relationships with Muslim residents.223 The mosque had already been involved with the local Quartiersmanagement (QM) for some years and participated in neighbourhood initiatives and street festivities, but they never conceptualised their own projects. In 2008 the board members of Haci Bayram Mosque in Berlin-Mitte approached a local baker, a member of the mosque community, with a special mission: they were looking for a project manager to open the mosque to the wider community. They knew the baker was going to close down his business and would have time available. They also thought of him as a person with communication skills. For the past 10 years, community members both financially and physically supported the construction of a new mosque building and community centre. The mosque's board consisted mainly of builders and taxi drivers. It was time to give something back to the community. 'What people need most is respect and acceptance by others in this area. We never opened up to the wider German society and they never got to know us. During the 1970s and 1980s, the state ignored us. Some 100,000 Muslims are living here, but schools, the local administration, nobody opened up to us.'22" Over tea and sesame rolls, the board members convinced Selcuk Saydam the baker to join the board, do public relations and project work. Apart from occasionally sponsoring activities for the mosque Saydam had no previous experience with project design, funding applications or PR. He heard about a new

Interview Niggemeier. There are two types of Muslim associations in the neighborhood: so-called Kulturvereine (culture clubs), basically pubs, and religious associations (Interview Fischer). 223 Interview Fischer. 224 Interview with Saydam.

221

222

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Exemplary Cases

community organising initiative in his part of the city.225 Community organising is a concept aimed at strengthening self-determination of citizens, social justice and the power of solidarity. The new community organising initiative began its work in Wedding in 2008 under the name Wirsind da! Biirgerplattform Mitte/Moabit (We are here! Citizen Platform Mitte/ Moabit).226 Saydam went to one of their meetings, hoping to learn new skills, and he began doing research on project tenders and funding opportunities on the Internet. When he saw a call for project proposals encouraging mosque participation in an educational project on the website of the Quartienmanagement Soldiner Kiez, Saydam set to work. Education is of great concern to many Muslims: 'One day there will be no more Hartz IV (unemployment benefits). What shall we do then? There are no more assembly lines, there is no industry ... This is a problem that has crossed the doorstep of our mosque, our children must be able to overcome this educational barrier and leave the Soldiner Kiez.'227 He drafted a proposal focussing on parental support and education, and submitted it just before the deadline. Three weeks later he received a phone call telling him that the Commissioner for Integration of the district, Maryam Stibenz, and the local mayor, Christian Hanke, wanted to support Haci Bayram with their proposal. According to Stibenz, the administration wants to activate the social potential of mosque associations, which is precisely what she told Saydam.228 'This was the first wake-up-call for Haci Bayram. For 30 years, society has been telling us what is right and what is wrong. Immigrants listened to mainstream society. Now, immigrants have to decide themselves over right or wrong. We can do it ourselves — Mustafa and Ali can do it. This is what we must show our congregation'.229

Refer also to the website of the Biirgerplattform Berlin Mitte/Moabit www.wir-sind-daberlin.de/ (accessed May 2011). 226 The concept goes back to American Sociologist S.D. Alinsky (1090-1972), who looked into questions of local organisation and social disintegration of local neighbourhoods. Community organising seeks to identify structural problems in the neighbourhood and then aims to solve them through deliberative process and the development of practical solutions for problems. The strengthening of ties between individuals and community groups is essential, as associations and organisations function as schools of democracy and multipliers (Huber 2010: 38-40). 227 Interview Saydam. 228 Interview Stibenz. 229 Interview Saydam. 225

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Process and outcome The QM tender had called for proposals for a tandem project with a mosque association.230 Haci Bayram applied individually and needed a partner organisation. The search entailed the challenge that the partner had to be experienced enough to be able to provide support to the mosque association, which lacked experience on how to run a publicly financed project. At the same time, this partner had to be ready to work with an organisation met with public and political reservations.231 Finally, QM and district administration teamed Haci Bayram with a well-established German welfare organisation, the Arbeiterwohlfahrt (AWO). The local AWO office in Berlin-Mitte had no experience working with a mosque, and it took some internal discussion between local and regional office before going ahead with the idea. AWO had no local presence in Soldiner Kie% and no experience working with a religious, Muslim organisation. Finally, the decision was made that 'active support of integration requires creative approaches'.232 Initially AWO was supposed to deal with organisational issues and be in charge of administrative tasks including budgeting. District Commissioner for Integration Stibenz, however, insisted on an agreement of cooperation based on equality.233 Next, political support for the tandem project was needed, especially since Haci Bayram appeared in the 2008 report of the Office for the Protection of the Constitution.234 The support of the conservative party (CDU) in Mitte was not at all guaranteed.235 At a meeting with the Social City, Integration and Equality commission of the district parliament of Berlin-Mitte in September 2009,

230The

tandem concept goes back to the worry that public funding of a mosque association could be exaggerated in the media. It was also a protection against political objections based on worries of religious fundamentalism in relation to youth work because of the IGMG connection of Haci Bayram (see below). (Interview Rix) 231 An additional problem was that Selcuk Saydam had based the concept for his proposal on the project model of another organization in the neighbourhood, who had also applied for new funding. The proposal to do their project in partnership with Haci Bayram was rejected (Hunger/Metzger 2011: 48-9). 232 Interview Rix. 233 Interview Stibenz. 234 For contacts with IGMG, who apparently increased their work to recruit youth for the organization. Haci Bayram opened a youth club in 2008 (Senatsverwaltungfur Inneres und Sport 2008: 52). 235 The CDU has always been reluctant about funding Muslim organisations. The conservatives have also been at the forefront of preventing representative mosque building projects in Berlin. see also Abgeordnetenhaus 2009.

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Exemplary Cases

Saydam underlined the need for this project. He pointed to conversations with parents at the mosque in which it became evident that the role of education is underestimated.236 In the end, the deputies of the conservative party (CDU) of Berlin-Mitte agreed the project funding, commending its model character, provided the results would be evaluated after two years. Saydam was relieved: 'The CDU - I have many friends who are members of the CDU, but they did give me a stomach ache. (...) We presented our project and were convinced the CDU would vote against it because we are mentioned in the Report for the Protection of the Constitution. (...) And the CDU, oh my God, then this CDU-guy gets up and says 'we support the project'.'237 The project began in 2009 with several units. The module 'Home Instruction of Parents with Preschool Youngsters (HIPPY)' addresses immigrant families with children between 4-6 years of age. The aim is to practice German, and it works on the basis of training women from the same ethnic group to visit and work with mothers and children in their homes.238 Women who belong to the mosque help 16 families. Training women from the congregation includes an element of sustainability, as they are likely to stay and pass on their knowledge.239 However, one of the driving forces behind the project, a fluent, bilingual woman born in Turkey and raised in Germany, has moved back to Turkey.240 The learning and play programme OSTAPJE focuses on families with children aged between 18-24 months, either at home or in playgroups that allow intercultural and interreligious contact. Another initiative is support for school children. Information sessions for mothers were organised in the mosque facilities to ask questions about primary school. 'The Imam says you should not raise your children the way you were raised but in accordance with their envi-

'Auszug — Tandemprojekt Elternbildung im QM Soldiner Strasse - Projektvorstellung durch das BA und den Projektträge f, 28. Öffentliche Sitzung des Ausschusses für Soziale Stadt (QM), Integration und Gleichstellung, September 16, 2009. 237 Interview Saydam. 238 The acquisition of German skills is essential for educational success. According to the Department for Education Science and Research of the Berlin Senate levels of fluency in both German and foreign mother tongue have declined over the past years. Part of the Berlin integration plan is free child care from the age of 3 up to school age (6 age), to make sure more children spend more time in a German-speaking environment where fluency is observed and facilitated, before entering school. See Bezirksamt Mitte (2010) Auszug - Konzept Sprachförder^entrum, 32. öffentliche Sitzung des Ausschusses Soziale Stadt (QM), Integration und Gleichstellung, Berlin, 20.1.2010. www.berlin.de/ba-mitte/org/auslaenderbeauftragter/sprachfoerderung.kinder3bis6.kital.html (accessed May 2011). 239 Interview Saydam. 240 Interview Rix. 236

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ronment. In Germany, our children enjoy freedom and less pressure in school. We can't be so strict with them anymore.'241 An idea proposed by Selcuk Saydam led to the establishment of a child-care workshop for fathers to enhance communication between fathers and their children. Fathers meet once a month at the mosque and exchange experiences. Many struggle with cultural conflicts inside their families, since traditionally raised fathers clash with more liberalminded youngsters. New initiatives and ideas developed during the period of cooperation. The partners began inviting each other to events. 'Initially, AWO had to deal with prejudice, like how do they treat women, will they accept our working methods. The mosque worried that AWO could dominate the project. We achieved more than expected. The joint approach removed all stereotypes and concerns.'242

Outlook The project awaits evaluation, which will determine if project funding will be renewed. A positive conclusion could indicate a change of direction for Haci Bayram as well as the work of the Commissioner for Integration towards more cooperation and active institutional support for Muslim civil society participation.243 However, Haci Bayram will need a partner, as it lost its charitable status after appearing in the report for the Protection of the Constitution. Niggemeier of the QM Soldiner Kiez suggested it is not at all helpful when a partner in one of its projects is stripped off the ability to receive further funding.244 Involvement in this project triggered a wide range of activities that connects Haci Bayram mosque with other initiatives in the neighbourhood. The mosque hosted a community organising meeting in June 2010 to discuss cooperation with local schools, with the Senate's participation, to address poor performance of immigrant children in school.245 The Haci Bayram Burgerladen (citizen shop) opened in February 2011, inviting people in in German and Turkish. People from all communities are welcome to receive support regarding f i l l i n g out forms or dealing with school problems. Once a week, social workers, a lawyer and the local police talk to area residents. Selcuk Saydam describes the Burgerladen as another step towards an open, common future. Members of the Haci Bayram community inaugurated the Interview Saydam. Interview Rix. 243 So far, Commissioner for Integration Maryam Stibenz tried to keep the press out, too worried they would report negatively (Interview Stibenz). 244 Interview Niggemeier. 245 Starting in summer 2011 with a reward scheme for parents and students (Interview Saydam). 241

242

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Exemplary Cases

initiative with a prayer, demonstrating the support of the community. The district mayor, who attended the inauguration with representatives of non-Muslim neighbourhood initiatives, described Islam 'as a part of our world'.246 Saydam is very keen to not only be personally involved with the Bürgerplattform, but to involve the broader Haci Bayram community.247 According to Katja Niggemeier of the QM office, he will have to recruit a team of people to continue community work inside and outside the mosque, as all the new activities are becoming too much for him to manage on his own.248 Saydam joined the immigrant party BIG, for which he stood as candidate in the 2011 elections in Berlin.

6.3. Impact of Integration Philosophy on Deliberation: Neukölln and Kreuzberg 'I don't think anything will change until there is a change of personnel. I believe all attempts community organising might make will be thwarted.' Imran Sagir, Muslim Counselling Hotline

Despite its large number of Muslim residents, Neukölln is a district that offers few opportunities for deliberation between Muslim organisations, administration and other civil society. An overview of Neukölln's integration approach and the dominant philosophy of integration underline the importance of structural facilitation of deliberation. It also shows the high dependence of individual politicians at the administrative level. Neukölln's mayor uses rhetoric of parallel societies that calls for a firm hand when facing a challenge of a largely uneducated immigrant population. This value-based interpretation of integration leaves little room for Muslim participation. The Neukölln approach contrasts with the neighbouring district of KreuzbergFriedrichshain, which is also home to a large population with roots in predominantly Muslim countries.249 Kreuzberg's administration follows a more inclusive approach and nurtures communication with Muslim communities. Muslim organisations are represented within various political bodies. Local government funding is distributed to Muslim groups, and district authorities and 246 Dein Kiez: „Der Haci-Bayram Bürgerladen ist eröffnet' (March 1, 2011). www.deinkiez.de/Der-Haci-Bayram-Buergerladen-ist-eroeffnet.5989.0.html (accessed April 13, 2012). 247 Interview Saydam. 248 Interview Niggemeier. 249 As the Muslim population of the district lives mostly in former West Berlin district Kreuzberg I will only refer to Kreuzberg in the following chapters, even though the district administration encompasses both areas.

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religious associations cooperate on local projects (Open Society Foundations 2010: 19). To some extent, structures in the system impact on relationships and networking among civil society organisations. Deliberative mini-publics, projects and representation on democratic advisory boards facilitate learning, contacts and respect. The case of Neukölln presents a negative example in terms of deliberative processes engaging Muslim civil society, thus demonstrating the benefits of deliberation more clearly. A detailed study on Muslims in Berlin-Kreuzberg, including participation, already exists (Open Society Foundations 2010).

Institutional Background: Neukölln and Kreuzberg The district of Neukölln is home to some 300,000 residents, about 40% of whom are immigrants or the offspring of immigrants. In certain parts of the district, 80% of youth have a migration background, with more than 160 countries represented.250 During the 1960s, guest workers mostly from Turkey settled here. Refugees from Lebanon, Palestine and Syria, and later from the former Yugoslavia joined them during the 1980s and 1990s. Kreuzberg has a total population of around 140,000. Some 33% have a nationality other than German. Its Muslim population can be very roughly estimated at about 35,000 (Open Society Foundations 20101: 43). In Neukölln, German families and wellestablished Turkish families moved out of neighbourhoods with large refugee communities. This trend continues in neighbourhoods with dense immigrant populations, while other areas of Neukölln have begun to attract young, middleclass Germans, since rents are low and cultural opportunities numerous.251 Neukölln's policy paper on integration describes the challenge: There is no longer a majority society, as even immigrants are divided in different cultural groups. Nevertheless, Neukölln must remain a city within a context of European values' (Bezirk Neukölln 2009: 14). In order to do so, all residents should know their rights and duties, and respect the rules of the free, democratic basic order written into the German Constitution. Similar to Mitte, integration is considered to be a cross-sectional responsibility, defined as the inclusion of all immigrants in all core areas of society, including cultural life and political participation. It also

See population statistics on the website of the Neukölln Commissioner for Immigration www.berlin.de/ba-neukoelln/msbeauftragten/bevoelkerungsstruktur.html (accessed March 17, 2012). 251 Trendanalyse der Entwicklung von Neukölln und Neukölln-Nord 2002-2007 im Vergleich Berlin insgesamt und anderen Teilgebieten in 'Berlin - Zusammenfassung - Gebietskoordination QM, November 2008 www.berlin.de/imperia/md/content/baneukoelln/allgemeingoedecke/neuk_llner_tren danalyse_zusammenfassung.pdfPdownload.html (accessed December 15, 2011).

250

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Exemplary Cases

spells out the need for top-down steering (Integration ist Chefsache).252 Heinz Buschkowsky (SPD), mayor of the district since 2001, acknowledges that integration is a complex process that requires a society ready to deal with conflict. 253 Demands on the immigrant population include the willingness to integrate, the desire to learn, and a willingness to adapt to German society (Besyrksamt Neukolln 2009: l). 254 Mayor Buschkowsky is well known because of his outspokenness on integration.255 In 2004 he declared multiculturalism to be a failure,256 and he has a reputation for Islamophobic remarks.257 Still, he is much less radical in his public remarks than fellow Social Democrat Thilo Sarrazin. 'Parallel societies, lack of education, people who established living within the social system ... all exist, without doubt. However, I will put it this way, I do think it is wrong to attach this stain to all immigrants' (Buschkowsky in Deutschlandradio Kultur.25s However, he only mentions Alevite as Muslims who may feel hurt when reading negative remarks about themselves in the media.259

252 See statement on website of Neukölln's Commissioner for Immigration. www.berlin.de/ba-neukoeUn/migrationsbeauftragten/integrationspolitik.html (accessed March 17, 2012). 253 The statement was assembled under participation of the district's Immigrant Advisory Board, where Muslim organisations are not represented, but participants from organisations who represent both the Arab and Turkish communities in general. www.berlin.de/ba-neukoelln/migrationsbeauftragten / integrationspolitik.html (accessed December 4, 2011). 254 The English version simply states that „newcomers must bring the willingness to assimilate, to learn and adapt' (City Council Neukolln 2009: 1). Also the District Commissioner for Immigration, Arthur Mengelkoch used the term adaptation: „We fund projects in the areas of education and adaptation.' (Interview Mengelkoch) 255Berliner Morgenpost: Berliner Stimmen %ur Wahl als Berliner des Jahres (January 2, 2011) www.morgenpost.de/berHn-akrneU/artidel498359/BerHner-Stimmen-zur-Wahl-als-BerHner-des-Jahres.html (accessed December 14, 2011). 256 Berliner Zeitung: Genosse Klartext (September 9, 2010) www.berUner-zeitung.de/archiv/dass-multikulti-gescheitert-ist—sagt-heinz-buschkowsky-schon-lange— seit-das-auch-thilo-sarrazin-propagiert—hat-die-ratlose-spd-den-buergermeister-von-neukoelln-fuer-sich-entdeckt-genosse-klartext,l 0810590,10743754.html (accessed December 14, 2011). 257 This view was expressed in several interviews with stakeholder experts working within the city administration or as advisors for the Islamforum. Representatives of immigrant and Muslim organisations criticize him for his lack of openness towards MusHms. 258 Deutschlandradio Kultur: Buschkowsky: Sarrazin verallgemeinert stark (August 25, 2010) www.dradio.de/dkultur/sendungen/thema/1257109/ (accessed November 24, 2011). 259 *We know, we have Shiites, we have Sunnis, we have Alevi Hving here. Alevi way of Hfe is characterized by rejection of violence and equaHty between the sexes. And if

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The district's own integration policy statement, available on the website of the Commissioner Immigration, first highlights the Constitution with its norms and responsibilities as the guiding framework. The tone of the document is not free of judgment or stereotypes: 'All accept that inviolable dignity extends to atheists or homosexuals. It means that women and men are equal before the law. Girls are free to choose if they want a professional life and their occupation, if and who they want to marry' (Bezirk Neukölln 2009: 4), pointing out shortages that are largely attributed to Muslim families. Integration policy in Neukölln deems the Berlin Integration Plan to be abstract and unsuitable, even though intercultural opening is acknowledged as an important step of active integration policy.260 According to Neukölln's Commissioner for Immigration, Arthur Mengelkoch, the district is unable to implement some of its core elements such as intercultural training without additional funding. Some 30% of trainees in the Neukölln district administration are of migration background, but hardly any of them will be offered a post afterwards due to lack of funds. In his view the Plan also tends to defy realities on the ground. Mengelkoch points out that the district indeed tries to recruit men of Arab descent for vacant positions in the district administration. However, there are few suitable candidates; so far, they have only managed to hire women of Turkish background.261 After some persuasion, job centres introduced a day of intercultural learning.262 Information leaflets are available in German as a well as a number of other languages. In line with the intercultural approach, a specially trained police unit works to maintain a positive relationship with immigrant and mosque associations and other interest representations in the field of immigration and integration.263

people who are practicing Muslims, but Alevi, when they read who they are lumped together with they are not happy.' (Deutschlandradio Kultur, 25/08/2010). See also Spiegel-Online: Der Kronzeuge und die Gutmenschen (November 26, 2004). www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/0,1518,329702,00.html (accessed December 14, 2011). 260 „Developing guidelines for intercultural opening is the logical next step on the way towards exemplary and active integration policy for the district administration in Neukölln'. See: www.berlin.de/ba-neukoelln/migrationsbeauftragten/integrationspolitik.htrnl (accessed November 25, 2011). 261 Interview Mengelkoch. 262 Berliner Zeitung: Beschäftigte der Jobcenter sollen Migranten besser beraten (April 12, 2008). www.berlinonline.de/berEner-zciumg/archiv/.bin/dump.fcgi/2008/0412/berlin/0101/index.html (accessed December 4, 2011). 263 www.berlin.de/poli2ei/be2irk/dir5/aga.htrnl (accessed November 23, 2011).

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Exemplary Cases

Kreuzberg's Commissioner for Integration and Immigration points to similar difficulties in intercultural opening of the district administration. While job centres and youth welfare and health offices have taken measures, regulatory authorities and social services apparently do not see the need for diversity training. This hampers intercultural training as much as lack of resources.264

Civil society participation The Neukölln policy statement on integration underlines the necessity of bringing together 'nearly all actors of the social sphere', but it suggests a lack of willingness among immigrant families to become productive members of German society. They have 'ensconced themselves in the welfare system, as they were not interested in rising their status in German society' (Bezirksamt Neukölln 2009: 1). Respect and communication are mentioned as core guiding principles, and cooperation with associations and cultural centres is desirable, provided they embrace constitutional values (Bezirk Neukölln 2009: 6). Hence, there is little communication and no cooperation with any civil society organisations listed in the reports of the Office for the Protection of the Constitution. There is some cooperation between district and local civil society in the area of education, with initiatives that support young children. 'Early childhood support is particularly important for children from immigrant families. We must intensify early language support to enhance learning and development potentials' (Bezirk Neukölln 2009: 12). Regarding education, the district highlights two factors: the way that parents facilitate learning and support children with their school work, and the type of schooling system (Bezirk Neukölln 2009: 8). Integration policy underlines enforcement related to school attendance. Parents can be fined if their children miss school too often, and if necessary the police will escort them there. The district lobbied for all-day school, which was introduced in Berlin initially for primary schools and since 2010 for certain types of secondary schools.265 Intercultural mediators and social workers in schools support pupils and teachers, but there is no cooperation with civil society organisations with direct links to Muslim or immigrant communities in the district. Education is an area in which working with civil society organisations can generate many benefits. The Haci Bayram case in Berlin-Mitte shows that mosque associations can be valuable partners. Two organisations in contact with the district administration, M.A.H.D.I. and AKI, both run an award system for

264

Interview Reinke.

265 www.berlin.de/sen/bildung/berlin_macht_ganztags_schule/

(accessed November 23,

2011).

The TIES study on second generation immigrants in Europe confirms that educational attainment of parents matters as much as the type of school system (Crul 2008: 5-7).

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young people who graduate from school, university or other types of advanced education.266 Both seek to further intercultural understanding and organise intercultural events. Both consider working with the district administration as an important step towards mutual acceptance and respect, but there is no budget. The message to all participating immigrant civil society is the same: dialogue is possible, but funding for projects not available.267 The district generally rejects project work as means of integration. In this way it clearly departs from the 2005 Integration Plan passed by the Berlin Senate. Neukölln's mayor does not consider projects to have much impact, as stated in one of the 10 guiding principles for Neukölln's integration policy (Bezirk Neukölln 2009: 4). Other officials, such as Kreuzberg's Commissioner for Integration and Immigration, Regina Reinke, share the view that project work often lacks sustainability beyond the funding period. However, she sees it as one element of integration that must go hand-in-hand with establishing relationships and continuous dialogue.268 One exception in Neukölln is the Stadtteilmiitter project. Unemployed mothers of non-German ethnic background are trained on issues including education and health, and pass on relevant information to families in their communities (Bezirk Neukölln 2009: 13).269 Women of mostly Arab or Turkish descent mediate between immigrant families, nurseries and schools, and facilitate communication between parents, teachers and children. The project has been widely acclaimed and reproduced in other districts.270 On the whole, the integration approach of the district of Neukölln emphasises the need for structural changes to be more up to date with the new realities of a pluralist society. 'For sustainable integration systems have to adapt to changing realities of life. Under systems we understand basic institutions of the state that AKI - Arabisches Kulturinstitut (Institute for Arab Culture) has been a member of the Immigrant Advisory Board of the district, received funding for several projects as part of neighbourhood management and works with local schools in Neukölln. M.A.H.D.I. has been invited to events of the Commissioner for Immigration in the district for campaigns on issues like violence in the families, psychological support for youth. M.A.H.D.I. has awarded more than 500 young people over the past few years who obtained a school or university degree in order to demonstrate positive examples - both to other young Muslims and German society. See mahdi-ev.de/ and www.aki-ev.de/seiten_de/ueber%20uns/ueber%20uns_de.html (both accessed March 19, 2012). 267 Interviews Nazar, Chahrour, Mengelkoch . 268 Interview Reinke. 269 For more information: www.stadtteilmuetter.de (accessed November 23, 2011). 270 e.g. Kreuzberg. 266

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Exemplary Cases

guarantee a life according to the rules in terms of the free democratic basic order. They encompass nurseries, schools, district administrations, social services and job centres, as well as police and judicial institutions' (Bezirk Neukölln 2009: 12). Such changes happen to be outside the district's responsibilities.

Immigrant Advisory Board Neukölln has an Immigrant Advisory Board whose participants represent and work with Arab, Turkish, Tamil, Iraqi, Bosnian and Aussiedler communities. Some may represent Muslim views in this forum, but there is no direct input from religious Muslim civil society. Participation in such a forum generates a sense of citizenship and belonging. 'If you say something valid and it doesn't matter if you are immigrant or German, then there is a sense of equality. It nurtures a feeling of belonging. Without this feeling you will never be a citizen. This feeling must be facilitated.'271 In Kreuzberg several Muslim organisations have been members of the Immigrant Advisory Board. In line with the statement of Mahmood Nazar of AKI, one participant underlines that participation in a deliberative forum such as this raises awareness on issues beyond the individual organisation's horizon: 'The purpose is to discuss decisions or discourses that affect the whole of society. Everyone can voice their perception of problems or deficits, to present the view of someone unemployed, of a refugee, of a practicing Turkish Muslim. The point is to look at problems from different angles and perspectives.'272 The fact that a religious Muslim voice is missing in Neukölln might also mean that a certain perspective is missing. Lydia Nofal, a former member of the Immigrant Advisory Board in Berlin-Kreuzberg, remarked that she can represent Muslim views because her organisation, Inssan, is in touch with most of the other Muslim associations and organisations in the district.273 The two organisations on Neukölln's Immigrant Advisory Board representing Arab communities, DAUG and AKI, both stated that they do not work with mosque associations in the district.274 However, due to their community work they might still be aware of Muslim views and voice them during meetings. Interview Nazar. Nofal on representation in the Immigrant Advisory Board in Kreuzberg. 273 In Kreuzberg, two Muslim organisations, Inssan and DITÎB , have been members of the Immigrant Advisory Board, founded in 1971 and the first in Berlin. Members are ten civil society organisations and associations covering immigrant, welfare and educational organisations, a job center and the police department. District mayor and Commissioner for Integration and Immigration attend the monthly meetings. For more details refer to www.berlin.de/ba-friedrichshainkreuzberg/verwaltxing/org/intmigbeauftragte/beirat.html (accessed March 19, 2012) 274 Interviews El-Gewazi and Nazar. 271 272

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The absence of Muslim civil society in participatory venues is also apparent in Campus BJitli, a prestigious school project brought to life after school riots in 2006 that became notorious in the whole of Germany and a symbol for failed integration.275 Despite the high number of pupils with migration or Muslim background, the steering committee and an action group coordinating the project so far have not included Muslim civil society actors. The only immigrant group represented in either of the two bodies is the Deutsch-Türkisches Zentrum (German-Turkish Centre), a secular organisation with close ties to DITIB. There are plans to change the steering committee into an advisory board, which could include more representatives from the immigrant communities in the neighbourhood.276 The Kreuzberg district administration is generally keen to involve civil society organisations in all action areas outlined in the Berlin Integration Plan.277 The district Commissioner for Integration and Immigration first mapped existing projects and participatory structures in those areas. District administration and project participants then came together to discuss future strategies. As mentioned above, Muslim organisations are part of the Immigrant Advisory Board and cooperate in a number of QM activities.278 Several QMs in Neukölln work with local immigrant organisations, but not with Muslim associations.279 A number of Muslim organisations in Kreuzberg have proposed a candidate for the new committee of citizen deputies in 2012, including a Milli Görüs mosque association. This committee is part of Berlin's 2010 Law in Integration and Participation and seeks to strengthen eitlen participation regardless of nationality. Six citizen deputies will participate in committees of district assemblies (Bezirksverordnetenversammlungen) and be entitled to vote. At least half of the deputies should have migration background.280 The district administration in

Eingetretene Türen, Attacken auf Lehrer, Chaos im Unterricht - die Rütli-Schule galt jahrelang als Inbegriff von Schulterror. Das ändert sich: Im Problembe^rk Berän-Neukölln entsteht eine vorbildliche Bildungsoase. Die benachbarten Schulen dagegen darben weiter.' In: Spiegel Online: Vom

275

Schlachtfeld ^um Bildungsidyll (October 26, 2010). www.spiegel.de/schulspiegel/wissen/0,1518,724761,00.html

(accessed November 23,

2011)

Interview Mengelkoch. Action areas are work integration, education affirmation of diversity, strengthening communities, intercultural opening of the administration and fostering civil society participation (Abgeordnetenhaus Berlin 2007). 278 Interview Reinke. 279 according to email inquiries with each QM in Neukölln. 280 see Aufruf fur eine Bewerbung als Bürgerdeputierte /Bürgerdeputierter im Integrationsausschuss. 276

277

182

Exemplary Cases

Kreuzberg also supported a campaign during the September 2011 local elections in favour of voting rights for non-EU citizens.281 Neukölln's Commissioner for Immigration, Arthur Mengelkoch, suggested that educational standards are too low and the influence by mosques too strong to push for local voting rights.282 In Neukölln there is little exchange between district and Muslim civil society organisations. Neukölln has a rich infrastructure of mosque associations. Mosques do not usually offer activities other than Quran studies, religious services and Arabic courses. Few hold prayers in German, some offer legal advice, psychological support, homework or practical support, or special women's groups (Bezirksamt Neukölln 2010). Most of them are Turkish speaking, one Bengali and one Albanian. Neukölln is home to two Arab mosque associations, the Islamisches Kultur- und E ryjehungst>entrum and the Islamische Gemeinschaft in Deutschland (Al-Nur mosque), both of which are Sunni associations.283 They appear regularly in the Berlin intelligence reports. They are also members of IBMUS, an umbrella organisation represented in the Islamforum. One reason for the absence of Muslim civil society organisations from deliberative venues and efforts by the district administration is the fact that most mosque associations in Neukölln have been listed in Office for the Protection of the Constitution reports.284 As outlined earlier, there is a lack of common agreement on how to interpret these reports. Policy actors in other administrative contexts in Berlin tend to be more flexible in their reading of the reports. In Neukölln the reading is simple: a listing equals the end of communication. The excessive focus on intelligence reports as reference criteria for dialogue expresses a lack of trust towards Muslim organisations, which does not further integration. A non-religious youth association such as M.A.H.D.I., which has

www.berlin.de/ba-friedrichshainkreuzberg/verwaltung/org/intmigbeauftragte/buergerdeputierte.html (accessed 16 March 2012) 281 Citizens for Europe/ Jede Stimme 3iihlt (Every vote counts) organised ballots for nonEU citizens where they were able to vote in favour of communal voting rights and cast a symbolic vote for the Berlin parliament The district administration itself distributed ballot papers to all polling stations that included a vote in favour of voting rights for non-EU citizens (Interview Reinke). Only around 580 votes by both EU- and non-EU-citizens, despite outreach campaigns by some polling stations. 282 Interview Mengelkoch. 283 The district published a leaflet in 2010 informing about each of the 21 mosques in the district with a short explanation of the most important Muslim rituals and holidays. www.berlin.de/imperia/md/content/baneukoelln/bbmbbvv/moscheen_in_neuk_lln2 009_2010.pdf (accessed 23 November, 2011) 284 Interview Mengelkoch.

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never appeared in Berlin intelligence reports and is in occasional contact with the mayor and his Commissioner for Immigration, does not feel free of suspicion. This hampers dialogue and participation: 'There is only dialogue after an organisation has gone through a political vetting process. ... It is never quite clear what they (the district administration) want to use associations for. We can continue this practice that we must be twice as good as others for the next 50 years. But in the face of that young people consider returning to their families' countries of origin.'285 Insensitive public messages by the district's mayor contribute to a tense relationship between Muslim communities and district administration. Renate El-Gezawi of DAUG, a non-religious Arab-German community organisation, highlights the role that civil society organisations can play as they reach into communities and families in a way that politicians, police and child protection offices cannot.286 Without demanding any special treatment for Muslims, El-Gezawi points to Buschkowsky's ambivalent role: 'He knows that many Muslims live in the district. ... There are many problems, we are all aware of that. But he shouldn't just point a finger and say 'They have 10-12 children, someone should administer the pill'. It's not very conducive to the issue.'287 Sending security-driven and stereotyping messages can turn into quite a balancing act for organisations. One Muslim association located in Neukölln is DITIB, which runs the largest representative mosque in Berlin, the Sehitlik mosque.288 DITIB has never been subject of speculation in the Reports by the Office for the Protection of the Constitution, even though it is now networking with many other Muslim organisations that are. The relationship between the local DITIB association and the Commissioner Immigration, Arthur Mengelkoch, is friendly. The connection to the district mayor, however, is tenuous. On the one hand, Buschkowsky did not show a sign of solidarity after repeated arsenic attacks on the mosque in 2011, "while he keeps visiting the Hindu temple'.289 On the other hand, DITIB is trying to keep a good relationship with him, which has become more difficult to convey to the membership since the attacks. Ender Cetin of DITIB adds that it does not help to build trust

Interview Chahrour. DAUG - Deutsch-Arabische Unabhängige Gemeinde (Independent German-Arab Community) is member of the Neukölln Immigrant Advisory Board and cooperates with the local QM, schools, police and different parts of the district administration. For more information see daug-berlin.de/ (accessed March 19, 2012). 287 Interview El-Gewazi. 288 www.sehitlik-camii.de/ (accessed December 15, 2011) 289 Interview Cetin. 285

286

184

Exemplary Cases

when Buschkowsky keeps saying if everyone here acted like the Alevite, there would be no problem with integration.290 Remarks like this also make it harder for Muslim and immigrant organisations to fulfil their potential as a bridge between Muslim communities and mainstream society. Renate El-Gezawi confirms that being seen with Buschkowsky can create an accountability problem with the community DAUG is serving. 'On the one hand we are some kind of best practice project. It is always nice to adorn oneself with borrowed plumes, but we don't benefit from that.'291 The Change Institute report on working with Muslim civil society confirms that working only with groups that seem unsuspicious can lead to problems for the organisation in question: 'In particular those groups who are seen as being favoured by the state can have their legitimacy eroded' (Change Institute 2008: 138). The security focus also hinders networking between civil society organisations, as it can discredit associations that enjoy a certain level of trust by the administration.292 Lydia Nofal of Inssan recalls the experience of attitudes turning against them. The association wanted to build a representative mosque and community centre in Neukölln, and sought contacts with numerous civil society actors in the area. 'Early on everything went really well. We seemed to understand each other. (...) There was even some interest for cooperation. And then came this frontal attack by the district, suggesting we are a camouflage organisation and extremists, in any case something else than we pretend to be. (...) And all of sudden no one wanted anything to do with do with us anymore, they just closed their doors.'293 The dominating anti-Muslim attitude in the district's policy approach also impacts on neighbourhood management in Neukölln, as suggested by Reinhard Fischer, former QM councillor in Soldiner Kiez, now with the Senate Department for Urban Development. He adds, on the other hand, that many mosque associations are not interested in engaging in the wider society.294 Such issues do not arise in Kreuzberg because the district communicates with every association that signals an interest in doing so, regardless of its status in intelligence reports. Organisations listed in the report cannot receive public funding, but as Kreuzberg Commissioner for Integration and Immigration Regina Reinke suggests, the district administration does not want to exclude anyone. The district suffers from the same financial and staffing constraints as Neukölln, but it is trying to find creative ways of cooperation generally

Interview Cetdn. Interview El-Gezawi. 292 'Therefore we don't want anything to do with a mosque under observation by the Office for the Protection of the Constitution.' (Interview El-Gezawi) 293 Interview Nofal. 294 Interview Fischer. 290 291

185

characterised by lack of inhibition in keeping the open door for everyone, but also in terms of finding ways to include new Muslim organisations — 'you have to be creative'.295 The district has been working with Inssan for many years, nurturing an atmosphere of trust. The organisation is also working with other civil society organisations throughout Berlin. In Neukölln, Inssan's mosque building project fell through in 2008, and attempts to establish a relationship with Neukölln Mayor Heinz Buschkowsy have failed.296 Former Kreuzberg Mayor Cornelia Reinauer (Die Linke) established the Runder Tisch der Islamischen Vereine (Roundtable of Islamic Associations) in 2004, inviting Muslim associations to deliberate on issues that matter to them. This practice was picked up again under the next Mayor Schulz (Greens). Meetings are held four times a year; every Muslim association receives an invitation and can propose items for the agenda. One of the issues discussed throughout 2011 was the proliferation of gambling halls in Kreuzberg and how to protect youth. The district administration is looking for ways to find a solution. For lack of additional funding, however, all activity depends on voluntary engagement.297 The most important outcomes of this roundtable, according to Doris Nahawandi, a former Commissioner for Integration and Immigration in Kreuzberg, are new contacts between actors and deeper knowledge and trust arising out of the exchanges between the different parties involved. Tasnim El-Naggar of Muslimische Jugend (Muslim Youth), a Germany-wide organisation with regional offices, confirms that practical outputs might be low but that there is an important symbolic benefit.298 'The patronage by Mayor Schulz is worth a lot. (...) He is great; he talks openly and takes people seriously. Discussions are on equal level. He always offers his symbolic support. (...) Associations literally open up in order to satisfy a deep longing for discussion.'299 However, participants tend to be frustrated by the lack of practical and financial support related to tight district budgets. They are also tired of combatting public stereotypes. Rather than engage in projects against Islamophobia, El-Naggar suggests that many are longing for a normalisation of relations.

295

Regular participants have been DITIB , Inssan, Islamic Relief, Muslimische Jugend, Fatih

Kulturhaus, Islamische Föderation, Berliner Studentenverein, an independent mosque association (Interview Reinke). Interview Nofal. 297 Interview Reinke. 298 *We talk, but I don't suppose it will lead to much action. Herr Schulz doesn't have much time and mosque associations think they are already doing too much.' (Interview El-Naggar) 299 Interview El-Naggar. 296

186

Exemplary Cases

Kreuzberg also involved Muslim groups in the federal programme against rightwing extremism, xenophobia and anti-Semitism.300 Interreligious dialogue was highlighted as one of the programme's strengths {Bundestagsdrucksache 16/1113: 8), and cooperation with Muslim actors symbolises at least some recognition. Inssan has been a member of the steering committee of the local action plan. In 2011 the organisation received funding for an interreligious and intercultural dialogue project.301 Lydia Nofal of Inssan concluded that there is a general atmosphere of mutual respect, openness and a lack of prejudice in the relationships between Muslim civil society and the administration in Kreuzberg.302 Neukölln introduced a series of public lectures and discussions, initiated by the District Commissioner for Immigration in cooperation with the youth welfare office, youth clubs and academic support. The first session of the series brought together administration staff, youth clubs and Muslim civil society representatives to discuss possible strategies for cooperation in the district.303 Following sessions covered more general questions in relation to Islam, e.g. religion as a means of repression of children (June 2011), Islamic healers and rituals (March 2011), and conflicting ideals and values in education (November 2010). There was also a meeting in Sehitlik mosque with Ender Cetin and other young people to hear about their youth work and discuss problems they face (September 2010). Few speakers representing Muslim civil society have been invited. This series of events might enlighten participants on certain aspects of Islam but it does not reach the grassroots level. Commissioner Mengelkoch suggested that some Muslim participants felt they were too much on display.304 In line with remarks by Tasnim El-Naggar of the youth organisation Muslimische Jugend, Mehdi Chahrour of M.A.H.D.I. said people are tired of answering questions on A programme funded by the federal CIVITAS programme (2001-2006), continued until December 2010 as ' Vielfalt tut gut under the auspice of the Federal Ministry for Families, the Elderly, Women and Youth. Bundesministerium für Familie, Senioren, Frauen und Jugend: Bundesprogramm Vielfalt Tut Gut. Jugend für Vielfalt, Toleranz und Demokratie 2007-2010. www.vielfalt-tut-gut.de/content/e4548/index_ger.html (accessed June 2011) 301 Kreutberg im Gespräch (Kreuzberg talks) organizes talks on topics like youth work in mosques or networking in the neighbourhood with Muslim civil society actors and representatives of the district administration. See: Lokaler Aktionplan (Local Action Plan) Kreuzberg-Friedrichshain: Kreutberg im Gespräch for more information: www.lapfriedrichshain-kreuzberg.de/content_files/kreuzber_talk_01.html (accessed 16 March 2012). 302 Interview Nofal. 303 Bundeszentrale für Politische Bildung: Islam in Neukölln (July 27, 2010). www.bpb.de/themen/UGBQRI,0,0,Islam_in_Neuk%F611n.html (accessed November 23, 2011) 304 Interview Mengelkoch. 300

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foreign affairs. They live in Neukölln and want to act locally, not merely talk. He suggests it is more important to publicly deliberate on topics that meet a grassroots concern rather than public opinions on Islam.305 There is little activity in Neukölln towards nurturing relationships with mosques. Apart from their appearance in reports of the Office for the Protection of the Constitution, they are deemed too unprofessional to engage in deliberation. Contact is limited to crisis response, e.g. in relation to particular pupils in school or to topics such as war in Lebanon in 2008, when members of mosque associations were invited to give talks in schools. 306 The attitude towards deliberative processes might express itself in the comment by the District Commissioner for Immigration about one of the Islamforum sessions he attended. He dismissed the topics being discussed as a waste of his time.307 Aspects such as nurturing respect and trust, mutual learning and new possibilities for networking went unmentioned. In January 2012 a new community organising initiative began working in Neukölln, bringing together numerous civil society organisations including a Milli Görüs mosque and several other mosque associations, faith-based Christian groups, youth and community organisations. Foundations and businesses sponsor the initiative.308 Following the example of community organising in Berlin's Mitte district, participants are hoping to solve local concerns by building a tight network. As the opening quote of this case example demonstrates, hopes are not high that it will change much in the relationship between Muslim civil society and district administration. However, it may promote Muslim voices in the local public sphere by fostering dialogue and trust among social actors.

Interview Chahrour. Arthur Mengelkoch on an event with 11 mosque representatives in his office. Participants had unrealistic ideas of the districts' means and possibilities. The other half of mosque associations did not respond to his invitation. Visits to mosque associations were also difficult to organize, according to Mengelkoch (Interview). 307 Interview Mengelkoch. 308 for a list of participants see de.indymedia.org/2012/01/323738.shtml. For more background see BMW-Stiftung: Community Organising. Eine Bürgerplattform für Neukölln. www.bmw-stiftung.de/de/gesellschaft-neu-denken/sektoruebergreifende-kooperation/community-organizing/community-organizing-buergerplattform (accessed March 19, 305 306

2012)

7. Analysis: Muslim civil society entering the public sphere? 'I think Muslims learned that they must leave their backyards. And that they will only belong to this society if they have the self-confidence to do so.' Ehrhart Körting, former Senator of Internal Affairs in Berlin

This chapter provides a detailed interpretation of the empirical evidence gathered in the light of the theoretical framework and methodology, critical to addressing the research questions guiding this thesis. In a cross-case comparison I approach the question of the development of voices in the public sphere, highlighting interpretive criteria like the interplay of structure and agency, as well as the relationship between process and outcome. The analysis is based on the interpretation of facts and evidence obtained in interviews with participants and stakeholders. Interpretation reflects normative democracy theory interventions as outlined by Habermas, and phronesis — the practical wisdom social and political actors extract from events and developments. Indicators on structure and process levels, in accordance with the theoretical framework, are the political opportunity structures that define the scope for Muslim participation in deliberative processes, and the nature of processes, including equality, agenda setting and accountability. The focus here is the discursive design of deliberative arenas, defined as: 'an institution which can be purposively structured to enhance communicative rationality' (Habermas 1995: 86). This part of the analysis refers to top-down practice and normative democratic standards potentially enhancing legitimacy of representation. Agency and outcome dimensions are reflected in theoretical propositions on citizenship generated by civil society participation in deliberative processes and the formation of a social movement sector, which can institutionalise bottom-up input to the system and promote the development of voices in the general public sphere. The actor level is concerned with phronesis, the practical wisdom generated from the lifeworld context. It looks at the potential for social transformation that actors see through changing power structures in the public sphere, the potential for less rhetoric and more critical publicity in public discourse on Muslim integration. Evidently, structure and agency dimensions meet in the public sphere. 'The publicity of an opinion is measured by: the degree it is the result of publicity

190

Analysis

generated inside membership organisations; and the degree to which this internal public communicates with an external public' (Habermas 1990: 357). Interpretation of empirical evidence from Berlin allows conclusions to be drawn about the democratic value of deliberation with Muslim civil society, thus dealing with normative questions of democratic practice. It also allows a detailed picture to be developed, of the conditions and challenges for minority access to the public sphere. Structure and agency, process and outcome together approach the research questions: /. How can deliberative processes and Muslim civil sodety participation establish Muslims as actors in the public sphere? 2. What role does the democratic process play in nurturing a sense of active dtiyenship and in the formation of a Muslim sodal movement sectorfirmly situated in the public sphere? 3. What conclusions can be drawn for sodetal integration and legitimate representation?

democratic

The whole theoretical approach of this thesis is heavily invested in Habermas' discourse ethics and deliberative democracy theory. However, his normative model of democracy cannot be readily applied to specific real life contexts without qualifications. The biggest challenge in pluralist and fragmented societies is for minorities to join the public sphere, which is structured by power relations. Habermas suggests these relations should be removed by equal and rational discourse, supported by institutionalised deliberative procedures. The largely negative discourses on Muslim integration in Germany and Berlin show the restrictions this minority faces in finding a voice. The next problem is that Muslims are not a homogeneous group, as presented in public discourse. Therefore my theoretical model assumes that three key steps are necessary to complement Habermas' model.

Engagement principle First, engaging minority groups like Muslim civil society in dialogue and deliberation certainly helps them build competences and the self-confidence they need to engage in the struggle for recognition in the public sphere. As chapter 5 'Political Opportunity Structures and Public Discourse' demonstrates, engagement with Muslim or immigrant communities is a relatively recent development. In the case of dialogue with Muslim civil society political opinions diverge. Despite overall consensus among political elites in Berlin to seek a dialogue with Muslim and immigrant communities not all politicians individually support this approach, as is evident in Neukölln. Engaging with civil society is a requirement of democratic legitimacy, according to Habermas; but social movement theory and migration research, on the other hand, argue that opportunities for participation depend on changing power alignments, events, public discourse, and

191

mobilisation, creating new political opportunities (e.g. Koopmans/ Statham 2000), rather than on normative democratic considerations. This is a first issue that needs analytical consideration.

Procedures for deliberation The next step is the establishment of deliberative procedures that invite Muslim civil society participation following criteria for successful deliberation identified in empirical research including equality, accountability, agenda setting and outcomes. Several administrative levels in Berlin have established mini-publics to enable undistorted communication with Muslim civil society organisations. Analytical criteria here are the promotion of mutual respect between parties through communication on an equal footing; the accountability of participants to their constituencies by providing a lifeworld account of the issues at stake, promoting learning among all participants; and involvement in agenda-setting, as it raises the stakes for participants to see deliberation through to the end (Ryfe 2005), raising communicative action to a new level. *We do not want to be talked about, we want to be talked to. We are willing to change, but only if the other side shares this willingness.'309 Participation in deliberative fora also requires visible results without undermining the independence of participating organisations. If projects are result or subject of the deliberation they should be genuinely 'joint' and involve as many civil society organisations as possible to promote networking, also with non-Muslim organisations (Change Institute 2008: 5-7). The most important outcome orientation in the context of this thesis is the potential of Muslim civil society participation in deliberative mini-publics to overcome plebiscitary rhetoric in public discourse, as proposed by Simone Chambers. This is where power as element of social reality comes in. Flyvbjerg observed that the question of power as communicative rationality or rhetoric depends on the context: 'The researcher must ask how communication takes place, and power operates. ... How do consensus seeking and rhetoric, freedom from domination and the exercise of power, eventually come together in individual acts of communication' (Flyvbjerg 2001: 94). This is linked to process, as it can produce communicative rationality. As a reminder: communicative action is rational to the extent that it produces inter subjective understanding. The quality of outcome is determined by the quality of interaction, distributing power as it frees participants from domination and allows consensus or agreement and promotes citizenship. Otherwise, public discourse remains plebiscitary, power rests with administration and mass media, and decisions are top-down without justified legitimacy claims. 309

Interview Salhi, IZDB.

Analysis

192

On actor level power as communicative rationality interlinks with the notion of citizenship as moral equal worth. Civil society theory assumes that participation in associations and organisations of civil society itself is an act of practical citizenship. Due to the communicative structure of civil society rooted in lifeworlds, Habermas identifies legitimacy in civil society claims even when they follow self-interest. Bringing lifeworld accounts forward in mini-publics with representatives of the state sphere and other civil society is bound to contribute to the sense of moral equal worth. The precondition for membership in a political body - and thus for the entitlement to rights - is social inclusion in civil society (Somers 2008: 26-8). The notion of citizenship by inclusion into the public sphere via a deliberative process is reflected in the analysis of each study in the words of the Muslim participants.

Joining the public sphere The final step inspired by Habermas' theoretical framework related to process and outcome is bringing Muslim voices from mini-publics to the broader public sphere, as it is only there that claims can be legitimised on the political agenda. In the face of dominating public discourse on Muslim integration deliberation behind closed doors is an important pre-condition for voice but cannot alter public discourse. This requires self-confidence and additional stamina on behalf of actors. Assuming that participation promotes learning and a sense of active citizenship it can strengthen Muslim civil society organisations and work towards establishing their input to discourse in the public sphere. The sustainable presence of Muslim interests in the public sphere through institutionalisation of access as a potential result of Muslim civil society participation in deliberative processes is an important condition for democratic legitimacy in terms of discursive inclusion. It is only logical to apply the concept of a movement sector with its ordering principles of structure and agency in the analysis of Muslim civil society participation in the public sphere, which in principle allows constant input by diverse formal and grassroots Muslim organisations (Rucht et al 1997). All empirical chapters will interpret Muslim civil society in respect to the formation of such a sector. It also shows the empowerment potential for Muslim voices in the public sphere from which conclusions for the level of democratic representation and legitimacy can be drawn. The question is if there is a visible change of Muslim presence in the public spheres of Berlin with impact on the general public sphere reflected in public discourse, influenced by the media. The final steps in the analysis return to normative concepts in democratic theory. I will reflect the exemplary cases against notions of legitimacy in Habermas' theory of deliberative democracy, with a special focus on the interplay of structure and agency. I then relate the empirical evidence and cross-case inter-

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pretation of examples of Muslim civil society participation to the wider theoretical frame of new forms of democratic representation and societal integration.

7.1. Political Opportunities and Muslim Civil Society Muslim civil society engagement in deliberation with representatives of the Berlin administration depends on opening opportunities inside the institutions. Changing opportunity structures depend on events, political alignments and individual convictions. Barbara John, first Commissioner for Foreigners, as this position was initially called, already visited all mosque associations during the 1990s. However, 'at the time, the term integration stood for subversive thinking'.310 Despite the lack of opportunities for participation it started a relationship between John and Muslim communities that many long-term Muslim activists value and remember. Political opportunities started changing with the reform of citizenship law, which initially led to growing numbers of Turks taking German citizenship. Politicians discovered the Turkish vote, but Muslims stayed in the backyard mosques until September 11, 2001. This event really changed political opportunity structures in Berlin. Politicians and the public discovered mosque and other Muslim associations in their midst, realizing they knew little about them. Likewise Muslim agency started. The leftwing government coalition decided to nurture dialogue with Muslim communities across the city, with the aim to reduce fears and normalise relationships with Muslims and other religious groups alike. The events of September 11 also shook Muslim communities and triggered interest in leaving the backyard situation. 'They saw it as a chance. Somehow a new form of publicity developed, opening opportunities for cooperation, for creating something together.'311 Muslim organisations started being invited to deliberate on federal, state and local levels. Regardless of disagreements quite a few were ready to take on the invitation, in tune with the mobilization model in social movement theory: an initiative starts inside the political system, but proponents of the issue must mobilise the public sphere because they need the support of certain groups to obtain consideration or implementation (Habermas 1996: 379-80). On the other hand, ill-considered emotions in the public sphere also led to restrictive policies like heightening homeland security. The new political opportunities for Muslim civil society participation on various administrative levels also produced new obstacles generated through public discourse. One recourse and strategy for immigrant participation in economic, cultural and political discourse 310 311

Interview John. Interview Spielhaus.

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Analysis

used to be to organise along ethnic lines (Niedermüller 1998). Over the last decade there has been a shift to religious terminology in public debates, which triggered also a turn in the struggle for recognition along religious lines (Spielhaus 2010; Yurdakul 2009). It forced a very diverse community of Islamic congregations and immigrant communities under the same label. One challenge for political participation is to disentangle the different voices and interests within this ascribed community while representing them in the public sphere. There are other obstacles. 'Each district has a minority who is against Muslim participation. If the political constellation is right, this minority will win the day.'312 Muslim participation in deliberation in Berlin still depends on individual positions inside the system. So far there is no political consensus on ways of working with Muslim organisations or on public funding for Islamic associations. There are extreme cases like the district of Neukölln, where Muslim participation is close to zero due to the district mayor's philosophy of integration. 'As the example of Neukölln demonstrates if the other side is not interested you can be as [willing to participate as] you like, there is no chance of participation. No matter how hard you try, it simply won't work.'313 Dialogue and cooperation are frequently questioned in the media. 'On the individual level as well as on the political party and civil service levels these people [who foster dialogue with Muslims] are at risk at being blamed for communicating. There are many examples showing this involving the media.'314 This requires more personal commitment, as in Mitte.315 Just as individuals can hinder participation, they can foster dialogue. In BerlinMitte former neighbourhood manager Fischer was the driving force in establishing a relationship with the mosque association IZDB.316 The friendly relationship between Fischer and member of IZDB board Feical Salhi helped the association to get project funding from the local neighbourhood management office (QM). The relationship was not sustainable. Fischer left the QM in early 2008, IZDB appeared in a report issued by the Office for the Protection of the Constitution and a much-quoted expert on Islam criticised the working relationship between QM and IZDB, which marked the end of the relationship.317 This

Interview Nofal. Interview Nofal. 314 Interview Spielhaus. 315 District Commissioner for Integration Stibenz points out that she sheltered the Haci Bayram - AWO tandem project from media attention for fear of negative reporting imdermining the mosque. 'Let them find their self-respect and sovereignty first.' (Interview Stibenz) 316 Interkulturelles Zentrum für Dialog und "Bildung (Intercultural Centre for Dialogue and Education). 317 Interview Fischer. 312 313

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example underlines the importance of establishing sustainable deliberative structures. According to Habermas open discourse in the public sphere including all worldviews and perspectives is the pre-requisite to political legitimacy. Constitutional norms justify different lifeworld accounts forming communicative rationality. They provide the normative foundation for discursive inclusion. Neukölln-based youth organisation M.A.H.D.I. for instance claims Article 2 of the German constitution, the free development of personality, as its organisational foundation: 'This includes the burka as well as a nose piercing'.318 Yet they wonder whether constitutional values are equally valid for each member of society. The next section examines deliberative processes and scopes for participation in the three exemplary cases. It will address the sense of equality and citizenship for each setting, as well as a range of other factors related to democratic legitimacy such as the chance to present lifeworld accounts, practical outcomes and communicative rationality during the exchanges, and a look at signs for forming a social movement sector to ensure sustainable input.

7.2. Deliberative Processes and Muslim Civil Society Participation Case I: the Islamforum Process Discussion on an equal footing is one of the founding principles of the Islamjorum. „We want to go down the route of dialogue, we want to help, and we don't see any other way. Muslims are part of society, we consider ourselves added value for society, but we also have a lot of problems that we cannot solve alone.'319 The Islamforum set out to address all this, to learn about each other, to identify problems together and to try to find possible solutions. Sessions behind closed doors facilitate open discourse on all sides. „After a while we got to know each other and now we know how the others are thinking. We had many discussions that helped pave the foundations for dialogue, and there is trust.'320 The sense of equality exists mostly in relation to the conditions of dialogue based on respect for each other. This sense of equality is part of the process. At the beginning, Muslim participants perceived of Ehrhart Körting as dominating the 318 319 320

Interview Chahrour. Interview Salhi. Interview Nofal.

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Analysis

discourse. The initial impression of domination mirrored the conditions in society, as Spielhaus points out: 'The point here is to be able to talk to someone who is not on an equal footing, someone located entirely differently in existing power structures' (Humboldt-Universität 2007: 153). Five years after the establishment of the Islamforum Muslim participants have found their voice and now freely express their opinions. They thus gained status as equal citizens with valid concerns, which is one of the important objectives of the initiative (Humboldt-Universität 2007: 154). There is a general sense of joint ownership of the forum. This is the result of changing the practice of agenda setting from topics for discussion decided by the host organisations (the Muslim Academy and the Berlin Commissioner for Migration and Integration) to including topics proposed by Muslim organisations. 'Joint ownership provides such initiatives with legitimacy for all partners, as well as among the broader CSO field and authorities and political interests' (Change Institute 2008: 56). Selecting mostly Muslim umbrella organisations to represent as many Muslims living in Berlin as possible comes at the expense of a certain lack of representation of the average Muslim population, typical for organised interest and political representation. 'Representatives are always part of the middle-class which makes it difficult to estimate how far they speak for their people. Muslims in Berlin are rather less educated, especially the Turks who came as manual workers.'321 On the other hand, communities are relatively small and civil society actors know lifeworld problems related to public discourse from their own experience. Some of them function as chairs of mosque associations or work directly with communities. As such they are in touch with the everyday concerns of people in their communities. Participants feel that they go to the Islamforum as representatives of their own organisation, 'but I am also a Muslim. I could have remained quiet in the discussion on Islamism, as it doesn't concern DITIB, but I didn't keep my mouth shut because I do have an opinion.'322 There is also a sense that they know how far they can make allowances on behalf of their communities.323 However, Islamforum participants have difficulty carrying over the learning process they undergo in the Islamforum to the lifeworld or other parts of the system. 'I read the newspaper every day and engage in secular activities. The Islamforum does not feature anywhere. It doesn't reach into congregations. Only a few people participate, otherwise nobody knows.'324 Legitimacy is located at the Interview Körting. Interview Cetin, DITIB. The Office for the Protection of the Constitution so far has never listed DITIB in its reports. 323 Interview Spielhaus. 324 Interview Misirlioglu. 321

322

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institutional level rather than at the grassroots; civil society organisations' impact can only be indirect. Some Muslim participants acknowledge that the Islamforum takes Muslim lifeworld experiences like Islamophobia into account and seeks to find structural solutions. In addition, the selection process of organisations participating in the Islamforum is seen as excluding important segments of the Muslim population and thus a whole range of perspectives. Despite communicating with many Muslim organisations in the planning phase of the Islamforum and securing the acknowledgement of more controversial Islamic groups, Ismet Misirlioglu underlines the importance of dialogue and communication with all. In his view excluding Milli Görüs betrays the principle of broad representation, as it has many members in Berlin. 'They might open up if listened to. Communication is key.'325 NonMuslim participants and stakeholders remark that Milli Görüs is represented through the Islamic Federation. Some Muslim actors do not consider this as sufficient. Personal contacts and individuals matter hugely. All Muslim actors interviewed for this research highlighted the positive role of Senator of Internal Affairs, Ehrhart Körting (2001-2011), who has a very positive reputation among Muslim activists now. He visited many mosque associations, regardless of their status in the report of the Office for the Protection of the Constitution, giving him lifeworld insights beyond accounts presented in the Islamforum and extending trust from civil society activists to members of mosque associations. He (unsuccessfully) defended the mosque building efforts of Inssan in Berlin-Charlottenburg.326 His presence in the Islamforum, also as Senator in charge of the Office for the Protection of the Constitution and as a person with executive power, carried much significance. The Islamforum enhanced the trust on both sides through the deliberative process Körting and Muslim organisations were able to engage in. It seems that both, administration and Muslim civil society can gain from the joint ownership expressed in joint agenda setting. The administration was interested in setting up a training project for imams, and the Islamforum gave them the support they needed from Muslim actors. Islamophobia, a subject still difficult to voice in public discourse, is a frequent topic of Islamforum debate. The

Interview Misirlioglu. In a newspaper article Körting described the way the district stopped the Inssan mosque as a political mistake, describing Inssan as capable for discourse and despite their connection to orthodox Islamic not suspicious of having connections to groups willing to use violence. 'If we want integration we must especially seek dialogue with orthodox groups.' see: Tagesspiegel, 16.4.2008 www.tagesspiegel.de/berlin/charlottenburger-moscheeprojekt-im-zwielicht/1212542.html (accessed December 18, 2011). 325

326

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Analysis

Office of the Commissioner for Migration and Integration of the Berlin Senate started funding an anti-discrimination project in late 2011.327 The motivation to discuss issues that would never make it on the agenda through public discourse at this point keeps participants engaged. The future effectiveness of the Islamforum will in no small part depend on the new Senator of the Interior, Frank Henkel, who took over from Körting in late 2011. 'As long as Mr Körting participated, there were no signs of tiredness. We will see what approach Mr Henkel is going to take.'328

Outcomes of the Islamforum The organisers' objective for the Islamjorum was to foster exchanges between Muslim civil society, the city administration and other faith-based and civil society groups, with the aim of furthering cooperation between Muslims and other groups in society. The change of public discourse is only an indirect goal. Hence the purpose is foremost the exchange of views, getting to know each other and generating trust relationships that facilitate communication. As such, outcomes are more of a symbolic than practical nature. Not all Muslim participants are satisfied with this. What have we achieved in five years? We are still listed in the intelligence reports, we still don't receive public funding, and we are still not accepted. Are we even taken seriously?'329 Different Muslim participants judge outcomes differently. Some feel that there has been too little action.330 However, the Islamjorum was not intended to trigger projects but to stimulate open exchange and nurture cooperation outside the Islamforum. 'At the beginning I wondered what all these other people were doing in the Islamforum. Then I realised these are people who are in touch with Muslims. A lot of dialogue ensued.'331 Others see scope for outcome-oriented participation. 'Of course it's a kind of lobbying, we propose topics where Muslims would like to see change. Those are put on the agenda and we have the chance to participate in the discussion. (...) I think this has generated some notable results.'332 Though Muslim participants

327 Also topics that still sit uneasy with Muslim participants are regularly voiced, like the issue of mosque associations opening up to the rest of society, usually brought forward by non-Muslim organisations represented on the Islamforum. According to Körting, Muslim representatives tend to react defensively, but regularly discussing it might result in the realization that opening is not necessarily a bad development (Interview Körting). 328 Interview Schneider. 329 Interview Salhi. 330 Interviews Kesici and Salhi. 331 Interview Cetin. 332 Interview Nofal.

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were not the ones who put the issue on the agenda of the Islamforum, Mohammad Abdul Razzaque appreciated the discussion about plans to reform Berlin's burial laws to accommodate Muslim needs.333 Lydia Nofal of Inssan took the same view.334 In that sense there are vested interests discussed in the Islamforum that explain why most participants have been keen to stay involved in this deliberative endeavour, despite all Muslim volunteers feeling overstretched. Learning happened on both sides. 'People went through an incredible learning process. All participants.'335 Muslim participants learned how to identify needs, to present them to the institutions and to manage expectations about solutions: 'It was difficult on the Muslim side to talk about their problems. Often due to a lack of understanding that they were able to and allowed to verbalise them. There was the question of prioritising issues and identifying those for which there is a possible solution.'336 According to Spielhaus, Muslim participants grew more and more self-confident in asking questions and making demands. Nofal agreed: 'I think people have more realistic ideas now. I think this is something that really changed.'337 Participants developed an understanding for the way the administration works. *We learned a lot about administrative procedures. Many people still don't understand the federal structure and the different levels of responsibilities. They had to understand that Körting can publicly support Inssan's mosque plans in Charlottenburg, but he is not in charge of granting building permissions.'338 This learning about the 'rules of the game' helped Muslim participants to understand how administrations work, and that sometimes problems do not stem from discrimination and stereotyping but from institutions' way of operating. It also helped people to identify administrations in charge of different problem areas. This learning process must continue outside the Islamforum. However, lack of knowledge about administrative rules and procedures is surely not only a problem among Muslim communities. As a result of the regular encounters with representatives of Muslim organisations that that keep being mentioned in the reports of the Office for the Protection of the Constitution, Senator Körting started to differentiate more clearly between levels of activity that determine listing or observation. 'Essentially all Islamic association ended up under the category of terrorism, which was regularly picked up by the large newspapers. (...) We introduced a distinction

333 334 335 336 337 338

Interview Interview Interview Interview Interview Interview

Razzaque. Nofal. Nofal. Spielhaus. Nofal. Sagir.

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Analysis

between terrorism and people who are willing to use violence for other reasons and those who represent another world view but who are by no means ready to use violence.' 339 All Muslim associations in Berlin listed in the reports fall under the last category, sending an important message to the public sphere. Another consequence of Islamfomm's deliberations is the use of terminology in public documents. 'I don't like to use the term 'Islamism' any more as it is too readily used in a negative notion of Islam. We don't associate extremism with 'Catholicism' either. I'd prefer to speak of Islamic extremism or something.' 340 The public use of the term 'Islamism' has been subject of discussion several times in the Islamfomm. 'The public use of the term leads to people being unable to distinguish between Islamism and Islam. We took this quite seriously, Muslim associations gave a very detailed account of their concerns.' 341 However, the media and public must still undergo the same learning process. Thus the Islamjorum example also shows the limitations of deliberating in mini-publics. Participants, all representatives of different constituencies, all learned about and from each other as deliberative advocates who must carry new ideas to their members before they can claim legitimacy (Schmidt 2008). Trust and respect are important aspects necessary to meet the challenge of legitimising deliberation outcomes and to strengthen actors in further actions. 'The many discussions created a positive foundation for discourse and trust. I think this is a very important benefit.' 342 The Commissioner for Integration and Migration, Giinther Piening, draws similar conclusions. During the ceremony marking the 5th anniversary of the Islamforum he highlighted the development of trust between Muslim organisations, state institutions and other civil society organisations as its most important achievement so far.343 Muslim participants in the Islamfomm were able to establish new channels of access to the administration. They can meet with Senators on specific issues and even small associations 'have access to decision-makers who would otherwise never see them. Have you ever tried to get an appointment with the mayor?' 3 4 4 Their attendance in the Islamfomm serves as a reference. When Imran Sagir was approached by the round-table of non-German prisoners on the issue of spiritual

Interview Körting. Interview Körting. 341 Interview Cetin. 342 Interview Nofal. 343 5 Jahre Islamforum Berlin - Festveranstaltung im Museum für Islamische Kunst (December 14, 2010) www.berlin.de / imperia/md/content/lb-mtegration-migration/Islamforum/5_jahre_Islamforum_bf.pdfPdownload.html (accessed December 16, 2011). 344 Interview Nahawandi. 339

340

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counselling of Muslim inmates, this was due to his participation in the Islamforum. 'Piening and Körting gave us testimony. Without the Islamforum that wouldn't have been possible.'345 Thus the success of the new Muslim initiative on prisoner counselling, endorsed by the Senate, is directly linked to the Islamforum. The fact that Muslim and political actors meet in the Islamforum allows participation in other political committees: 'It enables Körting or other members of the Senate to say 'I will invite this or that person to a hearing where they can present their concerns."34i One example is the discussion on Muslim cemeteries, where Muslim organisations were invited to present their ideas in a meeting with representatives of the responsible Senate Department.347 In this context the issue of Muslim organisations being formally accepted as a religious community came up in the Islamforum. This has been a long-standing goal of DITIB. Formal recognition as a religious community is the condition for running a Muslim cemetery. Officials inside the administration are ready to support Muslim organisations on this issue. The problem here is the lack of agreement among Muslim associations. 'They are too reactive. They could be much more advanced [towards their goal], they just need expert advice by a lawyer.'348 The newly established Muslim umbrella organisation represents a large percentage of the Muslim population. Important organisations like DITIB, however, have not yet joined, due to the old conflict lines among Muslim civil society organisations. The symbolic impact of legal recognition as a religious community would be enormous, according to Schneider. The fact that the administration is going this far in encouraging Muslim organisations also owes to the newly established relationships in the Islamforum. It certainly improved connections between civil society actors, both religious and non-religious. Nofal of Inssan reported that other organisations are now approaching them for cooperation.349 This is also a result of the joint ownership of the Islamforum where all participants can set the agenda. 'Partnership principles

Interview Sagir. Interview Spielhaus. 347 Sometimes Muslim associations are too overstretched to respond to calls for participation. In this case they did not manage to come up with a joint proposal on time. The subject was then further discussed in the Islamforum (interviews Misirhoglu, Cetin). At other times there is dispute about input, e.g. in relation to the guidelines for schools on Islam. The Islamic Federation Berlin contributed a lot of input for the first draft of the publication but did not support objections that anti-Semitism among Muslim youth should be included. With this stance IFB sought to overcome one prevalent subject in discourse in relation to Muslims. Finally the guidelines were published in a shorter version with less IFB input (Interview Kesici). 345 346

348 349

Interview Schneider. Interview Nofal.

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Analysis

promote a genuine engagement with the development of new working partnerships of broader benefit throughout the organisations involved. (...) The Berlin Forum and the subsequent cooperation between civil society organisations is a prime example of the benefits of this approach' (Change Institute 2008: 56). In June 2010 the Islamforum appointed two members of the Islamische Föderation as its representative on the Berlin Immigrant Advisory Board, extending representation of Muslim interests.350 From a sustainability of input point of view the improvement of relations among Muslim civil society organisations furthered by the Islamforum matters hugely. Religious differences among groups remain, but competition between ethnic groups and larger organisations are subsiding, as collaborations in prisoner counselling or the new umbrella organisation demonstrate. After all, 'the identification is not coming from within, from self-description, but from being seen and attacked as a community from outside' (Spielhaus 2010: 197). For now Muslim civil society groups have to organise along religious lines if they want to alter public discourse. From this point of view the Islamforum as a deliberative forum has limited impact, as little information feeds into public discourse or the Muslim grassroots. This is partly because sessions are closed to the public, a necessary price to pay for the participation of the Senator of Internal Affairs and for candid exchange between participants, protected from the media.351 Occasional statements of the Islamforum go largely unnoticed by the press. Selcuk Saydam of Haci Bayram mosque, a member of the Islamische Föderation, said that he never hears anything from the Islamforum. Members of Muslim umbrella organizations represented in the Islamforum have no idea what is going on.352 This highlights the need for broader deliberation outside mini-publics, as Chambers warned. Mini-publics offer the venue to establish a discourse free of rhetoric between participants. This can prepare the ground for deliberative rhetoric in the public sphere by altering opinions on structure and agency levels. On the structural level this can lead to changes of practice, like a revised presentation of the report of the Office for the Protection of the Constitution or the public use of terminology, as described by Körting. It also confirms the benefits of participation that need institutionalisation and are thus less dependent on the personal commitment of actors inside the system 'Piening doesn't care for small

Before that immigrant representation on the Board was restricted to regional representation. See protocol Session 13 (June 16, 2010). www.berlin.de/lb/intmig/Islamforum/Islamfonim_sitzungl3.html (accessed February 26, 2012). 351 Interviews Fischer, Salhi. 352 Interview Saydam. 350

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bush fires that don't change anything, he cares for structures and the building of structures that guarantee long-term effects.'353 Intersubjective learning and affirmation also strengthens minorities in their commitment to participation in general public discourse. Despite disappointment about the pace of progress among some Muslim participants in the Islamforum they remain a minority. Participants like Lydia Nofal of Inssan, Mohammad Abdul Razzaque of IBMUS or Ender Cetin of DITIB acknowledge the progress instilled by the Islamforum in terms of trust, being able to voice concerns, and the networking opportunities it entails. Other immigrant civil society actors agree with the benefits of dialogue and deliberation as a first step to understand each side better. 'The Islamforum was designed as a platform to exchange points of view. If this is all you expected from it progress is huge. We established contacts and built trust. Discourse is the beginning of change.'354 Despite a change of government coalition and the departure of Körting and Piening, participants in the Islamforum are planning ahead: 'A working group is drafting a new declaration on the goals of the Islamforum to be ready for the new election period. We want to be able to present it to the new Senator of Internal Affairs, Frank Henkel, with a paper stating our expectations and he can decide if he is willing to fill this role. This is going to be interesting.'355 They are also discussing new permanent Muslim participants. The Islamforum has clearly produced enough outcomes for participants to wish to continue.

Citizenship and Social Movement Sector The Islamforum is bringing different parties together in open dialogue. It fosters genuine discussions, trust and sense of being taken seriously among most Muslim participants. Many Muslim activists interviewed for this thesis underlined the wish to be recognised as equal citizens. Arguably, the outcomes described above contribute to this effect. My theoretical framework assumes a sense of citizenship to be consubstantial to civil society participation. The recognition as moral equal worth in a deliberative mini-public also encourages further engagement. Together with new knowledge and contacts required through the act of participation social actors gained new resources for voice in the public sphere. The fact that Muslim organisations have formed a new umbrella organisation that includes Milli Görüs demonstrates a new self-confidence. Also the insecurity of the future of the Islamforum seems to have diminished over the period empirical data was gathered. It seems Muslim organisations feel stronger with the closer

353 354 355

Interview Nofal. Interview Sagir. Interview Schneider.

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Analysis

ties they knit over the past few years. In a follow up interview in November 2011 Lydia Nofal of Inssan said that without Ehrhart Körting, who had announced his withdrawal from office that month, discussions in the Islamforum might become harder, but in this case they would concentrate more on internal affairs.356 The Islamforum also helped representatives of the administration to meet Muslim participants as citizens and actors in Berlin with resources that can be tapped into. It helps them to promote Muslim civil society as partners in cooperation with other civil society or initiatives, as in the case of prisoner counselling. Deliberation, participation and cooperation are still largely dependent on individual actors inside the system and inside Muslim civil society. Only a small number of Muslim civil society activists work with the institutions at municipal level. 'Some are sitting in every meeting, we make two phone calls, and they will always come to us.'357 A handful of activists sit on several boards and have known each other for a long time. 'Lydia, Sagir and I, we first met at university. We took the lead and think differendy. We approach things with more self-confidence.'358 As Fennema and Tillie point out, overlapping memberships and boards can help maintaining the norms and values of a community and thus strengthen civic communities. According to them this helps produce collective goods, pursue common goals, and increase social trust (Fennema/Tillie 2005: 229). They represent a new, more affluent generation while many mosque associations who are members of umbrella organisation represented in the Islamforum are still run by the older generation. It is too early to speak of Muslim grassroots consolidation in Berlin. The large majority of mosque associations focus more on internal than external issues. There is less interest to open up to mainstream society. Competition and lack of trust between different Turkish and Arab congregations still prevails, which makes inter-Muslim cooperation harder and leaves the younger generation of activists with a balancing act they have to master. 'I notice that umbrella organisations tend to be open but are anxious not to be pocketed by the western world. Many Muslim associations maintain a certain diaspora identity. I suppose they gain reputation in their own communities by making stringent demands and setting stringent [negotiation] red lines.'359 Muslim activists in the Islamforum therefore pursue certain projects without much grassroots consultation, like discussions of a new Muslim cemetery, which has major organisational implications — such as the formation of a new umbrella

356 357 358 359

Interview Interview Interview Interview

Nofal. Misirlioglu. Salhi. Körting.

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organisation of larger Turkish and Arab associations. 'The issue of inter-Muslim cooperation is in the air. The question is how to solve this problem. Maybe it is just a generational problem. Those who grew up here think very differently from those who migrated. Ethnic origin still strongly matters among Arabs, but it is obvious that we need a new dynamic.'360 The working relationship at the city level has also removed old competition between Turkish Muslim organisations, for example with regard to Islamic education in schools in Berlin. 'The Islamic Federation used to see us as competition. This way of thinking is over, also due to lack of staff. More primary schools could offer Islamic education, it doesn't matter any more if other associations are formally recognised as religious communities. Now the question is whether we do this in cooperation.'361 This development occurs largely away from grassroots attention. This does not contradict the movement sector model outlined by Rucht et al. (1997: 169-171), where grassroots organisations and formal organisations remain distinct entities. Mosque associations, including those who are members of larger networks like the Islamic Federation Berlin, remain relatively independent members, while changes occur on board level of larger associations. The movement sector model also predicts a change of infrastructure among members of the movement family (Rucht et al. 1997: 52) like building hierarchies and/ or functional work sharing. Certain segments of movement sectors become more professional, looking at problems with new knowledge and competences. Formal organisations are part of this infrastructure, which becomes institutionalized as it guarantees continuous political input (Rucht et al 1997). The planned new umbrella organisation of Turkish and Arab organisations, mostly consisting of members who have a representative in the Islamforum, is the result of learning and professionalization processes instilled at least in part by the Islamforum. On the one hand it allows civil society activists, who have been feeling the strain of participation in several venues across the city, to combine forces and alleviate some of the workload. On the other hand 'one organisation is better equipped to represent the interests of more congregations, if they succeed in finding agreement without one member organisation dominating opinion.'362 There is disagreement as to whether a new formal structure will actually trigger more cooperation. Also, as long as DITIB has not joined this network it cannot fulfil its potential. It certainly needs DITIB to run a cemetery, as there are high costs involved that need sharing.363 In other areas DITIB is part of the move360 361 362 363

Interview Interview Interview Interview

Sagir. Cetin. Spielhaus. Sagir.

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Analysis

ment organisational infrastructure, e.g. in the initiative on counselling for Muslim prisoners in Berlin. The benefit would be a potentially stronger voice in the public sphere. 'The topics are defined. We want to tackle Islamophobia and strengthen lobbying efforts. We want a joint representation of Muslim interests comparable to churches.' 364 Razzaque of IBMUS has a vision of different work groups and regular exchanges with politicians and other groups in society. The Islamforum is a platform to learn from, to learn how to think outside the box. 'That's why we go there with three or four people, to learn how to speak. We take young people along to learn and establish contacts.' 365 Robin Schneider, participant in the Islamforum on behalf of the Office of the Commissioner for Migration and Integration of the Senate, underlines the need for Muslim civil society to develop more voice: 'Members of the Islamforum know the channels of access, they use them in different ways (...) but they usually focus on single issues, often in response to demands of the administration. (...) There is a lack of publicity. Muslim associations must represent themselves [to the public].' 366 A larger organisation representing more Muslim interests might have more voice in the public sphere, but only time can tell. A range of Muslim civil society organisations engaging in this and other activities have demonstrated their potential as movement organisations in the sense that they have established contacts, professionalised and started networking or cooperating with each other and other social and political actors, demonstrating democratic citizenship. Before they fit the movement sector model they need a more actively engaged grassroots infrastructure of individual associations. 'A unified voice is difficult to achieve. People have different ideas and very different people must work together. Many prefer to stay in the ghettoes.' 367 The sense of citizenship as moral equal worth that Muslim participants in the Islamforum experience as a result of frank discourse with representatives of the administration and other civil society groups does not extent to the communities they stand for. This can only be achieved at grassroots level, where the whole community is directly affected by deliberation outcomes. Haci Bayram mosque in Mitte is an important example from that point of view. However, the experience of the Islamforum and developments related to it seem to equip Muslim activists with the motivation to continue their efforts.

364 365 366 367

Interview Interview Interview Interview

Salhi. Razzaque. Schneider. Razzaque.

207

Case II : Haci Baytam Tandem Process Engaging minorities in deliberative processes depends on the commitment to participation at the highest administrative level. In Mitte, the mayor Christian Hanke (SPD) follows the philosophy of discourse and learning. 'Hanke doesn't simply say no. He listens; he tries to understand. He wants to talk to people directly.'368 In accordance with the Berlin Integration Plan the district administration is seeking to activate the potential of civil society. Mosque associations are not far fetched, as they are deeply rooted in Muslim communities and often have social and welfare structures already at work. Despite a general commitment in the district administration to minority participation several challenges exist. First, lip service to participation does not help, as district Commissioner for Integration, Maryam Stibenz, underlines. People must be given a real sense of belonging. 'As long as politicians do not mean 'we' when they say 'we' but add a 'you' in the next sentence, participation hasn't succeeded.' At best, politicians in the past presented themselves as 'caring but degrading', not allowing Muslim organisations to discuss their identities in the public. However, by excluding certain groups one only achieves victim mentalities.369 The political discourse on spending public money on projects organised by Muslim associations is ambivalent. Second, according to Stibenz the lack of professionalism of Muslim organisations means that participation is an experiment.370 Mosque associations in Berlin do not yet have enough skills or advocacy power to realise social innovations on their own. They need structural support without undermining their self-determination. Conversations with Selcuk Saydam from Haci Bayram Mosque also revealed the sense of moral inequality as a major issue: the feeling of constantly having to justify their worldview kept the mosque from opening up for a long time. 'Haci Bayram had the will but no sovereignty.'371 This lifeworld account led Stibenz to propose a joint project with a major German welfare organisation based on an agreement of equal ownership. In their evaluation of joint projects between German and immigrant organisations for the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees, Hunger and Metzger found that participation in conceptualisation and implementation of the project is an important factor of success: 'In particular, involvement of both actors in the design was of utmost importance' (Hunger/Metzger 2011: 60). This

368 369 370 371

Interview Interview Interview Interview

Salhi. Stibenz. Stibenz. Stibenz.

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Analysis

is what happened in the Haci Bayram case, including joint responsibility for the budget. The cooperation agreement was explicit about the equality of the partners, making Haci Bayram the first mosque association in Berlin to work as a publicly funded partner in a cooperation project. Joint ownership does not only support motivation for the implementation of the project, it also generates trust. Immigrant organisations often complain about taking a minor position or being brought in at the last minute after conceptualisation of a programme (Hunger/Metzger 2011: 54). 'An equal 'partnership on equal footing' is often hindered by a lack of participatory opportunities for both partners and by problems of communication' (Hunger/Metzger 2011: 74-5). The cause is usually a lack of transparency and unstable organisational and funding structures — these problems were avoided in this case. Stibenz reports that the cooperation agreement was also an attempt to create transparency, including about the level of responsibility that comes with public funding of a project. It is an important fact that the board of the mosque came up with the idea of opening up to the wider community. It was ready to engage in a learning process and to work closely with representatives of district administration, QM and civil society. It was a stroke of good luck that the QM had posted a tender for a mosque association willing to cooperate in a joint project. The experience triggered a range of other ideas and certainly Saydam is very actively engaged in other initiatives of the district, most notably the local community organising platform, which offers more opportunities for sharing different lifeworld accounts. On the community organising website he addresses the importance for dialogue between schools and Muslim families about education, as part of the description of the educational project of the initiative. 372 Another important factor in this project is that there was little negative press coverage while the project was running. At the beginning of the project the news portal Spiegel TV made a portrait of Selcuk Saydam that showed him as a conservative Muslim, somehow in line with the image of a man who is active in a mosque monitored by the Office for the Protection of the Constitution. 'The environment can have a positive impact on cooperation, by (...) offering moral support' (Beer 2007: 42). Stibenz and the local QM supported Haci Bayram despite its listing in the intelligence report and shielded the project from too much media attention. Even though Katja Niggemeier of the local QM office regrets the hiding of a successful project from the press, Commissioner for Integration Stibenz was too worried that more negative reporting could undermine the process of 'finding sovereignty' in the mosque association. 373

372 373

www.wirsindda.com/unsere-themen/bildung.html (accessed March 28, 2012). Interviews Niggemeier, Stibenz.

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The enthusiasm that accompanied the joint project on both sides of the cooperative agreement confirms the importance of joint ownership and accountability. The process in this case is more of a supportive than deliberative nature, but it triggered all the possible benefits ascribed to deliberative processes, by respecting core requirements such as exchange on a basis of equality level, including lifeworld accounts as accountability towards constituencies and the involvement in agenda-setting to see the endeavour through from beginning to end. This case thus reunites theoretical and empirical reflections on deliberative democracy and the importance of process. The mosque became active with the aim of benefitting their community through integration in their wider neighbourhood. Participation is seen as a means of gaining more acceptance and as a way of explaining difference. The tandem project, though not their original idea but decided by the district administration, was a way to jump on the band-wagon with an established German welfare organisation which has a large network of its own and educational programmes ready to implement. In training women from Haci Bayram mosque for the educational project, the staff of the welfare organisation partner, AWO, had firsthand contact with Muslim women, reducing stereotypes and worries of one partner dominating the other.

Outcomes for stakeholders involved Former Quartiersmanager Reinhardt Fischer reports that when the QM started its outreach work to Muslim communities levels of Islamophobia in local organisations were high, including in local CDU and SPD groups.374 This underlines the importance of participation and the creation of local networks of citizen groups and initiatives to stimulate inter subjective learning. Since then progress has been made. The involvement of Haci Bayram in a participatory process based on equality ended up benefitting all parties involved. The mosque association reached their aim of opening up to the local community with the long-term goal of better social and economic prospects for their members. District administration and QM managed to activate the social potential of the mosque, allowing better access to parts of the local Muslim community in terms of service provision, education and economic emancipation. They found an important pre-condition for deliberation: they ascribe the same meaning to an important building block of integration discourse: 'Haci Bayram and the district administration are on the same level when it comes down to the meaning of the term integration.'375

374 375

Interview Fischer. Interview Saydam.

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Analysis

Networking between Had Bayram mosque and other civil society actors in the area has increased immensely. To Saydam, Germany's big welfare organisations serve as a model: 'Muslims must be strong enough to provide for people in a similar way. Haci Bayram should be able to at least provide for those in this neighbourhood.'376 AWO will continue to work with them if they get a further green light after the evaluation. According to their project coordinator Angelika Rix they are quite ready to plan further projects with Haci Bayram. It has been a steep learning curve for both organisations with unexpectedly valuable outcomes.377 The success of the project leads Katja Niggemeier to believe that inclusive process in project work has more effect in local development work than the existence of an elected neighbourhood council, where Muslim and minority organisations are a minority that rarely speaks up in a process that is not facilitated according to deliberative standards.378 Haci Bayram mosque was one of the polling stations during a 2011 campaign for voting rights for non-EU nationals in local elections and hosted several meeting of the community organising platform. Haci Bayram opened their 'citizen shop' down the road. The wall that used to hide the mosque has been torn down and the name of the mosque is written in large letters.

Citizenship and social movement sector The nurturing by district Commissioner for Integration and local QM paid off for Haci Bayram. 'Migrants can decide between wrong and right by themselves. We can do it; we know how to do it, Mustafa and Ali. We must show our communities.' Saydam reports that this is what he tells young men and women in the mosque's youth club. The mosque's website highlights a new self-confidence for active citizenship as part of its social mission and they confidendy maintain that integration is not about changing ways of life, it is about participation, as participation creates contacts and a sense of empowerment.379 Haci Bayram acquired new skills in the course of the project, which also increases their potential as participants. Angelika Rix from AWO points out that now the mosque knows how to write funding proposals. She also believes that they will be met with less prejudice in the neighbourhood.380 If positive the evaluation of the project will affect both the mosque and political structures. The

376 377 378 379 380

Interview Saydam. Interview Rix. Interview Niggemeier. See haci-bayram-moschee.de/?page_id=121 (accessed May 2011). Interview Rix.

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mosque can demonstrate a 'yes we can' attitude, and there is the potential for more funding in the future. It will help the self-confidence of the mosque and further respect for the Muslim community on the institutional side.381 Sovereignty triggers self-confidence, which is very important for social and political equality. This case shows the positive role that institutional structures can play to facilitate discursive inclusion. The story of Haci Bayram mosque is still a rare development at Muslim grassroots level. The Islamic Federation, the mosque's over-arching institution, is aware of the project but contacts between grassroots and more established organisation remain rare. There is little formal exchange. 'I don't know what's going on in the Islamforum. They want us to write reports, but I don't do it, it's not my thing. We each do our own stuff, but we trust each other.'382 Riem Spielhaus confirms that communication structures inside Muslim organisations work differently from those of formal associations. There are officeholders in charge of different work areas and elected boards, but channels of information are informal and include Friday prayers, work groups, the Internet and other external and internal contexts.383 This also affects the selection of organisational representatives, usually favouring well-educated members of the group with greater economic independence, which is common in civil society. More disadvantaged people are excluded 'through practical barriers of time, money, culture and information' (Perrin/ McFarland 2008: 1234). This picture largely mirrors Muslim civil society in Berlin, but the Haci Bayram case shows that the willingness of activists to engage in 'deliberative rhetoric' to voice the concerns of their communities is as important as education and resources for the self-perception of a community.384 Haci Bayram complements the emerging movement sector described in the previous section. It is not the only mosque participating in local community organising. They can set an example for other congregations in the district and across the city. 'For the last year Haci Bayram has not been as it used to be for over 30 years. We [now] feel strong and feel we must share this with other

Interview Stibenz. Interview Saydam. 383 Interview Spielhaus. 384 In another neighbourhood in Mitte the local QM also invited mosques to participate in some public decisions (e.g. new design of public space in the neighbourhood), but they had no feedback. Then they tried to visit mosques and to talk to children and parents. The QM was in favour of including a mosque association in the QM steering committee to have someone to pass on information to other mosques about activities. They elected one representative who then never showed up to the meetings (Interview Altunkaynak). 381

382

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Analysis

mosques.' 385 In this case the initiative was taken by the elected board o f the mosque on behalf and for the benefit o f their members. Individuals were pulled into the project as AWO started training women as educators. At the local level the mosque association became part o f other initiatives in the neighbourhood, thus opening communicative channels for their members, which they did not possess before. On the institutional level, channels of communication opened between mosque representatives and the district administration. The symbolic representation o f interests is important, especially in the context of the inclusion of weak interests through deliberative processes. On the other hand, ties between grassroots and more established movement organisations are important for the legitimacy o f the deliberative process and accountability of the representative who speak for the large and diverse Muslim community in Berlin. Religious issues were o f no concern in the joint project or in relation to community organising activities. The focus was on objectives like education, family relationships and social concerns, which the partners shared with other actors in the neighbourhood. At the same time the project helped Haci Bayram to get recognition as what they are: a religious Muslim association. Their engagement in deliberative and participatory processes helped them to make claims related both to identity and to their specific concerns, which Saydam underlines as important goal. W e don't want to change the way we dress, pray and bring up our children, but we want to participate. When we come together religious topics are taboo. (...) I don't want to discuss religious issues. Let imams deal with that. I have enough other things to do.' 386 I f they manage to integrate identity and social concerns Haci Bayram could even turn into a social movement organisation. It underwent opening and a certain degree of professionalization without changing its nature. Quite the opposite, listening to Saydam they managed to affirm their identity while working with other civil society organisations and initiatives, hence losing none of their credibility with other Muslim communities. They established numerous channels of access to insiders in the system and in other civil society organisations with whom they network around issues.387 So far Haci Bayram is a success story in favour o f deliberation and participation.

Interview Saydam. Interview Saydam. 387 Many associations active in community organizing happen to be religious groups, so Haci Bayram shares that as an identity base. 385

386

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Case III: Neukölln and Kreuzberg Process and Outcome This section is a general description of the integration approaches of the districts towards Muslim participation. It functions as an extreme case to describe the impact on Muslim civil society in a structural environment where participation is not possible. This partly supports all theoretical propositions. The district of Berlin-Kreuzberg follows a participation approach following the Berlin integration plan and serves as a mirror for district-level prospects for participation. Neukölln and Kreuzberg show the dependence on dominating views and norms and the power of individual actors in this field. Kreuzberg follows an inclusive process. Muslim organisations feel generally satisfied in terms of inclusion in discourse with the district administration and in the exercise of citizenship on this level. Deliberative processes involving Muslim civil society include agenda setting and outcomes like the possibility to discuss issues with the district mayor and occasional cooperation in projects. In Neukölln the participation of Muslim civil society, especially religious associations, is extremely limited. Hence I am deviating from the analytical structure used above and will reflect on power, citizenship, social movement sector, and legitimacy, as well as important characteristics of deliberative processes that constitute support for the exercise of citizenship as moral equal worth and for the nurturing of Muslim civil society. One aspect of equality in communication is expressed in respect, for instance respecting the fact that immigrant organisations are committed to working on behalf of their communities in district Immigrant Advisory Boards. In the Neukölln board immigrant organisations can propose items for the agenda, to be discussed amongst each other with the Commissioner for Integration, representatives of the administrative departments and the mayor — 'but most of the time he does not come'.388 In Kreuzberg the mayor is always present at meetings of the Immigrant Advisory Board. The big success of the Islamforum, participants agree, is the participation of high-profile politicians like the Senator of Internal Affairs. It shows a certain degree of interest and commitment. It is not only a symbolic act: it also enables officials to learn from the participants about their perspectives and concerns. As the Islamforum demonstrates, this can lead to changes of points of view on both sides. Organisations represented in the Neukölln Immigrant Advisory Board and other participatory venues appreciate the opportunity for dialogue as a first important step towards intersubjective learning. Mahmood Nazar of AKI, a participating organisation, remarked the importance of the deliberative process: 'People must

388

Interview Nazar.

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Analysis

be able to understand why they say yes to this and no to that, they must do it consciously and not because they fear that otherwise their organisation will receive no further funding. They must also act in a responsible way.' 389 Religious Muslim organisations in Neukölln are largely excluded from this process, while in Kreuzberg organisations like the Muslim Federation, DITIB and Inssan are and have been members of the district Immigrant Advisory Board and can always participate in the Muslim round table. Mehdi Chahrour of youth organisation M.A.H.D.I. in Neukölln would appreciate a monthly round-table with the district Commissioner for Integration in Neukölln, with a careful selection of participants that represent all communities in the district. He also suggests that representatives of the system must decide what outcomes they expect from participation on district level. He feels that recurring questions on his opinion on events in Gaza or elsewhere in the Middle East are beside the point. W h a t do they expect me to say? The question is: what can be done in Neukölln? But here they believe in patterns like: this guy has influence in his community. If we can change his political opinion he will carry it into the community. This has nothing to do with integration.' 390 Due to lack of commitment by the district administration to working with Muslim organisations, the rejection of integration through project work and general lack of public funding for projects, there is little sense of progress in enhancing relationships in the district. 'The mood in Neukölln's mosques in relation to the district administration is very negative. Relationships are damaged by the whole political approach of the district. What they do is erect frontiers.' 391 Due to the absence of contacts between district administration and mosque association there is no trust, no learning, and ultimately less sense of citizenship as moral equal worth, e.g. expressed in many young members of M.A.H.D.I. contemplating leaving the country. 392 As district Commissioner for Integration Arthur Mengelkoch reported, mosque associations are only contacted in case of problems with pupils at school. Burhan Kesici of the Islamic Federation, who has been involved with the Neukölln administration on several occasions as part of their series of discussion events, points out that the real issue in Neukölln is the lack of trust and the refusal of the district to work with Muslim organisations. 393 The message from the district mayor is clear, however: no dialogue with association who are listed in reports of

Interview Nazar. Interview Chahrour. 391 Lydia Nofal. 392 Interview Chahrour. 393 Interview Kesici. 389

390

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the Office for the Protection of the Constitution, which excludes the majority of mosques. The Neukölln district administration justifies its integration approach partly on the basis of structural limitations, such as the lack of funding for integrative measures like intercultural dialogue, or the need to change underlying structures like the school system, which lies outside the district's responsibility. The Commissioner for Integration also refers to insufficient resources on the part of the Muslim actors: the lack of suitable candidates for jobs in administration with Muslim background, the undue influence of mosque associations that make it impossible to support communal voting rights for non-EU nationals. The Commissioner states that mosque association either come with unreasonable requests that go beyond the districts responsibility, or that they don't respond at all. These views are mixed with security arguments.394 The QMs in Neukölln do not work with religious Muslim organisations either. In comparison with Kreuzberg it becomes evident that none of these structural and personal concerns presented really matter in terms of participation in dialogue and deliberation. Kreuzberg's philosophy is characterised by a rather inclusionary approach, continuously keeping the doors open for all Muslim organisation that are interested in participating. In Kreuzberg as in Neukölln, mosque associations often fail to send representatives to meetings, but quite a few do attend the meetings of the round-table of Islamic associations on a regular basis. 'In Kreuzberg there is participation and equality. You are not simply tolerated, you are a citizen.'395 The standing invitation to participation and the lack of reservations towards organisations known to be conservative like Milli Görüs foster a sense of belonging. The fact that now a representative of a Milli Görüs mosque applied to become a citizen deputy as part of the new Integration and Participation Law can be interpreted as a result of his open approach. Deliberation at the Muslim round-table furthers understanding between Muslim CSOs and the district administration. Despite few precise outputs the symbolic gain is important.396 Lifeworld concerns can be discussed and are picked up by the district administration, if possible. An important step is the new focus on cooperation between mosques and QMs in the neighbourhoods. For example, former Soldiner Kiez neighbourhood manager Fischer, who had prepared the ground for Haci Bayram to participate by actively seeking contact to Muslim organisation in his area of responsibility, recently shared his experiences with

394 395 396

Interview Mengelkoch. Interview Nofal. Interview El-Naggar.

216

Analysis

QMs in Kreuzberg. Outcomes are necessary to keep the momentum of participation going. Despite similar financial restraints in Kreuzberg and in Neukölln, the former's district administration also quickly engaged in communication and deliberation inside the administration to find ways to implement the action areas outlined in the Berlin Integration Plan. It has supported Muslim organisations in their fundraising endeavours, at times against suspicions raised by federal institutions. On the whole, Kreuzberg demonstrates that there are ways for deliberation and cooperation with Muslims in the district. Even if results are mixed in terms of scope, the Open Society Institute research on Muslim integration in Kreuzberg confirms that Muslims in Kreuzberg identify with their district and like living there. Muslim activists say that participation is possible if desired, even though channels of access like the Immigrant Advisory Board are deemed more efficient than the Muslim round table. 397 In Neukölln the public sphere is definitely structured by a top-down approach. Integration discourse in the district is characterised by rhetoric rather than rational arguments. For many Muslim civil society organisations doors for participation in discourse with the district administration are closed. Other organisations representing Muslims, like DAUG or AKI, have some deliberative impact in the Immigrant Advisory Board or through QM activities. However, if the district mayor does not attend Immigrant Advisory Board meetings he cannot hear lifeworld accounts transmitted there, excluding himself from the possibility of a joint learning process that facilitates intersubjective understanding. Hence his integration approach is unlikely to be altered. As district integration policy wholly bears the mayor's handwriting, when the decisive figure is missing, there can be little accountability of the deliberative effort. Chahrour believes that many young people could take another trajectory than the one evoked in public discourse in the district (low school attendance, crime, living off social benefits), if there was the political will to work with people. But there is the lack of abstraction from foreign policy: 'You should be able to work with someone in Neukölln who has origins in a country whose politics you don't agree with.' 398 Ender Cetin of DÎTIB confirms that inner-Muslim cooperation in Neukölln is difficult. "We look for ways of building bridges for other Muslims to help them out of getting a reputation as radicals. This is difficult if the state observes what kind of contacts we keep. I went to school with some of them, we

397 398

Interviews Reinke, Nofal. Interview Chahrour.

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meet, and we drink tea together. I wonder how far I am allowed to see them as member of an association.'399 The Change Institute recommends: 'Rather than simply cooperating with those perceived as 'moderates' and/or 'representative', it is necessary that authorities engage with a wider range of both progressive groups as well as with those groups who may make less comfortable ideological partners but are nonetheless opposed to violence for political ends' (Change Institute 2008: 138). Even organisations that don't fall under the security rule set by the mayor feel the negative impact of the security and stereotype-driven discourse in Berlin. "We don't have much hope, but we do carry on with our work.'400 From a deliberative democracy perspective Neukölln's approach to integration cements fragmentation instead of contributing to social integration. Their integration policy statement employs the term of 'adaptation to majority ways' of life, thus rejecting the possibility of putting norms and values of the majority up to discussion, making it impossible to validate them from one's own lifeworld perspective (Habermas 1996: 36-7). Despite the ideality and normativity of Habermas' theory it seems that Neukölln is a perfect example of aggregative democracy deemed insufficient in terms of legitimacy and problem solving power. As the empirical material shows, Muslim actors in the district do feel constrained by the mayor's philosophy of integration, which means that in this case phronetic experience and normative theory overlap.

7.3. Joining the public sphere Voice and critical publicity 'Muslims have been excluded for years. The consequences are obvious, political decisions all got into dead ends. Decisions can be taken for me, but as long as I don't participate, they won't lead to success.' Faical Salhi, IZDB

The public sphere is where normative theory and phronesis meet. The many publics constituted through civil society seem to segment the general public sphere, but Habermas argues that they remain porous and can build hermeneutical bridges within the larger public sphere that is connected to the political sphere.

399 400

Interview Cetin. Interview Chahrour.

218

Analysis

'Segmented public spheres are constituted with the help of exclusion mechanisms; however, because publics cannot harden into organisations or systems, there is no exclusion rule without a proviso for its abolishment' (Habermas 1996: 374). This permeability, supported by deliberative procedures, is the subject of analysis in this thesis with a view to giving voice in the general public sphere. The theoretical framework refers to deliberative democracy, civil society and social movement theory. Each contributes to the merging o f hermeneutical horizons in its own way. Deliberative democracy theory underlines the importance of structural support of civil society in the public sphere via institutionalised deliberative procedures. Civil society theory points to the exercise of democracy when participating in civil society. Even if issues are not directed at the common good civil society organisations offer new interpretations and counterknowledge. Fennema and Tillie picked up on the democratising potential generated in networks of ethnic voluntary associations conceptualised as civic communities (Fennema/Tillie 2005). Social movement theory points out the growing agency potential achieved through networking and joining forces, both between civil society organisations who share identities, as in the concept o f a Muslim movement sector, and with wider civil society on special issues. The modern approach to public sphere, the one Habermas would like to hold on to with his communicative rationality, which indicates a single best way of speaking (McKee 2005: 19), has been criticised for excluding minorities. However, the Berlin examples of Muslim participation in deliberative processes suggest that minorities can learn the way of speaking, or 'rules o f the game' necessary to achieve communicative rationality with other participants in deliberative mini-publics. Empirical findings contradict the postmodern support o f many public spheres to the extent that separate public spheres have less power to influence dominating public discourse. The case o f Haci Bayram mosque in Berlin's Mitte area, for example, shows that participation in the joint project was an important experience in terms o f self-confidence and motivation. It fired Saydam's imagination for further engagement o f the mosque. It is the further participation in neighbourhood activities like the community-organizing platform that gives them visibility and improves their image in the local public. However, different publics constituted in civil society are necessary in a phronetic, practical way, to get different voices on the way in the first place. Activists in civil society must believe in the possibility of change to push for the kind o f conflict that according to the hermeneutic tradition can then be discursively approached. Access to public discourse, however, is unequally distributed due to power structures determined by mass media and elite interests. 'On account of its anarchic structure, the general public sphere is (...) more vulnerable to the repressive and exclusionary effects o f unequally distributed power, structural violence, and systematically distorted communication than are

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the institutionalized public spheres of parliamentary bodies' (Habermas 1996: 307-8). Access requires the right political opportunity structures and support by insider agents who believe in the normative potential of deliberation.

If they had voice in the public sphere, what would they say? There is of course no 'Muslim' concern as such that 'they' in the sense of a homogeneous community want to enter into public discourse. Muslim lifeworld realities and related concerns in Berlin differ greatly. As Körting pointed out there is a certain diaspora mentality among many communities and mosques that are still dominated by first generation immigrants. They were ripped out of their cultural lifeworld context and can only partly reproduce it in immigrant neighbourhoods or mosque congregations, while being constantly exposed to other cultural influences. Their children grew up exposed to both lifeworlds; their grandchildren might already call an entirely different lifeworld context their own. This is the reason for Inssan or Muslimische Jugend to offer alternatives to younger generations who grew up here. At the same time, conservative organisations like Milli Görüs, who try to preserve a strict Islamic identity, also attract young people. Still, from a democratic legitimacy point of view the public sphere must also include undemocratic views (Keane 1998: 64). Inclusion might further appreciation of constitutional norms that guarantee democratic deliberation and pluralism. Fennema and Tillie suggest that 'civic engagement is not in itself democratic but within democratic governance it tends to become so' if such organisations are not fully isolated from the mainstream society (Fennema/Tillie 2005: 223). Schiffauer agrees in his study of Milli Görüs that extremist groups can be counter-balanced by inclusion (Schiffauer 2010). According to Muslim actors and other stakeholders interviewed for this thesis there are some general grievances that concern many Muslims in Berlin, like negative depictions of Islam and Islamophobia or the discrimination of women wearing headscarves in the labour market. Many interviews show, however, that Muslims simply wish to be recognised as equal citizens, without any further political concerns and without having to prove themselves as better citizens. A new Muslim cemetery will become an issue of public discussion in the near future. The best plot for a new cemetery is in a central position on Berlin's former Tempelhof airfield, now a recreational area with old trees and a café. A Muslim civil society with voice in the public sphere would be part of this discussion without having to answer for value-based concerns. This would help legitimacy of political support for this plot. So far there has been little Muslim access to public discourse on the local or civic level.

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Analysis

Promotion of voice through deliberation in mini-publics For the longest time Muslim organisations were unable to engage in communicative action in Berlin. Their lifeworld experiences clashed with dominating discourses in the public sphere. The immigrant generation started off without contacts in their new country where they were or still are aliens. For the most part they did not share a common understanding with their host society. This left them with little scope for participation and without voice in the public sphere; their concerns could not claim legitimacy. The situation started changing with Muslim civil society formation and the appearance of new deliberative mini-publics like local Immigrant Advisory Boards inviting Muslim associations or the Berlin Islamforum. Several factors came together that conditioned this development. Working with immigrant organisations is generally no longer seen as hindering integration. There is a new culture of institutional dialogue in Berlin with the potential 'to encourage the virtue of openness' and 'principles that govern the conduct of moral relations in public life' (Gutmann/Thompson 2004: 90/91), replacing bargaining and favouritism, not only to successfully engage minorities, but all citizens. The younger generation is more outward oriented and more familiar with the dominating culture than the older generation who came as guest workers or refugees. There is also more interest in participation and willingness to form identity and issue based cooperation. The openness of exchange in deliberative mini-publics like the Islamforum or the round-table of Islamic associations in Kreuzberg, but also an inclusive communication process that accompanied the Haci Bayram project in Mitte promoted mutual understanding, helping to coordinate action plans and actions in line with Habermas' communicative action paradigm. The Islamforum has been a steep learning curve for all participants. It also showed Muslim participants that they must close their ranks in order to move forward and get on their own feet. Six years later, some of the main Muslim actors participating in this venue are setting up a new umbrella organisation, claiming to represent majority Muslim interests in the city for the first time. Others came together to organise spiritual counselling for Muslim prison inmates. Both bring a variety of ethnic backgrounds together. Neither would have been possible without the relationships established in the Islamforum. However, grassroots connections need building, animosities must still be overcome and some minority groups like the Ahmadi or Alevi face exclusion from this consolidation process. Mini-publics function as a buffer and mediating agent inside the public sphere. This function is visible in the Berlin Islamforum. In a deliberative setting representatives of Muslim umbrella organisations and individual mosques, representing different ethnic communities and branches of Islam, and to some extent different generations of Muslims, come together with representatives of

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other faith-based groups, immigrant organisations and high ranking public officials. It is a setting where different views on issues related to Muslims can be exchanged and ideas put forward. What can be achieved in mini-publics and how do they contribute to overcoming plebiscitary rhetoric in the public sphere? First of all, there is the symbolic force of dialogue, which, albeit behind closed doors, occurs in the public sphere outside lifeworld contexts. Communication results in better networking but also in reducing stereotypes and prejudice, for example when Senator of Internal Affairs Körting changed certain points of view or vouched for Muslim organisation Inssan in their mosque building effort. Participants who represent diverse religious groups and do not necessarily agree stood together in support of the Ahmadi mosque in Pankow-Heinersdorf. New legislation can be proposed and discussed, as burial legislation reform or the Berlin Law on Integration and Participation. Muslim civil society projects like prison counselling, indirectly linked to the Islamforum, received endorsement by the Berlin Senate. The Office of the Commissioner for Integration and Migration funds a project against discrimination of Muslims, run by Inssan and the anti-discrimination body of the TBB.401 Government funding sends an important signal to the public sphere that the issue of Islamophobia is real and needs addressing. Even though the Haci Bayram project on district and neighbourhood management levels was more accompanied and steered by the administration and cannot really be described as deliberative mini-public it still fulfils all requirements of a successful deliberative process on local level, with the goal of giving this mosque association a voice, as analysis above demonstrates. Mini-publics create communication protected from public discourse and produce communicative rationality if following appropriate process. Lifeworld accounts contribute to the creation of communicative rationality. Lifeworld accounts delivered in the Haci Bayram case differ from accounts in the Islamforum in its immediacy. Selcuk Saydam is rooted in Haci Bayram community needs. Members of the mosque are the direct beneficiaries of the project and ensuing activities. Muslim participants in the Islamforum provide lifeworld accounts on a more general level, e.g. when discussing the impact of Islamophobia or the reports by the Office for the Protection of the Constitution on Muslims. Also, they belong to the better-educated middle class, speak fluent German, and are more eloquent in interest representation than most members of the organisations they represent. The communicative rationality achieved enables

401

Türkischer Bund Berlin-Brandenburg - Antidiskriminierungsnetzwerk

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Analysis

different types of action. Immediate outputs of the Islamforum are more of symbolic nature whereas Haci Bayram engaged in a practical activity. Inclusive process based on equality is an essential criterion for deliberation success, as described and demonstrated above. A 2011 evaluation of different cooperative projects between migrant and indigenous organisations in Berlin supports the criteria applied in the analysis. The report found that joindy designed, bottom-up programmes are more successful, as both partners have vested interest in the success of a project. Many top-down mobilisations failed because 'of an outside pressure that changed motivation or interest of the partners in working together' (Hunger/Metzger 2011: 53). Power structures changed during the course of participation. Muslim actors in the Islamforum started off with less communicative power than the other participants, who were more experienced in interest representation. In relation to the attending representatives of the political system, civil society actors necessarily find themselves in a hierarchically structured situation. However, the deliberative process according to principles for successful deliberation allows for power in the sense of citizenship as moral equal worth. According to participants, the Islamforum invites an open exchange and criticism based on trust relations established over time, and learning happens on all sides. The experience in Haci Bayram mosque is similar. The process fulfilled deliberative standards to the extent that all procedural requirements were met. Saydam reported that he felt he was taken seriously and that views of the congregation were respected. He describes the mosque as an equal stakeholder in the neighbourhood and in communication with the district administration. Both cases furthered the inter subjective understanding that helps to find compromise, agreement, or even consensus in deliberation about problems or conflicts. In Neukölln there are few possibilities for Muslims to provide lifeworld accounts. The absence of Muslim voices hinders people making sense of each other; hence they cannot produce communicative rationality that would allow communicative action. Validity claims (e.g. of integration approach based on security discourse) cannot be put to the test in deliberative process. Political action is purely legitimised by election, excluding large numbers of the district population. In Kreuzberg communicative rationality is possible to the extent that everybody is invited to engage in discourse in principle. In practice it still proves difficult to include Muslim organisations that are not already professionalised and engaged in networking. Mosque associations and other Muslim groups attending the round-table of Islamic associations have little scope for action. The district administration has few financial resources to support activities like open mosque days or other intercultural and interreligious events. Mosque associations lack

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resources and do not necessarily nurture relationships with other civil society actors without structural support402 The lack of deliberation outcomes of the round-table highlights the importance of a social movement sector including grassroots that can place more precise demands and concerns on the agenda.

Sustainability of actor input to the public sphere Grassroots mobilisation is important to include different Muslim voices and guarantee the sustainability of input and output. A district like Kreuzberg trusts in grassroots emancipation through participatory structures like the round-table. Without further consolidation of Muslim participation, following the infirastructural model of a social movement sector, there is a risk of participation fatigue. Voice in the public sphere requires both publicity and stronger agency. Former Senator of Internal Affairs Ehrhart Körting sought to bridge both dimensions with the Islamforum: 'It was important to me that Muslim associations don't act in isolation but together with others, that they are acknowledged by others. Events were often publicised, the work of the Islamforum is publicised, and I made sure as a representative of the Senate to attend as many Muslim events as possible to demonstrate their belonging.'403 Körting would welcome more mosque associations to open up like Haci Bayram to generate stronger Muslim voice in all its plurality. As pointed out earlier, many grassroots associations are homeland oriented or lack resources for participation. Nazar of AKI underlines that many refugee families in Neukölln are not there voluntarily, they do not have the same interest in building a life as immigrants who made a conscious decision of going somewhere else to start anew. Many older refugees dream of returning to their homeland and are overwhelmed with learning German, let alone finding work. Here the main objective of a mosque is offering support, not to get involved in politics.404 This situation can change with a new generation taking over, supported by institutionalised exchange with administration and wider civil society. Developments in Berlin point towards the potential of a Muslim social movement sector, if more grassroots organisations, including non-religious ones, can be mobilised. Inssan wanted to institutionalise a Muslim civil society network for a long time. They always cooperated with other Muslim organisations, regardless of their ethnic background. At the same time, they were actively presenting themselves as a progressive young organisation that cooperated with district and QM. When they tried to build a mosque, however, they hit a wall of resistance. The fact that they had worked with other organisations with a critical reputation 402 403 404

Interview Reinke. Interview Körting. Interview Nazar.

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Analysis

severely damaged their public status.405 Supported by exchanges in the hlamforum there is now a new network of several different Muslim organisations with grassroots behind them that could be activated and have institutionalised access to policy makers, state institutions and other faith based or civil society organisations. Muslim civil society actors understand that they must start realising projects on their own, which requires coordination and endurance. 'Muslim associations and organisations must organise better. They must endure many backlashes through the public or negative administrative decisions. But the more we gain independence, the harder it will be for the other side to act this way.'406 Imran Sagir also suspects that the new umbrella organisation will initially take public beating, despite support by the Senate. They will say 'now all radical Muslim groups get together'. Media reporting follows the principle 'Bad news are good news and good news are no news'.'407 Still, Muslim civil society actors are moving on. A positive example of mosque associations opening to their neighbourhood and the subsequent benefits for the congregation as in the Haci Bayram case might stimulate other mosque associations, reducing worries of domination by mainstream society actors in administration or wider civil society. The same learning applies to public officials. There are already some institutionalised Muslim actors in Berlin. Haci Bayram in Mitte, the organisations represented in the hlamforum, also those in Kreuzberg with close ties to the district administration like Inssan. However, the amount of information sharing between participating individuals and the organisational membership they represent seems low at this point. Theoretically speaking, grassroots member mosques could already reach the policy level with their lifeworld accounts through those insider allies. The danger of oligarchy is low, as scope and themes of Muslim civil society input is very close to general lifeworld experiences of Muslim communities. Even when the new larger umbrella organisation starts taking representative functions all member organisation will keep their independence. Some organisations like Inssan and umbrellas like IBMUS or the Islamic Federation take a more political role than others and arguably form movement organisations. DITIB is still hesitating how to position itself in relation to other Muslim organisations, but it certainly has the organisational resources for a movement organisation. Thus all requirements as outlined by Rucht et al. exist in Berlin.

405 406 407

Evidence gathered from various interviews. Interview Sagir. Interview Sagir.

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The infrastructure of Muslim civil society in Berlin has already been changing over the past few years, in no small part due to the Islamforum. Participants there have become more knowledgeable about how administrative structures work, they have found voice in the discussions behind closed doors compared to the first couple of years, they have forged personal contacts with people from inside the administration, they intensified networking with each other and other civil society organisations408 and have formed a new body of interest representation. The anti-discrimination project run by Inssan and the anti-discrimination body of the TBB also signals new ways of working together between a mostly Arab religious association and a secular Turkish interest organisation. Both wanted to keep financial independence, which might in part be related to ideological differences. However, discrimination has not only been experienced by women wearing headscarves, but also by people who look like Muslims or have Arab or Turkish sounding names.409 The Haci Bayram case shows the potential of changing from an isolated community into a self-confident player in the neighbourhood, working with a non-religious welfare organisation on early childhood education and cooperating with other local initiatives in community organising. On the whole there are many indications of the possibility to establish a Muslim social movement sector in Berlin, but differences, competition and lack of resources still remain a challenge. The joining of forces and opening up of Muslim civil society organisations towards other social actors in cooperations is likely to increase voice in the public sphere over time. It is the place where both formal and informal citizenship is practiced. Acknowledgement of identities in the general public sphere is essential for the self-perception as moral equal worth, even without voting rights. Discursive inclusion in the public sphere is therefore the only way to integrate difference. Deliberative mini-publics and processes in Berlin have triggered developments that show potential. It is, however, still a long way, both for Muslim civil society and the institutions of mainstream society. Muslim actors still feel marginalised and miss acceptance

Mostly with other faith-based groups: e.g. Religion auf dem Tempelhofer Feld, an initiative for interreligious dialogue between Christian, Muslim, Jewish and Hindu congregations in Neukölln www.religion-auf-dem-tempelhofer-feld.de/; Alif, Aleph, Alpha, a 2008 educational project for against religious stereotyping with Muslim, Jewish and Christian trainers www.berlin-divercity.de/diwiki/index.php?title=Main_Page ; annual football cup between Imams, Rabbis and Priests www.ekbo.de/1057507 (all accessed March 25, 2012). 409 The experience of discrimination is the uniting element here, as in the case of nonAhmadi Muslim participants in the Islamforum demonstrating support for the Ahmadi mosque in Berlin-Pankow, knowing they would face similar public hostility to other mosque projects. 408

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Analysis

as moral equal worth. Some activists regret having adopted German citizenship. Of course exclusion and lack of recognition as equal do not only depend on inclusion in participatory process. Lack of educational and economic success also plays an important role (Somers 2008: 42). The Neukölln integration statement over-emphasizes this point: 'Educationally disadvantaged families who have adapted the social system as means of livelihood and whose prospects are signified by a life as a welfare recipient are left behind.'410 The District Commissioner for Integration sees lack of education and influence of mosque associations as severe enough not to consider communal voting rights. 'How about unemployed Germans', Mehdi Chahrour justifiably asks.411 As a reminder: interest in Muslim voices arriving in the public sphere is derived from Habermas' defence of the modernist concept of a universal or overarching public sphere that includes many publics, but with dominating discourses forming public opinion. Integration is one of those dominating discourses in society. Chambers points to mini-publics to help overcoming plebiscitary rhetoric in the general public sphere, which characterises public discourse on Muslim integration that largely excludes different points of view, usually with references to security concerns and insurmountable cultural differences. Can critical publicity be achieved through deliberative processes and Muslim civil society participation in Berlin? Islam turned into an issue of controversy. It thus left the realm of lifeworld where it rested quietly for a long time, in the backyard mosques of Berlin. It only became an issue of public discussion in the wake of September 11th, which partly explains the one-sidedness of discourse. Also, Muslim organisations were not ready to engage in public discourse when attention turned towards them. The empirical evidence is encouraging, despite progress being slow. Muslim civil society is already established in some local public spheres, like Haci Bayram in their neighbourhood in Mitte. Muslim civil society activists in Kreuzberg are satisfied with the level of access to the district administration and networking opportunities with other social actors. Links to political actors on city level still go largely unnoticed by the general public, which makes it harder for the political system in Berlin to legitimately represent Muslim needs and claims on their behalf. There is no clear causality in the cases described in this thesis, but it is still likely that the Islamforum contributed to strengthening and preparing the ground for Muslim voices and concerns in several instances. Examples are the publicly funded project against Muslim discrimination, the new association for spiritual counselling of Muslim prison inmates and the new um410 www.berlin.de/imperia/md/content/baneukoelln/2009pdf/microsoft_word

ationspolitik_m_neuk_lln_englische_version.pdf (p.2). 411 Interview Chahrour.

integr

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brella organisation with the potential to speak on behalf of a larger community. Had Bayram in Mitte is at any rate a success story.

Law and the public sphere According to discourse theory actors should not only be able to find means to achieve their goals but also be able to justify their choices with lifeworld accounts and reference to underlying norms to defend their actions and claims (Eriksen Weigard 2003: 122). Habermas points out that with the loss of a unified lifeworld only a discursively justified constitution can replace the normative basis previously generated through lifeworld truths and facts. The constitution is the common denominator in pluralist societies. The study of Muslim civil society's struggle for voice in the public sphere confirms Habermas. Lacking a normative ground for their claims and grievances in public discourse, the constitution is the only justification they can point to.412 Similarly, Korting points to the constitution when supporting mosques in the city.413 Public discourses in Berlin in relation to previous mosque building projects show that there is still little legitimacy for visibility of Islam in the public sphere. Communicative power in the public sphere would enhance their chances for consensus rather than mere agreement based on legal provisions. Burhan Kesici of the Islamic Federation Berlin would prefer recognition on the basis of equal worth rather than based on the outcome of a long legal battle, like the one the IF finally won to be allowed to teach Islamic religious education in Berlin schools. The aim is not to hear statements anymore like 'you are ok as a person but unfortunately you belong to an Islamic association.'414 Due to the high levels of emotions, stereotyping and fear in relation to Islam, public discourse tends to be more of a moral nature, expressed for example, in Leitkultur (leading culture) discourse. With more presence of Muslim voices in the public sphere discourse might turn towards more pragmatic issues. This would promote the normalisation and recognition Muslim civil society actors wish for.

e.g. Chahrour pointing to the right of self-determination, others pointed to freedom of religion. 413 Interview Körting. 414 Interview Kesici.

412

Analysis

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7.4. Legitimacy, structure and agency 'A migrant willing to integrate knocks at the door. The society behind the door must open. If migrants are not willing and society does not have the patience to take them in, then it's not going to work. Integration can only work with someone knocking and someone opening.' Mahmood Nazar, AKI The Open Society Foundations' research on Muslims in Berlin shows that Muslims perceive discrimination as an aspect of their everyday life (Open Society Foundations 2010): interviewees maintain that they will never be accepted as Germans, whatever they do, or feel tired of having to prove themselves as good citizens.415 In relation to Habermas' notion of democratic legitimacy, generated through discourse in the public sphere, the overarching issue is whether there can be public spheres autonomous enough to emancipate themselves from dominant public discourse, allowing them to fuel it from the bottom up and overcome lifeworld colonization expressed in perceptions described by Muslims above. In Habermas' terms there is a large legitimacy deficit in both integration policy and in democratic representation in general. Habermas' solution lies in the institutionalisation of deliberative practice with civil society. The Berlin I slam forum and the example of Haci Bayram mosque show the positive impacts of deliberative practice, even though they can only approach the ideal described in Habermas' normative theory. He has been criticised for dreaming to return to the bourgeois public sphere he described in the Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, inhabited exclusively by educated white men (e.g. Fraser and Benhabib in Calhoun 1992). Such blames seem to ignore the full context of his theory, considering that his democratic model was inspired by new social movements. Habermas observed the transformation from private people into politically active citizens, coming together in the 'wild' and 'anarchic' realm of civil society, where ideas are unrestricted and there is room for emancipation. This transformation certainly happened to former baker Selcuk Saydam, who is now an activist working on behalf of his mosque, first in the tandem project, then in local community organising, and last as a candidate for the migrant party BIG during local elections in 2011. Habermas points out that lifeworld issues must be subjects of controversy in order to enter discourse in the public sphere, where they can be dealt with discursively and picked up by the strong public of the system. Thus lifeworld grievances turn into normative issues. Solutions require political legitimacy. In the case of Muslim lifeworld concerns the path is somewhat different. It was

415

For example Kesici and Chahrour.

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Islam that became a subject of controversy in the wake of September 11th, which turned German public attention to Muslim communities living in their midst. This woke up Muslim civil society and politicians alike, who largely picked up on the security concerns floating around in public discourse. From a Habermasian point of view public discourse legitimises political process, but not without fulfilling the criteria of deliberative democracy. These include institutionalised channels of access for all parties concerned, which were not in place. In Berlin it took a few more years for both sides to be prepared to enter into deliberation. As discourse theory points out, deliberative procedures and conditions for communication shape the interplay between system and informally constituted public opinions (Habermas 1996: 275). The Berlin example shows that institutionalised deliberative processes play a key role in building informal publics. Muslim civil society started off without many resources to gain voice in the public sphere. At the same time the system needs civil society to legitimise policy decisions designed to support them and their communities. 'When looking after minorities you must always make sure to take the large majority along on that journey. You must never give the impression that you only care for minorities and not for John Doe.'416 According to Habermas, political decisions can only be justified by an open communication process, based on a shared normative understanding: 'The success of a program does not just depend on the presence of cognitive ideas capable of satisfying policy makers that a given program will provide robust solutions. It also depends on the presence of complementary normative ideas capable of satisfying policy makers and citi2ens alike that those solutions also serve the underlying values of the polity' (Schmidt 2008: 308). Habermas points out that underlying values are only those defined in the constitution, while public discourse and political rhetoric tend to employ reference to western values that lack definition. Legitimacy needs structure and agency to work together. As outlined in ontological and epistemological statements this thesis is based on two fundamental assumptions, following Habermas separation of system and lifeworld: that there are ordering principles in the system world that provide the political opportunity structures of a polity and that social actors impact on social reality by presenting lifeworld generated ideas in the public sphere. Hence structure and agency are at the foundation of the research endeavour and form one reference frame in the analysis of the empirical data gathered. Structure and agency are also elementary terms in social movement research from which the concept of a social movement sector was extracted.

416

Interview Körting.

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Analysis

Civil society organisations can claim to represent and express sovereignty (Seligman 1992: 5). In Habermas' conceptualization civil society has an actionoriented function and a normative democratic function. Attempts to push their interpretations into the general public sphere display the wish of actors to change dominating practice. In this case it triggers the commitment of Muslim civil society to keep engaging in deliberative efforts and symbolic action. It demonstrates their wish of belonging, despite backlashes from media, critical politicians and public stereotyping of Islam. Actors must interpret and defend their normative content through conflict, rational discourse and deliberation in the general public sphere, structured by unequally distributed power, structural violence, and systematically distorted communication (Habermas 1996: 369 and 307). Muslims do not stand much of a chance in general public discourse without nurturing in mini-publics organised top-down by the system, due to a legitimacy crisis of Muslim claims in the public sphere where Muslim integration has become a normative question. Habermas' discourse ethics perspective on the other hand maintains that each norm must be up for questioning in the public sphere in principle, to continuously renew its legitimacy. Through this same process, authorities and political elites also maintain legitimacy. If civil society can restore this legitimacy by collectively negotiating the conditions for living together it must also include Muslim civil society. The normative function of civil society lies in the reflection of the relationship between the state and its citizens (Janoski 1998: 12). A sense of equality generated by government through the promotion of different voices in the public sphere builds the trust needed for people to reach and connect with others (Edwards 2004: 88). Fennema and Tillie argue that only a procedural democracy is equipped to govern a culturally and ethnically pluralist society and that minority civil society organisations can increase the social and political equality of their members (Fennema/Tillie 2005: 229). This notion of civil society acknowledges the structural dimension of the enabling state. The dimension of voice through participation is situated in the public sphere where civil society agents express their concerns and enter into deliberation with each other, further social actors and representatives of the state sphere. At the same time conflicts are formally discussed between media and political parties, situated at the state sphere end of public sphere, furthest away from lifeworld context (Janoski 1998: 13). Mass media generate manipulative publicity and shape public opinion. Public opinion can only be inclusive if mediated and informed by critical publicity exercised in intra-organisational public spheres (Habermas 1990). Opinion leaders situated in the weak publics of civil society must seek to connect to formal opinion-generating circles in order to put non-public opinions on the agenda (Habermas 1990: 355). Habermas calls this critical publicity, possible via

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'the participation of private people in a process of formal communication conducted through intra-organizational public spheres' (Habermas 1990: 35). In the context of this research, Muslim civil society must gain voice in the public sphere via organized structures and arenas, but it contains a public 'struggle for recognition' (Habermas 1996: 314) that needs strong agency. Having a stake in on-going controversy in the public sphere rests on capacity and confidence in communities. This is the only way to consensus, impossible to achieve without contention mobilised around identities and special interests. It is the way Muslim civil society in Berlin must take to acquire voice. Margaret Somers makes a strong connection between the marginalization of citizens, their voice, and the potential of Habermas' concept of deliberation in civil society and the public sphere. Deliberative democratic process that allows all voices to speak up in the first place makes the Haci Bayram-AWO tandem in Berlin-Mitte a positive example to illuminate the interplay of structure and agency. The local QM wanted to fund a project with a mosque to work as multipliers in parent education. All cooperation that involves public funding strongly depends on the political opportunity structures, but in this case there were deliberators within the political process of the district who argued in favour of the cooperation. The Commissioner for Integration of the district got involved. The tender was possible in the first place due to the open-minded approach to participation promoted by the district mayor.417 It coincided with the mosque's interest to open up. This concurrent interest is an important factor for success, as several actors wanted it. Top-down projects often suffer from pressure on the less interested partner (Hunger/Metzger 2011: 53). The fact that Haci Bayram appeared in the report by the Office for the Protection of the Constitution did not stop the project from going ahead. Neukölln is the counter-example. On the whole, integration policy in the district keeps a distance to organised Islam and plainly refuses contact with associations listed in the intelligence reports. This not only excludes religious Muslim organisations, it also affects non-religious civil society rooted in predominantly Muslim communities. In order to maintain credibility with the district, they avoid close ties with religious communities. At the same time too much closeness to the district administration can diminish their credibility in the community. This situation hampers the integration goals of the district.418 'We must overcome the lack of trust.'419

Interview Niggemeier. 'Under integration, we understand the inclusion and integration of all immigrants to the social core areas of the host society, but also their involvement in the cultural life and political participation. (...) We do not speak about them but with them. We cooperate with associations, alliances and cultural centres of different ethnic, religious and social 417 418

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Analysis

The improvement of interpersonal trust is one important result of regular deliberation in the Islamforum, where the majority of participating Muslim organisations regularly appears in the reports by the Office for the Protection of the Constitution. As none of them endorse the use of violence the Senator of Internal Affairs did not see this as a reason to not engage in dialogue with them. „In my view equality is more important than security discourse. There can only be peace in the city without excluding anyone.' 420 The exemplary cases presented in this thesis demonstrate the linkage between political opportunities provided by the system and social agents quite clearly. They also show that Muslim civil society participation is still highly dependent on individual advocates from within the political system to steer the effort towards success. A stronger institutionalisation of deliberative procedures would reduce the dependence on political opportunity structures with their dependence on power alignments and individual philosophies of integration. Membership in the Islamforum was designed 'to be representative of the full range of groups and communities in Berlin and bring on board a range of grass roots perspectives that also bring genuine reach into the communities of Berlin' (Change Institute 2008: 78). The aim was to equip the forum with both credibility and legitimacy. This objective is not or only partially fulfilled. Grassroots reach is low and some neighbourhood organisations question the benefits of the forum. On the other hand, it did open the opportunity for building a Muslim social movement sector. Structure and agency both impact the formation of a social movement sector. IBMUS and Inssan have tried building a Muslim network for a long time. The Islamforum helped connecting with further Muslim actors. The fact that Milli Görüs is a member of the new network in an attempt to unify more Muslim organisations in Berlin in order to better pursue their interests, mostly related to faith, like a new Muslim cemetery or a representative mosque in Berlin, but also related to discrimination, demonstrates a new cautious confidence. Potentially there is access to more orthodox groups through a forming institutionalised movement sector. Milli Görüs represents a large number of Muslims in Berlin. Their integration in public sphere activity can contribute to building civic capacities there, according to researchers like Schiffauer, Fennema, and Tillie. Muslim civil society actors in the Islamforum have clearly political interests. Support and cultural associations like DAUG in Neukölln tends to the Arab community in their neighbourhood while trying to have a voice in integration

groups. Prerequisite is the commitment of the respective organisations to the free democratic basic order' (Bezirksamt Neukölln 2009: 3&5). 419 Interview El-Gezawi. 420 Interview Körting.

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policy. They thus serve more than one purpose at a time, which is also the case for various mosque associations. 'They establish informal networks in their environment and activate self-help. Immigrant organisations are contact points and partners of cooperation for communal administration and politics' (Huth 2006: 30). Even with mini-publics like the Islamforum on city-level or the Muslim round table in Kreuzberg, as long as dialogue and participation are not structurally anchored in the system, agency continues to play a major role for Muslim civil society participation as well as for legitimacy. The establishment of a Muslim social movement sector could strengthen access and possibly circumvent parts of the administrative infrastructure that remains closed to Muslim claims making. It would promote legitimacy with wider Muslim civil society and would be able to make claims based on representation. However its establishment requires further deliberation inside Muslim civil society.421 Some limitations remain. As Fischer points out, only some 15% of Muslims in Germany are active members of Islamic associations, so the number of individuals represented is not that high. However, many more people frequent mosques for Friday prayers, and only those who live locally might participate in social activities like youth clubs, language classes, educational projects etc. It is difficult to estimate the actual numbers reached with such measures (Fischer 2005: 42). However, in a democracy based on proportional representation even a 15 per cent constituency representation makes a difference. Gutmann and Thompson argue in favour of increasing the moral content of politics and thus implementing a public morality for society as a whole. Deliberation between citizens and public officials based on mutual respect, they maintain, would work towards a view of the common good 'that is compatible with continuing moral disagreement' (Gutmann/Thompson 2004: 92). It would also alter the principle of democratic representation. This is a very normative demand, but the practice of deliberative exchange based on respect in the Islamforum and Haci Bayram examples serves as a practical confirmation of the benefits of introducing structures that enhance people's feeling of moral equal worth. The interplay of structure and agency is formulated in the Berlin Integration Plan, where positive affirmation of diversity, the fostering of civil society in the neighbourhoods and connecting communities are declared areas of political and Mehdi Chahrour of M.A.H.D.I. for example said he did not believe the right people would be present in this umbrella organisation. Renate El-Gezawi of DAUG pointed out that more networking was needed, that they all fight for the same approach and hence organisations operating at higher level should be more in touch with associations on the ground. Many people in the Islamforum have known each other for a long time, some of them in the home countries already. 421

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Analysis

social action. Part of a feeling of belonging is forging contacts within the neighbourhood and 'between people of different ethnic and cultural groups, as this helps to overcome prejudice and challenge stereotypes' (Open Society Foundations 2010: 50). One indication of the value of neighbourhood is Muslim participation in activities of the neighbourhood management (QM), but also other forms of engagement like the ~Biirgerplattform (community organising) in Mitte, which seems particularly attractive to mosque associations. The district administration in Mitte embraced and filled this action goal with life with the Haci Bayram project. An ethnographic study on second generation Turks shows that 'being from Berlin' sometimes replaces, but certainly complements ethnic or national belonging. 'As a category it prevents a definition from outside. It allows self-determination of one's own position in society' (Rauch 2010: 153). This positive identification seems largely present in Kreuzberg, home of many 'old' Turkish communities who settled there as part of work migration. The district administration tries to implement the Integration Plan of the Senate. It promotes open dialogue with Muslim civil society and connects them with other social actors in the district, for example on the issue of gambling halls.422 There is still a lack of cooperation between mosque associations and neighbourhood management. Activities on this level promise to be most successful, as Haci Bayram demonstrates. The district is looking into fostering partnerships on this level, but it requires more willingness to engage on the part of grassroots mosques. The Neukolln integration statement distances itself from the Berlin Integration Plan at least as far as mosque associations are concerned, as there is no attempt to involve them in deliberation and foster connections with other civil society. The Commissioner for Integration did publish a leaflet providing information about each mosque in the neighbourhood, giving them some recognition as part of the community. Still, evidence suggests that it is exchanges in deliberative process and the resulting reduction of stereotypes that both affirms difference and strengthens a sense of citizenship as moral equal worth and thus the commitment to further engagement. There are cognitive and normative justifications for the participatory approach of Berlin's integration policy. As part of the integration plan, for example, the Senate provided funding for cooperation between migrant and domestic organisations, based on the argument that integration is a matter of social inclusion,

Muslim organisations attending the round table had complained about the proliferation in the district. Commissioner for Integration and Immigration Regina Reinke tried to initiate strategies by bringing in other civil society actors like Caritas, a church based welfare organisation with experience in counselling for gamblers (Interview Reinke). 422

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which is a pragmatic statement free of normative judgement. 423 The normative justification for participation, and for the voice of Muslim actors in the public sphere, is to eventually change attitudes and promote societal integration. This seems to be working best starting on the very local level, where the case of the Haci Bayram mosque demonstrates that successful participation in an educational project can trigger wider public engagement and thus citizenship and inclusion in a broader discourse. Muslim integration and participation of certain Muslim groups is highly emotional and there is a need for rationalization of the debate. Access to the public sphere is key to present other images of Muslims than the stereotypes reproduced in the media.

7.5. Societal Integration and Democratic Representation In this research the assumption was made that deliberative process can help reduce stereotyping, foster inter subjective learning, further social inclusion and promote citizens in the realm of constitutional norms. The most important aspects of civil society are those of plurality of beliefs, thus containing a moral indifference principle, and generating ideas based in Iifeworld grievances and concerns. Ideas must be communicated via associations to the system. Shared beliefs should not be essential to an open society (Keane 1998: 58). If a process of social change includes different belief systems expressed in civil society there is a chance of avoiding Iifeworld colonization and societal disintegration (Habermas, 1981II: 445-489).

Societal Integration Can the interplay of structure and agency turn into societal transformation in the sense of altering discourses in the public sphere through discursive inclusion of Muslim voices? Although general public discourse expressed in the media continues to be largely exclusive of different perspectives in relation to Muslim integration, we see new publics emerging at the civil society end of the public sphere, promoted and supported by deliberative processes and mini-publics. Despite the difficulty of establishing precise causality in a qualitative study like this, interviews with Muslim civil society activists and stakeholders from the Berlin administration suggest that the participatory agenda had a positive influence on the development of Muslim civil society. Muslim CSOs in Berlin who are actively engaging with various levels of the Berlin administration are recognising each other more as sharing aspects of

Action programme Vielfalt fördern — Zusammenhalt stärken (Supporting Diversity — Strengthening Cohesion)

423

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Analysis

identity. They have started formulating grievances in accordance with each other. They also increasingly see some common ground with other civil society actors, mostly in interreligious and intercultural dialogue initiatives, but also in education, community and youth work. The learning process that all participants in the Haci Bayram tandem underwent was important to gain trust in cooperation with other civil society organisations. Both partners had initial worries. AWO wondered about the way a mosque association would treat women, who were conceptualised to be key multipliers in the educational projects. Haci Bayram feared that AWO would try to dominate the less professional mosque in the project. In the end AWO regrets the departure of one of the key female figures in the project, expressing the belief that discrimination against women wearing headscarves drives people out of the country, turning initial worries upside down. Haci Bayram started inviting AWO to events and vice versa, the worry of domination clearly removed, integrating the different worldviews of the participating partners. 424 The benefits of participation in the Islamforum for identifying common ground in civil society is expressed in initiatives like spiritual counselling for Muslim inmates in Berlin prisons, as the round table on prisoners decided to approach two organisation who are represented in the Islamforum. Another example is the cooperation of Inssan and the anti-discrimination body of the TBB, funded by the Commissioner for Migration and Integration of the Senate. These are just two examples of civil society slowly moving closer together, integrating different lifeworld contexts. There is potential for contributing to societal integration on a larger scale than mini-publics or sub-spheres, which is why stronger Muslim voices are desirable and should be supported. As societal integration is a process of constant reproduction, new realities can always be integrated. In pluralist and fragmented societies with different and sometimes contradicting worldviews and belief systems, Habermas theory of communicative action helps problem solving. Constitutional norms formulated in communicative rationality are the only underlying shared frame of reference. This is central to societal integration in terms of inclusive opportunities for participation, as every other aspect of social life is up to legitimate questioning and discussion. Discourse ethics enhance the validity of claims, while maintaining difference and distinctly other aspects of identity based in value-producing lifeworlds, communicated in public spheres with the help of civil society. Processes like this can have transformative character if they expand to wider society with the help of the public sphere.

424

Interviews Rix, Saydam.

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This is the reason why Muslim civil society must gain access to discourse in the general public sphere. There are a number of projects and cooperations including Muslim organisations in Berlin, and networking among Muslim actors is increasing. In order to generate voice and contribute to societal integration such cooperations must be sustainable and if possible increase. The future of Haci Bayram will in no small part depend on Selcuk Saydam recruiting other activists inside the congregation, as much networking and activity rests on his shoulders alone. The mosque association lost its charitable status due to listing in the report by the Office for the Protection of the Constitution and is thus no longer eligible to public funding. The network with other civil society in the neighbourhood via community organising has established new contacts. The question is if they generate cooperation beyond the community organising platform. The relationship with the district administration so far depends on the personal connection between Saydam and a few individuals like Commissioner for Integration, Stibenz. Still, it is hard to imagine Haci Bayram will withdraw again in its isolation. More networking, both within a Muslim social movement sector and other civil society, and continued affirmation by QM and district administration are important to keep the ball rolling. Integration in the neighbourhood will also be measured by women from the mosque using other educational offers in their areas, as project funding for the mosque is limited, time consuming and extremely dependent on individuals.425 The future of the Islamforum will at least to some extent depend on the continuation of symbolic outreach toward Muslim communities by high-ranking officials. The fact that Körting always attended meetings and had an open ear for all Muslim concerns was an important factor for developing trust and respect, but also to keep all Muslim participants on board over five years, despite doubts among some of them about Islamforutrfs effectiveness. The round table in Kreuzberg needs more outcomes to keep participants involved long term and should be complemented by mosque cooperation on the neighbourhood level. 'Cooperation tends to be more sustainable when linked to funding schemes of neighbourhood facilities like tandems' (Beer 2007: 42). This requires Muslim grassroots associations to express interest in cooperation. Relationships in Neukölln can only improve. Habermas considers communicative action in a deliberative process the only path to societal integration because of the system's dependence on lifeworlds. Only institutions that represent lifeworld interests can be deemed stable and legitimate. Muslim civil society has the potential to represent ideas, values and interests that can claim validity for a substantial minority in the population, 425

Interview Niggemeier.

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Analysis

highly observed in public discourse, but rarely heard in the public sphere. Discourse ethics is essentially related to norms rather than values. Habermas once referred to the Constitutional Court in Germany as being too value-driven. So is the public debate when referring to a hxitkultur (leading culture). Values of the majority society need justification in public discourse just like other truth claims. Habermas insists that the Constitution should not protect pre-established truths and the principle of representation should not be used as a shield against people's will reflected in the public sphere (Habermas 1996: 485). In the context of Muslim integration two sets of norms that are both coercive but legitimate (Habermas 1998: 43) come together: religion and law. Politicians and critics of Islam often maintain that Muslims must accept the legal structures enshrined in the Constitution and give religious claims second priority. At the same time Muslims refer to the constitutional right of freedom of religion when defending their claims. Here is a conflict of basic moral positions, as Gutmann and Thompson described it. The only hope for the social integration of this conflict is communication, as the legitimacy of norms that form the basis of law depends on the participation of citizens in a legitimizing discursive process. 426 There was an animated discussion in the Islamforum in response to a publication by the Berlin Office for the Protection of the Constitution on the Image of Islam as incompatible with constitutional values between Muslim participants the director of the intelligence agency, Claudia Schmid. 427 Such exchanges should be encouraged.

426 'The locus of social integration in the legal system is the legislative process. Participants in legislative process must be expected to exit the realm of private legal subjects and take a perspective as citizens and members of a freely associated legal community. This community either agrees on the normative foundations of living together based on shared traditions or achieved understanding through communication according to rules that are normatively acknowledged' (Habermas 1998: 50 and 52). The publication Zerrbilder von Islam und Demokratie (Distorted Images of Islam and Democracy) uses Islamist references to Islam and counters them with quotes by other Muslims that contradict extremist readings, in order to show that Islam and the German constitution are indeed compatible. The director of the Muslim Academy, Christian Abdel Hadi Hoffmann, criticized the attempt of the administration to interpret what constitutes a misuse of Islam and questions judgments of Islam based on the constitution. For more information and related documents see: hlamforum Session 16 (June 16, 2011) www.berUn.de/lb/intmig/islamforum/islamforum_sitzungl6.html (accessed April 20, 2012) 427

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Democratic representation More participation does not necessarily demand the implementation of direct democracy and the abandonment of a political decision-making system based on representation. In fact, Habermas and theorists of democracy like Urbinati speak in favour of representative democracy if democratic procedures allow deliberation and take more views into account. Deliberative democracy theory is an essential reference frame for civil society participation in pluralist societies. Despite its normative character it is generally acknowledged as superior to purely aggregative forms of decision-making. Mini-publics and democratic deliberation in institutional decision-making procedures offer a voice to groups and interests outside elections and official will-formation. Sometimes just the initiation of dialogue triggers a sense of empowerment. Civil society actors can feed concerns and ideas to representatives of administrations and elected assemblies in deliberative fora. This in turns allows for a more encompassing and informed representation of a plurality of interests. Representative democracy has a number of benefits compared to direct democracy. Urbinati and Warren argue that representation transcends the immediacy of interests (2008: 401), thus dealing with purposive rationality. Only in a representative democracy can different opinions be heard and plebiscitary decision kept at bay (Habermas).428 Representative democracy promotes organised interests like trade unions and employer associations, in the German case usually behind closed doors. Minority groups usually lack organised interests and are thus excluded from the support of states representing the sovereignty of the people, hence reducing the legitimacy of representative democracies in polities with a large migrant or minority population. Non-organised interests have to rely on deliberative participatory arrangements and social movement mobilising. Habermas extends representation by discursively structured public spheres that influence public opinions and political decisions. Civil society organisations inform and participate in public discourse, provide lifeworld accounts and propose possible solutions to conflicts. Participation and representation are related forms of democracy. Only representation based on deliberation is legitimate, only representation rather than direct democracy allows deliberation (Urbinati 2000: 759). Representation allows a future perspective, as citizens can see their ideas communicated in the public sphere through deliberation, taking shape in projections. Political representatives must take those ideas and future perspectives into account for the next elections, which in turn requires a strong and inclusive pub-

428

The notorious Swiss referendum against Minarets is a prime example of rhetoric.

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Analysis

lie sphere. Hence democratic institutions must nurture civil society participation to learn about different issues that constitute popular sovereignty. In order to represent the sovereignty of the people no one should be excluded. This requires some kind of commonality that can be furthered through deliberative process and civil society action, social movements and networking, helping citizens to discover common ground. Commonality should start with a sense of moral equal worth of each person in the polity, regardless of nationality and belief system. Deliberative democracy based on discourse ethics demands institutionalised processes that take contradicting and conflicting issues and identities into account (Urbinati/ Warren 2006). Representation of group interests is partly achieved in Berlin at the Senate level through the Islamforum, even though Muslim interests still need legitimation in the public sphere, as representatives from inside the political system could develop another kind of intersubjective understanding with Muslim civil society activists than the rest of the public. As a result of the intense cooperation between district administration, AWO and Haci Bayram mosque in Mitte, the mosque association has joined a vocal community organising platform that is busy putting grievances on the district administration agenda. The Muslim round table in Kreuzberg enables the mayor to know about questions and concerns of Muslim communities represented by the participants. This venue is open to all Muslim associations in the district. Despite few practical outputs it informs the mayor in his decisions, making him and other representatives who engage in deliberation with civil society actors 'deliberating advocates' inside the system (Urbinati 2000: 775). The legitimacy gain will depend on sustainability and broadening of deliberative practice, which also requires further engagement of Muslim civil society organisations. Haci Bayram mosque in Mitte now participates more in their area and is well known by the local administration, but so far they are the only mosque association in the district that underwent this transformation. It is unclear if engagement of the mosque will continue if Saydam leaves. As far as the Islamforum is concerned, with the resignation of Senator of Internal Affairs Ehrhart Körting in November 2011 and the announced departure of Commissioner for Migration and Integration, Günther Piening, in March 2012, the Islamforum looses two very committed deliberative advocates, which might alter the dynamic of the Islamforum. The next district mayor of Neukölln might decide to take another approach to integration and deliberation with the Muslim population. Strengthening Muslim civil society in a social movement sector and the institutionalisation of deliberative procedures might make them less dependent on individual advocates. Civil society organisations, social movements, interest groups, all claim to represent constituencies, hence special interests and purposive motivations prevail,

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but in the process of organising their claims those interests become objectified through discourse in the public sphere. This in turn makes it easier for the political system to pick them up as legitimate themes. 'Representation functions to depersonalise claims and opinions, for example, which in turn allows citizens to mingle and associate without erasing the bipartisan spirit essential to free political competition' (Urbinati/Warren 2008: 401). One example of Muslim interests moving this way is the conflict around the mosque project in Berlin-Pankow in 2006, which led to the formation of a citizens' initiative, supported by the right-wing NPD and a populist wing of the conservative CDU party. The public debate that ensued objectified the special interest of the Ahmadi who wanted to build there. It was the cue for other Muslim organisation representatives to the Islamforum to express their support for the congregation, Senator of Internal Affairs Körting made clear that erecting places of worship is a right granted by the Constitution.429 Thus the special interests of a small group turned into a wider social and political issue that strengthened the position of all Muslims after public debate and legitimised the political support of the mosque project as a matter of principle. This problem was settled in a discourse based on communicative rationality. 'If elections alone qualify representative democracy then it is hard to find good arguments against the critics of contemporary democracy who seek to unmask the role of the people as a mere myth' (Urbinati/Warren 2008: 31). The deliberative democracy principle of plurality of voices in the public sphere is an extension of representative democracy. 'The opposite of representation is not participation. The opposite of representation is exclusion. And the opposite of participation is abstention. ... Representation is crucial in constituting democratic practices' (Plotke 1997: 19). Participation and inclusion go hand in hand. The Berlin example demonstrates how the invitation to participate in public fora, projects and initiatives can generate inclusion in wider civil society networks, strengthen relationships with administrative and political actors, and foster a perception of active citizenship, provided deliberation follows due process. From a deliberative democracy perspective representation induces relationships based on judgements achieved through discourse, partly formalized through elections but equally through advocacy, the media and civil society. In this model, citizens and representatives feed information to each other, legitimized through the trust bestowed or removed through elections.

'I told the Imam, now you have to build here. There are serious constitutional rights involved here. Freedom of expression and freedom of religion are important constitutional norms for me, especially in the light of the Third Reich or the GDR. Freedom of religion is part of enlightenment.' (Interview Körting) 429

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Analysis

'Non-electoral forms of representation, we believe, are increasingly important to expanding and deepening democracy. But these developments challenge the existing conceptual and normative resources of democratic theory' (Urbinati/ Warren 2008: 388). Habermas ascribed the role of mediators between state and society to representative institutions like parliament via public spheres, in which judgement based on informed deliberation is achieved, thus making representation 'incomplete without the deliberative attentiveness of citizens mediated by public spheres, and the reflective transmission of public deliberations into the domain of representative institutions' (Urbinati/ Warren 2006: 392), opening a window for representation beyond election and geographic constituencies. Learning through deliberative engagement with civil society can turn political actors into deliberating representatives of constituencies based on the recognition of active citizenship as moral equal worth. Finally, the combination of normative and more practically guided concepts allows bringing insights from the study of a real life context in perspective with a new theory of representation based on identity as well as constituency. This mixing of normative concepts and practical wisdom is fair, as the latter informs how people act. Purposive rationality is always in the foreground when trying to build a better life for oneself or the community one belongs to. Normative reflections on the good society remain, if at all, in the background. This is different for governments who represent a democratic system based on the sovereignty of the people. In the name of legitimacy they are called upon to find ways to combine the plurality of interests and identities into the common good, keeping in mind how structure and agency play together in the struggle to find agreement. It does not mean solving all disagreement in the public sphere for the people but finding the best ways to support them to do it themselves, informing the political process. Hence deliberative politics can claim a normative foundation while not ignoring particularities that form phronesis. Inviting groups to deliberate in mini-publics or participatory processes helps them to identify needs and identity as a group. It can promote networking and cooperation to support claims-making in the public sphere. This is where active citizens are needed. They do not have to be concerned with the common good; they should just be concerned with making their voice heard. Representative democracy does the integrating.

8. Conclusion

8.1. Overview of knowledge gained The aim of this thesis was to examine how deliberative processes involving Muslim civil society organisations in Berlin contribute to giving a minority voice in the public sphere in the context of stereotyping and negative public integration discourse. Embedded in a theoretical framework combining Habermas' deliberative democracy theory and discourse ethics, civil society and social movement theory, deliberation was conceptualised as a participatory process in deliberative mini-publics that support Muslim civil society organisations in finding their own voice in the general public sphere. The inquiry followed both structural and agency factors, examining the interplay of system and lifeworlddriven social actors with special focus on conditions and outcomes of deliberative processes. This inspired conclusions in the realm of normative democratic theory with a focus to more legitimate representation and societal integration of a diverse polity in the context of a city. Germany's integration and immigration policy approaches of the last decades have been deemed largely ineffective. Studying Muslim civil society organisation participation in Berlin leads to the conclusion that a participatory and deliberative democratic process concerned with social and political integration must stimulate and encourage Muslim civil society to increase their internal and external networking, while institutionalising deliberative procedures. Policy makers and Muslim civil society organisations in Berlin have started to learn. In a hermeneutic tradition of focussing on the potential for change in situations of conflict this study is an encouragement for political actors to follow unpopular paths that promote minority voices in the general public sphere. It also opens the curtain for the incredibly active landscape of Muslim organisations in Berlin practising active citizenship, struggling to find their place in German society, not defeated by slow progress. The ontological statement referred to the complexity surrounding social agents, to pre-scientific knowledge and intersubjectively communicated symbols and norms that help people to make sense of the world and to solve conflict. Muslim associations in Berlin face exclusion from public discourse due to the prevalent power structures in the general public sphere that favour established interests. This exclusion and the prevailing negative integration discourse shape the social reality of Muslims. This research focussed on deliberative processes in mini-

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publics that circumvent the general public sphere, in principle allowing communicative rationality rather than rhetoric. Three steps necessary to complement Habermas' model of deliberative democracy as an extension to democratic representation based on elections were identified through the empirical investigation. Thus, this thesis contributes to knowledge in several ways. First, it demonstrates how deliberative procedures involving Muslim civil society depend on philosophies of integration. Engaging in deliberative dialogue with them or involving them in publicly funded initiatives is still a somewhat sectarian approach, promoted or rejected by individuals inside the structures of the system, which needs institutionalisation. Second, it underlines the process and outcome dimensions of deliberation anticipated in the empirical literature: deliberation works best when following certain procedures that generate output promoting relationships based on trust and respect, citizenship in the sense of moral equal worth, and civil society networking in a social movement sector. Third, Muslims gaining voice in the general public sphere seems to depend on the interplay of nurturing discourse in mini-publics behind closed door, shielding it from public discourse, and the agency of civil society actors, who must bring the willingness to compromise and learn. This shows that empirical investigation inspired by Habermas' ideal-typical work on discourse and deliberation is possible if supplemented by middle-range theories account for that phronesis, the practical wisdom of social actors. The analysis of this thesis is yet another confirmation not only that deliberation can work to the benefit of all parties involved, it also shows that there is still a place for ethics in politics today. Including contradicting worldviews in public discourses in the general public sphere not only helps legitimising political decisions. It also works towards societal integration. The focus on Muslim organisations in Berlin and their participation in society through deliberation with policy makers on local and city level informs current debates on social cohesion, integration or social inclusion, which all centre around the question how different people and communities who happen to live within the confines of a geographic territory, can come together as a society.

8.2. How structure and agency can work towards legitimacy Former Commissioner for Foreigners Barbara John underlined that structural barriers to participation must be removed and citizens must demand cooperation as a basic democratic requirement. Only users could know which participatory

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structures actually work.430 As the Berlin examples Islamforum and Haci Bayram mosque show deliberative processes can help identify what the issues are, nurture trust and respect, and further intersubjective understanding. Civil society participants learn how political processes and administrations work. Sometimes this takes time, as civil society participants are volunteers who are not necessarily familiar with government and have little time to learn other than by doing. Neukolln's Commissioner for Immigration invited representatives of mosque associations only once before concluding that they held unrealistic views that could not be dealt with. Regular sessions of the Islamforum, on the other hand, led to the development of new relationships between Muslim civil society actors and public officials that can be used outside meetings. Despite the conceptualisation of this platform as a purely deliberative venue it involved Muslim participants in political decisions that are of concern to Muslim communities in Berlin, like the reform of the burial law. It allows exchanges between Muslim actors and bodies that influence public discourse on integration like the Office for the Protection of the Constitution. Even though Muslim concerns related to their presentation in intelligence reports have not yet been resolved to their satisfaction, the issue of Islamophobia has been publicly acknowledged by funding an anti-discrimination project by Inssan and the TBB. Most participants perceive of deliberation in the Islamforum as beneficial, certainly as far as strengthening civil society structures and networking is concerned. Involving Muslim associations at neighbourhood level seems to promise the greatest benefit in terms of outcome, provided both the structures are supportive and actors committed to see deliberative process through to the end, as in the case of Haci Bayram mosque. The local neighbourhood management offices can help qualifying individuals from Muslim communities. The next step towards active citizenship is networking with other civil society organisations and institutions in the neighbourhood or local area. However, Haci Bayram also shows that it requires a lot of commitment and resources from either side of the participating parties. The actor perspective places individuals and their actions in their precise context in the sense ofphronesis, encompassing structures and dominating discourses that equip actors with a view of what exists and an idea of where to go, and give them a practical focus on how to improve their lives. Muslim civil society activists do not yet perceive of participatory structures in Berlin as sustainable and too dependent on individuals inside the system. At the same time only few believe that ground gained in terms of recognition can be seriously reversed, also

430

Interview John.

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Conclusion

because of their own enhanced networking. W e have known each other for years now. We established a network that can no longer perish. No one, no matter who it is, can come now and say 'oh, they are so bad'. No one would care about this today, because it is an established network with many people, many associations that support each other in one way or another.'431 Networking with other civil society as a result of deliberation behind closed doors helps to reduce public stereotypes, as does the public support and recommendation Berlin officials have been demonstrating (e.g. Körting vouching for Inssan or Piening's office recommending Muslim organisations to the roundtable on non-German prisoners), which also sends signals of normalisation. 'I am sure that 10 years ago it would have been impossible to bring in the issue of spiritual counselling of Muslim prisoners. Muslim associations have proven their worth with their work.'432 However, democratic institutions can only indirectly promote the reduction of stereotypes. On the other hand, ties between grassroots and more established movement organisations are important to institutionalise access to public discourse and the public sphere. Introducing the social movement sector model has proved beneficial here, as it allowed showing the potential for institutionalised Muslim civil society input already gained in Berlin. Bringing in a theoretical model that keeps a structure and agency focus complements the epistemological approach of this thesis, inspired by discourse ethics, hermeneutics and social constructionism that all believe in the potential for change achieved by social actors without ignoring institutional constrains. Establishing a social movement sector, supported by deliberative procedures initiated in the system, could provide an additional step in the democratising model of civil society as public sphere. On city level Muslim umbrella and independent organisations are beginning to form horizontal ties across ethnic divisions. However, so far discussions remain in this circle of leading activists, Muslim grassroots do not hear much, even though some discuss online with participating actors.433

431

Interview Nofal. Interview Sagir. 433 The emancipating effect of the Internet as a tool for communicative action and deliberation for Muslim civil society organisations is not considered here due to lack of access to this knowledge. Interviews with Muslim civil society activists suggest, however, that the Internet is quite vividly used to network and discuss. This could be another interesting topic for further research, especially in the light of the success of a new political party in Germany, the Piraten (Pirate Party) who promote the Internet as an inclusive and deliberative platform for democratic decision-making, termed Liquid Democraty. For more information see: liquidfeedback.org/2011/08/17/5-jahre-liquiddemocracy-in-deutschland/ (accessed April 18, 2012). 432

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System representatives suggest that Muslim organisations in Berlin could have achieved more already had they been better organised.434 To this end, Muslim organisations in Berlin must overcome their own differences and keep the momentum of participation and activism going. Muslim activists find it hard to be patient. 'At some point I just don't feel like participating any more. There is a certain tenor, why should I keep trying to get involved. There is a big solid wall that we can't surmount.'435 However, walls need surmounting on either side, as agreement among Muslim has been difficult to achieve due to different ethnic, religious or political interests. Including different Muslim actors in deliberative mini-publics like the Islamforum has furthered networking and cooperation among large Muslim associations in Berlin, but it is a long process in which actors are also anxious to keep their individual profile. 'Sometimes it is better to work next to each other, while keeping in touch.'436 Some larger Muslim associations coming together in an over-riding larger umbrella association start thinking about consolidating resources and recruiting young people to continue activism, as engagement and participation so far rests on the shoulders of a few. The shift away from purely religious activities also helps to diffuse perceptions of Muslim organisations dominated by prevailing stereotypes of Islam. The Haci Bayram case shows that they remain religious or culturally Muslim in their identity, but as many other faith or identity-based groups in civil society they focus on different areas of life. At the same time this study shows that top-down stereotyping of Muslim associations like in Neukölln also impacts on Muslim civil society structures, as Muslim organisations working with the district administration from time to time have to be careful about their credibility with communities. A security-driven participation agenda that also prevails on federal level makes it harder for organisations to work together, dispersing voices rather than making them stronger. W e get along on the personal level, we cooperate with other initiatives in many projects. But the stereotyping on federal level really annoys me: 'you are Islamists, the Office for the Protection of the Constitution says'. Are politicians blind? They don't see the potential I can see in my work with Muslim youth. What happens on the ground and what public discourse makes of it do not match. This is hard.'437

Schneider on Islam becoming a public corporation in Berlin and diversifying teaching Islam in schools. Schneider suggests a lack of agreement among Muslim actors. Muslim interviewees added lack of resources in terms of time, knowledge and funds. 435 Interview Misirhoglu. 436 Interview Cetin. 437 Interview El-Naggar. 434

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Muslim integration and participation o f certain Muslim groups is highly emotional and there is need for rationalization of the debate. Here access to the public sphere is key in order to present other images o f Muslims than the stereotypes reproduced in the media. Muslim civil society needs structural and procedural support. Districts like Kreuzberg and Neukölln are very constrained in their public funding capacities, but whereas Kreuzberg's mayor is encouraging his administration in creative ways to allow participation, Neukölln's mayor blocks deliberation with reference to the Office for the Protection of the Constitution. In relation to Muslim civil society The Change Institute recommends what amounts to the institutionalisation of deliberative procedures as outlined by Habermas: 'There needs to be more clarity in policy at Member State, regional and local level prioritising CSO involvement and setting out principles and a framework for co-operation. The approach should focus not solely on Muslim civil society but including other CSOs interested in the maintenance and development o f harmonious community relationships. This should be reflected in a) clear national strategies and b) clearer mandates for authorities and public servants' (2008: 142). Habermas points out that lifeworld issues must be subjects o f controversy in order to enter discourse in the public sphere, where they can be dealt with discursively and picked up by the strong public of the system. Thus lifeworld grievances turn into normative issues. Solutions require political legitimacy based on inclusive deliberation producing critical publicity. Can the interplay of structure and agency turn into legitimate societal transformation in the sense o f altering discourses in the public sphere through discursive inclusion of Muslim voices? In the Berlin case the longer-term result o f inviting Muslim participation is not yet clear, but it seems the ground is prepared. The dynamic certainly needs continuity.

8.3. Consolidating practical wisdom and the general public sphere Clearly, Habermas' discourse ethics and his model of deliberative democracy can inform civil society participation in local contexts. Adding more actor-focussed concepts developed in civil society and social movement theory, which also inform the notion o f citizenship as moral equal worth, allows using Habermas to inform research on a specific group in a local context. Selecting the critical case of Muslim participation in deliberation allows drawing conclusions about deliberation in mini-publics as a general normative addition to democratic practice.

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Both Islamforum and Haci Bayram mosque, despite being very different examples of participation (one project and one on-going discussion forum) on different administrative levels with varying numbers of participants and different outcome orientations, confirm Habermas to the extent that deliberative process furthers the possibility of agreement. All parties around the deliberating tables learned to engage in open and frank exchange based on respect, in deliberative democratic terms increasing the moral content of politics. With the constitution as only underlying normative reference frame and a participatory agenda introducing due deliberative process, Muslims do feel more appreciated as equal citizens than before — at least by the representatives of the system that support deliberative engagement. Learning about different points of views, including on the interpretation of constitutional norms must continue in the public sphere. Public discourse frequently suggests that aspects of Islam and German constitutional values are incompatible, while Muslims refer to the freedom of religion as a basic norm. In many ways this is a conflict arising from different interpretations that can only be solved discursively. As Habermas points out, the Constitution should not protect pre-established truths (Habermas 1996). Is civil society participation in deliberation beneficial from a democratic point of view? The ideal of deliberative democracy as extension to representative democracy is difficult to imagine as every-day practice because of the high demands it places on civil society and morality as motivation for political actors. Elected officials might argue that everyone in Germany can stand for election and participate in aggregative forms of decision-making. Indeed, with the reformed law on citizenship it is much easier to obtain German nationality, even though most people would have to give up the citizenship of their country of origin. In practice, Muslim concerns have little impact in electoral politics. Representative democracy promotes organised interests like trade unions and employer associations. Minority groups are usually excluded from that form of decisionmaking, thus reducing the legitimacy of representative democracies in polities with a large migrant or minority population. Non-organised interests have to rely on deliberative participatory arrangements and social movement mobilising, and must take their destiny into their own hands, highly dependent on political opportunity structures. This status quo is not good enough, neither for Muslims in Berlin, nor for democratic institutions that want to claim inclusiveness. The institutionalisation of deliberative procedures, on the other hand, promises a plurality of voices in the public sphere. Muslim civil society has the potential to represent ideas, values and interests that can claim validity for a substantial minority in the population, highly observed in public discourse, but rarely heard in the public sphere. Constituencies not merely based on geography and voting

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Conclusion

rights but also on collective identities independent of formal citizenship, represented through institutional procedures of deliberation with civil society organisation, working around issues or identities, legitimised through inclusion in public discourse, would extent representation to all members of a polity. Combining structure and agency dimensions of deliberative processes with a view to voice in the public sphere informs new reflections on democratic representation extended by issue and identity-based constituencies. This literature addresses the legitimacy deficit identified in contemporary democratic systems and the challenge of societal integration. Deliberative procedures encourage learning on both sides, among elected officials and in public administration, as well as among activists representing the interests of informal publics in civil society. This learning process can turn officials into deliberating advocates inside the system. The future perspective of representation allows including issue and identity-based concerns in the political agenda. Legitimising them in the public sphere through deliberation in and with civil society works as a buffer against claims of favouritism and increases the chance of equal consideration of Muslim voices in the general public sphere. A first sign for consolidating phronesis and the normative terrain of the general public sphere could be the review of the use of the term integration in relation to Muslims, which contradicts one of the basic principles of reasoned agreement. As a reminder, one prerequisite Habermas proposes for the possibility of conflict resolution is that different parties of an argument 'assume they mean the same thing by the same words and expressions' (Rehg 1998: xv). This is why the term integration in the public debate about Muslim citizens is problematic and needs reconsideration. There is little to no agreement as to what exactly integration means and entails, which in turn means that this condition can hardly be fulfilled and leaves Muslims with a permanent obligation to prove themselves as good citizens. Other related concepts floating around in public discourse are terms like Leitkultur or Parallelgesellschaften that are equally devoid of specific meaning. The solution is for the system to acknowledge the inappropriateness of normatively loaded concepts, and to use terms like participation, inclusion and active citizenship in terms of engagement instead in the public sphere.

8.4. Concluding remarks What can we learn from a study like this? As I stated in my methodology, examples are specific in their context and cannot simply be transferred from one location to another. The defining role that individuals play in each exemplary story confirms the particularity. Nevertheless, they also demonstrate Berlin as a micro-cosmos for different approaches to democratic representation. The Islamforum, the tandem project with Haci Bayram in Mitte and the open approach

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to participation in Kreu2berg are an encouragement for democratic practice based on inclusion and deliberation to tackle societal fragmentation and a legitimacy deficit in areas with high percentage of the population not eligible to vote. The Berlin example shows that institutionalised deliberative processes play a key role in building informal publics. Muslim civil society started off without many resources to gain voice in the public sphere. At the same time the system needs civil society to legitimise policy decisions designed to support them and their communities. Different publics constituted in civil society are necessary in a phronetic, practical way, to get different voices on the way in the first place. Activists in civil society must believe in the possibility of change to push for the kind of conflict that according to the hermeneutic tradition can then be discursively approached. The empirical findings encourage inclusive political approaches, based on the model of deliberative democracy in which the broader democratic public sphere must encompass mini-publics in order to overcome plebiscitary rhetoric (Chambers 2009) in public discourse, which prevails in relation to Muslims in Germany. Including identity or issue based claims through informal publics produced in civil society ads a discursive element to rhetoric in the general public sphere. Even though civil society organisations are driven by interests rather than by a concern for the common good, this is legitimized in Habermas' model through discourse based on communicative rationality in the mini-publics that help include voices in the general public sphere. Purposive rationality is always in the foreground when trying to build a better life for oneself or the community one belongs to. Normative reflections on the good society remain, if at all, in the background. If inclusion in civil society is the precondition for membership in a political body, as Somers suggested, civil society participation in mini-publics enhances democratic legitimacy and promotes a sense of citizenship beyond the ballot. Deliberative process can provide the tools for people to be heard in the public sphere, but it is also up to them to pick these tools up and use them. Voice in the public sphere in Berlin will depend in no small part on the further consolidation of Muslim civil society organisations amongst each other and on increased networking with other civil society to institutionalise access. Deliberative structures in Berlin designed to involve informal publics in civil society need institutionalisation. As the hlamforum in Berlin demonstrates, practical outcomes are just as important as symbolic public endorsement by key public figures. New governments should continue to follow the steps necessary to establish Muslim voices: inviting engagement, designing deliberative process that respects the requirements of equality, lifeworld accountability and involvement in outcomes,

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fostered in mini-publics protected from public discourse rhetoric that support the strengthening of civil society structures. What developed in Berlin since 2005 might well be the beginnings of a Muslim sector movement sector. It now depends on further nurturing by the city's administrations on city and district levels and keeping the doors open for dialogue and the occasional cooperation. In the name of legitimacy representatives of the system are called upon to find ways to combine the plurality of interests and identities into the common good. This means finding the best ways to support people solving disagreement in the public sphere, informing the political process.

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Annex 2: Online Resources Newspaper articles Berliner Morgenpost: Berliner Stimmen %ur Wahl als Berliner des Jahres (January 2, 2011) www.morgenpost.de/berlin-akmeU/articlel498359/Berliner-Stirnrnen-2ur-Wahl-alsBerliner-des-Jahres.html (accessed December 14, 2011) Berliner Zeitung: Beschäftigte der Jobcenter sollen Migranten besser beraten (April 12, 2008) www.berlinonline.de/berlinerzeitung/archiv/.bin/dump.fcgi/2008/0412/berlin/0101 /index.html (accessed December 4, 2011) Berliner Zeitung: Genosse Klartext (September 9, 2010) www.berlinerzeitxmg.de/arcUv/dass-mdtikulti-gescheitert-ist--sagt-heinz-buschkowsky-schon-lange-seit-das-auch-thilo-sarrazin-propagiert—hat-die-ratlose-spd-den-buergermeister-vonneukoelln-fuer-sich-entdeckt-genosse-klartext,10810590,10743754.html (accessed December 14, 2011). BILD: 'Innenminister warnt radikale Muslim? (April 29, 2012) www.bild.de/politik/inland/muslime/schock-smdie-muslime-verweigern-integration22901072.bild.html (accessed April 20,2012) Bildungsklick: Handreichung Islam und Schule'geht an die Schulen (September 16, 2009) bildungsklick.de/pm/75078/handreichung-islam-und-schule-geht-an-die-schulen (accessed November 14, 2011) Dein Kiez: „Der Haci-Bajram Bürgerladen ist eröffnet (March 1, 2011) www.deinkiez.de/Der-Haci-Bayram-Buergerladen-ist-eroeffnet.5989.0.html (accessed April 13, 2012) Deutsche Welle: Das Islambid in den Medien, Deutsche Welle (October 02, 2011) www.dw.de/dw/article/0„15429038,00.html (accessed March 8, 2012) Deutschlandradio Kultur: Buschkowsky: Sarrazin verallgemeinert stark (August 25, 2010) www.dradio.de/dkultur/sendungen/thema/1257109/ (accessed November 24, 2011) FAZ: "Gehen Sie eigentlich öfter in die Moschee?' (October 5,2011) www.faz.net/aktuell/feuilleton/buecher/riem-spielhaus-wer-ist-hier-muslim-gehen-sieeigentlich-oefter-in-die-moschee-11483644.html (accessed March 21, 2012) Islamische Zeitung: Licht und Schatten (May 3, 2010) www.islamischezeitung.de/?id= 13296 (accessed November 22, 2011) Migration und Bevölkerung: Deutschland: Der Bericht der Süssmuth-Kommission (July 2001) www.migration-info.de/mub_artikel.php?Id=010401 (accessed December 2, 2011) Migration und Bevölkerung: PISA-Studie: Erhebliche migrationsbedingte Leistungsunterschiede von Schulern (January 2002) www.migration-info.de/mub_artikel.php?Id=020103 (accessed March 13, 2012)

266

Online Resources

Migration und Bevölkerung: Rückblick: 30 Jahre Kiihn-Memorandum (September 2009) www.migration-info.de/mub_artdkel.php?Id=090705 (accessed December 2, 2011) Süddeutsche Zeitung:' Und der Verlierer ist: Deutschland, 22.10.2010 www.sueddeutsche.de/karriere/auswanderung-deutsch-tuerkischer-akaderniker-und-derverüerer-ist-deutschland-1.1014005 (accessed March 13, 2012) Spiegel-Online: Der Kronzeuge und die Gutmenschen, (November 26, 2004) www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/0,1518,329702,00.html (accessed December 14, 2011) Spiegel Online: The Man Who Divided Germany. Why Germany's Integration Demagoguety Has Many Followers (June 9, 2010) www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,715876,00.html (accessed April 20, 2012) Spiegel Online: Seehofer und Merkel befeiern die heitkultur-Debatte (October 15, 2010) www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/0,1518,723466,00.html (accessed March 8, 2012) Spiegel Online: Der Westentaschen-Wilders (August 26, 2010) www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/0,1518,713878,00.html (accessed March 8, 2012) Spiegel Online: Vom Schlachtfeld %um Bildungsidyll (October 26, 2010) www.spiegel.de/schulspiegel/wissen/0,1518,724761,00.html (accessed November 23, 2011) Spiegel Online: Der deutsche Geert, (January 3, 2011) www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d76121052.html (accessed December 20, 2011) Spiegel Online: Berliner Polizei nimmt Terrorverdächtige fest (August 08, 2011) www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/0,1518,785076,00.html (accessed March 8, 2012) Stern Online: Gericht streicht Schüler Mittagsgebet (May 27, 2010) www.stern.de/panorama/urteil-in-berlin-gericht-streicht-schueler-mittagsgebet1569681.html (accessed December 3, 2011) Tagesspiegel: Rätselraten um die Moschee (April 15, 2008) www.tagesspiegel.de/berlin/raetselraten-um-die-moschee/1211490.html (accessed December 20, 2011) Tagesspiegel: Charlottenburger Moscheeprojekt im Zwielicht (April 16, 2008) www.tagesspiegel.de/berlin/charlottenburger-moscheeprojekt-imzwielicht/ 1212542.html (accessed December 18, 2011). Tagesspiegel: Umstrittener imam agiert online (September 16, 2010) www.tagesspiegel.de/berlin/umstrittener-imam-agitiert-online/1935574.html (accessed April 13, 2012) Welt-Online: Innenminister - Islam gehört nicht Deutschland' (March 3, 2011) www.welt.de/politik/deutschland/articlel2691814/Innenminister-Islam-gehoert-nichtzu-Deutschland.html (accessed 5 May 2011)

267

Official documents Beauftragter des Senats fur Integration und Migration: Wie verändert Islam die Schule im Kiez?, Dokumentation Offenes Diskussionsforum, March 8, 2004 www.berlin.de/imperia/md/content/lb-integration-migration/Publikationen/dokus/islam_schule.pdf Beauftragter für Migration und Integration des Berliner Senats: Auftaktveranstaltung Weiterbildungfiir Imame und Seelsorgerinnen und Seelsorger' am 22.10.2008. Press Release October 15, 2008 ww.berlin.de/lb/intmig/presse/archiv/20081015.1000.111733.html (accessed December 16, 2011) Beauftragter für Migration und Integration des Berliner Senats: Aktiv gegen die Diskriminierung von Muslimen. Press Release December 8, 2010 ww.berlin.de/lb/intmig/presse/archiv/20101208.1000.322307.html (accessed March 10, 2012) Berliner Partizipationsgesetz www.berlin.de/lb/intmig/partizipationsgesetz_berlin.html Bezirksamt Mitte (2010) Auszug —Konzept Sprachßrder^entrum, 32. öffentliche Sitzung des Ausschusses Soziale Stadt (QM), Integration und Gleichstellung, Berlin, 20.1.2010 www.berlin.de/barnitte/org/auslaenderbeaufttagter/sprachfoerderung.kinder3bis6.kital.html Bezirksamt Neukölln, Bezirksbürgermeister: Integrationspolitik in Neukölln, May 2009 www.berlin.de/ba-neukoelln / migrationsbeauftragten/integrationspolitik.html Bezirksamt Neukölln, Migrationsbeauftragter: population statistics www.berlin.de/baneukoelln/msbeauftragten/bevoelkerungsstruktur.html (accessed March 17, 2012) Migrationsbeauftragter Arnold Mengelkoch (ed): Moscheen in Neukölln und Ihre Angebote, Berlin, 2010 www.berlin.de/imperia/md/content/baneukoelln/bbmbbw/moscheen in neuk Iln2 009_2010.pdf Bezirksverordnetenversammlung Neukölln von Berlin: Protokoll 32. öffentliche Sitzung des Jugendhilfeausschusses, 19.03.2009 www.berlin.de/imperia/md/content/baneukoelln/jugend/jha2009/32_190309_protokoll.pdf Bundesministerium für Familie, Senioren, Frauen und Jugend: Bundesprogramm Vielfalt Tut Gut. Jugend für Vielfalt, Toleranz und Demokratie 2007-2010 www.vielfalt-tutgut.de/content/e4548/index_ger.html (accessed June 2011) Bundesregierung: Nationaler Integrationsplan www.bundesregjerung.de/Webs/Breg/DE/Bundesregierung/Beauftragtefuerlntegration /ThemenNeu/Nationalerlntegrationsplan/nationaler-integrationsplan.html City Council Neukölln, District Mayor: Integration Policies in Neukölln, May 2009 www.berlin.de/ba-neiikoelln/migrationsbeaufttagten/integrationspolitik.html

268

Online Resources

Gebietskoordination Quartiersmanagement: Trendanalyse der Entwicklung von Neukölln und Neukölln-Nord 2002-2007 im Vergleich syt Berlin insgesamt und anderen Teilgebieten in BerlinZusammenfassung, November 2008 www.berUn.de/imperia/md/content/baneukoelln/allgemeingoedecke/neuk_llner_tren danalyse_zusammenfassung.pdfPdownload.html (accessed December 15, 2011) Gesetz zur Schaffung eines Gesetzes zu Artikel 29 der Verfassung von Berlin und zur Änderung des Kindertagesbetreuungsgesetzes vom 27. Januar 2005, Berlin (Law to Create a Law on Art. 29 of the Berlin Constitution and on Changing the Law on Child Care, January 27, 2005) www.berlin.de/imperia/md/content/senatsverwaltungen/justiz/gvbl2005/seiten_81 96_heft_nr._4_vom_08.02.2005.pdf (accessed April 14, 2012) Geschäftsordnung des Ausländerbeirates Berlin-Mitte (Rules of Order of the Immigrant Advisory Board) www.berHn.de/ba-mitte/org/integrationsreferent/index.html (accessed 15 November 2011) Islamforum Berlin (2005) Grundsätze. Muslimische Akademie/ Büro des Beauftragten des Senats für Migration und Integration www.berlin.de/imperia/md/content/lbintegration-rrugration/islamforum/islamforum_grundsaetze_bf.pdfPdownload.html 5 Jahre Islamforum Berlin - Festveranstaltung im Museum für Islamische Kunst am 14. Dezember 2010 www.berlin.de/imperia/md/content/lb-integrationnügration/islamforum/5_jahre_islamforurn_bf.pdf?download.html (accessed December 16, 2011) Islamforum Berlin: Topics www.berlin.de/lb/intmig/islamforum/index.htrnl Islamforum: Session 16, June 201 Owww.berlin.de/lb/intmig/islamforum/islamforum_sitzungl3.html (accessed February 26, 2012 Islamforum: Session 17, October 2011: Further development of the Islamforum www.berlin.de/lb/inflTUg/islamforum/islamforum_sitzungl7.html (accessed March 15, 2012) Lokaler Aktionplan (Local Action Plan) Kreuzberg-Friedrichshain: Kreutberg im Gespräch www.lap-friedrichshain-kreuzberg.de/content_files/kreuzber_talk_01.html (accessed 16 March 2012) Press Release of the Berlin Senate: Aktionsprogramm Integration und Ausbildung' des Berliner Senats gestartet (December 13, 2010) www.berlin.de/lb/intmig/themen/aktion/index.html (accessed 23.08.2011) Press Release of the Berlin Senate: Neue Beteiligungsrechte des Parti^pationsgeset^es werden genutzt: Starker Wunsch nach Teilhabe (October 7, 2011) www.berlin.de/lb/intmig/partizipationsgesetz_berlin.html (accessed November 25, 2011) Protokoll Sitzung Beirat Integration Kreuzberg (June 11, 2011) www.berlin.de / imperia / md/content/bafriedrichshainkreuzberg/beauftragtedesbezirks/juni_ll.pdf (accessed November 15, 2001)

269

Senatsverwaltung für Bildung, Jugend und Wissenschaft: Politische Bildung (political education) www.berlin.de/sen/bildung/politische_bildung/index.html (accessed November 14, 2011) Senatsverwaltung für Bildung, Jugend und Wissenschaft: Berlin macht ganztags Schule www.berlin.de/sen/bildung/berlin_macht_ganztags_schule/ (accessed November 23, 2011)

Senatsverwaltung für Integration, Arbeit und Soziales (2007), Handlungsfelder der Zusammenarbeit mit islamischen Vereinen im Stadtteil, Berlin www.berlin.de/imperia/md/content/lb-integrationmigration/publikationen/religion/handlungsfelder.pdf Statistisches Bundesamt Deutschland - Einbürgerungen - Fachserie 1 Reihe 2.1 - 2008 (Federal Office for Statistics - Naturalisations) www.destatis.de/jetspeed/portal/cms/Sites/destatis/Internet/DE/Content/Publikation en/Fachveroeffendichungen/Bevoelkerung/MigrationIntegration/Einbuergerungen,tem plateId=renderPrint.psml (accessed December 2, 2011) Verwaltung Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg: Aufruf fur eine Bewerbung als Bürgerdeputierte IBürgerdeputierter im Integrationsausschuss www.berlin.de/ba-friedrichshainkreuzberg/verwaltung/org/intmigbeauftragte/buergerdeputierte.htrnl (accessed 16 March 2012)

Others Alif, Aleph, Alpha - Respekt ist der Anfang www.berlindivercity.de/di wiki/index.php?title=Projekt_AHP/o2C_Aleph%2C_Alpha_%E2%80%93 _Respekt_ist_der_Anfang (accessed March 25, 2012) BMW-Stiftung: Community Organising. Eine Bürgerplattform für Neukölln www.bmwstiftung.de/de/gesellschaft-neu-denken/sektoruebergreifende-kooperation/communityorganizing/community-organizing-buergerplattform (both accessed March 19,2012) For a list of participants: http: //de.indymedia.org/2012/01/323738.shtml. Bundesamt fur Migration und Flüchtlinge: Integrationskurse - Was ist das? www.bamf.de/DE/Willkommen/DeutschLernen/Integrationskurse/integrationskursenode.html (accessed June 2011) Bundeszentrale für Politische Bildung: Islam in Neukölln (July 27, 2010) www.bpb.de/themen/UGBQRI,0,0,Islam_in_Neuk%F611n.html (accessed November 23, 2011) Bürgerplattform Berlin Mitte/Moabit (Community Organizing Berlin Mitte/Moabit): Topics www.wirsindda.com/unsere-themen/bildung.html (accessed March 28, 2012) Evangelische Kirche Berlin-Brandenburg-schlesische Oberlausitz: Intemligiöses «wrwww.ekbo.de/1057507 (accessed March 25, 2012)

Fussballtur-

Frindte, W., K. Boehnke, H. Kreikenbom, and W. Wagner (2012) Lebenszeiten junger Muslime. Bundesministerium des Innern www.bmi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Kurzmeldungen/DE/2012/02/junge_muslime.html

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Kriminologisches Forschungsinstitut Niedersachsen (2010) Jugendliche in Deutschland als Opfer und Täter von Gewalt. Erster Forschungsbericht zum gemeinsamen Forschungsprojekt des Bundesministeriums des Innern und des KFN. www.kfn.de/versions/kfn/assets/fbl07.pdf (accessed November 21, 2011) Mein Kiez Soldiner Strasse www.deinkiez.de/Quartiersrat.4846.0.html (accessed November 16, 2011) Decker et al (2010) Die Mitte in der Krise. Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung www.fes-gegenrechtsextremismus.de/inhalte/studien_Gutachten.php (accessed March 8, 2012) TIES — The Integration of Europe's Second Generation www.tiesproject.eu

Weblinks Arabisches Kulturinstitut - AKI (Arab Cultural Center) www.aki-ev.de Beauftragter des Senats für Integration und Migration www.berlin.de/lb/intmig/aufgaben/ (accessed December 3, 2011) Beirat für Integration und Migration, Berlin Kreuzberg-Friedrichshain (Integration and Immigration Advisory Council) www.berlin.de/ba-friedrichshainkreuzberg/Verwaltung/org/intmigbeauftragte/beirat.html Berliner Ratschlag für Demokratie www.berlinerratschlagfuerdemokratie. de/index.php /478.110/1 Berliner Stadtteilmütter (District Mothers Berlin) www. s tadtteilmuetter. de/ Bürgerplattform Berlin Mitte/Moabit (Community Organizing Berlin Mitte/Moabit) www.wir-sind-da-berlin.de/ Deutsch-Arabische Unabhängige Gemeinde — DAUG (Independent German-Arab Community) daug-berlin.de/ Deutsche Islamkonferenz www.deutsche-islam-konferenz.de Haci Bayram Mosque haci-bayram-moschee.de/?page_id= 121 Initiative Berliner Muslime — IBMUS (Initiative of Berlin Muslims) www.ibmus.de Inssan www.inssan-ev.de Islamische Föderation Berlin — IFB (Islamic Federation Berlin) if-berlin.de/ Jede Stimme zählt (Every Vote Counts) jedes timme2011 .de/

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KUMULUS e.V. www.aub-berlin.de / fuer-jugendliche/kumulus Landesstelle für Gleichbehandlung - gegen Dislmminierung (Regional Office for Equal Treatment - Against Discrimination) www.berlin.de/lb/ads/ Lichtjugend www.lichtjugend.de/verein/ Muslime aller Herkunft deutscher Identität - M.A.H.D.I. (Muslims of all origins of German identity) mahdi-ev.de/ Muslimische Akademie www.muslimische-akademie.de/ Muslimische Jugend in Deutschand — MJD (Muslim Youth Germany) www.mjd-net.de / Muslims in Europe www.soros.org/initiatives/home (accessed December 3, 2011) Polizeidirektion 5 - Zentrale Aufgaben: Arbeitsgebiet Migration und Integration (Police Unit 5 - Central Tasks: Work Area Immigration and Integration) www.berlin.de/polizei/bezirk/dir5/aga.html Quartiersmanagement Berlin - QM (Neighbourhood Management) www.quartiersmanagement-berlin.de / Religion auf dem Tempelhofer Feld www.atlas-religioeser-lernorte.de/files/materialien/Flyer_Religion.pdf (accessed March 13, 2012) Runder Tisch für ausländische Gefangene in Berlin (Berlin Round Table of Foreign Prisoners) www.freiabos.de/rundertisch.html Sehitlik Mosque, Berlin www.sehitlik-camii.de/ Türkisch-Islamische Union der Anstalt für Religion e.V. - DÍTÍB (Turkish-Islamic Union for Religious Affairs) berlin.DITiB-landesverband.de / Verband der Islamischen Kulturzentren - VIKZ (Association of Islamic Cultural Centers) www.vikz.de/

272

List of Interviewees

Annex 3: List of Interviewees Muslim and Immigrant Civil Society Chahrour, Mehdi: Muslime aller Herkunft Deutscher Identität e.V. - M.A.H.D.I. (interviewed 9/5/2010) Cetin, Ender: Türkisch Islamische Union der Anstalt für Religion e.V. - DITIB Berlin (interviewed 14/11/2011) E L Ge2awi, Renate: Deutsch-Arabische Unabhängige Gemeinde e.V. — D A U G (interviewed 10/5/2010) El-Naggar, Tasnim: Muslimische Jugend Deutschland - MJD (interviewed

18/1/2012)

Kesici, Burhan: Islamische Föderation in Berlin - IFB (interviewed 18/2/2010) Misirlioglu, Ismet: Islamic Relief, Muslimisches Seelsorgetelefon (interviewed 11/5/2010) Dr. Nazar, Mahmood: Arabisches Kulturinstitut e.V. - A K I (interviewed 14/5/2010) Nofal, Lydia: Inssan für kulturelle Interaktion e.V. — Inssan (interviewed 21/4/2010 and 10/11/2011) Razzaque, Abdul Mohammad: Initiave Berliner Muslime - IBMUS (interviewed

28/11/2011)

Sagir, Imran: IBMUS, Muslimisches Seelsorgetelefon, Muslimische Gefangenenseelsorge (interviewed 18/1/2012) Salhi, Faical: Interkulturelles Zentrum für Dialog und Bildung — IZDB (interviewed 13/4/2010) Saydam, Selcuk: Haci Bayram Moschee e.V. (interviewed 16/5/2010)

Public Officials and other Stakeholders Altunkaynak, Sükran: Neighbourhood Manager, Q M Pankstrasse, Berlin-Mitte (interviewed 12/5/2010) Fischer, Reinhard: Former Neighbourhood Manager Q M Soldiner Strasse, Berlin-Mitte (1999-2008), now Senatsverwaltung für Stadtentwicklung (interviewed 26/5/2011)

273

Dr. John, Barbara: Former Commissioner for Foreigners (1981-2003) (interviewed 11/2/2010) Dr. Körting, Ehrhart: Former Senator of Internal Affairs and Sports (2001-2011) (interviewed 25/1/2012) Mengelkoch, Arthur: Commissioner for Immigration, Berlin-Neukölln (interviewed 16/2/2010) Nahawandi, Doris: Former Commissioner for Integration and Immigration in Berlin-Kreuzberg, now Office of the Commissioner for Integration and Immigration of the Senate (interviewed 10/1/2010) Niggemeier, Katja: Neighbourhood Manager QM Soldiner Strasse, Berlin-Mitte (interviewed 9/11/2011) Reinke, Regina: Commissioner for Integration and Immigration in BerlinKreuzberg-Friedrichshain (interviewed 11/3/2010 and 23/1/2012) Rix, Angelika: Arbeiterwohlfahrt Berlin-Mitte, AWO-coordinator for tandem project with Haci Bayram mosque (2009-2011) (interviewed 27/5/2011) Dr. Schneider, Robin: Office of the Commissioner for Integration and Immigration of the Senate (interviewed 19/12/2011) Dr. Spielhaus, Riem: Founding member of the Muslim Academy in Germany and co-moderator of the Islamforum Berlin (2005-2009), now University of Erlangen (interviewed 3/3/2010) Stibenz, Maryam: Commissioner for Integration in Berlin-Mitte (interviewed 11/11/2011)

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