Toward Resolution?: The Falklands/Malvinas Dispute 9781685851606

Citation preview

Toward Resolution?

Toward Resolution? The Falklands/Malvinas Dispute

edited by

Wayne S. Smith

Lynne Rienner Publishers

•

Boulder & London

Published in the United States of America in 1991 by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 1800 30th Street, Boulder, Colorado 80301 and in the United Kingdom by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 3 Henrietta Street, Covent Garden, London WC2E 8LU © 1991 by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. All rights reserved Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Toward resolution? : the Falklands/Malvinas dispute / edited by Wayne S. Smith, p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 1-55587-265-4 1. Falkland Islands—History. 2. Argentina—Foreign relations—Great Britain. 3. Great Britain—Foreign relations—Argentina. 4. Pacific settlement of international disputes. I. Smith, Wayne S. F3031.T63—1991 997'. 11—dc20 91-13435 CIP British Cataloguing in Publication Data A Cataloguing in Publication record for this book is available from the British Library.

Printed and bound in the United States of America The paper used in this publication meets the requirements of the American National Standard for Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials Z39.48-1984.

Contents Preface

vii

A Short Historical Chronology Mauricio Reina and Enrique Velasco-Ibarra 1 Why Resolution of the Dispute Is Important Part 1

1 Wayne S. Smith

9

Historical and Juridical Bases of the Claims to the Islands

2 The View from Whitehall David Thomas

15

3 The View from Buenos Aires Ruben M. Perina

45

Part 2

The Political Realities Faced by Both Governments

4 Political Opinion in Britain

Walter Little

63

5 The Argentine Perspective Carlos Floria

81

Part 3

Toward a Solution?

6 Confidence Building and the Future Charles Maechling, Jr.

109

7 Possible Solutions Christian Herter, Jr., and Wayne S. Smith

121

8 What Role for the United States? RiordanRoett

135

Appendix The Contributors Index About the Book

143 151 153 159

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Preface The British call them the Falkland Islands. To the Argentines, they are the Malvinas. Neutral observers carefully avoid taking a position by referring to them as the Falklands/Malvinas. All three terms will be used in this book. Whatever they are called, the dispute over whose flag should rightfully fly over these remote islands continues. Argentina and Great Britain have declared an end to hostilities, reestablished diplomatic relations, resumed trade and air links, and in other ways returned to the status quo ante bellum. The dispute, however, remains as sharp and potentially disruptive as it was before the outbreak of hostilities in April 1982. It will take a very long time for the scars of war to heal. Meanwhile, however, it should be borne in mind that eventually the dispute must be addressed. The North American authors of this book are motivated by the conviction that when that time comes, it will be possible to fashion a settlement that will protect the interests and satisfy the bottom-line needs of all sides, the islanders included. It is but a matter of good will and flexibility on all sides. Our British and Argentine colleagues did not necessarily share that conviction, but they too were guided by the belief that henceforth the matter must be handled without resort to force. That blood has already been spilled over an issue so clearly within the faculties of humankind to resolve is tragic; that it should ever again be spilled would be inexcusable. *

*

*

This book was made possible by a grant from the United States Institute of Peace to the Johns Hopkins U n i v e r s i t y ' s Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). Those who wrote and edited the book wish to take this opportunity to thank the Institute of Peace for the vision and generosity behind that grant. If world peace is ever to become a reality and force excluded as an instrument of international relations, disputes such as this one must be resolved through peaceful means. Clearly, the vii

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Preface

Institute of Peace was guided by that conviction in supporting this project, and those involved in the writing of the book have been guided by the same conviction. Thanks are also due to the Exxon Corporation, which has long and generously supported the Argentine Studies Program at SAIS. That support made it possible for the Argentine Studies Program to bring together the authors of this book for an exchange of views and a public discussion of the dispute in October 1990. Finally, our deep appreciation to Cynthia Carlisle, who translated the two Argentine chapters, and to Maria Gutierrez, the program assistant at SAIS who prepared the manuscript. W.S.S.

A Short Historical Chronology

Mauricio Reina Enrique Velasco-Ibarra

1501

On his second expedition to the new world, Amerigo Vespucci sights some islands, which, according to his d e s c r i p t i o n and their l a t i t u d e , w e r e p r o b a b l y the Falklands/Malvinas.

1520

Esteban G6mez, one of Ferdinand Magellan's captains, sights the islands and calls them Islas de Sanson y de los Patos.

1522-1523

Pedro Reinel, a Portuguese cartographer, draws the first known map showing the islands.

1540

A lost ship from Francisco de Camargo's expedition finds refuge from violent weather in the islands. The crew remained there several months and called the place Puerto de las Zorras.

1592

J o h n D a v i s , w h o had d e s e r t e d his leader, T h o m a s Cavendish, sights the islands and "discovers" them for Great Britain.

1600

Returning to Holland, part of Jacob Mahu's expedition under the command of Sebald Van Weert sights the islands and calls them the Sebaldes in honor of Van Weert.

1690

During the War of the English Succession, Captain John Strong is pushed off course by contrary winds and enters the sound between the islands, naming it Falkland Sound in honor of Anthony, Viscount Falkland. This is the first landing of an Englishman on the Falklands/Malvinas.

1713

Under Article 8 of the Peace Treaty of Utrecht, signed on July 13, 1713, England agrees that Spain has the right to control the seas around Spanish dominions.

1

2

Chronology

1763 February 10 1764 March 17

1765 January 1766 January 8

1767 April 1

1770 June 4

1771 September 15

1774 May 20

1776

The Treaty of Paris renewed and confirmed Spain's right to control the South Atlantic. Without officially informing Spain, the French government allowed Louis Antoine de Bougainville to found Port Louis, the first known settlement on the islands. John Byron lands and claims the islands for George III. An expedition under the command of Captain John McBride lands in the islands. He warns the French to leave and establishes Port Egmont. After a negotiation with the Spanish government, Bougainville agrees to return the islands to Spain, receiving a sum from the Marques de Grimaldi for expenses incurred in establishing an illegal settlement. He returns Port Louis to Spain. A Spanish expedition under Juan Ignacio de Madariaga anchors in the bay of Port Egmont and demands the peaceful withdrawal of the English from Spanish territory. The English refuse and the Spanish attack Port Egmont. The English surrender and are expelled. To avoid a "pride war," the Spanish return Port Egmont to the British, though stressing that this in no way dilutes their claim to full sovereignty over the islands. There is speculation that the British have given assurances that they will abandon the islands after a brief face-saving reoccupation of Port Egmont. No documentary evidence of such an agreement has ever been produced, however. The English abandon Port Egmont, leaving a lead plaque fastened on the block house indicating their continued claim to sovereignty. Charles III of Spain creates the viceroyalty of Rio de la Plata and places the Malvinas under its jurisdiction.

Chronology

3

1777

Charles III orders the complete destruction of the abandoned Port Egmont to prevent its use by foreign vessels.

1781

Port Egmont is destroyed by the Spanish.

1790

England signs the Nootka Sound Convention, giving up any rights to settle in the South Atlantic areas and acknowledging Spanish sovereignty over islands in the southern ocean just off the mainland.

1811 January 8 1816 July 9 1820 November 6

1823

1826 January 1829 June 10 August 30

1831 August

December

The Malvinas are evacuated by the Spanish because of the wars of independence raging on the mainland. Argentina declares its independence from Spain as the United Provinces of Rio de la Plata. Daniel Jewitt, a North American in the service of the U n i t e d P r o v i n c e s , takes f o r m a l p o s s e s s i o n of the Malvinas for Argentina. A concession is granted to Jorge Pacheco and Luis Vernet by the United Provinces, giving them lands on East Falkland Island. Vernet, a French-German in the service of Argentina, establishes a settlement on the islands. After the great success of his colony, Vernet is appointed military and political governor of the islands. Vernet issues a decree telling the captains of ships in the area to stop whaling and sealing, under the penalty of being arrested and taken to Buenos Aires for trial. Three US vessels disregard Vernet's decree and are apprehended while sealing off the coasts of the islands. They are arrested and Vernet escorts their captains to Buenos Aires to stand trial. The US consul in Buenos Aires protests vigorously. On instructions from the US consul in Buenos Aires, the USS Lexington, under the command of Captain Silas Duncan, retaliates for the arrest of the US sealers by

attacking Puerto Soledad, sacking the town, destroying its cannons and fortifications, imprisoning the officer left in charge by Vernet and his garrison of six soldiers and removing them to the Argentine mainland. The United Provinces protest Duncan's actions to Washington, calling them "piratical." The United Provinces send Captain José Maria de Pinedo to reinstate their authority in the islands and to reinforce the colonists who remain there. Two British warships, the Clio and the Tyne, arrive under the command of Captain James Onslow. Onslow sends a message ashore announcing that he is there to claim the islands for Great Britain. He gives Pinedo twenty-four hours to surrender. Without cannon or fortification, Pinedo is helpless. He surrenders under protest. Pinedo and his handful of soldiers embark for Buenos Aires. Many of the colonists take to the hills. Eventually, however, they are all driven off the islands by the British. As soon as Buenos Aires learns of the British attack on its garrison and seizure of the islands, it protests in the strongest terms and demands that the islands be returned. The Argentine ambassador in London, Manuel Moreno, repeats his country's protest and demand, both of which are rejected. Additional protests are lodged in 1834,1841, 1842, and from time to time thereafter. Henry Smith, the first British officer to govern the Falklands, arrives at Port Louis, the former Argentine capital of the Malvinas. The capital is moved from Port Louis to Port William, later renamed Port Stanley. Queen Victoria issues a letter patent incorporating the islands into the dominions of the Crown.

Chronology

1852

1960 December 14

1965 December 15

1968 November

December

1971 July 1

1973 April

December

1975 October

5

The Falkland Islands Company, organized by a group of British entrepreneurs, receives a royal charter from Queen Victoria to develop the colony. The United Nations calls for the end of colonialism through Resolution 1514. Britain lists the Falklands among its colonies and Argentina protests. United Nations Resolution 2065 calls for Argentina and Britain to negotiate over the islands. Secret conversations between the two countries begin. Lord Chalfont, undersecretary for Latin American affairs in the British Foreign Office tries to persuade the islanders to accept a "position of agreement," discussing with them the possible future transfer of the islands to Argentina. The British Parliament refuses to accept the "position of agreement," arguing that it was not the policy of Britain to transfer the sovereignty over the Falklands against the islanders' wishes. The "position of agreement" is not presented to the United Nations as previously scheduled. An agreement is reached by Argentina and Britain on providing improved transportation and communication between the islands and the Argentine mainland in both directions. The declaration includes a statement that in signing it neither nation renounced its claim to sovereignty over the islands. Britain refuses to negotiate the question of sovereignty, arguing that it cannot give up the islands without the consent of the inhabitants. Negotiations virtually cease. The General Assembly of the United Nations passes Resolution 3160, urging Argentina and Britain to renew negotiations over the islands. A mission, under the direction of Lord Shackleton, is sent by Britain to investigate the possibilities of exploiting the natural resources of the Falklands. Argentina protests declaring that it has not given official permission.

6

Chronology

1976 January

1979 1981 September

December 20

Argentina withdraws its ambassador to London to protest the Shackleton mission and the British attitude toward the question of sovereignty. Britain also recalls its ambassador to Buenos Aires. Argentina and Britain agree to reinstate diplomatic relations on the ambassadorial level. The British Foreign and Commonwealth Office gives up the initiative in the negotiations. It suggests that Argentina make proposals. Without British authorization, Argentine scrap dealer C. S. Davidoff visits South Georgia to inspect some purchases.

1982 Februrary 3 February 27

Britain protests the Davidoff episode to Argentina. Argentina and Britain reach an agreement to establish a permanent negotiation commission.

March 19

Argentine workers contracted by Davidoff land in the Leith station in South Georgia without British authorization.

March 23

The Thatcher government sends the Endurance to expel the Argentines from the islands.

March 24

The Argentine navy orders the Bahia Paraíso to South Georgia.

April 2

Argentine troops land on the Malvinas.

April 3

The United Nations Security Council calls for the withdrawal of Argentine troops from the islands and the immediate cessation of hostilities.

April 8

The United States secretary of state, Alexander Haig, attempts to mediate.

April 30

Haig declares his mission terminated. President Ronald Reagan declares US support for Britain and economic sanctions against Argentina.

May 2

Belaunde Terry, president of Peru, presents a peace proposal to Argentine president Leopoldo Galtieri, who gives his preliminary acceptance with some proposed modifications. Before the Argentine junta ratifies the acceptance, Britain sinks the cruiser General Belgrano. The junta

Chronology

7

rejects the proposal. May 4

Argentina sinks the HMS Sheffield.

May 18

A peace proposal presented by the United Nations secretary general, Pérez de Cuéllar, is rejected by Britain.

May 21

British forces land on East Falkland.

June 14

Argentine forces surrender.

July

Britain formally declares an end to hostilities, and the 200mile exclusion zone established around the islands during the war is replaced by a Falklands Islands Protection Zone (FIPZ) of 150 miles.

September

An agreement is reached on the reciprocal lifting of the financial restrictions imposed by each country against the other during the war. While Britain fully implemented the agreement, Argentina did so only partially.

November 7

Prime Minister Thatcher declares in a newspaper interview that she is willing to enter into talks about normal relations with Argentina, but not about sovereignty.

1984 January

July 18-19

1985 July

The British government starts confidential exchanges through the Swiss government with the purpose of setting an agenda of practical measures of mutual benefit for both countries as a means of working towards the restoration of bilateral relations. Talks between the two countries take place in Berne, as agreed, but the meeting fails because the Argentines at once raise the issue of sovereignty. The Argentine government declares that it was not prepared to discuss normalization of bilateral relations until Britain agrees that a mechanism be established for the eventual discussion of sovereignty. A new Falklands Islands constitution is promulgated. Britain unilaterally lifts the ban on Argentine imports imposed during the war. Argentina responds by stating that relations can be improved only if Britain agrees to discuss sovereignty.

8

Chronology

1986 October February November

1987 January

1989 July

October

1990 February

The British government announces the establishment of the Falklands Islands Interim Conservation and Management Zone (FICZ) coinciding with the FIPZ. Outraged by the establishment of the FICZ, the Argentine government launches a diplomatic offensive against the British action. Failing to achieve diplomatic results, the Argentine government makes an indirect approach to Britain through the US government, suggesting confidential discussion on fisheries topics. The British government is reluctant to enter into new talks. After his inauguration, the new Argentine president, Carlos Menem, proposes direct bilateral talks with Britain with the question of sovereignty to be set aside. At their meeting in Madrid, both sides agree to set the sovereignty issue aside and note that all hostilities between them have ceased. After these talks, Argentina would remove all remaining economic measures against Britain. At a further meeting in Madrid, both governments agree to restore full diplomatic relations. A permanent working group on South Atlantic issues is set up to provide a forum for further considerations of fishering and confidence-building measures.

SOURCES Falklands: Whose Crisis? London: Latin American Bureau, 1982. Goebel, Julius. The Struggle for the Falkland Islands. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1927. Hastings, Max, and Simon Jenkins. The Battle for the Falklands. New York: Norton, 1983. Hoffman, Fritz L., and Olga Mingo. Sovereignty in Dispute: The Falklands/Malvinas 1493-1982. Boulder and London: Westview Press, 1984. Moreno, Juan Carlos. Nuestras Malvinas. Buenos Aires: Ateneo, 1950.

chapter one

Why Resolution of the Dispute Is Important Wayne S. Smith There are those who ask why a settlement is needed at all. The two parties to the dispute, they point out, have now not only ended hostilities, resumed diplomatic and trade relations, and agreed to a series of confidence-building measures, but have also put aside the question of sovereignty over the islands. Why, then, must the question be addressed at all? Why can it not be left aside indefinitely? Indeed, does the mutual agreement to reserve positions not in effect recognize that the positions are mutually exclusive and can never be accommodated—and hence that the best thing to do is to carry on relations as though the underlying dispute did not exist? Is it not, in short, best to leave well enough alone and not remind anyone that the dispute is still there? There is a certain logic at least to the last question. For the moment, it may indeed be best to let well enough alone. All sides understand that in the wake of the war in 1982, the matter is more complex and will take more time than ever to resolve. The scars of war must heal before there can be any hope of a propitious atmosphere to address the underlying dispute. That may be many years away. Thus, for the foreseeable future, the best course of action for the two parties is to carry on as normal a relationship as possible, go forward with their confidence-building measures, and say very little about the underlying dispute. That having been said, it is also important that all parties bear in mind, albeit in an innermost corner, that the present arrangement is temporary and that the dispute will not simply go away. One has the sense that the British—and certainly the islanders—rather hope that it will. Indeed, the British and the Argentines have doubtless entered into the Madrid agreements with very different expectations. For their part, the British remember that it was precisely during the period when Argentina was most prosperous and when it was virtually an extension of the British economic system (say, from 1880 until 1943) that it seemed to attach the least importance to the question of whose flag should fly over the Falklands/Malvinas. They probably now hope that by facilitating Argentina's greater economic engagement with the

9

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European Community, and by being helpful in other ways, they can contribute to its e c o n o m i c r e c o v e r y and b r i n g about a situation in w h i c h Argentina will again be less inclined to raise the sovereignty question. If that is the British expectation, it is an understandable one. As a general rule, the more desperate a nation's economic and internal political situation, the greater the enthusiasm with which it turns to issues that have to do with national pride. If this rule holds, then it would not be unreasonable to hope that an Argentina that had left hyperinflation behind, resumed economic growth, and developed a greater sense of national well-being would pursue the sovereignty issue less passionately—if at all. It is not an unreasonable expectation, but neither is it likely to be realized. The conviction that the islands rightfully belong to Argentina is now so deeply embedded in the Argentine psyche, and the sense of national outrage over their loss is so profound, that no amount of economic prosperity is likely to dispel them. Indeed, the Argentines enter into the Madrid agreements with exactly the opposite expectation to that of the British. They recognize that the invasion was a mistake and that the period of military dictatorship, with its dirty war and blatantly arbitrary rule, caused great damage to Argentina's image in the world at large, damage not alleviated in any way by the country's seemingly chronic economic difficulties. As one Argentine diplomat summed it up at a recent conference in Washington: "If I were an islander looking at Argentina today, I would not see any advantages in a closer association with it. That is up to us to change." And that is one of the major expectations with which Argentina undertakes the Madrid agreements: it believes that by reengaging with Great Britain, by putting its economic house in order, by demonstrating over time that democracy has taken firm root, and by winning the approval of the Western European countries, it can change the unfortunate image alluded to above. Argentines hope to demonstrate that theirs is a serious nation with a prosperous, democratic future. But while the British hope that a more prosperous, stable, democratic Argentina would be less inclined to pursue the Falklands/Malvinas issue, the Argentine expectation is that it is precisely under those circumstances that the question of sovereignty could again be raised, i.e., after Argentina has proved itself to be a reliable partner. Should that expectation prove groundless, the reaction in Argentina m i g h t be d a n g e r o u s i n d e e d . T h e p r e s e n t A r g e n t i n e g o v e r n m e n t f u l l y acknowledges that resort to force was wrong and has committed itself to the search for a peaceful solution. Public opinion polls cited in the following chapters point up the Argentine public's support for that position. But they also point up the fact that the Argentine public expects that at some point there will be a solution. If force didn't produce one, in other words, then peaceful means will. Should years of slow, patient diplomacy not result in meaningful discussions of the underlying sovereignty dispute, the chances

Resolution of the Dispute

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that Argentines will begin to demand more resolute action of their government are quite high. This probably would not result in another Argentine invasion, but it might well mean sharply renewed tensions—tensions that could quickly force Great Britain to return to a Fortress Falklands posture, with thousands of troops garrisoned permanently in the islands. Indeed, Argentina could virtually force the British to such a posture simply by positioning its own naval and air units in the far south, within striking distance of the islands. This would divert the resources of both sides from tasks really more vital to their national interests, to say nothing of the emotional strain it would place on both nations, and on the islanders themselves. The latter's overriding wish is to be left alone to pursue their traditional way of life in peace. But should it become clear that the way to a settlement is permanently blocked, and tensions again rise, as already suggested, that wish would become forlorn indeed. The traditional way of life does not include constant tensions and thousands of troops garrisoned in the islands. Further, the virtual resumption of a state of hostilities—even if no shots were ever fired—would likely be far more disruptive in the future than in 1982. Though in the latter instance the Latin American states supported Argentina's claims to the islands, few had any sympathy for the oppressive military government then in power in Buenos Aires, and even fewer thought that it had been right to invade. Chile and Brazil especially were lukewarm in their support for Argentina even though they also were under military governments at the time. Chile, which had its own territorial disputes with Argentina, may even have secretly cheered the British on. That is not likely to be the case in the future. Argentina is now under a democratic government in good standing with its neighbors. It has committed itself to search for a peaceful settlement. The other Latin American countries, like Argentina itself, expect that at some point that "search" will lead to a serious discussion of the underlying dispute, i.e., concerning the question of sovereignty. Should it become apparent that that is not to be the case, a solid bloc of Latin American states would share Argentina's acute frustration and could be expected to back almost any Argentine response short of armed force. After 1992, on the other hand, Great Britain's dispute would in a sense become that of the European Community. To a far greater extent than was the case in 1982, then, renewed tensions over the Falklands/Malvinas would probably involve and affect Latin America and Western Europe as a whole, possibly even leading to some antagonism between the two in the United Nations. In sum, while the Madrid agreements wisely place the dispute over sovereignty to one side, this simply postpones the need to address it. It may be left on the shelf for an indefinite period, but failure to come to grips with it eventually could lead to a dangerous situation inimical to the interests of all parties involved—the British, the Argentines, and the Islanders—and not at

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Dispute

all helpful to the communities of nations to which Argentina and Great Britain belong. This is not an issue that will go away. In the final analysis, it behooves all sides to seek an acceptable solution rather than allowing it again to come to the verge of conflict.

Part One

Historical and Juridical Bases of the Claims to the Islands

chapter two

The View from Whitehall David Thomas The purpose of this chapter is to describe the approach of successive British g o v e r n m e n t s to the dispute with Argentina over sovereignty over the Falkland Islands and Dependencies. (I will use the term "Falkland Islands" throughout this chapter, rather than "Falkland Islands/Malvinas" or other variants, for simplicity, and because I seek to reflect the official British viewpoint). I will refer especially to the period since 1965, when the United Nations General Assembly adopted Resolution 2065 inviting the two countries to enter into discussions intended to lead to a peaceful solution of the differences between them. I will not attempt to analyze the conflicting historical and legal arguments adduced from the often confused dealings between Britain, France, and Spain during the eighteenth century, still less to adjudicate them. THE BRITISH CLAIM TO SOVEREIGNTY

The most recent authoritative, albeit summary, statement of the principal elements of the United Kingdom's claim to sovereignty over the Falkland Islands is c o n t a i n e d in a m e m o r a n d u m s u b m i t t e d by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) to the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee in November 1982. 1 It is worth reproducing at length: In brief, the United Kingdom's title to the Falklands Islands is derived from early settlement, reinforced by formal claims in the name of the Crown and completed by effective occupation for nearly 150 years. The exercise of sovereignty by the United Kingdom over the Islands has, furthermore, consistently been shown to accord with the freely expressed wishes of the people w h o form their permanent population. In 1690 Captain John Strong R N made the first recorded landing on the Falkland Islands and gave them their English name after Viscount Falkland, who was the Treasurer of the Royal Navy. The Islands remained uninhabited until 1764 when a small French colony was established at Port Louis on East Falkland. A British landing in 1765 was followed by a British settlement at Port Egmont on

15

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Claims

West Falkland in 1766 (initially unaware of the presence of the French). After remonstration by Spain (to which the French handed over Port Louis in 1767 in return for financial compensation) the British settlers were expelled in 1770, but returned in late 1771 after an exchange of declarations between the two Governments and agreement to return to the status quo. The British settlement withdrew for reasons of economy in 1774; but the British Commanding Officer left the British flag flying and a plaque affirming British ownership and possession of the Islands in the name of George III. After the withdrawal of the Spanish garrison in 1811 the Islands were left unpopulated; but from 1820 the new Government in Buenos Aires made various attempts to establish occupancy. In 1823 a Governor was appointed but he never visited the Islands; a settlement was established in 1826. The Buenos Aires Government issued a Decree claiming the Islands in 1829; HMG protested formally. In 1831, the Argentine Governor seized three American sealing ships and in return a US warship dispersed the settlement and declared the Islands free of all government. British occupation of the Islands was resumed in 1833. From that date until April 2, 1982, Britain remained in open, continuous, effective and peaceful possession, occupation and administration of the Falkland Islands. This situation has been restored following the Argentine surrender of June 14. The facts as briefly outlined above set out the basis for legal title on the part of the United Kingdom to the Falkland Islands. It is also necessary to take account of another factor which is nowadays recognized as of fundamental importance, namely the right of self-determination of peoples. This principle is enshrined in Article 1 of the United Nations Charter. It is highly relevant that the inhabitants of the Islands, who are a permanent and not a transient population, have repeatedly made clear their wish that the Islands should remain British. It flows from the United Kingdom sovereignty over the Falkland Islands that the United Kingdom also exercises sovereignty over their territorial sea . . . and the air space above the Islands. Thus the geographical extent of the United Kingdom's sovereignty over the Falkland Islands comprises the Islands themselves, the territorial sea and the superjacent air space. This account reflects changes in the emphasis that British governments have c o m e over time to place on different aspects of Britain's title to sovereignty in the light of historical research and developments in international legal concepts. Thus, for example, there is no reliance placed on the doubtful argument of prior discovery, which formed one of the bases for the traditional British claim in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Both the Spanish claims to prior discovery (Magellan in 1520 and Camargo in 1540) and the British (Davies in 1592 and Hawkins in 1594) rest on inadequate evidence; the first conclusively authenticated sighting was that of the Dutch navigator Sebald van Weert in 1600. In any event, it is a generally accepted principle of international law that any inchoate form of title that discovery may confer must be consolidated within a reasonable time by the effective occupation and possession of the territory concerned. 2 Debate about which country's sailors first sighted the Falklands is interesting but irrelevant. Arguments about the implications for the validity of the conflicting British and Spanish claims of the events of 1764-1774 (summarized earlier),

The View from Whitehall

17

the alleged and unsubstantiated "secret pledge" by Lord North in 1770 to withdraw from the Falklands, the Anglo-Spanish Nootka Sound Convention of 1790, the Spanish evacuation of East Falkland in 1811, and the applicability of the doctrine of uti possidetis are complex. The crucial factor, from the British standpoint, is that at no time did the British Crown consider that it had relinquished its title—as was made clear in the British government's formal protest against the Buenos Aires government's decrees of June 10, 1829, in which Argentina asserted that its rights over the Falkland Islands derived from the Spanish Viceroyalty of La Plata. And in a note responding to the Argentine protest at the bloodless repossession of the islands by Britain in 1833, the British government stated that it had "only exercised its full and undoubted rights. . . . The rights of His Majesty are of ancient standing and have been relinquished. 3 Throughout the remainder of the nineteenth century, sporadic Argentine protests were met, when they were not ignored, with responses reaffirming Britain's rights to the islands and declaring that the question of sovereignty was closed (e.g., March 1842, November 1887). Notwithstanding the confidence expressed by successive British governments, a revival of the Argentine challenge to Britain's title in the early years of the present century gave rise to a reexamination of the history of the dispute up to 1833 by Gaston De Bernhardt, the assistant librarian of the Foreign Office. De Bernhardt's memorandum of December 7, 1910, identified potential weaknesses in a British case that had hitherto been accepted almost without question by British governments over the years and implied that the Argentine claim to possession of the islands in 1833 could be stronger than Britain allowed. Nearly three quarters of a century later, De Bernhardt's doubts were echoed by the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of Commons in their report on the Falkland Islands of October 1984. 4 After referring to the conflicting evidence that had been presented to them and to "doubts [about the strength of the British claim] expressed, by Government officials at least, during the first half of this century," the committee concluded that "the historical and legal evidence demonstrates such areas of uncertainty that we are unable to reach a categorical conclusion on the validity of the historical claims of either country." They added, however, that "much of the historical argument . . . has been rendered less relevant by Argentina's illegal resort to arms in April 1982." Commenting on the report, the government regretted the committee's reluctance to reach a categorical conclusion on the legal validity of Britain's title to the Islands and displayed no such reluctance itself, roundly declaring: "The Islands are British territory." As for the official doubts to which the committee had referred, the government observed that "it is hardly surprising that, with a subject as complicated as the history of the Falkland Islands, differing and in some cases conflicting views on the question of sovereignty should in the past have been expressed from time to time by officials. These comments were made when concepts of

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international law, such as prescription and self-determination, were less clearly established than they are today. Successive British Governments have made it clear that they have no doubts about our sovereignty over the Falkland Islands."* The distinction drawn in these comments between the views of officials from time to time and the consistent position of successive governments may appear strained, but it is a valid reflection of British constitutional theory and practice. More significant, however, is the reference to the modern evolution of the concepts of prescription and self-determination, which have become important pillars of the British case—as the FCO memorandum quoted earlier illustrates. As a consequence of developments in international law, the emphasis in the British case since the 1930s has tended to be placed more on post-1833 than pre-1833 criteria. 6 Thus, the judgment in the Island of Palmas case in 1928 marked an important stage in the definition of international law on prescription, that is to say, the acquisition and consolidation of title through continued possession and settlement. The British government has never had occasion formally to advance detailed legal arguments on prescription in relation to the Falkland Islands; and debate among international jurists and historians raises as many questions as it answers as to the extent to which arguments based on acquisitive prescription may be held to validate the British claim. It is tempting to recall Goebel's comment that there is "a certain futility in interposing the lean and ascetic visage of the law in a situation which first and last is merely a question of power."? Controversy remains over whether the British occupation of the islands in 1833 constituted usurpation of Argentine territory inherited from Spain or repossession of territory belonging to the British Crown, and over the extent to which subsequent Argentine protests may be considered to have delayed or prevented the process of prescription. But the fact of the exercise of British sovereignty through "open, continuous, effective and peaceful possession, occupation and administration" of the islands since 1833 (apart from the ten weeks of forcible Argentine occupation in 1982) does undoubtedly serve to consolidate the British position. By contrast, that short-lived Argentine occupation cannot be held to have strengthened Argentina's claim. Indeed, it can be argued that the attempt to resolve the dispute by force has had the reverse effect. In their 1984 report, the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee concluded that "whatever the strength of Argentina's claims to the Falklands prior to the invasion, we have no doubt that those claims have been seriously weakened by Argentina's resort to arms." The committee added: "Equally, whatever the previous uncertainties about the United Kingdom's legal claims to sovereignty, the invasion and war have greatly reinforced the moral and political force of HM Government's commitment to protect the interests and rights of the population of the Falklands." 8

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The latter comment goes to the heart of the contemporary dispute between Britain and Argentina. The clash between the principles of self-determination and territorial integrity was the issue over which the 1982 war was fought, and it has presented an impassable obstacle to progress towards a peaceful resolution of the dispute both before the war and since. It has been said that self-determination is "a political axiom . . . not a legal c o n c e p t . . . it has no strength in international law but great strength in international relations." 9 There may be room for debate about how far Britain's prescriptive title is reinforced in law by the facts that its occupation and administration of the Falkland Islands have been done with the consent of their inhabitants and that these inhabitants have repeatedly made clear their wish that this state of affairs should be preserved. There can be little doubt that the British government sees its defense of the islanders' right democratically to determine their own future as the most important function of its exercise of sovereignty. In April 1982, Mrs. Thatcher declared that "we cannot allow the democratic rights of the Islanders to be denied by the territorial ambitions of Argentina"; 10 and Britain's resolve to defend and sustain the islanders' right of self-determination is reaffirmed in nearly every official statement on the subject. The Argentine contention that the principle of self-determination does not apply to the Falkland Islanders—on the grounds that they are a transient or impermanent population and thus not a "people" in terms of the relevant United Nations resolutions, and that they originally replaced an indigenous Argentine population expelled by force—is dismissed by the British government. The Falklands never had an indigenous population, and the handful of inhabitants there in 1833 cannot be said to have constituted a settled population. Today the permanent population is still small (around 1,900 people occupying a group of islands with a total land area of 12,000 square kilometers—greater than Cyprus or Jamaica). But it is an established and ethnically homogeneous community: over 95 percent of the islanders are of British origin and, according to the 1980 census, about 75 percent of them were born in the Falklands. Far from being transients or recent arrivals, many of them can trace their island ancestry back through five or six generations: "Many Falkland Islands families have been established there far longer than many Argentines in Argentina." 11 The British view is that the small number of the islanders in no way detracts from the rights that the United Nations Charter and the international covenants on human rights accord them, including, specifically, the right of self-determination. "In the judgment of my Government," Sir Anthony Parsons, the British permanent representative at the United Nations, told the Security Council on April 3,1982, "whether they are 1,800 or 18,000 or 18,000,000 they are still entitled to have their freely expressed wishes respected." 12 To underline the point, the introduction to the chapter on human rights in the new Falkland Islands Constitution of 1985 contains language drawn from

20

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Article 1 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: "All peoples have the right to self-determination. B y virtue of that right they freely determine their status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development." This formal affirmation of the islanders' right to self-determination was inserted in their constitution (and approved b y the B r i t i s h Parliament) in response to the wishes expressed by elected members of the Falkland Islands councils. It did not mark any new departure in British policy but was consistent with the undertakings entered into by the United Kingdom on its own behalf and on behalf of its dependent territories when it ratified the covenant in 1976, and with the position it had consistently adopted at the United Nations. The argument over self-determination finds political expression in the contentious question of how far the "wishes," as opposed to the "interests," of the inhabitants should be taken into account in determining the putative future status o f the Falkland Islands. Argentina, relying on the letter of Article 73 of the United Nations Charter, which provides only that "the interests of the inhabitants of [non-self-governing] territories are paramount," has on numerous occasions offered to safeguard the interests of the islanders and to allow them to preserve their culture and way of life after sovereignty is transferred (or, as it would argue, restored) to Argentina. But, as already noted, Argentina does not concede that the islanders enjoy the right to determine their own future and insists that resolution of the sovereignty issue is exclusively a matter for decision by the British and Argentine governments. The trouble is that the Argentine position implies that it is for others—Britain and Argentina during the negotiating phase and, after sovereignty is transferred, Argentina alone—to define the islanders' interests, not the islanders themselves. This is the antithesis of the British position that since the islanders have the right to "freely determine their status and . . . pursue their economic, social and cultural development," it is for them to decide where their interests lie; their wishes will consequently reflect their own assessment of their interests. The constitutionally inexact doctrine that "the wishes of the islanders are paramount," first articulated b y the Labour foreign secretary, M i c h a e l Stewart, in the House of Commons in 1968 and repeated by representatives of both Labour and Conservative governments ever since, is shorthand for the condition on which the British government at the time was prepared to negotiate a change in the islands' status, namely that it would do so "only if it were clear . . . that the islanders themselves regarded such an agreement as satisfactory to their interests." 1 3 It is constitutionally inexact because the decisions of Parliament are paramount, not the wishes of the islanders (or any other minority interest group subject to the British Crown at home or abroad). But it reflects the political reality that, as Baroness Young, minister of state at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, told the House of Commons Foreign

The View from Whitehall

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Affairs Committee in 1984, "it would be inconceivable for [Parliament] to take a decision on sovereignty against the wishes of the islanders." 14 Viewed from afar it may appear obvious that, in the words of the first Shackleton report (1976), "In any major new developments of the islands' economy, especially those relating to the exploitation of offshore resources, cooperation with Argentina—even participation—should, if possible, be secured." 15 The Anglo-Argentine Communications Agreement of 1971 and the Oil Agreement of 1974 had earlier marked an effort by Britain to encourage in the islands a habit of closer practical collaboration with their mainland neighbor and in Argentina a policy of courting the islanders' goodwill (critics would say that the unspoken aim was to promote the islands' growing dependence on and eventual absorption by Argentina). The 1976 Shackleton report itself, so fiercely criticized in Argentina as a provocative challenge to Argentine territorial aspirations, was conceived by the British government of the day as a means of engaging Argentine cooperation in joint development of the economic resources of the Southwest Atlantic. 16 The desirability of "educating Islander opinion" on the material benefits that a closer relationship or even integration with Argentina could bring has frequently been canvassed both in Britain and Argentina. But the most effective lesson in the consequences of Argentine intervention in the islands' affairs was given by the Argentine army in 1982; and its traumatic effects will not be erased from the collective memory of the islanders for many years to come.

SOUTH GEORGIA A N D THE SOUTH SANDWICH ISLANDS

The Argentine claim to sovereignty over South Georgia and the South S a n d w i c h I s l a n d s , d e s i g n a t e d until 1985 as the F a l k l a n d I s l a n d s Dependencies, is of relatively recent origin. It forms part of a geopolitically inspired aspiration to control territory that also includes the sector of Antarctica claimed by Argentina (this overlaps sectors claimed by Britain and Chile; the competing claims were frozen by Article 4 of the Antarctic Treaty of 1959). It need not detain us long. The British case for sovereignty over South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands was set out in the FCO memorandum to the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee 17 as follows: The Falkland Islands Dependencies consist of South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands. (Until 1962 the Dependencies also comprised British islands and territories south of 6 0 ° South latitude, principally the South Orkney Islands, South Shetland Islands, Graham Land, Palmer Land and Coats Land. In 1962 these southern islands and territories were detached from the Falkland Islands Dependencies so as to constitute the British Antarctic Territory. It is necessary to bear in mind the more extended scope of the Falkland Islands Dependencies in relation to statements made and events occurring before 1962.)

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Claims

The question of title to the Falkland Islands Dependencies is legally distinct from the question of title to the Falkland Islands themselves, although for convenience the Dependencies are administered by the Falkland Islands Government. The United Kingdom's title to the Dependencies is accordingly based on different facts from those which support title to the Falkland Islands, although in some respects similar general considerations apply. South Georgia was discovered in 1775 by Captain Cook, who landed there and took formal possession on behalf of the Crown. The South Sandwich Islands were also discovered by Captain Cook in 1775 on the same voyage. In 1908 British sovereignty over the Dependencies was confirmed and defined by the Crown by Letters Patent (amended by further Letters Patent in 1917) and since 1909 there has been a continuous British administrative presence on South Georgia. In 1955 Her Majesty's Government submitted to the International Court of Justice an Application instituting proceedings against Argentina (and a similar Application was submitted instituting proceedings against Chile) concerning sovereignty over the islands and territories which then comprised the Falkland Islands Dependencies. The Application set out in detail the facts and arguments which establish the United Kingdom's sovereignty over all the islands and territories in question. However, neither the Argentine nor the Chilean Government accepted the C o u r t ' s jurisdiction for the p u r p o s e s of H M G o v e r n m e n t ' s Application. As with the Falkland Islands, United Kingdom sovereignty over the Falkland I s l a n d s D e p e n d e n c i e s e x t e n d s also o v e r the t e r r i t o r i a l sea a r o u n d the Dependencies and the air space above the Dependencies and their territorial sea. Prior to [1982], the Dependencies have, at no stage in their history, been occupied by Argentina. Argentina did not make any claim to South Georgia until 1927 and no specific claim to the South Sandwich Islands was made until 1948 (although a reservation of rights claimed by Argentina was made in 1937 in general terms in relation to the Falkland Islands Dependencies as then comprised). Whatever historical basis Argentina may advance for its claim to the Falkland Islands could not therefore apply to the Dependencies. In 1976 Argentina established a research station on Southern Thule in the South Sandwich Islands. Her Majesty's Government repeatedly protested to Argentina and asserted British sovereignty over Southern Thule. Argentine occupation of the research station was ended in June 1982. In contrast to the doubts they expressed over the relative merits of the historical claims by Britain and Argentina to the Falkland Islands, the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee in their report of 1984 had "no difficulty in concluding that the claims advanced by Argentina in respect of the Dependencies of South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands are without legal foundation." In 1977, the British government did agree with the Argentine government that the question of sovereignty over the Falkland Islands Dependencies would be considered in future negotiations, along with sovereignty over the Falkland Islands themselves. But the negotiations came to nothing (see next section) and the offer lapsed. It has not been renewed. In 1985, the promulgation of a new constitution for the Falkland Islands provided the occasion for a change in the arrangements for the administration o f the D e p e n d e n c i e s ,

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involving a modification of the role of the Falkland Islands government. The governor of the Falklands remains also the commissioner for South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands, but the Falkland Islands Executive Council has lost its former executive powers with respect to the Dependencies, although it may still be consulted on matters relating to the Dependencies that are also relevant to the interests of the Falklands. ANGLO-ARGENTINE NEGOTIATIONS 1966-1979

When Argentina raised the Falklands issue in the Committee of 24 at the United Nations in 1964, the British representative responded in the fashion of British governments since 1833 that the issue was not negotiable. Yet, within three years Britain and Argentina were discussing a transfer of sovereignty. Various factors contributed to this remarkable change in the British position. By securing the adoption by the UN General Assembly in December 1965 of Resolution 2065, which invited Britain and Argentina to enter into negotiations for a peaceful solution to the Falklands problem, Argentina succeeded in giving this hitherto relatively obscure bilateral dispute an international dimension and thereby laying the foundation for the first meaningful exchanges on a matter hitherto treated as non-negotiable by Britain. 18 In January 1966, as part of an effort by the Foreign Office to restore Britain's waning economic and political influence in Latin America, Michael Stewart paid the first-ever visit to the subcontinent by a British foreign secretary; inevitably the Argentine claim to the Falklands was raised with him in Buenos Aires. To a Labour government committed to completing the process of colonial disengagement as smoothly as possible, already set on reducing Britain's overstretched international defense commitments to match its diminished military and economic capabilities and interested in repairing its relations with Latin America, a resolution of the long-standing and newly active dispute with Britain's historically closest partner in the region appeared a highly desirable aim. There was never any question of simply abandoning the Falkland Islands to Argentina. This was politically unthinkable and, besides, it was feared that giving up the islands could undermine the British position in Antarctica. Indeed, the Operación Condor incident in September 1966, when an armed group of young Argentines landed a hijacked Aerolíneas Argentinas aircraft on the racecourse at Port Stanley, led to the reinforcement of the largely symbolic Royal Marines detachment on the Islands to platoon strength of about forty men (at which it remained until 1982). The perceived Argentine threat also led to the establishment of a naval presence—also largely symbolic—in the form of regular deployment to the South Atlantic of a lightly armed ice patrol vessel. But the successful negotiation of the Antarctic Treaty (which came into effect in 1961) had induced a feeling in the Foreign Office that the

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of the

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imagination, hard work and, goodwill that had defused the increasing tensions generated by competing territorial claims in Antarctica could equally well be applied to solving the intractable Falklands problem—a feeling later described by one of the British officials involved as "negotiator's hubris."19 Britain's opening gambit in bilateral talks in November 1966 was, accordingly, to propose a "sovereignty freeze" for thirty years, at the end of which the islanders would be free to choose between British and Argentine rule. This was rejected by Argentina; and in March 1967, the British government for the first time stated formally to Argentina that it would be prepared to cede sovereignty over the islands under certain conditions, provided that the wishes of the islanders were respected. 20 There followed several months of confidential negotiations at the official level on the drafting of an AngloArgentine memorandum of understanding. The crucial passage in the draft, agreed ad referendum in August 1968, provided that "the Government of the United Kingdom as part of . . . a final settlement will recognize Argentina's sovereignty over the Islands from a date to be agreed." 21 The date—not less than four and not more than ten years after signature—was to be set once the British government had satisfied itself that the interests of the islanders would be secured by the as yet undetermined safeguards and guarantees to be offered by Argentina. But by this time, Britain's negotiating options had been narrowed by dissent in the islands and its louder echoes in London. In February, Falkland Islands councillors had been consulted in confidence about an early draft of the memorandum of understanding. Their reaction was to appeal to members of Parliament for help to prevent "the handing over of the Falklands to the Argentines." Their cry for help led to the formation of a powerful all-party Falkland Islands lobby, and the government found itself under assault in Parliament and the press. The government had entered into the negotiations with Argentina with the implicit assumption that it was the best judge of the interests of the islanders and that they could be brought to share its judgment. 2 2 It was soon disabused. It therefore proposed that the AngloArgentine memorandum of understanding should be accompanied by a unilateral statement making clear that the British government would proceed to transfer sovereignty to Argentina only if and when it was satisfied that this was acceptable to the inhabitants of the islands. Argentina was not prepared to agree to this; and for its part the Falkland Islands Legislative Council in May affirmed the islanders' resolve "to remain British under the British Crown." Nevertheless, in November, Lord Chalfont, the responsible Foreign Office minister, visited the Falklands to try to gain the islanders' acquiescence in the prospective Anglo-Argentine agreement. He was not successful; and on his return, the Falkland Islands lobby mobilized 100 members of Parliament to sign a motion calling on the government once and for all to assert that the Falkland islanders were British and would not be transferred

The View from Whitehall

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against their wishes to an alien land. Faced on the one hand with inflexible Argentine opposition to the test of acceptability to the islanders of any agreement between the two governments and, on the other, by the prospect of what at least one cabinet minister regarded as an "unnecessary storm" 2 3 in Parliament over an issue of marginal importance compared with other major economic and foreign policy problems, the cabinet decided in December to abandon the effort to reach agreement with Argentina on the basis of the memorandum of understanding. Announcing the decision to a noisy House of Commons on December 11, 1968, the foreign secretary stated that the government still desired to continue negotiations with Argentina, but only on condition that "in no circumstances would the United Kingdom put itself in a position in which it would be required to surrender sovereignty against the wishes of the islanders." 24 The paramountcy of the islanders' wishes as reflected in Parliament had been established, and the question of sovereignty over the Falklands had become an issue of domestic politics rather than foreign policy. 25 After 1968, successive British governments fell back on trying to manage the dispute with Argentina rather than resolve it. From time to time Britain was prepared to discuss the sovereignty issue or to explore devices such as condominiums or leaseback, which were designed to finesse it; but the inescapable condition of any such discussion was that the outcome must be acceptable to the islanders. The British tactic, therefore, was to concentrate on seeking to develop functional cooperation with Argentina in relation to the Falklands in the hope that over time this would sway opinion in the islands towards closer organic links with Argentina. Argentina, while willing to go some way along this track, never deviated from its insistence that the only solution acceptable to it was a transfer of sovereignty. Talks resumed in 1969 and were continued by the Conservative government elected in 1970. Sovereignty was off the agenda. The talks, which took place without prejudice to either side's position on sovereignty (under the socalled "sovereignty umbrella"), were concerned with improving communications between the islands and Argentina. The agreements announced in September 1971 included a weekly air service between Comodoro Rivadavia and the islands provided by the Argentine airline LADE, provisions to facilitate travel by islanders to and through Argentina, and exemption from Argentine military service for inhabitants of the islands. In 1972, the Argentines built an airstrip at Port Stanley and in 1974 (despite setbacks in the Anglo-Argentine political dialogue), a further agreement provided for YPF, the Argentine national oil company, to supply petroleum products to the islands at mainland prices. Paradoxically, these agreements, intended in part to encourage the islanders to appreciate the benefits of closer collaboration with Argentina, served rather to stimulate their suspicion of Britain's motives. The British government's failure, due to financial constraints, to replace the

26

Bases of the Claims

sea service to Montevideo withdrawn by the Falkland Islands Company in 1974 only deepened these suspicions. Meanwhile, in 1972, the Argentine government renewed its pressure for negotiations on sovereignty and responded to Britain's reluctance by securing the passage in 1973 of U N General Assembly Resolution 3160 (XXVII), which called on the two sides to accelerate their efforts to find a solution. The British reaction (initiated by the Heath government and pursued by the Labour government led by Harold Wilson, which was elected in March 1974) was to float the idea of condominium. But this was received without enthusiasm in the islands; the Falkland Islands Executive Council did not object to the British government exploring the subject with Argentina, but insisted that there should be no participation by the islanders in the talks. The Argentine government indicated that it would discuss condominium only if Britain first recognized Argentina's sovereignty over the islands. By August 1974, the condominium idea was dead. Anglo-Argentine discussions continued from the mid-1970s to the eve of the Argentine invasion but always, despite several attempts by Britain to refocus the dispute, against a background of the insurmountable deadlock over sovereignty and growing political tension. Britain's room for diplomatic maneuver was limited by its undertaking to respect the islanders' wishes regarding their future status. A n d increasingly after 1974, w h e n a major review of defense policy had accelerated the reduction of overseas security commitments and of the British armed forces' capability to conduct operations outside the NATO area, persistent pressures on the defense budget meant that the commitment to defend the Falklands against perceived threats of Argentine military (and particularly naval) action was always more symbolic than substantial. In 1976, the chiefs of staff concluded that it would not be practicable to garrison the Falkland Islands in the strength required to repel a determined Argentine a s s a u l t . A n d in 1977, the foreign secretary, David Owen, minuted to his Cabinet colleagues that the Islands were "militarily indefensible except by a major, costly and unacceptable diversion of current resources." 2 7 The British objective during this period was, therefore, to persuade the Argentine government that it was worth its while to continue the negotiations. Making bricks without straw became an essential skill for Britain's diplomats. In July 1975, Britain proposed Anglo-Argentine discussions on joint development of the Southwest Atlantic. In response, Argentina suggested that these should be linked to a transfer of sovereignty over the Falkland Islands followed by their simultaneous leaseback to Britain for a number of years, accompanied by unopposed occupation of South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands by A r g e n t i n a . This w a s u n a c c e p t a b l e to Britain, and Argentina rejected talks on economic cooperation from which the sovereignty issue was excluded. Nonetheless, the British government still sought to

The View from Whitehall

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promote the concept of economic collaboration as a means of diverting the sterile sovereignty dispute into potentially more constructive areas. The survey of the economic prospects of the Falklands commissioned in 1975 from a group led by Lord Shackleton was intended as a means to this end. The Shackleton report published in May 1976 identified numerous potential growth areas in the Islands and offshore and (as already noted) pointed to the need for collaboration with Argentina if this potential were to be realized. (It also called for substantial capital investment by the government in infrastructure projects, thereby ensuring, in the financial climate of the time, that its principal recommendations were not implemented.) The Argentine reaction was very hostile. The Shackleton team's arrival in the Falklands in January 1976 was denounced by the Argentine foreign minister as an "unfriendly" act and led to the mutual withdrawal of ambassadors. In February, an Argentine destroyer fired on the unarmed British research vessel RRS Shackleton in an unsuccessful attempt to arrest her in disputed waters off the Falklands. In December 1976, an illegal Argentine military presence, subsequently alleged by the Argentine authorities to be no more than a scientific research station, was discovered by a Royal Navy helicopter on Southern Thule in the South Sandwich Islands. The British government decided against removing the Argentine party by force in order to avoid escalating the dispute; it subsequently emerged that had Britain followed this course, the Argentine navy planned to seize the British Antarctic Survey personnel on South Georgia in reprisal. Despite British protests, this Argentine presence was maintained on Southern Thule until 1982. Notwithstanding these signs of growing tension, exploratory discussions took place throughout 1976 with a view to resuming the dialogue; and in April 1977, terms of reference for new Anglo-Argentine negotiations were announced. These provided that the negotiations would "concern future political relations, including sovereignty, with regard to the Falkland Islands, South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands . . . directed to working out a peaceful solution to the existing dispute . . . and the establishment of a framework for Anglo-Argentine economic cooperation."28 The terms of reference also made clear that the negotiations would be held under the "sovereignty umbrella" and that the British government would consult the islanders during their course. Once again sovereignty over the Falklands and, for the first time, the Dependencies was up for discussion. But if the terms of reference had changed, the political realities had not; and no substantive progress was made in the five rounds of negotiations that took place at official and ministerial level between July 1977 and March 1979. The British government assessed that it would have to give ground on sovereignty in the end and hoped that Argentina would be satisfied by some form of leaseback arrangement coupled with a program of economic cooperation. But time would be needed to persuade opinion in the

28

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islands and in Britain to acquiesce in this solution. British tactics therefore were to buy time by retaining sovereignty as long as possible while making concessions, if necessary, over the Dependencies and the maritime resources in the area. 29 But what the British regarded as buying time looked to Argentina like simple procrastination; and the talks were conducted against a background of signs of growing impatience on the part of the Argentine junta (particularly the commander of the navy, Admiral Massera), leading in November 1977 to the precautionary deployment to the South Atlantic of a Royal Navy nuclearpowered submarine and two frigates. 30 The British negotiators sought to draw the talks into such areas as scientific cooperation and joint exploitation of maritime resources; the Argentines were reluctant to follow, since they regarded these areas as no more than diversions from the central issue of sovereignty. The one draft agreement that was reached, on joint scientific research in the Dependencies, was rejected by Falkland Islands councillors on the grounds that it was liable to legitimize a process of Argentine encroachment that could in time embrace the Falklands themselves. Two things are worth noting about the Labour government's approach to these negotiations. First, it w a s prepared to contemplate concessions to Argentina over the Dependencies, where Argentina's claim is much more tenuous than it is over the Falklands, and where the implications for Britain's position in Antarctica could arguably be more damaging. Second, although it came privately to regard transfer of sovereignty over the Falklands combined with leaseback as the most realistic solution, it did not discuss this possibility w i t h A r g e n t i n a . T h e r e a c t i o n in t h e H o u s e of C o m m o n s w h e n i t s Conservative successor did canvass the leaseback option suggests that it was wise—at any rate in terms of domestic politics. THE THATCHER ADMINISTRATION The Conservative government led by Margaret Thatcher took office in May 1979. Compared with other major foreign policy issues, such as the development of the European Community, East-West relations, and Rhodesia, the Falklands were low on the new government's list of priorities. But it undertook a thorough review of policy options during 1979 and the first half of 1980. Early soundings of Falkland Islands and Argentine views by Nicholas Ridley, the new minister of state at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, in June and July 1979 produced f r o m the islanders a strong preference for a sovereignty freeze. It produced from Buenos Aires a tough restatement of the Argentine demand for "more dynamic" negotiations on sovereignty, coupled with an assertion that the islanders should not be a third party to the negotiations. The British government was not disposed to take up the Falklands issue until it had dealt with the more pressing problem of Rhodesia; the successful resolution of the latter probably raised exaggerated hopes in Buenos Aires

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that once Lord Carrington's negotiating skills were applied to the Falklands, that problem too could quickly be solved. Exploratory Anglo-Argentine talks in April 1980 ran into the familiar deadlock over sovereignty, but did result in agreement that the two sides should discuss further the possibility of cooperation on development and conservation of the resources of the Southwest Atlantic. It was not until July 1980 that the cabinet Defense and Overseas Committee again reviewed the position and agreed to attempt to reach a solution to the dispute on the basis of a leaseback arrangement. 31 Following this decision, Mr. Ridley paid a second visit to the Falklands to test the islanders' views. While generally apprehensive of or hostile to any change in the status quo, islanders appeared to be divided on leaseback, with a substantial minority opposed to it and the majority undecided. On his return, Ridley made a statement in the House of Commons on December 2, 1980. Explaining that the government had no doubt about British sovereignty over the Falklands but that the dispute with Argentina was damaging the islands' prospects, he reported that he had discussed with the islanders various possible bases for seeking an acceptable negotiated settlement, including leaseback. He emphasized that "the essential elements of any solution . . . should preserve British administration, law and way of life for the islanders. Any eventual settlement would have to be endorsed by the islanders and by this House." 32 Despite these assurances, the statement provoked a universally hostile response from all sides of the House of Commons, and this was quickly echoed in the press. As in 1968, diplomatic problem solving proved to be no match for parliamentary emotion. In January 1981, the Joint Councils of the Falkland Islands approved a motion demanding that in future talks with Argentina the British aim should be an agreement to freeze the sovereignty dispute for a specific period of time. Despite these setbacks, the government's immediate reaction was to try to keep negotiations going. A further round of talks took place in February 1981, at which the British proposal for a freeze of the dispute was immediately rejected by Argentina. The foreign secretary then concluded that no useful purpose would be served by further talks until the islanders had cleared their own minds. There were no more formal Anglo-Argentine talks during that year, which the Foreign and Commonwealth Office spent debating how it might contrive to play its unplayable hand. The British dilemma was familiar, but it was becoming steadily more acute. As Lord Carrington minuted to the prime minister in September, leaseback offered "the most likely, and perhaps the only, basis for an agreed solution." 33 But the very mention of leaseback had been howled down in the House of Commons the previous December and opposition to it in the islands was hardening: all the members of the Legislative Council elected in October 1981 were opposed to negotiations on sovereignty, and the governor reported

30

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that the islanders wished to have nothing whatsoever to do with the Argentines. 34 FCO officials advised that if the leaseback option was still to be pursued it would be necessary to mount a public education campaign to bring home to opinion in Britain and the Falklands the dangers inherent in a failure to pursue negotiations with Argentina and the advantages of achieving a peaceful settlement of the sovereignty dispute. But Lord Carrington was unwilling to pursue this course, believing that it would not be endorsed by the cabinet and fearing that, even if it were, it would smack of coercing the islanders and be counterproductive. By the end of the year, leaseback was no longer seen as a practicable objective. Substantive negotiations on sovereignty were ruled out, but AngloArgentine talks had somehow to be kept going. The alternative of deliberately letting the Argentines know that sovereignty was again non-negotiable and accepting the consequences was not regarded as a viable option. Intelligence assessments that such a course would be likely to generate an increased threat of forcible action by Argentina meant that it would have to be accompanied by effective military deterrent measures; but these were ruled out by budgetary constraints. Early in 1981 the government had carried out another defense review with the avowed aim of cutting expenditure. Its results bore particularly heavily on the Royal Navy. Far from providing scope for a possible buildup of the defenses of the Falkland Islands, the review included the decision that HMS Endurance (the ice patrol vessel whose periodic deployment to the South Atlantic and Antarctica was intended to demonstrate Britain's commitment to protect the islands) was to be withdrawn from service in 1982. Lord Carrington protested that this was bound to be seen in the islands and in Argentina (as indeed it was) as a political act signaling a diminution of the British government's willingness to defend the islands. The prime minister, determined above all to cut costs, was unwilling to support her foreign secretary, and the public argument between the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the Ministry of Defense was still unresolved at the time of the Argentine invasion. The symbolic significance of the decision to withdraw HMS Endurance was one factor that encouraged the Galtieri junta's resort to force in April 1982; had it waited two years longer the more substantive cuts in the Royal Navy predicated in the defense review would have rendered Britain incapable of deploying the task force that retook the Islands. Meanwhile, in July 1981, the Argentine Foreign Ministry again demanded accelerated negotiations on sovereignty. The pressure was alleviated slightly by a meeting between Lord Carrington and the Argentine foreign minister, Oscar Camili6n, in New York in September; and in October Dr. Camili6n told the British ambassador in Buenos Aires that he recognized that meaningful negotiations would be long and difficult. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office was encouraged to hope that negotiations could be protracted. But following General Galtieri's accession to the presidency,

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Argentine pressure was intensified. In January 1982, the Argentine Foreign Ministry delivered a communication to the British Embassy calling for negotiations that would culminate "without procrastination" in the recognition of Argentine sovereignty over the Falkland Islands, South Georgia, and the South Sandwich Islands. It proposed the establishment of a permanent negotiating commission to achieve this result within one year. The British reply, delivered February 8, rejected the predetermined outcome posited by Argentina but reaffirmed Britain's willingness to seek an early and peaceful solution acceptable to the British and Argentine governments and the people of the Falkland Islands. 35 The Argentine proposal for a negotiating commission was discussed at talks in New York at the end of February. Agreement was reached on an informal working paper setting out the purpose and operation of the commission (including agreement that its work would be conducted without prejudice to either government's position on sovereignty) and on a brief but positive joint communiqué. But this relatively cozy outcome did not fit in with the junta's secret plans for direct military action. The joint communiqué was repudiated by the Argentine Foreign Ministry, which, on March 1, issued a unilateral statement giving a full account of the talks (despite agreement in New York that the details should remain confidential) and concluding that if there were not an early solution of the dispute Argentina would "choose freely the procedure which best accords with her interests." The British government was still considering its response to this lightly veiled ultimatum when on March 19 the unauthorized landing in South Georgia of a party of Argentines contracted to remove scrap from disused whaling stations provoked the crisis that provided the farcical prologue to the tragedy of the South Atlantic conflict.

ABORTIVE PEACE TALKS, APRIL-JUNE 1982

The attempts at mediation by the US secretary of state, Alexander Haig, by President Belaunde Terry of Peru, and by the UN secretary-general have been exhaustively documented and will not be described again here. Immediately following the Argentine invasion, Britain secured the adoption by the UN Security Council of Resolution 502. This demanded an immediate cessation of hostilities and withdrawal of all Argentine forces from the Falkland Islands and called on the governments of Argentina and the United Kingdom to "seek a diplomatic solution to their differences and to respect fully the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations." Strict compliance with this mandatory resolution by Argentina remained a fundamental British demand throughout the ensuing negotiations. The British government was prepared to discuss arrangements for international supervision of the Argentine withdrawal and for a degree of international involvement in

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the interim administration of the islands, subject to the islanders retaining their right to participate, through their elected representatives, in the running of their own affairs and their right to express their wishes about the islands' future. The British position was most fully developed in the government's "final proposals" for an interim agreement with Argentina presented to the UN secretary-general on May 17. 36 This provided for complete Argentine withdrawal from the islands and the withdrawal of British and Argentine armed forces to positions at least 150 nautical miles from the islands, these withdrawals to be completed within fourteen days and subject to international verification; exclusion zones around the islands and economic sanctions against Argentina would be lifted; a UN administrator would administer the government of the islands in conformity with their traditional laws and practices and in consultation with the islanders' representative institutions (the legislative and executives councils). Britain would also be prepared to enter into negotiations, under the auspices of the UN secretary general, for a peaceful settlement of the dispute by the end of the year, provided that no outcome should be either excluded or predetermined. The Argentine response of May 19 included a number of counterproposals that were wholly unacceptable to the British government. The Argentines demanded that British and Argentine forces should both return to their normal bases and areas of operation; that the interim administration of the Islands should be the exclusive responsibility of the United Nations, with no role for the islands' own democratic or judicial institutions but with advisers drawn equally from the tiny number of Argentine inhabitants and the much larger British population; that Argentine nationals should be free to take up residence, work, and own property in the islands on an equal basis with the existing inhabitants; that negotiations for a long-term settlement should be on the basis of UN General Assembly resolutions favoring Argentine sovereignty, and that if negotiations failed to come to an agreed conclusion within a given period, the dispute should in effect be settled by the General Assembly. The British government concluded that this represented further evidence of the junta's obduracy and procrastination aimed at maintaining their occupation of the islands, leading eventually to sovereignty. On May 21, British troops landed at Port San Carlos. It is idle to speculate what the outcome might have been if the junta had had the wisdom and capacity to accept the compromise that was offered. In the event, as on other occasions in the past, the issue was settled by force of arms. But it is worth noting that the allegation that the British government ordered the sinking of the Argentine cruiser General Belgrano on May 2 in order to torpedo the peace proposals being floated by President Belaunde has been shown to be without foundation: the General Belgrano was sunk for military reasons three hours before the first information about the still embryonic Peruvian proposals was telegraphed to London from Washington, where

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the British foreign secretary had been apprised of them by Secretary of State Haig. 37 The sinking of the British destroyer HMS Sheffield by an Exocet missile fired by an Argentine navy aircraft on May 4 did not prevent the British government from responding positively to the subsequent efforts at mediation by UN Secretary-General Perez de Cuellar. ANGLO-ARGENTINE RELATIONS SINCE THE WAR

In the British government's view, the outcome of the war marked the definitive reassertion of British sovereignty over the Falklands. Its immediate aims were to restore the islanders' morale; to rehabilitate and develop the islands' economy (Lord Shackleton was c o m m i s s i o n e d to produce a second report—this time the government acted on most of his recommendations); and to ensure that Britain's commitment to defending the islanders' physical security and their right to self-determination should not again be underestimated by Argentina. To this latter end the decision was taken to maintain a sizable garrison in the Falklands and to build a new all-weather airport capable of accommodating long-haul jet aircraft in order to provide a permanent capability for rapid military reinforcement in an emergency. The Mount Pleasant complex came into operation in May 1985, thereby making possible a progressive reduction of the permanent garrison and of the costs to the defense budget. In parallel with this reaffirmation of its commitment to the islands, the government sought to reduce tension and restore more normal relations with Argentina. In July 1982, Britain formally declared an end to hostilities, and the 200-mile total exclusion zone established around the Islands during the war was replaced by a Falkland Islands Protection Zone (FIPZ) of 150 miles radius, from which Argentine warships and military aircraft were excluded (Argentine civil aircraft and shipping would be allowed to enter the zone with prior British agreement—in practice this was never sought). Both the lameduck military government in its remaining months in power and the Alfonsin administration throughout its period of office refused to reciprocate Britain's formal cessation of hostilities. Notwithstanding President Alfonsin's repeated assertions that Argentina would pursue its claim to the Falklands exclusively by peaceful means, Argentina's unwillingness formally to declare hostilities at an end, coupled with its demands for the removal of the FIPZ and the ending of British "militarization" of the Falklands and accusations that Britain's defensive dispositions in and around the Islands constituted a threat to regional stability, remained a persistent element of discord in the political deadlock that characterized Anglo-Argentine relations from 1982 to 1989. In September 1982, agreement was reached on the reciprocal lifting of the financial restrictions imposed by each country against the other during the war; again, while Britain quickly implemented the agreement in full,

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Argentina did so only partially, and some discriminatory restrictions on the activities of British companies in Argentina remained in force throughout the Alfonsin presidency. Alfonsin's election in October 1983 had raised hopes in London that the restoration of democracy in Argentina might open the way to normalization of bilateral relations—but not to discussion of the future of the Falklands. The tone was set by Mrs. Thatcher in numerous statements in Parliament and to the press. For example, in a newspaper interview published on November 7, she said, "I am willing to enter into talks. We want good commercial relations, diplomatic relations, we want normal relations. But I am not entering into talks about sovereignty." 38 The signals from Buenos Aires were equally uncompromising. On November 13, Dante Caputo, the prospective Argentine foreign minister, w a s quoted as saying: "Argentine sovereignty over the Malvinas is not negotiable. That is the starting point of any negotiation." 3 ' N o t w i t h s t a n d i n g t h e s e u n p r o m i s i n g o v e r t u r e s , M r s . T h a t c h e r and President Alfonsin exchanged guardedly friendly messages on the occasion of the latter's inauguration in December; and in January 1984, confidential exchanges were initiated by the British government through the Swiss government (Britain's protecting power in Argentina since 1982), with the aim of setting an agenda of practical measures of mutual benefit that might be explored by British and Argentine officials as a means of working toward the restoration of bilateral relations. From the outset, the British government made clear that it would not discuss sovereignty over the Falklands; and it gave short shrift to a proposal aired by President Alfonsin in February that negotiations on sovereignty should be resumed under United Nations auspices (and that U N observers should be stationed in the Falklands to monitor the Anglo-Argentine "ceasefire"). The Argentine government, which w a s simultaneously engaged in delicate negotiations with Chile over the Beagle Channel and consequently susceptible to Peronist pressures on two issues that touched raw nationalist nerves, did not feel able to risk entering into discussions with Britain from which sovereignty was wholly excluded. Eventually a basis for talks was agreed upon, which specified that the Argentine representatives would be free to raise the question of sovereignty, but that if they did so the British side would state in reply that they were not prepared to discuss it; the talks w o u l d then m o v e on to other p r a c t i c a l m a t t e r s of m u t u a l concern. 40 This, at any rate, was the British government's understanding. In the event, the talks, which took place in Berne on July 18-19, 1984, foundered almost at once on the sovereignty issue and, instead of improving relations, provoked mutual recriminations and accusations of bad faith. As part of the preparatory negotiations, texts in English and Spanish of the statement that Her Majesty's Government was not prepared to discuss sovereignty had been conveyed to the Swiss for onward transmission to the Argentine government in advance of the talks. Yet, when they heard it in Berne, the

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Argentine representatives appeared to be genuinely taken aback and subsequently claimed that they had been led to expect a more flexible British position. There is circumstantial evidence (submitted by a well-informed Argentine witness to the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee) 41 to suggest that the British text reached Buenos Aires, not in English or Spanish, but in a French version that allowed an ambiguous interpretation. Whatever the truth of the matter, the Argentine response to the British statement was that they, in turn, were not prepared to discuss normalization of bilateral relations unless and until Britain agreed that a "mechanism" be established for the eventual discussion of sovereignty. They were brought, with difficulty, to listen to British proposals for the restoration of trading relations and of British air and sea communications with Argentina (British ports and airports were already open to Argentine ships and aircraft), the upgrading of official relations, visits to the Falklands by the next-of-kin of Argentine war dead buried there, and so on. But they refused to respond. One conclusion drawn by the British government from the Berne meeting was that it would enter into fresh talks with Argentina only on the basis of watertight ground rules clearly established in advance. More importantly, the Berne talks formalized the stalemate, which frustrated any significant improvement in Anglo-Argentine relations for the next five years. Britain was willing to talk to Argentina about all aspects of normalization of bilateral relations but not about the future status of the Falkland Islands; but without a prior commitment by Britain sooner or later to discuss sovereignty, Argentina refused to talk about normalizing relations or to respond to the initiatives that Britain took unilaterally to this end. The British government was widely criticized for its absolute refusal to discuss sovereignty; and the apparent reasonableness of the Argentine call for negotiations on the Falklands issue brought strong and increasing support for the resolutions it introduced each year at the UN General Assembly. But behind this show of moderation, the Alfonsin government's position on the substance of the matter was every bit as intransigent as that of any of its predecessors. The negotiations envisaged by Argentina could have only one outcome—the transfer of sovereignty over the Falklands, South Georgia, and the South Sandwich Islands from Britain to Argentina. This was made explicit by President Alfonsin on many occasions, including his speech to the UN General Assembly on September 24, 1984; and in answer to a question at a press conference the same day, he called for the islands to be "returned to us in five years, three years . . . during the lifespan of our generation." 4 ^ Language of this sort served only to strengthen the British Government's resolve that sovereignty was not negotiable. The war had reinforced both its commitments to uphold the islanders' right of self-determination and the islanders' abhorrence of any hint of Argentine involvement in their affairs. In response to Argentine arguments that Anglo-Argentine negotiations should

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return to the status quo ante April 1982, Britain replied that it was futile for Argentina to behave as if the war had never happened: the illegal resort to force by the junta had created a new situation, and Argentina must live with the consequences. When it was suggested that Britain should offer concessions over the Falklands in order to shore up the fragile edifice of Argentine democracy, the British replied that they did not understand how democracy in Argentina would be strengthened by the denial of democratic rights to the Falkland islanders. When Britain suggested that the sensible course was to promote an improved climate of bilateral relations through confidence-building measures and practical steps of benefit to both countries—and took such steps on its own account, as when in July 1985 it unilaterally lifted the ban on imports from Argentina imposed during the war—the Argentine response was that relations could be improved only if Britain agreed to negotiations on sovereignty. The deadlock was complete. THE FALKLAND ISLANDS FISHERIES Throughout this period, one matter that in the British thought could serve as a vehicle for regional cooperation between Britain and Argentina, but that Argentina chose to treat as a further cause of friction, was the control of international fishing in the Southwest Atlantic. The possibility of collaboration in exploitation and conservation of maritime resources in the area had been raised periodically in Anglo-Argentine discussions since the mid-1970s, but nothing had come of it. After 1982, the conservation issue assumed a new urgency when the international distant water fishing industry was attracted to the waters around the Falklands (now no longer patrolled by Argentina, at any rate within the FIPZ) as the last major unregulated fishing grounds in the world. Between 1984 and 1986, the number of vessels active in the area (mainly from the Far East, the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and Spain) increased from around 250 to over 600. In particular, the discovery of a valuable squid stock led to a dramatic rise in the fishing effort of fleets from Japan, Taiwan, and Korea. Prior to 1982, scientific knowledge of the Falkland Islands fishery had been scanty; studies commissioned by the British government in 1983 and 1985 indicated that if the level of fishing continued to grow without control, the stocks could soon come under threat. Concern was also voiced in the Committee on Fisheries of the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO). In addition to fears about the overexploitation of the fishery, the government was faced with growing pressure from the Falkland islanders and their parliamentary supporters in London unilaterally to declare a 200-mile fishing zone around the Falklands. This had been recommended by Lord Shackleton in his 1982 report, mainly as a means of providing a new source of revenue for the islands. However, the government was reluctant to take this step—and

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w a s s u p p o r t e d in this by the H o u s e of C o m m o n s F o r e i g n A f f a i r s Committee 4 3 —for a number of reasons. A regulatory regime confined in practice to the FIPZ would have limited effect as a conservation measure, since the areas in which finfish and squid stocks were to be found at different times of the year were much more extensive. Moreover, a regime imposed unilaterally would be likely to provoke renewed tensions with Argentina over sovereignty and, if it were challenged by the fishing nations, could give rise to awkward problems of enforcement. Early in 1985, the British government sought to enlist the support of the FAO in promoting a multilateral fisheries management regime in the South Atlantic. It was hoped that such an arrangement under UN auspices would overcome the disadvantages of a unilaterally imposed regime and also provide a neutral forum for collaboration between Britain and the coastal states involved, including Argentina. As a first step the FAO, in November 1985, launched a technical study of the fishery, to which Britain and Argentina and some of the fishing nations contributed data. But progress was slow and the level of fishing continued to grow. Britain succeeded in negotiating voluntary restraint agreements with some of the fishing nations for the 1986 season, but the response to its efforts to extend this self-denying ordinance to the 1987 season was at best patchy. Meanwhile, it became evident that Argentina's commitment to the unilateral FAO approach was less than wholehearted and that it was attempting to bypass it by negotiating a network of bilateral agreements with the fishing nations. Argentina also stepped up its own patrolling activities in 1986, culminating in the sinking of a Taiwanese ship, with loss of life, in disputed waters more than 200 nautical miles from the Argentine coast and within 200 nautical miles of the Falklands. In July, Argentina signed bilateral fisheries agreements with the Soviet Union and Bulgaria that granted them access to the Argentine Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) as defined in Argentine legislation, i.e., purporting to include waters around the Falklands, South Georgia, and the South Sandwich Islands. Britain immediately protested to all three governments, and subsequently the Soviet Union voluntarily gave up fishing in the waters controlled by Britain. Faced with this evidence that Argentina appeared to be giving higher priority to exploiting the fisheries issue as a means of pursuing its sovereignty claim than to solving the conservation problem, 44 and with the urgent need to limit the overfishing forecast for the 1987 season, the British government concluded that it could no longer afford to await the outcome of the slowmoving FAO study and the dubious prospect of agreement on a multilateral scheme. On October 29,1986, it announced the establishment of the Falkland Islands Interim Conservation and Management Zone (FICZ) with a radius of 150 miles around the Falklands coinciding with the FIPZ (apart from a small segment in the southwest to accommodate a putative median line with Argentina). At the same time, the government declared the Falkland Islands'

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entitlement under international law to a fisheries limit of 200 miles, subject to delimitation with Argentina, and confirmed Britain's right to jurisdiction over the continental shelf around the Falklands up to the limits prescribed by international law. The new management regime introduced with the FICZ was accepted by the international fishing industry with reasonably good grace. Under it, the Falkland Islands government determines the allowable level of fishing effort for the principal species in each season in light of scientific advice and allocates licenses on that basis. Conservation remains the major consideration in the management of the FICZ 45 (for example, in 1990 the season during which illex squid—the fishery's most valuable resource—could be caught was shortened) 46 and vessels are being encouraged to observe voluntary restraint with respect to endangered species when operating outside the zone. As expected, licensing fees and other activities with the fishery have provided a major new source of revenue for the Falkland Islands. At the time of the announcement of the FICZ, the foreign secretary, Sir Geoffrey Howe, sent messages explaining the reasons for the British government's decision to the UN secretary-general and to the governments of the countries directly affected, including Argentina. In his message to Foreign Minister Caputo he suggested that Britain and Argentina should review how they might cooperate to support conservation on a regional basis. Predictably, the Argentines were outraged by this formal extension of British sovereignty and responded by launching a diplomatic offensive against the British action. A meeting of the foreign ministers of Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay on November 2 called for bilateral negotiations between Britain and Argentina, and this was followed by an extraordinary meeting of the OAS called by Argentina. A declaration issued to the press on November 17 and communicated to the British government repeated the Argentine demand for negotiations on sovereignty. But failing to achieve results with rhetoric, the Argentine government then resorted to quieter diplomacy and in January 1987 made an indirect approach to Britain through the United States government suggesting confidential discussion of fisheries topics. There followed a slow exchange of "nonpapers" through the State Department with the aim of establishing a basis for talks. But the British government, mindful of what had happened in Berne in 1984, was reluctant to enter into new talks until it was fully satisfied that both sides were unambiguously agreed on cut-anddried conditions; and early in 1989 it decided to await the Argentine presidential elections before resuming the dialogue.

THE RESTORATION OF ANGLO-ARGENTINE RELATIONS Contrary to the fears and expectations aroused by his electoral campaign rhetoric, President Menem announced shortly after his inauguration in July 1989 that he wished to see an improvement in relations with Britain and

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proposed direct bilateral talks, with the question of sovereignty set to one side. A meeting between British and Argentine representatives in New York in August quickly produced agreement in principle on a "sovereignty umbrella" formula to protect each side's position "with regard to sovereignty or territorial and maritime jurisdiction over the Falkland Islands, South Georgia, and the South Sandwich Islands and the surrounding maritime areas," 47 on measures to improve diplomatic contacts and communications, and on an agenda for further talks. At their next meeting in Madrid in October, the two sides formally agreed on the "sovereignty umbrella" formula. The two governments confirmed their commitment fully to respect the principles of the UN Charter, including their obligations to settle disputes exclusively by peaceful means and to refrain from the threat or use of force. They also noted that all hostilities between them had ceased (thus removing the main obstacle, in the British view, to the restoration of diplomatic relations). It was agreed that working groups on fisheries and on confidence-building measures in the South Atlantic would be established. At the same time, the British delegation announced the extension of the territorial seas of the Falkland Islands and South Georgia from 3 to 12 nautical miles. Official relations were reestablished at the consular level. Argentina agreed to remove all its remaining economic measures that discriminated against Britain, thereby opening the way to negotiation of a cooperation agreement with the European Community, which Britain agreed to facilitate. Air services between Britain and Argentina would be resumed and Argentine ports would be reopened to British shipping. A further meeting took place in Madrid in February 1990, when the two governments agreed to restore full diplomatic relations: British and Argentine ambassadors are once again resident in the two capitals after a gap of eight years. The Madrid meeting also approved the reports of the working groups set up the previous October. On fishing, the two sides agreed to exchange information and analyses relevant to fisheries management and to explore the scope for cooperation on conservation. A range of confidence-building measures was agreed, covering mutual notification of military exercises in the South Atlantic and of movements of military aircraft and naval vessels approaching the coasts of Argentina or the Falkland Islands, rules of behavior for naval and air units operating in proximity, maritime and air safety, and establishment of a direct military communications link between the Falklands and Argentina. These measures came into effect on March 31, 1990, on which date the Falkland Islands Protection Zone (but not the fisheries zone) was lifted. As part of the Madrid agreements, a permanent working group on South Atlantic issues was set up to provide a forum for further consideration of fisheries and confidencebuilding measures. Relations between Britain and Argentina can once again fairly be described as normal—in every sense, since the way is now open to the resumption of a full range of bilateral activities; but the fundamental question

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of sovereignty over the Falklands is still pending. CONCLUSION For more than 130 years, successive British governments maintained that British sovereignty over the Falkland Islands and Dependencies was not negotiable. When this long-standing principle was breached by the Labour government in 1967, the hostile reaction in the islands and in Parliament caused the Falklands to become, as it has remained, a sensitive issue in British domestic politics no less than in relations with Argentina. Any British government was bound to be reluctant to pursue a policy on an issue it regarded as being of relatively low priority if by doing so it risked gratuitously stirring up trouble for itself among its own supporters as well as the opposition parties. The reactions from all sides of Parliament to the possibility of concessions to Argentina in 1968, at the outset of the period of negotiations on sovereignty, and in 1980, nearly at its end, were only the most dramatic demonstrations that the political price of compromise would be higher than governments of both main parties were willing to pay—even assuming that Argentina, too, would be willing to compromise. Whatever objective judgments may be made about the balance of advantage to the Falkland Islands of closer association with Argentina, the islanders themselves made very clear from the start their wish to remain subjects of the British Crown. For reasons both of democratic principle and political expediency, successive British governments since 1968 have clung to the article of faith that any arrangement with Argentina must be acceptable to the inhabitants of the islands, thereby ensuring that so long as Argentina held to its inflexible aspiration to sovereignty over the Falklands, no accommodation was attainable. At the same time, Britain was unwilling to divert from other higher priority defense commitments the resources required to provide an effective deterrent to military action by Argentina, relying instead on the hope that no rational Argentine government would resort to force so long as the two sides were still talking to each other. For Britain, the negotiating process up to 1982 became an increasingly difficult and ultimately unsuccessful exercise in seeking to keep Argentina sufficiently interested in peripheral issues of regional cooperation to refrain from forcing the issue on sovereignty. The most significant consequence of the war was the political transformation it brought about in Argentina. It did nothing to promote a settlement of Argentina's claim to the Falklands; on the contrary, short of Argentina abandoning its claim, it set back the possibility of settlement for the foreseeable future. For Mrs. Thatcher and the British government, the defeat of the illegal A r g e n t i n e resort to f o r c e s t r e n g t h e n e d B r i t a i n ' s position on sovereignty and its commitment to uphold the interests and wishes of the islanders: once more, sovereignty was not negotiable. This commitment is

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now backed up by a significant, albeit diminishing, military presence in and around the islands, together with the permanent infrastructure required to maintain a rapid reinforcement capability, and a long-term economic development program. For the inhabitants of the Falkland Islands, the immediate result of the war was to reinforce their total dependence on Britain. The air service between the United Kingdom and the Falklands introduced since 1982 has increased contacts between the islanders and Britain (the Mount Pleasant military airport also has a significant commercial potential), but for several years after the war the islanders remained wholly isolated from the South American mainland. Vestigial commercial links have now been reestablished with Chile and Uruguay. But there is no contact with Argentina. The Argentine occupation stifled any incipient willingness there may have been in the islands to consider accommodation with Argentina: it is hard to exaggerate the islanders' distrust and hostility towards their nearest neighbor. In the 1960s and 1970s, an enhanced Argentine presence in the islands could plausibly be presented as offering a way of dispersing the air of social stagnation and economic decline that overhung them. In the new situation brought about by the war and its aftermath, with social changes (e.g., in land tenure) and economic diversification and development promoted by Britain and locally generated economic activity boosted by revenues from the fishing zone, the islanders' attitude is that they don't want to have anything to do with Argentina and they don't need to either. Since the restoration of democracy in Argentina, the British government has sought the normalization of Anglo-Argentine relations—but not at the expense of its pledge to uphold the Falkland islanders' right democratically to decide their own future. President Alfonsin's ill-judged persistence in his efforts to set British acquiescence in renewed sovereignty discussions as the price for improved bilateral relations gained him some easy victories—and caused Britain some fleeting embarrassment—at the United Nations, but nothing more. Indeed, overall it probably harmed Argentina's wider interests, for example, in relation to the European Community and maritime conservation in the South Atlantic. (The domestic political considerations driving Alfonsin's approach are outside the scope of this chapter.) By his pragmatic decision to accept the restoration of bilateral relations essentially on the terms that had been on offer since 1984, President Menem reversed this sterile policy and opened the way to defusing potential sources of tension in the South Atlantic. The new permanent working group on South Atlantic issues could promote a habit of cooperation between Britain and Argentina on matters that hitherto have been a cause of friction and could provide a vehicle for wider bilateral collaboration. But it will not solve the underlying problem. Argentina understands, and for the time being is prepared to accept, that sovereignty is not for discussion. It is possible to envisage circumstances in

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w h i c h a f u t u r e British g o v e r n m e n t m i g h t be p r e p a r e d to e x p l o r e w i t h Argentina alternatives to the present stalemate. There is no lack of models that could be considered. 4 8 But it is hard to foresee circumstances in which the British Parliament would approve a settlement that was opposed by a majority of the inhabitants of the Falklands. Unless and until there are fundamental changes in the attitudes of all three protagonists—Britain, Argentina and the Falkland islanders—the argument between territorial integrity and self-determination is likely to remain unresolved.

NOTES 1. House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, Session 1982-83; Minutes of Evidence, 10 November 1982; HC 31—i. 2. Claims to the Falkland Islands, Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) Background Brief, 1986. 3. Ibid. 4. Fifth Report from the Foreign Affairs Committee, Session 1983-84, HC 268-1, October 1984. 5. Fifth Report from the Foreign Affairs Committee, Session 1983-84: Observations by Her Majesty's Government, Cmnd. 9447, February 1985. 6. Peter Beck, The Falkland Islands as an International Problem (London: Routledge, 1988). 7. Julius Goebel, The Struggle for the Falkland Islands, 1982 ed. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1927). 8. HC 268-1. 9. Quoted in Beck, op. cit. 10. Hansard (Commons), 3 April 1982; 6th Series, vol. 21, col. 634. 11. Cmnd. 9447. 12. Britain and the Falklands Crisis: A Documentary Record (London: HMSO, 1982). 13. Hansard (Commons), 26 March 1968; 5th Series, vol. 761, cols 1446-1467. 14. House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, Session 1983-84; Minutes of Evidence, 20 June 1984; HC 268-11. 15. Economic Survey of the Falkland Islands (The Shackleton Report) (London: Economist Intelligence Unit, 1976). 16. James Callaghan quoted in Michael Charlton, The Little Platoon (Oxford: Blackwell, 1989). 17. House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, Session 1982-83, Minutes of Evidence, 10 November 1982; HC 31. 18. Beck, The Falkland Islands. 19. Robin Edmonds quoted in Charlton, op. cit. 20. Falkland Islands Review: Report of a Committee of Privy Councillors (The Franks report), Cmnd. 8787, January 1983. 21. Ibid. 22. Lord Chalfont quoted in Charlton, op. cit. 23. Richard Crossman, The Diaries of a Cabinet Minister, vol. 3 (London: Cape, 1977). 24. Hansard (Commons), 11 December 1988; 5th Series; vol. 775, cols. 424-434. 25. Charlton, op. cit.

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26. Cmnd. 8787. 27. Quoted in Charlton, op. cit. 28. Cmnd. 8787. 29. Ibid. 30. Ibid. 31. Ibid. 32. Hansard (Commons), 2 December 1980; 5th Series; vol. 995, cols. 128-134. 33. Cmnd. 8787. 34. Ibid. 35. Ibid. 36. House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, Minutes of Evidence, 20 June 1984 (Memorandum by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office), HC 268-11. 37. Third Report from the Foreign Affairs Committee, Session 1984-85, Events Surrounding the Weekend of 1st and 2nd May 1982, HC 11 July 1985; Lawrence Freedman and Virginia Gamba-Stonehouse, Signals of War (London: Faber & Faber, 1990). 38. HC 268-11, Memorandum by the FCO. 39. Ibid. 40. Statement by Sir Geoffrey Howe, Hansard (Commons) 20 July 1984; 6th Series, vol. 64, cols. 639-645. 41. HC 268-11, app. 13 (Memorandum by G. Makin). 42. Ibid., app. 6. 43. HC 268-1. 44. Fishing Around the Falklands, FCO Background Brief, November 1986. 45. FICZ Fisheries Report 1987/88, Falkland Islands Government, Port Stanley 1989. 46. Falkland Island Government News, May-June 1990, Port Stanley. 47. Britain and Argentina: Restoring Relations, FCO Background Brief, March 1990. 48. See, for example, Beck, op. cit. chap 6; and the following South Atlantic Council Occasional Papers, London: No. 1, Bruce George and Walter Little, Options in the Falklands-Malvinas Dispute (April 1985); No., 3, Donald Bullock and Christopher Mitchell, The Aland Islands Solution (March 1987); and No. 5, Martin Dent, Shared Sovereignty: A Solution for the Falklands/Malvinas Dispute (March 1989).

chapter three

The View from Buenos Aires Ruben M. Perina The Argentine claim to sovereignty over the Malvinas, South Georgia, and the South Sandwich Islands is based on a series of principles of international law that regulate the ways in which rights of sovereignty over territories are acquired. It is also based on related historic events that give legitimacy and validity to the claim. As will be seen, both history and international law support Argentina's claim to the Malvinas Islands as an "acquired territory." They also bear out the Argentine claim of having a greater right or entitlement to sovereignty over the islands than Great Britain. Moreover, the treatment of the issue in the United Nations confirms this position, lending further legal and political credence to the Argentine claim. This chapter attempts to synthesize some of the principal works on the subject and some of the most important arguments that have been advanced over the years supporting the Argentine position. WAYS OF ACQUIRING TERRITORIES

The study of conflicts over sovereignty can be reduced to a careful analysis of the acceptable or valid methods of obtaining territory. In the strictest sense, the validity of a claim to sovereignty over a given territory depends on how it was acquired. In this chapter, I will first identify the methods by which Spain originally acquired these territories and thus the titles to them that Spain held at the moment of Argentine independence. Then I will show the way in which Argentina acquired those territories and its rights over them, both as a derivative of, and independently from, Spain. Among the valid methods of acquiring territory, the following will be considered here: discovery, occupation, and the succession of states. Discovery was one of the principal methods of acquiring territory during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. It was considered as a valid basis for 45

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territorial acquisition if the discovery came as the result of an expedition organized with the explicit intent to explore and discover territories in the name of a sovereign state. 1 Nonetheless, after this initial period, increasing competition among European nations for new discoveries and dominion over territories dictated that more precise conditions be established as the bases for territorial claims. As a result, by the seventeenth century, the idea of occupation as a determining factor for the acquisition of territories, res nullius, began to prevail. Under this stipulation, territories that had already been discovered and placed under the jurisdiction of a nation could not be discovered or occupied subsequently. From this time on, international law required that a territory be occupied by the discovering nation to qualify as a valid acquisition. 2 Occupation as a means of acquisition thus began to carry greater weight than mere discovery. The act of discovery confers only an initial or inchoate title to the acquiring nation—that is, a title that must be completed and confirmed through the occupation of the territory in question. Such an occupation must be an "effective" occupation as opposed to a "fictitious" or symbolic one. It must be carried out by an independent state and not a private person. It also implies the establishment of a legitimate state authority over the territory, performing the true functions of a state. Finally, there must be no manifest opposition by other nations to the possession of the occupied territory.3 These legal principles were eventually codified in the Berlin Agreements of 1885, through which the European powers established the territorial limits of the colonial territory in Africa. In these documents, it was agreed that the acquiring nation must establish its authority in the territory occupied, and that it must notify other member nations of the taking of the territory so that any objections or counterclaims could be addressed. Succession, as a means of acquiring territory, refers essentially to the passing on of a title from one nation, generally the colonizing nation, to another as a result of the latter's becoming independent and/or a separate state. As a consequence of colonial emancipation in Latin America, the territories belonging to Spain were passed on to the newly independent nations that were, in effect, heirs to the mother country's possessions. The concept and the process are related to the principle of uti possidetis. This principle of international law was applied frequently in the nineteenth century by the n e w l y independent nations of Latin A m e r i c a . Accordingly, the administrative frontiers established by Spain around 1810 became the political frontiers between the emerging nations. By applying this principle, the new Latin American nations sought, according to Vinuesa, "to ensure that the succession of nations emerging out of the post-colonial period take place throughout the territories governed by Spain, as well as to minimize future border conflicts." Its application implied "the recognition of the demarcation of internal colonial jurisdictions, independent of the effective

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occupation or possession of the territories assigned to each colonial administrative district . . . "; it clarified "the territorial reaches of the colonial districts"; and made it clear that "if the mother country was indeed sovereign over the territory before third parties, after the date of succession, the nation that inherited the territory had the right to that sovereignty."4 THE MALVINAS QUESTION: THE HISTORIC FACTS

Historic events give substance and validity to claims to a territory and permit the parties to appeal to the principles of international law to obtain recognition of their rights. In the case of the dispute over the sovereignty of the Malvinas Islands, the historic events related to the discovery and the occupation of the Malvinas Islands by Spain, and to the postcolonial succession of this land to Argentina, are the elements that confer greater validity to Argentina's claims over the islands than to those of Great Britain. Discovery According to the Spanish maps published in 1522, the archipelago of the Malvinas was discovered by the Spanish. 5 The first map that testifies to the discovery was published by Pedro Reinel in that year, followed by other maps by Diego Ribero (cartographer of Carlos V), which are exhibited in the Weimer public library and in the Vatican library. Afterward, the map "Description of the Islands" of Alonso de Santa Cruz in 1541 (cosmographer of Carlos V), the "planisphere" of Gaboto in 1544, and the maps of Diego Gutierrez in 1561 and of Bartolome Olives in 1562 were also published. On most of these maps, the archipelago is called "Sanson Islands"—a name that is thought to be related to San Anton, the name of one of the ships involved in the expedition of Fernando Magellan. It appears that the captain of that ship, Esteban Gomez, returned to Spain when he discovered the islands in 1520. By contrast, there is no evidence that the English discovered the archipelago before the Spanish. The first voyages to this area documented by Great Britain were carried out by the English "corsair" privateer Francis Drake between 1580 and 1587, followed by Thomas Cavendish (1586), John Davis (1592), and Richard Hawkins (1594).« As far as the issue of discovery is concerned, Spain clearly had more rights over the Malvinas than England. The title to them was later completed and validated through their effective occupation by the Spanish. Occupation As far as the issue of occupation is concerned, in 1580, Pedro Sarmiento of Gamboa was sent from Peru to the region to intercept and expel Francis Drake. Gamboa, acting as an appointee of Philip II, took symbolic possession

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of Cape Vírgenes at the mouth of the Magellan Straits. In keeping with the normal practices of the period, his conquest secured the exclusive sovereignty of Spain over the land itself, the adjacent islands, and sea areas. He also affirmed Spain's exclusive sovereignty over the region and its determination to maintain its dominion over the same. 7 In terms of "effective occupation," the United Kingdom was not the first country to effectively occupy the region. The Frenchman Luis Antonio de Bougainville, who left Saint-Malo with a group of French immigrants from Canada, landed on the Malvinas on February 2, 1764, and founded a settlement on the eastern island that he called "Port Louis." King Carlos III of Spain, acting in response to what he considered a violation of his sovereignty and dominion over these territories, protested to the King of France, Louis XV. The issue was settled through diplomatic channels. The French monarch r e c o g n i z e d S p a n i s h s o v e r e i g n t y over the i s l a n d s and ordered that Bougainville leave the Port Louis settlement, as he solemnly did on April 2, 1767. The king of Spain, however, reimbursed the French for the expenses incurred in establishing the settlement in the Malvinas. After the French withdrew, the Spanish authorities with their dependents settled and remained in Port Louis. The town was later renamed Puerto de la Anunciación and, finally, Puerto Soledad. This return of the territory to Spain by the French constituted an irrefutable recognition of Spain's sovereignty over the islands. After the French occupation, Great Britain sent Commodore John Byron on a secret mission (it was necessary to keep the mission secret to avoid French and Spanish opposition) to explore and inspect the southern seas—although these regions, in reality, had already been discovered by Spain and France and occupied by France—a fact that the English knew perfectly well. In carrying out his orders, Byron "founded" Port Egmont on Saunder Island, at the north of Western Malvinas Island, on January 23, 1765. But he did not establish a settlement there and did not meet up with the French settlement in Port Louis. Nonetheless, he sent back to Great Britain the news of his "discovery." 8 At the end of 1765, the British Crown sent out an expedition under the command of Captain John McBride, with the public and explicit objective of occupying those islands that had supposedly been "discovered" by Byron. McBride arrived at the Malvinas in January 1766 and established a settlement in Port Egmont. In essence, this action by the British violated a series of treaties and rules that regulated the existing balance of power in Europe as well as the competition between European nations resulting from commercial and colonial expansion in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. Among these treaties were the papal bull Inter-Coetera of 1493, the Tordesillas Treaty (1494), and the

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Ea-Qua papal bull (1506), which conceded to Spain and Portugal exclusive rights of discovery, commerce, and colonization in the Americas. 9 There were several additional bilateral treaties between the Spanish and British crowns that clearly laid out the rights and obligations of both nations in the Americas, restricting most particularly British activities in the lands and seas of the South—areas that were recognized by the European community to be colonial Spanish possessions. The Treaty of Madrid of May 23, 1667, indicates that "neither monarch will attempt, carry out, or achieve, under any pretext, publicly or privately, in any place, on sea or on land, in the ports or on the rivers, anything that could be harmful or detrimental to the other party." Similarly, the agreement signed in Madrid on July 10,1670, prohibited the English from trading with or sending ships to those places in the Indies that were Spanish possessions, but confirmed that Great Britain nevertheless had sovereign rights in those lands in America that were already under its control. The Pact of Madrid of March 23, 1713, established in its Article 14 that Great Britain was obliged to stop "any ship of the English nation that dares to sail the South Sea"; and in the eighth article of the Treaty of Utrecht of July 1713, Spain promised not to transfer to France or any other nation "territories or possessions situated in the West Indies, and England agreed to help Spain keep these islands as a single entity." 10 In view of these factors, Spain was not about to tolerate the violation of its sovereignty over these territories and responded immediately and energetically to the establishment of the Port Egmont settlement. The government of Madrid ordered the governor of Buenos Aires, Captain Francisco de Paula Bucareli, to organize a naval force to confront the British in Port Egmont and demand that they leave the island. When the British refused the request, the Spanish naval force issued an ultimatum demanding their withdrawal within six months. On June 10, 1770, after the British continued to refuse such requests and after the arrival of reinforcements, the Spanish forces disembarked on the island and forced the British to capitulate and leave. When faced with the possibility that the incident could provoke a war with Great Britain, Spain began diplomatic negotiations, with the mediation of France, in order to arrive at a peaceful solution to the conflict. The negotiations concluded with an agreement that restored Port Egmont to the British in 1771. Spain, nonetheless, made it clear that such a restitution "should not be interpreted to the detriment of Spain's right of sovereignty over the Malvinas." This action simply made restitution for the damages against the British Crown that had resulted from the forceful and hasty removal of the resident British subjects from Port Egmont. On the other hand, some scholars have argued, although without conclusive proof, that the agreement also included a secret understanding stating that the English

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had promised to leave the islands once they had received the requisite reparation. In this way both nations would retain their honor. 1 1 In accordance with this bilateral agreement, a small group of British subjects returned to Port Egmont in 1771, occupying the port and the garrison for the next three years. In May 1774, the British departed the island, leaving a British flag and a lead plaque stating that the retreat was carried out for economic reasons and that it did not represent an abdication of Great Britain's sovereign rights over the island. Nonetheless, the Spanish Crown (and the Argentine government) always interpreted this abandonment of Port Egmont as an implicit recognition of Spanish sovereignty over the islands. In fact, the British never even questioned the conditions relating to sovereignty contained in the Spanish declaration of 1771, nor did they demand a simultaneous departure of the Spanish from the island. The plaque was simply an attempt to salvage British honor. Moreover, the British government made no protest when both the plaque and flag were removed by Spanish authorities. 12 S u b s e q u e n t l y , S p a i n and G r e a t B r i t a i n s i g n e d the N o o t k a S o u n d Convention in 1790, by which each agreed not to interfere in the jurisdictions of the other's colonial possessions on the coasts and islands adjacent to the South American continent. On this occasion, the British did not object to or protest the Spanish occupation of the Malvinas, thus implicitly recognizing Spanish sovereignty over them. On the other hand, as Vinuesa has indicated, the treaty "precludes any recovery or potential British right to reclaim the Islands on the basis of a discovery, which has not been proven historically . . . or of a later occupation, which was not the first and did not prosper at that time." 1 3 Thus, after 1774, the Spanish Crown had taken possession of and effectively, e x c l u s i v e l y , u n i n t e r r u p t e d l y , and w i t h o u t d i s p u t e o c c u p i e d the Malvinas up until its own withdrawal from the region in 1811. At this time, after having occupied and administered the region for forty-four years, the Spanish authorities withdrew their naval forces from the islands in order to redeploy them against the forces fighting for independence from Spain. Up until Latin American independence, Spain clearly had better claims and rights to sovereignty over the archipelago than Great Britain. Spain's strongest claims lay in the cartography of the sixteenth century that, reflecting reports of "discoveries" made by certain sailors at the time, showed the archipelago as part of the Spanish possessions in the southern seas. Later, the claims made on the basis of discovery were completed and validated through the requisite process of occupation, conquest, and administration of the islands by the Spanish Crown—and then by its effective occupation of the islands after 1767 when the French departed, recognizing Spanish rights to sovereignty. A f t e r 1767, S p a i n ' s undisputed occupation of the islands lasted forty-four years, until 1811. 14

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Furthermore, the papal grants and treaties of the eighteenth century that Spain signed with the European powers, and with Great Britain in particular, legally ratified Spanish sovereignty and Spain's exclusive rights over the lands and the seas in the southern region of the Western Hemisphere. These treaties were based on the principles of international law governing discovery and occupation, which later served as a guide for international behavior of nations, for the evaluation of this behavior, and for the determination of the validity of titles and claims. 15 In sum, the strongest Spanish claims are based on: (1) the treaties and papal bulls that established the rights of Spain over the lands and seas of South America; (2) the historic events that confirmed Spain's legitimate claims of discovery and of effective occupation; and (3) the principles of international law that support or endorse those titles. Succession of States The Argentine position concerning its own rights of sovereignty over the islands is based on the law of succession of nations. On becoming independent from Spain in 1816, the country became the natural heir to the titles and rights that Spain had enjoyed until then over its territories in the South Atlantic. This became the mode of acquisition by which Argentina attained its titles of sovereignty over the islands. The legitimacy of these titles is reinforced by the principle of uti possidetis, which postulates that the possessions of the mother nation accrue to the successor nation on its independence. 16 The application of this principle implies that nations inheriting the territory respect the colonial borders established by the mother country. This was the case for all the emancipated nations in the region that inherited the territories and provinces that belonged to Spain at the moment. The same law applied in establishing the territorial boundaries between Chile and Argentina. In addition, by 1820 the government of Buenos Aires had already officially taken possession of the islands. Captain Daniel Jewitt, sent by the Argentine government at the helm of the frigate Heroina, took charge of Port Louis (Puerto Soledad) openly and without any opposition and, in the presence of several foreign ships, declared the sovereignty of the United Provinces of Rio de la Plata. 17 Three years later, the Argentine government sent another expedition to the region under the command of Luis Vernet and Jorge Pacheco with the express objectives of exercising sovereignty, of controlling the exploitation of the marine life there (sea lions were the prey of pillaging expeditions carried out by foreign ships), and of issuing official Argentine licenses and permissions for commercial operations. In 1826, Vernet received territorial concessions and commercial rights, and in 1829 the government of Buenos Aires created, by decree, the Political and Military Command of the Malvinas

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Islands and the Islands of the South Atlantic, designating Luis Vemet as governor of the islands. 18 Although the British contend that their government submitted a note of protest after the signing of this decree, Great Britain nevertheless accepted the transfer of the territories from the Spanish Crown to the United Provinces as well as their territorial rights and obligations. This was implicit in the British failure to activate any claim or register any reservations concerning their own supposed rights of sovereignty over the Malvinas Islands when they recognized Argentine independence in 1823, or when they signed the treaty of friendship and business with Argentina in 1825. By remaining silent, Great Britain confirmed implicitly Argentina's right of possession and sovereignty over the islands. 19 It can be stated categorically, then, that the Argentine Republic effectively occupied the islands from 1820 until January 3, 1833, when the British arrived. True, the United States warship Lexington forced Argentine authorities out of Puerto Soledad in 1823 in connection with a conflict over fishing and sealing rights and the arrest by the Argentine authorities of a number of US sealing vessels. Even so, the colonists themselves remained on the islands, and a few months later the Argentine government sent the ship Sarandi to Puerto Soledad to reestablish its authority over the islands. Thus, when the British arrived in 1823 aboard the warship Clio, they did not find a group of uninhabited islands; rather, there was an Argentine colony there. Some of the colonists attempted to fight from the hills, but British military superiority prevailed. 20 In time, all the colonists were forced from the islands by British occupiers, who now claimed the islands belonged to Great Britain. Despite the forced eviction of the Argentines, it is clear that claims of Argentine sovereignty over the islands were based on two fundamental points: that all the claims and rights of Spain over the archipelago of the Malvinas up to the time of Latin American emancipation were passed on to the Argentines; and that they were reaffirmed and strengthened independently by virtue of the occupation and effective settlement of the islands by the Argentine government across thirteen consecutive years. Those facts leave no doubts as to the Argentine intention to occupy and acquire the islands or to the legitimacy of Argentina's claims on the territory. 21 THE WEAKNESS OF ENGLISH CLAIMS Over the years, the British diplomatic establishment has presented various arguments to justify Britain's illicit occupation of the Malvinas Islands. For example, Great Britain originally argued that the validity of its claims rested on its having discovered the islands and on their subsequent occupation by Great Britain. According to the British position, this occupation was recog-

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nized and confirmed by the King of Spain when he returned Port Egmont to Britain in 1771. 22 Several facts demonstrate the weakness of this argument: the islands had already been discovered and visited by the Spanish and Dutch by 1766, when the British settled Port Egmont; they had already been recognized as Spanish by virtue of certain treaties; they had already been claimed by Spain as part of the Spanish domain and of the Spanish possessions in South America; and they had already been occupied (illegally) by the French. In sum, the islands could no longer be considered res nullius, a basic requirement for any claim the British might have of sovereignty. Furthermore, the temporary occupation of the islands by the British violated the multilateral treaties and accords that England had signed with Spain that recognized the sovereignty and exclusivity of Spanish rights over the lands and seas of South America. 23 On the other hand, if England based its claims on the fact that John Davis discovered the islands in 1592 or Captain Hawkins in 1594, certainly one cannot argue that the founding of Port Egmont by Captain John McBride in 1766,172 years later, constituted a subsequent occupation. 24 Likewise, the argument that Commodore Byron discovered the islands in 1765 clearly goes against available historical evidence as recorded above concerning their discovery and occupation before Byron's visit. 25 Nor does the argument that Spain implicitly recognized British rights over the islands by returning to Great Britain their Port Egmont installations in 1771 have any historical basis. Spain's action was simply an attempt to make amends for having offended British honor when they forcefully expelled British residents from Port Egmont, thereby avoiding a likely war. Indeed, on accepting the Spanish offer, Great Britain made no reference to its own supposed claims over the islands, nor did it question the rights of Spain over the same. 26 On the other hand, the absence of the British from the islands over a period of fifty-nine years (1774-1833), casts doubt on their determination to occupy and take possession of the islands (animus dominandi). Certainly the simple action of having left a symbolic marker on the island cannot be considered an act of effective occupation sufficient to maintain a claim of possession. Such a right can be obtained only through effective occupation. Furthermore, after the departure of the English, the symbolic plaque they had left was removed by the Spanish without protest from the British, just as they did not protest the continuous and effective occupation of the islands by Spain. 27 Finally, whatever British intentions may have been in 1774 when they abandoned Port Egmont, those intentions were rendered irrelevant by British signature of the Nootka Sound Convention in 1790, under which they effectively renounced any claims to these islands off the southern mainland. In the face of the general lack of recognition that the British were receiv-

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ing for their claims, they began to argue at the beginning of the twentieth century that their occupation of the Islands after 1833 represented a consolidation of the acquisitive prescription—i.e., that the British claims were based on a public, continuous, and peaceful occupation of the islands. However, as Vinuesa noted, "As long as other nations are formulating protests and making counter-claims, one cannot say that the effective exercise of sovereignty over a territory is peaceful." The protests signify the intention of the nation that formulates them to refuse the authorization for or deny its acquiescence to the other nation's occupation. Moreover, it is not necessary that the protest be repeated periodically. In 1849, Argentina had already indicated that "it did not consider it to be necessary to repeat its protests, given that the English intransigence did not allow an adequate treatment of the conflict." According to Vinuesa, Argentine protests "maintained the conflict alive and avoided any possible British assertion of Argentine prescription.'^ Furthermore, from the year 1833, when the Argentine representative in London, Manuel Moreno, first lodged a diplomatic protest concerning British seizure of the islands, Argentina has protested repeatedly the illicit British occupation of the islands, asserting its own sovereign rights over them. The treatment of the question in the United Nations and the subsequent recognition by the General Assembly of the existence of a conflict over the sovereignty of the islands weakens even further the British claim of acquisitive prescription. To counteract the overwhelming evidence against the validity of its claim, Great Britain attempted to apply the principle of historic consolidation, by which the right to eminent domain and to the title of a territory does not necessitate recognition by a third nation and is not concerned necessarily with the cause or origin of occupation and acquisition. It is based exclusively on an extended de facto occupation of the territory and on the exercise of eminent domain over it. According to this argument, the claim depends neither on the acquiescence of a third nation nor on the conditions required by acquisitive prescription. This principle of consolidation is applicable when "the parties involved show the existence of uncertainties or imprécisions that are geographic and/or legal relating to the origin of their respective entitlements," and when there is no possibility of objectively corroborating those titles with historic events (which, of course, does not pertain to the Argentine position). In the case of the Malvinas, the simple act of occupation and the passage of time does not constitute British acquisition. It would be relevant only if there had been no protests lodged or if the nation that has better or equal rights to the title were to acquiesce. Acquisition cannot be consolidated without taking into account the wishes of the other nation. 29 From the time that Argentina lodged its first protest in 1833, Argentine governments have objected to their illegal eviction from the islands and have

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sustained their sovereign rights over the territory. The British failed to respond in any way that might establish a basis for negotiation or for arbitrating the disagreement. The difference in relative power between the two nations also favored Great Britain, which refused to address Argentine protests or answer its calls to sit down at the negotiating table. In 1834,1841,1842, and 1849, the Argentine government lodged several official protests through its plenipotentiary minister before the Court of St. James, Don José Manuel Moreno. Later, in 1884, 1886, 1887, and 1888, the Argentine government renewed its call for negotiations in order to resolve the conflict peacefully, receiving once again a negative response. 30 On July 21, 1908, Great Britain sent a royal dispatch designating a governor of the Malvinas Islands (or Falkland Islands, as the British call them), placing under his jurisdiction the Georgia, South Orkney, Shetland, and South Sandwich islands, and Graham Land. The same dispatch established British jurisdiction over Antarctica between longitude 20 degrees and 50 degrees west and from latitude 56 degrees south to the South Pole; and between longitude 50 degrees and 80 degrees west and from latitude 58 degrees south to the South Pole. Incredibly, this jurisdictional determination included not only territories in continental Argentina (the provinces of Santa Cruz and Tierra del Fuego), but also in the Republic of Chile. That provoked an immediate joint protest by Argentina and Chile, obliging Great Britain to modify the jurisdictional boundaries established by its royal dispatch and to set new frontiers that excluded the continental areas. During negotiations and contacts with Great Britain in 1925, 1926, and 1933, Argentina continued to stand by and reassert its rights to sovereignty over the islands. Moreover, the theme was debated in the Inter-American conferences of 1938 and 1940.31 Nonetheless, the most critical point to make here is that, although there were long periods without negotiations or, indeed, correspondence, between Argentina and Great Britain related to the Malvinas question, in no way does that imply that Argentina was consenting or tacitly acquiescing to British claims. Rather, the absence of direct and explicit communication with the British government was the result of Argentina's frustration and humiliation at repeatedly facing either the absolute silence of the British and their refusal to negotiate, or the lack of seriousness of their responses. 32 In 1946, when the issue of the Malvinas was raised in the United Nations, a new possibility of initiating negotiations with Great Britain and of obtaining international support and legal recognition for the Argentine position opened up. In 1964 and 1965, the i n t e r n a t i o n a l c o m m u n i t y c o n f i r m e d the Argentine position by approving resolutions b e f o r e the U N General Assembly that recognized the existence of a dispute over the sovereignty of the islands. That action implicitly signified a rejection of the British

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attempt to legitimize its illicit occupation of the islands by invoking an alleged Argentine prescription. THE MALVINAS QUESTION IN THE UNITED NATIONS The issue of the Malvinas appeared for the first time before the United Nations in 1946, when the colonial powers reported on their territories within the Commission for Information on Non-Autonomous Territories. At this time, the United Kingdom included forty-three territories on its list, among them the Malvinas Islands, to which Argentina responded by asserting its own sovereign claim. In actuality, by submitting its claim to consideration by the world body, Great Britain implicitly admitted that the Malvinas question was not an exclusively domestic issue. Indeed, from that time on, the dispute ceased to be a purely bilateral issue and became a question of concern for the entire international community. During the fifteenth UN General Assembly, in 1960, forty-three African states presented a resolution titled "The Declaration Concerning the Concession of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples," which was approved by a significant majority. This became the historic Resolution 1514 (XV), which affirms the self-determination of peoples as the fundamental principle guiding the processes of decolonization. However, it also specifies that the territorial integrity of nations must be respected as an exception to the fundamental principle. 33 With reference to the particular case of the Malvinas, the 1965 UN General Assembly passed Resolution 2065 (XX), which expressly established the colonial nature of the English presence-in the Malvinas Islands. That resolution, approved by a 94-0 vote with fourteen abstentions, also "invited the parties to pursue negotiations with a view to finding a peaceful solution to the problem, taking into account the objectives of the Charter of the United Nations and Resolution 1514 (XV)," as well as the "interests of inhabitants of the Malvinas Islands." It is worthwhile to note that the resolution does not employ the term "desires" of the population (as Great Britain had proposed), which would have eventually led to the application of the principle of self-determination to the case. This would have been detrimental to the application of the principle of territorial integrity and to the Argentine position. If this were the case in the Malvinas, the principle of self-determination of the peoples would protect a population (the "Kelpers") that was placed on the island by Great Britain and was representing the very same colonial power that Argentina was pressuring to withdraw from the islands. 34 In any case, even the principle of self-determination does not appear to favor the position held by either the Kelpers or the British. On the contrary, to invoke the principle of self-determination to the benefit of the Kelpers, they

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would have to be considered as a people who were being subjugated and exploited by a foreign colonial power. This would be really absurd, because it is no secret that the Kelpers' interests and desires respond to and coincide with those of the colonial power that placed them there; the -Kelpers want nothing more than to be British citizens. It is quite inappropriate, therefore, to apply the principle of self-determination to a people that does not want or does not seek its own identity. In any event, it is the entire Argentine population that suffers, having been denied the right to self-determination in a part of its own territory as a result of Britain's illicit occupation of the islands since the year 1833 when the British forced the Argentine inhabitants out. Significantly, UN Resolution 1514 (XV) also categorized the Malvinas question as a conflict of sovereignty, and the conflict has come to be recognized as such by the international community. This led to a change in the long-standing and imperturbable conduct of the British: Great Britain at last accepted the Argentine invitation to negotiate and began negotiations in 1966. Since that time, Argentina has presented various drafts of resolutions, which have been systematically approved by the UN General Assembly. These resolutions urge the parties, in various ways and languages, to carry out negotiations in order to resolve the question of sovereignty peacefully. 35 BILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS

Although secret bilateral negotiations were begun in 1966, the first official conversations between Argentina and Great Britain were carried out in London in 1970, in Buenos Aires in 1971, and in Port Stanley in 1972. Without exception, the British delegation systematically avoided addressing the issue of sovereignty. Despite the fruitlessness of the negotiations between 1977 and 1980 in terms of Argentina's interests, the British Labour government did initiate a series of consultations with the local Malvinas authorities that sought to establish specific proposals that could be submitted to negotiation. The most radical of these was the idea of leaseback, by which Argentine sovereignty over the islands would be recognized, but the islands would be leased to Great Britain for a number of years, thus delaying any real transfer to Argentina. Another possibility presented was to create a joint administration of the islands. Despite these suggestions, the maximum authority on the islands, the Legislative Council, decided that the best option would be to maintain the status quo. The remarkable fact about these Labour government initiatives was that they opened up unexpectedly the possibility of including the issue of sovereignty in the negotiations, to the complete and utter surprise of the

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general public. The Labour administrations probably recognized that their intransigent position on the sovereignty issue was unsustainable over the long term, given the pressure being applied by the international community to seek a peaceful solution. Nonetheless, their efforts were frustrated by the intransigence of the inhabitants of the Malvinas and their nationalist and conservative allies back in Great Britain. 36 By 1982, the Argentine military government proposed to the United Kingdom the establishment of an agenda with defined themes and time periods. Once more this proposal by Argentina did not receive a positive response, a fact that was interpreted by the military government of the time as a matter of bad faith, aimed simply at maintaining the status quo. As a result, Argentina's military leaders decided in April of 1982 to retake the Malvinas Islands through military action, which led to a brief war between the two nations. Diplomatic and consular relations were broken. For the next seven years, each nation made accusations against the other concerning the postwar situation, while Argentina continued to assert its claims of sovereignty over the Malvinas and the islands of the South Atlantic. On taking power in July 1989, the new Argentine government of President Carlos Menem launched an initiative that led to dialogue between the Argentine and British delegates in New York in August and in Madrid the following October. During the course of these negotiations, both parties agreed that neither could better its position vis-à-vis the islands and that whatever was agreed upon could not be used to oppose or negate the claims of sovereignty made by either of the parties in the future. Fortunately, these negotiations led to the reestablishment of diplomatic relations in April 1990. CONCLUSION

Not only did the reestablishment of diplomatic relations end the conflict but it also created the conditions needed to resume dialogue and direct cooperation between the two countries. This should certainly encourage the building of mutual confidence and improved collaboration in investment and economic development projects throughout the archipelago and the southern region of Argentina. Such cooperation should, in turn, lead to a better interaction and greater interdependence between the governments and between their societies. The southern area of the continent (a stepping stone to the Antarctic) boasts a great wealth of natural resources that should be exploited in environmentally sensitive ways. Furthermore, despite the distance and inhospitable nature of the terrain, technological advances in communications, transportation, and housing open up the possibility of developing and integrating the region into the regional and international systems of commercial and economic activity. The extensive financial and technological resources needed for such a process, however, can be made available only through bilateral and

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multilateral cooperation. If these developments should take place, the region would b e c o m e a true example of international cooperation for development and peace in the newly emerging international order. On the other hand, the strengthening of democracy, stability, peace, and prosperity in this southern region are of the highest interest for all concerned and are crucial for their security and w e l l being. Only when these conditions appear to be permanent and viable will Argentina and Great Britain be able to explore anew the diversity of alternatives that revolve around the theme of sovereignty. Only then will there be sufficient confidence and mutual respect between the parties, and a sufficient number of interests and values shared by them, to allow for an opening up of new initiatives around the issue. To avoid failure, these initiatives must be rational and take into account the interests of all the parties involved in the conflict.

NOTES 1. Adrian F. J. Hope, "Sovereignty and Decolonization of the Malvinas (Falklands) Islands," Boston College International and Comparative Law Review 6, no. 2 (1983): 398-399. 2. In 1609, Grocio, in declaring the freedom of the seas, states that discovery should be followed by occupation. In his work published in 1625, De Juri Belli ac Pads (vol. 2, chap. 3, pt. 4), he cites occupation as the only way of acquiring territory. 3. Hope, op. cit, 399. 4. Raúl E. Vinuesa, The Conflict of the Malvinas Island and International Law," lecture delivered at a conference held May 4,1982, University of Buenos Aires, pp. 4, 11. 5. Hector Ratto, Maritime Activities in Patagonia During the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries. Buenos Aires: 1930. 6. Enrique Ruiz Guinazú, Proas de España en el Mar Magallanico (Buenos Aires: Peufer, 1945), and Roberto Le Villier, América la Bien Llamada (Buenos Aires: Kraft, 1948). Nonetheless, it is not clear who discovered the islands. The following are often credited with the deed: Amerigo Vespucci in 1501; Esteban Gómez, member of the crew of Magellan in 1519-1520; Captain Pedro de Vera, member of the expedition of Garcia Loayza in 1525; Alonso de Camargo in 1540. On the other hand, historians also mention the Dutch Sebald Van Weert as a possible discoverer in 1600. See Roberto Etchepareborda, "The Malvinas Question in Its Historic Perspective," an u n p u b l i s h e d p a p e r w r i t t e n in W a s h i n g t o n , D . C . , 1983, p p . 2 - 4 . See also E t c h e p a r e b o r d a ' s excellent work " T h e Recent Bibliography on the Malvinas Question," The Inter-American Journal of Bibliography, no. 1, (1984), OAS, Washington, D.C. 7. E. Ruiz Guinazú, op. cit. 8. Bonifacio del Carril, The Malvinas/Falklands Case (Buenos Aires: Emecé, 1982), 16-17. 9. Although these papal grants and treaties dealt only with Spain and Portugal in this period, the same conditions were understood to be applicable to other Catholic kingdoms such as the British Crown. The papal authority had authority over the Catholic kingdoms. 10. Etchepareborda, op. cit., 5-6; Hope, op. cit., 407-413; and Vinuesa, op. cit., 10.

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11. Vinuesa, op. cit., 7; and del Carril, op. cit., 22-23. 12. Etchepareborda, op. cit., 9-11. 13. See Vinuesa, op. cit., 10-11; Hope, op. cit., 413; and Lauirio H. Destefani, The Malvinas, the South Georgias and the Sandwich Islands: The Conflict with Britain (Buenos Aires: Edipress, 1982). 14. del Carril, op. cit., 37, 38. 15. Etchepareborda, op. cit., 15-16; and ibid. 16. Hope, op. cit., 418. 17. Etchepareborda, op. cit., 12; and Hope, op. cit., 413. 18. Etchepareborda, op. cit., 13; and Hope, op. cit., 421-422. 19. Hope, op. cit., 418,423. 20. Etchepareborda, op. cit., 14-15. From the extensive bibliography consulted in his work, Etchepareborda concludes that the Argentine government had reestablished its presence in Puerto Soledad after the assault of the North American warship Lexington, which in retaliation for the Argentine efforts to control fishing and hunting in the area, destroyed the settlement and took away a group of the colonists to Uruguay in February 1832. The government, nonetheless, reestablished its presence in Puerto Soledad, sending the ship Sarandi and designating new authorities, but these fell before the military power of the English ship. 21. Hope., op. cit., 422. 22. del Carril, op. cit., 33; and Hope, op. cit., 318. This argument appears in the letter of the British envoy in Buenos Aires, Mr. Woodbine Parish, to the Argentine government, protesting its decree naming a governor in the Malvinas Islands in 1929. 23. Concerning treaties, refer to Etchepareborda, op. cit., 5-6; Hope, op. cit., 407413; and Vinuesa, op. cit., 10. 24. Hope, op. cit., 402. 25. del Carril, op. cit., 40-42. 26. Ibid., 43-49. 27. Ibid., 50-51; Vinuesa, op. cit., 9; and Hope, op. cit., 425. 28. Vinuesa, op. cit., 18-19; and Hope, op. cit., 427-436. 29. Vinuesa, op. cit., 20-21. 30. Hope, op. cit., 433-434. 31. Ibid, 435-436. 32. Ibid, 432-433. 33. Vinuesa, op. cit, 24. 34. Ibid, 24. 35. Ibid, 26-27. 36. Etchepareborda, op. c i t , 22-29; and Ruben de Hoyos, "Isias Malvinas or Falkland Islands: The Negotiations of a Conflict," in Controlling Latin American Conflict, Michael A. Morris and Victor Millan (eds.) (Boulder and London: Westview Press, 1984).

Part Two

The Political Realities Faced by Both Governments

chapter four

Political Opinion in Britain Walter Little P o l i t i c a l o p i n i o n is d i v i d e d and c o n f u s e d over the i s s u e of the Falklands/Malvinas. Partly this is because there is considerable polarization at both mass and elite levels between supporters and detractors of the status quo. But more important is the fact that so many people hold internally inconsistent views. The basic problem is that, generally speaking, the British wish to resolve the sovereignty dispute but at the same time feel deeply obligated to the islanders. One result of this has been a blurring of the communications process. No particular set of party sympathizers is clearly associated with a particular view. When combined with the highly centralized nature of decisionmaking in Britain, this meant that Margaret Thatcher was able to dominate policymaking and was relatively immune from criticism. So complete was her domination of the agenda that she may well have succeeded in constraining the freedom of maneuver of future governments. There is no evidence of any change being forthcoming under her successor, John Major. PUBLIC OPINION

An April 1990 poll indicated that a substantial majority of the British people support the recent improvement in relations between Britain and Argentina. Seventy percent supported the restoration of diplomatic relations, 69 percentthe resumption of direct air links, and 68 percent the ending of trade restrictions. No less than 90 percent looked with approval upon the possibility of Argentine visits to the war graves on the islands. Less than 20 percent were hostile to these moves, and there were few differences in terms of party affiliation, social class, or gender. 1 It might seem then that the British public is broadly conciliatory in its outlook. However, a few reservations are in order. First, these opinions do not seem to be the result of a softening of attitudes with the passage of time. One might expect that as memories of the sacrifices incurred fade, so public 63

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attitudes might become more emollient. Yet, in 1984, a mere two years after the fighting, an even higher proportion of the general public favored such moves. The slippage is slight in percentage terms'but nonetheless real. 2 Further, one might wonder why, given the almost zero salience (and, probably, thought) attached to the Falklands by those polled, there was not even stronger support for bilateral normalization. Certainly, the same poll indicated that the Argentine public is consistently stronger than the British in its support for such rapprochement.3 Finally, one should bear in mind that the issues arising out of Madrid merely represent a restoration of the status quo ante 1982. They do not involve preferences about the political future of the islands. When the question of that future is raised, a rather different picture emerges. When asked how they saw the long-term future of the islands, 33 percent opted for permanent British control, 22 percent for independence, and 25 percent for compromise of some sort; 9 percent (doubtless not fans of Mrs. Thatcher) were prepared to accept handover of the islands to Argentina. Thus, as in 1984 and in sharp contrast to Argentina, the British public is not broadly of one mind over the core issue of the sovereignty of the islands. However, a clear majority of British citizens are hostile to the preferred Argentine outcome. There are also some surprises when the option of compromise is looked at more fully. For example, though leaseback as a solution was pushed (and then dropped) by the British government prior to 1982, it attracts almost no support amongst the general public. This may be because people regard it as having been unsuccessfully tried, because some may fail to grasp what it would involve, or because it is seen as a shabby option that leaves the problem for some future generation. Nor do the ideas of incorporation into Argentina with special guarantees for the inhabitants, or condominium, find much favor, though they are more acceptable than leaseback. Most striking is the preference for third-party involvement: no less than 42 percent of those polled indicated that if the dispute had to be compromised, then their preference would be for the islands to be administered (presumably in perpetuity) by the United Nations. However, it should not be forgotten that those ready to compromise or to see a handover to Argentina represent less than a third of those polled, and it is doubtful whether their opinions are anything like as firmly held as those who wish to see the islands remain British. When asked what steps might be taken now that diplomatic relations have been restored, 24 percent favored no further action, 24 percent wanted continued talks that would exclude sovereignty, 20 percent favored talks in which the Argentine side might state their case on sovereignty, and 20 percent were prepared to countenance actual negotiations about sovereignty. So far as the status of the islanders in the dispute was concerned, no less than 63 percent of Britons polled declared that the islanders had the right to decide the future of the islands, 26 percent that islanders' interests (but not their

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wishes) should be taken into account, and only 4 percent that the islanders were a secondary factor and they must accept any decision reached bilaterally between Britain and Argentina. Opinion varied more according to party identification than according to gender and class. Thus, 48 percent of Conservative supporters wanted the islands to remain permanently British as compared with only 29 percent of Labour supporters. Conversely, on the question of the next steps to be taken, whereas a quarter of Labour respondents favored specific negotiations over sovereignty, only 13 percent of Conservatives were so disposed. But there may be a danger in making too much of the apparently greater flexibility of Labour supporters. Though almost half of them felt that the election of a Labour government would improve the prospects of a settlement being reached, only 13 percent supported a transfer of sovereignty to Argentina and 25 percent negotiations over sovereignty, while no less than 60 percent felt that the islanders had the right to decide their own future. That is, Labour supporters (and this is true, though to a lesser extent, of Conservatives as well) seem to be torn between their desire to see the dispute resolved and the obligations they feel they have toward the islanders. It is not clear to what extent the general public (or, for that matter, parliamentarians) appreciate that these goals may be inconsistent. There is also the problem of salience. In 1984, the public was concerned about defense costs, political stability in Argentina, and the long-term economic viability of the islands. Six years on, recurrent defense expenditure has been dramatically reduced, the economy of the islands has significantly improved, and Argentina has become much less bellicose. The details of these developments are not widely understood, but the general trend seems to be reflected in a greater public willingness to accept the status quo. If public debate is any guide to popular attitudes, then the islands are of little political importance. They remain newsworthy but on page five rather than page one, and it would take a dramatic turn of events for this to be reversed. The combination of low salience and division of opinion does have political implications. Together they mean that decisionmakers have had a remarkably free hand in the making of policy. The question that now arises is whether a Labour leader would enjoy the same freedom of maneuver. Certainly, he or she would be more flexible in principle, but whether a shift on the sovereignty issue could be sold to the public is unclear. On the one hand, a good third of voters take a hard line and would be certain to protest at any such move, and it is also true that the status of the islands is radically different from their pre-1982 condition. On the other hand, British governments traditionally enjoy a high level of autonomy in foreign affairs. Much would depend upon the size of any future government's majority and upon precisely what modifications of policy were contemplated. At present the indications are that any "handover" to Argentina would provoke a political storm that no new

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government would contemplate lightly. The most that could be sold politically would seem to be some internationalization or neutralization option. LOBBIES B e c a u s e of this public i n d i f f e r e n c e , such running as is made on the Falklands/Malvinas problem has tended to fall to the lobby groups. The oldest and most determined of t h e s e — t h e Falkland Islands C o m m i t t e e (FIC)—was established in 1968 when Britain and Argentina began serious discussions. It was set up by islanders and their supporters in the UK as a panic response; and the fear of betrayal has motivated it ever since. The committee has branches in London and Port Stanley and represents hard-line opinion in both places. Its ambition is to so secure the position of the islands that there can be no change in their status, even if London and Buenos Aires could agree on one. Since the Falkland Islands government opened a representative office in London, the FIC has found that its claim to speak for island opinion has been seriously weakened. However, if the prospect of "betrayal" ever loomed, it would no doubt be revitalized. The committee is assisted by the more amorphous Falkland Islands Association. A less explicitly political grouping, it was established after the first Shackleton report (on the economic development of the islands) of 1976. It includes in its membership not only politically committed FIC members but also those with an interest in the history, flora and fauna, and strategic position of the islands and their surroundings. In recent years the association has concentrated its campaigning activities on the matter of fishing and marine conservation. In this it has been assisted by explicitly conservation-minded groups such as the Falkland Islands Foundation, whose primary concern is to maintain the ecological status of the region. It has often been suggested (especially in Buenos Aires) that the influence of the Falkland Islands Company lies behind the activities of the lobby. It is true that the company remains the largest landowner, employer, and retailer on the islands, but the evidence suggests that over the years it has been motivated more by commercial than political considerations. Relations between it and the islanders (it was until recently in a virtual monopoly position) have not always been easy, and there are even those who have suspected it of being insufficiently hostile to the Argentine position. It is claimed, for example, that the company supported the leaseback proposal and it certainly did business with the Argentine occupying forces in 1982. Finally, it is worth noting that as a result of the agrarian reform and investment policies pursued since 1982, the company is in less of a monopolistic position than it was. If it is assumed that the long-term economic prospect of the islands would be best served by Anglo-Argentine cooperation, then it would not seem to be in the interests of the company to oppose such accommodation. At the same time,

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the c o m p a n y has to o p e r a t e in a politically charged e n v i r o n m e n t , and its response to this dilemma has been to keep a very low profile in recent years. There is, of course, a lobby that promotes the idea of accommodation with Argentina. Chief here is the South Atlantic Council, which w a s formed in late 1983. Its membership includes businesspeople, but it is essentially a parliamentary, academic, and clerical body whose charge is the search for a negotiated compromise. Aware of the fact that it is regarded by hard-liners as a pro-Argentine organization, the council has had to tread a narrow tightrope, suggesting that the sovereignty issue must at s o m e point be addressed but that it should not be prejudged. M u c h of the council's efforts go into the preparation of discussion papers and the promotion of goodwill contacts between the two countries. However, the restoration of diplomatic relations has rather cut the g r o u n d a w a y f r o m the c o u n c i l ' s " g o o d w i l l " policy. It never did have much political influence and is likely to have even less in the future. T h e hard-liners are in a stronger position than the doves. Partly this is because of the greater emotional resonance of their position (national pride, respect for those w h o died, etc.), partly because of the inherent sympathy Mrs. Thatcher had for them, and partly because of the sophistication with which they have presented themselves as mere pawns in an interstate conflict. They have also been helped by the broadly conservative character of the popular media in Britain, which have ensured that, outside of broadsheets such as the Financial Times or Guardian there is little criticism of the status quo. Finally, the intransigents can call on the support of "influentials" in the conservative m o v e m e n t such as Lords Shackleton and Buxton. These men enjoy the respect of the political establishment in Britain, have a forum available in the House of Lords, and so have been able to help set the tone of debate. T h e doves are in a weaker position, partly because they have no clear vision of the future and partly because there is little popular symbolic reference for their views: appeals to moderation are not the stuff of which headlines are m a d e or passions raised. They are also vulnerable to the charge of seeking to interfere in a matter in which—unlike some of the island hard-liners—they have no personal stake and only indirect expertise. T h e case of the Church illustrates the difficulties involved. Leading clerics (notably the archbishop of Canterbury) have spoken in the pulpit on the need for reconciliation b e t w e e n Christian nations, h a v e visited and received their counterparts in Argentina, and h a v e drawn the contrast b e t w e e n d e f e n s e expenditure and domestic social spending. For their pains they have been pilloried in the popular press and by leading Thatcherite politicians. It might have been expected that business groups would have formed a powerful lobby for some rapprochement with Argentina, but this has not been so. This may reflect their ideological sympathy for the Conservative government but also the fact that they have been less affected by the trade embargo than has sometimes been assumed. In general, the major actors—the British creditor

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banks and multinationals operating in Argentina—have been able to do business without serious hindrance. In this sense, the commercial restoration agreed at Madrid is as much symbolic as real in content. But, though these lobbies have been active, none can claim to have significantly influenced the policy process. There are structural constraints that contribute to this. Though pressure groups are active in British politics, they are notably ineffective when it comes to foreign affairs, which remained very much within the prerogative of the executive—i.e., Mrs. Thatcher and her civil servants. Thus, hard-liners repeatedly have failed in their efforts to persuade London to establish an exclusive economic zone around the islands, while the doves have got nowhere in their attempts to have sovereignty placed on the agenda. They are also woefully underfinanced, relying on unpaid labor, individual subscriptions, and occasional modest contributions from charitable foundations and philanthropic individuals. In short, they are marginal to the policy process, though they can occasionally frustrate or complicate it through supporters in Parliament. THE CONSERVATIVE PARTY

A majority of Tory activists have no strong views on the Falklands but are prepared loyally to go along with whatever the prime minister decides. Most seem to feel that British victory in 1982 restored a sense of purpose to Britain and greatly enhanced its standing in the world. After decades of apparent drift and decline, the crisis came to symbolize what could be achieved by a rejuvenated country united under sound Conservative government. They also share Mrs. Thatcher's view that success in 1982 was directly responsible for the surprising scale of their victory in the elections of 1983. 4 This is very much what one might expect. The Conservative Party was traditionally the party of empire, and elements in it continue to espouse robust (some would say chauvinist) foreign and defense policies. Of course, this same party oversaw the process of decolonization in the 1950s and 1960s, but some of the nostalgia lingers on. It should also be recalled that the Falklands jibed well with the "little Englandism" (some might say racism) that is also present in the party, especially at grassroots levels. The islands not only looked like parts of Britain but had white, English-speaking, and pronouncedly patriotic inhabitants. This racial dimension, incidentally, is not lost on the islanders, who are well aware of how shabbily the British have treated the majority of their (nonwhite) microdependencies, and, indeed, of how shabbily they/themselves were treated prior to 1982. Conservatives are also drilled into an ethic of solidarity. Unlike the Labour Party, which (at least until recently) has liked nothing better than a spot of fratricide, Tories try hard to keep their internal squabbles private. Last, the party has a long tradition of personal rather than collective leadership.

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Mrs. Thatcher's joint position as leader of the party and national executive gave her more authority than any Western counterpart. Thus, while supporting her was no guarantee of preferment, opposing her could have seriously damaged a Tory's political health. On the back benches, there are only two (smallish) groups prepared to have their views placed on the public record. There are those who vociferously supported (indeed, outdid) Mrs. Thatcher, and those who have been generally dissatisfied with the thrust of policy since 1982. Generally on the extreme right of the party, the intransigents are determined that British sovereignty shall be maintained. As one especially strident spokesman put it in a debate on the economic development of the island: Do not local commitment and private investment depend on confidence at home and in the Falkland islands that the British will to defend British sovereignty will be maintained . . . the nation will not tolerate a return to the shilly-shallying, ambivalent conversations that took place over the years on the question of sovereignty. 5

Moderates within the party were concerned about the costs (both political and economic) of such intransigence. But turning them to political capital proved more difficult. A major problem confronting such "realists" has been that the costs of the British position have not in fact been unduly burdensome. Defense costs have been constrained, diplomatic embarrassment is what diplomats are trained for, and the islanders are happy to have nothing to do with Argentina. Further, these moderates are unable to offer any clear alternative; whatever they might feel privately, they cannot come out publicly in support of anything that could be portrayed as a handover to Argentina. Finally, recent events have seriously undercut their position, since the restoration of diplomatic and other arrangements is widely seen as a vindication of Mrs. Thatcher's policy of firmness. 6 There is also the question of how one interprets the silence of so many Tory MPs. Some, of course, are genuinely indifferent, but in other cases it seems the issue is something of an embarrassment. At cabinet level only Mrs. Thatcher was outspoken in defense of the islands' constitutional status quo. The relevant departmental ministers toed the official line when called upon to do so in the House, but with no great enthusiasm. Privately, a fair number may regard it as a distraction, almost an opera buffa affair that does not merit the attention of serious politicians. In a curious way it verges on the vulgar, and few today believe it is of any political importance. MRS. THATCHER

As a result, Mrs. Thatcher was given a remarkably free hand in the making of Falklands policy and there is no doubt that it was her creation and hers alone.

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She was personally identified with it to an unusual degree and such was her dominance over her cabinet, party, and civil servants that the policy has been consistently adhered to since 1983. No decision of any significance concerning the islands was taken without her express approval, in sharp contrast to the situation prior to 1982, when she left things in the hands of the Foreign Office. Basically, her policy after 1983 consisted of endeavoring to restore normal relations with Argentina but not at the price of any concessions over (or even discussions about) sovereignty. As it happens, the Argentines have finally acceded to this British position, but if they had not, Mrs. Thatcher (and, almost certainly, John Major) would have been quite prepared to have continued the policy indefinitely. Her stress upon the sovereignty issue was understandably most accented when she talked to the islanders: I want to make one thing very clear to you. I am not negotiating the sovereignty of the Falkland Islands with anyone. They are British."7

This resolute position is in turn a reflection of a perception of the Argentine position which, at least until Carlos Menem became president, was probably correct: It is obvious that the Argentines see negotiations solely as a means of achieving direct transfer of sovereignty over the Falklands and the dependencies to Argentina. It is totally unacceptable to us and no amount of pressure will induce me to enter negotiations on that basis."8

It should be remembered, too, that the Falklands also had mythic status for Mrs. Thatcher. She confronted other major challenges such as the IRA hunger strikes and the miners' strike and won. But the Falklands challenged her not just as a party politician but also as the leader of a nation. At the time it occurred, her popularity was at a low ebb, and to have failed probably would have meant the end of her government and her career then. The crisis allowed her to display all of her undoubted courage and determination. Success elevated her to virtual regal status and she did not forget that. 9 Nonetheless, the stridency of her language and her personalization of the issue tended to obscure the fact that, for her, the central issue was not the islands as such but the islanders. That is, it was about the principle of selfdetermination and resisting aggression: You simply cannot lay claim to someone else's territory and then claim there's a dispute and other people have to talk with you . . . whether you are a dictatorship or a democracy . . . but when you have become a democracy, that means the government in power has been put in power by the wishes of the people. You expect such a government to respect the wishes of other people." 10

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Mrs. Thatcher's career showed that she was a more pragmatic politician than either she or her image makers like to admit to. On a number of lesser issues she backtracked and modified her stance but this never happened over the Falklands. Thus, she acknowledged that paramountcy rests not with the islanders but with the House of Commons, but at the same time she made explicit her intention of "honoring" and "respecting" the islanders' wishes. The net effect of this was to ensure that the islanders remain intransigent, and this self-imposed constraint surely did not escape a politician of her undoubted intelligence. It seems that she accepted that on this particular issue she had no room for maneuver. For her to have compromised sovereignty would have been to acknowledge that the decision to fight was unwise (if not actually "wrong") and that hundreds (including those who died when she ordered the sinking of the Belgrano at a time when it was moving away from the British fleet) died in vain as a direct result of her decisions. This intransigence may also have had something to do with her contempt for those (liberals, academics, diplomats, and the like) whose preference for compromising complex issues prevents them from taking decisive positions. John Mayor, her successor, seems unlikely to depart from her overall position. The policy of the last eight years has had its successes. Diplomatic pressure has been resisted, the islands have prospered, and, above all, the Argentines have acceded to her insistence that sovereignty is to stay off the agenda. The financial price of this has been significant but one that many regard as having been well worth paying. THE LABOUR PARTY

When the crisis broke in 1982, the Labour Party found itself in a delicate position. Partly this was because it was to some extent a prisoner of its own record. It had long supported decolonization and the principle of self-determination that had underpinned it. However, it had also extended the right of self determination to the islanders. When they indicated beyond all doubt that their preference was for continued colonial status, the Labour Party had no option but to accept this unpalatable outcome. Thus, as the news of the Argentine invasion became clear, the leader of the party, Michael Foot, stated: The rights and circumstances of the people of the Falkland Islands must be uppermost in our minds. There is no question . . . of any colonial dependence or anything of the sort. It is a question of people who wish to be associated with this country and who have built their whole lives on [that] basis. We have a moral duty, a political duty, and every other duty to ensure that that is sustained."11

Similarly, the Labour Party had been criticizing the military regime in Argentina for some years because of its abuses of human rights and the

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Conservative government for its arms sales to the regime. 1 2 Under these circumstances, it could hardly endorse what all agreed had been a blatant act of aggression. Foot again: We can hardly forget that thousands of innocent people fighting for their political rights in Argentina are in prison and have been tortured and debased. We cannot forget that fact when our friends and fellow citizens are suffering as they are at this moment. 13 There were also partisan considerations at work. Mrs. Thatcher's rapid decision to send troops was an extremely risky decision, and she and the Labour Party were aware that military failure would lead to her downfall. Though Labour could never publicly acknowledge that failure would be to their advantage, the point was not lost. In addition, the party was well aware that in the eyes of the electorate it had often been regarded as insufficiently patriotic. It therefore had little choice but to support the sending of the task force, but, with a weather eye out, made it clear that the decision to do so lay wholly with Mrs. Thatcher. It also directly attacked the government for the policy failings that led to the crisis, claiming that in 1977 the Labour government had successfully averted a similar situation. As David Owen has claimed, the Labour Party faced both ways as the crisis unfolded and has continued to do so. Within the Parliamentary party only the left were prepared to go further and directly attack the military response. Thus, Tony Benn: I tell the Prime Minister that this is an ill-thought-out enterprise and will not achieve the purposes to which it is put The United Nations has been urging negotiations for ages. Now is the time . . . to cede sovereignty to a condominium or to the United Nations.... My advice . . . is that the task force should be withdrawn." 14 The majority of the party could not afford such clarity. Throughout the crisis, it found itself caught between the need to support the islanders and British force of arms and its own preference for negotiation and compromise. Its critique of the government, such as it was, consisted of pragmatic questioning (about such matters as military proportionality) of the conduct of hostilities. At no time was there any disagreement in principle about the right to forcibly resist aggression. Since then, attitudes within the party (especially at parliamentary level) have shifted somewhat. The cost of defending and developing the islands, the identification of Conservatives with their retention, and, above all, the emergence of democratic government in Argentina have, at least until the recent breakthrough, given Labour rather more political space than was available while the crisis was current. For the left, the issue is of little importance in itself, but it has provided an opportunity to attack government policies in general and the prime minister in

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particular. Thus, the cost of the rapid deployment airport has frequently been contrasted to cuts in domestic spending on welfare programs. Similarly, the Belgrano sinking has been pursued because the fact that ministers have seemingly misinformed the House and the general public has been a chink in the Tories' constitutional armor. Not surprisingly, the leftists in the general public are more radical than their representatives in Parliament, with 13 percent happy to see the islands handed over to Argentina. Among left-wing constituency activists this figure is probably a lot higher still. For such people, the Falklands question is indissolubly linked to Mrs. Thatcher: what she liked they abhor, and vice versa. Labour moderates have also been concerned about the economic, defense, and diplomatic costs of the status quo, but unlike their Tory counterparts they are more ready to accept that the issue of sovereignty should be addressed. Thus, the opposition spokesman on Latin American matters: To encourage the development of democracy in Argentina we need to be seen to be working with that democratic government in a way which we were completely and rightly unprepared to work with the junta. To do that sovereignty must come into the discussions." 15

The failure at Berne in 1984 seemed to reinforce the majority view within the Labour Party that this question of sovereignty must be confronted. As Dennis Healy put it: Will the [Foreign Secretary] seriously consider changing the basis on which the government has so far sought to open discussions with the Argentines, recognizing what everybody in the world knows to be the case—that some time or other the question of sovereignty w i l l have to be discussed between the British Government and the Government of Argentina. 16

Nevertheless, this did not mean that the issue of sovereignty was to be prejudged in Argentina's favor, nor that the wishes of the islanders were to be wholly discounted. On the contrary, Labour critics have found it essential to stress that concessions were needed from the Argentine side and that the islanders must be involved in any decision affecting their future. Thus, Healy again: The Minister, his colleagues, and the Prime Minister constantly say that any solution must have the approval and acceptance of the Falkland Islanders. I do not dissent from the fact that they must be involved in the solution. With the changed circumstances of democracy in Argentina, and because the Falkland Islanders must live in peace with their near neighbors, what initiatives are the Minister and his colleagues taking to talk to the Falkland Islanders to find out what they now think? 17

The recognition that the islanders have a part to play points to the fact that Labour is still in a difficult position. Its policies have been well-meaning

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but have rested upon assumptions about islander and Argentine attitudes that do not seem to be supported by the facts; that is, the spirit of compromise necessary for a definitive solution to the sovereignty issue seems to be absent. In a sense, Labour has been repeating the mistakes of pre-1982 governments (both Labour and Tory) in that it wants negotiations but has nothing to negotiate with. In its defense, it should be remembered that this is broadly the position of the public at large in Britain. What from abroad looks like traditional British perfidy is actually no more than a wish for an easy way out; i.e., old-fashioned hypocrisy, or, more charitably, wishful thinking. Labour also suffers from the tension between what it believes in and what it can afford to be thought to believe in. It would like to compromise the issue somehow but not at the price of helping the Tories win the next election. The strength of popular nationalism and Mrs. Thatcher's continuing ability to rouse it has made the Labour leadership very wary of taking too firm a line. 18 What a future Labour government might do has always been unclear, but the recent rapprochement with Argentina suggests that it would prefer to leave the whole matter alone. Madrid has "vindicated" the Tory position (at least in the medium term), and it is hard to see what political advantage would accrue from disturbing an acceptable state of affairs from the British perspective. THE CENTER PARTIES

The parties of the center (Liberal Democrats and the now defunct Social Democrats) have consistently taken a more critical line than Labour since 1982. This may reflect the special interest of former foreign secretary David Owen (he sent a nuclear submarine to the area at a time of tension in 1977); but it is also perhaps a reflection of the fact that the parties have no hope of winning office and can therefore afford to pursue a clear policy. Owen has repeatedly made clear his view that while outcomes should not be prejudged, sovereignty must be addressed and in a bilateral fashion: I b e g her [Mrs. Thatcher] to be very careful about the use of this word "paramountcy." There are eighteen hundred people. There are parish councils in this country with more p e o p l e . . . . I am prepared to discuss sovereignty. 19

And later: Mrs. Thatcher is mistaken in the view that the British forces went there to ensure that the Union Jack would fly over the islands in perpetuity. They went there to resist armed aggression. 2 0

The Social Democratic Party in particular outlined in some detail how the sovereignty question might be approached. For example, at its 1984 conference it overwhelmingly passed the motion that while the islanders'

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views should be given the fullest consideration, they could not be regarded as paramount and that talks over sovereignty should be initiated by transferring initially to the United Nations, the OAS, or to some joint arrangement. Indeed, Owen has suggested that sovereignty could be permanently vested in the UN in the form of a strategic trust territory. This is a good deal further than all but the solid left of the Labour Party are prepared to go. But the non-Labour center is eclipsed in current British politics, so there is no likelihood of it ever implementing its policy. It is nonetheless revealing that the clearest opposition position should have been taken by the weakest parties. In a sense, it is a testament to the power and efficacy of Mrs. Thatcher on this issue and to the latent resonance of the issue. OFFICIALDOM Much of Mrs. Thatcher's power came from her unwritten constitutional position: she controlled the party, the cabinet, and the House, and she used her powers of promotion and dismissal ruthlessly. If this were not enough, she also had at her disposal the services of one of the most centralized and efficient administrative machines in the world. Permanent officials have often been seen as the holders of secret political power in Britain by virtue of their collective memory and command of information. Under a weak cabinet and prime minister they may indeed enjoy great autonomy, but it was not so under Mrs. Thatcher. So far as the Falklands were concerned, there were no private projects of any sort, and officials were obliged to faithfully execute her policies. Privately, there were some who showed disenchantment, but their complaints never became public and were never communicated to her in the form of alternative policy suggestions. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) is not particularly popular in British political circles. Partly this is because chauvinist elements in the press and the House are suspicious of the department's inevitable preference for quiet negotiation rather than public attitudinizing. Partly it is because the inevitable concentration on the Atlantic and European theaters has led to a downgrading of peripheral areas in general and colonial residues in particular. And, it must be said, the FCO's collective air of superiority does not help. 21 In the specific context of the Falklands, the FCO has often been seen as "soft" on Argentina. In some circles it is even seen as "pro-Argentine." This is widely believed in the islands, as witness the remark by one ex-councillor to the Foreign Affairs Committee: It is true to say that the Foreign Office has not been trusted. . . . [because they] . . . have come here to request that sovereignty be discussed and, more recently, to suggest ideas such as leaseback, which have not found favor locally, and so they are identified with propositions that are disagreeable to us. 22

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This seems to be a misreading of the position of the FCO. It is true that prior to 1982 it sought compromise with Argentina and even succeeded in (temporarily) selling the option of leaseback to ministers. But, as some islanders will even concede, this strategy came to naught because of the consistent application of the rider that any agreement with Argentina was subject to their agreement. The fact that leaseback was abandoned when it could have been railroaded through suggests that the Foreign Office was not in fact "proArgentine" but merely "pro-diplomacy." At present, the official departmental view is that the hostilities of 1982 and the subsequent reconstruction of the islands have radically altered the calculus of decisionmaking. The Argentine case, they argue, has been seriously weakened. 23 The restoration of relations is seen by many as a vindication of British firmness, though few diplomats believe that the dispute does not have the potential to turn sour again in the future. Other departments in Whitehall are less concerned than the FCO. No doubt the Treasury and the Department of Trade would have preferred to have avoided the costs of reconstruction and the trade embargo, but not to the point of making their reservations public. For so long as the politicians have been prepared to make extra resources available, then it seems the economic departments have preferred to keep their silence. Within the Ministry of Defence the pressures have been a little more in evidence. Officials and seconded officers are agreed that the decision to retake the islands was correct (that it was a lifesaver for the Navy is widely believed), feel vindicated by British martial success, and believe that Britain's credibility elsewhere in the world (Belize for example) has been enhanced. They are also not displeased that commanders have gained useful experience, that equipment has been tested in real-war conditions, and that the government agreed to make good the losses incurred with new and enhanced equipment. Costs and the diversion of assets out of area have been another matter. For so long as the additional costs of garrison keeping are an additional charge upon the defense budget and do not involve cuts elsewhere, the military has not been inclined to press for any change, but there is evidence that concern over the diversion of men and materials away from the NATO area has been real. The argument that it represents only a marginal burden is subscribed to by defense planners but probably not believed by them. 24 Finally, so far as the O v e r s e a s D e v e l o p m e n t A d m i n i s t r a t i o n (ODA)—technically a branch of the Foreign Office—is concerned, the Falklands/Malvinas problem has proved to be something of a poisoned chalice. On the one hand, they have the responsibility for reconstruction and development and have been given adequate resources to meet them. On the other hand, they have found the task more difficult than they had hoped. Lack of infrastructure and specific expertise have led to delay, increased costs, and

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at least one notorious case of mismanagement of funds. The result has been serious criticism from parliamentarians and the media. Moreover, the fact that heavy investments have been made in the islands at a time of cutbacks in the overall level of British overseas aid has not been appreciated by officials who see their main role as alleviating poverty in the Third World. But the ODA has no political clout at all, and its officials, like their counterparts in the parent department, have had no alternative but to toe the government line. The overall picture among the officials of Whitehall has been one of a resigned recognition of political realities. They feel that open dissent from the line laid down by Thatcher and followed by Major would neither be proper nor effective in the absence of strong support from government ministers. THE ISLANDERS It is surprising that, in view of the importance attached to their views, so little is known about the inhabitants of the islands. Argentines have tended to ignore them and, insofar as they consider them at all, have tended to regard them as oppressed colonials exploited by absentee landowners. The British, for their part, have an equally misplaced notion of them as a sturdy crofting yeomanry. Both are wide of the mark. The reality is that island society, despite its small size, is surprisingly complex. Local government employees, contract expatriates, independent farmers, farm managers, shepherds, and nonwaged groups have distinct, though obviously overlapping, interests. This diversity is compounded by differences between Stanley and camp residents, income groups, educational attainments, and personal and family reputation. The islands also have their own postage, coinage, radio station, and representative in London. The fact that their local councillors have become perfectly at home addressing the United Nations suggests that it is a much more sophisticated society than it might at first seem. 25 However, the inhabitants are united in their determination to remain British citizens and in their resistance to any accommodation with Argentina. It may not have always been so. There are suggestions that in 1980, at a time when they were feeling especially demoralized, some islanders were prepared to accept the idea of leaseback. But since 1982, the collective memory of invasion, of the risks run by Britain on their behalf, and of the revival of the island economy through fish licensing has reinforced their solidarity and confidence in themselves. It would be a brave or foolhardy islander who suggested that sovereignty might be discussed with Argentina. 26 Their Britishness, however, is distinctly odd. The islands have no sushi bars, no crime to speak of, no narcotics problem, and no problems of congestion, inner-city decay, or other manifestations of modern Britain. Their way of life, typified by outdoor pursuits and face-to-face communication, evokes

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a pastoral vision of a way of life that barely exists in Britain outside of the Scottish Isles. In fact, island society is not British as such but uniquely Falkland. They are not a displaced or transplanted population but an indigenous one. Their attachment to their "British" identity, then, stems not from a desire to be like Britain but out of their desire to remain unique. 27 Islanders are well aware, of course, that their wishes are not paramount, and they know full well that their good fortune stemmed almost exclusively from the warm feeling that Margaret Thatcher had for them. Thus, while they are deeply suspicious of the Labour Party, the UN, the Foreign Office, the South Atlantic Council, and other soft-liners, they are also aware that they could easily overplay their hand. Sensibly, they restrict their pressure group activities to issues such as fishing, communication links, and the like. They cannot be but a little uneasy about the recent rapprochement with Argentina, but they are far too politically alert to do other than endorse it. It is hard to see what role the islanders will play in the future. Clearly, if a British government is determined on some compromise over sovereignty, they will have to accept it. But in such a situation they will abandon their current low-key position and return to the aggressive lobbying of a decade ago. Such a lobby would have real influence, and the government of the day would have to be very determined indeed to risk such a confrontation. It has also been suggested that more contact with Argentina might help soften islander attitudes. This has been tried in the past and it has failed; such is the gulf in attitude between islanders and Argentines (reinforced by the experience of military occupation), that there is no obvious likelihood of it succeeding in future. For islanders, long-term fears remain, but the status quo is more than acceptable. ANTARCTICA The issue of the Falklands has often been linked with that of Antarctica in the sense that the islands are seen as some sort of gateway to the last unexploited continent. Indeed, some have gone so far as to suggest that the dispute with Argentina is less about the islands than it is about future access to the marine and mineral wealth of the southern ocean and the Antarctic mainland. This geopolitical perspective (which is also to be found in Argentina, especially in military circles) also often includes reference to the potential of the narrows between Cape Horn and Antartica as a Strategic Lane of Communication (SLOC), and to the fact that Argentina and Britain have overlapping territorial claims to the Antarctic mainland. Thus, Lord Shackleton at the time of the conflict: There is much more at stake than the Falkland Islands.... What is at stake and what understandably is in the minds of the Argentineans . . . [is] . . . their claim to Antarctic territory.28

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It is true that both Britain and Argentina have an interest in maintaining their respective claims. It is also true that in the past (as in 1943 and 1952) the two countries have clashed in the area. And the long-standing Argentine commitment to sovereign acts (such as live births and even cabinet meetings) in Antarctica has been paralleled by the 60 percent increase in funding that the British Antarctic Survey has received since 1983. However, too much should not be made of the potential for conflict, for the record over the last ten years shows clearly that Argentina and Britain have a shared interest in distinguishing the future of Antarctica from that of the Falklands. First, both are contracting parties to the Antarctic Treaty and, like other members of that voluntary club, have come to the conclusion that maintaining the treaty offers them more advantage than any breach in it. Both have a vested interest in peace and stability in the region and this is best served by the existing consultative system. Moreover, both have vested interests in resisting the claims of non-Antarctic Treaty States (non-ATS) that the continent belongs to all of humanity and not just nation states active in the regional system. In brief, the issue of the future of Antarctica is distinct from that of the Falklands and is so perceived by both Britain and Argentina. How else could their representatives have continued to calmly discuss Antarctic issues while the war between them raged? CONCLUSION

For so long as Mrs. Thatcher remained prime minister there could be no shift in the British position on sovereignty. And her entrenched policy seems to have been accepted by her successor. Also, there can, in short, be no going back to the status quo ante 1982. Of course, a different (i.e., non-Conservative) government in Britain would have much less commitment to the islands than the present one. But for as long as Argentina remains peaceably inclined, the incentive to tackle the fundamental problem of sovereignty will remain weak. The very most that can be anticipated might be some exploration of the possibility of neutralization or internationalization of the islands. There remains, however, the question of Argentina. President Menem surprised most observers by his acceptance of the British position, but it is not clear how deeply committed he is to it. Much will depend on the British capacity to assist Argentina in its relations with OECD nations and those of the European Community in particular. Much will also depend on the longterm democratic stability of Argentina. While this cannot be foreseen, Britain remains skeptical, and is likely to remain cautious in its future dealings with Argentina.

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NOTES 1. Gallup/Socmerc, March 1990. 2. This suggests that some members of the public may have become resigned to the situation. 3. Closed poll questions, of course, "force" responses from those questioned. 4. It has been suggested that a perceived upturn in economic expectations was behind the win, but the belief that it was due to the Falklands is now established wisdom. No doubt this encouraged Mrs. Thatcher in her policy. 5. Sir John Biggs-Davidson, Hansard, 8 December 1984, col. 864. 6. It is worth recalling that Pym was subsequently sacked. 7. Christmas message to the islanders. Times, 24 December 1983. 8. Times, 27 January 1983. 9. Witness the victory parade after the fighting when, contrary to custom, the salute was taken by Mrs. Thatcher and not by a member of the royal family. On occasion she even inadvertently used the royal "We" and has been roundly mocked for it. 10. Channel 4 News, 4 January 1984. 11. The Falklands Campaign, HMSO, 1982, p. 8. 12. This was done partly to appease radicals at the constituency level in the party. 13. The Falklands Campaign, HMSO, 1982, p. 8. 14. Ibid., 44. 15. G. Armor, Hansard, 22 December 1983, cols. 612-613. 16. D. Healy, Hansard, 20 July 1984, col. 640. 17. Ibid., 22 December 1983, col. 612. 18. In 1983, the present Labour leader made the mistake of accusing Mrs Thatcher of showing her "guts" by spilling those of others. 19. Times, 26 January 1983. 20. Times, 3 June 1983. 21. As the old Whitehall joke has it, the Department of Education lobbies for teachers, the FCO for foreigners. 22. Foreign Affairs Committee, Evidence, HMSO, London, 1983. One islander remarked to me that the FCO was a greater "danger" than Argentina. 23. To support this they point to public condemnation of Britain by OAS members and their private reassurances to the contrary. Too much might be made of this. 24. Given the recent events in Europe, this may change. There is already evidence within the Ministry of Defence of a new enthusiasm for out-of-NATO commitments. 25. The islands are not a nation state but have, in miniature, some of its trappings. 26. This is true especially given that so much communication is via eavesdropped shortwave radio. 27. Many have pointed to the fact that islanders use Anglo-Spanish pastoral terms (such as "camp" for countryside) and it is clear there there is much about modern Britain (such as multi-racialism) of which they disapprove. 28. Lord Shackleton, Hansard (Lords), 3 April 1982, col. 1585.

chapter five

The Argentine Perspective Carlos Floria Foreign policy is not made in a vacuum. A nation's policies toward other states, and the way it handles conflicts of interest with those states, will be shaped by its style of national leadership, by that leadership's perceptions of the nation's strengths, weaknesses, and interests, and by the domestic economic and political realities within which the leadership must operate. This chapter will analyze the leadership style of the present Argentine government as it relates to the country's handling of the Malvinas issue. What, for example, are the government's objectives, both in the near and medium terms, in entering into agreements with Great Britain? How much can the foreign policy establishment of Argentina achieve, especially given the parameters fixed by the country's domestic problems? And what would be the political constraints on any Argentine government attempting to manage, or to settle, the dispute? A STYLE OF GOVERNANCE In his 1989 inaugural speech before the Legislative Assembly, President Carlos Menem declared the following: "As President of Argentina, I am now making an irrevocable pledge. I pledge to devote the majority of my efforts and energies to a cause that I will pursue with the full confidence of complete legal and moral justification. It will be the great Argentine cause: the recovery of our Malvinas, South Georgia, and South Sandwich islands." This goal, expressed with clarity and precision, w a s entirely predictable—any other policy pertaining to the Malvinas would be unthinkable. The principal emphasis of this speech was on the legal and moral legitimacy of the new government, which was the result of the democratic baton being passed from one constitutional government to another; however, the Malvinas issue also figured prominently, even seven years after Argentina's defeat at the hands of the British. The problem that Menem faced was to frame the Malvinas issue in such a way that negotiations with the United Kingdom

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could move forward. The president's inaugural speech led to quick action. The Argentine Foreign Ministry named Ambassador Lucio García del Solár as a special representative. Likewise, the British appointed Sir Crispin Tickell. Garcia del Solár had served as ambassador in Washington during Raúl Alfonsín's presidency and was a career government official and member of the Radical Party during the 1960s when Miguel Angel Zavala Ortiz was the minister of foreign relations for President Arturo Illia. His appointment reflected a desire to continue the difficult negotiations begun by the Alfonsin government and to reestablish relatively flexible contact with the United Kingdom. The style of President Menem himself merits some analysis as well because it reflects in part not only his diplomatic strategy but also his economic strategy. Carlos Menem is at once a charismatic leader and an outsider—not an ideologue but an empiricist. He won the Peronist, or Justicialista, Party nomination for president in the uniquely Argentine "internal" party primaries, facing considerable opposition from the party machinery and with relatively weak union support. Nonetheless, he did receive hundreds of thousands of votes from the party members in the interior provinces and from the critical province of Buenos Aires. When he became the Peronist candidate for president, he did not propose a precise plan of action but rather asked for the good faith of his followers in electing him. Carlos Menem was not only an outsider but, as his policies later demonstrated, he was not supportive of the programmatic traditions of Peronism. As an outsider, he was able to deal with both national and international policy issues with relative ease. Adopting a leadership style that thrived on spectacle, he chose to avoid the use of intermediaries and address the people directly. Further on, we shall analyze the benefits and the costs of this leadership style, and what the president seeks to achieve by adopting it, all of which is closely related to the issue of foreign policy. Peronism—or the Justicialista Party, as it is referred to in formal terms—triumphed in the national elections of 1989 over the Radical Party, which put forward Eduardo Angelóz as its candidate, not so much because of its current platform but rather because of its past history. The Peronist Party was founded on antiliberal and nationalist tenets rather than liberal and pluralistic tenets and considers economic growth and social justice as its most critical objectives. When Raúl Alfonsin triumphed as the head of the Radical Party in 1983, those were not the objectives that people sought. At this point, the country was just emerging from the toughest years of the military regime, a violent decade of internal war, and the bitter experience of defeat in an international war with Great Britain over the Malvinas. It was also facing a potential conflict with Chile, headed off at the last moment through the mediation of Pope John Paul II. The values sought most fervently

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were peace and rule by law. And the political party that best reflected these sentiments was, without a doubt, the Radical Civic Union (UCR). In 1983, the Argentine public was well aware of the fact that the nation had finally moved beyond the "natural state" of the military regime, using Hobbesian terminology, but remained fearful of the ease with which it might revert to this state. In contrast, by 1989, the danger appeared to lie in falling prey to an economic "natural state"—that of hyperinflation. The first constitutional government of Argentina's democratic transition had been quite successful in political and institutional terms. Despite having adopted certain policies that gave rise to much debate and having its hegemony neutralized by a general reluctance to place too much power in the hands of one leader, the government of Alfonsin had at least left the country ideologically calmed and had embarked on a process of institutionalizing the recent changes, although one could still not talk of democratic consolidation. Alfonsin was not successful, however, in administering the economy or other important sectors of the state. He was forced to resign the presidency months before finishing his constitutional mandate, besieged by an all-out and apparently uncontrollable hyperinflation. Carlos Menem found himself taking on the presidential mantle much sooner than planned. In addition to these economic and political problems, Menem also faced a difficult military situation. The relations between Alfonsin and the military establishment had been fraught with hostility as a result of his subjecting the military to public trial for crimes committed under the previous military government. Menem inherited this problem. It is fair to say that few, if any, had a clear idea of how to deal with the military, not even the military establishment itself. However, the military establishment found little objection to the prospect of a Peronist as president; rather, the focus of its increasing hostility was, and continues to be, "Alfonsinism." This, because of a factional, intramilitary battle during the presidency of Alfonsin between a nationalist group, known since the crisis of Holy Week of 1987 as the carapintadas (painted faces—they were called this because they painted their faces in order to distinguish themselves during combat) and the "institutional" group in the army. President Menem took power with the approval of the carapintadas, who saw the Peronists as far more useful intermediaries than the Radicales and the natural subordinates of the institutional army. The battles for power within the army and the careful forging of alliances by a skillful Carlos Menem would modify this view with time, but these were the general perceptions at the beginning of his administration. The new president stepped into power at a propitious moment in the civil sphere as well—Argentine society appeared to have abandoned the strong anti-Peronist sentiment of the "impossible game" era when any government that allowed the free and open participation of Peronists in the struggle for

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power was brought down by a coup. As an outsider who operated outside his own party as well as the others, Carlos Menem had greater freedom of action than would the head of a traditional party. He took full advantage of this freedom from the very moment in which he named his cabinet, when he proved himself skilled in coopting members from political groups that had historically distanced themselves from Peronist politics. The foreign policy of the Menem government should be analyzed within the context of this leadership style and of the economic policy that he proposed from the very beginning of his term—much to the surprise of his followers and his advisers. Under M e n e m , the Peronist Party, with its historically statist and nationalist tradition, emerged as the primary force behind what Menem termed a "popular market economy," giving a populist slant to the "social market economy" idea that had been espoused until that time by liberals and conservatives belonging to other parties such as the Union of the Democratic Center (UCD), led by an old politician of the Argentine right, Alvaro Alsogaray. Naturally, this new economic plan called for the forging of new political and socioeconomic alliances, both internal and external. Domestically, Menem worked to create an alliance that we could call "center-right," embracing the UCD of Alvaro Alsogaray, a majority of the provincial parties, sectors of the old Frondizi wing of the political system, and people who were independent of any party affiliation but associated with certain important economic groups. Such "objective alliances" were being formed before the national elections of 1989 and were supported informally by the Radical groups supporting Eduardo Angeloz. While such a strategy might not be surprising to political analysts, it represented quite a change for "traditional P e r o n i s m " — f o r those loyal to the h i s t o r i c a l t e n e t s and style of Peronism—and for nationalists in general. This alliance of the center-right would find a somewhat adversarial counterpart in a center-left alliance that emerged during the presidency of Alfonsin in opposition to the Angeloz wing of the party. It was made up of such loyal groups as the Coordinadora—a faction of the Radical Party, some sectors of the left, and a good part of the Renovadores—a faction of the Peronist Party led by the current governor of the province of Buenos Aires, Antonio Cafiero. This group was, and continues to be, "center-leftist" with the social democratic characteristics of a European party. This alliance with the center-right affected not only political but also economic policy, a circumstance that came as a surprise to Menem's followers as well as his adversaries. In terms of socioeconomic alliances, contemporary Argentina has long been a battlefield for a group of converging interests made up of both rural and agro-export sectors and competitive national concerns. International and

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multinational firms stood on one side, and national firms, dependent on their relations with the state and union support, stood on the other. It had been the national firms, not the multinationals, that had been the traditional bulwark of Peronism. Yet, from the beginning of his presidential term, Carlos Menem clearly favored the multinationals. His cabinet appointments made these alliances explicit. Executives of a multinational firm founded in Argentina—Bunge and Born—were the first ministers of economy in the presidential cabinet, leading the new economic program; Alvaro Alsogaray was named as presidential counsel for the foreign debt negotiations; an esteemed economist, Javier González Fraga, became the adviser on foreign banks at the Central Bank; Maria Julia Alsogaray, the daughter of UCD leader Alvaro Alsogaray, headed the privatization of the chief national telephone firm. Menem began by amassing all the resources possible to launch a profound economic transformation that would have inevitable political consequences. The "popular market economy" necessitated not only new domestic alliances but also international alliances; therefore, once the choices concerning the political economy were made, the Argentine government turned its attention to evaluating current relations with the United States and the European Community. I will not address these relations in this chapter. If the evaluation was indeed correct, they were analyzed by members of the presidential staff, the Foreign Ministry, and the Ministry of Economy, who all focused on Argentina's national interests, its strong and weak flanks, the distribution of its technological resources, the influence of non-national actors, and the inequalities of military power. In short, the entire inventory of considerations presented at the beginning of this chapter was reviewed by the Argentine government in order to make the most informed decisions possible concerning the spokespeople who would best represent Argentina at the international level. It remains to be seen what degree of success these choices will have. While the Malvinas issue played an important role in the forging of Argentina's political and economic policies, both in the national and international context, there were other circumstances that conditioned the decisions made. These include the critical attitudes and beliefs of significant sectors of the Argentine public and of the "constellation of power." THE SEQUENCE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS CONCERNING THE "MALVINAS QUESTION" The positive reaction of most of the public to the president's inaugural speech before the Legislative Assembly, his reference to the Malvinas as a critical issue for Argentina, and his call for the immediate establishment of negotiations with the United Kingdom were all welcomed, however cautiously, by the British.

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Indeed, as early as August 16-18 of 1989—shortly after the inauguration of the new Argentine government—preliminary talks were held in New York between special representatives from Argentina and the United Kingdom. At the end of this first meeting, a press brief was issued making public the points agreed upon in the meeting. These included the date, the agenda, and the conditions for the next "substantive" meeting between representatives of both governments, which was to take place in Madrid on October 17 and 18,1989. The meeting was to cover the full spectrum of Argentine-British relations, including the future of diplomatic and consular relations. It specified that "when necessary, the discussions will take place under the terms of a formula that protects the position of each party vis-à-vis the sovereignty or territorial and maritime jurisdiction of the Malvinas, South Georgia, and South Sandwich Islands, and the surrounding maritime areas." President Menem had stated earlier that the issue of sovereignty "would be protected by an 'umbrella'"; the formula for the negotiations appeared to draw on this metaphor. According to the communiqué, the meeting in New York was to seek to establish: (1) increased confidence between the parties in order to avoid military incidents; (2) commercial and financial relations; (3) air and maritime communication; (4) an agreement to conserve the stock of fish and establish the basis for future cooperation in the fishing industry; (5) contacts between the Malvinas and the continent; (6) cultural, scientific, and sport relations; and (7) other bilateral issues. The goal held in common by both parties was "peace and stability in the South Atlantic." The meeting in Madrid produced a formula for interpreting the "umbrella of sovereignty" metaphor: "No act or activity that the Republic of Argentina, the United Kingdom, or any third parties carry out as a consequence of and in execution of that which is agreed upon in the present meeting or in any subsequent meeting, can constitute the basis for confirming, supporting, or denying the rights of the Argentine Republic or the United Kingdom relating to the sovereignty or territorial and maritime jurisdiction over the Malvinas and South Georgia and South Sandwich Islands, and the surrounding maritime areas." The declaration also reaffirmed the promise to avoid resort to force and to establish diplomatic and consular relations in accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations. It specified that working groups should be set up to help avoid military incidents, examine the fishing issue, reestablish air and maritime communications between the two countries, and normalize commercial and financial relations by lifting the restrictions that had persisted since the onset of the conflict. Under the aegis of this agreement, the British government agreed to work toward the reestablishment of cooperative relations between Argentina and the European Community, which for the Argentines was one of the most important objectives of the entire negotiating process.

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For its part, the British delegation announced unilateral decisions of varying degrees of importance. Most importantly, these included the elimination of an unilateral prohibition that required that Argentine merchant ships not enter the British military "zone of protection," which had been established around the islands as a result of the Malvinas conflict. Nonetheless, the zone of fishing conservation and administration, which encompassed the same area as the zone of protection and which was also out of bounds to the Argentines, was not eliminated; therefore, Argentine fishing vessels are still not allowed to fish in these waters. The implication of those decisions is still in dispute in Argentina. In Montevideo, Uruguay, on December 5 and 6,1989, the working group on military issues met. The result was a series of agreements related to increasing the security of maritime and air navigation in the South Atlantic, particularly in cases of emergency, in order to avoid armed confrontation. The group also prepared the final report of the delegations to be presented to both governments during a meeting in Madrid on February 8 and 9,1990. The working group on fishing met in Paris on December 18 and 19, 1989. The communiqué issued after that meeting contains various agreements on reciprocal reporting of scientific findings concerning the fishing resources south of the 45th parallel. In the future, treatment of this issue would also involve the Falklanders, as will be seen. The special representatives held a "second substantive meeting" in Madrid, on February 14 and 15,1990. This meeting produced a joint declaration that begins with a reiteration of the agreement made at the first meeting concerning the sanctity of the sovereignty issue and follows with the statement of a bilateral decision to reestablish diplomatic relations. It also makes public the decision by the British to deactivate the Protection Zone established around the Malvinas Islands by March 31,1990. The fact that the war had taken place and that the inhabitants of the islands were concerned about future Argentine behavior gave immediacy to the question of military security. Systems of information and reciprocal consultations were established vis-à-vis the activity and movement of armed units in areas of the Southwest Atlantic within the limits allowed by the sovereignty issue. This system, activated vigorously on March 31, 1990, was designed not only to reduce the possibility of incidents but also to limit the consequences of such incidents if they were to occur. During the second substantive meeting in Madrid, officials decided to establish a "Working Group on South Atlantic Affairs," which would include the military and fishing working groups. Through normal diplomatic channels, they are dealing with issues such as: communications between the islands and the continent; the elimination of the visa requirement for nationals in both countries—which would be resolved in a matter of weeks; the protection of the environment; ways of cooperating in the battle against narcotics

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trafficking; and the formalization of the accord reached by the fishing group concerning fishing rights. O n February 26, embassies in B u e n o s Aires and L o n d o n w e r e finally opened. And on M a y 1, 1990, in his message before the Legislative Assembly, President M e n e m stated: Just as I announced in my inaugural address before this same honored assembly, our sovereign rights over the Malvinas, South Georgia, and South Sandwich Islands represent the most important issue in our foreign policy. The basic objectives of our actions were to reinitiate a constructive dialogue with the British government in order to recreate a bilateral framework that promotes friendship and cooperation between both countries and which, in the future, will permit us to resolve the territorial dispute in peace through negotiations. This policy bore fruit in the agreements reached in Madrid February 14 and 15, 1990. The joint declaration made on this occasion served as the basis for a wide range of accords and measures aimed at putting relations between Argentina and the United Kingdom back on track. At the same time, through the mechanism of the so-called umbrella of sovereignty, the preservation of our country's rights over the territories in question was insured. Those rights will remain intact until the day in which both governments can begin a search for a lasting solution to this problem.

These statements by the Argentine president announce the beginning of a long journey toward establishing the conditions needed to achieve a recognition of the rights that Argentina considers to have been ignored. That "long j o u r n e y " has begun with deliberate and realistic steps. But it will not be an easy journey, particularly for the Argentines, w h o have to deal with, and attempt to accommodate, obsolete analyses of the situation, popular sentiment, partisan interests, the effects of the changes in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, the interests of the islanders, and the foreign policy of Great Britain. S o m e of these aspects deserve a more detailed reading.

A REVIEW OF HISTORY

To be effective, political analysis needs to be carried out at several levels. This is particularly true of the Malvinas question. We shall therefore examine: (1) events leading up to the crisis and their impact on the outcome, (2) public opinion concerning the Malvinas issue, and (3) the unique behavior patterns of the national and international actors involved. In the case of this study, this does not m e a n an analysis of the ideas themselves—as relevant as they m a y b e — b u t of their manifestation across diverse sectors of society and their impact on Argentine policy. The Argentines of the 1920s looked on the formulation of ideological, political, and economic conflicts, themselves inextricably bound to international issues, with both suspicion and enthusiasm. This mixed reaction w a s

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particularly the case as the legitimacy of the liberal constitutional regime was undermined by the emergence of antiliberal nationalism, a movement with a very complex political and social history that has always represented the "nationalist tradition" of Argentina. The nineteenth-century ideas espoused by Alberdi, Sarmiento, and other lesser-known thinkers ran into problems when applied institutionally and when adapted to a new political culture. Nonetheless, they did not suffer the severe intellectual contradictions of the antiliberal nationalist movement reflected in twentieth-century Argentine political thought. Liberals and a wide range of nationalists, including those embracing the French ideas of Charles Maurras, the Spanish variation of his ideas, and, to a lesser extent, the Italian and German fascist versions, bitterly disputed the question of "national identity" and the character of the true enemy of the country. They also disagreed on which were the domestic and international factors that prevented Argentina from donning the mantle of protagonist on the world stage, a role that Argentines as well as many foreigners felt was Argentina's "manifest destiny." These intellectual debates had a profound impact on Argentine political thought and led to: (1) a serious fragmentation of the political culture, (2) dramatically opposing ideas about which are the most legitimate and effective political and economic regimes, and (3) the debate over how to achieve a role for Argentina in the global system. Shouldn't it be immediately obvious that a critical condition for the insertion of Argentina into the global system would be relative internal stability? Shouldn't it be recognized that Argentina's institutional instability worked against its playing a more significant role in the world at large, and that it might, in fact, deserve Thomas McMann's cordial observation that Argentina is a "maverick"—unpredictable and undependable? Around the middle of the 1960s, it was generally accepted that, to have an active role in the international system, a nation needed the following attributes: (1) the desire to maintain a sustained presence in certain critical international theaters such as the United Nations—to do so, Argentina used the foreign policy establishments of Brazil and France as models to create the official body of permanent, independent actors with the technical and cultural training it needed; (2) the desire to be the "lord of its own destiny," an ambitious expression that recognizes both the importance of international relations and the need for a nation to have autonomy in its political, economic, and military spheres; (3) the ability to effectively solve the critical problems that often affect important nations; and (4) an appreciation of global issues and of the relative strengths and weaknesses of medium-sized nations as well as the superpowers. In sum, this analysis calls for a nation to have a strong, international presence, sufficient technical expertise, and some decisive political, economic, and

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military options at its disposal in order to move onto the global stage. The common perception was that the Argentine foreign policy establishment had none of these tools in the mid-1960s. Within this political and intellectual framework, critics assert that the constant elements of Argentine foreign policy have often paradoxically contributed to its very inconsistency. "The Argentine Republic has always lacked a foreign policy of the type that Cobden recommended for England and Gladstone put into practice." This statement is over 100 years old and was made by Sarmiento in the opening speech of the session of the Argentine Congress in May 1868. Members of the ruling Liberal Party and of the incipient revisionist nationalist movement made the same observation. In conclusion, the primary "constant" in Argentina foreign policy has been its inconsistency. Gustavo Ferrari, a noted Argentine foreign policy analyst, adds six more: (1) pacifism, (2) isolationism, (3) evasion by means of law, (4) moralism, (5) confrontation with the United States and Europeanism, and (6) territorial disintegration. Note the ambivalence of this list, which was, after all, made up by a respected intellectual who dedicated his life to carrying out a historical analysis of Argentine foreign policy. His conclusion is a veiled criticism of Argentine foreign policy and exhibits a lack of conformity with its tenets. While Ferrari's observations were not universally accepted, they did find resonance in diplomatic circles, and particularly in military circles, because the Argentine military has long considered foreign policy to be, if not its unique domain, at least within the realm of its responsibility. Indeed, some feel that the military has all too often "expropriated" such themes from the ruling party. Ferrari's list had sufficient historical relevance to at least open up a debate over Argentina's foreign policy objectives and methods. As concerns the issue of "pacifism," Argentina was not always pacifist, just as Chile and Great Britain, for example, were not. Instead, from the time of independence until the end of the nineteenth century, it tended to be bellicose—in order to liberate its peoples, of course—and would become so again in the 1970s and 1980s under military rule. The debate over Argentina's foreign policy objectives reappears when Ferrari examines the Argentine tendency toward national disintegration. To what extent is his observation that Argentina is susceptible to national disintegration justified, given that "territorial nationalism" played such a powerful role in Argentina political thought, particularly in the realm of international issues? If one's analysis is based on a "viceroyship" concept of Argentina, the nation most certainly has lost territories. Chile has reached this conclusion regarding its own territories, as have many other Latin American nations. In fact, one researcher proposes a curious thesis that Latin America suffers from a kind of territorial megalomania that has given rise to such delusions as that

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of a "Grand Bolivia," and a "Grand Peru." When the "maps" that come out of such thinking are superimposed on reality, they provide a poignant illustration of the shattered dreams of history. The most relevant analysis concerning Argentine territorial integrity is put forward by the Argentine Carlos Escudé. He states that the dominant perception held by the Argentines concerning their borders comes from the estimates of the uti possidetis act of 1810 and proposes that these borders were actually fictitious. While the first theory proposes that Argentina has been steadily losing territories, the second maintains that Argentina gained territory, or at least retained what it had originally, except for the Malvinas and nearby territories. Escudé actually expresses reservations about the relevance of some of the Argentine claims over these territories—a view that would be inadmissable for a vast majority of Argentines on the basis of international law and political ethics. TENDENCIES IN ARGENTINE FOREIGN POLICY

Argentine foreign policy is profoundly affected by its geographical situation—it is a country in the south of the South in terms of its history, its demography, its natural resources, its technological capability, its political culture, and its relations with other countries. If one carries out an ethical and objective analysis of Argentine foreign policy, one can easily reach the same conclusion as José Maria Ruda, the Argentine judge who serves on the International Court at The Hague. He underscores a f e w c o m m o n themes that run through the debate over Argentine foreign policy: • • • • • •

The tendency toward isolationism The tendency toward a leadership role in Latin America The tendency to a "moderate Latinamericanism" "Anti-yanquism" "Europeanism" "Rule by principles"

In the case of the Malvinas, the contradictions inherent in this list, in combination with a grossly inadequate understanding of the international sphere, would inevitably have a severe impact on Argentine politics and, above all, on its stubborn people. At this point, I would like to propose an interesting digression. According to the policy platforms of the Argentine political parties active in the elections of 1983, the "Malvinas question" was addressed in the following ways. The Justicialist or Peronist Party formulated its foreign policy within the

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ideological framework of what Peron referred to as "the Third International Position," promoting pragmatic relations with the United States, Western Europe, and the Soviet Union. In the conflict with Great Britain, the Peronists proposed the affirmation of sovereignty over the island territories of the South Atlantic by means of a "peaceful and just" solution to the conflict, with the support of the rest of Latin America. The victorious Radical Civic Union (UCR) proposed an independent foreign policy based on the principles of the defense of sovereignty, territorial integrity, sovereign equality between states, nonintervention, respect for the free self-determination of peoples, opposition to any kind of imperialism, colonialism, or neocolonialism, repudiation of racism, affirmation of ideological pluralism, universal respect for human rights, reestablishment of relations with the United States and Europe, and universal condemnation of international terrorism. As far as the Malvinas issue was concerned, the UCR called for the recuperation of the islands "through the realization of the resolutions of the General Assembly of the United Nations concerning the issue, especially of 2065 (XX) and 37/9." The Movement of Integration and Development (MID), headed by exPresident Arturo Frondizi, emphasized the importance of diplomacy in dealing with the Malvinas question within the broader rubric of economic development, national integration, and institutional recovery. The Communist Party, electorally irrelevant, said Argentina could depend upon the "socialist community . . . as one of the most active supporters of our anti-imperialist objectives" in the case of the Malvinas. In keeping with the typical ambiguity of Argentine communism, it proposed that the Malvinas be recovered by "determining the ways and means most suited to the circumstances." The UCD, led by Alvaro Alsogaray, proposed that independent civil authorities investigate the political and diplomatic aspects of the war. It also called on the military to assume responsibility for having initiated and waged the war so that it could then declare it ended. A review of the range of foreign policy options put forward during the 1983 campaign period contributes to a more complete understanding of Argentine history. It also highlights some of the classic elements of Argentine foreign policy as formulated by Ruda and espoused at this time by the two dominant parties: the Justicialista Party and the Unión Civica Radical. The foreign policy of the victorious Radical government under Raúl Alfonsín between 1983 and 1989 can be summed up as follows: (1) nonalignment, (2) a peaceful solution to all disputes, (3) an active involvement in the international arena, (4) selective participation in North-South issues, (5) the exercise of open, public diplomacy (in contrast to the secret diplomacy of the military establishment), and (6) the recuperation of control over foreign policy under more serious, applied management. These goals are interrelated. For

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example, the search for peaceful solutions to disputes was put forward not just out of ethical concerns but also because it was politically convenient and realistic—peace was not simply a Utopian value but a strategy for securing a meaningful role for Argentina on the global stage. Even though the approach tried by the Alfonsin administration was not completely successful, it did reflect the wise assumption that a policy of reintegrative nationalism would likely work against the national interest. This apparent paradox has typified traditional Argentine foreign policy and provides important insights into the Malvinas conflict. PUBLIC OPINION AND THE MALVINAS QUESTION There is what a classic analyst of contemporary Argentine literature, Eduardo Mallea, refers to in his Story of an Argentine Passion as an "interior" Argentina. There is also a "secret" Argentina engendered by the distance between popular sentiment and the actions of the nation's leaders. Public surveys are far from decisive in providing a reading of these sentiments and attitudes, but they do provide valuable insights. In the past, foreign policy has not captured the imagination of the Argentine public. There has long been a firm conviction—unchallenged even by most intellectuals and analysts—that Argentina's sovereignty over the Malvinas is undeniable; therefore the issue had simply not been the subject of domestic debate. However, foreign policy became a subject of national concern during the 1970s: the Beagle Channel dispute with Chile and the Malvinas conflict with Great Britain transformed foreign policy into the transcendent problem of the moment. If peace and government by law were the predominant values sought by the populace on the eve of the national elections of 1983, the sentiment sprung in large part from Argentina's recent experiences with domestic conflict and international war. The collective memory of Argentine society was as profoundly affected by the culture of violence of the 1970s as it was by the policy decisions made during the first part of the 1980s, which kept it in a suspended state of insecurity. Experience shows that the collective memory of the Argentines is weak and selective. What margin for action does a government have in formulating a foreign policy with so little input from its people? Conversely, how prudent is a foreign policy that presumes the indifference of a collective memory or attempts to exploit its perceived weakness? In March 1990, the firm of Socmerc of Argentina under the direction of sociologists Manuel Mora and Felipe Noguera, together with the Gallup firm in Great Britain, carried out simultaneous political polls in both countries examining popular reaction to the establishment of relations b e t w e e n Argentina and Great Britain and to the other agreements reached. According to the final report prepared by both institutions, voters were

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consulted as to whether they supported four of the points agreed upon in the meetings in Madrid: the restoration of diplomatic relations, the establishment of direct flights between Buenos Aires and London, the raising of restrictions on bilateral commerce, and the granting of permission to the families of Argentines killed during the Malvinas conflict to visit their graves in the islands. One more issue was included, although it was not formally approved: whether or not the voters supported an international agreement over fishing rights "which included Great Britain, Argentina, Uruguay, and other fishing countries." On these five points, the responses were clearly favorable; four of the five points received greater support from Argentine voters than from British (see Table 5.1).

Table 5.1

Response to the Socmerc and Gallup Polls British Total Cons

Diplomatic relations Direct air flights Ending trade restrictions Visits to war graves Fishing agreement

70 69 68 90 74

69 67 66 88 73

Lab 70 69 70 91 75

Argentine Total Prnst 81 78 75 97 71

81 73 76 95 74

Rad 79 85 79 97 73

UCD Left 89 93 93 96 71

87 74 63 94 63

Note: Figures are given as percentages of those who "Agree strongly" or "Agree" with each point in the main parties: Conservative and Labour in Great Britain, and in Argentina Peronist, Radical, Union of the Democratic Center, and the Movement for Socialism and other left parties. In both countries there were also minor parties and respondents who made no choice.

In A r g e n t i n a , the s a m p l e of v o t e r s c o n s u l t e d included P e r o n i s t s , Radicales, and members of the UCD and the left. In Great Britain, members of the Conservative and Labour parties were consulted. There were no significant differences of opinion registered between the Conservative and Labour voters in Great Britain, nor between Peronists and Radicales in Argentina. The right to visit the graves of the war dead was virtually uncontested in the two countries, despite the reservations of the Falklanders. The majority of public opinion favored establishing reciprocal official contacts; however, the questions posed also sought to ascertain public opinion on what should have been done before the war broke out (see Table 5.2). The question of sovereignty clearly affected the Argentines more than the British. In both countries, the majority of those polled supported the official policy of their respective homelands, but only 33 percent of the British supported the permanent sovereignty of Great Britain over the Islands, while 66

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Table 5.2 Response to the Leaseback Question

Very good idea Good idea Bad idea Very bad idea Don't know

British Total

Cons

Lab

6 23 36 17 19

4 19 35 28 14

8 28 35 12 17

Argentine Total

Prnst

Rad

UCD

Left

4 28 47

2 29 41

5 25 49

4 54 36

2 33 48

-

-

21

28

-

21

-

7

-

17

Note: The question read: "Before the war, Britain and Argentina discussed the idea of leaseback—that is, Britain would give the Falklands to Argentina but the islanders would remain under British control for the lifetimeof the present islanders. Do you think that this would have been a very good, good, bad, or very bad idea?"

Table 5.3 Response to the Future Question British Total Cons Permanently British Handed to Argentina Be independent Some compromise Don't know

33 9 22 25 11

48 5 20 19 8

Lab 29 13 19 27 11

Argentine Total Prnst 2 66 8 18 6

1 75 5 11 7

Rad

UCD

Left

1 64 8 24 4

7 54 11 25 4

4 63 11 17 4

Note: The question read: "What do you think would be the best long-term future for the Falklands—to remain permanently British, to handed over to the Argentines, to be independent, or some compromise arrangement?"

percent of the Argentines claimed sovereignty over the islands (see Table 5.3). The distinct possibility of a compromise settlement being reached between the two countries was reflected in the response to the options presented in Table 5.4. When each option was considered separately—except that relating to the Malvinas being administered by the United Nations, a question not submitted to the Argentines due to an involuntary error—the results showed the Argentines to be firmly decided on the issue of sovereignty but willing to seek a negotiated solution (see Table 5.5). This reflects a definite change in the Argentine stance. S o c m e r c points out that in 1984 a majority of Argentines adamantly resisted the idea of a negotiated solution with Great Britain. Five years later, 58 percent supported negotiations. It appears that the majority of the British were more concerned with accommodating the wishes of the Falklanders than with resolving the question of sovereignty over the territory. Even in the Argentine survey, 61 percent of

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Table 5.4

Realities

Response to the Compromise Question British Total

Argentine Total Prnst

Cons

Lab

8

16

75

4

7

8 48 32

An Argentine province with guarantees of a 13 separate way of life for the islanders Leaseback 6 Joint control of the two countries 13 A United Nations administration 42 None, don't know 26

Rad

UCD

Left

79

75

68

78

1

0

1

0

0

16

11

9

13

14

13

42 20

3 10

2 9

1 11

14 4

4 4

Note: The question read: "Various compromise arrangements have been suggested. Which of the following do you find the most acceptable?"

Table 5.5

Percentage Acceptance of Each Option Considered Separately British Total Cons

Lab

Argentine Total Prnst

Rad

UCD

Left

An Argentine province with guarantees Acceptable Unacceptable

33 47

24 60

41 41

87 7

87 7

86 1

100 0

89 7

Leaseback Acceptable Unacceptable

20 56

23 58

18 51

24 62

23 66

18 66

39 61

28 61

Joint control Acceptable Unacceptable

30 53

22 65

39 46

34 56

30 63

29 56

54 46

28 63

United Nations administration Acceptable Unacceptable

57 25

58 20

57 24

Question not asked in Argentina

those polled accepted the fact that the "Falklanders" should be consulted, although 37 percent did not feel that they should have the final say on the fate of the islands. In sum, the general opinion was that the finalization of the accords would be welcome but that much remains to be done before this can be achieved. It is true that the most critical issues the Argentines face today are not

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related to foreign affairs but rather to domestic issues such as the cost of living, education, and health. In a questionnaire that addressed these concerns as well, the polls reflected little interest in the Malvinas question: 1 percent. In Great Britain, it elicited 0 percent interest. Nonetheless, as soon as the central focus became the "international issues" facing both countries, while the British were primarily concerned about the environment, the Economic Community, Hong Kong, Eastern Europe, world peace, German unity, and the conflict in Northern Ireland, 42 percent of the Argentines cited the foreign debt and 22 percent the Malvinas conflict as their priorities. OTHER VOICES, OTHER CONTEXTS Occasionally there are isolated events that have some influence on foreign policy; for example, the recent visit to Argentina of the archbishop of Canterbury, Robert Runcle, brought to public attention the importance of the Malvinas question for the global religious community. The Buenos Aires Herald in its political editorial of June 3, 1990, and La Nación in its religious column of June 4, 1990, reported that the conflict was frequently referred to throughout Runcle's visit. The Anglican bishop stated that, in his opinion, "there has been significant progress made since the Madrid agreements, while maintaining due respect for the stipulation that the sovereignty of the islands not be discussed" (La Nación). The Malvinas issue was also the dominant theme during the dramatic trip of Pope John Paul II to Argentina in 1982 and has continued to be an issue of concern for the Catholic church both in Rome and in Argentina. The coincidence of both spiritual leaders on the importance of this issue is significant. Runcle clarified that the Malvinas question was not addressed during his visit with Menem, which lasted nearly an hour, except in a brief reference to it "as a sad occasion that should help us to build better relations in the future by its example." There are more than just two players in this game. The 1,800 islanders represent much more than an appendix of Great Britain. A little-known report on this issue, direct and substantive, was written by Hugh O'Shaughnessy, Latin American correspondent of the Observer of London, published in the Catholic paper the Tablet in its London edition of August 12,1989, and reprinted in the Catholic magazine Criterio in Buenos Aires on January 18, 1990. O'Shaughnessy reports that "the Faraway Island of John Bull" has undergone a profound political and economic transformation over the last few years that neither Argentina nor Great Britain can ignore. This transformation provides the subject for his analysis which is widely recognized by both governments and by an elite group of readers as one of the most interesting documents of its kind. It highlights the appearance of a '"specific nationalism'; coherent, welldefined: a resistance to intruders and an affirmation of native political will in

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the islands." As O'Shaughnessy asserts, this new ideology could be harmful to negotiations; furthermore, it is being managed in a surreptitious manner that is characteristically "Falklandian." In the end, whether the ideology prevails or not, island politics will most likely never be the same. Simultaneous with the current negotiation process between the Argentine and British governments, an internal crisis has arisen in the islands. At issue is the "Strategy for Agricultural Concession," a project in which the government of the now-rich Falkland Islands proposes to foster its agricultural sector by providing it with investment funds made available through the considerable income now at the disposal of the authorities in Stanley. This income, which has made the Falklands the wealthiest community in the Western Hemisphere, according to the rather misleading index of per capita gross national product (GNP), results from a decision by the British government to place a 150-mile fishing limit around the Islands and to allow the government at Stanley to exact a tax on all international boats that fish in those prolific waters. In 1989, those taxes yielded more than £18,000 sterling per islander in a territory that boasts a total annual budget of not more than £600,856. The existence of that zone and that privilege is among the thorniest topics for negotiation, particularly for the British, and has led to the organization of a special fishing rights working group. Under these circumstances, it is not surprising that the apathetic approach to politics that characterized the Falklanders of the 1970s has given way to a more active and affirmative role focussed on obtaining political and economic independence. According to O'Shaughnessy, the inhabitants accepted that they were protected by the British Foreign Office during the 1970s and until the war of 1982 because of their status as an "unjustifiable colonial dependency" whose eventual absorption by the government of Buenos Aires could only improve relations between the United Kingdom and Latin America. The Foreign Office did everything possible to guide the islands into the economic orbit of Argentina in the hope that this policy would accelerate the absorption process. Such a strategy engendered in the Falklanders "the lack of selfesteem and insecurity found in a child abandoned by his parents." But that soon changed. As O'Shaughnessy observes, "After the recapture of the Malvinas, London reverted to its policy of subtle economic and political subversion in an effort to rebuild the islands within an environment of greater confidence and viability. The measures adapted included loans and concessions and the declaration of an exclusive fishing zone, the result of an intense lobbying effort by certain islanders well-versed in politics and wellconnected in London." The activity and economic prosperity that the new fishing regime brought with it exceeded expectations. In a period of eight years, the islanders went from orphanage to privilege and wealth, from underdevelopment and marginalization to development and self-esteem.

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O'Shaughnessy states: "To turn the Falklanders over to Argentina, which in 1979 would have been considered an abortion, would now be seen as infanticide." In sum, the newly assertive character of the Falklanders increases the complexity of the negotiation process for Argentina. Predictably, this change is not sufficiently appreciated by either the British or the Argentines, as reflected in the opinion polls, but it has been noted by informed observers. This new Falklander nationalism, combined with the islands' recent economic affluence, has also given rise to a desire for self-determination. Whereas in Madrid and New York there were only two parties at the table—Argentina and Great Britain—today the islanders—rich, prosperous, and nationalistic—have emerged as a third party that considers its interests only partially represented by the diplomats of the mother country. That is the fact of the matter, and it would be ill-advised to ignore it. In addition to examining the new Falklander nationalism and the rather cautious role of the British diplomatic establishment in the negotiations, the Argentine nationalist tradition must also be taken into account. That tradition is alive and well within small, militant segments of society. It could easily spread. Traditionally, nationalist sentiments have affected the entire "constellation of power" in Argentina in both the political and social realms. Although more active in the past, they reappear now and again, above all in certain sectors of the military and the unions, the antiliberal right, the leftist groups that espouse causes like anti-imperialism, and the populist wings of the parties, especially that of Peronism. Correspondingly, nationalist ideology has exacerbated the characteristic tendency toward factionalism within the military, as reflected in intense battles for power within the institution. The influence of the so-called carapintadas (painted faces) movement is not easy to measure, but some of its constituent groups enjoy the firm support of important sectors within the military. Its leaders, and those who aspire to leadership positions, invoke the issue of traditional nationalism as critical to Argentine interests and solidly defend the military's role in the war of the Malvinas. Their slogans of opposition to the official conduct of the military reflect a desire to recover the institution's lost dignity, reestablish institutional unity, and redress a perceived wrong inflicted on the national interest. They are fully aware that the Malvinas question is a worthy flashpoint for these sentiments. Argentina must take these sentiments into account in forging an effective foreign policy during the nation's difficult transition to democracy, and care must be taken to avoid policies that would exacerbate factionalism. Although nationalism may have been rejected as the driving force of Argentine policy, it would be ingenuous to suppose that it is completely absent, particularly in the context of a military institution convulsed by defeat and facing the transition to a constitutional republic with its open wounds fully exposed.

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Argentine foreign policy in the Malvinas conflict is a "long march" along a narrow and rocky path. Policymakers must face not only internal problems but also external factors that encroach on the domestic sphere. For example, British attitudes are critical to the success of the negotiations; according to O'Shaughnessy, a reasonable management by the British of the situation before the initiation of the conflict might have led both parties to a negotiated solution of the sovereignty issue. That aside, the current British willingness to address the legitimate issues that concern the Argentines is a hopeful sign that a solution satisfactory to both parties is within reach. One can only pray that this sentiment prevails in Great Britain, despite the current lobbying efforts by the Falkland nationalists. Initially, President Alfonsin had to do a careful balancing act in his handling of the Malvinas issue. Public opinion did not then support open negotiations with Great B r i t a i n u n l e s s s o v e r e i g n t y w a s to be d i s c u s s e d . Government-to-government diplomacy failed to break that impasse. Military disgruntlement threatened Alfonsin's government on several occasions, and might have become a more serious problem if he had appeared soft on the Malvinas issue. According to political scientists Roberto Russell and Francisco Corigliano, in a comparative analysis of foreign policy under President Alfonsin and President Menem, the general sentiment within the Peronist Party as Menem came to office was that the Malvinas question had reached a deadlock under Alfonsin. One possible solution was to remove the debate from the seat of the United Nations under the conviction that this organization had proven "insufficient and incompetent" in the words of the Peronist politician Italo Luder. Russell and Corigliano observe that Dante Caputo, Alfonsin's foreign minister, himself initially an enthusiastic supporter of the use of international fora to air this debate, ended his term recognizing the limits of such a multilateral strategy. The exploration of alternative channels was made through "white papers," in one of which, dated July 12, 1987, Caputo included the "umbrella" metaphor that set the sovereignty issue apart from the other issues related to the conflict. The analysis of these two political scientists shows the pragmatic approach of the government of Carlos Menem as one of "resigned realism," the attitude of British diplomacy as a policy of power without concessions for Argentina, and British inflexibility in the negotiations as part of a dilemma that Alfonsin's diplomacy could not resolve. From the Argentine perspective, the United States had moved from a position of unconditional ally to that of a worried ally who intervened to resolve the conflict peacefully, to slow the plundering of the fishing resources in the zone, and to reestablish acceptable and fluid relations not only with the civil society but also with the military society. In short, the impasse in Argentine-British relations had not only hardened the conditions of the

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negotiations but had shaken almost all of the international actors: the United States, Europe, Brazil, and Uruguay. The support for Argentine diplomacy by the latter two Latin American countries on certain difficult points is practically imperceptible. The agreements reached by the Menem government have broken the impasse—a circumstance that few would deny; the Radicales view them as representative of a more "bland" position being adopted by Argentina, while the former supporters of Frondizi and Alsogaray back them without reservation, and the Peronists are split according to whether they support historical Peronism or President Menem's Renewalist movement. The Radicales should be prudent in their criticisms, because any intransigence on their part might well act against Argentina's international interests. The least that Argentine diplomacy should strive toward—particularly after the example of the frustrated 1984 meeting in Bern—is to keep open the negotiating process itself while taking care that the sovereignty issue remains under the protection of the symbolic umbrella. Of course, not all Argentines agree with the moderate course chosen by President Menem. A relatively small group of ultranationalists believe the islands should be returned to Argentina immediately and without any caveats. They would probably support the use of force to achieve that. An even smaller number of Argentines see economic relations with Great Britain and the other countries of the European Community as of such overriding importance that they would be willing to put the Malvinas issue aside—perhaps forever. Fortunately, however, most Argentines, and the great majority of the principal actors, operate within the central nave of the political cathedral. They wish to pursue the matter of sovereignty, but peacefully and patiently. There is fundamental agreement on the methodology adopted by the Menem government in dealing with the Malvinas issue, though there are disagreements over the extent of the concessions made by the British. Critics observe that (1) there needs to be an implicit confirmation of the zones of security and preservation; (2) the concessions made concerning the provision of information on the movement of vessels and warships contradict the terms of the declarations that affirm that a state of war does not exist; (3) the "harsh verbal interchanges," reflective of an anxiety to obtain results, are inconsistent with the kind of actions, historical consciousness, and strategic objectives needed as a basis for negotiation; (4) there has been insufficient caution observed in separating the desire to reestablish necessary relations from the pursuit of the still-disputed but genuine rights of a nation; and (5) if the minimum objective of open and revived negotiations is still sought, there have already been too many concessions and admissions made without reciprocal gestures. In sum, what must be done is to maintain the negotiations, thereby protecting the sovereignty issue without jeopardizing the carefully laid

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groundwork needed in both Argentina and Great Britain for a decisive negotiation. THE CASE OF THE ANTARCTIC There is one other point related to the Malvinas situation that should be examined—the rights that Argentina and other countries claim over regions in the Antarctic, a discussion that has apparently been suspended for the moment by mutual agreement. As is the case with many countries, Argentine maps include this disputed area, known as Argentine Antarctica, within its territory. In April 1990, the Chamber of Deputies voted to create the new province of Tierra del Fuego, comprising the old territory of Tierra del Fuego, the Malvinas, and other South A t l a n t i c islands, and the section of the Antarctic that Argentina claims as its own. The vote was carried despite the assertion by the opposition that the chamber was approving a law that created a "utopian province," over some parts of which the authority of the Argentine state did not yet extend. Further, as noted by the Radical congressman Jorge Vanossi, "the inclusion of the islands would adversely affect negotiations with the United Kingdom over the Malvinas." According to reports of this debate, the creation of the province of Tierra del Fuego by the Argentine legislature reflects two sentiments: the predominant opinion concerning Argentine sovereignty over the islands and the increasing conviction that Argentina has manifest rights over part of the Antarctic. The first point is simply an extension of the Malvinas issue. The second sentiment is the desire to build public support for Argentine claims in part by not presenting the counterarguments. As such, when it becomes clear that Argentina's claims over the Antarctic are virtually unrecognized at the international level, there could well be a frustrated reaction and the suspicion that Argentina had, once again, suffered the amputation of part of its territory. We have here, then, an example of Argentine foreign policy that connects the Malvinas issue with the Antarctic issue. Some favor a very specific foreign policy toward Antarctica that centers on ecological issues. But those opinions do not reflect wider public sentiment. W h y ? Because it is known that Argentina favors its claims in previous national sovereignty acts. The British, as well as the various countries that have signed the Antarctic Treaty, do not have better rights than the Argentines. In reality, the future of the Antarctic region is a different question. The geopolitics is only one side of the issue. A DELICATE FOREIGN POLICY The road that lies ahead is not an easy one, but the current state of the Malvinas negotiations is more or less favorable for Argentina if the nation can depend on the support of a stable, constitutional regime and if certain

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indispensable conditions are met. First, Argentina must approach both the negotiations with the United Kingdom and the terms of the accords that have reopened those negotiations from the position of a vanquished party in an international war. Second, the accords must reflect the fact that the war was waged as a result of the decision of a military government whose understanding in 1982 of the international situation and the relationship between forces was highly questionable and was judged as such in an Argentine court of law. Third, it must be acknowledged that there was a war, with dead and heroes on both sides, although the true heroes are those who have least claimed or achieved that status. Fourth, as in every postwar treaty or accord, each party must recognize that its counterpart will seek to protect its own interests with varying degrees of luck or success. Fifth, the treaties must depend not only on the degree to which they are respected by each party but also on historical circumstances. Sixth, the privileged status of the Falklanders must be recognized by Argentina and taken into consideration by the two negotiating parties, whether critical or supportive of a given policy. Falklander nationalism and its postconflict economic prosperity are little appreciated in Argentina or Great Britain and have a fundamental role to play in the negotiation process. In the end, it is necessary to examine closely the conditions under which the parties have come to the negotiation table. Certainly, the Argentine negotiators do not enjoy great advantages. The fact that Argentina is in a profound crisis and vulnerable is a fundamental point that no policy analyst should underestimate. However, this should not encourage any disparagement of the Argentine position, nor encourage a British relapse into indifference. In short, sensible realism must be observed in dealing with the negotiations. Argentine foreign policy should proceed along the lines of open negotiations with Great Britain, not only because conditions are now propitious for taking the first steps of what will be a long process to a resolution, but also because relations with the Economic Community and the United States have been improving over the recent past and should be encouraged. If Argentina were in condition to ignore these ties, it could approach the process very differently, but that is not the case. The reappearance of a frustrated nationalism, which hides other ambitions, could reflect a relapse into policies that would encourage risky, illadvised behavior. On the other hand, a policy that, having broken a stalemate in negotiations, does not register tangible, sustainable progress could give rise once again to visions of permanent injustice. The need for sensible realism in foreign policy is not restricted to the Argentines. It is a necessary attribute also for the British, whose people appear to be less triumphalist than the Falklanders. And it is well known that triumphalism and frustrated nationalism are mutually reinforcing.

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APPENDIX Public opinion poll conducted in Argentine urban centers by Edgardo Catterberg and Associates in April 1988, near the end of Raúl Alfonsín's term in office. 1. Reaction to the Argentine invasion of the Malvinas: Totally correct 9 percent More or less correct 10 percent More or less incorrect 18 percent Totally incorrect 56 percent 2. Reasons for disagreement with the invasion (question was asked only of those who said they disagreed with the war): War never solves anything 23 percent Inferiority of Argentine forces 37 percent Military made tactical errors 22 percent Military are unrepresentative and invaded only to divert attention from their internal problems 6 percent Military are crazy 5 percent Other reasons or no opinion 10 percent 3. Reasons for agreement with the war (asked only of those who agreed totally, or more or less): Defense of sovereignty 67 percent Decision was correct but results bad 22 percent Others 12 percent 4. Best way to resolve the Malvinas problem: Fundamentally by negotiating with British 80 percent By military means if necessary 8 percent Other means 3 percent 5. The Alfonsin government's handling of the Malvinas problem: Government has pressed the British 3 percent It has done the best it could given the circumstances 49 percent It has shown weakness toward the British 36 percent No opinion 12 percent 6. What would help more in negotiating with the British? Pressure of Latin American states 34 percent Pressure of the United States 28 percent Pressure of the United Nations 17 percent Pressure of other sources 6 percent No opinion 15 percent A new poll taken in June 1990 by the same service indicated that 62 percent of those polled agreed with the Menem government's policy toward Great

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Britain, and 57 percent agreed with its handling of the Malvinas problem. Conversely, only 24 percent disagreed with the present government's policy toward Great Britain and only 25 percent with its handling of the Malvinas problem. NOTES 1. This analysis utilized the following resources: Berkowitiz, Bruce D. "Realignment in International Treaty Organizations." International Studies Quarterly 27, no. 1 (March 1983). Choucri, Nazli, and Thomas W. Robinson, eds. Forecasting in International Relations: Theory, Methods, Problems, Prospects. Boston: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1978. Deutsch, Karl W. The Analysis of International Relations. Buenos Aires: Editorial Paidos, 1974. (The original edition is from 1968.) Floria, Carlos. Foreign Policy During the Argentine Transition. Paper presented at the conference entitled Realities and Possibilities for Relations Between Spain and America During the 1980s (Third ICI-ILAS Conference), Madrid, March 1985. Institute for Iberoamerican Cooperation. Grosser, Alfred. In the Name of Whom? Fundamentals of Political Morality. Paris: Edition du Seuil, 1969. Jaguaribe, Helio, et al. International Policy in the 1980s: A Latin American Perspective. Buenos Aires: Editorial de Belgrano, 1982. "The Long Road Toward the Malvinas." Editorial in Criterio (Buenos Aires), no. 2044 (8 March 1990). Ministry of Foreign Relations and Culture. Chronological Outline of the Negotiations over the Malvinas Islands. Buenos Aires, 1990. O'Shaughnessy, Hugh. "The Far-Off Island of John Bull." Criterio (Buenos Aires), no. 2043 (18 January 1990). Reproduced in the Tablet (London). Perez Lana, Carlos. "The Foreign Policy of Post-Malvinas Argentina." Estudios Internacionales, no. 60 (October-December 1982). Of particular relevance to the Malvinas issue are articles by Helio Jaguaribe, Celso Lafer, and Francisco Orrego Vicuna. It is interesting to note, in some cases, the erroneous conjectures made concerning the future of the international system. Of course, the earth-shaking events in Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union—whose power has clearly been overestimated—were not at all foreseen. Estudios Internacionales is edited by the Institute of International Studies at the University of Chile and published with the support of RIAL. Russell, Roberto, and Francisco Corigliano. "The Menem Administration and the Negotiations Concerning the Malvinas." America Latina/Internacional (FLACSO, Argentine Program) 6, no. 22 (October-December 1989). South Atlantic Council. "Argentine and British Opinion Polls Show Improved Relations Endorsed by Both Sides." Report on the polls carried out by Socmerc Argentina and Gallup London, published 26 March 1990. "Tierra Del Fuego, a Province in Addition to the Malvinas." La Nación (Buenos Aires), 27 April 1990, along with the speech made by the national delegate for the Unión Civica Radical, Jorge Reinaldo Vanossi, in the debate over the provincialization of the national territory of Tierra del Fuego. 2. I also benefited from commentaries concerning the Malvinas question I received from José María V. Otegui, general director of the Malvinas, South Atlantic,

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and Antarctica Division of the Ministry of Foreign Relations and Culture; and from Carlos Escudé, Carlos Pérez Llana, José Teófilo Goyret, Archibaldo Lanus, Roberto Russell, and Roberto Guyer. Naturally, none of them is responsible for the opinions put forward in this work, nor for my analysis of the direction or state of Argentine foreign policy. 3. I wish to recognize the quality of the papers and comments generated by the Falklands/Malvinas Conference on 25-26 October 1990 in Washington, D.C., and, in particular, the frank explanation of the British political map by Professor Walter Little of the United Kingdom. 4. I realize that for the rest of my life I should continue to study these and other foreign policy issues in terms of the unforeseeable consequences of the collapse of the Soviet Union, the relative decline of the United States as one of the superpowers, and the reflexes of an old British empire.

Part Three

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chapter six

Confidence Building and the Future Charles Maechling, Jr. THE ROAD TO NORMALIZATION Since the end of the Falkland war, relations between Great Britain and Argentina, though still below the cordial level of prewar years, have been gradually returning to normal. The status of the Falklands is still, of course, the sticking point. On the question of who should have sovereignty, the positions of the two governments, increasingly flexible on other issues, remain in seemingly irreconcilable deadlock. Argentina has not retreated an inch in its demand for sovereignty, and its Congress has just included the islands within the boundaries of its new twenty-third state, Tierra del Fuego. Britain continues to hinge the sovereignty issue on the right of the Falkland islanders to self-determination. The approach of each of the respective governments to normalization directly reflects the outcome of the war. As the winner, and as befits an advanced industrial democracy, second only to the superpowers and Japan as a world power, Great Britain has led the way in seeking to restore the prewar relationship, while holding firm in its refusal to allow Argentina to obtain through the United Nations or at the bargaining table what it was unable to obtain by conquest. It has acted promptly and unilaterally to open British doors to Argentine citizens and trade without waiting for reciprocal action on the part of Argentina. Argentina has tried to use restoration of normal relations as a bargaining counter to force Britain into negotiations on the sovereignty issue; it has also tried, so far unsuccessfully, to shift the negotiating forum to the United Nations. One result of being the loser has been to impair Argentina's ability to compromise the sovereignty issue and make meaningful concessions in other areas. Argentine negotiators, as polished and skillful as any in the world, still live in the shadow of a decade of repressive military rule, the country's chaotic, debt-ridden economy, and the fragility of Argentine democracy. The postFalklands generation of democratic presidents cannot afford to renounce the 109

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symbol of Argentine nationalism that sovereignty over the islands represents. Nor can they risk diplomatic humiliation in negotiations with the victor. For the present, Britain deals from a position of strength and can afford to be tough on sovereignty and flexible on other issues. Argentina deals from a position of weakness and must preserve face by clinging to symbols. Whether confidence building and settlement of bilateral issues will ultimately lead to resolution of the sovereignty issue is still an open question. What can be said is that the last five years have seen substantial progress in normalization of Anglo-Argentine relations. In July 1982, Britain unilaterally declared an end to active hostilities with Argentina and replaced the wartime 200-mile total exclusion zone around the Falkland Islands with a 150-mile Falkland Islands Protection Zone (FIPZ). In September 1982, Britain and Argentina agreed to lift the financial restrictions and trade embargoes imposed by each country during the war, although implementation on the Argentine side had to wait for another seven years. At the end of 1982, Britain began unilaterally to open its ports and airports to Argentine ships and aircraft, subject to certain requirements of advance notice; in 1983, it offered to reestablish the prewar commercial air services agreement. Argentina again did not reciprocate. Between 1983 and 1986, as David Thomas recounts in an earlier chapter, further movement toward normalization was put on hold by successive Argentine attempts to bring the Falklands dispute before the United Nations and put negotiations on the sovereignty issue under UN auspices. Argentina refused to respond to British proposals for restoration of trading and diplomatic relations, opening of Argentine ports and airports, and other measures of reconciliation, keeping these steps in reserve as bargaining chips to force the British to discuss sovereignty. For four years after the conclusion of hostilities, Argentina consistently rejected bilateral negotiations absent a prior British commitment to put sovereignty on the agenda. Nonetheless, in July 1985, Britain lifted the trade embargo. It took a natural resource crisis in the South Atlantic to produce a breakthrough. The discovery in Falkland waters of valuable stocks of illex and loligo squid—a fish much prized in Asian and Mediterranean markets—led to an influx of over 600 deep-sea fishing vessels from Japan, the Soviet Union, Spain, Korea, and elsewhere, with catches that seemed to threaten exhaustion of the fishing grounds. Patrolling by Argentine revenue cutters, never more than sporadic, had virtually ceased since the war. Early in 1986, Argentina signed bilateral fisheries agreements with the Soviet Union and other countries and began to enforce fishing restrictions within its own 200-mile Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) as it was entitled to do under international law. However, when Argentina redefined its EEZ to include the waters surrounding the Falklands, South Georgia, and the South Sandwich Islands, thereby overlapping the 200-mile limit that Britain was entitled to proclaim

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around the islands (but had refrained from doing for fear of inflaming the sovereignty dispute), the British government felt impelled to clarify its rights. On October 29, 1986, the British government established a 150-mile Falkland Islands Interim Conservation and Management Zone (FICZ) around the islands, while at the same time reserving its right to extend the FICZ to 200 miles in accordance with the 1982 UN Law-of-the-Sea Convention. Britain also declared its right to exclusive jurisdiction over the Falkland's continental shelf. The effect of these declarations was to make the FICZ coextensive with the Protection Zone, subject to delimitation by a median line where the two overlapped with the Argentine EEZ in the south and west. Patrol trawlers were purchased for the Falkland Islands government (named Desire and The Right, the latter after the islands' sole political party), and the FICZ became operational with a system of fishery licensing in February 1987. Argentine failure to get anywhere in the UN, and unilateral action by the British government in setting up a fisheries regime, finally forced Argentina, now under the newly elected government of Carlos Menem, into bilateral negotiations. After some preliminary diplomatic skirmishing, British and Argentine negotiators held two substantive meetings, one in August 1989 in New York and one in Madrid in October 1989. At the October meeting, both sides agreed in principle to an "umbrella formula," whereby the sovereignty issue would for the time being be put aside with each side reserving its position; the parties would then proceed to negotiate settlements on other issues involved in restoration of normal relations. Although couched in terms of a mutual concession, the sovereignty umbrella in fact covered an Argentine diplomatic retreat: the negotiations were now on a bilateral track, and sovereignty was not on the agenda. At the October meeting, Argentina finally confirmed, seven years after the event, that hostilities between the two adversaries were at an end. Both governments reaffirmed their commitment under Articles 2 (3) and 2 (4) of the UN Charter to settle disputes exclusively by peaceful means and to refrain from the threat or use of force. Argentina agreed to begin terminating restrictions on British trade and investment; Britain agreed to facilitate Argentina's negotiation of an economic cooperation agreement with the European Community. Argentina also agreed to finally reopen Argentine ports and airports to British shipping and aircraft. STEPS TOWARD CONFIDENCE BUILDING

The 1989 agreements set the stage for the next phase of normalization styled "confidence building." In this phase the parties undertook to take concrete measures to stabilize the security situation in the Falklands region, formalize return to a normal bilateral relationship, and make a joint effort to protect the South Atlantic fisheries. It was agreed that negotiations in this phase would

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preserve the "sovereignty umbrella," protecting the positions of each side on the issue. This involved a tacit understanding that neither party would raise claims or couch presentations in such a way that would make resolution of the claims depend on a sovereignty premise or on an assumption regarding national jurisdiction. In the two following meetings that took place in 1990 this formula produced successful results. A February meeting held in Madrid confirmed the understandings reached the previous October and resulted in a joint statement 1 listing the following points of agreement: • Full diplomatic relations would be restored in 1990. • Britain would lift the 150-mile Falkland Islands Protection Zone in effect since the onset of the Falkland War. • The two governments would institute a "reciprocal information and consultation system" covering movements of their respective armed forces in the Southwest Atlantic and agree on rules of reciprocal behavior governing the operation of naval and air units in proximity to each other. • The two governments would establish a direct communication link between the islands and the mainland to reduce the possibility of incidents and enhance common knowledge of military activity. • The two governments would agree on a system of navigational safety and air-sea rescue procedures. • The two governments would draw up fishery conservation measures, establish a system of fishery information interchange, and formalize the joint working group on fisheries. • The two governments would abolish visa requirements for each other's nationals, negotiate an investment protection agreement, consult and cooperate in control of drug trafficking, and facilitate communications and trading opportunities between the islands and the mainland. One annex to the February 15 joint statement delegates the task of setting up reciprocal information and communications system to the military authorities of the British defense forces in the Falklands and the Argentine military command on the mainland. It also specifies the military movements to which the system applies and the verification procedures to be followed. Three other annexes cover safety measures for naval and air units of each country operating in proximity, navigational safety, and air-sea rescue procedures. The joint statement issued at the conclusion of the November meetings 2 established for the first time the beginning of an Anglo-Argentine fisheries regime for joint control and supervision of South Atlantic fishing grounds. This is accomplished in two brief paragraphs. The first paragraph establishes the South Atlantic Fisheries Commission,

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composed of delegations from both states, to assess the state of fish stocks in the South Atlantic. The second authorizes a total temporary prohibition of all commercial fishing in a 50-mile belt eastward of the 150-mile FICZ—thereby extending with Argentine consent the Falkland EEZ to its legal 200-mile limit but avoiding jurisdictional overlap with the Argentine EEZ in the west. Subsequent paragraphs empower the commission to receive and assess fishing information, recommend conservation measures to both governments, and monitor the implementation of the fishing ban. Both the February and November joint statements contain disclaimer clauses reaffirming that nothing therein shall be construed to affect the reserved positions of the respective governments with regard to the sovereignty issue. An attachment to the February agreement is clearly intended to confirm the British commitment to self-determination for the islanders. It states that the legislative councillors of the Falkland Islands accept the assurance of the British government that sovereignty was not discussed at the Madrid talks, and that they are satisfied that present defense arrangements coupled with the British guarantee of protection against future aggression provide an adequate alternative to the lifting of the Protection Zone. The tone is one of grudging acquiescence based on British assurances, not Argentine. By any definition, the confidence-building agreements of February and November 1990 are milestones in the improvement of Anglo-Argentine relations. The 150-mile Protection Zone was duly lifted on March 31,1990. The November fisheries agreement constitutes unprecedented cooperation in a sensitive area directly bordering on the sovereignty question. However, the practical consequences of these agreements run deeper. To begin with, the security provisions in the February agreement place delusive emphasis on protection from offensive military action. In fact, the new British military presence in and around the Falkland Islands and Dependencies now provides a defense capability that was totally absent in the years before the 1982 invasion. However inflammatory it may be to Argentine national sensibilities, the British military presence in the islands is so patently defensive that any security threat to the Argentine mainland can only be classed as fantasy. What the security provisions do establish is an early warning system for the islands—and this can only reinforce the status quo. The provisions on communication, safety of navigation, and air-sea rescue in the February agreement are new and of great importance to the islands in light of their geographic remoteness. But while they seem to portend stronger future links with the Argentine mainland, they actually entail greater dependence on the British homeland. The communications and information exchange system cannot help but be dependent on British military command and control, electronic and signals equipment, satellite reception facilities, and the personnel to operate them. This implies a permanent UK military presence of some size, since it is almost inconceivable that any British

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government would go to the trouble and expense of replacing a military communications system that fulfills a military security function with some kind of civilian equivalent. The communications system to implement the security provisions thus further reinforces the status quo. The November fisheries agreement, however, represents the biggest step to date in forging new Anglo-Argentine cooperative links and thereby accelerating normalization. The terse and understated language of the joint statement gives the new South Atlantic Fisheries Commission virtually plenary powers to determine fishing levels in the area around the Falkland Islands by providing data and assessments on stocks to the two governments and monitoring enforcement of the prohibited zone. While there are still no arrangements for joint Anglo-Argentine patrolling— which would certainly be resisted by the islanders—this is a future possibility if current licensing and enforcement procedures prove ineffective. On broader issues of normalization, the year 1990 witnessed the reestablishment in Buenos Aires and London of full diplomatic relations at the ambassadorial level and a return of diplomatic staffs to prewar strength. Visa requirements for travel by each country's nationals have also been lifted. In December 1990, an investment and trade protection agreement was signed in London by Argentine Foreign Minister Domingo Cavallo—the first visit to Britain by an Argentine foreign minister since the end of the Falklands war. Since the restoration of full diplomatic relations on April 1, 1990, Argentine exports to Great Britain have risen to £20 million per month and British exports to Argentina to £13 million per month. 3 Another year should see other economic and political relationships between the two countries back to normal, always provided there has been no public revival of the Falkland controversy. But while relations between Britain and Argentina continue on an upbeat note, this cannot be said with regard to the underlying issue of the Falklands controversy, the sovereignty dispute. The confidence-building measures described above, while certainly solidifying bilateral relations, have done nothing to mitigate Argentina's claim of legal sovereignty. Nor have they softened British insistence on the paramount right of the Falklanders to self-determination, let alone the inveterate hostility of the islanders to any association with Argentina. To the contrary, the severance of the islanders' prewar connections with the Argentine mainland, and development of new patterns of communication and transportation with the British homeland, have introduced stiffer obstacles to a political solution than existed in the good old days when the Falklands were bleak and forgotten islands in the bottom half of the world.

THE CHANGING LOCAL ENVIRONMENT

The prospects for a long-term resolution of the Falklands dispute, or of reaching a modus vivendi that amounts to the same thing, cannot realistically be

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discussed in an exclusively Anglo-Argentine political framework. The wishes of the Falkland population must be taken into account. The social and economic profile of the Falklanders, their orientation to the outside world, and their attitudes toward the mother country and Argentina, now play a much larger role in the debate than they did before the 1982 war. Before 1982, the economy and society of the Falklands can best be summed up as static. The economy was based on sheep raising and exports of high-quality wool valued at about $5 million per annum. 4 The infrastructure was supported by British treasury subventions (about £6.6 million between 1976 and 1980) for provision of basic services like roads, electricity, public health, and education.^ The 1976 Shackleton report resulted in the beginnings of a land reform program and a low-cost housing program. Most heavy equipment and structural materials arrived by ship from England, but there were also air and sea links with the Argentine mainland through the port city of Comodoro Rivadavia. Together, these were adequate for the modest needs of the islands. The Argentine government was cooperative in facilitating oil and bottled gas shipments and deliveries of fresh produce and mail, and in providing emergency rescue services on the rare occasions when the Falklanders requested them. The feelings of the Falklanders toward Argentina and the homeland were then far more ambivalent than they are today. The Falklanders are descendants of Scottish and Welsh rural tenants and farm laborers and are as stoical and apolitical as their forebears in the British countryside. Accustomed to a Spartan but undemanding way of life, they took an essentially pragmatic view of their geographic and economic condition and would have welcomed stronger economic ties with Argentina had that country been in a position to help them. Indeed, had Whitehall handled the matter more adroitly, they might have acquiesced in 1977 to Argentine sovereignty under leaseback or other arrangement, provided these were accompanied by guarantees of local self-government and noninterference with language, primary and secondary education, and other aspects of the British way of life. But this was while Argentina still had a positive image as the most advanced country in South America and before the collapse of the Argentine economy, the horrors of Argentine military rule, and the 1982 invasion. The war put an end to both a tolerant view of Argentina and British "neglect" of the Falklands. Between 1982 and 1984, the British government initiated a recovery plan of which the main features were a £6 million grant for rehabilitation from war and occupation damage and a £31 million appropriation for economic development, including accelerated land reform. A Falkland Island Development Corporation (FIDC) was established to handle the details of subdivision and to provide mortgages and limited amounts of starting capital to land purchasers. As a result, the pattern of land ownership changed substantially. Before the war, big sheep farms owned by absentee

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landlords and land corporations in the UK dominated the island economy; the majority of the farming population was content with tenant status. Today over half of the islands' thirty-six farms are owned by smallholders. In the prewar era, the Falkland Islands Corporation owned 42 percent of the arable land; today it owns 27 percent, mainly on the East island. The British military presence has given a shot in the arm to the independent service and shop sector. 6 On a macroscale, the nature of the Falkland economy has also changed. Sheepherding out in the "camp," as the Falklanders call their rangeland, is still basic, but the largest revenues now come from offshore fisheries. Since the 150-mile FICZ became operational in February 1987, a system of licensing has been instituted, patrol vessels purchased, some joint ventures with outside capital initiated, and a small bureaucracy set up to sell licenses to foreign fishing vessels and supervise fishing activities. Thanks to the new fisheries regime, the GNP of the Falkland Islands grew from £9 million to over £30 million in one year. 7 Falkland waters now account for 80 percent of the 500,000 tons of squid caught annually, and fishing vessels from as far away as Taiwan and the Soviet Union also make the long voyage southward in search of whiting and hake. 8 Yet another new factor is the British military presence at the 5-squaremile Mount Pleasant Airport (MPA) complex 30 miles from the capital, Port Stanley, and at the small naval base at Mare Harbor. MPA with its 8,500-foot runway and sophisticated radio, radar, and satellite communications is now the hub of the F a l k l a n d s ' communications with the outside world. A squadron of four F-4 Phantom jets is based at MPA, and a Royal Navy frigate and nuclear-powered attack submarine are on regular station in Falkland waters. The British Forces Falkland Islands (BFFI) based at Mount Pleasant and Mare Harbor number about 2,800, more than the civilian population. 9 The British military p r e s e n c e has altered the orientation of the Falklanders to the outside world in more ways than one. RAF Tridents provide biweekly air service between MPA and the RAF base at Brize Norton in Oxfordshire, with a single refueling stop at Ascension Island in the South Atlantic. A ship ferry carrying twenty passengers and 1,400 tons of cargo makes regular runs between Stanley and both Montevideo, Uruguay, and Punta Arenas, Chile. A weekly air service between MPA and Punta Arenas has been proposed. The petroleum shipments and health services once offered by Argentina have been superseded by those available at MPA or in Argentina's two neighbors. The 1982 invasion, increased exposure to the media, the change in communication and transportation patterns, and the new sense of economic confidence have hardened the opposition of the Falklanders to any change in their political status. Since 1985 they have a new constitution giving them a greater degree of local self-rule. Nevertheless, these are not colonists of the old New England or white Rhodesian stamp, restive under rule f r o m

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Whitehall and ready to cut home ties and forge an independent destiny. They know that they are too few in number and too geographically remote from civilization to make it on their own, let alone share in the material bounties of the outside world. They have no aspirations for a separate national identity and no desire for association with the alien Latin culture, turbulent politics, shaky economy, and periodic military repression of Argentina. As the Falkland Islands Legislative Council affirmed in 1968, the islanders "want to remain British under the British Crown."10 They see not the slightest reason to abandon the life-support system that has enabled them to survive as an outpost of the mother country for the last century and a half. A recent Financial Times survey of the Falklands summed up the local attitude in one pungent sentence: "The islanders speak with one voice on this issue: no links, of any kind, with Argentina."11 FUTURE PROSPECTS

Since the confidence-building measures of 1989-1990 and resumption of full diplomatic relations, there have been no further negotiations of substantive issues between the British and Argentine governments nor at this writing are any contemplated. What to do next! There seems to be little choice but to stay the present course—i.e., to continue to solidify Anglo-Argentine relations, keep the sovereignty issue in abeyance, and extend confidence building in directions that will point the way to future settlement. The most obvious place to start is closer collaboration in fisheries conservation. The new South Atlantic Fisheries regime, embracing some of the richest and most unexploited waters on earth, is still in a rudimentary stage of development. Argentine and Falkland fishing grounds are a continuum with different species moving seasonally between the two. Data collection is intermittent and inefficient owing to the paucity of inspection vessels. The new South Atlantic Fisheries Commission has virtually no capability in the way of staff and computer facility to analyze the effect of annual catches on stocks or to predict depletion rates. The recent attempt by the British government to reduce the number of annual visits of foreign fishing vessels to the FICZ has met with resistance from Spain and other countries. The 200-mile area that includes the prohibited zone is so vast in relation to the few government patrol vessels available that enforcement of the fishing ban and of limitations on catches depends in large part on the honor system. Argentina has as big a proportionate stake in the protection of fisheries as the Falklands. Argentine fishing exports have risen from 127,000 tons with a value of $159 million in 1984 to over 225,000 tons with a value over $300 million in 1989. Using the licensing arrangements of the Falkland Islands as a model, Argentine negotiators recently managed to raise the levy paid by the Soviet fishing fleet on the value of its catch from 3 percent to 12 percent, and

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plan to make the 12% levy standard for other national fishing fleets.12 Since the fisheries involve international waters and a British-proclaimed conservation zone and prohibited area (even though under local management), the joint control of adjacent fishing grounds is one area of AngloArgentine collaboration where Whitehall can legitimately override the resistance of the islanders, if in fact the latter occurs. British and Argentine negotiators should be able to agree on joint patrolling of the two fisheries and joint enforcement of the total ban in the prohibited zone. Ideally, this should include joint air surveillance by the RAF operating out of Mount Pleasant and the Argentine Air Force operating from the mainland but with refueling and emergency maintenance rights at MPA. Both governments should commit themselves now to joint funding of the Fisheries Commission at a level to permit efficient pooling of data, joint analysis of results, joint publication of statistics and findings, and joint recommendations to governments on future action. Other areas of cooperation should also be explored. There is no reason why limited civilian air and sea service between Argentina and the Falklands should not be resumed at an early date, provided the traffic is there to justify it. Development of the Falklands as a sea and air way station to the Antarctic peninsula and to British and Argentine polar stations elsewhere on the Antarctic continent should certainly be explored, though not in connection with renewal of the Antarctic Treaty. An equally important avenue to be investigated, perhaps by a joint scientific commission, is use of the Falklands as a scientific base. The establishment in the islands of Anglo-Argentine or US-Argentine meteorological, satellite observation, and telecommunications relay stations, together with other scientific facilities, would give the islands a high-tech function and put British military facilities to constructive civilian use. In time, these installations would liberate the islands from their static existence and make some form of joint or multinational administration natural and inevitable. This kind of transformation will take time, but absent a new crisis, time is not a scarce commodity in this part of the world. For the present, the priorities should be to keep the political temperature down, especially in Buenos Aires; to make existing confidence-building measures more effective; to expand collaboration in the fisheries field; and to explore ways to put the unique location of the Falklands to use as a scientific and technological outpost and stepping stone to Antarctica. Unless the Falklands can be hooked up to the modern age in a meaningful if modest way, the impasse over the sovereignty issue will continue, even though temporarily dormant under the umbrella. Negotiating positions will also remain in the same old rut, dictated on the one hand by Argentine national pride and on the other by the defensive and dependent mentality of the islanders, which in turn reflects their subsistence economy and limited prospects.

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A leaseback formula or other politico-legal arrangement aimed at circumventing the sovereignty impasse should certainly be broached at the next round of negotiations whenever they take place. It may well succeed as a palliative and short-term solution. But even if adopted it will only postpone the problem of the islanders to another day and leave their condition essentially unchanged, except for some improvement in living standards as a result of fishery revenues. For a new lease on life the islands need a new mission and an infusion of fresh blood that will give all parties concerned—Argentina, Great Britain, the United States, the Falklanders, and other countries as well—a joint stake in the islands' future and an incentive to put substance over symbol. NOTES 1. Joint statement of Argentine-UK negotiators, 16 February 1990. 2. Joint statement of Argentine-UK negotiators, 30 November 1990. 3. Financial Times, 12 December 1990. 4. Raphael Perl, ed., The Falkland Islands Dispute in International Law and Politics—A Documentary Record. This document contains a summary of the islands' economy. (Dobbs Ferry, NY: Oceana Publishers, 1984.) 5. Financial Times (Falkland Islands Survey Report), 7 November 1988. 6. Ibid. 7. Economist, 28 May 1988. 8. Financial Times, 30 November 1990. 9. Financial Times, 17 February 1990. 10. See earlier chapter by David Thomas. 11. Financial Times, 17 February 1990. 12. Financial Times, 27 March 1990.

chapter seven

Possible Solutions

Christian Herter, Jr. Wayne S. Smith

The juridical bases of the British and Argentine claims to the islands are laid out quite eloquently in the previous chapters. To understand what the dispute is all about one must, of course, be familiar with those claims and with the history of how they evolved. At this point, however, the dispute clearly will not be resolved on the basis of whose legal position is the strongest. Too much time has gone by, and the political interests of the two governments are too much involved for that to be the case. If the two sides had been prepared to submit the case for arbitration, leaving it to the arbiter to decide the issue of sovereignty, there would no longer be a dispute; it would have been resolved long ago. But they were not so prepared, and are not now. This is not, then, a case that will be decided by the World Court or by any other international forum on the basis of international law. Rather, it is one that will be resolved as the result of a political settlement that takes into account the concerns and satisfies the bottom-line needs of all sides, the islanders included. The purpose of this chapter is twofold: (1) to emphasize that such a settlement could indeed be worked out, and (2) to indicate a number of options that might be considered. Before taking up the task at hand, however, it is important to understand that certain of the juridical positions themselves are in fact motivated by political necessity. The British, for example, insist that the whole issue really comes down to the well-established principle of self-determination. It is simply up to the islanders. Do they wish the islands to be under British or Argentine sovereignty? Since all the islanders are in fact British, one can imagine how that question would be answered. This is not, however, simply a self-serving position. It reflects a political need that North Americans can easily understand if they put themselves in the same position. Imagine, for example, that back in 1832, the USS Lexington not only dispersed the Argentine garrison on the islands but also encouraged the US whaling vessels in the area to set up a colony there. And let us say that for over 150 years, the descendants of those US 121

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colonists have been living on the islands and that the United States has come to think of the islands as a US territory, despite the dubious means by which it acquired them. But now someone in the State Department has suggested that it is too expensive to hang onto the islands and that, in any event, doing so is damaging our relations not only with Argentina but with other Latin American countries. Perhaps, say the diplomats, we ought to discuss with Argentina the status of the islands—even at some point to consider passing sovereignty back to Argentina. One can imagine the cry of outrage the islanders would set up, and how it would almost certainly be echoed in the US Congress. Senators and members of Congress would vie with one another in asserting that never would these stout islanders be turned over to the jurisdiction of Argentina against their wishes. In short, in the hypothetical case just described, any US administration, be it Democrat or Republican, and certainly the majority in the US Congress, would probably have taken the same position that the British government and Parliament did take with respect to the Falklands/Malvinas once the islanders had loudly asserted their wish to remain British. Politically, this is an u n d e r s t a n d a b l e and d e f e n s i b l e p o s i t i o n . Governments have responsibilities to their citizens, politicians to their constituents. But while politically sound, it has little basis in international law. One nation cannot seize territory claimed by another, drive off the settlers living on that territory, settle its own citizens there and then claim for them the right of self-determination. What would be the reaction of the United States if in another hypothetical case Japan had years ago seized some remote islands in the Aleutians, expelling the handful of Americans living there and bringing in hundreds of Japanese settlers. The United States, let us say, has protested through the years, but for a variety of reasons (not the least of which being that it needed Japanese loans, investments and trade to keep its economy afloat), it has taken no direct action. Now it seeks to take the matter to the United Nations but finds that as far as Japan is concerned there is nothing to discuss. The decision, says the Japanese ambassador to the United Nations, is up to the Japanese settlers. Do they wish to become American or to remain Japanese? It is, he concludes, simply a question of self-determination! The United States would be as unlikely to accept that answer as A r g e n t i n a is to accept the B r i t i s h p o s i t i o n in the case of the Falklands/Malvinas. It is equally unlikely that the World Court would accept either. Which brings us to the point that if this were in fact clearly a question of self-determination backed by the precepts of international law, what the British ought to do is clear: try to rush the case as quickly as possible to the World Court. That they do not do so suggests that they in fact recognize that juridically speaking this is not such a case. Politically, however, the British government must behave as if it were. It must protect the rights of the

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islanders, preserve their identity as a community, and see to it that any outcome assures them a just and satisfactory way of life. One can appreciate the depth of the British government's feelings on that score. Further, the situation has been made more difficult by the Argentine invasion of 1982. If an eventual solution depended in part on the willingness of the islanders to develop amicable ties with Argentina, the midnight appearance of thousands of Argentine soldiers with painted faces and fixed bayonets was not calculated to advance the cause. Nor did it strengthen Argentina's legal case. Quite the contrary: the British might now argue, if they were of a Metternichian mind-set, that whatever the merits of their case before 1982, they now have title to the islands through right of conquest, or, in this case, reconquest. In fact, they do not make that argument; what they do contend is that the spilling of British blood to regain the islands makes it all the more difficult to negotiate their status, as to do so might appear to be trivializing the sacrifice of the war dead. A moral government does not ask its young men to sacrifice their lives to regain territory only the next day to negotiate it away. No. Time must pass, wounds must heal, and the confidence-building measures described in the previous chapter must first create a propitious environment. Only then might the underlying dispute again be addressed. WHAT IS THE BOTTOM LINE FOR THE THREE PARTIES? Before trying to devise a formula that might be acceptable to the islanders as well as to the British and Argentine governments, one must come to some judgment as to what it is that each party would want to see come out of any future negotiations—or, perhaps more accurately phrased, what is it that they could not give up?

The Argentines Clearly, Argentina's needs are the easiest to define. Argentina does not seek to regain the islands because of some expected economic or strategic gain. Still less does it want them for purposes of colonization. It has great difficulty persuading its citizens to move as far south as Patagonia and Tierra del Fuego. There would be few indeed who would have any interest in moving out to the Falklands/Malvinas. But it has been an article of faith with generations of Argentines that the islands were illegally taken and kept from them by force. As the old Argentine refrain has it: "The Malvinas are a constantly bleeding wound, flesh torn from the body that is Argentina." It is a deeply felt matter of national honor that this "flesh" be returned, that Argentine sovereignty be restored. Argentina's bottom line is to have the islands again colored blue on the maps and the Argentine flag to fly over them. The configuration of the regime over which that flag flies is much less important than that the flag be raised. In the final analysis, Argentina could accept almost any settlement that

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produced the latter event. It could accept none that did not. The Islanders One must understand that people who choose to live in a region as remote, as isolated, as the Falklands/Malvinas are of a different breed—even if we are talking about the contract employees of the Falkland Islands Company. These are not people who would move easily from one place to another, who would be as comfortable in Los Angeles, Rome, or Rio as in London or York. They are deeply attached to a place and to a way of life that has developed there over generations. What they want more than anything else is to continue that way of life unmolested. They want to remain in their remote islands, remain British citizens, remain Anglicans, continue with their sheep raising, and now to continue with the collection of the fees for commercial fishing licenses that have over the last few years given the islands the highest per capita income in the Western Hemisphere. In short, they want things to continue as they are. The British

Government

From the fact that the British government was in the 1970s withdrawing forces from the islands and was willing to negotiate their status, even to the point of considering their return to Argentine sovereignty, a clear calculation on the British side emerges: the islands are a net economic drain on the British economy and require an unwanted diversion of military capability from areas far more vital to British interests. Holding on to the Falklands does not in any way advance the national interests of the United Kingdom. In fact, on balance, it makes it more difficult to concentrate on and protect those interests. Thus, London, or at least Whitehall, was prepared to consider a change in status. However, as David Thomas pointed out in Chapter 2, that willingness ran directly afoul of the islanders' wish to maintain the status quo. Whitehall was savaged for its supposed willingness to sell out the interests of the islanders to an Argentine military government of unsavory repute. Since that time, the governing calculation of the British government has been—and almost inevitably would be, whatever the government in power—the following: sharp and perhaps debilitating political debate at home would result if any effort were again made to raise the question of the islands' status. The islands are a net drain, yes, but not an unbearable one. Refusal to discuss a settlement damages Great Britain's overall position in Latin America, and to some extent at the United Nations. Again, however, the damage is limited. It is acceptable. Thus, the domestic political risks of raising the issue outweigh the economic and international costs of not doing so. One may, of course, add to this Mrs. Thatcher's natural aversion to any negotiations that even hinted at a change of status. She won her place in history by retaking the islands. She was not likely to jeopardize it by appearing

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even to consider giving them up. Mrs. Thatcher is now gone, but the political calculation just outlined remains. To overcome it, it would have to be clear even before negotiations began that the outcome could be acceptable to the islanders, that indeed a settlement might better serve the interests of all parties than does the status quo. ADVANTAGES OF A SETTLEMENT It is not difficult to see how a settlement would benefit Argentina. Any change in the status quo that returned sovereignty, however titular and whether whole or divided in character, would advance Argentina's objectives. It is no more difficult to see how it would benefit the British government. The original calculation with which Whitehall opened negotiations in the 1970s still holds, i.e., on a strict cost-analysis basis, the islands require more in resources, especially military resources, than they are worth. Further, the United Nations has called on the two sides to negotiate a solution, a call that implies that the status quo is not regarded as "normal." To refuse to negotiate is in effect to defy the United Nations and detracts from Great Britain's image as a country that adheres to the UN Charter. That, too, implies a cost. Were it not for the wishes of the islanders themselves, London would haul down the flag rather than continue to pay those costs, in resources and prestige. Thus, if an honorable solution could be found that was acceptable to the islanders and that could thus avoid a p o l a r i z i n g debate in Parliament, the British government would almost certainly accept it gratefully. It could complete what its real interests dictated that it begin to do back in the 1970s. It could withdraw with dignity from a territory that may once have been a positive asset but that is no longer. But what of the islanders? Do they not want to maintain the status quo? How then could a settlement answer their needs? The answer to that lies in the distinction between the status quo and what it is supposed to ensure the islanders: that they be able to continue their traditional way of life. They believe that the only way to ensure the latter is to maintain the former. In fact, that may not be true. Insisting that there be no change in the status of the islands may have the opposite effect; it may make their traditional way of life impossible. They cannot, after all, live as they have been accustomed with thousands of troops garrisoned in the islands and the place turned into a veritable fortress. For the moment, the Argentines have forsworn use of force. But clearly, they expect that at some point there will be a settlement and that their willingness to pursue the matter through peaceful means will produce what their mistaken use of force did not. The patience of Argentina, however, is not infinite. If the British government is under pressure f r o m the Parliament to respect the islanders' wishes, the Argentine government is under pressure also—to right the wrong Argentines believe to have been done to them over

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150 years ago. At the moment, that pressure is not intense, but, as suggested in Chapter 1, it could become so again should it become apparent that the way to a settlement is blocked indefinitely by the intransigence of the islanders. Public opinion would then demand that the Argentine government take a less patient, a less peaceful approach. As suggested in Chapter 1, even if Argentina did not again resort to force, the uncertainties in the situation and the resulting tensions might be such that Great Britain would have little choice but to go back to a Fortress Falklands posture, with a fleet, air squadrons, and thousands of troops deployed indefinitely to protect the islands. Under these circumstances, the islanders could forget about their traditional way of life; rather they might live behind sandbags a decade or two. All that could be avoided with a settlement that changed the status of the islands but guaranteed the internal status quo—that is, that assured the islanders that nothing would change in the pattern of their daily lives, that they could live as before, remain British citizens, be governed under much the same laws, and continue to collect the fishing fees. A different flag, or flags, might fly, but otherwise little would change. Initially, of course, the islanders would be suspicious. They would fear that no matter how attractive and reasonable the terms of an agreement, those terms might be ignored or renounced by some Argentine government of the future. And having lost the shelter of their ties to Great Britain, the islanders would be defenseless in the face of such violations. Such suspicions are inevitable and perfectly understandable. It will be up to the negotiators, when the time comes, to devise a settlement whose terms are in fact guaranteed by more than the word of the contracting parties. That can be done. Meanwhile, the key fact for the islanders to face up to is that, for the reasons indicated above, they may not be able to have it both ways, i.e., preserving both the present status of the islands and their established pattern of life. If trying to maintain the first results in living behind sandbags and the protection of thousands of troops, it would thereby make the second impossible. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS

What the Argentines would doubtless prefer, in the best of all possible worlds, would be that Great Britain acknowledge Argentina's sovereignty, straight and simple, without any conditions. But that, for all the reasons discussed earlier, is not possible—and the Argentines know that it is not. To be considered by the British, any formula for solution must be acceptable to the islanders, and the undiluted recognition of sovereignty would not be. Leaseback Only slightly less acceptable at this point would be a leaseback arrangement under which Great Britain would transfer sovereignty to Argentina but the

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latter would then immediately lease the islands back to Great Britain for a period of years. This was Whitehall's formula back in the late 1970s. One can argue that it was not given a fair hearing by the islanders. Perhaps not, but the fact remains that it was angrily rejected by them then and would be even less acceptable now, the idea having acquired over the years, in the collective memories of the islanders, the aura of "the devil's work." That is unfortunate, for while the idea as it was put forward in 1978 may have been flawed, there is no reason that some form of leaseback could not work. The islanders maintained that it only delayed an unacceptable outcome. True enough, as it was structured. It also would have been difficult to agree on a period of time. The islanders would have wanted at least ninety-nine years. The Argentines would not have wished to wait more than a few years before running up their blue and white standard. But what if leaseback had been part of a package? What if, for example, the interested parties had agreed that as titular sovereignty would pass immediately to Argentine, it could hoist its flag even during the period of leaseback? Further, at the end of the lease period—say twenty years—the islands were to become a semiautonomous, self-governing territory, with the rights of the islanders guaranteed by the British, the Argentine, and perhaps a series of other governments. The period of leaseback would have been simply a time of transition and testing, a time of working the kinks out of the system and getting accustomed to a new regime that would allow the islanders to go on with their lives, but under an Argentine flag rather than the Union Jack. Or it could have been a transitional period leading to a co-dominion. As part of some kind of package along those lines, leaseback might have worked. Unfortunately, because of its earlier rejection, it is not likely to be tried again.

Shared Sovereignty Almost without fail, the immediate reaction to the idea of shared sovereignty is that it is unworkable. But, in fact, such a system has worked and worked well in Andorra for over 700 years! And Andorra has a much larger population and a more complicated political situation than do the islands. Shared sovereignty does not tend to work if all decisions must be made, or at least approved, by the two co-domini. That leads to stalemate. But as Martin Dent has argued in his excellent paper on the subject,i co-dominion need not be so structured. What Dent proposes for the Falklands/Malvinas is a system under which both the British and the Argentine flags would fly over the islands and both anthems would be played on ceremonial occasions, but in which neither government took a direct role in the governance of the islands. Rather, there would be a council of the co-domini on which they would be equally represented. Further, the Argentine and British governments would not only appoint representatives to this council, they would also appoint a governor, who would act as "the tactful administrator" of the

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islands. Finally, the islanders themselves would elect representatives to a council of inhabitants. The key to the success of the system would be (1) that the two co-domini stay as much as possible out of the business of administering the islands, leaving that mainly to the governor and the council of inhabitants and making their policy inputs only through the council of the co-domini; (2) that the governor be beholden to neither co-domini and that as a good administrator he or she should consult fully with the inhabitants; indeed, the system could be so structured that much of the day-to-day business of administering the islands would be overseen by both governor and council; and (3) that it be agreed beforehand that as little as possible would change in the internal affairs of the islands. All those presently constituting the population of the islands would remain British; those born after the new system goes into effect would be dual nationals. There would be total freedom of religion. Islanders could, of course, continue to worship as Anglicans just as before. But Catholic and Protestant churches would be provided as the need arose. Immigration from both the British Isles and Argentina would be sharply limited, and landholding patterns would not change appreciably. Argentina and Great Britain would jointly exploit any mineral resources on the islands or in surrounding areas. If, for example, there are exploitable oil deposits in the region, the two would develop them together. Finally, the two would maintain a 200-mile fishing zone around the islands, with the fees for fishing licenses to be collected at the discretion of the governor and the council of inhabitants. These fees, in fact, would be the islands' main source of revenue and would be used to defray the cost of government, to maintain schools, airports, and roads, and to finance an education fund to be used in sending young people abroad for their university education. Finally, the legal system would remain as before the change of status, with modifications to be made only gradually by a council of jurists appointed by the co-domini. The educational system might remain as it is for a time but could be gradually modified, as over the years a small number of Argentine colonists were added to the population, to include Anglo-Argentine schools similar to those on the mainland that teach in both English and Spanish. Similarly, English could remain the official language for an indefinite period of time, though all official documents might be printed in both English and Spanish as soon as the co-dominion system went into effect. The two co-domini would guarantee the island's security, but there would be no need for the presence of troops. The two might keep warships on station, however, perhaps on a rotating basis, with facilities to service the vessels of both nations in Port Stanley. Should an emergency arise, troops could be airlifted quickly from the Argentine mainland and then from Great Britain. The great advantage of a co-dominion arrangement would be that it would allow the British flag also to fly, ensure the islanders their established

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pattern of life, and, crucially, with the continued protection of the Union Jack. Very little would have to change in the daily lives of the islanders, who would be more secure and doubtless more prosperous than ever. In his paper, Dent envisages the co-dominion solution as a temporary one, lasting perhaps only twenty to thirty years and leading eventually to sole Argentine sovereignty. That would, of course, be up to the co-domini to decide as they worked out the terms of their co-dominion. The present authors see no reason, however, that the system might not be continued indefinitely. If codominion has worked in Andorra for 700 years, why prejudge or preclude that possibility in the Falklands/Malvinas. And that, incidentally—Falklands/ Malvinas—might become the official name of the islands. One possible embellishment to the co-dominion system discussed by Dent, given its newly strengthened status, would be to involve the United Nations. This might be done by having the secretary general of that organization appoint the governor, with the concurrence of the two co-domini. The governor could then be removed only with the consent of all three: the secretary general and the co-domini. Further, the United Nations would act as an additional guarantor of the terms of the agreement, and the secretary general would be the automatic arbiter in any differences of opinion between the codomini on matters pertaining to the islands. The mechanics of this proposed system are but one possibility. Codominion could be structured in a variety of ways and could be made to work, provided the co-domini stayed out of the picture as much as possible and the right person were picked to be the governor/administrator.

The Islands as a Semiautonomous Territory Another system that would satisfy the bottom-line needs of all three parties would be one under which titular sovereignty would pass to Argentina, but the islands would become a semiautonomous, self-governing territory. There is, in fact, an excellent precedent for such a system: the Aland Islands lying between Sweden and Finland in the Gulf of Bothnia. Though originally belonging to Sweden, the islands had been lost to czarist Russia in 1809. From that point until 1917, the islands were administered as part of the Grand Duchy of Finland, controlled by the czar. With the upheaval attending the Russian Revolution, civil war broke out in Finland also between the Reds and the Whites. In 1919, the islanders called on Sweden to intervene. Sweden complied, not only occupying the islands, but seeking to reclaim them. The dispute that followed between Sweden and a newly independent Finland was settled in 1921 by the Council of the League of Nations. It rejected the islanders' claim to the right of self-determination. Upon becoming independent, the council ruled, Finland had inherited Russian sovereignty. Special p r o v i s i o n s w e r e m a d e , h o w e v e r , f o r the a u t o n o m y of the i s l a n d e r s themselves—provisions that were to ensure that their language, cultural iden-

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tity, and way of life be maintained. The most important of these provisions were • that the governor of the islands would be selected by the Finnish government from a list of three candidates chosen by the islanders themselves, i.e., the governor would be an islander; • that instruction in primary and technical schools should be only in Swedish; • that the islanders themselves would be given the right of preemption before any land could be sold to outsiders; and • that any newly arrived settlers could have the rights of islanders only after a residence of five years. The practical result of all this has been that the islanders virtually govern themselves, and their way of life has been ensured. There are to be sure major differences in the two cases. The Aland Islands belonged to Finland; the population was Swedish and wished to associate with Sweden. That is almost the reverse of the Falklands/Malvinas case. It would be as if they belonged to Argentina but their British population wished to associate with Great Britain. Nonetheless, as a case in which one state holds sovereignty while the cultural identity and way of life of the settlers of another state are protected by a semiautonomous self-governing status, the precedent of the Aland Islands is interesting and relevant. 2 Let us assume for a moment that such a solution was agreed to between the British and Argentine governments and was acceptable to the islanders. The resulting regime could be so structured that the islanders would elect their own representatives to a governing council and this body would carry on the day-to-day administration of the islands. The Argentine flag, would fly over the islands, but as in the co-dominion system discussed earlier, everything else would remain very much the same. Indeed, a Falkland Islands' flag might be devised to fly alongside that of Argentina. The council, together perhaps with a governor (see next paragraph) would oversee the collection of the fishing fees, run the schools, provide law enforcement, and maintain public buildings and roads. The educational system, language, and legal system would be modified, if at all, only over a long period of time—as a few Argentine colonists appeared in the islands and there was some need to address their requirements as well as those of the longtime inhabitants. Here again, immigration from Argentina would have to be sharply limited, and in this case also, as in the Alands, the longtime inhabitants ought to have the first opportunity to buy any land that might be put up for sale. As for the governor, there are a number of options from which to choose. He or she could be elected directly by the islanders themselves or, as in the case of the Aland Islands, could be selected by the Argentine government

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from a list of two or three candidates chosen by the islanders directly, or perhaps by their governing council. Another option would not only provide for a governor but also resolve one of the major obstacles to acceptance by the islanders of a self-governing status within an Argentine commonwealth: that is, their lack of confidence that all Argentine administrations would respect the rights of the islanders as outlined by the agreement, or even to respect the semiautonomous nature of the islands themselves. As one representative of the islanders put it some years back: "A trustworthy, democratic government might agree to respect our rights today, but a week later a bloody military dictatorship might take over and disregard them." It is a problem that until recently had no ready solution. Obviously a guarantor, or guarantors, would be needed, but finding one or several willing to accept such an open-ended responsibility and who were at the same time acceptable to all p a r t i e s — t h e British, the A r g e n t i n e s , and the islanders—would have been difficult, though by no means impossible. Now, however, with the strengthened role of the United Nations and its involvement in conflict resolution all over the world—in Namibia, Cambodia, Angola, Nicaragua, El Salvador and a number of other places—the logical solution would seem to be that the United Nations act as guarantor and that the secretary general or the Trusteeship Council, which includes all five permanent members of the Security Council, appoint a governor for the islands. With a revitalized United Nations thus placed firmly in the picture, the islanders could be assured that the terms of the agreement would be respected by all sides. A United Nations

Trusteeship

Worthy of mention is yet another option. Given the deep suspicions on all sides, an interim arrangement under which the question of sovereignty was left for later resolution might be useful. One such arrangement could be a United Nations trusteeship. Article 77 of the UN Charter says the trusteeship system can be applied to various categories of territories, including those that are "voluntarily placed under the system by the states responsible for their administration." Although in fact no territories, historically, have been placed under the trusteeship system in accordance with this particular provision, there would seem to be no reason that they could not be. Great Britain and Argentina might jointly agree to place the islands under trusteeship. They would then be appointed co-trustees. The secretary general, with the approval of the two cotrustees, would appoint a neutral, unbiased, and eminent person as governor or key administrator. This official, who would answer to the secretary general, would be responsible for the day-to-day administration of the trusteeship under Article 76 of the UN Charter, which states that the basic objective of

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the system is to promote the political, economic, social, and educational advancement of the inhabitants of the trust territory, or territories. The governor as well as the co-trustees would be bound by this provision. Clearly, as in several of the options outlined earlier, the governor would be assisted by a council of inhabitants, and the machinery of government would be in the hands of the islanders themselves. Almost nothing in the daily lives of the islanders would change. The question of sovereignty would be put aside during the period of the trusteeship—perhaps twenty to twenty-five years, though there is no objective or juridical reason it could not be for a much longer period. The trusteeship idea would be attractive to the islanders—in that basically nothing would change—and to the British—as it would avoid a decision on the question of sovereignty. For the same reason, it would be relatively less attractive to the Argentines. If, however, formulated as an interim arrangement at the termination of which the question of sovereignty would be addressed, it could probably be sold to the Argentines as well. A variation would be to establish a trusteeship as described earlier, but one that by prearrangement would lead either to a co-dominion, or to the status of semiautonomous, self-governing territory within an Argentine commonwealth. Trusteeship, in effect, would be used as a confidence-building experience leading to some already-negotiated new status. SOUTH GEORGIA AND THE SOUTH SANDWICH ISLANDS Argentina claims South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands as well as the Falklands/Malvinas. So too, of course, does Great Britain, and in fact for the past few years the former two groups of islands have been dependencies of the Falklands/Malvinas, administered from Port Stanley. Even so, there is no reason that all three groups of islands must be placed in the same basket for solution. Their situations are quite different. For one thing, Argentina's claims to South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands are much more recent and much less compelling than is the case with respect to its claims to the Falklands/Malvinas. For another, unlike the situation in the Falklands/Malvinas, where the wishes of the islanders are one of the k e y s — a n d i m p e d i m e n t s — t o a solution, South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands have no permanent inhabitants. Their disposition, then, could more easily follow the lines of what is pragmatic, sensible, and acceptable to both London and Buenos Aires. Should it eventually be decided, for example, that the Falklands/Malvinas were to become a semiautonomous, self-governing territory under the Argentine flag, there would be no reason that South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands could not be left under British sovereignty and control, in recognition of Great Britain's stronger claims to those two groups, and in keeping with the

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spirit of a compromise solution. On the other hand, should the co-dominion solution be preferred, preceded perhaps by a United Nations trusteeship, it would probably make more sense to apply the new arrangement to all three groups. Thus, South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands would remain as dependencies of the Falklands/Malvinas, would fly both Argentine and British flags, and would be administered by the governor in Port Stanley—whether appointed by the co-domini or the secretary general of the United Nations. IN CONCLUSION

The options outlined by no means represent an all-inclusive list. Various other arrangements can be devised—arrangements that at one and the same time address the sovereignty issue, yet leave the islanders to continue their traditional way of life unmolested. As is so often the case in the affairs of humankind, solutions most certainly could be found, if the human beings on all sides of the dispute but have the will to look for them in a spirit of mutual respect. NOTES 1. Martin Dent, Shared Sovereignty: A Solution for the Falklands/Malvinas Dispute (London: South Atlantic Council Occasional Papers, March 1989). 2. For an excellent study of the Aland Islands precedent, see Donald J. Bullock and Christopher Mitchell, The Aland Island Solution (London: South Atlantic Council Occasional Papers, March 1989). For additional views on the subject, see J. Barros, The Aland Island Question (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968).

chapter eight

What Role for the United States? Riordan Roett In seeking remedies to current conflict, hindsight—especially that which casts a glance beyond the memory of contemporary actors—rarely proves d e c i s i v e in f o r m u l a t i n g a s o l u t i o n . And in c o n s i d e r i n g the Falklands/Malvinas conflict, despite the considerable energy of historians and jurists, as it has already been conceded, the historical and juridical claims will bring the contending parties no closer to a resolution than contemporary political conditions allow. However, in thinking about the shape of a settlement and what roles may be assigned to what actors in reaching that settlement, a glance to the recent past is necessary to understand what actors may reasonably be cast—and how proficiently they can be expected to play their roles. In the case of Argentina and Great Britain, of course, each is unlikely to be a conciliatory peacemaker. Were it not for the unfortunate turns of recent history, it might be otherwise. Had the Anglo-Argentine stalemate over the islands in the 1980s not followed such a painful episode in Argentine history as the military administration of 1976-1983 and the coincident dirty war, Argentine public opinion might not now require a decisive diplomatic victory to salve its wounded pride. Had British lives not been lost in the 1982 war, British sensibility might have prevailed over the enduring, though quite predictable, jingoism of the former empire. Indeed, were the Falklands/Malvinas conflict not currently so naggingly irreconcilable, it might well be fertile ground for dramatic comedy. Not unlike "The Mouse That Roared," the fictional account of the tiny kingdom of Grand Fenwick, which declares war on the United States and wins, a few thousand sheep farmers adrift in the South Atlantic have managed to put the foreign policies of some of the most prominent governments in the industrialized and developing worlds on a very short tether. However much the pragmatic instincts of both sides (Britain's desire to cut loose the economic burden and Argentina's hunger to reclaim a measure of prestige sooner rather than later) might prompt leaders in London and Buenos Aires to 135

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cut a deal, each side enjoys precious little political slack with which to explore such a settlement. Neither British nor Argentine national conscience appears ready at the moment to countenance a permanent solution even minimally acceptable to the other. While the islands have long since had their day on the world stage, the dialogue over their fate continues quietly. And at the current juncture of this drama, the United States remains in the wings, sheepishly contemplating what role it might salvage for itself: diplomatic fairy godmother, fool, or footman? A closer look at each of these possible roles reveals the constraints facing the US in pursuing a permanent settlement of the Falklands/Malvinas dispute. To date, the United States has been unable to wave the superpower wand and make the conflict go away. It cannot, with mere superpower largess, simply force a negotiated solution that provides a US economic or political payoff to sweeten the settlement for one or both parties. Furthermore, there is little likelihood that, given the nature of the Falklands/Malvinas dispute—its essence steeped in the national pride of both nations—such a solution could be found in the future. The fairy godmother, her talents purposefully simple in some diplomatic scrapes, is useless in this instance. In the absence of a commanding US solution, then, the United States is left to play the simpleton or the footman. Unable to impose a solution, it has so far stood idly by, playing the former rather than the latter role. But it is the latter that it can and should assume. In this instance, the United States must stand up as the competent and patient assistant—a facilitator—keeping the diplomatic coach on course for a settlement. For reasons to be discussed at greater length later, however much the United States might like a more prestigious role, it has been disqualified as a driver on this course. AMERICAN LIABILITIES?

In considering the failure of the United States to bring about a diplomatic solution to the 1982 crisis, Assistant Secretary of State Thomas 0 . Enders remarked just one week after the Union Jack was raised in victory over Port Stanley: I ask myself whether the lack of close ties with Argentina—not only by us but by most other American states—the effects of the long period of self-isolation and isolation by others, did not. . . play a role. It is difficult to have credibility in a country unless one has strong links to it. 1

The difficulty Secretary of State Alexander Haig encountered in communicating to the Argentine junta the strength of British resolve to dislodge the Argentine landing party on the islands supports Enders's view. And in the end, the weak linkage of the US and Argentine governments prevented each side from accurately interpreting the bureaucratic machinations of the other

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in the course of discussing a settlement—and thus predestined the diplomatic breakdown. Moreover, the breakdown ushered in consequences that continue to shape the US role in the conflict. In contemplating a peacemaker role in the Falklands/Malvinas dispute, the United States cannot claim to be an unprejudiced third party, a disinterested observer, no less an ideal arbiter. Previous US diplomatic action as well as its superpower status preclude this. The US determination to side with the British in the 1982 war clearly colors any claim to impartiality the United States might wish to make. As a partisan in that conflict, indeed a defender of British interests by war's end, the United States cannot hope to enjoy full Argentine confidence on the Falklands/Malvinas matter. Nevertheless, the US role to date should not constitute a basis for either Argentina or Great Britain to exclude US assistance in the pursuit of a settlement. Indeed, the changing face of the United States in the hemisphere in the last nine years is reason enough to expect that country to assume a useful role in pursuing a permanent solution to the dispute. THE DE-REAGANIZATION OF US POLICY IN LATIN AMERICA With nearly a decade elapsed since the failed diplomatic efforts of 1982, it should be easier for the United States to find a role in the next effort to frame a Falklands/Malvinas settlement. Whatever diplomatic liabilities the United States incurred with its backing of Britain in 1982 have been offset in subsequent years, to some degree, by several factors. First, a moderating US policy in Latin America since late 1988 has provided US policymakers with an increasingly more cordial environment in which to operate. With the exception of the US invasion of Panama in 1989, which, despite a public outcry to the contrary, was not altogether regretted by other American states, US policy in the region has become decidedly less activist during the first years of the Bush administration. The virulent rhetorical attacks on Nicaragua's Sandinista government, financial and military support for the Contra rebels, and controversial military assistance to El Salvador have, by circumstance or by choice, been reduced or eliminated under the Bush administration. Moreover, given that Nicaragua and El Salvador are no longer among the leading items on the US foreign policy agenda (and, thankfully, much less a source of friction with US allies in the hemisphere), the US enjoys considerably more latitude to originate and facilitate productive diplomatic exchanges in the hemisphere. Second, the change in diplomatic actors and policymaking styles since the early Reagan years contributes as well to increased US diplomatic maneuverability now. At the time of the 1982 debacle, personality clashes and turf battles between Secretary of State Alexander Haig and US Ambassador to the United Nations Jeane Kirkpatrick, as well as Haig's interminable friction with

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the White House staff, wreaked havoc with the ability of Washington to speak with one voice, maintain one public face, and facilitate a diplomatic solution to the 1982 invasion. As Joseph Tulchin notes, The squabbling within the Reagan administration, especially between U.N. Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick and Secretary of State Haig, did not help, and no one benefited from the charade of Haig's exhausting shuttle from Washington to Buenos Aires to London and around again. His ineffectiveness is a clear demonstration of how out of touch with things in Argentina the State Department had become over the years.2

More than mere squabbling in policy discussions, Haig suggested that a freelance policy—advanced by Kirkpatrick without his knowledge or that of the White House—led the Argentines to expect greater US support in the conflict than Haig ever extended: Before the end of the first week of the crisis, the British were telling us they believed that Mrs. Kirkpatrick had told the Argentinian ambassador to the U.N. that if his country continued to support the United States on Nicaragua, there would be no American criticism in the U.N. on the landing in the Falklands. I assured an agitated [British] Ambassador Henderson that, no matter what his evidence, this statement bore no resemblance to official U.S. policy. Mrs. Kirkpatrick continued to assure me that she was not engaged in such activity.3

It was, in fact, the combination of the distance of the US-Argentine relationship and the conflicts within the Reagan administration that ensured the failure of the US diplomatic effort. HEMISPHERIC RESPONSIBILITIES

Beyond the recent history of US involvement lies the question of US responsibility in the hemisphere. More specifically, given the history of repeated US military involvement in the hemisphere to maintain "hemispheric order and security," the United States should not stand by and claim to fulfill its responsibilities as a regional power without stepping forward in some capacity to remedy a conflict in its midst. The role of the United States in any resolution of the Falklands/Malvinas conflict should be predicated on two basic assumptions: (1) as a superpower and a leading political influence in the Western Hemisphere, it has a responsibility to invest its resources in seeking resolution to a conflict in the hemisphere—regardless of the fact that it may not have immediate interest in that conflict; and (2) as a member of the United Nations, the Organization of American States, and NATO, it is uniquely placed to serve as an intermediary. That the United States may need to extend a hand to win back the confidence of Argentina or that its 1982 support for Britain may disqualify it as a

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formal negotiator in the process should not dampen the US obligation to participate, in some measure, in shaping a permanent solution to the conflict. WHERE THE UNITED STATES CAN HELP Indeed, despite its history in the conflict, the United States still maintains a foot in both camps. In addition to the normal diplomatic relations with Argentina that the United States has enjoyed during the postwar period, the Bush administration, to its credit, has extended substantial support to the administration of President Carlos Menem. A visit by President Bush to Buenos Aires in late 1990, though scheduled for some time, was particularly propitious in signaling Washington's support for a democratic Argentina within hours of a coup attempt against the Menem government. At the moment, there is little reason to believe that the Argentines would not be willing to accept US assistance in the search for a settlement. The British, too, long proud of their "special relationship" with the United States, are not about to snub US offers of assistance. And it is in the British camp where the US may be able to stimulate the most progress. As Britain's ally in the war, the US may enjoy greater leverage in bringing Her Majesty's Government to the table to formulate a peace. Indeed, given the likely desire of the British government to be done with the dispute—provided it can be settled without a domestic political backlash—the United States should expect to maneuver easily within British circles for the purposes of peacemaking. It is precisely in these movements that the United States can be most helpful. Friendly US pressure, judiciously placed, could coax British action where Argentine mudslinging will not. Though Britain already faces the oblig a t i o n of the U n i t e d N a t i o n s to o p e n n e g o t i a t i o n s o v e r t h e Falklands/Malvinas, in recent years the public pressure to make good on its UN obligations has come almost exclusively from Argentina. Clearly, the British government would never be seen capitulating to Argentine public demands to come to the negotiating table. But US requests, packaged with sensible negotiating alternatives such as those elucidated in this book by Herter and Smith, could persuade the British to return to the table. While there is little doubt about Argentina's willingness to return to the negotiating table provided sovereignty is somewhere on the agenda, the United States may be able to lend assistance in ensuring that the Argentines arrive at any new talks with a realistic idea of the British position. As David Thomas details in his chapter, the last round of negotiations in Berne in July 1984 broke up amid "mutual recriminations and accusations of bad faith." Though subsequent bilateral talks on issues unrelated to the sovereignty question were accomplished in 1989 and 1990 in an atmosphere of relative cordiality, care needs to be taken to prevent a repeat of Berne when once again the time comes

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for discussion of sovereignty and the substantive issues of the conflict. The US can be of assistance in ensuring clear communication between Argentina and Great Britain on that next step in the negotiating process. THE US AND THE PERMANENT PEACE

Whatever the final settlement—a leaseback, shared sovereignty, a United Nations trusteeship or otherwise—the United States should forswear any pretensions of being a sole guarantor and indicate early its support for a multinational guarantee of the final Anglo-Argentine agreement. Given the history of US partisanship in the conflict (discussed earlier) and the need for a settlement that endures the test of time, it would be unfortunate for any secondary dispute over the validity of the guarantor to weaken the legitimacy of the final accord at some time in the future. The United States can most effectively lend its support to the final agreement as a co-guarantor with other British and Argentine allies and, more helpfully, with the United Nations. CONCLUSION

What Enders mused about US-Argentine relations in the days following the cessation of hostilities in 1982 had by August 1982 become the official US explanation of the diplomatic breakdown. As Enders told the House Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs: During the South Atlantic crisis, our ties with Argentina proved too weak to promote effective cooperation in support of common interests. Repeated efforts were made by us and by others—before the Argentine landing on the islands, again when the British fleet was approaching, and again when the US and Peruvian and U.N. peace plans were advanced in turn—to explain to Argentine leaders what would happen if they did what they proposed to do. Although our predictions consistently proved accurate, they were not believed. Communication failed utterly.4

In light of such utter failure, it can be hoped that the US-Argentine link is stronger in the 1990s than it was in the 1980s. Given the current status of the Bush and Menem governments discussed earlier, there is reason to believe it is. And, clearly, a stronger link can only bode well for current efforts to find a permanent Falklands/Malvinas settlement. On other fronts, one faces conditions today that at once portend an easier and yet a more complicated settlement. On the one hand, the principal leaders of Great Britain and Argentina at the time of the 1982 war are now out of power—Margaret Thatcher and Leopoldo Galtieri comfortably away from the polemic—and the new leaders (in Argentina, yet a second generation removed from the 1982 military conflict) in both countries have somewhat

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less political capital to defend. On the other hand, the pain of military conflict still resonates; and national leaders respond, if not always in lockstep, to national feeling. The factor that will likely urge the contending parties on toward a settlement is the simple fact that to fail to do so is to predestine future, quite possibly armed, conflict. Such an eventuality would be most unpalatable to the islanders themselves, who throughout the latest episode of the dispute have maintained their desire for little more than to preserve the stability of the status quo. The prospect of future conflict is equally unsettling for the British, who have no desire to foot the bill for a garrison on the islands or maintain a naval force in the South Atlantic indefinitely. The Argentines, forever frustrated at their unfulfilled pretensions to regional preeminence, seek the quickest route to a restoration of their national pride. Governments in both London and Buenos Aires seek political ground that will burnish their international reputations and promote domestic tranquility. The good faith efforts of both parties, in the bilateral discussions of 1989 and 1990, are evidence that time has at least partially healed the wounds of the 1982 war. With additional time, and the sympathetic diplomatic assistance of the United States and international organizations, a permanent settlement appears more likely now than at any time in recent memory. NOTES 1. Remarks of the assistant secretary of state for Latin America, Thomas Enders, to the Council of the Americas, Washington, D. C., 21 June 1982. 2. Joseph S. Tulchin, Argentina and the United States: A Conflicted Relationship (Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1990), 156. 3. Alexander M. Haig, Jr., Caveat Realism, Reagan, and Foreign Policy (New York: MacMillan, 1984). 4. For the full text of Enders's statement, and other documents relating to the US-Argentine exchanges during April and May 1982, see "The South Atlantic Crisis: Background, Consequences, Documentation, " Selected Document No. 21, United States Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Washington, D.C.

Appendix APPENDIX I: JOINT STATEMENT BY THE BRITISH AND ARGENTINE DELEGATIONS (MADRID - 1 5 FEBRUARY 1990)

1. Delegations of the British and Argentine Governments, as agreed at their meeting in Madrid in October 1989, met again in Madrid on 14 and 15 February 1990. The British delegation was led by Sir Crispin Tickwell, Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations, and the Argentine delegation by Ambassador Lucio Garcia Solar, Special Representative of the Government of Argentina. 2. Both delegations reaffirmed that the formula on sovereignty over the Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas), South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands and the surrounding maritime areas, recorded in paragraph 2 of the joint statement of 19 October 1989, applied to this meeting and its consequences. 3. Both Governments, wishing to develop further friendship and cooperation between their two peoples, agreed to re-establish diplomatic relations following notification of the Protecting Powers. Embassies will be reopened shortly and Ambassadors appointed in accordance with international practice. 4. The British delegation announced the decision of the British Government to lift the Protection Zone established around the Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas). 5. Both Governments approved with satisfaction the final report of the "British-Argentine Working Group about measures to build confidence and avoid incidents in the military sphere" and decided, under the terms of the formula on sovereignty referred to in paragraph 2 of the present joint statement, the following: (a) To establish an "Interim reciprocal information and consultation system" for movements of units of their armed forces in areas of 143

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Appendix the south-west Atlantic. The aims of this system are to increase confidence between the United Kingdom and Argentina and to contribute to achieving a more normal situation in the region without necessary delay (the text of this agreement is included as appendix 1 to the present joint statement); (b) To establish a direct communication link between the Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas) and the mainland in order to reduce the possibility of incidents, to limit their consequences in the case of occurrence, and to increase common knowledge of military activities in the south-west Atlantic (see Appendix 1.1); (c) To agree on a set of rules of reciprocal behavior for naval and air units of their armed forces when operating in proximity (see Appendix 1.2); (d) To agree on a mechanism for emergencies aimed at facilitating air and maritime search and rescue operations in the south-west Atlantic (see Appendix 1.3); (e) To establish a system of exchange of information on the safety and control of air and maritime navigation (see Appendix 1.4); (f) To continue bilateral consideration of these matters and to review the measures agreed upon within one year from their coming into force. 6. The agreements described in paragraph 5 above will enter into force on 31 March 1990. On the same day, the decision mentioned in paragraph 4 above will be implemented. 7. Both delegations expressed the satisfaction of their Governments with the report of the Working Group on Fisheries, which met in Paris on 18 and 19 December 1989. It was agreed that both Governments should proceed—through their respective foreign Ministries—to exchange available information on the operations of the fishing fleets, appropriate catch and effort statistics and analyses of the status of the stocks of the most significant offshore species in the maritime area of the Atlantic Ocean between latitude 45 degrees S and latitude 60 degrees S. They also agreed to assess jointly such information, and to explore bilaterally the possibilities for cooperation and conservation. 8. Both Governments decided to set up a Working Group on South Atlantic Affairs with the mandate to continue consideration of the issues entrusted to the two working groups mentioned in paragraphs 5 and 7 of the present joint statement. The Working Group will meet as frequently as the parties consider necessary; its first meeting will be held within one year of the date of this joint statement. 9. Both delegations considered the situation regarding contacts between the Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas) and the mainland and agreed to continue considering this matter. The British delegation recognized

Appendix

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11.

12.

13.

14.

15.

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the Argentine readiness to facilitate communications and trading opportunities between the Islands and the mainland. Both delegations expressed their agreement to a visit to a cemetery on the Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas) by close relatives of Argentine nationals buried there. The visit—based on humanitarian considerations—will take place under the auspices of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). Both Governments will seek the good offices of the ICRC and agree, through diplomatic channels, on the arrangements for and timing of the visit. Both delegations agreed that the feasibility and desirability of a general cooperation agreement should be examined through diplomatic channels. Both Governments, recognizing that the promotion and reciprocal protection of investments should encourage private initiative and increase prosperity in both States, agreed to begin, through diplomatic channels, the negotiation of an Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement. Both delegations agreed that it would be appropriate to abolish the requirement for visas for nationals of each country wishing to visit the other. This measure would become effective once negotiations had been concluded through diplomatic channels. Both Governments, conscious of the need to increase efforts to protect the environment, will work to ensure bilateral consultation and cooperation, including within the international institutions. Both Governments, recognizing the threat that illicit drugs and drug abuse have created for all countries, agreed to explore ways of collaborating in this field, including exchanges of information, control of trafficking and an agreement to trace, freeze and confiscate the proceeds of drug trafficking. The Argentine delegation announced that its Government would be represented at the world conference on "Demand Reduction and the Cocaine Threat" to be held in London in April 1990. Both delegations, noting the importance of current international trends towards greater political and economic interdependence and integration, agreed to consult through diplomatic channels on these trends, particularly those concerning the European Community and Latin America.

17. It was agreed that both Governments would jointly send the text of the present statement and its appendices to the Secretary-General of the United Nations for distribution as an official document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 37, and of the Security Council. The United Kingdom will transmit the present joint statement to the Presidency and Commission of the European Community,

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and the Government of Argentina will do likewise to the Organization of American States. 18. In conclusion, both delegations expressed their thanks to the Spanish Government for its generous hospitality and support. APPENDIX 1.1: INTERIM RECIPROCAL INFORMATION AND CONSULTATION SYSTEM

Both parties agree to establish an Interim Reciprocal Information and Consultation System for movements of units of their armed forces in areas of the south-west Atlantic. The aims of this system are to increase confidence between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and Argentina and to contribute to achieving a more normal situation in the region without unnecessary delay. The system consists of the following provisions: I. Direct Communication Link A. A direct communication link will be established between the respective military authorities under the supervision of both Foreign Ministries, in order to: (a) Reduce the possibility of incidents and limit their consequences if they should occur; (b) Increase common knowledge of military activities in the south-west Atlantic. B. The respective military authorities will be: (a) Argentine Naval Authority: Commandante del Area Naval Austral (Ushuaia); (b) Argentine Air Authority: Jefe de la Novena Brigada Aerea (Comodoro Rivadavia); (c) British Authority: Commander British Forces Falkland Islands (Malvinas). C. It is agreed to establish a direct radio link between the respective authorities, which will include voice and/or telex transmissions. The link will be manned on a 24-hour basis and will be tested at least once a week. Technical information relating to equipment, frequencies and modalities of use will be exchanged through diplomatic channels. D. It is agreed to establish a communications plan for radio links between units and stations of the parties. Technical information will be exchanged through diplomatic channels. II. Definition of Units A. Ship Any ship belonging to the naval forces of the parties bearing the external marks distinguishing warships of its nationality, under the command of an officer duly commissioned by the

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Government and whose name appears in the naval list, and manned by a crew who are under regular naval discipline, and British Fleet Auxiliaries. B. Aircraft Any aircraft belonging to the armed forces of the parties, manned by a military crew who are under regular armed forces discipline. C. Combatant units Any ship or aircraft equipped with weapons systems or means of offensive power or offensive projection capabilities (naval examples: aircraft carriers, cruisers, destroyers, frigates, corvettes, submarines, fast patrol boats, amphibious ships or ships carrying troops; aircraft examples: strike aircraft, fighters, bombers, missile or troop-carrying aircraft). III. Reciprocal Information About Military Movements 1. Reciprocal written information will be provided through diplomatic channels, not less than 25 days in advance, about: (a) Movements of naval forces involving four or more ships; (b) Movements of aerial forces involving four or more aircraft; (c) Exercises involving more than 1,000 men or more than 20 sorties by aircraft; (d) Amphibious or airborne exercises involving more than 500 men or more than 20 sorties by aircraft. The areas of application of this measure are: For Argentine Forces: within rhumb lines joining the following geographical coordinates in the specified order: 46S 63W, 50S 63W, 50S 64W, 53S 64W, 53S 63W, 60S 63W, 60S 20W, 46S 20W, 46S 63W. For British Forces: the area south of parallel 40°S and west of meridian 20°W and north of the 60°S. Each party will accept the presence of an observer ship from the other party in the vicinity of naval forces involving four or more ships engaged in manoevres within the relevant area of application. 2. Reciprocal notification of identity, intended track and purpose will be given, not less than 48 hours in advance, of a ship or an aircraft that intends to approach closer to coasts than 50 nautical miles by sea or 70 nautical miles by air. When specific movements of the kind described in this paragraph are intended to be carried out by combatant units and might cause political or military difficulty to the Argentine Government or to the British Government, the notifying party will be informed immediately and mutual agreement will be necessary to proceed. IV. Verification Verification of compliance with the reciprocal information arrangements in provision III above will be by national means, by observer ships (as

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provided for in III.l), and by consultations through the direct communication link. If disagreement should arise, the parties would have recourse to the diplomatic channel. V. Reciprocal Visits Reciprocal visits to military bases and naval units may be agreed through the diplomatic channel on a case-by-case basis. VI. Applicability of International Practice In situations not specifically covered in this system, it is understood that normal international practice will be applied on a reciprocal basis. VII. Duration This system, including the reciprocal information measures, will be reviewed at regular diplomatic-technical meetings. The first of these meetings will take place within one year after the entry into force of the system and will be convened at a date to be agreed through the diplomatic channel. APPENDIX 1.2: SAFETY MEASURES FOR NAVAL AND AIR UNITS WHEN OPERATING IN PROXIMITY

When operating in proximity, naval and air units of the parties will comply with the following general regulations and rules: (a) Naval and air units of the parties shall avoid any movement or action that might be interpreted as a hostile act or an act carried out with hostile intent; (b) Naval units of the parties shall manoeuvre in a manner that clearly shows their intentions and shall strictly observe the letter and spirit of the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea of 1972; (c) Air units shall use the greatest caution and prudence when maneuvering in proximity to units of the other party, in order to contribute to safety and avoid mutual interference; (d) Naval and air units of the parties shall not simulate attacks nor aim guns, missile launchers, torpedo tubes, other weapons or fire control radars in the direction of units of the other party; (e) Naval and air units of the parties shall not launch any object in the direction of passing ships or aircraft of the other party, nor use searchlights or other powerful illuminations devices to illuminate their navigation brigades; (f) Naval and air units of the parties operating in proximity shall avoid the darkening of lights and, in this respect, shall comply with the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea of 1972 and the provisions of annex VI of the Convention of International Civil Aviation of 1944; (g) On no account shall the communication and detection systems of units of the other party be interfered with or disrupted;

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(h) A prompt exchange of information shall be conducted in the event of any occurrence that might cause concern to the other party. APPENDIX 1.3: MARITIME AND AIR SEARCH AND RESCUE

When communication or coordination is required in relation to maritime and air search and rescue (SAR), the following procedures will apply: (a) The headquarters of the British Forces in the Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas) shall inform the regional SAR coordination centres of the South-West Atlantic Area: Maritime SAR: Ushuaia Maritime SAR Coordination Centre Air SAR: Comodoro Rivadavia Air SAR Coordination Centre (b) Maritime SAR operations shall be conducted in accordance with the SAR manual of the International Maritime Organization and the SAR manual for merchant ships. Air SAR operations shall be conducted in accordance with the provisions of annex XII to the Convention on International Civil Aviation and its amendments; (c) In the event that joint participation in a SAR incident becomes necessary, the headquarters of the British Forces in the Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas) and the appropriate Argentine SAR-Coordination Centre will coordinate their activities. APPENDIX 1.4: SAFETY OF NAVIGATION

1. The parties will exchange all relevant information so that Argentina, the R e g i o n a l C o o r d i n a t o r of N a v a r e a VI, as d e f i n e d by the International Maritime Organization, may issue the appropriate notices to mariners for that area. 2. In order to enhance flight safety, the parties agreed: (a) To facilitate the operation of Argentine Flight Information Centres by supplying the information necessary to provide the Air Traffic Control, Warning, Search and Rescue, Communication and Meteorological Services within the Argentine Flight Information Regions (FIR); (b) To exchange information between the Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas) and Comodoro Rivadavia (CRV) Flight Information Centre for identification of aircraft in flight in the FIRs, in particular on flights in the vicinity of coastal areas; (c) To respond positively in an emergency to requests to provide alternative landing facilities at their airfields for each other's aircraft and aircraft of third parties; and (d) To exchange aeronautical information about the airfields of both parties (navigation, approach and surface facilities).

The Contributors Carlos A. Floria is professor of the theory of the state at the University of Buenos Aires and professor of contemporary history at the University of San Andres. Dr. Floria is a member of the Vatican's Commission for Peace and Justice, the president of the Argentine Association of Political Science, and of the National Academy of Moral and Political Sciences. Christian A. Herter, Jr. is professorial lecturer in international relations at The Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) of The Johns Hopkins University, and a fellow at the SAIS Foreign Policy Institute. Trained in law, Mr. Herter has held a variety of positions in business, teaching, and public service. Mr. Herter came to SAIS in 1982, after having been adjunct professor of international law at the University of New Mexico Law School. In August of 1983, Mr. Herter was appointed by President Reagan as deputy US representative to the International Whaling Commission. Walter Little studied at Nottingham, Johns Hopkins, and Cambridge Universities. Dr. Little currently teaches Latin American politics at Liverpool University. A specialist on Argentina, he recently published (with C. Mitchell) In the Aftermath: Anglo-Argentine Relations Since the War for the Falkland/Malvinas Islands. Charles Maechling, Jr., is an international lawyer and former member of the law faculties at the University of Virginia, Georgetown University, and Cambridge University (UK). Mr. Maechling was a senior official of the State Department in politico-military affairs during the Kennedy and Johnson administrations and served as naval attaché in South America. Ruben Perina is an Argentine citizen. He is professor of Latin American Studies at Georgetown University and an official in the general secretariat of the Organization of American States. For many years, Dr. Perina worked 151

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About the Authors

closely with the late Roberto Etchepareborda, Argentina's leading expert on the Falklands/Malvinas dispute. Mauricio Reina is a Colombian citizen and a graduate of SAIS and of the University of the Andes (in Bogota, Colombia). He taught economics at the undergraduate level at the latter university (1985-1989), and was senior researcher at its Center for International Studies from 1989 until 1990. Riordan Roett is Sarita and Don Johnston Professor and director of the Latin American Studies Program at SAIS. Dr. Roett is a former president of the Latin American Studies Association (LASA) and a frequent consultant and writer on Latin American subjects. Wayne S. Smith is a former US Foreign Service officer. Dr. Smith served five years at the American Embassy in Buenos Aires (1972-1977) and is now director of Argentine Studies at SAIS. David Thomas is a member of the Council of the Royal Institute of International Affairs and an associate fellow of the University of Warwick, and is a former career British diplomat. He was assistant undersecretary of state for the Americas at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office from 1984 to 1986. Enrique Velasco-Ibarra is a Mexican citizen and a graduate of the University of Guanajuato (in Mexico), the Escuela Diplomatica (in Madrid), and of SAIS.

Index Acquired territory, 45-47,54 Air-sea rescue, agreement on, 112,113,144,149 Aland Islands, semiautonomous status of, 129-132 Alberdi, 89 Alfonsin, Raúl, 33,35, 41,82, 83,92,105; election of, 34; Malvinas issue and, 100 Alsogaray, Alvaro, 84,85, 92,101 Alsogaray, María Julia, 85 Andorra, co-dominion status of, 127,129 Angelóz, Eduardo, 82, 84 Anglo-Argentine Communications Agreement of 1971,21 Antarctica, 28; British in, 21,23,24,27,55, 78-79; claims on, 102; Falklands issue and, 78-79,102 Antarctic Treaty of 1959,21,23,79,118,102 Arbitration, 121 Argentine Antarctica, dispute over, 102 Beagle Channel, dispute over, 34,93 Belaunde Terry, 6, 32; mediation by, 31 Benn, Tony: quote of, 72 Berlin Agreements of 1885,46 Berne talks, 7,34-35,73,101,139 Bilateral negotiations, 24, 31,38, 39,57-58, 85,88,110,139-141 Bilateral relations: improvement of, 33-36, 111; restoration of, 7, 8,34,35,38-41, 58-59, 64, 67,69,70,87,94,112,114,117, 143. See also Normalization Bougainville, Luis Antonio de, 48 Brazil, support from, 11 British Antarctic Survey, 27,79 British Antarctic Territory, 21

British-Argentine Working Group, report of, 143 British Forces Falkland Islands (BFFI), 116 Bucareli, Francisco de Paula, 49 Buenos Aires Herald, 97 Bush, George, 139,140 Byron, John, 2,48,53 Cafiero, Antonio, 84 Camargo, Francisco de, 1,16 Camilión, Oscar, 30 Caputo, Dante, 38,100; quote of, 34 Carapintadas movement, 83, 99 Carlos III (Spain), 48 Carrington, Lord, 29,30 Cavallo, Domingo, 114 Cavendish, Thomas, 1,47 Chalfont, Lord, 5,24 Chamber of Deputies (Argentina), 102 Charles III (Spain), 2 Chile, 22,90; commercial links with, 41; dispute with, 93; negotiations with, 34; support from, 11 Clio, HMS (warship), 52 Co-dominion status, 127-129,132,133 Coats Land, 21 Collaboration. See Cooperation Colonialism, 4, 92 Commission for Information on NonAutonomous Territories, 56 Committee of 24 (UN), 23 Committee on Fisheries (FAO), 36 Commonwealth status, 131 Communications, 5,87,112-114,144-149; Falkland Islanders and, 78; reestablishing, 86

153

154

Index

Communist Party, Argentine, 92 Compromise, 73,74, 95,96,133; Falkland Islanders and, 77; Labour Party and, 72; promotion of, 67-68 Condominiums, 25,26, 64 Confidence-building measures, 9,36,39,58, 59,110-114,117,118,123,132 Conflict resolution, 25; UN and, 131 Conservation, 36,37,39, 66, 87,102, 112-113,117,118,144. See also Environmental issues Conservative Party: opinion poll of, 94; solidarity of, 67-68; sovereignty and, 65 Convention of International Civil Aviation of 1944,149 Cook, Captain, 22 Cooperation, 36-39,58-59,66-67,86,117, 118,144,145; development of, 114,143; economic, 26-29,41,58, 66,101; functional, 25 Coordinadora, 84 Corigliano, Francisco, 100 Critero, 97 Cultural identity, ensuring, 130 Culture of violence, Argentina and, 93 Davidoff, C. S., 5 - 6 Davies, 16 Davis, John, 1,47,53 De Bernhardt, Gaston, 17 Declaration Concerning the Concession of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, (UN), 56 Decolonization, 46,56, 67; Labour Party and, 71 Defense and Overseas Committee, 29 Defense spending, 69,76; concern for, 65 "Demand Reduction and the Cocaine Threat," conference, 145 Democracy, restoration of, 34,36,40-41,59, 80,83,99,109 Dent, Martin: on co-dominion status, 127-129 Department of Trade, trade embargo and, 76 Desires. See Wishes Diplomatic relations. See Bilateral relations Discovery, 46,47; claims of, 50,51; exclusive rights of, 49; international law and, 51 Drake, Francis, 47 Drug trafficking, agreement on, 112,145 Duncan, Silas, 4

Ea-Qua papal bull (1506), 49 EEZ. See Exclusive Economic Zone El Salvador, 137 Embargo. See Trade embargo Enders, Thomas O.: quote of, 136,140 Endurance, HMS, 6,30 Environmental issues, 87; cooperation on, 58. See also Conservation Escudé, Carlos, 91 European Community, 145; Argentina and, 10, 41,79-80,86,101,103, 111; Falklands/Malvinas issue and, 11-12 Exclusion zones, 32,33,110. See also Falkland Islands Protection Zone Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), 37,110, 111, 113; establishment of, 67 Falkland, Anthony, 1,15 Falkland Islanders: hostility of, 41,78,115, 123; nationalism of, 99,103; obligation to, 63,65; role of, 73-74,103,115; self-determination and, 19,109,113,114; society of, 77-78,115-116; wishes of, 24-29,32,40, 64-65,71,75,77,78,88,95-96,119,121, 124-127,131 Falkland Islands Committee (FIC), establishment of, 66 Falkland Islands Company, 26,124; concerns of, 66; organization of, 5 Falkland Islands Constitution of 1985, 7; human rights in, 19-20 Falkland Islands Dependencies, 28; title to, 21-22,27. See also South Georgia; South Sandwich Islands Falkland Islands Development Corporation (FIDC), 115,116 Falkland Islands Executive Council, 26; Dependencies and, 23 Falkland Islands Foundation, concerns of, 66 Falkland Islands Interim Conservation and Management Zone (FICZ), 113,116,117; establishment of, 8,37, 111 Falkland Islands Legislative Council, 24,29, 57,117 Falkland Islands Protection Zone (FIPZ), 7,33, 36,37,110,143; lifting of, 39,87,112,113 FCO. See Foreign and Commonwealth Office Ferrari, Gustavo: observations of, 90 FIC. See Falkland Islands Committee FICZ. See Falkland Islands Interim Conservation and Management Zone

Index

FIDC. See Falkland Islands Development Corporation Financial Times, 67; survey by, 117 FIPZ. See Falkland Islands Protection Zone Fisheries, 8, 78,100,114,144; bilateral negotiations on, 37,38,110; conservation of, 66, 87,112-113,117; cooperation in, 36-39, 86,117,118; revenues from, 38,41, 98, 111, 116,119,124,126,128,130; sovereignty and, 37; studies of, 36 Fishing licenses, 111, 124,126,128 Fishing rights: concern for, 88; international agreement on, 94 Fishing zones, 98; declaring, 36; maintaining, 128; revenues from, 41 Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), support of, 36,37 Foot, Michael: quote of, 71,72 Foreign Affairs Committee (Commons), IS, 20-21,22, 35,37; report by, 17,18 Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), 23-24,29, 30,70; diplomacy and, 76; Falkland Islanders and, 78,80n22; memorandum by, 15,18, 21-22; unpopularity of, 75-76 Foreign Ministry (Argentina), 30,31 Foreign policy, 81,100; control over, 65,89, 92; inconsistency in, 90; influences on, 97; making, 81; options for, 92; tendencies in, 91 Fortress Falklands posture, 11,126 Fraga, Javier González, 85 Frondizi, Arturo, 92,101 Galtieri, Leopoldo, 6,30-31,140 García del Solár, Lucio, 143; appointment of, 82 General Belgrano (cruiser), 6 , 3 2 , 7 1 , 7 3 Gómez, Esteban, 1,47,59n6 Graham Land, 21,55 Great Britain: interests of, 124-125; US bias for, 6,137,139 Grimaldi, Marques de, 2 Guardian, 67 Gutierrez, Diego, 47 Haig, Alexander, 33,136; Kirkpatrick and, 137-138; mediation by, 6,31 Hawkins, Richard, 16,47,53 Healy, Dennis: quote of, 73 Heroína (frigate), 51 Historic consolidation, principle of, 54 Howe, Geoffrey, 38

155

Human rights, 19,71,92 Hyperinflation, 83 Ulia, Auturo, 82 Immigration, limitation on, 128,130 Independence, Argentine, 50,52 Inter-American conferences, 55 Inter-Coetera of 1493,48 Interim Reciprocal Information and Consultation System, 146 International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), 145 International Court of Justice. See World Court International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 20 Internationalization, 79 International law, 18,46,51,121,122; appeal to, 47; territorial claims and, 46 International Maritime Organization, 149 International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea of 1972,148-149 Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement, 145 Islanders. See Falkland Islanders Island of Palmas case, 18 Isolationism, 90,91 Jewitt, Daniel, 3 , 5 1 John Paul II: mediation by, 82; visit of, 97 Joint Councils of the Falkland Islands, 29 Junta: attack by, 36; compromise and, 32-33; secret plans of, 31; Justicialista Party, policy of, 82,91-92. See also Peronist Party Kelpers, 56-57 Kirkpatrick, Jeane: Haig and, 137-138 Labour Party, 67,75; Falkland Islanders and, 78; Falklands crisis and, 71-74; opinion poll of, 94; sovereignty and, 57-58,65 LADE (Argentine airline), 25 La Nación, 97 Latin America: independence of, 50,52; leadership role in, 91; sovereignty issue and, 11-12; territorial megalomania of, 90-91; US policy in, 137-138 Law-of-the-Sea Convention, UN (1982), 111 League of Nations, 129 Leaseback, 25-27,29,57,76,77,95,115, 119,126-127; rejection of, 127; support for, 30,64,66; US and, 140

156

Index

Lexington, USS (warship), 3,52,60n20,121 Liberal Democrats, Falklands crisis and, 74-75 Lobbies: description of, 66-68; influence of, 67 Louis XV (France), 48 Luder, Italo, 100 McBride, John, 2,48,53 McMann, Thomas, 89 Madariaga, Juan Ignacio de, 2 Madrid talks, 7, 9-12,39, 74,86-88,94, 97, 111, 112; joint statement from, 143-146 Magellan, Ferdinand, 1,16,47,59n6 Mahu, Jacob, 1 Major, John, 63,70,71,77 Mallea, Eduardo, 93 Mare Harbor, naval base at, 116 Massera, Admiral, 28 Maurras, Charles, 89 Menem, Carlos, 7, 38,41,58,70,79,97, 111, 139,140; leadership of, 81-82,84, 85,101; military establishment and, 83; policy of, 104-105; quote of, 81,88; resigned realism of, 100; sovereignty umbrella and, 86 MID. See Movement of Integration and Development Ministry of Defence, 30, 76,80n24 Mora, Manuel, 93 Moreno, Josi Manuel: protests of, 55 Moreno, Manuel, 4,54 Mount Pleasant Airport (MPA), 33,41,73, 116,118 Movement of Integration and Development (MID), 92 National identity, 89,117,141 Nationalism: Argentine, 89; Falkland Islander, 99,103; frustrated, 103; Malvinas issue and, 110; «integrative, 93; specific, 97; strength of, 74; territorial, 90; traditional, 99 Navigational safety, 112,113,144 Negotiations. See Bilateral negotiations Neutralization, 66, 79 Nicaragua, 137 Noguera, Felipe, 93 Non-Antarctic Treaty States (non-ATS), 79 Nonintervention, 92,115 Nootka Sound Convention (1790), 3,17,50,53 Normalization: acceleration of, 114; support for, 64,109-111. See also Bilateral relations North, Lord: "secret pledge" by, 17

North-South issues, 92 O'Shaughnessy, Hugh, 97,98,100; quote of, 99 OAS. See Organization of American States Observers, UN, 34 Occupation, 47-51; acquiescence to, 54; effective, 46,48,50,51,53; international law and, 51; requirements of, 46 ODA. See Overseas Development Administration Oil: exploitation of, 21,128; supply of, 25 Oil Agreement of 1974,21 Olives, Bartolomé, 47 Onslow, James, 4 Operación Condor incident, 23 Opinion polls, 93-97,104-105. See also Public opinion Organization of American States (OAS), 38, 75,138 Ortiz, Miguel Angel Zavala, 82 Overseas Development Administration (ODA), clout of, 76-77 Owen, David, 26,72,74, 75 Pacheco, Jorge, 3,51 Part of Madrid (1713), 49 Palmer Land, 21 Panama, 137 Papal bulls, 48-49 Parsons, Anthony: quote of, 19 Peaceful solution, 19,30-33,39,58,92, 93, 111, 125; public support for, 10-11 Pérez de Cuéllar, Javier, 6,33 Perón, Juan, 92 Peronist Party, 82-85,94,99,100,101; foreign policy of, 91-92; Menem and, 84. See also Justicialista Party Piñedo, Josí María de, 3 , 4 Political and Military Command of the Malvinas Islands and Islands of the South Atlantic, 51-52 Political culture, fragmentation of, 89 Polls. See Opinion polls Popular market economy, Menem and, 84,85 Port Egmont, 15; abandonment of, 50; settlement of, 3,48,49,53 Port Louis, 4,15,16,48,51 Port San Carlos, 32 Port Stanley, 4,57,77,116,128,132; airstrip for, 25

Index

Position of agreement, 4-5 Postwar relations. See Bilateral relations Prescription, 18,56; acquisitive, 54 Public diplomacy, 92 Public opinion, 30, 63-65; Argentine, 135; division of, 63; Malvinas issue and, 93-97. See also Opinion polls Puerto Soledad, 4,48,51,52,60n20 Radical Civic Union. See Unión Civica Radical Radicales, 83,94,101 Radical Party, 82,84 Reagan, Ronald, 6 Realism: resigned, 100; sensible, 103 Regional preeminence, 141 Reinel, Pedro, 1,47 Relations. See Bilateral relations Religion, freedom of, 128 Renewalist movement, 101 Renovadores, 84 Resolution 502 (UN), 31 Resolution 1514 (UN), 5, 56,57 Resolution 2065 (UN), 5 , 1 5 , 2 3 , 5 6 Resolution 3160 (UN), 5,26 Ribero, Diego, 47 Ridley, Nicholas, 28, 29 Ruda, José Maria, 91,92 Runcle, Robert: quote of, 97 Russell, Roberto, 100 Sanctions, 6, 32. See also Trade embargo Sansón Islands, 47 Santa Cruz, Alonso de, 47 Santa Cruz province, 55 Sarandi (ship), 52, 60n20 Sarmiento, Pedro, 47,89, 90 Security, 87; guaranteeing, 128 Self-determination, 18,41, 64-65, 92, 99,116, 121,122,129,131; Falkland Islanders and, 19,109,114; Labour Party and, 71; principle of, 56-57, 70; right to, 16,20,33, 35-36; support for, 65,113; territorial integrity and, 42 Semiautonomous status, 129-132 Shackleton, Lord, 27,33,36,67; mission of, 6; quote of, 79 Shackleton report (1976), 66,115; quote from,

21 Shared sovereignty, 127-129; US and, 140 Sheffield, HMS (destroyer), 7,33

157

Smith, Henry, 4 Social Democrats, Falklands crisis and, 74-75 Socmerc, 93,95 South Atlantic Council: Falkland Islanders and, 78; formation of, 67 South Atlantic Fisheries Commission, 114, 117,118; establishment of, 112-113 Southern Thule: Argentine presence on, 27; sovereignty over, 22 South Georgia, 6,26, 27,35,39,81,86,88, 110; claims to, 45,132-133; fishing at, 37; landing on, 31; sovereignty over, 21-23,55. See also Falkland Islands Dependencies South Orkney Islands, 21; jurisdiction over, 55 South Sandwich Islands, 26,27,32,35,39, 81,86, 88,110; claims to, 45,132-133; fishing at, 37; sovereignty over, 21-23,55. See also Falkland Islands Dependencies South Shetland Islands, 21; sovereignty over, 55 Sovereignty, 9-10,59,92,94,121; Argentine claim to, 45; British claim to, 15-21,40; circumventing, 49,119; compromise over, 24,109; deadlock over, 7,14,26,29, 40-41,54, 63,109; exclusive, 48; Falkland Islanders and, 78; fisheries and, 37; Labour Party and, 73; maintaining, 69; negotiations on, 30,35,38; public opinion on, 64; sanctity of, 87; Social Democrats and, 75; Spanish, 50,51,53; transfer of, 23,25,35, 126-127; US and, 140 Sovereignty freeze, 24,28 Sovereignty umbrella, 27,39, 88,100,101, 111, 112; Menem and, 86 Spain: occupation by, 47,50-51; sovereignty of, 48,53; subsequent, 52-53; territorial acquisition by, 45 Stability: institutional, 89; political, 65; regional, 79 Status quo: Falkland Islanders and, 78,125; maintaining, 64,65, 69,124,126 Stewart, Michael, 20,23 Story of an Argentine Passion (Mallea), 93 Strategic Lane of Communication (SLOC), 78 "Strategy for Agricultural Concession," 98 Strong, John, 1,15 Succession, 46,47, 51-52 Territorial integrity, 19, 90-92; self-determination and, 42 Territories, acquiring, 45-47,54

158

Index

Terrorism, condemnation of, 92 Thatcher, Margaret, 7,19,40,63, 80n4,80n9, 80nl8,124-125,140; authority of, 69-73, 75-77; quote of, 34; sovereignty and, 28, 70,79; support for, 67, 74,78 Third International Position, 92 Thomas, David, 110,124,139 Hckwell, Crispin, 143 Tierra del Fuego province, 55,102,109 Tordesfflas Treaty (1494), 48 Trade: growth of, 116; restoration of, 110,114 TYade embargo, 33,63,67,76,110. See also Sanctions Treaty of Madrid (1667), 49 Treaty of Paris (1763), 2 Treaty of Utrecht (1713), 1,49 Trusteeship, 131-133; Falkland Islanders and, 132; US and, 140 Thisteeship Council (UN), 131 Tulchin, Joseph: quote of, 138 Ultranationalists, 101 Umbrella of sovereignty. See Sovereignty umbrella Unión Cívica Radical (UCR), 83, 92 Union of the Democratic Center (UCD), 84,94 United Nations, 11,20, 32, 35,41,45,54,72, 75,77,89,92,100,109,110,125,139,140; administration by, 95; co-dominion system and, 129; conflict resolution and, 131; Falkland Islanders and, 78; fisheries

management and, 37; Malvinas Islands and, 55-57,95; observers from, 34; resolutions of, 4,5,15,23,26,31,56,57; support for, 64; trusteeship and, 131-133 United Nations Charter, 16,19, 20, 86,132 United Provinces of Rio de la Plata, 3,51,52 United States: bias of, 137; diplomatic relations with, 139,141; hemispheric responsibilities of, 138-139; role for, 135-141 Uruguay, 41 Uti possidetis, 46,51, 91 Vanossi, Jorge, 102 Vernet, Luis, 4,51-52 Vespucci, Amerigo, 1,59n6 Victoria, Queen, 4 Vinuesa, Rail E., 46-47,50,54 Visa requirements, elimination of, 87,114,145 War of the English Succession, 1 Weert, Sebald van, 1,16,59n6 Wilson, Harold, 26 Wishes, 20,32,56,65 Working Group on Fisheries, 144 Working Group on South Atlantic Affairs, 144; establishment of, 87 World Court, 22,121,122 Young, Baroness, 20 YPF (Argentine national oil company), 25

About the Book To the British, they are the Falkland Islands; to the Argentines, the Malvinas. The dispute between the two countries over these remote islands has smoldered since 1833, when the British expelled the few Argentine settlers and established their own colony. A century-and-a-half later, in April 1982, Argentina seized the islands by force and war ensued. By June, the islands were again under British control, but not until 1990 did Argentina and Britain formally declare an end to hostilities and resume full diplomatic trade relations. And even now, the conflict remains unresolved and festering. The authors of this book stress the need to end the dispute lest it again lead to armed hostilities. Two distinguished British authorities outline the bases of the British claims and also the practical political considerations behind London's position. Two equally distinguished Argentine authors provide the same elucidation of Buenos Aires's position. In the role of neutral observers, US specialists suggest ways in which the two sides might begin to reduce the bitterness resulting from this issue and eventually work out a solution acceptable not only to London and Buenos Aires but to the islanders themselves. The underlying premise of the book is that such a solution would serve the interests of all parties, the islanders included.

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