Torah in the Observatory: Gersonides, Maimonides, Song of Songs 9781618110183

Citation preview

TORAH IN THE OBSERVATORY: Gersonides, Maimonides, Song of Songs

Emunot: Jewish Philosophy and Kabbalah Dov Schwartz (Bar-Ilan University), Series Editor EDITORIAL BOARD Ada Rapoport-Albert (University College, London)

Raphael Jospe (Bar-Ilan University)

Gad Freudenthal (C.N.R.S, Paris)

Ephraim Kanarfogel (Yeshiva University)

Gideon Freudenthal (Tel Aviv University)

Menachem Kellner (Haifa University)

Moshe Idel (Hebrew University, Jerusalem)

Daniel Lasker (Ben-Gurion University, Beer Sheva)

TORAH IN THE OBSERVATORY: Gersonides, Maimonides, Song of Songs Menachem Kellner

For Rose Shoulson for being herself, and for giving me Jolene

Boston 2010

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Kellner, Menachem Marc, 1946Torah in the observatory : Gersonides, Maimonides, Song of Songs / Menachem Kellner. p. cm. -- (Emunot : Jewish philosophy and Kabbalah) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-1-934843-80-2 (hardback : alk. paper) 1. Jewish philosophy. 2. Philosophy, Medieval. 3. Levi ben Gershom, 1288-1344. 4. Maimonides, Moses, 1135-1204. 5. Bible. O.T. Song of Solomon--Criticism, interpretation, etc. I. Title. B755.K45 2010 181’.06--dc22 2010021777

Copyright © 2010 Academic Studies Press All rights reserved

Book design by Olga Grabovsky, Cover idea: Rivka Kellner Published by Academic Studies Press in 2010

28 Montfern Avenue Brighton, MA 02135, USA [email protected] www.academicstudiespress.com

TABLE OF CONTENTS PREFACE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

CHAPTER ONE Providence and the Rabbinic Tradition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

CHAPTER TWO Mosaic Prophecy: Maimonides and Gersonides . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47

CHAPTER THREE Eschatology and Miracles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69

CHAPTER FOUR Creation, Miracles, Revelation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101

CHAPTER FIVE Song of Songs and Gersonides’ World . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121

CHAPTER SIX Maimonides and Gersonides on Astronomy and Metaphysics . . . . . . 149

CHAPTER SEVEN Gersonides on the Song of Songs and the Nature of Science . . . . . . . 159

CHAPTER EIGHT Politics and Perfection: Gersonides vs. Maimonides . . . . . . . . . . . . 181

CHAPTER NINE The Role of the Active Intellect in Human Cognition . . . . . . . . . . . 207

CHAPTER TEN Imitatio Dei and the Dissemination of Scientific Knowledge . . . . . . . 235

CHAPTER ELEVEN Moses ibn Tibbon and Gersonides on Song of Songs . . . . . . . . . . . 255

CHAPTER TWELVE Misogyny: Gersonides vs. Maimonides . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 283

CHAPTER THIRTEEN Gersonides and his Cultured Despisers: Arama and Abravanel. . . . . . 305

AFTERWORD – PERSONAL REFLECTIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 333 WORKS CITED . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 337 INDEX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 365

PREFACE

B

etween thirty and forty years ago a cohort of young traditionally-educated Jews from the United States became attracted to the study of medieval Jewish philosophy, made aliyah to Israel, and took up posts teaching the field in Israeli universities. Even though we really did not know each other before moving to Israel, we shared a great deal in common beyond halakhic observance and Zionism. Largely left of center politically, moderate in our religious views and practice, we found the study and teaching of medieval Jewish philosophy to be of more than simply antiquarian interest: it engaged us as academics and as Jews. I sometimes wonder what was in the air of the sixties and seventies which prompted this development. I was part of that wave (perhaps “ripple” would be more accurate). Indeed, I may be the most extreme example of the influence of the sixties on my cohort since my doctoral dissertation (written under the supervision of the late and sorely missed Steven Schwarzschild) was entitled: “Civil Disobedience in Democracy: A Philosophical Justification.” My studies were philosophical as opposed to philological and it was more a matter of luck than design that I embarked on what continues to be a very fulfilling career in the study of Jewish thought through the generations. My first academic article was on Gersonides and, despite a growing fascination with Maimonides, I published another dozen articles on Gersonides between 1974 and 1996, produced a critical edition of his commentary on Song of Songs (2001) and translated the commentary into English (1998). Many of the chapters which make up this volume were originally written in connection with my Song of Songs project. Indeed, several of them were part of an extended introduction which I had written for the English translation. When I sent the translation to Ivan Marcus, editor of the Yale Judaica Series, 7

he was forced to explain to me (gently) that he expected an introduction of about fifty pages, aimed at “my intelligent uncle,” and not two hundred pages aimed at my colleagues. All of the chapters in this volume have been substantially revised for their publication here. In my later writing I have tried to make my language more gender-inclusive than it used to be, but in the case of Gersonides that would be grossly anachronistic (see ch. 12 below). I have updated references, and have sought to reduce overlap and repetition. Hebrew and Arabic terms are transliterated without diacritical marks. The first four chapters all relate to difficulties Gersonides had in reconciling his philosophy and his Judaism. Chapters 5-10 grew out of my work on Song of Songs. Since Gersonides interprets that text as a handbook in Aristotelian epistemology and as a guide to how to study the sciences in order to kiss God as it were (Song of Songs 2:1), these essays deal with questions of knowledge, science, and leadership. Chapter 11 deals with the extent to which medieval Jewish philosophers knew of each other’s work. Chapter 12 deals with Gersonides’ misogyny, while in the closing chapter I look at the way in which Gersonides was criticized after his death. This is the only chapter of the book in which Maimonides is not used as a foil to Gersonides, and thus this book is as much about the Great Eagle as it about R. Levi ben Gershom.

8

Acknowledgements The present volume (and its companion volume of studies on Maimonides, Science in the Bet Midrash) is the fruit of an initiative of my friend Dov Schwartz. For this, and much else, I am very grateful to him. I would also like to make note of the friendly, helpful, and very professional staff of Academic Studies Press, led by Kira and Igor Nemirovsky. Over the years, many relatives, friends, and colleagues have generously helped me in my work. I here happily record my gratitude to: Herbert Davidson, Seymour Feldman, Thomas Finn, Harry Gamble, Michael Glatzer, Zev Harvey, Giora Hon, Alfred Ivry, Rivka Kellner, Howard Kreisel, Y. Tzvi Langermann, Daniel J. Lasker, Tyra Lieberman, Charles, Bezalel and Chip Manekin (all three of them), Avraham Melamed, Avram Montag, Benzion Netanyahu, Alvin Reines, Shalom Rosenberg, Norbert Samuelson, Marc Saperstein, Maimon Schwarzschild, Steven Schwarzschild, z”l, Julia Schwartzmann, Adam Shear, Baird Tipson, and Charles Touati, z”l. I acknowledge with gratitude permissions received from the original publishers of the chapters of this book: “Gersonides, Providence, and the Rabbinic Tradition,” Journal of the American Academy of Religion 43 (1974): 673-685. [http://www.jstor.org/view/00027189/ap050032/05a00090/0] “Gersonides and His Cultured Despisers: Arama and Abravanel,” Journal of Medieval and Renaissance Studies 6 (1976): 269-296. “Maimonides and Gersonides on Mosaic Prophecy,” Speculum 42 (1977): 6279. [http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0038-7134%28197701%2952%3A1%3C62%3A MAGOMP%3E2.0.CO%3B2-6] 9

“Gersonides on Miracles, the Messiah and Resurrection,” Da’at 4 (1980): 5-34. “Gersonides on the Problem of Volitional Creation,” Hebrew Union College Annual 51 (1980): 111-128. “Gersonides’ Commentary on Song of Songs: Why He Wrote it and to Whom it was Addressed,” G. Dahan (ed.), Gersonide en son Temps (Paris and Louvain; Peeters, 1991): 81-107. “Maimonides and Gersonides on Astronomy and Metaphysics,” S. Kottek and F. Rosner (eds.), Moses Maimonides: Physician, Scientist and Philosopher (Northvale: Jason Aronson, 1993): 91-96 and 249-51. “Politics and Perfection: Gersonides vs. Maimonides,” Jewish Political Studies Review 6 (1994): 49-82. “Gersonides on the Song of Songs and the Nature of Science,” Journal of Jewish Thought and Philosophy 4 (1994): 1-21. “Gersonides on the Role of the Active Intellect in Human Cognition,” Hebrew Union College Annual 65 (1994): 233-59. “Gersonides on Imitatio Dei and the Dissemination of Scientific Knowledge,” Jewish Quarterly Review 85 (1995): 275-96. “Communication or Lack Thereof Among 13th- 14th Century Provençal Jewish Philosophers: Moses ibn Tibbon and Gersonides on Song of Songs,” S. Menache (ed.), Communication in the Jewish Diaspora (Leiden: Brill, 1996): 227-55. “Philosophical Misogyny in Medieval Jewish Thought: Gersonides vs. Maimonides,” in A. Ravitzky (ed.), Y. Sermonetta Memorial Volume (Jerusalem: Magnes, 1998): 113-28 (Hebrew).

10

INTRODUCTION

R

abbi1 Levi ben Gershom (1288-1344)2 is known to the Jewish world as Ralbag (Rabbi Levi Ben Gershom) and to the wider world as Gersonides.3 Gersonides wrote important and in many cases ground-breaking works in many fields. These include biblical exegesis, astronomy, astrology, geometry, halakhah, logic, mathematics, philosophy, philosophical theology, and extensive supercommentaries on the commentaries of Averroes on Aristotle. With the exception – perhaps – of his mathematics and geometry, all of these works are interconnected and must be understood together if they are to be understood at all. This interconnectedness is illustrated in the various chapters of this book. As far as is known, Gersonides spent all his 56 years in Provence (in the cities of Orange and Avignon, then the seat of the papacy during its 1309-1378 “Babylonian Captivity”). Details of his biography are scarce. The precise date of his death is known,4 but not the circumstances of his family and education.5 That his father and at least one of his grandfathers were learned is evi1

It has long been customary to attach this title to medieval Jews. In the case of Gersonides it appears to be both apposite (he was a profoundly learned Talmudist, he wrote widely accepted commentaries on many books of the Bible, he is the author of a lost commentary on at least one Talmudic tractate, and two halakhic responsa are attributed to him) and irrelevant (by all available evidence, he devoted the lion’s share of his considerable intellectual energy to what we today would call scientific and philosophical pursuits).

2

For a very useful chronological table of Gersonides’ writings, set against the (few) known events of his life and events of contemporary historical significance, see Weil-Gueny, “Gersonide.”

3

For a comprehensive account of Gersonides’ life and thought, see Touati, La pensée. For an annotated bibliography of works by and about Gersonides see Kellner, “Bibliographia Gersonideana”; updated in Kellner, “Bibliographia Gersonideana 1992-2002.”

4

At the time of his death, Gersonides was working on an astrological prognostication with a Christian colleague, who reported that Gersonides died on April 20, 1344. See Goldstein and Pingree, “Prognostication.”

5

What is known about Gersonides is summarized in Shatzmiller, “Gersonide et la société

11

MENACHEM KELLNER

dent from occasional comments cited in their names in his commentary on the Torah. His rabbinic erudition is staggering, but the names of his teachers remain unknown. R. Simeon ben Zemah Duran (1361-1444) claimed a family connection to Gersonides; since he was born only 17 years after Gersonides’ death, it is likely that he wrote from specific knowledge.6 We do not know how Gersonides earned a living, although there is evidence that on at least a number of occasions he engaged in money-lending. He worked with Christian astronomers and astrologers and apparently enjoyed a cordial relationship with them.7 His reputation in the wider world was such that a very large number of his scientific and philosophical works were translated into Latin8 and his astronomical tables were sought after by Johannes Kepler.9 In the world of Jewish tradition Gersonides is best known as the author of commentaries on the earlier prophets and of Job.10 These commentaries are found today in the Mikra’ot Gedolot editions of the Bible along with traditional commentaries. When I was young and foolish I was surprised by this: Gersonides was treated with respect as a rishon (significant early authority, in the period after the Geonim and before the publication of the Shulhan Arukh) because of a decision made by Daniel Bomberg, publisher of the first printed edition of Mikra’ot Gedolot, and his associate, Felix Pratensis.11 Bomberg was a Gentile and Pratensis an apostate Jew. It was they who decided to include Gersonides’ commentaries. When I matured,12 I realized that Bomberg and Pratensis were businessmen seeking to make a profit on an expensive and risky juive.” See also Shatzmiller’s earlier studies cited there. 6

Responsa, I:103.

7

See Goldstein, “Preliminary Remarks,” p. 243.

8

Dahan, “Les traductions latines.”

9

Goldstein, “Preliminary Remarks,” p. 253.

10 His commentaries on the Pentateuch were printed in Mantua (before 1480), Pesaro (1514), Venice (1547), and in Amsterdam (1724-27). In our day three separate editions have appeared, or are appearing. See “Works Cited” at the end of this book. For close to three hundred years, in other words, the Pentateuch commentaries were rare and largely unavailable. 11 On Bomberg and his print shop, see Amram, Hebrew Books, pp. 146-224, Haberman, HaMadpis Daniel Bombergi, and Hirsch, “A New Look.” 12 As to the question how much I have matured, I direct all inquiries to Jolene Kellner, who has strong opinions on the subject.

12

INTRODUCTION

venture. If they included Gersonides in their edition, it was not in order to slip a radical philosopher into the Jewish canon, but it was because their market research showed it to be a prudential move. In other words, Gersonides did not become accepted in the traditional Jewish world because of his appearance in Mikra’ot Gedolot; rather at least some of his commentaries were already accepted,13 and because of that, they were included in Mikra’ot Gedolot.14 Once in the Mikra’kot Gedolot, Gersonides’ status as a rishon was assured, despite his unusual positions on a whole range of theological issues (which will be mentioned below in this Introduction and in detail throughout the rest of this book). This led to the following scenario. In 1958 Rabbi Jacob Moshe Shurkin of 1946 Bergen Street, Brooklyn, printed (and sought to copyright!) a photo-reproduction of the first volume of the Venice, 1547 edition of Gersonides’ commentary on the Torah.15 Rabbi Shurkin received an approbation (haskamah) from Rabbi Moshe Feinstein, z”l (1895-1986), universally considered the leading halakhic decisor of his generation and a central figure in haredi (so-called “ultra-orthodox”) Judaism. Rabbi Feinstein wrote of his pleasure in the fact that Gersonides’ commentary on the Pentateuch would once more be available, and that he hoped “that everyone would buy this book at full price.” Rabbi Feinstein was worldlier than his Artscroll hagiographers have made him out to be, but it still beggars the imagination to think that he really wanted Jewish householders to own and presumably study Gersonides on the Torah. In the opening pages of the introduction to the commentary, for example, Gersonides (2c/4/5) cites Aristotle to explain the nature of the truths taught in the Torah and, at the very beginning of the commentary itself (9a/20/30), informs the reader that without knowledge of the notion of formal cause it is impossible to attain any perfection 13 There is no way of knowing why Gersonides’ commentary on the Torah was not included in Bomberg’s Mikra’ot Gedolot, although it appears likely that its excessive length played a role in the decision. In general, as Zev Harvey pointed out to me, an impressively large number of his works were printed in the first hundred years of Jewish printing, surely an indication of the wide interest in his works in that period. 14 Indeed, Bomberg and Pratensis did not invent the format, later adopted by Bill Gates, of putting different commentaries in “windows” around the main text. There are many such commentary compilations in manuscript, several of which include commentaries by Gersonides . 15 New York: Gross and Weiss, 1958 (http://hebrewbooks.org/19168).

13

MENACHEM KELLNER

of the soul at all. It is more than likely that if Rabbi Feinstein had any acquaintance with Gersonides it was from his commentaries on the earlier prophets.16 Gersonides’ more outlandish views rarely come up in those commentaries.17 So perhaps my youthful foolishness was not so foolish after all? Given that Gersonides’ rabbinic erudition, on display throughout his commentaries on Exodus, Leviticus and Numbers, was not known to the “yeshiva world,” and that the unusual positions defended in his philosophical works would hardly be known in that world, it does appear that his status today as a link in the chain of tradition is a function of his appearance in Mikra’ot Gedolot. Thus, it appears that Gersonides’ place in the canon was assured by a business decision taken by a Gentile and an apostate Jew, on the basis of what one assumes was careful market research (the enterprise was hugely expensive) in a Jewish world apparently more open to the wider culture than it is often thought to have been. 16 As opposed to Gersonides’ commentary on Job, a biblical book which was hardly part of the curriculum in the world in which Rabbi Feinstein grew to maturity, but which was still available in Mikra’ot Gedolot. 17 For whatever it is worth, the Bar Ilan Responsa Project database has one reference to “Ralbag” in R. Feinstein’s responsa, Iggerot Mosheh (Even ha-Ezer, pt. 1, section 74). Among the ideas many readers will find as outlandish, the notion of the Active Intellect probably stands out. The “Active Intellect” comes up over a dozen times in these commentaries, and since this term is both central to Gersonides’ thinking, and foreign to contemporary ears, it is fitting to say a few words about it. God created the world such that there is a series of intellects which emanate from God (see the commentary on Exodus, p. 179/375 – the passage is missing in the Venice edition) and which – without self-awareness of any sort – govern all natural processes. The tenth (and “lowest”) of these intellects is called the sekhel ha-po’el, the Active (or Agent) Intellect, which, in Gersonides’ scheme, functions as a kind of lens through which the activities of the “higher” intellects are focused. This is the intelligence of the lunar sphere which governs the sublunar world, endowing it with the intelligence and purpose visible in its processes and evolutions and actualizing man’s potential for knowledge. It is thus the cause of the order we find in what we call contingent events. The Active Intellect embodies in itself all the laws governing the influences of sublunar nature and all the laws governing the influences of the celestial bodies. This latter is possible because the Active Intellect is an emanation, not of the ninth intellect alone, but of all the separate intellects together. Thus, while it is inferior in degree to the other intellects, it has a view of all of sublunar nature while they each apprehend only one aspect of it. It apprehends the sum of what they apprehend. The Active Intellect is the immediate cause of prophecy and miracles. Many of my students, when first hearing about the doctrine summarized here, wonder how insane medieval philosophers were. Because of its cognomen (and I suppose, also because of our tendency to capitalize its name), they tend to personalize the Active Intellect, but it has no more “personality” than does, say the law of gravity. The doctrine of intellects is simply an attempt to explain observed phenomena with the intellectual and scientific tools then available. For a fuller discussion, see below, ch. 9.

14

INTRODUCTION

Gersonides’ apparently positive reception (as evidenced by his inclusion in the Mikra’ot Gedolot) notwithstanding, there is no denying that he became a controversial figure by the later middle ages. This is admitted by the man who first arranged for the publication of his major work of philosophy and theology, Milhamot Adonai (Wars of the Lord).18 This was Jacob Marcaria, a physician who received permission from Cardinal Cristoforo Madruzzo, bishop of Trent, to establish a Hebrew printing press in Riva di Trento (in what is today Northern Italy) in 1558.19 In the four years of its operation, the press published about 35 Hebrew titles, including three by Gersonides: the Milhamot in 1560, his commentary on four of the five scrolls,20 and an anthology of the lessons (to’alot21) found at the ends of the various sections into which he divided his commentary on the Torah. Marcaria opens his preface to the Milhamot, a preface written in lashon meshubezet (language in which biblical verses and rabbinic sayings are artfully inlaid into the text), as follows: To the reader: Now this time will my husband be joined unto me,22 because I have borne23 you, and you will be called book of the Wars of the Lord24 [written by] the divine philosopher,25 the Master, Rabbi Levi ben Gershom, may his memory 18 The title comes from Nu. 21:14. One wonders against whom Gersonides was battling in the book (for one suggestion, see below, ch. 11, note 19). It is interesting to note that R. Abraham Maimuni wrote a book with the same title in defense of his father. 19 On this press, see Bloch, “Hebrew Printing,” Amram, Hebrew Books, pp. 296-305 and Benayahu, Ha-Defus, pp. 107-118. It is important to note that a prominent rabbinic figure, Rabbi Joseph ben Nathan Ottolenghi (d. 1570), rosh yeshiva of Cremona, played a central role in the press and that many of its publications were standard rabbinic works. Marcaria himself seems to have sat on religious courts (batei din) in Cremona. 20 No commentary on Lamentations is extant. 21 Marcaria published them under the title To’aliyot, and the name stuck. See Braner, “Introduction,” p. iv. 22 Yilaveh ishi elai; a play on Gersonides’ name, Levi. 23 Gen .29:34 .The verse speaks of three sons ,and the Milhamot is the third of Gersonides’ books Marcaria published. I thank Adam Shear (who in turn thanked Daniel J. Lasker and Charles Manekin) for pointing this out to me. 24 Nu.21:14 . 25 This may simply mean, “metaphysician.” Isaac Abravanel (1437-1508), who ended his eventful life in Italy, and who was another author published by Marcaria, referred to Plato, Rabbi

15

MENACHEM KELLNER

accompany him for life in the world to come, who in his philosophy ascended on high,26 and spoke about God. And even though some of his words appear to contradict our Torah and the Sages of our nation, it is for God that the battle is before and behind,27 a help meet for him.28 And likewise many29 call it ‘Wars With the Lord’. But these are the waters of Meribah [=contention], where they strove30 for they are many that fight against the Most High.31 Forsooth, did he not explain32 this in the Introduction to the book, and in the last chapter of the first treatise? We saw33 there that the words of the Torah stand to one side, the words of philosophy, to another – “they deal with what is theirs, and we deal with what is ours.”34 I have not come to serve him as an angel or intercessor,35 for the Wars of the Lord did he fight.36

By Marcaria’s time the pun Wars With the Lord was already well established (see below, ch. 13). Despite that, and despite acknowledging the problematic nature of much of the book’s content, Marcaria and his rabbinic partner, Rabbi Ottolenghi, published the Milhamot and two others of Gersonides’ works. In fact, in the continuation of the preface, Marcaria acts as an angel or intercessor, defending Gersonides from his detractors.

Akiva, Maimonides and even himself as “divine” as well. For details, see Hoch and Kellner, “Voice.” 26 Based on Ps68:19 27 II Chron.13:14 . 28 Gen.20 ,2:18 . 29 Nahum.1:12 30 Nu.20:13 . 31 Based on Ps .56:3 .Gersonides is here presented as waging war on those who attack God. 32 hitnazel. 33 The text has a four letter word ,resh, alef, nun, vav; I read it as if he meant to write ra’inu. 34 Ber8 .a .I wonder what Marcaria means by this – perhaps that the Gersonidean reading of the Torah is” ours?“ 35 Based on Job.33:23 36 My late teacher, Steven Schwarzschild, collected Riva imprints. His son, Prof. Maimon Schwarzschild, was kind enough to scan all the prefaces for me. Marcaria wrote prefaces for many of the books he printed and I hope to make a study of them, in Steven Schwarzschild’s memory. This is also the place to thank Mr. Jordan Cherrick of St. Louis, who presented me with a copy of the Riva Milhamot.

16

INTRODUCTION

I will have occasion to note below that Gersonides genuinely believed that he did not read science and philosophy into the Torah.37 Not only was the science of his day the true meaning of the Torah, but, he was convinced, he came to understand that science thanks to his study of Torah. As my student and friend Oded Horetzky helped me to see, this fact explains why Gersonides might be thought to be of antiquarian interest only. Maimonides (1138-1204), for example, uses both Aristotle and what we might call historical anthropology to help him understand the Torah, but leaves himself considerable room for negotiation, as it were, by countenancing scientific progress and by admitting that his allegorical interpretations might simply be wrong. For Maimonides, the important principle is that the non-halakhic portions of the Torah are open to allegorical interpretation. He would approach with equanimity the notion that our understanding of the allegories must change as science progresses.38 Gersonides, on the other hand, was a working scientist39 and one who was convinced that many of the sciences had or were about to reach completion.40 The construction of the Tabernacle, for example, really and truly does express symbolically the structure of the universe.41 Unfortunately, that universe is Ptolemaic. Since we no longer live in a Ptolemaic universe, Gersonides’ extended interpretation of the significance of the Tabernacle is reduced to an historical curiosity. Maimonides also lived in a Ptolemaic universe (as is evidenced by “Laws of the Foundations of the Torah,” I-IV) but he left enough room between Ptolemy and the Torah to keep the latter intact

37 Harvey, “Quelques réflexions,” argues that Gersonides, as opposed to Maimonides and other philosophers, genuinely believed he was discovering the true philosophic meanings of the midrashim, and not creatively reinterpreting them. I certainly agree with him about Gersonides, but am less sure about Maimonides. 38 On all this, see Kellner, Science, chs. 12-15. 39 Note the title of Gad Freudenthal’s anthology of articles on Gersonides: Studies on Gersonides – A Fourteenth-Century Philosopher-Scientist. Compare Goldstein, “Preliminary Remarks,” p. 247: “Levi is almost unique among medieval astronomers for his effort to base a new system of astronomy on his own observations rather than those of the ancients.” Freudenthal (“Felicity,” p. 64), opines that Gersonides spent more time on his astronomical observations than on all his other pursuits combined. 40 See below, chs. 6-10. 41 Commentary on Exodus, pp. 104a-105d/362-372/290-304 and on Leviticus, p. 170d/355/384.

17

MENACHEM KELLNER

when science advanced and the former was rejected.42 The result of this is that it might be thought that while Maimonides has much to say to the contemporary traditionally oriented Jew, Gersonides has very little. The importance of Gersonides to contemporary Judaism, it seems to me, lies in the fact that he was not ejected from the bet midrash (traditional study hall), as it were. He was medieval Judaism’s most prominent actual working scientist; his commitment to rational thought led him to adopt positions which would be anathema in today’s Orthodox Jewish world; explicitly rejecting the midrashic approach to understanding the true teachings of the Torah,43 Aristotle was his guiding star for understanding the Torah; and yet, despite all this, he remained unswerving in his commitment to Torah and halakhah. Gersonides stands as an ongoing rebuke to all who would tell Jews that in order to be faithful to Torah they must turn away from the wider world. Let us digress for a brief moment to expand on that last point. Glossing Ex. 32:32 (Now if You will forgive their sin, well and good; but if not, erase me from the book which You have written!), Gersonides wrote: Behold, the book which God ‘wrote’ is all that exists since it is caused by Him. [Moses] thus said, “erase me from the book which You have written!” It is as if he had said, “take my soul.” [In so doing] he allegorically compared the cosmos to a book, since, just as a book indicates the conception which is the cause of its existence, so sensible existence indicates the lawful character of the intelligible world [cognized by] God, from which derives the existence of the sensible world.

Using a metaphor which would become very popular in the Eighteenth Century, Gersonides describes God as the “author” of the book of the world. Actually, the metaphor is a bit more complicated than that. A book can only exist if the author has some plan (“conception” in Gersonides’ Aristotelian language) which he seeks to execute. Similarly, the world as we know it exists because God has a conception of the cosmos having a pattern or structure 42 The approaches of Maimonides and Gersonides to science is one of the topics which I repeatedly address in this book. 43 See p. 2c/3/4 and the introductions to his commentaries on Song of Songs, Ecclesiastes, and Job.

18

INTRODUCTION

which Gersonides calls nimus (from the Greek, nomos, “law”) and which we would call natural law.44 It is not too much of a stretch at all to say that the title of the book authored by God is Physics. Returning to my comparison of Gersonides and Maimonides, this view of the world is certainly one with which Maimonides would have been very comfortable. But despite that, Gersonides’ attitude towards him hints at a certain ambivalence. Thus we find Gersonides stating: It is appropriate that we not be brief in thanking our predecessors who wrote about ma’aseh bereshit [account of the creation] for they, even though they are far from the meaning [lit.: intention] which we found here – as you will see from what Maimonides explained in his distinguished book Guide of the Perplexed and what the sage Rabbi Abraham ibn Ezra explained in his commentary on the Torah – they were, to a certain degree, the cause for our establishing the truth in this matter.45

Maimonides was certainly to be taken seriously – after all, the Milhamot was largely written to correct Maimonides’ mistakes – but not as an authority whose positions were to be accepted as such (or reinterpreted to make them acceptable, as has often been the case for the last 800 years). Gersonides’ commentary on the Torah is peppered with both implicit and explicit disagreements with positions held by the Great Eagle.46 Indeed, while writing the 44 Indeed, Gersonides takes this idea to extreme lengths in his commentary on Exodus, p. 190/390 (24th to’elet – the passage is missing in the Venice edition), where he sounds almost Spinozistic. 45 Commentary on Genesis, p. 14a/48/83. 46 A very clear example of this is Gersonides’ view of sacrifices. See Commentary on Numbers, p. 201b-202b/158-163/376-387 where his disagreement with Maimonides is ignored. (This is also an excellent example of the way in which Gersonides superglues his science to the text of the Torah.) On the other hand, when he first mentions the issue (in connection with Noah’s sacrifices, and echoing Nahmanides on Lev. 1:9) he makes his disagreement with Maimonides explicit. See his Commentary on Genesis p. 21a-b/92-94/172-174. He silently disagrees with Maimonides on the nature of language: p. 14b/53/87. It is not possible that he was unaware of Maimonides’ unusual position on the nature of Hebrew. See Kellner, Confrontation, ch. 5. In contrast to Maimonides (“Laws of the Foundations of the Torah VIII.1), Gersonides maintains that faith is and should be based on miracles (Exodus, p. 68a/102/224). These examples lend support to the thesis of Charles Manekin, that Gersonides in many ways was much more conservative than Maimonides. See Manekin, “Conservative Tendencies.” Oded Horetzky is currently writing a doctoral dissertation on the subject.

19

MENACHEM KELLNER

previous sentence, it suddenly struck me that there are relatively few places in the Commentary on the Torah where he even mentions Maimonides. This is striking if one considers how often Maimonides is quoted by a figure like Nahmanides, who had much less intellectual sympathy for Maimonides than did Gersonides, and, for that matter, how often Aristotle is cited in Gersonides’ commentary on the Torah.47 In halakhic matters, Gersonides found much to disagree with in Maimonides’ Sefer ha-Mizvot (enumeration of the commandments) and, in fact, planned to write his own book enumerating and explaining the commandments.48 Gersonides was very much his own man, and treated Maimonides with respect, but not with adulation.49 An issue which must be addressed in seeking to introduce Gersonides is whether or not he hides his true views to any extent whatsoever. On the one hand, he denounces esotericism openly in the Introduction to the Milhamot, implicitly criticizing Maimonides for hiding his real doctrines (Milhamot, p. 8; Wars, pp. 100-101). Gersonides explicitly notes also that contradictions are one way of obfuscating a text which he will assiduously avoid. Self-conscious contradictions, he argues, are intellectually and consequently morally evil. Thus, he writes (Milhamot, p. 6; Wars, p. 98): “The reader should not think that it is the Torah which has stimulated us to verify what shall be verified in this book, [whereas in reality] the truth itself is something different. It is evident, as Maimonides (may his memory be blessed) has said, that we must believe what reason has determined to be true. If the literal sense of the Torah differs from reason, it is necessary to interpret those passages in accordance with the 47 I did a quick check of those of Gersonides’ commentaries available on the Bar Ilan Responsa Project Database (early prophets and Job). Maimonides (ha-rav ha-moreh) showed up 3 times, Aristotle (ha-philosoph), six. There were no hits for other common names of Maimonides. In the commentary on Song of Songs (see below, ch. 5), Aristotle appears forty-four times, Maimonides, only twice. 48 See the Commentary on Exodus, pp. 72-87/188-197. The entire passage is missing from the Venice edition. See Braner’s note on p. 188 of his edition. Gersonides’ independence is on display here in another way. Despite the long and well-established tradition maintaining that there were precisely 613 commandments in the Torah, Gersonides (p. 86/194) holds the number to be only homiletical and intended not to be bound by it in his own (planned) enumeration of the commandments. On the history of the idea of 613 commandments, see Friedberg, “An Evaluation.” 49 It is surely worthy of note that Gersonides invested huge effort in commenting on the works of Averroes, but not on the works of Maimonides.

20

INTRODUCTION

demands of reason.” Gersonides returns to this subject in Milhamot I.14 (p. 91; Wars, p. 226): “...we have not assented to the view that our reason has suggested without determining its compatibility with our Torah. For adherence to reason is not permitted if it contradicts religious faith: indeed, if there is such [a contradiction], it is necessary to attribute this lack of agreement to our inadequacy”; i.e., there can be no contradiction in fact between reason and Torah. Gersonides reverts to the issue, at some length, towards the end of his book (Milhamot VI.ii.1, p. 419; Wars, p. 428): It is quite clear that religious principles do not imply the belief in creation ex nihilo.50 Indeed, we find that all [the examples] of miracles are [generations] of something from something; as, for example, the generation of blood from water, the generation of flies from dust, the generation of the snake from Moses’ staff. Analogously, the swallowing of all the other staffs by Aaron’s staff is not a [case] of destruction into nothingness. For it is the snake that swallows up the other snakes; unless one wants to call the transformation of food into the very substance of the organism “destruction into nothingness.” Similarly, the miracle of oil brought about by Elisha does not entail the [belief in] creation ex nihilo. For, according to us, this was like the transformation of the staff into a snake: when the woman emptied the pitcher, the air entering the vessel was transformed into oil. In general, the Torah is not an imposed law that forces us to believe false doctrines and to perform useless actions, as the masses believe. Rather, it is the most perfect law, as has been explained in our Commentary on the Torah. Indeed, its perfection leads men to want to live according to this perfect law, and this is the definition of a perfect law, as Aristotle has pointed out. Accordingly, there is obviously nothing in the Torah that would lead us to believe something false; for whatever is false does not itself induce belief in and adherence to it. Hence, it is necessary that we posit what the Torah teaches in such a way that it is in agreement with philosophical inquiry. For this reason Maimonides interpreted anything in the Torah that suggested the corporeality of God in such a way that it did not contradict the teachings of reason. Similarly, he said [Guide, II.25] that if philosophy could prove the eternity of the universe, he would be obliged to interpret those pas50 As Maimonides himself teaches in Guide II.25.

21

MENACHEM KELLNER

sages in the Torah that seem to differ from this doctrine in such a way as to be agreement with reason.51

Reading this paragraph, one gets the impression that Gersonides followed Maimonides in making reason the criterion by which the Torah is to be interpreted. But in the next paragraph Gersonides makes a claim which is stronger (and from my perspective more naïve) than anything Maimonides ever affirmed: It should be realized from what has been mentioned in the Torah concerning the creation of the world that the opposite has in fact happened to us; i.e., we need not force ourselves to explain the Torah with respect to this topic, [i.e., creation], in such a way as to be in agreement with reason. Rather, what the Torah teaches on this topic has in some sense been a cause of our having arrived at the truth on this issue by rational means. For what has actually stimulated us to find the truth on this topic was that which was indicated to us explicitly in the Torah about creation. [Indeed,] that which the Torah records about this subject is especially helpful to the inquirer in his search for the truth on this question, as we have pointed out in our Commentary on the chapter dealing with creation. And this is what we should expect of the Torah. Since the Torah is a law by means of which man attains his ultimate perfection, as we have explained in our Commentary to the Torah, it is necessary that the Torah lead men to the attainment of the truth on those topics that are especially obscure and difficult. For when the truth concerning these questions is revealed by tradition and in addition [our] knowledge is guided in some way by matters that lead man to the truth on this topic, then much of the difficulty in the attainment [of the truth] on these questions will be removed.52

Gersonides sincerely believed that he did not read science and philosophy into the Torah. Not only was the science of his day the true meaning of the Torah, but he came to understand that science through his study of Torah. All this being the case, Gersonides saw no reason for esotericism.

51 Translations in this paragraph are Feldman’s. 52 For analyses of Gersonides’ position on the relation between Torah and philosophy see Staub, Creation, pp. 81, 84-85, and 148-153, and Samuelson, “Philosophic and Religious Authority.”

22

INTRODUCTION

The explicit doctrines Gersonides defends in the Milhamot, like those relating to God’s creation of the cosmos out of a kind of pre-existing matter, and especially those relating to God’s knowledge and providence, are daring. Indeed, Isaac Husik called his doctrine of God’s knowledge a “theological monstrosity.”53 And yet, Gersonides consistently gives the impression of being insouciantly unaware that his teachings might arouse controversy. He is never coy about stating them in the Milhamot and gives every indication of being earnest in his belief that the doctrines taught in that book are those of the Torah itself, and accepted as such by the Talmudic Sages. In his biblical exegesis, on the other hand, he expresses himself in very traditional language, especially with respect to miracles, divine providence, and God’s knowledge. This could be seen as a form of esotericism, hiding true views behind traditional language. But, on the third hand (studying Gersonides, like studying the Talmud, demands many hands), he is also bluntly explicit in his biblical exegesis about his true views.54 Let us look at some examples. In his Commentary on Genesis (p. 43b/214/438), Gersonides says that “God knows all hidden things.” In other places, he is quite open about his view that the “hidden things” which God knows do not include individual humans and what actually happens to them, since “what is ordered [by the arrangement of the stars] is what God knows [and not what happens as a result of humans exercising free choice] as was made clear in the third part of the Milhamot Adonai” (Commentary to Exodus, p. 54d/10/27). This is by far not the only place in his Bible commentaries that Gersonides has occasion to explain his “theologically monstrous” views on God’s knowledge. In fact, in one passage he expresses himself at great length (Genesis p. 28d (16th to’elet)/136/272-273): Sixteenth Lesson: Concerning doctrines. The Torah teaches us here something remarkable about God’s knowledge of things, a point that has eluded all our predecessors whose writings are accessible to us. It is this. Whatever God knows of [human] deeds here on earth may be different from what men actually do. For what God knows of human actions is that which is appropriate

53 Huisk ,History, pp. 345-346. 54 See Funkenstein, “Gersonides’ Bible Commentary,” p. 308: “He has nothing to hide.” See also pp. 305 and 310.

23

MENACHEM KELLNER

for them to do according to the astral patterns that He has arranged, which govern their original births and provide general supervision throughout the human species. However, human choice prevails over this pattern in their actions deriving from the heavenly patterns. Therefore, it is possible that what men do may be different from what God knows about the pattern ordering their actions; for He knows these deeds insofar as they are knowable, and this is in their being ordered and determinate. However, in the sense in which they are contingent, there cannot be any knowledge of them, for if there were knowledge of them, they would not be contingent. Accordingly, Scripture narrates symbolically that God was about to see whether the people in Sodom and Gomorrah had actually done those evils which He had already known they would do [if they had not chosen otherwise]; for it was possible for them to do otherwise than what God had known of them…55

Gersonides was convinced that most human beings do not exercise free choice but live out the lives determined for them by the astral patterns regnant at their births. In his eyes, the truth of this is borne out by the success of a well-attested empirical science, namely astrology.56 God does not know what particular individuals do, but, like Hari Seldon,57 God knows what the overwhelming mass of humanity does. It is immediately obvious that this view of God’s knowledge does not allow for a doctrine of providence in which God actually guides, rewards, and punishes in any normal sense of those terms.58 Gersonides is quite clear about this doctrine in his Commentary on Job (see below, ch.1). Yet despite that, with respect to divine providence Gersonides writes, for example, that Joseph’s sale to Egypt was providentially arranged (Gen., p. 44d (8th to’elet)/223/455) as was 55 I cite the translation of Feldman, “Gersonides and Biblical Exegesis,” p. 229 . Howard Kreisel says of Gersonides that “only one who studies the philosophical treatise understands the full implications of his comments in his biblical commentary” (Kreisel, “Philosophical Interpretations,” p. 108). He is correct, but that is only because the argumentation for the positions is largely lacking in the commentaries, not because the positions themselves are not clearly stated. 56 See Langermann, “Appendix“. 57 The “psychohistorian” éminence grise in Isaac Asimov’s “Foundation” series who predicts the future on the basis of sophisticated statistical analysis. 58 For an interesting example of how divine providence does work ,entirely through the natural world ,see Gersonides on 2 Samuel.24:1

24

INTRODUCTION

the finding of baby Moses by Pharaoh’s daughter (Ex., p. 54a/6/18). He mentions the possibility that providence over the people of Israel was inherited from the Patriarchs so often that it misled a serious Gersonides scholar into thinking that Gersonides actually held a doctrine of inherited providence.59 It is clear to me that Gersonides was not trying to fool anyone.60 On one and the same page (Ex., p. 58b/31/78) for example, he tell us (1st to’elet) that God’s providence over good people (tovim) will be continued to their descendents (timashekh mehem li-zar’am) – in other words, providence is transitive and inheritable. But in the very next paragraph (2nd to’elet), he explains that “divine providence will cleave to a person [only] to the extent that he apprehends God’ existence” (i.e., achieves a high level of understanding in the field of metaphysics). In this brief sentence we learn three things: the righteous are the intellectually perfected; providence is a consequence of that perfection, and varies with its extent; there is no possible mechanism familiar to Gersonides whereby providence so defined could flow from one person to another. But in the first paragraph he told us that providence extends to the good (i.e., the morally and intellectually perfected), and from them to their progeny many generations distant. Gersonides appears to be influenced by audience and context. If my interpretation of his Commentary on Song of Songs (below, ch. 5) is correct, and if that interpretation holds for his other commentaries, then Gersonides did not write his Bible commentaries for “professional” philosophers. Given the tremendous energy invested in the halakhic materials, and his repeated attempts to show their congruence with philosophy, it appears that the intended 59 Eisen, Providence. The term is Eisen’s. What I understand Gersonides actually to mean is that thanks to certain initial conditions (receipt of the Torah and the inheritance of a land particularly well-suited for achieving intellectual perfection) the descendants of the Patriarchs benefit (in an entirely natural and even one might say mechanistic fashion) from advantages no other nation enjoys. For examples of how Gersonides tries to show this working in practice, see his commentary on Exodus, p. 70a/113/254 and 86a/150/334. 60 Even Dov Schwartz, who finds what may be called a pedagogical esotericism in the Milmahot, does not think that Gersonides is trying to pull the wool over anyone’s eyes (See Schwartz, Setirah, pp. 144-181). Indeed, Gersonides explicitly states (Milhamot, p. 8; Wars, p. 100) that “it is clear than author does not write for himself, but to impart [his knowledge] to someone else. It is therefore necessary that he try to present his material in such a way that the reader will achieve the intended purpose of the book. For this reason, it is necessary for the author to begin the discussion with the easier material, even if that which comes first [in presentation] does not make known in an essential way that which comes afterwards.”

25

MENACHEM KELLNER

audience consisted of Talmudically trained Jews who also welcomed exposure to the latest scientific advances61 (and who were not, it appears, particularly perplexed by this double exposure). The Bible expresses itself in what we would today call mythologically charged language – it was to unpack that language that Gersonides wrote his commentary. In using very traditional language to explain his (historically untraditional) views he was following in the footsteps of the Bible itself (p. 14a/51/84): We begin by explaining [mitnazlim] why what we write here does not fit the simple peshat of the verses in the way in which our explanations heretofore fit the language of the Torah: the matters that follow from this were deeply concealed in the Torah by well-hidden and very obscure allegories. The intended meaning as we understand it is to make known the tools given by God to men to bring them to felicity of the soul, through which eternal life may be obtained.

In explaining the peshat of the Torah, Gersonides sticks to its language; when explaining the Torah’s deeply concealed, well-hidden, obscure allegories (the meaning behind the peshat), he waxes philosophical. Well, then, why was so much of the Torah couched in deeply concealed, well-hidden, obscure allegories? So far as I can determine, Gersonides does not address the question directly. He does tell us that mistakes with respect to metaphysical matters are very dangerous, distancing a person from perfection.62 It may very well be that in Gersonides’ eyes such mistakes are more dangerous than simple-minded ignorance and for that reason the Torah taught science/philosophy esoterically. I have sought to show here that Gersonides did not adopt a version of philosophical esotericism. But that was not the only form of esoteric writing prevalent in the Jewish world of his day. Popular tradition has it that Gersonides was descended from Nahmanides (1194-1270).63 There is no evidence that this is actually true, but it does raise an interesting issue: Gersonides’ re61 In the Introduction (p. 2a/3/4) he says that readers of the commentary ought to have prior knowledge of the speculative sciences. 62 Commentary on Song of Songs, Introduction, pp. 7 and 10. 63 Touati, La pensée, p. 35.

26

INTRODUCTION

lation to Kabbalah. In the generation after Gersonides Profiat Duran (c.1350 – c.1415) presents a stark trichotomy, distinguishing sharply among Talmudists, philosophers and kabbalists.64 Other medievals, and certainly quite a few modern scholars, have followed Duran in this.65 Gersonides’ non-treatment of Kabbalah, and his failure to mention Nahmanides – it is not credible that he never heard of him – would seem to lend strength to the philosopher vs. kabbalist distinction drawn by Duran. As to Talmudists, Gersonides certainly was one, but so far as can be judged on the basis of his surviving works,66 he was independent in his rabbinic thought, and not part of any school. But, he was a member of a school in the sense that he continued the tradition, illustrated by Halbertal in Bein Hokhmah, of individuals who combined rabbinic and philosophical erudition. As Halbertal shows, one of the characteristics of the Provencal philosopher-talmudists like Menahem ha-Meiri was to ignore Kabbalah. Gersonides, it appears, adopted the same approach. In short, Gersonides left no evidence that he ever read a kabbalistic text or met a kabbalist and it would be surprising had he indeed left such evidence.67 A “renaissance man” before the Renaissance, a “scientist” before the scientific revolution, strikingly independent in his thinking, Gersonides seems to have led many lives simultaneously: he wrote commentaries on Bible, Talmud, and Averroes (seeing them as different facets of the same project); he devoted hundreds and perhaps thousands of long nights to astronomical observations; 64 See “Hakdamat Sefer Ma’aseh Efod,” pp. 766ff. 65 For details, see Hoch and Kellner, “Voice.” 66 He wrote at least one rabbinic work which is lost, and planned, in addition to his abovementioned enumeration of the commandments, a commentary on the entire Talmud. (In his Introduction to the Torah Commentary [p. 3d/11/14] he promises to write a complete Talmud commentary and mentions a completed commentary to Tractate Berakhot in his Commentary on Deuteronomy [p. 207b/10]). One can only begin to imagine what his reputation would be like today had he completed these works and had they survived. 67 It is interesting to note that he uses the expression al derekh ha-emet (“according to the truth” or “according to the true way”) freely in his commentaries. This expression was a favorite way of introducing kabbalistic exegesis by Nahmanides and his school. A quick check of Bar Ilan’s Responsa Project database, however shows that the expression was used in a nonkabbalistic way by ibn Ezra and Kimhi before Gersonides and by his older contemporary Meiri (1249-1310). The database has shows the expression in nine places in Gersonides’ commentary on the early prophets and Job. I also found the expression in his commentary to Genesis (p. 9d [al da’at ha-emet]/26 [al da’at derekh ha-emet]/41 p. 14d/55/92) and in his commentary to Exodus, p. 79b/172/365.

27

he wrote independent and in some cases remarkably original treatises in logic, mathematics, and music; he was an active astrologer – all this without benefit of tenure or research grants. I hope that the chapters of this book will help make this fascinating figure better known.

CHAPTER ONE Providence and the Rabbinic Tradition

G

ersonides maintained that there were three possible views concerning God’s providence. Either providence extends to all men, to some men, or to no men. By providence Gersonides usually means guidance, although sometimes he uses the term in the sense of retribution. Understood in the first way, the three possible views about providence are that God guides all men, some men, or no men. Understanding providence in the second sense, the three possible views are that first, all good deeds are rewarded and all bad deeds punished; second, some good deeds, but not all, are rewarded and some evil deeds, but not all, are punished; third, no good deeds are rewarded and no evil deeds are punished. In his Milhamot Adonai Gersonides generally uses providence in the first sence; in his Commentary to Job he generally uses it in the second sense.1 In both works Grsonides identifies the view that providence extends to no men with Aristotle. The contrary view, that providence extends to all men, he 1

Gersonides’ account of his doctrine of providence is found in Book IV of the Milhamot and throughout his Commentary to Job. There are no differences of substance between the positions described in the two books. Not only does Gersonides constantly refer one to the other, but he uses identical arguments, and often identical passages, in them both. See, for example, Milhamot, IV.4, p. 165 (Wars, p. 175) and his Commentary to Job 38, Lassen, pp. 232–33. Gersonides’ Hebrew term for “providence” is hashgahah. His discussion of providence in the Milhamot is basically a sequel to his discussion of God’s knowledge of particulars in Book III. Most of his examples, therefore, relate to the ways in which God does and does not extend providential guidance to individual men. In his Commentary to Job he discusses the same issue with respect to the question of how God’s guiding providence relates to reward and punishment. Most of his examples, therefore, relate to retribution. The theological and philosophical problems, however, are the same. Treatise IV of the Milhamot has been translated into English, with introduction and notes, in Bleich, Providence. Further on providence in Gersonides, see Touati, La pensée, pp. 359-392; Eisen, Providence and the studies cited there; as well as Nadler, “Providence.” Eisen detects in Gersonides a doctrine of what he calls “inherited providence” but provides no explanation of how such a doctrine could possibly work, given the constraints of Gersonides’ system.

PROVIDENCE AND THE RABBINIC TRADITION

identifies as the opinion of the masses of the Jewish People and as the opinion of Job’s friends Eliphaz and Zophar. The last opinion, that providence extends to some but not to all men, he identifies as belonging to Elihu, Maimonides, and himself.2 Gersonides rejects the Job–Aristotle position on the grounds that it is contradicted by sense experience:3 “we all have experience of dreams, divination, and prophecy, all of which indicate that God does indeed guide his creatures.”4 Gersonides rejects the popular position on the grounds that it, too, contradicts sense-experience: we all have experience of the righteous suffering and the wicked prospering. Gersonides discusses three attempts at circumventing this difficulty. The first is that of Zophar, who maintains that we confuse the righteous with the wicked. The second is that of Bildad, who maintains that we confuse good with the evil. The third attempt is that of Eliphaz, who argues that God does reward and punish in accord with desert, but that the good and evil which befalls men unjustly does not come from God. Gersonides points out that Zophar and Bildad are basically appealing to mystery.5 But, in that case they neither follow the evidence of sense experience nor, indeed, show the justice of God’s ways. Eliphaz, Gersonides explains, must hold either that divine providence extends to all individuals but does not govern all the details of their lives or that divine providence extends to some men and not to others. We know that he rejects the second view while the first also fails to show the justice of God’s ways. More generally, Gersonides argues against the second view in the following way: We have already proved that God’s knowledge does not extend to particulars insofar as they are particulars.6 He knows these particulars as they are ordered 2

In reading the book of Job as a philosophical allegory, in which each speaker represents a different philosophical school, Gersonides follows Sa’adia and Maimonides. See Kasher, “Job’s Image” and Eisen, Job.

3

Gersonides was a thorough-going empiricist (in the Aristotelian, not Humean, sense). The following is typical of his view: “… unless men derive knowledge from sense experience it is valueless” (Commentary to Job, chap. 2, very end; Lassen, p. 87).

4

Gersonides, Milhamot IV.3, p. 159 (Wars, p. 167).

5

Commentary to Chapter 11, end; Lassen, p. 87.

6

For a detailed analysis and criticism of Gersonides’ account of God’s knowledge of

30

CHAPTER ONE

by the spheres and stars … He also knows that man’s free actions might upset this ordering. Now if God rewarded or punished each man in accord with his actions, one of these two things would have to be true. Either God rewards and punishes in accord with what He knows from the heavenly order, or judges them in accord with their deeds, whether good or bad. But if we say that He judges them in accord with what He knows of their actions from the [heavenly] ordering, this would be an essential injustice in God for they might not have acted in accord with that ordering. But this is exactly the opposite of what those who hold this position wanted! On the other hand, if we say that God judges them in accord with their actions, it is then necessarily the case that He knows their actions insofar as they are particular – and we have already shown that to be false. Further, it is self-evidently clear that evil cannot come from God except by accident or the necessity of matter…7

Having thus refuted the two extreme positions, Gersonides maintains that the intermediate position must be true, since these three are the only possible positions in this matter. Gersonides articulates this purportedly correct view of providence in the following way: living beings in the sublunar world vary in terms of their proximity to the Active Intellect.8 Those closer in degree to the Active Intellect are particulars, see Samuelson, God’s Knowledge and Samuelson, “Gersonides’ Account.” 7

Milhamot IV.3, p. 159 (Wars, p. 167). Gersonides accounts for the existence of evil in the sequel to this passage (p. 160) and in the introduction to his Job Commentary (Lassen, pp. 7–9). (In this passage in the Commentary, by the way, he refers to the Milhamot.) He traces the source of all evils happening to man to the hylic cause (i.e., man’s materiality) and to accident. Evils consequent upon the hylic cause originate in the recipient of the evil and are due either to his temperament (i.e., the combination of his bodily humors) or to the evil propensities of his (material) soul. Evils consequent upon accident are those which arise through external causes and are due either to the behavior of others (traceable in turn to their temperaments or souls) or to natural disasters which are purely accidental but which occur in order to keep the elements in equilibrium. That even never comes directly from God is an idea which comes up repeatedly in Gersonides Commentary on the Torah. For one example, see his commentary on Deuteronomy, p. 207c (8th to’elet)/12.

8

The Active Intellect (ha-sekhel ha-po’el) is the intelligence of the lunar sphere which governs the sublunar world. It has two functions: first, to endow sublunar nature with the intelligence and purpose visible in its processes and evolutions; second, to actualize man’s potential for knowledge. See the detailed discussion below in ch. 9. Modern readers of medieval philosophical texts often have problems with the the Active Intellect, seeing it as some sort of weird mystical notion. For a thinker like Gersonides it functions much as does gravity in contemporary physics: a natural force which explains observed phenomena.

31

PROVIDENCE AND THE RABBINIC TRADITION

better prepared to guard their well-being than animals farther from it. Among men, similarly, some are closer to the Active Intellect than others. Those that are closer to the Active Intellect deserve to be guided more than those far from it. To the extent that man actualizes his material intellect he achieves union with the Active Intellect. Such men can see more clearly than others what events will be caused by their actions and by the actions of their fellows and can thus take the necessary measures to increase their good and minimize their pain. Men become worthy of divine providence, then, when they fulfill their end as men: the perfection of themselves in knowledge, character, and morals.9 In his Commentary to Job Gersonides writes: Elihu explains that man’s low state, as compared to God, does not in any way prevent the latter from extending to him His providence … Man is mighty of heart (Job 36:5); namely, he is potentially able to conceive ideas.10 If this is the case, we have then, on the one hand, God great in understanding in actuality and, on the other hand, man of great understanding in potentiality. It is also known that what is actual completes that which is only potential and helps to bring it out into actuality. We find, then, in the endeavor of a man to realize his conceptions from the potential state to the actual, a quality which unites him with God in a certain way, inasmuch as actuality of thought is common to both of them, though in widely differing degrees. It is then evident that it is not right that God despise man, but on the contrary, on account of his striving for unity with and cleaving to Him, it is meet that He watch over man in a complete manner. And since this unity arises through man’s actual attainment of conceptions, not because of his potential comprehensive power which is possessed by the entire human genus, it is evident that the providence extended 9

Ibid., IV.4, pp. 164–165 Wars, pp. 174-175. In his Commentary to Job (Introduction, Lassen, p. 9) Gersonides writes: It is worthwhile for you to know that these evils that accrue from bad ordering are not proper human evils for human evils should happen to that part of man where proper human good occurs, as the subject wherein contrarieties occur is always the same. Now since proper human good pertaining to the part of the soul, which we call reason, is not in the nutritive or sensory parts, for these parts do not belong to man qua man, it is evident that proper human evils also pertain wholly to this part, and just as we call the perfection of human reason proper human good, so we should call lack of that perfection, proper human evils.

10 Gersonides builds here on the traditional understanding of the heart as seat of the intellect.

32

CHAPTER ONE

to the intellectual man is primarily because of his individual capacity to bring his potential power of conception into a state of actuality. It is therefore clear that God does not forsake the individuals of the human species because of their low state, but watches over intellectual men; and since wickedness prevents men from conceiving exalted ideas, as was stated by Job himself, it follows that no providence is extended to the wicked but they are left to the evil fate destined for them by the constellations, and they also lack the salvation of the soul… But it is meet that we understand that Divine providence varies with the degree of its recipient, namely, that the more man endeavors to unite with God, the greater is the degree of providence extended to him; but this is quite evident to everyone studying our words.11

Having thus characterized the correct view of providence, Gersonides, in the sixth chapter of Book IV of the Milhamot, argues that his view is consistent with that of the Torah and the Rabbis.12 This argument is interesting both in its own right and for the further light it sheds on Gersonides’ views. Gersonides first shows that his theory has sound biblical warrant. Indeed, he cites twenty-three distinct texts from all three portions of the biblical canon in proof of his theory. Since one can use isolated Bible verses to prove almost anything, this part of the argument is of little interest, except insofar as it demonstrates Gersonides’ insistence on reading the Bible as a philosophical text. Gersonides then points out that the Sages held that reward and punishment were reserved for the world to come and that it is not necessary that material retribution be justly apportioned in this world. Gersonides welcomes this view, of course, because it helps to explain the evidence of our senses that the righteous suffer and the wicked prosper. He could accept this view because he felt that the goods and evils enjoyed and suffered in this earthly life are not truly human goods and evils.13 Gersonides was indeed forced to adopt this view because it is clear that on his theory the most undeserving could lead lives of near-perfect (material) bliss were that ordained for them in the stars. 11 Commentary, end of Chapter 38; Lassen, pp. 232-233. 12 Pp. 179-184 (Wars, pp. 195-205). 13 Ibid., pp. 181-182 (Wars, pp. 199-201).

33

PROVIDENCE AND THE RABBINIC TRADITION

Gersonides then notes two problems with his position. First, how can he account for the fact that the Torah often speaks of Israel and other nations suffering punishment at God’s hands? Second, the Torah clearly states, in many places, that a man is judged by all his actions, be they good or evil. The first is a problem because Gersonides denies that evil can come from God. This we saw above. The second is difficult to reconcile with his position because he denies that God knows individuals in their particularity. He knows what people are ordained to do, and He further knows that they might exercise their freedom in not doing what is ordained, but He does not know what they actually end up doing. How, then, can He reward them for their good deeds and punish them for their wicked ones? Gersonides asserts that the first problem is not difficult to solve. All the punishments about which the people of Israel are warned are not punishments so much as instances of guiding providence causing the people to turn from their evil ways. They are thus more properly construed as rewards. Similarly, Gersonides finds little difficulty in dealing with the problem raised by the suffering of nations other than Israel which is attributed to God. Such suffering serves as a demonstration to the righteous, or actually protects the righteous. Thus, these evils too are really examples of providential guidance and reward for the righteous.14 In dealing with the second problem with his theory, that of the repeated claims in the Torah that each man is judged by all his actions, Gersonides writes: It is clear that this problem is not beyond solution. This is so because, according to our theory, each man is truly rewarded for his righteousness and surely rewarded for his wickedness. His reward consists in success of the soul, his punishment in its lack. It is further clear that each man is materially punished for his wickedness to the greatest extent consistent with order and justice. The providential guarding the man from evil will extend to the righteous according to their goodness and be lacking to the wicked. It is thus clear that it is possible to say that man is judged with reference to all his actions, be they good or evil. With this, the second problem is solved.15 14 Ibid., pp. 183-184 (Wars, pp. 202-203). 15 Ibid., p. 184 (Wars, p. 203). Emphasis added.

34

CHAPTER ONE

These “solutions,” however, raise serious problems of their own. It is to their articulation that I now turn. Gersonides argues, in effect, that there are two types of providence. A general providence, extending to the entire world, and manifested in the good order we find in nature. This ordering, on its own, generally rewards the righteous and punishes the wicked. In his Commentary to Job he argues … God possesses all the possible wisdom and might to bring good to this lower existence, and that He does extend His providence to it in the best manner possible. God also mentioned, in his reply [to Job] the fact that the created things from which evil ensues, bring also some good namely, the punishment of the wicked. This thought is contained in the expression and the wicked will be removed from it (Job 38:13). This shows that the righteous are not affected by these evils, for it is said, the wicked, since they alone are thus harmed, as Elihu explained (Job 35). From the punishment of the wicked great use is derived, for other people will be thereby chastened and turn to God and thus attain the salvation of their souls. Now just as nature implanted in plants a power to repel that which does not agree with their essence, in order that they be not injured, likewise God placed such forces in the world, which, in some way, drive out the wicked from human society so that other men shall not be harmed by them. This is accomplished by the accidental evil ensuing from the order determined by the heavenly bodies, which evil, as said, is intended to harm the wicked.16

A more specific providence is extended to the righteous, who, through the unification of their intellects with the Active Intellect, are thus able to foresee events ordained by the order of the stars and take appropriate pre-emptive measures. We see here, by the way, how the two senses of providence distinguished above come together. God guides the righteous and thus assures their (material) rewards; they are protected from avoidable evils. By punishing the wicked, God further guides the righteous, encouraging them to eschew evil and thus win the delights of the world to come (eternal unification with the Active Intellect). 16 Commentary to Chapter 49, end; Lassen, p. 252.

35

PROVIDENCE AND THE RABBINIC TRADITION

This two-fold theory of providence raises a number of problems of which Gersonides fails to take explicit account. Basically, Gersonides argues that the wicked are punished by the very fact that they do not unify their intellects with the Active Intellect and thus cannot avoid evils ordained by the stars. But, beyond that, the wicked are punished by the loss of immortality which goes hand in hand with unification with the Active Intellect. There is one immediate technical problem with this approach. The material punishment of the wicked consists in their being left to their fate. This fate, however, might be good, not evil! Indeed, since the order of the universe is such that it maximizes all possible good, it is likely that their fate will be good. This, Gersonides recognizes, is the reason the wicked may prosper. Their real punishment, however, is saved for their deaths, when they suffer deprivation of eternal life. We are faced with a more serious problem, however, when we seek to understand punishments meted out to the people of Israel as a whole. God can never be sure that abandoning them to their fate will really chastise them: even if the fate ordained for them is evil (not necessarily the case) they can change it by their own free action. More troublesome than this problem is the fact that, on Gersonides’ account, punishments inflicted on the people of Israel are not so much punishments as instances of God’s guiding providence. But, as the people become more evil, they become less worthy of divine providence, and thus there is less of a likelihood that God will reward them; yet the chastisements are exactly rewards. Furthermore, unification with the Active Intellect is supposed to lead to material reward (as well as eternal life). Why should that unification be rewarded with material punishments? Last, and I think, most important, Gersonides is failing to live up to his own empiricist standards here. He is, indeed, grotesque. He is forced to interpret great calamities –the destruction of the two temples, the expulsion from Spain, even I imagine, the Holocaust– as instances of God’s special love and favor for Israel. That, surely, is to turn upside down the evidence of both sense and reason. Gersonides also seems to be falling into the same trap which, he said, undid Bildad. He writes in his Commentary to Job 11 that Bildad holds “that what we consider an evil is not an evil because it ultimately brings good and the apparent 36

CHAPTER ONE

good which comes to the wicked is in reality evil, for it ultimately brings evil.”17 He then rejects Bildad’s view (along with that of Zophar) because they made confused statements and took no account of sense experience; they merely attempted to remove difficulties by saying that the things are mysterious. But if the case is so, how then can they maintain that things in this world are conducted in the proper order and follow a plan of justice? Whence do they know that, since there is a mystery enveloping these things, they have no criterion for testing the knowledge thereof? Not only will this principle with which they operated prevent them from reaching the truth in this disquisition, but one who follows it will never be able to reach truth in anything, for unless men derive knowledge from sense experience it is valueless.18

Now Gersonides would, I think, reject my criticism for two reasons. First, he would probably argue that he does not deny that material evils are evil, merely that they are not proper human evils; this, he would undoubtedly maintain, nullifies the charge that he is appealing to mystery and ignoring the evidence of our senses. Second, he would probably point out that he nowhere asserts that all “things in this world are conducted in the proper order and follow a plan of justice” – indeed, as we shall see, he explicitly denies that. Gersonides’ reply, however, raise a very serious question, not about his internal consistency –he is nothing if not internally consistent– but about the extent to which his views may be said to be consistent with those of the Talmudic Sages. The problem may be made clearer if we summarize what we have said to this point. Gersonides would like to say that failure to unify one’s intellect with the Active Intellect leads to material punishment. But, because of the order inherent in the world, and because of pre-ordained fate, it is likely that a miscreant will prosper. Gersonides is thus forced to say that there is no justice in this world and that true rewards are of the soul and pertain to the world to come. There are a number of ways in which this theory of providence would seem to fall clearly outside of the realm of rabbinic thought on the subject. It clearly 17 Chapter 11; Lassen, p. 84. 18 Ibid., p. 87.

37

PROVIDENCE AND THE RABBINIC TRADITION

violates the spirit of the vast number of rabbinic dicta concerning God’s personal and very intimate love for each and everyone of His creatures. Gersonides recognizes this and tries to accommodate the two views.19 But there would seem to be no way that Gersonides could accommodate his view to the rabbinic claim that all retribution is done measure for measure (middah kineged middah). Further, in denying that all matters of this world are governed in accord with justice, Gersonides is clearly flying in the face of the near-absolute rabbinic unity behind the claim that God orders everything justly. Gersonides himself was well aware of how innovative his ideas were, and recognized the tension between his position and that of the rabbis. In concluding his discussion of the problems raised for his theory by the rabbinic position, he writes: “It is thus clear that it is possible [yitakhen] to say that a man is judged with reference to all his actions, be they good or evil.”20 Gersonides seems to asserting that his position is formally consistent with rabbinic thought on the subject, even if it does not approach it in the same spirit. In this I think that he is wrong. The idea of retribution in kind (middah kineged middah) is firmly entrenched in rabbinic literature and is nowhere seriously doubted. The pithiest, and certainly most famous expression of this opinion is the saying attributed to Hillel in Avot II.7: “Moreover, he saw a skull floating on the face of the water and he said: ‘Because thou drownedst they drowned thee and in the end, they that drowned thee shall be drowned.’” It is even confirmed in the well-known mishnaic attempt to spiritualize the doctrine of retribution: “Ben Azzai said: 19 Job 39:1: Knowest thou the time when the wild goats of the rock bring forth? Or canst thou mark when the hinds do calve? Gersonides says: “This animal [the wild goat of the rocks], according to the rabbis, ascends, at time of giving birth, to a rock, and God sends, at the particular moment, an eagle to receive the newly born baby on its wings, so that it should not fall off the rock. If such is the case, then this is the meaning of the verse. If not, the meaning is, according to our opinion, as follows: The young of this animal is born with great difficulty and danger and therefore special care is taken by God to bring the young forth in such a state that they do not die at birth…” (Commentary to Job 39:1; Lassen, p. 239). Gersonides is referring to the following passage (Baba Bathra 16a–b): “’Knowest thou the time when the wild goats of the rock bring forth? Or canst thou mark when the hinds do calve?’ This wild goat is heartless towards her young. When she crouches for delivery, she goes up to the top of a mountain so that the young shall fall down and be killed, and I [God] prepare an eagle to catch it in its wings and set it before her, and if the eagle were one second too soon or too late it would be killed. I do not confuse one moment with another…” 20 Milhamot IV.6, p. 184 (Wars, p. 204).

38

CHAPTER ONE

‘Be swift in fulfilling even a light precept and flee from transgression. For the reward of a precept is a precept, and the reward of a transgression is a transgression’” (Avot IV.2). There can be no doubt that in denying the principle of measure for measure in rewards and punishments in this world, Gersonides is stepping out of the mainstream of normative rabbinic Judaism. In denying that strict justice obtains in this world, Gersonides is taking a much bolder step. The doctrine of God’s unfailing justice, extending to all His creatures at all times is a central element of rabbinic teaching.21 Gersonides bases his claim on two passages in the Talmud. In Kiddushin 39b we read that “R. Jacob said: ‘There is no reward for the fulfillment of precepts in this world’.” This, says Gersonides, implies “that it is not necessary that physical reward and punishment be justly apportioned here.”22 Gersonides continues the citation from Kiddushin by recounting the story told there of how Elisha ben Abuyah came to sin. It came about that Elisha saw a son fulfilling his father’s command to ascend a tree to get birds eggs (thus fulfilling the commandment to honor one’s parents, the promised reward for which is that thy days may be prolonged [Dt. 5:16]). When the boy reached the nest he fulfilled the commandment to chase away the mother bird before taking the eggs, the promised reward for which is that it may be well with thee and thou mayest prolong thy days (Dt. 5:22). When descending from the tree, the boy slipped, fell, and died. Elisha saw this and exclaimed: “Where is this boy’s happiness and where is his prolonging of days?” He thereupon became an unbeliever. But R. Jacob, Elisha’s grandson, interpreted the verses in the following way: “But in order that it may be well with thee, means on the day that is wholly good; and in order that thy days may be long, on the day that is wholly long.” Both promises, R. Jacob explains, refer to the next world. True reward comes after death. Gersonides cites one other passage in support of his position, from Moed Katan 28a: “Length of life, children, and sustenance depend not on merit, but rather on mazal.”23 The fact that Gersonides cites only two supporting texts is itself instructive. His general tendency is to quote supporting texts at inter21 See, for example, Moore, Judaism, Vol. 1, pp. 357–400. See especially pages 379 and 388 and the sources there cited. 22 Milhamot IV.6, p. 180 (Wars, p. 197). 23 Ibid. Generally translated as “luck,” mazal originally meant any one of the constellations.

39

PROVIDENCE AND THE RABBINIC TRADITION

minable length, when they are available. Moreover the texts which Gersonides quotes here are hardly typical of rabbinic utterances on the question of justice in this world. Not only that, but they really do not do what he needs them to do. Neither explicitly denied that “things of this world are ordered in justice,” nor need they be interpreted in that way. Indeed, given the overwhelming preponderance of rabbinic opinion to the contrary, it would be presumptuous to so interpret them. In fact, Gersonides wrenches these passages out of context, totally obscuring their meaning. In the first instance he says of the rabbis: “They said: ‘There is no reward for precepts in this world’.”24 Gersonides was referring to a passage in Kiddushin 39b where Raba says: “This latter agrees with R. Jacob, who said: ‘There is no reward for precepts in this world.’” Raba, in turn, was referring to (and indeed, immediately cites) the following passage at the very end of Hullin 142a: “It was taught: R. Jacob says: ‘There is no precept in the Torah, where reward is stated by its side, from which you cannot infer the doctrine of the resurrection of the dead’.” It is clear that R. Jacob was not trying to imply, as Gersonides maintains, that there is no justice in this world, but was trying to prove the doctrine of resurrection. R. Jacob’s point was that one ought not to expect rewards for his good deeds (and punishments for his evil ones) in this life. But even this claim is modified in the sequel: But did not R. Eleazar say that those engaged in the performance of a precept never come to harm? [R. Jacob had cited, in proof of his dictum, the example, mentioned above, of the boy falling from the tree after both obeying his father and dismissing the dam.] When returning from the performance of a precept it is different. But did not R. Eleazar say that those engaged in a precept never come to harm, either when going to perform it or when returning from the performance thereof? It must have been a broken ladder that was used, so that injury was likely; and where injury is likely, it is different, as it is written: “And Samuel said, ‘How can I go? If Saul hear it he will kill me.’”

The Talmud asserts here, then, that R. Jacob is basically wrong. Generally speaking, one is rewarded for precepts in this world, except in cases where such 24 Ibid.

40

CHAPTER ONE

reward would depend upon a miracle, contravening the general principle that one may never rely upon a miracle (ein somkhin al ha-nes). It is only in these instances that there is no reward for precepts in this world. The tendentiousness of Gersonides’ reading of R. Jacob’s claim is thus clear. Gersonides follows up his use of R. Jacob’s dictum with the following: It has already been explained to you that reward and punishment do not occur in physical goods and evils and it is thus not impossible that they occur without order and justice. They [the rabbis] said: “Length of life, children, and sustenance depend not on merit, but rather on mazal.” It is clear that they did not mean to differ here with the Torah which promised in many places that physical rewards accrue to those who walk in her paths, but only that this matter is dependent upon the principles of mazal. Therefore, it should not be a cause for doubt if the wicked are rewarded materially, for these rewards accrue to them by the workings of mazal, not by virtue of their evil deeds.25

Gersonides, again, is building a lot on one short quotation. Material reward and punishment is governed, not by justice, but by mazal, “luck,” “destiny,” “that which is determined by the stars.” And again, the context of this quotation is instructive: Raba said: “Length of life, children, and sustenance depend not on merit, but rather on mazal.” For, take Rabbah and R. Hisda. Both were saintly rabbis. One master prayed for rain and it came. The other master prayed for rain and it came. R. Hisda lived to the age of ninety-two. Rabbah only lived to the age of forty. In R. Hisda’s house there were held sixty marriage feasts, at Rabbah’s house there were sixty bereavements. At R. Hisda’s house there was the purest wheaten bread for dogs, and it went to waste; at Rabbah’s house there was barley bread for human beings, and that not to be had.

Now, in the first place, Raba says that three things, and three things only, depend upon mazal: length of life, children, and sustenance. The specificity of his claim is made clear by the anecdotes about Rabbah and R. Hisda. In the second place, the Gemara (Shabbat 156a and b) argues at great length that Is25 Ibid.

41

PROVIDENCE AND THE RABBINIC TRADITION

rael is immune to mazal. Thus, at the very best (from Gersonides’ perspective) the view he cites is that of a minority of one and the view itself is much more restricted than necessary for his purposes. Indeed, in the one instance where a rabbi explicitly uttered the view that there is no justice in this world he was immediately and harshly silenced by none other than Rabbi Akiba who, in his long life, was given plenty of reason to question God’s justice on this earth: R. Pappias also expounded: “But He is at one with Himself, who can turn Him? (Job 23:13) He judges all that come into the world by Himself and there is none to argue against His words.” Said R. Akiba to him: “That is enough, Pappias.” He, then, said to him: “How do you interpret, But He is at one with Himself, and who can turn Him?” Akiba said to him: “There is no possible argument against the words of He who spoke and the world came into being, for every word is in accord with truth, and every decision in accordance with justice.” 26

Rabbi Akiba’s judgment here is final, unequivocal, and fully representative of rabbinic thought on this issue. I am not trying to imply here that the rabbis were blind to the problem of the righteous suffering and the wicked prospering. They expend much energy in trying to deal with this problem. Their general approach, however, is that of Rabbi Yannai who said (Avot IV:19): “Within our reach is neither the tranquillity of the wicked nor even the suffering of the righteous.” This is generally understood to mean, in the words of the Mahzor Vitry (ad loc.), that “it is not within our power to understand why the way of the wicked prospers and why the righteous are made to endure sufferings.” The rabbis recognized the seeming injustice in the world; but they refused to take the logical step of affirming that the injustice was real and place responsibility for it with God. It remained for them a problem. For Gersonides this approach was impossible. The problem of justice and providence was, he was convinced, a genuine problem which needed a genuine solution. This he provided. Gersonides expounds his doctrine of providence through his Commentary to Job. It may be that he finds support for his position in that book and can 26 Mekhilta, Tractate Beshallah, Chapt. VII (to Exodus 14:26–31), Vol. 1, p. 248.

42

CHAPTER ONE

claim biblical, rather than rabbinic authority for it. This possibility is certainly worth examining. The Book of Job can certainly be interpreted as expounding the doctrine that there is no justice in this world. Throughout the book Job’s friends enunciate a very conventional view of retribution, insisting that Job must be guilty of some sin, for otherwise he would not be suffering. Job consistently denies his guilt and affirms his innocence. Throughout the book he calls upon God to present Himself before the bar of justice, as it were, to testify on his behalf. The question of who was right –Job or his friends– is decisive here. If Job is right, then we cannot avoid the conclusion that there is no justice in this world. There is strong evidence to support the claim that Job was correct. The very first verse informs the reader that There was a man in the land of Uz, whose name was Job and that man was whole-hearted and upright, and one that feared God and shunned evil. God Himself attests to Job’s righteousness: And the Lord said unto Satan: ‘Hast thou considered my servant Job, that there is none like him in the earth, a whole-hearted and upright man, one that feareth God and shunneth evil?’ (Job 1:8). The source of Job’s trials is clearly stated: a wager, in effect, between God and Satan. The book’s prologue makes it clear beyond any doubt that Job’s suffering was gratuitous, totally undeserved. Job repeatedly calls upon God to testify to this fact, to affirm his (Job’s) innocence. Nowhere, it should be noted, does Job doubt God’s power, only His justice, thus presenting the problem of evil in its starkest form. The presumption of Job’s innocence is strengthened when God does exactly what Job demanded, answering him out of the whirlwind. Not only does God accede to Job’s demand, but He castigates Job’s friends: And it was so, that after the Lord had spoken these words unto Job, the Lord said to Eliphaz the Temanite: ‘My wrath is kindled against thee, and against thy two friends; for ye have not spoken of Me the thing that is right, as My servant Job hath’ (Job 42:7). God Himself thus attests to Job’s innocence, clearly implying that there is no strict, isomorphic justice in this world. If the world were ordered justly, Job’s righteousness would have protected him from such suffering. But God’s speeches must not be ignored. God does testify to Job’s innocence, implying that his suffering was undeserved. At the same time, howev43

PROVIDENCE AND THE RABBINIC TRADITION

er, God castigates Job for doubting His justice: The Lord answered Job out of the whirlwind, and said: ‘Who is this that darkeneth counsel by words without knowledge? Gird up now thy loins like a man; for I will demand of thee, and declare thou unto me’ (Job 38:1). Traditionally, God’s speeches are taken to mean that divine justice cannot be comprehended by humans and that they must accept it on faith. This, however, is certainly not the only reasonable reading of the text. God’s speeches, with their emphasis on cosmic phenomena, and couched as they are in very broad terms, might be taken to be a demonstration of the perfect and just ordering of the whole universe. The universe as a whole may be just, even if that justice is not manifested in all its parts. Thus, God is just, and there is, at least from our perspective, injustice in this world. Gersonides seems to be leaning towards some variant of this position when he says: God, in His discourse, reproached Job for his judging Divine actions as being defective and imperfect. He referred to Job’s complaints, first, why God placed human individuals under the order which ensues from the activity of the heavenly bodies, in which there is injustice as manifested by the prosperity of the wicked and the suffering of the righteous. Second, if it were impossible to arrange differently, why then did God create the unfortunate ones to whom death is preferable to life? To meet these complaints, God unfolds before Job the wonderful panorama of His actions in the Universe. This unfolding has two purposes: first, to tell Job that it is not right for him to judge His actions, since he does not conceive them, and a judge must, first of all, have complete knowledge of the things he judges. Second, it may become evident to him that God possesses all the possible wisdom and might to bring good to this lower existence, and that He does extend His providence to it in the best manner possible. God also mentioned, in His reply, the fact that the created things from which evil ensues bring also some good, namely, the punishment of the wicked… 27

27 End of Commentary to Job 39; Lassen, pp. 251-252.

44

CHAPTER ONE

Gersonides then goes on to say: … Were it possible to arrange that all people should be guarded from evil, I (God) certainly would not have failed in accomplishing it. But I placed in men, who are at times not protected by the stars, an instrument by means of which they can save themselves from the impending evil which is their intellect. They can be saved if they strive to unite, by means of their reasoning power, with the Active Intellect.28

Even if Gersonides is here adopting some form of the interpretation of Job briefly described just above –and it is not clear to me that he is– this in no way will save his claim that his views are consistent with those of the Rabbis. In the first place, they overwhelmingly reject this interpretation. Second, the Bible as understood in the Talmud, not the Bible itself, is normative for rabbinic Judaism. Gersonides could not consistently appeal to an interpretation of the Bible not sanctioned by the Talmud and at the same time claim to be working within the rabbinic tradition. The conclusion to which we are thus forced is that Rabbi Levi ben Gerson’s solution to the problem of divine justice in an imperfect world –striking, creative, and original as it is– cannot be easily squared with the standard views of the subject found in rabbinic literature. Given the tendentious nature of his attempts to prove his consistency with rabbinic thought there is good reason to suspect that Gersonides was aware of this tension. In a wider sense, however, it should be noted, first, that Gersonides was hardly the first to enunciate views on providence like the ones discussed in this chapter. To one extent or another all the Jewish Aristotelians were forced to adopt positions substantially similar to his.29 But Gersonides was certainly the clearest, the boldest, and the most forthright of the group. Second, it should not be inferred from the fact that Gersonides’ position was strikingly different from that adopted by the rabbinic tradition that he is therefore of necessity a heterodox thinker; if nothing else, his writings demonstrate the wide range for theological maneuvering available within the context of rabbinic Judaism.30 28 End of Commentary to Chapter 41; Lassen, p. 264. 29 See, Eisen, Job. 30 That is not to imply that Gersonides did not receive a lot of criticism. See ch. 13 below.

45

CHAPTER TWO: Mosaic Prophecy: Maimonides and Gersonides

G

ersonides and Maimonides shared many ideas concerning the possibility and nature of prophecy. This is hardly surprising; not only did they share basic philosophical and Jewish outlooks, but Gersonides clearly implies that the problems he raises in his major philosophic work, Milhamot Adonai, are those problems and only those problems to which Maimonides failed to provide adequate solutions.1 In this chapter, I will examine Gersonides’ understanding of prophecy in general and his conception of Mosaic prophecy in particular. This issue is of considerable importance. By examining Maimonides’ and Gersonides’ opinions concerning the prophecy of Moses, we can better understand their opinions concerning the immutability of the Torah and the election of Israel. The case of Gersonides is particularly interesting since his novel approach to the question of Mosaic prophecy, I will suggest, is an important key to understanding his atypical and forward-looking world view. To provide background and context for this discussion, I will first describe Maimonides’ views on this subject. Maimonides’ views concerning prophecy generally are found in his Guide of the Perplexed.2 His views concerning the special nature of Mosaic prophecy are also found in his Mishneh Torah.3 In the Guide Maimonides notes that among theists there are three opinions concerning prophecy (II.32; 1

Milhamot, p. 4 (Wars, p. 94). Gersonides’ views on prophecy are contained primarily in the Milhamot, Book II, and Book VI, part 2, chs. 12-13, and at the end of his commentary on Deuteronomy, pp. 247a-248a/346-352.

2

Guide II.32-48. For a discussion of Maimonides on prophecy, see Kreisel, Prophecy.

3

“Laws Concerning the Foundations of the Torah,” VII.6. This passage slightly revises Maimonides’ earlier version of the differences between Mosaic and non-Mosaic prophecy in the seventh of his ‘Thirteen Principles’. For the text, see Kellner, Dogma, pp. 12-14. On the differences between the two versions, see Harvey, “Miriam the Prophetess.”

47

MOSAIC PROPHECY: MAIMONIDES AND GERSONIDES

pp. 360-363). The first and most popular view is that God chooses prophets without reference to their intellectual attainments: he or she4 whom God wishes to be a prophet will prophesy. The second opinion according to Maimonides is that of the philosophers: “It affirms that prophecy is a certain perfection in the nature of man” (p. 361). A superior individual who perfects his or her rational and moral qualities as well as the imaginative faculty will, provided certain other preparations are made, necessarily become a prophet. “The third opinion,” Maimonides says, is the opinion of our law and the foundation of our doctrine. It is identical with the philosophic opinion except in one thing. For we believe that it may happen that one who is fit for prophecy and prepared for it should not become a prophet, namely, on account of the divine will. To my mind this is like all the miracles and takes the same course as they. For it is a natural thing that everyone who according to his natural disposition is fit for prophecy and who has been trained in his education and study should become a prophet (p. 361).

Prophecy, Maimonides tells us, (II.36, p. 369), results from an overflow from God through the Active Intellect to the rational faculty and then to the imaginative faculty.5 “This,” he says, is the highest degree of man and the ultimate term of perfection that can exist for his species; and this state is the ultimate term of perfection for the imaginative faculty. This is something that cannot by any means exist in every man. 4

In this case the gender-inclusive language reflects not only my values, but those of Maimonides as well. See ch. 12 below.

5

Maimonides’ understanding of the nature and activity of the Active Intellect may be discovered by noting his relatively few references to it in the Guide. All the important references are in Book Two. In chapter 4 he characterizes the Active Intellect as the tenth of the separate intellects, “whose existence is indicated by the facts that our intellects pass from potentiality to actuality and that the forms of the existents that are subject to generation and corruption are actualized after they have been in their matter only in potential ...” (p. 257). In chapter 6 (p. 264) he identifies the Active Intellect with “the angel and prince of the world constantly mentioned by the Sages.” In chapter 36 (p. 369) Maimonides characterizes prophecy as an overflow from God, through the intermediation of the Active Intellect first to man’s rational and then to his imaginative faculty. In short, Maimonides held that the Active Intellect gives forms in the sublunar world, actualizes our potential intellects, and is the intermediary between God and the prophets. For a valuable discussion, see Kogan, “What Can We Know.” For extensive background, see Davidson, Alfarabi.

48

CHAPTER TWO

And it is not something that may be attained solely through perfection in the speculative sciences and through improvement of the moral habits, even if all of them have become as fine and good as can be. There is still needed in addition the highest possible degree of perfection of the imaginative faculty in respect of its original natural disposition.

The function of the imagination here is important. It is one of the five faculties of the soul, “retaining things perceived by the senses, combining these things, and imitating them” (p. 370). It functions both as what we would call memory (retaining the images perceived by the senses) and as what we would call imagination (combining these images – as when we imagine a unicorn – and imitating them – as when we call to mind what something looked like). When God, through the Active Intellect, causes a certain overflow to reach the rational faculty and thence to overflow to the imagination, prophecy or true predictive dreams result. The difference between such dreams and prophecy is one of degree, not one of kind. A highly perfected imagination will perceive this overflow as if it were caused by an actual sense perception, not as the dream or vision it really is.6 Maimonides lists three prerequisites for prophecy (II.36). The first is the perfection of the rational faculty through study. To attain this, a person must have a brain suited by its natural disposition (substance, size, position, and inter-relation of its parts) for study, and relatively independent of the hindrances caused by other parts of the body. The second prerequisite is the natural perfection of the imagination. This is an inborn characteristic which cannot be acquired. Last, the prophet must perfect his or her morals by turning away from the pleasures of the senses (especially the sense of touch as exemplified in activities like eating, drinking, and sexual intercourse),7 and by turning away from the desire to dominate and rule other people. Since individuals can have these three prerequisites for prophecy in different degrees, it follows (and is confirmed by the evidence of the Bible and the tradition) that there can be different degrees of prophecy. In sum: 6

On the imagination in Maimonides, see See Wolfson, Studies, Vol. 1, chapters 15-18. More recent studies include Faur, “Maimonides on Imagination;” Harvey, “Theories of Imagination;” and Ravven, “Spinoza and Maimonides.”

7

See Kreisel, “Asceticism.”

49

MOSAIC PROPHECY: MAIMONIDES AND GERSONIDES

Now there is no doubt that whenever in an individual of this description –his imaginative faculty, which is as perfect as possible, acts and receives from the intellect an overflow corresponding to his speculative perfection, this individual will only apprehend divine and most extraordinary matters, will see only God and His angels, and will only be aware and achieve knowledge of matters that constitute true opinions and general directives for the well-being of men in their relation with one another (p. 372).

Maimonides notes one further important prerequisite for prophecy. In the Mishneh Torah he says: The prophets did not prophesy whenever they pleased, but had to concentrate their minds, resting, joyous and cheerful, in solitude. For the spirit of prophecy does not descend upon one who is melancholy or indolent, but comes as a result of joyousness.8

This, Maimonides explains in the Guide (II.36, p. 373), is the reason that prophecy has ceased since the destruction of the Temple and the Exile: How can anyone be joyous? Maimonides is careful to distinguish prophecy from related phenomena. Philosophers, he says (II.37), are those people who receive an intellectual overflow from the Active Intellect which does not in turn overflow to the imagination. Prophets are those who receive an overflow to both the rational and imaginative faculties (where the imaginative faculty is as perfect as it can be).9 In the Guide (II.34-35) Maimonides alludes to the uniqueness of Moses and to the special nature of his prophecy. He does not discuss the issue in detail there, other than to emphasize its importance, and refers to his other writings on the subject. He does, however, point out that prophetic revelation came to every prophet but Moses through the intermediation of an angel (p. 367). He says that the use of the word “prophet” is amphibolous; that is to say, it is the same word but it used with reference to two totally distinct and fundamentally dissimilar phenomena. In the same vein he insists that the miracles associated with Moses are different in kind from the miracles associated with the other prophets. 8

“Laws Concerning the Foundations of the Torah,” VII.4.

9

Further on prophecy in Maimonides, see ch. 4 in Kellner, Science.

50

CHAPTER TWO

In the introduction to his commentary to the tenth chapter of Mishnah Sanhedrin (Perek Helek), Maimonides lists his famous thirteen articles of faith. The introduction to the seventh principle goes as follows: The seventh foundation is the prophecy of Moses, our Teacher; to wit, it should be known that: Moses was the father of all the prophets –of those who came before him and of those who came after him; all were all beneath him in rank and that he was chosen of God from among the entire species of humanity and that he comprehended more of God, may He be exalted, than any man who ever existed or ever will exist ever comprehended or will comprehend, and that he, peace be upon him, reached a state of exaltedness beyond humanity, so that he perceived the level of sovereignty and became included in the level of the angels. There remained no veil which he did not pierce, no material hindrance burdened him, and no defect whether small or great mingled itself with him. The imaginative and sensible faculties in his perception were stripped from him, his desiderative faculty was still and he remained pure intellect only. For this reason, they remarked of him that he discoursed with God without the intermediacy of an angel.10

Maimonides goes on to describe a number of ways in which Moses’ prophecy differs from that of the other prophets. He elaborates this list in the Mishneh Torah: Moses received his prophetic messages while awake and standing; all the other prophets did so in dreams or visions. Moses received his messages directly from God, clearly and without parables or riddles; all the other prophets received their messages from angels, in riddles or parables. Moses, unlike the other prophets, suffered no fear or consternation during the receipt of his prophetic messages. Further, Moses prophesied at his pleasure, not needing the special preparations (such as isolation, concentration and special joy) of the other prophets. He was able to do this because he totally abstained from sexual intercourse and similar satisfactions, “never going back to his tent.” Thus, his mind was always on God and was always ready for prophetic inspiration. Last, and in consequence of his abstinence, the kavod (usually translated as ‘divine glory’) never left him.11 10 I quote from the translation of Blumenthal, Hoter, p. 125. 11 On Maimonides’ understanding of the kavod, see Kellner, Confrontation, ch. 6 and Diamond, Converts, ch. 6.

51

MOSAIC PROPHECY: MAIMONIDES AND GERSONIDES

To summarize, we may say that for Maimonides non-Mosaic prophecy is the result of a divine influence or emanation working through the intermediation of the Active Intellect upon the rational and imaginative faculties of certain individuals. Any person having the requisite moral, intellectual and native abilities necessary for prophecy will become a prophet unless a special act of God, akin to a miracle, intervenes. The prophecy of Moses is different in kind from that of all other prophets; God communicated with Moses directly, through no intermediary, in a way which was unique and will never be repeated.12 Gersonides’ understanding of the nature of prophecy generally and of Mosaic prophecy in particular is, in its broad outlines, similar to that of Maimonides. Gersonides does, however, differ from Maimonides on some crucial points. We will concentrate on these differences. Our first question must be: Why does Gersonides examine the issue of prophecy at all? We noted above that Gersonides addresses only those questions in the Milhamot which he feels were insufficiently treated in the Guide of the Perplexed. What is it about Maimonides’ discussion of prophecy, then, which Gersonides rejects? As is the case with so many issues in the Milhamot, the answer, I think, relates to Gersonides’ theory of God’s knowledge of particulars. Gersonides devotes Book Three of the Milhamot to a detailed and difficult discussion of God’s knowledge of particulars. His conclusion is that God knows that particulars exist, but does not know them as individuals.13 We may readily see that Gersonides could not accept Maimonides’ claim that God can miraculously withhold prophecy from an otherwise qualified individual. Further, there are many questions about the various forms of prognostications which Maimonides fails to answer: What sort of information may be conveyed, to whom exactly, and how?

12 Other studies on Maimonides on mosaic prophecy include: Bland, “Moses;” Ivry, “Image of Moses;” Kasher, “Cleft;” Ravitzky, “Leadership;” and Schwarz, “Significance.” 13 On Gersonides’ views of the nature of God’s knowledge, see the different views of Samuelson, God’s Knowledge, and Manekin, “Limited Omniscience.” Samuelson, God’s Knowledge, is a translation, with introduction and commentary, of Milhamot, III. See also the same author’s “Gersonides’ Account.” Gersonides’ position here may be sound Aristotelianism, but it does raise many difficult theological questions. It is on this point that Isaac Husik says: “Levi ben Gerson’s solution, whatever we may think of its scientific or philosophic value, is surely very bold as theology, we might almost say it is a theological monstrosity ...” (History, pp. 345346).

52

CHAPTER TWO

Gersonides introduces his discussion of prophecy and related phenomena with the following problem: Given the fact that cases of prognostication are more than just lucky guesses (and this is the evidence of our senses), and given the fact that prognostication rarely occurs with respect to necessary events, it follows that events predicted in this manner are contingent. But for these events to be predictable they must be fixed and ordered in some way (i.e., predetermined) and this ordering must be known by the agent causing the predictions. But if this is true then all these so-called contingent events are really determined. And if this is true, there can be no free will! Gersonides goes on to say: Now, if we assume that contingent events occurring to individual men are not ordered and fixed, how can we understand the knowledge given to men about them, for this very knowledge makes it necessary that these events be ordered and fixed? Because of this problem Averroes concluded that prognostication cannot occur with reference to contingent events. But experience testifies to the opposite, as we have noted. I have many times experienced this form of prognostication in dreams, with respect to contingent events. It is not proper that we contradict experience because of these problems; rather, we should investigate how these prognostications may be made with respect to chance events (Milhamot, II.2, p. 95; Wars, pp. 32-33).14

Gersonides’ solution to this problem depends upon his acceptance of astrology. He maintains that the Active Intellect, through the instrumentality of the heavenly bodies, orders and determines human affairs. It is thus possible that predictions may be made concerning human events. Gersonides preserves human choice by asserting that man, through its exercise, can change the fate determined for him by the stars (II.2, pp. 96-97). Generally speaking, God has so ordered the world to make the greatest maximization of good possible. Thus we find that evil men rarely accomplish their wicked intentions and that civil society is organized very efficiently. It is still possible, however, that individual men might maximize their own good better than can the preordained cycle of events. For this reason God endows men with the power of 14 Compare below, ch. 8, note 47 for other examples of Gersonides’ penchant for citing his own experiences.

53

MOSAIC PROPHECY: MAIMONIDES AND GERSONIDES

choice and with an intellect to guide that choice. In the third chapter of Book Two Gersonides argues that it must be the Active Intellect – the intelligence of the lunar sphere which governs the sublunar world, endowing it with the intelligence and purpose visible in its processes and evolutions and actualizing man’s potential for knowledge – which is the cause of the order we find in what we call contingent events. He argues from this that it must be the Active Intellect which is the agent causing the prognostications of future contingent events to be made known to men. This is so because it is the Active Intellect which knows the order of the sublunar world as a whole, the heavenly bodies being its tools.15 Gersonides explains that the various forms of prognostication function as forms of divine providence, helping man to avoid evils ordained for him by the stars (II.5, p. 104).16 In his sixth chapter Gersonides raises eight questions relating to the activity of the Active Intellect with respect to prophecy. The answers to the third, sixth, and eighth questions contain material which helps to elucidate Gersonides’ understanding of prophecy. In the third question, Gersonides asks how it is possible that the Active Intellect makes known some future event to an individual person as an act of providential care if the Active Intellect does not know individual human beings (II.6, p. 105). Gersonides solves this problem by pointing out, first, that a particular individual will be more concerned with his own problems than with the problems of some other person. So he will concentrate on them, and be most prepared to receive a divine overflow with respect to that problem.17 15 Gersonides uses many arguments to establish, first, that it is the Active Intellect which is the agent behind the various forms of prognostication and, second, that it is the Active Intellect which is the cause of the order in the sublunar world. One interesting argument in support of the first claim is that the ordering of contingent events was established in order providentially to guide humankind. Since it is the Active Intellect which is the immediate source of providence for man, it follows that the Active Intellect is the cause of that ordering (p. 98). It should not be inferred from Gersonides’ claim that the heavenly bodies are the tools of the Active Intellect that the latter can manipulate them. This would be absurd, since, as Gersonides points out repeatedly (e.g., VI.ii.12, p. 456) the Active Intellect is but an effect of the heavenly bodies and could not, therefore, manipulate them. The point here is that the Active Intellect makes use of what is determined by the heavenly bodies to regulate this world, not that they are its instruments. 16 Compare also the Commentary on Genesis, p. 51c/261/556. 17 See the Commentary on Genesis, p. 50c/255/540, eighth to’elet where Gersonides explains that if a prophet concentrates on another person, he will prophesy with respect to that

54

CHAPTER TWO

But secondly, and more fundamentally, Gersonides points out that the Active Intellect does not send messages, as it were, to particular men. Rather it is constantly overflowing information about the general order of the sublunar world in order to provide providential care for men. Just as the Active Intellect providentially endows individual men with limbs and capabilities which protect them, without knowing them as individuals, so too, it emanates information concerning the order of events as an act of providential care and guidance which is made without knowledge of the individuals who will benefit by it. This point will become clearer if we briefly examine Gersonides’ doctrine of providence. He maintains that there are two types of providence. There is a general providence extending to the entire world. This is manifested in the good order we find in nature.18 A more specific providence is extended to the righteous, who, through the unification of their intellects with the Active Intellect, are able to foresee events ordained by the order of the stars and take appropriate pre-emptive measures. In order to protect the righteous, therefore, the Active Intellect is constantly emanating information about the disposition of future events. Anyone with adequate preparation can benefit from this providential activity.19 Gersonides phrases his sixth question as follows: “Why does this information come to some men clearly and to some men in riddles and parables? Isn’t the cause one and the same?” (II.6, p. 105; Wars, p. 50). Here is his answer to this problem: Even though the agent of these prognostications is one, this differentiation is caused by differences among the recipients, in one or both of two ways. First: because the material soul is perfectly prepared to receive the perception. In such a case the person receives the information clearly. Another person, however, may not have the ability to receive the perception perfectly; what does reach him comes only in the form of a riddle or parable. Riddles and parables are open to many interpretations. It is necessarily the case, then, that information which comes in this fashion is deficient. The issue here is similar to person. 18 This is the view of providence which Maimonides (Guide, III.17) attributes to Aristotle. 19 For a more detailed examination of Gersonides’ views on providence see above, ch. 1.

55

MOSAIC PROPHECY: MAIMONIDES AND GERSONIDES

the case of two people, one having good vision, the other having poor vision, both of whom see the same sight. The first will see it as it is, while the second will only perceive its type. That is to say, he will see that it is red or green, but will not see the degree of its redness or greenness. So it is with this information: the person who receives this emanation perfectly will perceive the order [determined] for this man or this nation in that [he perceives the order determined] for any man or nation having this ordering20… a vision will result in which this class is depicted in such a way that it could be anyone of the species in that class. This depiction is the riddle or parable.... [The second reason for differences among those who receive prognostications] relates to the perfection or deficiency of the imagination,21 not to the excellence or lack thereof of perception. When the imagination is perfectly prepared to copy what the material intellect perceives it will copy that ordering as it is. But when it is not thus perfectly prepared it will not copy it as it imagines it to be. This is [the source of] parables (II.6, pp. 108-109; Wars, pp. 55-56).

Gersonides’ eighth problem relates to the fact that prognostications of various sorts come to fools and children much more frequently than to better educated men, who, it might be supposed, would be better prepared to receive intellectual emanations, having a greater degree of unification with the Active Intellect (II.6, p. 105). Gersonides’ answer is important to us since in it he distinguishes between prophecy on the one hand and (predictive) dreams and divination on the other.22

20 That is, he perceives the future determined for any entity governed by this particular arrangement of the heavenly bodies. 21 I have emended the text here to read ‘imagination’ (medameh) for ‘degree’ (madregah). Both the Riva di Trento and the Leipzig editions have the same (apparently incorrect) reading. In Wars (p. 56) Feldman agrees with this emendation. 22 This is a convenient spot to note an important difference between Maimonides and Gersonides. Gersonides is here trying to distinguish qualitatively between predictive dreams and divination on the one hand and prophecy on the other. This is the general problem to which he addressed himself in Book Two. Maimonides, on the other hand, addresses another problem: how qualitatively to distinguish Mosaic from non-Mosaic prophecy. This concern so dominates his thinking that in the Guide (II.45) he even lists predictive dreams as one of the degrees of non-Mosaic prophecy. This is also a good spot to point out that it was Freud, perhaps, who first insisted that dreams relate to the past, not to the future.

56

CHAPTER TWO

Gersonides commences his answer to this problem (p. 111) by pointing out that it is well known that prophecy, unlike (predictive) dreams and divination, requires perfection of the intellect. He then lists four differences between prophecy on the one hand and (predictive) dreams and divination on the other. First, he observes, the ability to prophesy is a capacity which must be developed through training and apprenticeship. He points to the many biblical references to the “sons of the prophets,” whom he takes to be apprentice or student prophets. There is no training or apprenticeship associated with dream predictions or divination. Second, “one of the conditions of prophecy is wisdom, unlike the case in dreams and divination, which often occurs among children and fools, indeed, more often than it occurs among educated people” (p. 111; Wars, p. 56). Third, everything which the prophet says is true. If he predicts evil and it fails to occur this is no impeachment of the truth of his prophecy, since it is possible that the subject of the prophecy escaped the evil fated for him through intelligent (or lucky) application of his freedom of choice. It is certainly the case, however, that at the time of the prophecy the heavenly bodies did ordain what the prophet predicted. When the prophet predicts that something good will happen, however, it comes about without fail. Since man’s ability to choose was given him that he might maximize his good, it is not possible that the exercise of that choice would undermine some benefit ordained for him by the heavenly bodies. Gersonides closes this discussion by pointing out that one finds much falsehood in divination and (predictive) dreams, and that this is confirmed by our experience (p. 111). Fourth, the point of prophecy is to guide men to human perfection. This is not the case with (predictive) dreams and divination. Gersonides continues this answer to the eighth problem by making explicit something to which he had earlier alluded. Prophecy, he says, results from the direct action of the Active Intellect on man’s (material) intellect.23 23 Gersonides holds that each person is endowed with a material (hylic) intellect which consists in the potential to acquire knowledge. The knowledge which a person actually gains is called the acquired intellect. It is the immortal element in man. The perfection of the material intellect through learning is intellectual success and the appropriate goal for man. It is the Active Intellect which acts to realize this human potential for knowledge, and through knowledge, eternity. Gersonides develops these ideas in the first book of the Milhamot. For a

57

MOSAIC PROPHECY: MAIMONIDES AND GERSONIDES

This differs from (predictive) dreams and divination which are the result of the action of the Active Intellect on man’s imagination. “It is impossible that the recipient of the divination and dreams should be the material intellect,” he argues, “since if it were they [the dreams and divination] would differ in degree in accord with the level of the recipient, such that he whose intellect was more perfect would be more ready to receive this emanation. But if this were the case we would find these prognostications among educated people more often than among fools and children. But this is the opposite of our experience” (p. 113; Wars, p. 62). Gersonides goes on to point out that the Active Intellect does not act directly on the imagination (which, unlike the material intellect, does not receive emanations from it) but only through the intermediation of the separate intelligences. Each of these agents through its heavenly body orders one part of the sublunar world. Information gleaned from them is thus less complete than information obtained from the Active Intellect which unifies in itself the laws governing the entire sublunar realm. This is why dreams and divination are often false, while prophecy is always true. When the imagination is separated from the other human faculties (both intellectual and sensual) it is better able to receive emanations from the heavenly bodies. This separation is more easily achieved in fools and children than in educated adults. Gersonides summarized his views on the various forms of prognostication in the eighth and last chapter of Book Two of the Milhamot (pp. 118-119; Wars, pp. 72-73). He says: The more perfect a person’s intellect, and the greater ease with which he can separate it [from his other faculties], the more perfect will he be in prophecy. The varying degrees of these qualities accounts for the different degrees of prophecy. Men receive these prognostications about different subjects in accord with their natures: the more a man directs his thought to a subject, the more will he receive prognostications about it. This is common to both the diviner and the prophet. Thus, it is found that some diviners predict certain kinds of events exclusively, such as those who direct their thoughts –either detailed study, see Davidson, “Material and Active Intellects.”

58

CHAPTER TWO

naturally or by custom– to the matching of men and women, as is common among female diviners. He who directs his thoughts exclusively to the success of the intellect will single out those matters conducive to the success of the intellect and those matters which direct one to it.

We may conveniently summarize this material by developing a metaphor originally suggested by Norbert Samuelson.24 The Active Intellect may be likened to a powerful radio transmitter that broadcasts constantly without knowing who, if anyone, is tuned in to its broadcasts. Some people have excellent radio receivers with very high antennae; they pick up the broadcasts very clearly. These are the prophets who are “tuned in” to the Active Intellect. The Active Intellect, however, is not the only broadcasting station and the prophets are not the only people with “radios.” Everyone is equipped with a radio and there are many smaller broadcasting stations the transmissions of which often compete with and interfere with those of the Active Intellect. These are the senses. There are different ways in which people lacking prophetic radios can pick up the emanations (“broadcasts”) of the Active Intellect. Some of them live in areas where there are few competing stations. These are the blind, among which there are many diviners. Some people pick up the broadcasts at night when the smaller stations are off the air. These are the people who receive the emanations of the Active Intellect in dreams. Some people have excellent “tuning equipment” which helps them to block out the “static” caused by the smaller broadcasting facilities. These are the people who can separate their imaginations from their other faculties. Everyone who lacks the superior equipment of the prophet, however, will receive inferior broadcasts: they will be garbled and hard to make out. Thus, divination and dreaming usually convey information in the form of parables and riddles. It is immediately clear that Gersonides’ conception of non-Mosaic prophecy accords with the second view described by Maimonides, that of the philosophers. The philosophic conception of prophecy holds that prophecy is a human perfection, attainable, in principle, by all people. Any person who achieves a certain level of intellectual and moral perfection will prophesy. This is clearly Gersonides’ view. Maimonides’ own position is a modification of 24 Samuelson, “Free Will,” p. 14.

59

MOSAIC PROPHECY: MAIMONIDES AND GERSONIDES

the philosophic conception. He agrees that in order to be a prophet a person must perfect himself in certain ways. He denied, however, that every person who so perfects himself or herself will prophesy: God can miraculously withhold prophecy from such a person. Gersonides could not possibly adopt this view since he denied that God knows individuals as individuals. Whether or not a person has reached the level of prophecy is not something which is in the province of God’s knowing. The implications of Gersonides’ “philosophic” conception of prophecy can be clarified through a discussion of his understanding of the special nature of Mosaic prophecy. Gersonides discusses the special nature of Mosaic prophecy in three places. In Milhamot, Book II, Chapter 6, he says that knowledge about nontheoretical matters is generally received while the subject is asleep because it needs the separation of the intellect from the imagination or the separation of the two of them [the intellect and the imagination together] from the rest of the perceiving faculties. This is most often accomplished in sleep, since, while one is awake, the senses are busy with their activities. This [prognostication] occurs occasionally during wakefulness for one of three reasons: (1) because of the perfection of the subject’s receiving ability; (2) the ease with which the other perceiving powers of the soul are subjugated to the ability to receive [emanations]; (3) because of the weakness of the senses…25 It would appear that Moses, our Teacher, peace upon him, received prophecy while he was awake for the first two reasons. By that I mean that his ability to receive [emanations from the Active Intellect] was absolutely perfected. For this reason he achieved a degree of prophecy greater than the degrees [of prophecy achieved] by all the other prophets. This is just as the Torah testified about him: And there hath not arisen a prophet since in Israel like unto Moses... [Dt. 34:10]. Also, his other perceiving faculties were easily subjugated to the faculty of his soul which received [emanations]. For this reason he was able to prophesy every time he wanted to as when he said: Stay ye, that I may hear what the Lord will command concerning you [Num. 9:8]. Due to the ease with which his other perceiving faculties were subjugated to the faculty of his soul which received [emanations] he did not undergo trembling or consternation when prophecy came to him as was 25 As is the case, for example, with the blind.

60

CHAPTER TWO

the case with the other prophets, peace upon them, who could not so easily separate this receiving faculty from their other perceiving faculties ... (II.6, pp. 110-111; Wars, p. 58-59).

In chapter eight (p. 119, Wars, p. 73) Gersonides says: In Moses, our Teacher, peace upon him, were combined all three [elements conducive to prophecy]: very great perfection of the intellect, ease of separation [of the intellect from the other faculties] and concentration on nothing but the success of the intellect. Because of this his prophecy was distinguished from that of the other prophets, peace upon them. It is very difficult to combine these three qualities in their highest possible human degree in one man. For this reason the Torah testified that no prophet like Moses has arisen in Israel [Dt. 34:10].

In its general outlines, Gersonides’ description of Mosaic prophecy seems to be similar to that of Maimonides: both emphasize the unique nature of Moses’ prophecy, and both explain it with reference to the special attributes of Moses. There are, however, important differences. Maimonides asserts that the prophecy of Moses is absolutely unique, coming to him directly from God without any intermediaries. He asserts that Moses was more than human – indeed, that he became an angel. He further asserts that Moses was chosen by God from among all humanity. From all these it follows that the revelation of the Torah through Moses was an absolutely unique event which can never be repeated. In the Milhamot Gersonides does not make any of these claims, and indeed, cannot, if he is to be consistent. Gersonides absolutely rejects the idea that God, acting through the Active Intellect, chooses His prophets. Prophecy is a human perfection: anyone reaching a certain level of moral and intellectual perfection will prophesy. Gersonides gives absolutely no indication here that he thinks that the situation is different with Moses. It is the perfection of Moses’ character which makes him Moses, our Teacher, not God’s choice. Similarly, for Gersonides, Moses’ prophecy is unique, but it is contingently unique, not necessarily unique, by that I mean to say (to adopt a Gersonidean locution) that it is theoretically possible that there might arise another Moses. Gersonides says, “It is very difficult (kasheh me’od) to combine these 61

MOSAIC PROPHECY: MAIMONIDES AND GERSONIDES

three qualities in their highest possible human degree in one man” (emphasis added).26 “Very difficult” – but not impossible. Gersonides cannot be sure that no other prophet like Moses will ever arise. Indeed, as we shall shortly see, he maintains in his Bible commentary that another prophet like Moses, a “new Moses,” as it were, will arise: King Messiah. Gersonides’ discussion to this point raises many interesting and important questions. If a new Moses can arise it would seem, then, that there might be a new Torah. The Torah, after all, is the record of the content of Moses’ prophecies, including the supreme prophecy on Sinai. Since, in Gersonides’ conception, Moses’ prophecy is the result of his intellectual attainments and represents his superior ability to receive the emanations of the Active Intellect, it follows that any new Moses will be able, in fact will bring a new Torah, the content of his prophecies. (That he will make his prophecies known, i.e., that he will reveal his Torah, follows, I suggest, from the fact that prophecy exists to guide people to human perfection. The prophet, as the tool of this process, will not, cannot hide his prophecy.) Now it might be argued that if a new Moses were to arise his message would be identical with that of the original Moses: he would not really be bringing a new Torah. It is certainly true that on Gersonides’ account the substance of the two messages would be identical. This is so because what Moses apprehended in his prophetic inspiration were the eternal truths known by the Active Intellect and constantly emanated by it. These truths do not change. But their applications in our world can. Thus, the messages of the two Moseses, though identical in substance, will not be identical in form. The new Moses will not cast the account of the revelation vouchsafed to him in terms of the patriarchs Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, will have no reason to make any reference to the Exodus of the Israelites from Egypt, will institute different holidays, etc. There follows from Gersonides’ conception of Mosaic prophecy another problem. To the extent that the election of Israel is grounded in the covenant at Sinai (rather than in the covenant with Abraham) it would seem that with the new Moses there could be a new chosen people.

26 II. 8, p. 119 (Wars, p. 73). Note that Gersonides is here taking oblique exception to Maimonides’ claim that Moses transcended his human nature.

62

CHAPTER TWO

Gersonides himself seems to recognize that a new Moses might arise. Indeed, as we shall see immediately, he maintains not only that a new Moses might arise, but that one will, and that he will be King Messiah. The doctrine that the Messiah will bring a new Torah, a new teaching, a specific hilkhita le-meshiha (special messianic law) is not unknown in Judaism.27 But Gersonides’ problem is not that on his account the Messiah might be a new Moses but that there is no reason to assume that no other new Moses will come before the Messiah. To argue that if such a prophet were to arise he would, ipso facto, be the Messiah, is to remove from God the power to decide when the Messiah will come.28 Maimonides avoids these problems in his account of Mosaic prophecy in a number of ways. First, he rejects the opinion of the philosophers that prophecy is nothing more than a human perfection. This makes it possible for God to withhold the gift of prophecy from any person who, unlikely as it may be, turns out to be as gifted as Moses. Thus he preserves the uniqueness and immutability of the Mosaic revelation. Second, he simply posits that Moses was a case apart, not really a prophet, but something more, in fact an angel, specifically deputed by God to bring His Torah. Gersonides could not possibly adopt positions such as these. They are inconsistent with his understanding of God’s knowledge of particulars and depend for their acceptability upon Maimonides’ “negative theology” which Gersonides uncompromisingly rejects.

27 For an examination of the various texts relevant to this issue, see Davies, Torah. The term hilkhita le-meshiha, by the way, garnered 254 “hits” in the Bar-Ilan database. 28 That Maimonides relates the uniqueness of Moses to the uniqueness and immutability of the Torah is evident from the fact that he places the laws relating to false prophets (who wish to add to or detract from the Torah) immediately after his discussion of the special nature of Mosaic prophecy (“Laws Concerning the Foundations of the Torah,” chs. 7 and 8). The doctrine of the decline of the generations cannot be used to help Gersonides here. This is the claim, found frequently in halakhic literature, that each generation since Sinai has been and will continue to be somewhat inferior –morally and intellectually– to the generation that preceded it. If we had evidence that Gersonides accepted this doctrine we could argue on its basis that no person living after Moses could ever achieve his level of perfection. Not only is there no evidence that Gersonides accepts this idea, but there are grounds for claiming that he actually rejects it. In his introduction to the Milhamot, for example, he says that just because preceding generations (including and especially Maimonides) were not able to determine whether or not the world was created ex nihilo is no reason to assume that he will not be able to determine it. On the absence of this doctrine in Maimonides see Kellner, Decline.

63

MOSAIC PROPHECY: MAIMONIDES AND GERSONIDES

In reading his commentary to Dt. 34:10 it becomes clear that Gersonides was aware of the problems we have just noted. The description of Moses and his prophecy given there is considerably more “orthodox” than that given in the Milhamot. It is not possible to judge whether or not Gersonides was aware of the disparity, but it clearly exists. He says (p. 247a/344): It is known that the Torah says that no prophet of Torah [navi Torah] arose and none will arise other than Moses. No prophet will be trusted [if he attempts] to add or detract from it [the present text of the Torah] in such a way as to make of these changes a [new or different] Torah to be followed by all generations. Certainly, then, no prophet will be trusted if he wants to replace the Torah with another teaching.... It [the Torah] mentioned that which distinguished Moses from every other prophet to arise to prophesy to Israel. From this it is clear that another prophet like him [Moses] will arise to prophesy to Israel and the other nations ... For, were such not the case, the mention of “in Israel” [And there hath not arisen a prophet since in Israel like unto Moses ...] would be a superfluous conditional statement. This prophet who will prophesy to Israel and the other nations is the King Messiah ... (emphasis added).

Gersonides goes on in his commentary to this verse to distinguish between the prophecy of Moses and that of the other prophets. First, God knew Moses face to face, “one intellect emanating directly to another.” Second, the signs and demonstrations which Moses performed were done both before great multitudes of people and were seen across vast territories. None of the other prophets performed signs and demonstrations in this manner.29 Third, Moses’ signs and demonstrations persisted through long periods of time, such as occurred with the manna in the wilderness.30 His commentary continues: 29 As, for example, with the plagues in Egypt. In the Milhamot (Book Six, part two, ch. 12, p. 455) Gersonides explains the significance of the fact that Moses’ miracles persisted for a long period of time and extended over a wide area. In general, he says, since this world was created in the most perfect manner possible, and since miracles always occur in order to work some improvement for man, it is not possible that miracles should permanently change the accustomed order of nature. But the miracles of Moses, while not effecting permanent changes, were very general indeed and were thus much greater than those associated with lesser prophets. On Gersonides on miracles, see ch. 3 below. 30 These considerations are important since the publicity and duration of Moses’ miracles are among the prime warrants for the truth of his prophecy.

64

CHAPTER TWO

Moses is differentiated in these ways from all other prophets both in quality and in quantity. Thus, it is written: And there hath not arisen a prophet since in Israel like unto Moses, whom the Lord knew face to face, in all the signs and wonders, which the Lord sent him to do in the land of Egypt, to Pharaoh, and to all his servants, and to all his land; and in all the mighty hand, and in all the great terror, which Moses wrought in the sight of Israel [Dt. 34:10].

These comments do not solve the problems we noted above. Granted that Moses is different from the other prophets, what is there is stop the coming of a second Moses? At the end of each section of the Pentateuch (parashah) Gersonides gives a list of advantages (to’alot) to be learned from the section.31 In the fifteenth to’elet to ve-zot ha-berakhah, the last parashah in Deuteronomy, Gersonides takes explicit note of this problem of a possible second Moses: ... all this comes to clarify the great difference between Moses and all other men. For someone might ask: “Why is it not possible that there be another prophet, a prophet of Torah like Moses? How then could the Torah decree that no changes ever be allowed in it? If this would be the case, the ability [of the new prophet to be a prophet of Torah] is null!” Here is the answer: There is no other who is equal to Moses in this matter. For his Torah prophecy is given in a wonderful [miraculous] way. No other prophet qua prophet has this ability, except for a miracle. For God, may He be exalted, has made it clear that it is not His will either to make another Torah, nor to add or detract from this present Torah ever ... (emphasis added).

Even here Gersonides continues to emphasize that Moses is a man. A very special man, a man through whom was worked a unique miracle, God’s revelation on Sinai. But, in the final analysis, Gersonides’ position is very little different from that of Maimonides: both basically appeal to the mysterious will of God.32 This, given Gersonides’ consistent attempt to rationalize everything 31 Gersonides includes these to’alot in line with his claim (made at the beginning of his introduction to his Pentateuch commentary) that the Torah was given to guide man to perfection and true (i.e., intellectual) success. He tries to show, therefore, what guideposts to success (or scientific truths – the apprehension of which aids man in uniting his intellect with the Active Intellect) are included in each parashah of the Torah. 32 There is very little profit to be had from analyzing Gersonides’ conception of miracles in the hope that it will clarify his position. Isaac Husik notes: “Miracles loom large in the Bible

65

MOSAIC PROPHECY: MAIMONIDES AND GERSONIDES

in Judaism, is little short of amazing. To my knowledge it is the only place in which Gersonides is forced to retreat from his consistent and thoroughgoing rationalism. In this regard it is apposite to quote here from Gersonides’ own criticism of Maimonides: We say that it would appear that this view of the Rabbi, the Teacher, may his memory be blessed, concerning the knowledge of God, may He be blessed, did not result from speculative foundations. This is because philosophical thought rejects this [position] as I shall explain. Rather, it would appear that the Torah put great pressure on him in this matter…33

Now what are we to make of this? It is possible that “the Torah put great pressure” on Rabbi Levi ben Gerson in this matter and that he was simply being inconsistent. But he could be inconsistent in one of three different ways. First, it is possible that Gersonides was being inconsistent without being aware of it. Second, we may say that the doctrine of prophecy expounded in the Milhamot is Gersonides’ true opinion and the ideas expressed in the commentary were meant for public consumption only and did not truly represent his thought.34 Last, we may say that the more orthodox position is truly his and that he failed to make it explicit in the Milhamot. The first theory is open to serious criticism. If he is unselfconsciously contradicting himself here it is, to my knowledge, the only place in all his writings where he does so. Also, he wrote the commentaries and the Milhamot simuland no rationalist could afford to ignore them. Gersonides, therefore, devotes considerable space to a discussion of these troublesome phenomena. His method here too is that of the systematic rationalist. He generalizes on the basis of the descriptions of these phenomena in the Bible. Since miracles are performed for a purpose they are not chance events. And since they come only rarely and are of no value in themselves, but only as a means to an end, their author must be someone less than God. As they come through prophetic inspiration, the author of miracles must be the same as the inspirer of prophets, and we have seen that this is the active intellect. .... By what process a miracle happens at all Gersonides does not tell us, except that a miracle is not different from the natural process of generation and destruction, and the active intellect which is in charge of sublunar nature can shape it to suit its purposes.” Husik, “Gersonides,” p. 184 (emphasis added). 33 Milhamot III.3 (p. 132, Wars, p. 107-108). I have used the translation of Samuelson, God’s Knowledge, p. 33. 34 Several scholars are of the opinion that Gersonides “watered-down” his ostensibly unorthodox views in his commentary on the Torah. I do not share that view. See Schwartz, Setirah and my discussion of esotericism in the Introduction to this volume.

66

CHAPTER TWO

taneously.35 It is not likely that he would allow such an egregious contradiction to escape his notice. The second theory claims that the contradiction is purposeful. It implies that Gersonides had a “secret doctrine” which he was trying to hide from the masses who were likely to read his commentary to the Bible but were hardly likely to read the difficult and abstruse Milhamot. But this theory, too, is not without its problems. In the Introduction to the Milhamot Gersonides explicitly notes that contradictions are one way of obfuscating a text which he will avoid assiduously. Self-conscious contradictions, he argues, are intellectually and consequently morally evil. More important, I think, is the fact that the other explicit doctrines he defends in the Milhamot, like those relating to God’s knowledge and providence, are at least as daring as his doctrine of Mosaic prophecy which depends upon them. Why should he try to hide the latter and not the former? He is, furthermore, quite explicit in his commentary to Job about the limits of God’s knowledge and providence. If he is explicit in one part of the Bible commentary, why not in another? The third theory suffers from the fact that it makes Levi ben Gerson much more “orthodox” in this one place than he is in any other place. Why should he be more concerned with orthodoxy here than in his discussions of God’s knowledge of particulars or of divine providence? On balance I would say that the first explanation offers the fewest problems. This is, I think, one place where Gersonides simply contradicted himself without being aware of it. This approach is consistent with what I take to be an important if little-noted aspect of Gersonides’ thought. He seems to have been a man caught between two worlds. In many ways he is clearly and emphatically medieval – his method, his style, his sources, the questions he asks, all mark him as such. On the other hand, I would like to suggest, he should in some senses be understood as a pre-Renaissance thinker, straining towards the future. His thought is marked by many ideas and motifs ordinarily associated with post-medieval thinking. For example, he emphasizes the importance and power of man. He reasserts the centrality of man as opposed to the typically scholastic claim of man’s 35 He constantly refers one to the other. On the composition of the Milhamot, see Glasner, “Early Stages.”

67

MOSAIC PROPHECY: MAIMONIDES AND GERSONIDES

insignificance. Gersonides is forced to choose in Book Three of the Milhamot between human freedom on the one hand and divine knowledge of particulars as such on the other. He chooses human freedom. In our own discussion we have seen how he understands prophecy to be a human perfection, not a gift of God’s grace. He constantly emphasizes that Moses was a man – a special man, it is true, but no more than a man. Gersonides’ ideas about history, too, contain within them conceptions which were later to mark Renaissance thought. We saw above that he rejects the idea that the generations are continuously diminishing in moral and intellectual value. In chapter fifteen of part 1 of Book Six of the Milhamot he argues that the world must have been created; for were it not, man would surely have progressed much further than he has in the infinite time in which he has existed. This is a clear and startling application of what is often considered the post-medieval idea of linear progress.36 In the following chapter he makes the optimistic claim that the world, once created, can never be destroyed.37 All of these arguments are made clearly and explicitly in the Milhamot. I would argue that the “retreat from rationalism” noted above was not an attempt at fooling his readers but was an unselfconscious accommodation to what Gersonides understood to be the demands of traditional Jewish teaching. Had he realized that he was contradicting himself I don’t think that he would have. Not only does he constantly attack Maimonides for what he implies is “intellectual dishonesty” in contradicting himself in this way, but he explicitly argues in the Introduction to the Milhamot that the Torah does not contradict the findings of human reason: Let not the reader think that the Torah moves us to find true what we conclude in this book without respect to its being true in itself. It is clear, as the Rabbi, the Guide, elucidated, that it is appropriate that we believe that, the truth of which has been made clear by speculation [iyyun]. If this should contradict the simple meaning of the words of the Torah, it is appropriate that we interpret these words to accord with speculation.38 36 On intellectual progress, see ch. 6 below and Kellner, Science, ch. 13. 37 In this he follows Maimonides as he understood him. See Feldman, “Universe.” 38 P. 6; Wars, p. 98.

68

CHAPTER TWO

It seems clear, therefore, that Gersonides would not have consciously perverted the truth of reason in order to make it accord with what seems to be the teaching of the Torah, no matter how widely that teaching was accepted in the Jewish world of his day.

69

CHAPTER THREE Eschatology and Miracles

A

lmost all of the major Jewish philosophers of the Middle Ages devoted some attention to the related questions of the coming of the Messiah and the resurrection of the dead. We find full-fledged discussions of these issues in the works of Sa’adia,1 Maimonides,2 Crescas,3 Albo,4 and, of course, Abravanel.5 Although Gersonides made no systematic study of the questions relating to the Messiah and resurrection, he says enough on the subject to make it possible to summarize and analyze his position. It is my intention here to sketch out Gersonides’ account of the Messiah and the messianic era, describe those elements of his overall philosophical system which are necessary for an understanding of his messianic account, and then to discover to what extent Gersonides’ discussion of the Messiah is or is not consistent with the rest of his philosophy. I will show that serious inconsistencies remain, and will attempt at the end of this chapter to explain why Gersonides adopts a highly traditional understanding of the Messiah and resurrection despite his willingness to be untraditional in so many areas and given the problems it causes him. 1

Treatises eight and nine of Saadia’s Emunot ve-Deot are devoted to resurrection and redemption.

2

Maimonides’ Epistle to Yemen and Treatise on Resurrection both deal with our theme. So do his commentary on Helek, chapters eight and nine of “Laws of Repentance,” and chapters eleven and twelve of “Laws of Kings.”

3

Hasdai Crescas deals with the question of the Messiah in Treatise III, part I, principle 8 of his Or Adonai and with resurrection in III.1.4.

4

Joseph Albo deals with the Messiah in his Sefer ha-Ikkarim, IV. 42.

5

Abravanel wrote three books about the messianic redemption: Ma’ayenei Yeshuah, Mashmia Yeshuah, and Yeshu’ot Meshiho. See Lawee, “Messianism.” For an analytic survey of messianism in medieval Jewish thought, see Schwartz, Ha-Ra’ayon ha-Meshihi. On Gersonides, see Eisen, Providence, pp. 147-154.

71

ESCHATOLOGY AND MIRACLES

An objection to the whole project embodied in this chapter must be considered, however, before I proceed. Gersonides does not treat the coming of the Messiah as a philosophical issue. Indeed, in the Milhamot the issue never comes up. In the one place where he does mention the question of resurrection he immediately apologizes for the digression, writing, “But it is not our intention here to investigate the issue of resurrection. It is more appropriate that that inquiry made in our commentary to the words of the Prophets and of the Sages of our Torah.6 But we were brought to it by the order of the issues [at hand].”7 It might be urged, therefore, that it is not fair to Gersonides to treat a strictly theological issue as a philosophical problem and to judge it by the same canons of intellectual rigor by which we judge Gersonides’ purely philosophical analyses. This objection to our inquiry here, while it has a measure of initial plausibility, is itself based on a distinction which Gersonides rejects, that between theology and philosophy, or, put more accurately, between revealed truth and philosophical truth. There is only one truth, he maintains, and any contradictions between reason and revelation must be only apparent and not real contradictions. Thus, for example, as noted at the end of the last chapter, Gersonides writes in the Introduction to the Milhamot: The reader ought not to think that the Torah moved us to affirm as true that which we affirm as true in this book without its being true in itself. This is so because it is clear, as Maimonides established,8 that one ought to believe what is established as true by philosophical speculation [iyyun]. If the Torah when understood literally should disagree with what has been so established, then its words ought to be interpreted so that they accord with philosophical speculation.9 6

No commentary of Gersonides on the Talmud is known to have survived. That he composed one, or began to compose one, is evidenced by the fact that on p. 207b/10 of his commentary on Deuteronomy he mentions a commentary of his on Tractate Berakhot. In his introduction to his Torah commentary (Gen. p. 3d/11/14) he lists the rabbinic works he planned to write: a book of commandments, and a commentary on the entire Talmud.

7

Milhamot VI.ii.10, p. 453 (Wars, p. 486).

8

See, for example, Maimonides’ Guide of the Perplexed, II.25.

9

Milhamot, Introduction, p. 6 (Wars, p. 98). See also Milhamot III.6, p. 150 (Wars, pp. 136137), and VI.ii.1, p. 419 (Wars, pp. 428-429). For discussion, see above in the Introduction.

72

CHAPTER THREE

If Gersonides understood Biblical references to the Messiah and resurrection literally, therefore, it is because he thought that this understanding accorded with philosophical speculation and was rationally grounded. It is neither inappropriate nor unfair, therefore, to seek to determine to what extent this is actually the case. Gersonides nowhere presents a systematic exposition of his ideas concerning the messianic redemption. Most of his statements the Messiah are scattered through his commentaries on the Pentateuch and the Book of Daniel.10 Like many of his contemporaries, Gersonides sought to describe the course of events leading up to the coming of the Messiah and even sought to predict the year of the Messiah’s advent. Along with many other medieval Jewish thinkers he set the date as 1358.11 I will not concern myself with these questions in the present context since they have little or no bearing on the philosophical issues raised by belief in the Messiah and resurrection.12 Those of Gersonides’ statements concerning the coming of the Messiah which do concern us here fall under four headings: (a) what brings the Messiah? (b) the nature of the messianic era; (c) the Messiah and Moses; and (d) the Messiah and resurrection. Gersonides makes it clear that obedience to the Torah by Israel as a whole is both a necessary and a sufficient condition for the coming of the Messiah. He interprets the verse, If thou shalt keep all this commandment… (Dt. 19:9) to mean “that if Israel were to keep all the commandments of the Torah they would be redeemed.”13 That this redemption is an example of divine providence is evidenced by comment on the verse, if ye will hearken unto My voice indeed… (Ex. 19:5): “Divine providence will be extended to him and protect 10 Gersonides’ commentary on Daniel (CD henceforth) has been published a number of times exists in a large number of mss. See Touati, La pensée, p. 69. It is most conveniently available in Ozar ha-Perushim II, Tel-Aviv, 1966. 11 The year 1358 was given as the date of the coming of the Messiah by Rashi, Abraham bar Hiyya, and others as well as Gersonides. See Silver, Messianic Speculation, pp. 94 and 102. Gersonides gives 1358 as the date of the messianic advent in CD 12:11. Given that Gersonides died in 1344 at the age of 56, it would not have been unreasonable for him to have expected (or at least hoped) to live another fourteen years. What this says about his mind-set is worthy of a serious discussion, but not here. 12 For a thorough-going description of this material, see Touati, La pensée, pp. 469-477. 13 Dt., p. 226c/172.

73

ESCHATOLOGY AND MIRACLES

him from the evils due to befall him.”14 The coming of the Messiah, therefore, is an act of divine providence, brought about by the obedience of the People of Israel to the Torah. In discussing the nature of the messianic era, Gersonides emphasizes, as one of its most striking characteristics, the unanimity of religious belief which will prevail. He repeats this claim in almost every context where he discusses the Messiah and, over and over again, uses Zephaniah 3:9, For then I will turn to the people a pure language, that they may all call upon the name of the Lord, to serve Him with one consent, as his proof-text. Another important characteristic of the messianic era is universal peace, which Gersonides sees as directly connected to the absence of religious divisions. Thus, in his commentary on Daniel 2:45 Gersonides cites Zephaniah 3:9 and then writes: “Because of this there will be no wars on the earth, as there will be no differences in religion,15 this being greatest cause of wars.”16 During the time of the Messiah, whose reign will last forever,17 the earth will be filled with the knowledge of the Lord.18 As a consequence of this prophecy and visions will multiply19 and all people will choose to perfect themselves as human beings.20 The messianic world will not be different in nature from the world as we know it now21 and the resurrected dead, like ourselves, will be able to choose between good and evil.22 14 Ex., p. 75a (3rd to’elet)/144/320. The providential character of the messianic redemption will be discussed again below at greater length. 15 Literally: “in beliefs”. 16 See also, CD 12:1, 12:3, and Dt. 248b (19th to’elet - the last in the whole book)/352. Given the times in which he lived (thirteenth/fourteenth centuries) it is hardly surprising that Gersonides saw religious divisions as the chief cause of war. 17 Sec, CD 2:45, CD 4, 23rd to’elet, CD 12:1, and CD 12, 6th to’elet. Gersonides says that the messianic kingdom will last forever; he does not say that the Messiah will live forever. Compare Maimonides’ commentary on Helek (in Twersky, Reader, p. 415), where he says that the messianic kingdom will last for a very long time but not forever. In Sheilat, Hakdamot, the text is found on p. 139. Given their relationship it would in general be valuable to compare the views of Maimonides and Gersonides on the subjects touched upon in the discussion which follows. Here I restrict myself to noting the most important similarities and differences. 18 CD 12, 7th to’elet. Compare Maimonides, “Laws of Kings,” XII.5. 19 CD 9:23. 20 I.e., perfect their intellects; see CD 9:23 and below, ch. 7. 21 Compare Maimonides’ oft-repeated assertion that in the days of the Messiah the world will follow its accustomed patterns. See, for example, “Laws of Repentance,” IX. 3. 22 CD 12:2; CD 12, 7th to’elet.

74

CHAPTER THREE

Gersonides devotes very little attention to the character of the Messiah himself. When he does address this question it is usually by way of comparing the Messiah to Moses. We find the following comments, for example, at the end of his commentary on the Pentateuch: The nineteenth to’elet23 is that to which the Torah testified in saying, And there hath not arisen a prophet since in Israel like unto Moses... (Dt. 34:10). For another prophet like Moses with respect to the things mentioned24 will arise who will not be a prophet only in Israel, for [he will prophesy] to Israel and the rest of the nations. He will perform25 the multitude of signs and demonstrations26 (Dt. 34:11) like Moses over a broad area and before many people. He will uninterruptedly demonstrate God’s mighty hand and the great terror (after Dt. 34:12) to a great nation.27 Since there has not yet arisen such a prophet with respect to these things28 in any place, we know that he will be the Messiah, son of David,29 who shall be exalted and lifted up very high (Is. 52:13). He will perform all these wonderful miracles to turn to the people a pure language, that they may all call upon the name of the Lord, to serve Him with one consent (Zeph. 3:9). There will then be peace on the earth because there will not be different religions and therefore they shall beat theirs words into ploughshares, and their spears into pruning hooks, nation shall not lift up sword against nation, neither shall they learn war anymore (Micah 4:3). This30 is the stone mentioned in the words of Daniel, which filled the earth,31 and about which it was said And in the days

23 To Ve-Zot ha-Berakhah (Dt. 33:1-34:12), the last section of the Pentateuch. 24 In Dt. 34:11-12. 25 With reference to miracles, Gersonides almost invariably uses the Hebrew root hiddesh which I translate variously as “work” or “perform”. 26 I.e., miracles. 27 Greater in number than the nation of Israel in the sight of whom Moses worked his miracles. See Dt. 34:12. 28 I.e., one whose miracles were superior to those of Moses. 29 As opposed to his precursor, the Messiah son of Joseph, about whom Gersonides also writes. See Gen., p. 51b/259-260/552 and Dt., p. 247d (10th to’elet)/349. It is noteworthy that Maimonides strenuously avoids references to Messiah son of Joseph in his “Laws of Kings.” On this, see Kellner, Science, ch. 18. 30 I.e., the Messiah. 31 See Dan. 2:34-36.

75

ESCHATOLOGY AND MIRACLES

of those kings shall the God of heaven set up a kingdom which shall never be destroyed; nor shall the kingdom be left to another people ... (Dan. 2:44),32 About this it was said, And there was given to him dominion, and glory, and a kingdom, that all the peoples, nations, and languages should serve him; his dominion is an everlasting dominion, which shall not pass away, and his kingdom shall not be destroyed (Dan. 7:14).33 May the Lord mercifully make speed and hasten His work that we may see it (Is. 5:19), amen and amen, selah!34

From this passage we learn that the Messiah will be a prophet and that he will be superior in rank to Moses.35 His superiority will be expressed in three ways: first, his prophecy will be directed to the whole world, not only to the People of Israel; second, the miracles36 he will work will be visible over broad areas and to many people; third, the changes introduced by these miracles will be of long duration.37 From the verses which Gersonides cites we learn that during the messianic era all humans will be united in their worship of God, that war will therefore disappear, and that the messianic kingdom will last forever.38 Not only will the Messiah prophecy to a wider audience than did Moses but, as the passage just cited indicates, his miracles will be greater than those of Moses. In his commentary on Dt. 34:10 he writes: But the truth of the matter, which follows necessarily from this verse, is that [the statement that] no other prophet like Moses arose refers to a prophet 32 Gersonides’ commentary on this verse merely paraphrases the Aramaic into Hebrew without actually commenting on it. 33 In his commentary on this verse Gersonides says that the Messiah will first appear as an ordinary man and will come before the old man sitting on the throne of Rome (the Pope) to plead for his people as Moses did before Pharaoh. In the end, the dominion mentioned in the verse will be given to him. One wonders if Gersonides was drawing a parallel between the Pope and Pharaoh. 34 Dt., p. 248b/352. See also Nu., p. 198b (2nd to’elet)/136/324, Dt., p. 210a/28, and Dt., p. 247a/344. 35 Compare Maimonides, who says (“Laws of Repentance,” IX.3) that the Messiah will be a great prophet near in rank to Moses (emphasis added). 36 Notably resurrection, as will be seen below. 37 The significance of this will be made clear below. 38 In contrast to Maimonides, who thinks that the messianic kingdom will last for a very long time, perhaps even a thousand years, as he puts it. See above, note 17.

76

CHAPTER THREE

[who prophesied] to Israel only, despite which there will be a prophet [who will prophesy] to the nations of the earth also. He is the King Messiah. As they said in the midrash, “Behold my servant shall prosper (Is. 52:13) ... this means that he will be greater than Moses.”39 It is clear that his miracles will be greater than those of Moses because while Moses drew only Israel to the service of the Lord with his miracles, he will draw all the nations to the service of the Lord, as it says, For then I will turn to the peoples a pure language, that they may all call upon the name of the Lord, to serve Him with one consent (Zeph. 3:9)...40

Moses prophesied to the People of Israel and his miracles drew them to the worship of God. The Messiah will prophesy to all the peoples of the earth and his miracles will draw all nations to the worship of God. Not only will the miracles of the Messiah be greater than those of Moses in their effect, they will also be greater in substance: they will be seen by more people, in more places and will persist for a longer time.41 Gersonides maintains that the greatness of a prophet’s miracles determines his greatness as a prophet.42 It is evident, therefore, that the Messiah is a prophet far superior to Moses. But, despite this, he will not supplant the Torah of Moses. Gersonides writes: You ought to know that what we said in Parashat Balak [Nu. 22:2-25:9] that there will arise a prophet like Moses [who will prophesy] to Israel and the nations,43 this being the King Messiah for whom we hope, does not mean that he will be a legislative prophet [navi Torah]. This is impossible. It is not the way

39 See Yalkut Shimoni to Is. 52 (section 476). 40 Dt., p. 198b/136. This passage may be better understood in the light of an exegetical problem raised by Gersonides in his commentary on Dt. 34:10. He says there that the Torah “mentioned that which distinguished Moses from every other prophet to arise to prophesy in Israel. From this it is clear than another prophet like him [i.e., Moses] will arise to prophesy to Israel and the other nations ... For, were such not the case, the mention of in Israel [in Dt. 34:10] would be a superfluous conditional statement. This prophet who will prophesy to Israel and the other nations is the King Messiah ... “ (emphasis added). See also Nu., p. 198b (2nd to’elet)/136/324. 41 These, as will be seen below, are Gersonides’ three criteria for judging the greatness of a miracle. 42 This will be shown below. 43 Nu., p. 198b/136/324. This passage was quoted just above.

77

ESCHATOLOGY AND MIRACLES

of prophecy44 to communicate a divine Torah law [nimmus tora-i elohi] except by way of miracle as was the case with the prophecy of Moses.45 The meaning of this is that he46 will be alike or superior to Moses in connection with those things which are mentioned there;47 i.e., the working of signs and demonstrations and the other things connected with the statement, And there hath not arisen a prophet since in Israel like unto Moses (Dt. 34:10).48

The superiority of the Messiah over Moses as a prophet poses no threat to the immutability of the Torah because Gersonides views the function of the prophet as being primarily predictive, not legislative. Thus, his main concern in Treatise II of the Milhamot is to distinguish prophecy from other forms of prognostication, namely divination and veridical dreams. This may be contrasted with the position of Maimonides, for whom prophecy had a preeminently political and legislative character.49 Thus, in his own discussion of prophecy, Maimonides is primarily concerned with distinguishing Mosaic from non-Mosaic prophecy. He must do this in order to protect the unique character of Moses’ legislative prophecy, the Torah. The Messiah’s superiority to Moses is determined by the greatness of his miracles. There is one miracle in particular which will demonstrate this superiority and which will also cause all the peoples of the earth to turn to the Lord. This is the miracle of resurrection.50 Gersonides emphasizes this point repeatedly. It even occurs in one of his rare messianic references in the Milhamot : But resurrection of the dead, being one of the greatest miracles, is clearly brought about by individual providence, intended, as you might say, to cause all men at that time to acquire perfect faith in God, just as the working of miracles by Moses was intended to cause Israel to acquire perfect faith in God.

44 On this, see Dt., p. 248a/351. 45 On this issue, see above, ch. 2. 46 I.e., the Messiah. 47 Dt. 34:11. 48 Dt., p. 210a/28. 49 See Maimonides’ Guide, II.32-48, especially chapters 37 and 40. See also ch. 2 above. 50 Maimonides denies that it is the Messiah who will resurrect the dead. See, for example, “Laws of Kings,” XI.3.

78

CHAPTER THREE

As when He said about Pharaoh, For I have hardened his heart (Ex. 10:1), the end of the passage being, that ye may know that I am the Lord (Exodus 10:2).51 Similarly, the working of this miracle at that time52 [will be intended] to cause all men to acquire perfect faith, as [the prophet] predicted and said, For then I will turn to the peoples a pure language, that they may all call upon the name of the Lord, to serve Him with one consent (Zeph. 3:9).53

Gersonides explicitly compares the miracle of resurrection with the miracles of Moses in the continuation of a passage already quoted: It is clear that his miracles will be greater than those of Moses. Moses drew only Israel to the service of the Lord with his miracles while he will draw all the nations to the service of the Lord, as it says, For then I will turn to the peoples a pure language, that they may all call upon the name of the Lord, to serve Him with one consent (Zeph. 3:9). This will be done by means of a wonderful miracle which will be seen to the edges of the earth [and] by all the nations [of the earth]. This is the resurrection of the dead.54

We may summarize the material presented to this point as follows. According to Gersonides, obedience to the Torah on the part of Israel will bring about the coming of the Messiah. His coming, and the miracle of resurrection which he will work, are instances of divine providence, intended to benefit all mankind. During the reign of the Messiah, which will last forever, religious divisions will be obliterated, all humans will serve the Lord together, and war will therefore disappear. The Messiah himself is a prophet, superior even to Moses. His superiority is evidenced by the fact that his prophecy is directed to all mankind, with the intention of bringing them to worship God, and by 51 The intervening passage is crucial for an understanding of Gersonides’ point. The two verses in their entirety read: And the Lord said unto Moses: Go unto Pharaoh; for I have hardened his heart, and the heart of his servants, that I might show these My signs in the midst of them; and that thou mayest tell in the ears of thy son, and of thy son’s son, what I have wrought unto Egypt, and My signs which 1 have done among them; that ye may know that I am the Lord. The point of this is that “the working of miracles by Moses was intended to cause Israel to acquire perfect faith in God.” 52 I.e., the miracle of resurrection at the time of the Messiah. 53 Milhamot VI.ii.10, pp. 452-453 (Wars, p. 486). 54 Dt., p. 198b/136.

79

ESCHATOLOGY AND MIRACLES

the high degree of his miracles, especially resurrection. In the messianic world the earth will be filled with the knowledge of the Lord, prophecy will become prevalent, and all will choose to perfect themselves. Other than that, however, the world will not change its nature. At first glance Gersonides would appear to be presenting a highly traditional account of the messianic future. But before this account can be analyzed it is evident that certain key terms will have to be elucidated within the wider context of Geronsides’ thought. We cannot hope to understand Gersonides’ account of the messianic redemption unless we understand how he uses terms like “the purpose of the Torah”, “human perfection”, “providence”, “prophecy” and “miracle”. Most of these issues have been given extensive scholarly attention and can be treated briefly here. Gersonides’ account of miracles, however, has not been subjected to sustained analysis. Since it turns out to be of crucial importance in the present context it will have to be examined at length. We have seen that Gersonides maintains that the coming of the Messiah will be brought about by Israel’s obedience to the Torah. It behooves us, therefore, to inquire closely into this issue. The purpose of the Torah, Gersonides informs us in the introduction to his commentary on the Pentateuch, is to direct man to true perfection and true felicity (hazlahah), the “the ultimate fruit of human endeavor.”55 This true perfection, upon which depends man’s ultimate felicity,56 is perfection of the intellect, based upon correct cognition of all that exists.57 It is through obedience to the Torah’s commandments that we can reach this intellectual perfection.58 55 Gen., p. 2c/1/1. See also Ex. 115d/451/443, Lev. 137b/144/301, Song of Songs 2:1 (pp. 38 and 110) and 8:12 (p. 93). The texts and mss. vary between kol pri ha-adam and pri kol haadam; either way, the literal meaning would be something like “the fruit of every man.” See also Gersonides’ Introduction to Ecclesiastes (p. 25d/17). It is interesting (if not particularly relevant) to note that in his commentary on Genesis 2:3 Nahmanides characterizes the fruit referred to in the Creation story as Torah and commandments. 56 I.e., human immortality. 57 See Lev., p. 137c/144/301; Dt., p. 210a/28; Milhamot VI.i.19, p. 378 (Wars, p. 345) and Milhamot VI.ii.8, p. 435 (Wars, p. 458). 58 See Dt., p. 213d (14th to’elet)/58. In general, in his commentary Gersonides seeks to show how the Torah guides one to intellectual perfection. See Heinemann, Ta’amei ha-Mizvot, Vol. I, pp. 97-101.

80

CHAPTER THREE

What is this intellectual perfection towards which the Torah seeks to guide its adherents? The answer to this question is intimately bound up with Gersonides’ conception of the Active Intellect, the last of the separate intellects and the mover of the sublunar sphere.59 It functions to impart forms to the sublunar world and, by virtue of its fully realized and purely intellectual existence, to actualize man’s potential for knowledge. The Active Intellect embodies in itself all the laws governing the processes of sublunar nature.60 When a person perfects himself intellectually, he achieves a certain measure of conjunction61 with the Active Intellect. The greater the level of intellectual perfection, the greater the conjunction with the Active Intellect, and the greater the person’s understanding of the laws governing the world in which he lives. Providence and prophecy are the consequences of different levels of conjunction with the Active Intellect. Providence is thus a law-governed, one might almost say, mechanistic affair.62 To give a simple-minded example, if one has perfected one’s intellect sufficiently to comprehend the law of gravity, then (unlike many cartoon characters) one knows it is a good idea to step out of the way of falling pianos. One’s avoidance of the falling piano is at one and the same time an act of providential care and a reward for having perfected one’s intellect to the degree of comprehending the law of gravity.63 Gersonides summarizes his view of providence in the following words: “God’s providence in regard to individual human beings consists of making known to them the 59 Much of the first treatise of the Milhamot is over to a discussion of the Active Intellect (see especially chapter six). The Active Intellect embodies in itself all the laws governing the influences of sublunar nature and all the laws governing the influences of the celestial bodies. This latter is possible because the Active Intellect is an emanation, not of the ninth intellect alone, but of all the separate intellects together. Thus, while it is inferior in degree to the other intellects, it has a view of all of sublunar nature while they each apprehend only one aspect of it. It apprehends the sum of what they apprehend. See further Milhamot V.iii.12-13 and ch. 9 below. 60 See Milhamot I.6, pp. 35-36 (Wars, pp. 146-147) and Touati, La pensée, pp. 325-358. 61 Hebrew: devekut. I use the term “conjunction” in the epistemological, not the ontological, sense. On this important distinction, see Feldman, “Gersonides on Conjunction.” 62 Treatise IV of the Milhamot (on providence) has been translated into English, with introduction and notes, in Bleich, Providence. The translations from Treatise IV presented here are Bleich’s. Further on providence in Gersonides, see ch. 1 above. 63 Providence and retribution are thus seen to be two sides of the same coin for Gersonides.

81

ESCHATOLOGY AND MIRACLES

benefits and misfortunes about to come upon them so that they may guard against the misfortunes and direct themselves to the benefits.”64 It should be emphasized that on Gersonides’ view of providence neither God nor the Active Intellect plays any direct providential role in the sense of responding to human actions. Providence is a natural phenomenon, directly and wholly dependent upon the extent to which one perfects or fails to perfect one’s intellect.65 This lack of what we would call responsiveness is no imperfection in God. God does not know us as particulars and cannot, therefore, relate to us as particulars.66 It would truly be an imperfection in God were divine activities anything other than constant and immutable. To return to the issue of providence, we see that obedience to the Torah, which promotes intellectual perfection, thus also causes one to be guided and cared for providentially. As Gersonides says, “Divine providence will be extended to him who follows the ways of the Torah to guard him and protect him from the evils due to befall him ... “67 We must also note that providence, while ordinarily extended to individuals, can also be extended to whole nations. This is brought about either by virtue of the perfection of the progenitors of the nation (who are thus rewarded for their perfection68) or by virtue of the perfection of the people making up the nation. We may thus understand how obedience to the Torah on the part of the Jewish People can bring about their redemption as a nation, as opposed to their individual salvation.69 Prophecy, according to Gersonides, is little more than a variant of providence.70 Persons with the appropriate constitutional predispositions, who per64 Milhamot, IV.5, pp. 166-167 (Bleich, p. 69; Wars, p. 178). 65 God does not and can not respond to human behavior. Being fully real (and hence entirely perfect) God is changeless. With the crucial exception of creation, God cannot be said to act in any significant sense of that term. 66 On God’s knowledge of particulars, see Samuelson, God’s Knowledge, and Samuelson, “Gersonides’ Account.” 67 Ex., p. 75a (3rd to’elet)/144/320. 68 Gersonides nowhere explains how this could possibly work; we are left with the option of taking him at his word (as does Eisen) and leaving him with a promise, as it were, that he cannot possibly fulfill, or maintaining that he expressed himself loosely on this matter (as I prefer to do). Neither option is really attractive. 69 Milhamot IV.6, p. 181 and p. 182 (Wars, p. 199-200). See also CD 9:21. 70 On prophecy in Gersonides, see Touati, La pensée, pp. 451-468, Kreisel, Prophecy, ch. 6,

82

CHAPTER THREE

fect their intellects sufficiently, achieve such a measure of conjunction with the Active Intellect that they can “tap into” the latter’s holistic comprehension of all the laws governing the sublunar world. By using their imagination, the prophets can instantiate these laws in particular circumstances. As with the case of providence, prophecy is a purely natural phenomenon, in no way dependent upon specific activity on the part of God or the Active Intellect. Gersonides’ conception of prophecy plays an important part in his account of miracles. A fairly lengthy examination of that account is not only necessary for an understanding of his views concerning the Messiah and resurrection, but will help to deepen our understanding of his description of prophecy. Gersonides’ systematic account of miracles is found in Milhamot VI, ii, 9-12.71 He opens chapter nine (pp. 441-443) with questions about miracles: and ch. 2 above. Gersonides says that the purpose (takhlit) of prophecy is providence at Milhamot II.5, p. 104 (Wars, p. 48). 71 Further on Gersonides’ account of miracles see Touati, La pensée, pp. 469-477; Eisen, Providence, pp. 22-28; Kreisel, Prophecy, pp. 392-399; Borodowski, Abravanel on Miracles, pp. 81-91; and ch. 4 below. This is the place to take note of a debate on Gersonides’ account of miracles between Robert Eisen and myself. I shall allow a third party to summarize the issue: Thus the ambiguous treatment of this issue is witnessed by the fact that contemporary scholars, many centuries after Abravanel, continue to be divided concerning the meaning of Gersonides’ ‘miraculous order’. Eisen maintains that, according to Gersonides, specific miracles occur only when individuals, at the proper level of perfection, activate the miraculous laws. However, echoing Abravanel, Kellner and Staub claim that miracles are unusual events programmed in the natural order since creation. According to this theory, predetermined unusual phenomena acquire the character of miracles through their prophetic prediction. While the first opinion defines the miraculous event by the special character of the person and laws that produce it, the second determines the miraculous by virtue of its predictability. (Borodowski, Abravanel on Miracles, pp. 124-125). Kreisel, Prophecy, p. 396 sides with Eisen, noting generously that “Kellner makes a gallant, if unsuccessful, attempt to extract Gersonides from this difficulty [of the particularity of miracles].” I am unconvinced by Eisen’s account of Gersonides for the same reason that I reject his account of “inherited providence”: Gersonides has no way of making it possible. The only one of his arguments against my interpretation which might be thought to hold water is that Gersonides entertains the possibility that nonprophets might be associated with miracles. But see my discussion below in ch. 8. I there discuss Milhamot VI.ii.11 (pp. 453-454) where Gersonides comments that miracles are a form of providence vouchsafed to the very highly perfected. There can be cases, he says, of highly perfected philosophers, on the verge of prophecy, as it were, having miracles worked on their behalf. But this phenomenon is very rare: after all, how often will a person be perfected enough to have miracles worked on his or her behalf, but not be perfected enough to achieve prophecy? As long as I have dragged Abravanel into our discussion, see, on his critique of Gersonides’ account of miracles, Feldman, Philosophy, pp. 67-82. See further ch. 8 at note 51 and ch. 13.

83

ESCHATOLOGY AND MIRACLES

what is their purpose? in what way do they occur? what is their cause? As a good Aristotelian, Gersonides first turns to the evidence concerning miracles before attempting to draw any conclusions about them. In this context that means examining Biblical accounts of miracles, the only hard evidence we have about them. We find, he says, that some occur with respect to substance (e.g., turning a staff into a snake or water into blood) and some occur with respect to accidents (e.g., turning a healthy hand leprous). The (unstated in this context) consequence of this is that we find miracles occurring only with respect to things that are already in existence. We further find, Gersonides continues, that some miracles occur after a prior communication to a prophet and some do not. These latter, however, fall into two classes: those that occur after a prophet prays for them and those that occur a prophet announces that they would occur. The (unstated in this context) consequence of this is that prophets are not caught by surprise when a miracle occurs: they know about them in advance. What Gersonides does point out here is that in every event we find a prophet associated with miracles. Gersonides concludes chapter nine by pointing out that the evidence shows that all miracles occur as acts of goodness, mercy, or providence, intended to bring one to faith or to some bodily good, or to protect one from some evil, whether physical or spiritual.72 Indeed, how could it otherwise, Gersonides asks, since miracles, involving as they do some change in form, must be ordered by one the separate intellects from which only good can come?73 Having established that miracles occur with respect to created things, that they are always associated with a prophet, and that they always occur with some providential end in view, Gersonides turns in chapter ten (pp. 443-453) to the question of their cause. He rejects the thesis that miracles are uncaused on the following grounds: all miracles are directed to some good end; all things

72 In general, Gersonides maintains that it is the purpose of miracles to bring people to the service of God (which, of course, leads to physical and spiritual goods). This is the point of the miracle of resurrection as was seen above. See also Ex. p. 74d-75a (1st to’elet)/143/320. 73 Gersonides traces all evil in the world ultimately to matter. For example, Milhamot IV.3, p. 160 (Wars, p. 168). The word ‘ordered’ in this sentence must not be misunderstood: the separate intellects should be understood as something parallel to the notion of natural law in our science. Without them, there would be no order in our world, but they give no orders. Similarly, without gravity our world would be disordered, but gravity gives no orders.

84

CHAPTER THREE

directed to an end must have a cause.74 Second, we find that in some miracles living beings are created; this could not come about by accident or chance. Third, miracles are preceded by a communication to a prophet; Gersonides had demonstrated in Treatise II of the Milhamot that such communications could not be the consequence of accident or chance.75 From the fact that miracles are caused rather than accidental or chance events, Gersonides deduces a number of conclusions. First, miracles must fall under the laws governing the world. Second, the cause of miracles must know those laws in some fashion or other. This excludes from the pool of possible candidates for cause of miracles the celestial bodies, or, more properly, the separate intellects which move them, since the latter have only a partial knowledge of the orderings governing the sublunar world.76 But the fact of miracles being law-governed events emphatically makes it possible for God, the Active Intellect, or the prophet to be the direct cause of miracles. In fact, these three are the only possible remaining candidates since, as was pointed out above, miracles are caused by an intellect and there are no intellects but God, the separate intellects (including the Active Intellect), and, tremendously inferior to these, humans. Gersonides now proceeds to analyze the “aspects of plausibility” of the various claims put forward in support of the candidacy of God, the Active Intellect, and the prophet as the cause of miracles. Gersonides adduces three arguments in support of the claim that God is the direct cause of miracles. First, the generation involved in miracles is like the volitional generation exercised by God at the creation of the world. Second, God ordained the nature of all creation. It would not be proper if some other being, subordinate and inferior to God, were capable of changing that nature. Last, the Torah attributes miracles to God. Gersonides next presents those arguments which support the claim that it is the Active Intellect which is the author of miracles. The first of these argu74 Gersonides implies that all things directed to some end have a cause at Milhamot VI.i.6. 75 See Milhamot II.1, pp. 92-93 (Wars, p. 27). 76 The movements of each of the celestial bodies is responsible for one type of astrological influence on the sublunar world. The Active Intellect, while inferior in degree to the other separate intellects (being the last or, lowest emanation among them) unifies in itself an understanding of the influences of all of the celestial bodies.

85

ESCHATOLOGY AND MIRACLES

ments concerns the relationship between miracles and prophecy. The Active Intellect is the source of prophetic prognostications concerning impending miracles. It is thus obvious that the Active Intellect knows about miracles. But if miracles were the result of specific acts of God’s will they would be subject to no laws and would thus be totally unknowable to the Active Intellect which knows particular things, not as particulars, but only to the extent that they are subsumed under some general law or ordering. Thus if the Active Intellect knows about miracles (and we have seen that it does) they can not be attributed to God. Leaving aside the possibility that the prophet is the cause of miracles (which possibility Gersonides discusses later), it is evident that the Active Intellect must be the cause of miracles. A further indication that it is the Active Intellect which is the cause of miracles is the fact that miracles occur only with reference to entities under its governorship.77 Third, miracles are all examples of providence. The Active Intellect, as had been established in Milhamot IV, is the agent of providence. It follows from this that it is the Active Intellect which is also the cause of miracles. There are also three reasons which might lead one to think that the prophet is the cause of miracles. The first of these is the fact that working miracles seems to involve separate acts of volition. This is impossible for God and the Active Intellect. We have seen that prophets are always involved in the working of miracles; this is a second reason for supposing that they themselves cause the miracles. Last, we find that the greatness of a miracle is directly dependent upon the greatness of the prophet associated with it.78 This, too, would seem to indicate that the prophet causes miracles. Having summarized the arguments which support the claims of God, the Active Intellect, and the prophet as being the direct agents of miracles, Gersonides now turns his attention to the arguments refuting these claims. Beginning with God, he says that there are five arguments against attributing the work77 In his commentary on Joshua 10 and II Kings 22 and in Milhamot VI.ii.12 Gersonides uses the fact that it is the Active Intellect which is the cause of miracles to prove that miracles cannot occur with respect to the celestial bodies. He is not guilty of circular reasoning there, however, because the argument cited here is not his critical argument in support of the position that it the Active Intellect which is the cause of miracles. See below, ch. 13. 78 As was seen above, this is the reason for asserting the superiority of the Messiah over Moses.

86

CHAPTER THREE

ing of miracles to direct divine causality. First, were God the immediate cause of miracles, then His activities would not always be essentially good (turning a healthy hand leprous is not good in and of itself) while those of the Active Intellect would be. Gersonides rejects this conclusion as absurd, thus refuting the supposition upon which it is based. Second, God’s activity would be intermittent (He is not always working miracles) while that of the Active Intellect would be constant and uninterrupted. Gersonides also rejects this conclusion as absurd, thus refuting the supposition upon which it is based. Third, were God the immediate cause of miracles, prophetic foreknowledge about them would be impossible since such foreknowledge, as we know, comes from the Active Intellect, not from God. The fourth and fifth arguments, Gersonides says, apply as much to the Active Intellect as they do to God. In the fourth argument Gersonides poses a dilemma. Either God has a new instance of willing each time a miracle occurs or the occurrence of each miracle is predetermined by God’s eternal will at creation. The first horn of the dilemma is impossible to accept. The second, according to Gersonides, is the opinion of some of the Sages of the Talmud, who said that God made “conditions” at creation.79 This latter possibility Gersonides rejects on the following grounds. First, it makes the prophet superfluous to the working of miracles. Second, it involves an insoluble dilemma itself: either God predetermined the miracles with respect to the ends they were supposed to achieve or He did not. But in the first instance contingency is destroyed80 and in the second instance we have the absurdity of God’s activity not being directed to any particular end. Further, it is difficult to understand on this account why it is that miracles actually do have the beneficial effects they have. Gersonides’ fifth argument depends upon the fact that God can act upon existent beings by virtue of the fact that He in effect embodies the laws governing them.81 But miracles are, prima facie, exceptions to the laws govern79 I.e., predetermined all miracles at the time of creation. See Genesis Rabbah V.4, and Maimonides, Guide II.29. 80 Despite the fact that Gersonides maintained that the world was subject to astrological influences, humans can still, through the exercise of choice, alter the future mapped out by the celestial bodies. On this subject see Samuelson, “Free-Will.” 81 Gersonides actually says here (p. 448; Wars, p. 480) that God is the law and ordering of existent beings. See above, Introduction, note 44.

87

ESCHATOLOGY AND MIRACLES

ing existent beings, there being no limitation to the generation possible in miracles.82 This being so, God cannot be the author of miracles, since they are not subsumed under the laws which He embodies and by virtue of which He acts upon the world. As noted above, this argument, like the previous one, is equally effective against the supposition that it is the Active Intellect which is the cause of miracles. Gersonides now addresses the possibility that the prophet might be the cause of miracles. He used four arguments to refute this contention. First, were miracles dependent upon the will of the prophet, there would be no need for communications to the prophet concerning them since he would know about them in advance. Second, humans cannot know the laws governing sublunar nature perfectly and without knowledge of laws, they can not manipulate that nature. Third, if a person could work miracles, it would mean that he did know those laws perfectly. But that is only possible if he had succeeded in totally separating his intellect from matter. But in such a case, he would be a separate intellect and could have no new instances of volition.83 But if this is the case, then one of the main reasons for supposing that the prophet is the author of miracles –that the prophet can have new instances of volition, unlike God or the Active Intellect– is removed. Fourth, and finally, were the prophets the direct agents of miracles it would mean that a person could change oneself substantially. Gersonides rejects this conclusion as absurd and thus refutes the supposition upon which it is based. These arguments, Gersonides says, are conclusive: the prophet is not the cause of miracles. The arguments in support of that position really do no more than show that the prophet plays some role in the working of miracles. Similarly, the proofs against God’s being the immediate cause of miracles are conclusive while the arguments in favor of God’s being the cause of miracles do not really demonstrate that God is their immediate cause. For one thing, the generation involved in miracles is not really like the generation attributed to God at creation since it only involves changing one already existent thing to something 82 Gersonides makes this statement for the sake of argument. We will see that he holds miracles to be law-governed events as well. 83 For an explanation of why separate intellects do not have new instances of volition, see Maimonides, Guide, II.18.

88

CHAPTER THREE

else. This type of generation, involving as it does only changes in form, falls under the province of the Active Intellect. Nor is it the case that miracles alter the nature of the world as ordained by God (and thus should not be attributed to any being inferior to God): they are governed by the laws ordained by God (thus making it possible for them to be known by the Active Intellect): that miracles are governed by the laws ordained by God does not prove that God is their immediate cause since the Torah often attributes actions to God of which God is only the ultimate cause.84 On this basis we may see that while neither God nor the prophet can be the immediate cause of miracles, the Active Intellect can be. But does not the problem of new volition versus predetermination also rule out the Active Intellect? That is to say, either the working of each miracle represents a new volition on the part of the Active Intellect or the occurrence of each and every miracle is predetermined. The former alternative is impossible and the latter destroys the contingent nature of events in the world and thus makes human choice impossible. Gersonides’ solution to this problem, crucial to his account of miracles, is phrased as follows: We say that it has already been established in the second treatise of this book how it is possible for a particular communication or action to come from a separate cause,85 its particularity being from the perspective of the recipient. In the treatise on providence86 it was established that the providence [extended to one by] the Active Intellect is greater the closer one approximates its degree. Because of this it is necessary that its providence extends to different men in different degrees, according to the different levels among men with respect to their nearness or distance from the level of the Active Intellect. It is clear that this providence which it extends to men according to their nearness to it has87 a law and an order. Providence extends to a particular man not because he is that particular man but because he happens to be a man in that degree of 84 Maimonides makes the same claim in the Guide, II.48. 85 I.e., from a separate (i.e., incorporeal) intellect acting upon the world. 86 Milhamot IV. 87 I.e., is governed by.

89

ESCHATOLOGY AND MIRACLES

nearness to the Active Intellect. This being so, and since it is established concerning miracles that they occur providentially, it is clear that in this way we may solve the problem of miracles coming from the Active Intellect without it having new knowledge or will...88

This passage certainly needs some explanation. The Active Intellect does not “knowingly” extend providence to any particular individual, nor does it “knowingly” communicate prognostications to any particular prophet. Rather, the Active Intellect, one of the separate intellects, embodies (if such a term may be used of an entity which is bodiless by definition) what might be called the “blueprint” of the sublunar world: knowledge of all the laws governing the processes of sublunar creation and of the laws governing the influences of all the celestial bodies on the sublunar world. By perfecting one’s intellect one achieves a certain level of conjunction with the Active Intellect. This gives one a greater or lesser understanding –depending upon the degree of one’s intellectual perfection– of all the laws governing the world. The Active Intellect thus does not “tell” a prophet anything. The prophet, by virtue of his intellectual perfection, comes to understand some of the laws governing the world. Using his powers of imagination the prophet can apply those general laws to particular cases. Thus, for example, the Active Intellect did not actually communicate any concrete information to Jeremiah about Assyria, Egypt, and the Jews. Rather, using his intellect, Jeremiah came to know certain historical laws; using his imagination he was able to apply them to the situation at hand and predict the consequences of certain actions, such as concluding an alliance with Egypt. In the present context, Gersonides merely extends this description to include miracles. Miracles occur just as prophecy and providence occur, authored by the Active Intellect, without its having new instances of will or knowledge. This explanation is not yet complete, of course, since Gersonides has not yet told us exactly what miracles are. This becomes clear as he develops his theory of miracles, to which we now return.89 88 Milhamot VI.ii.10, p. 451 (Wars, pp. 483-484). 89 It should be pointed out that the interpretation of Gersonides’ account of miracles offered here depends heavily upon the passage quoted from p. 451 of the Milhamot just above. I take him at his word, that is, and interpret his theory of miracles on the assumption that he meant

90

CHAPTER THREE

We are now in a position to understand why it is that a prophet must ordinarily be associated with miracles. Providential care of the magnitude involved in miracles demands the presence of a highly perfected individual, that is to say, a prophet. Thus, the higher the degree of the prophet (i.e., the greater his intellectual perfection and hence the degree of his conjunction with the Active Intellect), the greater will be the miracles worked on his behalf. This is so because miracles are a form of providence, and the greater the individual being protected by providence, the greater will be the providential care extended to him.90 In the closing pages of chapter ten Gersonides makes some important comments about miracles. In the sense that they fall under a law or ordering, he says, they are similar to natural generation. In the sense, however, that the material which is subject to miraculous change is not limited (e.g., snakes are not ordinarily generated from staffs, although in miracles they are), and in the sense that the generation involved in miracles is not accomplished through the intermediation of the movements of the celestial bodies (which is ordinarily the case), they are like the volitional creation by which the world was created.91 Thus miracles are not ordinary events, but they are not eruptions of divine volition into the natural order of the world either. They would seem to occupy a point somewhere between these two possibilities. It is at this juncture that Gersonides introduces the brief discussion of resurrection quoted above. He points out, once again, the connection between miracles and providence. In chapter eleven Gersonides deals with the question of whether or not an extraordinarily wise man may take the place of a prophet in the working of miracles. Chapter twelve is given over to a discussion of the questions of what miracles are and with respect to what kind of entities can they occur. Gersonides opens the chapter by telling us what miracles can not cause permanent change in nature. He argues, in effect, that if miracles could bring about permanent it to be consistent with his accounts of prophecy, providence, and God’s knowledge. 90 This same reason, of course, applies to nations protected by providence. 91 The significance of the linkage between volitional creation and miracles will be touched upon below.

91

ESCHATOLOGY AND MIRACLES

change it would mean that God’s creation is in need of improvement. It follows from this, Gersonides points out, that the greater and more permanent a change introduced by a miracle, the greater the prophet with which it is associated. It is a tribute to the greatness of Moses that the manna fell over many places in the Wilderness of Sinai for forty years. Second, miracles can not effect self-contradictions. Thus, there can be no miracles affecting mathematical issues as such, and there can be no miracles affecting the past. It is also impossible for miracles to occur with respect to the celestial bodies. There are three reasons for this. In the first place, it is the Active Intellect which is the immediate cause of miracles. But the Active Intellect is itself an effect of the celestial bodies (or, more properly, of the separate intellects which move them) and it could not, therefore, cause any change in them. In the second place, the movements of the celestial bodies are so ordered as to maximize all possible good in the sublunar realm. Any alterations in their motions, therefore, could only have deleterious effects. Miracles, however, are wrought only to help men, not to injure them. It is evident, therefore, that miracles cannot occur with respect to the celestial bodies. In the third place, if miracles could indeed occur with respect to the celestial bodies it would mean that Joshua could indeed have stopped the sun and the moon. But that would mean that one of Joshua’s miracles was greater by far than any of Moses,’ none of which affected the celestial bodies. But that is impossible. This third argument leads Gersonides to a discussion of the two Biblical accounts which seem to involve miracles with respect to the celestial bodies, Joshua 10 and II Kings 22. His discussion here parallels his commentaries to these passages. He shows how the Biblical accounts do not really contradict his claim that miracles do not occur with respect to the celestial bodies.92 Gersonides now turns to the question of what miracles actually are. Although they certainly modify the accustomed order of nature, they are not, Gersonides maintains, actually contraventions of it.93 Miracles represent natu92 Gersonides’ commentaries on these two passages are discussed below in ch. 13. 93 In general, Gersonides consistently tries to reduce what might be called the “miraculous” nature of miracles, insisting that they take place in the least outlandish way possible. He establishes this as a general principle, writing, for example: “When God performs miracles He uses means which are the most appropriate according to the natural order... when

92

CHAPTER THREE

ral processes which, however, take place much more quickly than usual, and without the intervening steps which ordinarily occur. Thus, there is no reason why a staff could not turn into a snake, and vice versa, in a perfectly natural fashion, over an extended period of time. This, Gersonides notes, is another reason for rejecting the claim that miracles can affect the celestial bodies: their movements can not be accelerated. This concludes the exposition of Gersonides’ account of miracles in the Milhamot. As might be expected, it is a highly naturalistic account. Miracles are not instances of special divine intervention in the course of nature. They are, rather, a part of that very nature; a special part, it is true, but a part of it nonetheless. They are not “supernatural” in the ordinary sense of that term. One may thus truly speak, with Julius Guttmann, of a “natural law of miracles” in Gersonides.94 It could not be otherwise. The Active Intellect, the cause of miracles, can not have new will or knowledge. The Active Intellect can not be said to respond to human needs in any but the most mechanistic sense. How could it, since it does not know human individuals in their particularity? We cannot say, to illustrate the above with an example, that the Active Intellect, perceiving the distress of the Israelites caught between the sea and the advancing forces of Pharaoh, responded to that distress and to the Israelites’ pleas for salvation by intervening in the ordinary course of events and miraculously splitting the sea. What we can say is that by virtue of the greatness of Moses and, perhaps, of the Patriarchs, providential care was extended to the whole people of Israel. This providence consisted in the fact that Moses was able to foresee that by an extraordinary concatenation of otherwise natural forces the Red Sea would split apart just long enough for the Israelites to pass through it safely. This splitting and reforming of the Sea was to take place, he foresaw, not in the eons ordinarily required for such prodigious change but in a very short time indeed. Would the Sea have split had the Israelites chosen another route out of Egypt and not been in need of salvation just there and just then? Gersonides providential necessity brings God to change this order, it is appropriate that He depart from it as little as possible” (Gen., p. 20d [7th to’elet]/91/170; see also, Nu., p. 185c [12th to’elet]/47/440). See also Braner and Cohen’s edition of the commentary on Exodus, p. 230, note 35. 94 Guttmann, Philosophies, p. 248.

93

ESCHATOLOGY AND MIRACLES

does not address himself to this question but there can be only one answer to it. Yes, the sea would have split. There is no other way of escaping from the dilemma of the predestination of miracles versus new knowledge and will in the Active Intellect. But if the sea was going to split in any event what made its splitting before the Israelites miraculous? Gersonides does not really address himself to this question either, but on the basis of what he does say an answer is not difficult to find. In the first instance it is miraculous because it falls under the “natural law of miracles” and not under the ordinary laws of nature. But that can not exhaust its miraculousness; it was going to split whether or not the Jews needed it. It was truly a miraculous occurrence because it was predicted by Moses and used by him to reinforce the faith of the Israelites. Extraordinary events happen all the time; they are miraculous when they are used by a prophet to bring people to the service of God.95 Gersonides does not state all this explicitly, but these claims are implicit in his theory and he cannot deny them without self-contradiction. These considerations, by the way, make it clear why it is necessary that a prophet be associated with miracles: it is the prophet’s prediction which makes the event truly miraculous.96 We may now return to the questions of the Messiah and of the resurrection of the dead. To what extent is it possible to fit Gersonides’ account of the messianic redemption into his account of prophecy, providence, and miracles? To put the question in other words: to what extent can Gersonides’ conception of the messianic redemption be explained in wholly naturalistic terms? Gersonides maintains that obedience to the Torah (which conduces to a high degree of intellectual perfection) will bring about the coming of the Messiah. Two questions immediately present themselves: is such a high degree of widespread intellectual perfection actually possible, and, if it is, how will bring about the coming of the Messiah? The answer to the first question is clearly positive. Gersonides, following Aristotle, believed that all men seek knowledge.97 Gerson95 That this is the point of miracles is emphasized in the Commentary to Exodus, p. 74d-75a (1st to’elet)/143/319. 96 This explains why Gersonides finds it hard to accept rabbinic accounts concerning miracles worked by non-prophetic wise men. See Milhamot VI.ii.11, and see note 71 above. 97 Milhamot, VI.i.15, p. 358 (Wars, p. 317) and Aristotle, Metaphysics, first line.

94

CHAPTER THREE

ides was also convinced that intellectual progress was an integral part of the human condition.98 That is, not only do humans seek knowledge, but they actually attain it. By virtue of having the Torah the Jewish People has a special advantage over all other peoples in this regard. Since people in general seek intellectual perfection, and since the Jewish People are furthermore guided, encouraged, and aided in that pursuit by the Torah, there is every reason to expect that they will achieve a high degree of intellectual perfection on a very broad scale. How will the intellectual perfection of the Jews bring about the Messiah? By perfecting their intellects the Jews will merit divine providence, not only as individuals, but as an aggregate as well.99 What greater providence could there be for the Jewish people than the conversion, in effect, of the whole world to Judaism?100 How can the truth of Judaism be better demonstrated to the world than by a miracle of such extraordinary proportions that it can not be ignored by anyone?101 The foregoing certainly explains how on Gersonides’ account the days of the Messiah may be providentially brought about as a reward to the Jewish people for their righteousness (i.e., their intellectual perfection102); it does not 98 See the passage cited in the previous note as well as the Introduction to the Milhamot. Gersonides has an interesting relationship with his predecessors. On the one hand, the pays them great tribute (Commentary on Genesis p. 13d/51/83 – with special reference to ibn Ezra and Maimonides; Song of Songs 1:2, p. 23). On the other hand, he is convinced that he has progressed in scientific and Torah understanding beyond his predecessors. Further on the idea of progress in Gersonides, see below, ch. 7. 99 It is interesting to note that for Gersonides intellectual perfection plays the role usually reserved for repentance in traditional Jewish accounts of the coming of the Messiah. Note also that in Gersonides’ view the coming of the redemption is dependent entirely upon the behavior of the Jewish people and wholly out of the hands of God. This is at least formally consistent with the rabbinic view that the Messiah will not come until Israel merits his coming. For a dramatic example of how Gersonides treats righteousness as intellectual perfection, see Gen., p.18d/80/146, where he glosses Genesis 6:9 (…Noah was a righteous man [zaddik]…) as follows: “[the term] zaddik is used with respect to perfected moral virtues, or with respect to perfection of the intelligibilia [shelemut ha-musklalot], as in the righteous [zaddik] lives through his faith [Hab. 2:4]; it is in that second sense that it is used here.” 100 Note should be taken of the dramatically universalistic nature of Gersonides’ account of the messianic era. 101 It should be noted that this in effect makes resurrection a reward, not for the resurrected deed, but for the generation of the Messiah. 102 Although there may be reason for calling the equation of righteousness and intellectual perfection into question within the context of Maimonides’ thought (see Schwarzschild, “Moral Radicalness”), there is none with respect to Gersonides. See, for example, Milhamot,

95

ESCHATOLOGY AND MIRACLES

explain the appearance of a personal Messiah. That is to say, it does not explain how the perfection of Israel can guarantee the appearance of a prophet superior even to Moses. Without either destroying the contingent nature of future events or allowing the Active Intellect to have new instances of knowledge and will, how can Gersonides say that a particular individual, endowed with particular characteristics, will appear at a particular time? This is not to say that Gersonides cannot confidently predict that sooner or later the Messiah will actually appear. Given that the world is so constituted so as to maximize all possible good, given that it is possible for a prophet superior to Moses to arise, and given that in the fullness of time all things that are possible can reasonably be expected eventually occur, there is no reason for Gersonides not to expect the coming of the Messiah. What he cannot guarantee, it would seen, is that this prophet superior to Moses will appear exactly when he is supposed to appear, i.e., just when the People of Israel will have earned his coming. It might be proposed that only in a period of universal peace and widespread knowledge could a person with the potential to become the Messiah actualize that potential. But Moses, whose perfection is surely close to that of the Messiah, appeared during a period of widespread warfare and abysmal ignorance.103 On this account also the “days of the Messiah” precede and actually make possible the coming of the Messiah, instead of being ushered in by him. It might be argued here that the presence of a prophet superior to Moses (the Messiah) is necessary so that miracle superior to those of Moses (resurrection) can be performed. But this, while true enough in Gersonides’ terms, does not solve the problem outlined just above. This is so for two reasons. First, by what even remotely natural process, no matter how speeded up, can the acquired intellects of the righteous (i.e., intellectually perfected) dead –and it is the acquired intellect which is the only part of the human soul to survive IV.6, pp. 170 and esp. 177 (Wars, pp. 183 and 193). 103 Gersonides makes the point that philosophy was little known during the time of Moses (and for this he relies on Aristotle!). See his commentary to Exodus p. 104a-b/362/290. In contrast, Gersonides affirms (Songs of Songs 1:2, p. 23) that in the time of Solomon “the sciences were then greatly perfected in our nation.” No believer in the decline of the generations he! See above, ch. 2, note 28 and below, ch. 7.

96

CHAPTER THREE

death, according to Gersonides104– be reunited with the appropriate matter to form a resurrected whole? In other words, Gersonides nowhere explains how resurrection will occur and I am very doubtful that an explanation consistent with his overall philosophical position can be offered. The second problem is even more serious than the first. There is no way, consistent with this account of miracles, that Gersonides can guarantee that the resurrection will occur when it is supposed to. That is to say, prophets (including the Messiah) do not cause miracles. They announce them before their occurrence and that is what makes them miracles. By insisting that the Messiah will perform a specific miracle at a specific time Gersonides seems to be promising more than he can deliver. How can Gersonides know in advance that the resurrection of the dead (leaving aside the problems involved in providing it with a suitably naturalistic explanation) will occur at a time when it can be predicted by the Messiah? Unless there is some mechanism whereby the advent of the Messiah triggers the resurrection (and Gersonides gives us no hint as to what that mechanism might be) Gersonides cannot be sure that the resurrection of the dead, even assuming it will occur, will occur in conjunction with the advent of the Messiah. There are a number of conclusions to be drawn from all this. While Gersonides can account for “the days of the Messiah,” an era of universal peace and faith, while he can even account for an era of widespread knowledge of the Lord in which all men or nearly all men prophesy, and while he can be certain that sooner or later the Messiah himself will appear, he cannot easily account for the resurrection of the dead and cannot at all be sure that the coming the Messiah, “the days of the Messiah,” and the resurrection of the dead will all occur at roughly the same time. We are now faced with a fairly obvious question. Gersonides did not hesitate to promulgate what certainly may be called heterodox if not downright heretical views concerning many of the basic beliefs of rabbinic Judaism. His views on prophecy, providence, and miracles, as sketched out in this chapter, 104 See Milhamot, I.10. Note should be made of what can only be called Gersonides’ tenuous understanding of human immortality, which allows for personal immortality in only the most abstract and extended sense of the term. For discussion, see Hyman, Eschatological Themes.

97

ESCHATOLOGY AND MIRACLES

and certainly his account of God’s knowledge of particulars, are all very hard if not impossible to reconcile with the mainstream of rabbinic Jewish thought. Why then did he insist on maintaining a highly traditional approach to the questions of the Messiah and resurrection in the face of the fact that he has great difficulty in justifying this approach in the broader context of his philosophical system? Put in other words, why was Gersonides not content to ignore resurrection and speak only of “the days of the Messiah” as opposed to the Messiah himself? I do not mean to imply that Gersonides was consciously contradicting himself here.105 But surely there was some impetus which impelled him to adopt a position which, had he examined it more carefully, he would have found to be at odds with some of his basic presuppositions. We may put the question another way and sharpen it somewhat in the process: Gersonides, it seems, could have retained doctrinal orthodoxy, if not thoroughgoing consistency with the forms of Jewish tradition, had he taught that messianic prophecies referred to “the days of the Messiah” as opposed to a Messiah and had he interpreted resurrection of the dead in terms of human immortality (as, it was alleged, did Maimonides106). He could have done this and remained consistent with the rest of his philosophical system. Why, then, did he insist that the Messiah would user in the Messianic era and resurrect the dead? A possible answer to this problem suggests itself to me, although in the present context it can only be sketched out and presented tentatively. It was a commonplace among medieval Jewish philosophers, especially the post-Maimonideans, that miracles guaranteed volitional creation which in turn was an absolutely necessary prerequisite for revelation.107 Put bluntly, if one rejected miracles, one rejected Judaism. The one miracle which many of these thinkers 105 Whatever merits the approach of Leo Strauss and his followers has with respect to Maimonides, I do not believe that there are any reasons whatever to suppose that Gersonides had an esoteric doctrine, hidden behind the plain meaning of his words. See the discussion in the Introduction above. 106 On this, see the Rabad’s gloss to “Laws of Repentance,” VIII.2 and the discussion in Silver, Maimonidean Criticism, pp. 109-135. On the controversy around Maimonides’ views of resurrection in the West, see Septimus, Hispano-Jewish Culture and in the East, see Stroumsa, Reshito. 107 See Maimonides, Guide, II.25. In his Commentary to Numbers (p. 191a/90/214) Gersonides makes explicit the connection between believing in miracles and believing in the Torah. Further on this, see ch. 4 below.

98

CHAPTER THREE

accepted as being proof-positive of volitional creation was resurrection.108 We have noted above that Gersonides accepts what may be called the theological linkage between miracles and creation. If Gersonides had also come to accept resurrection as the crucial proof of volitional creation, then he might have felt it to be impossible to reject the former without endangering the latter, which he certainly did not want to do. Once he accepted resurrection he needed a prophet superior to Moses to account for it; thus the importance of belief in a personal Messiah appearing in conjunction with “the days of the Messiah” and resurrection. This solution to the problem of Gersonides’ surprising orthodoxy on the question of the messianic redemption is offered only tentatively, especially since it rests as much on psychological as on philosophical grounds. But there does not seem to be any other solution to the problem readily forthcoming. It is strange, perhaps, to criticize Gersonides –a thinker much vilified for his heterodox positions– for holding too orthodox a view on a theoretical issue. But that criticism ought to be viewed, I think, as a tribute to the freshness, ingenuity, and consistency which Gersonides generally brought to bear on his doomed attempt to clothe Judaism in the robes of Aristotelianism.109

108 Maimonides himself makes this very connection in his “Treatise on Resurrection.” In Kafih’s edition of his Iggerot, it is on pp. 94-95, and in Halkin’s translation on pp. 228. The connection between resurrection and volitional creation is mentioned by later writers, among whom may be cited Rabbi Shimon ben Zemah Duran. See Duran’s Ohev Mishpat, pp. 13b-4a. 109 This criticism is also of a piece with recent attempts to see Gersonides as a thinker with strong conservative tendencies. My student Oded Horetzky is writing a dissertation on the subject. In the meantime, see Manekin, “Conservative Tendencies.”

99

CHAPTER FOUR Creation, Miracles, and Revelation

G

ersonides and Maimonides agree that the denial of volitional creation has theologically unacceptable consequences. Both are forced to confront the question, therefore, of how a perfect, perfectly simple, and changeless God can create the world by an act of volition. Maimonides’ account of divine attributes allows him to say –at least as he is read by Gersonides– that God creates the world by will without thereby undergoing change, in a way which we cannot hope to understand. Gersonides is faced with the same problem. But, since he rejects Maimonides’ account of divine attributes, he cannot give the answer given by Maimonides. Gersonides raises the question explicitly, promises to answer it, and never really does. I will present a Gersonidean solution to the problem of new volition in God, based upon Gersonides’ analysis of God’s knowledge. God knows all that there is to know in a single, timeless “act” of knowing. Gersonides can be read as saying in similar fashion that God created the world with a timeless “act” of will. This solution, however, raises new problems since it does not guarantee, even theoretically, the possibility of God’s intervention in history and nature; i.e., it does not guarantee the theoretical possibility of miracles. Gersonides’ account of miracles, however, is so highly naturalistic that it actually does accord with the account of creation by will offered here. In other words, the proposed Gersonidean solution to the problem of creation by will succeeds. But in the final analysis I show that Gersonides’ account of miracles demands an entirely naturalistic account of revelation, an account from which Gersonides himself retreated in order to preserve the immutability of the Torah. I conclude that Gersonides cannot simultaneously and consistently maintain his theory 101

CREATIONS, MIRACLES, AND REVELATION

of volitional creation and protect the immutability of the Torah, both of which he wants to maintain and claims to affirm. Creation, like providence and prophecy, presented special problems for the medieval Aristotelians, Maimonides and Gersonides among them. The issue was not so much reconciling creationism with Aristotelianism –Maimonides sought to show that one could accept the creation of the world without following the mutakallimun in rejecting basic Aristotelian principles1 and it is the burden of Gersonides’ arguments in Milhamot, Book VI, part i, that the creation of the world is actually entailed by Aristotelian physics2– but reconciling creation by will with Aristotelianism. Maimonides and Gersonides both maintain, for important religious reasons, that God created the world by an act of will. They both realize that this claim seems to involve the inadmissible corollary that God’s will is subject to change. They thus share one problem. But the logic of their overall philosophic positions prevents them, or should prevent them, from proposing the same solutions. This chapter will focus on the differences between their solutions and the problems involved in Gersonides’ position. Gersonides’ position, the main subject of this chapter, must be read in the light of that of Maimonides. Not only was Maimonides perhaps the single most important philosophical influence on Gersonides, and not only did Gersonides structure most of his discussions as responses to those of Maimonides, but the whole tenor of his Introduction to the Milhamot makes it clear that he wrote his book primarily to improve upon Maimonides’ discussion in a certain number of areas. But in studying Maimonides to understand Gersonides it is not Maimonides’ own positions we must examine so much as Gersonides’ reading of Maimonides. Gersonides read Maimonides in the Hebrew translation of ibn Tibbon3 and although he quite evidently knew that Maimonides occasionally sought to obfuscate his text and perhaps hide his own true views,4 1

This is the burden of Maimonides’ discussion in the introduction to and first chapter of the second part of the Guide.

2

This is argued by Feldman in “Gersonides’ Proofs.” Aside from Touati, La pensée (pp. 161– 298), the only other recent studies of Gersonides’ account of creation are Feldman, “Platonic Themes,” and Rudavsky, “Philosophical Cosmology.”

3

On that translation, see Fraenkel, From Maimonides.

4

Not only does Maimonides himself draw attention to these intentional obfuscations (see

102

CHAPTER FOUR

he never makes any references to any esoteric teachings of Maimonides when analyzing the latter’s doctrines. In dealing with Maimonides and Gersonides on creation, therefore, I will in the first instance assume that Gersonides agrees with Maimonides unless he makes the disagreement between them explicit. In the second instance I will attempt to describe Maimonides as he was read and interpreted by Gersonides, without attempting to discover whether or not Gersonides’ reading was actually correct. A central concern in Maimonides’ Guide of the Perplexed, central not only in its importance but even in the place it occupies in the book’s structure,5 is the proof of God’s existence, unity, and incorporeality. Maimonides’ claims about the unity of God are particularly important, for it was Maimonides’ extreme insistence on God’s unity and absolute simplicity which led him to adopt his celebrated doctrine of negative attributes, the so-called via negativa.6 This conception of God, however, raises a problem. How can an absolutely simple God perform many diverse actions? Maimonides recognizes the problem and solves it by appealing to the idea of God’s will: If, however, such a state of affairs7 exists with respect to a thing acting by virtue of its nature, it exists all the more with respect to one who acts through will, and again all the more with respect to Him, may He be exalted, who is above every attributive qualification.8

An inanimate natural cause, such as fire, can produce diverse effects acting “by virtue of its nature.” That being so, a being which acts by will, and not simply by nature, Maimonides here informs the reader, can certainly produce Guide, I, Introduction), but Gersonides (Milhamot, Introduction, p. 8; Wars, p. 100) promises not to mislead his readers intentionally. His words there appear to be an explicit reaction to Maimonides. See the discussion in the Introduction above. 5

On the structure of the Guide of the Perplexed see Kellner, Science, ch. 7, and the studies cited there.

6

See Guide, I.51–60; for an accessible introduction to the main philosophical issues in Maimonides’ treatment of divine attributes, see Rynhold, Introduction, pp. 78-103 and the sources cited there.

7

I.e., one entity having many different effects, as is the case with fire, which cooks, burns, melts, etc.

8

Guide, I. 53, p. 120.

103

CREATIONS, MIRACLES, AND REVELATION

many diverse effects without a diversity of causes. This is easily understood in terms of human beings who often enough cause many diverse effects without a multiplicity of causes (squeezing one’s finger when it is wrapped around the trigger of a gun, for example, can produce many different effects). We cannot really ask what it means in terms of God, however, for, as we shall see, Maimonides holds that the term “will” applies to humans and God only in an absolutely equivocal way. We cannot ever know, therefore, how God’s will actually functions. We can say, however, that for Maimonides, one simple agent –God emphatically included– can produce many diverse effects by volition without thereby impugning its unity and simplicity.9 Maintaining, therefore, that God performs many actions without thereby suffering any diminished unity, Maimonides is now confronted with a new problem: does not the affirmation of the existence of a divine will introduce multiplicity into God? Not at all, according to Maimonides: he repeatedly asserts that God’s essence, will, and wisdom are all identical. Thus, at I.69 (p. 170), he writes: ...the order of all ends is all ultimately due to His will and wisdom, as to which it has been made clear, according to our opinion, that they are identical with His essence: His will and His volition or His wisdom not being things extraneous to His essence. I mean to say that they are not something other than His essence.

This analysis of God’s will and wisdom, which sees them as being identical with God’s essence, solves a fairly important exegetical problem. Gersonides nowhere analyzes Maimonides’ use of the term “will” with respect to God. But since God’s will and wisdom are identical for Maimonides (and Gersonides), Gersonides’ analysis of Maimonides’ use of the term ‘knowledge’ when applied to God should make it clear how he understands Maimonides’ use of the term ‘will’ when applied to God. Maimonides summarizes his position on God’s unity and will at the end of I.53 (pp. 122-123) where he points out that the various attributes predicated of God (life, power, will, knowledge, etc.) “have been thought of [only] in ref9

104

On this, see Manekin, “Divine Will.”

CHAPTER FOUR

erence to the diverse relations that may obtain between God, may He be exalted, and the things created by Him.” God is thus one, simple, and unchanging. That we attribute volition to God reflects the Deity’s relationship to the created world but involves no multiplicity in the divine essence. Maimonides uses this idea of God’s will perhaps most emphatically in his description of creation. In Guide, II.13 (p. 281) he describes what he calls the opinion of the Torah concerning creation: the world as a whole –I mean to say every existent other than God, may He be exalted– was brought into existence by God after having been purely and absolutely nonexistent, and that God, may He be exalted, had existed alone, and nothing else – neither an angel nor a sphere nor what subsists within a sphere. Afterwards, through His will and His volition, He brought into existence out of nothing all the beings as they are, time itself being one of the created things.10

Maimonides defends this opinion in the next several chapters of the Guide in the face of its rejection by the followers of Aristotle who maintain “that it is absurd that God would bring a thing into existence out of nothing,” (p. 282) since this is to say that God can do the impossible. Maimonides writes that Aristotle asserts –though he does not do so textually, but this is what his opinion comes to– that in his opinion it would be an impossibility that will should change in God or a new volition arise in Him; and that all that exists has been brought into existence, in the state in which it is at present, by God through His volition; but that it was not produced after having been in a state of nonexistence. He thinks that just as it is impossible that the deity should become nonexistent or that His essence should undergo a change, it is impossible that a volition should undergo a change in Him or a new will arise in Him. Accordingly it follows necessarily that this being as a whole has never ceased to be as it is at present and will be as it is in the future eternity (p. 284).11 10 According to this opinion, the world was created ex nihilo as a consequence of divine volition. Whether or not “the opinion of the Torah” concerning creation is also the opinion of Maimonides is a question debated by scholars (Seeskin, Origin). There can be no doubt, however, that Gersonides understood it to be Maimonides’ position. In Milhamot VI.i.2 (p. 294; Wars, p. 219) Gersonides explicitly attributes to Maimonides (“the excellent philosopher”) the opinion that the world was created by God from absolute nothingness. 11 On the question of the “future eternity” of the created cosmos in Maimonides’ thought, see

105

CREATIONS, MIRACLES, AND REVELATION

Maimonides’ philosophical arguments in defense of his position need not concern us here since we are more interested in Gersonides’ understanding of Maimonides than in arriving at an understanding of his own position as he himself conceived of it. We may therefore turn directly to an examination of Maimonides’ theological defense of his theory of volitional creation. He develops his ideas in Guide, II. 25, writing that the belief in eternity the way Aristotle sees it –that is the belief according to which the world exists in virtue of necessity, that no nature changes at all, and that the customary course of events cannot be modified with regard to anything– destroys the Law in its principle, necessarily gives the lie to every miracle, and reduces to inanity all the hopes and threats that the Law has held out (p. 328).

Maimonides here states that the denial of volitional creation has three unacceptable consequences: the destruction of the Torah, the falsification of miracles, and the impossibility of reward and punishment. On the surface, and that would seem to be the way in which Gersonides read him in this instance,12 Maimonides maintains here that the denial of volitional creation destroys the Torah since volitional creation demonstrates that God can act volitionally and the Torah is nothing other than the product and revelation of God’s volition. Further, since Torah from Heaven is a form of miracle, to deny miracles is to deny Torah from Heaven. In the Aristotelian world, entirely subject as it is to natural law, there is no room for miracles. Similarly, if the world exists by necessity, and God does not act volitionally, it makes no sense to say that God rewards those who act in accord with His will and punishes those who deviate from it. Maimonides further argues that to deny God’s volitional creation is to invite unanswerable questions about the purpose of God’s various activities, to which the different views of Feldman, “Universe” and Weiss, “End of the World.” Maimonides’ overt position is that once created, the world will never be destroyed. 12 As with the case of creation, it must be pointed out that Maimonides’ attitude towards miracles is hotly debated (Langermann, “Miracles”). There can be no doubt, however, that he says he accepts the reality of miracles here and that Gersonides did as well (Milhamot VI.ii. 9–12 and ch. 3 above) and that he connected the possibility of miracles to the creation of the world just as does Maimonides here (see below, note 15). It is certainly safe to assume, therefore, that Gersonides understood Maimonides to accept the reality of miracles.

106

CHAPTER FOUR

questions Maimonides simply answers: “He wanted it this way; or His wisdom required it this way” (p. 329). If we assume that the world proceeded necessarily from God, however, we must ask why it is not more “logical” than it is. We now seem to be faced with a problem. Maimonides needs a God possessed of will in order to guarantee the validity of the Torah. But the notion of will seems to involve that of change. Maimonides himself says that “the true reality and quiddity of will means: to will and not to will” (II.18, p. 301). That is, for God to act volitionally means for Him to will something at one moment but not at another. But Maimonides, like Aristotle, cannot admit that “volition should undergo a change in Him or a new will arise in Him” (II.13, p. 284). This is impossible for Maimonides to admit since he equates God’s will and essence. To allow for change in God’s will is to import change into God’s very essence. Maimonides raises this very problem at II.18, (p. 301). He also provides a solution for it: Somebody might object: All this is correct, but does not the supposition that God13 wishes at one time and does not wish at another time imply in itself a change? We shall reply to him, No, for the true reality and the quiddity of will means: to will and not to will. If the will in question belongs to a material being, so that some external end is sought thereby, then the will is subject to change because of impediments and supervening accidents. But as for a being separate from matter, its will, which does not exist in any respect for the sake of some other thing, is not subject to change, as we have explained. It shall be explained later on14 that it is only by equivocation that our will and that of a being separate from matter are both designated as “will,” for there is no likeness between the two wills.

God can thus will or not will. But if He wills, then, unlike that of a human being, His will never changes. While a person might be forced by impediments 13 Pines translates this as “one” offering “God” as an alternative translation in a note. 14 Maimonides is apparently referring to his discussion at Guide, III.20 where he argues that only a mere “community of terms” obtains between human “knowledge” and divine “knowledge.” He does not argue explicitly there that the same equivocation holds between human “will” and divine “will.” But since Maimonides equates God’s knowledge with His will the argument in III.20 can stand as the promised proof that “it is only by equivocation that our will and that of a being separate from matter are both designated as ‘will’ ...”

107

CREATIONS, MIRACLES, AND REVELATION

or supervening accidents to alter his will, the will of an immaterial being is not so subject to change. Thus, God’s will never changes. We see here that Maimonides admits that ordinarily willing does involve change. But this need not imply that the fact that God wills means that God changes, since the term ‘will’ when it is used of God does not mean the same thing as the term ‘will’ when it is used of people. In defending his position in this way Maimonides relies on his analysis of what we know about God’s knowledge, which may be summarized in the following fashion. Maimonides wanted to reconcile God’s knowledge of human individuals with the Aristotelian conception of God which allowed, among other things, for no new knowledge in God. He was also faced with the classic dilemma of affirming human freedom in the face of God’s omniscience. He solved both his problems, in effect, by affirming the mysterious nature of God: God knows human individuals, but we do not know how; God knows the future, but our freedom is not destroyed thereby and again we do not know how. We have seen that Maimonides equates divine will with divine knowledge. With regard to the latter Maimonides asserts that while God is omniscient it is still the case that “no new knowledge comes to Him in anyway; that His knowledge is neither multiple nor finite; that nothing from among all the beings is hidden from Him; and that his knowledge of them does not abolish their natures, for the possible remains as it was with the nature of possibility” (III. 20, p. 483). Similarly, and on the same grounds, Maimonides asserts that God created the world by an act of will without thereby having a new volition. We have shown why Maimonides needs the idea of volitional creation, the problem it raises, and his solution to the problem. The facts are important for an understanding of Gersonides’ approach to the issue of volitional creation. Like Maimonides, Gersonides cannot dispense with the idea of volitional creation and is thereby faced with the same problem which faced Maimonides: how to allow for God’s will without there by affirming change in God.15 Ger15 That Gersonides accepts the theological significance of volitional creation posited by Maimonides is shown by the fact that he writes (VI.ii.1, p. 419; Wars, p. 428): “If it was not necessary that we believe in miracles, it would be easy for us to explain what the Torah says regarding creation in accord with the opinion of the Philosopher.” That is to say, we have to adopt the theory of volitional creation in order to preserve the possibility of miracles. Gersonides further says that miracles are a form of generation “like creation” (VI.ii.9, p. 441;

108

CHAPTER FOUR

sonides, however, cannot solve the problem in the same way in which Maimonides does, although he actually seems to try to. But what works for Maimonides does not work for Gersonides. Gersonides devotes the sixth book of the Milhamot to the issue of creation. The book is divided into two parts. The first, comprising twenty-nine chapters, contains Gersonides’ refutation of Aristotle’s eternity hypothesis, his proofs that the world is created (but incorruptible)and his argument that God created the world, not ex nihilo, but from a pre-existing eternal matter. In the fourteen chapters of the second part of Book VI Gersonides deals with some of the more strictly religious problems raised by his theory of creation. He provides an exegesis of the first chapters of Genesis, paralleling his Bible commentary on the same text, in which he argues that the biblical account of creation must not be taken literally since it describes the logical, as opposed to temporal, sequence of creation.16 He closes this section, and the Milhamot as a whole, with an account of miracles. The specific details of Gersonides’ refutation of Aristotle and of his positive account of creation are extremely technical and need not be described in this context. It is important, however, to take careful note of his claim that God’s creation is volitional. In Milhamot, VI.i.8, Gersonides argues that the heavens were created. He closes the chapter with the following passage: It is appropriate that God’s activity be more wonderful and more exalted that the activity of other agents, who are His effects, just as His level of being is higher than theirs beyond measure. It is therefore appropriate that their activity be defined and ordered, without their being able to change that order, as is the case with government officers who are under the first head [of state].17 [It

Wars, p. 170). It should also be pointed out that if Gersonides did not accept the linkage between volitional creation and miracles there would seem to be no other reason to insist on volitional creation, with all its attendant difficulties. Furthermore, since Gersonides makes his disagreements with Maimonides clear, at least in the Milhamot, it is reasonable to assume that if he disagreed with Maimonides he would have said so. Last, the very fact that Gersonides juxtaposes his discussions of volitional creation and miracles in Treatise VI of the Milhamot also indicates that they are significantly related. Gersonides affirms the linkage between creation and miracles at the beginningof his Commentary on Genesis, p. 9a/20/31. 16 See Charles Touati, “La lumière”. 17 Unlike God, Whose activity is not defined and ordered.

109

CREATIONS, MIRACLES, AND REVELATION

is further appropriate that] God’s activity accords with what His will decrees, as is the case with a first head of state who orders matter of state as he wills. The matter being so, that which is proved by the previous argument, that the heavens are created, shows that they are created in the way in which [things] are created by choice and will and not in the way in which things are created in nature.18 We will investigate how it is possible to ascribe this matter to God in a way such that objections will not be raised, after we have completed our investigation of the eternity of the world and its creation in all the respects that are possible for us (p. 320; Wars, pp. 256-257).

Gersonides does not explain exactly how this volitional creation came about, beyond asserting in a number of places that the world came into being “immediately upon God’s willing it.”19 But he does have more to say about it, at least obliquely, in the chapters following the passage just quoted, in which he continues to describe and support his views on creation. In chapter eighteen, having concluded the exposition of his theory, he begins to examine and deal with problems raised by it. By way of fulfilling the promise made at the end of the passage just quoted from chapter eight, Gersonides deals with an objection raised by the issue of volitional creation. It is the ninth and last objection dealt within the chapter and he phrases it as follows: The ninth objection that the questioner will ask is: “What is it that brought the agent20 to will this generation at this time, [since] He did not will it before this? Did He have some new knowledge that He did not have before this? Or, did He need it now, but not before this? Or, was there something restraining Him which was removed?” (p. 371; Wars, p. 335).21

This is an argument against the creation hypothesis, arguing that creation is impossible since there is no reason why God should create at one time rather than another. Gersonides asserts that the solution to this objection is not difficult to find: 18 I.e., by necessity. 19 See Milhamot, VI.ii.8, pp. 429 and 438; Wars, p. 449 and p. 462. 20 I.e., God. 21 Further on this, see Wolfson, Spinoza, pp. 103-104.

110

CHAPTER FOUR

This is so, since, if God had created the world for some advantage to Himself, this doubt would have some aspects of plausibility. But, since it has been made clear that God had no advantage from His creation,22 but [did] it rather in accord with His goodness and grace, it is therefore attributable to His will alone (p. 377; Wars, p. 342).

This reply, which, on the face of it, might not seem to answer the question at hand at all, depends upon and is clarified by a passage in the Guide. Maimonides takes cognizance of the same problem we are dealing with here (phrasing it explicitly in terms of an argument that the world must be eternal since there is no reason why God should have made it at one time rather than another) and writes in response (II.18, pp. 300–301): Know that every agent endowed with will, who performs his acts for the sake of something, must of necessity act at a certain time and not act at another time because of impediments or supervening accidents.... It has thus become clear that supervening accidents may change the will and that impediments may oppose the will in such away that it is not executed. All this, however, only occurs when acts are in the service of something that is external to the essence of the will. If, however, the act has no purpose whatever except to be consequent upon the will, that will has no need of incentives. And one who wills is not obliged, even if there are no impediments, to act always. For there is no external end for the sake of which he acts and that would render it necessary to act whenever there are no impediments preventing the attainment of the end. For in the case envisaged, the act is consequent upon the will alone.

Maimonides is arguing here that acts of volition only occur when they are directed to something outside of the willing agent. When, however, the willing agent is not seeking to realize some end external to himself, he then can act by volition without having separate acts of will. The question of why God created when He did is no question since it presupposes that God acted for some external end. That, however, is not the case.23 22 I.e., He did not do it for any end external to Himself. 23 Maimonides’ account of God’s will is exactly parallel to his account of God’s knowledge. Just as God can know us in our particularity without thereby undergoing change, God can also create the world and perform miracles (pre-eminently the miracle of revelation) by volition

111

CREATIONS, MIRACLES, AND REVELATION

With this passage as background it is now easier to understand Gersonides’ response to the ninth objection. He is arguing that the question presupposes that God’s creative work is motivated by something outside of God (that which “brought the agent to will this generation at this time”), while the true nature of God’s will is that it is motivated by nothing outside of itself. The question is simply based on a false assumption. Gersonides continues his answer to the ninth objection as follows: Somebody might object: “In that God’s existence is uniform,24 it is necessary that this should be the case with His will. If we assume that at one time He wills and at another time He does not will it necessarily involves some change in God Himself.” We would say to him that the nature of the material principle25 necessitates that the good existing in it have a temporal beginning, since this good was necessarily arranged in it by something other than itself, as was explained above. From this it follows necessarily that the world was created; this being so, it is clear that the existence of the good in this material principle is from God. [The fact that the good] was not always found in it is due to the deficient nature of this principle which necessitated that the existence of good in it be created. Otherwise the good would be in it without the work of an agent, as was explained, and this is false, as we explained. This being so, it is necessary that the world enter existence at some time [or other]. For this reason one cannot pose the question, “Why did not God create it26 before this?”27 For if He had made it before this by any measure of time, the same question could be asked. Now, just as the ability simultaneously to create two contraries in one thing is not attributed to God, since the nature of the recipient would prevent Him from doing this, [so too] the ability always to put good in the body from which the world was generated is not attributed to God, since the deficiency in the nature of that body itself necessitates that the good in it be created. We will

without thereby undergoing change. It is beyond our powers to understand how this is possible. 24 I.e., immutable. 25 Out of which the world was created. 26 I.e., the world. 27 I.e., the time of creation.

112

CHAPTER FOUR

broaden this inquiry more when we investigate the arguments with which the Philosopher demonstrated the eternity of the world (p. 377; Wars, p. 342).

Gersonides continues his answer to the ninth objection, we see, by raising a new question, concerning change in God. This is a problem for Gersonides because he categorically denies that God can “change His mind,” as it were, having new instances of willing and knowledge. He writes: “the claim that God has new volitions or knowledge is absolutely false.”28 Gersonides rejects this possibility because his Aristotelian conception of God, a conception he shared with Maimonides and the other Aristotelians, made any change in God a sign of deficiency. God’s one activity is knowing; according to Gersonides, the object of His knowledge is only Himself, one and unchanging. The question, which Gersonides raised in his answer to the ninth objection, may be phrased as follows: How can God create the world by an act of will without thereby having a new volition? It is hardly surprising that Gersonides raises this question in this context: he is following the argument as developed by Maimonides in the Guide at II.18. Maimonides, we have seen, raised the question of why God created the world when He did and answers it by appealing to God’s unconditioned will. Gersonides proceeds in exactly the same way. Maimonides next raises the issue of change in God. Gersonides does also; indeed, Gersonides uses the very same words as does Maimonides (in the Hebrew of ibn Tibbon) to introduce the question: “im yomar omer” (“somebody might object”). Maimonides phrases the question in the following words: “Somebody might object: All this is correct, but does not the supposition that God29 wishes at one time and does not wish at another time imply in itself a change?” (p. 301). Now we find something truly curious. Gersonides goes on, as we have seen, to present a reply to this question. But the reply is no reply at all! Indeed, it is an excellent answer to the question posed in the ninth objection (about why God created when He did) but no answer to the question –about change in God– which Gersonides purports to be answering. Gersonides shows, supplementing the answer already supplied, that it makes no sense to ask why God chose to 28 Milhamot, VI.ii.10, p. 447; Wars, p. 478. 29 Pines translates this as “one” offering “God” as an alternative translation in a note.

113

CREATIONS, MIRACLES, AND REVELATION

create the world exactly when He did. But the answer wholly fails to address the problem of change in God implied by the doctrine of volitional creation. The situation is yet more curious: Gersonides says here in VI.i.18, that he will “broaden” the inquiry in a subsequent chapter. He promises to return to it in his investigation of the arguments adduced by Aristotle in defense of the eternity hypothesis. But the promise remains unfulfilled. Indeed, in a later chapter, in the middle of his inquiry into Aristotle, he asserts that the problem relating to change in God was solved in chapter eighteen! In chapter twentyfour, in response to an argument of Aristotle’s based on the nature of motion, he asserts: …and with respect to that which the Philosopher argued in refutation of this claim, that when the agent acts at one time and does not act at another, some change necessarily occurs in him, on account of which he arouses himself to do this activity and did not arouse himself to do it earlier, we have already given an answer in the eighteenth chapter of this treatise (p. 394; Wars, p. 370).

But, as we have just seen, Gersonides does not seem to provide an answer to this question in chapter eighteen. We are now faced with an obvious question. We saw above that Maimonides was confronted with the same problem which troubled Gersonides. Maimonides presents a straightforward answer to the question: he appeals to the absolutely equivocal nature of the term ‘will’ as it applies to God and man. Why does not Gersonides solve the problem in the same way? Gersonides cannot adopt Maimonides’ solution to the problem of new volition in God since it depends upon the equation of God’s will with His knowledge, which latter is such that no analogies can be drawn between it and human knowledge. This allows Maimonides to say that God creates (and can author miracles) by an act of will but that this involves no new volition in Him, in a way which we simply cannot hope ever to understand. We must now turn to a brief consideration of Gersonides’ response to this position. Gersonides rejects Maimonides’ claim that predicates affirmed of both God and man are so affirmed in terms of absolute equivocation.30 But, then, how 30 Indeed, Gersonides maintains that Maimonides adopted this position only because of the “pressure” of the Torah. See Milhamot, III.3, p. 135; Wars, p. 111. See above, ch. 2, at note 33.

114

CHAPTER FOUR

are such terms used? Gersonides says that it is impossible that such terms be affirmed of God and man univocally, that is, with no equivocation at all. He therefore adopts a middle ground, saying that in one sense they are equivocal and in another sense not. They are equivocal in the sense that they do not mean exactly the same thing, they are not wholly equivocal in the sense that the meanings are related. They are related “by priority and posteriority.” The term ‘knowledge’ –to adopt the example used by Gersonides himself– is affirmed of God “by priority” (be-kodem) while it is affirmed of human beings “by posteriority” (be-ihur). That is to say, ‘knowledge’ is used of God in a primary sense and of human beings in a derivative sense. Human knowledge is, furthermore, caused by God’s knowledge; the difference between the two is that God’s knowledge is vastly more perfect than ours.31 It is clear, then, that for Gersonides human knowledge is not wholly and absolutely unlike God’s knowledge, as Maimonides maintained. God’s knowledge is the cause of human knowledge and is immensely superior to it: in the final analysis those entities which are the only possible objects of human knowledge are indirect copies, as it were, of the entities (or actually, entity) which forms God’s knowledge. As with knowledge, so it is with all other essential attributes: they may be predicated of God and human beings only “by priority and by posteriority.”32 The upshot of all this is that Gersonides cannot avail himself of the Maimonidean solution to the problem of volitional creation. That solution depends upon Maimonides’ analysis of essential attributes. It is possible for him to say that God wills creation (and other miracles, notably Torah from Heaven) without having acts of volition and without undergoing change, because God’s will is wholly different from ours. Human beings cannot will different things without having distinct acts of volition and without undergoing change but God can. How, it is impossible to say. Gersonides, however, rejects Maimonides’ analysis of essential attributes, insists that there must remain some community of meaning between terms predicated of both man and God, and 31 Milhamot, III.3, p. 132; Wars, p. 107-108. This form of equivocation, called pros hen equivocation in Greek, is discussed by Aristotle in the Metaphysics Book Kappa, 3, 1060b36– 1061a7 and in the Categories, 1, 1a1–6. See Samuelson, God’s Knowledge, pp. 28-33 and 7779. 32 Milhamot, III.3, pp. 133 and 137; Wars, p. 109 and p. 115.

115

CREATIONS, MIRACLES, AND REVELATION

maintains that what is impossible for one cannot be possible for the other.33 How, then, can God will creation (and miracles) without undergoing change? It would seem that Gersonides has backed himself into an impossible situation. He presents the problem in the clearest possible terms, but does not seem to be able to find a solution for it. Even if it be asserted that Gersonides’ analysis of the term ‘will’ as equivocal by priority and posteriority allows him to maintain that God created the world with a timeless “act” of will, without thereby under going change, it fails to solve what might be called the theological problem of creation.34 I refer to the need, shared by Maimonides and Gersonides, to allow for God’s miraculous intervention in history. It will be recalled that both Maimonides and Gersonides assert that they must maintain that God created the world volitionally in order to guarantee the possibility of God’s acting in history, particularly in connection with the miracle of revelation, as well as in connection with other miracles. Maimonides’ account of essential attributes enables him to maintain God’s unchanging character on the one hand and the (at least theoretical) possibility of His specific intervention in history and nature on the other hand. 33 Milhamot, III.2, especially pp. 129-131; Wars, pp. 102-103; III.3, pp. 133-134 and p. 135; Wars, p. 107-109. 34 It might be suggested that this is what Gersonides was trying to do in his answer to the ninth objection (presented above). God’s will, Gersonides can be understood as saying, is free in its sheer arbitrariness. It is totally unconditioned. It never undergoes any kind of change since, to paraphrase Maimonides (Guide II.18. pp, 300–301), a will which acts for no purpose outside of itself has no need of incentives. There thus can be no “new” volitions in God for acts of volition achieve nothing for the will that has the volition, the latter being perfect and without any needs whatsoever. Understanding His will in this way, we can say that God can create the world by a timeless act of will, without thereby undergoing change. The only change that takes place is in the primordial matter, which is transformed from sheer imperfection to something having order and a certain degree of perfection. On this interpretation of Gersonides, we can now see the parallelism which obtains between his accounts of God’s knowledge and God’s will. God’s knowledge is largely distinguished from human knowledge by virtue of the fact that the object of God’s knowledge is not distinct from God: God’s knowledge has no object external to Himself. With God, the knowing agent, the act of knowledge, and the object of knowledge are all one and the same. Similarly, God’s will has no object external to Himself. Moreover, God’s intention to act and His act itself are not distinguished as they are in human beings. God, His will, and His knowledge, are all one. Even if this interpretation is correct, it does not solve Gersonides’ problems, as will become immediately evident below. Furthermore, while this account might make sense in the context of a discussion of God’s knowledge, in the context of the divine will it seems to be no less an appeal to “mystery” than is Maimonides’ account.

116

CHAPTER FOUR

Gersonides’ account, in contrast to this, may make it possible for him to assert that God creates the world volitionally, but at the expense of draining it of all “theological” utility to him, since it does not allow him to go on to say that God can, even theoretically, actually intervene in history and nature. It will be immediately objected that Gersonides’ theory of miracles is such that even his account of God’s volition allows for them. In order to understand the force of this objection it is necessary to revisit Gersonides’ general theory of miracles, as set forth in Milhamot, VI.ii.9-14.35 Reducing his theory of miracles to its barest components we may say that for Gersonides miracles are, minimally, unusual, wonderful events having great religious significance. That miracles are wonderful events almost goes without saying; the idea is expressed in one of the terms used by Gersonides (and others) to denote ‘miracle’, namely ‘nifla’ (wonder). By saying that these wonderful events have great religious significance I mean that Gersonides understands miracles to come about for one purpose only: to guide human beings to true belief. Such true belief involves actualization of one’s potential intellect which, in turn, is the key to the only form of salvation there is, cleaving36 to the Active Intellect after death. That Gersonides understands this to be the purpose of miracles is evidenced by the question he asked of the traditional interpretation of the miracle at Gibeon (Joshua 10): This stopping of the sun –if it occurred– would have no particular advantage for Israel or others. This is so because the Israelites believed in prophecy at that time, and we have not found that any of the other nations tried to turn to God on account of this demonstration (Milhamot VI.ii.12, p. 458; Wars, p. 494).

The idea is again expressed in the terminology of the day: miracles are otot and mofetim (signs and demonstrations) that lead to true belief. Gersonides also maintains that it is the Active Intellect, not God, which is the agent of miracles.37 This being so, miracles must occur in accord with some defined law and must be governed by some general ordering. Otherwise, the 35 See ch. 3 above and ch. 13 below. 36 By “cleaving” I do not mean “identification with.” See Feldman, “Gersonides on Conjunction.” 37 Gersonides argues that the Active Intellect is the agent of miracles in Milhamot VI.ii.10.

117

CREATIONS, MIRACLES, AND REVELATION

Active Intellect could not know about them. Thus there must be what may be called a “natural law of miracles.”38 One may legitimately wonder how this natural law of miracles actually functions. Gersonides provides no answer to this question. But if we take his position on its own terms, no answer to this question is really necessary. Miracles are not non-natural events, interruptions in the accustomed order of nature. They are, rather, parts of that very order. What sets miracles apart from other natural events is not the nature of the event itself but its prediction. By that I mean to say that a prophet by virtue of his superior understanding of the laws governing the sublunar world can predict when some anomalous natural event will occur. He can use that prediction to bolster the faith of his followers. The splitting of the Red Sea, for example, was miraculous because Moses predicted it and used it to teach his followers truth. Had Moses not predicted it and used it in this fashion, the splitting of the Red Sea would have taken place but it would not have been a miracle. There is, thus, no specific answer to the question of how miracles occur, since they occur like every other law-governed natural event. They are just usually more spectacular than most. It is easy to see how this theory of miracles fits into Gersonides’ overall philosophical and theological structure. By defining miracles in this fashion he preserves their reality without being forced to impute new knowledge, volition, or activity to God. Nor is he forced to assert that the most perfect possible natural order, that which was ordained at creation, needs or is susceptible to non-natural change. Thus, it would seem that Gersonides’ theory of miracles meshes perfectly with his account of volitional creation: the natural law of miracles is a product of God’s volitional “activity” at creation. This being so, our criticism of Gersonides above, that his description of volitional creation does not guarantee miracles, would seem to be off the mark. But this objection is itself open to a serious counter objection. Gersonides’ theory of miracles demands an entirely naturalistic account of revelation, one which does not call for a specific act of divine will at the time of revelation and one which can thus be subsumed under the “natural law of miracles.” Gersonides, however, is forced to retreat from a wholly naturalistic approach to 38 I adopt this phrase from Guttmann, Philosophies, p. 248.

118

CHAPTER FOUR

revelation in order to preserve the immutability of the Torah. He claims that revelation is a miraculous event; but, as we shall see, he needs a stronger kind of miracle than his theory can actually give him. Defending the immutability of the Torah and the uniqueness of Moses, he writes: There is no other who is equal to Moses in this matter. For his Torah prophecy is given in a wonderful way [ke-minhag hanifla’ot]. No other prophet qua prophet has this ability except for a miracle [pele]. For God has made it clear that it is not His will either to make another Torah, not to add to or detract from this present Torah ever.39

I do not think that Gersonides can, however, actually defend the miraculous nature of Mosaic prophecy on his own account of miracles. There are, it seems, three ways in which the uniqueness and immutability of Mosaic prophecy can be understood as miraculous. None of these, however, accord with Gersonides’ theory of miracles. First, it might be thought that any other prophet who achieved Moses’ rank would miraculously be kept from prophesying. But that would make miracles into non-natural events and would demand that God (or the Active Intellect) know particulars as particulars. Second, it might be asserted that Moses was specifically and miraculously chosen to bring the revelation. This is Maimonides’ position; Gersonides cannot accept it for the reason that it would seem to involve, again, knowledge of particulars on the part of God or the Active Intellect. Third, it might be asserted that it is written in the “natural law of miracles,” as it were, that only once in human history would anyone man combine all the qualities needed to bring revelation. That man turned out to be Moses. This would accord with Gersonides’ general position that miracles are extraordinary natural events which are predicted by prophets. Prophecy is a natural event; Mosaic prophecy is simply a spectacular (and because predicted by a prophet – Moses – miraculous) example of this natural phenomenon. But this description of the miracle of Mosaic prophecy on Gersonidean terms is ultimately satisfactory since it involves a number of problems itself. First, there would have to be a natural law governing one, unique event. That 39 Commentary to Deuteronomy p. 248a/351. See ch. 2 above.

119

CREATIONS, MIRACLES, AND REVELATION

is certainly strange. Second, either Moses was predetermined to actualize his capabilities to the extent that he did or he was not so predetermined. In the first case Moses loses his freedom and in the second revelation becomes an accidental event, one that might not have occurred. Neither alternative is acceptable for Gersonides. We may now revert to the question of volitional creation. Gersonides, as we saw above, affirms volitional creation in order to make miracles possible. Given that according to Gersonides’ theory miracles do not involve specific acts of divine volition, but are simply spectacular natural, (i.e., naturally explicable) events, this makes excellent sense; Gersonides’ description of volitional creation is sufficient to account for miracles as well. But the issue of revelation raises a serious problem for Gersonides. He insists upon the miraculous character of Mosaic prophecy. But, as we have just seen, the miracles of Mosaic prophecy cannot be explained in terms of Gersonides’ general theory of miracles. In order to make the miracles of Mosaic prophecy possible, therefore, volitional creation must be such as to guarantee the possibility of specific acts of divine intervention at specific points in history, not simply the working out of some natural law. The miracle of Mosaic prophecy is more than the product of God’s one, unchanging act of will but demands a specific divine volition. This Gersonides cannot provide. Thus, in the final analysis, it would seem that Gersonides cannot concurrently and consistently maintain his theory of volitional creation and protect the immutability of the Torah, both of which he wants and claims to affirm. He simply cannot dance at both weddings simultaneously.

120

CHAPTER FIVE Song of Songs and Gersonides’ World

S

ong of Songs, traditionally attributed to King Solomon, is the first of the so-called “five scrolls” (hamesh megillot) and is named after its opening words. The book consists of a series of poems in which two lovers express the delight they find in each other and anguish at their separation. The lovers describe each other in graphic terms of passion and physical desire. The book is unique in the biblical canon not only for what is in it but also for what is not in it. Like the Scroll of Esther, God is nowhere mentioned in Song of Songs; but unlike Esther, God is not even lurking in the background and no moral or religious lesson is easily drawn from the poems in Song of Songs, or even hinted at by them. The book contains no prophecy, no historical narratives, no wisdom, no prayers, and certainly no mizvot (commandments). Not only is God absent from Song of Songs, but so is Israel; indeed the book is innocent of theological concerns altogether. If ever a biblical text “cried out” to be interpreted allegorically, Song of Songs is it. Indeed, the Talmud records the opinion that it is forbidden to all intents and purposes to take the book literally, in terms of its peshat, the straightforward contextual meaning.1 The Rabbis of the Mishnah and the Talmud understood the book as describing God’s love for the People of Israel and Israel’s reciprocal love for God as evidenced through Jewish history. The Targum carries this view through to the future, seeing in Song of Songs an expression of Jewish eschatology as well. Kabbalistic texts interpret Song of Songs mystically, as dealing with the inter-relationships of the sefirot. None of these solutions, however, were available to medieval Jewish philosophers, especially those in the Aristotelian tradition, whose vision of Judaism was not only relatively ascetic, but also abstract, austere, and intellectualist 1

See Sanhedrin 111a.

121

SONG OF SONGS AND GERSONIDES’ WORLD

in the extreme. Song of Songs presented two kinds of problems for them, the first having to do with the explicit sexuality of the text itself,2 the second with the accepted allegorical interpretations of the text, which heavily anthropomorphized God. In the summer of 1325, at the age of 37, Gersonides completed his commentary on Song of Songs.3 This was only the second of the many biblical commentaries which he composed, the first being his lengthy commentary on Job, completed the year before.4 He had already written a large number of works, beginning with his Wars of the Lord, parts of which were completed in 1317, continuing through independent works on logic, mathematics, and astronomy, and culminating in a long series of super-commentaries on many of the commentaries of Averroes on Aristotle. In 1325, Gersonides completed his first biblical commentary, on the book of Job. Thereafter, biblical commentaries became a regular part of his work, the second, on Song of Songs, appearing only six months after the first. Indeed, if in his first 37 years Gersonides wrote almost exclusively what we today would call philosophical and scientific works, the last 19 years of his 1ife were devoted almost exclusively to what can be called more narrowly Jewish works. With the admittedly notable exceptions of a super commentary on Averroes on the Metaphysics, Wars of the Lord, V, and some smaller works, all of his later productions involved commenting on the Bible or the Talmud. In this chapter I will describe Gersonides’ commentary on Song of Songs and then address myself to the related questions of (a) why he wrote the commentary and (b) to whom it was addressed.5 Examination of these issues will help us better to understand the cultural milieu which formed the backdrop for Gersonides’ philosophical investigations and his reasons for committing the results to writing. In so doing I am in effect calling for a new approach to the study of Gersonides, one which goes beyond the 2

These philosophers considered the sense of touch in general and sex in particular to be repulsive and animal-like, the very antithesis of our true human nature. See, for example, Maimonides’ Guide of the Perplexed III.8 and Kraemer, “Naturalism,” p. 67.

3

At the end of his commentary (p. 94), Gersonides writes that he completed it at the end of Tammuz, 5085. The 29th of Tammuz that year corresponded to July 11, 1325.

4

On the Job commentary, see ch. 1 above.

5

Note should be taken of the fact that much of what I say here is true also of Gersonides’ commentary on Ecclesiastes. See Ruth Ben-Meir, “Gersonides’ Commentary on Ecclesiastes.”

122

CHAPTER FIVE

undeniably crucial stage of reading him against the backdrop of his literary sources to the attempt to tease out of his writings hints and indications about the cultural, social, religious and even political contexts which could not but have influenced the way he studied and wrote. Gersonides prefaces his commentary to Song of Songs with an introduction (haza‘ah) which may be divided into three parts. The first consists of an apologia in which Gersonides explains why he wrote the commentary. It is simply the case, he claims, that no previous commentary is adequate since all of the commentaries with which he is familiar follow the midrashic approach of the Talmudic rabbis.6 Gersonides hastens to assure us that midrashim are fine in and of themselves –he even promises to write a book devoted to them7– but 6

There are two known philosophic commentaries on Song of Songs which predate that of Gersonides. The first is by Joseph ben Judah ben Jacob ibn Aknin, Hilgalut ha-Sodot. On ibn Aknin, a contemporary of Maimonides, but not the Joseph ben Judah to whom he addressed the Guide, and on his commentary to Song of Songs, see Halkin, “Ibn Aknin’s Commentary.” The second philosophic commmentary on Song of Songs is by Moses ibn Tibbon and was published in Lyck in 1874 under the title Perush al Shir ha-Shirim. On this commentary, see ch. 11 below. While there are definite similarities between these two commentaries and that of Gersonides, detailed examination of the three betrays no literary connections and there is no reason to doubt Gersonides’ assertion that his commentary is indebted to no previous ones. In the case of ibn Aknin this is hardly surprising, since he wrote his commentary in Arabic in North Africa. It was not translated into Hebrew in the Middle Ages and it would have been surprising had it reached Provence in time for Gersonides to have been aware of it. That Gersonides was unfamiliar with the commentary of Moses ibn Tibbon, who flourished in the generation before Gersonides and who lived in reasonably close physical proximity to him, is more surprising; I address this issue in ch. 11 below. In addition to the two full commentaries of ibn Aknin and ibn Tibbon, Joseph ibn Kaspi (b. 1279/80) wrote a very short introduction to Song of Songs based on Maimonides’ comments in Guide III.51, and reads the text as an allegorical account of the union between the active intellect and the material intellect, just as Gersonides and ibn Tibbon do. Another contemporary of Gersonides, Immanuel ben Solomon of Rome (c. 1261-1328) wrote a commentary on Song of Songs based on the commentary of Moses ibn Tibbon. On both these commentaries, see the introduction to my translation of Gersonides on Song of Songs. Note should be taken of the fact that Abraham ibn Ezra, in the introduction to his commentary to Song of Songs, says that “the philosophers [anshei ha-mehkar] have interpreted this book as dealing with universal matter, and the way in which the supernal soul joins with the body...”. I do not know to whom he is referring, but from his comment we may infer that at least one philosophically oriented commentary on Song of Songs was composed before the first half of the twelfth century, when ibn Ezra flourished.

7

In this, Gersonides repeats a promise made by Maimonides. So far as is known, Gersonides never kept his promise, just as Maimonides never kept his. In his commentary to the tenth chapter of Mishnah Sanhedrin (Perek Helek) Maimonides wrote: “I will write a book in which I will collect all the derashot found in the Talmud and other places and will clarify and explain them with an explanation which matches the truth...” (Commentary on the Mishnah,

123

SONG OF SONGS AND GERSONIDES’ WORLD

they ought not to be taken as attempts to explicate the intended meaning of the text. Gersonides emphasizes the importance of distinguishing between the straightforward explication of a text and the erection of midrashic structures on the text. Failure to make this distinction can only result in the reader’s despising the text, both because of the prolixity which this combined approach involved and because it involves the confusion of substantial and accidental matters. It is his intention, Gersonides announces, “to write what we understand of this scroll without mixing with it other things which vary from the author’s intention” (p. 3). He will not attempt to interpret the rabbinic midrashim on Song of Songs since they are deep and the task of interpreting the text itself is burden enough. Furthermore, the proper interpretation of the text is a prerequisite for understanding the midrashim. The bulk of the introduction is given over to a discussion, in very basic terms, of various epistemological issues. This discussion is made necessary by the fact that Gersonides here defines the ultimate felicity of human beings as “cognizing and knowing God” so far as one is able (p. 4). Song of Songs, it will turn out, is an attempt both to describe the stages of this cognition and to guide the individual seeking ultimate felicity by its achievement. How do we cognize and know God so far as we are able? This is achieved, Gersonides informs us, through the observation of the order and harmony evident in all existent beings. Since an agent’s activity indicates something about the agent, detailed examination of the world demonstrates aspects of God’s wisdom.8 This being the case, the question of how we know becomes crucial. Although Gersonides does not allude to this explicitly, the reason for Kafih ed., vol. IV, p. 140). Some thirty years later, in his Guide of the Perplexed, Maimonides wrote: “We had promised in the Commentary on the Mishnah that we would explain strange subjects in the ‘Book of Prophecy’ and the ‘Book of Correspondence’ – the latter being a book in which we promised to explain all the difficult passages in the Midrashim where the external sense manifestly contradicts the truth and departs from the intelligible. They are all parables. However, when, many years ago, we began these books and composed a part of them, our beginning to explain matters in this way did not commend itself to us...”. See Maimonides, Guide of the Perplexed, Introduction, p. 9. 8

124

This notion that one can gain some knowledge of God through an examination of nature has a long history in medieval Jewish thought. See, for an early example, Bahya’s Duties of the Heart, Treatise II and for an example closer to Gersonides’ time, S. Harvey, Falaquera’s ‘Epistle of the Debate’, p. 40. Compare Maimonides’ “Laws of the Foundations of the Torah,” II.1 and IV.12.

CHAPTER FIVE

this is evident: unless we know how to know, so to speak, we will never achieve cognition of God so far as we are able and will thus never achieve ultimate human felicity. Having established the importance of learning, Gersonides launches into a detailed account of how it is done. This is, to the best of my knowledge, the most detailed discussion in Gersonides’ writings of how we form concepts based upon our observations of the world around us. After describing the techniques by which we learn, Gersonides informs us that even “knowing how to know,” so to speak, is no guarantee for successful knowing. Learning is so difficult a process that the achievement of human felicity, based as it is on learning, is very difficult to achieve. This is so for two reasons: first, it is extraordinarily difficult properly to cognize the existent beings of the world and, second, there are many impediments which obstruct us in our attempts to achieve this cognition. Gersonides details eight separate reasons for the aforementioned difficulty in properly cognizing the existent beings of this world. Because cognition of the world (which is the prerequisite for the ultimate felicity, cognition of God to the greatest extent possible) is so difficult, the Torah guides us to it in the proper way.9 Gersonides distinguishes between two levels of guidance in the Torah. The first deals with ethics (without which cognitive perfection is impossible), is geared to the masses, and is thus taught by the Torah publicly. The second, which deals with speculative matters, is aimed at scholars;10 it is kept secret from the masses and conveys that information 9

On the relation between Torah and philosophy in Gersonides’ thought see his well-known comment in the Introduction to the Milhamot (p. 6): “The reader should not think that it is the Torah which has stimulated us to verify what shall be verified in this book, [whereas in reality] the truth itself is something different. It is evident, as Maimonides (may his memory be blessed) has said, that we must believe what reason has determined to be true. If the literal sense of the Torah differs from reason, then it is necessary to interpret those passages in accordance with the demands of reason” (Wars, p. 98). Gersonides returns to this subject in Milhamot I.14 (p. 91): “...we have not assented to the view that our reason has suggested without determining its compatibility with our Torah. For adherence to reason is not permitted if it contradicts religious faith: indeed, if there is such [a contradiction], it is necessary to attribute this lack of agreement to our inadequacy” (Wars, p. 226); i.e., there can be no contradiction in fact between reason and Torah. See also Milhamot VI.ii.1, p. 419 (Wars, p. 428). Further on the relation between Torah and philosophy in Gersonides, see my Introduction above, and Staub, Creation, pp. 81, 84-85, and 148-153, and Samuelson, “Philosophic and Religious Authority.”

10 Gersonides’ comments here call to mind the following passage in the Guide: “The Law as a

125

SONG OF SONGS AND GERSONIDES’ WORLD

required by scholars seeking their own perfection: information concerning those speculative roots with which the scholar typically has great difficulty and information concerning those issues about which mistakes are particularly dangerous since they distance an individual from perfection. The narratives and commandments of the Torah generally hint at such information, but there is only one text in the whole Bible which deals exclusively with it – Song of Songs. Since, unlike the rest of the Bible, Song of Songs is meant to guide only selected individuals to their felicity, its apparent meaning was not made useful to the masses. This, apparently, is Gersonides’ solution to the problem of how a text like Song of Songs, with its outward meaning of frank carnality, came to be included in the Bible. Having brought us this far, Gersonides now shows how the structure of Song of Songs reflects its intent. The main topics dealt with in the book are the following: (a) the overcoming of those impediments to cognition (and thus to felicity) related to moral behavior; (b) the overcoming of those impediments caused by failure to distinguish between truth and falsity; (c) the need to engage in speculation according to the proper order; (d) the division of the sciences (mathematics, physics, metaphysics) and how nature reflects that division; (e) characteristics of these types of sciences. The overall structure of the book now clear, Gersonides provides us with a detailed table of contents. When the intent of its author is properly understood, Song of Songs is seen to fall into the following sections: 1. Introductory material concerning the book, its name, its author, his position, the book’s form of exposition, its subject matter, and its purpose;11 refutations of those objections which throw doubt upon the possibility of achieving felicity (1:1-8) whole aims at two things: the welfare of the soul and the welfare of the body... Know that as between these two aims, one is indubitably greater in nobility, namely, the welfare of the soul –I mean the procuring of correct opinion– while the second aim –I mean the welfare of the body– is prior in nature and time. This latter aim consists in the governance of the city and the well-being of the states of all its people according to their capacity” (III. 27, p. 510). 11 In imputing to Solomon the intention systematically to introduce Song of Songs in this manner Gersonides may have been following in the footsteps of al-Farabi and Averroes, who thought highly of such introductions. See p. 55 in S. Harvey, “Hebrew Translation.” This furthermore reflects Gersonides’ own behavior. He closes his Introduction to the Milhamot (p. 10) thus: “We have here explained the purpose and utility of this book, the meaning of its title, its order, the necessary arrangement of its parts, and its value” (Wars, p. 104).

126

CHAPTER FIVE

1. The necessity of overcoming impediments relating to moral imperfection (1:9-2:7). 2. The necessity of overcoming impediments relating to imagination and opinion so that one can distinguish truth from falsehood (2:8-2:17). 3. The study of mathematics (3:1-4:7). 4. The study of physics in the proper fashion (4:8-8:4). 5. The study of metaphysics (8:5-8:14). This table of contents brings the second section of Gersonides’ introduction to his commentary on Song of Songs to a close. The third section is given over to an explanation of many of the symbolic representations12 out of which the book is constructed. A few examples here will suffice to give the flavor of the whole: Jerusalem stands for man. Just as man, among all the compounded entities, is set apart for the worship of God, so is Jerusalem set off from other cities. Furthermore, the name Jerusalem is derived from the Hebrew word perfection: man is the most perfect of all the sublunar entities and thus is called Jerusalem. The faculties of the soul are the daughters of Jerusalem while Solomon refers to the intellect. Since Zion is the worthiest part of Jerusalem, the daughters of Zion refer to those faculties of the soul closest to the activity of the intellect. Gersonides continues in this vein, interpreting in this fashion many of the expressions found in Song of Songs. These are, briefly summarized, the main points in Gersonides’ introduction to his commentary to Song of Songs. In his commentary to the scroll itself Gersonides reads the text neither as a dialogue between two physical lovers, nor, as the Rabbis had read it, as a dialogue between God and the House of Israel, but as two dialogues. In Gersonides’ view the first dialogue is between a person’s 12 Hikkuyim. This term, derived from the Hebrew root meaning “to portray” (see Ezekiel 8:10) and in medieval and modern Hebrew used in the sense of “imitation,” is not easy to translate. In Milhamot II.6 (p. 109; Wars, p. 56) Gersonides defines it as hiddah (“riddle” or “enigma”) or mashal (“allegory”). Feldman uses “representation” (offering “symbol” as an alternative) which for our purpose here is too broad. I have therefore used “symbolic representation.”

127

SONG OF SONGS AND GERSONIDES’ WORLD

material intellect and the Active Intellect, a kind of conjunction with which is one’s highest perfection and greatest felicity, and the second is between the faculties of the soul and the hylic intellect.13 These are not dialogues in the true sense, since in most instances Gersonides construes the participants in this discussion as talking about and not to each other. In any event, the main thrust of these discussions relates to the overwhelming desire of the hylic intellect to approach the Active Intellect and its attempts to enlist the (willing) aid of the faculties of the soul in this quest. The most amazing thing about this commentary is the way in which Gersonides’ approach, absurd on the face of it as an attempt to explicate the true meaning of the text as intended by its author, whatever that may have been, becomes more and more convincing as one goes along. Having described the content of the commentary in very broad terms I will first turn to some issues of form and then return to questions of content. Gersonides cites the Bible 29 times in his commentary;14 of these citations, 24 are of verses explicitly cited as such, 2 are verses simply worked into his text without comment and 3 are verses referred to but not quoted. He explicitly cites rabbinic texts seven times and I found two places where rabbinic statements were incorporated into the text without comment. He cites Maimonides twice, once from the Guide of the Perplexed and once from his commentary on the Mishnah. Gersonides cites himself eight times, four of these citations referring to the Milhamot, three to his supercommentary to Averroes’ Epitome of Aristotle’s On the Soul and one referring to his supercommentary on Averroes’ Epitome of Aristotle’s Parva Naturalia. Turning to non-Jewish authors, we find Gersonides citing Aristotle fortyfour times. Five of these references are to Aristotle generally, the rest being to specific Aristotelian books (eight in all). Ptolemy’s Almagest is cited three times while Epicurus, Ghazzali and Averroes are each explicitly mentioned 13 On the sort of conjunction with the Active Intellect which Gersonides had in mind, see Feldman, “Gersonides on Conjunction.” 14 Note should be taken of the fact to which Touati (La pensée..., p. 75) draws our attention, namely, that in all of Gersonides’ many supercommentaries on Averroes he cites the Bible only twice. This may be an indication that the intended audience for his commentaries on Averroes was very different from the audience to which he directed his biblical commentaries.

128

CHAPTER FIVE

one time. This list may be rounded off with two references to unspecified medical works. In the few places where Gersonides cites at the same time both the Bible and Rabbis and philosophic sources he cites the Jewish sources first. In this he varies from his custom in the Milhamot where he generally quotes from the Bible and Rabbis –to the extent that he does at all– only after he has completed his philosophical discussion. There are other ways in which Gersonides’ commentary on Song of Songs is unlike his parallel writings. In his other Bible commentaries we usually find the text of the commentary divided into three or sometimes four parts: explanations of individual words and phrases; explanation of the sense of each passage; discussion of the philosophic import of the passage (where appropriate); and in the commentary on the Pentateuch, lists of the moral, political, halakhic and philosophic lessons (to’alot) to be derived from each section of the text. None of this is to be found in the commentary on Song of Songs. Here we are presented with a running commentary, moving along verse by verse. In this commentary Gersonides generally tells his reader who the speaker of the verse is (the Active Intellect, the hylic intellect, or the faculties of the soul usually represented by the faculty of imagination), to whom the statement is addressed or about whom it is made, and the way in which the words and phrases of the verse advance the needs of the allegory (mashal). Occasionally Gersonides will alert the reader to the fact that a particular verse is to be interpreted as relating only to the allegory or only to its intended meaning (nimshal); this, however, is relatively rare since he construes most of the verses as having significance for both, as one would expect in a well-constructed allegory. Summarizing these comments on the form of Gersonides’ commentary on Song of Songs we find a text structurally unlike any of Gersonides’ other commentaries, one in which there is no separate attention paid to the meanings of individual words, where the text, while divided into sections, is not treated in a section by section fashion, and where there is no attempt to draw moral, political, halakhic or even philosophic lessons from the text under discussion. It is, furthermore, a commentary on a Biblical book in which explicit citations from non-Jewish (i.e., philosophic and scientific) sources far outweigh the number of citations from Jewish ones. This last point becomes even clearer 129

SONG OF SONGS AND GERSONIDES’ WORLD

when note is taken of the fact that most of the Biblical citations relate to the explication of peshat in what is, after all, a Biblical book (Song of Songs); what we have here is not so much an appeal to Jewish sources as the use of an entire literary unit (the Bible) in the explanation of words and phrases in part of that unit. Furthermore, the eight citations to Gersonides’ own writings all refer to his philosophic and scientific works, not to his Job commentary, and relate exclusively to philosophic issues. The preponderance, then, of philosophic and scientific citations in Gersonides’ commentary on Song of Songs over those of what may be called a strictly Jewish character (primarily citations from the Rabbis) is absolutely overwhelming. Gersonides, unlike Maimonides, pays very little attention to matters of stylistic elegance. For him the form in which his discussions are presented has relatively little intrinsic importance, as long as he can make his point in the clearest possible way. Like a good Bauhaus architect, Gersonides believed that form should follow function. Since this is the case, we cannot hope to learn anything useful from the way in which Gersonides presented his ideas until we know more about their content. I return then, as promised above, to a consideration of some of the issues discussed by Gersonides in his commentary on Song of Songs. The first point which I wish to note has the character of a paradox. On the one hand, this commentary is clearly aimed at an intellectual elite and not at the masses of the Jewish people. That it was Solomon’s intent to keep the ideas taught in Song of Songs from the masses is a point which Gersonides makes on a number of occasions. Referring to an example of repetitiveness in the text, Gersonides says that “the repetition of this allegory was intended to stimulate the reader of his words to understand his intention in this wonderful allegory according to his ability while understanding that despite this the intended meaning of the allegory was to remain hidden from the masses by virtue of the symbolic representations and allegories which he used” (p. 12). It might be thought that this is a trivial point. After all, once we admit that Solomon did not compose Song of Songs with the intention of writing a poem exalting carnal love, it is immediately obvious that it has a hidden meaning beyond what the plain sense of the words conveys. But that does not mean that the secondary meaning was intended to be hidden from the masses. This 130

CHAPTER FIVE

is evidenced by the fact that the Rabbis did not construe Song of Songs as a poem describing a love affair between a man and a maid. They insisted that the poem had a level of meaning beyond that of the peshat, and did everything in their power to bring that higher level of meaning to the attention of the masses. Gersonides’ point, therefore, is hardly trivial. This does not prove, however, that Gersonides aimed his own commentary on Song of Songs to an intellectual elite. Perhaps like the Rabbis he was eager for or at least unconcerned by the prospect of the masses reading and understanding his commentary. That this is not the case is indicated by the following. Explaining why some of the verses in Song of Songs relate to the allegory only and not to its intended meaning, Gersonides says that the text combined “the hidden and the open, for this adds obscurity to his words, properly perfecting them as they ought to be in such cases, namely, keeping them hidden from those who are not fit for them and open to those who are fit” (p. 14). In this passage Gersonides not only tells us that Solomon sought to obscure the meaning of his words so that they would not be understood by all, but that he also approves that intent, at least with respect to the subject matter of Song of Songs. This being the case, we may safely conclude that Gersonides addressed his commentary on Song of Songs to some sort of intellectual elite. The exact character of that elite will be discussed below. I promised a bit of a paradox. We have just seen that the people to whom Gersonides addressed his commentary on Song of Songs are not the masses, but an intellectual elite. When we turn to examine the nature of the material addressed to them we find it surprisingly basic, introductory, and elementary.15 For a work ostensibly designed to guide its reader to intellectual enlightenment, to cognizing God so far as one is able, and thus to ultimate human felicity, we find next to no philosophic argumentation or proof. In fact, nothing at all is taught directly about God, very little about God’s activities, and almost nothing about the nature of the world around us, from the examination of which we are supposed to abstract conceptual knowledge which will lead us to 15 That does not mean that the philosophical positions in the commentary are presented in a hackneyed fashion. Where Gersonides disagrees with prevailing opinion he presents his own. But creative or not, Gersonides’ accounts presuppose next to no philosophical sophistication on the part of his reader and make modest demands upon his intelligence.

131

SONG OF SONGS AND GERSONIDES’ WORLD

the cognition of God. In place of this we find detailed discussions of the process of learning and constantly repeated and reiterated emphasis on the importance of approaching the process of learning in a properly structured fashion and in the proper order. A large portion of the Introduction is given over to a discussion of the division of the sciences, a proof that this division mirrors reality, and a passionate plea for studying these sciences in their proper (i.e., natural) order. The division of the sciences is repeated again in the commentary proper. This last point is worthy of note since generally Gersonides does not repeat in the commentary points made in the introduction; rather, he refers his readers to his earlier discussion. But, more than all this, we find Gersonides repeatedly (at twenty different places at least, by my count) emphasizing the importance of studying the sciences in their proper order. Furthermore, the text takes very little for granted, citing “chapter and verse” in Aristotle and other scientific and philosophic writers in support of almost all its claims, including those with which we would expect any philosopher to be perfectly familiar. The elementary character of Gersonides’ teachings here becomes even clearer when we compare our text with his commentaries on Job and Genesis with their detailed and often difficult philosophical discussions.16 Here, then, is our paradox. On the one hand, we have a text ostensibly addressed to an intellectual elite, to whom it is appropriate to reveal the secrets concerning humankind’s ultimate felicity taught by Solomon in Song of Songs.17 On the other hand the text itself is clearly addressed to beginners in philosophy, takes very little in the way of philosophical erudition for granted, deals with the most basic issues in an elementary fashion, presents no philosophical proofs concerning the existence and nature of God, and propagandizes unceasingly for the proper approach to the study of science and philosophy. To whom, then, does Gersonides address his commentary on Song of 16 Gersonides’ commentaries on Job and Genesis contain much the same material as his philosophic accounts in Milhamot IV and VI.ii. The commentaries are no simpler than the accounts in the Milhamot. He himself draws attention to the overlap between Milhamot IV and the Job commentary in his Commentary to Exodus, p. 83d/208/22. 17 It might be objected that while Gersonides repeatedly “threatens” to reveal secrets of philosophy here in the Song of Songs commentary he does not in fact do so. That is simply incorrect. The secret teaching of Song of Songs is that it is an account of a dialogue between the hylic intellect and the Active Intellect and that humankind’s ultimate felicity lies in intellectual perfection.

132

CHAPTER FIVE

Songs? It is to the examination of that question that I propose to turn in the next section of this chapter. The second point concerning the content of Gersonides’ commentary on Song of Songs to which I want to draw attention involves the question of esotericism. Gersonides, as we have seen, makes no bones about the fact that Solomon wrote Song of Songs for a restricted elite. Thus, he writes: However, that which it contains concerning the improvement of the soul was kept hidden because of its irrelevance for the masses. Most of what the Torah guides us towards concerning speculation deals either with the speculative principles the apprehension of which for the scholar is very difficult, or with the great principles, mistakes concerning which greatly distance a man from human perfection (p. 8).

Distinguishing Song of Songs from all other Biblical books, Gersonides writes, “But this book, Song of Songs, guides only the elite to the way of achieving felicity, and thus its external meaning was not made useful to the masses” (p. 8). In his discussion of the various allegories, metaphors, and similes found in Song of Songs Gersonides explains that some of them were designed specifically to confuse the simple reader of the book. While most of the descriptions in the book relate to its intended meaning, some of them mean nothing more than what they are taken to mean at first glance in the allegory. This approach, Gersonides explains, combines “the hidden and the open, for this adds obscurity to his words, properly perfecting them as they ought to be in such cases, namely, keeping them hidden from those who are not fit for them and open to those who are fit” (p. 14). At the very end of the introduction Gersonides praises Solomon’s skill in arranging matters such that his words would be understood “by those fit to understand them while they remain hidden from the masses, as is necessary” (p. 15). There is no doubt, then, that Gersonides saw Song of Songs as a book written by its author in an esoteric manner. But beyond that, and, as we saw above, Gersonides approves Solomon’s intention, agreeing that the ideas taught in Song of Songs are not really appropriate for consumption by the masses. Furthermore, Gersonides himself time after time makes note of the subtle and sophisticated way in which Solomon 133

SONG OF SONGS AND GERSONIDES’ WORLD

constructed his allegory so as to arouse those for whom it was intended while keeping somnolent those for whom it was not intended.18 Fine and good: there is nothing new or surprising here. What needs to be answered, however, is the following question: if Solomon constructed Song of Songs as a poem with a meaning hidden by the outward sense of the words, and meant for that meaning to be understood by a restricted elite, by what right does Gersonides publicly reveal that secret doctrine? There is no reason at all to doubt that Gersonides believed that Song of Songs was written by Solomon son of David, King of Israel, and that he wrote it by virtue of the holy spirit. That being the case, it is surely odd that Gersonides should at one and the same time admit that Solomon meant to keep hidden the doctrines taught in Song of Songs while cheerfully and enthusiastically revealing those doctrines to all and sundry.19 It may be objected that Gersonides himself rejects esotericism. In his Introduction to the Milhamot he implicitly criticizes Maimonides for his esotericism and here in his commentary to Song of Songs further intimates his opposition to it.20 All this is true; but the fact that Gersonides criticizes esoteric writing in Maimonides and rejects it as an option for himself in the Milhamot does not mean that he must reveal what the Bible kept hidden. No one forced 18 See for example, Gersonides’ comments on p. 14 concerning the wonderful structure and perfect construction of Song of Songs. 19 All this, of course, assumes that Gersonides recognized Solomon’s authority and would feel the need to justify behavior which went against the King’s express wishes. This is a safe assumption: Gersonides, as we have seen, asserts that Solomon wrote Song of Songs as one who speaks by virtue of the holy spirit. Even if that is a low level of prophecy (compare Maimonides, Guide of the Perplexed, II. 45, who maintains that it is not really prophecy at all), it is still worthy of respect! But even in the unlikely eventually that Gersonides saw no need to justify his revelation of what Solomon sought to keep secret; he would still have to justify such behavior in the light of Maimonides’ strictures against it. Maimonides’ position will be discussed below. (On King Solomon in medieval Jewish thought, see Klein-Braslavy, King Solomon.) Furthermore, at the beginning of the introduction (p. 4) Gersonides indicates that his philosophic interpretation of Song of Songs will make the rabbinic midrashim upon it understandable. The clear implication of that is that the interpretation of Gersonides accords with that of the Rabbis, which interpretation the Rabbis sought to keep secret by casting it in allegorical fashion. That being the case, Gersonides must justify making public not only what Solomon sought to keep secret, and what Maimonides insisted must not be made public, but what the Rabbis of the Midrash actually did try to keep hidden. 20 For Gersonides’ critique of esoteric writing, see Milhamot, Introduction, p. 8 (Wars, pp. 100101). See p. 3 of his commentary on Song of Songs for his striving for clarity there as well. The issue is taken up in my Introduction to this volume.

134

CHAPTER FIVE

him to write a commentary on Song of Songs! He would have kept silent on the issue or communicated it privately to a select group of colleagues or disciples.21 Thus, our question remains: how did Gersonides justify to himself the fact that he was revealing to anyone with a reading knowledge of Hebrew secrets which Solomon, wisest King of Israel, strove to keep hidden? Summarizing the material presented to this point, we find ourselves faced with two inter-related questions: Why did Gersonides publicly reveal the secrets hidden in Song of Songs and for whom did he write the commentary? Addressing these questions may shed interesting new light on Gersonides the Jew and Gersonides the historical figure, as opposed to Gersonides the philosopher and Gersonides the literary figure. Before turning to these questions, however, an objection to our entire project here must be considered. It might be objected that my concentration here on Gersonides’ commentary on Song of Songs is unwarranted and illegitimate. It is, after all, only one of Gersonides’ many Bible commentaries and one of four which he wrote on the “Five Scrolls.” I myself argued above that Gersonides’ many citations of biblical verses in this commentary is not noteworthy since Song of Songs is only one part of a text (the Bible) which Gersonides apparently saw as being, in many respects, a unified literary unit. By what right do I single out this particular commentary for detailed attention? By what right do I assume that the intended audience for this commentary is in some fashion distinct from the intended audience for Gersonides’ other commentaries? This objection can be met, I think, in two ways. First, Gersonides himself construes Song of Songs as being unique. It is the only book of the Bible whose outward meaning conveys no advantage to the reader. With the exception of Song of Songs, all Biblical books were written to benefit both the masses and the intellectual elite. Song of Songs, however, is unique in that it contains no message of benefit to the masses. As we saw above, it is aimed only at the intellectual elite. The uniqueness of the text on which the commentary is written justifies us, I submit, in treating the commentary itself more or less in isolation from Gersonides’ other Bible commentaries. Second, as noted above, the commentary is unique in literary terms. In its form and structure it is simply unlike 21 On Gersonides’ coterie of students, see Glasner, “Levi ben Gershom” and Glasner, “Philosophical Commentaries.”

135

SONG OF SONGS AND GERSONIDES’ WORLD

all of Gersonides’ other Bible commentaries. Now it might be objected to this that I cannot make this argument because the commentary on Song of Songs was only the second of Gersonides’ Bible commentaries to be written; might he not have developed the approach we consider typical after he had finished the commentary on Song of Songs? But while it is true that Song of Songs is the second of his Bible commentaries, it was not the first. That distinction belongs to the commentary on Job, and in that commentary we find almost all of the structural and stylistic peculiarities which mark Gersonides’ other commentaries and which are so dramatically absent from his commentary on Song of Songs. The pattern, therefore, was set before Song of Songs and continued after it. We may, therefore, safely maintain that Gersonides’ commentary on Song of Songs is not only marked off as unique by the uniqueness of the text on which it comments, but also by structural and formal criteria. In order to suggest answers to the questions why Gersonides revealed the secrets of Song of Songs and to whom he addressed the commentary, it will be helpful to examine the way in which Gersonides’ Maimonidean predecessors dealt with the question of revealing the secrets of the Torah in general and of Song of Songs in particular. Note must also be taken of an event which occurred when Gersonides was seventeen years old, and of which he must surely have been aware: the ban in the year 1305 against persons under the age of twenty-five studying philosophy issued by the greatest halakhic authority of the age, Rabbi Solomon ibn Adret of Barcelona.22 Maimonides’ ideas concerning the proper approach to the interpretation of biblical texts are well-known if hardly uncontroversial. For our purposes here a brief exposition of the basic points as explicitly presented by Maimonides will be sufficient. Near the beginning of the Introduction to his Guide of the Perplexed Maimonides explains that The first purpose of this Treatise is to explain the meanings of certain terms occurring in books of prophecy. Some of these terms are equivocal... others are derivative terms... others are amphibolous terms...23 22 On the ban of 1305 see G. Stern, Philosophy and Religious Culture and the studies cited there. On Gersonides in this connection, see ch. 11 below. 23 Introduction, p. 5. On Maimonides as a Bible commentator see Klein-Braslavy, “Bible Commentary.”

136

CHAPTER FIVE

The Guide, however, also has a second purpose: namely, the explanation of very obscure parables occurring in the books of the prophets, but not explicitly identified there as such. Hence an ignorant or heedless individual might think that they possess only an external sense, but no internal one. However, even when one who truly possesses knowledge considers these parables and interprets them according to their external meaning, he too is overtaken by great perplexity. But if we explain these parables to him or if we draw his attention to their being parables he will take the right road and be delivered from this perplexity... (p. 6).

Many Biblical texts, therefore, have two meanings, an external or public sense and an internal or esoteric meaning. Texts having both senses are parables but are not always recognized as such. It is one of the purposes of the Guide, then, to specify certain Biblical texts as parables. Maimonides does this explicitly concerning Song of Songs in Guide III.51 (p. 626) and III.54 (p. 636). Generally speaking, however, Maimonides is loath to reveal these matters directly and clearly: Hence you should not ask of me here anything beyond the chapter headings. And even those are not set down in order or arranged in coherent fashion in this Treatise, but rather are scattered and entangled with other subjects that are to be clarified... so as not to oppose that divine purpose which one cannot possibly oppose and which has concealed from the vulgar among the people those truths especially requisite for His apprehension (p. 6).

This is a very important passage. According to Gersonides, Song of Songs does guide us to “those truths especially requisite for His apprehension,” and it is precisely Gersonides’ intent to lay out the teachings of Song of Songs in the clearest possible fashion, thus laying him open to the charge of opposing “that divine purpose which one cannot possibly oppose.” The conflict between Maimonides and Gersonides surfaces in another fashion also. Maimonides writes: “The parables of the prophets, peace be on them, are similar. Their external meaning contains wisdom that is useful in many respects, among which is the welfare of human societies, as is shown by 137

SONG OF SONGS AND GERSONIDES’ WORLD

the external meaning of Proverbs and of similar sayings. Their internal meaning, on the other hand, contains wisdom that is useful for beliefs concerned with the truth as it is” (p. 12). For Gersonides, however, the external meaning of Song of Songs does not contain wisdom that is useful in many respects; on the contrary, its external meaning is crude.24 Turning to Maimonides’ comments on Song of Songs itself, we find that he adopts two different approaches to the interpretation of the scroll. Maimonides cites verses from Song of Songs twenty-five times in his writings.25 Of these, seven are instances where Maimonides uses a verse from Song of Songs in order to explain the meaning of a word in another context and two are verses used for their stylistic contribution without reference to their meaning in their original contexts. The remaining citations all involve interpretations of verses from Song of Songs, but not all of these interpretations –because of their specific, out of context character– grant us any insight into Maimonides’ views on the nature of Song of Songs generally. Those that do grant such insight seem to be divided into two groups. On the one hand, Maimonides in his Epistle to Yemen and in his Epistle on Martyrdom follows the pattern established by the Rabbis and interprets Song of Songs as a story of the love between God and the House of Israel. Thus, we find the following passages in Epistle to Yemen: The prophets have predicted and instructed us, as I have told you, that pretenders and simulators will appear in great numbers at the time when the advent of the true Messiah will draw nigh but they will not be able to make good their claim. They will perish with many of their partisans. Solomon, of blessed memory, inspired by the Holy Spirit, foresaw that the prolonged duration of the exile would incite some of our people to seek to terminate it before the appointed time, and as a consequence they would perish or meet with disaster. Therefore he admonished them and adjured them in metaphorical language to desist, as we read (Song of Songs 2:7): I adjure you, 0 maidens of Jerusalem, by

24 In his commentary on Song of Songs 1:1 (p. 17) Gersonides writes: “it is not the way of those who speak by virtue of the holy spirit to speak poems which are so constructed as to attract a man to despicable actions; nor [do they write] poems of emptiness and falsehood”. 25 I rely here on Kafih, Ha-Mikra.

138

CHAPTER FIVE

gazelles or by hinds of the field: do not wake or arouse love until it please. Now, brethren and friends, abide by the oath, and stir not up love until it please.26

Maimonides continues in this vein in his other citations from Song of Songs in the Epistle to Yemen. He writes: Long ago Solomon compared our community with a beautiful woman having a perfect figure, marred by no defect, in the verse (Song of Songs 4:7): Every part of you is fair, my darling; there is no blemish in you. He further depicted the adherents of other religions and faiths... who strive to entice us and win us over to their convictions as beguiling seducers who lure virtuous women for their lewd purposes. Similarly they seek devices to trap us into embracing their religions, and subscribing to their doctrines. To those who endeavor to decoy her into avowing the superiority of their creed, he in his wisdom answered in the name of the community: “Why do you take hold of me, can you confer upon me something like the felicity of the two companies?” She challenges them, saying: “If you can furnish me with something like the theophany at Sinai, in which the camp of Israel faced the camp of the divine presence, then I shall espouse your doctrine.” This is metaphorically expressed in the verse (Song of Songs 7:1): Turn back, turn back, O maid of Shulem! Turn back, turn back, that we may gaze upon you. “Why will you gaze at the Shulammite in the Mahanaim dance?” Shulammite signifies the perfect one; the Mahanaim dance the joy of the revelation at Mt. Sinai that was shared by the camp of Israel... (p. 105).

In the Mishneh Torah27 and the Guide of the Perplexed, however, we find Maimonides adopting another mode of interpretation, one with substantial elements of danger. In these texts verses from Song of Songs are presented as expressing, not the love between God and the House of Israel, but the love between God and individual human beings. This approach, it should be noted, is risky in the sense that while the rabbinic interpretation renders the sting implicit in Song of Songs harmless by reading it exclusively in terms of the love between God and the House of Israel, thus rendering a carnal interpreta26 See Halkin and Hartman, Crisis and Leadership, p. 130. 27 See “Laws of the Foundations of the Torah”, II.12 and VI.9; “Laws of Torah Study,” V.4; and “Laws of Repentance,” X.3.

139

SONG OF SONGS AND GERSONIDES’ WORLD

tion impossible, when the poem is read as referring to individuals (God and those individuals who love Him) and not to a corporate entity like the House if Israel, it is an easier step to move from interpreting the poem as an exaltation of the love of the “God intoxicated” individual for God to interpreting the poem as an exaltation of carnal love between two human individuals. Be that as it may, Maimonides does indeed take the –so far as I know– innovative step of reading the poem in terms of the love between God and the human individual who seeks Him. Thus, in the Guide, for example, we find passages such as the following: And there may be a human individual who, through his apprehension of the true realities and his joy in what he has apprehended, achieves a state in which he talks with people and is occupied with his bodily necessities while his intellect is wholly turned toward Him, may He be exalted, so that in his heart he is always in His presence, may He be exalted, while outwardly he is with people, in the sort of way described by the poetical parables that have been invented for these notions (Song of Songs 8:2): I sleep, but my heart waketh; it is the voice of my beloved that knocketh, and so on (III.51, p. 623). In this dictum the Sages, may their memory be blessed, followed the generally accepted poetical way of expression that calls the apprehension that is achieved in a state of intense and passionate love for Him, may He be exalted, a kiss, in accordance with its dictum (Song of Songs 1:2): Let Him kiss me with the kisses of His mouth, and so on (III.51, p. 628). Therefore you ought to desire to achieve this thing, which will remain permanently with you, and not weary and trouble yourself for the sake of others, O you who neglect your own soul so that its whiteness has turned into blackness through the corporeal faculties having gained dominion over it – as is said in the beginning of the poetical parables that have been coined for these notions; it says (Song of Songs 1:6): My mother’s sons were incensed against me; they made me keeper of the vineyards; but mine own vineyard have I not kept (III.54, p. 636).

140

CHAPTER FIVE

Maimonides’ philosophical interpretation of Song of Songs is most succinctly summarized at the end of his Book of Knowledge, in “Laws of Repentance,” X.3: How does one love [God] properly? It is to love God with a great and exceeding love, so exceedingly strong that his soul is preoccupied [literally: tied up] with the love of God, so that he is constantly ravished by it, like people sick with love whose thoughts are never free of the love of that woman [whom they love]... All of Song of Songs is an allegory concerning this matter.

Maimonides never composed a fully worked out commentary on Song of Songs. But his comments adduced here show that he would have commented on the text in a fashion which Gersonides could not but have found largely congenial. Comparing Maimonides and Gersonides briefly, we may say that while the latter appears to have agreed with Maimonides (and, as noted above, and apparently without realizing it, with ibn Aknin and Moses ibn Tibbon) on the inner meaning of Song of Songs, he certainly disagrees with him on the value of the outer meaning of the poem and on the obligation to keep its inner meaning secret. Having looked at these Maimonidean texts we are in a somewhat better position to understand the background against which Gersonides wrote his commentary on Song of Songs, but not much closer to an answer to our two questions, why he was willing to reveal Solomon’s secrets and thus, in Maimonides’ words, “oppose that divine purpose which one cannot possibly oppose,” and second, to whom he addressed the commentary. In a number of important studies Aviezer Ravitzky has drawn attention to the existence of self-conscious school of Jewish philosophers founded by Samuel ibn Tibbon (died c. 1232), the translator of Maimonides’ Guide.28 Members of this school saw themselves as engaged in a joint project, that of furthering Maimonidean values and teachings. One of the issues which exercised them all was the question of the extent to which it was legitimate to give public expression to the secret teachings of the Torah. In one sense, their deliberations on the issue have an almost hypocritical flavor since they all wrote 28 See Ravitzky, “Political Role” and his earlier studies mentioned there.

141

SONG OF SONGS AND GERSONIDES’ WORLD

books in which these secrets were publicly revealed and some of them were even active and enthusiastic propagandists for the philosophical interpretation of the Torah.29 Samuel ibn Tibbon, for example, the founder of the school, whatever his hesitations on the matter, certainly did much to aid the public spread of philosophical ideas and interpretations of the Torah. He translated the Guide into Hebrew, composed a glossary of philosophical terms (Perush ha-Millot haZarot asher bi-Ma’amar ha-Rav, z’’l),30 explained some of the esoteric meanings of Ecclesiastes in a commentary,31 and wrote an independent work of philosophical Bible exegesis, Ma’amar Yikkavu ha-Mayim.32 The twenty-second and final chapter of this book serves as a kind of apologia for it, consisting as it does in ibn Tibbon’s justification for having written the book. He explains that if he has revealed more than he ought of those things “which the Sages commanded to keep hidden,” he did it only for “the sake of Heaven”: For I have seen that the truths which our prophets and the sages of our Torah hid then are all well-known today to the nations of the world, and they explain according to these truths the secrets which are in the Torah, in the words of the prophets and those who speak by virtue of the holy spirit in most of the places, while our nation is so absolutely ignorant of them that because of that ignorance we have become an object of mockery in their mouths: they denounce us, saying that we have nothing of the words of the prophets but the shells... (p. 173).

This is a bitter pill indeed: the Jews are mocked because of their ignorance of the truths of their own Torah, which truths have been appropriated by the gentile nations. What better reason for re-acquainting the Jews with their own philosophic heritage!33 29 See Halkin, “Ban.” Halkin asserts that most 13th century Jewish philosophers agreed that it was their obligation to keep the secrets of the Torah from reaching the masses but that they did not live up to that obligation. See p. 37 and the examples he cites there. 30 This text is printed in most editions of ibn Tibbon’s Hebrew translation of the Guide. 31 Robinson, Samuel ibn Tibbon. 32 Pressburg, 1837. On this book see Vajda, “An Analysis.” The book is now easily accessed at HebrewBooks.org. 33 See Twersky, “Non-Halakic Aspects,” pp. 190 and 204.

142

CHAPTER FIVE

Ibn Tibbon goes on to point out that, in any event, times had changed. The gentile nations had by now learned many of the truths hidden in the Torah. The existence of God and of the separate intellects, once known only to the Patriarchs, was known to all. Thus, the philosophic, secret interpretation of the Torah, which had been handed down from teacher to pupil “with the rest of the Oral Torah” (p. 174) was no longer the unique patrimony of the Jews. Furthermore, because of various exigencies, hints concerning these truths had been written down from time to time, culminating in the work of “the Rabbi, righteous teacher, great sage, divine philosopher of Torah, our master Rabbi Moses...” (p. 174). Ibn Tibbon is offering a compound justification here: “the secret is out,” so to speak, because the gentile nations know some of it, because previous Jewish authors have revealed portions of it, and because Maimonides revealed more of it. Ibn Tibbon is implicitly using the authority of Maimonides to justify his own behavior: Maimonides’ public (or semipublic) teaching of the secrets of the Torah made the project respectable for others. Ibn Tibbon justifies himself in these terms explicitly in the last paragraph of the book: And I, the youth who comes after him, also saw that those who understand his hints have greatly diminished in number, how much more so those who understand the hints in Scripture. I saw that the true sciences have become very widely known among the nations under whose government I am and in whose land [I live] even more than their publicity in the lands of Ishamel. I saw the great need to enlighten the eyes of the intellectuals [maskilim] with what God has graced me to know and understand of His words... therefore did I reveal in this book and in the commentary to Ecclesiastes what I revealed, what no man has revealed before now, so that we will not be [an object of] mockery to our neighbors, nor a scorn and a derision to them that are round about us [Psalms 44:14]... (p. 175).

Samuel ibn Tibbon, then, was faced with a cruel dilemma. Convinced, like his teacher Maimonides, that the Torah was the ultimate repository of all truth, including most emphatically philosophic truth, and stung by the barbs of the gentiles who mocked the Jews for their lack of philosophic sophistication, he 143

SONG OF SONGS AND GERSONIDES’ WORLD

naturally desired to publish the philosophic teachings of Judaism in the clearest possible fashion. Doing so would not only salve his injured pride, it would also acquaint those Jews capable of understanding it with their philosophical heritage. On the other hand, there existed a long tradition, he thought, of keeping these very teachings hidden from the masses, a tradition emphatically endorsed by his teacher Maimonides in word and deed. In the end ibn Tibbon broke with Maimonides on this issue, and made some of the philosophic teachings of the Torah public in his commentary on Ecclesiastes and in his Ma’amar Yikkavu ha-Mayim. He justified his behavior in a number of ways. In the first place, the hidden teachings of the Torah had become known to the gentiles while the Jews had forgotten them and were thus mocked by the gentiles. Revealing these truths in Hebrew works, therefore, would teach nothing to the gentiles that they did not already know and would defend the honor of the Jewish people. Furthermore, many of these teachings had been given semi-public exposition in the works of various Jewish thinkers, first and foremost Maimonides. Ibn Tibbon in effect wraps himself in the mantle of Maimonides, claiming to be continuing a Maimonidean project. Samuel ibn Tibbon’s relation, Jacob Anatoli, was in the habit of preaching Sabbath sermons in which rationalist interpretations of Scripture featured prominently.34 He collected these sermons in a book, Malmad ha-Talmidim, which achieved a high level of popularity.35 Following in ibn Tibbon’s footsteps, Anatoli also bemoans the disrepute into which the Jews have fallen in the eyes of the gentiles because of their ignorance of the philosophic teachings of the Torah.36 Anatoli was somewhat ambivalent on the issue of teaching these truths, insisting that they be revealed only to select students.37 This, however, did not stop him from publishing his book. This tension between the desire to reveal the true teachings of the Torah and the perceived necessity of keeping them secret from the masses unprepared to digest them is typical of all thirteenth century Jewish philosophers 34 On Anatoli and his work see Saperstein, Jewish Preaching, pp. 111-125 and the sources cited there. See also Halkin, “Ban,” pp. 35-36. 35 On Anatoli’s popularity, see Zinberg, History, Vol. III, p. 60. 36 See Twersky, “Joseph ibn Kaspi,” p. 253. 37 See pp. 9a, 32b, and 51a in Malmad ha-Talmidim.

144

CHAPTER FIVE

in the Tibbonian school. That they resolved this tension in favor of revelation is evidenced by the fact that they ultimately wrote the books by which we know them. The activities of these philosophers did not go unnoticed. They were criticized by those who rejected the philosophical interpretation of the Torah for their falsification of the teachings of Judaism and even by those who accepted those teachings but objected to their being revealed wholesale to the uninitiated. Of particular interest is the criticism of “would-be philosophers” (mithakmim), individuals, apparently, who study philosophy without being ready for it.38 The opposition to these activities culminated in the ban of 1305. The ban forbids the study of physics and metaphysics by individuals under twenty-five years of age; it also forbids the teaching of these subjects to such individuals. Questions concerning the areas in which the ban was applied and its actual efficacy need not detain us here. As a resident of Provence, Gersonides may not have been directly affected by a ban issued in Barcelona (even though it was aimed directly at individuals like Gersonides, who, as we know, was only seventeen at the time), but it strains credibility to suggest that he was unaware of it.39 Furthermore, Gersonides was a brilliant and innovative halakhist;40 it seems unlikely that he would cavalierly and totally ignore a stand taken so decisively by a rabbinic figure as eminent as ibn Adret. Given the background here briefly surveyed we can now revert to the questions posed above, why was Gersonides willing to oppose what Maimonides had called the “divine intention” of keeping the secrets of the Torah hidden from the masses, by revealing in his commentary the secrets of Song of Songs, and second, for whom did he write his commentary, dealing as it does with philosophic themes in so elementary a fashion and emphasizing as it does questions of pedagogy and the proper order for the study of the sciences? The background we have provided makes the answers to these questions almost obvious. Once Maimonides and the Tibbonian school had published their writings, there was no longer any point in keeping hidden the secrets of 38 See pp. 173 and 175 of Halkin, “Yedaiah Bedershi’s Apology,” and Twersky, “Non-Halakic Aspects,” p. 205. 39 See ch. 11 below. 40 On this, see Braner, “Gersonides.”

145

SONG OF SONGS AND GERSONIDES’ WORLD

the Torah. The material was already in the public domain, so to speak. When Samuel ibn Tibbon used that claim to justify his philosophic activities, its legitimacy was questionable at best. By the time of Gersonides, just a bit more than a generation later, the claim was entirely legitimate, as is evidenced by the ban of 1305. The danger lay not in revealing the philosophic secrets of the Torah, but in their being misunderstood and misused. Thus, in revealing the secrets of the Torah generally and of Song of Songs in particular, Gersonides was not opposing God’s intention. That intention had already been opposed –successfully, I might add– by Maimonides in a hesitant, partial fashion, and by Samuel ibn Tibbon and his school in a more straightforward way (although they would, of course, have denied that they were thus opposing God’s will). In his own fashion and, perhaps, without being explicitly aware of it, Gersonides was continuing the Tibbonian project of spreading philosophic erudition and sophistication among the Jews. If so, why was his commentary to Song of Songs framed in so curious a manner, treating allegedly of the highest questions of human perfection without actually taking substantive steps to guide the reader any closer to that perfection by teaching him or her and proving the truth of philosophic conceptions of God? Furthermore, why does he frame the commentary as if it is addressed to tyros in philosophy, spelling out basic ideas in elementary form, citing chapter and verse for commonly accepted philosophic notions and emphasizing over and over the importance of studying the sciences in their proper order? Once again the historical background provided above suggests an answer. The critique of the would-be philosophers, noted above (a criticism later to be leveled against Gersonides himself41) coupled with the very issuance of the ban of 1305, indicates that there existed a not insubstantial class of would-be philosophers who apparently confused enthusiasm for philosophy for the hard work of philosophic study and argument.42 Assuming the existence of such 41 Isaac Husik identified Gersonides as the author whom Judah ben Jehiel Messer Leon (15th century) characterized as “the wise in his own eyes.” See Husik, Judah Messer Leon, section xii, pp. 93-108. 42 There is considerable evidence to the effect that large numbers of Gersonides’ contemporaries in the south of France had at least a modicum of philosophical knowledge. If nothing else, the ban of l305 points to this. See also Shatzmiller, Médecine. It appears that a

146

CHAPTER FIVE

a class answers our question. Gersonides’ commentary on Song of Songs is a polemical work, addressed to philosophic amateurs unaware of their amateur status. It is designed to convince them that philosophic perfection can only be achieved through hard, well-organized work and study and that the soughtafter goal is worthy of the effort. If the attitude of many of our contemporaries is any guide, then Gersonides was wise to go about his task in the way he did. By teaching this material in the form of a commentary on the Bible he indicates to the “sophisticated” that the Torah is not to be despised as unsophisticated since it is the repository of philosophic truth. Thus, too, we can explain the relative wealth of “academic” references and the relative dearth of Jewish ones in what purports to be a Bible commentary. Many “sophisticates” today and, one supposes, in the Middle Ages, would be more impressed by references to Aristotle than to Akiva. On the other hand, by teaching this material in the form of a commentary on the Bible, Gersonides accomplishes the second goal of indicating to more conservative Jews (such as those who promulgated the ban of 1305) that philosophy ought not to be despised since it is taught in the Torah. This last point is of some importance. Those of Gersonides’ contemporaries who opposed the teaching of philosophy were not by and large entirely ignorant of the discipline; rather, they were deeply suspicious of its potential for causing damage to the Jewish community. Convincing such individuals that Solomon was a philosopher can be seen as a vitally important enterprise. We may have here a further explanation of why Gersonides chose to take up the issues he discusses in his commentary to Song of Songs precisely in that commentary and not in an independent treatise. Addressed as it is, then, to over-eager philosophic amateurs, Gersonides’ commentary on Song of Songs quite rightly teaches basic philosophic conceptions, refers the reader to the relevant classical discussions of these issues (and, occasionally to Gersonides’ own contributions to these discussions in very large percentage of Jews in Gersonides’ day earned their livelihood through the practice of medicine. Since the study of physics and metaphysics was part of the medical curriculum, we have here, at least, a large body of individuals with at least a smattering of philosophical training. For the generation or two before Gersonides, see Saperstein, Decoding, chapter seven. Saperstein demonstrates how broadly and in many cases shallowly philosophy had entered into the intellectual life of thirteenth century Provencal Jewry.

147

SONG OF SONGS AND GERSONIDES’ WORLD

the Milhamot), and, most importantly, urges the student time and time again to take these things in their proper order, and not to rush ahead to metaphysics before achieving proper grounding in the mathematical and physical sciences. This, too, might explain why Gersonides emphasizes the importance of the cooperative nature of scientific progress and the need to take advantage of what has been accomplished by previous generations of scholars.43 Persons studying together in a group under the guidance of a seasoned tutor are less likely to go astray and follow their fancies than those who pursue their studies alone and without guidance.44 The considerations adduced in this chapter tend to the following conclusion: in order fully to understand the writings of Gersonides we must go beyond reading him in the light of his Greek, Arabic, and Latin forbears and seek to understand the Jewish environment, both literary and social, in which he lived and worked. Implied here also is a criticism of the view expressed by one the foremost twentieth-century interpreters of medieval Jewish philosophy, that Christian philosophy “is the natural historical context of Gersonides’ thought.”45 Gersonides himself would have certainly objected to such a characterization.

43 See Gersonides’ comments on Song of Songs 1:2 (pp. 19-24). 44 And now, thanks to Glasner (above, note 21), we know that Gersonides was precisely that seasoned tutor. 45 See Pines, “Problems,” p. 457.

148

CHAPTER SIX Maimonides and Gersonides on Astronomy and Metaphysics

This chapter serves as a general introduction to chapters 7-10 and recapitulates matters analyzed in depth in Kellner, Science, chapters 12-14.

M

aimonides and Gersonides shared much the same universe of discourse. Their areas of disagreement, therefore, are more important than their areas of agreement. Having proved philosophically to his satisfaction that the world was created (a proof Maimonides had deemed impossible to attain) Gersonides adds the following consideration: That which adds publicity and perfection to what has been made clear concerning the creation of the world is that we find that all that has been written in the sciences (hokhmot) is new and recent. We find that the early [savants] said something about each science; afterwards each was perfected during the course of time. We find sciences which did not reach their perfection till Aristotle and others which did not reach their perfection till Galen. There is another science which we do not find perfectly in the work of any of the ancients; this is the science of astronomy. [All this shows that] a science which demands more time for its perfection because of what you must determine concerning it from the senses reaches its perfection later. Thus, the mathematical sciences, such as geometry and arithmetic, are found earlier than other sciences. Aristotle’s predecessors already expressed them perfectly, according to what is told about them. Physical science, on the other hand, because of its greater need of the senses, reached its perfection later. Thus the art of medicine, which is more 149

MAIMONIDES AND GERSONIDES ON ASTRONOMY AND METAPHYSICS

dependent upon the senses, especially with respect to what is learned in it from the senses and from dissection, reached perfection still later. But astronomy, which depends upon the senses in such a fashion that its perfection through them can come about only after a stupendously long time, reaches its perfection even later. Since these sciences bring a man along the route to perfection, and he naturally desires them, it cannot [therefore] be said [both] that the human race is uncreated and that these sciences were discovered by them recently, for were the matter so we would be faced with a possibility which only became actualized after the passage of an infinite period of time, despite the existence of many natural implements for bringing it into actuality, and of humankind’s extremely strong natural desire to actualize it. This is clearly absurd.1

In this text we find an idea of scientific progress clearly expressed. Gersonides places a great deal of emphasis on the cooperative nature of the scientific enterprise: students of nature labor, generation after generation, to add to our knowledge.2 Alongside this view of scientific progress we see the clearly expressed view that such development is not an open-ended affair: the various sciences reach perfection or closure. The mathematical sciences were perfected by Aristotle’s predecessors; Aristotle himself, it seems, brought physics to 1

Milhamot, VI.i.15, p. 356; Wars, p. 314. Compare also the Commentary on Genesis, p. 16b/68/117. Further on this text, see below, ch. 7, at note 41.

2

The idea is repeated frequently in Gersonides’ commentary on Song of Songs. See, for example, the following comment on 1:2 (p. 23): The third impediment –our ignorance of the way that leads to perfection– will also be overcome in this fashion. This is so because whereas each of those who endeavor to achieve this apprehension by themselves will apprehend either nothing or very little, when what all of them has apprehended is gathered together, a worthy amount will have been gathered, either in and of itself or by virtue of its directing those who see their words towards the achievement of the truth in this. Therefore, one must always be aided in one’s research by the words of those who preceded him, especially when the truth in them has been revealed to those who preceded him, as was the case during the time of this sage, for the sciences were then greatly perfected in our nation. The matter being so, our perfected predecessors guide us in speculation in a way which brings us to perfection, either through their speech or writing, by virtue of the natural desire they have for proffering this influence, and will make known to us concerning each thing the way in which it should be researched, and what they have understood concerning it, together with the assistance concerning it which they have derived from their predecessors. For literature on this subject, see Hourani, Averroes, pp. 46-47 and Nisbet, Idea of Progress, pp. 86-88.

150

CHAPTER SIX

perfection; Galen brought medicine to perfection; astronomy, which depends upon a huge number of difficult observations, had not yet been brought to perfection.3 What is Maimonides’ view on this question? Did he also believe that the sciences could or had reached closure? There is one clear-cut reason for thinking that he had. Maimonides opens the second chapter of his Mishneh Torah by telling us that Jews are commanded to love and fear God. “What is the way,” Maimonides then asks, “that will lead to the love of Him and fear of Him?” The answer, he says, is the examination of God’s work of creation. By way of helping his reader to fulfill the commandment to love and fear God, Maimonides explains “some large, general aspects of the works of the Sovereign of the Universe.”4 The next two chapters of the Mishneh Torah present an account of the physical universe as Maimonides saw it. It is a finite universe, composed of nine concentric spheres, with the earth in the center. The ninth and largest sphere “includes and encircles all things.” Each of the eight internal spheres is divided into sub-spheres, “like the several layers of onions.” These sub-spheres are contiguous, with no empty space between them at all. In addition to the concentric spheres which encompass the earth, there are smaller spheres (epicycles) fixed in the larger spheres. The heavens are “alive” in the sense that they are populated by living, thinking entities. The sublunar realm is the world of the four elements and of bodies composed of them. It is a world in which things strive always to return to their natural place. It is a world of constant generation and corruption, a world the most fundamental principles of which are form and matter. Maimonides’ description appears in a law code, the Mishneh Torah, in a section called “Laws of the Foundations of the Torah.” Maimonides composed his code in an apodictic fashion because he expected it to be exactly that: a code. Furthermore, it was a work meant to translate the immutable Torah of God into a useful, manageable body of specific prescriptions. It was Maimo3

This understanding of scientific progress is unfashionable today, and derided as “whiggish” by many students of the history of science circles. By imputing this view to Gersonides (and, as shall be seen, to Maimonides) I do not mean to express either approval or disapproval of it.

4

“Laws of the Foundations of the Torah,” II.1. Further on the issues raised in this chapter, see Kellner, Science, chs. 12-15.

151

MAIMONIDES AND GERSONIDES ON ASTRONOMY AND METAPHYSICS

nides’ hope that the Mishneh Torah would be adopted as the binding code of Jewish law. It is reasonable to assume that Maimonides expected his vision of the physical universe to be as immutable as his codification of the laws, say, of theft. This being the case, it would seem that Maimonides would have had to have held that the physical sciences, at least, had reached closure in his day. Otherwise, how could he present them in the apodictic fashion that characterizes his discussion in the Mishneh Torah? The matter, however, is not so simple. There are good grounds to think that Maimonides did not present the description of the physical universe in “Laws of the Foundations of the Torah” as the last word on the subject. Among the reasons for supposing that Maimonides would urge us to relate to his account of the universe in the Mishneh Torah as being nothing more than a statement of the best science available in his day, and not as an incontrovertible account of the world as it actually is, was, and always will be, are the following: 1. The strongest reason for understanding Maimonides in this fashion is his account of how we are to relate to the scientific pronouncements of the rabbinic sages. He sharply distinguishes their role as transmitters of the Sinaitic revelation from their role as individuals reporting on their own ideas and interpretations or reporting on the best science of their day. Indeed, in two passages in the Guide for the Perplexed Maimonides informs his readers that the sages erred on scientific matters. If Maimonides thought that the sages could err when they relied on the best science of their day, would not Maimonides feel the same about his own reliance on the science of his day?5 2. Further support for this position is found in Maimonides’ attitude toward Aristotle. Despite his tremendous admiration for the “chief of 5

152

Guide of the Perplexed II.8 (p. 267) and III.15 (p. 459). It might be argued, of course, that Maimonides could attribute error to the sages on scientific matters while being sure that he himself did not err in like fashion simply on the grounds that the sciences, while deficient in the times of the sages, had reached perfection and completion in his own times. That in fact Maimonides did not indeed adopt this position is noted below and proved in Science, chs. 12-15.

CHAPTER SIX

the philosophers,” he still maintained that Aristotle could err. It is well known that Maimonides rejected Aristotle’s claim that the universe was uncreated.6 Furthermore, Maimonides held that Aristotle was indubitably correct in what he had written about the sublunar world, but wrong with respect to much of what he had to say about the celestial world.7 Once gain, if Aristotle can be mistaken about scientific matters, would not Maimonides admit that he himself could be mistaken? 3. Maimonides held that human beings progress both scientifically and in spiritual terms. Maimonides expressly taught that “the science of astronomy was not in his [Aristotle’s] time what it is today,” that Galen had brought anatomy to high pitch of perfection, and that his own astronomical knowledge might be superseded.8 Without getting into the vexed question of when the idea of progress entered Western culture, we can see here that Maimonides admitted the fact of scientific development and even anticipated that science would develop beyond what he himself had been able to accomplish in it. 4a. In terms of what we can call “spiritual progress,” Maimonides indicates that human beings grow and develop from generation to generation, both as individuals and as a race. As individuals, Maimonides maintained in one of the most notorious passages in the Guide, the generation of the Exodus was unable to worship God in a truly mature fashion and needed a sacrificial cult.9 Our forefathers may have been religious primitives; spiritual progress had taken place since the days of the Exodus, however, and some Jews in Maimonides’ day were ready to be told how to truly worship God (Guide, III.51, p. 621): “it consists in

6

This, at least, is Maimonides’ publicly expressed position (Guide, II.15-18). Many of his medieval and modern interpreters, however, maintain that Maimonides adopted a view at variance with his publicly expressed position. On this, see Seeskin, Origin.

7

Maimonides, Guide II.22, pp. 319-320.

8

Guide II.19, p. 308 see also Maimonides, Medical Aphorisms, vol. 2, p. 205.

9

Maimonides, Guide III.32, p. 526. For discussion, see Kellner, Confrontation, pp. 140-148.

153

MAIMONIDES AND GERSONIDES ON ASTRONOMY AND METAPHYSICS

setting thought to work on the first intelligible and to devoting oneself exclusively to this as far as this is within one’s capacity.” 4b. Individual human beings have progressed spiritually to the point where they can worship God through intellectual meditation.10 Eventually, all human beings will progress to the point where they abandon idolatry and embrace Judaic monotheism. Thanks to the intervention of Christianity and Islam, the world is being slowly monotheized, thus making possible the eventual advent of the Messiah.11 With such human development possible, is it credible that Maimonides would think that the description of the universe presented in his Mishneh Torah would never become outdated? 5. Maimonides, it turns out, for all his interest in presenting the Mishneh Torah in apodictic terms, was not even wedded irretrievably to the details of his account of halakhah presented there. He recognized the fact that he could err, corrected mistakes which he caught himself, and admitted the fact when others found mistakes in the work.12 It seems fairly clear that if Maimonides was willing to admit that in halakhic matters the Mishneh Torah was not necessarily the last word, he would even more be willing to admit that such was the case with scientific matters. If Maimonides presented the science of the Mishneh Torah provisionally, then an important reason for thinking that he would have agreed with Gersonides’ claim concerning the closure and perfectibility of the sciences must be rejected. There is a further and even more convincing argument to the effect that Maimonides would have rejected Gersonides’ views on this subject. This has to do with another debate between them. In his well-known monograph, To Save the Phenomena, Pierre Duhem distinguishes between two approaches to astronomy in the Middle Ages, the 10 This last point was suggested to me by Jacob Ross. See his “Maimonides and Progress.” 11 “Laws of Kings” XI:4 (pp. xxiii-xxiv). 12 For a recent discussion, see Shapiro, Studies.

154

CHAPTER SIX

formalistic and the realistic. The formalistic or instrumentalist, utilitarian approach follows Plato and Ptolemy.13 According to it, our models of planetary motions are nothing other than mathematical constructs designed to facilitate our calculations; they are not meant to describe the “real world” as such. The formalistic approach was interested only in “saving the phenomena” (i.e., describing and calculating the occurrence of specific phenomena). The second, or “realistic” approach followed Aristotle in affirming that our astronomy ought to reflect physical reality. On this issue Maimonides placed himself firmly in the formalistic camp,14 while Gersonides placed himself just as firmly in the realist camp.15 Why does Maimonides reject the opposed, realistic approach to astronomy? “The heavens are the heavens of the Lord,” Maimonides quotes from Psalm 115:16, “but the earth hath He given to the sons of man.” As is well known, Maimonides places severe limits on the extent of human knowledge.16 Knowledge of the heavens is literally beyond our ken. This is not a matter of “sagacious skepticism,” as Duhem would have it, but of crucial religious importance to Maimonides. Insisting on the limitations of human knowledge and emphasizing the absolutely qualitatively different characters of divine and human knowledge allows Maimonides to eat his cake and have it too with respect to any number of theological problems. Breaking with the school of Andalusian Aristotelianism on this matter was thus absolutely crucial to Maimonides. It was more than simply criticizing Aristotle’s celestial physics so as to make the refutation of his arguments for the eternity of the world easier, it was a central element in the edifice Maimonides was trying to construct, an edifice in which the “foundation of all foundations” was equivalent to the “pillar of all the sciences.” In order to harmonize Torah and (Aristotelian) science, Maimonides had to draw narrow 13 Or so Duhem thought; he was apparently wrong about Ptolemy. See Goldstein, “The Arabic Version.” The issues raised here are developed more fully below in ch. 8; there is a certain amount of overlap between the two discussions. 14 See Maimonides, Guide II.24, p. 326. 15 See Freudenthal, “Felicity.” 16 The extent to which Maimonides holds that true knowledge of metaphysics (and hence immortality) is possible is debated by scholars. For recent discussions of the debate, see Stern, “Maimonides on the Growth of Knowledge” and Manekin, “Limitations of Human Knowledge.”

155

MAIMONIDES AND GERSONIDES ON ASTRONOMY AND METAPHYSICS

limits around what we can in principle know. His formalistic astronomy is a further expression of this.17 Adding detail to the claims made in the previous paragraph will make my point clearer. There are a considerable number of theological problems solved by Maimonides’ theory of attributes. According to this theory, terms predicated of God and human beings may be so predicated only by way of “absolute equivocation,” whereby all the terms have in common is the name (e.g., God’s knowledge and human knowledge have only one thing in common: the word knowledge).18 Maimonides uses this theory to good effect in solving several problems. For example, the problem of evil in the world is ultimately solved by recourse to the fact that we cannot in principle know why God created the world as He did. The problem of God’s knowledge of particulars vs. human freedom is ultimately solved by affirming that we can never understand how God’s knowledge works; similarly for the problem of God’s will. Maimonides’ philosophical agnosticism concerning the creation of the universe can also be traced back to his theory of attributes. Returning to the point under discussion, what does Maimonides’ attempt to “save the phenomena” have to do with the question of his attitude toward the science he presents in the Mishneh Torah? We are now in the position to state categorically that superlunar science had not reached perfection or closure in Maimonides’ day for the simple reason that he held that such science would never reach that stage: the full picture is beyond our abilities to apprehend. Therefore, the science he presents in the Mishneh Torah is, by its very nature, incomplete and provisional.19 Comparing Maimonides and Gersonides on this point may illuminate the issue a bit further. Rejecting Maimonides’ theory of attributes, Gersonides affirms that when the term knowledge is applied to God and to human beings, the equivocation is not absolute.20 A consequence of this approach is that for Gersonides the scope of possible human knowledge is much wider than it is for Maimonides. Gersonides, additionally, affirms the following claims, all 17 Further on the issues raised in the paragraph, see Kellner, Science, pp. 177-178. 18 See Wolfson, “Negative Attributes.” 19 Compare Kellner, Science, chs. 12-15. 20 See above, ch. 4, note 31, Samuelson, “Gersonides’ Account,” and Rynhold, Introduction.

156

CHAPTER SIX

denied by Maimonides: all knowledge (not just knowledge of metaphysics) leads to felicity; we can in principle know the heavens; we can prove the creation of the universe. We study the heavens, Gersonides furthermore affirms, not just for utilitarian reasons but both in order to increase our knowledge of highly worthwhile things, thus increasing our felicity, and in order to learn about God’s providence, which is most clearly expressed through the ordering of the heavens.21 If studying the heavens adds to our felicity, then such study must produce true knowledge and not simply successful predictions. There can be no surprise, therefore, that Maimonides is a formalist in his astronomy while Gersonides is a realist. In order to make his synthesis of religion and philosophy possible, therefore, Maimonides must claim that the science of astronomy can never be brought to perfection or closure. What we can know of astronomical phenomena must never be thought to accord with the true facts; rather astronomical knowledge is only a model which allows us to make predictions, while telling us nothing about the true state of the heavens. Maimonides is driven to this position by his theory of attributes. In consequence, Maimonides’ account of the heavens in “Laws of the Foundations of the Torah” must be understood as having been presented provisionally. Those who insist on reading Maimonides’ science as canonically as they read his halakhah, therefore, are not, whatever they are, followers of Maimonides. Gersonides, however, did not see himself bound by either Maimonides’ science or Maimonides’ halakhah and was thus a true Maimonidean.

21 On all this, see Freudenthal, “Felicity.”

157

CHAPTER SEVEN Gersonides on the Song of Songs and the Nature of Science

T

he debate between Maimonides and Gersonides introduced in the last chapter is reflected in Gersonides’ commentary on Song of Songs. Gersonides’ commentary on Song of Songs helps us to understand his views on the nature of science, and his views on the nature of science help us to understand elements of his commentary on Song of Songs. In particular, I have structured my argument in this chapter in the following stages: (a) a description of Gersonides’ understanding of Song of Songs; (b) an argument for the claim that for Gersonides, unlike for Maimonides, the study of physics is sufficient to bring one to some level of intellectual perfection and hence immortality; (c) refutation of an objection to the thesis that for Gersonides the study of physics is sufficient to bring one to perfection; (d) Gersonides’ claim that the study of physics suffices to bring one to perfection is shown to reflect his scientific realism, while Maimonides’ claim that such study is insufficient is shown to reflect his scientific formalism; (e) Gersonides’ scientific realism is further proved by his position on the closure of the sciences and by an unusual division of the sciences proposed in his commentary on Song of Songs; (f) summary. In his commentaries on Job and Song of Songs a striking characteristic of his approach to the Bible becomes clear: “Philosophical allegory is the peshat and it serves not only to refute and remove wrong opinions but to delineate a complete, correct cosmology (though pedagogically attuned to lesser minds) and metaphysics.”1 That is not to say that Gersonides ignored the historical, legal, and moral teachings of the biblical books. In his commentaries he goes to great trouble to make sense of the historical narratives and to derive moral 1

Funkenstein, “Gersonides’ Bible Commentary,” p. 309.

159

GERSONIDES ON THE SONG OF SONGS AND THE NATURE OF SCIENCE

and halakhic teachings from the texts. He also was the author of an innovative method of connecting the text of the Torah to received halakhah. He was, however, convinced that the Written Torah was, among other things, a scientific treatise and ought to be approached as such. This situation is particularly clear with respect to the commentary on Song of Songs. In comparing the three “Solomonic” books (Ecclesiastes, Proverbs, Song of Songs) in his introduction to his commentary on Ecclesiastes (p. 25d/17), Gersonides explains that in the first of his books Solomon collects commonly accepted ideas on ethics, while in second (Proverbs) he examines them in detail, distinguishing the useful from the harmful. “Since the choicest of the species of good is speculative perfection, it being their fruit, he then perfected the investigation concerning it in Song of Songs, according to what we think.” The commentary on Song of Songs itself is preceded by a lengthy introduction, the bulk of which is given over to a discussion of various epistemological issues. This discussion is made necessary by the fact that Gersonides defines the ultimate felicity of human beings as “cognizing and knowing God to the extent possible,” (p. 4) and the purpose of Song of Songs as making known the way to achieve such felicity.2 Song of Songs, it will turn out, is an attempt both to describe the stages of human cognition and to guide the individual seeking ultimate felicity by its achievement. Gersonides holds that the narratives and commandments of the Torah generally hint at the way to felicity, but that there is only one text in the entire Bible which deals exclusively with it: Song of Songs. Since, unlike the rest of the Bible, Song of Songs is meant to guide only selected individuals to their felicity, its surface meaning (an erotic love song) was not made useful to the masses.3 This, apparently, is Gersonides’ solution to the problem of how a text like Song of Songs, with its outward meaning of frank carnality, came to be included in the Bible. Gersonides maintains that the structure of Song of Songs reflects its intent. On his reading, the main topics dealt with in the text are the following: (a) 2

Hazlahah; see Rosenthal, “Eudaimonia”; Rosenthal traces the term through the Arabic sa’ada to the Greek eudaimonia, offering “beatitude” as an English translation.

3

Thus, he writes in his Introduction to Song of Songs (p. 8): “But this book, Song of Songs, guides the elite only to the way of achieving felicity, and thus its external meaning was not made useful to the masses.”

160

CHAPTER SEVEN

the overcoming of those impediments to cognition (and thus to felicity) related to immoral behavior; (b) the overcoming of those impediments caused by failure to distinguish between truth and falsehood; (c) the need to engage in speculation according to the proper order; (d) the division of the sciences (mathematics, physics, metaphysics) and how nature reflects that division; (e) characteristics of these types of sciences. Songs of Songs turns out for Gersonides to be a series of dialogues between the human material intellect and the Active Intellect, in which the former seeks its perfection with the assistance of the latter. In the Introduction to his commentary on Song of Songs, Gersonides makes the following claim: We shall begin by laying down the following premise, which encompasses everything included in this book. It is evident from the perspective of the Torah and the Prophets and from the perspective of philosophic speculation that man’s ultimate felicity resides in cognizing and knowing God to the extent that that is possible for him. This will be perfected through the observation of the state of existent beings, their order, their equilibrium, and the manner of God’s wisdom in organizing them as they are (p. 4).

Human felicity consists in the knowledge of God; one acquires that knowledge through the study of nature. Put in terms more congenial to Gersonides, one arrives at ultimate human felicity through mastery of metaphysics, to the extent that that is possible; one cannot master metaphysics till one has achieved solid grounding in physics.4 It is the point of Song of Songs, as understood by 4

Compare Maimonides, Guide of the Perplexed, Introduction, p. 9: Do you not see the following fact? God, may His mention be exalted, wished us to be perfected and the state of our societies to be improved by His laws regarding actions. Now this can come about only after the adoption of intellectual beliefs, the first of which being His apprehension, may He be exalted, according to our capacity. This, in its turn, cannot come about except through divine science and this divine science cannot become actual except after a study of natural science. This is so since natural science borders on divine science, and its study precedes that of divine science in time as has been made clear to whoever has engaged in speculation on these matters. Hence God, may He be exalted, caused His book to open with the “Account of the Beginning,” which, as we have made clear, is natural science. And because of the greatness and importance of the subject and because our capacity falls short of apprehending the greatest of subjects as it really is, –which divine wisdom

161

GERSONIDES ON THE SONG OF SONGS AND THE NATURE OF SCIENCE

Gersonides, to bring the reader to the realization that, no matter how much one wishes to study metaphysics, it cannot be done properly without first mastering oneself (ethical perfection), mathematics, and physics. Gersonides’ position here depends upon a particular understanding of the nature of science,5 an understanding on which his two central philosophical mentors, Maimonides and Averroes, are divided. In the case under discussion, Gersonides chose Averroes over Maimonides. As I will explain below, Averroes was a scientific realist in his astronomy, Maimonides an instrumentalist. The meaning and significance of this issue will be made clearer as we proceed. Let us begin, however, by focusing on another important debate between Maimonides and Gersonides. For the former, to the extent that any knowledge can bring us to perfection, it must be knowledge of metaphysical matters. For Gersonides, learning truths about the physical universe also perfects us and brings us to immortality.6 According to Gersonides we achieve our fullest realization as human beings, our felicity, through the cognition of intelligibles.7 When we do so, we obtain what Gersonides calls an “acquired intellect,” which constitutes our immortality. Maimonides and Gersonides agree that the achievement of metaphysical understanding (to the extent that it is possible8) depends upon a high has deemed necessary to convey to us– we are told about these profound matters in parables and riddles and very obscure words. On the boundary between physics and metaphysics in medieval thought, see Freudenthal, “Scope of Metaphysics.” 5

Hebrew: hokhmah; it is difficult to write on this subject without falling into anachronistic usages. The term can also be translated into modern English as “philosophy.” Hokhmah, however, can also mean a specific discipline, and as such is adequately captured by the modern term “science” when it refers to a specific scientific discipline. But here, too, the overlap in meaning is hardly isomorphic. The main problem is that between the time of Gersonides and his contemporaries and our own day the great scientific revolution of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries took place and the term “science” began carrying with it a whole new range of sociological and epistemological meanings; furthermore, the term “scientist” was coined, a usage which has no place in discussions of medieval thought.

6

For details of this debate, see Harvey, “Crescas and his Critique of Philosophic Happiness.”

7

Hebrew: muskalot. Muskal means that which is apprehended by the intellect (sekhel), i.e., things known intellectually as opposed to things apprehended by the senses. In simple terms: concepts. The use of “intelligibiles” however, preserves the medieval flavor of the text and is used in this unique sense here, whereas the English term “concept” can be used in a variety of senses.

8

The extent to which Maimonides holds that true knowledge of metaphysics (and hence

162

CHAPTER SEVEN

level of prior knowledge of physics; they further agree that one ought to proceed as far as one can along the road of intellectual perfection, a road which leads from physics on to metaphysics. They differ, however, with respect to the person who has achieved deep understanding of physics but no more: for Gersonides such a person has an acquired intellect, for Maimonides such a person does not have an acquired intellect.9 Gersonides defines the acquired intellect succinctly as “the intelligibles that accrue from abstracting material forms from their matter.”10 The acquired intellect, in other words, is really nothing other than a collection of ideas. Gersonides devotes Milhamot I.11 to a proof that “the acquired intellect is everlasting.” Gersonides there adds to our information concerning the nature of the acquired intellect, maintaining that “it is clear that the acquired intellect is the perfection of the material intellect brought about by the Active Intellect,” and that “the acquired intellect is itself the order obtaining in the sublunar world that is inherent in the Active Intellect.”11 It is not just any ideas, then, that constitute the acquired intellect, but just those ideas found in a systematic fashion in the “mind” of the Active Intellect.12 What sorts of ideas are found in the Active Intellect? Gersonides tells us in the passage just quoted: “the order obtaining in the sublunar world.” That is to say, the intelligibles which in a certain sense constitute the Active Intellect, the apprehension of which constitutes our perfection, felicity, and immortality, relate to and govern the physical world in which we live. One acquires these intelligibles, then, through the study of physics, not metaphysics.13 That is not to say immortality) is possible is debated by scholars. For recent discussions of the debate, see Stern, “Maimonides on the Growth of Knowledge” and Manekin, “Limitations of Human Knowledge.” 9

The texts on which this (fairly standard) interpretation of Maimonides is based are collected in Kellner, Perfection, pp. 1–5. See further the “parable of the palace” in Guide of the Perplexed III.51 where only those who go beyond physics to metaphysics are called “men of science.” For details on the parable, see Perfection, pp. 13–31. For modifications of the standard interpretation, see Kellner, Science, ch. 4.

10 This definition is found in Gersonides’ supercommentary to Averroes’ Epitome of the De Anima; see Mashbaum, “Gersonides’ Supercommentary,” p. 150. 11 Milhamot, p. 81 ( Wars, pp. 212-213). 12 For Gersonides’ doctrine of the intellect see ch. 9 below. 13 We study the physical universe, it should be pointed out, not so much to learn about its constituent entities themselves, but in order to understand their underlying structure. This

163

GERSONIDES ON THE SONG OF SONGS AND THE NATURE OF SCIENCE

that the study of metaphysics is disdained by Gersonides (far from it!) or that the Active Intellect itself has no metaphysical knowledge (it has knowledge of the influences of God and the separate intellects). Gersonides’ point here is that in order to “acquire an intellect” it is sufficient to become proficient in physics. Further evidence to the effect that perfection in physics is sufficient to bring one to the status of having an acquired intellect may be found in another aspect of Gersonides’ epistemology. Knowledge itself, as known by the Active Intellect, is unitary; the human (material) intellect cannot apprehend it in that fashion, however; rather, it “receives these intelligibles from the Active Intellect with difficulty because it needs the senses [in order to cognize them]; hence, it happens that it does not apprehend them as a [single] ordered system of plans, but in greatly varying degrees.”14 Knowledge, then, is not something simply imparted by the Active Intellect to the material intellect; in order to benefit from what Gersonides will later call the “emanations” of the Active Intellect, the material intellect depends upon information derived from the senses; i.e., knowledge of the physical universe. How this works in detail is spelled out in the Commentary to Song of Songs. But, when all is said and done, even if Gersonides holds that all knowledge is equal, some knowledge, withal, is “more equal” than other knowledge. follows from Gersonides’ claim (made, for example, in his commentary to Proverbs 2:7) that the nomos of existent beings is more “true” (i.e., more real, of a higher order of existence) than the beings themselves. See further the following passage in Gersonides’ commentary on Song of Songs 4:8 (p. 60): By top of Amana he hinted at the First Mover from which are emanated these natural matters as the waters of Amana emanate from the top of Amana; further, Amana indicates truth; further, that the First Mover is the cause of truth of every being other than Himself for He is the cause of the existence of everything and that which makes another thing exist is the cause of its being true. The First Mover, however, has no cause which makes it exist and thus is true in and of itself. This is so because the degree of things with respect to truth is the degree of their existence. This has already been explained in Metaphysics I. On the connection between “existence” and “truth” see Metaphysics II, 993b30: “...as each thing is in respect of being, so is it in respect of truth”; Maimonides, “Laws of the Foundations of the Torah,” I.3-4; and the discussion of Isaac Abravanel on this passage in Rosh Amanah, ch. 20. See further Fox, Interpreting, p. 243. 14 Milhamot, p. 38; Wars (p. 148) translates: “The material intellect, however, receives these objects of knowledge from the Agent Intellect with difficulty because it needs the senses [for its cognition]; hence, it happens that it does not apprehend them as an ordered system of plans, but in a diffuse and disordered way.”

164

CHAPTER SEVEN

Knowledge of the physical universe is not only valuable in and of itself, as we have seen, but also for bringing us to knowledge of God.15 In this connection, not all knowledge is equal. Gersonides writes in Wars V.i.2: ...the significance of the inquiry is proportional to the significance of the subject of the inquiry, and it is clear that the subject of this inquiry, i.e., celestial body, is the most noble of all natural bodies, and the form that moves it is the most noble of all natural forms . . .16

Similarly, see the very beginning of Gersonides’ Introduction to the Milhamot: It is clear then that a man examining this topic [i.e., creation] is engaged in no small task. For the value of the inquiry depends on the value of the subject of the inquiry; and there is no more important topic than this one, for the universe in its entirety is by far more important than anyone of its parts (p. 2; Wars, p. 91).

This approach has a clear Aristotelian basis: “The scanty conceptions to which we can attain of celestial things give us, from their excellence, more pleasure than all our knowledge of the world in which we live; just as a half glimpse of persons that we love is more delightful than an accurate view of other things, whatever their number and dimensions.”17 There is, then, a hierarchy of knowing: the study of the physical entities and processes of the sublunar world is valuable, but not as valuable as the study of the movements of the heavenly bodies (astronomy); that study, in turn, is not as noble as the study of the movers of those bodies (metaphysics).18 The most exalted of all disciplines is that part of metaphys15 Compare further Gersonides’ Commentary on Leviticus, p. 170d/355/384, where the Temple, its implements and cult, and the Sukkot festivals’ four species are all explained in terms of the lessons concerning physics we learn from them, lessons which in turn lead us to knowledge of God. See also, Commentary on Exodus, pp. 104a-105d/362-372/290-304 and my discussion in the Introduction above at footnote 41. 16 I quote the translation of Goldstein, Astronomy, p. 24. 17 See Parts of Animals i.5, 644b 31–35. 18 Thus, Gersonides says (Introduction to Song of Songs, p. 9): “Physics necessarily precedes divine science which is metaphysics since metaphysics goes further than it on the path of perfection and purpose.”

165

GERSONIDES ON THE SONG OF SONGS AND THE NATURE OF SCIENCE

ics devoted to the study, not just of the movers of the heavenly bodies, but to the study of the mover of the entire universe, God. Indeed, we opened our discussion here with a quotation from the commentary on Song of Songs, to the effect that “man’s ultimate felicity resides in cognizing and knowing God to the extent possible.” Given this perspective, it is not surprising that Gersonides holds that human beings have an inborn desire to learn as much as they can about God; indeed, this desire is so strong that individuals are occasionally led to overstep the bounds of what they can actually accomplish. In the Introduction to his commentary to Song of Songs Gersonides speaks of “the great desire which humans have to achieve the end, for this brings them to break through and enter first what should be last in order of study. In this manner, not only do they not acquire perfection, but, rather, add deficiency to their deficiency.” From Gersonides’ perspective, Solomon’s main purpose in writing Song of Songs was to restrain the overeager from over-reaching themselves, thus increasing their deficiency instead of their perfection. The erotic allegory of Song of Songs reflects the strength of this desire to know God. I opened our discussion here with the claim that for Gersonides, unlike Maimonides, one achieves intellectual perfection and thus felicity through the study of physics and not just metaphysics. But the texts we have adduced to this point lead to the conclusion that we have a strong natural desire for the study of metaphysics, that the object of such study is more noble than metaphysics, that the quality of the intelligibles acquired through the study of metaphysics is greater than those apprehended through physics, that the satisfaction and felicity attainable through metaphysics are greater than those brought about by the study of physics, and that all in all the ultimate end of human beings is to know God so far as this is possible (which knowledge, of course, is the highest level of metaphysics). All this being so, how can I claim that Gersonides in effect recommends the study of physics over metaphysics? The answer to this question lies in the fact that whereas in principle the study of metaphysics is superior to the study of physics, in practice such study is both difficult and dangerous and, more to the point (and in this Gersonides radically differs from Maimonides), in an important sense it is unnecessary: one can achieve felicity without it. 166

CHAPTER SEVEN

In his Introduction to Song of Songs (p. 6), Gersonides emphasizes the difficulties attendant upon the study of metaphysics: One ought not to ignore the fact that there is great difficulty in acquiring this stupendous felicity towards which we are disposed; so much so that its ultimate acquisition is very unlikely for any particular human being; indeed, only very few individuals can acquire even a large measure of it.

There are two reasons for this difficulty; “first, the difficulty in perfectly apprehending the states of existent beings;” i.e. the fact that achieving perfection in even the physical sciences (which perfection, of course, is a necessary first step towards the study of metaphysics) is inordinately difficult. Second, “the multiplicity of impediments which impede our attempts properly to achieve this apprehension.” These impediments themselves are of two types: the first “is the effervescence of our natures while we are young which causes us to be drawn after our physical desires.”19 The second impediment “is “the misleading [nature] of imagination and opinion which brings us to confuse substantial and accidental matters and to think that what exists does not, and vice versa.” Reverting to the first difficulty in achieving perfection in metaphysics, Gersonides specifies eight different reasons why achieving much progress in physics is difficult. Many of these eight reasons have to do with the problems in making accurate scientific observations. “Generally,” Gersonides concludes (p. 7), acquiring felicity is inordinately difficult because of the reasons just mentioned and others like them. Therefore, the Prophets and Sages never ceased guiding individuals to the way in which they could acquire felicity, each [individual] according to his ability.

It is the purpose of Song of Songs to direct the astute student towards felicity. But Song of Songs is clearly an esoteric text, the true meaning of which is known only to very few individuals. 19 Compare Maimonides, Guide of the Perplexed I. 34 (pp. 76-77) and III.51 (p. 627). Gersonides refers to this matter again in his Commentary on Leviticus, p. 171b/358/390, maintaining there, in effect, that “intellect improves with age.” The weakening of physical powers allows for strengthening of the intellect; the screen of matter is diminished in old age. The issue comes up again in the commentary to Song of Songs 8:8.

167

GERSONIDES ON THE SONG OF SONGS AND THE NATURE OF SCIENCE

Not only is it extremely difficult to achieve perfection in metaphysics, the very attempt can be dangerous. Metaphysics, Gersonides writes (p. 10), is impossible for one who is not strongly settled on the true views from the perspective of Torah and speculation, and for one the effervescence of whose nature has not quieted, lest his yearning to follow after his desires brings him to make his views in this science accord with what he sees fit, as is well known concerning Elisha Aher when he entered Pardes,20 adding to this [the fact that] the smallest mistake which occurs in this science is great from the perspective of the degree of the subject matter and [also] since the object of this science is the utmost human felicity.

The study of metaphysics is appropriate only for the individual who is well settled in his or her religious and scientific beliefs (which, for Gersonides as for Maimonides before him, are really the same21), and who has overcome the rashness of youth and the nearly overpowering desire for the satisfaction of physical cravings.22 Engaging in the study of metaphysics before these conditions are met is dangerous, as the case of Elisha ben Abuyah proves; Elisha, led astray by his lusts, allowed his desires to determine his metaphysical conclusions instead of basing them on objective reality.23 Furthermore, even small mistakes in metaphysics, since it is the most foundational of all the sciences, lead one much further from the truth than similar mistakes in more narrowly focused fields. Such mistakes are indeed likely, Gersonides adds both in the Introduction to Song of Songs and in the commentary to 8:8, since in metaphysics one “uses generally accepted premises, a characteristic of which

20 For the story of Elisha ben Abuyah, the notorious apostate Tanna, see Hagigah 15a. The phrase translated here as “with what he sees fit” is lifi mah she-ya’ut lo. A possible alternative is, “in accordance with what pleases him.” 21 For an explication and defense of this interpretation of Maimonides see Kellner, “Conception of Torah” and Kellner, Science, chs. 12-15. 22 Gersonides refers to this issue again in his commentary to Song of Songs 8:8 (p. 91), there adding that “our ancient Sages did not permit it [i.e., the study of metaphysics] to themselves except in their old age” (compare Hagigah 13a). Gersonides, who died at age 56, and who clearly began studying science at a relatively young age, apparently did not apply this stricture to himself. See also ch. 11 below. 23 Compare Maimonides, Guide of the Perplexed I.32 and Diamond, “Failed Theodicy.”

168

CHAPTER SEVEN

in most cases is that one may find demonstrations on their basis for both a thing and its opposite.”24 Apprehension of metaphysical truth, then, is inordinately difficult and the attempt is fraught with serious dangers: heresy and scientific mistakes.25 These dangers and difficulties lead Maimonides to become an intellectual elitist and philosophical esotericist: very few people are and ought to be privy to the truth; this truth must be hidden from the masses, for whom it is dangerous and destructive.26 Gersonides affirms the difficulties and dangers, but seems much less of an overt elitist than Maimonides, and explicitly rejects philosophical esotericism.27 Furthermore, and connected to these points, Gersonides, as I have noted above, and unlike Maimonides, affirms the possibility of achieving an acquired intellect (and thus immortality) through the study of physics alone, without the successful study of metaphysics demanded by Maimonides. These differences between Gersonides and Maimonides relate to a debate between them concerning the nature of science.28 In the Guide of the Perplexed (II.24, p. 236) Maimonides raises a question about epicycles which he answers in the following fashion: However, I have already explained to you by word of mouth that all this does not affect the astronomer. For his purpose is not to tell us in which way the spheres truly are, but to posit an astronomical system in which it would be possible for the motions to be circular and uniform and to correspond to what is apprehended through sight, regardless of whether or not things are thus in fact.

What is Maimonides talking about here? He seems to be saying that astronomers are not interested in what actually happens in the skies, only in 24 I quote the commentary to 8:8, p. 91. 25 It ought to be pointed out that for Maimonides and Gersonides heresy is itself first and foremost a scientific mistake. The point is made by Gersonides in his commentary on Genesis, p. 18d/80/146. See also Gersonides’ commentaries to Proverbs 11:18, 20:26, and 23:5. Explaining this point with respect to Maimonides would take us too far afield; I refer the reader to the discussions in Kellner, Confrontation, ch. 2. 26 On the connection between esotericism and elitism in Maimonides, see Kellner, Confrontation, p. 16. 27 See my Introduction above. 28 This point was raised first by Freudenthal, “Felicity.” My indebtedness to Freudenthal here is considerable.

169

GERSONIDES ON THE SONG OF SONGS AND THE NATURE OF SCIENCE

our ability to provide a model of what happens and, one assumes, to predict astral phenomena. This is precisely Maimonides’ position. In order to understand it, we must take a brief glance at the long running debate over the nature of science in general and of astronomy in particular briefly introduced in the last chapter. Pierre Duhem focussed attention on the question in his well-known monograph, To Save the Phenomena.29 Duhem distinguishes between two approaches to astronomy in the ancient and medieval worlds, the formalistic and the realistic. The formalistic or instrumentalist, utilitarian approach follows Plato and Ptolemy.30 According to it, our models of planetary motions are nothing other than mathematical constructs designed to facilitate our calculations; they are not meant to describe the “real world” as such. The formalistic approach was interested only in “saving the phenomena” (i.e., describing and calculating the occurrence of specific phenomena). The second or “realistic” approach followed Aristotle in affirming that our astronomy ought to reflect physical reality.31 On this issue Maimonides placed himself firmly in the formalist camp.32 That is the brunt of the passage just quoted from II.24. Duhem points out that Maimonides was the only Arabic writer to adopt the Platonic idea that 29 Duhem’s account of the status of astronomical hypotheses in the classical world has been called into question by Lloyd, “Saving the Appearances.” For further reservations see the next two notes. 30 Or so Duhem thought; he was apparently wrong about Ptolemy. See Goldstein, “The Arabic Version.” 31 As we shall see immediately, Duhem’s distinction is very helpful for understanding Maimonides; that does not mean that he is necessarily correct in the way in which he applies it across the board through the entire history of medieval science. For criticism of Duhem’s understanding of astronomy in the sixteenth century see Jardine, Birth, pp. 225–57. 32 For a discussion of this issue, see Bechler, “The Methodological Basis.” I am not convinced by Bechler’s claim that Maimonides’s main intent here was to undermine the authority of Aristotle generally so as to make the conflict between Aristotelian philosophy and Judaism less severe. The claim that Maimonides was a formalist is criticized by Langermann, “True Perplexity.” It is Langermann’s opinion, expressed to me in personal communication, that there is no value in applying the realist/formalist distinction to medieval science in general and to seeing Maimonides as a formalist in particular. Some of my reasons for questioning Prof. Langermann’s approach with respect to Maimonides are spelled out in Science, chs. 12-14. I think that it is further useful to note that Maimonides takes what might be called a “formalist” approach to halakhah (See Kellner, Confrontation, ch. 2) which fits well with his views of astronomy. Gersonides, on the other hand, was what might be called an halakhic

170

CHAPTER SEVEN

astronomical hypotheses are not judgments bearing on the nature of things; that it is not necessary that they be deducible from the principles of physics, nor even that they be in harmony with these principles; that it is not necessary that they allow of representation by means of suitably arranged rigid bodies revolving one on the other, because, as geometric fictions they have no function except that of saving the appearances.

Duhem continues: The idea that dominates all of Maimonides’ astronomical discussions –a new idea within Semitic Peripateticism, and one which, in this milieu, surprises by its sagaciously skeptical tendencies– is the one suggested by Ptolemy and developed by Proclus: The knowledge of heavenly things, in their essence and true nature, is beyond man’s capacities; sublunary things alone are accessible to our feeble understanding (pp. 32–35).

Maimonides expresses himself quite clearly on this in another passage: Know with regard to the astronomical matters mentioned that if an exclusively mathematical-minded man reads and understands them, he will think that they form a cogent demonstration that the form and number of the spheres is as stated. Now things are not like this, and this is not what is sought in the science of astronomy… But there has been no demonstration whether the sun has an eccentric sphere or an epicycle. Now the master of astronomy does not mind this, for the object of that science is to suppose as a hypothesis an astronomy that renders it possible for the motion of the star to be uniform and circular with no acceleration or deceleration or change in it and to have the inferences necessarily following from the assumption of that motion agree with what is observed (II.11, pp. 273-274).

Why does Maimonides reject the realistic approach to astronomy? “The heavens are the heavens of the Lord,” Maimonides quotes from Psalms 115:16, but the earth hath He given to the sons of man. I mean thereby that the deity alone fully knows the true reality, the nature, the substance, the form, the realist. My student Mr. Oded Horetzky is writing a dissertation on this distinction.

171

GERSONIDES ON THE SONG OF SONGS AND THE NATURE OF SCIENCE

motions, and the causes of the heavens... For it is impossible for us to accede to the points starting from which conclusions may be drawn about the heavens; for the latter are too far away from us and too high in place and rank (II. 24, p. 327).33

As is well-known, Maimonides places severe limits on the extent of human knowledge. Knowledge of the heavens is literally beyond our ken. This is not a matter of “sagacious skepticism,” as Duhem would have it, but of central religious importance to Maimonides. Insisting on the limitations of human knowledge, and emphasizing the absolutely qualitatively different characters of divine and human knowledge, allows Maimonides to eat his cake and have it too with respect to any number of theological problems. Breaking with the school of Andalusian Aristotelianism on this matter was absolutely crucial to Maimonides. It was more than simply criticizing Aristotle’s celestial physics so as to make the refutation of his arguments for the eternity of the world easier; it was a central element in the edifice Maimonides was trying to construct, an edifice in which the “foundation of all [religious] foundations” was equivalent to the “pillar of all the [Greek/Arab] sciences.34 In order to harmonize Torah and (Aristotelian) science Maimonides had to draw narrow limits around what we can in principle know. His formalistic astronomy is a further expression of this.35 Gersonides, unlike Maimonides, was a realist in his approach to science.36 This is made evident in a number of ways. Gad Freudenthal has drawn our 33 Compare Duhem’s explanation: “The beings with which the first of these two kinds of physics deals are regarded as of a nature infinitely higher than that with which the second physics deals; hence the inference that the former is incomparably more difficult than the latter. Proclus teaches that sublunary physics is accessible to man, whereas celestial physics passes his understanding and is reserved for the Divine. Maimonides shares this view of Proclus; celestial physics, according to him, is full of mysteries the knowledge of which God has kept unto Himself; but terrestrial physics, fully worked out, is available in the work of Aristotle.” Duhem then makes the following interesting observation, “Yet, contrary to what the men of antiquity and the Middle Ages thought, the celestial physics they had constructed was singularly more advanced than their terrestrial physics” (p. 114). 34 Laws of the Foundations of the Torah,” I.1 , as interpreted by Abravanel, Principles, p. 76 (chapter 5, 4th objection). 35 The ideas in this paragraph are also addressed above in ch. 6. 36 In this, he followed his other master, Averroes. For an important discussion of the exact nature of Averroes’ position, see Sabra, “The Andalusian Revolt.”

172

CHAPTER SEVEN

attention to several of them;37 these include the nature of Gersonides’ astronomy, the fact that the study of astronomy leads to an understanding of God’s providence (which, for Gersonides, works through the motions of the heavenly bodies), and the fact, as was demonstrated above, that for Gersonides all true knowledge, not just knowledge of metaphysics, leads to felicity and immortality. It should be noted that in imputing scientific realism to Gersonides and scientific formalism to Maimonides I am not claiming that they were clearly aware of the distinction or that they explicitly adopted one or the other of the two positions. I am claiming, rather, that the distinction helps us to understand their differing approaches to science. We may strengthen the claim for Gersonides’ scientific realism by taking note of two further debates of his with Maimonides, one concerning the closure (or perfectibility) of the sciences, and the second concerning God’s attributes. We will then use Gersonides’ realism to explain an otherwise difficult text in his commentary on Song of Songs. In line with his scientific instrumentalism, and in concert with certain religious claims of his, Maimonides adopted the claim that the science of astronomy can never reach completion or closure.38 What does it mean for a science to reach completion or closure, to reach the state of perfection? The idea of the closure of the sciences involves the claim that one can reach a point where there is nothing new to be learned in a given branch of knowledge. This is a particularly medieval idea: few working scientists today would claim that they could ever (practically, if not necessarily theoretically)39 achieve a complete and once for all account of some aspect of science.40 37 Freudenthal, “Felicity.” 38 This point is proved in Science, ch. 13. 39 On this subject see Rescher, Limits of Science. 40 In modern philosophy of science this view has been particularly emphasized by Karl R. Popper, who called his autobiography, Unended Quest. See, for example, p. 131: “This is why the evolution of physics is likely to be an endless process of correction and better approximation. And even if one day we should reach a stage where our theories were no longer open to correction, since they were simply true, they would still not be complete – and we would know it. For Goedel’s famous incompleteness theorem would come into play: in view of the mathematical background of physics, at best an infinite sequence of such true theories would be needed in order to answer the problems which in any given (formalized)

173

GERSONIDES ON THE SONG OF SONGS AND THE NATURE OF SCIENCE

The reason for this has to do with modern conceptions of science as process, not product, and, overall, with the question of the perfectibility of science. While other sciences might reach closure, Maimonides held that astronomy could not. But Gersonides, as we have seen, clearly held that it could: That which adds publicity and perfection to what has been made clear concerning the creation of the world is that we find that all that has been written in the sciences is new and recent. We find that the early [savants] said something about each science; afterwards each was perfected during the course of time. We find sciences which did not reach their perfection till Aristotle and others which did not reach their perfection till Galen. There is another science which we do not find perfectly in the work of any of the ancients; this is the science of astronomy. [All this shows that] a science which demands more time for its perfection because of what you must determine concerning it from the senses reaches its perfection later. Thus, the mathematical sciences, such as geometry and arithmetic are found earlier than other sciences. Aristotle’s predecessors already expressed them perfectly, according to what is told about them. Physical science, on the other hand, because of its greater need of the senses, reached its perfection later. Thus the art of medicine, which is more dependent upon the senses, especially with respect to what is learned in it from the senses and from dissection, reached perfection still later. But astronomy, which depends upon the senses in such a fashion that its perfection through them can come about only after a stupendously long time, reaches its perfection even later. Since these sciences bring a man along the route to perfection, and he naturally desires them, it cannot [therefore] be said [both] that the human race is uncreated and that these sciences were discovered by them recently, for were the matter so we would be faced with a possibility which only became actualized after the passage of an infinite period of time, despite the existence of many natural implements for bringing it into actuality, and of humankind’s extremely strong natural desire to actualize it. This is clearly absurd.41

theory would be undecidable.” Stephen Hawking is notorious for holding the opposed view that we will soon achieve knowledge of all the fundamental equations of reality. 41 Gersonides, Milhamot VI.i.15, p. 356 (Wars, p. 314)

174

CHAPTER SEVEN

Sciences in principle can reach closure; the problem in reaching it is purely practical. The more a science depends upon observations of the physical world, and the more difficult these observations are to obtain, the later will a given science reach closure or perfection. Thus, Aristotle’s predecessors perfected the mathematical sciences, Aristotle perfected physics, and Galen brought medicine to a state of closure. The one important science still unperfected in Gersonides’ day was astronomy.42 The notion of the perfectibility or closure of astronomy involves the claim that one can achieve true information about and understanding of astronomical matters; the study of astronomy is not just the attempt to “save the phenomena;” it is the attempt to achieve actual, objective truth about a class of related phenomena. Gersonides’ claims about the perfectibility of astronomy further confirm our understanding of him as a scientific realist. There is an important metaphysical underpinning to this debate. Maimonides’ instrumentalism in astronomy limits us in what we can know of metaphysics;43 this, in turn, supports his arguments about what we can meaningfully say about God. By limiting our ability to talk meaningfully about God, Maimonides solves a considerable number of serious theological problems. For example, the problem of evil in the world is ultimately solved by recourse to the fact that we cannot in principle know why God created the world as it is; the problem of God’s knowledge of particulars versus human freedom is ultimately solved by affirming that we can never understand how God’s knowledge works; similarly for the problem of God’s will; Maimonides’s philosophical agnosticism concerning the creation of the universe can also be traced back to his theory of attributes.44 Gersonides, on the other hand, widens the area in which we can achieve actual knowledge: there is actual true information that we can learn about God, the separate intellects, the heavenly bodies, and their movements. This position supports and is supported by his scientific realism. Studying the heavens does more than give us a tool for making predictions; it provides us with real knowledge 42 And thus, perhaps, his devotion to that science; Freudenthal (“Felicity,” p. 64), opines that Gersonides spent more time on his astronomical observations than on all his other pursuits combined. 43 Astronomy deals with the motions of the heavenly bodies; metaphysics with their movers. 44 For details, see Wolfson, “Maimonides and Gersonides on Divine Attributes.”

175

GERSONIDES ON THE SONG OF SONGS AND THE NATURE OF SCIENCE

about the heavenly bodies and their movers – it thus allows us to acquire intelligibles of a very high and noble degree, adding significantly to our felicity. An interesting indication of Gersonides’ scientific realism may be found in the following passage in the Introduction to his commentary on Song of Songs (pp. 8-9): But this book, Song of Songs, guides only the elite to the way of achieving felicity and thus its external meaning was not made useful to the masses. According to our understanding of its words, it first referred to the overcoming of impediments consequent upon moral deficiency, for this is what ought to come first, as was noted above. After this, it referred to the overcoming of impediments consequent upon the failure to distinguish between truth and falsehood. After this, it referred to the preparation for speculation according to the proper order of three kinds, as Aristotle mentioned in many places: one kind deals with body and what is abstracted from body in speech only, not in reality, as you will find concerning mathematical things; one kind deals with body and what is not abstracted from body in speech, as in the case of physics, for the study there of form deals with it insofar as it is a perfection of matter, and matter is studied in physics insofar as it is a substratum for form; one kind does not deal with body at all, neither in speech nor in reality, as is the case with metaphysics.

We have before us a classification of the sciences, presented in the order: mathematics, physics, metaphysics. Gersonides claims that this classification is Aristotelian. In actual fact, however, Aristotle presents the sciences in the following order: physics, mathematics, metaphysics.45 H. A. Wolfson takes note of similar discrepancies, and seeks to solve them “by the distinction between the arrangement of these sciences according to the order of importance and their arrangement according to the order of study.”46 This solution does not hold good for Gersonides’ arrangement here which, as he argues in the continuation of the passage just cited, not only reflects the proper order of study, but also the order of existence. 45 See, for example, Metaphysics VI.l and the studies of H. A. Wolfson: “Classification” and “Note on Maimonides’ Classification.” 46 See p. 516 of the first study cited in the previous note.

176

CHAPTER SEVEN

Furthermore, Gersonides presents the sciences in the same order in his commentary to Song of Songs 2:17 and in the Introduction to the Milhamot.47 Moreover, Gersonides divides the fifth treatise of the Milhamot into three parts, maintaining (in the last chapter of that treatise, V.iii.14, pp. 290-291; Wars, p. 192) that each part of Treatise V deals with one of the sciences, “for the sciences altogether are three, mathematics, physics, metaphysics, as Aristotle mentioned in many places.”48 In his discussion of this division of the sciences in the Introduction to his commentary on Song of Songs, Gersonides explains it by noting that he presents the sciences in descending order of verifiability: we are more certain of our results in mathematics than in physics, and more certain of our results in physics than in metaphysics.49 There is, however, another reason for the order in which Gersonides presents the sciences, one which also explains the presentation in the Introduction to the Milhamot and the division of the parts of Treatise V. This division of the sciences, unsupported as it may be by texts in Aristotle or the Aristotelian tradition, makes excellent sense in the context of a realist approach to science. Mathematics teaches us about relations, while physics and metaphysics teach us true information about real entities. Dividing metaphysics from physics by placing 47 P. 3; Wars, p. 92 and p. 7; Wars, p. 99. If we follow Feldman’s emendation of the second text, then there too Gersonides presents mathematics as preceding physics both “in order [of knowledge] and by nature.” 48 Joseph ben Judah ibn Aknin presents a similar classification of the sciences in chapter 27 of his (Arabic) “Hygiene of the Soul.” An English translation of the passage in question may be found in Marcus, The Jew, p. 375: These studies are divided into three groups. The first group is normally dependent upon matter, but can, however, be separated from matter through concept and imagination. This class comprises the mathematical sciences. In the second group speculation cannot be conceived of apart from the material, either through imagination or conception. To this section belong the natural sciences. The third group has nothing to do with matter and has no material attributes; this group includes in itself metaphysics as such. There is no reason to assume that Gersonides had any knowledge of ibn Aknin’s text; it is hardly credible that it served as the source for Gersonides’ unusual division of the sciences. 49 Gersonides’ discussion is analyzed by Feldman, “Wisdom of Solomon,” pp. 73–76. In his discussion Feldman emphasizes Gersonides’ implied claim that while he presents the sciences in descending order of verifiability, they are thus presented in ascending order of ontological significance.

177

GERSONIDES ON THE SONG OF SONGS AND THE NATURE OF SCIENCE

mathematics in the middle (as did Aristotle) confuses a significant issue. Physics and metaphysics both seek to provide actual information about the entities they deal with, and dividing them by placing between them a science which deals with properties abstracted from real entities50 confuses this important issue. Furthermore, in an important sense, Gersonides held that the objects of the physical sciences are more real than the objects of mathematics, while the objects of metaphysics are more real than the objects of physics.51 Thus, it makes sense to place them in that order. Mathematics/ physics/ metaphysics are thus listed in the ascending order of the reality of their objects. But if Gersonides understood physics in an instrumentalist fashion, then its objects are in truth no more real than the objects of mathematics and the traditional Aristotelian order: physics/ mathematics/ metaphysics, would make as much sense as the order presented by Gersonides. Defending a realist as opposed to instrumentalist view of science was not an explicit issue for Gersonides, although it was one which both reflected and shaped issues of fundamental philosophical and theological concern for him, as seen above. The hierarchy, mathematics, physics, metaphysics, makes excellent sense on the basis of a realist view of science and Gersonides’ adoption of it lends further support to the claim that his vision of the nature of science was indeed realist, not instrumentalist or formalist. Indirect expression of this point can be found in Gersonides’ commentaries to Song of Songs 4:6 and 4:8. In the former (p. 57), he explains that the mathematical sciences are not “intended for themselves, but [are intended] in order to direct [one] to physics and metaphysics.” Mathematics, that is, serves as an introduction to or propadeutic for physics and metaphysics. These two latter sciences are distinguished from mathematics by bringing one to the acquisition of intelligibles, enabling some form of connection with the Active Intellect (4:8, p. 59): “He called her bride because this is the beginning of his joining together with her in an essentially fruitful joining. This is not the case with respect to the mathematical sciences. 50 This is the way Gersonides described mathematics in his commentary to Song of Songs 2:17: “By mountains of spices he meant division and abstraction, [which are] the mathematical sciences. This is so because with them one renders abstract in speech that which is not abstract in existence. He used the plural here because the mathematical sciences are many.” 51 By “more real” here, I mean that they stand on a higher plane of ontological existence. See the discussion above, in note 13.

178

CHAPTER SEVEN

This is clear to anyone who has deeply researched the matter of the faculties of the soul.” The mathematical sciences, as opposed to physics and metaphysics, do not bring one to the apprehension of those truths which result in “fruit.” It is his realist conception of science that brings Gersonides to make this distinction. Attributing a realist understanding of science to Gersonides, then, makes his division of the sciences more comprehensible. Were we to attribute an instrumentalist view of science to Gersonides, on the other hand, we would be hard-pressed to understand why he deviates from the standard Aristotelian division of the sciences.52 Gersonides’ commentary on Song of Songs, as an attempt to explicate what Gersonides takes to be the peshat of the text, is thus an excellent example of his overall approach which sees what we today would call science and religion as one. In his commentary we see him giving expression, directly or indirectly, to his realist conception of science, and his view that the various sciences can reach completion or perfection. Construing Song of Songs as both a guide to human perfection and an attempt at restraining the unprepared from overreaching themselves in their attempt to gain that perfection, Gersonides gives expression to his realist conception of science. According to this conception, the study of physics (including, most emphatically, astronomy) leads one to perfection. This view diverges from that of Maimonides according to whom human perfection, to the extent that it is attainable at all, depends upon the study of metaphysics. Gersonides’ realist view of science is connected to his conception of science as an enterprise capable in principle of reaching completion or closure. This realist conception also underlies Gersonides’ unusual division of the sciences: mathematics, physics, metaphysics, as opposed to the more common division: physics, mathematics, metaphysics. But, above all, the commentary on Song of Songs gives dramatic expression to Gersonides’ views on the salvific character of the study of physics. 52 Tzvi Langermann drew my attention to an interesting point which ought to be raised in this connection. In the various places where Gersonides discusses the division of the sciences he consistently speaks of mathematics, physics, and metaphysics but consistently fails to mention a science to which he devoted much thought, attention, and originality, namely, astrology. A reason for this which suggests itself to me may be in an early version of the contemporary distinction between basic and applied science: astrology is the “fruit” of metaphysics (for details, see Langermann, “Review,” p. 316). As such, it is not so much a science in and of itself as the application of science and therefore should not figure in the ordering of the sciences themselves.

179

CHAPTER EIGHT Politics and Perfection: Gersonides vs. Maimonides

G

ersonides is consistent in seeing the pure life of the mind as the highest end to which a human being can aspire. Maimonides certainly presented the vita contemplativa as a crucially important goal but made room in his view of the perfected life for what we would call today statesmanship or politics.1 This chapter compares Gersonides’ pure intellectualism with Maimonides’ modified intellectualism. Gersonides’ view is surprising because it is so much at variance with the dominant strains of what may be called the political theology of medieval Jewish and Muslim Aristotelianism. Gersonides, it appears, was the only medieval Jew or Muslim who followed neither the Platonic path charted in Islam by al-Farabi and in Judaism by Maimonides, nor the position held by ibn Bajja. Nor was he decisively influenced by Aristotle’s Politics as were so many of his Christian contemporaries. Putting the matter crudely for the moment, the Platonists called for some sort of integration between the vita contemplativa and the vita activa, the Aristotelians called for their separation, while ibn Bajja called upon the philosopher to withdraw entirely from society. Gersonides, as we shall see, charted a fourth path. With respect to the question of the political component of the

1

For a discussion of Maimonides’ views on this subject, see Kellner, Perfection. I should emphasize that the view of Maimonides presented in this chapter is, like every presentation of Maimonides, emphatically an interpretation of his thought. Some interpreters (such as Leo Strauss, Shlomo Pines, and Lawrence Berman) would argue that I understate the political element in Maimonides’ view of human perfection while yet others (such as Hermann Cohen, Julius Guttmann, and Steven Schwarzschild) would insist that I overstate politics at the expense of morality. Yet other interpreters (such as Isaac Husik and, it would appear, H. A. Wolfson) would maintain that I overemphasize matters of practical perfection (politics or morality) at the expense of intellectual perfection. For details, and a defense of the interpretation of Maimonides assumed here, see Perfection.

181

POLITICS AND PERFECTION: GERSONIDES VS. MAIMONIDES

perfected life Gersonides was, as with so many other issues, emphatically his own man. It fell to the lot of Leo Strauss to set the tone and direction for much of the twentieth century’s scholarship on medieval Jewish and Muslim political thought. One of the clearest statements of his position is found in “How to Begin to Study Medieval Philosophy”: “Religion is conceived by Muslims and Jews primarily as a law. Accordingly, religion enters the horizon of the philosophers primarily as a political fact. Therefore, the philosophic discipline dealing with religion is not philosophy of religion, but political philosophy or political science.”2 Strauss points out that the political science in question is Platonic, and this divides the Muslim/Jewish world from the world of Christian scholasticism, “whereas the classic political science in the Western world was Aristotle’s Politics, the classics of political science in the Islamic-Jewish world were the Republic and the Laws. In fact, Aristotle’s Politics was unknown to the Islamic-Jewish world,3 and the Republic and the Laws made their appearance in Christian Europe not before the fifteenth century.” Muslims and Jews, of course, considered their laws to be divine, laws “given by God to men by the intermediary of a prophet. The prophet is interpreted by al-Farabi, Avicenna, and Maimonides in terms of the Platonic philosopher-king; as the founder of the perfect political community.” Ever since Augustine, and in radical contrast to the Muslim/Jewish approach, medieval Christianity had distinguished the city of God from the city of man, using the doctrine of the “two swords” to distinguish the spiritual from the temporal realms.4 If Plato sought to define the ideal Republic, al-Farabi, 2

See Strauss, Rebirth, p. 223.

3

Shlomo Pines has shown this claim to be somewhat exaggerated, but Pines’ findings do not undermine the basic correctness of Strauss’ generalization. See Pines, “Aristotle’s Politics.”

4

Here is a typical expression of the idea from Aquinas: The ministry of this kingdom is entrusted not to the rulers of this earth but to priests, so that temporal affairs may remain distinct from those spiritual: and, in particular, it is delegated to the High Priest, the successor of Peter and Vicar of Christ, the Roman Pontiff: to whom all kings in Christendom should be subject, as to the Lord Jesus Christ Himself. For those who are concerned with the subordinate ends of life must be subject to him who is concerned with the supreme end and be directed by his command.

182

CHAPTER EIGHT

the Virtuous City, and Maimonides the constitution of the best Jewish state (in the Mishneh Torah)5 all in this world, medieval Christian thought tended to defer the actualization of the city of God to another dispensation. As Abraham Melamed put it, …medieval Christianity inclined, as did Aristotle in the Politics, to see the political sphere as separate and independent, concerned with human laws and temporal rule. This sphere was largely isolated from divine law and affairs of spiritual authority, which were deemed non-political or supra-political. By contrast, Judaism and Islam, as Strauss pointed out, laid distinct stress on the political quality of the revelation, which as divine law. The founding prophet was also lawgiver and political leader.6

The notion of the philosopher/king/prophet7 became a standard trope in post-Maimonidean medieval Jewish thought; in consequence, Maimonides and his followers saw political involvement or statesmanship as one of the requirements for the perfected life. Gersonides stands in stark contrast to this consensus.8 He did not, however, stand alone. The Muslim philosopher ibn Bajja called for the withdrawal of the philosopher from society to the greatest extent possible. His “Governance of the Solitary” was taken as a model by Jewish thinkers such as Samuel ibn Tibbon, Moses Narboni, Joseph ibn Kaspi, and others.9 Ibn Bajja’s position in the Islamic world, it should be noted, was so unusual that in his Political Thought in Medieval Islam, Erwin I.J. Rosenthal See Aquinas, Selected Political Writings, pp. 75-77. 5

On this, see Kraemer, “Alfarabi’s Opinions.”

6

Melamed, Philosospher-King, p. 3. See further, Rosenthal, Political Thought, p. 14: “In Islam the ruler combines political with spiritual authority; in Christianity the functions are divided between the emperor and the pope; in Judaism authority rests with the rabbis until the Messianic kingdom is established.”

7

Paralleling al-Farabi’s well-known and oft-quoted affirmation that “the meaning of the imam, of the philosopher, and of the lawgiver is identical.” See al-Farabi’s “Attainment of Happiness,” in Lerner and Mahdi, Medieval Political Philosophy, p. 47.

8

Lerner and Mahdi (pp. 16-17) maintain that Jewish thinkers influenced by Latin Christians base themselves on Aristotle’s Politics, not on Plato’s Republic; Melamed, “Aristotle’s Politics,” convincingly refutes their contention. While Gersonides indeed stands outside of the Muslim/Jewish philosophical mainstream on this issue, it is not because of his preference for the Politics over the Republic. I shall revert to this issue below.

9

For details, see Melamed, Philosopher King, ch. 3, section 3.

183

POLITICS AND PERFECTION: GERSONIDES VS. MAIMONIDES

called his chapter on ibn Bajja, “Ibn Bajja: Individualist Deviation.” Its impact on the Jewish world, as Melamed shows, however, was far from inconsequential and some medievals wanted to read Maimonides in the light of ibn Bajja’s doctrines. In his first comment on Guide of the Perplexed III.51, for example, Efodi says that the chapter deals with hanhagat ha-mitboded (i.e., the governance of the solitary individual), a clear reference to ibn Bajja’s book of that name.10 Gersonides, as we shall see, was no more a follower of ibn Bajja and his Jewish enthusiasts than he was of Maimonides. Leo Strauss, Shlomo Pines, and Lawrence Berman have repeatedly drawn attention to the important Platonic/al-Farabian elements in Maimonides’ thinking, especially concerning the centrality of statesmanship or political involvement in the perfected life. I have argued that they have collectively over-emphasized this aspect of Maimonides’ thought, painting him as more the disiciple of al-Farabi than as the disciple of Moses.11 While thus differing from Strauss, Pines, and Berman on the weight Maimonides gave to the political element in the perfected life, I do not deny that to one extent or another it does play an important role for him.12 This point is examined here, so as better to be able to compare Gersonides with Maimonides. For our purposes, two related issues in Maimonides are crucial: the nature of prophecy and the nature of human perfection. Maimonides discusses the nature of prophecy in many places, including the introduction to his Commentary on the Mishnah, in his Thirteen Principles of Faith, in “Laws of the Foundations of the Torah,” in his “Epistle to Yemen,” and, most extensively, in the Guide of the Perplexed, Part Two, chapters 32 through 48. We will concentrate on that discussion, since it represents Maimonides’ most complete exposition of the subject. Given that Maimonides’ ideas on prophecy are wellknown,13 we will focus only on those issues which emphasize the political aspect of the perfected life and which illuminate the ways in which Gersonides differs from Maimonides.

10 Further on this see Blumberg, “Alfarabi.” 11 This is one of the main theses of Kellner, Perfection. 12 Blidstein, Ekronot Medini’im. 13 See Kreisel, Prophecy.

184

CHAPTER EIGHT

Maimonides understands prophecy to be “a certain perfection in the nature of man” (II.32, p. 361). In Chapter 36 Maimonides makes clear what the nature of that perfection is: Know that the true reality and quiddity of prophecy consists in its being an overflow overflowing from God, may He be cherished and honored, through the intermediation of the Active Intellect, toward the rational faculty in the first place and thereafter toward the imaginative faculty. This is the highest degree of man and the ultimate term of perfection that can exist for his species; and this state is the ultimate perfection for the imaginative faculty. This is something that cannot by any means exist in every man. And it is not something that can be attained solely through perfection in the speculative sciences and through the improvement of the moral habits, even if all of them have become as fine and good as can be. There still is needed in addition the highest possible degree of perfection of the imaginative faculty in respect of its original natural disposition (p. 369).

Prophecy, then, results from an emanation from God through the Active Intellect upon the human rational faculty; this emanation is “rich” enough not only to fructify the rational faculty, but continues “overflowing” on to the imaginative faculty. For a person to prophesy it is not enough that he or she have perfected morals and “perfection in the speculative sciences”; the aspirant to prophecy must also have the highest possible degree of perfection of the imaginative faculty. Why this emphasis on the imaginative faculty (which is mentioned three times in the passage just quoted)? One of the reasons is that Maimonides construes the difference between veridical dreams and prophecy to be “only a difference in degree” (II.37, p. 370). This is a consequence of Maimonides’ concern here to distinguish veridical dreams and prophecy, on the one hand, from Mosaic prophecy, on the other; by assimilating prophecy to other similar phenomena, Maimonides can draw the line between such phenomena and Mosaic prophecy that much more sharply.14 14 Gersonides, on the other hand, is more concerned to distinguish prophecy from veridical dreams and divination (and, generally, less concerned to distinguish Mosaic prophecy from “normal” prophecy); see below and also ch. 2 above.

185

POLITICS AND PERFECTION: GERSONIDES VS. MAIMONIDES

For our purposes, however, there is a more important reason for this emphasis. In II.37 Maimonides explains that the same divine emanation can stimulate three sorts of responses, each conditioned by the characteristics of the person who benefits from the emanation. Cases where the emanation reaches the rational faculty alone, and does not spill over, as it were, on to the imaginative faculty, are “characteristic of the men of science engaged in speculation;” i.e., of philosophers (p. 374).15 If, on the other hand, “the overflow only reaches the imaginative faculty ... this is characteristic of the class of those who govern cities, while being the legislators, the soothsayers, the augers, and the dreamers of veridical dreams” (p. 374). Prophets are those individuals who, thanks to the natural perfection of their constitutions, the perfection of their morals, and the perfection of their intellects, are such “that this overflow reaches both faculties – I mean both the rational and the imaginative” (p. 374). The prophet, therefore, is not only a philosopher, but he or she must also be a statesman (II.36, p. 372): Now there is no doubt that whenever –in an individual of this description– his imaginative faculty, which is as perfect as possible, acts and receives from the intellect an overflow corresponding to his speculative perfection, this individual will apprehend divine and most extraordinary matters, will only see God and His angels, and will only be aware and achieve knowledge of matters that constitute true opinions and general directives for the well-being of men in relations with one another.

What constitutes “the well-being of men in relations with one another”? In Guide of the Perplexed III.27 (p. 510), Maimonides seems to answer that question: The Law [i.e., the Torah] as a whole aims at two things: the welfare of the soul and the welfare of the body.... As for the welfare of the body, it comes about by improvement of their ways of living with one another. This is achieved through two things. One of them is the abolition of their wronging each other. This is tantamount to every individual among the people not being permitted to act according to his will and up to the limits of his power, but being forced to do 15 People whom today we would call scientists.

186

CHAPTER EIGHT

that which is useful to the whole. The second thing consists in the acquisition by every human individual of moral qualities that are useful for life in society so that the affairs of the city may be ordered.... [The welfare of the body] consists in the governance of the city and the well-being of the states of all its people according to their capacity.

The concern of the prophet for “the well-being of men in relations with one another” is not then simply the concern of a religious leader for the spiritual health of his or her individual contemporaries (which can be achieved in isolation), but is, rather, the concern of a political leader for the well-being of his or her state. Not every prophet, however, is concerned with the well-being of states or even of other individuals. Maimonides discusses such persons in II.37. “Sometimes the prophetic revelation that comes to a prophet,” he says, “only renders him perfect and has no other effect. And sometimes the prophetic revelation that comes to him compels him to address a call to the people, teach them, and let his own perfection overflow toward them” (p. 375). This ought not to be construed as some sort of retreat from the Platonic/al-Farabian structure we have seen to this point, according to which the perfected life contains some component of statesmanship or politics. Individuals who benefit from the divine emanation but are not led to benefit others may indeed be called prophets since they benefit from the divine emanation; but their level of perfection is inferior to that of prophets who feel compelled to improve the states and societies in which they live. As Maimonides says, some individuals “achieve perfection to an extent that enables them to govern others, whereas others achieve perfection only in a measure that allows them to be governed by others, as we have explained” (p. 374; emphasis added). Let us recall that in Guide II.36 (p. 369), speaking of prophecy, Maimonides said: “This is the highest degree of man and the ultimate term of perfection that can exist for his species.” The prophet, therefore, represents the ideal towards which humans ought to aspire and part and parcel of being any but the most inferior of prophets, as we have seen, involves statesmanship or political involvement.16 16 We have focused here on one small aspect of a large and complex issue in Maimonides; for a fuller statement of the issues involved, and an argument to the effect that over and above moral and intellectual perfection and statesmanship the truly perfected life for a Jew,

187

POLITICS AND PERFECTION: GERSONIDES VS. MAIMONIDES

None of this should be at all surprising. Medieval Jewish political thought –one of the main architects of which was Maimonides– followed the Platonic tradition in seeing the ideal ruler as a philosopher-king, and followed the Jewish tradition in both refusing to divorce political from spiritual leadership and in refusing to see the world as we know it as beyond repair. The religiously perfected individual (which for Maimonides meant the philosophically perfected individual) as such had to be concerned with the governance of state and society. What is surprising is the way in which Gersonides virtually ignored this aspect of medieval Jewish (and Muslim) Aristotelianism, presenting a vision of human perfection in which politics and statesmanship plays literally no role whatsoever. Rabbi Levi ben Gershom had two philosophical masters: Maimonides and Averroes. Indeed, his philosophical magnum opus, Milhamot Adonai, may be best understood as a work designed to correct the views of Maimonides (divine knowledge, creation) or interpret those views (human immortality, prophecy, providence). Rare are the places where Gersonides clearly rejects views held jointly by Maimonides and Averroes. The place of politics in the perfected life is one of those places. Gersonides’ ideas of human perfection are uncompromisingly intellectualist. We may profitably begin to examine them by noting that in his Milhamot Gersonides clearly states that “the reward and punishment that occur to man insofar as he is man have to be good and evil that are [truly] human, not good and evil that are not human. Now human good consists of the acquisition of the felicity of the soul, for this good concerns man as man, and not the pursuit of good food and other sensual objects.”17 Having learned that “human good consists of the acquisition of the felicity (hazlahah) of the soul,” we must now ask in what that felicity consists. “God’s according to Maimonides, involves a particular kind of obedience to halakhah (Jewish law), see Kellner, Perfection. 17 This passage is found in Milhamot IV.6 (p. 170; Wars, p. 182). Translations of the Milhamot in this chapter are from Feldman’s translation, with occasional small alterations. I have here taken the liberty of slightly altering Feldman’s translation and will do so below as well, without necessarily taking note of the fact. Compare further in the same chapter, p. 177 (Wars, p. 192). For the source of the expression here, “man as man,” see Guide of the Perplexed, III.51, p. 635.

188

CHAPTER EIGHT

intention [in creation],” Gersonides tells us in his commentary to the Torah, “was that man’s striving be for nothing but the perfection of the human intellect.” In light of this, Gersonides continues, “[God] commanded that man strive to acquire the apprehensions specific to the human intellect, these being the intelligibiles through which he becomes everlasting.”18 In a number of places, Gersonides calls knowledge “the fruit of all human endeavor” (pri kol ha-adam).19 Thus, in his commentary on Exodus (p. 115d/441/443, fifth to’elet) Gersonides writes that one ought not to give up striving after the acquisition of intelligibles even after having acquired many of them, but, rather, one ought to direct “all of one’s striving towards always continuing to learn, for this is the fruit of all human endeavor.” Gersonides takes as paradigmatic here Moses’ ceaseless desire to learn ever more “speculative apprehensions” (hassagot iyyuniot). Gersonides carries this idea over to his commentaries on Ecclesiastes and Song of Songs. In comparing the three “Solomonic” books (Ecclesiastes, Proverbs, Song of Songs)20 in his introduction to his commentary on Ecclesiastes, Gersonides explains that in the first of his books Solomon collects commonly accepted ideas on ethics (mefursemot), while in the second (Proverbs) he examines them in detail, distinguishing the useful from the harmful. “Since the choicest of the species of good is speculative perfection, it being their fruit, he then perfected the investigation concerning it in Song of Songs, according to what we think.”21 In his commentary to Song of Songs 8:12, with reference to metaphysical studies, Gersonides comments on the verse (My vineyard which is mine is before me; Thou, O Solomon, shalt have the thousand; And these that keep the fruit thereof two hundred) as follows (p. 93): She said that this vineyard is in front of her, and that she will endeavor [to see to it] that the thousand pieces of silver (8:11) become his – it being the fruit in

18 Commentary on Genesis p. 15c/61/106. Compare further Gersonides on Proverbs 18:9 and 19:5. Gersonides is here referring to his doctrine, proved in Milhamot, Treatise I, that human beings achieve immortality through the acquisition of intelligibiles. 19 Compare ch. 3 above, note 55. 20 On these three books in Gersonides’ thought, see Feldman, “The Wisdom of Solomon.” 21 P. 25d/17

189

POLITICS AND PERFECTION: GERSONIDES VS. MAIMONIDES

what came above,22 and that the keepers will endeavor to apprehend the discrete matters, the apprehension of which is related to them, till the intellect move from what was gathered to it by all the keepers to the apprehension of this one which was mentioned above, which is the fruit of the intellect and its end.23 He expressed it with this number, i.e., two hundred to indicate that when that which all of the senses –of which there are only five, as has been established in On the Soul,24 – apprehend for him is gathered together, there was gathered together from this that which is potentially the fruit,25 which is a thousand pieces of silver (8:11), for five times two hundred is one thousand.

The highest level of human endeavor, then, is “the fruit of the intellect and its end.” The endeavor referred to here is the study of metaphysics.26 Gersonides’ purely intellectualist orientation towards the nature of the perfected life comes out very clearly in his commentary to Song of Songs, in his doctrine of immortality, and in his analysis of prophecy. Let us look first at the commentary to Song of Songs. As presented by Gersonides in that text, the ultimate end of human beings qua human beings is the study of the sciences, most especially metaphysics. Moral perfection and the study of mathematics are preparations for the study of the sciences, the latter being the proper object of human activity. Indeed, in his introduction to Song of Songs, Gersonides says that the “prophets and those who speak by virtue of the holy spirit27 never ceased from guiding men to perfection, either to the first perfection, or to the final perfection, or to both. This will be accomplished when what is 22 I.e., in 8:11. 23 I.e., knowledge of God is the ultimate end. 24 See Aristotle, On the Soul, III.1, 424b21ff. 25 Since, in the final analysis, everything we know derives in one way or another from sense experience. 26 Gersonides has interesting things to say about the relationship of the study of physics to the study of metaphysics, on which, see ch 8 below. Further on the intellectualist nature of human perfection, see Milhamot II.2 (p. 95; Wars, p. 33) where Gersonides explains “that man is by far the most noble of the terrestrial substances,” since “he has in common with the divine substances the use of reason;” and VI.i.15, p. 358 (Wars, p. 317), where it is maintained that man naturally strives to achieve wisdom, “which is his perfection and felicity.” 27 I.e., the authors of the Sacred Writings (Hagiographa) which latter, of course, include Song of Songs.

190

CHAPTER EIGHT

understood by the multitudes from the words of the Prophets guides one to moral perfection and what is understood by the elite guides one to conceptual perfection.”28 The “public” teaching of the Torah guides one to moral perfection; its esoteric teachings guide the initiate to intellectual perfection. But the moral perfection taught publicly by the Torah is crucial for achieving intellectual (i.e., truly human) perfection, as Gersonides makes clear in the commentary to Song of Songs 1:9 (pp. 31-32): With respect to this it is clear concerning the material intellect that it cannot possibly go to the place of its desire if the man had not previously decorated himself with praiseworthy moral qualities and divested himself of the filthy garments,29 i.e., inferior moral qualities. This has been made clear and referred to by the prophets and those who speak by virtue of the holy spirit, the Sages have made reference to this, and the philosophers have made reference to this as well. Abu Hammad [al-Ghazzali] already said in his book about intentions, making an allegory about this matter, that the intellect is similar to a mirror; just as a dirty, unpolished mirror will not receive the impression of things seen, but will receive them when its dirt is removed and it is polished, so the intellect will not apprehend things if it is not cleansed first of the filth of inferior moral qualities and if their dirt is not removed from it.30 This is the intention of his words, even if he did not phrase them in this fashion.

The propadeutic nature of ethical behavior is thus made perfectly clear: one must be good, not for its own sake alone, or in order thereby to imitate God, or to fulfill God’s commands, but ultimately in order to make it possible to achieve one’s fullest realization as a human being: the apprehension of intelligibles.31 28 Literally: “perfection of the intelligibles.” Gersonides makes a similar distinction in his commentary on Dt. 6:4 (p. 211d/39). Hear, O Israel, he says, refers to hearing, believing, and understanding. (Perfected) individuals understand, the multitude believes. 29 See Zech. 3:3. 30 For the source of this parable in the writings of al-Ghazzali, texts in Arabic and in English translation, and extensive discussion, see Lazarus-Yafeh, Studies, pp. 312-320. 31 This point about the nature of ethical perfection is repeated often in Gersonides’ writings. Compare the commentary to Song of Songs 1:12, 1:17, 2:10; Milhamot IV.6 (p. 177; Wars, p.

191

POLITICS AND PERFECTION: GERSONIDES VS. MAIMONIDES

Gersonides’ highly intellectualist orientation to the question of human perfection is made clear in his discussion of human immortality, the reward (actually, the consequence) of having achieved perfection. That part of the human being which survives death is the acquired intellect. Gersonides defines the acquired intellect succinctly as “the intelligibles that accrue from abstracting material forms from their matter.”32 The acquired intellect, in other words, is really nothing other than a collection of ideas. Gersonides devotes Milhamot I.11 to a proof that “the acquired intellect is everlasting.” Gersonides there adds to our information concerning the nature of the acquired intellect, maintaining that it is clear that the acquired intellect is the perfection of the material intellect brought about by the Active Intellect,” and that “the acquired intellect is itself the order obtaining in the sublunar world that is inherent in the Active Intellect.”33 It is not just any ideas, then, that constitute the acquired intellect, but just those ideas found in a systematic fashion in the “mind” of the Active Intellect.34 Nowhere in his various discussions of the acquired intellect does Gersonides retreat from his position that one acquires an intellect, and thereby “earns” immortality, through the perfection of the intellect alone.35 Our point becomes very clear in Gersonides’ discussion of prophecy. Milhamot II is devoted to the subject. The issue has been widely treated in the scholarly literature on Gersonides and there is no need here to present a detailed account of Gersonides’ theory of prophecy.36 Rather, we will pick out those details which illuminate the heavily intellectualist cast of his thought and which stand in contrast to elements of Maimonides’ doctrine. 193); the commentary on Proverbs 1:2, 1:7, 1:1-19 (second to’elet), 12:1, and 15:32; and the commentary to Ecclesiastes, pp. 25c/16 and 26a/18. 32 This definition is found in Gersonides’ supercommentary to Averroes’ Epitome of the De Anima; see Mashbaum, “Gersonides’ Supercommentary,” p. 150. 33 P. 82; Wars, pp. 212-213. 34 For Gersonides’ doctrine of the intellect, see ch. 9 below. 35 Maimonides, it should be emphasized, holds a similar view (at least publicly); but unlike Gersonides he insists that the truly perfected individual will not “selfishly” devote herself or himself only to the perfection of the intellect, but will also descend Jabob’s ladder or return to Plato’s cave in order to provide political leadership for the less perfected. Gersonides, too, will call upon the perfected individual to do more than simply perfect his or her intellect; but this extra effort demanded by Gersonides, as we shall see, has nothing to do with political leadership. 36 See ch. 2 above.

192

CHAPTER EIGHT

Gersonides sees prophecy in the first instance as a species of precognition and treats of it in connection with other types of precognition, namely divination and veridical dreams. Indeed, the entire thrust of Gersonides’ discussion of prophecy in Milhamot II is to distinguish it from divination and veridical dreams. Thus, he opens his discussion as follows (II.1, p. 92; Wars, p. 27): “Let us begin by stating that the knowledge man possesses concerning future events through dreams, divination, or prophecy cannot be by chance, for what occurs by chance occurs both infrequently and only in a few things.” For Maimonides, on the other hand, pre-cognition is hardly the point of prophecy (Guide of the Perplexed II.36-37). The information conveyed by prophecy (and by divination and veridical dreams as well) “occurs rarely, if at all, with respect to necessary matters.”37 In other words, prophecy rarely conveys information about what we would today call scientific matters and what Gersonides would have called speculative (iyyuni) matters, i.e., the domains of physics and metaphysics. “Rather,” he continues, for the most part it concerns possible states of affairs among individual men to the extent that they do in fact occur. Indeed, we used the phrase, “that they occur among individual men” because it is evident from experience that dreams, divination, and prophecy communicate information only about human circumstances and chance events. When we do have [such] knowledge of things other than human affairs, this knowledge is related to a particular man.

The standard domain of prophecy, then, is matters of interest to individual human beings. After determining the type of information usually conveyed in dreams, divination, and prophecy (future events of interest to particular individuals) and the agent which conveys the information to the dreamer, diviner, or prophet (which agent turns out to be the Active Intellect, as Gersonides proves to his satisfaction in Milhamot II.3), Gersonides devotes a short chapter (II.5) to the “determination of the purpose of this communication.” “We maintain,” he says, that the 37 Milhamot II.2 (p. 93; Wars, p. 30).

193

POLITICS AND PERFECTION: GERSONIDES VS. MAIMONIDES

purpose of such information is the provision for and preservation [of the human species]. For, since man has the freedom to pursue the good and avoid the evil that is pre-established for him by the pattern that has been ordered by heavenly bodies, and since he has little knowledge of the good and evil that can befall him, this type of communication is given him in order that he [can] avoid the evil that he [now] knows has been set for him or [he can] pursue the good that has been set for him by means that will realize this good. In this way good will be increased.

Prophecy, it turns out, is a species of providence, designed to enable the prophet to escape evils to which he would otherwise fall prey, or to maximize the goods available to him. In other words, prophecy (as well as dreams and divination, of course) exists primarily for the good of the prophet. In Milhamot II.6 Gersonides raises a number of questions concerning his theory of dreams, divination, and prophecy, the fourth and fifth of which are of particular interest in this context (p. 105; Wars, p. 50): Fourth, how is it possible for this communication to be so specific that [it is] more [concerned with] the man to whom the communication is given, with the people with whom he grew up, with his family, his nation and his enemies, rather than with other people? ... Fifth, how can a man receive knowledge concerning the affairs of other men if this knowledge is supposed to be concerned with the provision and preservation [of these people]? It would be [more] proper for this knowledge to be conveyed to the person who would receive from it the intended benefit, for the sake of which this knowledge exists.

The assumption behind these two questions is that the precognitive knowledge afforded through dreams, divination, and prophecy is intended to benefit the dreamer, diviner, or prophet. This point is confirmed in Gersonides’ answers to these objections: “The fourth objection is also easy to solve. This knowledge is generally concerned with the people [within the acquaintance of the recipient], for it is only about them that the recipient thinks.”38 The dreamer, diviner, or prophet receives information from the Active Intellect about the futures of persons for whom he or she has strong personal concern; 38 P. 107; Wars, p. 54.

194

CHAPTER EIGHT

the prophet may benefit others, but that benefit is basically an extension or overflow of the benefit which the prophecy endows upon the prophet. This point is made clear in Gersonides’ answer to the fifth objection (pp. 107-108; Wars, pp. 54-55): “Someone who has reached this level has a strong natural desire to inform others of what he has learned about their affairs. ... For it is the nature of a perfection, which is possessed by such a man, that when he has reached the point that he can disseminate his knowledge to others, he has a desire to so transmit it.” The prophet receives information about persons close to him; to the extent that their well-being is of concern to the prophet, he will obviously seek to be of assistance to them. But, even were this not the case, once one has reached the level of prophecy, one has an inner need to share the knowledge he has acquired with others. Once again, prophecy serves the needs of the prophet more than the needs of others. Two further aspects of Gersonides’ theory need to be discussed; the first has to do with the distinction between prophets and diviners, while the second involves the distinction between prophets and hakhamim, masters of physics and metaphysics, whom we shall call philosophers.39 In distinguishing prophecy from dreams and divination, Gersonides reminds us that “it is well-known that prophecy requires the perfection of the intellect.”40 Building on this point, Gersonides continues (pp. 111-112; Wars, pp. 59-60): Now prophecy differs from divination and dreams in several ways. First, prophecy is a perfection that is attained after study. ... No such thing obtains in divination or dreams. Second, a condition for prophecy is wisdom, which is obvious from the very nature of prophecy. But this is not true for divination or dreams. ... Third, everything that a prophet transmits is true. ... However, in divination and dreams there are many falsehoods, as the senses testify. Fourth, when a prophet conveys this knowledge, he guides the man or nation to whom he transmitted this information toward human perfection, such as when the prophet tells the man to depart from his evil ways and return to God and the

39 Were it not for its anachronistic connotations, “scientists” would probably be a more accurate translation. 40 Milhamot II.6, p. 111; Wars, p. 59.

195

POLITICS AND PERFECTION: GERSONIDES VS. MAIMONIDES

man does in fact depart from his evil path. Indeed, most of the information transmitted to man [through prophecy] is for his perfection. This is not the case with divination or dreams.

From this passage we learn a number of facts important for our purposes here. In the first place, we learn that a prophet must be a hakham. This, of course, is no surprise, it being a staple of Jewish Aristotelianism and a central element in Maimonides’ doctrine of prophecy.41 It is also a point which Gersonides had already made explicit in the Introduction to the Milhamot (p. 4; Wars, p. 94). “A prophet,” he says there, “is necessarily a philosopher” (hakham). Second, Gersonides here tells us that the purpose of the prophet is to guide others towards human perfection. As was made clear above, human perfection for Gersonides is intellectual perfection. Adopting a distinction quoted above from Maimonides (Guide, III.27), we may say that for Gersonides the prophet aims exclusively at the welfare of the soul, basically ignoring the welfare of the body (which, for Maimonides at least, meant primarily the establishment and nurturing of just states and societies). One ought to not think that Gersonides’ comments about the role of the prophet in causing humans to abandon their “evil ways,” thereby returning to God, in any way lessen the intellectualist cast of his prophetology. In the first place, we saw above how for Gersonides moral behavior is prized as a means towards intellectual perfection. To the extent that the prophet inveighs against injustice and seeks to correct evil behavior, he does this so as to bring people to be able to adopt a correct (philosophical) understanding of God and nature. In the second place, Gersonides himself makes the point clearly in his commentary on the Torah, there claiming that the term zaddik (“righteous individual”) is applied to one whose morals are perfected and is applied to one who has achieved intellectual perfection.42 Departing from evil ways and returning to God for Gersonides means not only behaving morally, but also achieving intellectual perfection. Gersonides’ purely intellectualist approach to prophecy is made clear in the eighth and last chapter of the second Treatise of the Milhamot (p. 119; Wars, p. 41 On this, see Kreisel, “Sage and Prophet” and above, ch. 3, note 71. 42 Genesis, p. 18d/80/146. For discussion of this passage, see above, ch. 3, note 99.

196

CHAPTER EIGHT

72) in which he discusses the gradations to be found among prophets, diviners, and dreamers. With respect to prophets, he says that “whoever is more perfect in intellect and in whom the isolation [of this faculty] is more complete attains a more perfect degree of prophecy.” Prophets are thus distinguished one from the other by their intellectual abilities. He continues, further emphasizing the intellectual character, not only of the prophet, but also of prophecy: “Someone who is concerned only with intellectual perfection will give information that concerns this perfection and the things that are conducive to its attainment insofar as they lead to this end.” The diviner, however, is distinguished from the prophet, not by being less intellectually oriented, but by being perfected in another direction altogether: “The most perfect diviner, [on the other hand], is someone whose imaginative faculty is more prepared to isolate itself from the other faculties and has in addition an [imaginative] capacity that is constitutionally perfect.” Like prophets, diviners are of different degrees; the better a diviner’s imaginative faculty, and the more easily he or she can isolate it from other faculties of the soul, the better diviner will he or she be. We emphasize this last point because of its importance in comparing Gersonides and Maimonides. For the latter, as we have seen, the prophet combines both perfection of the intellect and perfection of the imagination. For Maimonides, the prophet shares imaginative perfection with the political leader; it is precisely that perfection which Gersonides here dramatically de-emphasizes with respect to the prophet. Once again, the prophet’s intellectualism is emphasized: he or she is not meant to be a political leader. Our discussion has brought us to one last question which must be raised about Gersonides’ teachings concerning prophecy. If the prophet is really nothing other than a species of philosopher, in what way is prophecy distinguished from philosophical wisdom, and how is the prophet superior to the philosopher? This is an issue which seems to have exercised Gersonides to some extent, and he returns to it time and again, perhaps because, unlike Maimonides, he has no easy answer to the question. The issue comes up for the first time in the Introduction to the Milhamot (p. 4; Wars, pp. 94-95). Defending himself against the claim that “investigating the question of the eternity or the creation of the world,” betrays “arro197

POLITICS AND PERFECTION: GERSONIDES VS. MAIMONIDES

gance and rashness,” Gersonides argues inter alia against the assumption that “only a prophet can attain the truth on this matter,” since, it is alleged, “what a prophet obtains through prophecy is inaccessible to a philosopher who uses only reason.” Gersonides disposes of this objection by noting, as we have seen already, that “a prophet is necessarily a philosopher.” Thus, some of the things that are known by him are peculiar to him as a prophet, e.g., most of the things he predicts that will occur at a particular time; other things he knows simply because he is a philosopher, i.e., the things that are known by him about the secrets of the world.43 The difference between a prophet and a philosopher, however, lies merely in the [relative] ease with which the prophet obtains [his knowledge]. The knowledge of the prophet is generally greater than the knowledge of a philosopher who is not a prophet. The prophet is thus distinguished from the philosopher in two ways: he can predict the future,44 and he is generally a better philosopher. With respect to knowledge, and putting the issue in modern terms, the prophet is quantitatively, not qualitatively, superior to the philosopher who has not achieved prophecy. Gersonides hastens to emphasize this very point, taking issue with a position enunciated by Maimonides in Guide of the Perplexed II.38, to the effect that prophets, unlike philosophers, know some propositions intuitively: Therefore prophecy is joined with wisdom [but] not [in the sense] that what is to a philosopher a derived cognition is to the prophet a primary cognition, as some people have maintained. If this were the case, the knowledge of the philosopher would be more perfect, since he knows the thing by means of its causes, whereas the prophet does not. But this is absurd. It is possible that there are things that a philosopher who is not a prophet cannot apprehend, but which can be known by a philosopher who is [also] a prophet, insofar as he is a philosopher.

Gersonides rejects the idea that the prophet knows intuitively things the philosopher must learn; this, on the Aristotelian grounds that true knowledge 43 I.e., the “secrets” of physics and metaphysics. 44 On the astrological basis of the ability of the prophet (and diviner and dreamer) to predict the future (without thereby destroying contingency and free will), see Milhamot II.2.

198

CHAPTER EIGHT

of a thing is knowledge of the thing with its causes;45 intuitive knowledge is thus inferior to learned knowledge. If the prophet is superior to the philosopher (something assumed here by Gersonides), it cannot be because the former knows intuitively while the latter does not. That is not to affirm, Gersonides adds, that philosophers know everything that prophets know; they do not, but that is because prophets are better philosophers than non-prophetic philosophers, not because they have some special insight or intuition. This being the case, it might be asked, why would anyone want to be a prophet? The job-description of prophets as found in the Bible is hardly attractive – very few prophets, it would seem, die peacefully in bed! Gersonides would not understand this question at all. He certainly agreed with Aristotle that “all men by nature desire to know;”46 and, as we have seen, was convinced that once a person “knows,” he will naturally seek to share that knowledge. Prophecy per se is not sought; it is the natural outcome of the human urge to perfect oneself. Gersonides returns to the question of prophet and philosopher in Milhamot II.4, a chapter devoted to “an examination of the possibility of [prophetic] communication about theoretical matters.” In other words, do prophets as such receive philosophical instruction? After repeating the claims made in his Introduction that true knowledge of a thing is knowledge of it with its causes, and again rejecting the view that the prophet has intuitive knowledge qualitatively different from philosophical knowledge, Gersonides affirms (in part on the basis of his own experience47) that “when the prophets (may they rest in peace) received some knowledge through prophecy, the causes of this knowledge were also transmitted.”48 This happens, Gersonides explains, when someone has been intellectually occupied with a particular problem, working 45 See, for example, Physics ii.3, 124b17. 46 The first sentence of the Metaphysics; see Milhamot VI.i.15, pp. 356 and 358 (Wars, pp. 314317); commentary to Song of Songs 1:3 (p. 24); commentary to Proverbs 1:21, 2:17-3:3, first to’elet, and the commentary to Ecclesiastes, p. 34c/48. 47 Rather more than most other medieval Jewish philosophers, Gersonides makes explicit reference to his own experiences. See, for example, the Commentary on Exodus, p. 114b/432/420 and, for discussion, Lasker, “Gersonides on Dreams.” See also above, ch. 2, note 14. 48 P. 103; Wars, p. 45.

199

POLITICS AND PERFECTION: GERSONIDES VS. MAIMONIDES

at it with diligence while awake; they may then apprehend the answer in prophetic dream or trance. It is this ability which truly distinguishes the prophet from the philosopher, but it is not a qualitative difference between the two: the prophet is a “super-philosopher,” not a “supra-philosopher.” There are two other ways in which Gersonides emphasizes the qualitative likeness of prophet and philosopher while preserving their quantitative unlikeness: prophets can err on theoretical matters,49 and philosophers can, rarely, bring about miracles. The fact that prophets can err on theoretical matters (as, according to Gersonides, Ezekiel did)50 proves that with respect to such matters they are not qualitatively superior to philosophers. The point is further emphasized by Gersonides’ claim that non-prophetic philosophers can (rarely) bring about miracles. Gersonides devotes Milhamot VI.ii.11 (pp. 453-454) to this issue, there commenting that miracles are a form of providence vouchsafed to the very highly perfected.51 There can be cases, he says, of highly perfected philosophers, on the verge of prophecy, as it were, having miracles worked on their behalf. But this phenomenon is very rare: after all, how often will a person be perfected enough to have miracles worked on his behalf, but not be perfected enough to achieve prophecy? There are other ways in which Gersonides’ disinterest in politics and emphasis on the intellect as the sole route to perfection find expression in his writings; we will mention some of them here, briefly. Gersonides’ views on the imitation of God give clear expression to his intellectualist position on the perfect life. Once again, comparing his views to those of Maimonides will be illuminating. As noted above, I differ from Strauss, Pines, and Berman, all of whom maintain, in one way or another, that for Maimonides the perfected life is the life of the statesman and that one imitates God most fully by founding (as in the case of Moses) or sustaining (as in the case of other prophets) virtuous states. But it is well-nigh impossible to deny that the imitation of God involves some degree or other of political involve49 See Touati, “Inerrance prophetique.” 50 See the Commentary on Genesis p. 24d/115/222, and the Commentary on Job 39:30; compare Touati, La pensée, pp. 459-466 and Kreisel, Prophecy, p. 291. 51 On Gersonides’ doctrine concerning miracles, see ch. 4 above and ch. 13 below. On the question of non-prophetic miracles, see above, ch. 3, note 71.

200

CHAPTER EIGHT

ment. The clearest expression of this is found in the very last sentences of the Guide (p. 638): It is clear that the perfection of man that may be truly gloried in [a reference to Jeremiah 9:22-23] is the one acquired by him who has achieved, in a measure corresponding to his capacity, apprehension of Him, may He be exalted, and who knows His providence extending over His creatures as manifested in the act of bringing them into being and their governance as it is. The way of life of such an individual, after he has achieved this apprehension, will always have in view loving-kindness, righteousness, and judgment, through assimilation to His actions, may He be exalted.

The perfected individual apprehends God to the greatest extent possible; understands the nature of God’s governance over created beings; then seeks to practice “loving-kindness, righteousness, and judgment, through assimilation” to God’s actions. God governs the universe and part of our imitation of God must take the form of governance to the extent possible to us. Gersonides’ views on the imitation of God are very different.52 The key text is found in the Introduction to the Milhamot (pp. 5-6; Wars, p. 97): “Moreover, it is not proper for someone to withhold what he has learned in philosophy from someone else. This would be utterly disgraceful. Indeed, just as this entire universe emanated from God for no particular advantage to Him, so it is proper for someone who has achieved some perfection to try to impart it to someone else. In this way he is imitating God as best he can.” One imitates God, then, by teaching philosophy to others after having learned it oneself. Analysis of this and further Gersonidean texts leads to the conclusion that Gersonides maintains that one imitates God by teaching hokhmah. To translate Gersonides’ point into modern idiom we may say that one fulfills the halakhic obligation of imitatio dei, not through the study of Torah in the narrow sense, not through the fulfillment of the commandments, not through metaphysical speculation, nor even through pure scientific research; rather, one imitates God by leading advanced seminars on the cutting edge of contemporary scientific inquiry. That Gersonides devoted the 52 See ch. 10 below.

201

POLITICS AND PERFECTION: GERSONIDES VS. MAIMONIDES

lion’s share of his energies to pure scientific study is known;53 given his views on the imitation of God, it is not surprising.54 There is a further point here to be made; it is of crucial importance in this context, further helping to distinguish Gersonides from Maimonides, on the one hand, and from ibn Bajja, on the other. For Maimonides, superior beings perfect inferior beings, but not by design or intention – the perfection of inferiors is a natural by-product of their emanative activity. Maimonides explicitly rejects the idea “that all that has been made has been made for it [i.e., the human species] alone so that even the heavenly spheres only revolve in order to be useful to it and to bring into existence that which is necessary for it. ... It should not be believed that all the beings exist for the sake of the existence of man. On the contrary, all the other beings too have been intended for their own sakes and not for the sake of something else.”55 Maimonides makes a similar point in another passage (II.11, p. 275): “Know that in the case of every being that causes a certain good thing to overflow from it according to this order or rank, the existence, the purpose, and the end of the being conferring the benefits, do not consist in conferring the benefits on the recipient.” Superior beings do perfect inferior beings; but this is not the reason for the existence of the superior beings, their purpose, or their end. From the point of view of the superior beings, the benefit conferred on inferior beings is an unintended consequence of their activity.56 Gersonides, on the other hand, explicitly maintains that the heavenly bodies exist for the sake of sublunar entities.57 In effect, God created the heavenly bodies so that they would perfect us. In teaching science, one is not simply allowing one’s excellence to overflow onto one’s inferiors; rather, one is actively imitating God. One seeks out students in order to imitate God (contra ibn 53 See p. 64 in Freudenthal, “Felicity.” 54 It is here that Gersonides’ divergence from ibn Bajja finds clear expression: the philosophically perfected individual may not be called to fill a Maimonidean role in the leadership of state and society, but he or she is certainly not meant to withdraw from that society either! 55 Guide III.13, pp. 451-452. 56 On this, see Harvey, “Perfection, Awe, and Politics.” 57 Gersonides devotes Milhamot V.ii.3 (pp. 194-197; Wars, pp. 39-42) to proving this proposition. My thinking here was stimulated by comments made by Freudenthal in “Maimonides’ Stance.”

202

CHAPTER EIGHT

Bajja); teaching those students is not the unintended consequence of one’s own perfection (as with Maimonides) – it is the very point of that perfection. There is another indirect expression of Gersonides’ disinterest in politics that ought to be noted here. In the Introduction to his commentary on Ecclesiastes (p. 25a/15) Gersonides notes that political philosophy (ha-filosofiah hamedinit) investigates good and evil;58 as philosophers have noted, “this subject is not susceptible of perfect verification; rather, commonly accepted principles (hakdamot mefursemot) are clarified in it; it is of the nature of these principles that one finds contradictions among them.” A bit further on in his discussion, Gersonides asks (in the name of Solomon) whether the “good” is “the pleasant or the useful” and concludes that the latter is the proper definition of the good.59 A number of points of interest to us arise from this text. Gersonides defines political philosophy in terms of ethics. This should be contrasted with Maimonides’ discussion in his Logical Terms, Chapter 14, where ethics is subsumed under political philosophy. Second, ethics itself is defined as the science of determining the useful or practical on the basis of commonly held opinions. For a person convinced that the apprehension of necessary truths is the only key to human perfection and thus immortality, this places ethics (and thus political philosophy) relatively low on the hierarchy of subjects to which one ought to devote time and attention. This view is borne out by a glance at Gersonides’ to’alot, the lessons or “advantages” which he derives from biblical texts. Whereas he devotes considerable ingenuity in deriving philosophical teachings from the text, and in connecting specific halakhot to biblical verses, his comments on ethics and politics in this context fall under the heading of “good advice.” The to’alot pertaining to ethics and politics which Gersonides derives from the biblical text are by and large obvious, and often seem fairly cynical. He certainly did not devote to them the kind of attention and insight which he brings to bear on those texts which can be milked for to’alot concerning philosophical doctrines (de’ot as he calls them). Maimonides had followed the view of Plato as developed by al-Farabi, and saw an overlap, if not full identity, between the perfected individual, the 58 Compare Gersonides’ commentary to Proverbs 23:12 for the same claim. 59 On the trichotomy good/pleasant/useful, see Melamed, “Development.”

203

POLITICS AND PERFECTION: GERSONIDES VS. MAIMONIDES

philosopher, the prophet, the religious leader, and the political leader. The perfected life contains some element of communal leadership or governance. Gersonides, in his definition of the perfected life, in his understanding of the nature of prophecy, and in his approach to imitatio Dei, radically divides the philosopher from the statesman, and excludes political involvement from his description of the perfected life. Why? The question is legitimate; it cannot be answered, as so many Jewish questions are, with another one: Why not? This is so for the following reasons: First, Gersonides, as noted above, had two philosophical masters: Maimonides and Averroes. The latter’s political philosophy falls into the same Platonic/ al-Farabian mode as Maimonides’. This is a well-known matter and can be illustrated here simply. In a text which Touati holds was known to Gersonides,60 and which certainly could have been known to him,61 Averroes writes, “Hence these names are, as it were, synonymous – i.e., ‘philosopher,’ ‘king,’ ‘lawgiver’; and so also is ‘imam,’ since ‘imam’ in Arabic means one who is followed ... as to whether it should be made a condition that he be a prophet, why there is room here for penetrating investigation.”62 This passage reflects a well-known al-Farabian text63 and gives clear expression to the fact that Averroes adopted the same Platonic mode of political discourse as did Al-Farabi and Maimonides. Cases where Gersonides diverges from both Maimonides and Averroes demand explanation. Second, were Gersonides familiar with Aristotle’s Politics then it could be urged that he simply adopted it as his basic text for political philosophy in place of the Republic. The facts of the situation, however, are as follows: while medieval Jews and Muslims knew of the existence of the Politics it was surmised to have been lost; as such it was never translated into Arabic or Hebrew. It reached Latin Christianity through the translation (directly from the Greek) of William of Moerbeke (c. 1260) but had almost no influence whatsoever on subsequent Jewish thought.64 To the best of our knowledge, Gersonides gives no evidence whatsoever of even being aware of the existence of the Politics. 60 See Touati, La pensée, pp. 40 and 364; I am not convinced that Prof. Touati is correct here. 61 It was translated into Hebrew by Samuel of Marseilles in 1320-22. 62 Averroes, On Plato’s “Republic,” p. 72. 63 Cited above in note 7. 64 For details on all this, see Melamed, “Aristotle’s Politics.”

204

CHAPTER EIGHT

Why, then, did not Gersonides follow in the footsteps of all of his Jewish predecessors, contemporaries, and successors in the Maimonidean stream in adopting some variant of the Platonic approach to the question of the place of political involvement in the perfected life?65 There seem to be two probable answers to this question: the influence of contemporary Christian thought, or the influence of having lived in a Christian environment. The question of whether or not Gersonides knew Latin divides scholars;66 similarly, the extent to which he was influenced by Latin thought is a subject of controversy;67 but it is known that he collaborated on astrological and astronomical researches with Christians and there seems to be no reason to reject out of hand the idea that he conducted discussions with them on philosophical matters.68 This being so, perhaps he was influenced by contemporary Christians in his political philosophy?69 This strikes me as unlikely for the simple reason that were Gersonides consciously adopting a position at variance with that of Maimonides and Averroes he would have said so. Gersonides made every effort to get clear on where he agreed and disagreed with his philosophical interlocutors and had he become convinced of the superiority of a position based on the teachings of contemporary Christians (those, it would seem, whom he calls mit’ahrim),70 there is every reason to expect that he would have come right out and said it. Since he nowhere makes explicit reference to any disagreement with the Maimonidean al-Farabians on the issue of the place of polities in the perfected life, it seems likely that Gersonides did not frame his position in opposition to theirs. In other words, Gersonides adopted a position at variance with that of Averroes and Maimonides without being consciously aware of what he was doing. What could bring a thinker as perspicacious and self-conscious as Gersonides to adopt a radically new position without being aware of it? The most 65 That Gersonides rejects ibn Bajja’s position is less surprising since it is also rejected by both Maimonides and Averroes. 66 See Glasner, “Gersonides’ Knowledge of Languages.” 67 See Pines, “Problems.” 68 On Gersonides’ work with Christians, see Goldstein and Pingree, “Prognostication.” 69 Or, more accurately, in his disinterest in Platonic political philosophy. 70 See, for example, his commentary to Song of Songs 1:2 (p. 21) where he seems to be referring to an argument of Scotus.

205

POLITICS AND PERFECTION: GERSONIDES VS. MAIMONIDES

likely answer to that, it would seem, is the influence of the life he lived. This does not mean his own personal inclinations, although such matters ought not to be excluded altogether.71 Gersonides lived in, and was apparently very much aware of, a Christian culture which, at least in principle, sharply divided the temporal from the spiritual realms. In political terms, at least, it was that culture which framed Gersonides’ universe of discourse and it is to that culture, perhaps, that we should look in seeking to understand his unusual position on the place (or lack thereof) of politics in the perfected life.

71 Harvey suggests that Gersonides’ critical attitude towards political power (as expressed in his commentary on Deut. 17:14-20) is connected to his personal attraction to the life of contemplation and his conviction that the vita contemplativa is its own end and our greatest happiness. See Harvey, “Philosopher and Politics.” Harvey’s analysis strengthens the claims being put forward here about Gersonides’ negative attitude towards politics; his explanation for that attitude complements rather than contradicts the interpretation offered here. I cannot accept it fully, however, since it fails to take into account Gersonides’ approach to imitatio dei as discussed above; contemplation is not enough – one must also share the fruits of one’s studies with appropriate students.

206

CHAPTER NINE The Role of the Active Intellect in Human Cognition

A

s we have seen, the question of how we know is of crucial importance for Gersonides. It is, he is convinced, the hidden meaning of Song of Songs, the holiest poem in the Bible.1 Felicity in this world and existence in the next depend upon knowledge. Despite the importance of these considerations, Gersonides, like many other medieval Jewish and Muslim philosophers, presents no systematic account of his epistemology.2 One of the epistemological problems with which he did grapple was as old as the debate between Plato and Aristotle. Following the Aristotelian tradition, Gersonides was convinced that knowledge must have an empirical basis. But Aristotle himself had admitted that true knowledge was of unchanging universals.3 For Gersonides, it was particularly important to protect the claim that true knowledge consists of universals, for it allowed him to affirm that while God knows everything that can be known, God does not know –indeed cannot know– particulars, since mutable entities cannot be objects of knowledge.4 This allows Gersonides to affirm God’s com1

In his commentary on Song of Songs 1:1 (p. 17), Gersonides quotes a variant of the mishnaic passage (Yadayim III.5), “All the poems are holy, but the Song of Songs is the holy of holies.”

2

Seymour Feldman comments: “...like most philosophers in the Arabic and Hebrew medieval orbit, Gersonides did not write on epistemology as such.” See Feldman, “Platonic Themes,” p. 261.

3

Aristotle writes in On the Soul ii.5, p. 417b: “...what actual sensation apprehends is individuals, while what knowledge apprehends is universals, and these are in a sense within the soul itself.” With respect to the stable, unchanging character of these objects of knowledge, Aristotle writes (in Posterior Analytics I.8,75b22-25) “It is evident too that, if the propositions on which the deduction depends are universal, it is necessary for the conclusion of such a demonstration and of a demonstration simpliciter to be eternal too. There is therefore no demonstration of perishable things, nor understanding of them simpliciter but only accidentally, because it does not hold of it universally, but at some time and in some way.”

4

As he says, knowledge “must itself be stable and be of a stable entity...” This passage is found in Milhamot I.6 (p. 47; Wars, p. 162).

207

THE ROLE OF THE ACTIVE INTELLECT IN HUMAN COGNITION

prehensive knowledge (of what can be truly known) while protecting human freedom. Gersonides is thus faced with an important problem: the process of coming to know must have an empirical basis, but it must result in transempirical knowledge of universals. Before turning to Gersonides’ solution to this problem, a word must be said about the different ways in which he uses the term ‘intellect’. Gersonides, along with most other medieval Aristotelians, distinguishes between the material intellect, the acquired intellect, and the Active Intellect.5 Gersonides’ doctrine of the material intellect is sketched out in Milhamot I.5. As Gersonides presents it on the basis of an extended philosophical debate with Alexander of Aphrodisias, Themistius, and Averroes, the material intellect is really nothing other than the human capacity to learn. ‘Material intellect’ is the name given to the ability humans have to receive properly abstracted sensory data and, with the assistance of the Active Intellect, transform them into universals, the proper objects of knowledge.6 In Gersonides’ words “the body is the subject of this disposition via the imaginative faculty.”7 Davidson (p. 205) summarizes the position thus: “The human material intellect is, then, a disposition that has the body as its ultimate subject, that resides immediately in the imaginative faculty of the soul, and that is not mixed with either the imaginative faculty or the body.” Gersonides defines the acquired intellect succinctly as “the intelligibles that accrue from abstracting material forms from their matter.”8 The acquired intellect, in other words, is really nothing other than a collection of ideas. Gersonides devotes Milhamot I.11 to a proof that “the acquired intellect is everlasting.” Gersonides there adds to our information concerning the nature of the acquired intellect, maintaining (p. 82; Wars, pp. 212-213) that “it is clear that the acquired intellect is the perfection of the material intellect brought 5

On this subject see Davidson, “Material and Active Intellects”; Feldman, “Gersonides on Conjunction”; and Ivry, “Gersonides and Averroes.”

6

As we will see below, while Gersonides thinks that there are three players in this drama (the imagination, the material intellect, and the Active Intellect), he is not clear on which of them does what. Which of them is the actual agent of the process of abstraction? How does the Active Intellect bring about the transformation of properly abstracted sensory data into intelligibilia? These are questions to which Gersonides supplies no satisfactory answers.

7

Milhamot I.5 (p. 36, Wars p. 145).

8

This definition is found in Gersonides’ supercommentary to Averroes’ Epitome of the De Anima; see Mashbaum, “Gersonides’ Supercommentary,” p. 150.

208

CHAPTER NINE

about by the Active Intellect,” and that “the acquired intellect is itself the order obtaining in the sublunar world that is inherent in the Active Intellect.” It is not just any ideas, then, that constitute the acquired intellect, but just those ideas found in a systematic fashion in the “mind” of the Active Intellect. By “acquiring” ideas found in a perfect and systematic fashion in the Active Intellect, humans achieve immortality through the permanent existence of these ideas in the Active Intellect.9 What appears to be missing from this account is the human subject. Can there be thoughts without a thinker? What we seem to have is the following situation: The material intellect is a disposition to learn; that which it learns is a series of ideas found in the Active Intellect; it is, however, not an independent entity in and of itself.10 This is an issue to which Gersonides pays no sustained attention, nor is there any reason for him to have done so. The focus on the individual, with his or her personality, needs, and aspirations –that is, the emphasis on a thinking substrate underlying thought– is foreign to Gersonides’ way of thinking. This point is important enough to justify a bit of a digression, since if it is not made clear, the contemporary reader has no hope of understanding Gersonides. Gersonides’ concern is not so much with the thinking subject as with the objects of thought. In this it may be thought that he betrays a typically medieval rather than a modern attitude. The distinction between these two attitudes is well expressed in an oft-quoted saying of Lessing’s: “Were the Lord to give me the choice of seeking after the truth, or the truth itself, I would choose the search, for only He is worthy of the truth itself.”11 The first half of this sentence is relevant to our concerns here: Lessing, in contrast to Gersonides, is more interested in the search for truth (the activity of the thinker) than 9

The exact nature of this “acquisition” is a matter discussed by interpreters of Gersonides. See Feldman, “Gersonides on Conjunction” and Mashbaum, “Gersonides’ Supercommentary,” pp. xlvi-xlviii. For an exposition of Gersonides’ ideas on human immortality, see Touati, La pensée ..., pp. 434-442 and Hyman, Eschatological Themes.

10 Of course, there is no real “it” here: the material intellect is a disposition of the imagination, not an independent force, let alone substance; once perfected, the material intellect becomes the acquired intellect, but the imagination, a corporeal force or power, remains unchanged. It takes a fair amount of flexibility and ingenuity to square this conception with traditional notions of reward and punishment in the world to come. 11 Cited in Levy, Between Yafeth and Shem, p. 4.

209

THE ROLE OF THE ACTIVE INTELLECT IN HUMAN COGNITION

in the truth itself (the object of thought). The issue here parallels, I think, the medieval view of science in the last instance as a static body of knowledge as opposed to the modern view of science as an “unending quest.”12 It is hard for us to understand Gersonides’ apparent disinterest in the thinking subject; it would have been equally hard for him, I suspect, to understand our interest in the search for knowledge as opposed to its attainment.13 Gersonides, it should be pointed out, could have developed a theory of knowledge in which there is room for what Fazlur Rahman calls “an ultimate persisting self,”14 as was done for example, by Avicenna.15 In the Jewish world, Shem Tov ibn Falaquera, who lived in the generation before Gersonides, developed and went beyond Avicenna’s ideas on the subject.16 Gersonides, however, did not take this step. He followed Aristotle in emphasizing the objects of what we would call mental acts while ignoring the actor almost entirely.17 It is on this basis that he could arrive at his theory of human immortality, according to which what survives death is that which was learned, and nothing else. This point will be important for our purposes below. Returning to the theme of our study, the Active Intellect in Gersonides’ view is the “lens” through which the other separate intellects influence the sublunar world, the giver of forms in that world, and the cause of human knowledge. Gersonides devotes Milhamot I.6 to an exposition of the essence of the Active Intellect, there focussing on the role of the Active Intellect in human cognition, a point to which we will return in detail below. The role of the Active Intellect in the generation of sublunar entities is discussed in Milhamot III.iii.13. 12 In modern philosophy of science this view has been particularly emphasized by Karl R. Popper, who called his autobiography, Unended Quest. On this issue in Maimonides see ch. 7 above and Kellner, Science, ch. 13. 13 In this connection, medieval conceptions of the completability or perfectibility of science, as opposed to modern conceptions of science as inherently incomplete, come into play as well. See above, ch. 6. 14 In his discussion in Avicenna’s Psychology, p. 14. 15 Rahman traces the roots of Avicenna’s idea of a self-conscious soul which is the substratum of all experience from Aristotle through Strato, Alexander, Simplicius, and Philoponus; see pp. 12-19. Further on Avicenna’s discussion itself, see Davidson, Alfarabi, pp. 83-88. 16 See Jospe, Torah and Sophia, pp. 244-446 and 335-336. 17 For a fascinating account of how this Greek emphasis on the objects of thought to the almost total exclusion of the thinker was transmuted to our contemporary obsession with the selfconscious thinking entity, see Taylor, Sources of the Self.

210

CHAPTER NINE

We may now turn to Gersonides’ solution of the problem of how transempirical knowledge of universals can be based on experience. Gersonides solves this problem (to his own satisfaction, at least) by appealing to the role of the Active Intellect in human intellection. Human knowing involves a process of abstraction in which the material aspects of the sensory data presented to the intellect by the senses are stripped away in a series of stages;18 the end result of this process is subjected to certain influences of the Active Intellect, in consequence of which knowledge of universals is obtained. The Active Intellect is invoked, it would seem, to overcome the problem posed by the fact that the material intellect is not any thing, but is only a disposition or capacity. There are a number of problems with this account (which will be spelled out in greater detail below), one of which is: How is it possible for the acquired intellect, which is nothing other than the intelligibles (or concepts) which it cognizes, to constitute itself in the fashion? This, however, is a problem that Gersonides shares in common with other medieva1 Aristotelians and can be safely ignored in the present context.19 18 Gersonides’ most detailed description of this process is found in the Introduction to his commentary on Song of Songs (pp. 5-6): It has already been shown in On the Soul and in Parva Naturalia that there are different levels of spirituality among the impressions which reach the soul from the senses, these latter being outside of the soul. The first of these is the impression which is presented by the sensation of any of the individual senses. The second level is the impression presented by the form in the sensation of any of the individual senses to the common sense. The third level is the impression which is presented by the sensations in the common sense to the faculty of imagination. The fourth level is the impression which is presented by the impression in the imagination to the faculty of discrimination. The fifth level is the impression which is presented by the faculty of discrimination to the faculty which preserves and remembers. These impressions are more spiritual than all the others because the other faculties have already abstracted from them many of the hylic attributes of the sensed object by virtue of which it was distinctively particular. Thus the impressions in the faculty of memory are potentially the sensible form. So also with the impressions in the imagination, i.e., that they are potentially in the sensible form, since these impressions reach the soul through these faculties from the sensed objects, after many of the hylic attributes of the sensed object outside of the soul were abstracted from them. So also each of these faculties of the soul ought to be considered in connection with the faculty of the soul which precedes it; for example, the imaginative forms are potentially in the impressions which are in turn potentially, not actually, in the common sense since they are more abstract and more spiritual. 19 Hasdai Crescas, of course, refused to ignore it, and subjected Gersonides to withering criticism. See Harvey, “Crescas’ Critique,” esp. pp. 143 ff.

211

THE ROLE OF THE ACTIVE INTELLECT IN HUMAN COGNITION

Another problem raised by this account, however, turns out to be crucial for our understanding of Gersonides’ commentary on Song of Songs and its relationship to others of his writings. What is the precise role of the Active Intellect in the process of human knowing? In particular, what is its role vis-à-vis the information abstracted from sensation? Two distinguished scholars have noted apparent inconsistencies in Gersonides’ thought on this issue. Seymour Feldman has observed that in the commentary on Song of Songs, and in his supercommentary on Averroes’ Epitome of De Anima, Gersonides seems to minimize the role of the Active Intellect vis-à-vis that of the human material intellect. In the Milhamot, on the other hand, the role of the Active Intellect in the process of human cognition is emphasized.20 Feldman (p. 264) maintains that in the Milhamot (I.4 and 6) Gersonides holds that the Active Intellect, literally imparts intelligible forms to the human mind. Gersonides uses the terminology of Avicenna, referring to the Active Intellect as the giver of forms (noten hazurot).21 Once un-formed, the human intellect is capable of distinguishing the essential from the accidental, the universal from the particular in the sense images it has accumulated. Having acquired these universal concepts, it can formulate universal propositions true of all members of a species or genus. This is knowledge proper.

Feldman then goes on to claim that in the commentary on Song of Songs (and in Gersonides’ supercommentary on Averroes’ Epitome of De Anima), the material intellect plays a more active role than that given it in the Wars: Gersonides describes the material intellect as a power or disposition residing in the imagination, or in the imaginative forms themselves, stimulated to abstract general concepts from these forms by the external action of the Active Intellect. Here the latter functions primarily as a catalytic agent.... Both the Active Intellect and the images provided by sensation are neccessary (and together sufficient) to afford us ordinary knowledge ... intellection is the power of the

20 Feldman, “Platonic Themes,” pp. 265-266. 21 On this activity of the Active Intellect, see H. Goldstein, “Dator Formarum.”

212

CHAPTER NINE

imagination to abstract the general nature embedded in many idiosyncratic images, a power brought into action by the Active Intellect (p. 265).

In the Milhamot, however, Feldman insists, Gersonides’ main concern is to magnify the role of the Active Intellect, and he does so at the expense of the imagination ... [making it] virtually the sole agent in cognition.... The Active Intellect, Gersonides claims, acts directly on the material intellect and renders it capable of apprehending the general concept present in potentia in the individual images produced by sensation. Since the Active Intellect possesses these general concepts a priori, it can ‘endow’ the material intellect with them (pp. 265-266).

Feldman concludes his exposition with the dramatic claim that “Aristotle has given way to Plato. Human cognition is now more a matter of external illumination than of the mind’s own abstraction of concepts” (p. 266). It seems to me that Feldman has overstated the Platonic character of Gersonides’ thought here, a point to which I will return below. But be that as it may, Feldman sees a definite tension between the apparently Platonizing account of human knowing in the Milhamot and the more Aristotelian account in the commentary on Song of Songs and in the supercommentary on Averroes on De anima. Herbert A. Davidson finds this tension throughout Gersonides’ writings. As Davidson understands Gersonides, the latter takes both sides of the issue in the Milhamot and in the Song of Songs commentary; these two texts do not stand in opposition to each other, rather they both reflect the tension internally.22 He summarizes his detailed discussion as follows: Gersonides, in sum, speaks of an emanation that originates in God and passes through the Active Intellect to the human intellect. He states that human concepts are knowledge of the intelligible pattern in the Active Intellect. He also, however, describes intelligible thoughts as abstractions from images in the imaginative faculty and he credits the Active Intellect as well as the human intellect with the act of abstraction; whereupon he turns around and insists, on the contrary, that no genuine abstraction takes place, after all. His analogy of

22 See Davidson, “Material and Active Intellects,” pp. 239-250.

213

THE ROLE OF THE ACTIVE INTELLECT IN HUMAN COGNITION

the inventor23 would, if pressed, indicate that thought does not come directly from the Active Intellect. Finally, he writes that the Active Intellect employs forms in the imaginative faculty as a tool to move the material intellect and give the material intellect an intellectual thought (p. 247).

Davidson, like Feldman, notes an apparent tension in Gersonides’ writings between knowledge as the result, so to speak, of emanation from above and knowledge as the consequence of abstraction from below. Within the abstraction model, Davidson notes the further tension over the question of what does the abstracting: the Active Intellect or the human intellect. Feldman and Davidson make two distinct criticisms of Gersonides. On Feldman’s reading, Gersonides presents two different theories of the role of the Active Intellect in human intellection. One theory, found in Gersonides’ commentaries to Song of Songs and to Averroes’ Epitome of the De Anima, minimizes the role of the Active Intellect; human intellection is primarily a matter of the human material intellect abstracting ideas from the sense data presented to it. This “Aristotelian” approach is replaced in the Milhamot, according to Feldman, with a more “Platonizing” approach which magnifies the role of the Active Intellect, which latter literally imparts intelligibles to the human intellect. Davidson, on the other hand, faults Gersonides for adopting an internally inconsistent position throughout all his discussions, a position which unsuccessfully melds what we have been calling (following Feldman) Aristotelian and Platonic elements in human intellection. It is my understanding of Gersonides that both Feldman and Davidson are off the mark in this matter. Gersonides presents one theory of the role of the Active Intellect in human intellection in all his writings, a theory which he thought successfully merged elements of Plato and Aristotle, solving the problems inherent in their two separate positions. It is true, as I will show, that Gersonides is not sufficiently clear on all the details of his theory, and that in different contexts he emphasizes different aspects of it; it is these characteristics of his exposition which lead Feldman and Davidson to the claims they make. 23 A reference to a passage in Milhamot I.11 (p. 83), discussed by Davidson, “Material and Active Intellects,” on p. 246.

214

CHAPTER NINE

The issue is not only important for understanding Gersonides’ epistemology in general, it also pervades his commentary on Song of Songs,24 and any attempt to understand that text must deal with it. Before turning to an examination of what exactly Gersonides says in that commentary and in the other texts where he deals with the nature of human intellection, let us recall Aristotle’s opening salvo in a discussion which was to continue for well over a thousand years: Since in every class of things, as in nature as a whole, we find two factors involved, a matter which is potentially all the particulars in the class, a cause which is productive in the sense that it makes them all (the latter standing to the former as, e.g., an art to its material), these distinct elements must likewise be found within the soul. And in fact thought [nous, i.e., mind or intellect], as we have described it, is what it is by virtue of becoming all things, while there is another which is what it is by virtue of making all things; this is a sort of positive state like light; for in a sense light makes potential colors into actual colors. Thought [nous, i.e., mind or intellect] in this sense of it is separable, impassible, unmixed, since it is in its essential nature activity (for always the active is superior to the passive factor, the originating force, to the matter).25

This brief, puzzling passage is the basis for all subsequent discussions of the Active Intellect (the “separable, impassible, unmixed” intellect “which is what it is by virtue of making all things” and which “is in its essential nature activity”). There are two metaphors here, one of light, clearly Platonic in origin (as in the role of the sun in the parable of the cave), and the other of the 24 Gersonides makes reference to the contribution of the Active Intellect to the process of human knowing in at least fifteen separate passages in the commentary: in his Introduction and in his commentaries to 1:2, 1:7, 1:11, 4:5, 4:8, 4:12, 4:16, 5:2, 6:11-12, 7:1, 7:6, 7:10, 8:8, and 8:13. 25 De anima, bk 3. ch. 5, p. 430a 10-20. Davidson opens his Alfarabi with the comment (p. 3) that these are “probably the most intensely studied sentences in the history of philosophy.” Feldman, in his “synopsis of Book One” in his translation of the Wars of the Lord (p. 72) notes “It is not an exaggeration to describe this passage as ‘obscure’. Indeed its obscurity was responsible for the almost endless number of commentaries and treatises written by the ancient and medieval commentators on this topic.” Davidson’s book follows the debate in Arabic philosophy, while Feldman (pp. 71-84) shows how that debate served as background for Gersonides’ discussion of the issue.

215

THE ROLE OF THE ACTIVE INTELLECT IN HUMAN COGNITION

union of the mind with what it knows. Gersonides, I suggest, sought to merge these two metaphors in his theory of the role of the Active Intellect in human intellection. Let us examine what Gersonides says on the subject of the role of the Active Intellect in human knowing in the three texts which focus on the subject: Milhamot I.6, the supercommentary on Averroes’ Epitome of the De Anima, and the commentary on Song of Songs. We will then see how Gersonides summarizes his view on the subject in a little-noted passage in his commentary on the Torah. It is my intention to show that while Gersonides indeed emphasizes different aspects of his theory in different contexts, in the end he has only one theory concerning the role of the Active Intellect in human intellection, a theory which finds consistent and, I think, internally harmonious expression in all of his writings. The first of these texts is Milhamot I.6.26 Having analyzed the nature of the human material intellect, Gersonides finds it necessary to discuss the Active Intellect, since Averroes had maintained that human immortality is a consequence of its union with the Active Intellect, and it is the question of human immortality which is the focus of Gersonides’ interest in Milhamot I. His discussion is divided into two parts, the first dealing with the role of the Active Intellect in human intellection, the second with the role of the Active Intellect in bringing sublunar entities into existence.27 In his first discussion, Gersonides’ concern is with the nature of the Active Intellect; I here abstract from that examination his comments on how the Active Intellect brings human beings to know. Gersonides opens his inquiry by citing Aristotle’s principle that “whatever has been brought forth from a state of potentiality to actuality requires the activity of an agent that has in actuality what the recipient has only in 26 Actually, Gersonides appears to have worked on the first treatise of the Milhamot and his supercommentary on Averroes’ Epitome more or less simultaneously; I choose to begin with the Milhamot because it is the more fully worked-out text and because there is no doubt that it represents Gersonides’ own position, as opposed to the supercommentary in which he subordinates his own views to those of Averroes. On the dating of the texts, and on Gersonides’ stance in the supercommentary, see Mashbaum, “Gersonides’ Supercommentary,” pp. xii-xiii and p. lviii. 27 These two discussions correspond to the two functions which medieval Aristotelianism attributed to the Active Intellect.

216

CHAPTER NINE

potentiality.”28 It is the Active Intellect which knows in actuality the knowledge known potentially by the material intellect. The Active Intellect conveys knowledge to the material intellect a little bit at a time: “the Active Intellect causes the material intellect to know these orders one after the other...”29 Gersonides’ language is a bit misleading here. It is not as if the Active Intellect is “stingy” with the information it is “willing” to impart; rather, the acquisition of knowledge from the Active Intellect depends upon the antecedent exposure to sensory data on the part of the human learner. Knowledge itself, as known by the Active Intellect, is unitary; the human (material) intellect cannot apprehend it in that fashion, however; rather, it “receives these intelligibles from the Active Intellect with difficulty because it needs the senses [in order to cognize them]; hence, it happens that it does not apprehend them as a [single] ordered system of plans, but in greatly varying degrees.”30 Knowledge, then, is not something simply imparted by the Active Intellect to the material intellect; in order to benefit from what Gersonides will later call the “emanations” of the Active Intellect, the material intellect depends upon information derived from the senses. How this works in detail is spelled out in the commentary to Song of Songs. For our purposes, the important point here is that the acquisition of that knowledge which constitutes our perfection, felicity, immortality, depends ultimately upon sensation. Gersonides next disposes of an alternative theory, according to which the Active Intellect does not itself have the knowledge it stimulates in the material intellect; rather, it is thought to function like light, allowing the material intellect to “see” that to which it was blind before this illumination. In his examination of this theory,31 Gersonides is led to indicate what the actual objects of knowledge (the intelligibles) are: “the general nature embedded in the image.”32 The imagination presents to the material intellect an image or apprehension of 28 Milhamot, p. 36; Wars, p. 146. For the source in Aristotle, see Metaphysics IX.8, p. 1049b, 2425. 29 Milhamot, p. 37; Wars p. 146. The “orders” (siddurim) referred to here are the rational interconnections between “individual” universals (in effect, what we would call “laws of nature”) which consititute the Active Intellect’s objects of knowledge. 30 Milhamot, p. 38; Wars, p. 148. 31 On which, see Davidson, “Material and Active Intellects,” pp. 240-243. 32 Milhamot, p. 38; Wars, p. 148.

217

THE ROLE OF THE ACTIVE INTELLECT IN HUMAN COGNITION

an object in the physical world from which many of its material aspects have been abstracted. But this image is not yet the intelligible. One of the reasons for this state of affairs is that “the material attributes can themselves all be cognized when considered from one perspective, i.e., when they are not considered with the subject to which they are accidents ...”33 The accidental properties of some substance, in other words, can be apprehended intellectually qua properties. When examining the image of a cow, for example, the material intellect cannot itself know on which of the many properties presented for its inspection it ought to focus, since many or all of them can, in the right context, be considered from their aspect of generality. How, in other words, does the material intellect “pick out the general nature in the image from all the accidental features” presented for its inspection?34 This, it turns out, is the function of the Active Intellect. “The matter being so,” Gersonides summarizes, “it is clear that if the Active Intellect actualizes the intelligible which was [only] a potential intelligible in the imaginative form, it does so by choosing35 from the imaginative form the general nature from among the material attributes.”36 Here the contribution of the Active Intellect to the process of knowing is made clear: it “instructs” the material intellect on which feature of the imaginative form to focus its attention, so to speak. Gersonides will expand on this point in his commentary to Song of Songs. Gersonides completes his analysis of the nature of the Active Intellect’s knowledge with a discussion of issues which need not detain us here and then turns to the second subject of I.6, the way in which the Active Intellect functions as the cause of the existence of sublunar entities. Towards the end of the chapter, he returns to our issue. He proves that the Active Intellect must exist 33 Milhamot, p. 38; Wars, p. 149. 34 Milhamot, p. 39; Wars, pp. 149-50. 35 From the root b-r-r. Feldman here translates “abstracts” which I do not think is quite the best translation; for ‘abstraction’, Gersonides usually uses some variant of p-sh-t. Feldman’s translation makes the Active Intellect the agent of the process of abstraction, a point which Gersonides does not explicitly make here (or elsewhere, I think). Gersonides’ use of the active voice here is misleading: the Active Intellect, of course, does not actually do anything specific here; rather it does what it always does, namely, generate –without will or consciousness– intellectual emanations, and nothing else whatsoever. 36 Milhamot, p. 39; Wars, p. 150.

218

CHAPTER NINE

because it actualizes the material intellect by causing it to acquire intelligibles.37 It might be objected, Gersonides admits, that this does not necessitate the existence of an intellect which actualizes the material intellect since, the imaginative forms are sufficient to bring it [i.e., the material intellect] from potentiality to actuality, for the intelligibles which it apprehends are already found in them to some extent. Even though the material attributes through which these imaginative forms are particularized are found in them [i.e., in the imaginative forms], no intellect is needed to abstract these intelligibles from the material matters with which they are intermixed. This is so because it is possible that [even] without another intellect’s abstracting them [i.e., abstracting the intelligibles from the imaginative forms], the material intellect might apprehend those intelligibles from out of the imaginative forms without their being mixed with material attributes, since it can be maintained that its specific [object of] apprehension is the general nature [of things], and it is thus possible for it [i.e., the material intellect] to apprehend it [i.e., the general nature or universal] with the material attributes abstracted from it ... 38

The existence of the Active Intellect has been posited since it makes it possible for the material intellect to pick out the general nature from the image presented to it by the imagination (what Gersonides calls the “imaginative form”), within which image the general nature is camouflaged , so to speak, by a plethora of accidental characteristics (the “material attributes”).39 But, it might be objected, perhaps the material intellect is itself endowed with this ability, and needs no help from the Active Intellect? To this objection, Gersonides presents a double-barreled response. In actual fact, most of what the material intellect knows is accidental properties, and only through these accidental properties does it have any knowledge of general natures. Furthermore, were it indeed the case that the material intellect’s “specific [object of] apprehension is the general nature [of things],” then 37 Milhamot, p. 45; Wars, p. 160. 38 Milhamot, p. 45; Wars, p. 160. 39 It is difficult to express Gersonides’ ideas in modern idiom without falling into misleading forms of expression. The material intellect, which in itself is nothing other than a disposition grounded in the imagination, does not “pick out” anything.

219

THE ROLE OF THE ACTIVE INTELLECT IN HUMAN COGNITION

the material intellect would not be able to confuse accidental and essential properties. “But this is absurd,” Gersonides counters, “for the material intellect frequently makes mistakes of this kind; indeed, most of its mistakes are of this type, as is quite evident to anyone who reads this book.”40 Because of its propensity to confuse essential and accidental matters the material intellect cannot be said to have a special talent, so to speak, for zeroing in on the general natures embedded in the gorgeously material images presented to it by the imagination. Gersonides continues his defense of the role of the Active Intellect in human cognition by noting that if the material intellect did not indeed need the Active Intellect in order to recognize general natures, then there would be no need for input from the senses in acquisition of knowledge. “But this,” as Gersonides likes to say, “is clearly absurd, for there are many things in this world that require repeated observations and great effort before we acquire the intelligibles of them.”41 Experience teaches that the acquisition of intelligibles requires effort and repeated observations; this proves that the material intellect on its own is not qualified to simply look and know. “Hence,” Gersonides concludes, “it is evident that we must postulate an Active Intellect in order to account for the operation of the material intellect, i.e., its actualization from a state of potentiality, in the acquisition of knowledge.”42 This concludes Gersonides’ only extended treatment of our subject in the Milhamot, such as it is; he does, however, make passing references to it in other texts in Treatise I and it is to these texts that I now turn. At the end of I.7 Gersonides explains why we have more perfect knowledge of some things than others: “the material intellect requires sensation in the reception of the emanation of the Active Intellect, and hence our knowledge cannot be perfect if the sense-data are not available for this knowledge.”43 The Active Intellect emanates upon the material intellect; for that emanation to have any effect, the material intellect must be properly prepared. In the same sentence Gersonides 40 Milhamot, p. 46; Feldman, Wars (whose translation I present here and in the next two paragraphs, with slight alterations), p. 161. 41 Milhamot, p. 46; Wars, p. 161. 42 Milhamot, p. 46; Wars, p. 161. 43 Milhamot, p. 51; Wars, pp. 168-69.

220

CHAPTER NINE

speaks of the emanation of the Active Intellect and the need for sense-data in preparing the material intellect for utilizing those emanations. It is the nature of that preparation which will turn out to be the main subject of Song of Songs, according to Gersonides. Gersonides’ use of emanationist language here44 should not confuse the reader into thinking that the role of the Active Intellect in human knowledge is to emanate “ready-made” knowledge onto the material intellect, so to speak, thus diminishing the importance of observation in the process of learning. As we have seen already, the material intellect cannot benefit from the activity of the Active Intellect unless it is properly prepared. But all the preparation in the world will not enable the material intellect to separate out the general natures from the welter of material attributes with which they are presented to it by the imagination if the Active Intellect is not involved. Now, when an incorporeal being acts, that action is called “emanation” (shefa). This is a commonplace of medieval Aristotelianism.45 In the context of his extended discussion of the nature of universals in Milhamot I.10, Gersonides is led to reaffirm the dual components in all acts of human knowing: properly processed sensation and the influence of the Active Intellect.46 Sensible objects exist thanks to the activity of the Active Intellect; such objects, in turn, are “the causes of the origination in us of the intelligible, but not of its [own] existence itself.”47 In this chapter, Gersonides not only echoes positions already defended, he also adds new information concerning the part played by the Active Intellect in human cognition. What is the object of the Active Intellect’s activity – the material intellect, or the imaginative forms? Gersonides is emphatic: “The Active Intellect works upon the material intellect, causing it to cognize it [i.e., 44 See Davidson, “Material and Active Intellects,” p. 243 for other sources. 45 See, for example, Maimonides’ definition of the term fayd (Arabic for ‘emanation’) towards the end of Guide of the Perplexed II.12. 46 Who or what does this “processing” – is it the imagination itself, the material intellect, or the Active Intellect? As noted above, Gersonides does not answer this question. Those who find a Platonic emphasis in Gersonides’ epistemology see the Active Intellect as the agent of abstraction; my own understanding of the texts is that Gersonides invokes the Active Intellect after the process has been completed. 47 Milhamot, p. 73; Wars, p. 201.

221

THE ROLE OF THE ACTIVE INTELLECT IN HUMAN COGNITION

the imaginative form] after its [again, the imaginative form] having been intelligible only potentially.”48 The imaginative form, becoming an intelligible, is also affected by the activity of the Active Intellect, but only accidentally, not substantially. As will become clear in the commentary to Song of Songs, the material intellect stands at a sort of midpoint in the process, receiving information from the senses after that information had been brought to a relatively high level of abstraction by the various internal senses, culminating in the imagination, while at the same time receiving the emanations of the Active Intellect,49 which allow it to distinguish general natures from the accidental qualities in which they are embedded in the abstracted perceptions offered to it by the imagination. That the Active Intellect works upon the material intellect is a point made by Gersonides indirectly in his last explicit reference to our subject in the first treatise of the Milhamot. “It is clear,” he says in I.11 (p. 83; Wars, pp. 212-213), “that the acquired intellect is the perfection which comes from the Active Intellect to the material intellect.” In the sequel, Gersonides emphasizes that the acquired intellect is wholly independent of sensation, once it has become an acquired intellect. This claim in no way dilutes his earlier emphasis on the contribution of empirical observation to the material intellect’s becoming an acquired intellect. Not surprisingly, given that he wrote it at more or less the same time that he wrote the first treatise of the Milhamot, Gersonides’ supercommentary to Averroes’ Epitome of the De Anima presents a teaching indentical in all important respects to that of Mihamot I. Here is the crucial text, in the translation of Jesse S. Mashbaum: Now that this has been established, we say that when potential intellect has been aroused by the imaginative forms, and forms have been abstracted from their matters for a limited number of sensed individuals, and when the poten-

48 Milhamot, p. 76; Feldman’s translation (Wars, p. 205) reflects his preference for a different textual reading, a preference I do not share; both texts, however (the printed version which I follow, and the ms. preferred by Feldman) agree on the sense of the passage. 49 It would have been nice had Gersonides made clear what these emanations are; he did not. One might be tempted to answer that they are intelligibles; but were that the case, what would be the role of the imaginative forms presented by the imagination in intellection?

222

CHAPTER NINE

tial intellect has been aroused by the Agent [=Active] Intellect and has formed an infinite judgment concerning those forms, then there occurs to the material intellect the same order that is in the soul of the Agent Intellect regarding this intelligible; and the material intellect unifies with the Agent Intellect to some degree, and it becomes eternal in this respect. ... You ought to know that, insofar as these intelligibles are dependent upon extra-mental substrata, from which the forms are abstracted, they are subject to dissolution when those substrata dissolve. However, insofar as they are dependent upon the order in the soul of the Agent Intellect –which is the aspect by which we formed an infinite judgment– they are necessarily eternal... 50

Gersonides’ concern here is less with the way in which the Active Intellect works upon the material intellect than with the eternal (a parte post) existence of the acquired intellect, but, withal, the position defended is the same we found in the Mihamot: the potential intellect (called “material intellect” in the texts cited above from Milhamot I) “aroused” by the imagination’s presenting it with stuff ultimately derived from sensation (the imaginative forms) is thus prepared to be “aroused”’ by the Active Intellect, which enables it to derive an unrestricted judgment (the “universal” or “general nature” of the Milhamot), i.e., a claim about many entities made on the basis of a few observed examples. Having reached this stage, the material intellect achieves a kind of conjunction with the Active Intellect, which conjunction constitutes its eternal existence. The material intellect thus transformed is the acquired intellect. As noted above, the subject of the role of the Active Intellect in the process of human intellection comes up again and again in Gersonides’ commentary on Song of Songs. Aspects of the process are described in greater detail than in the Milhamot, but I find no differences in overall conception between the two texts. Gersonides pictures Song of Songs as two dialogues: one between the imagination (representing all the faculties, or internal senses, of the soul) and the material intellect, the other between the material intellect and the Active Intellect.51 Song of Songs describes the desire of a properly regulated imagination to perfect the material intellect so that the latter can benefit from the 50 Mashbaum, “Gersonides’ Supercommentary,” pp. 159-161. 51 See the commentary to 1:12.

223

THE ROLE OF THE ACTIVE INTELLECT IN HUMAN COGNITION

emanations of the Active Intellect, and also describes the desire of the material intellect to benefit from those emanations. It is in the context of explaining that this is the point of Song of Songs that Gersonides raises our issue (p. 13): Since perfection of the intellect comes from the Active Intellect by way of those imaginative forms which the imagination emanates upon it, and this is perfected –i.e., the presentation to the intellect by the imagination of what it [i.e., the intellect] needs from the senses in each subject of study– when it [i.e., the imagination] so wonderfully desires to be subservient to the hylic intellect that it places all of its activities in the service of the intellect so far as it can, he allegorically compared this desire to the desire of the male and female who desire each other, in order to indicate the great extent of this desire. He allegorically compared the intellect to the male since it is on the level of form relative to the imaginative faculty. This is something which continues throughout this book.

Rephrasing this paragraph in a less ambiguous fashion, Gersonides says that the material intellect is perfected through the emanations down to it, so to speak, from the Active Intellect, and up to it, so to speak, from the imagination.52 This only occurs, however, when the faculty of imagination is disciplined and remains subservient to the material intellect, placing itself, so to speak, entirely at the disposal of the material intellect. This being so, Gersonides says that the author of Song of Songs likened the attraction between material intellect and faculty of imagination to the sexual attraction between male and female, where the intellect corresponds to the male and the imagination to the female. Three characters have roles in human intellection: the Active Intellect, the material intellect, and the imagination. Perfection of the material intellect “comes from the Active Intellect,” Gersonides says here, but only if that material intellect has been properly prepared by the imagination through the imaginative forms (or images) which the latter “emanates”53 upon it. This is 52 Emanation, of course, typically moves “downward,” not “upward.” My paraphrase here reflects Gersonides’ language. See the next note. 53 Gersonides uses this term here to connote the non-physical influence of a force, power, or capacity on something else. The use of this term in this context supports my claim made above that Gersonides speaks of the Active Intellect “emanating” upon the material

224

CHAPTER NINE

precisely the position adumbrated in the Wars and in the supercommentary on Averroes’ Epitome of the De Anima. In his commentary to Song of Songs 1:2 (p. 24), Gersonides adds what may be thought of as a new wrinkle to this theory, writing: He said, Let him kiss me and not “I will kiss him” because in truth God is the Actor in this matter, for what we know is an emanation emanating upon us from God, through the intermediation of the Active Intellect.54

Here human intellection is connected to God’s emanation, a point not previously made in the other texts we have examined. But this is, of course, nothing new. It was a commonplace of medieval Jewish Aristotelianism that God is the ultimate mover of all that occurs in the universe.55 The Active Intellect does nothing on its own initiative, as it were, serving merely as a conduit between God and the sublunar world. This point aside, Gersonides continues throughout his commentary in developing the theory already described in the Milhamot and in the supercommentary. Thus, in his commentary to 1:11 (p. 33) he succinctly restates the entire theory: His saying we will make refers to the fact that the actualization of this potentiality is not attributed to the Active Intellect alone, other assistance being needed as stated above, this being provided by the perfected ones who guide one to this perfection. Further, there is no way of acquiring the primary intelintellect without thereby meaning to imply a Platonic role for the Active Intellect in human cognition. The Active Intellect does not emanate “ready-made” universals, so to speak, upon a suitably prepared substratum. Rather, thanks to the absolutely necessary preparatory work of the imagination, we are enabled to grasp the universal by comprehending, for example, the relation between “cowness” and being a ruminant. 54 God is active in the human quest for knowledge in the sense that without the unceasing intellectual emanations from God through the Active Intellect humans could not actualize their intellects, thereby achieving self-realization. Norbert Samuelson has proposed a helpful metaphor to illustrate this: God functions like a high-powered radio transmitter. The transmissions themselves are not enough, since one must also tune into them. Human perfection depends upon God’s universal unceasing intellectual emanation, aimed at no one individual in particular, and the action of individuals doing their utmost to “tune into” those emanations. See Norbert Samuelson, “Free Will.” 55 See, for example, Maimonides, Guide of the Perplexed, I.66 (p. 160), and Gersonides, Milhamot III.4 (p. 137; Wars, p. 116).

225

THE ROLE OF THE ACTIVE INTELLECT IN HUMAN COGNITION

ligibles from the Active Intellect without sense, imagination, and the faculty of memory, as above.

The “perfected ones” referred to here are scholars and teachers who can guide the beginner’s studies. Here again we see the claim that the material intellect needs help from both “above” and “below” in order to achieve its perfection. In his commentary to 7:1 (p. 79), Gersonides explains why it is that the material intellect needs the input of the Active Intellect in order to achieve knowledge and cannot reach it on the basis of the imaginative forms presented to it by the imagination alone: I mean, that we acquire knowledge of the things themselves on the basis of the weak knowledge we have of these attributes and accidents and we then achieve perfect knowledge of these attributes due to the knowledge we have of the things themselves in themselves. The level of knowledge thus achieved is so great that it has been thought that this would be something absurd and impossible; and if there were not another agent here having a role with respect to this emanation the objection would have aspects of plausibility. But since there is here another agent –the Active Intellect– our acquisition of perfect knowledge on the basis of the weak knowledge we have from perception is not rendered impossible.

Sense perception enables one to come to know only those things available for its inspection, namely, the attributes and accidents of things themselves. How do we come to know universals on that basis? Indeed, Gersonides admits, were empirical observation the only source of our knowledge, we would never apprehend the general natures of things. It is here that the contribution of the Active Intellect is crucial. But even with that contribution, in order to acquire “perfect knowledge” we still need “the weak knowledge we have from perception. “But what exactly is the contribution of the Active Intellect? This question is answered in Gersonides’ Introduction to his commentary (p. 5): It has been shown in the Posterior Analytics that in order to acquire any particular intelligible a person needs prior knowledge. This prior knowledge is of two types: primary intelligibles and secondary intelligibles, these latter being 226

CHAPTER NINE

acquired syllogistically from the primary intelligibles. We acquire the primary intelligibles through our sense by way of repetition. This is carried out by our faculties of memory and imagination, for the imagination acquires for us the sensed notion upon its being revealed by the senses, and the faculty of memory perfects the repetition by virtue of which the universal statement is completed. Thus these two faculties are to some extent a cause of our acquiring all the intelligibles which we acquire. There is another, worthier agent which plays a role in the process of our acquiring intelliglibles: this is the Active Intellect, as was shown in On the Soul. No intelligible can be acquired without it for only through it can we determine whether the repetition which is presented by the senses is essential to those things or not. We then make an infinite judgment on the basis of this multiplicity, apprehension of which comes from the sense; i.e., on this basis we judge the continuation of the judgment concerning each individual member of that species and in every particular time, without end.

This passage emphasizes that there is joint causality in the acquisition of intelligibles: the imagination receives information from the sense (after it has been stripped of most of its material attributes); memory allows us to store the product of this process (the imaginative forms) and thus to realize that we have been exposed over and over to the same information. But this by itself is not enough for us to be able to distinguish between the substantial and accidental aspects of the things to which we are exposed. Let us say that we have seen cow after cow after cow. How are we to know which attributes of the cow (that it is a ruminant, for example) are essential to its “cowness” and which (that it has brown, curly hair, for example) are accidental to its “cowness”? Observation alone will not teach us that.56 It is the emanation of the Active Intellect57 56 The issue of distinguishing substantial from accidental matters is thus quite important to Gersonides and he makes explicit reference to it in at least four separate places in the commentary (1:2, 1:17, 2:8, and 2:15); not surprisingly, it comes up often in his other writings as well. See, for example, Milhamot I.6 (p. 46; Wars, p. 161); the Commentary on Ecclesiastes 1:17; and the Commentary on Genesis, p. 16a/63/110. Compare also Sherlock Holmes’ comment in “The Adventure of the Priory School”: “Before we start to investigate that, let us try to realize what we do know, so as to make the most of it, and to separate the essential from the accidental.” 57 The Active Intellect is called a “worthier agent” in this passage not because it is more important than imagination and memory in the process of intellection, but because it is in itself much worthier than they in its very nature, being incorporeal and permanent.

227

THE ROLE OF THE ACTIVE INTELLECT IN HUMAN COGNITION

that enables us to seize the essential connection between the predicate and the subject of a statement, allowing us to universalize on the basis of our limited experience, and to make judgments like, “cows are ruminants” (the “infinite judgement” of the text just quoted). How precisely the Active Intellect does this, Gersonides never explains; that the Active Intellect does this is crucial for Gersonides’ explanation of how we can have knowledge of universals which ultimately originates in experience. Gersonides summarizes his account of the role of the Active Intellect in human intellection in a text written after the Milhamot, after the supercommentary on Averroes, and after the commentary on Song of Songs, namely, his commentary on Genesis: The intended purpose [of Genesis 2:1-3:24],58 as it seems to us, is to make known the tools which God has given man to bring him to felicity of the soul through which he achieves eternal life. We offer here a general introduction concerning everything included in this narrative which continues till the passage [beginning], And the man knew Eve his wife [Genesis 4:1]: it has already been made clear in De Anima that the human intellect is, at the beginning of its creation, naked of all the intelligibles it will [eventually] apprehend, and that it is the Active Intellect which emanates the intelligibles upon it through the intermediation of the senses, the faculty of imagination, and the faculty of memory. This emanation which it [i.e., the Active Intellect] emanates upon it [i.e., the material intellect], communicating the deep secrets of existence, appears similar to lightning or to the flaming sword which turned every way [Genesis 3:24] which alternately shines forth and disappears. [It appears thus] because of the difficulty of achieving the necessary separation of the human intellect from the other faculties of the soul in this form of apprehension, as we explained in our commentary to Song of Songs.59

Maintaining that the point of Genesis 2:1-3:24 is to make known to human beings how they can achieve their ultimate felicity (through the cognition of intelligibles), Gersonides provides an introductory comment, explaining the bare bones of the process. We are born –as a good Aristotelian empiricist must 58 I.e., the passage on which Gersonides is commenting here. 59 Commentary on Genesis, p. 14a/51/84.

228

CHAPTER NINE

insist– without any innate knowledge. We apprehend intelligibles thanks to an emanation upon us from the Active Intellect. In order to benefit from this emanation, the human intellect must have the cooperation, so to speak, of the senses (which provide it with raw data), of the imagination (which may be the agent which processes that data into material accessible to the intellect through abstraction), and the memory (to store the processed data and allow us to become aware of repeated exposures to the same or very similar bits of data). But knowledge of the “deep secrets of existence” (i.e., a correct understanding of the laws governing the processes of the physical universe and their interconnection),60 while it cannot be gained without the assistance (or, perhaps, better, stimulation) of the senses, imagination, and memory, ultimately depends upon emanations from the Active Intellect. This emanation is not perceived as a constant, flowing, uninterrupted affair, but, rather, as intermittent. The “choppy” nature of the process, Gersonides explains, is a function of the fact that the human intellect cannot easily achieve the “separation” or concentration necessary for it to focus on the imaginative forms presented to it by a properly disciplined imagination while at the same time “tuning in,” so to speak, to the emanations of the Active Intellect.61 In other words, the action of the Active Intellect is constant (of course) while its implementation in the process of human intellection comes and goes with the level of preparation of the individual concerned. This, Gersonides adds, was explained in the commentary to Song of Songs. This last statement is not strictly correct. Aside from a passing reference in the commentary to 1:12, the “separation” of the intellect from the other faculties of the soul is not really addressed in Gersonides’ commentary to Song of Songs. It is likely that Gersonides meant that the entire issue described in the paragraph under discussion was “explained in our commentary to Song of 60 This is an anachronism; Gersonides would have written “the [rational] orders [siddurim].” 61 On hitbodedut, the ‘separation’ spoken of here, in medieval Jewish philosophy in general, see Idel, “Hitbodedut.” In Gersonides, the concept refers primarily to an individual’s ability to separate the intellect from the other faculties of the soul. In plain English: to achieve a high level of concentration. See, for example, his discussion of Moses in Milhamot II.6 (pp. 110-111, Wars, pp. 57-59) and II.8 (p. 119; Wars, pp. 72-73). Notably, see his description of his own ability to focus on intellectual matters even while eating, drinking and conversing: commentary on Exodus, p. 114b/432/420. It is quite a remarkable passage. See also above, ch. 8, note 47.

229

THE ROLE OF THE ACTIVE INTELLECT IN HUMAN COGNITION

Songs.” Understood thus, the statement is certainly true, since the commentary, as we have seen, really does include Gersonides’ most extensive discussion of the role of the Active Intellect in the process of human cognition. Either way, it is clear from the reference to the Song of Songs commentary that Gersonides saw the view adumbrated here as being consistent with that of the commentary on Song of Songs. He is pretty clear here in emphasizing the role of the Active Intellect and in presenting human intellection as a process which crucially depends upon emanations from the Active Intellect to the human intellect. Reading this text alone, an interpreter of Gersonides might be led to impute to him a theory of knowledge in which the role of the Active Intellect is magnified at the expense of the role of sense experience. Reading this passage in the light of the commentary on Song of Songs, as Gersonides tells us to do, forbids such an interpretation. I hope that it is clear from the preceding that Gersonides does not really hold different positions concerning the role of the Active Intellect in human intellection in his various writings. There is also good reason to insist that he could not have adopted the Platonizing position on human cognition said to be maintained by him in the Milhamot. Had he done so he would have blatantly contradicted another view of his, one which he expresses in many places in his writings. This has to do with the question of whether it is possible to achieve new cognitions after death. The point is made explicitly in Milhamot I.13: “But it should be realized that after death the intellect will acquire no new knowledge, since it does not have the organs by means of which it can acquire such knowledge, such as the sense, the memory, and the other faculties making use of the senses.”62 Had Gersonides actually adopted a Platonizing as opposed to an Aristotelian view of human intellection in the Milhamot, he would have had no reason not to allow the possibility of new knowledge after death. Gersonides reverts to the issue a number of times in his biblical commentaries. Indeed, in his commentary to Numbers, Gersonides calls the teaching “that after death the intellect will not acquire any new intelligible which is had not acquired [already] while it was with matter” a “great principle of [philo62 Milhamot, p. 90; Wars, p. 225.

230

CHAPTER NINE

sophic] speculation.”63 On the preceding page (193d/107/246) he explained why such new knowledge was impossible: with a man’s death the human form is removed from matter and the specific craft of the human form is removed from it, inasmuch as it is a corporeal power, it [i.e., the human form’s specific craft] being the acquisition of new intelligibles, it being the way [of such intelligibles] that they be acquired through the intermediation of senses, imagination, and the faculty of memory, for after its separation from matter, it is impossible for it [i.e., the human form] to use this craft, since it has no tools which enable it to do so.

It is a cornerstone or principle of philosophic speculation that human beings acquire no new knowledge after death; the acquisition of such knowledge is the ability or craft (melakhah) specific to the human form, and as such one might think its accomplishment depends upon the form alone. Gersonides hastens to assure us that such is not the case: it cannot be accomplished without material tools: senses, imagination, memory. Gersonides repeats the point in a number of places in his commentary on Ecclesiastes. Thus, on p. 35d/52, commenting on the last phrase in Ecclesiastes 9:5, For the living know that they shall die; but the dead know not any thing, neither have they any more a reward; for the memory of them is forgotten, Gersonides explains that the dead have no new apprehensions, “for the memory of them is forgotten”; the memory is a tool for the acquisition of intelligibles, “for sense, the imagination, and the faculty of memory are tools which enable a man to acquire his intelligibles.”64 It is fair then to take as one of Gersonides’ settled doctrines that human beings acquire no new intelligibles after death, since the acquisition of such knowledge is crucially dependent upon sense perception and corporeal faculties such as memory and imagination. This view is called “a great principle 63 Commentary on Numbers, p. 194a/109/251. On Gersonides’ use of the expression pinnot haiyyun, ‘cornerstones’ or ‘principles of speculation’, see Eisen, “Reason [and] Revelation,” esp. pp. 19-20. 64 See also, pp. 36b/53 and 38c/63. I found another reference to his doctrine in the eighteenth to’elet at the end of 1 Kings. This is a long text; the passage in question is found towards the bottom of the first column on p. 92 of Mikra’ot Gedolot Ha-Keter, published by Bar Ilan University Press (1995).

231

THE ROLE OF THE ACTIVE INTELLECT IN HUMAN COGNITION

of philosophic speculation,” in the Bible commentary, it is defended in the Milhamot, is repeated in three separate places in the commentary on Ecclesiastes, and pops up in an unlikely place in the commentary on 1 Kings. This being the case, it is highly unlikely that Gersonides would have adopted the “Platonizing” view of human knowledge of universals (that it depends upon emanations of the Active Intellect alone) attributed to him by recent scholarship in at least some of his texts. On that view, there is no reason why new knowledge after death should be impossible. For Gersonides, new knowledge is impossible without sense experience, memory, and imagination. These three jointly constitute what might be called the material cause in the acquisition of knowledge, preparing the substratum. The Active Intellect is the proximate formal cause of our knowledge in that its emanations make it possible to grasp the universal. That is not to say that the Active Intellect “supplies” a suitably prepared substratum with the universal (what I have been calling the “Platonizing” interpretation of Gersonides). Had Gersonides maintained that whatever survives death is some sort of substance with a distinct identity, he could then deny the possibility of new knowledge after death on the simple grounds that whatever survives death, precisely because it is incorporeal, is fully actual or actualized and therefore incapable of further change, including whatever changes might be associated with learning. But this position is denied him by his claim that thoughts survive death, not the thinker. This being the case, were the Platonizing interpretation of Gersonides correct, there would be no reason why new thoughts could not be added after death to the complex of thoughts constituting a particular individual’s immortality. But since the Platonizing interpretation is not correct, Gersonides cannot allow for this. We have up to this point followed Gersonides’ discussions of the nature of human intellection in three different texts, showing how he consistently presents the same view throughout them all: in order to benefit from the emanations of the Active Intellect, the material intellect must prepare itself through the acquisition of imaginative forms abstracted from sense experience. We then showed how Gersonides emphasized the importance of a consequence of this view (that no new knowledge is possible after death) by calling it “a great principle of philosophic speculation” and by repeating it several times in his 232

CHAPTER NINE

writings. There is a third reason for maintaining that Gersonides would not want to be interpreted as having retreated from his account of human intellection. Quite simply, he was proud of it! In at least three places Gersonides draws explicit attention to the fact that his theory solves an ancient philosophic problem. In the Introduction to his commentary on Song of Songs, after presenting the theory of human intellection discussed in this chapter, he writes (p. 6), “In this manner one may solve the problem which prompted the ancients to posit Forms and numbers or to deny the possibility of knowledge, as was made clear in the Metaphysics.” In Milhamot I.6 he writes, “It should be noted that our proofs have dissipated all the doubts that some of the ancients have brought forth either against the possibility of knowledge or for the introduction of forms that exist outside the mind.”65 As Gersonides understood him, Plato had thought that knowing demanded the existence of permanent, stable objects of knowledge. His solution was to posit the independent existence of Forms. Gersonides thought that his own epistemology made knowledge possible without the necessity of assuming the existence of Forms as self-subsisting entities. He makes the point clearly in the third place in which he draws attention to the advantages of his theory: If you understand what we have been aiming for here, you will be rid of all those doubts which forced Plato to posit universal forms existing outside the soul. In general, based on our theory, they have an intelligible existence in the soul of the Active Intellect, not a sensible existence; for their sensible existence occurs in the individuals which exist outside the soul.66

Gersonides’ theory of human intellection is a mixture of Plato and Aristotle: as with Aristotle, universals do not exist in and of themselves outside of sensible objects in the “real” world. To learn about them, one must begin with empirical study of those objects. But universals do exist as objects of thought in the soul of the Active Intellect and it is emanations from that Active Intel65 Milhamot, pp. 46-7; Wars, p. 162. Gersonides’ pride in his theory is further expressed in the last sentence of this chapter: “Accordingly, the fact that our theory of the Active Intellect solves all those problems concerning knowledge and definitions that have marred other theories makes our theory of the Active Intellect even more evident and complete” (Milhamot, p. 48; Wars, p. 164). 66 Mashbaum, “Gersonides’ Supercommentary,” pp. 165-166.

233

THE ROLE OF THE ACTIVE INTELLECT IN HUMAN COGNITION

lect that enable us to grasp them as universals after a process of abstraction involving sense experience, imagination, and memory. It is wildly unlikely that Gersonides would have written anything which he thought might be interpreted as a withdrawal from aspects of a theory in which he took obvious pride and which, to his mind, solved an ancient and pressing philosophical problem. Not only would he not want to be so interpreted, I have tried to show in the body of this chapter that he should not be so interpreted. Gersonides presents one view of the process of human intellection (and of the role of the Active Intellect in it) in all of his writings. Different aspects of me theory may be emphasized in different contexts, but differences in emphasis ought not, I submit, be construed as tensions or inconsistencies within the theory itself. And it is that very theory which is the central message of the holiest book of the Bible, Song of Songs.

234

CHAPTER TEN Imitatio Dei and the Dissemination of Scientific Knowledge

H

aving learned how to learn, so to speak, in the previous chapter, we may now turn to another question: what do we do with the knowledge thus gained? We will now see that Gersonides’ ideas on what would today be called a religious issue, but which for him was clearly a matter of philosophic (i.e., scientific) import –not that he would have recognized the distinction– influenced his approach to a practical and social issue. An important element in Gersonides’ vision of the perfected life is assisting others to perfect themselves. This has a religious dimension, since the person who teaches scientific truth to another thereby imitates God, and it also has what might be called a social dimension, since it leads Gersonides to emphasize the importance of relying upon the scientific work of one’s predecessors and of disseminating one’s own scientific advances. For Gersonides, the perfected life itself is the life of intellectual attainment, cognition of the intelligibiles.1 Human perfection, Gersonides avers, consists in immortality of the intellect.2 It is the point of Milhamot I.10 to prove that human immortality is constituted by knowledge of universals.3 Gersonides’ claims about the imitation of God were obviously not made in a vacuum and in order better to understand his position we must take a brief 1

Compare above, ch. 3, note 99.

2

See Milhamot I.4, p. 25; Wars, p. 130. Quotations from the Milhamot in this chapter will be from Feldman’s translation, with occasional minor alterations.

3

For a discussion of Gersonides’ views on this subject, see Feldman, “Gersonides on Conjunction.” Gersonides states his position in an interesting fashion in his commentary on Prov. 24:14. The verse reads: So know thou wisdom to be unto thy soul; if thou hast found it, then shall there be a future, and thy hope shall not be cut off. Gersonides comments: “Knowledge of wisdom will be very sweet unto thy soul; if thou hast found wisdom you will acquire thereby a good future, it being human felicity.”

235

IMITATIO DEI AND THE DISSEMINATION OF THE SCIENTFIC KNOWLEDGE

look at the philosophic and Jewish traditions on the issue of imitatio dei to which he was heir. The philosophic tradition begins with Plato: Socrates: Evils, Theodorus, can never pass away; for there must always remain something which is antagonistic to good. Having no place among the gods in heaven, of necessity they hover around the mortal nature, and this earthly sphere. Wherefore we ought to fly away from earth to heaven as quickly as we can; and to fly away is to become like God, as far as this is possible: and to become like him, is to become holy, just, and wise.4

The medieval philosophic tradition built upon this base. Aristotelians, emphasizing the intellectual character of divinity, called upon individuals to imitate God through the development of their intellects.5 The Jewish tradition took a different course, defining the imitation of God as God-like behavior, as opposed to becoming like God. The Torah indeed calls upon the Jew to be holy, for I the Lord your God am holy (Lev. 19:2). But it then specifies: And now, Israel, what does the Lord your God require of you, but to fear the Lord your God, to walk in all his ways, and to love him, and to serve the Lord your God with all your heart and all your soul (Dt. 10:12). The connection between achieving holiness through the imitation of God on the one hand, and specific forms of behavior on the other hand, is made fairly clearly in another verse from Deuteronomy (28:9): The Lord will establish you for a holy people unto himself, as he has sworn unto you, if you keep the commandments of the Lord your God, and walk in his ways. These three verses became the basis for subsequent halakhic discussions of the obligation to imitate God.6 Medieval Jewish and philosophic traditions thus agreed (not always explicitly) that God, the most perfect existent, is the ultimate model for human emulation. This doctrine was more clearly expressed in the religious sphere –as the doctrine of imitatio dei– but as Berman has shown, underlay philosophic conceptions as well. If God is active in the world, then to emulate God is to adopt a life of activity in the world. If God is essentially inactive, busy contemplating the most perfect 4

Theaetetus 176 (emphasis added). Compare Laws 4.716.

5

For details see Berman, “Political Interpretation” and Berman, “Disciple.” Compare also ch. 7 above.

6

For background, see Kreisel, “Imitatio Dei,” and Kaplan, “Maimonides and Soloveitchik.”

236

CHAPTER TEN

possible entity (namely, God), then to emulate God means to withdraw from active involvement in the world in order to contemplate, to the extent that one is capable, the most perfect possible entity (God). Either way, the perfected life is the life lived in the imitation of God. According to the mainstream of classical Judaism, this involves the submission to God’s will and the fulfillment of divine commands. According to the philosophic view, on the other hand, human perfection and felicity involve the intellectual contemplation of God. Maimonides codifies the obligation to imitate God in three texts.7 The upshot of his discussion is that one fulfills the commandment to imitate God by imitating certain of God’s attributes of action; fulfilling the commandments is presented as the way in which this is done. But despite his emphasis on the obligation to imitate God through types of behavior, Maimonides is consistent throughout almost all of his works in seeing human perfection in strictly intellectualist terms. As he describes it, a human being’s “ultimate perfection is to become rational in actu....”8 In the closing passage of his Guide of the Perplexed, however, Maimonides seems to go beyond his uncompromising intellectualism: It is clear that the perfection of man that may be truly gloried in [a reference to Jer. 9:22–23] is the one acquired by him who has achieved, in a measure corresponding to his capacity, apprehension of Him, may He be exalted, and who knows His providence extending over His creatures as manifested in the act of bringing them into being and their governance as it is. The way of life of such an individual, after he has achieved this apprehension, will always have in view loving-kindness, righteousness, and judgment, through assimilation to His actions, may He be exalted....9

The shift in Maimonides’ thinking here is extreme: apprehension of God is no longer a human being’s most glorious perfection; rather, such perfection consists in the imitation of God’s loving-kindness, righteousness, and judgment, after having achieved intellectual perfection through the apprehension of God. The vita activa has triumphed over the vita contemplativa. 7

For details see Kellner, Perfection, pp. 41-45.

8

Guide of the Perplexed, III.27, p. 511. For an anlysis of Maimonides’ intellectualism, see Kellner, Science, ch. 4.

9

III.54, p. 638.

237

IMITATIO DEI AND THE DISSEMINATION OF THE SCIENTFIC KNOWLEDGE

Maimonides’ interpreters are divided into two schools over this matter: one school maintains that despite this apparent and sudden shift, Maimonides remains wedded to the conception that it is intellectual perfection which constitutes humanity’s greatest perfection; the second school follows the closing passage in the Guide in affirming that it is some form of perfection of practice which is Maimonides’ ideal, but this school is itself divided into three camps when it comes to determining the sort of practical perfection Maimonides had in mind. One camp sees this perfection in terms of moral behavior, a second in terms of a certain kind of political involvement, and the third in terms of a particular kind of obedience to the commandments.10 Be that as it may, very few contemporary interpreters of Maimonides understand him to call for the (philosophic) imitation of God in strictly intellectualist terms; some practical element (political, moral, halakhic) must be involved. Gersonides’ basic orientation concerning the issue of imitating God finds expression in a long passage in the Introduction to the Milhamot. In this passage Gersonides explains in part why he had the temerity to write a book like the Milhamot. Moreover, it is not proper for someone to withhold what he has learned in philosophy from someone else. This would be utterly disgraceful. Indeed, just as this entire universe emanated from God for no particular advantage to Him, so it is proper for someone who has achieved some perfection to try to impart it to someone else. In this way he is imitating God as best he can. It is also clear that none of the perfect ones should fault me for entering into these difficult inquiries. Rather, I should be praised for attempting to arrive at the truth in such profound questions, even if only for my effort, not my success. ... Nor should anyone of my readers, whom I love and want to help, contend with me simply because he likes to argue. ... Indeed, I have been very hesitant in writing a treatise on these questions, but I know the ways of those who are fools 10 For detailed discussion see Kellner, Perfection, pp. 7-11. The main point of that book is to defend the third interpretation of Maimonides’ views on human perfection, that for Jews it consists in a particular kind of obedience to the commandments. This obligation is not imposed upon Gentiles, without in any way diminishing the human perfection to which they can aspire and hence the reward they can expect to reap in the world to come.

238

CHAPTER TEN

but wise in their own eyes,11 especially on these profound topics. Nevertheless, my strong desire to remove the obstacles that block the man of inquiry from attaining the truth on these great questions –mistakes concerning which greatly distance a man from his felicity– has led me to undertake this project.12

God created the world to no self-advantage. Gersonides takes it as a given that we wish to imitate God; in other contexts he will also insist that this is an halakhic obligation. We obviously cannot create worlds, as God does. How, then, can we imitate God? The answer provided by Gersonides is that we do so by imparting to others the perfection which we have ourselves achieved. Failing to do so “would be utterly disgraceful.” In a personal aside Gersonides tells us that not only does he wish to impart the knowledge he has acquired in order to imitate God, but also that he does this because of his love for his reader. He closes by giving expression to his own “strong desire” to help other philosophically inclined inquirers reach the truth in very important matters – matters so important that properly understanding them brings one closer to one’s felicity, while misunderstanding them distances one from felicity.13 Why does Gersonides believe that endowing others with the truth is the imitation of God? In another passage in his Milhamot Gersonides explains: Someone who has reached this level [i.e., has achieved prophecy] has a strong natural desire to inform others of what he has learned about their affairs ... for it is the nature of a perfection, which is possessed by such a man, that when he has reached the point where he can disseminate his knowledge to others, he has a desire to so transmit it. For this reason wise men have written books containing what they have attained in wisdom. They have not written books 11 It is ironic that Gersonides himself was accused of being “wise in his own eyes” by Judah Messer Leon. See Husik, Judah Messer Leon, pp. 93-108. The expression refers to Prov. 26:5 and 26:12. 12 Milhamot, pp. 5-6; Wars, p. 97. I emended the last sentence to make the translation more literal. 13 We may be seeing here the echoes of Gersonides’ rejection of all forms of hermeticism. In the Jewish context this could mean either Kabbalah (of which Gersonides makes no mention in any of his writings so far as I can determine) or Maimonidean esotericism. Gersonides criticizes the latter in the Introduction to the Milhamot, p. 8; Wars, p.100. See the discussion in my Introduction above.

239

IMITATIO DEI AND THE DISSEMINATION OF THE SCIENTFIC KNOWLEDGE

for themselves but to teach others their knowledge.14 In this way reality is perfected, i.e., out of love and grace superior beings desire to give forth their perfection as much as possible to those inferior to them. For example, were it not for the loving and gracious will of God to bestow as much as possible some perfection upon beings inferior to Him, were it not for the loving and gracious wills of the separate intelligences to emanate each upon the other, and were it not for the loving and gracious will of the heavenly bodies and Active Intellect to emanate upon the sublunar world – there would be no such world, all the more so would it not be perfect.15

It is the nature of perfection, Gersonides in effect maintains, that it seeks to expand. Perfected individuals are not content to exist in lonely splendor, as it were, but are driven by nature to seek to share their perfection with others. Gersonides proves the point by appealing to the literary work of scholars. In an age before royalties and academic promotion, no one undertook the hard labor of writing a scientific work for his or her own benefit; rather, if such books were written, it must have been out of the author’s desire to be of benefit to others. This characteristic of perfection is universal, explaining God’s beneficence in creating the universe and explaining the beneficial emanations of the separate intellects and heavenly bodies.16 But if this desire to perfect others is a natural consequence of one’s own perfection, why does Gersonides attribute it to a “loving and gracious will?” His answer, while perhaps educationally sound, is not entirely convincing: We have said that this emanation is the expression of love and grace, because it is obvious that these substances do not emanate these emanations for their own needs, for their effects are not necessary for their own existence.17 Indeed, the truth is just the opposite: these effects [e.g., the sublunar world] would not exist were it not for these substances.

14 See Maimonides, Guide of the Perplexed, II.37 (p. 375). The views of Maimonides and Gersonides will be compared below. 15 Milhamot II.6 (p. 108; Wars, pp. 54-55). 16 This last is a reflection of Gersonides’ astrological views. See Goldstein, “Levi ben Gerson’s Astrology” and Langermann, “Appendix.” 17 As Feldman notes, Gersonides argues this point in Milhamot V.ii.3 (pp. 194-197).

240

CHAPTER TEN

Gersonides’ answer here is a bit disingenuous: the separate intellects and heavenly bodies, unlike God, impact upon the sublunar world without will or choice.18 To call the consequences of their actions “expressions of love and grace,” is to be guilty either of anthropomorphism or of attributing divine characteristics to non–divine substances.19 But the educational point is sound; when we impart knowledge to others, it ought to be done as an act of “love and grace.” Not only is the imitation of God through the imparting of perfection a natural consequence of that perfection; it is also a commandment of the Torah: The fourth advantage [to’elet] concerns commandments – that [God] commanded us to imitate Him so far as one can, as it says to walk in His ways (Dt. 28:29), for this will direct a person towards [the adoption of] all the praiseworthy virtues when he considers how God behaves with respect to His creatures, with an absolute measure of grace, loving-kindness, and justice. This will also bring one to apprehend God so far as possible, for one will thus always investigate God’s ways in order [to know how] to accustom oneself to imitating Him as much as possible.20

We are commanded to imitate God, this commandment itself having two positive consequences: the adoption of excellent virtues and the stimulation to learn as much as possible about God. Gersonides connects the commandment to imitate God with God’s holiness in the following words: “Since I am holy and separated from matter, you ought to be separated and divided from matter so far as possible.”21 God’s holiness consists in his being absolutely incorporeal; we ought, so far as pos18 By this I mean that these entities are not presented with the option of emanating upon inferior beings or not emanating upon them. It is what they do uninterruptedly, and moreover, it is what they were created to do, as we shall see below. 19 See my discussion in the Introduction concerning Gersonides’ esotericism. 20 Commentary on Deuteronomy, p. 239d (4th to’elet)/290. 21 Commentary on Leviticus, p. 137b/143/300 (on Lev. 11:44-45: For I am the Lord your God; sanctify yourselves therefore, and be holy, for I am holy; neither shall you defile yourselves with any manner of swarming thing that moves upon the earth. For I am the Lord who brought you up out of the land of Egypt, to be your God; you shall therefore be holy, for I am holy). Gersonides’ commentary here may reflect the well-known interpretation in the Sifra of “holy” as “separated” (perushim).

241

IMITATIO DEI AND THE DISSEMINATION OF THE SCIENTFIC KNOWLEDGE

sible, to diminish our corporeal characters (in the sequel Gersonides continues, with reference to the laws of kosher food, “thus you should not eat the foods which thicken matter.”). Although Gersonides does not make the point explicitly here, there is no better way –in fact, there is only one way– of emphasizing the non-corporeal aspects of human character than through intellectual pursuits. Regarding imitation of God through the imparting of perfection, Gersonides makes the connection between the two explicit in the following argument: It is appropriate for everyone who has achieved some portion of human perfection to use it to perfect others, for this is God’s way, providentially to bring about the perfection of existent beings in this fashion, to the end that they not fall short of achieving whatever perfection they can reach. For this reason He said, they shall teach Jacob your ordinances, and Israel your Torah (Dt. 33:10), as if He said, “Let them know your ordinances and Torah,” for after they know them they are obligated to teach [them to] Israel.22

One who has achieved some level of perfection ought to seek to perfect others; “this is God’s way,” and when we perfect others we are thereby imitating God. God seeks to bring every creature to its greatest perfection. Addressing the Levites, Moses reminds them that after learning God’s Torah and laws, they are obligated to teach them to others.23 Imitatio dei is actually a commandment which in one sense is particularly easy to obey, since human beings have a natural propensity to seek to bring others to the perfections which they have achieved. Gersonides makes this point often in his commentaries on the Solomonic books of the Bible: Proverbs, Ecclesiastes, and Song of Songs.24 Thus, commenting on Proverbs 5:16 (Let your springs be dispersed abroad, and courses of water in the streets), Gersonides explains that “after you achieve speculative perfection your springs will be dispersed abroad to emanate upon others, and courses of water will be dis22 Commentary on Deuteronomy, p. 247d (7th to’elet)/348. 23 It must be remembered that for a thinker like Gersonides “Torah” includes physics and metaphysics. 24 On Gersonides’ understanding of the interrelationship of these three books, see Seymour Feldman, “Wisdom of Solomon.”

242

CHAPTER TEN

persed from them in the streets –in which [streets] many people are found– to teach them your wisdom and direct them to perfection.” The verse expresses neither a commandment nor advice; rather, it is a prediction of the natural behavior of the perfected individual.25 That such is the case is evidenced by Gersonides’ commentary to Ecclesiastes, in which he writes (p. 32a/39): “In general, it will be found with respect to all things that the higher acts upon the lower and perfects it; in this manner God acts upon existent things and the Active Intellect actualizes things here [i.e., in the sublunar world].” This idea of the natural desire of the perfected to help others achieve their own perfection finds expression in Gersonides’ commentary to Song of Songs 5:1 (p. 64): “Moreover, he said this further to indicate the natural desire of one who has apprehended part of this science to emanate it upon others.”26 The science in question is physics. Special note ought to be taken of Gersonides’ language here. In his commentary to Song of Songs, and in medieval Hebrew generally, the term “emanate” is usually restricted to the activity of God and the separate intellects (angels). Indeed, in Guide II.12 (p. 279) Maimonides defines emanation (Arabic fayd, Hebrew shefa, or as here, hashpa’ah) as “the action of one who is not a body.” Gersonides, it is true, is using the term in a borrowed sense here, and basically means by it the incorporeal influence of one intellect upon another, but he did not have to use the term to express the idea. By telling us that a person who has achieved expertise in physics naturally seeks to emanate upon those who have not yet achieved that expertise, Gersonides subtly emphasizes his claim that the teacher of science is engaged in the imitation of God. Summarizing the discussion to this point, Gersonides, we find, maintains that one imitates God by teaching science. To translate Gersonides’ point into modern idiom we may say that one fulfills the halakhic obligation of imitatio dei not through the study of Torah in the narrow sense, not through the fulfillment of the commandments, not through metaphysical speculation, nor even through pure scientific research; rather, one imitates God by leading advanced 25 Compare also the commentaries to Prov. 1:5 and 11:30. 26 On the issue here compare further the commentary to 4:11: “He allegorically compared what she emanates to him, because of its pleasantness and sweetness, to dripping honey, and to honey and to milk.”

243

IMITATIO DEI AND THE DISSEMINATION OF THE SCIENTFIC KNOWLEDGE

seminars on the cutting edge of contemporary scientific inquiry. That Gersonides devoted the lion’s share of his energies to pure scientific study is known;27 given the attitude expressed here, it is not unlikely that he also taught science, and indeed, Ruth Glasner has presented evidence to that effect.28 One imitates God, then, by sharing with others whatever perfection one has achieved in the sciences. Does this position have any impact on the way in which Gersonides thinks we ought to engage in scientific study? It turns out that it does. We have seen that individuals who have achieved perfection in the sciences have a natural inclination to seek to perfect others; in so doing they imitate God, and are indeed commanded to do so. In his commentary on Song of Songs Gersonides makes repeated reference to the fact that the attainment of felicity by any individual is dependent upon this willingness of the perfected individual to perfect others. Progress towards scientific (i.e., philosophic/religious) enlightenment is bedeviled by many “impediments” which make its attainment well-nigh impossible. God provides us with “instruments” which make it possible for us to overcome these impediments. The most important of these is individuals who have already achieved perfection and who are able, willing, and commanded to help us: Solomon mentioned the existence of another instrument which God gave us to direct us to our felicity. This is the existence of perfected individuals in every generation, who naturally desire to direct others to perfection, whether through speech or writing, as it is29 natural to imitate God – who has emanated from Himself this perfect existence not in order to achieve anything useful for Himself – so far as possible.30

In what ways do such individuals help us? One of the problems we have in achieving progress in scientific research is achieving the discipline necessary for the hard, grinding work of scientific investigation. Perfected individuals

27 See p. 64 in Gad Freudenthal, “Felicity.” 28 See Glasner, “Levi ben Gershom”; see also Glasner, “Philosophical Commentaries.” 29 Literally, “as if it were natural.” 30 Commentary to Song of Songs 1:2 (p. 22).

244

CHAPTER TEN

can help us with this problem, as Gersonides makes clear in a passage in his commentary on Song 1:3 (p. 23): The second impediment –our desire ab initio to follow our physical lusts– will also be overcome in this fashion, for these perfected individuals will employ stratagems to lead people away from being attracted by their lusts, so far as possible, in a way which will cause them to perfect their endeavors to reach human felicity.

The job of a teacher, then, is in effect to trick students into abandoning the mad pursuit of the satisfaction of their physical desires, and to direct their energies instead towards endeavors which will lead them to their felicity. In Gersonides’ view of the world that means achieving intellectual perfection, i.e., learning to understand the natural world to the greatest extent possible, and then, on that basis, achieving whatever metaphysical knowledge one can achieve. But there are other impediments to our perfection beyond seeking to satisfy our lusts. Much learning in the sciences is based upon painstaking observation; if each scientist had to repeat these observations, cumulative progress in the sciences would be impossible. Here, too, already perfected individuals help those who come after them: And that for which we need sensual apprehensions which can be accomplished only with difficulty and over a long time, surpassing the span of a human life, will also be completed in this fashion, for these perfected ones will make known to us what they and their predecessors apprehended concerning this through sensation over time, so that we arrive at the complete truth in this matter in this fashion.31

31 The same point comes out in an interesting passage in Gersonides’ Commentary to Genesis (p. 16d/68/117). Gersonides raises the question of how humanity could have achieved so much scientific progress in the relatively short time which had elapsed between creation and his day (he completed the Genesis commentary 5090 years after creation according to the traditional Jewish reckoning, which he accepted). The answer (p. l8b/76/136) is that our early human forbears were extraordinarily long-lived, allowing individuals to accumulate much more scientific knowledge than we can acquire in our short lives. This gave the sciences a sort of “jump start,” allowing them to develop very rapidly. On the longevity of the Patriarchs, see Lasker, “Longevity.”

245

IMITATIO DEI AND THE DISSEMINATION OF THE SCIENTFIC KNOWLEDGE

For Gersonides, then, completion in the sciences is in theory possible.32 But it will never actually come about if scientists do not collaborate. Such collaboration, the passing on of information and insight gleaned by one generation to the next, is the way in which human beings imitate God. Gersonides summarizes the issue in his commentary on Song of Songs 1:8 (p. 30): The Active Intellect responded to her that nature has already provided for the overcoming of all of these impediments which she mentioned, in that it has brought into existence in every generation perfected individuals who direct others to the intended felicity, either through their speech or through their writing, because of the natural longing for this influence given them by nature. We have already explained above how all these impediments can be overcome in this fashion. Thus he said, “if you know not what your soul loves, and know not how you will feed my way, which is the way of sheep which have a shepherd and a leader, then nourish thy faculties beside the shepherd’s tents” – they being the perfected individuals who guide other men and direct them to the places from which the soul takes its nourishment, i.e., its perfection, just as the shepherd guides the sheep to the place where they can graze. The comparison of leaders with shepherds and those who receive their admonition to sheep is often repeated in the words of the prophets.33

According to Gersonides’ understanding of Song of Songs, the material intellect expressed concern over its ability to achieve perfection; it was worried lest the impediments to perfection render its attainment impossible. In this passage the Active Intellect reassures the material intellect: in every generation there are perfected individuals who help others reach perfection. In the imagery of Song of Songs these are the shepherds mentioned in 1:8 (If you know not, O fairest among women, go your way by the footsteps of the flock; and feed your kids beside the shepherds’ tents), and elsewhere. 32 On this issue in Gersonides see ch. 5 above. I mean here that individual sciences can be brought to a state of completion, not that we humans can ever hope to achieve the complete, integrated, holistic knowledge of the cosmos possessed by God. 33 It is noteworthy that while by Gersonides’ day the shepherd/flock metaphor had developed a clear political, indeed monarchical, meaning, he ignores that meaning altogether. On this issue see Melamed, Philosopher-King.

246

CHAPTER TEN

Not only did Gersonides seek to motivate those who had achieved some measure of perfection to imitate God by “emanating” on to others, but he repeatedly urges those engaged in the pursuit of perfection to seek to benefit from the learning of others. In a text addressed both to teachers and to students, but with an obvious emphasis on the latter, he writes: The third impediment – our ignorance of the way that leads us to perfection – will also be overcome in this fashion. This is so because while each of those who endeavor to achieve this apprehension by themselves will either apprehend nothing or very little, when what all of them have apprehended is gathered together, a worthy amount will have been gathered, either in and of itself or by virtue of its directing those who see their words towards the achievement of the truth in this. Therefore one must always be aided in one’s research by the words of those who have preceded him, especially when the truth in them has been revealed to those who have preceded him, as was the case during the time of this sage [i.e. Solomon], for the sciences were then greatly perfected in our nation.34 The matter being so, our perfected predecessors guide us in speculation in a way which brings us to perfection, either through their speech or through their writing, by virtue of the natural desire which they have for proffering this emanation, and they will make known to us concerning each thing the way in which it should be researched, and what they have understood concerning it, together with the assistance concerning it which they have derived from their predecessors.35

Here what might be called the cooperative nature of the scientific enterprise is clearly emphasized. The student of science is urged to make use of the work of his scientific predecessors who themselves teach not only what they have discovered, but also pass on the results of their own predecessors. The scientific enterprise thus becomes an inter-generational collaboration, each scientist building on the work of his predecessors, and passing on the knowledge and insight thus accumulated to later generations. 34 The myth that the ancient Israelites had achieved a high level of perfection in the sciences known to the medieval world was widespread throughout that world. See Melamed, Al Kitfei Anakim. 35 Commentary on Song of Songs 1:2 (p. 23).

247

IMITATIO DEI AND THE DISSEMINATION OF THE SCIENTFIC KNOWLEDGE

In subsequent passages (especially the commentaries to Song 1:11 and 1:12) Gersonides reaffirms the need which students of science have to rely upon the work of their predecessors, those “shepherds” whom God has providentially provided to guide them in their scientific work and thus bring them closer to their felicity. These shepherds, of course, do this because, having achieved some measure of perfection, they have a natural inclination to “emanate” it upon others, because in so doing they imitate God in the only way possible, and because they thus fulfill an halakhic obligation. In his commentary to Song 7:14 (p. 86) Gersonides makes the point again, and very clearly: The meaning of her statement, new and old which I have laid up for you, O my beloved, is that what has been apprehended anew from these things through the senses, with what was apprehended of old, was all stored for him in the faculty of memory by her, so that the appropriate sensual repetition of this could be accomplished.36 This is accomplished either through what she apprehends through the senses or through what she apprehends from another, and this indeed is added to her, as is well known.37 This is so because there exist here many things which cannot in any fashion be fully apprehended by any individual alone, as is the case with the species of animals and what is similar to them, as Aristotle has mentioned in On Animals 11.38 Thus the correct way to proceed is to gather what has been apprehended concerning these matters by those among the ancients who are trustworthy and in this way to bring to completion what is needed from the senses.

Here our inability to proceed alone is clearly stated and we are urged to rely upon the work of “those among the ancients who are trustworthy.” This raises an interesting point, which requires some digression. On the one hand Gersonides was very respectful of the work of his predecessors and deviated from their teachings reluctantly. Thus, he writes, 36 I.e., the memory must store the impressions of previous sense experiences if their repetition will be of any use to us. 37 Or, “because it has become well-known,” i.e., the scientific accomplishments of others have become well-known and available to researchers. 38 On Animals 11 is actually Parts of Animals, bk. 1. Gersonides is here following the medieval Muslim bibliographic tradition.

248

CHAPTER TEN

But when deciding to dissent from the teachings of the ancients, one should do so with extreme care and scrutiny, deviating from these teachings as little as possible. This is appropriate because the ancients were lovers of truth and endeavored to approach it as closely as possible even when their principles prevented them from reaching it entirely....39

On the other hand, as we see here, he emphasizes that we ought to rely only on those among the ancients who are “trustworthy.” Indeed, Gersonides is notorious for having relied relatively little on the work of the ancients, as the manifold studies of Bernard Goldstein on his astronomy have shown.40 In this connection Gersonides writes at the beginning of his discussion of astronomy in Milhamot V.i.1: “None of the ancients whose works have reached us tried to investigate the science of astronomy in its perfection, and thus some gaps remain in it. For this reason we decided to investigate it here.”41 This attitude of independence is as true of Gersonides’ philosophy and biblical exegesis as it is of his astronomy. The point is repeated in the Introduction to the Milhamot: “Our predecessors have not treated most of these questions philosophically, and what they do say philosophically about them is false, as will be demonstrated in our book.”42 In Gersonides’ introductions to his commentaries on Job and Song of Songs we find the same refusal to be cowed by the opinions of his predecessors. In the Job commentary we find: This is the reason which prompted us to explain this book, because among earlier commentators we have not found one who stated the real meaning and content of the book. They concentrated on textual exegesis and as a result missed the right method which should be employed in a commentary 39 Milhamot V.i.46; I quote from the translation in Goldstein, “A New Set,” p. 385. 40 This is also evidenced by his independent way of linking the Written and Oral Torahs. 41 I quote from the translation of Goldstein in Astronomy, p. 22. Further on Gersonides’ attitude towards “ancient” astronomers, see his commentary to Song 3:7 (p. 52): He said this because here part of this science requires much help from the senses for repetition. This part is astronomy, which is the fruit of the mathematical sciences and their purpose. Further, the making of the observations which steer one to what is correct in it has elements of difficulty; this was unknown to the ancients as was mentioned in the Almagest [apparently 9.2]. 42 Milhamot, p. 3; Wars, p. 93.

249

IMITATIO DEI AND THE DISSEMINATION OF THE SCIENTFIC KNOWLEDGE

on a book of this nature. What behooves the commentator is to direct the explanation of the words in accordance with the meaning of the contents; for the words are not isolated, but integrated even as are the subjects discussed in the book.43

Gersonides is equally critical of earlier commentators in his Introduction to the Song of Songs, even if for a different reason (p. 3): Said Levi ben Gershom: We have seen fit to comment on this scroll, the scroll of Song of Songs, as we understand it, for we have not found any other commentary on it which could be construed as a correct explanation of the words of this scroll. Rather, we have seen that all the commentaries which our predecessors have made upon it and which have reached us adopt the midrashic approach, including interpretations which are the opposite of what was intended by the author of Song of Songs.

On the whole it would seem that Gersonides would agree with the substance of the following comment of Maimonides: “The great sickness and the grievous evil (Eccl. 5:12) consists in this: all the things that man finds written in books, he presumes to think of as true – and all the more so if the books are old.”44 Returning to the theme of this chapter: it must be emphasized that Gersonides’ insistence on the cooperative nature of scientific research must never be confused with the advocacy of blind reliance on the works of others. How unusual was Gersonides’ position? Gersonides was both what we would call an active scientist45 and philosopher, as well as a religious thinker. As a scientist who called upon his fellow scientists to share the results of their research, he may have been, if not unique, at least not representative. The position being urged by Gersonides upon contemporary scientists was not universally accepted. David Hull comments that, “early in the history of science, scientists were extremely secretive, in part because science grew out of traditions in which secrecy was embedded – wizardry and technology. Alchemists 43 I quote from the Lassen translation, p. 4. 44 Maimonides, “Letter on Astrology,” p. 179. 45 On this aspect of his work, see the relevant essays in Freudenthal, Science.

250

CHAPTER TEN

and the like kept their knowledge as secret as possible because only in this way could they benefit from it.”46 As a philosopher, on the other hand, calling upon the perfected to impart their wisdom to the as yet unperfected, Gersonides was not alone. Consider the following passage from Averroes, a philosopher often cited by Gersonides: Since it has not been established that there is an obligation of the Law to study intellectual reasoning and its kinds, just as there is an obligation to study legal reasoning, it is clear that if none of our predecessors had formerly examined intellectual reasoning and its kinds, we should be obliged to undertake such an examination from the beginning, and that each succeeding scholar would have to seek help in that task from his predecessor, in order that knowledge of the subject might be completed. For it is difficult or impossible for one man to find out by himself and from the beginning all that he needs of that subject, as it is difficult for one man to discover all the knowledge that he needs of the kinds of legal reasoning.47

The subject under discussion is different, the overall attitude the same. But then Averroes turns to the same subject matter (physics) discussed by Gersonides in his commentary to Song 7:14 and affirms: “And again it is clear that in the study of beings this aim can be fulfilled by us perfectly only through successive examinations of them by one man after another, the later ones seeking the help of the earlier in that task, on the model of what has happened in the mathematical sciences.”48 Hourani (p. 88) calls this idea “common currency among the Greek and Muslim philosophers,” and cites a long list of sources. The idea was also common currency among Jewish philosophers, many of whom expressed it in terms of the phrase made famous by Isaac Newton and Robert K. Merton, that later generations see farther than their predecessors because they are like “dwarves sitting on the shoulders of giants.”49 46 See Hull, Science as a Process, pp. 322-323. 47 Quotation from Hourani, Averroes, pp. 46-47. 48 I do not believe that Gersonides anywhere explicitly cites Averroes’ Fasl al-Maqal (the text translated by Hourani here) although it was apparently translated into Hebrew during his lifetime. See Golb, “The Hebrew Translation,” pp. 100-102. 49 See Robert K. Merton’s idiosyncratic, aggravating, and brilliant study, OTSOG and Melamed, Al Kitfei Anakim.

251

IMITATIO DEI AND THE DISSEMINATION OF THE SCIENTFIC KNOWLEDGE

Gersonides the philosopher, then, calling for cooperation in the pursuit of truth, is clearly part of a wider tradition. Anchoring that call, however, in the philosophic and halakhic obligation to imitate God may well have been a uniquely Gersonidean idea. Comparing Gersonides to Maimonides in this regard is particularly helpful. For Maimonides, superior beings perfect inferior beings, but not by design or intention. The perfection of inferiors is a natural by-product of their emanative activity. Maimonides explicitly rejects the idea that all that has been made has been made for it [i.e., for the human species] alone, so that even the heavenly spheres only revolve in order to be useful to it and to bring into existence that which is necessary for it ... It should not be believed that all the beings exist for the sake of the existence of man. On the contrary, all the other beings too have been intended for their own sakes and not for the sake of something else.50

Maimonides makes a similar point in another passage (Guide II.11, p. 275): Know that in the case of every being that causes a certain good thing to overflow from it according to this order or rank, the existence, the purpose, and the end of the being conferring the benefits do not consist in conferring the benefits on the recipients.

Superior beings do perfect inferior beings; but this is not the reason for the existence of the superior beings, their purpose, or their end. From the point of view of the superior beings, the benefit conferred on inferior beings is a by-product of their activity.51 Superior beings exist for their own sakes, not for the sake of inferior beings. 50 Guide, III.13, pp. 451-452. Compare ch. 13 below. 51 For a defence of this interpretation of Maimonides, see Harvey, “Perfection, Awe, and Politics.” In this connection Y. Tzvi Langermann has drawn to my attention an interesting point which deserves independent investigation: Maimonides seems to use variants of the term fayd (“emanation,” or, as Shlomo Pines preferred, “overflow”) in the intransitive where Gersonides prefers transitive usages of the Hebrew shefa. This would seem to be a reflection of the fact that for Maimonides emanation is an unintended consequence of perfection, while for Gersonides it is a willed activity.

252

CHAPTER TEN

Gersonides, on the other hand, explicitly maintains that the heavenly bodies exist for the sake of sublunar entities.52 In the course of his exposition Gersonides retreats a bit from his initial claim and distinguishes between the existence of the heavenly bodies and the way in which they operate. The heavenly bodies exist for their own sakes; they were created, however, in the way in which they were created in order to perfect inferior entities (like us). In effect God created the heavenly bodies so that they would perfect us.53 It is important to note, so as not to misrepresent Maimonides, that his conception of the perfected life involved an important political element. For him the ideal person seemed to be the philosopher-king, embodied most perfectly in Moses, the founder of the Jewish polity and the most perfected of all philosophers. In all of Gersonides’ writings there is no reflection of this at all.54 In conclusion, for Maimonides one imitates God by seeking one’s own intellectual perfection (III.51) and guiding the behavior of others (III.54). So guided, some (few) individuals can hope to progress on the road to intellectual perfection. This guidance involves political leadership.55 For Gersonides, on the other hand, one imitates God by seeking the intellectual perfection of other human beings. This guidance involves actual teaching. Philosophically, then, Maimonides and Gersonides differ on the nature of imitatio dei. Their halakhic positions differ as well: for Maimonides one fulfills the command to walk in God’s ways by obeying the demands of Jewish law; for Gersonides one fulfills that command by helping others advance along the route to intellectual 52 Gersonides devotes Milhamot V.ii.3 (“in which it is explained that the stars exist in the spheres for the sake of sublunar entities”) to this issue. 53 Gad Freudenthal, who stimulated my thinking in this regard, puts the point as follows: “In Gersonides’ view, when God created the celestial bodies, he endowed them with such natures as to allow them to perfect, as far as possible, all sublunar existents. The heavens were designed with utmost wisdom for the benefit of the sublunar existents, and particularly for that of man, the most perfect among them.” See Freudenthal, “Maimonides’ Stance,” p. 90. 54 On this see ch. 8 above where I expand upon my understanding of the political component in human perfection for Maimonides, a component which I show to be entirely lacking in Gersonides’ thought. 55 Maimonides was not unmoved by the Jewish tradition, nor did he ignore Plato’s parable of the cave. It is the point of my Maimonides on Human Perfection to argue that for Maimonides the Jew is obligated to go beyond the intellectual imitation of God to a kind of perfected halakhic obedience, one with clear political and moral overtones. But the person who does this does not increase his or her human perfection thereby; the obligation devolves upon Jews only.

253

IMITATIO DEI AND THE DISSEMINATION OF THE SCIENTFIC KNOWLEDGE

perfection. In this context, then, Maimonides’ philosophic and halakhic positions are distinct56 while those of Gersonides are identical. In the present chapter I have traced the connection in Gersonides’ mind between the obligation –philosophic and halakhic– of imitating God and what might be called its social consequences, the idea that one fulfills that obligation best by teaching science, and that science is therefore best pursued as a cooperative activity, each scientist benefiting from the work of those who went before and seeking to pass that benefit on to subsequent generations. Gersonides’ vision of scientific collaboration in this sense as the imitation of God seems to be uniquely his own.

56 I do not mean to say that they conflict with each other. The relationship between intellectual perfection (Maimonides’ philosophic view of the imitation of God) and obedience to the commandments of the Torah (Maimonides’ halakhic view of the imitation of God) is explored in my Maimonides on Human Perfection. Also relevant here (as pointed out to me by G. Freudenthal) is Maimonides’ esotericism: Maimonides actually seeks to keep knowledge of physics and metaphysics from the masses. This is dramatically opposed to Gersonides’ ideas concerning the imitation of God through the teaching of science.

254

CHAPTER ELEVEN Moses ibn Tibbon and Gersonides on Song of Songs

G

iven that Gersonides, as we have just seen, prized scientific collaboration and saw the teaching of science as the most effective way of fulfilling the Torah’s commandment to walk in God’s ways, he opens his commentary on Song of Songs with a surprising claim, one which, when analyzed, sheds interesting light on the ways in which medieval Jewish philosophers communicated (or failed to communicate) with each other. Gersonides begins his commentary (p. 3) as follows: Said Levi b. Gershom: we have seen fit to comment on this scroll, the Scroll of Song of Songs, as we understand it, for we have not found any other commentary on it which could be construed as a correct explanation of the words of this scroll. Rather, we have seen that all the commentaries which our predecessors have made upon it and which have reached us adopt the midrashic approach, including interpretations which are the opposite of what was intended by the author of Song of Songs.1 These midrashic explanations, even though they are good in and of themselves, ought not to be applied as explanations of the things upon which they are said midrashically. For this reason one who wishes to explain these and similar things ought not to apply to them the derashim regarding them; rather, he should endeavor to explain them himself according to their intention. He also ought not to combine those derashim with his explanations, for this will either confuse the reader and cause him to misunderstand what he intended, most especially with deep things such as these, or because this will bring the reader to despise the words of the author. This latter is so for two reasons: [a] the excessive length of the matter, or [b] 1

On the midrashic approach to Song of Songs, which sees the text as a description of the love between God and Israel, see Hirshman, Ha-Mikra, pp. 65-73.

255

MOSHE IBN TIBBON AND GERSONIDES ON SONG OF SONGS

the confusion in them of essential and accidental matters, for all this causes things to be despised.

Gersonides here justifies his decision to write a commentary on Song of Songs. Such a commentary is needed, he explains, because no appropriate commentary on the book has ever been written. Previous commentators have followed the Midrash; midrash is certainly valuable in and of itself, but it ought not to be construed, Gersonides insists, as an actual explanation of what the text really means.2 Furthermore, if one does seek to explain the actual intent of the author of Song of Songs, then one ought not to confuse or irritate the reader by also citing midrashim. This statement is surprising in light of the fact that a detailed commentary on Song of Songs was composed by a figure who was temporally, geographically, and, most importantly, philosophically close to Gersonides, Moses ibn Tibbon. If Gersonides was unaware of ibn Tibbon’s commentary, we must ask how it is possible that he was unaware of it. On the other hand, had Gersonides indeed read his predecessor’s commentary, then we must ask why he ignores it in his own commentary, in effect pretending that it did not exist. In order to answer these questions, it would be useful to take a rather extended detour, noting different understandings of Song of Songs, attending to a number of relevant philosophical issues, and to aspects of the cultural history of the Jews of (what is today) Southern France and Northern Spain in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. In particular, it would be valuable to explain the special problems posed by Song of Songs for medieval Jewish philosophers like Gersonides and Moses ibn Tibbon, and describe the solution offered by Maimonides (and adopted by Gersonides and ibn Tibbon). Commentaries to Song of Songs in what may be called a Maimonidean “spirit” would then have to be described. Doing all this, however, would result in a study far too long for the present volume. These matters will be attended to, therefore, very briefly. More attention, however, will be devoted to showing that Gersonides and ibn Tibbon lived near each other in space and time, and shared a similar intel2

256

Despite his French origins, Gersonides was apparently unsympathetic to the sorts of approaches to texts which have emanated from the left bank of the Seine over the last generation. For a discussion of his attitude towards midrash, see Harvey, “Quelques réflexions.”

CHAPTER ELEVEN

lectual, cultural, and religious universe of discourse. The ban of 1305, forbidding the study of philosophy by young Jews, will then be adduced as adding force to the claim that Gersonides had to have seen himself as a member of the same (embattled) party as ibn Tibbon.3 Against this background it seems quite incredible that Gersonides should have been unfamiliar with Moses ibn Tibbon’s commentary. I then undertake a detailed comparison of the two commentaries, the result of which is negative: there is no conclusive evidence unequivocally pointing towards Moses ibn Tibbon as a source for ideas, expressions, or interpretations found in Gersonides’ commentary. In the end, we are left with two possibilities: Gersonides really never read ibn Tibbon’s commentary, or he had, and sought to hide that fact. In the final section of this chapter each of these possibilities is analyzed for its implications concerning communication among Jewish philosophers in Provence in the transition period between the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. Maimonides identifies love of God with knowledge of God: “love [of God] is proportionate to apprehension [of God].”4 It is no surprise, therefore, that he interprets the love so graphically described in Song of Songs as referring to the intellectual love of God which is the ultimate aim of all human existence.5 Maimonides’ philosophical interpretation of Song of Songs is most succinctly summarized in “Laws of Repentance,” X. 3: How does one love [God] properly? It is to love God with a great and exceeding love, so exceedingly strong that his soul is preoccupied [literally: tied up] with the love of God, so that he is constantly ravished by it, like people sick with love whose thoughts are never free of the love of that woman [whom they love].... All of Song of Songs is an allegory concerning this matter.

Song of Songs, then, may appear to describe the physical attraction between “a man and a maid,” and it may have been used to symbolize the love 3

See Ben Shalom, “Communication.” In his commentary to Genesis (16d/67/115), Gersonides criticizes those of his contemporaries (kezat ha-mit’ahrim) whom he finds guilty of overallegorization. There may be an indication here that he was not wholly uninterested in the debates which preceded the ban of 1305 (as if he could have been).

4

Guide of the Perplexed III.51, p. 621. See Kellner, “Philosophical Themes,” and Lasker, “Love of God.”

5

This is the love that Spinoza was to call amor dei intellectualis.

257

MOSHE IBN TIBBON AND GERSONIDES ON SONG OF SONGS

between God and Israel, but what it really refers to is human striving for intellectual perfection and through it felicity. Maimonides never composed a fully worked out commentary on Song of Songs. But his comments here show clearly how he would have interpreted it. Indeed, the various philosophical interpretations of Song of Songs written by medieval Jews after Maimonides all follow his lead. Several commentaries on Song of Songs in a “Maimonidean” mode were written before that of Gersonides.6 Two or these, by Moses ibn Tibbon7 and Immanuel of Rome,8 adopt approaches generally congenial to Gersonides and were written by individuals who lived shortly before him. Moses ibn Tibbon lived in close geographical proximity to Gersonides and Immanuel in what might be called cultural proximity, and yet Gersonides claims to have seen no commentaries on Song of Songs which “could be construed as a correct explanation” of it.9 That Gersonides may not have known Immanuel’s commentary is not all that surprising: Immanuel was Gersonides’ senior by only about 17 years and lived all his life in Italy. It would not be odd for his commentary not to have come to Gersonides’ attention at all. Such, however, is surely not the case with Moses ibn Tibbon’s commentary. This is so for three reasons, each of which 6

For a detailed and exhaustive account of medieval Jewish commentaries on Song of Songs generally (including, of course, the philosophical commentaries), see Walfish, “Annotated Bibliography.”

7

Further on Moses ibn Tibbon’s commentary on Song of Songs see Simon, “Interpreting the Interpreter,” pp. 103-104. The text of ibn Tibbon’s commentary was published in Lyck, in 1874. Ibn Tibbon flourished in the latter part of the Thirteenth Century.

8

Immanuel ben Solomon of Rome (c. 1261-1328), was an older contemporary of Gersonides’. On Immanuel, see Yarden, “Introduction,” pp. 11-19. Immanuel’s commentary was analyzed and the subject of philosophic commentaries on Song of Songs summarized in I. Ravitzky, “R. Immanuel.”

9

Note should be taken of the fact that Abraham ibn Ezra, in the introduction to his commentary to Song of Songs, says that “the philosophers [anshei ha-mehkar] have interpreted this book as dealing with universal matter, and the way in which the supernal soul joins with the body....” I do not know to whom he is referring (the comment sounds like a reference to the work of Solomon ibn Gabirol, or some other neo-Platonist) but from his observation we may infer that at least one philosophically oriented commentary on Song of Songs was composed before the first half of the twelfth century, when ibn Ezra flourished. (Ibn Ezra is quoted often by Gersonides in his commentary to the Torah; there are also a number of places in the commentary to Song of Songs where his commentary might have influenced Gersonides.) See ibn Ezra’s Commentary.

258

CHAPTER ELEVEN

will have to be examined separately: the first is the geographical and temporal proximity of Moses ibn Tibbon and Gersonides; the second is the similarity of their approaches to Song of Songs; the third is the fact that they both belonged to the same embattled party. Moses ibn Tibbon was born in Montpellier and apparently spent most of his life there. His translations, for which he is most famous, were all made in the years 1244-1274. Aside from the first year of this period, when he visited his relation Jacob Anatoli in Naples,10 Moses apparently spent all of his time in Montpellier. Montpellier is less than one hundred miles from Avignon and Orange, the towns in which Gersonides spent his life (on which, see below). Contacts among Jews in the various communities of Provence, as the Jews called the area (parts of which are known to the French themselves as Languedoc), were intimate.11 The political situation was such that familial, commercial, religious, and intellectual interchanges between the Jews of Avignon, Montpellier, and Barcelona (the importance of which will come up below) were common. Gersonides, it turns out, not only could have been aware of the work of Moses ibn Tibbon, but actually owned several of Moses’ Hebrew translations of Averroes, a partial copy of Anatoli’s Malmad, a copy of Samuel ibn Tibbon’s Ma’amar Yikkavu ha-Mayim, and, it appears likely, a copy of Samuel’s commentary on Ecclesiastes.12 But owning copies of other works by Moses ibn Tibbon, and by members of his family (whose connection with him, it must be emphasized was strongly intellectual, and not just familial)13 does not 10 In his Malmad ha-Talmidim, p. 12, Anatoli refers to Samuel ibn Tibbon, Moses’ father, as his hatan. On this basis, most scholars claim that Jacob was Samuel’s son-in-law, and hence Moses’ brother-in-law. In the Introduction to his commentary on Song of Songs, however, and in the commentary itself, Moses repeatedly refers to Jacob as his uncle (dod). Assuming that Moses knew his own family better than nineteenth and twentieth century scholars do, I suspect that Jacob was Samuel’s brother-in-law, not his son-in-law. I do not find the matter of sufficient interest or importance to investigate further and will content myself with noting that some family relation obtained between Moses and Jacob without attempting to determine what exactly it was. 11 See Emery, The Jews of Perpignan, pp. 12-17 and Septimus, Hispano-Jewish Culture, p. 46. 12 See Weil, La bibliothèque; for Moses’ translations of Averroes, see the index, p. 155, under “Mosheh ben Shemu’el ibn Tibbon;” for Anatoli, see p. 58; for Ma’amar Yikkavu ha-Mayim, see p. 90; and for the Ecclesiastes commentary, see p. 60. 13 In a number of valuable studies Aviezer Ravitzky has drawn attention to the fact that a circle

259

MOSHE IBN TIBBON AND GERSONIDES ON SONG OF SONGS

prove by any means that Gersonides was familiar with Moses’ commentary on Song of Songs. Gersonides grew to maturity it would seem, when Moses ibn Tibbon was already an older man, or had already died. The two lived in communities separated by roughly one hundred miles (even in the middle ages, not an insuperable distance, especially in an area of fairly intense commercial activity, and in an area in which Jews in particular moved around quite a bit14) but closely connected by all sorts of commercial, familial, and cultural ties. Moreover, the area in which they lived was perceived by the Jews as being fairly homogeneous (so much so that they ignored shifting political boundaries and simply referred to the region as “Provence”). We have seen that Gersonides was familiar with Moses’ activity as a translator of Averroes, and owned (and presumably read!) works by members of Moses’ immediate family. But more than that, Gersonides and Moses were joined by a commonality of interest and outlook, one which would make it even more likely that the former would know the work of the latter. This point may be sharpened by comparing the views of the two authors concerning the work under discussion here, Song of Songs. On p. 6 of his Introduction, Moses makes the following statement: I, Moses, son of R. Samuel, son of R. Judah ben Tibbon of Rimmon in Spain,15 z”l, seeing this very precious and great scroll, and seeing that earlier [commentators] followed various approaches which failed properly to attend to its details and to the division of its parts, and understood it all entirely in terms of [rabbinic] homilies –even the sage Ibn Ezra is included in their number– despite their knowing the testimony of the Sage R. Akiva, who said that “all the Writings [i.e., Hagiographa] are holy, but Song of Songs is the holy of holies,” I set myself the task of commenting on it originally, following after what Maimonides had explained concerning some of its verses and upon which my father and teacher had expanded. of like-minded Jewish thinkers, centered on the ibn Tibbon family, functioned in Provence and Italy in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. For the latest of these (with references to the earlier studies), see Ravitzky, “Political Role.” 14 On both these matters see Emery, The Jews of Perpignan. 15 Granada, Judah ibn Tibbon’s birthplace, was often called “Rimmon Sefarad” (i.e., “the pomegranate of Spain”) in medieval Hebrew literature.

260

CHAPTER ELEVEN

Moses ibn Tibbon here tells us explicitly that his commentary on Song of Songs is Maimonidean in nature.16 The reference to his father, Samuel ibn Tibbon, relates to comments the latter made on Song of Songs in his commentary on Ecclesiastes. Moses’ commentary is indeed Maimonidean in its approach to Song of Songs. “Solomon” in Song of Songs is presented as symbolizing the perfection of human intellect and its conjunction with the separate intellect (p. 8) and the point of the poem in its entirety is to direct one to love God, to cleave to God, and thus earn immortality (p. 9). This approach is sketched out in greater detail on p. 11, where Moses understands Song of Songs as describing the conjunction of the human soul with its intellect or the conjunction of the human intellect with the separate intellect, where the “human soul” here refers to the material (or potential) intellect. When actualized, this intellect cleaves to the separate intellect and thus becomes immortal. Moses interprets the specific symbols in Song of Songs in light of these guidelines. The “daughters of Jerusalem,” for example, are faculties of the soul, while the beloved (dod) refers either to God or to the Active Intellect. Gersonides’ approach, while differing in detail (as we will see below), is similar to that of Moses in overall approach. As we have seen in earlier chapters of this book, Gersonides defines the ultimate felicity of a human being as “cognizing and knowing God to the extent that that is possible for him”. Song of Songs is an attempt both to describe the stages of this cognition and to guide the individual seeking ultimate felicity by its achievement. The main topics dealt with in the poem are the following: (a) the overcoming of those impediments to cognition (and thus to felicity) related to immoral behavior; (b) the overcoming of those impediments caused by failure to distinguish between truth and falsity; (c) the need to engage in speculation according to the proper order; (d) the division of the sciences (mathematics, physics, metaphysics) and how nature reflects that division; (e) characteristics of these types of sciences. Like Moses, Gersonides understands the specific images found in Song in Songs as symbols referring to the human quest for intellectual perfection; thus, 16 On Moses’ commentary, see Sirat, History, pp. 228-232 and Freudenthal, “Les sciences” pp. 61-63.

261

MOSHE IBN TIBBON AND GERSONIDES ON SONG OF SONGS

Jerusalem stands for humankind – just as humans, among all the compounded entities, are set apart [or the worship of God, so is Jerusulem set off from other cities. Furthermore, the name Jerusalem is derived from the Hebrew word for perfection; humans are the most perfect of all the sublunar entities and thus are called Jerusalem. The faculties of the soul are the daughters of Jerusalem while Solomon refers to the intellect. Since Zion is the worthiest part of Jerusalem, the daughters if Zion refer to those faculties of the soul closest to the activity of the intellect. We have established that Gersonides lived shortly after Moses ibn Tibbon, in close physical, commercial, and cultural proximity to him, and that they both understood the nature of Song of Songs in much the same way. We have also seen that Gersonides owned others of Moses’ literary productions, as well as books written by members of the latter’s immediate family. None of this, however, makes it necessary or even particularly likely that Gersonides should have been familiar with Moses’ commentary on Song of Songs. For this, we must look at another kind of proximity between the two, beyond geography, time, and even general intellectual inclinations. On July 26, 1305, corresponding to the ninth day of the Hebrew month of Av, the most somber day in the Jewish calendar, marking the destruction of both Temples and the end of Jewish sovereignty over the Land of Israel, as well as many other national and spiritual calamities, the Jewish community of Barcelona met under the leadership of the leading rabbinic authority of the day, R. Solomon ibn Adret (Rashba; c. 1235-c. 1310) formally, publicly, and solemnly to ban the study of philosophy (specifically, physics and metaphysics) by individuals under the age of 25. To study philosophy before the age of 25, or to teach it to individuals under that age, was to court excommunication.17 The ban was imposed one hundred and one years after the death of Maimonides and capped a century of intermittent agitation on the subject.18 In the run-up to the imposition of the ban itself a wide-ranging debate took place, involving Jews from Catalonia and Provence, in particular the cities of Barcelona 17 The ban itself, a series of three letters, has never been translated in its entirely into any European language, or annotated. These letters may be found in ibn Adret, Responsa, pp. 722-738 (part one, nos. 415-417 in the traditional numbering). A small portion of the text was translated to English by Marcus, The Jew, pp. 189-92. Compare above, ch. 5, at note 22. 18 On the ban of 1305 see G. Stern, Philosophy and Religious Culture and the studies cited there.

262

CHAPTER ELEVEN

(home of the Rashba), Lunel, Perpignan, Montpellier, and Béziers. The debate was acrimonious and heated, and divided communities and families. Given the solemnity with which the ban was imposed, the agitation which preceded it, the way in which individuals were forced by the participants in the debates preceding the ban to range themselves in one or the other of the opposed camps, it is not possible that Gersonides, who was 17 at the time of the ban, could have been unaware of what was happening or uninterested in it. It must be further recalled that Gersonides was, for all his scientific and philosophical attainments, an accomplished halakhist and could not have been either ignorant of the Rashba’s work or unimpressed by it. But despite that, just 12 years after the imposition of the ban, Gersonides published his philosophical opus, Wars of the Lord. It thus seems likely that Gersonides consciously refused to comply with the terms of the ban when it was promulgated, For our purposes, then, we see that Gersonides not only lived shortly after Moses ibn Tibbon flourished, in reasonably close geographical proximity, and in very close cultural and intellectual proximity, but that Gersonides clearly and self-consciously belonged to a beleaguered and harassed camp within the Jewish community of his time and place, a camp in which Moses ibn Tibbon had to have been considered a major figure.19 Is it really possible that Gersonides was unaware of Moses’ commentary on Song of Songs? The implications of this for the nature of communication among Jews in the Middle Ages are considerable. If indeed Gersonides had never seen Moses ibn Tibbon’s commentary on Song of Songs, then we must really wonder what efforts philosophically oriented Jews in that period made to disseminate their own ideas and find the publications of other like-minded Jews.20 Moses ibn Tibbon, after all, clearly did not write his commentary on Song of Songs in order to secure promotion at some university or other. Given 19 Remember that Gersonides called his philosophical magnum opus Wars of the Lord, indicating, perhaps, its polemical intent. Could this reflect the cultural environment in which he found himself after 1305? 20 Note should be made of the fact that Gersonides consistently justifies his writings on the grounds that he had found no previous compositions which served the purpose of his own writings. This implies that he had looked for such compositions. For instances of this, see the passage from the commentary on Song of Songs with which I opened this chapter, Gersonides’ Introduction to his commentary on Job, Milhamot, Introduction, p. 4, Wars, p. 94 and Milhamot VI.i.1.

263

MOSHE IBN TIBBON AND GERSONIDES ON SONG OF SONGS

the way that he refers in the commentary over and over to the works of his father and of Anatoli it seems very likely that Aviezer Ravitzky is correct in seeing this commentary as part of a cooperative effort to explicate all the Biblical books in the spirit of Maimonides; it is not credible, therefore, to assume that Moses wrote it for his own private satisfaction or for a small circle of intimates. No, the work was clearly meant to be read by as wide a circle as possible.21 For his part, aside from the Bible, Talmud, Maimonides, and himself, Gersonides quotes from no Jewish authors in his commentary on Song of Songs.22 If he had read Moses’ commentary, why pretend that he had not? As we saw above, they started from similar standpoints and arrived at similar conclusions. Why not use the authority or Moses to bolster his own interpretations? This is precisely what Immanuel of Rome did in his commentary on Song of Songs, borrowing liberally, heavily, and explicitly from Moses. The question of how medieval Jewish philosophers related to earlier authorities is both interesting in and of itself and clearly relevant to our theme. While individual medieval philosophers were not immune to the temptation to borrow from earlier figures without attribution (a point to which I shall return below), and appeals to authority were a staple of the rabbinic tradition, Maimonides and Gersonides both appear to have adopted a respectfully critical approach to earlier thinkers and appear never to have cited these figures simply as authorities. Maimonides is explicit on this issue: “The great sickness and the grievous evil (Eccl. 5:12) consists in this: that all the things that man finds written in books he presumes to think of as true – and all the more so if the books are old.”23 Not only is Maimonides thus opposed to “name dropping” simply in order to add authority to his positions, he tells us explicitly that he does not always 21 On the efforts of members of ibn Tibbon’s circle to circulate philosophical ideas and propagandize for them, see ch. 5 above and Fraenkel, From Maimonides. 22 While quoting heavily from Aristotle (44 times), and less heavily from Ptolemy (3 times); Epicurus, Ghazzali and Averroes are each cited once. I ought to note, so as not to convey a false impression, that Gersonides, like Maimonides before him, rarely quotes from postTalmudic Jewish authors (other than Maimonides and ibn Ezra). 23 “Letter on Astrology,” p. 179. For a discussion of Maimonides’ use of his sources, see Twersky, “Did R. Abraham ibn Ezra.”

264

CHAPTER ELEVEN

cite his sources. The issue comes up in Maimonides’ Introduction to his commentary on the Mishnaic tractate, Avot: Know that the things about which we shall speak in these chapters and in what will come in the commentary are not matters invented on my own nor explanations I have originated. Indeed, they are matters gathered from the discourse of the Sages in the Midrash, the Talmud, and other composition, of theirs, as well as from the discourse of both the ancient and modern philosophers and from the compositions of many men. Hear the truth from whoever says it. Sometimes I have taken a complete passage from the text of a famous book. Now there is nothing wrong with that, for I do not attribute to myself what someone who preceded me said. We hereby acknowledge this and shall not indicate that “so and so said” and “so and so said,” since that would be useless prolixity. Moreover, the name of such an individual might make the passage offensive to someone without experience and make him think it has an evil inner meaning of which he is not aware. Consequently, I saw fit to omit the author’s name, since my goal is to be useful to the reader. We shall explain to him the hidden meanings in this tractate.24

In order not to arouse the ire of his readers, Maimonides refuses to cite by name the authorities he uses, but he makes that point explicitly, and does not seek to pull the wool over anyone’s eyes.25 Gersonides is perhaps even more critical than Maimonides of his predecessors, freely attacking throughout his works Aristotle, Avicenna, Averroes, and even Maimonides. Indeed, the Milhamot is explicitly presented, not as a comprehensive work, but as a series of discrete discussions of issues which had been dealt with incorrectly by preceding thinkers. Thus, even in the “best of circumstances” (were Gersonides to have been full of admiration for the insight, acumen, and erudition of Moses ibn Tibbon, something which could not have been the case, as we will see below), he is not likely to have cited the work of Moses simply in order to bolster the authority and acceptability of his 24 I cite the text as it is translated in Weiss and Butterworth, Ethical Writings, p. 60. The philosophers used but not cited by Maimonides here are Aristotle and al-Farabi; see Davidson, “Shemonah Peraqim.” 25 The question of Maimonides’ attitude towards the intellectual authority of his rabbinic and philosophical predecessors is addressed in Kellner, Decline.

265

MOSHE IBN TIBBON AND GERSONIDES ON SONG OF SONGS

own. Nor would he have any reason to follow Maimonides ’ practice as expressed in the text cited just above, and use ibn Tibbon’s ideas without explicit attribution, since citing Moses ibn Tibbon in his commentary would hardly offend any of his readers. But perhaps my assumptions here are entirely incorrect? Perhaps Gersonides had read Moses’ commentary, but found it so unhelpful as not to warrant a mention? Let us recall Gersonides’ statement cited at the beginning of this investigation, in which he says that he composed his commentary because he had “not found any other commentary on it which could be construed as a correct explanation of the words of this scroll.” Gersonides insisted there that a commentator on Song of Songs explain the words of the poem “according to their intention.” No previous commentator has yet done so. Gersonides goes on to exclude Midrash as an appropriate way of explaining the true meaning of Song of Songs and also rejects as a suitable commentarial strategy the attempt to combine Midrash with a correct explanation of the text. Could it be that Gersonides was not unaware of Moses’ commentary, but rejected it because of one of these two failings? I shall examine that possibility below towards the end of this chapter, but let me here note that even if that turns out to be the case we are still faced with a question of interest for the history of medieval Judaism: why would Gersonides refuse to admit that he had read the commentary of Moses ibn Tibbon? Perhaps our problem can be solved if we can show good cause for thinking that his protestations to the contrary, Gersonides had actually read Moses’ commentary. Leaving aside the general orientation which both Moses and Gersonides adopted from Maimonides, and the fairly obvious interpretations of specific symbols in the poem which follow from that orientation, I have found a number of ideas and interpretations which Gersonides shares with Moses ibn Tibbon. The question which must be asked is, did Gersonides learn these things from ibn Tibbon? In the Appendix to this chapter I examine this question in detail; here it will suffice to present the conclusion of that investigation. My examination of the commentaries on Song of Songs by Moses ibn Tibbon and Gersonides yielded no clear proof that Gersonides was familiar with ibn Tibbon’s commentary. Each interpretation, linguistic usage, or idea in Gersonides’ commentary which might be thought to have been derived 266

CHAPTER ELEVEN

from that of ibn Tibbon can be shown to have plausible roots in other sources. On the available evidence we cannot use the similarity or dissimilarity of the ideas expressed in their commentaries to prove a relationship between them. In brief, no “smoking gun” has been found: Gersonides may have read Moses ibn Tibbon’s commentary on Song of Songs or he may not have; there is no clear proof one way or the other. But perhaps we are approaching the whole question of Gersonides’ knowledge and use of Moses ibn Tibbon’s commentary on Song of Songs backwards. I have assumed all along that the two commentaries are so similar, and were written by individuals who lived in such close temporal, geographical, and cultural proximity, that it is highly unlikely that Gersonides would not have known ibn Tibbon’s work. I then looked in Gersonides’ commentary for ideas, interpretations, or expressions which could be reasonably to traced to ibn Tibbon’s parentage (in the Appendix below) and found nothing unequivocal. But perhaps we should be looking for aspects of ibn Tibbon’s commentary which Gersonides would find objectionable and use them to show that the latter was aware of the former’s work and consciously rejected it? There are indeed very clear dissimilarities between the two commentaries, despite their shared Maimonidean orientation. Ibn Tibbon and Gersonides divide the text of Song of Songs into different parts, ibn Tibbon speaks of God or the separate intellects as the object of conjunction while Gersonides is careful always to refer to the Active Intellect as the object of conjunction, ibn Tibbon raises the idea that Song of Songs deals with progress through the sciences only to reject it, while Gersonides makes that idea the whole focus of his commentary, and, finally, the two do indeed interpret most of the verses of the text in dissimilar ways. None of these divergences, however, would seem to justify Gersonides’ claim that he had not “found any other commentary on it [i.e. Song of Songs] which could be construed as a correct explanation of the words of this scroll.” After all, when all is said and done, Moses ibn Tibbon accepts the Maimonidean interpretation of Song of Songs no less than does Gersonides. The differences between them relate to matters of detail, not overall conception, and certainly are not greater than the differences between Gersonides and Averroes, say, on human immortality, or between Gersonides and Maimonides on providence; in these and similar cases, Gersonides does 267

MOSHE IBN TIBBON AND GERSONIDES ON SONG OF SONGS

not ignore his predecessors, he argues with them. Indeed, in all of his writings Gersonides is careful to cite his sources and when he disagrees with a position, presents it fully before trying to refute or modify it. There is, however, one further glaring difference between the commentaries of ibn Tibbon and Gersonides which we have to this point ignored. Let us recall what Gersonides wrote concerning the use of rabbinic midrash in explaining Song of Songs: “He also ought not to combine those derashim with his explanations, for this will either confuse the reader and cause him to misunderstand what he intended, most especially with deep things such as these, or because this will bring the reader to despise the words of the author.” There is no doubt that Moses ibn Tibbon is “guilty” of this crime. Throughout his commentary on Song of Songs ibn Tibbon presents a brief exposition of the “Maimonidean” meaning of the verse under discussion and then, typically, a lengthy citation from the Midrash on the same verse. He does thus indeed combine rabbinic derash “with his explanations.” Is this malfeasance so great as to have led Gersonides to ignore Moses ibn Tibbon’s commentary altogether, in effect pretending that it did not exist? I would like to address that and similar issues in the next and final section of this chapter. Moses ibn Tibbon and Gersonides lived in what I have called close temporal, geographical, and cultural proximity. They both shared a clear Maimonidean orientation in their understanding of Song of Songs. They were both members of the same embattled party within their Jewish world. Gersonides clearly knew of Moses’ existence, having been the owner of some of his translations. Yet, despite all this, Gersonides nowhere mentions Moses ibn Tibbon’s commentary on Song of Songs. There seem to be three possible explanations for this state of affairs: (a) Gersonides knew of ibn Tibbon’s commentary but sought to hide that fact from his readers, presumably so that he could steal some of ibn Tibbon’s ideas; (b) Gersonides knew of ibn Tibbon’s commentary but for some reason (other than hiding plagiarism) did not want to mention it; (c) Gersonides did not know of ibn Tibbon’s commentary. The first explanation may be rejected out of hand: there is no evidence of such “plagiarism,” it is inconsistent with what we know of Gersonides’ behavior in other contexts (he is very generous in citing his sources),26 and he could 26 Here I take issue with Ruth Ben-Meir, who sought to present evidence of extensive

268

CHAPTER ELEVEN

hardly have expected to “get away” with it. This, despite the fact that as is wellknown, medieval thinkers generally felt freer than we do today to appropriate the ideas and words of others without attribution. Canons of citation were certainly different, and the notion of intellectual property apparently foreign to their way of thinking. But within the Jewish world in particular citing a statement in the name of its author was considered a high value,27 and persons who contravened that convention were censored.28 It has been the burden of my argument to this point that we cannot prove either the second or third explanation: Gersonides may or may not have known of ibn Tibbon’s commentary on Song of Songs. What are the implications of this state of affairs for the history of the Jewish community of Provence in the thirteenth-fourteenth centuries? Let us first examine the possibility that Gersonides did not know of ibn Tibbon’s commentary. We then have the following situation. In an attempt to further the Tibbonian project of spreading Maimonidean values in the Jewish world Moses ibn Tibbon wrote a commentary on Song of Songs. He wrote this commentary, most likely, while living in Montpellier sometime between 1244–1274, in the generation immediately preceding Gersonides’ birth (in 1288). Gersonides spent all of his life within one hundred miles of Montpellier. The world of Jewish intellectuals in Gersonides’ day was bitterly divided between those who supported the study of the sciences, and those who opposed it; this came to a head in 1305 when Gersonides was 17 years old. The 17 year old Gersonides could not have been unaware of the Rashba’s ban and also clearly and consciously contravened it.29 He had to have identified himself borrowing by Gersonides from ibn Giat, Joseph Kara, ibn Ezra, and Samuel ibn Tibbon (father of Moses). See Ben-Meir, “Gersonides’ Commentary on Ecclesiastes.” 27 As expressed in the oft-cited rabbinic maxim, “one who cites a statement in the name of its author brings redemption to the world” (Megillah 15a). The very fact that this statement was made and then reiterated proves, I would think, both that some individuals were not always particular in this regard and that a casual attitude towards authorship was considered reprehensible. 28 Isaac Abravanel (1437-1508) borrowed without attribution from the writings of other thinkers and was even explicitly accused of plagiarism by the son of one of them. For details, see Lawee, “Isaac Abarbanel.” 29 I am not saying that the ban was necessarily effective, or that the young Gersonides felt himself obligated to obey it; rather, I am only saying that whatever his response to it, It strains credulity to think that Gersonides was unaware of the ban or so unimpressed with

269

MOSHE IBN TIBBON AND GERSONIDES ON SONG OF SONGS

self consciously, that is, with the same camp in the Jewish intellectual world with which Moses ibn Tibbon (and his entire family) was clearly identified. And yet, despite all this, Gersonides was unaware of Moses’ commentary. If this is indeed the case we learn that the diffusion of philosophical works in thirteenth- fourteenth century Provence was fraught with difficulty and that a man like Gersonides could remain unaware of the existence of a work like Moses ibn Tibbon’s commentary on Song of Songs. Communication among Jewish philosophers on matters of considerable concern to them was thus apparently a hit or miss affair. A person like Gersonides would have been an obvious target for ibn Tibbon’s commentary; that he was apparently unaware of it when he wrote his own commentary on Song of Songs shows how such targets could be missed.30 But let us examine the other possibility: Gersonides knew of Moses’ commentary, but did not want to draw attention to it. The most likely reason for this, it seems to me, is that Gersonides found some aspect or aspects of Moses ibn Tibbon’s commentary embarrassing to the philosophical camp and wished to draw attention away from it, or at least not criticize it by name. Since he himself tells us that a proper commentary would eschew midrash altogether, and ibn Tibbon certainly did not do that, it is safe to surmise that this is what Gersonides found objectionable in the earlier commentary. If this supposition is correct, then we have evidence that Gersonides felt strongly enough about the deficiencies of Moses ibn Tibbon’s commentary to write another commentary on Song of Songs and, apparently, felt strongly enough about the solidarity which ought to be displayed towards another member of the philosophical camp that he ignored ibn Tibbon’s commentary rather than criticize it. There is also another aspect of ibn Tibbon’s commentary which Gersonides could hardly have found congenial. Put briefly, Gersonides was much more serious about his allegorical reading of the text than was ibn Tibbon. Throughout his commentary on Song of Songs, ibn Tibbon jumbles together the Rashba’s authority and importance as to ignore the ban without giving the matter any serious attention. 30 My conclusion here, concerning the hit or miss character of communication among Jewish philosophers, is obviously tentative, depending entirely upon the specific case of Gersonides and ibn Tibbon. The entire body of contemporary literature would have to be studied before the conclusion could be broadened.

270

CHAPTER ELEVEN

midrashic and philosophical allegory, with no attempt to harmonize between them. He leaves the reader with the impression that he found one as forced as the other. Gersonides, on the other hand, takes his allegory very seriously, a point which comes through over and over again throughout the commentary. Thus, commenting on the following phrase in Song of Songs 1:4, Draw me, we will run after Thee, Gersonides writes (p. 26): This verse is addressed to God, in order to indicate the passionate desire –notwithstanding the multitude of impediments31– which directs it32 to Him and which draws it so much that it runs after Him, it and the other faculties of the soul. This will occur when the other faculties of the soul are subordinated33 to the service34 of the intellect. Or, by we will run after, he and others like him –i.e., other rational beings– may be meant, in that this desire is naturally found in all men; this interpretation makes more sense.

We see Gersonides striving to arrive at the correct allegorical interpretation of the verse, something he would only do if he thought that the allegory was in truth read out of the verse, not read in to it.35 On balance, however, it seems to me that this second possibility is less likely than the first. Combining Maimonideanism and midrash and not taking allegory seriously might not have been to Gersonides’ taste, but this hardly renders the ibn Tibbon commentary valueless for a Maimonidean. There is much in the commentary to which Gersonides could have pointed to approvingly had he been aware of it. It seems much more likely that my first supposition is correct: Gersonides was unaware of the commentary on Song of Songs of Moses ibn Tibbon when he wrote his own commentary, with all that implies for the 31 Here I correct a mistake in my published translation (“ to indicate the passionate desire and many motivating factors which directs…”). 32 I.e., the intellect. The root here for “direct” (y-sh-r) is also the root of the word translated as “sincerely” at the end of the verse. 33 Perhaps, “subordinate themselves.” 34 Avodah can mean work, worship, or sacrificial cult. The Hebrew expression here, avodat hasekhel, carries with it connotations which the translation cannot hope to capture. 35 For further examples of many, see the commentaries to verses 1:11, 1:12, and 2:4. For an analysis of different approaches to allegory in medieval Judaism, Marc Saperstein, Decoding, pp. 14-15 and p. 48.

271

MOSHE IBN TIBBON AND GERSONIDES ON SONG OF SONGS

(surprising) lack of communication among like-minded individuals living in relatively close proximity one generation after another. Appendix: A Comparison between the Commentaries on Song of Songs of Moses ibn Tibbon and Gersonides Ibn Tibbon and Gersonides both interpret Song of Songs 1:2 (Let him kiss me with the kisses of his mouth) as indicating that human perfection is possible. Moses ibn Tibbon writes that this verse comes to “indicate that conjunction of the human soul with the separate intellect is possible, for no man would desire nor imagine [lit. “describe”] that which is impossible....” Gersonides writes at greater length, but makes the same point (p. 19): In that the acquisition of this perfection is so unlikely that for many reasons it is thought to be impossible, this sage began this book by making the possibility of its acquisition clear, since that is the object of inquiry in this book, i.e., how it is possible for a man to acquire this perfection. It is not possible to investigate the way which will bring one to it if he does not first make known that it is possible to acquire it.

Now, in the light of Guide of the Perplexed III.51 (p. 628), cited above, it is no surprise that both ibn Tibbon and Gersonides understand this verse as referring to intellectual perfection. What is striking, however, is that both of them interpret the verse as reassuring the reader that ultimate human perfection is actually attainable. Song of Songs 1:5. I am black, but comely, O ye daughters of Jerusalem, as the tents of Kedar, as the curtains of Solomon, appears at first glance as if it is interpreted by ibn Tibbon and Gersonides in a conspicuously similar fashion. Ibn Tibbon explains that in this verse “the human intellect addressed the other faculties of the soul....” Gersonides wrote (p. 27), “The material intellect said to the other faculties of the soul that ab initio she is black since she lacks any intelligibles, but is nonetheless comely because of her disposition to receive every intelligible when she will be stimulated to do this.” But ibn Tibbon does not follow up on his opening, and immediately casts the verse back into the traditional midrashic mode. Ibn Tibbon and Gersonides also approach Song of Songs 1:15, Behold, thou art fair my love; behold, thou art fair; thine eyes are as doves, with similar terminology. Ibn Tibbon explains, “that is, I am prepared to accept and bear 272

CHAPTER ELEVEN

your activity and form,” while Gersonides comments (p. 36) that “the material intellect allegorically said concerning the beauty of this faculty of the soul’s preparation and the natural longing between then to cooperate in order to proceed towards perfection....” The similarities we have seen so far do not seem to me to be very significant. In each case the verses more or less cry out for the interpretations given by ibn Tibbon and Gersonides, once the overall Maimonidean approach to Song of Songs is adopted. This is not the case with the resemblance between the approaches of Moses ibn Tibbon and Gersonides to Song of Songs 3:5 and 8:4. Both verses deal with “adjurations” (3:5: I adjure you, 0 daughters of Jerusalem, by the gazelles, and by the hinds of the field, that ye awaken not, nor stir up love, until it please). Ibn Tibbon is typically laconic: “that ye awaken not – that they not break through, or not rebel....” Gersonides is clearer (p. 49): “This oath comes here because of the great longing to seek out the end: it urges that one approach the different species of speculation in their order, lest they break through and the end be withheld from them.” The term translated here as “break through” comes from the root h-r-s. Both Moses ibn Tibbon and Gersonides appear to be following Moses’ father Samuel’s translation of Maimonides’ tahajjamu (Guide 1.5, p. 30), following Ex 19:21. ...lest they break through unto the Lord to gaze, and many of them perish. Samuel ibn Tibbon discusses the term in his Perush ha-Millot ha-Zarot, explaining that it refers to the act of entering into a place one has no right to enter in order to see that which one ought not to see.36 Moses ibn Tibbon and Gersonides both use a relatively unusual term, invented for the specific use to which they both put it by Samuel ibn Tibbon. More important than the use of the term is that they both understand the “adjurations” in Song of Songs as relating to individuals who seek to enter areas of study for which they are not yet ready. This point, it seems to me, is more significant than the similarity in linguistic usage. Once they interpret the “ad36 Here is what Samuel says: “it is when one causes himself to enter into that which he ought not enter, from lest they break through [unto the Lord] (Exodus 21:19), the meaning of which is, according to its peshat, that they should not enter a place which they ought not to enter, to see what they ought not to see; its intention is that they not study that which they ought not to study, and thus anyone who causes himself to enter the study of a science before knowing its premises is called hores.”

273

MOSHE IBN TIBBON AND GERSONIDES ON SONG OF SONGS

jurations” in a similar fashion, it makes sense that they both use a term found in Samuel ibn Tibbon’s translation of the Guide of the Perplexed at a point where Maimonides is making a similar claim. Other linguistic similarities between the two commentaries are, it appears to me, of little importance. Thus, both ibn Tibbon and Gersonides interpret the term aperion in 3:9 to mean a marriage canopy. In this, however, they both follow Rashi’s commentary on the verse. They both understand Song of Songs 6:8, There are threescore queens, and fourscore concubines, and maidens without number, as referring to the great number of psychic faculties in the human soul. But, once they adopt Maimonides’ interpretation of Song of Songs as recounting the soul’s longing for its ultimate perfection, it is not really surprising that they would each understand this verse in this way. Gersonides could easily have arrived at this interpretation without the influence of ibn Tibbon.37 There thus do not appear to be any places where Gersonides can be shown to have borrowed interpretations of specific verses from Moses ibn Tibbon. Can the same be said for the apparently similar ideas which we find in the two commentaries? The first of these is the unusual claim that Song of Songs is the product of King Solomon’s old age, not his youth.38 The idea that Song of Songs was written in Solomon’s enthusiastic youth, Proverbs in his maturity, and Ecclesiastes in his disillusioned old age is a commonplace in the Jewish tradition. But the idea that Song of Songs was the last of the three, not the first, was hardly Moses ibn Tibbon’s invention. It is found in the Talmud,39 in the Midrash,40 and in the 37 There are some other places (such as verse 8:11) where ibn Tibbon and Gersonides offer similar interpretations of specific verses; but these are as easily understood as coincidences as they are as evidences of direct Tibbonian influence on Gersonides. 38 Ibn Tibbon, p. 9; Gersonides, Commentary an Ecclesiastes, p. 25d/16-17. Gersonides, thus, does not actually make the claim in his commentary on Song of Songs, a point of no importance here. 39 Bava Batra 14b lists the Hagiographa in chronological order of composition; of the three Solomonic books Songs of Songs is listed there last. Rashi in his comment on this passage explicitly interprets the text to mean that the Talmud here holds that Song of Songs was written in Solomon’s old age. Gersonides, it should be noted, owned copies of many of Rashi’s commentaries; See Weil, La bibliothèque, index, p. 156: “Shelomoh ben Yishaq de Troyes.” 40 Song of Songs Rabbah I.10 debates the order of the Solomonic books. The discussion is introduced as follows: “[Solomon] wrote three books: Proverbs, Ecclesiastes, and Song of

274

CHAPTER ELEVEN

introduction to R. Menahem b. Solomon Meiri’s (Perpignan, 1249-1316) commentary on Proverbs.41 That Gersonides mentions this idea in his commentary on Song of Songs is thus no indication that he read Moses’ commentary. We saw just above that both Moses ibn Tibbon and Gersonides understand the “adjurations” in Song of Songs as relating to individuals who sought to learn things they were not ready to study. This similarity, it turns out, actually reflects a more basic similarity between the approaches of ibn Tibbon and Gersonides. On pp. 24a-24b of his commentary, Moses ibn Tibbon divides Song of Songs into three parts. The first (1:1-2:17), “deals with a man who has not actualized his potential, neither through eating of the fruit of the tree of life nor of the tree of knowledge of good and evil; or, [it deals with] a man of good [moral] qualities whose beliefs and opinions are true and correct, adopted by [acceptance of] tradition, not [rational] proof.” The second part (3:1-5:l ), deals with “a man who has actualized his perfection and has eaten of the tree of life.” The third part (5:2-8:14) – deals with “the man who has eaten of the fruit of knowledge of good and evil.” So far, so good; nothing here is reminiscent of Gersonides’ division of Song of Songs. But then ibn Tibbon remarks: It is possible to say, although this is an unlikely interpretation, that the first section deals with the person who studied only the mathematical sciences: the second section deals with a person who also learned the physical sciences; the third section deals with a person who also learned metaphysics.

Now this interpretation may be “unlikely” but it is precisely that offered by Gersonides in his commentary on Song of Songs, and it is certainly the interpretation of Song of Songs which underlies both ibn Tibbon’s and Gersonides’ understanding of the “adjurations” in Song of Songs. Can we say that Gersonides adopted this interpretation from ibn Tibbon? Perhaps the fact that he adopted from ibn Tibbon an interpretation which the latter rejected explains Songs.” In the debate itself, the following options are defended: (a) Proverbs, Song of Songs, Ecclesiastes; (b) all three were written at the same time in Solomon’s old age; and (c) Song of Songs, Proverbs, Ecclesiastes. But before the debate itself, the Midrash speaks of “three descents which Solomon descended.” In that context, Song of Songs is listed last. 41 Perush al Sefer Mishlei, p. 3. Meiri may himself have been influenced here by Moses ibn Tibbon; be that as it may, there is no reason to assume that Gersonides was influenced in this by ibn Tibbon.

275

MOSHE IBN TIBBON AND GERSONIDES ON SONG OF SONGS

why Gersonides failed to mention his source? Let us defer dealing with this question untill after we look at two further ideas which both Gersonides and Moses ibn Tibbon find in Song of Songs. Moses ibn Tibbon rejects an interpretation of Song of Songs according to which the poem is divided into three parts; the first part describes the individual who has mastered mathematics, the second part the individual who has also mastered physics, and the third part with the individual who has gone past mathematics and physics and studied metaphysics. Now Gersonides divides Song of Song into more than three parts, and certainly does not agree with ibn Tibbon’s actual division of the poem,42 but there are still two ways here in which his understanding of the poem is strikingly like that of ibn Tibbon. The first is the very claim that the poem deals with the study of the sciences, while the second relates to their order. Is it really odd, however, that both Moses ibn Tibbon and Gersonides should read a text like Song of Songs as teaching one how to progress through the sciences? On the face of it, perhaps yes, but when we remember their shared Maimonidean background then their joint approach becomes immediately understandable, indeed, almost expected. Both ibn Tibbon and Gersonides learned from Maimonides that Song of Songs deals with the individual’s attempt to achieve intellectual perfection. It was Maimonides also, however, who emphasized the need to approach that perfection in the proper order and in a restrained manner. This is the burden of the letter to Joseph ben Judah with which Maimonides prefaces the Guide of the Perplexed, of Guide I.31-34,43 and of the “parable of the palace” in III.51.44 It is, I think, fair to say that once one reads Song of Songs in a Maimonidean vein, it is almost a foregone conclusion that one is going to find in it a discussion of the sciences which one must master in 42 Gersonides divides the poem as follows: a) introductory material, 1:1-1:8 b) overcoming moral impediments, 1:9-2:7 c) learning to distinguish truth from falsehood, 2:8-2:17 d) mathematics, 3:1- 4:7 e) physics, 4:8-8:4 f) metaphysics, 8:5-8:14 43 For a valuable exposition of these chapters, see Klein-Braslavi, King Solomon. 44 On which, see Kellner, Perfection, pp. 13-31.

276

CHAPTER ELEVEN

order to apprehend God and thus to love God. But not only do we find ibn Tibbon raising the possibility that Song of Songs deals with the student’s efforts at studying the sciences, and Gersonides enthusiastically presenting that as the only correct interpretation of Song of Songs, but they both present the sciences in the same order: mathematics, physics, and metaphysics. This, it turns out, may be significant. In a variety of places in his writings, including most emphatically the commentary of Song of Songs, Gersonides presents the sciences in the order: mathematics, physics, metaphysics. Gersonides maintains that this division of the science is Aristotelian. In point of fact, however, Aristotle consistently presents the sciences in the order: physics, mathematics, metaphysics.45 Perhaps Gersonides’ ordering of the sciences was influenced by that of Moses ibn Tibbon in the latter’s commentary on Song of Songs? While this possibility cannot be excluded, it does not appear likely to me. This, for a number of reasons. First, and most important, Gersonides’ ordering, as I argue in the chapter just cited, reflects his realist orientation to science. The objects of physics, for Gersonides, are more real than the objects of mathematics, and the objects of metaphysics are more real than the objects of physics. Furthermore, knowledge of physics and metaphysics (contra Maimonides) brings one to perfection and immortality; thus the two are linked together, not divided by mathematics. To speak anachronistically, Gersonides’ ordering of the sciences reflects his own philosophy of science (as well as his epistemology) and it is hardly credible that he owes that orientation to an interpretation of Song of Songs raised in an aside by Moses ibn Tibbon and then immediately rejected by him. Furthermore, Gersonides’ ordering of the sciences is reflected in the tripartite division of Treatise V of the Milhamot, another indication that this order is important to him, not something casual. It is simply not reasonable that Gersonides would have adopted a position so central to his thinking on the basis of an offhand remark by Moses ibn Tibbon. There is one more issue which must be examined in our search for a “smoking gun” proving that Gersonides had or had not read Moses ibn Tibbon’s commentary on Song of Songs. This is their respective attitudes towards the nature of that conjunction which is humankind’s highest perfection. The issue 45 For the texts, see ch. 7 above.

277

MOSHE IBN TIBBON AND GERSONIDES ON SONG OF SONGS

is complex and a full and detailed discussion of it has no place here. Briefly, Gersonides and ibn Tibbon agree that humans actualize themselves most fully through a process of intellection the end result of which is “conjunction” (devekut) with the Active Intellect.46 In the tradition of medieval Aristotelianism conjunction was broadly understood in one of two ways.47 Conjunction was either understood as actual ontological union between the human intellect and Active intellect (the two literally become one) or as epistemic union (borrowing the language of Seymour Feldman), whereby the human intellect achieves some level of knowledge of the concepts known by the Active Intellect. The two thus share objects of knowledge and in that sense, and in that sense only, are “conjoined.” The issue here will become clearer if we take a moment to summarize Gersonides’ different uses of the term “intellect.” Gersonides, along with most other medieval Aristotelians, distinguishes between the material intellect, the acquired intellect, and the Active Intellect.48 Gersonides’ doctrine of the material intellect is presented in Milhamot 1.5. As Gersonides presents it on the basis of an extended philosophical debate with Alexander of Aphrodisias, Themistius, and Averroes, the material intellect is really nothing other than the human capacity to learn. ‘Material intellect’ is the name given to the ability humans have to receive properly abstracted sensory data and, with the assistance of the Active Intellect, transform it into intelligibiles, the proper objects of knowledge, Gersonides defines the acquired intellect succinctly as “the intelligibles that accrue from abstracting material forms from their matter.”49 The acquired intellect, in other words, is really nothing other than a collection of ideas. Gersonides devotes Milhamot I.11 to a proof that “the acquired intellect is everlasting.” Gersonides there adds to our information concern46 More precisely, Gersonides is careful to define conjunction as occurring between the human and Active intellects. Moses ibn Tibbon speaks of conjunction between humans and the separate intellects (p. 8) and even between humans and God (p. 9). 47 For the background in Arabic philosophy, see Davidson, Alfarabi. On Gersonides’ views see Davidson, “Material and Active Intellects,” and Feldman, “Gersonides on Conjunction.” 48 On this subject see ch. 9 above. 49 This definition is found in Gersonides’ supercommentary to Averroes’ Epitome of the De Anima; see Mashbaum, “Gersonides’ Supercommentary,” p. 150.

278

CHAPTER ELEVEN

ing the nature of the acquired intellect, maintaining that “it is clear that the acquired intellect is the perfection of the material intellect brought about by the Active Intellect,” and that “the acquired intellect is itself the order obtaining in the sublunar world that is inherent in the Active Intellect.”50 It is not just any ideas, then, that constitute the acquired intellect, but just those ideas found in a systematic fashion in the “mind” of the Active Intellect. By “acquiring” ideas found in a perfect and systematic fashion in the Active Intellect, humans achieve immortality through the permanent existence of these ideas in the Active Intellect. This is the “epistemic” sense of conjunction. The Active Intellect in Gersonides’ view is the “lens” through which the other separate intellects Influence the sublunar world, the giver of forms in that world, and the cause of human knowledge (including prophetic knowledge). Gersonides is one of the very few medieval Jewish or Muslim Aristotelians to define conjunction in epistemological as opposed to ontological terms. Shalom Rosenberg maintains that Moses ibn Tibbon adopted the same view in his commentary on Song of Songs.51 Rosenberg (p. 142) points to ibn Tibbon’s commentary on Song of Songs 1:2 (p. 8a of the commentary): “It says, let him kiss me in the third person, and for thy love is better than wine (Song of Songs 1:2) in the second person to indicate that apprehension of God is not constant, but [God] will be apprehended once and another time not, like the light of the flaming sword which turned every way (Genesis 3:24).”52 The episodic nature of conjunction indicated here proves, Rosenberg affirms, that Moses ibn Tibbon adopted an epistemological, not ontological, understanding of conjunction. Ontological union, after all, is not something 50 Milhamot, p. 82; Wars, pp. 212-13. 51 See Rosenberg, “Philosophical Hermeneutics.” 52 In discussing the apprehension of the secrets of the Torah in the Introduction to the first part of the Guide of the Perplexed (p. 7) Maimonides comments, “There are others between whose lightning flashes [of prophetic apprehension] there are greater or shorter intervals. Thereafter comes he who does not attain a degree in which his darkness is illumined by any lightning flash. It is illumined, however, by a polished body or something of that kind, stones or something else that give light in the darkness of the night. And even this small light that shines over us is not always there, but flashes and is hidden again, as if it were the flaming sword which turned every way. It is in accord with these states that the degrees of the perfect vary.”

279

MOSHE IBN TIBBON AND GERSONIDES ON SONG OF SONGS

that comes and goes; it is actual (and according to Rosenberg, apparently, permanent) union. Assuming Rosenberg to be correct here, what does this say about the relationship between the commentaries of ibn Tibbon and Gersonides? Well, if ibn Tibbon really did understand conjunction in epistemological terms in his commentary on Song of Songs, and was one of the few medieval Jews to hold that view, and Gersonides knew that he held this view in his commentary on Song of Songs, is it really credible that Gersonides would maintain that he had “not found any [other] commentary on it [Song of Songs] which could be construed as a [correct] explanation of the words of this scroll”? It does seem unlikely. If Shalom Rosenberg is correct, then it seems that we have a fairly strong indication that Gersonides did not know ibn Tibbon’s commentary. In this particular case, however, I think that Rosenberg is supporting a fairly heavy conclusion with rather a thin reed. Is it indeed the case that ontological conjunction cannot be episodic? Averroes held an ontological view of conjunction;53 yet for him conjunction was clearly episodic in nature.54 Maimonides’ views on this subject are not clear, although on balance it appears that his view of conjunction was more ontological than epistemologica1.55 Not only is he unclear on whether or not he adopts an ontological or epistemological theory of conjunction, and unclear on the question of with what (or whom) one achieves conjunction, but he is also inconsistent on whether or not conjunction once achieved is permanent. By and large, his position seems to be that it is not.56 Thus, the fact that Moses ibn Tibbon sees conjunction as 53 See Davidson, “Material and Active Intellects,” p. 249. 54 See the texts analyzed by Ivry in “Averroes on Intellection,” p. 85 and in Ivry, “Moses of Narbonne,” p. 286. 55 See the sources cited by Feldman, in note 21 of his “Gersonides on Conjunction” on the debate over Maimonides’ views on this issue. 56 See Kellner, Perfection, p. 31 and Klein-Braslavy, Perush ha-Rambam, p. 256. Klein-Braslavy and I base ourselves on statements such as “...the intellect which emanated from Him... toward us is the bond between us and Him. You have the choice: if you wish to strengthen and fortify this bond, you can do so... it is made weaker and feebler if you busy your thought with what is other than He” (Guide of the Perplexed III.51, p. 621). Pp. 624-28 of the same chapter, furthermore, make precious little sense if the episodic interpretation of conjunction is not adopted. But Maimonides does seem to contradict himself on this issue; see 1.62 (p. 152): “It has been made clear in the books that have been composed concerning divine

280

CHAPTER ELEVEN

a phenomenon that “comes and goes” does by any means prove that he held a view similar to that of Gersonides on the nature of conjunction. We thus cannot use his theory of conjunction as an indication that Gersonides had not read his commentary.

science that it is impossible to forget this science; I mean thereby the apprehension of the active intellect....” Berman seeks to explain this passage as reflecting, not Maimonides’ own views, but those of the rabbis whose text he is here explaining; see his ibn Bajjah, pp. 28-29.

281

CHAPTER TWELVE Misogyny: Gersonides vs. Maimonides

S

ong of Songs is an erotic love story and as such not a likely place to find expressions of misogyny.1 This is even more the case if a reader is resolute in reading the text as an allegory plain and simple, having nothing to do with flesh and blood women at all. But despite this, there are a small number of places in his commentary on Song of Songs in which Gersonides gives some indication of his remarkably dismissive attitude towards women. In this commentary his disdain for women is muted. In other contexts, however, Gersonides is not loath to express his negative and disdainful attitude towards women. One can find sources for his scathing comments in Aristotle and in the works of the Talmudic rabbis. But, as the examples of Maimonides and Averroes will show, he did not have to follow these sources in adopting what can only be called (and without anachronism, as we will see below) a misogynistic view. In the Introduction to his commentary on Song of Songs, Gersonides writes (p. 13) that the author of the book “allegorically compared the intellect to the male since it is on the level of form relative to the imaginative faculty. This is something which continues throughout this book.” In his commentary to Song of Songs 1:6 (p. 28) he distinguishes among faculties of the soul in the following way: “She called them sons because they are active faculties. The faculties which are in turn affected by them, that is, which obey them, are the daughters of Jerusalem [Song of Songs 1:5].” Gersonides here associates activ1

By interesting coincidence, while I was working on the original (Hebrew) article upon which this chapter is based, two colleagues of mine in Haifa were also beginning to write on medieval Jewish philosophical misogyny, creating what I like to think of as the “Haifa School” on the subject. See (in order of publication): Schwartzmann “Image”; Melamed, “Women”; Schwartzmann, “Gender Concepts”; and Schwartzmann, “Isaac Arama.” Of late, Gedaliah Oren has also joined the “school.” See Oren, “Meiri’s Attitude.” Further on our subject, see Grossman, “Contempt,” and Grossman, “Attitude of Meiri.”

283

MISOGYNY: GERSONIDES VS. MAIMONIDES

ity with masculinity, passivity to femininity. The idea is repeated in the commentary on verse 9 (p. 32): “In truth, he compared her to a mare and not to a stallion because in this passage he allegorically presents the material intellect as a female, since the female is passive, whereas the male is active.” There are two ideas expressed in these passages: males are connected to form and females to matter, and males are active while females are passive (which is simply to repeat the first idea in other language). Both ideas were widely accepted in the Middle Ages, and both find support in the writings of Aristotle: “what the male contributes to generation is the form and efficient cause, while the female contributes the material [cause].”2 This being Aristotle’s view, it is no surprise that slightly later in the same text he writes (II.1, 732a1-10): Again, as the first efficient or moving cause, to which belong the definition and the form, is better and more divine in nature than the material on which it works, it is better that the superior principle should be separated from the inferior. Therefore, wherever it is possible and so far as it is possible, the male is separated from the female.

If biology is destiny, then women are destined to be inferior and subservient. Gersonides is a faithful follower of Aristotle in this regard, at least in his commentary to Song of Songs, and as such is not all unusual in the medieval landscape. In his other biblical commentaries, however, Gersonides gives expression to much more radical views concerning women. There may have been greater misogynists than Gersonides in medieval Jewry, but he certainly ranks high in that category.3 Gersonides was convinced that women were essentially inferior to men, and must therefore be subservient to them and serve them. This principle helps him to explain the order in which Noah and his family entered the ark 2

Aristotle, On the Generation of Animals I.20, 729a5-10. See Horowitz, “Aristotle and Women” and “Image of God.” For a discussion of the connection between Aristotle’s biology and his attitude towards women, see Freudenthal, Aristotle’s Theory, pp. 24 and 37-39. Further background on our issue: Allen, “Plato.”

3

As will become clear below, the term ‘misogynist’ is not anachronistic here. For examples of medieval Jewish misogyny, see Saperstein, Decoding, pp. 89-102 and Jospe, Torah and Sophia, pp. 143-146. Jacob Anatoli was of the opinion that women were not created in the image of God. See Malmad, p. 25b. He was not alone in this view. See Schwartzmann, “Image.”

284

CHAPTER TWELVE

in Genesis 7:13 (In the selfsame day entered Noah, and Shem, and Ham, and Japheth, the sons of Noah, and Noah’s wife, and the three wives of his sons with them, into the ark): “He and his sons were mentioned before their wives, as men are the fundamental point [ikkar] of creation, while women were made to serve them and preserve the species” (19c/84/160). The men entered the ark before the women (no “women and children first” in this scenario!) because they are the point of creation; women exist only in order to satisfy their needs and in order to guarantee future generations. The same idea shows up in the Commentary to Dt. 29:8-10 (Observe therefore the words of this covenant, and do them, that ye may make all that ye do to prosper. Ye are standing this day all of you before the Lord your God: your heads, your tribes, your elders, and your officers, even all the men of Israel, your little ones, your wives, and thy stranger that is in the midst of thy camp, from the hewer of thy wood unto the drawer of thy water). Gersonides explains (240a/293) that the list in these verses follows an order of descending importance: leaders and chief men, elders and officials, and all the other men of Israel. Male children precede women, since they are destined to fulfill (all) the commandments (as opposed to women, who are not obligated to fulfill positive, time-bound commandments). Women are mentioned last in this list of people who shouldest enter into the covenant of the Lord thy God –and into His oath– which the Lord thy God maketh with thee this day that He may establish thee this day unto Himself for a people, and that He may be unto thee a God, as He spoke unto thee, and as He swore unto thy fathers, to Abraham, to Isaac, and to Jacob (verses 11-12); only the alien, not part of the covenant, is mentioned after women. These ideas about male superiority also have a clear Aristotelian basis: At all events we may firstly observe in living creatures both a despotical and a constitutional rule; for the soul rules the body with a despotical rule, whereas the intellect rules the appetites with a constitutional and royal rule. And it is clear that the rule of the soul over the body, and of the mind and the rational element over the passionate, is natural and expedient; whereas the equality of the two or the rule of the inferior is always hurtful. The same holds good of animals in relation to men; for tame animals have a better nature than wild, and all tame animals are better off when they are ruled by man; for then they 285

MISOGYNY: GERSONIDES VS. MAIMONIDES

are preserved. Again, the male is by nature superior, and the female inferior; and the one rules, and the other is ruled; this principle, of necessity, extends to all mankind.4

Not only are women inferior to men in generally human and specifically Jewish terms, according to Gersonides, but in consequence of this they are obliged to serve the superior sex. This Gersonides derives from the account of the creation of Eve from Adam. Woman was created from man “since he is the reason for her existence; that is, she was created to serve him” (14d/56/9495). This issue comes up also in Gersonides’ commentary on Esther (a text which certainly lends itself to a non-chauvinist reading), there commenting that “it is fit that wives be subservient and fulfill the will of their husbands, since they were created to do the will of men, as we explained in the Torahreading of Genesis.”5 According to Gersonides, women are meant to serve men so that the latter can achieve their purpose: “It is also clear that the female of the human species is distinguished from the female of animals, since she was created to serve the male so that he have the leisure to apply himself to the acquisition of intelligibles in order to achieve his felicity; but among the other animals, the male does not have this same superiority over the female.”6 In all species but the human race, males and females have parallel tasks, and one does not serve the other. Only among humans was the female created in order to take care of the physical needs of the males, so that they would be able to devote themselves to achieving intellectual goals, thereby ensuring themselves eternal life.7 The essential difference between human males and females is centered in their different intellectual abilities: 4

Politics I.5, 1254b10-16; emphasis added.

5

Commentary on Esther, fifth to’elet (p. 44b). Compare also the Commentary on Genesis 25d (third to’elet)/120/234): “A wife should not do anything except in accord with the will of he husband, for in this way the welfare of the home will be perfected.”

6

Commentary on Genesis 14b/52/86.

7

Commentary on Genesis 15c/61/106. Dr. Rivka Temima Kellner pointed out to me that on Gersonides’s view of matters it is next to impossible for women to achieve a share in the world to come. Intellectual perfection is the only key to immortality, and we have seen how weak Gersonides holds the female intellect to be. It would appear that his world to come is devoid of women, which does not seem to be the vision of the afterlife held by the Talmudic rabbis. My thanks to Dr. Kellner for translating the original draft of this chapter into Hebrew.

286

CHAPTER TWELVE

The man called his wife ‘Eve’8 when he comprehended the weakness of her intellect, i.e., that she was not much superior to other animals, even though she has an intellect. This is so because most of her utility [sic] was prepared for her on a physical plane, because of the weakness of her intellect, and because she was created in order to serve man. It is therefore unlikely that she achieve any intellectual perfection. But she is withal more worthy than the other animals, and they all exist to serve her. That is why she is called the mother of all living (Gen. 3:20).9

Gersonides apparently found Darwin’s missing link: woman! Women are not totally lacking in intellect,10 but it is unlikely that they could ever do anything substantial with the small amount of intellectual abilities vouchsafed to them. They are still superior to animals, but much inferior to men, and exist in order to serve them. Their perfection is to be found in physical and material contexts and it is to those areas that they must devote themselves.11 Gersonides expresses his position concerning the inherent weakness of the female intellect in many different contexts. Women, for example, are not obligated to wear fringes on four-cornered garments (zizit) because the scientific message hinted at by that commandment (the doctrine of the four elements) is too difficult for them to comprehend: “We have learned that women are not obligated to put fringes on their garments; this is appropriate, since the matter indicated by that commandment is very deep and it is not possible that it be apprehended by the female intellect because of their giddiness [kalut da’at].”12 Similarly, Gersonides explains that only a few words sung by women were mentioned in connection with the Song at the Sea (Ex. 15:1-19), “since it is not fitting that women take part in recounting the praises of the Lord, may He be exalted, with such deep matters, because of the deficiency of their intellects. 8

Hebrew: havah; connected etymologically to the words for life and animal. In effect, Gersonides says that Eve’s name means ‘animal-like’.

9

Commentary on Genesis 16a/64/110.

10 They are endowed with practical intellects, i.e., the ability to match means to ends; Commentary to Genesis, p. 15c/61/107. 11 Because women are intellectually weak, and thus less important than men, less care was taken in the construction of their physical constitutions. That is why the must endure menstruation, pregnancy, and childbirth. Commentary on Genesis p. 16a/67/109. 12 Commentary on Numbers 188a/65/162. For the term kalut da’at, see Shabbat 33a.

287

MISOGYNY: GERSONIDES VS. MAIMONIDES

In contrast, “the [male] Children of Israel sang this wonderful song.” “It is for this very reason,” concludes Gersonides, referring to the weak female intellect, “that the Torah does not obligate women to study Torah, and other similar commandments. The Sages said [Sotah 21b]: ‘He who teaches his daughter Torah — it is as if he taught her frivolity.”13 Here, too, Gersonides follows Aristotle (at least with respect to the weakness of the female intellect; Aristotle did not have much to say on whether women should wear zizit): Now, it is obvious that the same principle applies generally, and therefore almost all things rule and are ruled according to nature. But the kind of rule differs; the freeman rules over the slave after another manner from that in which the male rules over the female, or the man over the child; although the parts of the soul are present in an of them, they are present in different degrees. For the slave has no deliberative faculty at all; the woman has, but it is without authority, and the child has, but it is immature. So it must necessarily be supposed to be with the moral virtues also; all should partake of them, but only in such manner and degree as is required by each for the fulfillment of his duty.14

But the philosophical and religious contexts in which Gersonides flourished added other dimensions to his view of women, over and above what he learned from Aristotle. This can be seen in his discussion of the question of the question whether women were created in the image of God. While I have found no unambiguous text in which Gersonides says that women were not created in God’s image, this conclusion follows from his comments about the limited nature of the female intellect. This point will be clearer if we examine Gersonides’ teachings in their Maimonidean context. In his commentary to Genesis 1:26-27 (And God said: ‘Let us make man in our image, after our likeness; and let them have dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the fowl of the air, and over the cattle, and over all the earth, and over every creeping thing that creepeth upon the earth.’ And God created man in His own image, in the image of God created He him; male and female created 13 Commentary on Exodus, p. 70c(10th to’elet)/115/258. 14 Politics I.13, 1260a13-16. All of chapters 12 and 13 are relevant to our concerns here. Further on this text, see Horowitz, “Aristotle and Women,” pp. 206-210.

288

CHAPTER TWELVE

He them.), Gersonides makes explicit reference to Maimonides’ explanation of the verses. This is what Maimonides says (Guide I.1, p. 22): The term image [zelem], on the other hand, is applied to the natural form, I mean to the notion in virtue of which a thing is constituted as a substance and becomes what it is. It is the true reality of the thing in so far as the latter is that particular being. In man that notion is that from which human apprehension derives. It is on account of this intellectual apprehension that it is said of man: In the image of God created He him (Gen. 1:27). … That which was meant in the scriptural dictum, let us make man in our image (Gen. 1:26), was the specific form, which is intellectual apprehension, not the shape and configuration.

In his Genesis commentary (ad locum) Gersonides writes: “zelem is said of the human intellect, as Maimonides explained. It refers in some aspects to the world of angels as will be clear to anyone who knows about the nature of the human intellect and how it achieves apprehensions.”15 We can never know if Gersonides would agree with the blunt assertion of Jacob Anatoli that women are not created in the image of God, but a direct consequence of his position is that even if women were created in the image of God, we must say, because of the deficiency of their intellects, that God’s image is expressed less clearly in women than in men. The Book of Ecclesiastes serves Gersonides as a convenient hook on which to hang a number of misogynist comments. He explains verses 25-26 in chapter 7 (I turned about, and applied my heart to know and to search out, and to seek wisdom and the reason of things, and to know wickedness to be folly, and foolishness to be madness; and I find more bitter than death the woman, whose heart is snares and nets, and her hands as bands; whoso pleaseth God shall escape from her; but the sinner shall be taken by her.) as follows (p. 34d/48): “I have found that being engrossed by women is the most despicable of evils, for woman is more bitter than death, her heart is snares and nets …” According to the verse itself, it is being attracted to women which is the source of danger;16 Gersonides makes this the fault of the woman. In his eyes women are snares 15 Commentary on Genesis p. 12d/43/70. Further on Gersonides’ understanding of the term, see the commentary on Exodus, 179/375 (the text is missing in the Venice edition). 16 Here I follow ibn Ezra, who understands the verse in this fashion.

289

MISOGYNY: GERSONIDES VS. MAIMONIDES

and nets which keep men which keep them from achieving their perfection (p. 35d/52): “the woman is snares and nets to ensnare the heart of men to prevent them from achieving any perfection of the soul whatsoever.” Not only do women ensnare men and thereby render them intellectually impotent, but sexual relations weaken men, making it more likely that they will get sick.17 Gersonides’ remarks about women are not always blatantly negative. But even his positive comments reflect his basically negative orientation towards the female sex. A man should never force a woman to marry him, not because this a wicked thing to do, but because it will cause his wife to be unfaithful to him (Commentary on Genesis, p. 33a (eleventh to’elet)/161/327): “It is not appropriate to marry a woman unless it be according to her will and with her consent since it is not fitting to force her in this connection, since this will bring her to play the harlot in her husband’s home, along with the other deficiencies in the welfare of a household that this will cause.” Thus also, Gersonides sees fit to teach his readers a lesson (to’elet) in virtuous behavior; namely, to mourn their wives after they die, and not continue business as usual until the end of the mandated period of mourning. He apparently felt it necessary to give this sort of advice, despite the clear-cut halakhic obligation to mourn a spouse.18 There can be no doubt that for Gersonides the notion of a female prophet was problematic. After all, the key to prophecy is intellectual perfection and we have seen how unlikely it is in his eyes that women achieve that. Unfortunately for Gersonides’ theories, the Bible explicitly teaches that God communicates with women (Sarah, Miriam) and that Miriam, Deborah, Huldah and Noadiah were all prophets. The Talmudic Sages (Megillah 14a) list seven female prophets (Sarah, Miriam, Deborah, Hannah, Abigail, Huldah, and Esther).19 I have found very few explicit references to the phenomenon of female prophecy in Gersonides’ writings. In his Commentary to Exodus, p. 53d/5/13, he says that Yocheved, mother of Moses, might have known through prophecy that Moses was to save Israel. The text is not entirely explicit, however, and could be read 17 Commentary to Leviticus, p. 147b/208/63. 18 One wonders at the family relations which could spawn such advice. Note that Nahmanides, speaking as an halakhic decisor (posek), writes (Kitvei Ramban, Vol. 2, p. 52) that “therefore one tears one’s clothing [in mourning] for any Jew, even a woman.” 19 Of course, Gersonides might take the small number of female prophets as confirmation of his views.

290

CHAPTER TWELVE

as indicating that the prophet in question was not Yocheved herself. But in the Commentary to Numbers, p. 184d/42/107, Gersonides explicitly says that God addressed Miriam in prophecy. In the first to’elet to 1 Samuel 7 Gersonides admits, grudgingly in my view, that Samuel’s mother was a prophetess. But so far as I can see, the most illuminating reference to female prophets is in the third to’elet to Gersonides’ commentary on Judges 5:31. There he writes: “The third to’elet is to indicate the truth of the prophecy [of Devorah], even though it was that of a woman…” (emphasis added). Gersonides was honest enough to admit that the Bible presented Devorah as a prophet – that does not mean that he had to be happy with it! In other places where the Bible has God speaking directly to women (Hagar, Genesis 16:10; Rebecca, Genesis 25:23) Gersonides explains that in each case the women in question heard God’s word through a prophet (Commentary on Genesis, p. 25c/118/229-230; p. 34a/165/333). According to Gersonides, then, women are connected to matter, not form, passive, and intellectually weaker than men. They occupy a position between human beings (men) and animals. In Jewish terms, they occupy the lowest rung of the hierarchy, even lower than (male) children. Women were created to serve the needs of men and to be subservient to them, so that men could occupy themselves with intellectual matters and reach thereby the perfection that would guarantee them a place in the world to come. But women are dangerous, very dangerous – when a man succumbs to their wiles, he endangers his immortality.20 As already noted, Gersonides’ attitudes towards women are not unusual in the medieval intellectual and spiritual landscape. Even though one can easily find rabbinic sources for many of his misogynistic positions, I have emphasized their Aristotelian background since his comments about the nature and status of women betray their source in the writings of the Stagirite: material, passive, intellectually inferior, and naturally governed by men.21 20 Gersonides seems to look for opportunities to be dismissive of women. See, for example, in his commentary on Exodus, p. 74c/141/314 and p. 77d/164/355 (where women are treated as nothing more than possessions of men). 21 It is noteworthy that at some point in his life Gersonides composed a list of the books he owned. See Weil, La bibliothèque. Only a very small number of the 248 books on the list fall under the category of belles-lettres. One of them is the book [Minhat Yehudah] Sone’ Nashim (=The Gift of Judah the Misogynist) by Judah ben Isaac Halevi ibn Shabbetai (who died after 1225). The book was written in Toledo at he beginning of the Thirteenth Century. It should

291

MISOGYNY: GERSONIDES VS. MAIMONIDES

But, it turns out, it is not necessary to present women in this fashion, even for a medieval rabbi strongly influenced by Aristotle. It is the burden of the rest of this chapter to make this point. As noted many times in this book, Gersonides had two philosophical guides, Maimonides and Averroes. The Milhamot is largely an attempt to supplement and correct the Guide of the Perplexed. Gersonides cites Averroes constantly, and much his of technical philosophical work involved writing supercommentaries on Averrroes’ commentaries on Aristotle. Gersonides rarely rejects views held jointly by Maimonides and Averroes. His misogynist approach is one such example: his extreme view on the nature and status of women turns out to be a rejection of much more moderate views held jointly by Maimonides and Averroes. In a text which Touati is sure that Gersonides knew,22 Averroes writes: And we say that women, in so far as they are of one kind with men, necessarily share in the end of man. They will differ only in less and more; i.e., the man in most human activities is more diligent than the women, though it is not impossible that women should be more diligent in some activities, such as is thought concerning the art of practical music.23

Averroes also comments (p. 100): “The same is the case with the upbringing of women who are disposed by nature to lordship. We ourselves have already said that the woman shares in common with the man all the work of the citizens.” He thus denies explicitly that women are essentially different from men, and establishes the principle that they should be full partners with men in the privileges and obligations of citizenship. States which refuse to do this only impoverish themselves (p. 59). According to Averroes, then, women can learn, be noted that already in 1210 two replies in defense of women were penned in Burgos by an author known only as Isaac; these are Ezrat ha-Nashim and Ein Mishpat. All three works are analyzed in Huss, “Minhat Yehudah” (esp. pp. 40-67). It may be that ibn Shabbetai’s book is a parody of misogyny and not an expression of it, but either way its presence in Gersonides’ library at least shows that it is not anachronistic to attach the term ‘misogyny’ to him. See Jacobs, “Defense” and the studies cited there (to which may be added: Huss, “Three Editions”). See also Roth, “Wiles of Women.” An English translation of Sone’ Nashim by Raymond Scheindlin may be found in Stern and Mirsky, Rabbinic Fantasies, pp. 269-294. 22 La pensée, pp. 40 and 364. 23 Averroes, On Plato’s “Republic”, pp. 57-58.

292

CHAPTER TWELVE

guard the state, even lead it; a state which refuses to take advantage of their abilities loses out thereby. In three short paragraphs, Averroes simply and completely denies the foundation for medieval misogyny. As to Maimonides, he was indeed convinced that the vast majority of women in his day were less able than men to apprehend intellectual matters. But this, I will show, was a function of sociology, not of ontology. Maimonides took no concrete steps to improve the lot of women; on the contrary, his halakhic writings contributed to the continued Jewish social discrimination against women. But, like Averroes and independently of him,24 he certainly understood that the basis for the difference between men and women (beyond the biological) lay in the way which humans organized their lives (on the social and halakhic levels alike) and not in any essential and natural difference between the sexes which in effect rendered them different species. Social (and even halakhic) differences can be overcome if there is the need and will to do so; not so with differences rooted in ontology.25 I do not claim that Maimonides saw no natural differences between men and women. Like Gersonides, he was very much aware of Aristotle’s ideas concerning the nature of womankind, and he adopted some of those ideas. But despite this, he arrives at very different conclusions from Gersonides. Maimonides mentions the parallelism, male/ form, female/matter, attributing it to Plato (Guide I.17) and uses it to explain one of the parables of King Solomon: The outcome of all this is a warning against the pursuit of bodily pleasures and desires. Accordingly Solomon likens matter, which is the cause of all these bodily pleasures, to a harlot who is also a married woman. In fact, his entire 24 Maimonides came to know of Averroes only towards the end of his life; as will be seen here, his view of women was established in his earliest writings. 25

Maimonides adopted a position which sat well with his view towards women, but for us the issue is purely theoretical since I doubt that any medieval could be reasonably expected to take note of it. The Hebrew language is, in contemporary terms, profoundly chauvinist (just consider the Hebrew words for husband, ba’al; woman, ishah; and female, nekevah). Maimonides was one of the few medieval Jews who held Hebrew to be a language like all other languages (for details, see Kellner, Confontation, ch. 5). Its chauvinism, therefore, does not reflect some profound divine plan, but the chauvinist nature of ancient Jewish society. Gersonides, on the other hand, thought that Hebrew nouns expressed the essential nature of things named (Commentary on Genesis, p. 14b/53/87).

293

MISOGYNY: GERSONIDES VS. MAIMONIDES

book is based on this allegory. And we shall explain in various chapters of this Treatise his wisdom in likening matter to a married harlot, and we shall explain how he concluded this book of his with a eulogy of the woman who is not a harlot but confines herself to attending to the welfare of her household and husband. For all the hindrances keeping man from his ultimate perfection, every deficiency affecting him and every disobedience, come to him from his matter alone, as we shall explain in this Treatise.26

Maimonides was convinced that women by nature had “weaker” souls than men and therefore tend towards depression and despondency. As he puts it (Guide III.48, p. 600): “women are prone to anger, being easily affected and having weak souls.” It is for that reason that their oaths are made dependent upon the men in whose homes they live (fathers or husbands). But, Maimonides hastens to add, “a woman who is governed by herself and not dependent upon the control of the master of the house, has with regard to vows the same status as men.” But despite his view that women have “weak” souls, and despite all the restrictions which Maimonides the halakhic decisor placed upon women, he nowhere even hints that as far as their humanity goes, that is, so far as their inborn intellectual abilities go, that women are by nature inferior to men – women and men were created in the same divine image. Maimonides gives both direct and indirect expression of this view in his writings. In terms of indirect evidence, Maimonides simply never states that women are by nature inferior to men. In places where Gersonides presents women as naturally inferior to men, Maimonides is silent. Maimonides, for example, consistently discriminates in favor of the intellectually gifted at the expense of the intellectually disabled, without making any reference to the gender of the intellectual or ignoramus.27 We can see this clearly in a number of texts, one of them being the ‘parable of the palace’ in Guide III.51. In the parable, groups of human beings are distinguished one from the other on the basis of their intellectual abilities and 26 Guide I, Introduction, p. 13. Compare III.8, p. 431. 27 For a discussion of Maimonides’ well-known intellectualist elitism, see Freudenthal, “Biological Foundations.”

294

CHAPTER TWELVE

attainments.28 Women are simply not mentioned. Similarly, there is a pair of texts in Maimonides’ Commentary on the Mishnah in which humans are divided by their intellectual attainments; again, women are simply not mentioned. In each of these cases, Maimonides’ approach differs from that which we have seen Gersonides adopt. Here are the two texts in question. In his Introduction to the Mishnah, Maimonides deals with the usefulness of various animals and plants: “When we come to realize that the purpose of each of these is the existence of human beings, it behooves us to investigate why human beings exist and what is the purpose of their existence.” This purpose, Maimonides determines, is the apprehension of intelligibles and the knowledge of truths in the clearest way possible. “It is not possible that the purpose of human existence be to eat and drink, or to have conjugal relations, or to build a house, or be a king, since all of these are transitory accidents which do not add to a person’s substance. [This is true] especially in light of the fact that all these activities are shared by humans and other animals.”29 The end of human existence is the attainment of intellectual perfection; every other human activity ought to serve that end. What is the nature of a person who does not strive to achieve his or her end as a human beings, but is satisfied with eating, drinking, conjugal relations, building houses and ruling? In another place in his Commentary on the Mishnah, Maimonides gives an explicit answer to this question: “one in whom human characteristics have not been brought to perfection is not truly a human being and exists only to serve the purposes of the true human being.”30 This text, however offensive it is to our ears, is very important for our purposes. Where Gersonides saw women as creatures whose purpose in life is to serve men and thereby make it possible for them to achieve intellectual perfection, Maimonides sees this as the role of all people who do not pursue intellectual pursuits, men, women, and kings alike. Maimonides does not attach importance to one’s gender, but, rather, to what one does with one’s inborn talents.

28 On the parable, see Kellner, Perfection, pp. 13-33. 29 Kafih edition, p. 22 30 Commentary to Baba Kamma IV.3. On this text see Kellner, Science, pp. 286-288.

295

MISOGYNY: GERSONIDES VS. MAIMONIDES

We saw above that Gersonides in effect turns women into the ‘missing link’ between humans and animals. In Maimonides’ ‘parable of the palace’ this role is explicitly played by others (p. 618): Those who are outside the city are all human individuals who have no doctrinal belief, neither one based on speculation nor one that accepts the authority of tradition: such individuals as the furthermost Turks found in the remote North, the Negroes found in the remote South, and those who resemble them from among them that are with us in these climes. The status of those is like irrational animals. To my mind they do not have the rank of men, but have among beings a rank lower than the rank of man but higher than the rank of apes. For they have the external shape and lineaments of a man and faculty of discernment that is superior to that of the apes.31

However much we might deplore these views, they must not he confused with contemporary racism. Maimonides’ view is based upon the climatological theory, widely accepted as scientifically accurate in the middle ages, according to which people born and raised in countries the “climates” of which were harsh were inferior to those born and raised in more salubrious environments.32 For our purposes, we see that for Maimonides, Darwin’s missing link, as it were, is not womankind, but semihumans (men and women both) who had the misfortune to be born and raised far from the equator. There are also texts in which Maimonides’ view that women are not by nature (as opposed to nurture) intellectually inferior to men find more or less explicit expression. Thus, towards the end of the Guide of the Perplexed (III.51, pp. 627-628) Maimonides deals with the deaths of those who have perfected their intellects: The Philosophers have already explained that the bodily faculties impede in youth the attainment of most of the moral virtues, and all the more that of pure thought, which is achieved through the perfection of the intelligibles that lead to passionate love of Him, may He be exalted. For it is impossible that it should 31 For a discussion of this particular passage, see Melamed, Image, p. 139-143. 32 On the climatological theory mentioned here, see Melamed, “Land,” Fontaine, “Scorching,” and Altmann, “Judah Halevi’s.”

296

CHAPTER TWELVE

be achieved while the bodily humors are in effervescence. Yet in the measure in which the faculties of the body are weakened and the fire of the desires is quenched, the intellect is strengthened, its lights achieve a wider extension, its apprehension is purified, and it rejoices in what it apprehends. The result is that when a perfect man is stricken in years and approaches death, this apprehension increases very powerfully, joy over this apprehension and a great love for the object of apprehension become stronger, until the soul is separated from the body at that moment in this state of pleasure.

Humans who have conquered their physical desires, and who went on to achieve a stupendously high level of metaphysical insight into the nature of God, so far as that is possible, will die in a state of heavenly rapture, so much so that for them the passage from life to death is likened to a kiss. Maimonides goes on to tell us that according to the Talmudic rabbis only three people in all of human history have achieved this33 – and one of them was a woman! He continues: Because of this the Sages have indicated with reference to the deaths of Moses, Aaaron, and Miriam that the three of them died by a kiss…. But with regard to her [Miriam] it is not said, by the mouth of the Lord;34 because she was a woman the use of the figurative expression was not suitable with regard to her.35 Their purpose was to indicate that the three of them died in the pleasure of this apprehension due to the intensity of passionate love. In this dictum the Sages, may their memory be blessed, followed the generally accepted poetical way of expression that calls the apprehension that is achieved in a state of intense and passionate love for Him, may He be exalted, a kiss, in accordance with its dictum: Let him kiss me with the kisses of his mouth, and so on (Song of Songs 1:2). [The Sages], may their memory be blessed, mention the occurrence of this kind of death only with regard to Moses, Aaron, and Miriam.36 33 Note well that here, as in many, many other places, Maimonides takes it as a given that the Talmudic rabbis accepted his Aristotelian reading of Judaism. 34 As was said with respect to Moses and Aaron. 35 In the eyes of the Talmudic rabbis, Maimonides here tells us in an illuminating aside, describing God as (figuratively) kissing Moses and Aaron is acceptable, but not so with respect to Miriam. 36 Here is the rabbinic text to which Maimonides appeals here:

297

MISOGYNY: GERSONIDES VS. MAIMONIDES

There is, of course, much to be learned from this passage, especially about the way in which Maimonides (and, following him, Gersonides) read Song of Songs. But for our purposes, we see that for Maimonides 33.3% of all humans who achieved the highest possible level of human perfection were women. Compare this to Gersonides, who has trouble with the idea that any woman can achieve prophecy. In contrast, “Laws of Repentance,” X.1 seems to contradict this positive understanding of the nature of womankind. In this text Maimonides seeks to encourage his readers to worship God out of love, and not just out of awe (yir’ah). One who worships God out of awe (i.e., out of hope for reward or fear of punishment) is neither a prophet nor a sage (paragraph 2): It is not right to serve God after this fashion, and whoever does so, serves Him out of awe. This is not the degree of the prophets and sages. The only ones who serve God in this way are ignoramuses, women or children whom one trains to serve out of awe, till their knowledge will have increased when they will serve out of love.

In paragraph 5 Maimonides expands this point. The Talmudic sages had encouraged the study of Torah out of ulterior motives (shelo lishmah) on the grounds that such study would ultimately lead to the study of Torah for its own sake (lishmah). “Hence,” Maimonides continues, when instructing children, women, or ignoramuses generally, we teach them to serve God out of awe or for the sake of reward, till their knowledge increases and they have attained a large measure of wisdom. Then we reveal to them this secret, little by little, and train them by easy stages till they have grasped and comprehended it, and serve God out of love. Our Rabbis taught: Six there were over whom the Angel of Death had no dominion, namely, Abraham, Isaac and Jacob, Moses, Aaron and Miriam. Abraham, Isaac and Jacob we know because it is written in connection with them, in all, of all, all; [a reference to Abraham] Moses, Aaron and Miriam because it is written in connection with them [that they died] By the mouth of the Lord [Nu. 33:8; Dt. 34:5]. But the words by the mouth of the Lord are not used in connection with [the death of] Miriam? — R. Eleazar said: Miriam also died by a kiss, as we learn from the use of the word there [in connection both with her death] and with that of Moses [Nu. 20:1; Dt. 34:5]. And why is it not said of her that [she died] by the month of the Lord? — Because such an expression would be disrespectful (Baba Batra 17a).

298

CHAPTER TWELVE

In these passages women are compared to children and ignoramuses – hardly complimentary! But what do children and ignoramuses have in common? Not defective intellects, but deficiencies in education. By comparing women to them, Maimonides tells us that they are as a matter of fact (but not of nature) deficient in education. There is no need to guess that Maimonides would want us to educate women to worship God out of love, and not just out of awe (as he would certainly want us to educate our children and our neighbors who have not studied). He tells us this explicitly: “Then we reveal to them this secret, little by little, and train them by easy stages till they have grasped and comprehended it, and worship God out of love.”37 How does one worship God out of love? Maimonides explains (paragraph 6): One only loves God with the knowledge that he knows Him. According to the knowledge will be the love. If the former will be little or much, so will the latter be little or much. A person ought therefore devote himself to the understanding and comprehension of those species of wisdom and understanding which will inform him concerning his Master, as far as it lies in human faculties to understand and to comprehend,38 as we have explained in “Laws Concerning the Foundations of the Torah.”

Earlier (paragraph 2) Maimonides had written: Whoever serves God out of love, occupies himself with the study of the Torah and its commandments and walks in the paths of wisdom,39 impelled by no external motive whatever, moved neither by fear of calamity, nor by the desire to obtain material benefits; such a man does the truth because it is the truth; ultimately good comes because of it. This degree is indeed a very high one; not every sages attains to it. It is the degree of the Patriarch Abraham, whom God called His lover,40 because he served only out of love. It is the degree which God, through Moses, bids us achieve, as it is said, And thou shalt love the Lord 37 See further Maimonides’ Introduction to the Mishnah, pp. 19-20. 38 On this expression, and its messianic significance, see Aviezer Ravitzky, “‘To the Utmost.” 39 On Maimonides’ use of the term wisdom (hokhmah) see Twersky, Introduction, pp. 366-368, 395, 473-476, and 495-497. 40 Is. 41:8.

299

MISOGYNY: GERSONIDES VS. MAIMONIDES

thy God (Dt. 6:5). When one loves God appropriately, he will immediately fulfill all the commandments out of love.

What must one do in order to arrive at this sort of love of God? In “Laws of the Foundations of the Torah,” II.1 Maimonides explains that study of God’s creation leads one to love of God. He devotes the following three chapters to a summary of physics and metaphysics, those sciences through which one becomes acquainted with God’s creation, and thus the sciences which one must study if one wishes to worship God out of love. These sciences may be called physics and metaphysics in Greek, but in Jewish terms they are called pardes (“Laws of the Foundations of the Torah,” IV.12) and may be approached only after one has filled one’s belly with knowledge of permitted and forbidden matters (i.e., halakhah).41 Maimonides is not one to repeat himself. But with respect to seeing love of God as an outgrowth of knowledge, he repeats himself frequently. Indeed, in Guide III.51 (p. 621) he says this himself: “Now we have made it clear several times that love is proportionate to apprehension.”42 What is the upshot of all this for our purposes? It is appropriate to teach women to worship God out of love. The Abrahamic worship of God out of love is the aim of all humanity, and not just the masculine part of it. But, in order to worship God out of love, one must study physics and metaphysics. Such study is permitted only to one who has settled his (or her!) mind through the study of halakhah. This is an approach radically at variance with that of Gersonides. Remember, for Gersonides women do not wear zizit because their minds are too weak to comprehend the physics of the four elements. I must emphasize that nothing I have said here means that Maimonides supported social equality for women. We also have no evidence that he was in the least bothered by the glaring inequality between men and women in the society in which he lived (and which he helped shape through his halakhic decisions). Maimonides was certainly no egalitarian, whether in Platonic or contemporary terms, but he was certainly no misogynist either. This may be 41 On the identity between ma’aseh merkavah and metaphysics, and ma’aseh bereshit and physics, see Kellner, Science, pp. 219-225. 42 For a survey of “these several times,” see Kellner, “Philosophical Themes.”

300

CHAPTER TWELVE

seen in places where halakhic inequality is emphasized, but ontological inequality is implicitly denied. Thus, for example, Maimonides opens his “Laws of Torah Study” with the following statement: “Women, slaves, and the immature are exempt from the obligation of Torah study. But it is the duty of a father to teach his young son Torah…. A woman is under no obligation to teach her son, since only one whose duty it is to learn has a duty to teach.”43 At first glance, this does not appear to be a promising text for one who seeks to prove that women are no way intellectually inferior (and hence subordinate) to men. But let us look at it more closely. Women, we learn, are exempt from the obligation of Torah study – exempt, but not incapable. If women were incapable of Torah study there would be no point in exempting them from it. Gersonides, who was convinced that women are incapable of the intellectual effort needed in Torah study, would not have written as Maimonides did. Indeed, by closing with the decision that women are exempt from the obligation to teach Torah to their sons, Maimonides once again implies that they are capable of such instruction. There is no point in exempting a person from what they can not in any event do. In Maimonides’ eyes women do not stand on an equal footing with men with respect to social and halakhic status. That is clear. But whatever the reason for it may be, it is not because he saw women as naturally inferior to men. This point finds expression in a passage which seems even more clearly negative than the one just examined: A woman who studies Torah will be rewarded, but not in the same measure as a man, for study was not imposed upon her as a duty, and one who performs a meritorious act which is not obligatory will not receive the same reward as one upon whom it is incumbent and who fulfills it as a duty, but only a lesser award. And notwithstanding that she is rewarded, yet the Sages have warned us that a man shall not teach his daughter Torah, as the majority of women have not a mind adequately directed [mekhuvenet] for its study but, because of the poverty of their intellects, they will turn the words of the Torah into trivialities. The Sages said (Sotah 21b), “He who teaches his daughter Torah – it is as if he taught her frivolity.” This stricture refers only to instruction in the Oral 43 For a very valuable study of this text, see Harvey, “Obligation.”

301

MISOGYNY: GERSONIDES VS. MAIMONIDES

Torah. With regard to the Written Torah, he ought not to teach it to her; but if he has done so, it is not regarded as teaching her frivolity.44

Two issues relevant to our discussion stand out here: the reward which women receive for Torah study, and the question of whether they ought to be taught it at all. Women receive less reward for their Torah study than do men, on the basis of the Talmudic rule cited by Maimonides. Torah study for women should be avoided, not because they are by nature incapable of plumbing its depths, but because the majority of women have not been trained in its study and therefore suffer from intellectual poverty. There is no reference here to the nature of women, but to the nature of the society in which Maimonides lived and functioned.45 It is because of poor education, and for no other reason, that women in Maimonides’ world who study Torah turn it into trivialities. Most women in Maimonides’ day did suffer from intellectual poverty, but he did not see this as a consequence of their inborn inability to enrich their intellects. It is with these texts from “Laws of Torah Study” as background that we should approach the following passage from Guide I.35 (p. 81): …the negation of the doctrine of the corporeality of God and the denial of His having a likeness to created things and of His being subject to affections are matters that ought to be made clear and explained to everyone according to his capacity and ought to be inculcated in virtue of traditional authority upon children, women, stupid ones, and those of a defective natural disposition, just as they adopt the notion that God is one, that He is eternal, and that none but he should be worshipped.

Including women in a group which also includes stupid and defective people is hardly likely to endear Maimonides to us. But, since the list includes children, it in no way indicates that Maimonides thought that women were in principle uneducable. Were that the case, he could not have included children in the list. Women in his day certainly lacked education; that does not mean that he thought that they could not be educated. 44 “Laws of Torah Study,” I.13. On this passage, see Seeman, “Silence.” 45 Compare Averroes, as above.

302

CHAPTER TWELVE

For Maimonides, it is actual intellectual attainments, not gender (or national origin) which distinguishes the perfected from the deficient.46 Women in his day were almost always ignorant (certainly of physics and metaphysics); but this is a sociological fact, not a normative claim. As we have seen, Maimonides allows for the possibility, at least in principle, that women can study Torah, physics, and metaphysics, and reach the stage whereby they worship God out of love, and not just out of awe. Since women can reach that level of perfection, they can earn shares in the world to come, something which Gersonides apparently denied. And it was a woman, Miriam, who was one of three to achieve the highest level of intellectual perfection available to humans. It is the ignorant, not women, whose utility (sic!) in our world reduces to the services which they can render the intellectual elite, freeing that elite from the yoke of day to day cares, so that they might devote themselves entirely to the true end of humanity, understanding. It is the ignorant, not women, who serve as the link between humankind and the animal kingdom. It is against this Maimonidean background that Gersonides’ views –that women are the “missing link” between animals and humans, that in principle they cannot achieve intellectual perfection (and hence immortality), that no woman could understand even simple physical doctrines, and the claim that women were created ab initio to serve men– show that he was indeed a misogynist and that it is not anachronistic to attach that label to him. The examples of Maimonides and of Averroes show that Gersonides did not have to adopt his unfortunate views about women. Why, then, did he? Why did he not follow his two great mentors in understanding that women are created in the image of God and can, therefore, engage in rational thought on the same abstract, exalted level as men? Our question becomes even more urgent if we take note of an insight of Gad Freudenthal’s. Freudenthal shows that even had he wanted to, Aristotle could not escape from the position that in human generation, it is the male which bequeaths the form, the female the matter, and from the consequences which follow from that idea. Freudenthal explains: 46 Maimonides denied that Jews are inherently distinct from and naturally superior to other peoples. See Kellner, Maimonides, and Kellner, Science, chs. 16-20.

303

MISOGYNY: GERSONIDES VS. MAIMONIDES

In Aristotle’s scheme, therefore, the chains of living beings resembling one another in their essential features are produced through the vital heat, specifically that which is operative in the male semen. In brief, it is the theory of vital heat which accounts for the persistence of species…. Thus, Aristotle states that, although sublunar individuals are perishable, they can yet participate in the divine, namely via the transmission of the form of the species from parent to offspring, whereby the eternity of the biological form is ensured. Similarly, the fact that the male principle informs the matter supplied by the female, makes it, Aristotle says, more divine…it is the male form, not the female matter, that is perpetuated and which therefore has a greater share in divinity.

But medieval thinkers, Gersonides emphatically among them,47 held that the Active Intellect guarantees the persistence of species. “They differed from Aristotle,” Feudenthal explains (p. 39n), in a crucial respect; the medievals held all plant and animal reproduction to depend upon the assistance of the active intellect … This is precisely the kind of theory which Aristotle rebutted: man begets man and he does no on his own. Thus vital heat, as an entity immanent to the individual being, assumes for Aristotle precisely the explanatory role which the medieval Peripatetics were to ascribe to the active intellect.

Aristotle may not have been able to escape the idea of male superiority; his biology committed him to it. The contribution of the Active Intellect to the persistence of species, however, made it possible for Gersonides to minimize the ontological significance of gender differences. He chose not to. Philosophically, Gersonides could have followed Maimonides and Averroes in his understanding of the nature of womankind. He did not and we simply have no way of knowing why he disdained women so much.

47 Freudenthal, Aristotle’s Theory, pp. 197-198.

304

CHAPTER THIRTEEN: Gersonides and his Cultured Despisers: Arama and Abravanel

I

t can come as no surprise that the Gersonides whose work we have examined in the chapters of this book aroused great opposition. Indeed, from a contemporary perspective, it is surprising how widely his works were distributed in the centuries immediately after his death. Gersonides is the greatest example of one strain of medieval Jewish philosophy: the attempt to reconcile Jewish theology to Greek philosophy. Because he accepts Greek philosophy much as he received it, his philosophical arguments rarely break new ground. On the other hand, his attempt to fit the Torah into an Aristotelian mold is, to say the least, creative. That Gersonides defends positions which are difficult to reconcile with any traditional understanding of Jewish theology has long been noticed. He has been the subject of both vituperative attack and zealous defense.1 The first important reference to Gersonides is in the work of his younger contemporary, Rabbi Isaac bar Sheshet Perfet (13261408). In his Responsa Perfet mentions Gersonides twice, in numbers 45 and 118.2 In both places he refers to him in terms of great respect. In Responsum 45 Perfet replies to the following question: “What is Greek wisdom from which one must distance oneself; does this refer to those world-famous books, the Physics and the Metaphysics?”3 In his response Perfet does not condemn the study of Greek philosophy outright, but adduces the examples of two “kings” 1

The most comprehensive list of figures to have criticized Gersonides is given by Touati in his magnificent La pensée, pp. 541-559. Touati provides an exhaustive listing, with complete bibliographical information, spanning seven centuries.

2

For more information on Perfet see Hershman, Isaac ben Sheshet. He discusses Responsum 45 on pp. 89-90. Parts of this responsum have been translated into English by Freehof in Treasury, pp. 72-77. For my own own translation of the complete responsum, with introduction and notes, see Kellner, “Rabbi Isaac.” The Responsa themselves were first published in Constantinople (1546) and in many subsequent editions. The book is now conveniently available in Bar Ilan University’s Responsa Project dtabase.

3

On ‘Greek wisdom’ (hokhmah yevanit), see Lieberman, “Alleged Ban,” Schwartz, “Greek Wisdom,” and “Schwartz,” “More on Greek Wisdom.”

305

GERSONIDES AND HIS CULTURED DESPISERS: ARAMA AND ABRAVANEL

(Maimonides and Gersonides) who, despite their great learning, were led astray by these foreign teachings and “said things which it is forbidden to hear.” Perfet’s responsum clearly displays the two poles between which Gersonides’ reputation was to move. On the one hand, Perfet speaks of Gersonides with great respect, referring to him as he-hakham rabbi Levi (“the sage, Rabbi Levi”) and describing him as “a great student of the Talmud and the author of a fine commentary to the Torah and prophets.” On the other hand, in the midst of an halakhic responsum, he condemns some of his teaching and, in effect, forbids his questioner to study it. Perfet’s sometime colleague and sometime antagonist, Simeon ben Zemah Duran (1361-1444), a kinsman of Gersonides, wrote a series of glosses on the latter’s commentary to the Bible in which he defends Gersonides from his attackers. This book, called Livyat Hen (Gracious Escort), is lost. Duran wrote a second volume in defense of Gersonides called Or Ha-Hayyim (Light of Life) in which he attacks Hasdai Crescas. This book is also lost.4 It was Hasdai Crescas who first subjected Gersonides to sustained criticism. His Or Adonai (Light of the Lord)5 was written to refute the teachings of Maimonides and Gersonides. Tracing their objectionable theological views to their espousal of Aristotelianism, Crescas concentrates his attack on the philosophical underpinnings of their systems, to the almost total exclusion of theological considerations. It is with Shem Tov ibn Shem Tov (c. 1380-1441) that we find the first of a long line of authors who simply malign Gersonides without any attempt seriously to discuss his ideas. In his Sefer Ha-Emunot (Book of Beliefs) Shem Tov dismisses Gersonides as a fool for his rationalistic explanation of certain Biblical miracles.6 It is Shem Tov who first called Wars of the Lord, Wars Against the Lord.7 Shem Tov’s intolerance towards Maimonides earned him the ire of Moses ben Isaac Alashkar (1466-1542), the author of glosses on the Sefer HaEmunot, who, tongue in cheek, wondered why it had not been decreed that 4

At the end of Part III of his Responsa Duran provides a list of all his writings. For a recent study on Duran, with full bibliography, see Kadish, Book of Abraham.

5

On Crescas, and for references to works by and about him, see Lasker, “Chasdai Crescas.”

6

For a recent study on Shem Tov, wih copious references to earlier studies, see Peleg, “Shem Tov.”

7

Ibn Shem Tov, Sefer Ha-Emunot, part IV, ch. 19, p. 45b.

306

CHAPTER THIRTEEN

Shem Tov’s book should be burned even “on a Day of Atonement which fell on the Sabbath.”8 Two notable exiles from Spain in the fifteenth century engaged in extended and serious theological discussion of the writings of Gersonides. These are Rabbi Isaac Arama (1420-1494)9 and Don Isaac Abravanel (1437-1508).10 They pay Gersonides the compliment of taking him seriously and subject his views to sustained criticism. Their contemporary Abraham Shalom (d. 1492) cites Gersonides frequently but, instead of criticizing him, often reinterprets his statements so that they can be read in a nonobjectionable, orthodox way.11 Judah ben Jehiel Messer Leon (also fifteenth-century) also attacked Gersonides, but on unique grounds: for deviating from Averroes’ interpretation of Aristotle.12 Judah Moscato (c. 1530-1593), in his commentary on Judah Halevy’s Kuzari, briefly attacks Gersonides for his account of God’s knowledge of particulars and for deviating from the teachings of Maimonides on that issue. He approvingly quotes some of Arama’s strictures on Gersonides. He ends his short discussion with a play on the words of Numbers 1:49: “Howbeit the staff of Levi thou shalt not number nor hold high his commentary on these matters among the children of Israel.”13 Menasseh ben Israel (1604-1657) dismissed Gersonides’ account of the Witch of Endor as “vain imaginings” (dimyonot hevel) and criticized Gersonides (in his book of Wars Against the Lord) for denying that souls can learn new facts after death.14 In the same century Spinoza quotes from Gersonides occa8

Alaskhar, Responsum 117, p. 311. The book is now conveniently available in Bar Ilan University’s Responsa Project database.

9

On Arama, see Pearl, Medieval Jewish Mind, Heller-Wilensky, Yizhak Arama, Kellner, Dogma, pp. 159-161, and Frydman-Kohl, “Hazut Qashah.”

10 For a discussion of works by and about Abravanel, see Lawee, “Isaac Abarbanel” and J. Kellner “Bibliography.” 11 On this, see Davidson, Abraham Shalom, p. 10. 12 Isaac Husik identified Gersonides with the author whom Messer Leon characterizes as “the wise in his own eyes.” See his Judah Messer Leon, sect. XII, pp. 93-108. 13 Moscato, Kol Yehudah (Commentary to the Kuzari), pp. 22-23. It is possible that Moscato is here also making a pun on the name of Levi’s astronomical invention, the bacculus Jacob (“Jacob’s staff ”). On Moscato, See Shear, “Moscato’s Self Image.” 14 Menasseh ben Israel, Nishmat Hayim, pt 1, ch. 7 (p. 32) and pt. 1, ch. 11, p. 56.

307

GERSONIDES AND HIS CULTURED DESPISERS: ARAMA AND ABRAVANEL

sionally and, as Wolfson shows, was strongly influenced by him.15 Manasseh ben Israel is, for all practical purposes, the last author of any significance to attack Gersonides. The latter’s philosophic writings were hard to find and, with the end of the tradition of medieval Jewish philosophy, almost unintelligible to any Talmudist who might stumble across them. Gersonides’ commentaries on some of the prophetic books were published in the standard Rabbinic Bible but were apparently studied only rarely. He became the object of pious veneration but of no real attention.16 It is readily apparent from this very brief survey that of the many authors who criticize Gersonides only four –Crescas, Shalom, Arama, and Abravanel– engage in extended and serious discussion of Gersonides’ thought. Of the four, only two, Arama and Abravanel, engage him in serious theological debate. Both of them attack him on the same grounds: his account of miracles in general and his account of the miracle in Joshua 10 in particular. Their criticisms of Gersonides highlight one of the central issues of Jewish Aristotelianism, namely, the difficulty of reconciling the God of Aristotle, whose one activity is knowledge, with the God of Moses, Who revealed His will at Sinai. Their criticism is further important in that it sheds light on a possible inconsistency, or at least significant tension, in the thought of Gersonides himself. This can best be seen by examining their criticism in some detail and thus allowing it to speak for itself. Rabbi Isaac Arama (b. 1420) lived in Christian Spain until the Expulsion, when he fled to Naples, where he died in 1494. He headed a number of rabbinical academies and was widely known during his life as a Talmudist, philosopher, and preacher. He was the author of a number of books, the most important of which was his Akedat Yizhak (Binding of Isaac), a collection of Sabbath sermons. These sermons, which had a tremendous influence on subsequent Jewish preaching and which are still readily available today,17 demonstrate Ara15 See the index (s.v., “Gersonides”) in Wolfson, Spinoza. 16 Although, in a letter to me dated March 9, 1980, the late Louis Jacobs wrote: “Curiously enough, some Hasidim appear to have been fascinated by Gersonides. I recall reading somewhere that R. Menahem Mendel of Lubavitch (the Tzemah Tzedek) once came late for the teki’ot [shofar-blasts] on Rosh ha-Shanah, explaining that he had been studying the Milhamot because he had had a dream showing him that Gersonides required a tikkun [repair of his soul].” For an example of pious veneration of Gersonides, see above in the Introduction. 17 In reprints of the 1849 edition and on ha-taklitor ha-torani.

308

CHAPTER THIRTEEN

ma’s combined concern with Talmud and philosophy.18 Scattered throughout the Akedah are numerous references to Gersonides and citations both from the Milhamot and from the Bible Commentaries. Arama’s aim in these passages always is to criticize Gersonides. Arama faults Gersonides for his description of creation, for his account of God’s knowledge of particulars, and at great length for his rationalistic explanation of many Biblical miracles. Arama devotes a significant part of Sermon 13 of the Akedah to an extended criticism of Gersonides’ account of two Biblical miracles: Isaiah’s causing the shadow on Hezekiah’s sundial to move back ten degrees and Joshua’s stopping the sun at Gibeon (2 Kings 20 and Joshua 10). In his commentary to 2 Kings 20:10 and in the Milhamot, Book VI, Part II, Chapter 12 (pp. 458-459), Gersonides had written that the miracle of Hezekiah did not involve the unnatural movement of the sun but, rather, a miraculous shifting of clouds which caused the shadow on the sundial to shift back ten degrees. Calling him “one of the most famous” of the Bible commentators, Arama dismisses Gersonides’ explanation of this miracle as empty wind. He accuses “our sages,” and among them Gersonides, of having made a covenant with Greek philosophy to nullify all the miracles and signs about which the divine Torah testifies. These philosophers, he says, corrupt Scripture and say things which it is forbidden to hear.19 “But,” Arama goes on, “even more despicable than this is what he [Gersonides] wrote about the sun at Gibeon.”20 Gersonides’ account of that miracle is worth examining in detail since it is the subject of extended criticism by both Arama and Abravanel. He discusses the miracle in his commentary to Joshua 10:12 and in the Milhamot, Book VI, Part ii, Chapter 12 (pp. 454-458). His account in both places is the same, although the discussion in the Milhamot is considerably longer and more detailed. Gersonides’ main point is that the miracle could not have involved the actual stopping of the sun. This is true, he says, for a number of reasons. First, “it is impossible that a miracle occur with respect to the heavenly bodies. This is so because, as we have already explained, the Active Intellect is the cause of these wonders, as explained above, and it is not possible that the Active 18 See Bettan, “Sermons.” This article was reprinted in Bettan, Studies. 19 Arama echoes R. Isaac bar Sheshet here; see above, note 2. 20 Akedat Yizhak, Sermon 13, p. 97a. Cited below as AY.

309

GERSONIDES AND HIS CULTURED DESPISERS: ARAMA AND ABRAVANEL

Intellect could work upon the heavenly bodies, since it is an effect of them.”21 Second, miracles are performed only as an act of divine goodness and grace; any unnatural alteration in the configuration of the heavenly bodies can only cause great harm to befall the sublunar world. This latter claim follows from Gersonides’ acceptance of astrology and his belief that the heavenly bodies which determine the future are so ordered as to maximize to the greatest extent possible the good of those whose futures are so determined. Any change in their interrelationship can thus only cause more harm than good.22 Third, the Torah testifies to the fact that the miracles of Moses were greater than the miracles of all the other prophets (Dt. 34:10). “If Joshua’s demonstration were such as to have effected a change in the law [nomos] governing the movements of the heavenly bodies then this demonstration would be immeasurably greater than the demonstrations of Moses, our Teacher; this is very clear.” This is clear, Gersonides maintains, since none of Moses’ miracles affected the heavenly bodies.23 Gersonides advances a fourth argument in defense of his interpretation of the miracle at Gibeon: “This stopping of the sun, if it occurred, would have no particular advantage for Israel or others. This is so because the Israelites believed in prophecy at that time, and we have not found that any of the other nations tried to turn to God, blessed be He, on account of this demonstration” (p. 458; Wars, p. 494). The alleged miracle was thus unnecessary for the Israelites, who by this time had learned to trust in prophecy, and a failure, if meant to impress other nations, none of which are known to have been impressed by it (as well they would have been, had it occurred as described). Gersonides also maintains that the verses themselves do not support the traditional interpretation that the sun stood still for Joshua. He supports this contention with his own exegesis of the passage. But if the traditional interpretation is incorrect, what does the passage describe, and what is the miracle which made that day unique? Gersonides answers: 21 P. 456 (Wars, p. 491). 22 Cf. Milhamot, III.2, p. 123 and Commentary to Job, end of ch. 49. 23 P. 457 (Wars, p. 493). Gersonides defends the claim that Moses’ miracles were superior to those of all other prophets in Milhamot, II.6, pp. 110-111, in II.8, p. 119, and in his commentary to Deuteronomy 34:10. For a description of Gersonides’ views on prophecy see above, ch. 2.

310

CHAPTER THIRTEEN

Now the miracle of Joshua was that he said that the revenge of the nation upon its enemy would be completed in the short time during which no descent of the sun is noticed since it is in the midst of the heaven. And thus he said: And the sun stood still and the moon stayed, until the nation had avenged themselves of their enemies. Is this not written in the Book of Jashar? And the sun stayed in the midst of the heaven and hasted not to go down about a whole day. And there was no day like that before it or after it, that the Lord hearkened to the voice of a man; for the Lord fought for Israel [Joshua 10: 13-14]. It means to say by this that the sun moving away from opposite Gibeon was not noticed by the eyes of Israel and the moon did not move from opposite the Valley of Ayalon until revenge was completed upon the enemy nation (p. 457; Wars, p. 493).

Thus, by Gersonides’ account, Joshua’s miracle did not involve the actual stopping of the sun, but a victory so fast that it seemed that the sun must have stopped. Gersonides’ arguments here provide a number of indications about his general understanding of miracles. Miracles cannot, apparently, contradict the accepted order of nature. Or, put more precisely, miracles cannot be acts which are impossible, such as would be the case if an effect (e.g., the Active Intellect) were to force its causes (e.g., the heavenly bodies) to depart from their accustomed, natural order. In positive terms we can say on the basis of the arguments adduced here that Gersonides maintained that miracles were examples of divine grace (i.e., providential concern) the main aim of which is to lead men to correct belief. We learn this from his argument that since the Israelites already believed in prophecy at the time of Joshua and since there is no record of other nations turning to God on account of this miracle, it could have no purpose. We also learn here that, for Gersonides, no prophet can perform miracles greater than those of Moses. Last, but not least important, Gersonides explicitly states here that the Active Intellect is the author of miracles.24 This, then, is the account of Joshua’s miracle which Arama so disdainfully rejects, saying that it and the exegesis which supports it are the product of imagination and empty ideas. He compares Gersonides unfavorably with Maimonides who, he says, “did not minimize this miracle, did not doubt it at 24 Further on miracles, see above, chs. 3 and 4.

311

GERSONIDES AND HIS CULTURED DESPISERS: ARAMA AND ABRAVANEL

all, and did not force the verses out of their simple meaning, as did Gersonides” (AY, 13, p. 98a). Arama goes on to point out that Gersonides (and Narboni,25 for whom he had little more respect) minimize man’s importance vis-a.-vis the heavenly bodies and are thus forced to explain away miracles which purport to show some human influence on them: However, the inner reason which moved these sages to confuse the verses and to nullify the signs and demonstrations was that the image of man was diminished in their eyes and his form was despised before their faces. [This is seen] in their saying, “How is it possible that the superior heavenly entities and, a fortiori, the separate [intellects] which move them should be forced to submit to the needs of this low and unimportant being, whose beginning is lewdness and whose end is decay? Heaven forfend that their Creator would force the precious to submit to the common!”26

Arama argues against this opinion in Sermon 5, rejecting the claim that the heavenly bodies are living intelligences. Human beings, having souls, are superior to all the heavenly bodies, which are nothing more than lifeless matter. It was the influence of foreign philosophy, he says, which led thinkers like Maimonides to minimize humanity’s value and reinterpret the verses which show it to be the final purpose of creation.27 This, then, Arama asserts, is the real claim these philosophers are trying to defend, which they hide under their zeal to protect the honor of Moses and the special nature and stature of his prophecy. They argue, he says, in the following way: For even though he [Moses], may he rest in peace, was the master of all the prophets, it is not written about him that he altered the nature of created things

25 Moses ben Joshua of Narbonne (d. 1362). Born in Perpignan, Narboni, a philosopher and physician, is best known as the author of an Averroist commentary to Maimonides’ Guide of the Perplexed. 26 AY, sermon 13, p. 98a. 27 AY, sermon 5, pp. 40a-41a. On this point see Heller-Wilensky, “Arama on Creation,” esp. pp. 142-143. A case can be made that Arama (and Abravanel after him) was unfair to Gersonides; see my comments at the end of ch. 2 above.

312

CHAPTER THIRTEEN

except on the earth below.... And how can it be believed that his disciples and the disciples of his disciples should ascend to heaven with the degree of their accomplishment? ... the Torah said: “And there hath not arisen a prophet since in Israel like unto Moses whom the Lord knew face to face, in all the signs, etc.” [Dt. 34:10]. So how can it be accepted that the prophets who came after him increased in stature [enough] to do wonderful miracles beyond his?28

But, Arama argues, this jealousy for the honor of Moses, tendentious as it is, is also Scripturally fallacious. Moses’ greatness consisted, first, in his speaking with God, “face to face,” and second, in his certitude that the miracles for which he prayed would be performed. No other prophet could be certain of this. A prophet’s greatness was not dependent upon the miracles he performed. “The clear truth in this matter,” he says, “is that all the prophets used whatever sign and demonstration was necessary for the hour.” Further, he denies the assumption that “miracles done with respect to the heavenly bodies are of greater value than those done with respect to sublunar existences. We have no guarantee for the truth of this, and there is much plausibility in the opposite [claim].” Arama concludes by wondering why it is that these philosophers are willing to accept the creation of the world and God’s revelation on Sinai while questioning such relatively minor acts as stopping or reversing the sun (p. 100a). Arama’s rejection of Gersonides’ account of the miracle at Gibeon is the most detailed critique of Gersonides in the Akedah.29 It is repeated and amplified by Isaac Abravanel, to whose criticism we now turn, after noting that from the material described here we learn one more important fact about Gersonides’ understanding of miracles, namely, that the magnitude of a prophet’s miracles is directly proportionate to the level of his prophecy, that is to say, to the level of his conjunction with the Active Intellect. Don Isaac ben Judah Abravanel is one of medieval Jewry’s most celebrated figures. Born in Lisbon in 1437, the son of the Treasurer of Portugal (Dom 28 AY, sermon 13, p. 98b. 29 But it is, of course, not the only one. In Sermon 19, for example, Arama criticizes Gersonides’ account of God’s knowledge of particulars. In Sermon 60 he criticizes some of Gersonides’ attempts to explain the commandments. In this chapter I restrict my discussion to Arama’s criticism of Gersonides’ account of miracles, since it is that criticism which is continued and amplified by Abravanel.

313

GERSONIDES AND HIS CULTURED DESPISERS: ARAMA AND ABRAVANEL

Judah ben Samuel Abravanel), he died in Venice in 1508. He was the father of Judah Abravanel (c. 1460-1523), known as Leone Ebreo, the author of the Dialoghi di Amore. He is known as a statesman, financier, exegete, and philosopher. As a philosopher he took a strong stand as a defender of the orthodoxy of his day and as such often criticized both Maimonides and Gersonides.30 Although Abravanel mentions Gersonides critically in a wide variety of places in his works,31 only two extended discussions of Gersonides’ ideas survive, and both deal with the same issue: Gersonides’ account of the miracle in Joshua 10. The passages are found in Abravanel’s own commentary to Joshua and in Treatise X, Chapter 9, of Mifalot Elohim (Deeds of God) (Venice, 1592).32 The two passages are complementary rather than redundant, and both show the strong influence of Isaac Arama.33 In the Joshua commentary Abravanel attacks Gersonides’ claim that it is the Active Intellect, not God, which is the immediate cause of miracles. In the passage in his Mifalot Elohim he refutes Gersonides’ five arguments (from Milhamot, VI.ii.12) defending his interpretation of Joshua’s miracle. As we noted above, Gersonides argues in the Milhamot (VI.ii.10) that it is the Active Intellect, not God, which is the author of miracles. Gersonides begins his discussion there by pointing out that miracles must have a cause as opposed to being chance occurrences, since, among other reasons, they are often accompanied by an announcement to a prophet about them. He goes on to point out that the doer of miracles must be familiar with the laws (nomos) governing created things and their ordering since it is only with respect to them that miracles occur. It follows from this, he says, that the author of miracles can only be God, the Active Intellect, or the prophet himself, but no 30 On Abravanel’s conflicted attitude towards Maimonides, see Hoch and Kellner, “Voice” and the sources cited there. 31 A search for the term “Ralbag” in the Responsa Project Database of Abravanel’s commentary on the Torah, for example, resulted in 220 hits. 32 This work has been republished twice in recent years: Jerusalem, 1988 and Jerusalem, 1993 (Ozar ha-Poskim). Citations here will be to the 1592 and 1988 editions. 33 Abravanel was strongly influenced by Arama, borrowing many ideas from him. Indeed, he even lifted entire passages from Arama’s writings and included them in his own without citing their source. Arama’s son Meir (c. 1460-1545) accused Abravanel of plagiarizing his father’s works. For discussion of this issue, with references to the literature on it, see Lawee, “Isaac Abarbanel,” pp. 228-229.

314

CHAPTER THIRTEEN

other (p. 444). First, the working (havayah) of miracles is similar to the willful act of creation which is attributed to God. Second, since God Himself set up the present order of nature, it would not be appropriate for any other being to rearrange it, just as the officers of a great king do not alter his laws. Third, the Bible itself attributes all miracles to God. Finally, a number of the sages assert that God is the doer of miracles (p. 445). Gersonides follows this discussion with arguments purporting to prove that it is the Active Intellect which is the doer of miracles. Citing arguments from Book II of the Milhamot, he asserts that prophetic information concerning these miracles comes from the Active Intellect, which must, therefore, know about them.34 That being so, it is not possible that God be the doer of miracles: if we attributed these miracles to God, describing them as examples of willful divine action, there is no way that information about them could be conveyed to the Active Intellect. This follows from the fact that their occurrence would be governed by no law (nomos) or order (siddur), and the separate intellects, of which the Active Intellect is one, act only in accord with their knowledge of general orderings. Thus, if the Active Intellect knows about the miracles, so to speak (and this, Gersonides maintains, was established in Book II), it is reasonable to assume that it does them. We have already argued, he continues, that there is a defined law governing miracles, for without it predictions concerning them would be impossible.35 From this it follows, though Gersonides fails to make this explicit, that the Active Intellect could know miracles and that they are not dependent simply upon the will of God. Gersonides’ argument to this point can be summarized in the following way. It has been established that the Active Intellect announces the advent of a miracle to the prophet. Thus, miracles must occur in accord with some defined law and are governed by some general ordering. Otherwise the Active Intellect could not know about them. But if there is some “natural law of miracles,”36 then they are not simply acts of willful divine intervention in the affairs of the sublunar world. The claim that miracles occur in accord with some law is buttressed by another argument. It is impossible, Gersonides says, 34 Milhamot, II.3, pp. 98-101. 35 Ibid., pp. 93-98. 36 I owe this phrase to Guttmann, Philosophies, p. 248.

315

GERSONIDES AND HIS CULTURED DESPISERS: ARAMA AND ABRAVANEL

“that a separate intellect could have knowledge of a particular insofar as it is a particular [e.g., a miracle ungoverned by a general law], and thus it is clear that miracles have a general law.” Predictions concerning these miracles, he says, reach the prophet in the way in which all particular information is received from the Active Intellect, as was also explained in Book II.37 Further, miracles occur in this world only with respect to entities which can be acted upon by the Active Intellect. Thus, for example, you will find no instance –since the creation of the world– of the miraculous creation of a new star in the heavens. Gersonides’ last argument supporting his contention that the Active Intellect is the doer of miracles relates to the issue of providence. Miracles occur only as examples of divine providence and grace. Since the Active Intellect is the immediate source of providence in this world, it is appropriate that this form of providence be attributed to it (pp. 445-446; Wars, p. 476). Leaving aside those points which seem to indicate that the prophets themselves work miracles, we can turn to Gersonides’ rejection of the claim that they are done by God. He supports this rejection with a large number of arguments, some of which shed further light on his attitude towards miracles. If God were the author of miracles, he says, the activity of the Active Intellect in this world would be more honorable (yoter nekhbad) than that of God. This is so because the activity of the Active Intellect would be constantly and uninterruptedly good in itself, while some of God’s activity would not be good in itself. Turning a staff into a snake is not intrinsically good, even though it is instrumentally good in that it causes people to have faith in God. So also, making a prophet’s hand leprous is not good in itself, is indeed bad in itself, even though it happens to have good consequences. Similarly, if God did the miracles then His activity in this world would be less perfect than that of the Active Intellect since it would be sporadic while the Active Intellect’s activity would continue uniformly and uninterruptedly. Further, if God were the doer of miracles, it would not be possible that predictions concerning these miracles could be provided to the prophets, as Gersonides explained before. Very important for our purposes is the following argument relating to the possibility of new knowledge and desire in God: if we insist that God is the doer of miracles, we have to say either that new desires and knowledge oc37 Milhamot, II.6, p. 105.

316

CHAPTER THIRTEEN

cur in God when He decides to perform the miracles, which is impossible, or that the occurrence of each miracle is defined and ordered by God’s will antecedently to the occurrence of any of them (i.e., before creation). This latter opinion, Gersonides says, was held by some of the Talmudic rabbis who said that God set certain conditions on the laws of nature at the time of creation.38 But there are a number of problems with this opinion. For one thing, miracles could occur independently of prophets; this contradicts well-known facts.39 Further, this opinion leads to a dilemma, neither horn of which can be accepted: either we have to say that the miracles were predetermined without regard to the special ends which they did in fact accomplish, such accomplishments being merely accidental, or we have to say that they were predetermined to accomplish certain ends. In the first case we are attributing to God actions without any particular end, which is ridiculous. It is also not possible that all the miracles would have worked out as well as they did if they occurred in this haphazard fashion. The problem with the second case is that it makes it impossible for there to be contingent events (pp. 447-448; Wars, pp. 478-480). Gersonides goes on to show that the arguments adduced in favor of the contention that God is the author of miracles are not conclusive. First, miracles are not really similar to creation, in that they affect only part of the world, not all of it, and relate only to already existent entities. Second, the working of miracles need not be a violation of God’s ordering but could be a part of it (since they are governed by defined laws and occur in accord with general orderings). Third, the Scriptural verses which attribute miracles to God need not be interpreted as making God the “immediate cause” (ha-poel ha-karov) of the miracles, since Scripture attributes many things to God of which He is only the ultimate, but not direct, cause (p. 450). These passages shed further important light on Gersonides’ theory of miracles. He argues here that the author of miracles is the Active Intellect, not God, and that miracles are neither haphazard, chance occurrences, nor acts dependent upon the specific will of God, but events which, like all other natural events, are governed by a law of their own. Miracles are always associated with the ministry of some prophet, occur only in the sublunar world (since their author is the Active Intellect 38 See Genesis Rabbah V.5. 39 See above, ch. 3, note 71.

317

GERSONIDES AND HIS CULTURED DESPISERS: ARAMA AND ABRAVANEL

which can exert influence nowhere but in the sublunar world), and are examples of divine providence. In these passages, then, Gersonides sets forth and defends the claim that the Active Intellect is the immediate source of miracles. At the very beginning of his commentary on Joshua 10, Abravanel cites this opinion of Gersonides and summarizes it in the following way: Gersonides, in his Milhamot, VI.ii.10, said that the doer of all the miracles is the Active Intellect, not the Creator, blessed be He. He argued for this from the fact that it is the Active Intellect which announces these miracles to the prophet. The Active Intellect could not make these announcements unless it worked the miracles. He further argued from the fact that [if God were the immediate cause of miracles] there would be change and new knowledge in Him. He also argued that if God worked the miracles the natural activity of the Active Intellect would be more perfect and regular than the activity of God, since God’s miraculous activity would be irregular and [thus] lacking in perfection. He also said that the Active Intellect [with respect to its knowledge of the order of things in this world] is appropriately the doer of miracles, just as all natural activity is appropriate to it.40

After raising a number of other issues with respect to the miracle, and after examining the opinions of a number of Talmudic rabbis, Abravanel returns to the issue of the Active Intellect in the second iyyun (disquisition) of his commentary on this chapter. He says: The later Ishmaelite scholars have fallen into the opinion that there exists an Active Intellect which gives forms.41 Many scholars from among our people have been drawn after them. This has truthfully become an obstacle and a stone of stumbling [after Is. 8:14] before the Children of Israel, for they believed that it gives forms and the intellectual soul, and they have forgotten the Rock of their childhood, Who said, For the spirit which enwrappeth itself is from Me and the souls which I have made [Is. 57:16]. . . . They believed that it is the bundle of life [1 Sam. 25:29] and that the reward for souls is cleaving unto it after death. [They believed] that it is the guard and keeper of this world and they believed 40 Perush al Neviim Rishonim, p. 51. 41 See H. Goldstein, “Dator Formarum.”

318

CHAPTER THIRTEEN

that it emanated upon the prophets and caused them to prophesy. This opinion was forced upon them because they thought that prophecy was a natural thing,42 thus contradicting the words of the prophet Isaiah, peace upon him . . . [who, at 42:5-6] explained that the God who created heaven and earth, and gives souls, speaks to prophets and uses them to perfect the people . . . and even though He may occasionally do this through an intermediary, we cannot escape [the fact] that prophecy comes from Him, may He be blessed, in a simple individual act of willing, miraculously.... They further believed [the Active Intellect] to be the doer of all the miracles and that the Creator, blessed be He, did not do them ... (p. 53).

Abravanel goes on to argue that it is appropriate that God be the direct cause of miracles, since they are a form of willful creation which is unique to Him and not part of the accustomed order of nature. That order is governed by the stars and all the host of heaven or by the Active Intellect “according to those who believe in it.”43 Abravanel continues with a long, ad hominem attack on those who confuse the “living God” with the Active Intellect, beginning with the expostulation, “Woe to the ears which hear this!” (p. 53). He mentions a few thinkers by name, among them Narboni, ibn Caspi,44 and Albalag,45 but singles out Gersonides for special attention: But why should I continue to bring their names to my lips when a book written by my antagonist [ish rivi], Gersonides, will testify to this, his lips clearly uttering his thoughts. See his opinion concerning the creation of the world, where 42 Abravanel is referring here to what Maimonides (Guide, II. 32) called the “philosophic” conception of prophecy, which maintains that prophecy “is a certain perfection in the nature of man.” 43 P. 53. This raises an interesting point. Abravanel seems to be indicating here that he himself does not admit to the existence the Active Intellect. Yet it is clear from his commentary to the Guide (see Hoch and Kellner, “Voice”) that it is not the Active Intellect itself to which he objects but the various activities attributed to it as opposed to God. 44 Joseph ben Abba Mari ibn Caspi (1279-1340). He was a prolific author of philosophical, exegetical, and grammatical works. On ibn Caspi see Mesch, Caspi and Herring, Kaspi. For reasons which I cannot fathom, Bar Ilan University’s Mikra’ot ha-Gedolot ha-Keter includes Caspi’s singularly unilluminating commentary on the earlier prophets. 45 Isaac Albalag was a thirteenth-century Spanish Jewish Aristotelian, strongly influenced by Averroes. On Albalag, see Vajda, Isaac Albalag.

319

GERSONIDES AND HIS CULTURED DESPISERS: ARAMA AND ABRAVANEL

he wrote that a formless matter pre-existed the world. See his words concerning the soul, prophecy, and the signs and wonders. It is forbidden to listen to them, let alone believe in them (p. 54).

Abravanel then refers the reader to his composition Mahazeh Shaddai (Vision of God), in which he refutes those philosophic opinions to which he objects.46 In that book he provides an extensive discussion of the Active Intellect and confronts Gersonides directly and explicitly. But, he says, his anger here will not allow him to avoid mentioning, at least briefly, some of the arguments he adduces in that book. He argues there that only God could perform miracles, since it was He who created the natural things in the world and it is only He who can alter their roles. Second, it is not the Active Intellect, he maintains, but God Who speaks to the prophet, allowing him to predict miracles. Even if this information is conveyed through intermediaries, it is still from God and it is still He Who works the miracles. Next, Abravanel attacks Gersonides’ argument that if God did the miracles there would have to be change in Him. If we can ascribe the creation of the world to God, he says, we should be able to ascribe miracles to Him. “Also, there is no new desire in this since God, blessed be He, always desires improvement; when the natural order opposes this, He modifies it to the end of making it better and more perfect, which end He always knows and desires” (p. 54). Abravanel’s last argument in this section is a refutation, he claims, of Gersonides’ assertion that if God performed miracles directly the activity of the Active Intellect would be more perfect than His: “[this argument is] vanity and striving after wind [Eccl. 2:17] because ordered natural activity and miraculous activity all come from God; He maintains the natural [order] through intermediaries in a defined order which they cannot change, while He does the miraculous activity Himself. That is, He explicitly commands that it be done, because the intermediaries cannot do anything except that which is ordered” (p. 54). It is now evident that Abravanel is working here with a definition of miracles very different from the one being used by Gersonides. For Abravanel, a 46 This book is unfortunately lost. In fact, the manuscript was destroyed during Abravanel’s own lifetime. See Netanyahu, Abravanel, pp. 24, 85, 272.

320

CHAPTER THIRTEEN

miracle is an event which occurs outside of the natural order of creation by virtue of an explicit command of God. The implications of this difference of opinion will be examined below, after I describe Abravanel’s second extended critique of Gersonides, that found in his Mifalot Elohim. It is noteworthy, even strange, that his primary arguments against Gersonides’ account of the miracle in Joshua 10 are not given in his own commentary to the passage, but in an independent philosophical work the purpose of which was to prove the power of God, especially with reference to the redemption.47 Equally strange, his criticism of Gersonides’ account of the Active Intellect (on the very grounds that it in effect minimizes God’s power to act in this world) is given not in the Mifalot but in Abravanel’s commentary to Joshua. In the Mifalot Abravanel summarizes and criticizes the account of the miracle in Joshua 10 given in the Milhamot (VI.ii.12). His discussion may be roughly divided into two parts. In the first he presents Biblical and rabbinic citations supporting the traditional understanding of the miracle. In the second part he responds to the five arguments which are adduced by Gersonides in support of his interpretation of the miracle. This is the passage that interests us here. Abravanel first turns his attention to Gersonides’ assertion that since it is the Active Intellect which is the cause of miracles, the sun could not have stopped, since the Active Intellect is an effect of the heavenly bodies and could not work miracles upon them (Milhamot, VI, ii, 12, p. 456). He denies that the worker of miracles is Gersonides’ Active Intellect and asserts that it is rather “God, may He be exalted, for He alone does great wonders. Since He made the heavens in wisdom and made the great lights, it is appropriate that He make signs and wonders in the heavens and upon the earth, for it is all the work of His hands, like [unformed] material in the hands of the craftsman ...” (p. 82d/253). He goes on to cite various Biblical verses which support this view. Abravanel next discusses Gersonides’ claim that the sun could not have stopped, since that would involve serious deleterious consequences for the sublunar world. This would conflict with the general aim of all miracles (as a form of providence), namely, human betterment. Abravanel argues that Gersonides would be correct if this “confusion” of the heavenly bodies had oc47 Netanyahu, Abravanel, p. 80.

321

GERSONIDES AND HIS CULTURED DESPISERS: ARAMA AND ABRAVANEL

curred through some natural event or accident. But this interruption of the natural order was miraculous, part of the miracle being that it involved no harmful consequences. Further, Joshua did not pray simply for the stopping or slowing of the sun but for a simultaneous interruption in the movement of all the heavenly bodies. Thus, their relative positions were unchanged and no harm could follow (p. 83a/254). Abravanel then goes on to discuss Gersonides’ fourth argument,48 that there could be no particular advantage to the miracle as traditionally understood, since there is no record of its having been used as an example to direct men to a proper understanding and fear of God. “The advantage of this miracle,” Abravanel writes in response, “is the [same] purpose and advantage which accrues from the other wonders; to help God’s world acquire faith in His providence and there is no doubt that the prophets and sages of that generation used this to direct other men [to the truth].” He points out that are passages in the Talmud which maintain that this miracle was seen from one end of the world to the other and that “nations heard and trembled.” At this point Abravanel provides his own exegesis of the verses in question, disputing that of Gersonides and defending the traditionalist stance. This precedes his last and longest argument, in which he disputes Gersonides’ claim that the miracle could not have involved the stopping of the sun because that would make it a greater miracle than any performed by Moses (p. 83b/254). Abravanel’s basic contention in this passage is that the miracles associated with a prophet are irrelevant to the degree of his prophecy and that they are done in accord with the needs of the hour. In making this argument he also contends that miracles can be worked on any and all created existents, not just those found in the sublunar world. He adduces evidence to the effect that Moses even worked miracles with respect to the shekhinah (divine presence). “Now, therefore,” he concludes, Let the mouths of liars be shut [Ps. 63:12]. For the hand of God is upon all degrees of created things to do among them miracles and wonders according to His will. Know from this that Moses performed miracles and wonders with 48 The apparent haste with which Abravanel composed his works is indicated by the fact that he takes up Gersonides’ arguments out of order, without seeming to be aware of that fact.

322

CHAPTER THIRTEEN

respect to all the degrees of created things, beyond number, such as you will not find with any other prophet from among the prophets, fulfilling what the Torah said: And there hath not arisen a prophet since in Israe1like Moses ... in all the signs ... [Dt. 34:10]. It is thus clear that miracles may be performed with respect to all that is created in the sublunar or heavenly worlds and with respect to the spiritual angels. This is what I wanted to clarify here (p. 85b/259).

In the Mifalot, then, Abravanel reaffirms his claim that God, not the Active Intellect, is the author of miracles. Miracles are a type of creation, appropriate only to the Creator Himself. We see that he agrees with Gersonides in maintaining that the aim of all miracles is to direct men to the truth, while sharply disagreeing with him on the matter of relating the level of prophecy to the magnitude of the miracles a prophet performs and on the matter of limiting the scope of miraculous activity to the sublunar world. To recapitulate, Abravanel’s criticisms of Gersonides in the commentary and in the Mifalot fall into two groups, those aimed at Gersonides’ account of the Active Intellect, and those aimed at his explanation of the miracle in Joshua 10. With respect to the first group, Abravanel’s arguments follow from his insistence that God acts directly and willfully in this world. Following Arama he asks Gersonides: “If you can accept God’s miraculous activity at creation and Sinai, why can’t you accept His other miracles?” This latter question is, among all the criticisms made by Arama and Abravanel, seemingly the hardest for Gersonides to respond to. Indeed, on the face of it, it seems to strike at the very heart of Gersonides’ attempted synthesis between Judaism and medieval Aristotelianism. To understand why, we must briefly examine a critical passage in the Guide of the Perplexed. Generally speaking, Maimonides holds that miracles are necessary to attest to the truth of revelation and, more important, to support the claim that God guides men by giving them the Torah. The fact that miracles occur refutes the assumption, which follows from the hypothesis of the world’s eternity, that the world and its laws emanate from God by necessity. The fact that miracles occur demonstrates that God can freely interrupt the course of nature. This is crucial to any reasonable understanding of law and of reward and punishment. Maimonides says: “the belief in eternity the way Aristotle sees it ... de323

GERSONIDES AND HIS CULTURED DESPISERS: ARAMA AND ABRAVANEL

stroys the law in its very principle, necessarily gives the lie to every miracle, and reduces to inanity all the hopes and threats that the Law has held out.”49 We may summarize Maimonides’ argument in the following way: the fact of miracles proves creation; creation in turn is a necessary precondition for the possibility of revelation. In particular, he says: Know that with a belief in the creation of the world in time, all the miracles become possible, and all questions that may be asked on the subject [about God’s purpose in creation and revelation] vanish ... the answer to all these questions would be that it would be said: He wanted it this way, or His wisdom required it in this way. And just as He brought the world into existence, having the form it has, when He wanted to, without our knowing His will with regard to this or in what respect there was wisdom in His particularizing the forms of the world at the time of its creation – in the same way we do not know His will or the exigency of His wisdom that caused all the matters, about which questions have been posed above, to be particularized. If, however, someone says that the world is as it is in virtue of necessity, it would be a necessary obligation to ask all those questions; and there would be no way out of them except philosophers would succeed in demonstrating eternity as Aristotle understands it, the Law as a whole would become void, and a shift to other opinions would take place. I have explained to you that everything is bound up with this problem. Know this.50

With this passage from the Guide in mind we can now attempt to understand a very puzzling fact. Both Isaac Abravanel and Isaac Arama demonstrate considerable familiarity with the corpus of Gersonides’ Jewish-philosophic writings contained in his Bible commentaries and in the Milhamot. Both are concerned to defend what they understand as traditional orthodoxy against the attacks of Gersonides and to condemn him for deviations from that orthodoxy. Both choose to attack him at greatest length on the same point: his account of the miracle in Joshua 10. The question which begs to be answered here is why they criticize this aspect of Gersonides’ thought in particular.

49 Guide II. 25, p. 329. 50 Ibid.

324

CHAPTER THIRTEEN

The problem becomes more complicated when one considers the fact that Gersonides’ account of the miracle in Joshua 10 can reasonably be construed as being among the least of his heterodox statements. His account of God’s knowledge of particulars in Book III of the Milhamot concludes that God does not know particulars as such. Surely that claim contradicts important elements of the Jewish tradition more directly and more fundamentally than Gersonides’ rationalistic account of the miracle at Gibeon. Similarly, Gersonides’ accounts of providence and of prophecy would seem to pose greater problems for a defender of orthodoxy than his account of this miracle. One may further wonder why they object to his account of the miracle at all. After all, Gersonides nowhere denies that the miracle took place. He merely redescribes the way in which he understands the miracle really to have taken place. Gersonides expressly maintains that a miracle occurred at Gibeon: the speed with which the Israelite nation avenged itself upon its enemies and the rocks falling from heaven were miraculous occurrences. He simply denies that the sun stood still opposite Gibeon and that the moon stayed over the Valley of Ayalon. Not only that, but Gersonides adduces support from the verses themselves for his position. His description of the miracle thus appears to be positively innocent when compared with some of his other positions. I think that I can explain the strange decision to attack Gersonides for this of all his teachings after noting one more item. The program of Gersonides’ philosophy was to demonstrate the fundamental consistency of the Torah with the teachings of true philosophy as Gersonides understood them. This is basically what Maimonides had attempted in the Guide. Since the aim of this project is unrealizable –the teachings of the Torah and the teachings of Aristotle cannot be reconciled in every important issue– there are going to be points of strain and weakness in any edifice erected to achieve that aim. This is clear in the Guide at the places where Maimonides, whether wittingly or not,51 sacrifices a strict adherence to the teachings of philosophy in favor of Jewish orthodoxy. 51 Gersonides insists that the compromises are made wittingly. He strongly attacks Maimonides for succumbing to the “great pressure” put upon him by the Torah. See for example, Milhamot, III.3, p. 132 (Wars, pp. 107-108 ) and above, in the Introduction.

325

GERSONIDES AND HIS CULTURED DESPISERS: ARAMA AND ABRAVANEL

Now Gersonides’ Milhamot Adonai is a remarkable attempt to achieve this synthesis without any overt contradictions or inconsistencies. At points where Judaism seems to demand some divergence from the teachings of true speculative philosophy, Gersonides protects the synthesis by reinterpreting Judaism. This is nowhere clearer than in the final chapter of Book III, where he argues that his account of God’s knowledge of particulars is in perfect accord with the teachings of the Bible. Now, given the fact that Arama and Abravanel apparently accepted as true Maimonides’ contention that miracles are necessary to guarantee (willful) creation, which in turn is necessary for revelation to make any sense, and given the fact that they share the same definition of miracles (Abravanel making it explicitly, Arama implicitly), namely, that miracles are events which come about because of explicit commands of God in specific situations for specific purposes (“for the needs of the hour”), we can understand why Arama and Abravanel attack Gersonides on this point. Given their understanding of the situation, they must have thought that they had discovered a breakdown in the Gersonidean synthesis. Gersonides, they seem to be arguing, denies miracles but affirms creation; this is inconsistent! This, then, is the point of the question which both Arama and Abravanel ask of Gersonides: “If you can accept the miracles of creation and revelation, why can’t you accept the miracle of the sun standing still?” Put into other words, the question says that belief in creation and revelation is tantamount to affirming that God can affect the course of history through explicit commands in response to specific situations. This is the crux of the problem as Arama and Abravanel see it: as a good Aristotelian, as Maimonides has shown, Gersonides cannot accept the miracles of creation and revelation. As a good Jew he cannot reject them. So he tries to effect a compromise; he waters down every Biblical miracle to the point where it presents very few if any scientific (i.e., Aristotelian) problems, while retaining belief in creation and revelation. In effect, as Arama and Abravanel seem to understand him, Gersonides affirms the possibility of miracles (which Maimonides, they thought, had shown to be a theological necessity) by retaining belief in creation and revelation, while in effect denying the miraculous character of each recorded miracle. This then is the import of the Arama-Abravanel 326

CHAPTER THIRTEEN

question: if Gersonides is going to naturalize and rationalize the miracles, he should do the same to creation and revelation; if he is going to retain them, he should retain the miracles. These considerations help us to understand why Arama and Abravanel criticize Gersonides’ account of miracles. But why do they criticize the miracle of Joshua 10 in particular? That question is easily answered. To the best of my knowledge this miracle is the only one which Gersonides treats at such great length and in such great detail in both the commentary and the Milhamot. I think that there are further considerations, however, which help to explain why Abravanel in particular would attack this point. Isaac Abravanel lived during a period of what was then considered unparalleled trauma in the history of the Jewish people. It fell to Isaac Abravanel, through his messianic writings, to provide the ideological substratum upon which the Jewish people fashioned their defenses against the calamity. In the words of Benzion Netanyahu (p. 202): It was Abravanel who, with powers of imaginative thought perhaps incomparable in the entire messianic literature, restored Jewish faith in salvation, and thus not only demonstrated the worthwhileness of the Jewish struggle for survival in his own time, but also gave meaning and purpose to the entire historic course of the Jewish people.

It was Abravanel’s lifelong task to defend and explicate the idea of a speedy messianic redemption. This may account for the fervor with which he attacks Gersonides: it is not at all unlikely that he saw in the latter’s account of the miracle in Joshua 10 (an early example of God’s miraculous redemption of his people) the implicit denial that God had the power to bring about Israel’s salvation. If this suggestion is correct, then Abravanel saw in Gersonides a figure who denied, at least by implication, everything he was passionately concerned to prove. This suggestion is given further support in that it helps to explain an otherwise puzzling fact. I noted above that Abravanel’s criticism of Gersonides’ account of the miracle in Joshua 10 finds its most complete statement, not in his own commentary to Joshua but in his book Mifalot Elohim (Deeds of God). The aim of this book, as Netanyahu says (p. 80), “is to prove and expound the 327

GERSONIDES AND HIS CULTURED DESPISERS: ARAMA AND ABRAVANEL

principle of divine power. As in New Heavens [Shamayim Hadashim]so in the Deeds Abravanel sought to support his theory on the possibility of a divine, miraculous redemption.” Thus, it would seem that Abravanel attacked Gersonides so vehemently because he saw in Gersonides’ account of the miracle of Joshua 10 an implicit denial of the possibility of messianic redemption. It thus made excellent sense for him to include an attack on that position in a book in which he emphatically attempted to prove that just such redemption was bound to come. One final question remains. Were Arama and Abravanel correct? Did they indeed discover a fatal weakness in Gersonides’ synthesis between the God of Aristotle who knows and the God of Sinai Who loves and commands? On the basis of their own argument I do not think that they have succeeded in establishing the point. For the Arama-Abravanel argument as I have presented it here to succeed, Gersonides must, first, accept their definition of miracles and, second, accept Maimonides’ argument as described above. We have already noted that Gersonides does not accept the Arama definition of miracles. For Gersonides, miracles cannot be result of God’s direct activity in this world; God does not act directly in this world – the sublunar sphere is the province of the Active Intellect. Miracles cannot result from specific acts of divine will in particular circumstances, since that would involve change, new knowledge, and multiple acts of volition in God, all of which would deny divine unity. Miracles are not exceptions to the laws of nature but are, rather, governed by a natural law of their own. What, then, for Gersonides, does count as a miracle? Miracles are, minimally, unusual, wonderful events having great religious significant. This needs some unpacking. That Gersonides considers miracles to be wonderful events is shown by the term he uses most consistently to denote miracles, namely, nifla, “wonder.” By having great religious significance, I mean that Gersonides understands miracles to come about for one purpose only: to guide human beings to true belief. Such true belief involves actualization of one’s potential intellect, which in turn is the key to the only form of salvation there is, cleaving to the Active Intellect after death. That Gersonides 328

CHAPTER THIRTEEN

understands this to be the purpose of miracles is evidenced both by his terminology and by the question he asked of the traditional interpretation of the miracle at Gibeon: This stopping of the sun –if it occurred– would have no particular advantage for Israel or others. This is so because the Israelites believed in prophecy at that time, and we have not found that any of the other nations tried to turn to God, blessed be He, on account of this demonstration (Milhamot, VI.ii.12, p. 458; Wars, p. 494).

Further support is found again in Gersonides’ terminology: in addition to the word nifla, Gersonides uses the two Hebrew terms mofet (demonstration) and ot (sign) to denote miracle. Miracles are signs and demonstrations which lead to true belief.52 A number of things follow from Gersonides’ conception of miracles. Since miracles do not guarantee God’s ability to act willfully and decisively in this world, we do not have to say, with Maimonides, that miracles demonstrate the possibility of willful creation. Gersonides could further argue in response to the Arama-Abravanel attack that the issue of creation itself is irrelevant to the issue of revelation. This rejection of Maimonides’ central contention in the passage quoted above follows from Gersonides’ naturalistic account of Mosaic prophecy. Prophecy itself is a natural perfection of men.53 The revelation at Sinai was vouchsafed to a very special man in virtue of his superior capabilities, not because of some specific act of God’s will. All this being so, it is clear that on Gersonides’ own terms the Arama-Abravanel critique misses the mark. It is based on a definition of miracles which Gersonides rejects and on an argument of Maimonides which Gersonides denies. But the matter cannot rest here. There are indications that this answer 52 Noteworthy in this regard is the fact that, despite his extensive discussion of miracles and his emphatic affirmation that they occur, Gersonides nowhere explains the exact process by which they come about. On this, see Isaac Husik, “Gersonides,” p. 184. But he does make explicit what miracles are not. In Milhamot VI.ii.12, pp. 454-60, Gersonides tells us that miracles cannot effect permanent changes in the sublunar world, cannot cause self-contradictions, cannot alter the past, and cannot affect the heavenly bodies. 53 Given Gersonides misogyny (on which, see above, ch. 12), the gender-specific language here is appropriate.

329

GERSONIDES AND HIS CULTURED DESPISERS: ARAMA AND ABRAVANEL

is too facile and superficial. Gersonides may not be so easily rescued. This is true for three different reasons. First, the consequences of Gersonides’ position with respect to revelation as briefly described here are Jewishly difficult: to accept a naturalistic account of the revelation at Sinai (i.e., to adopt the view that Israel received the Torah simply because Moses happened to be a superior prophet and that the Torah consists of nothing more than aspects of divine knowledge translated into human terms) is to play havoc with any construal of the Torah as command and is to make any but a totally mechanistic view of reward and punishment impossible (since God will have no occasion to punish deviations from His will, retribution turns out to be little more than the “just deserts” of someone who refuses to heed what is, in effect, the “advice” of the Active Intellect). Thus, if Gersonides preserves the consistency of his system at this juncture, it is only at the expense, I would suggest, of keeping faith with important elements of traditional Jewish belief. Second, Gersonides himself retreats from his strictly naturalistic account of Mosaic Prophecy. In the Milhamot (II.6, pp. 110-111) Gersonides explains that Moses’ ability to receive emanations from the Active Intellect was absolutely perfected. That explained the special nature of his prophecy. But it does leave open the possibility that another person as well qualified as Moses might arise. That would destroy the immutability of the Torah. In apparent response to this problem, Gersonides asserts (in his Commentary to Dt. 34:10, to’elet 15) “There is no other who is equal to Moses in this matter. For his Torah prophecy is given in a wonderful way. No other prophet qua prophet has this ability, except for a miracle [pele]. For God, may He be exalted, has made it clear that it is not His will either to make another Torah, nor to add to or detract from this present Torah ever.” It would appear then that in this instance at least Gersonides would have to accept some specific divine intervention in a “miraculous” way in order to preserve what he considers to be an important teaching of Judaism (the immutability of the Torah). His consistency would appear to be in danger of breaking down here.54 Last, I would like to suggest that Gersonides himself hints that he doesn’t fully reject the Maimonidean connection between miracles and creation. He hints this with a curious juxtaposition; namely, the only two subjects discussed 54 The point is argued in ch. 2 above.

330

CHAPTER THIRTEEN

in the sixth book of the Milhamot are creation and miracles. One has to ask why he treats them together in this way if they do not stand in some important logical relation to each other. After all, it would have made excellent sense, in terms of the architectonic of the Milhamot, to have discussed miracles in Book II, in which Gersonides explains prophecy, since he maintains that miracles are almost always associated with prophets. Failing that, since miracles occur as manifestations of divine providence, they could have easily been discussed in Book IV. I think that Gersonides was too careful a writer to have haphazardly appended his discussion of miracles to the end of the book for no other reason than convenience. Gersonides himself answers this question. He asserts that miracles are a form of generation “like creation,”55 thus accounting for his otherwise strange juxtaposition of miracles and creation in Book VI. But, more important, he writes: it does not follow from the [fact of] miracles that the world was created ex nihilo, as the Master and Guide [Maimonides] explained, [saying] that this was what forced him to believe in creation, for, if it was not necessary that we believe in miracles, it would be easy for us to explain what the Torah says regarding creation in accord with the opinion of the Philosopher.56

The implication of these passages is that while creation ex nihilo does not follow necessarily from the fact of miracles, the fact of creation itself –which, for Gersonides, was willful57– does. But if Gersonides is trying to make the Maimonidean connection between miracles guaranteeing willful creation, then perhaps the Arama-Abravanel argument is right after all: Gersonides’ miracles, not demanding specific, willful, divine intervention, do not turn the trick he needs in this instance. These three facts would seem to indicate that there is a definite tension here in the system of Gersonides on the issue of miracles and that he was pulled in two directions at once by the Aristotelian need to reject the possibility of miracles as events not governed by natural laws on the one hand and by the 55 Milhamot, VI.ii.9, p. 441 (Wars, p. 470). See also the commentary on Genesis, p. 9a/20/31. 56 Milhamot, VI.ii.1, p. 419 (Wars, p. 428). 57 See Milhamot, VI.ii.8, esp. pp. 428, 429, 433, and 438 (Wars, pp. 449-450, 457, and 462)

331

GERSONIDES AND HIS CULTURED DESPISERS: ARAMA AND ABRAVANEL

Jewish need to preserve the possibility of God’s commanding obedience to His will on the other hand. For all his subtlety and sophistication, there is thus good reason to believe that Gersonides could not consistently and simultaneously dance at both these weddings.58

58 If these final suggestions are correct, they provide some substantiation of an interesting thesis originally proposed by Schwarzschild in “Lure,” in which he asserts that the peculiarly Jewish element of medieval Jewish philosophy was its insistence on preserving the possibility of God’s will manifesting itself in the world, transcending natural causation. Schwarzschild goes on to assert (following Hermann Cohen) that it is this element of divine will active in the world which makes moral behavior possible. Gersonides’ admission of the special miraculous nature of revelation, and his seeming acceptance of the Maimonidean linkage of miracles-creation-revelation, would seem to be a striking confirmation of at least part Schwarzchild’s thesis. Given his continuing impact on my life and work, it is fitting that this book end with a reference to Steven Schwarzschild.

332

AFTERWORD

Personal Reflections

L

et us engage in a thought experiment. What would Judaism look like today had Maimonides not lived? Had he not created the first systematic and comprehensive code of Jewish law (Mishneh Torah), would his successors in that project, R. Jacob ben Asher, author of the Arba’ah Turim, and R. Joseph Karo, author of the Shulhan Arukh, have had the vision and courage to embark on what would have been, if not for Maimonides, a revolutionary innovation? Had Maimonides not placed Judaism on a firm dogmatic footing (with his ‘Thirteen Principles’), would it be possible to speak of Jewish orthodoxy (orthos + doxos = straight beliefs) in any technical sense of the term? Had not Maimonides thrown the massive weight of his considerable authority behind the project of integrating science and Judaism (in his Guide of the Perplexed) how much room would the Jewish world have made for rationally oriented Jews in the Middle Ages and today? Had not Maimonides presented the Jewish world with an alternative to Kabbalah, would all Jews today embrace various offshoots of Kabbalistic Judaism? (Alternatively, if Moshe Idel is correct, and Kabbalah “went public” in response to Maimonides, would the Jewish world be much less mystically oriented than it is today?) Finally, had Maimonides not enunciated a universalist vision of Judaism would almost all Jews today be even more particularist than they are? Obviously there are no answers to these questions. I only raise them to emphasize how important Maimonides has been in the shaping of Judaism 333

PERSONAL REFLECTIONS

as we know it and in order to contrast him to Gersonides. Had Gersonides not lived is there any way in which Judaism today would look different than it did? I cannot think of any. There are, I think two reasons for this. First, there were precisely four figures ordinarily considered to be medieval Jewish philosophers who were also, so far as we know, Talmudists of the first-rank: Sa’adia Gaon, Maimonides, Gersonides, and Hasdai Crescas. Sa’adia and Maimonides are, to put it mildly, well-known in the Jewish world, Gersonides and Crescas almost not at all. The reason for this is obvious: both Gersonides and Crescas planned to write substantial halakhic works, but died before they could accomplish their aims. Gersonides wrote the commentaries on which his reputation in the traditional world is based, but the commentary on the Torah survived into modernity in rare editions, editions in which much of the halakhic material did not in any event appear. In brief, the rabbinic reputations of Sa’adia and Maimonides made their philosophic writings kosher, as it were. But Gersonides and Crescas had no such rabbinic reputations. Second, Crescas’ philosophy, difficult as it is, was designed to save Judaism from Maimonides’ radicalism. Gersonides’ philosophy, on the other hand, and speaking in the broadest possible terms, was largely designed to save Judaism from Maimonides’ conservatism. Crescas was destined to oblivion, but not to obloquy; Gersonides to both. What did Gersonides write that so offended later generations? God knows all that can be known, and knows it perfectly. What can be known, however, does not include what actually happens on earth, to whom and by whom. God has perfect knowledge of the formal structure of the cosmos, but not of individuals who are individuated by their materiality – i.e., you and me. God has perfect knowledge of the natural world which He created but humans can, thanks to the way God created them, exercise free choice. Most humans do not, but when they do, God cannot be aware of the choices and their outcomes. Just consider what this does to traditional religious views of providence, reward and punishment, and prayer. God created the universe, but out of a pre-existent uncreated matter, which stubbornly resists God’s not wholly successful attempt to impose order and goodness upon it. There is thus evil in the world, and it is not just an absence of good (as Maimonides and countless others would have us say) but real, thumping evil (even if controlled and 334

AFTERWORD

minimized by God to the greatest extent possible). Gersonides accepts as correct what Maimonides calls the philosophical conception of prophecy, which makes prophets into nothing other than “super-philosophers.” Some few humans can indeed achieve immortality, but in doing so must sacrifice their individuality – and how could it be otherwise, since what individuates us is our matter (which surely does not survive death)? I called this book Torah in the Observatory and I assume that many readers (if there are any still with me) will stop at this point and say, where is the Torah in all this? Let me give an example of how Gersonides might respond to such an accusation. If God knew what we actually do, free human choice would be destroyed, since divine knowledge of this sort must encompass what we have done, what we do, and what we will do. But, if there is no free human choice, the entire notion of commandment loses all meaning, and with it the possibility of Torah. Preserving Torah necessitates restricting the range of God’s knowledge. This is not a new problem, and Gersonides knew (and rejected) all the standard answers to it. I think that he would have been singularly unimpressed had someone told him, “But, Rabbi Levi, no one before you entertained such a notion and none of your contemporaries finds it acceptable!” He would have said that Abraham, Moses, and Solomon had certainly understood the world as he did (and, it is safe to say, he would have added: all the prophets and sages of Israel did as well). God endowed us with the ability to distinguish truth from falsity and we are expected to make full use of that divine endowment. If using this ability leads us to positions unacceptable to the mass of humanity (or to the mass of rabbis), why so much the worse for them. Loyalty to God and to God’s Torah demands nothing less. In our eyes, Gersonides was trying to square the circle: dressing Moses in the robes of Aristotle, or attaching Mosaic fringes to Aristotle’s toga. In Gersonides’ eyes, one God only created the cosmos, endowed humans with reason, and revealed the Torah to Moses. Accepting the divinity of the Torah and the rule of the intellect, he was led to the positions described and analyzed in this book. Conservative rabbinic figures today, when faced with a figure like Gersonides, have a number of options. Denial is not just a river in Egypt and it is a safe assumption that many will simply deny that Gersonides holds the posi335

tions attributed to him here. On the one hand, that job is made easier by the very traditional language found in his commentaries on the Torah (on which I commented in the Introduction to this book); on the other hand, Gersonides also speaks very, very clearly in many places (including his Bible commentaries) and pulls no punches in expressing his unusual positions, no matter how shocking they may be to (many or most) rabbinic ears. The case of Gersonides is complicated for such people in that his works are not part of the rabbinic syllabus: for eight hundred years rabbis have worked hard to domesticate Maimonides; no such work has been done on Gersonides. This last point brings up a second fallback position: Gersonides, it will be claimed, is unknown to the traditional Jewish world because God providentially made sure of that. Gersonides’ least objectionable commentaries were known, if little studied, while the more “dangerous” writings were simply unknown. This was no accident, such figures will tell us (as it was no accident that Meiri’s work was largely unknown until the twentieth century). That we now have access to Gersonides’ works does not mean that we should study them: if ignorance of his unusual positions was good enough for our sainted forbears, it should be good enough for us. But there is also a third approach: From my perspective, Gersonides is Jewishly important because he offers the example of an erudite and penetrating Talmudist unafraid to go where his search for scientific truth led him. Halevai vi-yirbu kemoto bi-Yisrael.

336

WORKS CITED Works by Gersonides:

I

published three bibliographical essays on Gersonides: “Rabbi Levi Ben Gerson: A Bibliographical Essay,” Studies in Bibliography and Booklore 12 (1979): 13-23; “Bibliographia Gersonideana,” in G. Freudenthal (ed.), Studies on Gersonides – A Fourteenth-Century Philosopher-Scientist (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1992): 367-414; and “Bibliographia Gersonideana 19922002,” Aleph 3 (2003): 343-374. It is the nature of the beast that bibliographies grow outdated (indeed, they are usually outdated before the ink dries) so I have not reproduced them in this volume. Milhamot Adonai (Wars of the Lord) was printed by the physician Jacob Marcaria in Riva di Trento, Northern Italy, in 1560.1This edition was photoduplicated without place or date (according to the catalogue of the University of Haifa library: in Jerusalem in the 1960’s). The Riva edition is available, in unsearchable pdf files, at ‘Seforim Online’ – http://www.seforimonline.org/ and at http://www.Hebrewbooks.org The Milhamot was printed again in Leipzig in 1866; this edition was reproduced in Berlin in 1923. Pages references to the Milhamot throughout this book will be to the Leipzig/Berlin edition. The latter is available at http://www.Hebrewbooks.org The text of Milhamot is found on DBS Corporation’s ‘ha-taklitor ha-torani’. Citations from the Milhamot will be to treatise, part, and chapter, followed by page references to the Leipzig edition (and to Feldman’s translation in parenthesis). Seymour Feldman translated the work in three volumes under the title Wars of the Lord (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society, 1984-1999). In most of the chapters of this book, translations from the Milhamot are mine; in some cases they are Feldman’s. In every case the sources are made clear. For the convenience 1

I own a copy of this edition, one of my prized possessions, thanks to the generosity of Mr. Jordan Cherrick of St. Louis, MO. On this edition, see the Introduction above.

337

WORKS CITED

of the reader, page references to Feldman’s translation are given in every instance. Vol. 1 contains Feldman’s introduction and treatise 1. Vol. 2 contains treatises 2, 3, and 4, while vol. 3 contains treatises 5 and 6. Feldman’s translation is a tour de force, making “Gersonides the Graceless” –as he might well be called– actually readable. That readability is occasionally purchased at the expense of literalness. In the present volume I need literalness more than elegance and I have therefore translated most of my citations from the Milhamot myself. Gersonides’ commentary on the Torah (Pentateuch) was published in Mantua (before 1480), Pesaro (1514), Venice (1547), and in Amsterdam (1724-27). A photo-duplicated version of the Venice edition (no place or date) was issued in two volumes under the title, Perush ha-Ralbag al ha-Torah (Ralbag’s Commentary on the Pentateuch). The commentary was edited by Ya’akov Levi and published in five volumes (beginning in 1992) by Mossad ha-Rav Kook in Jerusalem. A vastly superior edition is being published under the editorship of Baruch Braner and others (Ma’aleh Adumim: Ma’aliyot) beginning in 1993. As of this writing, Genesis, Exodus, Leviticus and Numbers have appeared in six volumes. The on-going edition of Mikra’ot Gedolot being published in RamatGan by Bar-Ilan University Press, Mikra’ot Gedolot Ha-Keter, also contains an edition of Gersonides on the Pentateuch. So far Genesis and the second half of Exodus have appeared. Page citations to the Commentary on the Torah will be as follows: Venice/Jerusalem/Ma’aleh Adumim. Gersonides’ commentaries on other books of the Bible have been published in a large variety of venues, including most editions of the Mikra’ot Gedolot Bible. Both ‘ha-taklitor ha-torani’ and Bar Ilan’s Responsa Project database include Joshua, Samuel, Kings, Proverbs, and Job. My edition of the Song of Songs commentary (Ramat-Gan: Bar Ilan University Press, 2001) is the only critical edition of any of his non-Pentateuchal commentaries. The commentary on Job was published in English translation by Jacob Lassen: The Commentary of Levi ben Gerson (Gersonides) on the Book of Job (New York: Bloch, 1946) and that of Song of Songs by me (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998). Page references to the Song of Songs commentary will be to my translation. Page references to the commentaries on Ecclesiastes and Esther will be to two editions of Gersonides’ Commentary on the Megillot: Koenigsburg, 1860 and Jerusalem: Mossad ha-Rav Kook, 2003, as follows: Koenigsburg/Jerusalem. 338

WORKS CITED

Works by Maimonides: Commentary on the Mishnah, ed. and trans. from Arabic J. Kafih, 6 vols. (Jerusalem: Mosad Harav Kook, 1963-67). Introductions to various parts translated into Hebrew by Yizhak Sheilat in: Hakdamot ha-Rambam le-Mishnah (Jerusalem: Ma’aliyot, 1992). Essay on Resurrection, in Crisis and Leadership: Epistles of Maimonides, edited by A. S. Halkin and David Hartman, 211-292 (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society, 1985). Ethical Writings of Maimonides, trans. Raymond Weiss and Charles Butterworth (New York: Dover, 1983). Guide of the Perplexed, English trans. Shlomo Pines (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963); Hebrew trans., J. Kafih (Jerusalem: Mosad Harav Kook, 1972); Hebrew trans., Michael Schwarz (Ramat Aviv: Tel Aviv University Press, 2002). Letter on Astrology, in Ralph Lerner, Maimonides’ Empire of Light: Popular Enlightenment in an Age of Belief (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000). Letters: Iggerot Ha-Rambam. Edited by J. Kafih. Jerusalem: Mossad ha-Rav Kook, 1972. Medical Aphorisms of Maimonides, translated and edited by F. Rosner and S. Muntner (New York: Yeshiva University Press, 1971). Mishneh Torah: The Book of Knowledge, trans. Moses Hyamson (Jerusalem: Feldheim, 1974). Book of Judges, trans. A. M. Hershman (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1949).

I have freely (and silently) emended both these translations.

339

WORKS CITED

A Abravanel, Mifalot

Abravanel, Isaac. Mifalot Elohim. Venice, 1592. Edited by Brachah Genut-Daror, Jerusalem: Reuven Mass, 1988.

Abravanel, Perush al Nevi’im Rishonim

Abravanel, Isaac. Perush al Nev’iim Rishonim. Tel Aviv: Torah va-Da’at, 1955/56.

Abravanel, Principles

Abravanel, Isaac. Principles of Faith. Translated by Menachem Kellner. London: Littman Library of Jewish Civilization, 1981.

Abravanel, Rosh Amanah

Abravanel, Isaac. Rosh Amanah. Edited by Menachem Kellner. Ramat-Gan: Bar-Ilan University Press, 1993.

Alaskhar, Responsa

Alashkar, Moses ben Isaac Responsa. Brooklyn, 2004.

Allen, “Plato”

Allen, Prudence. “Plato, Aristotle, and the Concept of Woman in Early Jewish Philosophy.” Florilegium 9 (1987): 89-110.

Altmann, “Judah Halevi’s”

Altmann, Alexander. “Judah Halevi’s Theory of Climates.” Aleph 5 (2005): 215-246.

Amram, Hebrew Books

Amram, David. The Makers of Hebrew Books in Italy. London: Holland Press, 1963.

Anatoli, Malmad

Anatoli, Jacob. Malmad Ha-Talmidim. Lyck: Mekitze Nirdamim, 1866.

Aquinas, Selected Political Writings

Aquinas, Thomas. Selected Political Writings. Edited by A.P. D’Entreves. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1951.

Arama, Akedat Yizhak

Arama, Isaac. Akedat Yizhak, 6 vols. 1974.

Aristotle, Complete Works

Aristotle. The Complete Works of Aristotle. Edited by Jonathan Barnes. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984.

Averroes, On Plato’s “Republic”

Averroes. On Plato’s “Republic”. Translated by Ralph Lerner. Ithaca Cornell University Press, 1974.

340

WORKS CITED

B Bechler, “The Methodological Basis”

Bechler, Zvi. “The Methodological Basis of Maimonides’ Attack on Aristotelian Physics.” Iyyun 17 (1966): 34-41 (Hebrew).

Benayahu, Ha-Defus

Benayahu, Meir. Ha-Defus Ha-Ivri Be-Cremona. Jerusalem: Machon Ben-Zvi and Mossad ha-Rav Kook, 1971.

Ben-Meir, “Gersonides’ Commentary on Ecclesiastes”

Ben-Meir, Ruth. “Gersonides’ Commentary on Ecclesiastes: Analysis and Text.” Ph.D. Hebrew University, Jerusalem, 1993 (Hebrew).

Ben-Shalom, “Communication”

Ben-Shalom, Ram. “Communication and Propaganda between Provence and Spain: The Controversy over Extreme Allegorizaton (1303-1306).” In Communication in the Jewish Diaspora: The Pre-Modern World, edited by Sophia Menache, 171-226. Leiden: Brill, 1996.

Berman, “Disciple”

Berman, Lawrence V. “Maimonides, the Disciple of Alfarabi.” Israel Oriental Studies 4 (1974): 154-78.

Berman, “ibn Bajjah”

Berman, Lawrence V. “Ibn Bajjah ve-ha-Rambam.” Ph.D. Hebrew University, Jerusalem, 1959.

Berman, “The Political Interpretation”

Berman, Lawrence V. “The Political Interpretation of the Maxim: The Purpose of Philosophy Is the Imitation of God.” Studia Islamica 15 (1961): 53-61.

Bettan, “Sermons”

Bettan, Israel. “The Sermons of Isaac Arama.” Hebrew Union College Annual 12-13 (1937-38): 583-364.

Bettan, Studies

Bettan, Israel. Studies in Jewish Preaching. Cincinnati: Hebrew Union College Press, 1939.

Bland, “Moses”

Bland, Kalman. “Moses and the Law According to Maimonides.” In Mystics, Philosophers, and Politicians: Essays in Jewish Intellectual History in Honor of Alexander Altmann, edited by Jehudah Reinharz and Daniel Swetschinski, 49-66. Durham: Duke University Press, 1982.

Bleich, Providence

Bleich, J. David. Providence in the Philosophy of Gersonides. New York: Ktav, 1973.

341

WORKS CITED Blidstein, Ekronot Medini’im

Blidstein, Ya’akov. Ekronot Mediniim Be-Mishnat HaRambam. 2nd ed. Ramat-Gan: Bar-Ilan University Press, 2001.

Bloch, “Hebrew Printing”

Bloch, Joshua. “Hebrew Printing in Riva di Trento.” In Hebrew Printing and Bibliography, edited by Charles Berlin, 89-110. New York: Ktav and New York Public Library, 1976.

Blumberg, “Alfarabi”

Blumberg, Zvi (Harry). “Alfarabi, Ibn Bajja, and Maimonides on the Governance of the Solitary Individual, Sources and Influences.” Sinai 78 (1976): 135-145 (Hebrew).

Blumenthal, Hoter

Blumenthal, David. The Commentary of R. Hoter Ben Shelomo to the Thirteen Principles of Maimonides. Leiden: Brill, 1974.

Borodowski, Abravanel on Miracles

Borodowski, Alfredo Fabio. Isaac Abravanel on Miracles, Creation, Prophecy, and Evil: The Tension between Medieval Jewish Philosophy and Biblical Commentary. New York: Peter Lang, 2003.

Braner, “Gersonides”

Braner, Barukh. “Gersonides’ Attitude Towards Maimonides’ Approach to the Enumeration of the Commandments.” In Iyyunim U-Beurim Be-Divrei HaRambam, edited by Elhanan Samet, 228-242. Ma’aleh Adumim: Ma’aliyot, 1999 (Hebrew). http://www.daat. ac.il:80/daat/kitveyet/maaliyot/yahaso-2.htm

Braner, “Introduction”

Braner, Baruch. “Introduction.” In Hamishah Humshei Torah Im Beurei Ha-Ralbag, edited by Baruch Braner and Eli Freiman, iii-xiii. Ma’aleh Adumim: Ma’aliyot, 1993 (Hebrew).

D Dahan, “Les traductions latines”

Dahan, Gilbert. “Les traductions latines médiévales des oeuvres de gersonide.” In Gersonide en son temps, edited by G. Dahan, 329-368. Paris and Louvain: Peeters, 1991.

Davidson, Abraham Shalom

Davidson, Herbert A. The Philosophy of Abraham Shalom: A Fifteenth Century Exposition and Defense of Maimonides. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1964.

Davidson, Alfarabi

Davidson, Herbert A. Alfarabi, Avicenna, and Averroes on Intellect. New York: Oxford University Press, 1992.

Davidson, “Material and Active Intellects”

Davidson, Herbert A. “Gersonides on the Material and Active Intellects.” In Studies on Gersonides: A FourteenthCentury Jewish Philosopher-Scientist, edited by Gad Freudenthal, 195-265. Leiden: Brill, 1992.

342

WORKS CITED Davidson, “Shemonah Peraqim”

Davidson, Herbert A. “Maimonides’ Shemonah Peraqim and Alfarabi’s Fusul Al-Madani.” Proceedings of the American Academy for Jewish Research 31 (1963): 33-50.

Davies, Torah

Davies, W. D. Torah in the Messianic Age and/or the Age to Come. Philadelphia: Society of Biblical Literature, 1952.

Diamond, Converts

Diamond, James. Converts, Heretics, and Lepers: Maimonides and the Outsider. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2007.

Diamond, “Failed Theodicy”

Diamond, James. “The Failed Theodicy of a Rabbinic Pariah: A Maimonidean Recasting of Elisha Ben Abuyah.” Jewish Studies Quarterly 9 (2002): 353-80.

Duhem, To Save the Phenomena

Duhem, Pierre. To Save the Phenomena: An Essay on the Idea of Physical Theory from Plato to Galileo. Translated by Edmund Doland and Chaninah Maschler. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969.

Duran, “Hakdamat Sefer Ma’aseh Ephod”

Duran, Profiat. “Introduction to Ma’aseh Ephod by Profiat Duran Edited by Dov Rappel.” Sinai 100 (1986-1987): 74995 (Hebrew).

Duran, Ohev Mishpat

Duran, Shimon ben Zemah. Ohev Mishpat. Venice, 1590 (Tel Aviv: Zion, 1971).

Duran, Responsa

Duran, Shimon ben Zemah. Sefer Tashbez. 2 vols. Edited by Yoel Katan. Sha’alvim: Yeshivat Sha’alvim, 1998-2002.

E Eisen, Job

Eisen, Robert. The Book of Job in Medieval Jewish Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004.

Eisen, Providence

Eisen, Robert. Gersonides on Providence, Covenant, and the Chosen People: A Study in Medieval Jewish Philosophy and Bible Commentary. Albany: SUNY Press, 1995.

Eisen, “Reason and Revelation”

Eisen, Robert. “Reason, Revelation, and the Fundamental Principles of Torah in Gersonides’ Thought.” PAAJR 57 (1991): 11-34.

Emery, The Jews of Perpignan

Emery, Richard W. The Jews of Perpignan in the Thirteenth Century: An Economic Study Based on Notarial Records. New York: Columbia University Press, 1959.

343

WORKS CITED

F Faur, “Maimonides on Imagination”

Faur, Jose. “Maimonides on Imagination: Towards a Theory of Jewish Aesthetics.” The Solomon Goldman Lectures 6 (1994): 89-104.

Feldman, “Gersonides and Biblical Exegesis”

Feldman, Seymour. “Gersonides and Biblical Exegesis.” In Wars of the Lord, Vol. 2, 213-47. Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society, 1987.

Feldman, “Gersonides on Conjunction”

Feldman, Seymour. “Gersonides on the Possibility of Conjunction with the Agent Intellect.” AJS Review 3 (1978): 99-120.

Feldman, “Gersonides’ Proofs”

Feldman, Seymour. “Gersonides’ Proofs for the Creation of the Universe.” Proceedings of the American Academy for Jewish Research 35 (1967): 113-37.

Feldman, Philosophy

Feldman, Seymour. Philosophy in a Time of Crisis: Don Isaac Abravanel: Defender of the Faith. London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003.

Feldman, “Platonic Themes”

Feldman, Seymour. “Platonic Themes in Gersonides’ Cosmology.” In Salo Wittmayer Baron Jubilee Volume, 385-405. Jerusalem: American Academy for Jewish Research, 1975.

Feldman, “Universe”

Feldman, Seymour. “The End of the Universe in Medieval Jewish Philosophy.” AJSReview 11 (1986): 53-77.

Feldman, “Wisdom of Solomon”

Feldman, Seymour “The Wisdom of Solomon: A Gersonidean Interpretation.” In Gersonide en son temps, edited by G. Dahan, 61-80. Louvain: Peeters, 1991.

Fontaine, “Scorching”

Fontaine, Resianne. “Between Scorching Heat and Freezing Cold: Medieval Jewish Authors on the Inhabited and Uninhabited Parts of the Earth.” Arabic Sciences and Philosophy 10 (2000): 101-138.

Fox, Interpreting

Fox, Marvin. Interpreting Maimonides: Studies in Methodology, Metaphysics, and Moral Philosophy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990.

Fraenkel, From Maimonides

Fraenkel, Carlos. From Maimonides to Samuel ibn Tibbon. Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 2007 (Hebrew).

Freehof, Treasury

Freehof, Solomon B. A Treasury of Responsa New York: Ktav, 1973.

344

WORKS CITED Friedberg, “An Evaluation”

Friedberg, Albert Dov. “An Evaluation of Maimonides’ Enumeration of the 613 Commandments, with Special Emphasis on the Positive Commandments.” Ph.D. University of Toronto, 2008.

Freudenthal, Aristotle’s Theory

Freudenthal, Gad. Aristotle’s Theory of Material Substance: Heat and Pneuma, Form and Soul. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995.

Freudenthal, “Biological Foundations”

Freudenthal, Gad. “The Biological Foundations of Intellectual Elitism: Maimonides vs. Al-Farabi.” Maimonidean Studies 5 (2008): 293-324.

Freudenthal, “Felicity”

Freudenthal, Gad. “Human Felicity and Astronomy: Gersonides’ Revolt against Ptolemy.” Da’at 22 (1989): 5572 (Hebrew).

Freudenthal, “Les sciences”

Freudenthal, Gad. “Les sciences sans les communautés juives médiévales de provence: leur appropriation, leur rôle.” Revue des etudes juives 152, no. 1-2 (1993): 29-136.

Freudenthal, “Maimonides’ Stance”

Freudenthal, Gad. “Maimonides’ Stance on Astrology in Context: Cosmology, Physics, Medicine, and Providence.” In Moses Maimonides – Physician, Scientist, and Philosopher, edited by Samuel Kottek and Fred Rosner, 7790. Northvale: Jason Aronson, 1993.

Freudenthal, “Scope of Metaphysics”

Freudenthal, Gad. “Maimonides on the Scope of Metaphysics Alias Ma’aseh Merkavah: The Evolution of His Views.” In Maimonides Y Su Epoca, edited by Carlos del Valle Rodriguez, 221-230. Madrid: Sociedad Estatal de Conmemoraciones Culturales, 2007.

Freudenthal, Science

Freudenthal, Gad. Science in the Medieval Hebrew and Arabic Traditions. London: Ashgate, 2004.

Frydman-Kohl, “Hazut Qashah”

Frydman-Kohl, Baruch. “Hazut Qashah: Faith, Felicity and Fidelity in the Thought of Yishaq Arama.” Ph.D. Jewish Theological Seminary of America, New York, 2004.

Funkenstein, “Gersonides’ Bible Commentary”

Funkenstein, Amos. “Gersonides’ Bible Commentary: Science, History, and Providence.” In Studies on Gersonides - A Fourteenth-Century Jewish PhilosopherScientist, edited by Gad Freudenthal, 305-315. Leiden: Brill, 1992.

345

WORKS CITED

G Glasner, “Early Stages”

“The Early Stages in the Evolution of Gersonides’ Wars of the Lord.” Jewish Quarterly Review 87 (1996): 1-46.

Glasner, “Gersonides’ Knowledge of Languages”

Glasner, Ruth. “On Gersonides’ Knowledge of Languages.” Aleph 2 (2002): 235-57.

Glasner, “Levi ben Gershom”

Glasner, Ruth. “Levi Ben Gershom and the Study of Ibn Rushd in the Fourteenth Century.” Jewish Quarterly Review 86, no. 1-2 (1995): 51-90.

Glasner, “Philosophical Commentaries”

Glasner, Ruth. “On the Writing of Gersonides’ Philosophical Commentaries.” In Les methodes de travail de gersonide et le maniement du savoir cez les scholastiques, edited by Sara Klein-Braslavi, Colette Sirat, and Olga Weijers, 90-102. Paris: Vrin, 2003.

Golb, “The Hebrew Translation”

Golb, Norman. “The Hebrew Translation of Averroes’ Fasl Al-Maqal.” PAAJR 25 (1956): 91-64.

Goldstein and Pingree, “Prognostication”

Goldstein, Bernard R. and David Pingree. “Levi Ben Gerson’s Prognostication for the Conjunction of 1345.” Transactions of the American Philosophical Society (NS) 80, no. 6 (1990).

Goldstein, “A New Set”

Goldstein, Bernard R. “A New Set of Fourteenth-Century Planetary Observations.” Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society 132 (1988): 371-99.

Goldstein, Astronomy

Goldstein, Bernard R. The Astronomy of Levi Ben Gerson (1288-1344): A Critical Edition of Chapters 1-20 with Translation and Commentary. New York: Springer-Verlag, 1985.

Goldstein, “Levi ben Gerson’s Astrology”

Goldstein, Bernard R. “Levi Ben Gerson’s Astrology in Historical Perspective.” In Gersonide en son temps, edited by G. Dahan, 287-300. Louvain: Peeters, 1991

Goldstein, “Preliminary Remarks”

Goldstein, Bernard R. “Preliminary Remarks on Levi Ben Gerson’s Contributions to Astronomy.” Proceedings of the Israel Academy of Sciences and Humanities 3 no. 9 (1969): 239-254.

Goldstein, “The Arabic Version”

Goldstein, Bernard R. “The Arabic Version of Ptolemy’s Planetary Hypotheses.” Transactions of the American Philosophical Society (NS) 57 (1967): 1-55.

346

WORKS CITED Goldstein, H. “Dator Formarum”

Goldstein, Helen Tunik. “Dator Formarum: Ibn Rushd, Levi B. Gerson, and Moses B. Joshua of Narbonne.” In Essays in Islamic and Comparative Studies, edited by Isma`il Faruqi and A. O. Nasseef, 107-121. Washington: International Institute of Islamic Thought, 1982.

Grossman, “Attitude of Meiri”

Grossman, Avraham. “The Attitude of R. Menahem Ha-Me’iri Towards Women.” Zion 67 (2002): 253-91 (Hebrew).

Grossman, “Contempt”

Grossman, Avraham. “Contempt for Women on Philosophical Grounds: Joseph Ibn Kaspi.” Zion 68 (2003): 41-67 (Hebrew).

Guttmann, Philosophies

Guttmann, Julius. Philosophies of Judaism : The History of Jewish Philosophy from Biblical Times to Franz Rosenzweig. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1966.

H Haberman, Ha-Madpis Daniel Bombergi

Haberman, Abraham Meir. Ha-Madpis Daniel Bombergi Ve-Rishimat Sifrei Bet Defuso. Safed: Museum of the Art of Printing, 1978.

Halbertal, Bein Torah

Halbertal, Moshe. Bein Torah Le-Hokhmah: R. Menahem Ha-Meiri U-Ba’alei Ha-Halakhah Ha-Maimunim’im BeProvanz. Jerusalem: Magnes, 2000.

Halkin, “Ban”

Halkin, A. S. “The Ban on the Study of Philosophy.” Perakim 1 (1967-68): 35-55 (Hebrew).

Halkin, “Ibn Aknin’s Commentary”

Halkin, A. S. “Ibn Aknin’s Commentary on the Song of Songs.” In Alexander Marx Jubilee Volume, edited by Saul Lieberman, 389-424. New York: Jewish Theological Seminary, 1950.

Halkin, “Yedaiah Bedershi’s Apology”

Halkin, A. S. “Yedaiah Bedershi’s Apology.” In Jewish Medieval and Renaissance Studies, edited by Alexander Altmann, 165l84. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967.

Halkin and Hartman, Crisis and Leadership

Halkin, Abraham S. and David Hartman Crisis and Leadership: Epistles of Maimonides. Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society, 1985.

Harvey, “Crescas and his Critique of Philosophic Happiness”

Harvey, Warren Zev. “R. Hasdai Crescas and His Critique of Philosophic Happiness.” Proceedings of the Sixth World Congress of Jewish Studies 3 (1977): 143-149 (Hebrew).

347

WORKS CITED Harvey, “Crescas’ Critique”

Harvey, Warren Zev. “Hasdai Crescas’ Critique of the Theory of the Acquired Intellect.” Ph.D. Columbia University. New York, 1973.

Harvey, “Miriam the Prophetess”

Harvey, Warren Zev. “The Heresy of the Prophetess Miriam in Maimonides’ Seventh Principle.” In By the Well: Studies in Jewish Philosophy and Halakhic Thought Presented to Gerald J. Blidstein edited by H. Kreisel, U. Ehrlich, D. Lasker 183-94. Beersheva: Ben-Gurion University Press, 2008 (Hebrew).

Harvey, “Obligation”

Harvey, Warren Zev.” The Obligation of Talmud on Women According to Maimonides.” Tradition 19 (1981): 122-30.

Harvey, “Perfection, Awe, and Politics”

Harvey, Warren Zev. “Maimonides on Human Perfection, Awe, and Politics.” In The Thought of Moses Maimonides, edited by Ira Robinson, 1-15. Lewiston: Edwin Mellin Press, 1990. Harvey, Warren Zev.” The Philosopher and Politics: Gersonides and Crescas.” In Scholars and Scholarship: The Interaction between Judaism and Other Cultures edited by Leo Landman, 53-65. New York: Yeshiva University Press, 1990.

Harvey, “Philosopher and Politics”

Harvey, “Quelques réflexions”

Harvey, Warren Zev. “Quelques réflexions sur l’attitude de Gersonide vis-a-vis du midrash.” In Gersonide en son temps, edited by Gilbert Dahan, 109-116. Louvain, 1991.

Harvey, “Theories of Imagination”

Harvey, Warren Zev. “Three Theories of the Imagination in 12th Century Jewish Philosophy.” In Intellect and Imagination in Medieval Philosophy, edited by Maria Candida and Jose F. Meirinhos Pacheco, 287-301. Turnhout: Brepols, 2006.

Harvey, S. Falaquera’s ‘Epistle of the Debate’

Harvey, Steven. Falaquera’s ‘Epistle of the Debate’: An Introduction to Jewish Philosophy. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1987.

Harvey, S., “Hebrew Translation”

Harvey, Steven.” The Hebrew Translation of Averroes’ Prooemium to His Long Commentary on Aristotle’s Physics.” PAAJR 52 (1985): 55-84.

Heinemann, Ta’amei ha-Mizvot

Heinemann, Isaac. Ta’amei Ha-Mizvot Be-Sifrut Yisrael. 2 vols. Jerusalem: World Zionist Organization, 1954.

Heller-Wilensky, “Arama on Creation”

Heller-Wilensky, Sara. “Isaac Arama on the Creation and Structure of the World.” PAAJR 22 (1953): 131-149.

348

WORKS CITED Heller-Wilensky, Yizhak Arama

Heller-Wilensky, Sara. R. Yizhaq Arama u-Mishnato. Jerusalem: Mossad Bialik, 1956.

Herring, Kaspi

Herring, Basil. Joseph Ibn Kaspi’s Gevia Kesef: A Study in Medieval Jewish Philosophic Bible Commentary. New York: Ktav, 1982.

Hershman, Isaac ben Sheshet

Hershman, Abraham M. Rabbi Isaac Ben Sheshet Perfet and His Times. New York: Jewish Theological Seminary, 1953.

Hirsch, “A New Look”

Hirsch, Ya’akov. “A New Look at Daniel Bomberg and His Work.” Yad le-Kore 18 (1979): 105-108 (Hebrew).

Hirshman, Ha-Mikra

Hirshman, Menachem. Ha-Mikra u-Midrasho. Tel Aviv: Ha-Kibbutz ha-Me’uhad, 1992.

Hoch and Kellner, “Voice”

Hoch, Liron and Menachem Kellner. “’The Voice is the Voice of Jacob, but the Hands are the Hands of Esau’: Isaac Abravanel between Judah Halevi and Moses Maimonides,” Jewish History, forthcoming.

Horowitz, “Aristotle and Women”

Horowitz, Maryanne C. “Aristotle and Women.” Journal for the History of Biology 9 (1976): 183-213.

Horowitz, “Image of God”

Horowitz, Maryanne C.” The Image of God in Man - Is Woman Included.” Harvard Theological Review 72 (1979): 175-206.

Hourani, Averroes

Hourani, George F. Averroes on the Harmony of Religion and Philosophy. London: Luzac, 1961.

Hull, Science as a Process

Hull, David L. Science as a Process: An Evolutionary Account of the Social and Conceptual Development of Science. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986.

Husik, “Gersonides”

Husik, Isaac. “Gersonides.” In Husik, Philosophical Essays, edited by L. Strauss and M.C. Nahm, 172-185. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1952.

Husik, History

Husik, Isaac. A History of Mediaeval Jewish Philosophy. New York: Atheneum, 1969.

Husik, Judah Messer Leon

Husik, Isaac. Judah Messer Leon’s Commentary on The “Vetus Logica” Leyden: Brill, 1906.

349

WORKS CITED Huss, “Minhat Yehudah”

Huss, Matti. “Minhat Yehudah, Ezrat Ha-Nashim, Ve-Ein Mishpat.” Ph.D. Jerusalem: Hebrew University, 1991.

Huss, “Three Editions”

Huss, Matti. “The Three Editions of Minhat Yehudah Sone’ Ha-Nashim.” In Kiryat Sefer - Collected Essays, Supplement to Volume 68, 59-84. Jerusalem: Jewish National and University Library, 1998 (Hebrew).

Hyman, Eschatological Themes

Hyman, Arthur. Eschatological Themes in Medieval Jewish Philosophy. Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 2002.

I ibn Adret, Responsa

Adret, Solomon ben Abraham. Responsa. Jerusalem: Mossad ha-Rav Kook, 1990.

ibn Aknin, Hitgalut Ha-Sodot

ibn Aknin, Joseph ben Judah ben Jacob. Hitgalut HaSodot Vi-Hofa’at Ha-Me’orot. Translated by A. S. Halkin. Jerusalem: Mekize Nirdamim, 1964.

ibn Ezra, Commentary

ibn Ezra, Abraham ben Meir. Commentary on Canticles after the First Recension. Edited by H. J. Matthews. London 1874.

ibn Shem Tov, Sefer Ha-Emunot

ibn Shem Tov, Shem Tov. Sefer Ha-Emunot. Ferrara, 1556. Photo-edition, Jerusalem, 1969.

ibn Tibbon, Commentary on Song of Songs

ibn Tibbon, Moses. Perush Shir ha-Shirim. Lyck, 1874.

ibn Tibbon, Ma’amar

ibn Tibbon, Samuel. Ma’amar Yikkavu Ha-Mayim. Pressburg, 1837.

Idel, “Hitbodedut”

Idel, Moshe. “Hitbodedut as Concentration in Jewish Philosophy.” Jerusalem Studies in Jewish Thought 7 (1988): 39-60 (Hebrew).

Ivry, “Averroes on Intellection”

Ivry, Alfred. “Averroes on Intellection and Conjunction.” Journal of the American Oriental Society 86 (1966): 76-85.

Ivry, “Gersonides and Averroes”

Ivry, Alfred. “Gersonides and Averroes on the Intellect: The Evidence of the Supercommentary on the De Anima.” In Gersonide en son temps, edited by G. Dahan, 235-251. Paris and Louvain: Peeters, 1991.

350

WORKS CITED Ivry, “Image of Moses”

Ivry, Alfred. “The Image of Moses in Maimonides’ Thought.” In Rambam: Shamranut, Mekoriut, Mahapkhanut, edited by Aviezer Ravitzky, 481-99. Jerusalem: Merkaz Zalman Shazar, 2008 (Hebrew).

Ivry, “Moses of Narbonne”

Ivry, Alfred. “Moses of Narbonne’s ‘Treatise on the Perfection of the Soul’: A Methodological and Conceptual Analysis.” Jewish Quarterly Review 57 (1967): 271-97.

J Jacobs, “Defense”

Jacobs, Jill. “’The Defense Has Become the Prosecution’ – Ezrat Ha-Nashim, a Thirteenth-Century Response to Misogyny.” Women in Judaism 3, no. 2 (2003): 1-8.

Jardine, Birth of History and Philosophy of Science

Jardine, Nicholas. The Birth of History and Philosophy of Science. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984.

Jospe, Torah and Sophia

Jospe, Raphael. Torah and Sophia: The Life and Thought of Shem Tov Ibn Falaquera. Cincinnati: Hebrew Union College Press, 1988.

K Kadish, Book of Abraham

Kadish, Avi Seth. “The Book of Abraham: Rabbi Shimon Ben Zamah Duran and the School of Rabbenu Nissim Gerondi.” Ph.D. University of Haifa, Haifa, 2006.

J. Kafih, Ha-Mikra

J. Kafih, Ha-Mikra ba-Rambam. Jerusalem: Mossad haRav Kook, 1971.

Kaplan, “Maimonides and Soloveitchik”

Kaplan, Lawrence. “Maimonides and Soloveitchik on the Knowledge and Imitation of God.” In Moses Maimonides (1138-1204): His Religious, Scientific, and Philosophical Wirkungsgeschichte in Different Cultural Contexts, edited by Goerg K. Hasselhoff and Oftried Fraise, 491-523. Wuerzburg: Ergon, 2004.

Kasher, “Cleft”

Kasher, Hannah. “Maimonides’ Interpretation of the Story of the Divine Revelation in the Cleft of the Rock.” Da’at 35 (1995): 29-66 (Hebrew).

Kasher, “Job’s Image”

Kasher, Hannah. “Job’s Image and Opinions in Maimonides.” Da’at 15 (1985): 81-88 (Hebrew).

Kellner, “A Selected Bibliography”

Kellner, Menachem.” A Selected Bibliography of Studies on Maimonides, 1991-.” Jewish History 18 (2004): 243-89.

351

WORKS CITED Kellner, “Bibliographia Gersonideana”

Kellner, Menachem. “Bibliographia Gersonideana.” In Studies on Gersonides — a Fourteenth-Century Philosopher-Scientist, edited by G. Freudenthal, 367-414. Leiden: Brill, 1992.

Kellner, “Bibliographia Gersonideana 19922002”

Kellner, Menachem. “Bibliographia Gersonideana 19922002.” Aleph 3 (2003): 343-74.

Kellner, “Conception of Torah”

Kellner, Menachem. “The Conception of Torah as a Deductive Science in Medieval Jewish Thought.” REJ 146 (1987): 265-79.

Kellner, Confrontation

Kellner, Menachem. Maimonides Confrontation with Mysticism. Oxford: Littman Library of Jewish Civilization, 2006.

Kellner, Decline

Kellner, Menachem. Maimonides on the “Decline of the Generations” and the Nature of Rabbinic Authority. Albany: SUNY Press, 1996.

Kellner, Dogma

Kellner, Menachem. Dogma in Medieval Jewish Thought: From Maimonides to Abravanel. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986.

Kellner, Perfection

Kellner, Menachem. Maimonides on Human Perfection, Brown Judaic Studies 202. Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1990.

Kellner, “Philosophical Themes”

Kellner, Menachem. “Philosophical Themes in Maimonides’ Sefer Ahavah.” In Maimonides and His Heritage, edited by Lenn Evan Goodman, Idit Dobbs-Weinstein, and James Grady, 13-35. Albany: SUNY Press, 2009.

Kellner, “Rabbi Isaac”

Kellner, Menachem. “Rabbi Isaac Bar Sheshet Perfet’s Responsum Concerning the Study of Greek Philosophy.” Tradition 15, no. 3 (1975): 110-118.

Kellner, Science

Kellner, Menachem. Science in the Bet Midrash: Studies in Maimonides. Brighton, MA: Academic Studies Press, 2007.

Kellner, J., “Bibliography”

Kellner, Jolene. “Academic Studies on and New Editions of Works by Isaac Abravanel: 2000-2008.” Jewish History (2009): 313-317.

Klein-Braslavy, “Bible Commentary”

Klein-Braslavy, Sara. “Bible Commentary.” In Cambridge Companion to Maimonides, edited by Kenneth Seeskin, 245-73. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005.

Klein-Braslavy, King Solomon

Klein-Braslavy, Sara. Shlomo Ha-Melekh Ve-Ha-Ezoterizm Ha-Philosophi Be-Mishnat Ha-Rambam. Jerusalem: Magnes, 1996.

352

WORKS CITED Klein-Braslavy, Perush Ha-Rambam

Klein-Braslavy, Sara. Perush Ha-Rambam La-Sippurim Al Adam Bi-Parashat Bereshit. Jerusalem, 1986.

Kogan, “What Can We Know”

Kogan, Barry S. “’What Can We Know and When Can We Know It?’ Maimonides on the Active Intelligence and Human Cognition.” Studies in Philosophy and the History of Philosophy 19 (1989): 121-37 = Moses Maimonides and His Time, edited by Eric L. Ormsby .

Kraemer, “Alfarabi’s Opinions”

Kraemer, Joel. “Alfarabi’s Opinions of the Virtuous City and Maimonides’ Foundations of the Law.” In Studia Orientalia: Memoriae D. H. Baneth Dedicata, edited by J. Blau et al., 107-153. Jerusalem: Magnes, 1979.

Kraemer, “Naturalism”

Kraemer, Joel. “Naturalism and Univerisalism in Maimonides’ Political and Religious Thought.” In Me’ah She’arim: Studies in Medieval Jewish Spiritual Life in Memory of Isadore Twersky, edited by G. Blidstein, E. Fleischer, C. Horowitz, and B. Septimus, 47-81. Jerusalem: Magnes, 2001.

Kreisel, “Asceticism”

Kreisel, Howard. “Asceticism in the Thought of R. Bahya Ibn Paquda and Maimonides.” Da’at 21 (1988): v-xxii.

Kreisel, “Imitatio Dei”

Kreisel, Howard. “Imitatio Dei in Maimonides’ Guide of the Perplexed.” AJS Review 19 (1994): 169-211.

Kreisel, “Philosophical Interpretations”

Kreisel, Howard. “Philosophical Interpretations of the Bible.” In The Cambridge History of Jewish Philosophy from Antiquity through the Seventeenth Century, edited by Steven Nadler and Tamar Rudavsky. 88-120. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009.

Kreisel, “Sage and Prophet”

Kreisel, Howard. “Sage and Prophet in the Thought of Maimonides and His School.” Eshel Beersheva 3 (1986): 149-169 (Hebrew).

Kreisel, Prophecy

Kreisel, Howard. Prophecy: The History of an Idea in Medieval Jewish Philosophy. Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2001.

L Langermann, “Appendix”

Langermann, Y. Tzvi. “Appendix: Gersonides on Astrology.” In The Wars of the Lord, translated by Seymour Feldman, Vol. 3. 506-519. Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society, 1999.

Langermann, “Miracles”

Langermann, Y. Tzvi. “Maimonides and Miracles: The Growth of a (Dis)Belief.” Jewish History 18 (2004): 147-72.

353

WORKS CITED Langermann, “Review”

Langermann, Y. Tzvi. “Review of Goldstein and Pingree, Levi Ben Gerson’s Prognostication for the Conjunction of 1345.” Isis 83 (1992): 316-317.

Langermann, “True Perplexity”

Langermann, Y. Tzvi. “The ‘True Perplexity’: The Guide of the Perplexed, Part II, Chapter 24.” In Perspectives on Maimonides: Philosophical and Historical Studies, edited by Joel Kraemer, 159-74. Oxford: Littman Library of Jewish Civilization, 1991.

Lasker, “Chasdai Crescas”

Lasker, Daniel J. “Chasdai Crescas.” In History of Jewish Philosophy, edited by Daniel H. Frank and Oliver Leaman, 399-414. London: Routledge, 1997.

Lasker, “Gersonides on Dreams”

Lasker, Daniel J. “Gersonides on Dreams, Divination, and Astronomy.” Proceedings of the Eighth World Congress of Jewish Studies Division C (1982): 47-52.

Lasker, “Longevity”

Lasker, Daniel J. “The Longevity of the Ancients - Faith and Reason in Medieval Jewish Thought.” Dine Israel 26 (2010) (Hebrew) (forthcoming).

Lasker, “Love of God”

Lasker, Daniel J. “Love of God and Knowledge of God in Maimonides’ Philosophy.” In Ecriture et reecriture des textes philosophiques medievaux: volume d’hommage offert a Colette Sirat, edited by J. Hamesse and O. Weijers, 329345. Turnhout: Brepols, 2005.

Lawee, “Isaac Abarbanel”

Lawee, Eric. “Isaac Abarbanel’s Intellectual Achievement and Literary Legacy in Modern Scholarship: A Retrospective and Opportunity.” In Studies in Medieval Jewish History and Literature vol. 3, edited by Isadore Twersky and Jay M. Harris, 214-245. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000.

Lawee, “Messianism”

Lawee, Eric. “The Messianism of Isaac Abarbanel, ‘Father of the[Jewish] Messianic Movements of the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries’.” In Jewish Messianism in the Early Modern World, edited by Matt D. Goldish and Richard H. Popkin, 1-39. Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2001.

Lazarus-Yafeh, Studies

Lazarus-Yafeh, Hava. Studies in Al-Ghazzali Jerusalem: Magnes 1975.

Lerner, Maimonides’ Empire

Ralph Lerner. Maimonides’ Empire of Light: Popular Enlightenment in an Age of Belief. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000.

Lerner and Mahdi, Medieval Political Philosophy

Lerner, Ralph and Muhsin Mahdi, eds. Medieval Political Philosophy: A Source Book. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1972.

354

WORKS CITED Levy, Between Yafeth and Shem

Levy, Ze’ev. Between Yafeth and Shem. New York: Peter Lang, 1987.

Lieberman, “Alleged Ban”

Lieberman, Saul. “The Alleged Ban on Greek Wisdom.” In Hellenism in Jewish Palestine, 100-114. New York: Jewish Theological Seminary of America, 1950.

Lloyd, “Saving the Appearances”

Lloyd, G. E. R. “Saving the Appearances.” Classical Quarterly 28 (1978): 202-222.

M Manekin, “Conservative Tendencies”

Manekin, Charles. “Conservative Tendencies in Gersonides’ Religious Philosophy.” In The Cambridge Companion to Medieval Jewish Thought, 304-344. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003.

Manekin, “Divine Will”

Manekin, Charles. “Divine Will in Maimonides’ Later Writings.” Maimonidean Studies 5 (2008): 189-222.

Manekin, “Limitations of Human Knowledge”

Manekin, Charles (Bezalel). “The Limitations of Human Knowledge According to Maimonides: Earlier vs. Later Writings.” In Rambam: Shamranut, Mekoriut, Mahapkhanut, edited by Aviezer Ravitzky, 297-316. Jerusalem: Merkaz Zalman Shazar, 2008 (Hebrew).

Manekin, “Limited Omniscience”

Manekin, Charles. “On the Limited-Omniscience Interpretation of Gersonides’ Theory of Divine Knowledge.” In Perspectives on Jewish Thought and Mysticism, edited by Alfred Ivry, et al., 135-170. Amsterdam: Harwood Academic Publishers, 1998.

Marcus, The Jew

Marcus, Jacob R. The Jew in the Medieval World. Cincinnati: Union of American Hebrew Congregations, 1938.

Mashbaum, “Gersonides’ Supercommentary”

Mashbaum, Jesse Stephen. “Chapters 9-12 of Gersonides’ Supercommentary on Averroes’ Epitome of the De Anima: The Internal Senses.” Ph.D. Brandeis University, Waltham, MA.,1981.

Meiri, Perush al Sefer Mishlei

Meiri, Menachem. Perush Al Sefer Mishlei. Edited by Menachem Mendel Meshi-Zahav. Jerusalem, 1969.

Melamed, Al Kitfei Anakim

Melamed, Abraham. Al Kitfei Anakim: Toldot Ha-Pulmus Bein Aharonim Le-Rishonim Be-Hagut Ha-Yehudit Binei Ha-Benayim U-Ve-Reshit Ha-Et Ha-Hadashah. RamatGan: Bar Ilan University Press, 2003.

355

WORKS CITED Melamed, “Aristotle’s Politics”

Melamed, Abraham “Aristotle’s Politics in Medieval and Renaissance Jewish Thought.” Pe’amim 51 (1992): 27-69 (Hebrew).

Melamed, “Development”

Melamed, Abraham. “The Development of the Motif of Love of the Pleasant, the Useful, and the Good in Albo, Allemano, Judah Abravanel, and Moscato.” In Philosphiat Ha-Ahavalt Shel Yehudah Abravanel, edited by M. Dorman and Z. Levy, 57-72. Tel Aviv: Ha-Kibbutz ha-Me’uhad, 1985 (Hebrew).

Melamed, Image

Melamed, Abraham. The Image of the Black in Jewish Culture: A History of the Other. London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003.

Melamed, “Land”

Melamed, Abraham. “The Land of Israel and the Climatological Theory in Jewish Thought.” In Eretz YisraelbBe-Hagut ha-Yehudit bimei ha-Benayim, edited by Moshe Hallamish and Aviezer Ravitzky, 52-79. Jerusalem: Yad Ben-Zvi, 1991 (Hebrew).

Melamed, PhilosopherKing

Melamed, Abraham. Philosopher-King in Medieval and Renaissance Jewish Political Thought. Albany: SUNY Press, 2003.

Melamed, “Women”

Melamed, Abraham. “Maimonides on Women: Formless Matter or Potential Prophet?” In Perspectives on Jewish Thought and Mysticism, edited by Alfred Ivry, et al., 99134. Amsterdam: Harwood Academic, 1998.

Menasseh ben Israel, Nishmat Hayim

Menasseh ben Israel, Nishmat Hayim. Jerusalem: Yerid haSefarim, 1995.

Merton, OTSOG

Merton, Robert K. On the Shoulders of Giants: A Shandean Postscript. New York: Free Press, 1965.

Mesch, Caspi

Mesch, Barry. Joseph Ibn Caspi. Leiden: Brill, 1975.

Moore, Judaism

Moore, George Foot Judaism in the First Centuries of the Christian Era. 2 vols. New York: Schocken Books, 1971.

Moscato, Kol Yehudah

Moscato, Judah. Kol Yehudah. Vilna, 1914.

N Nadler, “Providence”

Nadler, Steven. “Gersonides on Providence: A Jewish Chapter in the History of the General Will.” Journal of the History of Ideas 62 (2001): 37-57.

Nahmanides, Kitvei Ramban

Nahmanides, Moses. Kitvei Ramban. 2 vols. Edited by Haim Chavel. Jerusalem: Mossad ha-Rav Kook, 1963.

356

WORKS CITED Netanyahu, Abravanel

Netanyahu, Benzion. Don Isaac Abravanel, Statesman and Philosopher Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998.

Nisbet, Idea of Progress

Nisbet, Robert. History of the Idea of Progress (New York: Basic Books, 1980).

Oren, “Meiri’s Attitude”

Oren, Gedalya. “R. Menahem Ha-Meiri’s Attitude toward the ‘Other’.” Da’at 60 (2007): 29-49 (Hebrew).

Pearl, Medieval Jewish Mind

Pearl, Chaim. The Medieval Jewish Mind: The Religious Philosophy of Isaac Arama. London: Vallentine, Mitchell, 1971.

Peleg, “Shem Tov”

Peleg, Erez. “R. Shem Tov’s Critique of Maimonides’ Concept of Man.” In Maimonides and Mysticism: Presented to Moshe Hallamish on the Occasion of His Retirement, edited by A. Elqayam and D. Schwartz, 195-217. RamatGad: Bar-Ilan University Press, 2009 (Hebrew).

Pines, “Aristotle’s Politics”

Pines, Shlomo. “Aristotle’s Politics in Arabic Philosophy.” Israel Oriental Studies 5 (1975): 150-160.

Pines, “Problems”

Pines, Shlomo. “Problems in Gersonides’ Teachings.” In Mehkarim bi-Kabbalah ... Mugashim li-Yeshayahu Tishbi, edited by J. Dan and J. Hacker, 447-457. Jerusalem: Magnes, 1986. (Hebrew).

Popper, Unended Quest

Popper, Karl. Unended Quest. LaSalle, IL: Open Court, 1976.

R Rahman, Avicenna’s Psychology

Rahman, Fazlur. Avicenna’s Psychology. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1952.

Ravitzky, “Leadership”

Ravitzky, Aviezer. “Philosophy and Leadership in Maimonides.” In Maimonides after 800 Years: Essays on Maimonides and His Influence, edited by Jay Harris, 257290. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2007.

Ravitzky, “Political Role”

Ravitzky, Aviezer. “The Political Role of the Philosopher: Samuel Ibn Tibbon Versus Maimonides.” Maimonidean Studies 5 (2008): 345-374.

Ravitzky, “To the Utmost”

Ravitzky, Aviezer. “’To the Utmost of Human Capacity’: Maimonides on the Days of the Messiah.” In Perspectives on Maimonides: Philosophical and Historical Studies, edited by Joel Kraemer, 221-256. Oxford: Littman Library of Jewish Civilization, 1991.

357

WORKS CITED Ravitzky, I., “R. Immanuel”

Ravitzky, Israel. “R. Immanuel Ben Shlomo of Rome, Commentary to the Song of Songs, Philosophical Division.” M.A., Hebrew University. Jerusalem,1970 (Hebrew).

Ravven, “Spinoza and Maimonides”

Ravven, Heidi M. “Some Thoughts on What Spinoza Learned from Maimonides About the Prophetic Imagination. Part 1: Maimonides on Prophecy and the Imagination. Part 2: Spinoza’s Maimonideanism.” Journal of the History of Philosophy 39 (2001): 193-214, 385-406.

Rescher, Limits of Science

Rescher, Nicholas. The Limits of Science. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984.

Robinson, Samuel ibn Tibbon

Robinson, James. Samuel Ibn Tibbon’s Commentary on Ecclesiastes. Tuebingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2007.

Rosenberg, “Philosophical Hermeneutics”

Rosenberg, Shalom “Philosophical Hermeneutics on the Song of Songs, Introductory Remarks.” Tarbiz 59 (1990): 133-151 (Hebrew).

Rosenthal, “Eudaimonia”

Rosenthal, Erwin I. J. “The Concept Eudaimonia in Medieval Islamic and Jewish Philosophy.” In Rosenthal, Studia Semitica II: Islamic Themes, 127-134. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971.

Rosenthal, Political Thought

Rosenthal, Erwin I. J. Political Thought in Medieval Islam. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968.

Ross, “Maimonides and Progress”

Ross, Ya’akov. “Maimonides and Progress - Maimonides’ Concept of History.” In Hevrah Vi-Historiah, edited by Yehezkel Cohen, 529-542. Jerusalem: Ministry of Education and Culture, 1980 (Hebrew).

Roth, “Wiles of Women”

Roth, Norman. “The ‘Wiles of Woman’ Motif in the Medieval Hebrew Literature of Spain.” Hebrew Annual Review 2 (1978): 145-165.

Rudavksy, “Gersonides”

Rudavsky, Tamar. “Gersonides.” The Stanford [Online] Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2008).

Rudavsky, “Philosophical Cosmology”

Rudavsky, Tamar. “Philosophical Cosmology in Judaism.” Early Science and Medicine 2 (1997): 149-84.

Rynhold, Introduction

Rynhold, Daniel. An Introduction to Medieval Jewish Philosophy. London: I. B. Taurus, 2009.

358

WORKS CITED

S Sabra, “The Andalusian Revolt”

Sabra, A. I. “The Andalusian Revolt against Ptolemaic Astronomy: Averroes and Al-Bitruji.” In Transformation and Tradition in the Sciences: Essays in Honor of I. Bernard Cohen, edited by Everett Mendelsohn, 133-153. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984.

Samuelson, “Free Will”

Samuelson, Norbert. “The Problem of Free-Will in Maimonides, Gersonides, and Aquinas.” CCAR Journal (January, 1970): 2-20.

Samuelson, “Gersonides’ Account”

Samuelson, Norbert. “Gersonides’ Account of God’s Knowledge of Particulars.” Journal of the History of Philosophy 10 (1972): 399-416.

Samuelson, God’s Knowledge

Samuelson, Norbert Max. Gersonides on God’s Knowledge. Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 1977.

Samuelson, “Philosophic and Religious Authority”

Samuelson, Norbert “Philosophic and Religious Authority in the Thought of Maimonides and Gersonides.” CCAR Journal, (October, 1969): 31-43.

Saperstein, Decoding

Saperstein, Marc. Decoding the Rabbis: A ThirteenthCentury Commentary on the Aggadah. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980.

Saperstein, Jewish Preaching

Saperstein, Marc. Jewish Preaching, 1200-1800: An Anthology. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989.

Schwartz, “Greek Wisdom”

Schwartz, Dov. “’Greek Wisom’ – a Re-Examination During the Period of the Debate over the Study of Philosophy.” Sinai 104 (1989): 148-153 (Hebrew).

Schwartz, Ha-Ra’ayon ha-Meshihi

Schwartz, Dov. Ha-Ra’ayon Ha-Meshihi Be-Hagut HaYehudit Bimei Ha-Benayim. Ramat-Gan: Bar-Ilan University Press, 1997.

Schwartz, “More on Greek Wisdom”

Schwartz, Dov. “More on the Issue of ‘Greek Wisdom’.” Sinai 105 (1990): 93-95 (Hebrew).

Schwartz, Setirah

Schwartz, Dov. Setirah Ve-Hastarah Be-Hagut Ha-Yehudit Bimei Ha-Benayim. Ramat-Gan: Bar-Ilan University Press, 2002.

Schwartzmann, “Gender Concepts”

Schwartzmann, Julia. “Gender Concepts of Medieval Jewish Thinkers and the Book of Proverbs.” Jewish Studies Quarterly 7, (2000): 183-202.

359

WORKS CITED Schwartzmann, “Image”

Schwartzmann, Julia. “Is She Too Created in the Image of God? Medieval Philosophical Exegesis of the Creation of the Woman According to Genesis 1-3.” Da’at 39 (1997): 69-86 (Hebrew).

Schwartzmann, “Isaac Arama”

Schwartzmann, Julia. “Isaac Arama and His Theory of Two Matches (Zivvugim).” Jewish Studies Quarterly 13 (2006): 27-49.

Schwarz, “Significance”

Schwarz, Michael. “The Significance of Maimonides’ Distinction between Moses’ Miracles and Those of Other Prophets (Guide, II.35).” Da’at 38 (1997): 5-8 (Hebrew).

Schwarzschild, “Lure”

Schwarzschild, Steven “The Lure of Immanence.” Tradition 9 (1967): 70-99. Reprinted in: Schwarzschild, Steven S. The Pursuit of the Ideal: The Jewish Writings of Steven Schwarzschild. Edited by Menachem Kellner, 61-81. Albany: SUNY Press, 1990.

Schwarzschild, “Moral Radicalism”

Schwarzschild, Steven S. “Moral Radicalism and ‘Middlingness’ in the Ethics of Maimonides.” Studies in Medieval Culture 2 (1978): 65-94. Reprinted in: Schwarzschild, Steven S. The Pursuit of the Ideal: The Jewish Writings of Steven Schwarzschild. Edited by Menachem Kellner, 137-160. Albany: SUNY Press, 1990.

Seeman, “Silence.”

Seeman, Don. “The Silence of Rayna-Batya: Torah, Suffering and Rabbi Barukh Epstein’s ‘Wisdom of Women’.” Torah u-Madda Journal 6 (1995-96): 91-128.

Seeskin, Origin

Seeskin, Kenneth. Maimonides on the Origin of the World. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005.

Septimus, HispanoJewish Culture

Septimus, Bernard. Hispano-Jewish Culture in Transition: The Career and Controversies of Ramah. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1982.

Shapiro, Studies

Shapiro, Marc. Studies in Maimonides and His Interpreters. Scranton: University of Scranton Press, 2008.

Shatzmiller, “Gersonide et la société juive”

Shatzmiller, Joseph. “Gersonide et la société juive de son temps.” In Gersonide en son temps, edited by G. Dahan, 33-43. Paris and Louvain: Peeters, 1991.

Shatzmiller, Médecine

Shatzmiller, Joseph. Médecine et justice en Provence médiévale. Aix-en-Provence: Publ. de I’Univ. de Provence, 1989.

360

WORKS CITED Shear, “Judah Moscato”

Shear, Adam. “Judah Moscato’s Scholarly Self-Image and the Question of Jewish Humanism.” In Cultural Intermediaries: Jewish Intellectuals in Early Modern Italy, edited by David B. Ruderman and Giuseppe Veltri, 149177. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004.

Silver, Messianic Speculation

Silver, Abba Hillel. A History of Messianic Speculation in Israel. Boston: Beacon, 1959.

Silver, D. Maimonidean Criticism

Silver, Daniel Jeremy. Maimonidean Criticism and the Maimonidean Controversy: 1180-1240. Leiden: Brill, 1965.

Simon, “Interpreting the Interpreter”

Simon, Uriel “Interpreting the Interpreter: SuperCommentaries on Ibn Ezra’s Commentaries.” In Rabbi Abraham Ibn Ezra: Studies in the Writings of a Twelfth-Century Jewish Polymath, edited by Isadore Twersky and Jay M. Harris, 86-128. Cambridge: Harward University Press, 1993.

Sirat, History

Sirat, Colette. A History of Jewish Philosophy in the Middle Ages. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985.

Staub, Creation

Staub, Jacob. The Creation of the World According to Gersonides. Chico, CA: Scholars Press, 1982.

Stern and Mirsky, Rabbinic Fantasies

Stern, David and Mark J. Mirsky. Rabbinic Fantasies: Imaginative Narratives from Classical Hebrew Literature. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990.

Stern, G. Philosophy and Religious Culture

Stern, Gregg. Philosophy and Rabbinic Culture: Jewish Interpretation and Controversy in Medieval Languedoc. London: Routledge, 2009.

Stern, J. “Maimonides on the Growth of Knowledge”

Stern, Josef. “Maimonides on the Growth of Knowledge and Limitations of the Intellect.” In Maimonide philosphe et savant, edited by Tony Levy and Roshdi Rashed, 143191. Louvain: Peeters, 2004.

Strauss, Rebirth

Strauss, Leo. The Rebirth of Classical Political Rationalism: An Introduction to the Thought of Leo Strauss - Essays and Lectures by Leo Strauss. Edited by Thomas L. Pangle. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989.

Stroumsa, Reshito

Stroumsa, Sarah. Reshito shel Pulmus ha-Rambam baMizrah. Jerusalem: Makhon Ben-Zvi, 1999.

T Taylor, Sources of the Self

Taylor, Charles. Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989.

361

WORKS CITED Touati, “Inerrance prophetique”

Touati, Charles. “La probleme de l’inerrance prophetique dans la theologie juive du moyen age,” Revue de l’histoire des religions 175 (1968): 169-197. Reprint in: Charles Touati, Prophètes, talmudistes, philosophes (Paris: Cerf, 1990).

Touati, “La lumière”

Touati, Charles. “La lumière de l’intellect, création du premier jour l’exégèse de Genèse 1, 1-3 chez Gersonide.” In In Principio, 37-45. Paris, 1973.

Touati, La pensée

Touati, Charles. La pensée philosophique et théologique de Gersonide. 1st ed. Paris: Editions de Minuit, 1973; 2nd ed. Paris: Gallimard, 1992.

Twersky, “Non-Halakic Aspects”

Twersky, Isadore. “Some Non-Halakic Aspects of the Mishneh Torah.” In Jewish Medieval and Renaissance Studies, edited by Alexander Altmann, 95-118. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967.

Twersky, “Did R. Abraham ibn Ezra”

Twersky, Isadore. “Did R. Abraham Ibn Ezra Influence Maimonides?” In Rabbi Abraham Ibn Ezra: Studies in the Writings of a Twelfth-Century Jewish Polymath, edited by I. Twersky and Jay Harris, 21-48. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993 (Hebrew).

Twersky, Introduction

Twersky, Isadore. Introduction to the Code of Maimonides (Mishneh Torah). New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980.

Twersky, “Joseph Ibn Kaspi”

Twersky, Isadore. “Joseph Ibn Kaspi: Portrait of a Medieval Jewish Intellectual.” In Studies in Medieval Jewish History and Literature, 231-257. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1979.

Twersky, Reader

Twersky, Isadore. A Maimonides Reader. New York: Behrman House, 1972.

V Vajda, “An Analysis”

Vajda, Georges. “An Analysis of the Ma’amar Yiqqawu HaMayim by Samuel B. Judah Ibn Tibbon.” Journal of Jewish Studies 10 (1959): 137-149.

Vajda, Isaac Albalag

Vajda, Georges. Isaac Albalag: averroiste juif, traducteur et annotateur d’al-Ghazali Paris: J. Vrin, 1960.

Ventura, “Belief in Providence”

Ventura, Moise. “Belief in Providence According to Gersonides.” In Minhah Le-Avraham [Festschrift for Abraham Elmaleh], 12-21. Jerusalem: Va’ad Ha-Yovel, 1959 (Hebrew).

362

WORKS CITED

W Walfish, “Annotated Bibliography”

Walfish, Dov Barry. “Annotated Bibliography of Medieval Jewish Commentaries on Song of Songs.” In Ha-Mikra BeRe’i Mefarshav: Sefer Zikkaron Le-Sarah Kamin, edited by Sarah Yafet, 518-571. Jerusalem: Magnes, 1994 (Hebrew).

Weil, La bibliothèque

Weil, Gerard E. La bibliothèque de Gersonide d’après son catalogue autographe. Louvain: Peeters, 1991.

Weil-Gueny, “Gersonide”

Weil-Gueny, Anne-Mary. “Gersonide en son temps: un tableau chronologique.” In Studies on Gersonides — A Fourteenth-Century Philosopher-Scientist, edited by Gad Freudenthal, 355-365. Leiden: Brill, 1992.

Weiss, “End of the World”

Weiss, Roslyn. “Maimonides on the End of the World.” Maimonidean Studies 3 (1992-93): 195-218.

Weiss and Butterworth, Ethical Writings

Weiss, Raymond and Charles Butterworth (trans.). Ethical Writings of Maimonides. New York: Dover, 1983.

Wolfson, “Classification”

Wolfson, Harry Austryn. “The Classification of Sciences in Mediaeval Jewish Philosophy.” In Studies in the History and Philosophy of Religion, Vol. 1, 493-545. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1973.

Wolfson, “Maimonides and Gersonides on Divine Attributes”

Wolfson, Harry Austryn. “Maimonides and Gersonides on Divine Attributes as Ambiguous Terms.” In Studies in the History and Philosophy of Religion, Vol. 2, 231-246. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1977.

Wolfson, “Negative Attributes”

Wolfson, Harry Austryn. “Maimonides on Negative Attributes.” In Studies in the History and Philosophy of Religion, Vol. 2, 195-230. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1977.

Wolfson, “Note on Maimonides’ Classification”

Wolfson, Harry Austryn. “Note on Maimonides’ Classification of the Sciences.” In Studies in the History and Philosophy of Religion, Vol. 1, 551-560. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1973.

Wolfson, Spinoza

Wolfson, Harry Austryn. The Philosophy of Spinoza: Unfolding the Latent Processes of His Reasoning. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1983.

Wolfson, Studies

Wolfson, Harry Austryn. Studies in the History of Philosophy and Religion 2 vols. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1973, 1977.

363

WORKS CITED

Y Yarden, “Introduction”

Yarden, Dov “Introduction to Mahbarot Immanuel HaRomi.” In Mahbarot Immanuel Ha-Romi. Jerusalem: Mossad Bialik, 1957 (Hebrew).

Z Zinberg, History

364

Zinberg, Israel. A History of Jewish Literature. 12 vols. Cleveland: Case Western Reserve University Press, 19721978.

INDEX knowledge of

A Abraham

62, 285, 298, 299-300, 335

Adam

89-90, 93-94, 96, 163, 217-218, 313, 316 286

Abraham ben David (Rabad) 98

Adret, Solomon ben Abraham (Rashba) 136, 145, 262, see also ban of 1305

Abraham ben Maimonides 15

Aher, see Elisha ben Abuyah

Abraham ibn Ezra

19, 123, 258

Akiba

16, 42, 147, 260

Abravanel, Isaac

15, 71, 83, 164, 172, 269, 305-308, 312, 312-332

Aknin, Joseph ben Judah

123, 141, 177

Albalag, Isaac

319

57, 96, 162-164, 169, 192, 208-209, 211, 222-223, 278-279

Albo, Joseph

71

Alashkar, Moses

306

al-Farabi (Alfarabi)

126, 181-184, 187, 203-205, 265

account of the chariot, see ma’aseh merkavah

al-Ghazzali

128, 191, 264

Active Intellect

Anatoli, Jacob

144, 259, 264, 284, 289

Abraham bar Hiyya

acquired intellect

73

account of creation, see ma’aseh bereshit

14, 31, 32, 35-37, 45, 48-50, 52-62, 65-66, 81-83, 85-96, 117-119, 123, 128-129, 132, 161, 163-164, 178, 185, 192-194, 207-234, 240, 243, 246, 261, 267, 278-281, 304, 309, 311, 313-321, 323, 328, 330, see also intellects, separate

Andalusian Aristotelianism 155, 172 angels

16, 48, 50-51, 61, 63, 105, 186, 243, 289, 323, see also intellects, separate

angel of death

298

anthropomorphism see also incorporeality

91, 349,

365

INDEX Arama, Isaac

307-314, 323-324, 326-329, 331

Aristotle

11, 13, 17, 18, 20-21, 29-30, 55, 94, 96, 105-107, 109, 114-115, 122, 128, 132, 147,149, 155, 170, 172, 174-178, 181-183, 190-199, 204, 207, 210, 213-217, 233, 248, 264-265, 277, 283-284, 288, 292-293, 303-304, 307-308, 323-325, 328, 335

B Bahya ibn Pakudah

124

ban of 1305

136, 142, 145-147, 257, 262-263, 269-270

belief, religious, unanimity of in messianic era 74 belief, true

117, 275, 311, 328-329, 333

Berman, Lawrence

181, 184, 200, 236, 281

Bomberg, Daniel

12-13 83

Maimonides on

150-153

Borodowski, Alfredo

astrology

11-12, 24, 53, 85, 87, 179, 198, 205, 240, 310

C

astronomy

11-12, 17, 27, 122, 149-157, 165, 169-175, 179, 205, 249, 307

Atlas, Samuel

273

attributes, divine

101, 103-104, 115-116, 156-157, 173, 175, 237

attributes, material

177, 218-219, 221, 227

Augustine

182

authority, rabbinic

12, 43, 136, 143, 183, 262-265, 270

Averroes

11, 20, 27, 53, 122, 126, 128, 162, 172, 188, 204-205, 208, 216, 228, 251, 259, 260, 264-265, 267, 278, 280, 283, 292-293, 302-304, 307, 319

366

chauvinism 293, see also election of Israel choice, see freedom of the will chosen people, see election of Israel Christianity

154, 182, 205-206

183,

Cohen, Hermann

181, 332

commandments

20, 27, 72, 73, 80, 121, 126, 160, 201, 237, 238, 243, 254, 285, 313

conjunction

81, 83, 90-91, 97, 117, 128, 223, 261, 267, 272, 277-281, 313,

see also intellection contradictions

20-21, 67, 72, 94, 125, 203, 326, 329

conversion

95

covenant see also Sinai

62, 285,

INDEX creation

19, 21-22, 82-83, 85, 87-88, 91, 98-99, 101-121, 149, 151, 156-157, 165, 174-175, 188, 197, 245, 300, 309, 313, 315-317, 319-321, 323-324, 326-327, 329-332,

Elihu elitism

169, 294

Elisha ben Abuyah

39, 168

emanation

14, 52, 56, 58-60, 62, 81, 85, 164, 185-187, 213-214, 217-218, 220-222, 224-230, 232-233, 240, 243, 247, 252, 330

see also eternity volitional

85, 91, 98-99, 101102, 106, 108-110, 114-115, 118, 120

and miracles

19, 21, 101-102, 309, 313, 315-317, 319321, 323, 324, 326327, 329, 330-332

Crescas, Hasdai

71, 162, 211, 306, 308, 334

D

30, 32, 35

emunah, see belief, true Epicurus

128, 264

equivocation

104, 107, 114-116, 136, 156

eschatology 71-100, 121, see also immortality; messiah and messianic era; and resurrection esotericism

20, 22-23, 25-26, 66, 98, 103, 133-134, 137, 142, 167, 169, 191, 239, 241, 251, 254

decline of the generations

63, 96

divination

30, 56-59, 78, 185, 193-196

dogma

333

Esther

290

dreams

39, 49, 51, 53, 5659, 78, 185-186, 193-200, 308

eternity

21, 57, 105, 106, 109, 110, 113-114, 155, 172, 197, 323-324,

Duhem, Pierre

154-155, 170-172

Duran, Profiat

27

see also creation

F

Duran, Simeon ben Zemah 12, 99, 306

faith, see emunah

E

Feinstein, Moses

13-14

Feldman, Seymour

56, 127, 177, 207, 212-215, 218, 222, 278, 337

felicity

26, 80, 124-126, 128, 131-133, 139, 157, 160-163, 166-169, 173, 176,

Efodi, see Duran, Profiat Eisen, Robert

25, 29, 82, 83

election of Israel see also chauvinism

47, 62

367

INDEX 188, 190, 207, 217, 228, 235, 237, 239, 244-246, 248, 258, 261, 286

117, 128, 223, 261, 267, 272, 277-281, 313 creation

19, 21-22, 82-83, 85, 87-88, 91, 9899, 101-121, 149, 151, 156-157, 165, 174-175, 188, 197, 245, 300, 309, 313, 315-317, 319-321, 323-324, 326-327, 329-332

divine attributes

101, 103-104, 115116, 156-157, 173, 175, 237

eschatology

71-100, 121

esotericism

20, 22-23, 25-26, 66, 98, 103, 133134, 137, 142, 167, 169, 191, 239, 241, 251, 254

faculty of imagination

49-50, 56, 58, 60, 83, 90, 127, 129, 167, 177, 197, 208-209, 211-213, 217, 219-229, 231-232, 234, 311

human knowledge

14, 22, 31-32, 55, 57, 60, 81, 88, 9498, 119, 131, 150, 155-157, 161-166, 172-173, 175, 186, 190, 193-195, 198-199, 207-208, 210-214, 217, 219-221, 225-227, 229, 232-233, 239, 241, 245, 277-279, 295, 299-300

human perfection

13, 22, 25-26, 32, 48, 50, 57, 59, 61, 63, 65, 80-82, 9091, 94-95, 125, 128, 132-133,

formalism, see science, formalist view freedom of the will

23-24, 34, 53-54, 57, 68, 87, 89, 108, 120, 156, 175, 194, 208, 241, 334-335

G Gates, Bill

13

Gentiles

143-144, 238

Gersonides acquired intellect

57, 96, 162, 163, 164, 169, 192, 208, 209, 211, 222, 223, 278-279

Active Intellect

14, 31, 32, 35-37, 45, 48-50, 52-62, 65-66, 81-83, 85-96, 117-119, 123, 128-129, 132, 161, 163-164, 178, 185, 192-194, 207-234, 240, 243, 246, 261, 267, 278-281, 304, 309, 311, 313-321, 323, 328, 330

astrology

11-12, 24, 53, 85, 87, 179, 198, 205, 240, 310

astronomy

11, 12, 17, 27, 122, 149-157, 165, 169-175, 179, 205, 249, 307

attitude towards Maimonides 17-20, 292 conjunction

368

81, 83, 90-91, 97,

INDEX 146-147, 150, 159-160, 162-163, 166-168, 181-203, 217, 222, 224-225, 237-239, 242, 244245, 252-254, 258, 261, 272-277, 279, 286-287, 290-291, 294-296, 298, 303, 318-319 imitation of God

235-254

immortality

36, 80, 97-98, 155, 159, 162-163, 169, 173, 188-190, 192, 203, 209-210, 216-217, 232, 235, 261, 267, 277, 279, 286, 291, 303, 335

metaphysics

149-158

miracles

14, 19, 21, 23, 41, 48, 50, 52, 64-77, 75-80, 83-100, 101102, 104, 106, 108109, 111, 114-120, 200, 306, 308-332

Moses

18, 25, 47-68, 73, 75-80, 86, 92-94, 96, 99, 118-120, 123, 184, 189, 200, 229, 242, 253, 290, 297-299, 310-313, 322, 330, 335

politics

181-206

prophecy

14, 30, 47-69, 74, 76, 78-83, 86, 90, 119-120, 184-185, 188, 190, 192-200, 204, 239, 290-291, 298, 310-313, 319-320, 322-323, 325, 329, 331, 335

providence

23-25, 29-46, 54-55, 67, 73-74, 78-84,

86, 89-91, 93-95, 97, 102, 157, 173, 188, 194, 200-201, 237, 267, 316, 318, 321-322, 325, 331, 334 scientific progress

159-180, 235-254

women

283-304

God author of the universe

18-19

corporeality, incorporeality of 21, 103, 302 creator, see creation image of

284, 288, 289, 294, 303,

imitation of

200-202, 235-239, 241-243, 253-254

just

30, 34, 37, 39-45, 241

knowledge of particulars

23-24, 29-30, 44, 52, 63, 66-68, 82, 91, 98, 101, 104, 107, 108, 110, 111, 113-119, 156, 186, 189, 246, 307, 309, 313, 318, 325-326, 328, 330, 334-335

love of

140-141, 151, 236, 255, 257, 261, 277, 296-300, 303

perfection of

82

will of

48, 65, 86-87, 101-108, 110-116, 118-120, 146, 156, 175, 237, 240-241, 308, 315, 317, 322, 324, 328-330, 332

wisdom of

43, 52, 54, 57, 189, 213

369

INDEX worship of see also attributes, divine

76, 77

ikkarim, see dogma imagination, faculty of

H hakham

195-196

hokhmah (wisdom)

162, 201, 299, 305

halakhah, see commandments Harvey, (Warren) Zev

13, 17, 206

Hawking, Stephen

174

hazlahah see

felicity

Hebrew

19, 29, 293

heresy

169

holiness

236, 241

Holmes, Sherlock

227

Horetzky, Oded

231, 296

human beings, definition of 32, 62, 95, 122, 166, 237, 295-297 Husik, Isaac

Immanuel ben Solomon of Rome 123, 258 immortality

36, 80, 97-98, 155, 159, 162-163, 169, 173, 188-190, 192, 203, 209-210, 216217, 232, 235, 261, 267, 277, 279, 286, 291, 303, 335

intellect, acquired

57, 96, 162-164, 169, 192, 208-209, 211, 222-223, 278279

intellect, hylic see intellect, material intellect, material

32, 56-58, 123, 128-129, 132, 161, 163-164, 191-192, 208-209, 211-214, 216-224, 226, 228, 232, 246, 272-273, 278-279, 284

intellects, separate

14, 48, 81, 84-85, 88, 90, 92, 143, 164, 175, 210, 240-241, 243, 261, 267, 272, 278279, 315, 316

23, 52, 65-66, 146, 181, 307, 329

I ibn Bajjah

188

ibn Falaquera, Shem Tov

210

ibn Gabirol, Solomon

258

ibn Shabbetai, Judah

291-292

see also Active Intellect

ibn Shem Tov, Shem Tov

306

intellection

ibn Sina (Avicenna)

255

ibn Tibbon, Moses

123, 141, 255-282

ibn Tibbon, Samuel

113, 141-144, 146, 183, 260

idolatry

370

154

49-50, 56, 58, 60, 83, 90, 127, 129, 167, 177, 197, 208209, 211-213, 217, 219-229, 231-232, 234, 311

211-212, 214-216, 222-225, 227-230, 232-234, 278

see also conjunction instrumentalism, see science, formalist view of Islam Israel, see election of Israel

154, 181, 183

INDEX

J

Madruzzo, Cristoforo

Jacobs, Louis

308

Jerusalem

127, 261-262, 283

Jesus

182

justice, divine

30, 34, 37, 39-45, 241

Maimonides acquired intellect

57, 96, 162-164, 169, 192, 208-209, 211, 222, 223, 278-279

Active Intellect

14, 31, 32, 35-37, 45, 48-50, 52-62, 65-66, 81-83, 8596, 117-119, 123, 128-129, 132, 161, 163-164, 178, 185, 192-194, 207-234, 240, 243, 246, 261, 267, 278-281, 304, 309, 311, 313-321, 323, 328, 330

eschatology

71-100, 121

esotericism

133-35, 137-142

imitation of God

235-254

Moses

47, 50, 51, 52

women

293-303

K Kabbalah

27, 239, 333

Kellner, Rivka

9, 286

knowledge, human

14, 22, 31-32, 55, 57, 60, 81, 88, 9498, 119, 131, 150, 155-157, 161-166, 172-173, 175, 186, 190, 193-195, 198199, 207-208, 210214, 217, 219, 220, 221, 225-227, 229, 232, 233, 239, 241, 245, 277-279, 295, 299-300

knowledge, new, after death

230-232

knowledge, scientific

235-254

Kreisel, Howard

24, 83

L

15

Marcaria, Jacob

15-16, 337

mazal

39, 41-42

Meiri, Menahem

27, 275, 336

Menasseh ben Israel

307

Melamed, Abraham

183

Langermann, Y. Tzvi

170, 179, 252

Messer Leon, Judah

146, 239, 307,

Lasker, Daniel J.

15

messiah, messianic era

62-64, 71-80, 83, 86, 94-99, 138, 154,

Latin

148, 183, 204-205 metaphysics

25, 126-127, 145, 147-149, 155, 157, 159, 161-169, 173, 174-179, 190, 193, 195, 198, 242, 254, 261, 262, 275-277, 300, 303,

M ma’aseh bereshit see also physics

19, 300,

ma’aseh merkavah see also metaphysics

300,

see also ma’aseh merkavah

371

INDEX miracles

14, 19, 21, 23, 41, 48, 50, 52, 64-77, 75-80, 83-100, 101-102, 104, 106, 108-109, 111, 114120, 200, 306, 308332

Miriam

290-291, 297-298, 303

Mishneh Torah

47, 50-51, 151-152, 154, 156, 183, 333

misogyny

8, 283-304

O Ottolenghi, Joseph 15-16

P Patriarchs

25, 62, 93, 143, 245

perfection, human

13, 22, 25-26, 32, 48, 50, 57, 59, 61, 63, 65, 80-82, 9091, 94-95, 125, 128, 132-133, 146147, 150, 159-160, 162-163, 166-168, 181, 184-185, 190192, 195-197, 201, 203, 217, 222, 224225, 237-239, 242, 244-245, 252-254, 258, 261, 272-277, 279, 286-287, 290291, 294-296, 298, 303, 318-319

moral perfection, see perfection, moral Moscato, Judah

307

Moses

18, 25, 47, 50-52, 60-65, 68, 73, 7580, 86, 92-94, 96, 99, 118-120, 123, 184, 189, 200, 229, 242, 253, 290, 297299, 310-313, 322, 330, 335,

moral

32, 49, 95, 125, 127, 162, 181, 185190

of the imagination

56

see also prophecy, Mosaic

N Nahmanides

19, 20, 26, 27, 80, 290,

Narboni, Moses

183, 312, 319

nature

14, 31, 35, 55, 64, 66, 80-81, 85, 8889, 91-92, 94, 101, 103, 106, 110, 116-118, 122, 124, 126, 131, 161, 171, 177, 196, 199, 215, 217, 240, 246, 261, 288, 292, 294, 296, 299, 302, 311, 315, 317319, 323, 328

Noah

372

Perfet, Isaac bar Sheshet

305-306, 309

peshat

26, 121, 130-131, 159, 179, 273

philosopher-king

182-183, 188, 253,

physics

126-127, 145, 147, 150, 155, 159, 161167, 169, 171-173, 175-179, 190, 193, 195, 198, 242-243, 251, 254, 261-262, 276-277, 300, 303,

see also ma’aseh bereshit Pines, Shlomo

148, 181-182, 184, 200, 252

Plato

15, 155, 170, 182,

19, 95, 284-285

INDEX 203, 207, 213-214, 233, 236, 293 Pratensis, Felix

12-13

pri kol ha-adam (kol pri ha-adam) 80, 189, 160 prognostication see also prophecy

11, 53-54, 58, 60, 78,

progress, scientific

17, 68, 95, 148, 150-151, 153-154, 167, 244-245, 253, 267, 276

prophecy

14, 30, 47-69, 74, 76, 78-83, 86, 90, 119-120, 184-185, 188, 190, 192-200, 204, 239, 290-291, 298, 310-313, 319320, 322-323, 325, 329, 331, 335,

see also prognostication and miracles

86, 90, 91, 94, 97, 102, 117

degrees of

49-50, 56, 58, 60, 197

Mosaic

47-69, 76, 78, 119-121, 134, 185, 329-330

providence

Ptolemy

23-25, 29-46, 5455, 67, 73-74, 7884, 86, 89-91, 9395, 97, 102, 157, 173, 188, 194, 200-201, 237, 267, 316, 318, 321-322, 325, 331, 334 17, 155, 170-171, 264

R Rabad see Abraham ben David

Rahman, Fazlur

210

Rashba, see Adret, Solomon ben Abraham Rashi

73, 274

rational animals, see human beings, definition of revelation

50, 61-63, 65, 72, 98, 101-120, 139, 154, 183, 187, 313, 323-324, 326-327, 329-330, 332,

see also Sinai and reason

20-22, 68-69, 72, 125, 157

resurrection

40, 71-99

Riva di Trento

15-16, 56, 337

S Saadiah Gaon

30, 71, 334

sacrifices

19

Samuelson, Norbert

59, 225

sanctity, see holiness Schwarzschild, Steven

S. 7, 9, 16, 181, 332

sciences, progress in, see progress, scientific separate intellects, see intellects, separate Shalom, Abraham

307-308

shefa see emanation Sinai

62-63, 65, 92, 139, 308, 313, 323, 328-330

see also revelation Solomon

96, 121, 126-127, 130, 131-135, 138-139, 147, 160, 189, 203, 242, 244,

373

INDEX 247, 261, 262, 272, 274-275, 293, 335 Strauss, Leo

V vita activa

181, 237

vita contemplative

181, 206, 237

98, 181-184, 200

T

W

tabernacle

17

Thirteen Principles

47, 51, 184, 333

to’alot (to’aliyot)

15, 65, 129, 203

will, divine, see God, will of will, freedom of, see freedom of the will William of Moerbeke

204

Torah includes physics and metaphysics 242

wisdom, see hokhmah

perfection of

21

women

secrets of

132, 135-136, 141-143, 145-146, 279

world to come, see immortality

374

283-304