Tolerance and Transformation: Jewish Approaches to Religious Pluralism (JEWISH PERSPECTIVES) [1 ed.] 0878205047, 9780878205042

Citation preview

TOLERANCE AND TRANSFORMATION Jewish Approaches to Religious Pluralism

SANDRA B. LUBARSKY

THE

J E WISH PERSPECTIVES

SERIES

OF THE HEBREW UNION COLLEGE PRESS

The Jewish Pe rspective s s e ries p resents scholarl y works that are o f b road i n te rest a n d relevant to co nte mporary J e w i s h l ife .

EUGENE MIHALY

A Song to Creation.' A Dialogu£ with

a

Text

SHELDON H. BLANK

Prophetic T hought: Essays and Addresses HAROLD M SCHULWEIS

Evil and the Morality oj God SANDRA B. LUBARSKY

Tolerance and Transformation: Jewish Approaches to Religious Pluralism

Tolerance and Transformation Jewish Approaches to Religious Pluralism

SANDRA B. LUBARSKY

HEBREW UNION COLLEGE PRESS C incinnati

© Copyright 1 990 by the Hebrew Union Col lege P ress Hebrew Union College-Jewish I n stitute of Rel i gion Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Lubarsky, Sandra B. Tolerance and transformation : J ewish approaches to religious plural ism / by Sandra B . Lubarskv. p. ern. - ( Jewish perspectives ; 4) I neludes bibliographical references . I S B N 0-8 7820-504-7 1 . J udaism - Relat ions - Christiani ty. 2. Ch ristianity and other rel i gions -Judaism . 3. Judaism - 2 0th century. 4. Dialogue­ Religious aspects . 5. Religious pluralism . I . Title . II . Serie s . B M535 . L7 6 1 990 90-4206 2 9 6 . 3'8 7 2 - dc20 eI P

P rinted o n acid-free paper Manufactured in the U n i ted States of America Distributed by Behrman House , I n c . 235 Watchung Av("nue, West Orange, New Jersey 0 7 052

This book is dedicated to my husband, Marcus Peter Ford

Contents Acknowledgments IX

Introduction

Chapter One

Veridical Pluralism and Transformative Dialogue

5 Chapter Two

The Non-Jew Through Jewish Eyes

17 Chapter Three

Leo Baeck: Practical Tolerance

29 Chapter Four

Franz Rosenzweig: Complementarity Without Parity

49 Chapter Five

Martin Buber: Serving Separately and Yet All Tog ether

73 Chapter Six

Mordecai Kaplan: Co-inclusive Civilizations

101 Chapter Seven

Toward Mutually Transformative Dialogue:

The Example of Judaism and Buddhism 119 Notes

129

Acknowledgments This book began as an i n q u i ry i n t o the mean i n g of chosen ness in a plu ralis­ t i c world . Very soon into that proj ect , the i s s u e of compe t i n g truth claims became cent ral , and I was led into the larger world o f comparative rel i g i o n s and fro m there into i n terrel i g i o u s dialogu e . I n this plu ral istic society, i t see m s not o n l y prete n t i o u s but a l s o anachro n i s t i c t o try to m ake s e n s e o f ( o r to decl are as nonsense) the idea o f chosen n e s s without reference to the self­ u nderstandings of other trad i t i on s . It has become clear to me that dialogue between trad i t i o n s i s fu ndamental to do i n g theology . I am parti c u l arly i n debted to two i n d i v idual s for their g u i d a n c e and e n c o u r ­ age m e n t o n t h i s project . Professor J o h n B . C ob b , J r . , both before and since serv i n g as m y d i ssertation advisor, has been m y "master teacher. " I t has been m y great good luck to study with h i m ; his b oo k , Beyond Dialogue: Toward a Mutual Transformation of Christianity and Buddhism, has been my model for t h i s study. When

I

be gan m y docto ral s tu die s , Dav id Ellenson's cou rse i n modern

J ew i s h though t at the Hebrew U n i o n C ollege , Los A n gel e s , electrified m e . He has c o n t i n ued to be a sou rce of knowledge and encou ragem e n t , and I h ave been sustained by h i s fri e n d s h i p . I am gratefu l to E u reka C ol l e ge , E u reka , I l l i n o i s , which provided me with fu n d s for this proj e c t . In part i c u l ar, I want to thank the l i b rary staff which , u n d e r the d i rection of M s . Nancy B l o m s t ro m , provided me with exten s ive interlibrary loans and endless renewals. Professor M i chael A . M eyer and h i s assistan t s, M s . Barbara Selya and R ab b i Faedra Lazar We i s s, read the e n t i re m an u script and offered many h elpfu l suggestions on both style and conten t . I a m t h an k fu l , too , fo r the m an y years o f support and e n c o u rage m e n t given t o m e by my parents- Ruth Lubarsky, Barbara Ford, and Dr. Peter F ord . T h i s book is dedicated to my h u sban d , Marcus Peter Ford . M any t i m e s o u r m u t u al students have wondered what o u r d i n n e r conversat i o n s are l i k e : over the past five years they very often have been abou t t h i s m a n u sc ript . M arcus'

IX

x

Tolerance and Transformation

unwavering support, his critical remarks and leading insights, have been crucial to this project. Together we hope that our two young sons, Aaron and Daniel, will have the temperaments and the desire to talk with others ( i nclud­ ing the i r parents) about the thi n gs that m atter m o st .

Introduction In the last twenty-five years , the e ffo rt to u nderstand the ways of others has re i n v i gorated reli gi o u s discussion o n many level s . We have e ntered what one lead i n g Jewish t h i n ke r has described as the "Age of D i a l o gue ."] But what should be the natu re of such dialogue? And what should be its go a\? What exactly is the prope r relat i o n s h i p between d i fferent com m u n i t ies of faith? In December of 1 987, t hese questions were addressed o f the

New York Times

Oil

the opin i o n pages

by Arthur H ertzbe r g , an o fficer o f the World J e w i s h

C o n gre s s , i n reply to a state m e n t m a d e by J o seph C ardinal Ratzin ger, t h e chief Vatican theologian . A s i nterpreted b y H e rtzberg, C ardinal R atzin ger's posit i o n i s that "a J e w encounters the ful l tru th of h i s J u daism only by becom­ ing a C atholic ."2 Prote s t i n g t h i s assertio n , J ew i s h parti c ipant s i n the for m al C atholic-J ewish d i al o gu e that be gan i n 1971 between the two com m u n ities canceled their scheduled meet i n gs , argu i n g that such a p o s i t i o n makes dia­ logue i m possibl e . B u t H e rtzberg argued that C ar d inal R atzin ger did n o t h i n g o ffe n s i v e ; instead , he "cu red u s of an illusion" and r i ghtly red i rected the path o f d ialogue . Accord i n g to H e rtzberg, C ardinal Ratzin ge r claimed for C at h o l i ­ c ism what m o s t J e ws wish to claim for J udaism : "rel i g i o u s primacy." While such a claim does put an end to the developm e n t of "a n e w , l iberal theology" which can be professed by both Jews and C athol i c s , i t does n o t put an end to i n t e rrel i g i o u s d i al o gue. It is thus c l e a r n o w beyond an y doubt t h a t n o dialo gue t h a t h a s any t h e o l o gi­ cal content can b e conducted b e t w e e n t h e two c o m m u nities, for s u c h discussion s c a n l e a d only to increasi n g a n g e r. But the dialogue is n o t therefore a t a n e n d . . The fal lout fro m C ardinal Ratzinger's interview h as sim p l y re-established t h at Jews and C atholics b e l o n g to differing religion s . The dialogue c a n n o w return to its origins, n o d oubt in a m u c h m ore sober m o o d . J e w s should con­ tinue to discuss with Catholics a whole host of social and even political problems i n which b o t h com munities a r e involve d . the quest for social j u s tice

. . J e w s a n d C a t h olics a r e c o mrades i n

3

H ertzberg clearly restates the modern appro ach to the relationship between faith s : people o f d i fferent traditions who fin d themselves i n close pro x i m i t y and dependent upon the same resources, and perhaps h av i n g a c o m m o n

2

Tolerance and Transformation

encmy, m u st tolerate one another's differences and even cooperate with one another. But they need not , and ought not , go beyond tolerance to a relation­ ship that i s not simply "external ," concerned with social or political or eco­ nomic relations, to a relationship that is "internal ," concerned with one's deep­ est convictions about the nature of reality. On the model of the polite visitor who refrains from speaking about reli gion or politics to his o r her hosts , the dialoguc between different reli gions should also shun any critical discussion of the things that matter most : our perceptions of truth . This book i s written from a position that is at odds with the notion that we should en gage in dialogue only in order to assure social tranquility and not also as a means for uncovering truth . I t should be undertaken fur both rea­ son s . Dialogue that joins diverse people together for work on a shared good lIlay lead us into fellowsh i p . Dialogue that extends our understanding of one another, of ourselves , and of truth , may ground that fellowship in deep soil so that its sweet fruit m i ght endure . I ndeed , "practical" dialogue - abou t social p roblems - and "theological" dialogue - about perceived truths - go hand-in­ hand . Theological dialogue is not only possible ; i t is h i ghly desirable because it i s a means for acquiring a fuller understanding and hence a deeper peace . This book is an attempt to describe a Jewish approach to non-Jewish tradi­ tion s . Beyond this , it is an attempt to describe a way i n which Jews m i ght remain faithfu l to their relationship with God even as they encounter other tradition s . It i s based on the assumption that the plurality of faiths is a blessed fact and that the strongest affirmat ion of this fact - an affirmation of the theological relevance of other religions - i s also the more profound way of remaining faithfu l as .Jews to God's presence in our Jivc s . I t begins w ith a n affirmation of veridical pluralz'sm and a rejection of both absolutism and relativism . I Veridical pluralism is the position that there is a plurality of truth-laden traditions . The truths that are possessed by d i fferent t raditions, both religious and nonreli gious, may be different - that is, they m ay be illuminative of different aspects of reality, or they may be the same truths expressed diflercntlv. Truth itself is coherent - i t holds together without contradiction ; the partial truths that are known to u s through our l i m ited perspectives may thus be different from each other, but not mutually contra­ dictory. There is a u niverse and it contains a plurality of true expressions . I t also contains m a n y incorrect descriptions . O u r task , as members of the uni­ verse and of partieular truth-seeking traditions , is to distingu i sh between the true and the false and to make the truth our inheritance, regardless oj its progenitors. I t is in dialogu e that we who participate in various t raditions which claim knowledge of the truth are challenged to correct , enlarge , restate and/or reform our knowledge . VVhen it is u ndertaken fix the sake of the u niverse ­ that i s , for the sake of everyone , including ourselves and others , the non­ h u m an world and God - it entails the m u tual setti n g forward of our most private and crucial beliefs for the purpose of reaping a fuller u nderstanding of

Introduction

3

truth . Such dialogue i s termed i n this essay transJormative dialogue because serious regard for another's truth claims may well lead to a transformation of one's own self-understan d i n g'" In brief, verid ical plu rali s m assumes both a profound comm i tment to truth and a wholehearted com mitment to a trad i t ion . A t the same time , i t presup­ poses the historical conditionality of all traditions and yet stipulates that the hypothesis that they are equally valuable be tested i n dialogue . Finally, i t requires ful l openness t o the claims o f others a n d the willingness to transform one's own trad i tion in l i ght of the truth that i s foun d . I ndeed, t h i s book constitutes a methodological prelude to t ransformative d i alogue between Jews and non-Jews or between J udaism and nonreligious outlooks such as M arxism and evolutionary b iology. I n chapter one , a fuller argu m e n t for veridical plural i s m i s made and transformative dialogue i s fur­ ther explained . C h apter two i s a brief overview of the h istory of the J ewish u nderstandi n g of non-Jewish trad i t ion s . The models that fou r major modern J ew i sh thinkers - Leo Baeck , Franz Rosenzwe i g , M artin B uber, and Morde­ cai Kaplan - developed for understan d i n g non-Jewish traditions have been formative for contemporary liberal J ewish though t . In chapters three through six, these models are examined i n detai l , both to i l l u m inate our options and to move us beyond their creators' i n s i ghts . The fin al chapter i s an i maginative construction of a transformative d ialogu e , undertaken to show the benefi t s of such an exchange . While not the result of an act u al i n terchange between a Jew and a Buddhist , it i s to be read as an example of some of the possibilities i nherent in transformative dialogu e . The poin t o f depart u re here i s t h e affirmation o f veridical plural i s m , which requi res a new way of approachi n g other trad i t ion s . It i s argued that mutually transformative dialogue i s the most fru i t fu l way to respond to the fac t of veridical plurali s m and should therefore be the goal of J ewish participants in d i alogu e .

1 Veridical Pluralism and Transformative Dialogue Because Jews have almost always l ived as a minority community whose religio- cultural orientation differed , sometimes more and sometimes less, from that of the majority community, they have been ready advocates o f rel igious tolerance . This advocacy was n o t a recognition of the truth claims of other religious tradition s . I ndeed , traditional J udaism seldom (if ever) main­ tained that other religions were in themselves pathways to salvation . R ather, the Jewish affirmation of religious tolerance was primarily a response to the sociological conditions of the Jewish peopl e . Were C hristians and Muslims to establish a policy of religious tolerance , life fo r the Jewish population within their borders would be a good deal less fragile . I ndeed , since religious toler­ ance is the basis for civic tolerance , the political , social , and economic benefits of religious tolerance would be considerable . I n the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century, there was a signi ficant increase in the level of tolerance that was accorded the Jews who lived in Western Europe . But the basis of Jewish emancipation was not the Chri stian community's acknowledgment of the truth value of Judaism . What was affirmed was that despite Judaism , Jews ought to be accorded some l iberties. A position of tolerance was reached on the basis of a general humanitarianism : all human bein gs. by virtue of their humanity, deserve a certain amount of respect . I mportant as this insight was , it required no reconstruction of Chris­ tianity's understanding of J udaism . Jews , not Judaism , were to be tolerated . I n the main , the emancipated J ewish community did not move beyond this general humanitarian principle . J udaism's own , much older, theory of the natural rights of human beings continued to serve as the framework for assess­ ing the non-Jew . The tradition of the Noachide Laws asserts that salvation is available to non-J ews if they maintain a minimal level of humanity. People of other traditions are to be tolerated - indeed , will be saved - if they adhere to the Noachide Laws . The only "truths" that other religious traditions possess are the "truths" of J udaism , most especially those that are stated i n the Noachide Laws .

5

Tolerance and Transformation

6

N either C h ristianity nor Judaism proposed that there migh t be more than one true and salvific t radition . What eventu ally came to be recogn ized , how­ ever, was the fact that theological absolutism i s insupportabl e . Today we know that the logic of absolutism does not hold . We know it by means of contempo­ rary physics, which asserts that we arc limited by our subj e ctivity and our physical location . We know it thro u gh h istory, with its bloody evidence of the destructive consequences of absolutism . \Ve know it through biblical scholar­ shi p , which i n forms us that our t raditional basis for confidence is itself an example of shifting perspective s . And we know it through our personal experi­ ences of 100'ing those who do not share our tradition s . B u t n o w w e m istakenly believe that w e m ust e mbrace relativism i f we are to avoid the corruptions o f absolutism . Relativism , however, has its own seriou s failings. Most signifi cantly, while it denies any religion the right to assert its truth over that of another, it also results in a negation of the existence of truth itself. Moreover, relativism repeats some of the errors of absol u t ism; most egregiously, it too makes any real sympathy for another tradition impossibl e . O u r choices , howewr, are not limited to absolutism and relativism . We do not need to absolutize our position and hence annul the other's position , and we do not need to abandon the truths we possess i n order to make room for other religions. There i s a t hird option , the option of veridical p luralism. Veridi­ cal pluralism allows u s to maintain the insights of modern phy sics , biblical scholarsh i p , historiography, and existential encounter, insigh t s that remind u s o f our personal limits a n d i nform u s o f o u r fellow beings' capabilitie s . Unlike relativism , however, it also allows us to hold to the position that truth exist s . Veridical pluralism i s t h e position that there i s more t h a n o n e tradition that "speaks truth" (verus dicere). It is based on the principle that reality is one and that truth i s cohere n t . The truths that are spoken by traditions are partial and particular truths, and for that reason they may appear to conflict with one another. B u t i f what a tradition speaks i s really true , then it must be congruent with other statements of truth . Veridical plu ralism affirms the idea that there m ay be real and i mportant differences (as well as similarities) between tradi­ tions, but that which is t rue is o f necessity compatible with al l else that i s true . I n its affirmation of the partial nature of human u nderstanding, veridical pluralism opposes absolutism and exclusivism . I n its affirmation of the one­ ness and the necessary coherence of truth , veridical pluralism opposes relativism . Veridical pluralism i s not simply the recognition that there are many ways b y which humans seek salvation . It i s the affirmation that several of these arc ways of t ruth . In other word s , veridical pluralism goes beyond the recognition of the fact of plurality to a j u dgment about the plural forms that fil l the worl d . T h e human dimension of t h e world is a n d always h a s consisted of a wide variety of sal v at i o n seekin g way s , not only religious but also political , philo­ sophical , and aesthetic. Not all of these have generated i mportant truth s , and -

Fer,Jimi j'iuIU[ism and j;a/ljjurmativr Dialogue

7

i ndl't'd, many ha\ (' contained serious falsehoods or only trivial insi!-;hts, Such traditions are clearly inkrior to those that embody important truths . I n reach­ ing this cvaluation, veri d ical pluralism i s distinguished from cultural plural­ i sm , which silll ply affi rms the external fact of plurality but does not attcmpt to eyaluatt' the internal nature uf each form. \'criclical pluralislll also d i ffers frolIl i nc!usiyism , the position that there are many traditions that contain truth s , b u t which arc true o n l y i nsofitr as the v conftJrlTI to the one, greater tradition . While inclusivism seems to affirm the truth \ alue of other filith s and hence pluralism , it is really a f()rm of absolut­ ism. For the inc!usi\'ist , there is o n l y o n e true religion ; a l l others are regarded as cieriYati\'C, partial , supplementary, and basically nonessential. Bv virtue of thei r relationshi p w ith the one m ature tradition , they are \'aluable: to the degrce that they stray from the matu re tradition , they decrease in valu e . I n contrast, veridical pluralism declares that there lllay be important truths within another tradition that are not now present withi n one's own, Thi s recognition i s fundamentaL It follows, thc n , that veridical pluralism moves in a d i ffercnt direction fro m that plu ral i sm w h i c h assumes that t h e differences between traditions a r c n o t essential difference s . 1 :\!though veridical plu rali sm recognizes that there i s a good deal of overlap between some traditions ( for example , between J udaism, C hristi anity, and Islam) , it also recognizes that the differences between tradi ­ tions a r c no l e s s important - a n d perhaps arc l'\Tn more i mportant - than thei r simi\;u'itie s . There may in fact be a universal theology that inf the personal integrity of the other tradition and l i sten in hope for the verification of that inte grity. I t i s analogous to the attitude of objectivity

Vrridical Pluralmll and Tram/u rmatire Dlaln.r:ur

c a lled fCll' by t h e ,ciel1tific m c t hod, That notiol1, for a l l its mist aken ds s u m p­ tio n s about reality, righ t fu l l y attem p t s to ex p ress the same dqit ude c;t!led fo r by the theo l o gical a s s u m p tion of parity: gen uinc openness t o t h a t which o n e is t rying t o u ndlTs t a n d , The notion o f p ari t \ is a h y p o t hesis - t h a t t here are several equ ally valid way s , I t needs to he tes ted in dialugu e , uut the dialugue in which it m u s t be tested w o u l d not h;l]lpen if t h e a s s u m ption of parity were n o t m ack , In contrast , within the relati\'ist []lodel, the notion of p arit y is a fu regone concl u sion , The rel ati\'is t j u d gment of parity p rior t o dia l o gue a c t u ­ ally renders dialo gu e s u perfl u ou s: If all t raditio ns a r e equally v alid , then t here is little motivation fCJr listenin g with anything other t h an cu rio sity t o adheren t s o f another t radition: thlTC i s no m o ral o r existen tial reason

to

do so , M o re­

over, t h ere is n o c o n vincin g rea son to rem ain committed t o o ne's own t radi­ t io n , I f all path s arc eq u a l l Y val u able, the po ten tial t r aveler is faced with the questio n , \\'hy choose this path rather t h a n another?

A

p articular p a t h might

be m o re convenien t o r t he one t h a t family members h an' long taken , But it ca n n o t be claimed t h at the chosen path is the o n l y true one o r the m o s t t ru e o n e . Vigorous com mitment t o a t radition i s t h u s diffic u l t , if n o t im p o s sible , t o s u s t ain . Relativism - tht' perem ptory affirm ation of p arity betwt't'n religio n s p rior t o investigat i o n - is at best a su perficial endorsement of p l uralism a n d tolerance . Other t r aditio n s arc reco gnized as valid , b u t t h at reco gnition docs n o t hin ge on a n y in-depth u n derstandin g or a p p reciation fo r t h e o ther. On p rinciple. and not as a c o n sequence of intentio n al interactio n , the rel ati\'ist affi r m s t h e validity of another t raditio n . In fact , it Ill av be cOll1 pletely u nkno w n t o the rel ativist who n onetheless affirm s its v alidity. This is t o lerance at it s \\ e ' t olerance fo r its o w n sake, not fo r the s a ke o f t r u t h . I n deed , it can be t reacher­ ous if fol lowed con sistently, fo r it can resul t in t h e t oleration o f evil .

We k n ew t h e re were religious cann i b als, reli gious sacri f ices o f h Ulll a n \'icti lm. reli gious wars of aggn·"ion. reli gious m urders, religious castes - and so OIL \Iost of these h a\'e b('('n pushed asi d e in our consciousness t h ro u gh t h e fl('('d , and i t is a rcal need , to be tolerant and to free religion from its b akful faulh of i n t ol e rance , fimati cislll, and unbridled cru elty . .. and twcnt i e th-century expni­ {'IHe has abo i l lustratcd this point extrayagantl y. For i n our cent u ry i n tolerable for llls of reli giun and rhe religious h ave Clppcareu: i n virulentlv nationalistic Shint o , in Nazism , i n aspects of Stalinism and l'vlaoi'lIl. in KhollH'ini-and i n each of t h ese s it u a tions a n absolutc reli gi o n sanctions an oppressive class, racc, or national po",er. Tht'Se represen t t h e "shado\\' side" of rel i gion, and they arc radi cally destructive.I

In o rder t o a c t agai n s t s u c h (' \'il s , w e IIIlls t be able t o po sit a set o f values t h at is not limited to this o r that t r adition , b u t which SClTt'S as a tUltlsC'en dcll t n o r m b y which all filith s a r c j u d ged a n d which l e a d s u s t o t h e concl usion t h a t n o t all

10

TO/I'rance and 1i-an:,joTrnation

are equally valid. To postulate such a standard i s , of course , to dissolve relativism . Those people who prescribe relativism as an antidote to the evils of absolut­ ism find themselves in an insuffCrable position when the antidote no longer stems the poison and may even advance i t . When they choose to resist the evil promotions of another tradition, they believe themselves to be without ground to stand on. But the ground is there . I t is the ground of veridical pluralism . Veridical pluralism i s affirmative both of the modern insight that all activity is culturally conditioned and of the traditional insight that there are values that t ranscend particular cultures. One i s not thereiclIT forced into choosing betwcen absolutism and relativism or between particularism and u niversal­ ism . Like relativism , veridical pluralism u pholds the historical and cultural relativity of all traditions . And yet , l i ke the models of cxclusivism and inclusiv­ ism , veridical pluralism affirms whole-hearted cOlTlmitment to a tradition . For just as scientists cannot d issolve their subj ecti\'itv evell as they seek after objectivity, adherents of specific religions need not relinquish their faith com­ m itments in order to achieve an attitude of opennes s . Openness and commit­ ment arc not contrary positions ( unless one is committed to a lack of open­ ness) . I n deed , commitment is a necessary i n gredient for a fru i t ful d ial ogu e : it i s what makes the whole enterprise important and passionate . I f one is not committed to it tradition , engagement in a dialogue may be intellectually stimulating or academically interesting, but not crucial . Seen from within the model of veridieal plural i sm , profound com mitment to a tradition and accep­ tance of its limited nature are not two horns of a dilemma. Onlv if one does not accept the premise that all traditions have been at least partiallv formed within the crucible o f h i s t ory , or i f one contends that the relationship between all traditions i s one of parity, are ful l commitment to a tradition and full openness to other t raditions inimical . The sort of commitment that one m akes to a tradition (or person or institu­ tion) i n the bee of historical consciousness is analogous to an ongoing promise of IO\'C . (;ommitment to one's spouse or one's children is not a consequence of their perfection , and indeed onc lov es them even as one recognizes their l i m itations . So too with commitlllcn t to a t radition : in spite of that t radition's l i mitation s , and because of what it i s and what it could be , we commit our­ selve s , as lovers, to it . The denial of the absolute nature of any tradition is at the salllc time the affirmation of t h e dynamic character of all religions. Those that span millenia and continents have changed a great deal; i n some cases their modern and original forms resemble one another very littl e . There are , for example , enor­ mous differcnces between Judaism i n the sixth century B . C . E . and i n the first century C .E . or between American Reform and Moroccan Orthodox J uda­ ism . The model of veridical plu ralism affirms and values the dynamic charac­ ter of all of these J u d ai s ms . It is a fact that when traditions interac t , they often

11

Vrrz'dz'(a/ Pluralism and iTwljurmative Dialugu6'

chan ge. one another: tor exam ple , J u daism affe c t e d H e l l e n i s m ane! w a s i n t u rn H e l lcnized ,

Such changes are n o t nece s s a r i l y good o n e s: whcn m ade in

response to new t r u t h s, however. thn are very likdv b e n e ficiaL In o r d e r t o be fait h fu l to onc', own t r u t h-secki n g t r adition, one m u s t r e s p o n d to t r u t h no mat t e r \\ ho its bearer is . But bec a u s e o f the funda m e ntally dyn amic n a t u r e o f t raditio n s , t h e e n c o u n t e r w i t h n e w t r u t h s n e e d n o t l ead t o a breakdown o f o n e's o w n fai t h o r a fallin g away fro m i t . I t

may han' t h o s e consequ e n c e s ,

but i t

i s n o t l i m i t e d t o t h e m . The decision t o c o n v e rt afte r h a v i n g e n gaged i n dia­ l o gu e rna\' be a s t a t e m e n t about t h e inabili t y of one's o w n t radition to incorpo­ rate a s i g n i fica n t truth adequately, The d e c i s i o n t o reaffirm one's t r ad i t i o n w i t h o u t change m a y be a s t a t e m e n t t h a t n o s i gnifi c a n t n e w t r u t h was encoun­ t e r e d . I n te rrel i gi o u s d i al o g u e rna\' l e a d to

conversion

or to a firm

reiteration

of

one's fai t h , B u t because t r a d i tio n s arc m u table , d i al o gu e m a y also l e ad t o t h e

transformation

of one's own t radition in response to an e n c o u n t e r with a signifi­

c a n t new t r u t h .

.J u d a i sm

has b e e n m o s t successfu l in t r a n s form i n g i t self (and , i n c e r t a i n

i m p o r t a n t instance s , others) i n response t o i t s e n c o u n t e r ()\'e r the c e n t u r i e s w i t h o t h e r tradit i o n s and c u l t u r e s , A n d y e t i t h a s been a b l e t o m a i n t a i n a balance between co n t i n uity and c h a n ge . I t h a s b e e n able to i n t e grate m a n y n e w i d e a s t h at w e r e fi rst "alien" b u t w h ich b e c a m e 'Je w i s h ." A n d t h e s e n e w ideas w e r e n o t c r u d e l y graft e d on so t h a t J u da i s m became a s y n c re t i c ju m b l e . R a t h e r, on the m o d e l of a person , J u d ai s m m a i n t ai n e d i t s

per.lorlhood,

i t s self­

c o n t i n uity, even as it grew and t ravel e d , flo u rished a n d s u ffe red a n d aged , This ach inTm e n t w a s possible because of t h e classical J e w i s h method o f self­ u n d e rstanding Of self-explan atio n : co mnH' n t arv. " C o m m e ntary allowed d i ffe r ­ e n t ge nerations o f J e w s t h e opport u n i t y t o cfe atively interpret t heir i n t e l l e c t u al 5 h e r i tage within t h e context of a t r ad i t i o n ." B ecause of t h i s m e t h o d , t h e c e n tr a l a n d d e fining " s t o ry"

1'01' J u daism

could a b i d e , b u t

it

t h o u s a n d variat i o n s o n t h e

s t o r y c o u l d Ill' m ade , T h e re arc two p ri ncipal co m p o n e n t s to t h e m e t hod:

peshat

and

draIh. PeIhat

i s t h e a ttclIl pt to u n de r s t a n d the text as it speaks for i t se l f; the l is t e n e r approaches the text i n a p h e n o m e n ol o gical way, a t t e m p t i n g t o h e ar t h e u n e m ­ b e l l i s h e d (;[(:ts t h at i t g i ve s ,

Drash

i s t h e existe n t i al r e ad i n g o f t h e text; t h e

reader i s fre e to tIlO \'C beyond t h e pro saic t o a personal and creat ive interpreta­ tion of it. D a\'i d H ar t m a n d i scloses t h e s i gn i ficance o f t h e s e e l e m e n t s fo r t h e lIl e t h o d o f cOlIl lll e n tary a s a whole :

C o m m entarv thus involves an interestinl( balance o f pot(,nt ially contradictory attitudes. Prshlll d e m ands of the com m entator that h e subordinate his i n t e rests and feelings t o the t(,xt before h i m , while mldrash [drash] frees t h e com m cntator to uncover personally lllea n i n gful i nsights and attitudes w i t h i n the gi\'en text. The d ialectical tension between conti n u i t y and change l i es at the heart of com m e n -

12

Tolerance and Transformation tary a n d explai n s how Jewish creativity was able to express vastly differing 6 religiou s orientations without severing its conn ection to the past

Jews have l o n g had a way to incorporate n e w ideas i n t o the trad i t i o n w i t h o u t l o s i n g i t s central i n s i gh t s and expressions. An d J u daism has a l o n g h i story o f tran s formative change . T h e most o b v i o u s example i s the one that i s assumed b y t h e fo rego i n g discussion o f commentary - i t s transformation from a b i b l ical to a t al m u d i c o r rabbinic t r ad i t io n . The decision to write down the o ral tradition and to give i t authority equal to the biblical material was a decision that affirmed both c o n t i n u i t y and change . A n d it was no accident that the written form o f the o ral trad i t i o n i n cluded c o n fl i c t i n g opi n i o n s and argu ­ m e n t s ; it was a con scious acknowledgment of the dynam i c n a t u re of l i fe and hence o f religio n . In the precedi n g page s , veridical plural i s m has been promoted as the l o gi c al consequence of modern h i storical conscio u s n e s s . There i s , however, a rel i ­ gious argu m e n t , i n deed a spec i fically J ew i s h one , to be made i n behalf o f v e r i d ical plural i s m : t h e argu m e n t based o n J e w i sh theoce n t r i s m . J u daism is a theocentric trad i t i o n . What it means to l ive a J e w i sh l i fe is to attempt to live i n fait h fu l n e s s to God , to be holy like God , to do God's will , to walk w i t h God , t o be respo n s ive to God , t o m ake God the center o f one's l i fe so that all o f l i fe becomes sanctifi e d . What does i t mean to be God-centered in a world i n which we are aware of the l i m i t a t i o n s of our percepti o n s and t r u t h s and rel i gious trad i t i o n s? What does i t mean to be fai t h fu l to God's presence i n these m o d e r n t i m e s? S u rely i t mea n s that we m u st give u p the notion that everythi n g that i s important to be known has already been revealed to u s . Revelation need n o t b e "con tentless ," b u t the content that i s revealed cannot be assumed to be fully concl u s i ve . To believe that there i s noth i n g further for J ews to learn abou t God's pre sence i n the world is to m a i n t a i n a conceit that limits God and moves toward idolatry o f the h u m an m i nd . What has been revealed m ay be d i ffe rent from what i s b e i n g revealed and fro m what will be revealed . We must work to be ful l y open t o God's m e ssage as i t i s spok e n t o u s now . F urthermore , i n fai t h fu l n e s s to God , we m u s t be tr uly receptive to the m e ssage spoken b y adhere n t s o f other fai th s . To maintain that God speaks only t o Jews i s corruptive o f the n a t u re o f God for i t imposes a human d e sire for excl u sivity on God , who is n o t exclusive . A n d to hold that God spe aks best t o Jews o r to assert , apart from gen u i n e dialogue , t h at J ews u n derstand best what God say s , i s an attitude o f such pre sumpt u o u s n e s s that our theocen t r i c foc u s i s b l u rred . It i s precisely the J e w i sh c o m m i t m e n t to God , who i s presen t throughout the world a s a l o v i n g a n d comm u n i cative pare n t , that calls for a J ew i s h affirmation of veridical plural i sm . Ope n n e s s to others is ope n n e s s to God . I n the twentieth c e n t ury, responsiveness to God takes the form o f

Vnidical Plurallsm and Transformatia Dialog,,/,

responding, openly and seriously, to the claims of other faith s . The fundamen­ tal theocentricity ofj udaism stands as the best reason for a J nvish affirmation of veridical plural i sm . I t follows, then , that the only sacred principle in the dialoguc process is the principk of ful l openness in the quest for t ruth . Such a principle drin's us, in this modern world . into the domains of religions other than our own and we are required , for the sake of OUT TFlationship ll'ith God. to come to appropriate terms with them . Tradi tionally, the Jewish rommunity has seen itself in relation to the non­ Jewish world as the normativc religion , compared to which every other reli ­ gion was inadequate . Yet , non-J ewish traditions were tolerated . prO\'idi n g t h a t t h e y adhered to conditions t h a t Judaism deemed essenti al . I f thev satisfied the code of moral s . the Noachide Law s , then although they were bereft of value in their own righ t , Judaism acknowledged their righ t to exist . 7 C u rrently, most liberal Jews approach non-Jewish traditions with an atti­ tude of appreciation . Other faiths arc not merely tolerated; they are appreci­ ated for the value that they hold for their adherents. This approach is a genuine advance over the traditional one , for i t recognizes that other religions have intrin sic value that is not necessarily derived fro m J udaism . \Vhen we meet non -J ews in dialogu e . our task i s to learn to appreciate these reli gions in their own right - apart from any imposition of our value structure o n them ­ and to elicit a positive appreciation of our own tradition from them . \Ye encounter each other as h istorians of religion , seeking t o understand the value that each faith has for itself Neither of these models i s profoundly affirmative of veridical plural i s m , o f t h e notion that there is more t h a n o n e truth-laden tradition . I t i s w i t h t h e model of mutual transformat ion that we are able to recognize n o t o n l y that other reli gions may h ave value for their own adherent s , but also that they may h ave value for those who adhere to other way s . Buddhism . C h ristianity, l'vlarxism or any other non-Jewish tradition , m ay also have value for Judaism . This i s no more than the logical outcome of the recognition that other t radi­ tions deserve our appreciation . If they are gen uinely \'aluable and hence elicit our appreciation , then true appreciation must issue i n reflexive action , in appreciating the other for myself. Such an encounter with other traditions should thus be understood as potentially transformative of the participants and their faiths. The encounter of reli gions with one another, when carried o n for the purpose of approaching the t rut h , cannot be restricted to either mutu al tolerance or mutu al appreciation . For t ru t h . when i t is encountered , must not be sequestered : we are naturally and logically led to the process of transformat ion . The model o f mutual transformation has been given its fullest elaboration by the C h ristian theologian John B. C obb , J r. , i n h i s book , Beyond Dialogue: 7bward a Mutual Transj(nmation of Christianity and Buddhis m " Dialogue that

14

1blerance and Transformation

begins with the possibility of mutual transformation i s very different from dialogue whose intent i s l i mited to mutual appreciation . Dialo�ue with representatives of such �roups [ non-Christian traditions I would be fi rst and foremost jar our own lakf as Christian.l . We would hope to en rich our lives and purify our faith by learni n g from theIll . q

Thc first purpose of dialogue, the n , i s self-enlightenment . I t is undertaken with the assumption that other religions have something v aluable to contribute to our self-understandings , something that cannot be gained . or at least has not yet been gained . apart from such interactio n . Transformative dialogue denies "unintegrated plural i sm" and affirms "who­ listic pluralism ." That i s , i t assumes that reality i s a whole and that true statements about i t cannot be contradictory. For exampl e , within this perspec­ t ive both the Buddhist belief that there is n o God and the Jewish belief that there is cannot be true since they contradict one another. But there m ay be truths reflected in the Buddhist statement that will serve to correct the Jewish statement . The truths of the Buddhi st insight and the truths of the Jewish insigh t will be integrated i n such a way that the self-consistent wholeness of reality is preserved. The encounter with other traditions is an u ndertaking that affirms the wholistic nature of truth , even as it affirms diverse experiences and expressions of truth . Transi()rmative dialogue encourages people to seck after the wholeness which characterizes reality and thus to be en riched . l o The wholeness to which transformative dialogue strives must not be con­ fused with vaguene s s , indefinitenes s , or shallowne s s . On the contrary, when individuals engage i n transformat ive dialogu e , they seek to overcome the abstractions and superficialities of their own historical perspectives . They do this by opening themselves up to the insights of others : The result , ideally, is not a loss of insigh t s already achieved , but a deepen i n g of the sense of reality and thus a broadening of the communal u nderstanding. Nor must the wholeness to which it strives be confu sed with a denial of particularism . Transformative dialogue i s not an invitation to the formation of a u niversal rel i gio n , nor is it motivated bv the assumption that all religions are essentially similar. Another way to talk abou t the exchange it makes possible and encourages has been articulated by the Jewish theologian Eugene Horo­ witz . What Horowitz calls "the dialectic of J ewish particularity" can also serve as a model for the possibilities and the limits of transfimnative dialogue . M y J ewish filith leads me to assert that there i s no inherent need to departicular­ ize one's bith because one i s drawn t o its universal vision of humanity. I suggest that we may fin d it far more valuable and authent i c III acknowledge our sim u lta­ neous assertion o f particular and universal truths and see how we can envision our particularit y so as not to violate our u niversality. I I

Veridical Pluralism and Tra nsfo rmative Dialogue

15

Borowitz contends that the J e wish affirmation of the u n iversal availability of salvation via the Noachide covenant does not mean either that all traditions are equally worthwhile or that any particular religion i s dispensabl e . I ndeed , he argues that u niversalism requ ires particularism . . . w i th o u t a p a r t i c u l ar i s t i c grou n d i n g for u n i v e rs a l i s m r do n o t see h o w it c a n

a r I s e . . . . ( l ) f u n iversal i t y i s grou n d ed i n part i c u l a r fai t h i t w o u l d s e e m o d d t h a t u n iversal i t y c o u l d ever fu n d a m e n t a l l y n e g a t e the t ru t h o f p a r t i c u l a r i t y for i n so 12 doing i t would d e s t roy its own l e g i t i m a t i o n .

Hence , it i s crucial to distingu i sh between "transformation" a n d "transmuta­ t ion ." Transformation is not an alchemical process in which one entity is change d into an entirely d i fferent sort of entity when i t i s exposed to the righ t (or wro n g) condition s . Transformative dialogue i s not a c a l l for participants t o depart from t h e i r traditions w h e n t h e y encounter something of u nique value i n another tradition . I ndeed , i n transformative dialogue a degree of authentic­ ity and distinctiveness i s assumed such that the breakdown of a tradition ­ either through rej ection or assimilation - would be understood as a loss for all , adherents and nonadherents ali ke . Although the immutability of traditions i s rej ected , transformative dialogue i s not a program for haphazard change , simple eclecticism , or reductionism . I t i s not a call for those who encounter other truth claims to give u p their own , to simply add the truth claim s of the other to one's collection of such items , or to merge the claims togethe r amiably i n such a way that the novelty i s lost or trivial i z e d . Somethi n g much more strenuous is i n volved here . What the other person says i s spoken to our very beings and the appropriate response i s to u nderstand ourselves anew , to reconstitute our self- understan d i n g i n response to this new experience . H av ­ i n g met t h e other, we m e e t ourselves as n e w l y constituted selves . I t i s not always the case that o u r new selves will b e fundamentally d i fferent from our preencounter selv e s . Not every tradition necessarily has somethi n g o f worth to s a y to every other, nor are t h e contributions o f d i fferent religions of equal i m portance . Every relationship that takes place i n genuine openness should change us, but the degree of change m ay range from the sligh t to the significan t . That determination of wort h , however, cannot be m ade apart from an actual encounter u ndertaken i n complete openness to the other. "How can one better serve the u n iversal reveali n g and sav i n g presence of God than by submitting all that one believes to radical questioning and open­ ing oneself critically to ali e n ideas;>" Cobb asks . 1 3 Alien ideas made intimate are the means by which our lives and the l i fe of God are e n riched , for they strengthen our connectedness with one another. A n d when these ali e n ideas are t ru e , mutual l y transformative dialogue becomes a bid for freedom , replac­ ing "freedom from one another" with "freedom for one another."1 4

16

Tolerance and Transformation

"Freedom for one another" entails not only the openi n g u p of ourselves to the truths of the other, but the sharing of our own truths with our partners in the belief that the depth and power of their religious experiences will also be increased . The purpose of such sharing i s neither conversion from one tradi­ tion to another nor the confluence of many into one u niversal religion . Con­ version entails a complete turning away from the old ; this is not what is demanded by the occasion of truth-sharing. Rather, the encounter with new truths entails a recreating of the old by the new , or agai n , a reconstituting of the self. Moreover, the goal is not the achievement of a single religious com­ munity i n which our differences are i gnored , degraded or forgotte n . The truth should shape us, and when a truth becomes the property of many communi­ ties , those communities will share certain similarities and will move , in this way, closer to each other. But the diversity of comm unities will remain and should be cause for continued serious eval u ation and for celebratio n . Indeed, as C obb argu e s , "It i s the most radical differences that stimulate the most fundamental reconsideration ."' " The hope i s that i n presenti n g the insigh t s of our tradition and in opening ourselves to the insights of others , each m ight become more adequate to the task of expressing the truths of life . Dialogue that moves i n the direction o f mutual transformation sounds dif­ ferent from dialogue whose intent is an airing of ideas . I t has a different quality, too , from that which i s content with the cultivatio n of appreciation for diversity. Mutually transformative dialogue is the h arvest of these preparatory fields of dialogu e . It is commitment to religious pluralism in its most mature form .

2 The N on-J ew Through Jewish Eyes The traditional basis for the Jewish u nderstanding o f and interaction with non-J ewish populations has been the concept of the "Seven Commandments of the Sons of Noah" (sheva mltsvot bene no'ah) . Applying both to those who l ived befo re the revelation of Torah at M t . Sinai and to those who l ived after but still apart from the H alachic C ode . the Noachide Laws provide a framework for understanding both "pre-J udaic" people and "co-J udaic" peopl e . 1 It i s a frame­ work that dates back to the period of intellectual construction which followed the destruction of the Second Tem ple and which is yet operative among many Jewish thinkers today. ' Although there have been various lengthier formulations of the doctri n e , t h e standard seven commandments enjoined upon every human bei n g as the basis of morality are as follows : the requirement to refrain from 1) idolatry ; 2) m urder; 3 ) blasphemy; 4) incest ; 5 ) theft ; 6) the eating of a limb from a living animal ; and the positive requirement to 7) establish courts of law . 3 The individual who lives within these parameters lives within a covenantal rela­ tionsh i p , the model for which i s the relationship between God and N oah . The N oachide covenant is the manifestation o f the universal bond between God and humankind . In every case but that of the Jew - who must obey the 6 1 3 commandments detailed i n the Torah - the individual who abides by the seven N oachide Laws may obtain salvation . This opportunity for salvation is available i n spite of the individual's non­ Jewish rel i gious tradition . I n deed . under the framework of the N oachide cove­ nan t , the salvifi c role of non-Jewish religion is rendered superfluou s : The blessing of salvation comes through the covenant alone. The degree to which Jews believe that the Noachide CO\'enant satisfies the moral and salvific needs of the non-Jew has varied over the years separating medieval from modern time s . 4 Maimonides added the important stipulation that it be u nderstood as a divine revelation , and not as something that could be arrived at through natural mean s . Those who l ive according to the Laws of Noah but who do not also reco gnize the l aws' divine origin fal l into the category of "sages of the world ," and will not be granted a place i n the "world to corne ," whereas those who practice the laws because they ar� divinely revealed are the "righteous of the world" and will be granted a portion in i t . For

17

18

Tolerance and Transjinmation

M aimonide s , the n , it is not sufficient to live an ethical l i fe as outlined by the Noachidc Law s ; salvation hinges o n the recognition that the laws are divine . Moreover, it i s clear that , for M aimonide s , the Noachide covenant is inferior to the Sinai covenan t : what the non-Jew lacks i s Torah , and i t is only through Torah t h at the highest relationship - one based on the i ntellect - i s reached between the human individual and God . The broadest interpretation of the ability of the Noachide covenant to fulfill the religious needs of the non-Jew i s given by R. Elij ah Benamozegh ( d . 1 900) . I n h i s advice to a m an w h o wished to convert to J u daism , Benamozegh makes clear the power of the covenant of God with the Gentiles : . . In order to adhere to the t ru e r e l i gion , in order t o becom e , as vou wish t o d o , o u r brother, i t i s i n n o sense n e c e s sary for Y O ll t o adopt J ll d a i s m - t h a t i s t o s ay,

to subject yourself to the law . vVe , who are Jews, have ourselves a t our d isposal the religion i ntended for the whole human race - the one religion , that is, to which the nations have to subject themselves and through which they may b e redeemed and come to stand within God's grace exactly as did our own Patriarchs The religion of mankind is Noachism . bejim the TfeelatioTl of the raw at Sinai . .

.

.

.

.

.

I t i s t h a t r e l i g i o n t h a t J u d a i s m has prf'scrv e d , i n order t o t r a n s m i t i t t o t h f' j people s .

I n Benamozegh's mind, the relationship between God and the Gentile who upholds the Noachide covenant and between God and the Jew who upholds the Sinai covenant i s qual itatively the same . The more liberal reading nevertheless maintains the root presumption of the more consen'ative reading: that religious traditions other than J udaism or "Noachism" impart neither moral nor salvific value to the believer. The basis for this contention i s the belief that all non-Jewish traditions are essentially idolatro u s . It i s with reference to this belief that the generations of medieval Jews, with few exception s , carved out their relationships - both theoretical and practical - with the non-J ewish world . 6 Rash i , the preeminent tenth-century rabbi o f Ashkenazic Jewry, held the classic talmudic position which m ade no distinction between Christianity and I slam and thc varieties of "pagan" religion s . All were ovde avodah zarah , adher­ ents of "alien worship .") A positive appraisal of these non-Jewish religions was inconceivable ; the discussion centered o n whether members of idolatrous groups nevertheless l ived within the p arameters of the Noachide coven an t . This approach is the dominan t one within Jewish medieval though t . Even when social and economic factors demanded that Christianity be exempt from the category of paganism , the ideology remained unchanged . Modifieations i n the practical relations of Jews with C h ristians were m ade , but they were argued casuistically rather than by a chan ge in the very principle which gave rise to the problem . II

lite Son JI:w Th lll/u;h ./I'iClsh Eyes

19

I t i s w i t h :\\ oses :\ l aimo n i des i n t h e t w e l ft h cen t u rv th;lt the equ at i o n between t h e r i ghteo u s of t h e world - t h at i s , n o n -Jews w h o h an' a p l ace i n t h e world t o c o rn e - an d the S o n s o f :\oah becomes a n u n c o n tested ;1I1 c1 pertll a­ nent d o c t r i n e i n .Jew i s h t r ad i t i o n , A s n o ted abmT , :\Iailll o n i des adds the p r o v i s o that obedi e n ce to t h e S nTn Laws of )ioah be i n lT SPOll S (' to t h e revel atory n a t u re o f the covenan t , There i s vet o n l y one d i v i n e rel i gi o n a n d t h a t i s. J ud a i s lll . C h ri s t i a n i t v and I sl a m a r c i n fu sed w i t h i d o l a t r o u s clemen t s . Despite t h e i r s i mil a rities \\' i t h J u d a i s m . t h n' are to be u n derstood as mere " " s u perficial i mitatio n s o f i t , a k i n to a statue shaped in the image of a real man ,

Whe reas a person i gnorant of di" i l1l' wisdolll or of God's works scc.' t h e ,Lltll6'; The u n ive rsal concept was embodied in a particular people and the particular people took on a u n iversal task . That task i s to teach people how to choose God and thus be chosen . The belief that Jews are the chosen people of God , reinterpreted as it is by Baeck , does not violate the u n i versal nature of God or of e t h i c s . J ewish part i cularism i s for the sake of u n iversal tru t h . The truth that i s given i n God's ongoing revelation to t h e world i s t h e truth of ethical monothe­ ism , and because that i s the essence of J udai s m , the J ew i sh people serve as the example of how the divine-human relationship ou ght to be actualized . Hence , the Mosaic covenant becomes inseparable from the Noachide covenan t . I n deed , Baeck goes a s far a s t o contend that since the S i nai event , the Noachide covenant ultimately depends upon the M o saic covenan t . In the N o achide covenant , God has reached out to human ity ; i n the Mosaic cove­ nan t , h umanity as represented by Judaism h as reached back . In reaching bac k , J u daism has become e ndowed with the messianic spirit and Baeck applies the name " M essiah" to the nation of I srae l , the servant of God . T h i s p i c t u re of t h e M es s i a h passes i n t o t h a t of h i s peopl e . t h e people of I s rael , whose p a t h i s t h e path to t h i s fu t u r e , and w h o s e h i st o r y t h e r e fore becomes

M e s s i a n i c h i s t o r y , t h e h i s t o ry o f t h e fu t u r e . T h e des t i n y o f h u m a n i t y i s I s rael's d e s t i n y , and I s rael's d e s t i n y i s that o f h u m a n i t y . T h e o b l i g a t i o n that has been

laid upon it i s also the p r o m i s e that h a s been given t o i t . T h e re fore the people of this rel i gi o n comes t o be the M e s s i ah . "I the Lord have called thee i n r i g h t e o u s ­ n e s s . a n d h a v e t a k e n a h o l d o f t h y h an d , and k e p t t h e e , a n d set t h e e for a

c o v e n a n t of the peopl e , for a l i g h t of t h e n a t i on s ; to open t h e b l i n d e y es , to b r i n g o u t t h e p r i s o ners fro m t h e d u n ge o n , a n d t h e m t h a t s i t i n darkness o u t o f t h e p r i s o n house .'>li 7

I s rael is not merely the messe n ge r of God's revelation . The people of I s rael i s " t o serve to reveal to humanity God's covenant with i t , what God's l a w a n d h i s mystery have expressed . Through this people, too, humanity shall come to experience GOd.'>6R The direct revelation of God to I s rael has now become the revelation of God through I srael . B aeck has secured a place for J udaism that will not become i rrelevant with time . Baeck does not believe that h i s claim for J udaism's u niversalism is also a claim for Judaism's absoluteness. I n fact he believes that J udaism is u nique i n i t s ability t o avoid t h e extremes of absolutism a n d relativism which character­ ized P rotestant thou ght of his d ay. B aeck offers a d i stinctively Jewish alterna­ tive when he describes rel ativism or "historicism" as the movement that resulted i n revelation beco m i n g "a predicate of history." This "crisis o f h istori­ c ism" was combatted by the absolutists who retained "both the determined situation and the determ i n i n g norm . . h istory became a predicate of revela­ tion ." On e specifi c moment , the moment of God's revelation , was established

44

To!erance and Transformation

as that which is normative once and for all. Baeck argues that u niversalism can be achieved without the absolutizing of an historical moment . H i story and theology need not be separate nor m u st one be subordinate to the other for according to Baec k , u niversalism "is realized when an idea eme rges fro m a singl e or collective individuality as a living spiritualforce which can no longe r be physically or intellectually removed from the collective life and thou ght of humanity."69 The idea that defines J udaism - the incursion of the I nfinite into the realm of finitude and the moral tension that results - "stands opposed to that universal idea of the finished and perfected .")O The specific problem that J udaism articulates for humanity is this: finite creatures can never complete the task which is theirs by the grace of God . Perfection and the complacency it engenders are revelation-denying postures . An idea that i s u niversal m u st be expressed within the ongoing events of history, else it loses its quality of u niversalism . The idea itself has a permanent eSSeJHT , but the essence is characterized by the power of self- renewal . Ethical monotheism is both the permanent essence of Judaism and the source of J udaism's continual growth and self-modification . "The old revelation ever becomes a new revelation and J u daism experiences a continual renaissance .,,) t In Baeck's alternative to abso­ lutism and relativism , revelation is not "dogmatized" - "it has its manifoldness and i t s movement . . . so that i t [is] constantly revitalized , reshaped and born aney\' . " 7 2 The dynamic nature of J udaism enables it to be responsive to God's contin­ uing revelatory presence . Its dynam i s m , however, i s characterized by Baeck as self- renewal , as a process of reachi n g into oneself, and not i n any sense as self­ transcendence , as a process of reaching out for the novel . The effort to look beyond J udaism for truth i s futile because no other tradition h as appropriated God's revelation o f ethical monotheism to the extent that J udaism has . Baeck refers to the Jewish pcople's "genius for reli gion ,"71 meaning the religious self­ consciou sness that originated at M t . Sinai . Because of this reli gious gen i u s , t h e covenant between G o d a n d I srael i s a n everlasting covenan t ; accepted b y o n e generatio n , i t cannot b e dissolved by fut u re generations. "It shall not depart out of thy mouth , nor out of the mouth of thy sec d , nor out of the mouth of thy seed's seed ."74 It is to be renewed by the generation s , each in its own way, but the process of renewal is contained within the parameters of J udaism itself. This inward power, this capacity to produce and shape and grow , is peculiar to t h e religion of I s rael . . . . At an early stage it became conscious of it, and this consciousness found expression in the assurance that I srael was an elect nation and i n the conviction that the goal of all his/or)' lL'a5 contained in the election 7c,

J u daism's development i s i nward ; it i s a matter of internal renewal . But the development of all other traditions , Baeck argues, is outward , toward the truth

Leo Baed

45

that is J udaism . Judaism is the goal because it is the purest excmplificat ion of the divinc-human relationsh i p . And jllr Baec k , the fact that there is only one order of reality means that there is only one path to understanding that reality. "The One God can only mean one religion to which all me n are called and which can only find its complete historical fulfillment vvhen all possess it . " ; h J udaism is not a completed religion because it is still working jllr u niversal acceptance . Yet it is the complete rellj"ion , the rel igion which lights the way to God's truth . The special reli gious consciousness that i s t he possession of its adherents nceds no external emendatio n s . B aeck ends The Essence ojJudaism w i t h a concise statement of his position on the relationship between J udaisIll and other faiths. W e acknowledge the treasures possessed by othe r rel i gion s , especially by those that spru n g from our midst . He who holds convictions will respect the convic­ tions of others . Filled with reve rence fo r its tasks , we J ews realize what o u r religion really mean s . W e k n o w t h a t there c a n be applied to it t h e words of o n e of t h e old J ewish sage s : "The begi n n i n g bears witness t o t h e end , and the e n d w i l l at l o n g last bear witness to the beginning.""

Other t raditions are respected , especially in sofar as they reflect the insights of J udaism . These traditions should be tolerated, but J u daism alone deserves serious regard . In the end , all will recognize this to be the truth .

Critical Reassessment It is B aeck's deep regard for the individual and the rights that belong to the individual by virtue of his or her membership i n humanity that is most charac­ teristic of his though t . Baeck's appreciation for all people is rooted i n his understanding o f God as the one C reator of all . The relationship between every individual and the C reator i s the reason for the unity and the equality of all peopl e . rvloreover, it is creation that guarantees salvation . B aeck uses the langu age of covenant to express the fact of the relatedness of all l i fe to God and hence of the interrelatedness of all life . Traditionally under­ stood as a metaphysical real ity, the notion of chosen ness is reconceived by B aeck to be descriptive of a psychological and historical event only. God did not favor the Jews over all others ; the Jewish people are not the chosen people bu t the "choosing" people , choosin g consciously on one momentous occasion to identify themselves as a people-related-to-God . The covenant made on Mount S inai is not metaphysically different from the covenant made on Mount Ararat - that i s , from the Noachide covenant which describes the rela­ tionship of the non-Jew with God . B aeck affirms both an equality of human rights and an equal ity of divine dispe n sation b ased on the common h umanity of all .

46

Tolerance and Transformation

As a result of our common humanity, there is a natural sympathy and respect for the other and fClr th e community in which the other reside s . There i s an intuitive level of mutual u nderstanding between individuals such that "faithfulness i s able to understand faithfulness ."7R Both on the intuitive level and on the intellectual levcl , the right of all individuals to witness aggressively to their faiths and the right of no individual to oppress another are affirmed . On this level , B aeck's regard for the person al integrity of every individual is extremely valuable . B u t i n emphasizing individual ity, Baeck tends to deemphasize comm u nity, especial l y the com m u n al aspects of life which are formative for the non-J e w . A maj o r difference between the Noachide covenant and the Sinaitic covenant - a difference which B aeck does not directly acknowledge - is that the Noachide covenant is an account of the relationship between the individual and God while the Sinaitic covenant is an account of the relationship between a com­ munity o f individuals and God . 79 Within the Noachide framework , value is accorded to the individual bu t not to the individual-in-community. Hence Baeck , in relying on the Noachide framework , deprives the non-Jew of what he considers to be essential to .Jews and a cause for celebration : peoplehood . I ndeed , by not recognizing the social nature of non -Jews, B aeck comes close to creating a metaphysical split between Jews and non-Jews and hence undercut­ ting his position o n the equality of all . B aeck's failure to addre ss the comm u n al dimension of non-J ewish life is indicative of his lack of appreciation for the diverse ways i n which the human population lives out its day s . B acek's desire for the peaceful coexistence of members o f different faiths - the lIlotivating ideal behind his e fforts at interfaith dialogu e - cannot be aided by abstracting the individual out of his or her community. For dialogue to be productive , i t m u s t b e reco gnized t h a t individuals l ive within h istorical , cultu ral , a n d reli ­ giou s communities a n d are shaped by these comm u n ities . Dialogue m u s t take plaee between individuals as participants in diverse communities . Then the individ­ u ality of persons can be taken seriously and the pluralistic nature of human l i fe affirmed . Baeck's attention to the "conduct of belief," to the social and political conse­ quences of religion s , is an important corrective to the psychological approach to faith which was popular at the time he wrot e . H owever, in equating religion with ethics, he sacrifices much of its richness and much of what there i s to appreciate about and to learn from other faiths. There are three major wavs in which he limits the exchange between religions in this regard . First , Baeck maintains that what people h ave to share with one another are codes of behavior and not visions of reality, ways of acting and not ways of thinki n g . Not only does this not seem to be the case empi rical l y - for example , the Buddhist and the J ewish u nderstandings of reality sound m arkedly different - but it also seems contrary to our intuition about the nature of the relationship between thought and action .

47

Second . the reduction o f rel igion to ethics requ ires that Baeck systematically deny the plural forms that J udaism as well as other world religions haye taken . Judaism . for example . is purged of both its mvstical elements and the "dog­ matic" articl es of philosophical rationalism . The artificial ity of this approach is most striking in his picture of what remains of Chri stian ity after its dogmatic bark has been stripped away. The rel igion of Christianity, thus reduced to C h ristian eth i c s . i s ju d ged by B aeck to be derivative of J udaism and i n ferior to it. Any exchange that m i ght t ake place would be one-directional , from J uda­ ism to C h ri stianity. Third , Baeck rules out the possibilitv that there i s something of value to be gained from com m u n i ties that are not self-consciously dedicated to the ethical life . M i ght not the ethical l i fe be enhanced by aesthetic and intellectual insights? Any attempt to define the essence of reli gion will result in a weaken­ ing of the ability to appreciate the diversity o f rel i gious experience and the manifold ways in which it is expressed . Finally, Baeck's enC)rt to ayoid the snares o f relativism and absol utism is particularly relevant to a discussion of plural i sm . H e contends that what is fundamental to J udaism - the commandment to be holy - "stands opposed to that u n i versal idea of the finished and perfected." Baeck argues that there i s no final form ofJudaism . and his beliefs that revelation is an ongoing process and that J udaism has no dogmas are supportive of this contention . Because J uda­ ism is constantly reshaping itself i n response to the unfolding revelatory truth i n h istory, the life of J udaism cannot be captured in one absolute mome n t . For Baeck. then . change is an essential part of J udai sm's present stren gth and fut u re vitality. A J u daism that embraces change and m akes no claims of absolutism is ripe for the kind of transformative dialogue which a strong commitment to reli­ gious plurali sm can vield . I t is most u n fortunate , the n , that Baeck obstructs his path to it by limiting change within Judaism to an internal process , to "self­ renewal" and "renaissance ." J u daism i s powered by its own inward life ; its interest in other religions could not be for the purpose of self-enligh tenment . Though it await s completion , J udaism is yet a complete rel i gion . I n his neglect o f the role o f community for the non-Jew , i n his reduction of religion to ethics . and in his p icture of J udaism as self-sufficient , Baeck limits the relat ionship ofJ udaism with that of other religions to that of tolerance . But in h i s e mphasis on the relationship of every individual with God , in his attention to the soci al and political consequences of reli gion . and in his rejec­ tion of an absolute fc)rm ofJ udaism , B aeck points the way toward transforma­ tive dialogue within a pluralistic contex t .

4 Franz Rosenzwei g : C omplementarity Without Parity Dialogue , for Franz Rosenzwe i g , is n o t one amon g several ways to comm u ­ n icate , n o r i s i t restricted to t h e exchanges that t ake place casually a n d rou­ t i nely. I t i s the mode of c o m m u n ication for proper way

to think .

all thought,

indeed it is the only

I t i s d i alogue o r "speech t h i n k ing" that Rosen z w e i g pre­

scribes as the c u re to the ail i n g philosophy and theology o f n i neteen t h - c e n t u ry Germany and it is d ialogue in the fo rm of a s u stai ned conversat i o n that , in the original sense o f the word "converse ," t u rned R o s e n zwe i g's own rel i g i o u s l i fe aro u n d . I n asserting that dialogue is the esse n t i al m e thod for uncovering and estab­ lishing truth, Rosenzweig affi rms certain conditions that m ake for ge n u i n e i n t e rchange between i n di v i du al s : t h e b e l i e f t h a t the relat i o n s h i p between real i n d i v i d u a l s is the are n a in which truth u n fo l d s ; the recognition that h u m an knowledge of truth is incomplete and hence an attitude of openness to the sources from which fu rther truth m ay come ; the position that t i m e i s irrevers­ ible and that the fu t u re can be anticipated but not known ; and the affirmation that freedom , m u t u al i t y, spontaneity, and subj e c t i v it y are prerequ i s i t e s for d i alogue and hence for real t h o u gh t . M oreover, R o se n z w e i g m a int a ins that the content o f d i alogue m u st be theological and philosophical i n nat u re . Dia­ logue i s u ndertaken for the p u rpose of d e fi n i n g and defe n d i n g one's orienta­ t i o n i n the world by answe r i n g the "so- called 'ultimate quest i o n s' conce r n i n g God , man and the worl d . " ] U n l i ke t h e Reform J e w s o f h i s day, represented i n t h i s s t u d y by L e o B aec k , Rosenzweig d o e s n o t l i m i t e i t h e r t h e purposes o r t h e param eters of dialogu e . W h i l e B aeck calls u po n rel i g i o u s com m u n i t i e s to p rom u l gate ci vic tolerance alo n e , Rosenzweig ask s , "How else can rel i g i o n s be , tolerant o r intolerant except i n theologic al terms?, 2 Dialogue i s fundamentally a conversation abou t theol o gy and philosophy (which are , Rosenzwe i g ,

i n se parabl e ) ,

not

accord i n g to

a means o f fix i n g a standard o f public

conduct . :; R o s e n z we i g is the shaper of a new k i n d of inte rfaith d i scussion largely because of his emphasis o n dialogue as the i n d ispen sable tool o f the t ru t h ­ s e e k e r and h i s contention t h a t i n terfaith discussion m u st t ak e place o n a 49

50

Tolerance and Tran:,formation

theological leve l . H i s correspondence with Eugcn Rosenstock- H u essy, a C h ristian , has been called , "the most perfect example of a human approach to the Jewish-Christian problem ," { Over a period of fou r years , the relativist Rosenzweig was challenged to come to a nonrelativistic position , and then challenged to defend the position , J udaism , which he chose . This di alogue was first an impetus for and then an intellectual expression of the religious experi­ ence which brought him back from what he had thought to be inevitable - his own conversion to C h ristianity - to complete immersion in J udaism . Yet it is indicative of the kind of dialogue that Rosenzweig advocated and of the l i mita­ tions that he placed on the purposes of dialogue that Rosenstock- Huessy described their relationship as that of an "anvil and hammer."" For the dia­ logue between Rosenstock- H uessy and Rosenzweig rin gs with the forthright expression of men who are committed to positions which they believe to be "irreconcilable" within any hi storical time . There is a bond between anvil and hammer - together they forge an opposition to paganism , relativism , and indifference - but it is a bond wrought through the attraction of elements which are (in many ways ) opposed to one another. Rosenzweig has been praised for his remarkable openness to Christianity. The basis of that praise lies in his assertion that both C h ristianity and J u daism are "true religion s ." Such an acknowledgment should make possible Rosenzweig's picture of everything a dialogue should be , but this is not , in fact , what happe n s . For the way i n which Rosenzweig conceives of J u daism , the way he u nderstands cove n an t , points to o n l y a hal fhearted belief in the existence of two covenants . I n the final analysis, Rosenzweig is not unlike his colleagu e , Leo B aeck , for whom dialogue could be nothing more than an airing of ideas , not an exchange . Unlike Baeck , Rosenzweig has the desire and the means to go beyond the sociological concerns of d i alogu e , but he fails t o do so . The reason for this, I believe , lies in his conception of Jewish relationality - his conception o f what it means to be covenanted - and his lack of commitment to the truth value of Christianity. The "New Thinking "

"Speech thinking" is what Rosenzweig cal l s dialogu e and it is the "cu re" for those disciplines of though t , philosophy and theology in particular, which have been felled by "apoplexia philosophica ,"" that i s , German idealism . Thou ght that i s so diseased has the qualities of abstraction and timelessness ; it professes completeness and lacks subjectivity. To one who hears it, it is tedio u s , monolo­ gical , a dry-throated soliloquy of deat h . "I n the old philosophy, 'thinking' means thinki n g for no one else and speaking to no one else (and here , if you prefe r, you may substitute 'everyone' or the well-known 'all the world' for 'no one' ) ." In contrast , the "New Thinking" which Rosenzweig propose s , requ ires the genuine presence of at least two true individual s ; it i s though t that is

Frrz n� H osm::weif(

.'i 1

addressed to another and that ;l\\ aits the response of that other. "Speak i n g means speaking t o s()me ont· a n d thinking f(J I' some one . a quitl' definite sOlll e one , and he has not only ears , like 'all the \\ orl el : but al., o a mouth ." .\,sUlll ing llllltuality, subject i\'ity, and a real fut u re . i t i s de pendent upon l istt' ncrs who spontant'oll sly occornc spt'akcrs . Speech , or Illore prcci sl'iy. dialogu e , i s the method of the New Thinking, and its starting point is "experience ." The sort of experience that Rosenzweig refers to is not the experience "of" anyth i n g ; reality i s not m ade u p of fixed substances that can be isolated from or reduced to one another. Rather, reality i s an "enduring process" i n \\'hich t h e present i s "born a n e w each instan t , and each i nstant it dies ." To the question , "\Vhat i s the eSl l'II Cf of life?" Rosenzweig ans\\ er s . "Life 'is' not. i t simply occurs ."!' Questions about essence arc wrong­ headed because they presuppose that there is something behind experience to which all can be reduced - one isolated , unchanging thin g . Such questions are the symptoms of reasoning that is expnientially u n sound , of reasoning that can lead the individual into a "paralysis o f arti ficial death ."9 "Artificial death" i s the gift of t h at philosophy which works to dull the sting of death by numbing individuality. I s the fear of death OVl'rcorne when the individual takes his or her place i n The Whole which dissolyes the one: No , says Rosenzweig, death simply comes more "warmly recommended" by phi­ losophy. "We don't want a P hilosophy that moves i n the train of Death and tries to d istract u s from its ptTen n i al dom i n ion by the harmony of' her dance " l ll There i s no cure fo r death . But the "narrowness of l i fe" which afflicts thc i solated indiyidual can be trcate d , not by means of philosophical idealism which merely "mocks" the i ndividual , but by a philosophy that affirms the individual as one irreducible bct whose existence can only be understood i n reference t o other i rredu cible facts . Philosophy that is based on experience rccognizes the standing claim of "common sen se" : that God , the \ \'orld , and the I ndiyidual are the "first and l ast subjects of all philosophizing." l l These are the i rreducible elements of real experience , The filct that they arc not i nterchan geable - that , tl)r exampl e , neither the d i\'inc n o r the human individual c a n b e dissolved into the Wo rld ­ does n o t preclude the fact that they a re i nterrelate d . I ndeed , the relationship between the three elements of reality i s " the experience of factualitv that precedes all fact s of real experiencc" ; experience i s itself relational . t h e l i t tle \\ md "and" [ i s l t h e basic word of all experience , t h t, word t h e p h il osopher's t o n g u e is n o t used to. (;od and the world "nd man ' This "and" \\'as t h e beginning of t'''perit'nce and so it must f'('cur i n t h e u l t i m at e aspect of t ru t h . For t h e re must be an " dlHJ' w i t h i n t ru t h i tself, w i t h i n u l t i m mc t r u t h thdt can onh' I)l: one. 1 1

52

li;lerana and Tranoformation

The key to overcoming the narrowness of l i fe without prematurelv destrov i n g the individual is t o embrace that w h i c h embraces us - to become conscious of the interrelatedness of God and the World and the I ndividual . certainty of b e i n g "some t h i n g" i s n o t achic\"( ·d by p l u m b i n g the depths o f slIch an e n t ity. b u t r a t h e r by ope n i ng t h e floodgates and p e rm i t t i n g the s t ream ()f ,,·hich it i s a part t o i n u ndate it. t:I

There is no "someth i n g" i n abstraction from the stream of l i fe . To be "some­ t h i n g" means to he i n "contex t ," l iterally to be woven together with the other parts of reality. I n Understanding IIiI' Sick and the Healthy , Rosenzweig exposes his hypothetical patie n t , a sufferer of German idealism , to the "environment al treatment" as the only means of chasing away the ghosts created by abstraction and recover­ ing the concrete wholeness of life . Fundamental to this treatment is the posi­ tion that while God . the \'\'orld , and the I ndividual are "all equal ly t ranscen­ dent i n regard to each other," "God , man . and the world reveal themsclves only i n their relations to one another, that i s , in creation , revelation , and n�delllption ." 1 4 (;od- I n dividual-VVo rid signify the three points of one triangl e ; C reation-Revelat i o n - Redemption signify the three points of another. When o\Trlapped , the two triangles f(mn the six-pointed "Star of Redemption ," the \'isual model of the l'iew Thinking . Linking the points into an ordered form are the l i nes that represent the interrelationship of each with all . C reation , revelation , and redem pt ion are not single events which can be plotted o n a time line ; they are the u llceasin g and interconnected processes which define all l i ft> . I t is in the ongoing uialogu e between God, the Individual , and the World that the barest word becomes a meanin gfu l story. I t is the con nective "and" that stands in defiance to the reductive "one" of the Old Thinking. Where bef()re there had been the solitary sounds of though t , n o w there was a many-voiced dialogu e . Where befo re the singleness of conti­ nuity had rei gned, now both continuitv (I n d novelty could flouris h . Where before the fut u re was indistinguishable from the past , now the fut u re could be hoped for, anticipated , but not known until after it was given . Reality, as the "speaking speaker" u nderstands i t , is i ncomprehensible to the "thinking thinker." The former exchanges t imeless thought for u n finished, because yet u nm ade , cOll versatio n . The speakin g speaker "lives by virtue of another's l i fe ." . . . I do no! know i n advance what t h e other person will say t o me, because I do n o t even know what I myself am goi n g to say . . . . To requi re t i m e means t h a t w e c a n n o t anticipat e , t h a t we m u s t w a i t for every t h i n g , that what i s o u rs depends 0 71 u'hat /I Ill/II/lin's. 1 5

Franz R osenzweig

For Rosenzwe ig, dialogu e is the best description of the process of life because it exemplifies that p roce ss. Like all l i fe , dialogue seeks t o ()\'ercome the power of the past , "to t ranscend the law which constitutes causation ," l " and to be continuallv revital ized , I t is the future which offers up newly-born moments as a replacement tor that which is perpetually perishing, "In actual cOll\Trsation something happen s ," and what happens i s life itself. 1 7

Judaism Despite Christiani�y:

A

Case Study z n Dialogue

What happen s when the ideal dialogue of the New Thinking is give n the particular content of Jewish-Christian dialogu e ') I n the conTspondence between Rosenzwe i g and R oscilstock- H uessy we have a ready-made case study, "\Nc don't want to be philosophers when we are philosophizing, but human beings ," writes Rosellzweig in a letter to Rosenstock-H u essy, "and so we must bring our philosophy into the form of our human i ty," 1 8 I n authentic dialogue the philosophe r-as-human-being finds h i s or her real v'oice , the v'oice oj a concrete individual speaking in full subjectiv ity, The letters of Rosenzweig and Rosenstock- H uessv provide us with the record of a hard-heade d , sus­ tained exchange between two philosophically sophisticated , existentially ori­ ented , reli giously committed "spt'l'ch thinkers" who do not agree , \Nhat comes of this dialogu e , what "happens" in the i r conversation') The disappointing and ironic fact i s that although both part i cipants hold to the metaphysics of the :\'ew Thinking, their conversation never generates the power they believe lies in real dialogu e , power that i s tran sforlllativT , In the cou rse of their interac­ tion , neither Rosenzweig nor Rosenstock- Huessy is sign i ficantly transformed ; they remain hammer and anvil . :\lor does the contact between them succeed i n changi n g the pitch o f t h e sound they produce , I t is sharp , loud , and all too consisten t , I n the language o f the :\lew Thinkin g , what happens between Rosenzweig and Rosenstock-Huessy, or what doesn't happen , can be attribu ted to the loss of that which contributes "vital reality" to the lan guage of experience : the "and ," There are , accordin g to Rosenzwei g , t h ree "archetypal" words of expe­ rience , out the first two - "vea" and "nay" - require the third - "and" - for their context . "A nd" is the "keystOIH' of the arch of the substructure over which the edifice of the logos of l i n gu i st i c sense is erected ."l,! The "and" makes language meanin gful because it is the expression of o u r basic intuition about reality itself. I t is the "and" that is absent in the exchange between Rosenzwe i g and Rosenstock-Huessy, The positions they hol d , their personal conceptions o f J udaism and C h ristian ity, are elaborated for one another - t h e "yea" a n d the "nay" arc given , B u t the "and" that makes "what is ours depend[entJ on what i s another's" is only superficially apparent , Thus what m i ght hav'e been an cxell1-

Tolerance and lramformation

plary case of dialogue is instead an exemplarv example of two individuals "witnessing" to their biths . Rosenzweig believes that Jews and C h ristians have an "obligation to u n der­ stand" one another. A certain le\'el of appreciation and an equal degree of' tolerance follows from such u n derstanding. But R o senzweig makes it clear that the duty to u nderstand another's faith and the duty to attempt to change it are incongruent . The m issionary character o f Christianity "t h rottle[ s 1 the obli­ gation to u nderstand ," and thus it is an intolerant religion . J udaism , i n con­ tras t , is "naturally tolerant" of other people both because it "promises 'eternal bliss to the pious of all people' " and because it does not e ngage i n missionary activitv. !11 Understanding breeds tolerance and tolerance excludes all e fforts to change another religion . For Rosenzweig, the goal of an\' exchan ge between Jews and Christians is not change , but u nderstanding. Rosenzweig makes an i m portant shift in his eval u ation of "change" when the discussion turns from general metaphysics to missionary work . I n his outline of the ge neral nature of reality, Rosenzweig u n derstands creation as the ong()­ ing process which renews itsdf because it never ceases its creative activity. I t is an affirmation of time ; indeed , it endows time with meaning. C hange , nov­ elty, the future - these are fundamental s of reality ; they are the zest of l i fe . \Vhen t h e creatin' process o f l i fe i s personalized, it becomes , in Rosenzweig's terminology, rn'l'lati()n . For Rosenzweig, what is revealed is not a past fact but a present reality. In revelation , God speaks to the individual as a "Thou" to a "Thou ," as one immediate presence to another. A gai n , it is the spontaneity and the open-endedness of speech that captures the spirit of the reality envi­ sioned by Rosenzweig. When Rosenzweig takes up the topic of interfaith relations , however, he sets aside his positive valuation of ehange and replaces it with the Aristotelian notion that change is a process which implies deficiency. M issionary activity assu m e s the need for change among those to whom the m ission i s brought . In Rosenzweig's understanding, the missionary must assume that the duties being performed will result in that which is lesser - non-Christian traditions ­ beco m i n g that which is greater - C hristianity. M issionary acti\'ity is legitimate activity when dealing with those faiths which are lacking in religious truth . To be tolerant of such traditions i s t() be tolerant of those who are ignorant or that which is false . In this ease , tolerance is not a virtue . The relationship betwccn the proselyteI' and the would-be proselyte i s not one of u nderstanding, but one of change . For Rosenzweig, religious tolerance and m i ssion ary work are at odds . It is R()senzweig's position , however, that the C h ristian "obligation to mis­ si()nize" takes precedence over the "obligation to understand" when the cir­ cUlll stances involve non-Jewish faiths . At the root of this position is his belief that only J udaism and Christianity are indeed religio n s . All other faiths arc tim l l S of paganism which , while not devoid of religious insight and feeling, are

Franz Rn,enzweig

prereligi()l1s insofar as they lack a relationship with God gained throu gh revelatioIl . Pagan i s m is Il () more , Il () I,'ss thall t ru t h itself, b u t truth reduced to i t s dement s . i n v i s i ble and u n revealed truth . S o that whenever paganism St·ts () u t t o rep resent t h e whole instead o f an elemell t , the f(,rm instead o f the i ll \ isible , n'\"('bt i o n i nstead of the u ll rt·\"('aled . i t becomes a l i e . 2 ! '

Pagan traditions have "forgotten o r denied" the revelation that \vas bestowed on Adam and thereby on humanity in general . Nevertheles s , the pagan is not denied salvation . The rites of pagan ism IIlay be' "nothing but stupe'ndou s elTor," yet the prayers of individuals have not gon e u n heard . D i d G o d wait for �1 () u n t S i n a i o r , perhaps , G ol gotha'! N o p a t h s t h a t k a d fro m S i n a i a n d Golgotha are guaranteed t o k a d t o h i m , b u t n e i t h e r c a n he

possibly have failed to come t o one who sought h i m on t h e trails skirting Olympus . There i s . n o block o f "'ood i n which h e may not once t ake u p his dwelli n g , a n d n o psalm of David that w i l l always reach h i s ear. "

I n regards to "paganism ," Rosenzweig upholds the classic Jewish doctrine that God grants salvation to "the pious among the nations ," while the pagan tradi­ tion i n itself i s not acknowledged to be a valid agency of salvation . "For the voice of one !i\'ing God echoes only where there is l i fe , even if that l i fe be int()xicated with gods and hostile to God ."" Because non-Jewish , non-C hristian t raditions operate without cognizance of divine' re'vel ation . the truth they do possess as benefi ciaries of the continu­ ous creation is unintegrated and therefore easily tempted into idolat ry. There is something arti ficial , "founded ." abuut these other faiths" , the result uf their being bound to the level of humanity o r nature . Of the "good Turk" I the Moslem l , Rosenzweig writes that he "has Ill o re in common with Goethe than with either Jew or C hristian ." H e doesn't know , and cannot know, the quitt' o therworldly a t t i t u d e of the s o u l that yet breathes t h e world with every breat h , an attitude that i s peculiar to rdig-ion within revelation ( because only revelation means that overshadowing of t h e world bv another world , which i s the obj ective presuppusition of that attitude o f t h e soui . ('

Rosenzweig rej ects the idea that I slam has the same sort of relationship with J udaism that Christianity does. So thoroughly does he disregard I slam's own self- understanding that he u n flinchingly asserts that i t i s a "remarkable case of plagiarism i n world h istory," insofar as it is based o n revelation imparted not

56

Tolerance a n d Tramformation

by God, but "derived directly from pagan i sm ." The way o f Allah i s no tran­ scendent path , accord i n g to Rosenzwe i g , but simply a scries of all too hu man act s . 26 I n a similar manner he d isposcs of Buddhism , Hindu i s m , and Taoism . Their efforts to dissolve the particular i n to the universal distort the real rela­ tions that exist between the irreducible elements of reality. If the world and the individual are melT illusions , then it is not possible to talk meanin gfully about creation , revelation , redemption , or relationships between actual individual s ; n o r i s it possible t o maintain t h e relationships which characterize a truly religious perspecti\"(' - those between the C reator and the creation , the RnTakr and the rece iver, and the Redeemer and the redeemed . What all non-Jewish , non-C hristian traditions share i s their inadequate understanding of or sensitivity to divine revelation , and consequently, their understandings of creation and redemptio n arc u n sat isLIC"tory. For creation , revelation , and redemption are not separate processes that occur in isolation from one another: they arc i n fact , all the same - the proce ss i n which God loves the world and the i ndividual and i n which the individual responds to that 10\-e . Although n o one part of the process i s less essential than another part , there is a sense i n which revelation i s the linchpin . I n revelation , general truths of creation arc addressed to the individual , who is called upon to act i n l i gh t of these truth s . \Vhat t h e individual i s called to d o i s to "love the nighest ," the neighbor, and this love becomes the individual's personal testament to God and to the love which God has for the creation . I n loving the neighbor and thereby returning love to the Lover, the response to revelation becomes an act of redemption . TI'adit ions , then , that do not hear the voice of revelation cannot fully appre­ ciate the acts of crealion or fully partic i pate i n the acts of redemption . There is no u n i t y to the lin's of those communities. W i thout a sense of the inten:on­ nectedness of all l i fe (as represented by the overlappi n g triangles of the S t ar) , these commu nities have no real redemptive power and leave their members with the choice either to live without any ultimate mean i n g or to provide meaning by raising that which i s not u l t imate to the level of ultimacy. It is this second option that is most oft e n chose n , and that i s the reason why the i n s i ghts of paganism become distorted into idolatry. To these communities the C hris­ tian m ission i s rightfully an advocate of change , calling upon the indi\'idual to move from the i n adequate , the false , and the pseudo-religious into a truly religious l i fe. The Relationsh ip between Judaism and Christian ity

I t i s the invalidity of the pagan traditions as rel i gions that legitimates mis­ sionary e ffort s , but the situation i s entirely otherwise when two valid religions meet . In the encounter between two tenable rel i gion s , the i m pulse to convert

Fra nz R osenzweig

57

i s replaced b y the desire t o u nderstand , the purpose o f such a n encounter being to reach a level of u nderstan d i n g that will yield both theolo gical and sociological tolerance . The participants take each other's claims seriously ­ seriously enough to put aside all m i ssiona,'y activity, but not so seriously as to transform one's own religion in l i gh t o f the other. The encounter between J u daism and C h ristianity is the encounter between "the two distinct h i storical manifestations of revelation"27 - that i s , the only two gen u i n e religious fai th s . The s i milarity between J udaism and C hristianity h i n ge s o n this common grounding i n the revelatory word of God and , conse­ quently, t he i r fundamental antagonism toward pagani s m and "natural reli gio n ." This c o m m o n rel i gi o n , q u i t e real , i s the h u m an aspect o f t h e c o m m o n obj e c t i v e o r i g i n o f reve l a t i o n . also q u i t e real , j u s t as t h e c o m p l e m e n t ary c o n t rast b e t w e e n t h e i r s a i n t s i s t h e h u m an aspect o f t h e obj ec t i v e o n e n e s s o f the two fai t h s , a o n e n e s s determ i n ed by

a

c o m m o n goal . H e n c e t h e c o m m o n d i st i n c t i o n of t h i s 2B

reli g i o u s l i fe fro m all that s t a n d s o u t s i d e revela t i o n ( o r p u t s i t s e l f o u t s i d e )

But although Judaism and C hristianity share a common origin and goal (and common opponents as well) , although they are two coins m inted of the same "metal ," they are not the same coi n , 2" To describe the u niqueness of the rela­ tionship between Judaism and Christianity, Rosenzweig forges a middle way "between complete identity and absolute opposition ."30 This m iddle way is the means by which Rosenzweig attempts a solution to one of the sorest problems of modern religious thought - how to escape reli ­ gious absolutism y e t avoid religious relativism - a n d to answer o n e of its most p ressing quest i o n s : wh at , i f any, i s the place of J u daism i n the modern worl d ? W h at Rosenzwei g argu e s i s that t h e relationship between t h e t w o gen u i n e reli gions i s t h e paradoxical one of complementarity a n d polarity. I n t h e i r worst antagonist they fin d their best compleme n t . Thou gh they are d i fferent h i stori­ cal expressions of the truth given i n revelation , they are both valid expres­ sions , Thus the reason for much of the strife that has existed between the two faiths lies in the tendency to d i sregard the complementary parts of their nature s ; each sees itself as the only vali d fai t h and m i stakes the other for a pagan form . I n fact , Rosenzwe i g argu e s , they stand together against a mutual external foe . I n a letter to Rosenstock - H uessy, Rosenzwei g assert s : T h a t w h i ch ab i d e s [ afte r t h e s a c r i fi c es o f M o ri a h a n d G o l go t h a ] i s d i fferen t ; o n t h e o n e h a n d a n e x t e rn a l c o m m u n ity, a n d o n the o t h e r a n e x t e r n al m a n - a n d t h e c o n s e q u e n c e s o f t h i s m a k e m u t u al u n derstan d i n g so d i ffic u l t t h at t h e o n e s i d e i s a l w a y s b e i n g s e d u c e d i n t o c l a s s i fy i n g t h e o t h e r w i t h t h o s e t h a t k n o w o f n o t h i n g abi d i n g [ th a t i s , pagan i s m ] . l t

Tolerance a n d Tran:,jormation

58

.I udaism and C hristianity must recognize that they are dependent on one

another i f the enemy i s to be vanqui shed . They own different weapo n s , each necessary but neither sufficient without the other. I n the fight to overcome p aganism , victory i s the premi u m of cooperation . Rosenzweig supplies a standard against which the variety of world faiths can be measured , thereby avoiding the horn of relativism . H e finds two faiths which meet the standard , yet which cannot claim self-sufficiency, and thus he avoids the horn of absolutism . By naming Judaism as one of only two v alid religions and conceiving of these two religions as adverse to one another and yet i ndebted to one another, Rosenzweig m arks out a clear place for German J ewry. Whether Rosenzweig does this by proposing that there are two equally valid , equallv su fficie nt covenants - one between God and the J e w s , the other between God and the Christian s - is the topic u nder con side ration in the

remainder of this chapter.

The Eternal People and Eternal Life Between the year 1 906 , when h e was twenty years old , and the year 1 9 1 6 , when he was thirty, Rosenzwei g's personal commitment to and u nderstanding ofJ udaism u nderwen t a radical change . I n a diary entry dated March , 1 906, Rosenzweig enumerates the bases of h i s J udaism :

1 . "I t is the religion of my fo refathers" . "I enjoy observing certain customs without having any real reason f()r doing so." 3. "I believe i n P l ato " . 4 . "I like t o think in terms uf biblical Images Of these pillars , 1 is the central and stronges t ; 2 is a circle of slenderer col u m n s that support t h e periphery of the temple roof; :1 a n d 4 a r e pilasters , s t r o n g enough i n them­ selves, but i n this particular edifice service only as orname n t s . " 2.

.

.

.

Rosenzweig's primary reason for being a Jew i s based on "nationalism ," on the coincidence of parentage . He terms his second reason "metaphysical" or dog­ matic , "since the ceremonial law is in a sense our dogm a ." The third and fourth reasons fall into the categories of "eudaemonist moods" and " a d i sposition toward myth-making," respectively. \l This set of j ustifications , Rosenzweig soon real i ze s , is not a very robust program for either remaining Jewish or returning to J udaism . \Vhen his cou sin , Hans Ehrenberg, decides to convert to C h ristianity Il1 1 909 , Rosenzweig writes h i s parents:

Franz RosenzweIg

59

\\'..

;lIT C h ri s t i an in " \Trythi n g . W e l i v e i n a C hristian s t a t e i n short . o u r w h o l e "culture" r e s t s e n t i rely o n a ( : h ri s t i an foundatio n : conseqlll' n t"· a m a n who has nothing holding h i m b a c k n e e d s only a VlT\ slight p u s h to make him accept C h ristianity 1 4

In llJ 1 3 , following an inten se discussion on religion with Rosenstock­ Hucssy, it became clear to Rosenzwcig that his reasons for remaining nomi­ nally J cwish were insubstanti al . Aside from his enjoyment of Plato and biblical imagen·, which h ave a pl ace in C h ristianity as wel l , Rosenzweig's Judaism appeared to be mere sentimentality, not real rel i gion at all . For one who belie\'Cd that a religious orientation was essential to an individual's life , bap­ tism seemed to be the only viable alternative . B u t Rosenzweig's conclusion was annulled during what was to be h i s last Yom K ippur service before becoming a C h ristian . Although Rosenzweig ne\'er spoke directly about what happened to him during the service , i t i s clear that he left the synagogue able to m ake a confession of faith fro m within Judaism . The experience was the cornerstone of Rosenzweig's fut u re work ; the "reasoning process" by which he built h i s experience into a m odern form o f J udaism occupied the rest of Rosenzwe i g's intellectual life . The basis of Rosenzwei g's new understanding, unl ike that of h is earlier ] udaislTl , is metaphysical and theological . H e summarizes it in a letter to Rosenstock- H uessy : ( 1 ) That we have t h e t ru t h , ( 2 ) that we are at the goal , and (:l) that any and t'\"('ry Jew feels in the depth of his so u l t h a t C hristian relation to God , and so in a sense their rel i l,(i o n . i s particul ar'" and extremely p i t i fu l , poverty- s t ricken , and cere­ m o n i ou s ; namely, that as a C h ri s t i an one has to learn frolll someone else . whoever he may b e , to call God " ou r Father." To the jew, that God i s our Father i s the first and most self-evident fac t - and what need is t h e re for a t hird person between m e and m y fath e r in Heaven' That i s no discovery of modern apolo­ getics but the s implest J l'\\" i s h i n s t i nct , a m i x t u re of fai l u re to u nderstand and pitying contemp t . l5

The core of these three articles i s the same : the centrality o f rel ationship . H aving the truth and being at the goal are two ways of describing the ultimate human relationship with God . The goal of reli gion is to speak the Truth that becomes "truth for someone ,"'" that is truth by which the individual can live even in the face of death . Such truth i s embodied in those religious forms which anticipate eternity and thereby d issolve the dominion of death . That which anticipates eternity i s already at the goal ; i n such truth i t knows redemption . A religion that i s at the goal i s a religion that realizes the immedi­ ate i nterconnectedness of the three l i fe processes - creation , revelation , and redemption - an d the three subjects or life - God, humanity, and the worl d . I t i s l i fe whose pattern i s the "Star o f Redemption ."

60

Tolerance and Transformation

For Rosenzwei g , it is this experience of relational immediacy between the individual and God that characterizes .J udaism and that distingu i shes i t from C h ristianity. In the face of this experience , dogmatic affirmations and debates about essences arc disruptive noise s . "There i s n o 'essence of J u daism ,' there is only : 'Hear 0 I s rael ! ' " 3 7 "Hear 0 I srael ! " i s the call to relationship and i n the dial o gue which follow s , the individual .J ew establishes the terms of his or her relationship with God . The call to relationship with God i s not only revelatory but also redemptive . The moment in which the people of I srael l i stened is the moment i n which eternity was written i n their heart s . The experience of relational immediacy that i s expressed i n t h e liturgy as "'H e ar 0 I srael !" has its life in the "fact of the Jewish people ." At Sinai and in every moment thereafter, the Jews constituted themselves as a "we ." I n response t o that which was i mparted and comm unicated, thev formed the framework fil r ongoing part i c ipation , community. This community, this people , i s the "visible form by whose means they [the Jews] wrest their eternity from time ."lB In the people o f I srael there is no longe r any contradiction between creation and rn'e!ation because redemption has become transparent . I t is i n the Jewish people that eternity - the promise of redemption - has a home i n the present . I t is becau se the Jewish people form a perfect community that eternity i s both anticipated by i t and realized within it . I The .J ewl does not h ave to wait t,lI' world h i story to u n roll i t s lOll;; course to let h i m gain what h e fecls h e already possesses in the circui t of every year: the experience oj the immediacy oj" each single individual to God, realized in the perfect comm u ­ n ity oj all with God. I '!

For Rosenzweig, i t is the fact of the Jewish people that is the expression of J udaislTl 's ult imacy as a religion . Th e notion of ekction and the idea that eternity i s a presen t reality in the Jewish people arc one and the sam e . I ndeed , Rosenzwe i g rarely employs the traditional appellation , "chosen people ," speaking i n stead of the Jews as the "eternal people .".111 Like the medieval Jewish thinker, Judah H alevi , Rosenzwe i g starts with the fact of the Jewish people . H is discussion focuses on the consequences of this fact for the people itself and for the whole of humanity, not the events which preceded i t . N o causal connection i s m ade between the behavior of the com­ m u n it y which recei\'Cd revelation and the fact that revelation was given t o i t . I n t h is , Rosenzweig i s consonant with that p art of Jewish tradition which affirms the spontaneo u s , arbitrary nature of God's revelation at Sinai . That the Jewish people is, not how i t came to be , i s his concern . "We are what we are , but we are J e w s ," runs the catch of a little Galician song with unsurpassably illogical logic - "but ," not "lhcrci()re ."·! !

Fra nz R osenzweig

61

The Jewish people i s defi n e d , above all , b y its sheer existence . The prerevelatory hi story of the Israelites i s not remarkable . I t i s the moment when eternity penetrated h istory, when this assembly became a com­ mun ity, that i s extraordinary. At that moment , when the I sraelites became a community under revelation , they entered the K i n gdom and , paradoxically, gave real i ty to the K i n gdom . T i m e , for this people , i s no longe r the relation­ ship between past and fut u re ; it i s the relationship between the K i n gdom that has come and the K i n gdom that will com e . This people now lives from within a "future which without ceasing to be future i s nevertheless present ."42 To experience eternity or redemption , to live in the K i n gdom and in hopes of the K i n gdom , i s to be electe d . In the l i fe of the J ewish peopl e , the fut u re bears witness to the past , which is to say that the redemptive future is already the possession of this people . E t e r n i t y is j u s t t h i s : t h a t t i m e no l onger h a s a r i g h t to a place between t h e prese n t m o m e n t a n d c o n s u m m a t i o n , a n d t h a t t h e whole fu t u re i s to be grasped 41 tod ay

The Jewish people i s the Eternal People in a double sense : Time is not descriptive of Jewish relationships because i n its witness to the eternal , Jewish l i fe has become nontemporal l i fe . The power of J u daism l i e s i n its ahistorical or "metah i storical" nature - only that which lives outside of time can truly represent that which i s timeless . The notion of Jewish timelessness or eternality has several i mportant impli­ cations for Rosenzweig's conception o f J u daism . First , there i s the idea that the destiny o f the Jewish people has been determined once and for all by the first generation , the Sinai generation . Love for God , once born , becomes an element in the people's l i fe that i s "stat i c , a constant ."H Rosenzweig insures the constancy of this love over the generations by translati n g theology into biology. There i s o n l y o n e c o m m u n i t y

which cannot u t t e r t h e "we" of i t s u n i t y

w i t h o u t heari n g d e e p w i t h i n a v o i c e t h at add s : "are etern a l . " I t m u s t b e a blood­ c o m m u n i ty, because o n l y bl o o d gives present warrant t o t h e h o p e for a fu t u re . . O n l y a c o m m u n i t y based on c o m m o n blood feels t h e warrant of e t e r n i l y \vann i n i t s v e i n s even no\v . 45

Rosenzweig advances a version of the traditional birt h dogma of chosen ness . "Shal l I 'be converted' when I have been 'chosen' fro m birth?" he asks h i s friend Rosenstock- H u e ssy. 16 While conversion i s not theologically necessary, i t i s also not biologically possibl e . There is one route to becomi n g a Jew , a route which overlaps with the biological process of embryogenesi s . A n d there i s no route by which one can take leave of one's destiny. "A soul that thinks i t can say no to its destiny will find out that it i sn't free bur simply naked ."4i

6'2

Tolerance and Transformation

Secondly, the idea of timelessness is strengthened , and the necessity for biological inheritance as well , by Rosenzweig's position that the Jewish people i s "in" the world but not "of" i t . 48 Jews are in the world only as witnesses to the generations which preceded them , as witnesses to their blood relation s . The purpose of the Jewish people i s to flue and to reproduce , and thereby to ensure the continued historical presence of the eternal revelation . The fulfillment of this duty requires that the existence of the Jewish people not be tied to any conditional reality, to any historical form which might claim the loyalty that is reserved for existence itself. To this purpose the Eternal People refuses the garments that other people wear to distingu i sh themselves as commu n al enti­ ties : land, lan guage , and laws and customs set down by temporal powers. The land for which the Eternal People yearns is not a nation-state but a "holy land" ; the language of the .J ews is not a langu age of politics and markets , but a "holy langu age" ; and the laws and customs by which the Jews abide are not fluid and mutable , but eternally valid. To wear the robe of eternity is to discard all accoutrements of temporality. And so, in the final anal v s is , i t [ t h i s people 1 i s n o t alive i n t h e sense the n a t i o n s are alive : i n a n a t i o n al l i fe m a n i fe s t o n t h i s earth , i n a n a t i o n al territory, s o l i d l y based and staked out on the soil . It i s alive only i n that which guarantees i t will endure beyond t i m e . i n that which pledges i t e\"crlastin�ncss , i n d rawing i t s o w n et e rn i t y from t h e sources of t h e blood . 49

For the Jewish people , biology is not modified by postrevelation history ; it is magnifie d . Thirdly, Rosenzwei g describes J udaism as the fire t h a t burns at t h e core o f t h e star, at the center of the matrix of life . I n t h i s metaphor, J udaism's eternal­ ity i s again stressed . T h e fi re of t h e core m u s t burn i n c e s s an t l y. I t s fl ame m u s t eternally feed u p o n i t s e l f. I t requ i re s n o fuel from w i t h ou t . T i m e has n o power over i t and m u s t r o l l past .

It must produce its

own

time

and

reproduce i tself forever. ',11

Rosenzweig's description of J uclaism here bears a surprising resemblance to the neo- Platonic description of the Eternal One . In hav i n g e ntered the realm of eternity, the fire that i s J udaism "burns through and in itself." " I n blazing beyond time , the flame glows without the aid of external relationships . I t is self-sufficient , rekindl ing itself by its own heat . Moreover, and related to this, the flame renews itself but does not grow - all turning i s a return horne . I t i s precisely t h i s self-sufficiency, t h i s l a c k of relations , "this rooting i n ourselves, and i n nothing but ourselves, that vouchsafes ctcrnity.",,2 Without hesitation Rosenzweig draws the logical conclusion that follows from this positio n .

Fra nz Rosmzwclg \\'hat does t h i s

Ill e ;lIl:

63

t o root i n one's s e l f' \\' hat docs it mean that hne one

i n d i v idual people d Ol' S n o t seek t h e warrant of its existence in t h e e x t c rnal , and

reach e s out for eternity i n its very lack of relations with the outside world) I t means n o morc and n o less than lhal onc pt'oplc, lhou gh i t i s only one pt'opl c , claims t() constitute AlL ·' ;

Rosenzweig completes his picture of J udaism with an assertion o f Jewish absolutism . I n so doing, both the theory o f the New Thinking and the method it gave rise to - dial o gue - are undercu t . Two related questions o f significance need yet to b e explore d : t h e question of Jewish efficacy in the world and the question o f the necessity and value of C h ristianity. First , how i s it that Rosenzweig can hold that a relationship of immediacy with God can be maintained apart from any relations with external reality'� The problem is especially pressing because Rosenzweig maintains that the commandment t o love God can only be ful filled by loving one's neighbor. Secondlv, how can Rosenzwe ig maintain that C hristianity i s a necessary com­ plement to Judaism! I n what sense are the two faiths interdependent i f J uda­ ism is self-sufficient and com plete ?

Christianity: The Eternity oj Realization H ad "failure to understand" and "pitying con tempt"·'" been R osenzwei g's last words o n C hristian ity, Rosenzweig's theological legacy would have been much diminished . But in fact , i n h i s uniqu e u nderstanding of Christianity, Rosenzweig turns i n the opposite direction from pity and contempt toward respect and appreciation . Beyond that , he makes the significant move toward a degree of mutual dependency between J u daism and C h ristianity. Rosenzweig's sympathy for C h ristianity, h owever, rarely extends beyond the i nstrumental value that C hristianity has for J udaism . C h ristianity i s the vehicle by which J u daism finds worldwide acceptance ; it is the means of Jewish efficacy i n the e\'ents o f history. F i n ally, for Rosenzwe i g , Christian ity's value i s primarily i n strumenfal and only minimally intri n s i c . It is this under­ standi n g of C h ristianity which foils the possibility that the J ewish role in dialogu e will be anythi n g m o re than that of witness . The I ntrinsic Value of C h ristianity Rosenzweig's positive evaluation o f Christianity has been acclaimed b y numerous Christian thinkers as t h e ground for t h e modern discussion o f Jewish-C hristian relations . H i s approach i s favorably viewed by Christians a s a "breakthrough to real dialogue ,"�'�' a n d conversely, h i s recognition of C h ris­ tian claims has o ften been assessed with suspicion by Jewish thinke rs .

G+

Tolerance and Transformation

The common ground of J udaislll and C h ristianity extends beyond that which Rosenzweig attributes to the various forms of pagani s m - that i s , beyond t h e recognition that salvation i s u niversally available to t h e pious among the nations . U nl i ke paganism , which reflects the "secret premise s of ever renewed reality" and hence exhibits its participation in the divine creative process, .J udaism and C hristianity are the two "form s that eternally reflect a real i t y eternally renewed ."56 I t is because they are formed by revdation that J udaism and C hristianity reflect eternity. And i n sofar as they arc products of revelation they are both valid rdigions . In this way Rosenzwei g accords C hris­ tianity an independent significance ; its \'alidity i s rooted i n revelation and is not dependent upon any normative determ inations made bv Judaism . .J u daism and Christianity differ in tht, "exter n al , v isible 1(>rlIl S by whose

"fact" of the J ew i sh p c op l e is the Jewish limn of etern it y ; its parallel i n C h ristianity i s the "evt'nt" that i s the life of .J esu s . ,,) Rosenzweig regards J udaisllI and Christianity as the "ultimate filets" and i n doi n g so recognizes that he has transcended "the usual apologetics and polemics in the field - probably for the first time .",,!l The strongest as sertion of parity between J udaism and Christianity i s s ues mean s they w rest eternity froIll time ." The

(W ill Rosenzweig's theory of tru th . W ithi n the parameters of the New Thi n k ­

ing, truth is relational , validated i n l i fe , and known by the individual only partially. Unlike the truth of the philosophers , which i s not allowed to know anythi n g b u t itself, t h i s t ru t h must be t r u t h for s o m e one . I f it i s to b e the o n e t ru t h , i t can be only fo r the O n c , (;od . And that is why our truth lIlllst of necessity become m a n i fold , and why "the" truth must be converted into "our" truth . Thus truth ccast'S to be w h a t " i s " t r u e and becomcs a \'e r i t y that wants t o b e verified , real i z e d in acti\'e l i fe

s9

u n derstanding of tru th as that which becolllcs the concrete e x perience o f h uman l i fe . Sometimes verification is attained only in the sacrifice of an i n d ividual's life , and sometimes the sacrifice of generations of l ives is required for \Trification . Never does verifi­ cation encompass the whole truth , for that i s God's possession alone . What i t m e a n s to be human i s to have a personal portion of t h e eternal ; truth has becn " i m - parted" to humanity. 'li) God's Truth which i s One, humankind speaks the word , "Truly," it word which reflects the fragmcntary and subj ective portion of the truth that is human ity's . '>o Such a theory of truth "replaces the old theories of non-contradiction and objects , and introduces a dynamic for t h e o l d static concept o f obj ectivity." Although he prefers not to l abel his position , Rosenzweig fin d s the tag, "abso­ l u te empiricism ," most descriptive , partly becau se i t fits "the attitude that

The New Thi n k i n g p romotes an t r u e only w ithin

Franz R mnlucelg

65

clai m , to know nothing more of t h e d i v i n e t h a n i t has experienced and nothing more of terrestrial m atter, than it has experienced ."O ] From this theOl'y of truth , Ro,cnzwcig is able to affi rm the truth of C hris' tianity as wcll a, the truth of J udaism . Like all human knowledge , these truths arc partial and the expression of their parti al nature is the contradiction ari ,ing from the two claim s . There is no human wav to resolve the contradic­ tion , fi)r verification i n h istory i , also only partial . Each religion 'peaks truth , but neither speaks the Truth in its \\'holeness. It i, not possibl e , according to Rosenzwcig, to a\Tr am'thing more than thi s . this messianic theun' of knuwledge that \'alues truths according tu what it has cost t o verify thcm, and accord ing to the bond they create "lIlong men , cannot lead beyond the two eternally irreconcilable hopes for tht' !l.lcssiah : the hope li)r one to cOllie and t h e hope for one to return ; i t cannot lead I)('yond t h e ""nd" of t h e s e final dlorts i n behalf of t ru t h . Beyond t h i s , o n l y C;od can verify tht' t ru t h , and for h i lll only i s therc only one t ru t h . '"

The preceding d i scussion constitutes a solid basis fin the clailll that Rosenzweig affi rm s a Christian as well as a J ewish cO\'t'nant and that in so doing, he initiates an interfaith d i alogue that is open , m u t u ally appreciative , and potentially transformati\'e . I f the truth that each individual possesses i s only partial and if d i fferent indi\'iduals possess d i fferent t ruths . then both a "why" and a "to what ends" of dialogue are gin·n . �loreO\'t'r, and rel ated , Rosenzweig seems to affirm that C h ristianity is intrinsically \'alu able as a religion based o n revealed truth . I t is valuable apart from its relationship t o .J udaism . The I n strumental Value of Christianit\, ; C h ristianity i n t h e Service o f J udaism There i" however, m u ch i n Rosenzweig's di scussion which serves to weaken his apparently wholehearted affirmation of the parity between Judaism and C h ristianity. N u merou s statements disrupt this picture of equality between the two fai ths . The weight of these statements i n Rosenzweig',; thought eX(Teds that given to those statemcnts in which Rosenzweig affirms C h ristian-Jewish pari tv. It is the New Thinking that , among other things , enables Rosenzweig to defy absolutism and to declare himself i n favor of a pluralism of rnTaled religion s . In particular, it is the New Thinking that opens a wa\' fil r Rosenzweig to pronounce with v i gor and conviction his allegiance to J udaism . H O\\'C\'(T, in pursuing the possibilities made a\'ailable to him by t h i s i n i tial insight , Rosenzweig returns to the principles of though t which h ad obstructed hi s way in the begi n n i n g - the historical absolutism of H e gelian thou gh t . The

Tolerance and Transformation

66

N e w T hinking, with its emphasis o n relationality and its orientation to t h e future is mostly forgotten by R osenzweig when he describes t h e "hyper­ cosmos ." J udaism is the metahistorical and self- s u fficient expression of eter­ n i t y o n which all other fait h s , i n c l u d i n g C h ristian ity, are dependen t . J u daism i s the embodiment o f that anticipation for which all faiths hope . In the fin al a n al y s i s , J u daism

is

what other rel igions yearn , mostly u n consciou sly, to

become. In Hegelian terms, i t i s the ideal that is really real. T here are two maj or metaphors by which R osenzweig conceptualizes the relationshi p between Judaism and C hristianit y : the seed and the branch and the fire and i t s ray s . The fundamental i n feriority of C hristianity to J u daism i s at the heart o f e a c h one . T h e m etaphor o f the s e e d and the branch figures prominently i n Rosenzweig's discussion and does m u c h to dam age the argu ­ m e n t for parity between the fait h s . I t is borrowed from the medieval J ewish t h i nk e r, J udah H al ev i , and Rosenzweig quotes i t i n its e n tirety at the e n d o f h i s discussion o f C h ristianity i n

The Star oj Redemption .

"Th u s G o d has a secret plan for u s , a plan l i k e h i s plan for a seed- grain which d ro p s into the gro u n d a n d appears t o change into earth a n d w a t e r a n d d i rt , t i l l n o t h i n g rem a i n s o f i t b y w h i c h t h e e y e m i gh t recogni z e i t ; a n d w h i c h n o n e t h e l e s s t ra n s fo r m s earth and w a t e r i n t o i t s own e s s e n c e , whi ch decomposes t h e i r ele­ ments step b y step and converts a n d adapts t h e m t o i t s o w n material , till i t p roduces bark a n d l e av e s ; a n d o n c e i t s i n n e r m arrow i s prepared t o recei v e the e mb ry o o f the for m e r seed for n e w corporeali t y, the t ree p roduces fru i t l i k e t h a t whence the seed fir s t cam e : t h u s t h e l aw o f M os e s draws every successor i n i t s t r ai n , t r a n s fo r m i n g h i m i n real i t y even t h o u gh t o a l l a p p e a r a n c e s everyone rej e c t s i t . A n d t h e nations are t h e read y i n g a n d preparati o n o f t h e M e s s i ah w h o m we awai t . H e w i l l be t h e fru i t , and all w i l l become h i s fru i t a n d acknowl­ e d ge h i m , a n d t h e t ree will b e one. Then they w i l l praise and glo r i fy t h e root ,,61 which once t h e y d e s p i s e d , o f w h i c h I s aiah spoke .

The above discussion and its fu rther elaborat ion are placed u nder the h e ad i n g , "The Realizat ion of Etern ity." Judaism a s t h e seed is eternity implanted in t h e world , and a s t h e frui t it is redemption universally realized. A s t h e branch o f the t re e , C hri stianity i s m e re l y the temporary physical structu re w h i c h sup­ ports the proce s s ; i t i s neither the nece ssary n o r the s u fficient part . The force that drives the fru it from its leaves i s other than the branch itself. C hristianity i s the "way" b u t it i s n o t the "life ." I ndeed , Rosenzweig asserts that "the t r ut h lies

behind

the way," and he c o n t i n ue s , "the way e n d s when home has been

reached."64 C hristianity is an instrument for attaining t h i s end. But the end itself is J udaism . The second m e t aphor, the fire and i t s ray s , is only slightly more generous i n i t s depiction o f C h ristianity. C hristianity i s symbolized as t h e ray s which e m anate from the fire that i s J u daism . To the Jew, God gave eternal l i fe b y "kindling t h e fire of t h e Star of his truth in o u r heart s." T o the C hristian was

Franz R OJl'llZWClg

67

gi\Tn t h e eternal \\ a)', guided bv "the rays of that Star of his truth j() ]' all time unto the eternal cnd .""·' The rays an' in a dire('( sense the light unto the nations - th e y illuminate God's truth j()r those as yet u n responsive to revela­ tion . A s Judais lll is both eternity anticipated and the anticipation of ct ('f' nity , C hristianity i s , lor the Ilun-J e w , hoth the way to truth anu eternally un the way t() truth . \\'hil(· i ll .J udaism i t is life that i s ('(crnal - the lire burns inces­ santly, in C h ristianity it is the \\a\' that i s eternal - in the light shed bv the ray s , an endless path is irradiated . Although in this llletaphor there i s a certain degree of interdependence , the exchange is not s\'lll metricai . \Vhilc the fire depends o n the rays j()r its effec­ t ivenes s , for the extension of itself, the rays depend on the fire for their ver v life . '�J u daism . . i s the One Nuclcus whose glow pr()\'ides invisible nourish­ ment to the rays .""" In discussing the relationship of fire to rays . the theory of truth \\hich had enabled Rosenzweig to affirm C hristian truth is qualified . Although he still maintains that J udaism and C hristianity have a common goal - the redemption o f the world - an asymmetrical relationship emerge s from the m etaphor. There is an intimacy between the two that proves their common cause . C hristianity is indebted to J u daism for the content of its message . The truth which Christianity preaches i s a disgu i sed version of the t ruth already alivc within J udaism . C O l1\'Crsely, J udaislll i s i ndebted to C hristianity for the form by which the message i s m ade accessible to the pagan world . For "life" cannot hc taught to another - it cannot be objectifie d ; i t i s what one is born into . One c,m , ho\\,(·\'('r. be instructed i n that which i s exemplified in dogma and crccd ­ in the "way" - and hence the non-Jew can be shown the path to truth through the baptism al ceremonies of missionary C hristian s . That which is eternal i n itself, t h e Jewish people , knows n o t the "way" t o eternity - i t "is" while all others are "becoming" - and hence requires the aid o f those who are on the way in order to be effectin' i n the world . C h ristianity i s the bearer of that tnlth which is I i n'd b\' the Jewish people and which inspire s C hristianity. B u t it i s only the beast of burden , the messeng(,r. J udaism i s the spil'itual bearer, the parent "ever u n recognized by the nations" who bore "that prophecy which the nations had to believe , already ful filled i n the vicariou s suffering o f the incli­ vidual for the indi\·iduals ."(); C h ristianity i s the means by which the world is made to understand the wav to redemption . It is the i n strument of that which already lin's in eternity, .J udaism . J udaism and C hristianity complement one another, but they are not symmetrical : J udiasm i s intrinsically val u able while C hristianity is only i nstrumental l y val u able . As the i n strument of Judaism , C hristianity has i t s l i fe i n the pagan worl d , to whom i t can speak hf'cau se i n its "blood" i t i s pagan .

68

Tvlerance a n d Transformation This i s , in lact , t h e profo u ndest d i fk rence between Jewish and C hristian man : t h e C h ristian is by n a t u re or at kast by birth - a pagan ; t h e ] e\\ , h(me\er, is a ./ ('W . Thus t he way of t h e C h rist i all II111s1 be it way of sel f-externalizat i o n , of sl'if­ renunciation. . . The l i fe of t h e J e w , on the other hand , must preciseh' not lead him o u t of h i lll s l'i f; Ill' musl rather l ive h is way l'\'lT t\('('jlt'l' i n t o h imself. Th(' llIore h e finds h i mself, the marl' he t u rns h is b ack o n paganism , " hich for h i m is on the outside n o t . as \,i t h the C h risl i a n , on the i nside 6H

Cnlike the Je\\' who i s born J ewish , the C hristian m u st be baptized into C: hristianit\·. It is in Christ , not in thelllselves, that eternal i t y i s « llll1 e1 . " ') It i s because o f the pagani s m within Christianity that C h ristianity can conquer the world - i t i s truly of the world - and yet not attain the complete­ ness which redemption brings . The C hristian's flesh and blood arc profaned , not j u st because the C h ristian elwells within the profane world , but because the C hristian is corrupted by this worl d . In its quest for power, the C hristian enters into compromise with the pagan . I t i s this compromising nature that diverts C h ristianity from the end and keeps i t ever at the begi n n i n g of the way. The means by which the pagan people arc '�j udaizcd"70 i s yet i n constant turmoil with its own pagan roots . F o r Rosenzwei g , t h e C hristian conception o f t h e God-Man i s t h e most telli n g example o f the affi n i ty between C hristian ity and paganism . He I lh e C h risti a n ] cannot i m agine t h a t G o d h imself, the h oh' C;od. could so condescend t o h i m as he demands, exce p t by beco m i n g human h i mself. Thi' inextinguishable segment o/jmgan ism which is innermost ill I'I'I'T)' Christzan bursts forth here .

The pagan wants to be surrounded by human d e i l ies: he is n o t satisfied ",it h b e i n g h u man h imself: C;od t()O m ust be h u m an . ; !

This belief. that God somehow becamc human i n the l i fe of .Je su s , is central to C h ristian i ty. I t i s h ighl\' significant that Rosenzweig impugn s this cru cial theological doctrine , declarin g i t to be inextricably tied to paganism and hence to i rreligion . H uc i t becomes especially clear that the conversion from pagan­ ism to C hristianity i s not enough , that there must be something beyond C hristianity which corrects it and completes it. That somethi n g I S , I!1 Rosenzweig's syste m , J udaislll . The existence o f t h e Jew constantly subj ects Christianitv to t h e i d e a t h a t it is n o t a t t a i n i n g t h e goal . t h e t ru t h , t h a t i t ever remains - on t h e way . That is t h e profoundest rcason j(l r t h e C hristian h a t r e d of t h e Jew, which is h e i r t o the pagan h atred of [hc '/C\\· . i t is h a t re d of o ne's own i m pe rfection , one's own -, not-vet . ' -

A s the "louse i n the fur" of Christian ity, ; I J udaism drives C h ristianity to the realization that despite its worldly power, i t i s i ncomplete , dependent , and

Franz Rosenzweig

69

ever i n danger of losing its way. "By radiating apart to the outside , C hristian­ ity threatens to lose itself i n individual rays far from the divine nucleus of truth ." It is the existence of the Jewish people that not only keeps C h ristianity on the way, but most sign i ficantly, actually "stands surety for their [ C hristian 1 tru th . " 7 4 P recisely because C hristianity i s "a living effectiveness of truth ," that i s , the worldwide network b y which J ewish insights are disseminated , i t does not know truth i n the way known by J udaism . Neither of the rel i gions , i t i s t ru e , possesses the whole truth , b u t Rosenzwe i g deprives C h ristianity of the degree of t ru t h he grants to J udaism . They [ the C h r i s t i an s ] , for t h e i r pan , r u n a ft e r t h e c u rr e n t of t i m e , b u t t h e t r u t h re m a i n s at t h e i r b ac k ; t h o u gh l e d b y i t , s i n c e t h e y fol l o w i t s rays , t h e y d o n o t s e e i t with their eyes.

t h e y a r e d e n i e d a l i v i n g v i e w altogether for t h e s a k e o f a 75

l i v i n g effec t i v e n e s s of t h e t rmh

C hristians see that which is irradiated b y the rays emanat i n g from the core of truth while J ews see the core o r "star" itself. Jews do not , however, see that which is ill u m i n ated by the l i gh t of C hristian­ ity. N e v e r t h e l e s s , w h a t R o s e n z w e i g d e n i e s the J e w - i ll u m i n a t i v e e ffectiveness - does not finally seem to b e so m u c h o f a loss , a n d t h i s for several reason s . Primarily, in Rosenzweig's m i n d , the Jews as a people have already arrived at the goal for which all other peoples yearn . J ews have "that inner unity of faith and l i fe which is still no more than a dream to the nations within the church ." In perhaps the most i mportant paradox that Rosenzwe i g frames , he asserts the u nique characteristic of the J ewish people to be its ability to "bind creation as a whole to redemption while redemption i s still to come ." Althou gh redemption means redemption-of-the-world , there i s for Rosenzwe i g a sense i n which redemption h a s occurred i n a basically u n re­ deemed world . The Jewish people has "reached the goal which i t anticipates i n ,, hope . )6 Secondly, Rosenzweig maintains t h a t t h e i n ternal self-examination o f t h e J ew cannot but y i e l d u niversal benefits : At the interior of J u daism i s the u l t i m ate structure of existence - the essential i nterconnectedness of God , the Worl d , and the Individual . In this u nderstan d i n g of reality, "the apparently exclusively-J ewish aspect of this threefold sentimen t , apparently constricted and exclusive and i solated , now closes ranks again into the one all­ ill u m i nating stellar i mage of truth .")) There i s one fin al way i n which Rosenzweig quali fies his statements about Jewish loss of the worl d . Jewish art and theology, he argu e s , give the J e wish people a unity and a stability. The J ewish people i s then able to "work as a ferment on C h ristianity and through it on the world ."78 The Jewish people does not l ack relationships and hence efficacy i n the worl d . In important w ay s ,

70

liJlerance and Transfo rmation

the n , C hristianity is "rendered irrelevant to J udaism ."79 "The fire is not aware of the rays nor does it have need of their ligh t for itself."8o There is no parity of value i n this statement . What then at various times appears to be an affi rm ation of two religious covenan t s , of the parity of value between J udai slll and Christian ity, fin ally does not have a secure place i n Rosenzweig's system . There are not , for Rosenzweig, two "ways" to truth ; there i s one way toward truth - Christian ity, and there is one l i fe I n truth -Judaism . The Hegelian d i alectic which would h ave supported a two-covenant approach -J udaism as the thesis, Christianity as the antithesis, redemption of the world as the synthesis - does not hol d . For Rosenzweig, C hristianity i s not truly J udaism's antithesis; instead , it i s an e fficacious tool of J udaism . More significantly, Rosenzwei g maintains that redemption is possible only if J u daism is fin ally the only kind of redemptive power working within the worl d . "Where everythi n g i s o n fire , there are no more ray s , there is only one l i ght ."H I Very close to the end of The Star of Redemption , Rosenzweig writes that "it i s the m o u t h b y whose words man lives ."R2 W h at a r e the words that it J e w who l istens closely to Rosenzwei g's words can speak i n an encounter with a non­ Jew? Despite Rosenzwei g's strong advocacy of a new way of thinking estab­ l i shed on principles that would m ake for genuine dialogue between real incli­ vidual s , he describes a form of J u daism which i s incongruent with these principl e s . Dialogu e requires that the participants maintain an openness that applies to truth ( at least in p art) and to time (that is, a real future) . But Rosenzweig's J u daism i s self-sufficient - not fundamentally dependent on another human structure ; i t is essentially complete , stat i c , temporally u n am ­ bivale n t , monolithic, a n d actually a n d wholly t r u e (though n o t t h e whole truth ) . In contrast to the Jews, the people of the covenan t , are those who are in the process of becoming covenanted to God but who never reach this goal i n human h i story. There are n o t t w o covenan t s . There arc those who arc already w ith God and there are those who are on the way to God . To those who are on the eternal way, the Jewish witness to eternality i s a l i gh t and a lam p . The transformative exchan ge which may occur i s one-directional , extendi n g from J u daism to C h ristianity and then to pagani sm . Critical Reassessment

In a 1 9 2 2 d iary entry, Rosenzweig wrote about the i n fluence of his friend , R . Nobel , on his l i fe : Th rou gh him I have become more tolerant than I was formerly. Three years ago [ was more orthodox , anti-Christian , anti-here tical than I am now . VVhat I have learned from Nobel is that the soul of a grrat Jew can accommodate many things . There i s danger only for the little souls '";

71

Fra nz R osenzweig

H o w great-so u l e d R o s e n zweig fin al h w a s able t o be in re gard t o j e wish­ C h ristian rel atio n s is q u e stionable , h ()wever. Scen \\'ithin t h e context o f his gene ration,

R o s e nzweig desenTs thc p r aise he has receiH'ci Ill r m o \-in g

b e v o n d t h e t r adition al j e wish u n d e rstanding () f C h ristianity to a l e v e l of t o l e r ­ ance based o n t h e o l o gical respect . r n seein g C h ristianity as a po sitive m e a n s o f achievin g salvation f o r all n o n -j e w s - as a "distinct his t o rical m anifc s t ation o f revelation" - he breaks t h r o u gh t h e :'I,) oachide paradigm in w hich J udaism i s t h e o n l y positive v e h ic l e t o s a l v a tion . I n this w a y h e succeeds in expandin g t h e s o u l o f J u d aism . I t is Rosenzwei g's c o n c e p t i o n of t h e c o m p l e m e n t ary n a t u re s o f t h e two rel i gion s - t h e idea that there is a third o p tion hetween " c o m p l e t e identity and absolute opposition " - that t r a n s c e n d s the ninetee n t h - c e n t u ry context o f his t h o u gh t and has significance for t h e current d i sc u s sion o f inte rfaith dial o gu e . R o s e nz weig's s e n siti\'ity t o t h e c o m plexity o f t h e relatio n ship between t h e t w o faiths is appare n t in the fol l o wi n g d i a r y e n t ry :

J ews and C h ristians both deny that t h e ethical and religious principle of "I .mT God and thy neighbor" is their common possession . Each tries to impute pag-an­ ism to the other: the C h ristians hy disallowing our love of neighbor, we by disallowing t h e i r ImT or God . Both arc right and hoth wro n g . H ere the insincer­ ity of liberal thcolog-y becomes apparent . 8-1 "Both are r i gh t a n d both wrong" - h e r e is the basis tll r d i a l o gue that migh t o p e n i t s participa n t s t o a deeper s e n s e o f the t r u t h . I n e m p ha sizin g c o m p l e ­ m e n t arity

rat h e r

than

eithn

extreme

of

c o m m o n al i t y

or

o p p o sitio n ,

R o s e n z weig moves toward t r a n s form ative dialo gu e . H e fails , however, t o carry o u t t h e in sigh t s eit h e r o f his t h e o ry o f r e ligion o r o f t h e m e t h o d , t h e N e w T h i n kin g , w h i c h s u p p o r t s his t h e o ry. T h e s u b o rdinate p o sitio n o f C h ri s t ianity in R o s e n z weig's pic t u re o f j u d ai s m a s the s t a r a n d C h ristianity as t h e ray s , o r J u d aism as e t e r n al life a n d C h ristianity a s t h e e t e r n al

way,

is

d e s t ru ctive

of a

truly

c o m p l e m e n t ary

rel atio n ship .

In

R o s e n z weig's vie w , j udaism n e e d s n o c o m p l e m e n t; it i s cOlll p l e t e a n d fu l filled apart froIll any rel a t i o n s h i p with C h ri stiani t y . B u t C h ristianity (an d all other faiths a s w e l l ) d e p e n d s o n it s relation ship t o j udaism , which is both t h e c ffc c ­ ti\-e cause o f (: h ristianity - it gen e rates C h ristianity's p o w e r in the world - and the fin a l cause o f C h ristianity - it is the goal toward which C hristianit\· ailll s . T h e c o n t rast b e t w e e n t h e t w o r e ligio n s which h a d fir s t elicite d Rosen zweig's respect is lost i n his s y s t e lll atic e x p o sition o f the rel atio n ship betwecn t h e fai th s . \Yh a t h a d b e e n a p p reciated a s " d i v e r sit i e s i n c o ntrast" b e c o m e s , in history. "diversitic s in o p p o sitio n" go a n d u l tim ate l y , a t the end o f tim e , a n u nt r a n s formed sin gul a rity. R o s e n zweig a n ticipates t he coming toge t h e r o f a l l t e mporary religiou s m o d e s into t h e p e r m a n c n t , e t e r n al life o f j udaisill . C h ris-

72

Tolerance a n d Transfo rmatio n

tianity i s finally not the "ultimate fact" Rosenzweig h a d named it to be . I t i s J udaism alone t h a t i s "ultimate ." T h e fruits of pluralism remain u nsavore d . Apart fro m Rosenzweig's n o t i o n of complementarity, there i s another o p e n ­ i n g i n his thought w h i c h could yield stronger support for veridical plural i s m . I n the "New Thinking" and i n his u n derstan d i n g of revelat io n , the common theme i s relational i m m ed iacy. What happens between two speech-thinkers i n dialogue and what happens i n revelation i s analogo u s : the presence o f the one becomes known t o the other. There is n o formal content either o f divine revelati o n or o f h u m an encounter; we meet commanding presence s , but n o i m personal commandments, objective l aw s , or u n i versal formulas . T h e condi­ tions for the events are the same as well : freedom , spontaneity, subjectivity, mutual ity, and openness to the future . The event of encounter i s a call for the novelty of a new relationship . And in the immediacy of that event truth i s made . I t i s i rrelevant to speak o f "essences" i n regard t o t h e participan t s ; it i s because t h e participants are "unfi n ished" t h a t relational immediacy c a n occur. What i s essential is the connective "and" - the " 'and' within truth itself."B6 When Rosenzweig declares that what God reveal s in revelation is "nothi n g but H i m self to man ," and when he asserts that "there i s no 'essence of J u daism ,' there is only : 'Hear 0 I srael " "87 there is reason to hope for transformative , dialogic exchange . B u t it is the primary word "and" that is lost i n Rosenzweig's description o f J ewish-Christian relations ( an d of Jewish-non-Jewish relations i n general ) ; the "yes" and the "no" are voiced loudly, but without the relational "an d ," their sound i s hollow . When Rosenzwei g remove s J udaism to a metaphysical plane , he takes i t away fro m all connective experience and away fro m l i fe i t self. M o reover, the very divine-human relationship that he had i n tended to perfect i s entirely distorted when J udaism becomes an atemporal fact . H ad Rosenzweig maintained h i s emphasis on relational immediacy, he would have had to relinquish the notion of the eternality o f the Jewish people . But he would h ave been able to sustain the i nsights of h i s New Thinking and thus the openness o f Judaism to truth which m i ght u n fold i n dial o gue with representa­ tives o f other religio n s .

5 Martin B uber : Servin g Separatel y and Yet All To gether One of Mart i n Buber's most v"iv"id memories was the scene which opened each class session of his early school years . Except for a small Jewish contin­ gent , the majority o f students at the Franz J oseph Gymnasium wcrt" Poli s h C atholics . "Personally the p u p i l s g o t on w e l l with o n e another, but the t\\·u groups as such kncw almost nothing abou t each other." In general the "atmo s­ phere" was one of "mutu al tolerance without mutual understanding." At eight o'clock each morning, the class focused its attention on the large crucifix before which the teacher's desk was centered . . all I h e pupils slood up in t h e i r benches. Th,' I

It i s P au l's relentless dualism that i s responsible for the loss of immediacy between the C h ristian and God . Whether there i s another way to "contend with both things" - with the imaged C h rist and the imageless God - Buber does not inquire . I ndeed , he disre gards the centuries of trinitarian and christo­ l ogical debates . The force of his argument i s that Pauline C h ristianity fail s to maintain the level of immediacy between God and h u m an i t y attained b y Pharisaic or original J udaism . I m m ediacy, as the "primal reality of a l i fe relationship ,'�)3 is Huber's measure of the strength of the I - Thou relationship . A n d it is i n the i mageless religion , i n J u daism , that immediacy is most ful l y embraced . E lsewhere Buber poses h i s criticism of C h ri stian i mmediacy i n d i fferent term s . In The Origin and Mean ing oj Hasidism , Buber links the emphasis on nationhood i n H asidic though t to the H asidic u nderstanding of redemption . I n response to those who wonder why H asidism didn't become "one of the great religions of redemption i n the worl d ," Buber answers , "It could not pass to humanity because it could not disconnect the redemption of the soul from the redemption of the nation ." I t i s this organic structure between the individ­ ual and h i s or her people , between the people and their nation , that Buber holds to be the fou ndation for the vitality of the divine-human relationship and thus for the redemption of the world . T h e a c t i o n of C h ri s t i a n i t y at t h e t i m e of h e r s e p a r a t i o n fro m J u d a i s m , h e r

fo rsak i n g of t h e idea o f the h o l i n e s s o f the n a t i o n , a n d t h e absol u t e val u e o f i t s t a s k , c o u l d n o t be i m i tated b y H a s id i s m , for, i n t h e e y e s o f H a s id i s m , between t h e world a n d t h e i n d iv i d u a l t h e re i s an i n te r m e d i a t e e x i s t e n c e which c a n n o t be overlooked - t h e nation

94

Buber recognizes no irony in h i s position that the nation is an "intermediate existence" necessary to world redemption . For this i n termediate existence , u n l ik e the C h ristian mediator, serves to h e i ghten the e fficacy and immediacy of the divine-human encoun ter. When the individual i s set apart and saved apart fro m h i s or h e r communi t y, the unity of redemption i s broken and hence the I -Thou relationship i s weakened . Then "people became C h ristians only as ,, individual s , but the nations as nations remained idol worshippers . 95 This indeed i s the "crisis of Pistis" for modern C hristian s : the ever-wide ning "dis­ parity betwee n the sanctification of the individual and the accepted unholi­ ness" of the community. The solution to this crisis i s to seek a "form of P i stis

,Hartin Ruber

') 5

nearer t o Elllu n ah . " " Since on unah presupposes membership in a cOllllll unitv which is consciou s of itself as it people covenanted to God , Buber is itch'ocat i n g a new f"rlll of C h ristianit\·. a Ill o r e Jewish fo r Ill . I n t h e l as t chapter of h i s hook, 'livo Types of Flli/h , B u lw r r e tu rn s t o t h e i n i t i a l c1 i s t i n c t i o n h c h a d elrawn betwecll JuelaislIl a n el C h r i s t i a n i t \·. bctween oll ullah and pistil . "The faith of J uclaism and the faith of C hristianity are by nature different i n kind , each i n conformity with its human basis." That distinction implies a differencc i n origin -.I udaism arose as a part of a national soul and C hristianity arose "outside thc hi storical experienccs of nations" and within the' "souls o f indiyidual s ."": It d()l's not necessarily imply that one religion is supe­ rior to t h e other i n the relationship i t fosters hetween the indiviclual and Gocl . I n the final analysis , however, this is Huber's position . C h ristianity is indeed an "authentic sanctu arv"98 in which the I -Thou relationship is to be found . It i s n o t C hristianity's authenticity that Buber challenge s , however, b u t its efficacy. In its reliance upon mediatorship and i n its emphasis o n the individual over the com m u n ity, C hristianity deprives the I - Thou relationship of its most intense form of immediacy. i\larti n Bubcr's position on Jewish-Christian relations (and , by extensio n , on interreligious relations a s a whole) does not , however, close with a n asser­ t ion abou t Judaism's superioritv to C hristianity (and, b y implication , to other religions) . I t ends i n stead \\'ith a reemphasis on the necessity of openness and the essential activity of d ialogu e . H a\'ing defined the sort of "passionate" position that re auies one for uialog-u e , Huher moves aheau t o con sider the difficult task of dialogue between individuals who are comm itted to their positions and , i n the case of J udaislll and C hristianity, whose positions arc in many ways Ill u t u ally exclusive . \\'e can t ry to do something ,·"tremelv d i fficul t , sOllleth i n g which i s extn'mely d i fficult fo r the rel i giously oriented pnso n , sOlll e t h i n g which ru ns ('()unter to h i s orientation a n d relationships or, rather, seems to r u n counter t o them , somc­ thing which seems t o run counter t o h i s relationship w i t h Cod . We can acknowl­ edge as a my.ltery that which , notwithstandi n g our existence and self' knowledge . " others conkss as t h e i r reali t y of belie·f. "

The great mystery at work in the u n i verse i s the mystery of unity formi n g o u t of tremendous diversity. Part of t h i s mystery i s that two faiths c a n contra­ dict one another and vet have something to say to each other that i s t ru e . According to B uber, this i s the paradox w ithin which Jews and C hristians live . What Jews know abou t them seh'es and thereby about C h ristianit\, i s "funda­ mental l y and irreconcilably different" from what C hristians know about them­ selves and thereby about J u daism . 1 1111 Jews know that they h ave a relationship of personal immediacy with a God who i s imagekss , a relationship which has not been contravened . C hristians know them selves to be the true I s rael . to

Tolerance and 7ransformation

96

have a relationship with God that supercedes J udaism's relationship , secured as it is by the incarnation of God in the Messiah . Whether God has been incarnated i n the messianic figure of Jesus and whether the continuity of history has been broken by the messianic redemption - these form the human perspectives which are resolved for Buber only in the "mystery" that i s finally God's truth . I t is not , however, sufficient merely to maintain a "common watch for a unity to come ." Even though this u nity "soar I s 1 above all of your imagination and all of ours ," we must work to anticipate its form . 1 0 1 Buber ends his book on J ewish C h ristian "interpenetration" with this important suggestion : -

. . . an I s rael s t r i v i n g a ft e r t h e renewal of i t s fai t h t h ro u gh t h e rebirth of t h e p e r s o n a n d a C h r i s t i a n i t y s t r i v i n g for t h e renewal o f i t s fai t h t h rough the rebi r t h o f n a t i o n s w o u l d have s o m et h i n g as yet u n s a i d to say t o each o t h e r and a h e l p t o 1 2 g i v e o n e a n o t h e r - hardly to b e conce i ved a t t h e present t i m e . 0

Here it i s clear that Buber's conception of dialogue extends well beyond that of Baeck's and Rosenzweig's . Those who hold a firm position can yet remain "open to the world" and thereby grow "more and more true to reality" without also becoming less true to themselve s . 1 03 I t behooves b o t h you an d us to h o l d i nv i o l ab l y fas t to o u r own t rue fai t h , that i s

t o o u r deepest relationship t o truth . I t behooves both o f u s t o show a rel igiou s respect for the t ru e fai t h of the other. This is n o t what is called "tolerance ," o u r

' t a s k i s not t o to l erate each other s wayward n e s s b u t t o ackno wledge t h e real relatio n ­

shlj' i n which both stand t o t h e truth . Whenever we b o t h , C h r i s t i a n and .J ew , care m o r e ttl r God h i m se l f than fo r o u r i m ages o f God , we are u n i t e d i n the k d i n g t h a t o u r Father's house i s d i ffe r e n t l y c o n s t ru ct ed than (l U I' h u m a n m o d e l s take i t

to

be . I 04

Truth is approached through dialogue between partners who strive to "acknowledge the real relationship i n which both [partners 1 stand to the truth ," and who seek a mutual deepening of their imperfect imaginations and of their unfi nished truth s ,

Critical Reassessment Buber's approach to dialogue is grounded in his understanding of reality as fundamentally social or relational . From this basic affirmation , a number of notions follow which together constitute B uber's method of dialogu e . These notions may be summarized as follow s : 1 ) "Real meeting" involves the confir­ mation of one's partner as existing for him or herself, as "elementally other" ; 2 ) The recognition of "otherness" i s formative for personal identity ; 3 ) Reci­ procity i s essential to all relationshi p s ; 4) There is a "sphere of the between" in

Martin Buber

97

which t W () " othe rs" meet and in their t ogetherness m ap out new tnriton' : 5 ) Knowledge and meaning are c()nfirmed and created i n a relat ionship of real meeting; 6) There is no absol u t e . exclusive , or final revelation to which h u m ans han' acces s ; and 7 ) Because there are no absolute dogmas, the mood of l i fe i s one of "hoIv i nsecurity" ; what sustains l i fe i s not knowledge of absolute Tru th but relationships of togetherness in which new truths arise . These , then , are the clements which define Buber's approach to non-Jewish tradit ion s ­ notions which are affirmative of \T ridical pluralism and which i l1\'ite m u tually transformative dialogu e , U n l i k e Rosenzwe i g , B u b e r d o c s not controvert his o w n method by lifting J udaism out of the realm of i nterhu m an relations and onto the plane of the eternal . In fact , B u ber emphasizes the this- worldly character of J udaism , exalting concret e , daily l i fe as the arena i n which dialogue occurs , I n part , Buber argues for the " hiddennes s" of the messianic proce s s , a hiddenness which i n sures the continuity of daily l i fe . Sacred and profane should not be seen as i n gredients of two different worlds , but as parts - redeemed and unredeemed - of the one world . Moreover, it i s life-in-community that fosters the "world of unity," and the sort of community he has i n mind i s one in which theological concerns are not removed from political concerns , By affi rm i n g J udaism's connectedness to the temporal world , Buber stresses the i mperative nature of J u daism's in\'(llvement i n the dialogic proce s s . B u b e r acknowledges J esus as "m y great brother"' ''' a n d enjoins Jews to make a place for Jesus within Jewish h istory. B u t i t i s in his call for a reconsid­ nat ion of Judaism i n light of the C hristian emphasis O il personhood that the rad ical consequences of Buber's thought are manifested most clearly. I quote again the i m portant passage to which I rcf'e r: an I srael striving aft e r t h e renewal of i t s faith t h rough t h e rebirth of t h e person and a C h ri s t i a n i t y s t r i v i n g fo r t h e renewal of i t s fai t h t h rough the rebi r t h of n a t i o n s w o u l d ha\'e some t h i n g as yet u n said to say to each other and a help to give one another - hardly to be conceived at the present t i m e , ' ""

The great d isappointment is that , having developed the method and pointed to a significant area of applicati o n , Buber does not undertake any further elabo­ ration o f his insight . He does not directly engage i n transfo rm i n g Judaism in response to his encounter with other tradition s , Indeed , despite Bube r's abili t y to e n t e r into transformative dialogu e , he d o e s n o t do so in a n y sustained way. To explain why not , one need only consider the social m ilieu i n which Buber li\'ed and w rote . Is it not too much to expect Buber to celebrate the w i sdom of C hristianity for J udaism at a time when the C h ristian m i ssion to J udaism was fervent and then later, when antisemitism was most inf1amed:> And aside fro m these considerations , overwhelming though t h e y m ay be , there is a further

98

ToLerance and Tramjormation

explanation within B uber's own thought for his reluctance to act on his i n s i gh t : h i s hypostatization o f the Jewish peopl e . Jewish peoplehood i s Suber's answer to t h e questions o f w h y J udaism o u ght to survive i n the twentieth century and how i t m i ght do so . Accord i n g to Buber, the proper model for h u m an existence i s l i fe-i n-commu n ity and J ew i sh peoplehood is the example par excellence of that structu re . The unit of h u m an l i fe is not the solitary individual but the individual - i n-community. " . . . [ P ] eo­ plehood i s the presupposition o f the whole h uman response to God ," 1 1I7 and J ewish peoplehood i s the "prototype" for this respo n se . I t i s when B uber attributes personal existence to the Jewish people , when he treats the collective as a true individual w i th a genetic heritage as well as a reli gio-pol i t ical one ­ with an u nbroken and unbl"eakable relationship with God - that he steps out o f the dialogical framework he has c reated . In essence , he finds a security for J u daism that violates h i s notion of "holy i n security." When Buber argue s that the immed iacy with which the Jewish people i s related to God qual i fies the com m u n ity as a whole and , despite external appearance s , ever-characterizes the relationship , he provides a surety for J udaism which m i n i mizes the need for Jews to seek truth i n the truths o f others . E specially when Buber criticizes C hristianity for its lack o f peoplehood and i mmediacy - the two attributes upon which J udaism's con fidence i s based - he undermines the desire and necessity for Jews to approach C hristianity i n a radically open way. I do not mean to minimize the external events which may have affected Buber's actual encounter with non-Jewish t raditions; nor do I wish to m i n i ­ m i ze Buber's great contributions to interreligious relation s . I ndeed , t h e bar­ rier to transformative d ialogue within Buber's u n derstanding o f Judaism can , I believe , be easily overcome . There i s a way to talk about "co m m u nity" without falling into the abstraction of "people hood" and losing the concrete , historical , nonabsolute , non monolithic character o f l i fe l ived in intimate rela­ tionship with others . The Hasidic comm u n ities o f Eastern Eu rope (as Buber u nderstood them) served as Buber's paradigm for the individual - i n ­ commun ity and for l i fe l i v e d i n "holy i nsecurity." H i s n o t i o n o f "peoplehood" d i ffers u nnecessarily from the i mage o f "com m u nity" derived from H asidism . O f the thinkers considered i n this study, it i s B u be r who is best able to acknowledge the theological i m portance o f other traditions for the self­ u n derstandi n g of J udaism and who moves farthest in that direction . When Buber writes about the C hristian claim for J e su s' messiahship and declares that , "fo r his [Jesus'] sake and my own , I must endeavor to u nderstan d ," 1 118 he shows h i m self to be open to the transformative nature o f dialogue . The reli­ gious claims o f other s , i n particular o f C hristian s , are , for B uber, claims upon him self, u pon h i s l i fe as a J e w . In recogn i z i n g that "we serve separately and yet all together," 1 119 he does not avoid confrontation with those whose beliefs negate his own ; nor does he seek a common ground o f u nderstan d i n g which passes

Martin lJuoo

99

ov e r the serious d i lllTcll c e s between t ra d i t i o n s . VVh at Bube r acknowl e d ge s arc thc l i lll i t at i o n s o f

ou r

h u m an p e r s p c c t i v e s : Tru t h is gre ater than

Ill \"

perspec­

t i v e o r y o u r s , and t 1l l' re i'o re i t i s illlperat i v e t h a t we j oin t o ge t h n to cnlarge o u r p c r s p e c t i n' s a n d t h u s o u r u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f t ru t h .

6 Mordecai Kaplan : C o- inclusive C ivilizations In a tribute , M o rdecai Kaplan praises M a r t i n B u b e r for h av i n g fu l filled the "legi t i m ate task o f the theologian " : to "transpos [ e J the id iom of a religious tradition i n to the thought-pattern o f one's con temporarie s ." i In so defi n i n g the theological task , Kaplan - the foun der o f J e w i s h Reco n s t r u c t i o n is m - reveals h i s own l i fe's proj ect and i n tellectual bias m o re acc u rately than that o f B u b e r's . B u ber's work cannot be reduced to the for m u l ation of "some acceptable idiom into wh ich to transpose the be l i efs , v al u e s , ideals and norm s" o f the Jewish past. 2 Above all , B u b e r was concerned w i th "religiosity," w i t h the i m m e d i at e ,

personal ,

d i al o gical

relationship

between

the

i nd i v i d u al - i n ­

com m u n ity a n d God . U n l i k e B u ber, Kaplan d o e s not d i s t i n guish between rel i giosity and rel i gi o n , between the spontaneou s , creative event and the "organized ," obj e c t i fied fo rm o f that experience . That the d i s t i n c t i o n i s not i m portant to Kaplan i s best illu strated by what he calls a "C opernican revolu­ tion" i n the understan d i n g o f J u daism . What Kaplan "discovered" i s that throughout J ewish h i sto ry, the "central real ity" of J u daism has been the J ewish peopl e , n o t the J ewish rel i gion per se . The trad i t i o nal fo r mulat i o n , that the people se rve the rel i gion and that the rel i gi o n l i t e rally " i n s p i re s" ( t hat is, b r i n gs l i fe into) the people , is reversed . Kaplan contends that "the J ewish religion must be m a i n t a i ned i n order that the people m ay l i ve" and

not

that the people

should survive for the sake o f the religio n . ·! J udaism i s to be u n derstood as an evol v i n g civilizat i o n , expressive o f the l i fe that Jews have lived and are l i v i n g . Rel i gi o n i s

one

e l e m e n t o f t h a t l i fe , u n ique to t h e c i v i l i z at io n , b u t not the

reason for the c i v i l i zation . I t is by me a n s of t h i s " C o p e rn i can revolu t ion" that Kaplan fin d s what he believes to be an i di o m appropriate to the modern , sci e n t i fi c worldview . He rej e c t s the " m y tholo gical and m e t aphysical types of religion ," the for m e r b e c a u s e of i t s s u p e r s t i t i o n s and supernatural i s m , the latter because o f i t s e m phasis o n theories and proofs , o n "abstrac t i o n s fro m reality." I n their stead he o ffe rs "scie n t i fic" rel igio n : "rel igious h u m an i s m ." This type of rel i gi o n is not concerned "to give a m e taphysical conception o f God , b u t to m ake clear what we mean by the belief i n God , from the standpoint o f the d i ffe rence that belief m akes i n human conduct and strivin g ."4 The theological task for Kaplan i s 101

1 02

la/erance and Transfii rmation

d i fferent from that undertaken by Ruber, as well as by Rosenzweig and Baeck, fundamentally becau se Kaplan's J udaism i s not God-centered but pcople­ centered . " Indeed , Kaplan's though t has been characterized by one of his students as "really not a theology at all but an account of the psychological and ethical ,, consequences of having one . 6 K aplan , of course , has a metaphysics , j u st as all social scientists have a metaphysics , implicit and u n developed as i t m ay be . And Ill" has a Cod-concept . But neither philosophy nor theology per se are on Kaplan's agenda. Kaplan conceives of religion i n functional and pragmatic terms and as one element i n the overall confi gu ration of a people . Theological i s sues are superceded by sociolo gical concerns . I n his m any efforts to "transform Jewish l i fe from a l iability, which so many J e w s think i t is , i n t o an asset,"; Kaplan rarely extends h i s dis c u s sion beyond t h e b o u n darie s of J u daism . The m aking o r remaking o f J u daislll into an asset

docs not , for h i m , include an extended comparison between Judaism and other fai th s . The revitalization of J udaism depends on the reinterpretation and modernization of all the components which m ake u p the Jewish civiliza­ tion . The task i s primarilv an i nternal one. :"Jeverthelc s s . Kaplan do e s corne to some conclusio n s abo u t the relation ship of ci\'ilizations to each o ther, with J u daism as his m o del for the se relatio n ship s .

Kaplan ckn)tcs h i mself to responding to t h e challenge t h a t modernity poses t o J udaism - n o t o n l y t h e challenges of science , evolution , psychology, anthro­ pology, and sociology, but also those posed b y democracy and national ism . I n every case h e assumes that modernity h a s someth i n g important t o say to Je\\'s and that J udaislll , if it is to remain viable , m u s t accept and adj u st to the se ne\\' insights . s Although he doc s not take u p the s u bj e c t of intnreligiou s or intercul­ t ural dialogue directly, Kaplan reaches a position on the relationship of.] uda­ ism to the n on-Jewish world through a discussion of these secular topics .

Judaism as a Civilization Kaplan's pragmatic orientation i s appare n t fro m the fir s t in the question he holds to be fundamental : How is J ewish survival to be secured in the twentieth century? In askin g "how" i nstead of "why," K aplan distingu ishes himself from all post-Eman c ipation thinkers (other than certain Zionists) who saw their task and dilemma to be the j u st i fication of J udaism in ligh t of modern philosophy. psychology, and science . For these thinkers, the s urvival o f J udaism dep e n d e d o n wheth e r they could adequately answer those who u rgently asked, "Why should one be a Jew today r As Kaplan note s , the assumption was that J u da­ i s m d i ffered from other traditions solely in terms of religio n ; the solution , then , was to m ake the Jewish relzj;ion compatible with modern schools of thought a n d thus insure its val i d ity. For Kaplan , as for h i s pre-Emancipation forbears, the existence of the Jewish people i s an h istorical fact and , as such .

l U C;

,Hordemi Kaplan needs no j u s t ificat i o n , T h e e x i s t e n c e of a c i v i l i zation

IS

s i m plY a " g i n' n ," To

ask w h y i t should e x i st i s wron gheaded and u n n atural . I n ot h , The v e ry e x i stence o f J u d a i slll is regarded 1)\ C h r i st i an i t y and \l oham­

Illeuani s m r sic 1 as a chalkm:;c TO their authoriT\'. The New Trs t aTll e n t i s nO l e s s i n t e r e s t e d i n d e n o u n c i n g .J tl(Llisrn t h a n i ll ;uh all c i n g i t s o w n i d ,' as o f w h a t lll a n

Ill lL s t d " t o e n t e r t h e K i n gd o m " f C"d .

I t lI o u l d t h l T e fo re be t h e h e i gh t o f

a b s u r d i t y for a Jew t o want to relII.lin "- lew while subscri b i n g t o C h ristianity or M oha m m edani s m , j u s t as i t would 1 )(' absurd fo r Wl(' t o be a Christ ian and a M o h a m m edan at t h e same t i me " "

Elsewhere he m akes the same clai m , that the h i story o f Jewish-Christian relations abol i shes the viahi l i t y of maint ai n i n [; loyaltv t o both civilization s . W i thout i n any way derogating ( : hristianity as a means to sah'ation lor t h e Christian , the a\,lTa�e ,J e w who would adopt it as an al ternative to .J u d a i s m " ,lUld I)e d o i n g , io i . 1 9 5 8 ) . p . 60 .

g . II nri.

.

p . (i 2 .

,) \ L t n i n Buber. The Knowledge o/ Ma n, A I'h l/osophy of /he Interh uman , cd . M . Fried­ m a n , t ra n s . M . Friedman and R . C . S m i t h ( N e w Yo r k : H a r p e r To rchl)()() k s . 1 ')66) . p . 1 1 :2 .

1 0 . lind. ,

p.

7':) .

M a r t i n B ubel', Between Ma n anrl .\fa n , t rans . R . G . S m ith ( :'>ic\\' Yor k : The M a c M i l l a n C o m p any , 1 9 48) , p . 2 (l :l . 1 2 B u be r. Kllow/edge of lv!a n . p p . 6 0 , tiL . 1 :, . IInri. . p. ti l . 11.

1 + . Ihiri . p p . ti 8 , 6 9 . 7 1 .

B u bl'l'. I I/ lid Tho u , p . 1 1 3 . I ti . B ubt'!. I\lIou-ledge of ,Ha n . p p . gO , 7 0 .

1 :1

1 7 . Ibid. . P

70 .

l B . Ibid. , p. 7 1 . 1