Thucydides on War and National Character 0813336449, 9780813336442

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Thucydides on War and National Character

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HISTORY AND WARFARE Arther Ferrill, SeriesEditor

THUCYDIDES ON WAR AND NATIONAL CHARACTER Robert D. Luginbill A ROCKY MOUNTAIN SAILOR IN TEDDY ROOSEVELT'S NAVY: The Letters of Petty Officer Charles Fowler from the Asiatic Station, 1905-1910 Rodney G. Tomlinson, editor SOLDIERS, CITIZENS, AND THE SYMBOLS OF WAR: From Classical Greece to Republican Rome, 500-167 B.c. Antonio Santosuosso THE ORIGINS OF WAR: From the Stone Age to Alexander the Great Arther Ferrill A HANDBOOK OF AMERICAN MILITARY HISTORY: From the Revolutionary War to the Present Jerry K. Sweeney, editor THE MILITARYREVOLUTION DEBATE: Readings on the Military Trans£ ormation of Early Modem Europe Clifford J. Rogers, editor SUN PIN: MiiITARY METHODS

Ralph D. Sawyer, translator •

THE GENERAL'S GENERAL: The Life and Times of Arthur MacArthur Kenneth Ray Young TO DIE GALLANTLY: The Battle of the Atlantic Timothy J.Runyan and Jan M. Copes, editors GOOD NIGHT OFFICIALLY: The Pacific War Letters of a Destroyer Sailor William M. McBride SUN-TZU: ART OF WAR Ralph D. Sawyer, translator FEEDING MARS: Logistics in Western Warfare from the Middle Ages to the Present John Lynn, editor THE SEVEN MILITARY CLASSICS OF ANCIENT CHINA Ralph D. Sawyer, translator

Thucydides on War and· National Character

Robert D. Luginbill

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Routledge

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Taylor & Francis Group

LONDON AND NEW YORK

To my dear mother and to the memory of my dearfather

First published 1999 by Westview Press Published 2019 by Routledge 52 Vanderbilt Avenue , New York , NY 10017 2 Park Square, Milton Park , Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business Copyright © 1999 by Taylor & Francis All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic , mechanical , or other means , now known or hereafter invented , includin g photocopying and recording , or in any information storage or retrieval system , without permission in writing from the publishers. Notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks , and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe .

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Luginbill, Robert D . Thucydides on war and national character / Robert D . Luginbill. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0-8133-3644-9 (he.) 1. Thucydides-Views on war. 2. Thucydides. History of the Peloponnesian War. 3. National characteristics, Greek. 4. Plague-Greece Athens-History. 5. Greece- History-Peloponnesian War, 431-404 u.c.-Influence. I. Title. DF229.T6L84 1999 938' .05--dc21

98-54300

CIP ISBN 13: 978-0-367-27400-9 (hbk)

Contents

1

Charting History's Flow

1

Learning from History, 1 Investigating History's "Earthquakes'', 3 The Historyas Historical Paradigm, 5 Thucydides as History's Pathologist, 7 2

Thucydides' Discovery of National Character

14

National Character and the Psychology of the History,14 Definition of National Character in the History,15 The Literary Background, 16 Scholarship on National Character in the History,17 3

Physis:The Biology of War

21

Thucydides' _Philosophy of History, 21 Antiphon's Influence on Thucydides' Theory of Physis,22 Physls:The Origin of National Character, 24 The Essential Drives of Physis: Imperialism and Freedom, 28 4

The Balance of Power and Necessity

36

Restraining Kinesis:The Development of a Balance of Power, 36 The Psychological Effects of Balance, 41 Necessity and War, 46 5

Risk and Reason

53 V

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Contents

Vl

6

Hope and Fear

65

Hope and Fear: GnomeConfronts Tyche,65 Thucydides' Terminology for Hope and Fear, 66 Hope and Fear as Regulators of Historical Behavior, 67 The Origins of Hope and Fear, 70 7

The Elements of National Character

82

Thucydides' Terminology for National Character, 82 The Significance of National Character in the History,83 Basic Tendencies of Spartan and Athenian National Character, 87 8

Spartan National Character in Action

105

Book I, 105 Book II, 108 Book III, 111 Book Iv, 114 Book V, 118 Books VI and VII, 120 Book VIII,123 9

Athenian National Character in Action

134

Book I, 134 BookII, 137 Books III, IV, and V, 140 Books VI and VII, 152 Book VIII,159

10

Syracuse: The Formation of National Character

173

11

National Character and Leadership

189

Aspects of Leadership, 189 The Plataean Paradigm, 193 The Trojan Paradigm, 196 Battlefield Leadership, 200 National Leadership, 203

Contents 12

The Inevitability of War

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Vll

216

The Violent Rhythm of War, 216 The Inevitability of the Peloponnesian War, 217 The Lessons of History, 221

Bibliography

Index

225 229

Taylor& Francis Taylor & Frar1cisGroup http://taylorandfrands.con1

Charting History's Flow

Whatexperienceand historyteachis this-that peopleandgovernmentsneverhave learnedanythingfrom history,or actedon principlesdeducedfrom it. -G. W.F.Hegel

Thosewhocannotrememberthe pastarecondemnedto repeatit. -G. Santayana

Waris a violentteacher . -Thucydides

This book is addressed to those who realize that the complexities and anomalies of modern life have not rendered everything that past generations have undergone hopelessly irrelevant to the problems of today, who understand that in the pages of history we are apt to find images of ourselves staring back at us. There is no better person to deflate the myth of modern uniqueness than the fifth century B.c. Greek historian . Thucydides. In his classic Historyof the Peloponnesian War, Thucydides shows us that there is a better way to face the on-coming flood of events than to meet each individual swell that breaks across our bow as if it were entirely unique. Thucydides teaches us about the pattern behind history 1s flow.

Learningfrom History The political career of a young Athenian general by the name of Thucydides came to an abrupt end on a stormy winter night in Thrace in 424 B.c., when Brasidas, a Spartan general of uncommon brilliance, took the outposts protecting the Athenian colony of Amphipolis by surprise. Through a clever mixture of threats and promises he secured his victory the following day, and came to terms with the inhabitants for the surren1

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der of the city. Along with his colleague Eucles, Thucydides had been responsible for the defense of Thrace, and so bore the brunt of his countrymen's ire over the loss of this strategic city whose role in supplying timber and other necessities for the Athenian navy was vital. No matter that his response to Brasidas' coup had been a vigorous one, or that it was only the rapidity of his counterattack which had saved Eion (the important naval base on the Strymon river south of Amphipolis)-as punishment for his part in the debacle Thucydides was stripped of his office and banished from Athens for the duration of the war. Whether he had the savvy tactics of Brasidas, the ineptitude of Eucles (who happened to be present at Amphipolis at the time of the attack), or perhaps even his own poor luck to blame, in the wake of this defeat Thucydides found himself forced into an unexpectedly early retirement. The Peloponnesian War turned Thucydides' life upside down, and he lived to see that war take a terrible toll on his beloved city of Athens as well. Perhaps the most shocking aspect of the national and personal tragedies he experienced was the unforseen nature of them both. Even with the benefit of hindsight, Thucydides' failure to prevent the capture of Amphipolis seems due to a number of unpredictable factors, and we cannot justly find fault with him for failing to predict the movements of Brasidas, failing to anticipate the appreciable luck and daring of the man, or failing to recognize before the fact the fickleness which the inhabitants of Amphipolis would display under pressure. The Athenians, however, did blame him, and thrust upon him a life of leisure, which (though it may not seem so terribly unpleasant to us) was certainly not one Thucydides, a man of action and intense political interests, had previously cultivated. With most of the Greek world at war and entangled in a struggle that would last some twenty years more, our young general, despite his more than modest means and aspirations, was thus pushed into the role of observer and forced to take an Olympian view of the terrible events that ebbed and flowed around him. Had he been a man of anything less than exceptional ability and curiosity, this affair might have passed as quietly as any one of a myriad such accidents occasioned by the Peloponnesian War. But Thucydides, suddenly finding himself with time, opportunity, and sources of information previously unavailable to him, intensified his efforts to produce a history of the war (begun, as he tells us, at its very inception),1 and brought an uncommon talent to his enterprise. The result is his Historyof the Peloponnesian War, not merely a valuable chronicle of events, but a provocative glimpse of what Thucydides saw as the true inner-workings of history. Thucydides felt that he had found an explanation for the historical riptides which had dragged him and his city under, and his Historyis the embodiment of that explanation. The great tragedy of Athens along with his own personal tragedy were

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3

not isolated incidents, but part of a larger pattern, a pattern which was to Thucydides' way of thinking common to all human history and which he expected to dominate our collective experience for all time. In his view, history lies deep at the psychological center of the human being, and is made manifest in the characteristic behavior of the nations which dominate its stage. Out of the horror and violence of the Peloponnesian War, Thucydides created a masterpiece whose lessons about the causes, courses, and consequences of war are still valuable today, and perhaps more so now than ever before. The mere act of writing the Historywas a hopeful one, and in its pages Thucydides has bequeathed us a chart to history's more treacherous currents. It is up to us to choose whether to navigate by the wisdom of the past, or to open our sails to the winds of war.

Investigating History's ''Earthquakes'' The catastrophe which rocked Greece in 431 B.c. was of such enorn1ous proportions that its after-shocks were felt throughout the ancient world. That titanic clash between the Athenian empire and the Spartan alliance which we know as the Peloponnesian War produced historical tremors on a scale beyond anything that Hellenic civilization had yet experienced, prompting Thucydides to call it ''the greatest disturbance (KtVT)O"t~, kinesis)that had ever befallen the Greeks." 2 The word kinesis(literally "movement") 3 is used by Thucydides in the second book of his Historyto describe the earthquake on the island of Delos, seen by many of his contemporaries as an ominous harbinger of the war to come. 4 This image of a massive seismic convulsion is invoked by Thucydides at the inception of his work in order to stress the cataclysmic nature and unusual magnitude of the Peloponnesian War.5 The metaphor is at once a powerful and shrewdly descriptive one. Like a violent temblor, war is a ruinously powerful and unpredictable catastrophe, set in motion by forces which are often unseen, leaving misery and desolation in its wake. The Peloponnesian War was just such a chaotic event. The shock waves of devastation and suffering it produced radiated outward from its epicenter in central Greece to Thrace and Ionia in the north and east, and to Corcyra and Sicily in the west, only to return to their source with even greater force. For nearly three decades (until its conclusion in 404 B.c.) the war unleashed its destntctive fury upon the Hellenes. It made the Peloponnesian league (that archaic edifice of Spartan power) totter and sway, and very nearly brought it tumbling to earth. It did count among its victims the Athenian empire, which, in the end, came crashing irreparably down.

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Extending from 431 to 404 B.c.,this was a war which saw disasters unprecedented in the Greek world . The extermination of the Melians, the eradication of the city of Plataea, and the annihilation of the Athenian army at Syracuse provide graphic proof of the savagery caused by this protracted conflict. At the conclusion of his proem, Thucydides gives us a grim summation of the exceptional suffering that that war engendered: This war was drawn out to great length, and in its course misfortunes befell Greece such as had never before occurred in a like space of time. For never before had there been so many cities captured and depopulated, whether by foreigners, or the warring factions themselves (some even receiving a new set of inhabitants after their capture) . Never before had so many been banished, so many slaughtered, whether by war or revolution (1.23.1-2).

In Thucydides' words, this war was "the greatest kinesis"that had yet befallen Greece, and it is to the sheer scale of the conflict that he attributes this intensity of suffering. Thucydides cites a number of factors that contributed to making the Peloponnesian War an event of such magnitude. After the conclusion of the Persian Wars (in which Athens and Sparta had been allies), Athenian power grew as that city gradually converted the anti-Persian alliance it led into an empire. 6 By the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War, both the Athenian and Spartan militaries had reached a peak in terms of the forces available for the war, 7 and the constant skirmishing of the intervening period had produced highly experienced military establishments in both states .8 The very fact that Athens and Sparta were so powerful relative to the rest of the Greeks meant that any other state or group which sought redress or assistance would (and did) naturally gravitate to one of these tw·o ''super-powers." 9 The net result was that nearly the entire Hellenic world was drawn into the epic confrontation between them, thus adding strength to one side or the other. 10 The growth in military power in the fifty years between Persia's defeat and the Peloponnesian War was so massive that at the outbreak of the latter, Thucydides tells us, Athenian power had actually eclipsed the combined strength of the entire Greek alliance in the days of the Persian Wars. 11 In addition to the terrible damage caused by the shock wave or kinesis of the Peloponnesian War, a second point of comparison in Thucydides' mind between wars and earthquakes is that both seismic activity and human conflict originate from natural sources. In his view, war is a product of the human psyche. In its conscious designs and unconscious drives, human nature is the biological force that produces the historical shock waves of war and revolution, thus violently altering the political landscape in a way analogous to the shifting of the earth's crust. Thu-

ChartingHistory'sFlow

5.

cydid .es recognized that just as our ability to anticipate the earth's convulsions is extremely limited, so the volatility of human behavior makes it impossible to predict the exact time and place where the equally disturbing phenomenon of war will vent its fury. There is also a third point of comparison that makes Thucydides' analogy a particularly apt one. Just as earthquakes depend upon the changes in and movements of discernible portions of the earth's crust, so history (at least within the History)is shaped not by human nature in general, but by specific ·collectives of human beings that exhibit the common tendencies of their nature. In Thucydides' opinion, the causes and the courses of human conflict are directly linked to the behavioral tendencies of these large, national collectives. Within the pages of his History,Thucydides explores the "plate tectonics" of these groups, that is, the national characters of Sparta, Athens, and Syracuse, and demonstrates for us how these influence and direct historical events.

The History as Historical Paradigm It is perhaps because he focuses upon less endearing aspects of human behavior that Thucydides is not ·particularly well known in our time, and that of the two great originators of western historical writing it is Thucydides' contemporary Herodotus, the "father of history'' as Cicero calls him, who is the more widely celebrated. No doubt Thucydides' choice of subject matter has also worked against him. After all, Thucydides' topic is not, as Herodotus' was, the glorious victory of the Greeks over Persian aggression, but rather the Peloponnesian War, an internecine clash of the two leading Greek states. It may also be the case that Herodotus' colorful account of the Persian Wars coupled with its fascinating ethnographic digressions has proved more entertaining to modern ears than Thucydides' somewhat somber treatment of the Peloponnesian War. Where it is Herodotus' method to include several, often amusing, explanations for ·a given event, Thucydides has done the critical work himself and supplies the reader with what he judged to be "the facts" as best as he could ascertain them. His preoccupation with discovering the truth even when it conflicted with a "good story" was bound to make him seem less interesting to some. Indeed, Thucydides had anticipated that choosing what he saw as fact over anecdote would likely reduce his readership: My process of investigation was a painstaking one, since those actually present at any given event did not give the same account of identical matters, but spoke from bias or fading memories. And ·perhaps this .lack of fantasy in my narrative will make it appear less enjoyable (1.22.3-4).

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For Thucydides, however, popularity was not the ultimate goal. He was writing not for the amusement of the masses, but for any and all who desired to know what was really behind the events of the Peloponnesian War. For such knowledge might provide an interpretive key to the future as well: It will be enough for me for those to judge my work useful who wish to investigate the unobscured reality behind events, both what occurred in the past, and what, given the human condition, is likely to occur again in the future in a similar or comparable way (1.22.4).

It is not merely in methodology that Thucydides differs from Herodotus. His ·purpose is fundamentally different as well. While Herodotus is primarily looking back at the past to preserve (and, to Thucydides' mind, to entertain), Thucydides is looking forward, examining the past in order to instruct his readers about what was likely to occur in the future. It was with this in mind that Thucydides made what is perhaps his most celebrated statement: My work is not a popular piece written for off-hand enjoyment, but a possession for all time (1.22.4).

The word translated "possession'' here is the Greek ktema (K'tf)µa), while the phrase "popular piece'' is agonisma(ayCJ>vtcrµa),meaning a composition designed to win a prize. Thucydides intended his work to be something of true intrinsic value, no matter what the judgment of the public might be. He did not write his History with a view toward pleasing the ear or the sentiments of a particular audience, nor did he design it to be entertaining. His work was meant to be useful to the serious student of history. The contrast of ktemawith agonismais a not too assiduously veiled reference to Herodotus' work, and we can best see how Thucydides intended to implement the essentially different objective of his Historyby comparing the statements of purpose issued by each of these authors in their respective prologues. At the outset of his work, Herodotus states that in writing his history, he is attempting to preserve the memory of great deeds done during the Persian Wars, and to explain their cause: The investigations of Herodotus of Halicamassus are here set forth so that what has happened may not fade from the memory of man with the passage of time, neither the great and wondrous deeds done by Greeks and foreigners, nor especially the reason why they made war on one another (1.1.1).

ChartingHistory's Flow

7

Thus Herodotus' aim is somewhat epic in nature, and to a certain degree we can consider him to be assuming the role of epic poets such as Homer, men who sang of the great deeds of warriors done in battle. Herodotus adds to this celebratory role the avowed purpose of explaining the causality behind the Persian Wars. Thucydides' preface starts in a similar way with the name of the historian placed first in the Greek, but the stated intent of his work is different, and that fact is immediately made clear: Thucydides, an Athenian, wrote the history of the war between the Peloponnesians and Athenians, namely how they made war on one another (1.1.1).

Thucydides' stated objective was not, as Herodotus' wa~, to preserve the memory of glorious deeds, nor to explain the root cause of this particular conflict, but rather (in the process of writing a detailed history) to explain how the Peloponnesian War was fought. 12 It is in this way that Thucydides meant his Historyto be a ktema,that is, a lasting, useful possession. By carefully examining the Peloponnesian War, the most significant event in his lifefune and, as he saw it, in the history of his people, 13 Thucydides hoped to give his readers an historical model which he expected to be duplicated as long as men remained essentially the same "given the human condition." 14 He wanted to present the Peloponnesian War as a paradigm of historical behavior whose study would prove to be beneficial "forever.'' Where Herodotus told us about the glories of the past, Thucydides intended to use the past to convey not only something about his own times, but about funes to come as well. His Historywas meant to be a source of valuable insights into the motive forces of history and their manifestations in actual events. The paradigm which Thucydides bequeathed to us is a framework of historical motivation and historical action, a model that he expected to be repeated again and again in the course of human experience, a ktemawhose true value lies in its ability to show us the pattern behind human history.

Thucydides as History'sPathologist During the summer of the second year of the war (430 B.c.), a terrible pestilence broke out in the Piraeus, Athens' harbor on the Saronic gulf, and soon spread inland to the city of Athens its~lf. It was one of the most devastating reverses suffered by the Athenians during the war, and Thucydides' treatment of it is instructive of his historical method.1 5 In many ways, the plague and its effects upon the Athenian state provided Thucydides with an apt analogy to the effects of war upon civilization and the historical status quo. Furtherniore, his portrayal of that terrible event

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is more than a little revealing about the sort of utility he means us to gain from his work. Thucydides' description of the great plague 16 follows on the heels of the most strikingly beautiful passage in the History,the funeral oration of Pericles. Thucydides' juxtaposition of this famous epitaphiosand its sublime praise for Athenian civilization with the contagion that wracked that state morally as well as physically is no accident. 17 The plague's destructive course parallels the deleterious consequences of the war. Thucydides reports that both were unparalleled in scope. 18 Moreover, his portrayal .of the moral degeneration that attended the societal disruption engendered by the plague is hauntingly similar to the chaos occasioned by the political and social fragmentation on the island-state of Corcyra later in the war. 19 The parallel between the war at large and the plague in particular gives us some clear indications of what Thucydides felt his ktema,or "predictive'' model of historical action could accomplish, and what it could not. Just as he had left it to Herodotus to explain the ultimate cause of a particular war, so he dismisses the question of the plague's ultimate source: As to questions of its probable origin or the causes deemed sufficient to produce such a disruption, let each man, physician and layman alike, speak according to his knowledge. I, on the other hand, shall relate the manner in which it progressed. I shall also describe the symptoms, through close attention to which the reader may, on account of this prior knowledge, be best able to recognize it, if it should break out again. I too was sick with the disease and saw with my own eyes others suffer under it (2.48.3).

In addition to distancing his treatment of the plague from other, less "scientific" approaches, this passage also bears a number of similarities to 1.22.4, where, as we have seen, Thucydides promises a certain utility for his work based upon the principle of historical repetition: 1) in both instances the detailed information is addressed to the reader with the understanding that the report is meant to be useful; 2) the reader must give his careful attention to what is reported in order to benefit from it;20 3) the point of this process is for the reader to get a "clear view" of the matter; 21 4) the nature of the benefit is similar in both cases as well. By learning from Thucydides' report, the reader will thereby have gained some sort of predictive ability. In the case of the plague, the benefit is a rather specific one. Thucydides cannot say for certain that the same malady will occur again, but he does say that the information he supplies should give the properly instructed reader the ability to recognize what is happening. In the case of war and historical action, this predictive knowledge is less

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particular, and the increase in the scope of application brings with it a concomitant increase in the utility of the knowledge imparted. In both cases usefulness springs from Thucydides' description and analysis of events. Thucydides' contrasting of his approach to the plague with that of unnamed others is nearly identical to the deliberate break he made with Herodotus at the start of the History. Just as his book will answer the question how the Athenians and Spartans made war on one another, 22 so in his treatment of the plague Thucydides will explain the manner in which the contagion progressed. 23 The significance of these two statements has been largely overlooked. They are deceptively simple, but essential to understanding what Thucydides had in mind when he promised that his work would be of use. If we explore Thucydides' method of dealing with the plague, we begin to gain some idea of where this utility lies. He says that he will relate the manner in which it progressed. But Thucydides' report contains more than a detailed factual account of the disease regarding its outbreak, course and nature. Besides his meticulous recording of the facts of the case, Thucydides gives us the benefit of his insight into the psychology of the situation which the pestilence produced as well. The plague's origin (possibly Ethiopia), its spread (starting in Athens' port city of Piraeus and traveling inland to the city proper), and its symptoms (including fever in the first stage, congestion in the second, and vomiting with convulsions in the third) are all faithfully recorded. 24 It is in his discussion of the psychological and social effects of the catastrophe, however, that we are struck by the acuity of his analysis. The most dreadful thing about the disease on an individual level, he tells us, was the terrible despondency it caused. 25 So virulent had it proved itself that once the illness was contracted, sufferers tended to "turn themselves toward hopelessness in their mind, give in much more readily, and cease to resist." Fear of disease kept many from attending the sick, especially since those who "made it a point of honor" to visit them perished themselves. Many reached emotional overload. Overcome by the magnitude of the disaster they ceased mt?urning even for their own relatives. Those who managed to survive the pest experienced a sense of euphoria, thinking themselves immune to any future ailments (since it had been observed that those who survived it were never fatally afflicted if struck by the disease a second time). Besides its effect upon the psyches of individuals, Thucydides also charts the corruption of the Athenian social fabric wrought by the plague. 26 The calamity exerted dire psychological pressure on the populace. They were terribly hard pressed by the violence of it.27 Lacking hope for the future, they began to make no distinction between the holy and

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the profane, disregarding prior customs concerning burial rites, even casting their dead upon the funeral pyres of others. In short, the plague marked the beginning of a new era of lawlessness for Athens: In other respects as well, the plague marked the start of a new level of lawlessness for the city. When they saw what a volatile disruption was occurring in the status quo, people more readily risked doing what they had previously sought to conceal for fear their self-indulgent motives would come to light. For the rich were dying suddenly, with their possessions falling to the lot of those who previously had nothing. So they resolved to make short work of their capital, spending it on pleasure and putting but a transitory value on their bodies too as well as their money. No one was willing to take a long-term approach to pursue anything that seemed honorable, so doubtful did the prospects seem of achieving it before expiring. But whatever was pleasurable here and now, or could contribute to that end, no matter the source from which it sprang, this passed as honorable and useful too. Neither fear of the gods nor man's law restrained them. For when they saw everyone perishing without distinction, it seemed one and the same to them whether they acted piously toward the gods or not, and none were expecting to survive until the prosecution of their fellow men should force them to pay the penalty for their crimes. Much to the contrary, it was the common opinion that a far weightier sentence was already hanging over their heads, and that it was only reasonable to get some enjoyment out of life before it fell (2.53).

Thucydides' fascination with the social anomalies caused by the plague transcends the bare facts of the situation and takes us to a deeper level of analysis, one which contemplates the dynamics of human behavior and the effect on that behavior of historical pressure. As we shall see, the psychological dispositions of hope and fear that we see playing such a prominent role in Thucydides' treatment of the plague, as well as the concept of risk and its evaluation, are also of critical importance in Thucydides' theory of individual and national behavior in war. Further evidence for the psychological focus of Thucydides' historical method can be seen in his final words about the plague. 28 There was a prophecy much quoted at the time of the Peloponnesian War, whose exact form was in dispute. It predicted that in conjunction with ''a Dorian war'' either a "famine" or a ''plague" would arise, depending upon whether one considered the Greek word limosor loimosto be original to the verse. True to form, Thucydides is more concerned with analyzing popular reaction to this prophecy than in debating its validity. As it happened, the plague interpretation proved to be the most popular, but should a famine occur in a future war, Thucydides observes, '' famine" .,.

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would likely be remembered as the correct word, for people tend to ''make their memories conform to their experiences''. With this last statement, we can see a bit more clearly what Thucydides had in mind at the beginning of his discussion of the plague when he promised to show us "the manner in which it progressed." 29 The history of the event is recorded based upon details garnered from personal experience and other carefully tested sources, but that is just the beginning. Thucydides moves on to analyze the event in terms of its psychological impact, both on individuals and on Athenian society as a whole. He does so by exploring the event in terms of his own psychological system, which is heavily weighted toward the effects of hope and fear on human action as these emotions are produced by historical pressures. There was no cure for the plague that wracked the city of Athens during the second year of the Peloponnesian War, and Thucydides offers no solutions or therapies for it. His account is useful more from the sociohistorical point of view than it is from the medical one. What Thucydides offers us is a "pathology" not merely of the disease, but of the plague as a phenomenon affecting individuals and society. Through attention to his account, we gain insight into human behavior under the stress of contagion, information_about patterns of behavior that Thucydides did not see as limited to the one historical situation he describes. The occurrence of the plague was a unique historical event, but the reaction of people to it was something that was likely, in Thucydides' view, to be repeated under similar historical pressures. Thucydides' pathology of the plague's effect on Athenian society is, as we shall see, consistent with the system of historical psychology he develops throughout his History. Both the Peloponnesian War and the plague were examples of kinesis,events of a magnitude great enough to have a historically significant effect. In terms of Thucydides' system, the main difference between the plague and the Peloponnesian War (or any war) was that the plague, while it affected human behavior, did not originate from human behavior. It is the impact of the psychological pressure generated by both events that intrigues our historian. As with the plague, Thucydides carefully dissects the psychological forces at work during the course of the Peloponnesian War and displays them for us in the pages of his History. From Thucydides' point of view, war is also a disease. It produces its share of physical casualties, and, like the plague, can do great psychological damage to societies as well as to individuals. Thucydides does not promise us a cure for war anymore than he does for the mysterious, savage disease that debilitated his city and his own body. But he does give us a pathology of the plague of war, a paradigm whose lessons he expected would endure and prove valuable to future generations, a posses-

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ChartingHistory'sFlow

sion for all fune. Knowledge of the origins of human conflict, of the behavior of men under the pressures of war may not in itself prevent war, but is certainly information without which that most destructive of human diseases will never be properly understood. If we fail to learn on our own the lessons preserved for us by Thucydides, we may find ourselves taking instruction from that most "violent teacher," War itself. NOTES

1. 1.1.1. 2. 1.1.2. A.W. Gomme, in Essaysin GreekHistoryand Literature(Oxford 1937) 120-121, sees Thucydides' remark as directed to the scale of the Peloponnesian war: From the standpoint of its duration, casualties, intensity and scope, it was the worst war to have befallen Greece, doing more material and moral damage than any of its predecessors. cf. the English words kinetic 3. The word is derived from the verb kineo(1Ct11eco); and cinema. 4. 2.8.3.Thucydides was fascinated by such natural phenomena. At 3.89 of his History,he documents a series of earthquakes that occurred during the sixth year of the war, and links directly to the force of these quakes a number of tidal waves which subsequently hit the Greek mainland, inundating several islands. 5. In ''The Arrangement of the Thought in the Proem and in other parts of Thucydides I,'' CQ 2 (1952)134,N.G.L. Hammond describes the use of kinesisat 1.2 as a "series of events which radically changed the political situation for Greece and a considerable part of the non-Greek world.'' 6. 1.118.2. 7. 1.1.1. 8. 1.18.3. 9. 1.18.3. 10. 1.1.1. 11. 1.19.See chapter nine below and A. W. Gomme, v.l A HistoricalCommentary on Thucydides(Oxford 1959)[cited as Gomme HCTI133-134. here as how" is sugges_ted by the scholiast and 12. Translation of the Greek we; (Londefended by E. F. Poppo (ed.) in v.1 pt.4 Thucydidisde BelloPelaponnesiaco ·BookI (London 1905) 133. don 1843),and by E. C. Marchant (ed.) in Thucydides: See chapter 7, part 2, for a discussion of the significance of this distinction for the subject of national character. 13. 1.1. 14. 2.22.4. 15. The scholarship on this issue is extensive~ See in particular Leven, K., "Thukydides und die 'Pe~t' in Athen,'' MHJ 26 1991 128--160,Mittelstadt, M., -"ThePlague in Thucydides: An Extended Metaphor?" RSC 16 (1968) 145-154, and Parry, A., The Language of Thucydides' Description of the Plague," BICS 16 (1969)106-118. 16. 2.47-54. 17. For a different perspective see Gomme, HCT in loco. 11

11

ChartingHistory'sFlow

13

18. 1.1.2 compared with 2.47.3. 19. 3.82-3.83. 20. The Greek verb skopeo,"toinvestigate," is used in both passages. 21. Thucydides uses to saphes,"the clear thing" in 1.22.4, and deloo,"to make clear" in 2.48.3. 22. w£;,1.22.4. 23. oiov, 2.48.3. 24. The disease has been variously identified as bubonic plague, measles and typhus, but no theory as to its exact diagnosis is without its problems. See Poole, J.C.F.and Holladay, A. J.,"Thucydides and the Plague: A Footnote,'' CQ 32 (1982) 235-236, and by the same authors, "Thucydides and the -Plague: A Further Footnote," CQ 34 (1984)483-485. 25. 2.51. 26. 2.52-53. 'tOU x:ax:ou. 27. U1t£pJ3ta~oµevo'U 28. 2.54. 29. 2.48.3.

•

Thucydides' Discovery of National Character

National Character and the Psychology of the History Military action in war necessarily involves the risk of defeat with all its concomitant consequences. Risk is a pivotal element in Thucydides' system. It underpins every act of war Thucydides describes and forms a psychological barrier that men are driven to confront by the motivating forces of human nature. In the psychological schema of the History, it is Man's nature to be deterred from risk-taking as he contemplates the hazards of war, and incited to it as he anticipates war's potential rewards. Ideally, we might suppose that this tension between the fear of action and the desire to act would be resolved intellectually. In reality, as Thucydides demonstrates for us, decisions about which risks to nm and which to avoid are often made on an irrational basis. 1 As a result, the Historyis replete with examples of men's hopes and fears being translated directly into policy with those responsible for the decision failing to take heed of the actual risks involved or the resources necessary to confront them. Man's limited ability to overcome the urgent demands made by his nature guarantees that many of the policies he undertakes will be irrational in light of the actual risks. Such policies occur in two basic forms in the History:the overbold, and the overcautious. Human nature encouraged by hope tends to take foolhardy risks, but when cowed by fear its natural state is inaction, even in the face of excellent opportunities. The genius of Thucydides' implicit system of psychology, however, lies in his connection of national and individual psychology. The psychological effect of circumstances can work its power on nations as well as on individuals. Furthermore, at the collective level a bold or a cautious attitude can be locked in place by particularly critical events. The resultant 14

Thucydides'Discoveryof NationalCharacter

15

predisposition in a group's nature gives it a preconceived orientation toward risk-taking, in other words, a national character. The characteristic daring of the Athenians and caution of the Spartans are tendencies of character forged in the crucible of historical experience. These tendencies predispose the former in favor of risk-taking, and the latter against it. Because of the primary role of these two groups in the History,the effects of their two opposite national characters permeate the work. The dominance of the emotions over the intellect in decision making, a condition that obtains throughout much of Thucydides, means that for the most part Athenian and Spartan decisions are made in accordance with their national characters, regardless of the historical circumstances that confront them. The pervasiveness, significance, and essence of national character have been overlooked by many past studies of the History.2 However, the pervasiveness of national character is ubiquitous, for Thucydides has woven it into the whole warp and woof of his work. The significance of the theme would be difficult to overstate, for national character is more than just a brightly painted fresco on the edifice of the History.It is one of the central supporting pillars upon which the work is founded and plays a crucial role in motivating and conditioning much of the important historical behavior in the work. Finally, the essence of national character cannot be understood apart from the principles of individual psychology that give rise to it, for, in Thucydides, the human psyche is the wellspring of national character, and the stream which bears all national behavior along in its powerful c11rrent.In the chapters that follow, it will be our purpose to document the ubiquity of national character in the History, the fundamental importance of the theme to the historical events that Thucydides describes, and the essential connection between national character and the principles of individual psychology as Thucydides develops them. Definition of National Character in the History

The resilient, characteristic proclivities for or against risk-taking that are attributed by Thucydides to the war's major combatants have been referred to as "national character'' throughout this study. Despite the problems inherent in both words, this phrase has been chosen because it is the usual designation found in Thucydidean scholarship. 3 The behavioral tendencies involved in Thucydides' system of national character are intrinsically related to the psychological dispositions of hope and fear. In his psychological schema, these attitudes are largely responsible for determining whether or not risks will be run by individuals. In a similar manner, national character disposes a particular national group toward

16

Thucydides'Discoveryof NationalCharacter

action or inaction. Unlike hope and fear in the psyche of the individual, however, national character is a more resilient force and therefore less susceptible to modification by setbacks and successes. If we were to imagine the individual's predilection toward risk-taking as infinitely variable, moving freely along a scale whose polar opposites were complete inaction and unrestrained activity, national character would represent the collective psyche of a whole people frozen in place at some point along that scale. This is the essence of national character as it occurs in the History,and resilience is the essential factor that distinguishes national character from the attitudes of hope and fear in Thucydides' system of individual psychology. For Thucydides, national psychology is merely individual psychology writ large and in nearly indelible ink. Even the encouragement of signal victories and the discouragement of tragic defeats fail, within the span of time covered in the work, to bring more than minor, temporary variations in Spartan and Athenian behavior. National character as it is found in the Historythen, consists of that peculiar degree of willingness to act that a national group can characteristically be expected to exhibit within the confines of Thucydides' narrative. The Literary Background

Thucydides' characterization of Spartan and Athenian behavior should be differentiated from similar techniques of character portrayal found in other literature of his day. Three factors distinguish the characterization in the Historyas unique: 1) Thucydides' exclusive concentration on characteristics that have historical significance; 2) the empirical rather than purely literary basis which Thucydides claims for the national characters he describes; and 3) the link he provides between group characteristics and his system of universal psychology. His focus upon historically significant characteristics can best be illustrated by a brief comparison of his method with that of Herodotus. The Spartans were well known for their economy with words, and Herodotus is our source for one of the more famous references to this ''laconic'' tendency.4 He records that members of a Samian embassy once responded to Spartan protestations about the length of their speech requesting aid by saying simply "the sack needs meal.'' This was greeted by a Spartan reply that the word "sack'' was unnecessary. Despite the subsequent granting of the Samian petition, the characteristic Spartan brevity is here merely part of an entertaining anecdote; it plays no role in the policy decision of the Spartans. 5 Herodotus thus shows no apparent interest in national character as a functional aspect of history. His Historiesfocus on individuals acting from personal motives,

17

Thucydides'Discoveryof NationalCharacter

and he stresses the unity of all Greeks, rather than the differences between them. 6 Other contemporary Greek literature is also bereft of parallels to the historically significant national characterizations of the sort found in Thucydides. 7 The second unique feature in Thucydides' characterization of national groups is his empiricism. Thucydides claimed to have based the History upon detailed research, and made a clear distinction between his own scientific methodology and other works that he considered whimsical. 8 This research, conducted in an atmosphere of budding empiricism which characterized the fifth century, contains elements of presocratic, sophistic, and medical thought. 9 Thus, our historian would have had a number of empirical models to guide him, such as the study of the pathology of diseases, 10 and the observation of behavior in animals.II In classifying groups of human beings according to their behavioral tendencies as Thucydides does in his treatment of national character, he is perforrr1ing a task that may be likened to that of ethologists contemporary to him. 12 The use of such empirical techniques to gather data for an historical work, however, and their application to groups of human beings were developments that were entirely Thucydides' own. A third distinguishing element of Thucydides' national characterization is its grounding in principles of individual psychology. This feature too makes Thucydides' work unique among his contemporaries.I 3 For Thucydides, national character grows out of the same forces that he sees at work in the individual human psyche. Scholarship on National Character in the History The war's vicissitudes and the changes it wrought in the life of Thucydides are, as much as anything else, largely responsible for the attitude that dominated Thucydidean scholarship for more than a century. Scholars doubted the feasibility of maintaining consistent opinions and a consistent philosophy throughout the course of a war lasting some three decades, especially for a man who had suffered the reverses which Thucydides had, and who claimed to have begun writing at its inception. For this reason, the so-called uThucydides question" (that is, the quest to find ''original" passages in the Historybefore Thucydides supposedly modified and expanded them at a later date) dominated the scholarship of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries . The search for the History'soriginal strata (the objective of analyst'' scholarship, as this school has come to be known) had a tendency to eliminate a priori the idea that there might be any unifying themes that bound all the parts of the work together. Schwartz, for example, maintained that discrepancies between the four speeches delivered at the first 11

18

Thucydides'Discoveryof NationalCharacter

Peloponnesian congress in Book I were evidence that Thucydides had changed his view of the true cause of the war at some point in the process of composing his History,and had added the speeches of the Athenian ambassadors and Sthenelaidas as a result. 14Analysts such as Schwartz thus tended to disregard any possibility of consistency in Thucydides' underlying philosophy that might support his claim of utility based on historical repetition.1s Interest in the psychological aspects of Thucydides' work returned later this century with "unitarians" such as J. H. Finley, who sought to prove the essential unity of the Historyby demonstrating the consistency of Thucydidean ideas throughout the work. Finley's work marks the inception of modern studies in Thucydidean psychology. 16While there is much in his study that is insightful and helpful, Finley is primarily concerned with countering the analysts, and so does not seek to explicate Thucydides' system for its own sake. To a large degree, a synthesis of the two positions occurred in the post-war era, thus removing a major impediment to the study of the History'spsychological elements. 17 But if such issues were previously obscured by the struggle between analysts and unitarians, modern discussions of Thucydides have been at least partially beclouded by a similar disagreement between "optimists" and "pessimists." 18The latter position understands Thucydides' view to be that human planning is essentially futile, and so adherents of this view have generally considered the historical patterns evident in Thucydidean psychology to be deliberately misleading. 19Since, on the other hand, optimists see the Historyas a validation of human planning, scholars fr0m this camp have tended to underestimate the importance that the irrational element in mankind has in Thucydides' system. 20 The truth lies in a synthesis between the two extremes. The broad psychological patterns of behavior in the Historyare both irrational and regular. Thucydides is neither optimistic nor pessimistic about the human condition. His Historysets out to describe the world of mankind as he perceived it and to explain that world by examining human behavior in the microcosm of the Peloponnesian War. Successful planning, he believed, was possible . Regrettably, however, it was an all too infrequent occurrence, and in its absence, we should instead expect to see the rhythmic forces of human nature take control, ever tipping the balance of the historical process toward the barbarous and the irrational.

NOTES

1. For the dominant role of the irrational in the Historysee W. Schmid, in W. Schmid and 0. Stahlin, GeschichtedergriechischenLiteraturv.7, pt.1, no.5 (Munich 1948) 39, and Connor, Thucydides(Princeton 1984) 246-247.

Thucydides'Discoveryof NationalCharacter

19

2. Of interest, however, is W. Roscher's Leben,Werkund Zeitalterdes Thukydides (Gottingen 1842) 379-396. Roscher describes Thucydides' characterizations of the Spartans and Athenians as literary portrayals. He suggests that the differences between the groups should be accounted for by the different natures of the two opposing alliances they headed, and that their dissimilar behavior should be ascribed to internal political form. 3. "Character 1 ' implies a wider cultural scope than is involved in Thucydides' exclusive concentration on the politico-military aspects of historical behavior. See F. Jacoby, Abhandlungenzur Griechischen Geschichtsschreibung (Leiden 1956) 92. 4. 3.46. 5. At 3.47, Herodotus explains the Spartan decision to help the Samians in terms that have nothing to do with this incident or with any other tendency inherent in the Spartan character: i.e., it was either a requital for past services (according to the Samian view), or a desire to avenge the theft of a bowl and breast plate (according to the Spartan account). 6. The Athenian appeal to Hellenic unity at 8.144 points out that all Greeks, in addition to sharing the same blood, language, religion, also possess customs that are "identical in character 1' (f18ecx6µ61tpo1ta)to those of their fellow Hellenes. 7. For more examples of "anecdotal" characterization such as the proverbial stupidity of Boeotians see W. Wachsmuth, HellenischeAlterthumskundev.1 (Halle 1846) 122-138, and M. Goebel, Ethnica(Bratislava 1915). 8. 1.22.4. 9. See especially G. B. Kerferd, The SophisticMovement(Cambridge 1981), W. Nestle, "Thukydides und die Sophistik,"NJA 10 (1914) 648--685, and C. Lichtenthaeler, Thucydide et Hippocrate (Geneva 1965). Thucydides himself made painstaking efforts to collect accurate information as a base for his historical analysis (1.22.2). 10. Such empiricism is very much a mark of the Hippocratic school of medicine. C. Singer, GreekBiologyand GreekMedicine(Oxford 1922) 80. 11. The Ionian periegeseis, Hecataeus' description of the hippopotamus and crocodile, and Democritus three books of ai1t(at 1tepl ~ci>oov are all indicative of the interest in Thucydides day in empirical observation of animal behavior. See 1

1

I. Heiberg, GeschichtederMathematikund Naturwissenschaften im Altertum (Munich 1925) 88--89. 12. The Aristotelian work HistoriaAnimalium,although later than the History, makes a very interesting parallel in this regard . In it, man is conceived of as part of the animal kingdom, exhibiting characteristics similar to the gregarious and social animals (H.A. 488a). The work describes how animals differ from one another in disposition; for example, some animals are gentle, others sluggish and non-aggressive, while still others are ferocious, aggressive and stubborn (H.A. 488b). 13. This is true even in the case of political works such as the Athenian Constitution. While this document parallels many of the History's other themes, it has nothing to say about Athenian national character. For example, the author notes the relatively relaxed social standards at Athens, but considers this circumstance relatively insignificant to the city's historical behavior (2.7--8). 14. E. Schwartz, Das Geschichtswerk des Thukydides(Bonn 1919) 102-116.

20

Thucydides'Discoveryof NationalCharacter

15. This is evident in other analyst works as well: cf. W. Ullrich, Beitrligezur Erkliirungdes Thukydides(Hamburg 1846), W. Schadewaldt, Die Geschichtsschreibung des Thukydides(Berlin 1929), and A. Grosskinsky, Das Programmdes Thukydides(Berlin 1936). 16. J.H. Finley, ThreeEssayson Thucydides(Cambridge 1967) 118-169, originally published as "The Unity of Thucydides-' History,-'' HSCP supp. v.l (1940)255-298. 17. J.De Romilly provides an excellent summary of this synthesis in Thucydides and AthenianImperialism(London 1963) 3-11. 18. So named by L. Edmunds, Chanceand Intelligencein Thucydides(Cambridge 1975)212-213. H.P. Stahl, Thukydides(Munich 1966)and G.E.M. de Ste. Croix, The Originsof the PeloponnesianWar (London 1972) may serve respectively as examples of pessimistic and optimistic interpretations. 19. This is especially true where national psychology is concerned. P. Pouncey in TheNecessitiesof War(New York 1980) 58, drops a profitable discussion of "national character-types-" on account of what he calls Thucydides' '' descent to the particular." By this he means Thucydides' pessimism, which, in his view, kept pace with the war and resulted in his eschewing general principles for individual ones. Similarly, W.R. Connor, in Thucydides(Princeton 1984) 36--47,assesses national character in the History as an ironic device intended to ''misdirect" the reader. 20. See H. Herter, "Freiheit und Gebundenheit des Staatsmannes bei Thukydides,'' RM 193 (1950) 151-153.

Physis: The Biology of War

National character has its roots in a system of individual psychology inherent in the History.In order to understand Thucydides' conception of characteristic Athenian and Spartan behavior, it is therefore necessary to examine his understanding of the broader principles of hmnan psychology, for it is from this source that the national behavior described in the Historyflows. Thucydides' Philosophy of History

In an oft quoted dictum, the Greek sophist Protagoras proclaimed that "man is the measure of all things, of things that are that they are, and of things that are not that they are not." 1 Variously interpreted, this sentiment at the very least calls attention to an approach to understanding the world that is radically different from that of archaic titnes. For it points to a turning away from the mythical world of gods and heroes to a field of inquiry still central to our concerns today, the study of man hirrtself. Thucydides' philosophy of history was shaped amidst the intellectual revolution that occurred in fifth century Gr~ece and was inextr~cably tied to advances in medicine and science, especially to the behavioral theorizing of sophists such as Protagoras. Within the pages of his History,we see a modern realism that stands in stark contrast to Herodotus' archaic smile. Sophistic interests such as an emphasis on scientific inquiry, a depreciation of superstition and of religious interpretations of phenomena and events, a belief in the power of education and an intense interest in the nature of mankind are all themes to be found in Thucydides' work in a way that differentiates his work from previous historical writings. It is on this last point that Thucydides owes his greatest debt to the influence of the sophists, namely his shift of analytical focus away from the 21

22

Physis: The Biologyof War

supernatural to the most natural of all historical factors, the nature of man. Everything depends upon understanding this most crucial element in the historical process, for, it will be remembered, Thucydides' promise of usefulness for his Historywas based on an expected repetition of historical patterns generated by "the human condition'' or human nature .2 Instead of a supernatural explanation of events, Thucydides has given us what we may call a "biological" interpretation of historical action. Our historian has passed from theological history to something approaching behavioral research, and the constant factor he discovered that ensures that history will repeat itself is the nature of man. Thucydides believed the patterns of behavior that men manifest under the pressures of history to be persistent since they are based upon an essential physis,or nature, common to all mankind. Far from being incidental, these patterns are usually deterrrunant to the historical actions of individuals and groups alike, and ensure a cyclical pattern to history, which Thucydides expected to endure as long as humanity did. In the course of this book, we shall explore those patterns of behavior as Thucydides has recorded them, explicating his ktema,the paradigm he hoped would prove useful to subsequent generations. We shall demonstrate how he used this paradigm to interpret and explain both the various events of the Peloponnesian War, and the behavior of the individuals and groups who produced them. In doing so, it is hoped that the utility Thucydides envisioned will be partially realized. For the value of the History as Thucydides foresaw it is not dependent upon revisions, real or imagined, that were visited upon his incomplete masterpiece. Thucydides began his work with a philosophy of history that was already preformed. The result is that the History contains a theory or model of human historical behavior that is remarkably consistent.

Antiphon'sInfluenceon Thucydides'Theoryof Physis Thucydides' interest in and understanding of physis, or human nature, owes perhaps more to the sophist Antiphon of Rhamnus than anyone else. Hermogenes knew of a tradition that made this Antiphon Thucydides' teacher, 3 and Marcellinus' biography of Thucydides reports that he was schooled in philosophy by Anaxagoras, and in rhetoric by Antiphon the rhetor (the strategist behind the oligarchic revolution at Athens in 411 B.c. for whom Thucydides reserves unaccustomed praise, 8.68.1-2).Hermogenes suggests (on stylistic grounds) that the sophist Antiphon and the rhetor Antiphon are two different individuals, a view challenged by many scholars today. 4 Thucydides' praise of the rhetor coupled with the close correlation of ideas between his work and that of the sophist is certainly suggestive of a single Antiphon. 5 In any case, it is the similarity in

Physis: The Biologyof War

23

thought between the Historyand the remaining fragments of Antiphon the sophist that concerns us here. Antiphon shares with the other sophists, presocratics, and Thucydides an interest in natural phenomena and a tendency to see traditional Greek religion in naturalistic terms. 6 Two of the more interesting fragments of his work On Truth preserve unusual words for earthquakes. 7 Both are based on the Greek stem grypan-and mean wrinkled or corrugated. Antiphon apparently understood that a "wrinkling'' of the earth (an earthquake) took place when the fire (of the sun) heated and melted it. Antiphon's interest in the natural world is no more isolated from his concern for human behavior than is Thucydides'. We have already seen by way of overview how Thucydides' theory of historical movement used the natural phenomenon of the earthquake (the kinesis)as an analogy for the process of history. In a similar way, Antiphon's earthquake explanation (in conjunction with his other explorations of the physical world in On Truth) serves a broader purpose, for On Truth is primarily concerned with advancing Antiphon's social agenda. 8 Antiphon shares with Protagoras and other sophists a certain relativism, a sense that knowledge is limited on account of the inherent subjectivity of the human perspective, that the unity of existence is somehow at odds with the world we perceive sensually. 9 For example, time, in Antiphon's opinion, has no substantial existence or meaning apart from human measurement and the mind of man. 10The effect of this perspective is not apathy, but a an energetic desire to exploit the most valuable of all our commodities, time, 11and to do so by using our most valuable tool, the mind, the entity that in Antiphon's view exercises the ultimate leadership over the body. 12 . Antiphon stresses the primacy of the mind and the need to utilize time actively and efficiently. It should come as no surprise then that he also places significant emphasis on the role of education in human affairs. The mind should not be unprepared, 13 for there are no second chances in life; one's "life-moves" cannot be rearranged like pieces on a game board when one makes a mistake. 14 Learning, then, is the thing of primary importance, for a good education can be expected to reap benefits throughout one's life.1s The similarities to Thucydides are clear. The possibility of training the mind through education rather than bitter experience, of learning history's lessons and hence avoiding mistakes before the fact, is the essential goal of the History.For the sophist and the historian both, however, this is no easy thing to achieve. The imprecision of human thinking and the vast potential for error make the job of the educator a daunting one. This is made clear in Antiphon's own treatment of the psychology of action, and his analysis is, as we shall see, strikingly reminiscent of Thucydides'

24

Physis: The Biologyof War

own similar descriptions of motivation during the Peloponnesian War: In situations involving confrontation, hesitation is sometimes wise; though it is the result of fear, that fear may produce restraint which will save a person many troubles in the long run; hopes, however, often cast men into terrible disasters; on the other hand, sometimes people hesitate when there is no need to do so; some who are bold in speech when dangers are absent, moreover, shrink back in the face of actual peril. 16 Pro.dent action based upon accurate calculation is, of course, the recommended approach, but for Thucydides and Antiphon both, this is IlOt necessarily the normal way of things in life. The circu~spection and insight that a proper education can give is not the property of all men. What then rules human actions when this ingredient, necessary to a proper, civilized life, is lacking? The answer to the question above is hinted at in one of Antiphon's fragments and affirmed in great detail throughout the pages of Thucydides' History.In one of these surviving fragments of On Truth(preserved by Aristotle), Antiphon argues that if one were to bury a bed made of wood and if by some chance this rotting wood were to regain life, what would grow out of it would be wood, not a bed. 17 In other words, the essence of the thing would reassert itself in the end, and the form of the bed, imposed from without, would disappear. One of the words Aristotle uses to describe this essential force within (a word that is probably Antiphon's own), is physis.18 We can only guess at how Antiphon may have applied this theory of the primacy of physis to human actions, but we do know that physis figures 8trongly in his attempts to debase the claims of nomosor law in his work On Truth.19 We also know that, for his pupil Thucydides, physisbecame a key element in the psychological system later expressed in his

History. Physis: The Origin of National Character It is the consistency of human physis, of "human nature," that Thucydides sees as responsible for the repetitive pattern of human history, and it is the grounding of his philosophical system in this belief that gives the work a consistency of philosophy transcending any possible revisions or periods of composition. Thucydides did not expect the exact details of the Peloponnesian War to be repeated in future time anymore than he could find their like in the history known to him. The factor he found common to that war and other historical events was Man . The kinesis,or disturbance, caused in the historical status quo by the Peloponnesian War was thus biologically based according to Thucydides' view, and, as with all such historical "temblors," had its origins in human

Physis: The Biologyof War

25

behavior rising out of a comm.on human nature. Thucydides' earthquake (or kinesis)analogy likens the violent shifting of the earth to changes in the political situation of mankind brought about by extreme historical events such as war, revolution, and mass migration. The use of a natural analogy of this sort is fitting, since, after all, it is a natural force, the power of human biology, which Thucydides saw as responsible for historical "movements ." As Antiphon did, Thucydides uses the word physis(literally "nature") to represent this natural force that lies at the root of history. · Human behavior throughout the Historyproceeds according to a definite psychological system based upon certain assumptions Thucydides made about the ways in which this physis (essentially equivalent to the human psyche as we would express it in today's terms) tends to operate.20It is important to note that Thucydides' system is limited to the aim he hoped to achieve for his work; only those aspects of human behavior that bore historical significance were deemed worthy of inclusion. Therefore his system of psychology can be described as at once practical, empiricaJ., and specific. It is practical in that Thucydides is concerned with actual human behavior rather than a theoretical constitution of the human psyche. 21It is empirical in that Thucydides is attempting to explain real events rather than abstract possibilities. 22 It is specific in that Thucydides is dealing with military and political actions that had a demonstrable effect upon the course of history as he observed it, rather than with the whole spectrum of human behavior. The psychological explanations given by Thucydides for the behavior he chronicled in the Historyare present in the narrative, the speeches contained within the text, and in his own editorial comm.ents. These have proved both understandable and satisfying to generations of scholars and casual readers of the History alike. The system of psychology on which such observations are based, however, remains imperfectly understood. The primary cause for this is the absence in the work of an overt delineation of that overall system. 23 Previous investigations of the History'spsychological framework have generally assumed a schism in the human psyche between two opposing, antithetical parts most commonly represented by the Greek words gnome ("mind'') 24and orge("desire"). 25 It is true that in the History,gnomecan sometimes represent the rational side of Man, while orgerepresents his irrational side. 26But it is also true that Thucydides sometimes juxtaposes these two words as if they were essentially synonymous. 27The terms "rational" and "irrational" have therefore caused no little hindrance in attempting to understand Thucydides' system of psychology. In fact, orge and gnome,important as they are in Thucydides' work, do not so much represent two separate entities competing for domination of the human soul as they do different aspects of the same entity, human nature. 28

26

Physis: The Biologyof War

In Thucydides' system, orgeand gnomeactually represent the two essential facets of human nature, or physis:the motivational, impulsive side 29 These two facets or as(orge),and the perceptual, evaluative side (gnome). pects of physiswork together in close conjunction and are not generally in conflict. When, for example, a person is motivated to act by one of the various impulses of his nature (orgeexpressing itself in terms of acquisitiveness, love, hate, anger, etc.), he also has some degree of awareness (gnome) of the obstacles that stand in the way of satisfying these impulses. The orge part of his nature (we might say "his emotion") urges him on, while the gnomepart (we might say "his mind") reflects and deliberates, sometim.es approving and facilitating, sometim.es rejecting the demands of orge.However, this evaluative process is not necessarily what we should call a ''rational" one, for gnomeusually bases its evaluations on subjective and emotional criteria and is often fickle in its outlook. 30 Physis,therefore, represents Thucydides' concept of human psychology in the aggregate. 31 In Thucydides' system, physis is the sum total of that natural dynamo within Man that drives the historical process, giving history its violent rhythm. Its innate tendencies are the motive force behind historical action. It is this physis,or human nature, in its capacity as a psychological force that, in Thucydides' view, produces that pattern in historical events whose discernment he hoped would be of great utility to his readers. 32 This principle is stated most explicitly in two passages written in Thucydides' own voice. The first of these occurs in the methodological section of the proem .33 In that passage (it will be remembered), Thucydides indicated that future events will be "equivalent and comparable" to past events . The element linking past and future is given to be human nature, for it is ''according to the human thing" that one can expect the future to repeat the pattern of the past. 34 A second passage linking historical repetition to human nature or physis occurs in the description of the Corcyrean stasis. 35 Here Thucydides tells us that the ''many horrible events'' which befell Corcyra and other cities on account of revolution "happen and will always happen as long as Man's nature is the same.'' The parallels between this passage and 1.22.4 are striking. 36 Aided by similarities in diction, the two passages deliver an identical message: The repetitive nature of historical events is a direct result of the constancy of the human psyche. 37 At its most basic level, human nature strives to satisfy the demands of its impulsive side (orge)wherever it can, and it is this drive to fulfill physis' desires that is the ultimate motivator of historical activity.38 The connection between natural desire and behavior is posited in principle by Diodotus during the Mytilenian debate. 39 In an attempt to dissuade his

Physis: The Biologyof War

27

fellow citizens from executing the Mytilenians, Diodotus argues that the death penalty will not prevent future rebellions since it is in the "nature" of all men to err.40 According to Diodotus, men are led into dangerous activities by a variety of circumstances under the influence of their impulsive side (orge);supported by hope, desire holds sway over mankind and is wont to take the lead in human activity; with the help of hope, desire contrives schemes that bring disastrous results; one cannot, therefore, restrain physisfrom anything it is eagerly set upon doing: All men ·are naturally .prone to make mistakes, publicly and privately, and no law can prevent it. Mankind has exhausted the entire store of penalties in hopes of suffering less at the hands of evil-doers. It is likely that in ancient times penalties for the most serious wrongs were at first less severe, then, as transgressions persisted, all eventually were escalated to capital punishment. But men continue to break the law nevertheless. Now then, we are either going to have to find some terror more horrible than death, or accept the principle that death is no adequate deterrent .. The pressure of poverty (which produces recklessness), the arrogance and pride of wealth (which produce greed), and the passion (orge)of life's other various and sundry conditions lead men into dangerous courses of action, according as they are overcome by some more powerful, irresistible force, whatever their condition . Hope and Desire govern everything. Desire leads, Hope follow~. When Desire concocts a scheme, Hope convinces us that good luck will attend it, and together these two do immense damage, proving more persuasive than dangers we can see, though invisible themselves. Luck, too, is no less an instigator, for by making unexpected appearances she sometimes induces men, and even entire states, to run ri~ks greater than their resources, especially when the game is for the highest stakes: freedom and empire. Standing in company with all his fellows, every man is prone to make unreasonable estimates of his own abilities. In short, it is impossible and pure idiocy to suppose that, when human nature is zealously set upon doing something, the force of law or any other terror can dissuade it (3.45.3-7).41

The sentiments given to Diodotus regarding the dominant role played by the impulsive side of man's nature are consistent with those to which Thucydides expressly gives voice.42 This can be seen from his comments regarding the defection of the Athenian allies to Brasidas. Incited to rebellion, these allies had acted out of impulse in a state of blind desire, not out of prudent foresight. According to Thucydides, this is the natural way of things. Men are wont to take counsel of their hopes and act recklessly when they desire something, peremptorily rejecting whatever interferes with these desires:

28

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When they heard of the capture of Amphipolis, the terms being offered for capitulation and Brasidas' moderation, the cities subject to Athens were exceedingly eager to revolt, and secretly sent messengers to him urging him to come, each wishing to be first to rebel. Indeed, this policy appeared to be a safe one, for they seriously misjudged Athenian power, though it was later revealed to be far greater than their estimates. In making this judgment they relied more upon what they wished to be true (though unsupported by the facts), than upon what forethought (a more certain guide) would suggest. It is, after all, the way of men to surrender to their hopes without reflection when they want something, and to reject subjectively whatever disagrees with their hopeful estimates (4.108.3-6).

The dominance of the biological drives of human nature (physisfor short) over human behavior is evident in the two passages above. 43 In both instances, we see physismanifesting itself in the form of impulsive desire and leading men to act recklessly. 44 Faulty judgment results. 45 Here we see clearly the core of the pattern Thucydides delineates: After human nature (physis)provides the impulse (orge,manifest here in the form of desire), men then generally act upon that impulse. 46 What is perhaps surprising at this point in our study is that rather than discouraging the impulsive side of physisor directing it into more constructive channels, reason (gnome),the deliberative side of physis,is described as little more than a facilitator of those impulses. 47 The Essential Drives of Physis: Imperialism and Freedom

While human nature may focus its desires on any number of different targets, Thucydides recognized two objectives of physisthat are of decisive historical importance: 1) the desire to rule over others and 2) its opposite, i.e., the desire to be free from the rule of others. 48 These are more than mere comrnonplaces, for in Thucydides' system they have a definite historical significance, constituting a dangerous, pent-up force that is ever threatening to jolt history's topography and produce a kinesis(such as war, revolution, or migration). 49 Imperialism and freedom are ''the highest stakes'' as we have seen Diodotus testify, and the desire to attain them is often the spark that sets off historically significant activity.50 In his speech at the Gela conference, Hermocrates describes the clash between these two contrary desires: Ignorance of the difficulties war entails, cannot compel anyone to wage it, nor can fear deter anyone from it, if he thinks he can profit by it. War ensues when its potential gains appear greater than its risks to one side, while the other side would rather undergo its dangers than be subjugated in any way (4.59.2).

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29

The ~~im.perialurge'' or ''will to power'' is a given within the pages of the History,and is first articulated by the Athenian ambassadors at Sparta in defense of their empire, and specifically mentioned as a function of human nature: We have thus done nothing extraordinary nor divergent from human nature, if, influenced by the greatest inducements of honor, fear, and gain, we accepted an empire when it was offered and then refused to relinquish it (1.76.2).51

Hermocrates too connects im.perialism to physis(as well as im.perialism's opposite, the desire to be free): It has always been the nature of man to rule him who yields, and to resist him who attacks (4.61.5).

We find this principle validated on an individual level by Thucydides in his own voice when he diagnoses the terrors that occurred during the Corcyrean revolution. He tells us that the ulfunate cause of the destructive societal degeneration produced by the revolution was "the lust for rule, which originated from greed and ambition.'' 52 Likewise, the desire for freedom is assumed throughout the Historyto be an equally powerful motivation. 53 That liberty is the normal desire for any state is confirmed by the Syracusan assumption that defeat of the Athenians would result in her subject cities returning to a free condition.54Furthermore, freedom is the principle and hope upon which states are founded.SS Since this is so, states deprived of freedom are inclined to revolt whenever possible. Diodotus and Nicias use similar language in their separate attempts to make the Athenians understand that this is the natural way of things,s 6 and Thucydides gives voice to a similar personal observation, relating how the subject cities who had been given a degree of independence soon attempted to acquire '' outright freedom.'' 57 For as Pagondas tells his Boeotian comrades, it is the part of valorous men to ''fight for the liberty of their own land."SS In the classic confrontation between the im.perial state of Athens and the small, independent state of Melos, 59 Thucydides demonstrates for us what happens when the two contrary premises of Hermocrates' dictum collide .60 Both sides defend their actions on the basis of the two opposing principles. The Athenians attribute their actions to the "necessity of human nature'': For what we believe to be true of the gods, we know to be always true of men, that by the necessity of their nature they rule wherever they have the upper hand (5.105.2).

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The Melians defend their actions as equally intelligible, maintaining the reasonableness of fallowing a course of action in preserving their freedom, which is, a fortiori, the more understandable given the risks Athens' subject states are willing to take to regain theirs: Well then, if those who are already subject to you are willing to run as terrible a risk to escape your rule as you are to maintain it, how completely worthless, how cowardly we who are still free would be, should we fail to prefer anything to slavery (5.100).

In the end, the victory of a stronger, imperial power over a smaller, free state is not unexpected. 61 At first glance, this state of affairs may make it seem that Thucydides' positing of such powerful human drives toward imperialism on the one hand and freedom on the other are a prescription for personal and historical anarchy with a level of perpetual conflict outstripping even the grim historical record in intensity, and ending in world-wide tyranny. There are, however, restraining influences in Thucydides' schema that limit the dual drive toward imperialism and freedom. It now remains to consider the forces that prevent these psychological impulses of physis from being acted upon and fulfilled in every instance. NOTES

1. Diels, Vorsokr.BO,B 1. 2. katato anthropinon(1ecxi=a to uv8pw1ttvov): "according to the human thing'' (1.22.4). The expression may well encompass more than human nature (as some scholars have argued) but since, in Thucydides' system, human nature generates the human condition, the distinction is hardly important. 3. "For I am told by many that Thucydides was the pupil of Antiphon of Rhamnus (Diels, Vorsokr.87, A 2). 4. For the most recent defense of the "unitarian" or one-Antiphon position see "The Ancient Tradition on the Identity of Antiphon," by Michael Gagarin GRBS 31 (1990) 27-44. 5. See my article "Rethinking Antiphon's Ilept ~i118eicxc;,11 Apeiron30 (1997) 163--187. 6. See especially Diels, Vorsokr.87, B 10-11, 26-31. 7. Diels, Vorsokr.87, B 30-31. 8. See especially the two extensive papyrus fragments found at Oxyrhynchus (Diels, Vorsokr.87, B 44 A B). These contain an extensive defense of aristocratic privilege based on the claims of "nature" (physis) against those of the "law" (nomos).See Luginbill 1997, passim. 9. Diels, Vorsokr.87, B 1. This idea can be traced to the Eleatic school: Kathleen Philosophers(Oxford 1946) 395. Freeman, The Pre-socratic 10. Diels, Vorsokr.87, B 9. 11

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31

11. Diels, Vorsokr.87, B 77. 12. Diels, Vorsokr.87, B 2. 13. Diels, Vorsokr.87, B 3. 14. Diels, Vorsokr.87, B 52. 15. Diels, Vorsokr.87, B 60. 16. Diels, Vorsokr.87, B 55-58. 17. Diels, Vorsokr.87, B 15. 18. Physisis the Greek word for nature and the source of many English words such as "physical.'' 19. Diels, Vorsokr.87, B 44. See Luginbill 1997 for commentary. 20. These assumptions are seldom stated directly. Evidence in this study for Thucydides' psychological schema has been drawn from the speeches as well as from the narrative and editorial sections of the work. In cases where speech material has been utilized to reconstruct the History's psychological system, it has been in conjunction with evidence gathered from the other portions of the work, in order to ensure that a given principle is in actuality Thucydides' own. In any case, while individual actors in the History often disagree as to the policiesthey favor, the speeches invariably indicate that all parties in the work are operating from common, implicit psychological principles. 21. For the importance of the psychological dimension of the History for Thucydidean studies see 0. Luschnat, "Thukydides," in Pauly'sRealencyclopiidie der classischenAltertumswissenschaft,ed. A. Pauly and G. Wissowa, supp. v.12 (Munich 1970) cc. 1239-41. 22. P. Huart, Le vocabulaire de !'analysepsychologiquedans !'oeuvrede Thucydide (Paris 1968) 41 [cited as Huart VAPT]. 23. The problem of evidence in the reconstruction of Thucydides' psychological system is not confined to the speeches. Within the narrative and even within the small corpus of the author's personal comments, Thucydides' flexibility of expression makes a rigorous correlation of psychological concepts with vocabulary items difficult. Though we may agree with P. Huart' s claim, in VAPT21, of precision on Thucydides' part in the use of synonymous terms, his choice of vocabulary in the expression of concepts (psychological and otherwise) is broad and flexible. In addition to the problem of conceptual referents, the rhetorical bias of the speeches (in relation to the outcome each individual speaker is trying to achieve) must be taken into account in any attempt to reconstruct Thucydides' psychology. When these problems are given due consideration, however, the psychological principles underlying all parts of the History have proved, in this study, to be remarkably uniform. 24. See chapter 5 below for gnome's role in Thucydides as the psyche's emotional arbiter. 25. The idea of a psychological struggle in the History between the rational principle in man (yvwµ,i) and his irrational side (variously represented as 6py11 or q,uai~) is common in literature that treats Thucydidean psychology. Among those who identify man's irrationality with opy~ are Huart VAPT,54-57 and in rNnMH chez Thucydideet ses contemporains (Paris 1973) [cited as Huart rNnMH] 86-87; W.R. Connor, Thucydides(Princeton 1984) 55, n.9; C. Schneider, Infonnation und Absicht bei Thukydides (Gottingen 1974) 151; and L. Edmunds 1975, 9-10.

32

Physis: TheBiologyof War

W. Schmid, in his article JJ'Thukydides," in W. Schmid and 0. Stahlin, Geschichte dergriechischenLiteratur(Munich 1948) 32-39, comes to a similar conclusion, but (physis). The position taken by Miiri in calls the irrational principle 4>ucr1~ uBeitrage zur Verstandnis des Thukydides," MH 4 (1947) 251-275, is similar (though stated in a somewhat more complex fashion). According to Miiri, gnome represents the human psyche for Thucydides (255--57). This "inner man," however, has two essential aspects: gnomeproper ("Das Rationale, die Kraft der Uberlegung, der gedanklichen Konzeption," 258) and orge( Affektmasse, verandliches Gemilt," 258). 26. Thucydides occasionally does oppose the two (e.g., 'tou µ11opyfi µaAAov ,; yvwµn .... ~aµap'teiv, 2.22.1). P. Huart, VAPT 154-57, notes that Thucydides' classification of psychological terms does not follow traditional Greek schemes, but that there exists a precise division between the rational and irra .. tional in the History which Huart takes to be represented by the antithesis between orgeand gnome. 27. e.g., tv µev ya:p Eip'flVTI .... ctµe(vouc; 'ttxc;yvwµac; £XOt>crt.... 0 0£ 1t6Aeµoc;.... 1tpoc;'tct 1tap6v 'ta 'tctc;opy&c; 'tO)lJ1tOA,A,0)1J oµotoi, 3.82.2. 28. As E. R. Dodds notes in TheAncient Conceptof Progress(Oxford 1973) 194, with the development of the nomos-physisantithesis (i.e., law versus nature), the sophists had expanded the concept of physis to include human nature. Thucydides is often regarded as characterizing physisas compulsive and malevolent. See W. Nestle, "Thukydides und die Sophistik," NJA 10 (1914) 667ff. 29. Compare 2.22.1: 6py'fi µciAAOV,; yvwµn. Examples of Man's impulsive side being represented by orgeand its related verb (opyuat~ and 1:0 rtv8pwt vov in TheHuman Thing(Chicago 1981) 185ff. and passim,should be questioned. The use of the neuter article with an adjective in place of an abstract noun is a common phenomenon in Thucydides as J.Denniston has shown in GreekProse Style (Oxford 1952) 36f. See also Huart VAPT25. Furthermore, the construction is used in several instances as a deliberate variation on an abstract noun employed elsewhere. For example, the Corinthian mission to Athens makes reference to the Corcyrean claim of aroq>poauv,i (1.32.4) by referring to it as ,:o a&q>pov, and in like manner, during the debate at Sparta, when Archidamus responds to Corinthian complaints of Spartan µeAl11atc; (1.69.4) and ~paout,ic; (1.71.4), he refers to them as to µt:AAov and to ~pa6u (1.84.1). We should see the switch from to rtv8pw1tt vov at 1.22.4 to q>uotc; etv8pw1tcovat 3.82.2 as just such a variation . For an identification of to etv8pw1t t v ov as human nature see E. Topitsch, "'Av8pco1te(cx q,uat~ und Ethik bei Thukydides," WS 61/62 (1943/7) 50. 35. 3.82.2. 36. The participle y t y v6µe vexin 3.82.2 refers to the contemporary historical events of the war (as did tfuv ye voµtvcov at 1.22.4), while cxiei taoµevcx refers to the repetition of similar events in the future (as did t&v µ£AA6vtcov 1to1:t au81c;.... ecrecr8cxt atl.22.4). Thephraseseooc; &v rt cxut~ q>ucrtc;rtv8pw1tcov TI here and x:cxtrt to av8pw1ttvov at 1.22.4 both serve to explain the connection that Thucydides adduces between past and future history, namely the consistent action of physis. 37. Topitsch 1943, 53 notes the connection between 1.22.4 and 3.82.2 but does not discuss the verbal similarities. 38. Other more specific manifestations of this impulsive side are anger (as in the case of Aristogeiton and Harmodius: we;&v µe1toµevT)),anditislikewiseaccompaniedbyfairhopes of success (euel1ttOE~. 43. ctywv _ 111~ oo~TJ~. 44. 1.11.2: etv,: (1taAot 6v 1 E~. 45. Ka'ta 1:0£ iKO~. 46. 8.87.4: av11xaAo:x;µfil-Aov,; uxooeea1:epo:x;. 47. 5.8.2: etv1:{1tcxAcx y&p ncoc;~v. 48. This is so in spite of its clear numerical superiority in the figures last given at 8.79 of 112 for the Peloponnesians versus 82 for the Athenians. 49. 8.78. 50. 7.12.4: Otct 'tO CtV'tt1CCXAOU~ ... ouaa,~ a,iei 1tpoaoo1e(av. 51. 7.37.1; 7.23. 52. Thucydides describes a similar positive reversal of fortune producing an identical effect upon the allied light troops and the Spartan hoplites they faced on Sphacteria. The peltasts gradually lost their fear of these veterans after a series of successful attacks upon them, while the Spartan hoplites were cowed by the unaccustomed nature of the fighting and the reverses they were suffering (4.34). 53. 4.73.1. 54. 4.73.4: µ,i etv1(1taAov eivat acp(at 10v 1eivouvov. 55. 3.11.1: 1:0 ctv111taAovoeo~. E. C. Marchant is certainly correct in following the scholiast who understands this to mean an equality of resources (or xapaaKEuti) between the two parties, ThucydidesBook III 118. Gomme's expansion of the idea to mean "fear based on equal power" is validated by the context immediately following, v.2 HCT 263. 56. 3.11.1: o yap 1tapaJ3a(vetv -tt J3ouA6µevo~ 1:4l µ1) 1tpouxoov iiv t 1te A8 e iv ct1to 1:p ex e 1:at. 57. 4.92.4: 1:0 etv1(1taAov Kai EA.Eu8epov Ka8(a1:a,1at. Gomme takes the balance mentioned here in a psychological sense, rendering it as u readiness to contest with an invader, v.3 HCT 561. 11

11

The Balanceof Powerand Necessity

51

58. 4.92.2: OUyap "CO1tpoµ118ec;,oic; av pocruv11, "prudence") and polypragmosyne(1tOAU1tpaµocruv11, "meddlesomeness"), which are occasionally employed to describe Spar82

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tan and Athenian behavior respectively. When the Corinthians speak of internal Spartan sophrosynecoupled with external naivete, they do seem to have the Spartan national character in view. 4 Similarly, when Nicias discusses the benefits of Athenian polypragmosyne, he is speaking about his countrymen's character (even connecting the ter111with the word tropos in this instance). 5 Yet there are also problems with accepting these words as clear designators of national character. Apart from their relative rarity in the History,there are also indications given by Thucydides that he may not accept the connotations of either word as true to the national characteristics of the two peoples. 6 In short, as was the case with tropos above, there is no true correlation between instances of characteristic beSince havior in the Historyand the words sophrosyneand polypragmosyne. the concept of national character permeates the History,our search will not be limited to those few locations where such specialized terminology is employed. The Significance of National Character in the History

Even in respect to themes that are generally regarded to be of importance to the History,Thucydides often declines to make direct, personal comments. This reticence is most likely the result of his desire to maintain an objective authorial stance. The fact that he does not devote more space to an explicit development of national character, therefore, should not be taken to mean that he considered the theme of only minor import. Imperialism, for example, is generally considered of great moment in the History despite the fact that Thucydides' own attitudes towards it are never explicitly stated. 7 Its significance derives rather from the role it plays throughout the work as a whole. Thucydides is much more explicit about national character than imperialism. He gives the topic a high profile in the Historyrelative to other themes, and supports the numerous references to it in the narrative and speeches with several explicit statements. What is more, these explicit statements occur at critical junctures in the work. Thucydides calls special attention to national character in his analyses of the causes of both the Archidamian and Decelean phases of the war, 8 in his treahnent of the debates that precede them, 9 and in his summations of national psychology following Sphacteria and Euboea. 10 Thucydides thus makes use of these explicit statements of the theme of national character in an architectonic way to support and shape the major sections of his History. De Romilly has noted the importance of Thucydides' analysis of the causes of the war, observing that one should expect to find the author's own interpretation of events more perceptible here than anywhere else.it The fact that both the Archidamian (the first phase of the Peloponnesian

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War) and Decelean Wars (the second phase) owe their origins in Thucydides' view to the posture of the respective national psyches of Sparta and Athens is an indication of the significance Thucydides meant for national character to have in his work. In discussing the causes of the Archidamian War, Thucydides tells us that it was Spartan fear, the essential element in Spartan national character, 12 that provided the impetus for the hostilities. 13 In a similar manner, Thucydides maintains that Athenian greed (an offshoot of their national character) 14 was the true cause of the Sicilian expedition, the opening salvo in the Decelean War.15 National character is also an issue of concern in Thucydides' report of the debates that precede the two wars. In the conference of Peloponnesian allies at Sparta, national character forms a central part of the Corinthian argument that swift action is necessary to meet the Athenian threat: It seems to us that you are unaware of the differences [between yourselves and the Athenians], and that you have never stopped to consider what sort of men these Athenians are with whom you will have to fight, and how absolutely different they are from you (1.70.1).16

Furtherr11ore, Archidamus' reply to the Corinthians does not attempt to dispute the accuracy of their estim.ation of Spartan character, so much as attempt to justify those qualities: 17 Be not ashamed of this ''slowness" and "hesitation" wherein they especially find us at fault (1.84.1).

During the debates before the Sicilian expedition at Athens and Syracuse, national character is also in view. 18 Nicias' analysis of the reason for the Athenian interest in Sicily, for example, is substantially the same as Thucydides' interpretation. 19 It is precisely to counter the hopeful, optimistic expectations of his countrymen that are inclining them to take this risky course that Nicias steps forward to speak. 20 During the course of his speech, he calls direct attention to the national character of the Athenians when he describes them as hard to dissuade from risky actions by any appeal to the merits of conservative, low-risk behavior: 21 My words would prove ineffective against your tropoi,if I should encourage you to preserve your present resources, and not risk what you have for what are merely uncertain expectations (6.9.3).22

In his discussion of Alcibiades following this speech, Thucydides mentions a particular characteristic of the man, which he then attributes to

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the Athenian state as a whole: the tendency to indulge one's desires in undertaking actions that exceed the means available: He habitually gave way to lusts exceeding his resources, both as _a horse fancier and in other expensive pursuits as well. This was just the sort of behavior which in no small part later ruined the Athenian state (6.15.3).

Thucydides thus draws a parallel between Alcibiades' tendency to adopt the hopeful pattern of behavior 23 and that same tendency as a particularly destructive part of the Athenian national character.24 In his response to Nicias, it is also to the Athenian nature that Alcibiades makes his appeal, arguing that a shift to a low-risk foreign policy would be illadvised, because, among other reasons, it would not suit the national character: 25 I have no doubt that a state of the active type would be destroyed very quickly by shifting to inactivity, and that it is the people who conducts its foreign policy with the least divergence from its present character and customs (even if these be deficient) that possesses the greatest security (6.18.7).26

The Athenian national character also surfaces in the debate at Syracuse occasioned by the initial reports of the expedition. Hermocrates correctly evaluates the Athenian intention as the conquest of Sicily,27 and counsels his fellow countrymen not to be dismayed by their characteristic daring.28 Athenagoras, on the other hand, completely misreads the Athenian character: It is not reasonable to assume that the Athenians will leave the Peloponnesians behind them with the war there not yet securely brought to an end and embark of their own free will on another war of no lesser magnitude (6.36.4).29

Besides calling attention to national character as the root cause of both phases of the Peloponnesian War and highlighting it in the debates that precede them, Thucydides also reintroduces the issue of national character at critical points in the narrative. Following the events on Sphacteria, he notes that the string of Athenian successes and Spartan defeats had the effect of intensifying the tendencies of their respective national characters. He informs us that Athenian confidence had been elevated to a new high passing all rational bounds, 30 and attributes this to the pattern of encouragement with which we are now well familiar.31

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To such a degree did they rely upon their present good luck that they expected to suffer no serious opposition, but instead to accomplish with equal success the possible and impossible, whether their resources were sufficient for the task or inadequate. This was because of the incredible success of most of their undertakings which lent a strong degree of confidence to their hope (4.65.4).

These same events have the opposite effect on the Spartan character and explain how Spartan attitudes became even more intensely circumspect. They feared revolution, 32 being shaken by the unexpected nature and scope of the calamity on Sphacteria 33 and by the unaccustomed nature of the war. 34 These setbacks resulted in an intensification of the characteristic Spartan hesitancy and unwillingness to take risks: Moreover, the many blows of chance which befell them contrary to their expectations and in such a short period shocked them tremendously, and they were afraid that some other disaster might chance upon them like the one on the island [of Sphacteria]. And for this reason they went less boldly into battle and were afraid of failure in any risk they might take. For being unacquainted with adversity, these events had produced in them a serious lack of resolve (4.55.3-4).35

Before we examine the national characters described in the History,one further pair of passages should be mentioned as indications of Thucydides' incorporation of national character into the essential structure of the work: his preface (1.1.1) and the summary statement of his final summation on national character (8.96.5).36 As we saw earlier in chapter 1, in his preface Thucydides stated that he had composed a history of the war elucidating ''the manner in which'' the two sides had conducted it.37 This suggests that he had shown how the Athenians and the Spartans formed and carried out military strategy and operations. Thucydides' declaration that he has written an account of "how" the Athenian empire and the Spartan alliance made war is usually overlooked as a programmatic statement. It looms larger in importance if one compares it with his remarks at 8.96.5. Here Thucydides states that the Spartans were ''most convenient to make war upon" 38 and that the Syracusans, on account of the similarity in their national character to that of the Athenians, "made war upon them most effectively." 39 By using such striking similarity of language in this crucial summary statement of the war's primary antagonists, Thucydides seems to be telling us that the promise inherent in his preface (that of explaining the true mechanics behind the war) has been answered, at least in part, by his development of the theme of national character. 40 While the ''how'' of the preface undoubtedly entails more

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than national character, it seems clear that Thucydides means to include national character as an important part of the war's overall explanation. 41 In sum, the regular occurrence of such relatively explicit and consistent passages on national character at such structurally important junctures in the Historygives us reason to believe that Thucydides meant the theme to be a significant part of his work. Basic Tendencies of Spartan and Athenian National Character

The purpose of this section is to give an overview of the basic national characteristics of the Spartans and Athenians as Thucydides sketches them in the History.This will be done by way of synopsis, focusing on a number of key terms that Thucydides uses to portray their respective national characters throughout the work. The Athenian and Spartan characters are the primary concern in this study because they are the only two national characters about which Thucydides makes explicit comments. 42 In Thucydides' view, it is their characteristic behavior that had a profound influence upon the course of the Peloponnesian War. The Spartan and Athenian national characters are primarily extensions of the individual psychological states treated in chapter 6 (i.e., the fearful and hopeful dispositions respectively). 43 The Spartan and Athenian characteristics that Thucydides describes inevitably revolve around the idea of willingness or reluctance to take significant risks. This section will provide a glimpse of the pattern of national character, as well as a better understanding of the sort of terminology Thucydides uses to describe the phenomenon.

SpartanNationalCharacter In Thucydides' schema, Spartan national character is essentially an outgrowth of what, on the individual level, we have tetmed the fearful disposition.44 Over time, however, this psychological tendency has become of their national psyche. As a people, the Spartans are pora predisposition trayed in the History as generally disinclined to undertake significant risks, 45 alw.ays assuming the worst from tyche. As a consequence, they tend to focus their efforts on preserving what they already possess, eschewing opportunities on account of their fear of unpredictable ad versity. This is a mind-set that at times engenders ''protective aggression" on their part, but that is on the whole antithetical to typical Athenian behavior. The Spartans generally avoid risky enterprises, even though such activities may give promise of new acquisitions. On those rare occasions in the Historywhere the Spartans do act out of hope, such action is generally short-lived. 46

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The truth of this precis can be seen from Thucydides' direct, explicit summary of the Spartan and Athenian characters at 8.96.5, in which he defines the essential behavioral characteristics that both Spartans and Athenians manifest throughout the work: It was not only on this one occasion that the Spartans showed themselves to be the most convenient of enemies for the Athenians to make war upon. For the two groups were radically divergent in national character, and this fact gave the swift, adventurous Athenians a decided advantage against the slow, cautious Spartans, especially since the former were primarily a naval power. The Syracusans give proof of this, for after their national character had developed along lines similar to that of the Athenians, they then also fought agairu;t them most effectively (8.96.5).

It will be noted that the description of the Spartans as slow (bradeis, J3paoE tc;) and cautious (atolmoi,iit oAµo t ), and the Athenians as swift (oxeis,o~Eic;) and adventurous (epicheiretai, E1tt~E tp11ta() constitutes a rather narrow description of character. But as we have seen in the preceding chapters, Thucydidean psychology is essentially a psychology of action, which excludes from consideration the sort of ethnic traits that would have been of great interest to Herodotus. The first Spartan characteristic that Thucydides refers to at 8.96.5 (represented by atolmoi,u cautious") is a general predisposition against the taking of risks. The second characteristic, represented here by bradeis, ''slow," is a corollary to the first: hesitation in the execution of whatever actions are eventually decided upon. This composite tendency (i.e., reluctance to risk coupled with a dilatory implementation of necessary actions), though described by variable terminology in the body of the History, constitutes the essential element of Spartan national character as Thucydides saw it. Spartan characteristic reluctance to undertake military actions involving any appreciable level of risk can be seen in their failure after the fall of Euboea to exploit a tempting weakness in the Athenian situation (caused by the Sicilian defeat and the oligarchic coup), when they passed up the opportunity of sailing directly against her main harbor at Piraeus. This overcautious stance is overtly censured by Thucydides: An approach [to the Piraeus] would have been easily accomplished, had they but been more daring. In that case they would have either been able to intensify the civil disruptions in the city by blockading it, or, if they chose to disembark and lay siege to the city, would have compelled the fleet in Ionia to come to the aid of their kinsmen and country, despite their hostility to the current oligarchic regime (8.96.4).

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The quality of extreme cautiousness is evident in Spartan behavior throughout most of the Peloponnesian War (as described in the History), and we have already treated Thucydides' description of its intensification fallowing the major setbacks of the Archidamian phase of the war. 48 Thucydides even goes so far to suggest that several of Sparta's most successful operations, including the dispatch of minor aid to Syracuse 49 and the fortification of Decelea, 50 were almost never ventured at all, despite the relatively low risks involved. Only after being convinced of the risks of inaction by Alcibiades' persuasive rhetoric did they decide to undertake even these minimal efforts. As Thucydides tells us, it was not uncomm.on for the Spartans to take quite a long time to decide to embark upon military operations: The Spartans, although they were aware of the increase of Athenian power, made only insignificant attempts to hinder it, remaining inactive instead during most of the period. For even prior to this they were never quick to go to war unless compelled by necessity (1.118.2).

This ''slowness" of theirs was often the object of criticism from their allies, as in the period before the battle of Mantinea (an event that retrieved the Spartan reputation for valor): And so with this single success they blotted out all the charges being made against them at that time by the Greeks, namely that they were cowards (because of their defeat on the island [of Sphacteria]), and that they were inde cisive and dilatory (5.75.3).

A lack of daring, then, is the most salient quality ascribed to the Spartans by Thucydides, whereas Athenian boldness is their most distinguishing trait. In this overview of the respective characters of the two peoples, therefore, we shall concentrate on the word tolma (t6Aµa) and its cognates . Thucydides frequently uses this tolm- ("bold/ daring") group of words to represent the degree to which the possessor of the quality is willing to take risks. 51 Since it is the absence of this characteristic which is a Spartan trademark in the History,52 we should not be surprised to see the tolm-group of words representing what was anathema to the Spartan character: excessive risk. 53 Thucydides often opposes tolm-words to terms designating the cautious, fearful state, such as weakness (malakia,µaAa1e(a.: 5.7.2),security(asphaleia,

cicrq>aAe(a.: 3.56.5, 5.107,8.24.5,and 1.69.5,1.107.3),prudence (sophrosyne, crco4>pocruv11: 8.24.4-5), inactivity (apragmosyne,a1tpayµocruv11: 1.32.5), fear (phobos,4>6~0~:1.74.2-4, 4.55, 7.21.3-4), and hesitancy (okneo,61evero: 7.21.4).54 Moreover, following the pattetn of discouragement (detailed in

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chapter 6), the tolm-quality produces fear in others, 55 while it tends to encourage those who possess it.56 The element tolm-generally represents that national quality that, while so characteristic of the Athenians (as we shall see), was notably lacking in the Spartans, namely daring. The History'sdescription of Greece under the tyrants is particularly illustrative of this Spartan group behavior we are studying. 57 Thucydides says that in the days of the tyrants, the various states were atolmotera,by which he means that they did not undertake any daring ventures, because the tyrants made security (asphaleia) their primary objective. 58 This same preoccupation with security is prominent in the Corinthians' castigation of Spartan inaction prior to the war's start, 59 and we are to understand that, as it was with the tyrants, Spartan caution is predicated on the desire to preserve what has already been acquired. 6 Caution is, therefore, essentially the result of an unwillingness to put the status quo at risk for the sake of an uncertain future result. 61 This reluctance is evident in those instances where Thucydides treats Spartan character in ter1ns of their lack of tolmaas when he describes the abortive attempt upon the Piraeus by Cnemus and Brasidas. The plan to sally forth from Nisaea caught the Athenians by surprise because they did not expect their enemies to risk such a sudden attack:

°

There was no expectation that the enemy would ever sail suddenly against them in such a way, for they would not openly take such a daring course of action (2.93.3).

As it turned out, the Athenian presumptions about Spartan national character proved to be correct, for the risk of the operation eventually did deter the Spartans from carrying it out as originally planned: When they had reached Nisaea at night, they laWlched their ships and set sail- but not for the Piraeus, as they had intended to do, for they were terrified of the risk (2.93.4).62

On another occasion, the Athenians were greatly angered that the Spartans (in their attempt to nurture the rebellion that had broken out against the Athenians at Mytilene) had had the tolmato cross the Ionian sea, regarded by Athens as a veritable mare nostrum.63 But Thucydides' own analysis of the operation leaves us with a different appraisal of Spartan behavior in this affair. The forces under Alcidas, he tells us, proceeded on their mission at a leisurely pace, instead of sailing swiftly to Mytilene as they should have done. 64 As a result, they did not come in time to help the Mytilenians, and Alcidas, because he feared the risks involved in attacking without the element of surprise, decided to forgo the attempt al-

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together. 65 His chief concern was not with the situation at Mytilene, but with getting back to the safety of the Peloponnesus as quickly as possible,66and he effected his flight with speed out of fear of an Athenian pursuit.67We may compare the conduct of the forces under the command of Alcidas and Brasidas at Corcyra. These behave in the typical Spartan manner (though Thucydides attributes the cause primarily to Alcidas) when they fail to take advantage of a similar opportunity. Thucydides specifically states that although they had been victorious in the naval battle that preceded, they did not have the daring to attack the city itself. 68 This characteristic Spartan lack of boldness is variously interpreted by Thucydides and by the actors in his History.It may be held up to criticism, as, for instance, when it is called athymia("lack of spirit," et8uµ(a: 8.11.3), malakia("weakness,'' µala1e(a: 2.18.3, 2.85.2, 5.75.3), or anandria("cowardice," cx,vav6pia: 1.83.1).But the quality itself is sometimes described in more favorable terms. The most significant group of words that put a positive spin on Spartan caution are those of the sophron-family. The difference between characterizing caution as sophronsyne("prudence") or, alternatively, as a lack of tolmacan be clearly seen in Thucydides' description of the Chian revolt. We are told that the Chians (along with the Spartans) were among the most prudent men Thucydides knew, 69 and that the tolmathey demonstrated in revolting from Athens was yet characterized by great concern for their own security: And lest it be assumed that in making this revolt they acted counter to their security, they did not in fact dare to undertake it until they were assured of running the risk in company with many excellent allies, and recognized that after the disaster in Sicily the Athenians, even in their own estimation, were in a desperately insecure position (8.24.5).

In other words, the Chians acted with sophrosyne,which means, within the confines of the History,that they would not undertake any risk they viewed as overly hazardous. The fact that they underestimated Athenian resiliency does not change their psychological motivation, and Thucydides excuses their error, saying that they were tripped up by human miscalculation. 70 The Spartans are also sometimes presented in terms of sophrosyne,a description that likewise puts a positive interpretation on the extreme caution they exhibit in undertaking actions involving a high degree of risk. 71 The other Spartan quality mentioned by Thucydides at 8.96.5 is "slowness," represented by the root brad-in that context,72 is also invoked by a variety of other terms such as anbole("delaying," etva~ol~), 73 diatribe ("wasting time," 6 ta't pt ~~),74 mello("hesitating," µellc.o),75oknos("shirk76 scholaiotes 77 an excessive use of ing," 01evo~), (''laziness," crxola t61:11~),

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chronos("time," xpovoc;),78 and a lack of tachos("speed," 1:axoc;79). The thrust imparted by such terms in these and other passages is, once again, to express the usual Spartan hesitancy to act. In essence, then, Spartan slowness is not fundamentally different from Spartan caution.

AthenianNationalCharacter Although we are dealing here with predispositions toward risk-taking, and therefore with a concept that is capable of varying degrees of intensity, in many ways the Athenian character is a reverse image of that of the Spartans. Throughout the History, Spartan caution is contrasted with Athenian boldness, while Spartan slowness is set against Athenian speed. Furthermore, just as the Spartan character generally exhibits the tendencies of the fearful disposition, so we see the Athenian character usually operates in ways that are nearly indistinguishable from the hopeful disposition. 80 However, neither national psyche is moved from its predisposition by every chance circumstance that may befall. When the Athenians do become discouraged, for instance, they do not stay so for long. 81 The two basic ingredients of Athenian national character described at 8.96.5 are a propensity for risk taking and a rapidity of execution once action has been decided upon. These two traits do in fact dominate Athenian behavior in the History, apart from those rare occasions when effective leadership is able to rein them in. The Athenian national character was well known to contemporary Greeks according to Thucydides' account, and was a factor to which they often reacted. Fear of characteristic Athenian daring is the reason he gives for the Spartan dismissal of the Athenian contingent at Mount Ithome, 82 and for the desire on the part of the Peloponnesian allies to keep Athens without defensive walls after the Persian Wars.83 Moreover, Athenian daring was such a pronounced quality that it stirred amazement in non-Athenians. 84 Even so, the extent of their boldness was continually underestimated by the rest of the Hellenic world, as Thucydides makes clear in his description of Athens' dire situation in the midst of the Sicilian adventure: The Athenians were especially feeling the pressure of the two front war. In spite of the situation, however, they continued to exhibit such tenacity that no one who heard about it would have believed it before it actually came to pass. To think that while they themselves were being put under siege by a Peloponnesian occupation, they were not only unwilling to let go of Sicily, but were in tum laying siege there to Syracuse, a city in its own right no smaller than Athens. So completely had they befuddled Greek expectations of their power and daring (7.28).

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The rapidity with which the Athenians put their designs into motion is frequently referred to. They customarily desire to strike the first blow, thus surprising their adversaries. 85 When, for example, the Athenians begin the ·construction of their siege wall around Syracuse, they do so with an unparalleled rapidity of execution that leaves their adversaries stunned. 86 Just as the lack of tolmais a key Spartan trait, the term (along with its cognates) is a frequent indicator of Athenian boldness. At the Gela con£erence, Hermocrates tried to steel the hearts of his countrymen against any panic that might result from shock at the tolmainvolved in a possible Athenian attempt to conquer all of Sicily.87 In the course of their speech at the first Peloponnesian congress, the Corinthians likewise describe the Athenians as "men of tolma,''88 and in the response of their ambassadors on the same occasion, the Athenians characterize themselves in similar terms, recalling the ''exceptionally daring" nature of the zeal they displayed during Xerxes' invasion. 89 The Athenians clearly thought of themselves in these terms, even before the generation that fought the Peloponnesian War. Themistocles and his contingent of Athenian envoys had specifically reminded the Spartans of how, during the invasion and with their land in enemy hands, the Athenians had abandoned their homes and boarded their ships to fight the invader, "deciding to take this risk" quite on their own. 90 In Pericles' estimation, this Athenian quality carried more weight than the size of the forces they had employed in their victory over the Persians and in their expansion of the empire. 9 1 Athenian tolma often catches adversaries by surprise. Before thefirst engagement at Naupactus, the Corinthians and their allies do not believe that twenty Athenian ships will dare to attack their own forty-seven, and are caught off-balance by the bold stroke. 92 This Athenian willingness to gamble on very long odds is seen by Athenians and foes alike as potentially demoralizing to their opponents. And Phormio makes just this point in his exhortation to his troops just prior to the second battle off Naupactus. He tells them not to fear the enemy's tolma,which is based upon their greatly superior forces.93 Instead, he argues, they should consider that the enemy fears them all the more because they are willing to dare confront them with seemingly insufficient numbers. 94 The only way to deal with such men, at least in Hern1ocrates' opinion, was to fight fire with fire: Against daring men such as the Athenians, those who oppose them with equal daring appear the most troublesome to them. For it is by means of this quality that these men intimidate their neighbors - not by superiority of power in every instance, but by the boldness of their attacks. I am convinced

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that by daring to make a stand against the Athenian navy against their expectations, we shall have an advantage on account of the shock this will occasion, and that this will outweigh any benefit that might fall to the Athenian advantage in experience (7.21.3).95

The word used by Thucydides at 8.96.5 to describe this quality of boldness is epicheiretes("adventurer, enterprising person, risk-taker,'' E1tt XEt P11t11c;).That the root of this word may refer to the· same concept of boldness treated above is clear from several passages where it is juxtaposed with tolmawords. 96 Other terms used by Thucydides to express the Athenian willingness to take risks are elpis ("hope," EA1tic;:1.74.2-4, 2.62.5, 6.31.6, 6.56.3), eras("desire," eproc;:2.43.1, 3.45.4-5, 6.54.1, 6.59.1), pleonexia("greediness," 1tAEo v E~ (a: 3.45.4-5, 3.82.6),thrasos(''boldness," Bpcicroc;:2.89.3, 4.126.4-5), 7.21.3), prothumia(''enthusiasm," 1tpo8uµ(a: 1.74.2, 1.92.1, 6.69.1), andreia(''courage," av8pE(cx: 3.82.4 6.69.1), kindyneuo("to risk," 1Ct v8uvE\XO:1.70.3, 1.75.4, 1.76.1,5.100.1),epicheireomai ("to attempt,'' E1tt XEt peoµcx t: 2.40.3, 6.31.6, 6.54.1, 7.21.3), philonikia ("determination," et>t lo v t 1e(cx:7.28.3),97 neoteropoiia("innovation," VECO'tEpo1tot(cx:1.102.3), and polypragmosyne("meddlesomeness," 1tolu1tpayµocruv11: 6.87.3).As we have noted before, however, Athenian character in the narrative is brought out by Thucydides' description of Athenian behavior, for which an even broader and more varied vocabulary is sometimes employed. The corollary to Athenian boldness is the swiftness of execution that they display. The Athenians are often described as oxeis,"swift" {l.70.2, 3.38.6, 6.10.5, 6.12.2, 8.96.5), and as acting with tachos,"speed" (1.70.6, 2.53.1-2, 4.55.1, 6.98.2). Additionally, words used to describe sluggishness when coupled with a negative may also express the Athenian quality of rapid execution of their bold designs. 98 Just as it is natural to be dilatory when one is disinclined to take risks (as in the case of Spartan national character), so the obverse characteristic of daring in the Athenian national character is complemented by its reverse side: speed of execution.

Summary Perhaps the best way to summarize the above information on the Spartan and Athenian national characters is by conducting a brief examination of the speech given by the Corinthians at the first Peloponnesian congress. 99 Thucydides' synopsis of Spartan and Athenian national character at 8.96.5 is succinct, focusing, as we have seen, upon the psychological principle of willingness to risk, and upon its corollary, the relative speed of implementing such actions. The Corinthian speech has much the same

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focus where it treats the respective national characters of Athens and Sparta. The Corinthians complain of Athenian action and Spartan inertia, and they attribute this state of affairs to the respective national characters of the two parties. Even their analysis (though they use a wider vocabulary) is substantially the same as that employed by Thucydides in his own voice at 8.96.5: While the Athenians act boldly, the Spartans continue to move cautiously (far too cautiously to suit the Corinthians), proving that there is a great divide between the national characters of the two peoples. 100 The Spartan unwillingness to risk war with Athens is reproached by the Corinthians in several ways. 101They claim that the Spartans are so re1uctan t to see the dangers of inactivity that it takes actual suffering to move them. They characterize this sluggishness as neglect, bemoaning the fact that it took the Spartans so long even to discuss the present situation, and claim that this characteristic inactivity is unique to the Spartans. They suggest sarcastically that, while the Spartans may believe that they are defending themselves by this habitual hesitation, there is no true security in their behavior. This is evidenced by the fact that the Persians had to come to their very doorsteps before suitable action was taken. Spartan lack of initiative, foot-dragging, and general hesitancy to act is the theme of the Corinthians' opening remarks. The Athenians, on the other hand, are radically different in character. They are given to innovative plans and rapid execution of their designs,102while the Spartans are more concerned with protecting what they have and are unwilling to take even necessary risks. The Athenians are overbold risk-takers and filled with hopes, while the Spartans take less action than their means allow, lack confidence even in relatively secure situations, and fear that once they embark on a dangerous course they will never be free of it. The Athenians do not hesitate to act, though the Spartans do. The Athenians are ever abroad and active, the Spartans ever at home and inactive. The hopeful Athenian attitude assumes that activity (i.e., political and military risk) will result in gain, while the fearful Spartan attitude assumes that further risk will only endanger present possessions. The Athenians exploit their victories, retrench as little as possible in defeat, and equate their hopes with deeds already done. So hopeful are they and so swift in hazarding the requisite actions to obtain their hopes that the Corinthians describe the conception and fulfillment of these hopes as simultaneous. 103The Athenians, therefore, live lives filled with dangers and allow inactivity neither to themselves nor toothers: It seems to us that you are unaware of the differences [between yourselves and the Athenians], and that you have never stopped to consider what sort

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of men these Athenians are with whom you will have to fight, and how absolutely different they are from you. They are always concocting some new plan and are not only quick to conceive new designs, but also to put into action whatever they devise. But you are inclined only to preserve your present possessions, never developing any new plans and failing to execute even those which are absolutely necessary. Moreover, they are men whose daring leads them into enterprises which surpass their resources, whose willingness to run risks exceeds conventional wisdom, and who are filled with the expectation of victory while the contest is still at issue. But it is your way to accomplish less than what it is in your power to achieve, to be mistrustful of even the most secure plans, and to fear that you will never emerge safe from the fray. And now these men who stop for nothing are arrayed against you whose talent is procrastination - men who cannot be made to remain in their own land against you who refuse to go abroad. By venturing forth they expect to add to their possessions, while you are afraid that any expedition will only risk those you already have. Of all men, they press their victories the most aggressively, and yield to their defeats the most grudgingly. They expend their bodies readily in their city's behalf, but their talents they husband dearly so as to work her will. Whenever they fail to carry out a plan they have merely devised, they feel cheated of something rightfully theirs; whenever they do achieve their object, they deem it insignificant in comparison to what they will attain soon thereafter; and whenever a plan misfires, they fill the void by conceiving other hopes to replace it. They alone have what they hope for as soon as the plan is formed because of the rapidity with which they carry out their designs. Thus they toil their whole lives long amidst hardships and dangers, scarcely ever enjoying the fruits of their labor because of this constant acquisition, honoring no form of recreation except to do what is useful, and actually considering peace and quiet a greater annoyance than toilsome exertion. If we should sum them up by saying that it is their nature to allow rest neither to themselves, nor to others, we would not fail to hit the mark (1.70).

The Corinthians conclude by reproaching the Spartans for their continued hesitancy against such opponents, who are more than willing to undertake risks in search of further gains. 104 Since the Spartans are endangering even those thlngs that they do possess by their characteristically cautious behavior, the Corinthians urge them to put an end to their sloth. 105 The essence of the Corinthian analysis (though set in the form of a rhetorical attempt to influence Spartan behavior) is the same as the one Thucydides produces in his own voice at 8.96.5 and elsewhere, namely that the Spartans avoid risks and proceed slowly, while the Athenians rush into them.

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1. On tropos'wide range of meaning during the classical period see K. Kuiper "De Vocabuli 't p61toc; Vi atque Usu per Saecula VI et V," Mnemosyne36 (1908) t c;,Tp61toc;,~H8oc;(Gottingen 1935). In Euripides' 419-434, and 0. Thimme, ct>ucr Suppliants187, Adrastus uses the word to describe Sparta as equivocal (l:1t&p111 µtv wµii 1ecx.1 1tE1to(1etA1CX.t 'tp61tot>c;).Compare the Corinthian assault on Spartan faithlessness at 1.69-71. Gorgias used the word in a psychological sense (o t ex0£ 'tl7c;0'1/ECO1t01J'tCX, t: Diels, Vorsokr.82, 11.15), and in Hipponax we see it employed to describe behavior in general (y&µoc; Kptt1 tcr't6c; ECl't\ V civopt crwq>povt, / 'tp61tov yuvcx.tKoc;XPflCl'tOV e6vov Acx.µj3cive t v, fr.81 P). The prologue to Theophrastus' Charactersuses the plural, tropoi,to indicate character ('t1 apex.6tj1to'te 'tflc; 'EAAciooc;u1to 'tOV CX.U'tOV a€pcx,lCE t µiv11c;,CCX\ 1tciv'tOlV't(l)VtEAAtjvc.ovoµo(ox; 1tCX, to Euoµevc.ov, cruµJ)eJ)f11CE v ~µiv ou 'tfl v CX.U'tfl v EXEt v 'ttt~ t v 1 p61toov ;). See also Characters 30.11, where the oligarch addresses those who are of like politics and like disposition (oµo 1.O'tp 01to 1.). Menander uses troposto describe a particular trait of one of his characters (i.e., that he is 6ucr1COAOc;: oµooc;ouv 't~ 'tp61t~ 'tO \OU'toc;WV / x-r,po:vyuvo:i,c • ey11µe, Dyscolus,13), and we see troposshading into particular courses of action in the case of Euripides' Agamemnon (eipyoucrt xp11cr80:t µ~ lCO:'tCX yvwµ11v 't p61to tc;, Hecuba,867.). 2. The Corinthians refer to old fashioned Spartan .(/practices" (apxa1.6'tpo1ta uµfuv 'tCXi:1t1.'tflOEuµa'ta, 1.71.2), while Pericles lauds the Athenian tropoi(2.36.4, 2.39.4, 2.41.2), and Nicias pronounces himself helpless in the face of the same (6.9.3). 3. See E. Betant, LexiconThucydideumv. 2 (Genf 1847) 463. While the word is used for national character at 8.96.5 and elsewhere (notably in Nicias' comment about the character of the Athenians at 6.9.3), it has a variety of other meanings as well. In an address to his troops at 7.63, Nicias uses tropoito describe the procedures and benefits of the Athenian empire. In Pericles' epitaphios(2.36, 2.39, 2.41), it encompasses more than behavioral traits, and includes elements which form part of Pericles' idealistic assessment of Athens. 11Although it is possible to take tropoi[in the epitaphios]to mean 'character traits,' the general nature of the term suggests something like the ...spirit' of Athens." N. Loraux, The Inventionof Athens (Cambridge 1986) 407, n.11. 4. tiµa8{~ (1.68.1). H. North in Sophrosyne(Ithaca 1966) 102-105, sees a clear connection between croo~pocruv11 and Spartan character at 1.68 of the History.See Grossman 1950, 70-89. occurs in the History, 5. 6.87.3. While this is the only place 1tOAt>1tpayµocruv11 ti1tpayµwv (and related words), when coupled with a negative idea (1.70.7; 2.40.2; 2.63.2; 6.18.6--7),may be taken to represent the same notion. See W. Nestle, u 'A1tpo:yµocruv11," Philologus81 (1925) 129-140; V. Ehrenberg, "Polypragmosyne: A Study in Greek Politics," JHS 67 (1947) 46-67; K. Kleve," A1tpo:yµocruvn and Il0At>1tpayµocruv11:Two Slogans in Athenian Politics,'' SO 39 (1964) 83-88; A. Adkins, "Polupragmosune and Minding One's Own Business, 11 CPh 71 (1976) 301-327; J.Allison, "Thucydides and Il0At>1tpayµocruvn,'' AJAH 4 (1979) 10-22.

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The Elementsof NationalCharacter

6. The problem lies in the connotations of the two words. Spartan behavior in the History is separate in Thucydides' view from the positive "prudence" mherent in the word arocppoauvTl.This can be seen from Thucydides' castigation of Spartan behavior at 8.96 and elsewhere. In like manner, Athenian behavior is not always open to the charge of "meddlesomeness" that attaches to 1tOAt)1tpayµoauv1'1, as is evident from the praise for Athenian activity during the Persian Wars that Thucydides puts into the mouths of Themistocles, Pericles, and the Athenian ambassadors at the Peloponnesian conference. 7. J. De Romilly, 1963, 10, notes, for example, that Thucydides has been taken as everything from an apostle to an opponent of imperialism.

8. 1.23, 1.88, 6.6, 6.8, 6.15, 6.31. 9. 1.68-86, 6.9-23, 6.33--40. 10. 4.55, 4.65, 8.96. 11.De Romilly 1963,16. 12. Note that here fear provokes action, though the intent is protective and defensive. See chapters 5 and 6 above. 13.1.23.6: 1:ouc;A811va(ot)c;iJyouµat µEyciAOt)~y1yvoµevo'\)~ Kai cp6J3ov Compare 1.88: 1tap€xov1a~ 1oic; AaKEOatµov(ot~ avayKaaat E~10 1tOAEµEiV. OU1oaou1:ov 100\I~'\)µµtixrov1tEt0'8£V1E~1:oic;AOYOt~OO'OVcpo~OUµ£VOt 10U~

tA8T1va(ot)~µ~ £1ti µEi~ov OUVT18foat v. 14. On desire as a common manifestation of the hopeful disposition see chapters 3 through 5 above. 15. 6.6.1: ecpt €µ£VOt µev 1n 8 E0'1a1n 1tp OcpticrE t 111~ 1tUO'Tl ~ (Xp ~at. Compare 6.8.4: 1tpo4>ciaE t J3paxE1q Kai Eu1tpE1tEi111~It KEAia~, µEyciAou epyou, Ecp(Ecr8at. 16. On the subject of national character, the analysis offered by the Corinthians is nearly identical to that of Thucydides. This coincidence of views will be treated more :ully in section three below, but at present we may note briefly some of the more obvious similarities between 8.96.5 and the Corinthians' speech, especially paragraph 1.70. Thucydides says that the Spartans and Athenians are "most divergent in character" (o tciq>opot 1tAEicr1ov 10v 1p61tov), while the Corinthians accuse the Spartans of failing to consider just how different the Athenian character is from their own (oaov uµ&v Kai we; 1tClVotaq>epovta~). Thucydides says that the Athenians are swift (o~Eic;)and enterprising (£1tt ~Et Pll 1ai), while the Corinthians call them swift (6~E ic;),"bold beyond their ability and daring beyond good judgment" (1tapa ouvaµ t V 10AµTl1a\ K(X,\ 1tapa yvwµ11V K t vOUVEU1CX,1) and restless (cxo1evo t). The Spartans are called slow (J3paoEic;)and cautious (&1:oAµo t) by Thucydides, while the Corinthians talk of their slowness (J3paou1tjc;, 1.71.1), call them "delayers" (µEAA'fl1a(),and reproach their timid policies (iJcruxa~e 1£ yap µ6vo t tEAA11VOOV, 1.69.4). 17. 1.80-86. 18. 6:9-23 and 6:33--40respectively. 19. Compare Thucydides' comment (oi 'A811vaio t cr1pa1£uE t v wpµ11v1:o, E

ciaEt 117~1tUO'TlacrE t J3paxE(c;tKai EU1tpE1tEi111~:rt KEAiac;Cl1taa11~, µEyCXAO'U epyOt), eq>(eaeat, 6.8.4).

al,,

The Elementsof NationalCharacter

99

20. 6.8.4: 1tapEA-8wv(X1t0-tpewat E~OUA,E-tO. According to Nicias' analysis, success has only intensified Athenian confidence. This follows the pattern of the hopeful disposition treated in the previous chapter. Thucydides also comments upon this heightened Athenian optimism (see 4.65.4). Success beyond their expectations has produced a contemptuous confidence and an intensified desire for more (Ota -to 1tapa yvwµT]v au-t&v 1cpo~a Epovtjaav't£~ t)OT]Kai :>:tKEA-ta~ icpiEa0E, 6.11.5). 21. He uses the word tropos.Compare this usage with that of Thucydides at 8.96.4: 01veue1v recalls the Corinthian characterization of the Athenians as ictv o t>v Et>'ta{ (1.70.3),and represents the same basic characteristic referred to by Thucydides' E1tt ~Et pT]'ta( (8.96.5).The phrase O'(t>~E t v 'ta i>1t1tapxov~« 'tE 0'~~£tV ,cai £1ttyv&vat µT]O£V,cai epy~ OU 'trtvay,caia £~t lC£0'0at, 1.70.2). 23. On the pattern of hope and desire as universal human psychological forces working in tandem to induce risk-taking see chapters 3 and 6 above, and compare Diodotus' remarks on the subject: ti 't£ £A1ti~,cal 6 epo.x;e1ti 1tav't(, 6 µev fl'YOUµE VO~,ti O' £