Through the 1971 Crisis: An Eyewitness Account by a Soldier [illustrated] 0195797787, 9780195797787

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THE

1971 INDo-PAK WAR

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1971

THE

INDO-PAK WAR

A SOLDIER' s NARRATIVE

MAJ.·GEN.

HAKEEM AR.SHAD S)uRESHI HI (M), S.1., S.Bt.

OXFORD VNIVBUITY PUSS

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OXFORD VNIVBl.SITY PUSS

Great Clarmdon Street, Oxford ox2 6oP Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford. It furthers the University's objective of cxccllcnce in research, scholarship, and education by publishing worldwide in Oxford New York Auckland Bangkok Buenos Aires Cape Town Chennai Dax es Salaam Delhi Hong Kong Istanbul Karachi Kolkata Kuala Lumpur Madrid Melbourne Mexico City Mumbai Nairobi Sio Paulo Shanghai Taipei Tokyo Toronto Oxford is a registered trade mark of Oxford University Press in the UK and in certain other countries

0 Oxford University Press 2002 The moral rights of the author have been asserted First published 2002

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, translated, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the prior pc1mission in writing of Oxford University Press. Enquiries concerning reproduction should be sent to Oxford University Press at the address below. This book is sold subject to the condition that it shall not, by way of trade or otherwise, be lent, re-sold, hired out or otherwise circulated without the publisher's prior consent in any form of binding or cover other than that in which it is published and without a similar condition including this condition being imposed on the subsequent purchaser. ISBN 0 19 579778 7

Typeset in Times Printed in Pakistan by Kagzi Printers, Karachi. Published by . Amcena Saiyid, Oxford University Press 5-Bangalore Town, Sharae Faisal PO Box 13033, Karachi-75350, Pakistan.

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To the martyrs of the 1971 upheaval in East Pakistan, who fearlessly committed themselves to the task ofpreserving national integrity and unhesitatingly laid down their Jives with the hope that we may live with honour and dignity as a free and progressive people.

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26th Battalion of the Frontier Fciru Reafment (26 FF) It is fairly nonnal for old soldiers to despair at the actions of troops and units which have not confonned to the normal principles of tactics in the field. It very often happens that the basic principles are drummed in for years ·but as soon as action starts everything M'"'D'S to be forgotten and this leads to a setback. Anyone reading the account of 26 FF cannot but note that the doctrine and the principles taught after empiric:al studies have been closely followed by the Commanding Officer and the men of this battalion. In fact the defence of Dinajpur during open hostilities in December 1971 against the Indians is almost a textbook copy of what should be done in a situation. This action of 26 FF should be studied in a suitable school of instruction to show how the basic tactical teaching in the Pakistan Army was a sound one even under the very difficult circumstances. The Wardens oftlte Marcltes By Lt.-Gen. M. Attiqur Rahman (p. 137)

On Capture of Dlnajpnr General Aurora acknowledged that Mankeshaw rang him up on 13 December and admonished him saying, 'Dinajpur and Rangpur have not fallen.' Aurora pretended not to hear and said, 'Send your message in writing.' Interview with Lt.-Gen. Aurora Tragedy of Errors By Lt.-Gen. Kamal Matinuddin (p. 377) HlndllstlUI n-, 20 Auplt 1973, under the heading 'Top Brass', while announcing the appointment of Lt.-Gen. Mohan Lal Thapar as Vice-Chief of the General Staff, Indian Army, wrote: 'Lieutenant-General Mohan Lal Thapar (SS) who will take over as the Vice-Chief of the General Staff from LieutenantGeneral Harprasad in November next is a battle-scarred veteran. As Corps Commander in Siliguri during the 1971 Bangladesh operations, his toughest assignment was overcoming the Pakistani resistance at Hilli and Dinajpur and he accomplished it in accordance with the General Staff plans' - an oblique admission of the quality of professionalism displayed by the defenders. The fact is, however, that although he did enter Hilli on or about 10 December, when it had been vacated by 4 FF after a bloody fight, Dinajpur he didn't enter till three days after the surrender.

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CONTENTS

Preface

Xl

1. Total Recall 2. The Way it Was . 3. The Elections and After 4. Ground Realities S. Dance of Death 6. A Flexing of Muscles 7. Reassertion of State Power 8. Ro-establishment of International Border 9. A Breathing Space I 0. Interlude-Miles to Go 11. Run-up to Disaster 12. The Build-up to War 13. Preparations for War 14. The War IS. The Ultimate Shame 16. Captivity- A State of Non-Existence 17. Camp 88. Where Gandhi Lived 18. An Undending Dilemma 19. Journey's End 20. In Retrospect 21 . Home at Last 22. A Reappraisal 23. Alive Again 24. The Military Action 25. Concluding Observations

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25 32 53 60 71

85 99

106 118 130 137 174 193 203 210

225 231 2"4 254 260

265 283

Annexures Bibliography

297 315 317

Index

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PREFACE

Even after twenty-six years, the debate on the factors leading td the break-up of Pakistan continues unabated. Spurious, selfserving arguments, backed up by half-truths, are advanced to confuse the basic issues. Refusing to face reality, we tend to obliterate irritants by reinterpreting history in such a manner that the conclusions suit our attitudes and opinions. The honourable way is to rewrite history with our blood. I was a participating witness to both the creation and the bifurcation of my homeland-an unusual experience that needs to be recorded for posterity, though belatedly in this case. But then, history is not a collection of ·comments on current happenings. I have always had an urge to reduce to writing the deeds of valour performed by the rank and file of 26 FF. They laid down their lives, lost their limbs, suffere4 injuries, in an effort to preserve the integrity of this internally divided, mismanaged and exbemely unfortunate nation. Their conduct was spontaneous-not a moment's hesitation in embracing the dangers inherent in an explosive situation. They deserve recognition. It may provide solace to their families, their neighbours, and their countrymen. A Roll of Honour is at Annex A. As a war veteran, it has been my desire to share the battle experience, whatever its worth, with the young and the middlerank officers of today and tomorrow. An unbiased analysis of the developments leading to our forced break-up is likely to spotlight the strengths and weaknesses of the planning and execution of operations in East Pakistan. This may help posterity to handle similar situations in the future in a pragmatic manner and with improved chances of success-history has a habit of repeating itself for those who do not learn from it.

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PREFACE

XII

The participants, especially at brigade and unit level, who were directly involved in the upheaval in East Pakistan have always resented being called 'incompetents' and 'rogue army' by the Indians, labels reinforced by the selective leakage, over the years, of the Hamoodur Rehman Commission Report (HRCR). The Commission, lilc:e any other court of law, must have based its findings and opinion on the evidence produced before it However, participating witnesses to such debicles have a tendency to hedge responsibility and shift the blame elsewhere. No doubt, 'defeat is an orphan'. Despite the fact that freedom of inquiry in this case was badly curtailed by the appointing authority, limiting the terms of reference, its conclusions have been widely accepted. The publication of declassified portions of the report has not helped the cause of the Eastern Command either: it has degraded the status of the higher command echelons and, as a consequence, blanketed the performance of the field units tinder very trying conditions. The collateral damage done to the loyalty and professionalism of the subordinate ranks has been enormous. I feel that the impression of imbecility that has been created about the officer corps, and the army as a whole, in the minds of the general public is not fair. For an objective appreciation of the army's conduct, I have attempted to recreate the atmosphere of intrigue and desperation in which we had to discharge our responsibility. Single-minded devotion to duty at the risk of life and limb, especially at the lower levels of command, deserves recognition. Hardly anyone deserted his post; the majority did not give up the fight when the going got tough. It was the decision-makers who decided to tlrrow in the towel. Post-HRCR, actions by the government were rather erratic. Whereas those accused of staging a coup against Field Marshal Ayub Khan were summarily dismissed, a few others, recommended to be court-martialled for specific acts of omission and commission in East Pakistan, were elevated to exalted ranks and positions, belittling the Commission. (Our courts are in any case notorious for not handing down judgments against the people in power.)

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PREFACE

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Insurgency, counter-insurgency, armed rebellion, or for that matter a civil war, demand mature, measured, and timely responses, tempered with experience. The tragedy of 1971 holds many lessons for posterity. An impartial examination would allow us to adopt a pragmatic approach to eliminating institutional weaknesses and expanding areas of strength so that we can face our future as a vibrant nation, equal to any challenge to national integrity. While documenting the events of those traumatic days, I could not help reflecting on the Pakistan Movement and the society that has developed over the years. How different is our today from the aspirations of the Founding Fathers! Centrifugal forces are active in different parts of this unfortunate land. Concentration of power in the hands of a few, to the exclusion of the majority, has triggered alarm bells in sensitive areas. It is necessary that the bitter experience of the loss of East Pakistan and the circwnstances leading to it are dissected dispassionately and corrective measures initiated in the right direction to harness the dangerous trends currently gaining ground. These attitudes are potentially destructive to national unity and an impediment in the way of progress.

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1 TOTAL RECALL

It was 15 October 1985, a crisp and sunny day with clear blue skies. The Pakistan flag outside the Director-General's residence was fluttering in the gentle morning breeze. There was a nip in the air. That day I was to visit the checkpost at Wagha. I had taken command of the Pakistan Rangers a few days earlier. The Range Rover by which I was to travel was parked in the porch, spotlessly clean, metal parts shimmering in the sunlight., blinding the vision momentarily, the paintwork so vigorously polished that it reflected the 100-year-old trees surrounding the house. I had taken extra care to dress for the occasion, so all my medals were prominently displayed on my chest. I walked out and.sat in the jeep. The guard gave a General Salute. We sped off towards the border. Moving along the canal, across the Bambanwala-RaviBedian Link (BRBL), and onto the Grand Trunk road, we were in Wagha in twenty minutes. I was deep in my thoughts and recalled the circumstances of my posting to East Pakistan in 1970 and the epoch-making events tl)at had followed in quick succession: general elections; insurgency; counter-insurgency; war; an unanticipated surrender, and the humiliation that had accompanied it. I was still lost in my reflections when, without warning, my jeep came to a stop just short of the border, in front of the Rangers guardroom. I stepped out of the vehicle. The moment I put my foot on the ground, a great noise brought me back to reality. Bugles were blown, commands were shouted, and the gates marking the border were thrown open with a loud clank, in unison. It all happened very unexpectedly. I was startled.

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Smartly-dressed ceremonial guards, on both sides of the border, turned out for my inspection-as part of an unwritten protocol of the Border Security Forces (BSF) to greet newly-appointed Directors-General on their first visit to the Joint Checkpost. I walked 'towards the Ranger contingent. Here was a group of specially selected men-all above six feet in height, slim, muscular, and with ferocious moustaches adorning their faces. In their starched uniforms (shalwar kamiz and beautifully tied pugris), they were a sight to behold. After reviewing the Rangers, I went across the border to inspect the BSF contingent. A shiver went up my spine. I had come a complete circle. It was twelve years since I had last gone over the dividing line, though the purpose of the exercise and this direction of approach were completely at variance with my past experience. I inspected the Indians. They had obviously made a special effort to impress me. And they were pretty good, though not as awe-inspiring as the Rangers. I wrote my remarks in the Visitors Book, presented fruit baskets and a cash reward (a standard operating procedure) to the Guard Commander, and stepped back into my own country. It was a unique experience sentimental, nostalgic, full of memories, some sweet, some very bitter. It reminded me of my first ever visit to Wagha, on 17 October 1973. I had approached the Joint Checkpost, on foot, from the Indian side, along with a Jong line of gaunt, dispirited colleagues, some dressed in clothes marked with black crosses. I shuddered at the strange ways of the Almighty to bring home to us our servile position in His scheme of things. Honour and disgrace flow from Allah Almighty (Tuizzo Mun Tushaa, wa Tuzzillo Mun Tushaa). On that occasion, the Pakistani side was beautifully decorated with buntings, flags, and colourful marquees. Military bands played patriotic tu~es. A long reception line headed by a senior military commander, government officials, and Red Cross personnel with garlands in their bands were waiting for us. The scene resembled the return of a conquering army to Rome, Hollywood style.

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TOTAL RECALL

We were part of over 90,000 (45,000 army) prisoners of war, including a large complement of East Pakistan Civil Armed Forces (EPCAF), police, and civilians, who had surrendered to the Indian 'conquerors' on 16 December 1971. Now, after having given up half of the country and having preferred surrender to martyrdom, there we were being received like heroes, with bands playing stirring patriotic tunes. It was embarrassing and depressing. Maybe a simpler, matterof-fact reception, minus the colour, would have been more befitting to the occasion and lent dignity to our actual state of being. I had wanted to get away from it all as quickly as possible, to a quieter place and into the arms of my family; to reflect, to absorb, and to come to terms with the harrowing experience which I as an individual and we as a nation had been through. How had it come about? 1971 had turned out to be a year of trial for Pakistan. As in A Tale of Two Cities, 'It was the best of times and it was the worst of times.' It brought out the best and the worst in us as i,ndividuals and as a nation. On promotion in August 1970, I was directed to take command of the 26th Battalion of the Frontier Force Regiment located at Saidpur, East Pakistan. On arrival at Dhaka airport, on 30 August, I was greeted by a friend, Colonel Sheikh Nusratullah, who was posted to HQ, Eastern Command. I stayed the night in Dhaka, and my friend brought me up to date on prevailing conditions, which were rather disconcerting. The gravity of the situation could be gauged from the fact that all military personnel were required to travel with an armed escort whenever moving out of the cantonment limits. The abnosphere was permeated with mutual distrust. All non-Bengalis had become objects of dislike. I boarded the train for Rangpur the next day, without an escort. Everywhere there was a vast sea of humanity, halfdressed, oblivious to the surroundings. Their poverty was visible, their condition pitiable. Apparently, for them, freedom from British rule had been a hallucination, without any benefits. I was reminded of a poem:

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Yeh galion Jee awara be/car kute Keh balchsha gayajin /co zauq-e-gadai Zamane ki phath/car sarmaya in/ca Johan bhar ki dhut/car inki /camai Yeh muz/um mukhluk gar sar uthai To insan sab sar/cashi bhool jai Yeh chaheen to dunya ko apna bana leen Yeh aaqaon ki haddian tuc chaba leen Koi inko ehsas-e-zillat di/a de Koi inki soi hui dum hi/a de

Stray street dogs, Importune beggars by birth. Contempt has been their lot From the beginning of time And wretchedness their only reward. If only they would revolt And teach arrogant man a lessonTear his fancy clothes, Bury their fangs in his bones. If only someone Would make them see their terrible degradation - Faiz Ahmed Faiz (English translation by Daud Kamal)

I trembled all over, suddenly apprehensive. It started raining heavily. The journey was uneventful in the physical sense. I had a Bengali gentleman, a professor at Mymensingh Agriculture University, as my travelling companion. We started discussing the on-going political developments in the province. He was of the view that, during the elections scheduled for that year, a politically emotional approach based on 'Hate Punjabi shalla' [a derogatory term] would carry the day. I reminded him of the televised interview of Maulana Bhashani in which he had asserted that East Pakistan was basically a deficit area and that before Partition he had advised Mr Jinnah to demand the inclusion of Assam along with East Bengal in the Federation of Pakistan, to offset the economic burden. In his opinion, the

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TOTAL RECALL

inclusion of East Bengal simply meant millions of additional mouths to feed, which Pakistan could ill afford. Famine at the tum of the century, and again in 1943, when millions starved to death, was a stark reminder of the economic imbalance of the area. Historically, the locals-'sons of the soil'-had always blamed 'outsiders' for their miseries, and now West Pakistan was being cast in the role of a villain. We were objects of hate. Lush green fields on both sides of the railway track, as far as the eye could see, were a constant reminder of the fertility of the land. The train was stopped at will by pulling the emergency chain, whenever and wherever a passenger desired to detrain. No one appeared to be bothered about ticketing or travel rules. Public behaviour was not in harmony with the serenity and discipline of the well-laid-out ricefields. But maybe it was not so incongruous after all. Beyond the ricefields was a confusion of uncontrolled growth and a riot of colours. My second-in-command received me at Rangpur with the inevitable armed guard in tow. He was not pleased to find me travelling unescorted, and politely admonished me for having contravened Commander Eastern Command's orders. Was I being stand-offish? Or was it because.of a habit of disregarding orders, or just to be different? Or was it to surprise people, so that they would sit up and take notice? Maybe all these factors had something to do with my conduct, but the main reason was my conviction that, except in enemy-occupied territory, where the vanquished have no love for the victor, employment of an escort to guard against one's own people was wrong in principle. If the majority detests you .to the point of wanting to harm you bodily or even kill you, then it is imperative to look into the causes for this. And instead of fortifying each individual civilian and soldier under threat, it is time to initiate measures to inject sanity into human relations. Escorts, fortifications, or a fortress outlook prompt actions, further isolating the individual or community from the mainstream of the population around. Imagine, for a moment, two extremely antagonistic and suspicious families living side by side, but with a high boundary wall between so that they

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cannot look into each other's backyard. Under these circumstances, even the noise produced by the accidental rattling of pots and pans could be misconstrued as the loading and unloading of firearms. Fear prompts perceptions of threat from directions where none exists. In a tense atmosphere, minimum danger provokes maximum response, overreaction leads to overkill. Such a state of mind in a ruler, an administrator, or a military commander invariably results in excessive action or panic, ultimately leading to disaster. Having an armed escort to guard me from my fellow countrymen was a new experience, very different from the tales we had heard about our predecessors in the area. In one story from the mid-fifties, a young officer, when asked to arrange the reception (a guide and transport from the railway station to the Officers' Mess) for his newly-posted commanding officer, had commandeered all heads of civil departments and prominent notables of the town, lined them up at the railway platform with garlands in their hands and a local brass band in attendance, and placed a ceremonially-decorated elephant at the end of the line to give a regal look to the occasion, in the best tradition of the native rulers of the days gone by. Perceiving displeasure on the countenance of his superior, the youngster apologized for the lack of ' adequate' arrangements due to insufficient warning time. What a contrast it was to my own reception- an armed escort led by a Major. What had brought about this incomprehensible change in a few years? Was it the overbearing attitude of the ruling elite, predominantly West Pakistani? Was it a reaction to the Bengalis' perception that they were being treated like flunkies? After all, even a child, when asked to line up for a foreign dignitary on holiday, is resentful, unless provided with proper transport, food, and UNICEF milk. How can grown-up, responsible citizens appreciate lining up for the reception of a non-entity at the behest of a youngster? It could have also been the realization that Independence had hardly changed anything for the majority. They felt that they were still under colonial rule-only the masters had changed.

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2 THE WAY IT WAS

I took over the command of 26 FF the next day. The unit bad been raised after the 1965 Indo-Pak war. The majority of the soldiers were young and inexperienced, we branded them ' Noor Jahan's soldiers' because it was generally assumed that their latent patriotism had been 'excited' by the war songs of that popular singer. The next three months were spent in the field, training for war- the best way for a commander to get to know his troops in the shortest possible time. It may take months to understand individuals and their capabilities in a peace station, where contact with the commanding officer is infrequent. During field exercises, commanders rub shoulders with their men all the time and can gauge their intrinsic worth quickly. After that, the commanding officers and the brigade commanders participated in an operational planning exercise for the defence of Sylhet, Comilla, and Chittagong sectors. Lt.-Gen. Sahibzada Yaqub Khan, Commander Eastern Command, a man of vision, conducted the exercise. The object was to determine the implications of the assigned mission, the effect of terrain and operational environment on the design of battle. It aimed at channelling the thought processes of commanders at all levels. Discussions brought home to us the paucity of available resources and the ineffectiveness of existing defensive measures. It was disconcerting to notice the inadequacies in plans prepared in the past. With hindsight, however, what is incomprehensible is that, even at that late stage, just before the elections, we had no inkling of the coming events. We had not felt the heat of the

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molten lava bubbling beneath the surface, had been unable to discern the extent to which the virus of provincialism, parochialism, and ethnicity had permeated society. We had failed to detect any signs of the impending insurgency which was to play havoc with the Two Nation Theory and challenge the very existence of Pakistan. This lack of understanding of objective realities is confirmed by the fact that Bengali officers participated fully in the exercise, and that a two-front scenario, i.e., enemy within and enemy without, was not included in the planning. Not even a hint of such a situation in the foreseeable future was dropped, despite the fact that a Bengali translation of Che Guevara's book on guerrilla warfare, with illustrated recipes of the explosive charges required to destroy bridges, make bombs, blow up dumps, houses, etc., was being sold on the footpaths of main cities and towns of East Pakistan. So much for the intelligence agencies; for the foresight and forward planning of the political and military leadership of the time. But then, we had not anticipated a landslide election victory by the Awami League, either. . Wamings of impending floods prompt even the most lethargic to repair the embankments, fill up the rat holes, place rescue and repair material at the relevant sites, and organize damage control. Had we comprehended the coming events, we could have avoided them altogether, or at least controlled them by the political and other means at our disposal. We could have confined the madness to manageable limits; we could have worked out a plan of action to avoid war on two fronts, which even defeated Hitler at the height of his glory. My family joined me at Saidpur in October 1970. They came by air to Thakurgaon, the only airfield in the north-west of East Pakistan, then to Saidpur under escort. Why had I asked them to join me? Were conditions conducive to family life? Was it sensible to expose my wife and three lovely children to the uncertain conditions? With the advantage of hindsight, the answer is an emphatic no, but at that time I did not consider the . situation serious enough to warrant cancellation of their journey. Obviously I was wrong. But then, others who had been around

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TIIEWAYITWAS

much longer than I had not considered it necessary to send their families back. Perhaps that was what had led to my decision. At first, we had to stay in the officers' mess-a constricted living, but after a couple of months, we moved into the newlyconstructed houses in the cantonment. Because of the prevailing tension, social life was restricted to interaction between station families; a movie at the local cinema, of course with proper escort, was the apex of entertainment. Occasionally, musical concerts were arranged, with mostly Bihari artists. Now Biharis were a separate entity, divorced from the mainstream of Bengali nationalism. Because of language and cultural affinities, they were much closer to the West Pakistanis, and were identified as such by the Bengalis. This actually was a major cause of their ultimate undoing. They lived in close-knit communities in Saidpur, Parbatipur, Santhahar, certain localities of Dhaka, and some other towns of East Pakistan, where they dominated the railway service. They were a great help to us throughout the turmoil, and in the final analysis, they were the biggest sufferers of the conflict, apart from our national pride, professional prestige, and ideological moorings. During the run-up to the elections a terrible emotional, intellectual, and physical polarization had taken place between the communities. While political activity was permitted from I January 1970, the Legal Framework Order (LFO) was promulgated on 30 March. The LFO, besides enumerating various rules of conduct, laid down certain basic principles for the future Constitution of Pakistan: it must preserve Islamic ideology; it must be democratic in essence; it must be truly federal in nature. Sheikh Mujibur Rahman totally ignored it. He claimed that the elections were in effect a referendum on his Six Points, which confined the jurisdiction of the Federal Government to the subjects of Defence and Foreign Affairs; proposed separate currencies for each region; authorized separate foreign currency accounts; and permitted the federating units to formulate their own fiscal policies and have their own paramilitary forces. The Six Points were in direct conflict with the LFO and aimed at weakening the federation. Nothing was

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done to stop Mujib from contesting the elections on that basis, and distorted accounts of the exploitation of Bengalis by Punjabis, narrated during election rallies, inflamed the atmosphere. The elections, initially scheduled for 5 October, were postponed to 7 December because of floods that bad affected most of East Pakistan, followed by a typhoon and a tidal wave that struck coastal areas and offshore islands on 19 November, killing 150,000. The anned forces were heavily involved in providing relief, and the job done by them was appreciated by everyone, including Sheikh Mujibur Rahman- in bis case privately. But the absence of West Pakistan political leaders and senior bureaucrats from Islamabad was noticed by the people of East Pakistan and thoroughly exploited by Mujib's strategists and the print media, who made full capital out of the misery of the people whose cause they were professedly championing. In this ominous atmosphere, public conduct deterioratedpassing anny vehicles were a frequent target of abuse-and unrestrained political activity made the situation volatile. Bengali chauvinists with lethal weapons started roaming around the countryside, threatening one and all to vote for Awami League or face the wrath of Bengali nationalism. How could a poor hapless Bengali with a large family and limited means go against such 'sound advice'?

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3 THE ELECTIONS AND AFTER

Whether Law and Order can go hand in hand or are mutually exclusive is arguable. Law, if applied in our environment, means chaos, whereas maintenance of order demands the breaking of a few heads, which may not be legally possible. In December 1970, the army in East Pakistan was deployed to ensure law and order during the elections. 26 FF had the responsibility of supervising the events in the district of Dinajpur, which had a population of some 2.5 million. We reconnoitred the area. collected intelligence on the troublemongers and the sensitive spots, and positioned troops accordingly, down to subdivisional level. The High Command directed the army to ensure that the elections were conducted fairly. At the same time, we were asked to stay away from the immediate vicinity of the polling stations unless requested to be present by the Election Commission authorities. This direction was apparently based on the assumption that the Bengali civil servants would also play fair and remain impartial during the casting of votes. This selfrestraint meant that the election staff could do what they pleased. The result was a foregone conclusion. How did the Awami League manage a 'total victory'? Is it possible for any one party to so overwhelmingly dominate all others in a free election? Can a society divided from within, and having leaders ofBhashani's calibre among the opposition, unite so completely overnight? Can peopre suddenly override parochial feelings and narrow self-interest of their own free will? Or was it achieved through coercion, hence spurious? What part did the Bengali civil administrator, through influence and patronage,

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play in this drama? The answers to some of these questions are well lqtown. For example, we know that Maulana Bhashani was neutralized by the arrest of over 1,400 of his ;tctive workers by the provincial administration. He ultimately withdrew from the election. The Muslim League suffered a major set-back when its party funds were frozen by the government. The Jamaat-elslami and all other political parties were coerced into submission by the unbridled strong-arm tactics of the Awami League. What is often not appreciated is that, although the elections were held under the overall supervision of the army, the actual casting and counting of votes was directly controlled by the civil administration. It is they who, in collaboration with Awami League militants, ensured a 'complete victory'. It is pertinent to recall an old adage: 'Democracy is not just one man one vote-it depends too often on who counts the votes.' Even in today's Bangladesh, allegedly, the League is not above enlisting party workers as 'school teachers' to be subsequently employed on election duty to manipulate the counting of votes. We had, apparently, played into the hands of the vested interests, by leaving the field clear to the Awami League workers and the Bengali civil servants. We did not react to their highhandedness because, unfortunately, we were more worried about the 'form' than the substance of our conduct. We refused to look beyond our noses, isolated ourselves from the realities of the situation, and allowed a spurious seal of legality and respectability to be put on the election 'victory'. A comprehensive monitoring system, incorporating the army and the judiciary, could have been worked out to ensure free and fair casting and counting of votes. Under the circumstances, as custodians of martial law and prime movers in the holding of polls, it was our responsibility to ensure fair play in the conduct of elections. We hedged the responsibility. The involvement of the Bengali civil service with Bengali nationalism had not come about overnight. India had realized at the time of Partition that widespread riots, wanton killings of Muslims, and destruction of their property, had resulted in a wide gulf between the communities. The revival of bitter

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memories of the partition of Bengal in 1905, for administrative reasons which inadvertently created a Muslim majority province, and its undoing in 1911 through Hindu machinations, had further complicated inter-community relations. This big gap had to be bridged before Muslim Bengal could be brought to a common platform of language, heritage, and culture with the Hindu minority. They initiated measures for the creation of such a platform: 'conversion' through conviction, 'friendly persuasion', or coercion of the young leadership amongst student bodies and the working classes, using a 'lethal' combination of wine, women, and money, was started straightaway. The declaration of Urdu as a national language, the administrative dominance of non-Bengalis, and their haughty conduct, led to language riots in the early 1950s that culminated in the . erection of 'martyrs' memorials all over East Pakistan, permanent symbols of hate for West Pakistan, and rallyingpoints for dissidents. This had increased friction between the Wings, as well as between the Centre and the Provinces. Sometime before the elections, while driving from Dinajpur to Phulbari, I noticed a crowd sitting in a circle by the roadside. I stopped my jeep to see what was going on. A man, stark naked, was standing in the middle of the gathering, bleeding profusely and being stabbed by three others with sharp-edged bamboo sticks. Each assailant, after thrusting his stick into the soft portions of the human target, would withdraw a few paces and, to the beat of a drum and the accompanying shouts of the crowd, run in and stab again. I shouted at them to stop their inhuman conduct. They responded automatically, and then I noticed a couple of policemen, in uniform and fully armed, in the crowd. They attempted to slip away, but my yelling brought them to the road. I asked them the score. They told me that the victim was a cattle thief who had been caught red-handed by the villagers, and that what I had witnessed was the traditional way of dispensing justice to such characters. I put the victim and the policemen in the escort vehicle and proceeded to PhuJbari before the crowd could react. The man died en route.

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The incident shook me. Was I in the outback, witnessing the lynching of a horse thief during the conquest of that vast land by the 'convicts' deported from Europe? Even the dispensation of roadside justice by a kangaroo court may be acceptable in certain societies, but what I had seen was no mob acting in frenzy, but a well-organized group of people killing a fellow being in a deliberate, cool, and calculating manner and obviously enjoying it. It was a shameful display of depravity. The situation continued to deteriorate. The Armed Forces were practically confined to lines-so much so that fresh vegetables, meat, and fruit became scarce in the cantonments. Our milkboy confided that he was being threatened by the villagers for selling milk to us. He foresaw an upheaval around the comer. At that stage, even an uneducated Bengali youth could perceive disaster, but not the people in power. The months of January and February saw a drift towards bloody conflict. After the elections, the various power centres took their positions, namely the President (representing himself or the Army), the Awami League, and the Pakistan People's Party (PPP). The Awami League demanded the handing over of power to the majority party, i.e. itself, without any preconditions placed on its political, constitutional, and regional ambitions. The PPP, apparently, stood for the resolution of constitutional issues outside the Assembly, before its inaugural session, possibly to pre-empt the Awami League, with its simple majority, from forcing through the Assembly a Constitution of their choice. The result might have been at variance with the constitutional provisions laid down in the. Legal Framework Order and inimical to a fair deal for the provinces of West Pakistan. The army ostensibly backed the transfer of power to a government guaranteeing a united Pakistan. Individually, General Yahya Khan appeared to be manoeuvring for a place for himself in the future set-up. It was expected that, once these issues were settled, the heat generated by the elections would dissipate, and tranquility would return. But that was not to be. Unfortunately, despite intense exchanges of views and a number of meetings between the various parties, no agreement could be reached on how to transfer power

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1HE ELECTIONS AND AFTER

smoothly to the elected representatives of the people. On a number of occasions during the parleys, an end to the political impasse appeared to be on the cards, but sometimes legal niceties, and on other occasions the shifting stance of the participants on serious constitutional issues, scuttled an agreement. The Awami League oscillated between a united Pakistan with a weak Centre and a Pakistan in the shape ofa loose confederation, practically conMling an independent State of Bangladesh. At one stage they went to the extent of issuing a draft constitution which was uncompromising on the Six Points; proposed naming ofEast Pakistan as Bangladesh; envisaged shifting of a Service HQ to East Pakistan. The PPP, · despite being a minority party, attempted to dictate terms for cooperation, demanding equal share in the power structure. General Yahya Khan was averse to presiding over a weakly-fabricated confederation. Apparently, no serious attempt to resolve the points of contention was made, and lack of mutual trust precluded an amicable settlement of basic constitutional issues. Thus confrontation instead ofreconciliation became the order of the day, and no transfer of power could take place. It is possible to manage or manipulate state affairs for an extended period of time without going to the people, provided credible individuals from different walks of life are taken into the government. But to initiate and conclude party-based elections through a democratic process that encompassed the preparation and propagation of party manifestos, nomination of candidates, holding of public meetings and processions, casting of votes, and declaration of results, and then to deny the transfer of power to the majority, is like feeding a bull the year round, getting him into the arena, showing him a red rag, and then hoping that he does not charge. It belongs in the realm of fantasy. Once a political process has been set in motion and the heat of argument generated, sentiments and aspirations excited, it is sensible to let it run its full course. Any rough edges can be rounded off through dialogue. It is futile to attempt to dam a 15-foot-high tidal wave in the middle of an ocean; better to allow it to spend its fury and then harness it near the shoreline. Political problems must be resolved by political means-but not

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necessarily by politicians, who have so often been found wanting in this respect. On 1 March 1971, an indefinite postponement of the inaugural session of the National Assembly, scheduled to be held on 3 March, further electrified the atmosphere. After having put the seal of authenticity on the 'triumph' of the Awami League, now to deny it power was like building a sand wall to control the floodwaters of the mighty Gangi:s-an exercise in futility. All sections of society reacted spontanea