Through an Ethnic Prism: Germans, Czechs and the Creation of Czechoslovakia 9783110749885, 9783110749403

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Stephen M. Thomas Through an Ethnic Prism

Stephen M. Thomas

Through an Ethnic Prism Germans, Czechs and the Creation of Czechoslovakia Edited by Karen Alexander, Vladimir Pistalo and Elizabeth Marshall Thomas With an Introduction by Pedrag Markovic

ISBN 978-3-11-074940-3 e-ISBN (PDF) 978-3-11-074988-5 e-ISBN (EPUB) 978-3-11-074995-3 Library of Congress Control Number: 2021943953 Bibliographic information published by the Deutsche Nationalbibliothek The Deutsche Nationalbibliothek lists this publication in the Deutsche Nationalbibliografie; detailed bibliographic data are available on the Internet at http://dnb.dnb.de. © 2022 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston Cover image: T. G. Masaryk přehlíží vojáky“, unknown author (https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:T._G._Masaryk_přehlíží_vojáky.jpg), marked as public domain, more details on Wikimedia Commons: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/Template:PD-old. Printing and binding: CPI books GmbH, Leck www.degruyter.com

Prologue A Savvy Political Operative: Czechs Thought He Was Russian, and Russians Thought He Was Czech Steve Thomas was my beloved husband. Nobody has ever found a more compatible husband. We were together since we were eighteen and in our junior year at Harvard. We met when he came to our house with my brother. For the rest of his life he remembered the dress I was wearing when he saw me coming down the stairs, and I still remember the jeans and yellow shirt he wore when, moments later, I saw him. Many years later, long after we were married, a nice man who was studying the reactions of people to the college they attended came to question us. I said, “Harvard was sort of okay, I guess, although I didn’t learn much,” but Steve was very enthusiastic. He loved the classes he had taken and he learned an amazing amount. The nice man told us that colleges like Princeton were usually seen with Steve’s enthusiasm while colleges like Harvard were not. Why? Because the Princeton professors knew their students, liked them, and guided them while the Harvard professors just entered the classrooms, gave their lectures, and walked out. But Steve loved to learn. He didn’t care if the professors knew him and he didn’t need their help. Harvard offered a wide array of subjects and Steve consumed as many as he could. Steve was especially interested in languages. He soon learned French and German, and then moved from his dormitory to the home of a Russian couple where he soon was speaking fluent Russian. During that time, he and I took a course in Spanish together. When the class was over I left with no more than entiendo nada, but he left speaking fluently. By the time he was in his thirties he spoke German, French, Spanish, Russian, Czech, Italian, English of course, and also some Yoruba and Korean. He didn’t count Yoruba or Korean because he didn’t think he “spoke” a language until he was fluent. I spoke only English but even in English he knew more words than I did. He knew what onomatopoeia meant, for instance. What does it mean? Don’t look at me. When we graduated from Harvard he was drafted and stationed at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, in a unit of soldiers chosen for the languages they spoke. All but Steve were from other countries. The Army, of course, deals with other languages constantly and this unit was their source of expertise. Steve’s memory of the experience was writing notes in Korean for planes to drop on Korea, or in other words, it wasn’t too exciting. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110749885-001

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We got married and, when he was discharged, we moved to New York City where I got a job and he went to graduate school at Columbia University to study the history of Central Europe. That program didn’t offer a PhD, just a paper saying you had taken the courses, but he wasn’t interested in degrees—all he wanted was to learn about Central Europe. Which he did. He was equally interested in politics. After Columbia, he worked for a company that focused on electing senators who were opposed to atomic warfare. He would visit the states where the candidates lived, learn what the general public was thinking, decide whether or not the candidate had what it took to win, and whether or not to support that candidate. At one time, literally half the senators in Congress had been put there thanks to Steve’s investigations and help. One of those senators is now President Joe Biden. I met him many years later when he was running for President and gave a talk in the little New Hampshire town where Steve and I had settled. Steve was no longer living but Biden remembered him with much affection. Without Steve’s help, said President Biden, he would not have been elected to the Senate. When Steve was in his late fifties, he left this interesting job to pursue his other passion—the history of what had been Czechoslovakia and became, in part, the Czech Republic. In 1989 after the Iron Curtain was lifted, non-communists were allowed to visit the archives, of which there were many, so that is what he did. By then he spoke Czech quite perfectly. Czechs really did think he was a Russian and the Russians believed he was a Czech. He would spend three months in the Czech Republic, which after World War II had reacquired the German area of Sudetenland, then three months at home, then again three months in the Czech Republic, a plan which he kept for perhaps fifteen years. He liked to be thorough. Did I object to his long absences? Well, I missed him, of course, but I wanted him to be happy. Also, I could visit him so I often did, and he hadn’t objected when, before all this, I had taken our two little kids to northern Uganda so I could write a book about the Dodoth warriors, or when I left the little kids with him so I could spend a summer alone beside a den of wolves on Baffin Island and include wolves in a book I was writing about the dog family. So there we were. I wrote several books, including the dog book, and he wrote this book, a step-by-step account of the Czech v. Czech and Czech v. German struggles, including all the participants and all the results—the only book that I know of that begins to demonstrate what really happened. If my books are like molehills, his is like a mountain.

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Steve died in 2015 of ALS, that’s amyotrophic lateral sclerosis—not a good disease to have and always fatal—with his loving family beside him. He left us this book. Elizabeth Marshall Thomas Peterborough NH, USA April 12, 2021

Contents Introduction Competing Politicizations of Ethnicity in Austria-Hungary and Czechoslovakia, 1 1848 – 1936 Map of Czechoslovakia Chapter 1 Austrian Prelude Chapter 2 Deliverance

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Chapter 3 German Rejection

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Chapter 4 Making the New Rules: Language and Autonomy Chapter 5 Reaffirmation of the National State

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Chapter 6 The Heyday of the Pětka and the Pětka′s Demise Chapter 7 German Activism

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Chapter 8 The End of the Affair Epilogue Roads Not Taken References Index

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Introduction Competing Politicizations of Ethnicity in Austria-Hungary and Czechoslovakia, 1848 – 1936 Stephen Thomas’s excellent book, Through an Ethnic Prism: Germans, Czechs and the Creation of Czechoslovakia, presents a narrative that meticulously recreates the most important episodes in Czech-German relations in what is now the Czech Republic. Drawing on comprehensive archival research, Thomas depicts the establishment of the Czechoslovak Republic from the ruins of the AustroHungarian empire and examines its political and public life in the 1920s and 1930s through the lens of ethnic rivalry between Germans, the former rulers, and Czechoslovaks, the victorious new sovereigns. Rather than dramatizing the story about nationalistic passions and fears, Thomas tried to understand them. His historical approach is extremely nuanced. Among other things, Thomas believed that, when they are strong, dominant ethnic groups (like the Germans in Austria-Hungary and later the Czechs in Czechoslovakia) should behave counterintuitively, by making concessions to minority groups. For Thomas, there were no good or bad, progressive or regressive nationalisms, there were only missed opportunities. A lot can be said about the collapse of Austria-Hungary, and even more can be said about the creation of the new states in Eastern Europe in the aftermath of World War I. Indeed, a lot has been written on those topics in the past hundred years. This rich and diverse historiography has produced various interpretations on the structural and other weaknesses of the Dual Monarchy. Many different disciplines have addressed the question of state formation with all its complexities and uncertainties. Moreover, the question of nationalism and the use of ethnicity as a political tool is an issue any history student is confronted with today in undergraduate studies. To an extent, one can say that Steve Thomas’s book is a continuation of this historiographical tradition. His analysis covers the complicated breakup of Austria-Hungary and the emergence of the Czech national movement. We are given a very detailed insight on the inner workings of the Revolutionary National Assembly and its activities leading up to the proclamation of Czechoslovak independence. Then, the story chronologically follows the life of the young Czechoslovak state, narrated from the perspective of top-ranking politicians, as it follows their activities in the Parliament, press, political parties, and so on. All this verily encapsulates the reality among political and national elites in Czechoslovakia in the decades following the Great War—their idealism, grievances, confrontations https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110749885-002

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and political infighting. Throughout the book, we follow the works and thoughts of dozens of different politicians and executives, including Tomáš Garrigue Masaryk and Edvard Beneš, among others. From a purely factual perspective, Through an Ethnic Prism is a particularly detailed account of Czechoslovakia’s creation, its parliamentary life, and the workings of its governments during the 1920s and 1930s. However, what makes this book extraordinary and an interesting addition to the existing literature is that its basic layout juxtaposes the German and Czech perspectives as part of the same story. This framework allows us to appreciate new, seldomly researched complexities regarding the creation of Czechoslovakia. Although Thomas’s book is not a theoretical one, like every good history, it touches upon deeper, more fundamental questions. In his case, these questions deal with the nature and legitimacy of the nation state, as well as with the concept of a national minority. The concept of a nation-state, emerging from the French Revolution and Napoleonic Wars, proposes the idea that states are organized around the interest of one nation—thus, the state is conceived as a tool through which a nation fulfills its historical and political needs, interests, and strivings. Because a nation-state is designed to both embody and safeguard its nation, it fosters its language, history, culture, and traditions. Western Europe developed and refined this concept throughout the 19th century, establishing a model for all others. When the Great War ended, all empires in Eastern Europe collapsed and were replaced by states “belonging” to newly liberated peoples. After centuries of oppression and foreign rule, these nations felt their historical moment had arrived. But the eastern portion of the continent was much more ethnically heterogeneous than Western Europe. Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, Romania, Poland, not to mention the Soviet Union, all accommodated exceptionally diverse populations—nationally, religiously, and linguistically. Suddenly, nations that had fought very hard to liberate themselves and finally create states of their own found significant numbers of people belonging to different nations within their borders. Presumably, these people needed their own states. Thus, the issue of minorities emerged, an often-researched problem rarely placed in a wider historical context. This is exactly what Thomas’s book delivers—a comprehensive study of the legitimacy and political viability of the nation state and its relationship to ethnic minorities. As such, this book is part of an interesting historiographical trend that includes, for example, Holly Case of Brown University. This trend investigates the ways in which eastern European states paradoxically tried to accommodate dissatisfied minorities and persuade them to accept the new reality even as they were attempting to create a country that would be, first and fore-

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most, the historical and political expression of only one nation. Case’s Between States: The Transylvanian Question and the European Idea during World War Two (Stanford University Press, 2009) explores themes and issues similar to Thomas’s, only in terms of Romanians and Hungarians in Transylvania. While most of Through an Ethnic Prism deals with events in the 1920s and 1930s, Thomas also presents insightful historical context in the initial chapters. Here, he explains the rapid transition from a more territorial understanding of patriotism to an ethnic understanding among the Czech population in Bohemia starting in 1848, in consequence of German refusal to accept the Czech language as equal in status. This emerging antagonism assumed the form of endless negotiations about restructuring the dwindling Habsburg monarchy. All these negotiations and eventual resolutions proved to be dissatisfactory for the Czechs, who eventually decided the Austrian Empire was not a state in which they could enjoy their national rights. Austria-Hungary was dismantled after its defeat in World War I. This enabled the Czechs to finally achieve their independence by creating Czechoslovakia, a nation-state of Czech and Slovak nations (the Slovaks inclusion was problematic at the time, and Thomas also analyses this). In great detail, Thomas describes the events of 1918 – 1920. The newly created country was quite complicated. Czechs, the “standard-bearing” nation of the new republic, comprised slightly less than half of the total population. Adding the Slovak population brought the combined number up to two thirds of the Czechoslovak population. The rest were “Others”—Germans (23 % of the total population), Hungarians, Jews, Poles and Ukrainians. Germans, who for centuries had controlled all aspects of political, social, and cultural life in the Czech crown lands, found themselves a minority, living in a nation-state designed for the newly established Czechoslovak nation. All of a sudden, the Germans became a political entity whose position in the new republic was uncertain and whose national rights needed to be addressed. The Czechs, having been second rank citizens for centuries, were now in position to forge their own destiny, foster their own language and culture, and create their own future. Nobody planned the Germans into this future. German leaders in Bohemia well understood that the formation of a Czech nation-state, “dedicated” to the Czech nation, meant that Germans in that nation would necessarily be subjected. At this point, a distinct political identity emerged among Germans in Czechoslovakia. As Thomas explains: “in a psychological sense the term ‘Sudeten German’ was a defense mechanism which stressed the large number of Germans who were pitted against an admittedly far more numerous Czech majority”. Germans rejected the new state, claiming

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the right to self-determination for themselves, the same right Czechs used in 1918 to create their state. Thomas argues that this problem was the defining issue in Czechoslovakia’s political life of the 1920s and 1930s. Throughout this period, the young republic (unlike most countries in East Europe) was a truly vibrant democracy with a rich, if perhaps ineffective, parliamentary life. Most of his research is devoted to the inner workings of Czech political elites and their endless debates on the German issue, as well as to the activities of German parties on different levels. Much like during the pre-war period, official language was the most prominent point of discontent. Czechs made their language the official language of the state, thereby limiting the use of German and forcing Germans working in public administration to learn Czech. The language issue proved important in policy making regarding other nations in Czechoslovakia. Contrary to widely held impressions, the relationship between the Czechs and the Slovaks, the other titular nation within the new country, was not without internal turmoil. Major disputes emerged over naming the new official language of the state—whether it would be “Czechoslovak” or “Czech and Slovak”. As Thomas explains, “behind the terms ‘Czechoslovak’ and ‘Czech and Slovak’ lay the question of whether the two peoples constituted a single Czechoslovak nation or two separate nations.” The issue was symbolic, as it frequently is in ethnic conflict when legitimacy is brought into question, in this case, the legitimacy of a separate Slovak identity. But the overarching problem—the status of Germans, German language, and administrative division in German areas—never saw a fitting solution. Whereas both sides did attempt to find a common ground, nothing changed much, even when towering figures like Masaryk and Beneš tried to lobby for a favorable compromise with the Germans. Thomas’s central claim argues that the Czechoslovak nation state envisaged by the Czechs was incompatible with any meaningful integration of the German minority. This was paired with complete refusal of the German elites to participate in politics and their open secessionism. Nothing changed much even after moderate Germans (who accepted the existence of Czechoslovakia) finally entered the government. All this—in addition to stark ideological differences between both camps, and institutional ostracism of the second most prominent political party, the Communists—made the political situation in Czechoslovakia chaotic and unstable. But paradoxically enough, it wasn’t internal instability and political opportunism that eventually brought the collapse of the First Czechoslovak Republic. Rather, international factors played an even greater role. With the economic crisis in the early 1930s, both Czechs and Germans grew more radical. Fifteen years of attempted compromise went down the drain with the emergence of German National Socialism. Thomas ends his book with a sweeping Nazi victory in the

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Sudeten German electorate in 1935. Rallying around this staunchly chauvinist, irredentist, and militarist movement ended all hopes for a common understanding between the Czechs and the Germans. Only four years later, the country will be occupied, dismantled and annexed by the Third Reich in a prelude of the greatest ethnic conflict in human history. Thomas, in the end, leaves open the question of whether Czechoslovakia would have been able to overcome its ethnic divisions without foreign interference. He does not speculate on whether alternative paths could have been paved with different, more rational political thinking. He does, however, leave his readers with a rather disconcerting, if accurate, thought on the very nature of the political formation we live in even today: “Privilege is inherent in the concept of the nation state, the privilege of the dominant nation and the subordinate status of all the others.” Predrag Markovic Belgrade, Serbia November 19, 2020

Map of Czechoslovakia

Fig. 1: Map or Czechoslovakia, 1928 – 1938 (https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Czechoslovakia01.png). Modified by Karen Alexander.

https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110749885-003

Chapter 1 Austrian Prelude Ethnicity is at least as old as humankind. Ethnic nationalism, the invocation of ethnicity to rally and organize the masses, is a far more modern phenomenon, perhaps no more than the two hundred and some years that have elapsed since the French Revolution. Nonetheless it has played a central role in the recent history of the world. In 1848, when revolutionary winds swept across the European continent engulfing the Austrian monarchy of the Habsburgs, there was at the outset a relative harmony between Czechs and Germans in the Czech crown lands of Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia. The harmony was not to last. In Moravia and Silesia the traditional concept of identity based upon place of origin, territorial patriotism, still tended to prevail. In Bohemia, however, this sense of territorial patriotism was beginning to be tinged by a new element based on ethnic affiliation or ethnic nationalism. At first, representatives of the Prague Germans joined with the Czechs to establish a “National Committee”. Both Czechs and Germans participated in its work. On March 11, 1848, the Committee adopted a petition to the Emperor calling for the legislative and administrative unity of the three lands of the Czech crown, for the equality of the Czech and German languages in schooling and administration, and for administrative officials with a command of both languages.¹ Had these language provisions been carried out, the bitter language strife in the Czech lands that characterized the final decades of the monarchy before its collapse might to a large extent have been averted. Soon, however, there were protests from German Bohemia against the authority of the National Committee in Prague. The Moravian Diet unanimously declared the independence of Moravia. Silesia also rejected closer ties to Prague. It became clear that the initial concept of a common territorial identity of Czechs and Germans in the Czech lands was not viable.² One cause of the division was the convocation of the German National Assembly in Frankfurt. On March 31st the pre-parliament met and called for elections to a constituent assembly which was to draft a liberal constitution for Germany. Among those invited to attend were Czechs and Germans from the

 Tobolka, Zdeněk. Politické dějiny československého národa od r. 1848 do dnešní doby (Praha: Československý Kompas, 1932), vol. I, pp. 38 – 39.  Jaksch, Wenzel. Europas Weg nach Potsdam (Stuttgart, Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1958), p. 35. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110749885-004

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Austrian provinces of the Czech lands. The response of the Germans was enthusiastic. The response of the Czechs was not. The Czech political leader and historian, František Palacký, rejected the invitation in a letter to Frankfurt dated April 11th, 1848. He wrote: “I’m not a German, or at least I do not feel like one … I am a Czech of Slavic origin and I have dedicated all my meager belongings and humble ability to the service of my nation…. Another reason that prevents me from participating in your discussions is that according to everything which up to now has been publicly declared regarding your purpose and intentions your unswerving aim was and is to permanently weaken, indeed render impossible, Austria as an independent empire, the empire whose preservation, integrity and strengthening is and should be a matter of great importance not only for my nation but for all of Europe, indeed for all humankind and culture itself…. Surely if the Austrian state had not long since existed, we would have to strive as quickly as possible that it be created in the interests of Europe and humanity…. If I lift my gaze beyond the Czech borders, natural and historical reasons impel me to look not to Frankfurt but to Vienna and to see there that center which is suited and intended to secure and defend the peace, freedom and rights of my nation…. [W]hoever demands that Austria [and Bohemia with it] be linked nationally to the German empire asks for the state’s suicide and that makes no moral or political sense.”³ The line was drawn. What is noteworthy in the passages cited from Palacký’s letter is the element of Czech dependency. The assertion of Czech ethnic identity is perfectly clear, but in his defense against the pan-German nationalism of the Frankfurt parliament, Palacký invokes the Austrian Empire on which he depends, just as Czech politicians in domestic Austrian politics would later depend on their alliance with the Bohemian nobility in their opposition to German hegemony. This dependence reflects the relative weakness of the early Czech national leaders, later known as the Old Czechs. As purely ethnic nationalism came increasingly to the fore, the gathering strength of the Czech national movement and the extension of the electoral franchise would all reduce this dependency. In March of 1848, in the full ferment of the revolutionary upsurge, elections to a constituent assembly were promised by the government, but on April 28th the young emperor, Franz Josef, issued a constitution for Austria before the assembly could even form and start its work. Dissatisfaction with this constitution was so widespread that the crown was forced to retreat and promise democratic revisions. On July 22nd, the constituent assembly, or Reichstat, met in Vienna.

 Palacký, František. Spisy drobné (Praha: Bursík a Kohout, 1898), vol. I, pp. 17– 22.

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During the October uprisings in Vienna, the Reichsrat withdrew to the peaceful Moravian town of Kremsier where it became increasingly out of touch with ongoing developments. Nonetheless, on March 1st, 1849, the Reichsrat completed its deliberation on the new constitution, which provided for a federal form of government and might well have served as a firm basis for the future development of the Austrian monarchy, although it did not deal with the question of Hungary. The new constitution never took effect. On March 4th the Austrian government, which had suppressed the revolution in Austria and was preparing to launch a fresh offensive against revolutionary Hungary, again intervened, dissolved the Reichsrat and issued its own constitution which applied to all the Habsburg possessions. The deliberations of the Reichsrat in Vienna and Kremsier are of particular interest in view of the two proposals put forward by Palacký for the reform of the monarchy. In his first proposal he called for a Cisleithanian⁴, or Austrian part of the monarchy consisting of four lands: Polish, Czech, German Austrian and western Adriatic or Illyrian, each embracing the territories which historically belonged to them. Thus, the Czech lands would consist of the Czech crown lands —Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia—together with their large German minority. By contrast his second proposal, influenced by the success of imperial troops in revolutionary Hungary, called for five lands in Cisleithania based on nationality— German Austrian, Czech, Polish, west Adriatic and Italian—to which, with the addition of the Hungarian crown, would be added three additional lands—Yugoslav, Magyar and Rumanian. In this second proposal, in effect an ethnic federation of the empire, Palacký called explicitly for the inclusion of the Slovaks of northern Hungary in the Czech kingdom from which the German lands would be separated, although he was unable to outline the practical basis for this latter division of territory.⁵ Palacký’s proposal for an ethnic federation of the empire, with its consequent separation of Czechs from Germans in the Czech crown lands, conflicted both with the position of other Czech political leaders and with that of the Bohemian nobility. The Czechs were intent on upholding Czech state rights, but the nobility was still very much in the ascendancy in the Bohemian lands and would only lose political influence with a separation of the two peoples. Toward the  The Leitha River was the symbolic dividing line between Austria and Hungary, although the kingdoms and lands represented in the Austrian Reichsrat extended eastward far beyond the Leitha, both in the north and in the south. Thus, Austria was Cisleithania and Hungary Transleithania.  Tobolka, Z. Politické dějiny československého …, vol. I, 142– 143.

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end of the 19th century with the suffrage extended and, in consequence, with the role of the nobility diluted, the Czechs continued to insist on the unity of the Czech lands, although the incorporation of the Slovaks in the Czech kingdom was dropped. The Germans, however, were beginning to call for an administrative separation of Czechs and Germans. In both cases, ethnic nationalism was increasingly the dominant factor. At the Paris Peace Conference in 1919, Czechoslovak diplomacy, now unshackled completely from any dependency on the old feudal nobility, merged Palacký’s two proposals and called for the creation of a new state, both with the inclusion of the Slovaks and with the retention of the historic borders of the Czech crown lands with their large German minority. This was granted. The revolution in Austria ended with the dissolution of the Reichstag at Kremsier in March of 1848. The revolution in Hungary ended with the defeat of the Hungarians at Világos in August of 1849. In the short term, the defeat of the revolution led to the restoration of absolutism—government in which all power is vested in the ruler—but the era of neoabsolutism lasted only until the creation of the enlarged Reichsrat in July of 1860, an event which proved to be the first step toward the restoration of constitutional government. At this turning point in history, the Austrian monarchy faced two possibilities: a federalist solution which would entail the delimitation of discrete territorial entities for each nation of the monarchy, or a dualistic solution, that is, the division of the monarchy in two parts with the Magyars in ascendency in one, and the Germans in ascendency in the other. By addressing the national problem at the very outset, the federalist solution would in the long run have provided greater stability to the monarchy, but it would have been extremely difficult to accomplish. The various nations of the monarchy evolved at varying paces in their national consciousness, education, and economic development. In the 1860s some of these nations were still at a very early stage. It is open to question whether the monarchy had ever possessed the statesmanship to guide itself across the shoals it would inevitably have encountered in forging a federalist solution. Certainly, the young emperor, Franz Josef, did not. The enlarged Reichsrat, created in July of 1860, adopted a constitution in October of the same year which pointed toward a federalist solution and recognized the historic rights of the Bohemian kingdom and its three lands. In February, 1861, however, this constitution was replaced by a new constitution which diminished the jurisdiction of the land diets and ignored Czech state’s rights. In June of 1863, four years before the Austro-Hungarian compromise, the Czech deputies left the Reichsrat in what would become a sixteen-year boycott of the Viennese legislative body. In so doing they cited the February constitution and declared

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their unwillingness to participate further in the proceedings of the Reichsrat as long as the February constitution was upheld.⁶ In the spring of 1865 Palacký wrote a series of eight articles entitled “The Idea of the Austrian State”. Published in the daily newspaper, Národ, it presented a program that had Czech support across the political spectrum. Palacký warned against the introduction of dualism, which he regarded as the division of rule over the Empire between the Germans and the Magyars. The core of his program was Austrian federalism—the resolution of the national problem in a fully just manner. Palacký said of the Slavs in the Empire that if Austria failed to fulfill its historic mission, the Slavs would nevertheless survive. “We existed before Austria,” he said, “and we will exist after it.”⁷ Thus, for the first time, he expressed his doubts about the future of Austria and its capacity to accomplish its historic role to fulfill the aspirations of its various nations. The successive steps that led ultimately to the decision in favor of dualism were time-specific and driven by external events. In 1859 French troops of Napoleon III and Piedmontese troops of Victor Emmanuel battled the Austrians, successfully in the case of the French if not the Piedmontese. Nonetheless, the Austrian monarchy lost Lombardy to Piedmont in the peace settlement. In the Austro-Prussian War of 1866, Piedmont in alliance with Prussia won Venetia. Far more significant, however, was that Prussian troops routed the Austrians near the Czech town of Hradec Králové (Könniggrätz in German) and in consequence Austria, having lost the war, was expelled from the German union. Seeking to consolidate the monarchy at home and then to challenge the German victory, Emperor Franz Josef had entered into negotiations with the Hungarians and in 1867 the Austro-Hungarian Empire came into being. It was in the context of these critical events, spread over the relatively brief period of eight years, that the remodeling of the Austrian monarchy took place.⁸ Nonetheless in 1870 – 1871, France’s defeat in the Franco-Prussian war led to the unification of Germany under Prussian rule and the declaration of the German Empire on January 18, 1871. The Austro-Hungarian Compromise of 1867 divided the empire into two parts, Cisleithanian Austria and the kingdom of Hungary where the Emperor was also crowned as king, although Hungary enjoyed its own parliament and

 Tobolka, Z. Politické dějiny československého …, vol. I, 142– 143.  Palacký, František. “Idea státu rakouského”, Národ, 9 Apr–16 May, 1865. Online at: https:// books.openedition.org/ceup/1957?lang=en (accessed May 13, 2021).  Křen, Jan. “1867– 1871: Deutschland, die Deutsche and der Österreichische Augleiche”, in Brandes, Detlef et al., eds, Wendepunkte in den Beziehungen zwischen Deutschen, Tschechen und Slowaken, 1848 – 1849 (Essen: Klartext, 2007), p. 85.

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prime minister. The Emperor retained control of the military, foreign affairs and common financial matters, although common budgetary matters were negotiated on a decennial basis between delegations of the Austrian and Hungarian parliaments, which never met personally but negotiated with each other in writing. The decennial budget negotiations were a hallmark of the dual monarchy. For the Emperor, the new arrangement entailed a substantial loss of authority in Hungary.⁹ Significantly, dualism gave the Magyars hegemony in Hungary and assigned to the Germans a privileged position in the Austrian lands. For the compromise to come into effect, however, the approval of the Austrian Reichsrat was required and that also entailed major concessions by the Emperor to the German Liberals: fundamental civil liberties and the ongoing ascendancy of the Germans in Austria. German and Magyar predominance came at the expense of the other nations in both realms and was deeply resented by the Czechs in Austria, among others. With a two-thirds German Liberal majority in the Reichsrat, the necessary legislation for the new Cisleithanian Constitution was adopted in December of 1867. A few days later, with the support of the same German Liberal majority, the first joint ministers were also appointed. The Dual Monarchy had come into being. Dualism was a humiliating defeat for the Czechs and a major setback for the monarchy as a whole. It denied the Czech crown any constitutional standing and reduced the Czechs to the status of an ethnic minority. In addition, Magyar constitutional theory held that Cisleithania was bound by its constitutional laws, adopted in December of 1867, which meant that it must remain a unitary state like Hungary and not be federated to accommodate its various nationalities.¹⁰ In effect, Magyar constitutional theory blocked the resolution of the national problem both in Hungary and in the empire as a whole. The Compromise of 1867 only impelled the Czechs to an ever more tenacious assertion of Czech state rights. In addition to their boycott of the Reichsrat they also boycotted the two land diets of Bohemia and Moravia. The fact of Moravia’s participation in the boycott, now in contrast to its posture in 1848, is further evidence of an increasingly ethnic quality in Czech nationalism. In the summer of 1868, there were mass protests in the Czech crown lands against the Compromise and against the Cisleithanian Constitution, protests in which, for the first time, peasants and workers participated in significant numbers. Gradually in Vienna, both the Court and the governing circles came to see the need for a further con-

 Kann, Robert A. A History of the Habsburg Empire, 1526 – 1918 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980), pp. 338 – 341.  Kann, R. History of the Habsburg Empire …, pp. 334– 335.

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solidation of the monarchy and, consequently, for a compromise with the Czechs. This was especially true in the summer of 1870 when German troops were driving deep into France. That summer, fresh elections to the Bohemian diet—with help from manipulation of the large landowners’ vote—produced a federalist majority. The new diet declared dualism to be a violation of the rights of the Bohemian crown. In September, in a special rescript, the Emperor responded by promising that the unity of the lands of the Bohemian crown would be acknowledged, and that he would be crowned King of Bohemia, which had been the old practice since the eleventh century under the native Přemyslid dynasty and its successors before the advent of the Habsburgs. Even after the Habsburgs ascended to the throne, their rulers were crowned as Kings of Bohemia until 1791, although the prerogatives of the Czech crown had ceased to be observed for decades past. Franz Jozef’s promise of coronation fulfilled a central demand of Czech states’ rights.¹¹ Just how deeply symbolic the question of the coronation and the crown itself were to the Czech people was apparent after the Austro-Prussian war when the Czech crown jewels were returned to Prague from their safekeeping in Vienna. Throngs gathered at railway stations to greet the passing train. In celebration, bonfires on hill tops blazed bright against the night sky. In February of 1871, the Emperor called upon the German clerical leader, Count Siegmund Hohenwart, to form a new government for, among other things, the express purpose of reaching a compromise with the Czechs. Professor Albert Schäffle, who together with Hohenwart was a leading proponent of federalism, was named to the cabinet as were two Czechs, both loyal Viennese. Negotiations with the Czechs were opened immediately. For the Czech side, the leading figures were František Rieger, who was Palacký′s son-in-law, and the Moravian Alois Pražák, both members of the Liberal Party, and Count Jindřich Clam-Martinic, leader of the conservative large landowners. Clam-Martinic played the leading role in the Czech negotiating team. In August, agreement was reached on the “fundamental articles”—the eighteen articles which were to determine the constitutional standing of the Bohemian crown. The articles granted the Czech crown lands a sub-dualistic autonomy similar to the autonomy of the Croats in Hungary. This autonomy was formulated constitutionally in contrast to the merely de facto autonomy previously granted to the Poles in Galicia. The German demand for the administrative partition of Bohemia was not met, but an accompanying national law did pro-

 Křen, J. “1867– 1871: Deutschland …”, p. 100.

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vide for nationally homogenous administrative districts. The Czech and German languages were placed practically on a par, and the Czech demand that command of both languages be required for appointed government officials was granted. At the last minute the Czechs raised the ante, insisting that the government must similarly address the demands of other nations. This prolonged the negotiations, while opposition to the 1871 Compromise was building in the monarchy. German Liberals opposed the federalist initiative, but the Magyars opposed it even more. Their prime minister, Andrassy, feared that the Compromise would set a precedent for the federalization of the entire monarchy. By the time the Compromise was submitted to the Crown Council on October 20th, 1871, the German army was long since victorious in France and the idea of retaliation against Prussia had been largely set aside. That rationale for the compromise with the Czechs had simply evanesced. Within the council, both Count Gyula Andrassy, the Hungarian Prime Minister, and Count Friedrich Ferdinand Beust, the foreign minister with the title of Austrian Chancellor, opposed the project strongly. On October 30th Franz Josef issued a rescript in which he withdrew his promise to be crowned. Among the Czechs there was a widespread feeling of betrayal by the monarch. Although the bitterness diminished with time, it was readily rekindled by any new conflict with the monarchy. The permanent legacy was a loosening of the bonds which tied the Czechs to the empire. The argument has been made that the emperor never took seriously the idea of a national settlement between Czechs and Germans. In his biography of Franz Josef, the Austrian historian Josef Redlich reports the widely held view of Austrian parliamentarians that the Emperor did not favor such a compromise because, according to a statement of his daughter, Archduchess Marie Valerie, “if Germans and Czechs should make a compromise, the situation would become the same as in Hungary—the Emperor would lose his power there too”.¹² After the project of the Czech compromise in 1870 – 1871, there was henceforth no effort to address the national problem in constitutional terms either in Austria or in the Habsburg monarchy as a whole until the final days of the monarchy at the end of the First World War. Despite the sharp political setbacks that the Czechs encountered—dualism and the failure of the Czech Compromise—the Czech national movement was making giant strides. As the economy expanded, Czech peasants were drawn to the major cities of the Bohemian lands and in consequence contributed to

 Jászi, Oskar. “Some recent publications concerning the dissolution of the Habsburg monarchy.” Journal of Modern History 2– 1 (1930): fn 92; doi.org/10.1086/235558.

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an urban ethnic transformation. In the 1830s Germans were 56 % of the population of inner Prague, but the population of the city was growing rapidly. By the year 1880, Czechs were 86 % and in 1900 they were 93 %. The trend was ineluctable. In the late 1870s, political prospects for the Czechs also took a turn for the better. In 1879, after sixteen years in abstention, the Czechs returned to the Reichsrat and entered the government of Count Eduard Taaffe. The Taaffe cabinet, the “Iron Ring” around the German Liberals, consisted of Poles, Czechs, Southern Slavs and German Catholic Conservatives. This government was in power in the years 1878 – 1893, the longest term of any Austrian government. The political key to the Taaffe government and the many years of its rule was the determination of the Emperor, to the extent possible, to weaken the standing of the German Liberal Party in the state.¹³ Under Taaffe, as a consequence, the process of emancipating the non-German nations of Cisleithanian Austria was set in motion. Inevitably the issue of language came to the fore. For the Germans the dominant position of their language in the bureaucracy and in the state assured them hegemony in Austria comparable to that of the Magyars in Hungary. For the Slavs language was the basis for their autonomy and cultural development and the use of their language in state administration, in education and the courts was a fundamental political demand. The Czechs hoped to profit from their return to active politics in the Taaffe government, but at the outset their efforts to extend the use of Czech alongside German in Bohemia and Moravia ran into strong opposition. During the long period of Czech passivity, the field had been left open for the German Liberals and, as a consequence, the bureaucracy was largely staffed with nationally minded Germans who were little disposed to make concessions to the Czechs on language questions. Far more successful was the effort to separate the university in Prague into Czech and German divisions, a move which the Taaffe government supported. But when the Czech University opened its doors in 1882, only some of the departments were Czech. The others were still German. Not until the end of the decade was the Czech University finally completed. In January of 1890, a second giant step was taken with the establishment of the Czech Academy of Sciences, Literature and the Arts of Emperor Franz Josef I. In 1891, the Czech national theater with its golden dome opened its doors to the public in Prague. Even earlier a significant change of the electoral law, promoted by the Taaffe government, brought about an important political development in the Bohemian

 Redlich, Joseph. Österreichische Regierung und Verwaltung im Weltkriege (Wein: Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky, 1925), p. 39.

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diet in 1883. For the first time in thirteen years, autonomists won a majority which consisted, as in the past, of the conservative nobility and the Czech deputies. These were the Old Czechs and the Young Czechs, the latter being the younger and more progressive wing of the Czech political spectrum, which in 1874 had emerged as an independent political party. The non-German majority remained until the end of the monarchy. Never again would Germans win a majority in the Bohemian diet.¹⁴ Nonetheless, the prospects for achieving Czech state’s rights were not strong. Powerful figures in the monarchy—the Emperor himself, the Foreign Minister, the Magyar magnates and the vast majority of the government—opposed the restoration of Czech state’s rights. German Liberal deputies saw in the restoration of the Czech crown the permanent subordination of the Germans in the Czech lands and, already in the 1880s, the Germans in those lands began calling for administrative separation. For radical Germans this meant a total separation of German Bohemia and its governmental institutions from Czech Bohemia and the creation of a separate land diet in Reichenberg (Liberec in Czech). For moderate Germans the goal was national separation in nationally delineated districts and accompanying reforms in the language question. Both the Old Czechs and the Young Czechs still shared the common goal of Czech state’s rights, but for the time being the Old Czechs put the issue aside with the dwindling hope that with a settlement between Czechs and Germans in Bohemia the coronation of the emperor as Czech king might be seen in the interests of the monarchy. The deputies of the Czech Club in the Reichsrat together with conservative German deputies supported land autonomy, but not Czech state’s rights with its demand for the coronation of the emperor. On this basis in 1890 Count Taaffe succeeded in forging agreement on a language compromise between Czechs and Germans in Bohemia, but he made the fatal mistake of including only the Old Czechs in the negotiations, while the Young Czechs, whose popular support was rapidly rising and who continued to champion Czech state’s rights, were left out entirely. They attacked the compromise because of its provisions for the administrative separation of Czechs and Germans. Radical German nationalists were delighted to let the compromise go down. The net effect of Taaffe’s efforts was to weaken the Old Czechs, strengthen the Young Czechs and further embitter both Czechs and Germans. When the results of Taaffe’s negotiations between the Old Czechs and Germans became known, the Young Czechs attacked the government and the Old Czechs. This ultra-nationalist posture proved extremely popular with the voters and led

 Tobolka, Z. Politické dějiny československého …, vol. III, part 1, pp. 100 – 103.

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directly to the Young Czechs surprising upset in elections to the Reichsrat in 1891. The Young Czechs won three times as many seats as the Old Czechs. The elections proved to be the swan song of the older generation. In 1897 Count Kasimir Badeni, prime minister of Cisleithania, issued language ordinances for Bohemia and Moravia which essentially placed Czech and German on an equal footing. The ordinance introduced Czech alongside German as an internal language of administration, the language which government officials used in communicating with one another as opposed to the external language of communication which was used in dealing with the public at large. The ordinances required all government officials to have a command of both Czech and German within four years. For most Czechs this requirement was no problem since through their education and military service they were already bilingual. Since equality of the languages was originally proposed in 1848, nearly a half-century had lapsed, but few Germans had gained a command of Czech and few were psychologically prepared to make the effort now. The predominantly German government officials in the Czech lands faced the prospects of losing their positions. It is this factor that accounted for the ferocity of the German response to Badeni’s ordinances. From the outset, the ordinances were a flawed initiative.¹⁵ The motive behind them was not to resolve the language question in the Bohemian lands, let alone to affect a settlement between Czechs and Germans, but rather, reflected Badeni’s desperate need for the votes of the Czech deputies in the Reichsrat for urgent impending legislation. Earlier the delegations of the Austrian and Hungarian parliaments had negotiated the decennial agreement on joint economic matters in terms favorable to Hungary, but widely unpopular in Cisleithania. The Hungarian delegation insisted that the agreement be adopted by a vote in the Reichsrat rather than by imperial decree under Paragraph 14 of the Cisleithanian Constitution of 1867. Herein lay Badeni’s predicament. His attempt to resolve it offers a classic example of the effort to govern by muddling through. Badeni negotiated with the Czechs at great length, even incorporating some of their suggestions into the final text of the language ordinances for Bohemia and Moravia. In contrast, his negotiations with the Germans were brief and inadequate. To compound the problem the ordinances were issued by imperial decree, rather than facing a vote in the Reichsrat. German opposition was certainly anticipated, but not the firestorm of protest which erupted. In parliament the

 Mommsen, Hans. “1897: Die Badeni Krise als Wendepunkte in den deutschen-tschechischen Beziehungen”, in Brandes, Detlef, et al., eds, Wendepunkte in den Beziehungen zwischen Deutschen, Tschechen und Slowaken, 1848 – 1849 (Essen: Klartext, 2007), pp. 111– 113.

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German deputies resorted to obstructionism—a time-honored practice of both Czechs and Germans in which deputies shouted, tooted horns, slammed their desktops, and hurled their ink pots at the speakers. The institution was rendered dysfunctional. Opposition spilled into the streets of Vienna and the German towns of the Czech crown lands. Eventually the ordinances were revoked and Count Badeni stepped down. The Czechs felt themselves once more betrayed. The Badeni crisis of 1897 poisoned Czech-German relations for years to come, especially in the Bohemia lands, and for a time rendered parliamentary government impossible in Cisleithania.¹⁶ The negative impact of the crisis doomed all future efforts to resolve the language issue even before they could fully come into effect.¹⁷ The one bright note from this period came with the Czech-German compromise in Moravia in 1905.¹⁸ The Germans surrendered their previous majority in the land diet but under conditions which prevented the Czechs from exercising a tyranny of the majority. The establishment of electoral blocs or curia, the requirement for a qualified number of those present, and for a qualified majority on important national legislation, effectively assured the Germans of veto authority. The school system was divided along national lines and Czech and German were placed on equal footing in land and local administration. Around the turn of the century the multi-party system that would characterize political life in the first Czechoslovak Republic began to emerge.¹⁹ As early as 1878 the Czech Social Democratic Workers Party was formed, as was the Austrian Social Democratic Party. It was the clear intent of the Czech Social Democrats to join the Austrian party just as soon as the Czech party could put down its own roots. The consolidation of the two parties occurred at the Hainfeld Party Conference on December 31st-January 1st, 1889, but the autonomy of the Czechs within the larger party continued to be recognized. In reality, the party founded at Hainfeld was a German-Czech party, since in the Polish and the southern Slav lands Social Democratic organizations had not yet been founded.²⁰ By 1911 tensions

 Mommsen, H. “1897: Die Badeni Krise als Wendepunkte … ”, pp. 115 – 116.  Klepetař, Harry. Der Sprachenkampf in den Sudetenländern (Prag: Strache, 1930), p. 94.  Kaindl, Raimund Friedrich. Der Völkerkampf und Sprachenstreit in Böhmen im Spiegel der zeitgnössischen Quellen … (Wein: W. Braumüller, 1927), pp. 64– 65.  Lemberg, Hans. “Das Erbe des Liberalismus in der ČSR und die Nationaldemokratische Partei”, in Bosl, Karl, ed., Die erste Tschechoslowakische Republik als multinationaler Parteienstaat (Bad Wiessee: Collegium Carolinum, 1979), vol. 24– 27, p. 63.  Bachstein, Martin. “Die Sozialdemokratie in den böhmischen Ländern bis zum Jahre 1938”, in Bosl, Karl, ed., Die erste Tschechoslowakische Republik als multinationaler Parteienstaat (Bad Wiessee: Collegium Carolinum, 1979) vol. 24– 27, pp. 82– 83.

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over the Czech Social Democrats’ insistence on forming separate union organizations led to an open breach and their exclusion from the Austrian party. Thereafter the Czech Social Democrats proceeded as an independent party. In 1894 the Czech Christian Social Party made its appearance and three years later the Czech National Socialist Workers Party, a bourgeois alternative to the Social Democrats, arose from the ranks of the Young Czechs. This new party rejected the internationalism and class-based ideology of the Austrian Social Democrats. In the same year an agrarian faction, the Farmers′ Federation, broke from the Young Czechs and in 1904 was reconstituted as the Czech Agrarian Party. During this time, as the Young Czechs came more and more to replace the Old Czechs in their hegemonic role in Czech politics, they could satisfy the more radical elements in their ranks less and less. The result was a splintering away of the more radical factions of the party between 1897 and 1900.²¹ These new parties grouped and regrouped in the following years contributing further to the proliferation of the Czech party system. These developments of the late 1890s reflected prior extensions of the suffrage and their further expansion by Count Badeni in 1896 with the creation of a fifth electoral bloc that granted the vote to all males twenty-four years of age and older while leaving intact the previous four electoral curia.²² The decisive turning point came with the elections to the Reichsrat in 1907 and 1911, both conducted under universal, equal and secret suffrage. The new suffrage led to the appearance of the modern mass party in the Czech lands. Among the Czech parties the Agrarians took first place, the Social Democrats second place and the Young Czechs fell back to third place. Similarly, the German Social Democrats and Agrarians came to the fore as the leading German parties in the Czech lands, while the Reichsrat elections of 1897 had already confirmed the collapse of the German Liberal camp. This transformation of party politics in the last decades of the Habsburg monarchy was the direct result of the monarchy’s electoral democratization, although universal and equal suffrage were not yet applied in elections to the land diets. But this progress was not accompanied by progress in forging a settlement between Czechs and Germans. Badeni’s successor, Baron Paul Gautsch, issued new language ordinances in 1898 which were a retreat from the terms of the Ba Lemberg, H. “Das Erbe des Liberalismus…”, p. 64.  The curial system divided voters into blocs—nobility or large landowners, interest groups such as trade and commerce, urban and rural—with the votes in each bloc weighted so that, for example, a vote cast by a noble might count forty times as much as an urban vote. It was not democracy, but it was a step in the direction of democracy.

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deni ordinances. The requirement that government officials have a command of both languages was replaced by the provision that language knowledge would reflect the actual needs of the individual service post in question. The introduction of Czech as an internal language of communication was sharply curtailed. The Czechs felt that the Gautsch ordinances deprived them of the equality which Badeni had granted them, but it was German opposition once again which was the most strenuous. Gautsch, who had always seen his administration as provisional, stepped down the day after his language ordinances were issued. The language ordinances were themselves repealed a year later. There was yet another serious effort to resolve the language issue in 1900 under the government of Ernst von Körber, but his initiative was rejected outright by both Czechs and Germans. In 1913 – 1914 a final effort to reach a settlement between Czechs and Germans was made under Prime Minister Count Karl Stürgkh, but these negotiations also ended in failure. The last pre-war recorded effort to revive negotiations came in July of 1914, but without success.²³ The repeated clashes between Czech and German interests in the final decades of the monarchy created an important legacy. The Czechs, calling for equal rights with the Germans, emerged as the champions of democracy and of the small Slav nations in Austria-Hungary, while the Germans never identified themselves with a broader ideal but merely defended their privileged position and rejected any notion of equality with the Slavs. The identification with Western political practices served Czech propaganda well during the war and was an important element in projecting the democratic image of the Czechoslovak Republic after the war. There was, however, another important legacy which Czechs and Germans shared in common—the Austrian Reichsrat. It schooled them both in parliamentary procedure and enabled the Czechs after the war to establish firm control of the Czechoslovak Parliament. It also schooled them both in party politics which kept the Germans in Czechoslovakia from rallying to a single national leader and held open at least the possibility of Czech-German accommodation until the crisis of the 1930s. As in every previous instance, the failure of negotiations to achieve agreement led to deep and widespread bitterness on both sides. This was true especially on the German side to such an extent that it prompted the moderate German Reichsrat deputy, Franz Jesser, shortly before the war, to write an article in defense of the unity of Bohemia from a German point of view. It was a rational

 Kazbunda, Karel. Otázka česko-německá v předvečer velké války (Praha: Karolinium, 1995), pp. 424– 425.

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and cogent expression of the moderate German view of the necessity for Bohemian territorial and administrative unity. Jenner wrote: “The fierceness of the national struggle, and the commendable urge to help one’s fellow countrymen in danger has led to a situation in German Bohemia where anything which has anywhere been proclaimed a national demand for the defense of threatened Germandom is presented as a universal German demand. And so there has emerged a list of such demands lacking any inner coherence, frequently in contradiction with one and other, but rich in protest against Czech demands and the government’s official wishes. National separation, minority defense, bilingualism in the capital city, the preservation of German institutions of higher learning in Prague, national autonomy, a province of German Bohemia, establishing our own central administration in the German territory, moving the German institutions of higher learning, renunciation of the minorities, the principle of personal rights and the principle of territorial rights, German as the state language and Czech as the inner language of administration—all these slogans fly back and forth and all this is presented to the masses as a German Bohemian demand, a national political program. “No one in Bohemia has ever seriously tried to prove or deny the practical national value of this or that demand or to show that its execution might work to the disadvantage of other parts of the German nation. No one would expect someone to sacrifice. He would shrink from conjuring up a conflict between national enthusiasm and sober, harsh reality. To create the impression of unanimity one avoids any open criticism of particular demands and instead places a special emphasis on the negative side which is directed against the Czechs’ desire for victory and which is freely shared by all German Bohemians. Yet the scope and content of particular ideas are not clear nor is there any clarity about the scope of what must unquestionably be achieved, still less about any acceptable concessions. “Today all of German Bohemia knows that an official unity does not suffice, that a list of demands and rejections is still not a program and that an honorable national policy must summon the courage to oppose the heartfelt desire for a single territory or clusters of our people, because it is unworkable or detrimental for a large part of the people …. This doubt is fully warranted—and it is precisely the ruckus that Czech political agitation raised over the breaking up of Bohemia that should have set us to thinking. “This ruckus is only theatrical noise. Serious Czech politicians had only time for a superior smile at this most radical of German demands. They called for protest against the destruction of Bohemia’s territorial unity, however, because in that way they could brand a factually based demarcation as separatist and thereby combat it. Besides for the Czechs there was the consideration that they could

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awaken sympathy in the Alpine provinces where Slovenes and Italians are striving to break up German lands.”²⁴ In his essay, Jesser argued that the Czechs knew that a Bohemian German province was not a viable structure and that the effort to create it must fail. The German Bohemians themselves supplied the Czechs with confirmation when, for example, they did not reject the transfer of the headquarters of the German fire brigade to Prague from the provinces, or the transfer there of the central organization for district representation. In addition, they rejected petitions that would have removed Prague as the seat of the largest German gun club. In other words, Prague was seen as the natural capital of German Bohemia, and Jesser saw a practical political value in stating what, by nature, German Bohemia actually was. He described the map of Bohemia as displaying a distinct-wide German border area surrounding the coherent land mass of Bohemia, interrupted here and there by several Czech settlements. The German border region was divided into several natural regions which, with one exception, opened out into the Czech interior. The exception was the region on both sides of the Elbe—Northern Bohemia and Northwest Bohemia, with Aussig/Ústí nad Labem²⁵ as its natural center. For the rest of the area, which is to say Western Bohemia, Southwestern Bohemia, Southern Bohemia, Eastern Bohemia and Northern Bohemia, Prague was clearly the center of economic activity and transport. Jesser then described the development of the Bohemian border area, pointing out that its various regions developed separately, with diversity in their economic and social conditions as well as in their local customs. He found this to be true in the Adlegebirge /Orlické Mountains, in the Risengebirge/Krkonoše, in the Elbegau/Polabi, in Saazer Land/Žatecko, in the Erzgebirge/Krušné Mountains, in Egerland/Chebsko and in the Böhmerwald/Šumava. In these regions, industry was unable to exercise its usual leveling effect. Considerable differences were found among the industrial workers of the many regions. No less varied, but easier to discern, were the many regional differences among the local people in the farm areas and in the small towns. Jesser pointed out that Bohemia’s German territory was distinguished by marked differences of local life not found in middle or southwest Germany, or not to the same degree. Social and cultural conditions as well as natural conditions such as isolation and climate, plus a lack of fre-

 Jesser, Franz. “Deutsche in Böhmen und Deutschböhmen”, in Deutscher Österreich – Deutsche Soziale Nachrichten; reprinted in Deutsche Landpost, July 7, 1936.  In the following place names divided by a forward slash, the German name comes first and the Czech name follows the slash.

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quent contact and a general diversity of economy contributed to the marked differences, as did the relative isolation of these areas. As a result of the social, cultural, and economic differences, Jesser found widespread differences in attitude toward Czechs and toward particular national and political issues. The Egerland/Chebsko found insufferable what the northwest Bohemian coal districts accepted as inevitable. Southern Bohemia judged the Czechs differently than did the people of Königreichwalde/Dvůr Kralové or those on the edge of the Pilsner/Plseň basin. The people of these regions were not commonly thought of as separate German minorities, since thinking of them in this manner and giving them regional rights would be incompatible with the notion of establishing a province of German Bohemia. “The German people of the border regions of Bohemia,” wrote Jesser, “aren’t an ethnic group and they aren’t an economic group, because their area of settlement is not a centralized territory but rather a divided one with differing natural existential needs. It follows logically,” he added, “that if the radical national autonomists want to break up German Bohemia into several autonomous administrative districts, if they want to hammer the German island of east Bohemia into Moravia and hammer the Šumava/Böhmerwald into Upper Austria, such a breakup would increase the tendency toward separate development, weaken the solidarity of national defense and make still more difficult the unity of national political tactics for all of Germandom in Austria. And these isolated lands would be up against a compact Czech land mass, a divided land against a centralized land.” This central Czech landmass, as Jesser pointed out, was the mediating and connecting territory for the Germans of Bohemia for the purpose of geographical communication. No administrative reform could do away with the fact that Bohemia as a whole offered a much more natural unity. Jesser then stated the key to his thesis. “This unity is by no means uniformity,” he writes. “It is the interdependence and interaction of separate land areas. It is the unity of a very finely structured organism. Each part has its special function which can only be performed by serving the whole.”²⁶ Taken as a whole, Jesser argued, German Bohemia was not at all ethnographic, but rather political. German Bohemia was conceivable as a national and cultural community only so long as it remained a political concept, only so long as it remained part of a higher unity—the border region of the central land mass of Bohemia’s geographical unity. The point from which the peripheral German territories were drawn together by the power of attraction was not in Reichenberg/Liberec or in Aussig/Ustí nad Labem but in Prague.

 Jesser, F. “Deutsche in Böhmen und Deutschböhmen”.

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Jesser wrote: “What binds the Bohemian Germans together is the idea that they have been forced unnaturally into a community of destiny by their affiliation with the land of Bohemia and that they can only maintain themselves as Germans if the centralizing power is stronger than the tendency of the lands to separate. In order to become a national community, they must remain Bohemian, and in order to remain German Bohemians, they must not establish a province of German Bohemia …. The leaders of the Czech nation who know that the break-up of the land is a phantom and nonetheless invoke this boogieman should be criticized for what they actually want is national domination and not national peace. “Despite all this, we should remind ourselves that there is good will. Nothing creates for the Germans of the Bohemian borderland more national power of resistance, consistency and careful planning of their political tactics than the fact that they are to a certain extent a community of destiny due to the unity of the land and that there are altogether millions who can find their fulfillment only in Bohemia. Nothing strengthens the unity of the land more than the granting of national autonomy in the framework of Bohemian administrative unity. Not a break-up of the land but rather a decentralization of the administration, not the autonomy of a province of German Bohemia but national autonomy within Bohemia. On this basis alone can a uniform, common national political program be established. Only in this sense is the demand for the protection of the minorities and bilingualism of the capital city compatible. “To many a reader this polemic against the province of German Bohemia will appear superfluous. He will point out that the German negotiators have never aimed at this goal. This observation is correct but this polemic is not superfluous. The negotiators are so unpopular in German Bohemia and the results of their negotiations have been judged with such disparagement by many of their compatriots that the catchword Province of German Bohemia has come into common use among the ordinary people. Besides for most members of the nation the catchword coincides with the concept of an autonomous province, national autonomy or separation. “Hopefully our remarks will help to clarify the concept. They would also show that national autonomy is possible in only two forms: unrestricted in the form of several autonomous national districts corresponding to natural regions without regard to existing borders or restricted in the form of a decentralized administration within the geographical and administrative unity of Bohemia. An

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autonomous province of German Bohemia with a German Bohemian capital is no ideal but rather a phantom.”²⁷ All too soon, what Franz Jesser feared took place. With the outbreak of World War I voices of moderation were swept aside and the voices of extremism came to the fore. In the early spring of 1915 the German National Union—an Association of all German nationalist, non-clerical factions—had outlined in private meetings a policy of understanding with the Magyars for the purpose of a future reordering of the entire monarchy. At the same time, on the assumption of a victorious war, they formulated a plan for the amendment of the Austrian Constitution through which the German character of the Austrian state would be secured for the future. The main points of the program were: 1. The Reichsrat should not be reconvened until after the war to prevent Czechs and South Slavs from inciting their co-nationals in a manner detrimental to the war effort; 2. At the appropriate time the Imperial government should promulgate a new Constitution, which would establish Austria as a predominantly German state and bring to an end the national struggle between Germans and non-Germans which had been going on for more than half a century; 3. After the war the alliance between Austria-Hungary and Germany should be fashioned into the closest possible union with close economic ties, which would form the basis for the economic union of Central Europe; 4. German predominance in Austria would be secured by eliminating Galician representation in the Reichsrat, which would assure Germans a majority by establishing German as the official language of the Austrian Empire and by establishing single language administrative districts, especially in Bohemia. This already ultra-nationalist program was far from satisfactory for smaller but more radical groups—members of the German Club in Vienna, the Alumni Unions of the German National Academic Association, German Councils in individual crown lands and the German Radical Nationalist Party. They took the original proposal of the German National Union and expanded almost every point in the program, issuing their own document at Eastertide in 1916 which came to be known as the Easter Demands. Characteristically, the text stated that ”the relationship between the Germans and the other nations is to be regulated by secur-

 Jesser, F. “Deutsche in Böhmen und Deutschböhmen”.

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ing and permanently protecting for the German nation the dominant state and cultural position in the future.”²⁸ These chauvinist demands, entertained when the outcome of the war remained an open question, lost meaning as the conflict dragged on. In November of 1916 the old Emperor Franz Josef died. The brief, two-year reign of his successor, the young Emperor Charles I, was devoted to a desperate effort to secure peace for the monarchy. The task was bound inextricably with the need to address the sharply radicalized demands of the empire’s non-Germans. This led in 1917 to a broad political amnesty and in May of that year, at the urging of the Emperor, to the convocation of Parliament for the first time during the war. Both steps, important in their own right, were insufficient to the need. By the summer of 1918, when Austria-Hungary’s separate negotiations with the Allies had collapsed and, in consequence, Allied recognition of the Czechoslovak government in exile and its military forces in the field was forthcoming, the monarchy turned its attention to domestic reform, now only months before the war’s end. The ruling Magyars in Hungary were opposed to any change in the existing dualist system so that the Austrian Prime Minister Baron Max von Hussareck, appointed in July with the impossible task of satisfying the demands of the monarchy’s nationalities, was forced to confine his proposals to Cisleithanian Austria. On October 1, he spoke in the Reichsrat offering national autonomy in a federated Austrian state. The idea was long outdated and widely rejected. His proposal to separate Czechs and Germans only assured vehement Czech opposition. Despite the antagonistic response, the Emperor Charles issued a manifesto on October 16 granting autonomy to the nationalities of Austria. Under threat of cutting off food supplies, Hungary forced the inclusion in the manifesto of the statement that the constitutional changes in Austria would in no way affect the kingdom of Hungary. The historian Robert Kann aptly summarized the resulting situation: “This meant that at the time when Serbs, Croats, Czechs, Slovaks, Slovenes, and Rumanians were sure to achieve their independent statehood, the Austrian government offered a farcical solution which could not guarantee national unification to any of these peoples even within the boundaries of the Empire.”²⁹ Rejection of the manifesto was universal.

 Redlich, J. Österreichische Regierung …, pp. 245 – 255.  Kann, Robert A. The Multinational Empire: Nationalism and National Reform in the Habsburg Monarchy 1848 – 1918, vol. II, Empire Reform (New York: Columbia University Press, 1950), pp. 281– 282.

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Efforts at nationality reform in the monarchy were at an end. On November 3 the armistice on the Italian front took effect and on November 11, 1918, came the armistice that ended World War I.

Chapter 2 Deliverance On December 17th 1914, the opening year of the Great War, Professor Tomáš Masaryk left the monarchy for the third and final time in order to organize a resistance movement abroad aimed at the destruction of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy and the establishment of an independent Czechoslovak state. At first he established himself in Geneva. There, he made contact with two prominent academics—specialists on central Europe—Professor R.W. Seton-Watson in England and Professor Ernest Denis in France. Both men had extensive and close connections with the governing circles in their countries. On September 3rd 1915, Masaryk was joined in Geneva by a colleague from his Realist Party, Dr. Edvard Beneš. Neutral Geneva was scarcely the proper venue for the revolutionary activities that both men were intent upon carrying out. It was decided that Masaryk would proceed to London and Beneš to Paris. In December of 1915, Beneš was joined in Paris by Milan Rostislav Štefánik, a Slovak astronomer serving at the time in the French Air Force. The conservative Štefánik had excellent entrees into many of the leading salons of Paris and could open the way for Masaryk and Beneš into a society where they could meet and confer freely with members of the French government. These three men formed the core of the resistance abroad. In London, Masaryk was developing the theme in publications and public addresses that the war was fundamentally a conflict between democracy and autocracy. With the fall of the tsarist government in the first Russian Revolution in March of 1917, the burden of defending this thesis was greatly eased. From the outset of the war, Czech émigrés abroad in the allied countries and in the United States sought to join the allied forces or create military units that would fight alongside allied troops at the front. Masaryk sought to stimulate these activities. From the very beginning he had in mind the plan for a large army. In February of 1915 he formulated his intentions as follows: “If we deploy an army, we will achieve a new legal standing both with regard to Austria, but also to the Allies. A further step might be a formal declaration of war against Austria-Hungary. That would bring about a situation which would enable us at the time of the peace negotiations to put through at least a minimum of our demands. In any case neither the Allies nor Vienna could pass us over in silence if

https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110749885-005

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we had troops…. Without a determined military struggle we will gain nothing from anyone.”³⁰ The French front proved the most difficult, since no Austro-Hungarian troops were deployed there. Eventually the French contingent consisted largely of emigré volunteers and some 4,000 Czech soldiers withdrawn from Serbia in a tortuous retreat through Albania. In Italy and Russia, the principle recruitment was from among Czech and Slovak prisoners of war. In Italy the major obstacle was the reluctance of the Italian government to recruit Austro-Hungarian prisoners of war into the Italian military. Only in April of 1918 did the Italian government finally agree to the formation of such units. It was the Russian Revolution of March, 1917, that offered the first major opportunity for the recruitment of prisoners of war as Czecho-Slovak legionnaires. With the news of the revolution, Masaryk departed for Russia. He arrived in St. Petersburg on May 16th, 1917. Already on April 6th, the military council of the provisional government had affirmed the right of organizing a Czecho-Slovak army, its units to be under the command of Czech or Slovak officers, but this decision still ran into opposition and Masaryk took the lead in further negotiations. The Czechs launched a massive recruitment drive. By wars’ end there were some 10,000 Czechoslovak legionnaires in France, some 15,000 in Italy and over 60,000 in Russia.³¹ Altogether the Czechoslovak National Council fielded an army of some 85,000 soldiers fighting on the Allied side. This was a formidable fighting force and, as Masaryk had reasoned, would later prove to be a formidable political force as well. On January 8th, 1918, President Woodrow Wilson presented his Fourteen Points which he proposed as the basis for a peace settlement. On the subject of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy he was quite circumspect. He called for Polish independence and for “redrawing the boundaries of the Balkan states along historically established lines of nationality,” but he only spoke of “self-determination for the people of Austria-Hungary” without any further elaboration.³² His circumspection reflected the Allies ongoing interest in separate peace negotiations with Austria-Hungary. Those negotiations, begun in December of 1916 and continuing until February of 1918, ended with a total and public collapse

 Beneš, Edvard. Der Aufstand der Nationen: Der Weltkrieg und die tschechoslowakische Revolution (Berlin: Cassirer, 1928), p. 96.  Pichlík, Karel, Bohumír Klípa and Jitka Zabloudilová. Českoslovenští legionáří, 1914 – 1920 (Praha: Mlada´ fronta, 1996), p. 244.  Wilson, Woodrow. “Fourteen Points Speech”, Address to Congress on January 8, 1918. https://www.ourdocuments.gov/doc.php?flash=false&doc=62&page=transcript (accessed May 14, 2021).

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and with Austria subordinated even more closely to its German ally.³³ Allied diplomacy now turned to the obvious alternative, the dissolution of the monarchy. On June 30th, 1918, the French foreign minister, Stephen Pichon, wrote Beneš: “… the government of the Republic, in recognition of your efforts and your attachment to the Allied cause, considers it just and necessary to proclaim the rights of your nation to its independence and to recognize publicly and officially the National Council as the supreme organ of its general interests and the first step towards a future Czecho-Slovak Government….”³⁴ On August 9th the British Foreign Office issued a statement: “Since the beginning of the war the Czecho-Slovak nation has resisted the common enemy by every means in its power. The Czecho-Slovaks have constituted a considerable army, fighting on three different battlefields and attempting, in Russia and Siberia, to arrest the Germanic invasion. In consideration of their efforts to achieve independence, Great Britain regards the Czecho-Slovaks as an Allied nation and recognizes the unity of the three Czecho-Slovak armies as an Allied and belligerent army waging a regular warfare against Austria-Hungary and Germany. Great Britain also recognizes the right of the Czecho-Slovak National Council as the supreme organ of the Czecho-Slovak national interests, and as the present trustee of the future Czecho-Slovak Government to exercise supreme authority over this Allied and belligerent army.”³⁵ On September 2nd the state department of the United States put forth a declaration from Secretary Lansing: “The Czecho-Slovak peoples having taken up arms against the German and Austro-Hungarian empires, and having placed in the field organized armies, which were waging war against those empires under officers of their own nationality and in accordance with the rules of civilized nations, and Czecho-Slovaks having in the prosecution of their independence in the present war confided the supreme political authority to the CzechoSlovak National Council, the Government of the United States recognizes that a state of belligerency exists between the Czecho-Slovaks thus organized and the

 Pichlík, K., Klípa, B. and Zabloudilová, J. Českoslovenští legionáří …, pp. 189 – 190.  Beneš, Edouard. A nemzetek forradalma (Bratislava: Pozsony, 1936), vol. II, p. 344.  Anon. “Czechs Recognized by U.S. [1919]”. New York Times Current History, vol. 9, p. 86. https://books.google.com/books?id=iiRPAQAAMAAJ&pg=PA86&lpg=PA86&dq=In+consid eration+of+their+efforts+to+achieve+independence,+Great+Britain+regards+the+Czecho-Slo vaks+as+an+Allied+nation&source=bl&ots=tYx0M8U4tq&sig=ACfU3U0KdLNEEsRdBKG3Hbd4TaWdWs00lA&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwiyp9uO_8nwAhX2MVkFHWpeAFYQ6AEwAnoECAUQAw#v=onepage&q=In%20consideration%20of%20their%20efforts%20to%20achieve%20independence%2C%20Great%20Britain%20regards%20the%20Czecho-Slovaks%20as%20an%20Allied%20nation&f=false (accessed May 14, 2021).

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German and Austro-Hungarian empires. It also recognizes the Czecho-Slovak National Council as a de facto belligerent government, clothed with the proper authority to direct the military and political affairs of the Czecho-Slovaks.”³⁶ The war was rapidly moving toward its close. On October 7th, Count Julius Andrassy, the Austro-Hungarian foreign minister, sent a note to Washington calling for negotiations for an armistice based on Wilson’s Fourteen Points. On October 17th, former Hungarian Prime Minister, Istvan Tisza, rose in the Budapest parliament and declared the war to be lost. Count Mihály Károlyi on behalf of the opposition Party of Independence urged that Hungarian troops be brought home immediately to defend the borders of Greater Hungary. The Hungarian Defense Minister seconded the motion, and it was carried unanimously. Word of the Hungarian parliament’s action instantly spread across the front. Unrest spread in Magyar and Croatian units and their soldiers began to abandon their positions at the front. Where unit commanders sought to prevent this, mutinies occurred and shots were fired at superior officers. In other cases, entire units deserted. The departure of Hungarian regiments from the Italian front and the desperate efforts of the Austro-Hungarian command to offset these losses by ordering reserves to the front to fill the gaps led to further turmoil. This in turn led to widespread protest and unrest in the units affected by these orders regardless of their nationality. Shots were fired in the air and hand grenades were detonated. Orders were given to disarm the rebellious troops and the disarmed units were returned to their bases. The original orders were eventually rescinded.³⁷ The monarchy was in free fall. On October 18th Washington’s reply was received by the Austrian government. Secretary Lansing stated that the United States government could no longer proceed on the basis of the Fourteen Points, that events had intervened in the meantime and the U.S. government had recognized that the Czecho-Slovaks were in a state of war with both Germany and the Austro-Hungarian empire and that the Czecho-Slovak National Council was a warring government clothed with the appropriate authority to direct the military and political affairs of the CzechoSlovaks. The U.S. government also recognized the justice of the Yugoslav nation’s demand for freedom. President Wilson was not prepared to recognize the mere autonomy of these nations as the basis for peace but to insist that they, and they alone were to be the judges of what actions on the part of the Austro-Hungarian

 Anon. “Czechs Recognized by U.S.”, vol. 9, p. 85.  Nedorost, Libor. Češi v 1. světové válce (Praha: Nakl. Libri, 2007), vol. III, pp. 271– 273.

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government would satisfy the aspirations and opinions of their nations regarding their rights and their determination as members of the family of nations. In the afternoon of October 25th, there was a council of Czech politicians in Vienna with representatives of other Austrian Slavs in attendance—Slovenes, Croatians, and Poles.³⁸ Present for the Czechs were: the Social Democrat Vlastimil Tusar, soon to be the first Czechoslovak Ambassador to Vienna and later the second and third premier of the new Republic; the Czech Agrarian leader Antonín Švehla, later to be the sixth, seventh and ninth premier; two State’s Rights Democrats (renamed National Democrats in the Republic); Dr. Karel Kramář, later the first premier; and Dr. Alois Rašín, later the first and sixth finance minister who carried out the conversion to the new Czech currency. Present for the Slovaks was Dr. Milan Hodža, who in 1935 – 1938 would serve as Czechoslovak premier of three successive cabinets. Representing the Croats were Dr. Korošec and Dr. Žerav, Secretary of the Yugoslav Club. Representatives of the Glombinský faction of the Polish national resistance attended also. The topic of their meeting was dealing with the monarchy in the coming days. Prior to this meeting, the Austrian prime minister designate, Professor Heinrich Lammasch, called for a meeting with Czech and Yugoslav politicians seeking their agreement to a non-violent termination of the war. Vastimil Tusar was not opposed to this idea. During the war years he had grown too accustomed to the Viennese milieu for him not to see that a military collapse could lead to general social turmoil. He was inclined to settle on the basis of compromise so that Austria would not be driven from the outset into the camp of the enemies of the newly established Czechoslovak state. But the politicians from Prague were implacable, especially Dr. Kramář, who on the afternoon of October 25th rejected Lammasch’s call that Czech representatives enter into Lammasch’s planned executive committee, and Dr. Rašín, who was determined to drive the course of events toward the capitulation of the monarchy. At the meeting it seemed to Rašín that the Yugoslavs were somehow reluctant to commit themselves to a radical solution. Therefore, he presented the meeting with his view of the military situation. He argued that the Austro-Hungarian army might succeed with the help of Slavic politicians—without it, they would not—in clearing the front at Piave and, without loss of personnel or war materials, they would move from the front at Piave to the Isonzo where the war would only be unnecessarily prolonged and peace negotiations put off. Not coincidentally from Rašín’s line of reasoning, the Yugoslavs would

 AMZV ČR [Archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Czech Republic], State Papers of Vlastimil Tusar, 1– 10.

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face a major Italian offensive. He wanted the capitulation of the monarchy. Without that, he rejected any negotiations with a government still waging war on the battlefields. Rašín’s point of view was adopted by the meeting as a whole. Negotiations would not commence until the monarchy had capitulated. Vlastimil Tusar was informed that Msgr. Koroshets and Dr. Žerav were to accompany a delegation of Czech deputies headed to Geneva with due authorization from the Austrian government for consultations with Dr. Beneš. Only Vlastimil Tusar would remain in Vienna as acting vice-president of the Czech Union. In mid October when reports first arrived in Vienna of the mutiny of Magyar army units, the Supreme Military Command, better known as the old Austrian Army High Command headquartered at Badenu near Vienna, saw that the army was in disarray. The Military Command feared social revolution in Austria and with it the annihilation of the existing order. Under these conditions it was willing to seek support anywhere, even among supporters of the revolutionary nations, for whom, until then, it had had no other name than traitors. It was clear to the army command that it lacked the moral authority to cause the soldiers not to rebel or force them to remain in the trenches. The power stemming from the monarch and from the monarch’s officials was at an end, while all around the nations were organizing into new state entities and ignoring prior authority. Soldiers of the Military Command, always accustomed to subordinating their political convictions to the will of the monarch, held that the time had come to adapt to new conditions and to take into consideration the opinions of people whom they were accustomed to regarding from aloft as mere civilians, and not only to attend to their opinions but to submit even more in political affairs to the decisions of their representatives. In this they were led by the hope that they would preserve themselves from the revolution by depending on the power of those who in these times seemed alone to enjoy the trust of the popular masses. Guided by these and similar considerations, the Military Command wrote on October 25th to the prime ministers of Austria and Hungary that individual units of the army, persuaded by the speeches of politicians and newspaper articles, no longer wished to remain in the trenches and urged that they be sent home to protect their threatened national territories. According to the Military Command, such a development would have unforeseen consequences. Abandoned by the troops, the front would be left to the will of the enemy, rail transport would be impossible, the troops would fall to Bolshevism and the monarchy would be swept up by social revolution. This must be prevented at all costs. Deputies of the Austrian nationalities should go to the front and persuade the troops,

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but before they did, the Chief of the General Staff, Arthur Arz von Straussenburg, should explain to them the consequences of such a disorganized demobilization. That was on Friday, October 25th, the day when Czech, Yugoslav, and Polish political leaders conferred in Vienna. On Sunday, October 27th, the Austrian Minister of the Interior, Baron von Geyer, summoned Deputy Vlastimil Tusar to invite him to an urgent meeting that would supply him with important information. When Tusar arrived at von Geyer’s office the Minister greeted him with the news that the General Staff would like to speak directly with him. He offered to have Tusar driven to the Military Command at Badenu and informed him that an auto was prepared for him. Tusar refused to go, mindful of the decision of the meeting of October 25th that there be no further negotiation with Austrian authorities while awaiting the capitulation of military and civilian authorities. He was, however, willing to talk with representatives of the General Staff in Vienna. Minister of the Interior von Geyer then agreed to a meeting between Tusar and a representative of the Military Command at six that evening. General Max Ronge, chief of the intelligence division of the General Staff, came to the meeting on behalf of the Military Command. Von Geyer and the Yugoslav deputy, Msgr. Koroshets, were also present. Ronge explained to the participants the objective of his meeting, which he assured them was taking place with the knowledge of Emperor Charles himself. He stated that the situation of the army on the southern front was already catastrophic. The army would not fight, individual units had abandoned the front and a complete destruction of the army and its supplies was threatened. Ronge wanted the deputies to leave immediately for the front to urge the army to remain in their positions a few more days until the armistice was concluded. During this meeting, as Dr. Rašín wrote in his memoirs, still another officer joined them, presenting himself as an emissary of Chief of the General Staff von Straussenburg, and stated that the mission of the deputies to the front did not permit delay and must be executed immediately. Both deputies listened to Ronge. Msgr. Koroshets explained to him that he could do nothing without his first consulting in Zagreb with the Croatian leader, Svetozar Pribichevich, and requested a supporting letter for him, which he was given. Vlastimil Tusar was more decisive. He understood the situation of the army command, but he could not accommodate Ronge. Any intervention by Czech deputies was precluded as long as the monarchy did not accept an armistice and all the conditions of the Allied powers without exception. Ronge replied that acceptance of the armistice exceeded his authority because that decision rested with the Emperor. Ronge promised to go to Badenu where Emperor Charles was staying and on the following day would give Tusar an answer. Tusar’s meeting with Ronge was not his only meeting with the military authorities. The Austrian navy was in a situation similar to that of the Austrian

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army. Around 8 p.m. on the same day the army command received an urgent telegram from the Austrian Admiralty stating that mutiny would inevitably break out in the Austro-Hungarian fleet in Pola and that it was necessary to convince the Austrian sailors at Pola and Kotor to remain in their barracks until the armistice was concluded. If they did not, the Admiralty believed, a probable consequence would be the Bolshevization of the fleet and the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian marine. As a consequence of that telegram Admiral Holub got to Tusar the following day—it was already October 28th—and informed him that the fleet was in revolt and that it was necessary to send a deputy to have a heart-toheart talk with the seamen. Tusar again repeated what he had told Ronge at their meeting. It was not possible to send Czech deputies to the front. The Minister of the Interior’s questions in the morning, and the visit in the afternoon by Chief of Intelligence Services Ronge showed Tusar that events had suddenly assumed a rapid pace. It was certain that Austro-Hungarian governing circles would only take such drastic steps at a time of extreme danger, at a moment when those in power felt the ground giving way beneath their feet. It was extremely important, thought Tusar, that his political friends in Prague received this news immediately. But how could he inform them? Not only was it Sunday, but the telephone calls he made from Vienna to Prague were known to be tapped. Fortunately, chance intervened. That evening Dr. Hodač called him to say that he wanted to come to Vienna with a delegation from the Union of Industrialists. Amazingly, telephone calls from Prague to Tusar were not tapped, and Tusar was able to speak freely. He told Dr. Hodač that he must not come to Vienna, and asked him to tell Antonín Švehla or Dr. Rašín to call him on a matter of necessity. Half an hour later the telephone rang in Tusar’s apartment. Dr. Rašín was calling. Tusar told him of Ronge’s visit and the content of their conversation. Rašín took note of it and with trembling voice confirmed to Tusar that he understood his report. He said he knew that Ronge was a creature of the Archduke Friedrich—never more evident than in 1916 when he and Dr. Kramář′ were tried for treason.³⁹ Ronge was the military expert sent to the trial by the General Staff and there he showed himself to be a passionate enemy of the Czech nation. If such a man now turned to a Czech deputy for help, then things must be very tight for the ruling circles.

 In 1916 a military tribunal convicted Kramář and Rašin of treason and sentenced them to death. Only his own death prevented the old emperor, Franz Joseph, from signing the sentences, which were commuted by his successor, the Emperor Charles.

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Tusar informed the Viennese secretariat of the Yugoslav delegation of his conversation with Rašín. The delegation sent a report to Zagreb to the Croatian National Committee, which in the Yugoslav resistance was directing the actions of the revolutionary movement just as the Czechoslovak National Committee was directing the Czech movement. From then on events in Prague and Zagreb proceeded in tandem. In Prague, Dr. Rašín reached agreement with Dr. Scheiner, chief of the Czech Society of the Sokol, which in the first weeks of the revolution served on occasion in a paramilitary capacity.⁴⁰ Dr. Scheiner was concerned with military preparations for a revolution in the Czech lands, and prepared for the following day everything which would be necessary for the success of the revolution. In the morning Rašín reached agreement with other members of the National Committee, Dr. Soukup and Jiří Stříbrný, and together they went to the apartment of Antonín Švehla in Havlíčkové Square. Here Rašín reported on his conversation with Tusar. All four politicians agreed that the capitulation of the monarchy was coming and that they would take over the state administration and proclaim the Czechoslovak state. Through Dr. Rašín came a telephone report from the editor of the Národní listy of Andrassy’s response to the note of President Wilson. The monarchy had severed its traditional ties with the German Empire and demanded a separate peace from President Wilson. The report, understood in Prague as the capitulation of the monarchy, gave impetus among the leading elements in the National Committee to the takeover of all state power and the proclamation of the Czechoslovak state. At a special session at half past noon, the National Committee decided on the takeover of the state. The Czechoslovak State was declared by a law drafted by Dr. Rašín on October 27th-28th and approved by the National Committee on October 28th, 1918. By telephone at five o’clock in the afternoon of October 28th the new Austrian Prime Minister, Professor Lammasch, called Vlastimil Tusar to the Ministerial Council then in session at the Modenský Palace. Prague’s governor, Count Maximilian von Coudenhove, who had arrived in Vienna only that morning, was already present. The Prime Minister seated Tusar next to himself to question him about events in Prague. Tusar replied that he knew nothing of the events in Prague and that, on the contrary, he wished for information from the Ministerial Council. In his mind, Tusar suspected—correctly, as it turned out—that the revolution in Prague might already be in progress, but if so, it would be only a few

 The Sokols, the word means falcon, were a popular gymnastic organization with a large national membership. The organization dated from the 1860s. Akin to the German Turnverein the Sokols fostered in their members individual discipline and devotion to the nation.

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hours old. Therefore, he should treat with the Viennese government in a nonbinding way in order to ensure the success of the revolution. The Ministerial Council itself knew little of the events in Prague. It had in hand only two telephonograms from the representative of the Prague governorship, Kosina, which conveyed the demand of the National Committee for transfer of the administrative agenda of the Czech lands. Upon arriving at the Ministerial Council, Tusar was showered by questions from the ministers. The swiftest mind of the Lammasch ministry, the Finance Minister Dr. Josef Redlich, formed the opinion that the events in Prague were an act of rebellion by the radical front which, exploiting the absence of the actual political leaders who were then in Geneva, wished to seize control of events in order to steal a march on the leaders of the nation. The Ministerial Council agreed not to oppose the demand of the Prague National Committee for the transfer of administrative authority, but insisted upon two conditions: first, a clarification of the legitimacy of the people demanding the transfer of administrative authority, and second, a clarification of the administration to be provided in the German parts of the Czech lands. Clearly the council hoped that by broaching both questions it would gain time until the peace negotiations were in progress. It was assumed they would begin immediately. Count Coudenhove, believed that nothing had yet happened that could not be corrected. His deputy, Kosina, was instructed to reject the demand of the National Committee for the transfer of the land administration and refer the committee members to the Governor, who was returning to Prague. After Coudenhove’s departure, Vlastimil Tusar asked for a telephone link to Prague. He called Dr. Scheiner, chief of the Sokols, the nationalistic gymnastic association that, in the first weeks of the revolution, had served on occasion in a paramilitary capacity. He told him briefly what was happening, and that Count Coudenhove was on his way to Prague to “set things aright”. Dr. Scheiner replied that there was complete peace in Prague and that it would be best if Vienna were not to interfere in Czech affairs. When the Count descended from his train in Prague, he was greeted by a contingent of the Sokols who accompanied him to his office. As he crossed the city, Coudenhove could see that the Czech authorities were in firm control. There was no unrest and no sign of public disturbances. The Governor was interned in his offices by the National Committee which then entered into negotiations with him.⁴¹ Even before his return, four members of the National Committee had gone to the governor’s office and declared to his deputy who was standing in for the governor that they were assuming full governmental

 Tobolka, Z. Politické dějiny československého …, vol. IV, pp. 391– 392.

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power. The National Committee had organized the defense of the city, entrusting the Sokol Association with the necessary security measures.⁴² As the negotiations with Coudenhove opened, it was clear that he was not aware that the National Committee had already declared the independence of Czechoslovakia. He did not accept the authenticity of the National Committee because it rejected the division of Bohemia into two parts, Czech and German, as called for in the Emperor’s manifesto of October 16th. Only as negotiations continued did Coudenhove gradually come to see that he could no longer rely on the support of the military and the police. He finally decided to step down by asking for permission to go on leave. The Count’s decision was made easier in that his deputy, the Czech official Kosina, would direct the Governor’s Office. The National Committee then reached agreement with the acting governor on the joint direction of public administration. Through this agreement the National Committee gained oversight over the administrative activities of the governor’s office. The Viennese government, not suspecting that it was a question of ‘deft maneuvering,’ gladly accepted this arrangement, assuming it was provisional until the return of the Czech deputies from Geneva. After their return, it was assumed, a decision would be made as to what conditions would be necessary for the transfer of power to the Czechoslovak state. The Viennese government also nurtured the hope that, alongside the Czechoslovak National Committee, there would also be a German National Committee in the Bohemian lands. The Czechoslovak National Committee entered into the agreement with the acting governor because it did not wish to reveal its hand until the question of the military command could be resolved. On the evening of October 28th, with the help of the Sokol Association, first efforts were made to form an independent military force subject to the Czechoslovak National Committee. Later that evening General Kestřanek, the commanding officer in the Prague Command of the Austro-Hungarian Army, and General Zanantoni, the local commander, attended a meeting of the National Committee. After midnight the two parties agreed that the Czech rank and file and their officers were to be subject to the National Committee, that Dr. Schreiner of the Sokol Association was to become their commander and that Austro-Hungarian troops of non-Czech nationality were to be returned to their homes in a matter of weeks. On the afternoon of the following day the Ministerial Council met in Vienna. Prime Minister Lammasch and several members of the cabinet sharply criticized the unilateral action of the military authorities. The day before, without prior

 Alexander, Manfred. Deutsche Gesandtschaftsberichte aus Prag (München: Oldenbourg, 1983), vol. I, nue. ref. 2.

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agreement with the civil authority, the Ministry of War had granted authority to the commands in the individual lands of the monarchy to enter into agreement with the national committees in their jurisdictions and together with them to seek to maintain order. Late that same afternoon the Austro-Hungarian Prague Command received from the Ministry of War a response to the proposals it had made based on its agreement with the National Committee. The ministry accepted most points of the agreement, but refused to permit the formation of an independent Czechoslovak army subject to the National Committee. It also overruled the swift removal of non-Czech troops from Prague. The Austrian command in Prague now tried to take back a part of its agreement with the National Committee. It repealed its promises to the National Committee and no longer accepted Dr. Schreiner’s role in the military command. For the moment that meant renewed opposition to an independent military force subject to the National Committee, but a majority of Czech officers had already given their oath to the Czechoslovak Army. By now it was also clear that Austrian and Hungarian military units could not be kept at Prague. They simply began to leave without orders to do so. Similar was the behavior of Rumanian units which were sympathetic to the revolution in Prague. They turned over their arms and ammunition to the National Committee. The Austro-Hungarian command no longer controlled events. In this situation the National Committee cut telephone communications between Prague and Vienna so that Austrian authorities could no longer communicate with the Prague Command. In the morning of October 30th, the Sokol leader, Dr. Schreiner, and Dr. Soukup and Stříbrný, representatives of the National Committee, visited the military command and made clear that any further efforts to oppose the events in Prague would be prevented. Their position was supported by the presence of armed Czech soldiers and the conduct of non-Czech troop units within the Austro-Hungarian Prague Command. At 9:30 a.m., Vienna was informed that the effort of their military in Prague to master the situation had failed once again. Similar reports were coming to Vienna from other parts of the Empire. Vienna had no alternative than to accept the report from Prague.⁴³ On the same day two other military commands in the Czech lands transferred their authority to the National Committee, Litoměřice and Plzeň. The path was now clear for the formation of an independent Czechoslovak army which at first consisted of soldiers and officers from the old Austrian units who had taken an oath to the new Republic. They were supplemented by units of the Sokols and from time to time by the police. It was the sort of transitional phe-

 Tobolka, Z. Politické dějiny československého …, vol. IV, pp. 391.

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nomenon that one might expect to encounter at a time of revolution. Thoughts now turned to the future return of the legionnaires from Italy and France. Here were veteran Czech and Slovak soldiers, deeply committed to the Czechoslovak cause and commanded by seasoned officers of their own nationality. In the Czech lands the monarchy was no more. Yet, the vibrant legacy of ethnic conflict, which had characterized relations between Czechs and Germans in the last decades of the monarchy, would persist in the Czechoslovak Republic.

Chapter 3 German Rejection The National Committee, first established in 1916, was reconstituted as the Czechoslovak National Committee on July 13th, 1918 and served in the coming months as the collective voice of all the Czech political parties. In collaboration with the Czechoslovak National Committee in Paris, it acted as a guide for the benefit of the nation at home. On October 28th, 1918, this reconstituted National Committee declared the independence of Czechoslovakia and became the first government of the new state with Dr. Karel Kramář as prime minister. The National Committee appointed the Revolutionary National Assembly which was to serve as the legislature of the new state until elections to a constituent assembly could be held. At its first session on November 14th, the Revolutionary National Assembly elected Tomáš Garrigue Masaryk the first president of the Czechoslovak Republic. Party representation in both the wartime National Committee, as reconstituted in July of 1918, and in the appointed postwar Revolutionary National Assembly, in so far as the Czech parties were concerned, was based on the principle elaborated by the Agrarian Party leader, Antonín Švehla, known as Švehla’s Key. It provided that party representation in both bodies be based on the number of votes which each party had received in the last elections to the Reichsrat in 1911. From the very outset this new Czechoslovak government faced a major challenge to establish administrative control over all the territories to which it laid claim. At first it exercised authority only in the Czech regions of the Bohemian lands. Its authority did not yet extend to the predominantly German border regions in the Czech lands or to Slovakia and Ruthenia in Northern Hungary. The fate of all three regions rested ultimately upon the decisions of the Paris Peace Conference, but the government moved immediately to assert control. With the weak forces at its disposal there was little possibility in the near term of effectively challenging the existing Hungarian government, which would without hesitation defend its expiring prerogatives in northern Hungary. In fact, an initial effort of the Czechoslovak government in November of 1918 to occupy Slovakia with inadequate forces proved unsuccessful. The situation with the Germans was different. Neither Austria nor Germany was in a position to provide the Germans in the Czech lands with military support and, unlike the Hungarian government, they understood this from the outset. If at first the German nationalists in the Czech lands appeared to be in an advantageous position vis-a-vis the Czechs, these advantages proved to be illuhttps://doi.org/10.1515/9783110749885-006

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sory. Most of the military units deployed in the predominantly German territory were German or Magyar and most of these units were subordinate to the military command at Leitmeritz/Litoměřice⁴⁴ in northern Bohemia—predominantly German settled territory. Yet in the very first days of the revolution Austro-Hungarian military authority collapsed, and commanders quickly saw that they lacked the authority to restore discipline.⁴⁵ The path was open for Czech occupation. The basis for Sudeten German consciousness—although the word ‘Sudeten’ was then seldom used for the purpose—evolved before the war in response to the expansionist Czech national movement.⁴⁶ By the war’s end the sense of German unity in diversity within the context of Bohemia, celebrated in Jesser′s essay on Bohemian unity and quoted at length in the opening chapter, had been replaced by an urgent need in urgent circumstances to unite the Germans in the Czech lands in common defense against triumphant Czech nationalism. In a psychological sense, the term “Sudeten German” was a defense mechanism which stressed the large number of Germans who were pitted against an admittedly far more numerous Czech majority. On October 21st, 1918 the Austrian national assembly met in its first session and laid claim to all the German territories of Austria including the German territories of the Czech lands.⁴⁷ On October 23rd, five days before the declaration of Czechoslovak independence, German deputies from the Czech lands met at the Reichsrat in Vienna, established a preparatory committee which was to plan for the German Austrian province of Deutsch Böhmen (German-Bohemia) and elected the provincial government. At a subsequent meeting of the same committee on October 25th, the first provincial governor of German Bohemia, Raphael Pacher, favored the partition of Bohemia by the Imperial government. The German Social Democratic leader, Jozef Seliger, opposed this as historically outdated, and Pacher was replaced in a matter of days by the independent Deputy, and later leader of the German Nationalist Party, Dr. Rudolf Lodgman von Auen. The conflict between German

 For the period prior to the end of the Czech occupation of the German territories in the Czech lands, place names appear first in German followed by the Czech name. After the occupation only the Czech name is used.  César, Jaroslav, and Bohumil Černý. Politika německých buržoazních stran v letech 1918 – 1938 (Nakl: Československé akademie vĕd, 1962) vol. I, pp. 73 – 75.  Jaworski, Rudolf. Na straží němectví nebo v postavení menšiny. Sudetoněmecký národnostní boj ve vztazích výmarské republiky v ČSR ([Praha]: Pražská edice, 2004), p. 36. .  Brügel, Johann Wolfgang, Tschechen und Deutsche, 1918 – 1938 (Munich: Nymphenburger Verlagshandlung, 1967), p. 48.

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Social Democratic and bourgeois nationalist political leaders in the Czech lands would be a constant in months to come. On October 28th, the committee was taken by surprise by the Czechoslovak Declaration of Independence. On the following day, it hastened to reassemble at the Reichsrat in Vienna and to declare German Bohemia an integral province of German Austria. The establishment of German Bohemia was followed by the establishment of Sudetenland, cobbled together from a patchwork of communities in Moravia, western Silesia and in the Orlické Mountains of eastern Bohemia, on October 31st. Both new provinces directly abutted the border of Germany and both lacked a common geographic link to Austria. Finally, on November 3rd, Southern Bohemia/Böhmerwaldgau and German Southern Moravia/Deutschsudmähren were formed, the former to be linked to Upper Austria and the latter to Lower Austria (See Fig. 1). During the time when the new German-Austrian entities were emerging in the Czech lands, Dr. Lodgman, not yet the provincial governor of German Bohemia, visited Prague on October 30th to negotiate with the officials of the National Committee. It was the first such political contact since the Czechoslovak Declaration of Independence. The negotiating positions of the two parties were diametrically opposed. Invoking the right of self-determination, Lodgman asserted the independence of the German territories from the new Czech state and their status as an integral part of German Austria pending the final ruling of the Peace Conference. For the time being he urged the cooperation of the two parties as equals on an international basis. However, the Czechs rejected Lodgman′s argument. At the very least, acceptance would have undermined their claim to the entirety of the Czech lands within their historic boundaries. Antonín Švehla, leader of the Czech negotiating team, stated that “the Czechoslovak nation has carried out a revolution. The matter is settled.” The Germans were invited to join in the work of creating the new state.⁴⁸ But co-operation in creating the new state would have undermined the German claim to the right of self-determination and to Austrian citizenship. Lodgman did not yield his ground. After an hour the negotiations came to an end without agreement. This total impasse between the parties would characterize their relations during the autumn of 1918 and into the new year. On November 4th, there was a second round of talks when Jozef Seliger, the German Social Democratic leader and deputy to Dr. Lodgman, who was now the governor of German Bohemia, came to Prague to discuss the provisioning of

 Brügel, J.W. Tschechen und Deutsche …, p. 61.

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foodstuffs for the German territories. He met with a representative of the National Committee, Dr. Alois Rašín. In the course of their conversation, Rašín casually remarked that self-determination was a nice phrase but that now the Entente had won, force would decide. Then he uttered the words: “We do not negotiate with rebels”. It is claimed that he was not speaking seriously but merely quoting General Windischgrätz, the Austrian military commander in Prague during the Revolution of 1848. Whatever the intent, the effect is beyond doubt. Rašín′s remarks were reproduced in the German press in the Czech lands and left a bitter impression. In fact, the notion of rebels was misplaced since the borders of the Czechoslovak state had not yet been drawn, except perhaps in the thinking of ultra-nationalist Czech circles. In his report to the foreign office in Berlin, Consul Baron Fritz von Gebsattel, the ranking German diplomatic representative in Prague, questioned whether Rašín could ever have uttered such words, but went on to report that: “I too have repeatedly negotiated with Dr. Rašín, and while I found his colleagues from the beginning accommodating and friendly, with him I had to contend with a constantly reemerging reserve.”⁴⁹ Less circumspect was the comment of the Czech Social Democratic leader, Rudolf Bechyně: “I regard it an irreparable mistake that when, after our revolution, Deputy Seliger came to Prague with the intention of negotiating with us in the name of the Germans, Minister Dr. Rašín rejected any further negotiations with the words: ‘We don′t negotiate with rebels’. These words poisoned our relations with the Germans.”⁵⁰ Why the negotiations with the Germans were assigned to a blatant chauvinist such as Dr. Rašín remains an open question. The new German territories which had come into existence in the Czech lands existed on paper and in solemn declarations, but a coherent administrative apparatus for these territories and for their territory as whole was almost entirely lacking. During the brief period of their existence this situation did not substantially improve. In his memoirs, President Masaryk treated the German territories dismissively: “After the war and especially after the revolution in Prague our Germans tried to organize their territory, but this very effort, as I have noted, demonstrated the impossibility of combining scattered and separate territories administratively. The fact that four German territories were created speaks for itself.”⁵¹

 Alexander, M. Deutsche Gesandtschaftsberichte aus Prag …, num. ref. 21, p. 80.  Klepetař, Harry. Seit 1918…Eine Geschichte der Tschechoslowakischen Republik (M.-Ostrau: Verlag Julius Kittls nachfolger, 1938), pp. 99 – 100  Masaryk, T.G. Světová revoluce za války a ve válce, 1914 – 1918 (Praha: Cin, 1938), p. 525.

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Dr. Lodgman, the architect of German Bohemia, held a markedly different view. In early 1938, a critical article under the title, “The Mistakes of 1918”, appeared in the newspaper, Večerní České Slovo. The article attacked Lodgman’s efforts in the immediate aftermath of the war. The author of the article charged that the four territorial governments of German Bohemia, Sudetenland, Southern Bohemia and Southern Moravia were mistaken when they invoked the right of national self-determination and sought to keep their territory as a part of Austria. This action over which Dr. Lodgman presided was, however, confirmed by the Austrian National Assembly in November 22, 1918, even though, as the author of the article charged, it was an utter absurdity to award to Austria the territory of German Bohemia and the Sudetenland, neither of which abutted it. Lodgman’s critic declared that it simply did not occur to the political leaders of the time to attach these territories to Germany which from a geographical point of view was possible. He explains this failure, on the one hand, by pointing to the fact that the German Reich as far back as Bismarck′s time had little, if any interest in Austrian Germans and in 1866⁵² gladly refrained from annexing them while, on the other hand, the Germans of the Bohemian crown (in the geographical sense) had no emotional attachment to the empire and gravitated exclusively to Vienna. As a consequence, the thought did not occur to them to attach themselves to Germany. Lodgman responded, saying that the author of the article was correct in claiming that neither Germany nor Austria was prepared to support the demands of the territorial governments by force of arms. However, he questioned whether Germany′s failure actually stemmed from a lack of desire to hear about the Austrian Germans. Anyone who correctly saw the situation at the time, he said, would not find it incomprehensible that Germany, given its military powerlessness and trusting in the armistice terms which had been solemnly agreed to, was intent on realizing the principles of Wilson′s Fourteen Points. Considering the existing military situation, Germany did not have high hopes for intervention by force. It should not be overlooked that Germany itself was also facing disaster. The Spartakist uprising, which, Lodgman argued, was completely forgotten by 1938 when his own article appeared, was threatening to destroy Berlin and the German Reich. Lodgman said he knew “from my own experience” that the lack of German military help from Dresden should not be attributed to the fact that

 In the Austro-Prussian War Bismarck’s aim was the exclusion of Austria from Germany, but he also anticipated the possibility of the Austrian empire as a future ally of Germany united under Prussia.

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the government of Saxony did not have adequate appreciation for German Bohemia, but rather to the fact that in November, 1918, “as I and Seliger saw for ourselves in Dresden”, all order had collapsed. Be that as it may, the author of the article made two erroneous assumptions in Lodgman’s view—first, that Germany’s alleged lack of appreciation for the national demands of the Austrian Germans was shared by the Austrians themselves, or more especially by the German populations in Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia; and second, that this lack of appreciation explained why the idea of annexation to Germany rather than with Austria simply never occurred to the political leadership of German Bohemia. At no time, Lodgman argued, could the political arrangement which he pursued be characterized as “absurd and astral”—the language of his critic. His critic has overlooked Article 2 of German Austrian Constitutional Law dated November 12, 1918. Article 2 reads: “Austria is part of the German Republic.” A glance at the map of European linguistic areas addresses the question of absurdity quite satisfactorily. Although the four disparate territories are separated geographically from one another, two abutting Austria in the south and two abutting Germany in the north, Article 2 explains this convincingly and beyond the objections of Lodgman’s critic. In Lodgman’s thinking the northern territories, German Bohemia and Sudetenland, were to be attached in accordance with Austrian constitutional law to Germany without the need of special decisions by their territorial governments which they were not constitutionally competent to make. Similarly, the two German provinces of Southern Bohemia and Southern Moravia would also be annexed to Germany together with the rest of Austria. Under the circumstances any discussion of the lack of emotional ties of the German population in this territory with the German Reich due to their strong Bohemian patriotism becomes irrelevant. This entire elaborate schema rested on a caveat, expressed in a single sentence written by Lodgman: “It should not be forgotten that in practical terms, the entire plan of the defeated at that time rose or fell on the question of enforcing the right of national self-determination”.⁵³ Lodgman’s document is a striking example of his romantic nationalism. In his memoire of the Paris Peace Conference the young British diplomat, Sir Harold Nicolson, recalled that “we came to Paris confident that the new order was about to be established; we left it convinced that the new order had merely fouled the old”. Of the outcome of the peace process, he wrote that “the Paris Peace Conference was guilty of disguising an impe-

 NA, MZV-VA [Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs, newspaper clipping archive], no. 1, Karton 3513.

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rialistic peace under the surplice of Wilsonianism [and that] seldom in the history of man has such vindictiveness cloaked itself in such unctuous sophistry”.⁵⁴ As a consequence, the right of national self-determination emerged from the peace process less a principle than a pretext for punishment and reward—reward for those states and foreign resistance movements that had supported the Allied cause and punishment for those which had opposed it. The winners were Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Rumania and Greece. The losers were Germany, Austria, Hungary, Bulgaria and the Ottoman Empire. This is a precise roster of the war time affiliation of each. If this outcome could not be anticipated in the autumn of 1918, common sense should have suggested that after years of trench warfare neither France nor Great Britain would be disposed to sanction the territorial aggrandizement of Germany in Central Europe. Yet, Lodgman was not alone. Virtually every significant German political leader in the territory of the emerging Czechoslovak state, regardless of the individual differences among them, invoked the right of national self-determination. The war lost, there was no other hope for them. As at the war’s end, so also in the spring of 1919 when the Peace Conference proceeded without recognizing the right of self-determination for the Germans in the Czech lands, many Germans experienced a profound sense of humiliation and resentment, in some instances even betrayal, sentiments which were scarcely compatible with the need to adapt to the changed realities of the new, postwar Czechoslovak republic. On December 22nd President Masaryk addressed the Revolutionary National Assembly for the first time since his return from abroad. In the course of his remarks, he turned to the subject of the Germans: “In so far as the Germans in our country are concerned, our program has been known for a long time. The territory inhabited by the Germans is our territory and will remain ours. We built our state, we have maintained it and we are building it anew. I wish that the Germans would join us in this. That would be a better politics than their present dubious efforts. I understand of course and take into account that they are in a difficult situation. They took up the aggressive Pan-Germanic, anti-Czech program too eagerly. They failed to grasp the world situation. They were blinded by early, illusory successes. Our Germans became the victims of false, deceitful Austrianism and the short-sighted Habsburgs. It is psychologically understandable that they are disappointed to have been so fatefully mistaken and that we were right and we are right. “I repeat: We have created our state and that determines the constitutional position of the Germans who originally came to this country as colonists and im-

 Nicolson, Harold. Peacemaking 1919 (London: Constable), p. 187.

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migrants. We are entitled to the riches of our land which are essential for our industry and for the industry of the Germans who live among us. We will not and cannot sacrifice our sizeable Czech minorities in the so-called German territories. We are also convinced that economic advantage binds our German countrymen to us. It is up to them to adopt a proper attitude toward us. Let them recall that in the year 1861 they together with us beseeched the emperor to be crowned king of Bohemia. I sincerely wish that we will come to agreement as soon as possible. I frankly confess that it is extremely difficult to forget that our Germans and Germans in Austria in general accepted the inhumane cruelty of German and Magyar soldiery without protest. It is difficult for us to forget that our Germans placed the most furious emphasis on Pan-Germanism. Despite this we will gladly welcome them if they decide to collaborate. No one can hold it against us if we have become cautious after so much experience, but I assure you that the minorities in our state will enjoy full national rights and civic equality. The American republic preferred civil war to the secession of the South. We will never permit the secession of our north with its mixed population. By building a true democratic autonomy we will create an appropriate way to resolve the nationality problem. In view of the large and particular mixture of both nations a complete separation is not possible, and the problem is no longer a national one but also a very intense social problem.”⁵⁵ The words ‘colonists and immigrants’ provoked deep resentment among the Germans. In their asperity, these words were quite uncharacteristic of Masaryk. In early November Czech troops had begun occupying communities in northern Bohemia largely with weak military forces and in most cases at the invitation of communal authorities who were unable to cope with local looting. The airfield at Eger/Cheb in western Bohemia was taken.⁵⁶ Soon the operation began to assume a more earnest character. On November 27– 28th, Czech troops occupied Brüx/Most after clashing with the German defense force. Brüx was one of the important centers of the northern Bohemian brown coal district. Czech troops were also advancing in southwest Bohemia in the foothills of the Böhmerwald/ Šumava.⁵⁷ In December, Czech troops took Dux/Duchov, a second important center in the northern Bohemian brown coal district. Czech troops also pushed farther south and westward toward the Bavarian border. They took Saaz/Žatec in the Bohemian hops region. For the first time, Reichenberg/Liberec, the seat of the Ger-

 Masaryk, T.G. Světová revoluce …, p. 525.  Alexander, M. Deutsche Gesandtschaftsberichte aus Prag, vol. I, num. ref. 18, p. 73.  Alexander, M. Deutsche Gesandtschaftsberichte aus Prag, vol. I, num. ref. 31, p. 106 – 107.

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man Bohemian government, appeared to be under threat.⁵⁸ The Czech occupation continued to expand into northeastern Bohemia in the foothills of the Riesengebirge/Krkonoše and to the major spas of western Bohemia, Marienbad/Mariánské Lázně and Karlsbad/Karlovy Vary. On December 10th, looting broke out in Aussig/Ústí nad Labem, and local authorities in the city asked the Czech government for help. Some three infantry battalions and an artillery detachment entered the city and restored order. As Czech troops drew nearer to Reichenberg/Liberec, the German Bohemian government crossed the border into Saxony and soon relocated in Vienna. Its leader, Dr. Lodgman, had already taken refuge with his staff in Friedland in northern Bohemia.⁵⁹ On December 13th, Czech troops occupied Tetschen/Děčín and Bodenbach/Podmokly, giving the Czechs control of Elba shipping. On this occasion, the Czech troops had been under the command of an English major and a French captain, which lent the action an Allied imprimatur.⁶⁰ On December 15th, the Czechs entered Reichenberg/Liberec. For the first time Czech legionnaires from Italy were among the occupying forces. In recent days Czechs had also taken Komotau/Chomutov, Falkenau/Falknov and the rest of Eger/Cheb. This put all the important places in German Bohemia in their possession.⁶¹ On a number of occasions in mid-December, Prime Minister Kramář sent couriers to Paris, first to Dr. Beneš and then to President Masaryk, requesting that one of them get from the Entente a clear declaration that German Bohemia belonged to the Czechoslovak state. On November 13th, the Austrian foreign minister, Dr. Otto Brenner, sent a note to the Allies protesting the Czech efforts to keep the Sudeten Germans in Czechoslovakia and demanding that a referendum be immediately arranged. In a fresh note three days later, he demanded that the borders between Austria and Czechoslovakia and Austria and Yugoslavia be determined by a court of arbitration. Beneš immediately intervened diplomatically with the Allies, justifying the actions of the Czechoslovak government and requesting at least provisional recognition of the historic borders (naturally the final decision would rest with the Peace Conference). Within days Beneš received notes of agreement from France, Great Britain, and the United States. On December 22nd, he notified Dr. Kramář by telegram of the Allied agreement and two days later he sent the text of his original petition and the Allied replies. Under the terms of the Armistice, the Allied powers had the right to occupy strategic

   

Alexander, Alexander, Alexander, Alexander,

M. M. M. M.

Deutsche Deutsche Deutsche Deutsche

Gesandtschaftsberichte Gesandtschaftsberichte Gesandtschaftsberichte Gesandtschaftsberichte

aus aus aus aus

Prag, vol. Prag, vol. Prag, vol. Prag, vol.

I, I, I, I,

num. num. num. num.

ref. ref. ref. ref.

34, p. 112. 36, p. 115. 37, p. 116. 39, p. 119

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positions in Austria-Hungary to enable them to conduct military operations or to maintain order, but in their scope the Czech operations exceeded these provisions. As Dr. Beneš acknowledged, Czech operations had begun right after the revolution and, in character, had been at first “revolutionary”, but with Allied approval they became “legal”.⁶² German resistance to the occupation had been sporadic and ineffectual. With the initial efforts to establish an administrative structure for German Bohemia there was also an effort to establish an armed force. All German soldiers were ordered to report to the guard corps. Pay of five kroner per day and food were promised.⁶³ Few soldiers returning from the war responded. Fatigue, a reluctance to return to active duty and the desire to go home combined to thwart the efforts to build an army of resistance. As already noted, even before the Czech occupation the German Social Democratic leader, Jozef Seliger, had opposed the idea of dividing Bohemia into German and Czech lands. In an article written earlier, but published in November of 1918, he elaborated on that theme. After the collapse of the monarchy, he wrote: “every nation will see clearly where it stands, what state its neighbors are in and how it should shape its relation to them and it will then be apparent that even the right of self-determination like everything else in the world is a highly relative matter …. The independence of German Bohemia! … A glance at the linguistic map of Bohemia shows us that this is not possible … For this reason, it is completely impossible for eight German scraps of land separated from one another by broad belts of Czech settled territory … to unite so to speak in the air and over foreign land into a unitary state or administrative territory which first of all must be a unitary economic territory.”⁶⁴ Events overtook this article before it could be published, and Seliger’s views underwent a profound change. On October 14th, he spoke to a workers’ meeting in Teplitz-Schönau/Teplice-Šanov on the future to come: “There is no power which would be capable of preventing the Poles, the Czechs and the Yugoslavs from establishing their own states…. We German Social Democrats grant this right unconditionally to all nations, but we also lay claim to it for our nation. Then for us there are but two possibilities—either an independent Austrian state or annexation to our motherland, the new democratic Germany!”⁶⁵

 Beneš, E. Der Aufstand der Nationen …, pp. 685 – 687.  Alexander, M. Deutsche Gesandtschaftsberichte aus Prag, vol. I, num. ref. 14, p. 61.  Brügel, J.W. Tschechen und Deutsche …, pp. 51– 52.  Hofbauer, Jozef and Emil Strauss. Josef Seliger: Ein Lebensbild (Prag II: Reka´zanka 18 Verlag des Parteivorstandes d. Deutschen sozialdemokrat. Arbeiterpartei in d. Tschechoslowak. Republik, 1930) pp. 133 – 134.

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By the spring of 1919, Seliger had further consolidated his position and in a fourteen-page pamphlet outlined the position of German Social Democracy toward the emerging Czechoslovak state.⁶⁶ At the outset he was concerned with the correctness of the policy the party was pursuing: “We, the German Social Democratic proletariat, are carrying on a struggle for the right of self-determination of our nation,” he argued, “and that struggle has brought us on a course with the bourgeois class against which we have struggled most intensely until now. Have we not strayed then from the course of our class struggle?” The answer to this oratorical question was obviously no, but the justification which he offers is quite interesting: “The collapse of the Habsburg monarchy has also liberated the Czech nation from the old fetters of the nationality state. This nation is proceeding to create its own state, but they will not be content to limit its borders within the boundaries of their nationality but are grasping beyond them. The Czech nation wants to annex to their state also nations liberated in their territories, Slovaks, Germans, Poles, Magyars and Ruthenians. Thus, they will establish a new nationality state. But they have not invited those nations to establish a common state with the Czechs on the basis of their own free will, but rather will subject them to the state by force. It is not to be a nationality state of free nations, but a state in which the Czech nation will rule nationally over the other nations.” Seliger does not reject the idea of a nationality state per se but argues that due to the diversity of population it is more difficult for the proletariat to fulfill its task. Nonetheless, the nationality state does not preclude a successful struggle for democracy and socialism. He declares: “We assume that after the collapse of the Habsburg monarchy the Czech bourgeoisie might have sought a path to understanding with the Germans when they began to establish their own state system. In that case they would not have rejected the Germans as rebels and traitors but would have invited them together with the Czech nation to establish a common supranational state system, something like Switzerland. And we assume that the Germans might have accepted this proposal… Then despite its supra-nationality, the situation of the working class would have been the same as that of the workers in a nation state. It is not only conceivable but very probable that the German and Czech working classes in this new state would immediately have joined together in the struggle for democracy. And once democracy was secured, they would immediately have proceeded to

 Seliger, Josef. Warum Kämpfen Wir für das Selbstbestimmungsrecht Unseres Volkes (TeplitzSchonau: Verlag der Druck und Verlagsanstalt, [1930s]).

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carry out socialization in the economy to be newly built, precisely as the working class in German Austria and the workers in Germany have done.” This hypothetical reasoning leads Seliger to the question “…how could such a democracy be possible in a Czechoslovak state? Can one expect from the Czech bourgeoisie which enriches itself with the unbridled energy and brutality of a young capitalist class and wants to make effective its exploitation that it will place in the hands of the nations suppressed by it such an immense amount of power through such a democracy?” The conclusion is inevitable: “Faced with this indescribable misfortune there is but one way out for us: that our people not be subjected to foreign rule and that the right of national self-determination applies also for our people. That of their own free will, our people will determine their own destiny and through the free expression of their will the German people will enter the Reich and be able to join with it in the free, democratic and social German republic.”⁶⁷ In this way both Seliger and Lodgman, despite their differences, shared the common goal of bringing the Germans through the creation of German Bohemia ultimately to a safe haven. But it was perhaps the only thing they shared in common. Lodgman, the political romanticist, saw himself as the leader of the entire nation. Seliger, the pragmatic leader of the German Social Democrats, saw himself as the champion of the working class. Once the borders of the new Czechoslovak state were established as a fait accompli, Seliger was able to begin to adapt. Lodgman was not. At a session of the German Bohemian provincial assembly, which took place on December 28th in the Viennese parliamentary building, there was a sense of uneasiness when the German Social Democrat Seliger warned the Czech and Moravian bourgeoisie against punishing and mistreating their German fellow countrymen after the earlier fashion of the German bourgeoisie and bureaucracy. Seliger also warned against ignoring the Germans’ right of national self-determination. With a long-windedness that clearly was intentional, Seliger described the centralizing and germanizing sins of the German bourgeoisie. In that same session there was a sense of irresolution and conflict. The German radical deputy K.H. Wolf explained that, in German Bohemia, the annexation with German Austria had been voted for with confidence in the union of German Austria with the German Reich. In the German nationalist circles of Bohemia, people were beginning to regret that decision. They had counted on the vigorous support of the German Austrian government against their being trampled on by the Czechs. The paper protests of the Viennese government

 Seliger, J. Warum Kämpfen Wir ….

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had been downright useless and ineffective against the Czech occupation. Twelve thousand German Austrian troops would have sufficed to restrain the Czechoslovaks. The session gave the impression that German nationalist circles in Bohemia were inclined to look for a possible opportunity for direct annexation to Germany and were no more attracted to Vienna than were the German Alpine lands of Austria.⁶⁸ Of all the deputies in the German Bohemian provincial assembly, none perhaps was more pro-German than Lodgman. On February 8th, 1919, Lodgman met in Berlin with Privy Councilor R. von Riepenhasen. The two men had known each other before. It was Lodgman’s intent that, through von Riepenhasen, he might be able to gain the support of the German government for German Bohemia. Lodgman was traveling to Switzerland with the hope of persuading the Allies to recognize German Bohemia as an independent state, something which he thought might more readily be achieved than either Allied recognition of German Bohemia as part of German Austria or Allied acceptance of German annexation of German Bohemia. If German Bohemia, despite its odd geographical structure, was recognized as an independent state, so Lodgman reasoned, the Allies would have no cause to oppose its assimilation into Germany if that resulted from German Bohemia’s request. Lodgman was strongly opposed to German Bohemia remaining in German Austria. In the event of Allied acceptance of this proposal, Lodgman sought support from the German government. If German Bohemia was cleared of Czech troops, he feared that the departing troops together with the mob would loot and pillage. To prevent that, he proposed two steps. First, German troop units would be assembled inobtrusively under the pretext of border defense and at the suitable moment would be marched in as a police force. Naturally the German Bohemian government would officially present a request for such action and take care to notify the Allied governments in order to avoid the impression of a spontaneous and imperialistic action by the German government. Second, the Imperial government would arrange for weapons caches to be placed at various points along the border for self-defensive action by the German Bohemians during the withdrawal of the Czech troops. In effect, Lodgeman was asking that a defeated Germany intervene in a territorial dispute in a neighboring Allied country. The entire episode demonstrates once again how far Lodgman’s thinking had departed from political reality. That reality was reflected in a report which a German representative in Prague at that time, Professor Säger, sent to Berlin regarding the situation of the

 Alexander, M. Deutsche Gesandtschaftsberichte aus Prag, vol. I, num. ref. A 17, pp. 597– 598.

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Germans in the Czech lands. Säger wrote: “I am of the opinion that … German Austria should become a bridge to the South-East, especially as far as the important Czechoslovak state is concerned. That can happen if from our side no support will be given to the German irredenta in Bohemia once the Paris Peace Conference decides about the territorial outlines of the Czechoslovak Republic. On the contrary, we have to encourage the Germans in Bohemia to be politically active and to participate in the new state and to seek their national fulfillment in safeguarding their German culture.”⁶⁹ This view was entirely consistent with the policy which Germany pursued at the time—to studiously avoid any intervention in the domestic affairs of Czechoslovakia on behalf of the Germans in that country. In the German Bohemian provincial assembly, the shift in sentiment from a pro-Austrian to a pro-German stance (to the extent that it actually occurred) was not reflected in the sentiments of the broader German public in Bohemia. When the Austrian government announced the first elections to a new parliament in Vienna, Bohemian Germans were eager to participate, although the Czechoslovak government ruled against their participation. In protest the German Social Democrats called for mass demonstrations throughout German Bohemia in defense of self-determination. The demonstrations were to be held on March 4th, 1919, the day the new Austrian parliament would convene. The other German parties actively supported the demonstrations. The demonstrations were boisterous but orderly, but the inexperienced Czech troops who were ordered to monitor them were unversed in the art of crowd control. On a number of occasions, the Czech militia fired into the crowds killing fifty-two people and wounding eighty-four.⁷⁰ German chauvinist politicians instantly seized on March 4th as the occasion to commemorate the fallen and rekindle rejection of the Czechoslovak state. The practice continued annually in the First Republic until its demise in 1938. In Vienna the provincial government of German Bohemia lingered and languished ineffectually. The population in Bohemia lacked leadership at home and, due to the suppression of traffic across the border, had lost contact with their leaders in Vienna. In these circumstances the German Social Democrats were least affected. Seliger, their leader, managed to visit Teplice on several occasions and consult with members of his party. That left the rank and file of the non-Marxist parties lamenting that they were virtually without leadership.⁷¹  Perman, D. The Shaping of the Czechoslovak State (Leiden: Brill), p. 177.  Jaksch, W. Europas Weg nach Potsdam, pp. 209 – 210..  Nittner, Ernst. Dokumente zur sudetendeutsche Frage, 1916 – 1967. (Mü nchen: Ackermann-Gemeinde, 1967), pp. 75 – 76.

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Shortly after the signing of the Treaty of St. Germain with Austria, the government of Deutsch Böhmen was dissolved on September 24th, 1919. On October 25th, 1918, three days before the Czechoslovak revolution, the German Consul von Gebsattel wrote what turned out to be an apt postscript to this phase of German rejection: “Completely different prospects would open up for the Bohemian Germans,” he said, “if they were to decide voluntarily on remaining in the Czech state. In that case they would not of course fulfill all of their national political wishes, but they could still secure from the Czechs in this regard the greatest concessions…. Quite recently the Czechs have not failed to make friendly, promising offers and have also shown clear signs that they are prepared for immediate negotiations…. If the Germans will sit down to negotiations with the Czechs now, it would be for them the favorable moment to gain far-reaching concessions in every direction. But the Germans must agree to grasp the extended hand immediately, before the peace negotiations. The Czechs can wait longer quite calmly…. But then the Germans would have to be prepared for less favorable conditions and not expect the indulgence of their national interests. It appears to be in the interests of the Germans to secure for themselves through direct negotiations the most favorable position in the Czechoslovak state.”⁷²

 Brügel, J.W. Tschechen und Deutsche …, pp. 56 – 57.

Chapter 4 Making the New Rules: Language and Autonomy German rejection of the new state had severe consequences. Only a few days before the armistice, Dr. Beneš, now Foreign Minister of the Czechoslovak National Council in Paris, had met in Geneva with representatives of the political leadership at home. As a result of their discussions, it was agreed to appoint to the government a German minister without portfolio to represent German interests. But with the outburst of German negativism toward the new state this decision was not implemented. Thus, the Germans were not represented in the Cabinet, nor were they represented in the Revolutionary National Assembly, the legislature initially appointed to serve until elections to a constituent assembly could be held.⁷³ Later, the life of the Revolutionary National Assemble was extended and—still in the absence of German and other minority deputies—it was assigned the task of drafting the constitution. An equally serious and early response to the Germans’ negativism was a shift in Czech public opinion. Not surprisingly, this resulted in a move to the right on nationality issues and a decline in interest to find a common ground. Under the circumstances, prospects for accommodation between Czechs and Germans were sharply reduced. Nonetheless, in an effort to find a way to common understanding in December of 1918, Masaryk met with a number of German political leaders representing the German Social Democrats, Christian Socials and Agrarians and even the little German Democratic Progressive Party. Masaryk also met with the rejectionist leader of the German National Party.⁷⁴ In January of 1919, Masaryk wrote to Beneš in Paris at the Peace Conference of the problem of the Germans in Czech lands and what course should be pursued: “I urge that we must have a clear plan what to do with them,” he wrote, “and that we give them everything which they should and must have so that they don’t extract it from us piecemeal. Stop the agitation as soon as possible and engage them in work.”⁷⁵ Masaryk returned to the topic somewhat later in correspondence with Premier Kramář, also in Paris at the Peace Conference: “I think that after publication of the peace terms the Germans should be immediately invited to enter the national assembly.” In his next letter to Kramář he ex Klepetař, H. Seit 1918 ….  Gayan, Koloman. T. G. Masaryk a Vztahy Čechů a Němců 1882 – 1937 (Praze: Masarykova společnost, 1997), pp. 148 – 149.  Šolle, Zdeněk, ed. Masaryk a Beneš ve svých dopisech z doby pařížských mírových jednání v roce 1919 (Praha: Archiv AVČR. Rok vydání, 1993), vol. II, p. 159 [January 23rd, 1919]. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110749885-007

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panded on the theme: “My view is that we should immediately give the Germans everything they can reasonably demand so that we don’t have national feuding in parliament and use their strengths also for building up the state. Then we don’t have to fear nationality (the Germans have a different position than in Austria) and we can devote ourselves to the substantive solution of social, cultural and other tasks. But our nationalists also can’t break free of the former national battle and its traditions and are mired in trivialities…. We must deal with the Germans. The question is when and how? I do my best to prepare for what may be.”⁷⁶ Local elections in the Czech lands, scheduled for June 15th, 1919, brought the first significant break in the German resistance. Already preliminary reports had come from Paris indicating that German demands for self-determination would not be considered when drawing up the terms of peace, and that, despite the large German minority in the Czech lands, the historic borders of these lands would in large part be recognized. In response to this, in order to seize the last opportunity to demonstrate to the Allies the large number of Germans in the Czech lands as well as to preserve the autonomy that was afforded to the Germans at least at the local level, the German parties participated actively in the local elections. Their participation did not yet signal acceptance of the new state. It did show, however, that the Germans had at last reacted in recognition of the political realities that faced them. The German Socialist Democrats and Agrarians led the German vote, yet it was the vote cast for the Czech parties which brought the most dramatic change stemming from the local elections. Despite the general drift to the right on national issues, Czech voters registered a sharp swing to the left on economic and social issues reflecting the interests of workers and farmers. The two Czech socialist parties and the Czech Agrarians, all three the most moderate Czech parties on national issues, dominated the Czech vote and emerged with a clear majority. Negotiations were opened for the formation of a new government to replace the right of center all-national coalition of Dr. Karel Kramář. On July 8th, the new government took office with the Social Democrat, Vastimil Tusar, at its head. The government coalition consisted of the two Czech socialist parties and the Czech Agrarians (the parties which had dominated the Czech voting and came to be known as the Red-Green Coalition), the small Czech State’s Rights Progressive Party and members of the Slovak Club.

 Bílek, Jan, ed. Korespondence T. G. Masaryk-Karel Kramář (Praha: Masarykův U´stav AV ČR, 2005), pp. 340 [March 18th, 1923], 343 [March 24th, 1919].

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More than a week before the swearing in, President Masaryk’s chancellor, Přemysl Šámal, announced to the press that the new government intended, in the near future, to invite the Germans to collaborate and to take their representatives into the legislature, the appointed Revolutionary National Assembly. A short time later, Šámal expanded upon these remarks by saying that even the question of German entry into government was under serious consideration. Until the fall of the old Kramář government, the differences of opinion within it regarding the Germans had remained unresolved. These differences pitted the Švehla wing of the Agrarian Party and the Socialists who wanted to reach an accommodation with the Germans against the National Democrats, the Christian Socials and the conservative wing of the Agrarian Party who wanted to assert Czech and Slovak dominance in the new state. Thus, although efforts at accommodation with the large and potentially powerful German minority had been obstructed from the outset, it now seemed that, with the change of government, the opportunity for Czech-German conciliation might be at hand. Šámal was careful to condition his remarks: “Prospects for collaboration did not depend on the Czechs alone”, he stated, “The Germans must renounce their negative attitude toward the Czechoslovak state…. If in accordance with their own party line they were prepared to ‘join in’ with corresponding Czech groups, then nothing stood in the way of assigning ‘any German a portfolio.” This last remark was clearly aimed at the German Social Democrats and the German Agrarians whose Czech counterparts would belong to the new governing coalition. On August 5th, Tusar confirmed Šámal’s remarks: “It is our sincere wish to call the Germans to active collaboration on the basis of expedient welfare legislation and democratic reforms, to win them as loyal fellow citizens and to offer them political respect.”⁷⁷ Given the complex and undoubtedly awkward steps required on the part of the Germans for such an abrupt transition from negation to collaboration, the new government might have been wiser to choreograph those steps solely in negotiations behind the scenes rather than with the glare of public attention. There were already bonds of personal trust between the German Agrarian leader Franz Křepek and both the Czech Interior Minister Švehla and President Masaryk, and based on their shared Austrian past there were certainly open channels of communication between the two Social Democratic parties. In any case, the German response, judged by the comments in their press, was minimal.⁷⁸

 Kracik, Jörg. Die Politik des deutschen Aktivismus in der Tschechoslowakei, 1920 – 1938 (Frankfurt am Main; New York: P. Lang, 1999), pp. 51– 52.  Kracik, J. Die Politik des deutschen Aktivismus …, p. 52– 53.

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From the outset, it had been the intention of the Czech political parties to hold elections to a constituent assembly which would draft the constitution. But with the prospects for collaboration with the Germans fading, attention turned to an alternative approach—to proceed without the Germans and assign the task of constitution-making to the appointed Revolutionary National Assembly. The decision to abandon parliamentary elections was taken neither lightly nor hastily. As late as May of 1919, Czech party leaders were still discussing the date for elections.⁷⁹ Even at the end of July, consistent with the ongoing hope for German collaboration, Masaryk responded in a press interview to the question of German participation: “Currently the new electoral law would be introduced and here it is a question whether later an agreement can be reached with the Germans,” he said. “The position of the present national assembly is peculiar. It came into being on a revolutionary basis. The intelligentsia and the party people have reached agreement without the participation of the Germans who at the time were hostile to this revolution. In recent political developments the Germans have once again distanced themselves from collaboration. It will depend upon the Germans whether they collaborate on the constitution”.⁸⁰ In late August the German diplomatic representative in Prague reported an intensification of anti-German sentiment. He wrote: “There seems to be a new wave of hatred toward the Germans coming across the land…. The display of good will on the part of the leading ministers in Tusar’s cabinet to create tolerable relations between Czechs and Germans and to avoid the Austrian misery of the nationality battles which hampered any productive work has not by a long shot penetrated into the mentality of the nation. I am hoping for a curative effect from the Germans’ entry into the future parliament. There it will be apparent that without the good will of the Germans, without their economic and cultural abilities, one cannot build up this state and get rid of the remnants of the old rotten economy. Fortunately, the leaders of the important German parties in the country, the Social Democrats and the Agrarians, are in agreement on the success of a promising program and even if they march separately, they will go into battle united…. Both groups have fortunately abandoned the deplorable ideas which the antiquated leaders of certain German bourgeois groups and grouplets propagate to sabotage the Czechoslovak state—ideas which especially some members of the former German Bohemian provincial government pleaded for in their despair and used in their agitation.”⁸¹  Kučera, Jaroslav. Minderheit im Nationalstaat; Die Sprachenfrage in den Tschechischen-Deutschen Beziehungen, 1918 – 1938 (Mü nchen: Oldenbourg, 2009).  Die Zeit [newspaper], July 31st, 1919. AKPR/8500/37/H/IV. část.  Alexander, M. Deutsche Gesandtschaftsberichte aus Prag, vol. I, num. ref. 67, pp. 188 – 189.

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Finally, on September 22nd, President Masaryk informed the German representative that the decision on drafting the constitution had been made. The German Embassy report to Berlin on this issue deserves to be quoted at length: “On September 22nd I was invited to tea at the Koloděje castle by the president of the republic. At the time the president was clearly extremely depressed by the burden of domestic political conditions and difficulties that seem to be insoluble, as had been evident before, so that it was natural that even with me he brought the conversation to this matter. “He complained especially about the political parties’ lack of discipline, the greed for office, the incompetence of party politicians who would be placed in key positions in technical ministries and the lack of a sense of national community and respect for authority in the people. At the same time, he admitted frankly that the greater part of the deficiencies, which he criticized, could be traced to forty years of opposition politics against the authorities of the Habsburg monarchy. For him the chauvinism of the National Democrats is an outrage. He likened it to a boulder which blocks the path to compromise with the Germans of the country and in the process obstructs the consolidation of the state and society. I noticed that the president of the republic was violently opposed to the party of the national bourgeoisie at the moment when that party sensed the prospects of the fall of the Tusar cabinet and had in mind to place at the top of a new coalition cabinet its own representatives, first and foremost among them the former finance minister, Dr. Rašín. The President called Dr. Rašín a Talmudist of chauvinism.⁸² “With a stubbornness heightened by this opposition he sticks grimly with the task which appears especially dear to his heart—to find a modus vivendi with the German Bohemians whom he in fact characterized as too conservative and blinded by backward, anti-republican ideas, but whose economic superiority in many fields (finance and industrial technology, for example) he recognized and whose respect for authority he praised. “In connection with these complaints the President explained to me the two methods which are under consideration for the solution of this special task and which could lead to success. The obvious legal way would be to call parliamentary elections on the basis of a fully democratic election law which worked well in the local elections and was also favorable for German interests and so to enable the Germans to participate in the deliberations on the constitution. “With this procedure the President feared that there would be wheeling and dealing, flare-ups and obstruction which could be detrimental to the matter-at-

 One versed in the dark lore of chauvinism, perhaps.

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hand. Therefore, he hoped for greater success through the dictate of a thoroughly liberal constitution which would give the Germans maximal rights. He believed the Tusar cabinet would be strong enough to gain acceptance for this constitution even with the present nationalistic mentality of the people and the political parties. The President seemed to me to be inwardly quite prepared for a dictatorial intervention⁸³, to take charge of the confusion and to achieve those things which he considers to be absolutely essential such as the introduction of German as the internal language of administration in the densely populated areas of German settlement. For Slovakia naturally a different, far less liberal election law should be introduced, since the people are politically and culturally immature.⁸⁴ “The unreserved frankness of these declarations which amount almost to a political confession is explained by his friendly relationship with me which dates from earlier times. During these declarations I mainly just listened. Yet I also did stress once again on this occasion the point of view which I have consistently held from the very beginning that the German government regards the issues of German Bohemia to be one of domestic policy. This point of view has determined my conduct. Naturally our interest in this central question of domestic Bohemian politics is not simply eliminated as a consequence. It would be foolish to pretend that one can be truly objective, but this emotional interest in the destiny of our linguistic and national comrades beyond the present-day borders has not the slightest thing in common with the interest which is expressed in the press and in the conduct of groups infected with Pan-Germanism. The president responded that he had no doubt of the loyalty of this statement and from our wish for loyalty he hoped for the best in the future development of our mutual relation.”⁸⁵ In a later conversation with Privy Councilor Wolf, Masaryk elaborated on the theme of proceeding with the appointed Revolutionary National Assembly and without German participation: “The Germans are now asserting that we should not enact a constitutional law without their participation. One wants that, but it can’t be done that way. We would never finish….

 “Dictatorial intervention” is an overstatement. President Masaryk lacked both the inclination and the political authority for dictatorial action. It might have been more accurate to say that he “was prepared to act forcefully”.  In general, the old monarchy in Hungary was far less advanced than Cisleithanian Austria. In the case of the Slovaks in northern Hungary they had suffered for decades from a lack educational institutions in the rural villages, and in the cities, when they did exist, they were exposed to efforts at forceful assimilation undertaken by the government.  Alexander, M. Deutsche Gesandtschaftsberichte aus Prag, vol. I, num. ref. 71, pp. 197– 198.

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“The wish of the Germans to collaborate on these laws is to be answered as follows: today the national assembly is nationalist and revolutionary. Whether they wish to be in this national assembly is more than doubtful. The demand is not unnatural. But how would their collaboration take place? Even if they succeeded outside of parliament, they would always be challenged. Even if the Germans were in the national assembly, they and the Czechs would not find common ground. Thus, we must first try to make the laws alone. “We will have the elections follow as quickly as possible. At most in two months they will take place. Everything will be weeded out of the elections law that might in any way encroach on the Germans. We absolutely want to have peace. You can’t have more liberal elections than we chose in our last local elections. It will be exactly so in the new elections to the legislative assembly. This legislative assembly can scrutinize the laws passed by the Revolutionary National Assembly and replace them with others. Their revision is always possible. But the Germans will be satisfied [Emphasis in the original]….” ⁸⁶ On the following day, October 7th, the evening edition of the National Democratic newspaper, Národní listy, reported: “On Saturday Dr. Kramář stated clearly with the agreement of the entire nationally minded Czech nation that ‘in this state we must be the masters and the Germans must get accustomed to that. All German supremacy must be eliminated. The Czech can never again be a citizen of second rank as he still is today in the mixed territories.⁸⁷ In this sense our nationality policy in the republic must change.’”⁸⁸ Only in December did the German party leaders seek out and meet with Prime Minister Tusar—the German Social Democrats led by Josef Seliger on December 10th, and the German bourgeois parties under the leadership of Rudolf Lodgman on December 12th. Both delegations demanded elections to a constituent assembly with the participation of all the nationalities. Tusar rejected their request pointing to the fact that until very recently they had had their own counter government, therefore there was no reason for their participation. The meetings of the Germans with Tusar had come too late. The decision to proceed without the Germans had long since been made. The constitution and five accompanying pieces of major legislation which had been under preparation for months, if not for most of the year, had already been completed and submitted to the national assembly. By December 10th, the day that the first of the Ger Alexander, M. Deutsche Gesandtschaftsberichte aus Prag, vol. I, num. ref. 54, footnote 3, pp. 158 – 159. Conversation occurred on September 30th, 1919.  This is a reference to the borderlands of Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia which were predominantly German in population with scattered Czech minorities.  Reported in Ráno [newspaper], October 9th, 1919: in NA, MZV-VA 1, Karton 3447.

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man parties sought entry into the constituent assembly, the constitutional committee of the Revolutionary National Assembly had already begun its work. In his conversation with the German representative on September 22nd Masaryk had spoken of a thoroughly liberal constitution which would give the Germans maximal rights. He expressed confidence that the Tusar government would be strong enough to gain acceptance for this constitution. And, as noted, he ended his conversation with Privy Councilor Wolf by saying that the Germans will be satisfied. In that same conversation Masaryk referred specifically to two proposals that dealt with issues fundamental to relations between the Germans and the Czechs which would be dealt with in the constitutional deliberations: the language law which he characterized as most important for the Germans, and an administrative law which would introduce separate regions in which the Germans would be accommodated.⁸⁹ In addition to the constitutional document itself, both these legislative initiatives were central to the program which faced the Revolutionary National Assembly in late 1919 and early 1920, both sought to grapple with the knotty issues of ethnicity in a multi-ethnic society and both are dealt with below in some detail.⁹⁰ Privilege is inherent in the concept of the nation state, the privilege of the dominant nation and the subordinate status of all the others. Such privilege need not extend to every realm of social intercourse. In the First Czechoslovak Republic, universal suffrage and the universal obligation to military service are two prime examples to the contrary. Language usage on the other hand was based on a fundamental inequality. Under the language law as finally adopted, Czechs and Slovaks in their dealings with state officials were free to use their own languages anywhere in the territory of the Czechoslovak state. Use of minority languages, on the other hand, was restricted to those judicial districts where a minority reached the threshold of 20 % or more of the local population. The inequity was evident and resented. In the monarchy, Czechs had consistently called for complete equality of Czech and German. Now they chose to elevate Czech and Slovak to a privileged position. Had the new state been constitutionally organized in all its provisions as the multi-ethnic society that it actually was, all languages, Czech and Slovak included, would have been subject to a common threshold of usage. Such a system would have conferred two immediate benefits—equity and a powerful incentive  Alexander, M. Deutsche Gesandtschaftsberichte aus Prag, vol. I, num. ref. 54, footnote 3, pp. 158 – 159.  Law of February 29th, 1920, according to Article 129 of the Constitution by which Language Rights in the Czechoslovak Republic Are Established; and Law of February 29th, 1920, on the Establishment of Provincial and District Authorities in the Czechoslovak Republic.

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to work toward reducing the common threshold of language usage—but such a system would have worked to the disadvantage of the Czech minorities in the predominantly German border regions wherever they failed to meet the required threshold. After decades in the old monarchy, when German held a privileged position and Czech was restricted in its application, there was limited inclination in the Czech public at large to grant an equal role to other languages in the new republic and absolutely no inclination to restrict the use of Czech. Initially, however, under transitional law adopted at the outset of the revolution, Czech and German were left on an equal footing as in Austrian law, if not in Austrian practice. Only later in the summer of 1919 did the Tusar government assign to the Ministry of Interior the task of drafting new language legislation. Thus, the process of replacing past practice began.⁹¹ Up until then in the German territories German had continued as the inner language of administration, the language which government officials used in dealing with one another, and the outer language of administration, that is, the language used in dealing with the public. In the Language Law of February 29th, 1920—an integral part of the constitutional legislation adopted for the Republic—the Czechoslovak language was granted the status of the state, official language and was established as the internal language of administration throughout the country. These provisions in the Constitution would inevitably impact the standing of the minorities in general and the hiring, retention, promotion and enforced early retirement of German state employees as well. The language issue was fraught with many consequences, not the least of them the even-handedness with which it was handled and the consequent legitimacy of the new state in the eyes of its minorities. In an interview with the German press in early September, Masaryk addressed the issue of language. He proposed that in the Czech lands three languages—Czech, German and in Silesia also Polish—must be official languages. By the term “official language” Masaryk intended that government officials would use the language of a majority of the population which they served. At this level of administration officials would correspond with one another in their own language, and in effect, the local language would be the inner language of administration. The central authorities in turn would correspond with other officials in the language of those officials. At the primary level of administration, the community and the district, single language offices would be permitted. In its permissiveness Masaryk’s proposal, although lacking in essential

 Kučera, J. Minderheit im Nationalstaat …, p. 26.

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details, was far more generous than the terms of language usage recommended to the Revolutionary National Assembly by the Tusar government. Later in the interview Masaryk commented: “The Bohemian question, the Bohemian German question, is in my eyes in the first place a social question, namely that the elimination of language and national conflict should contribute to social progress. We are not so naive as to believe that an independent Bohemia can survive alongside Germany if its German population feels dissatisfied over a long period of time.”⁹² In late July or August, the government called upon the ministry of interior to begin the process of drafting language legislation. In the coming weeks the greatest blow to Masaryk’s concept of language policy would come not from the ranks of the opposition in the National Assembly but from the Tusar government itself. Perhaps one early indication of this appears in a press interview with President Masaryk. Asked how Germans would be assured the right to use of their language before the courts up to the highest court, Masaryk responded, “I don’t yet have a report on the language law. For myself I wish, and I support that the Germans will receive full rights and that they will not be abridged in the slightest. There can and should be no talk of oppression or Czechization.”⁹³ In the efforts to consolidate the new state there were two broad approaches to the issue of language usage. Masaryk recognized the need for a majority language at the state level but opposed establishing it in the constitution. He expected it would gain its central role through its “natural political, cultural and economic significance”.⁹⁴ This was the most accommodating approach granting maximal access to the people in their own language when dealing with the government. The Tusar government, thus virtually all the coalition parties, favored a single official language—Czech at first and a fictional Czechoslovak in the later version—to be imposed throughout the territory of the state. The use of minority languages, any other language than Czech or Slovak, was to be restricted to clearly defined conditions. This was a top-down approach which reinforced the central authority of the state and the primacy of the Czechoslovak nation. The government’s proposal was completely at odds with Masaryk’s thinking. He had shared in efforts of the government to define language policy and had characterized the issue as the most important for the Germans. But on September 12th, he informed the cabinet that he was withdrawing from the efforts to craft the  Berlinertagblatt und Handelszeitung [newspaper], September 12th, 1919. Berlin State Library, Prussian Cultural Heritage Collection, https://zefys.staatsbibliothek-berlin.de/list/title/zdb/ 27646518/-/1919/#sep (Accessed June 16, 2021).  Die Zeit, July 31, 1919. AKPR 8500/37/H/IV část.  Kučera, J. Minderheit im Nationalstaat …, p. 38 – 39.

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legislation.⁹⁵ On December 2nd the government approved the language bill along with the draft constitution and other accompanying legislation, all of which were then sent to the Constitutional Committee. One issue which arose early in the Committee’s discussions was the question whether to use the term “Czechoslovak” or “Czech and Slovak” to describe the official language of the republic. In later private correspondence, Masaryk wrote at some length about the relations between the two languages and his observations then are of interest in the present context. He wrote: “I have no doubt that Slovak is a dialect of Czech, or that Slovak and Czech are two dialects of which one, Czech, is in written form more improved and grammatically refined. If I am not mistaken, every Slavic language has its own accented rhythm. Slovak has the same accent as Czech, they are grammatically also identical and finally there are only slight differences in their vocabulary. In practical terms a Slovak child understands a Czech one and vice-versa, a farmer understands another farmer and so forth. However, the moral and political significance of Slovak is not determined by this fact. “Above all Slovak, though but little different from Czech, is for the Slovak the mother tongue and therefore held dear. To be sure the written language is everywhere artificial and hence the significance of the dialect and the peculiarities of the language as spoken in the family…. Up to now Czechs have been and are weak in culture and literature, and therefore their attraction for the Slovaks is weak. Both Czechs and Slovaks have needed and need the German language for their culture…. “I have already once voiced the wish that the Slovak language should have its place in poetry, especially in lyrical verse. In academic writing Slovaks could write in Czech so that they would buy and read more Czech scientific books. I know that now at the beginning of our cohabitation the Slovaks would try to the gain even academic recognition in their own language, but it is up to the Czechs to demonstrate to the Slovaks in open competition and by the quality of their writing the benefits of a single written language. As far as poetry is concerned, even the Germans have their Fritz Reuter and the French their Mistral.⁹⁶ French literary historians do not assigned Mistral a place in their own literature, but they have accepted his main work which the poet himself has translated into

 Kučera Kučera, J. Minderheit im Nationalstaat …, p. 44.  A popular German novelist (1810 – 1874) who wrote in Low German. Gounod’s Mireille (1864), an opera still in the active repertoire, is based on the poem Mireio of Frédéric Mistral.

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French and Gounod has popularized by his opera. From this example both Czechs and Slovaks can learn something worthwhile….”⁹⁷ The original draft of the Language Law indicated that Czech alone was the official language, but that was later amended to Czechoslovak in subcommittee and accordingly the term Czechoslovak language was incorporated into the text of the constitution as well. The terminology was not primarily linguistic but rather political, since behind the terms “Czechoslovak” and “Czech and Slovak” lay the question whether the two peoples constituted a single Czechoslovak nation or two separate nations. Implicit in these discussions was the Czech determination to assert the numerical dominance of the Czech nation, fortified now with the Slovak numbers in a Czechoslovak nation which constituted two thirds of the country’s entire population. The Germans were slightly less than one quarter of the whole.⁹⁸ The term “Czechoslovak” prompted objections in the Slovak Club, which spilled over to the general debate in the constitutional committee and very quickly became the topic of tense discussions. On January 14th, deputy Ľudevít Medvecký of the Slovak Club, commented on the issue: “I would recommend leaving the original wording of ‘Czech and Slovak’, because the alternative could be poorly received by some members of our club and while in the language law there is mention of a Czechoslovak language, it was accepted only with certain reservations and still has not been adequately resolved in subcommittee. In the language law it said that the official language of the republic is Czechoslovak, that is Czech and Slovak. This would lead to differences of opinion now. I propose that the original text remain.” The following discussion ensued: Department head, Ministry of Interior, Professor Dr. Hoetzel: “It was emphatically recommended to me that I should advocate the view that it must be ‘Czechoslovak’. The minister charged me with this. These are the orders he gave me and I must act on his directive.” Chairman: “We can’t act as referees between the government and the Slovak Club. We will have to settle the matter with a consistent language law. We could adopt the paragraph and make a reservation for amending the word ‘Czechoslovak’ or ‘Czech and Slovak’”. Deputy Dr. Dérer, Slovak Club : “I have an amendment to propose, that is instead of the formulation ‘The Czechoslovak language is the official language  Letter of Masaryk to Professor V. Chaloupecký, November 19, 1930. AÚTGM.f.TGM [Archivu Ústavu Tomáše Garrigua Masaryka], Korespondence II, část 78. Cited in part in Anthony Zbyněk‘s, Edvard Beneš: politicky´ životopis (Praha: Mlada´ fronta, 2009) pp. 57– 58.  Broklová, Eva. První československá ústava: Diskuse v ústavním výboru v lednu a únoru 1920 (Praha: U´stav pro soudobe´ dějiny ČAV, 1992), pp. 67– 74, passim.

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of the Republic’ there should be the ‘Czech and Slovak language’. Personally, neither I nor my colleague Medvecký have any objections to the proposals of the subcommittee, but in the Club this met with opposition, since it was said that a Czechoslovak language actually doesn’t exist, but both the Czech and the Slovak languages do exist and that this formulation would not express what they wish, namely that the Slovak language is on an equal footing with the Czech language.” Interior Minister Švehla: “Were we to assume the point of view which Dr. Dérer holds, we would have to change the entire construction and we would have to hold to the original text. We made this change in the subcommittee assuming that in fact we were accommodating the gentlemen of the Slovak Club. If the outcome of the discussions in the Slovak Club is that it must be divided (into ‘Czech and Slovak’), then I ask that we be permitted to postpone the discussion so that tomorrow we can present you with the original text from which this language came.” Deputy Medvecký: “I think a solution may be found which would accommodate both the demands of the Slovak Club and the objection of the minister if we were to say: the Czechoslovak language, that is the Czech and the Slovak language—this would be in parentheses—is the official language, etc.” Chairman: “That won’t do.” Interior Minister Švehla: “Then we would have to say either the ‘Czecho-Slovak language’ with the two words separated by a hyphen, or else it should stay as it is here. We have debated over this matter for a long time. There were philological doubts, but we managed to dispel them. A uniform language is in fact already arising. Minister Šrobár showed me a letter of which no one could say if it was Czech or Slovak. This will certainly be the trend especially in Bratislava. If we form one nationality and if we say Czechoslovak, anyone would ask: what is this. If we managed to create this for the nation and the state, so it should be entirely possible to do the same for the language. In fact, it’s just two dialects. I believe that this solution is the simplest solution and the best way out of the matter.” When the Agrarian Deputy, Dr. Bohdan Zahradník, spoke next, the gloves came off. Deputy Dr. Zahradník: “I say openly to my Slovak colleagues that it is especially painful for me. I assumed that with our unification especially the Slovak intelligentsia will come to see that the wedge driven between us by Hungary has been set aside and that we are one body and one soul. Indeed, people around Strážnice, Hodonín and Slovenský Brod [in eastern Moravia at the Slovak border] speak just like you and it wouldn’t occur to anyone that they weren’t our blood. It’s also justified ethnographically and just as formerly French was the official language and it existed alongside Provençal so I assumed that the Slovak

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intelligentsia would urge the people to say: We are one nation, we speak one language and just as I wouldn’t recognize Ukrainians as a truly independent nation and would consider their language as a dialect of the Russian language, so too I cannot acknowledge that the Slovaks are an independent nation and their language is an independent language. I wanted to propose the same as my colleague Švehla that this matter be postponed but I would like to offer my Slovak brethren a heart-felt wish that the Slovak Club consider the matter thoroughly, because, gentlemen, forgive me, it will elicit in the Czech nation not revulsion but pain, for anyone with a bit of intelligence will see in it a schism between the two of us. We would like to show you, if for no other reason than to disprove the old principle of divide et impera that what happened to you some decades ago was calculated only to weaken you,⁹⁹ to tear you from the big Czech body, to make you a small nation in order to then strangle and engulf you. I ask that in the Slovak Club you see to it that the Slovak Club accedes to our point of view or at least to the compromise ‘Czecho-Slovak’, but that you don’t make two nations out of one and two languages out of one.” Deputy Dr. Josef Dolanský, Czechoslovak Peoples’ Party: “Taking into account the minister’s declaration, I formally propose that negotiations be interrupted so that the gentlemen of the Slovak Club may take our reasons into consideration and give us their decision as soon as possible. This is a delicate matter. Perhaps with further debate we might take on a disturbing tone. They themselves know that this matter is important for us and for them, for outer unity, and I will make a request as did my colleague Zahradník that they consider the matter well and then definitely resolve this question.” Legislative reporter and Czechoslovak Agrarian, František Hnídek: “I would like to ask the gentlemen of the Slovak Club that they make clear that the original wording was ‘Czech language’. With the current wording we wanted to express that Slovak is placed on a level with Czech. We wished to accommodate the Slovak Club and indicate to them that Czech not even formally should have priority before Slovak and we insist that there is a simple parity between the Czech and Slovak dialects.” Deputy Medvecký: “I agree with the postponement and declare that we will negotiate this matter still today and I would like to ask that Minister Švehla come to these discussions. I and my colleague Dérer acknowledge that the proposed wording is fully and only just, that no wrong is done to the Slovak language, but we must represent a standpoint which our opponents in the Slovak Club brought forward against our will.”

 Presumably, through the creation of literary Slovak.

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Chairman: “Who agrees with the proposal of our colleague Dolanský that we postpone this issue? Adopted unanimously.” The committee to which the discussion now returned was unique among the political committees in the Revolutionary National Assembly. Unlike the Czech party clubs, its membership was not based on party affiliation nor determined by a variation of Švehla′s key, that is, by extrapolation from the outcome of the elections to the Austrian Reichsrat in 1911. There had been elections to the Hungarian parliament in 1910 but not on the basis of universal suffrage. Formidable property qualifications and outright rigging were characteristics of parliamentary elections in old Hungary. Only a handful of Slovaks had ever served in the parliament in Budapest. Instead of appointment based on the last pre-war election to the Hungarian Parliament, appointment of the members to the Slovak Club was assigned to Dr. Vavro Šrobár, an ardent Czechoslovak and the only Slovak in the government at the time. The Slovak delegation to the Revolutionary National Assembly that resulted from this process was simply unrepresentative. Šrobár appointed forty deputies to the Slovak Club. As deputy Dr. Karol Kmeťko, soon to be Roman Catholic Bishop of Nitra, wrote in the newspaper, Slovak, only ten of those appointed were Catholic and thirty were Protestant, although in Slovakia Catholics were 80 % of the population and Protestants less than 20 %. Even more striking, only four of the ten Catholics were supporters of the Slovak Peoples Party¹⁰⁰, reconstituted in December of 1918 under the leadership of Father Andrej Hlinka and later to emerge as the leading political party in Slovakia and the champion of Slovak autonomy. In March of 1919, membership in the Slovak Club was increased to fifty-five, but the enlargement scarcely rectified the original problem. Religious denomination had clear political implications. In the 1830s and 1840s, modern written Slovak had come into being. Initially, Slovak Protestants who used the Czech Kralice Bible from the 16th-century in their services and hymns preferred to base the written language on a western Slovak dialect. The young Protestant pastor, Ľudevit Štúr, persuaded his followers to support the choice of a central Slovak dialect, something more amenable to Slovak Catholics. The choice was purely political and not linguistic, but it assured the success of the new written Slovak language. Latent tensions between the two religious communities, nonetheless, persisted and, not surprisingly, resurfaced with the establishment of the Czechoslovak state. Broadly speaking, Slovak Protestants, heavily represented in the population of western Slovakia, tended to be Czecho-

 Sidor, Karol. Slovenská politika na pôde pražského snemu (1918 – 1938) (Bratislava: Na´kladom kni´htlačiarne ”Andreja”, 1943), vol. I, p. 36.

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slovak in their political orientation, while Slovak Catholics, far less attracted to Prague, were keener in their sensitivity to a separate Slovak identity. The demand for Slovak autonomy would soon be the main political slogan of the Slovak Peoples’ Party. On October 16th deputy Dérer reported in the constitutional committee that the Slovak Club had accepted the wording of the Czechoslovak language promoted by minister Švehla and the Tusar government.¹⁰¹ For the moment at least, the status of the Slovak language had been successfully subordinated to Czech national interests. The issue was symbolic, as it frequently is in ethnic conflict when legitimacy is brought into question, in this case the legitimacy of a separate Slovak identity. But the underlying consideration of Czech predominance in the new state meant that the issue of language orthodoxy would remain vibrant over time. This was apparent in the year 1925 when a bureaucratic brouhaha erupted between the State Statistical Office and the Ministry of Schools precisely on the question of language terminology.¹⁰² In its publications dealing with the schools, the State Statistical Office had in the past used the terms “schools with a Czech language of instruction” and “schools with a Slovak language of instruction.” Now with a new publication pending on industrial and technical schools, the Ministry of Schools and National Enlightenment intervened and insisted that the term “Czechoslovak language of instruction” be used instead. This the State Statistical Office rejected on the grounds that in the past it had consistently used the terms “Czech or Slovak language”. This practice, it insisted, merely adopts “a principle which today is generally recognized that we are one nation which speaks two languages, Czech and Slovak. Nor does this conflict with the Language Law, which to be sure in its first paragraph establishes that the Czechoslovak language is the state, official language of the Republic, but in its fourth paragraph expressly stipulates that officials in the Czech lands will as a rule officiate in Czech and officials in Slovakia in Slovak. We also assume that use of the expression ‘Czechoslovak language’ will unnecessarily provoke Slovak autonomists and give them the pretext for the untruthful assertion that in general there are no schools with the Slovak language of instruction and that the government is Czechizing the Slovaks by introducing in the schools in

 Broklová, E. První československá ústava …, p. 81.  Letter of the State Statistical Office to the Presidium of the Ministerial Council, February 7th, 1925; Communication of the Presidium of the Ministerial Council to the Ministry of Interior, February 16th, 1925; and Circular of the Ministry of Interior of May 6th, 1925: SUA, MV, K 1487, od. 14, č. 1, podč. 11.

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Slovakia the Czechoslovak language which of course from their lips will be changed in this case to Czech.” The Ministry of Schools and National Enlightenment rejected these arguments and insisted on the term “Czechoslovak language of instruction”. The State Statistical Office then turned to the government for a resolution of the issue. After consulting with the Ministry of Interior, the cabinet issued its ruling. The formulation “Czechoslovak language” was to be used exclusively and the expressions “Czech language” and “Slovak language” were to be dropped. When necessary to distinguish between Czech and Slovak, only such formulations were to be used which did not express the view that Czech and Slovak were two languages but also did not express the view that they were two separate dialects. With regard to educational establishments, the phrases to be used were: an educational establishment with the “state language of instruction” or with the “Czechoslovak language of instruction”. When it is necessary to make the distinction, the formulation was to be: “state language of instruction/Czech version” or “in Czech” and “state language of instruction/Slovak version” or “in Slovak”. The independent Slovak language was now all but bureaucratically embalmed and the Germans as a consequence apparently reduced to a more manageable minority. Yet in the streets and in their homes, people continued to speak Czech or Slovak as they had in the past. A more threatening challenge to the Language Law as proposed by the government came from the National Democrats and the Christian Socials. It was the National Democrats who took the lead against the Language Law. The difference in approach between the National Democrats and the government cannot be measured from left to right on an ideological spectrum. There were instances where Dr. Kramář, the leader of the National Democrats, was more liberal in the measures which he supported than the government would allow in its own proposals. What separated Kramář and the government was the difference in their understanding of the purpose of the legislation.¹⁰³ The government saw the legislation as a skeleton law to be supplemented and fleshed out by subsequent ordinances as relations between Czechs and Germans improved, something which moderate nationalists believed would occur with time. For Kramář, who did not believe the Germans would ever willingly come to terms with the new reality, the law was to be the final word, the system of the new order cast in stone, something which the Germans would be forced to confront and learn to respect. That hard line approach brings to mind Masaryk’s cautionary note: “We are

 Kučera, J. Minderheit im Nationalstaat …, p. 53.

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not so naive as to believe that an independent Bohemia can survive alongside Germany if its Germans feel dissatisfied for a long period of time.” The contrast between the two approaches is apparent in an exchange which occurred on February 26th during the final hours of debate on the language law.¹⁰⁴ Dr. Hnídek, legislative reporter for the language law, reported a proposed provision for that law put forward by Dr. Kramář that stated: “State officials as well as officials of state institutions and state enterprises must have a complete command of the Czechoslovak language, both spoken and in writing.” Dr. Hnídek reported that the government was opposed to this provision and wished to regulate the question by ordinance rather than in the law. The Minister of Justice, František Veselý of the Czech Progressive Party, spoke next for the government: “I ask you gentlemen not to adopt this paragraph, not that the provision merits rejection but that I do not consider it appropriate to put it in a constitutional law. Clearly the government will require of all officials knowledge of Czech and German, but today’s conditions are such that this provision cannot be carried out for a number of years. Three quarters of our court officials are Germans who don’t know Czech. They will have to learn it. Some German won’t be able to learn it. His speaking ability is such that for him some words cannot be pronounced. The government will decide according to Czech nationality but also according to actual needs…. Through this provision all German officials who know they must learn Czech and don’t learn would be concerned for their families. They would know that within five years they must go on pension, because they can’t learn Czech. We must not turn the mood even more against us. I ask you not to put this provision into basic state law but leave it to the government to require knowledge of Czech in official practice.” Dr. Kramář responded: “You think it’s impossible to require Czechoslovak officials to learn this language in five years. Is it something peculiar, this wretched Czech language? If someone can’t say ř,¹⁰⁵ that’s no misfortune. Indeed, you have exceptions: ‘Exceptions in implementation which are necessary in the interest of uninterrupted administration may be permitted by ordinance for the period of five years from the day that the law takes effect’…. “You say make a special law. You are afraid to say something today and I don’t know why. Do you want the Germans to start wrecking havoc and we won’t be able to implement it? Why don’t you do it right away? Don’t you know the psychology of the Germans, that they will shout at you if you don’t

 APS, P-ČR [Archiv Poslanecké sněmovny Parlamentu České republiky]-AFS, RNS, 160. VÚ, 26. 2.1920a, pp. 16 – 17.  The soft r – ř – is a particularly difficult consonant for foreigners to pronounce.

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speak clearly? …. What are you afraid of? It’s fear of these Germans. Why do I want to have it in law? Since everyone will see that you can’t do anything about it and then every German will try to learn.”¹⁰⁶ This was not simply a debate over an abstract principle. In 1924 the number of state employees was recorded at nearly 350,000, who together with their dependents, accounted for more than one in ten citizens of the Republic.¹⁰⁷ At stake in terms for the acquisition and knowledge of the Czech or Slovak languages by state officials, and in the course of later debate by state employees, were potentially tens of thousands of German and other minority jobs in the state service and to a large extent as a consequence the economic well-being of entire ethnic communities. On this issue the government ultimately was able to defend its position. The law in its final wording stated: “More detailed regulations regarding the obligation of state officials and employees and officials and employees of state institutions and enterprises to have a command of Czechoslovak will be established by ordinance.” Also pertinent to this debate was the fact that immediately after the remarks of Justice Minister Veselý on behalf of the government position, his colleague in the governing coalition, the Agrarian deputy Zahradník, strongly objected: “I don’t agree in everything with the Minister of Justice. We should not retreat from this requirement which in my view is so vital for the character of our state. In old Austria I debated with the minister of railways about this. When I explained that it is difficult to learn a second language, it was of course like talking to a blank wall…. Whoever has a little bit of good will can learn even the most difficult second language in five years. We won’t hold it against someone if he can’t say ř or ť, but rather it is a matter that that person is aware that he is in the services of the Czechoslovak state and if a Czech comes to Cheb, they don’t send him to someone else with a chuckle and ‘Ich verstehe nicht.”¹⁰⁸ This was by no means the only occasion when a member of the governing coalition clashed with the official government position. In its initial wording, the Language Law opened with the statement that Czechoslovak is the official, principal language of the Republic. In his opening remarks to the Constitutional Committee, Interior Minister Švehla explained the use of the term “principal language”: “We understand that in fact Czech is the principal language and the other language is mentioned because we have a minority population. It logically follows: there is a minority and we grant it rights. Let’s not make ostrich-like pol-

 APS, P-ČR-AFS, RNS, 160, VÚ, 26. 2.1920a, pp. 21– 22.  Kučera, J. Minderheit im Nationalstaat …, p. 246.  APS, P-ČR-AFS, RNS, 160. VÚ, 26. 2.1920a, p. 17.

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itics and say it quite calmly: Various businesses will be conducted also in other languages…. Paragraph 2 states clearly and precisely when another language can legally be introduced in administration. We have adopted a position that that right arises in a certain administrative district… and we have specified precisely that if the number of members of another nationality reaches 20 % it can seek its rights in that district in its own language. We have adopted a fully practical point of view, namely that language is here to mediate citizens’ relations to the state, to enable them to seek their rights in court and in the administration…. In this way administration in another language comes about…. Our legislature without the presence of the Germans, of its own will, has decided upon this great step and on this most pressing matter has undertaken one of the greatest deeds since it grants it itself without the any sort of pressure.”¹⁰⁹ To this statement of the Minister, the Agrarian Deputy Hnídek, who was acting as the government’s legislative reporter on the legislation, responded: “As reporter I insist that in Article 1 the word ‘principal’ be stricken…” He argued against the government’s language that the term “principal official language of all state officials” will mean also recognizing the non-principal languages of all state offices, “that is German in all state offices—and we don’t want that. If we leave it, it would follow that in state offices German and Magyar are also official languages. I emphatically propose that the word ‘principal’ be stricken.” At this point the committee chairman declared the debate closed: “since indeed the matter is such that certain clarifications are necessary, it will be better to postpone the vote than to conduct it in such chaos.” To this Hnídek agreed. Zahradník and Hnídek were both Agrarian deputies who belonged to the conservative wing of their party. Like the more nationalist deputies in the Czech National Socialist Party, reflecting that party’s rather schizophrenic ambivalence between its socialism and its nationalism, the conservative Agrarians could not be relied upon to consistently support the government position where language was concerned. In this sense the discipline of the coalition government parties was rather fragile, in contrast to Masaryk’s judgment that the Tusar government would be strong enough to gain acceptance for a thoroughly liberal constitution “even with the present nationalistic mentality of the people and the political parties.” The lack of discipline is the more striking in that the electoral system of proportional representation, familiar to Czechs from Austrian times and adopted in the new constitution, consistently produces coalition cabinets for which party discipline is essential in assuring orderly government.

 Broklová, E. První československá ústava …, pp. 75 – 81 passim.

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The language issue that ignited perhaps the greatest passion was characterization of the Czechoslovak language—opposed to the minority languages—as the official language as the government proposed, or the state language as the opposition insisted. Neither term had a precise legal definition, but the issue was not a legal one. Rather, it was a question of moderation or insisting on ethnic ascendancy. On January 16th, the second day of discussion of the Language Law in the Constitutional Committee, an early exchange between the National Democratic Deputy, Dr. Brabec, and Interior Minister Švehla set the stage for this debate.¹¹⁰ Deputy Brabec expressed concern that on the previous day the idea was put forward that “we are giving the Germans more than we are obliged to according to the peace treaty” and “we would do better if we were to adhere strictly to the provisions of the peace treaty.” He continued: “There will always be complaints. Let the Germans battle with us. We will have an advantageous political position, which you would throw away today, toward an enemy who has an unchanged mentality as he had when he oppressed us. Germans are incorrigible and I would favor that we resolve this entire law on the basis of the Peace Treaty and that we give only what we must.” Interior Minister Švehla responded: “In effect there begins once again today a general debate not at all about the language agenda but about politics in general and what we might write into the law. We’ve beaten the Germans and we’d like them to do daily penance. It’s appalling. We are working on a law that is supposed to deal in practical terms with the official language, but what we care more about is this: We’ll write into the law that you are defeated. That’s horrible. The whole world knows the Germans are defeated…” Deputy Brabec: “They don’t know!” Interior Minister Švehla: “… and if they don’t know, perhaps you think that here you are going to mash it into their brains…. Here it is a question of knowing what is Czechoslovak, German, etc. and what are their rights. That is clear and let’s not open up a political debate.” The government withdrew the language bill from committee in late January, but when discussion resumed in late February the issue immediately reemerged. On the afternoon of February 25th, the debate was taken up in the Constitutional Committee.¹¹¹ Deputy and legislative reporter Hnídek framed the issue at hand. The legislation as it stood provided that “The Czechoslovak language is the official language of the Republic.” Others put forward an alternative proposal that

 Broklová, E. První československá ústava, pp. 82– 83.  APS, P-ČR-AFS, RNS, 159. VÚ, 25. 2.1920b, pp. 28 – 32.

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the words “official language” be replaced by the words “state language.” Finally, there was a compromise proposal that the law read, “The Czechoslovak language is the state (official) language of the republic.” Hnídek explained that those who favored the word “official” invoked the original French text of the Treaty where the word “officielle” is used. A further complication was the translation of “officielle” into Czech. There were two options: the Slavic word “úřední“ or its equivalent, the Czech loan word, “oficiální”. The Ministry of Foreign affairs had translated the word as “úřední” which, Foreign Minister Beneš interjected, was a bad translation. Finally, Hnídek pointed out that the word in the Austrian treaty was translated with the German term “Staatssprache”.¹¹² Around this linguistic potpourri there emerged a heated debate. Hnídek called upon Dr. Beneš to speak first. Dr. Beneš opened by stating that: “I argue this matter on a purely legal basis and justify my point of view only legally. Above all there are political reasons which are to be deduced from this legal basis.” He pointed out that in many places the translation of the peace treaties was incorrect and it would be necessary to review the entire translation and put it on a legal basis. From the viewpoint of foreign policy, it would be correct to “use the same word that is in the Peace Treaty”. “For me,” he said, “the question of ‘official’ or ‘state’ seems to be a question of terminology. There is a difference between German-Hungarian terminology and western terminology. For me, it is preferable to use western, French terminology, since it is suitable on all sides and I assume that we should rid ourselves of the old Austrian and Hungarian terminology. We know how we battled against the term ‘Staatssprache’, because we knew what Austria and Hungary and Germany meant by it, namely forceful Germanization. In view of the fact that we willingly accepted this treaty and since the word ‘officielle’ can in no sense be harmful, it is in our interest to use this terminology.” Finally, he pointed out, an editorial committee was established at the Peace Conference which was designed to give legal interpretations for matters that might lead to terminological or practical controversy. Beneš understood the “official” language as the language which would represent Czechoslovakia in negotiations abroad, but nothing would imply “forcing another language on someone of a different nationality.” If anything, forceful was imputed to the word “official”, which the Germans would instantly perceive as having the same connotations as “Staatssprache” and there would be no reason to use the word “state” language, since you would already have the same

 This is the German term for ‘state language’.

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thing. Beneš saw it as a practical matter that “we don’t give the Germans an opportunity to cause us trouble.” On the other hand, if one wished to give the term “official” a meaning less pregnant than the term “state language”, then it might give the Germans “an opportunity to seize upon something in our constitutional laws and cause us problems with the allies, before the League of Nations, etc. I consider it politically disadvantageous if we were to give up this term.” ”Today the situation is favorable, tomorrow it will change, and we can’t know what the trends will be and how the people will be judging these things. I would not like to commit the prestige of the nation in matters in which a priori we might be at a disadvantage, especially when the Germans might cite from the old arsenal, which we used to invoke and which proved so effective in Austria, and turn all that against us. They wouldn’t forget to offer evidence: See, they were the first to smash the old Austria and they use the same terminology as we. For these reasons of foreign policy, I would defend the view of using the word official.” Beneš’ reasoning was logical and practical, but also defensive. The word “official” would invite the fewest German complaints. It would insulate against criticism. Deputy Dr. Kramář attacked the central idea: “The foreign minister will forgive me if I tell him that I can’t accede to his line of reasoning…. The foreign minister has said that there is a difference between western and German-Hungarian terminology. That is entirely correct, and I must only add that we also must adopt German-Hungarian terminology, since it concerns us. When we make a law for the Czech lands, we are not making it for Paris. What they think about it is, for me, a matter of indifference, since I can’t launch into an explication of a term which, for them, is simply unclear and which has, as I have seen, a long list of translations. If I want to make a precise law, I must think in the mentality by which our nation thinks as well as the Germans or the Magyars.” At this point the speaker asked that a further part of his speech not be recorded. Kramář stated in conclusion: “I cannot accede to this line of reasoning and ask that our language be the state language of the Czechoslovak republic. I do not fear to appear before a foreign forum, since when I point to this provision which is in this law and compare it with what they have proscribed for us, everyone will see that we aren’t ruffians but that we wish to live in peace, but I repeat that the state is ours and we therefore are the state nation.” And this applied for the Slovaks as well, although in Kramář’s formulation these recently liberated people were now completely subsumed within the Czech nation.¹¹³ “I wish for the Slovaks that they have a state consciousness and that

 APS, P-ČR-AFS, RNS, 159. VÚ, 25. 2.1920b, 38 – 40.

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they realize that they are a state nation, but I don’t wish thereby to do violence to other nations. All I want is for them to free themselves from the Magyar yoke and say to themselves that within this Czech nation they are a state nation, which in Hungary they never were and never would be. In Hungary, they would remain as they were before.” Kramář later returned to the theme of language terminology: “If you say that the Germans will defend themselves from history, please forgive me, but that is possible. Why? Because in the government’s original proposal there was ‘official’ and then ‘principle language.’ That aroused our greatest protest. That is, it said that this ‘officielle’ has a catch.¹¹⁴ It goes without saying that the Germans know this original proposal. If the assembly were to say: I want to adopt this ‘officielle’—which the government has always wanted—they [the Germans] would interpret that in a way to which we could not agree. As it is today the Germans have no reason to make any sort of interpretation, since they themselves have translated the word as ‘Staatssprache’ and in doing so have said themselves what they understood by the word ‘officielle’. Besides, do what you will, the Germans will always see a provocation in it.” Finally, Kramář turned to what actually lay behind the debate over language terminology—the issue of ethnic ascendancy. As the Minister of Justice had said, “We are surrounded by enemies.” Kramář readily acknowledged, “Yes we are, as everyone knows and as everyone also knows you won’t improve this situation by concessions to the Germans. Do what you want, speak to them perhaps angelically. Just as soon as they come to power, you will see how they think of it. Whatever you do will make no difference to them. I agree with you that we shouldn’t do violence to anyone, but what I propose isn’t the slightest sort of violence. You know, when you came with proposals which prevented actual violence, I was the first for it. But when I have grown up with this, when I have been against it for twenty-five years, when I know what it is and what it means in the life of two nations, don’t be surprised that I see to it that we really are the state, since our entire minority policy depends upon it. We must make every one of our members in the minority territory feel that behind them stands the entire state with its authority, that their Czech national identity should no longer be a sacrifice for them and that the great sacrifices which they are making must also have a little compensation. Only then will our minority know that it is they who represent us, and they will not be oppressed morally or in morale by those who are economically more powerful.”

 Kramář uses the French word to emphasize its foreign quality.

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In the final hours of debate in the National Assembly, a further concession on terminology was made to the critics of the language law. The Czechoslovak language was designated the state, official language of the republic with the two words “official” and “state” reversed in sequence and without the use of parentheses at all. Czechs constituted very slightly less than half the population of the country. Germans were over 23 %, ‘dangerously’ close to one quarter. The ratio between the two figures was unsettling for moderate Czech nationalists as well as for Czech chauvinists. On the other hand, Czechs and Slovaks combined in a single nation amounted to two thirds of the country’s population, a psychologically far more reassuring figure. In this way Czech dominance over the Germans seemed to be rooted in the Czechoslovak idea fortified now by the state, official language, Czechoslovak. Another issue of fundamental importance to the relations between Czechs and Germans was the question of autonomy. Czechs had been passionate champions of autonomous administration in the communities, districts and lands of the old monarchy. The elected legislatures of Bohemia and Moravia in particular, though the franchise fell far short of democratic principles, were major arenas in which the Czechs battled to assert their national claims. Now that they had gained their independence, however, Czech politicians lost interest in the very institutions they had championed in the past. The provisional constitution, adopted on November 13th, 1918, foreshadowed the change. Article 4 provided that “the national assembly shall exercise legislative authority for the entire state and its individual parts and supervisory authority over the executive until such time as the elected assembly convenes and establishes itself in accordance with the Constitution.” In the following seven months, the appointed Revolutionary National Assembly adopted three pieces of legislation which dismantled the existing land commission of Bohemia and the land committees of Moravia and Silesia and replaced them with appointed institutions directly subordinate to the central authorities. In separate legislation the oversight capacity of the land assemblies over land administration was transferred to the central government. All this was confirmed by Article 7 of the Constitution, which provided that the legislative and administrative activity of the land diets had come to an end. The justification for this provision is summarized in the report of the Constitutional Committee of February 24th, 1920: “In Austria land autonomy, where we had the majority, was a welcome defense for us of our nationality, but today this motive is lacking and it is time to regulate our administration on a more modern basis, well proven also in other countries…. Our Republic is not so large that its legislation cannot express its jurisdiction over its entire territory,

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and the need of a more local type can be cared for in the regions and the districts.”¹¹⁵ On the other hand, Masaryk often stressed the fundamental importance of autonomy in a democracy. “Whoever wants peace and justice must work for the principle of autonomy. If Silesia represents a single administrative entity, why cannot Bohemia be divided into ten regions and Moravia into four regions of the size of Silesia, thus autonomous regions more or less the historically determined size and population numbers of Silesia.” To the extent possible the territory of the region should be delineated in accordance with language: “In the larger urban communities with sizeable national minorities national communities more or less like the church parish can be established for the minorities. If autonomy is no longer to be merely a catchword but is actually to be achieved, then it must be carried out in the very first place at the community level….” Masaryk then cautioned that “it goes without saying that, alongside political autonomy, political centralization must come into play. Admittedly the problem is to find an organic harmony between these two forces.” ¹¹⁶ In his New Year’s address in 1922, Masaryk made clear where in his view the boundary between these two forces lay in the case of the Czech lands: “On the Czech side it is often emphasized that we are adopting a solution based on the Swiss model. Perhaps it might be better to speak of the Belgian model, because Belgium is a unified state, whereas Switzerland has been divided since ancient times into many independent, little states. Our state—and especially the Czech lands—developed historically in a uniform manner and consequently it must remain so. There can and will be no discussion of territorial autonomy. Also, the disadvantageous configuration of the minorities does not permit it.”¹¹⁷ The system of regional administration that Masaryk described above reflected legislation which had long been under preparation at the ministry of interior. From the beginning it was clear that the government favored a regional system of administration in place of the traditional administration in the Czech lands of Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia. If in terms of size and population Masaryk invoked Silesia as a basic unit of administration, it should be noted that these proposed regions were similar in size to the traditional Hungarian county administration already in existence in Slovakia. This meant that the newly proposed regional system offered a uniform basis for organizing the intermediate tier of

 Lipscher, Ladislav. Verfassund und Politische Veraltung in der Tschechooslovakei, 1918 – 1939 (Mü nchen: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1979), p. 48.  Berlinertagblatt und Handelszeitung, September 12th, 1919.  Masaryk, T.G. Cesta Demokracie (Praha: Čin, 1933), vol. II, p. 212.

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administration throughout the country. Unification of the country’s administration was one of the primary objectives of administrative reform. Yet, smaller regions might have accommodated more of the German population in their demand for autonomy. In his essay on Bohemian unity, cited at length in the first chapter, Franz Jesser had named seven distinctive German regions in Bohemia.¹¹⁸ Smaller provinces might have accommodated these regions and similar regions in Moravia, but they would have raised the old issue of minorities. In the Austrian monarchy the German linguistic islands in the Czech lands had been a stumbling block to administrative reform.¹¹⁹ When the administrative subdivision of Bohemia along national lines was proposed, German nationalists objected that the Germans in the linguistic islands, largely urban concentrations of population, would be reduced to the status of a minority in the surrounding Czech countryside. Now if Jesser′s distinctive German regions were to be preserved in small provinces, it ran the risk of creating substantial Czech minorities in predominantly German territories, something which was taboo for the Czech chauvinists and simply unacceptable for Czechs in general. In any event, the questionnaire which Švehla had earlier circulated for commentary to the representative institutions of autonomous entities, towns and districts, and to the association of government officials, contained the option for small or large regions. The small regions had met with widespread disfavor, therefore, the final text of the legislation provided for a system of large regions. Two of these regions had an overwhelming German majority while keeping the Czech minority to a minimum—less than 11 % in Česká Lípa and merely 3 % in Karlovy Vary. The two regions, however, would only include a third of the Germans in the Czech lands. The system did provide the Germans with the region of Silesia, where they would constitute 40.5 % of the population and might be able to form a majority of the elected delegates to the provincial assembly together with the Poles, who would have 11.2 % of the population. The final regional administrative system offered by the government in parliament was not, viewed strictly from an ethnic point of view, an adequate response to German demands. More importantly it did not offer the opportunity for a future expansion of German autonomous rights. It was not the first step toward an eventual accommodation but rather a legislative non plus ultra. And still it met with concerted opposition in the Revolutionary National Assembly.  These were Adlegebirge/Orlické hory, Risenbegirge/Krkonoše, Elbegau/Polabí, Saazer Land/Žatecko, Erzgebirge/Krušné hory, Bömischerward/Šumava and Egerland/Chebsko.  The German linguistic islands in the Czech lands were Brno/Brünn, České Budějovice/Budweis, Jihlava/Iglau, Olomouc/Olmütz, Svitavy/Zwittau and Vyškov/Wischau. Note that now the Czech name comes first.

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In early May, Interior Minister Švehla submitted a draft proposal of the legislation to the Cabinet. With its approval it was sent on to the ministries for discussion and comment.¹²⁰ In the following months two primary issues stood out in these discussions, whether the new regions should replace the old crown lands—a position favored by the Ministry of Interior but encountering significant opposition—and what size the regions should be: large, small or medium. Both issues were at the center of later debate in the Constitutional Committee and on the floor of the National Assembly as well. On October 16th, the government approved the text of the proposed legislation for the regional administrative system, although not without dissenting voices. On October 30th, preliminary discussions on the legislation were opened with the political parties.¹²¹ As in the case of the Language Law, the two major opponents of the legislation were Czechoslovak National Democracy and the Czechoslovak Christian Social Peoples’ Party. Also opposed were representatives of the Czech minorities from the predominantly German regions in the borderlands. For the Christian Socials the issue was primarily one of practical politics. Moravia was the base of their political power and preservation of the land of Moravia as a single administrative unit seemed to offer them the best prospects for preserving that traditional base. For the National Democrats the situation was quite different. In the later debates in the National Assembly, both in committee and on the floor of the assembly, they would offer different alternatives to the government’s proposal: either small regions with the retention of the traditional lands to which those regions would be subordinate, or else larger regions which would replace the government’s regions entirely and eliminate the need to retain the traditional land administration. It was not the regional system per se to which the National Democrats objected, but rather the fact that two of the regions proposed by the government, Karlovy Vary and Česká Lípa, would have very large German majorities consistent with Masaryk’s belief that “the territory of the region should be delineated in accordance with language.” During the preliminary discussions with the political parties, the National Democrats were able to win a limited concession from the government. A provision was inserted into the draft legislation calling for the formation of regional associations grouped within the borders of the old land administrations. These were to serve as a substitute for the land administration, but the provision was hastily and imperfectly drafted and the terms and conditions under which

 Schelle, Karel. Vývoj české veřejné správy (Ostrava: Key Publishing, 2008), p. 206.  Schelle, Vývoj české veřejné správy, p. 209.

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the associations would function remained unclear and open to further determination, if and to what extent the associations proved useful and effective at all. Taken as a whole, the government proposal was scarcely a radical one. What it envisaged was a system of regional and district administration in which local administration at the level of the administrative district would be subordinated to the region and the region in turn would be answerable to the Ministry of Interior in Prague. It was a conservative proposal which leaned heavily on central authority. The autonomous elements of political administration, though the government spoke of the legislation as democratic reform, were so whittled down and circumscribed by bureaucratic institutions that they enjoyed little independent authority. The regional governor would be appointed by the Ministry of Interior. Concern was expressed in the cabinet that the regions might become centers of political dissent and it was urged that the jurisdiction of the regions be strictly limited to administrative matters.¹²² Added to this was the fact that most Germans would not even benefit from the system of regional autonomy at all. Ninety five percent of the Germans in the Republic lived in the Czech lands, but only one third of these resided in the two regions with a German majority which the government proposed to establish. The remaining two thirds were assigned to provinces with a Czech majority. All this was a far cry from German demands. After the reports from the Peace Conference regarding the future borders of the Czechoslovak state and after the watershed local elections in June the German Social Democrats, the German Agrarians and the German Christian Socials began to reevaluate their position in the new state. For the German Social Democrats, the process of reevaluation actually began before the June elections and reached a culmination in the platform adopted at the Teplice party conference in early September 1919.¹²³ It called for national autonomy based on the right of self-determination, in effect an ethnic cantonization of the country. For the German Agrarians and German Christian Socials national autonomy also became the goal. None of these demands re-

 In later parliamentary debate this provision was explained on the grounds that “from actual life in the republic it has many times been demonstrated that members of various nations living here easily come to agreement on matters of economic and common interest and easily find the way to work together when they are not hindered by interest in political affairs which in fact is not an appropriate field for those affairs and where there is no reason that they be debated and thrashed out”.  Zessner, Klaus. Josef Seliger und die nationale Frage in Böhmen: Eine Untersuchung über die nationale Politik der deutschböhmischen Sozialdemokratie, 1899 – 1920 (Stuttgart: Seliger-Archiv, 1976), pp. 116 – 117.

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flected Masaryk’s cautionary note that “alongside political autonomy political centralism must come into play”. Within the confines of the new state, what the Germans sought was separation from the Czechs to the greatest extent possible. The Czechs on the other hand sought to consolidate and solidify their control of the new state. Between the two, for the moment at least, the gap was unbridgeable, but the regional system presented to the national assembly offered no prospect for a future accommodation once inter-ethnic strains had quieted. On December 2nd, Švehla was able to announce the complete agreement of the coalition parties in the government on the regional system. That majority held firm in the debates in the constitutional committee and on the floor of the national assembly and the bill was enacted into law by a comfortable majority over the opposition of the National Democrats and the Czech Christian Socials. In that sense the issue was already settled before it was even sent to the Revolutionary National Assembly. But parliamentary majorities come and go, and the intensity of the opposition was such as to suggest that the issue was far from settled even after the regional law’s adoption. What is most striking at this stage in the debate is precisely the virulence of the opposition. As noted above, the law had been so crafted in the Ministry of Interior that autonomous elements in the political administration, at both the regional and the district level, were so completely subordinated directly or indirectly to the bureaucracy, and hence to the central authorities, that popular or local sentiment was essentially toothless. With this in mind the passionate nature of the debate over the regional system is somewhat difficult to understand. In the parliamentary debate the subject of the Germans was never far from the surface. It would not be an exaggeration to say that nationality was an inherent element of the logic behind administrative legislation for both the proponents and the opponents of the regional system. In his opening remarks in the full constitutional committee the Agrarian Deputy, Jan Malypetr, the government’s legislative reporter for the bill, pointed to the fact that self-rule had been “almost the only sanctuary of the patriotic and political efforts of the Czech nation during the former state” and suggested that “self-rule, of course in a more active and effective form and also in a form harder to abuse, could also be a sanctuary for that part of our population which holds hostile feelings toward our state.”¹²⁴ Even in a provision of the legislation that at first glance might appear unrelated, the issue of nationality arose. Two days after Malypetr’s comments on self-

 APS, P-ČR-AFS, RNS, 120. VÚ, 21.1.1920, p. 20.

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rule there was discussion of the fact that, in the proposed legislation, “political” topics were prohibited from debate in the provincial assembly, and the provincial governor at his own discretion was permitted to bar any topic on this basis. The committee chairman and Social Democratic Deputy, Dr. Alfred Meissner, found the language so broad that the governor might ban things which were not strictly of a political nature. In its rulings on debate in district and communal assemblies the administrative court had already demonstrated how plastic a word “political” actually is. He feared that the provision could impede speech. The Social Democratic Deputy, Karel Dědič, added that “it cannot be established in law where politics begins and where it ends” to which Dr. Jaroslav Brabec, National Democrat, commented that “that’s the eternal argument of whether it’s political or not. Things have developed for us in such a way that whatever is controversial is called political”.¹²⁵ Interior Minister Švehla sought to assure his colleagues regarding the provision in question: “We have a special concern which stems from the structure of our entire life and our state. If we didn’t have this experience in our state, if we didn’t have the irredenta¹²⁶ which is still here, we would leave this out. We would like our assemblies to be devoted to more peaceful work. Gentlemen, our aim is only to have some way in which we could intervene against this irrendenta and to do it in such a way that it would not interfere with freedom of speech, criticism, interpolations and our ability to solve issues. These things are hard to define. We all know that. After all, we are finally at a point where we can openly say that irredentist practices do not suit us well.”¹²⁷ Even advocates of regional autonomy were apprehensive of potentially fissiparous tendencies inherent in any system of administrative autonomy. In the parliamentary debate over the government bill, the Czechoslovak Socialist deputy, Josef Záruba-Pfeffermann, a staunch supporter of the regional system, went out of his way in defending the legislation to point out that one region in northern Bohemia, which extended to the German border and was later named the region of Louny, would serve as a wedge geographically, separating the two German regions from one another, Karlovy Vary to its west and Česká Lípa to its east: “If we look at the entire state from the point of view of the national strug-

 APS, P-ČR-AFS, RNS, 123. VÚ, 23.1.1920, p. 8 (a).  In the unification of Italy in the 19th century those lands which still lay beyond the borders of the newly unified state were called ‘irredenta’ which means unredeemed. By extension any national groups remaining under foreign rule may be designated an irredenta. For advocates of Pan-Germanism the Germans in the Czech lands were regarded as a major irredenta, a view held by many Germans in Czechoslovakia.  APS, P-ČR-AFS, RNS, 123. VÚ, 23.1.1920, p. 10 (a).

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gle,” he reasoned, “where we would rather have a Switzerland but where we wish to be firm in so far as the position of our own nation is concerned, we must say at first glance that we also have our basic front line…. Our front line in northern and western Bohemia is our western political front and in truth once again the strategic idea … is to break the German front, since at a glance it can be seen that the entire German front line has a weakness and that is the place where we have 250,000 miners at Most and Duchov. There the Czech element is closest to the border and there we have the largest national island. The region itself is very important from the economic point of view. If we … break the German front up to the border, we will turn all these [Czech] minorities which were our eternal sources of pain into a majority, since we will place them under the protection of an enormously powerful Czech element and then the Germans on their principal front will be geographically separated into two regions.”¹²⁸ In the subcommittee on the regional system on February 18th, Dr. Karel Kramář, leader of Czechoslovak National Democracy, had launched a full-scale assault on the government’s regional system. He called instead for a system of small regions and for the retention of the traditional administrations of the Czech crown lands—Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia. On the following day Interior Minister Švehla suspended the previous agenda for debate and proposed instead: “We won’t decide on the revision of individual paragraphs, but instead we will open debate on what should be the guideline for the subcommittee, if small regions should be created as Dr. Kramář proposes, always of two or three districts which means a population count of 100,000 – 120,000, or regions with an average population of 500,000 – 750,000,” as the government was proposing. Dr. Kramář intervened: “Don’t you think it would be good to discuss at the same time also the instance of the land? We will discuss this simultaneously.” Dr. Václav Bouček, Czech Progressive Party, objected: “It’s better to divide them since they are two different matters.” At this point Deputy Josef Záruba-Preffermann spoke: “It is a single system and we will have a single debate…. In that case it is a matter of creating definitively with all its consequences a structure with all its details so that the thing is harmonic. That means a certain firm system must be created. We all debated about the regional system without Attachment A [the government’s detailed listing of the regions, their provincial seats and the districts of which the regions would consist], because we all tacitly assumed that it was a matter of a certain

 APS, P-ČR-AFS, RNS, 153a VÚ, 19. 2.1920, p. 29.

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broadly accepted principle which already was not especially controversial except in some details. Even Dr. Kramář said to me yesterday that is a matter of a system worked out in detail. We can agree with that. If we all have in mind a certain model, let us say Bavaria or Baden, it should be dealt with in that framework. “Yesterday however Dr. Kramář declared that he conceived of the matter entirely differently and here permit me a polemic with Dr. Kramář. I am an engineer and if Dr. Kramář declares himself against such a definite system which already has been prepared in detail and that he conceives the matter entirely differently, he must demonstrate that with concrete and precise plans, that is such and such a geographical division, such and such precise boundaries, especially linguistic boundaries, such and such a hierarchical system of authority, etc. Then the thing is completed, and we can place one system in contrast to the other, but we can’t extract one detail and place it in opposition to another detail since everything is tied together as when a big building is constructed”.¹²⁹ Dr. Kramář did not rise to the challenge. Instead on February 19th, the same day that Záruba-Pfefferman had spoken, he offered yet another counter proposal, a system of five regions for the Czech lands that tripled the population size of the regions the government had proposed, engulfed the Germans, and left them in the minority everywhere. He opened his remarks with the words: “I conceive of the division of the Czech lands as follows: Prague would extend all the way to the border which would result in a region where the German element would not amount to more than 20 %, since the Czech element in Prague and its surroundings would have such a strong effect. To the north, we also have a strong Czech element around Most. Thus, we could go to the Saxon border and achieve a fantastically crushing Czech majority in the region. “We could have a strong Czech region in Budějovice. For that reason, I am not in favor of a region of Tabor, because we would like to make a powerful Czech region from Budějovice. I am not in favor of the two regions in eastern Bohemia but only for a Hradec region which would encompass the districts of Trutnova, Vrchlabí, Kralice and Lanškroun and have a very strong Czech element. That way, most regions we would create would be Czech and we would be left with only Plzeň in the west and then also northeastern Bohemia. “Here we would get a long list of Czech districts with which to strengthen the district of Jihlava. I have been working in that district for a long time, and if you don’t give Jihlava six or seven Czech districts, the process of absorption will not be as rapid as we would wish, and you know what troubles that would mean. If you create a Jihlava region as proposed, that is Jihlava and Znojmo, and of the

 APS, P-ČR-AFS, RNS, 153a VÚ, 19. 2.1920, pp. 25 – 26.

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Czech districts leave only Třebíč, then you’ll be left with a permanent political struggle. But if you add Pelhřimov, Chotěboř, Habry, Německý Brod and Humpolec, then Jihlava will be completely engulfed in a Czech region and within twenty years the Jihlava district will be assimilated beyond recognition. “Although I like Uherské Hradiště, I would be decidedly against assigning it a region. In order to strengthen the Czech element I would rather take Kyjov and other districts from Uherské Hradiště to support the Czech element in the Brno district and link the northern part of Hradiště district to Olomouc in order to paralyze the strong German element in the Opava district. There still remains the Těšín district where I would make only one region. I wouldn’t put it in Moravská Ostrava, but to achieve some increase I would put it in Těšín where there are already buildings and the regional seat would stand apart from the traffic of factories and heavy industry. “This would be my ideal: Prague, Plzeň, Budějovice, Hradec and regarding the conflict between Jičín and Mladá Boleslav I would not hesitate to make the seat of that region in northeastern Turnov which lies between them and where there is an excellent railway hub. That’s how I see it. This is the system of large regions. That is why I wish that we could give these large regions so much power and rights that a fourth administrative tier (the traditional land administration) would be completely ruled out and there would be no need of any regional associations. The regions would care for their own affairs, and we would have three regions with a sweeping Czech national character, and I would fabricate a Czech majority in another two provinces so that we wouldn’t have any German provinces at all. “With regard to Karlovy Vary I do not entertain any high hopes…. In Karlovy Vary the Germans have always been in the lead. I know that there will be some sort of commercial rivalry, but it won’t go too far. It’s the same in Česká Lípa. If these Germans are in larger regions, they will be in a minority, whereas this way, our Czech minorities in the Karlovy Vary and Česká Lípa regions will disappear and these places will turn into a nest of irredentism. If, on the other hand, we put these Germans into Czech provinces, we will tear them up…”¹³⁰ For supporters of the government’s regional system, Kramář’s frontal assaults began to wear thin. On February 20th the Social Democratic deputy Dědič spoke of this: “You know, gentlemen, that the regions were almost completely prepared. That was the work of almost six or seven months and during that preparatory work the gentlemen from National Democracy contributed a good deal with their knowledge… now when the National Assembly is supposed

 APS, P-ČR-AFS, RNS, 153a. VÚ, 19. 2.1920, pp. 34– 35.

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to finish, you come with a long list of new proposals for great changes. We hear your speeches by the hour—I have nothing against your expressing your views— and now you tell us what you want to do and what you have decided. We want to hear you further, but what you could make worse, you have already made worse. Both bourgeois parties which you control have already quarreled between themselves and you have quarreled with us and both have sought that nothing democratic is achieved and that everything old that has been before will remain. “In the interests of agreement so that the National Assembly can disperse as soon as possible and we can hold new elections, we have kept silent about this and even persuaded the members of our clubs to keep silent, and now when everything is supposed to be ready, a general debate begins once again. It reminds me of Czech-German peacemaking in Vienna, since it stretches on and on like a snake, but on that basis we won’t get any further.”¹³¹ To the arguments of those opponents who favored retaining the traditional land administration the Czech Progressive Party deputy Dr. Bouček also offered a comment: “If it is said that it is impossible to sweep aside a thousand years of history, Dr. Kramář is right, but from this let us also draw a conclusion for the relations with the other nations of our republic…. we are trying to come up with a constitution, regions, etc. and all the while there are forces trying to restrict freedom just to prevent the Germans from protesting some resolution. “If we want to acknowledge gentlemen who have nothing on their side but tradition whether here or in Moravia, how can you hold it against the Germans who don’t want to forget their ties to the great German nation, etc. If I proclaim a certain principle, I must also proclaim its consequences and just as many rights as I want applied to myself must also be applied to others. While I am far from wishing to make concessions to the Germans so that they can bring down the state, their behavior is going to depend on how we behave toward them.”¹³² On February 24th deputy Brabec, Czechoslovak National Democracy, launched an effort to redraw the boundaries of the electoral districts and in so doing to deprive the Germans of two electoral districts which, as they stood, would produce only German mandates to the National Assembly. Later on the same day the German Embassy was able to inform its Foreign Office in Berlin that “under pressure from the President of the Republic, Prime Minister Tusar and Interior Minister Švehla, the Constitutional Committee at the last minute has found a majority which abandoned the establishment of only mixed electoral districts and granted the Germans at least two purely German electoral dis-

 APS, P-ČR-AFS, RNS, 154. VÚ, 20. 2.1920a, p. 3.  APS, P-ČR-AFS, RNS, 154. VÚ, 20. 2.1920, pp. 32– 33.

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tricts—Karlovy Vary/Karlsbad with twelve deputies and Česká Lípa/Bömische Leipa with thirteen.”¹³³ On the following day the Constitutional Committee voted to reject Brabec’s motion to reconsider five regional and electoral boundaries and, in a separate vote, the boundary of the rural region of Prague. Immediately, Dr. Kramář sought a loophole to escape the consequence of that vote: “I don’t wish to be disloyal, but there is a question on what was actually agreed to in the political discussions. I will say outright that we would not have voted for the Prague region if I had not been told that it was accepted in political negotiations, but now our people say that was not the case. I only voted for it, because I thought it was the result of political agreements. I will announce a minority vote on the Prague region. However, had we known what had been agreed to in the political discussions, perhaps we would not have cast a minority vote.” Prime Minister Tusar: “In the political discussions we had the same maps as now and we gave the same account as now. On the basis of those discussions, I considered the region to be approved. Of course, we didn’t vote at the time.” Deputy Dr. Kramář: “And what did our representatives say?” Prime Minister Tusar: “Your representatives proposed amendments to which the other parties did not agree.” Deputy Dr. Kramář: “We are free then.” Prime Minister Tusar: “In those discussions you were in the minority. Of course, there was no vote there.” Interior Minister Švehla: “The political discussions had the goal of achieving unity regarding the overall strategy pertaining to all constitutional questions in general. The regional system was one of its elements but not a principal one. Questions of principle were dealt with in such a way that all parties could reach agreement on them. On some questions of lesser importance, one party or the other, regardless whether it belonged to the government or some other bloc, had to concede something. In turn some concessions were made on the other side so that there was no vote and no statement of concession or non-concession on these issues. The overall outcome had to be accepted in its totality and it should be stated that we were all bound by the results. It would not be a good thing to say that ‘I am free’. That would mean repeating the entire negotiations once again and once again modifying particular concessions which had already been made, etc. In this political bargaining it was absolutely impossible to meet all the wishes of one or another party. That’s the nature of compromise and it can’t be otherwise. These things form a single whole, and one can’t de-

 Alexander, M. Deutsche Gesandtschaftsberichte aus Prag, vol. I, p. 254.

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mand that individual parts be broken out and reserved for separate negotiations. If one of the parties had said that for me something is condition sine qua non, I can’t accept that under any circumstances, there would have been no further discussions. The entire negotiations would have stopped. However, since no such declaration was made which would have made further negotiations impossible, it is obvious that all the parties at least tolerate certain things even if they can’t quite fully agree with them. I offer this as an explanation regarding these political discussions. It just doesn’t follow from our discussions up to now that any party could reserve freedom of action on this or that matter”.¹³⁴ On February 24th the Constitutional Committee finished discussion of the bill on provincial and district administration and the bill together with the committee’s legislative report was sent to the National Assembly. On the same date the committee also submitted its legislative report on the constitutional document. In the Chamber of Deputies Dr. Kramář and his colleagues tried one final time to revisit the issue of regional administration, but to no effect. Against his opposition the bill was enacted into law. The opening paragraph of the Law on the Establishment of Regional and District Authorities states that the law and the electoral system contained in it would take effect from a date and within bounds to be determined by government ordinance. That provision reflected the need for extensive preliminary work, the reorganization of public administration and supplementary legislation, ordinances and regulations including legislation governing the independent organization of the capital city of Prague.¹³⁵ Given the complexity and uncertain duration of such preparatory work the provision made good sense, but it also held open another possibility—that the law would never take effect. During the debate in the constitutional committee Dr. Meissner, the committee chairman, pointed out that the Language Law is a constitutional law which can be amended only by a qualified majority, whereas the regional system is a common law which can be amended by simple majority. “In future, for example, we might not have a regional system or such a one as we have today….”¹³⁶ The point was not missed by the opposition. In the final hours of debate in the National Assembly, Dr. Brabec, Czechoslovak National Democracy, raised the issue: “To sum up then, I come to the conclusion that our regional system as it is presented is imperfect and defies prior historical development. It is a stop gap,

 APS, P-ČR-AFS, RNS, 159. VÚ, 25. 2.1920, pp. 26 – 27.  Schelle, K. Vývoj české veřejné správy, p. 230.  APS, P-ČR-AFS, RNS, 158. VÚ, 24. 2.1920a, p. 36.

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and it is necessary to consider and compare various facts and thus to perfect the whole thing. Therefore, I have the impression that partitioning by region, as recommend by the constitutional committee, even if approved, will not be realized, and we won’t live to see its execution but rather it will require amendments and eventually will have to be reworked altogether.” Perhaps those contemporaries were best advised who took to heart the declaration of Dr. Kramář in the constitutional committee: “What I oppose are two large German regions and I will fight them to the death”.¹³⁷ On February 29th in the early hours of the morning, the Constitution, the Language Law, the Law on Regional and District Administration and other accompanying legislation was adopted by the Revolutionary National Assembly. The German response was outrage across the political spectrum. Among the loudest critics was the shrill voice of Dr. Lodgman von Auen, the erstwhile governor of the separatist province of German Bohemia, who spoke out even before the Constitution had finally been adopted. In a speech at Dux he declared that “we could never recognize a constitution which without our collaboration and against our protests will adopt a system which does not reflect the opinion of a majority of the population.”¹³⁸ Lodgman’s judgments were often broad, often intemperate but also often had some basis in fact. He was especially critical of the powers of the presidency, the right to return legislation for further consideration, to dissolve the National Assembly and when there was no parliament, to govern through a committee of its representatives. This latter provision he compared derisively to Paragraph 14 of the Austrian Constitution of 1867 which permitted the emperor to rule by decree when the Reichsrat was not in session. “Despite all the technical, legal dodges”, he continued, “one cannot deny that the Czech nation in this state is a minority and that they have concocted a majority by calling themselves … a Czechoslovak nation. Today it still isn’t clear that this will amount to much, since under the circumstances bad old Father Hlinka¹³⁹ can throw a nice spanner in the works.” He characterized the land reform as “the Czechization of German land under the guise of social and economic measures” and the Czechoslovak language as “simply invented. No one understands it. Not a single soul has even come across it before. But it is established as the official language.” President Masaryk had spoken to the German representative of “a thoroughly liberal constitution which would give the Germans maximal rights.” The mod APS, P-ČR-AFS, RNS, 153b. VÚ, 19. 2.1920, p. 25.  Bohemia [newspaper], January25, 1920, in SUA, MZV-VA 1, Karton 2513.  Father Andrej Hlinka, leader of the Slovak Peoples Party and champion of Slovak autonomy.

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est provisions of a problematic law on a system of regional and district authorities offered scant assurance in this regard and the provisions of the language law, although satisfying treaty requirements and constitutional in their authority, were scarcely maximal rights and were open to dilution through subsequent administrative ordinance. The Constitution provided for a centrist administrative structure. In the short term, a centrist administration in a multi-ethnic state may have seemed the logical outcome of the Czech national revival, but in the longer term its viability was very much open to question. For the Germans it was inevitably an abrupt discontinuity with their own immediate past and at best offered uncertain prospects for their future. Even for the Slovaks, although liberated from Hungary, centrism in the Czechoslovak state was not in the long run a logical outcome of their own political past. The Constitution offered basic guarantees of minority protection as required by treaty under the provisions of the general postwar settlement established by the Peace Conference, but it made no concessions to German or other minority national concerns. Taken as a whole, the constitution of the First Czechoslovak Republic was thoroughly democratic. It provided individual rights, an equal vote for all citizens on the basis of universal suffrage for both male and female voters, proportional representation, a bicameral legislature and an independent judiciary. Aside from the issue of language it offered equal rights to all citizens. What it did not do, what no constitution can do, was to eliminate ethnicity in a multi-ethnic society or erase memories of the living and historical past. These remained. With the establishment of the new state Czechs warmly embraced the transition from monarchy to the republic, but neither Czechs nor Germans were prepared for the transition to a pluralistic society. Ethnicity had played an important role in the discussions of the Constitution and accompanying laws in the Revolutionary National Assembly, and it would be ever present in the daily politics of the First Republic. The constitutional wand does not exorcise reality. The central role of ethnic identity held true for all elements of the new society: the Germans, the Hungarians, the Ruthenes, the Poles and for the Slovaks, whether of the Slovak or the Czechoslovak orientation, as well as for the Czechs, the dominant ethnic group. Nonetheless, it remains beyond dispute that under this Constitution Czechoslovakia remained a vibrant democracy until its destruction in the years 1935 – 1938. For reasons which have been described at some length, primarily for the German refusal to participate until long after the decision to proceed without them had been made, the Constitution was imposed by an appointed constituent assembly without German, or for that matter any minority participation and it therefore did not rest on Czech-German accommodation. The lack of that funda-

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mental element may well have been one of its greatest weaknesses when one turns to the future developments in Czech-German relations.

Chapter 5 Reaffirmation of the National State In the second half of April, 1919, only weeks after the dissolution of the Revolutionary National Assembly, the first parliamentary elections were held to the new National Assembly. The results confirmed the earlier vote in the communal elections of June, 1919. In both the Czech and German camps, the socialists once again held a firm lead. Once again President Masaryk called upon Vlastimil Tusar to form the new government. Despite its internal weaknesses, the first Tusar government, under which the Constitution was crafted and adopted, had enjoyed firm parliamentary support. To the one hundred and thirty-eight mandates of the Red-Green Coalition were added the fifty-four mandates of the Slovak Club and the six mandates of the Czechoslovak Progressive States Rights Party, one hundred and ninety-eight votes in an assembly of two hundred and seventy deputies. In January of 1920, the Agrarian leader Švehla even succeeded in gaining, for certain constitutional provisions (the regional system and the institution of the Senate), the twenty-four votes of the Czech Christian Socials in exchange for a commitment to drop the provision for the separation of church and state from the Constitution, a commitment which was promptly fulfilled.¹⁴⁰ By contrast, a constant and overriding concern of the second Tusar government during its brief existence was the unrelenting search for a majority from one parliamentary vote to the next. Tusar was not even certain of a majority on the initial vote to accept the government’s program.¹⁴¹ In such fragile and precarious circumstances the government had two options to assure its longer term survival: a restoration of the all national coalition of the first Kramář cabinet, with a return of the National Democrats and Christian Socials to the government majority, a choice which the Agrarians favored but the Social Democrats rejected; or expanding the government majority by enlisting the support of the German Social Democrats and the German Agrarians, the option that was tried and proved unsuccessful. Underlying this precarious situation was an even deeper crisis, the widening rift within Czechoslovak Social Democracy itself between the moderate, democratic wing of the party, which had formed the government, and the revolution Campbell, F. Gregorz. “Die Tschechische Volkspartei und die Deutschen Christlichsozialen”, in Bosl, Karl, ed., Die erste Tschechoslowakische Republik als multinationaler Parteienstaat (Bad Wiessee: Collegium Carolinum, 1979), p. 296.  Peroutka, Ferdinand. Budování státu (Praha: Lidove´ noviny, 1991), vol. III, p. 1122. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110749885-008

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ary left, growing day by day among the rank and file and determined to overthrow the existing social order and establish a dictatorship of the proletariat. Under the second Tusar government, post-war ferment was coming to a peak. Already in October, 1919, the Social Democratic left had challenged the party’s coalition politics, demanding that the government adopt a program of socialization and that the party leave government if the program was rejected. At that time, the party leadership turned down the proposal by a sixty-five to thirty-six vote. In December of 1919, however, the left was back with a declaration which openly called for the dictatorship of the proletariat and the establishment of workers’ councils. For the last time, party unity was restored when the new Tusar government presented its program to parliament on June 10th, 1920, and the left voted unanimously for the government,¹⁴² but it was a government which had been given only provisional support at a leadership conference of the Social Democrats on April 19th. The conference merely recommended the party’s entry into government for the time being until a party conference could be summoned. The final decision was left to the future party conference. From that moment on, the moderate wing of the Social Democrats sought to postpone that conference for as long as they could.¹⁴³ From the very beginning, then, the second Tusar government lived on borrowed time. Even before the elections, Tusar had called upon the Germans to join with Czechs and Slovaks in building for the future. Immediately after the elections he turned to the German Social Democrats and offered them participation in government.¹⁴⁴ The German party was bedeviled by the same threatening rift within in its ranks as the Czech Social Democrats. In the middle of negotiations between Tusar and Seliger, the leader of the German Social Democrats, a conference of the German party’s left-wing meeting at Liberec/Reichenberg, issued a “manifesto of the left” which condemned coalition politics and rejected the principles of parliamentary democracy. In the negotiations with Tusar, Seliger invoked the program which German Social Democrats had adopted at Teplice in September, 1919, calling for such a degree of German autonomy that, in reality, it would have threatened the stability, if not the viability of the new state. Seliger held that the constitution adopted by the Revolutionary National Assembly provided “an extreme Czech national system in state administration and policy” and “we Germans will not submit to the fate that has forced us into this state, if it remains as you Czechs have pre-

 Klepetař, H. Seit 1918…, pp. 83 – 84.  Peroutka, F. Budování státu, vol. III, pp. 1110 – 1111.  Kracik, J. Die Politik des deutschen Aktivismus …, p. 75.

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pared it for us”.¹⁴⁵ In foreign policy, the German Social Democrats called for closer relations with Austria and Germany and a parting with the Entente, the Western powers which had sanctioned the creation of Czechoslovakia and were the guarantors of its existence. These were impossible demands. On May 19th, the negotiations over German Social Democratic participation in government came to an end. German national demands were an insurmountable obstacle for the Czechs, but for Seliger, the demands of his party’s left wing were also decisive. On the occasion, German Social Democracy issued a declaration: “The tactical guidelines of the party”, it stated, “are given in the programmatic resolutions of the Teplice Party Conference which are binding on all representative bodies of the party. These resolutions will also determine the tactical conduct of the party’s parliamentary representation. A deviation from this could only occur on the basis of new resolutions of a party conference. There is presently, however, no reason to summon a party conference for this purpose, because no disposition for a change in the tactical conduct of the party exists and no representative body wishes it”.¹⁴⁶ At least for the near term the prospects for collaboration between Czech and German Social Democracy were not bright at all, but the government, lacking any alternative acceptable to the Czechoslovak Social Democrats, did not forsake the quest. As Tusar was assembling his second cabinet, moves were afoot in the German camp to forge a united national front in the aftermath of the elections. Spearheading the drive for national unity was Dr. Lodgman, now leader of the German National Party. Lodgman envisaged a national organization which embraced all the German political parties and spoke with a single voice on behalf of the Germans of Czechoslovakia. It was Lodgman’s ambition to lead it, but from the outset he encountered difficulties at every step. The first, which proved insurmountable, were the workers’ parties of the left and right, the German Social Democrats and the German National Socialist Workers Party. For Lodgman, the German Social Democratic Party, as the largest German party, was of critical importance. Twice he appealed to them for support, and twice they declined. The party’s left wing was utterly opposed to any alliance with the German bourgeois parties, but opposition was not confined to them. On May 16th, at a national conference of German Social Democracy a majority of the delegates and the party’s leadership declared their opposition to participation in the proposed Parliamentary Union.¹⁴⁷ German Social Democracy

 Alexander, M. Deutsche Gesandtschaftsberichte aus Prag, vol. I, num. ref. 105, pp. 275 – 276.  Zessner, K. Josef Seliger und die nationale Frage in Böhmen …, p. 158.  César, J, and B. Černý. Politika německých buržoazních …, vol. I, pp. 212– 213.

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would be supportive of shared national interests, but the party would pursue its own course. At first the German National Socialists made entry into the union dependent on the simultaneous entry of the Social Democrats, but they continued in discussions of the union even after the Social Democrats declined to join.¹⁴⁸ In the end however, they too opted for an independent course. The German National Socialist Workers Party was founded in 1904 as the German Workers Party, then an allAustrian party, but it was concentrated in Bohemia and Moravia where the migration of Czech workers to predominantly German areas gave rise to frequent labor conflict. Czech workers commonly accepted lower pay and poorer working conditions than their German counterparts and were, therefore, resented and seen even as a perpetual threat.¹⁴⁹ German National Socialism in Czechoslovakia had its roots in the Austrian labor movement and began with nearly visceral anti-Czech nationalism. In the parliamentary elections in 1920, the German National Socialists had posted a common slate with the German National Party and it was their ultra-nationalist inclinations which ultimately prevailed. In September, 1920, they finally joined the German Parliamentary Union. Even among the parties which joined with the German National Party in the Parliamentary Union in May of 1920—the Agrarians, Christian Socials and the Democratic Freedom Party—Lodgman encountered reservations as each sought to preserve its freedom of action, especially the German Agrarians, on economic and social issues where they might find common ground with the Czech Agrarians. The Parliamentary Union that emerged from the negotiations was not the monolithic institution which Lodgman had sought, but in its initial public appearances it projected nonetheless a convincing monolithic facade. On May 25th the new government took office and, two days later, Parliament assembled for the election of the President of the Republic. Given the broad support which Masaryk enjoyed among the Czech parties, there was no question of his reelection, but Dr. Lodgman, invoking the initial address which Masaryk had delivered to the Revolutionary National Assembly in December, 1918, in which he spoke of the Germans “who came here once as immigrants and colonists”, was determined to exploit the situation on behalf of the German Parliamentary Union. Once Masaryk had taken the oath of office, Lodgman rose and declared that “the German immigrants and colonists are leaving the hall”, as he led the deputies of the German Parliamentary Union from the chamber.

 Alexander, M. Deutsche Gesandtschaftsberichte aus Prag, vol. I, num. ref. 107, p. 279.  Whiteside, Andrew Gladding. Austrian National Socialism Before 1918 (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1962), p. 87

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In the actual voting, the Parliamentary Union had cast their ballots for a symbolic counter-candidate, Senator Dr. Naegle, a professor at the German University in Prague. The German Social Democrats cast blank ballots, not in protest against Masaryk whose merits they recognized but “against the creation of this state by violating the right of self-determination of the nations forced within its borders and against the fact that the present constitution was created with the exclusion of the representatives of those nations….”¹⁵⁰ When parliament assembled on June 1st to receive Tusar’s statement of the government’s program, Lodgman once again adopted a rejectionist stance. In response to Tusar’s appeal for the collaboration of all nations in the state, Lodgman asserted that the victorious powers of the Entente had forced the Germans into the Czechoslovak state against their will and in violation of their right of self-determination and Wilson’s Fourteen Points. He claimed: “The meager protection which the allied great powers have granted to the German people has been demolished by the violent actions of the Czechoslovak Revolutionary Assembly. All Czechoslovak legislation, including the dictated Constitution, constitutes a clear violation of the protective minority treaties. Therefore, we solemnly declare that we do not recognize any of these laws as binding upon us.” When Lodgman stepped from the dais, the presiding officer called him to order, pointing out that his declaration was in conflict with the oath which he had taken upon his entry into Parliament.¹⁵¹ Some days later another voice from the German Parliamentary Union, that of the normally moderate Agrarian leader, Franz Křepek, spoke in response to Tusar’s address. He noted that the Premier’s principal theme was a call for the participation and collaboration of all the nations in the state. The appeal was nothing new, he said. First, the government must take concrete steps to make collaboration possible. He pointed out how different Czech conduct had been in the past: “You felt oppressed in the old Austria,” he told the Czech deputies. “You accused it of hindering your development as a nation, of not giving you political freedom to the extent required by the needs of your nation. You began with these reproaches. Then you turned your national and political demands into your program and promoted this program so far that you wished to crown your demands with the establishment of your own state at a point when you were still Austrian citizens. And when misery and danger befell this state in the World War, you did not relinquish this program. You sent your brightest minds

 Peroutka, F. Budování státu vol. III, pp. 1108 – 1109.  Digitální parlamentní knihovna [Common Czech-Slovak Digital Parliamentary Library], June 1, 1920. https://www.psp.cz/sqw/hp.sqw?k=82 (Accessed June 16, 2021).

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abroad to negotiate with the enemy. Behind the front lines you systematically denied this state the means to conduct the war and in so doing you contributed to its destruction. “You did all this to achieve your rights and national freedom. Now you have established your own state and with the help of the Entente you have bound us to it. We have now taken your place in similar national oppression. Don’t you see that only recently you have set an example which can now be simply emulated? You yourselves have laid out a program for the German nation on how one must act in such a state and against such a state.” It was for the government to show the way, Křepek asserted. “It is not our task to come forward with proposals. You have the power and that is the obligation of power…. [The German nation] finds itself in great misery and not only our but your nation too expects not merely speeches but also real work. Today we are not in a position to do such work for your nation. Therefore, we must call upon our people: ‘German people, wait but be calm! The champions of your inalienable political and national rights stand firm in this Parliament and in this Republic on the banks of the Vltava!’”¹⁵² In addition to the two representatives of the Parliamentary Union, the German Social Democratic leader, Josef Seliger, spoke in response to Tusar’s address. First, he presented a declaration on behalf of the party’s parliamentary club which premised its socialist program for the reorganization of society and the economy on an acceptance of the new state and of the Parliament which it was entering. In his own subsequent remarks, Seliger commented at length on the government’s program before turning to the question of German Social Democracy’s participation and collaboration in the government majority. Here Seliger drew the line: “Even in nationally unified states the issue of government and majority is often difficult and complex. In a nationally mixed state, in a state of nationalities, the issue is vastly complicated and much more difficult. And here it seems, gentlemen, that already on this point we witness not only a crisis of parliament but also of the state. Because the elections revealed a crisis of the state, and if we see difficulties in creating a majority, it is a parliamentary expression of a reality which was clearly expressed in the elections. And here it is clear, gentlemen, what great, grievous mistakes you made, you gentlemen, who in the former so-called National Assembly organized and built this state. In that National Assembly Germans were overlooked, and nonetheless you saw them as the subjects of your laws. And yet, you didn’t see them as future effective factors of parliamentary politics. You were all wrap-

 Digitální parlamentní knihovna, June 10, 1920.

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ped up in your imperious, nationalist schemes when you built this state politically. Perhaps this was mixed somewhat with a feeling of fear of the Germans —and you were blind and didn’t see the deep cracks in your own nation. And now you have a mess. It is said that there are two possibilities: either a national coalition or a class coalition. A national coalition—I don’t know if anyone in this house is seriously considering such a thing. In preliminary discussions today, we saw that it may well be impossible to create a national coalition, because with the social rifts in each of the nations the forces are not numerically strong enough to be sufficiently reliable. The idea of socialization dominates the thinking of the workers to such an extent that it is hardly conceivable that a coalition could arise between the representatives of the proletariat and of the purist capitalism. “And so it seems that the creation of a national coalition is impossible, regardless of the difficulties in which the entire government apparatus finds itself. Thus, there arises the idea of a class coalition as we have seen and still see in other states. A coalition of workers and farmers. It has been much discussed. We see it in German Austria, we see it in Germany; of course, created by necessity, under duress, and at a moment of insurmountable reality which permits neither one side nor the other to act freely. But here it is apparent how serious was the mistake which you, gentlemen, made in the former National Assembly. There is also talk of another possibility of class coalition, not only of peasants and farmers; there is also the thought of joining the bourgeois classes in this state in a government majority. But in all cases, the impossibility is apparent in the following: you have placed the fetters of national servitude on the nations with which you wish to join in coalition. You erected your constitution and wrote above it ‘Unalterable’. You surrounded it with so many provisions that it is difficult, even inconceivable, to discuss the question of creating a common constitution which would benefit us all, under which we could all live freely, a constitution which would give the nations what they inevitably need for life and what is for them their daily bread…. You did not give the other nations the right to administer their schools, their social institutions and thus you made them subject to your will.”¹⁵³ With this somber note the prospects for a near-term participation of German Social Democracy in government were not bright. None of these three responses to Tusar’s appeal for collaboration and participation could be welcome to a party leadership desperate to expand the government’s support in Parliament in the face of the disintegrating support within the

 Digitální parlamentní knihovna, June 2, 1920.

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party’s own rank and file. Since the disintegration continued unabated, however, the government resumed its quest. On August 17th Tusar met with the German ambassador. The report of that meeting, which the ambassador sent to Berlin, is a revealing document. It shows clearly how dependent Tusar was on winning German support to shore up his government and how natural was the German reluctance to commit themselves in a situation as precarious as that of the Red-Green Coalition in the summer of 1920. From then on German party leaders who were inclined to collaborate with their Czech counterparts were constantly apprehensive of getting ahead of their voters and leaving themselves open to the charge of national treason, which Lodgman or the National Socialists would not hesitate to bring up if they felt it to be to their advantage. In the course of their conversation the ambassador referred to some excesses of the Czech officials of which he had heard. Tusar knew of them and acknowledged them, but he insisted that a politics of true conciliation and national accommodation would only be possible when the German Social Democrats and German Agrarians decided to enter the government and give it a firm majority. With three or four German ministers in the cabinet, he could put school and language policy on a different track and create separate administrative districts, since he was sure of the fundamental agreement of his party comrades. The individual German deputies with whom he had been speaking were understanding and inclined to give approval, but they feared public opinion and their press. The ambassador found the caution of the Germans perfectly natural, particularly now before the impending conference of the Czechoslovak Social Democrats, where it would become clear whether a majority of that party still favored continuing in the government coalition or not. Tusar professed the expectation that, under closer examination, the Communist wing of the party would turn out to be a small group of idealists and dreamers. He believed that he could persuade the leftists around Šmeral, their leader, to remain in the party and in the coalition on the grounds that otherwise they would be doing the work of the reaction. If that were not successful, however, Tusar did not see how anyone could pursue a future domestic or foreign policy. Tusar said that, with the full approval of President Masaryk, he had rejected out of hand a coalition of all the Czech parties, which would bring the National Democrats and Clericals back to government. If the bridges to the Germans were broken, it would be an intolerable situation for both sides. To govern with a majority of three votes is intolerable in the

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long run also. Thus, there remains only the path to the Germans.¹⁵⁴ This is the only instance in the First Republic when a Czech premier seriously considered concessions to German party leaders, albeit under duress, not to mention the specific concessions which Tusar was offering to address German national concerns. School and language policy and administrative autonomy were all points which Křepek and/or Seliger had touched upon in their responses to Tusar’s declaration of the government’s program. Some days later the ambassador returned to this topic in a subsequent embassy report and cast doubts on the prospects for collaboration: “… even if the German Bohemian Social Democrats, in accordance with their international thinking, were prepared to moderate their demands in national matters, truly united political action would be thwarted by the nationalistic thinking innate or cultivated even in the lowest ranks of the Czech proletariat. As long as the Czech Social Democrats do not turn against the terror in the language and school questions and against Prague centralism, which is strangling the Germans, there can be no talk of a common proletarian front of both nations.”¹⁵⁵ To foster Tusar’s efforts President Masaryk called a secret meeting of Czech and German Social Democratic leaders for September 8th at Castle Hluboš near Příbram, which was then the President’s country residence. In attendance were five Czech party leaders led by Tusar and five German party leaders led by Seliger.¹⁵⁶ From Masaryk’s brief notes we know that Tusar at the outset of the meeting expressed his regret that the Czech party had not decided earlier to do battle with the left. Now they were determined. Masaryk raised the question of the German Social Democrats’ entry into government. When Seliger came to speak, it was clear they would not. The meeting had failed to achieve its goal.¹⁵⁷ Underlying that failure, at least in part, was the differing situation which the two Social Democratic leaders faced within their own ranks. For Tusar, the rift within his party had already reached a point of no return and what was left was to salvage what could yet be saved. The only possibility of the government’s survival was to win German support. For Seliger, however, the situation, at least in the near term, was less threatening. He could anticipate keeping majority support in his party’s upcoming conference in October, which in fact is what he

 Alexander, M. Deutsche Gesandtschaftsberichte aus Prag, vol. I, num. ref. 122, pp. 307– 308.  Alexander, M. Deutsche Gesandtschaftsberichte aus Prag, vol. I, num. ref. 128, pp. 319 – 320.  The Czechs were Tusar, Habermann, Aster, Tomášek and Bechyně. The Germans were Seliger, Dr. Czech, Czermak, Pohl and Dr. Heller.  Nečásek, František et al., eds. Dokumenty o protilidové a protinárodní politice T. G. Masaryka (Prague: Orbis, 1953), vol. II, num ref. 15, pp. 68 – 70.

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did¹⁵⁸, but joining in a coalition with Czech bourgeois parties—not only the Czech Agrarians and but also National Socialists in the eyes of the German left wing—would be an open provocation to the left. Seliger was determined to hold the party together and hold it in the democratic column. Ironically, the issue had just been settled in the longer term for both parties. In late August the Communist Third International at its meeting in Moscow had established the Twenty-One Conditions for entry into the International and they were such that the split of both parties was an inevitability. Decades later in London, a Czech exile who attended the meeting at Hluboš wrote that: “it was comrade Seliger who at this meeting saw more clearly than others the consequence of the Communist invasion in Germany and Czechoslovakia, at the time of course only intellectual…. With his analysis comrade Seliger had such an effect on everyone that the meeting ended with the promise of representatives of both parties that both would be guided by the principle of the greatest national tolerance and strict democratic conduct.”¹⁵⁹ One may question the accuracy of this account, since Masaryk’s notes show that, after the meeting, Tusar complained that “the Germans exaggerate the danger of Bolshevism in order to extract national and language concessions.”¹⁶⁰ In any case the government’s days were numbered. On September 12th, Tusar and Švehla informed President Masaryk that they were leaving the government, which would leave Tusar and his Social Democratic ministers free to battle the party’s Communist wing. Švehla was in agreement.¹⁶¹ He also would leave the government. The Social Democrats would not be pleased to see such a strong personality remaining in the cabinet. What was envisaged at that time was a cabinet reshuffle with fresh ministers from the Red-Green Coalition.¹⁶² Two days later on September 14th, however, the two leaders told Masaryk that they were leaving the coalition. In effect, the RedGreen Coalition was at an end and the new government would be a non-parliamentary, caretaker cabinet. In those final hours, Švehla evidently argued for preserving the Red-Green Coalition, motivated by a wish to keep the Czech Christian Socials from the gov-

 Returning from the conference of German Social Democracy, Seliger, who had been in ill health for some time, died on October 18th, 1920.  Mokrý, Adolf. “Velká povinnost”, Demokracie a Socialismus [London newspaper] issue 35, March 4– 5, 1957.  Nečásek, F. Dokumenty o protilidové …, p. 69.  Nečásek, F. Dokumenty o protilidové …, p. 70.  Klimek Antonin. Velke´ dějiny zemi´ Koruny česke´, 1918 – 1929 (Praha: Paseka, 2000), vol. XIII, p. 202.

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ernment majority. In the recent elections to Parliament they had proven themselves a significant competitor with the Czech Agrarians for the rural vote. Švehla is reported to have argued, in an evident appeal to the anti-clerical sentiments of the Social Democrats, that “if you leave, we will crawl apart like cockroaches and then that black fart Šrámek will crawl [into the government coalition] and no one will ever get him out again—little by little, but certainly he would manage to break the door in.”¹⁶³ In fact, in September, 1921, Monsignor Jan Šrámek, leader of the Czech Christian Socials, entered the next Beneš cabinet, the only party leader to do so, and he served thereafter in every parliamentary cabinet of the First Republic. President Masaryk was surprised and displeased by the sudden turn of events. He had already begun to work on the cabinet reshuffle. Now he would assemble a cabinet headed by the Moravian bureaucratic official, Jan Černý, which would consist exclusively of bureaucratic specialists and in support of which there would emerge in Parliament not the Red-Green Coalition joined by the German Social Democrats, but rather a national coalition, a purely “Czechoslovak” government majority, which inevitably would include the National Democrats and Christian Socials, whom he did not wish to see again in power.¹⁶⁴ Prospects for accommodation between Czechs and Germans, already dampened heavily in parliament by German reluctance and in some cases by outright rejection, now were taking a new turn for the worse. Initially the Černý government was expected to last for only a short time until a new majority could be assembled in Parliament, but the breakup of the Czechoslovak Social Democratic Party and the consequent disarray in Parliament did not yield to short term resolution. As events transpired, Černý’s caretaker cabinet lasted for a year and in that year Czechoslovak politics underwent a fundamental transformation, a restoration of the all-national coalition which had characterized the reconstituted National Committee of July, 1918, in the final three months before independence, and the first Czechoslovak government under Dr. Karel Kramář, which lasted from October, 1918, until June, 1919. Because this renewed constellation of political forces brought the ultra-nationalist National Democrats and the Czechoslovak Christian Social Peoples Party back to power, it brought with it what soon emerged as a virtual veto on efforts for conciliation between Czechs and Germans. Events which began to unfold at the same time as the new cabinet was sworn in hastened this process of transformation. The Agrarian leader, Franz

 Nečásek, F. Dokumenty o protilidové …, p. 70.  Klimek, A. Velke´ dějiny zemi´ Koruny česke´ …, vol. XIII, p. 203.

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Křepek, responding on behalf of the German Parliamentary Union to the government’s declaration, saw in the appointment of a ministry of officials “the deplorable end of that apparent democracy which was made the foundation of this coercive state on October 28th, 1918.” The Černý government entered office on September 16th, 1920. On October 1st, German recruits were conscripted into the military. At a number of recruiting places Germans staged protest demonstrations by the provocative display of Germans colors, singing the nationalist hymn, Wacht an Rhein, or declaring fidelity to “Greater Germany” rather than the Czechoslovak Republic. The German Parliamentary Union called on Premier Černý to establish German military units with German the language of command, garrisoning them in German territory and eventually replacing the army with a militia. Černý refused to enter into negotiations on this basis pointing to the provocative behavior of the German recruits.¹⁶⁵ In this charged atmosphere local events in the German territories began to assume a broader significance. Already in the spring of 1920, the Czech minority in Teplice had called for the removal of a statue of the Habsburg Emperor Joseph II from the public square. Local authorities rejected the demand and were backed up in their decision by higher-ups in the state administration. The situation festered, but in September the legionnaire unit stationed at Teplice joined the call for the statue’s removal. Joseph II, widely regarded by historians as an enlightened and progressive monarch, had become for the Czechs in Teplice a symbol of former foreign rule whose image should be removed from public view as swiftly as possible. As the situation became more tense, local officials, awaiting a decision from above, ordered the statue boarded up. On November 5th, Germans from Teplice removed the boards. The issue came under heated debate in Parliament. The government ruled that removal of the statue would be illegal, but cautioned local authorities to avoid violent clashes. The situation continued to teeter back and forth until November 11th, when the legionnaires declared that they would remove the statue themselves, not on orders from their commander but on their own initiative. The troops occupied the square with weapons loaded, dismantled the statue and put it in the local museum.¹⁶⁶ Tension spread in the German territories. On November 13th, Czech legionnaires were heckled and spat upon by demonstrating German residents in Cheb. On the following night, the legionnaires tore down the statue of Joseph II in the marketplace, breaking off an arm. When the bells of the city began to

 Klepetař, H. Seit 1918 …, p. 149.  Peroutka, F. Budování státu, vol. III, pp. 1287– 1288.

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ring, the legionnaires withdrew. Large groups of people came into the streets and began to tear down bilingual signs and smashed windows in the Czech school. The statue was restored, but without the missing arm. A hunt began for German girls who had taken part in the “entertainment” of the Czech military in Frankental Hall. The German newspaper Bohemia reported that “many such females who were known to be sweethearts of the Czech soldiers had their hair cut off. A stock was erected for them with the plaque ‘Women of Shame’ and tufts of their snipped hair were placed on display.” The mayor demanded the “final liberation of the German city from its Czech garrison”. While the unrest spread to other German cities, it also spread to Prague. On November 16th, the Czech National Democrats organized an “informative” gathering in Wenceslas Square. At midday, Czech school children came before the building of the newspaper, Národní listy ,¹⁶⁷ displaying banners which read: “Our school in Cheb is destroyed”, “Come to Our Help”, “Contribute to the Restoration of the School”. The crowd grew in number—officially placed at some 1,500 at its peak—and there were shouts for revenge. The crowd first went to the German Estates Theater. Here, it found the main entrance blocked by police and this time by legionnaires who supported them, but by ascending an outside stairway the rioters were able to gain entry through a broken window. Once in possession, Czech actors announced the evening’s performance—Smetana′s Bartered Bride, a symbol of the Czech national revival. The sign posted on the box office door announced: “Czech Theater. November 16th. For Cheb and Teplice”. The performance was attended, among others, by the mayor of Prague, the anti-German and anti-Semitic ‘Czechoslovak’ National Socialist, Dr. Karel Baxa. The rioting continued on November 17th and 18th. The Jewish city hall became a target. People who were planning to immigrate to America had gathered there to eat. When they came under attack, the American consul permitted the American flag to be raised over the building. On November 18th, the new German theater was also briefly occupied. However, the seizure of the Estates Theater was the culmination of the national storms which swept across the Czech lands. Although in recent years the theater had been little used, it remained a symbol of former glory. In 1787, it had presented the premier of Mozart’s Don Giovanni. Shortly before the rioting, the editor of the Prager Tagblatt, Walter Tschuppik, wrote that the theater lived “in retirement so to speak… Only now and then was there a play. On the other days the mice must have nibbled at the old costumes and sets.” But for the Ger-

 A publication of the Czechoslovak National Democratic Party.

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man Jewish author, Ernst Weiss, the loss was profound: “The taking of the old theater had a devastating effect on one’s inner life and a decisive effect on one’s outer life. It was the only stage I truly loved. For me it was irreplaceable…. Generally speaking, I am not a sentimental man. But I could no longer live in a city where such an event is possible. You must be able to breathe. You can’t do that without a sense of justice.’¹⁶⁸ Ernst Weiss moved to Berlin. Later there was monetary compensation for the loss of the Estates Theater, which remained in Czech hands, but the monuments in the German territories were not restored. The next crisis to face the new government grew out of the split in the ranks of Czechoslovak Social Democracy and it came within days of the recent national storms. On September 14th, the day before the Tusar government resigned, the moderate leadership of Social Democracy had met and ruled that those who chose the Communist orientation were no longer members of the Social Democratic party and could have no further say over its internal affairs. It postponed the date for the dreaded party conference until December. In response, the breakaway left wing of Social Democracy held its first congress on September 25th-28th, the original date for the party’s conference, and adopted the Twenty-One Conditions for entry into the Third (Communist) International. On October 7th, the deputies of the Social Democratic left, later the Communist Party, formally went into parliamentary opposition pursuant to the decision of their party conference. In the showdown between the two wings of the party, the Communists seized the initiative and, stealing a leaf from the nationalists’ book, on September 16th, had occupied the party’s headquarters, Lidový dům (the People’s House), which also housed the print shop and editorial offices of the newspaper, Právo lidu (People′s Right), of the moderate wing. The issue of the Lidový dům was taken to court and, on October 25th, the Prague district court ruled in favor of the moderate wing of the Social Democrats. At first, the government hesitated to intervene, but on December 9th, the police expelled the Communist occupiers and the building was restored to its legal owners. On December 10th, the Communists declared a general strike. It was a misguided move. Their new party was still in disarray and ill-equipped for such a struggle. Aside from Kladno and a few other smaller centers, the strike failed to take hold. Within days the situation was brought under control. The psychological impact of the strike, however, should not be minimized. The Czech political parties found themselves opposed in Parliament by a noisy and turbulent  Becher, Peter, Peter. “Kulturpolitische Konfliktherde in der ersten Republik: Der Streit in des Prager Staattheater und die Prager Tonfilmaffäre 1930”, in Hoensch, Jörg K. and Dušan Kováč, eds. Das Scheitern der Verständigung: Tschechen, Deutschen und Slowaken in der Ersten Republik (1918 – 1938) (Essen, Klartext 1994), pp. 122– 127.

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opposition—the Communists and the national minorities often with the Germans in the lead. For Premier Černý, whose government lacked parliamentary roots and who saw himself serving first and foremost at the will of the President, a further blow came in January, 1921, when Masaryk was taken seriously ill. For a time, his condition was considered life threatening. Only in May had he recovered sufficiently to travel abroad and continue his recuperation on the island of Capri. Masaryk returned to Prague on August 11th, 1921. In this situation of crisis and diminished authority at the center, a new institution came to the fore, the Pětka or the Five, so-named for the Parliamentary Committee of the five representatives of the major Czechoslovak political parties which together then constituted a majority in Parliament. Absent German participation in government, which had failed to emerge from the discussions at Hluboš, there was no other workable alternative, at the time, to the mono-ethnic Pětka. Under the leadership of the Agrarian Antonín Švehla, the Committee evolved into a major force in Czechoslovak politics and would remain such for the next six years. The Pětka could provide the parliamentary support that could enable the Černý cabinet to govern, but it could also withhold it. Over time, it became the dominant partner, not only between government and Parliament, but also between the Pětka itself and the parties in Parliament which it represented. The Pětka functioned in secrecy and that secrecy gave its members protective cover, although individual parties would often disassociate themselves in public from government measures which the Pětka as a whole had authorized. Most commonly, the weakened Czechoslovak Social Democrats did so, intent upon shoring up their own position among the workers in their on-going competition with the Czechoslovak Communist Party. In general, members of the Pětka came to wish to discredit the caretaker government so that, later, a new parliamentary government would be greeted with relief.¹⁶⁹ The Pětka was roundly criticized for its autocratic methods and for its lack of constitutional sanction, but faced with an appointed government, it restored a voice to Parliament and brought back stability in a time of crisis. The Social Democrat, Rudolf Bechyně, famously defended the institution: “Given the geographic and national composition of our state and the political and social stratification of the people”, he wrote, “it comes about that our conflicts are deeper and more dangerous than elsewhere…. Our state cannot rely internally on any historical or any new force except the state nation…. The Czechoslovak parties alone can and

 Peroutka, F. Budování státu, vol. IV, p. 1393.

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must guide and uphold parliament—and precisely therefore they must have a parliamentary organization of these parties which is strict and firm. To summarize: the Pětka is a necessity. It is the opposite of chaos.”¹⁷⁰ There was another dimension to the Pětka, however, which was less promising. United, the parties of the Pětka spoke for a majority in Parliament. In reaching a decision, therefore, unanimity was essential to the authority of the institution and while the need for unanimity encouraged compromise, it also gave an outsized role to any potential dissenter. This in turn gave a disproportionate voice to the smaller, ultra-nationalist parties, the National Democrats and the Christian Socials. Dr. Karel Kramář, leader of the National Democrats, commonly argued that Czechoslovakia was a Czechoslovak national state in which the position of the Germans was effectively one of permanent subordination. In defending the Pětka as a necessary instrument for building the Czechoslovak state, Monsignor Jan Šrámek, leader of the Christian Socials and that party’s representative in the Pětka, held that the Germans already had ample opportunity for national fulfillment in Germany, Austria and Switzerland, whereas the Czechs had only Czechoslovakia.¹⁷¹ Even Jiří Stříbrný, the representative of the National Socialists in the Pětka, had strong reservations about power sharing. He did not oppose the participation of a German party in government, provided that the Czechoslovak parties in the government coalition had a clear majority in parliament in their own right: “Otherwise, before every vote the Germans represented in the government would be tempted to engage in extortionist politics, to put forward more and more demands and finally it would break the national character of our state.”¹⁷² This fundamental dilemma in Czech-German relations was never resolved in the First Republic. German party leaders argued that concessions to the Germans were needed to convince their voters that the politics of collaboration was beneficial. For some Czechs, however, national concessions to the Germans were a threat to the national character of the new state. For them, above all, the Constitution adopted in February of 1920 was the immutable standard which, once and for all, had established the ground rules of the game. Given the political composition of the Pětka, the prospects for the collaboration of Czechs and Germans were not bright.

 Peroutka, F. Budování státu, vol. IV, pp. 1390 – 1391.  Šrámek′s speech was delivered in March, 1922. Cited in F. G. Campbell, “Die Tschechische Volkspartei …”, p. 298.  “Poslanec Stříbrný o účasti Němců ve vládě,” Pražský večerník [newspaper] December 12, 1921.

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It would be impossible to describe the scope of Czech-German relations with any brevity, simply because it ran the gamut from close, personal friendship to open and bitter hostility. Whether expressed in personal relations or institutionalized in government practice, however, antagonism between the two peoples was a constant impediment against the consolidation of a multi-ethnic society. In early 1928, a professor of hygiene in the medical faculty of the German University in Prague died. In his will, but also in a separate letter addressed to the faculty senate, he expressed the wish that his long time assistant and adjunct professor at the university be appointed his successor. Opposition was immediate. The assistant was accused of being nationally unreliable. The opposition was focused among German professors from Germany, but was so intense that German and German Jewish professors from the Czech lands failed to rally to the candidate’s defense, although the Jewish professors, in particular, were not opposed on principle. One of the opponents derisively told the candidate to get an official position “with the help of minister Spina…. Your marriage excludes your appointment,” he said. Dr. Franz Spina, a German Agrarian leader, was Minister of Public Works at that time. The candidate’s “deficiency” was that he had married a Czech, the daughter of a well-known Czech architect. She was a writer, a contributor to Lidové noviny, in the early years of the Republic, the newspaper of the moderate, oppositionist wing of National Democracy based in Moravia.¹⁷³ Lidové noviny was a pillar of the Czech establishment which, during the First Republic, numbered among its contributors such prominent moderates on the nationality issue as Ferdinand Peroutka and Karel Čapek. In late 1919, shortly after the seizure of the German Estates Theater, an issue arose at a session of the Prague City Council regarding the public display of German signs in the nation’s capital. The mayor had ordered the removal of German signs by the end of the year. The lettering of the signs had already been covered over. He justified his order with the statement: “As a result the facades of some houses have been disfigured in a way which can no longer be tolerated in the interests of the good name of our city which will be visited more and more by strangers.” Dr. Spina, the German Agrarian leader at that time, questioned the order: “on the assumption that the mayor (acts) in accordance with his officially sworn duty not to put up with anything which would disturb the coexistence of citizens of this Republic who have equal rights and do harm to the real interests of the state which faces a difficult internal crisis.”

 AKPR, T 12/25, část IV.

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The mayor, Dr. Karel Baxa, responded: “I really don’t feel myself obliged to respond to the question directed to me”, he said, “since the entire affair is a matter for the city council. But as the issue has been raised, I will say a few words about it. I must insist on the position which all the political parties of the council jointly adopted earlier at a session in the presence of the Germans. I declare that all accusations of wrong-doing and lawlessness are groundless—and that holds for my person, the council and the population of Prague as well. We regard it our most sacred duty to preserve the Czech character of our capital city for all the future. [Stormy applause from all the Czech city councilors.] If you really want to live with us in peace and quiet [Dr. Epstein calls out: ‘And in freedom!’], yes, and in freedom, you must avoid any provocation of the population of Czech Prague. This issue is for us above all a matter of maintaining public peace and security. [Cat call of a National Democrat: ‘Just hang out a sign and you will see!’] Therefore, I must insist on what the nation assigned to us as our duty and what was decided upon in a full session. As the Czech mayor I must first of all fulfill my duties.” City Deputy Dr. Leo Epstein said: “Defense of minorities is in the peace treaties”. Dr. Baxa replied: “So far as the peace treaties are concerned, you certainly know, Doctor, their purpose. I can say nothing else than to repeat and insist on what I have said”.¹⁷⁴ The practice which eventually emerged was that, with some exceptions, German signs and notices could not be publically displayed in Prague. A visitor to the city might come across the large sign “Vacuum Oil Company” or such signs as “Au chat noir” or “Gelateria Italiana”, but there was no sign for “Deutsches Haus”, the community center of the Germans in Prague.¹⁷⁵ Such was the setting when the Pětka made its appearance. Especially with Masaryk’s illness, the Černý cabinet lacked adequate authority to govern alone. The Pětka gradually assumed control and for some time directed the affairs of state from behind the scenes until the immediate crisis had passed. It was a period marked by a return to the principles of the market economy. On the instructions of the Pětka, above all on the demand of the Agrarians, the government began in 1921 to dismantle the regulated economy in food stuffs, which had been firmly set in place at the war’s end when the poorest were threatened with starvation and when the wave of socialist sentiment was running high.

 Memo of Chancellor Přemysl Šámal, MZV-VA 1, krabice 2255.  Rádl, Emanuel, and Ladislav Hejda´nek. Válka Čechů s Němci (Praha: Melantrich, 1993), p. 241.

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Although rent controls would still continue for many years, the restrictive regulations on new construction were now also eased and opened increasingly to competitive practices. Above all, the specter of socialization ceased to loom over the economy. All this reflected a rightward shift in the center of gravity within the Pětka itself, where the socialist parties, represented by Rudolf Bechyně for the Social Democrats and Jiří Stříbrný for the National Socialists, were weakened, out of power and on the defensive against the Communists. The non-Marxist parties now came to the fore, represented by Dr. Alois Rašín for the National Democrats, the Christian Social leader Dr. Jan Šrámek, but above all the pragmatic Agrarian leader Antonín Švehla, who commanded the center position among all five members of the Pětka, which was the position of greatest influence and of greatest opportunity. By the summer of 1921 the Černý government, having largely completed its task of restoring order, had outworn its usefulness in the eyes of the Pětka and informal talks began on the formation of a new government. From the outset it was assumed that Švehla would head the government and that it would be decidedly parliamentary in character. The issue of German participation in this government did not play a significant role in these discussions, although efforts at accommodation had by no means ceased with the advent of the Černý government. Only months after the installation of this government Švehla opened negotiations with the Germans Farmers Union and the German Social Democrats with a view to bringing Germans into the government. These talks were continued into the new year, but without success.¹⁷⁶ In the autumn of 1920, President Masaryk had also met with both Franz Spina and Robert Mayr-Harting, the German Agrarian and Christian Social leaders, the two most prominent moderate German leaders in the German Parliamentary Union. Although both stressed that they had met with the President only as private persons and not in any official capacity on behalf of the Union, both thereafter were found quite often visiting at the Presidential Chancellery.¹⁷⁷ Against this encouraging backdrop new events intervened of a strikingly different character. In April of 1921, shortly before his departure for convalescence on the island of Capri, Masaryk summoned the various party leaders for consultation on the current political situation with a view perhaps of reconfiguring the present government as a quasi-parliamentary government with a political pre Alexander, M. Deutsche Gesandtschaftsberichte aus Prag, vol. I, num. ref. 149, pp. 362– 363; see also Daniel E. Miller, Forging Political Compromise; Antonín Švehla and the Czechoslovak Republican Party 1918 – 1933 (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2009), p. 78.  Kracik, J. Die Politik des deutschen Aktivismus …, p. 88.

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mier. The leaders of the German parties were among those invited. The leaders of the German Social Democrats accepted their invitation. On April 20th, Masaryk met with the German Agrarian leader Franz Křepek. It was once again an effort on Marasyk’s part to be forthcoming with the Germans. He had in mind the appointment of a German official to the next government, the appointment of three Germans to the Committee of the Land Administration and the installation of a German section chief, perhaps in the Ministry of Agriculture. He assured Křepek that the offer was in no way linked to any conditions. He also hoped to receive other chairmen of the German parliamentary clubs in the coming days.¹⁷⁸ Křepek reported Masaryk’s offer to the members of the German Agrarian Parliamentary Club, but they wanted to leave any decision to the German Parliamentary Union. In the Parliamentary Union, negative radicalism prevailed and Masaryk was rebuffed. The official report of the session stated that “it was decided by the Union to send to the President through its chairman, Dr. Lodgman, the message that the Union saw no grounds for further conversations and that its united parties would therefore refrain from further receptions. Deputy Dr. Lodgman did not accept the invitation already sent to him.”¹⁷⁹ The Czech press denounced the Union’s action as tactless and offensive. The German press in Prague held it to be an unnecessary snub, and the German Embassy report to Berlin was no less condemnatory. The German representative noted in the report that the vote in the Union, already weakened in national matters by the absence of the Social Democrats, had not been unanimous and that the German Agrarians and German Democrats had dissented. He questioned if the Union would survive the ordeal and pointed out that: “a tactic based on tactlessness will not strengthen the German cause…. This demonstration seems to me pointless, tactless and therefore harmful. It seems obvious to me to go to the castle and say to the President that one has no more to tell him, since the minimum demands of the Germans have been known for a long time and also, he must have known for a long time that nothing has happened to bring their realization any closer.”¹⁸⁰ In the summer events took a turn for the worse. Organized crowds of Czechs began to appear in towns in the German language territory to stage festivities and parades in support of the local Czech minority. The German population for the most part responded passively, withdrawing from the town and only returning once the demonstrators had left. This was the case with the Sokol dem Alexander, M. Deutsche Gesandtschaftsberichte aus Prag, vol. I, num. ref. 184, p. 427, and num. ref. 186, pp. 434– 435; Kracik, J. Die Politik des deutschen Aktivismus …, p. 91.  Klepetař, H. Seit 1918 …, p. 132.  Alexander, M. Deutsche Gesandtschaftsberichte aus Prag, vol. I, num. ref. 184, p. 427.

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onstrations in German Trutnov, in Stříbro, in Karlovy Vary and in Žatec. On July 31st, however, there was a gathering of legionnaires in Ústí nad Labem which made demands to the government on behalf of the Czech minority, among them that only nationally reliable Czech officials be appointed in German territory. On another occasion two special trains with discounted fares brought some 200 Czechs to Postelporty from Louny. They occupied the town for some time and left several wounded Germans behind them. In response, German Deputies of the Parliamentary Union submitted an interpolation calling for an explanation from the Premier. When a response was not forthcoming, they resorted to obstruction, determined to bring the business of the Chamber to a halt. Finally, the Chamber president ordered five German Deputies expelled. When they did not leave volutarily, the parliamentary guard was called and ordered to remove them by force. With that, the Parliamentary Union declared that it would abstain from sessions of the Parliament until the current state of affairs was officially clarified. On August 3rd a German gathering at Ústí nad Labem was attacked by some 200 armed legionnaires from Roudnice, followed by armed civilians. At one point the legionnaires fired into the crowd. A large number of Germans were wounded, some critically, and one young man was killed. Finally, on August 4th, Premier Černý made a belated statement which expressed official regret over the events. His statement offered no explanation of how demobilized legionnaires came into possession of weapons or why special trains with reduced fares had been placed at the disposal of organized Czech bands participating in the actions. He reported that the legionnaires were back in their barracks, but made no mention of measures, if any, that might be taken against them. These actions of the legionnaires were supported for the most part by the Czech press, with the noteworthy exceptions of Tribuna and Čas. Čas pointed out that there is no excuse that, alongside the official government, a parallel government of legionnaires claimed the right to forcefully make “order” and argued that, even in the circles of Czech deputies, anger over the violent acts of the legionnaires should be great.¹⁸¹ By contrast, National Democracy declared that: “the action for the protection of our minorities ended with the complete victory of our outstanding legionnaires…. The Czechoslovak Legionnaire Association in Roudnice should be completely satisfied with its exemplary action.”¹⁸² In this atmosphere German participation in government was scarcely in the cards.

 Alexander, M. Deutsche Gesandtschaftsberichte aus Prag, vol. I, num. ref. 206, pp- 519 – 521.  Peroutka, F. Budování státu, vol. IV, p. 1518.

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In August and the first three weeks of September, leaders of the Pětka parties negotiated with Švehla as “head of government designated” by the President. The first break with expectations came when Švehla informed them that some experts might be retained in the cabinet. Yet in the course of the negotiations, Masaryk more and more considered Beneš for the premiership and, on September 8th, Švehla adopted the proposal that the non-partisan Beneš head the government. He cited his own poor health and announced that he would be going abroad to convalesce. He also stated that: “all the political parties are weak; care must be given to them” and, therefore the party leaders won’t enter government.¹⁸³ What accounts for the departure from the original intention to restore full parliamentary government with the full participation of the Pětka has been the occasion for considerable controversy. Pětka negotiations, of course, remained secret. There was no written record. It may have been largely a matter of Švehla’s health. His health problems were real enough. On the other hand, it may also have been caution on the part of Švehla, a politician who was by no means impatient in coming to power. It was the first parliamentary government since the collapse of the political system a year earlier. How the new coalition would function was uncertain. Švehla feared a temporary return of the old anarchy. If the government were to fall, who as powerful as the Pětka was left to form a government? Pětka’s entry into government, especially without Švehla in the lead, was premature. That the Pětka did not enter the government was a sign that it did not yet consider the situation clear and the old turmoil dispelled.¹⁸⁴ The new government took office on September 26th, 1921. It was a hybrid cabinet, part parliamentary and part not, with both party representatives and nonparty experts heading up the individual ministries and with a non-partisan premier who retained his post at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. With the exception of the Christian Social leader, Monsignor Šrámek, who was named Minister of Railways, the leaders of the Pětka did not enter the government which they expected to be a weak and provisional regime. Beneš could not indefinitely sustain his position as both Premier and Foreign Minister. Lacking a political base, he was dependent on the Pětka for the political support it was prepared to give him. Yet Beneš had come to the premiership through the intervention of Masaryk and neither Masaryk nor Beneš was prepared to leave the recent dominance of the Pětka in Czechslovak politics unchallenged.

 Klimek, A. Velke´ dějiny zemi´ Koruny česke´ …, vol. XIII, pp. 290 – 291.  Peroutka, F. Budování státu, vol. IV, p. 1525.

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At the same time as the Pětka was asserting its primacy, another institution, also not envisaged in the Constitution, was coming to the fore. This institution was known as the Castle, so named for the edifice which housed the Presidency and, briefly at the outset, was the site of the Foreign Ministry as well. The Castle was a loose coterie of individuals, scattered across the political spectrum, who shared a common sympathy with the governing philosophy of President Masaryk and the person of the Foreign Minister and second President, Edvard Beneš—the two leaders of the resistance movement abroad during the First World War. Among these individuals were former members of Masaryk’s Realist Party, dissolved during the war. They had migrated to various political parties in the Republic, but kept their loyalty to Masaryk. Among political parties, the socialists were foremost, the “Czechoslovak” National Socialists in the first place, especially after Beneš joined the party, the Czechoslovak Social Democrats and later the German Social Democrats. To these should be added labor organizations affiliated with the socialists, the Czechoslovak Association of Unions and the Alliance of German (Free) Unions, but also bourgeois parties, both agrarian and clerical, the callisthenic organization of the Sokols, and the legionnaire associations and other groups close to the foreign resistance movement during the war, individuals in banking and finance and, of critical importance, journalists, editors and publishers, writers and prominent intellectuals. The Castle even had representatives in parties opposed to it.¹⁸⁵ Because Masaryk stood at the pinnacle of the Castle, the Chancellery of the President of the Republic played a central role. Here, the two key figures were Přemysl Šámal, the head of the Chancellery, and Josef Schieszl, head of its political and legislative division. Both were former members of Masaryk’s Realist Party. In 1922, when the struggle with the Pětka was a foremost concern, Masaryk approved a plan to create an apparatus at the Chancellery to gather political information by both official and unofficial means. Others outside the Chancellery, principally journalists, were recruited for this task. What grew out of these efforts was a far-reaching network that funneled information two ways: information on how the president felt about important issues was sent out to the network, and through the same channels answers and suggestions flowed back. A similar information network was established at the Foreign Ministry.¹⁸⁶ Unlike the Pětka, the Castle exercised no direct political power, but its influence in domestic pol-

 Bachstein, Martin. “Die soziologische Struktur der ‘Burg’”, Bosl, Karl et al., eds, Die “Burg”: Einflußreiche Kräfte um Masaryk und Beneš (Münich; Wien: Oldenbourg, 1973 – 1974), vol. I, pp. 2– 6.  Klimek, A. Velke´ dějiny zemi´ Koruny česke´ …, vol. XIII, pp. 236 – 238.

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itics was formidable, nonetheless. Reflecting Masaryk’s views, it was consistently supportive of efforts to foster Czech-German rapport. For the parties of the German Parliamentary Union, the new government offered a convenient opportunity to revisit and revise their abstention from Parliament, a tactic which had produced no benefits for them. Earlier in the year, Lodgman had succeeded in winning adoption of a resolution by the Union which rejected Masaryk’s invitation to them to participate in discussions of the current political situation. It was a stunning set back for the moderate parties in the Union and widened the rift between radicals and moderates. Now, Lodgman insisted that the policy of abstention not be abandoned, but on this occasion he found himself bitterly opposed and his proposal rejected. In its stead, the Union declared: “The German Parliamentary Union has decided to adhere to its fundamental policy even toward the new government and to make its approach dependent upon the deeds of the government. With regard to tactics, it is decided for the time being to participate in sessions of the Parliament.”¹⁸⁷ Even before presenting the government program in the National Assembly on October 18th, 1921, Beneš had outlined in a press interview the fundamental principles of his government—among them, relations with the Czech Germans —with the clear statement: “I will pursue the policies of Masaryk”. His official programmatic statement in the National Assembly did not, however, reflect his personal views, but rather the program agreed to by the representatives in the Pětka. It omitted any reference to the issue of the Germans, something of which all the German deputies in their comments on the program were sharply critical.¹⁸⁸ Just how touchy the Czech nationalists were on the question of any accommodation of the Germans was once again apparent in their response to a conciliatory gesture by Beneš toward the German deputies in the National Assembly. In advance of his speech on foreign policy to be delivered in mid November, Beneš had the text translated into German and distributed to the German Deputies. Národní demokracie, the newspaper of ‘Czechoslovak’ National Democracy, responded sharply: “This is clearly a circumvention of the rules of procedure which do not recognize such a procedure …. The Germans have previously demanded that the rules of procedure be violated, but every previous government rejected their demand. Now the Germans are accommodated. “Beneš’s concession to the Germans can be a very dangerous breach of the rules and of procedure. The Germans will clearly demand that other ministers

 Klepetař, H. Seit 1918 …, p. 164.  Klimek, A. Velke´ dějiny zemi´ Koruny česke´ …, vol. XIII, 301.

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also translate the text of their speeches in advance into German. And clearly they will get similar circumventions of the rules of procedure for the statements of legislative reporters and for the communications and speeches of chamber presidents as well.”¹⁸⁹ Less than half the seventy-two German Deputies understood Czech and fewer than a quarter of these could follow a complicated speech in Czech. Few of the ten Magyar Deputies understood Czech, but all of them knew German.¹⁹⁰ In addition, major Parliamentary addresses were already routinely translated into French for the benefit of the diplomatic corps. Tensions within the new government on the issue of Czech-German relations were also reflected in an article, ”The Government Program and the Question of Accommodation”, first run in Čas, an unofficial organ of the new Prime Minister, and subsequently rerun in the German language Prager Abendblatt. The article stated that: “… there is no indication in the short term that it will come to negotiations on a national settlement in Parliament despite the fact that the closing of the Czech ranks, disenchantment with the politics of abstinence, the appointment of Dr. Beneš and the recent statements of President Masaryk on the war loans have not been without their effect on the attitude of the Germans. The system of the all-national coalition has the advantage perhaps that it represents nearly perfectly what the will of the Czechoslovak nation would be or could be so that any step on its part toward an agreement between Czechs and Germans is not merely the act of a government based on a more or less chance constellation, but with greater likelihood the act of parties which represent the great majority of the electorate and thoroughly understand public opinion, but it only seems that a guarantee of the matter hurts rather than helps. A lasting Czech-German agreement—and only such an agreement built on a firm basis has value— will not be achieved until both parties cease to fear. In other words, until our Czechoslovak public has so much national and state consciousness that it does not fear the German specter with which the national ultras, who more than they know are dependent on the German ideology, scare naive people; and not until on the German side the conviction takes firm root that the old times of German dominance not only will not come back but that it would not be desirable for the Germans themselves that it come back and that even for the Germans it is far more advantageous in a democratic state which offers all its citizens a full measure of equality to join in common work hand in hand with the other nation which founded this state. Today the change on the German side is at too early a date that it would offer the assurance of being long term and that it has set aside

 Národní demokracie [newspaper], November 16, 1921.  Prager Tagblatt [newspaper], November 26, 1921.

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all mistrust. Therefore, it seems to us that the question of peace is not yet ripe for the negotiating table…. The present government, it seems, will deal first with economic and social problems, separation of church and state and so forth. It is certain that these problems will be resolved from a national point of view completely impartially and thereby a great deal can be accomplished in resolving the conflict which due to Communism had driven us to two systems, either to a caretaker government whose first goal was administration and which therefore was not completely free in its initiatives or to a system of the all-national coalition which despite its advantages has its negative side as well [emphasis added].”¹⁹¹ This was a time when the issue of Czech-German relations was under lively discussion in the Czech press. In an article, “Self-Determination in a Nationality State”, which appeared only days after the installation of the Beneš cabinet, Tribuna responded to the Večerník Českého Slova, a newspaper of the “Czechoslovak” National Socialists, by tackling the question of the Germans in an even more aggressive manner. Tribuna acknowledged at the outset that the majority of Czechs rejected the German view of the state and, in confirmation, cited the Večerník Českého Slova: “This state is a national state,” the V. Č. S. had written, “in the sense that in it and only in it the right of the Czechoslovak nation to self-determination is carried out. Anyone who wants to work politically in it must necessarily admit that the Czechoslovak nation will at all costs prevent its republic from becoming an instrument of foreign will…. The Czechoslovak republic is a national state. Any agreement with the Germans is precisely limited by the fact that this state would lose its raison d’etre as a nationality state and considerations about Czech-German relations cannot be based on numbers but will always stem from our nation’s moral right to self-determination…. It is in our interests to win our Germans for our state. But that there is no greater mistake than to think that we could win them by lying to them about the nature of our state….” Tribuna’s response was forceful and succinct: “And nonetheless there is still one greater mistake: to think that we can win the Germans for this state if we lie to ourselves about its nature.” Tribuna continues: “What we read in ‘Večerník Českého Slova’ are views which are very well known and firmly rooted. These are not the thoughts of a single journalist who writes of his own accord, but they are the views which guided the entire Czechoslovak nation at the time when this state was built. There is no doubt that we wanted a state in which the Czechoslovak nation could do what it wanted. There was no other notion of this state. We wanted a state that would respond sensitively and dutifully to every

 Prager Abendblatt [newspaper] October 8, 1921.

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tremor of the Czechoslovak national soul and we thought that this state would fit on the body of the Czechoslovak nation like a glove. Now after three years we definitely see that the jacket is poorly sewn, appears unseemly and is wrinkled. “If we took this problem to our tailor, clearly he would tell us that all the inadequacies are understandable, since we ordered him to use all the material which we brought him for the clothing and not just what was needed for our frame. That’s where the folds and looseness come from. Otherwise, he would have to take less material. If we leave the comparison with the tailor and the jacket, we can put it this way: insisting that the state be restored in the historic boundaries of the Czech crown lands, we got such a foreign element that the wish of the Czechoslovak nation to present itself in a manner purely personal and its own encountered the resistance of very many. The state was not fashioned in such a way that it fits the body of the founding nation like a glove…. The problem, whether the Germans here are immigrants or old time settlers, will not change the reality at all that they are here and that they have their wishes as we have ours.” With this logic Tribuna insisted that the Czechoslovak state was in reality a nationality state and that reality must be acknowledged: “It is not of course a matter of giving this state over night all the forms of a nationality state. That can come only with the passage of time, and it also requires a change in the German mentality. Today it would still mean a danger for this state to turn itself in a fit of philosophical radicalism into a perfect nationality state. One can all too well predict to what purpose German radicals would use it. A perfect and just organization of this state can come about only with practice and experience which of course takes time. What is crucial, though, is to recognize the right direction.”¹⁹² Such were the views of Tribuna, a dissenting voice. Far more representative of mainstream Czech opinion was the consensus derived from the diverse views which characterized the Pětka, however much that consensus obstructed accommodation between Czechs and Germans. Upon taking office, Beneš, with the backing of President Masaryk sought to curtail the authority of the Pětka and redress the balance between the Castle and the Pětka more in favor of the Castle. The Pětka, jealous of its prerogatives and certain of its importance, was especially resentful of Beneš’s initiatives in domestic policy, which it considered its own preserve. By January, 1922, Beneš faced a crisis in government in which Pětka members openly criticized his leadership and governing style. Though the government survived for several months longer,

 Tribuna [newspaper] September 29th, 1921 (part I), and September 30th, 1921 (part II).

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talks began on reconstituting or replacing it altogether. It was clear that the Pětka held the upper hand. During this time, Beneš, with the full authorization of the Pětka, entered into negotiations with the Germans on two critical issues—compensation for the old Estates Theater which had been seized during the national rioting in the autumn of 1920; and payment of outstanding war loans debt of the old Austrian monarchy which had been assigned to the Czechoslovak government by the Peace Treaty. On the question of the Estates Theater, the ‘Czechoslovak’ National Democrats did not wish to be held responsible before the public for the talks, although those talks had been authorized by the Pětka with their own representative present and voting in the affirmative. Now the National Democrats charged Beneš and Masaryk with showing greater concern for the Germans than for their own nation. A similar situation arose with the issue of the war loans, only this time the ‘Czechoslovak’ Socialists also joined in the criticism. The war loans were heavily subscribed by the Germans but also by some Czechs, who had often been signed on under duress during the War. For the Germans, the issue was not only the individual creditor, it also had institutional dimensions involving the solvency of banks and capital for German manufacturers. In the summer of 1922, the government offered to pay back the loans of small bond holders, perhaps four-fifths of the total amount owed, but only at 75 % of face value. When the Germans resisted, a special commission was appointed to deal with the matter confidentially. The result was a bill submitted to the National Assembly, which the German Deputies opposed. When the National Democrats and “Czechoslovak” Socialists refused to acknowledge publically that they had already supported the terms of settlement in the Pětka, the government withdrew the legislation.¹⁹³ Against this backdrop there were also major on-going developments within the German camp. To understand them properly, it is best to revisit German efforts to forge national unity which had begun in the aftermath of the parliamentary elections of 1920. The prime mover behind those efforts was Dr. Lodgman of the German National Party. As already noted, his biggest setback came at the outset when the German Social Democrats, the largest German party, twice declined to join the effort. In this, they were soon joined by the German National Socialists. But rifts within the ranks of the German parties did not stop there. At the founding session of the German Parliamentary Union held on May 14th, 1920, at the German Casino in Prague, the participating parties were jealous of their individual prerogatives and unwilling to surrender them for the sake of

 Peroutka, F. Budování státu, vol. IV, pp. 1610 – 1611.

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greater national unity. They insisted on their right to veto decisions of the Union rather than leaving the decision to a simple majority vote of the plenum. They also insisted that the chairmanship of the Union be rotated between the three largest parties—the Agrarian Party, the National Party and the Christian Social Peoples Party—and that the chairman’s term be limited to three months. Although the German National Socialist Party joined the Parliamentary Union in September, 1920, its entry did not lead to any strengthening of the radical nationalist position in so far as the rules of procedure were concerned. The German National Party Senator, Hans Hartl, informed Dr. Lodgman that he intended to introduce a proposal to repeal the party veto on national political issues at the next session of the Union, called for September 17th: “in order to oppose this spirit of partisanship. The repeal of the party veto would mean that the Union would decide the aforementioned issues by a simple majority in just the same way as though it were a single party.” When he got to the session, however, he found that none of the parties would renounce the right of veto and he was forced to withdraw his proposal.¹⁹⁴ In the autumn of 1920, Czech and German Agrarians entered into intermittent negotiations. The issue at first was the upcoming vote on the budget, when Švehla was uncertain of a majority. Once the majority was secured, however, interest on the Czech side in continued talks fell off. That interest was revived when Czech and German Social Democrats submitted an urgent interpolation in the Chamber of Deputies calling, among other things, for Czech and German farmers to supply grains voluntarily from their reserves over and above the obligatory quota established under the controlled economy. Although intermittent, the talks between Czech and German Agrarians had extended over some time and had been completely secret. It was some surprise, then, when both parties announced a unity front in a joint communiqué of January 27th, 1921. This also proved episodic, but the German Agrarians had clearly demonstrated their determination to pursue an independent course, when they held it to be in their own interests.¹⁹⁵ In April of 1921 came the rebuff by the Parliamentary Union under the chairmanship of Dr. Lodgman of President Masaryk’s invitation to German parties for political talks. The reaction in the Czech press had been swift and denunciatory, but the more profound effect was in the Parliamentary Union itself, where a

 “Senator Hartl on the ‘Crisis’ in the German Parliamentary Union”, Reichenberger Zeitung [newspaper] June 25, 1921.  Linz, Norbert. Der Bund der Landwirte in der Ersten Tschechoslowakischen Republik (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1982). pp. 289 – 291.

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growing rift between hostile factions now grew into a gulf between two irreconcilable camps. In early May, 1921, the Parliamentary Union met once again to reconsider their rules of procedure. The outcome was scarcely encouraging for the radical nationalists. The surrender of the veto was rejected by a roll call vote of twenty-nine to seventeen. The election of the chairman from the full assembly also fell short. Because it received twenty-two votes to twenty-one, less than the two thirds majority required for amending the statutes, the chairmanship remained in rotation among the three major parties. The extension of the chairman’s term from three months to the full session was adopted in a simple majority vote of eighty-eight to thirteen, but even this victory was conditional. On the basis of established procedure, the decision on extension of the chairman’s term would now be referred to each of the party clubs to decide whether it should enter into legal force or whether the party would raise objections to it.¹⁹⁶ Commenting on the outcome of the meeting, Senator Hartl pointed out that: “a parliamentary merger of the German bourgeois parties into a single unified German national party has the essential precondition that such unification is earnestly desired by the population itself and this cannot be assumed. On the contrary, there is an increasing tendency toward the formation of new parties on the basis of economics and interest groups. The formation of the political Party of Trade (Gewerbepartei), which occurred despite the professional groups organized in the National Party, is striking evidence of this. And perhaps only the mass defection of German teachers to the Social Democratic and Communist camps saved us from a serious effort to establish a teachers’ political party.”¹⁹⁷ In these remarks one senses the decline of radical nationalism in the German electorate as a whole. On June 15th, 1921, German Agrarian leader, Franz Spina, published a long article on the front page of Bohemia under the title ‘Activism’ which described the political movement that had been gradually evolving in the moderate parties of the German Parliamentary Union. He characterized its aim as “the achievement of the possibility of the moment”. The movement sought to salvage, from the relentless struggle which had set in since the revolution, as much of what was needed as possible, and to achieve a willing cohabitation with equality of language and national and cultural autonomy. These were the pragmatic words which would guide activism in the coming years. Spina briefly characterized the opposing position of the radical nationalists in the Union: “The other

 Prager Tagblatt, May 13, 1921.  “Senator Hartl on the ‘Crisis’ …” Reichenberger Zeitung, June 25, 1921.

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movement stands firmly for an unconditional and unrelenting struggle against the regime and the state under all conditions.” Only later, toward the end of 1922, did the leader of the radical nationalists, Dr. Lodgman, give his orientation the name of “negativism”, a catchy counter to the name “activism” , and the new term rapidly came into common use. At the time Spina’s article appeared in Bohemia, the difference between the two orientations was already fundamental and could not be glossed over with compromise formulations. Yet Spina was unwilling to renounce the Parliamentary Union. The risk with the voters would have been too great. Instead, he proposed a loosening of its structure to accommodate the diversity of its views, “confident” that the parties remained united on “basic and existential issues”.¹⁹⁸ Even the resumption of inter-ethnic unrest in the summer of 1921, which led to the Parliamentary Union’s withdrawal from the National Assembly, did not impede the further evolution of the activist movement. Despite the strenuous opposition of outgoing chairman Lodgman, the Union voted on October 8th to forsake its abstinence and return to Parliament with the installation of the Beneš cabinet. During the late autumn and winter of 1921– 1922, conflict in the Union continued unabated behind the facade of unity. Finally, it burst once again into the open on June 24th, 1922, when the German National Party and the German National Socialist Party formed a narrower coalition, still ostensibly within the Parliamentary Union, which they called the Combat Group (Kampfgemeinschaft). They declared their action necessary, because to work for the benefit of the German people on the basis of the Republic or in the National Assembly was not possible. The previous work of the Union had brought no success. Two days later the other parties in the Union—the Agrarians, the Christian Social Peoples Party and the German Freedom Democratic Party–-accused the radical nationalist parties of threatening to destroy German unity, aiming to shift on them the onus of the breach in the national ranks, while they themselves declared their determination to remain active in the Union.¹⁹⁹ Over time, these activist parties came to be known as the Working Group (Arbeitsgemeinschaft). German politics was now divided into three camps: Social Democracy, the Working Group and the Combat Group. By contrast, Czech politics at this time were coalescing in the all-national coalition. Yet before that process was completed, there was a brief interlude when Švehla opened negotiations

 Der Bund der Landwirte …, pp. 300 – 302.  Peroutka, F. Budování státu, vol. IV, p. 1718; César, J, and B. Černý. Politika německých buržoazních …, vol. I, p. 272.

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with the two principal parties of the Working Group, the German Agrarians and the German Christian Socials. On May 30th, 1922, the Christian Social leader, Dr. Robert Mayr-Harting, stopped by at the Presidential Chancellery to tell Chancellor Šámal of a recent conversation with the Czech Agrarian leader Švehla. Both he and Dr. Spina, who was also present, came away with the impression that Švehla did not believe in a long duration for the present coalition and wanted to replace it with a Czech and German coalition of Social Democrats, Agrarians and the Catholic parties of both nations. Mayr-Harting pointed out that the Germans could not enter such a coalition unconditionally without demonstrating its benefits. He named, in first place, a satisfactory resolution of the war loans, language concessions, a guarantee that no more German schools would be closed and German school autonomy. Finally, he mentioned German representation in the land office which administered land reform.²⁰⁰ Three weeks later Mayr-Harting stopped by the Chancellery again to report a further conversation. On this occasion, Švehla sent his secretary, Dr. Bohumír Bradáč, to ask Mayr-Harting whether the Germans would be willing to enter the government. Mayr-Harting responded that this time it was possible, if they could show their voters certain benefits, of which Švehla was already informed. On this occasion he stressed an end to school closings and language concessions. He had received no response from Švehla about all this.²⁰¹ On June 23rd, a visibly shaken Mayr-Harting called on Šámal. The government’s proposal to honor the war loans only in the amount of 75 %, and only with the smallest subscribers, caused complete amazement, especially with the Agrarians: “The proposal will drive radical voters into the arms of Dr. Lodgman and leave us, the moderate elements, behind. In the interests of our future collaboration with the government and government circles this proposal should be put off until the autumn.” Šámal’s response was sympathetic. He suggested that Mayr-Harting speak to Professor Horáček, a former Minister of Finance in the first Tusar cabinet and an Agrarian Senator close to Švehla in the party’s leadership. Mayr-Harting was not assuaged and Šámal promised to report the matter through Section Chief Schieszl to Premier Beneš and Deputy Švehla and, with Schieszl’s agreement, to Deputy Dr. Rašín, widely expected to be Minister of Finance in the future cabinet.²⁰²

 AKPR, T 12/25, část II: entry of May 30, 1922.  AKPR, T 12/25, část II: entry of June 20, 1922.  AKPR, T 12/25, část II: entry of June 23, 1922.

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Two weeks later, Mayr-Harting once again visited the Chancellery. He reported that he had been successful in getting the Senate Pětka to select a special commission from among the senators to examine the issue of the war loans. He considered this somewhat of a success, which should strengthen the position of the activists vis-a-vis the Combat Group. He mentioned the need for Czech newspapers to moderate their tone and assume a more equitable stance toward the German activists. He also spoke of the need for an independent German newspaper to which German industrialists could contribute now that steps were leading away from Dr. Lodgman—and that, quite confidentially, the paper would of course be supportive of the government. All this might have seemed promising, but in fact the talks with Švehla went nowhere. The fact that Švehla sent a stand-in to the second meeting raises the question of how seriously he took the talks at all. Stepping back and viewing the general political situation at the time, there appears to have been two possibilities for German participation in government: a restoration of the Red-Green Coalition, or the combination of the German Agrarians and Christian Socials with some or all of the parties of the Pětka. Theoretically, a restoration of the Red-Green Coalition was a possibility. But it was common knowledge to all the parties of the Pětka, the Social Democrats foremost among them, that the parliamentary representation of the Czechoslovak Social Democratic Party in 1922 far exceeded its actual support among the voters. In fact, in the 1925 parliamentary elections, the Social Democrats would lose close to half of the mandates they had won in the elections of 1920 and managed to retain after the split with the Communists. Restoring the Red-Green Coalition by including the German Agrarians and Social Democrats would have been forging a coalition without a future. Even in the short term, it would have deprived the Czech parties in Parliament of their majority and left them dependent on German support at a time when the German commitment to collaboration was still uncertain. There was no realistic prospect for such an undertaking. Creating a coalition of the Pětka parties with the German Agrarians and Christian Socials was the other possibility, but that alternative created a different set of problems. Topically, the situation was promising. There was nothing in the German demands—with the possible exception of language usage—which was inherently constitutional in character. War loans, school closing and school autonomy and even land reform were all negotiable issues if the overriding concern had actually been to bring about an accommodation between Czechs and Germans that made allowance for German wishes. Yet politically, the situation offered scant prospects for accommodation. The sticking point was the German demand for concessions. Any concessions to the Germans were anathema to the ultra nationalists, the “Czechoslovak” National

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Democrats first and foremost but also the Christian Socials, and might well have triggered a veto in the Pětka. Also, concessions to the Germans would not have sat well with the Stříbrný wing of the “Czechoslovak” Socialists or with the conservative wing of the Agrarians. Under these circumstances it is difficult, if not impossible to imagine any constellation of political forces in 1922 that could have accommodated the parties of the Pětka and simultaneously the German parties of the Working Group in a governing coalition. It is a classic example how the extremes in ethnic conflict, in this instance, the Czech ultra nationalists, militate against accommodation at the moderate center which is where accommodation is found. Beyond these considerations, however, was another, very different factor. Far more promising was the all-national coalition of the five major Czech parties. It offered a firm basis for the next government and the expectation that the consolidation of the Republic and the ascendant position of the Czechs within it, or Czechs and Slovaks as the case might be, which had begun after the political crisis of 1920 – 1921, would continue into the future. Accordingly, in negotiations for the new government, the parties of the Pětka firmly resolved to fulfill three important ”national tasks” which would not be realized by some Czech-German government: the adoption of the administrative ordinance to the Language Law of 1920, placing the administrative apparatus overwhelmingly in Czech hands, and carrying out the land reform, to the extent possible, with the exclusion of the Germans.²⁰³ This held true for all five parties in the Pětka, but for none more than the Agrarians, who emerged from the era of the Černý and Beneš cabinets as the strongest player in the field. Industry support had already begun to shift from the National Democrats to the Agrarians. In 1922, the majority of the Slovak National and Farmers Party had joined the Agrarian Party. In the autumn of 1921, the effort of the leftist wing of the Agrarian Domoviny for Independence was eliminated and in June, 1922, the party celebrated Švehla’s victory over the large landowners’ wing by changing its name to the Republican Party of the Czechoslovak Agrarian People and Small Holders.²⁰⁴ Seemingly, land reform offered almost unlimited possibilities for growth and expansion. The German demand for representation in the land office was a threat to the Agrarians’ near monopoly of land reform. Germans had been excluded from the administration of the land reform from the outset. Their presence in the land office could have led to a call for land redistribution based on the nationality key, that is on the actual number of Germans in the population as a whole.

 Klepetař, H. Seit 1918 …, p. 197; Kracik, J. Die Politik des deutschen Aktivismus …, p. 134.  Klimek, A. Velke´ dějiny zemi´ Koruny česke´ …, vol. XIII, p. 356.

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Uninhibited, land reform together with the cooperative movement offered the Agrarians the opportunity to build and consolidate electoral support both in the Czech lands and in Slovakia. For the Agrarians these were compelling considerations. In September, negotiations for the formation of the next government began in earnest. During that month, Beneš was in Geneva dealing with the business of the League of Nations. In June, Masaryk had gone abroad once again for convalescence on the island of Capri and he did not return until September. On September 30th, Švehla, who was now forming his own first cabinet, gave his proposal on the composition of the government to the President and Beneš for their comment. Švehla wished to preserve for the parties of the Pětka above all else the carefully negotiated balance between the number of ministers and the importance of their ministries. There were four ministers for the Agrarians, four for the Social Democrats and, after Beneš joined the party in March, 1923, four for the National Socialists as well. There were two ministers each for the Christian Socials and the National Democrats. Altogether there were eight socialist and eight non-Marxist ministers and one non-partisan specialist, J. Kallay, for the administration of Slovakia. Masaryk made a number of changes in the individuals assigned to individual ministries, but the partisan structure remained unchanged.²⁰⁵ For the first time, members of the Pětka appeared before the public as Ministers in the Cabinet: Rudolf Bechyně for the Social Democrats at the Ministry of Schools, Alois Rašín for the National Democrats at the Ministry of Finance, Jiří Stříbrný for the National Socialists at the Ministry of Railways, Jan Šrámek for the Christian Socials at the Ministry of Public Health and Antonín Švehla as Premier. At the New Year in 1922, in his annual address to the members of the National Assembly, President Masaryk returned once again to the German problem. On that occasion he said that: “the old regime and the War caused great mistrust between Czechs and Germans, and not only mistrust but also irritation. If I am not mistaken, a certain calming has come about and calmer considerations of needed collaboration…. In my view the Czech-German question is the most important. We actually have only this problem.” On October 7th, 1922, when the Švehla government entered office, the CzechGerman question was not a priority of the Pětka. Commenting on the situation, the German ambassador wrote to Berlin that: “the German Parliamentary Union has not up to now resolved the split between the Combat and the Working Group and its inner difficulties are illustrated by the fact that for three quarters of a year

 Klimek, A. Velke´ dějiny zemi´ Koruny česke´ …, vol. XIII, pp. 353 – 354.

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no plenary session of the Union has been called…. Unfortunately, there is no process in the Czech coalition similar to the ongoing separation of minds on the German side. As healthy as a separation of the radical from the moderate elements on both sides might be, it will be harmful if it occurs only on one side and in such a way that the national opponents come to a closer merger and a more energetic assertion of their national dominance. The conciliatory prospects which the Prager Tagblatt expects from the final split of the German opposition into two blocs will as a result be a fata morgana purchased by the heavy sacrifice of national unity.”²⁰⁶ Some two weeks later at an executive session of the German Parliamentary Union Dr. Lodgman announced that the German National Party was leaving the Parliamentary Union. The German National Socialist Workers Party promptly followed suit. Now even the pretense of unity no longer remained between the German activists and the German negativists, while the mono-ethnic Pětka was firmly ensconced in government.

 Alexander, M. Deutsche Gesandtschaftsberichte aus Prag, vol. II, num. ref. 38, 93.

Chapter 6 The Heyday of the Pětka and the Pětka′s Demise In 1920, the Slovak Peoples Party entered the first elections to Parliament jointly on the same slate with the Czech Christian Socials. They later came to believe that running on a common slate with the Czechs had been a mistake which had cost them dearly in votes. In late 1921, they broke from the alliance and proceeded independently, emerging as a major force in Slovak politics and calling for Slovak autonomy.²⁰⁷ In turn, the Slovak Agrarian leader, Milan Hodža, began to urge the introduction of the regional system, anticipating that it would steal the winds from the sails of the Slovak clericals and stabilize the political situation in Slovakia. It was a risky calculation. The Slovak Peoples Party was calling for political autonomy for Slovakia as a whole, while the regional system offered merely administrative autonomy, and at that in six separate Slovak regions. Nevertheless, in the spring and summer of 1922, when Švehla was assembling the coalition of his first government, implementation of the regional system was included in the government program. Here he ran into an insurmountable obstacle. Karel Kramář, the National Democratic leader, was utterly opposed to implementing the regional system and the National Democrats vetoed it in the Pětka.²⁰⁸ Švehla was unwilling to countenance a disruption of the emerging coalition for the sake of regional administration and instead the two men reached a compromise. In the following year the regional system would be introduced in Slovakia, but in the Czech lands the traditional land administration would remain in place indefinitely. On January 1st, 1923, the introduction of regional administration in Slovakia was launched. The vote in the regional assemblies came on September 30th of that year. The Agrarians confidently expected that they would take first place among the competing parties. Instead, first place went to the Slovak Peoples Party in five of the six regions and the Agrarians, in response, resorted to a provision in the law that enabled them to alter the outcome of the popular vote.²⁰⁹ The original text of the law on regional and district administration, as submitted by the Ministry of Interior to the Constitutional Committee of the Revolu Lipscher, Ladislav. K vývinu politickrj správy naa Slovensku v rokoch, 1918 – 1938 (Bratislava: Vydavatels̕tvo Slovenskej akade´mie vied, 1966), p. 103.  Miller, D.E. Forging Political Compromise …, p. 149.  Lipscher, L. K vývinu politickrj správy …, Table 9, p. 114. Košice Province, where the Agrarians took first place, was the exception. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110749885-009

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tionary National Assembly, provided that the regional assemblies were to consist in part of elected members and in part of members appointed by the Ministry of the Interior. While the government characterized the law as democratic and progressive, this provision was unacceptably regressive to a majority of the Committee, who deleted it in its entirety. At this point, however, the Slovak Social Democrat, Ivan Dérer, appealed to his colleagues in the Slovak regions: “If particular conditions in some of them require, the government could appoint, for a certain electoral period, further members of the regional assembly, whose number however could not exceed one third the elected members”. He justified the proposal with the statement that “the Slovak element in Slovakia is not politically and culturally so mature that it could resist the old Magyar-centralist influences and therefore it is feared that in our regions these old Magyar-centralist elements will prevail.” Dérer’s proposal was adopted.²¹⁰ Faced now with an unwelcome political situation the government turned to this provision, intended originally to curb Magyar influence, and directed it against a different target—Hlinka’s Peoples Party calling for Slovak autonomy. In each of the six provinces the maximum number of appointments permissible under the law was made. Of the total of sixty-seven members appointed to the six assemblies, the largest share—forty-six seats—went to the Agrarians with the remaining twenty-one seats distributed among the other parties of the all-national coalition. As a consequence, the coalition parties dominated the regional assemblies and the results were similar in the districts.²¹¹ The popular vote was set aside and the substitute in its place was a centrist orientation reflecting the consensus of the Pětka parties in Prague, the equal rights granted by the constitution to every citizen to the contrary not withstanding. Not surprisingly, at the organizational meeting of each of the regional assemblies a representative of the Slovak Peoples Party read a resolution into the record which stated in part “the entire new regional law cannot be considered as such from which the true autonomy of the Slovak nation will evolve over time.”²¹² Given the tepid provisions on autonomy in the original law, given the indefinite postponement of the regional system in the Czech lands and now in Slovakia, given the stifling of local sentiment when the regional system was introduced, the prospects for autonomy in the Czech lands and for the two German regions envisaged in the law were not at all bright.

 Schelle, Karel. “Organizace státní zprávy podle zákony o župních a okresních úřadech”. Slovenská archivistka 20 – 2(1985): 100 – 101.  Lipscher, L. K vývinu politickrj správy …, pp. 113 – 115.  Lipscher, L. K vývinu politickrj správy …, p. 126.

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On October 7th, 1922, President Masaryk appointed the Švehla government. On October 24th the government presented its program to the National Assembly. Švehla enumerated a long list of tasks, largely inherited from the Beneš government, which the new government had set itself: supplementing and improving the legal system, administrative reform, introduction of the regional system in Slovakia on January 1, 1923; in foreign affairs, stabilization of peaceful conditions on the basis of the peace treaties and strengthening the Little Entente, a stable exchange rate of the currency in foreign markets; retrenchment of budgetary outlays and moderation of taxes, tax reform, amelioration of the economic crisis, reducing unemployment and support for the unemployed, government investment to stimulate growth, support for agriculture and export industries, land reform; in social policy, pension and disability insurance for workers, continued build-up in military strength, consolidation of the school system and accessibility of public schooling for all, railway construction in Slovakia and Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia, unification of laws, administration and justice, and more. There was not a single mention of the Germans. Beyond a rather predictable list of governmental chores which Švehla presented was something of far greater significance: this government was designed to last over time. It was a government confident in its own capacities. In contrast to the two preceding governments, when the Pětka was content to govern from the wings, it now stepped to the fore and its five members entered government in a ministerial capacity, unabashed by their exposure to public view. It was also a government which offered the Germans no role and there was no prospect that that would change in the foreseeable future. In his response to Švehla, the German Agrarian leader Franz Křepek, speaking for the German Farmers Union, Christian Socials and German Democrats of the Parliamentary Union, pointed out that only recently the leader of the Czech nationalist party declared at a public meeting: “The sacrifices in fidelity to political conviction are the cement which holds this government together. But,” Křepek noted, “there is yet another matter, namely the shared hatred of the Germans which always reunites (the government) and which causes it to scrupulously avoid giving to our nation in this state the rights to which before God and before the world it is entitled.” Nothing remains for the Germans than battle, Křepek continued, “to gain our rights, to preserve our national honor and to protect our political freedom.” The response of Dr. Ludwig Czech, the German Social Democratic leader, was no less challenging. “And now we stand before a new government. Its praise is sung in every key as the government of national focus, as the government of national solidarity, consolidation, peace, order, restoration and finally as a great government. However, what does it bring in reality? Nothing but a change of per-

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sons.… The all-national system remains. It finds in the new coalition, in the oldnew coalition, its resurrection and continuation.… By such primitive means it is held to be possible to govern such a complex state form as is the Czechoslovak state. It is held that by these meager means it is possible to uphold permanently the fiction of the national state, chauvinism as the state principle.… To eradicate this coalition is one of our foremost tasks. The coalition is what we will fight against.” Nonetheless, Dr. Czech went on to say, “we would wish that at least the German Social Democrats had the courage to free themselves from the nationalist orientation of the German bourgeoisie and to create common socialist guidelines both in the interests of national peace and also in other socialist interests.” Dr. Lodgman, speaking for the German National Party and the German National Socialist Workers Party, was, as could be expected, completely rejectionist. “We do not expect our liberation from this chamber,” he said, “from the agreement of the Czech parties, but rather from a unified resistance of the oppressed and constantly explaining to the world which finally will demonstrate the untenability of the Paris peace treaties and hence also of this state imposed by force.” The comments of Franz Křepek and Dr. Czech were harshly critical, but they were, nonetheless, voices from the parliamentary opposition. Dr. Lodgman spoke as an irredentist who rejected altogether the legitimacy of the Czechoslovak state. The gulf between German activists and negativists was unbridgeable. But there were many who did not perceive this. For a time, the Pětka government was regarded as irreplaceable. Aware of that, it dared to ignore substantive criticism from the opposition and regarded attacks on it, what ever the justified reason many have been, as attacks on the very substance of the state.²¹³ In such a charged atmosphere criticism could be taken for disloyalty. In so far as the German opposition was concerned, that misperception lasted for many for a full three years and for others far longer. The new government pursued a policy of strengthening the national currency in exchange with foreign currencies. In the near-term, that led to economic crisis. The author of the policy was the finance minister, Dr. Alois Rašín. As wages and salaries plummeted in order to adapt to declining domestic prices, Rašín′s popularity plummeted as well. In January, unemployment reached its peak, and on January 5th, Rašín was shot and fatally wounded. Six weeks later on February 18th, the finance minister died. In the previous year, due to the sharp increase in autonomist sentiment in Slovakia, the government had given consideration to a law for new security reg-

 Peroutka, F. Budování státu, vol. IV, p. 1624.

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ulations, but at the time it was felt there were insufficient grounds for the introduction of emergency legislation.²¹⁴ Now the government moved swiftly and decisively. On February 12th, the government approved the new law and on February 15, it was submitted to the Chamber of Deputies. With Senate approval on March 17th, it cleared the final legislative barrier and took effect on March 19th. The Law for the Defense of the Republic, or the Defense Law as it was commonly called, was modeled on similar legislation adopted in Germany in the previous year after the assassination of the Foreign Minister, Walter Rathenau. Twice amended, the law demonstrated its value and its effectiveness in the 1930s, but in 1923 it was correctly seen as directed against the opposition, not only the Communists but also the national minorities and the Slovak clericals. The law was directed against attacks on the republic, military treason, assassination of authorities, slandering the President of the Republic, illicit weapons, conspiracy of secret societies, sanctioning criminal acts, disturbing the peace, incitement to hatred and circulating false reports among other offenses. This last item is of note, because it dealt not only with reports which the offender knew to be false but also reports for which there was insufficient reason to consider them true, a loose formulation which was open to a wide range of interpretations. The national minorities, the Germans prominent among them, rose in protest. The German ambassador deemed the legislation to be the introduction of a permanent state of emergency. For anyone not a supporter of the all-national coalition this was draconian legislation. Despite the tension and the turmoil German activism continued to evolve, although not without hitches and starts. At the Liberec district party conference of the Farmers Union in January of 1923, the Agrarian leader, Dr. Spina, delivered an address which can be understood as a challenge to Dr. Lodgman, leader of the German National Party. He spoke of the situation of the Germans in the state. Because the Germans in Czechoslovakia had no prospects of support from abroad, their task must be to bring into effect provisions of the peace treaties which provide for the defense of the minorities. Spina noted pointedly that it was both politically realistic and wise not to conduct a struggle against the state, but to struggle for rights within the state. Spina regretted rhetoric such as Lodgman’s statement that “Treason is the duty of every German”. Such language only encouraged the Czech coalition. With such remarks, the Czechs always gained the means to challenge legitimate German claims.²¹⁵

 Alexander, M. Deutsche Gesandtschaftsberichte aus Prag, vol. II, num. ref. 50, p. 129.  Verständigung September 1, 1923: see MYV-VA, Karton 3942, Spina, Franz.

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Yet only five days later in an article in the Deutsche Landpost, the principal newspaper of the Farmers Union, Spina felt constrained to hedge his remarks on the issue of autonomy. “If … we pursue autonomy within the Czech state,” he wrote, “we do so with the view that the right of self determination … is not achievable for us in the foreseeable future for reasons which are generally known. On the other hand, we believe that the demand for autonomy in this state does not at all mean the renunciation of a later reordering in central Europe. On the contrary, we firmly believe that a reordering will come.” Here we see a central dilemma of German activists in the early 1920s: the need to affirm their acceptance of the new state and to win the support of their voters for this position, while facing the persistent apprehension that, if they moved too fast, they would leave themselves open to the charge of betraying the national cause, a charge which the German ultras would not hesitate to make. Ultimately it was an issue that the German voter would decide. In July of 1923, the German embassy in Prague reported to the Foreign Office on the evolving political situation: “Completely averse to any concession to opportunistic realpolitik is the German National Party under its leader Lodgman, one of those courtly all or nothing politicians, whose pure goals and flawless means cannot obscure his lack of political moderation. His party comrades brand any negotiations with the Czechs as treason to the German cause…. “The opposite among the German bourgeois parties has recently been the Farmers Union under its wise leader, Dr. Spina. The small farmer who is bound to his soil and who commonly is mixed together with the agricultural property of the Czech Agrarians cannot avoid daily contact with Czech fellow farmers and with the Czech administration as much as the mostly urban German National Party voter who lives in the German language territory and sees over himself a German city administration. The German farmer who actually is quite close to the conservative views of the German Nationals shows therefore an increasing tendency toward a realistic politics and toward peaceful, friendly cohabitation with the Czechs. Dr. Spina has been the first to find the courage to recommend such a politics to his voters…. In the meantime, the other bourgeois parties waiver between these two extremes, but they appear to be inclined gradually to take up the opportunistic orientation.” At the same time this report also offered its characterization of the Švehla government: “The position of the Czechoslovak government—the present one as the previous one and probably many to come—is outwardly correct toward the Germans. As everyone knows, the Czechs are masters of this correctness. “In our truly democratic state the Germans have the same rights as any other citizen, indeed more rights than the Czechs. Besides the rights of the majority, they enjoy also those rights of the minority guaranteed by the minority treaty, the con-

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stitution, the language law, etc. As long as he acts on the basis of the state and the constitution, he has no grounds for complaint.’ That is the façade with which the government conceals the national struggle, and countless foreigners, the Germans unfortunately as well, who visit the country, let themselves be deceived by it every year. “Inwardly, beneath this correct surface the government supports by every means a stubborn, bitter struggle for Czechdom…. The law for the defense of the Republic threatens all citizens equally, but its application is often aimed first and foremost at silencing the Germans and their criticism. The land reform appears to be a social measure, but in reality it serves to intersperse Czech colonists in purely German areas, to make the German officials of the large landed estates homeless and jobless and to separate the Sudeten German villager from the German border by a zone of Czech forest administration. The non-solution of the war loans is a financial problem, but its effects only diminish the Germans, thousands of whom have been brought into poverty, while the Czechs own no war loans. The nationalization of the Aussig-Teplitz and Buschtehrad railway is ostensibly an economic measure, but in reality it is a means to drive a Czech wedge from one end of the German language territory to the other. It would be too much to enumerate here what the state administration accomplishes daily in Czechization, how it takes from the towns their older rights and jurisdictions (nationalization of the police), how German civil servants are gradually driven from service by language exams and lots of chicanery (transfer to the Czech territories), how it favors Czech firms in the allocation of work and provisioning and how it sends to the remotest German mountain village a Czech postman, gendarme and road agent with large families as the pacemaker for Czech minority schools and the future national disintegration of the community.”²¹⁶ At this time, surprisingly, there was actually little doubt among Czech moderates that if the new Pětka government were to falter, there was no other practical alternative than some combination which would either bring Germans into government or in the case of a caretaker government at least into the parliamentary coalition which supported it. Due to ill health Švehla temporarily withdrew from active politics in early January, 1923, to undertake a course of treatment and rehabilitation. In February, Interior Minister Malypetr became deputy premier. In Švehla’s absence conflict between the parties in the Pětka began to rise. At the Castle they began to consider that, with the tangle of partisan quarreling, it would be best with an enlightened, or rather supra-partisan government of “specialists”. In early May, Beneš told Šámal that in all likelihood the situation

 Alexander, M. Deutsche Gesandtschaftsberichte aus Prag, vol. II, num. ref. 65, pp. 166 – 167.

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would end with the collapse of the coalition. Then, a caretaker government would be formed with a new majority without the National Democrats and Christian Socials but possibly supported by Germans. A caretaker government was anathema to the parliamentary parties of the majority coalition and the project did not come to fruition. Švehla also considered collaboration with the German parties but with a difference. While Masaryk and Beneš were thinking of a caretaker government supported by the German socialists and others, Švehla had in mind a parliamentary government with German non-Marxist parties.²¹⁷ This project also was set aside. Švehla returned to the premiership in June and his government remained in office for two more years. In communal elections in September, 1923, two German parties with strong activist components, the Farmers Union and the Christian Socials, gained significantly in voter support. In the following month they joined with the German Democrats to form the parliamentary Working Group. High on the agenda of this new group was autonomy for the Germans gained by parliamentary means.²¹⁸ Despite these signs of maturing activism there remained a fundamental disconnect among German activists. Although frustrated in their efforts so far, the German Social Democrats were keen to establish understanding and agreement with their Czech counterparts, while withholding support from the German non-Marxist activists. As a consequence, when the German non-Marxist Farmers Union and Christian Socials finally entered government, the German Social Democrats together with their Czech comrades were opposed.²¹⁹ Class ideology trumped ethnic identity by far. On March 1st, 1924, the Working Group held the first plenary session of its joint parliamentary clubs. The Agrarian leader, Franz Křepek, presided. He sketched the history of the German parties in parliament, the creation of a single “German Union”, its collapse and the founding of the new “Working Group” consisting of the Agrarian, Christian Social and Democratic Freedom parties which were later joined by the new Party of Trade. “Given its origin, the natural goal of this group is,” Křepek stated: “binding together all the elements of the German people of this state in a common defense against national oppression and for the common struggle for national rights, for autonomy. The group pursues this goal as a member of the opposition, determined to use all suitable means to topple the unnatural system of the national state, to organize the entire German nation and to inform those abroad that in this state, contrary to all principles of justice

 Klimek, A. Velke´ dějiny zemi´ Koruny česke´ …, vol. XIII, pp. 393 – 394.  Klimek, A. Velke´ dějiny zemi´ Koruny česke´ …, vol. XIII, pp. 393 – 394.  Kracik, J. Die Politik des deutschen Aktivismus …, p. 133.

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and contrary to treaty obligations, the rights necessary for existence are denied to a nation of several million, numbering more than one fourth of the entire population of the state…. “The group holds the view that the status belonging to them must be demanded for the German people, now that they already are in this state. The parties united in the Working Group will maintain the independence of their programs, but they must avoid partisan egotism and competition everywhere where it is a question of the common national interest. Thus, the group will be an autonomist bloc struggling forcefully and effectively for German self-government.”²²⁰ Some six weeks later in mid April the Christian Social leader, Dr. Robert Mayr-Harting, added a further important observation on the founding of the Working Group. “The separation of the irredentist from the Working Group is a success for the Germans in that the parties united in the Working Group, which do not on principle reject the state, deprive the Czechs of the opportunity to refuse negotiations with the Germans as enemies of the state. The situation of the present day government majority makes it necessary that the Germans prepare for the creation of a new government majority and with it for entry into government.”²²¹ Scarcely a month later, however, Mayr-Harting acknowledged that there were significant differences between the activist leaders of the Working Group on the vital issue of German entry into government. On May 19th he visited the presidential chancellery and confided to chancellor Šámal that “in so far as the premier and deputy Křepek are concerned, they would be happy with an agreement immediately. By contrast we, that is myself and Professor Kafka, favor an agreement by stages and with the fulfillment of certain preconditions, especially that before an agreement there must be a period of time when a so-called Castle peace settles in, when in official, school and language matters there occurs no worsening to our disadvantage. Professor Spina finds himself between these two approaches. I have the impression that he is thinking of the Working Group stepping in in place of National Democracy.”²²² These discussions were not academic. Toward the end of March, Mayr-Harting had publicly suggested the possibility of German entry into the government coalition, a suggestion which met with a favorable response in the Castle and official press. After agreement with Švehla and Beneš, the President, on April 1,  Presidium zemské správy politické v Praze (PZSPP) report no. 9, March 6, 1924: NA, PMR. K. 4, 1924.  PZSPP, report no. 16 of April 24, 1924: NA, PMR, K. 4, 1924.  AKPR, T 12/25, část II.

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summoned to himself Professor Bruno Kafka, leader of the German Democrats, to whom he said: “because one of the key principles of foreign-policy is the best possible relations with the Germans, the participation of the Germans in government is a necessity. One cannot however repeat the mistakes of the monarchy and discuss this publicly…. I could call all the German and Czech parties here… but right away in the first hours radicals on one side and the other would break up such an effort…. I recommend to the moderate Germans therefore confidential negotiations with the premier who has already agreed to that.” However, this all came to nothing. Švehla could not negotiate without the agreement of the entire Petka, and the Pětka drew the line against non-loyal forces which especially Kramář and Stříbrný considered the Germans as a whole to be.²²³ One might also question, of course, the extent of Švehla’s commitment to the project. The land reform, one of the three national priorities in the program of the all-national coalition, was in full swing, but its successful completion assumed the continued exclusion of the Germans. Land reform was a centerpiece of the Agrarian Party’s recruitment drive in the countryside. A second consideration and another of the national priorities in the coalition’s program was the transfer of the administrative apparatus into overwhelmingly Czech hands, in effect a sharp reduction of the number of Germans in the state bureaucracy. This program, in the form of testing German officials for their proficiency in the “state” language, was already underway, but also incomplete. The national priorities of the governing coalition were simply incompatible with a mixed national government of Czechs and Germans. If efforts to bring the Germans into government bore no fruit, discussion of German entry into government continued in the press throughout the remainder of the year. German activists and negativists adhered to their established points of view and recriminations were bandied back and forth between them. The Czech press by and large opposed German entry into government with an occasional dissenting view. On August 20th, Národní politika, a National Democratic newspaper, published an article, “Nové Stanovisko (A New Point of View)” which simply slammed the door on German entry into government. The article said that all sincere efforts by the Czech side for conciliation had been rejected and if even a single German declares himself for a politics of conciliation, an opposition movement would arise immediately against him: “Today, it is clear that conciliation is not possible. The Germans do not wish even participation in gov-

 Klimek, A. Velke´ dějiny zemi´ Koruny česke´, vol. XIII, p. 447– 448.

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ernment, let alone conciliation. The lesson—to win the Germans for our state is not possible. It is necessary to depend only on ourselves and our allies.” In mid-August, German entry into government was dealt with in an article, “Die Deutchen als Regierungspartei (The Germans as a Government Party)” in a government supported German language publication, Tchechoslovakische Korrespondenz. The article considered that only the German Agrarians and Christian Socials should actually come into consideration, since, it claimed, “it is not possible to count on the German Social Democrats who compete with the German Nationals and the German National Socialists in national radicalism and there are too few German Democrats. The German Agrarians and Christian Socials have between them in the Chamber of Deputies only twenty-two seats and in the Senate only thirteen, however, not even this number is assured for the politics which the Germans would have to carry out in government and Parliament and which is completely different from what they are accustomed to. For this reason their participation in the government majority would be numerically insignificant. The present coalition has a sufficient majority: twenty-eight in Parliament and thirty in the Senate.” By contrast, the Tribuna of August 21 stressed in an article, “Nebezpečí Setrvačnosti, (The Danger of Inertia)” that from a democratic point of view it was necessary that the Germans also have a share in government, in as much as the state needs their taxes, their sons for the military and their hand in economic life. “To wish to rule for ever with the present coalition is not in the interests of the state. Without the Germans the present coalition can be replaced by nothing, unless the Communists were to be brought into government.… With the present day government system we can be lords only as long as the others lie back. Later, it will be necessary for the preservation of the state that we harness everyone into its service and the awkward situation might arise that we will be begging the Germans for government collaboration”.²²⁴ But the single, most astute comment on German entry into government was made many months earlier at the beginning of 1924 with comments from Professor Bruno Kafka, leader of the German Democratic Freedom Party. He predicted that Germans would not enter government before the next parliamentary elections, when the all-national coalition would not possess a stable majority. This actually happened.²²⁵ The Czechoslovak Republic inherited a state bureaucracy with a disproportionate number of German officials, reflecting the privileged position of the Ger-

 PZSPP report nr. 33 of August 21, 1924; NA, PMR, K. 4, 1924.  Klepetař, H. Seit 1918 …, p. 197.

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mans in the old monarchy. It was only natural that the Czechs wished to redress the balance, but they did not stop there. They were determined that the administrative apparatus of the state would be decisively in Czech hands. This called for a sharp reduction in German officials and bringing Czechs into the state service to replace them. In 1923 and 1924 the mass testing of German railway and postal workers in the Czech language began. Many German officials had little or no knowledge of Czech, but often the tests themselves were conducted in an arbitrary manner which provoked bitterness and resentment and widespread hostility among the Germans toward the tests themselves. When parliament reconvened in the autumn of 1924 to debate the state budget, there was deep bitterness in all the German parties because of the language tests. On November 5, in the course of a general debate in the budget committee the German Social Democratic Deputy, Siegfried Taub, declared that 7,000 railway workers who had passed the language test were nonetheless dismissed from service. The German Social Democrats walked out of the committee and the German bourgeois parties joined them. On November 7th, the railway minister Jan Stříbrný responded to Taub in the absence of the Germans that 70 % of employees tested in the state language had passed the test. Unfortunately, some of the personnel were incited for political reasons by people who called the test a farce, but not even those who did not pass the test were dismissed. Rather, they were granted a period of time before retesting. When 20 % did not show up for the repeat test, they were asked once again to take the test. But if the railway administration came to the conviction that it was dealing with refractory elements, they could not yield.²²⁶ Proper records of the language test results were not kept. Later efforts to reconstruct the events were unable to establish what actually happened in reliable detail. That a disproportionate number of German officials were dismissed is not in question. On November 19th, Sozial Demokrat, the newspaper of German Social Democracy, ran an article entitled, “You Have Reduced the State to the Coalition and the Coalition to the Pětka.” It stated: “To this we can ascribe the fact that all trust in state administration has vanished and deep bitterness grips wide circles of the population including those circles belonging to your own camp. All your boastful pronouncements on the stability of your system cannot hide the fact that it is deeply disrupted and that its periodic crises show that you yourself can no longer go on this way. Corruption has penetrated the state apparatus which you have erected and only a true insider can guess at its extent…. With

 Klepetař, H. Seit 1918 …, pp.198 – 199.

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burning pain and ever deeper disappointment we see that even the (Czech) socialist parties are ensnared in this lamentable state policy….” The dismissal of German officials who failed their language exams was not sufficient to give the state bureaucracy the composition which the all-national coalition wanted. Since government institutions were overstaffed and needed to be reduced on financial grounds as well, the government introduced legislation at the end of 1924 for a reduction in the number of state officials. The German parties and the Slovak opposition felt threatened by the legislation and they sent a joint delegation to the premier which consisted of representatives from the German Democrats, Christian Socials, Social Democrats and National Socialists and the Slovak Peoples Party. The delegation asked the premier to give assurance that the national key would be invoked with the retrenchment of German and Slovak state employees. Švehla replied that only factual and not national factors were decisive in drafting the law and he refused to include the national key in its provisions. Over strenuous opposition the law was adopted in December of 1924, and civil service retrenchment was carried out in 1925.²²⁷ Among the foremost goals of the Agrarian Party since its founding was the introduction of agricultural tariffs to enhance the earnings of the domestic producer. The tariffs would benefit the entire countryside, the cotter, the small and medium farmer and the large landowner alike. In the context of the Pětka, however, the Agrarians faced the determined opposition of the socialist parties, the Social Democrats in particular. An increase in market prices for the agricultural producer would lead to an increase in food prices for the worker and with good reason the socialist parties feared a heavy loss of voters to the Communists as a consequence. The agricultural tariffs were by no means the only source of sharp tensions within the Pětka. The socialists demanded support for a progressive and costly law on social insurance which would benefit the workers primarily and largely at the expense of other taxpayers. The Agrarians threatened to withhold their support in the National Assembly without an explicit linkage between the two laws, and the socialists finally reached agreement with their Pětka partners, foremost among them the Agrarians that, after the adoption of the law on social insurance, they would support a law on agricultural tariffs. Divisions within the Pětka increased, threatening the survival of the coalition. It was suggested to create a caretaker government which would pass both laws, but for the non-Marxist parties a caretaker government was anathema, both in its own right and because it would lead to an increase of influence

 Klepetař, H. Seit 1918 …, pp. 199 – 200.

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of the Castle. The proposal was dropped, but at this point the Agrarians unwisely yielded on the issue of linkage. On October 9, 1924, the law on social insurance was adopted. The government socialists then withdrew their support for the agricultural tariffs despite their original promise.²²⁸ It was an open breach of coalition discipline. The seemingly impregnable Pětka had cracked and begun to splinter. After medical convalescence, Švehla returned to active politics in May of 1925, and the Agrarians reasserted their demand for the grain tariffs. The Social Democrats were willing to agree to the tariffs when agricultural production was actually threatened, but that was not now the case. When the price of wheat fell to 140 crowns the Social Democrats would permit the tariffs. The Agrarians wanted their introduction at the price of 200 crowns. Negotiations were begun, tensions mounted and again the existence of the coalition was threatened. The Czech National Socialists put forward a compromise proposal that set the threshold for the tariffs at 180 crowns. The Social Democrats rejected that and declared a threshold of 160 crowns to be their final concession. The government adopted the National Socialist compromise proposal as its own and, avoiding a parliamentary vote and over the opposition of the Social Democratic ministers, it issued an ordinance on June 3, 1925, which introduced a system of sliding tariffs. The Social Democrats did not resign but placed their portfolios at the disposal of the party. The party in turn instructed them to remain in government, since important legislative and administrative tasks needed to be carried out before the impending parliamentary elections.²²⁹ The issuance of the ordinance was at most a Pyrrhic victory for the Agrarians. The ordinance consisted of two parts. In the first part tariffs on all sorts of cereals, flour, livestock, lard, etc. which had been repealed after the war, were now restored. Their basis was the Austrian tariff rate of 1906, but their amount was multiplied by the Agrarians by a co-efficient of six. In the second part of the ordinance the tariffs were regulated so that the height of the coefficient was dependent on the given price of a specific product and, with a rise in that price past a certain threshold, the product thereafter remained without a tariff. In other words, the higher the price the lower the tariffs would be and vice versa. And because the threshold for no tariffs fluctuated with the level of current prices, the entire new system actually remained inactive.²³⁰ In principle, the ordinance established agricultural tariffs, but in practice nothing changed. For that reason,  Klimek, A. Velke´ dějiny zemi´ Koruny česke´ …, vol. XIII, pp. 453 – 454.  Klepetař, H. Seit 1918 …, pp. 201– 202.  Polák, Erik, “K otázce rozpadu všenárodní koalice a nastolení vlády mezinárodní koalice v letech 1925 – 1926”. Československý časopis historický 9(1961): 18, fn. 5.

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the controversy soon abated, but the issue remained unresolved and was bound to resurface at some point in the future. In the spring and summer of 1925, the Czechoslovak political scene was dominated by anticipation of the upcoming parliamentary elections. The Czechoslovak Social Democrats, dreading the inevitable losses they would suffer to the Communists, urged to defer elections as long as possible until the mandatory date in the spring of 1926, but theirs was a lone voice in the Pětka. Parliament was dissolved on October 16th and elections were called for November 15th. On that last day of the session the government enacted new electoral legislation dampenening the prospects of smaller parties entering Parliament, which were often a breakaway offshoot from one or another of the Pětka parties. This was accomplished by requiring a party to win at least one mandate in a single electoral district in order to cross the threshold for entry into Parliament regardless of that party′s total vote statewide and by dividing the large Prague electoral district into smaller districts.²³¹ The two provisions created a significant barrier for smaller parties with a widely scattered vote. In the months preceding the elections, foreign diplomacy was bringing a new theme to Czech-German politics. Germany had proposed to the Western powers a pact permanently settling the border between Germany, France and Belgium with Great Britain and Italy serving as the guarantors of their agreement. Early in these discussions there were press reports that Germany was also willing to conclude arbitration treaties with Poland and Czechoslovakia. The report of Germany’s willingness for a mediation agreement had a shattering affect on the Sudeten German party leaders. The German ambassador reported to Berlin that the leaders of all the parties—including the Social Democrats, a very rare act on their part—met immediately to discuss the situation. They were in agreement that a mediation treaty together with recognition of the current division of assets between the two countries would be the grave of their hopes. Even worse, if the Czechs no longer needed to take into account the mood in imperial Germany, they would deal with the Sudeten Germans in an outrageous manner. Neither the minority treaty nor the League of Nations would alter this situation. The Germans in Bohemia and Moravia would be doomed to ruin. They came to the conclusion that it would be best for the Germans in Czechoslovakia if the mediation treaty did not come about. However, if the Reich for its own reasons wished such a treaty, it had a sacred duty not to toss the Germans recklessly overboard, but to include conditions in the treaty itself to pre-

 Klimek, A. Velke´ dějiny zemi´ Koruny česke´ …, vol., XIII, p. 477.

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vent the worst. In this response, Ambassador Koch saw evidence that “the illusion of sooner or later shaking off the hated yoke of this state and joining the Reich was alive not only in the parties of the right but to an equal degree in all the parties.”²³² The comforting notion of Germany as the protector, if indeed not the deliverer of the Germans, was not easily abandoned. On October 5, the European parties met at Locarno, Italy to finalize the agreements which had been under negotiation for so many months. On October 16, the final day of the conference, the Czech-German mediation treaty was signed and proved to have a beneficial effect, at least in the near term, on relations between Czechs and Germans in Czechoslovakia. The Czech-German treaty implied, although it did not guarantee, recognition of the status quo and made it far more difficult for the negativists to argue that sooner or later a resurgent Germany would come to their rescue. It also served to embolden the activists. For the Czechs, there was reassurance and fears of their powerful neighbor were at least to some extent abated. The overall result was a lessening of tensions between Czechs and Germans in Czechoslovakia. In the final months a new initiative was raised to create a common front of the German parties for the elections. The appeal was launched by Dr. Lodgman of the German National Party, who called for a German “electoral bloc”. Unexpectedly at the end of August, the Farmers Union responded positively to this appeal by urging the creation of a “German unity front”. The other parties joined in the negotiations with the exception of the Social Democrats, who in early October rejected the appeal and refused to participate. On October 15, the non-Marxist parties succeeded in forming a “Sudeten German Union” which was to serve as a coordinating organ for parliamentary work. For the moment, it appeared as though the negativists and the activists had rejoined forces as once before in the old German Parliamentary Union of 1920 – 1922, but on October 18, only three days later, the German National Socialists abandoned the project, preferring to run independently, although still open to cooperation after the election.²³³ Two days later the German Christian Socials and Party of Trade also withdrew. At this late date the German Nationals appealed to the Farmers Union to spare the population at least an electoral struggle between the two largest national parties and instead to join the population of the cities and the countryside. The Farmers Union, however, preferred to form a common slate with the German Party of Trade, the Germans in Slovakia and the Hungarian Nationalist Party.²³⁴

 Alexander, M. Deutsche Gesandtschaftsberichte aus Prag, vol. II, A 42. pp. 700 – 702.  Kracik, J., Die Politik des deutschen Aktivismus …, p. 143.  PZSPP report no. 22, November 5, 1925: NA, PMR, K. 4, 1925.

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The common slate offered protection for its weaker members against the new requirements for entry into parliament. Less fortunate was the German Freedom Democratic Party. It fell victim to the new law. Standing alone without electoral partners it had no prospect of winning a mandate in any one single district and its leader, Prof. Bruno Kafka, announced that it would not contest the elections. A small but intellectually important German party vanished from the parliamentary scene. In the 1925 elections the all-national coalition lost heavily and lost its majority in parliament. Nonetheless, the Czechoslovak Agrarians took first place with forty-five mandates. Among the twenty-nine parties competing in the elections, it was the Communists, campaigning for the first time, who took second place with forty mandates, but those forty mandates were virtually beyond considering for any role in government, thereby shrinking the resources available and making the task of assembling a parliamentary majority the more difficult. Among the German parties, three out of four mandates were captured by the activists—the Farmers Union, the Christian Socials, the Party of Trade and the Social Democrats—an important reaffirmation of the increasing popularity of German activism. Together with these gains, there were milestones in the careers of three German party leaders. In the 1925 elections, the elderly Agrarian leader, Franz Křepek, withdrew to the Senate, while the leadership of the Farmers Union devolved upon the younger Deputy, Franz Spina, Professor of Bohemistics at the German University in Prague. Lodgman von Auen, leader of the German National Party, failed to win election in the first round. If he had remained in contention, he would have been elected in a later count, but instead he retired permanently from active politics. It was an act of pique, coupling pride, perhaps, with the recognition that his uncompromising negativism had failed to attract the popular support which he had expected. A major paradox of the elections was that the Czechoslovak Agrarians were the clear victors, although the all-national coalition had lost so heavily. The biggest losers in the old coalition were the Social Democrats, who in 1920 had won seventy-four mandates, had retained more than fifty when the Communists defected, but were now reduced to twenty-nine. National Democracy garnered only thirteen mandates, for them a loss of six. Most of those votes went to the new National Party of Labor, a venture with uneven Castle support which garnered some 90,000 votes from more moderate elements of National Democracy, but ran afoul of the new electoral law and failed to win a single mandate. In this way, the Agrarians with forty-five mandates emerged as the essential linchpin of any parliamentary majority, whether an expanded version of the old all-national coalition or a multi-national coalition which brought the Germans into government.

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Švehla opted for a restoration of the old mono-ethnic coalition by adding the Czech Party of Trade with its thirteen mandates, in effect, expanding the Pětka (the Five) to the Šestka (the Six). Given the recent sharp clashes between the Agrarians and Social Democrats over the issue of the agricultural tariffs it seemed prudent to broaden the coalition still further by including the Slovak Peoples Party with its twenty-three mandates. Negotiations with the Slovak clericals bore no fruit, but Švehla nonetheless was determined to persist with the allnational coalition at least as originally expanded. It was an interesting decision. A government based on the Šestka would have a majority of 159 – 141. The same government with the German Farmers Union and Christian Socials or the Farmers Union and the German Social Democrats would have had a majority of 170 – 130 or 174– 126, even if National Democracy withdrew from the coalition. There was, of course, the unfinished national agenda of Švehla’s previous government and Švehla must have believed that he would prevail in negotiations with the Social Democrats on the issue of the tariffs. The parliamentary mathematics of Švehla’s new coalition were simple and straightforward, but its chemistry was at best problematic. Nor was it a government that came together easily. Three weeks elapsed after the election before the new government was appointed. Persuading the parties to accept the ministries assigned to them proved a daunting task. At one point, Švehla reported to Masaryk that he had been unsuccessful in the effort and the task in turn was given to Msgr. Šrámek, leader of the Christian Socials, the primary stumbling block to forming the new coalition. Without Agrarian support Šrámek, could accomplish nothing, which in effect he reported to Masaryk three days later. Then, the task was assigned to the Social Democrat, Rudolf Bechyně, who had no greater success. As Masaryk made preparations and the possibility of a caretaker government began to threaten, Švehla resumed his efforts. This time the necessary compromises fell swiftly into line and the task was completed.²³⁵ Nonetheless skeptics abounded. There were those who viewed the new government merely as a provisional arrangement. With the New Year when parliament failed to convene as expected, because the coalition partners could not reach agreement on a working program, the skepticism was clearly well grounded. The coalition parties could not find a compromise on a number of different issues: an increase in official salaries to be paid for by taxation on sugar and alcohol—which officials would benefit and how much salaries would increase were directly at issue; the financial reform proposed by finance minister, Karel

 Klepetař, H. Seit 1918 …, pp. 216 – 217.

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Engliš; and the term of military service, either to be reduced to fourteen months as demanded by the Social Democrats or to remain at eighteen months as favored by the others. To this the Christian Social Peoples Party added a major new demand—the congrua—a term from canon law which means ‘suitable support’, in this case state support for clerical salaries and salaries of church employees. The demand was anathema on ideological grounds for both socialist parties. Finally, there were the agricultural tariffs which the Agrarians pressed for relentlessly and the Social Democrats opposed with equal determination. In an effort to break the impasse and to re-instill a sense of discipline in the coalition’s negotiations under this intractable circumstance, Švehla decided to play the chauvinist card on the sensitive issue of language. On February 3, the government issued an administrative ordinance to the Language Law of 1920. In all the years of its existence the Pětka had been unable to find consensus on this difficult issue. Now in the ordinance that the government released, the more conservative views of the partners in the coalition, principally the National Democrats, were favored. And the national minorities with the Germans in the lead responded in a chorus of protests, both in parliament and in public demonstrations across the country. In his report to Berlin, the German ambassador noted that “after the lapse of six years of relatively calm development in a state which calls itself democratic that a matter such as the language question, which daily effects every individual member of the minorities and therefore nearly one third of the population, is regulated in all its details without giving the parliamentary representatives of those minorities an opportunity to express themselves, should be seen as something unique. It illuminates before the entire world like lightning the lack of inner consolidation from which Czechoslovakia ails.” To this he added that: “the administrative ordinance was completed by the coalition behind closed doors, … published without prior notice and immediately put into effect.” In its substance the ambassador found a “homogenizing tendency … in all the provisions of the ordinance which breaks new ground for the state language at the expense of the minority languages and in so doing fosters the Czechization of the minority territories and that its effect in practice consists principally of the fact that it will foment new fruitless national quarreling and bring it to the smallest village.”²³⁶ The rash of demonstrations in the country was an early sign of that. In the end, however, it was not protest demonstrations but dissent from within that brought the government down. Two Social Democratic ministers, Ru-

 Alexander, M. Deutsche Gesandtschaftsberichte aus Prag, vol. II, num. ref. 183, pp. 473 – 475.

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dolf Bechyně, Minister of Railways, and Lev Winter, Minister of Social Welfare, opposed the administrative ordinance to the Language Law which the government adopted by simple majority and which took effect without their votes. After the issuance of the ordinance, the impasse in the coalition only deepened. Švehla once again withdrew from active politics due to ill health and Bechyně assumed the role of deputy premier. Finally on March 17, Bechyně informed the government that the absent premier, on the advice of his doctor, had submitted his resignation to the President of the Republic and Bechyně recommended that the others do so as well. Their agreement was unanimous. The old structure of the Pětka lay in shambles. On May 18, President Masaryk appointed a caretaker government once again under the leadership of Jan Černý. The language ordinance remained in effect. After the parliamentary elections in November, 1925, the non-Marxist German parties sought to restore a measure of unity among themselves. The result of their efforts was the German Union, a parliamentary institution which four parties joined, the Farmers Union, the Christian Socials and the Party of Trade, the three activist parties, and the German National Socialists, scarcely an activist party, but at that stage at least, one willing to exercise tactical pragmatism in contrast to the rigid German National Party which remained isolated in the negativist camp. The Association was slow in forming. Initially, the four members merely authorized the Agrarian Franz Křepek to make a joint constitutional declaration in Parliament on their behalf, which he did on December 18. Křepek declared that “our experience of the seven years of existence of the Czechoslovak state has shown that a nation and its one-sided nationalist system of government has intentionally, and by its very nature, done our nation severe injustice and caused it immense harm.” He enumerated the injustices at some length and concluded: “we wish to jointly struggle for the constitutional recognition of a full equality of our people, for our own school administration, for the equality of our language, for German soil and for German jobs. By removing a system of domination of a one-sided national force, we wish to defend the national assets of our people and to clear for them the path to free development.” On February 5, the four parties formally joined the German Union, a loosely knit parliamentary association under the chairmanship of Franz Spina, which left the member parties freedom in their dealings and the right of veto on all-important matters which the union had to decide.²³⁷ Yet, less than two weeks later, when a delegation of the German Union visited the German Embassy, its mem-

 Kracik, J., Die Politik des deutschen Aktivismus …, p. 148.

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bers informed Ambassador Koch in language of a more explicitly activist tone: “The leaders of the German Union have decided, for the time being among themselves, to forsake the previous purely negative Sudeten German politics, to recognize the Czecho-Slovak state, although it was created without the Germans, and on the basis of the Constitution to direct opposition against the present regime. They wish to adopt the stance of a truly loyal minority.” After this they requested of Ambassador Koch that the German government indicate its approval of the course they were setting out upon.²³⁸ As ever, when they actually approached the point of undertaking activist policy, the apprehension grew that the voters might turn against them. Until then, of course, they had not received encouragement from any Czech political party. The day of their visit to the embassy was March 17, the day when the Švehla government resigned. On the following day, the Černý government was installed, and in a trice the entire political situation was turned upside down. Černý declared in Parliament that his government would pursue the policies of the preceding government. This was not possible. The old government was gone and the coalition upon which it depended was scattered in disarray. As with his first caretaker government, Černý would have preferred to follow the instructions of President Masaryk, but he needed parliamentary backing. At that time there was no majority in Parliament, although the Agrarians were moving swiftly to create one. When Švehla withdrew once again from active politics due to ill health, the leader of the Slovak wing of the Agrarians, Dr. Milan Hodža, took charge of the effort to create the new majority. From the outset the outlook was promising. On a number of occasions leading German Agrarians had indicated a willingness to support tariff legislation. Prospects with the Slovak Peoples Party were also favorable and the clerical parties of all nations—Czech, German, Slovak and Hungarian—were increasingly drawn to the new coalition with the introduction of the issue of clerical salaries, especially when the Czechoslovak Agrarians committed to support the congrua in return for clerical support of the agricultural tariffs. The legislative campaign was initiated in the Senate, since the Chamber of Deputies had not yet returned from winter recess and the Czechoslovak Agrarians were unwilling to wait. On April 21, the Czech Agrarian, Senator Václav Donát, introduced a motion that the government should annul the sliding agricultural tariffs adopted earlier in the previous year and present a legislative bill

 Alexander, M. Deutsche Gesandtschaftsberichte aus Prag, vol. II, num. ref. 186, pp. 483 – 484.

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to establish fixed tariffs. The motion was designed to clear the path for tariff legislation and if accepted, clarify the nature of the new majority. In the Committee on Initiatives, it received support from two former opposition parties, the Farmers Union and the Slovak Peoples Party. The issue was even separately submitted to the members of the German Union. The German National Socialists opposed the motion, but it received the support of the Farmers Union, the Christian Socials and the Party of Trade. The outlines of the new majority, which was soon known as the Tariff Majority, had clearly emerged. On May 19th, the Senate adopted the motion.²³⁹ By this date the gathering storm had caused a realignment of political forces in parliament. The new Tariff Majority formed the largest bloc. Facing them was a newly formed Socialist Bloc, clearly at a numerical disadvantage. The Communists remained in isolation. There was also realignment within the German Union. On May 5th, the Union met to consider the situation. It was decided that the agricultural tariffs were primarily an economic issue and not a matter for the Union. This decision meant that the individual parties were left free to pursue their own course.²⁴⁰ The activist parties continued to support the tariff majority, while the National Socialists more and more turned against the activism of the other three. Eventually the battling between the parties broke the German National Socialists from the German Union and brought them into the opposition socialist bloc. For them, the willingness of the activist parties to support the tariff majority without any compensating concessions to German national demands was simply unacceptable. At the party conference in Opava on May 16th, the German National Socialists declared themselves uniformly against the policy of activism and criticized its representatives on the questions of agricultural tariffs and the congrua. It was a further substantial step of this party toward separation from the other parties of the German Union and its return to the negativist camp.²⁴¹ In fact, the German activist parties had deliberately foregone concessions on national issues. The Pětka had collapsed and the subsequent realignment of forces in parliament only reinforced the lines of division between the former Pětka members. This already was a substantial gain for the activists. A young member of the party leadership of the German Christian Socials at the time, Hans Schütz, recalled many years later the debate within the leadership on the party’s possible participation in government. Although he was commonly re-

 Klepetař, H. Seit 1918 …, pp. 233 – 234.  PZSPP report nr. 10 of May 20, 1926: NA, PMR, K 4, 1926.  César, J, and B. Černý. Politika německých buržoazních …, vol. I, p. 366.

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garded as belonging to the clerical wing of the party, he openly declared to the leaders of his party that he would be prepared to vote for the separation of church and state, if thereby he could break up the all-national coalition.²⁴² This was not an isolated point of view. Revulsion from the mono-ethnic dominance of the Pětka was widespread among the Germans. If the tariff majority perpetuated the new situation, that fact in itself was a major step forward. In forging the new majority, Milan Hodža faced one remaining hurdle, the National Democrats acting in this context as the spokesmen for Czechoslovak export industries. Commercial negotiations with the agricultural states of Hungary, Poland and Yugoslavia and with Germany were pending. If the Agrarians imposed high fixed agricultural tariffs in advance, they could prove to be obstacles or barriers to the negotiation of satisfactory commercial relations. The posture of the National Democrats was watchful and apprehensive. Hodža decided on a confrontational policy. The Agrarian bill introduced in the Senate on April 21 required the repeal of the sliding tariffs established in Article 2 of the Government Ordinance of June 4, 1925, but the retention of the sixfold tariffs based on the old Austrian custom rate as provided in Article 1 of that ordinance. The bill further provided that the government was to proceed immediately with new, definitive tariffs before the negotiation of the commercial treaties. For the National Democrats, it was a worst-case scenario. Negotiations between the two parties were initiated. On May 6, the Agrarians introduced the bill in the Chamber of Deputies which increased their pressure on the National Democrats. In the end a mutually beneficial compromise was reached. In its final and amended form, the bill consisted basically of two articles. The first provided a new, very high fixed tariff on most agricultural products and various industrial goods, and the second created a lower rate for most of them, a treaty rate which could be used in negotiating the upcoming commercial treaties.²⁴³ The new language continued to promote the interests of the agricultural producer, while addressing the needs of the industrial exporter. It marked the final consolidation of the tariff majority. On May 28th, the parliamentary battle over the tariff legislation began in the Agricultural Committee of the Chamber of Deputies, where there were day-andnight sessions, and a nearly endless stream of amendments was offered. From June 4th -8th, the frenetic debate was resumed in the Budget Committee, until  Schütz, Hans. “Gedanke eines Aktivisten zur Frage der Chancen und Grenzen des Aktivismus”, in Bosl, Karl, ed., Aktuelle Forschungsprobleme um die erste Tschechoslowakische Republik, (Mü nchen; Wien: Oldenbourg, 1969), p. 152.  Polák, E., “K otázce rozpadu …”, pp. 34– 36.

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on June 9th, the bill came to the floor of the Chamber of Deputies. Finally, on June 12th, after a nearly 30-hour session the agricultural tariffs were enacted into law. On June 25th the congrua was approved. A multinational coalition of bourgeois parties had, for the first time in the history of the Republic, prevailed over the opposition of socialist, Communist and minority parties. During the debate and after the vote, the German Social Democrats charged the activist parties with national treason, an interesting accusation coming from a party which traditionally prided itself on its internationalism, but for these Social Democrats the activists had acted not to promote international understanding, but to join in marshaling the forces of reaction against the worker. The charge of national treason was also made by the German National Party, now rejoined in the negativist camp by the German National Socialists. The adoption of the tariffs, the congrua and related legislation marked the end of any need for the caretaker government, but it opened an array of questions regarding the composition of its successor. In assembling the Tariff Majority, Hodža had always had in mind a more permanent alliance at least of Czech and German Agrarian interests. There were others, however, the National Democrats foremost among them, who opposed German entry into government and favored a return to the all-national coalition. It is interesting that at this juncture one of Czechoslovakia’s foremost political commentators, Ferdinand Peroutka, should have missed his cues. On June 17th, only days before the final vote on the tariffs, Peroutka wrote: “the agricultural tariffs are certain and clearly the congrua as well. Only the representatives of the minorities will go back into opposition. Then it will be necessary to restore the all-national coalition.” The statement rested on two assumptions: only the all-national coalition was capable of governing Czechoslovakia, and the country could not be governed without the socialists. Both assumptions were inaccurate. But Peroutka was quick to regain his footing. On July 1st, he wrote: “the non-socialist parties showed no willingness to give up what they have achieved.”²⁴⁴ Many people were uncertain of the future course of political events and the polemics on the topic in the press were heated. The activists were confident, and the new majority held firm, but the issue was unresolved across the summer. It was only in September when Švehla returned from abroad that negotiations reached their final intensity. Hodža reported to him on the political situation and the two Agrarian statesmen discussed the prospects of a parliamentary government. A resurrection of the all-national government seemed unworkable

 Klimek, A., Velke´ dějiny zemi´ Koruny česke´ …, vol. XIII, pp. 541– 542.

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to them, since it would be nearly impossible to reach agreement on a stable working program among parties of such differing economic and social interests. The proposal came up for discussion of leaving the caretaker government in office until the spring and then holding new elections. They dismissed both this solution and calling upon a reconfigured caretaker cabinet as unworkable. Despite numerous warnings, both Agrarian politicians decided to immediately take the decisive step and to try for the formation of a Czech-German parliamentary government. On September 18th, the negotiations of the Czechoslovak Agrarians and Christian Socials with the German Agrarians ended successfully. Švehla promised the Germans entry into government but not any concessions on national demands. The situation left open the final composition of the government which could include any suitable coalition, even with the socialists.²⁴⁵ The promise of German entry into government engendered relief at the German Embassy. The breakup of the Pětka would be perpetuated, at least for the time being. In his report on the new situation to the foreign office in Berlin Councilor von Heeren invoked a touch of schadenfreude (spiteful glee) and even a touch of bitterness. He wrote: “The all-Czech coalition is shattered which, held together by national chauvinism and angst for the security of the new state structure, has ruled dictatorially until the spring of this year despite all its social antagonisms and now, the rift ever widening, will wash a good part of its dirty laundry in anger before the public, dirty laundry which in the years of its cooperation it carefully concealed from the common enemy, the national minorities.” When the parliamentary club of the Deputies and Senators of the Farmers Union congratulated Senator Křepek on his seventy-second birthday, it decided to ask him to write a memorandum on the development of activist politics under his leadership up to the entry of the Germans into government. Křepek did this and the Deutsche Landpost printed excerpts from the memorandum in its edition of January 30th, 1927. Křepek recalled that in 1920, after the entry of the German Deputies into Parliament, on the occasion of his first invitation from the President, he mentioned to Masaryk the necessity of a German-Bohemian settlement and stressed the right of the Germans to participate in government. In this first conversation the President expressed his agreement that a German Bohemian settlement was a very important state problem. On an occasion in 1924, Křepek, as Chairman of the German Parliamentary Working Group, met again with Masaryk. After lunch they talked for a long time

 Klimek, A., Velke´ dějiny zemi´ Koruny česke´ …, vol. XIII, p. 581.

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in the library about the political situation. From their conversation, Křepek gained the impression that President Masaryk had achieved his great political goal through his well-timed dealings with the Western powers, that he was the most successful politician in central Europe and that he had assumed the Presidency in order to continue a historic mission which his predecessor, the Emperor Franz Josef, failed to achieve, although as monarch he had declared it to be a necessity of the state—namely, the settlement of the German Bohemian problem. Křepek expressed the opinion that, without a solution to this great state problem, Masaryk’s historic idea would remain for all time incomplete. Once again, the President declared the settlement a necessity. In 1926, when Švehla returned from convalescence abroad, Karlovy Vary was the place where his negotiations began. Once the leadership was back in his hands, he came to Prague. All the Czech parties and their newspapers were at loggerheads. Švehla intervened and within eight days the public squabbling at least fell silent. And then came serious negotiations, truly serious. Now, the Germans could not afford to be like those politicians whom Bismarck once called “timeless” because they never did anything at the right time. President Masaryk’s principal—politics is discussion—was put to use. Everyone excitedly awaited the outcome of the power-sharing discussions. That all the wards and precincts of his party organization arrived at unanimous agreement was for Křepek a pleasant surprise. On that decisive day, October 10th, the Christian Social People’s Party also came to its final decision, and so it could be arranged that the new ministers journeyed to Topolčany²⁴⁶ to meet the President. On the following day the Oath of Office took place. A great, important turning point for this country and its people, both politically and nationally, had taken place. A new era had begun.²⁴⁷ Upon his return Senator Křepek sent a letter to his colleagues in the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies: “I have fulfilled my life’s task. I stand rapt in thought on the roof of my house and look back at the long and distant journey which I have completed with the help of the Almighty. In this state the German nation has its due share of power! Now everything depends upon the nation itself, upon its men, their discretion, circumspection, firmness and strength.”²⁴⁸

 President Masaryk’s summer residence in Slovakia.  NA, MZV-VA I, Karton 3471.  Národní politika, October 19, 1926.

Chapter 7 German Activism Křepek’s euphoria was misplaced. In a somewhat histrionic prelude to his memorandum, Křepek cited two instances from history which demonstrated how the inept behavior of a political leader had cost his people dearly and how exemplary behavior had rewarded them richly. In the first case, he cited Emperor Franz Josef’s audience in 1879 with the German Liberal Democratic, Dr. Eduart Herbst, at the time of his greatest power as the leader of the Germans in the Austrian Parliament. The Emperor, Křepek recounted, was without a cabinet and sought a new premier, but Herbst was obstinate in his conduct and ruined his chances. Instead, Franz Josef turned to Count Eduard von Taaffe, who formed a cabinet with the Poles, the Czechs, the clericals and the aristocrats. All of them grabbed for power without hesitation. The result was a fourteen-year government of Czechs, Poles and aristocrats. “In those fourteen years,” Křepek recalled, “the former power of the Germans in Austria and even the Germans in Bohemia suffered immense damage whose consequences continue until today.” In his second case, Křepek turned to the example of the Hungarian national leader, Ferenc Deak. The year was 1866. Austria was at war with Prussia and, at the battle of Könniggrätz, Austrian troops were routed and the Emperor defeated. Now, the Emperor’s main concern was Hungary. The consolidation of the entire monarchy depended on a successful conciliation with Hungary. Earlier negotiations had not gone well. The Emperor summoned Deak to Vienna. He and his counselors feared that, after Könniggrätz, the Hungarians would substantially increase their demands. The Emperor asked Deak what Hungary wanted for concluding the compromise. Deak replied with dignity: “The demands of my people are not new. We have presented them to you long ago. We stand by them and we have nothing to change.” Austria breathed a sigh of relief. From that time on Deak was master of the situation. The Austro-Hungarian compromise was quickly completed and, Křepek concluded, Hungary savored its benefits as long as the monarchy existed.²⁴⁹ Whatever the didactic value of Křepek’s first example, his second one was simply irrelevant. In 1866, the young Emperor made generous concessions to the Hungarians, concessions which they continued to enjoy until the fall of the monarchy in 1918. In 1926, Švehla made no concessions to the Germans. German entry into government was not a concession; it was the salvation of the

 NA, MZV-VA I, Karton 3471. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110749885-010

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Czech non-Marxist parties. Yet upon entry, the constraints of forging a government majority deprived the Germans of any element of concession on national demands. Six parties, which were originally recruited by Hodža for the Tariff Majority, made the transition smoothly from legislative to government coalition; the Czechoslovak Agrarians and the German Farmers Union, the Czech and German Christian Socials and the Czech and German Parties of Trade. Together, these six parties had 127 mandates which formed the foundation of the new government but fell far short of the majority required. Two other parties, the Slovak Peoples Party with twenty-three mandates and National Democracy with fourteen, posed separate problems which required Švehla’s special efforts. The thirty-seven mandates of these two parties were essential for launching the new government. For the Slovak Peoples Party, the decisive issue was autonomy. They were offered administrative reform which would permanently set aside the regional system then in use in Slovakia and replace it with the administrative unity of the entire Slovak land, the traditional system in the historic Czech lands. For the first time in history Slovakia would become a single administrative entity. Given the party’s experience under the provincial system, it is not difficult to understand how the Slovak clericals saw in this proposal a first step towards the realization of eventual Slovak autonomy, although later experience would show how illusory the “autonomous” elements of land administration actually were. On the basis of this proposal the party agreed to join the government coalition, but on the question of participation in government, they preferred to await the return of their leader, Father Andrej Hlinka, from his travels in the United States. Upon completion of the negotiations with Hlinka, Deputy Dr. Marek Gažik was appointed Minister of Unification and Deputy Dr. Josef Tiso Minister of Health on January 15th, 1927. For the National Democrats, the permanent elimination of the regional system, which they had opposed from the outset, and its replacement in law and in practice by the traditional land administration of the Czech lands was a major victory. In and of itself, however, it was insufficient. There remained the issue of German national demands. On September 24, 1926 the National Democracy Parliamentary Club met to consider the possibility of German entry into government. The mood of the meeting was that, if the Germans joined, National Democracy should enter government as well. That point of view was defended by no less a figure than the poet, Viktor Dyk, who argued that there must be a counterweight to the Germans in government. On that same day Kramář met with Švehla to discuss the situation. Švehla favored immediate parliamentary government but was of two minds regarding the participation of the Germans and National Democracy in it. Under the first option neither the Germans nor National Democracy would send representatives

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to the government for the time being. The second alternative, favored by a majority of the National Democratic Club, was that National Democracy send its representatives into government, but in that case the Germans would also participate in government. Kramář favored the first option. It seemed to him that if the Germans were merely in the parliamentary majority, it would not be necessary to give them anything, but if they were in government, they would extract concessions.²⁵⁰ Kramář′s position was tantamount to policy for the National Democrats. The Germans did enter government but without any concession on national demands. With this compromise, Kramář had relented by agreeing to National Democracy entering the government coalition. The cause, it is said, was political ambition. Elections for the Presidency of the State were scheduled for May, 1927. Kramář’s ambitions for the Presidency were well-known, but without the support of the parties in the new government coalition he could not hope to mount a candidacy. In the event, while the German activists joined the government with the appointment of two ministers, National Democracy joined the government coalition but refrained from sending a representative into government. Instead, Dr. František Peroutka, Minister of Trade in the Černý government and an official close to the National Democratic Party, remained in the same capacity in the new government.²⁵¹ With these arrangements Švehla completed his negotiations with Dr. Kramář. It was only in April of 1928 that the National Democratic Party sent Deputy Ladislav Novák to replace Peroutka as Minister of Trade. There remained the question of the nature of German representation in the new government. At first Švehla thought in terms of a single minister without portfolio on the model of the old Austrian land minister. The German activist parties objected. If there were to be no concessions on German national demands, the only advantage of their entering into government would be to share in state power, to administer one or another of the government ministries. Švehla agreed. The German agrarian leader, Dr. Franz Spina, Professor of Bohemistics, the study of Czech language and literature, at the German University in Prague, was assigned to the Ministry of Public Works. The German Christian Social Deputy, Dr. Robert Mayr-Harting, Professor of Civil Law also at the German University, was given the Ministry of Justice. At first, the German parties asked for the Ministry of Schools for Mayr-Harting, but it was precisely at the Ministry of Schools that the Czechs did not wish to

 Štefánek, Josef, ed. Dokumenty o protinárodní politice T. G. Masayka (Praha: Orbis, 1953), pp. 147– 148.  Klepetař, H. Seit 1918 …, pp. 245 – 246.

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have a German in charge. Instead, the Minister of Schools was Dr. Hodža, the Slovak Agrarian leader, who promised the Germans cultural autonomy, a perennial German demand, but he could not fulfill his promise when the Czech parties in the government failed to support him.²⁵² President Masaryk greeted the Germans’ entry into government which he had been calling for for many years. On the day of their appointment, he wrote to Švehla: “I constantly see the Germans before me, a marvelous and fine thing! And I am glad I am not alone who took the matter seriously and well—let us carry it out successfully”. But Masaryk also understood that the tariff-congrua coalition, which was the foundation stone of the new government, did not grow out of ideals but arose from momentary political opportunism, when the parties in question saw the possibility to achieve the predominantly material interests of the elements which they represented.²⁵³ A year earlier in August of 1925, the Czechoslovak ambassador in Berlin, Kamil Krofta, had written to President Masaryk, recommending the creation of an Institute for the Study of the National Minorities in the Czechoslovak Republic. In justification of his recommendation, he explained that “the minority problem, the problem of the relations of the national minorities to the state, is primarily a political problem and ultimately can only be resolved by the responsible political authorities, the government and the National Assembly. But this resolution, if it is to be successful and permanent, should not be so much the fruit of political negotiations driven by the chance political situation, a work of superficial compromises whose principal goal might be to help some government out of difficulty by winning a portion of the national minorities for government policy, etc. On the contrary it must be properly prepared by detailed scholarly work on the various aspects of the minority problem”. Krofta enumerated at some length the needs for such study and concluded that: “there is no doubt that as the state nation we have not only the duty but also the urgent need to know the minority nations of our state well, their material and spiritual life, their actual conditions and their feelings, wishes and longings. It is not necessary to recall how the Austrian Germans and Hungarians paid dearly for their lack of knowledge of the other nations of the former Habsburg monarchy”. Krofta’s proposal had much to be recommended, but it is difficult to see how an independent body of refined and detailed knowledge about the national minorities of Czechoslovakia could have changed the outcome of Švehla’s negotia-

 Klepetař, H. Seit 1918 …, p. 248.  Klimek, A. Velke´ dějiny zemi´ Koruny česke´ …, vol. XIII, p. 548.

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tions. The formation of the new government was the result of an opportunistic exploitation of a parliamentary crisis by all the political parties involved, Czech and German alike. It was a political decision made by politicians on the basis of political calculations and it reflected the political culture of Czechoslovakia at the time. The institution of the Pětka, reformed as the Šestka (the Six), had self destructed in early 1926, but the culture of the Pětka, the culture of the national state, was far too deeply entrenched. It survived intact. It survived in the former Pětka parties themselves. All this was reflected in the outcome of Švehla’s negotiations. Nonetheless, as future events would demonstrate, the mere entry of two German ministers into government fell far short of any real accommodation between Czechs and Germans, which the country sorely needed. The German ambassador reported to Berlin that “for the first time it has been demonstrated in fact that something like a nationally mixed ministry is possible without, as the Czech hotheads claim, the Czech state collapsing, and without, as the German irredentist’s predict, all the Germans of the border regions rising to a man against such a betrayal of the nation”. To this he added in a more somber tone that “by the entry of the Germans into the cabinet it emerges irrefutably that Czechoslovakia is a nationality state. If at the present the Czechs were able to see any possibility for another majority, they would have chosen it; and as soon as some possibility of a purely Czech majority is offered, they will throw the Germans overboard, only to resurrect the fiction of the nation state.” Future events did not bear out the ambassadors dire forecast, but they did demonstrate the basis of his skepticism. The strains within the new coalition were apparent from the outset. The Pětka, which had dominated Czechoslovak politics for more than five years, was followed with the second Švehla government by the Šestka, the committee of party representatives in the government coalition at that time. The Šestka met rarely, Švehla preferring to deal separately with the individual members. Now came the Osmička (the Eight), the committee of the eight parties in the new coalition of the third Švehla government. The Osmička was a shadow of the once formidable Pětka. It had no firm, written rules and, with the return of Švehla’s illness, the committee’s leadership passed to Bohumír Bradáč, a capable politician, but no match for the charismatic and prestigious Švehla. Most importantly, the Osmička ceased to function as a committee of equals. More and more the Agrarians emerged as the dominant partner and the Germans fell back to a position of subordinate status. Josef Patzel, President of the Parliamentary Club of the German National Socialists and a moderate within the party who favored collaboration with the Czechs, wrote that the Czech parties in the Osmička first

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reached agreement among themselves, and then informed their German “colleagues” of their decision.²⁵⁴ Beyond the compromises by which Švehla forged the government majority and the government program, there remained a breach between the Czechs and Germans newly entered into government on an issue of fundamental importance. In midsummer of 1926, before the Germans’ entry into government, the Agrarian leader Franz Spina declared: “The nationality state is the goal of activist politics….”²⁵⁵ A fundamental demand of the nationality state was equality and autonomy for the ethnic minorities. Shortly after the Germans’ entry into government, the National Democratic leader, Karel Kramář, stated: “We counted on the fact that at some point under certain circumstances it would come to the Germans’ entry into government, but only when the foundation of our national state had been completely and safely secured.”²⁵⁶ This sentiment regarding the national state was not confined to Dr. Kramář. It reflected a common Czech view. It was shared at the very least by many in the Christian Social Peoples Party and by many in the Agrarian Party. It had supporters in the ranks of the two socialist parties in opposition. It was reflected in the refusal of the Czech parties in government to support Hodža′s promise of cultural autonomy for the Germans. It was the glue that had held the Pětka together for so many years until the final, failed attempt to resurrect that institution with the language ordinance. Here, then, was an intractable difference not amenable to compromise, the multi-ethnic society with power shared among its nationalities, on the one hand, and the national state, on the other hand, with power concentrated at the center by the dominant Czech—or, as the case might be, the Czechoslovak nation. Švehla, in the government declaration to Parliament, stated that “today, thanks to democratic ideas, we can negotiate directly and openly as free citizens within our own state, without foreign patronage and as equals among equals. We realize that the differences which stem from the dissimilarities of national cultures will not disappear, but what is at stake is the possibility and need to improve the methods for dealing with and resolving such differences”. Especially the words “equals among equals” as applied to the Germans were exhilarating rhetoric, but they were nonetheless rhetoric. The reality would be soon apparent when the government turned its attention to the issue of administrative reform.

 Klimek, A. Velke´ dějiny zemi´ Koruny česke´ …, vol. XIII p. 589.  Kracik, J. Die Politik des deutschen Aktivismus …, p. 162.  Národní listy, November 16, 1926.

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In presenting the program of the new government on October 14, 1926, Švehla made no mention of administrative reform. In a press interview a month and a half later Masaryk stated: “we are about to fully implement the system of regional administration which will bring an element of autonomy to every realm of administration.”²⁵⁷ From the foregoing it appears that at the time the President was still unaware of the government’s intentions. Based on commitments which Švehla had made to the Slovak Peoples Party and to the National Democrats in forming the new coalition, the government began deliberations in late 1926 on an administrative reform that envisaged scrapping the regional system in its entirety and replacing it with four land administrations: Bohemia, Moravia-Silesia, Slovakia and Ruthenia. Regressive legislation emerged from these discussions. The two German provinces, Karlovy Vary/Karlsbad and Česká Lípa/Bömische Leipa, established in the original legislation, would not come into being. Silesia, in which Germans had a plurality of 40.5 %, was merged with Moravia to create Moravia-Silesia where Czechs enjoyed a robust majority. The appointment of one third of the members of the otherwise elected assemblies, confined to Slovakia in the original legislation, was now extended to all four lands. The range of activities of these same assemblies was extremely narrowly defined and subject to firm government control. The result was a heavily centrist administrative system in which bureaucracy played a dominant role. Autonomy, which was a principal demand of all the activist parties, the two parties in the government coalition but also the German Social Democrats in opposition, was a major casualty of the legislation. The final text of the legislation was approved by the government on February 4, 1927, and sent to the constitutional committee of the Chamber of Deputies on February 23rd. The legislative reporter was Dr. Karel Kramář, inveterate foe of German autonomy, who presented the government’s report on the legislation on the same day the bill was submitted to the committee. The report by Dr. Kramář was curiously disingenuous, ostensibly seeking support with arguments that its critics readily rebutted. On the controversial issue of the government’s appointment of one third of the membership of otherwise elected assemblies, Dr. Kramář declared: “It is clear to me that this is not a corrective for the right to vote…. Its purpose is that people get there who are actually above the daily political battle and who will represent objective interests there. If ever universal suffrage were to have the result that people are excluded who by right and justice should be

 President Masaryk’s interview by the editor of the Deutsche Presse, Dr. Rudolf Schaffer, on November 29, 1926: AKPR, D8500/37/H/IV.

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there, the government has the obligation to do it (appoint them).”²⁵⁸ The qualifier “if ever” is quite gratuitous. The law provided for the routine appointment of one third of the membership of all land and district assemblies in the entire country. In his response, the leader of the German Social Democrats, Dr. Ludwig Czech, seized upon the assertion by Dr. Kramář that the regional law had failed to prove itself. Dr. Czech commented: “Dr. Kramář now believes [that] the sevenyear experience with the regional law has shown that the region does not meet the need and that it has not taken root. It is therefore no wonder, Dr. Kramář believes, that steps are now undertaken that the regional law not be carried out. The statement with the seven years is most certainly not correct, since in the historic lands the experiment was never carried out and the regional system has existed in Slovakia only since 1923. Where then has Dr. Kramář created the seven years of experience? “But equally incorrect is the statement that the regional system has not taken root. On November 14, 1924, the then Minister of Interior, Malypetr, made the following statement in the name of the government in the budget committee: ‘The experience, which has been made in Slovakia with the regional system, is very favorable, so favorable that the law on district and regional administration will absolutely be carried out in the Sudetenland and Carpathian Ruthenia in the very near future.’ By contrast he opposed the maintenance of the lands as administrative entities, since this system has shown itself to be cumbersome…. Two years later, in November, 1926, Minister Černý came to speak of the administrative reform and in the budget committee he said literally: ‘Conditions in the Czech lands are different than in Slovakia where until 1922 there were sixteen impossible authorities.’ And he concluded: ‘From these entities the reform has created six which are viable economically, culturally and socially.’ “The minister declared that four months ago. Thus, the statement is unfounded that the regions have not taken root. Only four months ago the Slovak regions were described on high authority as viable. Today in the presence of the same minister and without a word of protest from him the opposite is declared.”²⁵⁹ From the foregoing it was apparent that the government legislation on administrative reform grew not from the needs of administration in a democratic country, but from a transient constellation of conservative interests.

 PS-II-24 VÚP, February 23, 1927, p. 14.  PS-II-25 VÚP, March 3, 1927, pp. 46 – 47.

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The fate of the administrative law, however, did not depend upon the debate in the Constitutional Committee. That was a formality. As long as the government held a firm majority in the committee and in the plenum, the law’s passage was assured. The Czech Social Democratic Deputy, Alfred Meissner, acknowledged this in his concluding remark: “You have the power in your hands, you can adopt it. We do not have in our power any way to prevent it, but I express the hope that this bill will not become a fact…. I hold that it would be more just not to take up these changes and provisions which truly mean a step backward and will do no honor to the republic.”²⁶⁰ And for a moment it appeared that the bill might not become law. Within the ranks of the government dissension had broken out over the reform legislation. The Slovak People’s Party, the German Farmers Union and the German Christian Socials all expressed objections. A representative of the Slovak Peoples Party, Ferdiš Juriga, condemned the bill, but went on to charge that the language of the legislation had not been drawn up in the government, but in the Osmička, the committee of the eight governing parties. There, the negotiations between the parties had not been conducted openly but for the most part in secret with one version of the draft legislation given to the representative of the Slovak Peoples Party and another version to the Czech parties. The two German parties did not reject the legislation altogether, but called for fundamental changes. Joined by the parties of the opposition the negative response was overwhelming and the government had no alternative than to withdraw the bill from consideration for a time, pending efforts to reconcile off stage the dissidents within its own ranks.²⁶¹ Three months later, in June of 1927, the bill was reintroduced to the Constitutional Committee. The formality of debate was resumed, but the government majority had been firmly restored in the meantime, the opposition was consistently voted down and the bill was favorably reported from committee. After further debate in the plenum and despite the din of obstructionists, it was routinely adopted into law. For the German parties in government this law, often called the Kramář law, was a heavy price to pay for entry into government. In no way did the German citizen of Czechoslovakia stand to benefit from the legislation. On the contrary, two German provinces, Česká Lípa and Karlovy Vary, would be eliminated altogether as would Silesia where Germans were in such numbers that, together with

 PS-II-25 VÚP, March 3, 1927, p. 91.  Schelle, K. Vývoj české veřejné správy …, pp. 302– 303; Klimek, Antonín. Boj o Hrad (Praha: Panevropa, 1998), vol. II, p. 117.

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the Poles, they stood to form a majority. All that was gone. In its place an administrative system, even less progressive than originally proposed in the regional law, would be introduced. Faced with these prospects the two German parties demanded in compensation the repeal of the Language Ordinance of 1926, but they failed to achieve this objective as well.²⁶² Švehla had spoken movingly of “equals among equals”. Instead, it appeared that German activism had been stillborn. Language usage and autonomy had been principal demands of all the German parties from the outset, but the law on political administration of 1927 and the Language Ordinance of 1926 remained in effect until the end of the First Republic. After many years in fruitless opposition to the government, at first in an openly rejectionist posture and then increasingly seeking to collaborate with their Czech counterparts, the two German activist parties now in government, the Farmers Union and the Christian Socials, resigned themselves to the new administrative system and chose to remain in government. By comparison with 1925, both these parties suffered losses and the overall activist vote declined in the first elections to the land assemblies in 1928. Although the two government parties never fully recovered their losses, in the 1929 parliamentary elections, when the economy was still prospering, German activist parties as a whole continued to garner strong electoral support. An important sequel to the legislative struggle over administrative reform was the government’s implementation of the controversial provision on the appointment of one third of the members of the land and district assemblies. With rare, individual exceptions the appointed members came from the Czech government parties. It was the same tactic which the government had used in 1923 in its appointments to the regional assemblies in Slovakia. For the two German parties in the coalition, it was a bitter reminder of their second-class status. If the standing of the Germans in government was unenviable, the standing of the Germans in general in Czech high society was scarcely better. Indicative of the situation was the Social Club, an institution established in 1927 with generous support from the Foreign Ministry. Government funds paid for the building in which it was housed on National Avenue in downtown Prague and for refurbishing the building. Government funding also covered a third of its operating expenses. Its purpose was to project an idealized image of Czechoslovak society for the foreign visitor and its membership included the cream of Castle-friendly Czech society—politicians, artists, journalists, and intellectuals. The Social Club

 Schelle, K. Vývoj české veřejné správy, p. 307.

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sponsored dinners, receptions, lectures and debates, literary evenings and dances to which prominent foreign visitors were invited. Largely missing from these events were representatives of the Czechoslovak minorities—one third of the population. Absent from the list of invitees sent out when the club was formed was the name of any German or Hungarian. Of the initial fifty invitees there were only five Slovak names or Bratislava addresses, although Slovaks officially were one branch of the Czechoslovak nation. A German citizen of Czechoslovakia attending the club did so as a guest, not as a member.²⁶³ Toward the end of June, 1927, a city councilman from Liberec/Reichenberg in northern Bohemia visited the presidential chancellery in Prague. He was Adalbert Lux, editor of the Reichenberger Zeitung, one of the leading German newspapers, and he had come to ask if it would be appropriate to issue a formal invitation for President Masaryk to visit the Liberec Trade Fair in August. He pointed out that the President’s visit would be an important step “toward conciliation between Prague and the largest German city in the Republic”. In a later written response, the invitation was declined, but the accompanying explanation bears noting: “A presidential visit to some German city has already been under consideration for some years,” it stated. “Unfortunately, political considerations have not permitted such a visit, since naturally it is not possible to expose the person of the President not only to a cold reception but even to possible attacks by radical elements. Of course, the participation of some German political parties in government has improved the situation and perhaps we will come to see even in this respect an important day for the state and for the coexistence of both nationalities. I think that Liberec would be among the first places under consideration. In any case I will keep the matter in mind and as soon as there is something concrete, I will not neglect to inform you. For the current year, of course, the matter is ruled out, since just at the time of the Liberec Trade Fair the President will already be staying in Slovakia where a rather demanding program requires his uninterrupted presence.”²⁶⁴ Nine years after independence and more than six months after the entry of the first German ministers into government, the multi-ethnic society of Czechoslovakia was so little integrated that security concerns prevented President Masaryk’s free movement in heavily settled German areas.

 Orzoff, Andrea. Battle for the Castle: The Myth of Czechoslovakia in Europe, 1914 – 1948 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), pp. 158 – 160.  AKPR. T 12/25, Část IV.

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At a local party meeting of the German Farmers Union in February of 1927 Minister Dr. Spina commented on the German entry into government: “Events of recent months in the republic are of such a kind that historians will have to record them, because they are a continuation of the work which was launched again and again in old Austria but was never successful: a settlement of the national, social and economic conflicts in the Sudeten lands. We know that the entry of the Germans [into government] touched upon a fundamental problem of the state, a problem of which the President of the Republic has spoken often: as long as an improvement of relations between the principal nations of this state is not carried out, this state is not consolidated…. And thus, came about what the old Emperor Franz Josef strove for in vain: the collaboration of similar Czech and German civic parties…. For the first time in the existence of the state the minority also joined in legislative services, by which proof is offered that in Czechoslovakia also political situations are possible where things don’t work without the collaboration of the German minority. That recognition of the state and work in the interest of the state is linked with this collaboration is as obvious as the principal that the recognition and fulfillment of German rights must be linked with the assumption of responsibility toward the state. For the first time national consciousness and consciousness of the state have been linked together. Constant demonstrations, the radicalism of strong words which are not followed by radical deeds, lead merely to an embitterment of the situation. The minority has only two paths: to thwart the majority or to adapt to it and to collaborate. There is no third way. And in the end, we might have been spared a great deal, if we had already come to this perception earlier.”²⁶⁵ If Spina’s words to his party supporters were upbeat, a year later, on May 16, 1928, a more sober assessment appeared in a joint statement by him and MayrHarting, the two German ministers in the government. Their statement read: “Should the impression arise in the international public and especially among some particular members of the League of Nations that the mere participation of German parties in the Czechoslovak government already amounts to a solution of the extremely complex minority question here, it is to be attributed either … to insufficient information or to misunderstanding. Our participation in government stems from our determination for collaboration in the state and from a special, domestic political situation. From the point of view of national politics, it can certainly be regarded as a meaningful attempt at a solution, but not at all as a final solution. Therefore, in our view neither the minority treaties

 Národní politika, February 11, 1927.

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nor an actual improvement in the procedures on the minority question at the League of Nations have become superfluous. Though we also hope that the existing nationality problem can be gradually resolved with goodwill through domestic politics, this depends above all upon the accommodation of the Czech and Slovak people. Since one can never predict the development of such difficult questions with certainty, an appropriately improved and far-reaching guarantee of the defense of minority rights by the League of Nation is still necessary.”²⁶⁶ Two years later, in a still more sober frame of mind, Senator Franz Křepek, who had led the German Farmers Union before Spina, called upon the Chancellor of the Presidential Chancellery, Přemysl Šámal, on January 30, 1929, to discuss the current situation. Křepek reckoned that an early call for fresh parliamentary elections would be “catastrophic” for the Farmers Union. The Farmers Union, as well as the German Christian Socials, could only feel “bitterness” that they had entered the government majority and the government without any concessions. This reproach was now even sounded from the ranks of the German Christian Socials. Also there was the fear that a significant part of the German voters would defect either to the German National Party or to the Communists. He wished in the name of his party to ask of President Masaryk not to schedule elections in the foreseeable future. In case it should come to a Czech-German coalition in the future parliament, the German public will no longer tolerate an unconditional entry into government. Therefore, the Czech Agrarians finally must make up their minds to work for the good of the entire state. Unfortunately, according to Křepek, the Czech Agrarians had become “too strong” and the only person who could stifle the “excesses of this sense of power” was Antonín Švehla. For reasons of health, he had been eliminated from political life. His successor up to that point, Jan Šrámek, was “incapable” of doing it. Therefore, the German government parties consider Karel Viškovský as the most capable candidate to carry on the office of Premier, while František Udržal would be better left at the Ministry of Defense. At the end of the conversation Křepek, repeated that: “it is now necessary to consolidate the state”.²⁶⁷ Two days later, on February 1, 1929 František Udržal was appointed Premier. In September, fresh elections were called for October 29, 1929, two years before the end of the normal parliamentary term. If such were the vicissitudes experienced by the German parties in government, the years 1927– 1929, nonetheless, marked the highpoint of German activism, as confirmed by the results from the first elections to the land assemblies

 Nittner, E., Dokumente zur sudetendeutsche Frage …, num. ref. 66, p. 115.  Conversation between Křepek and Šámal, January 30, 1929: AKPR, T 12/25, část IV.

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in December of 1928, and the parliamentary elections in October of 1929, when on both occasions activist parties, both government and opposition, captured three quarters of the votes cast for all German parties. At the same time, there were crosscurrents in these years, inconclusive when they occurred, but which pointed to a very different outcome for German politics, if activism were ever to falter and lose its popular support. On the occasion of the National Congress of the German Christian Social Party on May 25 – 26, 1927, Senator Karl Hilgenreiner, elected party president at the Congress, stated in an opening address that no one could say whether the German ministers in government were a blessing for the people or not and whether the effort at collaboration of the different nations would lead to its goal, but the effort was undertaken with the utmost serious intent. In its resolution the Congress welcomed and approved the entry into government but sounded a strong cautionary note—without achieving equality the permanent collaboration of Germans in government and in parliament was unthinkable.²⁶⁸ In July of 1927, with the final vote on administrative reform, two deputies from the German Farmers Union, contrary to the instructions of the party leadership, voted against the government bill. Deputies Josef Mayer from western Bohemia and Georg Hanreich from southern Moravia were leaders in the nationalist wing of the party and their local organizations had for some time been critical of the activist policies pursued by the national leadership. The party moved swiftly against them. Both were expelled from their parliamentary club, from the party and finally on February 8, 1928, were stripped of their mandates by the electoral court, but both persisted on their nationalist course. After a preliminary effort to found an independent farmers party in southern Moravia in January drew limited response, Hanreich launched the Sudeten German Land Union (Sudetendeutscher Landbund, SLB) in Brno on March 25, 1928. The SLB sought to enlist disaffected, nationalist elements in the Farmers Union in order to represent the “national demands of the German rural people.” The ultimate aim was to forge with other parties an organization which embraced the entire German nation. The response this time was broader, but nonetheless moderate. Consequently, in the first elections to the land assemblies in December, 1928, and again in the parliamentary elections in October, 1929, the Landbund joined in a common slate with the German National Party, the common practice of smaller, weaker parties seeking to ensure themselves legislative representation.²⁶⁹

 PZSPP report no. 8 of May 28, 1927: NA, PMR, K 5, 1927.  Kracik, Die Politik des deutschen Aktivismus …, pp. 239 – 241.

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On November 5, 1927, Dr. Alfred Rosche of the German National Party caught the public’s attention with an address in the Budget Committee of the Chamber of Deputies in which he said that the National Party accepted activism. Dr. Rosche pointed out that the Germans still did not enjoy equal rights in the state and in many regards were oppressed, which had not changed even with the entry of some German parties into government. The German ministers were playing a role like the first Czech ministers in old Austria. They were enacting a pageantry for the consolidation of conditions, but the offensive against German culture and economy continued. Nonetheless, Rosche affirmed, the German Nationals were not irredentists in the sense in which the Czechs present them. They were prepared for active, positive work, but of course under different conditions than the German government parties.²⁷⁰ This report was greeted with considerable skepticism, but soon thereafter came another, stronger signal from the German National Party of initiatives for conciliation between the German government parties and the opposition parties. On November 15, 1927, there appeared an article in Bohemia by the leader of the National Party, Dr. Heinrich Brunar. He argued that the German minority in the state could gain its greatest influence by proceeding in unison. So far, efforts at unity had failed and that, according to Brunar, was because they deprived the individual parties of the possibility of independent action. It was necessary to consider a form of unified action while preserving the independence of the political parties. Dr. Brunar judged that, with goodwill under present circumstances, all the German parties might join in a single union which would make binding decisions by a majority, by a qualified majority in certain especially difficult cases, but the individual parties would be free to present their own opposing views to the public with the aim of winning a majority and guiding Sudeten German politics themselves. These suggestions of Dr. Brunar drew considerable attention in the Czech and German press and were considered by most as a further step of the German Nationals on the path to activism.²⁷¹ Rosche’s replacement of the ultra-nationalist Keibl as the leader of the German National Party’s Parliamentary Club only strengthened this impression. Behind these events was an unexpected development in the German National Party. More moderate elements grouped around Dr. Rosche judged that, with the current popularity of activism obstructionism, at least for the time being, they would not win votes and pressed for greater openness to activist ideas.

 PZSPP report no. 14 of November 19, 1927: NA, PMR, K 5, 1927.  PZSPP report no. 15 of December 16, 1927: NA. PMR, K 5, 1927.

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But the activism which Rosche espoused differed from the activism of the German parties in government. He called for real concessions to German demands. At one point, Rosche expressed approval of the activist parties’ entry into government, but faulted them for failing to win concessions, at first with their vote for the agricultural tariffs before their entry into government and later at the time of their entry. Rosche, like Brunar, pressed as well for a united front of German non-Marxist opposition and government parties which would strengthen the German position overall. Altogether, it was a more robust and nationalistic activism. These developments led to negotiations between the German parties in government, principally the Farmers Union, and the German National Party represented by Rosche and his supporters. Other leaders of that party, unrelenting nationalists who were averse to collaboration, did not participate actively in the talks. The Czech parties in government also held back, waiting to see how events would unfold. At the same time Rosche and his supporters were determined to curtail the dominant influence of the Farmers Union in the activist camp, and instead to focus attention on the German Political Labor Office (Deutchpolitisches Arbeitsamt), a German “nonpartisan” coordinating organization dealing with minority matters which, in their view, was a more appropriate base for activist politics, acceptable for the other opposition parties and even for the Social Democrats.²⁷² None of these efforts bore fruit. Instead, the pendulum swung against Rosche within his own party. Intransigent nationalists deeply resented the direction which their party had taken under his influence and they now moved against him. On April 21– 22, the National Party leadership met and adopted a resolution that stated with regret that: “the willingness to reach understanding and work together, which despite all bad experiences the National Party still maintains, continues to find no understanding in the other German parties. With regard to the upcoming elections to the land assemblies, if it is not possible to form a single slate of at least all the German non-Marxist parties, the National Party will be forced to campaign independently. It does not fear that because the speeches and acts of the German government parties have brought about a division of the Sudeten German electorate into Czechoslovak patriots and German patriots to such an extent that the electorate will have no difficulty in deciding.” The press of other parties deduced from the wording of the resolution that the conciliatory activity of Dr. Rosche had not met with success and that radical-

 César, J. and B. Černý. Politika německých buržoazních stran …, vol. I, pp. 401– 402, 406.

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ism in the National Party was beginning one again to prevail. On April 23, Národní listy reported that a time limit had been given to Dr. Rosche for his efforts to unify all the German parties on a common basis. That time limit had expired and now it would be decided if Dr. Rosche will remain as the head of the Parliamentary Club. On April 28, Dr. Brunar, leader of the National Party, wrote an article in Norden which emphasized the efforts of his party to create a unified front for the land elections and regretted that without any fault on its part it was impossible to achieve unity.²⁷³ On July 10, 1928, Dr. Rosche announced in a farewell address in the chamber of deputies that he was surrendering his mandate. In his speech, he faulted Czech politics since the war, since it had introduced in its own country precisely the conditions which it opposed in old Austria. The politics of the Sudeten Germans, however, was most regrettable, because it presented an image of the greatest fragmentation. This was apparent also in resolving the question of whether the German parties should remain in opposition or participate in government. Agreement of all the German parties would unquestionably strengthen their position vis-à-vis the Czechs, but all the efforts of Dr. Rosche to achieve this agreement have not met with success, and that was not without the fault of his own party which in underhanded ways had thwarted his efforts. In these circumstances, Dr. Rosche could not remain in his position as president of the Deputies Club and had requested, as is well known, that he should maintain his mandate outside the party and continue in his activities. The party did not approve this solution and therefore Dr. Rosche was surrendering his mandate. Nonetheless, he maintained his principles of agreement within the nation and between the nations and would continue to work for that.²⁷⁴ Shortly thereafter Rosche announced the formation of a new political grouping, the German Labor and Economics Association (Deutsche Arbeits und Wirtschafts Gemeinschaft, DAWG) which consisted initially of the German Party of Trade, the German Democratic Freedom Party and the now independent Rosche group. The three groups had decided to merge, pressed by the needs of the Sudeten German people, and to eliminate the unfortunate consequences of partisan fragmentation. The goal of the association was to cultivate the idea of a national community of the Sudeten Germans, to support understanding within the Sudeten German parties and to work for a just settlement between the nations in the state. The groups in DAWG planned to enter the upcoming elections to the land and district assemblies with a common slate. Despite the subsequent with-

 PZSPP, Report nr. 5 of May 7, 1928. NA, PMR, K 5, 1928.  PZSPP, Report nr. 8 of July 29, 1928. NA, PMR, K 5, 1928.

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drawal of the Party of Trade, which campaigned independently in the land elections, DAWG won 122,000 votes in the Czech lands and captured two mandates in Bohemia, a remarkable success for a new party. Still, as events would show, it was their only significant success. These three events—early and serious reservations regarding activism within the ranks of the German Christian Socials and the formation of the Sudeten German Land Union and the German Labor and Economics Association, both pressing for German political unity—were not major events when looked at individually. Yet, taken together against the longer-term backdrop of repeated, if unsuccessful efforts at German political unity, they suggest a latent, untapped potential which in changed circumstances could be awakened to challenge the ascendancy of the activist parties and the German multi-party system itself. In August of 1920 German members of the State Statistical Council for Preparation of the Census complained in a letter addressed to the Prime Minister that the Council was proposing “to inquire in the upcoming census not about the mother tongue but rather about nationality directly.” Their objection was that the Council intended to create a separate Jewish nationality which, by substituting nationality for mother tongue as its criterion, had the potential to dilute the apparent number of German speakers in the population at large. The Language Law of February 29, 1920, entitled any minority which constituted 20 % or more of the population of a judicial district to use its own language in dealings with government authorities, a provision clearly based on the speaker’s mother tongue. Countries which inquire about nationality in their censuses generally recognize the mother tongue as an objective characteristic of nationality. Creation of a separate Jewish nationality without regard to mother tongue, to the extent that it attracted German speakers, could disqualify the minority population of a given judicial district from the benefits provided under the Language Law. Although the letter did not raise the issue, a separate Jewish nationality had an equal, if not even greater potential to dilute the number of Magyar speakers in judicial districts in Slovakia and Carpathian Ruthenia. Finally, the letter argued, the provision of a separate Jewish nationality was unnecessary since the questionnaire could be designed to provide respondents the opportunity to record a nationality different from the mother tongue in the same column of the census where they indicated their mother tongue. If the separate Jewish nationality was retained in the census, as proposed, no one would be in any doubt that this was done to harm the Germans and not to benefit the Jews.²⁷⁵ The letter failed to achieve the desired result and the separate Jewish na-

 Letter to Premier Vlastimil Tusar, February 3, 1921: NA, PMR, K 3285, num. ref. 736.

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tionality was introduced in the 1921 Census. The issue arose once again when preparations were under way for the 1930 Census. Dr. Antonín Boháč, who had supervised the preparation of the 1921 Census and was again assigned that task for the 1930 Census, was disturbed by the situation he confronted and appealed to Dr. Edvard Beneš. He wrote to Beneš: ”Discussions of the upcoming census have been so difficult and awkward that beyond substantive reasons, explicitly political and national views play a role. Clearly the Minister of Interior²⁷⁶ still takes the view that a German gain is our loss and vice versa. I don’t see that their representatives are going to rise to a higher level that it is more reasonable to accommodate the Germans and expand their language rights and not to conduct policy against them. “In discussions which should be guided by substantive and scientific considerations, national and political reasons are deciding. I am of the view—and act accordingly—that it is wiser to agree with Professor Rauchberg who represents the Germans than to vote in such a way that he will feel beaten nationally. I deal with him honestly and can do so the more readily in that he is substantively correct in insisting on the mother tongue. “In the last census we needlessly complicated the matter by linking nationality to the mother tongue. The views of statisticians of the school of Professor Dr. Krejčí, among whom only Dr. Auerhan was an exception, decided the issue. And then there was the effort to reduce the number of Germans and Magyars with a Jewish nationality. Thus, we turned the census into a battle over the Jews and of course there were consequences. “This year I have been successful in persuading a majority of the members of the committee that we should be consistent and that if we identify nationality with language, we should grant Jewish nationality only to those who speak [Yiddish] or Hebrew. The outcome is Professor Rauchberg’s article in Prager Tagblatt which I consider the most valuable document of the present period.” “Only the decision has the draw-back that in the heading are the words ‘Nationality/Mother Tongue’ and it should read only ‘Mother Tongue’. On the current basis the Zionists claim full recognition of the Jewish nationality, while at the Ministry of Interior Mr. Škába, the representative of the National Associations,²⁷⁷ protests that Jews are helping Germans and Magyars to qualify linguistically in some districts. Under this pressure, Section Chief Joachim, who is a member of the Subcommittee for the Census and was present at the last meeting, has ac-

 The Minister of Interior was the Slovak Agrarian Juraj Slávik.  Protective organizations for the Czech minorities in predominantly German populated border regions.

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cepted the decision in silence and has submitted an appeal to the full committee against the subcommittee’s decision so that the matter must once again be negotiated.” “I am convinced—this is not intended as flattery to you—that you are the only minister who has scientific and also objective views of these matters. Therefore, I ask that you devote a little time to the matter, study it, let the Minister of Interior understand or recommend that he talk to me—I can’t call for that over the heads of the representatives of the Ministry of Interior, Section Chief Joachim and Ministerial Counselor Dr. Prokop. Also reach agreement with Ministers Spina and Czech²⁷⁸ and let me or the office president, Dr. Auerhan, know of your decision. The Subcommittee of the Committee on the Census, as I know, will gladly accept your judgment.”²⁷⁹ How Beneš responded to this appeal is not known but, in any case, separate Jewish nationality was retained in the 1930 Census and was widely interpreted, mistakenly, as a hallmark of liberal Czechoslovak democracy. Czechs and Slovaks, on the other hand, in both censuses had only the option of a Czechoslovak nationality based on a fictional Czechoslovak language. In private correspondence President Masaryk described the functional significance of Czechoslovak nationality. He wrote: “I shall not elaborate on the concept of the nation. Clearly, the substance of nationality does not rest on language. And if the Slovaks claim to be a separate and independent nation, they do so on a basis which is political and to a certain extent cultural…. What separates Hlinka²⁸⁰ from the Czechs is not his language but his Catholicism. “It is noteworthy that, despite all the opposition of the Slovaks, no emnity toward the Slovaks has arisen among the Czechs. I see it as a sign of recognition that the Slovaks are politically necessary for us Czechs.²⁸¹ Let’s not forget that we have three million Germans in our state. That means two Czechs against one German. Germans are culturally mature and strong, because they can draw on Germany with which they are connected by language and literature. By adding two million Slovaks, we increased the political and state power vis-à-vis the Germans. Of course, the Slovaks for the time being are more prominent in statistics

 The two German ministers in the cabinet.  Memo of Antonín Boháč, State Statistical Office, to Dr. Edvard Beneš, 20.II.1930. MU (BA), EB, the Transfer. Vnitropolitické věci, 1932, #5, krabice 122.  Father Andrej Hlinka, leader of the Slovak Peoples Party, which advocated Slovak autonomy.  In a population of more than thirteen million, Czechs were half of the total, ‘Czechoslovaks’ were nearly two thirds and Germans were slightly less than one quarter.

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than in politics or culture, but it is only a question of time, when they will awaken culturally in order to more effectively resist Magyar and German cultural influence. In any case … we Czechs and Slovaks should soon merge effectively and improve ourselves culturally.”²⁸² It would have been fascinating to know, in 1921 and again in 1930, how many Czechs and Slovaks would have voluntarily accepted the new identity of Czechoslovak as opposed to those who would have chosen the more traditional identity of Czech or Slovak. That option was not offered in the Census. Appointed on October 12, 1926, the third Švehla government with the first two German ministers—the “Gentlemen’s Coalition” as the socialists chose to call it—suffered a severe setback in March of 1928 when Švehla, who was plagued with kidney ailments, suffered a relapse which prevented his participation in daily political activities and from which he never recovered sufficiently to return to active political life. His deputy, Msgr. Šrámek, leader of the Czech Christian Social Party, the second largest party in the government coalition, assumed the role of acting premier. This new situation in the government, assumed at first to be temporary, led to tensions and then conflict between the Czechoslovak Agrarians and the Christian Socials. The Castle was vigorously opposed to a Catholic party leader heading the government. Results from the first elections to the land assemblies in December of 1928 increased the tension between the two leading parties in the coalition. The Czechoslovak Agrarians gained significantly in votes, while the Christian Socials incurred a strong setback. Czechoslovak Social Democracy also made sharp gains and immediately called for fresh parliamentary elections. Finally, on February 1, 1929, Švehla submitted his resignation and President Masaryk appointed the Agrarian Minister of National Defense, František Udržal, as the new Premier. Aside from the premiership itself, the new government did not differ in composition from its predecessor and the new dispensation brought no lessening of tensions within the coalition. For the Germans in government, the new leadership brought no improvement in their standing among their colleagues. On February 22, the semi-official Prager Presse reported that, on the previous day, an important meeting took place in Parliament of “some sort of narrower coalition committee” which consisted of representatives of the Agrarians, the Christian Socials, the National Democrats and the Party of Trade.²⁸³ Minister Dr. Šrámek,  Letter from President Masaryk to Professor V. Chaloupecký, November 19, 1930: AÚTGM, f. TGM, Korespondence II, část 78.  Bradáč for the Agrarian’s, Dolanský for the Christian Socials, Kramář for the National Democrats and Mlčoch for the Party of Trade.

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president of the Christian Social Party, also attended. The ongoing government program and the means of resolving important issues were discussed. There was also talk of new elections and their possible date, since that would naturally determine which matters in the government program should be carried out first. The Prager Presse noted explicitly that the German government parties and the Slovak Peoples Party were not represented in the discussions.²⁸⁴ On the following day the Právo lidu, the newspaper of Czechoslovak Social Democracy, also carried a report of the special committee, said to be called the “powerful four”. In this, the paper found further evidence of disarray in the coalition camp so that clearly, it held, there would be fresh elections in the autumn. Tensions did not abate. Finally, in September of 1929, two simultaneous, but separate developments brought about the collapse of the government. The first was a crisis within the Slovak Peoples Party and the second, an intensification of the conflict between the Czechoslovak Agrarians and the Christian Socials. At the New Year of 1928, an article appeared in Slovak, the newspaper of the Slovak Peoples Party, written by the paper’s editor, Vojtěch Tuka, which became widely known as “Vacuum iuris (An Absence of Law)”. Tuka, a confidant of the party leader Hlinka and a leading ideologist of the party, claimed that there was a secret codicil to the Declaration of St. Martin, by which the Slovaks declared their adherence to the new Czechoslovak state on October 30, 1918. This codicil allegedly put a ten-year term on the validity of the Declaration so that, Tuka claimed, on October 31, 1928, the Czechoslovak Constitution, the laws of the state and the authority of all government officials would come to an end and Slovaks once again would be free to decide their fate. The article engendered a raging controversy and a firestorm of criticism from Czech and Czechoslovak publications. Charges of treason were raised in Parliament and, in December, 1928, a criminal investigation was launched. The following month, Tuka was detained and charged with plotting against the Republic and with military treason. His trial opened in August, 1929. As it proceeded, the leadership of the Slovak Peoples Party grew increasingly nervous. On September 17, Hlinka met with Premier Udržal and said that his party would draw the necessary conclusions if the verdict went against Tuka.²⁸⁵ Against this backdrop, a new situation arose which further weakened the government coalition. When Udržal assumed the premiership in February of 1929, he had also retained the post of Minister of National Defense, but with

 Presidium zemského úřadu v Praze (PZUP) report no. 3 of March 12, 1929: NA, PMR, K 6, 1929.  Klepetař, H. Seit 1918 …, p. 276.

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time the burden of the two offices proved overtaxing. In mid September, Udržal indicated his intention to resign from the Defense Ministry and called for his replacement by the Agrarian Deputy Dr. Karel Viškovský. On September 18, Lidové listy, the newspaper of the Czech Christian Socials, objected that appointing an Agrarian to replace Udržal at the Defense Ministry would upset the balance of representation by the parties in the government. The Agrarians responded that they had originally held the premiership and three ministries. Only Švehla’s illness had brought about a change and the appointment of Viškovský would restore the original arrangement. When the Christian Socials persisted in their objections, Udržal, with the support of his party leadership, recommended that President Masaryk dissolve Parliament and call fresh elections. On September 25, Masaryk dissolved Parliament and elections were called for October 27, 1929. On October 5, the district court in Bratislava found Tuka guilty of both charges, plotting against the republic and military treason, and sentenced him to fifteen years in prison.²⁸⁶ In the midst of active campaigning, the Slovak Peoples Party withdrew its two ministers from the government in response, and left the government coalition. In the first elections to the land assemblies in the previous year, the government had lost ground to the opposition parties and it was anticipated that the trend would continue in the parliamentary vote in 1929. This happened. Although the Czechoslovak Agrarian Party, on a common slate with the DAWG, maintained the commanding position it had attained in the 1925 parliamentary elections— even winning one new seat, the old government coalition lost its parliamentary majority. By contrast, the socialists gained sharply, the Czechoslovak Social Democrats strengthening their parliamentary representation from twenty-nine to thirty-nine seats and the National Socialists from twenty-eight to thirty-two. By all indications the election results would bring the socialists back into government. Anticipating the outcome, Masaryk wrote to Udržal on October 16 regarding the formation of a new government: “I conceive of the post-election procedure as follows: first to reach agreement with the biggest parties, that is Agrarians, Social Democrats, National Socialists, Christian Socials. Agree on the coalition and the program in its main outlines. Here you will have the core of the coalition and it is our core, Czech.” Masaryk made no mention of the German parties until he came to naming individual ministers. Here, the advice sounds more like instructions.

 PZUP report no. 11 of November 22, 1929: NA, PMR, K 5, 1929.

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He named ten ministers which he described as certain. Of these ten, eight were appointed to the new government.²⁸⁷ The negotiations did not proceed smoothly. Udržal was uncertain of his course. He began in the traditional manner, meeting with the Czech Social Democrat Antonín Hampl, leader of the second largest party. Hampl indicated that the willingness of the Social Democrats to enter government was dependent on the program which the government adopted. With that, Udržal took an entirely new tack in his negotiations, exploring the possibility of resurrecting the Gentlemen’s Coalition which would again exclude the socialists from government. This effort consumed time, but led nowhere. In the fourth week of negotiations Udržal, once again with Hampl, adopted a different approach. He tried to persuade the Social Democrats to break with their German comrades. Hampl responded by asking why the Agrarians didn’t break with the German Farmers Union. Udržal replied that possibly the Peoples Party would break with the German Christian Socials. One could return to the all-national coalition. The coalition would then have the backing of 170 deputies even without the Slovak Peoples Party. Hampl was not enthusiastic about the proposal, but on principle he did not reject it outright. On November 21, Udržal presented his proposal to President Masaryk who strenuously objected to excluding the Germans without reason when they had already entered government willingly. Two days later the Czechoslovak Social Democrats announced they would not enter a purely Czech government. On November 24, Masaryk invited Udržal and Foreign Minister Beneš to the President’s country residence at Lany where, apparently, the general plan of the new government was worked out. The government would include the Germans. In order to achieve a balance between socialist and non-socialist parties, the Slovak Peoples Party was eliminated along with the German Christian Socials.²⁸⁸ On December 7, 1929 the new government was installed. The new coalition emerged with 209 Deputies, with only ninety-one votes in the opposition. As a result, the thirty-seven votes of the three German parties— the Social Democracy, the Farmers Union and the DAWG—were not needed for a government majority. Consequently, the status of the Germans in the coalition declined further. At the same time, all five parties of the old Pětka were again in government. Most striking in the long drawn-out process of forming this new government was Udržal’s proposal to restore the all-national coalition. Clearly, he saw no special value in German activism. Such was the character

 Nečásek, F. Dokumenty o protilidové …, pp. 213 – 215.  Klepetař, H. Seit 1918 …, pp. 285 – 287.

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of leadership at the pinnacle of Czech political life for three years, from February of 1929 to December of 1932, during which František Udržal served as Premier of two successive governments. On September 29, 1932, Senator Franz Křepek, the senior statesman of the German Farmers Union, visiting the summer residence of the President in Slovakia, asked President Masaryk to induce Premier Udržal to get the Czech Agrarians to enter into warmer relations with the German Agrarians, since otherwise Spina’s position would be threatened. Masaryk instructed Chancellor Šámal to bring the matter to the attention of the Premier.²⁸⁹ Shortly after its installation in December 7, 1929, Deputy Bruno Kafka, responding to the program of the second Udržal government, addressed Parliament on behalf of the DAWG, which had campaigned on a common slate with the German Farmers Union and with it, for a time, formed a common deputies’ club in the new Parliament. Kafka declared: “The future will teach us through the deeds of the government whether our expectations were justified or remain unfulfilled. If it is a question of an honorably intended unity government which seeks to realize the great ideas of unity by taking into account the interests of all the nations inhabiting this state and all the elements of the population, it appears to us to be our duty to support this government in carrying out its tasks. Should it appear, however, that only a veiled all-national coalition has been formed or that only the needs of certain elements of the population find understanding, then there will no longer be a place for us in this majority to which we now belong….²⁹⁰ Less than a year later, on October 12th, 1930, the DAWG held a special meeting of its executive committee in Prague with the participation of all the party’s deputies and senators. The topic of the meeting was the general political situation and its consequences for the party. After several hours of discussion, a resolution was unanimously adopted that the government did not address the thoroughly justified interests of the middle class and even prepared further measures threatening business, trade and industry with heavy, new burdens. With the equal bitterness, it had to be said that even under the new government the burning national problem was no nearer to its resolution. On the contrary, authoritative figures of Czech public life had been caught up in a new wave of enmity toward everything German. The executive committee considered it intolerable that, without substantive changes in these conditions, the parliamentary faction should continue to remain in the government majority and bear a part of the re-

 AKPR, T 12/25, část V.  Nittner, E. Dokumente zur sudetendeutsche Frage …, num ref. 68b, p. 120.

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sponsibility for this system. The parliamentary representatives of the party were duly notified that—while continuing to adhere to the basic line of a positive approach to the state and a constant readiness for sincere agreement with the Czech nation—they should act according to the view of the executive committee and before the vote on the state budget, they should make the necessary decisions after prior discussion with both the other German majority parties and with the Premier as the leader of the present coalition.²⁹¹ On November 23, the executive committee of the DAWG met again in Prague and reaffirmed its decision of October 12. As a consequence, the party opened negotiations with the German Farmers Union to redefine the terms of their parliamentary collaboration. On November 28, deputy Dr. Kafka announced in the budget committee that, with the transformation of relations with the Farmers Union, the DAWG would leave the camp of the government majority and be relieved thereby of all responsibility for the actions of the present government. The party, of course, would not intend to use the freedom acquired to carry out opposition at any cost but rather would continue to devote itself to the interests of the German people in this state and particularly to the justified interests of the German middle class.²⁹² In view of the fact that the Grand Coalition enjoyed a majority of 209 votes in an assembly with 300 deputies, the loss of four votes could be dismissed as a minor event. Yet in 1930, with the German National Socialist Workers Party gaining popular support only months before new local elections, the departure from the government majority of the diminutive DAWG, the German Labor and Economics Association, could also be perceived as sounding an alarm. In the new Republic, there was the special situation of the Czech minorities, a people with a particularly deep sense of historical grievance, who were interspersed among the German population in the border regions of the Czech lands. In the old monarchy, the Germans in the border regions controlled the administration, the soil, factories, and enterprises. In a word, they had power. An effort was already underway in the 1870s to defend the Czech minorities. Although modest at the outset, it picked up pace with the establishment of the Central Educational Foundation (Ústřední matice školská) shortly after the appearance in 1880 of the German School Union (Schulverein). The decade of the 1880s saw the further establishment of defensive National Associations in Šumava in northern Bohemia, and in Olomouc and Brno in Moravia. As Czech minorities grew with the influx of miners, industrial workers, and agricultural laborers on

 PZUP report no. 12, December 9, 1930: NA, PMR, K 5, 1930.  PZUP report no. 13, January 29, 1931: NA, PMR, K 5, 1930.

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large landed estates, these institutions struggled to assure their legal rights. Meanwhile, the Central Educational Foundation fostered schooling for Czech children in their own national language. Still, more than 100,000 children of Czech nationality had to attend German schools in 1914 because there were no Czech schools for them.²⁹³ One account of this aspect of Czech-German relations, records held that: “a view of our prewar nationality map was in no way pleasing. A belt, broad in places, encircled the inner regions of Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia. This belt denoted the mixed territories where the Germans or, as the case might be, the Poles were masters. Still more, several foreign linguistic islands were notched into our flesh…. Now we can look upon the years that have passed since the revolution with some satisfaction. We did not achieve what the most enthusiastic of our people had wished after the revolution, but nonetheless we see that territory which was formerly Germanized has changed in our favor. Today a glance at the nationality map is much more tolerable, although of course far from satisfying if we think of the future. But in fairness let us admit: the work done since the revolution has born results.” At the same time the progress achieved since the Revolution had not come without its disappointments: “Land reform! When this slogan first appeared after the revolution, what hopes were tied to it! Also, among our border dwellers. Many a person saw in it the magic wand with the help of which everything in the Germanized territories would be changed with the stroke of a hand. Those who expected this were disappointed.”²⁹⁴ Contrary to the expectations of many, the prewar national associations did not go out of business after the Revolution, but remained active on behalf of the Czech minorities. A major issue in the new setting for them, as for the country as a whole, was to find a proper balance between the legitimate wish to undo the worst from the bitter legacy of the past and at the same time to recognize the legitimate needs of the Germans, now toppled from their former position of privilege. This was no easy task. For the National Democrats who found a political “happy hunting ground” among the Czech minorities, the question of balance did not even arise. On the occasion of a general conference of the national associations in 1922, Národní Demokracie, a newspaper of the National Democrats, wrote that: “the nation must say what sort of state it wishes, which it has purchased with its  Dvoršák, Jan, and Rudolf Stranský. “Idea československého státu a naši hraničáři”, in Kapras, Jan, et al., eds. Idea československého státu (Praha: Vydala Na´rodni´ rada československa´, 1936), vol. II, pp. 261– 262.  Dvoršák, J., and R. Stranský. “Idea československého státu …”, pp. 273 – 275.

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blood and sacrifices, whether it wishes a national or a nationality state, whether it approves of a Germanophile politics which irresponsibly gives the Germans important positions in the Land Office and the like in reward for their anti-state agitation, which seeks the implementation of the regional system which is nationally so disastrous for us and which goes so far that it leaves people hostile to us and who do not know our language in the most important positions in the political administration, the courts, the postal service, the revenue offices, etc., solely so that the Germans will not be irritated and feel themselves oppressed. In other words, to put it clearly, we will let our people continue to be oppressed, ridiculed, neglected and persecuted, because the Germans will see an abridgment of their rights if we intervene and silence them.”²⁹⁵ Two years later on the occasion of the general assembly of the National Association of Northern Bohemia, the National Democratic leader, Karel Kramář, returned to the theme. He wrote: “At the Peace Conference, there were those who wished to pare away from our lands a large part of our Germanized regions in accordance with the right of self-determination, but nonetheless in the end, a thousand years of history and our oppressed minorities prevailed. We cannot reverse the history of centuries of violence overnight. We cannot overcome, as quickly as we are asked to, centuries of Viennese influence and German dominance nor the profound changes caused by worldwide economic setbacks in the balance of power and wealth in industry and agriculture. All that will require perseverance, firm will, and above all the self-confidence of our state for many years to come, but our state must also support this process of reversal with all its authority.”²⁹⁶ At the time of Czechoslovak independence one third of the territory of Bohemia was owned by one hundred and fifty families. The concentration of land in the possession of the nobility in Slovakia was even more pronounced. In the months after independence, land hunger and the demands for land reform were so intense that they affected virtually every party in the Revolutionary National Assembly. On April 16, 1919, the Law Providing for Expropriation was enacted. It provided that landowners were liable for requisitioning if they possessed more than 150 hectares²⁹⁷ of arable land or 250 hectares of all kinds of land. In June, new legislation created the Land Office which was to administer the reform and was answerable to the government as a whole rather than the Ministry of Agriculture. The law also established a committee, its members se-

 Národní Demokracie [newspaper], April 1, 1922.  Národní listy, June 7, 1924.  One hectare equals 2.471 acres.

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lected by Parliament, which was to act in a supervisory capacity, but actually authorized actions of the Land Office and frequently intervened when it disapproved of actions under consideration. This governing board consisted of twelve members, Czechs and Slovaks, representing political parties on the basis of the returns from local elections held in June of 1919, the first free elections since the Revolution. The German parties that had participated in these elections, were not represented on the board. From the outset, not surprisingly, land reform was a highly politicized undertaking. It remained so until the end.²⁹⁸ In its official statements, the Land Office emphasized the social and economic benefits of reform. For example, the introduction to Preliminary Results of the Land Reform, published in 1930 when the redistribution of arable land was largely completed, states that: “by reducing the number and size of the great estates, the reform strengthens family agricultural enterprises and thereby alters the social conditions of our agriculture, because it limits wage labor in favor of a better and fuller utilization of the workforce of the small and medium farmer’s family. The institution of private property is strengthened and the extent of tenancy (small and large scale) is reduced.”²⁹⁹ There is no mention of nationality. On the other hand, the mayor of Prague, Karel Baxa, defending the reform against French critics, argued that “it is simply a matter of soil in the German border regions which was stolen from the Czech nation 300 years ago.”³⁰⁰ More authoritatively, due to his position in government and perhaps also to his choice of words, the Minister of Finance, Dr. Alois Rašín, described the land reform in the Budget Committee in December, 1920, as “the greatest task through which we will rectify everything performed by the Habsburgs after the Battle of the White Mountain and give the land back to our nation”.³⁰¹ For the farmer who received land, the benefits of reform were clear, but the popular rationale justifying land redistribution as the redress of historical grievances from the past was very much open to question. In 1618, a large part of the nobility of the Czech lands revolted against the ruling Habsburg monarch, Ferdinand II. Two years later Habsburg forces defeated them at the Battle of the White Mountain and, in retribution for their revolt, nearly three quarters of the noble lands—Czech and German—were confiscated. Their former owners

 Textor, Lucy. Land Reform in Czechoslovakia (London: Allen and Unwin, 1923), pp. 57– 58.  Voženílek, Jan. Předběžné výsledky pozemkové reformy: Země česká a moravsko-slezská (Praha: Selbstverl., 1930).  Pekař, Josef. Omyly a nebezpečí pozemkové reformy (Praha: “Vesmi´r”, nakladatelska´ a vydavatelska´ společnost s r.o., 1923), p. 9.  Cornwall, Mark. “‘National Reparation’?: The Czech Land Reform and the Sudeten Germans, 1918 – 38”. The Slavonic and the East European Review 75 – 2 (April 1997): 268.

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fled or were driven into exile. In his criticism of the land reform, the conservative Czech historian, Josef Pekař, who on historical and philosophical grounds opposed the reform except on a most limited scale, pointed out that in large part the confiscated lands passed through purchase into the possession of nobles of old, established Czech families. The new nobility at its core were not principled and original partisans of Ferdinand II, but rather had been active or passive supporters of the revolt, many among them Catholic. On the other hand, lands of families that remained loyal to the Habsburg monarchy and the Catholic faith were not confiscated.³⁰² In 1634, still in the reign of Ferdinand II, land confiscations arising from the Wallenstein conspiracy did pass largely into the possession of foreign noble families, perhaps half as gifts for loyal service to the Emperor. The large influx of foreign nobility began with the end of the Thirty Years War, and by the end of the 18th century nearly two thirds of the land in Bohemia was in the possession of foreign nobility.³⁰³ The process continued with the Germanization of many Czech noble families and the extinction of family lines, when property passed into the possession of new owners by inheritance or purchase. There were also offsetting developments, foreign nobles who took root and began to identify with their adopted land. Whatever the merits of the historical argument, a major transformation had taken place in the Czech lands, but the land upon which it was based had never belonged to the people or the nation in the modern sense of the word. Throughout, the land in question largely belonged to the nobility. One unstated, but commonly recognized mission of the Land Office was to increase the electoral support of the Agrarian Party among rural Czech and Slovak voters. This mission was carried out with great success. From the 1925 onward, the Agrarian Party was the leading, if not the dominant party in all parliamentary government coalitions. Land reform was a major factor in the growth of the party’s membership and electoral support. At the outset the German Farmers Union opposed land reform on the grounds that the Peace Conference had not yet established the borders of the new state. When the Law Providing for Expropriation was enacted, however, the Farmers Union urged that appointments to the Land Office should be based on the results of the local elections in June 1919. This was done as it applied to the Czech and Slovak parties represented in the Revolutionary National Assembly, but to their dismay the Germans found themselves entirely excluded from the Land Office and its governing board. The board was to be named

 Pekař, J. Omyly a nebezpečí pozemkové reformy, pp. 6, 9.  Pekař, J. Omyly a nebezpečí pozemkové reformy, pp. 69, 11.

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every three years, but no German was ever appointed, not even after 1926 when German activist ministers entered the government. German representation in the Land Office had been a frequent political demand. Not even in the depths of the Depression, when most of the arable and forest land had already been distributed, was any German included in the administration of the land reform. The consequences are not surprising. As of January 1, 1937 (the Land Office had closed in 1935), 48,820 German farm families had received 57,270 hectares (4.5 % of the land allotted).³⁰⁴ Had the nationality key been applied, they would have received five times as much. Hundreds of thousands of German farm family members would have been given a stake in the new Republic which they were never given in the old monarchy. Here a legitimate point is made that the German economy in Czechoslovakia was highly industrialized and that far more Czechs and Slovaks were engaged in agriculture than Germans. Yet, there was no shortage of land for allotment. Of the 4,066,221 hectares of land which were requisitioned for the reform 1,795,227 hectares (44.1 %) were returned to the original owners and 227,186 hectares (5.6 %) were diverted in the form of remainder estates for political purposes.³⁰⁵ Despite the presence of German activist ministers in government from 1926 onward the needs of the German farmer and the need to integrate a multiethnic society were never priorities of Czechoslovak land reform.

 Luža, Radomír. The Transfer of the Sudeten Germans (New York: New York University Press, 1964), p. 11.  Luža, R., The Transfer of the Sudeten Germans, pp. 10 – 11.

Chapter 8 The End of the Affair The worldwide economic crisis came late to Czechoslovakia. In 1930, the first year of major downturn, the number of unemployed at the beginning of the year stood at 73,000, but that number more than tripled by the year’s end. By January of 1933, the depths of the Czechoslovak Depression and the month Hitler came to power in neighboring Germany, unemployment had swollen to 872,000, thereafter fluctuating erratically and tapering only gradually.³⁰⁶ Economic deprivation and outright misery were constants of the 1930s, concentrated especially in the German areas of settlement where the rate of unemployment was more than twice the level of the Czech interior. With the exception of coal mining, German industry was export oriented and heavily dependent upon the sale of luxury goods in foreign markets that declined especially sharply. The economic situation became a driving force behind the transformation of German politics. Against the backdrop of deteriorating economic conditions there occurred an event in 1930 which contributed to the embitterment of Czech-German relations —street riots in Prague over German sound films. The issue was highly symbolic, a common phenomenon in ethnic conflict. On the evening of September 23, 1930, a crowd of young people gathered in front of the Avion Cinema in Prague demonstrating against the German sound film, The Immortal Rogue, which had opened a few days before, and another German sound film, Two Hearts in Three Four Time, which was already in its 17th week and a runaway box office hit, attracting not only German but Czech viewers as well. When police dispersed the demonstration, the crowd went first to the Palais Lucerna and then to Wenceslas Square chanting “Long Live Slavic Prague” and “Down with German Films”. The crowd passed on to Old Town Square, the Grave of the Unknown Soldier and the Passage Cinema. On the following day the crowds were larger and the demonstrations began earlier. In the morning, the Avion Cinema announced that two controversial scenes in The Immortal Rogue would be cut, but by afternoon the evening performance was canceled altogether. Cancellations followed at three other theaters, and Jewish firms in Dlouhy Street were targeted by the demonstrators. Finally, the crowd turned against a Czech language newspaper, České Slovo, based on the rumor that the paper had recommended the German films. In

 Jakub. Odvrácená tvář meziválečné prosperity: Nezaměstnanost v Československu v letech 1918 – 1938 (Praha: Karolinum, 2008), Table 12, p. 275, and Table 13, p. 348. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110749885-011

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the morning, the German Deputy, Prof. Kafka, went to the police command and received assurances that the police would take “every necessary defensive measure”. By contrast, the Mayor of Prague, Dr. Baxa, intervened at the Ministry of Interior demanding “measures against the misuse of German films for national demonstrations”. On the fourth day of rioting, České Slovo and the German House were targeted. The police advanced with fixed bayonets against the demonstrators who shouted at them: “You Czechs are going against us Czechs. We are defending Czech Prague against the Germans.” By evening many people had been arrested. The police “estimated the number of demonstrators at six thousand”. In Parliament many Czech deputies expressed their regrets over the events and were visibly disturbed by the remarks of the German speakers. The fourth day was the turning point. On the fifth day mounted police armed with bayonets swarmed into Wenceslas Square and nipped potential demonstrations in the bud. The Foreign Minister, Dr. Beneš, expressed his regrets to the German Ambassador. Again by contrast, the Prague Mayor, Dr. Baxa, signed a resolution of the City Council which greeted “the worthy demonstrations … in defense of Slavic Prague”, while calling for an end to demonstrations. The statements of the right-wing deputies, Gajda, Pergler and Stříbrný, and the press which they controlled, demonstrated that they fully supported the actions of the rioters, if they did not actually engineer them. No one was held accountable for the events. Those convicted were teenagers or young men in their early 20s. They were charged with such offenses as unlawful assembly, slandering the police, malicious damage to property and violation of the gun law. Reports of the anti-German rioting in Prague spread far and wide among the German population of the country and left their mark.³⁰⁷ The early 1930s were a period of intense radicalization among the Germans of Czechoslovakia. It affected every German political party and broader social organizations, most of which were already nationalist in orientation. It reflected the spiraling unemployment and outright misery which were especially intense in the German territories of the country. The younger generation was profoundly affected. Many had returned from the war to find the Germans a minority in the new Republic and political power firmly in Czech hands. Many of these young men were averse to parliamentary politics, to the wheeling and dealing of the political parties and the frequent compromise of “principle” which is the basis of productive legislation. They preferred the orderly discipline and decisive leadership which they had experienced in the military. When they did turn to politics in

 Becher, Peter. “Kulturpolitische Konflichtherde in der ersten Republik … ”.

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the early 1930s, they were drawn, above all, to the German National Socialist Workers Party (DNSAP), but the intense radicalization extended also to the other political parties and especially to the youthful members of those parties. The greatest beneficiary in terms of voter support in this period of ferment and unrest was the DNSAP which was radicalized and transformed under the influence of events in Germany. The party, which was founded years before the German National Socialist Party and enjoyed its own tradition of parliamentary activity and radical labor support, now became an appendage of its bigger German brother. The German National Party (DNP) underwent a similar radicalization, embracing the pan-German ideal, annexation to Germany and many of the trappings of German National Socialism. Under increasing pressure from his radical wing, Heinrich Brunar, who succeeded to the party leadership in 1925 when Lodgman withdrew from active politics, stepped down as head of the party in August of 1931, and in March of 1932, left the party altogether. But the sharp swing to the right did not help the DNP. In the local elections, which were conducted piecemeal over the period 1931– 1933, it lost votes to the DNSAP. The rapid growth of the DNSAP into a major German party reflected the radicalization of the German population, but also new methods of recruitment under the leadership of Hans Krebs. In the years before 1930, the party leadership was content to conduct its organizational efforts in the old democratic way. In 1930, large rallies began to be held on the German National Socialist model in all the major provincial cities on the same day. It was the beginning of the effort to build a mass party. For the first time on “People’s Day in Falkenau”, party members wore brown uniforms and appeared in formations of 10,000 demonstrating for autonomy. It marked the beginning of a new period clearly under the influence of the German National Socialist movement. On September 28, 1930, three deputies from the German Reichstag were present at the party conference of the DNSAP. Under the title of Hitler’s governor in Silesia, Gauleiter Brücknner-Breslau spoke. He promised that “we will never forget the Sudeten German people and know that they belong to the great German national community and will return to it.” Also in September of 1930, Deputies Jung, Krebs and others were active as speakers in the German elections to the Reichstag, which clearly demonstrates the close ties that already existed at that date. Under the propaganda and organizational leadership of Deputy Krebs, the systematic buildup of the entire party organization began with the goal of becoming the largest Sudeten German party. In the spring of 1931, large demonstrations for autonomy were held in even more German provincial towns. Although the party grew rapidly, misgivings arose in the party leadership regarding Krebs as the one who had introduced German National Socialist meth-

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ods, which were gradually proving to be harmful and were closely watched by Czech authorities. On January 1, 1932, Krebs was removed from his position and replaced by a successor. Nonetheless, Krebs repeatedly intervened in the recruitment process thereafter. In the spring of 1932, demonstrations against the widespread economic misery were introduced. The party continued to grow, but a rift began to emerge in party leadership.³⁰⁸ Viewed exclusively in terms of building party support, the recruitment methods introduced by Krebs were clearly effective. In 1929, in the parliamentary elections the DNSAP garnered 204,000 votes. Two years later, based on partial returns, the party gained well over 300,000 votes according to official estimates, and the party spokesman spoke of 400,000 votes. Whatever was the case, the party had gained substantially. The largest party previously, the German Social Democrats, had won some 507,000 votes in 1929, but in local elections it lost votes substantially to the DNSAP more than a year before Hitler came to power. The claim of the DNSAP that it was becoming the largest German party had to be taken seriously.³⁰⁹ For the authorities it was one thing for the German vote to be divided between five different parties and quite another to be concentrating in support of an irredentist party which was closely allied to the government of National Socialist Germany. In the local elections, every German party lost votes to the DNSAP and the loss of votes forced them to respond. At the same time, the activist parties were also affected by the increasing severity of the economic crisis which threatened their basic appeal with the voters—the promise through participation in government to improve the situation of the German population. These developments, taken together, marked the beginning of the transformation of the German electorate. As already seen, the DAWG (German Labor and Economics Association) left the government majority in November of 1930. In the spring of 1932, the Party of Trade followed suit. In both cases, they remained loyal to the government and the state, but reserved the right to criticize government actions they opposed. The increasing chauvinism of Czech Agrarians, the nearly exclusive focus of the Agrarian Party on the economic needs of agriculture, often at the expense of middle class interests, and its dismissal of German activist national demands contributed to their departure, but the German voter’s increasing nationalism and radicalization was an important factor, too.

 Die Entwicklung der DNSAP, 1930 – 1933,1– 3, Opis k č. 19.146/1933 Presidium Ministerstva Vnitra, AKPR, T 12/25-V. část.  Klimek, A., Velke´ dějiny zemi´ Koruny česke´ …, vol. XIV, p. 126.

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The DCV (German Christian People’s Party, Christian Socials) was also in a difficult situation. After only three years in government, it found itself once again in opposition. It had to defend itself against the rejectionist parties while at the same time attacking the German parties in government in order to carve for itself a clear identity and win back the voters it had lost in recent elections. At the first party conference in opposition, the DCV adopted the role of constructive opposition, but this policy came under fire from critics in the party rank and file. In January of 1931, the Deutsche Presse, a newspaper close to the party, wrote that it was now necessary to make clear to the electorate without restraint the harm that was done to the population by the present system. The party conference in October of the same year called for a frontal attack on the German parties in government. Robert Mayr-Harting, who had served as Minister of Justice in the third Švehla government, found himself in an awkward position as the criticism mounted. In the run-up to the party conference, he told Chancellor Šámal that he intended to end his political activities, because he saw no chance for success in the foreseeable future. Nonetheless, the party continued the new policy and Mayr-Harting continued to play a leading role in the party.³¹⁰ The German Social Democrats faced a different situation than the bourgeois activist parties. The mounting unemployment and the misery of labor in general left little doubt about the value of government participation. Instead, the party moved closer to the Czech Social Democrats (DSAP) who, in turn, came forward to support their national concerns. The first small step was a government ordinance providing for the care and tutelage of orphaned children according to their nationality. The step itself was small, but the willingness of a Czech party to support a measure based on nationality was symbolically important. Far more important was the amendment of the DSAP party program, adopted at a party conference in September of 1930, which placed new stress on minority policy. The party was now prepared to offer the minorities cultural autonomy. It was the first Czech party to support a major German national demand.³¹¹ Despite these gains the German Social Democrats faced a different challenge which severely limited their prospects on both national and economic issues—a coalition dominated by the bourgeois parties. The conflict between the nonMarxist parties and the socialist bloc was constant and rendered the government nearly inoperable. The increasing chauvinism of the Czech Agrarians was especially troublesome. German Social Democratic leaders pointed to the problemat-

 Kracik, J. Die Politik des deutschen Aktivismus …, pp. 212– 214.  Kracik, J. Die Politik des deutschen Aktivismus …, pp, 217– 218.

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ic nature of government participation and warned its members against great expectations.³¹² The German Farmers Union (BdL) did not enjoy the same support from the Czech Agrarians as did the German Social Democrats from their Czech partners, nor the same unity within their ranks regarding party policy. In October 1930, Spina confided to Chancellor Šámal that only with great difficulty had he been able to hold his ground against the pressure from the opposition within the party. In the party, there was even thought of leaving government and going into opposition.³¹³ At a national party conference in June of 1931, Spina gave vent to an uncharacteristic, but now more common expression of frustration with the Czech parties in the government coalition: “With regard to national politics, statements from the Czech Agrarian camp have been heard favoring justified German school demands and opposing the politics of chicanery, but they have had almost no impact on the other Czech civic parties. And here it must be frankly said that concern for the development of economic matters stands now at the forefront of interest and will for a long time to come, but the cardinal state issue remains the national problem. Germans have already been five years in government, and it is understandable that they would be glad to see some success in this regard. Well grounded pessimism is incompatible with remaining in government, but with all patience it is clear that developments are proceeding too slowly. And yet it must at some time come to a resolution and after long years of German activist collaboration in the state it cannot be put off for too long.”³¹⁴ Spina spoke against a backdrop of increasing radicalization of the German voter and the growing appeal of the National Socialist Party. In February of 1932, the government issued a ban against the National Socialists’ ‘Volkssport’ (VS, People’s Sports or Sports for the Masses) and the affiliated Student Union. The instigator behind the Volkssport was Deputy Hans Krebs, who had introduced National Socialist methods into the party’s recruitment program. In 1929, Krebs had urged the establishment of the Volkssport and the party leadership had given their approval to its statutes. Those statutes described the purpose of the organization as “cultivating and promoting touring, cycling, games and sports of all types,” but this was merely a façade. In reality, the Volkssport was a paramilitary organization modeled on the SA (Sturmabteilung [Storm Troopers]) of the ruling National Socialist Party in

 Kracik, J. Die Politik des deutschen Aktivismus …, p. 221.  Kracik, J. Die Politik des deutschen Aktivismus …, p. 210.  PZUP report no. 4, June 23, 1931: NA, PMR, K 5, 1931.

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Germany, and it worked in close collaboration with the SA. Its members wore uniforms—service dress, light parade uniform, full parade uniform and concealed service dress—which were subject to monthly inspection with all members required to be present. Officers wore insignia on their caps and the collars of their shirts. Training covered a wide range of weapons, with rocks or wooden models standing in for air guns, rifles and grenades in field maneuvers. For mock combat training in the field, German army practices were adopted. On frequent occasions, members crossed the border into Germany to participate in military exercises there and SA members came into Czechoslovakia to join in field maneuvers.³¹⁵ The Volksssport was a military force in training to be held in abeyance until needed. An investigation of the Volkssport and the Student Union found seven people chiefly responsible for its activities. On May 25, 1932, all seven—four of them students—were charged under the Defense Law with preparing attacks against the Republic. On August 8, their trial began in Brno. All seven were found guilty and sentenced to prison terms of varying duration, the longest being three years. The charge document concluded that “members of the Volkssport in Czechoslovakia were in constant contact with members of the SA in Germany and that they actually formed a militarily organized, organic component of Hitler’s Sturmabteilung (SA) in Germany … the goal of both parties was the same, that is, the unification of all Germans in a single, so-called ‘Third Reich’”.³¹⁶ On September 24, 1932, the day the verdict was delivered, there was a meeting in Brno of Deputies and Senators of the German National Socialist Party, Deputy Gustav Peters for the German Economics Association, Deputy Zajíček for the German Christian Social Party and the Rector of the German University in Prague, Mariano San Nicolo. The purpose of the meeting was to discuss the verdict in the Volkssport trial. Deputy Jung, leader of the National Socialist Party, declared that: “not only were the accused convicted by the verdict, but the entire National Socialist Party was convicted as well. The party must be prepared that the government will intervene against it and it must be prepared, should it be dissolved, to continue its activities under another name.”³¹⁷ In December, 1932, the authorities, acting on the basis of the verdict in the Volksssport trial, brought charges in the district court in Prague against five National Socialist Deputies: Jung, Krebs, Schubert, Kasper and Knirsch. The charges  “Zemské vojenské velitelství v Praze”; report delivered to Chancellor Šámal by General Chalupa on July 27, 1932: AKPR, T 12/ 25 – Část IV.  Klepetař, H. Seit 1918 …, pp. 315 – 317.  Ministry of the Interior to the Presidential Chancellery, September 26, 1932, no. 224/32: AKPR T 12/25, část V.

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under the Defense Law were preparing attacks against the Republic. The Chamber of Deputies was asked to lift their immunity. All five were involved in varying capacities in the activities and funding of the Volkssport. What Jung had anticipated in the meeting of September 24 was coming to pass. On February 23, 1933, the immunity of four Deputies—Jung, Krebs, Schubert and Kasper—was lifted. In the case of Knirsch, the district court requested more documentation. A week later, on March 1st, the district court ordered the arrest of the four deputies. Jung and Kasper, who faced lesser charges, were released on their own recognizance pending completion of the investigation. Out of custody, Jung resumed his efforts to establish an organization in which members of the DNSAP could find a safe haven and continue their political activities under a new name. In June, Krebs was released on bond and joined these efforts. He had in mind a popular front embracing all the German nonMarxist parties. The German Social Democrats were not taken into consideration, because they refused to join any organization dominated by bourgeois parties. In September of 1933, the German National Socialist Party formally proposed to all German non-Marxist parties that they merge in a new Sudeten German Popular Front. In the merger, the National Socialists would give up their name, but in Krebs’ view, they would retain a leadership role by virtue of the fact that they would be by far the largest party in the front. The German Nationals responded afirmatively, whereas the Farmers Union rejected the offer. The Christian Socials took it under advisement pending consideration by the leadership, although the party was clearly averse to the proposal. Discussions began immediately between the National Socialists and those responding favorably to the merger: the German National Party, the Party of Trade and the Rosche group from the DAWG. Also attending were Konrad Henlein, the leader of the Turnverband, the popular German calisthenic association with local branches throughout the territories in Czechoslovakia settled by the Germans, and his right-hand man, Dr. Walter Brand, the educational leader of the association. Both were known for some time to have worked for the unity of the German parties. On September 27, the Christian Socials rejected the proposed popular front, and on the following day, the DNSAP announced the failure of the project. As with similar proposals in the past, although in different circumstances, the outcome was the same. On September 30, Konrad Henlein issued his appeal for the creation of a Sudeten German Homeland Front (SHF).³¹⁸

 Klepetař, H. Seit 1918 …, pp. 240 – 242.

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In the run-up to the discussions on forming a popular front, Deputy Krebs had started looking for a person who was well known to the public, but had no prior partisan or political affiliation and would be suitable to lead the new organization. He went first to the Rector of the German University in Prague, San Nicolo, who turned down the offer and suggested Konrad Henlein in his stead. On September 12, Krebs met with Henlein, who in this first encounter made no commitment. But during discussions on the popular front which Henlein was attending, he met with Krebs for a second time on September 23. On this occasion he agreed to accept the leadership role.³¹⁹ On September 28, the DNSAP abandoned the project to form a popular front and two days later Henlein called for the creation of the Sudeten German Homeland Front under his own leadership. At this time the National Socialists were under intense pressure, convinced as their leaders were, that the government could intervene at any time to ban the party. At a special meeting on September 28, the leadership decided to dissolve the party themselves, thereby preempting government action. On October 3, the self-dissolution of the party was announced. Despite its self-dissolution, the government officially banned the party on the following day and suspended the activity of the German National Party, which in September had declared its merger with the DNSAP. All these events—the DNSAP’s abandonment of the proposed popular front, Henlein’s call to form the Sudeten German Homeland Front (SHF) and the selfdissolution of the National Socialist Party followed by the government ban—occurred within the span of a very few days. Not surprisingly, it caused widespread skepticism, especially on the left and center left of the political spectrum in the Czech camp. And beyond the question of timing, the very qualities of Henlein that Krebs welcomed—he had introduced the leadership principle in the Turnverband, organized its members on a military basis and adopted the ideology of the German national community (Deutsche Volksgemeinschaft)—were further warning signs to skeptics. Much of the Czech press condemned the SHF as merely a camouflaged refuge for the National Socialists. The reality was more complex. Konrad Henlein grew up in the Turnverband and, after coming back from the War and a prisoner camp in Italy, he returned to it in 1920. There, he had a meteoric career, establishing himself first as an outstanding calisthenics instructor and later displaying managerial and organizational talents in administrative posts of increasing importance. In 1931, he assumed the leadership of the entire association. By 1933, the Turnverband had been transformed. The new organiza-

 Kracik, J., Die Politik des deutschen Aktivismus …, pp. 243 – 244.

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tion and its new leader were presented at the association’s festival in Źatec/Saaz in July of that year. The event was carefully choreographed to make Henlein known to a broader public as an effective leader and a new figure on the national stage. The transformation was not only the work of the leader, but also of his leadership team. They were largely members of the Kameradschaftbund (KB, the Association of the Comrades) who had joined the Turnverband and risen to leadership positions. The KB had been established in 1926. Its members were young intellectuals, never more than two or three hundred, who were trained in the teachings of the Viennese Professor, Othmar Spann, an academic theorist of the modern state. These young people formed an elitist clique which sent its members into various German national associations and other organizations with the aim to rise to the highest possible position of influence and bring the institution in line with KB doctrine. This they did in the Turnverband with such success that it became their principal base of operations. Spann’s teachings called for the replacement of democracy by an authoritarian state, organized hierarchically and based on corporatist principles. At the pinnacle of society were the leader and his leadership team, unelected, bound only by the precepts of religion and ruling with absolute authority. Subordinate to them were the corporatist bodies, ranked according to their intellectual value and importance to the state. Each corporatist body was organized hierarchically as well, with a leader and its members ranked individually. In contrast to democratic society with its internal divisions and conflicts, Spann’s ideal society would be, in theory at least, a natural and seamless organism with each member in a particular role contributing to the wellbeing of the whole.³²⁰ Like other anti-democratic and archconservative doctrines of the interwar period, Spann’s theories shared common features with National Socialism in Germany. Both rejected liberalism, individualism and democracy and called for a struggle against Marxism. Both rejected the right of personal freedom, demanded the subordination of the individual to the will of society and, on the basis of the leadership principle, sanctioned the intervention of the leader in all realms of society. Both doctrines were based on the fundamental inequality of people, but for Spann, the inequality was not racial and biological as it was with National Socialism, but rather intellectual. For Spann, the legitimacy of rule by an elite was based on intellectual and not racial criteria.  Hoensch, Jörg. “Der Kameradschatbund, Konrad Henlein und die Anfänge der sudedtedndeutschen Heimatfront”, in Mühle, Eduard and Hans Lemberg, eds, Mentalitäten-NationenSpannungsfelder: Studien zu Mittel-und Osteuropa in 19. und 20. Jahrhundert (Marburg: Verlag Herder-Institut, 2001), pp. 106 – 108.

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Spannism differed fundamentally from National Socialism in other aspects. In contrast to the world view of the National Socialists, which was at best vaguely defined and subject to the will of the leader, Spann presented a coherent and logical system which— also differing here with National Socialism—gave a high place to religion as the supreme spiritual value. In contrast to National Socialism’s racial and biological concept of the nation, Spann defined the nation as a “spiritual community” which binds all its members together. Spann’s concept of the decentralized corporatist state is in contrast to the centralized, totalitarian state of National Socialism, although in practice Spann’s leadership was open to more dictatorial measures and differed less than in theory. In a broader context, Spann gave Germany, as the most intellectually advanced nation, the leadership position in the Western Christian sphere of culture. He envisioned a new European order based on restoration of the medieval imperial idea. Central and Eastern Europe were to be reorganized under German leadership and assured of peace in a loosely knit, supranational empire with the subject nations guaranteed political and cultural autonomy.³²¹ Here was no parallel, but certainly an analogy with Hitler’s expansionist intentions. By itself at the most fundamental level, Spannist doctrine was authoritarian and explicitly anti-Democratic. As a consequence, it was incompatible with the political institutions and practices of Czechoslovakia. Members of the Kameradschaftbund trained in the teachings of Spann held a dominant position in the Sudeten German Homeland Front, at the outset at least. Henlein almost invariably deferred to their views and, as a consequence, it was the KB that determined the policies of the movement. Yet, in the days before Henlein’s appeal to the Sudeten Germans to join the Homeland Front, he alone negotiated with the two parties threatened by the government ban. He dealt primarily with Hans Krebs for the DNSAP and Othmar Kallina for the DNP. It is difficult to imagine that both men did not press the interests of their parties. Henlein did make concessions to the DNSAP, including a commitment to take National Socialist functionaries into the leadership of the new movement, as long as they were not already politically encumbered by court proceedings, but he did not hold to it.³²² As soon as the two parties were banned by the government and it became apparent that a large segment of the public saw the Homeland Front merely as a camouflaged refuge for their former members, Henlein dropped the commitment. Party officials were not admitted to the Front.

 Hoensch, J. “Der Kameradsschaftbuncd … ”, pp. 108 – 110.  Zimmermann, Marco. “Die Wahlkampagne der Sudetendeutschen Partei 1935”. Střed. Časopis pro mezioborová studia Střední Evropy 19 a 20, 6 – 1(2014): 94– 126.

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None of this is surprising. While the influx of some 100,000 former members of the DNSAP and their counterparts from the DNP was welcome help in launching the Homeland Front, Henlein had no interest in political policies that were carbon copies of the DNSAP’s, nor in having its former leaders, now in the Front, crowding him into a subordinate, secondary role. Such a development would have triggered the authorities’ intervention to ban the movement. His political career would have ended before it had hardly begun. Aside from these concerns, Henlein’s ambitions extended far beyond the limited number of supporters who came to him from the two banned parties. This was apparent in the Homeland Front’s recruitment efforts. In the aftermath of Henlein’s appeal to the Sudeten German people, Walter Brand and Heinrich Rutha went to the German countryside in search of reliable people to form local branches. For this they relied heavily on members of the Turnverband. Within three weeks a rudimentary network of reliable people had come into being, spread across the entire territory of German settlement.³²³ By January of 1934, there were 136 local branches with 12,576 members. In April 1935, shortly before the election, membership had grown to 204,401 and in October after the election it reached a temporary peak of 384,982 in well over 3,000 local branches.³²⁴ Henlein’s appeal to the Sudeten German people, which was principally composed by Walter Brand, bears the unmistakable stamp of the KB. The appeal was addressed to all Sudeten Germans. It began by excoriating the existing political parties: “All efforts to unify the existing political parties into one great, solid political union in these frightful times of need have failed…. The blame is borne by those for whom the interests of their own parties and material advantage are more important than the needs of the nation.” We then learn that the nation has had enough of “this petty-minded party system” and wants no more “hatred between parties and nations.” It yearns for the “creation of a proper national community by overcoming party and class struggles. Its aim is the peaceful coexistence of the nations in this state.” Henlein then appealed: “to all parties, to people from all walks of life to gather together all of Germandom”, stating that, “I place myself at the leadership of this movement.” The Sudeten German Homeland Front aimed for the “unification of all Germans in this state who stand for the national community and the Christian worldview.” Recognizing the state in which “destiny has placed it” and acknowledging democratic principles, he ends on the hopeful note that: “once the representation of all political, cultural, social  Zimmermann, M. “Die Wahlkampagne der Sudetendeutschen Partei …”, pp. 106 – 107.  Kral, Václav, ed. Die Deutschen in der Tschoslovakei 1933 – 1947, Dokumentensammlung no. 88 (Prague: n.p., 1964); Zimmermann, M. “Die Wahlkampagne der Sudetendeutschen Partei …”, p. 107.

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and economic interests is unified, the wellbeing of the entire nation is decided by its own will. Workers, burgers, farmers! Close ranks! All work is good for our homeland!” This brief appeal launched a movement that would win more votes than any other political party in interwar Czechoslovakia. It presented no program, but stressed the evils of party splintering and the promise held out by the gathering together of all Germans in a unified national community. The man who made the appeal had no prior political affiliation—in fact, Henlein called himself a nonpolitician—and that only added to the legitimacy of his appeal. Henlein’s decision to lead the movement, he declared, came not from “personal ambition but from a love of nation and homeland.” The Sudeten German Homeland Front was also distinguished from the existing political parties by the youthfulness of its members. Henlein, himself, was thirty-five and Walter Brand was only twenty-six. The SHF appeared as something entirely new, a theme Henlein continually stressed. From the outset, the Homeland Front faced a serious and immediate problem—the threat of intervention by the authorities and the banning of the Front. To avoid this threat, Henlein decided to reconstitute the SHF as a political party and on March 20, 1934, the SHF joined the German Political Work Office along with the other German parties. The weekly Rundschau commented on this step: “The Sudeten German Homeland Front has of necessity organized itself as a political party in order to be able to participate in political events which currently are based on the party system. It will enter the elections as a party, because that is the only possibility for it to realize its professed principles. It goes into the electoral struggle as a party which has set for itself the goal of dismantling the party system, as a completely new political organization which out of necessity appears in the guise of the old party organizations.” Now Henlein needed a government party that would defend the SHF. Since the Homeland Front was strongly anti-Marxist, the choice fell to the German Farmers Union. The leader of that party’s youth wing, Gustav Hacker, was a personal friend of Henlein. Hacker introduced him to Franz Spina, leader of the Farmers Union and Minister of Health in the government. The rapport was good, and they quickly found the basis for an agreement. The Farmers Union would campaign in the countryside and the SHF elsewhere in the territory of German settlement. Henceforth, the Farmers Union held a protective hand over the SHF, and the Czech Agrarians were not displeased to find a strongly anti-Marxist movement in the German camp. Spina calculated that Henlein could be persuaded to join a common slate and, out of gratitude for the protection which he received, the Farmers Union would gain mandates that would otherwise fall to the SHF. He hoped to bring

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the SHF into tow and emerge as the most influential political leader in the German camp.³²⁵ Spina miscalculated. Relations between the two parties remained essentially warm until late in the election when the issue of dividing mandates came to the fore. Already the SHF had broken a prior agreement not to campaign where the BdL had local organizations. Now no agreement could be reached. On February 19, 1935. Spina proposed a pact to Henlein with the following provisions: 1. The Homeland Front is bound not to campaign in the countryside. 2. It is bound not to hinder the business activities of the BdL. 3. A court of arbitration is to be set up that will decide which places fall within the sphere of the interest of the BdL and which fall within the sphere of interest of the SHF. In a surprise response, Henlein countered with the proposal that the BdL and the SHF be fused completely. He expected a rejection and wanted one. It would put him in a position to charge the BdL with undermining German unity. Through their newspapers both parties attacked one another. As expected, the BdL was prompt with its rejection. One final effort to salvage an agreement ended without success. Throughout, Henlein had acted with new and greater self-confidence, as though he was no longer dependent on the protection of the BdL. In fact, he wasn’t. He had been received by one of the most influential leaders of the Czechoslovak Agrarian Party, Viktor Stoupal, a member of the Moravian Land Committee, who assured him that the Agrarian Party, or at least the powerful conservative wing for which he spoke, would oppose the dissolution of the SHF. On March 24, 1935, the Homeland Front informed the Farmers Union that it could not continue negotiations on a common slate of candidates. The SHF would enter the elections as an independent party.³²⁶ Gustav Hacker, who had been elevated to the position of Spina’s deputy in order to bind the youth wing more closely to the party, until now had favored a merger with the SHF. At this point he reaffirmed his loyalty to the BdL. Henlein had conducted himself deceptively in his dealings with the BdL, and his deceptions were effective. Similarly, the SHF campaign delivered a mixed message designed to appeal to those Germans who supported pan-Germanism and yearned for annexation to Germany, while simultaneously appealing to those Germans who had supported activist policies and wished for reform within

 Klepetař, H. Seit 1918 …, pp. 361– 362.  Klepetař, H. Seit 1918 …, pp. 365 – 369.

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the Czechoslovak state. This was apparent above all in the party’s campaign rallies, which were artfully choreographed and staged to deliver both messages. The staging was like the campaign rallies of the National Socialists in Germany. Military marches were played throughout the rally. The hall was decorated with banners. Stewards in uniform closed ranks in front of the podium and flanked the exits and entrances which gave the event a military air. On some occasions, Henlein arrived in a motorcade to the cheers of the crowd, dismounted from his auto and climbed to the podium from which he spoke. At the close Henlein reentered his auto and drove away again to the cheers of the crowd intermingled with shouts of heil.³²⁷ The spoken word, however, was consistently moderate—loyalty to the state, national autonomy for the Germans. No words threatened to impinge upon the law. Czechoslovak state flags waved over the podium. Before the actual vote, Henlein had a hurdle to clear. In April 1935, the issue of banning the SHF came once again to the fore. The Cabinet discussed it, but made no proposal. Prime Minister Malypetr asked the parties individually. All favored dissolution except the Agrarians, the dominant party in the government. The question could not be decided by a majority vote because it would precipitate a government crisis. Instead, Prime Minister Malypetr and Foreign Minister Beneš brought the issue to the President. Masaryk was oppposed to dissolution. He preferred to let Henlein be active on the floor of Parliament. If the Homeland Front became a danger to the state, the government had the authority to dissolve it. Masaryk’s opinion prevailed. The Sudeten German Homeland Front was permitted to participate in the election on the one condition that it change its name. Czechoslovakia had only political parties, not fronts. Henlein chose the new name, the Sudeten German Party, and the abbreviation SdP caught on quickly.³²⁸ As we have seen, the transition from “front” to “party” was not a problem for Henlein, but the transition brought with it large unanticipated expenses. Every piece of campaign literature needed to be rewritten and reprinted, but the money for that was not at hand. Money from Germany enabled Henlein to clear this last hurdle. Altogether, the German government provided the campaign with 330,000 German marks (3,000,000 Czechoslovak crowns), while by conservative estimate Henlein was able to raise at least 2,000,000 crowns through his own resources.³²⁹ On election day, May 19, 1935, the Sudeten German Party won a sweeping victory. It gained 1,249,000 votes, more than any other party competing in the elec-

 Zimmermann, M. “Die Wahlkampagne der Sudetendeutschen Partei …”, p. 118.  Klepetař, H. Seit 1918 …, p. 369.  Zimmermann, M. “Die Wahlkampagne der Sudetendeutschen Partei …”, p. 123.

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tion, more even than the ruling Czechoslovak Agrarians. Its vote total was 63 % of the votes cast for German parties. However, under the system of tallying and apportioning mandates, it won forty-four mandates, while the Agrarians received forty-five. For the German activists—the Social Democrats, the Farmers Union and the Christian Social Peoples Party—the election was a catastrophe. They won only half the votes which they had won in the 1929 parliamentary elections. The German Social Democrats and the Farmers Union, the two government parties, lost more than half. One election had transformed the political scene among the Germans in Czechoslovakia, but not yet among the Czechs. Henlein felt confident that no government would be formed without the forty-four mandates of the SdP. The Agrarians, however, had no intention to bring Henlein’s party into government. At that time, it sufficed for them to have at hand the threat to form a government without the Marxist parties in order to keep them in line.³³⁰ The vote for Henlein’s party laid to rest the notion that it was merely a refuge for the former supporters of the two banned parties, but it left very much open the question of what the SdP actually was. If one compares 1935 to the parliamentary vote in 1929, it appears that slightly over half of Henlein’s vote came from former supporters of one or another of the activist parties, while only a third came from supporters of the banned parties. The rest—some 16 %—were new voters. This indicates where most of the voters came from, but not necessarily what motivated them in 1935. Nonetheless, disenchantment with activism may have played as big a role as any other factor in Henlein’s success. In 1935, the long time German Ambassador to Prague, Walter Koch, retired. Several months before his departure he wrote a lengthy, topical memorandum to the Foreign Office in Berlin characterizing Czech-German relations. The document reveals Koch’s understanding of a fundamentally anti-German attitude on the part of the Czechs: “The ‘age old enemy’ of the Czechs—the result of their geographical position: This political fact is based on the thousand-year history of the Czechs which consists of nothing else but the successful effort of the Czechs, until now, to uphold their independence in a geographically exposed position against the superior German nation…. In Czech eyes their entire history is nothing but a constant battle with the Germans. Every Czech, so to speak, is endowed with this age-old enmity in the cradle and it is kept alive by their entire education, literature and the political views of all parties. So arose this age-old Czech fear of ‘Germanization’,

 Klepetař, H. Seit 1918 …, p. 380.

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literally a psychosis of angst, in which their fundamental political views are to be understood. “Czech reactions against ‘Germanization’ in their history: An objective view of the historical facts will allow that this fundamental attitude gained from experience, if not correct in every detail taught by Czech historians, is at least in general understandable. Beginning with Charlemagne, all true German statesmen have recognized the truth of Bismarck’s statement that whoever rules Bohemia rules Europe. ‘The Slavic thorn in the flesh of Germania’, as Dr. Kramář once called the Czech bastion projecting into the heart of Germany, must, on the other hand, seem intolerable at all times to the German nation…. Again and again came the effort either to annex this bastion to Germany, or in some way to neutralize it. Naturally, each of these efforts was accompanied by a seldom conscious but more often unconscious pulverizing or splintering of the Czech nation…. As a result, the efforts of the Habsburgs, based not on national but dynastic interests, to standardize their Empire is always seen by the Czechs, if incorrectly, as the consequence of a conscious effort at their Germanization. Therefore, everything which the Habsburgs inflicted upon them after the Battle of the White Mountain, for example, is blamed on the German nation…. “Inner development of the Czech position: A people do not forget such a history which can be characterized as glorious considering the relatively small Czech nation…. Since 1918, the Czech nation according to its inner plan has spread to fill the entire territory of ‘its’ state up to ‘the sacred borders of the realm of St. Vacláv’ and instead of a German ‘mixed’ border territory, later to create a pure Czech region. So, the Germans of this world actually appear as ‘colonists and immigrants’ who have settled wrongfully within the borders of the Czech national state and its Germanized territories. The victor is always in the right.”³³¹ This account by the ambassador accurately reflects the views of Dr. Kramář, leader of the National Democrats, and of the defensive associations of the Czech minorities settled in the border regions among a predominantly German population. It also reflects the views, if less aggressive and strident, of a broader segment of the Czech population in general. Those who dissented and called for a serious effort at accommodation between Czechs and Germans were always in the minority. This is another important factor in Henlein’s electoral success. It is also an important cause of the activists’ dilemma after their crushing electoral defeat. The activists desperately needed to win back their lost support.

 Dolezel, Heidrun and Stefan. Deutsche Gesandtschafts Berichte aus Prag (München: n.p., 1991), vol. IV, num. ref. 125, pp. 263 – 272.

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They had participated in government with the promise of improving the living conditions of the Germans. In the world economic crisis, the prospects of a short-term improvement in the economy were nonexistent. In the realm of German national concerns, the prospects for improvement were no better given the record of the Czech parties ever since the entry of the Germans into government in 1926. The activists’ response was to affirm their loyalty to the Czechoslovak state. The Social Democrats and the Farmers Union continued their participation in government, while the Christian Socials remained in loyal opposition. Only days after the parliamentary elections, the Social Democrats held a party conference at Prague to discuss the new situation and the future course of party policy and party action. Party Chairman Ludwig Czech addressed the issue of the election. “While the Czech nation in its overwhelming majority rejected fascism and thereby strengthened the democratic foundation of the state, the German people in their majority have flocked to a party which, despite all its bowing to the democratic state, cannot deny its alignment with brownshirted fascism. This deceptive political maneuvering would not have been successful if, for five years, people had not been driven to desperation and rendered powerless against any and all demagoguery.” The issue of the party’s participation in government was discussed, but only given final approval at the next party conference in June. On this occasion, Wenzel Jaksch at thirty-nine years of age was elected deputy chairman of the party. Jaksch represented the younger generation, but he also brought a new orientation in political thinking. He had forsaken the central Marxist concept of the class struggle. He wanted to open the ranks of the party to the farmer and to the middle class to create a far more inclusive group of supporters, a people’s socialism.³³² Wenzel Jaksch would become one of the most significant activist politicians of the First Republic. In the election, the Farmers Union suffered particularly severe losses. Only days after the vote, on June 3, 1935, the Rural Youth severed all ties with the party. At the party conference on January 4 and 5, 1936, Gustav Hacker, former leader of the youth wing and later deputy chairman of the party, was elevated to party chairman, although he continued to enjoy a friendly relationship with Konrad Henlein. Despite its crushing losses, the party campaigned openly for its activist politics with the clear support of a majority of its members who were mostly now of the older generation. On October 28, the anniversary of Czechoslovakia’s founding, Chairman Spina joined with Foreign Minister Beneš at Most/Brux in northern Bohemia. The two ministers unveiled a statue of President

 Kracik, J., Die Politik des deutschen Aktivismus …, pp. 307– 309.

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Masaryk. Spina openly attacked the SdP, which he held responsible for the fact that “[today] almost any Czech sees in the Germans a traitor”.³³³ Before the election the German Christian Social People’s Party was divided between its activist wing, grouped around Mayr-Harting and Senator Luschka, and its strongly nationalist wing under Party Chairman Karl Hilgenreiner. In the wake of the party’s heavy electoral losses the two wings clashed, and the activists prevailed. At the party conference on September 28 and 29, 1935, Hilgenreiner stepped down and was replaced as party chairman by former Senator Friedrich Stolberg, strengthening the activists. After the conference, the party set out once again on its earlier activist course. Attacks on the SdP played an important role. Mayr-Harting spoke out in favor of German participation in government, which he described as “desirable under any circumstance”. Democracy alone could guarantee the Sudeten Germans their national development. After its bitter electoral defeat, German activism had been able to assert and consolidate itself. In the Czech view at the beginning of 1936, the popularity of activism was on the increase. Subsequently, the DCV was invited to open negotiations on entry into government.³³⁴ The negotiations ended successfully and, in June of 1936, the DCV, with only six deputies in the lower chamber of Parliament, sent its representative, Senator Zajiček, to the government as a minister without portfolio.

 Kracik, J., Die Politik des deutschen Aktivismus …, pp. 313 – 316.  Kracik, J., Die Politik des deutschen Aktivismus …, pp. 317– 319.

Epilogue Roads Not Taken For Czechoslovakia’s First Republic, the end came quickly. President Masaryk, Europe’s Grand Old Man, now eighty-five and ill, resigned his office in December 1935, and died less than two years later. He did not live to see Germany annex the Sudetenland in October 1938, ending his hopes for unifying Czechoslovakia’s ethnic peoples under a functional democratic government. He did not see the Nazis carve up the First Republic, install Konrad Henlein as governor of Sudetenland and fill prominent government positions elsewhere in the Reich with loyal Sudeten Germans (1939 – 1945). Perhaps he could not have imagined a Second World War fought with such terrible animus and advanced weapon systems that it would obliterate the imperial Europe he had known as a young man. In that War’s aftermath, he might have mourned the expulsion of Germans and forced resettlement of many Hungarians, but reluctantly agreed with President Edvard Beneš, his successor, that their removal was necessary for the safety of the state. If he had lived, Masaryk would have been ninety-eight when Beneš, under extreme duress, acquiesced to a Communist coup in Prague in 1948. Czechoslovakia was a Soviet satellite until the Berlin Wall crashed down and the Iron Curtain fell. Once more a democracy in 1993, the country split peacefully along ethnic lines into the Czech Republic and Slovakia. In the end, apparently, even the Czechs and the Slovaks preferred to live apart. Just as Tomáš Masaryk did not live to see the dissolution of his country, Steven Thomas did not live to complete this book. We don’t know how he would have ended it. Thomas’s writing reveals a preference for evidence over theory, and definitely over speculation. Yet, the evidence he presents and the cliffhanger ending—knowing what we know about the cliff and the long fall—tempt speculation. In Thomas’s life’s work, partisanship and political processes shaped the course of democracies. Some processes strengthen the legitimacy of governance, others weaken it and governments flounder and fail. Although a model democracy on paper, Czechoslovakia’s First Republic never successfully governed because ethnic minorities had little voice in government. The dichotomy between the Czechs and Germans obscured dissatisfaction among the Poles, Magyars and particularly the Slovaks. Rifts among ethnic groups along regional, religious (Catholic, Protestant and Jewish), political (capitalist, socialist and Communist) and urban and agrarian lines further refracted ethnicity into gradations of political interest—Thomas’s ethnic prism—that presented myriad opportunities to reach common ground, as occurred when the Czech and German Agrarian parhttps://doi.org/10.1515/9783110749885-012

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ties came together in 1921. Yet, over and over, overtures towards accord among the leaders of different factions ended “without agreement”, were “to no avail”, “proved unsuccessful”. During Masaryk’s seventeen-year presidency, no political party got more than 25 % of the national vote, and ten different governments were formed under nine different premiers. Ordinary people soured on democracy. The Sudeten Germans, effectively locked out of the political process, voted overwhelmingly for the SdP in 1935. Counterfactual propositions are speculations made by historians who want to explore alternative historical pathways—such as the late Nobel Prize-winning economist and cliometric historian, Robert Fogel. In this spirit, I suggest three counterfactual scenarios that alter events at three points in time to consider alternative futures. What if the German political parties had participated in forming the government in 1919? What if a different Language Law had been passed in 1920 which respected the use of minority languages in government and schools (predominantly Slovak and German)? And what if systems of land reapportionment and regional administration had not been gerrymandered to strengthen Czech political control and dilute the strength of the Germans? For these scenarios to occur, enough of the antagonists would have had to trust in the process, if not in each other, to overcome intransigent objections. This is hard to imagine happening in the real world. Yet, if German parties had agreed to participate in government in 1919, it might have signaled acceptance, albeit grudging, of the new political order, and determination to participate in building it. Together, German and Slovak objections might have tempered the Language Law in 1920, making it more acceptable to both powerful minorities, and proving that ethnic partisans could ally to achieve mutually desirable ends. Under such circumstances, the Czech and German Agrarian alliance might have become a counterweight to Czech nationalism and encouraged other non-ethnic alliances of students, labor or other political groups. Political alliances that scrambled nationalist allegiances might have made ethnic gerrymandering harder to achieve and less effective; acts of ethnic discrimination and domestic terrorism harder to perform, ignore, or excuse; and demagoguery less attractive. Hitler’s invasion in 1938 might have been greeted differently, and that might have changed the course of the War. Some say such speculations are a waste of time. History is written in stone, after all, but the future is not. In a world plagued by a superfluity of suspicion, aggression, dispossession and demagoguery, we might do well to think about these things. Karen Alexander Whately MA, USA May 26, 2021

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Archival Material AKPR [Archive of the Office of the President; Czech Republic], D8500/37/H/IV; T 12/25, část II, IV, V. AMZV ČR [Archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Czech Republic], State Papers of Vlastimil Tusar. APS, P-ČR [Archive of the Chamber of Deputies in Parliament; Czech Republic]-AFS, RNS, 120, 123, 153a, 153b, 154, 158, 159, 160. AÚTGM.f.TGM [State Archive of Tomáš Garrigue Masaryk], Korespondence II. Digitální parlamentní knihovna [Common Czech-Slovak Digital Parliamentary Library] June 1st, 1920. https://www.psp.cz/sqw/hp.sqw?k=82 (Accessed June 16, 2021). NA, MZV-VA I [Czech Republic National Archives, Ministry of Foreign Affairs] newspaper clipping archive]. NA, MYV-VA [Czech National Republic Archives, Ministry of Agricultural Affairs], papers of Franz Spina. NA, PMR [Czech Republic National Archives, Presidency of the Council of Ministers] K 5, 6; Presidium zemského úřadu v Praze (PZUP) report nos. 3, 4, 11, 12, 13. NA (SUA), MV [Czech Republic National Archives, Ministry of the Interior], Vnitropolitické věci MU (BA), EB 5. Presidium zemské správy politické v Praze (Presidium of the Provincial Political Administration in Prague-PZSPP) report nos. 5, 8, 9, 10, 14, 15, 16, 22, 33 VÚP [Research Institute of Pedagogy in Prague] PS-II-24, 25.

214

References

Newspapers Berlinertagblatt und Handelszeitung, September 12, 1919. Bohemia, January 25, 1920. Die Zeit, July 31, 1919. Demokracie a Socialismus [London] 35, March 4 – 5, 1957. Deutsche Landpost, July 7, 1936. Národ, Apr 9–May 16, 1865. Národní demokracie, November 16, 1921; April 1, 1922. Národní listy, June 7, 1924; November 16, 1926. Národní politika, October 19, 1926. Prager Tagblatt, May 13, November 26, 1921. Prager Abendblatt, October 8, 1921. Pražský večerník December 12, 1921. Ráno, October 9, 1919. Reichenberger Zeitung, June 25, 1921. Tribuna, September 29th, 1921 (part I), September 30th, 1921 (part II).

Index 1848, Revolution of

7 – 10, 44

abolition of land diets 80 absolutism 10 accommodation 128 f., 170, 205 – accommodation between Czechs and Germans 56 activism 125 f., 136, 139, 148, 153, 167, 170 – 173, 175, 204, 207 – activism obstructionism 172 activist(s) 126, 128, 135, 137, 139 f., 141, 147 f., 151 – 153, 155 f., 160, 163, 172, 175, 188, 202, 204 – 207. – activist camp 173 – activist collaboration 194 – activist national demands 192 – activist parties 126, 153, 155, 164, 167, 171, 173, 192, 204 – activist policies 171 – activist vote 167 Adlegebirge/Orlické Mountains 22 administrative autonomy 86, 104, 132 – administrative districts 14, 103 – administrative law 63 – administrative reform 23, 82, 134, 159, 163 – 165, 167, 171 Agrarian 114 – Agrarian Domoviny for Independence 129 – Agrarian Party 41 – Agrarians 19, 127, 130, 154 agrarian 19 agricultural laborers 183 agricultural tariffs 144 f., 149 f., 152 – 155, 173 Albania 29 all national coalition 96, 106, 120, 121, 126, 129, 133, 136, 141 f., 144, 148 f., 154 – 156, 181 f. all national government 155 all-national system 135 Alliance of German (Free) Unions 118 Allied 29 f., 47, 49 – Allied diplomacy 30 https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110749885-014

– Allied nation 30 – Allied powers 34, 49 – allied troops 28 Allies 26, 28 f., 49, 53, 57 Alumni Unions of the German National Academic Association 25 Andrassy, Gyula 14, 36 Andrassy, Julius 31 annexation to Germany 191 anti-Czech 47 – anti-Czech nationalism 99 anti-German rioting in Prague 190 – anti-German sentiment 59 Archduchess Marie Valerie 14 Archduke Friedrich 35 Armistice (WWI) 49 – armistice 27, 31, 34 f., 45, 56 assassination 135 f. Auerhan, Dr. 176, 177 Aussig-Teplitz and Buschtehrad railway 138 Aussig/Ústí nad Labem 22 f, 49, 116 Austria 8 – 12, 14 f., 26, 28, 32 f., 41 f., 45 – 49, 55, 74, 77, 98, 100, 102, 111, 158, 169, 174 – Austrian Admiralty 35 – Austrian army 35 – Austrian Army High Command 33 – Austrian command in Prague 39 – Austrian constitution 8, 10 – Austrian Constitution 25 – Austrian Constitution of 1867 93 – Austrian constitutional law 46 – Austrian Empire 8 – Austrian federalism 11 – Austrian Germans 45 f. – Austrian labor movement 99 – Austrian monarchy 7, 9 – 11, 82, 123 – Austrian national assembly 42 – Austrian National Assembly 45 – Austrian navy 34 – Austrian parliament 54 – Austrian Reichsrat 12, 20

216

Index

– Austrian Slavs 32 – Austrian Social Democratic Party 18 – Austrian Social Democrats 19 Austria-Hungary 20, 26, 28 – 30, 50 – Austrian and Hungarian military units 39 – Austro-Hungarian 35 – Austro-Hungarian army 32 – Austro-Hungarian command 31, 39 – Austro-Hungarian Compromise of 1867 11 – Austro-Hungarian Empire 11 – Austro-Hungarian empire 31 – Austro-Hungarian government 32 – Austro-Hungarian marine 35 – Austro-Hungarian military authority 42 – Austro-Hungarian monarchy 28 f. – Austro-Hungarian Prague Command 39 – Austro-Hungarian troops 29, 38 Austro-Prussian War of 1866 11 authoritarian 199 – authoritarian state 198 autocracy 28 autonomy 13, 15, 18, 24, 26, 31, 48, 57, 70, 80 – 82, 133, 137, 139, 159, 163 f., 167, 177, 191 – autonomous administration 80 – autonomous districts 23 – autonomous elements subordinated 85 – autonomous province 24 f. – autonomous regions 81 – autonomous rights 82 Avion Cinema 189 Baden 88 Badeni, Kasimir 17 – 19 Badenu 33 f. Battle of the White Mountain 186, 205 Bavaria 88 Baxa, Dr. Karel 108, 113, 186, 190 BdL (German Farmers Union) 194, 202 Bechyně, Rudolf 44, 110, 114, 130, 149, 151 Belgium 81, 146 Beneš, Dr. Edvard 28, 30, 33, 49, 56, 77 f., 117 – 120, 122 f., 127, 129 f., 138, 140, 176, 177, 181, 190, 203, 206 – Beneš government 106, 121, 126, 134 Berlin 44 f., 53, 60, 90, 103, 109, 115, 130, 146, 150, 156, 161 f., 204

Beust, Friedrich Ferdinand 14 bicameral legislature 94 bilingualism 21 Bismarck, Otto von 45, 157, 205 Bodenbach/Podmokly 49 Boháč, Dr. Antonín 176 Bohemia 7 – 9, 12 f., 15 – 18, 20 – 24, 38, 42 f., 46, 48 – 50, 54, 65, 73, 80 f., 86 – 88, 99, 146, 158, 164, 168, 171, 175, 183 – 185, 187, 205 f. – Bohemia, Czech 16, 26, 38 – Bohemia, German 7, 16, 21 – 26, 38, 42 f., 45 f., 49 f., 52 – 55, 61, 82, 93, 156 – Bohemian crown 13 – Bohemian diet 13, 16 – Bohemian German question 65 – Bohemian Germans 55 – Bohemian kingdom 10 – Bohemian unity 82 Bohemia (newspaper) 108, 125 f., 172 Böhmerwald/Šumava 22, 48 Bolshevism 33, 105 – Bolshevization 35 Bouček, Václav 87, 90 bourgeois class(es) 51, 102 bourgeois nationalist 43 bourgeois parties 90, 118, 137, 155, 193, 196 – bourgeois activist parties 193 Brabec, Dr. Jaroslav 76, 86, 90, 92 Bradáč, Bohumír 127, 162 Brand, Dr. Walter 196, 200 f. Bratislava 68, 168, 180 Brenner, Otto 49 British Foreign Office 30 Brno 89, 171, 183, 195 brown coal district 48 brown-shirted fascism 206 – brown uniforms 191 Brücknner-Breslau, Gauleiter 191 Brunar, Dr. Heinrich 172 – 174, 191 Brüx/Most 48 Budapest 70 – Budapest parliament 31 Budějovice 88 f. Bulgaria 47

Index

calisthenics 197 Čapek, Karel 112 capital 123 – capitalism 102 – capitalist class 52 capitulation of the military 34 capitulation of the monarchy 32 f., 36 Capri 110, 114, 130 caretaker government 105, 110, 121, 138 f., 144, 149, 151 f., 155 f. Čas (newspaper) 116, 120 Castle (political institution) 118, 122, 138, 140, 145, 148, 167, 178 Castle Hluboš 104 Catholic 70, 127, 178, 187 – Catholicism 177 – Catholics 70 Census 176 – 178 central authority 84 Central Educational Foundation 183 f. Central Europe 28, 47, 137, 157 centrist administration 94 Černý, Jan 106 f., 110, 116, 129, 151, 165 – Černý government 106 f., 110, 113 f., 152, 160 Česká Lípa 82 f., 86, 89, 166 – Česká Lípa/Bömische Leipa 91, 164 České Slovo (newspaper) 189 f. Chamber of Deputies 124 Chancellery 114, 118, 127 f. Charlemagne 205 Charles I, Emperor 26, 34 chauvinism 60, 135, 192 f. – chauvinist 26, 44, 150 Cheb 74, 107 f. Chotěboř 89 Christian Social People’s Party 157 – Christian Socials 111, 130 Cisleithania 9, 12, 17 f. – Cisleithanian 17 – Cisleithanian Austria 11, 15, 26 – Cisleithanian Constitution 12 civil liberties 12 civil service retrenchment 144 Clam-Martinic, Jindřich 13 class coalition 102 clerical parties 152

217

coal districts 23 – coal mining 189 coalition politics 97 collaboration 98, 101 f., 139 colonists and immigrants 48, 205 Combat Group 126, 128, 130 commercial treaties 154 Committee of the Land Administration 115 common proletarian front 104 Communism 121 – Communist(s) 103, 105, 109, 114, 125, 128, 136, 142, 144, 146, 148, 153, 170 – Communist Party 109 – Communist Third International 105 compromise 4, 10, 12 – 14, 32, 60, 77, 91, 111, 132, 145, 149, 154, 158, 160, 163, 190 – 1871 Compromise 14 – Compromise of 1867 12 concession(s) 111, 153, 156, 158 – 160, 170, 173 conciliation 106, 141, 172 congrua 150, 152 f., 155 conspiracy 136 Constitution 64, 80, 93 f., 96, 100, 111, 118, 152, 179 – constitution 7 – 14, 56, 59 – 62, 65 – 67, 75, 90, 93 f., 97, 100, 102, 138 – Constitutional Committee 66, 74, 76, 80, 83, 90, 92, 132 – constitutional government 10 – constitutional law(s) 12, 46, 61, 73, 78 controlled economy 124 corporatist principles 198 – corporatist state 199 Coudenhove, Maximilian von 36, 37 Croatian(s) 31 – 34 – Croats 13, 26, 32 Croatian National Committee 36 crown lands 83 cultural autonomy 193, 199 curia 18 f. currency 134 f. Czech 9, 11, 15, 17, 20 f., 36, 71, 74, 112, 170, 177 f., 181, 189 Czech, Dr. Ludwig 134 f., 165, 206

218

Index

Czech Agrarian Party 19, 58, 129, 141, 144, 163, 180, 187, 192, 202 – Czech Agrarian(s) 57, 74 f., 85, 96, 99, 105 f., 110, 113, 124, 127, 129 f., 132 f., 137, 144 f., 148 – 150, 152, 154 – 156, 159, 162, 170, 178 – 182, 192 – 194, 201, 203 f. Czech and German civic parties 169 Czech and German nobility 186 Czech and Moravian bourgeoisie 52 Czech and Slovak 67 f. – Czech and Slovak dominance 58 – Czech and Slovak language 66 – 69 – Czech and Slovak soldiers 40 Czech authorities 37 Czech Bohemia 16, 26, 38 Czech bourgeois parties 105 Czech bourgeoisie 51 f. Czech character 113 Czech chauvinists 80, 82 Czech Christian Social Party 19, 178 – Czech Christian Social Peoples Party 150, 163 – Czech Christian Socials 58, 72, 83, 85, 96, 105 f., 111, 129, 132, 139, 149, 156, 159, 178 – 180 Czech Clericals 103 Czech Club 16 Czech coalition 131, 136 Czech colonists 138 Czech Compromise 14 Czech crown 12 f., 16 – Czech crown jewels 13 – Czech crown lands 7, 9 f., 12 f., 18, 87, 122 Czech currency 32 Czech dependency 8 Czech deputies 17 Czech element 88 f. Czech émigrés 28 Czech ethnic identity 8 Czech exile 105 Czech garrison 108 Czech-German relations 18, 95, 111 f., 120 f., 184, 189, 204 – Czech-German accommodation 20, 94 – Czech-German coalition 170

– Czech-German compromise in Moravia 18 – Czech-German conciliation 58 – Czech-German mediation treaty 147 – Czech-German parliamentary government 156 – Czech-German politics 146 Czech Germans 119, 146 Czech government parties 167 Czech landmass 23 Czech lands 7 – 10, 16 f., 19, 36 f., 39 – 44, 47, 54, 57, 64, 71, 78, 81 f., 84, 88, 108, 112, 130, 132 f., 159, 165, 175, 183, 186 f. Czech language 63 – 69, 71 – 74, 77, 160 Czech legionnaires 49, 107 Czech majority 42, 84, 88 f., 162 Czech military 107 f. – Czech militia 54 Czech minority(ies) 48, 64, 82 f., 87, 89, 107, 115, 183 f., 205 Czech moderates 138 Czech nation 24, 35, 51, 62, 67, 69, 78, 85, 93, 183, 186, 205 f. Czech national bourgeoisie 60 Czech national character 89 Czech National Democracy (Party) 89, 119, 148 f., 159 f. – Czech National Democracy Parliamentary Club 159 f. – Czech National Democrats 58, 60, 72, 83, 85, 96, 103, 106, 108, 111, 123, 129, 132, 139, 150, 154 f., 159 f., 164, 178, 184, 205 Czech national identity 79 Czech national interests 71 Czech national movement 8, 14, 42 Czech National Party of Labor 148 Czech national revival 94, 108 Czech National Socialist Workers Party 19 – Czech National Socialist Party 75 – Czech National Socialists 105, 111, 118, 121, 145, 180 Czech national system 97 Czech national theater 15 Czech nationalism 12, 42 – Czech nationalist party 134 – Czech nationalists 57, 80, 119

Index

Czech nationality 73 – Czech nationality policy 62 Czech nobility 187 Czech non-Marxist parties 159 Czech occupation 42, 49 f., 53 Czech opinion 122 Czech party(ies) 18 f., 41, 57, 99, 135, 157, 161 – 163, 166, 173, 187, 193 f., 206 – Czech party clubs 70 Czech Party of Trade 149, 159, 178 Czech party system 19 – Czech political parties 41, 59, 152 Czech politics 19, 174 Czech population 205 Czech Prague 190 Czech press 115 f., 124, 141, 172 Czech Progressive Party 73, 87, 90 Czech proletariat 104 Czech propaganda 20 Czech public opinion 56 Czech publications 179 Czech region 205 Czech school children 108 Czech settlements 22 Czech Social Democracy 98, 109, 178 f. – Czech Social Democratic leader 44 – Czech Social Democratic Workers Party 18 – Czech Social Democrats (DSAP) 18, 96 f., 104 – 106, 109, 118, 124, 139, 144 – 146, 148 – 150, 180 f., 193 Czech Socialists 58, 123, 129 – Czech socialist parties 57 Czech Society of the Sokol 36 Czech soldiers 29, 39, 108 Czech state 43, 55, 137 – Czech state collapse 162 Czech state’s rights 16 Czech State’s Rights Progressive Party 57 Czech troops 48 f., 53 f. Czech ultra-nationalists 129 Czech Union 33 Czech University 15 Czech workers 99 Czechization 65, 93, 138, 150 – Czechizing 71

219

Czecho-Slovak army(ies) 29 f. – Czecho-Slovak legionnaires 29 Czecho-Slovak Government 30 Czecho-Slovak language 68 f. Czecho-Slovak nation 30 Czecho-Slovak National Council 30 f. Czecho-Slovak peoples 30 Czecho-Slovak state 152 Czecho-Slovaks 30 f. Czechoslovak 67 f., 70, 76, 80, 94, 178 Czechoslovak army 39 Czechoslovak Association of Unions 118 Czechoslovak Christian Social Peoples Party 83, 106 Czechoslovak Communist Party 110 Czechoslovak Declaration of Independence 43 Czechoslovak democracy 177 Czechoslovak diplomacy 10 Czechoslovak government 26, 41, 49, 54, 169 Czechoslovak independence 42, 185 Czechoslovak language 64 – 68, 71 – 74, 76, 80, 93 Czechoslovak Legionnaire Association 116 – Czechoslovak legionnaires 29 Czechoslovak minorities 168 Czechoslovak nation 43, 65, 67, 93, 120 – 122 Czechoslovak National Committee 36, 38, 41 – Czechoslovak National Committee in Paris 41 Czechoslovak National Council 29 – Czechoslovak National Council in Paris 56 Czechoslovak National Democracy 83, 87, 90, 92 Czechoslovak National Socialist 108 Czechoslovak nationality 177 Czechoslovak officials 73 Czechoslovak Parliament 20 Czechoslovak Peoples’ Party 69 Czechoslovak Progressive States Rights Party 96 Czechoslovak Republic 18, 20, 40 f., 47, 54, 64, 78, 107, 142

220

Index

Czechoslovak revolution 55 Czechoslovak Revolutionary Assembly 100 Czechoslovak Social Democratic Party 106, 128 – Czechoslovak Social Democracy 96, 109 – Czechoslovak Social Democrats 98, 103, 110 Czechoslovak society 167 Czechoslovak state 28, 32, 36, 38, 44, 47, 49, 51 f., 54 f., 58 f., 63, 70, 74, 84, 94, 100, 111, 122, 135, 151, 179, 203, 206 Czechoslovak State was declared by a law 36 Czechoslovakia 20, 41, 47, 49, 54, 77, 94, 98, 105, 111, 136, 146 f., 162, 168 f., 188 f., 195, 199, 206 Czechs 7, 9, 12 – 23, 26, 29, 32, 40 f., 43, 50, 55, 59, 63, 66, 72, 80, 85, 94, 97, 106, 115, 137, 140, 163 f., 186 DAWG (German Labor and Economics Association) 174, 180 – 183, 192, 196 Deak, Ferenc 158 Declaration of St. Martin 179 Dědič, Deputy Karel 86, 89 Defense Law 136, 195 f. defense of the city 38 defense of the minorities 136 democracy 20, 28, 51 f., 81, 94, 107, 198 demonstrations 54, 107, 150, 169, 189 – 192 – demonstrators 115, 189 f. Denis, Ernest 28 Depression 188 f. Dérer, Dr. Ivan 67 – 69, 71, 133 deteriorating economic conditions 189 Deutsche Landpost (newspaper) 137, 156 Deutsche Presse (newspaper) 193 dictatorship of the proletariat 97 disorganized demobilization 34 dissolution of the monarchy 30 DNP (German National Party) 191, 199 f. DNSAP (German National Socialist Workers Party) 191 f., 196 f., 199 f. Dolanský, Josef 69 f. Donát, Senator Václav 152 Dresden 45

DSAP (Czech Social Democrats) Dual Monarchy 12 dualism 11 – 14 – dualist system 26 Dux/Duchov 48 – Duchov 87 – Dux 93 Dyk, Viktor 159

193

Eastern Bohemia 22 f. Easter Demands 25 education 10, 15, 17 – educational establishments 72 Eger/Cheb 48 f. – Egerland/Chebsko 22 f. Elba 49 Elbegau/Polabi 22 Emperor 7 f., 11 – 15, 26, 34, 38 England 28 Engliš, Karel 150 Entente 44, 49, 98, 100 f. entry of the Germans into government Epstein, Dr. Leo 113 equal rights 20, 94, 112, 133, 172 Erzgebirge/Krušné Mountains 22 Estates Theater 108, 123 ethnic ascendancy 76, 79 ethnic cantonization 84 ethnic conflict 40, 71, 129, 189 ethnic identity 94 ethnic minorities 163 ethnic nationalism 7 f., 10 ethnicity 7, 63, 94 export industries 154 extortionist politics 111

206

Falkenau/Falknov 49 Farmer(s) 57, 66, 102, 124, 137, 144, 171, 186, 201, 206 Farmers Federation 19 fascism 206 federalism 13 – federalist 10, 13 f. Ferdinand II, Emperor 186 f. field maneuvers 195 finance minister 60 financial reform 149

Index

First Czechoslovak Republic 63, 94 – First Republic 54, 94, 104, 106, 111 f., 118, 167, 206 foreign nobility 187 Fourteen Points (Wilson’s) 29, 31, 45 France 11, 13 f., 28 f., 40, 47, 49, 146 Franco-Prussian war 11 Frankfurt 8 Franz Josef, Emperor 8, 10 f., 13 f., 26, 157 f., 169 French front 29 Friedland 49 Gajda, Deputy 190 Galicia 13 Gautsch, Paul 19 Gažik, Marek 159 Gebsattel, Baron Fritz von 44, 55 General Staff in Vienna 34 Geneva 28, 33, 37 f., 56, 130 Gentlemen’s Coalition 178, 181 German 13, 15, 17, 20, 61, 76, 93, 168, 200 German activism 181 – German activists 128, 131, 139 German Agrarian Party 124 – German Agrarian(s) 19, 56 – 59, 84, 96, 99 f., 103, 106, 112, 114 f., 124, 126 – 128, 134, 136, 139, 142, 152, 155 f., 182 – German Agrarian Parliamentary Club 115 German ambassador 103, 130, 136, 146, 150, 162, 190, 204 German and Austro-Hungarian empires 30 f. German annexation 53 German army 14 German Austria(n) 9, 43, 52 – 54 – German Austrian Constitutional Law 46 – German Austrian troops 53 German autonomy 97, 139, 164 German Bohemia 7, 16, 21 – 26, 38, 42 f., 45 f., 49 f., 52 – 55, 61, 82, 93, 156 – German Bohemian government 49, 53 – German Bohemian provincial assembly 52 – 54 German Bohemian Social Democrats 104 German Bohemians 21 f., 24, 53, 60

221

German border(land) regions 83, 186 German bourgeois parties 62, 98, 125, 137, 143 German bourgeoisie 52, 135 German Casino 123 German Catholic Conservatives 15 German chauvinist 54 German Christian People’s Party (DCV) 193 – German Christian Social Party 171, 195 – German Christian Social(s) 56, 84, 99, 114, 127 f., 134, 139, 142, 144, 147 – 149, 151, 153, 159, 166 f., 170, 175, 181, 193, 196, 206 – German Christian Social Peoples Party 124, 126, 204, 207 German cities 108 German civil servants 138 German Club in Vienna 25 German collaboration 59 German conservative deputies 16 German cultural autonomy 161, 163 German-Czech party 18 German defense force 48 German demands 82, 84 German Democratic Freedom Party 99, 142, 174 – German Democratic Freedom 139 German Democratic Progressive Party 56 German Democrats 115, 134, 139, 141 f., 144 German Economics Association 195 German economy 188 German element 88 f. German Embassy 60, 90, 115, 137, 151, 156 German Empire 8, 11, 36 German entry into government 58, 140 – 142, 155 f., 158 f., 161, 169, 172 German Estates Theater 108, 112 German farm families 188 – German farmer 188 German Farmers Union (BdL) 114, 134, 136 f., 139, 147 – 149, 151, 153, 156, 159, 166 f., 169 – 171, 173, 181 – 183, 187, 194, 196, 201 f., 204, 206 German Freedom Democratic Party 126, 148 German front 87

222

Index

German government 17, 53, 61, 152, 203 German government parties 170, 172 f., 179 German hegemony 8 German House 190 German interests 60 German jobs 151 German Labor and Economics Association (DAWG) 174 f., 183, 192 German land 93 German language 63 – 66, 73, 75, 77, 107 – German language territory 115, 137 f. German Liberal(s) 12, 14 f., 16, 19 German Liberal Democratic 158 German Liberal majority 12 German Liberal Party 15 German majority(ies) 82 f., 84 German majority parties 183 German mandates 90 German military units 107 German ministers 178 German minority(ies) 9 f., 23, 57 f., 88, 94, 169, 172 German ‘mixed’ border territory 205 German Moravia 82 German nation 21, 26, 90, 101, 139, 157, 171, 204 f. German National Assembly 7 German national associations 198 German National Committee 38, 197 German national concerns 104 German national demands 98, 159 German National Democracy 140 German National Party (DNP) 56, 98 f., 123 f., 126, 131, 135 – 137, 147 f., 151, 155, 170 – 174, 191, 196 f. – German National Party Parliamentary Club 172 German National Socialism 99, 191, 198 – German National Socialist (movement) 191 – German National Socialist Party 124, 126, 191, 194 – 197 – German National Socialist Workers Party (DNSAP) 98 f., 131, 135, 183, 191 – German National Socialists 99, 103, 123, 142, 144, 147, 151, 153, 196 f., 203 German National Union 25

German nationalist(s) 16, 25, 41, 52, 82 German Nationalist Party 42 – German Nationals 172, 196 German negativism 56 German non-Marxist activists 139 German non-Marxist opposition and government parties 173 – German non-Marxist parties 139, 173, 196 German officials 73, 141 – 144 German opposition 135 German Parliamentary Union 99 f., 107, 115, 119, 123 – 125, 130 f., 134 German Parliamentary Working Group 156 German participation in government 61, 128 German party(ies) 19, 54, 57, 59, 63, 139, 143 f., 147 f., 160, 162, 166, 169, 171 – 174, 180 f., 186, 196, 201, 204 – German parties in government 166, 170, 173, 191 – 193 German Party of Trade 125, 139, 147 f., 151, 153, 159, 174, 192, 196 German people 23, 52, 100, 136, 140, 206 German Political Labor Office 173 German political party(ies) 98, 168, 190 German political unity 175 German Political Work Office 201 German population 82, 183, 205 German press 44, 64, 115, 172 German problem 130 German radical 52 German Radical Nationalist Party 25 German recruits 107 German regions 93, 133 German Reich 45 f., 52 German Reichstag 191 German rejection 56 German representation 160 German resistance 50, 57 German rights 61, 63, 93 German School Union 183 German self-government 140 German Social Democracy 51, 98, 101 f., 143, 181 – German Social Democrat(s) 19, 52, 54, 56, 58 f., 62, 84, 96 – 100, 103 f., 106,

Index

114 f., 118, 123 f., 128, 135, 139, 142 – 144, 146 – 149, 155, 164, 173, 192 f., 196, 204, 206 – German Social Democratic (Party) 42 f., 51, 98, 101, 193 German Socialist Democrats 57 German socialists 139 German soldiers 50 German sound film 189 German southern Moravia 43 German speakers 175 German state employees 64 German supremacy 62 German territory(ies) 23, 42 – 44, 48, 64, 82, 107, 109, 190 German troops 53 German ultra-nationals 137 German Union 139, 151, 153 German union (19th century) 11 German unity 42, 126, 202 – German unity front 147 German University 100, 112, 148, 160, 195, 197 German vote 57, 192 German Workers Party 99 Germanization 77, 187, 204 f. Germans 7, 9 f., 12, 14 – 20, 23 – 25, 40 – 43, 47 f., 51, 54, 57 – 60, 62, 65 – 67, 72 f., 75 – 80, 84 f., 89, 94, 97, 101, 106, 111, 113, 115, 119, 134, 137 f., 141, 152, 156, 158 f., 162 – 164, 175 f., 181, 184, 187, 194 – Germans in Czech lands 56 – Germans of Czechoslovakia 190 Germany 7, 11, 22, 30 f., 41, 43, 45 – 47, 50, 53 f., 65, 73, 77, 98, 102, 105, 111 f., 136, 146 f., 154, 177, 189, 191, 199, 202, 205 Geyer, Baron von 34 Glombinský faction 32 Gounod, Charles 67 government collaboration 142 Governor’s Office 38 Grand Coalition 183 Great Britain 30, 47, 49, 146 great estates 186 Great War 28

223

Greater Germany 107 Greece 47 gymnastic association 37 Habry 89 Habsburg(s) 7, 9, 13, 19, 47, 51, 60, 107, 161, 186, 205 – Habsburg monarchy 14, 51 Hacker, Gustav 201 f., 206 Hainfeld Party Conference 18 Hampl, Antonín 181 Hanreich, Georg 171 Hartl, Hans 124 f. Hebrew 176 Heeren, Councilor von 156 Henlein, Konrad 196 f., 199 – 206 Herbst, Dr. Eduart 158 Hilgenreiner, Karl 171, 207 Hitler 189, 192, 195, 199 – Hitler’s governor in Silesia 191 Hlinka, Father Andrej 70, 93, 133, 159, 177, 179 Hluboš 105, 110 Hnídek, František 69, 73, 75 f. Hodač, Dr. 35 Hodonín 68 Hodža, Milan 32, 132, 152, 154 f., 159, 161, 163 Hoetzel, Dr. 67 Hohenwart, Siegmund 13 Holub, Admiral 35 Horáček, Professor 127 Hradec 88 f. – Hradec Králové 11 Hradiště 89 Humpolec 89 Hungarian(s) 9 f., 11, 94, 168 Hungarian county administration 81 Hungarian government 41 Hungarian Nationalist Party 147 Hungarian Parliament 31, 70 – Hungarian parliamentary elections 70 Hungarian troops 31 Hungary 9 – 15, 17, 26, 31, 33, 41, 47, 68, 77, 79, 94, 154, 158 Hussareck, Max von 26

224

Index

ideal society 198 Illyrian 9 impediments to open debate 86 imperialistic action 53 independence of Czechoslovakia 38 independent judiciary 94 individual rights 94 individualism 198 inequality 63, 198 Institute for the Study of the National Minorities in the Czechoslovak Republic 161 inter-ethnic unrest 126 Iron Ring 15 irredenta 54, 86 – irredentism 89 – irredentist 86, 135, 140, 162 – irredentist party 192 – Irredentists 172 Isonzo 32 Italian(s) 9, 22, 27 – Italian front 31 – Italian government 29 – Italian military 29 – Italian offensive 33 Italy 29, 40, 49, 146, 197 Jaksch, Wenzel 206 Jesser, Franz 20, 22 – 25, 42, 82 Jewish city hall 108 Jewish firms in Dlouhy Street 189 Jewish nationality 175 – 177 Jews 175 f. Jičín 89 Jihlava 88 Joachim, Section Chief 176 f. Joseph II, Emperor 107 Jung, Deputy 191, 195 f. Juriga, Ferdiš 166 Kafka, Dr. Bruno 140 – 142, 148, 182 f., 190 Kallay, J. 130 Kallina, Othmar 199 Kameradschaftbund (KB) 198 – 200 Kann, Robert 26 Karlovy Vary 82 f., 86, 89, 116, 157, 166 Karlovy Vary/Karlsbad 91, 164 Karlsbad/Karlovy Vary 49

Károlyi, Mihály 31 Kasper, Deputy 195 Keibl (former head of the German National Party Parliamentary Club) 172 Kestřanek, General 38 Kings of Bohemia 13 Kladno 109 Kmeťko, Karol 70 Knirsch, Deputy 195 Koch, Walter 204, 147, 152 Koloděje castle 60 Komotau/Chomutov 49 Königreichwalde/Dvůr Kralové 23 Könniggrätz 11, 158 Körber, Ernst von 20 Korošec, Dr. 32 Koroshets, Msgr. 33 f. Kosina (Czech official) 37 f. Kotor 35 Kralice 70, 88 Kralice Bible 70 Kramář, Dr. Karel 32, 35, 41, 49, 56 f., 62, 72 f., 78 f., 87 – 93, 111, 132, 141, 159 f., 163 – 165, 185, 205 – Kramář government 58, 96, 106 – Kramář law 166 Krebs, Hans 191 f., 194 – 197, 199 Krejčí, Professor Dr. 176 Kremsier 9 f. Křepek, Franz 58, 100 f., 104, 107, 115, 134 f., 151, 156 – 158, 170, 182 Krofta, Kamil 161 Kyjov 89 labor 186, 191, 193 – labor conflict 99 – labor organizations 118 Lammasch, Heinrich 32, 36, 38 land administration 159 – land assemblies 167, 173, 178, 180 – land autonomy 16, 80 – land commission of Bohemia 80 – land diet(s) 10, 12, 16, 18 f. – land elections 174 f. Land Office 185 – 188 land redistribution 129, 186

Index

Land reform 93, 127 – 129, 134, 138, 141, 184 – 188 landowner(s) 144, 185 – large landowners 13, 129 language 7, 15 – 18, 21, 74, 81, 144, 175 – 177, 184 f., 189 – language compromise 16 – language concessions 127 – language equality 125, 151 – language issue 20, 64, 71, 76, 94, 104, 140, 150 – language rights 176 – language terminology 71, 79 Language Law 63 – 67, 71 – 74, 76, 80,83, 92 – 94., 129, 138, 150 f., 175 – Language Law of February 29th, 1920 64 – language of administration 61, 64 – Language Ordinance of 1926 167 – language ordinance(s) 17, 19 f., 151, 163 – language policy 65, 103 f. – language test(s) 143 – language usage 65, 128, 167 Lansing, U.S. Secretary 30 f. Lanškroun 88 Lany 181 Law for the Defense of the Republic 136, 138 Law on Regional and District Administration 93 Law on the Establishment of Regional and District Authorities 92 Law Providing for Expropriation 185, 187 League of Nations 78, 130, 146, 169 f. Legionnaire(s) 40, 107 f., 116 – legionnaire associations 118 legitimacy 71 Leitmeritz/Litoměřice 42 liberal constitution 63 Liberal Party 13 liberalism 198 Liberec 16, 48, 136, 168 Liberec/Reichenberg 97, 168 Liberec Trade Fair 168 Lidové listy (newspaper) 180 Lidové noviny (newspaper) 112 Lidový dům 109 linguistic islands 82, 184

225

Litoměřice 39 Little Entente 134 Locarno 147 Lodgman von Auen, Rudolf 42 f., 45 – 47, 49, 52 f., 62, 93, 98 – 100, 103, 115, 119, 123 f., 126 – 128, 131, 135 – 137, 147 f., 191 Lombardy 11 London 28, 105 Louny 86, 116 loyal minority 152 Luschka, Senator 207 Lux. Adalbert 168 Magyar(s) 9 f., 12, 14 f., 25 f., 42, 48, 51, 78, 133, 175 – Magyar and Croatian soldiers 31 – Magyar constitutional theory 12 – Magyar language 75 – Magyar mutiny 33 – Magyar speakers 175 – Magyar yoke 79 majority language 65 Malypetr, Jan 85, 138, 165, 203 Mandate(s) 96, 128, 146, 148 f., 159, 171, 174 f., 201, 204 manifesto of the left 97 March 4th 54 Marienbad/Mariánské Lázně 49 market economy 113 Marxism 198 – Marxist 206 Marxist parties 204 Masaryk , Tomáš Garrigue 28 f., 41, 44, 47 – 49, 56, 58 – 61, 63 – 66, 72, 75, 81, 83, 85, 90, 93, 96, 99 f., 103 – 106, 110, 113 – 115, 117 – 120, 122 – 124, 130, 134, 139 f., 149, 151 f., 156 f., 161, 164, 168 – 170, 177 f., 180 – 182, 203, 207 mass demonstrations 54 Mayer, Josef 171 Mayr-Harting, Robert 114, 127 f., 140, 160, 169, 193, 207 Medvecký, Ľudevít 67 – 69 Meissner, Dr. Alfred 86, 92, 166 middle class 182 f., 192, 206

226

Index

military 17, 26, 28, 31, 34 – 36, 38, 41, 134, 190, 197, 203 – military collapse 32 – Military Command 33 f., 38 f. – military exercises 195 – military operations 50 – military service 63, 142, 150 – militia 107 miners 87, 183 Ministry of Schools 71 f., 160 Ministry of War 39 minority concerns 94 – minority defense 21 – minority jobs 74 – minority languages 63, 65, 76, 150 – minority policy 79, 193 – minority problem 161 – minority protection 94 – minority question 169 – minority territories 150 – minority treaty(ies) 100, 137, 146, 169 Mistral, Frédéric 66 mixed national government 141 Mladá Boleslav 89 Modenský Palace 36 monarchy 40 mono-ethnic 110, 131, 149, 154 Moravia 7, 9, 12, 15, 17 f., 23, 43, 46, 68, 80 f., 83, 87, 90, 99, 112, 146, 164, 171, 183 f. – Moravia-Silesia 164 – Moravian Diet 7 – Moravian Land Committee 202 Moravská Ostrava 89 Moscow 105 Most/Brux 206 – Most 87 f. mother tongue 66, 175 f. Mozart’s Don Giovanni 108 multi-ethnic society 63, 94, 112, 163, 168, 188 multi-ethnic state 94 multi-national coalition 148 mutiny(ies) 31, 35 Naegle, Dr. 100 Napoleon III 11

Národ (newspaper) 11 Národní Demokracie (newspaper) 184 Národní listy (newspaper) 36, 62, 108, 174 Národní politika (newspaper) 141 national accommodation 103 National Assembly 41, 56, 59, 62, 65, 80, 83, 85, 89 f., 92 f., 96, 101 f., 119, 123, 126, 130, 134, 144, 161 National Associations 176, 183 – National Association of Northern Bohemia 185 national autonomy 21, 24, 26, 84, 125, 203 national character 111 national chauvinism 156 national coalition 57, 102, 106 National Committee 7, 36 – 39, 41, 43 f., 106 National Committee, 1848 7 National Council 30 National Democratic Party 160 – National Democracy 112, 116, 159 – National Democrats 111, 114, 129 f. national freedom 101 national island 87 national key 144 national minorities 81, 110, 136, 150, 156, 161 national oppression 101 national problem 194 national self-determination 45 – 47, 52 national separation 16, 21 national servitude 102 National Socialism 199 – National Socialist Germany 192 – National Socialist Party 194 f. – National Socialists 197 national solidarity 134 national state 121, 135, 139, 162 f., 185, 205 national treason 103 nationalism 7, 46, 75, 192 – nationalist(s) 62, 72, 75, 102, 124 f., 135, 171, 173, 190, 207 – nationalist system 151 – nationalistic 61, 75, 104 – nationalistic activism 173

Index

nationality 9, 29 – 31, 48, 56 f., 59, 68, 75, 77, 80, 85, 129, 175 f., 184, 186, 193 – nationality key 188 – nationality problem 170 – nationality reform 27 – nationality state 51, 121 f., 162 f., 185 negativism 126, 148 negativist(s) 131, 135, 141, 147, 151, 153, 155 Německý Brod 89 Nicolson, Harold 46 Nitra 70 nobility 8 f., 185, 187 non-Czech troop(s) units 39 non-German majority 16 non-Germans 26 non-Marxist 130 non-Marxist parties 54, 114, 144, 147, 193 – non-Marxist German parties 151 non-violent termination of the war 32 Norden (periodical) 174 Northern (northwest) Bohemia 22 Novák, Ladislav 160 obstruction 116 – obstructionism 18, 166 official language 64 – 68, 71, 76 f., 93, 141, 150 Old Czechs 8, 16, 19 Olomouc 89, 183 Opava 89, 153 Orlické Mountains 43 Osmička 166 Ottoman Empire 47 Pacher, Raphael 42 Palacký, František 8 – 11, 13 Palais Lucerna 189 pan-German 191 – pan-German nationalism 8 – Pan-Germanic 47 – Pan-Germanism 48, 61, 202 paramilitary 36 f., 194 Paris 28, 49, 78 – Paris Peace Conference 10, 41, 43, 46 f., 49, 54, 56 f., 77, 84, 94, 185, 187 – Paris Peace Treaty 76 f., 123, 135

227

Parliament 26, 99 – 102, 106 f., 109 – 111, 116, 119 f., 126, 128, 132, 142, 146, 151 f., 156, 158, 163, 178 – 180, 182, 186, 190, 203, 207 – parliamentary activity 191 – parliamentary coalition 138 – parliamentary democracy 97 – parliamentary elections 59 f., 96, 99, 123, 128, 142, 145 f., 151, 167, 170 f., 178, 180, 192, 204, 206 – parliamentary government 18, 110, 114, 117, 139, 155, 159, 187 – parliamentary majority 148 – parliamentary opposition 109, 135 – parliamentary parties 139 – parliamentary politics 101, 190 Parliamentary Club of the German National Socialists 162 Parliamentary Union 98 – 101, 114, 116, 124 – 126, 147 parliamentary Working Group 139 Party of Independence 31 party unity 97 Patzel, Joseph 162 peace negotiations 28 f., 32, 37, 55 peace treaty 76 peasants 12, 14, 102 Pekař, Josef 187 Pelhřimov 89 Peoples Party 133 Pergler, Deputy 190 Peroutka, Ferdinand 100, 112, 155, 160 Peters, Gustav 195 Pětka 110 f., 113 f., 117 – 119, 122 f., 128 – 132, 134 f., 138, 141, 143 f., 146, 149 – 151, 153 f., 156, 162 f., 181 – Pětka government 135, 138 – Pětka parties 117, 128, 133, 146, 162 Piave 32 Pichon, Stephen 30 Piedmont 11 Pilsner/Plseň 23 – Plzeň 39, 88 f. pluralistic society 94 Pola 35 Poland 47, 146, 154 – Poles 13, 15, 32, 50 f., 82, 94, 184

228

Index

– Polish (lands) 9 – Polish independence 29 – Polish national resistance 32 political amnesty 26 political and national rights 101 political autonomy 81, 132 political centralization 81 Postelporty 116 powers of the presidency 93 Prager Abendblatt (newspaper) 120 Prager Presse (newspaper) 178 Prager Tagblatt (newspaper) 108, 131, 176 Prague 13, 15, 21 – 23, 32, 35 – 37, 39, 43 f., 53, 59, 71, 88 f., 91 f., 100, 108, 110, 112 f., 115, 123, 133, 137, 146, 148, 157, 160, 167 f., 182 f., 186, 189 f., 195, 197, 204, 206 – Prague centralism 104 – Prague City Council 112 – Prague Command 39 – Prague Command of the Austro-Hungarian Army 38 – Prague district court 109 – Prague Germans 7 – Prague National Committee 37 Právo lidu (newspaper) 109, 179 Pražák, Alois 13 Preliminary Results of the Land Reform 186 Přemyslid dynasty 13 President of the Republic 99 Pribichevich, Svetozar 34 Příbram 104 principal language 74 f. prisoners of war 29 program of socialization 97 Prokop, Ministerial Counselor Dr. 177 proletariat 51, 102 proportional representation 75, 94 Protestant(s) 70 provisional constitution 80 Prussia 11, 14, 158 radical nationalism 125 – radical nationalist parties 126 – radical nationalists 125 radicalization 190 – 192, 194

Rašín, Dr. Alois 32 – 36, 44, 60, 114, 127, 130, 135, 186 Rathenau, Walter 136 Rauchberg, Professor 176 Realist Party 28, 118 Red-Green Coalition 57, 96, 103, 105 f., 128 Redlich, Josef 14, 37 regional administration 92 regional autonomy 84, 86 regional land administration 81 – regional land administration system 83, 85 regional system 85 – 87, 89, 91 f., 96, 132 – 134, 159, 164 f., 185 Reich 52, 146, 195 Reichenberg 16, 48 – Reichenberg/Liberec 23, 49 Reichenberger Zeitung (newspaper) 168 Reichsrat 9 f., 12, 15 – 17, 19, 26, 41 – 43, 93 Reichstag 10 Reichstat 8 rejectionist parties 193 Republic 39, 46, 68, 71, 74, 76, 101, 155 Republican Party of the Czechoslovak Agrarian People and Small Holders 129 Reuter, Fritz 66 Revolution 184 – Revolution of 1848 7 – 10, 44 Revolutionary National Assembly 41, 47, 56, 58 f., 61 – 63, 65, 70, 80, 82, 85, 93 f., 96 f., 99, 133, 185, 187 Rieger, František 13 Riepenhasen, Privy Councilor R. von 53 Riesengebirge/Krkonoše 22, 49 Ronge, Max 34 f. Rosche, Dr. Alfred 172 – 174 – Rosche group 174, 196 Roudnice 116 Rumania(ns) 9, 26, 47 Rumanian units 39 Rundschau (periodical) 201 rural electoral support 187 – rural vote 106 Rural Youth 206 Russia 29 f. – Russian Revolution 28 f.

Index

Rutha, Heinrich 200 Ruthenia 41, 164 f., 175 – Ruthenes 94 – Ruthenians 51 SA (Sturmabteilung [Storm Troopers]) 194 f. Saaz/Žatec 48 – Saazer Land/Žatecko 22 Säger, Professor 53 Šámal, Přemysl 58, 113, 118, 127, 138, 140, 170, 182, 193 f. San Nicolo, Mariano 195, 197 Saxony 46, 49 Schäffle, Albert 13 Scheiner, Dr. 36, 37 Schieszl, Josef 118, 127 School(s) 18, 71, 102, 127 f., 134, 138, 140, 151, 184, 194 – school and childcare 193 – school autonomy 127 f. – school policy 103 f. – school question 104 Schubert, Deputy 195 Schütz, Hans 153 SdP (Sudeten German Party) 203 f., 207 secrecy 110 self determination 29, 43 f., 47, 50 f., 54, 57, 84, 100, 121, 137, 185 – self-rule 85 f. Seliger, Jozef 42 – 44, 46, 50 – 52, 54, 62, 97 f., 101, 104 f. Senate 96 separation 24 Serbia 29 – Serbs 26 Šestka 149, 162 Seton-Watson, R.W. 28 SHF (Sudeten German Homeland Front) 196 f., 201 – 203 Silesia 7, 9, 43, 46, 64, 80 – 82, 87, 164, 166, 184 Škába, Mr. 176 Slavic 32 – Slavic language 66, 77 – Slavs 11, 15, 20 Slovak 65, 69, 94, 152, 168, 170, 178 Slovak (newspaper) 179

229

Slovak Agrarian (Party) 132 Slovak autonomy 71, 132 f., 159 – Slovak autonomists 71 Slovak clericals 136 Slovak Club 57, 67 – 71, 96 Slovak delegation 70 Slovak identity 71 Slovak intelligentsia 68 Slovak language 63, 66, 68 f., 71 f., 74 Slovak nation 133 Slovak National and Farmers Party 129 Slovak opposition 144 Slovak parties 187 Slovak Peoples Party 70 f., 132 f., 144, 149, 152 f., 159, 164, 166, 177, 179 – 181 Slovakia 41, 61, 70 f., 81, 130, 132 – 135, 157, 164 f., 167 f., 175, 182, 185 Slovaks 9 f., 26, 32, 51, 63, 66, 69 – 71, 78, 94, 97, 168, 179, 186 Slovenes 22, 26, 32 Slovenský Brod 68 Šmeral, leader of the Czechoslovak Social Democrats 103 Smetana′s Bartered Bride 108 Social Club 167 Social Democracy 98, 126 – Social Democrat(s) 19, 50, 52, 57, 104, 114, 127 f., 130, 194 – Social Democratic 125 – Social Democratic left 97, 109 social insurance 144 f. social revolution 33 socialism 51, 75, 206 Socialist Bloc 153, 193 socialist guidelines 135 socialist program 101 Socialists 114, 130, 155 socialization 102, 114 Sokol Association 38 – Sokol demonstrations 116 – Sokols 37, 39, 118 Soukup, Dr. 36, 39 Southern (southwestern) Bohemia 22 f., 43, 45 f. southern front 34 Southern Moravia 45 f. Southern Slavs 15

230

Index

Sozial Demokrat (newspaper) 143 Spann, Othmar 198 f. Spartakist 45 Spina, Franz 112, 114, 125 – 127, 136 f., 140, 148, 151, 160, 163, 169 f., 177, 182, 194, 201 f., 206 Šrámek, Monsignor Jan 106, 111, 114, 117, 130, 149, 170, 178 Šrobár, Vavro 68, 70 St. Petersburg 29 St. Vacláv’ 205 state language 76 f. state rights 9 State Statistical Council for Preparation of the Census 175 – State Statistical Office 71 f., 177 state’s rights 10, 12 f., 16 State’s Rights Democrats 32 Štefánik, Milan Rostislav 28 Stolberg, Friedrich 207 Storm Troopers (SA) 194 f. Stoupal, Viktor 202 Straussenburg, Arthur Arz von 34 Strážnice 68 Stříbrný, Jiří 36, 39, 111, 114, 129 f., 141, 143, 190 Stříbro 116 Student Union 194 f. Štúr, Ľudevit 70 Stürgkh, Karl 20 Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia 134 Sudeten German 42, 49, 138, 146, 152, 169, 173 f. – Sudeten German Homeland Front (SHF) 196 f., 199 – 203 – Sudeten German Land Union (SLB) 171, 175 – Sudeten German parties 174 – Sudeten German Party (SdP) 191, 203 – Sudeten German people 191, 200 – Sudeten German politics 172 – Sudeten German Popular Front 196 – Sudeten German Union 147 – Sudeten Germans 49, 146, 174, 207 – Sudetenland 43, 45 f., 165 Šumava 183 – Šumava/Böhmerwald 23

supranational state system 51 Supreme Military Command 33 Švehla, Antonín 32, 35 f., 41, 43, 58, 68 f., 71, 74, 76, 82 f., 85 – 87, 90 f., 96, 105, 110, 114, 117, 124, 126 – 130, 134, 138, 140 f., 144 f., 149 – 152, 155 – 161, 163 f., 167, 170, 178, 180 – Švehla government 130, 132, 134, 137, 152, 162, 178, 193 – Švehla′s key 41, 70 Switzerland 51, 53, 81, 87, 111 Taaffe, Eduard 15 f., 158 – Taaffe cabinet 15 – Taaffe government 15 Tabor 88 tariff legislation 154 Tariff Majority 153 – 155, 159 Taub, Siegfried 143 tax reform 134 Tchechoslovakische Korrespondenz (periodical) 142 Teplice 54, 84, 97, 107 – Teplice Party Conference 98 – Teplitz-Schönau/Teplice-Šanov 50 Těšín 89 Tetschen/Děčín 49 Third Communist International 109 Thirty Years War 187 Tiso, Dr. Josef 159 Tisza, Istvan 31 Topolčany 157 totalitarian state 199 traditional land administration 89 f., 159 treason 35, 136 f., 155, 179 f. Treaty of St. Germain 55 Třebíč 89 trench warfare 47 Tribuna (newspaper) 116, 121 f., 142 troops 48 f. Trutnov 116 – Trutnova 88 Tschuppik, Walter 108 Tuka, Vojtěch 179 f. Turnov 89 Turnverband 196 – 198, 200

Index

Tusar, Vlastimil 32 – 37, 57 f., 62, 90 f., 96 – 98, 100 – 105 – Tusar government 58 – 61, 63 – 65, 71, 75, 96 f., 100, 104, 109, 127 Twenty-One Conditions 105, 109 Udržal, František 170, 179 – 182 – Udržal government 178, 182 Uherské Hradiště 89 ultra-nationalist(s) 16, 25, 44, 99, 106, 111, 128, 172 unemployment 134 f., 189 f., 193 Union of Industrialists 35 United States 28, 30 f., 49, 159 unity government 182 universal suffrage 63, 94 university in Prague 15 Upper Austria 23 Ústí nad Labem 22 f, 49, 116 Večerní České Slovo (newspaper) 45 Večerník Českého Slova (newspaper) 121 Venetia 11 Veselý, František 73 f. Victor Emmanuel 11 Vienna 8 f., 12 f., 18, 28, 32 f., 35 – 39, 42 f., 45, 49, 53 f., 90, 158 – Viennese government 37 f., 52 – Viennese secretariat of the Yugoslav delegation 36 Világos 10 Viškovský, Dr. Karel 170, 180 Vltava 101 Volkssport 194 – 196 Vrchlabí 88 Wallenstein conspiracy 187 war loans 123, 127 f., 138 Washington 31

weapons 136, 195 – weapons caches 53 Weiss, Ernst 109 Wenceslas Square 108, 189 f. western Adriatic 9 Western Bohemia 22 Wilson, President Woodrow 29, 31, 36 – Wilson’s Fourteen Points 31, 100 Windischgrätz, General 44 Winter, Lev 151 Wolf, Privy Councilor 52, 61, 63 ‘Women of Shame’ 108 workers 12, 22, 50 f., 57, 102, 110, 134, 144, 155, 183, 201 – workers’ councils 97 – workers’ parties 98 working class 51 f. Working Group 126, 129 f., 139 f. World War (I) 14, 25, 27, 100, 118 wounded Germans 116 written language 66 written Slovak language 70 Yiddish 176 Young Czechs 16, 19 Yugoslav(s) 9, 31 f., 34, 50 – Yugoslav Club 32 – Yugoslavia 47, 49, 154 Zagreb 34, 36 Zahradník, Bohdan 68 f., 74 f. Zajíček, Deputy 195, 207 Zanantoni, General 38 Záruba-Pfeffermann, Josef 86 – 88 Žatec 116 – Źatec/Saaz 198 Žerav, Dr. 32 f. Zionists 176 Znojmo 88

231