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1 Thoughts on zJxCachiavelli
Thoughts on M AC H I AVE L L I
B Y L E O STRAUSS
T H E U N IV E R S IT Y O F C H IC A G O PRESS Chicago and London
The University o f Chicago Press, Chicago 60637 The University o f Chicago Press, L td ., London Copyright © 1958 by Leo Strauss A ll rights reserved. Published 1958 Phoenix E dition 1978 P rinted in the United States o f A m erica 82 81 80 79 78
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ISBN: 0-226-77702-2 LC N : 78-55044
Preface
I H IS is an expanded version o f fo u r lectures w hich J l I delivered at the U niversity o f Chicago in the fa ll term 1953, under the auspices o f the Charles R. W algreen Foundation. I am grateful to the Charles R. W algreen Foundation and es pecially to its chairman, Professor Jerome G . K erw in, fo r giving me the o p p o rtu n ity to present m y observations and reflections on the problem o f M achiavelli. I am also grateful to the W algreen Foundation fo r generous clerical assistance. Chapter I I o f this study has been published previously in the Am erican P o litica l Science Review (M arch, 1957). L.S. Chicago, Illin o is , December, 1957
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C ontents
I. II.
Preface
5
Introduction
9
The T w o fo ld Character o f Machiavelli’s Teaching
15
M achiavelli’s Intention:
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The Prince
III.
M achiavelli’s Intention: The Discourses
IV .
M achiavelli’s Teaching
174
Notes
301
Index
347
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In tro d u c tio n
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\V /E shall not shock anyone, we shall merely ourselves to good-natured o r at any rate harmless ridicule, if we profess ourselves inclined to the oldfashioned and simple opinion according to w hich M achiavelli was a teacher o f evil. Indeed, w hat other description w ould fit a man who teaches lessons like these: princes ought to exterminate the fam ilies o f rulers whose te rrito ry they wish to possess securely; princes ought to m urder th e ir opponents rather than to confiscate th e ir p ro pe rty since those who have been robbed, but not those who are dead, can th in k o f revenge; men forget the m urder o f th e ir fathers sooner than the loss o f th e ir patrim ony; true lib e ra lity consists in being stingy w ith one’s own property and in being generous w ith w hat belongs to others; not virtue but the prudent use o f virtu e and vice leads to happiness; injuries ought all to be done together so that, being tasted less, they w ill h urt less, w hile benefits ought to be conferred little by little , so that they w ill be fe lt more strongly; a victorious general who fears that his prince m ight not reward him properly, may punish him fo r his anticipated ingratitude b y raising the flag o f rebellion; if one has to choose be tween in flic tin g severe injuries and4in flic tin g lig h t injuries, one ought to in flic t severe injuries; one ought not to say to someone whom one wants to k ill “ G ive me yo ur gun, I want to k ill you w ith it,” but m erely, “ G ive me yo ur gun,” fo r once you have the gun in yo u r hand, you can satisfy yo u r desire. I f it is true that o n ly an evil man w ill stoop to teach maxims o f public and private gangsterism, we are forced to say that M achiavelli was an evil man.
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us to understand that there is deception beneath his own manifest blunders, or that his manifest blunders are intentional: they in d i cate his intention. W e arrive at this solution by taking most seriously w hat M achiav e lli says at the very beginning o f the Discourses: that he has dis covered new modes and orders, that such discovery is dangerous if it is communicated, and that he w ill nevertheless communicate his discovery. This most obvious and explicit, if in itia l and p ro vi sional statement concerning his intention guides us towards the adequate understanding o f his intention, provided “ we p ut 2 and 2 together” or do some thinking on our own. Regarding the example discussed above, we thus arrive at a solution w hich acquits M achiave lli o f the disgrace o f com m itting blunders o f w hich an in tellig en t high school boy w ould be ashamed. Some readers w ill feel that this solution is to be rejected because it does not do cre d it to M achiavelli’s m orality. As we have indicated fro m the outset, we are doubtful o f his m orality. T o the readers who w ould raise the d iffic u lty mentioned we may reply using M achiavelli’s own words: “ For some tim e I never say what I believe and I never believe w hat I say; and if it sometimes occurs to me that I say the tru th , I conceal it among so many lies that it is hard to find it out.” 41 T o discover from his w ritings what he regarded as the tru th is hard: it is not impossible. iMachiavelli’s w o rk is ric h in manifest blunders o f various kinds: misquotations, misstatements regarding names o r events, hasty gen eralizations, indefensible omissions and so on. I t is a rule o f common prudence to “ believe” that all these blunders are intentional and in each case to raise the question as to w hat the blunder m ight be meant to signify. The simplest case o f manifest blunder is the author’s self-contradiction and especially self-contradiction on one and the same page. In Discourses I 28, M achiavelli raises the ques tio n as to w hy the Romans were less ungrateful to th e ir fe llo w citizens than were the Athenians. H is answer is based on a number o f premises, among w hich the fo llo w in g is p a rticu la rly im portant in the present context: Athens was deprived o f her lib e rty b y Pisistratus during her most flourishing period, whereas Rome was never deprived o f her lib e rty b y any o f her citizens between the expulsion o f the kings and the tim e o f M arius and Sylla. Seven chapters later he says that the ten citizens elected fo r making laws
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b y the free votes o f the Roman people became tyrants o f Rome. W e are not at present concerned w ith the fact that this self-con tra d ictio n makes doubtful M achiavelli’s explanation o f Roman gratitude and Athenian ingratitude.42 W e m erely raise the pre lim in a ry question concerning the most obvious im plication o f M achiavelli’s obvious blunder. The tem porary disregard o f the Decemvirate amounts to a tem porary overstatement concerning the goodness o f the Roman republic; fo r long and continuous duration o f freedom is, according to M achiavelli, a great good.43 W e are then compelled to wonder w h y M achiavelli tem porarily overstates the case in favor o f the Roman republic. W e observe that in the same short chapter (I 28) he calls the period o f Pisis tratus firs t “ the most flourishing tim e” o f Athens, and, about a page later, Athens’ “ firs t times and p rio r to Athens’ grow th.” He thus suggests that the most flourishing period o f a c ity is the period preceding its grow th, i.e., the firs t tim e o r its beginning. This agrees w ith his earlier remark that at the b irth o f a republic, as distinguished from later periods, “ men are good,” and w ith his emphatic praise, in the firs t chapter, o f the kings o f E gypt who ruled that country “ in the most ancient a n tiq u ity.” The praise o f the beginnings o r origins, w hich, as we shall see later, is contra dicted elsewhere in the Discourses, is the context w ith in w hich M achiavelli’s deliberately exaggerated praise o f the Roman republic must be understood. He challenges the established modes and orders, whose prim ary claim to reverence rests on th e ir antiquity, p rim a rily b y appealing not to the good as such but to a more ancient antiquity, if not to “ the most ancient a n tiq u ity.” For he who desires to introduce new modes and orders, is compelled to retain at least a shadow o f ancient modes and orders, if he is unable or u n w illin g to use force and nothing but force.44 A n author may reveal his intention by the titles o f his books. The titles o f M achiavelli’s tw o books aje most unrevealing in this respect. The same is almost equally true o f the chapter headings, w hich occupy an interm ediate position between the titles o f the books and th e ir substance. W e have noted that the chapter head ings o f the Discourses, to say nothing o f those o f the Prince, reveal hardly anything o f the daring q ua lity o f his thought.45 In discussing a passage fro m the Discourses ( III 48), we observed a
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striking difference between the rule o f conduct stated in the head ing and the rule as restated w ith in the chapter: the rule as stated in the heading does not stimulate thought, whereas the restate ment arouses thought not to say indignation. The heading o f I 48 reads, “ He who wishes that a magistracy be not given to someone base or bad, induces either someone exceedingly base and exceed in g ly bad or someone exceedingly noble and exceedingly good to apply fo r it.” The argument o f the chapter leads to the conclusion that w hile the people deceive themselves as to generalities, they do not deceive themselves as to particulars. B ut at the end o f the preceding chapter, M achiavelli says that I 48 is meant to show how the Roman senate went about to deceive the people in regard to the distribution o f ranks and dignities among candidates, i.e., in regard to particulars. The heading o f I 13 reads, “ H o w the Romans used religion fo r reordering the c ity and pursuing th e ir enter prises and stopping tum ults” ; the heading does not give the slightest indication o f the fact that the body o f the chapter deals chiefly w ith the question o f how the Roman n o b ility used religion fo r controlling the plebs. In the heading o f I 26 M achiavelli speaks o f “ a new prince” ; neither in the heading nor in the body o f the chapter does he say what he says at the end o f the preceding chapter, namely, that I 26 is devoted to the phenomenon generally know n by the name o f tyranny. In the heading o f I 30, he uses the expression “ the vice o f ingratitude” ; at the beginning o f the chapter itself he replaces this expression b y “ the necessity . . . to be ungrateful” : the thought that men’s vices (and virtues) are due to necessity rather than to election is in no w ay suggested b y the heading. In the heading o f I 9, he says that “ I t is necessary to be alone if one wishes to order a republic afresh” ; there is not the slightest indication here that being alone can be achieved b y m urdering one’s only brother, as is developed at great length w ith in the chapter; in fact, the lesson to be learned from Romulus’s slay ing o f his brother may be said to be the chief theme o f the chapter. The heading o f Discourses I I I 18 makes one expect that Machia ve lli w ill discuss in that chapter the importance as w e ll as the d iffi c u lty o f understanding the enemy’s intentions. On the basis o f o ur previous observations we are not surprised to see that he drops this subject imm ediately after having referred to it, and replaces it by the d iffic u lty o f know ing the enemy’s actions, and not m erely
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his actions in the past and in remote places but his “ present and near” actions. He cites fo u r examples to prove his point. There is a s tric t parallelism among the examples: tw ice an ancient example is follow ed by a modern example. The firs t tw o examples deal w ith defeats caused b y errors as to the enemy’s present and near actions; the last tw o examples deal w ith victories due to correct inform ation as to the enemy’s present and near actions: in both the la tte r examples, possession o f true knowledge alone was decisive fo r v ic to ry . In both the la tte r examples, the v ic to ry lacked splendor and the acquisition o f knowledge lacked m erit. The ancient v ic to ry had this character: there had been a drawn battle between the Romans and the A equi; each arm y believed that the enemy had w on and each therefore marched home; b y accident a Roman centurion learned fro m some wounded A equi that the Aequi had abandoned th e ir camp; he therefore sacked the deserted camp o f the enemy and returned home a v icto r. The modem v ic to ry had this character: a Florentine and a Venetian arm y had been facing each other fo r several days, neither daring to attack the other; since both armies began to suffer fro m lack o f victuals, each decided to retire; b y accident the Florentine captains learned fro m a woman who, being “ secure because o f her age and her p ove rty,” had gone to see some o f her people in the Florentine camp, that the Venetians were re tirin g ; the Florentines therefore became courageous, w ent after th e ir enemies, and w rote to Florence that they had repulsed the enemy and won the war. In the ancient example we fin d then a bloody battle, wounded enemy soldiers, and the plundering o f the enemy camp. In the modem example we fin d a phony battle, an old and poor woman, and a boastful le tte r. The contrast w hich is not made explicit, between the an cient and the modern example teaches us nothing about the supe rio rity o f the v irile ancients to the effeminate moderns that M achiavelli does not te ll us w ith the utm ost explicitness in many other passages o f the Discourses. T hat silent contrast, therefore, does not teach us anything new as to his prim ary intention, w hich is to contribute tow ard the re b irth o f the s p irit o f a ntiquity. Yet tha t silent contrast perform s a function, o r rather it perform s tw o different, if related functions. In the firs t place, it draws our atten tio n to the fact that the chapter under consideration is secretly devoted to some aspect o f the central problem regarding the d if-
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ference between the ancients and the moderns. Secondly, it pre sents the general lesson in a mode w hich is less obvious throughout the Discourses and the Prince, than the opposite mode. E very reader, however superficial, o f either o f the tw o books cannot but become aware o f the g ra vity o f M achiavelli as a teacher o f princes and statesmen. I t is then o f some importance to realize that the sp irit o f comedy, not to say le vity, is not absent fro m his tw o most serious books. In fact, g ra vity and le v ity are com bined in these tw o books “ in a quasi-impossible com bination,” just as they were in the man M achiavelli.46 I f it is true that every complete society necessarily recognizes something about w hich it is absolutely forbidden to laugh,47 we may say that the determina tio n to transgress that prohib itio n sanza alcuno rispetto, is o f the essence o f M achiavelli’s intention. He does not reveal this intention. He even refuses to reveal the difficulties that bar the understanding o f the enemy’s intention. B ut he adumbrates those difficulties by suggesting a hierarchy o f the difficulties that prevent one from know ing the enemy’s present and near actions. In the last o f the fo u r examples, no error was com m itted by anyone because no action was taken during the night. In the firs t three examples errors, and in the firs t tw o examples even disastrous errors, were com m itted because darkness had supervened. In the last tw o examples, present and near daytim e actions o f the enemy were discovered by sheer accident. A ll fo u r examples deal w ith present and near actions. The difficulties increase in fin ite ly when one is concerned w ith discovering the tru th about nocturnal enemy actions done in remote countries and in the remote past. But even these difficulties are surpassed b y those obstructing the discovery o f the intentions o f clever enemies: they can never be discovered by accident.48 This is not to deny that accessible w riting s o f clever enemies p a rtly partake o f the character o f present and near daytime actions o f the enemy. In a deliberate self-contradiction an author says incom patible things or, more generally stated, different things about the same subject to different people, and in some cases to the same people in different stages o f the ir understanding. B ut to speak d iffe re n tly to different people may be said to be iro n y in the prim ary sense o f the w ord.49 W hatever may be the relation between iro n y and parody in general, certainly subtle parodies may fu lfill the demands o f
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iro n y proper. Discourses I I 12 is a parody o f this kind, a subdued parody o f scholastic disputations. M achiavelli discusses there the question o f w hether it is better, if one apprehends an attack, to assail the enemy in his country, or to await him in one’s own country. The discussion consists o f fo u r parts: arguments from authority fo r either side, arguments fro m reason fo r either side, a solution based on a distinction, and a defense o f the solution against an ad verse argument. I t is a parody o f a scholastic disputation both be cause it applies scholastic procedure to a non-scholastic subject and because the central a uth ority in favor o f the superior alternative is a “ poetic fable” : the place o f the Bible is taken by poetic fables. M achiavelli w ould seem to have inferred from the human, not heavenly, o rig in o f B iblical religion to w hich he had alluded seven chapters earlier, that the dogmatic teaching o f the Bible has the cognitive status o f poetic fables.50 W e are at present much more concerned, however, w ith the seemingly triv ia l circumstance that he hesitates in Discourses II 12 to call the arguments from a uthority b y that name: in that place he somewhat blurs the difference be tween a uth ority and reason.51 He stresses that difference six chapters afterw ard in a rather strikin g manner. In the heading o f II 18, he refers to “ the a uth ority o f the Romans and the example o f the ancient m ilitia ,” but he replaces this expression in the firs t line o f the chapter b y “ many reasons and many examples.” S hortly after ward, he quotes a L atin sentence, an extrem ely simple Latin sen tence, and then adds to the quotation its Italian translation, some th in g he does nowhere else in either book: after having replaced “ a u th o rity” b y “ reasons,” he goes on to replace the language o f a u th o rity b y his own native tongue.52 In the immediate sequel he says, “ if one must fo llo w a uth ority . . . A pa rt from authority, there are manifest reasons.” A fte r having established his opinion b y reason alone, he refers—and this is another unique occurrence —to “ the a uth ority o f those who regulate p o litica l things,” i.e., to “ the a u th o rity” o f the tra dition a l political theorists. One must bear in m ind the presence o f the problem o f a uth ority in this section o f the Discourses, a section w hich may be said to be opened b y the remark, discussed above, as to the meaning o f L iv y ’s silence. Otherwise, one may fa il to understand, among other things, the fo llo w in g irregularities occurring in an intervening chapter. Dis courses I I 13 is meant to prove that one ascends from a lo w to
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a high position through fraud rather than through force. M achiave lli gives some details concerning only tw o individuals who rose from an abject or low condition to great p o litica l power. Both individuals were nephews ( nepoti) o f the absolute rulers who preceded them; they cannot be said to have risen to th e ir com manding height from an abject or lo w place. T h at is to say, the examples are not apt: we are compelled to wonder w hich were the apt examples that M achiavelli had in mind. In the same chapter he asserts that not only princes but the Roman republic as w e ll rose to pre-eminence in itia lly by fraud, and he proves this b y quoting from L iv y a speech by an enemy o f the Romans; L iv y is presented as revealing the tru th about Roman fraud b y p utting certain words into the m outh o f an enemy o f Rome. Could a respectable Roman have been unable to say the tru th about Rome except b y making an enemy o f Rome his mouthpiece, just as a subject o f the Roman emperors was unable to say the tru th about Caesar except by praising Caesar’s enemy? Could a citizen o f the respublica Christiana have been unable to say what he regarded as the tru th about C hristianity except b y em ploying an enemy o f C hristianity o r a pagan, such as L iv y , as his mouthpiece? Machia ve lli certainly tries to establish the tru th about the H ebrew con quest o f Canaan by referring to an account about Joshua w hich goes back to enemies o f the Hebrews and w hich flagrantly con tradicts the Hebrew account.53 W hen an author deliberately contradicts him self in a subtle manner, he may be said to repeat an earlier statement o f his w hile varying it in a w ay w hich fo r some reason is not easily noticed. M achiavelli discusses in the Discourses the p o licy o f Florence tow ard Pistoia more than once. In the firs t statement ( I I 21) he says that the c ity o f Pistoia came vo lu n ta rily under the sway o f Florence because the Florentines had always treated the Pistoians as brothers. In the second statement ( II 25) he says that the c ity o f Pistoia came under the sway o f Florence b y means o f the fo llo w in g “ peaceful artifice.” Pistoia being divided in to parties, the Florentines favored now one, now the other p a rty and thus led the Pistoians to become so tire d o f p arty strife that they threw themselves vo lu n ta rily into the arms o f Florence. The peaceful art used b y the Florentines is described in the context as tha t o f dividing and conquering. In the second statement M achiavelli
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draws our attention to the difference between the tw o accounts o f the Florentine p o licy tow ard Pistoia b y referring to w hat he had said on this subject in another chapter and “ fo r another ρurpose.’, The cross reference is strikin g since it is the only one o f this character that occurs in the Discourses. M achiavelli must indeed have had more than one purpose if he could describe the same p o lic y firs t as an expression o f fra te rn ity and lib e ra lity, and then as an application o f the rule “ divide and conquer.” W hat firs t comes to sight as fra te rn ity and lib e ra lity, reveals itse lf on reflection as shrewd “ pow er politics.” The firs t statement agrees w ith the common view according to w hich m o ra lity can control and ought to control p o litica l life ; the second statement read in conjunction w ith the firs t suggests doubt o f the common view. N o one, I believe, questions the opinion that M achiavelli did doubt the common view regarding the relation between m o ra lity and politics, fo r every one has read chapters 15 ff. o f the Prince. The crossreference under discussion is im portant to us at present not because it throw s lig h t on the substance o f his teaching but because it reveals to some extent his w ay o f presenting it. The substance o f his teaching is bound to be misunderstood if one does not realize that he reveals his teaching, to the extent to w hich he does reveal it, o n ly in stages: he ascends fro m “ firs t statements,” w hich are, to exaggerate fo r the purpose o f clarification, in all cases respectable o r p u b lic ly defensible, to “ second statements” o f a different char acter. I f one does not realize the difference o f “ purpose” between “ firs t statements” and “ second statements,” one may read the “ second statements” in the lig h t o f the “ firs t statements” and thus b lu n t the edges o f his teaching; one w ill at any rate ascribe the same w eight to both kinds o f statements; and since the “ firs t statements” are more o r less traditional o r conventional, one w ill not grasp the magnitude o r enorm ity o f M achiavelli’s enterprise. I t is necessary, at least wherever M achiavelli refers to earlier statements on a given subject b y using expressions like “ as has been said,” carefully to compare the restatement w ith the original statement and to see whether the restatement does not im p ly a considerable m odification o f the firs t statement. T o give an example the com plexity o f w hich is proportionate to its importance, M achiavelli repeatedly discusses in the firs t book o f the Discourses the subject o f “ founders” o r o f men w ho established “ new orders.” In the firs t statement (I 9-10),
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he contends that a founder who is concerned w ith the common good, as distinguished from a tyra nt, cannot be blamed if he commits m urder in order to achieve his good end; the discussion is based on the fundamental and traditional distinction between the prince and the tyra nt, between the common good and the private good, between virtue and am bition; Caesar, in contrast to Romulus, appears as the outstanding example o f a most blame w o rth y tyra nt. In the second statement (I 16-18), M achiavelli makes use o f the distinction between co rru p t and uncorrupt peoples, and in connection w ith this blurs the distinction between princes and tyrants: was Caesar’s tyranny not inevitable, and therefore p erfectly excusable, given the corruption o f Rome in his time?64 A nd what do corruption and its opposite mean if, to say nothing o f other things, the uncorrupt character o f the earliest Rome per m itted Romulus “ to color his design” whereas Caesar presumably was under no compulsion to do this? Was then Romulus’s design not to promote the common good? In the th ird statement ( I 25-27), M achiavelli indicates that “ tyra nn y” is a traditional term , i.e., a term not necessarily required by, or compatible w ith , his intention. In a chapter w hich is e xp licitly devoted to what “ the w riters call tyranny,” he treats the godly K in g David as an example o f a ty ra n t; and in the chapter fo llo w in g he makes it clear that a very w icked ru le r who cannot be presumed to be guided b y any concern w ith the common good, may nevertheless earn eternal g lo ry by doing deeds w hich are conducive to the common good. W e are led to conclude that the prim ary distinction between public-spirited virtu e and selfish am bition is irrelevant since selfish am bition on the broadest scale can be satisfied only b y actions from w hich very many people p ro fit. In all these statements it is assumed that founda tio n is a unique act at the inception o f a commonwealth o r a regime. But M achiavelli eventually questions this assumption: foundation is, as it were, continuous foundation; not only at the beginning, but “ every day,” a commonwealth needs “ new orders.” 65 Once one realizes this, one sees that the founders o f a republic are its leading men throughout the ages, o r its ru lin g class. One sees therefore, that the section devoted to the ru lin g class ( I 33-45) is as it were the true and final statement concerning founders.66 W e may draw a fu rth e r lesson from M achiavelli’s tw o fo ld discussion o f the p o licy o f Florence tow ard Pistoia. He suggests m utually exclusive in te r-
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pretations o f the same fact: w hat is im portant is not the fact itself but the o p p o rtu n ity w hich it provides fo r making a point. Thus we understand that M achiavelli is not always concerned w ith his torica l tru th , and frequently changes at w ill the data supplied by the histories: if there are examples w hich are both beautiful and true,57 there may be examples w hich are beautiful w ith o u t being true. In the language o f our tim e, M achiavelli is an artist as much as he is an historian. He is certainly very a rtfu l.58 M achiavelli’s examples are not always apt nor always true. I do not believe that we can in fe r from this that they are not always w e ll chosen. He frequently uses expressions like “ I wish to leave it at this example.” I t is always necessary to wonder w h y he pre ferred the example o r the examples w hich he adduces: were they the most apt or the most suggestive examples?59 For what we know in such cases is m erely the fact that M achiavelli did not wish to m ention other examples; we do not know the reason w h y he did not wish to m ention them. As regards the Discourses in particular, the prim ary intention o f w hich w ould suggest an even distribution o f Roman and modern examples, one must pay attention to the actual d istribution w hich is h ig hly irregular. W e must do this even independently o f whether M achiavelli e xp licitly refers to his w ishing to leave it at the examples adduced. Expressions o f the type “ I wish to leave it a t . . .” may be said to indicate “ exclusions,” since they exclude fro m mention, or from fu rth e r discussion, what m ight w ell deserve to be, but what could not conveniently or w ith p ro p rie ty be, mentioned o r discussed at greater length. The opposite o f exclusions are digressions. A typ ica l expression indicating a digression is the rem ark “ B ut let us return to our subject-m atter.” In a digression an author discusses something w hich he characterizes as not belonging to the subject-m atter s tric tly understood. In books like the Prince and the Discourses, the digressions contain discus sions w hich w ould not be required to fu rth e r the prim ary, explicit, ostensible o r partial intention but are'required to fu rth e r the fu ll o r true intention. The prim ary o r partial intention o f the Prince w ould require the treatm ent o f only those kinds o f p rin cip a lity or o f the acquisition o f p rin cely pow er w hich are mentioned in the firs t chapter; that is to say, the firs t chapter leads us to expect the subject-m atters o f chapters 2-7; chapters 8-11, containing, among other things, the discussion o f the acquisition o f princely power
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by crime and the discussion o f ecclesiastical principalities, come as a surprise; it is not misleading, although it is not strict, to call chapters 8-11 a digression. The statement as to the sim ila rity between the state o f the Sultan and the Christian Pontificate, in the nine teenth chapter o f the Prince,60 is a typ ica l digression in the s tric t sense. W e w ould not consider as a digression in the s tric t sense a passage w hich M achiavelli does not indicate to be one. W e do regard as a digression however a passage w hich is presented as an answer to a possible question o r objection o f the reader.61 A passage o f this kin d is M achiavelli's discussion, in the eleventh chapter o f the Prince, o f how the temporal pow er o f the church rose to its present height. A nother passage o f this kind is the dis cussion o f the Roman emperors in the nineteenth chapter o f the Prince, A b rie f analysis o f the latter passage may be helpful fo r understanding the meaning o f digressions in general. In the n in th chapter M achiavelli had made it clear that there is one absolute lim it to the astute use o f princely pow e r w hile a prince may, under certain circumstances, safely disregard the interests o f the great and even destroy the great, it is absolutely necessary fo r him to respect the extrem ely moderate demands o f the common people. A fte r having restated this rule in a m itigated form in the firs t part of chapter 19, M achiavelli explains in the section on the Roman emperors that that rule, even in its original form , is b y no means universally valid: under the Roman empire there was a co n flict o f interests between the people and the soldiers; die pow er o f the soldiers was greater than that o f the people; therefore the emperors had to satisfy the demands o f the soldiers rather than those o f the people; hence an able Roman emperor who had the support o f die soldiers was under no compulsion to consider the people at alL The last brake on wicked rulers can be rendered ineffective. The outstanding example o f such a Roman emperor was Septimius Severus. I f M achiavelli had at this point been able to use traditional language, he w ould have said that Severus wras a typ ica l ty ra n t who had the support o f his bodyguard. N ow . it is precisely Severus, this “ most ferocious lion and most astute fox*’—the same Severus whom he calls elsewhere a crim inal—whom he holds up at the end o f the chapter as a model fo r founders o f states as distinguished from princes whose task is m erely to preserve a state already
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founded:62 as fa r as founders are concerned, the distinction between virtuous heroes and extrem ely able crim inals has ceased to exist. In reading M achiavelli’s books one is constantly kept wondering whether he is careful or careless in the use o f terms both technical and other. W e have observed so many examples o f his exceed ing care that we venture to make this suggestion: it is safer to believe that he has given careful thought to every w ord he uses than to make allowances fo r human weakness. Considering the difference o f rank between M achiavelli and people like ourselves, the rule o f reading w hich derives from that belief may be im practicable, since we cannot possibly com ply w ith it in all cases. I t is nevertheless a good rule, fo r remembering it keeps us awake and modest or helps us to develop the habit o f being in the proper m ixture both bold and cautious. There are certain terms w hich require particular attention, namely, ambiguous terms. The am b ig u ity o f “ v irtu e ” is best know n. M achiavelli says o f the crim inal Agathocles, in tw o consecutive sentences, firs t that he lacked virtu e and then that he possessed virtu e ; in the firs t case “ virtu e ” means m oral virtu e in the widest sense w hich includes religion, and in the second case it means cleverness and courage combined. Pope Leo X is said to possess “ goodness and in fin ite other virtues” and Hannibal is said to have possessed “ inhuman cru e lty together w ith (in fin ite ) other virtues.” T o use lib e ra lity “ virtuously and as one ought to use it ” is distinguished from using it prudently, i.e., virtu o u sly in a different sense o f the term .63 There is an intermediate meaning according to w hich “ virtu e ” designates political virtue o r the sum o f qualities required fo r rendering service to p o litica l society o r fo r effective patriotism . Even in accordance w ith this interm ediate meaning, inhuman c ru e lty could be a virtue and am bition a vice. In many cases it is impossible to say w hich kind o f virtu e is meant. This obscurity is essential to M achiavelli’s presentation o f his teaching. I t is required b y the fact that the reader is meant to ascend from the common understanding o f virtue to the diam etrically opposite understanding. E qually ambiguous is “ prince.” “ Prince” may mean a non-tyrannical monarch, o r any monarch, or any man or body o f men in a ru lin g position including the leading men in a republic, to say nothing o f another meaning. “ People” may mean a republican society as w e ll as the common
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people. “ Human beings” may mean human beings as such or male hu man beings, or the general run o f men, or the subjects o f princes.64 “ Heaven" may mean the visible heaven, the ground o f all regu la rity or order in the sub-celestial w orld, a thinking and w illin g being that may be kind to human beings o r love certain human individuals, chance, a goal o f human aspiration, and the cause o f catastrophes like plagues, famines or floods. “ W e” may mean Machiavelli, M achiavelli and his reader o r readers, M achiavelli’s contemporaries, the Florentines, the Christians, the contem porary Christians, the Italians, the contem porary Italians, all human beings, a society to w hich the speaker belongs in contradistinction to an enemy society, both a society and its enemy taken together. In some cases it is hard to decide what the first person plural pronoun precisely means, as fo r instance when M achiavelli calls L iv y “ our historian." or when he says “ we, at any rate, do not have knowledge o f things natural and supernatural.” 65 In the last case it is not im possible that “ w e" means “ we who are not philosophers.” The Discourses are devoted to the firs t ten books o f L iv y ’s H isto ry , or to the history o f Rome up to about 292 b .c . L iv y ’s H istory consisted o f 142 books. Strangely, the Discourses consist o f 142 chapters, fo r the prefaces to Book I and Book II are, o f course, not chapters. M achiavelli w ould seem thus to convey his intention o f elucidating the history, not only o f early Rome, but o f Rome from its beginning u n til the tim e o f the emperor Augus tus. A glance at the list o f the events discussed in the Discourses bears out this contention.66 The strange fact that the number o f chapters o f the Discourses is the same as the number o f the books of L iv y makes one wonder whether the number o f chapters o f the Prince is not also significant. Since the Prince consists o f tw e n tysix chapters and the Prince does not give us any inform ation as to the possible meaning o f this number, we tu rn to the tw e n tysixth chapter o f the Discourses. T hat chapter is the only chapter o f the Discourses w hich is devoted, according to its heading, to the “ new prince,” i.e., the chief theme o f the Prince. M oreover, the chapter deals w ith what the authors call tyranny, as Machia v e lli says at the end o f the preceding chapter; but the term “ tyra n n y” {o r “ ty ra n t") is avoided in the tw enty-sixth chapter. I f we tu rn fro m the tw enty-sixth chapter o f the Discourses to the Prince , w hich consists o f tw enty-six chapters, we observe that the terms
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“ ty ra n t” o r “ tyra n n y” are avoided in the Prince too: the tw e n tysixth chapter o f the Discourses imitates the Prince in such a w ay as to give us a clue to the Prince. Since this observation leads to fu rth e r relevant observations concerning the Prince, some o f w hich have been noted before, we gain some confidence that in taking seriously the number 26, we are on the rig h t path. But before pursuing this line o f thought, it may be wise to dw ell fo r a w hile on the tw enty-sixth chapter o f the Discourses. The firs t o f the tw o examples w hich M achiavelli uses in that chapter is K ing David, according to the Gospels, the ancestor o f Jesus. The measures that men like K in g David must em ploy at the beginning o f th e ir reign, i.e., in order to found or establish the ir states, are described by M achiavelli as “ most cruel and inim ical, not only to every Christian manner o f liv in g but to every humane manner o f liv in g as w e ll.” One measure o f K in g David was to make the rich poor and the poor rich . In speaking o f this measure M achiavelli quotes the fo l lo w in g verse fro m the M agnificat: “ He fille d the hungry w ith good things, and sent the ric h away em pty.” T h at is to say, he applies to the ty ra n t David an expression w hich the N ew Testament, o r M ary, applies to God. Since he characterizes as tyrannical, a w ay o f acting that the N ew Testament ascribes to God he leads us to the conclusion, nay, says in effect, that God is a tyra nt. In his ow n strange w ay he accepts the traditional view according to w hich David was a godly king o r walked in the ways o f God. I t is fo r the sake o f m aking this extraordinary and shocking suggestion that he uses the o n ly quotation from the N ew Testament w hich he ever uses in either the Prince o r the Discourses.®7 The most superficial fact regarding the Discourses, the fact tha t the num ber o f its chapters equals the number o f books o f L iv y ’s H isto ry , compelled us to start a chain o f tentative reason ing w hich brought us suddenly face to face w ith the only N ew Testament quotation that ever occurs in M achiavelli’s tw o books and w ith an enormous blasphemy. It*w o u ld be a great disservice to tru th if we were to use any other words, any weaker words fo r characterizing w hat he is doing. For it w ould be a mistake to believe that the blasphemy w hich we encountered is the only one o r even the w orst one w hich he com m itted. T hat blasphemy is, so to speak, only the spearhead o f a large column. W e have no com punction whatever about using a term w hich expresses very strong
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disapproval, although its use is lik e ly to be regarded b y our fe llo w social scientists as a “ culture conditioned” reflex and therefore as an aberration from the straight and narrow path o f scientific correctitude; fo r we believe that fa ilin g to call a spade a spade is not scientific. Someone m ight say in defense o f M achiavelli that he does not speak o f God in the incrim inated passage o r that the blas phemy is so w e ll concealed as to be non-existent fo r the m a jo rity o f readers. O ver against this one m ight w e ll urge that a concealed blasphemy is worse than an open blasphemy, fo r the fo llo w in g reason. In the case o f an ordinary blasphemy, the hearer or reader becomes aware o f it w ith o u t making any co ntribution o f his own. B y concealing his blasphemy, M achiavelli compels the reader to th in k the blasphemy b y himself and thus to become M achiavelli’s accomplice. One cannot compare the situation o f the reader o f M achiavelli w ith that o f a judge or a prosecutor who likewise re thinks crim inal or forbidden thoughts in order to bring the ac cused to justice and thus establishes a kind o f intim acy w ith the crim inal w ith o u t however in cu rrin g the slightest suspicion o f thus becoming an accomplice and w ith o u t fo r a moment having a sense o f g u ilt. For the crim inal does not desire and invite this kind o f intim acy but rather dislikes it. M achiavelli on the other hand is anxious to establish this kind o f intim acy if only w ith a certain kind o f reader whom he calls “ the young.” Concealment as prac ticed b y M achiavelli is an instrum ent o f subtle corruption o r se duction. He fascinates his reader b y confronting him w ith riddles. Thereafter the fascination w ith problem -solving makes the reader oblivious to all higher duties if not all duties. B y concealing his blasphemies, M achiavelli m erely avoids punishment or revenge, but not g uilt. W hen we tu rn from the tw enty-sixth chapter o f the F irst Book o f the Discourses to the tw enty-sixth chapter o f the Second Book, we find M achiavelli u ttering strong warnings o f a calculating character against hurting men’s feelings w ith words o f scorn; he concludes the chapter w ith quoting a sentence w hich Tacitus pronounces when speaking o f an enemy o f the ty ra n t N ero: “ Smarting jokes, if they draw too much on tru th , leave stinging memories behind them.” A liberal theologian once said w ith in m y hearing that the traditional judgm ent on blasphemy is based on too narrow a conception o f G od’s honor. He used the analogy o f a very wise and very pow erful kin g who w ould tolerate
TWOFOLD CHARACTER OF M AC H IAV ELLl’s TEACHING
and even enjoy jokes about him self however smarting, provided they are graceful and do not create a public scandal. This argument seems to us so patently inappropriate that we may dismiss it w ith out any discussion. W e prefer to subm it the fo llo w in g consideration. The kinds o f unbelief w ith w hich we are most fam iliar today are respectful indifference and such a nostalgia fo r lost fa ith as goes w ith an in a b ility to distinguish between theological tru th and m yth. A re not these kinds o f unbelief much more insulting to belief than is an unbelief like M achiavelli’s w hich takes seriously the claim to tru th o f revealed religion by regarding the question o f its tru th as all-im portant and w hich therefore is not, at any rate, a lukewarm unbelief? Furtherm ore, if, as M achiavelli assumes, B iblical religion is not true, if it is o f human and not o f heavenly orig in , if it consists o f poetic fables, it becomes inevitable that one should attem pt to understand it in m erely human terms. A t firs t glance, this attem pt can be made in tw o different ways: one may tr y to understand B iblical religion by starting from the phenomena o f human love or by starting from p o litica l phenomena. The firs t approach was taken b y Boccaccio in his Decameron, the second approach was taken b y M achiavelli. In Discourses II 12, w hich is a parody o f scholastic disputations, he indicates how political or m ilita ry truths can be transformed into poetic fables, o r how the p o litica l or m ilita ry truths underlying such fables can be elicited: Antaeus was not the son o f Earth nor therefore invincible as long as he stood on the earth and was not lifte d from the earth; but being a son o f a human m other, he was invincible as long as he waited w ith in the confines o f his realm fo r the attack o f his enemy. S im ilarly the fable according to w hich the ancient princes were taught th e ir art b y a centaur means nothing other than that princes must be half inhuman. In the same way, “ read ing the Bible judiciously,” M achiavelli discerns that the actions o f Moses were not fundam entally different from those o f Cyrus, Romulus, Theseus or H iero o f Syracusë: to “ read the Bible ju d ic i ously” means to read it not in its own lig h t but in the lig h t o f the fundam ental p o litica l verities.68 But even if we grant that he was compelled to raise the question regarding the p olitical phenomena o r the p o litica l hopes w hich in principle p erfe ctly explain the Bible and the B iblical conception o f God, we do not yet under stand w h y he had recourse to blasphemies. A fte r all, that ques-
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tio n is being discussed today and has been discussed fo r some generations by many scholars who are and were perfectly inno cent o f blasphemy. The answer is simple: fo r some generations, the authority o f the Bible has not been generally recognized and supported b y law; M achiavelli on the other hand was compelled to use subterfuges. M any features o f his w ritings, w hich to us may appear to be caused by mere le vity, are also caused by the necessity in w hich he found himself o f com bining sim ply p o litica l or m ilita ry lessons w ith indications o f what he thought to be the human o r natural phenomena that make intellig ib le the belief in the super natural or the desire fo r it. This necessity must not be disregarded when one reads his praise o f necessity in general: men’s hands and tongues w ould not have carried the w orks o f men to the height to w hich they are seen to have been carried, if men had not been driven on by necessity.69 T o repeat, we do not believe it to be accidental that the num ber o f chapters o f the Discourses is the same as the number o f books of L iv y , and hence we believe that one should wonder whether the number o f chapters o f the Prince, w hich is tw e n tysix, is not o f some significance. W e have seen that the tw enty-sixth chapter o f the Discourses is o f eminent importance fo r the under standing o f the Prince. W e note that when discussing the Roman emperors in the Discourses, M achiavelli speaks e x p lic itly o f the tw enty-six emperors from Caesar to Maximinus.70 T o say nothing o f the fact that Caesar was not an emperor, M achiavelli does not give any reason fo r making this particular selection from among the emperors; the only evident fact is the number o f the emperors selected. It m ight appear that there is some connection between the number 26 and “ prince,” i.e., monarch. This is not the place to give fu rth e r examples o f M achiavelli’s use o f the number 26 or, more pre cisely, o f 13 and m ultiples o f 13. I t is sufficient here to m ention some fu rth e r features o f his w ork w hich w ould seem to indicate that num bers are an im portant device used b y him. There are three chapters o f the Discourses w hich open w ith a quotation from L iv y ; they fo l lo w each other at an interval o f 20 chapters.71 The o nly tw o chapters o f the Discourses w hich contain exclusively modem examples are the twenty-seventh and the fifty -fo u rth chapters. I f a given chapter presents difficulties w hich one cannot resolve b y studying its context, one w ill sometimes derive help b y sim ply tu rn in g to a
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chapter w hich carries the same number either in another Book o f the Discourses or in the Prince. For instance, the key passages regarding silence are chapters to o f Book I and Book II o f the Discourses. The key passages regarding “ continuous foundation” are chapters 49 o f Book I and Book I I I o f the Discourses. Dis courses I I I 48 deals w ith deceit practiced by a foreign enemy w hile I 48 deals w ith deceit practiced by domestic opponents. The parody o f scholastic disputations occurs in Discourses I I 12; Discourses I 12 is e x p lic itly devoted to the harm done b y the Church. The eleventh chapter o f the Prince is devoted to ecclesi astical principalities; the eleventh chapter o f the Discourses is de voted to the religion o f the Romans. The most im portant discussions o f M . M anlius Capitolinus occur in Discourses I 8 and I I I 8, and so on.72 I t w ould be foolish to apply this suggestion mechanically, fo r M achiavelli’s devices w ould defeat his purpose if he had applied them mechanically. I t w ould be almost equally foolish to tr y to establish the meaning o f his teaching by relying ex clusively or even chie fly on his devices. But it w ould also be im prudent to read his w ritings in the w ay in w hich they are usually read. M achiavelli’s devices, judiciously used, lead the reader to the nerve o f his argument. The order o f finding is, however, not necessarily the order o f proving. T o summarize: M achiavelli has presented his teaching in tw o books whose relation to each other is enigmatic. Each book pre sents “ everything” he knows w ith a view to a specific audience or in a specific perspective. The question regarding the relation o f the tw o perspectives cannot be answered before one has fu lly understood the perspective o f each book and therefore before one has understood adequately each book b y itself. B y reading either book from the beginning in the lig h t o f the other, one ar rives at some average meaning that is more superficial than even the surface meaning o f either book and that can in no way claim to be authentic. U ltim ately, the twofoldness o f perspective re flects a twofoldness o f “ purpose” w hich is effective in each book and w hich corresponds to the difference between the “ young” readers and the “ old.”
CHAPTER
II
M achiavelli’ s Inte ntio n:
The Ψ rince
! A N Y W R ITE R S have attempted to describe the intention o f the Prince b y using the term M “ scientific.” This description is defensible and even helpful pro vided it is properly meant. Let us return once more to the begin ning. In the Epistle Dedicatory M achiavelli gives three indications o f the subject-m atter o f the book: he has incorporated in it his knowledge o f the actions o f great men both modem and ancient; he dares to discuss princely government and to give rules fo r it; he possesses knowledge o f the nature o f princes. As appears fro m the Epistle D edicatory, from the book itself, and fro m w hat the author says elsewhere,1 knowledge o f the actions o f great men, i.e., historical knowledge, supplies only materials fo r knowledge o f what princely government is, o f the characteristics o f the various kinds o f principalities, o f the rules w ith w hich one must com ply in order to acquire and preserve princely power, and o f the nature o f princes. It is only knowledge o f the latter kind that the Prince is meant to convey. T hat kind o f knowledge, knowledge o f the universal or general as distinguished from the individual, is called philosophic or scientific. The Prince is a scientific book because >54«
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it conveys a general teaching that is based on reasoning fro m experience and that sets fo rth that reasoning. T h at teaching is p a rtly theoretical (knowledge o f the nature o f princes) and p a rtly practical (knowledge o f the rules w ith w hich the prince must com p ly ). In accordance w ith the fact that the Prince is a scientific, and not an historical book, only three o f tw enty-six chapter head ings contain proper names.2 W hen referring to the Prince in the Discourses, M achiavelli calls it a “ treatise.” 3 For the tim e being we shall describe the Prince as a treatise, meaning by “ treatise” a book that sets fo rth a general teaching o f the character indicated. T o the extent that the Prince is a treatise, it has a lucid plan and its argument proceeds in a straight line w ith o u t either ascend ing o r descending. I t consists at firs t sight o f tw o parts. The firs t part sets fo rth the science o r the art o f princely government w hile the second takes up the tim e honored question o f the lim its o f art o r prudence, o r the question o f the relation o f art o r pru dence and chance. M ore particularly, the Prince consists o f fo u r parts: i) the various kinds o f principalities (chs. i - i i ) , 2) the prince and his enemies (chs. 12-14), 3) the prince and his subjects o r friends (chs. 15-23),4 4) prudence and chance (chs. 24-26). W e may go a step fu rth e r and say that the Prince appears, at the outset, not o n ly as a treatise but even as a scholastic treatise.® A t the same tim e, however, the book is the opposite o f a scien tific o r detached w ork. W h ile beginning w ith the words “ A ll states, all dominions w hich have had and have sway over men,” it ends w ith the words “ the ancient valor in Italian hearts is not ye t dead.” I t culminates in a passionate call to action—in a call, addressed to a contem porary Italian prince, to perform the most glorious deed possible and necessary then and there. I t ends like a tra c t fo r the times. For the last part deals not m erely w ith the general question concerning the relation o f prudence and chance, b u t it is concerned w ith the accidental also in another sense o f the term . The chapters surrounding thé e xplicit discussion o f the relation between prudence and chance (ch. 25) are the o nly ones whose headings indicate that they deal w ith the contem porary Ita lia n situation. The Prince is not the only classic o f political philosophy w hich is both a treatise and a tra ct fo r the times. I t suffices to re fe r to Hobbes’ Leviathan and Locke’s C ivil Govern m ent. B ut the case o f the Prince is not typical: there is a strikin g
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contrast between the dry, not to say scholastic, beginning and the hig hly rhetorical last chapter w hich ends in a quotation fro m a patriotic poem in Italian. Could M achiavelli have had the am bitio n o f com bining the virtues o f scholasticism w ith those o f patriotic poetry? Is such a combination required fo r the under standing o f p olitical things? However this may be, the contrast between the beginning o f the Prince, or even its firs t tw enty-five chapters, and its end forces us to m odify our remark that the argument o f the book proceeds in a straight line w ith o u t ascending or descending. By d ire ctly contrasting the beginning and the end, we become aware o f an ascent. T o the extent to wrhich the Prince is a treatise, M achiavelli is an investigator or a teacher; to the extent to w hich it is a tra ct fo r the times, he assumes the role o f an adviser, if not o f a preacher. He was anxious to become the adviser o f the addressee o f the Prince and thus to rise from his low , and even abject condition.® The movement o f the Prince is an ascent in more than one sense. A nd besides, it is not sim ply an ascent. In contradistinction to the Discourses, the Prince comes firs t to sight as a traditional o r conventional treatise. B ut this firs t ap pearance is deliberately deceptive. The antitraditional character o f the Prince becomes explicit shortly beyond the m iddle o f the book, and after remaining explicit fo r some time, it recedes again. Hence the movement o f the Prince may be described as an ascent follow ed by a descent. R oughly speaking, the peak is in the center. This course is prefigured in the firs t pan o f the book (chs. ι - n ) : the highest theme o f this part (new principalities ac quired by one’s own arms and virtu e ) and the grandest examples (Moses, Theseus, Romulus, Cyrus) are discussed in chapter 6, w hich is lite ra lly the central chapter o f the firs t part. But let us fo llo w this movement somewhat more closely. A t firs t sight, the Prince belongs to the traditional genre o f m irrors o f princes w hich are p rim a rily addressed to legitim ate princes, and the most fam iliar case o f the legitim ate prince is the un disputed heir. M achiavelli almost opens the Prince b y fo llo w in g custom in calling the hereditary prince the “ natural prince.” H e suggests that the natural is identical w ith the established or cus tom ary, the ordinary and the reasonable; or that it is the opposite o f the violent. In the firs t tw o chapters he uses only contempo-
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ra ry o r almost contem porary Italian examples: we do not leave the dimension o f the fam iliar. W e cannot help noting that in the Discourses, w hich open w ith his declaration that he w ill communi cate therein new modes and orders, the firs t tw o chapters are devoted to the remote beginnings o f cities and states: we imm edi ately transcend the dimension o f the fam iliar. In the th ird chapter o f the Prince^ he continues to speak o f “ the natural and ordinary” and “ the ordinary and reasonable” but he now makes it clear that nature favors the established no more than the disestablishment o f the established or, more generally stated, that the natural and ordinary stands in a certain tension to the customary: since the desire fo r acquisition is “ natural and ordinary,” the destruction o f “ natural” princes, “ the extinction o f ancient blood,” by an extraordinary conqueror is perhaps more natural than the peaceful and smooth transition fro m one ordinary heir to another.7 In ac cordance w ith this step forw ard, foreign and ancient examples come to the fore: the T urks and above all the Romans appear to be superior to the Italians and even to the French. Provoked b y the rem ark o f a French Cardinal that the Italians know nothing o f war, and thus justified, M achiavelli replied, as he re ports here, that the French know nothing o f politics: the Romans, whose modes o f action are discussed in the center o f the chapter, understood both w ar and politics. Furtherm ore, he transcends the Here and N o w also b y referrin g to a doctrine o f the physicians, fo r medicine is an achievement o f the ancients,8 and by opposing the wise practice o f the Romans to “ what is everyday in the m outh o f the sages o f our times.” But he is not yet prepared to take issue w ith the opinion held by more than one contem porary according to w hich fa ith must be kept. In chapters 4-6, ancient examples preponderate fo r the firs t time. Chapter 6 is devoted to the most glorious type o f w h o lly new princes in w h o lly new states, i.e., to w hat is least ordinary and most ancient. The heroic founders discussed therein acquired thè ir positions by virtue, and not b y chance, and th e ir greatness revealed itself by the ir success in introducing w h o lly new modes and orders w hich differed pro fo u n d ly from the established, fam iliar, and ancient. T hey stand at the opposite pole fro m the customary and old established, fo r tw o opposite reasons: they were ancient innovators, ancient enemies o f the ancient. Chapter 6 is the only chapter o f the Prince in w hich
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M achiavelli speaks o f prophets, i.e., o f men to whom God speaks. In the same chapter there occurs the firs t Latin quotation. Com pared w ith that chapter, the rest o f the firs t part marks a descent. The hero o f chapter 7 is Cesare Borgia, who acquired his p rin cip a lity by means o f chance. He is presented at the outset as sim ply a model fo r new princes. But, to say nothing o f the fact that he failed because o f a grave mistake o f his, he was not a w h o lly new prince in a w h o lly new state: he is a model fo r such new princes as try to make changes in ancient orders by means o f new modes rather than fo r such new princes, like the heroes o f chapter 6, as try to introduce w h o lly new modes and orders. A ccordingly, the emphasis shifts to modern examples fro m this p oint on.9 As fo r chapters 8-11, it suffices to note that even th e ir chapter headings no longer contain references to new princes; the princes discussed therein were at most new princes in old states. The last tw o chapters o f the firs t part contain, as did the firs t tw o chapters, only modern examples, although the last tw o chapters contain also examples other than Italian. The second part (chs. 12-14) marks an ascent from the end o f the first part. The firs t part had ended w ith a discussion o f ecclesiastical principalities, w hich as such are unarmed. W e learn now that good arms are the necessary and sufficient condition fo r good laws.10 As M achiavelli indicates through the headings o f chapters 12-13, ascends in these chapters from the w orst kind o f arms to the best. W e note in this part an almost continuous ascent from modern examples to ancient ones. T his ascent is ac companied by three references to the question as to w hether mod em or ancient examples should be chosen; in the central reference it is suggested that it w ould be more natural to prefer ancient examples.11 M achiavelli now takes issue not o n ly w ith specific po litic a l or m ilita ry errors com m itted by “ the sages o f our times” but (although w ith o u t m entioning his name) w ith his contempo ra ry Savonarola’s fundamental error: Savonarola erroneously be lieved that the ruin o f Ita ly was caused by religious sins, and not by m ilita ry sins. In this fa irly short part (about 10 pages) Machia ve lli refers six times to ancient literature w hile he had referred to it in the considerably more extensive firs t part (about 37 pages) only tw ice. O nly in the second part does he come close to referring deferentially to the highest authorities o f p o litica l o r
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m oral thought. H e refers, not indeed to the N ew Testament, but to the O ld, and not indeed to w hat the O ld Testament says about Moses b ut to w hat it says about David, and not to what it says about David lite ra lly but to w hat it says about David, or in con nection w ith David, fig urative ly. A nd he refers, not indeed to A risto tle, or to Plato, but to Xenophon whom he regarded how ever as the author o f the classic m irro r o f princes. Besides, the O ld Testament cita tion in chapter 13 m erely supplies at most an additional example o f the correct choice o f arms; Xenophon’s Ed ucation of Cyrus y mentioned at the end o f chapter 14, however, is the o n ly a u th o rity he refers to as setting fo rth a complete moral code fo r a prince. T o say the least, the height reached at the end o f the second part recalls the height reached in the center o f the firs t part: the second part ends and culminates in a praise o f Cyrus —one o f the fo u r “ grandest examples” spoken o f in chapter 6. In the firs t part, M achiavelli leisurely ascends to the greatest doers and then leisurely descends again; in the second part he ascends q u ic k ly to the origins o f the traditional understanding o f the greatest doers. R ig h t at the beginning o f the th ird part (chs. 15-23) Machia v e lli begins to uproot the G reat T ra d itio n . The emphasis is on a change in the general teaching: the firs t chapter o f the th ird part is the o n ly chapter o f the Prince w hich does not contain any historical examples. M achiavelli now takes issue e x p lic itly and coherently w ith the tra dition a l and customary view according to w hich the prince ought to live virtu o u sly and ought to rule v ir tuously. From this we begin to understand w h y he refrained in the second part fro m re ferrin g to the highest authorities: the missing peak above the O ld Testament and Xenophon is not the N ew Testament and Plato or A risto tle but M achiavelli’s own thought: all ancient o r traditional teachings are to be superseded b y a shockingly new teaching. B ut he is careful not to shock any one unduly. W h ile the claim to radical* innovation is suggested, it is made in a subdued manner: he suggests that he is m erely stating in his own name and openly a teaching w hich some ancient w riters had set fo rth co ve rtly o r b y using th e ir characters as th e ir m outh pieces.12 Y et this strengthens M achiavelli’s claim in tru th as much as it weakens it in appearance: one cannot radically change the mode o f a teaching w ith o u t radically changing its substance. The
THOUGHTS ON MACHIAVELLI
argument ascends from chapter 15 up to chapters 19 o r 20 and then descends again. In chapter 17 M achiavelli begins to speak again o f “ new princes,” after a pause o f 10 chapters, and he con tinues to do so in the three subsequent chapters; at the beginning o f chapter 21 he s till refers to “ a quasi-new prince,” but in the rest o f the th ird part this high theme disappears com pletely: M achiavelli descends again to ordinary or second rate princes.13 This movement is paralleled by a change regarding modem o r ancient examples. U p through chapter 19, there is, generally speaking, an increase in emphasis on the ancient; thereafter mod em examples preponderate obviously.14 The last tw o -third s o f chapter 19, w hich deal w ith the Roman emperors, may be said to mark the peak o f the th ird part. The passage is introduced as a rejoinder to w hat “ many” m ight object against M achiavelli’s own opinion. Chapter 19 is lite ra lly the center o f the th ird part, just as the peak o f the firs t part was lite ra lly its center (ch. 6 ). This is no accident. Chapter 19 completes the explicit discussion o f the founder w hile chapter 6 had begun it. Hence we may ju stly describe chapter 19 as the peak o f the Prince as a whole, and the th ird part as its most im portant part.15 Chapter 19 reveals the tru th about the founders, or the greatest doers almost fu lly .16 The fu ll revelation requires the universalization o f the lesson derived from the study o f the Roman emperors, and. this universalization is presented in the first section o f chapter 20. Im m ediately thereafter the descent begins. M achiavelli refers there to a saying o f “ our ancients,” i.e., o f the reputedly wise men o f old Florence, and rejects it in an unusually cautious manner:17 after having broken w ith the most exalted teaching o f the venerable Great T ra d itio n , he hum bly returns to a show o f reverence fo r a fa irly recent and purely local tradition. S hortly afterwards he expresses his agreement w ith “ the judgment o f many,” and im m ediately before questioning the wisdom o f building fortresses and before showing that the practice of building fortresses had wisely been abandoned by a considerable number o f Italian contemporaries, he says that he praises the building o f fortresses “ because it has been used fro m ancient times.” 18 He shows every sign o f w ishing to pretend that he believes in the tru th o f the equation o f the good w ith the ancient and the customary. A ctin g in the same s p irit he expresses there a belief in human gratitude, respect fo r justice, and honesty1·
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w hich is quite at variance w ith everything that went before, and especially w ith w hat he said in the th ird part. Just as the movement o f the argument in the th ird part resembles that in the firs t part, the movement o f the argument in the fo u rth part (chs. 24-26) resembles that in the second part. In contrast to the last chapters o f the th ird part, the fo u rth part is marked by the fo llo w in g characteristics: M achiavelli speaks again o f the “ new prince,” and even “ the new prince in a new p rin c ip a lity ” and he again emphasizes ancient models. P hilip o f Macedon, “ not the father o f Alexander, but the one who was defeated b y T itu s Q uintus,” i.e., an ancient prince who did not belong to the highest class o f princes, is presented as vastly superior to the contem porary Italian princes who also were defeated. W h ile the central chapter o f the fo u rth part contains o nly modern examples, it compensates fo r this, as it were, b y being devoted to an attack on a contempo ra ry Italian belief, or rather on a belief w hich is more com m only held in contem porary Ita ly than it was in the past. In the last chapter, Moses, Cyrus, and Theseus, three o f the fo u r heroic founders praised in chapter 6, are mentioned again; Moses and Theseus had not been mentioned since. In that chapter M achiavelli speaks in the most unrestrained terms o f w hat he hopes fo r fro m a contem porary Italian prince or fro m the la tte r’s fam ily. B ut he does not leave the slightest doubt that w hat he hopes fo r fro m a contem porary new prince in a new state is not more than at best a perfect im ita tio n o f the ancient founders, an im itation made possible b y the survival o f the Italians’ ancient valor: he does not expect a glorious deed o f an e ntirely new kind, o r a new creation. W h ile the last chapter o f the Prince is thus a call to a most glorious im ita tio n o f the peaks o f a n tiq u ity w ith in contem porary Ita ly , the general teaching o f the Prince , and especially o f its th ird part, i.e., M achiavelli’s understanding o f the ancient founders and o f the foundation o f society in general, is the opposite o f an im itation, however perfect: w hile the greatest deed possible in contempo ra ry Ita ly is an im ita tio n o f the greatest deeds o f a ntiquity, the greatest theoretical achievement possible in contem porary Ita ly is “ w h o lly new.” 20 W e conclude, therefore, that the movement o f the Prince as a whole is an ascent follow ed b y a descent. I t is characteristic o f the Prince to partake o f tw o pairs o f opposites: it is both a treatise and a tra ct fo r the times, and it
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has both a traditional exterior and a revolutionary in te rio r. There is a connection between these tw o pairs o f opposites. As a treatise, the book sets fo rth a timeless teaching, i.e., a teaching w hich is meant to be true fo r all times; as a tra ct fo r the times, it sets fo rth what ought to be done at a particular tim e. B ut the timelessly true teaching is related to tim e because it is new at the particular tim e at w hich it is set fo rth , and its being new, or not coeval w ith man, is not accidental. A new teaching concerning the foundations o f society being, as such, unacceptable or exposed to enm ity, the movement from the accepted or old teaching to the new must be made carefully, or the revolutionary in te rio r must be ca refully protected by a traditional exterior. The tw o fo ld relation o f the book to the particular tim e at w hich it was composed or fo r w hich it was composed explains w hy the preponderance o f modem ex amples has a tw o fo ld meaning: modern examples are more im m edi ately relevant fo r action in contem porary Ita ly than ancient ex amples, and a discussion o f modern examples is less “ presumptuous” 21 or offensive than is a discussion o f the most exalted ancient examples or o f the origins o f the established order w hich are neither present nor near. This must be borne in m ind if one wants to understand what M achiavelli means by calling the Prince a “ treatise.” 22 As matters stand, it is necessary to add the remark that, in describing the Prince as the w o rk o f a revolutionary, we have used that term in the precise sense: a revolutionary is a man who breaks the law, the law as a whole, in order to replace it b y a new law w hich he believes to be better than the old law. The Prince is obviously a com bination o f a treatise and a tra ct fo r the times. But the manner in w hich that com bination is achieved is not obvious: the last chapter does come as a surprise. W e believe that this d iffic u lty can be resolved if one does not forget that the Prince also combines a traditional surface w ith a revolutionary center. As a treatise, the Prince conveys a general teaching; as a tra ct fo r the times, it conveys a particular counsel. The general teaching cannot be identical, but it must at least be compatible, w ith the particular counsel. There may even be a connection between the general and the particular w hich is closer than mere co m patibility: the general teaching may necessitate the particular counsel, given the particular circumstances in w hich the immediate addressee o f the Prince finds himself, and the par-
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tic u la r counsel may require the general teaching o f the Prince and be incom patible w ith any other general teaching. A t any rate, in studying the general teaching o f the Prince we must never lose sight o f the particular situation in w hich Lorenzo finds himself. W e must understand the general in the lig h t o f the particular. W e must translate every general rule w hich is addressed generally to princes, o r a kind o f prince, in to a particular counsel addressed to Lorenzo. A nd conversely, we must w o rk our w ay upward from the par tic u la r counsel w hich is given in the last chapter to its general premises. Perhaps the complete general premises d iffe r from the general premises as e x p lic itly stated, and the complete particular counsel differs from the particular counsel as e x p lic itly stated. Perhaps the unstated im plications, general o r particular, provide the lin k between the general teaching as e x p lic itly stated and the particular counsel as e x p lic itly stated. W h a t precisely is the d iffic u lty created b y the counsel given in the last chapter o f the Prince ? As fo r the mere fact that that chapter comes as a surprise o f some kind, one m ight rig h tly say that in the Prince no surprise ought to be surprising. In the lig h t o f the indications given in the firs t chapter, chapters 8 -u come as a surprise, to say nothing o f other surprises. Besides, one m erely has to read the Prince w ith ordinary care, in order to see that the call to liberate Ita ly w ith w hich the book ends is the natural conclusion o f the book. F or instance, in chapter 12 M achiavelli says that the outcome o f the Italian m ilita ry system has been that “ Ita ly has been overrun b y Charles, plundered b y Louis, violated b y Ferdinand, and insulted b y the Swiss,” or that Ita ly has be come “ enslaved and insulted.” 23 W hat other conclusion can be drawn fro m this state o f things than that one must bend every e ffo rt to liberate Ita ly after having effected a complete reform o f her m ilita ry system, i.e., that one ought to do w hat the last chapter says Lorenzo ought to do? The last chapter presents a problem not because it is a call to liberate Ita ly but because it is silent as to the difficulties obstructing the liberation o f Ita ly . In that chap te r it is said more than once that the action recommended to Lorenzo, or urged upon him , w ill not be “ very d iffic u lt” : almost everything has been done b y G od; only the rest remains to be done b y the human liberator. The chapter creates the impression that the o n ly things required fo r the liberation o f Ita ly are the
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Italians’ strong loathing o f foreign dom ination, and th e ir ancient valor; the liberator o f Ita ly can expect spontaneous cooperation from all his com patriots and he can expect that they w ill all fly to arms against the foreigners once he “ takes the banner.” I t is true that M achiavelli stresses even here the need fo r a radical re form of the Italian m ilita ry system. In fact, he devotes the whole center o f the chapter, i.e., almost half o f the chapter, to the m ilita ry conditions fo r the liberation o f Ita ly . B ut all the more strikin g is his complete silence as to its p olitical conditions. W hat w ould be gained by all Italians becoming the best soldiers in the w o rld if they were to turn the ir skill and prowess against one another or, in other words, if there were not firs t established a s tric t u n ity o f command, to say nothing o f u n ity o f training? I t is absurd to say that M achiavelli’s p atriotic fe rvo r tem porarily blinds him to the hard practical problems: his p atriotic fe rvo r does not prevent him from speaking in the last chapter very prosaically and even technically about the m ilita ry preparation. The liberator o f Ita ly is described as a new prince, fo r the liberation o f Ita ly presupposes the introduction of new laws and new orders: he must do fo r Ita ly what Moses did fo r the people o f Israel. But, as M achiavelli had been at pains to point out in the earlier chapters o f the book, the new prince necessarily offends many o f his fe llo w countrym en, especially those who benefit from the customary order o f things, and his adherents are necessarily unreliable. In the last chapter he is silent on the subject o f the inevitable offensiveness o f the lib erator’s actions, as w ell as concerning the pow erful resistances w hich he must expect. The liberator o f Ita ly is urged there to furnish himself w ith his own troops who w ill be all the better if they see themselves commanded by th e ir own prince: w ill the Venetian or the Milanese troops regard the Florentine Lorenzo as the ir own prince? M achiavelli does not say a w ord about the difficulties w hich m ight be created fo r the liberator b y the various Italian republics and princes. He m erely alludes to those difficulties by raising the rhetorical question, “ what envy w ill oppose itse lf to him?” and by speaking once o f “ the weakness o f the chiefs” in Ita ly . Does he mean to say that the p atriotic fe rvo r o f the Italian people w ill suffice fo r sweeping aside those weak chiefs, however envious they m ight be? He certainly implies that before the lib erator can liberate Ita ly , he w ould have to take not m erely a
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banner, as is said in the text o f the chapter, but Ita ly herself, as is said in the heading. I t is a rare if not unique case in M achiavelli’s books that the heading o f a chapter should be more inform ative than its body. A p a rt fro m chapters 26 and 24, the headings o f w hich refer us to contem porary Ita ly , o nly one chapter heading in the Prince contains proper names and thus draws our attention to the particu lar. Chapter 4 is entitled: “ W h y the Kingdom o f Darius w hich Alexander had seized did not rebel against Alexander’s successors after his death.” 24 As a consequence, the place o f the chapter w ith in the plan o f the general teaching as indicated in chapter 1, is not im m ediately clear. Chapter 4 is the central one o f three chapters w hich deal w ith “ mixed principalities,” i.e., w ith the acquisition o f new te rrito ry b y princes o r republics, or, in other words, w ith conquest. The prim ary example in chapter 3 is the p o lic y o f conquest practiced b y K in g Louis X II o f France; but the co un try in w hich he trie d to acquire new te rrito ry was Ita ly . In chapter 3, M achiavelli discusses the difficulties obstructing foreign conquests in Ita ly , a subject most im portant to the liberator o f Ita ly . B y discussing the mistakes w hich the French king com m itted in attem pting to make lasting conquests in Ita ly , M achiavelli un doubtedly gives advice to foreigners contem plating conquest in his own fatherland.25 This m ight seem to cast a reflection on his patriotism . B ut one m ight ju stly say that such advice is o nly the reverse side, if the odious side, o f advice as to how to defend Ita ly against foreign dom ination, or how to liberate Ita ly . It appears fro m M achiavelli’s discussion that but fo r certain grave mistakes com m itted b y the French king, he could easily have kept his Italian conquests. The French kin g com m itted the grave mistakes o f perm ittin g the m inor Italian powers to be destroyed and o f strengthening a m ajor Italian power, instead o f protecting the m inor Italian powers and hum iliating that m ajor power. W e are forced to wonder w hat conclusion the liberator o f Ita ly w ould have to draw from these observations. Should he destroy the m inor Italian powers and strengthen the m ajor Italian powers? The destruction o f the m inor powers w hich M achiavelli has in mind was effected b y Cesare Borgia whose actions he holds up as models fo r Lorenzo. B ut w ould not the strengthening o f the other m ajor Italian powers perpetuate, and even increase, the difficulties o f
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keeping the foreigner out o f Italy? I t is this question w hich is taken up in an oblique w ay in chapter 4. M achiavelli there dis tinguishes tw o kinds o f p rin cip a lity: one like the Persia conquered by Alexander the Great, in w hich one man is prince and a ll others are slaves, and another kind, like France, w hich is ruled b y a king and barons, i.e., in w hich powers exist that are not sim ply dependent on the prince but rule in th e ir own rig h t. H e makes this distinction more general by comparing the French m onarchy to Greece p rio r to the Roman conquest. W hat he is concerned w ith is then the difference between countries ruled b y a single gov ernment from w hich all p olitical auth ority w ith in the co un try is sim ply derived, and countries in w hich there exists a num ber o f regional o r local powers, each ru lin g in its ow n rig h t. Seen in the lig h t o f this distinction, Ita ly belongs to the same kin d o f co un try as France. In discussing Alexander’s conquest o f Persia, M achiavelli is compelled to discuss the conquest o f a co un try o f the opposite kind, i.e., the conquest o f France. This, however, means that he is enabled to continue surreptitiously the discussion, begun in the preceding chapter, o f the conquest o f Ita ly .26 Chapter 4 supplies this lesson: w hile it is d iffic u lt to conquer Persia, it is easy to keep her; conversely, w hile it is easy to conquer France, it is d iffic u lt to keep her. France (fo r w hich we may substitute in this context Ita ly ) is easy to conquer because there w ill always be a discontented baron (state) that w ill be anxious to receive foreign help against the king (against other states w ith in the c o u n try). She is d iffic u lt to keep because the old local o r regional loyalties w ill always reassert themselves against the new prince. Secure possession o f the country is impossible as long as the ancient blood o f the local or regional lords o r dukes o r princes has not been extinguished. One m ight th in k fo r a moment that w hat is good fo r the foreign conqueror o f a co un try o f the kind under discussion is not necessarily good fo r the native liberator o f such a country. But, as M achiavelli indicates in chapter 3, the superiority o f France to Ita ly in strength and u n ity is due to the extirpation o f the princely lines o f Burgundy, B rittany, Gascony and N orm andy. G iven the urgency arising from foreign dom ination o f Ita ly , the liberator cannot afford to w a it u n til the other p rin cely fam ilies have become extinct in the course o f centuries. H e w ill have to do on the largest scale w hat Cesare Borgia had done on a small
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scale:27 in order to uproot the power o f the old local and regional loyalties w hich are a m ajor source o f Italian weakness, one must extinguish the fam ilies o f the obnoxious Italian princes. Cesare Borgia perform s a crucial fun ctio n in the Prince fo r the additional reason that he is the lin k between the foreign conqueror o f Ita ly and her native, p a trio tic liberator: since he was not sim ply an Italian, he could not w e ll be regarded as a potential liberator o f his fatherland.28 As fo r the Italian republics, we learn from chapter 5, the last chapter devoted to the subject o f conquest, that the o n ly w ay in w hich a prince, o r a republic, can be sure o f the lo y a lty o f a conquered republican c ity w ith an old tra d itio n o f autonom y is to ru in it, and to disperse its inhabitants, and that this holds true regardless o f whether the conqueror and the con quered are sons o f the same co un try o r not.29 The inform ation regarding the p o litica l prerequisites o f the liberation o f Ita ly is w ithheld in the chapter w hich is e x p lic itly devoted to the liberation o f Ita ly because M achiavelli desired to keep the noble and shining end untarnished b y the base and dark means that are indispensable fo r its achievement. He desired this because the teaching that “ the end justifies the means” is repulsive, and he wanted the Prince to end even more attractive ly than it began. The inform ation w ithheld in the last chapter is supplied in the section on conquest. T o that section above all others we must tu rn if we desire to know w hat kinds o f resistance on the part o f his countrym en the liberator o f Ita ly w ill have to overcome, and w hat kinds o f offense against his fe llo w countrym en he w ill have to com m it. T o liberate Ita ly fro m the barbarians means to u n ify Ita ly , and to u n ify Ita ly means to conquer Ita ly . I t means to do in Ita ly something much more d iffic u lt than what Ferdinand o f Aragon had done in Spain, but in certain respects comparable to it.80 The liberator o f Ita ly cannot depend on the spontaneous fo l lo w in g o f all inhabitants o f Ita ly . He must pursue a p o licy o f iro n and poison, o f m urder and treachery. He must not shrink fro m the exterm ination o f Italian princely fam ilies and the destruction o f Italian republican cities whenever actions o f this kind are con ducive to his end. The liberation o f Ita ly means a complete revo lu tio n . I t requires firs t and above everything else a revolution in th in kin g about rig h t and w rong. Italians have to learn that the p a trio tic end hallows every means however much condemned by
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the most exalted traditions both philosophic and religious. The tw enty-sixth chapter o f the Discourses, w hich has already supplied us w ith more than one key to the Prince, confirm s our present con clusion. Its heading says: “ A new prince, in a c ity o r co un try taken by him must make everything new.” From its text we learn that just as Cesare Borgia did not become master o f the Romagna except by “ cruelty w ell used,” P hilip o f Macedon did not become w ith in a short time “ prince o f Greece” except by the use o f means w hich were inim ical not only to every humane manner o f life but to every Christian manner o f life as w e ll.31 The m ajor Italian power w hich the would-be foreign conqueror, Louis X II, mistakenly strengthened instead o f hum iliating, was the Church. The native liberator o f Ita ly on the other hand, is advised to use his fam ily connection w ith the then Pope Leo X in order to receive support fo r his patriotic enterprise from the already greatly strengthened Church. He is advised, in other words, to use the Church ruled b y Leo X as Cesare Borgia, the model, had used the Church ruled b y Alexander V I. B ut this counsel can be o f o nly a provisional character. T o see this, one has to consider M achiav e lli’s reflections on Cesare’s successes and failures. Cesare’s succusses ultim ately benefited only the Church, and thus increased the obstacles to the conquest o r liberation o f Ita ly . Cesare was a mere too l o f Alexander V I and hence, whatever Alexander’s wishes may have been, a mere tool o f the papacy. U ltim ate ly, Alexander rather than Cesare represents the contem porary Italian model o f a new prince. For Cesare’s pow er was based on the pow er o f the papacy. T hat power failed him when Alexander died. Cesare’s failure was not accidental, considering that the average length o f a Pope’s reign is ten years, that the influence o f any Italian prince on the election o f a new Pope is not lik e ly to be greater than that o f the great foreign powers and, above all, considering that the Church has a purpose or interest o f its own w hich casts discredit on and thus endangers the use o f the pow er o f the Church fo r purposes other than strengthening the Church.32 The liberation o f Ita ly w hich re quires the unification o f Ita ly eventually requires therefore the secu larization o f the Papal states. I t requires even more. A ccording to M achiavelli, the Church is not only through its tem poral pow er the chief obstacle to the u n ity o f Ita ly ; the Church is also responsible fo r the religious and moral corruption o f Ita ly and fo r the ensuing loss
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o f p o litica l virtue. In addition, M achiavelli was very much in fear o f the Swiss, whose m ilita ry excellence he traced p a rtly to th e ir sturdy p iety. He draws the conclusion that if the Papal C ourt were removed to Switzerland, one w ould soon observe the deterioration o f Swiss p ie ty and morals and hence o f Swiss power.33 He seemed to have played w ith the thought that the liberator o f Ita ly w ould have to go beyond secularizing the Papal states; he m ight have to remove the Papal C ourt to Switzerland and thus k ill tw o birds w ith one stone. The liberator o f Ita ly must certainly have the courage to do w hat Giovam pagolo Baglioni was too vile to do, namely, “ to show the prelates how little one ought to respect people who live and rule as they do and thus to perform an action whose greatness obliterates every infam y and every danger that m ight arise from it.” H e must make Ita ly as united as she was “ in the tim e o f the Ro mans.” 84 The addressee o f the Prince is advised to im itate Romulus among others. T o im itate Romulus means to found Rome again. B ut Rome exists. O r could the im itation o f Romulus mean to found again a pagan Rome, a Rome destined to become again the most glorious republic and the seminary and the heart o f the most g lo ri ous empire? M achiavelli does not answer this question in so many words. W hen he mentions fo r the second tim e, in the last chapter o f the Princey the venerable models whom the addressee o f the Prince should im itate, he is silent about Romulus.85 The question w hich he forces us to raise, he answers by silence. In this connection we may note that, whereas in the Discourses “ W e” sometimes means “ W e Christians,” “ W e ” never has this meaning in the Prince. A t any rate, both the e xplicit general teaching and the explicit particular counsel conveyed b y the Prince are more traditional o r less revolutionary than both the complete general teaching and the complete particular counsel. The tw o pairs o f opposites w hich are characteristic o f the Prince , namely, its being both a treatise and a tra ct fo r the times and its having both a traditional exterior and a revolutionary center, are nicely interwoven. The Prince is alto gether, as M achiavelli indicates at the beginning o f the second chapter, a fine web. The subtlety o f the web contrasts w ith the shocking frankness o f speech w hich he sometimes employs or affects. I t w ould be better to say that the subtle web is subtly interwoven w ith the shocking frankness o f speech w hich he chooses to employ at the proper tim e and in the proper place.
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So much fo r the present regarding the character o f the Prince . The subject o f the book is the prince but especially the new prince. In the Epistle Dedicatory, M achiavelli indicates that his teaching is based upon his knowledge o f the actions o f great men; but the greatest examples o f great men are new princes like Moses, Cyrus, Romulus and Theseus, men “ who have acquired o r founded king doms.” In the firs t chapter, he divides principalities in to classes w ith a view to the differences o f materials and modes o f acquisition rather than to differences o f structure and purpose. H e thus in d i cates from the outset that he is chiefly concerned w ith men who desire to acquire principalities (either mixed o r w h o lly new ), i.e., w ith new princes. There is a tw o fo ld reason fo r this emphasis. The obvious reason is the fact that the immediate addressee o f the book is a new prince, and one who is, moreover, advised to become prince o f Ita ly and thus to become a new prince in a more exalted sense. B ut w hat at firs t glance seems to be dictated m erely b y M achiavelli’s consideration fo r the needs and prospects o f his imme diate addressee proves, on reflection, to be necessary fo r p urely theoretical reasons as w ell. A ll principalities, even if they are now elective or hereditary, were o rig in a lly new principalities. Even all republics, at least the greatest republics, were founded b y outstand ing men w ielding extraordinary power, i.e., b y new princes. T o discuss new princes means then to discuss the origins o r foundations o f all states or o f all social orders, and therew ith the nature o f society. The fact that the addressee o f the Prince is an actual or potential new prince somewhat conceals the eminent theoretical significance o f the theme “ the new prince.” The am biguity due to the fact that the Prince sometimes deals w ith princes in general and sometimes w ith new princes in par ticu la r is increased by the am biguity o f the term “ new prince.” The term may designate the founder o f a dynasty in a state already established, i.e., a new prince in an old state, or a man who “ seizes” a state, like Sforza in M ilan or Agathocles in Syracuse or L ive ro tto in Fermo. But it may also designate a new prince in a new state or “ a w h o lly new prince in a w h o lly new state,” i.e., a man who has not m erely acquired a state already in existence but has founded a state. The new prince in a new state in his tu rn may be an im ita to r, i.e., adopt modes and orders invented by another new prince, o r in other ways fo llo w the beaten track. B ut he may also be the
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orig in ato r o f new modes and orders, o r a radical innovator, the founder o f a new type o f society, possibly the founder o f a new re lig io n —in b rie f, a man like Moses, Cyrus, Theseus, o r Romulus. M achiavelli applies to men o f the highest order the term “ proph ets.” 36 T h a t term w ould seem to f it Moses rather than the three others. Moses is indeed the most im portant founder: C hristianity rests on a foundation laid by Moses. A t the beginning o f the chapter w hich is devoted to the grand est examples, M achiavelli makes unambiguously clear the fact that he does not expect the addressee o f the Frince to be o r to become an originator: he advises his reader to become an im ita to r o r to fo llo w the beaten track o r to be a man o f second rate virtue. This is not surprising: an originator w ould not need M achiavelli’s in struction. As he states in the Epistle Dedicatory, he wishes that Lorenzo w ould “ understand” what he him self “ had come to know and had come to understand” : he does not expect him to have come to know the most im portant things b y himself. Lorenzo may have an “ excellent” brain; he is not expected to have a “ most excellent” brain.87 How ever this may be, being “ a prudent man,” he is exhorted to “ fo llo w the track beaten b y great men and to im itate those who have been most excellent,” i.e., men like Romulus and Moses. On the other hand, the precepts w hich M achiavelli gives to Lorenzo are abstracted fro m the actions, not o f Romulus o r Moses, b ut o f Cesare Borgia.88 For, to say nothing o f other considerations, Lorenzo’s hoped-for rise depends upon his fa m ily connection w ith the present head o f the Church and therew ith on chance, just as Cesare’s actual rise depended on his fa m ily connection w ith a form er head o f the Church, whereas Romulus and Moses rose to pow er through virtu e as distinguished fro m chance. In im ita tin g Cesare Borgia, Lorenzo w ould adm it his in fe rio rity to Cesare: M achiavelli’s book w ould be somewhat out o f place if meant fo r a man o f Cesare’s stature and lack o f scruples. S till, Lorenzo is advised to im itate men* o f the stature o f Romulus and o f Moses. As appears fro m the last chapter, however, that im ita tio n is expected less o f Lorenzo b y him self than o f the illus trious house to w hich he belongs. In the last chapter the emphasis is altogether on Moses. M achi avelli says there that G od was a friend o f Moses, Cyrus and Theseus. The description is applied to Moses w ith greater p ro priety than
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to Cyrus and to Theseus. Lorenzo is then exhorted to im itate Moses. The notion o f im itating the prophets o f old was fam iliar to M achiavelli’s contemporaries: Savonarola appeared as a new Amos or as a new Moses, i.e., as a man who did the same things w hich the Biblical prophets had done, in new circumstances. This is not to say that there is no difference between the im itation o f Moses as Savonarola meant it and the im itation o f Moses as M achiavelli understood it. In order to encourage Lorenzo to liberate Ita ly , M achiavelli reminds him o f the miracles w hich God had performed before the ir eyes: “ The sea has been divided. A cloud has guided you on yo ur way. The rock has given fo rth water. Manna has rained.” The miracles o f Lorenzo’s tim e w hich indeed are attested to by M achiavelli alone, im itate the miracles o f Moses’ time. M ore precisely, they im itate the miracles w hich were per formed, not in E gypt, the house o f bondage, but on the w ay fro m E gypt to the promised land—to a land to be conquered. D iffe rin g from Savonarola, M achiavelli does not predict that Florence, or her ruler, w ill become the ru le r o f Ita ly ,39 fo r the success o f the venture now depends alone on the exercise o f human virtu e w hich, because o f man’s fre e -w ill, cannot be foreseen. W hat may be imm inent, M achiavelli suggests, is the conquest o f another promised land, the land w hich M achiavelli has half-prom ised to Lorenzo. But alas, the im itation o f Moses is bad fo t Lorenzo; fo r Moses did not conquer the promised land: he died at its borders. In this dark way, M achiavelli, the new sibyl, prophesies that Lorenzo w ill not conquer and liberate Ita ly .40 He did not regard the practical proposal w ith w hich he concluded the Prince as prac ticable. He had measured the forces o f contem porary Ita ly too w e ll to have any delusions. As he states in the tw o Prefaces o f the companion book, w hich in this respect takes up the thread where the Prince drops it, “ o f that ancient virtu e [w hich is p o litic a ll no trace has been le ft” in Ita ly . N o t the short range project suggested at the end o f the Prince, but rather the long range project indicated throughout the Discourses offers hope fo r success. M any w riters have dismissed the last chapter o f the Prince as a piece o f mere rhetoric. This assertion—if it were follow ed up b y an intellig en t account o f the enigmatic conclusion o f the Prince—could be accepted as a crude expression o f the fact that that chapter must not be taken lite ra lly or too seriously.
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M achiavelli is not content w ith indicating his opinion by leading us to th in k o f the inauspicious character o f the im itation o f Moses in respect o f the conquest o f a promised land. W h ile stressing the im itative character o f the w o rk to w hich he exhorts Lorenzo, he stresses the fact that the liberator o f Ita ly must be an originator, an inventor o f new modes and orders, hence not an im ita to r. He him self hints at some far-reaching tactical innovations. B ut it is clear that the innovator o r the inventor in these matters w ould be M achiavelli, not Lorenzo. The c ry p tic prediction o f Lorenzo’s failure, if he were to attem pt to liberate Ita ly , can therefore be restated as follow s: only a man o f genius, o f supreme virtu e , could possibly succeed in liberating Ita ly ; but Lorenzo lacks the highest fo rm o f virtue. T his being the case, he is com pelled to re ly too much on chance. M achiavelli indicates and conceals how much Lorenzo w ould have to re ly on chance by the religious language w hich he employs in the last chapter. He mentions God as often there as in all other chapters o f the Prince taken together. He refers to the liberator o f Ita ly as an Italian “ s p irit” ; he describes the liberation o f Ita ly as a divine redem ption and he suggests its resemblance to the resurrection o f the dead as depicted b y Ezekiel; he alludes to the miracles w rought by G od in Ita ly . H ow ever much we m ight wish to be moved by these expressions o f religious sentiment, we fa il in our effort. M achiavelli’s certainty o f divine intervention reminds us o f his expectation o f a spontaneous a ll-Italian rising against the hated foreigners. Just as that expectation is at variance w ith w hat earlier chapters had indicated as to the ce rtainty o f pow erful Italian resistance to the liberator and u n ifie r o f Ita ly , so the expression o f religious sentiment is at variance w ith earlier explicit remarks. A ccording to those remarks, fear o f God is desirable o r indis pensable in soldiers and perhaps in subjects in general, w hile the prince need m erely appear religious, and he can easily create that appearance considering the c ru d ity o f thé large m a jo rity o f men. In the last chapter itself, M achiavelli calls the G od-w rought con tem porary events w hich resemble certain B iblical miracles not “ miracles” b ut “ extraordinary” events “ w ith o u t example” 41: he thus denies the re a lity o f those B iblical miracles and therew ith, fo r an obvious reason, the re a lity o f all B iblical miracles. W ith o u t such a denial, his own free invention o f the contem porary “ extraor-
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dinary” events w ould not have been possible: those invented miracles have the same status as the B iblical miracles. A ccording to the Prince, miracles are happenings w hich are neither common nor reasonable. T hey are happenings that cannot be traced to secondary causes but only to God d ire ctly. Near the beginning o f chapter 25 M achiavelli suggests that what is generally meant by God is in tru th nothing but chance. Hence the suggestion made in chapter 26, that a number o f miracles had happened in contem porary Ita ly is the figurative equivalent o f the assertion, made e xp licitly in chapter 25, that chance is p articula rly pow erful in contemporary Ita ly . M ore specifically, many “ miraculous losses” have been sustained in contem porary Ita ly .42 In the last chapter M achiavelli enumerates seven astonishing defeats suffered in the immediate past by Italian troops.43 Since there is no defeat w ith o u t a victo r, one may speak w ith equal rig h t o f “ miraculous losses and miraculous acquisitions” being the necessary consequence o f the preponderance o f Fortuna’s pow er in contem porary Ita ly .44 This means that, given the poverty o f the Italian m ilita ry system and the ensuing preponderance o f chance, a w e ll advised and industrious prince m ight have astounding tem porary successes against other Italian princes, just as Pope Julius I I had such successes against his cow ardly enemies. In particular, Lorenzo m ight succeed in building up a strong pow er in Tuscany. B ut the thought o f defeating the pow erful m ilita ry monarchies w hich dominate parts o f Ita ly remains fo r the tim e being a dream.45 One cannot understand the meaning o f the last chapter, and therew ith o f the Prince as a whole, w ith o u t taking in to considera tio n the position, the character and the aspirations o f the other partner in the relationship, not to say in the dialogue, w hich is constitutive o f the book. In proportion as the status o f Lorenzo is lessened, the stature o f M achiavelli grows. A t the beginning, in the Epistle D edicatory, Lorenzo appears as dw elling on the wholesome heights o f majesty whereas M achiavelli must inhale the dust at his feet: the favorite o f Fortuna is contrasted w ith her enemy. M achiavelli presents him self as a man who possesses inform a tio n w hich princes necessarily lack and yet need. He describes that inform ation in a way w hich is surprising not o nly to those who are forced by disposition o r training to th in k o f statistical data. He claims to possess knowledge o f the nature o f princes:
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just as one sees mountains best fro m a valley and valleys best fro m a m ountain, so one must be a prince in order to know w e ll the nature o f peoples, and one must be a man o f the people in order to know w e ll the nature o f princes. In other words, w hile Lorenzo and M achiavelli are at opposite ends o f the scale o f Fortuna, they are equal in wisdom: each possesses one half o f the whole o f p o litic a l wisdom ; they are bom to supplement each other. M achi avelli does not say that they should pool th e ir resources in order to liberate Ita ly . N o r does he wish to hand over his share o f p o litic a l wisdom to Lorenzo as a pure g ift. He desires to receive something in return. He desires to better his fortune. Looking fo rw a rd to the end o f the book, we may say that he desires to better his fortune b y showing Lorenzo how to better his fortun e through becoming prince o f Ita ly . For, as he says already in the Epistle D edicatory, chance and Lorenzo’s other qualities promise him a greatness w hich even surpasses his present great ness. He dedicates the Prince to Lorenzo because he seeks honorable em ploym ent. H e desires to become the servant o f Lorenzo. Perhaps he desires to become an occasional o r tem porary adviser to Lorenzo. Perhaps he is even th in kin g o f the position o f a permanent adviser. B ut the absolute lim it o f his am bition w ould be to become the m inister o f Lorenzo, to be to Lorenzo w hat A ntonio da Venafro had been to Pandoifo Pétrucci, prince o f Siena. H is desire w ould be w h o lly unreasonable if he did not see his w ay tow ard convincing his master o f his competence. The p ro o f o f his competence is the Prince. B ut competence is not enough. Lorenzo must also be assured o f M achiavelli’s lo y a lty or at least re lia b ility . M achiavelli cannot refer, not even in the Epistle D edicatory, to the fact that he had once had honorable employm ent in w hich he served lo y a lly . F o r he was a loyal servant o f the republican regime in Florence, and this b y itse lf m ight compromise him in the eyes o f his prince. H e faces this d iffic u lty fo r the firs t tim e in the chapter on c iv il principalities, i.e., on the kind o f p rin cip a lity o f w hich Lorenzo’s rule is an example. He discusses there the question o f how the prince ought to treat the notables among his subjects. H e distinguishes three kinds o f notables, the central one consisting o f men w ho do not com m it themselves entirely to the cause o f the prince because they are pusillanimous and have a natural defect o f courage. M achiavelli advises the prince to em ploy men
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o f this kind provided they are men o f good counsel, “ fo r in prosperity you are honored on account o f this and in adversity you have nothing to fear from them.” Men o f good counsel w ill have the required pusillanim ity if the power o f the prince has strong popular support: the few who can see w ith th e ir own eyes “ do not dare to oppose themselves to the opinion o f the many who have the majesty o f the state on th e ir side.” Since M achiavelli was suspected o f having participated in a conspiracy against the M edici, it was p articula rly necessary fo r him to show through the Prince that men o f his kind w ould never have the tem erity to engage in such dangerous undertakings fo r they w ould th in k only o f the probable outcome o f the deed and not o f its possible intrinsic n o b ility. He almost presents the spectacle o f a conversa tion between himself and a potential conspirator against the prince in w hich he tries to convince the conspirator o f the fo lly o f his imaginings—a spectacle the very suggestion o f w hich must have edified and reassured Lorenzo should he have read the Prince. Eventually, M achiavelli does not refrain from speaking e x p lic itly about how a new prince should treat men who in the beginning o f his reign had been suspect because o f th e ir lo y a lty to the preceding regime. He urges the prince to em ploy men o f this kind. “ Pandolfo Pétrucci, prince o f Siena, ruled his state more w ith those who were suspected by him than w ith others.” The mere fact that such men are compelled to live down a past makes them w illin g to be reliable servants o f the prince. B ut b y proving so com pletely his re lia b ility in addition to his competence, M achiavelli m ight seem to have overshot the mark. H is potential em ployer m ight w ell wonder whether a man o f M achiavelli’s cleverness, if employed as an adviser or m inister, w ould not receive all credit fo r wise actions o f the government and thus b y contrast render the less wise prince rather contem ptible. M achiavelli reassures him , as w ell as he can, by setting up the in fa llib le general rule that a prince who is not himself wise cannot be w e ll advised.40 Con sidering the great hazards to w hich M achiavelli exposes him self by try in g to enter the service o f a new prince, one may wonder whether according to his principles he ought not to have preferred poverty and obscurity. He answers this question in the Discourses since it cannot be answered w ith p ro p rie ty in the Prince. Men in his position, he indicates, live in continuous danger if they do
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not seek em ploym ent w ith the prince; in try in g to give advice to the prince, they must indeed “ take things m oderately,” i.e., they must avoid standing fo rth as the chief or sole promoters o f a bold scheme. O n ly if the bold scheme is backed b y a strong p arty can some risks be safely taken.47 The particular counsel w hich M achiavelli gives to Lorenzo e xp licitly, i.e., the counsel w hich he gives in the last chapter o f the Prince, is moderate both because it is silent concerning the extreme measures required fo r the liberation o f Ita ly and because it cannot but be very popular w ith ve ry many Italians. W e have not yet considered M achiavelli’s strange suggestion that he possesses one half o f p o litica l wisdom, namely, knowledge o f the nature o f princes, whereas Lorenzo may possess the other half, namely, knowledge o f the nature o f peoples. He makes this suggestion in the same context in w hich he declares his intention o f g iving rules fo r princely government. B ut to give rules to princes as to how they ought to rule, means to teach them how they ought to rule th e ir peoples. M achiavelli cannot then teach princes w ith o u t possessing good knowledge o f the nature o f peoples as w ell. In fact, he gives much evidence o f his possessing such knowledge inasmuch as he transmits it in the Prince to his p rin ce ly pupil. He knows then everything o f relevance that the prince knows, and in addition he knows much that is relevant o f w hich the prince is ignorant. He is not m erely a potential adviser o f a prince but a teacher o f princes as such. In fact, since more than one o f his precepts is not required fo r princes at all, because princes w ould know such things w ith o u t his instruction, he also, through the Prince, teaches subjects what they should expect from th e ir prince, or the tru th about the nature o f princes.48 As an adviser o f a prince, he addresses an individual; as a teacher o f p o litic a l wisdom, he addresses an indefinite m ultitude. He indicates his dual capacity and the corresponding duality o f his addressees b y his use o f the second person o f the personal pronoun: he uses “ T h ou ” when addressing the prince, and even the man w ho conspires against the prince, i.e., when addressing men o f action, w h ile he uses “ Y ou” when addressing those whose interest is p rim a rily theoretical, either sim ply o r fo r the tim e being. The la tte r kin d o f addressees o f the Prince are identical w ith the addressees o f the Discourses, “ the young.” 49
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M achiavelli mentions o nly one teacher o f princes, namely, C hiron the centaur who brought up A chilles and many other ancient princes. M achiavelli’s own model is a m ythical figure: he returns to the beginnings not only b y making the heroic founders his most exalted theme and the foundation o f society his most fundamental theme, but likewise in understanding his own doing. H is model is half beast, half man. He urges princes, and especially new princes, firs t to make use o f both natures, the nature o f the beast and the nature o f man; and in the repetition, sim ply to im itate the beast, i.e., to use the person o f the fo x and the lion, o r to im itate those tw o natures.50 The im ita tio n o f the beast takes the place o f the im itation o f God. W e may note here that M achiavelli is our most im portant witness to the tru th that humanism is not enough. Since man must understand him self in the lig h t o f the whole o r o f the orig in o f the whole w hich is not human, or since man is the being that must tr y to transcend hum anity, he must transcend hum anity in the direction o f the subhuman if he does not transcend it in the direction o f the superhuman. Tertium , i.e., humanism, non datur. W e may look forw ard from M achiavelli to S w ift whose greatest w o rk culminates in the recommendation that men should im itate the horses,51 to Rousseau who demanded the return to the state o f nature, a sub human state, and to Nietzsche who suggested that T ru th is not God but a W oman. As fo r M achiavelli, one may say w ith at least equal rig h t that he replaces the im itation o f the G od-M an C hrist by the im itation o f the Beast-Man Chiron. T h a t Beast-Man is, as M achiavelli indicates, a creation o f the w riters o f antiq u ity, a creature o f the imagination. Just as Scipio, in im ita tin g Cyrus, in fact im itated a creation o f Xenophon,52 so the princes in im ita tin g Chiron, w ill in fact im itate, not Chiron, but the ancient w riters, if the carrying out o f a teaching can ju s tly be called an im itation o f that teaching. But whatever may be true o f princes or other actors, certainly M achiavelli, b y teaching princes w hat C hiron was said to have taught, imitates Chiron o r follow s the creators o f Chiron. Yet, as we have noted before, m erely b y teaching openly and in his own name what certain ancient w riters had taught covertly and by using th e ir characters as th e ir m outh pieces, M achiavelli sets fo rth an entirely new teaching. H e is a Chiron of an entirely new kind.
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As a teacher o f princes o r o f new princes in general, M achiavelli is not especially concerned w ith the particular problems facing contem porary Italian princes. Those particular problems w ould be o f interest to him o n ly as illustrations o f typ ica l problems. The prim ary purpose o f the Prince then is not to give particular counsel to a contem porary Italian prince, but to set fo rth a w h o lly new teaching regarding w h o lly new princes in w h o lly new states, or a shocking teaching about the most shocking phenomena. From tha t fa ct we understand the meaning o f the last chapter. The par tic u la r counsel there given serves the purpose o f ju stifyin g the novel general teaching before the tribunal o f accepted opinion: a general teaching, however novel and repulsive, m ight seem to be redeemed if it leads up to a particular counsel as respectable, hon orable and praisew orthy as that o f liberating Ita ly . B ut how is this transform ation achieved? M achiavelli does not m erely suppress m ention o f the unholy means w hich are required fo r the achieve ment o f the sacred end. He surreptitiously introduces a new end, an end not warranted b y the argument o f the firs t tw e nty-five chapters. H e urges Lorenzo to liberate Ita ly on p a trio tic grounds or, to use a term to w hich he alludes near the beginning o f chapter 26, on grounds o f the common good. He thus creates the impres sion tha t all the te rrib le rules and counsels given throughout the w o rk were given exclusively fo r the sake o f the common good. The last chapter suggests then a tolerable interpretation o f the shocking teaching o f the bulk o f the w ork. B ut the firs t tw e n tyfive chapters had observed complete silence regarding the common good. The allusion to the common good near the beginning o f chapter 26 has the same status as the other surprising features o f tha t chapter: the expectation o f a spontaneous all-Italian rising against the foreigners and the expression o f religious sentiment. I t is o n ly when one subjects the particular counsel given in the last chapter to p o litica l analysis along the lines demanded by the earlier chapters tha t one realizes that one must have broken com pletely w ith tra dition a l m o ra lity and traditional beliefs in order even to consider that counsel. B ut the judicious reader cannot be satisfied w ith raising the question o f how that particular counsel could be p ut in to practice and thereafter whether it can be put in to prac tice under the given circumstances. He must raise this fu rth e r and more incisive question: w ould M achiavelli condemn the im -
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moral policies recommended in the bulk o f the book if they did not serve a p atriotic purpose? O r are those im m oral policies barely compatible w ith a p atriotic use? Is it not possible to understand the patriotic conclusion o f the Prince as a respectable coloring o f the designs o f a self-seeking Italian prince? There can be no doubt regarding the answer; the im m oral policies recommended through out the Prince are not justified on grounds o f the common good, but exclusively on grounds o f the self-interest o f the prince, o f his selfish concern w ith his own well-being, security and g lo ry .53 The final appeal to patriotism supplies M achiavelli w ith an excuse fo r having recommended im m oral courses o f action. In the lig h t o f this fact, his character may very w ell appear to be even blacker than even his w orst enemies have thought. A t the same tim e how ever, we are not forced to leave the m atter w ith the remark that the last chapter o f the Prince is a piece o f mere rhetoric, i.e., that he was not capable o f thinking clearly and w ritin g w ith con summate skill. These observations are not to deny that M achiavelli was an Italian patriot. He w ould not have been human if he had not loathed the barbarians who were devastating and degrading his fa ir coun try . W e merely deny that his love fo r his fatherland, or his fatherland itself, was his most precious possession. The core o f his being was his thought about man, about the condition o f man and about human affairs. By raising the fundamental questions he o f necessity transcended the lim itations and the lim its o f Ita ly , and he thus was enabled to use the p atriotic sentiments o f his readers, as w ell as his own, fo r a higher purpose, fo r an u lte rio r purpose. One must also consider an am biguity characteristic o f M achiavelli’s patriotism . In the Prince there are eight references to “ the fatherland.” In one case Ita ly is described as a fatherland. In six cases the fatherlands mentioned are, not countries, but cities. In one case, fo u r fatherlands are mentioned; tw o are cities (Rome and Athens) and tw o are countries; one o f the countries is Persia; as regards the other country, the fatherland nobilitated b y Moses, it is unclear whether it is E gypt o r Canaan, the land o f his b irth o r the land o f his aspiration.54 W hen we apply this observation to M achiavelli, we become aware o f a tension between his Italian patriotism and his Florentine patriotism . O r should one not rather speak o f a tension between his Roman patriotism and his Tuscan
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patriotism ? There exists a close connection between the transp a trio tic core o f his thought and his love fo r Ita ly . Ita ly is the soil out o f w hich sprang the g lo ry that was ancient Rome. Machiav e lli believed that the men who are born in a country preserve through all ages more or less the same nature. I f the greatest p o litica l achievement w hich the w o rld has ever known was a fru it o f the Italian soil there is ground fo r hope that the p o litica l rejuvenation o f the w o rld w ill make its firs t appearance in Ita ly : the sons o f Ita ly are the most gifted individuals; all modem w rite rs referred to in either the Frince or the Discourses are Ita l ians. Since that p o litica l rejuvenation is bound up w ith a radical change in thought, the hope from Ita ly and fo r Ita ly is not p ri m a rily p o litica l in the narrow sense. The liberation o f Ita ly w hich M achiavelli has p rim a rily in m ind is not the political liberation o f Ita ly fro m the barbarians but the intellectual liberation o f an Italian elite fro m a bad tra dition . B ut precisely because he believed that the men who are born in a country preserve through all ages more o r less the same nature, and as the nature o f the Romans was d if ferent fro m that o f the Tuscans, his hope was also grounded on his recollection o f Tuscan g lo ry :55 the old Etrurians had made a decisive co ntribu tio n to the religion o f the Romans. He seems to have regarded him self as a restorer o f Tuscan g lo ry because he too contributed tow ard supplying Rome w ith a new religion or w ith a new outlook on religion. O r perhaps he thought o f T a r quinius Priscus who, com ing from E truria, strengthened the demo cratic element o f the Roman p o lity. Furtherm ore, once one grasps the intransigent character o f M achiavelli’s theoretical concern, one is no longer compelled to burden him w ith the fu ll responsibility fo r that practical reck lessness w hich he frequently recommends. The ruthless counsels given throughout the Prince are addressed less to princes, who w ould hardly need them, than to “ the young” who are concerned w ith understanding the nature o f soçiety. Those true addressees o f the Prince have been brought up in teachings w hich, in the lig h t o f M achiavelli’s w h o lly new teaching, reveal themselves to be much too confident o f human goodness, if not o f the goodness o f creation, and hence too gentle o r effeminate. Just as a man who is tim orous b y tra in ing o r nature cannot acquire courage, w hich is the mean between cowardice and foolhardiness, unless he drags
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himself in the direction o f foolhardiness, so M achiavelli’s pupils must go through a process o f brutalization in order to be freed from effeminacy. O r just as one learns bayoneting by using weapons w hich are much heavier than those used in actual combat,δβ one learns statecraft by seriously playing w ith extreme courses o f ac tion w hich are rarely, if ever, appropriate in actual politics. N o t only some o f the most com forting, but precisely some o f the most outrageous statements o f the Prince are not meant seriously but serve a merely pedagogic function: as soon as one understands them, one sees that they are amusing and meant to amuse. Machiave lli tries to divert the adherence o f the young from the old to the new teaching by appealing to the taste o f the young w hich is not the best taste or, fo r that m atter, to the taste o f the common people:67 he displays a bias in favor o f the impetuous, the quick, the partisan, the spectacular, and the bloody over and against the deliberate, the slow, the neutral, the silent, and the gentle. In the Prince he says that a prince who has conquered a c ity w hich was w ont to live free must destroy that c ity if he cannot make it his residence. In the Discourses he says that precisely a prince ( if he is not a barbarian) as distinguished from a republic w ould spare and protect conquered cities and w ould leave th e ir autonomy intact, as much as possible.68 A nother resolute course o f action recommended in the Prince is to avoid neu tra lity when tw o pow er fu l neighbors come to blows: to take sides is always better than to remain neutral. M achiavelli gradually discloses the lim itations o f this advice. He admits firs t that n eu tra lity is not always fatal. He then states that because o f the pow er o f justice, to take sides is safer than to remain neutral. Thereafter he makes clear that under certain conditions it is most unwise to abandon n e u tra lity in case o f co nflict between tw o pow erful neighbors. F in a lly he admits that no course o f action is p erfe ctly safe or, in other words, that the power o f justice is not as great as he previously indicated.69 He suggests very strongly in the Prince that the one thing needful is good arms; he speaks less lo u dly o f the need fo r prudence.60 W e must return once more to M achiavelli’s suggestion that he possesses adequate knowledge o f the nature o f princes, whereas Lorenzo may possess adequate knowledge o f the nature o f peoples. As we have said, this suggestion is absurd: since to be a prince means to rule the people, it is impossible to know princes w e ll w ith o u t know ing peoples w e ll; to say nothing o f the facts that
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M achiavelli displays knowledge o f the nature o f peoples through out the Prince and, as he says e x p lic itly in the Discourses, there is no difference o f nature between princes and peoples.61 Since he knows w e ll the nature o f peoples, he intimates b y his strange suggestion that he is a prince. T his intim ation w ill appear strange o n ly to those who lack fa m ilia rity w ith Xenophon or Plato: he w ho knows the a rt o f ru lin g is more tru ly a ru le r than men who rule m erely b y virtu e o f inheritance o r force o r fraud o r election b y people w ho know nothing o f the art o f ru lin g .62 B ut if M achiavelli is a prince, he is a new prince and not one who im i tates the modes and orders found b y others, but rather an o rig i nator, a true founder, a discoverer o f new modes and orders, a man o f supreme virtue. In fact, if it is proper to call prophet the founder o f a new social order w hich is all-comprehensive and not m erely p o litic a l o r m ilita ry , then M achiavelli is a prophet. N o t Lorenzo, but M achiavelli is the new Romulus-Numa o r the new Moses, i.e., a man who does not m erely repeat in new circum stances w hat Romulus-Numa o r Moses had done in the olden times, but who is as original as they were. In the last chapter o f the Prince , he attests to certain miracles w hich had happened somewhere in contem porary Ita ly —miracles w hich resemble those o f the tim e o f Moses. The ancient miracles happened on the w ay fro m the house o f bondage to the promised land: they happened im m ediately before the revelation on M ount Sinai. W hat is im m i nent, M achiavelli suggests then, is not the conquest o f a new promised land, but a new revelation, the revelation o f a new code, o f a new decalogue. The man who w ill bring the new code, cannot be Lorenzo o r any other prince in the vulgar sense. The bringer o f the new code is none other than M achiavelli himself: he brings the true code, the code w hich is in accordance w ith the tru th , w ith the nature o f things. Compared w ith this achieve ment, the conquest o f the promised land, the liberation o f Ita ly , is a cura posterior: it can w ait, it must w ait u n til the new code has regenerated the Italians. The new Moses w ill not be sad if he dies at the borders o f the land w hich he had promised, and if he w ill see it o nly fro m afar. F or w hile it is fatal fo r a would-be conqueror not to conquer w hile he is alive, the discoverer o f the all-im portant tru th can conquer posthumously.63 Concerning prophets in general, M achiavelli remarks that all
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armed prophets have conquered and the unarmed prophets have failed. The greatest armed prophet is Moses. The only unarmed prophet mentioned is Savonarola. But as is shown b y the expres sion “ all armed prophets . . . and the unarmed ones,” he thinks not only o f Savonarola. Just as he, who admired so greatly the contem porary M uslim conquerors, could not help th in kin g o f Muhammad when speaking o f armed prophets, so he must have thought o f Jesus when speaking o f unarmed prophets. This is per haps the greatest d iffic u lty w hich we encounter when we try to enter into the thought o f the Prince: how can M achiavelli, on the basis o f his principles, account fo r the v ic to ry o f C hristianity? Certain o f his successors attempted e xp licitly to explain the v ic to ry o f C hristianity in purely political terms. T o quote from a presentday historian: “ In the most starkly Erastian utterance o f the [seventeenth] century, [H e n ry ] Parker all but maintained that it was Constantine, and not the preaching o r the miracles o f the early Church, that won Europe to the Christian fo ld .” 64 But we cannot bring ourselves to believe that a man o f M achiavelli's in telligence w ould have been satisfied w ith an answer o f this kind, w hich merely leads to this fu rth e r question: w hat m otivated Con stantine’s action? must C hristianity not already have been a power in order to become an attraction or a too l fo r a politician? T o see how M achiavelli could have accounted fo r the v ic to ry o f C hristianity, we have to consider a fu rth e r d iffic u lty w hich is no less obvious. A ll unarmed prophets, he says, have failed. But w hat is he himself if not an unarmed prophet? H o w can he reasonably hope fo r the success o f his enormous venture—enormous in itse lf and productive o f in fin ite enormities—if unarmed prophets neces sarily fail? This is the only fundamental question w hich the Prince raises in the reader's mind w ith o u t giving him even a suspicion o f Machiavelli's answer. I t reminds one o f the question, likewise le ft unanswered in the Prince, as to how new modes and orders can be maintained throughout the ages.65 For the answer to it, we must turn to the Discourses.
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M a c h ia v e lli’ s In te n tio n : T h e Discourses
U P E R F IC IA L readers o f the Prince who are not altogether careless w ill approach the Discourses w ith the expectation that that book is devoted to republic peoples as distinguished from princes. T h is expectation w i altogether disappointed. Since to speak about peoples is less danger ous than to speak about princes, the Discourses can be expected to be more outspoken than the Prince. W e have seen that it is so in an im portant respect: o ur inform ation concerning M achiavelli’s manner o f w ritin g is derived p rim a rily and chiefly fro m the Discourses. The Discourses cannot be described sim ply as a book on re publics. A t the beginning, M achiavelli indicates the intention o f the book b y presenting him self as another Columbus, as the dis coverer o f a h itherto unexpected moral continent, as a man who has found new modes and orders. B ut just as men generally were good at the beginning o f the w o rld o r o f societies, M achiavelli, w ho im itates in his books “ the things o f the w o rld ,” is good at the beginnings o f his books. A ccording ly, at the beginning o f the Discourses he appears to proclaim the daring character o f his enter prise w ith o u t any reserve: he does not seem to conceal anything.
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He seems to explain his daring action by his concern w ith the common good: he did not w rite the Discourses in order to better his fortune. Above all, the new modes and orders prove to be the modes and orders o f a ntiq u ity and hence ve ry old modes and orders. The ancient modes and orders are new because they have been forgotten, or buried like ancient statues. M achiavelli must then disinter them: no trace o f ancient virtue, the o rig in and progeny o f the ancient modes and orders, remains. B ut he does not claim that he is the firs t or the o nly modem man to become aware o f the ancient modes and orders. Everyone knows o f them and many admire them. But everyone thinks that they cannot be im itated b y modem man. The purpose o f the Discourses is not sim ply to bring to lig h t the ancient modes and orders but above all to prove that they can be im itated by modern man. M achiavelli’s enterprise therefore requires knowledge o f things modem as w e ll as o f things ancient; it cannot be the w o rk o f a mere antiquarian. The prevail ing unbelief concerning the possibility o f im itating ancient virtu e is p a rtly due to the influence o f C hristianity. M odern men do not believe that ancient virtue can be im itated because they believe that man now belongs to a different order o f things than fo rm e rly o r that his status has changed or that he has been m iraculously transformed. M achiavelli does not deny that modem men d iffe r from ancient men. B ut this difference, he holds, is due entirely to a difference in education and in knowledge o f “ the w o rld .” I f modem men were p roperly educated and properly taught, they could im itate the ancients. M odem men regard the im itation o f antiq u ity as not so much physically as m orally impossible. T h e y be lieve that the ancient modes and orders ought not to be im itated: they have been taught to regard the virtues o f the ancients as re splendent vices or to reject the concern o f the ancients w ith w o rld ly g lo ry in the name o f the B iblical demands fo r h u m ility and ch arity.1 I t is therefore not sufficient fo r M achiavelli to exhibit specimens o f ancient virtu e ; it is incumbent upon him to prove that the virtu e o f the ancients is genuine virtue. T o prove that ancient virtu e can be im itated and ought to be im itated is tantam ount to re fu tin g the claims o f B iblical religion. A ccording to an opinion w hich is venerable because o f its age, M achiavelli’s intention in the Discourses is to reduce the lessons
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im p lic itly o r even unconsciously conveyed through the narrative o f an ancient historian to general rules w hich even very mediocre minds can easily understand. T h is opinion is misleading fo r a number o f reasons. In the firs t place, it arises from disregarding the m ajor obstacle w hich has to be overcome before the general rules derived fro m ancient practice can be accepted as good rules. Secondly, it arises fro m disregarding w hat M achiavelli e x p lic itly says concerning the intention o f his book. In the Preface to the F irst Book where he indicates his intention, he speaks o f the ex amples o f the ancients but not o f rules derived from those examples. On a later occasion he says: “ A nd tru ly , not w ith o u t cause do the good historians . . . p ut down certain cases w ith particulars and d is tin c tly so that posterity can learn how to defend itse lf in sim ilar situations.” T h is w ould indicate that the reduction to rules o f what the good historians teach is a triv ia l o r pedantic business altogether unbecom ing a new Columbus. M achiavelli does say in the Preface to the F irst Book that “ the c iv il laws are nothing but decisions given b y the ancient jurists w hich, reduced to order, teach our present jurists to judge.” B ut he does not make this remark on the jurists in order to say that he w ill do in regard to ancient p o litica l prac tice w hat the present-day jurists do (o r perhaps w hat th e ir ancient and medieval teachers d id ) in regard to ancient ju dicial practice. H e makes that rem ark in order to show that in lim ited or sub ordinate matters modem men do im itate the ancients and thus to lead up to the demand that modern man should im itate the ancients in the greatest matters. He goes on to say that “ Medicine is noth ing but the experiences made b y the ancient physicians on w hich the present physicians found th e ir judgments.” The modem physi cians, who are more interesting to M achiavelli than the modern lawyers, d iffe r from the ancient physicians not because they reduce to rules w hat the ancient physicians did but because they do not have access to certain experiences o r observations except through the reports o f the ancient physicians, ^probably because dissection is no longer practiced but rather frow ned upon. The ancient physicians then are not tru ly im itated b y the modem physicians. The true im ita to r o f the ancient physicians is M achiavelli: the ancient physicians’ anatomy o f simple bodies is the model fo r his anatomy o f mixed bodies. The anatomy o f mixed bodies itself is w h o lly new. The anatomy o f the mixed bodies is the indispensable
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condition fo r elaborating any reliable rules regarding the treat ment o f mixed bodies, whereas no equivalent o f anatomy is needed in order to reduce to rules the decisions o f the ancient lawyers: the lawyers can and must take fo r granted the law, the positive law w hich is not a mixed body but a product o f a mixed body, and they cannot go back behind that product. In the context, the reference to something like rules in the case o f the lawyers and the complete silence about rules in the case o f the physicians is a sign o f the fact that law occupies a low er rank than medicine. W h ile differing from the modern physicians by the fact that he is an anatomist, M achiavelli is in the same position as they are in sofar as he too is compelled to re ly on reports b y the ancients: to anatomize an excellent republic is not possible fo r him on the basis o f imm ediately available phenomena since no excellent re public is at present near at hand. I t goes w ith o u t saying that in speaking about modem pursuits w hich in one way o r another im i tate ancient pursuits, M achiavelli does not speak o f theology: “ the Christian sect . . . has destroyed every memory o f ancient theol ogy.” But it is notew orthy that he does not mention in this context the fo u rth o f the fo u r faculties: he does not suggest that the present philosophers im itate the ancient philosophers.2 The ancient modes and orders wrhich M achiavelli desires to show can be im itated and ought to be im itated by modem men are those o f ancient Rome. The Roman historian o f Rome’s g lo ry is L iv y . For the experience, the first-hand knowledge, o f the mixed body to be dissected, M achiavelli w ill re ly on L iv y . The Discourses are e xp licitly devoted to the firs t ten Books o f L iv y . M achiavelli seems to promise a continuation to be devoted to the other Books o f L iv y w hich have been preserved.3 B ut as he indicates by making the number o f the chapters o f the Discourses equal to the number o f Books o f L iv y ’s H istory , the Discourses on the First Ten Books of Livy are meant to cover the whole ground covered b y L iv y ’s whole w ork. M achiavelli’s analysis o f the Roman republic w ould be incomplete if it did not include an analysis o f the destruction o f the Roman republic and therew ith, as matters stand, o f the destruction o f vigorous republican life in the w o rld fo r at least a m illennium and a half, but the Discourses include such an analy sis.4 In other words the Discourses, im ita tin g L iv y ’s H isto ry , fo llo w Rome from her beginning u n til the beginning o f C hristianity. Y et
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M achiavelli may have had an additional reason fo r creating the impression that he was dealing m erely w ith the events recorded in L iv y ’s firs t ten books. I t is not sufficient to say that he was p a rticu la rly concerned w ith the Roman republic in its state o f incorruption, fo r according to him Rome was s till in co rru pt at the tim e o f the Second Punic W a r and even by the middle o f the second century b.c.5 He indicates his true reason by saying that Rome reached her ultim ate greatness in about 266 b.c.,6 i.e., imme diately before the outbreak o f the F irst Punic W ar. The period im m ediately preceding the F irst Punic W a r was treated by L iv y in his second decade, w hich is lost. M achiavelli then was particu la rly concerned w ith L iv y ’s firs t ten books because they are the o n ly remains o f the o n ly Livian books w hich deal w ith the rise o f Rome fro m her humble origins up to her ultim ate greatness: the gro w th o f Rome up to its com pletion naturally takes precedence over her decay. Rome reached her ultim ate greatness when she ruled (m ost o f) Ita ly and had not yet embarked on foreign con quests. Hence the fu ll title o f the Discourses draws our attention to a united and free Ita ly , freed and united b y a hegemonial re public, be it Rome or Florence, and not b y a prince. In a be com ingly subdued manner, M achiavelli suggests a practical alter native to the practical proposal proclaimed in the last chapter o f the Prince. In order to show that the Roman modes and orders can be im itated and ought to be im itated b y modem men, M achiavelli w ould have to show in each case that the Roman practice was sound and the corresponding modern practice is unsound. He also w ould have to show that one o r another modem state successfully follo w ed the Roman practice, unless he could presuppose or estab lish that w hat men did once they can do always. A t any rate, through understanding the intention o f the Discourses one is led to a definite expectation regarding the general character o f each o f its 142 discourses o r chapters. This expectation must be m odified im m ediately w ith a view to the ve ry great dissimilarities among those chapters. There are chapters w hich contain o nly ancient ex amples; there are chapters w hich contain o n ly modem examples; there are chapters w hich contain o n ly ancient examples none o f w hich is Roman; there are chapters w hich contain only ancient and T u rkish examples.7 The longest chapter ( III 6) is about 72
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times as long as the shortest chapter (I 48). I t is curious tha t the longest chapter is the one w hich has the shortest chapter heading (tw o words) ever to occur in the book;8 at the opposite pole we fin d tw o chapters (I 55, I I I 30) whose headings consist o f th irty five words. T h irty -n in e chapter headings contain proper names; in thirty-seven cases the men or societies mentioned are ancient, in one case (I 12) they are modern, and in one case ( III 36) they are both ancient and modern. Connected w ith this is the fact that o nly th irty-th re e chapter headings refer to the past by the tense in w hich they are framed. In spite or rather because o f these and other irregularities, one is entitled to speak o f the typical chapter o f the Discourses and to seek fo r it. T hat chapter w hich at firs t glance is the most atypical is the chapter on conspiracies ( I I I 6). I t is follow ed b y a chapter, the i ooth chapter o f the book, w hich, I am inclined to th in k, is meant to be the typical chapter. T h at chapter stands out fro m the group o f chapters to w hich it belongs ( III 1-10) because it is the o n ly one in that group that is not e x p lic itly connected w ith the fo llo w in g o r the preceding chapter b y a reference at its end o r at the end o f the preceding chapter. The typ ica l chapter o f the Discourses is “ unconnected” in this sense. The heading o f the typical chapter does not contain any proper names and it is framed in the present tense: it expresses a permanent fact regarding man as man. The heading is less shocking than the body o f the chapter: w hile in the heading o f Discourses I I I 7 M achiavelli uses the ex pression “ w ith o ut blood,” he speaks in the body o f the chapter o f “ the blood and the death” o f “ innumerable men” ; o f one kin d o f change o f regime he says that those changes were always such as to make him shudder who reads o f them, to say nothing o f some one else. M achiavelli desires to remain silent about those changes, not however because they are so appalling but because the histories are fu ll o f them: the Discourses do speak o f things w hich make shudder him who reads o f them, to say nothing o f him who is faced by them, provided those horrible things are not w e ll know n; the Discourses deal w ith the hidden causes o f those horrors o r w ith the terrors inherent in the ultim ate causes o r w ith the in itia l terro r. In the chapter under consideration, one Roman and one modern (Florentine) example are mentioned. The Roman example occurs in L iv y . B ut no reference is made to L iv y (o r to any other
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w rite r) in any manner o r fo rm nor is any passage fro m L iv y (o r any other w rite r) quoted in the original or in the Italian. In the chapter the tw o references to “ the histories” underline the fact that no reference is made to L iv y in particular: every reference to L iv y (o r to any other w rite r) and every quotation from L iv y (o r fro m any other w rite r) requires an explanation. The examples used are parallels, not specimens o f opposites; the same kind o f event happened in ancient Rome and in modem Florence. W h ile knowledge o f the events is supplied b y “ the histories” or b y the author’s experience, M achiavelli selects the parallel events, lets us see that the ancient and the modem examples are identical in the decisive respect, and indicates the identical cause. These mental oper ations culm inate in the form ulation o f a rule w hich reveals the connection between one typ ica l phenomenon as the cause and an other ty p ic a l phenomenon as its effect. The rule in question could not have been discovered through the study o f ancient p o litica l practice because it is derived fro m a comparison o f an ancient and a modem event. W e are thus induced to w onder whether it is the ultim ate intention o f the Discourses to prove the superiority o f the ancients to the modems. B ut le t us return to the beginning. The in itia l impression ac cording to w hich the author o f the Discourses is a bold innovator is im m ediately afterw ard overlaid b y the impression that he is m erely the restorer o f something old. C ertainly the prim ary p u r pose o f the book is to prove that the ancient modes and orders can and ought to be im itated o r that those modes and orders are the best. The book as a whole constitutes this proof. B ut one cannot begin to prove anything if one cannot start fro m principles w hich are universally o r generally granted. The readers o f M achiavelli, being adherents o f the established modes and orders, are opposed to the modes and orders w hich he recommends. He must appeal to principles w hich those readers w ill grant him. W e learn fro m the Preface to the F irst Book that those readers, besides being adherents o f the established modes and orders, are also admirers o f classical a ntiq u ity. There exists a prejudice in favor o f classical a n tiq u ity to w hich M achiavelli can appeal. He fu lly enters in to the s p irit o f this prejudice as a prejudice. I t is significant that whereas the Epistle Dedicatory o f the Prince refers to the d iffe r ence between the ancients and the modems, the Epistle Dedicatory
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o f the Discourses is silent about that difference. W e are expected to lose sight o f m odernity, to lose ourselves in a ntiquity, in the adm iration fo r antiq u ity and in the im itation o f a ntiquity. M achiave lli demands that the admirers o f antiq u ity be consistent and im i tate antiquity not only in subordinate matters but in the most im portant matters as w ell. He desires to make adm iration fo r a n tiq u ity complete: the last and most im portant part o f the return to antiq u ity, or o f the ascent to antiquity, w ill take place under the guidance o f the most competent ancient, o f L iv y . M achiavelli argues dia lectically o r iron ica lly. The appeal to the half-hearted admirers o f a ntiquity, to the follow ers o f the via del mezzo, is insufficient. N o t all readers can be presumed to be “ humanists.” L et us not forget the many who could read and who had follow ed Savonarola. Savonarola had praised Pope G regory the Great fo r having burned the works o f L iv y .9 From this we understand w h y in the early part o f the Discourses, in the firs t 36 chapters o f the 142 devoted to L iv y , M achiavelli is very hesitant to refer to L iv y , to say nothing o f quoting from L iv y . H is firs t task is to establish the a uth ority o f L iv y and, p rio r to this, the a uth ority o f classical Rome. He does this by appealing to what is common to both opposite parties. Both appeal to antiquity, be it classical or B iblical a ntiquity. In some way they seem to assume that the good is the old, be it the old established or something disestablished. M achiavelli begins his argument by appealing to the equation, so natural to man, o f the good and the old. I f the good is the old, the best must be the oldest. From this we understand w h y M achiavelli in the firs t chap ter praises the kingdom o f E gypt so h ig hly. The kings o f E gyp t o r the ir subjects deserve higher praise than even Alexander the Great, fo r the kingdom o f E gypt existed “ in the most ancient antiq u ity.” I t goes w ith o u t saying that this praise is entirely pro visional. W hen, in the beginning o f the Second Book, he surveys the tem poral sequence in w hich virtue resided in different ancient kingdoms, he assigns the firs t place to Assyria and is silent about E gypt. Even if E gypt as the oldest kingdom had been the best kingdom , we could not know this in any precise and useful w ay; the ancient Egyptians w ould deserve higher praise than A lex ander the Great if we knew more about them.10 G ranting that the best is the oldest, one is compelled to be satisfied w ith that
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oldest w hich is sufficiently known. Since one must then com promise, one m ight as w ell prefer to the oldest sim ply that oldest w hich is one’s own. For the Tuscan M achiavelli this w ould seem to mean that he should choose old E truria. In fact he recommends to the present Tuscans that they im itate the ancient Tuscans. The ancient Tuscans resembled the present Swiss since they too were sturdy republicans and form ed a league o f independent and equal republics. Besides, being most pow erful on sea and on land, the Tuscans controlled a large part o f Ita ly and were prevented by th e ir p o litica l organization fro m acquiring te rrito ry outside o f Ita ly . A ncient E tru ria endured fo r a long tim e, famous fo r empire, arms, religion and virtu e w hile having her own customs and her ow n ancestral language. B ut w hat is true o f the exceedingly pious ancient Egyptians, is almost equally true o f the almost equally pious ancient Tuscans: hardly any reliable reports about them remain.11 N o choice then is le ft to M achiavelli except to return to ancient Rome: ancient Rome satisfies the conditions both o f being the heritage o f the Italian M achiavelli and o f being sufficiently know n. I t is sufficiently know n through L iv y . W e shall then fo llo w L iv y . In m editating upon things Roman we shall cling as much as possible to the sequence o f events as recorded by L iv y . W e shall defer to the text o f L iv y . W e shall cherish it. W e shall harken to it in filia l affection, in patient d o c ility , in pious reverence u n til it has revealed to us its fu ll message. In pious reverence we shall avert our eyes from L iv y ’s own references to the derivative o r u n tru stw o rth y character o f many o f the tales w hich he retells: we shall not even allude to those ja rring references. W e shall use L iv y in the w ay in w hich the theologians use the Bible. Just as L iv y is M achiavelli’s Bible, the Romans are his chosen people: a man who dares to promise a land w ill not hesitate to choose a people. Just as the Bible does not teach that the best modes and orders were the oldest, neither does L iv y teach it; nothing prevents us fro m believing that the Roman republic marks a great advance beyond the Roman kingship. The Bible, reputedly the oldest record o f the most ancient an tiq u ity and the authentic record o f the Mosaic laws and orders, is bypassed b y M achiavelli as he moves from ancient E gypt to ancient Rome. H e mentions Moses in the firs t chapter o f the Dis courses when speaking o f peoples w hich are compelled to leave
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th e ir native land and to seek a new homeland fo r themselves. In the same chapter he draws our attention to the question o f the goodness o f the Mosaic laws but he does not answer it there o r elsewhere in the Discourses. He says later on that Moses framed laws w ith a view to the common good, but he says the same thing o f Solon whose laws he criticizes severely: the goodness o f laws requires more than that the end o f the laws be good. On the other hand he bestows the highest praise on Moses’ native land and its ancient kings. Those ancient kings w ould deserve more praise than “ others whose memory is s till fresh.” This praise o f the ancient Egyptians is im m ediately follow ed by praise o f the kingdom o f the Sultan and the order o f the Mamelukes, i.e., b y praise o f infidels.12 I t is clear that M achiavelli fails to im itate B iblical a n tiq u ity or at any rate to recommend its im itation. But the indications men tioned do not show the reasons fo r this refusal. The problem posed by B iblical antiquity remains behind him like an unconquered fortress. The deeds and institutions w hich L iv y celebrates are not al ways o f such a nature as to command instant approval and admira tion. A t firs t glance the Roman modes and orders appear to be in fe rio r to those o f Sparta. The Spartan p o lity was established by a single wise man at one stroke in the beginning; hence Sparta was never in need o f improvement and therefore o f dangerous change; she was always p erfectly stable; she preserved her p o lity and her freedom w ith o u t any corruption fo r more than eight hun dred years. But·:the Roman p o lity was established in a fortuitous manner and in answer to accidents as they arose; therefore Rome was unstable and constantly im periled; her lib e rty lasted fo r less than fo u r hundred years. In Sparta there was harm ony between the n o b ility and the commons because she kept all her citizens poor and hence virtuous; Rome was constantly shaken b y the co n flict between her insolent nobles and her ambitious plebs. Sparta was organized fo r just defense whereas Rome was organized fo r unjust expansion. M achiavelli must therefore defend the Roman p o lity against its critics. He is strangely reticent as to the id e n tity o f those critics; in the crucial context he does not m ention a single proper name. Before discussing the q ua lity o f the Roman republic he refers to “ those who have w ritte n o f republics,” i.e., to the traditional p olitical philosophers.18 I t is on the basis o f w hat is
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taught b y the most famous traditional p o litica l philosophers that Rome necessarily appears in fe rio r to Sparta or that “ many con demn” the Romans. M achiavelli is then compelled to defend the Roman p o lity against the ancient philosophers just as the theo logians are compelled to defend the Bible and its teachings against the ancient philosophers. H e is compelled to attack the philos ophers in the name o f his authority. H is argument in Discourses I 2-6 is rem iniscent o f theological apologetics. However, since he defers to the prejudice in favor o f a ntiquity, he must proceed cautiously in taking issue w ith ancient philosophy. H is refusal to id e n tify “ those who have w ritte n o f republics” is a consequence o f this caution. B ut how cautious a man can be often depends more on the conduct o f others than on himself. As M achiavelli inform s us, there is disagreement among the traditional p o litica l philos ophers: it is not his fa u lt that he must take sides. B ut he is not so presumptuous as to settle the controversy b y himself. T aking the safest course, he adopts the opinion o f those p o litica l philos ophers w ho “ according to the opinion o f many” are wiser than th e ir opponents. Those wiser thinkers had preferred mixed polities to simple polities. M achiavelli reproduces th e ir doctrine and adopts it. H e m erely alludes to his disagreement w ith them by indicating a difference between his own reason and that given by the classi cal w rite rs fo r the inadequacy o f simple aristocracy. Im m ediately a fte r m aking this barely noticeable allusion, he e x p lic itly and em p hatically accepts a premise w hich has been demonstrated by all p o litic a l philosophers. A rg uing fro m this premise, he then ex p lic itly takes issue w ith the anti-Roman “ opinion o f many” and even dares to say that “ many inconsiderately condemn” the vio lent strife between the Roman n o b ility and the Roman plebs; that violent strife, he contends, was the cause o f Roman freedom and Roman greatness. Y et at the end o f this w h o lly new praise o f dis cord, he turns fo r support and com fort to Cicero’s On Friendship.14 O n ly after so much preparation does he meet the issue posed by the seeming superiority o f Sparta to Rome: is not the less demo cratic and more stable Spartan p o lity preferable to the more dem ocratic and less stable Roman polity? Here he is confronted w ith the d iffic u lty that democracy was controversial w ith in Rome herself, between the people and the senate. He is compelled to choose not between tw o sects o f ancient philosophers but between
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tw o parties into w hich his own authority is divided; this division seems to render nugatory that authority. He is compelled to fa ll back on his own reason. He reaches a decision in favor o f Rome and against Sparta. The decision seems to depend on demonstra tion, but in setting fo rth the decision M achiavelli says fo u r times “ I believe.” 15 Has he then demonstrated the superiority o f Rome to Sparta, or has he m erely shown that, before the trib u na l o f unassisted reason, the case fo r Rome is as strong as the case fo r Sparta, so that one is free to believe in the superiority o f Rome? Does he im itate an apparent am biguity o f theological apologetics? However this may be, the first step o f M achiavelli’s argument con sists in establishing through demonstration, or faith, or both, the authority o f ancient Rome and therew ith the a uth ority o f L iv y who celebrated ancient Rome. O nly after he has taken this step can he as it were id e n tify himself w ith L iv y and enter on those discourses w hich are properly and even e x p lic itly discourses on L iv y . M achiavelli cannot id e n tify himself w ith L iv y com pletely. The intention o f the Discourses cannot be identical w ith that o f L iv y ’s H istory. This is true on at least tw o levels. The intention o f an apologist is not identical w ith that o f his authoritative text; the apologist is confronted w ith such arguments against his authoritative text as are not met by that text. Besides, L iv y ’s purpose is to set fo rth the greatness o f ancient Rome but not to prove the superiority o f ancient Rome to m odernity. M achiavelli cannot then be a com mentator on L iv y ; he has to perform an im portant task w hich L iv y did not perform . M achiavelli does not emphasize this p o in t; not before the 91st chapter o f the Discourses does he e x p lic itly indicate the difference between L iv y ’s theme and his own purpose. He there mentions an event w hich L iv y had mentioned w ith an apology fo r m entioning it. The event was a w ar waged on Italian soil, but not a w ar in w hich Romans were engaged: L iv y ’s theme is s tric tly Roman. M achiavelli’s purpose, on the other hand, does not lim it him to things Roman. In the chapter in question, he dis cusses “ H ow vain both the faith and the promises o f those are who find themselves outside o f the ir fatherland.” He e x p lic itly lim its himself to tw o examples w hile indicating that there are other ex amples. N either example is Roman or modem. Both examples con tain references to Asia. N o t only is M achiavelli’s subject not
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lim ite d to Rome; it includes things w hich happened in Asia; u l tim ately his subject is not Roman at all. In the present case we may w onder whether the fatherland w hich he has in m ind is any fatherland on earth. A t any rate, M achiavelli reasons about matters o f state, w hile L iv y is an historian. M achiavelli knows im portant his to rica l facts w hich L iv y could not have known. He must then make im portant additions to L iv y . On the other hand, it goes w ith o u t saying that he w ill not repeat what L iv y has made sufficiently clear.16 Since M achiavelli’s intention is not identical w ith L iv y ’s, it cannot be expected that the plan o f the Discourses should be identi cal w ith the order o f L iv y ’s H istory. M achiavelli divides the Discourses in to three Books, each o f w hich is devoted to a sub je ct o f its own: the internal affairs o f Rome that were transacted on the basis o f public counsel ( I) , the foreign affairs o f Rome that were transacted on the basis o f public counsel ( II) , both p ri vate and public affairs o f Romans that were transacted on the basis o f private counsel ( I I I ) . 17 A t the beginning o f the 9th chapter he indicates the fo llo w in g division o f subject matter: founders, re li gion, m ilitia . A t the beginning o f the 66th chapter he indicates that the preceding chapters o f the Second Book had dealt w ith the Roman p o licy o f aggrandizement but in the sequel he w ill go on to discuss the Roman procedure in the waging o f war. These remarks show that he desires to order the happenings w hich L iv y narrates in th e ir tem poral sequence and therefore somewhat cha o tic a lly ; he desires to fo llo w not the Livian sequence but the essential order o f subject matter. He follow s a plan o f his own. H e therefore selects L ivian stories w ith a view not o nly to th e ir th ro w in g lig h t on the nature o f p o litica l things but likewise to th e ir fittin g in to his plan. Hence there occur a considerable number o f cases in w hich the examples taken from L iv y fo llo w one another in the Discourses in a w ay altogether different from the w ay in w hich they fo llo w one another in L iv y ; and likewise there occur a considerable num ber o f cases in w hich a series o f chapters o f the Discourses is m anifestly held together by no other bond than that supplied b y the id e n tity o f trans-historical subject m atter (g ra ti tude, character o f the m ultitude, etc.). W hen M achiavelli says that something w ill be discussed “ in its place,” he means that it w ill be discussed in its place w ith in his plan and not in its tem poral place.18
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A t the same time he betrays an unmistakeable tendency to fo llo w the order o f L ivy's H istory. A t the beginning o f the 8th chapter he retells a Livian story w ith o u t making any reference to his source; yet he introduces his discourse on that story as a rem ark on “ this te xt” ; he thus leads us to expect that every discourse is related to some Livian text regardless o f whether this is e x p lic itly said o r not. The 115th chapter deals w ith a subject that M achiavelli had sufficiently treated in another w o rk; he discusses that subject in the Discourses only because a certain Livian passage invites such a discussion; in L ivy's H istory that Livian passage im m ediately follow s the Livian passage discussed in the preceding chapter o f the Discourses. The 130th chapter begins w ith a reflection w hich is said to have been occasioned by a remark o f L iv y . The subject o f the 60th chapter is introduced w ith a view to “ the order o f the history” ; “ the order o f the history” is not the same as “ our order,” the order estab lished by M achiavelli o f w hich he speaks elsewhere.19 W hat then, in general, is the relation between the Livian order and the Machia vellian order? Let us begin at the beginning. The firs t 15 chapters are m anifestly ordered according to M achiavelli’s own plan; that plan is to some extent made explicit; M achiavelli draws our atten tio n to it by noting that he has deviated from the L ivian order and that he may have deviated from his own plan.20 In the rest o f the First Book there no longer appears a manifest plan. Y et one cannot say that M achiavelli therein sim ply follow s the Livian order: dis courses related to the expulsion o f the Roman kings ( I 16-18) pre cede discourses related to the firs t three Roman kings (I 19-24). However if we consider the references to L iv y in I 16-60, we see that they s tric tly fo llo w the Livian order; they lead us in a straight way from the beginning o f L iv y II towards the end o f L iv y V II.21 On the other hand, M achiavelli does not fo llo w the L ivian order in I 1-15. i.e.. in a group o f chapters w hich is m anifestly governed by a clear and even p a rtia lly e xplicit plan. The a uth ority o f the Livian order asserts itself in proportion as the lig h t coming from M achiavelli's own plan is dimmed. Yet we must not overlook the fact that only 13 o f the 45 chapters in I 16-60 and more specifically only 3 o f the 24 chapters in I 16-39 contain references to L iv y : the Livian order ru lin g these sections resembles a th in cover w hich is to m in many places rather than a strong bond; M achiavelli m erely pretends to fo llo w the Livian order. Hence M achiavelli’s manner
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o f fo llo w in g the L ivian order constitutes a problem : when the L ivia n order is follow ed, there must be a Machiavellian reason fo r it. W hen a num ber o f chapters are linked exclusively by the Livian order, i.e., when the study o f th e ir subject matter, conducted w ith o rdinary care, reveals no other lin k between the chapters than the L ivia n order, one ought not to assume that these chapters are not governed b y M achiavelli’s own plan; one should rather assume that M achiavelli’s own plan has gone com pletely underground. O r, to state w ith o u t reservation w hat we believe, the Livian order con ceals M achiavelli’s plan. There are three ways in w hich M achiavelli indicates his plan. In the firs t place, he sometimes connects a num ber o f chapters b y e x p lic itly referrin g in one chapter to the next u n til the true o r apparent end o f a section has been reached. In this w ay he suggests that I 2-8, I 25-27, I I I 1-6, I I I 8-10, and I I I 19-23 each fo rm a section.22 The second and most im portant w ay in w hich one can discover M achiavelli’s plan is the study, conducted w ith the proper care, o f the subject m atter discussed. I t is not suffi cient to understand the p u rp o rt o f a given chapter taken by itself. Par operi sedesi23 it is also necessary to raise the question o f w h y the teaching concerned is transm itted in the context in w hich it is transm itted, and not to le t this question drop if the event com mented upon follow s tem porally or in the Livian order an event commented upon in the preceding chapter: the second event sel dom im m ediately follow s the firs t event in L iv y ’s narrative; hence one must raise the question regarding the principle w hich guides M achiavelli’s selection o f events. In Discourses I 39 M achiavelli shows that the same accidents can frequently be observed among diffe re n t peoples. The accidents w hich he uses as examples illus trate the foolish humors o f the people, i.e., o f the common people; the same kind o f accident due to the foolish humors o f the common people happened both in modern Florence and in ancient Rome. T he preceding chapter had dealt w ith the difference between F lo r ence as a weak republic and Rome as a strong republic. Remem bering the preceding chapter, one realizes in reading I 39 that the difference between strong Rome and weak Florence cannot be due to the difference o f the popular humors in the tw o cities but must be traced to the dissim ilarity o f th e ir ru lin g classes. A ccord in g ly , the fu n ctio n o f I 39 is to contribute tow ard the exposition o f the essential character o f a virtuous ru lin g class: that chapter
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proves to be the central chapter o f the section devoted to the essen tia l character o f a virtuous ru lin g class as exemplified b y the Roman ru lin g class or the continuous founders o f Rome. This conclusion is not contradicted by the fact that I 39 is connected by an emphatic reference w ith I 13, the central chapter o f the section m anifestly devoted to religion; the Florentine ru lin g class differs fro m the Roman ru lin g class precisely in regard to religion: the Roman ru l ing class made “ a good use” o f religion. The th ird w ay in w hich M achiavelli indicates his plan is by the use o f hints. B ut this subject is better relegated to a note.24 The Second Book confronts us w ith a somewhat different situ ation: by the tim e we have reached the Second Book, we are sup posed to have learned something about the substance as w e ll as the mode o f M achiavelli’s teaching; therefore the devices used b y the author can and must be varied to some extent. In the beginning o f the Second Book we are not welcomed, as we were in the begin ning o f the First Book (I 2-8), by a series o f e x p lic itly connected chapters. On the other hand, the beginning o f the Second Book does present the same disregard o f the L ivian order and the same degree o f explicitness regarding M achiavelli's ow n plan as does the beginning o f the First Book.25 The number o f chapters w hich contain references to L iv y is proportionately much greater in the Second Book than it was in the First: w hile o f the 60 chapters in the F irst Book only 18 contain such references, o f the 33 chapters o f the Second Book 22 chapters do.26 I f we take in to account the fact, w hich we explained above, that M achiavelli could not w e ll refer to L iv y in the opening chapters o f the Discourses, and if we therefore compare the 33 chapters o f the Second Book w ith the last 33 chapters o f the F irst Book, we notice more clearly the amazing progress in the emphatic use o f L iv y : o f the last 33 chapters o f the First Book o n ly 11 contain references to L iv y . A ll the more noticeable is the fact that the references to L iv y in the Second Book do not s tric tly fo llo w the Livian order through a long series o f chapters as they did in the bulk o f the F irst Book; the equivalent o f the order o f L iv y references in I 16-60 w hich leads us in a straight way from the beginning o f L iv y I I tow ard the end o f L iv y V II, is the order o f L iv y references in I I 28-32, w hich leads us in a straight way from about the last th ird o f L iv y V tow ard the end o f L iv y X . In spite of, or because o f this, M achiavelli adapts
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his own plan to the L ivian order in the Second Book more closely than he had done in the F irst Book; in the Second Book he some times uses the L ivian order as a means fo r indicating his own plan, w hich is not guided b y chronology; he indicates beginnings o f new sections b y deviating fro m the Livia n order, or, more pre cisely, b y returning in the order o f his L iv y references fro m a later L ivia n passage (say, L iv y IX 20) to an earlier Livian passage (say, L iv y V III 13).27 A t the same tim e, he continues to use such devices fo r indicating his plan as he had already used in the F irst Book, namely, the expressions “ in the fo llo w in g chapter” occur rin g at the end o f chapters,28 “ not foreign to (m y) purpose” oc cu rrin g at the beginning or end o f chapters,29 and “ everyone knows.” 30 A particular d iffic u lty is created b y M achiavelli’s remark in I I 4 tha t a certain p oint w ill be made “ at the end o f this m atter,” fo r the rem ark cannot refer to the end o f the section to w hich I I 4 belongs, namely the end o f II 5. He thus indicates that the division o f the Second Book in to sections interferes somehow w ith the u n ity o f a certain “ m atter” or that in the Second Book he discusses a broad subject whose treatm ent requires, to say the least, more than one section. A t the beginning o f I I 15 he connects that chap te r w ith the preceding one by speaking o f “ this same matter and . . . these same beginnings o f the w ar between the Latins and the Romans” ; he thus may indicate that the “ m atter” in question is not identical w ith a historical subject like a given w ar o r the be ginnings o f a given w ar.31 F or in itse lf “ a m atter” may o f course mean both a historical subject like the Roman Decemvirate and a trans-historical subject like ingratitude.32 In other words, “ a m atter” may mean a Livian story o r a M achiavellian topic. W hen M achiavelli says tow ard the end o f I 34, “ to tu rn to our matter, I conclude,” and thus distinguishes between “ our” m atter and “ m y” conclusion, he means “ to tu rn from m y discourse to the m atter reported b y L iv y ” ; he thus supplies us incidentally w ith the simple form ula fo r his use o f L iv y and the Livian order: M achiavelli im presses his form on the m atter supplied by L iv y . B ut to return to the c ry p tic expression “ at the end o f this m atter” w hich occurs in I I 4, the context makes it clear that the “ m atter” in question is the contrast between the unarmed modem states and the armed ancient states and the demand fo llo w in g fro m the understanding o f tha t contrast, that the modem states ought to im itate the ancient
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modes and orders. I f one assumes that “ the end o f this m atter” w ill coincide w ith the end o f some chapter, one notices that it is impossible to decide w ith o u t guessing w hat M achiavelli means by “ the end o f this m atter” ; and if one does not make that assumption, one w ill be confronted by an even greater d iffic u lty . The ends o f the fo llo w in g chapters meet the requirem ent stated in I I 4: I I 18, 20, 24, 30, 33, I I I 15, 27, 31, 36. W e believe that “ the end o f this m atter” is the end o f the Second Book ( II 33), and that the c ry p tic statement in I I 4 therefore gives us more precise inform ation con cerning the subject m atter o f the whole Second Book than do the thematic statements. T h at subject m atter is not m erely Roman foreign p o licy insofar as it was directed b y public counsel or, as M achiavelli suggests elsewhere, the m ilitia ;33 the Second Book is devoted in a much higher degree than the tw o other Books to the contrast between the armed ancient states and the unarmed modem states, between “ the weak w o rld ” o f m odernity and the strong w o rld o f antiquity, between “ the unarmed heaven” 34 and the armed heaven, i.e., to the causes, the origin, and the essential character o f the contrast between the moderns and the ancients. In spite o f a certain preponderance o f ancient “ m atter” in the Second Book, we are entitled to say that the theme o f that Book is the c ritic a l analysis o f m odernity or, as M achiavelli intimates b y occasionally using “ modem” and “ Christian” synonymously, o f C hristianity; fo r the ancient examples are necessary to provide a provisional standard fo r the judgm ent on m odernity.35 The Second Book w ould then have a tw o fo ld function: it is devoted to the foreign p o licy and the wars o f the Romans or to the m ilitia , and it is devoted to the c ritic a l analysis o f m odernity. T o see the connection between the tw o themes one has merely to remember these three points. There is a certain sim ilarity between warfare proper and spiritual warfare, o r between a m ilitia proper and a spiritual m ilitia . The problem con cerning the m ilitia proper can be reduced to the alternatives o f a citizen army and an auxiliary arm y; these alternatives have a certain sim ilarity w ith the alternatives o f a citizen priesthood and a priest hood subject to a foreign head. A ccording to M achiavelli, there is a certain sim ilarity between the rule exercised by ancient Rome over other cities and countries and that exercised b y papal Rome: the rule o f both is to some extent indirect.36 The T h ird Book combines external features o f the firs t tw o
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Books.37 I t also combines th e ir subject m atter; in the T h ird Book, chapters devoted to domestic affairs alternate in an irregular w ay w ith chapters devoted to foreign affairs or war. T his is not alto gether surprising, fo r the domestic affairs o f the Romans are char acterized b y the enm ity or the co nflict between the n o b ility and the plebs.38 A t any rate, the T h ird Book “ repeats” the tw o preceding Books fro m a new point o f view . In his firs t statement relating to the organization o f the Discourses as a whole, M achiavelli had made use o f tw o divisions: the division in to domestic and foreign affairs and the division in to public and private counsel; and he had assigned to the F irst Book the com bination o f “ domestic affairs” and “ public counsel” ; in the second statement he had in fact assigned to the Second Book the com bination “ foreign affairs” and “ public coun sel” ; one could therefore expect that a T h ird and a Fourth Book w ould each be devoted to one o f the tw o rem aining combinations; in his last statement w hich occurs near the beginning o f the T h ird Book he makes it clear b y speaking o f “ this th ird book and last p a rt” that the T h ird Book w ill deal w ith both the domestic and foreign affairs o f the Romans as fa r as they were based on private counsel.39 W h ile this description is provisional, it is not therefore unim portant: proper names o f individual human beings occur in chapter headings only in the T h ird Book.40 Y et M achiavelli does not speak in the last statement o f “ private counsel” ; he mentions in it however “ private benefits.” Could the T h ird Book deal p ri m a rily w ith private deliberations o f Romans w hich were directed tow ard the private benefit o f the individuals concerned? In his second statement he distinguishes between the deliberations, dis cussed in the F irst Book, o f “ the Romans” concerning domestic affairs and the deliberations o f “ the Roman people” concerning foreign affairs. Could he have already dealt in the F irst Book w ith private deliberations o f the Romans? A central chapter o f the F irst Book is e x p lic itly devoted to the violent struggle in Rome over the agrarian law ; M achiavelli there praises th e patience and industry w ith w hich the Roman senate o r n o b ility prevented the enactment o f the agrarian law ; the Roman nobles opposed the agrarian law be cause they loved property, i.e., because each Roman noble loved his property. One o f the means w hich they employed was to oppose a tribune o f the plebs to that tribune who had proposed the agrarian law. In a passage to w hich M achiavelli does not refer, L iv y says
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that certain senators who had some private claims on certain trib unes used this influence in order to gain the support o f those trib unes; this w ould seem to constitute a kind o f private deliberation not w h o lly divorced from thought about the private benefit o f the individuals concerned. As we learn from the sequel in L iv y , there soon came a moment when the ordinary means employed b y the senate appeared to be inadequate; the senators therefore abandoned “ public counsels” and resorted to “ private counsels” w hich were guided by the consideration that the nobles must reach th e ir imme diate objective “ by fa ir means or fo u l” ; the result was the m urder o f an obnoxious tribune o f the plebs.41 M achiavelli does not say a w ord about this “ M achiavellian” deed, about this classic example o f private counsel. Instead he devotes the next chapter to the praise o f “ the generosity and prudence o f the senate.” This obtrusive si lence teaches us more than one lesson. In the firs t place, we see that if the F irst Book deals w ith such private deliberations as were directed tow ard private benefits, it deals w ith them only in a very subdued manner, and hence that private deliberations o f this kind may very w e ll be the peculiar theme o f the T h ird Book. Above all, we see that the common w ay o f studying the relation o f the Dis courses to L iv y is defective because it disregards that M achiavellian use o f L iv y w hich reveals itself only through the suppression o f Livian stories. This was the reason w hy, in considering the relation between M achiavelli’s plan and the Livian order, we lim ited our selves so s tric tly to the references to L iv y as distinguished fro m the mere use o f Livian passages: whether M achiavelli refers o r does not refer to L iv y in a given place can easily be seen, and the col lection o f his references to L iv y is a fin ite piece o f w o rk; but to achieve c la rity about his use o f L iv y is an in fin ite task: its comple tio n w ould require complete understanding o f every sentence o f the Discourses and o f L iv y ; fo r M achiavelli can be presumed to have read L iv y w ith in fin ite ly greater penetration than people like ourselves are capable of. The firs t eight chapters o f the T h ird Book deal w ith the ques tio n o f how to maintain a regime and a religion and how to establish a regime; they take up the theme o f the founder.42 The 9th chap te r “ depends” 48 on the 8th, and the 10th chapter “ depends” on the 9th; the 9th and 10th chapters prepare and even constitute the al most insensible transition from the theme “ founder” to the theme
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“ captain” w hich is m anifestly discussed in chapters 12-15. W e sug gest that I I I 1-15 constitute the firs t section o f the T h ird Book, and that this section is devoted to the theme “ the foundercaptain.” 44 The next section begins w ith emphatic references to the themes “ true v irtu e ” and “ republic.” Instead o f “ republic” we may also say “ the people” o r “ the m ultitude.” 45 Since according to M achiavelli, the m ultitude is the locus o f m o ra lity and o f p ie ty the argument shifts insensibly to a discussion o f the moral qualities. O r, perhaps more precisely, since the founder-captain is a prince, and prince and people are correlative, certain characteristics o f the founder-captain can only be brought out in the context o f a discussion o f the m oral qualities w hich are required fo r ru lin g the m ultitude. T h is context gives occasion fo r throw ing lig h t on the tw o types o f founder-captains w hich are fig urative ly represented b y Hannibal and M anlius Torquatus on the one hand, and by Scipio and Valerius Corvinus on the other.46 The section beginning w ith the 16th chapter ends w ith the 34th chapter, i.e., w ith a chap te r w hich repeats the theme o f I 58, the most im portant chapter o f the section on the m ultitude in the F irst Book. The last section o f the T h ird Book begins w ith a remark w hich must be quoted again: “ H o w dangerous a thing it is to make oneself the head o f a new th in g w hich concerns many people, and how d iffic u lt it is to man age it and to brin g it to its consummation and, after it has been brought to its consummation, to maintain it, w ould be too long and too exalted a m atter to discuss; I reserve it therefore fo r a more convenient place.” W ho w ill be so inhuman as to believe that M achiavelli was so inhuman as to w het the appetite o f the earnest reader and leave it com pletely unsatisfied? W e believe him on his w ord that he w ill not “ discuss that long and exalted m atter.” B ut is there no mean between discussion and complete silence? Is there no “ place” other than the lines o f a book? Is a series o f intim ations not “ a convenient place” fo r transm itting “ a m atter too long and too exalted to discuss” ? Seeing that M achiavelli is a discoverer o f new modes and orders, o f something new w hich concerns many people, w ho desires that these new modes and orders be adopted and maintained and who therefore must give thought to the ques tio n b y w hat procedures they may be adopted and maintained, the m atter too long and too exalted to discuss is his own enterprise insofar as it depends upon the cooperation o f “ the young.” In a
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w ord, we believe that the last section o f the Discourses deals ob liq u ely w ith M achiavelli’s enterprise: he selects fro m L iv y V II-X such stories as properly understood th ro w lig h t on his strategy and tactics. He conceals the most exalted theme b y scattering its parts, i.e., by presenting its parts not according to th e ir in trin sic order but according to the purely accidental order o f th e ir Livian equivalents.47 W e have discussed an example o f his intim ations— his discussion o f manifest blunders com m itted by an enemy ( I I I 48)—on an earlier occasion. A t present, it is necessary to note that the last sections o f the First and Second Books have the same theme as the last section o f the T h ird Book.48 The last section o f the F irst Book w ill be discussed in the proper place. Here we shall discuss b rie fly the last section o f the Second Book. M achiavelli begins the last section o f the Second Book, i.e., the 33rd chapter, w ith a remark as to w hat one ought to do in order to p ro fit from reading “ this Livian history,” i.e., L iv y ’s w o rk in general; this is the o nly reference to L iv y w hich occurs in the chapter. W h ile leading us to expect that he w ill in that chapter dis cuss more than one procedure o f the Roman people and senate, he in fact discusses only one such, namely, the ir giving very great discretionary power to the captains o f th e ir armies. He then speaks o f what the Romans did when they had decided upon a war, “ fo r instance, against the Latins,” but in the chapter he discusses only an incident in a w ar against the Tuscans. T hat incident was the conduct o f the consul Fabius who had crossed the Cim inian Forest w ith his arm y w ith o u t having had permission from the senate. On his return fro m the expedition he found tw o legates who o r dered him in the name o f the senate not to cross the Cim inian Forest. This order o f the senate does not exactly support the thesis, stated in the heading and restated more fo rc e fu lly w ith in the chapter, that the Romans gave the captains o f th e ir armies great discretionary powers. W hen we tu rn to the Livian text, we see that M achiavelli has made a m inor change: L iv y speaks not o f tw o legates but o f “ five legates w ith tw o tribunes o f the plebs.” But this m inor change indicates a m ajor change or a m ajor silence. M achiavelli does not te ll us how the d iffic u lty obstructing the passage through the Cim inian Forest was overcome. The Cim inian Forest was thought to be impassable and no Roman had ever entered it. The consul’s brother, M . Fabius, offered to explore it. M . Fabius had
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been educated in Tuscany, was learned in Tuscan letters, and knew the Tuscan language w ell. So he ventured among the Tuscans “ in a bold disguise.” W hat secured him against detection was how ever less Tuscan learning, or even his disguise, than the fact that “ it was repugnant to belief that an outsider w ould enter the Cim inian Forest.” 49 M achiavelli is another Fabius: it is the incredi b ility o f his enterprise w hich secures him against detection, i.e., against the detection o f the intransigence and awakeness w ith w hich he conducts his exploration o f hitherto unknown te rrito ry and thus prepares the conquest o f that te rrito ry by his brothers. W e agree w ith the com m only held opinion according to w hich M achiavelli, having decided to w rite Discourses on L iv y , must at some p oint o r other begin to refer to L iv y o r even to quote L iv y . B ut it cannot be in d iffe re n t to us at w hat precise point he fo r the firs t tim e introduces L iv y . The firs t reference to L iv y o r the firs t L atin quotation fro m L iv y w ill be no longer fo r us a triv ia l fact but an amazing occurrence; it w ill e lic it neither em pty curiosity nor yaw ning but disturbing wonder. Since, other things being equal, a L a tin quotation from L iv y w hich occurs in an Italian book re veals a more pow erful presence o f L iv y than does an Italian summary o f a L ivian passage, we tu rn our attention firs t to the firs t Latin quotations fro m L iv y . These quotations occur in the section w hich is e x p lic itly devoted to the Roman religion (I 11-15). T h e ir in tro d u ctio n was p roperly prepared. M achiavelli had estab lished the a u th o rity o f the Roman republic b y taking issue w ith classical p o litica l philosophy and w ith the aristocratic Roman tra ditio n. In that context he had criticized certain critics o f ancient Rome but had not openly criticized any ancient w riters in his own name. In the section w hich im m ediately precedes the section on religion, i.e., in the section e x p lic itly devoted to the founders ( I 9-10), he takes issue w ith the opinion “ perhaps” held by “ many” according to w hich Romulus is to be blamed fo r having murdered his brother; he refutes that opinion b y having recourse, not to any auth ority, but to “ a general rule” w ith o u t however saying a w ord as to whether that general rule is generally accepted. W hen, in chapter 4, he had attacked the opinion o f “ many” w hich con demned Rome fo r the discord between the plebs and the senate, he had eventually referred to the a uth ority o f Cicero. But now, when the deed to be excused is no longer shouting in the streets
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or the closing o f shops, as it was in the fo u rth chapter, but m urder, the m urder o f one’s only brother, he does not betray any need fo r support by authority. O r, if one wishes, one m ight say that the authority o f the divine founder o f Rome enables M achiavelli to oppose to the false general rule w hich unconditionally forbids m urder the true general rule w hich allows m urder under certain conditions. Thereafter, he openly blames in his own name those ancient w riters who servilely praised Caesar, w hile he praises those ancient w riters who obliquely blamed Caesar:50 his preferring the latter to the form er is no longer supported by “ the opinion o f many.” A t the most, one could say that he appeals ta c itly from a late Roman opinion to the opinion embodied in the republican practice o f ancient Rome. H ow ever this may be,51 im m ediately before beginning the section on religion, he takes the extreme step o f suggesting that the Rome w hich Romulus found was a co rru p t c ity , i.e., that in the beginning men were not good but corrupt. Such is the background against w hich L iv y himself, speaking his native tongue, makes his firs t appearance. The firs t L atin quotation from L iv y occurs in the chapter (I 12) in w hich M achiavelli at tacks the opinion o f “ many” according to w hich the w ell-being o f the Italian cities stems from the Roman Church. Against that opinion he adduces “ tw o most pow erful reasons w hich, according to me, suffer no denial.” Yet however pow erful these reasons may be according to him, he cannot take issue w ith the highest a uth ority existing in his age and country w ith o u t having the support o f some thing more pow erful than any reason, namely, another high author ity . T o take issue w ith the Roman Church in the section o f the Discourses w hich is devoted to the religion o f the ancient Romans means to question the modes and orders o f the established religion w ith a view to the modes and orders, rediscovered b y M achiavelli, o f the ancient religion, or to hold up the modes and orders o f the ancient religion fo r im itation b y modem men. W hatever may be true o f the introduction or restoration o f c iv il or m ilita ry modes and orders,52 the introduction or restoration o f religious modes and orders requires, as M achiavelli asserts, the support o f divine author ity , true or feigned, or at least, we may add, the support o f authori tative historians who transm it the original a uth ority to later ages; fo r religious modes and orders lack those “ evident reasons” o f w hich purely p o litica l modes and orders are capable: religious
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modes and orders rest on belief.63 L iv y must take the place o f the Bible; M achiavelli’s Bible permits him to uphold a teaching opposed to the teaching o f the Bible. M achiavelli makes an e ffo rt to enter in to the sp irit o f ancient piety: w hile quoting from L iv y in L a tin the words “ W ilt thou go to Rome?” w hich Roman soldiers had addressed to the image o f Juno in a Tuscan tow n after its conquest, he om its L iv y ’s rem ark that the question m ight have been prom pted b y “ y o u th fu l jo c u la rity .” 64 I t may seem incred ible that M achiavelli should have longed fo r the revival o f the w orship o f the Queen Juno. H e teaches e x p lic itly that states w hich desire to keep themselves in co rru p t should maintain the established religion. T his does not prevent him however fro m treating the Christian Savonarola’s speaking w ith God as an exact parallel to the pagan Num a Pom pilius’ simulated converse w ith a nym ph: the success o f Savonarola in Florence proves that the achievement o f Numa, the founder o f the religion o f the ancient Romans, can be repeated now .66 The least one w ould have to say is that M achiavelli is im partial as between paganism and C hristianity. In accordance w ith his desire to keep a nice balance, he mentions in the section on religion “ G od” seven times and “ god” or “ gods” seven times.66 Furtherm ore, however strongly he may have rec ommended that the contem porary Christian states ought to main tain the Christian religion, he believed that the Christian religion had in fact not been maintained in its p u rity but had declined and that its ru in m ight be near. He, as it were, applies to his own tim e the words quoted by him in L atin w hich L iv y had used about the decline o f the religion ancient in L iv y ’s time, i.e., in the tim e in w hich the Christian religion emerged.67 W hatever long-range pros pect this remark m ight suggest it is safer to leave it here at saying that fro m M achiavelli’s point o f view the im itation o f the ancient Romans as regards religion means that one should use the Christian re ligion in the manner in w hich, according to him , the ancient Romans had used theirs. He conveys this' lesson by retelling certain Roman stories and by making m inor changes in them. He retells the story o f how an ancient Roman, “ a citizen grave and o f author ity ,” had used religion fo r quieting the common people. W hen ta c itly taking up the same m atter in a later chapter, he adduces o n ly a Florentine example and speaks o f “ a man grave and o f author ity ” w ho quieted the common people: the “ man,” as distinguished
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from the “ citizen,” was a bishop “ who is now a cardinal.” A c cording to L iv y , the Roman who quieted the plebs, was a consul; M achiavelli transforms him in to a citizen, a man who did not hold at the time a p o litic o -m ilita ry command; he thus prepares the tran sition to the bishop in Florence.58 The lesson is obvious: the men in ancient Rome who quieted the plebs by means o f religion were citizens, not necessarily priests, fo r in ancient Rome religion was c iv il religion; the im itation o f ancient Rome w ould consist in using C hristianity as a c iv il religion. M achiavelli also retells the story o f how a Roman consul overcame the d iffic u lty caused b y the indis cretion o f some hen-men, a special kind o f soothsayers, b y having “ the prince” o f the hen-men killed and by describing that dead “ prince” to his arm y as a liar. In L iv y ’s version no “ prince” o f the hen-men is mentioned, nor does L iv y ’s consul call the hen-man in question a liar. M achiavelli stresses the hierarchic structure o f the Roman order o f soothsayers and injects some non-Livian venom into the consul’s words. As L iv y tells us, the soothsayers ( haruspices) were aliens from Tuscany.59 M achiavelli’s changes o f the Livian stories are meant to facilitate the im itation o f the ancient Romans by modem men, an im itation w hich is compatible w ith the form al maintenance o f the Christian religion. As he says elsewhere, “ up to the coming o f the Longobards, the P ontiffs did not acquire any other authority except that w hich was given to them on account o f th e ir manners and th e ir doctrine. In the other things they obeyed the emperors or the kings, and were sometimes killed by them, and used by them in th e ir actions as servants.” 60 B ut we must not lose sight o f the Latin quotations from L iv y . W h ile M achiavelli had quoted in each o f the chapters 12 and 13 one Latin sentence from L iv y he quotes tw o o f them in chapter 15, the last chapter o f the section. In that chapter it is shown how the Romans, led by the same consul who destroyed and discredited “ the prince o f the hen-men,” overcame b y th e ir virtu e the obstinacy w hich the ir foreign enemies had acquired by virtue o f religion: Roman arms proved to be superior to Samnite religion. M achiavelli thus prepares the firs t repetition o f the section on religion—a repe titio n in w hich he contrasts “ the quiet and religious” Roman king Numa Pompilius, the founder o f the ancient religion, w ith his successor who, “ armed w ith prudence and arms,” “ recovered the reputation of Romulus.” 61
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The three chapters w hich contain the firs t fo u r L atin quota tions fro m L iv y are preceded b y u chapters and follow ed b y 24 chapters in w hich no such quotations occur. T his isolation, fo r w hich there is no parallel in the book, enhances the suggestive pow er o f the quotations discussed. Those firs t fo u r quotations are separated fro m the next quotations b y an interval o f unique length. M achiavelli compensates us fo r the extraordinary th r ift w hich he practices, after having whetted our appetite, by a rare act o f p ro d ig a lity: in the firs t chapter in w hich he begins fo r the second tim e to quote L iv y in L atin —in order from then on to quote him in L a tin w ith some degree o f re g u la rity—he gives us six L atin quota tions fro m L iv y . T his density occurs in the firs t chapter o f the Discourses in w hich he discusses w ith complete neu tra lity the p o li cies required fo r saving lib e rty and the policies required fo r estab lishing tyra nn y. In order to show how a potential ty ra n t can be successful he studies the actions o f Appius Claudius, the founder o f all public and private law in Rome, who failed in his attempt to establish tyra n n y and whose laws retain th e ir force despite his ru in and violent death.62 This n eu tra lity w hich to us at any rate appears in the same lig h t in w hich it sometimes appears in the Discourses, namely, as the height o f p o litica l im m orality and therefore perhaps as the height o f im m orality sim ply, is a heresy comparable in g ra v ity to the n e u tra lity between paganism and B iblical religion. I t w ould seem then that the L atin quotations from L iv y as strands o f M achiavelli’s web are ominous rather than humanistic. As fo r the connection in M achiavelli’s m ind between B iblical religion and tyra nn y, we refer to the suggestion w hich he makes in Discourses I 20.63 M achiavelli begins to refer to L iv y sometime before he begins to quote L iv y . He begins to refer to L iv y im m ediately after he has established the a uth ority o f Rome by proving the superiority o f Rome to Sparta. In order to establish the a uth ority o f Rome and hence o f L iv y , he could not use Livy-»and he did not need L iv y ; the data supplied b y the sixth book o f the Greek Polybius, the unnamed supplier o f the chief “ m atter” o f Discourses I 2-6, are necessary and sufficient. The tw o chapters in w hich the firs t refer ences to L iv y occur (I 7-8) do not fit p e rfe ctly in to w hat m ight seem to be the proper order, as M achiavelli indicates at the begin ning o f the 9th chapter: if he had s tric tly adhered to that order,
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L iv y w ould not have appeared at all p rio r to the section on religion. W hat induced or compelled M achiavelli to deviate from the ap parently proper order? He begins to refer to L iv y when discussing a concomitant o f a democratic Roman in stitution, the plebeian tribunate. The tribunes o f the plebs were among those who had authority to accuse people before public tribunals. The firs t refer ences to L iv y occur in the tw o chapters w hich are devoted to the beneficial character o f public accusations requiring proof and to the pernicious character o f calumnies or o f sowing sinister opin ions about fello w citizens among the people. A ncient Rome had adopted the rig h t p olicy in regard to both accusations and calumnies. But the exact opposite is true o f modern Florence. The firs t refer ences to L iv y occur in the tw o chapters in w hich the superiority o f ancient Rome to modem Florence becomes fo r the firs t tim e the theme, or starting from w hich the intra-classical alternative ‘RomeSparta’ is superseded as it were once and fo r all by the alternative ‘ancient republics-modern republics.’ O ther considerations apart, recourse to L iv y becomes necessary in proportion as the quarrel between the ancients and the moderns becomes thematic or other wise im portant. One is entitled to say that in the tw o chapters in question there is a somewhat stronger emphasis on Florence than on Rome.64 One o f the victim s o f the bad Florentine arrange ment was “ a kind o f prince o f the c ity .” One may wonder whether in discussing the alternative o f accusations and calumnies, w hich is linked up w ith the difference between ancient Rome and modem Florence where Savonarola had been so successful, M achiavelli was not thinking o f the sermons o f Savonarola, the unarmed prophet, w hich are “ fu ll o f accusations o f the w o rld ly wise and o f invec tives against them.” Savonarola distinguished “ tw o armed hosts, one w hich fought under God and this was he and his follow ers, w hile the other fought under the devil, and this was the opponents.” 65 Descriptions o f one’s opponents in such terms are certainly not accusations in M achiavelli’s sense o f the w ord. One may wonder, in other words, whether the difference here discussed between an cient Rome and modern Florence must not be understood in the lig h t o f the difference between c iv il and trans-political religion. I t is true that M achiavelli does not refer only to modern Florence; despite the fact that, as he says, the previous examples are sufficient, he adds an example from ancient Tuscany. T h a t example shows
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tha t ancient Tuscany suffered from the same bad arrangement as modern Florence. W e may note in passing that M achiavelli supplies us here as it were accidentally, w ith that critique o f ancient Tus cany w hich is an im portant step on the way from the most ancient a n tiq u ity to ancient Rome. B ut however this may be, ancient Tus cany too, in contradistinction to ancient Rome, was the home and center o f religion. As regards ancient Rome, the example adduced b y M achiavelli shows that Manlius Capitolinus, having become out o f am bition a leader o f the plebs and having in this capacity calum niated the nobles, suffered capital punishment through the action, not o f course o f the tribunes o f the plebs, but o f a patrician dictator, the leader o f the patriciate. In modern Florence too the calum niators were “ friends o f the people.” In modem Florence how ever the calumniators succeeded in d rivin g “ the great men to de spair.” 66 I t is necessary to compare the context o f the firs t L iv y quotations w ith the context o f the firs t references to L iv y . The firs t L iv y quotations occur when M achiavelli discusses the ancient re li gion and therew ith the greatest contrast between the ancients and the moderns. The firs t references to L iv y occur when M achiavelli e x p lic itly discusses a much less fundamental and less general con trast between ancients and moderns. But, as may have become clear, this does not necessarily mean that the mere references to L iv y do not lead the reader towards the fundamental issue. In fact, they may even lead him in to a deeper stratum o f the fundamental problem ; the firs t references to L iv y are very suggestive regarding the relation between the common people and religion in general, and between the common people and B iblical religion in particular. I t w ould be dangerous to generalize from this observation regarding the difference between the firs t quotations from L iv y and the firs t references to L iv y . T his much however can safely be said: w hile, as goes w ith o u t saying, L iv y is present everywhere in the Dis courses, the meaning o f that presence, visible or invisible, m ight escape the reader if M achiavelli had notfisolated his firs t references to L iv y and his firs t quotations from L iv y and thus given us some directives. M achiavelli was compelled to establish the a uth ority o f Rome because the supe rio rity o f the Roman modes and orders to all others, fo r example the Spartan, was not obvious or universally ad m itted. In that context he had to speak o f certain alleged defects
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o f Rome w hich he did not deny but o f w hich he asserted in effect that they are the inevitable concomitants o f the best modes and orders. Later on, when defending the fra tricid e com m itted by the founder o f Rome, he refers again to Sparta; there he silently re tracts his in itia l statement according to w hich the state and the laws established by Lycurgus lasted fo r more than 800 years w ith out corruption o f those laws or w ith o u t any dangerous tum ult: the Spartans had deviated from the laws o f Lycurgus by the tim e o f K in g Agis, i.e., about 600 years after Lycurgus; Agis who trie d to restore the ancient laws was murdered by the ephors; A gis’ successor, who shared Agis’ desire massacred “ all the ephors and anyone else who could oppose him ” and yet failed to restore com pletely the laws o f Lycurgus.67 The stature o f Rome is thus s till more enhanced than it was after the original pro of o f Rome’s superiority to Sparta and after the firs t proof o f Rome’s superiority to Florence had been completed. This does not mean, o f course, that every Roman was a most excellent man: M achiavelli speaks o f the corruption o f Roman ro ya lty and o f the corruption o f the Roman people w hich was caused by the party o f Marius. In spite o f this, “ the example o f Rome is preferable to any other example” because it is more instructive than any other. Above all, certainly the lead ing Romans under the republic, o r at any rate the consuls, were “ always most excellent men.” The high p oint in the praise o f Rome is probably reached in M achiavelli’s contrasting the moderate char acter o f the foundation o f the Roman republic w ith the inhuman character o f the foundation o f the principalities o f David and o f P hilip o f Macedon; fo r the remark about David already suggests w hat M achiavelli w ill e xp licitly say later about the foundation laid b y Moses in the context o f the only e xplicit reference to the Bible w hich occurs in the Discourses: “ he who reads the Bible judiciously, w ill see that Moses was forced, in order that his laws and his orders should prosper, to massacre innumerable human beings who, moved b y nothing but envy, opposed his designs.” 68 N o t long after that high point has been reached, and at the very beginning o f the second half o f the F irst Book, more or less in the region where M achiavelli begins to fo llo w the Livian order even in his use o f L iv y , a fundamental change makes itse lf fe lt. Rather abruptly, if circum spectly, he begins to criticize the Roman republic as it was in its most in co rru p t period,60 and he goes on to do so though
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re turning again and again to the praise o f Rome. T w o Roman generals, not indeed consuls but m ilita ry tribunes w ith consular power, preferred the disgrace o f th e ir fatherland to a m inor sacrifice o f th e ir pride. The senate once acted contrary to the rule that one must not postpone benefiting the people u n til a th ird power forces one to do so.70 W h ile defending the Roman in stitutio n o f dictator ship b y means o f “ most evident reasons” against the opinion o f “ some w rite r” who had not “ considered the m atter w e ll” and whose ve rd ict “ has been quite unreasonably believed,” i.e., w hile tracing a pow erful erro r to its weak beginning, M achiavelli makes it clear that that Roman in stitu tio n was not superior to a different Venetian in stitu tio n w hich fu lfille d the same purpose equally w e ll:71 the modes and orders o f ancient Rome are not sim ply the model fo r the modems. Thereafter he speaks e xp licitly, if w ith due euphemism, o f “ the defect” o f the Roman agrarian law. T h a t defect was per haps im m ediately caused by the d ila to ry p o licy o f the senate but it was certainly in the last analysis caused by what, w ith o u t the use o f euphemism, w ould have to be called the avarice o f the Roman n o b ility . I t was ow ing to that avarice that Rome, in contrast to Sparta, did not com ply w ith the basic rule that the public should be kept ric h and all citizens be kept poor. In the context o f this criticism o f Rome, M achiavelli accepts the opinion o f “ the ancient w rite rs” as to the w o rkin g o f certain passions and, most im portant, refers to L iv y by name fo r the firs t tim e since the end o f the section on re lig io n :72 L iv y proves to be not only the celebrator o f Rome but also her c ritic . L iv y is no longer needed o nly fo r trans m ittin g to modern men the counter a uth ority w hich enables Machia v e lli to attack the established a uth ority; from this point fo rth he is also needed to discredit that counterauthority. In other words, the a u th o rity is henceforth no longer the practice and the p o lity o f ancient Rome, but L iv y , a book: only from here on is L iv y M achiavelli’s Bible or his counterpart o f the Bible. Just as the a u th o rity o f the Bible is adm ittedly not weakened but strength ened b y the fact that it contains the records o f how the children o f Israel were stiff-necked and went a-w horing after other gods, the a u th o rity o f L iv y is not weakened but strengthened by the fa ct that he enlightens us concerning the misdeeds o f the Romans and the defects o f the Roman modes and orders. I t is in the 39th chapter tha t M achiavelli draws the decisive conclusion from his
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criticism of the Romans: diligent examination o f things past en ables one not only to foresee what w ould happen in every republic in the future if the necessary remedies are not applied in tim e, and to apply the remedies used by the ancients, but also to discover the proper remedies in case the ancients did not use or know them. Since the Roman modes and orders have been shown to be defective in more than one respect, we are forced to conclude that, ac cording to M achiavelli, a progress beyond the ancient modes and orders is necessary, or that modes and orders w hich are new, not only relatively but sim ply, must be sought.73 Far be it fro m us to deny the genuine character o f M achiavelli’s adm iration fo r ancient Rome. But there is a great difference between genuinely adm iring an cient Rome and believing that ancient Rome is the peak o f all possible achievements. The ancient Roman p o lity was a w o rk o f chance, if o f chance often prudently used;74 the ancient Romans discovered the ir modes and orders absent-mindedly or b y accident, and they clung to them out o f reverence fo r the ancestral. M achiavelli, however, achieves fo r the firs t tim e the anatomy o f the Roman republic, and thus understands thoroughly the virtues and the vices o f that republic. Therefore he can teach his readers how a p o lity sim ilar to the Roman and better than the Roman can be deliberately constructed. W hat hitherto has been a lu cky accident, and therefore essentially defective, can become from now on, on the new continent discovered by M achiavelli, the goal o f rational desire and action. I t is fo r this reason that the modes and orders recommended by M achiavelli, even those w hich he took over bod ily from ancient Rome, are rig h tly described by him as new modes and orders. Even if the content o f those modes and orders remains the same, the ir character is w h o lly new. The Discourses tru ly con vey then, as M achiavelli promises at the beginning o f the book, new modes and orders. Just as the Prince, the Discourses present a w h o lly new teaching w hich is shielded b y a conventional or tra ditional exterior. But whereas the Prince conveys the w h o lly new teaching regarding the foundations o f society, the Discourses con vey in addition the w h o lly new teaching regarding the structure o f society, i.e., o f the best society. It w ould be w rong to believe that M achiavelli’s emphatic blame, in the next chapter, o f what may seem to be the biggest blunder committed by the early Roman republic, namely, the creation o f
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the Decemvirate, is no longer surprising. T h at chapter shows precisely that the creation o f the Decemvirate was not a blunder fro m the p oint o f view o f the senate o r the n o b ility : the Decem viri were chosen o n ly from the n o b ility ; they did not h u rt the n o b ility ; the y were actively supported b y the young nobles; the auth ority o f the senate survived under the Decemvirate; the creation o f the Decemvirate appears as a not im prudent act, b y w hich the senate frightened the plebeians into longing fo r the patrician consulate w hich they had theretofore loathed.75 I t is therefore necessary fo r M achiavelli to state, or to restate, in his next remarks on the subject that the orders o f Rome were perhaps not good in a certain im portant respect and that the Roman n o b ility often acted unw isely in its dealings w ith the plebs.76 In the penultimate chapter o f the F irst Book, the last chapter o f the section devoted to the m ultitude as the home o f m o ra lity and religion, M achiavelli pre pares the discourses o f the Second Book (the Book devoted to the Romans’ foreign p o licy) b y proving that republics are more fa ith fu l allies than princes. He refers to seven examples; none o f them proves the faithfulness o f the Roman republic.77 Since the Roman republic is the prim ary subject o f the Discourses, the reader cannot help being p a rticu la rly concerned w ith the faithfulness o f the Roman republic; but on the basis o f the evidence adduced b y M achiavelli he can do no more than believe that the Roman republic was more fa ith fu l than princes. M achiavelli trains him in believing by himself saying credo five times in that chapter. The five -fold credo pro nounced b y him at the end o f what one m ight call his destruction o f Rome’s a uth ority corresponds to the fo u r-fo ld credo pronounced b y him at the end o f the argument b y w hich he established Rome’s a u th o rity.78 Fourteen chapters later, when his theme is no longer the m ultitude as the home o f faith, o r o f good faith, he holds up as the model fo r republics w hich aspire to greatness the fraud w hich the early Roman republic, i.e., the senate, habitually practiced against its ve ry allies.79 But, as we have seen, even by the end o f the F irst Book M achiavelli’s fa ith in Rome is no longer what it was at the beginning: his fa ith in Rome was bound to be affected by w hat he believed to have discerned about the Romans’ faith. A t the beginning o f the Second Book, a new dimension o f the problem comes to sight. A fte r having defended Rome against a certain opinion held b y “ many,” and in particular b y “ a most
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grave w rite r” o f antiquity who is mentioned by name, M achiavelli shows that it was in the last analysis the Roman republic w hich destroyed freedom fo r many centuries in the W est. Im m ediately thereafter he suggests a revision o f the earlier verdict on the relative merits o f Rome on the one hand and o f Sparta and even Athens on the other. Rome was enabled to destroy freedom in the W est or to make herself mistress o f the w o rld because she lib e ra lly admitted foreigners to citizenship; Sparta and Athens, though ve ry well-armed republics w ith very good laws and apparently less tum ultuous than Rome, did not achieve Rome’s greatness because they, and especially Sparta, were fearful lest admixture o f new inhabitants corrupt the ir ancient customs. Rome was then enabled to destroy freedom in the W estern w orld because she was excessively cosmopolitan or constitutionally exposed to corruption.80 N o w on der that M achiavelli takes leave o f the reader o f the Discourses w ith the praise o f that Fabius who was deservedly called Maximus fo r having practically disfranchised “ the new people.” B ut Fabius’ measure did not stem the tide forever. Hence it remains true that the Roman republic, the greatest republic or the most p o litica l com m unity81 that ever was, prepared the W estern w o rld fo r A siatic obedience and fo r the suppression o f the supremacy o f p olitical or public life. The Roman republic is on the one hand the direct opposite o f the Christian republic, and on the other hand a cause o f the latter, or even the model fo r it. This is the ultim ate reason that M achiavelli’s judgment on the Roman republic is ambiguous. Near the center o f the Second Book, he notes that the ancient Romans once believed they could vanquish pride b y h u m ility. H e continues this thought six chapters later when, after having promised to speak o f both mercenary and auxiliary troops, he speaks in fa ct only o f auxiliary troops. A u xilia ry troops are soldiers sent to the help o f a state by “ a prince or a republic” that commands and pays those troops; in the repetition, M achiavelli drops “ o r a republic” ; auxiliary troops are the most harm ful and the most dangerous kind o f troops because the state w hich wishes to use them has no authority whatever over them: only “ the prince” who sends them has authority over them; they are so dangerous because they form a disciplined body subject to a foreign a uth ority whereas, as M achiavelli tells us elsewhere, mercenary troops are disunited and lack fear o f God.82 Im m ediately thereafter he discusses the
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manner o f co n tro llin g subjects w hich ancient Rome had invented. A ncient Rome did not claim to rule the towns w hich had become its subjects b ut m erely bound them to certain conditions; Rome’s rule was not visible and was therefore rather easily borne even though it may have imposed some hardship; since Rome did not exercise c iv il and crim inal ju risd ictio n in those towns, “ the prince” was much less exposed to calum ny and hatred than were the m unicipal authorities. In other words, Rome did not exercise direct rule over her subjects. M achiavelli compares the Roman way o f ru lin g her subject towns to the w ay in w hich Florence ruled Pistoia: the Florentines treated the Pistoians w ith b ro th e rly love, or, as he says “ in another discourse and fo r another purpose,” they ruled the Pistoians b y “ the arts o f peace,” i.e., b y presenting themselves as peace-makers to the quarreling groups among the ir subjects, thus keeping th e ir subjects divided.83 In the 78th chapter, i.e., almost exactly in the center o f the central Book, and nowhere else, M achi avelli mentions “ the a uth ority o f the Romans” in the heading o f a chapter. In the body o f that chapter he says that “ if one has to fo llo w auth ority, one ought to believe a Roman republic and many most excellent captains who were in it, rather than the one Hannibal alone.” But, as he makes clear in the next chapter, in fo llo w in g the a uth ority o f the Romans, one does not fo llo w the auth ority o f the Romans: the Romans discovered th e ir modes and orders “ w ith o u t any example (o f others), b y th e ir prudence, through themselves.” 84 In the T h ird Book, there is only one chapter w hich can be said to be devoted to the criticism o f the early Roman republic. A t the beginning o f the 105th chapter and nowhere else in either book, M achiavelli refers to what “ some moral philosophers have w ritte n ” and approves o f it. The philosophers in question had understood “ the virtu e o f necessity” or they had realized that necessity is the m other o f the highest virtue. T h e ir insight agrees w ith the thesis o f the chapter that necessity makes men obstinate and hence excellent fighters. The wise captain o r ru le r w ill therefore use every artifice to liberate his enemies from such salutary necessity; he w ill deceive the enemy populace b y making large promises to them and b y claim ing that he has no quarrel w ith them but only w ith the ambitious few in th e ir midst. W e must leave it to the readers to decide w hether M achiavelli him self is a wise captain,
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seeing that he directs his w id e ly audible accusations against the ambitious prelates and that he knows that the people cannot b u t be averse to his radical innovations. The chapter under discussion may be described as the most extreme specimen o f his criticism o f Rome, since it suggests a certain superiority o f modem Florence to ancient Rome.85 Before turning to Roman examples, he speaks of tw o Florentine examples. In discussing the firs t Florentine ex ample, he exculpates Florence from w hat amounts to a criticism by “ many” ; in discussing the second Florentine example, he exhibits the cleverness o f the M edici. Later he cites three examples o f how the Romans rendered th e ir enemies obstinate. The firs t o f these examples is supplied by the Romans’ conduct tow ard the Samnites w hich led to the disaster o f the Caudine Forks; it w ould have been easy fo r the Romans to say, and in this particular case they w ould have said w ith perfect justice, that they had a quarrel o n ly w ith the ambitious few among the Samnites; but the Romans did not avail themselves o f this opportunity. In the 15th chapter, we recall, M achiavelli had retold the story o f how the Romans overcame b y the ir virtue the obstinacy w hich the Samnites had acquired b y “ virtue o f religion.” In the present case, the Samnites were rendered obstinate by “ virtue o f necessity.” The second o f the three Roman examples shows how a Roman commander86 unnecessarily made the Veientes obstinate. M achiavelli does not te ll us that p rio r to the incident retold by him, the Roman consuls had made th e ir own soldiers obstinate by means o f religion87 o r that the Romans had acted like the Samnites. The last o f the three examples shows how the Romans drove the Volsci, led by Messius, into extreme ob stinacy. M achiavelli quotes in Latin a part o f the speech w ith which Messius exhorted his soldiers; in the part om itted b y him , Messius says: “ Do you believe that some god w ill protect you and carry you away from here?” 88 Here we are meant to see how an enemy o f Rome was driven by necessity into “ operating per fe c tly ” precisely by his subjective certainty that he and his arm y w ill not be saved by any god. Tim e and again we have become bewildered b y the fact that the man who is more responsible than any other man fo r the break w ith the Great T ra d itio n should in the very act o f breaking prove to be the heir, the by no means u nw orth y heir, to that supreme art o f w ritin g w hich that tra dition manifested at its peaks. The
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highest art has its roots, as he w ell knew, in the highest necessity. The perfect book or speech obeys in every respect the pure and merciless laws o f w hat has been called logographic necessity. The perfect speech contains nothing slipshod; in it there are no loose threads; it contains no w ord that has been picked up at random; it is not marred b y errors due to fa u lty memory or to any other kin d o f carelessness; strong passions and a pow erful and fe rtile im agination are guided w ith ease by a reason w hich knows how to use the unexpected g ift, w hich knows how to persuade and w hich knows how to fo rb id ; it allows o f no adornment w hich is not imposed by the g ra vity and the aloofness o f the subject m atter; the perfect w rite r rejects w ith disdain and w ith some impatience the demand o f vulgar rhetoric that expressions must be varied since change is pleasant. The translations o f M achiavelli as w ell as o f other great w riters, even if they are done w ith ordinary competence, are so bad because th e ir authors read books composed according to the rules o f noble rhetoric as if they had been brought fo rth in compliance w ith the rules o f vulgar rhetoric. In a famous le tte r M achiavelli has testified to what he owed to the w rite rs o f a n tiq u ity and th e ir creations. In the evening, when entering his study he p ut on regal and c o u rtly clothes and thus pro pe rly dressed he entered in to the ancient courts o f the men o f a n tiq u ity who received him lo vin gly. There he fed himself on that nourishment w hich alone was his and fo r w hich he was bom ; there he united him self w h o lly w ith the ancients, and thus did not fear poverty, fo rg o t every anguish, and was not frightened b y death. Because o f his nature and his devotion he came to sur pass L iv y . The peculiar charm and the peculiar remoteness o f the Discourses are due to the fact that a part o f the ir teaching is transm itted not only between th e ir lines, but as it were between the covers o f the Discourses and those o f L iv y ’s H isto ry . M achiavelli draws our attention to utterances o f L iv y o r o f L iv y ’s characters w hich he does not quote and to w hich he does not even refer, s tric tly and n arro w ly speaking. Those utterances, if read in the lig h t o f M achiavelli’s suggestive context, take on a non-Livian meaning and then illum ine the M achiavellian context; the thought w hich is transm itted in this w ay is not conveyed by the Discourses read b y themselves nor by L iv y ’s H istory read by itself. M achiavelli expects his reader less to have read L iv y and other w riters than to
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read them in conjunction w ith the Discourses after he has read the Discourses once or more than once.89 He certainly expects his reader to read L iv y w ith more than ordinary care or, to return to the surface, w ith profound reverence.90 This reverence need not be weakened by the changes w hich M achiavelli makes in the Livian stories or in the Livian text. N o t all theologians always refrained from m odifying the B iblical stories and from quoting Scripture inexactly. Such seeming liberties taken w ith the sacred books may w ell subserve the pious concern w ith applying the Biblical message to oneself and to one’s generation. The analogy o f the Bible and L iv y would not be perfect if L iv y were not M achiavelli’s authority in theology or its equivalent. L iv y is M achiavelli’s authority as regards Fortuna and her workings. I t is L iv y who, according to him, through a Roman example proves at length and w ith most efficacious words the power o f Heaven o r Fortuna over human affairs. The Livian proof is so complete that, as M achi avelli notes, no modern examples are needed to confirm the Livian thesis. M achiavelli reproduces the Livian p ro of in one o f the tw o chapters whose headings consist o f almost lite ra lly translated Livian statements. The Livian statement w hich heads the chapter contain ing that Livian proof is the only chapter heading in either book w hich pronounces dogm atically on the pow er and w orkings o f Fortuna.91 Once we have taken M achiavelli’s acceptance o f L iv y ’s author ity as seriously as we must, we become amazed by the relative ra rity o f quotations from L iv y and even references to L iv y . W e slow ly begin to dare to ask ourselves whether L iv y is after all the highest authority fo r him o r whether he did not regard certain other classical w riters as more im portant than L iv y . A ccording ly we note that L iv y is never mentioned in the Prince. L iv y is an historian, whereas M achiavelli reasons about matters o f state. T h a t is to say, L iv y supplies him w ith m atter, w ith examples; the con clusions drawn from the examples (o n ly a part o f w hich are supplied b y L iv y ), or the lig h t w hich illum ines the matter, or the reasoning w hich leads up to the causes of the events recorded b y L iv y and other historians is M achiavelli’s.92 As we observe next, M achiavelli ta c itly changes L iv y ’s stories and thus perhaps ta c itly criticizes L iv y . V e ry slow ly, very circum spectly, does he begin to attack L iv y e xp licitly and, after having done so, he very rarely, but all the
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more impressively, returns to that attack. The firs t e xplicit attack on L iv y occurs in the 58th chapter, i.e., about 20 chapters after he had begun e x p lic itly to criticize ancient Rome. B ut already in the 49th chapter he openly grants that L iv y ’s H istory may be defective in a point o f some importance, namely, in a p oint con nected w ith the issue o f “ accusations and calumnies.” In the same chapter, speaking o f Florence, he indicates that “ true m em ory” o f Florentine affairs is not available beyond a certain date. Could the possible defect o f L iv y ’s H istory be due to the fact that he did not have “ true m em ory” o f the event w hich he records in the passage referred to b y Machiavelli? Certain it is that L iv y him self speaks in that passage o f the uncertainty regarding events w hich are remote in tim e.93 M achiavelli then is not absolutely silent about the questionable character o f L iv y ’s stories and about L iv y ’s own references to that questionable character. In the 16th chapter he had already spoken o f the things “ w hich are read in the memories o f ancient histories” : L iv y ’s H istory , and certainly its firs t ten Books, consist o f such memories o f ancient histories.94 B ut even w hat is know n through tru ly historical records, i.e., through such records o f past events as were set down by contemporaries o f those events, is less tru ly know n than what everyone can see now ; it is an object o f belief rather than o f per ception.95 I t is fo r this reason that M achiavelli can substitute his summaries o f Livia n stories fo r the Livian stories themselves by sometimes describing summaries w hich lack any reference to L iv y as “ those texts” and then suggest that “ those texts” are the w o rk o f L iv y and M achiavelli jo in tly : M achiavelli can vouch fo r them as w e ll or almost as w e ll as could L iv y him self.96 I t may be fo r this reason that he sometimes makes triv ia l changes in L iv y ’s reports: whether the early Romans waged w ar in a given year against one neighboring tribe, say the Aequi, and not against another, say the V olsci, is not su fficiently established b y the fact that L iv y says they did. Even if an historian is tru stw o rth y regarding his facts, he is not necessarily tru stw o rth y regarding his selection o f facts; historians are inclined to regard as most w o rth y o f being remembered that w hich is miraculous o r spectacular. W hen M achi avelli retells the story o f the Decemvirate, he barely refers to the V irg in ia incident w hich is to ld at such length b y L iv y , to say nothing o f the fact that he does not m ention that heinous crim e
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when speaking of Appius Claudius’ mistakes.07 I t is also significant that the firs t historian e xp licitly quoted as stating a general cause, the cause o f a kind o f human conduct, is not L iv y but Tacitus.08 E ight chapters later M achiavelli summarizes an observation o f “ the ancient w riters” regarding human conduct in general, and thereafter gives a “ discourse” of his own in w hich he states the cause o f the phenomenon observed by the ancient w riters. There after he indicates that the most fundamental tru th regarding man can be known more easily by the moderns than b y the ancients because that tru th is most easily discerned b y considering “ present and ancient things” to g e the r." Long after all these preparations have been completed does M achiavelli praise L iv y fo r the firs t time. In the chapter preceding the one in w hich he e x p lic itly quotes L iv y in Latin fo r the firs t tim e after the central chapter o f the section on religion, i.e., in the th ird chapter before the one in w hich he states e xp licitly fo r the firs t tim e that L iv y ’s H istory may be defective, he says: “ Since T itu s Livius most prudently gives the reason w hy this arose, it does not seem to me not to be to the purpose to state precisely his words . . . ” The most prudent reasoning o f L iv y includes the fo llo w in g tw o remarks: the Roman n o b ility, w hile disapproving of the violence done by th e ir sons to the plebs, preferred, if the line had to be overstepped, that it should be overstepped by the ir own people rather than by th e ir domestic enemies; and: it seems as if it were necessary either to do w rong or to suffer w rong. It is easy to see w hy this Livian reasoning should appear to M achiavelli to be “ most prudent.” B ut the praise o f this particular Livian reasoning implies that L iv y does not always reason “ most prudently” about the events w hich he narrates: the very praise o f L iv y reveals a comprehensive c riti cism o f L iv y . Moreover, L iv y appears equally to accuse the n o b ility and the plebs o f dangerous am bition; but M achiavelli, in his own discourse w hich imm ediately follow s his restatement o f L iv y ’s reasoning, observes complete silence regarding the am bition o f the plebs: he speaks o f the am bition o f individuals who exploit the desire o f the common people fo r protection and m onetary support. Caesar is perhaps the greatest example o f such individuals. M achi avelli here quotes a sentence w hich Sallustius had put in to Caesar’s mouth and calls that sentence “ most true.” 100 W h y L iv y ’s reasoning is not “ most true” is indicated in the chapter fo llo w in g . R etelling
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a L ivia n story about an action o f the Roman plebs, he quotes a sentence in w hich L iv y traces that action to the dispassionate and in c o rru p t judgm ent o f the then plebs. Thereafter he ta c itly renders L iv y ’s explanation more precise and thus corrects it: the plebs— any plebs at any tim e—has tolerably good judgm ent in particulars b u t it is easily deceived regarding generalities. A fte r having made his p o in t he introduces a fu rth e r quotation fro m L iv y w ith the rem ark that L iv y ju s tly wondered about that action o f the plebs w hich, according to L iv y , revealed how lo fty the m ind o f the Roman plebs was at that particular period; M achiavelli implies that L iv y ju s tly wondered because he did not grasp clearly the character o f the popular m ind. Im m ediately thereafter, he retells a Livian story about an incident in Capua, a c ity in w hich everything, and in p articular the plebs, was co rru p t: the co rru p t Capuan plebs did not act d iffe re n tly than did the in co rru p t Roman plebs in a s tric tly parallel case. The hero o f the story is a high Capuan magistrate; when reading M achiavelli’s version, one receives the impression that tha t Capuan was a public-spirited and wise citizen; M achiavelli suppresses L iv y ’s rem ark that the individual in question was “ a w icked man b ut not altogether lost” who preferred to lo rd it over an in ta ct rather than a destroyed commonwealth: the distinction between clever wickedness and m oral w o rth is not as “ true” in M achiavelli’s eyes as it is in L iv y ’s.101 M achiavelli pursues this thought in the chapter w hich im m ediately precedes his firs t explicit attack on L iv y . A fte r having e x p lic itly quoted some Livian words in Latin, he e x p lic itly repeats L iv y ’s words and changes them somewhat as he does so: whereas L iv y him self had spoken o f the plebeians having become “ obedient,” M achiavelli makes him speak o f the plebeians having become “ vile and weak.” 102 M achiavelli’s subdued criticism o f L iv y prepares his criticism o f a u th o rity as such. In the firs t 57 chapters o f the Discourses, we fin d these fu rth e r suggestions w hich have an immediate bearing upon the broader issue. Cicero, the most famous L a tin prose w rite r, is mentioned three times in the Discourses; in the 4th chapter he is quoted w ith approval as a p o litica l thinke r; in the 33rd chapter he is quoted as having realized a grave erro r com m itted b y Pompey; in the 52nd chapter he is shown to have ruined him self and his p a rty b y a grave e rro r o f judgm ent w hich could easily have been avoided.108 N ear the beginning o f the 18th chapter M achiavelli
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says, quite casually as it m ight seem, that “ it is good to reason about everything” whereas he says in the Prince that “ one ought not to reason about Moses since he was a mere executor o f the things w hich were commanded to him by G od” and that one ought not to reason about ecclesiastical principalities, “ fo r, since they are exalted and maintained by God, it w ould be the w o rk o f a presumptuous and temerarious man to discuss them.” 104 The 18th chapter o f the Discourses begins w ith “ I believe” whereas the preceding chapter begins w ith “ I judge.” The distinction between “ believing” and “ judging” reminds us o f a passage in the firs t chapter o f Seneca’s De vita beata: “ Everyone prefers to believe rather than to judge. One never judges but always believes regarding the things w hich are vital. E rro r transm itted from hand to hand always turns us to and fro and throw s us down headlong, and we perish through follo w in g examples taken from others. W e shall be cured if we were but to secede from the crowd. As it is, however, the people, the defender o f its own evil, stands firm against reason.” I f we desire to understand M achiavelli’s thought, we must pay great attention to the kinship w hich according to Seneca exists between “ believing” and “ the people.” 105 In the 58th chapter M achiavelli e x p lic itly takes issue w ith L iv y and “ all other historians” or, as he says sh ortly afterw ard, w ith “ all w riters.” Does he enlarge the scope o f his attack as he presses forw ard or as he takes breath, or does he suggest that all w riters, i.e., all w riters that preceded him, are in a sense historians? H e certainly continues w ith these words: “ I do not judge nor shall I ever judge it to be a defect to defend any opinion w ith reasons, provided one does not even wish to use in such defense either authority or force.” 106 He could not have stated more clearly and more gently the principle that only reason, as distinguished fro m authority, can command his assent. T o reject a uth ority on principle means to reject the equation o f the good w ith the old and hence o f the best w ith the oldest; it means to derogate fro m the reverence fo r old men, the men most akin to the olden times. The F irst Book o f the Discourses, w hich almost opens w ith the praise o f the most ancient antiquity lite ra lly ends w ith the praise o f the many Romans who “ trium phed in the ir earliest youth.” A nd the Second Book begins w ith a rebuke o f the irrational inclination natural to men to praise the ancient times. M achiavelli addresses his passionate
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and muted call to the young—to men whose prudence has not enfeebled th e ir yo u th fu l vig o r o f m ind, quickness, m ilitancy, im petuosity and audacity.107 Reason and youth and m odernity rise up against auth ority, old age, and a ntiquity. In studying the Discourses we become the witnesses, and we cannot help becoming the moved witnesses, o f the b irth o f that greatest o f all youth move ments: modem philosophy, a phenomenon w hich we know through seeing, as distinguished fro m reading, o n ly in its decay, its state o f depravation and its dotage. The subject concerning w hich M achiavelli challenges “ all w rite rs” is the wisdom and the constancy o f the m ultitude. Oppos ing the whole tra d itio n and “ the common opinion,” he contends that the m ultitude is wiser and more constant than is a prince: not w ith o u t reason does one compare the voice o f the people, “ a universal opinion,” to the voice o f God. I t may easily appear that M achiavelli was the firs t philosopher who questioned in the name o f the m ultitude o r o f democracy the aristocratic prejudice o r the aristocratic premise w hich inform ed classical philosophy. He preferred the more democratic Roman p o lity to the less democratic Spartan p o lity . He expressed the opinion that the purpose o f the people is more honest, o r more just, than the purpose o f the great. I t is true that he did not favor the rule o f the m ultitude: all simple regimes are bad; every so-called democracy is in fact an oligarchy unless it verges on anarchy.108 But his bias in favor o f the m ultitude enabled o r compelled him not to id e n tify him self sim ply w ith the aristocratic o r oligarchic republicanism o f the classical tra dition : the just demands o f the common people may also be satisfied by a prince and even b y a tyra n t. This is one reason w h y the argument o f the Discourses consists p a rtly o f a movement away from re publics tow ard principalities and even tow ard tyrannies, w h y M achiavelli appears in some discourses to be com pletely neutral in the co n flict between free states and tyrannies, or w h y he some times seems to b lu r the distinction among tyrannies, principalities and republics. I t is no accident, I believe, that the most shocking o r the most “ M achiavellian” passage o f the Florentine Histories is the speech addressed b y a Florentine plebeian in the year 1378 to the Florentine plebs. The Florentine plebs had com m itted arson and robbery and was afraid o f punishment; the plebeian leader o f the plebs exhorts his audience to double the evils they had com-
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m itted and to m u ltip ly the arson and the robberies, fo r small faults are punished w hile great and grave ones are rewarded; they should not be frightened by the ancient blood o f the ir adversaries, fo r since all men had the same beginning, all men are o f equally ancient blood or by nature all men are equal, and o nly p overty and wealth make them unequal; great wealth and great pow er are acquired only by fraud or by force; fa ith fu l men always serve and good men are always poor; they should not be frightened by th e ir con science, fo r where there is fear o f hunger and prison there cannot be and ought not to be fear o f hell; G od and nature have so estab lished it that the things w hich men desire can be acquired b y evil acts rather than by good ones. A t any rate one may say that when indicating the character o f the ru lin g class in the Discourses, M achiavelli views the ru lin g class from the plebeian p oint o f view .109 Yet one may say w ith equal rig h t that he views the plebs to some extent from the patrician p oint o f view .110 A t present we must lim it ourselves to a more precise consideration o f the 58th chapter of the Discourses, the only chapter in the very heading o f which Machiavelli asserts the superiority o f the m ultitude to a prince. He attacks “ the common opinion” according to w hich the m ultitude is in fe rio r in wisdom to princes, and he contends that the voice o f the m ultitude, “ a universal opinion,” is lik e ly to be rig h t. But is not “ the common opinion” about the wisdom o f the m ultitude “ a universal opinion” ? A nd does not “ universal opinion” assert that “ universal opinion” is lik e ly to be wrong? Does not then the oracular voice o f the m ultitude deny wisdom to the m ultitude? Must M achiavelli not question the auth ority o f universal opinion in order to establish the authority o f universal opinion? M ust he not say that universal opinion must be w rong so that universal opinion can be rig h t and that universal opinion must be rig h t so that universal opinion can be wrong? Against this one m ight tr y to argue as follow s: “ the common opinion” o f “ all w rite rs” is not “ a universal opinion,” i.e., an opinion o f the m ultitude or o f the people;111 eleven chapters earlier M achiavelli had contended that the opinion o f the people is lik e ly to be rig h t regarding particulars, whereas it is lik e ly to be w rong regarding generalities; hence even if not only w riters but the peoples themselves were to deny wisdom to the peoples, this verdict, being a judgm ent on something general, may w e ll be w rong and yet the people may be wise in
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particular matters; in the ve ry 58th chapter M achiavelli does not go beyond contending that the m ultitude or the people is marvelous in foreseeing its own evil and its own good, i.e., its particular good o r evil here and now. Y et in the earlier discussion he had shown how easy it was fo r the Roman senate to deceive the people o r the plebs in regard to particulars. Granted that the m ultitude possesses sound judgm ent on particulars, such judgm ent is o f little value if the context w ith in w hich the particular comes to sight is beyond the ken o f the m ultitude: b y changing the context one w ill change the meaning o f the particular. A nd the generalities regarding w hich the people is adm ittedly incom petent are an im portant part o f that context: sound judgm ent regarding particulars is impossible if it is not protected b y true opinion about generalities. Hence the m u lti tude is frequently more moved b y things w hich seem to be than b y things w hich are. Hence M achiavelli can com fort the prince b y the thought that he can easily deceive the many about his char acter, i.e., about a particular, and he must w arn republics that the people, w hich is allegedly marvelous in foreseeing its own evil and good, desires frequently its own ru in because it is de ceived b y false appearance o f good and is easily moved b y grand hopes and valiant promises. In the 58th chapter itself, Machia v e lli says that the people can grasp that tru th w hich it hears. T his rem ark means, in the lig h t o f earlier remarks, that the people cannot fin d the tru th b y itself. B y itself, it is ignorant; it is in need o f guidance; it must be compelled or persuaded by prudent citizens to act sensibly. The Roman senate was a body o f such prudent citizens.112 W h a t is p a rticu la rly strikin g in the 58th chap te r is that M achiavelli compares therein the wisdom o f the m u lti tude o r o f the people w ith the wisdom o f princes, i.e., o f kings, emperors and tyrants, w ith o u t saying a w ord about the wisdom o f “ the princes,” i.e., the ru lin g class, in a republic. Instead, he ta c itly substitutes in a considerable part o f the argument o f that chapter “ republics” fo r “ m ultitude,” and thus ta c itly contrasts the wisdom o f princes, not w ith the wisdom o f the m ultitude, the common people o r the plebs, but w ith the wisdom o f the Roman senate, and therew ith renders the true issue com pletely invisible.113 The true issue becomes visible once one reflects on the fact that the m ultitude o r the plebs needs guidance. This guidance is sup plied o rd in a rily b y laws and orders w hich, if they are to be o f
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any value, o f necessity originate in superior minds, in the minds o f founders o r o f princes. O f princes thus understood—and princes thus understood include the series o f firs t rate men who were responsible fo r the continuous foundation o f Rome—M achiavelli says in the 58th chapter that they are superior to the peoples because they alone are fit to establish new laws and orders, whereas peoples are superior to princes as regards the m aintaining o f modes and orders already established. In other words, “ princes” are the founding or innovating o r rational element in society, w hile the people is the preserving or conservative element: once the people begins to abhor o r to love something, i.e., things o f a certain status or character, it clings to that opinion fo r centuries. The people is the repository o f the established, o f the old modes and orders, of authority. Therefore one may provisionally say that the peoples are by fa r superior to princes in g lo ry. B ut however this may be, one must say w ith fin a lity that the peoples are by far superior to princes in goodness; fo r goodness or m o ra lity is essentially preserving or conservative, and not innovating or revo lutionary, whereas the prototype o f princes is Romulus the fra tri cide.114 The peoples are the repository o f m orality. A fte r all that has been said this does not mean that the peoples always or even m ostly act m orally or even that they are fundam entally m oral; belief in m orality is not yet m orality. M achiavelli illustrates the conservative character o f the people by the fact that the Roman people hated the very name o f kings fo r many centuries. Y et in the same context he declares that “ the opinion unfavorable to the peoples arises because o f the peoples every one speaks w ith o u t fear and freely, even w hile the peoples reign, but o f princes one always speaks w ith a thousand fears and a thousand respects.” The Roman people could hardly have hated the very name o f kings fo r many centuries after the expulsion o f the Roman kings, and yet always have spoken o f kings w ith a thousand fears and a thousand respects. Considering the violent struggle between the Roman plebs and the Roman senate or the Roman “ princes,” the contradiction cannot be resolved unless one assumes that “ princes” does not always designate monarchs or even human government in general. W e suspect that M achiavelli sometimes uses “ princes” in order to designate superhuman powers. A nd vice versa, since he sometimes uses “ human beings” fo r designating the people, com-
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mon men o r the subjects,115 there is no reason that he should not, on the proper occasion, use “ the people” to designate human beings as distinguished fro m superhuman beings. A t any rate, fo r the same reason fo r w hich the peoples are the repository o f m orality, they are also the repository o f religion.116 W e are compelled here to make an observation sim ilar to that w hich we made when we considered M achiavelli’s firs t emphatic blame o f ancient Rome. The explicit and emphatic character o f his disagreement w ith L iv y ’s judgm ent on the m ultitude does not correspond w ith what we may call the re a lity o f this disagreement. W h ile forgoing recourse to a uthority, to say nothing o f recourse to force, M achiavelli does not forgo recourse to guile. He does not seriously disagree w ith L iv y ’s judgm ent on the m ultitude. He does disagree w ith L iv y , and w ith “ all w riters,” on the status o f m orality. T h is is not to deny that b y questioning the traditional view o f the status o f m o ra lity he is freed to question the traditional view o f aristocracy o r the rule o f men o f moral w orth . B ut questioning the tra dition a l view o f aristocracy is very different fro m adopting the extrem ely populist view w hich he seems to adopt in the 58th chapter. The tra dition a l doctrine asserted the moral superiority o f “ the better people.” A ccording to M achiavelli, his dissection o f the Roman republic entitles him to judge that the ru lin g class deserving o f the name is necessarily superior to the m ultitude in foresight, but is most certainly not m orally superior; rather it is m orally in fe rio r to its subjects. T o the extent to w hich he iro n ic a lly accepts the m ajor premise that human excellence is m oral excellence, he arrives at the conclusion that the m ultitude is sim ply superior to “ princes.” T h is does not mean that the acceptance o f that m ajor premise is arb itra ry. M achiavelli is a bringer o f new modes and orders. H e is a revolutionary, i.e., his adversaries have on th e ir side the laws and everything respected and honored. Com pared w ith the powers w hich he attacks, he may very w e ll appear as he describes him self, namely, a being o f a lo w and abject condi tio n ; and, as he teaches, one rises fro m such a condition through fraud rather than through other means. He is “ a man o f the people” not o n ly in the lite ra l sense, and the meaning o f his tu rn in g from L a tin to the vulgar tongue is not exhausted b y w hat every school boy is supposed to know . H is plebeian leader who encourages the plebs not to be frightened b y conscience, i.e., b y fear o f hell, is
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a caricature o f M achiavelli, but the caricature o f a man reveals something of the man himself. S till, even a plebeian leader is not sim ply a plebeian, and a leader o f the plebs is not necessarily him self a plebeian. Yet as a rebel against everything that is respected, Machiavelli must certainly adapt himself to the taste o f the vulgar, if he desires to get a posthumous hearing fo r his new modes and orders. This is one reason w h y he displays a bias in favor o f the extreme and spectacular. A Fabius iUaximus Cunctator is neces sarily unpopular; he can never demonstrate to the populace the soundness o f his opinion; his opinion is bound to appear abject.117 Even less popular w ill be the man who has discerned w ith perfect c la rity the true and natural principles on w hich men like the empirical Fabius act instinctively: the true opinion about the most general, the most comprehensive things can never become popular opinion; it w ill necessarily appear to the populace to lack glamor and even to be abject and degrading. iMachiavelli cannot train his readers in discovering fo r themselves the lo w ly but true principles which he can only intim ate, except b y appealing on d if ferent occasions to different principles all o f w hich are respectable or pub licly defensible but w hich contradict one another: the contradiction between them may lead some readers to the true principles in the ir nakedness. Thus he mitigates his attack on the Roman Church by appealing to original C hristianity. He mitigates his attack on B iblical religion b y praising religion in general. H e mitigates his attack on religion by praising hum anity and goodness. He mitigates his analysis o f the bad and inhuman conditions o f goodness and hum anity by cursing tyra nn y and b y blessing lib e rty and its prize, the eternal prudence and generosity o f a senate. H e mitigates the impact o f his unsparing analysis o f republican virtu e at its highest by paying homage to the goodness and religion o f the common people and to the justice o f th e ir demands. H e m itigates the impact o f his unsparing analysis o f the defects o f the common people by his appeal to a patriotism w hich legitimates the p o lic y o f iron and poison pursued b y a most ferocious lio n and a most astute fox or which legitimates the kind o f rule know n tra d itio n a lly as tyranny.118 W e are now in a position to describe more adequately than was hitherto possible the relation between M achiavelli’s tw o books. The firs t impression according to w hich the Prince is devoted to p rin -
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cipalities and the Discourses are devoted to republics is not mis leading. T he characteristic theme o f the Prince is the prince in the most exalted sense, the bringer o f new modes and orders o r the founder. The characteristic theme o f the Discourses is the people as the m aintainer o f established modes and orders,119 or as the reposi to ry o f m o ra lity and religion. I f it is true, as I believe it is, that the Bible sets fo rth the demands o f m o ra lity and religion in th e ir purest and most intransigent form , the central theme o f the Dis courses must be the analysis o f the Bible. This does not mean tha t the Discourses are silent about founders. O n the contrary, the Discourses articulate the phenomenon o f the founders much more tho ro u gh ly than does the Prince: the Discourses deal not only w ith heroic founders like Cyrus and Theseus but likewise w ith the series o f “ continuous founders’’ such as the Roman senate, and w ith the founder-captain like Romulus who in the Prince is mentioned in o n ly a single chapter—to say nothing o f the founder-captain M achiavelli him self. The contention that the characteristic theme o f the Prince is the founder as distinguished fro m the repositories o f m o ra lity and religion, means that the perspective o f the people does not predominate in the Prince in the w ay in w hich it predominates in the Discourses. In the Discourses, even the founders themselves are viewed in the perspective o f the society already founded. Hence, the Discourses make considerable use o f the distinction between kings and tyrants and they speak w ith proper frequency and em phasis o f the common good and o f the conscience; hence Machiav e lli speaks in the Discourses sometimes o f “ we Christians.” The Discourses in other words come closer than the Prince to w hat is generally or popularly accepted. B ut fo r the same reason the Dis courses go much fu rth e r than the Prince in the detailed analysis, resolution o r destruction o f the generally accepted: the attack in the Discourses on “ all w rite rs” has no parallel in the Prince. A nd if M achiavelli had not w ritte n the Discourses, people w ould not speak as frequently and as easily as they do o f M achiavelli’s “ pagan ism.” B ut if he had not w ritte n the Prince, it w ould not be as manifest as it is that he transcends the standpoint o f the people in the direction o f the standpoint o f the founder. A ll this m erely confirm s his suggestion that each o f the tw o books contains every th in g he knows but that in the Prince he has condensed everything he knows in the highest degree possible: only in the Discourses
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does he have room and leisure fo r beginning w ith w hat is “ firs t fo r us” and fo r leading up to what is “ firs t by nature.” Furtherm ore, we are now in a position to defend M achiavelli to some extent against the observation o f a modem c ritic that he completely distorts the meaning o f L iv y ’s stories and falsifies th e ir spirit. This criticism is fu lly justified if it is meant to im p ly that Machiavelli knew what he was doing. He consciously uses L iv y fo r his non-Livian purposes. He deliberately transforms the Roman ru lin g class as it was into a ru lin g class as, according to him, it should have been; he makes the Roman ru lin g class “ better” than it was; he transforms a group whose best members were men o f outstanding virtue and pie ty into a group whose best members, being perfectly free from all vulgar prejudices, were guided ex clusively by Machiavellian prudence that served the insatiable desire o f each fo r eternal g lo ry in this w orld. From M achiavelli’s presentation one receives the impression that p rio r to Num a Pom pilius there was no religion in Rome: M achiavelli is silent about the Livian testimonies to the religious character o f Rome’s founda tio n by Romulus. He may w e ll have adopted Polybius’ account o f the beginnings o f c iv il societies because that account is silent about gods and religion.120 A Livian story gives M achiavelli occa sion to praise “ the generosity and prudence” w hich the Roman senate showed in a reply it gave to Roman allies; the Livian senate referred in its reply to “ the sudden w rath o f the gods” ; the Machia vellian senate is too “ generous and prudent” o r too good a know er o f “ the things o f the w o rld ” to mention “ the sudden w rath o f the gods.” 121 The Livian eye-witnesses to the ru in o f the w icked legislator, Appius Claudius, m utter, each man to himself, that there are gods after all and that they do not neglect human things and that pride and cruelty receive th e ir divine punishment w hich, though late, is nevertheless not lig h t; the same event gives occa sion to M achiavelli fo r the reflection that it is im prudent and use less to leap from h u m ility to pride and from p ity to cru e lty w ith o u t duly taking the intermediate steps.122 A ccording to L iv y , the Roman pontiffs had a voice in the deliberations connected w ith Camillus’ having vowed to A po llo a tith e o f the booty taken in V e il; the Roman pontiffs have disappeared in M achiavelli’s re statement; here as elsewhere he does everything to obliterate the
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Roman pon tiffs o r the role that they played in the ancient Roman republic.123 A ccording to L iv y y the Roman people acquitted H ora tius Codes fro m punishment fo r having slain his sister chiefly because the y admired his steadfastness and virtu e ; according to M achiavelli, they acquitted him since they were moved by “ the prayers o f the father.” 124 A ccording to L iv y , when the Gauls en tered Rome after th e ir v ic to ry at the A llia , the Roman senate resolved that the men o f m ilita ry age and the able-bodied senators should re tire in to the citadel and the C apitol together w ith the ir wives and children, fo r it w ould not have been human to prevent the wives and mothers from saving themselves although they could not contribute anything to the defense o f w hat was le ft o f Rome; according to M achiavelli, the women stayed in the tow n as prey to the Gauls because p urely m ilita ry considerations prevailed. A c cording to L iv y , the Romans were greatly concerned in that calam ity w ith defending the citadel and the C apitol because those places were the dw ellings o f the gods, and w ith defending the gods themselves as w e ll as the Vestal virgins and the sacred things belonging to the Roman people; M achiavelli does not even allude to this part o f the story.125 A ccording to L iv y , both gods and men prevented the Romans fro m liv in g redeemed; M achiavelli makes him say that Fortuna did not wish that the Romans live redeemed b y gold.126 W hen re fe rrin g to L iv y ’s account o f the self-sacrifice o f the elder P. Decius Mus, M achiavelli suppresses every mention o f the religious character o f that act o f devotion, an act meant to expiate the whole w rath o f the gods, to draw upon Decius all the threats and dangers, offered b y the supernal and infernal gods, or to relieve o f religious fear the minds o f the Romans; he merely alludes to w hat he had indicated elsewhere (in the section on re lig io n ) about how one m ight make soldiers obstinate; instead he expatiates on the order w hich the Romans follow ed in th e ir armies and in battles, and w hich L iv y Ijad adm ittedly explained at length in the same context.127 Q uoting in the Second Book some Latin words fro m a Livia n speech w hich begins w ith the remark that the im m ortal gods have made the Roman senate the master o f the Fate o f Latium , M achiavelli leaves it open whether those words are words o f L iv y o r o f a Livia n character; there can be no question that they are n ot the words o f M achiavelli. In the whole Second
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Book, M achiavelli speaks only once o f gods o r G od; summarizing an argument o f an ancient w rite r, he says that the Romans b u ilt more temples “ to Fortuna than to any other god.” 128 By the end o f the First Book of the Discourses the reader is supposed to have liberated him self com pletely fro m belief in any authority. The Preface to the Second Book, being a “ repetition” o f the Preface to the First Book, summarizes the results o f the First Book insofar as they affect the problem o f a u th o rity in gen eral. The first Preface had identified the new modes and orders, discovered by M achiavelli w ith the ancient modes and orders, and it had appealed to the prejudice in favor o f a ntiquity. The second and last Preface exhibits the irrational character and the causes of that prejudice. M achiavelli does not deny that in a given part o f the w orld the men o f the present may be justified in regard ing themselves as in fe rio r to the ir forebears w ith respect to virtue. B ut this does not mean that virtue is the preserve o f a ntiq u ity and especially o f classical antiquity. There is at present as much virtu e in the w o rld as there was at any tim e in the past, o nly virtu e does not now reside where it resided in classical antiquity. I t resides now in N orthern Europe and in T u rke y rather than in Greece and in Ita ly . This is p artly due to the change in education and therefore to the change in religion. But if a contem porary Christian bom , say, in Greece becomes a T u rk , i.e., an in fid el—a pagan o r worse than a pagan—he has no reason to blame the present age o r to long fo r antiquity. The prejudice in favor o f a ntiq u ity is p a rtly caused b y the distorted accounts w hich we have o f ancient times. M ost w riters are so servile as to m agnify the virtues and conceal the vices o f the pow erful ones o f the ir time, whereas it is possible to acquire perfect knowledge regarding “ present actions.” In a w ord, most histories are u tte rly unreliable. Hence the g lo ry deriving fro m deeds is less solid than the g lo ry deriving from the production o f works o f art: works o f art can be as present to any later age as they were to the age in w hich they were brought fo rth . W e had been to ld orig in ally that the men most h ig h ly praised, w hether rig h tly or w rongly, are the founders o f religion: they are even more hig hly praised than the founders o f republics o r kingdoms who in the ir tu rn are more hig hly praised than men o f letters. W e are to ld almost imm ediately afterw ard that no g lo ry o r posthumous fame surpasses that o f the founder or restorer o f a c ity , like Romulus.
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W e are now given to understand that the g lo ry o f any doer is in fe rio r to that o f excellent artists o r w riters.129 In the F irst Book, M achiavelli had not dared openly to question L iv y ’s judgm ent before the 58th chapter. In the Second Book he questions it already at the beginning o f the firs t chapter. H e dis agrees w ith L iv y on no less a subject than the power o f Fortuna. L iv y as w e ll as many others held the opinion that Rome owed her empire to lu ck rather than to virtue. M achiavelli refuses to “ confess” this in any w ay: he, as it were, defends the virtu e o f the Romans against L iv y . H is criticism is directed, however, less against L iv y than against Plutarch, “ a most w eighty w rite r.” W e may note in passing tha t he never anywhere in the Discourses applies to L iv y an epithet o f equal force; he m erely calls him “ a good historian.” 180 Plutarch claimed that his opinion was supported b y the “ confession” o f the Roman people itse lf w hich had b u ilt more temples to Fortuna than to any other god. M achiavelli does not question Plutarch’s contention that the Roman people ascribed its w ell-being to Fortuna rather than to its own virtue. S ilently contradicting w hat he had said in the 58th chapter about the value o f the voice o f the people, b ut sile n tly confirm ing w hat he had indicated there in regard to tha t subject, he attaches no importance to the opinion o f the Roman people on the source o f its w ell-being. In defending the virtu e o f the Roman people against its own opinion, he questions the wisdom o f the Roman people. He directs his attack against P lutarch rather than against L iv y because he is not quite certain that L iv y shared the opinion o f the Roman people regarding the pow er o f Fortuna; it is less L iv y who speaks about the power o f Fortuna than L iv y ’s Romans whom L iv y “ makes speak” on that subject. L iv y was perhaps wiser than his Romans. Perhaps he did not “ confess” everything that his Romans believed. W h ile being the mouthpiece o f pagan theology, he was perhaps also its c ritic .181 Now here in the F irst Book had M * achiavelli even alluded to the problem posed b y the difference between L iv y and L iv y ’s char acters. O n ly once therein did he make an e xplicit distinction between an author and a character o f that author: he said that Sallustius “ p u t” a certain sentence “ in to the m outh o f Caesar.” 182 In the Second and T h ird Books, however, he refers 11 times to the difference between L iv y and his characters b y using expressions like “ L iv y makes someone say o r do certain things” o r “ L iv y p u t these
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words into the mouth o f someone.” B ut this is not the only difference between tne treatment o f L iv y in the F irst Book on the one hand, and in the Second and T h ird Books on the other. O nly in the tw o last Books do we find what we may s tric tly speaking call sermons on texts,133 i.e., discourses opening w ith a L atin quotation w hich functions as “ text” fo r the discourse in question. There occur altogether 3 such discourses; only Livian texts are used in the manner indicated. In this connection we may note that references to a “ text” occur proportionately more frequently in the Second Book and in the corresponding parts o f the T h ird Book than in the First Book.184 Finally, only in the tw o last Books does M achiavelli speak o f L iv y as a “ witness” ( testimone) or o f his “ testim ony” ( testimonio) or o f his “ vouching” (fare jede) fo r something.135 W e cannot help suspecting that these peculiarities o f the treatm ent o f L iv y in the tw o last Books are connected w ith the specific themes o f these Books. The Second Book deals w ith foreign p o licy and warfare or w ith the m ilitia ; the T h ird Book repeats the themes o f the First and Second Books. W ith one exception, it is o nly in such chapters o f the T h ird Book as are devoted to foreign p olicy or m ilita ry matters that the peculiarities o f the kinds mentioned occur; the exception is a passage dealing w ith Camillus, “ the most prudent o f all Roman captains.” 136 The reader w ill remember w hat was stated earlier at some length regarding the am biguity o f the themes “ m ilitia, warfare and foreign p o licy.” A fte r having alluded to the difference between L iv y and his characters fo r the firs t tim e in the firs t chapter o f the Second Book, M achiavelli does not return to that subject before the 13th chapter o f the same Book. The 13th chapter form s the center o f a section the meaning o f w hich is not obvious. The section is imm ediately preceded or appropriately prefaced b y the o n ly chapter o f the Discourses in the very heading o f w hich M achiavelli e xp licitly attacks a “ common opinion” and in the body o f w hich he shows that L iv y expresses his disagreement w ith a “ common opinion” more effectively by silence than he could have done by speech. The 13th chapter o f the F irst Book form s the center o f the section devoted to the religion o f the Romans. B ut neither the 13th chapter o f the Second Book nor the section to w hich it belongs can be said to deal w ith a specifically Roman subject. Non-Roman examples preponderate in that section. Am ong the 7
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utterances quoted in the whole series o f chapters fro m Discourses I I 4 to I I 18 inclusive, 6 are utterances o f men who were not Romans and one is an utterance o f L iv y about people who were not Romans. The chapter im m ediately preceding the chapter under consideration is the quaestio disputata w hich opens w ith 7 arguments fro m authorities, 6 o f w hich are o f non-Roman origin, one o f the la tte r having been taken fro m poetic fables. The chapter in question its e lf is devoted to the subject o f fraud as a chief means fo r rising fro m a lo w to a great position. Am ong the individuals who are said to have risen through fraud, Cyrus, a new prince o f the highest rank, a founder, is treated most extensively; fo r even founders and precisely founders are compelled to “ color th e ir designs.” I t is no accident tha t M achiavelli stresses the difference between authors and th e ir characters in such a context: not the men who use fraud on a grand scale but those who w rite concerning such men may, under certain conditions, reveal that fraud. T o reveal those condi tions may be said to be the chief purpose o f our chapter. As fo r the fraud com m itted b y Cyrus, M achiavelli refers to Xenophon. “ Xeno phon in his life o f Cyrus shows this need fo r deceit. The firs t expedi tio n w hich he makes Cyrus make is fu ll o f fraud, and he makes him seize his kingdom w ith deceit and not w ith force . . . He makes him deceive . . . . ” The evidence supplied by Xenophon’s Education o f Cyrus is then not historical. H aving realized “ this need fo r deceit” through observations made perhaps nearer home, Xenophon presents the lesson in a w o rk o f fic tio n the hero o f w hich is a foreign, A siatic ru le r who, according to M achiavelli, was as much a frie n d o f G od as Moses. As fo r L iv y , he laid bare the fraud through w hich Rome rose to greatness b y using a victim o f Roman fraud, an enemy o f Rome as his mouthpiece.187 Whereas Xenophon speaks in his own name about the fraud com m itted b y a foreign ru le r, L iv y speaks through the m outh o f a foreigner about the fraud com m itted b y his own rulers. N o one,#it seems, speaks in his own name about the deception w hich is the source o f the being or the w ell-being o f his own commonwealth. Being “ a good historian,” L iv y was not so servile as to suppress truths w hich were unpalatable to his own people and, being wiser than the Romans, he outw itted them. He uses a noble deception to lay bare an ignoble deception. T h is is not the o n ly case in w hich he reveals a harsh tru th about the Romans through the m outh o f an enemy o f Rome. In the 135th
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chapter o f the Discourses, M achiavelli uses a single example in order to establish the rule that promises made b y states under duress ought not to be kept; the example seems to be inadequate as appears at once if one reads M achiavelli’s summary w ith ordinary care. I f one turns therefore to L iv y , one sees that the incident in question taken by itself is w h o lly irrelevant fo r supporting M achi avelli’s rule. T o say nothing o f the fact that in the L ivian story the obligatory character o f promises made under duress is taken fo r granted by everyone, a Roman consul who had promised peace to the Samnites under duress recovers fo r the Romans the rig h t to recommence w ar under favorable conditions b y having recourse to an amazing piece o f legal fic tio n sanctioned b y sacred law. The leader o f the pious Samnites, the v ictim o f Roman pie ty, understandably fe lt that the Romans always put the appearance o f justice on acts o f fraud and were not ashamed to use in broad daylight mockeries o f religion, mockeries o f the mysterious pow er o f the gods, as puerile cloaks fo r breaches o f fa ith ; fo r that Samnite thought that wars are just and pious b y virtue o f th e ir necessity and not by virtue o f religious techniques. W h ile p u ttin g this judgment on Roman pie ty into the m outh o f an enemy o f Rome, L iv y on this occasion says in his own name that in this case the Romans perhaps com m itted a breach o f fa ith .188 A ll the more strikin g is M achiavelli’s reticence; he does not even refer to L iv y and hence to the simple Samnite’s remark about the Romans* hypocrisy. W e cannot deny that there is a shocking contrast between the simple rule laid down by the irreligious M achiavelli and the complicated evasion o f the opposite rule b y the pious Romans. The shock may make us aware o f the hidden argument w hich he directs against his opponents: the principles o f his opponents lead to unctuous hypocrisy because those principles are at variance w ith the nature o f things. In the 105th chapter o f the Discourses, M achi avelli e xp licitly quotes w ith approval some words fro m a speech b y another enemy o f Rome, the Volscian Messius, and im m ediately thereafter e xp licitly ascribes to L iv y a thought w hich is expressed, and as it is expressed, in that speech: he imputes to L iv y the senti ment o f a Livian character. B ut there is no reason w h y o n ly that thought and not also other parts o f Messius’ speech should have to be regarded as thoughts o f L iv y . In that part o f Messius’ speech about w hich M achiavelli is silent, Messius says to his soldiers: “ D o
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you believe that some god w ill protect you?” A nd he means by this that no god w ill protect them.139 A ccording to M achiavelli’s rule fo r reading L iv y as he applies it in this very passage, this denial o f divine protection w ould have to be ascribed to L iv y him self. Y et it is not L iv y but a Livian character who expresses that sentiment. I f one reads the statement o f M essius-Livy w hich we have quoted, in the lig h t o f the whole chapter in w hich M achiavelli quotes another statement o f Messius-Livy, one sees that the senti ment expressed in our quotation may w e ll be ascribed to M achiavelli him self. I t w ould appear then that M achiavelli stands in the same relation to L iv y in w hich L iv y stands to some o f his characters: he states w hat he regards as the tru th through sentences o f L iv y often unquoted but always alluded to ; M achiavelli’s L iv y is a character o f M achiavelli. B y using a variety o f characters as his mouthpieces, L iv y was enabled both to expound the principles on w hich the Romans ad m itte d ly acted or in w hich they believed, and to criticize them. H is H istory contains the tru th about pagan Rome because it con tains not o nly w hat one may call the official Roman version but likewise the know n or presumptive judgm ent on Rome b y Rome’s enemies, and therew ith the detection o f the fraud inherent in the Roman version. As fo r M achiavelli, he uses L iv y ’s w o rk firs t as a counter-authority or a counter-Bible; he ta c itly replaces the doctrine o f the Bible b y the doctrine o f the Romans w hich is transm itted b y L iv y , or he replaces it b y the doctrine o f L iv y . Thereafter he e x p lic itly questions the a uth ority o f L iv y and thus draws our attention to w hat he had done ta c itly in regard to the Bible. T o m ention only one example, by stating that L iv y ’s H istory is possibly defective in an im portant point, he makes us aware o f the possibility that the B iblical records are defective in decisive points. L iv y both expounds and criticizes Roman piety and pagan theology. T o the extent to w hich L iv y expounds pagan theology, M achiavelli can use him fo r suggesting an alternative to B iblical theology or fo r sowing doubts regarding B iblical theology. T o the extent to w hich L iv y criticizes Roman theology, M achiavelli can use him as a model fo r his own criticism o f B iblical theology. B y making L iv y ’s criticism less visible than his conformism, he presents L iv y as his model or transform s him in to his model and thus indicates his own procedure. F or there is hardly a single passage in either the Dis-
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courses or the Prince in w hich M achiavelli unambiguously reveals his complete break w ith the B iblical tradition, although there occur in each o f the tw o books many passages w hich are devoid o f mean ing if they are not taken as allusions to that break. These passages can easily be overlooked and if they are not overlooked th e ir bearing can easily be minimized since they are, as it were, covered over by innumerable others w hich are either neutral w ith regard to the problem posed b y the B iblical tradition, or else are tolerable from the point o f view o f believers whose ch arity is greater than their perspicacity. W ith some exaggeration one may say that Machiavelli uses L iv y as a corpus vile b y means o f w hich he can demonstrate how he has ta c itly proceeded in regard to the corpus nobilissimum. This tw o fo ld use o f L iv y is related to the tw o fo ld character o f pagan Rome w hich was both the enemy o f the Christian Church and the model fo r it. In Discourses II 2, M achiavelli notes that L iv y ’s H istory is silent as to how the race o f Porsenna, king o f Tuscany, became extinct. He is here no longer concerned w ith pointing out the defective character o f L iv y ’s H istory. The remark on the extinction o f Porsenna’s race is the spearhead o f a column o f somewhat scattered observations concerning the oblivion o f Tuscan things in general, and the cause o f that oblivion. W e hear next that the memory o f most Tuscan things is lost and then that it was lost as a consequence o f the destruction o f Tuscan power by Rome. T his fact made M achiavelli think, as he says, o f the causes, and as we may add on the basis o f what he does, in particular o f the human causes through w hich the memory o f ancient greatness is extinguished. These human causes are the changes o f religion and the changes o f lan guage. M achiavelli develops this thought in Discourses I I 5, where he refutes an argument allegedly proving that the w o rld had a beginning and where he ascribes to all religions a human, not a heavenly, origin and, on the basis o f this, a life span o f between 1666 and 3000 years. Reflection on the policy pursued b y “ the Christian sect” induces him to assert that every new religion attempts to extinguish every vestige o f “ the old religion,” and induces him to “ believe” in particular that the pagan religion destroyed all vestiges o f the religion preceding it. The context suggests that the religion preceding the pagan religion was the Tuscan religion. However this may be, the Romans certainly destroyed the pow er
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o f Tuscany and extinguished the customs and the language o f the Tuscans. I f we read somewhat more carefully M achiavelli’s remarks concerning w hat the Romans did to the Tuscans, we see that the Romans did not destroy, and did not even attem pt to destroy, the re lig io n o f the Tuscans; fo r instance, instead o f destroying the image o f the Tuscan Juno they made it the ir own. Hence Machia v e lli’s “ belief” that the pagan religion did to the preceding religion w hat “ the Christian sect desired to do to the pagan sect” is not more than a stage o f his argument, a provisional thought w hich he discards almost im m ediately after he expresses it. The allegedly universal rule inferred fro m the p o licy o f C hristianity, and o f Judaism, tow ard id o la try is a piece o f fictio n tem porarily coijvenient fo r M achiavelli’s purpose. W hat remains as undeniable tru th is the fact that Judaism and C hristianity attempted to destroy every vestige o f the pagan religion. Here again M achiavelli m om entarily overstates the case by saying that “ the Christian sect” destroyed “ every m emory o f that ancient theology” by w hich he p rim a rily means pagan theology.140 A few lines later he says that w hile C hristianity attempted the complete destruction o f every vestige o f paganism, it failed in that attempt. The tw o overstate ments perform one function. B y assimilating paganism and Chris tia n ity to each other in an absurd fashion, those statements draw our attention to the difference between paganism and C hristianity. The Romans could have destroyed every vestige o f the Tuscan re ligion if they had desired to do so, but they did not desire it; persecution o f “ the old re ligion,” and in particular “ destruction o f images,” is peculiar to the B iblical religion as distinguished from the pagan religion. I t w ill do no harm if the allusion to this peculi a rity o f B iblical religion reminds us o f the hazardous character o f M achiavelli’s campaign. On the other hand, C hristianity failed in its attem pt to eradicate every vestige o f paganism because it was compelled to retain the Latin and Qreek languages and hence to preserve a considerable part o f pagan literature, fo r instance “ those books o f L iv y w hich the m alig n ity o f the times has not intercepted.” C hristia n ity was compelled to perm it and even to encourage the study o f pagan literature. T h a t study and the adm iration fo r the pagan w ay o f life w hich it aroused in a few minds could thus become the entering wedge fo r M achiavelli’s criticism o f B iblical religion. H is praise o f ancient Rome is an essential element o f his
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w h o lly new teaching, but it is also, and even chiefly, a mere engine o f subversion or o f what one m ight call his immanent criticism o f the B iblical tradition. A dm iration fo r ancient Rome was the only pub licly defensible base fro m w hich he could attack the B iblical religion. The properly understood remains o f paganism were “ the fortress o f our hope and salvation,” the solitary elevation w hich commands the enemy position and w hich is d iffic u lt o f access to an army encumbered w ith baggage but not d iffic u lt fo r men lig h tly equipped. T o apply to M achiavelli his own expression, not being able to blame Caesar he praised Brutus. C hristianity, we must add in order to complete M achiavelli's statements, was forced to retain the Latin language because it was not, like Islam, a religion that conquered by force. C hristianity was forced to preserve its enemy to some extent. I t was then due to the “ unarmed” character o f prim itive C hristianity that .Machiavelli was enabled to use L iv y against B iblical religion. C hristianity averted the dangers emanating from the relics o f paganism by regarding them as u nw orth y o f faith wherever they contradict the B iblical teaching. F or instance, since the Bible is thought to teach that the w o rld was created about 5,000 years ago, one regards the H istory o f Diodorus Siculus as mendacious, “ although it gives an account o f 40,000 or 50,000 years.” By refusing credence to the pagan historians, one arrives at the conclusion that what those historians report as regards the modes and orders o f pagan Rome is not true and even is impossible and hence cannot be im itated.141 T o refute this conclusion as w e ll as all its questionable premises, M achiavelli must firs t restore the cre d ib ility of the pagan historians and especially o f L iv y . He does this, to begin w ith , in an exaggerated way by establishing the authority o f L iv y ’s H istory as a kind o f Bible. But he must also use such relics of paganism as stem from explicit enemies o f B iblical religion, and as are therefore particula rly serviceable fo r correcting the Biblical version o f the origins. He gives a specimen o f this kind o f in q u iry by citin g in Discourses II 8 a sentence stemming from pagan enemies of the Jews. L iv y ’s H istory contains both the official Roman version and its correction b y the enemies o f Rome because L iv y used not only Romans but also enemies o f Rome as his mouthpieces. The B iblical authors do not use enemies o f the B iblical religion as th e ir mouthpieces.142 B iblical religion even attempted to suppress all vestiges o f the thought o f its enemies.
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Hence L iv y ’s H istory is self-sufficient in the sense that it enables its reader to arrive at an im partial judgm ent about Rome, whereas the c ritic a l student o f the Bible must re ly on potentially o r actually anti-B iblical literature in order to discern the tru th about the B iblical religion. W h ile the Bible is not self-sufficient in the sense indicated, one could however say that the B iblical tra d itio n as transm itter o f pagan thought contains the judgm ent o f its enemies w ith in itself. W e conclude our discussion o f Discourses II 13 w ith a b rie f survey o f the principles o f historical criticism indicated by Machiave lli. In order to be certain o f something w hich one does not see o r has not seen, one needs witnesses in whom one can have faith . A d iffic u lty arises from the fact that the c re d ib ility o f a witness depends to some extent on the c re d ib ility o f the events to w hich he claims to have been a witness. W hat is “ very remote” fro m “ the ordinary and reasonable,” or what is miraculous, is in credible. B ut reverence fo r a certain Roman historian, an “ author ity ,” induces M achiavelli to “ believe” that historian’s report o f an event w hich is very remote from the reasonable. Y et to say nothing o f the am biguity o f the term “ belief” as used by M achiavelli, he says soon afterw ard o f one and the same actual event w hich hap pened in ancient Greece that it was “ impossible,” i.e., impossible as a natural event, and that it was and is regarded by “ the w riters” as “ rare and as it were, w ith o u t example.” The w riters contempo ra ry w ith M achiavelli w ill have been under no compulsion to treat the “ miracles” o f the pagans as more than rare natural events. T his passage shows how he w ould have achieved the transition from his thought about the B iblical miracles to fa irly candid speech about them had he been in a position to do so.143 He demonstrates his ta c it treatm ent o f the B iblical miracles by his explicit treatm ent o f incredible events reported by pagan historians: reports o f miracles are at best exaggerated reports o f rare events. O nly reports o f possible events are credible. One arrives at knowledge o f the pos sible by proper generalization from the seen particular. A history does not “ create fa ith ” if the possibility o f what it asserts is not borne out either b y present happenings or by proper generaliza tio n fro m present happenings. The crucial importance o f miracles in the B iblical records compels M achiavelli to adopt as a provisional canon the rule that very extraordinary events reported in the Bible
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fo r w hich there is no evidence stemming fro m men not believing in the Bible are not to be believed. He does not believe that one can doubt that there was once a flood through w hich almost all men perished because “ all histories are fu ll” o f reports o f such floods. Yet since the histories other than the Bible speak o nly o f the destruction by floods o f nearly all “ inhabitants o f a part o f the w o rld ,” M achiavelli does not believe more than the qualified reports: he ta c itly rejects the B iblical report o f the Flood as an exaggerated report o f a big flood somewhere in Asia. He e x p lic itly says that the survivors o f great floods—i.e., we add, Noah and his fam ily—are “ all rude mountaineers who do not possess knowledge o f any antiquity and therefore cannot leave such knowledge to the ir posterity. And if someone who did have such knowledge were to save himself, he w ould conceal that knowledge in order to make himself a reputation and a name and pervert that kn ow l edge after his fashion.” 144 A n y tra dition transm itted through Noah would then be no better than fraud, although the Bible describes Noah as a just man. Needless to say, a possible event is not neces sarily the same thing as an event w hich has indeed happened. Machiavelli gives some indications o f the difficulties w hich pre clude certainty as to nocturnal actions in remote places. Discourses II 14 does not properly speaking belong among the chapters in w hich M achiavelli draws our attention to the d iffic u lty caused by the difference between L iv y and L iv y ’s characters. The chapter deals not w ith deceiving others, but w ith deceiving oneself. Its purpose is to show that h u m ility is sometimes harm ful or, more precisely, that “ men often deceive themselves b y believing that they can vanquish pride by h u m ility .” The “ text” w hich is alleged in order to “ vouch” fo r this is taken from the same speech by an enemy o f Rome from w hich M achiavelli had quoted in the preceding chapter. The “ text” does not speak, as the heading and the beginning lead us to expect, o f the h u m ility o f the Romans but o f their patience and modesty. N o r does M achiavelli him self speak o f the h u m ility o f the Romans; he speaks only o f th e ir patience and, when generalizing from the Roman case, he replaces patience by fear and cowardice: the quasi-promised example o f harm ful h u m ility or o f self-deception regarding the power o f h u m ility is not given. The lesson o f the chapter is said to be “ vouched fo r” first by L iv y and then by the Latin praetor Annius who used cer-
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tain words w hich M achiavelli quotes and w hich are, o f course, taken fro m L iv y . M achiavelli’s a uth ority is then firs t L iv y and thereafter L iv y ’s authority, the L atin Annius. L iv y ’s vouching fo r a certain tru th is dependent upon Annius’ vouching fo r it. A l though M achiavelli refrains from saying so, the words used by Annius are as much put by L iv y into Annius’ mouth as were the words o f Annius quoted in the preceding chapter. Annius as a speaker is a creation o f L iv y . B y referring firs t to L iv y and then to Annius, M achiavelli refers then in fact to one and the same source. W hat this means appears if we remember that, according to him, the Bible is o f human o rigin, consists to a considerable extent o f poetic fables, and must be read “ judiciously,” i.e., in the lig h t o f non-B iblical o r even anti-B iblical thought. G iven these premises he must raise the question “ W ho has spoken to a prophet?” if the prophet says that G od has spoken to him , and he must answer that question in m erely human terms: the words o f God are words w hich the prophets ascribe to God o r put in to the mouth o f G od. I t is not G od who speaks through the mouth o f the in spired speakers or w riters, but the B iblical w riters who speak through the m outh o f God. W hat we believe to be reading is the w ord o f God, but w hat we do read is the w ord o f the B iblical w riters. G od stands in the same relation to the B iblical w riters as the characters o f L iv y stand to L iv y . In the chapter follo w in g, M achiavelli firs t quotes in L atin some words taken from the same speech fro m w hich the quotations used in the tw o preceding chap ters were taken; he ascribes those words to Annius w ith o u t refer rin g to L iv y ; thereafter, he quotes e x p lic itly from L iv y , in transla tio n and in direct speech, a saying o f another enemy o f Rome; tha t saying had been quoted b y L iv y in indirect speech, and L iv y had pointed out that it m ight be apocryphal.145 M achiavelli omits this qualification. C ontinuing the argument o f the preceding chap ter, M achiavelli indicates how easily the true orig in o f utterances can be forgotten and how easily what in the remote past was a rum or can be transform ed in to a fact imm ediately accessible to present readers however unlearned. In the chapter follo w in g, he says firs t that L iv y “ makes” the Roman and the Latin armies equal in certain respects and thereafter that L iv y “ says” that these armies were equal in the respects in question. By this he seems to indicate that the cre a tivity o f L iv y is not lim ited to the speeches w hich
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occur in his H istory but may extend to the deeds w hich he re ports.146 In conclusion we note that all the individuals whose utterances are cited in Discourses II 13-18 are enemies o f Rome. W e have been le ft in doubt as to whether, according to Machiavelli, L iv y “ made” his characters not o nly “ say” w hat they said, but also “ made” them “ do” what they did according to his H istory. There is only a single passage w hich dispels that doubt, namely, the beginning o f Discourses I I I 31. “ Am ong the other m agnificent things w hich our historian makes Camillus say and do in order to show what the make o f an excellent man ought to be, he puts into his mouth these words. . . M achiavelli questions here the distinction that he had made earlier between those who reason about p olitical life or give rules fo r p o litica l life o r determine how princes ought to live, and those who describe the lives o f princes or who are historians. By this he does not deny that precisely “ the good historians” present, among other things, models o f action fo r the instruction of posterity. For there is a fundamental difference between describing great actions or lives w hich can serve as models and presenting created or im aginary models like Xenophon’s C y rus.147 Machiavelli now suggests that “ our historian” is not m erely an historian, a man who describes w hat men have done, but that he is also a man who teaches “ Oughts” through making his ex cellent characters say and do things w hich excellent men ought to say and do, i.e., through acts o f fictio n. This remark enables us better to understand what M achiavelli had indicated earlier re garding the superiority o f the best kind o f w rite r to doers and speakers o f the highest order: the w rite r is a creator. W e also understand somewhat better how he conceived o f the B iblical w riters. W e may try to express his thought as follow s: the B iblical w riters present themselves as historians, as human beings who report what God said and did, w hile in fact they make G od say and do what in the ir opinion a most perfect being w ould say and do; the ground of what presents itself as the experience o f the Biblical w riters is the ir notion o f a most perfect being; that notion is so compelling that the “ O ught” comes to sight as “ Is” ; this connection is articulated by the ontological p ro o f; there is no w ay w hich leads from “ the things o f the w o rld ” to the B iblical G od; the only proof w hich commands respect, although it is not a gen uine proof, is the ontological proof. I t is hardly necessary to add
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that M achiavelli’s explanation in m erely human terms o f the ro o t o f B iblical belief presupposes his denial, his destructive analysis o f the phenomenon know n to us as the conscience. N o r w ill it be surprising that the other quotations from L iv y w hich occur in Discourses I I I 31 are ascribed to L ivian characters w ith o u t any reference to L iv y himself. B y consciously making some Roman captains say and do w hat excellent captains ought to say and do, L iv y magnifies the Roman republic or ascribes to it a perfection w hich is perhaps impossible. H e “ celebrates” Rome as M achiavelli says as the end o f the firs t chapter o f the Discourses. There is only one other occasion on w hich M achiavelli speaks again o f L iv y ’s “ celebrating” Rome or Romans. Discourses I I I 25 deals w ith “ the poverty o f Cincinnatus and o f many Roman citizens.” 148 This noble poverty is “ celebrated b y L iv y w ith golden words” w hich M achiavelli quotes in the o rig i nal. Im m ediately afterw ard he quotes in translation certain words o f Cincinnatus himself. The d ictator Cincinnatus had relieved a Roman arm y, w hich through the fa u lt o f the consul commanding it, had become besieged b y its enemies; the consul and his arm y had contributed to the raising o f the siege and the complete de feat o f the enemy. T hrough the words quoted by M achiavelli, Cincinnatus deprived the consular arm y o f every share in the rich b oo ty w hich the dictato r’s arm y had taken, and deprived the consul him self o f his command because o f his proved ignorance o f how to be a consul. W e are no longer concerned w ith the fact that we fin d here in M achiavelli’s own text the example o f a consul who did not know how to be a consul, although M achiavelli had to ld us earlier that the consuls elected b y the Romans in the good old times were “ always most excellent men.” O r could a man be “ a most excellent man” and at the same tim e a poor consul? I t ap pears that the words o f the Livian character w hich are not quoted in L a tin are not “ golden” precisely because they show the value, if not o f gold, at least o f w hat can be obtained by gold. I f we tu rn to L iv y , we see that Cincinnatus’ noble poverty was not al together fre e ly chosen. W hether rig h tly o r w rongly, his violent son Caeso had been accused o f homicide and had been heavily fined; the fine was c ru e lly exacted fro m Cincinnatus, who had to “ sell all that he had.” I t is fo r this reason that he lived on the famous small farm where he was found behind the famous plow
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by the men who brought him the message that he had been named dictator. W hile celebrating w ith golden words the noble poverty o f a great Roman, L iv y also reveals those causes o f his poverty w hich were not golden. Because he consciously created perfect cap tains L iv y is able to indicate the difference between the “ O ught” 149 and the “ Is,” between imagined perfection and “ factual tru th .” By merely alluding to the “ factual tru th ” in regard to Roman poverty and related subjects and thus to some extent concealing that “ factual tru th ,” M achiavelli deliberately impairs the selfsufficiency o f L iv y ’s H istory. He thus assimilates L iv y ’s H istory to the Bible as he conceived o f it. A fte r having indicated that L iv y makes one o f his captains say and do certain things in order to show how an excellent man ought to act, Machiavelli owes us an answer to the question regarding the function o f this b lu rrin g o f the difference between history and political philosophy. A fte r having shown in Discourses I I I 32 that one can make an arm y obstinate against its enemy, not only “ by virtue o f religion,” but b y some “ great v illa in y ” as w ell, he turns in the next chapter to the question o f how a captain can make his army confident o f v icto ry. Am ong other things, the captain must con ceal or minimize the things w hich when viewed from afar suggest dangers. A pparently no such salutary deception is possible regard ing things open to everyone’s easy inspection. “ The Romans used to make the ir armies acquire that confidence b y w ay o f religion.” The Romans controlled what is essentially elusive and hence frig h t ening by means o f religion. One may create obstinacy b y virtu e o f some great villa in y, but one needs religion fo r creating hope. N o good and wise Roman captain w ould ever start an action w ith o u t having used auguries and auspices, thus having convinced the soldiers that the gods were on th e ir side. H o w great an importance the Romans attached to religion or how strongly they disapproved o f the neglect o f religion is shown best b y “ the words w hich L iv y uses in the mouth o f Appius Claudius.” Appius Claudius had to defend in an assembly o f the people the sacred custom o f treating the auguries and auspices, i.e., the foundation o f the pagan religion, as a preserve o f the patricians, o r the sacred custom o f keeping the plebs at a distance from those sacred things. The defense had become necessary on account o f the machinations o f domestic enemies o f the patriciate—o f leaders o f the la ity as la ity , as one m ight
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say.150 Am ong the words used by Appius Claudius there are some w hich he puts in to the m outh o f plebeians who mock religion. Those mockers regard the very foundations o f religion, the things w hich assure men o f divine help, as “ little things.” W e do not know this from the mouths o f the mockers themselves. The Roman critic s o f the Roman religion do not express th e ir opinion w ith in our hearing. Perhaps they do not dare to speak in public on this subject and therefore are condemned to failure and oblivion. L iv y uses characters o f one o f his characters in order to inform us about Roman criticism o f the Roman religion. Appius Claudius adopts the words “ little things” as applied to religion and its ground; so does L iv y w ho puts these words in to Appius Claudius’ m outh; so does M achiavelli who uses these words in his own name when com m enting on the Livian speech. The expression or the thought migrates fro m the minds o f the mockers through the mouths o f a L ivia n character and o f L iv y him self to M achiavelli. The movement, started b y nameless characters o f a L ivian character, reaches its end in M achiavelli. The mockers are mistaken, say Appius Claudius, L iv y and M achiavelli in unison, fo r they are blind to the usefulness o f religion: the belief o f the people in “ those little things” is the source o f the w ell-being o f the commonwealth. The question is w hether the mockers were altogether mistaken. The leaders o f certain enemies o f the Romans trie d to use th e ir own soldiers’ and the Romans’ concern w ith “ little things” in order to defeat the Romans. T h e ir calculation was not altogether unreasonable; they did not p ut th e ir reliance in “ little things” but in other men’s re li ance on “ little things,” i.e., in a big thing. But they came to g rie f because they fo rg o t that the Roman leaders did not put th e ir tru st in “ little things.” M achiavelli quotes some words said by L iv y w hich the historian put in to the m outh o f the Roman dictator C in cinnatus addressing his master o f the horse. The enemies o f the Romans put th e ir trust, says the dictator, not, as one should, in arms and courage, but in chance, or, as M achiavelli interprets this, in ve ry m inor or “ weak” accidents or in things o f little w eight or in vain things. B oth Livia n characters who are introduced in this chapter as mouthpieces o f L iv y are patricians; the one who speaks to the people defends the little things; the other who speaks to another patrician disparages the little things. The little things mentioned b y the firs t speaker are not the same as those w hich
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the second speaker has in m ind: the form er are the auguries and the auspices proper, the second are any irrelevant accidents w hich fo r very weak reasons appear to be com forting o r frightening. B ut there is a connection between the tw o kinds o f little things: the Roman religion served the purpose o f mastering chance through the belief in gods and the worship o f gods who, as perfect beings, are thought to favor the just or pious. M achiavelli here presents L iv y as revealing the tru th about the Roman religion b y using as his mouthpieces Roman authorities addressing tw o different types o f audience.151 W hen speaking o f the Livian mouthpieces in Discourses I I I 33, M achiavelli does not say, as he o rd in a rily does, that the characters in question “ said” what they said but that they “ say” it: the chapter w hich is severely lim ited to Roman “ m atter” does not deal w ith “ ancient history.” The chapter ends w ith a b rie f discussion o f a mode o f procedure employed b y Fabius in a campaign “ in a new land against a new enemy” ; this mode “ deserves to be im i tated.” N o t Appius Claudius nor Cincinnatus but Fabius serves as a model. But nowhere in the chapter does M achiavelli say any thing against moderns who fa il to im itate the Romans. Perhaps there are moderns who im itate Appius Claudius and Cincinnatus. On the other hand, when M achiavelli returns to the chief theme o f the chapter in Discourses I I I 36, he stresses the in fe rio rity o f “ the m ilitia o f our times” to the Roman m ilitia . The only quotation occurring in I I I 36 is taken from a Livian speech, and it touches on the subject o f religion. I t is the only quotation occurring in the T h ird Book in w hich gods are mentioned; but “ the gods” and “ auguries” are preceded respectively b y “ men” and “ the edicts o f commanders.” M achiavelli does not te ll us to whom the speech is addressed. I f we turn therefore to L iv y , we see that the present case characteristically differs from the tw o cases discussed in Discourses I I I 33. In the present case a patrician, a dictator, defends the sanctity o f religion firs t in an assembly o f his arm y and then in an assembly o f the people, not against nameless plebeian mockers but against another patrician, his master o f the horse, Fabius him self. Fabius had waged a battle contrary to the dictato r’s s tric t orders and in the absence o f favorable auspices; he had w on a splen did vic to ry . Thereupon the dictator became blinded w ith anger, burning w ith fu ry and athirst fo r the scourging and the decapitation
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o f the offender. Y et w hat appeared to the d ictator as h oly zeal ap peared to Fabius as uncontrollable cruelty, insane envy and unbear able pride, as he did not hesitate to say in a public assembly. S trongly supported by the victorious arm y, b y the people and by the senate, Fabius was neither executed nor scourged but lives gloriously fo r ever in M achiavelli’s pages as a successful defender o f lib e rty .152 Quod licet Fabio, non licet homunculis. A ccording to M achiavelli, L iv y revealed his judgm ent on Rome to some extent through judgments w hich he put in to the mouths o f his characters. In this respect, the difference between enemies o f Rome and Romans, between Livian characters and characters o f those characters, and among the various audiences addressed by those characters are im portant. W e see no reason fo r doubting that he meant what he indicated in this respect. W e judge d iffe r e ntly o f his assertion that L iv y makes characters say or do things in order to teach how excellent men ought to conduct themselves. In Discourses I I I 31 he says that L iv y makes one o f his characters say and do certain things “ in order to show what the make o f an excellent man ought to be.” This assertion regarding L iv y ’s inten tio n is not borne out by the Livian speech to w hich he refers. There occur only tw o other passages w hich resemble the cited M achiavellian remark. In Discourses I I I 36 he says that through L iv y ’s testim ony one can learn fro m certain words o f a Roman leader “ w hat the make o f a good m ilitia ought to be.” In Discourses I I I 38 he says that through certain words w hich L iv y makes one o f his characters say, one can observe “ what the make o f a captain in whom his arm y can have confidence ought to be.” In both cases he does not even claim that it was L iv y ’s intention through his re p ort or his fic tio n to teach an “ O ught.” W e suggest this explana tio n. M achiavelli m om entarily presents L iv y as a conscious creator o f fictitio u s o r im aginary perfection fo r the reason stated above. H e therew ith obscures the character o f L iv y ’s H istory and thus in d ire c tly blurs the difference between the intention o f L iv y the historian and his own intention. As soon as his own intention be comes M achiavelli’s chief theme, as it does fro m Discourses I I I 35 on, he must again brin g this difference to lig h t. M achiavelli has discovered new modes and orders w hich he opposes to the old and established modes and orders. He has dis covered and explored te rrito ry h itherto inaccessible to men o f his
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kind. He begins a w ar against the established order—a new w ar in a new land against a new enemy o f the highest possible reputation. But he is a captain w ith o u t an army. He must re cru it his army. He can recru it it only by means o f his books. The last section o f the Discourses gives the necessary indications regarding his cam paign and its preparation. He had to ld us earlier that in order to be confident of v icto ry, an army must have confidence in the pru dence o f its captain. The proof o f M achiavelli’s prudence is the Discourses. The make o f a captain in whom his arm y can have confidence is shown by M achiavelli w ith the words w hich L iv y “ makes’’ one o f his characters “ say” to his soldiers. In L iv y , the quoted words are framed p a rtly in indirect and p a rtly in direct speech. The direct speech begins w ith the sentence “ M y deeds, not m y words, I wish you to fo llo w .” 153 The sentence, s tric tly understood, applies less clearly to ordinary captains than to a captain like M achiavelli. The chapter in w hich this quotation occurs is as such devoted to the perfect captain sim ply.154 Yet M achiavelli indicates that the chapter and a part o f the preceding chapter form a single “ discourse,” the theme o f w hich is less the perfect captain sim ply than the perfect captain w ith a new arm y facing· a new enemy in a new war. M achiavelli recommends in this discourse particularly the procedure o f Marius, a most prudent captain. M achiavelli chooses Marius because there does not happen to be an equally good example in the career o f Fabius although it is Fabius, not Marius, who waged w ar against a new enemy in a new country. Before engaging in battles, Marius trie d to accustom the eyes o f his soldiers to the sight o f a most te rrify in g enemy: he made them see that the new enemy w hich had the highest possible reputation was in fact a disorderly m ultitude, encumbered w ith baggage, w ith useless arms, and some o f them even unarmed. For this is the way in w hich the established order, the venerable tra d i tion contemporaneous w ith M achiavelli presented itse lf to him : as oblivious o f the fundamental issue and therefore rent in to many w arring schools or factions, as encumbered w ith innumerable texts, treatises and discourses, and as boasting o f many proofs w hich were no proofs. Such enemies could be depended upon, like blind Samnites, to forget to occupy “ the fortress o f our hope and salva tio n ” to w hich he refers in the next discourse ( I I I 39).1W T h a t chapter is the last in w hich M achiavelli refers to the difference
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