Thinking Through Systems Thinking [1 ed.] 041540519X, 9780415405195

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Thinking Through Systems Thinking

Systemicity is receiving wider attention thanks to its evident paradox. On the one hand, it occurs as a problem with complex symptoms. On the other, it is sought after as an approach for dealing with the non-linear reality of the world. At once problem and prize, systemicity continues to confound. This book details the mechanics of this paradox as they arise from human epistemological engagement with the world. Guided by an original analysis of the fundamental idea of emergent property, Thinking Through Systems Thinking uncovers the distinct significance, but also incompleteness, of the systems approach as a theory of human epistemological engagement. The incompleteness is treated through a non-eclectic interdisciplinary investigation which meets ten distinctly developed criteria required of any potential interdisciplinary partner to systems thinking. There results a theory of knowledge – an epistemology – which is systemic in both senses of the term: it belongs to the general systems movement, and it is systemically structured. The systems movement is thus offered a distinct epistemological voice which can compete on equal ground with other philosophical/epistemological positions. In true systemic fashion, this theory of knowledge also offers methodological, ethical and existential implications. Ion Georgiou is a member of the Editorial Board of the journal Systems Re­ search and Behavioral Science, the official journal of the International Federation for Systems Research. His interdisciplinary scholarship, founded upon operational research and its problem-structuring methods, interweaves systems thinking with phenomenology in order to inform decision-making.

Thinking Through Systems Thinking Ion Georgiou

First published 2007 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada by Routledge 270 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10016 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group © 2007 Ion Georgiou Typeset in Baskerville by Prepress Projects Ltd, Perth, UK Printed and bound in Great Britain by TJ International Ltd, Padstow, Cornwall All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Georgiou, Ion. Thinking through systems thinking / Ion Georgiou. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0–415–40519–X (hard cover) – ISBN 0–415–40520–3 (soft cover) 1. System theory. 2. Knowledge, Theory of. I. Title. Q295.G465 2006 003–dc22 2006019806 ISBN10: 0-415-40519-X (hbk) ISBN10: 0-415-40520-3 (pbk) ISBN13: 978-0-415-40519-5 (hbk) ISBN13: 978-0-415-40520-1 (pbk)

Nothing is more desirable than to be released from an affliction, but nothing is more frightening than to be divested of a crutch. James Baldwin

Contents

List of figures List of tables Preface Acknowledgements

ix x xi xiii

Part I

Contextual investigations

1

1

War

3

2

Dualisms

15

3

Questions

28

Part II

System theoretical investigations

39

4

Emergence

41

5

Emergent properties and complexes

53

6

Justification

68

Part III

Phenomenological investigations

85

7

87

Perception and intention

viii  Contents 8

Emergent properties and identities

102

9

Intentionality

120

Part IV

Systemic epistemological investigations

133

10 Intuition

135

11 Dogmatism and bounded rationality

149

12 A systemic epistemology

165

Part V

Applied investigations

179

13 Alienation

181

14 Methodological implications

195

15 An application in Organizational Learning theory

204

Part VI

Concluding reflections

215

16 Interdisciplinary partnership: present results and future recommendations

217

Bibliography Index

231 242

Figures

1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 2.1 8.1 8.2 8.3 8.4 12.1

Linear causation and systemic feedback Water flowing into a glass Negative feedback loop Arms in country B influenced by perceived arms in country A Positive feedback loop System theoretical vs. systemic Preliminary observations on perceiving a cube Layers of perception – sides Layers of perception – aspects The perception of a cube A map of the relational arrangements of the moments of the systemic epistemology 15.1 Intending–intuiting–learning matrix 15.2 Framework of proposed future research in organizational learning

6 7 7 8 8 23 103 104 105 107 174 210 211

Tables

1.1 Some key points of the holistic approach 3.1 The forgotten epistemological agenda of System Theory 4.1 Twelve aspects of emergent properties as given in the System Theory literature 6.1 Criteria required of any potential interdisciplinary partner to System Theory 7.1 Aspects of hearing and of listening 7.2 Aspects of perceiving and of intending 8.1 Comparison between System Theoretical emergent property and phenomenological identity 8.2 Two additional aspects of emergent properties with comments 10.1 Characterizations of each intuitive mode qua epistemological actualization of an intention 11.1 Fundamental understanding of critique required of System Theory 12.1 Epistemological conclusions from the foundational arguments of the theory of boundary judgements 12.2 Set of modal similarities between System Theory and phenomenology 12.3 Elements of an epistemology particular to System Theory 12.4 The division of the moments of the systemic epistemology into activities and conditions

11 36 48 77 92 95 112–5 117 142 162 170 171 173 175

Preface

In 1929, Emmanuel Levinas wrote of meeting a German student on the Berlin–Basel express heading for Freiburg: ‘When asked where he was going, he answered without batting an eye: “I am going to the home of the greatest philosopher in the world”.’ This sounds almost quaint in today’s world where the mass production and mass marketing of education promote an impersonal choice of university and even course of study. At the most one goes (or aspires to go) to a particular university because of its institutional fame; less often do we hear from a student that the choice was based on the fame of particular faculty members. I was lucky to have experienced something like the German student’s fortune. I was accepted at a prestigious university, and my choice was reinforced by a desire to study under one particular faculty member. The initial awe of the first lecture was soon replaced with something permanent: a lifelong motivation which propels one to continue to learn, to write, to exchange the most intangible human product of them all and yet one with profoundly tangible consequences: ideas. I studied what is, for some, an apparently much less known, if not less royal, subject than the queen of the sciences. I came to discover, however, that philosophy penetrated everything that I read. My studies were intensively concerned with human behaviour, with human choices, with human motives and consequences, and most of all with the uncertainty that human beings generate for themselves. Yet there seemed to be a greater tendency to control these human issues within a mathematical paradigm than any real attempt to deal with them in accordance with their all too human dimensions. Although initially attracted to the former paradigm, I increasingly felt pulled to pay attention to what was missing in such reductionist ways. In my own field, I kept encountering attempts to forge a new understanding based on philosophy and the social sciences. At the time I regarded such attempts as strewn with eclecticism. In retrospect, I regret the force of this summary judgement, though not its substance, for I have come to appreciate how difficult it really is to develop, justify and defend each and every corner of an interdisciplinary argument. All I knew for certain was that I wanted to be part of this game; I wanted to learn its rules and forge new ones, and most

xii  Preface of all I wanted to contribute. My choice was not to rely on the philosophers who had been so far applied, in whatever manner, to my field. And if I had, for some reason, to incorporate them, I was not to rely on my own field’s interpretations of them. I was, in a sense, to start from square one. Square one appeared in unexpected form, although it opened the door to everything which followed: the essays of James Baldwin collected under the title Nobody Knows My Name. It would take a whole book to trace the distinct, yet interconnected, conceptual developments which followed and which grew exponentially in my mind. Basically, I journeyed into system theory, becoming acquainted with such key thinkers as Ludwig von Bertalanffy, Peter Checkland and Robert Flood. I soon discovered, however, that key contributions were available from particular philosophers such as Jean-Paul Sartre, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Emmanuel Levinas and, most significantly, Edmund Husserl. For those already familiar with thinkers such as these, the absence of Martin Heidegger appears striking. For them also, the inclusion of thinkers such as these in a book on systems thinking may appear surprising. Both of these questions will, of course, be answered in the pages which follow. Of these thinkers, Sartre appeared to me to be the most dynamic and the most encouraging. Reading Sartre was exciting and I was convinced that I had found a potentially profound synthesis between systems thinking and phenomenological philosophy. The more I read Sartre, however, and in part owing to his genius, the more I felt Husserl tugging at my sleeve. And this was very worrying. Where Sartre’s eloquence illuminated the essence of what I wanted to contribute, Husserl wrote philosophy as a ‘rigorous science’. Reading Husserl, in other words, was much more challenging, requiring much greater expenditures of effort for each marginal gain in understanding. It was my earlier training in advanced engineering mathematics which, I appreciated much later, proved invaluable in preparing me to mentally face Husserl. And, ultimately, it was Husserl who trained me in disciplined, careful analysis of concepts and ideas. This book is certainly about System Theory, and especially about how it informs systems thinking. It is also, however, the product of Husserlian discipline, whose seed was sown by a renowned lyrical essayist, and of the writers I read in between. To them I am indebted, as is all of humanity. At times we hesitate to appreciate their greatness and, perhaps because we fear the effort they demand of us, we allow ourselves to be fascinated by their faults for too long. Ion Georgiou São Paulo, June 2006

Acknowledgements

During the course of writing the present work, I published a number of papers or short articles which gave me the opportunity to undertake initial explorations of some of its central aspects or ideas. The full references are as follows: • (2003) The idea of emergent property. Journal of the Operational Research Society 54: 239–247. • (2001) The ontological status of critique. Systemic Practice and Action Research 14: 407–449 • (2000) The ontological constitution of bounding-judging in the phenomenological epistemology of von Bertalanffy’s General System Theory. Systemic Practice and Action Research 13: 391–424. • (1999) Groundwork of a Sartrean input towards informing some concerns of critical systems thinking. Systemic Practice and Action Research 12: 585– 603. • (1999) A response to Flood, Taket and Valverde. Journal of the Operational Research Society 50: 101–103. • (1999) Furthering the operational research philosophical agenda. Journal of the Operational Research Society 50: 97–98. Although the arguments published in the above references have since been further developed, finding their most recent explication in this work, there are occasional phrases and paragraphs which have been reproduced here. Material published in the Journal of the Operational Research Society is reproduced with kind permission of Palgrave Macmillan. Material published in the journal Systemic Practice and Action Research is reproduced with kind permission of Springer Science and Business Media.

Part I

Contextual investigations

True opinions are a fine thing and do all sorts of good so long as they stay in their place; but they will not stay long. They run away from a man’s mind, so they are not worth much until you tether them by working out the reason. . . . Once they are tied down, they become knowledge, and are stable. That is why knowledge is something more valuable than right opinion. What distinguishes one from the other is the tether. Socrates (Plato, Meno)

1 War

There is an increasing call for holistic approaches to problems. This chapter discusses some contemporary examples of this call in order to highlight some key points of the holistic approach which are rarely, if ever, mentioned or understood. It concludes by arguing for a distinctly epistemological investigation if the idea of a holistic approach is ever to materialize as a practical alternative to problem resolution.

1.1 The holistic/systemic approach The holistic approach is gaining support in tackling problems. It is called upon when the treatment of a problem through the isolation of its constituent parts is rejected. This rejection usually criticizes such treatment not only as reductionist but also as too involved in the short term so that the longer term goals or consequences are detrimentally ignored. In an interview given by the then leader of the UK Liberal Democrats, Charles Kennedy, to the BBC’s Peter Sissons on 4 June 2001, Kennedy calls for a holistic approach in exactly this sense: Now these things can’t all be isolated one from the other. I think it’s part of the holistic approach to government which is longer-term and I think more far-seeing than the short-term which has tended to plague successive British administrations.1 In this, not only is there expressed a straightforward need for a holistic approach to problems, but it is assumed as obvious that the holistic approach offers broad methodological guidelines – themselves implying underlying epistemological guidelines – for dealing with the longer term future, for coming to know it, in a holistic manner. The holistic approach ranges from a simple inclusion of as much relevant and related data to a problem as possible, to the formation of interdisciplinary groups with the specific task of tackling a particular problem holistically, that is, by incorporating each group participant’s input to the situation. A good

  Contextual investigations example of the former, including its illustration of how easily what is deemed relevant and related data can increase exponentially, is given by Churchman (1979) in his discussion of the classic approach to inventory management. A good example of the latter is the formation of a think-tank charged with finding a ‘holistic’ way of improving UK flood defences to prevent a repeat of the 2000/2001 damaging floods which swept the UK.2 Chaired by the Chartered Institution of Water and Environmental Management, it includes water engineers, house builders, insurers, the Environment Agency and flood victims. Across such a range of application, the holistic approach demands a process of ‘sweeping in’ – to borrow a term from Churchman (Ulrich, 1988a) – as much related and relevant variety as is manageably possible. It is notable that the discussion has already referred to one of the leading thinkers in the history of the field known as system theory – C.W. Churchman – and to one of his most remembered concepts, the concept of ‘sweeping in’. Indeed, there can be no talk of a holistic approach without referring to system theory, for it is this field of thought which has championed the idea of a holistic approach to problems. Given this, any attempt at understanding the holistic approach is necessarily an attempt at understanding system theory, indeed is the attempt to understand system theory. Where holism reigns, therefore, the notion of system follows. Hardly a month goes by without a situation being said to exhibit systemic characteristics. The Inquiry into the 1997 Southall rail disaster in the United Kingdom, for example, found that it would be wrong to concentrate on the failings of the driver when there is compelling evidence of serious systemic failings within Great Western [Trains].3 Following the killing of an African-American youth by a police officer in Cincinnati, Ohio in May 2001, the head of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People said that he believed: the problems in [the police] department are systemic and they span the last two decades.4 In the autumn of 2000, the Hungarian newspaper Nepszava reported its concern over the methods of the country’s right-wing government by writing: The unrestrained and vulgar hatred-speeches against political rivals now common in parliament . . . degrade and threaten the peaceful systemic change based on social consensus.5 Setting up an alert on the Google News Internet site for the keyword systemic yields, on average, three to four alerts per week.6 Addressing systemicity is obviously currently fashionable. In the introductory words of the pioneering system theorist, Ludwig von Bertalanffy7 (1968: 3):

War  if someone were to analyse current notions and fashionable catchwords, he would find ‘systems’ high on the list. Such a statement probably rings more true today than in the 1960s when it was first written. Though it might ring more true, however, the notion of system, or holism, is more difficult to grasp than, say, the deterministic, reductionist approach. One reason may be the manner in which the idea of system renders difficult, or even constrains, the identification of causes of effects. In the above examples, this translates into the apportionment of blame.

1.2 Blame dynamics Seven people die and more than a hundred are injured in a train disaster. Emotions run high. Someone must take the blame: the train driver, the signals operator, the rail track company, the train company, the government – anybody, but somebody must take the blame to quench the anger and the suffering. The Inquiry, however, concludes that there is no straightforward guilt, only systemic failings within the train company. What does this mean? Where can the finger be pointed so that the anger is appeased? An African-American youth is killed by a white police officer in the United States. The officer receives what some perceive as ‘a slap on the wrist’. The penalty is not severe enough. Blame has not been given its due. The National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, moreover, the very association to which African-American youth might look for some action in apportioning blame, concludes that the problems in the police department are systemic. How does systemicity help apportion blame? How has this wrong been righted by reverting to systemicity? The Hungarian newspaper Nepszava makes systemic change proportional to, and a function of, consensus. How exactly can this relationship between systemicity and consensus be described, and how would that help to resolve situations which exhibit systemic characteristics? How can consensus be found in situations steeped in conflict? Appeals to systemicity in such contexts appear irrelevant and perhaps even insulting to the ears of those affected, of those who (believe they) know that, at bottom, someone must take the blame. Blame is a serious issue in such examples. It is not just some short term solution to the respective problem, for if there is a wrong then the source of this wrong must be discoverable – in much the same way as, if in general terms there is an effect, then the source of this effect, the cause, must be discoverable. The line between blame and scapegoat tactics, however, is very thin. At worst, the blame approach risks throwing society back to the middle ages where a crowd mentality creates the superficial division between innocent spectators and executed guilty, enabling society to wash its hands of the committed evil once the blame has been apportioned. The very notion of consensus, stressed by Nepszava, opposes this division and makes it difficult for anyone to wash their hands of the situation. Consensus implies togetherness,

  Contextual investigations indivisibility. Most of all it implies joint responsibility so that, if there is a wrong, all parties have contributed to this wrong. Consensus does not allow anger and suffering to be quenched at a stroke; it offers only more calls for understanding, more exploration of the situation. Consensus politics is much more demanding on the heart and mind than blame politics. It is also much more fruitful. For the application of systemicity to a situation gives rise to the possibility of redesigning the situation, contrary to solely apportioning blame whilst leaving the situation unchanged. There is a very real possibility, in other words, that the situation itself has enabled the problem to arise, and that the fact that someone has done wrong has been enabled more by the situation than by any other factor. The wrong might very well be a secondary product of the primary reason for its occurrence: the situation itself. In effect, blame takes a back seat in systemic problem resolution – if it has any role at all – and the demanding search for systemic causes begins.

1.3 The idea of feedback The idea of ‘feedback’ in systems is the prime mover in understanding a problematic situation holistically. This seemingly simple concept opens the door to quite sophisticated understanding. The basic conceptual unit of feedback is the ‘feedback loop’, that is, a closed chain of causal relationships that feeds back on itself. In general, whenever it is linearly postulated that A causes or affects B, a systemic approach looks for the ways in which B might in turn affect A, as shown in Figure 1.1. There are two types of feedback. Negative, or controlling, feedback aims towards some steady state. Positive feedback is self-reinforcing, either in terms of growth (regenerative dynamics) or deterioration (degenerative dynamics), both of which, in the absence of negative feedback, ultimately lead to the collapse of the system. Consider the following two examples, the second of which illustrates how a systemic problem-solving approach differs from one reduced to blame, anger appeasement and the linear search for causes. The first example, that of a negative feedback system, can be illustrated through the workings of a water faucet. A faucet is turned to control the level of water in a glass, as shown in Figure 1.2. The level of water in the glass and the desired level to be reached both determine the faucet position at any one

Linear approach A

Systemic approach

B

Figure 1.1  Linear causation and systemic feedback

A

B

War 

Water flow

Faucet position

Water in glass

Figure 1.2  Water flowing into a glass

time, so that the water in the glass ultimately reaches the desired level, as shown in Figure 1.3. In this example, the feedback serves to control the system, enabling it to reach some desired state, some goal. It is a feature of negative feedback loops to be goal-seeking in this way. Negative loops act to adjust systems towards equilibrium points or goals, just as a thermostat loop adjusts room temperature to a desired setting. A positive feedback system is the kind of system which requires systemic change, or redesign, based upon consensus but which instead easily falls into blame politics. Any arms race illustrates this type of system feedback. A country acquires more armaments to catch up with the competition, as in Figure 1.4. This effectively generates more armaments for the competition, as shown in Figure 1.5. Positive feedback loops may be seen as vicious circles which reinforce themselves more and more. They may also be seen as growth circles and evolutionary circles. Ultimately, with no negative control mechanism, the system collapses. Of course, most systems are constituted by a multitude of interconnected positive and negative feedback loops and their behaviour is rooted in a complexity which makes it difficult to see what causes what. A number of methodologies, quantitative and qualitative, exist to facilitate the navigation of such complexity (Sterman, 2000; Eden and Ackermann, 1998).8

1.4 ‘We have the war we deserve’ The concept of feedback is useful because it allows the linking of causal structure with dynamic behaviour. For example, the structure of the system, as causes and effects, of Faucet position – Water flow – Water in glass is analysed Water flow -ve

Faucet position Desired amount of water in glass

Figure 1.3  Negative feedback loop

Water in glass

  Contextual investigations A’s arms as perceived by country B Arms in country B

Arms in country A

Figure 1.4  Arms in country B influenced by perceived arms in country A

within the dynamic behavioural context of the faucet changing as the water in the glass changes. Undesired behaviour in the system can be controlled by identifying the structural reasons and intervening in the feedback loops. This usefulness is, however, trivial when compared to the more powerful aspect of the feedback concept – that aspect which dissolves any talk of blame and focuses the mind on a truly systemic approach to resolution. For the truly profound insight is the way the system, through an explication of its feedback loops, begins to reveal how it causes its own behaviour. Country A, for instance, perceives the arms race as ‘caused’ by country B and vice versa. It could equally well be claimed, however, that country A causes its own arms build-up by stimulating the build-up of country B. More accurately, there is no single cause, no credit or blame: the relationships in the system make an arms race inevitable. A and B are helpless puppets – until they decide to redesign the system, and this calls for consensus. Another example where the systemic approach highlights the essence of a problem and thus goes beyond blame consists in the periodic increases of the oil price. Rises that are blamed on OPEC could equally be blamed on the heavy consumption of the non-OPEC countries – but, more accurately, the price rises are an inevitable result of a growing economic system dependent on a depleting non-renewable resource base. Similarly one can say that the business world constitutes a system that is structured to generate recessions and depressions; or that the decisions of farmers make fluctuating commodity prices inevitable; or that the flu does not invade one – one invites it. In the words of Jean-Paul Sartre (1958: 555): ‘we have the war we deserve’. Seeing the source of a problem within the system that suffers the problem is never politically popular. Finding a ‘cause’ for problems somewhere ‘out A’s arms as perceived by country B Arms in country A

+ve

B’s arms as perceived by country A

Figure 1.5  Positive feedback loop

Arms in country B

War  there’ is much more appealing than to contemplate changing the relationships between the elements ‘in here’. It is comforting to view something outside the system as the cause of the system’s behaviour. This enables the relieving ‘blame’ reaction. Political decisions are frequently undertaken on this basis.9 For all its comfort, however, it is one small step from here to the medieval abyss mentioned earlier. The false idea that ‘the problem lies elsewhere’ results in the deceptive denial of having deserved the war. Once this false idea is removed, the concept of blame diminishes and the problem can begin to be resolved by tackling its systemic context. Since the problem lies within the system, the system is the mechanism for the solution, not ‘something else out there’ – causal structure and dynamic behaviour are the keys to finding a resolution. The italics are not accidental. They signify that situations cannot be understood solely by trying to uncover the causal behaviour therein. Their dynamic structure must be accounted for if understanding is to begin and a basis for amelioration is to be formed. It is the politically unpleasant repercussions of a systems approach to problem resolution which has led to it being much talked about but less practically evidenced. The idea of ‘system’ is very much in fashion, with little thought on what exactly it means, much less on how exactly it can be used to further understanding. Reduced to a sound bite, ‘system’ risks becoming – perhaps, in the day-to-day practical concerns of human beings, has already become – obsolete as a workable concept. In 1907, upon the publication of Henri Bergson’s L’Évolution Créatrice, William James wrote, not disparagingly: ‘Your book risks remaining in darkness for a hundred years’ (quoted in Mullarkey, 1999b: 62). It is perhaps no exaggeration to say that von Bertalanffy’s work, the first sustained attempt at uncovering the notion of system,10 has suffered a similar fate. Without seeking to deprecate the work of his successors, they have arguably fared a little better but not by much.11 For if the systems approach is so much in demand, where are the systems solutions meeting this great demand? Where is the political action which matches the rhetoric? Why do we keep getting ‘wars we deserve’? Despite the advances reported in the relevant journals and a number of respected books, the demand greatly outweighs the supply. One explanation may lie in the relatively poor manner in which the systems approach has been disseminated to the wider world. This may be due to the way the wider world works, or to ineffective marketing efforts of the systems movement itself. The fact is that the systems movement repeatedly fails to compete with the ever-flowing dissemination of questionable fads which pervade management thinking. If the systems movement has indeed a lot more to offer, especially in terms of quality and rigour, the manner in which the wider world appreciates it requires careful study and new marketing approaches. Another explanation may lie in the longer term focus of the systems approach, in its attempt to deal head-on with complexity, necessarily causing the fruits of the approach to appear gradually, over time, produced in degrees

10  Contextual investigations which do not match the rate of demand. If this is true, practical application of the approach risks becoming irrelevant as problems change faster than the speed with which the approach can deal with them. Even Checkland’s Soft Systems Methodology, one of the better known and more widely applicable system theoretical approaches, and arguably one of the more successful, is prone to this risk, as applications and surveys have shown (Brocklesby, 1995; Mingers and Taylor, 1992). Might an explanation also lie in that the systems approach still remains the science of and for the future – a future indicated by Ackoff (1979) as far back as the 1970s and yet still not with us? In this respect, the systems approach can be understood as comparable to the state of psychology as it emerged in the second half of the nineteenth century only to end up as a dominant field in the social sciences of the twentieth century. Upon reading Franz Brentano’s (1995: 3, 22–25, 28) description of the relatively new science of psychology in 1874, for instance, any systems thinker cannot help but recognize similarities, common views, and critiques: that the field is, for example, misunderstood; that it aspires to being scientific;12 that its birth is necessarily (and not accidentally) recent; that the need for it is pressing, almost forcing itself upon today’s reality; that its importance is gradually but increasingly accepted; and that it holds great promise as the science to which the future belongs, the science which will mould the future, the science to which other sciences will be (some would say, are) subordinate in their practical application, the science most capable of demonstrating all the richness to which the scientific method lends itself, the science which continually adapts itself to successively more and more dependent and complex phenomena – yet the science which is incomplete and requires development. Brentano’s description of the state of psychology ends on a cautionary note which speaks across decades to system theory. The new science must be ‘more clearly known and more fully developed’ if it is to be understood, and so ‘there remains much to be done’. This work provides but one contribution to all that remains to be done. This contribution focuses on a perceived primary benefit of system theory: its ability to descriptively explicate how the ‘wars we deserve’ are inevitable. The literature has yet to provide this substantive descriptive explication, and systems thinkers have yet to show a sustained venture into the polemic arena of ethics. Such description, however, can potentially lay bare behavioural and ethical concerns of the highest import. It is not enough to simply provide examples, such as that of the arms race, claim the obviousness of self-created consequences, and move towards replacement structures and dynamics. Replacing detrimental systems with new systems gives rise to new self-created consequences. Moving from example to example ignores the essential question: are the ‘wars we deserve’ inevitable and, if so, is there some manner of proving it? Or, can it be shown that human beings can indeed escape self-created consequences and hence alleviate themselves of some responsibility? Sartre (1958) argued for the inevitability of the ‘wars’ and for inescapable human responsibility. His influence is such

War  11 that his arguments have been at once strongly defended, praised, neglected, misunderstood and denigrated. This mix of responses alone would suffice to render Sartre worthy of serious study. It may be, however, that this multifarious reception is due to Sartre’s having mixed rigorous philosophical reasoning with rhetoric, lyricism and literary leanings. Clarity demands the provision of rigorous demonstration which is simultaneously as simple and as universally relevant as possible. If the systems movement aspires to be accepted as scientific, this aspiration at least motivates it to provide the demonstration in question. Despite Sartre, and at the systems movement’s own insistence, the inevitability of the ‘wars’ remains to be, and must be, demonstrated. Such a demonstration may provide a means of controlling their occurrence, or at least a means of understanding the phenomenon. Ultimately, if successful, such a demonstration should open doors towards acceptable ethical models which can be translated to political, social and administrative action. Such a demonstration is a core aim of this work.

1.5 Conclusion The above survey has identified some key points of the holistic approach which deserve to be highlighted. This is done in Table 1.1, wherein the terms holistic approach, systemic approach and systems approach are used interchangeably.13 It is worth noting that, especially in the last key point of Table 1.1, the holistic approach appears to be relevant only in situations where it is possible to change the system. The question arises, therefore, of this approach’s relevancy in situations where the system cannot be changed. Is it to be understood that, where the system cannot be changed, that is, where those Table 1.1  Some key points of the holistic approach A holistic approach, in mapping out the interrelationships of a situation, attempts to account for medium to longer term goals and consequences and does not focus only on the short term. The process of sweeping in as much relevant and related variety as is manageably possible raises the question of when and where to draw the line in such a process – this is known in the systems literature as the problem of ‘boundary judgements’. Against divisive tactics, systemic problem-solving approaches point out the indivisibility and joint responsibility of those affected by, and those affecting, the system in question. By focusing on the system in question, a systemic approach invites consensus and demands more of those affected by, and of those affecting, the system. The systems approach reveals how a system causes its own behaviour and thus points the way towards resolving undesirable consequences stemming from this self-induced cause. Though it is the system in its structure and in its dynamics, and not those involved within it, which causes certain behaviour, only those involved can change the system and hence they are responsible for the system’s self-induced causes.

12  Contextual investigations involved are condemned to a particular system, perhaps not even of their making, those involved do not bear the responsibility for the results of this system? Or, given how the holistic approach indicates that ‘we have the wars we deserve’, is it to be understood that, where the system cannot be changed, that is, where those involved are condemned to a particular system, perhaps not even of their making, those involved do bear the responsibility for the results of this system? This is perhaps one of the most profound questions which system theory needs to address, and this work will make such an attempt. It may be that a general answer is possible or it may be that the answer differs from system to system. If the latter, the theory of systems, or system theory, would need to identify criteria which could be used in particular situations. Whatever is the case, when dealing with any system in which human beings are involved, in any way, system theory should provide some answer. The idea of the holistic approach implies the taming of blame. It further points to a conclusion that ‘we have the wars we deserve’. The poignancy of this assertion demands a more profound investigation in order to verify the manner in which it reflects, describes and explains human reality. Now, the idea of a holistic approach to problems implies prior methodological guidelines. Methodology, in turn, implies prior epistemological guidelines. And epistemological guidelines find their roots in an epistemological theory. Like the manner in which the epistemology of British empiricism enabled the methodological guidelines of the experimental method which gave rise to the scientific approach, a holistic epistemology is required from which methodological guidelines may be deduced for a holistic approach. Consequently, when a holistic epistemology has been laid out, it will be possible not only to verify the claims and possibilities of a holistic approach, but to further provide a better understanding of this approach and, additionally, of the inevitability, or otherwise, of the ‘wars we deserve’. Indeed, the ideas of a holistic approach to problems and a holistic approach to knowledge are interrelated. For in the search for holistic resolutions to problems, the manner of knowing the problems themselves should be holistic. Therefore, the problem of knowledge itself must be informed through holistic approaches. In short, a holistic epistemology is required, one which not only enables holistic understanding of problem situations in general but is ho­ listically structured itself so that the manner in which knowledge arises (this being the specific problem of knowledge) is holistic and, additionally, can be understood holistically. It is not unreasonable to conclude, therefore, that, if the holistic approach’s most alarming ‘wars we deserve’ assertion is to find some foundation, an epistemological investigation is unavoidable. Furthermore, as noted earlier, any attempt at understanding the holistic approach must necessarily attempt to understand system theory. Where the next chapter turns to examining epistemology in some detail, therefore, it does so especially through the lens of system theory in order to delineate further the route for the investigations which follow.

War  13

Notes 1 See http://news.bbc.co.uk/vote2001/hi/english/programmes/specials/election_ call/newsid_1369000/1369845.stm (4 May 2001). It is also worth mentioning that an aspiration to holistic government (known as joined-up government) has, at least in theory, guided Prime Minister Tony Blair’s New Labour government in the United Kingdom since 1999 (Pollitt, 2003). 2 See Plans for ‘Holistic’ Flood Defence, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/ english/uk/newsid_1322000/1322493.stm (10 May 2001). 3 Rail Managers Rebuked Over ‘Catalogue of Errors’, available at http://news. bbc.co.uk/hi/english/uk/newsid_573000/573740.stm (21 December 1999). Systemic failings were further attributed to the rail industry as a whole by one of the companies prosecuted for the October 2000 Hatfield crash (Daily Telegraph, ‘Companies fined £13.5m for Hatfield crash’, available at http://www.telegraph. co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2005/10/08/nhatfield08.xml (8 October 2005)). 4 Officer Charged Over Cincinnati Killing, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/ english/world/americas/newsid_1318000/1318269.stm (8 May 2001). 5 BBC European Press Review, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/ europe/newsid_953000/953674.stm (3 October 2000). 6 It is worth noting a couple more examples. In his 2002 annual review Nick Land, Chairman of Ernst & Young, concluded: The root cause of corporate collapse and scandals in companies like Enron and WorldCom was not audit failure. They came about because of systemic failure in the US around corporate governance and transparency, accounting standards and regulation, and, perhaps most importantly, as a result of greed. Ernst & Young’s chairman’s review of the year 2002, available at http://www. ey.com/global/content.nsf/UK/UK_Annual_Review_2002_-_Chairmans_ review (accessed 23 October 2005)

7 8 9 10

On 18 October 2005, New York Federal Reserve President Timothy Geithner expressed his concern over a developing paradox: while increased complexity of financial systems reduces the individual vulnerability of firms, it compounds uncertainty as to how the financial system as a whole might function in the context of a systemic shock from hedge funds and other unregulated institutions. See Fed’s Geithner: Market changes have altered risk, available at http://today. reuters.com/investing/financeArticle.aspx?type=bondsNews&storyID=200510-18T200837Z_01_N18235770_RTRIDST_0_ECONOMY-FED-GEITHNERUPDATE-1.XML Ludwig von Bertalanffy (1901–1972), biologist, philosopher and acknowledged founder and chief exponent of General System Theory, the foundational theory which gave rise to the systems movement. In particular, Eden et al. (1992) show that the nature of feedback, when modelled according to their cognitive mapping methodology, can be established through the number of negative and positive links within a loop. The 2001 national election in the UK was marred by the increasing use of the ‘race card’ and the manipulation of the ‘immigration problem’, with candidates often accused of avoiding the real societal problems. Dubrovsky (2004) indicates, quite rightly, that the first comprehensive attempt at a system theory was Condillac’s (1938) Treatise on Systems. This work, however, is rarely studied today and von Bertalanffy’s work remains the acknowledged foundation for the systems movement, a movement seen as having emerged in the twentieth century.

14  Contextual investigations 11 Checkland (1983) goes so far as to describe Stafford Beer’s (1972, 1979) work as ‘an impressive but lonely edifice’. 12 One of its most well-known societies is called the International Society for the Systems Sciences. 13 The discussion thus far has been freely switching between these terms – a practice reflected in the mainstream literature, which goes so far as to even switch between systems theory and system theory. To a great extent all such terms are synonymous, with a consensus on their simultaneous use being implied throughout the literature. The liberal use of all such terms in the present contextual investigations is, therefore, arguably permissible. By the end of Chapter 3, however when the discussion will have identified the specific issues to be addressed in subsequent chapters, the capitalized term System Theory will have been adopted, and a justification for this single choice will be given.

2 Dualisms

Chapter 1 provided an understanding of the idea of holism and subsequently called for a holistic epistemology. An understanding of epistemology is, therefore, required. This chapter provides a panoramic excursion into the manner in which epistemological development has unfolded within the last few centuries, and in particular the twentieth century. Following this excursion, the system theoretical viewpoint is brought to bear upon epistemology, yielding two subtly different epistemological research avenues. The one deemed more relevant to the holistic approach will be identified, and its pursuit will guide this work.

2.1 The setting of scholarly thought At the risk of over-generalizing, it is possible to distinguish between two broad lines of scholarly thought. In fact, when approaching the question of the relation between knowledge and the phenomena about which there is knowledge, it is not so much a risk as an inevitability that a dualism arises on whose respective constituents a mode of thought more or less concentrates. Historically, the most applicable epistemological dualism has been that of empiricism and rationalism, a dualism which has been traditionally delineated in geographic terms: the British empiricism of Locke, Berkeley and Hume versus the continental (European) rationalism of Descartes, Leibniz and Spinoza. This historical dualism is by no means defunct, having evolved into numerous versions all of which, more or less, refer back to the classic division with respective differences concerning the base on which each rests.1 It is thus not unreasonable to talk of two broadly distinguishable modes of thought. The labels attributed to each side of the dualism, moreover, are not as important as the substance of the description of each side. One such description is outlined below. 2.1.1

Geometrical thought

The first mode of thought bases itself firmly within a faith in endgames, final effects, and determinable destinations. It is the linear thought so prevalent

16  Contextual investigations prior to the First World War, finding its strongest philosophical foundation in Hegel’s dialectic which argues that a legitimate endpoint exists which can take into account everything before it. Its art is one of pictorial climax: a central subject, located at or near the centre of the picture with the surrounding space in the picture subordinate to it, a space to be blended as harmoniously as possible with the central figure (Barrett, 1958: 50). This first line of thought reflects, and arises within, a societal context composed of a geometrically hierarchical class structure whose pyramid provides a peak, an endpoint, towards which all other classes are assumed to aspire. Indeed, this first line of thought may be labelled geometrical for it feels at home among inanimate objects, more especially among solids . . . [its] concepts have been formed on the model of solids; [its] logic is, pre-eminently, the logic of solids . . . consequently [it] triumphs in geometry, wherein is revealed the kinship of logical thought with unorganized matter and where [it] has only to follow its natural movement, after the lightest possible contact with experience, in order to go from discovery to discovery, sure that experience is following behind it and will justify it invariably. (Bergson, 1911: ix) As Bergson (1911: 10) notes, solids have a tendency to constitute isolable systems and hence render themselves geometrically analysable. He continues by stressing that, although matter may be defined by this tendency, it is only a tendency. Geometrical thought, however, goes to the end and completes the isolation. Hence, its Newtonian clockwork universe, based as it is on a Welt­ anschauung of detachable solids constituting isolated, closed systems, allows for the calculation, for any moment of time, [of] the position of any point of the system in space [and,] as there is nothing more in the form of the whole than the arrangement of its parts, the future forms of the system are theoretically visible in its present configuration. (Bergson 1911: 8) This is Laplacian determinism (Bergson, 1911: 38; Hawking, 1988: 53). Extended to human behaviour, its Lamarckian biological theory plays out the destiny of organismic life, with the human being considered – despite Darwinian protestations to the contrary – the endpoint towards which evolving life has been heading.2 Its linear, mathematized management theory is based on the determinable ‘one best way’ of undertaking a job (Taylor, 1914), which way is found by first reducing the work to its component tasks, analysing each part independently, and then putting the results back together to inform the whole – in other words, by using the classic reductionist and deterministic Cartesian-inspired methodology of science. The result of thus converting

Dualisms  17 management – that most human-oriented field – to a scientific approach, modelled upon the treatment of solids, is one’s solidification, one’s dehumanization, one’s reduction to being a closed, isolated system, isolated even from oneself. Paradoxically, whereas geometry, isolated closed systems, solids and determinism have no need of time – indeed, all of them lay claim to timeless truths – geometrical thought is identified by its intense use of history. Are not the Lamarckian and Darwinian theories at bottom historical accounts of biological development? The field of linguistics prior to Saussure was also steeped in historical and comparativist approaches to language (Saussure, 1983). The paradox, however, is not so hard to solve. Time, historical time, is indeed a factor in the analytical mode of geometrical thought. Only, once such thought identifies a result, an endpoint, this conclusion is posited as being exempt from the bite of time. This stepping from a historical analysis to a timeless result is a somewhat disturbing factor in this first line of thought. 2.1.2

Flat thought

Geometrical thought implies the existence of a single correct point of view, either a point from where the linearity stems or one which defines the very destination. The correctness of this point is usually justified in one of two similar ways: it is the point of God who lends existence to the world, or it is science whose quantitative methodology concretizes the truth and hence unites otherwise divided opinion. Homo sapiens, the inventor of this thought, and presumably the one set to benefit from it, is conspicuously ignored as a contributing factor to this mode of thought. In science, Heisenberg’s (1927) Uncertainty Principle and Bohr’s (1928) Complementarity contribute to the creation of a new mode of thought which not only involves the human being but simultaneously renders questionable the ‘concrete truth’ of science. Sartre’s (1958, 1997) famous doctrine ‘existence precedes essence’ philosophically supports this mode of thought not only by illuminating Homo sapiens’ constitutive role in the world but by simultaneously arguing for the impossibility of God.3 Einstein (1920), not only a scientist but an epistemologist (Holton, 1988: 258–264),4 proves the fallacy of geometrical thinking by showing that time and distance are not absolutes. The reality which was taken for granted since Descartes as simply being there is contorted once consciousness is embraced as an agent in its determination. Metaphysics is granted a small share of what was, since Descartes, only an epistemological pie. Darwinian theory gives way to neo-Bergsonism with its focus on duration as against timelessness (Mullarkey, 1999a). The Second World War, mass industrialization and mass production of masses of different goods and services contribute to the breakdown of hierarchical class division in society – a division which seemingly afforded some direction and certainty. Indeed, all hierarchies gradually begin to be flattened: ethical, cultural, racial and even epistemological.5 Mathematics, perceived as that

18  Contextual investigations most accurate of all certainties, is collapsed by Gödel, from whose knockout punch mathematics has yet to recover (Boyer, 1991: 611; Hoffman, 1998: 111, 116–117; Moscardini, 2000).6 With uncertainty being the norm, the age of probability (perhaps, more accurately, possibility) arrives signalling the death of linear determinism and the advent of systemic interrelational investigation, for if there are no more endpoints the focus necessarily switches to studying interrelationships.7 This is nowhere more evident than in the art and literature of this age, which flattens all planes, including that of time, flattens all climaxes and, most significantly, flattens all values (Barrett, 1958: 50–59).8 Optimality now gives way to notions such as ‘emergent property’ or ‘isomorphism’ – notions belonging to the family of probability/possibilityspeak and the study of relationships; notions, moreover, far removed from the quest for accurate pictures of reality; notions which hint at something more in the arrangement or form of the whole than in its parts. The old mathematized management theories are replaced with theories of organizational learning aimed at helping management deal with the unreliability of history’s projection into the future – the art of possibility emerges. The historical analytical method, limited to describing changes in time, is now complemented by what Saussure calls ‘synchronic analysis’, the study of the state of something (Saussure calls it ‘system’) at any one time. This, however, removes the neutral eye (and supposed inevitability) of history from the analysis and immediately replaces it with the requirement of perspective, a chosen point of view, which enables this picture of the whole phenomenon at one time. Perspectival history replaces deterministic history and timeless truths are replaced by all-temporal truths – that is, truths steeped in temporality. Results from this mode of thought can only be either outdated or, at the very least, incomplete as a consequence of the bite of time combined with their source in a limited perspective. The certainty of truths thus steeped in temporality demands to be chased infinitely with the results of this chase always lagging one step behind the ultimate answer.

2.2 Epistemology Truth, answers, descriptions, theories, methodology, justification, dialectic, investigations, thinking, the human perspective, the focus on relationships between variables, and even time: these are some of the realities with which epistemology is concerned. Epistemology is one of the three roots of philosophy, the other two being ontology and ethics.9 As roots, a theory in one of them implies particular theories in the other two. It is the development of such implications which enables a complete theoretical structure (or tree of knowledge) which can be called a philosophy or a philosophical system. Broadly speaking, ontology is an inquiry into being qua being. It is not concerned with the nature of particular beings but with the nature of being as such (sometimes capitalized as Being). It is an inquiry into the fundamental

Dualisms  19 basis of existence, famously brought to the fore of philosophy by Heidegger (1987: 1) when he asked: ‘Why are there essents rather than nothing?’10 It is an inquiry into what constitutes the bearable heaviness of being, filled with its significations and meanings, and why a lightness in being, its obfuscation, is unbearable for human experience, indeed unimaginable.11 Unlike the ontic sciences which inquire into particular beings or particular areas of being, ontology is an a priori science, inquiring into the pure possibilities applicable to any domain. Ontology is the pure mathematics, the geometry of being. Ethics concerns itself with purposeful action and how such action ought to be exercised, both in general and particular circumstances. It not only seeks normative guidelines but, as meta-ethics, uncovers the higher-order assumptions, arguments or structures which make such guidelines possible. Involved as it is with human questions of action, ethics embodies political philosophy, indeed may be understood as the political science of being. Epistemology investigates the nature of knowledge, its possibility, its scope and limits, and the process of acquiring and possessing it – as well as concerning itself with related issues such as perception, memory, proof, evidence, belief and certainty. In the same way that roots may intertwine, investigations intertwine between epistemology, ontology and ethics. Ontological investigations of knowledge, for instance, uncover the fundamental structure which enables knowledge as well as its manner of existing (the work of Edmund Husserl may be read in this manner). Epistemological investigations of ethics, on the other hand, examine the processes of knowledge implied by an ethical theory (examples include religious epistemology). Ethical investigations of knowledge, on the other hand, examine whether certain knowledge is morally acceptable, usually because of the manner in which it was acquired (such as whether the results from Nazi experiments on humans should form part of medical knowledge). Of the three roots, epistemology is the one most concerned with consciousness, that distinctly developed human phenomenon which serves to distinguish Homo sapiens from all other beings simply because of its pivotal role in enabling knowledge.12 Consciousness, in other words, is that phenomenon which enables the human being to epistemologically engage with other phenomena. Instead of being a purely instinctual or reactive phenomenon, consciousness actively enables knowledge and its manipulation and so, at root, consciousness is epistemologically actively engaged with other phenomena.13 It is only in this sense of active epistemological engagement that consciousness may be understood as enabling knowledge. It is in this sense, moreover, as opposed to some passive receptor of facts, that consciousness must be appreciated for the purposes of the present work. The forthcoming chapters will lead towards a more complete understanding of consciousness along these lines, culminating with the identification of consciousness’ essential constitution. Homo sapiens holds no special place in the ontological realm and is distinguished in the ethical realm only by a more complex socio-political immersion.

20  Contextual investigations A completely different and infinitely greater development from other beings is evident, however, in the epistemological realm. Homo sapiens is the only being for whom ontology arises as a possibility, for instance, and, without belittling the significant contributions from biological and physical constitution (including the capacity for language), such a possibility arises through a more complex epistemological ability which finds its root in consciousness. It is what the human being must possess qua Homo sapiens. Epistemology, therefore, to the degree that it is concerned with consciousness, is the science of human being par excellence.

2.3 Driving up a one-way street Epistemological issues and consciousness hold a primary role in the ensuing investigations. The current climate in philosophy, however, appears to indicate that the present work may be driving the wrong way up a one-way street. 2.3.1

Knowledge in the contemporary context

Consider, to begin with, the current tendency in epistemology. The last four hundred years have seen philosophy and science turned into strictly epistemological tools for approaching the world, the world itself being unquestionably regarded as available for inquiry. That is to say, metaphysics, which dominated thinking until Descartes, has been methodically ignored or pejoratively criticized ever since Descartes’ epistemological instigation of the modern period.14 Currently, however, epistemologists are seemingly exhausted and disenchanted with the possibilities of knowledge. The so-called ‘postmodern’ view that all knowledge is socially constructed and hence all its manifestations are equally acceptable and defiantly incommensurable appears to have done away with the need to search for such classic bastions as ‘truth’, ‘verification’, ‘justification’ and even ‘critique’. Indeed, the contemporary interest in knowledge is marked less by such issues than by the commercialization of knowledge: the talk is of the ‘knowledge economy’ and of managing knowledge as a corporate asset on the balance sheet. Against the once fervent search for knowledge, the contemporary preoccupation is with its operational usefulness and its justification as such. This is reflected not only in the commercial world but also in the academic world where the dispensation of research grants is increasingly (and alarmingly) linked to questions of potential practical yield. Knowledge has been reduced to a tool serving economic competitiveness and public policy interests. With academia itself playing into the hands of this current trend, the question of why, exactly, knowledge is sought is never asked. There is no reflection on knowledge. Current interest in knowledge, then, is less due to some confusion

Dualisms  21 regarding what knowledge is and more a consequence of wanting to harness as much knowledge as possible to reflect particular objectives, usually measurable on a scale of quantitative interests. In this regard, it is a new epistemological preoccupation, and one which does not stem from Descartes but from a combination of the increasingly commercial emphasis in academia and other traditionally non-commercial sectors, and academia’s self-inflicted uncritical submission to the so-called ‘postmodern’ epistemological view.15 2.3.2

Philosophy’s view on consciousness

Consciousness has been equally afflicted. The philosophical and scientific study of consciousness is something of a black sheep in philosophy. The brain, for instance, is designated legitimate for scientific study, presumably because it can be empirically dissected. The mind, too, has been awarded its own philosophical pedestal – philosophy of mind – partly in response to the scientific pretensions of psychology, and partly in response to the need for a philosophical recycle bin wherein that ‘loose collection of topics and issues that didn’t fall neatly into any one of the traditional subdivisions of philosophy’ (Echelbarger, 2002) may be chewed over. Consciousness, by contrast, remains unqualified: its intangibility renders it off-limits to science and the term philoso­ phy of consciousness raises too many philosophical eyebrows. Rejected by both science and philosophy, it has been relegated to consciousness studies. The study of consciousness, as opposed to the mind, is relatively new: philosophy of mind can be dated back to Ryle’s influential The Concept of Mind (1949), whereas consciousness studies take off only in 1974 with the publication of Thomas Nagel’s famous article ‘What is it like to be a bat?’ (Nagel, 1974). Philosophers, therefore, notorious as they are for their reluctance (fear?) to accept anything new (and anything less than thirty years old is considered infantile), might be excused for not endowing consciousness with the honorific philosophy of. Their reluctance, however, does betray, at times, a more sinister angle. Consider, for instance, the roundtable discussion at the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy in 1998,16 where the participants comprised some of ‘those esteemed individuals deemed important enough to be included in the Library of Living Philosophers’. Even considering that the discussion was something of a disappointment overall, consciousness was not even mentioned. Not mentioned, that is, except by Marjorie Grene, a philosopher who, like all those to whom the Library has dedicated a volume, has risen to the ‘philosophical equivalent of sanctification’. In a ‘brief and witty intervention’, Grene ‘added bite to the proceedings with some spiky, provocative comments’, which were neither contested nor endorsed by her fellow living saints: I do think it’s wrong to be a Cartesian. What I sometimes say about Descartes is that the only true statement he made was, ‘I was born 1596’ [sic]. I hate to say anything good about Heidegger. He was evil and we

22  Contextual investigations ought to forget him if we can, but he was right in wanting to get rid of consciousness as a central philosophical term. I’m just sick and tired of consciousness. If Grene is to be taken literally, philosophy is to revert to its medieval scholasticism, the value of philosophical works is to be judged by the character of their authors, and Homo sapiens, if it is to be an object of philosophical investigation, is to be approached as a consciousness-less being, that is, as dead. If such is the ‘bite’ and, significantly, the silent reaction of the ‘great minds’ at the end of the twentieth century, then the present work has not only seemingly taken a wrong turn: it finds lined up against it the greatest powers in contemporary philosophy. Interestingly, consciousness studies is very much like philosophy. It has a well-developed complex jargon, the level of argument is extremely scholarly, each new book proposes new insights founded upon a critique of previous works, and most authors in this area are philosophers. In fact, the only reason why it has failed to win the honorific philosophy of may lie in its seeming overreliance on thought experiments, some of which have acquired cult status; for example, Chinese rooms, Chinese nations, Zombies, Giant lookup tables, Abused scientists, Deviants and Demons. Philosophy is, of course, strewn with thought experiments and even the face of science was changed forever through Einstein’s pure thought experiments. The difference in consciousness studies, however, is that intuitive conceivability is held up as the condition to accept any particular conclusion. Such conceptual possibility, justified on the basis of what seems presently conceivable of thought’s evolutionary path, is hardly a reliable measure for accepting any apparent novel insights – as the history of scientific thought shows. In brief, studies in consciousness remain controversial. The present work, however, is not primarily concerned with philosophy of consciousness. It is primarily an epistemological investigation; and although this will require considering consciousness to some extent, and even draw conclusions about consciousness, the fact that the present work approaches consciousness through a distinctly epistemological route allows it to defend itself against the charges imposed upon consciousness studies.17 In so far as an epistemological investigation provides insight into formal principles, general structures and laws of thought and understanding, including their formal correctness and coherence, the present work outlines an epistemological logic, for such formal principles, structures and laws will be explicated. In so far as an epistemological investigation is concerned with the most general presuppositions of knowledge, with the relationship between thought and its objects, interested in the consonance between material objects and thought of such objects, hence interested in the truth of knowledge, the present work provides a theory of knowledge. The present work, therefore, investigates the practical truthfulness of knowledge through its coherently formal structure. As will be demonstrated, consciousness is central to such investigations.

Dualisms  23

2.4 System theoretical versus systemic With this broad understanding of epistemology in mind, the question is how epistemology may be appreciated from a holistic, or system theoretical, point of view. Epistemology, from such a viewpoint, yields two subtly different possibilities: one which emphasizes systemic structure and one which does not insist upon such structure and may thus be termed non-systemic. Both understandings are embedded within the systems field. In order to appreciate how they are so situated, the latter will be referred to as system theoretical whilst the former will be referred to simply as systemic. A system theoretical philosophy is one which draws upon, or uses, concepts from any number of theories of systems whilst not necessarily being systemically structured itself. A systemic philosophy is one whose structure exhibits characteristics of systems such as interactive and coactive relationships between, and properties irreducible to, the particular constituent concepts. Whereas the content of a system theoretical philosophy necessarily includes concepts from theories of systems, a systemic philosophy need not include such concepts: the structure itself of a systemic philosophy behaves like a system – the structure is systemic – although the concepts within this structure need not have been borrowed, or developed, from theories of systems. The distinction between system theoretical and systemic approaches is summarized in Figure 2.1. A system theoretical epistemology, therefore, is one which draws upon, or uses, concepts from theories of systems, without necessarily exhibiting a systemic structure itself, in order to account for the nature of knowledge. A systemic epistemology is one which may (or may not) draw upon, or use, concepts from theories of systems in order to account for the nature of knowledge, whilst necessarily being itself systemically structured. The former accounts for the nature of knowledge by applying, not necessarily in a systemic manner, concepts from theories of systems; the latter accounts for the nature of knowledge through its systemic structure without necessarily being constituted by concepts from theories of systems. The question arises, therefore: which type of epistemology is relevant to the holistic approach to problems? In section 1.5, the interrelation between the ideas of a holistic approach to problems and a holistic approach to knowledge was highlighted: the problem of

Philosophy or approach

Makes use of: System theoretical concepts

Systemic structure

System theoretical

Yes

Not necessarily

Systemic

Not necessarily

Yes

Figure 2.1  System theoretical vs. systemic

24  Contextual investigations knowledge itself must be informed through holistic approaches for, in seeking holistic resolutions to problems, the manner of knowing the problems themselves should be holistic. The epistemology called for, then, must be one which does more than enable holistic understanding of problem situations in general. As noted earlier, the demand is for an epistemology which is holisti­ cally structured itself so that the manner in which knowledge arises is holistic and, additionally, can be understood holistically. Given this, only a systemic epistemology can explicate the systemic structure of knowledge, if such a systemic epistemological structure indeed exists. Similarly, only a systemic epistemology can describe the systemic process through which knowledge arises, if indeed such a systemic process exists. Further, if knowledge itself is perceived as a problem, then the holistic approach to problems demands that this particular problem itself be approached holistically. Ultimately, if in referring to a holistic approach there is an implicit demand for a holistic resolution and understanding of the problem of knowledge, then, in the context of such demands, only a systemic epistemology is able to address the issue of knowledge as a problem in itself. As to holistically approaching problems in general, and thus enabling a holistic understanding of problem situations, the ‘sweeping in’ process referred to in section 1.1 does enable an appreciation of how individual problem elements interrelate. Problem situations, however, are problems precisely because of the manner in which aspects of the world are known. Such knowing implies an epistemology, that is to say, a manner of knowing. This manner of knowing need not be structurally systemic in order to posit a systemicity in the perceived phenomena themselves. That is, a system theoretical epistemology suffices in this regard in that it can apply concepts from theories of systems in order to posit the systemicity of the phenomena ‘swept in’. If problem situations, however, are problems precisely because of the manner in which aspects of the world are known, then a ‘sweeping in’ of such manners of knowing is required, structuring them so that their systemicity is made evident – resulting in a systemic epistemology. Only in this way can problem situations be said to be known, otherwise they are just accepted; only in this way are problem situations understood, otherwise they are only subject to one manner of knowing, which does not equate to understanding but to submission. If by a holistic understanding of problem situations it is implied that what is required is a holistic understanding of the manner in which problem situations are known, then only a systemic epistemology is able to address the issue of holistically approaching problems. In short, the holistic approach itself implicitly rejects as insufficient the singular application of system theoretical concepts to phenomena. First and foremost, it calls for a systemic epistemological process, one which can only arise through the explication of a systemic epistemology. Therefore, if it is to inform the holistic approach, any holistic epistemology must be a systemic epistemology.

Dualisms  25

2.5 Conclusion The holistic approach to problems has been recognized as requiring a systemic epistemology – one, that is, which may draw upon, or use, concepts from theories of systems in order to account for the nature of knowledge, whilst neces­ sarily being itself systemically structured. Being an epistemology required of the holistic approach, and given that this latter is the child of system theory, the required epistemology is one required of system theory itself. As such, its realization demands a preliminary inquiry into system theory in order to see whether this field already furnishes the epistemology required or, if not, whether it can at least propose an investigation. The next chapter undertakes such an inquiry and identifies the fundamental research required if the promise of a systemic epistemology is to be fulfilled.

Notes 1 A particular contemporary example of the existence of this duality is evident in the debate between linguist Noam Chomsky and empiricists, such as Nelson Goodman, concerning the existence of innate ideas (Solomon, 1998: 152; Chomsky, 2000: 46–74). In general, dualism in thinking has been a subject of extended debate. A powerful argument for its inescapability can be found in Lovejoy (1996). It is worth noting that dualism also penetrates diverse areas of thought. One, perhaps surprising, example may be found in basic theories of the state which may be divided between conflict and integration theories (Tainter, 1988: 33–38). 2 In Lamarckian theory, variation and adaptability are not results of chance but of directional, purposeful adaptive responses to a changing environment. Taken to the limit, the theory implies that Homo sapiens is a superior end product. The theory has been accused of committing the naturalistic fallacy of connecting what ought to be the case with what is the case. Nevertheless, the theory retains its attractions and has yet to be completely dismissed. 3 The conduciveness of existentialism to twentieth-century scientific knowledge has been expressed by Heisenberg and the physicist and mathematician Hermann Weyl (Holton, 1988: 210–211). For a concise description of the three kinds of arguments Sartre uses for the impossibility of God, see Cooper (1999: 146–150). In Notebooks for an Ethics, Sartre (1992: 146) interestingly appeals to the failure of the two dominant modes of thought, empiricism and rationalism, in determining the existence of God: ‘The Christian’s faith is bad faith. Besides, the very nature of God forbids us to believe in him. Not just because it is contradictory (that would not be anything), but because it is opposed to the psychological structure of belief. Belief replaces experience, intuition, etc., therefore those operations that can be carried out. However, we are taught in the first place that these operations cannot be carried out when it is a question of God. Hence we can neither see him nor grasp his infinite nature through rational intuition. Therefore we cannot found ourselves on any concrete operation, and so our belief is a belief in nothing.’ 4 Holton describes Einstein’s epistemological position as one of rationalistic realism: a synthesis of rationalism and empiricism. 5 Religion, as the keeper of the leading ethical principles, is undermined. Colonial systems, as the keepers of the highest forms of culture, are killed off. The white

26  Contextual investigations

6

7

8 9

10 11

12 13

14

Caucasian, as the keeper of racial purity, is tempered. Physics, as the keeper of the highest form of knowledge, is diminished. Gödel’s discovery of undecidable propositions is a response to the second of 23 problems Hilbert presented to the Second International Mathematical Congress in Paris in 1900. The second problem asks whether it can be proved that the axioms of arithmetic are consistent, that is, that a finite number of logical steps based upon them can never lead to contradictory results. Russell and Whitehead’s Principiae Mathematica of 1910 attempted an answer but failed. In 1931, however, Gödel showed that within a rigidly logical system – such as the one developed by Russell and Whitehead for arithmetic – propositions can be formulated that are undecidable or undemonstrable within the axioms of the system. In other words, within the system, there exist certain clear-cut statements that can be neither proved nor disproved. Consequently, it is not certain that the axioms of arithmetic will not lead to contradictions. The hope of mathematical and scientific certitude is thus foredoomed. Mathematicians, however, continue to pile theorem upon theorem. The middle of the twentieth century saw the rise of meta-mathematics – an attempt to lift maths from the quagmire of possible inconsistency by focusing on the interpretation of mathematical symbolism and operations. Transfinite induction, one such approach of meta-mathematics, is an example of the mathematical creativity spurred by Gödel’s results. Bergson (1911: 9) points out that geometrical thought ‘which considers isolated systems, [is] concerned only with the ends of the intervals and not with the intervals themselves’. One could even point out that it is not so much the age of probability which arrives as the age of capriciousness, the age of wild ‘postmodern’ extremes where, for example, ‘deconstructionists’ hold that it is readers, not authors, who create meaning in a text. With such theories, anything goes in epistemology. On the other hand, the advent of an ‘age of probability’ need not necessarily imply an orgy of capriciousness. It can signal the challenging quest for understanding systemicity. Cubism and James Joyce’s Ulysses are notable examples, as Barrett argues. Logic is understood here as belonging to epistemology, and metaphysics can be taken as a synonym for ontology. Other branches of philosophy can be understood as emerging from the three roots specified here. Aesthetics, for instance, may be understood as concerning the being of art and so finds its roots in ontology. Essents roughly means existents, whereby the significance is not restricted to spatio-temporal physical substances but extended to purposeful entities projecting themselves towards the future. Milan Kundera’s (1984) classic novel The Unbearable Lightness of Being may thus be read as a literary excursion into ontology. Jean-Paul Sartre’s literary and philosophical work, especially up to and including Being and Nothingness, may be described as a philosophy of the unbearable lightness of being. There is no relevance, for the purposes of the present work, in debating the existence of consciousness in organisms other than the human being. Since consciousness is, at root, that which enables one to epistemologically engage with phenomena, including oneself, and since the focus of the present work is largely epistemological, the term consciousness (instead of, say, human being) will be mostly used when discussing epistemological engagement with phenomena. The modern period is generally acknowledged as having begun with the turn of the seventeenth century and given way to the postmodern period with the death of Frederick Nietzsche in 1900 (Emmanuel, 2001). The latter period, whose end has yet to be defined, is marked more by the manner in which it has extended the ideas of the modern period to their logical limits than by any pretensions to have revolutionized thinking.

Dualisms  27 15 The situation is well documented not only in academic journals but also in the general media. A good example is Claire Fox’s ‘It’s All Academic Now’ in The Scotsman, 30 July 2000. 16 All citations regarding the roundtable discussion are taken from Baggini (1999) The participants were Karl-Otto Apel, Marjorie Grene, Peter Strawson, Sayyed Hossein Nasr, Willard V. Quine and Donald Davidson. The discussion was chaired by Peter Caws. 17 An epistemological approach to consciousness is also provided in Rowlands (2001), who discusses some of the aforementioned thought experiments.

3 Questions

The idea of a holistic approach to problems implies methodological guidelines which, in turn, imply epistemological guidelines. These latter find their roots in an epistemological theory. The discussion has identified the requirement of a holistic epistemology from which methodological guidelines may be deduced for a holistic approach. When a holistic epistemology has been laid out, it will be possible not only to verify the claims and possibilities of a holistic approach, but to further provide a better understanding of this approach and, additionally, of the inevitability or otherwise of the ‘wars we deserve’ discussed in Chapter 1. In the previous chapter, the requirement of a holistic epistemology was refined to one of a systemic epistemology. It was noted that the epistemology in question might already be evident in system theory itself. The present chapter begins with an overview of system theory in order to highlight that, although it is explicitly concerned with epistemological issues, it does not provide an appreciably complete epistemological theory. The chapter subsequently identifies what System Theory – as a whole and distinct field – demands of any epistemology with which it might be associated. This result provides the starting point towards the realization of the required systemic epistemology and, hence, sets the ensuing investigations on their course.

3.1 An outline of system theory 3.1.1

Beginnings

System theory may be categorized into three main areas. First, there is the instigation of the field itself which finds its roots in concerns about cybernetics, including the communication and control of systems; the relationship and dynamics between inputs, outputs and feedback; and information theory and automation. Wiener (1948), Ashby (1956) and von Bertalanffy (1968) are generally considered to be the principal thinkers of this developmental phase, with von Bertalanffy ranking as the acknowledged founder of the entire field of system theory thanks to his work on integrating what previously appeared to be only a loose federation of similar concerns. The foundational

Questions  29 significance of this first phase of system theory lies in its having formally defined a series of fundamental aspects of systems in general. The principal thinkers established parameters which allowed for systems to be tackled as systems: parameters such as inputs, outputs, transformation, feedback, and the environmental context in which a system is situated and with which it interacts. Furthermore, the idea of open system – along with its related concepts of homeostasis, boundary and morphogenesis – finds an elaborate explication in the work of such thinkers. From an epistemological perspective, this area of system theory considered two types of systems: (1) physical or concrete systems constituted by tangible objects (e.g. equipment, buildings, machines and other physical assets); and (2) abstract or conceptual systems constituted by intangibles such as plans, hypotheses and ideas, wherein symbols represent attributes and objects. Physical systems were understood as requiring abstract systems in order to function and realize their purpose or objectives – the physical structure of a university campus, for example, requires the abstract educational programme in order to realize its raison d’être. Reciprocally, abstract systems were understood as realizing themselves only when applied to respective physical systems – for example, software is tangibly usable only when installed into the physical circuits which make up a computer. Underlying this broad epistemological understanding is the assumption that physical systems exist in themselves as objectively definable entities. It was the recognition of this assumption as distinctly problematical for social systems which allowed for the rise of the second area of system theory known as soft systems thinking.1 3.1.2

Soft systems thinking

Contrary to positing systems as objectively definable entities, soft systems thinking argued that there is a large class of systems which are subjectively definable and hence answerable to consciousness: social systems, or those systems in which human beings are immersed in their daily lives. A social system (also termed human activity system), along with its boundaries and purpose, exists only in so far as human beings posit it as such. A social situation, constituted by any number of interrelations, cannot be solely defined as a system of such and such because any number of human beings will have any number of views of the situation which, in turn, define any number of systems, along with their respective boundaries and purposes and, hence, posit any number of understandings of the situation. Whatever the system is, in other words, depends directly upon the viewpoints, or worldviews, of the human beings engaging with the situation. This development of system theory finds a most ample explication in Checkland’s (1999) work and has led to one of the most applied methodologies of system theory, namely Soft Systems Methodology or SSM. This methodology, in effect, is the operationalization of soft systems thinking’s return to consciousness as the prime mover in defining social systems, allowing for their management, their redesign and their invention. A central component

30  Contextual investigations to this methodology is the mnemonic CATWOE2 which serves as the basis for defining a social system and centres around the idea of Weltanschauung3 as that which enables a seemingly singular system to be understood and defined in any number of ways. Soft systems thinking thus reinforced the significance of the human being as the instigator of social systems and provided, in SSM, a major methodology with which human beings may tackle social systems. For its part, SSM may be understood not only as a methodology but as an epistemological position which hints at the promise of system theory as an epistemological theory, or at least as a theory with a strength in applied epistemology. In broad terms, soft systems thinking enabled system theory to be appreciated as a useful theory or approach for tackling human problems.4 Because of the very focus upon human systems, however, soft systems thinking was gradually criticized for not fully taking into account the implications which arise from this particular focus. The critique of soft systems thinking, and the developments to which the critique led, form part of the third area of system theory, known as critical systems thinking. 3.1.3

Critical systems thinking

Critical systems thinking argued that soft systems thinking placed too much faith in the power of ideas (Weltanschauungen) as forces of change, failed to tackle distortion in communication, bypassed the management of power in any human situation and, hence, failed to deal with conflict, coercion and the possibility of degrees of emancipation from such negative realities.5 In other words, although soft systems thinking may have argued for the significance of human beings to the idea of system, it did not develop this significance far enough. More importantly, soft systems thinking was deemed not good enough at enabling human beings to be emancipated from coercive social systems. Tackling human emancipation is the core of critical systems thinking. In particular, critical systems thinking attempts to contribute to three broad philosophical concerns on the general nature of emancipation. The first addresses issues such as the epistemological ability of surfacing and questioning assumptions and values inherent in discourse and systems design – what is labelled critical awareness. The second encompasses the degree to which human beings can be emancipated from the governing modes of institutionalized and cultural practice in society, which modes lie within a broad spectrum defined on the one hand by the ‘rigour’ of the scientific method and, on the other, by the power of rhetoric – what is labelled social awareness. The third addresses what is termed human emancipation, that is, the concern with people’s well-being as well as the development of their potential. Included here are such issues as the quality of human existence, emancipation from the perceived prevalence of efficiency and effectiveness as dominant motivating factors, emancipation from the perceived limitations (if not contradictions)

Questions  31 in heralded participatory work practices in the face of outcomes shaped by ‘invisible’ forces, and emancipation from the Foucauldian (1980) stress on the might of knowledge-power. Interestingly, the three emancipatory concerns of critical systems thinking are concerns which, by their very definitions, link emancipation with knowledge. On a general level, Flood and Jackson (1991b: 2) describe the overall emancipatory concern as being directed at the formulation of ‘new methodologies to tackle problem situations where the operation of power prevents the proper use of the newer soft systems approaches [read: SSM]’. There is an implicit assumption here that new methodologies and (potentially) the new soft systems approaches, both of which qua methodologies are epistemological tools designed for the acquisition of knowledge, will break through the bonds of power and lead towards emancipation or freedom. Even Jackson’s (1982, 1983) early critique of Ackoff, Churchman and Checkland – a critique which contributed significantly to the birth of critical systems thinking and its concerns – rests upon the call for new ‘paradigms’. Since paradigms form such a seemingly conclusive foundation upon which knowledge is built (consider the Copernican, Newtonian and Einsteinian revolutions as examples in the history of thought), Jackson is but desiring new epistemological tools/worldviews which, it is Socratically assumed, will further human freedom or emancipation. On a specific level, at least two of the three concerns exhibit a link between emancipation and knowledge. Critical awareness, for instance, is concerned with epistemic abilities directed at epistemological assumptions (paradigms, one could also say). Social awareness is directed at the institutionalized epistemological norms such as scientific epistemological approaches. For its part, human emancipation is directed towards the ‘invisible’ forces which appear to work against human freedom and it is not clear, in this case, the extent to which epistemology plays a part in this concern, although efforts have been made to provide methodologies (by implication based upon epistemological theses) which tackle this concern (Flood and Jackson, 1991b). The present work, however, has already indicated that system theory warns how human beings have the ‘wars’ they deserve and that, if they are to be emancipated from them, epistemological research is necessary. The ‘wars we deserve’ conclusion and the necessary epistemological approach to it have never been considered, to any substantial degree, by critical systems thinking. If these are successfully considered in this work, there may result a useful contribution for critical systems thinking to tackle the furtherance of human emancipation.

3.2 Epistemological theorizing in system theory The above exposition serves to highlight that system theory, ever since its inception, has demonstrated a concern with epistemological questions, or at least with questions related to epistemological issues. Ramsés Fuenmayor

32  Contextual investigations and his colleagues at the Department of Interpretive Systemology of the Universidad de los Andes in Mérida, Venezuela, have even gone so far as to attempt what may be appreciated as a complete epistemological theory particular to systems thinking (Fuenmayor, 1991a,b). In a number of papers, they attempt to show that this epistemology has served methodological purposes for approaching problematic situations (Fuenmayor and Fuenmayor, 1999a,b; López-Garay, 1999; Suárez, 1999; López-Garay and Suárez, 1999). Arguably, this points to their epistemology’s practical relevance. It appears, however, to be an epistemology whose foundations remain more in philosophy, and especially phenomenology, and much less in system theory. Whilst, as will be shown, there is every reason to be sympathetic to the phenomenological leanings, it is not obvious how interpretive systemology roots such leanings in system theory itself. Without a tight interdisciplinary justification strictly guided by system theory, attempts such as interpretive systemology risk being branded eclectic in their approaches. The attempt that claims to present ‘an ontoepistemology for the systems approach’ (Fuenmayor, 1991c) may equally be read as presenting an ontoepistemology for phenomenology – indeed more so, thanks to the relatively little developmental emphasis placed on system theory itself. There is no need to provide an in-depth critique of Fuenmayor’s work here, since the ensuing chapters do not pretend to provide either an alternative or a correction to his work. Interpretive systemology appears as a mature piece of research which not only is philosophically sophisticated but also appears to assist in system theoretical approaches to problematic situations. The present concern is with founding an epistemology strictly rooted in system theory in order to enhance understanding of this theory. Though this venture may require interdisciplinary excursions, these will have to be justified solely on the basis of system theory and not because such excursions appear to be worthwhile in themselves. Indeed, a fundamental aspect of the present work, which serves to distinguish it from other system theoretical attempts at epistemology, is the historical approach to its task. The result of tracing key arguments in the history of system theory will dictate the unfolding investigations. In this way, system theory itself will provide its own answers to three interlinked issues: consciousness, epistemology and ethics. These three, in turn, inform the nature of human being, the dynamics of knowledge, and the implications for ethics. In other words, the present work will found itself in system theory proper in order to: •

•

provide a rigorous descriptive explication of how consciousness engages epistemologically with phenomena, that is, how it knows them for what they are, how it deals with them conceptually, and how knowledge may be said to arise and be knowledge from such processes; furnish the constitutive parts or concepts of an epistemology, including their arrangement, the manner in which this arrangement enables knowledge, and the manner in which this epistemological system can

Questions  33

•

account for certain key system theoretical concepts such as boundary judgements; ultimately, provide indications of the ethical implications and/or consequences arising from epistemological engagement.

3.3 The forgotten epistemological agenda of system theory In keeping with the requirement that system theory dictate the ensuing study, it is fitting to close the present introductory contextual investigations by asking where system theory explicitly asks for the development of its own epistemology. Where, in other words, does system theory itself ask that this book be written? In the early 1980s, Peter Checkland published a paper in the Journal of Ap­ plied Systems Analysis (JASA) entitled ‘Rethinking a Systems Approach’ (1981). The paper is informative in a number of ways: it provides a neat categorization of what is conveniently termed the ‘systems movement’; it discusses the differences between ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ systems thinking; it argues that ‘the hard paradigm is a special case of the soft’;6 it notes that Soft Systems Methodology (see section 3.1.2) is an attempt to ensure inquiry is systemic as opposed to being simply systematic;7 and, using Burrell and Morgan’s (1979) typology of sociology, it situates systems thinking in relation to work done in the social sciences, and sociology in particular – acknowledging a paper published a year earlier by Mingers (1980) which discusses this very topic. Checkland’s paper forms part of the handful of documents which, in retrospect, constitute the gestation process of what would later be baptized critical systems thinking.8 Some of those documents, as well as critical systems thinking in general, will be of interest in the present work. For the moment, however, attention may be directed to one particular comment made by Checkland towards the beginning of his JASA paper, a comment which appears to have either gone unnoticed or implicitly been deemed by the subsequent literature as needing no immediate consideration: The most fundamental systems idea is that of ‘emergent properties’ . . . we may regard systems thinking as the attempt to develop an epistemology built upon this concept. The comment immediately calls for a major task: the development of the systems epistemology built upon the idea of emergent property. Checkland appears to have left this task for others. Nowhere does he explicitly take up this challenge, nor does he provide any information which would allow for an appreciation of exactly how the idea of emergent property can be foundational to the systems epistemology for which he calls.9 It is doubly unfortunate since, for Checkland, the whole point of theorizing systemically – in particular through his Soft Systems Methodology – is to enable systemic knowledge

34  Contextual investigations of complexes; a knowledge which, for him, is possible only if there exists an epistemology built upon the idea of emergent property – an epistemology which he lays down as the primary task when theorizing systemically. Checkland may be interpreted as merely asserting what he believes to be the foundation of a systems epistemology and what he sees as the task of systems thinking. There is no need, however, to take his assertions as unsupportable. Consider for instance that, far from believing that it is parts which are initially given as open to analysis leading to knowledge of the whole, systems thinking states that it is the whole which is initially given – not gradually but immediately, prêt-à-connaître so to speak – and from the whole one gains knowledge of the parts. Since to be given is understood in an epistemological context, presently signifying to be known, for each whole, or system, there is at least one associated emergent property which is initially given equally immediately – spontaneously, so to speak. Since emergent properties are the properties which enable a description of the system in question, that is, a knowledge of it, then the idea of emergent property, especially given its spon­ taneous attachment to a given system, does indeed seem to be the epistemological foundation of systems thinking. Emergent properties, not the parts of the system, are primary in enabling knowledge of the system. Furthermore, according to this line of thinking, ultimately what emerges is not emergent properties for they are conceived immediately; what emerges from systems is knowledge of the parts, in other words, reductionist knowledge. Setting aside, for the moment, what the immediacy attributed to emergent properties implies about their exactitude vis-à-vis the systems associated with them, consider the idea of reductionist knowledge. According to Bergson (1911: ix), reductionist epistemology is built upon ‘the logic of solids’. When building a house, for example, it is not the whole house which acts as its own foundation, it is the parts made up of bricks and mortar and so forth. In the same way that the parts are foundational for solids, reductionist epistemology assigns primary epistemological relevance to the parts and from there attempts to build knowledge of the whole. Its error is to treat solids, on the one hand, and knowledge of these solids, on the other, as similarly constructed. For, when one comes to know a solid as ‘house’, one does not begin by getting to know its foundational parts, one does not begin to examine the bricks and from there infer that the solid in question is a house; one knows a house on sight, as a whole. If solids are built from their parts upward, knowledge of such solids is gained from their wholes downward. That is to say, if systems are built from their parts, knowledge of systems is gained from their emergent properties, such properties acting as epistemological unifiers for the parts. Whereas reductionism may thus be perfectly suitable to the physical construction of solids, systems thinking perfectly reflects how knowledge of such solids is acquired. Checkland’s demand for an epistemology built upon the idea of emergent property, therefore, cannot be rejected outright. The notion of emergent property does indeed appear to be foundational to systems epistemology. Moreover, given how solids come to be known, the idea of emergent property

Questions  35 promises to be the foundational concept of any epistemology, that is, of any theory concerned with knowledge. Although this latter promise remains an open question to be investigated in the following chapters, what is certain is that systems thinking is primarily an epistemological approach, as Checkland himself points out (1999: 318). In addition to the JASA comment presently under consideration, Checkland, writing that same year and this time in his book which would come to be considered an indispensable classic for the field, indicates that: The long-term programme of the systems movement may be taken to be the search for conditions governing the existence of emergent properties and a spelling out of the relation between such properties and the wholes which exhibit them. (Checkland 1999: 111) Checkland is asking for an understanding of that which renders emergent properties fundamental and, additionally, for an explication of the relationship between emergent properties and wholes. It is noteworthy that Checkland claims that these last two tasks (and, by implication, the one identified earlier) constitute the long-term programme of the systems movement and not just of systems thinking qua epistemological approach, nor exclusively of his own Soft Systems Methodology. For Checkland, the idea of emergent property is foundational for System Theory in general. It is the idea without which all other systems fields would remain impoverished. In accordance with Checkland’s reference to the systems movement, the capitalized term System Theory will henceforth signify the overarching school of thought housing all other systems disciplines, and to which such disciplines refer. Since the relevance of Checkland’s tasks is to this school of thought in its entirety, and since the present work aims at fulfilling these tasks, it will do so by referring to System Theory, as opposed to simply systems thinking. This indicates the taking of a particular position: systems thinking (or holistic thinking) is subordinate to, and the effect of, an overarching and general system theoretical instigation. The ensuing investigations, instead of depending upon particular developments of systems thinking (such as soft or critical systems thinking), will unfold from the instigative root of the modern systems movement: the work of von Bertalanffy and, in particular, his key text General System Theory (1968). Since von Bertalanffy’s instigation continues to interpenetrate, implicitly or explicitly, all system theoretical developments, the present work, in taking this position, aims to answer Checkland’s tasks in a manner which may be seen as relevant to System Theory as a whole. Consequently, the answer to Checkland’s tasks may be deemed as fundamental to all attempts which lay a claim to being systems thinking. Checkland’s tasks may be posed as questions constituting a forgotten epistemological agenda of System Theory, as given in Table 3.1. What these questions indicate is that, if System Theory is to play any part in uncovering the required systemic epistemology, such an epistemology

36  Contextual investigations Table 3.1  The forgotten epistemological agenda of System Theory How is the idea of emergent property fundamental to system theory? What is the relationship between emergent properties and the wholes which exhibit them? What is the epistemology of system theory that is built upon the idea of emergent property?

should be built upon the idea of emergent property. Here the present work has found its starting point: to attempt an understanding of the idea of emergent property which will subsequently allow for the construction of a systemic epistemology which informs the holistic approach.

3.4 Conclusion The contextual investigations began by identifying the need for a holistic epistemology which can inform the holistic approach to problems (see Chapter 1). It was argued that such a holistic epistemology should not only enable holistic understanding of problem situations in general but be holistically structured itself so that the manner in which knowledge arises is holistic and, additionally, can be understood holistically. It was further identified that the holistic epistemology in question is not only that which can inform the holistic approach, but also the epistemology expected from the field which gave rise to the holistic approach: System Theory. When a system theoretical viewpoint was brought to bear upon epistemology in Chapter 2, the requirement was further refined to one of uncovering a distinctly systemic epistemology – one, that is, which may draw upon, or use, concepts from theories of systems in order to account for the nature of knowledge whilst necessarily being itself systemically structured. When examining, above, how System Theory itself might assist in the proposed enterprise, the pursuit was refined even further to one which seeks to uncover a systemic epistemology built upon the idea of emergent property. Since the idea of emergent property is to act as foundation, understanding it becomes the immediate task of the present work. It is to such a task that the next chapter turns.

Notes 1 A term used to explicitly contrast with the term hard systems thinking which characterizes the mathematically and positively inclined instigation of the field of system theory. 2 For a concise introduction to the mnemonic CATWOE see Checkland’s explication of Soft Systems Methodology in Rosenhead (1989: 86–89) and Rosenhead and Mingers (2001: 74–83). The mnemonic refers to Customers, Actors, Transformation, Weltanschauung, Owners, and Environment. These terms have precise, technical definitions although their development or amelioration is a matter of continuing research (Basden and Wood-Harper, 2006). 3 A term borrowed from German and loosely translated as worldview. For an idea

Questions  37

4 5 6 7

8

9

of how central this idea is in SSM, see Checkland and Davis (1986). Yolles (1999: 315–357) provides a good introductory understanding of SSM with the idea of Weltanschauung receiving particular attention. Checkland and Scholes (1990) provide a good introduction in this respect. A concise critique of soft systems thinking is provided in Flood and Jackson (1991a: 186–190). Hard approaches are quantitative in nature whereas soft approaches are qualitative. Whereas the former aspire to objectivity, the latter provide rigorous methods for incorporating subjectivity. See also Checkland (1985). Briefly, for Checkland, a systematic approach is one related to that taken by hard systems thinking under conditions of well-structured situations. The objectives are clear and an orderly method of reaching them is available, the following of which can be said to guarantee certain results. A systemic approach is required in ill-structured situations and is exemplified by soft systems thinking. Here, the objectives are unclear and a more holistic perspective is required, with the results less easily foreseeable and hence requiring approaches to uncertainty. Rosenhead (1989: 1–20) provides a concise introduction to the two approaches, along with the paradigms which give rise to them – although he omits the distinction between systematic and systemic. Along with Minger’s (1980) paper; Dando and Bennett’s (1981) Kuhnian reflections; Jackson’s (1982) critique of the work of Churchman, Ackoff and Checkland; Checkland’s (1982) reply; and Jackson’s (1983) subsequent counterarguments; these may all be seen to constitute the gestation process in question. The explicit birth and baptism of critical systems thinking may be seen to date from Flood and Ulrich’s (1990) ‘testament’ and Flood and Jackson’s (1991b) Directed Readings – although the use of the term critical systems thinking or perspective is strewn throughout the literature from Ulrich’s (1983) Critical Heuristics onwards. Admittedly, Checkland does provide epistemological insights throughout his work, in part owing to his own Soft Systems Methodology, but the task in question here is never explicitly addressed.

Part II

System theoretical investigations

The construct of emergence is . . . only a foundation on which to build an explanation, not its terminus. (Goldstein 1999)

4 Emergence

The earlier contextual investigations concluded by highlighting three questions basic to the pursuit of a systemic epistemology. All three questions refer to the idea of emergent property, an understanding of which is central to the present work. It is noteworthy that the idea of emergent property has been treated so differently by commentators in the literature that it is difficult to come to terms with exactly what the concept refers to and what its significance might be. This is unfortunate, not only for those interested in System Theory; management science in general has already gained much from System Theory, and a solid understanding of one of its central ideas can serve to amplify such gains, be they purely theoretical or pathways towards practice. There is a need, therefore, to clarify the different views and come to some overall understanding. For the present purposes, in addition to Checkland’s earlier contribution (see Chapter 3), three other system theorists will suffice as guides: (1) von Bertalanffy, being the founder of the systems movement; (2) Weinberg, having written a classic interpretation of the movement’s methodological approach; and (3) Yolles, having recently provided a contemporary interpretation of the systems movement.1 A list of 12 aspects of emergent properties will result from this investigation, providing an introductory presentation on how emergent properties are understood in the System Theory literature. It will become obvious that the idea of emergent property in the System Theory literature converges with Checkland’s understanding of emergent property as unifying epistemological concept. In conclusion, the chapter will highlight the need for further investigations if such an understanding is to be fully appreciated.

4.1 The Bertalanffyan understanding of the idea of emergent property Contrary to what one may conclude when reading, for example, Checkland (1981, 1999), the idea of emergent property does not appear to be as fundamental or essential to theorizing about systems as he stresses. Von Bertalanffy,

42  System theoretical investigations for instance, pays little attention to it.2 His 1950 paper in the British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, arguably the paper designed to introduce his ideas to the wider academic community, does not even mention it, choosing to concentrate instead on the notions of isomorphism and equifinality. In his Gener­ al System Theory, von Bertalanffy (1968: 54–55) assigns less than two pages to the subject and it appears that this idea is of little significance or importance to his theory. This difference of emphasis between the acknowledged founder of the systems movement and one of his most respected heirs may be put down to their different interpretations of where exactly systems exist: the former opts for an empirical systemicity in situations themselves whilst the latter stresses rational systemicity in thinking about situations. In other words, it may be because of the different manner in which systems ideas are used by such thinkers that the concept of emergent property has a fundamental role to play in one theoretical development whilst apparently being of no significance in another. ‘Apparently’, because, as will be demonstrated in the forthcoming investigations, von Bertalanffy has much to contribute to the idea of emergent property and to an epistemology founded upon this idea. According to von Bertalanffy (1968: 54–55), complexes – that is, sets of elements, which elements are not necessarily in interactive or coactive relationships with one another – may be understood in three ways. First, complexes may be understood according to summative characteristics, that is, according to the number of isolated elements which constitute them, in which case it suffices to sum the elements in order to understand the complex. For example, a complex may be constituted of three poodles; thus it is understood that this is a complex of poodles. Second, complexes may be understood according to the species in which their elements belong, i.e. according to special characteristics. For example, a complex may be constituted by one poodle, one Dalmatian and one Alsatian. This complex is understood as being of three elements belonging to the species ‘dog’; it is thus a complex of dogs.3 Third, if there exist interactive and coactive relationships between the elements constituting a complex, the complex may be understood according to the relations between the elements, that is, according to relational characteristics. For example, a complex may be constituted of an Arabian stallion, his mare and their foal. This complex is thus one of a family of Arabian horses. In this last case, not only the summative and special characteristics of the elements should be known but also, more importantly, the relations between them: without knowledge of the relations this complex could never be defined as one of a family of Arabian horses. It could only at best be defined as a complex of a certain sum of Arabians or as a complex whose elements allow it to be recognized as a complex of the species ‘horse’. Given that a system is defined by von Bertalanffy (1968: 38) as a set of elements standing in interrelation, only this third complex is a system.4 The difference between the first two ways of understanding complexes and the third manner of understanding them is that, in the first two, the characteristics are intrinsic to the constituent elements in themselves irrespective

Emergence  43 of whether the elements lie within or outside either complex. For instance, a poodle is understood as characterized as ‘poodle’ and as ‘dog’, both in isolation and within the complex in which it might belong, be it the first complex of a series of poodles or the second complex of the species ‘dog’. The third manner of understanding complexes does allow, but does not depend upon, this attribution of characteristics to the constituent elements. It significantly adds new characteristics to the complex itself, in terms of the interrelationships between its constituent elements with which the constituent elements are now associated because of the fact that they interrelate, that is, not owing to any summative or special characteristics. The characteristic ‘family’, for instance, is attributable to the complex stallion–mare–foal because of the interrelationships between the stallion, the mare and the foal. In turn, each one of these constituent elements is associated with this new characteristic, owing to the fact that each element interrelates with the other elements within this complex. Without knowledge of the relationships, the characteristic ‘family’ never emerges as an attributable characteristic to the complex: the complex is reduced to being characterized only according to its constituent elements, e.g. as a complex of Arabians or of horses. In turn, the elements are not to be associated with any other characteristic than those which they directly possess, e.g. Arabians or horses. The moment the interrelationships of the elements come into focus, there appears a new characteristic, one whose ejection has been mediated by the fact that there are interrelationships between the elements. This characteristic, having arisen only because of the interrelationships of the elements, is not reducible either to the elements or to their summative or special characteristics. It remains afloat supported only by the fact that there are interrelationships, in other words, only by the fact that there is a system. This new characteristic is thus a property of the system and not a property of its singular elements; at best, if one wants to talk of elements, it is a property of the interrelations between the elements. Emergent properties are always properties of systems, never of their elements. In lieu of the existence of interrelationships between elements of a complex, a property emerges which is attributable to the complex as a whole system of interrelationships. Von Bertalanffy significantly draws awareness to the fact that the adjective emergent does not signify that the property composes itself gradually. There is no series of steps required – such as (1) look at the elements, (2) uncover interrelationships, (3) piece together the emergent property – in order to figure out whether an emergent property exists or not. There is no mental synthesizing of elements and interrelationships which yields an emergent property. ‘A system,’ von Bertalanffy (1968: 55) says, ‘has to be conceived of as being composed instantly.’5 Since a system is defined by an emergent property and recognized through it, then such an emergent property itself has to be conceived of as being composed instantly. This is an important epistemological assertion by von Bertalanffy for it states that consciousness conceives instant systemic compositions, not isolated elements which it then

44  System theoretical investigations synthesizes into systems. The assertion itself but repeats the systems-asprêt-à-connaître epistemological belief identified in section 3.3 as guiding the System Theory enterprise. Von Bertalanffy’s instantaneity is but the immediacy discussed earlier in the context of that belief. In summary, given interrelationships between elements, an emergent property is attributable to the system constituted by the given interrelationships. As a consequence of the relationships they have between them, the interrelating elements are associated with this emergent property. The emergent property is not reducible to the summative or special characteristics of the elements constituting any given system. The interrelating elements and the emergent property are mediated moments to each other, so that if one exists the other necessarily does so as well, the mediator rendering this dependency being the fact that the elements are known as interrelating. Being based on a knowledge of elements as interrelating, the momentary condition between interrelating elements and the emergent property is an epistemological condition. Consciousness conceives instant systemic compositions – a system is not mentally synthesized gradually – and hence whole emergent properties.

4.2 Emergent property understood as unforeseen consequence Faced with a complex of interrelated parts, it may be difficult to predict all consequences which might stem from the dynamics of a system. System dynamics, a methodology based upon the work of Forrester (1961),6 is particularly suited to modelling complex interrelationships in order to facilitate the discovery of otherwise unforeseeable consequences. Checkland (1999: 129) notes that, for systems engineers,7 such unforeseeable consequences are called ‘emergent properties’: Gosling makes a good systemic point when he writes: ‘The system engineer must also be capable of predicting the emergent properties of the system, those properties that is, which are possessed by the system but not its parts’. A good example of what is meant by unforeseen consequences, and of the reason why it is important to predict them, is found when studying the implementation of compulsory seatbelts in the driving of an automobile (Midgley, 2000: 40–41). In countries where seatbelts are required by law, the reason for the law is to safeguard the driver from death or injury. The implementation of this law, however, does not guarantee fewer deaths and injuries on the roads for, in wearing a seatbelt, some drivers usually feel safer and are willing to take greater risks – this is an unintended and unforeseen consequence of the implementation of the law, or, in the words of systems engineers, an emergent property. The reason for its unpredictability lies in the

Emergence  45 hidden assumption that the introduction of seatbelts will not alter the driving habits of drivers. Once this assumption is brought to the fore, a variety of consequen­ces can be taken into consideration including the driving habits of drivers. Equating ‘emergent properties’ with ‘unforeseen consequences’ or, more simply, ‘side-effects’ has gained some currency in the general presentation of emergent properties – that is, one does not find such equations only in the systems engineering literature. Hebel (1999), for instance, in a discussion on value systems far removed from any appeal to systems engineering, writes: ‘An emergent property of any system is the result of a collective interaction of components’, and finds it necessary to add, ‘although it is often an unintended consequence’. Weinberg (1975: 60–61) also broadly adheres to this understanding of emergent properties. He identifies two groups who differ in their understanding, and acceptance, of emergent properties. First, there are those who think that emergent properties are found in the system, and hence are properties belonging to a combination of interrelated parts and not singular parts. Then, however, there are those who criticize this view by saying that this understanding of emergent properties is but another form of finalism reduced to an unidentifiable vital essence. As vital essence, emergent properties would then be inherently unpredictable, so this camp goes on to demonstrate that there exist emergent properties which are perfectly predictable. Weinberg points out that what is common to both groups is that they both treat emergent properties as stemming solely from the system. For Weinberg, on the other hand, emergent properties are not properties that emerge solely from the system: they are properties which emerge through a relationship between observer and system. Weinberg distinguishes between emergence and prediction: for him, properties emerge when they could not be, or were not, predicted. In the seatbelt example, the property ‘drivers usually feel safer and are willing to take greater risks’ emerges if the hidden assumptions are not made explicit; it is predicted if they are. That is, the property emerges or is predicted according to the epistemological approach taken. Thus properties are emergent for one observer and predictable for another because emergent properties reduce to the epistemological relationship between observer and observed. In summary, what is key in this understanding of emergent properties is not that they can be equated to side-effects; the key issue here is that, ultimately, emergent properties are a function of the epistemological relationship between observer and the system observed. This does not signal epistemic relativism about what the property really is: for, whether the property emerges or is predicted, one is still referring to one and the same property. What is relative here is the epistemological manner of reaching the property, not the content of the property itself. Or, to be more specific, there exists a plurality of epistemological routes which lead to one and the same emergent property.

46  System theoretical investigations

4.3 Emergent property understood as reference point The notion that there exists an emergent property towards which all epistemic routes tend is further supported when turning to Yolles (1999: 19). He states that the emergent property of a system as a whole is ‘determined by the properties of the parts,’ making it clear shortly afterwards that it is the fact that the parts interrelate which enables the system to have an emergent property. He uses the example of a clock, whose emergent property is that of indicating the time, and adds that this property ‘can be used as a point of reference to simply consider the relational changes of [the clock’s] parts. Without this a clock may be seen as computationally complex.’ More than anything, this is an epistemological assertion which comments directly on what is knowable about systems. It says, in effect, that no matter the point of view taken when observing a system, the emergent property of the system, acting as it does as illuminating reference point, exists above and beyond the manifold points of view, is irreducible to such views and hence is on a different dimension from such views. Further, the potentially infinite points of view taken when observing a system all lead to one and the same emergent property, a property which acts as a point of reference without which the particularities of a system are not identifiable; in short, a property which forms the identity of the system. In general epistemological terms, this is to say that there exists a truth which is knowable and to which all points of view can, indeed will, adhere. In system theoretical terms, not only does the manifold of interrelated parts which constitute a system harbour an emergent property, a unifying reference point; the interrelated parts can only be understood given this emergent property. If such an emergent property did not exist, there would be no foundation upon which to posit that certain parts and certain interrelationships constitute certain systems. If such an emergent property did not exist, it would be impossible for an observer to enter into a relationship with the observed – by definition, for the observer to enter into a relationship, some identity, and hence some emergent property, is required with which to relate. If such an emergent property did not exist, it would be impossible to associate interrelated elements with a particular system. Ultimately, if such an emergent property did not exist, it would be impossible to conceive an instant systemic composition. This is the fundamental epistemological contribution of System Theory to reductionist science. For it is not quite accurate to claim that System Theory rejects mechanistic and reductionist science – it only rejects reductionism if this ‘logic of solids’ (as described by Bergson; see section 3.3) is claiming to be the ultimate epistemological route. Quite the contrary: System Theory seeks to complement such science epistemologically. Whereas reductionist science analyses parts and causal relationships between them, System Theory insists that parts and their interrelationships are only understood against the wholes which they constitute. Thus, the claim of System Theory, based as it

Emergence  47 is on understanding, is epistemological, not analytical. System Theory seeks to complement analytical reductionism with epistemological holism. In summary, the Weinbergian understanding of emergent properties as a function of the relationship between observer and observed – that is, of emergent properties approachable through a plurality of routes – leads to the notion of emergent property as point of reference without which a system is not posited as of any particular type but, at best, as a complex. As point of reference which enables the positing of a system, an emergent property acts as the identity for any given system.

4.4 Summary of the idea of emergent property as understood in system theory The discussion has unravelled some of the different interpretations of the notion of emergent property as used in System Theory. The Bertalanffyan understanding, with its adherence to an instantaneous conception of an emergent property, echoes the Checklandian understanding noted in section 3.3. For von Bertalanffy, then, the idea of emergent property is epistemologically significant, for it acts as the primary and spontaneous epistemological tool used by consciousness when engaging with phenomena. The understanding of emergent properties as unforeseen consequences noted that a number of relative epistemological routes lead to non-relative emergent properties. By considering the idea of emergent property as reference point, the former is seen to provide the epistemological identity of the system. All three interpretations and uses of the idea of emergent property significantly recall – indeed, appear to lead towards – Checkland’s attribution of epistemological primacy to this idea as discussed in section 3.3. The present discussion has yielded a number of significant results summarized in Table 4.1. Now, emergent properties, for Checkland, are epistemological properties. More importantly, they are the primary epistemological property upon which his desired systems epistemology may be built. Equally said, emergent properties – at least for System Theory but arguably, as mentioned in section 3.3, for any epistemology – are the primary epistemological property through which consciousness epistemologically engages with phenomena and understands them. Von Bertalanffy has made clear, however, that an emergent property is conceived by consciousness. Emergent properties, on this understanding, arise through consciousness for consciousness. That is, consciousness creates and simultaneously projects them upon phenomena of interest so that it may epistemologically engage with and understand such phenomena. This is illustrated in the example of the house (see section 3.3). That which consciousness creates and projects is some identity – e.g. house – which is attributed to the phenomenon of interest so that consciousness may henceforth epistemologically engage with the said phenomenon. The identity so created and

48  System theoretical investigations Table 4.1  Twelve aspects of emergent properties as given in the System Theory literature An emergent property: Is attributable to a system as a whole Is an attribute with which interrelating elements of a system are associated Is an epistemological moment to interrelating elements of a system Is irreducible to knowledge of the interrelating elements of a system and is thus on a different epistemological dimension from such knowledge Is irreducible to the potentially infinite points of view available about the system and is thus on a different epistemological dimension from such perspectives Is instantly conceivable as a whole Is a function of the relationship between observer and the system observed Can be reached through a plurality of epistemological routes Is a singular reference point without which a system is not posited as of any particular type Is a singular reference point without which the elements of a system cannot be readily understood as interrelating Is a singular reference point without which the system cannot be readily understood as existing qua system Is the identity of a system

projected refers, as was noted in section 3.3, to that which is given initially, immediately, as a whole. Since the identity refers to an initial, immediately given whole, the identity itself is, as von Bertalanffy noted, conceived equally immediately, or instantly, as a whole. Emergent properties, then, are epistemological properties, that is, epistemological tools created by consciousness for consciousness. They not so much emerge from phenomena themselves as are projected upon phenomena by consciousness. When faced with phenomena, consciousness seeks an order of relations between them, or seeks to group the phenomena into some system, a search constituted by the very creation and projection of an emergent property. Such a search, defined as it is by creation–projection, allows System Theory to assert an epistemological primacy of systems and emergent properties. The epistemological significance of emergent properties renders inappropriate any claim that the emergence of emergent properties is a passive affair: emergent properties do not singularly emerge from phenomena in order to present themselves to consciousness; consciousness actively creates them in the face of phenomena. Consciousness, moreover, actively projects them upon phenomena. Thus an emergent property is that which renders some phenomenon knowable, and knowable as a system.

Emergence  49

4.5 System Theory’s preliminary understanding of consciousness According to System Theory, then, consciousness is understood as an active epistemological force which creates emergent properties and projects them upon phenomena with which it engages. Such creation–projection is understood as instantaneous or spontaneous to the givenness of a phenomenon at any one time. This basic understanding is not without its pedigree. Auguste Comte (1988: 4–5), that most positively scientific pioneer of philosophy of science, echoes this understanding of consciousness: All competent thinkers agree with Bacon that there can be no real knowledge except that which rests upon observed facts. This fundamental maxim is evidently indisputable if it is applied, as it ought to be, to the mature state of our intelligence. But, if we consider the origin of our knowledge, it is no less certain that the primitive human mind could not and, indeed, ought not to have thought in that way. For if, on the one hand, every positive theory must necessarily be founded upon observations, it is, on the other hand, no less true that, in order to observe, our mind has need of some theory or other. If in contemplating phenomena we did not immediately connect them with some principles, not only would it be impossible for us to combine these isolated observations and, therefore, to derive any profit from them, but we should even be entirely incapable of remembering the facts, which would for the most part remain unnoted by us.8 Accordingly, emergent properties may be understood simply as theoretical creations projected by consciousness onto phenomena of interest. Significantly, von Bertalanffy’s instantaneity is also echoed in Comte’s immediacy. Thanks to such instantaneity/immediacy, the exactitude of the created–projected emergent property/theory is questionable. Given this, emergent properties are liable to some form of justification through consciousness’ continuing temporal engagement with phenomena. The only problem is that System Theory is silent about the dynamics of such justification. An investigation is required, therefore, in order to unravel what dynamics of justification might be relevant to System Theory.

4.6 Two required immediate investigations This explication, therefore, of the basic system theoretical understanding of emergent properties has allowed for an equally basic understanding of the manner in which, for System Theory, consciousness epistemologically engages with phenomena. This latter understanding has already called for one required investigation into what may be termed justificatory dynamics. The explication of emergent properties, however, itself raises a couple of issues which demand attention. First, emergent properties have been found

50  System theoretical investigations to be irreducible to the elements of a system in that they are independent of the summative and special characteristics of such elements. Now, emergent properties may well be independent of the summative and special characteristics of elements; yet elements come to be associated with them. In which case, the independence of emergent properties is not as simple as all that. An investigation is called for into the nature of this independence and into the manner in which elements – suffused with any number of summative and special characteristics, perhaps of different types – come to be associated with an emergent property. The issue arose through von Bertalanffy’s exposition of the idea of emergent property. An investigation into the relationship between emergent properties and elements of systems, therefore, may begin by reconsidering his own understanding. Second, constitutive of the understanding of the fundamental epistemological contribution of System Theory to reductionist science, emergent properties were highlighted as being irreducible to the potentially infinite perspectives, or points of view, of a system. In other words, for System Theory, the epistemological creations–projections of consciousness are understood as bypassing the potentially infinite manifestations of a system. The question is, then, what do these epistemological creations–projections aim towards? Such a question demands a more profound understanding of System Theory’s epistemological contribution. Given that von Bertalanffy was largely responsible for explicating the value of System Theory for reductionist science (see section 4.3), an investigation into the epistemological objective of consciousness’ creations–projections at the very least calls for a return to this pioneering system theorist and, in particular, to his distinctly epistemological deliberations. There are, therefore, two immediately required investigations which stem from the present review of emergent properties. The first concerns the relationship between emergent properties and the elements associated with them. The second concerns the epistemological objective or target of emergent properties. These two investigations have been identified as requiring a reconsideration of von Bertalanffy’s deliberations. As mentioned above, another required investigation has also been highlighted concerning what appear to be necessary justificatory dynamics which might minimize the potentially questionable status of the instantly conceived emergent properties. Given that such justificatory dynamics refer to the instantaneity imposed by von Bertalanffy upon the manner in which consciousness conceives emergent properties, yet another return to von Bertalanffy is called for in order to see what may be deduced from his deliberations that may assist an explication of these dynamics as relevant to system theoretical epistemology.

4.7 Conclusion This chapter has afforded an introductory explication into the manner in which emergent properties are understood in System Theory. Twelve aspects

Emergence  51 of emergent properties were highlighted. Fundamentally, emergent properties are understood by consciousness as instant theoretical creations, which it projects upon phenomena of interest in order to engage with such phenomena epistemologically. As these are instantaneous creations–projections, the exactitude of any created–projected emergent property was highlighted as questionable. It was therefore deduced that emergent properties are liable to some form of justification through consciousness’ continuing temporal engagement with phenomena. Since System Theory is silent about the form of such justification, an investigation was called for into what justificatory dynamics might be relevant to System Theory. The explication of emergent properties itself, however, highlighted the need for two more immediate investigations. The first concerns the relationship between an emergent property and the elements which come to be associated with it. The second is more explicitly epistemological in that it concerns the epistemological target of emergent properties. As discussed, both of these investigations require a return to von Bertalanffy’s deliberations. They will take up the next two chapters. Accordingly, the next chapter begins by revisiting von Bertalanffy’s contribution thus far to an understanding of emergent properties.

Notes 1 Arguably, any number of other sources could have been chosen. Indeed, an analysis of all relevant sources is a task which, if not overwhelming, might well provide interesting results. The sources chosen here reflect the acknowledged forerunner (von Bertalanffy), a respected classical interpreter (Weinberg), a recent integrator (Yolles), and one of the most respected contemporary thinkers (Checkland). They have been chosen, that is, especially because they can be identified with particular milestones in the literature, thus providing an adequate sample. One cannot ignore, of course, recent contributions to the linking of the idea of emergence with epistemology. One such contribution, for instance, is available in the journal Emergence: Complexity and Organization. Goldstein (2004), in introducing some contributed papers, highlights two significant issues which nevertheless the contributed papers do not resolve. The first concerns ‘the phenomenon of emergence in complex systems and its customary association of an explanatory gap between “higher” level emergent phenomena and the “lower” level components from which they emerge’. It would appear that this question is related to the second objective of the present work (see Table 3.1). The present work therefore aims at presenting a resolution to this concern. ‘Emergence,’ Goldstein continues, ‘also points to a second reason why epistemological concerns have become of paramount interest in complexity theory, namely, the debate about whether emergent phenomena possess genuine ontological status or are ultimately nothing more than mere subjective impressions.’ As Goldstein himself later makes clear, the issue here concerns the epistemological and ontological status of emergent properties, and the relationship between the two statuses. Goldstein cites the attempts by Holland (1998) and Crutchfield (1993) in this area, but remains unsatisfied with their responses. The present work, in addressing its three objectives, provides a response to this issue. 2 Checkland (1999: 250) identifies that for von Bertalanffy the concept emergent property is not a key system theoretical concept, and further states that this concept is key only in his own, i.e. Checkland’s, development of systems thinking.

52  System theoretical investigations 3 Von Bertalanffy notes that, as in the first type of complex, this second complex may also be understood through the sum of the elements since, in both cases, the elements do not relate one to another but simply belong to a group by their intrinsic characteristics. 4 Language can be broken down in a similar way. Adams (2001: 19) provides a good example for the present purposes. In the first instance a complex is constituted by 13 isolated words – saw, when, panicked, Jim, ripped, haystack, the, relaxed, when, cloth, the, but, he. This is a complex of words. The words are then arranged into meaningful but, at least at this stage, unrelated phrases: Jim panicked when the cloth ripped, but relaxed when he saw the haystack. This complex is comprised of two elements which belong to the species ‘meaningful phrases’. Note that there need not be a meaningful relationship between the phrases themselves, in the same way that there need not be a meaningful relationship between a poodle and an Alsatian for them to be considered as belonging to the species ‘dog’. Finally, if relations can be posited between not only the words but also the meaningful, yet seemingly unrelated, phrases, then this third complex is a system. This is possible, for this example, through a simple identifier such as ‘parachute’. 5 Italics added. 6 For contemporary developments in system dynamics, see Sterman (2000). 7 The notion of ‘systems engineer’ is well explicated by Checkland (1999: 125– 148) and need not be elaborated upon here. Suffice to say that systems engineers attempt to achieve well-defined ends in well-structured, though complex, problems. 8 Italics added.

5 Emergent properties and complexes

The previous chapter furnished an introductory presentation to how emergent properties are understood in System Theory. Three further investigations were highlighted as required in order to gain a more profound appreciation of emergent properties. The first of these, and the concern of this chapter, regards the relationship between an emergent property and the constitutive elements of systems. Specifically, the focus is on the manner in which such elements may be understood as being associated with the emergent property. What is called for, in other words, is an analysis of the dynamics between emergent properties and systems constitutive of elements. This issue arose through von Bertalanffy’s exposition of the idea of emergent property. Fortunately, von Bertalanffy has provided the analytical tools for the required analysis in the form of three distinct categories of characteristics: summative, special and relational, as discussed earlier. Accordingly, the investigation is centred on the summative and special characteristics of elements and the relational characteristics attributable to the systems constituted by such elements.

5.1 The transcendental ability of relational characteristics As already discussed, according to von Bertalanffy, summative and special characteristics are attributable to a complex in lieu of these same characteristics being intrinsic to its constituent elements. A relational characteristic (von Bertalanffy’s allusion to emergent property) is an additional characteristic attributable to a complex in lieu of the interrelationships in which its constituent elements may be participating, irrespective of such elements’ summative and special characteristics. A relational characteristic is mediated by, arises from or, simply put, emerges if, and only if, the elements participate in some interrelation with each other. Given this, a relational characteristic is a property attributable not to the elements but to the complex as a system of interrelations in which its elements participate. To say that a relational characteristic is attributable is not to say that, like

54  System theoretical investigations summative and special characteristics, it belongs intrinsically to the complex. On the contrary, such a property does not belong to but emanates from the interrelations in which the elements participate. The ejection of a relational characteristic, as was noted in section 4.1, is mediated by the interrelations themselves and such mediation in no way implies possession either by the elements or, in some magical fashion, by the interrelations.1 The relational characteristic emerges from the active actuality of interrelations and, because of such emergence, is therefore known as emergent property. In not being reducible to the intrinsic characteristics of the constituent elements – and this is where von Bertalanffy is not explicit enough – a relational characteristic is transferable, or transcends, to other elements. More precisely, the same relational characteristic emerges wherever any elements, possessing whatever summative or special characteristics, interrelate in a manner particular to this relational characteristic. The same may be said of systems. Indeed, it is von Bertalanffy’s pertinent discovery that systems transcend their constituent elements, hence his general system theory. A system defined as a particular set of interrelations exists wherever any elements, possessing whatever summative or special characteristics, interrelate in a manner particular to such defined interrelations. What makes systems systems is precisely the relationships which the elements hold between themselves, having nothing to do with the elements themselves. If systems are understood in this way as transferable, the relational characteristic is a characteristic of systems – which is but to state, in accordance with mainstream theory, that an emergent property is a property of systems and not of their parts. This understanding, however, renders von Bertalanffy’s definition of system subtly problematical. For if von Bertalanffy’s (1968: 38) definition of system as ‘a set of elements standing in interrelation’ is followed, the third, relational characteristic is not only a characteristic of the interrelations but also a characteristic of the set of elements stated as standing in interrelation. This leads to the conclusion that elements possess not only summative and special characteristics but also relational ones. Such an understanding destroys the transferability of the relational characteristic, for its general applicability stems exactly from having been freed of any dependence upon summative and special elemental characteristics. It also destroys von Bertalanffy’s idea of a general system theory. Thus, von Bertalanffy’s definition of system is not quite accurate enough. The relational characteristic is not a characteristic of a system according to von Bertalanffy’s definition: it is a characteristic of a system as defined above; that is, it is a characteristic of the interrelation in which a set of any elements may stand (literally a relational characteristic), and not a characteristic of a set of elements standing in interrelation. The elements may be associated with a relational characteristic but such association is due to the relations they hold between them and not due to the elements qua elements. In other words, to say that elements are associated with a relational characteristic is not to say that they possess this characteristic in the same way that they

Emergent properties and complexes  55 possess summative and special characteristics. It is precisely because of this lack of immediate possession on the part of the elements that the relational characteristic is independent of their intrinsic characteristics. Returning to the Arabian family example introduced in section 4.1, the relational characteristic ‘family of Arabian horses’ does indeed call up the summative and special characteristics of the elements – whilst also offering a characteristic of their interrelation. The relational characteristic ‘family’, however, does not. This characteristic is independent of summative and special characteristics, it is independent of the intrinsic characteristics of elements: in short, it is a characteristic of the interrelation which may hold between any elements. For ‘family’ might well be, in the first instance, a characteristic of relationships constituted by male, female and offspring elements of whatever organisms. More significantly, however, its independence from intrinsic characteristics such as ‘male’, ‘female’ and ‘offspring’ renders it applicable to a wide range of relations whose constituent elements are seen as interrelating accordingly. The scope of this range extends, for example, from the classification of rocks to World Cup squads!2

5.2 The relational characteristic as dependent upon complexes Now, if ‘family’ is a relational characteristic which may emerge from interrelationships between elements possessing such widely differing summative and special characteristics, not bound to reproductive relations between organisms but arising equally from complexes possessing inorganic or even organic but non-reproductive characteristics, identifying exactly what dynamics of interrelation allow for the emergence of this one characteristic from the spectrum of intrinsically different complexes suddenly appears as a challenging, if not overwhelming task. The task is no less overwhelming because of the restrictive methods available for its undertaking. On the one hand, an attempt could be made to identify the denominator common to all the different complexes which give rise to this relational characteristic. For the sake of convenience, this can be referred to as the empirical attempt. The problem with such an attempt is not only that it invites an infinite uncertainty as to whether all relevant complexes have been found, but that a common denominator between radically, inherently different complexes may well be impossible to identify.3 On the other hand, the task could focus on the relational characteristic itself and attempt to pluck from its depths the necessary or essential dynamics of interrelation which it demands of complexes, those dynamics, that is, which constitute its essence and, as such, govern its possibility of emergence from any particular complex. Such an essence (not only by definition but also because of the relational characteristic’s transcendental ability) is not limited or subject to particular summative and special characteristics, but allows for the relational characteristic’s emergence from a range of respectively

56  System theoretical investigations different interrelating summative and special characteristics. In addition, such an essence cannot itself possess summative or special characteristics, for the possession of such intrinsic characteristics would call into question the relational characteristic’s own transferability.4 Setting aside, for the moment, the question of whether this alternative approach is successful in identifying the required dynamics of interrelation which enable the emergence of any particular relational characteristic, the approach itself does call for a modified understanding of the relational characteristic in general. If the essence of the relational characteristic is not subject to particular summative and special characteristics but solely concerned with enabling the relational characteristic to emerge from a range of different interrelating elements, possessing respectively different summative and special characteristics, it is – no less so than complexes are – that which allows, or not, the relational characteristic to emerge. In other words, its essence governs the emergence of the relational characteristic by defining the fundamental dynamics of interrelation, which must actually be in any complex in order for the particular relational characteristic to emerge at all – to be actualized, irrespective of summative and special characteristics of complexes. On this understanding, therefore, the emergence of the relational characteristic depends, on the one hand, on there being particular interrelations between elements, and is governed, on the other, by the fundamental dynamics qualifying such interrelations as are demanded by its essence. On the one hand, the relational characteristic arises from interrelations, and on the other, it actively demands that such interrelations match its essential, qualifying criteria if it is to arise at all. In other words, the relational characteristic emerges from interrelations whilst simultaneously projecting upon them some qualifier. In effect, it is only when the interrelations match the qualifying relational necessities that a particular relational characteristic will emerge from the interrelations. Understood in this way, the relational characteristic does not passively emerge from an actuality of interrelations; it is a characteristic which actively projects a qualifying demand upon these interrelations. Only if this demand is matched by the actual interrelations will the relational characteristic emerge from them. If the demand is not matched, a particular relational characteristic will retreat, making way for some other relational characteristic to emerge: ‘clan’, say, instead of ‘family’. There is a potential emendatory and expansive interplay of relational characteristics posited against an actuality of interrelations. The essence of the relational characteristic, then, is a projected, inquiring activity. The lack of summative and special characteristics in its essence allows for the relational characteristic’s transcendental actualization wherever any elements, possessing whatever summative and special characteristics, interrelate in a manner which meets the demand of the relational characteristic’s essence. This demand is the very substance of the relational characteristic’s

Emergent properties and complexes  57 essence, which makes the substantiality of the relational characteristic very different from that of summative and special characteristics. For those characteristics do not make demands; they are passively born of their elements and are attached to them. The emergence of the relational characteristic, however, is not so passive. The relational characteristic neither emerges singularly from the elements themselves nor does it emerge singularly and simply from any interrelations in which elements of a complex may be participating. The relational characteristic projects a demand upon such interrelations and it will emerge only if its demand is matched by such interrelations. The relational characteristic, therefore, is essentially interested in its demand being met so that it may emerge. In short, the emergence of the relational characteristic is not simply a passive affair mediated by interrelations in which elements of a complex participate; the emergence of the relational characteristic is also mediated by the projecting activity of its essence. Understood as constituted by a demanding essence, a relational characteristic is completely dependent upon complexes for, essentially, it depends upon complexes in order to project its qualifying demand. The relational characteristic, to its core, depends upon – indeed, hungers after – complexes for without some complex there would be nothing to project upon and nothing from which to emerge.

5.3 Complexes as dependent upon the relational characteristic This modified understanding of the relational characteristic may be amplified by considering further. Although, as noted, summative and special characteristics do not hunger after complexes, the summative and special characteristics of complexes may change depending on the manner in which constitu­ ent elements interrelate. This is evidenced, for example, not only in biological evolution but also on the epistemological plane: note, for instance, Checkland’s (Rosenhead, 1989: 80) example of a prison whereby the respective relational characteristics rehabilitation system and university of crime5 govern the summative and special characteristics of the constituent elements. The possession of particular summative and special characteristics, therefore, is liable to the relational characteristic, introducing a potential transience to such possession. In other words, it is through the interrelation of their constituent elements that complexes acquire summative and special characteristics. This indicates that the possession by complexes of summative and special characteristics depends upon a participation in some relationship. Thus, whereas previously the emergence of the relational characteristic betrayed a dependence upon complexes being in the first place, complexes now begin to betray a dependence upon a relational characteristic in order for their summative and special characteristics to arise. How is this interdependence to be understood? Recall that complexes are sets of elements which elements are not

58  System theoretical investigations necessarily in interactive or coactive relationships with one another. If elements are not in interactive or coactive relationships with one another, each of them is closed in on itself. In effect, such constituent elements are closed systems. They are what they are and that is all. Yet System Theory shows that, in thus being closed, what they are is not at all all they are. For it is characteristic of closed systems that entropy increases with each temporal continuation of the system as closed. Entropy is the second law of thermodynamics and refers to the exhaustion, degradation, degeneration, disorganization, decomposition, disintegration and ultimate death of isolated systems. More exactly, it refers to the exhaustion, degradation, degeneration, disorganization, decomposition and disintegration of the system’s particular summative and special characteristics, leading to its acquiring a series of different such characteristics as entropy continues. Death, in turn, does not signify disappearance so much as absorption by other systems. As entropy sets in, summative and special characteristics are modified. In order for the original summative and special characteristics to subsist, the closed system needs to replenish itself. This is possible only if it opens itself to relational dynamics, that is, if it converts to being an open system. In such conversion, however, it risks again the modification, and possible loss, of its original summative and special characteristics as they are liable to the relational forces in which the system now participates. The summative and special characteristics of systems are always liable to modification through some relation, no matter whether the system in question is closed or open – for both closed and open systems are defined by some relation, respectively either internal, entropic and degenerative or external, negentropic and (re)generative.6 In effect, when considering complexes, the emergence of a relational characteristic from them is as inevitable as their possession of summative and special characteristics. In short, the emergence of a relational characteristic depends upon complexes as such, though is independent of their summative and special characteristics; complexes – qua complexes in possession of such and such summative and special characteristics – are always liable to some relational characteristic; depending upon the interrelation of their constituent elements, the summative and special characteristics of complexes may change.

5.4 The systemic governance Now, to say, as has been noted in the last point above, that the subsistence or modification of summative and special characteristics of complexes depends upon the interrelation of the constituent elements of complexes, is to signal some precedent participation by the complex in some relation, which relation governs the emergence of summative and special characteristics. The system theoretical immediacy (section 3.3), or the Bertalanffyan instantaneity

Emergent properties and complexes  59 (section 4.1), of the relational characteristic erects this characteristic as the instigator of, and prime actor in, a unidirectional influence upon summative and special characteristics. Indeed, the conclusion drawn earlier from Checkland and von Bertalanffy regarding the emergence, not of relational characteristics, but of summative and special characteristics follows from a necessarily implied attribution of exactly such precedence. Such a unidirectional relationship makes the relational characteristic the source of summative and special characteristics. In strictly logical terms, this is impossible given the difference in substantiality between the relational characteristic and summative and special characteristics, as discussed in section 5.2. It is also impossible given that the relational characteristic hungers after complexes – by definition, already in possession of summative and special characteristics – in order to realize itself and not to spawn summative and special characteristics of complexes. Such a unidirectional understanding, furthermore, would raise the question of how a relational characteristic could ever arise without the prior availability of a complex, necessarily already immersed in summative and special characteristics, upon which to project itself: no complex, no relational characteristic. The impossibility and weakness of this unidirectional understanding is due to the tendency to extend the current analytical investigation towards some analytical conclusion. For although it has been profitable thus far to treat summative, special and relational characteristics, as well as complexes, separately, such distinctions fail to allow for a coherent synthesis. At most, they might allow for the delineation of some recursive dependence between a relational characteristic on the one hand and a complex on the other, with summative and special characteristics understood as a by-product of such dependence. Recursive models, however, raise questions similar to the ones above. It would be a mistake to accept recursive models as systemic ones, even though they rely on feedback. Recursive solutions are not synthetic solutions in the system theoretical understanding of this term for the simple reason that they imply a singular source which initiates the recursion. If the interdependence seen to exist between a relational characteristic on the one hand and a complex on the other is neither unidirectional nor recursive, it can only be understood as a simultaneous dynamic without which neither complexes nor summative, special and relational characteristics are possible. This is to say that complexes, along with summative, special and relational characteristics, are four moments, none of which can subsist apart from the others, for each implies the others.7 Consider, in turn, the relational characteristic and complexes. In the case of the relational characteristic, the emergence itself of a relational characteristic cannot be put down solely to either complexes or the relational characteristic’s essence. There is nothing in complexes which singularly allows (or not) for the emergence of the relational characteristic; complexes are simply available for the relational characteristic’s projection upon them.

60  System theoretical investigations Similarly, there is nothing in its essence which singularly allows (or not) for the relational characteristic’s emergence; the essence is a pure activity of projection of some demand. Without the essential projection, complexes are indifferent to the relational characteristic. Without a complex, the essential projection evaporates (no complex, no relational characteristic). It follows that the enabling source for the emergence of a relational characteristic – having been identified in both complexes and the relational characteristic’s essence – does not allow for its analytical treatment. The challenging, overwhelming task, noted earlier, concerning the identification of the exact dynamics of interrelation which, for any particular relational characteristic, would allow for its emergence from a spectrum of intrinsically different complexes is compounded by this constraint imposed by systemicity. When such dynamics are sought for in some complex, the complex on its own offers nothing. When such dynamics are sought for in the relational characteristic, they fail to reveal themselves except through their application to some complex – an empirical revelation, rendering the search an empirical attempt with the associated problems noted earlier. Even if the problems associated with the empirical attempt could be overcome, moreover, it would still remain impossible to tell how much of a relational characteristic’s emergence is due to the complex upon which it is projected and how much is due to the demand of its essence. The very idea of emergence is an idea based upon synergy,8 rendering futile any analytic attempt at pinning down the dynamics of interrelation which allow for its transferability. Now consider the case of complexes. The acquisition and possession, by complexes, of summative and special characteristics cannot be put down solely to either complexes or the relation (entropic or negentropic) in which they participate. The moment the analysis attributes such possession to a relation, the relation itself offers nothing since summative and special characteristics are characteristics of complexes. The moment the analysis attributes such possession to complexes, the possession refers to participation by the complex in some relation through which the characteristics were acquired. In turn, it is impossible to tell how much of a complex’s possession of summative and special characteristics is due to the complex itself and how much is due to the particular relation in which the complex is immersed. Both the actualization (in Checkland’s implicit terms, existential eventuality9 or, in more abstract terms, positive possibility) and subsequent investigation of complexes and summative, special and relational characteristics – both necessarily ultimately refer to an original interdependence common to all four moments. This original interdependence forms part of the very structure of complexes and summative, special and relational characteristics – yielding an original emergence, ignorance of which renders all descriptions and analyses of complexes and summative, special and relational characteristics redundant. In short, this original relationship of interdependence is a relationship of systemicity.

Emergent properties and complexes  61

5.5 A closer look at the systemic governance The investigation into the dynamics governing relational characteristics and the complexes from which they seemingly emerge began by noting the transcendental ability of relational characteristics: any particular relational characteristic may emerge from any number of inherently different complexes. Such an ability of transcendental emergence implies the attribution of some activity to the relational characteristic which drives its transcendental ability. This activity was defined as a projection of some qualifier of relational necessities by the relational characteristic upon complexes, rendering this projection, together with complexes, the enablers for the emergence of the relational characteristic. The attribution of such activity led to the conclusion that a relational characteristic does not emerge singularly from complexes but is governed by a projecting essence to which its emergence is equally liable. Now, although the transcendental ability of the relational characteristic signalled its independence from any particular summative and special characteristics that a complex may possess, the attribution of a projecting essence served to reinforce the dependence that a relational characteristic maintains upon complexes. Complexes must be available, for without some complex there would be nothing to project upon and nothing from which to emerge. This seeming causal dependence upon complexes by the relational characteristic was tempered by noting how a complex, rather than being some abstract classificatory term, is always constituted by elements already in possession of summative and special characteristics. Whether this congregation of elements is considered as a closed or an open system, it is always liable to some relation – either entropic or negentropic – leading to the conclusion that the emergence of a relational characteristic from complexes is as inevitable as their possession of summative and special characteristics. Moreover, the relation was seen to govern the subsistence or modification of summative and special characteristics. Whereas, therefore, the emergence of a relational characteristic was initially seen to be dependent upon complexes, though independent of their summative and special characteristics, complexes qua complexes in possession of such and such summative and special characteristics were subsequently rendered liable to some relational characteristic. The governance by the relational characteristic of complexes’ summative and special characteristics might signal a respectively causal relationship whereby the relational characteristic itself spawns the summative and special characteristics of the elements constituting complexes. This, however, was rejected on the grounds of the difference in substantiality between the relational characteristic and summative and special characteristics, as well as through the interest that the relational characteristic has of realizing only itself. It is also refutable given the transcendental ability of the relational

62  System theoretical investigations characteristic which renders itself free of any summative and special characteristics but simultaneously applicable to (as opposed to yielding) any of them. At any one time, the possession, subsistence or modification of summative and special characteristics cannot be put down to either a relational characteristic or the elements themselves, for the above-mentioned inevitability of the emergence of some relational characteristic from a complex creates a systemicity between complexes, their summative and special characteristics, and the relational characteristic. Two further points may be deduced from the investigation here. First, whereas, in the absence of any particular relational characteristic’s essential projection, complexes may be seen to be indifferent to that particular relational characteristic, in the absence of complexes a relational characteristic’s essential projection is not simply indifferent but evaporates and, in turn, so does the relational characteristic. The transferability of the relational characteristic provides it with free projection but it is a freedom of projection, and hence subsequent possible emergence, only in the realm of complexes. For all its transferability, a relational characteristic cannot transfer itself out of the realm of complexes. A relational characteristic is free to move only within this realm, for only this realm enables its realization. The realm of complexes provides determinable, alternative complexes from which the relational characteristic may emerge – a range of alternatives without which such emergence would be impossible. This is not to say that the realm of complexes maintains some deterministic grip upon the relational characteristic. For where the relational characteristic emerges only through determinable complexes, such determinable complexes do not and cannot (if only because of the difference in substantiality) determine the relational characteristic’s essential, defining projection, nor do they determine its emergence from this complex rather than that one, nor from any number of such complexes. Second, given its unavoidable emergence from complexes, the relational characteristic seemingly acquires the summative and special characteristics of any particular complex from which it emerges. Recall, for instance, how, with each projection, ‘family’ seemingly acquires organic reproductive, inorganic or even organic but non-reproductive characteristics, respectively. With each projection, the relational characteristic acts as if it is according itself summative and special characteristics. This acquisition, however, were it possible, would destroy the transferability which defines a relational characteristic. In effect, should such an acquisition be possible, the relational characteristic would transmute itself into a complex. With each projection, the relational characteristic invites summative and special characteristics, and it is this very invitation which gives rise to the inevitable epistemological tension between its essential transferability and its desired realization – the very epistemological tension which, given the relational characteristic’s simultaneous emergence through some complex by its transcendental freedom to engage with any complex, renders futile the task of identifying the exact dynamics of interrelation which, for any particular relational characteristic, would allow for its emergence.

Emergent properties and complexes  63 In summary, a relational characteristic emerges only from complexes or, equally, complexes are available for some relational characteristic. Additionally, complexes are necessarily complexes with some relational characteristic or, equally, a relational characteristic is always of some complex or other. Although complexes and relational characteristics are distinct, or distinguishable, they are necessarily interdependent and so inseparable and hence systemically related.

5.6 Conclusion The uncovering of the systemic dynamics seen to govern complexes and relational characteristics stems from the attempt to tackle the question raised in section 5.2 of how any particular relational characteristic may emerge from interrelationships between elements possessing widely differing summative and special characteristics, that is, from the question of how any particular relational characteristic may emerge from a spectrum of intrinsically different complexes. The relational characteristic ‘family’, for example, was seen to emerge equally from reproductive relations between organisms, complexes possessing inorganic characteristics, and even complexes possessing organic but non-reproductive characteristics. The investigation led to a general understanding of the relational characteristic as constituted by an essential demand which it projects upon any given complex – making this essence of the relational characteristic, along with complexes, equally liable for the relational characteristic’s emergence. This attribution of a projecting activity to the seemingly abstract idea of relational characteristic, or emergent property, may appear to have treated this idea somewhat obtusely. Now, it will be recalled that emergent properties are created and projected by consciousness. The attribution of an essential demand to the relational characteristic, therefore, echoes the creative– projective force of consciousness as highlighted in the previous chapter. In other words, although consciousness has been left out of the present analysis for the sake of clarifying the systemic interdependence between relational characteristics and complexes, there is a certain degree of coincidence between certain traits of the relational characteristic and consciousness. Such coincidence allows for an amplification of the manner in which System Theory understands consciousness. Recall that System Theory understands consciousness as an active epistemological force which instantaneously, or spontaneously, creates–projects emergent properties upon phenomena so that it may epistemologically engage with them. The present identification of the transcendental ability of the relational characteristic serves to reinforce this understanding by implying that consciousness transcends towards phenomena which stand independent of it. The understanding of the relational characteristic as constituted by some demand also implies that consciousness’ creation–projection is, in essence, an epistemological demand. It follows, in line with the present analysis, that consciousness is not liable to summative and special characteristics

64  System theoretical investigations as part of its own constitution. That is, consciousness is not constituted by some substantial content. Consciousness, similarly to what was identified of the relational characteristic, is essentially a projecting, inquiring epistemological activity. That is, the activity of creation–projection is the very substance of consciousness. Thus, and similarly to what was uncovered of the relational characteristic, consciousness is essentially interested in phenomena, it hungers after them. Consciousness depends upon phenomena for without them there would be nothing to project upon. Moreover, any creative theorizing in the absence of phenomena would thus yield a solipsism of nothing, compounded by consciousness’ content-less constitution. In system theoretical terms, without phenomena to transcend, consciousness falls into extreme entropy. In the absence of phenomena with which to engage, consciousness evaporates. Consciousness, in other words, is maintained only as long as determinable, alternative complexes are provided, which provision does not deterministically act upon consciousness. In essence, consciousness creates–projects upon some phenomena or, equally, consciousness is only ever of some phenomenon. It is also worth recalling that, through an exemplification of Checkland’s understanding of the epistemological plane, the analysis noted that the possession of particular summative and special characteristics is liable to the relational characteristic. Given this, phenomena do not unequivocally surrender their summative and special characteristics to consciousness, but do so only in proportion to consciousness’ epistemological engagement with them. In simple terms, phenomena betray only what consciousness wants, attempts or is able to see. This understanding of consciousness’ epistemological engagement with phenomena is explicit in System Theory, as Vickers (1983) explains: Systems are thus tools of understanding devised by human minds for understanding situations, including situations in which human beings appear as constituents. They are not arbitrary constructs. They must include the minimum number of relationships needed to constitute the situation which is to be understood. But this is defined by its relevance to the concerns of some human mind. Thus in one sense all systems are human systems since they are distinguished by human minds and judged to be acceptable by their correspondence with human standards . . . Philosophers of science are less ready than they were to assume that even their concepts of natural science give us direct knowledge of objective reality. Positivism has passed its heyday and more modest assumptions have taken its place. There is no implied primacy of consciousness as instigator of, and prime actor in, a unidirectional influence upon objective phenomena. Such an understanding has indeed already been rejected.10 Vickers merely serves to highlight that, in an epistemology for System Theory, consciousness and

Emergent properties and complexes  65 phenomena are moments to each other and constitute the system from which knowledge emerges. Such an understanding is not only reflected in the systemic dynamics between relational characteristics and complexes: it is also found in von Bertalanffy’s own rejection of Homo sapiens as primarily a spectator. The rejection is posited for epistemological reasons: in other words, for von Bertalanffy, knowledge is impossible if the human being is to be primarily a spectator. Von Bertalanffy’s rejection centres around the following view: ‘any organism, man included, is not a mere spectator . . . rather he is a reactor and actor in the drama’ (1968: 239); the human being is not primarily a spectator, an ens cogitans, the human being is ‘essentially [and therefore primarily] a performer, an ens agens in the world he is thrown in’ (1968: 240); ‘the world-picture is determined by psychophysical organization [whereby] any stimulus is experienced not as it is but as the organism reacts to it’ (1968: 240–241). The stress here is always on the adverb ‘primarily’ – not an outright rejection of the spectatorial premise but a rejection of its supposed primacy in explaining how knowledge emerges. In this sense, von Bertalanffy does not hold that the spectatorial view is false or useless. What he rejects is its pretension to being epistemologically fundamental and adequate. For any primacy attributed to the spectatorial view would only come as close as saying that consciousness is the activity which enables phenomena to be made manifest to it. From such manifestation to consciousness, how does consciousness make the conceptual leap to any knowledge or understanding at all? Of course, human beings are spectators of some world in some way – but therein lies the crux of the matter: of what world and in what way? Thus any world of which human beings may be said to be spectators is fundamentally an epistemologically understood world made systemically manifest to consciousness through consciousness. For epistemological emergence, there is a necessary systemicity between human and world which is never lost to von Bertalanffy, and it reflects the systemicity understood to govern relational characteristics and complexes. Obviously, System Theory is quickly furnishing quite an elaborate understanding of consciousness. If the above is not sophisticated enough, more­ over, System Theory appears to go one step further. Recall how, with each projection, the relational characteristic ‘family’ seemingly acquires organic reproductive, inorganic or even organic but non-reproductive characteristics, respectively. Indeed, with each projection the relational characteristic inevitably associates itself with some set of summative and special characteristics. Any such association, however, threatens its transcendental essence. In effect, the relational characteristic risks transmuting into a complex constituted by the very summative and special characteristics of the elements upon which it projects. Upon this understanding, with each creation–projection consciousness risks associating itself with the summative and special content of the engaged phenomenon and, at the limit, risks losing itself in, or reducing itself to, that phenomenon. Consciousness, in other words, may be hungry after some phenomenon but with each epistemological engagement

66  System theoretical investigations it risks reducing itself to that phenomenon and so risks losing its distinctly epistemological active character. Beneath the surface of System Theory there appears to lie a highly sophisticated and complex conception of consciousness, a conception which System Theory has unfortunately never explored. This is unfortunate because from the very moment of its birth System Theory indicated that an understanding of consciousness is crucial to an understanding of emergent properties, for von Bertalanffy’s instantaneity signalled a system theoretical concern with how informational input presents itself to and through consciousness. The forthcoming chapters constitute an attempt at completing the system theoretical conception of consciousness along strictly epistemological lines. Having explored the dynamics inherent between emergent properties and systems, it is time to turn to the second investigation demanded of the initial introduction to the idea of emergent property. Recall that the introductory presentation understood that when consciousness epistemologically engages with systems, it creates–projects an emergent property which is irreducible to the potentially infinite perspectives, or points of view, of a system (see section 4.4). In other words, for System Theory, the epistemological creations–projections of consciousness are understood as bypassing the potentially infinite manifestations of a system. The question therefore arose of the target of emergent properties. As discussed, an investigation into this issue calls for yet another return to von Bertalanffy, this time to his distinctly epistemological deliberations. As will emerge, an answer to the question lies in the very project of what von Bertalanffy called General System Theory.

Notes 1 By definition, only substantial elements, and not relationships, can possess anything. 2 The New York Public Library Science Desk Reference (Barnes-Svarney, 1995: 385) states that ‘the Earth’s crust has three families, or classes, of rock based on their origin: igneous, sedimentary, and metamorphic’. The 2002 Brazilian World Cup Squad was nicknamed a família Scolari in honour of its coach. 3 Consider, for example, searching for a common denominator between rocks and World Cup squads. 4 Not to mention that, if this were possible, the possession of such characteristics would render the relational characteristic’s essence immediately identifiable, hence resolving the task quite easily. 5 Checkland specifically lists the following: rehabilitation system, punishment system, system to protect society, system to train criminals, and system to accept and store labelled people for a defined length of time. The repeated use of the term system emphasizes the relational nature of such characteristics. 6 The brackets serve to emphasize that open system relations may regenerate previous characteristics or generate new ones. 7 Indeed, it is such an implication which leads to the failure of the analytically inspired attempt at synthesis or recursiveness. 8 Emergence is a synergistic concept, which is not only simply applicable to a system (and not to its parts) but, in purer terms, that which describes momentary,

Emergent properties and complexes  67 systemic and hence synergistic relationships, as it does in the present case between complexes and relational characteristics. 9 See section 3.3, which describes Checkland’s call for a search into the ‘conditions governing the existence of emergent properties’. 10 The analytical mistake of attributing precedence to the relational characteristic was discussed in section 5.4.

6 Justification

This chapter is concerned with identifying the manner in which System Theory understands the target of consciousness’ created–projected emergent properties. The need to address this issue arose from the observation that emergent properties are irreducible to the potentially infinite perspectives, or points of view, of a system. In other words, for System Theory, the epistemological creations–projections of consciousness are understood as bypassing the potentially infinite manifestations of a system. The question is: what do these epistemological creations–projections aim towards? As discussed, answering this question calls at the very least for an in-depth investigation into von Bertalanffy’s epistemological deliberations. As will emerge, the answer to the question lies in the very project of von Bertalanffy’s General System The­ ory. The chapter begins with a broad panoramic view of the work of von Bertalanffy, after which the focus turns on his epistemological deliberations.

6.1 Panoramic view of the work of von Bertalanffy As a biologist, von Bertalanffy disagreed with employing reductionism in the appreciation of living organisms. He argued that in dividing them into parts and treating these as closed systems and independent units of analysis one lost touch with the dynamic and synergistic interplay of organisms: ‘for an understanding, not only the elements but their inter-relations as well are required’ (von Bertalanffy, 1968: xix). To this end he developed his theory of open systems in the mid-1920s, elucidating functional and relational organismic behaviour within a wider environmental context. A governing principle arising from this theory is the observation that, for open systems, a similar steady state of behaviour or organization can be reached although different initial conditions triggered the path towards the steady state (von Bertalanffy, 1968: 139–154). This is known as the principle of equifinality (von Bertalanffy, 1968: 40). For example, organisms of the same type (breed or species) grow to a more or less standard (i.e. steady state) weight, irrespective of whether their diet has been continuously normal, or whether the vitamin intake in the diet was reduced for a period and then reinstated. The theory of open systems complemented the theory of closed systems, and more will

Justification  69 be derived of this relationship later in this chapter when the case for an ontological primacy in ethical considerations is discussed. The work on open systems was soon to inform the more ambitious project of General System Theory whose aim was the ‘formulation and derivation of those principles which are valid for “systems” in general’ (von Bertalanffy, 1968: 32). General System Theory was based on the recognition that there could exist an effective methodological means of controlling and instigating the transfer of principles from one field to another, thus minimizing duplication of similar principles in isolated fields of thought (von Bertalanffy, 1968: 80). The derivation of such general principles is based on the view that similar forms and structures exist between otherwise radically different systems, different fields of science as well as completely different fields of knowledge – what is known as isomorphy, the condition of being identical or similar in form or shape. A simple example is found in physics where the same equations apply to the flow of liquids, of heat and of electric currents in a wire. Similarly, the statistical exponential equation1 applies to phenomena as diverse as the money in a bank account, radium atoms, and individuals in a population (von Bertalanffy, 1950). Another cornerstone of General System Theory, whose importance was to be highlighted by later theorists,2 is the observation – central to the present investigations – that systems, when viewed as a whole, exhibit characteristics which cannot be attributed to any of the parts separately but only to the systemic relations of the parts: characteristics which are known as emergent properties. By the 1950s, von Bertalanffy was applying his research to psychology in order to arrive at a ‘system concept in the sciences of man’ (von Bertalanffy, 1968: 186). He argued against a mechanistic conception of human beings, critiquing prevailing psychology of the time, and emphasized the consequential importance of the mental world on material events. The vision of von Bertalanffy was that General System Theory, being a general theory, could become the unifying theory of the natural and social sciences. Though this vision has yet to materialize, the theory’s generality has allowed for the use of its key concepts in particular problem areas.

6.2 The project of General System Theory Von Bertalanffy’s idea of a new discipline called General System Theory arose through a fairly simple, yet insightful, observation. All the specialized disciplines contributing towards epistemological understanding exhibit, in themselves, a gradual shift in focus from elementary units and mechanistic and determinist explanations to interrelated units, or wholes, and relational explanations. In other words, the specialized disciplines do not practice specialization as such, but tend towards greater degrees of generalization in their approaches and understanding – a generalization exhibited either through external excursions into interdisciplinarity or through internal, intradisciplinary excursions, that is, through the disciplines’ sweeping into

70  System theoretical investigations their field of vision a greater number of variables directly constitutive of their respective specialized areas. Von Bertalanffy (1968: 30–31) points towards trends in physics, biology, psychology and the social sciences that give rise to a perceived need for a general theory of the laws of dynamic interaction, of wholes, of organization and order, and, ultimately, of superordination. Von Bertalanffy expresses an immediate concern with the fact that, aside from the perceived rise of this trend across otherwise independent, specialized disciplines, such ‘cocooned’ disciplines (as he describes them) do address similarly structured problems and conceptions. This gives rise to a perceived duplication in effort and results, which could be eliminated through a theory aimed at exactly the similarities in question; a theory, that is, to which all others could refer, and through which they could communicate with one another, thanks to its formal conceptualization of the structural determinants common to them all. Von Bertalanffy (1968: 33) calls such common structural determinants isomorphs. Bertalanffyan General System Theory is thus a theory of common structural determinants, isomorphs or, quite simply, order. The type of relationship von Bertalanffy has in mind, between specialized disciplines and a general system theory, is similar to that between complexes and relational characteristics as discussed in Chapter 5. A general system theory, being irreducible to the particular concerns of specialized disciplines, transcends all such disciplines, and serves to describe and explain their internal and external excursions. A general system theory would particularly serve to describe and explain the internal interrelations with which specialized fields are concerned, and the external interrelations between such otherwise seemingly independent fields. It would be through their involvement in such seemingly unavoidable interrelations that all specialized disciplines would, ultimately, be associated with a general system theory. Von Bertalanffy’s hope that such a general system theory would enable the unity of science has yet to be fulfilled. On the basis of earlier investigations (see sections 5.4 and 5.5), this failure may be attributed to the very idea of a general system theory being based, like the idea of emergence, upon synergy – rendering futile any analytic attempt at substantiating or actualizing the theory without reference to any particular specialized field. Upon this understanding, the idea of the unity of science, an idea necessarily and ultimately elaborated in terms of interrelations or, in other words, a relational characteristic, will, indeed, never materialize. The closest possible alternative is interdisciplinarity.

6.3 The foremost object of interest of General System Theory Notwithstanding the ambitiousness of the project for a general system theory, what is more relevant to the present purposes is this theory’s exact, explicit and underpinning aim: the identification of the structural determinants

Justification  71 common to otherwise different systems. Although, as already noted, von Bertalanffy refers to such structural determinants as isomorphs, he also refers to them as principles, and he states General System Theory’s foremost object of interest as being the identification or ‘formulation and derivation of those principles which are valid for “systems” in general’ (1968: 32). Indeed, von Bertalanffy (1968: xix) describes his General System Theory as a ‘doctrine of principles’ and the terms principles, isomorphs and structural determinants can be used interchangeably. Principles qua structural determinants are apparently understood by von Bertalanffy as a governing dynamic of systems. That is to say, principles govern the manner in which systems are structurally and hence behaviourally constituted qua systems or wholes. Von Bertalanffy provides numerous examples of such principles: the principle of minimum action, principles of stationary and periodic solutions (equilibria and rhythmic fluctuations), principles of steady states, wholeness and sum, mechanization, hierarchic order, equifinality, homeostasis, allometry, feedback, and so on. In the space of just over a hundred pages, however, principles are identified, on the one hand, as things which ‘govern the behaviour of entities’ and, on the other, as things which ‘apply to systems in general, irrespective of the nature of their components and the forces governing them’ (1968: 33, 149).3 In other words, it is a seemingly open question whether the principles are what governs systems and their elements, or they are different from that which governs systems. Furthermore, von Bertalanffy equates principles with models and concepts, rendering it difficult to identify the difference between principles and the latter terms whose meaning, or reference, is somewhat different.

6.4 The nature of Bertalanffyan principles Although von Bertalanffy does so confuse the exact identification of the nature of principles, his examples do allow an inferred interpretation which is accurate with respect to his overall discussion. Consider, for example, behaviour formalized in the statistical exponential equation. Such behaviour is evident in otherwise dissimilar systems. In other words, otherwise dissimilar systems obey the same structured behaviour: such systems are, behaviourally, structured equally; or, in other terms, they are isomorphic to each other, or similarly ordered. More precisely, such systems are essentially similarly governed. That is to say, at their core, such systems’ intrinsic differences are irrelevant and substitutable. Essentially, such otherwise dissimilar systems are the same system, for their intrinsically different elements interrelate in a manner particular to the structure formalized in the statistical exponential equation.4 The behavioural governance, as well as the statistical exponential equation’s formal, mathematical description of this governance, transcend any particular system, serve to structurally unify otherwise dissimilar systems, pre-delineate what is possible for those systems of elements which behave accordingly,

72  System theoretical investigations render possible the existence of such otherwise dissimilar systems as systems of such and such, and ultimately describe the structure without which such systems would be inconceivable as systems of such and such. A principle qua structural determinant is, therefore, that which governs a system, structurally unifies a system, pre-delineates what is possible for that system of which it is a principle, renders possible the existence of that system qua system, and describes the structure without which the system would be inconceivable qua system. General System Theory as a ‘doctrine of principles’ is, therefore, a doctrine of those essential aspects of systems in general, a doctrine of that without which systems would be anarchic (ungoverned), unstructured, unpredictable, non-existent, indescribable and hence inconceivable – a doctrine of that without which not only knowledge of systems but systems as such would be impossible. It is a doctrine, simply put, which aims to uncover the essences of systems.5 It is worth noting two points which can be immediately deduced from this understanding. If a principle is that which governs the system, if it is that which pre-delineates what is possible for the system, if it is that without which a system would not exist, and if it is that without which a system would be inconceivable; then, as noted, it is that which unifies a system’s elements into relationships and, therefore, that which renders an identity to the system qua system. This understanding of von Bertalanffy’s principles, in other words, echoes the investigation into emergent properties undertaken here thus far. Both principles and emergent properties furnish the identity of the system. However, by insisting upon the identification of principles, von Bertalanffy’s understanding serves to highlight a central epistemological point: consciousness creates–projects governing identities upon objective phenomena, which lend themselves to such creations–projections precisely because such phenomena are intrinsically governed by principles. In other words, von Bertalanffy’s point is that a presupposition for systems being such that identities can be applied to them is that governing principles, structural determinants or some ‘order’ (as von Bertalanffy says), exist or reside in systems themselves (1968: 82–83). Indeed, the existence of governing dynamics in systems themselves was already strongly implied, earlier, when analysing the relationship between relational characteristics and complexes. For, from the moment a projecting demand was attributed to the relational characteristic, fundamental dynamics of interrelation were posited as necessarily existent in complexes (see section 5.2). Created–projected emergent properties, therefore, find their correlate in the principles existent in systems themselves. Created–projected emergent properties are thus isomorphically structured theoretical conceptions for they aim towards the isomorphic identity of systems: that singular reference without which a system cannot be understood as being of any particular type, without which the elements of a system cannot be understood as interrelating,

Justification  73 without which the system cannot be understood as existing qua system – three basic aspects of emergent properties which for von Bertalanffy are rendered basic to systems themselves. Hence, for von Bertalanffy (1968: 34), the basic problem of contemporary epistemological attempts, as opposed to classical science, is that of ‘organized complexity’, whose very organization, although complex, implies the presupposition of some governing organizer in the role of structural determinant. The Bertalanffyan attribution of residing principles in systems, therefore, although seemingly leaning towards a metaphysical, even vitalistic, understanding of systems, is not so much an attribution arising from speculative metaphysics as one which is rendered necessary by the manner in which consciousness is understood to epistemologically engage with systems. The existence of principles is posited by epistemological necessity. There is nothing peculiar in such an understanding for, as Checkland (1999: 111–112) notes, it underlies the scientific epistemological enterprise: Our experience of the natural world gives us a profound belief in its orderliness . . . Without this belief in a universe which is not capricious, scientific investigation would be a meaningless enterprise.6 Von Bertalanffy’s idea of a ‘doctrine of principles’ is essentially an epistemo­ logical doctrine, which does not so much say something about systems themselves as constitute a system theoretical attempt at an understanding of how consciousness epistemologically engages with phenomena as systems. The epistemological creations–projections of consciousness are irreducible to the potentially infinite perspectives, or points of view, of a system, bypass the potentially infinite manifestations of a system, skirt past the constitutive elements of a system, for they aim at the core of systems: the isomorphic governance of relationships which renders systems systems. For von Bertalanffy, then, the identification of principles forms the epis­ temological backbone of a general system theory. More significantly, if von Bertalanffy’s ‘doctrine of principles’ is the doctrine without which systems would be inconceivable, this doctrine, aiming as it does towards unifiers, is an epistemological doctrine that refers to principles as the fundamental factor without which knowledge could never arise. It is identified principles, ultimately, which render knowledge of systems possible. In summary, for von Bertalanffy, a phenomenon is determined by its governing principle. Knowledge of this principle enables knowledge of the phenomenon as a whole. Consciousness, therefore, aims towards the principle in order to know the phenomenon as a whole. The principle itself is a structural determinant, or isomorph. Hence, in order to know the phenomenon as a whole, the demand upon consciousness is to epistemologically grasp not the phenomenon itself but only its principle. As von Bertalanffy (1968: 241) points out, it is sufficient for consciousness to theorize in terms of isomorphs

74  System theoretical investigations – as opposed to grasping the potentially infinite perspectives upon a system – in order to know systems for the wholes they are.

6.5 Continual justification The earlier investigations have already noted that, because of the Bertalanffyan instantaneous nature of such theorizing, the exactitude of consciousness’ creations–projections is rendered questionable. After all, the instantaneity implies that consciousness does not first deliberate in order to subsequently create–project. Consciousness picks a theory ‘out of a hat’, so to speak, and projects it. Knowledge is a product of whatever theoretical tools are contingently available to consciousness. Von Bertalanffy himself does not disagree and indeed discusses three of them in quite some depth: linguistic, biological and cultural (1968: 222–238). He concurs with the general thesis that knowledge is a product of human contingency. In other words, he allows a place for relativism in knowledge. He refuses, however, to conclude that this necessarily leads to any futility in knowledge (1968: 239), for although relativism has often been formulated to express the purely conventional and utilitarian character of knowledge [coupled] with the emotional background of its ultimate futility, [one can see] that such consequence is not implied . . . in view of the levels both of experience and of abstract thinking, of everyday life and of science. Accordingly, for von Bertalanffy, if contingent prejudices play a foundational epistemological role, they do not necessarily bear upon subsequent epistemological developments. There may very well be a relativistic foundation to knowledge, but such foundation is not so much relevant to the development of knowledge as required in order to allow for the process of epistemological development in the first place. Reflecting the earlier deduction regarding a need to justify any creation–projection, von Bertalanffy (1968: 240) explicitly points out that the creations–projections in question ‘have continually to justify themselves’.7 The reason given is that, without such continual justification, consciousness is eliminated.8 Relativism, therefore, is understood as the end, or elimination, of consciousness. Any initial instantaneous creation–projection must be justified. Von Bertalanffy, however, takes this one step further for creations–projections need not only be justified once, twice or any number of times: consciousness creations–projections must be justified continually. Relativism is a continual threat to consciousness, for it haunts not only consciousness’ initial creation–projection but all of consciousness’ creations–projections always and already. Now, although his concern is clearly epistemological, von Bertalanffy presents his case from a biological perspective. Because of this, he provides

Justification  75 no epistemological reason why consciousness’ creations–projections must con­ tinually be justified, no epistemological explication of the process of continual justification, and no epistemological description of the elimination of consciousness arising from any halt in such continual justification. Justification is a function of the instantaneity imposed by von Bertalanffy, calling for him to present at least a hint of its dynamics. Yet, there is nothing in von Bertalanffy’s biologically inclined exposition of this matter that provides the slightest room for any deduction leading towards an epistemological explication. The most that can be observed is that von Bertalanffy does not attempt to fight relativism with the blunt weapon of objectivity which would apparently compress the seemingly infinite nature of the justificatory task in question. Such a refrain, however, is only in line with his rejection of the spectatorial view as seen in section 5.6. Given von Bertalanffy’s own silence, it appears that the discussion must expand its field of vision in order to answer three basic epistemological questions. First, why must consciousness’ creations–projections be justified con­ tinually? Second, what is the process of continual justification and how may it be explicated in distinctly epistemological terms? Third, how may the elimination of consciousness arising from any halt in such continual justification be described in distinctly epistemological terms? One immediately attractive alternative is to consult any number of explicitly epistemological explications in the System Theory literature. A prime candidate is Checkland’s (1999) classic work Systems Thinking, Systems Practice which, through its exposition of Soft Systems Methodology, is essentially concerned with the epistemological manner in which human beings come to understand and influence phenomena or situations. Yet another, profoundly epistemological, candidate is Ulrich’s (1983) influential Critical Heuristics of Social Planning, the first full-length book setting important foundations for System Theory’s ‘critical systems’ movement, whose gestation may be traced back to Mingers (1980) and Jackson (1982). Indeed, the critical systems literature provides a wealth of epistemological deliberations arising from interdisciplinary incorporations and interpretations of epistemological works from respected philosophers such as Kant, Habermas, Foucault and MacIntyre (Flood, 1990; Flood and Ulrich, 1990; Flood and Jackson, 1991b; Fuenmayor and López-Garay, 1991; Jackson, 1991a; Davila, 1993; ValeroSilva, 1996a,b; Munro, 1997). The problem is that there is nothing in this wealth of research which addresses the three basic questions identified above. Indeed, System Theory in its entirety is silent on these specific matters. It would appear, then, that with the completion of the two required immediate investigations demanded in Chapter 4, the third investigation demanded therein finds no startingblock from within System Theory itself. This is unfortunate, for justificatory dynamics are the only remaining piece of the system theoretical epistemological puzzle, the completion of which would allow for an initial overall

76  System theoretical investigations understanding of an epistemology based upon the idea of emergent property and particular to System Theory. It is doubly unfortunate given the epistemological fruits System Theory has yielded in the investigations thus far. Indeed, there is only one remaining viable option. If neither System Theory itself nor any of its recorded interdisciplinary excursions lend themselves to the issue at hand, then the present investigation must build its own interdisciplinary bridge from its own original results. To where, however, might the investigation turn without risking a whimsical journey or, worse, being branded eclectic? Thankfully, there is no shortage of criteria. What is sought, first of all, is an interdisciplinary partner whose epistemological outlook incorporates, as foundational, an idea similar to that of emergent property. Furthermore, such a partner’s foundational epistemological idea must reflect a significant number of those aspects of emergent properties identified earlier. Second, any potential interdisciplinary partner must understand consciousness as spontaneously epistemologically engaging with phenomena as wholes. Moreover, it must understand such engagement as being rendered epistemological through the instantaneous creation of theoretical constructs projected upon such phenomena. Such a partner, therefore, must understand consciousness as constituted by a transcendental ability whereby consciousness applies itself to phenomena. In brief, consciousness must be understood as being of some phenomenon. Aside from, first, incorporating a foundational epistemological idea similar to emergent property and, second, understanding consciousness along the lines summarized above, any interdisciplinary partner’s epistemology must incorporate the Bertalanffyan epistemological objective of uncovering the essences of phenomena. It must do so, however, through an understanding whereby essences are posited as resident in phenomena themselves owing to epistemological necessity, such an understanding stemming from the manner in which consciousness epistemologically engages with such phenomena. Finally, any interdisciplinary partner must be able to answer the three questions regarding justificatory dynamics identified above. In other words, it must incorporate a theory of justificatory dynamics on von Bertalanffy’s terms. These basic criteria are summarized in Table 6.1. Any interdisciplinary partner must reflect the criteria in Table 6.1 if its outlook is to inform System Theory without thereby distorting it. The question, of course, is what this partner might be.

6.6 The way towards phenomenology Upon examination, there is one criterion in particular which recalls a primarily epistemological movement in philosophy. The understanding of consciousness calls for consciousness as being only ever of some phenomenon. The phrase ‘consciousness is only ever of something’ finds its most famous home in the phenomenological movement. It is worth briefly considering,

Justification  77 Table 6.1  Criteria required of any potential interdisciplinary partner to System Theory Fundamental epistemological idea Epistemological outlook incorporates, as foundational, an idea similar to that of emergent property Foundational epistemological idea reflects a significant number of the aspects of emergent properties Understanding of consciousness Consciousness is understood as spontaneously epistemologically engaging with phenomena as wholes Engagement of consciousness with phenomena is understood as being rendered epistemological through the instantaneous creation of theoretical constructs projected upon such phenomena Consciousness is understood as constituted by a transcendental ability whereby consciousness applies itself to phenomena or, equally, consciousness is understood as being of some phenomenon Underlying epistemological objective Underlying epistemological objective is to uncover the essences of phenomena Essences are understood as resident in phenomena because the manner in which consciousness epistemologically engages with such phenomena renders such an understanding epistemologically necessary Incorporation of justificatory dynamics Demonstration of the reason that consciousness’ creations–projections must be justified continually Epistemological explication of the process of continual justification Epistemological explication of the elimination of consciousness due to a halt in justificatory dynamics

therefore, whether phenomenology might promise the assistance required. This consideration begins with a note on the founder of phenomenology, Edmund Husserl. The Concise Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Routledge, 2000: 369) opens its entry on Husserl with the following observation:9 Through his creation of phenomenology, Edmund Husserl was one of the most influential philosophers of [the twentieth] century. He was decisive for most of contemporary continental philosophy, and he anticipated many issues and views in the recent philosophy of mind and cognitive science. However, his works were not reader-friendly, and he is more talked about than read. The reference to philosophy of mind and cognitive science signals that Husserl might at the very least provide some relevant input for the present concern with consciousness. A warning is sounded, however, that understanding

78  System theoretical investigations Husserl’s position will require some careful reading of his work or at least readings of respected interpreters and developers. What, however, is phenomenology, and how does it stand as a worthy interdisciplinary candidate for the present requirements? Phenomenology was born at the very turn of the twentieth century with the publication of Edmund Husserl’s (1970a) Logical Investigations. This work is described in the Routledge Encyclopedia (Routledge 2000: 670) as an ‘epoch-making source of the phenomenological movement in which the reflective-descriptive approach was radicalized and extended beyond the original epistemology of logic and mathematics’. Phenomenology, in other words, is primarily concerned with epistemology, as Sokolowski’s (2000) introductory text makes clear. The manner in which phenomenology approaches epistemology is through its cornerstone thesis about consciousness, which the Routledge Encyclopedia (Routledge 2000: 671), in its explication of phenomenological epistemology, describes as follows: The key thesis of phenomenology, drawn from Brentano, is that consciousness is intentional, that is, directed onto objects. Phenomenologists interpret this to mean that subjects and objects are essentially interrelated, a fact which any adequate account of subjects and objects must preserve. Two aspects here require attention: intentionality, and the claimed essential interrelation between consciousness and objects. First, for Husserl and phenomenology in general, the intentionality of consciousness is what distinguishes consciousness from other phenomena. An elementary understanding of this distinguishing activity is given in the Routledge Encyclopedia (Routledge 2000: 399): Intentionality is the mind’s capacity to direct itself on things. Mental states like thoughts, beliefs, desires, hopes (and others) exhibit intentionality in the sense that they are always directed on, or at, something: if you hope, believe or desire, you must hope, believe or desire something. Hope, belief, desire and any other mental state which is directed at something, are known as intentional states. Intentionality in this sense has only a peripheral connection to the ordinary ideas of intention and intending. An intention to do something is an intentional state, since one cannot intend without intending something; but intentions are only one of many kinds of intentional mental states. As Sokolowski (2000: 9) briefly puts it – thereby only echoing Husserl and all his heirs – ‘Consciousness is essentially consciousness “of ” something or other’. Now, if consciousness is always of, it is essentially a transcending activity, applying itself to phenomena – as deduced earlier from system theoretical relational characteristics. Indeed, for phenomenology, it is of

Justification  79 the very essence of consciousness to be only just this transcending activity. This position, which stems directly from the theory of intentionality, finds its most radical explication in one of Husserl’s most influential heirs: Jean-Paul Sartre (1960). As to the claimed essential correlation between consciousness and phenomena to which the Routledge Encyclopedia above refers, it is a correlation rendered essential precisely for epistemological possibility. Indeed, it cannot be overstated that phenomenology’s underlying project is first and foremost an epistemological project, something which is not at all obvious in some phenomenological works but which nevertheless underpins them all.10 So that when phenomenology identifies, primarily for epistemological reasons, an essential and hence unbreakable interrelation or correlation between consciousness and the phenomena it intends, this reflects System Theory, which has already identified that, on the epistemological plane, the relational characteristic and complexes constitute a system (see Chapter 5). Phenomenology’s understanding of consciousness appears to be meeting that of System Theory. Von Bertalanffy himself never explicitly aligned his epistemological deliberations with any epistemological school or movement, let alone phenomenology. Still, von Bertalanffy’s ‘doctrine of principles’ has been found to be a doctrine whose underlying aim is to uncover the essences of systems. This in itself points towards a theoretical alignment with phenomenology. For, in the same way that, for von Bertalanffy, a principle is that which pre-delineates what is possible for that of which it is a principle, for Husserl, ‘every essence necessarily pre-delineates what is possible for that of which it is an essence’ (Brainard, 2002: 80). Von Bertalanffy’s ‘doctrine of principles’ is an aspiration to eidetic philosophy,11 as Husserl (1931) referred to his own phenomenology – one, that is, which aims at the elucidation of essential being. In addition, it can (and will) be shown how and why Husserl’s phenomenology aims at the elucidation of essential being, allowing it to be favourably compared with von Bertalanffy’s view that essences are rendered epistemologically, as opposed to metaphysically, necessary. By drawing upon Natanson’s (1973) exemplary study on Husserlian phenomenology, the process of continual justification – itself proposed by Husserl (1998) – can (and will) be explicated, the reason why consciousness’ creations–projections must con­ tinually be justified can (and will) be demonstrated, and a distinctly epistemological description can (and will) be given of the elimination of consciousness arising from any halt in continual justification. Moreover, exactly such an explication provides a strong degree of theoretical support for System Theory’s sophisticated understanding of consciousness as permanently at risk of losing its distinctly epistemological active character, as noted in section 5.6. Phenomenology, therefore, presents itself as a particularly suitable candidate for informing System Theory’s epistemological outlook. Of course, System Theory is no stranger to phenomenology. System Theory has been drawing upon the writings of particular phenomenologists for quite some

80  System theoretical investigations time, and in quite some depth, in order to further inform its own aims.12 The present discussion, however, implies that, at least on the epistemological plane, in reading a text on phenomenology with an eye towards System Theory, what becomes increasingly appreciated is not so much how System Theory may profit from phenomenology but how the two schools share similar concerns and are governed by conceptual similarities – correspondences which promise a profound interdisciplinarity. Now, System Theory has betrayed a sophisticated and complex, although unfinished, epistemological theory stemming from the foundational role it attributes to the idea of emergent properties. If phenomenology is to be proved a worthy interdisciplinary partner in the quest for completion, an investigation of its own foundational epistemological idea is in order; for the value of phenomenology to System Theory may be measured according to the degree to which the foundational concepts of each theory reflect each other. Accordingly, the discussion, in crossing from the pure system theoretical realm into the phenomenological one, will begin by addressing those criteria which have yet to be explicitly accounted for. This calls for an introductory presentation of the manner in which phenomenology understands consciousness’ epistemological engagement with phenomena, followed by a presentation of phenomenology’s basic epistemological idea: the idea of identities. As the discussion will demonstrate, this fundamental epistemological idea in phenomenology directly reflects the idea of emergent property.

6.7 Conclusion This chapter has identified that consciousness’ theoretical creations– projections are understood by System Theory as targeting the essences of those phenomena with which consciousness epistemologically engages. In other words, consciousness’ creations–projections are eidetically inclined. Moreover, the essences in question – or what von Bertalanffy calls principles – have been appreciated as necessary not so much because of some metaphysical position as because of the manner in which System Theory itself understands consciousness. In other words, essences of phenomena have been rendered epistemologically necessary. When consciousness creates–projects some theory in order to allow for its epistemological engagement with some phenomenon, system, or set of interrelations, consciousness bypasses the phenomenon’s multifarious appearances and aims for what is essential to the phenomenon, for only such an essence serves to define the phenomenon. Now, consciousness might very well aim towards what is essential to systems. Its very creation–projection, however, is, at any one time, an instantaneous one. The earlier investigations already discussed that owing to such instantaneity the exactitude of consciousness’ creations–projections is rendered questionable. Not only has von Bertalanffy agreed about their questionable status: he has radicalized it. For von Bertalanffy, not only might a creation–projection by consciousness be liable to some form of justification:

Justification  81 consciousness’ creations–projections have to continually justify themselves. If they do not then consciousness, according to von Bertalanffy, is eliminated. The discussion has highlighted this assertion as the only remaining link whose explication would serve to provide a complete epistemology for System Theory based upon the idea of emergent property. System Theory, for its part, has been seen to be silent about the requirements for such an explication. The discussion, therefore, turned to searching for a suitable interdisciplinary partner who might help in the elaboration. Phenomenology was identified as closely reflecting a number of significant results thus far. The discussion also hinted at how phenomenology promises to reflect a number of other results. Overall, the strength of phenomenology as a promising interdisciplinary partner to System Theory was argued to lie in the manner in which the former’s foundational concept of identity reflects the latter’s foundational idea of emergent property. Prior to launching into such phenomenological investigations, consider how the present work sits within phenomenology as a whole. Phenomenology stems from epistemological concerns, and epistemology is its ultimate focus. A four-dimensional epistemological framework characterizes phenomenology. First, there is the tendency to argue against reductionism and naturalism (including psychological behaviourism and social scientific positivism) as viable approaches to epistemology. Although empiricism and rationalism are taken into account, neither alone is deemed sufficient to describe the rise and development of knowledge. This holistic tendency is already obvious in the investigations thus far into systemic epistemology and will be further explicated in the forthcoming investigations. Second, phenomenology argues for the primary influence of consciousness’ theoretical creations as a fundamental input to knowledge. This is reflected in its theory of intuition, which the forthcoming investigations will explicate as informing the system theoretical emphasis upon consciousness’ creation–projection which the investigations have already highlighted. Third, phenomenology reflects upon the manner in which consciousness intends phenomena or, in terms of the investigations thus far, projects itself upon them, as a fundamental influence to the development of knowledge. Finally, phenomenology uses all three of the above components in order to provide epistemological understanding of both particular instances and essential characteristics of groups of instances; in the case of the latter it is referred to as eidetic phenomenology. In addition, phenomenology is delineated by four interrelated tendencies. First, realistic phenomenology aims towards the elucidation of essences and so is concentrated around eidetic analyses of the sort already evident as relevant in the present investigations. Second, constitutive phenomenology accounts for knowledge of objects in terms of the manner in which consciousness engages with them or, more exactly, epistemologically engages with them, similar to the significance of the part that consciousness is playing as the present investigations continue to unfold. Third, hermeneutical phenomenology investigates the interpretive dimension yielded by the emphasis on intentionality and

82  System theoretical investigations intuition, two fundamental building blocks which will shortly contribute towards a systemic epistemology. Finally, existential phenomenology builds upon phenomenology’s epistemological insights in order to inform human existence in the world, in much the same way that the present epistemological investigations aim towards informing the existential ‘wars we deserve’ conclusion. The general significance of existential phenomenology, and in particular its relevance to the present investigations, cannot be underplayed. Since their beginning, the present investigations have been developing an understanding of System Theory as an epistemological theory or, at least, as a theory with significant strength for epistemological relevance. Phenomenology is, primarily, an epistemological theory. Phenomenology, however, goes beyond its epistemological focus by using epistemology to inform ontological and ethical issues. A similar conclusion was drawn for System Theory in the earlier contextual investigations. A good example of the manner in which phenomenology applies its epistemological developments is found in the manner in which phenomenology became existential phenomenology, implicitly in Husserl’s (1970b) late work and explicitly from Heidegger (1962) onwards. A perfect example is Jean-Paul Sartre’s (1958) Being and Nothingness which begins with an extensive analysis and description of the manner in which consciousness epistemologically engages with phenomena (as well as with itself), shifts the attention to the bodily self, and concludes with descriptions and analyses of human relations. Sokolowski (2000) indicates how the epistemological primacy in phenomenology can inform ethical issues. Pietersma (2000: 38), moreover, in his discussion of phenomenological epistemology, stresses that, for Husserl, epistemology determines the general philosophic strategy because of epistemic duties to which human beings are bound. Epistemological investigation, therefore, aside from informing ethical issues is, for phenomenology, itself a deeply ethical affair. This ethical appreciation of epistemology is a particularly relevant and significant perspective for a theory, such as System Theory, which hints that ‘we have the wars we deserve’. If the strength of System Theory lies in its being appreciated as an epistemological approach, and if it shares non-trivial similarities with phenomenology, might not such an appreciation, combined with the correspondences which exist between the two fields, lead, through an interdisciplinary effort, not only to the recognition of System Theory’s epistemic duties but also to the development of its very own epistemological theory? Might this not then contribute to System Theory’s methodological development? Might it not pave the way towards resolving, or at least informing, System Theory’s ethical (that is, practical) concerns? At the very least, might not an epistemological appreciation of System Theory, supported by phenomenology, be the route for informing the epistemological agenda handed down by Checkland, especially given that such an agenda – focusing as it does on the idea of emergent property – finds a convenient reflection in phenomenology’s epistemological approach, an approach with its own respective and corresponding focus on the idea of identity? Such is

Justification  83 the initial understanding and hope, and such are the initial questions which arise, when confronted with the very real possibility of an interdisciplinarity between System Theory and phenomenology. It will fall upon the ensuing chapters to articulate in finer detail how it is exactly that phenomenology can provide interdisciplinary assistance, and how exactly this contributes to an advanced understanding of System Theory. This chapter has highlighted how the investigations thus far reflect phenomenology’s framework and tendencies. There appears to be a non-trivial, interdisciplinary bridge between System Theory and phenomenology, two fundamentally similar approaches which find their respective strength in epistemology. The next two chapters turn to an explication of phenomenology’s foundational epistemological idea, the idea of identity. It will be shown that this idea reflects the idea of emergent property in System Theory. A strong foundation of interdisciplinarity will thus emerge, thus paving the way for phenomenology to provide some guidance for the explication of justificatory dynamics.

Notes 1 The statistical exponential equation states that, given a complex of a number of entities, a constant percentage of these elements decays or multiplies per unit time. 2 Such as Checkland, as discussed in section 3.3. 3 Italics added. 4 This is in line with the clarifications given in section 5.1. 5 Von Bertalanffy claims that the identification of such principles assists in the minimization of duplication evident across the range of cocooned disciplines, for it can be demonstrated that all such otherwise intrinsically different disciplines can associate themselves and their subject matter with such essential determinants. Such association on the part of the cocooned disciplines renders each principle in question transcendental to them all. 6 Alves (2000: 39–40), in his clear and concise exposition of the philosophy of science, confirms this by stressing that the demand for order is based upon the very necessity of survival. For Alves, philosophy of science understands that life does not exist without order, and neither does intelligent behaviour – if human beings did not need order to survive, they would not search for it. 7 Italics added. 8 Von Bertalanffy, coming from biology, explicitly writes that the ‘organism’ is eliminated. The context of his discussion, however, is primarily epistemological given that it concerns the manner in which consciousness epistemologically engages with phenomena. 9 The entry is written by Dagfin Føllesdal, a leading contemporary phenomenologist working out of Oslo, Harvard and Stanford Universities. 10 Take for example the work of Sartre (1958) who on the surface appears to be more concerned with ontology than epistemology when, in fact, he builds an ontology on detailed epistemological foundations. 11 From the Greek εíδος which refers to kind, shape, form or species; in other words, essential trait. 12 The work of Fuenmayor and colleagues, as published in numerous issues of the journal Systemic Practice and Action Research (previously Systems Practice), is a good example.

Part III

Phenomenological investigations

We may discover that in the guise of epistemology Husserl pursues interests that are essentially ontological. Emmanuel Levinas (1995)

7 Perception and intention

System Theory provided quite a sophisticated epistemological theory in need of some assistance for its complete development. The previous chapter identified that phenomenology might be able to lend a special hand. Accordingly, it was concluded that an investigation into phenomenology’s foundational epistemological idea is required. For, if similarities arise between this idea and emergent properties, then the promise of phenomenology will be strengthened. The ensuing discussion, although recognizing that System Theory is no stranger to phenomenology, does not assume any previous knowledge of this philosophical movement. There is no need, furthermore, for an elaborate exposition. What is required is enough to demonstrate that phenomenology can indeed help in completing the epistemology particular to System Theory. This chapter is therefore an introductory presentation of issues in phenomenology relevant to the concerns of the present investigations. In particular, this chapter serves as an introductory appreciation of (1) the dynamics between perceived appearances and the known objects to which they relate and (2) phenomenology’s theory of intentionality.1 As such, it furnishes some necessary background for the next chapter which will delve into intentionality in more detail, leading therein to a much-welcomed interdisciplinary result.

7.1 Appearances Understanding appearances is not merely a philosophical pastime. Human beings are surrounded by appearances and all problems are, at least in part, constituted by them. The Cartesian scientific method of analysing parts in order to understand wholes is one approach which attempts to understand the reality of what appear to be interrelated parts which constitute a whole.2 To appreciate the complexity of appearances, one need only consider the variety of means of communication: spoken through an enormous assortment of media (including radio, television, microphones, megaphones, telephones, and so on), and written through an equally generous assortment of other

88  Phenomenological investigations media (such as pencils, computers, typewriters, and so on). We compound the appearances of communication by its forms or objectives, so that we have advertising, company reports, propaganda, laws and regulations, lies, proofs and so forth. Visual communication modes further compound the matter. Appearances are also multiplied by the rich variety of languages available through which to communicate, with translation, synonyms and word definitions contributing effectively to this multiplier effect. Communication is modified by the mode used. The essence of what is being communicated regresses whilst a multitude of communicated appearances progress to the fore of our attention. This has led to interesting theories about the degree of correlation between nature and appearances (Baudrillard, 1983). The issue of appearances historically arises at the very initiation of philosophy and the task of reconciling them with unifying identities has been undertaken in many guises.3 Reductionism, for instance, may be understood as interested in appearances whereas System Theory may (as will be shown) be understood as interested in identities. The main problems with appearances, as with reductionism’s failure to understand parts against the background of emergent properties, include the potential they have to present fragments with no recognizable identity and, to complicate matters, the potential they hold of presenting themselves in multifarious, polymorphic, heterogeneous ways. The recognition of such heterogeneity has led to what has been called the ‘postmodern’ view4 whereby human experience is flooded by fragments without any wholes [and] by manifolds bereft of identity . . . We have bricolage and nothing else, and we think we can invent ourselves at random by assembling convenient and pleasing but transient identities out of the bits and pieces we find around us. We pick up fragments to shore against our ruin. (Sokolowski, 2000: 3–4).5 In the words of William Butler Yeats:6 Things fall apart; the centre cannot hold; Mere anarchy is loosed upon the world[.] Examples abound. In management research, for instance, Jackson (1995) argues that the so-called management ‘fads’ offer the fragments managers pick up to shore against their ruin.7 Reduced, as Jackson notes, to ‘continually finding new pieces of the jigsaw but failing to fit them in properly’,8 fads are management research in postmodern overdrive with paradoxes such as the claim to practical universality from ill-fitting parts. Moreover, Jackson manifestly expresses a general uneasiness when arguing that fads seem ‘to require us to give up thinking and reasoning anymore about justice and freedom and from pursuing progress and emancipation’. Such surrender may not be necessarily

Perception and intention  89 disastrous – although Jackson provides some disturbing social data to support his pessimism; it is, however, certainly suspicious. Jackson argues that, faced with Yeats’ ‘mere anarchy’, management thinking should not lose sight of Enlightenment values in order to reinstate some centre. These values – the prime examples of which are science, reason and logic – are seen to be the key to liberation from misery, superstition and irrationality. For Jackson, System Theory draws on the Enlightenment values in order to reinstate some centre – echoing von Bertalanffy’s distinctly eidetic focus seen in section 6.6. If a basic introduction to postmodernism is anything to go by (Powell, 1998), however, for the postmodernists these values are the cause of rationally administered death camps, death squads, Auschwitz, the First and Second World Wars, Hiroshima, Nagasaki, ecological disaster, various systems of totalitarianism, the ‘death of God’, the death of religion and morality in general, as well as of the central symbols, institutions and beliefs in Western (and other) cultures. Should this be the case, it is only for the postmodernists that the centre did not hold or went into a tailspin. For if life after the Enlightenment appeared to continue as ‘nasty, brutish and short’ – to borrow Hobbes’ (1914: 289–297) much-quoted phrase – it is no fault of the Enlightenment which at least revealed the light at the end of the tunnel. A set of values cannot be expected to change the course of human history; there is only the hope that it might positively do so, and the continuing struggle. If postmodernism is indeed the aggressive anti-Enlightenment reaction which it is portrayed to be, it simultaneously has failed to provide an alternative foundation which may be theoretically and empirically plausible. Although, when approached as cultural and social commentary, postmodernism makes for stimulating reading, philosophically it suffers from an essential fault: the use of a critical ability, presented as emancipatory, in order to assert the falsity of reality, the falsity of hope and the falsity of values. Though the world appears de-centred after postmodernism, nature herself, as Hume (1985: 316) notes, suffices to cure the melancholy and delirium of such negation. For consciousness necessarily requires a centre, it is a human necessity without which consciousness cannot relate to anything, as Laszlo (1972: 11–12) explains: Even the myths of so-called primitive societies are now found to be highlevel order-seeking enterprises – ‘sciences of the concrete.’ Ethical norms, aesthetic sensibilities, and, in general, the organization of behavior, both civilized and primitive, appear to be based on a search for order and coherence. Seeking such order is in accord with those very processes upon which our entire way of life is built. Where System Theory talks of parts and emergent properties, phenomenology talks of appearances and identities. In the same way that System Theory is concerned with explicating parts not as isolable elements but through their systemic interrelationships, and hence through their relational unity,

90  Phenomenological investigations phenomenology is concerned with explicating appearances through the unity, or identity, of the objects which generate them. Consciousness needs wholes, not fragments; it needs identities, not unrelated manifolds. In needing them, it actively seeks them out and finds them – or, at the very least, creates them – otherwise consciousness’ epistemological engagement with, or experience of, phenomena would be impossible, as discussed in section 6.4. Yet, where previously there existed overt centres such as religion or the ideals of science and progress, with the advent of postmodernism there is a very real feeling that ‘nothing’ has replaced such centres. The shape of this ‘nothing’ comes in the form of bricolage, as Sokolowski mentioned earlier, so that if ‘we pick up fragments to shore against our ruin’ it is to shore against the ruins of an already fragmentary, makeshift, transient identity, a rope of sand. Even if the death of religion and the collapse of the authority of science are granted, however, it does not necessarily follow that centres of substance have altogether disappeared. Aside from arguing that parts are understood only against the background of appropriate wholes and that manifolds of appearance harbour identities or principles, System Theory demands of consciousness the exercise of responsibility and truthfulness. Indeed, the Bertalanffyan eidetic foundation in System Theory is included because a consciousness which aims at the essence as opposed to just the appearances is one which is exercising responsibility in the pursuit of truth. Phenomenology’s theory of intentionality is similarly inclined.

7.2 Introductory notes to the theory of intentionality The theory of intentionality is, in short, this: consciousness intends phenomena. This, however, already says too much and too little, for it presents too much ambiguity whilst ignoring the other, equally foundational, phenomenological theory: the theory of intuition. For the moment, the focus is strictly on intentionality, with the theory of intuition to be tackled later. For the present introductory purposes, the discussion will draw upon Husserl’s Cartesian Med­ itations (1995), Paris Lectures (1998) and Experience and Judgment (1973). To say that consciousness intends phenomena is to say that it directs itself towards them, but not in the manner of an eye directing itself towards objects it perceives. A crucial distinction exists between perception and intention – not a difference, for neither can exist epistemologically without the other.9 The following introductory notes on intentionality will be based upon this distinction, resulting in an explication of the relationship between intention and perception. There is a need to be quite explicit and accurate about the meaning of the verb to intend and the meaning of the noun phenomena and to emphasize that they constitute, respectively, an act and an object strictly related only to consciousness. This is in contrast to perception, which is undertaken only by biologically identifiable organs,10 the fundamental difference

Perception and intention  91 being that, whereas consciousness intends phenomena, biological organs perceive appearances. 7.2.1

An analogy: hearing and listening

As an analogy of the difference between perception and intention, it is useful to consider the distinction between hearing and listening. The ear hears and the ear is also important to listening, but whereas the ear is necessary to hearing (one cannot hear without ears), it is not sufficient to listening. To understand this distinction, consider that an ear hears noise – cacophony, for instance, is heard, it is not listened to. One, however, listens to a melody, to a tune, to a symphony, that is, to interrelated sounds. Consider also that one hears a noise in the tranquil night, and then one listens out for further noises. Why is it that one hears the first noise but subsequently listens out for further noises – what is this ‘listening out’? The tranquil night is a system of tranquillity particular to the night. A car may be heard passing by, music may be heard playing low from the neighbours – all such sounds being parts of the night tranquillity. That is, they blend into one another forming the system of night tranquillity. One listens to such tranquillity, for instance, whilst sitting on the porch outside; one does not hear it. One hears the passing car but one listens to the night’s tranquillity. Hearing is of one sound abstracted from the blend of sounds listened to. An unexpected sound one hears in the midst of this tranquillity is noise – in the statistical sense of the term, in that the sound does not fit the distribution of the other variables; it does not form part of the system of night sounds; it is sudden, unrelated, new. It is a singular sound. In a word, it is abstract. What one listens out for is another sound, perhaps the same, in order to place the singular, unexpected sound into the system of night tranquillity, either as an outlier (e.g. a burglar is on the prowl) or within the bulk of the distribution of sounds (e.g. a cat is rummaging through the garbage) – one is listening for the melody of the night tranquillity as constituted not only by all the previous familiar sounds but, now, also by this newcomer. Listening, then, includes anticipation as much as hearing – it is a creative act, unlike hearing which is completely passive. In listening, the ear is important, but so also is something else: an anticipatory and creative element of this listening qua listening and thus not reducible to hearing. This anticipatory and creative element is a fundamental activity of con­ sciousness. Cacophony is only heard because it defeats consciousness’ efforts to create an audible system. Cacophony is the paradigm of what human understanding would be like if consciousness was merely a passive receiver – broadly speaking, if the human being was merely a ‘hearer’.11 The unexpected singular sound is noise precisely in the fact that the ear has grasped it only once, from a limited perspective, from one audible angle, from one side so to speak. Consciousness may anticipate and create

92  Phenomenological investigations possibilities linked to this one sound, but such anticipations, such possibilities are not much more developed than the hearing of the singular sound. Consciousness’ creations remain on the level of cacophony, so to speak. With each repetition of the sound, or of other different sounds, consciousness’ creations transcend cacophony and become understanding, that is, knowledge. The unexpected sound in the midst of the night’s tranquillity causes anxiety precisely because consciousness’ knowledge of it remains on the level of cacophony. Consciousness has no knowledge of the sound except as a sudden appearance characterized by its equally sudden disappearance. Hearing is not an epistemological faculty, listening is. Additionally, of the two, listening is the systemic faculty par excellence. Epistemological development and systemicity are inextricably bound together. The analogy may be summarized as follows. Hearing necessarily requires the biological organ of the ear. The types of sounds heard are abstracted, singular. The act of hearing is passive. The manner of grasping the abstracted, singular sound is once, from a limited perspective, from one audible angle. The knowledge acquired of the sound is next to nothing, that is, it is knowledge that an abstracted, singular sound has been passively heard once from an audible angle: knowledge is tautological to hearing. On the other hand, the biological organ of the ear is not sufficient for listening. The types of sounds listened to are blended, interrelated. The act of listening is active, anticipatory, creative. The manner of grasping sound is as a temporal whole – that is, of grasping it along a temporal dimension. The knowledge of sound is a developed knowledge, that is, it transcends the individual sounds as singular, temporal contributors to the whole and it also transcends each instantaneous sound of the constituted whole (when, for instance, in memory it is appreciated as a whole).12 The results are tabulated in Table 7.1. Although, of the two, listening is the epistemological faculty, the moment of hearing forms part of the possibility of epistemological development for, without it, listening would have no information to work on. Hearing feeds into listening, in this respect, and listening renders contextual identity to the sounds heard. Sitting on the porch outside, one is a hearing–listening subject. Finally, hearing can be identified with a particular biological organ: the Table 7.1  Aspects of hearing and of listening Hearing

Listening

Biological organ Type of sound

Necessary Abstracted, singular

Act

Passive

Not sufficient Blended, interrelated Active, anticipatory, creative

Manner of grasping sound

Once, limited perspective, one angle, one side

As a temporal whole

Epistemological status of sound

Next to nothing, tautological

Developed

Perception and intention  93 ear. Listening, however, is not so easily correlated. The fundamental reason is that listening is not reducible to hearing, as the above analysis has shown. Although related to hearing, listening is on an altogether different experiential dimension of what, fundamentally, is the same raw material: sound. Activities correlated singularly with biologically identifiable organs are, in essence, activities of receiving, that is, passive activities, or, in other terms, activities of suffering. Hearing, for instance, is a passive activity in that it receives sounds, it suffers them. Hearing can make nothing else of these sounds without going beyond them, that is, without actively transcending them. This transcending is what enables the received sounds to be listened to as melodies, as cats in the garbage, as purposeful speech, as cars passing by and so forth – it is a transcendence necessary for reasons of understanding, that is, an epistemological transcendence. Listening, therefore, is the transcendent epistemological dimension, the experience of going beyond raw data in order to come back to them as known raw data. To conclude with a specific point: hearing is an experiential dimension of suffering, listening is an epistemological experiential dimension. 7.2.2

Perceiving and intending

Perception has come to be so closely associated with knowledge that it takes some considerable effort to appreciate that perception is void of knowledge, indeed is the handmaiden of knowledge. This is true to such an extent that the statement ‘to perceive, or see, a car’ is false. What is perceived is one side of the car, an abstraction from the rest of the car. This abstraction alone is not enough to enable the entry of the term ‘car’ into the statement, for ‘car’ implies the object as a whole, in its three dimensions, whereas the perception is confined to only two. One might argue that depth is perceived and thus so is the third dimension which thus allows for perception to infer ‘car’. However, there is nothing in pure perception that enables the ‘perception of depth’, let alone inference, as is easily shown when attempting to find the way through mazes of mirrors in fun fairs – ‘perception of depth’ is also a false statement. In order for the statement ‘to see a car’ to be true, a significant leap is required beyond the two-dimensional perception; a leap of creativity, that is, of creating a three-dimensional cognition from a two dimensional perception, a leap which anticipates future two-dimensional appearances in order to sustain the cognition’s three-dimensional creation ‘car’ (Husserl, 1995: 44–46; 1998: 18–19). This leap is known as intentionality. It will be observed that intentionality has been ascribed the very same creative and anticipatory nature earlier attributed to consciousness (see sections 7.1 and 7.2.1; see also Chapter 6). Indeed, whereas a biologically identifiable organ, the eye, perceives, intending is the function of consciousness. More correctly, the eye is perception incarnate and consciousness is intentionality.13

94  Phenomenological investigations ‘Car’ is a label for that epistemological creation intended by consciousness and justified through future perceptions undertaken by the eye. ‘Depth’ is also an epistemological creation intended by consciousness; however, with depth, it is justified not simply through visual perception but through a combination of sensory perceptions, and ultimately through the movement of the entire human body in space. Mazes of mirrors precisely augment perception to the detriment of intention resulting in minimal epistemological development and, thus, a disorientation of consciousness.14 Husserl (1995: 47) argues that it is not only ‘sight things’ which are characterized as two-dimensional appearances; the ‘ “things” of the other senses [also] have in themselves the character of appearances.’ Thus, the human being experiences the world in three dimensions not simply by being constituted by a three-dimensional biological body. It is the intentionality of consciousness which enables the human being to experience the world, including one’s own body, not only in three spatial dimensions but also in a fourth temporal dimension. It is the intentionality of consciousness which illuminates the third and fourth dimensions of experience – those dimensions crucial to biological survival. The human being is biologically constituted by a three-dimensional body but this is not known perceptibly (i.e. biologically), it is known intentionally (i.e. through consciousness). On the one hand, therefore, the human being is, physically, biologically constituted and, on the other hand, it embodies a non-biologically identifiable consciousness. The former opens two dimensions of space to the human being, the latter illuminates the third spatial dimension and the fourth temporal dimension. The human being is a systemic constitution of perceiving–intending.15 The two-dimensional perceptible references are known as appearances, so that perceiving is always perceiving of appearances. The four-dimensional references intended by consciousness are known as phenomena, so that intending is always intending of phenomena. Phenomena, by their very definition, are intended as wholes and, more exactly, as temporal wholes. Listening is an intentional activity, temporally blending sounds into a whole melody. As with listening, moreover, intended phenomena are open to justification so that not only are individual contributory intended phenomena transcendable, but the intention itself of one particular phenomenon is transcendable (Husserl, 1995: 57–58; 1998: 22–23). Husserl (1973: 88) explains justification through the example of perceiving an appearance which is intended as a ‘uniformly red, uniformly spherical’ ball. Each successive appearance transcends the intended phenomenon by fulfilling this intentionality more and more as ‘uniformly red, uniformly spherical’ ball – that is, each individual contributory intended phenomenon is transcended towards greater fulfilment. ‘But now,’ says Husserl, in the progress of perception, a part of the back side, not [perceived] at first, is gradually revealed; and, in opposition to the original [intention], which ran ‘uniformly red, uniformly spherical,’ there emerges a

Perception and intention  95 consciousness of otherness which disappoints the anticipation: ‘not red, but green,’ ‘not spherical, but dented.’ Thus the intention itself, ‘uniformly red, uniformly spherical’, of a phenomenon is transcended towards an intention of ‘non-uniformly red, also green, dented sphere’. By appreciating listening as an intentional activity, the earlier analogical results hold for the differences between perceiving and intending. Perceiving necessarily requires a biologically identifiable organ. The types of references perceived are abstracted, singular appearances. The act of perception is passive; perception merely receives raw data, appearances. Perception is the grasping of the abstracted, singular, limited perspective only once: the perception of the same appearance more than once is, if only due to memory, strictly speaking, intention. Knowledge of abstractions through perception is next to nothing, tautological. On the other hand, biologically identifiable organs are not sufficient for intending. The types of references intended are blended references, wholes, interrelated references otherwise known as phenomena. The act of intention is active, anticipatory of further appearances (even the same appearances), creative. The manner of intending phenomena, of grasping them, is as wholes. The knowledge of such phenomena is a developed knowledge; that is, it transcends the individual perceptible appearances as singular contributors to the whole, and also transcends each instantaneous intention of the intended whole. The results are summarized in Table 7.2.

7.3 Objective phenomena and intended phenomena It is important to be clear that, for phenomenology, there are objective phenomena, whereby objective means external to consciousness. There Table 7.2  Aspects of perceiving and of intending Biological organ Type of reference Act Manner of grasping reference

Epistemological status of reference Dimensional nature Temporal

Perceiving

Intending

Necessary Abstracted, singular, appearance Passive Once, limited perspective, one angle, one side

Not sufficient Blended, interrelated, phenomenon Active, anticipatory, creative As a whole, or at least more than once, not from a singularly limited perspective although from a limited number of perspectives; more than one angle or side Developed

Next to nothing, tautological Two spatial dimensions Third spatial dimension and fourth temporal dimension No Yes

96  Phenomenological investigations are intended phenomena, whereby intended means the manner in which consciousness epistemologically engages with objective phenomena.16 For example, there might be a cube as an objective phenomenon. Consciousness, however, might intend it – and so epistemologically engage with it – as a rectangular block. Only through further perceptions of appearances might consciousness ultimately intend it as a cube. Justificatory dynamics of identities depend upon perceiving a series of positive actualities of appearances – as System Theory has already noted.17 Indeed, the relevance of intentionality to the theory of emergent properties is already apparent. Perception perceives appearances, that is, it perceives only parts of an objective phenomenon. Given its externality to consciousness, these appearances are the necessary ways in which the objective phenomenon manifests itself to consciousness. Unlike perception, intentionality does not direct itself at the appearances but, through them, reaches out to the objective phenomenon as a whole. This whole is not some manner in which the objective phenomenon manifests itself – it is the complete objective existence of the phenomenon. Whereas, therefore, appearances are partial manifestations of the objective phenomenon, views of the objective phenomenon from outside it, manners in which the objective phenomenon presents itself to the world external to it, the term phenomenon signifies the very existence of the objective phenomenon as a complete entity, as a whole, and intentionality is the understanding of this very existence, of the objective phenomenon from inside it so to speak, the attempt to experience the objective phenomenon as it experiences itself as a whole. An intended phenomenon, therefore, is not some representation, in the mind, of the objective phenomenon – it is consciousness applying or throwing itself onto the objective phenomenon existing as a complete entity. The transcendental ability attributed by System Theory to consciousness is not lost to phenomenology. Husserl (1998: 17) stresses that ‘synthesis [is] the unique and fundamental characteristic of consciousness’.18 Indeed, as Sartre (1939) notes, consciousness grasps the objective phenomenon, battles with its ‘horror’ and its ‘charm’; for consciousness does not come to know anything, does not exist, in epistemological terms, within some internal retreat because, as Sartre continues, ‘ultimately, everything is outside, everything, even ourselves: outside, out in the world, amongst others’; epistemological initiation and development happens ‘on the street, in the city, in the middle of the crowd, a thing among things, a man amongst men’. Phenomenology retains phenomena as complete entities external to consciousness; perceiving is but an initial, as yet incomplete step, to bringing such entities to light as complexes. Intending enables knowledge of such entities as the phenomena they are; that is, as the complete entities as they exist external to consciousness. Consciousness is not inside itself, it is out in the reality of the world.

Perception and intention  97

7.4 The epistemological systemicity between perception and intention It is appropriate to state now – and here, Bergson (1911: 136–137), in discussing intelligence and instinct, provides a most reasoned warning19 – that the distinction made between perception and intentionality is too sharply drawn. Although it has been drawn in order to define what is intentional in intentionality and what is perceptible in perception, all intentionality is mingled with perception and all perception is penetrated by intentionality. Thus, the distinction drawn provides, as Bergson says, ‘only the mean position above and below which both constantly oscillate.’ Indeed, as the present investigations delve deeper into phenomenology, the outlines are somewhat softened in order, as Bergson says, to ‘replace the rigidity of a diagram by the suppleness of life.’ Paraphrasing some of Bergson’s insights allows for a taste of the suppleness in question.20 For instance, no doubt inferences are made from perceptions, ‘but inference, which consists in an inflection of past experience in the direction of present experience, is already a beginning of [intentionality]’21 (Bergson, 1911: 138). Perception, considered in its original features as described in section 7.2.2, provides, in appearances, the tools to make knowledge, in other words, to generate intended phenomena. Its distinctive feature is to indefinitely vary such tools, which variation develops knowledge (Bergson, 1911: 139). Intentionality, perfected, constructs and uses organized references, i.e. phenomena. Perception, perfected, perceives and uses unorganized references, i.e. appearances (Bergson, 1911: 140). Justificatory dynamics of identities have been stipulated to depend upon perceiving a series of positive actualities of appearances; however, epistemologically, perception is more dependent on intentionality than intentionality on perception, for the emergence of knowledge from crude appearances involves a degree of organization superior to perception, a degree that knowledge cannot attain save on the wings of intentionality (Bergson, 1911: 142). For epistemology, perception and intentionality represent two divergent attempted solutions of one and the same problem: the problem of the emergence of knowledge. At times the history of philosophy has favoured one (e.g. realism, materialism, objectivism) over the other22 (e.g. idealism, rationalism, subjectivism, respectively). This history implies that perception and intentionality are two radically different kinds of knowledge. Given that the epistemological status of the perceived reference was seen to be ‘next to nothing, tautological’, can some knowledge be attributed to perceiving, thus justifying philosophy’s occasional bent towards perception? For Bergson (1911: 148), since intentionality is of objective phenomena, whatever knowledge is associated with intentionality is knowledge of things, or wholes – as was discussed above. Since perception is of appearances, here, of course, there is next to no knowledge of things as wholes. Perception, however,

98  Phenomenological investigations implies that we move round the object, [and so perceptual knowledge] depends on the point of view at which we are placed and on the symbols by which we express ourselves . . . [Perceptual knowledge] may be said to be relative. (Bergson, 1912: 21) In contrast to intentionality, then, which implies that ‘we enter into’ an object, thereby dispensing with point of view and symbols – dispensing even with any dependence upon the means of perception through sense organs – providing thus the path towards essential knowledge23 (Bergson, 1912: 21), perceptual knowledge, dependent as it is on ‘moving round the object’, enables knowledge of relations as each appearance of the object is perceived. Thus, perception may be appreciated as knowledge of a form, and intentionality as knowledge of a matter (Bergson, 1911: 149). Indeed, it is exactly upon such knowledge of relations that the justificatory dynamics of identities depend.24 If a concise statement of the relationship between perception and intentionality is required, Bergson (1911: 151) provides one which is most succinct: There are things that [perception] alone is able to seek, but which, by itself, it will never find. These things [intentionality] alone could find; but it will never seek them. In short, no matter the dependence of justificatory dynamics of identities on perceptible actualities of appearances, Bergson is but confirming the inherent systemic dependence that phenomenology and System Theory ascribe between the intention of identities and the perception of appearances for the emergence of knowledge.

7.5 Conclusion As the discussion turns, in the next chapter, to a deeper investigation which focuses more on intentionality’s identities, it is worth highlighting certain basic results which will prove relevant in the forthcoming investigations. First, intentionality, being an activity which transcends any number of appearan­ ces, and one which grasps phenomena as wholes, can already be appreciated as that which grasps phenomena as systems. Indeed, the above has served to show that the systems System Theory sees are but the phenomena phenomenology sees. Second, aside from any instantaneity as attributed by von Bertalanffy, the anticipatory streak in intentionality indicates that its creations– projections will require some participation in justificatory dynamics. Indeed, if intentionality is essentially anticipatory, as described here, then justificatory dynamics are unavoidable, as von Bertalanffy seems to have understood. Third, intentionality has already begun to betray an eidetic inclination in that it aims for knowledge of the objective phenomenon from inside it – for

Perception and intention  99 only such inside knowledge serves to yield knowledge of the phenomenon as a system or set of interrelations. Such results serve to support phenomenology as a strong interdisciplinary partner to System Theory. With such a positive initial excursion into phenomenology, the next chapter examines intentionality in more detail in order to conclude with further evidence of the value of phenomenology to System Theory.

Notes 1 Phenomenology’s theory of intentionality will be further elaborated upon in the ensuing chapters. 2 In systems thinking, Checkland’s (1999) Soft Systems Methodology may similarly be understood as a system theoretical attempt to tackle the conflicts of perception which arise through appearances and the understanding of them. The field of organizational learning can also be appreciated as an attempt in management thinking to formalize understanding of appearances as experienced by groups of human beings – Arie de Geus (1988, 1997) and Pierre Wack (1985a,b) provide foundational ideas in this respect. 3 Consider, for instance, Plato’s theory of Forms. 4 Postmodernism is notoriously difficult to define – even the most basic of introductory texts acknowledges this (Powell, 1998). For the purposes here it suffices to understand postmodernism as a movement which aligns itself towards fragmentation and capricious assembling of fragments with no central reference point – this understanding is confirmed in The Penguin Dictionary of Philosophy (Mautner, 2000: 439). For a contemporary overview on postmodernism see Baggini (2002). 5 This chapter, as well as the next, will draw to some degree upon Sokolowski’s Introduction to Phenomenology. What sets Sokolowski’s book apart from other introductory texts to phenomenology is that he does not seek to explain what any particular phenomenologist has written or done. It simply ‘just tell[s] people what phenomenology is . . . offer[ing] the possibility of philosophical thinking at a time when such thinking is seriously called into question or largely ignored’ (2000: 2). Another introductory text which comes close to this achievement, and additionally traces Husserl’s development in a clear manner, is Stewart and Mickunas’ (1990) Exploring Phenomenology. 6 From his poem The Second Coming. 7 Fontrodona and Domènec (2002) also provide a good overview of the faddism suffered by management thought. 8 Italics added. 9 The case of intended phenomena not based on direct perception but based upon imagination (e.g. the case of intending a unicorn) will not be considered here, although it is appreciated that such intended phenomena are a central issue in phenomenology. This is not to say that intended phenomena based upon imagination contradict the present discussion. In particular, as with physical phenomena which exist external to consciousness, imagined phenomena do not reside in consciousness but are available publicly. If they were not, it would be impossible to talk about them intersubjectively. 10 Historically, perception has been discussed as sense perception, reserving the ability to perceive to the five senses of sight, touch, hearing, smell and taste, corresponding respectively to the biologically identifiable sense organs of eyes, skin, ears, nose and mouth. An understanding of perception would be incomplete if it were limited to visual perception. For present purposes, however, even the historical understanding of perception as sense perception is limiting, which is why the

100  Phenomenological investigations

11 12

13

14 15

16

17

18 19

20

term ‘biologically identifiable organs’ has been used. This term is wide enough to include the human body in its entirety and, strictly speaking, all aspects of the biological human body are capable of some degree of sense perception, especially touch. The brain, being enclosed in the skull and so having no direct external contact, is a more difficult case. Given that it is biologically structured (and so identifiable) as other organs, then this, too, is considered here as being an organ possessing sense perception. It must be noted that, in the present discussion, the brain is not to be equated with consciousness: whereas the latter specifically and only reaches out into the world, there is no explanation of how the brain qua biological organ can get beyond itself (Sokolowski, 2000: 9–10; Rowlands, 2001). In the language of systems thinking, it would be wise to view consciousness less as a substantial entity and more as an emergent property of the biological body. This view underpins Merleau-Pontyan phenomenology and, more recently, Catalano’s argument that ‘the whole body thinks’ (2000: 1). Deconstructionists have extended this line of reasoning to conclude that readers, not authors, create meaning in a text – the human observer becoming an agent in determining what there is. Perhaps a visual analogy is useful here. Appreciation of a still-life whilst it is being painted transcends the individual strokes of the brush. If not, there is no appreciation of what is understood as ‘still-life in progress’. When it is completed, appreciation of the work of art transcends any particular brushstroke of the constituted whole. The syntax implies that consciousness is not some substantial entity which first exists only to intend later, but that consciousness is the very activity of intending. Phrases such as ‘consciousness intends’ or ‘intended by consciousness’ suggest a substantial – as opposed to purely active – attribution to consciousness (Sartre, 1958, 1960). Such a disorientation is equal to consciousness losing control of its engagement with phenomena, in part owing to having its attempts at justification thwarted. As Bergson (1988: 221–223, 247–249) has discussed, this idea can be extended to all other living organisms where the distinction between sense organs and consciousness compared to the same distinction in human beings is one of degree, not one of ontological kind (Matthews, 1999). Willard (1995) confirms this: Husserlian phenomenology accords an ‘independence of the object or objectivity from the act and mind that grasps it in knowledge (epistemological realism)’. Koestenbaum (Husserl, 1998: xxxi–xxxvi) also makes this clear when discussing intentionality in his introduction to Husserl’s Paris Lectures. Chapter 5 began by noting that ‘the [intended] relational characteristic emerges from the active actuality of interrelations’. The further, volitional (intentional) understanding of the relational characteristic also confirmed the influential role that appearances exert upon justificatory dynamics, in this case through the manifest relations they exhibit between themselves. This is echoed in Husserl’s Cartesian Meditations (1995: 41–43). Bergson’s ‘intelligence’ and ‘instinct’ can be read as phenomenology’s ‘perception’ and ‘intention’, respectively. It is not surprising that the passages in which he discusses intelligence and instinct (1911: 137–153), when read in terms of perception and intention, provide a most useful introduction to phenomenology; for Bergson has always been recognized as, if not a precursor to, then a close affiliate of phenomenology. Some common points central to both Bergson’s philosophy and phenomenology include a return to consciousness in order to counter positivism and scientism, an intimate linking of time with subjectivity, and a recourse to intuition against symbolic constructions. It should be noted that adhering too much to this suppleness can result in

Perception and intention  101

21 22 23 24

terminological confusion. For instance, when introducing Husserl’s Paris Lectures, Koestenbaum (Husserl, 1998: xxxi) rightly discusses ‘the contraposition of the object as a unit with the obviously multifarious ways in which it appears’. In this discussion, he states: ‘The relation between the believed object and the actual presentations from which it emerges is one of the major problems in epistemology.’ Strictly speaking, what is at issue is the relation between the intended (not believed) object and the perceived (as opposed to merely actual) presentations. In fact, when the present investigations later turn to the theory of intuition, it will be seen that the correct terminology should be intuited (not merely intended) object. Bergson writes ‘invention’. Intentionality, in so far as it is a transcending of appearances, is indeed invention. Whereas phenomenology insists on their inseparable momentary relationship as constitutive of the system of knowledge. In other words, knowledge of essences. As noted in section 7.2.2, and especially illustrated through Husserl’s sphere example.

8 Emergent properties and identities

The previous chapter furnished an introductory presentation of the manner in which phenomenology understands consciousness’ epistemological engagement with phenomena. A number of points were highlighted as reflecting the understanding of System Theory. This chapter turns to phenomenology’s fundamental epistemological idea, the idea of identity, with the purpose of demonstrating the extent to which this idea reflects the idea of emergent property in System Theory. The demonstration in question will draw upon an example well outlined by Sokolowski (2000: 17–21): the perception of a cube. Not only is this by far the easiest of examples to use, albeit one which concentrates on visual perception; it is one which most clearly allows for the elucidation of the similarity between System Theory’s emergent properties and phenomenology’s identities. Sokolowski’s choice of a cube reflects Husserl’s (1995) well-developed example of a die. Indeed, Sokolowski’s Introduction, from which this discussion draws, is strongly Husserlian. The phenomenological idea of identity presented here, therefore, is one based upon Husserl’s own thought. The discussion begins with an outline of the dynamics of perception of appearances, which outline will lead towards an explication of phenomenological identities. This will serve to further the understanding of intentionality and to explicate the equation between such identities and system theoretical emergent properties.

8.1 The dynamics of perception of appearances: the cube example In the perception of a cube, Sokolowski notes a number of initial points. The cube is perceived from only one angle or perspective at a time. It is not possible to perceive it from all vantage points at once. It is thus essential to the perceptual experience of a cube that the perception be partial, with only one part of it being directly given at any moment. Moreover, it is not the case that the sides that are visible from the present viewpoint are the only sides consciously experienced. There is a co-intention of the hidden sides; a seeing

Emergent properties and identities  103 of more than what strikes the eye. The presently visible sides, therefore, are related to the potentially visible but actually absent sides. Absent sides, then, are also experienced, but precisely as absent (as anticipated). These immediate observations may be summarized in Figure 8.1. The experience has two dimensions, one belonging to the phenomenon intended1 and one belonging to the intending consciousness. The former may be labelled the objective dimension and the latter the subjective dimension: the former echoing the externality which phenomenology ascribes to phenomena (see section 7.3), the latter referring to those dynamics particular to consciousness in its intending of objective phenomena. Objectively, what is given when a phenomenon such as a cube is intended is a blend made up of perceptible sides that are present and sides that are absent but co-intended. It belongs to the being of the cube to be given in this way to consciousness; the phenomenon involves a mixture of the present and the absent – it does not completely reveal itself all at once. Intentionality, for its part, necessarily co-intends absent sides, otherwise its anticipatory identities would not be possible. Subjectively, the intention is a blend consisting of filled and empty intentions, that is, respectively, intentions directly related and based upon the perception of the present sides and intentions based upon a transcending, by consciousness, of the present sides towards the hidden, unperceived sides. Filled intentions, then, are ‘filled’ precisely by the ability to directly perceive, whereas empty intentions are precisely ‘empty’ of direct perception. Parts of the intention refer to what is presently perceived whilst other parts creatively leap in anticipation towards what is absent (those ‘other sides’ of the phenomenon). It belongs to the intending consciousness to operate in this

Seen from one angle/perspective The sides that are visible from the present viewpoint are not the only sides experienced Cannot see from all sides at once There is a co-intention of the hidden sides; seeing more than what strikes the eye It is essential to the experience of a cube that the perception be partial, with only one part of it being directly given at any moment

Presently visible sides are related to potentially visible but actually absent sides

Absent sides are ‘seen’; that is, are also experienced - but precisely as absent

Figure 8.1  Preliminary observations on perceiving a cube

104  Phenomenological investigations manner, whereby the empty and the filled intentions are equally important in understanding that what is perceived is a phenomenon of such-and-such. These results can be generalized in relation to all phenomena that consciousness intends, including, for instance, problem situations as tackled by Soft Systems Methodology (Checkland, 1999). All phenomena or problem situations are perceived from one angle/perspective, not from all sides at once – this is an epistemological cornerstone of Soft Systems Methodology. It is essential to the experience of a situation that the perception/description of the situation be partial at any one time. It is not the case that the perception/ description from the present viewpoint is the only one capable of being experienced, for there is a co-intention of the absent, implied or hidden angle and one always sees/guesses/expects more than what strikes the eye, so to speak. Thus, the present perception/description is related to potential but hidden/ unstated elements. The absent elements are experienced as absent and in need of explication; absent elements flank the current presence, they put it into a context, place it into a background which recedes in order to focus on the presence. The uncovering of Weltanschauungen as well as the iterations of Soft Systems Methodology may be seen as attempts to continually uncover the absent and to magnify the contextual detail of the situation in the service of providing it with some identity which can then guide engagement. Aside from such immediate observations, Sokolowski differentiates three interrelated layers of perception: perception of sides, of aspects and of profiles. All three are systemically related in giving a complete perception. First, the cube can be presented in any one of its six sides, as in Figure 8.2. In the same way that the cube can be given in different sides, a side can be given in different ways, depending, for example, on the angle of observation. These different ways in which sides may be presented are called aspects, as shown in Figure 8.3. If a side faces an observer directly, it has the aspect of a square, if it is turned at an angle it has the aspect of a trapezoid, and so forth. All these aspects are transitively, that is, through the sides, also aspects of the cube. Thus far, sides and aspects can be understood as belonging strictly to the cube, that is, to the objective dimension of the perception of the cube. It belongs to the cube to be given in different sides, of which aspects arise. The

Figure 8.2  Layers of perception – sides

Emergent properties and identities  105

Figure 8.3  Layers of perception – aspects

subjective dimension necessary to the perceptual experience, on the other hand, consists of the temporally individuated spatial position from which the aspects (and, through them, the sides) are perceived. Bergson (1911: 2) provides a helpful understanding of what is at work here: Let us take the most stable of internal states, the visual perception of a motionless external object. The object may remain the same, I may look at it from the same side, at the same angle [i.e. aspect], in the same light; nevertheless the vision I now have of it differs from that which I have just had, even if only because the one is an instant older than the other. My memory is there, which conveys something of the past into the present. My mental state, as it advances on the road of time, is continually swelling with the duration which it accumulates; it goes on increasing – rolling upon itself, as a snowball on the snow. Suddenly, then, a most subjective dimension to perception is introduced, one which influences the perception of the cube temporally and also through any number of internal mental states, or dispositions, in which consciousness finds itself during the perception. Whereas sides and aspects may be perceived by any number of viewers, the temporally individuated spatial position from which the aspects and sides are perceived is singular to each of these viewers. These views, belonging only to each singular viewer, are known as profiles. What changes with time is not so much the profile presented, although this could change through, say, material depreciation of the phenomenon perceived. What changes with time is the perception of the perceiver perceiving the profile if only because one perception is an instant older than the other, and at the very least memory is there to convey something of the past to the present. The profile is the aspect that cannot be seen by others. In order to clarify this even further, Sokolowski (2000: 19–20) introduces a new example: Let us change our example from the perception of a cube to the perception of a building. I look at the front side of the building. I look at that side

106  Phenomenological investigations from a point of view a little left of center: at that moment, I see one particular aspect of the front of the building. Suppose I say to you, ‘This view of the building is very attractive; come and look at it from here.’ As I move away from the spot and you move into it, you see the same aspect that I just saw, but you will be experiencing profiles that are different from the ones I experienced, because the profiles are the momentary presentations, not the look or the view or the aspect that can be seen by many viewers. An aspect, a side, and of course the building itself are all intersubjective, but a profile is private and subjective. The profile may even depend on my disposition at the time and on the condition of my sensory organs; if I am ill or dizzy, the profile may be wobbly or grayish instead of being steady or blue. The relative and subjective character of profiles does not mean that the aspects or the sides or the things given through them are relative and subjective in the same way. ‘Profile’ is the translation of the German word Abschattung which also signifies ‘sketch’, and which word is commonly found in many phenomenological texts. For of all three layers which make up perception, it is with profiles that phenomenology mostly concerns itself. The reason is twofold. First, any discussion of perception and appearances that disregarded profiles would remain an abstract discussion, for it is profiles which make consciousness’ intending an experienced intending. In other words, profiles are the epistemological backbone of consciousness’ epistemological engagement with phenomena. Second, profiles present a most interesting epistemological problem. Recall that the cube is given in sides which, in turn, are given in aspects – where both perceptual layers, precisely because they are of the objective dimension, are shared intersubjectively. These aspects, in turn, are given in profiles which belong strictly to the subjective dimension and are therefore private, or intra­ subjective. Each profile of an aspect is also, transitively, a profile of a side and, in turn, a profile of the cube itself. Ultimately, then, the cube is given in a manifold of privately subjective profiles. The perception of the cube can be illustrated as in Figure 8.4. The problem is this: since the cube is ultimately viewed through a series of profiles, and since these profiles are privately subjective, is there not a risk of falling into a solipsistic trap? Is not the cube reduced to a purely relative phenomenon, possibly viewed by some as not a cube at all?

8.2 The intention of identities The question is one of trying to find an intersubjectively agreed identity called ‘cube’ from the fact that ultimately it is given through a manifold of private subjective profiles.2 Such a problem, in reducing the cube to a relative phenomenon, implies that the posited identity qua ‘cube’ is of the same dimen­ sion as profiles – a dimension of individuated temporality – and, at the most, the identity is the sum of the profiles.

Emergent properties and identities  107

Intersubjective

Side

Aspect

Private Subjective

Profile

Figure 8.4  The perception of a cube

Now the discussion has shown that perception involves layers of manifolds, both actual (present) and potential (absent). It is noteworthy that in perceiving sides, aspects and profiles of the cube, it is essential to the perception that these manifolds are perceived as belonging to one and the same cube. The idea of a difference between an identity called ‘cube’ on the one hand, and sides, aspects and profiles associated with this identity on the other, is possible only through the necessity of a cube being there at all. This identity ‘cube’ never shows up, is never perceived, as a side, an aspect or a profile. Indeed, the identity ‘cube’ is never perceived at all. The identity, then, is never reducible to, nor simply the sum of, either of these perceptual layers. It is elusively present. Similarly, in System Theory a system is not merely the sum of its parts. The identity is other to the sides, aspects and profiles in that it is posited as the identity through all of them. As Sokolowski (2000: 20) puts it, the identity belongs to a dimension differ­ ent from that of the sides, the aspects and the profiles in that it transcends all of them, unifies all of them, and is posited as the identity to which all of them point, or, in other words, with which they are all associated (see section 7.2.2, which discussed the dimensional differences between perceiving and intending). Equally, System Theory also understands emergent properties as being on a different dimension from the potentially infinite points of view, or profiles, of a system as well as being on a different dimension from perceptible knowledge of the elements of the system themselves (see sections 4.3 and 4.4). Furthermore, according to System Theory, an emergent property may be a function of the epistemological relationship between observer and observed, but it transcends the potentially infinite plurality of epistemological routes, or points of view, acting as a point of reference for them all (see sections 4.2 and 4.3). Where emergent property is seen to be a whole which transcends the sum of the parts it unifies (von Bertalanffy, 1968: 55), identity

108  Phenomenological investigations belongs to a dimension different from that of the manifold. The identity is not one member of the manifold: the cube is not one of the aspects or profiles, the proposition is not one of the uttered sentences, the play is not simply one of its performances. The identity transcends its manifold of presentations, it goes beyond them. The identity is not merely the sum of its appearances; to see it as just their sum would flatten out the two dimensions that must be distinguished here. It would make everything just a series of appearances, all in one dimension, instead of recognizing the identity as beyond the dimension of appearances, as something presented through them all, and through other possible appearances as well. (Sokolowski, 2000: 30) As an example, consider the notion of ‘army’ and the soldiers which constitute it precisely as soldiers standing in particular interrelations. ‘Army’ unifies the soldiers in that it is posited as an identity towards which all present soldiers point – the British national who is a soldier, for instance, is a soldier of that entity posited as the British ‘Army’.3 In addition, ‘army’ is the entity with which all soldiers are associated. ‘Army’, however, never shows up, is never perceived, as a soldier or even as a sum, a group, of soldiers. The manner in which ‘army’ is epistemologically grasped is different from the manner in which a soldier or a group of soldiers is grasped: ‘Consciousness is “of ” something in the sense that it intends the identity of objects, not just the flow of appearances that are presented to it.’ (Sokolowski, 2000: 20). The identity is altogether on a different dimension of epistemological recognition than that of grasping the inter-related parts. In grasping the parts, however, in perceiving them, consciousness also grasps, or intends, an identity. Thus, in perceiving profiles, aspects and sides, an identity is intended simultaneously, spontaneously, or, in the words of von Bertalanffy (see Chapter 4), instantly. The distinction between perception and intentionality may now be reiterated: whereas consciousness actually perceives the flow of appearances (soldiers), it intends an identity (army). In this way, intending is recognized as a special type of seeing, different from perception. Consciousness is of – this of is the posited identity. Without this intending of an identity, the sides, aspects and profiles collapse into epistemological chaos. It is notable, moreover, that an identity – in keeping with von Bertalanffy’s instantaneity of emergent properties and System Theory’s understanding of consciousness’ instant creation–projection – is not gradually pieced together from the sides, aspects and profiles. An identity is grasped immediately, it is instantly called upon as a unifying epistemological force for whatever sides, aspects and profiles are perceived. Note that an identity is grasped spontaneously; one, that is, about which consciousness might be mistaken. The group of soldiers observed may not be associated with an army at all; they might be a group of mercenaries, or they might be terrorists,4 or they might be part of a carnival troupe dressed up as

Emergent properties and identities  109 soldiers, and so forth. The posited identity, therefore, is open to justification – as Husserl (1995: 57–58; 1998: 22–23) himself stresses – echoing the need for justificatory dynamics in System Theory. In short, identities are immediately intended, appearances are gradually perceived. In other terms, identities are immediately experienced, appearances are gradually analysed. Or as Alves (2000: 164) beautifully puts it: ‘Não vemos com os olhos. Vemos com as palavras.’ We do not see with eyes. We see with words. Identity, as with emergent property, forms part of those phenomena which are invisible to the eye but which are nevertheless foundational for epistemic possibility.

8.3 Summary of identity as understood in phenomenology This discussion of identity in phenomenology has already begun to reflect the earlier system theoretical discussion on emergent property. It has done so in such a way that this discussion can be summarized in a form that particularly echoes the Bertalanffyan understanding of emergent property, the relational and referential understanding as seen in Weinberg and Yolles, and the strictly epistemological understanding put forth by Checkland, as presented in Chapter 4. 8.3.1

Reflections of the Bertalanffyan understanding of emergent property

The discussion has shown that the notion of identity in phenomenology is attributable to a complex of appearances when these appearances are intended as interrelating. In turn, each of the appearances is associated with a posited identity as a result of the interrelationships intended as existing between appearances within this complex. For example, the manifold sides, aspects and profiles of a cube are intended as relating precisely as those of a posited identity ‘cube’. Their interrelationships form a complex to which an identity is attributable: an identity known as ‘cube’. Each of these sides, aspects and profiles is associated with the identity because each side, aspect and profile interrelates with other sides, aspects and profiles within this complex of manifold interrelationships – a primary form of such interrelationships is the transitive manner in which the cube, sides, aspects and profiles interrelate. In intending a cube, consciousness does not merely perceive an unrelated series of sides, aspects and profiles; consciousness intends that they are interrelated and this intentionality of relationships mediates the ejection of an intended identity. In effect, the cube is a system of interrelated appearances known as sides, aspects and profiles, which constitute it and to which system an identity is attributed, an identity called ‘cube’. Significantly, an identity does not emerge gradually through an analysis of

110  Phenomenological investigations the appearances. Once an appearance is presented, a whole identity is simultaneously called forth by consciousness. That is to say, a system is conceived instantly to which the appearance is seen as belonging. The success and failure of modern art hinge on its ability to frustrate consciousness’ intention of identities. For phenomenology, appearances and identities are, epistemologically, moments to each other: it is impossible to separate them when it comes to knowledge of/knowing a phenomenon. 8.3.2

Reflections of the relational and referential understanding of emergent property

The identity which is called forth by consciousness depends on the relationship between consciousness and the appearances perceived. On the one hand, an appearance in the dark calls forth the identity ‘man’, on the other it calls forth the identity ‘bush’. As more appearances are perceived, the identity is confirmed or it is denied in favour of another – it enters, in other words, into a process of justification. Ultimately, it is one identity which emerges as the identity of the appearances perceived, but this one identity can only be sustained if further appearances confirm it, including perhaps ones which were previously perceived, if only because the bite of time will have impacted upon them. Echoing the referential understanding of emergent properties, there does exist a truth, an identity, about each perceptible complex but this truth is sustained by, and depends upon, future appearances of the complex. The truth in question is not, strictly speaking, objective: it is temporal, which is not to say relative but subject to time. The intended identity acts as a point of reference when considering relational differences between the appearances. If such differences prove incompatible with the current intended identity, a new identity is called forth which synthesizes the appearances coherently, an identity to which all appearances can adhere. Ultimately, there exists one identity to which all appearances will adhere. As synthesizer of appearances, the identity is not reducible to them and is thus on a different epistemological dimension to them. If consciousness does not call forth an identity, there is no foundation upon which it can know any perceptible complex: it is impossible for consciousness to come to know a cube, for example, singularly from the series of sides, aspects and profiles which are interrelated and which constitute it, because it is by calling forth an identity that these very appearances are appreciated by consciousness as interrelating and constitutive. Without calling forth an identity, it would be impossible for consciousness to enter into any relationship with the perceptible complex: without calling forth ‘man’ or ‘bush’, for example, consciousness cannot experience, or relate to, the perceptible complex in any way. Without calling forth an identity, consciousness would not be able to associate certain interrelated appearances with a particular phenomenon. In short, if consciousness did not call forth an identity, it would

Emergent properties and identities  111 be impossible to conceive phenomena qua phenomena; it would be impossible for consciousness to epistemologically engage with perceptible complexes at all. 8.3.3

Reflections of the epistemological understanding of emergent property

Identities, therefore, are the foundational epistemological concept in phenomenology. They are primary in enabling knowledge of a phenomenon. They do not emerge but are conceived instantly. By contrast, what does emerge in observing phenomena is knowledge of the appearances of the phenomena and of the interrelationships of these appearances. Now, the discussion has already noted that, with the gradual emergence of appearances, the initial identity attributed to a phenomenon may need to be revised. It is in the sense of revision that an identity may be said to be ‘emergent’; so that if an identity is conceived instantly whenever perceiving a phenomenon, the identity which provides the optimal epistemological coherence of the appearances – or, what amounts to the same thing, the optimal coherence between the objective phenomenon and the intended phenomenon – emerges through some justificatory dynamics impacting upon the initially conceived identity. Identities, therefore, can emerge but not in a linear, gradual fashion, in other words, not in a reductionist manner; their emergence is a function of justificatory interplay. It is this necessity for justification of the initially conceived identity which reductionist epistemology seeks to avoid by postulating that the optimal identity can be reached, once and for all, without the need for exercises in justification, by first beginning with the appearances, with the parts, which lead towards the identity. Reductionist epistemology, however, ignores the fact that, for the appearances to guide knowledge towards an identity, some identity must be posited in the first place – indeed, is always and already posited.

8.4 System Theoretical emergent properties as phenomenological identities Given the similarities between System Theory’s idea of emergent property and phenomenology’s idea of identity from the summary above, the earlier 12 results (given in Table 4.1) on emergent property may now be recalled and compared to the manner in which identity is understood in phenomenology. For each of the earlier 12 results, Table 8.1 provides a comparative result of the manner in which ‘identity’ is understood in phenomenology, along with a unifying comment on the two. It is worth noting that Aspect 11 of Table 8.1 highlights an understanding which has emerged from the recent investigations. Emergent properties and identities refer, in distinct but similar ways, to the epistemological experience

3

An emergent property is an attribute with which interrelating elements of a system are associated.

2

An identity is an attribute with which the interrelating sides, aspects and profiles of a phenomenon (such as a cube), or its interrelating parts (such as the soldiers of an army) are associated. An emergent property An identity is an epistemological is an epistemological moment to the interrelating moment to interrelating sides, aspects and profiles – or the elements of a system. interrelating parts – of a phenomenon; to know the cube qua cube, the identity and the interrelating sides, aspects and profiles are epistemologically irreducible.

An emergent property is An identity is attributable to a attributable to a system phenomenon as a whole, not to any of as a whole. its sides, aspects or profiles (as in the cube), nor to any of its parts (as in the army).

1

Aspects of emergent property as understood in System Aspects of identity as understood in Theory phenomenology

This underlines that, primarily, emergent properties have an epistemological role. Knowing is an irreducible emergent property of an epistemological system constituted by intended identities and perceptible interrelating elements, which latter interrelationships are perceptible precisely in lieu of the intended identities.

This implies that phenomena exhibit systemic characteristics which open phenomena to the field of epistemological experience. Sides, aspects, profiles or parts (i.e. elements) are abstractions (appearances) plucked out from phenomena by consciousness’ analytical, purely formal, ability. Elements are not epistemologically experienced except as elements of some phenomenon, i.e. of some system; they are not epistemologically experienced except as in relation to other elements. This implies that ‘elements’ of a system can be material (such as parts), materially epistemological (such as sides and aspects whose material objectivity makes them epistemologically intersubjective), and subjectively epistemological (such as profiles).

Unifying comment

Table 8.1  Comparison between System Theoretical emergent property and phenomenological identity

6

5

4

An emergent property is irreducible to knowledge of the interrelating elements of a system and is thus on a different epistemological dimension from such knowledge. An emergent property is irreducible to the potentially infinite points of view available about the system and is thus on a different epistemological dimension from such perspectives. An emergent property is instantly conceivable as a whole.

An identity is instantly intended as a whole.

An identity is irreducible to the sides, aspects and potentially infinite profiles of the phenomenon and is thus on a different epistemological dimension from such appearances.

An identity is irreducible to knowledge of the interrelating individual appearances of a phenomenon and is thus on a different epistemological dimension from such knowledge.

The ‘conceiving’ of systems and emergent properties to which von Bertalanffy refers is the phenomenological ‘intending’; that special type of seeing which actively posits; that special type of ‘seeing with words’; that necessarily invisible, yet dominantly active, epistemic phenomenon. Bertalanffyan consciousness is a ‘conceiving’ consciousness; that is, it is an active positing consciousness, not a passive receptor of stimuli (1968: 239–241): ‘the perceiver is not simply a receptor of stimuli but in a very real sense creates his world’ (1968: 212).

What were termed ‘perspectives’ or ‘points of view’ when discussing System Theory are afforded more precise clarifications by phenomenology in its delineation of sides, aspects and profiles. Furthermore, in the same way that a phenomenon, in general, is ultimately viewed through an infinite series of profiles, a system is ultimately viewed through an infinite series of such privately subjective perspectives.

The ‘different epistemological dimension’ in question here is that which is contrasted with perception; that is, with the dimension of intentionality. Interrelating elements are perceptible; the identity/ emergent property attributed to them, and with which they are associated, is intended – and although the two are momentarily related, neither is reducible to the other.

An emergent property can be reached through a plurality of epistemological routes.

8

An identity can be reached through a potentially infinite set of profiles.

An emergent property An identity is a function of the is a function of the relationship between observer and the relationship between phenomenon observed. observer and the system observed.

7

Aspects of emergent property as understood in System Aspects of identity as understood in Theory phenomenology

Table 8.1  Continued

The basis of the relationship between observer and observed is the infinite set of subjective profiles through which intersubjectively viewed aspects and sides are understood, or, in other terms, the relationship is based upon the necessary objective and subjective dimensions for epistemic possibility. This joint basis governs whatever identity is intended. This indicates that the Weinbergian differences between ‘emerges’ and ‘predicted’ are differences of stress placed on the two necessary epistemic dimensions. A greater insight into the objective epistemic dimension leads to predicted properties (probably based upon previous objective insight). A larger stress on the subjective epistemic dimension leads to constitutive identities: identities, that is, that emerge from the phenomenon when it is accounted for in terms of the consciousness of it. Recall that the Weinbergian plurality of epistemological routes is based upon the relationship between the observer and the system observed. Such a relationship is one of epistemological engagement: it is because the observer and the system observed may engage in a plurality of ways that a plurality of epistemological routes is available. Each engagement will stress more or less the objective or the subjective dimension, and hence the properties of a system will either emerge or be predicted, respectively. In phenomenology, it is profiles which govern such engagements. Hence, the epistemological plurality of routes is the phenomenological infinite set of profiles.

Unifying comment

12

11

10

9

A system is posited as being of any particular type through a posited, unifying emergent property. The ‘reference point’ in question is simply another phrase for ‘emergent property’ and therefore has the same characteristics as ‘emergent property’; that is, it is intended. A posited emergent property not only allows an understanding of the perceptible aspects of a system; it also provides insight into what presently invisible aspects are being assumed by the positing consciousness and hence how the positing consciousness is grasping the system as a whole. Phenomena are seen by phenomenology as systems (in the same way that, for von Bertalanffy, consciousness conceives systems directly) – for, if they were not, the very idea of identity, central to phenomenology (and, in System Theory, the foundational epistemological concept of emergent property), evaporates, and, along with it, consciousness qua consciousness; that is, as epistemological engagement with other phenomena. In order to understand phenomena as systems, as do phenomenology and System Theory, some emergent property, some identity, must be posited which reflects the objective whole. The complete (or, as von Bertalanffy says, instant) composition of an emergent property is at one with the qualifier ‘emergent’, for what emerges is not the gradual construction of the property in degrees of non-instantaneous, half-composed revelation; what emerges is that the instantly conceived whole property/identity is liable to justificatory dynamics which either confirm it or render it liable to development.

An identity is the unifying force without which a phenomenon is not posited as of any particular type. It is precisely the intended positing of a unifier which defines a phenomenon. An identity is the unifying force called upon by consciousness for whatever sides, aspects and profiles are presented, and whatever ones are imagined as absent.

An identity enables appearances to be appreciated as interrelating and constitutive of a phenomenon – enabling, therefore, the phenomenon to be appreciated as a system and not as an abstraction.

An emergent property is An identity is the posited emergent the identity of a system. property of a phenomenon, wholly composed and posited as an epistemological property which emerges, through the perception of further appearances, either as confirmed or as non-coherent and therefore replaced by a new, or at the very least amended, wholly composed identity.

An emergent property is a singular reference point without which a system is not posited as of any particular type. An emergent property is a singular reference point without which the elements of a system cannot be readily understood as interrelating. An emergent property is a singular reference point without which the system cannot be readily understood as existing qua system.

116  Phenomenological investigations of, or engagement with, wholes. Correlatively, System Theory and phenomenology refer, in distinct but similar ways, to wholes. Although such wholes are given respectively different names (i.e. systems and phenomena), the similar manner in which they are referred to and understood, along with the similar manner in which epistemological engagement with them is understood (via the ideas of emergent property and identity), signifies that such wholes are similar. In short, the investigations have uncovered two equations. First, the respectively core ideas of System Theory and phenomenology have proved to be equal in the manner in which they refer to consciousness’ epistemological engagement with wholes. Second, and in part owing to such an equation, the systems System Theory sees and the phenomena phenomenology sees are rendered equal.

8.5 Two additional aspects of emergent properties The investigations noted early on (see section 3.3) what has come to be confirmed: emergent properties, being those properties which enable a description of a system – that is, a knowledge of it – and especially by their instant, spontaneous ascription to a given system, are the foundational epistemological idea of System Theory. It was further stressed that it is emergent properties, and not the parts of a system, which are primarily given to consciousness – through its own creation–projection – as that which enables knowledge by consciousness of a system. The discussion then pointed out that what stems from this is that, ultimately, what can be said to emerge is not emergent properties for they are conceived immediately: what emerges from systems is not knowledge of them but of their parts (or reductionist knowledge). That is to say, holistic knowledge does not gradually unfold from the bottom up; it is given instantly from the top down. What gradually unfolds is reductionist knowledge. No doubt this gradual unfolding of reductionist knowledge may call into question the immediate knowledge posited by some emergent property. For this reason, emergent properties are liable to some form of justificatory dynamics. With each justification, a complete emergent property is, again, instantly posited. The present investigations concur. Identities, being the foundational epistemological concept in phenomenology, are primary in enabling knowledge of a phenomenon. They do not emerge but are conceived and ascribed to a phenomenon instantly and completely. They thus constitute knowledge of a phenomenon as a whole or system. The investigation has demonstrated, through the example of the cube and Husserl’s sphere example (section 7.2.2), that what does emerge when observing phenomena is knowledge of the appearances of the phenomena and the interrelationships of these appearances. In a similar way to that described by System Theory, this temporal emergence of appearances renders an identity liable to justification. With each justification, however, a whole identity is, again, spontaneously intended.

Emergent properties and identities  117 The equations between the respective ideas of emergent property and identity allow for the derivation of two more aspects of emergent properties. The first has already been identified quite explicitly by drawing upon the example of ‘army’ (see section 8.2). The second finds its support in both von Bertalanffy’s idea of system hierarchies and Husserl’s idea of hierarchical structures as governing generalities. These two additional aspects are detailed in Table 8.2. Aspect 13 of Table 8.2 highlights that emergent properties are a function Table 8.2  Two additional aspects of emergent properties with comments 13

An emergent property is a function of the manner in which elements interrelate, including their interrelation with elements outside their complex.

Recall the complex of soldiers whose interrelation gives rise to the emergent property ‘army’. By changing the manner in which the elements interrelate, these very same soldiers give rise to the emergent property ‘mercenaries’ or ‘terrorists’. It is undoubtedly usual for mercenaries and terrorists to identify themselves as belonging to an ‘army’. The relationships inherent in ‘armies’ of this latter kind, however, are very different from those relationships which define the customary idea of ‘army’ (usually understood as ‘national army’). Hence, it is important to emphasize that the form of relationships in complexes governs the identity attributed to them.

14

An emergent property is epistemologically positioned in relation to other emergent properties in accordance with the manner in which systems relate hierarchically.

The idea of system hierarchies is central to von Bertalanffy’s theory (1968), his point being that, in the same way that elements can be abstracted from their systems, systems themselves, when viewed in isolation, are abstractions of larger systems of which they are parts. That emergent properties, in turn, relate hierarchically may be argued from two positions. First, given that systems relate hierarchically, and given the connection of emergent properties with their systems, emergent properties form part of other emergent properties attributed to more complex systems whilst housing within themselves emergent properties of sub-systems. Second, the relational hierarchy of emergent properties may also be argued by turning to their phenomenological correlate. In this case, by following Husserl (1973: 356–357), it can be seen that there are hierarchies of emergent properties in systems thinking as there are hierarchies of identities in phenomenology: Just as we have already been able to establish that there exists a hierarchical structure in the order of empirical generality [read: in the order of empirical phenomena/systems], rising from lower generalities to those ever higher, so also there is naturally one for pure generalities [read: one for identities/emergent properties attributable to the phenomena/systems].

118  Phenomenological investigations of the manner in which elements interrelate. This, however, is not to reduce emergent properties to some function of a system. For there exist systems which need not have functional properties, which have no reason for being but simply are. Such systems are contingent; an example, as discussed, is the cube. In this way, a singularly purposive understanding of emergent properties (such as the ‘vital essence’ argument noted and argued against by Weinberg, as discussed in section 4.2) is rejected. Functional properties may contribute to the emergent property of a system, but they do not alone define it. Aspect 14 in Table 8.2 can be illustrated with reference to the cube. Sides are abstracted from the cube and can be given in aspects such as squares, trapezoids or diamonds, as was earlier discussed. The fact that they are posited as squares, trapezoids or diamonds, however, shows that an identity is attributable to them – they are no longer abstract appearances but phenomena themselves. The identity ‘square’, for instance, now forms part of the emergent property ‘cube’, but the fact that it is itself identified as ‘square’ shows that it itself is a system, constituted by four interrelating equal lines, which in the present case is also a sub-system of the system ‘cube’. Thus, although a phenomenon is dimensionally more than an appearance, this is not to say that appearances cannot themselves be phenomena.

8.6 Conclusion Since the phenomenological idea of identity has directly reflected the system theoretical idea of emergent property, phenomenology has demonstrated its interdisciplinary relevance to System Theory on the fundamental epistemological level. In doing so, it has also demonstrated that its understanding of consciousness matches the understanding deduced from System Theory. In short, phenomenology has already met roughly half the criteria required of any potential interdisciplinary partner to System Theory, as defined earlier (see Table 6.1). What remains is to demonstrate an eidetic inclination in phenomenology which matches that found in System Theory. As will be shown, it will be exactly such a demonstration which will lead to the epistemological heart of intentionality, from which the investigations will be able to address the issue of justificatory dynamics on von Bertalanffy’s terms. Accordingly, the next chapter revisits intentionality with the aim of uncovering its eidetic inclination and that which specifically renders it epistemological.

Notes 1 The phenomenon intended is the cube, as opposed to the sides which are perceived. The distinction between perception and intention was given in Chapter 7. 2 In terms of Soft Systems Methodology, the question is one of agreeing on the nature of the problem, given that the situation is perceived as problematical first and foremost from a manifold of private/conflicting profiles/Weltanschauungen.

Emergent properties and identities  119 3 It is worth noting that the identity ‘British’ would furnish a similar example for the present discussion. 4 Admittedly, it all depends on how the term ‘army’ is understood, for it is usual for mercenaries and terrorists to identify themselves as belonging to an ‘army’. However, the relationships inherent in ‘armies’ of this latter kind are very different from those relationships which define the customary idea of a national ‘army’. Hence, it is important to emphasize that the form of relationships in phenomena governs the identity attributed to them, a point to be highlighted later in this chapter as informing the idea of emergent property.

9 Intentionality

The earlier consideration of the phenomenological theory of intentionality made the distinction between phenomena and appearances. Phenomena are intended (or, to use von Bertalanffy’s word, conceived) as systems constituted by the perceived present and co-intended absent appearances. As such, they are attributed an identity by consciousness in its epistemological engagement with them. In order to extract some knowledge from the perception of appearances, some identity, and hence some epistemological unifier, must be intended or created–projected. In addition, appearances themselves, once abstracted from their designated phenomena, can be phenomena with attributable identities. Ultimately, consciousness only engages with phenomena – that is, wherever consciousness directs itself, it posits identities in order to allow for an epistemological engagement with whatever it has directed itself towards. Consciousness cannot engage with mere appearances – this is the mistake of reductionist epistemology, which fails to see that in order to understand appearances, some identity, and hence some phenomenon as a system, must be posited first. Additionally, intentionality is the manner in which consciousness epistemologically engages with objective phenomena in order to know them as they experience themselves, to know them from inside (see section 7.3). This knowledge, from inside, is termed absolute, or objective, and so intentionality is understood as consciousness’ orientation towards truth. In this chapter, intentionality’s attempt at ‘inside knowledge’ will be explicated in order to demonstrate that phenomenology is eidetically inclined along Bertalanffyan lines.1 Thus, phenomenology’s underlying epistemological objective will be shown to reflect that of Bertalanffyan System Theory. As will emerge, the eidetic attempt of phenomenology revolves around the idea of intuition. This idea will be shown to be the epistemological complement of intentionality and the very heart of what is distinctly epistemological in intentionality. Uncovering intuition is significant for paving the way towards a detailed explication of justificatory dynamics as required by System Theory.

Intentionality  121

9.1 Intentionality: the classic description The intentionality of consciousness signifies that consciousness is always ‘consciousness of. . .’ (Husserl, 1990). The of constitutive of this understanding is crucial. Fundamentally, it signifies a distinction between consciousness on the one hand and objective phenomena on the other. Additionally, however, it appears to render consciousness as some substance which undertakes an activity. This activity has been identified as intentionality. This reading of consciousness as some substantial entity, some object, which undertakes an activity is somewhat misguided. By this understanding, a mediating middle must be allowed to exist which enables consciousness to act. For example, as Mohanty (1997) argues, consciousness may require embodiment but if it is embodiment itself which acts as the mediating element, thereby enabling consciousness to undertake its activity, one finds nothing by way of how this mediation operates.2 Moreover, the epistemological significance of Husserl’s conception of consciousness transcends embodiment to such an extent that it makes embodiment a derivative contingent (as opposed to a fundamental necessity) of consciousness. Husserl’s focus is on the structural aspect of consciousness and he finds that this in no way is a function of the body (Natanson, 1973: 40). Accordingly, a more precise conception of consciousness is as an activity whose quality is to intend. This still provides but a partial understanding of consciousness, which will be more fully developed in the course of the ensuing investigations. Kirkpatrick and Williams (Sartre, 1960: 14)3 point out that, as an alwaysalready activity of intending, consciousness acts so as to ‘intend [a phenomenon] standing over and against its activity’. The classic description of this activity is that it allows for any phenomenon (including consciousness itself in the mode of reflection) to be given to consciousness. Consciousness itself, this description goes on to say, in no way alters that phenomenon, it only enables that phenomenon to become available for investigation: it allows for intended phenomena to be described in their own right qua phenomena4 – ‘theory of knowledge need not be closeted with the activities of consciousness,’ Kirkpatrick and Williams note, ‘but could go directly in reflection to the intended objects of consciousness and the principles governing them’ (Sartre, 1960: 15). Thus knowledge is not about the certain mental syntheses, neither a priori as in Kant nor a posteriori as in Mill;5 it is also not tinged with derivative influences stemming from particular approaches to phenomena such as, say, the scientific approach. Knowledge emerges as a pure correspondence with the character of, and relation between, phenomena themselves – the focus is always on them.

9.2 Clarifying the classic description The problem with describing intending in this way is the manner in which phenomena are said to be given to or presented to consciousness. Such a description

122  Phenomenological investigations lends a passivity to consciousness, as if it constitutes some Cartesian regal throne of reason to which phenomena are brought to be judged. As with all monarchies, consciousness is thus separated from the phenomena of inquiry, generating the necessity of representations, both in terms of representatives of the phenomena in question (the peasant does not approach the monarch, only the peasant’s representative does so) and in terms of the manner in which consciousness knows the phenomena in question (it never knows them directly but only through representative mediations). Thus, the phenomenon in question is altered, is not itself available for investigation, and is not described in its own right. In turn, theory of knowledge does not get beyond the activities of consciousness, is flooded with derivative influences, and emerges as being in impure correspondence, if at all, with phenomena. The epistemological focus, given this understanding, is hardly on them. The classic description of intending only makes sense if it is somewhat inverted in the manner first hinted at by Sartre (see section 7.3). Phenomena are not given to consciousness. Consciousness throws itself onto them, grasps them, invades6 them, epistemologically battles with them. Phenomena do not come to consciousness, consciousness goes to phenomena – literally, intends them. Consciousness does not assume some monarchical independence, bestowing favours upon its phenomena at will. It is phenomena that have no need of consciousness and it that hungrily, desperately, seeks to intend them. The first lesson from phenomenology’s theory of intentionality is that consciousness depends upon phenomena – no phenomena, no consciousness of. Similarly, the earlier system theoretical investigations revealed that, for System Theory, the relational characteristic, to its core, depends upon – indeed, hungers after – complexes.7 In order to retain phenomenology’s enabling of phenomena to become available for investigation and its allowance that they be described in their own right; in order, furthermore, to allow for a theory of knowledge free from the activities of consciousness, free from derivative influences, a theory of knowledge, that is, as pure correspondence with the phenomena upon which it focuses – in order to retain such aims of phenomenology, consciousness must be considered as always and already out amongst the phenomena it intends; already in that it depends upon phenomena for its very being as intending consciousness, always in that it never retreats into some contemplative castle, no matter whether this castle is transparent, made of glass, or made of black-box brick. In phenomenology, in part owing to intentionality, consciousness is always and already engaged with phenomena and its reflection about intended phenomena takes place in the realm of phenomena, that is, out there, in the world.

9.3 The eidetic inclination of intentionality Now, consciousness epistemologically engages with phenomena by creating– projecting epistemological theories about and upon them. Consider what has

Intentionality  123 been learnt about identities thus far. An identity transcends the series of sides, aspects and profiles (i.e. appearances), is not reducible to them but is posited by consciousness through them as a unifier of them all (see section 8.2). It is such transcendence and irreducibility which rendered identities as belonging, according to Sokolowski, to a different dimension from appearances. Now, if appearances are the target at which perception aims, as discussed in section 7.2.2, what is the target at which intended identities aim? Well, if the intention of identities belongs to a different dimension from that of the perception of appearances (sections 7.2.2 and 8.2), the target of intended identities must be of a different dimension from the appearances. Sokolowski noted that the target of consciousness’ intentionality is ‘the identity of objects’8 (see section 8.2). Identities, however, do not belong to objective phenomena: they are targeted towards objective phenomena by consciousness so that it may epistemologically engage with such phenomena. If consciousness’ intended identities are in fact targeted towards the identity of objects, Sokolowski’s use of the term identity as being of an objective phenomenon refers, in this case, to something which belongs to the objective phenomenon. His use of the term, in this case, is thus not an identity understood as that which consciousness creates–projects upon objective phenomena in order to epistemologically engage with them. What is it that belongs to an objective phenomenon to which consciousness’ intended identities are targeted? Recall what an intended identity does. It unifies appearances. Consciousness posits an identity which serves to cohere manifest appearances. It thus identifies the appearances as being of one and the same objective phenomenon. The posited identity stipulates how the objective phenomenon manifests itself through appearances. In other words, the intended identity is a positing of the manner in which an objective phenomenon manifests itself. As such, the intended identity serves as a description of what consciousness understands as governing the currently perceived appearances, and, by extrapolating this understanding, the intended identity serves as a forecaster of future manifestations of the objective phenomenon – anticipations that the objective phenomenon will continue to adhere to the intended identity. The intended identity is, therefore, a positing of the governance of appearances: a positing of what consciousness understands as governing the manifestation of an objective phenomenon. If the target of an intended identity, therefore, must be something which belongs to an objective phenomenon, that targeted something must be what governs the manifestation of the objective phenomenon. This assumes that an objective phenomenon maintains within itself something which governs its manifestations. This something, because of its governing role, is indeed on a different dimension from the objective phenomenon’s manifestations – the former is an activity of governance whilst the latter arise in compliance to this governance. Of course, the assumption that a governance resides in any particular objective phenomenon immediately raises metaphysical questions – the very

124  Phenomenological investigations ones raised by von Bertalanffy’s focus upon principles noted in section 6.4. At the extreme, it risks adhering to a vitalistic view of objective phenomena. Such metaphysical speculations, however, can be averted if the investigation is focused upon the epistemological plane. The issue at stake is not to argue for the existence of governance in objective phenomena but to inquire into such governance’s epistemological necessity – to inquire, that is, into whether consciousness must assume a residing governance in objective phenomena in order to engage with them. A clue to such governance’s epistemological necessity lies in the condition of justification to which intended identities are liable. As already discussed, this liability arises through the spontaneously created–projected identity having to cohere with something. Thus far, the coherence in question has been highlighted as being that between the intended identity and the objective phenomenon. It has also been noted in section 5.2, however, that the possibility of a need to develop an intended identity (relational characteristic) arises through the intended identity having to more accurately match the actuality of interrelations between appearances – which actuality serves to unify them into certain relationships and refer them to the objective phenomenon which manifests itself through them. An intended identity, therefore, requires development only in so far as it does not cohere with the actuality of interrelations between appearances. Indeed, Husserl already mentioned this through his sphere example, as seen in section 7.2.2. Now, if there is an actuality of interrelations which stands against the intended interrelations, then this actuality is governed by an equally actual governance residing in the objective phenomenon. The intended identity, qua consciousness’ understanding of the governance of interrelations of appearances, is ultimately stood against the objective phenomenon’s own governance of its manifestation and not against the objective phenomenon in general. In broad terms, interrelations always refer back to some governance, a singular reference point which drives the relations to be like this and not like that. When interrelations are intended, they refer back to an identity. When interrelations are objectively actual, they refer back to an objectively actual governance. Husserl calls the objective phenomenon’s own governance of its manifestation its essence. An essence belongs to, is of, or, simply put, resides in, an objective phenomenon, governing the manner in which the objective phenomenon manifests itself; it governs, that is, the perceived order of the phenomenon; or, as noted in section 6.6, an essence is that which pre-delineates what is possible for the objective phenomenon of which it is an essence. If there exists one identifiable assertion which guides the whole phenomenological enterprise it is Husserl’s (1931: 53) claim, early on in the Ideas, that ‘it belongs to the meaning of everything contingent that it should have essential being and therewith an Eidos to be apprehended in all its purity’ (Husserl’s italics). If the intentionality of identities is of a different dimension from the perception of appearances, and if the intentionality of identities is of the governance

Intentionality  125 of appearances, the target of intentionality must be of a different dimension from the manifestation of the objective phenomenon and must be of that which gov­ erns such manifestation. The only aspect of an objective phenomenon which is of a different dimension from its manifestation, and which may be understood as governing such manifestation, is not the objective phenomenon in its entirety but the governing essence of the objective phenomenon. Epistemologically, therefore, the intentionality of identities aims at this essence. That is, irrespective of the metaphysical status of essences, the intentionality of identities is, primarily for epistemological reasons, targeted at essences. It is through exactly such an understanding of intentionality that Husserlian phenomenology is rendered eidetic. So that when Husserl, above, requires that everything contingent qua objective phenomenon should have essential being, he need not be interpreted as asserting some metaphysical opinion, for he is but noting an epistemological necessity: intentionality itself renders essential being of phenomena a necessary epistemological condition of epistemological engagement with such phenomena.9 Husserl’s epistemological objective to know phenomena from inside them is a necessary objective because consciousness epistemologically engages with phenomena by necessarily intending their essences – their inside. Exactly such an understanding of intentionality serves as the theoretical support and justification for von Bertalanffy’s eidetic inclinations. General System Theory’s foremost object of interest is the epistemological grasping of the principles of systems precisely because consciousness epistemologically engages with systems by necessarily conceiving (intending) their principles. The instantaneous composition of a system conceived by consciousness is precisely instantaneous because consciousness’ conceiving aims, spontaneously, directly at that which renders a system or, simply put, interrelations: the principle. It is the epistemological grasping of a principle which instantly reveals a system. Von Bertalanffy’s presupposition that order exists in reality itself is a necessary epistemological thesis given that consciousness’ conceiving/intending is directed towards the order (essence) of reality. Von Bertalanffy’s ‘doctrine of principles’, qua system theoretical attempt at an understanding of how consciousness epistemologically engages with phenomena/systems, is – as indicated in Chapter 6 – a Husserlian epistemological doctrine.10 Consciousness, for both phenomenology and System Theory, does not intend phenomena in their entirety, intending instead their governing principles/essences, for it is knowledge of these latter which allows for the emergence of knowledge of phenomena in their entirety.

9.4 The epistemological actualizer of intentionality The target of consciousness’ intending of an identity is the governing essence of an objective phenomenon. Now, intentionality may well provide the projection of the identity towards the objective essence, bounding the possibilities of what the appearances are of. There is nothing in pure intentionality,

126  Phenomenological investigations however, which may be understood as creating the identity so projected. Intentionality, understood as a directing, projecting activity, betrays no epistemological creativity. Intentionality projects a theoretical creation arising from some epistemological complement other than itself. Any epistemological adequacy attributed to intentionality necessarily implies a complement that serves to epistemologically actualize intentionality, which provides the epistemological creation for intentionality to project through appearances so that some knowledge may arise about the phenomena they manifest. In short, where there is intentionality, there is some epistemological creation accompanying it. Given this, consciousness’ intending is never undertaken purely. Being distinct from any other type of interphenomenal engagement, consciousness’ engagement with phenomena is undertaken in some epistemological fashion, in some epistemological mode. To the statement ‘consciousness intends that phenomenon’, a question is raised: ‘how is consciousness intending that phenomenon?’ Without the question answered, intentionality reverts to an epistemologically blind intending, equal to all other interphenomenal engagement usually understood as determined by cause–effect laws. The question, therefore, arises: what, in phenomenology, is the modal complement of intentionality that enables consciousness to enter into epistemological engagement with objective phenomena? The answer lies with Emmanuel Levinas and, in particular, in his Theory of Intuition in Husserl’s Phenomenology, published two years after his having studied under Husserl in Freiburg during the 1928–29 academic year.11 Levinas (1995: 65) writes: ‘The mode of consciousness . . . through which we enter into contact with being has a determinate structure; it is, let us declare at once, intuition.’12 Shortly afterwards, Levinas (1995: 67) writes that intuition ‘actualizes the mere intention’,13 enabling consciousness to ‘relate directly to the object, [to] reach it.’ Consider what is being stated. Intuition is a modal complement to, and actualizer of, intentionality. There is no mention of intuition understood as the specifically epistemological mode of consciousness’ engagement with phenomena, nor that which specifically epistemologically actualizes intentionality. Instead, an unqualified, undefined mode of consciousness is highlighted as that which allows consciousness to ‘enter into contact with’ objective phenomena, with no clarification of what is understood by ‘contact’ and whether this specifically refers to some epistemological contact. Additionally, consciousness is highlighted as ‘relating directly’ to, or ‘reaching’, objective phenomena with no elaboration of the nature of such relating and reaching. Is intuition that which renders consciousness’ engagement with phenomena epistemological? Is intuition the distinctly epistemological complement of intentionality, that which epistemologically actualizes intentionality? Is intuition that which provides the theoretical, in other words, epistemological, input and impetus to intentionality? Now, for Levinas’ Theory of Intuition, intuition is most definitely a central epistemological activity in phenomenological epistemology. Levinas (1995: 63, 94)

Intentionality  127 goes some way towards making explicit the theoretical and, hence, epistemological significance of intuition: for Husserl, intuition is a theoretical act . . . For a theory of intuition, the primacy of theoretical consciousness is of the first importance . . . The act of intuition, which brings us into contact with being, will be first and foremost a theoretical act.14 Intuition qua mode of consciousness, therefore, is a theoretical mode, or, equally, an epistemological mode. Furthermore, consciousness is identified as being not only intentional but theoretical. There is a theoretical act accompanying the intentional act; in other words, intuiting accompanies intending. From Levinas, therefore, it can be understood that intuition epistemologically actualizes intentionality, enabling consciousness to ‘relate directly to the object, [to] reach it’ epistemologically. Intuition is therefore that which provides the theoretical, in other words, epistemological input and impetus to intentionality which renders consciousness’ engagement with phenomena epistemological. Such an understanding is reinforced by Smith and Smith (1995: 32) who, in The Cambridge Companion to Husserl, write of intuition: [Intuition is that] through which we come to know [objective phenomena] . . . Knowledge about [objective phenomena] . . . proceeds, Husserl argues, by comparing corresponding intuitive observations and framing more theoretical judgements about what is known, and in principle going back and revising the initial observations. This is quite a natural account of human knowledge, weaving together strands of both empiricism (knowledge begins with observations) and rationalism (knowledge is guided by reason) in a quasi-Kantian thesis (knowledge centrally involves putting [objective phenomena] under ideal species via conceptual structures of certain sorts).15 If intentionality, therefore, is that through which consciousness may be understood as a bounding activity – that is, one which delineates objective phenomena from any series of appearances – then intuition is that which provides some knowledge/theory/judgement or, in short, epistemological guidance which informs the intending/bounding thus undertaken. Observations are qualified as intuitive, which signifies that they are epistemologically laden. There is a rationalistic streak evident in intuition. Intuition is understood as that which makes consciousness’ engagement epistemological. Furthermore, there is evidence of Husserlian phenomenology rejecting singular empiricism and singular rationalism, and yet incorporating them into any phenomenological epistemology as if their respective relevance and applicability can be maintained only if they can both be thus incorporated. Finally, and quite significantly, intuition is seen to be liable to a process of revision

128  Phenomenological investigations that echoes the justificatory dynamics already understood as central to an epistemology particular to System Theory. It is quite clear, therefore, that intuition is the epistemological actualizer of intentionality. What is not yet clear is exactly how the phenomenological term intuition differs from the common understanding of this term, for in this difference arise further significant characteristics. A definitional analysis of the term intuition can shed some valuable light on just how far Husserl’s own understanding diverges from the general meaning. Terms related to intuition in Roget’s Thesaurus of English Words and Phrases (Kirkpatrick, 1987) include ‘absence of reason’, ‘rule of thumb’, ‘spontaneous’ and ‘have a hunch’. These all agree with the notion of spontaneous, non-deliberated (i.e. non-reasoned) theories or creations–projections. However, Roget’s also lists ‘insight’, and insight has not arisen as relevant in discussions of consciousness’ creations– projections. This is especially so if ‘insight’ is to be understood as seeing the true nature of a phenomenon;16 that is, as having knowledge which is in complete correspondence with the phenomenon. Still, it is intuition as insight that dictionaries tend to emphasize. For instance, the Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary (Crowther, 1995) defines intuition as ‘the power of understanding situations or people’s feelings immediately, without the need for conscious reasoning or study’. Furthermore the Little Oxford Dictionary (Swannell, 1986) defines intuition as ‘immediate apprehension by mind without reasoning; immediate insight’. The notion of spontaneous non-deliberation is retained in these definitions but it is immediate knowledge of something which is stressed, not spontaneous theorizing which guides a route towards such knowledge. At root, the general understanding of intuition is as a form of knowledge. For Husserl, however, intuition is never correlated with a form of knowing, be it insight or immediate knowing/understanding/apprehension. Levinas (1995: 92) is very clear on how Husserl understands intuition, and hence how he differs from the standard definition of the term: [Husserl’s intuitionism] is the result of the analysis of the primary phenomenon of truth, analysis which finds intuition to be a part of every form of reason. In other words, intuition, as Husserl understands it, is not a mode of immediate knowledge which can be put beside other modes while judgments were made about the scope and value of this immediate knowledge compared with mediated knowledge. Intuition, for Husserl, is the very course of thought towards truth, the course which is at the basis of anything that could be used to justify intuition itself.17 For Husserl, therefore, intuition is an epistemological course consciousness is required to follow if its engagement with phenomena is to be rendered epistemological. Intuition is not an immediate insight into the essence but the course required to tread if an understanding of an essence is ever to occur. As such, phenomenological intuition echoes Comte’s ‘theory or other’ required

Intentionality  129 in order for consciousness to enter into epistemological engagement with phenomena. Intuition, therefore, is correlatively spontaneous to intentionality and constitutes the epistemological course which informs intentionality. Importantly, as Levinas notes above, Husserl adds that this course forms the basis of anything which might be used to justify intuition itself. Thus intuition is at the basis of all other epistemological modes. If these other modes are used to justify intuition, the fact that they find their basis in intuition reveals that ultimately only intuition is used to justify intuition. Intuition, then, acquires the prime role in epistemological matters since it constitutes not only the route but the process of justification itself. As Sartre (1958: 172, 308) notes: ‘there is only intuitive knowledge’ for ‘there is only the point of view of engaged knowledge’. In summary, intuition has been identified as the epistemological actualizer of consciousness. Whatever epistemological actualization was attributed to the intentionality of identities thus far has implicitly assumed Husserl’s equally prime epistemological theory: the phenomenological theory of intuition. Identities are intuited, or equally, they are intuitions. The phenomenological understanding has also noted that intuition is constituted by some determinable structure. Given this, a more thorough understanding of intuition is called for through an explication of its structure.

9.5 Conclusion Intuition has been revealed as that which epistemologically completes the understanding of intentional consciousness. The epistemological mode of consciousness’ intending is intuition or, equally, intuition epistemologically actualizes intention. Now, Koestenbaum (Husserl, 1998: xxvii), in his explication of Husserl’s Paris Lectures, notes that ‘Husserl, following Brentano, holds that the essence of consciousness is intentionality . . . Intentionality is a discovery about the nature of consciousness. To the question “What is consciousness?” phenomenology answers “intentionality.” ’ Given the discussion thus far, however, a more precise answer is available. If intentionality is a discovery about the nature of consciousness, then the understanding of the nature of consciousness is completed with the discovery of its equally important intuitionality. Intuition is consciousness’ continuous activity of spontaneous, eidetically directed theorizing which enables epistemological engagement with an objective phenomenon. Husserlian consciousness has a spontaneous, outward intentional direction coupled with an equally spontaneous, outwardly directed intuition. Intentionality must necessarily be accompanied by spontaneous intuiting, otherwise consciousness is an epistemologically empty, or blind, intending. Spontaneous intuiting must also be necessarily accompanied by intentionality otherwise there is no directed phenomenon about which to intuit. Intentionality and intuition are, therefore, two activities of consciousness, to neither of which is consciousness

130  Phenomenological investigations reducible if it is to retain an epistemological engagement with phenomena. Consciousness, it turns out, is a systemic, irreducible activity of intending–intuiting directed at phenomena. It would be well to note that standard phenomenological texts do not stress this systemic epistemological nature of consciousness, choosing instead to emphasize intentionality over intuition. The discussion here, however, has argued that, if consciousness is to be understood as the epistemological capacitor which human beings distinctly possess, then intentionality on its own is insufficient as an epistemological contributor. Mainstream phenomenological texts do discuss intuition at length but generally fail to make transparent the epistemological significance of intuition to intentionality and the necessity of their systemic conjoining for any viable phenomenological epistemology. Having drawn upon exactly such texts, the discussion has made the case for the systemic understanding in question. Having demonstrated the manner in which phenomenology’s eidetic inclinations reflect those of Bertalanffyan System Theory, the investigations have reached the epistemological heart of phenomenology, manifested as intuition. Phenomenology, that is, has fulfilled three-quarters of those criteria necessary of any potential interdisciplinary partner to System Theory (see Table 6.1). The final set of criteria, it will be recalled, concern an explication of Bertalanffyan justificatory dynamics. Such dynamics, for System Theory, are directed at those epistemological creations which consciousness projects upon phenomena in order to epistemologically engage with them. In phenomenological terms, justificatory dynamics are directed upon intuitions. Phenomenology, however, has noted that intuition is constituted by a determinate structure. An explication of this structure is required before any conclusion can be drawn on the impact of justificatory dynamics.

Notes 1 The eidetic inclinations in von Bertalanffy’s General System Theory were discussed in Chapter 6. 2 A similar comment was made in note 10 to Chapter 7. 3 Forrest Williams and Robert Kirkpatrick are the translators of Sartre’s (1960) The Transcendence of the Ego. 4 Hence the popular understanding of phenomenology as a method of description and not of explanation. In practice, the literature on phenomenology blurs this rather fictional division, for phenomenology particularly inquires into the possibility of knowledge and this requires as much explanation as description. Description is stressed for it enables insight; explanation, or argument, when it is used, serves the same purpose: argument, in phenomenology, never substitutes for insight but is used in order to facilitate it. Jeanson (1980: 16) seems to put it appropriately when he describes what he calls the ‘method of existentialism’: ‘its method will be descriptive explication [explication descriptive] rather than scientific explanation.’ 5 Mill ‘subscribed unwaveringly to what he called the “school of experience and association”. He denied that there is knowledge independent of experience and

Intentionality  131

6 7 8 9 10

11

12 13 14 15

16 17

held that attitudes and beliefs are the products of psychological laws of association’ (Honderich, 1995: 566). To use Hessen’s (1999: 20) most apt description. See section 5.2. Also see section 5.4, which highlighted: no complex, no relational characteristic. Section 5.5 also highlighted that the relational characteristic realizes itself only in the realm of complexes. Italics added. It is also worth noting that Husserl’s Eidos is ‘to be apprehended’; it is not explicitly apprehensible. The stipulation of an open future tempers any certainty of the possibility of apprehension, raising the spectre of justificatory dynamics. Husserl’s epistemological theory is, of course, not without its problems. In particular, at one point he actually argues against the realism of his theory, writing that consciousness itself ‘possesses an enormous inborn a priori’ (1998: 28). This opens the doors to idealism, whose influence in phenomenology has been much debated and has even caused rifts between Husserl’s own followers. In keeping with the history of phenomenology, a choice has been required here. The choice has been to adhere to a phenomenological realism without discounting the necessary participation of consciousness in knowledge formation and development. Levinas’ Theory of Intuition focuses upon Husserl’s Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenom­ enology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy, volume 1, published in 1913 (Husserl 1931). A related text is Levinas’ (1998) Discovering Existence with Husserl. Described by the publishers as a collection of ‘almost all of Levinas’ articles on Husserlian phenomenology’, this latter text blends autobiographical accounts of Levinas’ time in Freiburg – including accounts of meeting with Husserl – with philosophical exposition. Italics added. Italics added. Italics added. Italics added. Objective phenomena are referred to simply as objects in the original text. The substitution here does not distort the original. The original also appears to equate intuition with perception, phenomenological reflection, emotions, empathy and eidetic variation – an equation which might be justifiable but which lends to intuition an ambiguity beyond any reasonable degree of expectant understanding. The present investigation will explore the Husserlian understanding of intuition in some more depth and will find that no such equations are necessary – at least for the purposes of the present research. The Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary (Crowther, 1995) defines ‘insight’ as ‘the ability to see into the true nature of sth’. Italics added.

Part IV

Systemic epistemological investigations

If the twentieth century has had an objective neurosis here is surely one of its main components. What shall we do with freedom if it is possible, if we achieve it, if we even understand it? In the ‘conversations’ that Simone de Beauvoir published with her Adieux Sartre states with exceptional clarity his late view that freedom not only isn’t given, but can’t be – it has to be worked out by each individual: ‘freedom represents something that doesn’t exist but that gradually creates itself, something that has always been present in me and that will leave me only when I die. And I think that all other men are like me, but that the degree of awareness and the clarity with which this freedom appears to them varies according to the circumstances, according to their origins, their development, and their knowledge.’ In short, many of them don’t have it although any of them could, and many more have far less of it than they could. Peter Caws (1999)

10 Intuition

Phenomenological identities, in so far as they are consciousness’ epistemological creations projected upon phenomena, have been found to be equal to intuitions. They are projected through consciousness’ intentionality. Following from this, system theoretical emergent properties can be equated to phenomenological intuitions. However, phenomenology has indicated that intuition is constituted by some determinate structure. The purpose of this chapter is to uncover this structure. It has been noted that, since justificatory dynamics are directed, by von Bertalanffy, upon epistemological theorizing, uncovering the structure of intuition will serve for an explication of such dynamics.

10.1 The dual structure of intuition In 1973, Maurice Natanson published his celebrated1 Edmund Husserl: Phi­ losopher of Infinite Tasks. As a student of some of Husserl’s most respected heirs2 and member of the board of editors of Northwestern University’s authoritative series Studies in Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy, Natanson (1973: xix) presented his study on Husserlian phenomenology as ‘a way sometimes considered too existential to satisfy rigorous phenomenologists and too phenomenological to please committed existentialists’. Natanson’s balanced study is relevant to the present investigations, for it serves as a platform for understanding the determinate structure of intuition. Husserl, according to Natanson (1973: 33), finds that consciousness’ epistemological engagement with phenomena ‘involves two interpretative modes of intention – “idealizations,” in phenomenological terminology – which are at the basis of perceiving experience as continuous and orderly.’ In other words, when consciousness is engaged with phenomena, the epistemological mode of its intentionality is not simply intuition. The epistemological mode of intentionality involves two distinct intuitive modes. Thus far, then, intuition as the epistemological mode of intentionality is itself constituted by two modes. Natanson notes that Husserl labels the two modes of intuition and so forth

136  Systemic epistemological investigations and one can always again. Natanson himself, however, chooses to label them more succinctly as continuity and repetition, respectively. Now, if intuition is necessary for the possibility of epistemological engagement or experience, as the present investigations have indicated, and since intuition involves two intuitive modes, it is intuition qua continuity and intuition qua repetition that arise as the conditions necessary for the possibility of epistemological engagement. Natanson (1973: 35) confirms this: ‘Continuity and repetition are conditions necessary for the possibility of experience’. The present chapter will consider this statement at some length. For reasons that will become apparent, it will be convenient to label it Natanson’s inclusive assertion. The label points to Natanson’s use of the conjunction and which conjoins continuity and repetition. It will be exactly this inclusive conjoining which will be questioned as the investigation unfolds. To begin with, Natanson refers to the possibility of experience as opposed to epistemological engagement. Furthermore, he does not qualify the term as epistemological experience. An inattentive reader of Natanson’s text would, in the space of the first forty pages, begin to read back through these pages in order to discover what experience is being discussed, especially since the term has existential as opposed to epistemological connotations (which serve to further confuse the reader regarding Natanson’s exposition). Natanson’s discussion, however, is set firmly upon the epistemological plane – it begins, for instance, with a citation from Husserl regarding ‘natural knowledge’ (1973: 20). Given this, what Natanson is confirming, above, is that intuition qua continuity and intuition qua repetition are conditions necessary for the possibility of epistemological engagement. According to Natanson (1973: 16), for Husserl, ‘continuity and repetition are the basal presuppositions for there being anything given as part of our day-to-day reality’ and continuity and repetition are the ‘primordial assumptions about any element of [epistemological] experience.’ There is, in other words, an epistemological fundamentality in intuition’s two modes when consciousness epistemologically engages with phenomena. Natanson notes that, although the context in which Husserl first wrote of continuity and repetition is that of the ideality of logical structure,3 this context is but one of many illustrative frameworks through which they may be understood. Given that Husserl (1970b) himself later embedded them in his discussion of Lebenswelt, Natanson (1973) opts for a more experiential framework and rests his entire discussion of continuity and repetition upon Husserl’s thesis of the ‘natural attitude’, which situates consciousness in epistemological engagement with phenomena, as per the present requirements. In short, Natanson’s exposition is set firmly within the context required of System Theory. By following Husserl, the investigations, having already highlighted the systemicity inherent between intending and intuiting, now present a dual structure as constitutive of intuition: continuity and repetition. In other words, consciousness’ intentionality is not simply epistemologically actualized by intuition: consciousness’ intentionality is epistemologically

Intuition  137 actualized by two intuitive modes. The discussion will now consider each mode of intuition in turn. 10.1.1 Continuity/and so forth: the intuitive mode of development Natanson (1973: 33) cites Husserl as describing continuity/and so forth as ‘the form of reiterational infinity’. It is important to note that Husserl (1969: 188) does not say ‘repetitional’ – he explicitly writes reiterational. Although, in general, dictionaries stress only the repetitive aspect of reiteration, the -iterational significance of the word points not simply to repetition but to a de­ velopment as each iteration is passed through – in the same way, say, that each cycle of a heuristic, iterational methodology (such as Soft Systems Methodology) further develops a description. This is confirmed by Natanson’s (1973: 34, 35) emphasis that this intuitive mode allows for ‘adding new interpretative elements’, remaining open to ‘emendation and expansion’ – to ‘correctness’ as Husserl says (1973: 333). Thus, this ‘interpretative mode of intention’ may be identified as the mode of development of intuitions. 10.1.2 Repetition/one can always again: the intuitive mode of repetition Natanson (1973: 34) cites Husserl as describing repetition/one can always again as a ‘return to an ideal significational unity or to any other ideal unity’, wherein return equates to repetition4 so that this ‘interpretative mode of intention’ is a repetition of the unity in question.5 Unity, it will be recalled, is what an eidetically-inclined, epistemologically actualized identity offers in lieu of the epistemologically ideal significational unity of the essence to which it refers. An identity qua epistemological creation of consciousness, however, has been found to be an intuition. A repetition qua mode of intention of an ideal significational unity is, therefore, not a repetition of the identity itself. It can only be a repetition of the epistemological actualization, in other words, of the intuition. Thus, this ‘interpretative mode of intention’ may be identified as the mode of repetition of intuitions.

10.2 Continuity and repetition in a Bertalanffyan context Intuition is, therefore, dually structured. Consciousness’ epistemological creations are, at any one time, either repeated creations or developed ones. When it comes to epistemologically actualizing intentionality, consciousness is faced with a well-defined, dually structured, determinable course. Having reached this basic understanding, it would be well to reflect upon how it fits with von Bertalanffy’s general contextual understanding of the epistemological plane. Recall that for von Bertalanffy, although knowledge is understood as arising from a contingent relativism, knowledge is not

138  Systemic epistemological investigations condemned to such relativism, because of continual justification (section 6.5). Consider, for the moment, the claim that knowledge stems from a contingent relativism. The analysis thus far allows for a more specific consideration: the claim that consciousness’ epistemological engagement with phenomena begins with a relativistic epistemological actualization. With the dual structure of intuition in mind, consider what is found at this initial stage. There is, on the one hand, an intention in need of epistemological actualization and, on the other, a host of previous, or historic, epistemologically actualized intentions. The historical tapestry itself is constituted, on the one hand, by previously intended objective phenomena and, on the other, by those intuitions which epistemologically actualized such intentions, intuitions which were repeated or developed. Any intention in need of epistemological actualization is faced with this historical tapestry. The intention, as with all intentions, ‘has need of some theory or other’ if it is to be epistemologically actualized. That is, it requires an intuition. Given that intuition is dually structured, the question is: which mode of intuition’s dual structure fulfils this initial need? Consider the mode of development. The development of an intuition implies some prior intuition acting as the foundation for the development. When legendary jazz musician Charles Mingus was asked by counterculture icon Timothy Leary to participate in a drama with no script, Mingus – a master improviser – retorted: ‘You can’t improvise on nothing’ (Saul, 2000). Similarly, an intuition cannot be developed from nothing. The mode of development refers to the development of an intuition. In other words, this mode refers to an intuition which has already epistemologically actualized the intention in question. The mode of development is thus temporally beyond the initial epistemological actualization. The initial epistemological actualization of the intention cannot be some developed intuition. This leaves the mode of repetition. Consciousness, unable to create or develop an intuition out of thin air, and faced with a historical tapestry of previous intuitions, is left no other choice but to draw from this historical tapestry. In the language of relativism, the intention is epistemologically actualized relative to what is at hand. As von Bertalanffy seems to have understood, the primal emergence of knowledge is based upon a reversion to the historical contingent epistemological setting. Consciousness, in the first instance, borrows, and hence repeats, some previous intuition in order to epistemologically actualize an intention. That is, at least in the first instance, consciousness does not so much as spontaneously create–project as borrow– project and hence repeats a previous intuition. Indeed, it is through spontaneously having to draw upon previous intuitions that the current applicability of the creation–projection is rendered questionable.6 In brief, the intuitive mode for the initial epistemological actualization of an intention is always the mode of repetition. In terms of intuition’s dual structure, the relativistic cradle of knowledge conceded by von Bertalanffy lies in the intuitive mode of repetition.

Intuition  139 10.2.1 The inductive nature of the intuitive mode of repetition From the above, a primacy is attributable to the mode of repetition of intuitions. Phenomenology agrees and goes so far as to grant to the intuitive mode of repetition the status of structural epistemological principle without which no epistemological engagement is possible – as Natanson (1973: 35) points out through an illustration of consciousness epistemologically engaging with a phenomenon: The utility of simple tools in daily life is based on the possibility of repetition as a structural principle of everyday experience. Having learned to use a scythe, the farmer expects that each time he picks up that implement, holds it in the proper position, and swings it in that stiff, threshing rhythm he will be able to mow tall grass. If the blade is recently sharpened and the farmer executes his movement in traditional fashion, the grass is expected to fall. Any failure in the procedure must be due to its mechanics. Even before there is any thought of trouble, there is the tacit certainty that what worked in the past will continue to work in the future . . . Each empirical instance of using a tool in a routine way presupposes a nonempirical assumption: that routine use is always possible and that it will produce standard results.7 ‘Testing the tool,’ Natanson continues in the same passage, ‘does not mean testing the idealization its use exemplifies.’ An empirical experience may fail, but a failure of the possibility of a ‘return to an ideal significational unity or to any other ideal unity’, a failure of the ‘structural [epistemological] principle of everyday experience’ qua principle, in short, a failure of the intuitive mode of repetition as a ‘general criterion of life’ – to use von Bertalanffy’s (1968: 258) equally apt expression – would mean not only what Natanson (1973: 35) calls ‘a negation of everydayness, a nihilation of [epistemological] order within life’ but, more specifically, the evaporation of epistemological engagement and consequent understanding altogether. Ultimately, Natanson concurs that the primacy of the intuitive mode of repetition renders it the foundation/basis and catalyst for the intuitive mode of development – in other words, that any improvisational development of intuition is founded upon the mode of repetition – by noting that the mode of repetition is embedded in the possibility of the mode of development: Any typical act can be repeated in principle. If X can be added to [read: developed], X can be repeated. The act of addition [i.e. development] contains within it the possibility of returning to [i.e. repeating] whatever one commenced with.8 Interestingly, as Natanson’s ‘farmer’ illustration highlights, there is an inductive leap which qualifies the nature of the mode of repetition: consciousness

140  Systemic epistemological investigations repeats an intuition in the expectation that it will epistemologically actualize the intention in such a manner as to render sound epistemological engagement. Natanson (1973: 35) concludes that, in Husserlian phenomenology, the primacy, for the emergence of knowledge, of the mode of repetition indicates the primacy of inductive expectation in any epistemological engagement: ‘When Husserl speaks of “one can always again” as an idealization, he is referring to the a priori status of typified expectation.’ Of course, the attribution of such a primacy is not particular to phenomenology. Audi (1998: 250–259), in his thorough introduction to epistemology, shows that deductive knowledge is necessarily founded upon inductive knowledge. What is particular to phenomenology is what it reveals about the nature of relativism. The equation of the relativistic cradle of knowledge with the intuitive mode of repetition renders relativism not only the foundational structural epistemological principle from which epistemological engagement arises; not only the ‘general criterion’ to which consciousness reverts in setting some epistemological order within life; but a reversion to the contingent historical tapestry of previous intuitions in the expectation that they will provide for a sound epistemological engagement. Characterized by such expectation, relativism is induction taken to its limit.

10.3 A preliminary study of intuition’s two modes Having situated intuition’s two modes in von Bertalanffy’s general contextual understanding of epistemological development, the investigations allow for an amplified understanding of each mode. 10.3.1 The mode of development: intention intuiting The results thus far have indicated that, in the mode of development, consciousness epistemologically actualizes a given intention through the elaboration, emendation or expansion of an intuition formerly applied to such an intention. The focus of activity of the mode of development, in other words, is the enterprising emendation and expansion of intuition, a ‘reiterational infinity’ of intuitive creativeness in the service of a higher degree of eidetic correspondence which, with each iteration, is applied to intending. That is, when intending–intuiting is undertaken through the mode of development, there is a high degree of active intuiting for particular intending. The mode of development may therefore be characterized as intention intuiting. 10.3.2 The mode of repetition: intuition intending This is in direct contrast to the mode of repetition which, in falling back on relativism, reverts to passively accepting a former intuition in order to epistemologically actualize intending. Passively, for, if engagement with phenomena is rendered epistemological by epistemologically actualizing intentions through the repetition of former eidetically-inclined intuitions, then the mode of

Intuition  141 repetition reduces the epistemological actualization of consciousness’ intending to a mere passive acceptance of such intuitions. When intending–intuiting is undertaken through the mode of repetition, there is a high degree of epistemological parrotry. Some former intuition is pressed into service to epistemologically actualizing intending. The mode of repetition may therefore be characterized as intuition intending. 10.3.3 The mutual exclusiveness of intuition’s two modes The mode of repetition has been characterized as intuition intending in direct contrast to the mode of development which has been characterized as inten­ tion intuiting. The grammatical inversions serve to highlight an insightful dynamic. In the mode of repetition, intuition is the active subject which intends. In the mode of development, intuition is rendered the activity being performed (intuiting) by the active subject, intention. Similarly, in the mode of development, intention is the active subject which intuits; whilst in the mode of repetition, intention is rendered the activity being performed (intending) by the active subject, intuition. Where the mode of repetition ascribes intuition as the subject, the mode of development renders intuition the subject’s action. Where the mode of development ascribes intention as the subject, the mode of repetition renders intention the subject’s action. An active subject cannot simultaneously be the subject’s action. Given this, the grammatical inversions of the characterizations indicate that intuition’s two modes are mutually exclusive. This is confirmed when considering the insights which gave rise to the respective characterizations. The epistemological parrotry of the mode of repetition renders it epistemologically ‘lazy’ in that some former intuition bears upon intending. By contrast, the mode of development is epistemologically enterprising in that newly developed, created intuitions bear upon intending. If intuition comes in two modes, it cannot come in both modes simultaneously. It is either lazy or enterprising at any one time. Intuition qua consciousness’ epistemological course is fissured. 10.3.4 Intuition’s two modes: both/and, either/or The characterizations of each intuitive mode discussed above are summarized in Table 10.1. With such insights in mind, consider how intuition’s two modes, in their mutual exclusivity, impact upon some key pieces of the overall epistemological jigsaw. Consider, for instance, the relationship between epistemological engagement and the epistemological actualization of intentionality. In particular, recall the investigation in section 9.4 on the epistemological inadequacy of singular intending which highlighted that engagement with phenomena is rendered epistemological precisely through the epistemological actualization of intentions. That is, if intentionality is epistemologically actualized, then epistemological engagement arises. In other words, the epistemological actualization of intentionality leads to

142  Systemic epistemological investigations Table 10.1  Characterizations of each intuitive mode qua epistemological actualization of an intention The mode of development of intuitions

The mode of repetition of intuitions

Iterational, developmental epistemological actualizations Active; emendation and expansion of the theory which formerly epistemologically actualized the intention, resulting in many intuitions related to one intention

Repeated and repetitive epistemological actualization Passive; repetition/loan of some former theory – which epistemologically actualized some previous intention – pressed into epistemologically actualizing the present intention (epistemological parrotry), resulting in more than one intention being epistemologically actualized by the singular, repeated intuition: one intuition related to many intentions Epistemologically ‘lazy’ (former/repeated intuition bears upon the intention)

Epistemologically enterprising (newly developed, created intuitions bear upon the intention) Intention intuiting Subject: intention Subject’s action: intuition

Intuition intending Subject: intuition Subject’s action: intention

engagement as epistemological. Given this, the possibility of epistemological engagement depends upon the epistemological actualization of intentionality: no epistemological actualization of intentionality, no epistemological engagement – only a reduction to mundane, interphenomenal engagement. In short, the epistemological actualization of intentionality is a necessary condition for the possibility of epistemological engagement. How does this understanding of the relationship between epistemological engagement and the epistemological actualization of intentionality cohere with Natanson’s inclusive assertion (see section 10.1) that both intuitive modes, continuity and repetition, are conditions necessary for the possibility of epistemological engagement? Recall that epistemological actualization is yielded through intuition. Intuition comes in two modes: the mode of repetition and the mode of development. As long as one mode of intuition is present, intentionality is epistemologically actualized. That is, either intuitive mode epistemologically actualizes intentionality. Given this, the epistemological actualization of intentionality respects the mutual exclusiveness inherent in intuition’s two modes. Since, however, epistemological engagement arises when intentionality is epistemologically actualized, the respect which the epistemological actualization of intentionality has for the mutual exclusiveness inherent in intuition’s two modes raises a problem. For, if the epistemological actualization of intentionality is a necessary condition for the possibility of epistemological engagement, as noted above, then the possibility of epistemological engagement does not necessarily require both continuity and repetition; it requires either continuity or repetition, since either one epistemologically actualizes intentionality.

Intuition  143 Natanson is quite clear: the necessity of both continuity and repetition is a necessity for the possibility of epistemological engagement. The present discussion, however, has highlighted that epistemological engagement arises through either continuity or repetition. On the one hand, therefore, Natanson claims the necessity of both continuity and repetition for the possibility of epistemological engagement; and, on the other hand, the present analysis is leaning towards either continuity or repetition as necessary for the possibility of epistemological engagement. Either Natanson is wrong or the analysis has gone astray. Such apparent incoherence indicates that the exact necessity of both continuity and repetition for epistemological engagement has yet to be completely understood. Perhaps Natanson does not understand possibility in the manner supposed by the analysis. That X and Y are necessary for the possibility of Z has been interpreted, by the analysis, as X and Y are necessary for the inception of Z. Compare this with Natanson’s (1973: 36) fairly explicit understanding from the same short paragraph which rendered what has been labelled his inclusive assertion: the possibility of epistemological engagement is about consciousness ‘being able to regain the experiential world from moment to moment’.9 In other words, Natanson, in referring to the possibility of epistemological engagement, is actually referring to the temporal maintenance of epistemological engagement. So that, if, for Natanson, continuity and repetition are both necessary for the possibility of epistemological engagement, they are necessary for the temporal maintenance of epistemological engagement. How does the understanding of possibility as temporal maintenance impact upon the relationship between the epistemological actualization of intentionality and epistemological engagement? Earlier, it was highlighted that the epistemological actualization of intentionality is a necessary condition for the possibility of epistemological engagement. From the recent amplified understanding of the term possibility, this translates to the epistemological actualization of intentionality being necessary for the temporal maintenance of epistemological engagement. To talk of the temporal maintenance of epistemological engagement is to extend such engagement beyond its initial inception from any singular epistemological actualization of intentionality. Therefore, because of its dependency upon the epistemological actualization of intentionality, to talk of the temporal maintenance of epistemological engagement is either: (1) to extend epistemological actualization into a temporal series of such actualizations; or (2) to allow for one epistemological actualization to reverberate into time itself. The question is: which option renders the temporal maintenance of epistemological engagement? Given that epistemological engagement is a product of the epistemological actualization of intentionality, which actualization occurs through the employment of either intuitive mode, epistemological engagement arises through either continuity or repetition. Both continuity and repetition are claimed as required, however, for the temporal maintenance of epistemological engagement. In other words, even though either intuitive mode can initi­ ate epistemological engagement, it is claimed that both intuitive modes are

144  Systemic epistemological investigations necessary for its maintenance or continuation in time. Thus either intuitive mode is sufficient for the inception of epistemological engagement. Since, however, both are claimed as necessary for the temporal maintenance of epistemological engagement, then neither intuitive mode is sufficient, in itself, for such temporal maintenance. In accordance with the claim, therefore, one mode of epistemological actualization reverberating into time itself is insufficient for the temporal maintenance of epistemological engagement. Because of the claim that such temporal maintenance requires both intuitive modes, and since the mutual exclusiveness inherent to the two intuitive modes renders each singly employable at any one time, the temporal maintenance of epistemological engagement depends upon a temporal series of epistemological actualizations, which series must include any number of epistemological actualizations that employ the intuitive mode of development and any number of epistemological actualizations that employ the intuitive mode of repetition. Only such an understanding is commensurable to Natanson’s claim that continuity and repetition are both necessary for the temporal maintenance of epistemological engagement. Given this, the present analysis demands a demonstration of why each temporally sustained intuitive mode is, in itself, insufficient on its own for the temporal maintenance of epistemological engagement. Consider, therefore, each mode in turn.

10.4 Dogmatism: the mode of repetition of intuitions The intuitive mode of repetition has already been uncovered as one which passively accepts a previous intuition in order to epistemologically actualize intending. A high degree of epistemological parrotry characterizes this mode, with consciousness’ intending–intuiting being ultimately reduced to one intuition intending any number of phenomena. Now, there is nothing out of the ordinary in such epistemological parrotry. Consciousness requires it in order to initiate knowledge – as discussed earlier – and consciousness reverts to it because of the structural similarities inherent in otherwise different phenomena. The question, however, concerns consciousness’ sustaining this intuitive mode in time so that the mode’s temporal consequences may be uncovered. Sustaining this mode indicates that consciousness previously created some theory10 which enabled epistemological engagement with phenomena, and that consciousness has now borrowed it to epistemologically actualize its current intending. In essence, consciousness is no longer intuiting in that it is not actively creating theories but only borrowing and repeating one theory. Consciousness is involved in a closed epistemological system applicable to any number of intentions. The summative/special characteristic of this closed system is the intuition qua epistemological actualizer.11 Any closed system, however, suffers from entropy. With the passage of time, the intuition characteristic of this system is exhausted, degraded,

Intuition  145 degenerated, decomposed and disintegrated qua epistemological actualizer. Since epistemological actualization renders epistemological engagement, this latter is itself degraded, degenerated, decomposed, disintegrated. With the disintegration of the distinctly epistemological character of the system, consciousness’ engagement loses its original epistemological modality and is reduced to pure deterministic, or purely determined, engagement no different from that of all other interphenomenal engagement. However, this does not indicate that consciousness is primarily liable to the deterministic forces of the phenomena with which it engages. For the disintegration of the intuition qua epistemological actualizer does not so much signify its death or disappearance qua epistemological as its absorption or transformation into a different epistemological modality. With each circular, repetitive reinforcement, the intuition is transformed from one of any number of possible intuitions which consciousness could have borrowed to the intuition which epistemologically actualizes consciousness’ intending. In system theoretical terms (von Bertalanffy, 1968: 125), the intuition acquires a ‘time-independent’ status which, in epistemological terms, translates to the intuition acquiring the status of objective knowledge. As with such knowledge, it determines consciousness in its engagement with phenomena. It is only because consciousness is so primarily determined that it may be seen to be liable to the deterministic forces of phenomena. In short, temporal adherence to the mode of repetition renders consciousness a slave to epistemological determinism. In the words of Merleau-Ponty (1964), describing the first of two fronts on which Husserl’s struggle was focused, the mode of repetition ‘attempts to arrange for us an access to the truth lacking any contact with contingent experience.’ In System Theory, recognition of this scenario is illustrated by Flood and Ulrich’s (1990) warning against decision-making that adheres to some convergence or absolutisms. In the history of management, the failure of this mode in the context of human systems is best illustrated in the attempt to realize the ‘moon–ghetto metaphor’ – that is, the ‘hopelessly over-ambitious’ attempt to apply the power of successful moon-landing optimization techniques to inner-city social problems (Rosenhead, 1989: 4; 1992). For epistemology in general, the mode of repetition is not only a reflection of relativism, as indicated earlier; it also reflects a position exemplified in Wolff ’s Philosophia Prima Sive Ontologia; a Leibnizian rationalism which at first attracted Kant but which, because of its inability to link logical certainty with reality, he was later to define as dogmatic – a most apt label for this intuitive mode.

10.5 Bounded rationality: the mode of development of intuitions The intuitive mode of development has already been uncovered as one which is epistemologically enterprising, in that consciousness actively intuits. However, such intuiting is with reference to one particular intention. In effect,

146  Systemic epistemological investigations consciousness’ epistemological vigorousness and progression is bounded by its intention. Given this, this mode may essentially be understood as bounded intuiting or, perhaps more succinctly, as bounded rationality. In contrast to dogmatism, consciousness in this case is not involved in a static epistemological system, always constituted by the same intuitive component, closed to any external input or influences. Consciousness is instead involved in an open epistemological system whereby the intention drives further intuiting. In other words, the intention acts as an input to intuitive output, rendering a continuous change, in the form of development, of the intuitive component. Specifically because such change is in the form of continual development, consciousness’ current epistemological system – in further contrast to dogmatism – need not attain some time-independent constancy. For it is characteristic of open systems that they only might attain what can equally be termed ‘steady state’ (von Bertalanffy, 1968: 125). The realization of such eventual constancy requires a negative or controlling feedback mechanism. Such a mechanism is currently missing, for the intentional feedback to intuiting is a positive, reinforcing loop serving the generation of more developed intuitions. Because of this, the current epistemological system only ever tends toward some asymptotically receding time-independent constancy. In biological terms, consciousness, in this case, is involved in a purely anabolic open system of growth lacking any catabolic influence (von Bertalanffy, 1968: 135). In simple terms, there is epistemological building-up with no epistemological breaking-down. The asymptotic tendency of this system, therefore, is of an exponential nature or, as Husserl has so succinctly put it (see section 10.1.1), of an infinitely, epistemologically reiterational nature. In system theoretical terms, the mode of development of intuitions is a system of purely negative epistemological entropy, with intuiting only ever referring to the singular intentional import into the system. The temporal consequences are well spelt out by Merleau-Ponty (1964: 51) when describing the second of the two fronts on which Husserl’s struggle was focused. Specifically, the mode of development of intuitions reduce[s] the life of man to a mere result of external conditions acting on him and see[s] the philosophizing person as entirely determined from the outside, lacking any contact with his own thought and therefore destined to skepticism. In effect, the epistemological creations of consciousness at each moment are the result of only external causes which act upon it. In short, owing to the lack of any distinctly epistemological self-referentiality, temporal adherence to the mode of development renders consciousness a slave to phenomenal determinism. In System Theory, the mode of development is illustrated through the concerns expressed on the issue of holding singular goals as the over-riding

Intuition  147 driving decision-making factor – say, efficiency. This was the scenario which led Checkland (1999) to argue that at least three factors should drive the management of transformation: efficiency, efficacy and effectiveness. Significantly, he extended these to include ethicality and elegance (Checkland, 1999: A25; Yolles, 1999: 327). Furthermore, it was recognition of this mode which led him to insist that implementation may require systemic desirability but, more importantly, should be focused on cultural feasibility. Similarly, when Ackoff (1979) expressed concern over the overtly quantitative tendencies evident in management science, accusing the field of mathematical ‘masturbation’, it was this mode he had in mind.

10.6 Conclusion In order to epistemologically actualize intentionality, consciousness has at its disposal a fissured, completely determinable course, each of whose routes ultimately yields deterministic engagement with phenomena. At best, each may apply to a certain limiting approach to epistemological engagement and, additionally, to only a limited type of epistemological engagement. In either case, consciousness is, at best, limited or constrained epistemologically or, at worst, transformed from that which epistemologically engages with phenomena to a determined phenomenon. In simple terms, temporal adherence to either course transforms the human being from a knowing, acting subject to a determined object – as hinted by System Theory itself (see section 5.6). Adherence to either course renders consciousness futile, expendable, dispensable, redundant. Consequently, consciousness’ temporal engagement with phenomena loses its distinctly epistemological character and is surrendered to determinism. Having thus demonstrated the insufficiency of either lone intuitive mode for the temporal maintenance of epistemological engagement, and given the absence of any other epistemological course, it appears that, in line with Natanson, both intuitive modes must somehow participate together, although – as a result of mutual exclusivity – alternately, in time, for the possibility of epistemological engagement. Given this, what is called for is a demonstration of how such participation may be possible in a manner which reflects System Theory’s own epistemological concerns. The next chapter attempts such a demonstration with a view to informing System Theory’s understanding of consciousness and its epistemological engagement with phenomena.

Notes 1 Natanson’s book was winner of the 1974 National Book Award in the United States. 2 Natanson (1973: xix) writes: W.H. Werkmeister introduced me to the study of Husserl twenty-five years ago. That study was continued and intensified several years later under

148  Systemic epistemological investigations Alfred Schutz. Indirect instruction came from the writings of (and occasional meetings with) Marvin Farber, Herbert Spiegelberg, Erwin Straus, Harmon Chapman, Fritz Kaufmann, and Dorion Cairns. Although I cannot formally qualify as his student, I consider Aron Gurwitsch to be one of my teachers. The names Natanson lists are some of the most respected in phenomenology. 3 Natanson refers to Husserl’s (1969) Formal and Transcendental Logic, in particular pp. 188–189. 4 This equation is explicit on page 35 of Natanson’s text. 5 Natanson (1973: 136) later elaborates that such a return is a return to, or repetition of, something ‘taken for granted’. This elaboration, however, confuses the issue, for the central aspects of repetition are return, ideal, significational and unity. 6 This questionable status was discussed in sections 4.5–4.7, 6.5 and 6.7. 7 Italics added. 8 Italics added. 9 Italics added. 10 Epistemological actualization as the necessary creation of some theory by consciousness has been discussed throughout these investigations. In particular, see sections 4.5, 4.7, 5.6, 6.4–6.7, 9.3–9.5, 10.2 and 10.3.4. 11 For a discussion of the nature of closed systems and summative and special characteristics see Chapter 5.

11 Dogmatism and bounded rationality

With the delineation of intuition’s dual structure in the previous chapter, the investigations have reached their epistemological core. It would be well to recall how the investigations have reached this point in order to uncover how the recent results may inform System Theory’s epistemological deliberations. The investigations began with questions surrounding the idea of emergent property and the possibility of an epistemology built upon this fundamental idea (see section 3.3). A preliminary examination into emergent properties led to the identification of 12 characteristics (see Table 4.1). From this examination, it was found that emergent properties do not singularly emerge from phenomena themselves. Consciousness plays an active epistemological part in their creation. Emergent properties came to be understood as the epistemological tools of consciousness in its search for order, no different from theoretical constructs which consciousness creates and projects upon phenomena of interest. For System Theory, the nature of such creation– projection was seen to be understood as instantaneous. This very instantaneity led to the conclusion that emergent properties are liable to some form of justification. An analysis of the relationship between emergent properties and complexes led to a confirmation of consciousness as creating–projecting some theoretical conception which demands being justified. It highlighted, however, that knowledge is an emergent property of the system constituted by consciousness on the one hand and phenomena on the other (see section 5.6). As such, for System Theory, knowledge is a product of a systemic relationship between consciousness and phenomena, rendering knowledge neither purely rational nor purely empirical. Von Bertalanffy conceded that there might be rational beginnings to knowledge, but quickly tempered this influence with a demand that consciousness’ creations–projections be continually justified (see section 6.5). The understanding of the continual justification in question was rendered problematic. On the one hand, the instantaneous nature in which consciousness creates–projects emergent properties demands for their justification

150  Systemic epistemological investigations vis-à-vis the phenomena upon which they are targeted. On the other hand, von Bertalanffy demanded continual justification of knowledge for the very possibility of there being knowledge at all. Whereas the first call for justification appears to be quite understandable, the second, distinctly Bertalanffyan call, requires some explication. Phenomenology revealed how it understands consciousness’ epistemological creations through its theory of intuition. It moreover unveiled that intuition is structured by two mutually exclusive epistemological courses. Either course serves to epistemologically actualize intentionality, yet temporal adherence to either course reduces consciousness’ epistemological engagement with phenomena to a determined engagement. The investigations, therefore, are faced with two findings. First, knowledge is seen to arise from two epistemological routes, each of which, taken alone, is epistemologically inadequate in that it leads to a determined consciousness instead of one which enjoys a systemic relationship with phenomena. Second, knowledge is to be continually justified if it is to maintain its systemic tie qua emergent property of the system constituted by consciousness and phenomena. For phenomenology, the temporal maintenance of epistemological engagement is an emergent property of some incorporation of both intuitive modes. Since both are mutually exclusive, the incorporation of them both signals that they are to be played one against the other – which play could be construed as one being justified against the other. It is exactly this sort of understanding which this chapter attempts to unravel.

11.1 Exploring dogmatism and bounded rationality The elimination of consciousness was signalled by von Bertalanffy as arising from a failure to continually justify its creations–projections (see section 6.5) or, in phenomenological terms, its intending–intuiting. Unpacking the dual structure of intuition has revealed that consciousness cannot afford to place too much stress on either intending or intuiting. On the other hand, the only epistemological route available to it is one whose mutually exclusive dual structure demands exactly that consciousness, at any point in time, stress one side of its systemic intending–intuiting. Consciousness is condemned to an intuitive structure which ultimately yields its demise. Still, this is the only epistemological structure afforded by phenomenology to System Theory, based upon the earlier criteria for interdisciplinarity (see Table 6.1). An analogy may help to picture the significance of these results. Consciousness breathes epistemological air through a two-cylinder apparatus, each of whose cylinders, when drawn upon individually, ultimately asphyxiate consciousness. There is no third cylinder, no magical gulp of air from another source: the only sources upon which consciousness can draw in order to secure its epistemological survival are the very ones which lead it to its epistemological death. Yet another analogy provides further detail. Forces in physics act upon

Dogmatism and bounded rationality  151 each other in such a way as to keep a bicycle moving. They act, that is, in such a way as to keep the bicycle from falling to one side or the other. The moving bicycle, in this case, is epistemological engagement. On one side lies dogmatism and, on the other, bounded rationality. In order to keep the bicycle moving – and in order to maintain epistemological engagement – the cyclist (consciousness) must pedal. With each half-turn of the pedals, the bicycle (epistemological engagement) veers towards one side or the other. It is through continuous pedalling that the bicycle (epistemological engagement) is maintained in motion, otherwise the bicycle ultimately falls on one side or the other (and epistemological engagement ultimately reduces to either dogmatism or bounded rationality). Such continual pedalling, however, is only possible if the cyclist (consciousness) alternately applies force on either pedal. The cyclist cannot avoid stressing one side and the other alternately if the bicycle is to be kept in motion. Similarly, consciousness cannot avoid travelling alternately down the routes of dogmatism and bounded rationality if it is to maintain its intending–intuiting and hence its epistemological engagement. Additionally, the analogy indicates that if the cyclist simply stops pedalling, the bicycle will fall on one side or the other – on the side which was last stressed in the pedalling. In the same way, if consciousness stops travelling down the dual ‘course of thought’, to borrow Levinas’ term (see section 9.4), epistemological engagement crystallizes into either dogmatism or bounded rationality – depending upon which route was ultimately taken. In effect, only a continually alternate immersion into dogmatism and bounded rationality maintains epistemological engagement. In von Bertalanffy’s terms, consciousness must continually justify its epistemological creations against the mode through which they last emerged. Otherwise, consciousness succumbs to dogmatism or bounded rationality and to its consequent elimination as that phenomenon whose engagement with other phenomena is distinguished by its distinctly epistemological nature. In effect, it is the switch from bounded rationality to dogmatism which allows consciousness to engage with a multitude of phenomena instead of only a limited number, and it is the switch from dogmatism to bounded rationality which allows consciousness to learn more about particular phenomena instead of remaining ignorant about most of them. In short, if neither dogmatism nor bounded rationality can, in itself, secure the epistemological survival of consciousness then, in the absence of any other epistemological alternative, they must be incorporated into some system which allows for their equal availability and usage. Indeed, von Bertalanffy himself signals the need for such an incorporation. He refers to the two intuitive modes, respectively, as the empirico-intuitive method of systems study and the deductive approach (1968: 94–99); the ‘feverish “model building” ’, on the one hand, ‘as a purpose in itself and often without regard to empirical fact’, and, on the other hand, the ‘one-sided empiricism [of] science of the past (and partly still the present)’; on the one

152  Systemic epistemological investigations hand, ‘conceptual experimentation at random’ and, on the other, ‘at-random experimentation in the laboratory’; on the one hand, the mere intellectual play of theory without experience and, on the other, the blindness of experience without theory (1968: 100–101). Von Bertalanffy (1968: 99) notes that the danger of either approach ‘is to consider too early the theoretical model as being closed and definitive.’ Indeed, dogmatism and bounded rationality are, ultimately, epistemologically closed and deterministically definitive. From the investigation into the Bertalanffyan relational characteristic in Chapter 5, temporal epistemological engagement in System Theory calls for epistemological openness and deterministic indefiniteness. Significantly, to talk of the singular indefiniteness of an element, as well as of its open constitution, is to talk of such an element’s required incorporation into some system. Therefore, the demand of System Theory is to treat dogmatism and bounded rationality not as separable parts but as moments of an overall epistemological system. Given that neither intuitive mode on its own is epistemologically adequate, neither can be separated as that route which renders epistemological engagement. Von Bertalanffy, moreover, nowhere calls for some third synthesis but always maintains them in distinction – in line with their mutual exclusivity highlighted in the recent phenomenological analysis. In brief, the temporal maintenance of epistemological engagement is claimed to depend upon two intuitive modes, neither of which is capable, on its own, of yielding it, nor, by their mutual exclusiveness, are they capable of yielding it collectively, compositionally, aggregately in so far as this implies some addition of the two intuitive modes.1 In simple terms: X and Y are necessary for Z; X does not yield Z; Y does not yield Z; and, crucially, X + Y does not yield Z. Yet Z results from X and Y. What is Z? This is the riddle whose solution System Theory was born to provide. In short, an epistemology particular to System Theory demands a distinctly systemic incorporation of both dogmatism and bounded rationality, which systemic incoporation yields the emergent property epistemological engagement.

11.2 The primacy of systemicity There is therefore a requirement for the systemic incorporation of dogmatism and bounded rationality into some epistemological system. Such a system must respect the mutual exclusiveness of the two modes but cannot allow for single adherence to either intuitive mode. In effect, it must secure their dual necessity in time. Phenomenology provides, in the work of Sartre, a basic description of what is required. Bernard-Henri Lévy (2000: 155–156) puts himself in Sartre’s shoes and sufficiently presents the case: I refuse to choose between realism and solipsism, materialism and idealism – I refuse this face-to-face sterility, traversing the history of philosophy, of those who posit the world as without consciousness against

Dogmatism and bounded rationality  153 those fanatics of consciousness without world. How can one believe in the materiality of things without believing that that which we perceive is entirely dictated by them and is nothing but the reflection of a truth inscribed in their substance? How can one believe in the operation of consciousness without, inversely, going as far as to say that it is this, this operation, which confers on things the essence of their truth and their meaning?2 In view of the dual structure of intuition, Lévy’s Sartre is merely confirming the ‘sterility’ of each singular mode of intuition. Sartre recognizes the debilitating consequences of each mode and refuses to choose one in favour of the other. Lévy (2000: 156) goes on to point out that Sartre desires a ‘true’ thing, a ‘true’ subject and, in between the two, a dialectic which goes beyond the face-to-face sterility of thing-ism and subjectivism.3 In rejecting the idea that one mode must be chosen over the other, Sartre maintains both dogmatism and bounded rationality – but he does not maintain them purely structurally. Sartre calls for some ‘dialectic’ between the two singular modes. In other words, Sartre retains the dual structure of dogmatism and bounded rationality but simultaneously demands that these two pillars participate in some dynamic which he terms ‘dialectic’. In line with the present requirements, the ‘thing’ and the ‘subject’ are to be treated as irreconcilable components of an epistemological system governed by some dynamic. Accordingly, epistemological engagement and development will arise not from some synthesis between realism and idealism but, instead, from the necessity of maintaining both realism and idealism or, in terms of the present discussion, both bounded rationality and dogmatism. These two pillars not only form the courses along which epistemological evolution travels but, at any point in time, signal the destination towards which such evolution is headed. For Sartre, then, neither idealism nor realism taken alone contributes towards epistemological development. Some dynamic in which they participate, however, reverses their respective singular epistemological inadequacy. Sartre finds some contemporary support in the interdisciplinary philosopher Charles Taylor who also denies, in conspicuously Sartrean terms, any supposed helpful contribution arising from the standard idealism–materialism distinction. The standard perception of the dualism reduces to only one question: Does the reality precede the philosophical formulation or vice-versa? But this question is totally sterile, because it has left out the really interesting level . . . There isn’t a single answer to [the question of] which is the independent variable; it depends on the situation. Sometimes you find certain formulations have tremendous impact in history; at other

154  Systemic epistemological investigations times they are obviously limping behind very deep changes in the social imaginary. It is this constant, complex inter-relationship which plays out in so many different ways that you very rapidly leave behind these crude issues about whether you’re a materialist or an idealist. (Klaushofer, 2000) Is ‘the really interesting level’ the dynamic in question? Is it Sartre’s ‘dialectic’? Whatever the case, echoing the earlier observation that each singular mode of intuition’s singularly posited primacy results in no further use of consciousness, Taylor confirms the ultimate, literal consequence implied in either dogmatism or bounded rationality: ‘I think you have to be utterly out of your mind to be either.’ Additionally, for Taylor and for Sartre, that one cannot be either dogmatic or rationally bounded signals neither the dismissal of either mode nor their synthesis into some third. One must simply be both. 11.2.1 The Sartrean dialectic Obviously, the Sartrean ‘dialectic’ is not some Kantian/Hegelian-inspired synthetic aspiration. It calls for two irreconcilable moments whose dual necessity is maintained by this very ‘dialectic’. So what is the Sartrean ‘dialectic’? In this instance, Lévy (2000: 354–355) is most helpful: It is a new dialectic. It is a bizarre dialectic. It is a dialectic somewhat comparable to a ‘turnstile’, a ‘spiral’, more of a ‘multi-centred spiral’ . . . which differs from all other known dialectics, especially the Hegelian, on this major point, which changes everything: it functions as an operation in two moments. It has not three, but two terms. It does not say ‘x is opposed to y before fusing with it in order that they may, together, constitute z’, but, ‘x and y are opposed to each other, yes; they never cease to oppose each other; there is, moreover, at each spin of the spiral, a sort of new rising, or projection, whose two moments – begotten as they are, not by some transcendental principle, or a God, but by an intrinsic wellspring, nested at the heart of Being – allow, in effect, to continue to talk of a dialectic; but if there is rising, or progress, if the dynamic of [dialectical] opposing moves on, at each turn of the turnstile, to a higher degree of complexity, there is no third term, on the other hand, which would reconcile the former two and end up halting the never-ending dynamic.’ It is a dialectic, therefore, which neither unties nor resolves itself. It is a dialectic lacking recourse or synthesis, irreparable. It is an operation which, literally, goes around in circles and breaks with the linearity . . . implied by all the other dialectics.4 This is the most concise and informative description of the Sartrean dialectic to date – highlighting, moreover, a promising epistemological bridge

Dogmatism and bounded rationality  155 between System Theory and Sartrean scholarship at least on the epistemological plane. Lévy’s ‘x’ and ‘y’ are phenomenology’s, and System Theory’s, consciousness and phenomena – those two moments ‘begotten by an intrinsic wellspring nested at the heart of Being’ or, in system theoretical terms, an original emergence (see section 5.4). These two opposing terms are eternally opposed, the form of opposition being not the Hegelian frontal attack which fuses into a third term. Indeed, the Hegelian form makes no sense in this ‘never-ending’ opposition. Instead, the opposition is not shaped in the form of attack at all: the two terms are two irreconcilable moments dancing round each other in a ‘multi-centred spiral’ which ‘goes around in circles and breaks with linearity’. The ‘rising’ or ‘projection’, with ‘each spin of the spiral’, is but the emergent property of this dance, of this system, of this ‘dialectic’. The ‘higher degree of complexity’ reached with each ‘spin’ is the level of epistemological engagement which the dance between consciousness and phenomena affords. Being a ‘dialectic’ which lacks ‘recourse’ or a third synthetic term, and being unable to ‘untie’ or ‘resolve’ itself, the emergent property of this dance and, more importantly, the degree of epistemological engagement, refer directly back to the two systemic moments which, by pushing each other on unceasingly, have enabled and continue to enable the property and the epistemological engagement – forever retaining them umbilically tied to each progressive5 push of the spiral. For System Theory, this dialectic is not ‘bizarre’ (to use Lévy’s term) – it comes in the shape of that most fundamental system theoretical concept: the emergence-enabling dependent moment. It is a systemic dialectic – a radically systemic dialectic in that it is wholly and completely constituted by moments.

11.3 Consciousness’ choice If System Theory, therefore, requires an interdisciplinary reflection of its systemic epistemological aspirations, it finds such a reflection in Sartre – one of Husserl’s most influential heirs. Still, there is precious little explicitness of the ‘dialectic’ in which the two structural pillars of dogmatism and bounded rationality participate. Lévy, however, has already provided a neat clue to the dynamics in which dogmatism and bounded rationality participate: it is ‘at each turn of the turnstile’ that there is an emergence of epistemological engagement. The significance of this is obvious when considering that the incorporation of dogmatism and bounded rationality in any epistemology for System Theory must be one which simultaneously allows for these necessary yet irreconcilable epistemological courses, and yet avoids the abyss of either route taken singularly. Such an epistemology allows for consciousness to revert to intuition intending or intention intuiting6 at any one time owing to the irreconcilability of dogmatism and bounded rationality, but simultaneously provides for consciousness not to necessarily sink into the abyss of either one. Such a

156  Systemic epistemological investigations provision could well be envisaged as a turnstile through which consciousness passes; a turnstile which, for each pass, leaves open two gates: one to dogmatism, the other to bounded rationality. Any epistemology particular to System Theory, therefore, will provide some turnstile function for consciousness to move through. Consciousness must necessarily pass through this turnstile for it is the junction from where begin both courses of thought. On the other hand, consciousness need not necessarily pass into either dogmatism or bounded rationality. Dogmatism and bounded rationality present themselves as alternatives at the turnstile, but neither course alone beckons or determines consciousness. The structure of intuition provides the determinable, alternative routes down which consciousness may travel, the available routes without which the epistemological actualization of consciousness’ intentionality is impossible. Neither route maintains some deterministic grip upon consciousness. In other words, the structure of intuition does not so much determine epistemological understanding as provide the determinable setting from which epistemological understanding might arise.7 Given this, consciousness qua projection of epistemologically actualized intending refers to, and indeed depends for such epistemological actualization upon, the structure of intuition so that if consciousness’ intending hungers after phenomena, consciousness’ intuiting hungers after the structure of intuition without which consciousness would evaporate qua phenomenon which epistemologically engages with other phenomena. Whereas the phenomena that consciousness’ intending hungers after are singular wholes, however, intuition which consciousness’ intuiting hungers after is fissured (see also sections 10.3.3 and 10.6). The irreconcilability of this fissure demands that consciousness decide which route of this dual structure to take. Though, therefore, any epistemology particular to System Theory must provide some turnstile function, as a gate to intuition, for consciousness to move through, it will not, ‘at each turn of the turnstile’, choose for consciousness which of either course of intuition to tread. It is consciousness itself which chooses between dogmatism and bounded rationality. 11.3.1 The self-justification of consciousness’ choice Epistemological engagement is thus recognized as the emergent property of an irreducible epistemological system, comprising dogmatism, bounded rationality and a consciousness whose essential epistemological activity, even before it epistemologically actualizes its intentionality, is to choose between them. In this epistemological system, any objectivity attributed to either knowledge or the phenomenon about which there is knowledge is reducible to dogmatism or bounded rationality, respectively. Truth is thus only ever intentional truth through consciousness and to consciousness – in line with the early, purely system theoretical investigations in sections 4.4 and 5.6. It is interesting to note that this intentional truth closely reflects Ulrich’s (1983) ‘practical reason’. Consider that, as intentional, this truth is a truth of

Dogmatism and bounded rationality  157 engagement with phenomena. As intentional truth, this intentionality founds itself on some intuited theory, i.e. some epistemological positing. Intentional truth is, therefore, epistemological engagement. Similarly, however, intentional truth is the reasoning upon which practical purpose founds itself; and, as intentional, this truth is a truth for practical purpose. This is but the meaning of practical reason as used by Ulrich and, given that Ulrich’s thesis is firmly set within a Kantian argument, intentional truth is, ultimately, the Kantian practical reason as understood in System Theory. There are limits to this similarity with Ulrich. For instance, Ulrich (1983: 277) concedes that, ultimately, practical reason is morally self-responsible. Self-responsibility, however, implies a systemic feedback process which is not quite commensurable with Ulrich’s Kantian-based logically Hegelian end whereby practical reason is removed from its roots. Ulrich’s concession is correct only given epistemological systemicity. However, the moment such systemicity is brought to bear upon the issue of self-responsibility regarding practical reason/intentional truth, the limits of similarity with Ulrich are further highlighted. For consciousness’ choice between dogmatism and bounded rationality contributes to such intentional truth (by choosing either intuitive mode) but is also informed by it. Given that consciousness’ choice is both creator and transformer of intentional truth, given that it governs the manner (i.e. the choosing of either intuitive mode) in which such intentional truth arises as well as governing the continual content of such truth which informs it, it is not intentional truth/practical reason which is self-responsible but consciousness’ choice. Consciousness’ choice is itself its own justification. Seeing that consciousness’ choice is but a moment of the epistemology, whatever responsibility is attributed to it is necessarily attributed to any remaining moments – with the proviso that only those moments which are activities can, by definition, be so attributed. The only other active moment in the unfolding epistemological theory is the activity of intending–intuiting. Attributing responsibility to intending–intuiting is similar to Ulrich having attributed responsibility to practical reason – one need only consider that intentional intuition is the same as intentional truth since intuition is the positing of some theory qua truth. Importantly, however, the responsibility attributed to intending–intuiting is only in lieu of that belonging to consciousness’ choice – and this one discovers not through Ulrich, nor though the distinctly epistemological ‘critical systems’ movement upon which he has impacted, nor through Checkland’s overtly epistemological concerns, but through von Bertalanffy. 11.3.2 The self-responsibility of consciousness’ choice The very possibility of practical reason/intentional truth, as well as its very responsibility, is only in lieu of the continuing possibility of an active choice by consciousness, i.e. one which continually chooses between dogmatism and bounded rationality. Consciousness’ choice, qua the fork in the road prior to

158  Systemic epistemological investigations dogmatism and bounded rationality, is a crucial juncture of epistemological engagement. It is crucial because the only possibilities on offer for such engagement are dogmatism and bounded rationality – the very options which work towards the destruction of epistemological engagement and of consciousness. Thus, whereas in the previous view of consciousness’ choice as both creator and transformer of intentional truth, as governing the manner through which such intentional truth arises as well as governing the continual content of such truth which informs it – whereas in that previous light consciousness’ choice was infused with self-responsibility, in light of the additional fact that dogmatism or bounded rationality are the only routes which enable such creation, transformation, emergence and content of intentional truth, consciousness’ choice is not merely self-responsible but crucially selfresponsible. For consciousness’ choosing is not passive to possibilities: consciousness must actively engage with dogmatism and bounded rationality. Consciousness contains in itself the origin of its possible disappearance or of its continued existence (since it is self-responsible and self-justifying), and it reflectively projects before itself future conducts designed to keep at bay the threat of its own destruction in transcendental ends (ones which are not systemically related to itself). Such possibilities/future conducts, precisely because they are its own, are not determined externally. Thus, it is not strictly certain that they will be effective or adopted. Where determinism would ensure their sufficiency, they are only sufficient as potentially effective or potentially adopted. For intuition provides only the determinable setting upon which consciousness may travel. The only refuge from the consequences of the transcendental ends of dogmatism and bounded rationality is the undetermined future of potentialities sustained by consciousness’ choice. Sustaining the potentialities can only occur through continually choosing between these very modes of dogmatism and bounded rationality – any halt in the activity of alternate choosing, any indecision, and the sustained possibilities freeze into dogmatism or bounded rationality. Thus, indecision itself calls for decision and consciousness continues its crucially self-responsible activity of alternate choosing if it, as well as epistemological engagement, is not to crystallize into dogmatism or bounded rationality. The provision by intuition of a well-structured, determinable epistemological setting renders consciousness free to actively choose in the sense that its ability to choose is not crippled. Intuition offers an organized ensemble whose transparent means and ends free consciousness of any need but the need to choose between the two routes which constitute this exquisite epistemological structure. As Sartre famously notes throughout his works, consciousness is incredibly free, and yet incredibly free only to choose (Solomon, 1972: 279–310; Anderson, 1993). This, however, is in line with a specific understanding of freedom. For freedom is not necessarily measured by the quantity of available options but by the availability of well-structured options. This becomes evident when

Dogmatism and bounded rationality  159 considering how disorder invites complexity and, as a consequence of such complexity, gives no opportunity for adequate knowledge of means or ends, thus crippling the ability to choose and, hence, no freedom. Olson (1962: 125) attributes this understanding of freedom to Justus Buchler whom he describes as ‘the most profound of contemporary American thinkers in the pragmatic tradition’. With Buchler in mind, Olson (1962: 126) concludes: Freedom to achieve chosen goals thus implies, not the absence of obstacles, but the existence of the right kinds of obstacles in the right amounts. In the present context, dogmatism and bounded rationality meet the twin criteria of ‘right kind’ and ‘right amount’, the former being met through the analysis of intending–intuiting, which simultaneously yields the latter. It is not that consciousness can choose because it is free: instead, consciousness is free because it can choose. Consciousness, therefore, might very well be seen to be free to engage only with dogmatism and bounded rationality, free to determine its own disappearance or continuation (as well as that of epistemological engagement and development), and free to determine the future conducts designed to keep the threat of transcendental ends at bay. But it is not because it is free that such possibilities/future conducts are possible. On the contrary, it is because, on the epistemological plane, consciousness is faced with a clear structural route – whose means as well as ends are known in advance – that consciousness is understood as free. When it comes to epistemologically actualizing its intentions, consciousness is self-justifying, self-responsible, liable to either dogmatism or bounded rationality, but always and already omniscient about the means and ends of these two epistemological routes. Such are the constituents of its freedom. As Sartre (1958: 16–45) shows, such constituents allow for the attribution of an ontological mode of being to consciousness known as anguish. Exactly this anguished state renders consciousness a Bergsonian, strictly non-theological, anterior source of epistemological organization.8 Paraphrasing Mullarkey’s (1999b: 65–66) study of Bergson, consciousness exists as: a tension between two opposed [epistemological] forces or tendencies, an originating impulse that is already internally divided and perpetually divisive, a symmetry which was always already broken. This divisiveness is precisely what propels [episteme] forward and informs any point on its progress . . . Any specific [intuition] on its path . . . represents a forced accommodation between these opposed [epistemological] tendencies. Discovering what these [epistemological] tendencies are [takes] us into metaphysical and metaphilosophical territories, for the two are selfreferential: on one side the [epistemological] tendency towards having an [epistemological] end and so ceasing to [intuit], on the other the

160  Systemic epistemological investigations tendency towards neverending [intuition] . . . This internal contradiction fuels the motor of [epistemological engagement]. Intuition is that which renders consciousness epistemological and hence serves to distinguish it from any other phenomenon. Because of intuition’s dual, mutually exclusive structure, consciousness maintains itself qua epistemological only by adhering to this fissure. Consciousness, in other words, if it is to avoid plunging into an epistemological abyss, will always exist as a tension, which tension serves its epistemological maintenance and, hence, that of epistemic evolution. For this reason, consciousness’ activity of choosing is one which serves not merely to epistemologically actualize intentionality. The activity of choosing ensures that the tensional fuel which drives the epistemological motor never dries up. Thus consciousness’ activity of choosing is no mere random activity. It is a measured activity. It is one which gauges how far consciousness has plunged into solely sustaining transcendental possibilities or into solely supporting bounded possibilities. It is an activity whose attribute is to monitor consciousness from solely pursuing ends and to monitor it from solely pursuing means. It is an activity, in other words, which facilitates the systemicity of means–end, which discerns when the balance between means and end needs adjusting, which, when faced with the fork in the epistemological road, can judge between the limited alternatives. In short, consciousness’ activity of choosing is one which can reflect upon the epistemological engagement arising through consciousness and manifested to consciousness. Consciousness’ activity of choosing is capable of gauging, monitoring, facilitating, discerning, judging, reflecting. Such a capability is known as critique.

11.4 Conclusion The investigations have uncovered that consciousness intuits, and hence epistemologically actualizes its intentionality, through either dogmatism or bounded rationality at any one time. That is, at any one point in time, the epistemological engagement of consciousness with phenomena is guided either through theoretical creations or through the phenomena themselves. Neither dogmatism nor bounded rationality is sufficient in itself for the temporal maintenance of epistemological engagement, since they ultimately reduce such engagement to, respectively, either epistemological or phenomenal determinism (see sections 10.4 and 10.5). Yet, dogmatism and bounded rationality are the only two epistemological modes available for the temporal maintenance of epistemological engagement. The avoidance of the deterministic consequence and of consciousness’ redundancy is realized with an alternate exercise of dogmatism and bounded rationality. Such an exercise is realized through consciousness itself choosing between the two epistemological modes. Consciousness’ choice itself, therefore, contributes to epistemological engagement but is also informed by it. Indeed, it is this possibility

Dogmatism and bounded rationality  161 of feedback from the evolving epistemological engagement which allows for consciousness to alternately choose between the two epistemological modes. For this reason, consciousness’ choice has been identified as the activity of critique. In other words, consciousness only ever chooses critically if it is to be understood as being in epistemological, as opposed to determined, engagement with phenomena. The analysis, therefore, paints a scenario whereby consciousness, in order to maintain its distinguishing epistemological ability, is forced to change between epistemological modes with each epistemological actualization. If it chooses to repeat a particular epistemological mode, then its distinguishing feature, qua that phenomenon which engages epistemologically with other phenomena, asymptotically recedes in proportion to the temporal repetition of either epistemological mode. In effect, consciousness tends towards epistemological or phenomenal determinism, respectively. Ultimately, such determinism renders consciousness redundant since it excludes the possibility of choosing between the two epistemological modes. Consciousness, in other words, retains its distinction only in so far as it ever exercises a critical choosing between intuition’s two modes. Anything less, and consciousness reverts to being dogmatic or rationally bounded. In broader terms of philosophical discourse, the two intuitive modes can be recognized, respectively, as referring to meaning and reference (Rosenberg, 2000: 165–173), Bergson’s (1911) understanding of radical finalism and mechanism, Parmenidean and Preparmenidean outlooks (Shand, 1993: 1–20), and even rational comprehensive planning and incrementalism (Faludi, 1973). Perhaps their most obvious reflection is induction and deduction (Audi, 1998: 250–259). For dogmatism lacks epistemological value if such value is measured by the degree to which knowledge can realize itself in phenomena: it lacks deduction. Bounded rationality, on the other hand, lacks epistemological value if such value is measured by the degree to which knowledge can transcend its initial reference to a phenomenon and apply to other phenomena: it lacks induction. In brief, each intuitive mode has only regional or limited epistemological value. Now, although dogmatism and bounded rationality are reprehensible, they nevertheless do appear to enable an orienting knowledge – as Adams (2001: x) notes of ‘conceptual blocks’: Without them we would be less stable and predictable and perhaps less efficient at routine living. Our brains would be forced to process more information and our behaviour might be more bothersome to those around us. Moreover, there is an argument in support of a little dogmatism or bounded rationality which highlights that, were it not for the perseverance of a particular line of thought in the face of all the evidence, civilization as well as the sciences could never have emerged. This, however, is to confuse dogmatism

162  Systemic epistemological investigations Table 11.1  Fundamental understanding of critique required of System Theory Unattainability of objective knowledge Critique is a posteriori to the positing of some intuition as knowledge Critique is actioned at consciousness’ knowledge Without critique, knowledge is crystallized into either dogmatism or bounded rationality

and bounded rationality with perseverance. For if dogmatism, for instance, is evident as a contributing factor in the rise of science, it is but a contributing factor. The support for dogmatism or bounded rationality has always been on the level of ‘a little of it does not harm’ and ‘it contributes to the overall project or to the momentum of progress’. The reprehensibility of dogmatism and bounded rationality arises in their being construed as ends in themselves. Consciousness’ choice is exactly that critical activity which tempers their being construed as ends. Overall, this chapter has provided an in-depth, distinctly epistemological explication for the incorporation of justificatory dynamics as demanded by System Theory. It has demonstrated how phenomenology has served to meet the final set of criteria required of any interdisciplinary partner for System Theory (see Table 6.1). In doing so, however, it has uncovered critique as the distinctly fundamental activity of consciousness. System Theory’s own understanding of critique has yet to be explicated. As a reinforcement to the epistemological interdisciplinarity existing between phenomenology and System Theory, what is called for is a confirmation that System Theory’s understanding of critique matches the one uncovered in the recent investigations. Certain criteria can be identified which System Theory should match in order for the present understanding to cohere. Consciousness’ activity of choosing is only ever a critical activity. It is one which critically chooses between dogmatism or bounded rationality. Critique, upon this understanding, is actioned at the epistemological creations of consciousness or, in other words, its knowledge. As such, critique is a pos­ teriori to the positing of some intuition as knowledge. Any cessation of such critical choosing crystallizes knowledge into either dogmatism or bounded rationality. Avoidance of such detrimental consequences, however, renders the consequent unattainability of objective knowledge. These criteria are given in Table 11.1. The next chapter will uncover the manner in which critique is fundamentally understood in System Theory in order to unveil the degree to which it reflects the present understanding.

Notes 1 Gullberg (1997: 115) notes: ‘Addition was sometimes called “aggregation” in the 13th century. Fibonacci used the names “composition” and “collection” besides “addition”.’

Dogmatism and bounded rationality  163 2 Direct translation. The original reads as follows: je refuse de choisir entre réalisme et solipsisme, matérialisme et idéalisme – je refuse ce face-à-face stérile qui traverse l’histoire de la philosophie et qui est celui des tenants du monde sans conscience ou des fanatiques de la conscience sans monde. Comment croire à la matérialité des choses sans croire que ce que nous en percevons nous est entièrement dicté par elles et n’est que le reflet d’une vérité inscrite dans leur substance? Comment croire au travail de la conscience sans aller, inversement, jusqu’à se dire que c’est lui, ce travail, qui confère aux choses l’essentiel de leur vérité et de leur sens? The official translation reads as follows: I refuse to choose between realism and solipsism, materialism and idealism – I refuse this sterile confrontation which persists throughout the history of philosophy, between those who support the idea of a world without consciousness and the fanatics of a consciousness without world. How can one believe in the materiality of things without believing that what we perceive of them is entirely dictated by them and is merely the reflection of a truth written into their substance? How can one believe in the labour of consciousness without, conversely, drawing the necessary conclusion that it is this labour which confers on things the essential part of their truth and their meaning? (Lévy, 2003: 114–115) 3 Direct translation. The original reads as follows: une « vraie » chose, un « vrai » sujet et, entre les deux, une dialectique qui dépasse le face-à-face stérile du chosisme et du subjectivisme. The official translation reads as follows: a ‘real’ thing, a ‘real’ subject and, between the two, a dialectic that went beyond the sterile confrontation between thing-based objectivism and subjectivism. (Lévy, 2003: 115) 4 Direct translation. The original reads as follows: C’est une dialectique nouvelle. C’est une dialectique bizarre. C’est une dialectique qu’il compare tantôt à un « tourniquet » tantôt à une « spirale », voire à une « spirale à plusieurs centres » . . . qui diffère de toutes les autres dialectiques connues et, notamment, de l’hégélienne sur ce point majeur, et qui change tout, qu’elle fonctionne comme un moteur à deux temps. Elle n’a pas trois, mais deux, termes. Elle ne dit pas: « x s’oppose à y avant de fusionner avec lui pour, ensemble, constituer z » mais: « x et y s’opposent, oui; ils n’en finissent pas de s’opposer; il y a même, à chaque spire de la spirale, une sorte de montée nouvelle, ou de propulsion, qui, engendrées, non par un principe transcendant, ou un Dieu, mais par un ressort intime, niché au coeur de l’Etre, font que l’on peut, en effet, continuer de parler de dialectique; mais s’il y a montée, ou progrès, si le mouvement de s’opposer passe, à chaque

164  Systemic epistemological investigations tour du tourniquet, à un degré supérieur de complexité, il n’y a pas de tiersterme, en revanche, qui réconciliera les deux premiers et finira par arrêter la sempiternité du mouvement. » C’est une dialectique, donc, qui ne se dénoue ni ne se résout. C’est une dialectique sans recours ni synthèse, irrémédiable. C’est un moteur qui, à la lettre, tourne en rond et brise avec la linéarité . . . impliqu[é] par toutes les autres dialectiques. The official translation reads as follows: It’s a new dialectic. It’s a bizarre dialectic. It’s a dialectic which he compares sometimes to a ‘turnstile’, sometimes to a ‘spiral’, even to ‘a multicentered spiral’ . . . that differs from all other known forms of dialectic, in particular Hegelian dialectic, on this major point, which changes everything: it functions like a two-stroke engine. It doesn’t have three, but two, terms. It doesn’t say: ‘x sets itself up against y before fusing with it so as, together, to constitute z’, but ‘x and y are set up against each other, true; they never cease to be opposed; there’s even, at every turn in the spiral, a sort of new ascent or upward thrust which, engendered not by a transcendent principle, or a God, but by an inner spring, lodged at the heart of Being, means that it is indeed possible to continue talking of a dialectic; but if there is an ascent, or progress, if the movement of opposition passes, at each revolution of the turnstile, to a higher degree of complexity, there is none the less no third term that will reconcile the first two and finally bring to an end the sempiternity of the movement’. It is thus a dialectic which is never solved or resolved. It’s a dialectic without solution or synthesis, irremediable. It’s an engine which, literally, goes round in circles and breaks away from the linearity . . . implied by all other forms of dialectic. (Lévy, 2003: 267) 5 Lévy’s use of the term progress need not be interpreted as implying ‘improvement’ but merely ‘advancement’; this more basic interpretation excludes any judgement of the progress. 6 See section 10.3 for an explication of these terms. 7 This understanding reflects what has already been noted (see sections 9.4, 10.2 and 10.6), and also reflects the system theoretical understanding of the relationship between the relational characteristic and complexes (see sections 5.5 and 5.6). 8 Bergson attempted to explain consciousness and epistemological development without recourse to God, religion or Cartesian evil geniuses. His explanation was focused on consciousness’ structure, based on arguments on what must be for consciousness to be what it is; that is, based on ontological investigations and argumentation. In this sense, consciousness is to be appreciated as non-theological. It is, however, also the anterior source of epistemological organization in that such organization cannot even begin without consciousness’ structure in the first place.

12 A systemic epistemology

The previous chapter unravelled that consciousness holds within its core an activity of choosing between the two available intuitive modes qua epistemological actualizers of its intending. This activity was understood as being critique. A fundamental understanding of critique was thus afforded, calling for a comparison with the manner in which critique is equally fundamentally understood by System Theory. Critique has been placed at the very centre of system theoretical epistemological theorizing ever since the rise of the ‘critical systems’ movement in the 1980s. The present requirements do not call for an investigation into this movement as a whole but only into the manner in which it has afforded a system theoretical understanding of critique. Moreover, there is no need to investigate this understanding of critique in its entirety, but only to unveil the fundamental understanding which founds further developments. In keeping with the historical approach that has underpinned the investigations thus far, this chapter uncovers, and concentrates upon, the fundamental manner in which critique is understood by System Theory. Such an understanding finds its clearest exposition in the foundational arguments of System Theory’s deliberations on boundary judgements – perhaps the most significant theoretical contribution of the ‘critical systems’ movement to System Theory in general.1 The relevance to System Theory of the theory of boundary judgements should not be underestimated.2 Ever since the publication of Ulrich’s Critical Heuristics of Social Planning (1983), the idea of boundary judgements has received increasing attention in the System Theory literature (Jackson, 1985a; Ulrich, 1987, 1988a,b, 1994; Flood and Jackson, 1991b; Tsoukas, 1992; Midgley, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1997a,b, 2000; Romm, 1995; Ormerod, 1997; Clarke et al., 1997). In general, Ulrich has been identified as contributing this important idea to system theoretical thought (Midgley, 1997b). Ulrich himself (1988a), however, has noted that the idea was first introduced by Churchman (1971).3 Notwithstanding Churchman’s contribution, it is in the early works of Ulrich and Midgley that the theory of boundary judgements finds its firm theoretical foundations. In keeping with the investigations thus

166  Systemic epistemological investigations far, it is exactly such foundational arguments which are of interest for they not only have paved the way for other writers to propound relevant developments, but provide the essence which must be constitutive of any relevant development. Ulrich and Midgley, therefore, will act as guides. It must be stressed that the purpose of the ensuing excursion into the theory of boundary judgements is neither to provide a complete appreciation of the theory nor to provide an alternative understanding which may compete with those who have already elaborated the theory.4 Indeed, the interest is not so much with the theory itself as with how the theory informs System Theory’s understanding of critique. The excursion is necessary only to the extent that it can provide for an understanding of critique which matches the phenomenological understanding uncovered in the previous chapter, and summarized there in Table 11.1. The aim is to see whether the understanding uncovered there, and noted as required of System Theory, is actually evident in System Theory. The excursion is concise and divided into two steps. The first, in section 12.1, finds that boundary judgements are judgements made on the activity of delineating boundaries – what may be termed bounding. Bounding is also understood as the activity necessary prior to critique. In the second step, in section 12.2, an epistemological significance concerning the notion of boundary is uncovered, prompting a reconsideration of the analysis thus far. It is through this reconsideration, which involves an epistemological understanding of bounding, that System Theory quite quickly confirms the understanding of critique with which the previous chapter concluded. Both steps require a careful reading of the foundational ideas of the theory of boundary judgements, so careful in fact that the analysis may be charged with pedantry. In conclusion, however, it is demonstrated how the idea behind the theory of boundary judgements closely reflects intending–intuiting.

12.1 Critical presentation of the theory of boundary judgements Boundary judgements, dealt with in depth in Ulrich’s (1983) Critical Heuris­ tics, are those judgements which govern the delineation of the boundaries of a system: Whenever we apply the systems concept to some section of the ‘real world,’ we cannot help but make strong a priori assumptions about what is to belong to the system in question and what is to belong to its environment. We call such assumptions boundary judgments. (Ulrich, 1988b) Ulrich conceptualizes them as existing prior to empirical propositions: The problem with boundary judgments is that there is no such thing as ‘objectively necessary’ or ‘right’ boundary assumptions, yet all subsequent

A systemic epistemology  167 investigation of ‘the problem’ and suggestions for ‘improvement’ depend on them. (Ulrich, 1988b) Ulrich’s thesis appears to be more focused upon ‘boundary questions’ (1983: 226) than on judgement questions. That is, the ‘judgements’ to which boundary judgements refer appear to be judgements about the boundary; in other words, judgements about the bounding activity itself. Even the syntax implies this: boundary judgements are judgements about boundaries. A fair reading thus indicates that Ulrich’s ‘judgement’ presupposes, and is directed at, only one activity: that of bounding. Midgley (1995) notes that Ulrich was ‘the first person to use the terms “critical” and “systems” together’, thereby creating the methodology of critical systems heuristics. He explains this marriage: Truly rational inquiry is said to be critical, in that no assumption held by the inquirer should be beyond question. It is also systemic, however, in that boundaries always have to be established within which critique can be conducted. Indeed, Ulrich claims that both ideas are inadequate without the other. Critical thinking without system boundaries will inevitably fall into the trap of continual expansion and eventual loss of meaning (as everything can be seen to have a context with which it interacts, questioning becomes infinite). However, systems thinking without the critical idea may result in a ‘hardening of the boundaries’ where destructive assumptions remain unquestioned because the system boundaries are regarded as absolute. (Midgley, 1997b) The marriage of the terms critical and systems gave rise to what has become known as Critical Systems Thinking – a development of System Theory which stresses the systemic relationship between the idea of critical thinking and System Theory. In line with the manner in which Ulrich was read earlier, Midgley’s explanation above reinforces the singular importance placed on the bounding activity, in this case because of its intimate relation to critique. Now consider Midgley’s (1992) summary of ‘two needs’ that are stressed in Critical Systems Thinking: In Critical Systems research, two needs in particular are stressed: first, the need to be critical about defining systems boundaries and, second, the need to establish boundaries within which critique can be conducted. In keeping with the spirit of critical interpretation, Midgley can be read as actually positing only one need: the need for critique. This is clear enough in Midgley’s ‘first need’. The ‘second need’, however, is semantically debatable. It refers to the establishing of boundaries. Midgley writes that there is a need to establish boundaries. When the stress is kept on the word need it might be

168  Systemic epistemological investigations understood that this activity of establishing boundaries is arbitrary and does not always constitute systems or decision-making – as when one needs to do something because that something does not happen automatically. Upon this reading, the activity of establishing boundaries has no ontological status in System Theory, although, as Midgley (2000) himself has pointed out, it does have a significant analytical status. Midgley’s ‘second need’ can also be interpreted – in contrast to the belief in Critical Systems Thinking – as one which indicates that there might be boundaries which can be established within which critique cannot be conducted. It is understood that Midgley would not subscribe to such an understanding, and neither would any systems thinker or philosopher. Indeed the interpretation might appear too pedantic. Pedantry, however, has its usefulness – as will be shown. In keeping with the dissection at hand, therefore, a revision of Midgley’s summary is proposed: In Critical Systems research, one need is identified: the need for critique. Critique is needed when defining systems boundaries; given defined boundaries, critique needs to be conducted therein. This does highlight two issues. First, prior to the positing of critique as a need, there is a recognition that there exists an activity of defining boundaries: the activity of bounding. Second, along with Ulrich, the only prior activity identified thus far is the activity of bounding. Finally, consider the point at which Midgley (1997a) indicates that critique is first posited as needed: Critique, when translated into the terms of systems methodology, is about exploring different possible boundary judgements. Critique therefore is indicated as needed when addressing the manner in which boundaries are, or might be, delineated. In summary the analysis, in drawing upon Midgley and Ulrich, has highlighted one activity, that of bounding, as being prior to subsequent possible critical conduct; when such critical conduct is actioned, it is directed at the bounding activity. This conclusion seems only logical: one cannot critique unless a boundary has been set and the manner in which the boundary was set can be put forward for criticism. This, of course, is but one small aspect of the rich theory of boundary judgements, especially as expounded by Ulrich and Midgley. It is, however, a basic point and, as noted earlier, this investigation is interested in fundamentals.

12.2 Reconsidering the presentation Midgley (1997a) goes on to explain that critique is ‘exploring different possibilities for knowledge and identity’, and he also stipulates the boundaries in question as being those ‘of knowledge, and of the involvement of subjects in generating that knowledge’ – that is, of knowledge generation.

A systemic epistemology  169 Ulrich (1983: 175–264) also ascribes an epistemological importance to the notion of boundary. In retracing the presentation above, consider what is being said if ‘knowledge’ is substituted for ‘boundary’. Ulrich’s statements indicate that judgements are directed at knowledge or, in keeping with Midgley, at knowledge generation. Additionally, where Ulrich conceptualizes bounding as prior to empirical propositions, knowledge (and knowledge generation) can also be quite easily understood as being prior to empirical propositions since they require it in order for investigation and improvement to even begin. In paraphrasing Ulrich above (1988b), however, the following assertion is also reached: The problem with knowledge is that there is no such thing as ‘objectively necessary’ or ‘right’ knowledge. This immediately meets the first of the criteria required of System Theory’s understanding of critique given in Table 11.1.5 Now Midgley’s explanation (1997b) of the marriage between the terms ‘critical’ and ‘systems’ may, in turn, be paraphrased as follows: Knowledge always has to be established within which critique can be conducted. Critique without knowledge will inevitably fall into the trap of continual expansion and eventual loss of meaning. However, knowledge without critique may result in a ‘hardening of the knowledge’ where destructive assumptions remain unquestioned because the knowledge is regarded as absolute. Once again, the stress is on knowledge and that critique is directed at knowledge – thus reflecting the third of the criteria given earlier. Moving on to the pedantic revision made earlier, Midgley (1992) can also be read as saying: In Critical Systems research, one need is identified: the need for critique. Critique is needed when defining knowledge; given knowledge, critique needs to be conducted therein. So, prior to the positing of critique as a need, there is a recognition that there exists knowledge. Second, along with Ulrich, the only prior activity which has been identified by Midgley is the activity of knowledge generation. Both points reflect the second criterion given earlier. Finally, and paraphrasing once again, Midgley (1997a) indicates the point at which critique is first posited as needed: Critique, when translated into the terms of systems methodology, is about exploring different possible knowledge. Critique is therefore indicated as needed when addressing the manner in which knowledge is, or might be, generated. In summary, the analysis of the

170  Systemic epistemological investigations foundational arguments of Ulrich and Midgley has highlighted one activity, that of knowledge generation, as being prior to subsequent possible critical conduct; when such critical conduct is actioned, it is directed at this activity.

12.3 Results of the presentation The analysis provides a number of significant results which are highlighted in Table 12.1. It is notable that these results compare favourably with those of the earlier phenomenological investigation (see Table 11.1). The fourth point is a logical result of employing the first three, and in the system theoretical literature is given good expression by Midgley (1992). The investigations in the earlier chapters, however, have provided a refined understanding of the ‘false objectivity’ in question: it comes in the form of dogmatism or bounded rationality. It is worth complementing the discussion by mentioning that Ulrich (1983: 20) distinguishes between instrumental critique and practical critique, noting that only the latter ascribes to the unattainability of objective truth. Instrumental critique ultimately attributes objectivity and justification to some established norm, simultaneously ignoring that norms in themselves are answerable to consciousness and, in ignoring this, opening up an uncritical adherence to either one intuitive mode. Thus instrumental critique evaporates into fiction qua critique. Instrumental critique is not critique qua critique: instrumental critique is dogmatism or bounded rationality. Only practical critique can be identified with the self-responsibility and self-justification attributed to the critical choice of consciousness. Therefore, the epistemological results serve to show that epistemic development emerges in proportion to the extent to which practical critique is exercised by consciousness’ choice. Moreover, consciousness is critical in proportion to the extent to which it is aware of practical critique as necessary and, thus, to the extent to which it ceases to attempt to escape from practical critique into the realms of dogmatism and bounded rationality, that is, into the realm of instrumental critique. Overall, the theory of boundary judgements closely reflects phenomenological intending–intuiting. Actors are understood as engaging with situations by bounding them and passing judgements upon them. In essence, such Table 12.1  Epistemological conclusions from the foundational arguments of the theory of boundary judgements Knowledge is understood as never attaining the status of ‘objective’ or ‘right’ knowledge There must be knowledge in order for critique to be introduced – thus critique is dependent on some positing of knowledge Critique is actioned at knowledge Without critique, knowledge is crystallized – attaining a false status of objectivity

A systemic epistemology  171 actors are intending phenomena and epistemologically engaging with them through the creation–projection of intuitions. From the marriage between the terms critical and systems, actors may be understood as bounding–judging when they epistemologically engage with situations, in line with the understanding of consciousness as intending–intuiting.6 Such reflections between System Theory and phenomenology serve to recall a number of other similarities inherent in the two schools of thought which have emerged throughout the investigations. Emergent properties, for instance, or what von Bertalanffy terms relational characteristics, have been seen to be the phenomenological identities. The reality that System Theory deals with is constituted by systems in the same way that the reality that phenomenology deals with is constituted by whole phenomena. The Bertalanffyan principles have been seen to be equivalent to phenomenological essences, with von Bertalanffy’s ‘doctrine of principles’ having been identified as an aspiration to eidetic philosophy equal to that of phenomenology. The nature of such similarities, however, is not one of equations as such – which would reduce one theory to another and hence ignore how the theories may inform each other – but of modality. That is to say, concepts in the respective theories betray similarities in the manner in which they are used and understood, such modal similarities warranting non-trivial connections between the theories and the concepts. The modal similarities are presented in Table 12.2.

12.4 A systemic epistemology for System Theory There is clear evidence that phenomenology has served to provide an epistemological outlook which not only matches System Theory’s own deliberations but serves to amplify System Theory’s epistemological understanding. The present work, therefore, has reached the point where, based upon the investigations, it is possible to provide an overview of an epistemology particular to System Theory and so a relevant understanding of the manner in which consciousness epistemologically engages with phenomena qua systems. The basic understanding of consciousness is one of an activity which intends–intuits. This systemic understanding is irreducible on the epistemological plane (see sections 9.4 and 9.5). Intuiting, however, comes in two mutually exclusive modes, requiring that consciousness choose between them. Table 12.2  Set of modal similarities between System Theory and phenomenology System Theory

Phenomenology

Emergent properties/relational characteristics Bounding Systems Conceiving/judging Structural determinants/principles/isomorphs/order Doctrine of principles

Identities Intending Phenomena Intuiting Essences Eidetic philosophy

172  Systemic epistemological investigations Such choosing, moreover, is rendered necessary if epistemological engagement is to be temporally maintained. Hence, consciousness is constituted by a system of intending–intuiting which houses within it a distinctly epistemological sub-system of intuiting. The epistemological sub-system serves as the input to consciousness’ intuiting which is projected through the activity of intending. Constitutive of this epistemological sub-system is consciousness’ activity of choosing which has been shown to be critique. In short, epistemological engagement and consciousness are maintained as such through consciousness’ actively choosing alternately between intuitive modes and projecting such epistemological actualizations onto phenomena. Phenomena themselves provide information feedback which allows consciousness to develop its understanding. This was rendered especially possible through the intuitive mode of development. Since, however, neither this intuitive mode, nor its dogmatic partner, on its own provided for the temporal maintenance of epistemological engagement and consciousness, knowledge was confirmed as an emergent property of the systemic interaction between consciousness and phenomena (see, for instance, Chapter 5), with consciousness fuelling this interaction through an alternate choosing between intuitive modes. This alternate choosing was identified as a Bertalanffyan continual justifica­ tion rendered necessary for the avoidance of the elimination of consciousness – or, more exactly, its transformation into some determined phenomenon. Alternate choosing, however, also indicated that anything which can be called objective knowledge is, in this respect, unattainable. For even if it were attained it would only serve as the end of epistemological engagement and open the way towards purely determined engagement. Given that System Theory was seen to aim towards the principles or essences of phenomena qua systems, such essences may be understood as guiding the epistemological enterprise whilst always remaining out of reach. There might very well be an epistemological limit at whose point objective knowledge may be recognized as finally grasped. However, the realization of this limit, the attainment of this objective knowledge, recedes with each state of its realization. Objective knowledge, as de Muralt (1974: 11–43) argues, is an infinitely receding ideal whose degree of asymptotic recession is dynamically correlated with the temporal, current states of epistemological approximations which, by definition, realize it inadequately. These epistemological approximations are intuitions whose possibility presupposes some epistemological order, in the same way as von Bertalanffy (1968: 82–83) presupposes that, for the possibility of epistemological engagement, an order exists in reality itself (see section 6.4). It is noteworthy that von Bertalanffy (1968: 248) chooses to conclude his writings by explicitly pointing to his recognition that it is intuitions, in all their dogmatism and bounded rationality, that define ‘the limitation as well as the dignity of human knowledge’; that the antidote for such limitation and for this dignity do not lie in some yet-to-be-reached objectivity but in its receding with the progress of mankind – thus echoing de Muralt who, in

A systemic epistemology  173 turn, is but reiterating Husserl’s (1970b: 21–59) arguments in his own last unfinished work. For this reason, von Bertalanffy (1968: 241) quite rightly insists that knowledge is to be understood fundamentally as orientation, as an enabler for engagement with phenomena. Knowledge is an infinite limit, realizable asymptotically in the course of time. Its current orienting state is a dynamic reflection of an equally dynamic asymptotically receding ideal; in other words, the finitude of the orienting knowledge lying within any point in this temporality is but a continuous reflection of the infinite limit. In effect, both von Bertalanffy’s epistemological conclusion and Ulrich’s and Midgley’s assertion that knowledge indeed never attains the status of ‘objective or right’ knowledge are Sartre’s (1958: xxiii) recognition of the only remaining philosophical dualism in Husserlian epistemological phenomenology: ‘the infinite in the finite’. Phenomenological philosophers have tended to label this finite, situated (engaged, in Sartre’s terms; see section 9.4) orienting knowledge meaning in order to contrast it with the infinite limit which alone can be properly called knowledge. It is the finite, orienting knowledge, this meaning, which arises as inescapable in an epistemology for System Theory. That is, consciousness cannot escape its own activity of enabling orientation – of steering a course through the world in order to ‘guide the organism in such a way as to preserve its existence’ (von Bertalanffy, 1968: 241). Hence the conclusion that ‘we are condemned to meaning’ as Merleau-Ponty says (1962: xix), or, in the words of Cooper (1999: 47), ‘human being is inescapably seman­ tic’. Hence, also, the Sartrean (1958: 11, 21) conclusion that, as inescapable, consciousness’ activity of intending–intuiting ‘haunts Being’ and ‘lies coiled in the heart of Being like a worm’. From this overview of the results, it is possible to highlight the fundamental elements of an epistemology particular to System Theory, as given in Table 12.3. These elements may be understood as the constitutive parts of the epistemology particular to System Theory. For System Theory, intending–intuiting is fundamental, for it finds its reflection in the equally fundamental thesis of boundary judgements. It is not quite some prime mover, however. For although intending–intuiting necessarily implies that knowledge is essentially epistemological orientation, that objective knowledge infinitely recedes and Table 12.3  Elements of an epistemology particular to System Theory Activities of intending–intuiting/bounding–judging Continuous justification of intuitions/judgements Choice – the activity of choosing – between repetition or development of intuitions/ judgements Knowledge as orientation, i.e. meaning The infinite receding of objective knowledge The unattainability of objective knowledge

174  Systemic epistemological investigations is therefore unattainable, these latter in turn imply the necessity of intending–intuiting. There is, in other words, a systemic relationship between the constitutive parts – one which necessarily embraces the activities of continual justification and choice. There is not one part which can be detached if the remaining parts are to make any sense, and there is not one part which can be detached if the epistemology is to be recognized qua epistemology; that is, a theory of the nature of knowledge, its possibility, its scope and limits, and the process of acquiring and possessing it. There is an irreducible systemicity evident between the parts themselves: if one changes or collapses, all of them do. The parts, therefore, cannot be detached, they cannot subsist or be present apart from each other or from the whole which they constitute. They are, therefore, not independent pieces but dependent moments. Systemicity permeates this epistemology to its core beginning from its very foundation of intending–intuiting, this latter being itself a systemic composition of two moments. It is a systemic epistemology wholly and completely constituted only by moments which, by definition, are systemic parts par excellence. With such an understanding at hand, an attempt can now be made to map out the relational arrangement of the moments constitutive of this systemic epistemology. This is shown in Figure 12.1. In Figure 12.1, intending–intuiting, being theoretical, founds knowledge as orientation within the world and never as knowledge of the world in itself (objective knowledge). A knowledge which remains orienting must necessarily be continually justified if the orientation is to continue harmoniously, so continual justification of intuitions/judgements is founded upon the recognition of knowledge as orientation. The activity of choosing between these latter two is, in turn, founded upon the need for continual justification; they The unattainability of objective knowledge The infinite receding of objective knowledge Choice – the activity of choosing – between repetition and development of intuitions/judgements

Knowledge as orientation, i.e. meaning

Continuous justification of intuitions/judgements

Intending–intuiting/bounding–judging Figure 12.1  A map of the relational arrangements of the moments of the systemic epistemology

A systemic epistemology  175 are the forms this justification takes. The repetition or development of intuitions/judgements, in turn, founds the recognition of the infinite receding of objective knowledge. This latter, it may be said, is mediately founded upon the continual justification of intuitions/judgements. It also, however, not only founds the unattainability of objective knowledge, but also founds knowledge as orientation, for, if objective knowledge infinitely recedes, knowledge remains as orientation or meaning. Finally, the unattainability of objective knowledge founds intending–intuiting as the required epistemological foundation for the pursuit of knowledge: with no attainable objective knowledge, knowledge is necessarily founded upon intending–intuiting. Equally, the unattainability of objective knowledge is mediately founded upon intending– intuiting. It is also worth noting that the moments of the systemic epistemology are of two types: activities and conditions. Two activities constitute the systemic epistemology: consciousness’ choice – that is, the activity of choosing between intuitive modes – and consciousness’ intending–intuiting. The remainder of the systemic epistemology is constituted by conditions arising from these activities. It is through intending–intuiting, for instance, that the necessity arises for the continual justification of intuitions/judgements, and that knowledge remains orientation. Similarly, it is through consciousness’ choosing of repeated or developed intuitions that objective knowledge infinitely recedes. The division of the moments of the systemic epistemology into activities and conditions is given in Table 12.4. As a final observation, it is worth highlighting the essence of the systemicity which permeates the epistemology. The systemic epistemology has highlighted the means through which knowledge arises – dogmatism and bounded rationality. Such means apparently limit the epistemological freedom of consciousness. Simultaneously, however, consciousness has available to it a well-structured set of choices with which it must engage. Upon engaging with this structure, consciousness itself constitutes the perspective, the approach and the projection of an end vis-à-vis its epistemological engagement with phenomena. In other words, the apparent adversity in the available Table 12.4  The division of the moments of the systemic epistemology into activities and conditions Activities of the systemic epistemology

Conditions of the systemic epistemology

Activities of intending–intuiting/bounding– judging Choice – the activity of choosing – between repetition or development of intuitions/ judgements

Continuous justification of intuitions/ judgements Knowledge as orientation, i.e. meaning The infinite receding of objective knowledge The unattainability of objective knowledge

176  Systemic epistemological investigations means of dogmatism and bounded rationality cannot be an argument against epistemological development nor an argument against the freedom of consciousness. For the self-responsible choice of consciousness itself governs the degree of adversity accorded to each of the available means at any one time, thereby laying the path of epistemological development, and thus delineating the distance between consciousness qua intending–intuiting and the two abysses, of simple intending on the one hand and simple intuiting on the other, into which it risks falling. As von Bertalanffy (1968: 187, 227) notes: ‘little is left of Kant’s supposedly a priori and absolute categories’, for faced with systemicity the Kantian lineage is, in itself, ‘too simple for a complex world’. Still, if the relevance of a Kantian lineage begins to dissolve with these results, another lineage emerges as a possible candidate. In terms which clearly echo the above understanding, Sartre (1958: 482) describes consciousness’ epistemological engagement with phenomena by noting that, although situations in themselves may appear to make us impotent, the coefficient of adversity in things can not be an argument against our freedom, for it is by us – i.e., by the preliminary positing of an end – that this coefficient of adversity arises [and] although brute things can from the start limit our freedom of action, it is our freedom itself which must first constitute the framework, the technique, and the ends in relation to which they will manifest themselves as limits. This is Sartre’s introductory position of what may be termed his ‘coefficient of adversity thesis’.7 It constitutes the beginning of a lengthy deliberation on the epistemological alienation consciousness suffers in the face of phenomena as a result of the infinite recession of objective knowledge.8 The reason it reflects what was termed above as the essence of the newly unveiled systemic epistemology is that this very epistemology is an epistemology perme­ ated by epistemological alienation. For if consciousness is condemned to never quite reaching objective knowledge of phenomena, then it forever remains, to whatever degree, epistemologically alienated from them. In effect, the recently unveiled systemic epistemology for System Theory is an epistemology wherein epistemological alienation is unavoidable. Now, granted that the systemic epistemology reflects and fits the deliberations of System Theory identified early on, and granted that phenomenology has proved to be a worthy interdisciplinary partner, a need arises to demonstrate System Theory’s own explicit concern with epistemological alienation and the manner in which such a concern might be informed by the present results.

12.5 Conclusion Critique has been shown to be understood by System Theory in a manner similar to that inherent to the newly unveiled systemic epistemology. This has allowed for the tabulation of a number of modal similarities between

A systemic epistemology  177 System Theory and phenomenology, the latter having served the quest for a systemic epistemology particular to the former. With such similarities highlighted, it has been possible to provide a thorough overview of the systemic epistemology in question. This overview has identified that the systemic epistemology is, essentially, one wherein consciousness is understood as forever epistemologically alienated from the phenomena with which it engages. In this respect, the phenomenologist Jean-Paul Sartre has provided a coefficient of adversity thesis which reflects the essence of the systemic epistemology. That epistemological alienation permeates the systemic epistemology, however, has rendered necessary a demonstration that such alienation permeates System Theory’s own epistemological deliberations. For although epistemological alienation may be appreciated as a result of those of System Theory’s deliberations considered up until now, System Theory has yet to explicitly show its concern with such alienation. The next chapter, therefore, turns to demonstrating System Theory’s own concern with epistemological alienation with a view to informing it through the present results.

Notes 1 In section 3.2, mention was made that the investigations would follow a historical analysis focusing on certain key milestones in System Theory. The present investigation into the theory of boundary judgements traces the foundational arguments of this theory. From these have stemmed further developments, and some references to them are pointed out in what follows although, because of the different paths they have taken, they are not deemed directly relevant to the present discussion. 2 Midgley (2000: 33) goes so far as to state: ‘The boundary concept is fundamental: it is the core idea of systems thinking.’ 3 Midgley (2000: 34–38) confirms this. 4 In this respect, a thorough understanding is provided by Midgley (2000). 5 For Ackoff (1979), the unattainability of objective knowledge is inherent to System Theory and a consequence of this field’s ‘doctrine of expansionism’. 6 It is worth adding that Sokolowski’s discussion of parts and wholes – a discussion which is fundamental to phenomenology and which finds its original voice in Husserl’s Third Investigation (1970a) and subsequently in his Experience and Judg­ ment (1973) – further demonstrates how System Theory and phenomenology jointly promise a basis for interdisciplinarity. Any discussion of parts and wholes necessarily addresses the relationship between systems and their elements and so is of urgent interest to System Theory. Yet there has been no (critical or other) appreciation in the systems literature of Husserl’s investigation into this most systems-oriented of issues. The very basic distinction, for instance, made by phenomenology between two types of parts – pieces (independent parts) and moments (dependent parts) – can add a certain accuracy to system theoretical investigations which insist on the singular positing of ‘parts’ with no distinction between them: it is when pieces become moments and vice versa that the boundary of the system can be seen as having changed. The concern over boundary judgements is not so much about the inherent difficulty of where to draw the boundary of a posited system: the concern, rather, lies in the recognition that, with each delineation of a boundary, a different system is presented which, simultaneously, usually consists of the same parts. If the parts are more or less the same, it is only by thinking about them in terms of pieces and moments

178  Systemic epistemological investigations that any change in the system can be appreciated. The concern over boundary judgements is not alleviated – indeed is deepened artificially – if the parts which constitute the situation are not defined in terms of pieces and moments. 7 It is well known that Bachelard was the propagator of the idea of ‘coefficient of adversity’ and Sartre (1958: 324) does not fail to mention this. Sartre, however, uses the term for an altogether original analysis. 8 The fact that Sartre subtitled Being and Nothingness – wherein the ‘coefficient of adversity’ thesis is discussed – as ‘an essay in phenomenological ontology’ does not, upon close reading, signify that this work is a work on ontology; it can be read with equal lucidity as a work on epistemology. This is especially so given that the greater part of the work concerns consciousness and its epistemological engagement with phenomena. Sartre’s thesis is prone to being confused as being primarily ontological when it is actually epistemological. In this respect, Joannis (1996) provides an elementary introduction, though fails to address the ‘coefficient of adversity’ thesis. Respected interpretations of Sartre’s thesis may be found in Olson (1962: 104–106), Stack (1977: 49–72), Catalano (1974: 203–212), Flynn (1984: 76–81), Detmer (1986: 43–46), Anderson (1993: 22), Hayim (1996: 57), Wider (1997: 171) and Cooper (1999: 158). Of these, Catalano and Detmer provide the most explicit epistemological understanding, whilst the epistemological implications from the other interpretations may be inferred from the context of their analytical treatment. Sartre’s own original treatment spans over eighty pages (1958: 481–553). Ultimately, Sartre’s reference to freedom in the above citation must be understood primarily as epistemological freedom. This is especially evident when considering the following citation in view of the analysis presented in Chapter 5 (for those unfamiliar with Sartre’s work and distinctive terminology, the terms freedom and for-itself in the following citation should be read as consciousness, whilst the terms in-itself and brute existent should be read as objective phenomenon): The situation, the common product of the contingency of the in-itself and of freedom, is an ambiguous phenomenon in which it is impossible for the for-itself to distinguish the contribution of freedom from that of the brute existent . . . Thus it is impossible to determine in each particular case what comes from freedom and what comes from the brute being of the in-itself . . . Better yet, it is impossible to decree a priori what comes from the brute existent and what from freedom in the character of this or that particular existent functioning as an obstacle . . . [T]he world by coefficients of adversity reveals to me the way in which I stand in relation to the ends which I assign myself, so that I can never know if it is giving me information about myself or about it. (Sartre, 1958: 488–489) Ultimately, Sartre’s work is arguably irreducible to either epistemology or ontology, for it is written with the purpose of constructing a system through which the essence of human experience may be understood. It is in this respect, incidentally, that Renaut (1993) calls him the ‘last philosopher’. Building philosophical systems has, wrongly, been frowned upon at least since Kierkegaard, for they are, after all, symptomatic of consciousness’ belief, demand and need for order. The trick is to build the system which reflects the world and consciousness’ engagement in/with it. This is the task which philosophy, understood in its purest sense, sets itself. All other attempts are, ultimately, abstractions. For a discussion of Husserlian phenomenology as a system, see Brainard (2002: 23).

Part V

Applied investigations

One can only face in others what one can face in oneself. On this confrontation depends the measure of our wisdom and compassion. James Baldwin (1962)

13 Alienation

The previous chapter identified the newly unveiled systemic epistemology as one imbued by epistemological alienation. This has called for System Theory to demonstrate that it is itself fundamentally interested in such alienation. This chapter begins with a description of the context which gave rise to system theoretical discussions on epistemological alienation. This leads to an exposition of the fundamental manner in which epistemological alienation has been understood by System Theory. It is noted that such a basic understanding draws upon a philosophical treatment outside of the established corridors of System Theory. Notwithstanding the presumed value of such an external source, it is highlighted that the relevance of epistemological alienation to System Theory has yet to be established from within System Theory itself. Consequently, the recently identified systemic epistemology is brought to bear upon this issue. This allows for an explication of one manner in which the systemic epistemology fundamentally contributes to System Theory.

13.1 The proposal to ground Soft Systems Methodology within an appropriate social theory In 1980, Mingers proposed to ground Checkland’s Soft Systems Methodology within an appropriate social theory – an attempt explicitly supported by Checkland who, Mingers (1980) noted, ‘sees [his] methodology as compatible with Churchman’s1 analysis of “inquiring systems” ’. This desire to complement soft systems thinking (in general) with a social theory was echoed by Jackson (1982) and both came in the wake of other similar attempts (Prevost, 1976; Checkland, 1978; Naughton, 1979a; Thomas and Lockett, 1979). Jackson (1982), in particular, noted that the interest in informing soft systems thinking through social science arose from Vickers’ (1978) claim that professions which manage human systems lack support from the social sciences. In disagreeing with Vickers, Jackson claimed that there is ‘a mass of relevant theory’ in the social sciences, although it is in need of being sorted out. He coupled this with the assertion that it is to the social sciences that the

182  Applied investigations professions that manage human systems, and systems practitioners, must turn for the required theoretical guidance. Interestingly, the claim that the area of concentration should lie within the social sciences was made with no obvious consideration for the theoretical support which may be provided through the work of von Bertalanffy. Instead, Jackson took at face value the claims put forward by Naughton (1979b) that Bertalanffyan General System Theory does not seem likely to provide the necessary theoretical support. Ulrich (1983), writing soon after Jackson, not only similarly brushed aside General System Theory but further laid certain accusations against it. The force of Ulrich’s (1983: 20, 37) dismissal centred upon his unsupported and unexplained rhetoric that General System Theory is ‘neither general nor theoretical’ and his further accusation of it being ‘mechanistic’. Such views stem largely from Ulrich’s (1983: 223 and throughout) having coupled General System Theory with ‘cybernetics, RAND-systems analysis, Operations Research/Management Science etc.’. Drawing upon Habermas and Adorno, Ulrich (1983: 223) further accused General System Theory of having understood the systems concept ‘merely functionalistically, as referring to a set of variables to be controlled in a context of instrumental action’ and thus betraying an uncritical reduction of the systems concept to a merely functionalist systems concept. In his view (1983: 324), General System Theory, because of the above-mentioned coupling, suffers ‘from [the] inability to deal critically with the very social reality which [it seeks] to improve’.2 Mingers (1980), like Jackson after him, also bypassed the philosophical deliberations in General System Theory as building blocks for his proposal. Instead he focused upon Jürgen Habermas – the leading contemporary figure in Critical Theory – as the source for his deliberations.3 13.1.1 The basis of the proposal Mingers’ Habermasian argument is supported through the use of Burrell and Morgan’s (1979) typology of social science and through Checkland’s (1981, 1999: 280–281) delineation that Soft Systems Methodology (and, implicitly, soft systems thinking in general) spans two of the quadrants in the typology, one of which is also inhabited by Critical Theory – where the latter is shown as also being embraced by the former. Interestingly, Dando and Bennett (1981), writing a year after Mingers, mirrored three broad Operational Research/management scientific (OR/ MS) paradigms with three equally broad sociological paradigms: The three paradigms suggested [for] O.R. – official, reformist and revolutionary – can be related to the positivist, interpretive and critical paradigms taken up in Sociology.

Alienation  183 In the same paper the authors equated the revolutionary OR paradigm with the critical OR paradigm – making it clear that the terms are interchangeable.4 Recall that Checkland and Mingers had placed Soft Systems Methodology in the Burrell and Morgan typology in such a fashion that it embraces Critical Theory. Now consider the claim made by Thomas and Lockett (1979) that the critical/revolutionary stance [identifies] with what [it sees] as the real interests of the working class, i.e. a transition to a socialist society whose creation in practice is in turn a validation of Marxist theory. This was also cited by Dando and Bennett as part of their argument. ‘By contrast,’ Dando and Bennett went on to say, ‘the soft systems scientists claim that, although they are not objective, their work is available to everyone.’ This is a rejection by the soft systems scientists of the Marxist-inspired critical/revolutionary stance, a rejection which Thomas and Lockett also highlighted. It signals that the delineation made by Checkland and Mingers, based upon the Burrell and Morgan typology, remains dubious in its embrace of Critical Theory.

13.2 The fundamental issue in the Habermasian incorporation Notwithstanding the dubious nature of the attempted grounding, Mingers’ proposal placed the issue of epistemological alienation at the very centre of systemic theorizing.5 To appreciate how this issue arose, first consider how Mingers (1980) drew upon the similarities between Habermas and Checkland’s approach. Checkland (1999: 283) provides a neat summary of the three relevant points: In comparing Habermas’s thought with soft systems methodology Mingers (1980) finds three major points of agreement. First, both take seriously the problem of human action – at the same time purposive/ rational (hence capable in principle of being engineered) and natural, or unchangeable, as a result of the characteristics of the human animal. Second, both conclude that hard systems analysis, tied to technical rationality, cannot cope adequately with the multi-valued complexities of the real world. Finally, both deny the inevitability of the divorce between rationality and values which characterizes natural science, and both try to bring the two together in rational communicative interaction. Jackson (1982) subsequently disagreed with the Mingers/Checkland position, and highlighted not the similarities but the differences:

184  Applied investigations Mingers and Checkland seem to believe that the major difference between soft systems methodology and critical theory is the latter’s overt political stance . . . But this is not the case. The major difference is theoretical. Habermas recognises that though the social world is created by man, it is not ‘transparent’ to him. It escapes him, takes on objective features and constrains him. Man is still in the grip of unconscious forces and his actions still have unintended consequences . . . there is [a] need for a critical moment (corresponding to an ‘emancipatory interest’). Checkland (1982) was sceptical about what appeared to be central to Jackson’s argument: The reader may feel it significant that when Jackson writes of Habermas’s view that the social world takes on constraining objective features, man being ‘in the grip of unconscious forces’, he writes not that Habermas believes this to be the case but that he ‘recognises’ it. How, asked Checkland, could Habermas – at least, as perceived by Jackson – claim to recognize the opaqueness of the social world? Checkland was inclined to think that such a statement must be a statement of belief and not of perceived fact. A particular Weltanschauung seemed to be at work here which Jackson had yet to make explicit. Jackson (1983), in reply to Checkland, did not offer an elaboration upon Habermas but chose instead to lay out his own Weltanschauung: For myself, I am prepared to view the social world through the radical sociological paradigms identified by Burrell and Morgan and to see what I can learn about it by doing so. It seems that social systems can sometimes escape the understanding and control of the individuals who, in interacting one with another, create them. They can therefore exhibit ‘objective’ characteristics. Jackson’s reply is somewhat toned-down: the reply asserts that social systems can sometimes (as opposed to will always) escape understanding and control, and that they can (as opposed to will) exhibit objective characteristics. The general point which forms the basis of his own subsequent ‘critical systems’ agenda, however, is made: in between consciousness’ creations–projections and objective phenomena there lies an epistemological tension, whereby the objective phenomena intended by consciousness escape its understanding of them. There is something distinctly objective, or opaque, about phenomena which remains epistemologically closed to consciousness, unknown or unknowable – inassimilable by the subjective dimension. This failure by consciousness to completely penetrate objective phenomena epistemologically results in consciousness suffering a degree of constraint in relation to them. Such constraint is fundamentally epistemological: failure to completely

Alienation  185 epistemologically penetrate objective phenomena results in constrained or limited knowledge of them. It has, however, practical consequences: constrained or limited knowledge of objective phenomena renders imperfect epistemological engagement with them. Imperfect epistemological engagement renders, in turn, unconceptualized consequences. In short, Jackson provides the most concisely stated adherence, in System Theory, to epistemological alienation.

13.3 The strong case for epistemological alienation The question is, of course, whether ‘social systems’ can sometimes or will always escape understanding and control and whether they can or will exhibit objective characteristics. In other words, which version of Jackson’s argument should be accepted: his 1982 critique of the Mingers/Checkland position or his 1983 reply to Checkland? A clue lies in the ‘critical moment’ which, according to Jackson, will emancipate consciousness from having to suffer a constraint in relation to objective phenomena. Consider that if social systems can/may only sometimes escape understanding and control and thus can/may exhibit epistemologically impenetrable objective characteristics, there will be times when the ‘critical moment’ is not required. Earlier, however, not only the systemic epistemology but, more significantly, the exposition of System Theory’s own theory of boundary judgements highlighted that the critical idea is indispensable if assumptions bearing ‘destructive’ consequences are not to arise. A ‘critical moment’ can only be so vital in terms of Jackson’s initial, strong statement. In short, a ‘critical moment’ is rendered indispensable only if epistemological alienation is ontological. Now, the consequence of epistemological alienation as ontological is that consciousness’ knowledge of objective phenomena is always constrained/limited. Given that critique is actioned at knowledge – as both the theory of boundary judgements and the systemic epistemology show – the ‘critical moment’ may be understood as impacting upon such constrained/limited knowledge. Jackson notes that such an impact would be in the service of emancipating consciousness from its epistemological alienation. However, if this latter is accepted as ontological, consciousness can never be altogether thus emancipated. At the most, consciousness may tend towards greater degrees of emancipation from epistemological alienation, with a resulting diminution of destructive consequences, but never their complete obliteration.

13.4 Specific contributions to System Theory’s embrace of epistemological alienation In short, for Jackson, there is a distinctive characteristic of consciousness: epistemological alienation from the world in which it finds itself and with which it engages. If Jackson, by drawing upon Habermas, is seen as

186  Applied investigations complaining about lack of transparency; if objectivity shuts out subjectivity; if Homo sapiens is constrained; if the human being is in the grip of forces which cannot be conceptualized; if, with every act, unintended consequences arise; if, moreover, Homo sapiens creates the very social systems which escape its understanding and control – if such issues suddenly emerge as of primary importance to System Theory, their very emergence signals that, with the advent of the Jacksonian ‘critical systems’ agenda, System Theory explicitly takes its place on the table of alienation around which all the ‘great philosophical debates’ (Cooper, 1995; 1999: ix) have gathered. Of course, as even a superficial reading of von Bertalanffy’s General System Theory shows,6 System Theory has been commenting upon this debate ever since its instigation – something which Jackson and Ulrich in particular seem to have, perhaps conveniently, brushed aside (see section 13.1). With Jackson, however, is born a concerted effort in System Theory to provide a distinctive contribution to the debate. This effort is sustained through an embrace of Habermas’ Knowledge and Human Interests (Habermas, 1978), a text which, significantly, tackles alienation with the weapon of epistemology, as Critchley (2001: 112–113) summarizes: [For Habermas,] Kant’s critical philosophy is a reflection on the conditions of possibility of a knowing, speaking and acting subject. Kant is thus seeking to establish the foundations for theoretical, scientific knowledge, but his transcendental enquiry has an emancipatory point insofar as it seeks to defend the concept of human freedom. As Habermas remarks, ‘the act of self-reflection that “changes a life” is a movement of emancipation’. Hegel then takes this critical project a stage further by reflecting upon the ways in which Kant’s philosophy has to presuppose a whole set of contextually embedded assumptions rooted in the actually existing lifeworld and the structures and history of social life. That is, the Kantian picture of knowledge has to presuppose a whole series of interests that are not adequately reflected upon – this is the basis for Hegel’s claim that Kantian ethics, despite its laudable intention, remains a contextfree, abstract formalism. It is Habermas’s contention that, after Hegel, this notion of critical reflection on the relation of knowledge to interest is picked up in an exemplary way by Freudian psychoanalysis, despite Freud’s unfortunate tendency towards scientism, which Habermas does his best to excise. That is, psychoanalysis is a critical, reflective practice which seeks to emancipate human beings from the various illusions with which they are wont to delude themselves, and ‘by understanding these illusions the subject emancipates itself from itself ’. What is noteworthy is that although, clearly, epistemological alienation is, by definition, a problem/condition situated in the realm of epistemology, Habermas appears to believe that the answer to any degree of consciousness’ emancipation from it lies, not in epistemology, but in psychoanalysis.

Alienation  187 Jackson (1985b) does not hesitate to recommend Habermas’ point of view. In doing so, he immediately introduces the language, if not to say baggage, of psychoanalysis which simultaneously manipulates the issue at hand into one at once more expansive and vague: hidden meanings, distortions, selfdeception, concealment, unconscious forces, social world are all introduced into the broth, serving to blur what was a relatively well-defined issue. This is not to imply that the psychoanalytical input may not be helpful or relevant. It is but to ask why, if the issue is so distinctly epistemological, must resolving it call for an investigation which, from the very start, stretches beyond its primal realm having barely explored it? The value of retaining a strictly epistemological analysis can be demonstrated by drawing upon two ideas which permeate the Critical Systems agenda. 13.4.1 Unconscious forces To begin with, consider Jackson’s ‘unconscious forces’. The very terminology is linked to a Habermasian understanding, and use, of Freudian psychoanalytical theory. For Jackson (1985b) (and, according to him, for Habermas) the Freudian psychoanalytic model can, and should, be transferred to groups, organizations and society as a whole, for the actor in the social world is very often in the same position as the neurotic patient in the psychoanalytic encounter. S/he suffers from false-consciousness and does not truly comprehend his/her situation in that social world.7 In these few words is expressed the Weltanschauung which influences Critical Systems Thinking explicitly at least up until Flood and Jackson’s Directed Read­ ings in 1991.8 It is a view which reflects Renaut’s (1989: 66–67) observation that the social sciences have exploited the idea of the ‘ruse of reason’ either by drawing upon psychoanalysis or through pursuing a certain functionalist sociology which naturalizes the social, dissolves social action into causality and holds that social actors are unconscious of what they do and hence not responsible for a future which, it necessarily follows, will unfold without them qua active actors anyway. This idea, Renaut notes (and remember: he is writing two years prior to the publication of Directed Readings), has now fallen foul of the numerous problems it poses, notably ethical, politico-juridical and the manner in which the idea of responsibility is handled with such economy.9 Renaut concludes by suggesting that perhaps social phenomena might be better explained by supposing a conscious social actor, responsible for what he does.10 Indeed, to view social actors as being passive neurotics most of the time is to limit the understanding of them to an alarming degree. The systemic epistemology has shown that consciousness (i.e. the social actor) does not (indeed cannot qua consciousness) suffer passively. Undoubtedly, consciousness’ necessary activity implies a ‘coefficient of adversity’ which stops it from fully11 comprehending phenomena. Given the systemic epistemology,

188  Applied investigations however, this does not imply that the social actor is infused with a false consciousness. It only highlights that the social actor is epistemologically constrained – and there is a great deal of difference between knowing one’s constraints and suffering from false consciousness. Having laid bare the structure of epistemological actualization, its means as well as ultimate ends, the systemic epistemology serves to explain why full comprehension might be impossible (because of the pervasiveness of dogmatism and bounded rationality) whilst demonstrating the manner in which increased (though not full) comprehension might be attained (through the alternate choice between dogmatism and bounded rationality). 13.4.2 Ideal speech situation As a second case in point consider the ideal speech situation which has been described by Ulrich (1983: 120) as a discourse free of ‘empirically contingent constraints such as power, ideological and institutional constraints’. Such ‘empirically contingent constraints’ are said to potentially ‘distort’ communication among participants. Such distortion, however, is also said to arise from the structure of communication itself. The basic step away from these latter structural constraints, internal to communication itself, comes in the form of ‘a symmetrical distribution of the chances of all participants in the discourse to select and perform speech acts’.12 Thus the internal distortion of the structure of communication itself is associated with asymmetry, with the lack of opportunity for all discourse participants to ‘employ constative, regula­ tive, and expressive speech acts’ (Ulrich, 1983: 121) or, as Ulrich quotes Habermas, it is associated with the lack of opportunity to ‘establish assertions, recommendations, explanations and justifications’. The structure referred to, therefore, is the structure of allowance and ability to make speech acts (Ulrich, 1983: 121–122). What, however, is so internal about this structure of communication? The very word internal refers to some expected internal distortion in communication itself, but internal distortion here is associated with the asymmetry arising from external factors – be they power which would al­ low for the employment of the said speech acts or education, say, which would enable ability to employ them. Internal distortion understood in this way is reducible to external distortion. Something strictly internal to the structure of communication itself is indicated when Ulrich cites Habermas’ ‘unreflected and unchallenged prejudgements’ which should be open to opportunities for questioning by the participants. Although there is nothing internal in the opportunities themselves, the very idea of ‘unreflected prejudgements’ is very much internal to the structure of communication if communication is understood as an epistemological exercise; that is, an exercise in knowledge transference. For such ‘prejudgements’ echo the spontaneous dogmatism and bounded rationality of consciousness, a most internal distortion residing within knowledge itself, and hence within communication. In which case, there is no discourse free

Alienation  189 from internal distortion. Therefore, even if external distortion could be removed, because of its ascribed ‘contingency’ communication is nevertheless condemned to be distorted to some degree. The theorizing of the ideal speech situation as a model towards which discourse may aim is at best unhelpful, as it has not delineated the structural distortion internal to the manner in which consciousness understands reality. The systemic epistemology, on the other hand, has unveiled the internal cause of such distortion and, thus, opened up an avenue for its constituent moments to be incorporated as methodological milestones for approaches which work towards minimizing distortion. Dogmatism and bounded rationality, for instance, may be identified and their adherence tracked in order to signal the time for action of the ‘critical moment’ (to borrow Jackson’s apt term). Such incorporation might very well work for any methodology that neither assumes nor theorizes the erasure of distortions and which, more­ over, incorporates distortions as the central core of an iterative epistemological process.

13.5 The systemic epistemology as fundamental contributor Irrespective, however, of System Theory’s having resolved to defer an epistemological problem to psychoanalysis, irrespective of its having enlisted external sources to such an extent as to arguably render itself their blind disciple, a more fundamental issue permeates System Theory’s treatment of epistemological alienation to date. It is not a question of why Habermas or psychoanalysis or any other external source renders itself useful as a demonstration of the ontological status of epistemological alienation. It is a question of why System Theory itself must necessarily encompass epistemological alienation in its epistemological theorizing. What is there in System Theory itself that renders the epistemological tension Jackson so easily evokes? What is there in System Theory itself that allows it to attribute an epistemologically inassimilable opaque objectivity to phenomena? What is there in System Theory itself that allows it to condemn consciousness to forever suffer a degree of epistemological constraint or limitation in relation to those phenomena with which it engages? What is there in System Theory itself which leads it to conclude that such engagement is always and already imperfect? What is there in System Theory itself that lends it to embracing a ‘need for a critical moment’? What is there in System Theory itself that leads it to even consider consciousness’ emancipation and, by extension, not only humanity’s emancipation from the so-called ‘unconscious forces’ and ‘unintended consequences’ believed to constitute the social world, but its emancipation from what is believed to be its failure to understand and control those social systems it itself creates? These are fundamental questions about the legitimacy of the system theoretical enterprise to which System Theory, until now, has provided no answer.

190  Applied investigations It is only with this work that an answer is finally given. For all such questions are silenced with the identification of dogmatism and bounded rationality as the essential epistemological paths of consciousness constituent of the manner in which System Theory understands epistemological engagement through a systemic epistemology it may call its own. It is dogmatism and bounded rationality which inadvertently place epistemological alienation at the very centre of system theoretical epistemological theorizing. Consciousness, condemned to engaging with phenomena or situations through these two intuitive modes, cannot fail but fail to grasp such phenomena or situations completely. Its only recourse is its critical choice: that Jacksonian ‘critical moment’ which allows for some alleviation of, but not total emancipation from, epistemological alienation. The systemic epistemology, moreover, has allowed for the foundation and reason of this critical moment. For, through the systemic epistemology, System Theory can finally define critical practice. Such practice, for instance, first requires the identification of communicated information or knowledge as being either dogmatic or rationally bounded based upon the descriptions of these two modes as given earlier. Once so identified, critique may be seen as practised only once the epistemological focus is switched away from the current intuitive mode, that is, from dogmatism to bounded rationality or vice versa. For it is exactly this switch that encapsulates the critical activity. Without this switch, any so-called ‘critique’ reduces to mere dogmatism or bounded rationality. This is not to undervalue any chosen temporal adherence to either intuitive mode; it is but to highlight that, until a switch in focus is made, critical practice does not arise and, so, an uncritical, singular epistemological route is being pursued. At the most fundamental level, therefore, the systemic epistemology informs those concerns of the distinct branch of system theoretical thought known as Critical Systems Thinking – the branch which was responsible for the introduction of the critical idea to System Theory. The weakness in Jackson’s attempts at convincing Checkland of the perceptible ‘unconscious forces’ lies in his not having focused his explication on the governing situation under which all others, such as social interaction, belong: the epistemological system constituted by consciousness on the one hand and appearances through which it confers identities on the other. It lies in his not having begun with an appreciation that the situation which gives rise to seemingly ‘unconscious forces’ is not only simply a fundamental manner of human existence: it is primarily and necessarily epistemological, in other words, its fundamental status arises from the primacy of human knowing human existence from which all other situations stem. In light of the systemic epistemology, Jackson’s point, and indeed that of Habermas, does pierce through to the fundamental essence of human situations but this poignancy is founded upon the manner in which consciousness epistemologically engages with phenomena, such engagement being necessarily epistemological if consciousness (and, by extension, Homo sapiens) is to be differentiated from other objective phenomena

Alienation  191 and not be reducible to them. The character of Jackson’s ‘forces’ which ‘grip Man’ is fundamentally an epistemological character of adversity emerging from consciousness’ epistemological engagement with phenomena. Jackson’s ‘unintended consequences’ are the unintended limits that Homo sapiens places upon itself when spontaneously engaging with phenomena through the only available epistemological paths: dogmatism and bounded rationality. They are the identities consciousness confers on phenomena which come back to haunt consciousness as limited. In short, with the identification of the systemic epistemology, the role of System Theory as constitutive of the ‘great philosophical debates’ is amplified, for now it is in a position to make a contribution on its own terms. Phenomenology, of course, has lent a helping hand but such an input has been justified on System Theory’s own terms. Indeed, the only aspect of phenomenology which System Theory may be seen as having borrowed is the phenomenological structure of intuition. Given, however, that System Theory’s epistemological deliberations yielded little about the manner in which consciousness epistemologically actualizes its engagement with phenomena, and given, moreover, phenomenology’s proven relevance to System Theory’s epistemological deliberations, the phenomenological structure of intuition may be appreciated less as borrowed and more as a necessary amplification of System Theory’s epistemological understanding. System Theory’s own deliberations upon epistemological alienation, however, themselves inform the systemic epistemology itself. In fact, there is one crucial insight which emerges from such deliberations. Consider that epistemological alienation has been rendered essential, or ontological, to consciousness both by System Theory itself and by the systemic epistemology recently uncovered. Faced with such irreparable epistemological alienation, consciousness has no choice but to actively choose between dogmatism and bounded rationality if it is to know anything at all and therefore exist qua consciousness. For, if consciousness does not act, it transforms simply into an alienated phenomenon – alienated from itself by a lack of epistemological self-reflection (bounded rationality), and alienated from any other phenomenon in the same way that objective phenomena do not ‘think’ themselves as being anything at all or in relation to anything at all (dogmatism). In a word, consciousness’ choice is an ontological choice – it is one which will be made if consciousness is to be recognized, appreciated and understood as that phenomenon which epistemologically engages with other phenomena. This allows for an answer to the question which has haunted System Theory, particularly since the birth of Critical Systems Thinking; a question stated by Jackson (1985a, 1991b), and put forward as a criticism of Ulrich’s (1983) Heuristics, as: ‘why should the involved bother to take account of the views and interests of those who are affected but not involved?’ In more general terms: why is critique important at all? The answer demands that one set aside ideas such as exclusive groupings of involved/not involved which are, in any case, but examples of the generic question; set aside questions – of importance

192  Applied investigations to Jackson (1985b, 1991b) and, he adds, ‘critical theorists throughout the twentieth century’ – of which ‘class, group or agency has the power, the will and the interest to bring about the rational society’. Set them aside because the question is not social, historical, sociological or psychological – the question is epistemological. The answer: critique is ontological. Such a recognition of critique as ontological renders equally ontological the remaining elements of the systemic epistemology13 because of the momentary nature of their relationships and, so, the fundamental relevance of intending–intuiting to System Theory is warranted.

13.6 Three basic contributions to System Theory Thus far, the idea of epistemological alienation as central to System Theory has been demonstrated, in line with the ontological status attributed to such alienation by the ‘critical systems’ movement. Given this, the epistemological alienation of consciousness from its phenomena which arises from the systemic epistemology through the pervasiveness of dogmatism and bounded rationality is in line with System Theory’s own embrace of epistemological alienation. The final justification of the relevance of the systemic epistemology to System Theory has thus been given. Exploring such a justification has also shown how the systemic epistemology fundamentally impacts upon certain central epistemological positions of System Theory as espoused by its ‘critical systems’ arm. To begin with, a fresh understanding of social actors is called for. Against the psychoanalytic understanding which views social actors as neurotic sufferers of false consciousness unable to truly comprehend their situation or the phenomena which they face, the systemic epistemology favours the view of social actors as epistemologically active although constrained by dogmatism and bounded rationality. Their epistemological constraint, moreover, may be alleviated (though not completely) through the critical mechanism of choosing alternately between the two intuitive modes. Therefore, the consciousness social actors have of their world is based upon their own degree of dogmatism and bounded rationality coupled with the degree to which they alternate between the two, resulting in their having not so much false consciousness as dogmatic or rationally bounded consciousness. Their inability to fully or holistically comprehend their situation or the phenomena they face is ontological, but this does not necessarily reduce them to neurotics requiring psychoanalytical treatment, for the systemic epistemology identifies the switch between dogmatism and bounded rationality as the path towards ever greater comprehension. Such a switch is a concrete identification of what is required for holistic understanding. The systemic epistemology has also contributed to the understanding of the so-called ideal speech situation, for it has unpacked the structural distortion internal to the manner in which consciousness understands reality. Simultaneously, the systemic epistemology has destroyed any dream of ever

Alienation  193 attaining the ideal speech situation through the pervasive dogmatism and bounded rationality which form the twin pillars of the structural distortion in question. Instead of an ideal speech situation, the two pillars of intuition themselves become the focus for managing communication. The task reverts to one of tracking adherence to either dogmatism and bounded rationality to assist in the implementation of the critical switch between them in order to enhance understanding. It has been suggested that such a task works best within any methodology that neither assumes nor theorizes the erasure of communicative distortions and which, moreover, incorporates such distortions into its own methodological process. Finally, the systemic epistemology has been able to answer some fundamental questions about the system theoretical enterprise and hence provide System Theory with an enhanced status at the table of the ‘great philosophical debates’. For it is possible now to justify why System Theory embraces epistemological alienation; why System Theory attributes an epistemologically inassimilable opaque objectivity to phenomena; why System Theory condemns consciousness to forever suffer a degree of epistemological constraint or limitation in relation to those phenomena with which it engages; why, for System Theory, such engagement is always and already imperfect; and, more importantly, why System Theory considers a ‘critical moment’ so crucial for the emancipation of Homo sapiens from its failure to understand its world. It is important to highlight this contribution to System Theory, for previous research has discussed these issues at length but never demonstrated such justifications through the elaboration of an epistemological theory.

13.7 Conclusion This chapter began by demonstrating the relevance of the idea of epistemological alienation to System Theory, in line with both the ontological status attributed to such alienation by the ‘critical systems’ movement as well as by the systemic epistemology itself. This led to certain specific contributions by the systemic epistemology to System Theory’s embrace of epistemological alienation, specifically by addressing System Theory’s psychoanalytic leanings and aspirations towards Habermasian ‘ideal speech situations’. More fundamentally, the systemic epistemology has provided the underpinning of what have been, up to now, only assertions guiding System Theory ever since the rise of Critical Systems Thinking. In doing so, moreover, it has shown that critique is ontological and hence secured the importance of critical systems thinking in the field of System Theory. Ultimately, it has been shown how these investigations have introduced a fresh understanding of consciousness to System Theory and addressed some fundamental tenets of System Theory as espoused by Critical Systems Thinking. These two contributions may be seen to reflect, respectively, an understanding of human being and a foundational reinforcement which allows System Theory to contest other philosophies on an equal, if not stronger, basis. These two contributions,

194  Applied investigations moreover, suggest methodological implications, the more basic of which will be addressed in the next chapter.

Notes 1 See Churchman (1971). 2 Ulrich’s italics. 3 This initial Habermasian input to System Theory inadvertently paved the way for the development of the area now known as Critical Systems Thinking, instigated by Jackson in 1982. 4 Hence equating Critical Systems Thinking with revolutionary, Marxist-inspired agendas outlined in their argument. 5 An issue which has come to encapsulate the concerns of the area now known as Critical Systems Thinking. 6 Not to mention other writings, such as Robots, Men and Minds (1967) and ‘The world of science and the world of value’ (1964). 7 Italics added. 8 After 1991, Critical Systems Thinking fell under the spell of the attack on grand narratives which has affected philosophical thinking – in the same way that epistemology has succumbed to the postmodern influence, as discussed in section 2.3. In this respect, the nature of Critical Systems Thinking changed, so much so that the commitment to human emancipation (an original, fundamental underpinning) has, at least for its prime and most original supporter, Jackson (1997), been sidestepped as a direct concern of this field. 9 Sartre, in his Critique de la Raison Dialectique (1985: 48) notes (in uncannily Jacksonian terms) that the consequences of acts are ungraspable since, from the moment of their realization, they enter into a multiplicity of relations, which multiplicity surpasses an act’s intention (or even set of intentions). Sartre qualifies this as nothing specifically Marxist. It but confirms or reiterates common sense. In this respect, Sartre’s conclusion may be read as a reflection upon the concerns of Critical Systems Thinking whilst criticizing the Marxist influence on such concerns. He further notes that, from the Marxist perspective, action is reduced to a force whose effect depends upon that on which it is exercised. This, however, renders irrelevant any talk of doing. Whereas Homo sapiens does, avalanches (to borrow Sartre’s own example) don’t actually do anything. He accuses the Marxists of trying to have it both ways: they wish to retain the advantages of a teleological interpretation whilst making use of a crude explanation by finality. The second idea is used to present a mechanistic appreciation of history within which all ends have been conveniently brushed away. Simultaneously, the first idea is used to transform the unforeseeable consequences of activity into real human objectives. For Sartre, the result has been tiresome Marxist vacillations concerning the historical enterprise: on the one hand implicitly presented as goals (which are often no more than unforeseen results) and, on the other, reduced to diffused action across an inert environment. 10 In this respect, Renaut points towards the work of French scholar R. Boudon. 11 Against Jackson’s ‘truly’ (cited above), the term fully appears to be a more appropriate word. 12 This is Ulrich’s (1983: 120) translation of Habermas. Speech acts include making statements, asking questions, giving commands and so forth. They are referred to as ‘speech acts’ in order to stress that the concern is not so much with their grammatical, syntactic or semantic structure but with their pragmatic structure, that is, with their circumstantial embeddedness. 13 For a discussion of the elements of the systemic epistemology see section 12.4.

14 Methodological implications

The previous chapter reinforced the understanding of consciousness particular to System Theory as unveiled in the present investigations. It was thus able to address some fundamental tenets of the Critical Systems Thinking branch of System Theory. These two contributions were posited as reflecting, respectively, an understanding of human being and a foundational re­ inforcement which allows System Theory to contest other philosophies on an equal, if not stronger, basis. It was suggested that these two contributions imply methodological considerations. This chapter presents some thoughts on overall methodology and suggests that the systemic epistemology might be particularly relevant to Soft Systems Methodology.

14.1 The basic critical practice Consciousness, or human being, is understood as being in epistemological engagement with phenomena/systems. What renders such engagement epistemological is consciousness’ attribution of an identity, of a meaning or, equally, of an emergent property, to any phenomenon with which it engages (see section 12.4). Such an epistemological attribution arises through one of two epistemological modes. On the one hand, consciousness borrows a previous identity and attributes it to the phenomenon so that consciousness may epistemologically engage with the phenomenon. This is also understood to be the primary manner through which consciousness epistemologically engages with any phenomenon (see section 10.2). On the other hand, consciousness develops an identity previously attributed to the phenomenon in question, resulting in greater understanding of the phenomenon which informs the epistemological engagement in question. These two intuitive modes have been labelled dogmatism and bounded rationality, respectively (see sections 10.4 and 10.5). Consciousness’ epistemological engagement, therefore, arises from either one of two intuitive modes at its disposal. Its epistemological engagement in time, however, is only guaranteed if it alternately chooses between the two intuitive modes. For any temporal adherence to either mode leads to

196  Applied investigations a proportional degradation of epistemological engagement, approaching instead determined engagement.1 On the one hand, therefore, consciousness cannot escape from having to engage with phenomena either through dogmatism or bounded rationality. On the other hand, these very routes lead to consciousness’ succumbing to deterministic effects, respectively either epistemological (stemming from knowledge) or phenomenal (stemming from the phenomena with which consciousness engages). Temporal adherence to either intuitive route thus proportionally reduces consciousness’ epistemological engagement to determined engagement. Consciousness can temper the deterministic forces by drawing upon its critical faculty. This faculty is fundamentally the ability to switch from one intuitive mode to the other.2 On the one hand, by switching to dogmatism, it allows for consciousness to engage with a multitude of phenomena instead of only a limited number. On the other hand, by choosing bounded rationality, it allows for consciousness to learn more about particular phenomena instead of remaining ignorant about most of them. The switch between dogmatism and bounded rationality, therefore, is a process which allows consciousness to draw upon either intuitive mode. Only the intuitive modes, individually, allow consciousness to epistemologically engage with phenomena. That is, the critical switch between them does not, in itself, allow consciousness to epistemologically engage. Consciousness’ epistemological engagement is never free from the shadow of determined engagement. The force of determinism is kept at bay in proportion to the use made of the critical faculty. It follows that there is no argument for a continual, uninterrupted use of the critical faculty. For, even though such uninterrupted switching between dogmatism and bounded rationality would stop determinism from settling to any degree, such freedom from determinism would also render consciousness free from epistemologically engaging with phenomena – in the sense that it would be unable to so epistemologically engage because of the lack of dogmatism or bounded rationality which renders engagement epistemological. Such an inability destroys consciousness qua that phenomenon which epistemologically engages with other phenomena. Such a destruction does not render human being liable to either epistemological nor phenomenal determinism but, instead, throws it into the emptiness which lies between them, like an astronaut removed from the spaceship and lost in space. Human being, in other words, is caught between the abyss of determinism and crippling freedom. In strictly epistemological terms, human being possesses either dogmatic or rationally bounded knowledge, or is in possession of no knowledge at all. In engaging with phenomena epistemologically, human being is forced to surrender any idea of complete emancipation from such engagement’s crippling effect, but is rewarded with a critical faculty whose only operational hazard is the consequence of using it continually, though it may be used regularly and frequently. Such use of the critical faculty will allow human being certain degrees of freedom whilst, simultaneously, rendering human being susceptible to a certain amount of determinism. Human

Methodological implications  197 being, when epistemologically engaging with phenomena, is free to engage with them either dogmatically or through bounded rationality whilst, simultaneously, succumbing to the deterministic effects of either intuitive mode in proportion to a temporal adherence to either one of them. Given this understanding of consciousness’ epistemological engagement, the primary methodological objective is to ensure human being’s measured use of the switch between dogmatism and bounded rationality. For such a realization will enable the deterministic effects of either intuitive mode to be minimized at will. Switching from one mode to the other, however, implies identifying which mode is currently epistemologically actualizing the intention in question. Hence the first step towards methodological development involves identifying the intuitive mode in operation at any one time. In the case of an original epistemological actualization, the answer is given: in the first instance, consciousness always borrows or repeats some previous intuition in order to epistemologically actualize an intention and hence allow for epistemological engagement (see sections 10.2 and 10.4). In other words, any initial epistemological engagement with any phenomenon is always dogmatic epistemological engagement. Identifying intuitive modes is problematical only beyond this initial epistemological engagement. The question is: how is the presently operational intuitive mode identifiable, so that a switch to its opposite may be effected in order to thus ensure critical, as opposed to deterministic, epistemological engagement? In essence, how is either intuitive mode identified? Faced with a knowledge claim about any particular phenomenon, the following question may be raised: what is there inherent to this particular phenomenon that justifies the posited knowledge claim? If nothing inherent to the phenomenon in question is immediately identified, then the knowledge claim may be understood as dogmatic. For example, in dealing with a particular prison, the knowledge claim that it is a university of crime may be posited (see section 5.3). However, nothing inherent in this particular prison may have yet been identified which justifies such a knowledge claim. In fact, such a knowledge claim may actually be based on previous epistemological engagement with other prisons, and so this particular knowledge claim may be understood as dogmatic. Similarly, dolphins may be claimed to be fish because, like other similarly shaped organisms, they swim in open water. Exactly because such a claim is based upon those other organisms, it is clearly dogmatic. A switch to bounded rationality in this case – a switch, that is, to developed understanding of the phenomenon in question – will reveal that dolphins are, in fact, mammals endowed with a swimming ability similar to those other organisms in question. Equally, a switch to bounded rationality may reveal a model prison which does serve to protect society not only in the short term (as a system to accept and store labelled people for a defined length of time) but also in the long term (as an effective rehabilitation system). Knowledge claims about a phenomenon may be identified as rationally

198  Applied investigations bounded, on the other hand, when something inherent to the phenomenon in question justifies them. Having thus a rationally bounded and, hence, developed knowledge claim based upon the phenomenon in question, critical epistemological engagement with the phenomenon may be introduced by switching to dogmatism. Such a switch may be enacted by asking whether there is something in the sphere of existent knowledge which can be applied to the present phenomenon in order to enhance epistemological engagement with it. A prison, for example, is found to actually be a university of crime. Rationally bounded attempts to alleviate such an undesirable effect are not working. A critical switch to dogmatism, however, reveals knowledge of other systems, remote from the present one, which have led to desirable effects. Such dogmatic knowledge is brought to bear upon the present situation in order to reveal properties and practical requirements otherwise hidden. Questions such as the ones proposed allow for switching between dogmatism and bounded rationality and thus allow for critical epistemological engagement and, hence, critical system theoretical practice. They do not, however, assist in the identification of the degree of deterministic risk bearing upon any current epistemological engagement. They do not, in other words, help identify how far or near lies the abyss of either epistemological or phenomenal determinism, as the case may be. Epistemological determinism arises by allowing knowledge claims to govern epistemological engagement no matter the phenomenal evidence. That is to say, epistemological determinism arises through epistemological desirability without regard for phenomenal feasibility. The level of such determinism may be identified by asking to what degree the posited knowledge claim can act as the basis for continued epistemological engagement with the phenomenon. In other terms, to what degree does the present knowledge claim allow for feasible epistemological engagement with the phenomenon or even allow for phenomenal changes? The degree to which the answer tends towards the negative is the degree to which epistemological determinism has set in. Depending on this degree in the current epistemological engagement, a switch will be required to bounded rationality. Phenomenal determinism arises by allowing the phenomenon in question to govern epistemological engagement without regard for alternative knowledge claims. It arises, therefore, through phenomenal desirability without regard for epistemological feasibility. The level of such determinism may be identified by asking to what degree the phenomenon in question informs epistemological engagement. In other terms, how far does the particular phenomenon allow for feasible knowledge claims, given the general context of knowledge as a whole? The degree to which the answer tends towards the negative is the degree to which phenomenal determinism has set in. Depending on this degree in the current epistemological engagement, a switch will be required to dogmatism.

Methodological implications  199

14.2 The systemic epistemology and Soft Systems Methodology The above delineates the basic critical practice suggested by the systemic epistemology. It may be possible for future research to develop an entire methodology based upon the systemic epistemology. It is worth considering, however, whether a system theoretical methodology already exists which might incorporate the systemic epistemology as its epistemological basis, or at the very least draw upon it, for systemic interventions. In the discussion of the Habermasian idea of an ideal speech situation in section 13.4.2, it was noted how the systemic epistemology has served to identify the distortion inherent to epistemological understanding in the shape of dogmatism and bounded rationality. It was noted how these two intuitive modes, in their pervasiveness, become the methodological milestones for approaches which work towards minimizing distortion based upon the understanding that such distortion can never be completely eliminated. In other words, the systemic epistemology offers itself as a prime epistemological tool for those approaches which neither assume nor theorize the erasure of epistemological distortions. More especially, the systemic epistemology, by delineating the structure of such distortions and coupling such structure with a critical iterative ‘turnstile’ function (see Chapter 11), offers itself as a prime epistemological tool for those approaches which incorporate distortions as the central core of an iterative epistemological process. In this respect, Soft Systems Methodology appears to be a suitable candidate for working with the systemic epistemology and hence operationalizing it. This suggestion may be justified as follows. At the most fundamental level, what is called for is a methodology which embraces the idea of consciousness infusing objective phenomena with identities. In other words, human being’s engagement with the world must be understood as semantic.3 What is called for, therefore, is a methodology which accepts that, whatever knowledge is posited, any such knowledge is always only on the level of orienting meaning. As a direct result, the desired methodology should accept the infinite receding of objective knowledge and its unattainability. Therefore, intending–intuiting must be accepted, at least implicitly, as fundamental and as the starting point of any analysis of understanding as well as of epistemological and practical development. Second, given any level of situational complexity, it would also be desirable if the methodology in question provided not only for intending–intuiting but for making explicit fundamental contextual elements implied in any intending–intuiting; in other words, a methodology through which actors could contextualize their intending–intuiting. This requirement stems from the fourteenth aspect of emergent properties, which renders the border between appearances and phenomena dependent upon the context from which consciousness engages with either (see section 8.5). Third, what is called for is a methodology that will incorporate critique

200  Applied investigations as ontological and allow for consciousness’ ‘turn of the turnstile’ in some iterative fashion. In other words, what is called for is a methodology which embraces continual justification. In so doing, the methodology understands consciousness as in active epistemological engagement with phenomena and thus able to critically switch between dogmatism and bounded rationality without underestimating the value of temporally adhering to either intuitive mode. In short, the methodology in question should be, at heart, an iterative, learning process with epistemological roots which allow it, at any point in time, to categorize its knowledge claims as either dogmatic or rationally bounded. Consider how closely Checkland’s Soft Systems Methodology fits the above criteria. To begin with, by placing the idea of Weltanschauung as a central epistemological component towards effective practice, Soft Systems Methodology renders itself a semantic methodology through and through. The knowledge claims posited by the actors are thus recognized as epistemological claims of orientation through the problematic situation. Recall the basic example of the prison (section 5.3). Actors orient themselves through the idea of ‘prison’ by positing it as a rehabilitation system, or a punishment system, or a system to protect society, or a system to train criminals, or a system to accept and store labelled people for a defined length of time. Arguably, a prison is all of this and more. Each idea of a prison, however, is less a comprehensive idea and more of an orienting idea which highlights certain aspects which could inform practice. Each idea is a meaning or identity attributed to the phenomenon/system in question in order to guide consciousness’ engagement with the phenomenon/system. Intending–intuiting is implicit in this approach. Since, moreover, the prison is understood as being all of these ideas and more, objective knowledge is accepted as infinitely receding and unattainable. Next, consider the requirement for contextualization of any intending– intuiting. This is dealt with in Soft Systems Methodology through the provision of the mnemonic CATWOE (see section 3.1.2) which, aside from reserving a place for Weltanschauungen, provides a concrete context for each Weltanschau­ ung and thus renders them practicable. Such contextualization allows for the Weltanschauungen in question to be identified as either dogmatic or rationally bounded. For the contextualization itself will indicate whether any particular Weltanschauung is borrowed or developed. As an example, consider any specific prison. The general, and hence borrowed or dogmatic, understanding of this prison may be the idea of a system to protect society. Focusing upon the phenomenon in question, however, a more rationally bounded idea may emerge: the prison is a system that trains criminals. Either understanding invites radical changes to the remaining elements of the contextualizing CATWOE, helping to identify each ascribed identity as stemming from either intention intuiting or intuition intending.4 Finally, the iterative nature of Checkland’s methodology need not be un-

Methodological implications  201 derstood as simply an exercise in heuristics. Each iteration allows for a critical switch between dogmatic and rationally bounded Weltanschauungen, enabling actors to work critically through the problem situation whilst simultaneously providing ample tools to explore each Weltanschauung and, hence, temporally adhere to either dogmatism or bounded rationality as the case may require. Invariably, action will rest upon either a dogmatic or a rationally bounded solution, but this is in keeping with the epistemological alienation inherent to the systemic epistemology, discussed in sections 12.4, 12.5 and 13.4–13.6. Such action, however, will have resulted from a critical epistemological pro­ cess which the systemic epistemology can help identify. In short, Soft Systems Methodology is, in accordance with the requirements, an iterative, learning methodology with epistemological roots very similar to those of the systemic epistemology. Incorporation of the systemic epistemology signals that Soft Systems Methodology may be able to make a distinct contribution to critical systems practice and, in this respect, serve to temper the force of criticism laid upon it (Jackson, 1983).

14.3 The systemic epistemology and boundary judgements It is worth concluding by highlighting an insight constitutive of the above discussion: there exists, at least in theory, an infinite number of critical switches between dogmatism and bounded rationality but, invariably, any practical action at any one time will find its epistemological reasoning or root in either dogmatism or bounded rationality. There is no such thing as critical action; there is only a critical epistemological process which might inform action, but any action taken ultimately refers to either a dogmatic or a rationally bounded justification. What makes this insight significant is that it finds a direct reflection in System Theory’s ideas about boundary judgements. As Ulrich (1988a) makes clear, any number of boundary judgements concerning a situation are possible, and none of them can claim a higher degree of objectivity over others. Still, it is to the imposed boundary judgement that all subsequent action refers. In other words, exercises in boundary judgements may inform action but, ultimately, any action taken refers to one particular boundary judgement for its justification. The question is: given such similarities of reasoning, how may the systemic epistemology contribute to the understanding of boundary judgements? Boundary judgements qua judgements are a distinctly epistemological affair. That is, where the boundary is drawn is based upon an understanding of a situation. Given the systemic epistemology, such an understanding arises initially as dogmatic (see Chapter 10 from section 10.2 onwards) but may develop into a critically developed understanding based upon alternations between dogmatism and bounded rationality. Such alternations may inform where the boundary is ultimately drawn, but the drawing of the boundary

202  Applied investigations itself, the decision to draw it here rather than there, to include this and exclude that, requires that such alternations halt, otherwise no practicable drawing of a boundary is ever possible. The drawing of the boundary thus ultimately rests upon either dogmatic reasoning or rationally bounded reasoning. It is such reasoning, in other words, which draws the epistemological boundary upon which action depends and, given this, dogmatism and bounded rationality may themselves be seen to be exercises in (epistemological) boundary judgements. Indeed, given that these two intuitive modes form the epistemological foundations for practicable action, they may be seen to be the primary boundary judgements or, in other words, boundary judgements par excellence. In short, there are not simply boundary judgements; there are dogmatic boundary judgements and rationally bounded ones. Identifying either type serves to highlight the epistemological source upon which practice is pursued. This serves to distinguish between practice based upon repeated understanding and practice based upon new, or developed, understanding. Given that the judgements in boundary judgements are epistemologically suffused, and given that they form the springboard for practice, identifying them as either dogmatic or rationally bounded signals the direction of the critical epistemological turn consciousness must make as it pursues practice based upon either one. Systemic practice can be truly critical only when it can identify whether it is based upon dogmatism or bounded rationality so that it may critically turn to either one alternately. In turn, critical imposition of boundary judgements only arises with theoretical analysis or practical experimentation of both dogmatic and rationally bounded boundary judgements.

14.4 Conclusion This chapter has provided certain methodological insights and guidelines for future practice and research. It focused upon general theoretical insights, possible links to Soft Systems Methodology, and an appreciation of boundary judgements. Since Chapter 12, moreover, aspects of the systemic epistemology have been applied to various key themes in System Theory. Is it, however, only to System Theory that the investigations may prove relevant? After all, it was noted in section 3.3 that the idea of emergent property, upon which the systemic epistemology is based, promises to be the foundational concept of any epistemology. Undoubtedly, this is not the place to undertake extensive investigations of other epistemological theories in order to ascertain the degree of applicability of this promise. It is possible, however, to investigate the relevance of the systemic epistemology to a field somewhat removed from System Theory: Organizational Learning. As will be discussed, this field is seemingly devoid of a coherent epistemological and methodological basis. It is especially the lack of such bases that render Organizational Learning a fresh testing ground for the applicability of the systemic epistemology. The next chapter undertakes such an investigation.

Methodological implications  203

Notes 1 See section 10.6, the introduction to Chapter 11, and sections 11.4 and 12.4. 2 See sections 11.3.2 and 11.4, the introduction to Chapter 12, and sections 12.3, 12.4 and 13.5. 3 See Chapter 12 for the relevance of this to the systemic epistemology. 4 See Chapter 10 (section 10.3 and onwards) for an explication of these terms.

15 An application in Organizational Learning theory

The recent investigations have concentrated on the relevance of the systemic epistemology to System Theory. As the investigations draw to a close, however, it is fitting to turn to the systemic epistemology’s relevance to a field somewhat removed from System Theory, though of profound interest to it: Organizational Learning (OL). There is no doubt of the relevance of this field to management thinking and practice. Checkland (2000) goes so far as to argue that Soft Systems Methodology provides a means for practising OL. The early contextual investigations (in section 2.1.2), moreover, referred to OL as epistemologically significant. The intention here is to provide not a comprehensive examination of OL, but a substantial hint of the relevance of the systemic epistemology to this field. Given this, the discussion will focus upon applying the systemic epistemology to a model proposed for operationalizing OL.

15.1 Organizational Learning The epistemological significance of OL stems from its own focus upon pro­ cesses through which consciousness comes to know phenomena (Vera and Crossan, 2003). Therefore learning is essentially an epistemological concern. Since the investigations thus far have furnished exactly such a process, OL presents itself as a most promising option for applied investigations. The question is, of course, how exactly might the systemic epistemology serve to contribute to OL? In order to provide some idea of such a contribution a somewhat closer look into OL is required. There is no need here to study the rich OL literature at any length or in any detail. It suffices to provide a flavour of the current situation in OL in order to reach the conclusion that the systemic epistemology might help provide relevant contributions. This being so, a most timely publication serves the purpose: Easterby-Smith and Lyles’ (2003) Blackwell Handbook of Organiza­ tional Learning and Knowledge Management.1 As the title suggests, the field of OL is linked to the field of Knowledge Management (KM). The present concern is strictly with the former. This is

An application in Organizational Learning theory  205 because the systemic epistemology delineates an epistemological process for the development of knowledge and the learning focus of OL/KM is especially concerned with epistemological processes. This may be contrasted with the knowledge focus of KM which is concerned more with epistemological content (Easterby-Smith and Lyles, 2003: 3). The present concern with OL is justified even in light of its cousin, the learning organization. Whereas the latter presents itself as an ideal type focused upon the practical and performative applications of learning processes, the former is more akin to the present investigations qua study of an epistemological process with the purpose of understanding and informing such a process. As will be discussed, however, the relevance of the present research to studies of learning organizations should not be underestimated.

15.2 System Theoretical understanding in Organizational Learning An evidently strong influence in OL research is psychology. DeFillippi and Ornstein (2003) go so far as to identify five dominant theoretical perspectives in psychology which impact upon four, equally dominant, theoretical perspectives in OL. They also highlight that sociology and economics influence OL theorizing through the background or training many OL theorists have in such fields. A behavioural approach to OL (one which explicitly incorporates rewards and punishments into OL theorizing), as well as the impact of organizational failure, are suggested by the authors as related future research directions for OL. In so far as learning implies a cognizing mind, OL is justified in inviting psychology as a relevant research partner. Elkjaer (2003), however, points to the paradoxical consequence where learning theory in organizational learning research rests, in the main, upon individual-oriented psychology. There is, in other words, an implied assumption in much of OL that theories based upon individual learning reflect or can influence learning on an organizational scale. Elkjaer goes so far as to accuse Senge (who, interestingly, was largely responsible for introducing system theoretical ideas to OL) of making this mistake – which suddenly raises a most relevant question: what role, if any, is System Theory playing in OL? If the Handbook is indeed ‘a major statement of the state of the field at the start of the 21st century’ (Easterby-Smith and Lyles, 2003: 13), then, upon consultation by any system theorist, it will quickly disappoint. For it appears that, in OL/KM, systems thinking is simply and merely understood as a set of ‘skills to link a wider variety of information into actionable models’, or as one of a number of divergent ‘concepts that underlie the tools that lead to learning’2 (Carroll et al., 2003), or as one of Senge’s (1990) five ‘component technologies or disciplines [requiring] mastery or focus’ (DiBella, 2003). Evidence of any higher degree of understanding of systems thinking peaks by connecting it with the so-called double-loop learning (Carroll et al., 2003)

206  Applied investigations – which Senge (1990) discusses, though this idea is firmly rooted in the organizational studies of Argyris and Schön (1978). Such simplicity of understanding makes the system theorist cry out: since when is systems thinking a set of skills? Since when is systems thinking a concept? Since when is systems thinking a component technology, or – leaving Senge’s quite particular interpretation aside – even a discipline inviting its so-called mastery or focus? It may even legitimately be pointed out: what is Soft Systems Methodology, in its intricate theory and in its history of practice, if it is not organizational learning! In short, OL exhibits a paucity of understanding of exactly what the systems movement is, of its rich theory and practice in (what can clearly be termed) organizational learning, and of the potential contribution it can make – regardless of the present investigations. Indeed, evidence from the Hand­ book itself suggests that OL’s knowledge of the systems movement begins and ends with Senge (1990). This is unfortunate given that Senge’s work is far from being recognized as a prime reference for system theoretical ideas – as Jackson (1995) argues, Senge’s notion of learning is but a tame version of system dynamics which ‘fits most readily with determinism’. There is, therefore, a fundamental research avenue here for the systems movement as a whole. The initial purpose of such research would be to elucidate the manner in which the systems view of the world can inform OL, in particular through system theoretical epistemological deliberations.

15.3 Epistemological development in Organizational Learning It is evident from the Handbook that, in OL, a significant amount of importance is placed upon the relevance of epistemology. Elkjaer, for instance, points to a combination of social theory and certain concepts as used by Dewey as a relevant source for epistemological deliberations. Plaskoff (2003), in describing a heuristic model based on questions of belief, behaviour and belonging reminiscent of Ulrich’s (1983) own heuristic approach, notes the implications for OL stemming from the work of Russian psychologists Vygotsky and Leontiev and the social constructivist epistemological outlook. The work of Polanyi appears to be of some significant interest, especially his theory of tacit knowledge. Such knowledge is understood by OL as providing a unique competitive advantage (von Krogh, 2003; Easterby-Smith and Lyles, 2003: 8; Salk and Simonin, 2003; Szulanski and Cappetta, 2003; Chakravarthy et al., 2003).3 In general, on the one hand, the work of Polanyi seems to underpin a fundamental view in OL similar to that of epistemological alienation (Calhoun and Starbuck, 2003) as uncovered in the present investigations whilst, on the other hand, the seeming difference in understanding of key concepts such as perception (Vera and Crossan, 2003) renders such connections rather weak. Still, much stress is placed on learning qua process of knowledge acquisition and knowledge evaluation, especially by the

An application in Organizational Learning theory  207 influence of Polanyi’s definition of knowledge as dynamic, as activity (Vera and Crossan, 2003) – indicating that perhaps consciousness as understood in the present investigations might be of some contributory value to OL. Indeed, what is notable is the absence of any distinct epistemology from, for and by OL. Now, OL may argue that its ‘novelty’, ‘speed of development’, ‘increasing diversity’ and ‘specialization’ (Easterby-Smith and Lyles, 2003: 1) constrain its present ability to consider an epistemology. This may be due to novelty and developmental speed, although any number of developments may well be eventually discarded when set against any future OL epistemology – a waste of work which might be avoided if epistemological theorizing is brought to the fore earlier. Increasing diversity and specialization, however, are no arguments against epistemological theorizing for they are conditions existing within System Theory itself and they have posed no problems for the present investigations. Significantly, phenomenology, aside from a few particular uses of the term itself (Elkjaer, 2003; Fineman, 2003), appears to have had no treatment from within OL. This is unfortunate given the epistemological contribution it can make, as evidenced from the present investigations. Phenomenology may even be considered a most relevant theoretical input to OL. For, if the relevance of system theoretical epistemological deliberations to OL can be demonstrated – and it certainly can even on the single scale of Checkland’s own theorizing – then, given System Theory’s profound epistemological relationship to phenomenology, as demonstrated in the present work, OL can, at the very least, be seen to be related to phenomenology by association. There is, therefore, a fundamental research avenue here which calls for interdisciplinary studies constituted by System Theory, OL and phenomenology, whose primary aim would be to inform OL epistemologically.

15.4 Pointers towards the relevance of the systemic epistemology to Organizational Learning In the absence of any distinct OL epistemology, the mere fact that OL is interested in processes through which consciousness comes to know phenomena renders the present investigations relevant. For exactly such a process has been unveiled and, moreover, its systemic structure renders it relevant to contemporary concerns. The relevancy of the present investigations, however, need not be confined to the largely ‘academic study’ of OL (EasterbySmith and Lyles, 2003: 2). Indications of the relevancy of the present research to OL can be illustrated from within the practical and performative applicatory focus of OL’s learning processes as evidenced in studies of the learning organization. For studies of learning organizations, knowledge is one ultimate asset, perhaps the last – despite being the most original – source of competitiveness, which holds the key to commercial growth, or at least survival (Prusak, 1996). At first glance, this asset-based approach seems oceans away from

208  Applied investigations the concerns of epistemology. The problem, however, is that nothing can be put to practical use unless its function and construction are known. To seek a commercial promise from knowledge without first understanding what knowledge actually is, what it does and how it develops is to seek blindly in ignorance. Therefore, the commercial aspirations attached to knowledge cannot ignore the preoccupations of epistemology, if only because, without paying attention to the latter, any ‘value’ placed upon ‘knowledge’ reduces to the manipulation of meaningless terms. In essence, and by definition, the learning organization is an epistemological concern. In the late 1980s, de Geus (1988) published a straightforward paper filled with rich insights into the idea of the learning organization. De Geus notes that change is a function of knowledge, or, to put it another way, change is proportionally related to knowledge. To be sure, change is a vague term which requires delineation. For de Geus, as with commercial enterprise in general, change may equate with growth, be it financial, geographical or whatever. He further stresses, however, that growth itself is also about survival. Growth, in other words, may incorporate strategic (that is, voluntary or planned) stagnation or strategic regression which, when viewed longitudinally, contribute to it. In any case, commercially related growth is proportional to knowledge – an equation which de Geus identifies as probably the only sustainable competitive advantage of commercial organizations. In general, the thesis is that the greater the amount of knowledge accumulated through a process of learning – institutional learning, in the case of organizations – the greater the chance that a greater change, in other terms growth, will unfold. The smaller the amount of knowledge, the greater the chance of stagnation and the decline which usually follows, a decline which may arise either as a direct effect of the stagnation or indirectly via predator elements. Now, if organizations are perceived as learning entities then they are perceived as epistemological entities, that is, as consciousnesses. The systemic epistemology demonstrates that learning entities continue to learn in inverse proportion to the degree to which their dogmatism or bounded rationality approaches detrimental consequences because of the inactivity of ontological choice. Although this allows a certain degree of dogmatism and bounded rationality to persist in such entities, the degree of the persistence in either manner of knowing is in direct proportion to the failure of such entities qua learning entities, and hence in direct proportion to their general failure. The change referred to as being a function of knowledge is, from the point of view of the systemic epistemology, a function of ontological choice. This choice governs epistemological development, allowing for an elevated degree of epistemological engagement (and hence control over phenomena), continual justification of intuitions (or strategies), and – if so desired – the perseverance with a little dogmatism or bounded rationality. The systemic epistemology demonstrates that the process of learning relies on the necessary operation of ontological choice if the organization is not to fall into the consequential traps laid out by singular dogmatism and singular bounded

An application in Organizational Learning theory  209 rationality. Moreover, it demonstrates that, although learning may be claimed to be the only sustainable advantage, not only is it an advantage in terms of competitive strength but, given the crucial self-responsibility of the ontological choice, learning becomes the very source of continuing sustenance – no learning equates to the detrimental consequences of dogmatism or bounded rationality, which equates to the death of consciousness, that is, the death of the organization. It would appear, therefore, that life cycles of organizations, including their absorption by other organizations through mergers, may be analysed in terms of the systemic epistemology.

15.5 Towards the operationalization of the present investigations in the field of Organizational Learning On the one hand, it may be argued that such reasoning may be falling into the paradoxical trap indicated by Elkjaer earlier. On the other hand, such reasoning assumes that the present epistemological results can be operationalized so that they may be put to some applicative use. The first question calls for research far beyond the present requirements. An illustration of the operationalization in question, however, may be provided by drawing upon the relationship between knowing, knowledge and learning, as proposed by Vera and Crossan (2003). Knowing is understood, by the authors, as the application of knowledge on phenomena. Such application may be singular or multiple – respectively accorded the labels stable and change by the authors. In terms of the present investigations, knowing emphasizes the engaged status of consciousness, which engagement may be with one singular phenomenon or with multiple phenomena. Knowing, in other words, emphasizes consciousness’ intentionality or intending. Knowledge is understood, by the authors, as that which is possessed by consciousness. In terms of the present investigations, knowledge emphasizes the epistemological status of consciousness, whereby consciousness may be epistemologically equipped with only one intuition or multiple intuitions – again, respectively labelled stable and change by the authors. Knowledge, in other words, emphasizes consciousness’ intuitionality or intuiting. Learning, according to Vera and Crossan, is a function of ‘the change in knowledge and the change in knowing’ or, equally, ‘changes in cognition and changes in behavior’. Accordingly, there is no learning without some change in knowing and in knowledge – in the same way that the present investigations have shown that there is no consciousness without active intending or intuiting. In terms of the present investigations, this translates into learning being a function of the degree of active intending and intuiting by consciousness. But, as the systemic epistemology demonstrates, consciousness stresses either intending or intuiting at any one time. Given this, learning is only ever of a limited type and constitutive of a limited approach: either it is learning

210  Applied investigations whereby consciousness develops its intuitions based upon one phenomenon (bounded rationality or bounded learning) or it is learning whereby consciousness applies an intuition upon multiple phenomena (dogmatism or dogmatic learning). Vera and Crossan agree that there can be learning based upon either epistemological acquisition (bounded rationality) or epistemological application (dogmatism). Vera and Crossan also suggest, however, that learning can be based upon some simultaneous epistemological acquisition and application. No theoretical nor empirical support is provided for this conclusion. Yet it is presented as a viable alternative to either of the two other limited types of learning. The systemic epistemology, in having delineated the mutual exclusivity of the two intuitive modes, rejects such an alternative. Given the infeasibility of simultaneity, the systemic epistemology suggests that consciousness can only ever tend away from either of the two limited learning approaches by exercising its ontological choice, in other words, critique. Such a tendency, moreover, is only possible through alternate choosing between learning modes. When the systemic epistemology is brought to bear upon Vera and Crossan’s claims, therefore, the result is an intending–intuiting–learning matrix providing a rich set of insights which may guide the learning process at any one of its temporal stages, as shown in Figure 15.1. In effect, what this simple exercise has shown is that the promising research avenue of OL with respect to the present investigations is not merely one of promising transpositions. The present research has already proved relevant in clarifying the understanding, as well as content, of a basic model in OL. Interestingly, Vera and Crossan are attempting to integrate OL and KM and establish ‘a theoretical link between these constructs and perform­ ance.’4 The authors’ research, in other words, is very much geared towards the operationalization of learning, its impact and influence upon tangible Figure 15.1 Intending–intuiting–learning matrix

Intending (engaged status of consciousness)

Intuiting (epistemological status of consciousness)

Singular intention

Multiple intentions

Singular intuition • No active intending–intuiting • No active choosing between dogmatism and bounded rationality • Epistemological and phenomenal entropy • Entropic consciousness

Multiple intuitions • Bounded rationality • Phenomenal entropy • Epistemological negentropy • Consciousness liable to phenomenal determinism • Strong entropic tendency of consciousness • Rationally bounded learning

• • • •

• Active intending–intuiting • Active choosing between dogmatism and bounded rationality • Consciousness in active epistemological engagement with phenomena • Weak tendency toward either dogmatism or bounded rationality at any one time

Dogmatism Phenomenal negentropy Epistemological entropy Consciousness liable to epistemological determinism • Strong entropic tendency of consciousness • Dogmatic learning

Figure 15.1  Intending–intuiting–learning matrix

An application in Organizational Learning theory  211 organizational performance. In this respect, by having informed Vera and Crossan’s original understanding, the systemic epistemology is already on the path towards its own promising operationalization.

15.6 Framework of proposed future research in Organizational Learning Given such promise, it remains only to provide a framework for proposed research into OL. This is presented in Figure 15.2, followed by some relevant commentary. To begin with, it must be stressed that the research proposed is strictly epistemological because of the nature of OL, the strength of System Theory as an epistemological approach, the primarily epistemological concerns of phenomenology, and the epistemological focus of the present investigations. The epistemological delimitation, moreover, reflects some major research needs of the next five years in OL which focus upon knowledge creation, learning capabilities, cognition and guiding theoretical foundations as identified by Easterby-Smith and Lyles (2003: 639–652). If this were not enough reason for an epistemological delimitation, consider Kawalek’s (2004) conclusion in his survey of organizational learning/knowledge management: When investigating the conceptual literature on knowledge management it seems that it is burgeoning with viewpoints that overlap, and commonly contradict each other . . . the literature has not provided methodological guidance for doing knowledge management (i.e. managing knowledge), without which knowledge management is fated to remain ill-defined, open to misinterpretation and sometimes abuse by unscrupulous practitioners . . . there are quite significant differences between the writers on knowledge management, and following each will lead to quite different approaches to knowledge management practice . . . While the knowledge management literature presents many insightful points, definitions and analyses, none inspire confidence that successful management of knowledge will result (or is even possible) as a result of a process of selecting from these insights.5

System Theory

Learning Organization Epistemology

Phenomenology

Organizational Learning

Organizational Knowledge Knowledge Management

Figure 15.2  Framework of proposed future research in organizational learning

212  Applied investigations Since epistemology directs methodology, as argued in section 1.5, a distinct focus on epistemological research, as proposed here, might go a long way to resolving the contradictions and methodological failings highlighted by Kawalek. It appears, therefore, most relevant to provide OL/KM with a research framework which is geared towards epistemological investigations. Turning to Figure 15.2, the epistemological delimitation indicates that what is generally expected of the proposed research is an increase, refinement, development and so forth of epistemological understanding. Thus epistemological understanding can be envisaged as an ever-growing central stock of the proposed research available for usage. Where the general expectation of the research is to amplify epistemological understanding, however, the main concrete objective of the research is to inform OL. Surrounding, and focused upon, such an expectation and objective, lie the remaining fields and the information loops between them. The interdisciplinarity evident between System Theory and phenomenology as well as OL theory and practice are expected to inform epistemological understanding. In turn, epistemological understanding is expected to inform interdisciplinary studies in System Theory and phenomenology as well as OL. In a wider view, interdisciplinary studies in System Theory and phenomenology on the one hand, and OL on the other, are also expected to inform each other, particularly given the apparent abyss which exists between them, as identified earlier. These wider information loops are mediately informed by the central epistemological stock, whilst this latter may ultimately be understood as being mediately informed by the wider loops. Finally, OL is expected to inform, and be informed by, studies in learning organizations, organizational knowledge and knowledge management – an expectation resulting from the integrative objectives stressed by Vera and Crossan – whilst these latter three will ultimately mediately inform the other variables. If such a framework is adhered to, certain particular results are expected. For instance, it is expected that a certain degree of conceptual epistemological grounding for OL will unfold; that a profound appreciation may be acquired of the relevance of System Theory and phenomenology to OL; and, ultimately, that a profound appreciation may be acquired of the manner in which the present systemic epistemology – or some enhanced version – can inform OL theory and practice.

15.7 Conclusion The excursion into Organizational Learning has provided a hint of potential interdisciplinary studies with System Theory. In particular, it has been demonstrated how System Theory can contribute to ideas which envisage the operationalization of Organization Learning. Given this, it is deemed that the earlier investigations can inform a wider scope of management thinking in addition to purely system theoretical possibilities. In other words, given that System Theory is very much in the air of contemporary discourse and,

An application in Organizational Learning theory  213 additionally, given that Organizational Learning delineates the latest frontier of managerial and administrative thinking, the present investigations find themselves in the fortunate position of being able to inform both. Thus a general relevance of the investigations has been established and it is left to future research to build upon the links identified herein.

Notes 1 The Handbook is a collection of 30 original papers, in addition to the introductory and concluding papers of the editors. With 652 pages of text and an index spanning an additional 23 pages, the Handbook offers an in-depth view into a field barely a dozen years old and yet already rich in literature. For the present purposes, it more than serves what is required. 2 Original italics. 3 This may or may not indicate that perhaps an underlying requirement of any OL epistemology is that it incorporate an epistemological embrace of social competition. 4 Italics added. 5 In 1996, Laurence Prusak, principal at the Ernst & Young Center for Business Innovation in Boston, wrote of the ‘rhetoric surrounding “learning organizations” that is long on poetry and short on substantive theory’ (Prusak, 1996).

Part VI

Concluding reflections

If our problems did not concern the principles of our thought and our societal system, officials and business leaders would not need philosophy . . . We will need, as Balzac said, ‘profound people,’ and not merely those who calculate; radical minds and not merely technicians. Thus, we will need people trained through doubt and questioning. The havoc caused by routine thinking and political improvisation is clear enough today. Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1960)

16 Interdisciplinary partnership Present results and future recommendations

This final chapter begins by highlighting the main contributions of the preceding investigations. There then follows a critical discussion of the philosophical underpinnings of those investigations. The significance of phenomenology to System Theory is especially reinforced, and a course for future interdisciplinary work is suggested.

16.1 Main contributions Aside from the main contribution of providing a distinctly systemic1 epistemology for System Theory and the holistic practice it underpins, the present work has contributed to an advanced understanding of a number of related areas. Perhaps the best place to begin their enumeration is to return to the three questions, deduced from Checkland’s work, which have guided the present study (see Table 3.1), in order to provide them with succinct answers. •

On the fundamental importance of the idea of emergent property to System Theory The idea of emergent property is of fundamental importance to System Theory because it is this very idea which lends an identity to a phenomenon, and hence allows for System Theory to engage with it as a system. For this reason, emergent properties are fundamental, as they are the knowledge used by System Theory when faced with phenomena. In other terms, they are the fundamental building blocks of System Theory’s epistemological outlook. Additionally, System Theory understands consciousness’ fundamental activity as one which instantly, and hence unavoidably, creates emergent properties and projects them upon phenomena with which it engages. Given this, emergent properties do not simply spring from systems. They emerge from consciousness’ engagement with them and thus are, first and foremost, the theories which consciousness applies in engaging with phenomena. Emergent properties, therefore, are that which epistemologically actualizes

218  Concluding reflections

•

•

consciousness’ engagement with phenomena as systems. Without emergent properties, consciousness cannot epistemologically engage with systems. On the relationship between emergent properties and the wholes which exhibit them On the one hand, emergent properties depend upon systems in that there must be systems which can be conceptually grasped as such and thus attributed an emergent property. The particular summative and special characteristics of systems are not relevant to their being attributed an emergent property. However, the necessary existence of such summative and special characteristics and the entropic or negentropic tendencies which they attract renders systems as always being liable to some emergent property, irrespective of any emergent property attributed to them. Therefore, the ultimate emergent property of a system cannot be pinned down either to its attribution by consciousness or to the complexes standing objectively distinct from consciousness. The relationship between emergent properties and systems is a systemic relationship, whereby both taken together are required for any actualization and investigation of systems. This serves to further reinforce the fundamentality of the idea of emergent properties to System Theory. On the systems epistemology built upon the idea of emergent property The systems epistemology built upon the idea of emergent property is a systemically structured epistemology in six moments, constituted by two epistemological activities undertaken by consciousness and four epistemological conditions. It is an eidetically inclined epistemology, yet one which attributes ontological status to epistemological alienation from phenomena. It understands social actors as always and already epistemologically engaged with phenomena, yet constrained in the manner in which such engagement is rendered epistemological. The systems epistemology, however, identifies the means and ends of such constraints and hence lays bare the manner in which engagement is rendered epistemological. The most significant aspect of the epistemology is that it attributes ontological status to practical critique, not so much for such critique’s own sake, but for the survival of consciousness as that phenomenon whose distinct characteristic is to epistemologically engage with other phenomena. Thus it is an epistemology which demands consciousness to continually justify its epistemological engagement – ultimately to itself.

In addition to these specific contributions, this work has provided the following: • epistemological insights into some of the core ideas of System Theory such as emergent property and boundary critique – indeed, this work’s treatment

Interdisciplinary partnership  219

•

•

• • • •

of the former idea is unique in the system theoretical literature and provides an advanced epistemological understanding of this idea; the first developed system theoretical understanding of consciousness, hence contributing to studies of consciousness in general and, moreover, to an understanding of the manner in which human beings engage epistemologically with the world; the provision of a fresh, and distinctly epistemological, understanding of von Bertalanffy’s pioneering general system theory – an understanding which has served to also demonstrate the continuing relevance of the original ideas behind the contemporary face of System Theory, and the manner in which such ideas sit well with phenomenology; a systemic understanding of two cornerstones of Husserlian phenomenology: intentionality and intuition; an introduction, detailed treatment, and delimitation of the epistemological ideas of dogmatism and bounded rationality; an original, epistemologically focused critique of the idea of boundary analysis/boundary judgements; an original, epistemological treatment of the idea of alienation, further demonstrated as permeating System Theory and phenomenology.

It may also be added that, in having taken an epistemological approach to System Theory, this work has served to tame System Theory’s functionalist reputation through an explication of its ability to reflect epistemological engagement with the world. If, by way of the degree with which it is concerned with consciousness, epistemology is appreciated (even understood) as the science of human being par excellence, as argued in section 2.2, an epistemological approach to System Theory – such as the one taken in this work – provides a system theoretical science/understanding of human being. It is hoped that this work has provided at least a small contribution to such understanding. At the grassroots, this work serves to highlight the structure, process and significance of epistemological theory and epistemological practice in System Theory. In the broader scheme of thought, this work contributes to the appreciation of System Theory as a developing but quite sophisticated philosophy, one which questions more traditional philosophical positions and thus serves to redefine theories which guide methodological practice. Ultimately, this work demonstrates the value of interdisciplinary research and sets itself as an example of how interdisciplinarity may be undertaken in a non-eclectic manner.2 There remains only to critically consider the underlying theoretical under­ pinnings of this work in order to guide future research. In particular, Sartre’s ‘wars we deserve’ conclusion is revisited in order to understand it in the context of this work. This leads to considering the degree to which a Sartrean input, qua continuing theoretical underpinning, might be relevant to future studies.

220  Concluding reflections

16.2 The wars we deserve The role of phenomenology in the investigations has been marked in two ways. First, it has been demonstrated that the fundamental epistemological idea of phenomenology – identity – directly reflects that of System Theory (Tables 4.1 and 8.1). The phenomenological investigations, moreover, allowed for the deduction of two additional aspects of emergent properties, one of which found its direct reflection in the pioneering deliberations of von Bertalanffy (Table 8.2). There is no need to suppose that the reflections between the two respectively fundamental ideas stop here. Indeed, they serve as a solid foundation for future research into exactly this issue. Such research is recommended because, as was shown in the investigations, research into fundamentals yields rich fruits. In this case, it led to an amplified understanding of consciousness in a manner coherent with system theoretical deliberations, as well as to the identification of the theoretical course consciousness treads when epistemologically engaging with phenomena. Phenomenology was especially useful in delineating the dual course of thought, allowing for detailed analysis whose major result, in the form of dogmatism and bounded rationality, has served to highlight the epistemological heart of consciousness’ engagement with phenomena. Phenomenology has also been especially relevant in assisting towards the development of a systemically structured epistemology. In effect, the systemic epistemology of System Theory is a system – not least because it is constituted entirely by moments. System Theory, in other words, is in possession of a holistic approach to knowledge – which serves to recall certain of the key aspects of the holistic approach identified in Table 1.1. Recall, for instance, that a holistic approach was identified as one which maps out the relationships of a situation and accounts for consequences across the short, medium and long temporal spectra. In mapping out a systemically structured epistemology, these results, through an appreciation of the dogmatism and bounded rationality inherent in epistemological development, have been able to trace the tendencies of consciousness across all terms (see section 12.4). Moreover, these investigations have reinforced the idea that classic bastions such as truth, justification and critique still have much to contribute – in line with an underlying belief in System Theory (see section 7.1). Fundamentally, they have contributed towards an amplified – and at times original – understanding of the systems approach (see Chapter 13). This work also noted that, although for System Theory it is the system, and not those within it, which yields certain consequences, only those within it can change the system. Given this, it was concluded that those within the system are responsible for the system’s consequences. This may imply that the system can be changed. Yet in the systemic epistemology is revealed a system which cannot be changed. There has arisen a system not of consciousness’ own making and yet one to which consciousness is condemned; an alienated and alienating system, a system which can be neither manipulated nor

Interdisciplinary partnership  221 changed and yet a system to which consciousness and hence each and every social actor are bound if epistemological engagement is ever to arise. Not only are social actors bound to this system, however: they are recognized as completely self-justificatory and self-responsible – for the systemic epistemology does not so much act upon consciousness as provide the determinable setting upon which consciousness travels. Consciousness is condemned to a system which cannot be changed, and one which it has had no role in making, and yet bears complete responsibility for the results of this system. This type of result is to epistemology what extreme sports are to the sports world: it is too much. Yet, for System Theory, on the epistemological plane, the system which enables epistemological engagement cannot be changed, it is not of con­ sciousness’ own making and yet consciousness bears the responsibility for the results of this system. If the system cannot be changed, it is unavoidable. If the system is not of consciousness’ own making, it is alien. If consciousness is responsible for the system’s consequences, consciousness deserves such consequences. In short, for System Theory, on the epistemological plane, we unavoidably have the wars we deserve.

16.3 On the inherent interdisciplinarity between System Theory and phenomenology System Theory is in possession of an epistemology which unequivocally shows to consciousness that it will perpetually have the wars it deserves. More than merely epistemological, the ‘wars we deserve’ conclusion is tinged with a complex ethical – or, at the very least, existential – dimension; a dimension at which the early contextual investigations hinted in section 4.1. It was noted that this understanding reflects that of the phenomenologist Jean-Paul Sartre, which serves to suggest an important research avenue for the future. For if Husserlian phenomenology, in its distinctly epistemological focus, has served System Theory so well, might not Sartrean developments, grounded in epistemological analyses and yet revealing existential and hence ethical dimensions, serve as the basis for developing a system theoretical approach to ethics, theories of justice and political action? The suggestion already finds some grounding in this work, which has occasionally drawn from Sartre’s deliberations.3 Moreover, it is possible to further make a case for the relevance of Sartre’s deliberations in any future research by demonstrating how they converge with the present work. 16.3.1 Reservations regarding a chronological approach to phenomenology Prior to such a demonstration, however, the very jump itself from a Husserlian to a Sartrean focus might be questioned. Without diminishing any potential value Sartre’s deliberations might promise, why is the discussion implying that Husserl’s most outstanding pupil, and direct ‘heir’, should be

222  Concluding reflections bypassed? Specifically, (1) does not Martin Heidegger provide the existential turn in phenomenology which could serve future interdisciplinary research based upon the present work? and (2) is it also not the case that many central Sartrean themes are borrowed from, or at least reflect, Heidegger’s own analyses?4 The first question suggests a value in the chronological development of phenomenology as a viable means for informing the continuation of the present interdisciplinary research. Methodologically, such a linear approach might prove cumbersome, whilst simultaneously attempting to treat phenomenology as more a body of doctrine and less than the fluid movement it actually is. More significantly, it does raise the risk of attending to phenomenology for its own sake and less for the concerns which reflect System Theory’s own terms. In other words, it raises the spectre of eclecticism. In order to avoid this charge, future research would have to set down system theoretical criteria which Heidegger specifically meets – as was done in the case of phenomenology and the Husserlian focus in this work (see Table 6.1). The second question raises the possibility of Heidegger’s existential contribution as a platform for informing existential conclusions derived from the present, and any future, research. This is a fair possibility and should not be discounted, especially given that the present work has largely investigated the epistemological dimension by considering human being qua consciousness. For, although this delimited view of human being was justified early on, in section 2.2, and has served the present work well, it has set aside the equally important consideration of human being qua embodied consciousness. Indeed, Heidegger (and, later, Merleau-Ponty) criticized Husserl for having concentrated too much on the former view and thus ignoring a fundamental – arguably essential – aspect of consciousness: that consciousness is embodied and that the manner in which such embodiment impinges upon epistemological actuality must be included in any epistemological theory, particularly one which promises a route towards ethical/existential inquiry. This is not enough, however, to justify an immediate Heideggerian input to the present investigations (although such input might ultimately be advantageous if it meets system theoretical criteria). For the later writings of both Husserl5 and Sartre6 are attempts to amplify their earlier investigations into consciousness with an embodied and situated understanding of human being. Indeed, the first question concerning Heidegger finds its real force in the one which follows it: for Sartre’s debt to Heidegger is great; indeed, existential phenomenology as a whole would be inconceivable without Heidegger. Furthermore, the call to existential phenomenology’s pioneer is pertinent, for has not the present work, by returning to von Bertalanffy, demonstrated the value of returning to pioneers? On the other hand, does the quantity or quality of Sartre’s Heideggerian inspirations justify a full-fledged return to Heidegger; especially when Sartre’s own originality has been confirmed time and again by phenomenological and existentialist scholars? In particular, what is to be made of the value of a Heideggerian return in the face of

Interdisciplinary partnership  223 learned conclusions – from quite objective commentators with no Sartrean axe to grind – such as the following: From Husserl Sartre gained the insight that consciousness is not a natural object or a thing. And his development of this theme constitutes some of the most rigorous analysis of the nature of consciousness to come out of the phenom­ enological tradition.7 (Stewart and Mickunas, 1990: 73) What the citation indicates is that, if the first question finds its force in the second, it is here also that the Heideggerian meets with some stiff resistance. In the first place, consider the overall methodological approach which has drawn upon epistemology not only to inform but, more significantly, to demonstrate the existential conclusion that ‘we have the wars we deserve’. In phenomenology, the use of epistemology to argue for existential implications8 was first attempted in Husserl’s late work,9 but found its most complete attempt in the early work of Sartre.10 Heidegger eschews this particular methodology. In view of the point made by Stewart and Mickunas above, now consider that, in the present work, an understanding of consciousness has been central to developing the epistemological basis from which existential developments may begin. Again, in phenomenology, it is more Sartre’s work than Heidegger’s that builds upon Husserl’s own late attempts and that features consciousness as a primary factor. Sartre understands consciousness not only in a completely original manner,11 but moreover systemically: The relation of the [two] regions of being [read: consciousness and phenomena] is an original emergence and is a part of the very structure of these be­ ings.12 (Sartre, 1958: 4) It is Sartre’s understanding of consciousness which gives rise to his sophisticated epistemology, and which subsequently is drawn upon in order to reflect on existential implications. This original, Sartrean, understanding of consciousness reflects that of System Theory to such an extent that a mere sketch of it gives a taste of, and can serve as the basis for, a future, more ample, demonstration of how Sartre’s deliberations converge with the present work. 16.3.2 The case for Sartrean phenomenology as the fundamental interdisciplinary partner to System Theory To begin with, consider that, in a discussion wherein he rejects Cartesian dualism, von Bertalanffy (1968: 220) appears compelled to add a reference to the ‘direct phenomenological experience’ when rejecting the idea of ‘objects outside and ego inside’. Although von Bertalanffy does not elaborate, the only

224  Concluding reflections such directly phenomenological explication is to be found in Sartre13 (both currently and in von Bertalanffy’s day). Moreover, consider how closely von Bertalanffy mirrors Sartre whenever he does discuss the idea of ego. Never, for instance, does von Bertalanffy talk of the ego in Freudian terms, that is, as one part of the psychic structure. Von Bertalanffy (1968: 215) refers to it as ‘self-identity’ established after reflection by consciousness on itself. This is indeed a distinctly Sartrean understanding of ‘ego’, whereby consciousness imposes a formal unity on its past, present and future by reflecting upon itself – the ego does not exist per se, it is a construct of consciousness (Sartre, 1960; Barnes, 1993, 1998).14 Furthermore, for von Bertalanffy (1968: 215), the boundary of the ego ‘is never completely fixed . . . [it] is at once too fluid and too rigid’. Similarly, for Sartre: consciousness is process, not substantial entity . . . exist[ing] only as directed towards something other than itself . . . reach[ing] out towards being . . . Consciousness is not a self, and does not have a self; but as a self-making process, it pursues a self. Or, as Sartre says, it seeks to come to itself. (Barnes, 1993) In addition, to talk of an ‘ego inside’ is, for von Bertalanffy (1968: 221), to reduce consciousness at best to an animal’s limited ambient, its ‘soap bubble’ as he says, or, at worst, to make of consciousness a schizophrenic shell; it is to ignore that the ‘will is not determined, but is determinable’. Similarly, for Sartre, ‘contrary to what the Freudians might argue, the unified psychic cannot take on a life of its own. It cannot by itself turn back on a consciousness as a counterfinality’ (Barnes, 1992). To talk of an ‘ego inside’ is, ultimately, for von Bertalanffy – in the same way that it is for Sartre (1958, 1960) – to make everything excusable and empty consciousness of responsibility. More importantly for the present purposes, however, the rejection of an internal ego is exactly that understanding of consciousness which closely reflects that of System Theory. By drawing upon Sartre’s Transcendence of the Ego and relevant sections in Being and Nothingness, for instance, it can be shown that Sartre’s understanding of consciousness as sheer activity (which, by reflecting upon itself, intends–intuits some formal unity, labelled ego, on its past, present and future; see sections 7.3, 9.1 and 9.2) equates to consciousness inviting and seemingly acquiring the determined characteristics which such an ego attracts – in ex­ actly the same way that, for System Theory, a relational characteristic seemingly acquires the summative and special characteristics of any particular complex from which it emerges (see Chapter 5). Indeed, Sartre’s (1958: 47–70) celebrated analysis of what he terms mauvaise foi, or bad faith, is directed exactly to such apparent acquisition.15 Additionally, for Sartre, the creation–projection of an ego by consciousness

Interdisciplinary partnership  225 upon itself in no way negates the necessary transcendental activity of consciousness to intend objective phenomena – echoing the necessary transcenden­ tal ability of System Theory’s relational characteristics seen in section 5.1. It in no way negates what System Theory highlighted of the relational characteristic: its condemnation to the realm of phenomena (section 5.2). Any epistemological engagement with itself can only be undertaken alongside consciousness’ epistemological engagement with other phenomena. In keeping with System Theory’s ascribed systemic, original emergence of relational characteristics and complexes (section 5.4), Sartrean consciousness’ epistemological engagement with itself is only possible as one moment of a dual, simultaneous emergence whose other moment is constituted by the objective phenomena it intends. In the same way that the constraint of systemicity compounds the problem of identifying the exact dynamics of interrelation which, for any particular relational characteristic, would allow for its emergence from a spectrum of intrinsically different complexes (sections 5.4 and 5.5), the possession, subsistence or modification of an ego cannot be put down to either consciousness itself or the phenomena it intends. The ego is an emergent property of the epistemological systemicity governing consciousness and phenomena and so liable to the systemic dynamics of exactly this systemicity. The fundamentality of, and strict adherence to, intentionality voids consciousness of any substance in the same way that, for System Theory, relational characteristics are void of any summative and special characteristics (section 5.2). Consciousness exists as an intending process or activity which, in its inescapable and pervasive activity of intending, always and already transcends itself. Consciousness is sheer creation–projection of the demand to epistemologically engage – echoed by System Theory’s relational characteristics which are sheer projection of a relational demand (section 5.2) which, by definition, refers to the form of engagement between/within complexes. As such, consciousness is free of any perma­ nent summative and special characteristics, never free from inviting them and seemingly acquiring them, and never free from continually justifying them; in other words, never free from confirming, amending or expanding them – in line with System Theory’s systemic epistemology. Echoing System Theory’s understanding of the realm of complexes (section 5.5), the realm of objective phenomena to which consciousness is condemned provides determinable, alternative phenomena to intend – including consciousness’ constructed ego itself, hence Sartre’s indication that the ego is outside as a range of alternatives without which consciousness qua intending would be impossible. Where consciousness depends upon determinable phenomena for its intending, such determinable phenomena do not and cannot inject it with some substantial characteristics, for consciousness’ activity of intending itself neutralizes any substantial permanence ascribed to consciousness. Similar to relational characteristics, consciousness intends through the availability of some phenomenon other than itself through the transcendental (and condemned) freedom of itself to epistemologically engage with any phenomenon. Everything passes through it and nothing is invisible to it, and yet it is itself invisible

226  Concluding reflections to the world and permeates it completely. Consciousness – like System Theory’s relational characteristics – is an activity, essentially free of any substantive summative and special characteristics, which applies itself to phenomena. This applied nature of consciousness is inevitable, not only for Sartre but for System Theory. Consider first that System Theory has already highlighted the indifference of complexes (phenomena) towards the relational characteristic (consciousness) and contrasted this indifference to the inherent interest of the relational characteristic (consciousness) in complexes (phenomena) (section 5.5). Without such an interest – that is, in the absence of complexes (phenomena) – the relational characteristic (consciousness) evaporates. The relational characteristic (consciousness) is only ever as applied, as projection upon some complex (phenomenon). As Kirkpatrick and Williams (Sartre, 1960: 25) point out, Sartre’s correction to Husserl plunges consciousness into the world of phenomena and condemns it to remain there always–already, echoing System Theory’s having similarly plunged its relational characteristic into the world of complexes (see section 5.5). No doubt there is enough here to justify the suggestion that future research based upon the present work cannot afford to ignore the work of Sartre, especially a reading of such work from an epistemological angle. Still, there are at least two more points which can serve to strengthen the suggestion even further. The first concerns Sartre’s ‘coefficient of adversity’ thesis which was briefly mentioned in section 12.4 as reflecting the essence of the systemic epistemology. An introductory understanding of such a reflection, which simultaneously highlights the systemic nature of the epistemological situation to which consciousness is condemned, can be given as follows. Paraphrasing Sartre’s thesis, the systemic epistemology recognizes that the coefficient of adversity in the available means of dogmatism and bounded rationality cannot be an argument against consciousness’ emancipation from epistemological alienation, for it is by the a priori intending–intuiting of consciousness that this coefficient of adversity arises; and, although the means of dogmatism and bounded rationality can from the start limit consciousness’ emancipation from epistemological alienation, it is consciousness’ freedom itself – that is, the freedom to choose between dogmatism and bounded rationality – which first constitutes the framework, the technique, and the end in relation to which means manifest themselves as limits. Decomposing this understanding provides the following explication of the possibility of epistemological initiation and development: 1 The systemic epistemology has highlighted the means through which knowledge arises: dogmatism and bounded rationality. 2 Such means limit the freedom of epistemological manoeuvre of consciousness and its potential to be completely emancipated from them and hence from epistemological alienation (this latter, in fact, is reducible to the rather absurd desire of consciousness wanting to be emancipated from itself).

Interdisciplinary partnership  227 3 Simultaneously, however, it is the engaged, self-responsible free activation of the ontological choice which constitutes the perspective, the approach and the projection of an end; i this self-responsible freedom gives rise to dogmatism or bounded rationality as limits in relation to such constitutions. 4 Thus, the adversity discovered in the available means of dogmatism and bounded rationality is not an argument against epistemological development nor an argument against the emancipation of consciousness. 5 For the self-responsible ontological choice itself governs the degree of adversity accorded to each of the available means at any one time (by governing the degree of regularity and frequency of its own activity), i so lays the path of epistemological development, ii and thus delineates the distance between consciousness qua intending–intuiting and the two abysses of singular intending and singular intuiting into which it risks falling. The above serves as a respectable preliminary attempt to describe in words what is essentially challenging to so describe: systemicity (in the present case, epistemological systemicity). It also serves as an example of how Sartre’s deliberations – in this case, his ‘coefficient of adversity’ thesis – can inform research, such as that of this work, by providing not only methodological pointers (for instance, epistemology as the route towards existential analyses) but also conceptual and logical structures which may be used to coherently describe systemic results. Arguably, in phenomenology, it is Sartre’s, and only Sartre’s, explication of consciousness which comes anywhere near reflecting System Theory’s own understanding of consciousness and its consequent systemic epistemology as developed in the present work. Finally, Cooper (1999: 188–189) provides yet another insight which strengthens Sartre’s position in the present work. Cooper refers to Sartre’s (1993) paradigm of authentic human intercourse as outlined in the latter’s What is Literature? – that is, the relationship between committed writers and their readers. Echoing J.S. Mill, Sartre maintains that the writer writes in an open and honest way, appealing for an informed interchange of views. A mutual freedom can therefore rise between writer and reader. The criticism against this – from structuralists and critical theorists, for instance – is that this authenticity is impossible because of the systematic distortion of communication; a criticism which, incidentally, agrees with Sartre that authenticity requires transparent communication. Subscribing to this view yields the realization that one may be not only the product of distorted communication but also the recipient of such. Thus, Cooper says ‘The person who regards himself as engaged in distorted communication can have no confidence as to what speakers, including himself, are “realizing” and “accomplishing”.’ Cooper concludes:

228  Concluding reflections The ethical implication for a person who so conceives the character of communication is that he should work towards the construction of what Habermas calls ‘ideal speech situations’: conditions under which men can speak with one another without distortion, intervention and hidden agendas; conditions, that is, under which a person can view the language he speaks and hears as one through which he can really exercise the capacities of existential freedom. It is just this towards which Sartre envisages the ‘serious’ author to be working.16 There is evidence, then, that interdisciplinary studies between System Theory – in particular the Habermasian tendency in Critical Systems Thinking – and Sartrean scholarship are possible. In broader terms, a Sartrean input cannot be ignored by System Theory. Of course, it must be accepted that delving into French phenomenology necessarily requires an appreciation that philosophical works take different forms. After all, What is Literature? is a treatise on literature – undeniably philosophical, but still in the literary realm. Cooper hints above, however, that careful study yields valuable input. In the words of Jackson (1982), there indeed appears to be a ‘mass of relevant theory’ awaiting analysis. The identification of the systemic epistemology particular to System Theory is only one step in an enterprise which has yet to complete its existential position, that is to say, which has yet to complete the practice of systemic practice. With such strong Sartrean influences at hand, does this signal that ultimately System Theory is reducible to the philosophy of Jean-Paul Sartre? The implied premise is somewhat hasty and does not do full justice to System Theory itself. For this work has furnished System Theory with a systemic epistemology whose unique, well-defined, and sophisticated structure and content Sartre may have hinted at but did not elaborate. In short, System Theory is well prepared to draw upon interdisciplinary excursions into phenomenology without losing sight of its (now reinforced) ability to continue to develop its own philosophical and methodological position. The methodology and practice of the holistic approach thus rest on a stable epistemological foundation from which they may continue to develop.

16.4 Conclusion The systemic epistemology of a holistic approach, acting as the foundation for methodological guidelines for, and the practice of, this approach, has confirmed that such practice cannot ignore Sartre’s conclusion that ‘we have the wars we deserve’. Condemned to the prison of dogmatism and bounded rationality, consciousness possesses the key of critique which inhibits its determinable setting from becoming its determined end. It is exactly such possession which renders consciousness responsible for the products of its dogmatism and bounded rationality. The practice of the holistic approach is the practice, and management, of dogmatism and bounded rationality

Interdisciplinary partnership  229 founded upon the recognition that we have the wars we deserve. Equally, we have the wars we deserve because we are holistic thinkers condemned to critically engage with, and within, only dogmatism and bounded rationality.

Notes 1 The distinction between systemic and system theoretical was discussed in section 2.3. 2 Note that the interdisciplinary embrace of phenomenology in the investigations has been based upon its meeting the ten criteria required of any potential interdisciplinary partner to System Theory (see Table 6.1). 3 This is evident, for instance, in the manner in which Jean-Paul Sartre has intervened in crucial stages of the present work (see Chapters 1, 2, 6, 7, 9, 11, 12 and 13). 4 Stewart and Mickunas (1990: 69–75) offer an appreciation of the extent of Sartre’s debt to Heidegger. Aspects borrowed from Heidegger include: the temporalization of consciousness, its openness to the world, to its future and to its past, and its transcendental nature – that is, its continually being outside and ahead of itself; the notion of human situatedness; the ideas of authenticity and inauthenticity (analysed by Sartre as good and bad faith, respectively) and the partial inevitability of the latter. 5 For instance, his (1970b) The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology. 6 For instance, his (1985) Critique de la Raison Dialectique – précédé de Questions de Méthode. Tome I – Théorie des Ensembles Pratiques. 7 Italics added. 8 The term existential implications refers not only to mere descriptions of human situatedness but also to ethical and, further, political analysis, theory and description. 9 See, for instance, Husserl’s (1970b) Crisis. 10 See, for instance, Sartre’s (1960) Transcendence of the Ego, whose analysis of consciousness concludes with the following indication: ‘No more is needed in the way of a philosophical foundation for an ethics and a politics which are absolutely positive.’ Following this, Sartre’s (1958) Being and Nothingness is his attempt to demonstrate how an epistemological theory based upon his initial (1960) analysis serves as the basis for analysing and describing the human, or existential, situation. 11 Cooper (1999: 198–201) plausibly argues that Sartre, in contrast to Heidegger, does not surrender the understanding of consciousness to his predecessors. Cooper notes that Sartre drew upon Husserl and Descartes in order to produce his own original understanding of consciousness. 12 Italics added. 13 It could be argued that Heidegger, a few years prior to Sartre, had rendered the ego inside obsolete. However, such an argument rests on the fact that Heidegger chose to ignore consciousness in his (1962) Being and Time, or, as Cooper (1999: 201) notes, ‘Heidegger surrenders the concept of consciousness to the Cartesians and hence tries to provide an account of intelligent, intentional activity without invoking that concept. Sartre, more plausibly perhaps, regards the notion of consciousness as indispensable, and so tries to offer an account of such activity in terms of a concept of consciousness purged of all Cartesian trappings.’ Sartre, in other words, tackles the question of the ego explicitly. 14 In this respect, it is worth noting that Bergson (1911: 1–4) opens his Creative

230  Concluding reflections Evolution with a similar argument. Bergson assisted earlier in the understanding between perception and intention (see Chapter 7). 15 Which serves to highlight that Sartre’s most celebrated existential analysis is an equally forceful epistemological thesis. Further support for this conclusion is provided by Sartre himself. On the one hand, he employs his most famous paradox to the existential dimension: ‘We have to deal with human reality as a being which is what it is not and which is not what it is’ (1958: 58). Yet Sartre ultimately employs the paradox in order to describe knowledge: ‘The very meaning of knowledge is what it is not and is not what it is; for in order to know being such as it is, it would be necessary to be that being’ (1958: 218). It is unfortunate that a complete epistemological analysis and appreciation of Sartre’s oeuvre remains beyond the grasp (or perhaps interests) of contemporary philosophers. 16 Italics added.

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Index

Note: page references in bold refer to tables or figures; notes are indexed only where subjects will not be found through reference from the main text. abstract systems 29 Ackoff, R. 10, 147 activity 64–5, 78–9, 121–2, 175 Adams, J.L. 161 alienation 176, 183–93 anticipation 91–3, 103 appearances 87–90; dynamics of perception of 93–4, 102–9; identity and 110–11, 116–17; intentionality and 94; layers and aspects of sides 104–5; of communication 87–8 Audi, R. 140 being 18–19 Being and Nothingness (Sartre) 82, 178n Bennet, P.G. 182–3 Bergson, H. 16, 34, 97–8, 105, 161 Bertalanffy, L. von 9, 28–9, 35, 172–3; continuity and repetition 137–8; emergent property, as understood through 109–10; humanity as participatory 65; instantaneity 49–50, 74, 151–2; principles, doctrine of 68– 9, 70–4, 79; relational characteristics 53–9; Sartre’s phenomenology as interdisciplinary partner 223–8; see also General System Theory (von Bertalanffy) biological constitution 94 Blackwell Handbook of Organizational Learning and Knowledge Management 204–6

blame dynamics 5–6 Bohr’s Complementary 17 boundary judgements 165–6; critical presentation of theory of 166–70; epistemological conclusions 170–1; reflecting intending–intuiting 170–1; systemic epistemology and 201–2; see also dogmatism and bounded rationality bounded rationality see dogmatism and bounded rationality Brentano, Franz 10 bricolage 90 ‘C. West Churchman – 75 years’ (Ulrich) 166–7 Cambridge Companion to Husserl (Smith and Smith) 127 CATWOE 30, 200 centres of substance 89–90 change/growth 145–6, 208, 220–1 Checkland, P. 10, 29–30, 75, 147, 181–5; emergent property 33–6, 44, 47 Churchman, C.W. 4, 165 co-intention 103 ‘coefficient of adversity thesis’, 176, 226–7 communication 87–8, 188–9, 193, 199, 227 complexes relating to emergent property 42–4, 53–5; as dependent on relational characteristics 57–8; relational characteristics as dependent 55–7, 61–2; systemic governance 58–63 Comte, A. 49 conditions 175 consciousness 32; anticipatory element 91–3; centring of 89–90; as

Index  243 contingent upon continuality 74–6, 79, 137; intentionality 78, 110–11, 121–2; theories of, interdisciplinary partners 220–1, 224–8; knowledge and 209; phenomenology and 76–80; relational characteristics and 63–6; repetition 138–9; studies on 21–2; see also consciousness’ engagement with phenomena; perception consciousness’ engagement with phenomena 19, 76–80; activity and 64–5, 78–9, 121–2; alienation, epistemological 176, 185–93; choice as ontological 190–3, 226–7; choice between intuitions 155–60; choice, self-justified 156–7; choice, self-responsible/free 157–60, 176, 187–8; continuality 74–6, 79, 137–8; creation–projection 64–6, 72–4, 224–5, ‘critical moment’ and 185–7; determinate structure 137–8; emergent property and 43–4, 47–9, 50, 217–18; as imperfect (constrained/limited) 184–8; knowledge and 19, 74, 197–8, 209; methodological objective 197–8, 199–201; objective phenomena 96, 121–2, 125–9; open system 146; Soft Systems Methodology (SSM) 10, 29–30; summing-up of processes 195–7; through Sartrean dialectic 154–5; see also consciousness; perception Continental Philosophy: A Very Short Introduction (Critchley) 186 continuity, intuitive mode of 135–7 continuous justification 49–50, 74–80, 151–2, 200 Cooper, D.E. 227–8 creation–projection 64–5, 72–4, 224–5 Creative Evolution (Bergson) 98, 105 Critchley, S. 186 critical awareness 31 Critical Heuristics of Social Planning (Ulrich) 75, 165 Critical Systems Thinking 30–1, 33, 165–77; critical practice 170, 190–3, 195–8; epistemological alienation 187, 190–3; see also System Theory critique 165–77; instrumental and practical 170; as ontological 192; understanding of, required of System Theory 162 Critique de la Raison Dialectique (Sartre) 194n

Crossan, M. 209 cube example 102–6; intersubjectivity 106–9; layers of perception – aspects 105; layers of perception – sides 104; perception of a cube 107; preliminary observations 103 Dando, M.R. 182–3 Darwinism 17 ‘Dealing with coercion: critical systems heuristics and beyond’ (Midgley) 167–8 Descartes, René 17, 21–2, 87 determinate structure pertaining to intuition 135–47, 161, 196–8 determinism 16–18 development 140, 145–6, 197, 206–7 Directed Readings (Flood and Jackson) 187 distorted communication 188–9, 193, 199, 227 dogmatism and bounded rationality 144–6, 150–62; consciousness’ choosing 155–60, 190–3, 197–8, 226–7; deduction/induction and 161; epistemological alienation and 190–3; freedom and 196–7; as instrumental critique 170; methodological objectives 197–8; organizations and 208–9; rendered contributing by consciousness 161–2; systemicity applied to 152–4; viewed through Sartrean dialectic 153–5, 226–7; see also boundary judgements dualism 15, 25n dynamics: between complexes and characteristics 59–60; between system structure and principles 71; blame dynamics 5–6; continuity, intuitive mode of 135–7; justificatory 49–50, 74–80, 151; of perception of appearances 102–6; Sartrean dialectic 153–5 Easterby-Smith, M. 204 eidetic inclination of intentionality 122–5 Einstein, Albert 17 elements relating to emergent property 42–4, 50 Elkjaer, B. 205 emancipation, human 30–1, 185–6 embodiment 121 emergence 60 emergent property 69; Bertalanffyan

244  Index understanding of 41–8, 109–10; consciousness’ engagement with 43–4, 47–9, 50, 217–18; elements and complexes 42–4, 50; function and 117, 118; as isomorphically structured 72–3; phenomenological identity and 111–16; relational and referential understanding of 46–7, 110–11; System Theory and 33–6, 41–8, 107–10, 217–19; twelve aspects of 48; as unforeseen consequence 44–5; wholes 34–5, 218; see also relational characteristics empirically contingent constraints upon consciousness 188 Enlightenment values 89 entropy 144–5, 150–1 epistemology: actualization of intentionality 141–4; alienation 176, 183–93; von Bertalanffy’s doctrine of principles 73–4, 75; contemporary interest in knowledge 20–1; continuity and repetition 135–47; definition of 18–19; emergent property and 46–7; ethical appreciation of 82; Organizational Learning (OL) and 206–7, 211–12; phenomenology as focus of 78, 81; possibility and temporal maintenance 143–4; reductionist science and 46–7; system theoretical v. systemic 23–4; System Theory and 23–4, 29, 31–6, 82–3, 171–6, 219; see also systemic epistemology equifinality see principles, Bertalanffy’s doctrine of essences of systems and Bertalanffyan principles 72–4 ethics 19, 32–3, 82–3 existentialism 25n, 82, 222–3 Existentialism: A Reconstruction (Cooper) 227–8 expectation 139–40 Experience and Judgment: Investigations in a Genealogy of Logic (Husserl) 94–5 feedback 6–9, 146, 161 filled intentions 103–4 flat thought 17–18 freedom/self-responsibility 157–60, 176; emancipation 30–1, 185–6; sociological 187–8 Freudian psychoanalysis 185–6, 192 Fuenmayor, Ramsés 32

geometrical thought 15–17 General System Theory (von Bertalanffy) 42–4, 68–70, 125, 181–2; aim 70–1; continual justification 74–6; knowledge, relativism and 74; principles and identity of systems 71–4; see also Bertalanffy, L. von; System Theory generalization 69–70 geometric thought 15–17 Geus, A, de 208 governance 58–63; of objective phenomena 123–5 Grene, Marjorie 21–2 growth/change 145–6, 208, 220–1 Habermas, J. 182–9; ideal speech situation 188–9, 192–3, 228 hearing and sound analogy 91–3 Hebel, M. 45 Hegel, G.W.F. 16, 155 Heidegger, M. 19, 222–3 Heisenberg’s Uncertainty Principle 17 hermeneutical phenomenology 81–2 history 17, 97, 138; Marxian perspective 194n; perspectival 18 holistic approach: key points of 11; to epistemological structure 24, 220; to knowledge 12, 116; to problem solving 3–12, 24; see also systemic approach human systems see social sciences; social system Husserl, E. 77–8, 94–5, 102, 121, 124–5, 222; intuition 126–9, 135–7 ideal speech situation 188–9, 192–3, 228 identity 88, 195; emergent property, comparison between 112–15; emergent property and 102–18, 220–1; intention of 106–9, 124–5; self-identity/ego; 224 as synthesizer of appearances 110–11, 116–17 indefiniteness 152 instantaneity, Bertalanffyan 49–50, 74 instrumental critique 170 intentionality 78, 90–1; anticipatory nature of 93–5; classic description 121–2; co-intention 103; development 140; as distinct from perception 90– 5, 108–9; dogmatism and bounded rationality 155–60; eidetic inclination of 122–5; filled intentions 103–4; intending–intuiting 140–1, 150–1,

Index  245 157, 170–2, 210; knowledge and 93, 209–10; objective phenomena and 96, 103; perceiving and, aspects of 95; systemic relationship with perception 97; theory of 90–1 interdisciplinary partnerships 77–80, 112–15, 171–7, 217–28; relating to emergent property 102–9, 111–17, 217–19, 220–1; see also methodology interpretive systemology 32 intersubjectivity 106–9 Introduction to Metaphysics, An (Bergson) 98 Introduction to Phenomenology (Sokolowski) 88, 99n 102–6 Introduction to Positive Philosophy (Comte) 49 Introduction to Systems Philosophy (Laszlo) 89 intuition: as constituted by a determinate structure 135–47; dogmatism and bounded rationality and 144–6, 155–60, 190–3; as epistemological actualizer of intentionality 125–9, 197; intending– intuiting 140–1, 150–1, 157, 170–2, 210; learning and 209–10; modes of, development and repetition 135–41, 197; modes, characterization 142; modes’ mutual exclusiveness 141–4 intuitive conceivability 22 inventory management 4 isomorphy 69, 70, 71–3 isolated systems 16–17 Jackson, M.C. 31, 88–9, 181–93; ‘critical moment,’ 185, 190–1 Journal of Applied Systems Analysis (JASA) 33 justificatory dynamics 49–50, 94, 97–8; consciousness’ creations–projections question 74–6 Kant, E. 186 Kantian practical reason 157 Kawalek, J.P. 211 Klaushofer, A. 154 knowing 209 knowledge 122; change/growth and 208–9; communication and 188–9; consciousness’ engagement with phenomena and 19, 74, 197–8, 209–10; contemporary context 20–1; critique and 168–70; emancipation

and 31; emergent property and 33–6, 116; epistemology, systemic 24, 33–4, 208–9; epistemology and 19–21, 73; holistic approach to 12, 116; investigations into 29; knowable truth 46, 48–9; knowing 209; perception and 93–5, 97–8; reductionist 34, 116; relativism and 74, 138; tacit 206 Knowledge Management (KM) 204–5 language 17, 52n Laszlo, E. 89 learning 209–10; see also Organizational Learning (OL) Levinas, E. 126–7 Lévy, B.-H. 152, 154 linguistics 17, 52n Lockett, M. 183 Lyles, M.A. 204 Marxist perspectives 194n mathematized management theories 16, 18 matter and geometrical thought 16–17 Merleau-Ponty, M. 145 methodology: critical practice 170, 190–3, 195–8; freedom from determinism scenario 196–7; knowledge management 211; systemic epistemology and Soft Systems Methodology 199–201; see also interdisciplinary partnerships Midgley, G. 167–70 Mingers, J. 181–4 Mohanty, J.N. 121 moments of the systemic epistemology 174–5 Natanson, M. 135–43 objective characteristics, social 184–5 objective phenomena 95–6, 121–2, 184– 5; eiditic inclination of intentionality and 122–5; governance 123–5; see also phenomena OL see Organizational Learning (OL) Olson, R.G. 159 ontology 18–19, 185–9, 191, 208 open systems theory 29, 68–9 Operational Learning 205–6 Operational Research/management scientific (OR/MS) 182–3

246  Index Organizational Learning (OL) 204–11; epistemological development in 206–7; intending–intuiting–learning matrix 210; Knowledge Management (KM) 204–5; operationalization 209–11; proposed future research in 211–12; psychology and 205; System Theory and 205–6; systemic epistemology and 204–5, 207–9; see also learning perception: aspects of 95; identity, emergent property and 102–9; intention and distinction between 90–6; intention and systemic relationship between 97; knowledge and 93–5, 97–8; profiles 105; subjective dimension 105; see also consciousness; consciousness’ engagement with phenomena phenomena: consciousness’ aims at essences of 72–4; consciousness’ creation–projection and 64; consciousness’ epistemological engagement with 76–80, 106, 197–8; consciousness’ intentionality 90–1, 94, 121–2; determinism and 198; governance (essence) 124–5; as knowable 46, 48–9; knowledge claims and 197–8; see also objective phenomena phenomenology: appearances 87–90; chronological approach 221–3; eidetal inclinations of 120–9; as epistemological theory 48, 81–2; existential 82, 222–3; hermeneutical 81–2; identity 102–18, 220–1; as interdisciplinary partner to System Theory 76–80, 112–15, 171–7, 191, 220–8; intuition 126–9, 170–1; Organizational Learning and 207; profiles 105–6; Sartrean 223–8 physical systems 29; reductionist knowledge and 34 Pietersma, H. 82 possibility and temporal maintenance 143–4 postmodernist thinking 88–90 practical critique 170–1 principles, Bertalanffy’s doctrine of 68– 9, 70–1; aiming to uncover essences of systems 71–4, 79, 125 probability 18 problem-solving, holistic approach 3–12, 24

profiles 105–6 psychology 10, 205 realistic phenomenology 81 reductionism 34, 46–7, 88 relational characteristics: complexes dependent on 57–8; creative– projective consciousness and 63–6; as dependent on complexes 55–7, 61–2; systemic governance 58–63; transcendental ability of 53–5; see also emergent property relativism 74–5, 106, 137–8 Renault, A. 187 repetition: dogmatism 144–5; inductive nature of 139–40; as intuition intending 140–1; intuitive mode of 137–8 representations 122 ‘Rethinking a Systems Approach’ (Checkland) 33–6 Routledge Encyclopedia 78 Sartre, J.-P. 17, 82, 96, 121, 194n; coefficient of adversity thesis 176, 178n, 226–7; dialectic 153–5; existentialism 222–3; interdisciplarity 152–4, 223–8; ‘wars we deserve’ conclusion 10–11, 31, 82, 220–1 Saussure, F. 18 self-responsibility 157–60, 176, 187–8 Senge, P. 205–6 Siècle de Sartre: Enquête Philosophique (Lévy) 152–3 social awareness 31 social sciences: epistemological alienation 185–93; ideal speech situation 188–9, 192–3; Operational Research/management scientific paradigms 182–3; psychoanalysis 185–6, 192; Soft Systems Methodology 181–5 social system 29–30; critical systems thinking and 30–1; human emancipation 30–1, 185–6 sociology see social sciences Soft Systems Methodology (SSM) 10, 29–30, 33, 75, 181–5, 199–201; see also System Theory ‘Soft systems methodology as process:’ (Checkland) 184 Sokolowski, R. 78, 88; cube example 102–6, 123

Index  247 solids 16–17 speech 188–9, 192–3 SSM see Soft Systems Methodology structural determinants within systems theory 72–3 subjectivity 29, 64–5; intersubjectivity 106–9; of perception 105–6 summative and special characteristics 53–62; consciousness and 63–4 ‘sweeping in’, concept 4, 24 synchronic analysis 18 System Theory: categorization of main areas 28–31; criteria required of interdisciplinary partner 77; epistemological alienation and 183–93; epistemological theorizing in 31–3, 82–3, 219; epistemology viewed through 23–4, 33–6; ethical concerns 82–3; itself encompassing epistemological alienation 189–93; Kantian practical reason and 157; as obsolete 9–11; Operational Learning and 205–6; phenomenology and 77–80, 89–90, 111–16, 171–7, 191, 221–8; physical and abstract systems 29; reductionist science and 46–7; structural determinants within 72–3; see also Critical Systems Thinking; General System Theory (von Bertalanffy); systemic epistemology; Soft Systems Methodology systemic epistemology: boundary judgements and 201–2; defined 18, 23–4; epistemological alienation and 189–93; feedback loops 6–10; governance 58–63; moments of 174– 5; Organizational Learning and 204– 6, 207–9; perception and intention 97–8; Sartrean phenomenology and 154–5; Soft Systems Methodology

and 199–201; see also epistemology; holistic approach; System Theory ‘Systems thinking and knowledge management’ (Kawalek) 211 Systems Thinking, Systems Practice (Checkland) 35, 44, 73, 75, 183 ‘Taylor-made selves’ (Klaushofer) 154 Taylore, C. 153–4 temporal maintenance 143 ‘The nature of ‘soft’ systems thinking:’ (Jackson) 184 Theory of Intuition in Husserl’s Phenomenology (Levinas) 126–7 Thomas, A.R. 183 Transcendence of the Ego (Sartre) 121 truth 120, 170; intentional 125–9, 156–7; knowable 46, 48–9; temporal 110 Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy (1998) 21 Ulrich, W. 75, 156–7, 165–7, 182, 188–9 unforeseen consequences 44–5 unidirectional understanding of characteristics 59 Vera, D. 209–11 Vickers, G. 64–5, 181 ‘wars we deserve’ conclusion 10–11, 31, 82, 220–1 Weinberg, G. M. 45–7 Weltanschauung (worldview) 30, 184, 187, 200 What is Literature? (Sartre) 227 wholes 34–5, 177n 218 Yolles, M. 46–7

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