Theravada Studies 9789553118196

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Collected Papers : Asanga Tilakaratne Volume III

Theravada Studies

No part of this book may be reproduced in any form or by any electronic or mechanical means, including information storage and retrieval systems, without permission in writing from the publisher, except by a reviewer, who may quote brief passages in a review Sarasavi Publishers (Pvt) Ltd: [email protected] Collected Papers : Asanga Tilakaratne, Vol III - Theravada Studies First Print 2020 © Asanga Tilakaratne ISBN: 978-955-31-1819-6 Introduction Ruprt M. L. Gethin Editors Raluwe Padmasiri Thera and Ashoka Welitota Book and Cover Design by Bertram G. Liyanage Printed by Sarasavi Publishers (Pvt) Ltd No - 601, Athurugiriya Road, Malabe Published by Sarasavi Publishers (Pvt) Ltd No - 23, Ekanayaka Mawatha, Nugegoda www.sarasavi.lk and Sri Lanka Association of Buddhist Studies

COLLECTED PAPERS : ASANGA TILAKARATNE Volume III

Theravada Studies

Introduction Rupert M. L. Gethin

Editors Raluwe Padmasiri Thera Ashoka Welitota

2020

SRI LANKA ASSOCIATION OF BUDDHIST STUDIES

COLLECTED PAPERS : ASANGA TILAKARATNE Volume I - Buddhist Philosophy Volume II - Buddhist Ethics Volume III - Theravada Studies Volume IV - Buddhism and Modernity Volume V - Inter-Religious Understanding Editorial Board Prof. Raluwe Padmasiri Thera, MA. Prof. Miriswaththe Wimalagnana Thera, MPhil. Wimal Hewamanage, PhD. D. Denzil Senadheera, PhD. Ashoka Welitota, PhD. Bertram G. Liyanage, MA. Sheila Fernando, PhD. Editorial Assistants Thich Nu Khanh Nang Bhikṣuṇi, PhD. Sewwandi Marasinghe, MA. Nuwanthika Ariyadasa, MA.

Contents

Editorial Note ................................................................................. vii Acknowledgements .......................................................................... x Introduction .................................................................................... xi 1. Theravada Buddhism: An Outline of History, Doctrines and Practice................................................................................. 1 2. Three ‘Endangered Species’ in Theravada Buddhist Studies 34 3. Personality Differences of Arahants and the Origins of Theravada; A Study of Two Great Elders of the Theravada Tradition: Mahakassapa and Ananda.................... 55 4. Authentication of the Scripture: A Study in the Theravada Hermeneutics......................................................... 82 5. Hermeneutics in Buddhism: A Historical and Philosophical Approach......................................................... 104 6. Saṅgīti and Sāmaggi: Communal Recitation and the Unity of the Sangha................................................................ 119 7. Buddhist Heritage of Sri Lanka: Two Lasting Contributions to World Buddhism....................................... 136 8. Explaining the Absence of One Single Revered Text in Theravada................................................................................ 152 9. The Buddha and Sangha: A Study of Their Inter-relation in Theravada Tradition........................................................... 162 10. The Mahasi Sayadaw Method of Vipassanā Meditation: An Abbreviated Path to Nirvana or a Misunderstanding? 179 11. ‘Return to lower state’ (hīnāyāvattana) and ‘straying’ (vibbhamana): A Study of the Practice of Leaving Monastic Life in Theravada Tradition................................... 203

12. Donation of Children and Wives and Related Matters in the Theravada Buddhist Ethics.............................................. 218 13. The Theravada Standpoint on Meat Eating.......................... 236 14. Socio-historical Approach to Buddhism, Buddhist Social Theory/Philosophy and Buddhist Social Activism: Towards Clarification of Some Theoretical Issues................ 252 15. Xuan Zang and Fa Hsien on the History and Religion of Sri Lanka ................................................................................. 268 16. Traditional Theravada Meditation and Its Modern-Era Suppression............................................................................. 278 17. Sermon Studies and Buddhism: A Case Study of Sri Lankan Preaching................................................................... 290 18. Merit in Buddhism: Concept and Adaptation in Ritual Buddhism................................................................................ 299 Primary Sources and Abbreviations ............................................ 305 Secondary Sources and Translations............................................ 309 Index of Subjects .......................................................................... 316 Index of Proper Names ................................................................ 328 Asanga Tilakaratne....................................................................... 334 Editorial Board.............................................................................. 336

Editorial Note

Professor Asanga Tilakaratne, who has followed the footprints of such eminent modern interpreters of Buddhism as KN Jayatilleke and David J Kalupahana, has played a prominent role in the field of Buddhist studies in Sri Lanka. The idea about this whole project of compiling the academic papers of Professor Tilakaratne emerged at a casual discussion among a group of us at the occasion of his retirement in 2018 from the university service as the senior chair professor of Pali and Buddhist Studies, University of Colombo. As a tribute to his services to the field of Buddhist Studies, we decided to edit and compile his papers scattered in various journals and books. At first, we presumed that the collection would run into a few volumes only. But to the amazement of us and the author himself it far exceeded our initial calculations, now the whole series running into eight volumes altogether, three in Sinhala and five in English. The five volumes in English are Buddhist Philosophy, Buddhist Ethics, Theravada Studies, Buddhism and Modernity and Inter-Religious Understanding. Turning to the scholarship represented by Professor Tilakaratne, he rightly marks a transition from the traditional to the modern Buddhist studies, exhibiting in the course of his academic career expertise in both aspects. On the one hand, there are the traditional Buddhist studies continuing more than two millennia in this country celebrating the expertise in the Pali textual tradition, which Professor Tilakaratne mastered at Buddhashravaka Dharamapethaya, Anuradhapura. On the other hand, there is the modern Buddhist academic tradition pioneered by such eminent savants as GP Malalasekera and continued by numerous scholars such as Jayatilleke and Kalupahana who interpreted the teaching of the Buddha in the light of western analytical and empirical philosophical thought, which Professor Tilakaratne inherited first at

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University of Peradeniya and subsequently at University of Hawaii. Although Prof. Tilakaratne has his professional academic training in the Buddhist philosophy of language and philosophy of religion his wideranging interests and the needs of the Buddhist academic field in the country have made him venture into many aspects of Buddhist studies as this multi-volume collection would testify. This has indeed made the task of the editors pretty challenging. We sincerely thank, therefore, Professor Tilakaratne for trusting us to handle this task and supporting us all the way through. Our editorial function was mainly confined to three aspects of these collected articles. With the consent of the author, first, we updated some facts where they were necessary. In most cases, following our suggestions, the author himself came up with innovative ideas to revise them with new materials. Secondly, we highlighted instances that we felt needed clarifying which, again the author was kind to comply with us. Lastly, in order to fit the individual papers to a collected whole, we removed some papers particulars unique to specific contexts (excepting book reviews). Since the articles appearing in any particular volume are not written in regular order, we did not see a point in arranging them chronologically. Since overlapping of some information is unavoidable in a collection of this nature, we have only managed to remove some such repetitions with the least possible damage to the order and the content. We must, nevertheless, confess that we opted to leave some such recurrences untouched due to the structure of the given article. At the beginning of each article, we have mentioned the original publication in a footnote, which refers only to the first version of the corresponding article. Almost all papers in these collections are revised versions of these originals. Where there is not any remark about the first publication, the paper is either a fresh one written especially for the collection or a revision of an earlier article with a good amount of new materials. A marginal note is due here on the usage of diacritical marks and the citation style. Some of the Buddhist terms such as nirvana, karma, samsara are familiar to all English readers and hence we have treated them as ordinary English words. When it comes to proper nouns, particularly personal names, the author’s preference was to leave well-known names like Ananda, Sariputta, Mahakassapa without diacritical marks, expecting that the reader would find no difficulty of pronouncing them. If the given name sounds unfamiliar to the English tongue, we have inserted the diacritics (e.g. Vaṭṭagāminī, Koṇḍañña). For the secondary sources, we followed the Chicago style in citing references. For the primary

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sources, we have developed a consistent method catering to the actual editorial requirements. Moreover, we have to concede that we ignored spelling variations, British or American, insofar as they did not interfere with the comprehension of the content. Whenever spelling variation of a word appears critical to its meaning, we have rightly corrected it. In the course of this work, we have incurred many intellectual and emotional debts paying back for which our words will never be adequate. In addition to those kind-hearted individuals mentioned in the acknowledgement note of each volume, we must acknowledge sincerely and gratefully some individuals for their guidance, support, and assistance to the overall project. Of course, first comes Professor Asanga Tillakaratne, who entrusted this task on us without any hesitation. We are grateful to all editors and publishers of all original articles. We, nevertheless, regret our inability to take permission from individual editors and publishers. Since each volume represents a specific area of Buddhist studies, we invited five scholars to write introductory essays for the five volumes. We sincerely thank those distinguished scholars, Damien Keown, Rupert Gethin, Anne Blackburn, Abraham Velez and Ven. Soorakkulame Pemaratana, for their valuable contribution to the project. Our sincere thanks are due to Mr HD Premasiri, Chairman of Sarasavi Bookshop [Pvt] Ltd, Mr Chandu Haputhanthri, its Managing Director, and Mr Sripali Perera, its Publishing Manager, who undertook the substantial task of producing and publishing this series of volumes. In this context, we cannot fail to mention the Most Venerable Bellanwila Dhammaratana Mahāthera, the chief incumbent of Bellanwila Rajamaha Viharaya from whose magnanimity this project has gained much. A bulk of the editorial work was done at Postgraduate Institute of Pali and Buddhist Studies, University of Kelaniya. We owe a great debt of appreciation to its academic and non-academic members, for their kind cooperation and understanding. Madihe Sugatasiri Thera of the academic staff of University of Colombo deserves our thanks for his initiative to collecting and making copies of the papers to be edited. Finally, in his retirement, we wish Professor Asanga Tilakaratne, who has devoted more than 40 years of his academic carrier for the field of Buddhist studies, longevity, good health and happiness!

Editors  2020

Acknowledgements

Theravada Studies is the 3rd in the series of English medium volumes titled ‘Collected Papers: Asanga Tilakaratne,’ which is an outcome of the efforts of many dedicated people. Professor Asanga Tilakaratne deserves much thanks for permitting us to edit and republish some of his wellargued academic articles produced in different stages at his academic career. These articles address many aspects of Theravada tradition. We invited Professor Rupert M.L. Gethin of the University of Bristol, a distinguished scholar in Theravada Buddhism, to write the introduction to this collection. With a deep sense of gratitude we thank him for willingly accepting our invitation and writing a comprehensive introduction. We appreciate and acknowledge following colleagues and friends of ours for their valuable contribution to accomplish some assumed tasks: Ms Sewwandi Marasinghe, assisting in indexing articles; and Ms Sewwandi Marasinghe, Ms Nuwantika Ariyadasa, Ms Thanuja Dilrukshi for finding and completing some missing and incomplete primary and secondary sources. The Library staff, and Mr Mahesh Seneviratne, Mr Sadis Kumar and all others from the non-academic staff of Postgraduate Institute of Pali and Buddhist Studies, and Ms RWSN Sanari, Ms KLM Hansani, Ms DS Mekhala, trainee computer assistants, assisted us in numerous ways. We sincerely thank all these good-hearted people for their contribution to complete this project smoothly. Moreover, we are thankful to our editorial board for being true partners to this rewarding project. Finally, we wish Professor Tilakaratne good health and longevity to continue with his great academic service for the benefit of the future generations. Raluwe Padmasiri Ashoka Welitota

Introduction Rupert M.L. Gethin Professor of Buddhist Studies, Department of Theology and Religious Studies and Director of the Centre for Buddhist Studies, The University of Bristol. President of Pali Text Society, Oxford.

I first met Asanga Tilakaratne at the ‘Premier Colloque Etienne Lamotte’ in Belgium in 1989 where he presented a paper on ‘The Development of “Sacred Language” in the Buddhist Tradition’, which was subsequently published in the proceedings of the conference. (Although this paper is not reproduced in the present volume it is referenced and summarized in chapter 7.)* Since 1989 our paths have crossed on various occasions both in Sri Lanka and Europe. The present series of volumes of his collected papers is a fitting tribute to a career during which he has made a remarkably wide-ranging contribution to Buddhist studies. The volume of papers introduced here is specifically focused on Theravāda studies, and covers topics ofTheravāda history, its textual tradition, as well as matters related to the Sangha, ethics and meditation. Over the last fifty years, the study of Theravāda Buddhism has shifted away from a sometimes over simplistic identification of Theravāda with the early Buddhism of the Pali Canon towards an appreciation of Theravāda as a multifaceted tradition that over the centuries has found particular expressions in different places. Emerging as a distinct tradition in ancient times on the island of Lanka and in southern India, the Theravāda tradition developed and flourished not only in Lanka but also in the various countries and kingdoms of South East Asia. These different expressions, however, exhibit a certain unity informed by what the late Steven Collins has characterised as ‘the Pali imaginaire’, the discursive world of the imagination and values created and sustained by the Pali textual tradition. The essays in the present volume all reference this Pali imaginaire in one way or another. Significantly, they also suggest that in the modern world of globalized Buddhism, the imaginaire of

* The corresponding paper is published as Chapter 17 in Buddhist Philosophy, Vol.I of this series. Editors

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the Theravāda tradition must develop strategies to accommodate a conception of what Professor Tilakaratne calls ‘combined-yāna’ (miśrayāna) or ‘trans-yanic’ Buddhism.

1. Theravāda History The initial chapter of this volume, ‘Theravada Buddhism: An Outline of History, Doctrines and Practice’, begins with a survey of the canonical and commentarial literature of Theravāda tradition, before providing an outline of the structure and contents of Buddhaghosa’s Visuddhimagga. In his concluding remarks, Professor Tilakaratne considers the relative absence of explicit mention of laity and women from Buddhaghosa’s text, suggesting that nonetheless the path presented is intended to be common to all, irrespective of their gender or religious status. He identifies as specific innovations of Buddhaghosa the presentation of dependent origination (paṭiccasamuppāda) with reference to the three time periods of past, present and future, as well as ‘two conceptual innovations (among many)’: the idea of thought moments (khaṇa) and the concept of ‘own nature’ (svabhāva) to define dhammas. He also emphasizes the manner in which the Visuddhimagga documents a developing and living tradition, which is, moreover one that has subsequently continued to develop. By way of example, he draws attention to the manner in which Buddhaghosa’s notion of the ‘dry-insight worker’ has been the subject of discussion in the context of more recent developments of Buddhist meditation in Burma and Sri Lanka, a topic revisited later in the volume. In chapter 8, Professor Tilakaratne considers the intriguing question of the absence in Theravāda Buddhism of a single defining text or characteristic doctrine. He sees this as a point of contrast with other schools and traditions of Buddhism, such as Madhyamaka and Yogācāra. He suggests that this is to do with the Theravāda tradition’s inclusive understanding of ‘the word of the Buddha’ (buddhavacana). Also concerned with the theme of Theravāda history is chapter 15, ‘Xuan Zang and Fa Hsien on the History and Religion of Sri Lanka’, in which he considers the significance of the accounts of Xuan Zang and Faxian for understanding the history of Buddhism in Sri Lanka in the early fifth and seventh centuries ce.

2. The Theravāda Textual Tradition Four articles focus on aspects of Theravāda’s textual history. Chapter 4, ‘Authentication of the Scripture: A Study in the Theravada

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Hermeneutics,’ examines Theravāda strategies in establishing the authenticity of its textual tradition. Here Professor Tilakaratne begins by considering the four ‘great indicators’ (mahāpadesa) set out in the Mahāparinibbāna-sutta. These appear to assume the earlier existence of bodies of Sutta and Vinaya material. Turning to the commentaries, Professor Tilakaratne points out how they sometimes use the category of khuddaka-nikāya to bring a considerable variety of textual material into the canonical corpus, including the Abhidhamma-piṭaka. But what is clear is that the problem of which texts constitute the Khuddhakanikāya was the subject of some debate. This leads to a consideration of the commentarial discussions (principally in the Atthasālinī) aimed at establishing the authenticity of the Abhidhamma in the face of various challenges. Professor Tilakaratne also points out that the categories of the nine-fold classification of texts provide a way of including a variety of texts. He distinguishes two principal stages of the authentication process: the initial establishment of a basic core set of texts, and the subsequent discussion of whether further texts are to be included and recognized as having similar authority. Significantly, this ends in a situation where the Theravāda commentarial tradition presents what modern scholarship suggests is the latest part of the Theravāda canonical corpus (the Abhidhammapiṭaka) as having the most authority. This creates a tension between the flexibility and openness of the Suttanta teachings and the more rigid and absolutist tendencies of the Abhidhamma, especially as interpreted by the Theravāda commentarial tradition. In ‘Hermeneutics in Buddhism: A Historical and Philosophical Approach’ (chapter 5) Professor Tilakaratne highlights some of the principles used by the Theravāda tradition to interpret its textual tradition. He points out that the practice of interpreting Buddhist textual tradition goes right back to the canonical texts themselves in the form of analytical suttas as well as substantial portions of the Vinaya. A basic principle informing the Theravāda approach to interpretation is, suggests Professor Tilakaratne, the assumption of coherence expressed in the dictum that the Buddha’s teaching has only one taste, the taste of freedom (vimutti-rasa). This led to the application of a fundamental distinction between discourse whose meaning is direct (nīta-attha) and discourse whose meaning is indirect (neya-attha). By way of example Professor Tilakaratne cites the early dispute about the status of the person (pudgala) in the Kathāvatthu; here the Theravāda commentator suggests that the passages the advocate of the person adduced in support of their position all fell into the category of discourse whose meaning is

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indirect. The distinction between discourse whose meaning is direct and discourse whose meaning is indirect is then employed as the basis for the distinction between conventional truth (sammuti-sacca) and ultimate truth (paramattha-sacca). Chapter 7, ‘Buddhist Heritage of Sri Lanka: Two Lasting Contributions to World Buddhism,’ highlights two defining moments in the history of the Theravāda textual tradition: (1) the writing down of the canon in the first-century bce in the context of what is sometimes regarded as the fourth Buddhist council; and (2) the production of the Theravāda commentaries in the fifth century ce in the Pali language in order to establish the definitive way to read, interpret and understand the canonical texts. In this context, Professor Tilakaratne raises the question of the significance of the Pali language. He points out that, while the much-discussed Vinaya passage which stipulates that the Buddha’s teaching can be preserved sakāya niruttiyā probably meant in the disciples’ own dialects, it has been interpreting by the Theravāda commentarial tradition as meaning the Buddha’s own dialect, namely the Māgadha language, which for Buddhaghosa was the language of the canon, Pali. This led to a view of Pali as a sacred language whose precise pronunciation becomes crucial in such ritual contexts as ordination. Finally, in his review of Langer’s Sermon Studies and Buddhism: A Case Study of Sri Lankan Preaching (2013) (chapter 17), Professor Tilakaratne reflects on the tradition of preaching and sermons that begins with the ancient canonical discourses in Pali and ends in contemporary sermons in Sinhala. Here he contributes to the problem of defining just what a ‘sermon’ is with reference to J. L. Austin’s notion of ‘doing things with words’, as well as reflecting on Buddhist ‘preaching’ and the problems of translating and presenting the Sinhala spoken word in the framework of a scholarly study.

3. The Sangha Four chapters (3, 6, 9, 11) bring out various aspects of the Buddhist community. In chapter 3, ‘Personality Differences of Arahants and the Origins of Theravāda: A Study of Two Great Elders of the Theravāda Tradition: Mahākassapa and Ānanda’, Professor Tilakaratne argues that two contrasting personalities of the early textual narratives are reflected in the subsequent formation of the Buddhist community. On the one hand, we have the stern disciplinarian in the form of the austere forestdwelling ascetic Mahākassapa and on the other the more approachable

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and personable attendant of the Buddha in the form of Ānanda, who engages with others’ problems, especially those of the community of nuns. The textual tradition witnesses various tensions between these two. In the subsequent history of the Sangha, these tensions seem to be reflected in the tensions between forest-dwelling (arañña-vāsi) and village-dwelling (gāma-vāsi) monks, between the advocates of the duty of meditation (vipassanā-dhūra) and the advocates of the duty of books (gantha-dhūra), between the pāṃsukūlikas (wearers of rag robes) and dhammakathikas (preachers of the Dhamma). This tension is even reflected in the modern assessment of these ancient debates with Rahula criticising Adikaram’s lamenting of the pāṃsukulikas’ defeat. Nonetheless, Professor Tilakaratne suggests that it is Mahākassapa’s attitude to women and his strict adherence to the principles of Vinaya that in some circles have continued to inform the contemporary Theravāda attitude towards the re-establishment of the order of nuns. In ‘Saṅgīti and Sāmaggi: Communal Recitation and the Unity of the Sangha’ (chapter 6), Professor Tilakaratne seeks to bring out a somewhat overlooked aspect of the textual accounts of communal recitation (saṅgīti): namely, that communal recitations are presented not simply as a way of establishing and agreeing on the textual tradition but rather as a way of reaffirming the unity of the monastic community. Thus, the immediate context for communal recitation appears to be a situation of crisis that threatens the community’s unity. This goes back to the account of the circumstances that provoked the recitation of the Saṅgīti-sutta itself: the schismatic tendencies apparent in the rival Jain community and the imminent death of the Buddha. In chapter 9 (‘The Buddha and Sangha: A Study of their Interrelation in Theravada Tradition’), Professor Tilakaratne begins by considering the significance of the term Sangha in the canonical texts, distinguishing between its usage to refer to the communities of ordained monks and nuns (bhikkhu-saṅgha, bhikkunī-saṅgha), and its usage to refer to the community of realized disciples (sāvaka-saṅgha), which can include those who are not monks or nuns. It is the latter that is the object of refuge. In the rest of the essay Professor Tilakaratne brings out the manner in which the Buddha performed the role of unsurpassed teacher of the community. Chapter 11 (‘“Return to lower state” (hīnāyavattana) and “straying”(vibbhamana): A Study of the Practice of Leaving Monastic

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Life in Theravada Tradition), outlines the accounts of leaving the monastic life found in some of the ancient Theravāda textual sources. Professor Tilakaratne identifies four reasons for returning to the lay life in these accounts: (1) losing heart, (2) the allure of former partners, (3) personal and social reasons, (4) expulsion from the Sangha because of infringement of the Vinaya rules. He points out that the texts make a distinction between the formal abandoning of the training (which leaves open the possibility of reordination) and the moral failure that results in the infringement of the pārājika rules (which does not). Despite a certain pragmatism found in the Milindapañha, the general attitude of the texts to returning to the lay life remains generally negative. While this attitude persists today in Sri Lanka, this is not the case in the Theravāda societies of South East Asia, where temporary ordination is viewed more positively.

4. Theravada Ethics Four chapters (12, 13, 14, 18) deal with ethical issues: two of these with specific issues and two with the more general issue of socially engaged Buddhism.‘Donation of Children and Wives and Related Matters in the Theravada Buddhist Ethics’ confronts the, by modern standards, ethically problematic behaviour of the bodhisatva in giving away his children as recounted in particular in the Vessantara-jātaka. Having reviewed the presentation of the perfection of giving in the commentary to the Cariyāpiṭaka, Professor Tilakaratne turns to the discussion of the issue in the Milindapañha. The very existence of such a discussion indicates that the bodhisatva’s behaviour was also something of an affront to ancient sensibilities. Professor Tilakaratne concludes that the arguments adduced in the Milindapañha as justifications are in the main unconvincing. He argues that the power of the story lies in the manner in which it depicts Vessantara’s emotional conflict in relinquishing what is most dear to him, namely his wife and children. The key is the equivalence of ‘giving’ (dāna) and ‘giving up’ or renunciation. The story is thus ‘an effort by ancient authors to concretize the need for absolute renunciation’. Chapter 13 considers ‘The Theravada Standpoint on Meat Eating’. Against the background of the insistence of vegetarianism in certain strands of Mahāyāna Buddhism, Professor Tilakaratne discusses various relevant Theravāda texts: the Jīvaka-sutta (which allows monks to eat meat that has been offered as alms as long they have not seen or been

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informed, nor suspect that it has been slaughtered specifically for them); the Buddha’s resistance to Devadatta’s attempt to impose vegetarianism on the Sangha (Vin II, 197); the Āmagandha-sutta (Sn 239–252), which interprets ‘the smell of raw meat’ as a metaphor for unethical conduct more generally; a commentarial discussion (MA II, 47–8) of the principles that make meat eating by monks acceptable; and finally the canonical tradition that seems to indicate that the Buddha’s last meal consisted of pork. He points out that these early Buddhist discussions of meat eating concern the issue of meat eating by monks who depend on food given as alms; they thus do not properly consider the broader ethical issues raised by the wider demand for and supply of meat within a society; nonetheless they point towards an optimum situation where no being is deliberately killed for food. In the essay entitled ‘Socio-historical Approach to Buddhism, Buddhist Social Theory/Philosophy and Buddhist Social Activism: Towards clarification of some theoretical issues’ (chapter 14), Professor Tilakaratne begins by considering Weber’s account of Buddhism in The Religion of India as an essentially asocial religion concerned with individual salvation. Various canonical statements, as well as the social dimensions of monastic life and the value attributed to the lay life in the early sources all seem to problematize Weber’s judgment. Tilakaratne then reviews the work of Trevor Ling and David Loy, before briefly considering the emergence of a self-consciously and explicitly ‘socially engaged Buddhism’ in the twentieth century. In the final chapter of the current volume reviews Marasinghe’s monograph analysing the concept of ‘merit’ (puñña) as presented in especially the Pali Canonical sources where Marasinghe distinguishes between an early conception of merit as what is acquired by the individual through the discipline of the path of training and the subsequent development of the notion of ‘congregational merit’, namely, ‘merit acquired by the individual from community or group participation’, such as vandanā and pūjā.

5. Theravada Meditation Two chapters (10 and 16) focus on aspects of the Theravāda tradition’s approach to meditation. Chapter 10 (‘The Mahasi Sayadaw Method of Vipassanā Meditation: An Abbreviated Path to nirvana or a Misunderstanding?’), focuses on the debates between the advocates of Burmese vipassanā meditation and its Sri Lankan monastic critics

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that took place in the middle of the last century. The debate took the form of a learned exchange with both sides referencing passages from the Theravāda commentarial texts. It focused on two issues: the rise and fall of the abdomen as the object of meditation and the suggestion that vipassanā can be developed without the prior development of samatha. With regard to the latter, as Professor Tilakaratne explains, the crux of the debate is the interpretation of what is understood by the commentaries by ‘momentary concentration’ (khaṇika-samādhi); the advocates of Burmese vipassanā argued that it is equivalent to ‘accessconcentration’ (upacāra-samādhi), while its critics suggested that this equivalence was based on a misreading of the texts. Finally, in his review of Crosby’s Traditional Theravāda Meditation and its Modern-Era Suppression (chapter 16), Professor Tilakaratne problematizes the characterization of the ‘old meditation practices’ (boran kammaṭṭhāna) as ‘traditional’ Theravāda meditation practice in light of the lack of evidence for its practice in Burma and Sri Lanka in earlier centuries. He also raises a significant question about the particular conception of the nature of Buddhism that is today held by Buddhists in traditional Theravāda Buddhist countries: to what extent can this simply be imputed to the influence of European colonial scholarship and Buddhist modernism. The eighteen essays in this volume bear witness to a career spent trying to understand and explain the nature of the Theravāda Buddhist tradition. We can all be grateful to Professor Tilakratne for his writings, which provide us with a scholarly perspective on Theravāda Buddhism informed by his own experience of engagement with the tradition.

1. Theravada Buddhism: An Outline of History, Doctrines and Practice*

Introduction The aim of this paper is to give the reader a summary exposition of the Theravada tradition which is one of the three major schools of Buddhism and is traditionally found in South and Southeast Asia. Included within this larger organizational arrangement of the school are the followers comprising male and female monastic members and ordinary (lay) followers, their institutions and their actions. Apart from referring to Theravada Buddhism as an organization or a school, in this paper I use the term ‘theravada’ to refer to four inter-connected phenomena: a set of teachings that constitute the philosophical core of Theravada, a corpus of literature that contain those teachings, a tradition of interpretation, and a form (or forms) of practice based on or even not based on such teachings. In this paper, my specific focus is the Theravada practice, in particular, the practice of inner development as articulated by Buddhaghosa in his monumental work, Visuddhimagga (Vism) (Path of Purification). As background information for this discussion, I will make a brief study of the evolution of Theravada tradition from its early Indian beginnings.

Theravada: a historical perspective The beginning of Buddhism is the enlightenment experience of Siddhartha Gautama who became subsequently known as the ‘Buddha’ upon his enlightenment. It is said that Siddhartha was a prince of a small kingdom in ancient Northern India. Seeing the unpleasant realities of * An initial version of this paper was presented at the conference on ‘First World Encounter Teresian Mysticism and Interreligious Dialogue: Theravada Buddhism and Teresian Mysticism’ at Universidad Dela La Mistica, Avila, Spain, 2017.

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life such as old-age, disease and death Siddhartha left his royal life to become a religious person determined to search for a solution. After a series of trials and errors, Siddhartha discovered the way to make an end to suffering by purifying his mind of all defilements and by freeing his mind of all bondages. Having achieved his own goal, the Buddha spent the rest of his life teaching the path to men and women who wished to terminate their own suffering. What he so taught is known as the Dhamma and those who opted to follow the path taught by him became known by the collective name the Sangha. It is believed that the Buddha passed away at the age of eighty. By the time he passed away, his Dhamma was spread in what is called ‘middle land,’ the northern part of India. About one hundred years after the passing away of the Buddha, there emerged different sects among his monastic followers, and after several centuries of the gradual evolution of these sects there emerged three main traditions, Theravada, Mahayana and Vajrayana. Traditionally Theravada found its home in Sri Lanka and Myanmar, Thailand, Cambodia and Laos whereas Mahayana got established in East Asia, and Vajrayana in Tibet and surrounding hilly areas of the Indian region. Today due to various historical, political and economic factors these Buddhist traditions have gone into many parts of the world beyond their traditional habitats to create what can be called ‘global Buddhism.’ Theravada is the oldest of these traditions resembling the oldest available form of Buddhism. ‘Thera + vāda’ basically means the view or the doctrine of elders. In the Buddhist monastic tradition, a bhikkhu is called ‘thera’ or elder when he completes ten years after his higher admission.1 It is recorded in the Theravada Vinaya literature that a group of five hundred elders gathered after the parinirvāṇa (passing away) of the Buddha to make arrangements for the future and to determine as to what the ‘word of the Buddha’ was to be. The issue of determining the word of the Buddha must have been felt by the early disciples as urgent because, according to the Mahāparinibbāna-sutta (‘Discourse on the last days of the Buddha’), when Ananda, the elder who attended on the Buddha, inquired as to who will be the teacher once the Buddha is no more, the Buddha had answered that the Dhamma (doctrine) he taught and the Vinaya (disciplinary rules) he prescribed will be the teacher in his absence. At this gathering, which is called the first council in the history of Buddhism, they agreed 1 Higher admission –upsampadā- is to admit one as a full member of the monastic community which entails him to abide by a set of mandatory rules (‘theri’ being its female form for bhikkhunīs).

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upon what they considered the word of the Buddha and chanted it together as a mark of expression of their unanimous agreement.2 This event has been described as ‘that which belonged to theras’ - theriya but not thera-vāda yet. Nevertheless, this event can be considered the beginning of what subsequently came to be known as ‘Thera-vāda’ or the view of elders as a tradition of interpretation of what the Buddha taught and even later, what came to be known as a school of Buddhism. There is substantial debate among scholars as to when Theravada, as a school of Buddhism, really came to be known as Theravada.3 The term occurs in the Ariyapariyesaṇa-sutta in the Majjhima-nikāya and in few other places apparently in a sense nothing specifically Buddhist. The subsequent use of the term in the Pali commentaries and the Pali literature in Sri Lanka, as has been shown by scholars such as Rupert Gethin, is mostly to refer to the views of the theras, and only occasionally to denote a school or a tradition of Buddhism. According to these scholars, the use of ‘Theravada’ as a school of Buddhism is of more recent origin. Significant though this discussion for a better understanding of Theravada in its larger Buddhist historical context, for the purpose of the present discussion we may not need to go deep into it. Nevertheless, in the presence of Rupert Gethin’s challenge as to whether or not Buddhaghosa a Theravadin a word of clarification is called for at the very beginning. As Gethin has argued it is problematic to assume that Buddhaghosa identified himself as a Theravadin for the simple reason that ‘theravada’ had not yet been established as a name of a particular group of the Sangha. While this can well be true, the important question in the context of the present discussion is whether or not Buddhaghosa identified himself with the ideas he espoused in the Visuddhimagga and in the commentaries he subsequently ‘translated’ into Magadha dialect 2 Although the Theravada tradition likes us to believe that the Pali Canon as we have it today was chanted at this event scholars know that this is not the case. What must have happened most probably at this council was that the elders agreed upon a set of core discourses and disciplinary rules and traditions which became enlarged and finalized over the next three to four centuries. 3 A noteworthy publication containing the research of this genre is How Theravada is Theravada? Exploring Buddhist Identities edited by Peter Skilling and others (2012). The essay by Todd LeRoy Perreira “Whence Theravada? The Modern Genealogy of an Ancient Term” studies at great length the history of the use of the term Theravada to refer to the Theravada school. Rupert Gethin’s paper “Was Buddhaghosa a Theravadin? Buddhist identity in the Pali Commentaries and Chronicles” minutely analyses evidence found in the Sri Lankan Pali literature questions the appropriateness calling Buddhaghosa a Theravadin.

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(which is known as Pali today). If we say ‘yes’ to this question whether the lineage of the Sangha who accepted and followed this tradition of interpretation was called in whatever name is not a crucial issue. Again, this is not to be insensitive to the multiple values of the historical discussion conducted by the scholars. The continuation of a consistent manner of interpretation of the Dhamma and the Vinaya with which Buddhaghosa and others who accepted his writings identified is what is vital for this discussion. As Gethin has shown, while Buddhaghosa used ‘theravada’ mostly to refer to elders’ views and not to a lineage of the Sangha, in the Vism and in the commentaries he clearly said that he followed the tradition of the ‘Great vihara’ (mahavihara) of Anuradhapura. At the beginning of Vism. Buddhaghosa expresses his allegiance to the Mahavihara tradition of interpretation: (To them) I shall expound the comforting Path Of Purification, pure in expositions, Relying on the teaching of the dwellers In the Great Monastery … (Ñānamoli 1956, 2) Concluding his work Buddhaghosa again extols the virtues of Sanghapala Thera whom he takes as an epitome of virtues embodied in the Dhamma which he elaborated on. … accepting the suggestion Of the venerable Sanghapala, One born into the line of famous elders Dwelling within the Great Monastery, A true Vibhajjavāda, who is wise, And lives in pure simplicity, devoted To discipline’s observance, and to practice Whose mind the virtuous qualities of patience, Mildness, loving kindness and so on, grace… (Ñānamoli 1956, 836-837) Buddhaghosa makes similar expressions throughout his commentaries establishing beyond doubt that he accepted, endorsed and lived this line of understanding/interpreting the Dhamma and the Vinaya by the dwellers of the Great Monastery.4 4 Why Buddhaghosa often referred to the Great Monastery may have something to do with the presence of the other two rival schools, Abhayagiri and Jetavana. (Refer to Cousins (2012) for the views held by Abhayagirikas.) This very same reason could explain why he did not refer as frequently to Theravada: one has to mention specifically one’s own tradition only in the presence other rival traditions. In the absence of any

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Some scholars have a tendency to distinguish between early Buddhism and Theravada, assigning the three piṭakas to the former and commentaries etc. written for the piṭakas to the latter.5 But to maintain such a strict demarcation is a very difficult task mainly for the reason that doing so would presuppose that there is a marked difference between the piṭakas and their Theravada interpretations. Notwithstanding that Theravadins would vehemently deny such a division, the ambiguity inherent in textual interpretation will be unavoidable. Ultimately the criterion will be the internal coherence of the system of religion attributed to the Buddha. Richard Gombrich, a leading interpreter of Theravada, seems to disregard the assumed distinction between Pali ti-piṭaka and Theravada when he titled his well-known work as ‘Theravada Buddhism A social history from ancient Benares to modern Colombo’. Referring to the authenticity of the Pali Piṭaka Buddhist literature Gombrich has to say the following: In the precise form in which we have them, the Pali texts are undoubtedly much later than the Buddha; … they were long preserved only orally and not written down till the first century bce; moreover, their language may have been modified even long after that. On the other hand, I have greatest difficulty in accepting that the main edifice is not the work of one genius. By ‘the main edifice’ I mean the content of the main body of sermons, the four Nikāyas, and of the main body of monastic rules… I find (as Buddhists have always found) that the central part of the Canon (as I have just defined it) presents such originality, intelligence, grandeur and –most relevantlycoherence, that is hard to see it as a composite work (emphasis original). (Gombrich 1988, 20) The Theravada commentarial literature represents how the Mahavihara monastic tradition of ancient Anuradhapura understood the word of the Buddha. We know that Buddhaghosa, with his commentaries for almost the entire Tripiṭaka, was the main commentator of the Mahavihara tradition. His Visuddhimagga is considered to be a commentary for the entire Tripiṭaka. Continuing further in the line of history, the first saṅgāyanā referred to above can be considered the single most important event in the Theravada history. In addition to determining the basic form of its other Sangha lineages in the country, it is understandable that Buddhaghosa and others were mostly silent on this matter. 5 Refer to Tilakaratne (2012, xxi-xxvi) for a discussion on related matters.

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canon,6 the participants established certain very important traditions which determine the shape of Theravada even up to date. One such tradition is the unanimous decision the council reached to keep the disciplinary rules intact, without any change, not adding any new rules or not doing away with any already established rules. Another is the charge against Ananda for promoting the Order of the bhikkhunīs, the female renouncers, by persuading the Buddha to allow them to form a part of the monastic order. The influence of these two historical decisions is still seen in the Theravada tradition. In its entire history, Theravadins have not revised the decision to keep the Vinaya rules unchanged. It is as a result of this attitude they have got their identity as orthodox and traditional. Regarding the second: although the bhikkhunī organization existed in Sri Lanka till the end of the twelfth century and even though it seems to have thrived in the country at the early stage of its introduction, the overall reserved attitude of Theravada toward it is beyond doubt. Even up-to-today this attitude exists in Theravada countries in varying degrees. The Theravada records claim that the first saṅgāyanā was convened to recite the Dhamma and the Vinaya. What we can understand these records to mean is that the basic division of the Dhamma and the Vinaya was established in this gathering although they were far from being complete. The Sangha appears to have been split into groups after the 2nd saṅgāyanā, and till then all of them must have had this basic version of the Dhamma and the Vinaya as their textual basis or scripture. What we have as Theravada ti-piṭaka is this basic literature and what has been subsequently added to it roughly through the next four centuries or so till the texts were committed to writing in Sri Lanka by the beginning of the Christian era (Mhv Geiger, 1950, 237 (33: 102-103)).

Theravada literature: the three baskets (ti-piṭaka) and commentaries The primary literature of Theravada is the three collections, traditionally called ‘three baskets’ (ti-piṭaka), and the commentaries written for these three baskets. The Basket of Discourses, Sutta-piṭaka, contains the discourses delivered by the Buddha to various people on various occasions. The Basket of Discipline, Vinaya-piṭaka, is the explanation of the disciplinary rules prescribed by the Buddha to his male and female 6 The use of the concept ‘canon’ in order to refer to early Theravada Buddhist literature is beset with problems. The Pali term ‘piṭaka’ (basket) clearly has a less restricted sense. In a tradition which takes anything that is well said as the word of its teacher, talking about a canon with a definitive sense sounds a misnomer.

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monastic disciples and the procedures to be followed in their monastic activities. The Basket of Higher Doctrines, Abhidhamma-piṭaka, contains the analysis of the Dhamma in minute and scholarly details. The Basket of Discourses has been organized into five groups called nikāya according to the structural characteristics of the discourses. The Dīgha-nikāya, long discourses, contains 32 long discourses of the Buddha. The Majjhima-nikāya contains a group of 152 middle-length discourses. The Saṃyutta-nikāya, the group of connected discourses, contains 2,904 discourses (Bhikkhu Bodhi’s count) of varying lengths on various topics. The Aṅguttara-nikāya, the gradual discourses, contains 3,872 discourses (Bhikkhu Bodhi’s count) of varying lengths organized in a numerically ascending order from matters containing a single aspect up to matters having eleven aspects. The Khuddaka-nikāya, collection of ‘short discourses,’ in fact is not a collection of short discourses but 15 or 17 books of varying length. All these texts have been published in Roman letters by the Pali Text Society (PTS), United Kingdom.7 7 For the first four Nikāyas, in addition to the older PTS translations, the following more recent translations are available: For the Dīgha-nikāya, Long Discourses of the Buddha, by Maurice Walshe (Boston: Wisdom Publications, 1995; originally published under the title, Thus Have I Heard, 1987); for the Majjhima-nikāya, The Middle Length Discourses of the Buddha, Bhikkhu Ñānamoli and Bhikkhu Bodhi (Boston: Wisdom Publications, 1995; second edition 2001); and for the Saṃyuttanikāya, The Connected Discourses of the Buddha, Bhikkhu Bodhi (Boston: Wisdom Publications, 2000), and for the Aṅguttara-nikāya, The Numerical Discourses of the Buddha, Bhikkhu Bodhi (Boston: Wisdom Publications, 2012). (1) Khuddaka-pāṭha, the text of small passages (English translation: The Minor Readings and the Illustrator of Ultimate Meaning, by Bhikkhu Ñāṇamoli, 1960/1991); (2) Dhammapada, well-known collection of sayings by the Buddha in verse form (The Word of the Doctrine, by K.R. Norman, 1997); (3) Udāna, a collection of joyous utterances by the Buddha (Verses of Uplift in Minor Anthologies, vol. II, 1935/1985); (4) Itivuttaka, a collection 112 short discourses starting as ‘thus it is said’ instead of the usual ‘thus have I heard’ (As It Was Said, by F.L. Woodward, in Minor Anthologies vol. II 1935/1985); (5) Sutta-nipāta, ‘Collection of Discourses,’ contains 71 discourses in mostly verse form (The Group of Discourse by K.R. Norman, 2nd edition 2001); (6) Vimānavatthu,’ Stories of Celestial Mansions,’ 85 stories of people born in the divine world as a result of their meritorious deeds; (Stories of the Mansions, by I.B. Horner and H.S. Gehman, in Minor Anthologies, vol. IV 1974/1993); (7) Peta-vatthu, ‘Stories of Departed Ones’ contains stories of 51 people born in sorrowful existence as a result of their de-meritorious deeds (Stories of the Departed, by I.B. Horner and H.S. Gehman, in Minor Anthologies, vol. IV 1974/1993); (8) Thera-gāthā, ‘Verses of Elders’ contains utterances attributed to 107 monastic elders during the time of the Buddha; (9) Therigāthā, ‘Verses of Female Elders’ contains utterances attributed to 73 nuns who lived during the time of the Buddha (Elders’ Verses in two volumes (for both Thera and Therigāthās), by K.R. Norman 1969 and 1971 with subsequent reprints); (10) Jātaka,

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The Myanmar tradition adds to this collection Peṭakopadesa, ‘Piṭaka-instruction’ (Piṭaka Disclosure, by Ñānamoli Thera 1964/1979) and Netti-pakaraṇa, ‘Treatise on Guide’ (The Guide, Ñānamoli Thera 1962/1977); the two works deal with exegesis of the word of the Buddha, which Sri Lanka tradition includes among the post-canonical works with the status of commentaries. The Basket of Discipline has been organized into five books: Pārājikapāḷi and Pācittiyapāḷi providing detailed analysis of the 220 vinaya rules for monks and 304 rules for nuns; Mahāvaggapāḷi and Cullavaggapāḷi detail behaviours and traditions appropriate for the monastic life and ‘legal’ procedures to be followed in disciplinary matters; and Parivāra-pāḷi containing summaries and classifications of rules and an account of procedural matters related to monastic discipline.8 The Basket of Higher Doctrine contains seven books: Dhammasaṅgaṇi-pakaraṇa is an enumeration of the aspects of the Dhamma contained in the collection of discourses (The Expositor, by Pe Muang, in two volumes, 1920 and 1921/1976); Vibhaṅga-pakaraṇa: Analysis of the Aspects of the Dhamma as in the Dhammasaṅgaṇi (The Book of Analysis, by U. Titthila); Kathāvatthu-pakaraṇa contains the Theravada response to a series of issues disputed among Buddhist groups (Points of Controversy, by S.Z. Aung and C.A.F. Rhys Davids, 1915/1993); Puggala-paññatti-pakaraṇa deals with the explanation of various types of individuals (A Designation of Human Types, by B.C. Law, 1922/1992); Dhātukathā-pakaraṇa, a detailed analysis of aggregates (khandha), sense bases (āyatana) and elements (dhātu) (Discourse on ‘Birth Stories’, contains 547 stories of the Buddha’s past births (Jātaka or Stories of the Buddha’s Former Births, in three volumes by various authors reprinted in 1990); (11) Niddesa, ‘Demonstration,’ contains a commentary on major parts of the Sutta-nipāta (no English translation available); (12) Paṭisambhidā-magga, ‘Path of Comprehensive Understanding,’ is a detailed analysis of the key concepts available in the word of the Buddha (The Path of Discrimination by Ñānamoli Thera, 1982/1991 and the new edition 1997); (13) Apadāna, ‘Life-Stories,’ contains stories of 550 monks and 40 nuns (no English translation available); (14) Buddha-vaṃsa, ‘Tradition of the Buddhas,’ the story of the Buddha and 24 others who preceded him (Chronicles of the Buddhas, by IB Horner, in Minor Anthologies, vol. III 1975); (15) Cariyā-piṭaka, ‘Basket of Conduct,’ contains selected 35 stories from the Jātaka (Basket of Conduct, by I. B. Horner, in Minor Anthologies, vol. III, 1975). 8 The entire Vinaya Piṭaka has been translated into English by I.B. Horner and published by PTS as The Book of Discipline (in six volumes, reprinted in 19921993). The Vinaya rules for monks and nuns have been collected in the book called Pātimokkha; it has been translated into English by K.R. Norman (PTS 2001).

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Elements, by U. Narada Thera, 1962/1995); Yamaka-pakaraṇa (‘Pairs’) contains an analysis of basic categories of the Dhamma with a view to highlighting their interconnectedness (no English translation available); Paṭṭhāna-pakaraṇa deals with causation and the mutual relationship of matters of the Dhamma (English. tr. of the main section by U. Narada Thera, Conditional Relations, vol. I, 1969/1992; vol, II, 1981/1993). The most important source after the canonical texts is the commentaries written for them. In fact, it is in these commentaries that one finds the real ‘view of elders’ for they contain the manner in which the Theravada tradition understood and interpreted the word of the Buddha. The Visuddhimagga, the most important among the commentaries, was written by Buddhaghosa, the most prolific commentator of the Pali Canon. Although the Visuddhimagga is not a commentary on any particular text in the Canon, it is considered to be a general commentary on the entire three piṭakas. The tradition says that Buddhaghosa was asked by the monks of the Mahavihara to compile an exegesis to the word of the Buddha, so that they could assess his knowledge and perhaps allegiance to the tradition of Theravada. The result was the Visuddhimagga, a voluminous work containing a detailed analysis of the entire Buddhist path. The author Buddhaghosa himself says that it is a commentary for the entire word of the Buddha. The English translation of it is The Path of Purification, by Ñānamoli Thera (Colombo: R. Semage 1956). The majority of the commentaries have been written by Buddhaghosa. For the basket of discourses, Sumaṅgalavilāsinī for the Dīgha-nikāya, Papañcasūdanī for the Majjhima-nikāya, Sāratthappakāsinī for the Saṃyutta-nikāya and Manorathapūranī for the Aṅguttara-nikāya have been compiled by Buddhaghosa. Of the Kuddaka-nikāya works, the following commentaries are attributed to Buddhaghosa: Paramatthajotikā for khuddaka-pāṭha and Suttanipāta, Dhammapadaṭṭhakathā for Dhammapada, Jatakaṭṭhakathā for Jātaka. The commentaries for Udāna, Itivuttaka, Vimānavatthu, Petavatthu, Theragāthā, Therigāthā and Cariyāpiṭaka have been compiled by Dhammapala Thera under the name Paramatthadīpani. The commentary for Niddesa, Saddhammapajjotikā, was written by Upasena Thera, Saddhammapakāsini for Paṭisambhidāmagga by Mahanama Thera, Visuddhajanavilāsini for Apadāna by an unknown author, and Madhuratthavilāsinī for Buddhavaṃsa was written by Buddhadatta Thera. Buddhaghosa wrote commentary for the

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entire, Vinaya-piṭaka under the name of Samantapāsādikā and for Pātimokkha, the collection of Vinaya rules, he wrote Kaṅkhāvitaraṇī. For the entire Abhidhamma-piṭaka Buddhaghosa wrote commentaries, Atthasālini for Dhammasaṅgaṇi, Sammohavinodani for Vibhaṅga and Pañcappakaraṅaṭṭhakathā for the rest of the five works. The commentaries have sub-commentaries (ṭīka) and sub-commentaries have sub-sub-commentaries (anu-ṭīka) for which there are further exegetical literature.

Theravada: as teaching and practice The Buddha has more than once said that both at present and in the past that he taught only suffering and its cessation (S IV, 384; M I 140). This statement has to be understood as underscoring the main thrust of his teaching to which everything he has taught becomes relevant directly or indirectly. The doctrine of dependent co-origination (paṭiccasamuppāda (Pali)/pratītyasamutpāda (Sanskrit) is usually explained with reference to the arising and cessation of suffering. This application is so often seen in the discourses that one tends to think that dependent co-origination is an explanation of suffering. Nevertheless it is crucial to see that the theory itself is not confined to explaining arising or cessation of suffering. It is applicable to any known or unknown phenomenon in the world. In other words, everything that is explained in other religious and philosophical systems with reference to soul (jīva+ātma/individual essence/microcosm) or God (parama-ātma/universal essence/ macrocosm) is explained in the teaching of the Buddha with reference to the idea of dependent co-origination. Its most generic formula is given in the following manner: When this is, this is; (imasmiṃ sati idaṃ hoti) With the arising of this, this arises; (imassuppādā idaṃ uppajjati) In the absence of this, this is not; (imasmiṃ asati idaṃ nahoti) With the cessation of this, this ceases (imassa nirodhā idaṃ nirujjhati) (S II, 70). The Buddha has used this basic universal truth to explain how suffering arises and ceases. Although in that sense it is one of the applications, no doubt, it is the main application of this ‘nature of things’ (dhammaniyāmatā) which exists in the world whether or not there were Buddha’s to reveal it (S II, 25). The ‘Discourse on the Turning of the Wheel of Law’ (Dhammacakka-pavattana-sutta) (S V, 420-424), considered to be the very first

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public sermon of the newly enlightened Buddha, begins with a reference to the middle path, which is nothing other than the fourth noble truth of the four noble truth classification, which avoids two extreme ways of life, indulgence in pleasures and self-mortification adhered to by ascetic religious groups. The middle path mentioned here is the noble eightfold path to be followed by those who wish to realize the goal taught by the Buddha. Subsequently in the teaching of the four noble truths, the essence of the Buddha’s understanding of reality, namely, human predicament and the solution he proposed, has been described. The four noble truths constitute suffering, its origin, its cessation and the path leading to its cessation. According to this teaching, all those who have attachment to five aggregates of personality suffer owing that attachment which is variously characterized as lobha (desire), rāga (attachment), taṇhā (thirst etc). It is by getting rid of this desire that one realizes nirvana or the freedom from suffering. The noble eightfold path which constitutes right view, right concept, right word, right action, right livelihood, right effort, right mindfulness and right concentration has to be practiced in order to realize nirvana. The eightfold path is included within the larger category of ‘three trainings’, namely, morality, concentration and wisdom (sīla, samādhi, paññā). It is this basic insight that has been taught by the Buddha in many different ways to suit people with varying degrees of intellectual and emotional states which should explain why there are seemingly incongruent ways of practice prescribed by the Buddha. The concept of the four noble truths itself is a broad and general classification which requires more precise articulation. For instance, although desire (in its many forms) has been identified as the cause of suffering, it is in fact one among the set of three ‘roots of unwholesomeness’ which are analysed into number of such other categories as kilesa/defilements, āsava/ influxes, saññojana/fetters etc. Desire is the cause of suffering owing to its overarching character, not by being the one and only cause of suffering. The classification of three trainings, referred to above, is larger than the eightfold path. But the latter is the most general statement of the path. Mostly discourses are meant for individual or specific groups of listeners, and hence are with specific points of stress. Nevertheless there are certain discourses which give the complete standard path. A case in point is the Sāmaññaphala-sutta of the Dīgha-nikāya (2) (Long Discourses of the Buddha) which describes the gradual path to be followed by anyone who enters the sāsana (Religious organization established by the Buddha) in order to terminate one’s suffering. The

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path according to the Sāmaññaphala-sutta is the following: (1) One listens to the Dhamma taught by the Buddha; (2) establishes trust in the Buddha; (3) enters the sāsana; (4) observes monastic Vinaya and trains himself in sīla/morality; (5) protects his faculties; (6) knows the limit in his food; (7) trains in mindfulness and awareness; (8) becomes content; (This list is followed by a detailed study of sīla/morality under the categories of minor, medium and great covering the basic physical and verbal moral behavior and matters related to various types of practices unbecoming to one who has left household life and rest of the virtues mentioned under 5 - 8.); (9) enters a secluded place and starts inner training and purifies his mind of the five hindrances (nīvaraṇa); (10) develops four absorptions (jhāna); (11) directs his mind to develop knowledge and vision which enables him to see the relation between his mind and body accurately; (12) develops the ability to create mindmade bodies; (13) develops the ability to practice psychic powers; (14) develops divine ear; (15) develops the knowledge to know the state of others’ minds; (16) develops the knowledge to see one’s own past lives; (17) develops the knowledge to know how other beings fare in the samsara (cycle of repeated birth and death) according to their good and bad actions; (18) develops the knowledge to destroy the corruptions. It is with this last knowledge that one makes an end to one’s suffering completing the path. This detailed path does not mean that all would follow all aspects of it. Whereas all without exception have to abide by morality and related virtues (items 1-8) and the basic training of mind mentioned under - 9, as we will see later in more details, there is lack of consensus in the tradition as to whether or not one should develop absorptions and other advanced practices related to psychic powers (items 10-15). The last three, which are usually described as ‘three knowledges’, are given as the factors that constitute the final phase of the path and hence indispensable. Although there is no doubt about the last without which final liberation is impossible, the tradition is not quite clear about the extent to which one should have mastery on the two immediately preceding knowledges. Although the Sutta does not explicitly refer to three trainings, referred to above, it is clear that the path has been explained following that scheme. The three trainings receive its most elaborate articulation in the Visuddhimagga of Buddhaghosa. Before start studying Buddhaghosa and his monumental work some discussion on the background of the illustrious author and his equally illustrious work is called for. According

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to the Sri Lanka’s traditional sources, Buddhaghosa came to Sri Lanka in the 5th century ce during the reign of King Mahanama (410-432 ce) for the sole purpose of ‘translating’ into Pali the commentaries that were in Sinhala, the language of Sinhala people who created the Sinhala Buddhist culture in the country. Before handing over the important undertaking to the visitor, the head of Great Monastery (Mahavihara) of Anuradhapura, asked him to write a treatise on the following statement of the Buddha found in the Saṃyutta-nikāya (Connected Discourses of the Buddha). When a wise man, established well in virtue, Develops consciousness and understanding, Then as a bhikkhu ardent and sagacious He succeeds in disentangling this tangle (S I, 13; Ñānamoli 1956, 2) It is said that Buddhaghosa wrote Vism elaborating on the three key terms found in the stanza, virtue, concentration and wisdom which are none other than the three trainings mentioned above. On the position occupied by this work Gombrich says the following: Buddhaghosa is Theravada’s great scholastic; his position is even more dominant than that of St. Thomas Aquinas in the Roman Catholic tradition. His first work was the Visuddhimagga (‘The Path to Purity’), a compendium of Theravadin doctrine which has been regarded as authoritative ever since. … Though full of quotations from the canon and other literature, it is an original work, not a mere compilation. … The contents strictly concern the life of a monk. Though evidenced by some anecdotes by way of examples, they are fairly austere and afford few glimpses of devotional sentiment or popular practice. It is above all a handbook for meditators. (Gombrich 1988, 154) According to Kalupahana, … Buddhaghosa’s treatise is no more than an encyclopedic treatment of the path of purification, with a profuse use of the early discourses, and whatever was available in the Sinhalese commentaries, along with a variety of doctrines with which he was familiar before he arrived in Sri Lanka. … It is a gigantic synthesis. If there is any ingenuity in Buddhaghosa, it lies, as noted by Rhys Davids, not in any originality or independent thought on his part but in how he was able to analyze and synthesize the contents of the enormous body of literature with

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which he worked and about which he possessed an awesome knowledge. (Kalupahana 1992, 208-209) What exactly Buddhaghosa did in the commentaries is a matter of debate among the scholars. But there appears to be no doubt about his creative capacity and comprehensive knowledge on the word of the Buddha which he displays in the Vism.

The structure of the Vism The Vism is a well-planned treatise. It has been structured according to the soteriological concept of seven purifications (sattavisuddhi) placed within the larger framework of three trainings. The seven purifications and three trainings are inter-locked. But the latter is broader with not only the path but also the ultimate fruit. The nature of the relation between these two phenomena has to be understood following the statement made by Bhikkhunī Dhammadinna (Bodhi 1995/2001, 398) on how the eightfold path and the three trainings are related to each other. On being questioned on this matter she said that the three trainings are not included by the noble eightfold path, but the latter is included by the former. The same must be applicable with regard to the nature of the relation between the seven purifications and the three trainings. Thus the main structure of the Vism is three trainings within which seven purifications function as the skeleton. The locus classicus of the seven purifications is the Rathavinītasutta (‘relay of seven chariots’) of the Majjhima-nikāya (24) which is a dialogue between the two great elders Punna Mantaniputta and Sariputta. The point of the conversation is that any of the purifications by itself is not self-sufficient, and that each leads to the next, ultimately all together leading to nibbana, the final goal. This dialogue too suggests that the final goal is not included within the seven factors. In calling his work ‘Path of Purification’ Buddhaghosa uses ‘purification’ to refer to nibbana. He defines his choice of words in the following manner: “Herein, purification should be understood as nibbana, which being devoid of all stains, is utterly pure. The ‘Path of Purification’ is the path to that purification; it is the means of approach that is called the ‘path’ (Ñānamoli 1956, 2). Although Buddhaghosa uses the classification of seven visuddhi as his framework, the meaning of it differs from his use of the term in the title of his work. In the former it refers to means whereas in the latter it is the ultimate goal.

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The Vism has altogether 23 chapters, the first two of which deal with morality or virtue (sīla) under purification of virtue (sīla-visuddhi), the next eleven deal with concentration (samādhi) which is purification of mind (citta-visuddhi) and the last ten deal with wisdom (paññā) described under the rest of the five purifications, purification of view (diṭṭhi-visuddhi), purification by overcoming doubt (kaṅkhāvitaraṇavisuddhi), purification by knowledge and vision of what is and what is not path (magga-amagga-ñāṇadassana-visuddhi), purification by knowledge and vision of the path (paṭipadāñāṇa-dassana-visuddhi), and purification by knowledge and vision (ñāṇa-dassana-visuddhi).

Path according to the Vism: virtue (sīla) Buddhaghosa discusses virtue under the following headings: (i) what is virtue? (ii) In what sense is virtue? (iii) What are its characteristics, function, manifestation, and proximate cause? (iv) What are the benefits of virtue? (v) How many kinds of virtue are there? (vi) What is the defiling of it? (vii) What is the cleansing of it? According to the Vism virtue is “the states beginning with volition present in one who abstains from killing living things, etc., or in one who fulfills the practice of the duties.” What is highlighted in the definition is the psychological element of the action although virtue basically refers to disciplining physical or verbal behavior. This emphasis has to be understood with reference to the Buddhist view that volition is the action (“It is volition, Bhikkhus, that I call kamma.” Bodhi 2012, 963; A III, 415). Determining four elements such as characteristic in a particular phenomenon is a unique way of defining developed by Buddhaghosa. According to his analysis, the characteristic of virtue is composing, its function is to stop misconduct, it is manifested in bodily, verbal and mental purity, and its proximate causes are conscience and shame. Buddhaghosa gives the longest answer to the question on the kinds of virtue and describes it under the following nineteen headings with numerically increasing content: (i) Firstly all this virtue is of one kind by reason of its own characteristic of composing. (ii) It is of two kinds: as keeping and avoiding; (iii) Likewise as that of good behavior and that of the beginning of the life of purity;

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(iv) As abstinence and non-abstinence; (v) As dependent and independent; (vi) As temporary and life-long; (vii) As limited and unlimited; (viii) As mundane and supra-mundane; (ix) It is of three kinds: as inferior, medium, and superior; (x) Likewise as giving precedence to self, giving precedence to the world, and giving precedence to the Dhamma; (xi) As adhered to, not adhered to, and tranquillized; (xii) As purified, unpurified, and dubious; (xiii) As that of the trainer, that of the non-trainer, and that of the neither-trainer-nor-non-trainer; (xiv) It is of four kinds: as partaking of diminution, of stagnation, of distinction, and of penetration; (xv) Likewise as that of bhikkhus, of bhikkhunīs, of the not-fullyadmitted, of the laity; (xvi) As natural, customary, necessary, and due to previous causes; (xvii) As virtue of Pātimokkha restraint, of restraint of sense faculties, of purification of livelihood, and that concerning requisites; (xviii) It is of five kinds: as virtue consisting in limited purification, virtue consisting in unlimited purification, virtue consisting in fulfilled purification, virtue consisting in un-adhered-to purification, virtue consisting in tranquillized purification; (xix) Likewise as abandoning, refraining, volition, restraint, and non-transgression. It is of interest to note that the emphasis of this discussion of virtue is monastic life or the life of one who is dedicated for religious life. The five precepts which are meant for the ordinary householders are not mentioned in this account. In this sense Buddhaghosa’s account is strictly for those serious practitioners who are “although desiring purity have no right knowledge of the sure straight way” (Ñānamoli 1956, 2). Budhaghosa naturally begins with virtue since it is the “root of all perfection’s branches” (Ñānamoli 1956, 58). Included in the discussion of the virtue are ascetic practices (dhutaṅga) which are recommended for bhikkhus and bhikkhunīs but

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not made compulsory. They are thirteen in number: (i) the refuse-ragwearer’s practice, (ii) the triple-robe-wearer’s practice, (iii) the almsfood-eater’s practice, (iv) the house-to-house seeker’s practice, (v) the one-sessioner’s practice, (vi) the bowl-food-eater’s practice, (vii) the later-food-refuser’s practice, (viii) the forest-dweller’s practice, (ix) the tree-root-dweller’s practice, (x) the open-air-dweller’s practice, (xi) the charnel-ground-dweller’s practice, (xii) the any-bed-user’s practice, (xiii) the sitter’s practice. Buddhaghosa discusses these practices in detail, and recommends them for monks and nuns as means for perfecting such qualities as fewness of wishes and contentment which ultimately lead to nibbana.

Path according to Vism: concentration (samādhi) Buddhaghosa describes concentration under the following headings: (i) what is concentration? (ii) In what sense is it concentration? (iii) What are its characteristic, function, manifestation, and proximate cause? (iv) How many kinds of concentration are there? (v) What is its defilement? (vi) What is its cleansing? (vii) How should it be developed? (viii) What are the benefits of the development of concentration? The Vism defines concentration as ‘profitable unification of mind’ and further elaborates on it as “centering of consciousness and consciousness-concomitants evenly and rightly on a single object. … So it is the state, in virtue of which consciousness and its concomitants remain evenly and rightly on a single object undistracted and unscattered ….” What is meant is one-pointedness of mind. Its characteristics etc. are as follows: concentration has non-distraction as its characteristic, to eliminate distraction is its function, its manifestation is nonwavering, and its proximate cause is bliss. To the question ‘how many kinds of concentration are there’ the Vism answers with the following classifications: (i) First of all it is of one kind with the characteristic of nondistraction; (ii) It is of two kinds: as access (upacāra) and absorption (appaṇā); (iii) As mundane and supra-mundane; (iv) As with happiness and without happiness; (v) As accompanied by bliss and accompanied by equanimity;

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(vi) It is of three kinds: as inferior, medium and superior; (vii) Likewise as with applied thought and sustained thought, without applied thought, with sustained thought, and without applied thought and sustained thought; (viii) As accompanied by happiness, accompanied by bliss, and accompanied by equanimity; (ix) As limited, exalted and measureless; (x) It is of four kinds: as of difficult progress with sluggish directknowledge, difficult progress and swift direct-knowledge, easy progress and sluggish direct-knowledge, and easy progress and swift direct-knowledge; (xi) As limited concentration with a limited object, limited concentration with a measureless object, measureless concentration with a limited object, and measureless concentration with a measureless object; (xii) Four kinds of concentration according to the factors involved: the first jhāna with five factors (applied thought, sustained thought, happiness, bliss, and concentration), the second jhāna with three factors without the first two, the third jhāna with two factors with fading away of happiness, and the fourth jhāna where the bliss is abandoned and has two factors with concentration and equanimous feeling that accompanies it. (xiii) As concentration partaking of diminution, partaking of stagnation, partaking of distinction and concentration partaking of penetration; (xiv) As of sense-sphere concentration, fine-material-sphere concentration, immaterial-sphere concentration, and unincluded concentration; (xv) As zeal predominant concentration, energy predominant concentration, consciousness predominant concentration, and inquiry predominant concentration; (xvi) It is of five kinds according to the factors of the five jhānas reckoned by the five-fold method. It is at this stage that the practitioner is getting ready for meditation under the guidance of a competent instructor who is a ‘good friend’

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(kalyāna-mitta). The Vism elaborates on the following matters relevant to this stage: The practitioner should sewer any of the ten impediments that he may have; he should find a good friend as his instructor from whom he can receive a meditation subject (kamma-ṭ-ṭhāna); and he should apprehend from among the forty meditation subjects one that suits his temperament. The ten impediments: The following phenomena may affect the practitioner as impediments: (1) the place of living; (2) one’s family; (3) gains or the four requisites one receives as gifts; (4) the class of students with whom one studies the Dhamma; (5) work involved in constructing new buildings; (6) travel; (7) kin or one’s monastic community; (8) illness; (9) books or the responsibilities of memorizing the texts; (10) (mundane) supernormal powers (although not impediments for concentration, any desire for them should be given up by one who is intent on proceeding to insight meditation). The place to practice meditation is of utmost importance. According to the Vism a monastery may have the following eighteen faults in a monastery: largeness, newness, dilapidated-ness, a nearby road, a pond, (edible) leaves, flowers, fruits, famousness, a nearby city, nearby timber trees, nearby arable fields, presence of incompatible persons, a nearby port of entry, nearness to the boarder countries, nearness to the frontier of a kingdom, unsuitability, and lack of good friends. One must avoid a place with any of these faults. On a proper residence for a meditator, Buddhaghosa refers to the Buddha who identified five factors conducive for a practitioner: (1) a lodging is not too far, not too near, and has a path for going and coming; (2) it is little frequented by day with little sound and few voices by night; (3) there is little contact with gadflies, flies, wind, burning (sun) and creeping things; (4) one who lives in that lodging easily obtains robes, alms food, lodging, and the requisite for medicine as cure for the sick; (5) in that there are elder bhikkhus living who are learned, versed in the scriptures, observers of the Dhamma, observers of the Vinaya … capable of revealing what is unrevealed and explaining what is unexplained. Having found a suitable location, still the meditator will have to remove lesser impediments, namely, ‘long head hair, nails, and body hair should be cut; mending and patching of old robes should be done or those that are soiled should be dyed; if there is a stain in the bowl, the bowl should be baked; and the bed, chair etc., should be cleaned up.

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Characteristics of good friend who is the giver of meditation subject: He must have the following qualities: he must be pleasant; he must be dearly revered; he must be a speaker (of good things); he must be able to bear (others’) speech; he must be capable of engaging in deep discussions; and he must not direct (his students) in what is improper. Buddhaghosa does not say how a teacher with such qualities can be located or identified. It is imaginable that the teacher too must have been subject to scrutiny by the prospective student as the student was to be scrutinized by the teacher according to his temperaments (discussed below). If one has a good teacher where one lives it is better. However, if one does not have a good teacher at hand, one must go where such a teacher is available. How a prospective meditator should do this and with what kind of attitude that he should do so has been described by Buddhaghosa in detail: When (a bhikkhu) goes to him (teacher), he should not do so with feet washed and anointed, wearing sandals, with an umbrella, surrounded by pupils, and bringing oil tube, honey, molasses, etc.; he should do so fulfilling the duties of a bhikkhu setting out on a journey, carrying his bowl and robes himself, doing all the duties in each monastery on the way, with few belongings, and living in the greatest effacement. When entering that monastery, he should do so (expecting nothing, and even provided) with a tooth-stick that he had had made allowable on the way (according to the rules). And he should not enter some other room, thinking ‘I shall go to the teacher after resting awhile and after washing and anointing my feet, and so on.’ Why? If there are bhikkhus there who are hostile to the teacher, they might ask him the reason for his coming and speak dispraise of the teacher, saying ‘You are done for if you go to him’; they might make him regret his coming and turn him back. So he should ask for the teacher’s dwelling and go straight there. If the teacher is junior, he should not consent to the teacher’s receiving his bowl and robe, and so on. If the teacher is senior, then he should go and pay homage to him and remain standing. When told ‘Put down the bowl and the robe, friend’ he may put them down. When told ‘Have some water to drink’ he can drink if he wants to. When told ‘You may wash your feet’, he should not do so at once, for if the water has been brought by the teacher himself, it would be improper. But when told ‘ Wash, friend, it was not brought by me, it was brought by others’, then

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he can wash his feet, sitting in a screened place out of sight of the teacher, or in the open to one side of the dwelling. (Ñānamoli 1956, 101) This account goes further showing the meticulous care Buddhaghosa has taken in order to describe the process in minute details so that the important undertaking of a novice seeker of nibbana goes smoothly without any unforeseen calamity at the outset itself. The new practitioner should dedicate himself to the Buddha and to the master at the very beginning, and seek guidance with sincere inclination and sincere resolution. Forty meditation subjects: Under the guidance of one’s instructor one has to choose from the following themes for one’s practice: Ten totalities: (kasina), earth kasiṇa, water, fire, air, blue yellow, red, white, light and limited-space kasiṇa. Ten kinds of foulness: the bloated, the livid, the festering, the cut-up, the gnawed, the scattered, the hacked and scattered, the bleeding, the worm-infested, and a skeleton. Ten recollections: recollection of the Buddha, Dhamma, Sangha, virtue, generosity, deities, mindfulness of death, mindfulness occupied with body, mindfulness of breathing, and recollection of peace. Four divine abiding: loving kindness, compassion, gladness, and equanimity. Four immaterial states: the base consisting of boundless space, the base consisting of boundless consciousness, the base consisting of nothingness, and the base consisting of neither perception nor nonperception. One perception: perception of repulsiveness in food. One defining: defining of the four elements. Of these meditation subjects, one needs to choose what is appropriate for one’s temperament. There are meditation subjects of general nature suitable for all, such as loving kindness and mindfulness of death. In taking a meditation subject upon oneself, the meditator should develop loving kindness starting from his fellow monks in the monastery finally extending it to all living beings (Ñānamoli 1956, 98). Six kinds of temperament: greedy temperament, hating, deluded, faithful, intelligent and speculative temperament. According to Buddhaghosa, people from among whom the prospective meditators come are of six types judged by their temperament (He refers to other teachers who have more types, some fourteen, combining these characteristics. But he rejects such categories on the ground that there will be no end to divisions if these characteristics were to be combined in twos

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and threes etc.). The instructor must be able to discern the temperament of his student so that the most suitable subject of meditation may be assigned to him. One’s temperament may be determined by observing his behavior in sitting, standing, walking and sleeping (posture), how he does things (action), how he eats, how he responds to sense objects (seeing etc.) and by the kinds of states occurring in him frequently (Ñānamoli 1956, 106).

The practice of concentration meditation Having fulfilled all necessary preliminaries as discussed above one should embark on meditation in order to achieve concentration. This particular meditation has to be practiced following any one of the meditation subjects listed above. The Vism contains a vast wealth of material relevant to each subject. Although ultimately concentration meditation is to develop concentration in mind, each meditation subject is a unique way to achieve it. The kasina (totality) meditation has physical objects or qualities which are ethically neutral as aids to develop one-pointedness of mind and leads to higher states of mind which make various psychic powers possible. The meditation on ten stages of physical deterioration is different from kasina and requires a different personality to engage in it. The ten recollection meditation differs from both, and in particular, the first six recollections on the Buddha, the Dhamma, the Sangha etc. help develop a concentration of quite different quality. The recollection of death, mindfulness occupied with the body and the recollection mindfulness in breathing, and the last two, perception of repulsiveness in food and meditation on defining of the four elements, all seem to lead the meditator close to the practice of insight. The recollection on peace and the meditation on the four divine abidings seem to go along with the six recollections. The meditation on four immaterial states is for those who have achieved the four fine material jhānas. According to Buddhaghosa, concentration is of two kinds; access (upacāra) concentration and absorption (appanā) concentration. By the abandonment of the hindrances (nīvaraṇa) mind becomes concentrated at the plane of access; by manifestation of the jhāna factors mind becomes concentrated at the plain of obtainment (which is absorption). While the former is weak the latter is strong. The meditator needs to constantly practice these states and make one’s attainments stable. This meditation results in the states called jhāna, which are usually called ‘fine material jhāna’ (rūpa-jhāna) the first of which has five characteristics, namely,

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applied thought (vitakka), sustained thought (vicāra), happiness (pīti), bliss (sukha), and unification (ekaggatā). At the second jhāna, the first two characteristics become stilled, in the third, happiness fade away and equanimity remains with blissful experience; in the fourth, the pure equanimity with purity of mindfulness remains. By developing concentration the practitioner is able to enter and abide in these states called ‘jhāna’. Advancing from these four jhānas one may proceed to attain the four immaterial (arūpa) jhānas which are more subtle. In addition to the jhānas, by developing concentration, the practitioner becomes capable of generating the five kinds of direct knowledge (abhiññā), namely, knowledge of wielding supernormal powers (such as having been one, he becomes many etc.), knowledge of the divine ear, knowledge of the penetration of minds, knowledge of the recollection of the past lives, and the knowledge of the passing away and reappearance of beings. The last two in this category occur among the ‘three knowledges’ mentioned in the Sāmaññaphala-sutta discussed above. It is interesting to note that Buddhaghosa locates these five kinds of direct knowledge in between concentration and wisdom, at the end of the discussion of concentration and before the discussion on understanding begins. Here, Budhaghosa says that when concentration becomes advanced in these kinds of direct knowledge the understanding may be perfected more easily.

Path according to Vism: understanding (paññā) The discussion on concentration coincides with the purification of mind (citta-visuddhi). The rest of the five purifications are relevant to understanding, and they are dealt with toward the end of the Vism. If the purificatory process is understood as a tree, the first two purifications, virtue and concentration, are its roots, says Buddhaghosa. The rest of the five purifications are the trunk of that tree. Before discussing these purifications, five aggregates (skandha), eighteen elements (dhātu),twelve bases (āyatana), twenty two faculties (indriya), four noble truths (ariyasacca) and dependent co-origination (paṭiccasamuppāda) are described in detail for the reason that they constitute the soil on which the tree of purification stands. The discussion on understanding, as with the two previous aspects of the three trainings, is structured according to the following questions: (i) What is understanding, (ii) In what sense is understanding, (iii) What are its characteristic, function, manifestation, and proximate cause? (iv)

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How many kinds of understanding are there? (v) How is it developed? (vi) What are the benefits of developing understanding? Buddhaghosa defines understanding as ‘insight knowledge associated with skillful (kusala) consciousness.’ It is called understanding because it knows differently from the way the ordinary perception knows; understanding knows its object as impermanent, sorrowful and no-soul. The characteristic of understanding is to penetrate the essence (sabhāva) of the phenomena (Dhamma). Its function is to abolish the darkness of the ignorance. It is manifested as non-delusion, and its proximate cause is concentration. Answering the question ‘how many kinds of understanding are there’ the Vism has the following explanation: It is one as that which penetrates the individual essence. It is two as mundane and supramundane. It is again two as subject to cankers and free from cankers. It is two as defining of mentality and materiality. Two as accompanied by joy and by equanimity. It is two as the planes of seeing and development. It is three kinds as consisting in what is reasoned, consisting in what is learned and consisting in development. It is three as having limited, exalted and measureless objects. It is three as having skill in improvement, detriment and means. It is three as interpreting the internal, interpreting the external and interpreting the both. It is four as the knowledge of the four truths. It is four as the four discriminations (paṭisambhidā), discrimination of meaning, law (Dhamma), etymology and perspicuity. In answering the question ‘how is it developed’, first the Vism discusses in great detail what was mentioned above as the soil where understanding grows and subsequently the five purifications that constitute the trunk of the tree of understanding are discussed. The five aggregates are, materiality, feeling, perception, formations, and consciousness. The twelve bases are: the eye base, visible-data base, ear base, sound base, nose base, odour base, tongue base, flavor base, body base, tangible-data base, mind base and mental-data base. The eighteen elements are, eye element, visible-data element and eye-consciousness element; ear element, sound element and ear consciousness element; nose element, odour element and nose consciousness element; tongue element, flavor element and tongue consciousness element; body element, tangible-data element and body consciousness element; and mind element, mental-data element and mind consciousness element. The twenty two faculties are, eye, ear, nose, tongue, body,

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mind, femininity, masculinity, life, (bodily) pleasure, (bodily) pain, (mental) joy, (mental) grief, equanimity, faith, energy, mindfulness, concentration, understanding, ‘I-shall-come-to-know-the-unknown, final-knowledge, and final-knower. The four noble truths are, suffering, its origin, its cessation and the path leading to its cessation. What is placed last, but clearly not least, is paṭiccasamuppāda or the doctrine of dependent co-origination which is minutely analysed as a whole as well as by individual factors. In his analysis in brief, Budhaghosa describes the twelve factors from the following perspectives: (i) as different ways of teaching, (ii) meaning (iii) character (iv) singlefold and so on (v) as to defining of the factors. Subsequently the factors are analysed in detail. In analyzing how ignorance is a condition for formations, in order to describe in which way the former is a condition for the latter Buddhaghosa discusses the twenty four conditions (that are found in the canonical Abhidhamma).The emphasis of Buddhaghosa is to explain how beings fare in the saṃsāra according to their actions. The function of paṭiccasamuppāda is to continue the process of suffering in triple round, the round of kamma (kamma-vaṭṭa), round of defilements (kilesa-vaṭṭa), and the round of result (vipāka-vaṭṭa). Accordingly the twelve factors that form the chain of causal process are divided into the three time periods, past, present and future which is an innovation of Buddhaghosa. There are five causes of the past: ignorance, formations, craving, clinging, and becoming; There are five effects of the present: consciousness, mentality-materiality, six bases, contact and feeling; there are five causes of the present: ignorance, formations, craving, clinging and becoming; There are five effects of the future: consciousness, mentalitymateriality, six bases, contact and feeling. In this classification birth and decay and death, the last two factors, are included within consciousness. Having described the ‘soil’ on which the tree of purification stands, Buddhaghosa continues to describe the rest of the five purifications which constitute the trunk of the tree. Purification of view (diṭṭhi-visuddhi) is basically to see mentality and materiality correctly. Materiality is to be understood as the four elements and the twenty four derived phenomena, and mentality as eighty nine forms of mind. The same can be viewed from the perspective of eighteen elements, or twelve bases or the five aggregates. Viewed in any manner, the ultimate purpose of this purification is to get rid of the wrong view that there is a being over and above materiality and mentality.

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The purification by overcoming doubt (kaṅkhāvitaraṇa-visuddhi) is to discern the causes and conditions of the mentality and materiality discussed above and remove the doubts about the three divisions of time, past, present and future. In this exercise the meditator begins by getting rid of the wrong views that mentality and materiality are causeless or that there is an overlord (Creator) who is responsible for these phenomena. The meditator sees correctly how these phenomena arise due to causes and conditions. He further understands that causality and conditionality he sees in the present are applicable to the past and the future, and in this manner, removes doubts about the three divisions of time. He further sees that apart from actions and their results there is no any being who performs deeds or enjoys results thereof. The ultimate purpose is to get rid of the wrong view of the existence of an independent being. The vision arisen at this stage is summarized in the following stanzas: There is no kamma in the result Nor does result exist in kamma; Though they are void of one another There is no fruit without the kamma. … For here there is no Brahma God Creator of the round of births Phenomena alone flow on – Cause and component their condition. (Ñānamoli 1956, 700-701) When a man practising insight has become possessed of this knowledge, he has found comfort in the Buddha’s dispensation, he has found a foothold, he is certain of his destiny, he is called a ‘Lesser Stream-enterer’ (703). (The identification of a stage of practice (practitioner) called ‘lesser stream-enterer’ is an innovation of Buddaghosa). Purification by knowledge and vision of what is the path and what is not the path (magga-amagga ñāṇa-dassana-visuddhi): There are three types and levels of full understanding (pariññā), full understanding as the known, full understanding as investigation and full understanding as abandoning. What is discussed in the previous purification is the full understanding as the known (knowing correctly causes and conditions of mentality and materiality). At the level of ‘the purification … what is not the path’ the practitioner investigates materiality and mentality and all related phenomena by way of groups (kalāpa) to see that they are empty of any substance. The phenomena that come under this category

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are: (1) states that occur in the doors (of consciousness) together with the doors and the objects (eye, visible objects, eye-consciousness etc.) (2) five aggregates (3) six doors (4) six objects (5) six kinds of consciousness (6) six kinds of contact (7) six kinds of feeling (8) six kinds of perception (9) six kinds of volition (10) six kinds of craving (11) six kinds of applied thought (12) six kids of sustained thought (13) six elements (14) ten kasinas (15) thirty-two bodily aspects (16) twelve bases (17) eighteen elements (18) twenty two faculties (19) three elements (20) nine kinds of becoming (21) four jhānas (22) four measureless states (23) four (immaterial) attainments (24) twelve members of the dependent origination. These are to be known directly. The knowing here involves knowing the five aggregates as impermanent, sorrowful and no-soul. In order to strengthen this manner of comprehension the practitioner has to view the phenomena in the following forty ways: (1) as impermanent (2) painful (3) disease (4) a boil (5) a dart (6) a calamity (7) an affliction (8) as alien (9) as disintegrating (10) as a plague (11) a disaster (12) a terror (13) a menace (14) a fickle (15) as perishable (16) as unenduring (17) as no protection (18) no shelter (19) no refuge (20) as empty (21) as vain (22) as void (23) as not self (24) as a danger (25) as subject to change (26) as having no core (27) as the root of calamity (28) as murderous (29) as due to be annihilated (30) as subject to cankers (31) as formed (32) as Mara’s bait (33) as subject to birth (34) as subject to ageing (35) as subject to illness (36) as subject to death (37) as subject to sorrow (38) as subject to lamentation (39) as subject to despair (40) as subject to defilement. When the practitioner develops his comprehension of all five aggregates in this manner he develops what is called ‘tender insight (taruṇavipassanā), which, in itself, is not very strong. This insight can get mislead due to ten impediments, namely, (i) illumination (ii) knowledge (iii) rapturous happiness (iv) tranquility (v) bliss (pleasure) (vi) resolution (vii) exertion (viii) assurance (ix) equanimity (x) attachment (to insight). These misleading signs do not arise in persons who lack virtue or in enlightened ones (who have traveled the path). They arise only in those who tread the path. The practitioner should not get mislead by these signs. He needs to view these as “this is not mine; this is not I, this is not my self”. Seeing in this manner he does not waver or vacillate about these signs. It is at this point that he knows with confidence as to what is the path and what is not the path. With this purification of knowledge and vision of what is the path and what

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is not the path the practitioner is confident about the path which is the fourth noble truth. Purification by knowledge and vision of the way (paṭipadāñāṇadassanavisuddhi): The tender insight developed by being confident about the path (as discussed under the previous purification) leads to eight kinds of knowledge, namely (1) Knowledge of contemplation of rise and fall, (2) Knowledge of contemplation of dissolution, (3) Knowledge of appearance as terror, (4) Knowledge of contemplation of danger, (5) Knowledge of contemplation of dispassion, (6) Knowledge of desire for deliverance, (7) Knowledge of contemplation of reflection, and (8) Knowledge of equanimity about formations. Of these, the first five concern how the formations are to be contemplated and comprehended. The rest concern the advanced states that result from the practice of the earlier five. In particular, with the last, the practitioner’s insight reaches culmination and it leads to the emergence of the path. The seven kinds of noble person are spoken of on the basis of this knowledge. They are, (1) the faith devotee, (2) one liberated by faith, (3) the body witness, (4) the both-ways liberated, (5) the Dhamma-devotee, (6) one attained to vision, and (7) one liberated by understanding. Of these seven noble persons, the faith devotee, the Dhamma devotee and one attained to vision are stream winners. The body witness can be in any one of the four paths or fruits whereas the rest is arahants who have attained the highest fruit. By practicing the eight kinds of knowledge, ‘the knowledge in conformity with truth’ arises. Although the eight kinds of knowledge were in the practitioner at the previous stage of purification, as we saw, they were not strong, and liable to be misunderstood. What happens at the present stage of purification of knowledge and vision of the way is that those knowledges become stronger finally leading to the knowledge in conformity with truth which is the door to the deliverance. The actual door to the deliverance born from this knowledge is called ‘change-oflineage knowledge’ which marks the boundary between an ordinary person (‘individualist’ = puthu-j-jana) and a noble person (ariya). Purification by knowledge and vision (ñāṇa-dassanavisuddhi): After the change-of-lineage knowledge the practitioner realizes the four noble paths and the four noble fruits, the path and the fruit of stream entry, the path and the fruit of once-returner, the path and the fruit of non-returner and the path and the fruit of the arahant. The process

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of arising of the path knowledge is described by Buddhaghosa in the following manner: Herein, change-of-lineage knowledge is like the sign with the stick. Path knowledge is like the archer. Path knowledge’s making nibbana its object without pausing after the sign given by change-of-lineage and its piercing and exploding the mass of greed, hate and delusion never pierced and exploded before is like archer’s hitting the target without pausing after the sign. And not only does it cause the piercing of this mass of greed etc., but it also dries up the ocean of suffering of the round in the beginningless round of rebirths. It closes all doors to the state of loss. It provides actual experience of the seven noble treasures. It abandons the eightfold wrong path. It allays all enmity and fear. It leads to the state of the Fully Enlightened One’s breastborn son. And it leads to the acquisition of many hundred other blessings. (Ñānamoli 1956, 788) What is said about the state of stream entry is applicable to the rest of the paths and fruits as well. The four states are characterized by the presence of thirty seven factors of enlightenment (bodhipakkhiyādhammā), namely, the four foundations of mindfulness, the four right endeavours, the four roads to power, the five faculties, the five powers, the seven enlightenment factors, and the noble eightfold path. And the four are characterized by the absence of negative states, namely, the ten fetters (saññojana), ten defilements (kilesa), eight wrongnesses, eight worldly states (vicissitudes of life) (lokadhamma), five types of avarice (macchariya), three perversions (vipallāsa), four ties (gantha), four biased ways (agati), four cankers (āsava), four floods (ogha), bonds (bandhana), five hindrances (nīvaraṇa) and so on. These negative states are removed gradually at the four paths ultimately leaving nothing negative in the fourth noble person. The concept of visuddhi (purification) has its reference to the negative traits mentioned and not mentioned in the above list. Similarly nibbana is called visuddhi because it is purified of all defiling states. Similarly nibbana is called vimutti (liberation/freedom) because it is free from all kinds of ties, bonds and fetters. As benefits of developing understanding, in addition to the removal of various negative states from oneself, Buddhaghosa mentions the experience of the taste of the noble fruit by means of ‘fruition attainment’ (phalasamāpatti)

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and attainment of cessation (nirodhasamāpatti9) or the attainment of cessation of perceptions and feelings. Both these refer to states of being that could be entered into by a noble person and stay in those states during a pre-determined time period.

Concluding remarks The Visuddhimagga, in its true sense, is a path or guide to purity. As Buddhaghosa asserts at the very beginning it is addressed to those who wish to attain purity but hampered by not knowing how. The Vism is a guide to meditators whoever that may be. But Buddhaghosa’s ideal practitioner is a Buddhist monk, bhikkhu, not the household (gihi) followers of the Buddha, nor even bhikkhunīs, the female monastic practitioners. In describing eighteen faults of a monastery (Chapter IV), Buddhaghosa lists a monastery with edible leaves, flowers or fruits as unsuitable for meditation for there will be women who come to gather these things who could distract one’s mind. He also refers to women’s singing which could be distractive (Chapter iii). Nevertheless, he does not discuss how a monastery can be bad for a meditating bhikkhunī! The Vism has nothing absolutely about the practice of lay people. In its extensive study of sīla, there is no mention of the five precepts prescribed for householders. Why Buddhaghosa does not mention women or householders specifically cannot be because he had any disregard for them or dislike against them. It may well be due to the fact that the path taught by the Buddha was common for all irrespective of their gender or religious status. In fact he does refer to bhikkhunīs and householders when he described ascetic practices, and identified several practices not suitable for bhikkhunīs and just a few suitable for householder meditators. Furthermore the fact that Buddhaghosa exclusively aims at meditators should explain why Buddhaghosa does not have anything on such preliminaries as faith (saddhā) that motivates one to become a follower of the Buddha or taking refuge, which marks the beginning of life as a follower of the Buddha. Another example to highlight that Buddhaghosa as the author of the Vism functioned within his sorteriological limits is how he analysed dependent origination. Buddhaghosa presents this fundamental teaching only in so far it relates to the arising and ceasing of suffering. Although the main application of this principle in the teaching of the Buddha is 9  In addition to the Visuddhimagga account in its last chapter for a contemporary discussion see Griffiths (1985).

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soteriological, the principle itself has much broader application. As we mentioned in our discussion of dependent origination in the early part of this discussion, this is the principle with which the Buddha explained everything, not merely how suffering arises and ceases, but also such other phenomena as how sensory perception takes place, how beings are born, how natures such as seasons, seeds, karma, mind, and phenomena function without an interference of an agent in microcosmic or macrocosmic sense, and how social problems such as wars and conflicts arise and continue. In his elaborated discussion on dependent origination Buddhaghosa does not refer even once to the general statement of the principle in abstract form, which we referred to earlier. The reason should be that he was not interested in it as a general principle. The Visuddhimagga is such a monumental work with so much detail, classifications and categories, one may wonder whether all this was taught by the Buddha to his listeners in the 6th century bce India. Although early discourses contain such classifications as aggregates, bases and elements they are not as numerous as what is found in the Vism. When one reads Vism, for instance the discussion on ‘purification by knowledge and vision of the way’, one finds that the classifications and categories are so many that unless one is an erudite scholar one will never be able to attain the goal. This, nevertheless, suggests the type of contribution Buddhaghosa made to the teaching of the Buddha. It is hardly possible that this complex system of interpretation was purely authored by Buddhaghosa alone. Most probably the scholastic tendencies were developing in the Buddhist tradition by this time, and it is Buddhaghosa who gave the definitive expression to this development. Two conceptual innovations (among many), which characterize this development are the idea of thought moments (khaṇa) and the concept of ‘own nature’ (sva-bhāva) with which the dhammas were defined. One striking example for the former is how Buddhaghosa identifies the eight noble persons, in particular, how he identifies one who is in the path and one who has achieved the fruit. According to Buddhaghosa the difference between the two people is only a matter of thought moments (See Visuddhimagga chapter (xxii) on ‘Purification by Knowledge and Vision for further detail.). Then it turns out to be only a ‘logical’ necessity which will never be a tangible lived reality even for the person who has gained it. It is clear that the whole concept of eight noble persons will never be visible in its totality to ordinary people who regard the Sangha as ‘the incomparable field of merit’ for them.

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The concept of ‘sva-bhāva’ has been used by Buddhaghosa in order to define the idea of dhamma (phenomena). It is well known that different early schools developed their own views of dhamma (dhammavāda) to serve as the ‘ultimate building blocks of the universe’. Although Theravadins claimed to be the direct descendants of the earliest followers of the Buddha, and although they in fact were, that did not prevent them from adopting this subtle realism which was severely attacked as cryptoātmavāda (soul-view) by philosophers like Nagarjuna in later years. The unique value of the Vism is that it is a record of a tradition which was living and which continues to live up to date. In addition to the references to a large number of monastic practitioners as holding divergent opinions about the matters of the Dhamma (and the Vinaya in the commentary to the Vinaya-piṭaka) Buddhaghosa refers to meditation masters who had differences of opinion about matters related to practice. In discussing as to what governs the difference in the noble path’s enlightenment factors he refers to three views held by three teachers whom the commentary to Vism identifies by names (Ñānamoli 1956, 778). Another case in point is how the individual practitioners appropriated the path given in its standard from as comprising three gradual factors, virtue, concentration and understanding. Although all practitioners are expected to follow this path without leaving any aspect behind, Buddhaghosa refers to ‘dry insight workers’ (sukkha-vipassaka) or ‘bare insight workers’ (suddha-vipassaka) who apparently skip attaining jhānas. Buddhaghosa refers to three types of practitioners, a bare insight worker, one who possesses a jhāna but who has not made the jhāna the basis for insight, and one who has made the path to arise by comprehending unrelated formations after using the first jhāna as the basis for insight, and assert that all of them have attained the first jhāna. Even though, Buddhaghosa appears to hold that the first jhāna invariably is the basis for all practitioners, his introduction of the category of ‘dry insight worker’ (or ‘bare insight worker’) has caused doubt about the need for jhānas. In commenting on the Susīma-sutta of the Saṃyuttanikāya (S II, 123) Buddhaghosa uses the term ‘nijjhānaka’ (without jhāna or non-jhāna practitioners) to describe those monks who claimed themselves to be liberated by understanding (paññā-vimutta). But, as the Bhikkhu Bodhi too notices, in the particular Sutta there is no question raised about the basic jhānas, But it refers only to Susīma’s misconceived view that understanding is not possible without higher knowledges (abhiññā), and hence the Sutta does not provide a support to the view that understanding is possible without jhānas (Bodhi 2000, 785).

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The most recent example of this genre of practitioners who skipped jhānas in their practice is the well known Burmese meditator monk Mahasi Sayadaw (1904-1982). While this was accepted by the followers of Mahasi Sayadaw, there was opposition to it, particularly in Sri Lanka. In 1966 Kheminda Thera of Vajiraramaya, Bambalapitiya, Colombo, Sri Lanka published an article (“Access concentration and purification of mind”) in a journal named World Buddhism arguing that jhāna is indispensable in the path, defending thereby the indispensability of all the aspects of the threefold training which position widely attributed to Buddhaghosa. One Sayadaw Nyanuttara from Burma published a rejoinder (in two installments) in the same journal defending the view of Mahasi Sayadaw. The debate between the two monks continued for several years before it ended neither party convincing the other. I do not plan to reproduce this debate which I have discussed in detail elsewhere (refer to article no - 10 of this volume). While the encounter between the two Theravada elders was illuminating, for the present discussion it bears an added significance, namely, that Buddhaghosa and his Theravada practice constitute a living Buddhist tradition.

2. Three ‘Endangered Species’ in Theravada Buddhist Studies*

Introduction The theme discussed in this essay does not belong to Theravada studies proper because it does not involve any doctrinal, philosophical or any other aspect in Theravada Buddhism. If at all it may be accommodated among the methodological studies relevant to Buddhist studies in general and Theravada studies in particular. What I would like to do in this paper is to bring to the notice of the Buddhist and Theravada scholars specifically a trend prevalent in Theravada studies, if allowed to go unexamined, will cause invalidation of the subject altogether. The paper, accordingly, is both descriptive and prescriptive.

Theravada Buddhist Studies: The context As Theravada is the oldest and oldest existing Buddhist tradition, it has also a claim to be the oldest Buddhist academic tradition. Although one does not entail the other, in the case of Theravada, however, it so happens that it is both the oldest Buddhist tradition and Buddhist academic tradition as I will explain shortly. We all know that Buddhism as an institution started as a community of people who gathered around the Buddha and opted to follow the path shown by him. However, from what we can gather from the Sutta and the Vinaya we see the gradual evolution of this community to form an organization with people bound by a common philosophical vision and a way of behaviour. The life of such eminent disciples as Sariputta, Upali, Mahakaccana and Ananda, in particular, betray indications that they, in addition * The first version of this article was delivered as keynote speech at the 5th International Conference of the International Association of Theravada Buddhist Universities, 27 November 2018, Sri Lanka.

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to their being religious people with religious goals bearing on their inner purity and inner happiness, represented themselves within the community as ‘learned’ in the Dhamma and the Vinaya, in addition to being elders, guides, teachers, colleagues [co-religionists - sabrahmacāri] etc. The rest of the sangha depended on them for the knowledge of the teaching which was an essential prerequisite of the practice. Surely there must have been organized efforts during the time of the Buddha itself to keep without loss what the Buddha taught. Discourses such as Saṅgīti and Dasuttara (D 33, 34) seem to bear evidence to some of the early efforts by the immediate disciples of the Buddha to keep the Dhamma (and Vinaya) in some organized form. In the Alagaddupama-sutta (M 22) the Buddha finds fault with some bhikkhus who learned the Dhamma for wrong purposes. But it is sufficient evidence to believe that study of the Dhamma existed at this early stage as a separate function among the Sangha. According to my understanding, however, the clear beginning of what we may consider today as the ‘academic’ study of Buddhism is marked by the first council convened three months after the parinirvāna of the Buddha. Up to this point, by and large, the disciples of the Buddha learned the Dhamma only insofar as such knowledge was needed for the practice of the Dhamma for the simple reason that without knowing what the Dhamma is one cannot be expected to practice it. The rationale behind this approach to the Dhamma was well exemplified in the following well known statements of the Dhammapada1 (19-20): Though much he recites the Sacred Texts, but acts not accordingly, that heedless man is like a cowherd who counts others’ kine. He has no share in the fruits of the Holy Life. Though little he recites the Sacred Texts, but acts in accordance with the teaching, forsaking lust, hatred and ignorance, truly knowing, with mind well freed, clinging to naught here and hereafter, he shares the fruits of the Holy Life. Marking a turning point from this practical attitude to the Dhamma, in which learning was understood merely as a means to the soteriological end, was the Buddha’s parinirvāna, leaving none as the successor, and to make matters even worse (in the eyes, most probably, of many disciples 1  Bahumpi ce sahitaṃ bhāsamāno – na takkaro hoti naro pamatto  Gopova gāvo ganayaṃ paresaṃ – na bhāgavā sāmaññassa hoti (Dhp v. 1:19)  Appampi ce sahitaṃ bhāsamāno – dhammassa hoti anudhammacāri  Rāgañ ca dosañ ca pahāya mohaṃ – sammappajāno suvimuttacitto  Anupādiyāno idha vā huraṃ vā – sa bhāgavā sāmaññassa hoti (Dhp v. 1:20)

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who felt ‘refuge-less’ and started missing a personal leader), placing the Dhamma he taught and the Vinaya he prescribed in his place as the future guide (satthā) of the community (D II, 154). This state of affairs necessitated keeping the Dhamma and the Vinaya as a methodical and organized body agreed upon by all stake holders so that the authority of the teaching of the Buddha remained unchallenged. The immediate reason for the first saṅgāyanā, most probably, is this (although tradition highlights a different development as the reason) (Vin II,). As I have highlighted elsewhere (refer to article no 6 in this volume)2 the meaning of the act of ‘chanting together’ or communal recitation (sam+gāyanā) was acceptance with unanimity what is so chanted. Another very important tradition with far-reaching effects initiated at this meeting was to assign what was jointly chanted to specific groups to preserve for the sake of the future generations. Accordingly, the Vinaya was assigned to Upali Thera and his pupils who were already considered to be ‘Vinaya experts’. The four nikāyas (because the Khuddaka was yet to be formed), Dīgha, Majjhima, Saṃyutta and Aṅguttara were assigned in that order to the four Theras and their pupils, Ananda, the pupils of Sariputta (who had predeceased the Buddha) Mahakassapa and Anuruddha (DA, 13-15). Clearly what happened at the first sangāyanā was to establish what may be called an ‘academic’ tradition which has continued up till today. This should not be understood as something totally new in the monastic life which did not exist when the Buddha was still living. There is evidence in the canon to the existence of ‘learning groups’ organized around the chief disciples of the Buddha while the Buddha was still living.3 The interest in the preservation of the word of the Buddha should not come to us as a totally new innovation judging by the fact that some of the chief disciples of the Buddha were coming from 2  Refer to “Sangiti and Samaggi: Communal Recitation and the Unity of the Sangha” in Buddhist Studies Review vol. 17 No.2, 2000. 3  Discourses mention how different groups of bhikkhus, depending on their intellectual and emotional preferences, gathered around different elders among whom were those well versed in the Dhamma and the Vinaya. The Udāna (Ud: 59) and the Vinaya (I 197) mention that Soṇa Kuṭikaṇṇa, a student of Mahakaccana Thera, chanting the Aṭṭhaka-vagga (included the Suttanipāta) before the Buddha. Upali Thera and his pupils are known to have mastered the Vinaya. The Alagaddupama-sutta of the Majjhima-nikāya (22) mentions ‘certain empty persons’ (ekacce moghapurisā) who studied the Dhamma for wrong purposes. Mahakaccana Thera was praised as the highest among those who elaborated in detail what the Buddha said in brief (saṅkhittena bhāsitassa vitthārena atthaṃ vibhajantānaṃ yadidaṃ mahā kaccāno: A I, p.23). The story of Purana Thera (Cullavagga II 289-290) alludes to the existence of the individual ‘experts’ in the Dhamma and the Vinaya.

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Brahmin families who, we may imagine, were very familiar with the Brahminic tradition of Vedic studies. So what may have happened at the first sangāyanā was to officially establish as a tradition what was already there among the key disciples of the Buddha. From this point onward, it is reasonable to imagine that the bhikkhus and the bhikkhunis4 had the additional responsibility of learning the word of the Buddha for the sake of its preservation, which is to go beyond the needs of their immediate soteriological task, falling, nevertheless, very much within the scope of practice of compassion for others who were desirous of following the path. What I mean by ‘academic study’ in this context is this need to study the Dhamma and the Vinaya for an extra-soteriological reason. How the practice started in this manner gradually evolved to become a full-fledged academic tradition represented by the term ‘gantha-dhura’, the yoke of books, is a well-known story which I need not detail here.5 A peak occasion of this development is reported in the Buddhist history of Sri Lanka: the Mahāvamsa records that the word of the Buddha was committed to writing in books (potthakesu likhāpayuṁ) during the reign of Vaṭṭagamini Abhaya (29-17 bce). Although some modern scholars are reluctant to accept this as historical, citing that it is only literary evidence recording an event that took place five centuries back, what makes this record reliable is the context in which a good number of monks who remembered the texts died due to the long famine and the fact that for the first time the Mahavihara fraternity lost the royal support. The commentaries further report that one text, Niddesa, was remembered by only one monk whose moral integrity was questionable, making it hard for good monks to go to him and learn the text from him. It is quite logical that the monks decided at this crucial point to copy down the texts they maintained till that point by memory. The commentaries refer to a very important shift of emphasis in the Buddhist monastic life and attitudes that came along with this development, namely, the victory of the ‘preachers of the Dhamma’, (dhamma-kathika), who represented 4 Although nothing much is said in the Theravada literature about the ‘academic’ aspect of bhikkhunis, the discourses are not without reference to learned bhikkhunis during the time of the Buddha. The Cullavedalla-sutta of the M (44) refers to bhikkhuni Dhammadinna who explained deep Dhammma matters to her former husband; A (I: 25) refers to bhikkhunis who excelled in learnedness and teaching. In the later Theravada literature, the Dīpavamsa, the earliest chronicle of Buddhism in Sri Lanka, records a tradition of bhikkhunis who continued the unbroken tradition of Theravada bhikkhuni learning from the time of the Buddha to its writing presumably in the 2nd century ce. 5 For detailed discussions on this matter see Adikaram (2011) and Rahula (1956)

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the learning (pariyatti) or the yoke of books (gantha-dhura) over ‘those who wore rag-robes’ (paṃsukūlika), who represented practice (paṭipatti) or who practiced the yoke of insight (vipassanā-dhura). The relevance of this incident to the present discussion is that, whatever its implications for the soteriological practice of the monastic life, it marks the existence of a full-fledged academic tradition within Theravada Buddhism as far back as the 1st century bce. In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, we can safely assume that it is this tradition established in the 1st century bce that has continued in Sri Lanka till modernity. As we have just seen this tradition traces its origin to the time of the Buddha, to be more specific, to the first sangāyanā in which the immediate disciples of the Buddha played a key role. Although the Pali canon was still at its inception, it is reasonable to take what was chanted at the first sangāyanā as forming the basis not only for what later evolved to be the canon or the ti-piṭaka (‘three baskets’) of Theravadins but also of all the other traditions that broke away from it. In this sense the Pali canon claims the word of the Buddha in its earliest available form. The unbroken continuity of the canon also testifies to the continuation of Pali language which the Theravada tradition takes to be the language spoken by the Buddha. Here we have three basic beliefs which are central to the Theravada tradition, namely, the Pali canon as representing the earliest version of the word of the Buddha, Pali to be the language spoken by the Buddha and the third, which was not required to spell out specifically, that the tradition that traces its origin to the immediate disciples of the Buddha to be the Theravada tradition. The traditional Buddhist scholarship still asserts these beliefs, and these beliefs constitute the basic assumptions of the tradition. One may think that the tradition is dogmatic to hold these assumptions. Whether the present traditional Theravada Buddhist scholarship accepts these assumptions dogmatically or not, these beliefs are what is unanimously supported in the Theravada historical and commentarial literature. Anyone who accepts the recorded historical tradition cannot draw different conclusions. Nevertheless, the fact of the matter is that the tradition has been questioned and it has been questioned seriously by the modern Buddhist scholarship. What I am going to do in the remainder of this paper is to study the grounds on which these assumptions have been questioned, and to develop some thoughts on how the Theravada scholars should respond to these developments. When I say Theravada scholars or academics it, of course,

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includes both categories, scholars who specialize in Theravada as in any other academic discipline and hence Theravada scholars in professional sense and those scholars who, in addition to being Theravada scholars or academics in professional sense, also identify with the Theravada tradition as their religion inherited by birth or adopted subsequently. This division does not mean that only those academics who are not Theravada Buddhists question these assumptions or that the Buddhist scholars who are traditional Theravada Buddhists, or Theravada scholars who are non-Theravada Buddhists, do not question these assumptions.

Early Buddhism The concept of early Buddhism is not known to the traditional students of Buddhism. Nor was it a category conceptualized during the premodern period. It came into vogue starting from the late nineteenth century when the Western scholars started studying Buddhism. As we know, Pali texts started appearing in the West starting from the latter part of the nineteenth century6 and the systematic introduction of Pali texts to the West was started with the establishment of Pali Text Society in 1880 by Rhys Davids who came to Sri Lanka, then Ceylon, as a junior member of the British Colonial administration, and studied Pali from Sri Lanka monks. Rhys Davids appears to be the first to use the concept ‘early Buddhism’. As early as 1881 delivering Hibbert lecture series in America he announced the birth of Pali Text Society and said: “The sacred texts of the early Buddhists have preserved to us” (as quoted by Jaini in 2001, p.33). The Pali canon and early Buddhism were coextensive for these early scholars. In other words, early Buddhism was to be found in the Pali canon. The initial need to think in terms of early Buddhism may have been the perceived difference between what the Western visitors saw in the day-to-day practice of the lands where Buddhism was the traditional religion and what they found in the texts. Subsequently, in academic use, the term was more refined to signify a distinction between the canonical discourses and the commentaries and sub-commentaries and other related texts which were considered to belong to a later period. Going beyond this classification, even a finer distinction was made within the Pali canon itself, some texts or some sections of the texts to have earlier and some to have later origins,7 thus limiting the concept of 6 Refer to de Jong’s (1976) A Brief History of Buddhist Studies in Europe and America for a discussion on this matter. 7 Refer to G.C. Pandey’s Studies in the Origins of Buddhism, Allahabad, 1957 for an

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early Buddhism only to some sections of the texts or to some texts in the Pali canon. Gradually, with Buddhist scholarship expanding to non-Pali sources, particularly to the āgama literature found in classical Chinese sources, the concept of early Buddhism started having candidates other than the Pali canon. To illustrate this shift in Buddhist scholarship we may refer to two distinguished Sri Lankan Buddhist scholars, both are now no more, K.N. Jayatilleke and D.J. Kalupahana. When Jayatilleke published his main study of Buddhist philosophy, he named it Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge without any further explanation. His primary source was the discourses in the Pali canon and only very sparsely he referred to commentaries.8 Jayatilleke’s book was published in 1963, and he did his studies in London in late 1940s and 1950s. Kalupahana, on the other hand, who did his studies in London in late 1960s studied classical Chinese and made use of that knowledge to refer to Chinese Āgama to support his arguments. Thus for Kalupahana early Buddhism included not only Pali sources but also Classical Chinese sources. In his study of Nagarjuna Kalupahana refers to the Chinese translation of the Kaccāyanagotta-sutta in order to establish the authenticity of the sutta in the Pali canon (Kalupahana 1986, 94. n.23). With these new developments, on the one hand, the concept of early Buddhism shrunk because it was understood not to refer to the entire Pali canon but only some parts of it, and, on the other hand, it became expanded to include the Chinese Āgama literature and other sources considered as belonging to an early period. The story (or rather the fate) of early Buddhism does not end here. The more recent developments focus on the very concept of early Buddhism. A representative of the scholars who have questioned the validity of the concept of early Buddhism is Steve Collins, one of the leading Buddhist scholars whose recent demise is a great loss to the field of Buddhist studies.9 Collins identifies three periods in the history of Buddhism, namely, (i) early, pre-Asokan Buddhism, (ii) the ‘long Middle Ages’ from Asoka in the exercise of this nature. 8 Rune Johansson, psychologist turned Buddhist scholar who studied under K.N.Jayatilleke in 1960s at Peradeniya, is even a better example for this method. His Psychology of Nibbana, (George Allen and Unwin, London, 1969) does not refer to any of the commentaries, and is based only on some selected texts of the Sutta-pitaka. His subsequent works too follow the same method. 9 See Charles Hallisay (2018) “Exploring the Buddhist Middle Way from a Middle Ground: In Memoriam Steven Collins” in Sophia (2018: 57 # 2) pp. 203-206. for a discussion of his contribution to Buddhist studies and other academic fields.

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3rd century BC to the period of modernization, and (iii) modernization. Describing the early pre-Asokan period, Collins says: For the first period there is some archaeological evidence from Northeast India in the mid-1st millennium BC, from which we may be able to draw conclusions about urbanization and state-formation as contexts for early Buddhism. But for early Buddhism itself we have only the evidence of texts, all of which are from a much later period. In my view any attempt at delineating what early Buddhism was, and still more ‘What the Buddha Taught’ are fantasies, wish-fulfilment exercises which select materials from the later evidence and project them back to the Buddha.10 In this statement Colin’s argument to support his view is that texts are from much later period. About the Buddhist canonical texts we have the evidence, as we noted earlier in this discussion, from the Mahāvaṃsa which says that the word of the Buddha was committed to writing during the reign of Vaṭṭagamini Abhaya (29-17 bce, Mhv, 33: 100-101). But for critics like Collins this is textual evidence about textual evidence which was recorded in the Mahavamsa roughly about five centuries after the event. Since at least some of the Pali texts recorded in the 1st century bce could date back to the parinirvāṇa of the Buddha (which could have happened somewhere around 5-4 centuries bce) what the Mahavamsa recorded can be dated back to one thousand years. Furthermore, the palm-leaf manuscripts available for us today are hardly older than three hundred years.11 So the argument is: how can we talk about two thousand five hundred years of history based on evidence not older than three hundred years? The end result of this scepticism is that ultimately we are not in a position to say anything definitively about the teaching of the Buddha. As Collins would assert again in a more recent writing, ‘we cannot have any historically certain, or even reliable, 10  “ ‘Theravada Civilization(s)’? Periodizing its History”, paper published along with “The Theravada Civilizations Project: Future directions for the study of Buddhism in Southeast Asia” by Juliane Chober and Steve Collins in Contemporary Buddhism: An Interdisciplinary Journal 13.1 (pp.157-166). 11 According to Richard Gombrich (2005) many of the palm-leaf manuscripts found in Myanmar and Sri Lanka have been copied in the 18th or 19th centuries. A considerable number of manuscripts in Thailand belong to the 16th century. The oldest manuscript so far available is one of four leaves found in Kathmandu, Nepal, dated to the 800 ce, which may have been copied from a North Indian original several centuries back. Two Indian inscriptions containing several lines of canonical text have been dated to the 5th century ce or close to it. These lines are in a Middle Indo-Aryan dialect very close to Pali.

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knowledge of what Buddhism was’ (2013, 4). Hence his allusion in the above-quoted passage to Walpola Rahula Thera’s celebrated work, What the Buddha Taught, as betraying some kind of naïve sense of certainty on our knowledge of what the Buddha taught. When Walpola Rahula Thera published his work in 1959 he would not have imagined that the title of his book would carry a sense of arrogance or that it would be understood as making an emphatic statement of What the Buddha Taught. He must have simply accepted the textual tradition that was preserved in this country for about two millennia and presented in his work what these texts consistently and coherently contained as what the Buddha taught. The question is: is the situation as bleak as Collins would have us to believe? A leading scholar of Buddhism who has questioned this skepticism and relativism is Professor Richard Gombrich. His approach to this issue is twofold: one is by way of defending a method to understand the origin of the teaching of the Buddha and to interpret the Buddhist texts. And the other is a critique of the very liberal way of interpreting texts as ‘anything goes’. The method he uses is historical method. His more recent work deals mainly with this method following which he wishes to establish that the early Buddhist texts present a coherent philosophy which must have been thought by one person. In How Buddhism Began (second edition 2006) Gombrich elaborates on the historical method according to which the context or the historical context is crucial in to understand any historical text, and applies this method to understand Buddhism. The sub-title of the book, The conditional genesis of the early teachings’, amply clarifies this point. His subsequent work, What the Buddha Thought (Equinox, UK 2009), is a clear reference to Walpola Rahula Thera’s work and meant to answer those who question the possibility of knowing what the Buddha taught. Gombrich believes that the historical approach provides a way to understand the basic teachings of the Buddha as ‘dependently arisen’, or as responses to the main teachings of the Upanisadic traditions and other Indian traditions, in particular, the teachings of Bṛhadāraṇyaka-Upaniṣad (31). In responding to the interpretational relativism which holds that a text is open for any number of interpretations Gombrich says: That extreme form of relativism which claims that one reading of a text, for instance of a historical document, is as valid as another, I regard as such a contraction of knowledge. I wish to take the Buddha’s middle way between two extremes. One

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extreme is the deadly oversimplification which is inevitable for beginners but out of place in a university, the over-simplification which says that ‘the Buddha taught X’ or ‘Mahayanists believe Y’, without further qualification. The other extreme is deconstruction fashionable among social scientists who refuse all generalization, ignore the possibilities of extrapolation, and usually leave us unenlightened. (Gombrich 2006, 7) Against this form of relativism in interpretation Gombrich proposes that there must be one right way to understand what the Buddha thought and taught. In responding to the scepticism amounting to rejecting any knowledge of Buddhism Gombrich has to say the following: It [What the Buddha Thought] argues that we can know far more about the Buddha than it is fashionable among scholars to admit, and that his thought has a greater coherence than is usually recognized. …Incidentally, since many of the Buddha’s allusions can be traced in the Pali versions of surviving texts, the book establishes the importance of the Pali canon as evidence. (Gombrich 2009, Preface) Gombrich’s research aims to establish that the system of thought found in the Pali Canon is systematic and coherent, and hence it must have been thought out by one mind, and that mind should belong to the Buddha. It is not my purpose here to reproduce Gombrich’s arguments. My purpose here is to highlight the on-going academic debate on early Buddhism and the Pali Canon. The type of scepticism held by scholars such as Collins is based on questioning the authenticity of the Pali Canon. But what this scepticism fails to explain is the existence of the Pali Canon and its continuation through history. Is it a result of some kind of conspiracy on the part of the Buddhist monks in India or in Sri Lanka? There is no doubt that the texts originated at some point of time. But how did that happen? Did the texts come out of nowhere? What was the basis for these texts? Theravada has an answer for this question. But although it may not explain how all texts came into existence, at least that story tells us how the main set of texts came into being. If the basic dhamma and Vinaya were collected at the first council we can understand how Abhidhamma developed based on the Dhamma and how ‘abhivinaya’ (although it is not called so), namely Parivāra-pāḷi, came into existence based on the Ubhato-vibhaṅga and Khandhaka. If we do not accept this traditional story, the other possibility would

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be to attribute some mischievous plan to the early groups of monks to hoodwink the posterity to believe that there was a person called Buddha who taught these ideas. In this context, in particular, we cannot ignore the practical application of the teaching, namely, generations of people practicing the path and claiming to get results. This practical element is something unique to the Pali Canon. Although what is preserved in classical Chinese belongs to early schools, these texts were translated into Chinese motivated mainly by the desire to know what the Indian and hence early tradition was and to preserve those for posterity. The content may have been incorporated to some extent into the subsequent Chinese religious life. But in most of the cases, these texts have remained as library collections playing virtually no role in actual religious life of the people who preserved them. Theravada Pali Canon is different. It has an unbroken history of two millennia of continued practice at varying intensities in meditating, teaching, listening, memorizing etc. To believe in the tradition without critical inquiry is equally wrong as to reject it totally. I do not think that anyone should believe the story told in the accounts of the 1st saṅgāyanā that the entire three piṭakas were recited during that council. Historically it is a loss for the students of Buddhism to not to have the names of those who were responsible for compiling the canonical texts.12 With a text like Aṅguttara-nikāya which is clearly a result of great a compilation effort, it is ridiculous to think that the Buddha taught his disciples the collections of ones, twos etc. Abhidhamma texts with their detailed, precise and intricate analyses might have taken years to develop among different groups of teachers and pupils. In the over enthusiasm of the Theravada to make the entire Abhidhamma the word of the Buddha - buddhavacana - we have been deprived of the knowledge of a great analytical tradition of monastic scholarship. It is not a problem at all that the modern scholarship analyses the literary formation and the content of the Pali Canon which is the early phase of Buddhism. The real problem is when critical scholarship goes beyond the boundaries of constructive scholarship and tends to be dismissive and nihilist. Before dismissing the Pali Canon on the basis of the relative recentness of the palm-leaf manuscripts, one has to explain 12 It is possible that those arahants who were assigned at the end of the first council to study and maintain the Dhamma and Vinaya were in fact the compilers of those texts?

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how those manuscripts came into being. If they have been copied from earlier ones where did those earlier ones come from? Finally, either we have to go to the early beginnings of the texts right from the parinirvāṇa of the Buddha or we have to accept a conspiracy theory. The interesting and intriguing story of Purana Thera in the Cullavagga account of the first council clearly points to the possibility of the existence of ‘versions’ of the word of the Buddha already during the life time of the Buddha. Evidence of this nature recorded in the Theravada history, notwithstanding its potential harm to Theravada, cannot be ignored easily. Therefore, any effort to dissolve the very idea of early Buddhism and the Pali Canon’s claim on it is to take away the heart of Theravada Buddhist studies. The task of the Theravada Buddhist scholar is not to hold on to the traditional view at any cost but to subject it to logical scrutiny with an overall constructive attitude to the system.

Theravada and Pali language The other two aspects that have come under scrutiny of the modern Buddhist scholars are Theravada and Pali language. The recent academic discussions and debates on these two issues have been mainly on two matters: one is on Theravada and Pali as proper names: when were Theravada and Pali called Theravada and Pali and by whom? The second matter with regard to Pali is its historicity: is it the language spoken by the Buddha? Is the present Pali Canon a ‘translation’ from an original canon existed in even earlier more ancient dialect? For Theravada, the issue is whether or not there is any identifiable phenomenon called Theravada. The general flavour of these discussions is characterized by scepticism and hence leading to dismissal of the validity of these concepts. On the word pāli to refer to Pali language, there has been much scholarly discussion recently. As all scholars agree, initially pāli was not a term denoting a language. In the commentaries, it was used to refer specifically to the word of the Buddha. The language attributed to the Buddha in the commentaries is Magadha. The belief is that the Buddha spoke in Magadha dialect. In the Buddhist world, today, no one uses ‘māgadha’ to refer to the canonical language. This has been replaced by pāli. The question is when did this happen and who is responsible for it. The view proposed by such scholars as KR Norman and Oskar von Hinuber is that the Europeans started this usage and it was followed by the Theravadins, making it another instance of the European influence on Buddhist studies. Von Hinuber refers to Sangharājasādhucariyāva written in Sri Lanka in 1779 as the earliest instance of using ‘pali’ as a

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language name. He also refers to a report written in 1672 by Charles Angot who mentions that a French missionary named M Laneau in Thailand studied this language (Crosby 2004). According to Norman and von Hinuber initially this was a misunderstanding which later became established. I do not need to go into this debate which is now becoming a thing of the past. Kate Crosby (2004) in her paper “The Origin of Pali as a Language Name in Medieval Theravada Literature13” reviews the history of the whole debate among the European scholars on this matter and provides conclusive evidence to establish Pali as a language name is not a result of misunderstanding on the part of Europeans, but it was a natural development among the Theravada scholars, who used this word which initially referred to the word of the Buddha, to refer to the language of the word of the Buddha. She cites khuddasikkhā Abhinavaṭīka of Sangharakkhita Thera who was a pupil of Sariputta Thera of the Polonnaruva period of ancient Lanka (12th century ce) as the earliest clear reference to Pali as a language although she points out to an even earlier instance of commentator Dhammapala using it in his sub-commentary to Buddhaghosa’s Sumangalāvilasinī. The scholarly debate on the name of Pali language appears to be over. But the significance of this debate in the present context is how scholarly debates in the Theravada studies are formed. Furthermore it highlights how the things should not be taken for granted which is an undesirable characteristic of Theravada studies in the traditional Theravada settings. A similar scholarly discussion is taking place on the term Theravada: when was this term used to refer to the Theravada tradition as a whole14? Collins traces the recent history of the term: The modern use of the term seems to derive originally from the British civil servant George Turnour in Sri Lanka in 1836; the first use of the phrase ‘Theravada Buddhism’ seems to have been by the Thai Prince Chudadharn at the Chicago World’s Parliament of Religions in 1893 (though it was not used there by the much more influential speaker Anagarika Dharmapala), and by the western monk Ananda Maithreya (Allen Bennet) in an article in the Bulletin de l’Ecole frainciase d’extremeorient in 1907 (he wrote of ‘le pur Bouddhisme de l’ecole Theravada’). 13  Journal of the Centre for Buddhist Studies Sri Lanka, vol.II 2004. pp.70-116. 14  Todd LeRoy Pereira in his chapter (in Skilling 2012 pp. 443-571) on “Whence Theravada? The modern genealogy of an Ancient term” discusses in detail the early 20th century developments that led to the replacement of ‘hinayana’ by ‘theravada’.

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The single most important factor in establishing the world’s current usage was the decision by the World Fellowship of Buddhists to use the term (as opposed to others such as Hinayana or Southern Buddhism) taken at a meeting in 1950 (Collins 2013, 2). In this view, the term was first used by George Turnour who was a British civil servant in Sri Lanka (then Ceylon) in 1836. This is just after two decades from the British take-over of the country. Now, did Turnour invent this term on his own which is most unlikely? Where did he get it? Isn’t it more reasonable to think that he got it from an already existing tradition? Collins refers to Anagarika Dharmapala at Chicago and his non-use of the term. As I have highlighted elsewhere (refer to the article no. 15 of the volume IV of this series) Dharmapala had a global vision of Buddhism (which Kemper 2015 calls ‘universalism’) following which he represented not Theravada or Sri Lanka but all Buddhists all over the world. He started his inaugural speech at Chicago by saying that he brought good wishes of more than four hundred million Buddhists all over the world. Whatever that may be, what is more important to me in this debate, as I will discuss again shortly, is the reductionism which deprives Theravada of any definitive content or continuity. The term, as all know, occurs in the discourses such as the Ariyapariyesana-sutta (M, 22) clearly not in this later sense. But its presence even in a different sense makes its later metamorphosis more understandable because the later users did not have to invent a new term. But when did the tradition start using the term to refer to itself is a question. In the first sangāyanā the term used to refer to the event was therīya (belonging to Theras). In the subsequent commentarial literature the term is used to refer to the literal meaning of the term, the view or the standpoint of the elders. In the Samantapāsādikā introduction Buddhaghosa uses this term in this sense when he said: tathāpi antogadhatheravādaṃ – saṃvaṇṇanā sammā samārabhissaṃ. (VinA 1, 2) In a discussion of Theravada tradition and its identity (in the second IATBU conference keynote speech) Professor Oliver Abenayaka identifies three meanings of the term Theravada. One is the early canonical use of the term in the discourses such the Ariyapariyesana-sutta where it means stability (thira-bhāva). The second is the commentarial use of the term to refer to the views of individual Theravada elders. A representative instance of this use is Buddhaghos’a four criteria (apadesa), namely, sutta, suttānuloma, ācariyavāda and attano-mati.

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The first, three respectively mean the discourses of the Buddha, what is in conformity with the discourses, and commentaries. And the fourth is the views of individual elders (one’s own view) which is named Theravada (views of the elders). In degree of authority, Buddhaghosa maintains, this last occupies the lowest position. Elaborating on to the third meaning of the term, Abenayaka refers to several instances in the commentaries, sub-commentaries and Dīpavaṃsa which he interprets as referring to the entire tradition: Let me quote this passage completely: The third meaning is employed in the commentaries, chronicles and the sub-commentaries. The Samantapāsādika states that the Arahant Mahinda learned all the commentaries with Theravada from the Arahant Moggaliputta Tissa. The Venerable Buddhaghosa informs us that he compiled the Samantapasadika inclusive of the Theravada. The Dīpvaṃsa records that the collections of the First Council are called Theravada, since they were carried out by the Elders. The Dīpavaṃsa further informs that the Arahant Moggaliputta Tissa taught the complete Theravada and the entire Vinaya-pitaka to the arahant Mahinda. The Mahāvaṃsa too recounts that the First Council is called Theriya since it was done by the Elders. According to the Mahāvaṃsa, the Venerable Buddhaghosa studied both Theravada and commentaries at the Mahavihara in Anuradhapura. While elaborating the phrase sāṭṭhakathaṃ sabbaṃ theravādaṃ in the Samantapāsādika, the Sāratthadīpani, the sub-commentary on the Vinaya, clarifies that it means the Pali Canon inclusive of the commentaries that was determined in the first two councils. (Abenayaka 2009, 4) Of the evidence provided by Abenayaka, except for the Dīpavaṃsa and the Sāratthadīpanī, the occurrence of the term Theravada in the rest cannot be interpreted as exclusively referring to the entire Buddhist literature including the Pali Canon. ‘Theravada’ in such contexts could well be the views of the respected elders in the tradition as Buddhaghosa would usually maintain. However, two examples from the Dīpavaṃsa and the Sāratthadīpanī seem to support better Abenayaka’s interpretation. The question, however, is: while relegating ‘theravada’ to ‘one’s own view - attano-mati – which is the lowest in the degree of authority, how is it possible that the same tradition opts to go by that name? One possible way to explain this would be to make a distinction between the doctrinal tradition of Buddhaghosa and the

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historical tradition represented by the Dīpavaṃsa. When Buddhaghosa interpreted ‘theravada’ as referring to attano-mati he was viewing the phenomenon from a point of view of the Dhamma. The Dīpavaṃsa, and subsequently the Sāratthadīpanī following the Dīpavaṃsa, may have referred to a historical tradition in which Theravada was acquiring a broader definition which subsequently got established as the name of the entire tradition. According to Rupert Gethin who made a minute study of the instances of the occurrence of this term in the commentaries Buddhaghosa does not use the term to refer to the organization or the doctrine as a whole.15 Nor does Buddhaghosa identify himself with a tradition called Theravada for the most obvious reason that such an institution called Theravada did not exist for him. As I have shown in an earlier discussion (Collected Papers: Asanga Tilakaratne Vol. III, 1-33), notwithstanding our trust in Gethin in this matter, what is more relevant to the present context is whether or not Buddhaghosa identified himself with the interpretive tradition he is adhering to. On this matter there cannot be a doubt that he did. In his commentaries, Buddhaghosa makes frequent references to the tradition of the Mahāvihāra which he was following and he pays glowing tribute to that tradition.16 We cannot easily reject the story of the origin of the Visuddhimagga: Buddhaghosa was required to write a text incorporating the entire Mahāvihāra way of interpretation of the word of the Buddha. Buddhaghosa considered his work as central to all the other commentaries.17 This shows that there was a textual and interpretive tradition at Mahāvihāra which was very much settled even to the extent that the commentators of the calibre of Buddhaghosa came to Sri Lanka to study and translate it for the sake of the ’international community of the bhikkhus’ (dīpantare bhikkhujanassa18). It is this same tradition that was transmitted to the Southeast Asia in the 11th century ce and got established and developed further in that region. Another historical example of the existence of a homogeneous Dhamma and Vinaya tradition in the Theravada world is the phenomenon of ‘purification of the Sangha’ executed by the kings with 15  “Was Buddhaghosa a Theravadin?” in Peter Skilling and others (2012), How Theravada is Theravada? Exploring Buddhist identities (Thailand: Silkworm Books). 16  Refer to the introduction and the concluding remarks of the Visuddhimagga. 17  Refer to the introductory stanzas of the commentaries of all the four nikāyas. 18  Saṃvaṇṇanā sīhaladīpakena – vākyena esā pana saṅkhatattā na kiñci atthaṃ abhisambhunāti – dipantare bhikkhujanassa yasmā: (VinA I, 2.)

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the support of the Sangha. The first of its kind was done, according to the Theravada history, by King Asoka in India in the 3rd century bce. Subsequently, such acts were done, based on the Theravada Vinaya tradition, by kings in Sri Lanka and Southeast Asia which received the Sri Lanka tradition. Maha Parakramabahu in the 12th century in Polonnaruva of ancient Lanka did one such purification with farreaching effects. Subsequently, the practice was followed by many rulers in Southeast Asia, in particular, in Myanmar. These acts of purification of the Sangha presuppose the existence of a well-settled tradition of the Dhamma and the Vinaya which cannot be taken as just created abruptly and ad hoc by Asoka in India or Parakramabahu in Sri Lanka and the associated monks for the particular purpose exclusively. The conclusion is, there is no doubt that there was a well-articulated and well-defined system in the Theravada world. Whether it was called Theravada or ‘Mahāvihāra-vāda’ becomes less crucial from that point of view. Furthermore, why the tradition was not called by a specific name has something to do with the location of Sri Lanka as an island without any rival (Mahayana or Vajrayana) Buddhist schools.19 There was not any particular need for the Sri Lanka Theravadins or the Theravadins in the Southeast Asia to assert themselves Theravadins for naming requires differentiation.20

Theravada tradition This discussion of ‘theravada’ (Theravada as a term) has automatically led us to a discussion on Theravada as a tradition. As we just saw, whether it was called Theravada or not, that there was from the beginning a well-articulated systematic set of teachings and canonical and noncanonical literature containing such teachings we cannot deny. In its present usage, Theravada refers to an organization comprising men and women, both monastic and household, spread around the world, with innumerable branch organizations and institutions. In addition to this larger organizational aspect, Theravada refers to the following four interrelated phenomena: a set of teachings that constitute the philosophical core of Theravada, a corpus of literature that contain these teachings, a 19  This does not mean to deny that some elements of these two traditions were present in the country. How Abhayagiriya was open to the Mahayana and Vajrayana texts and teachers is well known. But Abhayagiriya was not Mahayana as sometimes believed. 20  Anyhow, it would be important for modern Theravada scholars to inquire as to how the pre-modern Sangha in Sri Lanka or in the Theravada world called themselves if they had to use a name at all.

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tradition of interpretation of those teachings, and a form (or forms of) practice based on or even not based on such teachings. In this last category, I would include, in addition to the very important and presently widespread practices of Theravada meditation, sociological, anthropological and cultural behaviours and practices of different Theravada groups. What I see as problematic is sometimes Theravada is presented without making adequate distinction between its different aspects. In particular, there is a tendency to present as Theravada whatever that is found in Theravada societies. This may be true from sociological or anthropological points of view. But it is important to be clear about the limits. At times, this way of presenting Theravada is supported by antiessentialist argument, namely, to maintain that there is something fixed called Theravada is to assume some sort of essentialism which is to be avoided. No doubt, anti-essentialism is closer to Buddhism, particularly in its understanding of reality including human being as non-substantial. That both the no-soul view and no-God view are rooted in Buddhist anti-essentialism is well known. However, if this position is taken out of its soteriological context and driven to an extreme, it becomes selfdefeating because there will not be a room to talk about something called Theravada Buddhism or the teaching of the Buddha in the absence of which chaos becomes inevitable. What Richard Gombrich says in a slightly different context may be relevant here: Those Buddhist traditions, which have lasted for over two and a half millennia and extended over a vast geographical area, are so diverse that some scholars scoff at the very notion that one can talk about ‘Buddhism’, and insist on using the word in scare quotes, if it has to be used at all. I disagree. Granted, Buddhism itself, as a human phenomenon, is subject to the Buddha’s dictum that ‘All compounded things are impermanent’. It would be astonishing if over such a long time, as it moved to different regions and cultures, it had not undergone vast changes; the same has happened to every human tradition. But the historian should be able to trace every branch of the tradition back to another branch, until we arrive at the trunk and root, the Buddha himself. (Gombrich 2009, 1-2) Gombrich uses the metaphor of going from branches to the trunk of the tree. This is equally applicable to Theravada. While it is possible to talk about different forms of Theravada, the very possibility of being able to talk about Theravada assumes that there is some basic thing called Theravada. If Theravada does not have a core, particularly when it

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comes to its soteriology, Theravada loses its purpose, will be ineffective, and consequently no longer will be Theravada. Hence, Theravada needs to be rescued from this self-defeating relativism.

Pali language Apart from the debates about ‘pali’ as a name for a language (which we discussed above), there is a wider debate about the status of Pali language. This debate is centred around the traditional notion of Theravadins that Pali is the language spoken by the Buddha. The Theravada notion of Pali which initially was called Magadhi is characterized in the later Pali literature21 in the following stanza: Sā māgadhī mūlabhāsā – narā yāyādikappikā Brahmāno cassutālāpā – sambuddhā cāpi bhāsare This Magadhi is the root language; it is the language which the human beings at the beginning of the aeon, Brahmas, those who have not yet heard any speech, and the Fully Enlightened Ones would speak. There is no evidence to show that this traditional belief was ever questioned by the Theravada tradition although there are indications in this very statement that it was, most probably, proposed by the Theravadins to counter the Brahmanic view that theirs was the language of gods (daivī vāg). Therefore, the contemporary Theravada tradition has to be appreciative of the recent scholarship, largely Western, for initiating critical studies of these beliefs. The point, however, is to have a realistic assessment as to what should be retained and what should be removed from the set of traditional beliefs. Geiger, one of the early scholars of Pali, holds a view closer to the traditional Theravada view. He says: I consider it wiser not to hastily reject the tradition altogether but rather to understand it to mean that Pali was indeed no pure Magadhi, but was yet a form of the popular speech which was based on Magadhi and which was used by Buddha himself. It would appear therefore that the Pali Canon represents an effect to reflect the Buddhavacanam in its original form. (Geiger 1978) More recently writing an essay on Pali language to the Pali Text Society edition of Geiger’s A Pali Grammar Richard Gombrich provides three inter-connected responses to the question ‘what is Pali? 21  Dīgha-nikāya Abhinava-ṭīkā introductory verses (Chaṭṭha-sangayana CD). Also found in the Payogasiddhi introductory verses.

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Pali is the language of the earliest Buddhist scripture as preserved in one (conservative, but not static) Buddhist tradition (xxiii). Pali is the form of Prakrit (or Middle Indo-Aryan, which is the same thing) used in first writing down the Theravada Buddhist Canon, an event took place in Sri Lanka in the 1st century B.C. (xxviii). Pali has undergone changes and development over the centuries: least in morphology (grammatic inflection) but quite noticeably in phenetics, syntax, style and vocabulary. As von Hinuber has put it, Pali is not so much a “dead” language as an artificial language that has been repeatedly reshaped. (Gombrich 2005, xxx) What the scholars such as Gombrich wish to allow Pali to be is that it is not the language the Buddha spoke but one related to it and very close to it. This scholarly understanding is a result of studying the different stages and different genres of Pali literature including the Pali Canon. In particular, scholars have observed various mixed linguistic characteristics in the canonical language. If we understand the Buddha’s refusal to translate his word into Sanskrit (chandas) and subsequent approval of learning the Dhamma in the disciples’ own language (saka nirutti), it is understandable how the word of the Buddha might have got mixed characteristics. In this manner, it is quite possible that disciples memorized the word of Buddha with slight variations in word order, vocabulary etc. Buddhaghosa’s commentaries testify to the existence of variant readings (Gombrich 2005). These may have been continued from early periods or found their way into the texts even after they were written down. If we accept that the entire Dhamma was not rehearsed at the first or even at the second saṅgāyanā, which means that the Pali Canon was gradually compiled by later disciples, then the present Tripiṭaka might not be the exact word of the Buddha, though undoubtedly, it is the closest we can get. This could be so even if what we have today is what was written down in the first century bce in Sri Lanka because writing down itself is not a guarantee that changes, omissions or inadvertent commissions found their way into the texts in the process of continued copying. One could argue for a ‘pure’ Pali Canon deriving support from Buddhaghosa’s interpretation of saka-nirutti as meaning the Magadha dialect used by the Buddha. Geiger too accepts the Buddhaghosa’s interpretation on the ground that the Buddha who did not approve

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translating his word into Sanskrit would not allow translating it into any other dialect (Geiger 1943/1978, 7). Although this is not the proper context to go into this interpretational matter, the possibility of a canon comprising the exact word of the Buddha clearly goes against all historical evidence. Even if we were to accept that the disciples studied the Dhamma in the Buddha’s own dialect it does not explain the presence of mix characteristics in the canonical language including non-Magadha uses. There is no doubt that Pali language has undergone changes. For instance, Geiger outlines four stages of its evolution, namely, Pali in the gāthas, canonical Pali, Pali in the post-canonical literature and Pali in the later artificial poetry (Geiger 1943/1978). For the disciples of a tradition which rejected the Vedic conception of sacred language it is nothing but natural that they were more concerned about the meaning of what the Buddha said than its wording itself. Presently, however, the Theravada tradition is guided by the Buddhaghosian tradition of attributing sacredness to the Pali language (refer to. 17th article of the Vol. I - Buddhist Philosophy of this series). Although here we are dealing with a sentiment of a long-held tradition, it is not always correct to interpret the early with the late. What is more crucial is to establish that there is a coherent and consistent system of thought articulated in these words.

Concluding remarks Early Buddhism, Theravada and Pali are three key terms in the Theravada studies. All three are related and connected to one another. Jeopardization of one is to jeopardize all three. As the present review shows, on the one hand, there is a growing scepticism and relativism in the field to the extent of denying any definitive content for the key concepts we discussed. On the other hand, we have the traditional scholarship, mostly but not exclusively, characterized by the unequivocal approval of the tradition lock stock and barrel. The correct position has to be found between these two extremes. The message of this study is not that Theravada scholars should wage war against the critical scholarship pertaining to the three concepts discussed above. What needs to be done is to employ the techniques of the same critical scholarship to counter the relativism and scepticism that have developed in the field to the point of self-destruction. It should be the responsibility of the higher learning centres of Pali and Theravada Buddhist studies world over to orient their studies and research to face this challenge successfully.

3. Personality Differences of Arahants and the Origins of Theravada A Study of Two Great Elders of the Theravada Tradition: Mahakassapa and Ananda*

Introduction At the very outset of this paper I would like to record, with deep sense of gratefulness, my appreciation of Dhammavihari Thera (formerly Jotiya Dhirasekera) from whom I learned so much about Buddhist studies and research. Although I have not been a formal student of him, working for him as a research assistant, first when he was the Editorin-Chief of Encyclopaedia of Buddhism and subsequently the Director of Postgraduate Institute of Pali and Buddhist Studies, University of Kelaniya, was very much an ‘on the job’ training in Buddhist research. All those who have come into contact with him know of his sharp critical eye from which errors do not find easy escape. I dedicate this paper to him, an Elder of Theravada in our own times. An often discussed subject in early Buddhist discourses is the postmortem status of an arahant. The four questions whether an arahant exists, does not exist, both or neither, after his death is a frequently asked set of questions in these discourses. In contrast, there is relatively less discussion on the arahant who is living. Still less is discussion on differences in qualitative sense among arahants. A reader of the Pali Canon tends to get the idea that arahants are basically a homogeneous group of people. This is not hard to understand in the context of early Buddhism represented in the Pali nikāyas which seem to consider the Buddha himself as one of the arahants.1 The tradition, nevertheless, did 1  The Buddha is seen comparing himself with the first sixty disciples who attained * This article was initially published in Dhamma-Vinaya: Essays in Honor of Professor Dhammavihari (Jotiya Dhirasekara), ed. Asanga Tilakaratne et al. Sri Lanka Association for Buddhist Studies, Colombo, 2005.

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recognize differences between the Buddha and arahants. As has been explained in discourses such as Gopakamoggallāna-sutta (M III, 15-20) the Buddha was ‘knower of the way, an understander of the way and skilled in the way’ (‘maggaññū, maggavidū, maggakovido’) whereas the disciples are ‘the followers of the way’ (‘magganuga’). In discourses such as Nagara-sutta (S II, 104-7) the Buddha, who discovered the noble eightfold path and reached nirvana having followed the path, has been compared to a pioneer who discovers a lost path following which he reaches an ancient city. Although this distinction has been made, the early discourses do not make much of a distinction between arahanthood attained by the Buddha and an arahant who follows the advice of the former. According to the Sāmaññaphala-sutta (D I, 47-86) in which the Buddha is presented as detailing the fruits of monkhood to be realized within this life itself, there are three kinds of knowledge, namely, the knowledge of recollecting one’s own past births (pubbenivāsa anussati ñāṇa), the knowledge of departure and arrival of beings (sattānaṃ cutūpapāta ñāṇa) and the knowledge of the extinction of defilements (āsavakkhaya ñāṇa), marking the culmination of the path leading to the nirvanic goal. Now it is these very same three knowledges that the Buddha realized when he attained Buddhahood and the disciples realized when they attained arahanthood by following the Master. Perhaps this may have prompted the early Buddhists to talk about similarities rather than differences of arahants. We, nevertheless, know that talking about similarities is not always revealing. Talking about differences, may lead, on the other hand, to contradict what discourses seem to be saying in one voice. There are discussions on the differences among arahants in so far as their positive spiritual faculties are concerned. The idea behind naming different arahants as having achieved excellence in different aspects of spiritual development is that there are differences in abilities and propensities among arahants.2 What is mentioned in this manner may be considered not very significant in so far as they lead only to minor variations in behaviour. Obviously this seems to be the way that these arahanthood when he says: “Monks, I am freed from all traps, divine and human. You too are freed from all traps, divine and human.”Even the compiler of the book who, obviously, belongs to a later period, though we do not know how later he may have been, confirms this usage when he says: “by that time there were sixty one arahants in the world.” (Vin I, 20-21) 2  See section called Etadagga-pāḷi in the Aṅguttara-nikāya for a detailed account of the areas of excellence and those arahants who were identified.

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differences have been understood in the tradition. If the differences, however, go beyond that and if such differences among the key disciples of the Buddha were so important as to influence the course of the sāsana I think it is worth discussing them. In undertaking to write this paper I believe that the personality differences between the great elders of the Theravada tradition have influenced its future path in a decisive manner. In fact, according to the tradition Ananda Thera was not an arahant until after the parinirvāṇa of the Buddha. Except his involvement in the first saṅgāyanā almost everything else we mention of him belongs to his life as a non-arahant. But there is no doubt that, in so far as the history of Theravada is concerned, Ananda was the most notable and influential non-arahant bhikkhu during and after the Buddha. The thesis of the paper is that the formation of Theravada tradition owes much to sharp personality differences and the resultant differences of the ways of living of the two elders Mahakassapa and Ananda. In order to support this thesis first I will make a study of the lives of the two elders including their function and role in the first saṅgayanā and subsequently I will show how some of the key trends in Theravada have their origin in the life and the philosophy of these two great elders.

Mahakassapa In the Theravada tradition the great elder Mahakassapa occupies a very special place. Though he is not the oldest nor is he one of the two highest among the disciples of the Buddha (namely, Sariputta and Moggallana) Mahakassapa has played a crucial role, quite different from the roles played by other important arahants, in the formation of the sāsana. For instance, the two highest disciples of the Buddha, Sariputta and Moggallana, have played a very important role in spreading the word of the Buddha and maintaining the stability of the sāsana. No doubt these leading disciples and many others with similar ranking were quite prominent during the time of the Buddha. Mahakassapa’s case, however, is different. Compared to other great disciples Mahakassapa’s physical presence was less visible among the Sangha for he had chosen to live in the forest during most of his monastic life although he made frequent visits to see the Buddha. In the history of Buddhism, however, his presence has been quite visible. At the parinirvāṇa of the Buddha Mahakassapa comes out of his seclusion and takes over the sāsana and lays the foundation of what has come to be known as Theravada.

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Although Mahakassapa was a disciple of the Buddha like any other his relationship with the latter seems somewhat different from that of other great or ordinary disciples. The usual nature of the relation between the Buddha and a disciple seems to have been characterized by a deep sense of respect on the part of the disciple and hence creating a distance from the master. With Mahakassapa, although he too had a great respect for the Buddha, relationship was closer in the sense that the latter had considered the former to be equal to him in some sense. There is a very interesting and unusual incident taking place between the Buddha and Mahakassapa right after the latter’s realization of arahanthood. It is the act of exchanging robes: the Buddha on seeing the fine upper robe offered to him by Kassapa as a seat-spread appreciates how refine it was. Upon this Kassapa offered his robe to the Buddha and he, in turn, gave Kassapa his own upper robe which was quite coarse and unrefined. In the Theravada tradition, of course, this is understood as a very special favour on the part of the Buddha bestowed on Mahakassapa. Apart from that, however, the tradition does not seem to attribute any further significance to this act. The later Mahayana tradition, however, seems to read this act in a different manner. According to the Chinese tradition Mahakassapa is believed to be the first patriarch who received the Buddha’s robe. It is significant that they believe that Ananda, who in turn received the transmission of Dhamma from Mahakassapa, is the second. The Mahayana idea seems to be in consonance with the later development of esoterism in the Buddhist tradition, but Theravada did not develop such an attitude and hence did not develop any particular individual monk to be the in-charge or owner of the Dhamma. Nevertheless, in the Theravada tradition too, it is recorded that Mahakassapa had the Buddha’s alms bowl in his possession as the de facto head of the sāsana and subsequently he chose Ananda to be his successor to receive the Buddha’s alms bowl (Nyanaponika and Hecker 1997, 132). The significance of the story, however, is that both Hinayana and Mahayana traditions accept the authority of Mahakassapa without debate. Another story that testifies to the high recognition that Mahakassapa enjoyed among the Buddhist traditions other than Theravada has been told by Hui Neng, the sixth patriarch of Mahayana tradition. The story (occurring in Taisho -1228) is as follows: Once the Buddha sitting in the middle of monks picked up a flower and raised it up. Of the monks gathered only Mahakassapa could understand the meaning of this act by the Buddha and smiled by way of response. It is

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said that through this silent conversation between the Master and the Disciple Zen tradition was born. The Theravada tradition does not highlight very much Maha Kassap’s wisdom as Mahayana seems to be doing. On the contrary, it highlights his austere way of life. Aṅguttara-nikāya contains a long list of disciples of the Buddha acclaimed as excelling in different aspects of religious life. While Sariputta, the first great disciple, is acclaimed as excelling in wisdom Mahakassapa is acclaimed as excelling in observing austere practices (dhutaṅga) (A I, 23). There are instances in the discourses that cause us to think that the Buddha considered Mahakassapa in some sense as worthy of acting on behalf of him. According to one discourse in the Saṃyutta-nikāya (section on Kassapa) the Buddha makes the folowing request from Mahakassapa: Exhort the Bhikkhus, Kassapa, give them a Dhamma talk. Either I should exhort the Bhikkhus, Kassapa, or you should. Either I should give them a Dhamma talk or you should. (S II, 203-204; Bodhi 2000, 667) When the Buddha says “either I or you, Kassapa...” the indication is that Mahakassapa is second only to the Buddha or it could even be interpreted as saying that both the Buddha and Mahakassapa are equal in this regard. In fact the commentary seems to come close to this second reading. It says: He (the Buddha) says this in order to appoint Mahakassapa to his own position. But weren’t Sariputta and Moggallana around? They were, but he thought: “They will not live much longer, but Kassapa will live until the age of 120. After my parinibbabāna he will hold a recital of the Dhamma and the Vinaya in the Sattapaṇṇi cave, and he will enable my Dispensation to endure for a full 5000 years. Let me appoint him to my own position. (SA II, 173) Whatever manner should we understand the statement one thing is clear: the Buddha has placed Mahakassapa on a position second only to that of himself. In another discourse the Buddha compares his higher attainments with those of Mahakassapa. These attainments include the four rūpa jhānas, four arūpa jhānas, various kinds of psychic power (iddhividha),

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divine ear, understanding the minds of other beings and persons, recollection of past births, divine eye and the taintless liberation of mind. The Buddha says: Bhikkhus, by the destruction of the taints, in this very life I enter and dwell in the taintless liberation of mind, liberation by wisdom, realizing it for myself with direct knowledge. Kassapa too by the destruction of the taints, in this very life enters and dwells in the taintless liberation of mind, liberation by wisdom, realizing it for himself with direct knowledge. (Bodhi 2000, 674) The discourse poses several problems about the nature of an arahant. The higher attainments listed here are usually described as common property of many arahants.3 If that is the case what is the meaning of the Buddha’s highlighting of Mahakassapa’s attainments in particular? Since Mahakassapa is a sāvaka of the Buddha like any other his realization is ultimately dependent on the guidance given by the Buddha. In this sense, he cannot be different from any other arahant. It is commonly accepted that there can be differences among arahants in so far their super-human attainments are concerned. But again the understanding given in most of the discourses is that anyone attaining arahanthood does so by achieving ‘three sciences’ (tisso vijjā). As described in the Mahāsaccaka-sutta (Majjhima-nikāya: 36), it is the same three sciences that the Buddha realized in attaining the Buddhahood. Therefore, there cannot be, according to the discourses, a difference among arahants in their destruction of taints, the final knowledge which completes one’s transfer from being an ordinary worldling (puthujjana) to a consummate noble person (ariya puggala). The attainment of arahanthood of any arahant is described in the words (quoted above) used by the Buddha in describing Mahakassapa’s attainment. Although all the arahants are similar to one another in being taintless, they could be different in their ability and mastery over some of the psychic attainments. In this sense one arahant can be considered as lower or higher to another arahant, not in kind but in degree. In fact, in describing Mahakassapa in those words, the discourse does not say anything new or extra-ordinary about him. Either the discourse says that Mahakassapa is equal to the Buddha in all respects, which is impossible, 3  Whether or not all the arahants have these attainments for their credit is an unresolved question in Theravada tradition. The early discourses do not seem to have clear position on this although the later commentarial tradition seems to have believed that what it calls sukkha-vipassaka (dry insight worker) is one who attains arahanthood without attaining jhānas.

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or it says that he is like any other arahant,·which is to make the discourses meaningless. We must not forget, however, that, describing the event of exchange of robes, the commentator describes Mahakassapa as ‘buddha paṭibhāga’ or ‘one comparable to the Buddha’ (Ibid 176). This indicates that the tradition placed Mahakassapa much higher than the other arahants, next only to the Buddha. In the tradition there are several other instances indicative of the very special status of Mahakassapa. As Mahakassapa himself describes, he was already a renunciant when he met the Buddha. He asks the Buddha to accept him as a sāvaka and the Buddha does so and instructs him. He says (S II, 221) that he achieved liberating knowledge on the eighth day of his admission to the sāsana. It is on this day that the Buddha exchanges robes with him. This, no doubt, is a very high honour conferred on the new comer (As we discussed earlier it had lot of implications for the later Buddhist tradition). In describing this extraordinary act, the commentary says: The Buddha exchanged the robe with the Elder saying: This robe worn out by wearing by the Tathāgata cannot be worn by one who has only a little virtue. This must be worn by one who is strong, capable of completing practice of virtues and a born-wearer of rag-robes (ThagA III, 135). The commentary further says that Mahakassapa also realized the gravity of the event; never became arrogant to think that there is nothing more to be achieved but stayed alone with the Buddha and attained arahanthood. In one of the dialogues with Ananda (which we will discuss in detail later) Mahakassapa reminds the latter of all the special ways the Buddha had treated him and the exalted position given to him. In addition to this, there is a belief that Mahakassapa was looking very much like the Buddha physically. According to a story occurring in the Pūjāvaliya, an ancient Sinhala literary work belonging to the 13th century (ch.34), due to this physical similarity, an elderly female devotee, who offered alms to Mahakassapa regularly, mistook the Buddha to be Mahakassapa and offered alms to the former. Not knowing what happened, Mahakassapa came after the Buddha to receive alms from the devotee. Recognizing her ‘mistake’ she took back what she offered to the Buddha and gave it to Mahakassapa. It is said that Mahakassapa felt very uncomfortable about the whole episode and as a result made a determination to live in the forest as long as the Buddha was alive. Another characteristic of the relation between the Master and the disciple emerges from an incident in which Mahakassapa is portrayed

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as not quite accepting but politely refusing a request made by the Buddha. At one point the Buddha makes the following suggestion to Mahakassapa: You are old now, Kassapa, and those worn-out hempen ragrobes must be burdensome for you. Therefore you should wear robes offered by householders, Kassapa, accept meals given on invitation and dwell close to me. (S II, 202; Bodhi 2000, 666) Mahakassapa responds to this by reminding the Buddha that he has been observing these practices for a long time in his life and that he has been doing so for his own happiness as well as out of kindness to the later generations. The Buddha withdraws his request and allows Mahakassapa to continue with his austere practices. The behaviour of Mahakassapa in this context is not typical of a disciple of the Buddha. Usually, what could have happened at this kind of occasion is that the disciple would abide by the request of the Master. We must not forget, however, that the issue does not involve any ethical or moral issue and, futhermore, Mahakassapa does not directly refuse the Buddha’s request. He simply makes his intentions very clear and the Buddha respects them. According to the Jātaka stories, Nyanaponika and Hecker maintain that Mahakassapa was connected with the Bodhisatva for nineteen times and of them six times as his father, two times as his brother and other times friend or teacher (Nyanaponika and Hecker 1977, 119). It is noteworthy that Mahakassapa in the past has had connections with Buddha only as his senior, superior or colleague but not as his junior or inferior. All this evidence points to one conclusion: the relationship between the Buddha and Mahakassapa was substantially different from the kind of relationship that is typical between the Master and a disciple. It is possible that at least some of the disciples of the Buddha were not very convinced of the high position occupied by Mahakassapa. An important clue is available in the comments made by the disgruntled nun Thullananda. The episode, which we will refer to again in our discussion of Ananda, is connected to Ananda’s wandering on tour in the area called Dakkhiṇagiri mostly with new recruits to the sāsana without much training. By the time the group returned Rajagaha a large number of these monks had left sāsana to return to lay life. Seeing this Mahakassapa reprimanded Ananda rather severely and called him a youngster who did not know his limits (Nyanaponika and Hecker 1977, 677).

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Hearing the conversation between the two elders, Thullananda, a nun who did not like Mahakassapa calling Ananda a youngster, expressed her displeasure by remarking: how can master Kassapa who was formerly a member of another sect (aññatitthiyapubbo samaṇo), think to disparage master Ananda ...? (emphasis added).4 This piece of gossip provides a glimpse of the kind of perception, at least, some of the disciples had towards Mahakassapa. Here again, if this statement is meant to say that Mahakassapa, before becoming a follower of the Buddha, was a follower of a different religious group it does not say anything extra-ordinary for there were many others like him who were former members of other religious groups. For instance, even the two chief disciples of the Buddha belonged to Sanjaya Belatthiputta’s group before they became the followers of the Buddha. But we do not find any similar remarks made on them. If so what is so special in Mahakassapa’s position to be singled out? A possible explanation of the situation is that Thullananda’s remark arises from the unusual manner Mahakassapa was admitted to the disciple-hood by the Buddha. In accepting Mahakassapa as a disciple it seems that the Buddha had to assert his superiority over the former by saying the following: Kassapa, if one who does not know and see should say to a disciple so single-minded as yourself: “I know, I see,” his head would split. But knowing Kassapa, I say, “I know, I see.” (Ray 1994, 678) The statement can be interpreted as the Buddha trying, so to say, to justify his position as the teacher of Mahakassapa. This is also somewhat unusual to the normal practice. As we saw in the discussion above there is no direct reference in the discourses that the Buddha gave him pabbajjā or upsampadā when he was accepted as a disciple. Mahakassapa was accepted as he was. Perhaps as a result of this Mahakassapa may have been perceived by others as still not totally belonging to the sāsana. He may have been perceived as some kind of outsider. As was noted earlier, the life of Mahakassapa was characterized by austerities. In the Theragāthā the following account attributed to Mahakassapa himself elaborates on his attitude to monastic life accompanied with unexpected experiences at times: 4  According to Mahāvastu, as reported by Reginald A. Ray, (2000, 106) the bhikkhunī does not stop at this; ‘she commits open insult against him by uncovering herself in front of him.

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Down from my mountain lodge I came one day And made my round for alms about the streets A leper there I saw eating his meal In (silent) courtesy I halted at his side. He with his hand all leprous and diseased Put in my bowl a morsel; as he threw, A finger, mortifying, broke and fell. Leaning against a wall I ate my shares Nor at the time nor after felt disgust For only he who takes as they come The scarps of food, medicine from excrement, The couch beneath the tree, the patchwork robe Stands as a man in north, south, east, or west. (Davids, Mrs 1980, 362; Verse 1054-7) The attitude to austere practices in the early monastic tradition seems to be one of accepting them as valuable but not making them compulsory or encouraging them for their own sake. In a well known incident Devadatta demanded that some of these practices be made compulsory for all monks for all the time which the Buddha refused (V II, 196-8). The Buddha’s response was that one may do or do not do according to one’s wish. There are instances (S II, 202-3), however, the Buddha joining Mahakassapa in praising those disciples of early times who followed such practices and expressing disappointment on the more recent disciples who, were not keen in following such practices. It is clear, however, that Mahakassapa’s unique point was that he made a life-long commitment to follow such austerities. This way of life, as we will see later in this discussion, is bound to have a great influence on the future shape of the sāsana. Another visible characteristic in Mahakassapa’s life was his lack of enthusiasm in the affairs of women. According to one discourse in the Saṃyutta-nikāya (S II, 214-7), which we will discuss again later) Mahakassapa was not very keen to visit bhikkhunīs. Ananda had to ask three times before he finally agreed to do so. The incident, however, ended up in a disaster when a nun called Thullatissa made a disparaging comment on Mahakassapa. According to the context of the event it is not clear whether the Bhikkhunī’s remarks are due to displeasure towards Mahakassapa or whether due to her high regards for Ananda. If it is the latter the bhikkhunī could have uttered a similar remark to anyone other than Ananda; Mahakassapa became victim merely by accident. There

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is another incident referred to earlier in which, hearing Mahakassapa making some critical comments on Ananda, a nun called Thullananda expressed her disapproval in very strong terms. This incident too may be due to the high regards the nun had toward Ananda. Or the events could be due to some less than favourable attitude the particular nuns had toward Mahakassapa. When we couple these episodes with Mahakassapa’s apparent reluctance to teach bhikkhunīs we may assume that he was not very enthusiastic about bhikkhunīs in particular and womenfolk in general.5 Mahakassapa’s position as the head of the Sangha is highlighted at the instance of the parinirvāṇa of the Buddha. The Mahāparinibbānasutta of the Dīgha-nikāya says that people could not kindle the funeral pyre of the Buddha till Mahakassapa arrived in there with his group from his forest abode. Once he arrived in there and saluted the feet of the Buddha, the Sutta says, the pyre got kindled automatically. It is clear, from the cremation of the Buddha onwards Mahakassapa took over as the leader of the Sangha. The subsequent incidents such as the first council took place under the direct guidance and direction of Mahakassapa. This, however does not mean that Mahakassapa started occupying the place of the Buddha. It only shows that he was accepted by the Sangha as the ‘Saṅghathera’ or the eldest in the group (More on this issue later).

Ananda If Mahakassapa is the embodiment of austerity, solitude and aloofness from society Ananda represents almost the total opposite: busy city life immersed in public relations and social engagements. The two eminent elders seem to occupy two different poles in the monastic life. We will come to this comparison later. Initially an account of Ananda as the chief attendant of the Buddha, treasurer of the Dhamma and the champion of the bhikkhunī sāsana is called for. Ananda becomes prominent in the sāsana mainly for two reasons: for being the attendant of the Buddha and for keeping in memory what the Buddha said or the word of the Buddha (Buddha vacana). According to the tradition, Ananda was appointed by the Buddha to the position of his attendant fulfilling an aspiration he has been cherishing for a long 5  The tradition has that although Mahakassapa, as a wealthy householder, got married to an equally wealthy lady they, by mutual consent, did not have any physical contact.

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time in his samsaric existence. In accepting the position, according to the Vinaya, Ananda came forth with a set of eight conditions. The Buddha accepted these conditions and ever since Ananda was the disciple physically closest to the Buddha attending to his daily needs, arranging meetings with the Buddha for those who came to visit him and serving as the intermediary between the Buddha and the rest. In the list of disciples excelling in various aspects of the sāsana life, Ananda was acclaimed the highest among those who are learned (bahussuta), mindful (satimanta), with good behavior (gatimanta), resolute (dhitimanta)6 and attending (on the Buddha) (upaṭṭhāka) (A I, 24-25; Woodward 1797, 19-20). Being closest to the Buddha naturally Ananda had most opportunities to hear what the Buddha said. Since Ananda, as the attendant to the Buddha, went everywhere the Buddha went again he was the most obvious choice for keeping in mind what the Buddha said. In a rare case when Ananda was not present with the Buddha, the latter would say to former what he had taught in his absence. In this manner Ananda became the most ‘heard’ (bahussuta) monk in the sāsana and naturally he was described as the ‘treasurer of the Dhamma’ (dhamma bhaṇḍāgārika). As the closest disciple of the Buddha, Ananda played a decisive role in persuading the Buddha to establish the bhikkhunī sāsana. The story of bhikkhunī sāsana as told in the early Buddhist sources is beset with problems. The impression given in the Vinaya Cullavagga, which is the basic source of the event, is that the Buddha agreed to establish the order for bhikhuṇīs simply and solely because he could not escape from persuasive Ananda. According to the report in the Vinaya, Maha Pajapati Gotami, the step-mother of the Buddha, had asked for permission from the Buddha when he was staying at Kapilavatthu, his native place, to receive ordination (pabbajjā) which the Buddha had refused even for the third time. Gotami did not give up her hopes and went, accompanied by a large number of similar-minded ladies, by walking to Vesali where the Buddha was subsequently residing, and waited outside of the place where she was hoping for a change of mind of the Buddha. Seeing Gotami in a depressed and sad mood Ananda offered to speak on behalf of her on the matter. He made a strong appeal for Gotami’s case reminding the Buddha that she was the one who really brought him up in the absence of his real mother. The Buddha would not be convinced and he would 6  The term ‘gatimanta’ is rendered as one who has mastery over the sequential structure of the teaching and ‘dhitimanta’ as steadfast in study (Nyanaponika and Hecker 1997, 169).

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refuse Ananda’s request even for the third time. Finally Ananda puts the crucial question to the Buddha, namely, whether or not a woman is capable of realizing the four stages of arahanthood in the sāsana. To this the Buddha gives a categorical and an affirmative answer, and if it was the case, the Buddha did not seem to have alternative but to agree to Ananda’s request (Vin II, 253). Consequently, it is quite natural that bhikkhunīs had developed a sense of great respect and indebtedness towards Ananda. It is also quite natural that, as we will be looking at in detail shortly, that some bhikkhunīs were not willing to see or hear anything that they perceived as damaging to their revered ‘patron saint’. The two instances connected with Mahakassapa and some bhikkhunīs need to be understood in this context. Encounters between Ananda and Mahakassapa are quite unique in Theravada tradition in the sense that they highlight glimpses into personality differences between two key disciples of the Buddha. We know that in the Vinaya there are references to ‘bad’ monks who found some way or other to behave notoriously. They are duly criticized by both good monks and the Buddha. In the discourses we find some monks such as Sati (M I, 256) and Ariṭṭha (M I, 130) who held wrong views, and they have been duly reprimanded by the Buddha or by fellow monks. What we have with Mahakassapa and Ananda, however, is quite different. The differences between Mahakassapa and Ananda do not involve any violation of Vinaya rules; nor do they involve any wrong views or wrong presentation of the Dhamma. What we witness is personality differences between two eminent disciples of the Buddha, one as an arahant and the other as a stream-winner. There are two discourses, which we have already referred to, in the section reserved for the sermons related to Mahakasssapa (Kassapa saṃyutta), of the Saṃyutta-nikāya (S II, 194-225), which betray such differences. The first of the two discourses contains the episode of Mahakassapa visiting reluctantly a bhikkhunī monastery in order to preach doctrine to bhikkhunīs. At the end of the sermon a nun called Thullatissa made the following disparaging remark. How can Master Mahakassapa think of speaking on the Dhamma in the presence of Master Ananda, the Vedehan sagethis is just as if a needle-peddler would think he could sell a needle to a needle-maker. (Bodhi 2000, 336) Mahakassapa overhears this and expresses his displeasure at this rudeness whereupon Ananda said to former: “Be patient, Kassapa, women are

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foolish”. Mahakassapa seems to understand this remark as an effort to defend the wrong-doer nun and warns Ananda sternly: “Hold it, friend Ananda! Don’t give the Sangha occasion to investigate you further”, and goes on to remind Ananda that it is he, and not Ananda, that was praised very highly by the Buddha in the presence of the Sangha as being capable of attainments similar to those of the Buddha himself. Here Mahakassapa refers to an earlier occasion, discussed above, when Mahakassapa’s higher attainments were compared by the Buddha with those of himself. Finally Mahakassapa concludes: Friend, one might just as well think that a bull elephant seven or seven and half cubits high could be concealed by a palm leaf as think that my six direct knowledges could be concealed. (Bodhi 2000, 676) If the remarks were to come from a non-arahant, one could well suspect signs of a ‘power struggle’ dormant in these remarks. It is not easy for us to make a judgment about the actual intention or the tone of the conversation. Since Mahakassapa is an arahant, we know, according to the tradition, that he is incapable of reverting to ‘dosa’ or anger which he has eradicated in attaining arahanthood. Therefore it is possible that the words were uttered in kindness, but there cannot be any doubt about the strongness and the critical character of the expression (highlighted above) and the reprimanding ‘tone’ contained in the repeated series of questions put to Ananda by Mahakassapa reminding him of the great attainments achieved by himself. One could well argue that all these are signs that Mahakassapa had such a great ego and arrogance, but this is not possible for an arahant. It is possible that Mahakassapas’ strong remarks come not only from this incident but also from his prior impression that Ananda had too much involvement with bhikkhunīs, and in his capacity as one next only to the Buddha naturally the great Elder was concerned about the overall welfare of the sāsana. Being only a stream-winner, however, it is, at least theoretically, possible that Ananda could be vulnerable to this kind of laxity in behaviour. But, again, as we saw earlier Ananda is one who has been acclaimed by the Buddha as the highest among those who are with good behaviour and resolute character, among other qualities. Besides, there is evidence to the very strong moral character of Ananda. According to an instance occurring in the Aṅguttara-nikāya (A II, 144-6) once a bhikkhunī wanted to seduce Ananda and sent for him saying that she was not well and wished to see him. Once at the bhikkhunī’s residence Ananda realized her real intention and admonished her on the futility of sexual gratification,

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helped her calm her mind and left himself intact. It looks that his good looks attracted many a opposite sex to Ananda. But the Theravada texts do not contain anything suggestive of any laxity on the part of Ananda. The episode described in the second discourse (referred to earlier) happens when Ananda returns from a tour in Dakkhiṇagiri with a group of his pupils. In the course of this tour some thirty younger disciples of Ananda who were not well-grounded in the sāsana reverted to household life. Having returned to Rajagaha Ananda visits Mahakassapa and the following conversation takes place: Friend Ananda, for how many reasons did the Blessed One lay down the rule that bhikkhus should not take meal among families in groups of more than three? The Blessed One had laid down this rule for three reasons, Kassapa Thera: for retraining ill-behaved persons and for the comfort of well-behaved bhikkhus, (with the intention) ‘May those of evil wishes, by forming faction, not create a schism in the Sangha! and out of sympathy towards families. It is for these three reasons, Kassapa Thera, that the Blessed One laid down this rule. Then why, friend Ananda, are you wandering about with these young bhikkhus who are unguarded in their sense faculties, immoderate in eating, and not devoted to wakefulness? One would think you were wandering about trampling on crops; one would think you are wandering about destroying families. Your retinue is breaking apart, friend Ananda, your young followers are slipping away. But still this youngster does not know his measure! Ananda’s response to the comments was the following: Grey hairs are growing on my head, Kassapa Thera. Can’t we escape being called a youngster by Mahakassapa Thera? (Bodhi 2000, 677) It is having heard this conversation that bhikkhunī Thullananda alluded to the fact that Mahakassapa formerly belonged to another religious group (which we discussed earlier). In the explanation that follows Mahakassapa gives a detailed account of his faith in the Buddha, on the special manner the Buddha treated him by exchanging robes with him (S II, 21) and how the Buddha acknowledged his higher attaihments.

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Looking at this second episode, we can see that Mahakassapa’s accusation to Ananda comes for some justifiable reasons. Ananda’s decision to go on a tour with a group of young and immature monks seems to be an act resulting from lack of responsibility. But, since we are not told of Ananda’s side of the story, we are not in a position to judge one way or the other. Calling Ananda youngster who does not know his limits, however, is a very severe accusation for which there is no textual support. The remarks made by Ananda in turn, nevertheless, show how frustrated he was at being called a youngster. The first council that took place three months after the parinirvāṇa of the Buddha was headed by Mahakassapa and it is yet another important series of events that shed light on the two personalities. Having decided to hold the council, the members of the Sangha asked Mahakassapa to select participants for the purpose. He selected 499 arahants. At this point monks said the following to Mahakassapa: Honoured Sir, this Ananda, although he is still a learner, could not be one to follow a wrong course through desire, anger, delusion, fear; and he has mastered much Dhamma and discipline under the Lord. Well, now, honoured sir, let the elder select Ananda Thera as well. (Horner 1975, 394) Mahakassapa selected Ananda accordingly. Ananda played a major role in being the key resource person for the basket of discourses (sutta piṭaka). At the end of the whole process, Ananda informed the Sangha that the Buddha at his last moment allowed the monks to abolish lesser and minor rules of training. Then there arose a question as to what were these ‘lesser and minor rules of training’. The group could not come to a consensus. At this juncture Mahakassapa reminded the Sangha that there were Vinaya rules which affect householders and since they are aware of them, if the Sangha were to abolish some of these rules people would criticize the Sangha saying that the disciples of the Buddha have changed the Vinaya rules once their Master is gone and brings forth the following motion: If it seems right to the Order, the Order should not lay down what has not been laid down, nor should it abolish what has been laid down. It should proceed in conformity with and according to the rules of training that have been laid down. (Horner 1975, 399) The Sangha passed this motion and thus a tradition of Theravada

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was born which, up to this date, remains unchanged formally by the Theravada Sangha. Right after passing the motion, however, the elders gathered accused Ananda of minor offence (dukkaṭa) of not making clear this issue from the Buddha and demanded that he must confess. Ananda agreed to confess, but said that he does not think that it amounts to a minor offence for he could not do so solely out of lack of mindfulness. Subsequently, the Sangha came out with another list of what they thought to be minor offences on the part of Ananda. They are; (i) that he sewed the Buddha’s robe for the rains sitting on it; (ii) that he had the Buddha’s body first of all honoured by women who defiled the Buddha’s body by their tears; (iii) that he did not invite the Buddha to live longer even when the Buddha was alluding to the possibility very clearly; and (iv) that he made an effort for the going forth of women in the Dhamma and Discipline proclaimed by the Buddha. To the first accusation Ananda responds by saying that although he did so, it was not out of disrespect; for the second he said that he had to give priority to women for it was not proper to let the women be there at the site of parinibbāna at an improper time; for the third he said he forgot to invite the Buddha for his mind was possessed by Mara; and for the last on initiating the bhikkhunī Order he said that he did so out of kindness for Maha Pajapati Gotami, the foster-mother of the Buddha. On these issues Ananda’s position was that none amounted to a minor wrong doing, nonetheless, he would confess out of respect for the Sangha. The first saṅgāyanā seems not only the first effort at organizing the word of the Buddha to form an accepted version of it but also the formal beginning of the tradition that subsequently came to be known as Theravada. The attitudes expressed and the decisions made at this meeting seem to have had tremendous influence in determining the subsequent history of the organization. The account in the Cullavagga, discussed above, makes it abundantly clear that the two key personalities in the whole exercise were Mahakassapa and Ananda (Although Upali Thera was the resource person for the Vinaya he does not seem to be emerging prominently). In the next section we will discuss the implications of the first saṅgāyanā on the history of Buddhism in more detail.

Doctrinal and historical implications It must be clear from the above discussion that both Mahakassapa and Ananda are among the most prominent in the sāsana and they

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encounter each other in sāsana-activities quite often. It is ultimately on these two individuals the future path of the sāsana rested. Some of the developments which still affect the nature of the sāsana may justifiably be traced to the personality differences of these two elders. As we noted earlier, Mahakassapa was basically a forest-dwelling monk who practiced austere ways of living. Secluded life away from crowds was the outstanding character of his behaviour. Ananda was the complete opposite of this and he represented the urban city living in an environment of established monasticism. The two modes of life, city living and forest living have been there from the beginning of the sāsana. The exact attitude of early Buddhists to forest living is hard to determine even though it seem to have been taken as the ideal. For instance, when one receives upasampadā (formal acceptance to the Sangha), one is reminded of the four requisites of monastic life, namely, rag robe, alms food, urine-medicine and living in the forest as the ideal although other kinds of requisites given by house holders are also acceptable (V I, 96). However, the Buddha’s somewhat negative response to Devadatta’s request to make compulsory these practices and abstaining from meat eating reveals that these practices are only optional. It is said that some religious people adhere to austerities in order to attract attention and thereby to increase their gains. Sariputta, described by a modern writer as “paradigmatic saint of settled monasticism,” (Ray 2000, 131) says that what really matters is not whether one lives in a village or in a forest but whether or not one is seen or heard to have defilements in his behaviour (Ñānamoli and Bodhi 2009, 112). Somewhat opposite sentiment has been expressed by the Buddha in responding to some remarks made by Mahakassapa7 on the deteriorated character of the Sangha at that time. When Mahakassapa said that now the bhikkhus are difficult to admonish, the Buddha responded by saying that bhikkhus in the past were forest dwellers, alms-food eaters, rag-robe wearers and so on and that they spoke in praise of such practices but it is no more (S II, 208). Here the Buddha is seen talking very highly of these qualities and practices which Sariputta thought some people could 7  In discussing an instance when a nun supportive of Ananda disparages Mahakasspa for being harsh on Ananda, Raynold A. Ray sees a pattern in this kind of behaviour of city dwelling monks toward forest dwellers. It is an aspect of this pattern that city dwelling monks level “vicious and unfair attacks on forest monks”. In this particular case, it is Ananda who was thought to be responsible. Although Mahakassapa happened to be a forest dweller and Ananda a city dweller it is hard to imagine that these particular events were triggered owing to this conflict. At least we do not have evidence to support this conclusion.

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misuse. Taking all these occurrences together we have to conclude that the early Buddhist stand on the issue is at best inconclusive. The two modes of living have been there with the Sangha up till today with all the tensions seen from the time of the Buddha. As the current practice has evolved, in the Theravada tradition, the practice of forest-dwelling (araññavāsi (Pali) or āranyavāsin (Sanskrit) is seen to be the ideal but practiced by only a few. Those others who are citydwellers (gāmavāsi (Pali) or grāmavāsin (Sanskrit) see themselves as falling behind the ideal but show, however, their allegiance to the ideal by organizing or joining with the laity in making pilgrimages to these places or by arranging dāna every year or so to those who live in forest hermitages. As we know, the Buddha himself was not a forest dweller; but he had a period of six years in the forest before he attained the Buddhahood. Having attained the Buddhahood it was meaningless for him to be in the forest for the very idea of the attainment was to teach people to make an end to their suffering. In this sense, living in the forest exclusively was not meaningful for even an arahant. Once attained arahanthood one has to show, out of kindness, the path to others. Even from Mahakassapa’s life we know that he was not an absolute forest dweller. The very fact that we talk about him or any one of that sort is that they bring their experience back to people. If one were to be in the forest absolutely without having anything to do with the society then there is nothing for us to talk about him. According to the Vinaya, for a monk to be exclusively in the forest (not withstanding the fact that survival in such manner is very doubtful) without having himself located within a particular Sangha is impossible; he must mingle with the rest of his group at least every fortnight to perform uposatha.8 Although it is theoretically possible for a group of monks to organize itself exclusively as a forest group which has nothing to do with lay society, it does not seem to have happened for practical reasons. The meaning of the practice, thus, seems to be serving a practical purpose, namely, retiring into forest as a means of re-strengthening one’s inner balance. Although Mahakassapa, who climbed the mountain every day and enjoyed in being in jhāna, (Higher states of mind characterized by calmness, purity and gradually increasing aloofness from sensory perceptions) seems to be the ‘extreme’ 8  Uposatha is the practice, prescribed by the Buddha for the upasampadā monks, of getting together every fortnight to confess the disciplinary violations if any and listen to the Pātimokkha (code of disciplinary rules to be observed by monks who have received upasampadā or the higher ordination) recited by a capable member of the group. The practice is meant to assure the purity as well as the solidarity of the Sangha.

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example we have from the time of the Buddha, he himself was not without social engagements in his own way.9 Ananda’s entire religious life seems to have been devoted for social engagements, namely, working for others including primarily the Buddha, with probably no records of forest dwelling at all. Both are eminent disciples of the Buddha in their own ways. The monk’s life today may well be described as one oscillating between these two great disciples of the Buddha. The idea that one who enters the sāsana has to engage in either in what is called the ‘yoke of text’ (gantha-dhura) or the ‘yoke of insight’ (vipassanā-dhura) seems to be a development belonging to the period after the Buddha. The commentaries, however, want us to believe that this division was already existent during the Buddha’s time itself (Bhante ahaṃ mahallakakāle pabbajito ganthadhuraṃ pūretuṃ na sakhissāmi, vipassanādhuraṃ pana pūressāmi, kammaṭṭhānaṃ me katheta: DhpA I, 8). It is not hard to imagine that there was some kind of organized effort, while the Buddha was still alive, to memorize what the Buddha said. But if we go by the Cullavagga record of the first council we see in it the real beginnings of an institutional effort to organize and preserve the word of the Buddha. The reason was basically religious: once the Buddha attained parinirvāṇa it was the dhamma that occupied the place of the Master. When the Buddha was alive one could go to the Buddha if there was any doubt about any matter relating to the Dhamma or the Vinaya. Now it was the very Dhamma and the Vinaya as taught and enacted by the Buddha left to be consulted (Yo vo ānanda mayā dhammo ca vinayo ca desito paññatto so vo mam’ accayen satthā: D II, 154). Hence the need to make the Dhamma and the Vinaya readily available in order to be consulted. The leading role played in the whole process by Ananda, who was acclaimed by the Buddha as possessing the highest learnedness (bahussuta) and memory (satimanta), is clear. This does not mean that Mahakassapa was away from textual interests. In fact, it is he who initiated the first council. And according to the Sumaṅgalavilāsinī (the commentary to the Dīgha-nikāya) account of the first council the Vinaya and the each division of the Canon was assigned to the leading arahants and their pupils, and thus Saṃyutta-nikāya was assigned to Mahakassapa and his pupils for preservation through memory (DA I, 15). Judging by the overall behaviour and attitudes of Mahakassapa it may be more accurate to assume that the circumstances after the parinirvāṇa of the Buddha forced him to take interest in these matters. Otherwise, 9  Mahakassapa’s dislike for the wealthy, including the divine beings, and kindness to the poor, the deprived and the sick is clear in the events recorded in discourses.

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he was more prone to meditation which was the main preoccupation in forest life. In the gāthās (stanzas) attributed to him (in the Theragāthā) nothing is mentioned about his being learned or anything related to studies. Instead a lot is mentioned in praise of secluded meditative life. The two yokes mentioned seem to have been incorporated into a broad scheme of concepts encompassing all the aspects of Buddhist life, namely, the idea of threefold sāsana, namely, pariyatti or study of the Canon, paṭipatti or the practice and paṭivedha or the realization. As commentaries report, there arose during the reign of Vaṭṭagāmiṇi Abhaya among the Sri Lanka Sangha a debate as to which aspect of the sāsana is more critical. The debate arose among the pānsukulikas (wearers of rag robes) and dhammakathikas (preachers of the Dhamma), a development in the Theravada comparable to ganthadhura and vipassanādhura or araññavāsi and gāmavāsi referred to earlier, when everybody including the monks had to suffer owing·to a long-lasting famine and a series of foreign invasions. Consequently, the practice of memorization of the Dhamma became almost extinct in the country. Finally, when the situation regained normalcy those who survived got together and arranged to write the word of the Buddha preserved up to that time in memory. Naturally, this was an occasion when the memorization of the Dhamma appeared to be very crucial for the existence of the sāsana. It is on this background the debate arose among the monks. In the debate dhammakathikas won the day by establishing that the practice of the Dhamma is impossible in the absence of knowledge what the Dhamma is (AA I, 92). Adikaram thinks that this turn of events marks a significant shift in attitudes of the early Sri Lanka Sangha, a shift not very desirable for the spiritual wellbeing of the Organization. He comments on the outcome of the debate: Practice was relegated to the background and preaching gained supremacy. The Sutta defeated the Vinaya. How different this was from the older attitude! Vinayo nāma sāsanassa āyu” Vinaya is the very life of the religion of the Buddha cried out in bold terms the theras of old. The change in attitude although no attention has been paid to it in the commentaries, is of the utmost importance in the history of Theravada Buddhism. This school of Buddhism claims its descent from Upali, the greatest Vinayadhara among the disciples of the Buddha. Mahinda, too, the founder of this school in Ceylon insisted of the Vinaya by a Ceylonese bhikkhu as it was only then he maintained, that the

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sāsana would take root in Ceylon. Mahinda’s Buddhism was religion predominantly of practice, and the victory, mentioned above, of Suttanta over Vinaya would not have been one after the heart of the great missionary. (Adikaram 1946, 77-78) The same series of events are perceived quite differently by Walpola Rahula, another eminent scholar in the history of Buddhism in Sri Lanka. Rahula does not see any signs of decadence in these events, as Adikaram does. Rahula dismisses Adikaram’s attitude as one “of a devotee lamenting over the “degeneration” and “corruption” of the Faith” (Rahula 1993, xi). These two rather polar views held by two of the eminent scholars of modern Theravada are indicative of the persistence of the division up till today. In this manner, the two vocations (dhura) and the two modes of living (in gāma or in ārañña) have been persistent in the sāsana throughout. Although the particular ways of description and establishment of categories came later, one can see the seeds of these historical developments in Mahakassapa and Ananda. Another important Theravada perception that continues up till today is its attitude toward women in general and the sāsana of the Bhikkhunīs in particular. It is a historical fact that the Order of bhikkhunīs is long discontinued in the Theravada tradition. The stalwarts of the Theravada have always maintained, following the Vinaya, that re-introduction of higher ordination upasampadā for bhikkhunīs is impossible without an already existent bhikkhunī Sangha. This standpoint comes fundamentally from two positions, both advocated and upheld by Mahakassapa. One is the attitude of the Sangha headed by Mahakassapa at the first council on the issue of changing the minor rules. As we saw earlier, at the end of the formal recitation of the canon10 Ananda informs the Sangha that the Buddha before his parinirvāṇa had given permission to abolish the minor rules if the Sangha so desired. At this there arose a question as to what the minor rules were. The elders could not come to an agreement. It is in this state of indecision that Mahakassapa proposed that the Sangha should not abolish any of the 10  Some scholars such as Steven Collins are of the view that the Pali Canon was put together in Sri Lanka by the Sangha of the Mahavihara as a response to the challenging situation created by the newly arisen Abhayagiri sect (1990, 89-126). While it could be believed that the controversy between the two monasteries had something to do with committing the canon into writing the canon itself may taken to have given at least its initial form and continued to be understood in that manner ever since the first council held right after the parinirvāṇa of the Buddha, the first time the monks realized that the Master was no more to go and consult, so his Dhamma had to be organized in an orderly manner.

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already existing rules; nor should the Sangha approve any new rules that have not been enacted by the Master. The members of the first council accepted this by maintaining silence. It is important to note that the Theravada tradition still upholds this decision for it has not been changed or abolished although in the history they have had several councils ever since.11 In understanding the position of the present Theravada leaders we need to keep in mind this historical tradition. In fact, the Theravada Sangha is still bound by the decision made at the first council, and by not approving the re-establishment of bhikkhunī sāsana the Theravadins are merely adhering to an age-old historical tradition (although whether or not doing so is the morally right thing to do is a different matter). It is clear that the strong Vinaya emphasis adhered to by the Theravada is mainly due to Mahakassapa. Although the Sangha accepted the proposal of the Great Elder still they accused Ananda of a minor offence of not making it clear from the Buddha and this move shows that at least some of the elders were not unwilling to change or abolish some of the rules. The other is the general attitude to women held by the elders at the first council. In our study of Mahakassapa we found that he was not enthusiastic about teaching Dhamma to bhikkhunīs. Two instances in which he agreed to do so he had to be coaxed to it by Ananda, and both incidents ended in disaster. These incidents also suggest that the dislike between Mahakassapa and bhikkhunīs was mutual. Now in the first council, as we saw earlier, one of the charges brought forth by the elders against Ananda was that it was wrong for him to make women, who soiled the body of the Buddha with their tears, pay their homage before others. This can be interpreted as resulting from the popular perception supported by Brahmanism that women must not be accorded a honour over men. Ananda’s response reveals his awareness of realities of life and respect for social norms. The other charge which has direct bearing on the issue is that he persuaded the Buddha to establish the bhikkhunī Order. This charge strongly suggests that the majority of the senior members of the Sangha did not like the existence of the bhikkhunī Order. Although this charge against Ananda is given as coming from the elders and not directly from Mahakassapa who was the head of the council it is imaginable that it was fully approved by the latter. This historical event that took place at the first council surely has been instrumental in determining the subsequent behaviour of the Theravada with regard 11  When the Burmese named their 1955 council the sixth, they acknowledged five previous councils: three in India, the fourth in Sri Lanka in the 1st century BC. and the fifth in Burma (present Myanmar) during the reign of king Min Dong.

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to the Bhikkhuni Order. It is clear that the attitude still exists. Ananda as the patron of the Bhikkhuni Order did not think what he did by initiating the Bhikkhuni Order was wrong. The subsequent history of Theravada, however, shows that Mahakassapa’s opinion has prevailed over that of Ananda. Earlier we referred to how Mahakassapa was accepted by the Sangha as the saṅgha-thera after the parinibbāna of the Buddha. The Mahaparinibbana-sutta account reveals how Mahakassapa took over the leadership of the Sangha right after the parinibbāna of the Buddha. It is necessary to understand this development in the context the assertion made by the Buddha before his parinibbāna to the effect had after him the Dhamma he taught and the Vinaya he promulgated will be the teacher. Some times, this is understood as the Buddha rejecting a leadership in the form of an appointed person for the Sangha. I think that this is a misunderstanding. The issue in the Mahāparinibbāna-sutta is the possible anxiety on the part of the disciples that once the Buddha is gone they would be left teacher-less. The word used here is satthā which is usually used to refer to the Buddha himself. The Buddha makes the following statement: Ananda, it is possible that the following occurs to you: ‘the teaching no longer has a teacher, there is no teacher for us’ (atītasatthukaṃ pāvacanaṃ ṅ’atthi no satthāti) (D II, 154). Ananda, it should not be understood in that manner; Ananda, the doctrine I have explained and the discipline I have prescribed will be your teacher at my passing. In making this statement what the Buddha does is to elevate the Dhamma and the Vinaya to the position of the satthā. In fact, no one including the Buddha could ‘appoint’ another as the satthā for, in order for this to happen, that other person has to be a Buddha himself. If the other person was himself a Buddha, question would not arise. But this difficulty cannot arise in appointing one to the position of Sanghathera. What really seems to have happened after the parinibbāna of the Buddha is somewhat similar to the second. A revealing discussion occurs in the Gopaka Moggallana-sutta (M III, 7-15) initially between Ananda and Brahmin Gopakamoggallana and subsequently between the former and Vassakara, the Chief Minster of King Ajatasatthu. Gopaka Moggallana asks from Ananda whether there was any single monk “who possesses in each and every way all those qualities that were possessed by master Gotama.” To this, Ananda replies in the negative. Subsequently,

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Vassakara enters the discussion and asks from Ananda whether there is any one monk appointed by the Buddha or by the Sangha as the refuge of the Sangha once he is gone. To this Ananda replied in the negative and explained that this did not mean that they were without refuge and that they had the Dhamma taught by the Buddha as their refuge. Being satisfied with explanation the Brahmin asks a further question, namely: Is there, Master Ananda, any single bhikkhu whom you now honour, respect, revere, and venerate, and on whom you live in dependence honouring and respecting him? (Bodhi 1995, 882) Ananda’s response to this question was in the affirmative. What this discussion makes very clear is that although there is no any other person equal to the Buddha, there were many who were revered as virtuous monks whom the rest of the monks respected and depended on. The case with Mahakassapa is similar to this. He was not the Master but he was the most respected of all. Some could take this case of Buddha’s not appointing a successor to himself and trace all the maladies of the Buddhist tradition to it. This is not reasonable for what the Buddha did not appoint was a teacher replacing or on behalf of himself, which is technically impossible. As Ananda himself admits, there was none equal to the Buddha in all respects for such a person himself has to be a Sammā-sambuddha. What is possible, however, is that there can be a leader for the Sangha. In fact, as Ananda explains later in the discussion, the Sangha in each locality comes together under the guidance of a saṅgha-thera in the group and recite the Vinaya in every fortnight and abide by it. This allows for a decentralized self-rule among various groups of the Sangha. On the same grounds, it is also possible to have a Sangha-thera appointed by the entire Sangha to be the leader of the whole group. The idea that the Buddha’s reluctance to appoint any one single bhikkhu as the successor to himself as the Sammā-sambuddha should not be taken as indicating that the Buddha did not allow for a leadership in the Sangha. Mahakassapa exemplified this possibility. It is well known that the Theravada tradition lays more emphasis on Vinaya. The strict adherence to Vinaya has been seen as its hallmark. As we saw above Mahakassapa’s decision not to abolish any of the rules prescribed by the Buddha and not to formulate any new rules crystallizes this attitude. It does not seem that the modern scholarship has paid sufficient attention to this phenomenon. I, nevertheless, believe that

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this trend has had far reaching implications on the overall character of the Theravada tradition. In the first Saṅgāyanā, according to the Cullavagga account, Mahakassapa chooses, with the consent of the rest, Vinaya to be recited first. The account of the event given in the commentaries is somewhat different. In it Mahakassapa is seen asking from his fellow elders as to what they should recite first. The answer he gets from them is as follows: “Venerable Sir, Kassapa, the Vinaya is the life of the sāsana; the sāsana exists when the Vinaya does” (DA I, 11). Here the primacy of the Vinaya is asserted by the rest of the Sangha but not by Mahakassapa. Whatever that may be, this emphasis seems to be closer to Mahakassapa’s sentiments than to those of Ananda. In the first glance one cannot see anything wrong with this emphasis on Vinaya. In the long run, however, this move can be interpreted as taking the Vinaya on its own disregarding the Dhamma basis of it. In fact, as has been shown by scholars such as Jotiya Dhirasekere,12 the Vinaya gets its validity and meaning from the Dhamma. In this sense, the real life of the sāsana is not the Vinaya but the Dhamma, and hence one could well say that both the sāsana and the Vinaya will exist if the Dhamma were to exist. The subsequent developments in the Vinaya show how, at times, the Theravada tradition found ways and means to manage to do whatever they wished to do without changing the letter of the Vinaya rule. The spirit of the Vinaya really lies in the Dhamma; but in some later developments one could clearly see that not too much care has been given to retain the spirit. Mahakassapa’s move to recite the Vinaya first, according to Cullavagga account, may be because he felt that Ananda cannot be given the key position over Upali who has been an arahant much before the former. But the matter seems to be going beyond this consideration to the personal history of the two elders. As we observed earlier it is possible that there was an element of difference in perspectives between the two elders. If that was the decisive factor in reciting the Vinaya before the Dhamma, the implications seem to go far beyond personal matters of the two elders. One could argue that ‘sāsana’ in this context did not mean the dispensation of the Buddha in the broad sense of the term, but simply the monastic organization. Granting this, still it seems that what is meant is only the male Sangha (bhikkhu but not bhikkhunī Sangha). Certainly the ‘bhikkhu-parisa’ alone, not the ‘catu-parisa’ (four groups) together, has played the key 12  In this valuable contribution to Vinaya studies, Dhirasekera (1984) brilliantly establishes how Vinaya was founded on the Dhamma and how it derives its validity from the same source.

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role. This may have seen natural and acceptable in the context. On the other hand, there is no doubt that the organization depended on its members’ adherence to its legal code. It makes perfect sense that the life of the sāsana as an organization is its code of law. If we understand the statement in this sense, that too says a lot about the nature and the way of thinking of the elders. It is clear that this move was instrumental in making decisive changes in the events of the future sāsana. As is evident from the subsequent commentarial literature, the end result of this emphasis was a monastic organization which lay more emphasis on the letter than on the spirit of theVinaya, namely, Dhamma.

Conclusion The personality, attitudes and the behaviour of the two great elders not only shaped the history of the sāsana at its formative years but also it continues to do so even at present. As we saw earlier all the traditional modes of monastic life of the Sangha such as, gāmavāsi and araññavāsi (busy life of social service in the city and solitary and meditative life in the forest), dhammakathika and pamsukūlika (life of comfort and ease and life of austerity characterized by wearing rag-robes and feeding Oil alms-food), and ganthadhura and vipassanadhura (life of erudition and learnedness and life of contemplative practice) may well be traced back to Ananda and Mahakassapa respectively. These divisions have been among the Sangha all the way through. In fact, they have been universal characteristics of the entire Sangha no matter whether they are Theravada, Mahayana or Vajrayana. The ideals behind Ananda and Mahakassapa do not need to be perceived as contradictory. They can be quite complementary. The life of any member of the Sangha may well be taken as oscillating between these two ideals although the degree of oscillation may differ from individual to individual. The ideal disciple of the Buddha is one who strikes a balance between these two poles, a feat by no means looking easy.

4. Authentication of the Scripture: A Study in the Theravada Hermeneutics*

Introduction Distinguishing what is authentic from what is apocryphal is of vital significance to any religious tradition. Authentication presupposes a method of interpretation or a manner of understanding the philosophy to which the text in question belongs. It is because of this that consistency and coherence are key factors in authentication. Buddhism, like many other religions, provides us with good number of cases of textual authentication which needs to be studied closely. Acts of authentication and interpretation of the Buddhist texts pose some interesting historical, philosophical and doctrinal problems. Most of these problems have been dealt with by a number of competent scholars in more detail.1 In this regard, scholars have tended to concentrate 1  Theory and practice of interpretation in the Buddhist tradition occupies a very important place in the contemporary Buddhist scholarship. The Theravada tradition has two very important works on the subject which are taken almost as canonical in the Sri Lankan tradition but are included in the canon itself by the Burmese tradition. They are the Peṭakopadesa and the Netti. The two works are on the theory of interpretation and hence purely methodological. Of the two the Netti is considered to be a better version of the Peṭakopadesa. The former has been edited for the Pali Text Society (PTS) by Professor E. Hardy (1961). Its English translation by Bhikkhu Ñānamoli has been published by PTS (The Guide 1977). His introduction to the original work remains by far the best secondary source in understanding the Theravada interpretation theory. The Word of the Buddha by George D. Bond (Gunasena, Colombo, 1982) is a thorough analysis of the Netti and the commentaries of Buddhaghosa as Theravada hermeneutics. Buddhist Hermeneutics, edited by Donald S. Lopez jr. (Motilal * This article was initially published in Wilhelm Geiger and the Study of the History and Culture of Sri Lanka ed. Ulrich Everding and Asanga Tilakaratne. Colombo. 2000. pp. 1-21.

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more on the problem of interpretation. If authentication has been discussed at all, it is because of its close connection with the problem of interpretation. Nevertheless, the scripture and the question of its authentication give rise to some interesting philosophical and religious (doctrinal) problems which have not been dealt with sufficiently from the point of view of the Theravada tradition. In particular, the systematic formulation and authentication of the Abhidhamma as the third Piṭaka (basket) and its elevation to a level higher than that attributed to the other two Piṭakas indicate a quite significant turn in the history of early Buddhist philosophical thinking. Therefore, the subject matter of the present paper basically constitutes the historical, philosophical and religious concerns behind the authentication process in the Theravada tradition. We will begin with historical materials more relevant to the actual process of the textual authentication.

Authentication in the Theravada tradition The Theravada itself presents a way of reading or understanding what is considered to be the word of the Buddha (buddhavacana). However, at the very early stage of its development, the Theravada itself had to face the problem of determining what constitutes exactly the word of the Buddha. Obviously, this problem could not have arisen when the Buddha was still living. The problem, as we can see from the history of Buddhism, arose immediately after the parinibbāna of the Buddha. But even earlier, the Buddha and his disciples were not unaware of the impending difficulty. In this connection there is a very interesting statement attributed to the Buddha in the Mahāparinibbāna-sutta: Ananda, it is possible that the following will occur to you: ‘the teaching no longer has a teacher; we do not have a teacher’. Ananda, that should not be understood in that manner; Banarsidas, Delhi, 1993) is a collection of useful papers on Buddhist hermeneutics in general. George D. Bond’s paper in this collection on Theravada hermeneutics tries to explain the historical and doctrinal context behind the Theravada tradition of interpretation. Buddhism and Language by Jose lgnacio Cabezon (State University of New York Press, 1994) is perhaps the latest addition to the field. Although it mainly deals with the Tibetan materials, his proposal to develop scholasticism as a category of interpretation of Buddhist texts seems to be useful in the area of Theravada too (However, I do not plan to explore this possibility in the present paper.). Two ‘classic’ works which can be very useful in the study of Theravada hermeneutics are Early History of Buddhism in Ceylon by Dr. E.W. Adikaram (Colombo, 1946) and Abhidharmadīpa with Vibhāṣaprabhāvṛtti by Professor Padmanabh S. Jaini (Kashi Prasad Jayaswal Research Institute, Patna, 1977).

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Ananda, the doctrine that I have explained and the discipline that I have prescribed will be your teacher at my passing.2 This statement basically addresses the issue of the possible lacuna in the minds of the disciples due to the absence of the Master. Here the Buddha seems to indicate that there is already an established form of teaching which is complete in itself, and therefore that there is no reason for the disciples to feel helpless for now they have the teaching of the Master instead of the Master. In the Mahāparinibbāna-sutta itself the Buddha refers to the four ‘great indicators’ (mahāpadesa) as the procedure that should be followed in determining whether or not a particular statement belongs to the word of the Master (D II, 124-126). In fact the criterion given could be reduced to one; however depending on the source of the claim it has been made fourfold. They may be summarily presented in the following manner: One may claim that a particular statement was heard (i) from the Buddha himself, or (ii) from the community of monks including elders and chiefs, or (iii) from a group of elderly monks who are well-versed in the Dhamma and in the Vinaya, or (iv) from a single elderly monk who is well-versed in the Dhamma and in the Vinaya and on these grounds one may claim that it is the Dhamma and the Vinaya and the message of the Teacher (satthusāsana). In such a situation the proper behaviour should be not to reject it outright nor to accept it readily but to check whether or not the statement is in accordance with the Discourse (sutte otaretabbāni) and in consonance with the Vinaya (vinaye sandassetabbāni). If it is, then one ought to accept it as the Dhamma and the Vinaya and if it is not one ought to reject it. The significance of this criterion is that it takes for granted that by the time of the Buddha there were what were called ‘Sutta’ and ‘Vinaya’ 2  The relevant statement is the following: siya kho panānanda tumhākaṃ evaṃ assa: atītasatthukaṃ pāvacanaṃ, n’atthi no satthā ti. na kho pan’etaṃ ānanda evaṃ daṭṭhabbaṃ. yo vo ānanda mayā dhammo ca vinayo ca desito paññatto, so vo mam’accayena satthā: D II, 154 The statement atītasatthukaṃ pāvacanaṃ has been translated by Henry Clerk Warren in Buddhism in Translation (New York: Atheneum. 1984, 107) as “the word of the teacher is a thing of the past”. Neither semantics nor syntax would allow this translation which gives a wrong impression. Maurice Walshe’s translation (Thus Have I Heard Wisdom, London. 1987, 269) as “the teacher’s instruction has ceased” too is not warranted by the grammar. Both Donald S. Lopez jr. (1993, 1) and Jose Ignacio Cabezon (1994, 29) quote Warren’s translation.

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as the established ‘scripture’3 of Buddhism. It is these two that came to be known as the ‘sutta piṭaka’ and the ‘vinaya piṭaka’ since the first council. Dhamma and Vinaya as they occur in ‘dhamma-vinaya satthusāsana’ seem to refer not so much to the scripture as such but to the doctrine and discipline as the teaching of the Buddha. However, Sutta and Vinaya in the context of ‘sutte otāretabbāni, vinaye sandassetabbāni’ seem to refer to the scripture although there is no evidence to suggest that they were in a written form by this time.4 The Theravada commentaries represent a quite well-developed and well-established tradition of interpretation. They are unanimous in claiming that by the time of the Buddha’s parinibbāna, all the three baskets had been clearly identified although they had to admit that, at least, the Abhidhammapiṭaka was not yet complete. By the time the Theravada commentaries received their final shape in Sri Lanka more than ten centuries had passed since the parinibbāna of the Buddha. Buddhaghosa, the greatest of all Pali commentators, lived in Sri Lanka during the reign of the king Mahanama (409-41 A.D.). The exact nature of the Buddhaghosa’s role is, all most, debatable. According to E.W. Adikaram it was “... to rearrange them (commentaries), to summarise them where necessary and to turn them into Pali language” (Adikaram 1994, 4). It is generally accepted that Buddhaghosa did not impose an interpretation of his own on the original commentaries. Buddhaghosa posed himself before his readers as a systematizer and a translator. He openly admitted that he was making use of and faithfully following the native commentaries such as Mahāṭṭhakathā, Mahāpaccari and Kurundi (VinA I, 2). He makes it very clear at the introduction of every commentary that he is following the commentarial tradition of the Mahavihara, the centre of the Theravada tradition. 3  The corresponding term for ‘scripture’ in early Buddhism is ‘pāvacana’ as referred to in the Mahāparinibbāna-sutta itself. This term has its older Sanskrit equivalent as ‘prāvacana’ which basically refers to the Brahmanic scripture, namely, the Veda. 4  The commentator seems to think somewhat differently. In explaining two terms, he refers to a Thera called Sudinna who claimed that there is nothing in the word of the Buddha (buddhavacana) which does not come within the category of Sutta and hence Sutta refers to the all three baskets (scripture) and Vinaya refers to the actual practice of disciplining oneself. On the basis of this claim, the commentator concludes: tasmā suttee ti tepiṭake buddhavacane otāretabbāni, vinaye ti etasmin rāg’ ādi-vinaya-kāraṇe samsandetabbānī ti ayam ettha attho (Therefore ‘in the Sutta’ means ‘that should be compared with the word of the Buddha which constitutes the three baskets’; ‘in the Vinaya’ means ‘that should be fitted with what causes the destruction of attachment etc.’ (DA II, 566).

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samayaṃ avilomento therānaṃ theravaṃsappadīpānaṃ sunipuṇa vinicchayānaṃ mahāvihārādhivāsīnaṃ: (DA I, 1; MA I, 1); vinicchayo anhakathasu vutto-yo yuttaṃ atthaṃ apariccajanto tato pi antogadhatheravada-saṃvaṇṇanaṃ sammāsamarabhissaṃ: (VinA I, 2) It must, however, be noted that when he had to record his own opinion, he clearly indicated it. All these lead us to conclude that Buddhaghosa had before him an already established tradition. According to Buddhaghosa, all the three baskets were rehearsed in the first council. Both Samantapāsādikā, the commentary to Vinayapiṭaka, and Sumaṅgalavilāsinī, the commentary to the Dīghanikāya contain detailed accounts of the first council. According to these accounts, in the first council the Theras rehearsed the Vinaya first. What was rehearsed under ‘Vinaya’ has been described as ‘saubhatovibhaṅgakkhandhakaparivāraṃ vinayapiṭakaṃ’ ‘the Vinayapiṭaka comprising two vibhaṅgas, khandhaka and parivāra’ (VinA I, 15; DA I, 1). After the Vinaya, the Dhamma was rehearsed. What is meant by ‘Dhamma’ in this context is the five nikāyas. After giving the names of the five nikāyas, the commentator adds the following explanation in respect of Khuddaka-nikāya: tattha khuddānikāyo nāma cattāro nikāye ṭhapetvā avasesaṃ buddhavacanānaṃ’- ‘here the Khuddaka-nikāya is the word of the Buddha exepting the four nikāyas’. This definition shows that even the Vinaya was included in the Khuddaka-nikāya. In fact, this is confirmed by what the commentator adds immediately after the above definition: Tatthā vinayo āyasmatā Upālittherena vissajjito; sesa khuddakanikāyo cattāro ca nikāyā ānandattherena- there the Vinaya was explained by the Upali Thera; rest of the Khuddaka-nikāya and the other four nikāyas were explained by Thera Ananda’ (VinA I, 16). Although one could suspect a ‘sautrāntika’ influence here, the context suggests that the commentator offered this explanation in order to substantiate his claim that the entire buddhavacana is fivefold nikāya-wise (sabbaṃ pi buddhavacanaṃ ... nikāyavasena pañcavidham: VinA I, 16). However, in asserting that the word of the Buddha is threefold piṭaka-wise, the commentator did not have a difficulty in recognizing the Vinaya as a separate Piṭaka. In the authentication process, it is interesting to note how the commentators used Khuddaka-nikāya as a convenient category to include everything other than the four nikāyas. In a subsequent definition of ‘khuddaka-nikāya’ Buddhaghosa includes in it the entire

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Vinayapiṭaka and the Abhidhammapiṭaka in addition to the usual fifteen books. He makes it very clear that except the first four nikāyas, the rest of the word of the Buddha (whatever) is Khuddaka-nikāya. katamo khuddakanikāyo. sakalaṃ vinayapiṭakaṃ, abhidhammapiṭakaṃ. khuddakapāṭhādayo ca pubbe nidassita pañcadasabhedā ṭhapetvā cattāro nikāye avasesaṃ buddhavacanaṃ: (DA I, 23) In the commentary to the Dīgha-nikāya Buddhaghosa reports a controversy between the Dīghabhāṇakas and the Majjhimabhāṇakas on the constitution and the placement of the Khuddakanikāya. According to the former, Khuddaka-nikāya consists of only thirteen books, namely, Jātaka, Mahāniddesa, Cullaniddesa, Paṭisambhidāmagga, Suttanipāta, Dhammapada, Udāna, Itivuttaka, Vimānavatthu, Petavatthu, Theragāthā and Therigātha. And these were included in the Abhidhammapiṭaka because they were considered small books (... khuddaka gantho nāma ayan ti ca vatvā abhidhammapiṭakasmiṃ yeva saṃgahaṃ āropayiṃsūti dīgha-bhāṇakā vadanti) (DA I, 15). However, the latter group was of the opinion that the Khuddakanikāya includes three additional books, namely, Cariyapiṭaka, Apadāna and Buddhavaṃsa and that this nikāya was included not in the Abhidhammapiṭaka but in the Suttapiṭaka. It is with this second view that the Sri Lankan Theravada tradition concurs from the time of Buddhaghosa. One of the most significant instances of the authentication process in the Theravada tradition is provided by the canonization of the Abhidhamma. As we saw above, the commentaries are quite unanimous in claiming that the Abhidhamma had developed as a Piṭaka by the time of the first council which is to say that like the Sutta and the Vinaya, Abhidhamma too is directly derived from the Buddha. We know that even in the Suttapiṭaka there are discourses given by the disciples of the Buddha both before and after his parinibbāna which the Theravadins included in the Suttapiṭaka and were not hesitant to treat them as the ‘buddha-vacana’ (word of the Buddha).5 On the other hand, in the case of the Abhidhamma, the commentary says that the Buddha while 5  Discourses attributed to the disciples, e.g. the Madhupiṇḍika-sutta (Majjhimanikāya) attributed to Mahakaccana Thera, were approved by the Buddha himself. Such discourses as Sāmagāma-sutta (Majjhima-nikāya) attributed to Ananda Thera belong to the period after the parinibbāna of the Buddha. Both these categories have been included in the Suttapiṭaka.

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teaching the Abhidhamma to the inhabitants of the divine world would meet the Sariputta Thera during his meals and give the gist of what he had said in the course of that day to the latter (‘ath’assa satthā nayaṃ deti’: DhaA 16). Sariputta Thera would explain what is said by the Buddha to his pupils. At one point the commentary clearly says that the wording of the Abhidhamma belongs to Sariputta Thera (abhidhammo vācanāmaggo nāma sāriputtattherappabhāvo: DhaA 17). On the other hand, the same commentary asserts that the Abhidhamma is the word of the Buddha: Kassa vacanaṃ ti? Bhagavato vacanaṃ arahato sammāsambuddhassa: Whose word is it? It is the word of the Buddha who is worthy and fully enlightened’ (DhaA 32). In another place, the commentary says that the Buddha reflected on the seven treatises during the fourth week after his Buddhahood while sitting in the gem-house (DhaA 13). As we saw earlier, it was not unusual for the Theravadins to attribute a certain discourse’ to a disciple and still call it the ‘buddhavacana’. In this case, the fact that they did not quite want to give the full credit to Sariputta although they came very close to it, has to be understood in their enthusiasm to authenticate the Piṭaka as the exact word of the Master. Buddhaghosa’s account in the introductory section of the Atthasālinī clearly shows that the Theravadins had several hurdles to overcome in authenticating the Abhidhammapiṭaka and that the task was not particularly easy. Already we have seen the ambiguity they had about the exact nikāya-location of the Abhidhamma. Whereas Vaibhasikas attributed the authorship of their Abhidharma works to the chief disciples of the Buddha,6 the Theravadins were hesitant in acknowledging the role of Sariputta in the compilation of the Abhidhamma. An additional difficulty they had to face with the attribution of the Abhidhamma to the Buddha was the problem of providing a nidāna (inception) to it. According to the Commentator, the Abhidhamma was explained by the Buddha in the Tāvatiṃsa heaven, under the ‘Parichattaka’ tree, seated on the ‘paṇḍukambala silā’ (DhaA 15). However, Buddhaghosa himself refers to this aspect of the controversy in some detail. The following adverse remarks were made by an opponent when someone was explaining the Abhidhamma: 6  The Vaibhasika Abhidharma is called ‘śāstra’, and the seven works and the names of the persons to whom their authorship has been attributed are as follows: Jnānaprasthāna by Acarya Katyayaniputra; Prakaraṇapāda by Sthavira Vasumitra; Viñāṇakāya by Sthavira Devasarman; Dharmaskandha by Arya Sariputra; Prajnaptiśāstra by Arya Maudgalyayana; Dhātukaya by Purna Sthavira; and Saṅgītiparyāya by Mahakaustila.

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You presented a long Sutta; what is the name of this Sutta? [When he was told that it is an Abhidhamma-sutta, he further asks] Why do you bring an Abhidhamma-sutta? Is not there any other Sutta explained by the Buddha? Who has told this? It was not told by the Buddha. tvaṃ dīghasuttaṃ āharasi, kiṃ suttaṃ nām’etaṃ ti āha. abhidhammasuttaṃ nāma āvuso ti. abhidhammasuttaṃ kasmā āharāsi, kiṃ aññaṃ buddhabhāsitaṃ suttaṃ āharituṃ na vaṭṭati ti. abhidhammo kena bhāsito ti. nā eso buddhabhāsito ti. (DhsA 28) The commentator enumerates the following possible responses to this charge: The first is to win over the questioner using an indirect means, namely, by inquiring whether or not he knows the Vinaya. If the person were to answer in the negative that itself can be taken as a weak point to be exploited against the opponent.7 The second is to cite the Mahāgosiṅga-sutta which refers to the conversation between Sariputta and Mahamogallana which is a ‘discussion on the Abhidhamma’ (abhidhammakathaṃ) and the fact that the Buddha praised their discussion. The third is to point out that some of the Khuddakanikāya books such as the Dhammapada, Jātaka and Suttanipāta too do not have a nidāna. The fourth is to point out that the Abhidhamm is comprehended by the Buddhas alone and that all the incidents associated with the preaching of the Abhidhamma in the heaven are well known (DhaA 23-30). In addition to these arguments, Buddhaghosa refers to Tissabhuti Thera, resident of Mangalarama, who traced the nidāna of the Abhidhamma to the Padesavihāra-sutta which describes how the Buddha immediately after the enlightenment reflected on the fundamental aspects of the enlightenment. He also refers to Sumanadeva Thera resident of the city (gāmavāsī) who produced the following nidāna to the Abidhamma: ekaṃ samayaṃ bhagavā devesu viharati tāvatiṃse pāricchattakamūle paṇḍukambalasilāyam. tatra kho bhagavā devānaṃ tāvatiṃsānaṃ abhidhammakathaṃ kathesi: (DhaA 31). This follows the exact structure of the usual nidāna seen at the beginning of the Suttas. To further fortify the claim of authenticity, Buddhaghosa finally adds that the Abhidhamma in fact has two nidānas whereas the Suttas have only one; They are, its origin as realization, that is at the time 7  In a debate over any one of the three Piṭakas, it seems to be an accepted practice among the Theravadins to counter-question the opponent on his knowledge of the other two Piṭakas.

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of Enlightenment (adhigama nidāna) and its origin as a discourse, that is at the Tāvatiṃsa heaven (desana nidāna). (DhaA 31) The commentator’s effort is to establish that the Buddha himself is the first proponent of the Abhidhamma (sammāsambuddho va paṭhamataraṃ abhidhammiko: DhaA 17). This conclusion has some justification when we analyze the content of the Abhidhammapiṭaka excluding the Kathāvatthu. We will come to this book later. The basic content of the other six books is nothing other than an exposition of the fundamental aspects of the teaching. As Professor Jaini has shown (Jaini 1977, 22-68) the tendency to collect the gist of the doctrine dates back to the time of the Buddha himself. In the Parinibbāna-sutta one can see time and again the Buddha referring to the thirty-seven bodhipakkhiyā dhamma as a summary of his teaching (D I, 16). The discourses such as Saṅgīti and Dasuttara (D I, 33-34) deal with similar categories given in topic-form. The books like Paṭisambhidāmagga that belong to the Khuddaka-nikāya deal with the fundamental aspects of the teaching in a manner quite similar to the method followed in the Abhidhammapiṭaka. Referring to the unanimity the disciples had on these fundamental aspects of the Buddha’s teaching Professor Jaini observes: The statement that there are no two opinions on the thirtyseven items, raises the latter to a high degree and can be called the central and universally accepted preaching of the Buddha. No particular Sutta is mentioned as the supreme, but only the sum total of all the teachings put into an aggregate later known as bodhipakkhiyā dhamma. It is the burden of a large number of Suttas in the Dīgha and Majjhima Nikāyas. It constitutes one of his last preachings to the congregation, following the declaration of his intention to enter parinirvāṇa... Almost all major works on Buddhism, both Hinayana and Mahayana, contain this list. This, therefore, was the supreme dharma, acceptable to all. It marks the beginning of the Abhidharma. (Jaini 1977, 31-32) What was there during the time of the Buddha as a collection of fundamentals in topic-form (mātikā: M I, 221) may have developed as the Abhidhammapiṭaka. In this sense, of course, we may agree with the commentator when he says that the Buddha is the first ābhidhammika. The case of the Kathāvatthu is somewhat more interesting because it is one of the last books to be added to the canon. It is attributed to Moggaliputtatissa Thera who is a historical figure and who served as the

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convenor of the third council. The book is an effort by the Theravadins to refute the views held by the other Buddhist sects. The inclusion of this book in the Abhidhammapiṭaka was opposed by some others. Buddhaghosa presents the opponent’s view in this manner: Why has the Kathāvatthu been taken? Was it not compiled by Moggaliputtatissa Thera after two hundred eighteen years of the parinibbāna of the Buddha? Therefore, it should be abandoned due to its sāvaka-authorship. kathāvatthuṃ kasmā gahitaṃ? nānu sammāsambuddhassa parinibbānato aṭṭharasa vassādhiākāni dve vassasatāni atikkaṃitvā moggaliputtatissattheren’ etaṃ ṭhapitaṃ? tasmā sāvakabhāsitattā chaḍḍhetha nan ti. (DhsA 3) The commentator’s answer is that the Buddha having foreseen the future ‘left the topics, in the form of incomplete sections’ relevant to all issues beginning from the eight-fold debating principles in two-fold pentad, in the four questions of the person-view’. sammāsambuddho hi sattappakaraṇāni desento kathāvatthuṃ patvā yā esā puggalavāde tāva catūsu pañhesu dvinnaṃ pañcakānaṃ vasena aṭṭhamukhā vādayutti taṃ ādiṃ katvā sabbakāthamaggesu āsampuṇṇābhāṇavārmattāya pāḷiyā mātikaṃ ṭhapesi (DhaA 4). The commentator further affirms that in compiling this manual, Moggaliputtatissa Thera did so not with his own knowledge but by the methods and topics delineated by the Buddha. Therefore, he concludes, that the entire manual is known as the teaching of the Buddha (buddhabhāsita).

Context in authentication The foregoing discussion should show how the Theravada tradition went on authenticating and establishing thereby what could be described as its scripture. There is a common concensus among the students of interpretation theory that texts have to be understood or interpreted in their proper context. Therefore, any process of authentication has to be understood in its historical, philosophical and religious setting. It is to this aspect of authentication that we tum next. The Buddha’s reference to the great indicators (mahāpadesa) makes us think that during his life time there had developed a twofold scripture identified as Dhamma and Vinaya. Apart from this, in the discourses

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themselves we come across a nine-fold classification of the doctrine which was described as ‘the nine-fold dispensation of the Teacher’ (navāngasatthusāsana). The nine aspects are: Sutta, geyya, veyyakaraṇa; gāthā, udāna, itivuttaka, jātaka, abbhutadhamma and vedalla. This classification does not have the two terms which signify the twofold distinction of Dhamma and Vinaya. Nevertheless, the discourses call this nine-fold division ‘Dhamma’.8 Apart from that, we do not have any clue in the Tripiṭaka itself as to what these nine divisions stand for. Perhaps the listeners of the Buddha may have had an idea, for, it seems to have been taken for granted. However, according to the commentary, the Vinaya and the Abhidhamma piṭakas are not particularly mentioned here for the former is included under ‘Sutta’ and the latter under ‘veyyākaraṇa’. suttan ti ādisu ubhato-vibhaṅga niddesa khandhaka parivārā suttaṃ ti veditabbaṃ. sakalam pi abhidhammapiṭaka yan ca aññaṃ pi atthāhi aṅgehi asaṅgahitaṃ buddhavacanaṃ taṃ veyyakaraṇanti veditabbam. (MA II, 106) The commentarial tradition uses this last category to incorporate not only the Abhidhamma but also anything else which was not included under other eight categories (MA II, 106). This interpretation of Sutta and veyyākaraṇa by the commentator as Vinaya and Abhidhamma bears evidence to the tradition’s enthusiasm to authenticate its version of the scripture. Obviously, the nine-fold category seems to be, if not the oldest, much older than the other categories. Therefore, we can understand the commentator’s desire to authenticate the scripture by using this classification. Mahāpadesa provides a guide-line to determine whether or not a particular statement belongs to the Buddha. The Buddha’s providing this guide-line occurs in the context of his declaring the teaching to be the teacher of his disciples after his parinibbāna. The reason for this declaration seems to be more related to the psychology of some of the disciples. Two mutually opposing aspects of this psychology are revealed from the texts. One is the obvious lacuna created in the minds of the disciples who depended on the Buddha for their guidance. That mentality is expressed in the remark-atītasatthukaṃ pāvacanānaṃ, n ‘atthi no satthāti- which we referred to earlier (MA II, 2). This mentality of helplessness is further revealed in certain discourses in which the question of the successor of the Buddha has been discussed. For example, Ananda Thera’s discussion with Gopaka Mogallana is revealing in 8  Having given the list of the nine aspects, for example, the Alagaddūpama-sutta

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this context. Gopaka’s first question was whether there was any one bhikkhu who is comparable to the Buddha in his attainments. Having answered this question in the negative, Ananda makes it very clear that the Buddha is the guide and others are his followers. Subsequently, Gopaka questions whether the Buddha or the Sangha has appointed one particular monk as the head of the organization on whom it can depend (ayaṃ vo mam’accayena paṭisaraṇam bhavissati...: M III, 3). Having answered this question too in the negative, Ananda says that they are not ‘without refuge’ and that they have Dhamma as their refuge (na kho mayaṃ brāhmaṇā appaṭisaraṇā,-sappaṭisāraraṇā mayhaṃ brāhmaṇā, dhammapaṭisaraṇā-ti: M III, 40). Ananda Thera’s response to the brahmin portrays the ideal situation, but the very question of the brahmin reveals how the ordinary people felt about the situation. In another discussion between the Buddha and Ananda, on the split that arose among the followers of Nigantha Nataputta after his death, the Buddha voices a similar concern when he expresses the hope, that there will not be such a split among the bhikkhu-Sangha after his parinibbāna (Māheva bhagavato accayena saṃghe vivādo uppajji: M II, 245). The other aspect of this dependent mentality is shown in the infamous statement attributed to Subhadda, the ordained-old (not the last disciple of the Buddha): Friends, there is no need to feel sorry or to lament; we are freed from that great samaṇa; we have been harrased by him saying ‘this is proper for you; this not proper for you’; now we will do whatever we like and will not do whatever we do not like. Alaṃ āvuso mā socittha, mā paridevittha; sumuttā mayaṃ tena mahāsamaṇena; upaddutā ca mayaṃ homa idaṃ vo kappati idaṃ vo na kappatīti, idāni pana mayaṃ yaṃ icchissāma taṃ karissāma, yaṃ na icchissāma na taṃ karissāma. (Vin II, 284-285) The context of this statement is the occasion when, having heard that the Buddha had passed away, the ordinary monks started weeping and lamenting. Now the behaviour of the ordinary monks represents the dependent mentality in its usual form Subhada’s statement betrays the opposite aspect of the same dependant mentality. One could argue that this kind of mentality is not in accordance with the over-all rational attitude encouraged in the early Buddhist tradition. On the one hand, we can assume that the ordinary disciples of the Buddha (as against the enlightened ones) had developed an excessive sense of devotion

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to and dependence on their Master. Although this should not be the ideal attitude, the situation is perfectly understandable. Obviously, the solution given by the Buddha in the Mahāparinibbāna-sutta cannot be consoling to those who felt in this manner. In fact, this solution needs to be appreciated more as therapeutic than anything else. On the other hand, the dependance of the disciples on the Buddha needs to be understood from a different perspective. Looking from such a perspective, in a religious system in which the founder has been compared to a pioneer who discovers an ancient path leading to a lost city, there is nothing unusual in this psychological attitude on the part of the followers (S II, 104-107, Nagara-sutta). Also there is nothing unusual in their expectation to have a clearly laid-down path once the teacher (the Buddha) is no more. This is basically a soteriological need. Having a well-articulated procedure to follow is particularly a must in a system such as Buddhism in which the path to the ultimate goal is a long and arduous one. While the Buddha was living, of course, one could go to him and clarified any doubt. Once the Buddha is no more what one has is the teaching he left behind. Therefore, we can understand the need for keeping the teaching neat, well-organized and authenticated. Authentication process seems to have stages. One is the authentication of the initial Dhamma and Vinaya. Although the discourses indicate the existence of a well-established scripture some have suggested that even this initial scripture had to be differentiated form several versions. For example, referring to the mahāpadesasa of the Mahāparinibbāna-sutta Professor Jaini observes: This passage, occurring in one of the most important and widely respected sutras, is very interesting for the history of the authenticity of several Buddhist scriptures handed down to us. It anticipates, even during the life-time of the Buddha the existence of several different versions and at least one authorised version of the Sutta and Vinaya collections. (Jaini 1977, 23) In order to support this view, Jaini refers to the Vinaya reference to ‘Purarna Thera’ who, on being asked by the participants of the first council to accept what they rehearsed, declined to do so saying: ‘The Dhamma and the Vinaya have been well rehearsed by the Theras; nevertheless, I will hold in the manner I have heard and accepted from the Buddha himself’ (susaṃgigit’āvuso therehi dhammo ca vinayo ca, api ca yath’eva mayā bhagavato sammukhā sutaṃ sammukhā paṭiggahitaṃ tathe’vahaṃ dhāressāmīti: Vin II, 290). In fact, what seems to be more

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realistic to assume is not that there were several versions during the time of the Buddha but that there were many disciples who had heard the teaching in varying capacities from the Buddha himself. What may have happened in the first council was to agree on an acceptable version of it by collating what everyone knew. Purarna’s response may be taken either as an expression of his displeasure of not being included among the councillors or as a disapproval of possible modifications that were introduced to the scripture at the council. The problem of authentication in its complete sense cannot have arisen during the lifetime of the Buddha. This is not to say that there were no misunderstandings or misreadings of the teaching by certain disciples. In fact, one such incident is reported in the Cūladukkhakkhandha-sutta where the bhikkhu called Sati thought that ‘it is this very consciousness that runs and wanders unchanged’ (tadev’idaṃ viññāṇaṃ sandhāvati saṃsarati anaññaṃ: M I, 256). The Buddha repremanded him for holding this view and corrected it. To say what is said by the Buddha as not said and what is not said by the Buddha as said has been described as a serious offence. yo ca abhāsitaṃ alapitaṃ tathāgatena bhāsitaṃ lapitaṃ tathāgatena ti dīpeti; yo ca bhāsitaṃ lapitaṃ tathāgatena abhāsitaṃ alapitaṃ tathāgatenāti dīpeti. ime kho bhikkhave dve tathāgataṃ abbhācikkhanti. (A I, 60) We also have the well-known incident of the monk called Arittha Gaddhabadhiputta who held a wrong view, namely, what has been called by the Buddha as dangerous to associate with is, in fact, not dangerous and vice versa (M I, 130). Whenever this kind of misunderstanding arose, the Buddha was there to correct it. Once the Buddha has given his verdict, it is impossible for one to hold to one’s own view any longer because it is the Buddha himself giving the proper interpretation to a statement he had made earlier. However, in the absence of the Buddha the entire thing becomes a matter of interpretation. What the first councillors may have done was to identify the content and boundaries of what the Buddha meant by Dhamma and Vinaya. Therefore, it is more probable that the first council, by approving a scripture, made possible for some other versions of the Tripiṭaka to emerge, and not as Professor Jaini seems to suggest, namely, that there were several versions of the scripture for the first councillors to choose from. However, in the first council itself the councillors had to follow certain criteria or guide-lines to determine what is Sutta and Vinaya and

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what is not. When the Buddha gave the mahāpadesas the assumption was that what is called Dhamma and Vinaya is characterised by internal consistence and coherence. In the mahāpadesa itself, however, the Buddha does not articulate the criterion to determine what is Dhamma and Vinaya. Nevertheless, there are sufficient instances in the discourses which provide clues. Throughout the discourses the Buddha has been underscoring that what he has taught is only the suffering and the cessation of suffering. In the well-known Alagaddūpama-sutta the Buddha says: Monks, both before and now I teach only the suffering and the cessation of suffering (pubbecāhaṃ bhikkhave etarahi ca dukkhañ c’eva paññapemi dukkhassa ca nirodhaṃ: M I, 140). In another instance, to Malunkyaputta who threatens the Buddha of leaving the Order unless he were given answers for the ten (‘metaphysical’) questions he raised, the Buddha asked to take what has been said by him as said by him and what has not been said by him as not said by him. In explaining further what he has said the Buddha says that it is the four noble truths alone that he has said (M I, 431). The commentaries confirm this perception when they unanimously affirm that the entire doctrine of the Buddha is one-fold in the sense of having one flavour, namely, the flavour of emancipation: ekarasam vimuttirasam: DA I, 16). This broad criterion may have initially served as the basis on which the Dhamma and the Vinaya were determined. The second stage of the scriptural authentication is to include texts into what is already accepted as scripture. The case of the Abhidhamma belongs here. At this stage, the authentication seems to be more a matter of the access into the scripture ‘physically’. Since the first council, the Theravadins started having an established scripture which they thought to conform to the ‘soteriology’ of the original teaching of the Buddha. Once this scripture was accepted as ‘the Dhamma and Vinaya’ it is reasonable to believe that it assumed a form of a textual authority which was accepted, more or less, without any further question. As we saw above, in trying to authenticate the Abhidhammapiṭaka, the Theravadins were more concerned with producing external evidence in order to substantiate their claim. The enthusiasm for inventing a ‘nidāna’ (origin) for the Abhidhamma is a case in point. This does not, however, mean that anything could be included within the ‘buddha vacana’ once some external evidence were produced. The tradition seems to have been well-aware of this. For example, in the case of the Abhidhamma, it is very clear that the commentators were

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very much concerned with determining exactly where the Abhidhamma first in the ‘soteriological’ process of early Buddhism. Atthasālinī, the Abhidhamma commentary, presents the following categories to show how the three Piṭakas constitute one whole ‘salvificatory’ procedure: i. The three kinds of teaching: command, convention and absolute. The Vinaya is teaching by way of command (āṇādesanā). The Sutta is the teaching by way of convention (vohāradesanā). The Abhidhamma is absolute teaching (paramatthadesanā). ii. The three kinds of teaching: offence-wise (yathāparādha), appropriate wise (yathānuloma) and ‘elements-of-reality’-wise (yathādhamma). The three Piṭakas in their respective order are included in these categories. iii. The account of restraint and non-restraint (saṃvarāsaṃvarakathā), the account of the destruction of views (diṭṭhiviniveṭhāna-kathā) and the account of the analysis of mind and matter (nāmarūpapariccheda-kathā). Again the three Piṭakas are included in their respective order in these categories. iv. The three forms of discipline: Discipline in higher morality (adhisīlasikkhā), discipline in higher concentration (adhicittasikkhā) and discipline in higher wisdom (adhipaññasikkhā). The three Piṭakas in their respective order are said to be responsible for these three kinds of discipline. v. The three kinds of abandoning: ‘transgression-abandoning’ (vītikkamapahana) by the Vinaya due to the fact that morality is against transgression; ‘springing-up-abandoning’ (pariyuṭṭhānappahāna) by the Sutta due to the fact that concentration is against being possessed by defilements, and ‘latent-condition-abandoning’ (anusayappahāna) by the Abhidhamma due to the fact that wisdom is against the latent defiling conditions. vi. Temporary abandoning of defilements by the Vinaya (tadanga), abandoning defilemens by supression (vikkambhana) by the Sutta, and complete abandoning of defilements (samuccheda) by the Abhidhamma. vii. Abadoning of the defilement of wrong behaviour (duccarita saṃkilesapahāna) by the Vinaya, abandoning of the defilement

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of attachment (taṇhāsaṃkilesapahāna) by the Sutta, and abandoning of the defilement of views (diṭṭhisaṃkilesapahāna) by the Abhidhamma. These classifications are followed by an enumeration of a fourfold hermeneutical category which is applicable to all the three Piṭakas. It is, namely, ‘text’9 (dhamma), meaning of the text (attha), expression of the text (desanā), and the comprehension of the text and its meaning (paṭivedha) (DhA 21-22). What the commentator is trying to do with these classifications and analyses is nothing other than justifying the claim of authenticity of the new Piṭaka. It is interesting to note that the new Piṭaka occupies the highest position in the gradual path of the Piṭaka ‘soteriology’. The implication of this move is something that needs to be understood in a wider context of the history of Buddhist philosophy, and we will come to this point later. Apart from this strictly ‘soteriological’ requirement behind the process of textual authentication there is another reason which is both ‘soteriological’ and organizational. The Cullavagga story of the first council gives as the immediate reason of the council the infamous statement of Subhadda, the ordained-old. Obviously Mahakassapa Mahāthera was in the opinion that in the absence of the Buddha there must be the Dhamma properly organized and agreed upon as the locus of the authority. The case of Subhadda was perceived as a clear warning on the things to come. Subhadda cannot be taken as representing an isolated case; it could have been an indication of the possible splits among the brethren. The idea of schism among the community (Sangha-bheda) seems to have caused utmost concern among the Buddhist community. During the time of the Buddha itself there was a conflict between ‘those who professed dhamma’ (dhammadhara) and ‘those who professed vinaya’ (vinayadhara) which could not be resolved (Vin I, 337-360; M I, 320-325) even by the intervention of the Buddha. However, this did not develop to the extent of a full-fledged ‘sangha-bheda’ for it was later resolved. The actual schism of the Sangha during the time of the Buddha in the sense a group breaking away from the mother group took place with the leadership of Devadatta. This has been included among the most heinous crimes which result in the birth in the most miserable 9  ‘Text’ in this context is what is in the mind of the speaker which is not expressed. This is indicated by the definition of ‘desana’ as tassa manasa vavatthlipitāya tantiyā desana’.

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‘hell’ (apāya) immediately after death (ānantarīya pāpakamma). This shows how the Theravada tradition perceived an act of schism. As we observed earlier too, there are several discourses which deal with the possibility of the Sangha undergoing a schism after the parinibbāna of the Buddha (For example, the Pāsādika-sutta of the Dīgha-nikāya refers to this incident. It is discussed by Jaini in detail: (Jaini 1977, 29-31). The incident that took place after the demise of Nigantha Nataputta, the Jaina leader, seems to have provided the Buddhist community with a warning of what could happen in the future. The MahāparinibbānaSutta begins with the Buddha explaining the seven matters conducive to non-down-fall of the community which include the acts of assembling often and assembling often in harmony. The Budddha further adds that the community will not decline but prosper as long as it adheres to these practices (D II, 74). There is a number of similar instances in the texts which highlight the importance of harmony among the community. There is no doubt about the fact that the underlying motive behind these moves is the preservation of the organization for posterity. Nevertheless, it is not justifiable to understand this phenomenon as a mere wish to perpetuate the organization just for the sake of its existence. I think that the Buddha’s concern for the harmony within the community should be understood as having mainly a ‘soteriological’ significance. Although the ultimate contemplative act of the Buddhist path to nirvana is not collective but purely individual, it has been emphasized that this has to take place within the community. For example, Suttas such as the Cūlagosiṅga and the Mahāgosiṅga of the Majjhima-nikāya glorify harmonious living of the Buddhist monastic community. The spirit of this religious life has been articulated in the expression: ‘by mutual admonition and mutual support’ (aññamañña vacanena aññamañña vuṭṭhāpanena: Bhikkhu Pātimokkha (12th saṅghadisesa)) which underscores the need for having a community support in treading the path to nirvana. The existence of the Sangha community in such a harmonious manner was always perceived as furthering the happiness and well-being of human and divine beings. It is in the light of this background that we have to understand the urge of the Theravadins to establish an authentic scripture for their tradition. It seems that the elders in the Theravada tradition such as Mahakassapa Thera were in the belief that an established scripture which bore the authority of the Buddha was a prerequisite for the longevity of the organization. The first council was basically a result of this understanding.

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The outcome of the council, as the commentators inform us, was the Tripiṭaka being accepted by the Theravada tradition as the true word of the Buddha. This incident can also be considered as introducing to the Buddhist tradition an absolutism and a sense of authority connected with the Tripiṭaka. Apparently referring to the four mahāpadesas, Professor KN Jayatilleke says that ‘from the Mahāparinibbāna-sutta we gather that sometimes after the death of the Buddha, there was an authoritative collection of texts called the ‘Sutta’ and the ‘Vinaya’ (Jayatilleke 1963, 401). Although, I believe that the actual beginning of the authoritative scripture is the first council and not earlier than that, my claim is further supported by Professor Jayatilleke’s remark. In this newly established authoritative collection what was taken to be the most valuable was the latest, namely the Abhidhammapiṭaka. Although the content of this Piṭaka was nothing other than the basic teachings of the Suttapiṭaka, the only difference being the manner in which the subject matter has been treated, what is significant for us in the present context is the attitude the tradition adopted towards this literature. For example, the Atthasālinī, Buddhaghosa’s main commentary to the Abhidhammapiṭaka repeatedly reminds the reader that the Abhidhamma is the ‘definitive’ teaching of the Buddha. Referring to a Sutta-explanation according to which the same phenomenon is described in several different ways he would say: This is the contextual (pariyāya) teaching; the Abhidhamma, of course, is the definitive (nippariyāya) teaching (Pariyāyadesanā h’esa. Abhidhammakathā pana nippariyāyadesanā: DhaA 222, 289). Another designation used to characterize the two Piṭakas is ‘conventional’ (vohāra) for the Suttapiṭaka and ‘absolute’ (paramattha) for the Abhidhammapiṭaka. It is true that the commentator does not make any explicit value judgment based on a comparison regarding the two Piṭakas so described, but it is clear that nippariyāya and paramattha are always higher than pariyāya and vohāra. This commentarial attitude directly contradicts the ‘philosophy’ of the Suttapiṭaka. For example, in the Bahuvedaniya-sutta of the Majjhima-nikāya, the Buddha clearly says that he teaches his doctrine contextually (Evaṃ pariyāyadesito kho Ānanda mayā dhammo: M I, 398). The occasion for this statement is the disagreement between two disciples, Pañcabaṅga, a carpenter and Udayi, a monk, on the number of feelings. The former was of the opinion that the Buddha has said only of two feelings whereas the latter thought the number was three. When

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the matter was brought to the Buddha, the Buddha said that neither of them was incorrect for there are certain contexts in which he had talked about two feelings and there are some other contexts he has talked about three, five or even six feelings. The most relevant point for the present discussion comes subsequently. The Buddha says that if one were not to entertain what is well-said by another when the Master has explained the doctrine contextually what can be expected of them is nothing other than conflict, turmoil and heated arguments with one another. The ability to rejoice in what is well-said by another, the Buddha adds, will result in peace and harmony among one another. Evaṃ pariyāyadesite kho Ānanda mayā dhamme ye aññamaññassa subhāsitaṃ sulapitaṃ na samanujānissanti na samanumaññissanti na samanumodissanti tesaṃ etaṃ paṭikaṃkhaṃ: bhandanajātā kalahajāta vivādāpannā aññamaññaṃ mukhasattīhi vitudantā viharissanti. (M I, 398) It is interesting to see that the Buddha was in the opinion that the flexibility or the non-absoluteness of the teaching is the way to maintain peace and harmony within the community. Therefore, the non-rigidity of the teaching was perceived as facilitating the well-being of the organization. However, in the commentarial interpretation of Abhidhamma what we witness is the exact opposite of this perception. The commentaries have made the Abhidhamma a rigid and an absolute system. Also the commentaries have determined the final shape of the Tripiṭaka so that nothing else could be included there. The last book to be canonized (with the possible exception of the Parivārapaḷi of the Vinaya) is the Kathāvatthu-pakaraṇa of the Abhidhammapiṭaka. Why this work was so important for the Theravada tradition is not hard to understand. It contains the Theravada critique of all major Hinayana positions. In an age when the existence of the ‘school’ became more crucial than the realization of the ultimate goal a work like the Kathāvatthu may have provided the tradition with the wherewithal to deal with its opponents effectively. The commentary says that the Buddha foresaw the developments in the future and left main points with which to deal with them. In all probability, this may be a later invention; nevertheless, the story is not without some justification. The methodology of the Kathāvatthu is to bring a controversial point to the table and produce textual evidence for and against it. The ultimate decision is made on the strength of scriptural evidence. Of course, the scripture belongs to the Buddha and in this sense, the Kathāvatthu is nothing but a representation of the scripture itself. Furthermore, this also shows that the

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authority of the scripture was simply unquestionable. This definitely is a long way away from the kind of inquiring and examining attitude advocated in such basic discourses as the Culahatthipadopama and the Vīmamsaka (M I, 175-184; 317-320). Finally, we have to understand why the tradition sought to authenticate the Abhidhammapiṭaka and elevate it to a position higher than that of the other two Piṭakas. As we saw earlier, even within the Theravada tradition itself there were those who rejected the authenticity of the Abhidhamma. However, this rejection is on the ground that it was not said by the Buddha. This explains why the proponents had to provide evidence to prove that the Abhidhamma was the actual word of the Buddha. A more serious charge against the Abhidhamma would be that the Abhidhamma is not really necessary for the practitioner. On this opinion, the Abhidhamma is not authentic not only because it was not said by the Buddha but also because it is not required. This second charge is not reasonable because such essential aspects of the path as dhammavicaya sambojjhaṅga (enlightenment aspect of analysis of dhammas) and dhammānupassanā (reflection on dhammas) clearly show that the Abhidhamma is nothing other than this practice without which it is not possible to attain nirvana. However, what is relevant in the present context is not the nature of the content of the original Abhidhamma but what the Theravada tradition did with it. We know that for the Theravada it represented the absolute essence of the teaching of the Buddha. The beginning of this trend marks a distinct change of attitude in the Buddhist tradition. In the Sri Lankan tradition, the Abhidhamma was perceived as the most abstruse and difficult and hence to be grasped only by the most intelligent. Nevertheless, ‘soteriologically’ speaking there cannot be this kind of ‘class’ distinction among the three Piṭakas. If the Abhidhamma is necessary for the realization of nirvana and if it is comprehended only by a privileged few this is tantamount to introducing a form of esoterism to the teaching, a move which was clearly rejected by the Buddha in the Mahāparinibbāna-sutta. Besides, this new approach implies a shift of priorities. Original Buddhism was a ‘soteriological’ system in which the Dhamma was compared to a raft to be given up once it has served its purpose. The new situation was such that the very doctrine seems to have become an end in itself. The authentication of the scripture by the Theravada tradition of Sri Lanka thus represents a significant ‘paradigm shift’ in the Buddhist thought.

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Conclusion It is necessary for the followers of any religion to know its scripture and what it signifies. This is particularly so with regard to such ‘religions of the book’ as Buddhism. The basic attitude the Buddha had toward his teaching was out-and-out pragmatic. Thus, whatever was conducive to the realization of nirvana was considered subhāsita (well-said). His teaching, being a pariyāya desanā, did not have a place within it for absolute dogmas or authorised and official interpretations of the doctrine. For this same reason, it did not develop a sacred language either. Thus, it is interesting to note the emergence and the crystalization of an absolutist trend within a religion which was a non-absolutist system of thought.

5. Hermeneutics in Buddhism: A Historical and Philosophical Approach*

Introduction Texts require reading or hearing which involves interpreting. In this basic sense, any reading/hearing involves interpretation, and hence, interpretation is not particular to religious texts in general or to Buddhist texts in particular. Since sacred texts form an important part in any religion, interpretation naturally becomes part and parcel of all forms of religious understanding. The Judeo-Christian tradition is known to have used hermeneutics in interpreting its religious texts for centuries. This, however, does not mean that methods of interpretation of religious texts are new to Buddhism, the history of which goes as far as the 6th century bce. Therefore, when I speak of Buddhist hermeneutics, my subject matter is something that goes to the very early times of Buddhism. In the early Buddhist tradition, exegetical act was described as ‘analysis of meaning’ (atthaṃ vibhajati), and the commentaries developed for this purpose were called ‘description of meaning’ (aṭṭha-kathā). As this discussion should show, the Buddha himself gave guidelines for interpreting his words for there were instances of interpretation/ misinterpretation of the Buddha’s statements during the time of the Buddha itself.1 1  The case of Ariṭṭha, a bhikkhu who held the view that the conduct prohibited by the Buddha is not really harmful, is an example of misinterpretation. The Buddha admonished the bhikkhu not to misrepresent what he taught (Alagaddupama-sutta, M I, 130-142). A similar case is bhikkhu named Sati who erroneously thought that it is the same viññānṇa (consciousness) that ‘runs through’ the saṃsāra (Mahātanhāsaṅkhayasutta, M I, 256-271). * The article was first published in Ermeneutica Dei Testi Sacri: Dialogo tra Confessioni Cristiane e Altre Religioni, ed. Salvatore, Mele, Edizioni Dehoniane Bologna (EDB), Bologna, 2016.

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In this essay, I will first discuss the origin of the historical need for interpreting the Buddhist texts (although ‘texts’ did not exist at this early period in material form). Subsequently, I will discuss the guidelines adopted in the Buddhist tradition for interpretation. Thirdly I will discuss some instances of continuation of interpretation in the Buddhist tradition, highlighting doctrinal and philosophical issues involved in such historical efforts of interpretation. As a prelude to the discussion, I will begin with an account of the Theravada Buddhist interpretational literature. The scope of my discussion here is the Theravada tradition, found in Sri Lanka and Southeast Asian region, which has the Pali canon as its literary basis. I mention this limit specifically for interpretation is very much a universal phenomenon across all three Buddhist traditions, Theravada, Mahayana and Vajrayana, found in such diverse languages as Sanskrit, Chinese, Tibetan and Kharoshti, in addition to Pali and some other forms of Prakrit. It is unrealistic for me to try to discuss methods of interpretation in all Buddhist traditions in the course of this paper. Nor do I have linguistic expertise, Chinese for Mahayana and Tibetan for Vajrayana, to venture into such an enterprise (Lopez 1993). I will, nevertheless, briefly refer to a few instances of classical Indian Mahayana interpretations found in Sanskrit Mahayana texts.

The Pali Canon and its interpretational tradition The Pali Canon comprises three ‘baskets’ (Tipiṭaka), namely Discourses (Sutta), Discipline (Vinaya) and Higher Doctrine (abhidhamma). The Basket of Discourses contains five compilations called ‘-nikāya’ (group). They are: Dīgha-nikāya (Long Discourses), Majjhimanikāya (Middle-length Discourses), Saṃyutta-nikāya (Connected Discourses), Aṅguttara-nikāya (Gradual Discourses), and Khuddakanikāya (small Discourses), in which fifteen works are included, namely, Khuddaka-pāṭha, Dhammapada, Udāna, Itivuttaka, Sutta-nipata, Vimāna-vatthu, Peta-vatthu, Theragātha, Therigātha, Jātaka, Niddesa, Paṭisambhidāmagga, Apadāna, Buddhavaṃsa, and Cariyāpiṭaka. The basket of discipline contains five compilations, namely, Pārājika-pāḷi and Pācittiya-pāḷi (dealing with main Vinaya rules), Cullavagga-pāḷi and Mahāvagga-pāḷi (dealing with monastic traditions not amounting to rules) and Parivārā-pāli (dealing with analyses of the above four compilations). The basket of Abhidhamma contains seven treatises, namely, Dhammasaṅgani, Vibhaṅga, Kathāvatthu, Puggala-paññatti, Dhātu-kathā, Yamaka and Paṭṭhāna.

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Commentaries (aṭṭha-kathā) have been compiled for all these three baskets. What we have today in the Theravada tradition are the commentaries in Pali language compiled mainly by the great commentator Buddhaghosa during the 6th century ce. and several others before or after. These Pali commentaries are believed to have been based on earlier commentaries originated in India probably from the time of the Buddha, and preserved, developed and some newly written in Sri Lanka (EB II, 1966, 335-352). Buddhaghosa wrote the following commentaries for the basket of discourses (Sutta-piṭaka): Sumaṅgalavilāsinī for Dīgha-nikāya; Papañcasūdanī for Majjhimanikāya, Sāratthappakāsini for Saṃyutta-nikāya and Manorathapuranī for Aṅguttara-nikāya. Of the works included in the Khuddakanikāya, Buddhaghosa wrote: Paramatthajotikā for Khuddaka-pāṭha; Dhammapadaṭṭhakathā for Dhammapada; Paramatthajotikā for Suttanipāta; and Jātakaṭṭhakathā for Jātaka. Dhammapala Thera wrote Paramatthadīpanī for Udāna, Itivuttaka, Vimānavatthu, Petavatthu, Theragātha, Therigātha, and Cariyapiṭaka. Upasena Thera wrote Saddhammapajjotikā for Niddesa. Mahanama Thera wrote Saddhamappakāsinī for Paṭisambhidāmagga, and Buddhadatta Thera wrote Madhuratthavilāsinī for Buddhavaṃsa. The author of Visuddhajanavilāsinī for Apadāna is not known. Buddhaghosa Thera wrote Samantapāsādikā for the entire basket of Vinaya (Vinaya-piṭaka), and Kaṅkhāvitaraṇī for the Pātimokkha which contains disciplinary rules for both bhikkhus and bhikkhunīs. Buddhaghosa Thera also wrote commentaries for the entire basket of higher doctrines (Abhidhammapiṭaka): Atthasālini for Dhammasaṅganī; Sammohavinodanī for Vibhaṅga and Pañcappakaraṇaṭṭhakathā for the rest of the five Abhidhamma books.2 The commentarial tradition does not stop here. Usually commentaries have sub-commentaries (tīkā), and even sub-subcommentaries (anu-tīkā) for some sub-commentaries. The practice of commenting on what the Buddha said started with the Buddha himself which was subsequently followed by his senior disciples. It is usual for the Buddha to begin a sermon with an outline, which is called ‘uddesa’ (short exposition), and then to elaborate on it (niddesa). Explanation of this sort is also called ‘analysis’ (vibhaṅga), and a series of discourses included in the Majjhima-nikāya ending with ‘vibhaṅga’ can be considered belonging to this genre. The Mahākammavibhaṅga-sutta (Great discourse on Analysis of Karma: 2  Refer to Adikaram (1946/1994) for an excellent analysis of the Pali commentarial literature.

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M III, 207-215) is an example. The Dhammacakkappavattana-sutta (Discourse on Setting in Motion of the Wheel of the Dharma: S V, 420424), considered to be the first sermon of the Buddha, can be included in this genre very easily. There are many discourses attributed to leading disciples, elaborating in a similar manner on what the Buddha said in brief.3 Among such disciples, Mahakaccana was praised by the Buddha as the foremost among those who are capable of elaborating in detail on what the Buddha said in brief. The ‘Discourse on Honey Ball’ (Madhu-pinḍika-sutta: M I, 108-114) is well-known among the many discourses elaborated by this great elder. Scholars consider this discourse as having considerable historical significance for in it the origin of the commentarial tradition of early Buddhist disciples may be traced. More importantly, they point out that this discourse makes clear that the analysis of the meaning of the Buddha’s original statements was the aim of the commentaries (EB II, 1966, 335-352). The ‘Discourse on the Analysis of Truth’ (Saccavibhaṅga-sutta: M III, 248-252) is a similar one attributed to the great elder Sariputta. All these and many similar discourses are included in the canon as the word of the Buddha, thus making interpretation an integral aspect of Buddhism. The basket of discipline (Vinaya Piṭaka) may be considered a very good example of a commentary. In a sense, the entire Vinaya Piṭaka is a detailed explanation of the vinaya rules prescribed by the Buddha to both bhikkhus and bhikkhunīs (monks and nuns). The set of rules is included in the collection called ‘pātimokkha’ to which Buddhaghosa wrote a commentary, as was mentioned above. Although Buddhaghosa Thera wrote a major commentary for the entire basket of vinaya, the Vinaya Piṭaka itself is a vast commentary on the vinaya rules. Writing commentaries is a universal phenomenon in the entire Indian tradition and is not confined to Buddhism. It is well known that in India commentaries are not mere explanations, but they are interpretations as well as analyses and critiques. Any new ideas or developments were presented by means of commentaries on earlier works. Although the Buddhist commentaries were meant to present the right way to understand the word of the Buddha, the possibility of new interpretations cannot be ruled out totally. As we will see below, the purpose of interpretation in the Buddhist tradition was to prove that the word of the Buddha had only one focus, or one taste, namely, the taste of liberation from suffering (vimutti-rasa). 3  See ‘aṭṭhakathā’ entry (notes 18-21) in Encyclopaedia of Buddhism for some examples.

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Although interpretation did not develop in Buddhism as a separate field of study, as did in Europe, the tradition was not without guides to interpreters. Historically, Peṭakopadesa and Netti, two post-canonical works, which are considered almost canonical, can be considered systematic efforts to provide guidance to interpreters of the Theravada canon. These two works have developed a conceptual framework comprising sixteen modes (called hāra) and five methods (naya) for developing a consistent reading of the texts and to be used as aids to interpretation (Two works are almost identical in content. Many tend to believe that the Netti is a systematization of Peṭakopadesa.). Ñānamoli Thera who translated the Netti into English called it ‘The Guide’, for he is convinced that the purpose of the Netti was to provide guidance to commentators so that they may interpret any text as representing the same ‘taste’. “All these commentaries”, says Ñānamoli Thera, “properly so called are deeply indebted to the guide, its method and its normative trappings.”4 I. Origin of the historical need for interpretation In the Buddhist tradition, interpretation developed from two needs, one historical and the other, philosophical. The historical need arose with the parinirvāṇa (passing away) of the Buddha. As the Mahāparinibbānasutta of the Dīgha-nikāya, the Sutta that contains an account of the last days of the Buddha, records, the Buddha did not name a successor to himself, and, instead, he said to his followers that the Dhamma (teaching) he taught and the Vinaya (discipline) he established will be their teacher (guide) once he is gone (D II, 154; Walshe 2012, 270). For those disciples who looked upon the Buddha as a person on whom they can depend, this move may have appeared strange and distressing. Nevertheless, it had obviously a philosophical significance. What is more important for the present discussion, however, is that this elevation of the Dhamma and the Vinaya to the status of the teacher is that the teaching and the disciplinary code, which are ultimately reducible to one whole which is called ‘words of the Buddha’ (Buddha vacana), had to be kept in an organized and methodical form. When the Buddha was living, the disciples could go to him to clarify their doubts and get answers to their 4  The Guide (1977) (PTS) p.liii. It is interesting to note that Theravada tradition attributes the authorship of the Guide to the elder Kaccana who was praised as foremost among those who described in detail what the Buddha said in brief. But this view is not accepted by the modern scholars. See Ñānamoli Thera’s introduction for an insightful discussion on the time, authorship of the Netti and its relation to Peṭakopadesa.

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questions. With the passing away of the Buddha now it was the word of the Buddha to which the disciples had to resort to. This necessitated organizing the word of the Buddha for easy reference. The first council at Rajagraha, after the three months of the passing away of the Buddha, was convened mainly for this purpose.5 Associated very closely with this effort is the challenge of determining what the Buddha’s word (Buddha vacana) was. Although there does not seem to have been a systematic method to keep what the Buddha taught without loss, the tradition holds that Ananda Thera, the chief attendant to the Buddha, who was known as the ‘treasurer of the Dhamma’ held in his memory everything the Buddha taught while Upali, known for his expertise in the Vinaya, held everything pertained to the Vinaya. The Cullavagga account says that in the first council, Ananda Thera functioned as the resource person for the Dhamma whereas Upali Thera was the resource person for the Vinaya. But it is imaginable that there must have been many statements that did not come under the purview of these two elders but kept in the memory of others.6 What if one were to produce a statement and claim that it was taught by the Buddha to him and that nobody else heard it? How is one to determine that the particular statement was the actual word of the Buddha? It is to solve situations of this nature that the four ‘great indicators’ (mahāpadesa) were given by the Buddha according to the Mahāparinibbāna-sutta mentioned above. The great indicators are as follows: 1. One may say a particular statement was heard by him directly from the Buddha. Such a claim should neither be rejoiced, nor be rejected, but be fitted in the discourses (i.e., the Dhamma) 5  The canonical account of the first council occurring in the Cullavagga-pāḷi, one of the five works of the original Pali Vinayapiṭaka, does not mention this purpose directly. But the Sri Lankan tradition (Pūjāvaliya: Prathama sangīti kathā) holds that what the Buddha taught was in a mixed state, like a heap of various flowers on a flowerstand, and hence had to be sorted out. 6  An instance that allows us to think of this possibility is the Cullavagga reference (Vin II, 289-290) to one elder named Purana who is said to have a group of five hundred followers. When the first council was drawing to a conclusion, this elder happened to pass Rajagrha with his group, and the elders who executed the council approached him and asked him to accept what they ‘chanted together’ upon which the latter said that although the elders must have well chanted the word of the Buddha that he will hold on to what he had directly heard from the Master. Although this elder Purana is an unsolved mystery in the early Buddhist tradition what he says points to the possible existence of more than one version of the word of the Buddha even at a very early stage in the history of Buddhism.

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and compared with the Vinaya, and if it fits with discourses and compares with the Vinaya, then should be accepted, if not, should be rejected. 2. One may say that a particular statement was by him from the monastic community (Sangha). Such a claim... 3. One may say that a particular statement was heard by him directly from the learned monks belonging to a well known establishment. Such a claim... 4. One may say that a particular statement was heard by him directly from a great learned monk. Such a claim... (D II, 124-125) Although the indicators are given as four depending on the sources of the statement in question, the criterion given for the purpose of determination is only one: a statement should be accepted only if it fits and compares with the Dhamma and the Vinaya; any statement that does not meet this test should be rejected. The criterion is basically an adoption of a coherence theory of truth which, in this particular case, anticipates an already determined corpus of doctrine and discipline against which to test the new statement. Since these indicators are attributed to the Buddha, we have to think that by the time of the Buddha’s passing away there was already a clear idea at least among his close followers as to what his teaching was. What happened at the first council may have been to collect the statements of the Buddha accordingly.7 In addition to this overarching criterion, the later commentarial tradition adopted its own four indicators, discourses (Sutta), what accords with discourses (sutta-anuloma), views of the teachers (ācariyavāda), and one’s own view (attano-mati) (VinA I, 231). Of these four, the last is supposed to be the last in the degree of acceptability. But in giving preference to discourses and what accords with discourses this classification too may be considered not basically different from the criterion advocated by the Buddha. The last two criteria are considered only in the absence of any input from the first two criteria.

7  This is not to say that what we have ‘the three baskets’ (ti-piṭaka) was formed at this meeting. But it is reasonable to think that the basic structure of the Buddhist canon was determined at this council.

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II. Guidelines for doctrinal/philosophical interpretation

Coherence as the criterion The criterion behind the four great indicators, the coherence or uniformity between the Dhamma and the Vinaya, seems to point to some overarching characteristic of the teaching of the Buddha. Such a characteristic has been articulated in discourses. The well-known statement that whatever is well-said (subhāsita), all that is the word of the Buddha (Yaṃ kiñci subhāsitaṃ sabban taṃ tassa bhagavato vacanaṃ: A IV, 164) hints at such an overarching characteristic. This statement can be interpreted as articulating a broad characteristic of the teaching of the Buddha, namely, well-said-ness. It can also be interpreted as affirming that everything said by the Buddha is well-said, meaning any statement found anywhere can be considered a word of the Buddha provided that it is well-said. What is well-said in this context is what conduces to the ultimate goal of making an end to suffering by purifying one’s mind of defiling factors. If well-said-ness is somewhat vague, there is a clearer idea presented as an overarching characteristic of the entire teaching of the Buddha. It is the taste of freedom/liberation (vimutti-rasa) referred to above. In one discourse, the Buddha says that his Dhamma and the ocean have several characteristics in common. One among such characteristics is that, whereas the ocean has the uniform salty taste his Dhamma has the taste of freedom/liberation (A IV, 203). What this highlights is that everything that has been taught by the Buddha pertains to achieve liberation or freedom from suffering. Confirming this view, the Buddha is found asserting in more than one instance that what he has always taught is only the arising and the termination of suffering (S IV, 164; M I, 140). At one instance, the Buddha contrasts what he taught with what he knew but did not teach. Taking some soil on the tip of his nail, he says that what he taught is comparable to the soil he has on his nail; but what knew but did not teach is comparable to the soil on the earth. Again, in a similar manner, taking some simsapa leaves in his hand, the Buddha says that what he taught is like the leaves in his hand whereas what he did not teach is comparable to the leaves in the simsapa grove. The Buddha explains the reason in the following words:

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So too, bhikkhus, the things I have directly known but have not taught you are numerous, while the things I have taught you are few. And why, bhikkhus, have I not taught those many things? Because they are unbeneficial, irrelevant to the fundamentals of the holy life, and do not lead to revulsion, to dispassion, to cessation, to peace, to direct knowledge, to enlightenment, to Nibbana. Therefore, I have not taught them. And what bhikkhus have I taught? I have taught: ‘This is suffering’: I have taught: ‘This is the origin of suffering’; I have taught: ‘This is the cessation of suffering’; I have taught: ‘This is the way leading to the cessation of suffering.’ And why bhikkhus have I taught this? Because this is beneficial, relevant to the fundamentals of the holy life, and leads to revulsion, to dispassion, to cessation, to peace, to direct knowledge, to enlightenment, to Nibbana. Therefore I have taught this. (Bodhi 2000, 1857-1858) Here, what the Buddha says is that a good amount of things he knew but did not teach do not pertain to the final religious goal. The point here is not that the Buddha knew much (although it is said automatically), but that whatever he has taught is what pertains to the final goal. The statements of this nature may be taken as explaining how the teaching of the Buddha has one taste. Furthermore, they function as hermeneutical guidelines to interpret the word of the Buddha in a uniform manner. The attribution of this uniform character to the teaching has enabled the Buddhist tradition to give an unrestricted broad meaning to the notion of ‘the word of the Buddha’ (Buddha-vacana). It is owing to this reason that in the basket of the discourses (sutta-piṭaka) there are discourses attributed to monastic as well as non-monastic disciples of the Buddha, both male and female. For instance, the CullavedallaSutta (M I, 299-305) (the shorter discourse on questions and answers) was taught by Theri Dhammadinna, and is accepted as the word of the Buddha. Apart from it being a rare instance in any religious literature in the world that a woman teaches while the teacher is still alive and that what she taught is accredited with the same authority as enjoyed by the statements of the master himself, the practice of interpreting the Dhamma as having a uniform character has enabled Buddhists to have a broad concept of what the Dhamma is and to consider even ‘what is said by the disciples’ as the word of the Buddha.

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Direct and indirect statements A conceptual tool that has proved to be wide spread across all Buddhist traditions is the distinction between direct and indirect mode of discourse or speech. The traditional terms used to denote these two categories are ‘speech (of the Buddha) with direct meaning’ (nīta-attha desanā) and ‘speech of the Buddha with indirect meaning’ (neya-attha desanā) (The literary meaning of nīta-attha is ‘brought in meaning’ and neya-attha, ‘meaning to be brought in’). A more literal translation of the two terms are: the speech with meaning already brought in (=direct speech) and speech of which meaning has to be brought in (=indirect speech). Although the classification is of vital significance in interpreting and understanding the Buddha’s teachings, it is mentioned only once by the Buddha in his sermons. The short discourse which refers to this classification is as follows: There are these two who misrepresent the Tathagata (A term used by the Buddha to refer to himself in the third person mode). Which two? He who represents a discourse of indirect meaning as a discourse of direct meaning and he who represents a discourse of direct meaning as a discourse of indirect meaning. (A I, 60) That the distinction is very important is clear by the Buddha’s remark that those who confuse these two modes of speech misrepresent the teaching of the Buddha. What these two modes are not described in the discourse. We have to seek help from the commentary in order to know as to what they are. What follows is the commentarial explanation of the two classifications: A discourse of the form “O monks, there is one individual, O monks, there are two individuals, ...” etc., is a discourse of indirect meaning. Here although the Perfectly Enlightened One speaks of one person, two persons etc., its sense has to be inferred since there is no individual in the absolute sense. But a person because of his folly may take this as a discourse of direct meaning and would argue that the Buddha would not have said ‘one person’ ‘two persons’ etc. unless a person existed in the absolute sense. Thinking that since the Buddha has said so, there must be a person in the absolute sense, he represents a discourse of indirect meaning as a discourse of direct meaning. A discourse of direct meaning is what is of the form: ‘this

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is impermanent, sorrowful and devoid of substance (soul)’. Here the sense is that what is impermanent is at the same time sorrowful and lacking in substance. But because of his folly, this person takes this as a discourse of indirect meaning and extracts its sense saying “there is something which is eternal, happy and is the soul” and thus represents a discourse of direct meaning as a discourse of indirect meaning. (AA II, 118) What this classification tries to address may be described as the challenge of using language, which assumes substantial entities behind words, in order to express and communicate non-substantiality of phenomena, which is anatta or no-soul view of Buddhism. Anatta (denial of ātma) is one of the most challenging of all concepts in Buddhism. It says that there is no-thing in any of the phenomena appearing to be substantial entities. The specific focus of the anatta doctrine is that there is no person or individual in ultimate sense over and above the five aspects with which (human) being is constituted. When the Buddha teaches the three characteristics of reality, namely, impermanence, unsatisfactoriness and non-substantiality, he uses language with direct meaning. In other words, the words used mean exactly what is said. However, the Buddha or any enlightened person cannot live in the world without communicating with other fellow human beings on ordinary day-to-day matters, which necessitates them to refer to persons, individuals, things etc. This is what is called indirect speech which should not be understood as referring to really existing persons, individuals and things, but as referring to nonsubstantial things. Some discourses of the Buddha are clear in their direct or indirect meanings. But all are not so. Some are mixed with both modes of meaning. To distinguish one from the other has been a challenge in the Buddhist tradition from the time of the Buddha himself. The following are some examples: To a bhikkhu named Moliya Phagguna who asked: ‘who consumes the nutriment consciousness?’ the Buddha said that the question is not proper for it assume a person who consumes this particular food. The proper way to ask the question was: for what is the nutriment consciousness (a condition), which is without the problematic ‘who’. (Bodhi 2000, 541) A bhikkhu named Sati had the view that consciousness runs and wanders around without change. The Buddha corrected

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this wrong view saying that consciousness is always dependently arisen. (and hence changing all the time: M I, 258) These are some instances of uncertainty that arose in the time of the Buddha. The subsequent history of Buddhism is marked with instances that made a considerable impact on the organization of the community of the followers of the Buddha. Prominent among such instances is what is known in the history of Buddhism as personalism (pudgala-vāda) or the belief that there is a person in absolute sense. Those who held this view argued that, in discourses, the Buddha referred to an individual who passes through samsara (cycle of existence) experiencing the good and bad results of actions s/he performed. It is clear that these later Buddhists (who broke away from the original Sangha after the second council held about one hundred years after the passing away of the Buddha) found that they cannot make sense of the beliefs such as action (karma), its results, consciousness, the cycle of existence and attaining nirvana in the absence of a real individual as is denied by the teaching of anatta (no-soul). Faced with this difficulty this group of bhikkhus accepted the reality of an individual who persisted through saṃsāra. The other Buddhist groups thought this view to be a violation of the key teaching of non-substantiality. Accordingly those who held this view were considered ‘heretics’ within. In the Kathāvatthu, one of the seven works belonging to the basket of Higher Doctrine (Abhidhamma), compiled by Theravadins, begins with this issue: whether a person obtains in real and absolute sense? The longest discussion found in this work is presented as a debate between the Theravadin and the Pudgalavādin (personalist). Toward the conclusion of the long discussion, both proponents and opponents resort to quoting the statements from the discourses of the Buddha. It is interesting to note that no final decision given for this debate. The commentary by Buddhaghosa says that all statements quoted by the opponent to support his claim are instances of indirect meaning (neya-attha) wrongly taken by him as statements of direct meaning (nīta-attha). Not only in this issue, in all debated matters in the Kathāvatthu (altogether 217 issues), the disputants finally resort to the statements of the Buddha. Ultimately, the matters rest on the correct interpretation of the statements of the Buddha.

Later developments The persistence of issues related to interpretation is a key characteristic of the entire Buddhist tradition. The various schools that emerged

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after the second council are an example for this tendency. The eighteen different schools differed from one another mainly on the matters of the Dhamma. One such view, believed to be the precursor of the Mahayana tradition, is the transcendentalist view (lokuttara-vāda), holding the view that the Buddha was a transcendental being who was never subject to human conditions and never lived in the human world. The emergence of Mahayana in the history of Buddhism is a much more complex issue than transcendentalism and is beyond the scope of this discussion. But what is relevant in this context is the emergence of Mahayana sutras as the true teaching of the Buddha. All the main Mahayana sutras are attributed to the Buddha. Since they are presented as the true word of the Buddha there was a serious need to interpret. The popular belief was that since there were not people capable of understanding these sutras when the Buddha taught them, they were kept in the nether world (nāga-loka = world of Nagas) till they were recovered by great teacher Nagarjuna. It is said that this is how the Mahā-prajnāpāramitā-sutra, a leading Mahayana sutra came into being. What is more probable, however, is that these sutrās were written by the early Mahayana teachers and claimed that they contained the true teaching of the Buddha. The Hinayana (lower vehicle) and Mahayana (great vehicle) classification was brought forward by Mahayanists to justify the new sutras and their new ideas. According to this classification, the lower vehicle was for those who had low capacities, whereas Mahayana was for those who had higher capacities. Although the division is based on a value judgment on so-called Hinayanists, it did not reject what is old: it was only relegated to a lesser position. The wide-spread use of the concept of skill-in-means (upāya kausalya), particularly in sutras such as the Saddharma-puṇḍarīka-sutra (Sutra of the White Lotus of the Good Dharma=Lotus sutra), is meant, among many other uses, to explain the existence of more than one yāna (vehicle). Ultimately, none is rejected, all are assimilated into one system, making them instances of the Buddha’s use of skill in means. The Vajrayana tradition, considered to be the third turning of the Dharma wheel by the Buddha, is a further development of Mahayana, giving prominence to certain esoteric practices and accommodating local Tibetan and folk traditions. It resorts to extensive use of interpretational materials in its effort to justify the use of ideas such as killing, stealing, lying and adultery8 in its religious discourse. The problem of metaphorical use 8  “Vajra Hermeneutics” by Robert Thurman and “Killing, Lying, Stealing and

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of such concepts has been persistent issue in this tradition, giving way to many paradoxical interpretations causing misunderstanding among those who are outside the tradition.

Concluding remarks Direct and indirect (nīta-attha and neya-attha) discourses, the basic category of interpretation given by the Buddha, was basically meant to solve the philosophical problem that arises from using language to convey a reality which is dependently arisen and hence does not exist in any absolute sense. This is a difficult task for language is generally used to convey our substantialist view of reality. On the other hand, there cannot be a separate language to convey exclusively our enlightenment. Hence, one is forced to make use of the ordinary, existing, worldly language in order to articulate one’s enlightening understanding. In the Buddhist tradition, it is said that the Buddha felt discouraged to teach when he contemplated on the unenlightened nature of the world. He felt that to teach what he realized is like swimming against current (paṭisotagāmi: M I, 160-175). Most probably, the Buddha must have felt the epistemological problem involving reality, understanding, and its expression (language). Overcoming this difficulty, the Buddha used language without getting emotionally or ideologically involved in it, which attitude the Buddha articulated in these words: These are merely names, expressions, turns of speech, designations in common use in the world, which the Tathāgata uses without misapprehending them. (Walshe 2012, 169) In the later Buddhist tradition, particularly in the later Abhidhamma period, the two discourses were understood as two truths, namely, the truth of worldly convention (sammuti-sacca) and the truth of the highest meaning (paramattha-sacca). This view held that the Buddha taught two truths, and that both are true depending on the context in which the Buddha was teaching. Basically, this new classification is not different from the earlier. But by adopting the concept of truth in order to articulate the difference of understanding, these later Buddhists brought in a fresh philosophical problem of having to deal with two simultaneous truths, which was prima facie open to the criticism that it violates the principle of non-contradiction and that it promotes the problematic distinction of appearance and reality. Adultery: A Problem of Interpretation in the Tantras” by Michael M. Broido in Lopez (1993) deal with interpretation-related issues in Vajrayana.

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In the ‘Discourse at Sāmagāma’ (M 104), the Buddha says that any dispute among his disciples on his teaching will be more serious than disputes on the Vinaya. Furthermore, the Buddha was satisfied at this juncture that his disciples did not have any dispute on his teaching. Contrary to this state of affairs, during the next several centuries of the history of Buddhism, we witness that there were many divisions among his disciples over the matters of the Dhamma, ultimately paving the way for several dozens of schools to emerge. The currently existing three main traditions are the results of the evolution of those schools. The three Buddhist traditions have developed over time an increasingly inclusive attitude toward one another, exchanging doctrinal insights as well as practices among traditions. I have called this tendency ‘miśra-yāna’ (combined yāna) or trans-yanic Buddhism (Abenayaka & Tilakaratne 2012, 569-585), which shows that the process of interpretation is not a thing of the past, but one that is on-going and continuing.

6. Saṅgīti and Sāmaggi: Communal Recitation and the Unity of the Sangha*

I The Pali word saṅgīti refers to ecclesiastical councils or ‘communal recitations’ (to borrow from L.S. Cousins1) held among the Theravadins on different occasions in their history. The historicity, function and role of these events in the history of Buddhism have been critically studied by a large number of Buddhist scholars, and I do not have anything new to add to this already existing vast knowledge. Nevertheless, the idea of writing on saṅgīti afresh comes from my feeling that the close connection between the act specified by the term saṅgāyanā, or reciting together, and the phenomenon of unity in the Sangha (monastic community) has not been adequately emphasised. I suggest that the most important purpose of saṅgīti has not been understood in its proper context.2 In this paper, I am going to argue that the fundamental purpose of the act of saṅgāyanā and therefore the events described as saṅgīti is the assurance of the unity of the Buddhist monastic organisation. Every time a crisis arose in the Sangha we know that the early Buddhists engaged in the act of saṅgāyanā in which the key activity was to recite together 1  ‘The “Five Points” and the Origins of the Buddhist Schools’ in T. Skorupski, ed., The Buddhist Forum II, London 1991, 27-60. 2  Charles Hallisey’s useful discussion on Theravada councils (‘Councils as Ideas and Events in the Theravada’ in Skorupski, ed., op. cit., 133-48) refers to different purposes and uses of councils. The point of the present paper, however, is, while not denying that these recitals served various purposes, to show that the fundamental purpose of, at least, the three classical Theravada saṅgītis was to preserve the unity and integrity of the monastic order. * An initial version of this article was published in Buddhist Studies Review, UK, vol.17, No. 2. London: Linh-So’n Buddhist Association, 2000.

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the Dhamma and the Vinaya. This basically has nothing to do with the memorisation or preservation of the canon. At least, it was not its main purpose. I plan to show that the act of saṅgāyanā, first and foremost, was meant to be a public expression of one’s allegiance to the organisation which was represented by the Dhamma and the Vinaya. I will further argue that, in this respect, the recital of the Pātimokkha by the members of the Sangha every fortnight serves virtually the same purpose. Although only a representative number of the Sangha took part in the actual act of saṅgāyanā, all including those who did not participate were expected to show their allegiance by accepting and abiding by what was recited. This is something which applied equally to the Pātimokkha recital. In a religious tradition where there is no reference to a divine point of origin, this was thought to be the only way to express allegiance.3 II A reader of the Pali Canon, in particular its Vinaya and the Sutta Piṭaka, is bound to be struck by a large numbers of instances where the unity of the Sangha has been spoken about. A well known line occurring in the Dhammapada (194), “sukhā saṅghassa sāmaggī”, says that the unity of the Sangha is happiness. As we will find shortly, the unity of the Sangha was seen as causing happiness not only in the Sangha but, ultimately, to the whole world. If Buddhism is considered to be a system concerned about individual liberation from samsara, one might wonder why there is so much emphasis on the unity of the Sangha, for liberation is ultimately one’s own personal affair. Contrary to such a view, the life of the seeker of nirvana has always been perceived as one in a community and thence community living has been considered very important. One might also see that the unity of the Sangha has been stressed because it was considered necessary for the preservation of the message of the Buddha for posterity and to ensure happiness to the entire world. A study of the Dhamma and Vinaya shows that sāmaggi of the Sangha has been emphasised on both grounds. The crucial importance of having kalyānamittas in monastic life was amply demonstrated when the Buddha corrected Ananda, who thought that half of one’s improvement in monastic life depended on 3  This way of arguing clearly anticipates the historical reliability of the accounts given in the ancient literary sources mentioned. There is no doubt that one can question the historical merits of these reports. The present account shows, at least, that what these sources say are consistent not only with one another but also with the religion and way of life upheld by the tradition represented in them.

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having good friends. The Buddha said that such improvement depended totally on having good friends (SA I, 156). The idea stressed is that the members of the community should behave as kalyānamittas to one another. This kind of attitude is impossible to imagine in a society where people are not in unity and harmony. The very nature of the Sangha as a body characterised by common ownership and minimal personal belongings was meant to be conducive to selfless living in order to achieve final liberation characterised by total eradication of all sorts of bonds and desires. Obviously, the idea was that one has to have a community life which enhances the sublime features of the ultimate goal. In other words, although the final liberation is a result of one’s personal effort, it has to be realised within a community in which everyone has a mutual commitment. This feature of Buddhist monastic life can well be demonstrated with reference to the Vinaya Piṭaka. The Uposatha-khandhaka of the Mahāvagga describes how the performance of uposatha gradually started and evolved. Once the act of uposatha was approved for the community it was mandatory that all members attend the function irrespective of their religious attainments.4 It was also the idea that this act should be performed in complete unanimity. As a result, an elaborate system was worked out to take the consent (chanda) and assurance of purity (pārisuddhi) of the members who found themselves unable to attend due to illness. It was included in the preliminaries (pubbakaraṇa) which needed to be completed before the act of uposatha began. The recital of the Pātimokkha, the collection of rules (sikkhāpada), was the key aspect of the uposatha assemblies. The ideal practice was to recite all the rules. If this was found impossible for some reason, then it was allowed to adhere to shorter versions. Every version of the recital, however, always ended with the following statement: ettakaṃ tassa bhagavato suttagataṃ suttapariyāpannaṃ anvaddhamāsaṃ uddesaṃ āgacchati. Tattha sabbeheva sāmaggehi sammodamānehi avivadamānehi sikkhātabbhan ti: This much is in the Vinaya rule, included therein, of the Blessed One, which comes up for recitation each fortnight. Herein all should train in concord and appreciation without dispute. 4  The case of Mahakappina is revealing. Being an arahant ‘purified with the highest means of purification’ ( ... atha khvāhaṃ visuddho paramāya visuddhiyā), Mahakappina started wondering whether or not he should attend the uposatha assembly. The Buddha admonished him saying, Kappina, if you do not respect and take this act seriously, who will? (Vin I, 105)

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This stresses on the need to follow the Vinaya in concord and appreciation without dispute provides us with a good clue as to why the act itself was compulsory. While, on the other hand, the value of the unity of the Sangha was underscored, any schism of the Sangha, on the other hand, was treated with the utmost seriousness. Among the saṅghādisesa offences, offences next only to pārājika in gravity, there are two specifically connected with schism in the Sangha: one is in connection with any member who causes schism within the Sangha and the other is regarding those who support the crime of such a person. Both persons are guilty of a saṅghādisesa offence (Vin III, 113). Another offence belonging to the same category is to make oneself unavailable for admonition by the Sangha (Vin III, 113). This rule contains a phrase which characterises the mutually dependent nature of the Sangha. It is: aññam-añña-vacanena, aññam-aññavutthāpanena - ‘mutual admonishment and mutual rehabilitation’. The relevant Vinaya rule says that one who violates this spirit of the Sangha is guilty of a saṅghādisesa offence. In the discourses too, the saṅghasāmaggi features as a very important aspect of monastic life. There are several discourses in the Majjhimanikāya where the harmonious life of the members of the Sangha is praised by the Buddha. The Cūlāgosiṅga-sutta (M I, 205-211) describes how the harmonious life of the elders Anuruddha, Nandiya and Kimbila came to be appreciated by the Buddha as ‘living in concord, with mutual appreciation, without disputing, blending like milk and water, viewing each other with kindly eyes’ (Bodhi 1995, 301). The discourse ends with an interesting side-episode: a spirit named Digha Parajana appears before the Buddha to express his appreciation of the three Theras. To him, the Buddha makes the following remarks, which can be taken as a demonstration of the Dhammapada statement mentioned earlier: And if the clan from which these three clansmen went forth from the home life into homelessness should remember them with confident heart, that would lead to the welfare and happiness of that clan for a long time, And if the retinue of the clan from which these clansmen went forth... the village from which they went forth ... the town from which they went forth ... the city from which they went forth ... the country from which those three clansmen went forth from the home life into homelessness should remember them with confident heart, that would lead to the welfare and happiness of the nobles for a long

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time. If all brahmins ... all merchants ... all workers ... should remember those three clansmen with confident heart, that would lead to the welfare and happiness of the workers for a long time. If the world with its gods, its Maras, and its Brahmas, this generation with its recluses and brahmins, its princes and its people, should remember those three clansmen with confident heart, that would lead to the welfare and happiness of the world for a long time. (Bodhi 1995, 305-6) The contrasting event which provided the background for these remarks was a dispute among some members of the Sangha who lived in Kosambi. The Kosambiya-sutta (M 48) which refers to this incident contains an admonition to those monks by the Buddha. However, the Vinaya Piṭaka contains a detailed report of the incident, according to which the Buddha could not resolve the dispute at the first effort. The Buddha found that the monks who were involved in the dispute were adamant and not yet ready to see their fault. Leaving these monks, the Buddha visits the three monks who lived in sharp contrast to the Kosambians (Vin I, 350-2). The Mahagosinga-sutta (M 32) too provides a similar example of a group of senior Theras such as Sariputta, Moggallana and Mahakassapa enjoying a harmonious life. In addition to such instances, there are a considerable number of discourses which refer to the unfortunate state of dispute among various religious groups caused by ideological differences. For instance, discourses such as Duṭṭhaṭṭhaka, Pasura, Cūlaviyuha and Mahaviyuha of the Suttanipāta5 discuss how disputes have arisen among religious people and how the real sage keeps himself away from such disputes. Although these discourses seem to refer to disputes in a broader religious context, ultimately they highlight the way the disciples of the Buddha should react to such situations, whether among themselves or among religious people at large. The instances of glorifying the harmony of the Sangha have to be understood in the context of the case of the Kosambians and some other dissenting groups among the Sangha. The classic example of such a situation was Devadatta, who seems to have developed a kind of rivalry with the Buddha and his followers. He, in fact, was successful in making a schism in the Sangha and taking away a fraction of it with him. This, however, ended in failure and brought disgrace on Devadatta.6 5  Sn 780-7, 824-34, 862-77, 878-94, and 895-914. 6  See Cullavagga - Sanghabhedaka-khandhaka - (I.B. Homer, tr., The Book of the Discipline V, PTS, 1952, 253-85) for details. A III, 402-9, too, refers to some aspects of this.

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Although the story of Devadatta ends with his death, we cannot imagine that things became absolutely unproblematic afterwards. Further possibilities of dissension were lurking, and the last days of the Buddha, in particular, allowed such developments to surface. The Mahāparinibbāna-sutta starts with the Buddha’s mentioning the seven virtues of non-decline (satta-aparihāniya-dhamma) to Sunidha and Vassakara, two ministers of Ajatasattu. Immediately after this discussion, the Buddha starts reminding the Sangha of similar virtues in which a major aspect is frequent and harmonious gathering, which was taken as the key to the non-decline and longevity of the Sangha as a body (D II, 76-7). In addition to the pending Parinibbāna of the Buddha, things that were happening among other religious groups too seem to have triggered concerns about the unity of the Sangha. The Sāmagāma-sutta (M 104) reports the troubled situation that arose with the passing away of the Jaina leader. According to the discourse, dissent first broke out in the monastic group. Subsequently, this resulted in splitting the lay supporters into rival groups. Ananda reports these events among Jain followers to the Buddha and voices his concern that a similar fate could befall the Sangha once the Buddha is gone.7 The Buddha responds to Ananda by enquiring whether his disciples had any doubt about the Dhamma, taken as constituting ‘the thirty-seven dhammas that contribute to awakening’ (bodhi-pakkhiya-dhammā).8 Ananda says ‘no’, but points out the possibility of disagreements on the Vinaya. To this the Buddha responds by saying that such disagreements will not be as serious as disagreements on the Dhamma, but instructs Ananda on how to deal with problems of discipline. The subsequent history of Buddhism, however, shows that things did not turn out exactly as the Buddha expected. It seems that the point Ananda was trying to make in this discussion was that the Jain disciples were disputing and ruining themselves because they were left without a refuge. What seems to have been meant 7  I thought, venerable sir: ‘Let no dispute arise in the Sangha when the Blessed One has gone. For such a dispute would be for the harm and unhappiness of many, for the loss, harm, and suffering of gods and humans’: Ñāṇamoli & Bodhi, 854. 8  Discussing the significance of lists in the Pali Canon, Rupert Gethin draws our attention to what he calls ‘composite lists’, such as the ‘thirty-seven dhammas that contribute to awakening’, which were used for both mnemonic and religious purposes: ‘The Matikas: Memorization, Mindfulness, and the List’ in Janet Gyatso, In the Mirror of Memory: Reflections on Mindfulness and Remembrance in Indian and Tibetan Buddhism (Albany 1992, 156-7).

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by refuge is a substitute for the leader. In other words, the question for the disciples of the Buddha was: who will be taking the place of the Buddha once he attains Parinibbāna? It is not that the Buddha did not feel this need. His response is reported in the Mahāparinibbāna-sutta. Addressing Ananda, the Buddha says: Ananda, it is possible that the following could occur to you: ‘the teaching no longer has a teacher, there is no teacher for us’. Ananda, that should not be understood in that manner; Ananda, the doctrine that I have explained and the discipline that I have prescribed will be your teacher at my passing. (D II, 154) Although this may not be what the ordinary disciples expected, this definitely made the Dhamma and Vinaya the ultimate repository of the authority of the Buddha. The same is confirmed in the idea of the great indicators (mahāpadesa) which comes in the same Sutta: In the absence of the Buddha to determine whether a statement is what is taught by him or not, it will have to be compared with the Dhamma and Vinaya. Philosophically, this was the exact situation which the Buddha anticipated even while he was living. Expressions such as “yo dhammaṃ passati so maṃ passati; yo maṃ passati so dhammaṃ passati” (S III, 120) (whoever see the Dhamma sees me, whoever sees me sees the Dhamma) indicate that a sharp distinction was not to be made or, at least, the Buddha did not wish to make one, between him and what he taught. Therefore, the real allegiance was to the Dhamma and Vinaya, and it meant that when the Buddha was no more the disciples unanimously accepted what the Buddha taught. We can see, in this manner, that both the Dhamma and the Vinaya underscore the need for the unity and harmony of the Sangha. On the one hand, there was a very important religious reason for this, namely, that the practice of the Path leading to the cessation of suffering was seen as best done in a community characterised by mutual support. On the other hand, there were equally important historical reasons, such as the split of the Jain community after the demise of its leader and also the instances of internal dispute among the Sangha itself, which made the Buddha and the leaders of the Sangha worry about the unity of the organisation. The rallying point was the Dhamma and Vinaya. Allegiance to the Vinaya was expressed every fortnight in the act of uposatha.9 As we saw earlier, these recitals were always concluded with 9  Because the recital of the entire Vinaya comprising both ādibrahmacāriyakasīla

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the admonition that all should abide by it ‘in concord and agreement without dispute’ (sāmaggehi sammodamānehi avivādamānehi). No doubt the recital must have helped the Sangha to remember what they have to abide by, but the real meaning of this function was the assurance of the unity of the Sangha. It is an instance of the Sangha following the aparihānīya-dhamma taught by the Buddha, namely, gathering in unity, leaving in unity, doing the ‘business’ of the Sangha in unity. This view can further be supported with reference to sāmaggi-uposatha which was added to the other two uposathas that are usually carried out on the fourteenth or fifteenth day of the lunar fortnight, namely, cātuddasī and pannarasi. The sāmaggi-uposatha is to be performed whenever a schism of the Sangha has been resolved (Vin I, 537). What this means is that up to that point there had been a faction of the Sangha which did not abide by all the rules of the Pātimokkha, but now that they have agreed they have to show that by all reciting the Pātimokkha together. The undivided recital - ekuddesa - is a characteristic of the Sangha in unity.10 This purpose of the uposatha performance has been duly emphasised by Gombrich when he says: It was the one thing which held the Sangha together. Each celebration, of course, was the announcement of the purity of a particular Sangha and ensured their renewal of face-toface relations ... these regular compulsory meetings bound the Sangha together as a whole. (Gombrich 1988, 81) Borrowing from Durkheim, he calls this ‘the Sangha’s solidarity ritual’ (Gombrich 1988, 80). The recital of Pātimokkha is usually called uddesa which means ‘brief exposition’ in the context of the Dhamma. The term saṅgāyanā has not been used in this context, and the recital of the uposatha ceremony is usually done by one member while the rest of the monks are expected to listen to him attentively. Nevertheless, the actual meaning of the whole function is no different from a saṅgāyanā where both the Dhamma and Vinaya were recited. Therefore, pātimokkhuddesa can well be seen as a mini-saṅgāyanā performed every two weeks by the entire Sangha in small groups who are united in their religious practice. and ābhisamācārika-sīla was impossible at these meetings, we can see that the Pātimokkha, which constitutes the former and which was considered fundamental, has been taken as representing the Vinaya. 10  samaggo hi saṅgho sammodamāno avivādamāno ekuddeso phāsu viharati’ti (‘for when the Community being in concord and in agreement and without disputes, holds undivided recitations (of the Pātimokkha etc.) then it lives in comfort’): Ñāṇamoli Thera, tr., Pātimokkha, Bangkok 1969, 74-6.

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III In our discussion of the Sāmagāma-sutta we saw that the Buddha was of the opinion that a dispute over a matter of the Dhamma would be more serious but, nevertheless, it seemed that the Buddha was confident that his followers did not have a dispute over his doctrine. In order that the disciples should not have any disputes over the Dhamma it was necessary, in the first place, for them to know what he taught. For this purpose the Buddha seems to have attempted to make frequent summary statements of his teachings. This practice appears to have been repeated more frequently when he was nearing his Parinibbāna. In the Mahāparinibbāna-sutta one often finds the following statement occurring: The Buddha staying at Vultures’ Peak mountain at Rajagaha would frequently make the following Dhamma remarks: The virtue is thus, concentration is thus, and wisdom is thus; concentration enriched by virtue becomes greatly fruitful and beneficial; wisdom enriched by concentration becomes greatly fruitful and beneficial; the mind enriched by wisdom will be delivered very well from cankers, namely, the cankers of pleasure, becoming, views and ignorance. (D II, 81,123,126 etc) This, no doubt, was meant to be a summary of the entire teaching. A very important discourse in this connection is the Saṅgīti-sutta of the Dīgha-nikāya (D III, 207-71) which has been attributed to the Sariputta Thera. The discourse seems to be a systematic collection of all the important aspects of the teaching arranged in ascending numerical order, starting from ones and ending in tens. What is revealing is the following statement occurring at the beginning of the discourse: Friends, what is that doctrine which is well-proclaimed and well understood by our Fully Enlightened One, which leads to Nibbana, is conducive for appeasement and well grasped by the Fully Enlightened One, which all must chant together, no one must dispute so that this noble way of life will be durable and long lasting, which, in turn will be for the welfare and happiness of gods and human beings? (D III, 211) At the end of the discourse, the identical statement is mentioned as the answer to the question adding ‘ayaṃ’ (‘this’) referring to the items of the doctrine that have been described. All the ten sections of the discourse, too, have the same question and answer at the beginning and end of each

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exposition. The recurring phrase “saṅgāyitabbaṃ na vivaditabbaṃ” puts the exposition in context. It very clearly suggests that what was done by Sariputta is a kind of prototype of a saṅgāyanā, in which the Sangha would chant the entire teaching of the Master, thereby affirming that they were all united in accepting this teaching. The Sutta is meant to contain the entire teaching of the Buddha in a condensed form. It makes available the teaching in one piece so that everyone knows what its content is, thereby removing any possible room for doubt. Elaborating on ‘composite lists’ or lists of lists profusely seen in the Pali Canon, Rupert Gethin cites the Saṅgīti- and Dasuttara-suttas as good examples of this category. On the former, he comments: ‘... it is hard to see in this much more than a convenient mnemonic device for remembering a large number of lists. Yet such an exercise as is carried out by the Saṅgīti-sutta is, I think, always looked on as preliminary: it sets out material that is then to be employed and applied in various ways’.11 The context of the Sutta and its emphasis on sāmaggi suggest that the composite list available in it was mainly meant to be ‘employed and applied’ as a comprehensive summary of the teachings of the Buddha, allegiance to which was crucial in maintaining the unity of the Sangha. Commenting on the date of the Sutta, KR Norman says that “the title, the fact that the authorship is attributed to Sariputta, and the nature of the text, which is numerical on the lines of the Aṅguttara-nikāya, all suggest that the Sutta is a late one”.12 Norman does not say how late it could be. But the sutta itself provides a very good reason to believe that it was compiled by Sariputta13 or by some other senior disciples of the Buddha before or immediately after the latter’s Parinibbāna. It is the same reason as mentioned in the Sāmagāma-sutta (referred to above), namely, the recent death of Nigantha Nataputta, the Jain leader, and the subsequent controversy among his disciples. The Jain predicament has been described as being appaṭisaraṇa or ‘without refuge’ and the damage caused to the organisation has been attributed, among other reasons, to it. In turn, what Sariputta is doing here is to explain the refuge the disciples of the Buddha have. The commentary describing the term ‘saṅgāyitabbaṃ’ says 11  See n.15 for the complete reference, 157. 12  K.R. Norman, A History of Indian Literature VII, Wiesbaden 1983, p.43. For a different view, see L.S. Cousins, ‘Pali Oral Literature’ in P. Denwood and A Piatigorsky, ed., Buddhist Studies -Ancient and Modern, London 1983, 1-11. 13  The tradition, however, holds that Sariputta predeceased the Buddha.

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‘saṅgāyitabban ti sāmaggehi gayitabbaṃ ekavacanehi aviruddhavacanehi bhavitabbaṃ’ (‘must recite’ means ‘must recite by being united, must be with unanimous words and noncontradictory words’: DA III, Stede 1932, 974) and affirms the close connection between the act of chanting together and the resultant unity. It further describes the term saṅgīti pariyāya, by which the discourse is referred to in the discourse itself, as sāmaggiya kāraṇam, ‘cause of further unity’ (DA III, Stede 1932, 1052). The close connection of saṅgīti in this context with sāmaggi is further supported by the commentator’s remark at the beginning and end of each section: iti eka-vasena dhammasenāpati sāriputto sāmaggirasaṃ dassetīti. Iti eka-vasena sāmaggirasaṃ dassetvā idāni duka-vasena dassetuṃ puna desanam ārabhi (DA III, Stede 1932, 977). In this context, what is meant by sāmaggirasa cannot be anything other than ‘taste of unity (of the Sangha)’, As O. von Hinüber too remarks, the Sutta was “a joint recitation of the Dhamma in the presence of the Buddha, who approves what has been recited” (emphasis added). He further remarks how the whole thing ‘strongly recalls ... the account of the first council’ (Hinüber 1996, 32).This sitting and chanting together of the Dhamma, as in the case of the Pātimokkha, was meant to be a way of expressing allegiance to the doctrine. Like those who did not sit together to listen to the Vinaya, those who did not chant the Dhamma together or did not give consent to what was chanted were regarded as dissenting.14 In the subsequent history of Buddhism we see this more clearly.

14  A revealing incident to this effect is reported in the Cullavagga. The elders who participated in the sangīti asked another elder, Purana, who was travelling with a large gathering of monks, at least five hundred, to ‘submit’ himself to this sangīti. To this request his response was: ‘Your reverences, well chanted by the elders are dhamma and discipline, but in that way I heard it in the Lord’s presence, that I received it in his presence, in that same way will I bear in mind’ (tr. I.B. Hormer, op. cit., 402). This response clearly shows that there was a considerable number of monks who did not accept the ‘version’ of the word of the Buddha determined at the first council. It seems that the elders such as Purana represented even more conservative a stance than that usually attributed to the Theravadins. There may or may not have been serious doctrinal or discipline-related differences, but we really do not know what, if any, such differences were. At this initial stage disagreements such as these may not have been taken as acts of splitting of the Sangha. It can well be imagined, however, that this type of difference of opinion may have led to fully fledged divisions among the Sangha in years to come.

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IV It is clear that the Saṅgīti-sutta was compiled as a response to a crisis which was not actual but possible. On the one hand, the leader of the Jains had passed away and his disciples were in disarray. On the other hand, the Buddha was nearing Parinibbāna and the same thing could happen in the buddha-sāsana too. The Dhamma and Vinaya are the refuge once the Buddha has gone. The Vinaya is already being recited every two weeks. There does not seem to be any such arrangement with regard to the Dhamma. What Sariputta seems to have initiated is the identical practice for the Dhamma. San+gīti or act of saṅ+gāyanā is very similar to the idea of eka+uddesa in the Vinaya. As ekuddesa cannot take place in a divided group, saṅgāyanā too cannot take place in a divided group. The whole emphasis on saṅgāyitabbaṃ na vivaditabbaṃ in the Saṅgīti-sutta has to be understood in this context. Once we have this close connection between saṅgīti and sāmaggi made clear, it is not difficult to understand what happened in the first saṅgīti immediately after the Parinibbāna of the Buddha. The Cullavagga, the locus classicus of the first and second saṅgītis, has this to say (attributed to Mahāthera Mahakassapa) on the origins of the first saṅgīti: Then at that time, your reverences, one named Subhadda, who had gone forth when old, was sitting in that assembly. Then your reverences, Subhadda who had gone forth when old spoke thus to the monks: ‘Enough, your reverences, do not grieve, do not lament, we are well rid of this great recluse. We were worried when he said “This is allowable to you, this is not allowable to you”. But now we will be able to do as we like and we won’t do what we don’t like’. ‘Come, let us, your reverences, chant dhamma and discipline before what is not dhamma shines out and dhamma is withheld, before what is not discipline shines out and discipline is withheld, before those who speak what is not-dhamma become strong and those who speak dhamma become feeble, before those who speak what is not discipline become strong and those who speak discipline become feeble’.15 15  Tr. Horner, op. cit., 394. What Horner translates as’ ... before what is notdhamma ... not discipline shines out ..’, Jayawickrama translates as ‘In the past, what was contrary to the Dhamma and the Vinaya prevailed ...’. Here the crucial term pure, according to him, means ‘formerly’ although traditionally it has been understood as

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It is clear that the words of Subhadda have been perceived as a warning of things to come. It is also clear from the account that, while some disciples lamented the Parinibbāna of the Buddha, some others felt relieved. This is clearly a bad state of affairs. The Mahāthera Mahakassapa decides to hold a saṅgīti and, in doing so, we can see that he was not initiating something totally new or unheard of in the tradition. Now that the Master is gone, it was necessary to get all the members of the Sangha to reaffirm their allegiance to the Dhamma and Vinaya by chanting them together. We are told, however, that before chanting together, the members of the council had to arrange the word of the Buddha into Piṭakas and their subdivisions. We can see that this historical literary exercise has had a great impact on the subsequent history of Buddhism. Nevertheless, it has to be seen, not as an end in itself, but only as a means and a necessary prerequisite to securing the allegiance of the Sangha to the word of the Buddha which was now to be considered the master. This way of looking at the councils is supported by the following remarks by Norman on the procedure of the first council: ‘... when it had been approved as a genuine utterance of the Buddha, the assembly as a whole confirmed their approval by repeating it together’ (Norman 1983, 08). The fact that the Cullavagga refers to it as the ‘chanting of Discipline’ is revealing. This suggests that, for the Theravada tradition, the event was, first and foremost, a matter concerning the behaviour of its members bearing direct implications for the wellbeing of the organisation. Therefore, it was necessary for this purpose to have the Vinaya wellorganised and accessible. In his account of the first council, Buddhaghosa says that, on being asked by Mahakassapa as to what should be rehearsed first, the monks said: “The Vinaya is the very life of the Dispensation of the Enlightened One: so long as the Vinaya endures, the Dispensation endures, therefore let me rehearse the Vinaya first” (Jayawickrama 1986, 11). This answer not only reveals how the Theravadins felt about their own way of life but also indicates how they perceived the role of the first council itself. Therefore, it is understandable why they called the event as something to do with the Vinaya.16 referring to the future (and hence Hormer’s rendering). If we accept Jayawickrama’s translation, the statement by Mahakassapa has to be understood as indicating a serious problematic situation that existed during the time of the Buddha. The existence of such a serious situation, however, is not suggested by any other evidence. Nevertheless, if we accept Jayawickrama’s reading, it makes all the more clear why the first sangīti was required. See NA Jayawickrama, The Inception of Discipline and the Vinaya Nidāna, PTS, 1986, 4 and 97, n.4. 16  EW Adikaram (1946), however, feels that this attitude underwent a radical

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The second council, according to the Theravada tradition, was necessitated by a clear Vinaya dispute. The ten points brought forth; the monks of Vesali are matters of discipline. The most important among these points was obviously the last, namely, that gold and silver were allowable. When the Yasa Thera refused to accept money and said to the lay followers not to offer money, the Vesāli monks naturally accused him of ‘reviling and abusing’ the lay followers and they carried out the formal act of reconciliation on him. Now this is clearly a situation in which what is not Vinaya was shown as Vinaya (and hence what is not Dhamma was shown as Dhamma). The subsequent account in the Cullavagga describes how Yasa, referring to the statements of the Buddha, had to establish his view before the laity as the right view. In the council, each of the ten points had to be repudiated, again, by showing how they go against the particular Vinaya rules laid down by the Buddha. These ten points, investigated by the Order, are matters that are against the Discipline, not belonging to the Teacher’s instruction (Horner 1952, 429). The Cullavagga account of the council does not give any change within the Sri Lankan Theravada tradition. Discussing the hardships faced by Buddhism which forced the monks to commit the Canon to writing, he says: ‘The period witnessed a change in the attitude of the monks towards ‘living the life’. Perhaps because it was easier to be a learned man than a saint, or perhaps the difficulty, and therefore all the more the necessity, of preserving the texts was becoming more and more evident, the bhikkhus tended to think that pariyatti (learning) was of greater importance than paṭipatti (living the life). The Manorathapuraṇī tells us that a discussion arose among the bhikkhus who returned from abroad after the famine “whether pariyatti was the root of the sāsana or whether it was paṭipatti (pariyatti nu kho sāsanassa mūlaṃ udāhu paṭipatti)”. After arguments had been adduced on both sides the dhammakathikas (preachers of the Doctrine) gained victory over the pāṃsukūlikas (observers of the ascetic practice of wearing rags). Practice was relegated to the background and preaching gained supremacy. The Sutta defeated the Vinaya. How different this was from the older attitude! “Vinayo nāma sāsanassa āyu” (Vinaya is the very life of the religion of the Buddha) cried out in bold terms the theras of old. The change in attitude, although no attention has been paid to it in the commentaries, is of the utmost importance in the history of Theravada Buddhism. This school of Buddhism claims its descent from Upali, the greatest Vinayadhara among the disciples of the Buddha. Mahinda, too, the founder of this school in Ceylon, insisted on the reciting of the Vinaya by a Ceylonese bhikkhu as it was only then, he maintained, that the sāsana would take root in Ceylon. Mahinda’s Buddhism was a religion predominantly of practice, and the victory, mentioned above, of Suttanta over Vinaya, would not have been one after the heart of the great missionary’ (EW Adikaram, Early History of Buddhism in Ceylon, Colombo 1946, 77-8). For a somewhat different reading of the incident, however, see Walpola Rahula, History of Buddhism in Ceylon, Colombo 1956/66, XI and 158-9.

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particular details of how the Dhamma and Vinaya were chanted on these occasions.17 It may be because prominence had been given to the settlement of the ten points by referring to the standard Vinaya. But the Samantapāsādikā and other sources give details (Norman 1983, 10). It seems that such occasions as these may have served as opportunities when the ordinary members of the Sangha, who presumably did not know all the details of the Vinaya they were supposed to follow, could learn from the experts of the tradition. The Cullavagga refers, as in the case of the first council, to the event as the ‘chanting of the Discipline’ understandably, because the convocation was necessitated by a dispute over the Vinaya. The monks who agreed with the interpretation of the ten points offered at this meeting may well have chanted the Vinaya and Dhamma as the final act of solidarity. The very act of saṅgāyanā - chanting together - seems to have been taken as a public expression of allegiance to what was chanted together. The historicity of the third saṅgāyanā has been questioned mainly because the Cullavagga does not refer to it and the other sects do not mention it. Whereas the Chinese tradition goes along with the Cullavagga in referring to the first two Councils, it is said that it is silent about the third (Vin I, 1929, XXXII). Judging by the fact that the first two councils were necessitated by crises triggered by the controversial behaviour of some members of the Sangha, we can conclude that the third council was an historical event, for all the existing sources (Samantapāsādikā, the commentary on the Vinaya (Jayawickrama, 162180), the Dīpavaṃsa (7: 34-59) and the Mahāvaṃsa (5: 229-74; 2759) unanimously tell us that there was a crisis within the Sangha during the period of Asoka. The most obvious aspect of the crisis was that the Sangha could not perform the uposatha due to the lack of unanimity among the members. The Mahāvaṃsa says that the king himself performed the purification and ousted those who held wrong views, thereby making possible the performance of the uposatha. Inscriptional evidence is there for Asoka’s keen interest - the unity of the Sangha, but 17  The Mahāvaṃsa account (4: 63-4), however, provides more information: All these (theras met) in the Valikarama protected by Kalasoka, under the leadership of the thera Revata (and) compiled the Dhamma. Since they accepted the Dhamma already established in time past and proclaimed afterward, they completed their work in eight months: W. Geiger, The Mahāvaṃsa, PTS, 1934, 25. This seems to suggest that additions were made to the already accepted scripture at this occasion. Although this is a possibility, we do not have any clue as to what they could have been. Whether such a thing actually happened or not, the point of a saṅgīti remains the same, expression of allegiance to the Dhamma and Vinaya.

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this particular act is not corroborated with evidence. But, as Gomrich says, ‘it is hardly out of character a king whom we know to have put up an inscription telling the Sangha which texts to study’ (Gombrich 1988, 98). The texts tell us that after the royal intervention the Sangha was united and performed uposatha (samgho samaggo hutvāna - tadākāsi uposathaṃ) (Mhv 5, 274)). Immediately after this account the Mahāvaṃsa describes the saṅgīti undertaken by seven hundred learned monks headed by Moggaliputtatissa Thera (5: 275-9). It is in this saṅgīti that the Kathāvatthuppakaraṇa, which is designed to establish the Theravada interpretation of the Pali Canonical view vis-a-vis the views of the other nikāyins, was compiled by Moggaliputtatissa Thera. When we put together the story of the nonperformance of the uposatha for seven years due to the lack of unanimity of the Sangha, with the writing of the Kathāvatthupakaraṇa in order to refute the internal wrong views held by some groups of the Sangha, we can see that the situation was serious enough for a saṅgīti to be held. A reaffirmation of the allegiance of the Sangha to the correct Vinaya and Dhamma was very much in order. The history of Theravada counts three more saṅgitīs and reports several other gatherings, too, as saṅgitīs convened for various reasons, such as reaffirming textual accuracy, consolidation of the sāsana, etc. On these occasions, the Dhamma and Vinaya may have been chanted as an expression of solidarity even if there was no immediate threat of a crisis in the sāsana (Norman 1983, 7-14). V In a tradition in which the canon was transmitted orally,18 the act of collective chanting may have proved extremely valuable. In addition to the practical value in enhancing each other’s memory and checking 18  The Pali Canon was committed to writing in Sri Lanka during the reign of Vaṭṭagāmaṇi Abhaya (29-17 bce). Ancient Theravada authors refer to this event as the Fourth Council (catuttha saṅgīti) (Norman 1983, 10-11). There is, however, no evidence to show that the act of writing down the texts was caused by any crisis among the Sangha. Although the origin of the Abhayagiriya sect, owing to a split of the Sangha during this period, is taken by many as a major reason for this development, it is difficult to think that the division had developed into a fully fledged Vinaya difference necessitating a saṅgīti the manner the first three saṅgītis were called for. This does not mean that the Dhamma and Vinaya were not chanted on this occasion. The act of writing surely must have required chanting. Furthermore, it is possible that all the monks gathered may have chanted together what they had just committed into writing. But still this event cannot be compared with the earlier events in India.

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for any discrepancies, doing so must have helped preserve the canon as a uniform text. There is no doubt that all these things were aims of a saṅgīti. Moreover, the tradition has it that the first and third saṅgītis were crucial in shaping the Pali Canon, by arranging its constituent parts in the first and by adding a treatise to the canon in the third. The Cullavagga accounts of the first and second saṅgītis could have been added at the second. A factor common to all the councils, however, is that each of them was necessitated as a response to a particular crisis within the Sangha. This indicates that we need to view these acts of communal recitals as determined, first and foremost, by a very important communal requirement, namely, the assurance of the solidarity of the Sangha, as a group, to one way of behaviour (the Vinaya). Discussing the Sangha’s duty to preserve the scripture, Gombrich says that ‘Buddhism is perhaps peculiar among world religions in the extent to which it depends on the preservation of its scripture’ (Gombrich 1998, 111). Given the belief that the Buddha installed the Dhamma and Vinaya (scripture in its tangible form) in the place of himself gone, there is absolutely nothing strange about this practice. We should add to this that it was further necessitated because it is the Dhamma and Vinaya that served as the foundation for the stability of the organisation.

7. Buddhist Heritage of Sri Lanka: Two Lasting Contributions to World Buddhism*

Introduction In this paper, I will discuss two important events in the history of Buddhism in Sri Lanka that have multiple implications both locally and beyond. The events I will discuss are committing of the word of the Buddha into writing which took place towards the conclusion of the 1st century bce, and compilation of Pali commentaries by Buddhaghosa, the greatest Theravada commentator. In the concluding discussion, I will point out the broader significance of these two events in the context of Theravada in particular and all three schools in general.

Committing the word of the Buddha to writing: its significance and impact In his pioneering and penetrative work, Early History of Buddhism in Ceylon, E.W. Adikaram describes the event of committing to writing the word of the Buddha as ‘the most momentous event in the history of Theravada Buddhism’ (Adikaram 2009, 73). This remarkable event took place during (the 2nd term of) the reign of Vaṭṭagāmiṇi Abhaya (2917 bce). The Mahāvaṃsa spares two stanzas to record this historical act (33: 100, 101). piṭakattaya pāliñ ca - tassā aṭṭhakathāmpi ca mukhapāṭhena ānesuṃ - pubbe bhikkhu mahāmati hānim disvāna sattānam - tadā bhikkhu samāgatā ciraṭṭhitattaṃ dhammassa- potthakesu likhāpayuṃ (Mhv 237, 33: 100, 101) * An initial version of this article was published in Collected Papers: The International Seminar on Preservation and Protection of Buddhist Cultural Heritage, Sitagu International Buddhist Academy, Yangon, Dec-15-17/2012.

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There is, however, much more information relevant to this event, particularly the information on social and political conditions that necessitated this measure, found in the commentaries and other works. These commentarial accounts support Adikaram’s judgment on the importance of this act on the history of Buddhism. By deciding to write down the word of the Buddha, it is clear that the Theravada Sangha made a very crucial decision at a fairly early stage of the development of their organization. To quote Adikaram again, “the event decided the future not only of the Theravada school of Buddhism but also of the whole field of Pali literature” (79). As we will see in the present discussion the significance of the event is not confined to Theravada or Pali literature alone. It has a much wider implications for Buddhism world-wide.

Historical background The writing down of the Pali Canon is counted as the fourth saṅgāyanā in the Theravada history (although the council of King Kanishka is counted as the fourth in the Indian history of Buddhism). The word of the Buddha was carried orally or by ‘the tradition of the word of mouth’ (mukha-paramparā) until that point. There are debates among the scholars about the date of the Parinirvāṇa of the Buddha. Modem European scholars believe that the traditional chronology followed in the Theravada tradition is at least longer by one hundred years. Consequently, the chronology they adopted is called ‘short’ and the one adhered to by Theravada is called ‘long’. I do not wish to go into this long-drawn debate at this point. But according to the so-called long chronology, the word of the Buddha has come down in the oral tradition nearly for five centuries. After the first saṅgāyanā, it is recorded that the word of the Buddha or dhammavinaya, as it was called at this assembly, was assigned to several eminent arahants and their pupils. The Vinaya was assigned to Upali Thera and his pupils. Dīgha, Saṃyutta and Aṅguttara-nikāyas were assigned respectively to Ananda, Mahakassapa, and Anuruddha Theras. Majjhima-nikāya was assigned to the pupils of Sariputta Thera who had already passed away. The Samantapāsādikā records the names of the monastic tradition that kept the Vinaya texts alive, namely, the pupillary succession of Upali Thera. The first Saṅgāyanā account of the Vinaya Cullavagga does not mention Abhidhamma-piṭaka. Nor does it mention the Khuddaka-nikāya which is a collection of texts,

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some old, some new, according to the critical scholarship. Although the texts belonging to Abhidhamma and Khuddaka were not assigned to any particular Thera, for either they did not exist in the present form or some of them did not exist at all but were compiled later. Gradually the groups who undertook to master these texts became experts in those texts. This can be considered as the beginning of the bhāṇaka tradition whose expertise became the basis for the written down version adopted at the ‘book council’ (potthaka-saṅgāyanā) of Aloka vihara.

Conditions that necessitated writing down The events that necessitated writing down the Buddha-vacana seem complex. The immediate reason may have been the famine that lasted more than a decade as a consequence of which many people including the monks who kept the Dhamma in their memory died, and some others went to neighboring India to save their life. The monks who opted to stay were determined to protect their memory even at the cost of their life. Commentarial accounts contain hardships they had to undergo in this effort. Finally, when the famine was over, and when the monks who had left the island had returned, one of the first things they did was to check each other’s memory of the Dhamma which they found was intact. Nevertheless, this whole calamity gave a serious warning to the Sangha on the perilous situation of keeping this vast and sacred literature in memory. An incident that precipitated this understanding is recorded in the commentaries. There was only one monk who remembered the Niddesa, a text belonging to the Khuddaka-nikāya. Unfortunately, since the moral integrity (sīla) of this monk was questionable, the other monks with greater sense of morality were not willing to go to him, pay respect and learn from him. Nevertheless, this had to be done and this was done. But situations of this nature may have triggered the need to adopting measures to safeguard the Buddha-vacana. Additionally, the unfavorable political situation of the country seems to have served another reason. With Vaṭṭagāmiṇi Abhaya’s open support of a monk who was brought under disciplinary measures by the Mahavihara was a direct challenge to the mainstream Sangha. The king was obviously not a supporter of the Mahavihara Sangha. This was unprecedented in the history of the sāsana of the country so far (although it happened again later). Although there is no evidence to say that Abhayagiri fraternity adopted Mahayana, it is clear that they were open to the other Buddhist traditions of India. These traditions

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are described by the general term ‘vetulla-vāda’ (vaitulya-vāda) or heterogeneous views. However, this naming alone does not allow us to determine what these views exactly were. That those ideas were different from those of Mahavihara is certain. The Mahavihara tradition, which was determined to preserve the teaching exactly in the same form as it was received from the arahant Mahinda, may have perceived this new development as threatening to the purity of the Buddha-vacana. Thus, it is understandable why and how they decided to commit to writing what they brought forward from memory.

Consequences There is no doubt about the momentousness of this decision by the Mahavihara Sangha. The Abhayagiriya factor may have been a decisive cause in writing down the Buddha-vacana. The fact that there was, for the first time, a group rival to the Mahavihara was taken as a threat to the integrity of the sāsana. It was crucial that the dhamma and the Vinaya, revered as the teacher-substitute ever since the Buddha attained parinirvāṇa, were kept intact, without any mixture. Some scholars wish to connect the very idea of a canon in the Theravada tradition to this specific development in the history of Sri Lanka. I do not think that the idea of a canon as an organized body of literature accepted by everyone was an outcome of the Abhayagiriya factor. On the one hand, the textual tradition, marked by unanimous acceptance, was there already by the time of Asoka. A good example is the method adopted in the Kathāvatthu, the last book to be added to the Abhidhamma-piṭaka and was compiled by Moggaliputtatissa thera. In this work, both Sakavādi (Theravadin) and Paravādi (opponent) quote the Suttas in support of their arguments. This is clear evidence that there was a corpus of literature accepted by all different Buddhist groups as the word of the Buddha. On the other hand, this did not mean that there was any fixed canon for these sections of the Sangha at any given time. Even within the Theravada tradition itself we know that Dīgha-bhāṇakas and Majjhimabhānakas did not accept the authenticity of the Abhidhamma-piṭaka. But this did not prevent them from being one group for all practical purposes including sharing the same monastic premises. This shows that the concept of canon as representing an exclusive and rigid body of literature is not quite at home with the Buddhist tradition. But on the other hand, it is clear that the basic division of the word of the Buddha as Dhamma and Vinaya and their main sub-categories date back to a period before the division of the Sangha into various schools, for all share

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this basic structure though with minor differences. Therefore, what the Mahavihara Sangha may have done when they committed the Buddhavacana to writing was to write down what had been already accepted as the Buddha-vacana in a broad sense. One thing that happened for sure with this step was to give the Pāḷi Tipiṭaka the shape it has continued to have until today. In other words, this event marked the culmination of the process of development of the canonical Buddhist literature, although the very idea of ‘development’ is unacceptable to some scholars. I do not plan to go to debate over this matter at this juncture, but simply assume the gradual shaping of the Pali Canon as a fact. What may safely be said is that nothing was substantially added or subtracted from the Tripiṭaka since the Vaṭṭagāmiṇi Abahya’s time (I say ‘substantially’ for scholars such as Oliver Abenayaka have argued that Khuddaka-pāṭha has been put together as a separate text by Buddhaghosa. The Netti and Peṭakopadesa are not counted as canonical by the Mahavihara tradition although these texts are included in the Khuddaka-nikāya by the Burmese Buddhist tradition.). Up to this point the Buddha-vacana was in the memory of individual members of the Sangha. Excepting the relatively rare cases of those who knew the entire Buddha-vacana, others had to depend on the experts of each text or section for the knowledge of that specific section or the text. Although the knowledge in the Dhamma was still public, it was public only within a limited group even among the Sangha. As far as ordinary householders were concerned, we can see that they virtually did not have any independent access to the Dhamma except receiving it from the sole source of the Sangha. Writing down on Ola-leaves and making public documents of the word of the Buddha is a tremendous step forward from its existence in relatively private memories. It is interesting to note that the disciples of the Buddha did not have any reservation about committing the word of the Buddha to writing and making it a public property, so to say. In order to understand the value of this attitude we could contrast it with the attitude of Brahmins toward their Vedas. It is a fact that the Vedas were studied and kept in memory and passed to subsequent generations exclusively by Brahmins. This knowledge was not shared with others, i.e. those who belonged to other castes. Consequently, the Vedas themselves and knowledge in general remained a monopoly of this elite group of people. This practice seems quite in accordance with their overall attitude to religion and soteriology in which purity (śuddhi) was allowed only for

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Brahmins (and other higher castes). It is due to this restrictive attitude that they criticized the Buddha for advocating purity for all four castes (samaṇo gotamo catuvaṇṇaṃ suddhiṃ paññapeti). This exclusivism in soteriology justifies their exclusivist attitude to their religious texts, namely, the Vedas. In the teaching of the Buddha, however, we know that this is not the case. The Buddha’s sāsana was open to all from the beginning. It has been compared to the great ocean in which the waters of all great rivers come together and intermingle. The Sangha has been described as ‘catuddisa-saṅgha’, the Sangha of the four quarters for this reason. The Buddha was always anxious to answer questions from his disciples, and he encouraged asking questions. Lying on his death-bed asked the disciples to ask any last questions, and he further said that one could get a friend to ask on their behalf if they do not feel asking directly. In the Vīmaṃsaka-sutta of the Majjhima-nikāya (47) the Buddha says that anyone who does not have ability to read others’ mind should question the Tathāgata whether or not he is fully enlightened (vimaṃsakena bhikkhave bhikkhunā parassa cetopariyāyaṃ ājānantena Tathāgate samannesanā kātabbā, sammāsambuddho vā no vā iti viññāṇāyāti: M I, 517). Finally, in the Mahāparinibbbāna-sutta the Buddha says that there is no ‘teacher’s fist’ (ācariya muṭṭhi) in his teaching, and that he did not ever make the distinction between inner and outer, which is characteristic of many religious traditions. It is this open attitude resulting from the universal friendliness, or mettā to all beings sans boundaries (diṭṭhā vā yeva addiṭṭhā ye ca dure vasanti avidure ... sabbe sattā bhavantusukhitattā ... mānasaṃ bhāvaye aparimānaṃ) that makes the kind of open-mindedness and non-exclusivism exemplified in the act of writing down the word of the Buddha and making it available to the public. The causes and conditions that necessitated writing down of the word of the Buddha seem to have been instrumental in bringing about a change of attitude among the Sri Lanka Sangha. This change of attitude is demonstrated in the establishment of the relative primacy of learnedness (pariyatti) over the practice (paṭipatti). The attitude in the early phase of Buddhism was to view pariyatti merely as a means to paṭipatti in which two together have realization (paṭivedha) as the goal. With the harsh conditions faced by the monks in preserving the word of the Buddha, there arose among them a question whether it is pariyatti or paṭipatti at the root of the sāsana (pariyatti nu kho sāsanassa mūlaṃ

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udāhu paṭipattīti: AA 92). After a debate the matter was decided in favour of pariyatti. The understanding was that in the absence of those who knew the word of the Buddha, the sāsana will not last, even if there were hundreds of meditating monks. Walpola Rahula Thera who discusses this matter (Rahula 1956, 159) takes this change as necessitated by the changing social and historical conditions. Adikaram, however, thinks differently. He says: This change of attitude, though no attention has been paid to it in the commentaries, is of the utmost importance in the history of Theravada Buddhism. This school of Buddhism claims its descent from Upali, the greatest vinayadhara among the disciples of the Buddha. Mahinda, too, the founder of this school in Ceylon, insisted on the reciting of the Vinaya, by a Ceylonese bhikkhu as it was only then, he maintained, that the sāsana would take root in Ceylon. Mahinda’s Buddhism was a religion predominantly of practice, and the victory mentioned above, of suttatna over Vinaya, would not have been one after the heart of that great missionary. (Adikaram 2009, 78) The word of the Buddha organized into three baskets (sabbam tepiṭakam Buddha vacanam) and written down at the Aloka-vihara saṅgāyanā became the ‘canon’ for the entire Theravada tradition which gradually spreads to Southeast Asia from this country in the 12th century. One of the most important phenomena behind the Pali Canon is that it has an unbroken tradition of practice running into two millennia by now. We know that many other early Indian schools had their own versions of the word of the Buddha in their vernaculars or in some forms of Sanskrit. But with the disappearance of these schools from India, and with their disappearance in the East Asia (China, Korea and Japan) where some of these schools were later established, their texts were preserved not as a part of a continuing tradition but as relics of the past. The situation with Theravada is quite different. These texts became a part of living Buddhist tradition in the Theravada countries. There were times when the practice of Buddhism became weak in these societies. But when it happened in one country the practice remained strong in other places. It never totally disappeared from any of the Theravada countries at any point of time. Therefore, the Theravada canon has been the basis for an unbroken tradition of practice ever since it was committed to writing. The word of the Buddha written down at the Aloka-vihara is the oldest version of the word of the Buddha available to us today. According to the Theravada history, the first construction of the Pali Canon was

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started at the first saṅgāyanā held three months after the parinibbāna of the Buddha. But as the Purana Thera’s episode reveals, even by this time, there were divergent opinions among the earliest Sangha on what constitutes the word of the Buddha. But at the same time, we have to accept that the earliest attempt at organizing the word of the Buddha was the first saṅgāyanā; and there are reasons to believe that it is this ‘canon’ that finally came to Sri Lanka with arahant Mahinda Thera. Since it is this same version, perhaps with some modifications, that was recorded at Aloka-vihara, our claim that the Pali Canon is the oldest of available all Buddhist canons is reasonable. This also gives a clue to the language spoken by the Buddha. Our traditional belief is that it is Māgadhi, also called ‘Pali’ today, that was spoken by the Buddha. But many modem scholars have questioned this assumption, and it is another debate which we cannot enter into in this forum. But what we can maintain safely is that if Pali as found in the three baskets recorded at the Aloka-vihara saṅgāyanā is not the exact language spoken by the Buddha, it is surely the closest we have to the actual words of the Buddha. The Pali Canon provided the textual basis for the modem westward journey of Buddhism. It is well known that Rhys Davids, who pioneered the Theravada Buddhist studies in the West, studied that language while he was serving as an administrative officer in British Ceylon. He was taught Pali by Yatramulle Dhammarama Thera. Also well-known is the support Rhys Davids received from the Sangha in Sri Lanka and other Theravada countries such as Burma and Thailand, not only in securing the Buddhist texts but also by way of funds to print his first publications. The modem beginning of Buddhist studies in the West thus owes much to Rhys Davids, and it is the Pali Canon and the earliest form of Buddhism contained in it that the West knew as Buddhism. This is true for both academic as well as religious studies of Buddhism in the West. The Chinese and Tibetan studies of Buddhism are relatively recent phenomena in the West compared to Pali Buddhist studies. Beyond academic studies of Buddhism, today there has developed, based on the Pali discourses, a world-wide movement of vipassanā meditation popularized by such eminent monks as Mahasi Sayadaw and Ajahn Chah and such lay teachers as U Ba Khin, and Goenka-ji. Today this practice, which is known as ‘mindfulness meditation’, has become the most exciting discovery of psychiatry world-wide. It was a result of a penetrative decision of the Sri Lanka Sangha that the word of the Buddha was committed to writing at a very early

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stage of the history of Theravada tradition. It was basically a precaution they took for the preservation of the Dhamma. They not only wrote it down but also they studied and practiced it diligently. The purity of the Sri Lanka Sangha was universally accepted in the Theravada Buddhist world almost up to the time of first arrival of Europeans. Subsequently, Buddhism in this country showed some signs of deterioration. But by that time the South Asian Buddhist countries, in particular Burma and Thailand, had reached the highest point of their learning and practice. The story of Theravada Buddhism during the past one thousand years is one of mutual support and enrichment by the Theravada countries. It is the word of the Buddha that was written down at the Aloka-vihara that provided and continues to provide the basis for the Buddhist study and practice going well beyond the boundaries of traditional South and Southeast Asia.

Buddhaghosa and Pali commentaries The most important event next to the writing down of the texts is the arrival of Buddhaghosa in Sri Lanka and compiling commentaries in Pali language which seems to have a direct causal relation to the Aluvihara event. Buddhaghosa arrived in Sri Lanka in the 5th century ce during the reign of Mahanama (409-431). Where he arrived from has been a hotly debated issue among Theravadins. Myanmar tradition in particular (according to the Buddhaghosuppatti of Mahamangala Thera of Burmese origin) claiming that he was a Brahmin from Bodhgaya, the north of India. The debate, though interesting, is not of direct relevance for the present discussion and hence we will bypass it. Buddhaghosa Thera wrote commentaries for the four main nikāyas of the basket of discourses (Dīgha, Majjhima, Saṃyutta and Aṅguttara), the entire Vinaya Piṭaka and the entire Abhidhamma Piṭaka, and several of books in the Khuddaka-nikāya. By any standard, Buddhaghosa’s work is of gigantic proportions. Its sheer size is mind-boggling not to mention the coherence and consistency of the interpretation developed and methodicity with which the enormous amount of material has been dealt with. Buddhaghosa Thera stands out as the greatest system-builder in the entire Buddhist tradition including Mahayana and Vajrayana. The following are some reasons that explain the vast significance of Buddhaghosa’s work. We may summarize some of them in the following manner:

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Buddhaghosa’s commentaries established what thera-vāda or the view of the elders is. Although the term ‘theravāda’ is found in the discourses, it started to be used to refer to the monastic tradition only since the first council. In the story of the first council (reported in such sources as the Samantapāsādikā, the commentary to the Vinaya Piṭaka and the Mahāvaṃsa) it is said that only ‘theras’ took part in this event. The Vinaya definition of ‘Thera’ is one who has completed ten years after his higher admission (upasampadā). Consequently, it was called ‘theriya’ or belonging to theras. Although traditionally there is no difference between what the Buddha said and how we understand it through Buddhaghosa, we have to admit that these are two different things: canonical texts and their interpretations (commentaries). One may argue that the so-called Tripiṭaka arranged and agreed upon by the executors of the first council itself is a Theravada production. Regarding this matter, we would make a distinction between systems, classifications and arrangements introduced by the executors of the first saṅgāyanā and the material or the content organized in such a manner. The assumption is that the Theravadins did not compose any new ‘sutras ‘ as it was the case with later Mahayanists. If we accept these assumptions and claims it amounts making a clear distinction between what is in the Tripiṭaka and what is in the commentaries. In this sense, the commentaries are the records of how theras interpreted and understood the word of the Buddha contained in the Tripiṭaka. Notwithstanding controversies the Theravadins themselves had on the origin of the Abhidhamma, it is safe to conclude that Buddhaghosa represents the ideological/doctrinal basis for the Theravada tradition. The Theravada tradition is clearly not Buddhaghosa or the other canonical commentators alone. The sub-commentaries (ṭīkā), sub-sub-commentaries (anuṭīkā) and other related literature, produced not only in Sri Lanka but also in the lager Theravada world, also represent the continuation of the Theravada tradition over the centuries. (i) Buddhaghosa’s interpretations provided the definitive way to read, interpret and understand the Pali texts. This does not necessarily mean that there were no divergent interpretations to certain matters within the Theravada itself. A classic example is the debate over the authenticity of the Abhidhamma which was openly questioned by Dīghābhānakas. The important thing, however, is that we know of these divergent interpretive traditions only through Buddhaghosa. We do not have any sources for any interpretive tradition other than those of Buddhaghosa. I do not suspect a foul play here. It may have been the

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simple fact that there were no any other divergent interpretive traditions substantial enough to gain identity and to enjoy continued existence as independent traditions. (ii) Buddhaghosa’s interpretive tradition served as the universal basis for Theravada tradition in South Asia as well as in South East Asia. While the Tripiṭaka finalysed at Aluvihara provided the universal Theravada doctrinal basis, the interpretive tradition of Buddhaghosa became the sole authoritative way to understand the canon. Buddhaghosa is accepted, owned and continued by the entire Theravada world without question. The critical studies of religion, particularly, that of one’s own religion, is relatively a new phenomenon. In the Theravada tradition of South and Souteast Asia, Buddhaghosa Thera has been revered as the ‘sound of the Buddha’ both its literal and figurative senses. (iii) Buddhaghosa Thera created the system which encompassed the entire teaching of the Buddha which, before Buddhaghosa Thera, was found scattered in the discourses. It is imaginable that the Buddha taught individual or specific groups to meet the particular inner requirements of those who listened to him. The Buddha was not a teacher who gave systematic ‘courses’ on particular themes to his listeners. It was left to Buddhaghosa Thera to create and develop a consistent and coherent ‘system’ out of the numerous discourses scattered all over the basket of discourses. Scholars debate over the exact nature of Buddhaghosa Thera’s work, as to whether he was a mere translator of the commentaries that were in Sinhala language, or did he write the commentaries anew or was he an editor cum translator. Discussing Buddhaghosa Thera’s role, Professor Kalupahana described him as a “great harmonizer who blended old and new ideas without arousing suspicion in the minds of those who were scrutinizing his work” (Kalupahana 1992, 217). The Visuddhimagga is a great example of Buddhaghosa’s systematizing genius. Without the aid of any modem technological sophistication Buddhaghosa compiled a gigantic treatise on the teaching of the Buddha which, in Buddhaghosa’s own words, is to serve as a commentary to the all three baskets of the Pali Canon. As is well known, he takes the main themes for the work, sīla, samādhi and paññā, from the Samyutta-nikāya stanza, sīle patiṭṭāya naro sapañño - cittaṃ paññañ ca bhāvayam (S I, 165). The teaching of the seven purifications (satta visuddhi) provides the structure within which the path comprising the three disciplines (tisso sikkhā) is elaborated. Accordingly, the first chapter of theVisuddhimagga deals with sīla which is the purification of virtue

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(sīla visuddhi). The chapters 2 through 13 deal with citta (mind) or concentration (samādhi) of the mind, and cover purification of mind (citta visuddhi). The remainder of the vast volume is devoted to discuss paññā (understanding) under the rest of the five purifications. Each of the key items, virtue, concentration and understanding, is described methodically under a set of sub-themes. Virtue is discussed under the following sub-headings: (1) What is virtue? (2) In what sense is it virtue? (3) What are its characteristic, function, manifestation and proximate cause? (4) What are the benefits of virtue? (5) How many kinds of virtue are there? (6) What is the defiling of it? (7) What is the cleansing of it? The other two themes too are discussed under similar sub-headings.1 This very organization of the subject matter shows how methodical Buddhaghosa was. An example of the systematization introduced by Buddhaghosa Thera into the Buddhist doctrine is his exposition meditation as comprising a clear-cut procedure. Again, it is a truism that the Buddha taught individual or groups as their specific requirements demanded. In the Visuddhimagga Buddhaghosa Thera formulated a general version of meditation which was an abstraction of the key discourses of the Buddha. Accordingly, Buddhaghosa Thera said that understanding necessarily comes after concentration of mind which is marked by the attainment of fine material or immaterial states of jhāna. It is Buddhaghosa who established the view that jhānas (or absorptions) must precede understanding (paññā) and they are a necessary condition of understanding. Notwithstanding Buddhaghosa Thera’s characterization of the path as necessarily involving jhānas, there are many discourses that allow one to think that one may attain nirvana without necessarily having jhānas. A relevant case is Susima who questions a certain group of monks who claims that they have won the defilement-less state in spite of the fact that they do not have jhānas (nijjhāanaka) (S II, 119-128). There have been discussions always among the practitioners regarding this issue. In recent times, there have been many heated debates over this issue. Elsewhere, I have studied the debate between two veteran Theravada elders of Sri Lanka and Myanmar, Bhikkhu Kheminda and Nyanuttara 1  The description of samādhi has an additional section on how it should be developed, and the account of paññā has only six sections without cleansing and defilement of it.

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Sayadaw respectively (Cf. article no – 10 of this volume). (4) It is an interesting question as to why Buddhaghosa ‘translated’ commentaries into Pali language. His own explanation is that he did so ‘for the benefit of those who are of other islands’ (dīpantaravāsināṃ atthāya). What is meant by ‘dīpantara’ (other islands) is not very clear. But it could refer to ‘jambu-dvipa’ (India), or even to countries beyond India towards China including China itself. The Buddhist world, by this time (6th Century ce), comprised countries and areas well beyond the present day India, and it may be assumed that the Buddhists of those areas belonging to various schools other than Theravada and those who belonged to classical Indian Mahayana and newly emerging Chinese Mahayana wished to have access to Theravada commentaries. It is reasonable to assume that Pali was more accessible to the Buddhist world at large than Sinhala. While Buddhaghosa Thera’s own reasoning behind his (and his contemporaries’) exercise has strong ground for acceptability, it may not be the only reason behind this momentous literary exercise.2 There is sufficient internal evidence in Buddhaghosa Thera’s commentaries themselves to believe that his effort was motivated not purely by his concern for the larger Buddhist world but it may have been equally motivated by the changing attitudes of the Theravada Buddhists toward the language that they believed to have been spoken by the Buddha himself. In other words, it appears that Theravadins by this time had developed or were already in the process of developing an idea of sacred language in their tradition. A concept of sacred language may mean that particular language is (i) divinely originated; (ii) eternal; (iii) has mystical powers;(iv) does not undergo change; and (v) associated with a person who is considered to be sacred. Shortly we will see that Buddhaghosa Thera attributes some of these characteristics to Pali language. His work may be taken as marking a new attitude to Pali language which Buddhaghosa called ‘Magadha’. On this matter, I would like to invite the attention of the reader to a paper I wrote in 1989 and read at Premier Colloque Etienne Lamotte at Universite Catholique De Louvain, which was later published. Although I do not wish to reproduce my paper here, I will give a summary of my argument. From what we can gather from early discourses, there is hardly any evidence to believe that the Buddha had 2  Growing presence of Abhayagiri monastery with its emphasis on Sanskrit language as their canonical language and various international links facilitated by the adoption of more wide spread Sanskrit language may also have been a reason for Mahaviharins to give a new life to Pali as a counter-balancing measure.

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preference for any particular language. In the Vinaya there is the well known episode of two brāhmin bhikkhus, Yamelu and Tekula who felt that the word of the Buddha was defiled by those who studied it in their own language (saka nirutti), and hence they should ‘keep’ the word of the Buddha in the Vedic language (tanti). When the idea was presented to the Buddha, he rejected it saying that his followers should study the Dhamma in their own dialects (sakāya niruttiyā ...) (VinA IV, 1241). Although in Buddhaghosa Thera’s interpretation of ‘saka nirutti’ is the Magadha language which the Buddha spoke, the context strongly supports us to believe that the Buddha may have meant at the language of his followers. Although any specific reason for the Buddha’s view is not given it is imaginable that the Buddha did not wish to endorse the view held by the two monks, namely, that the word of the Buddha was being polluted by the use of local languages. It is quite understandable that the Buddha rejected the view of linguistic purity which was strongly held by Brahmins. For him, language was a tool to be used without clinging into it. It is very unlikely that the Buddha made any extra emphasis on his own dialect over and above other dialects. The attitude to Pali language developed later by Theravadins is articulated in this stanza which occurs in the Saddhammasaṅgaha of Dhammakitti Thera belonging to the 12th century (The Journal of the Pali Text Society, 1890). sā māgadhi mūlabhāsā - narā yāyādikappikā brāhmāṇo cassutālāpā - sambuddhācāpi bhāsare This Magadhi is the root language with which the people of very early times, Brahmas, those who have not heard any utterance and the Buddhas would speak. It is interesting to note that the Buddhists claim that their language is one used by Brahmas who are higher than gods (deva) in the Buddhist cosmology. This can well be a response to Brahmins who claimed that their language is the language of gods (daivi vāk). Buddhaghosa Thera’s following account seems to provide the basis for the attitude expressed in this stanza: When a child has Tamil as the mother and Andhaka as the father and if it were to hear mother first, it would speak Tamil; if it were to hear the father first, it would speak Andhaka; if it were to hear neither, then it would speak the language of Magadha. If one were to be born in a deserted vast forest, if there were

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nobody capable of speaking, then, he, producing words by his own nature, would speak Pali. Everywhere, namely, hell, in the sphere of animals, petas, and human and in heaven, Pali alone is great. The languages such as Ottakirata, Andhaka, Yonaka and Tamil do change. It is this language of Magadha alone which is natural and the language of Brahmas and Aryans, and that it will not ever change. (VbhA 387) This account implies that the Pali is the original or the first language in the world, and says clearly that unlike other languages, it will not change. It is clear that this last assertion is totally in disagreement with the fundamental insight of Buddhism that all constructed phenomena are impermanent. Nevertheless, this has to be understood more as an expression of sacredness of the language in which the Buddha taught the Dhamma than as contradicting the Dhamma of the Buddha itself. Perhaps the most striking example of the elevation of Pali as the sacred language comes from Buddhaghosa Thera in his commentary to the Vinaya account of initial and higher admissions (pabbajjā, upasampāda). The practice during the time of the Buddha was to make the prospective candidates accept the Triple Gem as their refuge. This was done by uttering the formula: buddhaṃ saraṇaṃ gacchāmi, dhammaṃ saraṇaṃ gacchāmi, saṅghaṃ saraṇaṃ gacchāmi. Commenting on this practice, Buddhaghosa Thera says that, unless the formula is recited exactly without adding or omitting any one single syllable, the purpose is not achieved. “Therefore”, he concludes, “it is necessary that one must utter it as exactly as it is in the text.” Continuing his exegesis Buddhaghosa Thera says: pabbajjā hi saraṇāgamaneneva siddhā. Sikkhāpadāni pana kevalaṃ sikkhāparipuraṇatthaṃ jānitabbāni, tasmā tāni pāḷiyaṃ āgatanayena uggahituṃ asaṅkkontassa yāyakāyaci bhāsāya atthavasena pi ācikkhituṃ vaṭṭati: initial admission takes place only with taking refuge; precepts, however, are to be understood for the sake of practice; therefore for someone who is unable to understand as they have been articulated in the canon (or in Pali) (pāḷiyam) it is proper to explain the precepts in a language understandable to him. (VinA V, 670) This statement makes it clear that bestowing initial admission is impossible without using Pali language, and that it is not even necessary to understand it by one who receives it. What it indicates is that Pali language has a mystical power to make a drastic transformation in one’s

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personality. Although, judging by the strongly psychological emphasis in the teaching of the Buddha, what Buddhaghosa Thera says seems quite strange; it betrays the sacredness attributed to Pali language by Theravada Buddhists. While Buddhaghosa Thera provides unmistaken evidence to the newly developed idea of sacred language in the Theravada, his (and others) very act of translation into Pali commentaries that were in Sinhala for many generations marks the culmination of this new trend. When arahant Mahinda brought Buddhism to the island, he took it as part of his mission that he handed over it to the local community, an act which necessitated teaching and learning the Dhamma in the island language (dīpa bhāsā). In the subsequent history of Sri Lanka, one can see how two trends, namely, elevating of Pali as the sacred language and relative downgrading of Sinhala as not fitting to communicate the Dhamma, went in hand-in-hand, finally leading Vidagama Maithreya Thera, a 15th century author of a Dhamma book in Sinhala to make a special plea to his listeners (readers) not to treat his work lightly for he was writing in Sinhala!

Conclusion The two events discussed in this paper bear substantial significance not only to the history of Buddhism in Sri Lanka or to that of other Theravada countries in Southeast Asia but also to the Buddhist world at large. The Pali Tripiṭaka as the earliest available and complete Buddhist canon has today gone beyond its traditional geographical boundaries and serves as the basis for religious practice of people all over the world. This is not to mention its value as one of the earliest sources of Buddhist academic studies. Notwithstanding the fact that Buddhaghosa may not be the only way to understand the word of the Buddha, he still serves as the most comprehensive and systematic exegesis of the entire Pali Canon. The entire traditional Theravada world assumes uniformity owing to the Pali Canon as well as its commentaries compiled by Buddhaghosa Thera. Although both these phenomena have been the exclusive Theravada preserve, it is no longer so in this globalized world where a new form of Buddhism inspired by the texts and traditions of all Buddhist traditions is in the making.

8. Explaining the Absence of One Single Revered Text in Theravada*

Introduction In this short essay I ask the following question: why there is not one single revered text in Theravada, and answer it by pointing to some doctrinal considerations and historical conditions specific to the Theravada tradition that may explain this absence. Having a single text as the focus or as the statement of one’s key doctrinal position is quite characteristics of many Buddhist schools. For instance, at a very early stage in the history of Buddhism, a large group of the Sangha decided to define themselves through the commentarial literature called ‘vibhāśā’ which they wrote into the canon. This school became known as Vaibhāśika. Another major group which accepted the validity of the discourses (sutra) alone was known as Sautrāntika, those who accepted the authority of the sutras.1 Among the early Mahayana schools, both Mādhyamaka and Yogācāra, representing śunyatā-vāda and vijnāna-vāda, are centred around Nagarjuna’s Mūlamādhayamakakārikā and Vasubandhu’s Viṃśatikā and Triṃśatikā respectively. The latter was called ‘sun lung’ or ‘three treatises’ in the Chinese tradition for it recognized three key texts including the Mūlamādhyamakakārikā. Similarly in the Hinayana 1  Although Sautrāntika with its preference for the basket of discourses comes close to this category, strictly speaking, they defined themselves by rejecting the Abhidharma which was considered to be a later development. They accepted the entire basket of discourses and did not have a preference for any particular discourse. * An initial version of this article was published in Buddhist Texts and Traditions, ed. Mahesh A. Deokar, Pradeep Gokhlale and Lata M. Deoker, Department of Pali, Savtribai Phule Pune University and Central University of Tibetam Studies, India, 2015.

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tradition that was brought to China, Abhidhramkośa served as the basis for the school that bore its name. Furthermore, this trend is clearly seen in the East Asian Mahayana tradition in which we find, T’ien T’ai basing itself on the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka-sutra (Lotus sutra), Hwa Yen on the Sukhāvatīvyūha-sūtra and Ch’an (Zen) basing itself on the Flat formsutra of the Sixth Patriarch. Later in Japan Nichiren-shu was inspired by the Lotus sutra and has it as the key text. An exception to this trend is Theravada. In the Theravada tradition there is not one single text identified as unique or as the ‘measure’ (pramāṇa). Even in the countries into which Theravada has spread, although there are many sects that have arisen over time, there is no sect based on a particular text. This is so in Sri Lanka as well as in other Theravada countries such as Myanmar, Thailand, Cambodia and Laos. The absence of one single text as ‘the text’ in Theravada is as revealing as is the presence of such texts in other Buddhist traditions. The prominence given to one text within a tradition says much about its character. In a like manner, the absence of such specific emphasis in Theravada should be understood as making a statement about its character. We will explore the significance of this absence in the course of this discussion.

Emphasis on the totality of ‘what the Buddha taught’ The key argument I develop in this discussion, in order to explain the absence of one revered text in Theravada, is that the tradition from the very outset focused on the entirety of what it considered to be the ‘word of the Buddha’ (buddha-vacana), and not on any particular aspect or discourse of it. This may be explained both historically and sorteriologically. As revealed from the early texts, starting from the time of the Buddha, the totality of the word of the Buddha was intended when the teaching of the Buddha was referred to in a general way. The very concept of ‘the word of the Buddha’ was understood as an open-ended phenomenon. This practice has much to do with the absence of any one sacred text in the Theravada tradition, and therefore, in order to understand this characteristic of Theravada tradition we will inquire how Theravada started and evolved. The word of the Buddha (buddha-vacana) or ‘the teacher’s message’ (satthu-sāsana) was basically known as the doctrine and

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discipline, dhamma-vinaya. The totality of what the Buddha taught was encapsulated in this combined term. An instance that underscored this broad context was the Buddha’s statement to Ananda, his chief attendant, on the issue of his successor once he was no more. As the Mahāparinibbāna-sutta of the Dīgha-nikāya records, the Buddha felt concerned about the possible situation of disciples’ feeling helpless once he was no more. Ananda, it is possible that the following could occur to you: ‘the teaching no longer has a teacher; there is no teacher for us.’ Ananda, that should not be understood in that manner; Ananda, the doctrine (Dhamma) that I have explained and the discipline (Vinaya) that I have prescribed will be your teacher at my passing’. (D II, 154) In this statement the Buddha lays emphasis on the Dhamma and the Vinaya which represents the totality of his teaching. Furthermore in this statement the Buddha equated what he taught with himself. Accordingly, it is clear that this statement of the Buddha suddenly changed the status of what he had taught. Now it was the Dhamma and the Vinaya that was to be treated as the teacher himself. When the Buddha was alive there was no reason to consider the Dhamma as something separate from him. The Dhamma was what the Buddha said. In particular, if and when there was a problem or a doubt about any of his statements the disciples could go to him and receive clarification. But once the Buddha was no more, suddenly the disciples were left only with what he had taught. According to an earlier incident reported in the Majjhima-nikāya, Ananda (along with novice Cunda) informs the Buddha what has taken place among the followers of the Nigantha Nataputta after his demise, and expressed his concern: “Let no dispute arise in the Sangha when the Blessed One has gone.” Responding to Ananda the Buddha refers to the essence of his teaching (namely, the four foundations of mindfulness, the four right kinds of striving, the four bases of spiritual power, the five faculties, the five powers, the seven enlightenment factors, and noble eightfold path) and assures him that there is no dispute among the Sangha on the teaching. The expectation of many disciples, including Ananda, would have been that the Buddha would appoint a senior disciple as his successor. But the Buddha’s advice was to have oneself as the protection and refuge, to have the Dhamma as the protection and the refuge, and not to have any external refuge (atta-dīpā, atta-saraṇā, dhamma-dīpā

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dhamma-saraṇā anañña-saraṇā). This may not be the answer Ananada and many other disciples had expected from the Buddha. As is clear from the Mahāparinibbāna statement (quoted above) the Buddha was aware of the possible state of helplessness that would be created by his absence. Nevertheless, being true to the attitude he maintained throughout his life, the Buddha did not wish his disciples to depend on any personality for their salvation. The Dhamma was the teacher. We are thus reminded of this story – well-known in the Buddhist tradition - that the Buddha, immediately after his enlightenment, placed the Dhamma in the position of his teacher. The ‘philosophy’ outlined in the Mahāparinibbāna-sutta statement has a direct relevance to the Theravada emphasis on the entirety of the teaching of the Buddha. The origin of Theravada as a specific Buddhist tradition can be traced to the first council convened after three months of the parinirvāṇa of the Buddha. The new role attributed to dhammavinaya seems to have been the key reason behind the first council. According to tradition, the reason for the first council was the unpleasant remarks made by Subhadda who had entered the sāsana in his advanced age (Vin II, 284-85). The more substantial reason behind the gathering seems to have been the need to organize the Dhamma and the Vinaya, i.e. the teacher-substitutes, in an orderly manner so that one could consult them in order to determine what was right and wrong according to the Dhamma and the Vinaya. Accordingly, in the first council, the Dhamma was rehearsed and organized under the basket of discourses (sutta-piṭaka) which comprised at this initial stage four collections (nikāya), namely, Dīgha, Majjhima, Saṃyutta and Aṅguttara (There was no mention of Khuddaka as a separate collection.). The Vinaya was rehearsed and organized under four collections, namely, Pārājikā-paḷi, Pācittiya-pāḷi, Cullavagga-pāḷi and Mahāvagga-pāḷi.2 It is not easy to determine exactly how much was rehearsed at the first council. We know very clearly that the Abhidhamma developed after this event, and that the other two piṭakas also continued to develop for at least a few centuries more. The interesting phenomenon, however, is that the Theravada tradition incorporated all these developments within what they considered to be the word of the Buddha, and did not develop any schools based on what they knew to be early and later texts in the Pali Canon. The effort at the first Council was basically to achieve 2  According to the Cullavagga account of the first council, the elders rehearsed the Vinaya first and the Dhamma next. This was due to the belief that the Vinaya was the life of the sāsana. We will refer to this again.

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a well-organized collection for easy reference and to serve the purpose of a reliable guide for the practice of the religion. The notion of the word of the Buddha came to be understood not literarily as what was really uttered by the Buddha but as a unity of his teaching characterized by consistency and coherency. The criterion to determine what the Buddha said was not that the actual words that came from the mouth of the Buddha but instead that the content was considered to be coherent and consistent. This criterion is highlighted in the idea of the ‘great indicators’ (mahāpadesa) mentioned in the Mahāparinibbāna-sutta (D II, 123-125) referred to above. According to this concept, one must neither accept nor reject any statement attributed to the Buddha by the following four sources: (i) a monk’s claim that he heard the particular statement as the Dhamma, Vinaya and the teaching of the Master directly from the Buddha himself; (ii) a monk’s claim that he heard the particular statement as the Dhamma, Vinaya and the teaching of the Master from the Sangha at a particular monastery; (iii) a monk’s claim that he heard it as the Dhamma, Vinaya and the teaching of the Master from a group of learned and well known elders at a particular monastery; and (iv) a monk’s claim that he heard the particular statement as the Dhamma, Vinaya and the teaching of the Master from a learned and well-known monk at a particular monastery. But what one must do is to test such a statement with the Sutta (i.e. the Dhamma) and the Vinaya (sutte otaretabbāni vinaye sandassetabbāni). If the statement compares well with the Dhamma and the Vinaya then it must be accepted as the word of the Buddha and if not, reject it.3 The principle underlying this set of criteria is coherence and consistency. If any statement corresponds to the totality of the word of the Buddha and if any such statement does not contradict what is accepted as the word of the Buddha then such a statement may be accepted as a word of the Buddha (buddha-vacana). This, in other words, shows that the source of an idea does not provide for its justification or lack of it. What is important is not the source but the consistency and the coherence in relation to the body of the teaching. The four commentarial mahāpadesas (DA 576 ff) also indicate the fluid character of the ‘word of the Buddha.’ They are: i. discourses 3  This suggests that already there was an agreed upon corpus of teaching known as Sutta and Vinaya already during the time of the Buddha. The lists appearing in discourses such as the Mahāparinibbāna-sutta (Dīgha-nikāya) and Sāmagāma-sutta (Majjhima-nikāya) seem to support this statement.

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(Sutta), ii. what is in conformity with the discourses (sutta-anuloma), iii. experts’ views (ācariya-vāda), iv. one’s own view (attano-mati). These criteria are given in gradually descending order, the highest or the most reliable being the discourses attributed to the Buddha or his immediate disciples, and the least reliable being the last, one’s own view. The important point to note is that even one’s own view has not been totally rejected. The broad perspective in which the concept of ‘the word of the Buddha’ was understood in the tradition is highlighted in an interesting statement occurring in the discourses. According to it, ‘whatever is wellsaid’ (subhāsita) is the word of the Buddha: yam kiñci subhāsitaṃ, sabbaṃ taṃ tassa Bhagavato vacanaṃ (A IV, 164). This is a good indication to the non-absolute character of the teaching of the Buddha. While this statement contains some interesting philosophical implications, also it explains why any new ideas were not regarded as external or belonging to any particular teacher, but were considered as the word of the Buddha. In the very same discussion in which this statement occurs, the speaker, Uttara Thera, admits that whatever he or anyone else would say is dependent on what the Buddha had said (tato upādāyupādāya mayaṃ c’aññe ca bhaṇāma: A IV, 164). This has been explained with reference to an instance of a person carrying a basket of grain that is understood to have been obtained from a great granary nearby. Commenting on this George Bond says: Although a teaching had not been actually spoken by the Buddha, it could be considered the “the word of the Buddha” because of the Buddha’s boundless “granary” of wisdom. (Bond 1982, 31)

Significance of ‘evaṃ me sutaṃ’ With the exception of the Itivuttaka, all the Theravada discourses begin with evaṃ me sutaṃ (thus have I heard or this is what I have heard)’; attributed to Ananda Thera at the first council. The significance of this expression has not gone unnoticed in the Buddhist tradition. Different schools have produced lengthy interpretations on each word of the expression and the expression as a whole, has received academic study itself. The Theravada exposition is found in the Sumaṅgalavilāsinī (Brahmajāla-sutta-vaṇṇanā), the commentary to the Dīgha-nikāya. According to Buddhaghosa, the word ‘evaṃ’ is used in three different senses: (i) emphasis (avadhāranattha): to stress that what he recited

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was exactly what he heard and not otherwise; (ii) demonstration (nidassanattha) to say that he is simply repeating what he had heard the Buddha say, and that it is not his own creation; (iii) mode of listening (ākārattha) to indicate that his is one mode of hearing: “(among others) I too have heard; this is the way that I have heard”. This analysis as a whole seems to imply that the role of Ananda in the process was merely that of one who recited what he heard, and it clearly says that what he recited is not his own creation. What is emphasized is that the Dhamma belongs to the Buddha and not to anyone else. The attitude behind this way of thinking, characteristic of Theravada, explains why there are no second Buddhas in the tradition.4

How this attitude has shaped the character of Theravada In the history of Theravada, we witness several trends and historical developments that could have led to creation of new sects emphasizing certain sections or texts of the Pali Canon. Such trends, however, did not develop to the extent of creating separate schools owing to this emphasis on the totality of the word of the Buddha. One such instance is the assignment of the four nikāya and the Vinaya to arahants and their pupils for their protection and maintenance. At the conclusion of the first council, it is reported that the four nikāyas, Dīgha, Majjhima, Saṃyutta and Aṅguttara, were assigned to Ananda, Sariputta’s pupils, Mahakassapa and Anuruddha respectively, and the Vinaya was assigned to Upali thera. It is from these traditions, most probably, that the later bhāṇaka tradition evolved. Due to this holistic approach, even though there were bhāṇakas, they never constituted any group accepting or following that particular aspect alone. It is reported that the Dīghabhāṇakas rejected the authenticity of Cariyāpiṭaka, Apadāna and Buddhavaṃsa, and did not wish to include these three texts in the Khuddaka-nikāya (DA I, 15). That is the closest example that we possess to what we are considering. But that too, is in the final analysis, upholds the unity of the three baskets. What could have happened was that Theravadins grew to be vinaya-vādins at the expense of the Dhamma. As we learn from the

4  Although the Mahayana sutras were written and compiled later many of them too begin with this expression. For later writers, it seems to have been a way to authenticate their texts. For the original Theravadins this expression seems to have had a different significance. For Ananda, this expression defined his role in the process as one who kept these words in his memory and then reproduced them upon the request of the Sangha, and not more than that.

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Cullavagga account of the first saṅgāyanā, the Theravada tradition started as a tradition that gave prominence to Vinaya (Thilakaratne 2000, I). This emphasis is not without significance. We know that the foundation for the Vinaya is the Dhamma. The Buddha very clearly laid emphasis on the Dhamma. As we already saw in the Sāmagāma-sutta, the Buddha says that any disagreement of the Dhamma is more serious than disagreements on the Vinaya. The fact that Vinaya started later and sīla was the basis of good behaviour shows that it was Dhamma that was more important. This original position seems to have undergone change at the first council where Vinaya was given more prominence. Later in Sri Lanka, however, this attitude too seems to have undergone change. In the pariyatti (learning) vs. paṭipatti (practice) debate between dhammakathikas (Those who were learned in the Dhamma) and pāṃsukūlikas (those who followed more austere ways of practice) during the reign of Vaṭṭagāmiṇi Abhaya (29-17 bce), the relative prominence of the two was debated, and pariyatti was upheld at the expense of paṭipatti (Adikaram 1946, 78). Nevertheless, there did not emerge a school based on this change of attitudes. What happened in this instance was that the Dhamma emerged as learnedness, and consequently the practice of it became less important. But it did not develop to the extent of causing the creation of any distinctive school. Another similar situation among the Theravadins was the elevation of the Abhidhamma to a very high position. Buddhaghosa defines Abhidhamma as “the exquisite doctrine (abhi-visiṭṭho dhammo), and included it in the nippariyāya desanā (definitive teaching) and contrasts it with the basket of discourses which is described as pariyāya desanā (contextual teaching). The nidāna of the Abhidhamma says that the Buddha taught it in the world of gods to its inhabitants for it was difficult for human beings to understand. According to a Sri Lankan inscription of the 10th century,5 in a leading monastic education centre in Anuradhapura, the teachers of abhidhamma were paid more than the teachers of other two baskets. In spite of all these special treatments, the Theravada did not develop a separate abhidhamma school.

Soteriological perspective The answer to the question why Theravada did not develop separate traditions based on certain Suttas or certain aspects of the word of the Buddha can also be approached from a soteriological point of view. The purpose of the Dhamma is to make an end to suffering. Whether 5  Mihintala monastery inscription of King Mihindu (956-972 ce).

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one follows the Dhamma as a monastic member or a householder, this remains the same, although the latter’s path may be more round-about. The Vinaya is intended for the smooth operation of the monastic life which has termination of suffering as its ultimate goal. In this sense, the Vinaya is subordinate to the Dhamma. From our discussion of the Sāmagāma-sutta above, we know that what the Buddha took as the Dhamma was what subsequently came to be included in the thirtyseven factors of enlightenment (bodhipakkhiyā-dhammā). Although the discourses are large in number, ultimately all of them deal with these basic issues. In this sense, there is uniformity in the teaching of the Buddha: what is in the Dhamma is what is relevant for the ultimate soteriological goal. In one instance, the Buddha compares his teaching to the waters of the ocean which is uniformly salty, and says that, in like manner, the Dhamma has only one taste, namely that of freedom (vimutti-rasa) (A IV, 200-201). One could use the same characteristic of the Dhamma to support an argument to isolate one particular discourse of the Buddha and highlight it (i.e. if the Dhamma has the same taste universally, then one may select from anywhere in the Dhamma without any reduction to its essence!). Assuming that this is true, one may still argue that even if any particular discourse has the identical taste of freedom that is the core of this totality, that discourse may not be comprehensive in representing the path, hence isolating one particular discourse is bound to result in reception of only a partial picture.

Conclusion In Theravada there did not exist patriarchs or individual teachers around whom special sects or schools arose. For example, even though the arahant Mahinda, who brought Buddhism to Sri Lanka and is so revered by the Buddhists of the country, there has not developed any tradition to treat him as a teacher with his own particular teaching. History records that he introduced the teaching of the Buddha to the country by explaining the Cullahatthipadopama-sutta of the Majjhima-nikāya. We know that arahant Mahinda explained what the Buddha taught. But we do not have any records of what he actually said. But this is understandable for what he taught was not his own teaching; it was the teaching of the Buddha, and therefore there was no need to think that he taught something that was not found in the original discourses. As a result, nothing that can be described as ‘arahant Mahinda’s teaching’ has come down to us.

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Theravada’s lack of a leading text and its taking instead the entire word of the Buddha as its focus can be understood as saying something about the primeval character of the tradition. It is interesting to note that the early schools, that are believed to have emerged during the first two centuries after the parinirvāṇa of the Buddha, do not seem to have had any clear preference for any particular text. This is clearly seen among the earliest divisions of the Buddhist Sangha known to us, and now extinct. Of these early ‘schools’ (for we do not know whether these groups could be described as ‘schools’ with clear-cut doctrinal positions), Theravada alone remains, and this characteristic that we have investigated may be taken to point to the possibility that Theravada is the oldest extant school among all the other Buddhist schools. To repeat the absence of preference in Theravada for any one single text has both historical and soteriological reasons behind the phenomenon, and it says much about the tradition just as the presence of any preference for a text says much about those other traditions that have as their foundation particular texts.

9. The Buddha and Sangha: A Study of Their Inter-relation in Theravada Tradition*

Introduction Understanding the nature of the relationship between a religious teacher and his disciples constitutes a very important aspect in understanding a particular religious tradition. The place occupied and the role played by the disciples in a religious tradition also says a lot about its ultimate goal and the path leading to it. The present paper tries to understand the Sangha basically as a religious and a philosophical category and not as a historical institution although there is no doubt that the latter aspect is of very great significance.

What does the Buddhist Sangha mean? The word ‘Sangha’, basically means a group or a community. It has two specific uses in the Pali texts: One is the non-religious use of the term which implies any group of people or animals; the other is the religious usage which specifically refers to the community of Buddhist monks (bhikkhu) and nuns (bhikkhunī), the male and female monastic disciples of the Buddha. Whenever the term is used in a non-religious sense in the texts it is preceded by a word indicating the particular category of beings to which it refers. For example, the term ‘deve-saṅgha’ refers to group of divine beings. In the like manner ‘ñāti-saṅgha’ means a group of relatives and ‘go-saṅgha’ means a group of oxen. If the term is not preceded by any defining term it is understood to refer to the Buddhist monastic community, usually including both its male and female members. In determining what the Sangha is, it is useful to see what the tradition says. There is no doubt that the tradition understands the term * An initial version of this article was published in Pro Dialogo 113, 2003/2.

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to refer exclusively to the monastic community. The question, however, is whether this traditional understanding is exactly the same as what was meant by the term originally, say, during the time of the Buddha, at the initial phase of the sāsana (religious organization of the Buddha). If all the four groups were meat by the term, it becomes necessary that we reinterpret the notion of taking refuge in the Sangha. In a broad sense, the Buddhist religious community is constituted of four groups (often referred to in the Canon as ‘catu parisā) or four groups). They are monks, nuns and male house-holders (upāsaka) and female house-holders (upāsikā). But usually these four groups when spoken of collectively are not referred to as ‘Sangha’ but as ‘parisā’. But this cannot mean that the term Sangha refers exclusively to the members of the monastic order. There is one instance in the canon where it uses the word ‘Sangha’ in the context of male and female house-holders. The particular discourse lists four ‘Sangha-illuminating’ (saṅgha-sobhana) characteristics. Since what is referred to by the term is the four groups of disciples of the Buddha, it is possible to interpret this instance as an indication that the term has been used to refer to the Sangha in the sense of the Buddhist community. The context of the discourse, however, is open-ended and there is nothing that would prevent it from being understood as referring to each group merely as a group, not necessarily in a religious sense. The instance is significant for it indicates that the term has been used to refer, although very rarely, to all four groups without discrimination. But in the tradition, either literary or religious, such terms as ‘upāsaka-saṅgha’ (community of male lay followers) or ‘upāsikā-saṅgha’ (female lay followers) are not in vogue. The Vinaya usage of the term seems to be more definitive. In the Buddhist monastic Vinaya ‘Sangha’ refers to a gathering of monks or nuns consisting of at least four. The term ‘gaṅa’ refers to a gathering of two or three. An individual monastic member is referred to as ‘puggala’. In addition to the fact that term has been historically understood in the context of the Vinaya in this sense, there is more important internal evidence to this effect. It is the fact that the Buddha has promulgated a disciplinary code only for the monks and nuns and not for the householders who come under the jurisdiction of the secular ruler. Only the monastic members come under the rule of the Vinaya and the Vinaya makes it clear that during the time of the Buddha, the monks and nuns did not come under the secular rule. In the Vinaya there are stories of people who became members of the Sangha having deserted the army

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or having committed crimes or to avoid family or any other kind of obligations. The Buddha made it clear that those who were under state or any personal obligation cannot obtain membership of the Sangha as a long as they are subject to that condition. This shows that those who became monks and nuns did not come within the purview of state law. What they came under was the monastic Vinaya promulgated by the Buddha. On the contrary, lay society did not come under the sway of the Buddhist Vinaya. This state of affairs shows that what are meant by Sangha in the Vinaya is only the male and female monastic follower of the Buddha. From the discussion up to this point, it is possible to discern two senses of the term, namely, the religious and the legal. In the Vinaya it is clear that the term is being used in its legal sense referring only to monastic members. The Dhamma usage is not that clear cut. There are certain very important instances in the Dhamma indicating that what really mattered was not whether or not one is a house-holder or a renunciation but his or her religious attainments. For instance, in the well-known formula highlighting the virtues of the Sangha the term used is ‘sāvaka-saṅgha’ which literally means ‘the community of hearers (followers)’. The complete text of the formula is as follows: The Sangha of the Blessed One’s disciples practicing the good way, practicing the straight way, practicing the true way, practicing the proper way, that is, the four pairs of persons, the eight types of individuals; this Sangha of the Blessed One’s disciples is worthy of gift, worthy of hospitality, worthy of offerings, worthy of reverential salutation, the unsurpassed filed of merit for the world. (M I, 37; Bodhi 1995, 110) It is clear from this account that what is meant by the meant term ‘sāvaka-saṅgha’ is the followers of the Buddha who have attained the four paths and four fruits. They are four pairs and eight altogether. Now it is clear that there can be laymen and women among those who have attained the paths and fruits. The following question has been asked of the Buddha: Is there any one man, a lay follower, Master Gotama’s disciple, clothed in white enjoying sensual pleasures, who carries out his instruction, responds to his advice, has gone beyond doubt, become free from perplexity, gained intrepidity, and become independent of others in the teacher’s Dispensation?

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The Buddha’s answer to his question was that there are not only one hundred or even five hundred but more who qualify for inclusion in this description. The same is asked about women and the same answer has been given (M I, 490; Bodhi 1995, 597). Commenting on this formula Bhikku Bodhi, a leading contemporary authority of Theravada, says that the description refers to those who have achieved the first two stages of arahanthood (Bodhi 1995, 1274). The discourses report some householders who attained the third stage of arahanthood (A I, 88; S IV, 298) and also a few who attainted arahanthood while living a house-hold life. The Buddha’s father, king Suddhodana, was one such.1 Although it looks like that there were many lay followers who attained the first two stages of the path, the number of those who attained last two were not many. Those who attained the last stage are still fewer and in the canon there is no record that any such person lived a life of a householder while being an arahant. The Milindapañha, a post-canonical work, maintains that such an arahant had two choices, either to attain parinirvāṇa meanings death, or to leave household life and become a member of the Sangha for he or she is already a renounced person (Miln, 264-266). In this context it is useful to analyse the commentarial definition of the term ‘Sangha’. In the Visuddhimagga of Budhaghosa the Sangha is defined in the following manner: ‘The community (Sangha) of the followers is ‘sāvaka-saṅgha’ which means that they are harmony (saṅghāta) in being similar in morality and view’ (sāvakānaṃ saṅgho sāvakasaṅgho; sīladiṭṭhisāmaññatāya saṅghātabhāvaṃ āpanno sāvakasaṅghoti attho: Vism 218). The past participle ‘saṅghāta’ which derives from saṃ+ghat to bind together is not etymologically connected to ‘Sangha’ which comes from saṃ+grah, to take in or to comprise. It is quite usual in the commentarial tradition that instead of etymological or descriptive definitions, religious or prescriptive ones are given. This is also one such occasion. The significance of the definition is that it includes all those who are in harmony in holding similar views and having similar morality. Although the sense of the term is clear we are not so sure about its reference. Referring to the formula mentioned above, Buddhaghosa says that it describes ‘the virtues of the noble Sangha’ (ariya-saṅgha-guna). The noble or ariya-saṅgha is usually understood as the community of those who have attained the four paths and the fruits associated with them. Here again any gender or lay-clergy distinction is not made. This view is supported by a modern scholar in the Vinaya 1  The incident is mentioned in the commentary to Mahāpajāpati Gotami Therigāthā- vaṇṇanā in Therigāthā.

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when he says that “...originally the Pali expression sāvaka saṅgha, “the community of disciples” (literally ‘hearers’) was employed in canonical texts to designate all those disciples, lay or monastic, who had reached one of the four stages on the Path of Liberation” (Wijayaratne 1990, 173). Although the term ‘Sangha’ has a wide reference as shown in the above discussion, it is not difficult to see how almost exclusively the monastic order, even within it, only the male monastic order was taken to represent the community. When we take house-hold and monastic followers, it is clear that the latter was always considered to be more devoted to religious practice than the latter. Whereas the former had to follow the religion among their various economic and social activities, the latter found time almost exclusively to spend on their religious upliftment. The difference between one who has renounced house-hold life and one who is a house-holder has been described in the following striking simile in the canon: Even as the crested (peacock), blue-necked (the bird), that soars in the sky will never reach the speed of the swan, even so the householder cannot emulate (to match) the monk, the sage (leading a life) of seclusion contemplating in the forest. (Jayawickrama 2001, 83-84, verse 221) Although both follow the same path, the householder cannot match the speed of the renouncer. As a result, it is understandable that very likely there were less number of householders who attained the higher stages in the path compared to those who attained such stares in the monastic community. Even within the monastic community, it is clear that the female order was kept subordinated to the male order for practical and social reasons. There are also reasons to believe that the female members may have been less in number. Under these circumstance, it is understandable how the term ‘Sangha’ came to refer to the monastic community exclusively and to the bhikkhu-saṅgha in particular. Based on the word ‘Sangha’ in the Pali Canon: 1. There are two main uses of the term in the Pali Canon, namely, the Sangha as the community of followers of the Buddha who are in various stages of arahanthood and the Sangha as a monastic community comprising both men and women which represents an organized religious body. The former is usually referred to by the terms ‘sāvaka-saṅgha’ or ‘ariya-saṅgha’ whereas the latter is described by ‘bhikkhu-saṅgha’ and ‘bhikkhunī-saṅgha’ or ‘ubhato-saṅgha’ meaning twofold Sangha.

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2. In the first sense is religious, ‘Sangha’ is a term that denotes higher attainments in spiritual development as taught by the Buddha. It does not have any specific gender distinction. 3. In the second sense, it is basically the monastic order of Buddhism. Usually both the community of the monks (bhikkhu saṅgha) and that of nuns (bhikkhunī-saṅgha) are included here. Historically the former has been so prominent that very often it is the male monastic community that is referred to by the term.

The Sangha as a religious ideal The Sangha as the community of the followers of the Buddha (bhagavato sāvaka-saṅgha) or the noble community (ariya-saṅgha) is basically a religious ideal significant in the context of the Path leading to the ultimate ‘takes refuge’ (saraṇā-gamana) in the Triple Gem (ratana-ttaya), namely, the Buddha, the Dhamma (his teaching) and the Sangha. In the Vinaya it is reported that almost immediately after the Buddhahood of the Buddha two merchants became his followers by taking refuges in him and his teaching. These ‘upāsakas’ (lay male followers) had only two refuges in which to take refuge for there was no Sangha yet (Vin I, 3; A I, 26). Once there was the Sangha community those who opted to become the followers of the Buddha did so by taking refuge in the Triple Gem. The Vinaya reports how the Buddha asked the first 60 members of the monastic life to go in different directions and spread the massage. When these first monks did so, there were many who wanted to become monks and when they thought these would be renunciates to the Buddha he admitted them as monastic disciples by making them take refuge in the Triple Gem. Now it is interesting to see that a member of the monastic order (Sangha) is also one who has taken refuge in the Sangha. What is meant by ‘Sangha’ in this context is the community of the Sangha as followers of the path laid down by the Buddha. The presence of the Sangha which has realized the path taught by the Buddha is a living example of the correctness and the practicality of Dhamma. Taking refuge is basically an act of faith. One who decides to follow the Buddha, having given up one’s former religious beliefs if one had any, is one who is motivated by faith in the Buddha and what is taught by him. In this process the Sangha becomes very important for they are the human embodiment of the path. They prove that the ultimate goal taught in Buddhism, namely, nirvana, is realizable. In this sense, an individual member of the Sangha

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who follows the path finds the same soteriological significance in the Sangha. Although he himself is a member of the Sangha, in this religious act of taking refuge in the Sangha he looks up to this ideal community as his ultimate goal into wishes to assimilate himself.2 Another indication that the Sangha in this context refers to the ideal community is the meditative exercise of reflecting on the Sangha (saṅgha-anussati) which is one among many reflections a mediator has to practice in order to achieve concentration of mind (samādhi). Here a member of the Sangha reflecting on the virtues of the Sangha does not pose any problem for, it is the virtues of this ideal Sangha that he reflects on. The act of taking refuge, in this manner, is an act of religion; it is an act of faith. According to the teaching of the Buddha one’s act of taking refuge is motivated by faith resulting into the nature of the objects of one’s faith, namely, the Triple Gem, While rootless faith (amulikā saddhā) is discouraged ‘rational’ faith (ākaravatī saddhā) (M I, 320) is encouraged. When one follows the path and achieves results gradually one generates what is called ‘sense of appreciation born of knowledge’ (avecca-pasāda) (M I, 37). One needs faith in order to continue in the Path. It is at the culmination of the path where one has achieved knowledge that one’s faith becomes no longer necessary. Taking refuge has this religious purpose as its end. Taking refuge in the Sangha in this sense has no reference to any particular person or persons but constitutes a commitment to an abstract concept. It is in this sense that the Sangha can be considered an ideal community representing the highest standards in religious life.

The Sangha as the organized monastic community of the followers of the Buddha The Sangha as an organized body was a gradual creation. As we saw earlier the first two people who became the followers of the Buddha did not have the Sangha to take refuge in. The first member of the Sangha was born, 2  The usual statement attributed to those who expressed their wish to be accepted as a follower goes in the following manner:.. bhagavataṃ gotamaṃ saraṇaṃ gacchāmi dhammañ ca bhikkhu saṅghañca (I take refuge in the Gotama, Buddha, the Dhamma and the community of the male Sangha) (D I, 85). The specific reference to the Bhikkhu-Saṅgha here is problematic for the Bhikkhunī-Sangha is clearly excluded. Commenting on this Buddhaghosa simply describes the term as ‘bhikkhūnan saṅgho bhikkhu-saṅgho (‘the community of the bhikkhu is bhikkhu-Sangha…’) (DA I, 230). In the sense of the ideal community Sangha does not mean bhikkhu-Sangha alone. In taking refuge, one does not do so only in one particular segment of the Sangha; one take refuge in all those who are in harmony in being similar in views and morality.

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when out of this first five listeners the one called Koṇḍañña attained the state of stream-entry (sotāpatti), the first state of arahanthood. Within a very short period, the number rose to sixty and at this juncture, the Buddha asked his Sangha to go in every direction where roads lead to and spread the message of deathlessness (Vin I, Introduction). Thus began the Sangha which developed to be the first of this kind in history. In the broad religious spectrum of ancient India the Sangha belonged to the śramaṇa tradition which was a conscious departure from the brahmanic mainstream. Although the Sangha represented a śramaṇa tradition it had distinct features of its own. The difference has to be understood with reference to the basic philosophical outlook of the teaching of the Buddha. The cornerstone of the Buddha’s thinking was the teaching of dependent conditionality (paṭicca-samuppāda) which underscored the dependent and related character of reality. According to his understanding of reality there cannot be any independent phenomenon universal or personal. Egolessness thus becomes the central feature in the understanding of one’s personal reality. The ultimate goal of a person motivated by this understanding of reality is to achieve an unselfish way of living characterized by such qualities as friendliness and loving kindness. The life of the Sangha is an embodiment of this way of thinking. The Vinaya documents the gradual evolution of the Sangha to be a well-organized body of religious people. Individual from all walks of life and all castes become the members of the community. This was of particular interest for in the dominant Brahmanic tradition caste was observed with severe strictness. Religious life had become a monopoly of the privileged few. It was unimaginable that an outcaste could receive entry to religious life under Brahmanism. The Buddha gave new definition to the concepts of brāhmaṇa (high caste) and vasala (low caste). He said that one becomes either a high caste or low caste not by birth but behavior. This was a total rejection of the social structure based on the divinely ordained caste system of popular Brahmanic belief. The Buddha described the universal and egalitarian character of his Sangha in the following words: Just as the great rivers: the Ganga, the Yamuna, the Achiravati, the Sarabhu and the Mahi, entering the mighty ocean, lose their former name and identities and are termed simply ocean; even so these four castes: kshatriyas, brahmanas, vaishyas, and sudras, going forth from the world into the homeless life, into the

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discipline of Dhamma proclaimed by the Tathāgata, lose their former names and lineages and are reckoned simply recluses, sons of the sakya. (Hare 1978, 139) This rejection of the accepted social order highlights the ‘going-againstthe-current’ (paṭisotagāmi) character of the Buddhist Sangha. Those who became members of this community gave up their wealth, family ties, social status and everything related to the household life and assumed a life of selflessness. The Pali word which refers to becoming a member of the Sangha is ‘pabbajjā’. It usually means going forth, derived from the verb ‘pabbajati’ meaning ‘to exile’ (oneself). As the verb indicated, theirs was a self-exile from society, not meaning physically renouncing it but characterizing a conscious departure from accepted social values thereby opting for an alternative system of values exemplifying egolessness (anatta) as the mark of one’s self-understanding. The individual members of the Sangha did not own any private property except for one’s very personal belongings. The ownership of good a belong to the community and whatever the individual members received went to the common stock and everyone received according to one’s needs. The usual mode of getting one’s food was to go begging for alms. In doing so, they did not ask from a specific person; nor did they ask for anything in particular. They went on their alms round without making any discrimination and they only accepted what they needed for merely existing. This way of living served several purposes: on the one hand, it did not pose any extra burden on the society and on the society and on the other, it suited the life of detachment aimed ultimately at the eradication of all attachment to sensual gratification. The Sangha was very conscious of the fact that it was dependent on society for its existence. One has to understand the reasons behind the emphasis laid on virtues such as having less needs (appicchatā), content (santuṭṭhitā) and being easily maintained (subhara) in this context in addition to their obvious relevance to the nirvanic goal. The Sangha was not a group of people who shunned society in order to live in solitude. They were detached but not physically away from it. The picture of the arahant who is merely satisfied with his own liberation is not correct. It is true that they gave priority to it. But the Sangha had a definite social role. The laity provided physical sustenance (āmisa-dāna) or material support, the Sangha in return guided them on the right path, the gift of Dhamma (Dhamma-dāna). This reciprocal bond has been described in the Sigālovāda (The Advice to Sigala) in this manner:

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There are five ways in which a man should minister to ascetics and Brahmins...: by kindness in bodily deed, speech and thought, by keeping open-house for them, by supplying their bodily needs. And the ascetics and Brahmins, thus ministered to by him… will reciprocate in six ways: they will restrain him from evil, encourage him to do good, be benevolently compassionate towards him, teach him what he has not heard, and point out to him the way to heaven. (Walshe 1987, 468) While the Sangha and the laity behave in a mutually beneficial manner toward each other, the Sangha in itself was a group formed to accommodate those who wanted to develop a way of living characterized by self-less love. Within the Sangha the life is characterized by what is described as ‘by mutual advice, by mutual support’ (aññamañña vacanena aññamañña uṭṭhāpanena). The concern for the progress in religious life of oneself and others was characteristic of the Buddhist Sangha. Although there were elders and juniors within the Sangha and respect for the elderly was a key virtue among the Sangha in so far as practice is concerned, everyone was a wayfarer on the same road taking care of the wellbeing of both oneself and the other by caring and sharing. What is described above applies equally to both monks and nuns (bhikkhunī). The significance of the community of nuns, nevertheless, needs to be highlighted for it is perhaps the oldest systematic religious organization of women in recorded history. The Bhikkhu Sangha was started subsequent to its male counterpart. The Vinaya makes it clear that the Buddha had to take extra precautionary measures in establishing the bhikkhunī community. However, once established, the community not only grew in number rapidly but also it enabled women to achieve their full spiritual potential like their male counterparts. The general impression among people by this time was that women were of a lower intellectual level and that they cannot aspire to what men could achieve with their superior abilities. The Buddhist nuns proved that this belief did not have any foundation. The following conversation between Bhikkhunī Soma and Mara (the Evil One) is a case in point: That state so hard to achieve Which is to be attained by the seers Can’t be attained by a woman With her two-fingered wisdom What does womanhood matter at all -

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When the mind concentrated well When knowledge flows on steadily As one sees correctly into Dhamma One to whom it might occur ‘I’m a woman’ or ‘I’m a man Or ‘I’m anything at all’ Is fit for Mara to address. (Bodhi 2000, 222-223) The beauty of the response is that it is not a mere defense of womanhood as against manhood but goes beyond gender distinctions altogether. The ideal social identity that the Buddhist Sangha south to create, although not have been that way all the time, was one transcending all social conventions which had their ultimate justification in man’s vanity. The heights of spiritual achievement gained by bhikkhunīs are reported in the Therigāthā (psalms of the Sisters). This collection of poetry represents the first-ever recorded expressions of women’s liberation not from the traditionally attributed burdensome role of being a woman but also from the deeper psychological bonds of defilements, the causes of suffering. The following statement of the nun called Sumaṅgala-mātā, reveals the kind of relief achieved by some women by being in the Sangha: O woman! well set free, how free am I How thoroughly free from kitchen drudgery Me stained and squalid among my cooking-pots My brutal husband ranked as even less Than the sunshades he sits and weaves always Purged now of all former lust and hate I dwell, musing at ease beneath the shade Of spreading boughs- O, but ‘tis well with me! (Davids 1980, 25; verse 23,24) Bhikkhunī Dhamamdinna represents very high achievement in erudition. It is interesting to see how she explained the teaching of the Master by way of answering questions asked by her former husband, Visakha. Subsequently, on being asked by the latter to verify her explanation the Buddha praised her knowledge and approved her explanation in the following words: The Bhikkhunī Dhammadinna is wise, Visakha, the bhikkhunī Dhammadinna has great wisdom. If you had asked me the meaning of this, I would have explained it to you in the same

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way that the bhikkhunī Dhammadinna has explained it. (Ñāṇamoli and Bodhi 1995, 403-404) A situation of the female disciple teaching the doctrine while the Master is still and being acclaimed for that is something that one dose not come across in religious literature too often.

The Buddha and the Sangha The nature of the between the Buddha and the Sangha is basically a relation between a teacher and his pupils. The popular term used in the discourses to describe the Buddha is ‘satthā deva-manussānaṃ’, the guide/ teacher of gods and human beings’ highlights the role of the Buddha as the teacher. The following conversation between Ananda Thera, the attendant of the Buddha, and a Brahmin called Gopaka Moggallana shows how a leading disciple perceived this relation: Master Ananda, is there any single bhikkhu who possesses in each and every way all those qualities that were possessed by Master Gotama, accomplished and fully enlightened? There is no single bhikkhu, Brahmin, who possesses in each and every way all those qualities that were possessed by the Blessed One, accomplished and fully enlightened. For the Blessed One was the arouser of the unarisen path, the producer of the unproduced path, the declarer of the undeclared path; he was the knower of the path, the finder of the path, the one skilled in the path. But his disciples now abide following that path become possessed of it afterwards. (Ñāṇamoli and Bodhi 1995, 880-881) According to this account, the essential difference between the Buddha and his following lies in the fact that the former was, like a pioneer, the one who discovered the path and the latter were simply those who followed the same path and reached the same destination. Once the Buddha compared nirvana to an ancient city, the noble eight-fold path to be the lost track leading to this city and himself to be the one who discovered it (S II, 104-107). There is no doubt that there is a distinction between a pioneer who discovers something for the first time, particularly without assistance from any other and those who follow the guidance of the former and achieve the same result. The important thing, however, is that the end result of both the pioneer and his followers is the same. In the context of the teaching of the Buddha, it is the same path that was

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followed by the Buddha himself and his followers and it was the same nirvana that was realized by both. The metaphor of the pioneer highlights the possibility that the pioneer is endowed with knowledge and ability far exceeding that the followers. In the Buddhist tradition it is held that whereas there were certain kinds of knowledge shared by the Buddha and his followers alike, there were some other forms of knowledge which were known only by the Buddha. The Paṭisambhidā-magga, a canonical work belonging to the Khuddhaka-nikāya, lists such forms of knowledge that are owned exclusively by the Buddha. Most of these have to do with the Buddha’s ability to penetrate other people’s abilities and potentialities and propensities which explain how the Buddha became the effective communicator of the Dhamma that he was. The important point, however, is, in so far as the enlightenment is concerned there is no difference between the Buddha and an arahant for it is the very same three forms of knowledge, namely, knowledge of one’s past existence, knowledge of how beings come to be born and die and the knowledge of the extinction of defilements,3 that the Buddha and his disciples would realize in attaining enlightenment. Taking refuge in the Buddha, Dhamma and the Sangha being the first step in becoming a follower of the Buddha, faith (saddhā) in the Triple Gem is a prerequisite in the entire process.4 As we discussed earlier the faith that is spoken of in Buddhism is what is characterized by rational investigation. One needs faith to begin with and to continue. It, however, gradually disappears when knowledge takes its place. Finally, once a follower realizes nirvana, his faith is completely replaced by knowledge. Hence, the description of the arahant as ‘lacking in faith’ (‘assaddho’) (Dhp v. 97). Although the ideal picture of faith is characterized by rational investigation as described here there is no assurance that all the disciples of the Buddha exercised such a faculty when opting to follow him. The Buddha, on his part, has always discouraged his followers from accepting what he said without any investigation. For instance, the Buddha asked the rich and intelligent householder called Upali who wanted to change his religion in favour of the Buddha’s teaching to think twice before he made that decision: “Investigate thoroughly, householder. It is good for such well-known people like you to investigate thouroughly 3  The standard terms that refer to these knowledges are: pubbenivāsa-anussati-ñāṇa, cutupapāta-ñāṇa and āsavkkya-ñāṇa. See, Sāmaññaphala-sutta of the Dīgha-nikāya. 4  See, Collected Papers: Asanga Tilakaratne Vol. IV, 315-351.

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(Bodhi 2009, 484). He discouraged Vakkali who kept on looking at him admiringly. The Buddha said to him to look at Dhamma instead and see him through the Dhamma (S III, 120). On the part of the followers, this may not have happened always. Even the conversation between Ananda and Gopaka we quoted above can be read as betraying a sense of total and unconditional dependence of the Sangha on the Buddha for guidance. This is quite natural and it does not even have a problem as long as this dependence was based on good reasons. But whether or not it was so depended very much on one’s personal disposition. It is not only in the religious sense the Buddha did not want his Sangha to depend on him without investigation but also as the head of the Sangha he did not want his followers to look him as the head to whom they owe their obedience. In the Mahāparinibbāna-sutta which describes the last days of the Buddha, it is recorded that once Ananda requested the Buddha to make some sort of a last address to the Sangha. To this, the Buddha responded: Ananda, what does the order of monks expect of me? I have taught the Dhamma making no “inner” and “outer”. The Tathāgata has no “teacher’s fist” in respect of doctrines. If there is anyone who thinks: “I shall take charge of the order”, or “The order should refer to me”, let him make some statement about the order, but the Tathāgata (Does not think in such terms. So why should I) make a statement about the order? (Walshe 1987, 245) The Buddha, coming himself from gaṇa-saṅgha (collective) mode of rule as against autocratic kingship, advocated a similar decentralized and democratic rule for the Sangha in which there was no central point of power. The reference point in administration was not a person (either the Buddha or any other member of the Sangha) but the Dhamma and the Vinaya (teaching and discipline). The decisions of the Sangha were made in unanimity or with the consent of the majority. Any motion was read three times before the Sangha before it was considered approved. In this sense, the Buddhist Sangha provides a very early example of democracy in practice. The Buddha did not appoint a personal head to the Sangha once he was gone. The rationale for not doing so is basically philosophical: In a system in which the good behavior was not seen as obeying a command of a supreme commander but a voluntary submission to a code of ethics

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based on its philosophical foundation, there was no reason for there to be a personal head to the organization. The following remarks of a modern commentator are apt in this context: The Buddha also made sure that there would not be organizational loopholes for ambitious individual cliques to try and capture monarchical or oligarchical control of the Sangha. It was organized as a union of federation of self-governing and self-regulating communes. During his last illness, he was asked whether he would consider nominating a vicar or a successor to rule his Sangha after his death. The question was no doubt prompted by an anxiety that without his charismatic presence the sangha might disintegrate. The Buddha rejected this suggestion as foolish and fraught with peril. If during his lifetime, he had not acted as sovereign lord, why should he appoint someone on whom the Sangha should depend? (Swaris 1999, 422) The Sangha, nevertheless, was not without guidance. The resultant situation is articulated in the following dialogue between Ananda Thera and Vassakara, the chief minister of king Ajatasatthu: “Is there, Master Ānanda, any single bhikkhu who was appointed by the Master Gotama thus: ‘He will be your refuge when I am gone,’ and whom you now have recourse to?” “There is no single bhikkhu, Brahmin, who was appointed by the Blessed One who knows and sees, accomplished and fully enlightened, thus: ‘He will be your refuge when I am gone,’ and whom we now have recourse to”… “But if you have no refuge, Master Ānanda, what is the cause of your concord?” “We are not without a refuge, Brahmin. We have a refuge; we have the Dhamma as our refuge”… “Brahmin, the Blessed One who knows and sees, accomplished and fully enlightened, has prescribed the course of training for bhikkhus and he has laid down the Pātimokkha. On the Uposatha day as many of us live in dependence upon a single village district meet together in unison, and when we meet we ask one who knows the Pātimokkha to recite it. If a bhikkhu remembers an offence or a transgression while the Pātimokkha is being recited, we make him act in accordance with the

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Dhamma, in accordance with instructions. It is not the worthy ones that make us act; it is the Dhamma that makes with us act.” (Bodhi 1995, 881-882) As is clear from this dialogue the working of the Vinaya was understood to be impersonal. The members of the Sangha who implemented the Vinaya were not seen as individual person but as representing the totality of the Sangha. In this very same discussion, Ananda admit that there are elders in the Sangha who are more knowledgeable and virtuous than the rest and hence worthy of being looked upon as providing guidance. But this does not mean that they are over and above the Dhamma and the Vinaya, In other words, within the jurisdiction of the Vinaya any member of the Sangha, irrespective of their seniority or spiritual attainments, is only a member, like any other, who comes within its scope.5 In the history of Indian religion the Buddhist Sangha represents an important development in which we find the first evidence of a wellorganized but decentralized form of religious living, each individual member working for his own and other’s wellbeing in the context of community life. Although the monastic members of the community, both male and female, were understood as the Sangha, that does not mean that the laity was not a part of it. The difference between the two groups was more a matter of intensity than that of kind. In other words, the two groups were following the same path with varying degree of intensity. The role of the Buddha within the Sangha was that of a teacher although he was considered to be the teacher incomparable (anuttaro purisa-damma sārathi). The Buddha, on his part, always reminded his followers of the fact that he was only a guide and a pointer of the path (Tumhehi kiccaṃ ātappaṃ-akkhātāro tathāgatā: Dhp v. 276). Whether the followers always took this assertion in the same spirit remains an open question. In the history of Buddhism we can see that, at time, the 5  Even in the case of an arahant who is considered incapable of committing certain violation due to his/her very purified character this remains the same. An arahant cannot abstain from participating in his duties as a member of the Sangha owing to the fact that s/he has nothing further to do as far as his/her liberation is concerned. The Buddha’s advice to Mahā Kappina, who though that, since he was purified in the highest degree (visuddho paramāya visuddhiyā) he need not participate in the recital of the Pātimokka, testifies to this (Vin I, 105; The Book of the Discipline IV, Sacred Books of the Buddhists, Horner 1971, 137).

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Buddha has been elevated to the position of a virtual savior. This is, however, a totally different issue requiring a separate discussion.

10. The Mahasi Sayadaw Method of Vipassanā Meditation: An Abbreviated Path to Nirvana or a Misunderstanding?*

Introduction The history of Buddhism is not without its share of debates on practice. At a very early stage of Theravada in Sri Lanka, we are told, there arose a debate among its monastic followers as to which ‘yoke’ they should follow: the yoke of books or the yoke of insight meditation? In the debate, those who upheld the yoke of books claimed victory, and with some risk of making an over-generalization, one can say that this victory shaped the future path of Sri Lankan Theravada. In the East Asian Mahayana tradition, there is a longstanding debate over whether the realization is sudden or gradual. This debate started around the eighth century in China has continued up to the present time. This issue has been central in the history of Mahayana to the extent that the tradition has split into two contending schools. What happened within Theravada tradition during the middle of the last century has certain parallels to the earlier events although in comparison it may not have been as influential as its earlier counterparts. What follows is not a comprehensive study of the debate on the so-called new Burmese meditation method. In order for one to do a comprehensive study of the debate, one needs to know Burmese and Sinhala languages and such Southeast Asian languages as Thai, Laos, and Cambodian.1 Some materials from Burma have been translated 1  There is a discussion in Thambiah (1976, 252-66) of circumstances surrounding the introduction of new Burmese meditation to Thailand. Thambiah’s discussion does not touch either the doctrinal aspect or the larger social aspect behind this meditation * An initial version of this article appeared in Buddhist Meditation: Text, Tradition and Practice, ed. Ven. Kammai and Charles Willeman (Somaiya Publication Pvt. Ltd. Mumbai (2012).

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into English and Sinhala. But my personal limitations prevent me from consulting any of the Southeast Asian sources not translated into English or Sinhala. Of Mahasi Sayadaw’s own work, a concise work outlining the method (The Progress of Insight 1965) has been translated into English from its original Pali version by Nyanaponika Thera, the German scholarly monk who followed this method of meditation in Burma and lived in Sri Lanka. Sayadaw’s main work in two volumes originally written in Burmese has been translated into English, and published in Burma by 1979. I have not seen this book; what I have seen is a translation of it by U Min Sway.2 Nyanaponika Thera’s own early classic on Theravada Buddhist meditation, Heart of Buddhist Meditation, contains a very early account published in English (and later in German) on this method of meditation. I will begin this discussion by looking at social and historical factors behind the introduction of the new meditation movement to Sri Lanka. Subsequently, I will examine the doctrinal aspects of the debate with a view to assess the arguments presented. We will begin with a look at the life of Mahasi Sayadaw.

Mahasi Sayadaw (1904- 1982) The new Burmese Vipassanā meditation owes its origin to U. Sobhana Mahāthera who is better known as Mahasi Sayadaw for he took up his residence before moving Rangoon at a monastery known for its big (maha) drum (si). He was born in the village called Seikkhun seven miles west to the city of Shwebo, and received the initial admission to the monkhood at the tender age of twelve. He was very good at learning and he completed his monastic education with distinction. After his higher admission at the age of twenty, he completed all three Pali examinations with distinction and moved to Mandalay known for its monks with high scholarship. Having learned from the monks there, U. Sobhana for the context of his discussion is the political involvement of the Sangha in Thailand and not its doctrinal or social implications. He refers in passing to the popularity of the Burmese meditation among the laity, but does not connect it to any social changes in Thai society. The controversy that arose in Thailand was motivated purely by personal rivalries and ambitions between Phra Pimolatham, who introduced the new Burmese meditation to Thailand and his rival in the council of elders, Phra Maha Wirawong. 2  I would like to mention gratefully Udu-eeriyagama Dhammajiva Thera of Nissarana-vanaya, Meetirigala, Sri Lanka, for allowing me to make use of his collection including this manuscript of the translation Mahasi Sayadaw’s main work.

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moved into Moulmein and spent some years teaching the Dhamma. At the age of twenty eight, accompanied by a monastic friend, he started wandering looking for a meditation teacher. At Thaton he met U. Narada, also known as Mingun Jetawun Sayadaw the first, and started practicing meditation under his guidance. Having completed training under this teacher, he moved back to Moulmein to continue with more teaching and learning. In 1949 he moved back to his native village, took up residence there at Mahasi monastery and started giving instruction in vipassanā meditation. His method became very popular and his fame spread all over the country. In 1949 he was invited to Rangoon by U Nu, the Prime Minister, and started giving meditation instructions at the place called Thathana Yeikhtha which later became the main centre for Mahasi Sayadaw method of meditation. In the Sixth Buddhist Council (chaṭṭha-saṅgāyanā) which was held in Burma during 1954-56 Mahasi Sayadaw functioned as the questioner (pañha pucchaka), which is tantamount to the position held by Mahakassapa Thera at the First Buddhist Council which was held three months after the parinirvāṇa of the Buddha. By this time Mahasi Sayadaw was already established as the foremost of Burmese meditation masters. He was a perfect combination of both learnedness (pariyatti) and meditation (paṭipatti). By the time Mahasi Sayadaw passed away in 1982 at the age of 78 he was the foremost of Theravada meditation teachers in the world with a large local and international following.

Spread of new vipassanā meditation From the time Mahasi Sayadaw moved to Rangoon, he had foreign followers reaching him in search of instructions. In addition to visitors from western countries, he also had visitors from Sri Lanka and other traditional Theravada countries. The debate we are focusing on in this discussion took place, with the exception of a few western practitioners, mainly between the Burmese and Sri Lankan practitioners. Although the Burmese meditation reached Sri Lanka during the Buddha Jayanti (BJ) period (1955-56), the presence of Burmese monks in Sri Lanka and the origin of a sect of Sri Lankan monks with direct affiliation to Burmese Sangha, which provided the physical background for the new Burmese meditation to be popular in Sri Lanka, were the conditions already prevalent for some decades. As we know, the Buddhist connections between Sri Lanka and Southeast Asia, particularly with Siam and Burma, have a longer history. These relations took a new turn

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at the turn of the last century when monks from Burma started visiting Sri Lanka for pilgrimage. Among many such monks was Vinayalankara Thera who was instrumental in establishing several monasteries with direct Burmese affiliation. According to Rerukane Candawimala Thera, who was one of the prominent practitioners of the new vipassanā meditation, entered the sāsana as a result of the visit of a Burmese Thera named Vinayalankara. He came on pilgrimage to Sri Lanka in 1901, and in responding to the enthusiasm of people, spent more time than he initially planned. During the decade he was in Sri Lanka, Vinayalankara Thera was able to establish Burmese monastic tradition in the country. A monastery, Vinayalankararamaya, which was named after him, was offered to him where he took up residence. An important event that took place at this monastery was the entering into sāsana of a group of young boys among whom were Rerukane Candawimala and Rerukane Ariyanana (later Ariyaratne Rerukana) who later campaigned in support of the new method of meditation. These young novices were sent to Burma for further training. Although they got exposed to the practice of meditation in general, it was not to the new vipassanā meditation which was yet to emerge. Most of the Sri Lankan adherents of new meditation method including these two eminent practitioners got exposed to it in their subsequent travels to Burma. These early travelers to Burma provided the background for the arrival of new movement during the BJ period. Kahatapitiye Sumatipala Thera (1896- 1982), who later started the first ever Mahasi Sayadaw Vipassanā meditation center at Kanduboda (suburbs of Colombo) received initial admission in 1907, and went to Burma in 1913 for higher Dhamma studies. He came back in 1919, and went back there during the BJ period and received instructions in Mahasi vipassanā method, and came back to Sri Lanka to establish the Kanduboda centre. Thus the new vipassanā method was brought to Sri Lanka initially by monks such as Kahatapitiye Sumatipala Thera who received the training under Mahasi Sayadaw in Burma. Subsequently during the BJ season, there was a lot of enthusiasm on this meditation among particularly the lay practitioners of the country. As a result Sri Lankan government, headed by Sir John Kotelawala, the Prime Minister, invited Mahasi Sayadaw to arrive in Sri Lanka. This invitation was accepted, and in July 1955 four Burmese meditation teachers, headed by Mahasi

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Sayadaw, came to Sri Lanka. Initially, these monks stayed at private residence of the late H. Sri Nissanka. Sri Lanka Vipassanā Bhāvanā Samitiya (Sri Lanka Society for Vipassanā Meditation) was established in Colombo, and a centre was started for the monks to stay and instruct. The first systematic centre for meditation with residential facilities for lay people was started under the guidance of Kahatapitiye Sumatipala Thera at Kanduboda. The first anniversary of the centre was celebrated with the participation of SWRD Bandaranaike, the then Prime Minister of Sri Lanka and U Nu, the then Prime Minister of Burma. It is clear that the new method of meditation was introduced to Sri Lanka with state patronage. The two Prime Ministers, Kotalawela one who initiated BJ celebrations, and Bandaranaike, who completed the celebrations, took part in the public meetings and functions associated with the new movement. It appeared that the Buddhist laity of the country was open-minded about what was newly introduced. The opposition, however, came from the members of the Sangha among whom the monks from the well-known Vajiraramaya monastery of Colombo were in the forefront. Among those who wrote in English against the new method were Kassapa Thera (formerly Cassius A. Pereira, an eminent physician), Soma Thera and Kheminda Thera and Weligama Nanaratana Thera wrote in Sinhala. In Sri Lanka, the debate took place at two different flat-forms, one is the English speaking monks whose writings formed a part of the international debate. The writings of Soma Thera, Kheminda Thera and Kassapa Thera belonged in this category. As we will see later, it is the writings of Kheminda Thera that became the basis for Burmese rejoinders. The other flat-form was the debate conducted in Sinhala for the local monks and lay people. The key proponents in support of the new vipassanā meditation were Rerukane Chandawimala Thera and Ariyaratna Rerukana, mentioned earlier. They got exposed to the new method during the BJ period. There were some leading monks, such as Paravahera Vajiranana and Weligama Nanaratana, who wrote against the new method. A collection of essays critical of the new method was published under the title of ‘Method of Buddhist Meditation and the New Buddhist Meditation’ in Sinhala. Weligama Nanaratana Thera wrote a book (of one hundred pages) named “Critique of Burmese Meditation’ in Sinhala. Kassapa Thera who wrote in English and Nanaratana Thera who wrote in Sinhala were both polemical and hostile in their tone although both had very convincing reasons to offer against the new method.

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One of the early western adherents of this method was Nyanaponika Thera, a Theravada Buddhist monk of German origin and renowned author, who received his admission to the Sangha in Burma, and lived in Sri Lanka. He received instructions from Mahasi Sayadaw, practiced with him and became convinced of the effectiveness of the method. In his Heart of Buddhist Meditation, a classic on Theravada Buddhist meditation, he included a chapter on the new vipassanā method of Mahasi Sayadaw. Nyanaponika Thera’s discussion is objective in its approach, and does not get involved in polemics. Among the strong advocates of the traditional method as prescribed in the Visuddhimagga was Kheminda Thera of Vajiraramaya. He wrote a series of papers to the journal named World Buddhism (edited by the late Mr. Austin de Silva). His first paper appeared in the July 1966 issue under the title “Access Concentration and Purification of Mind”, and it was replied to by Sayadaw Nyanuttara whose piece appeared in two installments (rejoinder) in the same journal. Kheminda Thera replied to the rejoinder which appeared in two installments and to the rejoinder II which appeared in four installments. These articles appeared till the end of 1967. Subsequently, Sayadaw Nyanuttara wrote rebuttal to reply to rejoinder. This appeared in twelve installments and his rejoinder to the reply II appeared in six installments. The exchange came to an end in 1970. In 1979 the original article by Kheminda Thera, rejoinders by Sayadaw Nyanuttara, replies by the former and the rebuttals by the latter were all put together and published by Buddha Sasana Nuggaha Organization, Thathana Yeiktha, 16, Hermitage Road, Rangoon. In addition to these exchanges, the volume contains some comments by several practitioners of vipassanā meditation on Lama Anagarika Govinda’s criticism of Mahasi Sayadaw’s method. Writing a preface to this volume Mahasi Sayadaw says how he trusted the erudite scholar Nyanuttara Sayadaw to defend the method of meditation against criticisms from Sri Lankan monk. He further refers to some Burmese opposition: In our country two critics appeared, one a layman and another a monk. The latter is Syrian Tawya Sayadaw PKU Tilokanyana, who wrote a book (over 800 pages), sparing nobody, not even Ledi Sayadaw Thera in his criticisms. I wrote an Explanatory Note which was published as an Appendix to some of my publications. (iv)

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Mahasi Sayadaw also refers to Lama Govinda’s criticisms against his method (which the latter called “the so-called Burmese method”), and is satisfied with defenses produced by some of his followers. Later in 1980 Kheminda Thera published his own articles in a revised form under the title The Way of Buddhist Meditation Serenity and Insight according to the Pali Canon. In this book, he does not refer to the exchanges between him and his Burmese counterpart. But simply presents his account with the view to establish that paññā is impossible without samādhi. This publication demonstrates that in spite of all the strong arguments presented by his opponent, Kheminda Thera remained unconvinced about the method of new vipassanā meditation. Kheminda Thera begins his book with a quotation from the Pāsādika-sutta (Dīgha-nikāya) highlighting the importance of the four jhānas: There are the four ways of luxurious living, Cunda, which conduce absolutely (ekanta) to weariness, dispassion, cessation, calm, super-knowledge, enlightenment, (sambodha), extinction (nibbāna). What four? Here, a monk separate from sense-desire, separate from evil states of mind enters into, and abides in, the first jhāna … the second jhāna … the third jhāna … the fourth jhāna. The remainder of the quotation describes the four fruits of the noble path, stream entry etc., as the benefits of these four jhānas. This quotation from the Pali Canon, in a way, summarizes the argument of the whole book which is meant to defend the traditional approach. The key defender of the new method among the traditional Sri Lankan Sangha was Rerukane Candawimala Thera who, from his early formative years, had strong connections with Burma. He wrote several small books defending the Burmese method. In his ‘Critique of satipaṭṭhāna Meditation’, Rerukane Thera responded to the anthology of articles written by a group of senior monks in Sri Lanka. According to Rerukane Thera, possible reasons for the opposition to new vipassanā meditation are the following: misperceiving one’s lack of knowledge as erudition; concern that one’s own prestiges will suffer if the new method of meditation got established; concern that the number of one’s supporters will decrease; and the jealousy of the fame enjoyed by the teachers of this new meditation method. His admonition to the readers was that they should not let themselves be carried away by such critics who are motivated purely by personal concerns.

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Weligama Nanaratana Thera writing in Sinhala (‘Critique of Burmese Meditation’), takes Rerukane Thera to task. His tone is polemical and sarcastic. Nevertheless, he too has arguments adduced from discourses and commentaries in support of his anti-Mahasi stance. Nanaratana Thera’s attack is directed to the lay scholar and supporter of Mahasi method, Ariyaratna Rerukana. His immediate target, however, is Rerukane Thera’s rejoinder to the collection of articles mentioned above. Minus ad hominem arguments, this work contains a substantial discussion on the issues involved.

Sociology of the debate The arrival of vipassanā meditation in Sri Lanka in 1950’s has been studied by sociologists in relation to the phenomenon called ‘Protestant Buddhism’, a term coined by Gananath Obeyesekere to describe the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century reaction and response of Sri Lanka Buddhists to British Christianity. As in the case of Protestantism in its European context, the leading role played by lay people in the context of Buddhism in Sri Lanka has been identified as a key characteristic of the movement. It is interesting to see that lay groups showed enthusiasm for this meditation from its very introduction, and it is in fact some leading lay Buddhists who took lead to invite the meditation masters from Burma. As we saw earlier in the discussion, two then Prime Ministers of Sri Lanka, John Kotelawala and SWRD Bandaranaike, got themselves involved in inviting these meditation masters from Burma and providing local facilities for them. Subsequently, Sirima Bandaranaike, wife of the Prime Minister, herself involved in the Colombo centre of vipassanā meditation. The beginning of the movement of vipassanā meditation in Sri Lanka has been studied in detail by George Bond (1992; originally published in USA in 1988). I am not going to reproduce his findings. Richard Gombrich and Gananath Obeyesekere (1988/1990, 237-38 & 434) record the beginning of this meditation is Sri Lanka, and connect it with the ‘protestant’ characteristic of lay meditation, and also observe some interesting parallels between techniques of this meditation and those associated with the attainment of trans states found in the subculture of god-worship and being possessed by gods. Clough’s is a more recent (2012) discussion of the debate which covers some of the materials covered in the present paper which was completed in the same year. The introduction of vipassanā meditation to Sri Lanka and the lay involvement in it are almost like a text book case of the so-called Protestant

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Buddhism. This movement was basically an urban phenomenon which did not go to village. As far as the large majority of monks are concerned, it was never favoured by them. One would expect this kind of meditation to be popular among the urban Sangha represented by well-known Vajiraramaya. But it is the Vajirarama monks, whose mentor was Pelene Siri Vajiranana Nayaka Thera, known for his emphasis on traditionality and orthodoxy, who came forward against this new meditation method. Although Vajirarama monks were different from traditional monks in their English education and their exposure to new knowledge and to the new world, they were very strict in their observance of Vinaya. Bond characterizes such monks accurately as ‘neo-traditionalists’. Although they adopted new ways of doing things and new knowledge, they were essentially Theravadins who invariably went to Buddhaghosa to interpret the word of the Buddha. The monastic opposition to the new vipassanā meditation also remained an urban phenomenon, for meditation was not a key concern for the traditional Theravada monks. In addition to the Vajirarama monks, it is only handful of urban monks who took part in the debate. After almost six decades since its initial introduction, meditation still remains largely an urban lay phenomenon in Sri Lanka. Although more and more lay people and monks and nuns receive instruction in meditation from urban meditation centres, which are mostly vipassanā oriented, still the numbers are comparatively less. Still a lesser number of people go to secluded meditation centres for more intensive training. In spite of all these, still one has to admit that the numbers of the practitioners of meditation are increasing day by day. Such phenomena may not necessarily be understood in terms of Protestant Buddhism any more. We may need fresh categories to understand the new interest in meditation which may well be a part of global resurgence in vipassanā meditation.

Methodology of the debate The doctrinal debate seems to operate on two levels, namely, analysis of text and resorting to methodological considerations. Both the proponents and the opponents almost totally depend on textual evidence to establish their points of view. In this regard the practice is comparable to the method followed in the Kathāvatthu (One of the seven books of the Theravada Abhidhamma) where both sakavādi (proponent=Theravadin) and paravādi (opponent) adduce textual evidence in their support. Whereas in the Kathāvatthu the stake holders

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did not have commentaries or sub-commentaries for their support, the situation after almost two millennia is different. The participants in this debate had, in addition to the discourses, commentaries and sub-commentaries at their disposal. Being typical adherents of the Theravada tradition, they invariably would go to commentaries and sub-commentaries to interpret the text. I could not find a single instance where they would disagree with Buddhaghosa or with any other commentators for that matter. The whole debate ultimately melts down to a matter of interpreting texts. This text-dependence can be seen as a crucial characteristic in this entire debate. Although the parties involved, in particular, the Mahasi Sayadaw School, could make use of the experience as their strong point, they do not seem to give much weight to it.3 They almost totally depend on texts to support their claims. This is where and how the entire debate becomes one between two parties sharing the same methodological ground. One accuses the other for not reading the texts accurately. The opponents of the Mahasi method are not known to be great meditators. Although Soma and Kheminda Theras were known to have studied and practiced meditation in Burma, many others were not. They were typical Theravada monks with gantha-dhura (learning) as their ‘yoke’. Among the supporters of Mahasi method all seemed to have come from meditation backgrounds. But except for a few cursory remarks, they did not bring out arguments from experience. One explanation for the absence of reference to experience would be the strong prohibition against revealing any ‘attainments’ found in the Theravada monastic Vinaya. Pretending such attainments, unless one is truly self-deceived, is one of the most serious four offences resulting in losing one’s membership in the Sangha. In a tradition where even to confess that one liked to live in the forest is taken as tantamount to revealing a super-human quality, one can understand this overly cautious attitude towards referring to experience. The second aspect of the debate, methodological considerations are found very prominently in the Mahasi school, but both parties resort to methodological devices for their support. One such device is to refer to the internal logic of the teaching of the Buddha. In the following statement 3  Nyanuttara Sayadaw says on behalf of Mahasi Sayadaw: “Mahasi Sayadaw Thera writes …based on his personal experiences as well as on those of a large number of yogis, the attainments which are quite in accord with the most authoritative texts, commentaries and sub-commentaries (Myanaung 1979, 35).

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Kheminda Thera referring to “some teachers of contemplation in the present day” who deny that concentration is essential says thus: In doing so they (these present teachers) contravene the course of training laid down by the Buddha and set forth time and again in the Suttas and commentaries. But that our position may come to rest on more than appeals to ancient and perhaps antiquated authority, let us try to see the reasons behind the training course laid down by the Buddha. For the teaching of the Buddha is opanayika, it is designated to lead one onward to a specific end, the extinction of suffering or ill. There is a reason, therefore, behind every phase of the teaching, a reason for every inclusion and and every exclusion. When these are brought to light it will be seen why concentration cannot be dropped from the training, and why concentration must involve the first jhāna as a minimum. (Kheminda 1980, 5) In a similar vein, Rerukane Thera (1958/2008, 46) refers to the statement ‘amoghavacana jina’ (the Buddhas do not utter empty words’) in responding to his opponents who read the Satipaṭṭhāna-sutta passage “yathā yathā vā panassa kāyo panihito hoti tathā tathā nam pajānāti” as referring to the very same four positions mentioned prior to it. For the Mahasi tradition, the interpretation of this statement in the Satipaṭṭhāna-sutta is of crucial significance to justify paying attention to bodily movements including rising and falling of abdomen as a part of vipassanā meditation. In order to support their reading, the Mahasi tradition holds that if the statement refers to the very same four positions then it is redundant, and the Buddhas do not utter what is redundant. Kheminda Thera refers to the four great indicators (mahā-apadesa) as essential guidelines of his approach: The basic source for our position will be the word of the Buddha itself as laid down in the Sutta Piṭaka of the Pali Canon, together with those commentaries and sub-commentaries which are in accord with the Suttas. As the following passage clearly states, it is upon the Suttas that the Buddha, shortly before his parinibbāna, conferred supreme authority in respect of the Dhamma. (Kheminda 1098, xiii) It is important to note that, in this statement, Kheminda Thera specifies the commentaries and sub-commentaries “which are in accord with the Suttas”, betraying the possibility that not all commentaries and sub-commentaries are in accordance with the discourses. By confining

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himself to discourses and to commentaries and sub-commentaries that are in accordance with the discourses, Kheminda Thera effectively keeps himself away from the need to answer any and every objection based on these dubitable secondary sources. A methodologically very important division upheld in the course of this debate was that of direct (nītattha) and indirect (neyattha) meaning applicable to discourses. It is crucially important that a student of the Pali Canon should know about which applies to which discourses. In his support, Nyanuttara Sayadaw brings out this division, which is methodologically important to understand discourses accurately. Kheminda Thera goes by the usual definition of sammā-samādhi as comprising the four rūpa jhānas. In doing so he takes the discourse (i.e. the Satipaṭṭhāna-sutta) as having direct meaning. Referring to Kheminda Thera’s interpretation of the satipaṭṭhāna passage as a direct utterance Nyanuttara Sayadaw says the following: It is abundantly clear that the Maha Satipaṭṭhāna passage showing four jhāna Samadhi as Sammā Samādhi is not nītattha desanā but neyattha desanā Therefore, Kheminda Thera’s view had ever so tenaciously, that four-jhāna-samadhi along is sammā-samādhi is obviously not correct. (Satipaṭṭhāna Vipassanā, 238) Nyanuttara Thera’s claim in this regard is somewhat strange for he admits that all the other discourses referred to in the discussion are of direct meaning; the particular passage of the satipaṭṭhāna alone is of indirect meaning. The curious point is: what is the basis for his claim? He produces some commentarial support which themselves do not seem to support him. The problem in general with this interpretational device is that the instances to which this division is applicable are not clearly indicated. The very brief Sutta (A I, 60), which refers to the neyatthanītattha distinction, only introduces the two concepts and leaves us without any explanation. The commentary explains this division with reference to the anatta concept. According to the commentary, those discourses in which the Buddha refers to khandha, dhātu, āyatana etc. are with direct meaning (nīta-attha); those discourses in which the Buddha refers to substantial entities such as individuals are discourses whose meaning is indirect (neya-attha). The commentarial explanation makes perfect sense for it helps avoid the seeming contradiction of talking about individuals and beings which do not really exist. But the application of this division to interpret a single statement of the Satipaṭṭhāna-sutta seems arbitrary. Reference to this division is not

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found among the opponents of the Mahasi method. They seem to understand all relevant discourses as with direct meaning. Kheminda Thera’s claim is that all the discourses of the Buddha describing the path can be interpreted as advocating the path with three disciplines (tisso sikkhā). Nevertheless, the fact remains that there are variations in the manner the path has been presented by the Buddha. Kheminda Thera has two defenses against this. One is that the Buddha was teaching people with diverse capacities according to which he had to adopt different approaches of teaching. He says: Since the Buddha taught a great many disciples in accordance with their individual temperaments and stages of progress, it is not surprising to find that Buddhist contemplation is a subject of vast complexity. Not only is the general practice of contemplation divided into two systems, samatha and vipassanā, but each system in turn is an intricate whole comprising a variety of approaches, objects and applications. Nevertheless, the subject of Buddhist contemplation, though certainly complex, is not haphazard, but involves those elements of structure, order and pattern necessary to constitute it into just what it purports to be: the exact and unwavering path to the extinction of ill. (Kheminda 1980, xii) He further says that the aim of his effort is to uncover this pattern common to all discourses. A challenge to this effort at uncovering the pattern is the presence of discourses in which no mention of jhāna is found. According to Kheminda Thera “such passages are not to be understood, however, as a confirmation of the view that jhāna can be totally eliminated. They present not a difference in the path itself, but only in the exposition of the path, according to which the samādhi section is either presupposed or understood to be incorporated within one of the other categories of training” (Kheminda 1980, 44). In order to explain such absence Kheminda Thera uses what is known as “dear-track” method (migapadavalañjana naya4) which is a method enabling the assumption of the presence of the things in between two phenomena where only the beginning and ending phenomena are mentioned and what is in between are left unmentioned. For example, when sīla and paññā, the first and the last aspects of the path, are mentioned, one should assume 4  Listed and described in the Saddasārātthajālinī, by the 15th century Burmese author named Nagita.

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the presence of samādhi which is in the middle. The method gets its name from the following: when one sees the foot marks of a deer at the entrance point of a rock and at its departing point one is to assume that the dear must have passed through the rock even though its foot prints are not seen on the rock. Kheminda Thera explains the cases such as Bahiya (Udāna 8), Malunkyaputta (S IV, 72-76), Culapanthaka (DhpA I, 245-247), Punna and Silava (Theragāthā) in whose instructions samādhi is not mentioned clearly.

Two bones of contention The debate against the new method was centred around two main issues,5 namely, the view that vipassanā can be developed without prior completion of samādhi, and the focus on the rising falling movements of abdomen as the object of meditation. The first issue with its direct connection to the core of the path aroused much of the controversy between those who upheld the traditional view and the advocates of the new method. The second, however, was not perceived to be doctrinally very important by the opponents, although it too had far-reaching doctrinal implications. Based on this emphasis on the focus of attention, the method was ridiculed as ‘belly meditation’ (baḍa bhāvanāva - in Sinhala). But the issue itself does not seem to have aroused a serious doctrinal discussion. The remainder of this discussion will be a brief analysis of the arguments presented for and against these two positions.

Vipassanā without jhāna The main bone of the contention was the apparent by-pass of jhāna in the method of Mahasi Sayadaw. In a superficial look at the issue, it appears that Mahasi method simply by-passes the second step in the path, described as sammā-samādhi which is defined in the texts as the four fine material (rūpa) jhānas. But, what actually happens in the Mahasi method is not this. Both sides of the debate accept the commentarial 5  This does not mean that there were no other differences between the two methods. One such difference was how Mahsi Method approached the four foundations of mindfulness. The traditional approach found in the commentaries and invariably accepted by the proponents of the tradition was that the presence of four objects (body, feeling etc.) is to cater to the individual differences of the practitioners. The Papañcasūdanī, the commentary to Majjhima-nikāya, compares these four to four entrances to a city from any of which one may enter the city as one wishes to – one does not need to reflect on all four (Nanaratana (1959) defends the traditional position referring to commentaries.). But the Mahasi Sayadaw’s approach is that one reflects on any or all of these objects as occasion arises.

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classification of samādhi as constituting three stages, namely, momentary concentration (khaṇika samādhi), access concentration (upacāra samādhi) and absorption concentration (appaṇā samādhi). It is good to remember that this classification is not found in the discourses. The crux of the debate rests on the placement and the role attributed to momentary concentration by the two groups. In the sevenfold purification scheme, samādhi comes under the second, namely, purification of mind (citta-visuddhi). Commentaries describe the purification of mind as involving access and absorption concentrations, which is tantamount to attaining jhāna. The Mahasi method does not see the need to obtain jhāna in the process. This amounts to rejecting the need for purification of mind characterized by access and absorption concentration. But this is beyond acceptance by either party. Although jhāna may be ignored, one cannot ignore the need for purification of mind. In order to overcome this difficulty Mahasi methods claims that the purification of mind achieved by pure vipassanā follower (suddha vipassanā yānika) is momentary concentration (khaṇika samādhi), and it is included in the access concentration mentioned as constituting the purification of mind. Mahasi sayadaw clarifies and defends his position in the following words: But is it not said in the Commentaries that the term ‘purification of mind’ applies only to Access Concentration and Fully Absorbed Concentration? That is true; but one has to take this statement in the sense that Momentary Concentration is included in Access Concentration. For in the Commentary to the Satipaṭṭhāna-sutta it is said: “The remaining twelve exercises are subjects of meditation leading only to Access Concentration.” Now in the case of the subjects dealt with in the section of the Satipaṭṭhāna-sutta on Postures. Clear Comprehension and Elements, the concentration of one who devotes himself to these exercises will be definitely only Momentary Concentration. But as the latter is able to suppress the Hindrances just as Access Concentration does, and since it is in the neighbourhood of the Noble-path-attainment-concentration, therefore that same Momentary Concentration is spoken of by the name of ‘Access’ (or Neighbourhood), and also the meditation subjects that produce that momentary Concentration are called ‘meditation subjects leading to Access Concentration’. Hence it should be taken that Momentary Concentration, having the capacity to suppress Hindrances, and also the right to the name ‘Access’ and

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‘Purification of Mind.’ Otherwise ‘Purification of Mind’ could not come about in one who has made Bare Insight his vehicle, by employing only insight, without having produced either Access Concentration or Fully Absorbed Concentration. (Mahasi Sayadaw 1965, 5) Kheminda Thera in his very first article to appear in World Buddhism produces reasons against this identification of momentary concentration with access concentration. He shows, with reference to commentaries themselves, that momentary concentration arises “after jhāna attainment during the actual time of insight done by one who has risen from jhāna” (Myanaung 1979, 5). It is interesting to observe that both parties accept the need for concentration, and both accept the commentarial interpretation of concentration as having two phases, access and full absorption. The difference lies in accepting and not accepting the need for jhāna. For Kheminda Thera and others who go by the Suttas, samādhi or concentration mean the four fine-material jhāna, at least first of those four. For the Mahasi method the concentration needed for vipassanā does not need to be of the level of jhāna, the attainment of which may be time consuming and distractive. But these are not concerns for those who uphold the tradition. In this context Kheminda Thera refers to Pahārāda-sutta to show that the path is gradual and that “true penetration of knowledge occurs, not abruptly” (Kheminda 1980, 1: …imasmiṃ dhammavinaye anupubbasikkhā anupubbakiriyā anupubbapaṭipadā na ayatakeneva aññā paṭivedho). Furthermore, the Rathavinīta-sutta of the Majjhima-nikāya in which the Buddha makes clear how the final knowledge is attained in combination with all the seven purifications followed in succession is referred to in support of this position. In responding to Kheminda Thera, Nyanuttara Sayadaw draws our attention to the Visuddhimagga where Buddhaghosa points out that the Buddha has taught the path of purification some times by insight alone and sometimes by jhāna and understanding. Nyanuttara Sayadaw classifies these two as first category and second category respectively. He claims that there are Suttas dealing with these two approaches exclusively, and warns that one should not mix these two categories. Accordingly, he dismisses whatever the Suttas referred to By Kheminda Thera as not relevant (Myanuang 1979, 145-47). The reading of Kheminda Thera, however, seems to suggest that no such distinction can be made among the Suttas taught by the Buddha. Following the commentarial

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tradition, he seems to read all the discourses as advocating one and the same path. This trend, however, seems to have changed during the subcommentarial literature which seems to support Mahasi type of reading discourses as belonging to two categories. For example, commenting on the Visuddhimagga statement (mentioned above) that the Buddha shows the path sometimes as involving only vipassanā and some times as involving both samatha and vipassanā, the Commentary to the Visuddhimagga describes this as excluding samatha in the first category: Here it must be pointed out that the word ‘eva’ emphasizes the exclusion of samatha because samatha is the opposite number in the pair: samatha vipassanā. It is not meant to exclude virtue which is not the opposite number of vipassanā. Again, because the word ‘matta’ conveys the sense of distinction. It also emphasizes the exclusion of access and fixed concentration, which are distinctive. It does not exclude simple concentration, for no insight comes about without momentary concentration. (Myanaung 1979, 146-47) Now this position advocated by the commentary to the Visuddhimagga is exactly the same as that of Mahasi School. A distinction between two types of arahants found in the discourses themselves, namely, one who is liberated by wisdom (paññāvimutta) and one who is liberated by both aspects (ubhatobhāgavimutta) is often cited as supportive of a position which undermines the jahnic attainments in the path. In the discourses, often the arahanthood is described by the two combined terms, cetovimutti (liberation of mind) and paññāvimutti (liberation from wisdom). Some times, arahants are described simply as paññāvimutta, liberated from wisdom. The Susīma-sutta (S II, 119-128) is a familiar example of this category. It is clearly stated there that one can attain arahanthood without having supernormal powers (iddhividha), divine ear (dibba-sota), ability to know others’ mind (cetopariya ñāṇa), ability to see how people depart and reappear (cutūpapāta ñāṇa) and the peaceful formless deliverances (arūpa). The monks in question admit that they do not possess any of the above mentioned higher states but that they are freed by wisdom (paññāvimuttā mayanti). This account of the discourse does not really pose a difficulty for one who upholds the tradition for it admits only the absence of supernormal powers and the formless jhānas but not fine material jhānas. But a question arises when we go to the commentary which introduces two extra terms in order to clarify the situation of the position of these monks further, namely,

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sukkha vipassaka (practitioner of dry insight) and nijjhānaka, which could be interpreted as either ‘not having jhāna’ (ni-jhānaka) or ‘having understanding (nijjhānaka) (as in the case of ‘diṭṭhi-nijjhāna-khanti’). Mahasi Sayadaw School prefers the first meaning whereas the upholders of the tradition prefers the second. Mahasi method further holds that sukkha vipassaka is meaningless if they have attained jhānas. Although the Sutta in question clearly refers only to arūpa jhānas and not to rūpa jhānas, on the strength of the concept of dry insight worker, Mahasi method seems to interpret the episode with Susima as providing proof for the possibility of arahanthood without jhāna. The division of samathayānika (one whose vehicle is serenity) and vipassanāyānika (one whose vehicle is insight), introduced in the Visuddhimagga and commentaries, also seems to support Mahasi position. The Visuddhimagga introduces this distinction at the beginning of its discussion of purification of views, the third purification. It describes the two practitiners in the following manner: Herein purification of view is the correct seeing of mentalitymateriality. One who wants to accomplish this, if, firstly, his vehicle is serenity, should emerge from any fine-material or immaterial jhāna, except the base consisting of neither perception nor nonperception, and he should discern, according to characteristics, function etc., the jhāna factors consisting of the applied thought, etc., and the state associated with them (that is feeling, perception, and so on). But one whose vehicle is pure insight, or that same aforesaid one whose vehicle is serenity, discerns the four elements in brief or in detail in one of the various ways given in the chapter on the definition of the four elements. (Ñānamoli 1956, 679-80) This account suggests that the vipassanāyānika directly goes to discerning elements. Kheminda Thera, however, points out that this distinction was introduced only at the third purification, and takes it as indicating that both samathayānika and suddha vipassanāyānika had their citta-visuddhi characterized by the presence of the first four jhānas. The difference between the two according to Kheminda Thera is that “while the samathayānika enters and merges from jhāna to develop vipassanā, the suddhavipassanāyānika, without entering or emerging from jhāna, develops vipassanā direct” (Kheminda 1980, 30).

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Although discourses predominantly seem to lay emphasis on the standard method, a somewhat later tradition mentioned in Paṭisambhidāmagga allows four types of practice in relation to samatha and vipassanā. They are: (i) vipassanā preceded by samatha (samatha pubbaṅgama vipassanā), (ii) samatha preceded by vipassanā (vipassanā pubbaṅgama samatha), (iii) joint method of samatha and vipassanā (yuganaddhā), and (iv) method of one whose mind is distracted by phenomena (dhamma uddhacca viggahita manasā). Of this classification, the fourth seems out of place with the other three and does not betray any clear category. Nevertheless, the first three are clearer. The first category represents the standard practice accepted by the tradition. The second seems akin to what is advocated by the Mahasi Sayadaw method. The third, the joint method, can be understood as going beyond the boundaries of the first two methods. The traditional interpretation is that these categories are applicable only yo those who have completed their first two purifications, namely, purification of virtue and concentration. This is where the Mahasi Sayadaw school differs from the tradition.

Rising and falling act of abdomen In the Mahasi Sayadaw method, the practitioner is asked right away to notice or to be aware of the rising and falling movement of abdomen. In the regular satipaṭṭhāna method, the meditation begins with by being aware of inhalation and exhalation of breath. It seems that there has been some confusion about this innovation. Even some of the followers of the Mahasi method seem to have some confusion about the status of this focus of attention. Some tend to believe that this is also mindfulness of breathing with only difference in the physical focus for the movement of abdomen is connected to breathing and noticeable more vividly than the breath touching the tip of the nose. Mahasi Sayadaw in the 5th chapter of his main work, The Text on Dhamma on the Method of Vipassana Insight Meditation, justifies this choice under ‘remarks’. In this account, he does not say why he prefers rising and falling act to breathing; but justifies it on the basis of discourses. I will quote from Mahasi Sayadaw’s explanation and then summarize it: The obvious distension and act of moving at the moment of rising and falling of the abdomen being vāyodhātu – the wind element, and phoṭṭabba rūpa – the bodily feeling of touch, the right knowledge of the distension of stiffness and of the movement

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while contemplating and noting as “rising and falling”, rūpaṃ bhikkhave yoniso manasikarotha, rupaniccatamcayathabhutam samanupassatha (O monks, bear in mind the rupa with right devotion. You should also rightly contemplate the nature of the impermanence of rupa.” “Anicceyeva bhikkhave bhikkhu rupam aniccanti passati, sāssa hoti sammādiṭṭhi – O, Monks, a monk contemplates and realizes Rupa which in fact in inherent by nature impermanent, as being impermanent. This act of contemplation and realization by that monk is sammādiṭṭhi – right view. (Sam 2-4) In the subsequent discussion, he quotes from the canon to prove that the reflection of rising and falling of abdomen comes under phoṭṭabba (sensation). Then he quotes from the satipaṭṭhāna on internal and external air-element (vāyo-dhātu) and says that the acts of rising and falling of abdomen come under the reflection of element of air (dhātumanasikāra). It is further shown that this reflection comes under the truth of suffering associated with the aggregate of form associated with grasping (rūpūpadānakkhandha dukkhasacca). It is shown to be included in the reflection on the phenomena associated with noble truths (ariyasacca dhammānupassanā). Then he concludes: With these statements, it is quite evident that correct awareness of vayodhatu – the distension and movement, while noting as “rising” and “falling” (of the abdomen), falls within the ambit of the Teachings of the Lord Buddha as contained in the Pali scriptures and also falls in line with the wish of the Supreme Buddha. For this very reason, in the matter describing the manner of noting relating to Anapana in Chapter (4), it has been shown and stated as being embraced in the statement of Pali by using the expression “Yathā yathā vā panassa kāyo panihito hoti tathā tathā nam pajānāti.” (7) The traditional interpretation of this last quote from the Satipaṭṭhānasutta is that ‘kāya’ (body) here refers merely to the ‘body of in-breathing and out-breathing’ (assāsa-passāsa kāya). Mahasi School understands this term as referring to the entire human body with its various activities. Nyanaponika Thera provides more background information regarding this choice. A few explanatory words will be appropriate here concerning the ‘primary object’ (abdominal movement), introduced by

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U Sobhana Maha Thera. It may be objected that this practice is not found in the Satipatthana Sutta, nor in the texts. But it shares that circumstance with many other physical and mental processes which likewise are not expressly mentioned in the scriptures, but belong nevertheless to the all-comprehensive domain of mindfulness. Our ‘primary object’ may, however, well be included in the passage of the Discourses, saying, ‘just as his body is disposed, so he understands it’ or, alternatively, in the section of the Six Sense Bases ‘he understands the organ of touch and tactual objects’. Certainly, all objects of touch when they occur and are noticed, should be covered by the wide net of mindfulness. By an eminent monk of our days it was rightly said: ‘All conditional phenomena (saṅkhāra), bodily or mental, are legitimate objects of the insight practice. How that exercise came to be introduced together with the spirit in which it is offered by the Meditation Master, has been very aptly expressed by a lay disciple in Burma. ‘This exercise has not been “invented” by the Meditation Master, it was not arbitrarily or deliberately “devised”. It was rather so that the bodily processes concerned did not escape his attention’. (Nyanaponika 1962/2005, 118-19) Nyanaponika Thera says that this particular object of mindfulness has an added advantage, in addition to two advantages shared by breathing, namely, that both are automatic processes constantly present, and that both being movements give opportunity for numerous observations conducive to insight. The third and additional advantage in noticing rising and falling of abdomen is “that it is, and remains, rather ‘coarse’ in its impact, which is a definite advantage for observations conducive to insight: while breathing, in the advanced stages of the meditative practice, tends to become more and more subtle and hardly noticeable” (Nyanaponika 1962/2005, 119). Another difference pointed out to me by a meditation master6 is that focus on breathing can be directed to concentration which culminates in jhāna whereas noticing abdominal movement with other physical and mental movements will lead to only to vipassanā and that it cannot produce samatha. Although this explanation does not mean that mindfulness in breathing does not lead to vipassanā, it 6  Personal interview with Pemasiri Thera, the chief meditation instructor at Sri Sumatipala Meditation Centre, Kanduboda on September 8, 2010.

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hints at a very important emphasis in Mahasi method, namely, that it is a type vipassanā leading exclusively to realization that everything is ultimately impermanent, unsatisfactory and soul-less (anicca, dukkha, anatta). Refining mindfulness as one-pointed-ness of mind will lead to jhānas which can be a deviation from the direct path. Looking from this point of view we can see that the new object identified in the Mahasi system is not a simple alternative to the traditional object, but one meant deliberately to underscore the difference of approach of the two systems. According to Jack Kornfield, however, the system is no longer rigid about it. He says: Although Mahasi Sayadaw recommends the use of the rise and fall of the abdomen as a central meditation object, his teaching disciples also allow the use of the in-and-out-breath felt at the nose tip as an alternative way to practice. In this system what is essential is not which object is observed but the quality of clear, detached awareness used to see its true nature. (Kornfield 1977/1993, 52-3)

Conclusion A little more than five decades after the initial debate, today, almost all the then proponents as well as the opponents of new vipassanā method have passed away, and currently there is no on-going debate over this issue any more among the practitioners. The meditation instructors of today seem to have devised their own methods based on these past experiences. They do not seem to advocate one to the total exclusion of the other. Nyanaponika Thera voices the balanced view when he says thus: Leaving aside characters who, by nature, strongly incline to that approach of Bare Insight, there is no doubt that the method to be preferred is that in which the attainment of the Absorptions precedes the systematic practice of Insight. (Kornfield 1977/1993, 115) The advocates of the traditional method, represented by Kheminda Thera and the like, take the practice as having clear-cut stages, steps and limits. They do not wish to deviate from the methodical procedure outlined in the discourses such as Rathavinīta (Majjhima-nikāya), Sāmaññaphala (Dīgha-nikāya) etc. The commentarial tradition largely represented by Buddhaghosa is an effort at systematizing the whole practice. Where there is no apparent system seen, the commentators

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take pains to introduce one. When the path is taken as comprising three steps, virtue, concentration and understanding, the commentators assume what is lacking wherever any one aspect is missing. This method is in accordance with the methodology elaborated in the Netti (A postcanonical work prior to commentaries. considered canonical in the Burmese tradition), which is the manual of Theravada guidelines for commentators. As has been noticed by many, there are many discourses and episodes in the Tipiṭaka that do not conform to the standard ‘three training’ (tisso sikkhā) method. Well known cases such as Bāhiya Dāruciriya, Cullapanthaka, Puṇṇa, Cūla-māluṅkyaputta and Sīvaka seem to suggest that there is quite a lot of flexibility in the path. This does not need to be taken as posing a contradiction. It is clear that there is a general and standard exposition of the path. But given the Buddhist appreciation of individual differences, it is nothing strange that the path needs to be adjusted to suit specific conditions and requirements. Although the Suttas seem to take this ‘indeterminacy’ without any difficulty, the commentators are clearly embarrassed by such instances. The harmonizing and systematizing tendencies of commentators seem to have undermined the flexibility and spontaneity of the path allowed by the Master himself. Inretrospect, the debate over the new vipassanā meditation seems to have served a very important purpose as far as the practice of the path taught by the Buddha is concerned. Although the tradition has incorporated the satipaṭṭhāna method into the standard practice, there has always been some kind of uneasiness about how it fits into the total system. On the one hand, the satipaṭṭhāna practice comes under sammā-sati or right mindfulness of the eightfold path, thus making it only an aspect of the path. On the other hand, the Satipaṭṭhāna-sutta begins by saying that it contains the ‘only path’ (ekāyana magga) for the purification of beings, and concludes by saying that this practice alone suffices to attain realization in this life itself (diṭṭheva dhamme aññā). It was, at best, not clear how these two positions tally with each other (No wonder the Satipaṭṭhāna-sutta assumed a more ritualistic role in the traditional Theravada Buddhist societies!). The Mahasi Method is meant to bring out the significance of the satipaṭṭhāna as the direct practice of vipassanā which is the means to attain realization. What Mahasi Sayadaw presents is not necessarily a new path but rather highlighting of the approach to the satipaṭṭhāna method (which was already there buried in the tradition). As we saw earlier, Nyanuttara

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Sayadaw (Myanuang 145-47) is of the view that there are two approaches to the path and that there are distinctive Suttas that describe these two approaches separately, and that such Suttas need to be understood without mixing categories. His criticism of Kheminda Thera is that he fails to appreciate the two categories (The same point is put as not distinguishing between nītattha and neyattha discourses.). This method of reasoning of the Mahasi group, however, seems to beg the question: one thinks that there are two different categories of Suttas because one wishes to advance an interpretation different from what is traditional. In other words, it is not the two different groups of discourses that point out to the two different approaches but vice versa.

11. ‘Return to lower state’ (hīnāyāvattana) and ‘straying’ (vibbhamana): A Study of the Practice of Leaving Monastic Life in Theravada Tradition*

Introduction Whoever with no desire (for the household life), finds pleasure in the forest (of asceticism), though freed from the forest (yet) runs back to the very same forest. Come, behold that person! Freed, he runs back into that very bondage.1 The practice of returning to household life from the monastic life goes to the earliest stage of the beginning of the Buddhist monasticism during the time of the Buddha. In order for one to leave monastic life, it is a prerequisite that one must have entered that life. Thus the logical possibility for leaving arises with the beginning of entering itself. But when we examine the early Vinaya literature we see evidence to believe that there were a considerable number of actual instances of leaving monastic life (LML) as there were many instances of entering the Buddhist monastic life at this early stage. The present study is basically conceptual in the sense that it aims to study the nature of the phenomenon, the causes and conditions under which it occurred, and the attitude of the early Theravada tradition toward the act of LML. It is historical and sociological in the limited 1  Yo nibbanatho vanādhimutto – vanamutto vanam eva dhāvati Taṃ puggalam etha passatha – mutto bandhanam eva dhāvati (Dhp v. 344) According to the Dhammapada Commentary, this was said by the Buddha about a young man who, through faith, entered the Sangha, but later, tempted by sensual pleasures, returned to the household life. Translation adapted from Narada Thera (Narada 1993, v. 344). * An initial version of this article is to be published in forthcoming Professor P.D. Premasiri Felicitation Volume.

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sense that it studies the phenomenon during the time of the Buddha and its immediate evolution in the pre-modern sāsana. This methodological limitation is not meant to undervalue other approaches to the issue. In particular, the phenomenon, as it is practiced today, deserves a serious sociological study which I leave to people who are more competent in sociological and anthropological methods. The present study will help us understand how the attitudes toward the practice have evolved in the traditional Theravada societies in South and Southeast Asia. The sources for this study are the Sutta and the Vinaya piṭakas, the post-canonical works such as Milindapañha and the commentaries written for the three piṭakas, namely, Sutta, Vinaya and Abhidhamma.

The practice of LML (Leaving Monastic Life) Both the Dhamma and the Vinaya record instances of some members of the Sangha leaving monastic life and returning to household life. According to the early sources, those who left monastic life did so mainly for the following reasons: (1) losing heart with the practice of ‘higher life’ (brahmacariya) (2) being lured by their former partners/spouses (3) miscellaneous personal, social, and organizational reasons and (4) being dispelled by the Sangha or the preceptor as a punishment for violating disciplinary rules. Under the first category are included mainly those who lost their heart (anabhirati) with the practice of higher life for reasons such as being overwhelmed by lust for the opposite sex, or the desire to enjoy pleasures. This state of mind is not unknown in the tradition. Indriyajātaka (223) was taught by the Buddha to a bhikkhu who wished to leave monkhood owing to desire for the food provided by his former partner. Kanhadipayana-cariya of the Cariyāpiṭaka refers to a past life of the Bodhisatva who lived a dissatisfied life as a recluse (…anabhirato cariṃ ahaṃ: Cariyāpiṭaka, 332) due to his lust for pleasures. The Buddha, in no uncertain terms, states how powerful the physical attraction of women on men and that of men on women. I know of no physical appearance, … sound, … odour, … taste, … and touch which reduce a man’s mind to slavery as those of a woman do. The mind of a man is completely obsessed with woman’s physical appearance. I know of no physical appearance, … sound, … odour, … taste, … and touch which reduce a woman’s mind to slavery as those

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of a man do. The mind of a woman is completely obsessed with man’s physical appearance. (A I, 1-10) From all the accounts in the Vinaya and the Suttas and from all admonitions of the Buddha to bhikkhus and bhikkhunīs on how to guard themselves against the onslaughts of sensual desire, we can imagine that the biggest threat for the monastic life was desire for the opposite sex. One bhikkhu had sexual intercourse in dream with his former wife and became depressed and decided to leave which was prevented by being told that what happens in a dream does not involve a violation (Vin I, 39). By reading the case studies (Vinītavatthu) relevant to the first pārājikā and the first saṅghādisesa2 offences in particular, we can get a good idea about the emotional conflicts with which the early Buddhist monastic recruits struggled. Relevant to the second category, it is imaginable that not all spouses accepted the decision of their partners to leave home for monastic life without any resistance. The story of the bhikkhu named Sangamaji (Winner of war) whose former wife, having heard that he was visiting Savatthi to see the Buddha at Jetavana, brought their child and left it saying “this is your son; nourish him” highlights the influence exercised by former partners on those who renounced household life3 (Ud 5-6). In another instance, a bhikkhu was the victim of a sexual act committed on him by his former wife when he was visiting her (Vin I, 40). In the Ratthapala story, to be mentioned below, we are told that his wife, on hearing that he was visiting his former house, got ready to welcome him in a manner which she knew was most attractive to him. Although the instances mentioned did not end in LML, it is imaginable that there may have been many who could not resist the temptation. The state of mind of those who were tormented by their own desire for pleasures or by the influence exercised upon them by their former partners is called ‘anabhirati’ (dissatisfaction). The Vinaya bears evidence to the fact that a good number of bhikkhus and bhikkhunīs suffered from this state of mind. Usually anabhirati was followed by LML (Anabhiratti ukkanthito gihibhāvam patthayamanti attho: discontent 2  Pārājika (‘defeat’) offences constitute the most serious violations in the Buddhist monastic Vinaya. Sanghādisesa offences come next. The first of the four pārājika violations for the bhikkhus and eight for bhikkhunīs committing which one ceases to be a bhikkhu or a bhikkhunī is sexual intercourse (methuna dhamma). Sanghādisesa too contain violations of sexual nature. 3  The story says that the bhikkhu was not moved by this act.

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means dissatisfied, longing for the state of householder: S I, 217). In the section of the Vinaya detailing the duties of teacher and pupil (acariyaantevāsika) and preceptor and co-resident or attendant (upajjhāyasaddhivihārika), it is mentioned that if anabhirati was arisen in the student or in the attendant it is the duty of the teacher or the preceptor to dispel it, and the reverse holds true if such an anabhirati was arisen in the teacher or in the preceptor. The frequent reference to anabhirati should not mean that every case of anabhirati ended in hīnāyāvattana or vibbhamana.4 But it shows the uncertainties associated with the life of renunciation, and at least some of such instances would have ended in LML. In addition to the instances associated mainly with the first pārajika (‘defeat’) offence there are many instances in the Vinaya where vibbhamana has been given as a possibility. Such cases constitute the third category under discussion. The following discussion is not meant to be comprehensive at all. We will refer only to a few representative cases. For instance, we have the case of Sona who contemplated LML for he could not achieve his soteriological goal in spite of his hard practice (Vin I, 181-183). In the context of the Vinaya rule for bhikkhunīs on observing rainy retreat, namely, ‘that a bhikkhunī should not observe rainy retreat in an abode where there are not bhikkhus’, it is stated that if the bhikkhus have ‘strayed’ there is no offence for the bhikkhunī who observes the rainy season by herself (Vin IV, 313). In the rule for bhikkhunīs relevant to travelling in the forest, it is stated that she has to travel in the forest accompanied by another bhikkhunī. If, however, one bhikkhunī ‘strays’ the other bhikkhunī may continue all by herself and is not guilty of traveling alone (Vin IV, 230). Vibbhamana usually appears in the lists of possible conditions pertinent to many Vinaya rules. For instance, discussing the act of conveying through a messenger someone else’s purity (parisuddhi) or consent (chanda) for the uposatha function,5 Vinaya I lists vibbhamana of one who has been assigned to convey purity or consent among other reasons such as moving from the Sangha (pakkamati), passing away (kālam karoti) etc. as an instance of 4  ‘Vibbhamana’ is the noun form of the verb form ‘vibbhamati’. The verb form and various derivatives occur in the Canon but not the noun form. 5 6. This refers to the bi-monthly act of reciting the code of Vinaya rules by a community of Sangha. If any member of the community is unable to take part in the act due to illness or any other valid reason he must convey his purity or consent through another bhikkhu who functions as his messenger. Vin I, 120 ff for details of the complex procedure.

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the failure of the act (Vin I, 121). It is stated that probation (nissaya) given by the preceptor becomes ‘dissolved’, among other reasons, if the preceptor ‘strays’ (upajjhāyo pakkanto vā hoti vibbhanto …: Vin V, 129). There are many similar instances in which vibbhamana is given as a possibility, not directly indicating that the actual LML took place. Nevertheless, it is possible that at least in some of these cases vibbhamana actually took place. From the Vinaya we can gather that there were two methods followed by those who left the monastic life (Vin III, 24-28). One was to ‘reject the training or dissociate oneself from the monastic training and reveal the inability or admitting one’s inability to abide by the rules (sikkham paccakkhāya dubbalyam avikatvā) and leave. Here the crucial point is to express the rejection of the training in clear terms to a bhikkhu or to a bhikkhunī who has received higher admission or to anyone in normal state of mind who understands what is said. Mere admitting one’s inability will not fulfill this condition. The important thing is that one who has left the Sangha by rejecting the training on the ground of his inability to observe the rules may be allowed to return at a later stage and receive higher admission again. But a person who has simply revealed his inability will not be eligible to receive this favour for he is liable to be guilty of a pārājikā offence. One does not cease to be bhikkhu or a bhikkhunī by mere act of revealing the inability. The rationale here is that when a bhikkhu or a bhikkhunī rejects the training, he or she is not a bhikkhu or a bhikkhunī any longer, and even if such a person were to commit any act coming under the category of pārājikā he or she will not be guilty of pārājikā for the simple reason that, being not a bhikkhu or a bhikkhunī, that person is not within the purview of the monastic Vinaya.6 Anyone who does not do either (i.e. sikkham paccakkhāya dubbalyam anāvikatvā: having not rejected the training and having not revealed inability) and commits a pārājikā offence will not be eligible to return. The possibility of returning is open only for the bhikkhus. It is stated that a bhikkhunī will not be eligible to return even if she were to reject the training and leave the Sangha. A bhikkhunī, once left the Sangha, is ever left. Na bhikkhave bhikkhuṇiyā sikkhāpaccakkhānaṃ: yad eva 6  Although there are no records to the otherwise, this rule appears to be liable for misuse for, technically, one can leave monkhood any number of times having fulfilled the two conditions and return safely.

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sā vibbhantā, tad eva sā abhikkhunīti: Bhikkhus, there is no rejection of training for a bhikkhunī: once she strayed she is no longer a bhikkhunī: (Vin II, 279) The forth category includes those who were forced to leave owing to their violation of Vinaya rules. The forcible removal from the Sangha or ‘defrocking’ is described as ‘linga-nāsanā’ or destroying the mark (of being a monastic member). This punishment is specifically mentioned regarding male novices (sāmaṇera) who got involved in a rape case. The Buddha approved ‘nāsanā’ for a sāmaṇera named Kantaka who raped a bhikkhunī (Vin I, 85). It is interesting that the particular punishment has not been mentioned with regard to bhikkhus or bhikkhunīs with ‘higher admission’ (upasampadā). When a member of the Sangha with higher admission is guilty of defeat offence, he or she automatically loses one’s monkhood or nunhood. Such a person loses his or her right to represent the Sangha order. For such a person who automatically loses his monkhood (or nunhood for a nun) there is no any particular disciplinary procedure to be followed for the simple reason that the Vinaya law cannot be applied to anyone other than a current member of the Sangha. On this matter, Jotiya Dhirasekera has to say the following: The code of the Pātimokkha itself, in its details of disciplinary procedure, recommends certain forms of penalties for the categories of major offences. The parajika, being the gravest of the monastic offences, admits of no remedies or atonements. The penalty for parajika offences being complete ex-communication and loss of monastic status, it is spontaneously brought about by the commission of the crime. Thus, the disciplinary action on the parajika offences requires no details of procedure. The Sangha has only to take note of the fact that the offender is no more one of their fold and that they have no dealings with him. (Dhirasekera 1982, 109) Even though the offender is no longer a member of the Sangha, there is still the possibility that the guilty person may not leave the Sangha voluntarily. If the person leaves voluntarily he must leave removing his monastic robes and wearing household cloths. If the person would not leave the Sangha voluntarily then there is a need to remove that person’s monastic robes by others and make him (who is already a household (gihī) person) a household person. The section on case studies (vinītavatthu) of the Pārājika-pāḷi records many instances where the Buddha determines that the particular wrong-doer is guilty of defeat (Vin III, 56, 57, 58,

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59, 60 …). But neither the Vinaya text nor its commentary gives an indication as to what followed such pronouncements by the Buddha. We have to assume that upon such pronouncements the guilty persons left the Sangha voluntarily. This is confirmed by the fact that we do not have any instance of one refusing to accept the verdict of the Buddha. If all the case studies are to be taken as reports of actual violations, we have to believe that there were a good number of cases of vibbhamana. It is perhaps possible that what these case studies report are not all actual instances of commission of the offence, but only the possible instances in which case the actual act of LML did not happen. Before concluding this part of the discussion we must also refer to a category of disciples identified by the Buddha as in principle incapable of return to lower state (ababbho hīnāyavattituṃ). The clansman Yasa who was one of the early entrants to the sāsana, listening to what the Buddha taught to his father, became an arahant even before he was admitted to the Sangha. Referring to him who was still a householder the Buddha declared that ‘it is impossible for Yasa to return to lower state of being a householder and enjoy pleasures as he was before’ (Ababbho kho yaso kulaputto hīnāyavattitvā kāme paribhuñjituṃ seyyathāpi pubbe agārikabhūto: Vin I, 17). This shows that an arahant whose mind has been liberated from defilements is incapable of return to lower state whether or not he or she was a bhikkhu or bhikkhunī formally admitted to the Sangha.

‘Destroying the mark’ (liṅga-nāsanā) The procedure followed in removing an offender from the sāsana has been described by the simple word ‘nāsanā’ which Dhirasekera translates as ‘destruction or extermination’ (Dhirasekara 1982, 109). This can be done either by oneself or by someone else (Nāsitā nāma sayaṃ vā vibbhantā hoti, aññehi vā nāsitā: Vin IV, 217). The commentary to the Vinaya lists three types of nāsanā: samvāsa-nāsanā, liṅga-nāsanā and danḍakamma-nāsanā (VinA IV, 870). The first is to suspend temporarily one’s association with the Sangha; the second is to remove one from the Sangha by ‘destroying’ his/her monastic ‘mark’, and the third is to prohibit one from referring to the Buddha (as his teacher). The Buddha is seen using the same term (nāsanā) in discussing with horse trainer Kesi the methods of disciplining his followers. In this discussion, the latter says to the Buddha that he would use either soft or harsh methods or both in disciplining horses. On being asked as to what he would do to those horses that are not amenable to any of those

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methods, the horse trainer responds saying that he will kill them. In his turn, the Buddha admits using the very same methods in disciplining his followers, and on being asked as to what he would do to those who are not amenable to any of those methods the Buddha gives the same answer, and explains what he meant by ‘killing’. …When a person to be tamed won’t submit to discipline by the gentle method, the stern method, or the method that is both gentle and stern, then the Tathāgata thinks he should not be spoken to and instructed, and his wise fellow monks, too, think he should not be spoken to and instructed. For this, Kesi, is ‘killing’ in the Noble One’s discipline … (Bodhi 2012, 493) What is referred to here is nāsanā from the point of view of discourses (suttanta naya) which cannot be considered a punishment in a strictly Vinaya sense. This ‘destruction’ is to discontinue communication by the Sangha with the particular person. In such an eventuality the offender will have either to reform him/herself or to leave the Sangha with no third alternative. In the Vinaya, it appears that the concept of nāsanā was basically used to refer to ‘the destruction of the mark’ (liṅga-nāsanā).

Early Buddhist attitude to LML It appears that the early Buddhist attitude to LML is negative. This can be established with reference to both etymological analysis of the terms used to refer to the phenomenon and the internal evidence of the Canon. The terms frequently used in the Sutta and the Vinaya texts to refer to LML are hīnāyavattati and vibbhamati.7 Hīnāya+āvattati, one reverts to lower state, ā-vattati with prefix ‘ā’ have the sense of coming back to former state, which is low (hīna). The commentary to the Vinaya defines hīnāyavattana as ‘to return to householderness which is low, giving up the mark of the renouncer which is the sublime flag of the noble (ariya-dhaja) (Hīnāyavattitthati … uttamam ariyadhajam pabbajitaliṅgaṃ pahāya hīnāya gihībhāvāya āvattitvā: VinA I, 211). Bhamana (bhamati) with its basic meaning of going around or going round assumes a negative meaning with prefix ‘vi’ and means going astray, getting confused or losing one’s sense. According to the 7  There is another term ‘uppabbajati’ (ud+pabbajati) deriving from ‘pabbajati’ and ‘uppajjapeti’ from its causative form ‘pabbajeti’ to refer to the act of leaving or making someone to leave the monastic life. But, according to the references given in the PTS dictionary this term is found only in the Jātaka and commentaries. To my knowledge this term, with its neutral meaning, is not found in the Vinaya or in the discourses.

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commentary this is to become a householder (Vibbhamantīti ekacce gihī honti: VinA III, 625). The term without a negative sense is ‘gihibhāvam… which, however, is used less frequently in the canon. Of the two terms, vibbhamati is predominantly used in the Vinaya whereas hīnāyavattati is more used in the discourses although neither term is exclusive either to the Vinaya or to the Suttas. The two terms clearly betray a negative sense toward the phenomenon although ‘vibbhamati’ usually used in the Vinaya, in which matters are treated in technical and ‘legal’ manner, is less negative. Apart from these widely used terms, even a cursory look at the Pali Canon makes it clear that the attitude held by the early Buddhist monastic tradition toward household life in general and the attitude toward LML is negative. The wide-spread negative attitude toward LML is always associated with the positiveness attributed to the life of renunciation. Therefore, the phenomenon has to be understood in the soteriological context of the early Buddhist tradition. Viewed from this perspective, the first thing that is evident in the early literature is that Buddhism attributes a much greater significance to the monastic life viz-a-viz household life. This attitude becomes amply clear in statements such as: Sambādho’yaṃ gharāvāso – rajassāyatanaṃ iti Abbhokāso ca pabbajjā – iti disvāna pabbaji (Sn v. 408) He went forth seeing thus: ‘this household life is a hindrance, it is the domain of the dust (of defilement) and the going forth is the open air. (Jayawickrama 2001, 159) This high assessment of the monastic life and the relative low assessment of household life come from the value placed on the goal of attaining the ultimate release from suffering. Ratthapala, a young and wealthy householder, having listen to the Dhamma taught by the Buddha makes up his mind to leave behind his household life and join the Sangha, In justifying his decision Ratthapala says thus to the Buddha: Venerable sir, as I understand the Dhamma taught by the Blessed One, it is not easy while living in a home to lead the holy life, utterly perfect and pure as a polished shell. Venerable sir, I wish to shave off my hair and beard, put on the yellow robe, and go forth from the home life into homelessness. I would receive the going forth under the Blessed One, I would receive the full

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admission. (Bodhi 1995/2001, 678)8 As in the Ratthapala’s case, entering the sāsana can be a major decision in one’s life which could have considerable effect on others who are closely linked to the life of the renouncer. Consequently, the monastic life in the Buddhist tradition was meant to be a life-long pursuit. We do not hear of anything resembling the currently established tradition of temporary renunciation as practiced in some Southeast Asian Buddhist societies. The following statement attributed to King of Kosala refers to other religious traditions in which people practiced for a limited period and praises the monastic disciples of the Buddha for practicing life-long vows. Now, venerable sir, I see some recluses and Brahmins leading a limited holy life for ten years, twenty years, thirty years, or forty years, and then on a later occasion I see them well groomed and well anointed, with trimmed hair and beards, enjoying themselves provided and endowed with the five cords of sensual pleasure. But here I see bhikkhus leading the perfect and pure holy life as long as life and breath last. Indeed I do not see any other holy life elsewhere as perfect and pure as this. (Bodhi 1995/2001, 729-730) It is due to this very same emphasis that losing monastic life was considered a disaster. In the Buddha’s own words, to revert to lower state having given up training is death in the noble discipline (Maraṇaṃ hetaṃ bhikkhave ariyassa vinaye yo sikkhaṃ paccakkhāya hīnāyavattati: S II, 271). According to bhikkhunī Siha ‘it is better to hang herself than return to lay life (Varaṃ me idha ubbandhaṃ yañ ca hīnaṃ pun’ ācare: Thig 131).’ Sappadasa Thera asserted the same sentiment when he said: I would rather commit suicide; what is the meaning of my life if I were to die having given up the training? (Satthaṃ vā āharissāmi – ko attho jīvitena me – kathaṃ hi sikkhaṃ paccakkhaṃ – kālaṃ kubbetha mādiso: Theg 44). The soteriological goal was considered so high that leaving monastic life without achieving the goal was considered a serious down fall. How this attitude became established in the subsequent Theravada becomes clear in the Milindapañha which belongs to a post-canonical and pre-commentarial period.

8  The same sentiment is found expressed in the (Vin I, 181) by Sona, another similar entrant to the sāsana.

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The Milindapañha discussion One of the early discussions on the phenomenon of LML occurs in the Milindapañha (MLP), a post-canonical and pre-commentarial work. The discussion is important mainly for the reason that it features the attitude and the view that has become typical in the subsequent Theravada tradition. The discussion starts with the following question from King Milinda to Nagasena Thera: Nagasena Thera, this doctrine of the Tathāgatas is mighty, essentially true, precious, excellent, noble, peerless, pure and stainless, clear and faultless. It is not right to admit a layman who is merely a disciple into the Order. He should be instructed as a layman still, till he have attained to the Fruit of the First Path, and then be admitted. And why is this? When these men, still being evil, have been admitted into a religion so pure, they give it up, and return again to the lower state, and by their backsliding the people is led to think: “vain must be this religion of the Samana Gotama, which these men have given up.” That is the reason for what I say. In this question, the assumption is that men leave the sāsana because they are evil in their nature. Why their act becomes objectionable is because they bring disrepute to the sāsana of the Buddha, and people blame the sāsana. The king’s suggestion by way of remedy is that none other than those who have attained first fruit of the path should be admitted to the sāsana. Nagasena Thera responds first to the king’s assertion that people blame the sāsana for the misdeed of the ‘evil’ people. In order to establish that sāsana is not to be blamed he refers to three comparable situations: (i) There is a bathing water tank full of water. A person with a dirty and dusty body even having come to the tank, would not wash himself and become clean. (ii) There is a skilled physician capable of curing any disease. A person afflicted with illness will not allow the physician to cure him. (iii) There is a place with abundance of food. But a starving man would not enjoy that food and satisfy his hunger. In all three instances people will blame only those people concerned and not the bathing water tank, physician or the food. The Thera says, in like manner, even though the evil persons were to leave the sāsana, the fault is not in the sāsana but in those people who refused to be benefitted by the teaching of the Buddha.

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Secondly, Nagasena Thera responds to the king’s suggestion that only those who have attained the first fruit of the Path should be admitted to the Sangha. If the Buddha admitted only those who are stream winners “then would renunciation of the world no longer indeed be said to avail for the putting away of evil qualities, for purification of heart, then would there be no longer any use in renunciation.” This is comparable, Nagasena Thera says, to the following: (i) One excavates a bathing tank with great labour of hundreds of people, but prohibits people with dirty bodies from using it and allows only those with clean bodies to use it. (ii) One produces a great medicine which can cure any disease, but prohibits all who are afflicted with that illness from using it and allows only those who are healthy to use it. (iii) One prepares a large heap of delicious milk rice, but prohibits any hungry person from partaking of it, but allows only those who are well fed to partake of it. The point of Nagasena is that the sāsana will be useless and redundant if it allows only those who are already pure to be admitted. Thirdly, Nagasena Thera says to the king that there are some unintended advantages (“manifest thereby five immeasurably good qualities in the religion of the Conquerors”) for the sāsana when some return to the lower state. These good qualities are the following: (i) They show how glorious is the state of the sāsana; (ii) They show how purified it is from every stain; (iii) They show how impossible it is for the sinful to dwell within it together with the good; (iv) They show how difficult is to realize its glory; (v) They show how many are the restraints to be observed within it. Each good quality is further elaborated with a simile: (i) A weak person will never be able to hold the responsibility of being a ruler of a great kingdom; likewise the sāsana is so great that a weak person will never be able to stand the greatness of it. (ii) The sāsana is pure like a petal of a lotus which will never retain water fallen upon it. (iii) As the great ocean will never retain a dead body within it but evict it in no time a “sinful, foolish, with their zeal evaporated, distressed, impure and bad” person will never be able to be in the company of the great beings such as arahants. (iv) “As archers who are clumsy, untrained, ignorant and bereft of skill are incapable of high feats of archery … just so a “foolish, stupid, imbecile, dull, slow-minded” person will never be able to realize the subtle doctrine of the four noble truths showing thereby their weakness. (v) As a coward will run away from the battle field, a “wicked, unrestrained, shameless, foolish, full of ill-will, fickle, unsteady, mean

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and stupid” person will return to lower state not being able to observe the precepts. The final defence of Nagasena Thera is to admit that there can be some negative aspects in the sāsana which are trivial in comparison to its vast goodness. Illustrating his point Nagasena Thera shows how a double jasmine shrub with fragrant flowers could still have a few bad flowers which are negligible in comparison to the large number of good flowers. In like manner, he further shows how good rice field can have a few weeds, how a wish-conferring refined gem can have some rough space, and how a fragrant tree of red sandalwood can have some rotten places, and points out that sāsana too may have undesirable elements which are negligible in comparison. With this the MLP discussion comes to an end and the discussion makes it quite clear that those who leave the sāsana are “foolish, stupid, imbecile, dull, slow-minded.” Also they are “sinful, with their zeal evaporated, distressed, impure and bad.” Although the Pali Canon too is not at all positive about the phenomenon, it does not betray its negative attitude in such extreme terms as these. The unequivocal disagreement with and disapproval of the act of ‘return to lower state’ is clearly established in MLP. There may have been reasons as to why the author of MLP thinks that this is a worthwhile theme to discuss. But we will not inquire into these possible reasons at this juncture for it is beyond the task of the present study. What is important is the attitude it holds toward the phenomenon which is the reaffirmation of the early standpoint with much vigour.

The Buddhist attitude to household life It is clear that the early Buddhist attitude to LML is negative. The reason goes to the soteriological goal advocated in the teaching of the Buddha, and its diagnosis of the human problem of suffering as caused by ‘thirst’ (taṇhā) mainly for the sensual pleasures dominated by sexual desire. Accordingly the household life was considered ‘the domain of the dust (of defilements)’, and leaving monastic life to return to such household life was totally against the Buddhist rationality. Whether or not this negative attitude represents the Buddhist attitude to household life as a whole deserves to be examined. As scholars who have studied this aspect of Buddhism have noticed (Wijayaratne 1990, 173-178), the renouncer’s life is preferred to the householder’s life. Of the two types of happiness, that of householder and renouncer (gihi-

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sukha, pabbajita-sukha), the happiness of the latter is greater. It is the same with happiness associated with and not associated with material wealth (sāmisa-sukha, nirāmisa-sukha) (A II, 64-65; Bodhi 2012, 170). This position, however, cannot be portrayed as the Buddhist attitude to household life for the Buddha has accepted male and female household followers (upāsaka and upāsikā) as constituting the ‘the Buddhist community (catu-parisa - four groups of the sāsana) who tread path with mutual support. As a well-known statement in the Sutta-nipata articulates, the householder, like a peacock, is colourful but slow, and the renouncer, like a sawn, is simple but fast. Sikhī yathā nīlagīvo vihaṅgamo haṃsassa nopeti javaṃ kudācanaṃ Evaṃ gihī’nānukaroti bhikkhuno munino vivatthassa vanamhi jhāyato ti (Sn v. 221) But both tread the same path with different speeds. While householders go in a roundabout way performing meritorious deeds, raising their families and doing duties to different social groups renouncer’s go in a direct way. However, the life of a renouncer is impossible without a supportive group of householders. The well-known discourses such as Sigālovāda (Walshe 1987/1995, 461-469), Vyagghapajja (A 8:54; Bodhi 2012, 1194-1197) and numerous other discourses contain what the Buddha taught for the welfare and happiness of the householders. The ‘pleasure-enjoying’ household life is accepted in Buddhism. What is rejected for the household life is not necessarily kāma but kāmasukhallikānuyoga – excessive addiction to pleasures. The details are too well-known to be discussed here in detail. The conclusion is that the negative attitude of early Buddhism toward LML is a result of its overall soteriological emphasis which is not a negative appraisal of the life lived by its householder followers.

Concluding remarks It is interesting to observe that the Sri Lanka Theravada Buddhist society still retains this early Buddhist attitude to LML, and consequently view the phenomenon with some sense of disapproval. As an extension of this attitude, the idea of ‘temporary ordination’ is new to Sri Lanak society. Contrary to this attitude the Southeast Asian Theravada tradition in countries such as Myanmar and Thailand views LML in a positive manner, and practice temporary ordination for variety of reasons such as receiving the monastic experience, transferring merits to departed parents etc. and strengthening one’s inner faculties. It appears that while

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the Southeast Asian Buddhist societies recognize a person for what he gained by being a bhikkhu, the South Asian Sri Lanka society despises a person for what he lost by not being a bhikkhu.

12. Donation of Children and Wives and Related Matters in the Theravada Buddhist Ethics*

Introduction The Vessantara-jātaka is very popular in the Theravada Buddhist countries mainly for the last part of the story detailing how Prince Vessantara donated his two children and wife to some strangers as a part of the fulfillment of the perfection of generosity (dāna-pāramitā). As Cone and Gombrich rightly describe, it ‘is the most famous story in the Buddhist world’ (Cone & Gombrich 1977, xv). Pious Buddhists, particularly, womenfolk, listen to this part of the story deeply moved and usually shedding tears. It does not seem that the sympathy for the two children and the lady is not translated into a hatred to the donor king. These religiously motivated good people do not question the act but tacitly rationalize that becoming a Buddha requires such unimaginable acts of sacrifice. As the history bears evidence, the acts of the King Vessantara have not gone totally unquestioned either; the questions raised by King Milinda are a case in point. Looking from a modern point of view of human rights there is no question that the act is unacceptable. Not only it is unacceptable but also punishable, both the donor and the recipient are subject to be punished, under the laws prevailing in any modern state. This means that a Bodhisatva will not find it easy to fulfill this aspect of dāna within the present-day conceptual universe, although this does not mean that a sacrifice of the highest degree, in a manner as humane as possible, is not unimaginable. * An initial version of this article was published in The Mahachulalankararajavidyalaya University Journal of Buddhist Studies (MJBS) Vol. I. Thailand. 20072008.

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The present paper is an effort to meet this difficult point in Theravada Buddhist ethics and try to understand how those who shared in this conceptual framework understood and justified such acts of generosity. There is a larger problem of ethics looming behind this whole issue. I do not take it for granted that the modern ethical standards informed by the concept of individual rights and individualism are final. But, on the other hand, it has become almost an essential aspect of religious morality today as testified by the repeated expressions of allegiance by all the major religious groups to the conventions of human rights and rights deriving from them, such as children’s rights and women’s rights.1 There is also a considerable literature dealing with the validity of human rights from a Buddhist perspective.2 In such a situation, it is necessary that we look at this obvious ‘violation of human rights’ of the two children and the wife donated by the king, and at least make an effort to understand the conceptual universe within which this kind of act was deemed not only possible but also acceptable.

The Practice and its problems While dāna is counted as the first of the ten pāramitās as described in the Theravada Pali literature, donation of one’s children and wife has been considered an essential aspect of the perfection of dāna. Usually each pāramitā is divided into three aspects in ascending order, namely, pārami (perfection), upa-pāramī (sub-perfection) and paramattha-pāramī (perfection in the highest sense). The commentary to the Cariyapiṭaka (Cariyapiṭaka-aṭṭhakathā = CpA) gives various possible meanings to these aspects. Of those meanings, what is relevant for the present context, however, is the following: giving instruments (“upakaraṇa”) 1  For an account of how all the major religions have approved the human rights conventions, each on its own religious grounds, see: Kuhn and Kuschel, 1993. Convention on the Elimination of All forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), adopted in 1981, and Convention on the Rights of the Child (CDC), adopted in 1990, are derivative from basic Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), in particular, from its Article 2 (“Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status. Furthermore, no distinction shall be made on the basis of the political, jurisdictional, or international status of the country or territory to which a person belongs, whether it be independent, trust, non-self-governing or under any other limitation of sovereignty”) and Article 4 (“No one shall be held in slavery or servitude; slavery and the slave trade shall be prohibited in all their forms’). 2  See for detailed discussions on Buddhism and human rights: Perera, L.P.N. (1988) and (1991) Keown (1995).

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such as children, wives, wealth etc. is the perfection of dāna; giving one’s limbs is sub-perfection; giving one’s life is the perfection in the highest sense (CpA 321). It is curious to note that in this account, children, wives and wealth and many other things not specifically mentioned are put together as ‘instruments’ (upakaraṇa). This gives us an impression on how children and wives were considered as man’s ‘instruments’. In discussing the proper procedure of practicing dāna, CpA describes how the Bodhisatva would act when it comes to giving ‘children, wife, slaves and workers’ (putta-dāra-dāsa-kammakāraporise). According to this account the Bodhisatva will not give the abovementioned people if they are unhappy, or without letting them know well that they will be given; he will give them only if they are happy; nor will he give them knowingly to demons, raksasas, or pisācas or even to human beings whose behaviour is gross (CpA 304). In commenting on Vessanatara’s act of giving his children and wife away CpA quotes two stanzas from Jātaka and adds the following explanation which I have reproduced fully in translation. Due to the reason of enlightenment itself, I did not think when I gave up Jaliya, Kanhajina, the daughter, and faithful Maddi. Two children are not worthy of hate by me; nor is Queen Maddi; rather omniscience is dear to me; hence I gave (them). Here “I did not think when I gave up” means: ‘In giving up I did not think by way of grief; but being detached I gave them up’. In this context, some said (the following): Why does the Great Being gives away as slaves his wife and children, born into high warrior caste? Is it not the case that making non-slaves those who are slaves alone is good virtue? This has to be understood as in conformity with what is right (Dhamma). This act of giving, without any remainder, everything that is possessed by one as one’s own property is in conformity with the virtues causing Buddha-hood. It is in conformity with the ancient tradition that there is nothing possessed as mine that cannot be given away to one who asks for, by a Bodhisatva, who is intent on practicing the perfection of generosity without any discrimination of things to be given or the recipient. This is a practice followed and well followed by all the Bodhisatvas, it is their family lineage and family tradition, namely, the giving up of everything. Among such things giving up of the

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most beloved things is very special. There are no Bodhisatvas who have attained the Buddha-hood by not making the Five Great Sacrifices, namely, giving up wealth such as the glory of hereditary kingship, giving up of one’s limbs such head, eye etc., giving up of one’s life which is beloved, giving up of beloved sons who continue the family lineage, and giving up of beloved wife whose behaviour is agreeable. Accordingly, when the Buddha called Mangala, in the third birth before his enlightenment, was practicing virtues causing Buddha-hood and was living in a mountain along with his family, a demon named ‘rough-teeth’, knowing the intention of giving up of the Bodhisatva, came in the guise of a Brahmin and asked for the two children. Being happy at the thought “I will give my children to the Brahmin”, gave them away moving the Great Earth as far as water (upon which it is situated). The Demon, standing supported by the plank for hanging at the end of space for walking meditation, ate the children, before the Bodhisatva’s own eyes, as if he was eating a bunch of lotuses. On seeing the mouth of the Demon with streams of blood flowing, like the flames of fire, the Bodhisatva did not give way to the thought that he was deceived by the Demon; owing to the following, namely, that he had well practiced skill-in-means; that there was no lack of re-linking of the past phenomena; and that he had well polished his mind with impermanence etc. of constructed phenomena; and he thought: “with this bundle of constructed phenomena which is short-lived, fragile, and lacking in substance I could achieve my Perfection of Generosity, this happened having provided me with a great benefit” and became only happy. Seeing the behaviour of his own mind, which is not common to that of anyone else, he made the following wish: “on account of this occurrence, let rays emanate in the same manner from (my) body”. Owing to this wish, when he attained the Buddha-hood, the rays of his body pervaded the system of Ten Thousand Worlds. (CpA, 95-97) This account of the Commentator, which I have quoted, is important for the present study in several respects. It basically justifies the act on pragmatic and utilitarian grounds: These grounds are articulated as instances of ‘skill-in means’ (upāya-kosalla). On the one hand, the result

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is so great and sublime that it necessitates the actions of this nature be justified in view of greater happiness produced. In the subsequent discussion (which I have not translated) the author gives the analogy of a man put to jail by the king would substitute his son or a relative for him, and get released, and collects necessary funds, and later buys freedom for one imprisoned on behalf of him and also makes his own life and others’ lives happy. The commentarial discussion shows, with frequent reference to the concept of skill-in means, that the Theravada Buddhist tradition has resorted heavily to this concept, which seems to have initially articulated and made use of by Mahayana tradition. While the practice of skill-in-means is suggestive of non-absolute character of Buddhist ethics, which is good, it could very easily lead to justifying means, however questionable, on the basis of the end result.3 The incident regarding the practice of donation of children by former Mangala Bodhisatva suggests that the act took place without proper knowledge on the part of giver, which, as a result, was disastrous. The subsequent rationalization of the Bodhisatva that children are mere constructions (saṅkāra) which do not have a lasting value, is only capable by a such person and defies ordinary comprehension. As we saw in the CpA account, the Bodhisatva would not give knowingly his children or wife or anyone else to a demon or any unsuitable recipient. But the Mangala-Bodhisatva’s story suggests that very unfortunate accidents can happen. However, this has not been considered as a reason for not to practice this form of dāna. Vessantara’s own manner of giving his children was not in accordance with the preconditions CpA stipulate.4 In particular it violates the requirement that a Bodhisatva cannot give away unwilling parties, which, King Milinda would highlight in his question to Nagasena as we will shortly see. CpA, being obviously belonging to a later period than Jātaka and its commentary,5 seems to introduce certain principles to the practice 3  Read Upāyakausalya-sutra for both a detailed treatment of the concept and its practice and some problematic cases. 4  CpA itself refers, as we have already seen, to the practice of selling or mortgaging children for monetary purposes. In the later Buddhist history, we encounter incidents praising parents who sold or mortgaged their children in order to give dāna to the Sangha. In his study of the Rasavāhinī, a work in Pali language containing stories originating from India and Sri Lanka, Endo discusses an incident in Sri Lanka in which the parents sell their son in slavery in order to give dāna to the Sangha (Endo 1989, 165). 5  See the introduction to CpA by D.L. Barua.

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of donating children and wives. This can be considered as a result of an awareness to the difficulties encountered subsequently. The Milindapañha dialogue itself may be considered as a case in point. But the manner of giving the children by Vessantara, as described both in the Jātaka and the CpA itself, is not in conformity with the conditions the latter source articulates. There is another interesting manner in which the tradition has tried to deal with this difficult practice. This comes in the Tham Vessantara Jātaka (TVJ),6 which belongs to the South East Asian (Burmese) Buddhist tradition. The particular version which is a popular narrative in the dialect of the Tai-Khun people in Keng Tung of Eastern Shan State of Myanmar, runs as a commentary to the Pali Jātaka. The Pali headwords or phrases themselves are not always in proper Pali language, but appropriations to suit the tongue of the people who actually narrated the story. The version of the story itself is connected to an age-old tradition of ceremonial narration by monks, which is one of the main meritorious deeds the Buddhists in this part of the world would aspire to sponsor at least once in their life-time. What is interesting TVJ is that the long version of the story is concluded with a section which is not seen in the original Pali Jātaka version or CpA version, namely, a causal explanation of some of the unpleasant incidents that happened to the participants in the story including the Prince, the Queen, the two children, the Brahmin Jujaka and even the elephant who was donated by the Prince Vessantara, which in a sense, gave way to the whole subsequent episodes. The explanation begins with the elephant: he was given away by the Prince as a result of his past karma of not paying back a debt of one penny of silver to the Bodhisattva in one of its past lives. The explanation further adds that this elephant was the same as the one who later became the horse named Kantaka to the Buddha in his last birth. The Prince Vessantara had to be exiled from his kingdom and live in the forest as the karmic result of a past action of capturing many kings along with their families and exiling them into forest. Since, however, he released them later, Vessantara was able finally to return to his kingdom with his 6  For this information, I am indebted to Sengpan Pannyavamsa Thera, my graduate student at Postgraduate Institute of Pali and Buddhist Studies, Colombo. For details regarding the full text, a study of the ceremonial chanting and related practices, please refer to his PhD dissertation submitted to the Institute: The Tham Vessantara Jātaka. A Critical Study of the Vessantara-Jātaka and its Significance on Kengtung Buddhism, Eastern Shan State, Burma with English Translation (2007).

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family. The two children had to starve till evening in the hands of Jujaka, but were fed by divine beings in the evening as the karmic result of two actions: as two ox-herds in one of the previous births, they restrained a herd of oxen, which included the Brahmin Jujaka as one in the herd, all the day long without allowing them to grass and released them only in the evening and consequently they had to suffer starvation till evening; as a result of offering the pieces of clothes, which they received as payment for looking after oxen, to a monk who had lost his cloths they were subsequently born in rich families and were fed by divine beings in their captivity to Jujaka. The queen Maddi had to go far into the forest to pick up fruits in that fateful day leaving her children behind as a karmic result of accepting the services of a powerful ascetic who brought fruits for her from distance. Finally, the Prince gave away the children without telling their mother as a karmic result of the Queen, in one of previous births, both born as cat-fish couple, hid her children from her husband and caused great agony in him. Interestingly enough, a past action has not been traced for two children’s or their mother’s being given away by their father and husband in slavery! This karmic causal explanation provides an explanation beyond the immediate relationship of causes and effects according to which human actions are usually understood. Under usual circumstances, actors are praised or blamed, for their actions for we consider them as free agents. For example, in the dialogue between King Milinda and Nagasena Thera, the former accuses Vessantara for donating children and also for the manner he executed his action. This is possible only when we consider Vessantara to be a free agent. The causal karmic explanation, although in its extreme form, namely, that everything has a past cause, has been rejected clearly in the early Buddhist discourses, provides us with a series of distant causes and conditions, which are operative unknown to the actors, and under which the actors may be considered as ‘exonerated’ of their ‘mis-deeds’. This understanding, however, does not seem to be exactly correct. Actors are neither exonerated nor deprived of their due merit simply because there are past karmic connections behind actions. Although Jujaka’s subjecting children to starvation is a result of a past mis-deed of them, that fact would not exonerate Jujaka: at the end he is born in the hell. Nor is Vessantara’s completion of perfection of generosity marred by the fact that there are some past causal connections that necessitated, at least, some parts of the action. Nevertheless, the location of this explanation at the very conclusion of the long story strongly suggests that it was meant somehow to soften the possible

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hard or sad feelings of the listeners: after all what everyone got is what everyone deserved karmically. As we saw above, no direct causal connection has been given to the act of donating children or wife, which constitutes the essence of the whole story. Why a causal explanation has not been provided can also be revealing here. It could be because the ancient author may have thought that providing such an explanation will take the full worth of the action from the actor. On the other hand, we know that having a past cause has not been understood as taking away the moral responsibility from the present actor. What is important, however, is the two-tier explanation adopted by the Buddhist writers has not been perceived by them as posing a problem of determinism and hence freedom of will on the part of the actor. In an interdependent universe it is possible that events have causes both distant and immediate. The attitude in the early discourses has been to reject the view that everything is caused by events belonging to distant past (yaṃ kiñcāyaṃ purisapuggalo paṭisaṃvedeti sukhaṃ vā dukkhaṃ vā adukkhamasukhaṃ vā sabbaṃ taṃ pubbe katahetū ti: whatever, happiness, unhappiness or a neither happiness nor unhappiness that a person experiences, is due to what is done in the past: A I, 173) indicating thereby, however, that some events may well have such connections running into distant past. Nevertheless, the Buddhist concept of moral responsibility still allows room for innovation, and one is not absolutely bound by such causes. Therefore both the lack of causal explanation for two major acts and the presence of causal explanation for the rest of the acts in TVJ have to be understood in this context.

Milinda-Nagasena discussion The perfect generosity of Vessantara has not gone unquestioned in the Buddhist tradition itself. In the Vessantara-jātaka itself we are told that the people of the Vessantara’s kingdom did not approve of his excessive generosity, in particular, including the elephant believed to have possessed supernatural powers. This may, of course, be described as motivated by their personal interests. They did, nevertheless, question it. Consequently the prince had to leave the kingdom with his family to the forest where the act of generosity under discussion takes place. Naturally, the donation of Children and wife has not been questioned in the Jātaka itself which has the extraordinary act of the Prince as its climax. The history, however, has not been totally silent about it: the most prominent example occurs in the Milindapañha in which King Milinda questions Nagasena Thera on this issue (Mlinp 274-84).

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The Milindapañha in itself is a unique work within Theravada tradition trying to encounter various thorny issues, doctrinal, ethical and philosophical, and provide rational solutions for them. The questions such as whether the dialogue actually occurred or whether it occurred in the manner described in the Book remain up to historians to decide. Comparative textual studies have shown that the book itself has undergone phases of development and consequently the more discussions have been added at later stages. The significance of the work is that it tells us a story about how a tradition coped with its own doctrinal, ethical and philosophical difficulties, as we will discover shortly, not always successfully. At the very beginning of studying the dialogue between the King and the Monk we have to say that the responses of the latter represent possibly the lowest in so far as logicality and the convincing power of the answers are concerned. In the course of his defense, otherwise brilliant Nagsena adduces childish arguments in defense of the act; resorts to problematic ethics and suggests that the Prince in fact knew that the act of giving was only a temporary measure, and thereby deprives the act of any value if at all. Nagasena does seem to have at least one convincing argument which he does not seem to mind elaborating sufficiently. Let’s examine the dialogue. The King poses his question minutely breaking the Prince’s act into seven aspects with increasing severity. According to the King: (i) the prince’s very act of giving away ‘his own children, his only ones, dearly beloved’ was a hard thing to do; (ii) his second act, that he bound his own children, young and tender, with a jungle rope, and could look on the sight of his children, with their hands bruised by the creeper, being dragged by the Brahmin; (iii) the third act of binding his boy child again with a jungle rope when he escaped and ran to him; (iv) the fourth act of not appeasing his children when they cried that they will be eaten by this horrible man; (v) the fifth act of not acting on the word of the Boy to keep at least his sister and let himself alone go; (vi) the sixth act of not generating any pity on the lamenting children when the Boy was pleading for his kindness; (vii) the seventh act of not feeling sadness even when he saw his children being dragged away out of his sight into nameless horrors. Ultimately the King’s question was: How can one gain merit by bringing sorrow on others? Nagasena’s response to the question is that because of this very difficult act, the fame of the Bodhisatta spread among gods and men

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through ten thousand world systems. But it is needless to say that this answer is neither relevant nor convincing. Next the King asks: how can one gain happiness and rebirth in blissful states by giving gifts causing suffering on others-the very same first question connecting this time to the future fruit of action. Nagasena provides two counter-examples by way of response: (i) by carrying a crippled or sick person unable to walk by himself to a desired place by making use of a cart drawn by bullock one acquires merit in spite of the fact that the act caused suffering to the cart bullock; (ii) by drawing righteous taxes from his subjects a king may perform meritorious deeds that produce good karmic results in spite of the fact that money was got by harassing people by taxation. The analogy in the two examples is clearly not comparable in weight. Besides, in a social atmosphere in which animals and human beings assisted each other for survival whether using bullocks in carts is ethically wrong is a question. Clearly the ancient Indian society, or any agrarian society for that matter, does not seem to have had moral constraints in using domesticated animals for its day to day purposes. On the part of the ancient Indians, as both Buddhist and Hindu literature show, they felt that they should treat such animals humanely and be grateful to them. In the next analogy, having described the tax imposed by the king in question as ‘righteous’ to call it a ‘harassment’ right away seems contradictory. May be that Nagasena was of the view that, righteous or otherwise, taxation is always a harassment. If that is the case, to say that one can acquire merits through such an act is contradicting the overall philosophical position held in Buddhism, namely, that good cannot be achieved by means of bad. The king’s next objection is that excessive giving is held by the wise in the world as worthy of censure and blame. He produces several analogies such as excessive weight will break the axel of a cart; excessive rain will ruin crops etc. the monk gives the total opposite answer and affirms that excessive giving is praised, applauded and approved by the wise in the world. The outcome is that the giver will acquire fame in the world. One just wonders what this fame, which seems to be Nagasena’s main incentive behind the whole action, has to do with Bodhisatva behaviour. To adduce future fame as the reason for Vessantara’s acts is surely to miss the point. Nagasena’s analogies do not fare any better: a wild root can have such an exceeding power that it would even enable the possessor to vanish; a medical herb will kill excruciating pain by its excessive power; at exceeding

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heat fire burns; with excessive coldness water is capable of killing fire; by its exceeding purity a lotus remains undefiled by water or mud; a magic gem through its exceeding power is capable of granting anything that one wishes; lightening will destroy even the hardest things by its quick sharpness; the earth supports all beings and things such as huge rocks due to its exceeding size; the mount Sineru remains immovable due to its mighty weight; space remains infinite by its wide extent; the Sun with its mighty glory dissipates darkness; lion due to its greatness of lineage remains fearless; a wrestler will lift his opponent with greatness of his might; a king by the excellence of justice becomes overlord; a bhikkhu by reason of his virtue becomes an object of reverence of all beings; and the Buddha is peerless by the excellence of his supremacy. Nagasena sums up his response highlighting again the fame he achieved by means of this act. If these analogies are taken as premises the conclusion that excessive giving is good does not follow from them. Next Nagsena questions the King whether there is anything that ought to be withheld and should not be given when there is request and there is a possible recipient. To this, the King responds by listing that are not deemed proper to be given as gifts; namely, strong drink, women, buffaloes, suggestive paintings, weapons, poison, chains, fowls, swine, and false weights and measures. Nagasena objects to this response by reminding that he did not ask for what should not be given but whether there is anything that should be withheld if there one worthy of giving is present. The King responds by shifting emphasis into an action motivated by religious sentiment of faith and admits that people through faith give things they deem good. But he does not include any of the prohibited things that he enumerated earlier, in this act. Here one is at a loss to understand Nagasena’s logic. Even though he proposes that the King’s initial response was out of the point, it is clear that the King was really in the correct line of reasoning: what the King seems to intend is that even if there is a recipient the ten items listed must not be given. Thus reasoning behind this question and answer remains at best vague. Nagasena’s next defense is that some give away their own lives, and also that it is acceptable for a father fallen into debt to deposit his children on pledge or sell them. The King admits that such acts are the accepted practice in society. Then Nagasena clarifies to the King that Vessantara’s act has to be understood as an act of desperation caused by the anxiety to realize Buddha-hood and questions why Vessantara is singled out to attack on this ground. After all what Vessantara did was

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what many others have done! The King responds to this by pointing out that Vessantara should have instead made a barter with the beggar or give himself away instead of his children and wife. The Monk’s response to this objection is that one must give only what is asked for and not anything else: for one who asks for water, water must be given and not food. Nagasena further explains that the Bodhisatva, in the course of practicing perfection of generosity, had given away everything he possessed including his wife, children and himself. What is significant in this explanation is the idea of possession operative in this whole conceptual universe. After all, what Vessantara gave is what he owned, and there cannot be any question about it. We will return to this concept of ownership again towards the end of this discussion. What I would consider to be the most convincing of the arguments (which, in fact, occurs in the Jātaka, as quoted above along with CpA account) comes from Negasena next; Vessantara gave away his wife and children, near and dear to him, greatly beloved and cherished as his own life, not because he did not love them or because he hated them; it is purely because he loved the Buddha-hood more. In fact this should be the real reason, not the fame of good name among gods and human beings! At this point, Nagasena further describes the sorrow Vessantara experienced right after doing this act of extraordinary sacrifice, suggesting thereby the gravity of the act and the conflict of emotions involved. Subsequently, Nagasena elaborates on two reasons for this act of generosity: one is that the act of giving should not be interrupted, which seems to mean that even if children and the wife have to be given that act must not be withheld from doing; the other is that Vessantara knew that no one was capable of using his children as slaves and that they will be ultimately saved. I think this last reason is the most damaging to the act of generosity for this prior knowledge on the part of the Giver makes the whole act one of temporary significance devoid of any lasting value. In order to support the claim that no one will be able to keep the children as slaves Nagasena adduces analogies such as that the recipient, the Brahmin was too old to live long; that no one is capable of covering Sun or Moon by a basket; that the radiance of the wondrous gem of the Overlord will not be covered by a piece of cloth; that the great elephant king of Uposatha clan will not be covered by saucer or a winnowing fan; that no one will be able to reduce the great ocean; that mighty Himalaya

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mountain will never be seen rising like a cloud; and in the like manner, due to the renown fame of Vessantara, spread throughout the universe, no one will be able to keep his children as slaves. Finally, Nagasena adds that before giving the children away Vessantara instructed Jaliya, his son, how exactly his grandfather should be made to pay for them in order to release them from slavery and that his grandfather cannot free them by using his royal powers. This concludes the dialogue between the King and the Monk on this very important, problematic and ambiguous issue associated with the past life of the Buddha. For the South and South East Asian Buddhist tradition, the act of Vessantara are real acts that the Bodhisatva actually did. On the one hand there is the Buddha-hood which has to be attained at shedding all desires including the desire for one’s own children and wife. The fact that this extraordinary act has been assigned to the Bodhisatva in his penultimate human birth immediately before the Buddha-hood suggests that it was taken as the culmination of his practice of generosity. The real conflict, as Nagasena himself articulates in the course of the dialogue, is the one between emotions and the ideal, emotional attachment to one’s own children and wife, and the longcherished spiritual attainment for the sake of all beings. By successfully completing his practice, Vessantara has been made triumphant in his struggle between emotions and sacrifice. Nagasena’s bold effort has to be understood in the context of human emotions, on the one hand, and justifying the need for donating children and wife for the sake of severing all attachments without exception, on the other. The apparent failure in his defense should be taken as a sign of the ambiguity with which the tradition itself viewed the act rather than taking it as a weakness on the part of great debater Nagasena.

Problem of ownership of children and wife One of the very first questions that would come to the mind of modern reader is: how can one give away one’s children and wife: does he own them? Naturally one cannot give anything that one does not own. From the discussion, it is amply clear that the ancient Indian conceptual universe assumed without any question that children and wife were one’s property in the sense that he, father/husband, owned them. Cone and Gombrich describe this as “the man’s unquestioned right to dispose of his family as he thinks fit” (Cone and Gombrich 1977, xxi). The implication of being owned by someone is that one is subject

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to be treated more or less like an object is treated. In the case when these ‘objects’ are human beings or animals it is expected that owners treat them humanely, kindly, affectionately and so on. Such modes of bahaviour and attitudes, however, are only a part of one’s good nature and good behaviour, which may not be taken for granted at all times or from all people concerned. In the Saṃyutta-nikāya there is a saying that ‘sons are the property of people (puttā vatthu manussānaṃ: S I, 37). Commenting on this Buddhaghosa takes the term ‘vatthu’ as meaning a base or a support (patiṭṭhā) and says that this means that sons are one’s support when one is old (SA I, 93). In the same nikāya it is said that ‘woman is highest among objects/goods (itthi bhaṅḍānamuttamaṃ: S I, 43). Commenting on this Buddhaghosa says that a woman is a thing that cannot be dispensed with (avissajjanīya baṇḍatta “itthi bhaṇḍanam- uttamaṃ, varabhaṇḍaṃ”: SA I, 100), and that she is an exquisite object, and further adds that this has been said because it is in the womb of a woman that Bodhisatvas and universal monarchs are conceived (SA I, 100). According to these commentarial glosses, the Buddhist tradition does not seem to have understood children or wives in a narrow sense of being one’s property or goods. In this regard, one tends to see a difference in the Buddhist tradition from that of Hinduism. The Buddha’s recognition of and respect for familial relations becomes quite clear in the monastic Vinaya according to which one cannot enter the monkhood without the permission of parents (Vin I, 83). But it has to be also noted that whether one has to get the permission of one’s spouse when leaving home is not clear in the tradition. But obviously the case with giving away one’s children or wife is quite different. Nevertheless, what the popular Vessantara Jātaka forces us to believe is that the basic Indian tradition of treating one’s children and wife by the father and husband as if they were one’s property has been accepted in the Buddhist tradition. This ancient attitude to one’s wife and children is clearly no longer applicable to the present-day society informed by the concept of human rights which ultimately finds its ground in inalienable individual rights. Although parents have duties and obligations toward their children, their rights, if any, are subject to overall broad human and individual rights. The relationship between husband and wife is not based on any rights over each other. In such circumstances it is clear that one can question the Buddhist practice on modern ethical grounds, which, as we saw above, have been accepted by all religious traditions without exception.

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Conclusion Whether there was a concept of human rights or not, even in the ancient conceptual universe donation of children and wife was not something really acceptable. In addition to the King Milinda’s questioning, the accounts of the event in Jātaka, Cariyāpiṭaka and its commentary etc. clearly betray this attitude. Except in the Vessantara-jātaka we do not encounter instances of donation of children, and my guess is that this is also the only instance of donation of wife. The events themselves have been attributed to the Bodhisatva in his very last human birth before the Buddha-hood. And furthermore, it is said that the Earth trembled at this event. All these are suggestive of the fact that the ancient authors were not unaware of the gravity of what they were attributing to the Bodhisatva. Although Vessantara as the giver should not have any attachment to what was given CpA says that the Bodhisatva lost his consciousness when he saw his children again when they were reunited. More than all these things, ultimately Vessantara gets back everything he gave. Let me quote Cone and Gombrich again in this regard: In real life one cannot have one’s cake and eat it: what is given is gone. Only in myth and fantasy can one have it both ways. Vessantara gets back everything he has given away. He gets the spiritual reward for renunciation; but his forfeit of temporal advantages proves short-lived, and in the end he becomes king and even wealthier than he was at the beginning. His reward is both on earth and in heaven; and the supreme reward of Buddhahood is still to come. (Vin I, xxv) The question is: why a story, beset with such ethical contradictions as these, was created in the Buddhist tradition? In discussing somewhat different question of ‘why the story of Vessantara holds its unique position in Buddhist countries’ Cone and Gombrich refer to the need for emphasizing dāna in the context of the Buddhist monastic institution, and they derive support for this conclusion from Spiro who studied Burmese Buddhist religiosity and found that Burmese villagers would spend a quarter of their income for religious donations. This conclusion gets additional support from the wide-spread practice of chanting with elaborated ceremony of Tham Vessantara-jātaka by Keng Tung, and the vast amount of money ordinary people spent on it which is way beyond their means, and consequently getting into debts.7 I think this explains 7 The Tham Vessantara-Jātaka. A Critical Study of the Vessantara-Jātaka and its Significance on Kengtung Buddhism, Eastern Shan State, Burma with English

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why the story has remained popular. It does not, however, explain how the story originally could have come into being. I think the story, in particular the event of donation of children (which obviously has been the focal point of the story), is an effort by ancient authors to concretize the need for absolute renunciation or giving up by the Bodhisatva everything including the most dear, namely, children and the wife. It is important to remember that dāna has two meanings, namely, giving and giving up. In the Jātaka stories both senses are referred to while giving aspect has been highlighted. Considering, however, the need for getting rid of all desires, what becomes more crucial is giving up rather than material giving. I consider the Vessantara story as a result of reading the Bodhisatva’s giving up in a more literal sense as actual giving. This may be explained by using a better known parallel example of literal depiction of the Buddha’s triumph over Mara, the Evil One. The introduction to Jātaka, in which the Vessantara-jātaka constitutes the last of the stories, the Buddha’s encounter with Mara has been described as an actual encounter between the Buddha and Mara in person. It is a known fact that the concept of Mara and its retinue has been used in the discourses to represent the defilements that the Buddha had to purify his mind from in attaining the Buddhahood. In the subsequent history and culture this event that took place within the mind of the Buddha has been described in words and illustrated in painting as a real encounter between the Buddha and Mara. It is clear that what is happening in the Vessantara-jātaka is not different from this. The future Buddha has to practice renunciation or giving up in order to ultimately get rid of all desires. In actual fact, we are told in the Buddha’s own words in the discourses such as Ariyapariyesana-sutta (M I, 26), that he, as the Bodhisatva, did this in leaving behind his parents (and, although not specifically mentioned in this discourse: Princess Yasodhara and Rahula, his wife and son,) in his final ‘quest for what is wholesome’ (kim-kusalagavesi). Not only did the future Buddha do so, but also there were many male and female disciples of him who did the same. One classic example described vividly in the early Buddhist literature is monk named Sangamaji, who, ‘never looked at nor spoke with’ the infant child left before him by his former wife, demanding maintenance for herself and their child. Sangamaji is praised by the Buddha for ‘winning the battle’, his very name denoting this meaning (Ud 5-6). Both the Theragāthā Translation (2007) Unpublished Thesis at Post-Graduate Institute of Pali and Buddhist Studies, Colombo.

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and Therīgāthā,8 containing the accounts of experience of liberation of the early Buddhist monks and nuns contain hundreds of examples of this nature although they have not been vividly elaborated as in the case of Sangamaji. None of these people including the future Buddha actually gave away their wives or husbands or children. What everybody did was to give up their household lives including spouses and children. This must exactly have been what Vessantara did. Depicting this event as involving real giving away surely tends to produce intensive emotions and makes it lot easier for ordinary minds to grasp. The ultimate result, however, was a story, though highly moving, beset with considerable theoretical and practical difficulties. Finally, if we were to forget the Jātaka story beset with difficulties, one can still ask the question: is not it at all possible for a Bodhisatva to give his wife and children away for when a Bodhisatva gives up his wife and children in his mind, it does not really matter if he gives them to someone else or let them be taken care of by themselves. A Bodhisatva would not leave his family without at least providing for its protection and sustenance although the emotional aspect may be thought to be mitigated by the understanding of the willing objects of the dāna. In a situation where these conditions are satisfied it is not unimaginable that a Bodhisatva may practice his dāna even in the sense of actual giving, 8  Two works belonging in the collection of minor anthologies - Khuddaka-nikāyaof the Theravada Tipiṭaka (canon). A I, 1885 Ed. R. Morris and E. Hardy, London: Pali Text Society. Cone, Margaret & Gombrich, Richard (1977) The Perfect Generosity of Prince Vessantara, Oxford: at the Clarendon Press. Endo, Toshiichi (1989) “A Study of the Rasavahini-with special reference to the concept and practice of Dana” in Buddhist Studies (Bukkyo Kenkyu), Vol.XVIII March 1989.International Buddhist Association, Japan. pp.161-179. Keown, Damien (1995) “Are there “Human Rights” in Buddhism?”, Journal of Buddhist Ethics, Vol.II. Kuhn, Hans and Karl-Joseph Kuschel, eds. (1993). Declaration Toward a Global Ethic, Council for a Parliament of the World’s Religions, London: SCM Press. Majjhima-nikāya Ed. V. Trenkner and R. Chalmers, (1948-51) London: Pali Text Society. The Milindapanha with Milinda Tika (1880/1986) V. Trenckener, London: Pali Text Society. Paramatthadipani. Being the Commentary on the Cariyapitaka, (1979) Ed. D.L. Barua, London: Pali Text Society (abbreviated as CpA). Perera, L.P.N. (1988), Human Rights and Religions in Sri Lanka. A Commentary on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Colombo: Sri Lanka Foundation. ---- (1991) Buddhism and Human Rights. A Buddhist Commentary on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Colombo: Karunaratne and Sons. Saṃyutta-nikāya I (1884), Ed. L. Feer, London: Pali Text Society. Saṃyuttanikāya-Atthakathā I, 1929, Ed. F.L Woodward, London: Pali Text Society. Udana (1879/1997) Ed. Paul Steinthal, Pali Text Society, London. Vinaya (1879-83) Ed. H. Oldenberg, London: Pali Text Society.

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not mere psychological act of giving up. Therefore, the real problem at hand seems to be how the tradition has dealt with it than the act itself.

13. The Theravada Standpoint on Meat Eating*

Introduction Debates and disputes over the practice of meat eating have been continuous in the history of Buddhism. In a multi-religious context with divergent views and practices, it was necessary for the Buddha to clarify his position regarding this issue from the very beginning. In particular, extreme form of non-violence adopted by Jainism, the main Sramaṇa rival of Buddhism during the time of the Buddha, necessitated the Buddha to articulate his position clearly. With the advent of Mahayana with its clear-cut negative position on meat eating, in particular by the monastic disciples of the Buddha, Buddhists were clearly divided into two sides. More recently with advanced ideas and attitudes toward protecting and preserving nature there has been renewed interest on both vegetarianism in itself and the environment including all living beings who inhabit the planet. In this new perspective Buddhism has been viewed as an enlightening philosophy due to its emphasis on nonviolence and its world-view which encompasses all sentient beings. Contrasted with religions believing in creation Buddhism does not have a man-centred world-view according which all other living beings were created for the sake of man. Nor does it hold a view of supremacy of human being which allows him to exploit the environment for his own gain. The idea of dependent co-origination portrays reality as interdependent and inter-connected. With these enlightening and naturefriendly characteristics one would expect Buddhism to be naturally * An initial version of this article appeared in Bul Gyo Hak Bo: Journal of Korean Buddhist Research Institute, Dongguk University, 2008.

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advocating vegetarianism. But the dilemma is that it has not been so. Although the later Mahayana adopted vegetarianism, the early schools have not been quite clear on the issue. The challenge is to understand this apparently contradictory situation found in early Buddhism. In the present paper, I will try to understand the position adopted in the early phase of Buddhism including Theravada on meat eating. It is hoped that a study of the early standpoint may contribute to understand the later developments in the practice.

What do the texts say? In trying to understand the early Buddhist position regarding meateating we need to examine evidence form the basic canonical texts attributed to the Buddha himself. (I) The Jīvaka-sutta of the Majjhima-nikāya (55) is the locus classicus of the Buddha’s most direct explanation on the question of meat eating. According to this discourse, Jivaka, the physician, asks from the Buddha whether or not the rumour is true that the Buddha would knowingly eat meat of animals killed specifically for him. The Buddha says that the rumour is not true and then explains his position on the matter: Jivaka, I say that there are three instances in which meat should not be eaten: when it is seen, heard, or suspected (that the living being has been slaughtered for oneself). I say that meat should not be eaten in these three instances. I say that there are three instances in which meat may be eaten: when it is not seen, not heard, and not suspected (that the living being has been slaughtered for oneself). I say that meat may be eaten in these three instances. (Ñāṇamoli & Bodhi 1995/2001, 474) From this explanation, it is very clear that the Buddha does not reject the possibility of eating meat altogether. In fact, it admits that there are conditions under which meat eating is permissible. The Buddha does not give a categorical answer for Jivaka’s question. Of the four modes of answering questions1 the Buddha in this context seems to have adopted the method of answering a question by analyzing it (vibhajja-vyākaraṇīya= to be answered having analysed the question). Without categorically prohibiting the practice the Buddha provides a 1  The other three being, questions to be answered directly (ekmasa vyākaraṇīya), questions to be answered by asking a question (paṭipucchā vyākaraṇīya) and question to be set aside (ṭhapaniya). The four modes are mentioned in the Aṅguttara-nikāya (A II, 46).

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conditional answer. Any meat meeting the three conditions given has been described in the Vinaya as ‘fish and meat purified in three corners’ (tikoṭi pārisuddha maccha-māṃsa: Vin II, 197). In the discourse, the Buddha further explains how meat cleared from these three perspectives is found by a monk. It is important to note that the monk described here is one who is practising loving kindness (mettā) to all beings. He is described in the following words: Here Jivaka, some bhikkhu lives in dependence upon a certain village or town. He abides pervading one quarter with a mind imbued with loving kindness, likewise the second, likewise the third, likewise the fourth, so above, below, around and everywhere, and to all as to himself, he abides pervading the all encompassing world with a mind imbued with loving kindness. (Ñāṇamoli & Bodhi 1995/2001, 474) Now such a monk is invited by a householder for a meal, and when he visits the householder he is offered with ‘good almsfood’. Upon receiving this almsfood the monk does not become overjoyed by this offering, does not generate desire to receive such almsfood in future but consumes it “without being tied to it, infatuated with it, and utterly committed to it, seeing the danger in it and understanding the escape from it”. The Buddha asks from Jivaka, whether such monk in doing so would be doing something harmful for oneself, the other or both oneself and the other. Jivaka answers in the negative. The Buddha asks from Jivaka whether or not such a monk sustains himself with blameless food on that occasion. To this Jivaka responds by admitting that such a food is blameless. Then the Buddha goes on to show that the same applies to a monk who practices the rest of the sublime mode of living (brahma-vihāra), namely, compassion (karuṇā), altruistic joy (muditā) and equanimity (upekkhā). In concluding the discussion the Buddha identifies five stages in which one accrues much demerit if one were to slaughter a living being for the Buddha or his disciple. The five stages are: in saying “go and fetch that living being” one accrues demerit in the first instance; the second instance is when the living being experiences pain on being led along with a neck-halter; the third is when he orders someone to slaughter the living being; the fourth is when that living being experiences pain and grief on being slaughtered; and the fifth instance is when he provides the Buddha or his disciple with that unwarranted food. The discourse is

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concluded with Jivaka being satisfied that the monks sustain themselves with permissible and blameless food.

Discussion Although this discourse is the key place where the Buddha discusses the delicate issue of meat eating, we have to remember that the discourse addresses only a limited context, namely that of the monastic life. In this sense the discourse is not a discussion of the general issue of meat-eating applicable to both lay and monastic groups. The discourse views the problem from a point of view of a monastic follower. Even that follower, according to the discourse, is not an ordinary one but an exemplary person who is so developed as to pervade the four sublime states to the entire universe without any limit. For such a person eating is only for the sustenance of life. He does not generate any of the desires an ordinary person is bound to generate on food. He eats it with understanding the dangers associated with it and with an eye for escape from the samsaric existence which requires one to engage in manifold activities including eating food. Now for such a person what he eats cannot have any special significance. It would not really matter whether he eats a meal with meat or without meat; a splendid meal or ordinary meal. This part of the discussion suggests that not only the meal has to be cleared of three corners but also the one who consumes it has to be endowed with exemplary qualities of monastic life. The attitude toward food articulated in the Jīvaka-sutta has been the general attitude adopted by the monastic community throughout its history. In the Theravada monastic life, monks are expected to do what is called ‘reflection’ (paccavekkhana) when one uses the four requisites of life, namely, clothes, food, lodging and medicine. The idea is that a monk must always have in his mind that he uses these requisites only to satisfy the basic needs that they are meant to satisfy. Accordingly, the clothes are only for the protection of the body from external influences, and for covering oneself. Food is only for the sustenance of life. The lodging is only for the protection and for seclusion. And the medicine is only for the cure of illnesses. The particular formula to be used in reflecting on food runs as follows: Having reflected wisely, I consume this food. This food is not for sport, not for intoxication, not for beautification, not for adornment. I take this food only for the endurance and continuance of this body, for ending discomfort, and for

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assisting the holy life, considering: ‘Thus I shall terminate old feelings without arousing new feelings, and I shall be healthy and blameless and shall live in comfort’.2 The idea is that when a person takes food from the perspective as described above the quality or the type of food one eats seems to have not much significance. The situation emerging is not that of: ‘people give and I eat (I do not have a responsibility) which is easy. But it is the following: ‘people give; I have not seen or heard that it was killed for me and I have no suspicion that it was killed for me; so I eat’. In monastic life, it is difficult to separate the issue of eating meat from the attitude toward food prescribed by the Buddha for the monks and nuns. In addition to the above-discussed ‘wise reflection’ this attitude has been forcefully articulated in the discourse on the Simile of Son’s Flesh (Puttamāṃsūpama-sutta: S II, 97-100). In order to explain the attitude toward gross food (kabalinkāra-āhāra) that a monk should adopt, the Buddha brings out the parable of parents who ate their own son’s flesh in order to survive a deadly desert. The Buddha asks from the monks: What do you think, bhikkhus? Would they eat that food for amusement or for enjoyment or for the sake of physical beauty and attractiveness? “No, venerable sir” Wouldn’t they eat that food only for the sake of crossing the desert? “Yes, venerable sir” It is in such a way, bhikkhus, that I say the nutriment edible food should be seen. (Bodhi 2000, 598) Eating is only for the survival and for nothing else. In particular food is not meant for increasing one’s desire for sensory gratification. The attitude advocated, no doubt, is for those who have renounced their worldly life. (II) The next important canonical discussion on the issue of meat eating occurs in the Vinaya Cullavagga-pāḷi (Vin II, 197). Here Devadatta, who is known in the Buddhist tradition for being the enemy of the Buddha, is seen as making five requests from the Buddha, namely, 2  This formula in the first person has been adopted from the early discourses such as the Sekha-sutta of the Majjhima-nikāya (M 460-465) where the Buddha describes moderation in eating (bhojane mattaññutā) to be practiced by a monk.

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that the monks should live their entire life in the forest, on alms-food (piṇḍa-pāta), wearing rag-robes, dwelling at the root of trees, and that they should never eat fish or meat (maccha-māṃsaṃ na khādeyya). In presenting these five proposals Devadatta reminds the Buddha that the latter praises so much the simple and contended life with less wants and these request are conducive for the development of such virtues. The Buddha’s response to Devadatta was that the monks should observe the first four of these practices on their own discretion, and the fifth on fish and meat eating is permissible provided that it satisfies the three conditions (mentioned already) (Tikoṭiparisuddhaṃ macchamaṃsaṃ adiṭṭhaṃ asutaṃ aparisaṅkitaṃ - fish and meat purified in three corners, not seen, not heard, and not suspected: Vin II, 197).

Discussion The context of the present episode too is monastic life. Devadatta’s requests are not for all the followers of the Buddha but only for the monastic followers. Inclusion of meat eating in the list of requests suggests that fish and meat were considered as part of ‘good meal’ (paṇīta bhojana). But as we found in the above discussion whether it is splendid or ordinary would not matter for one who eats his food with wise reflection. (III) The discourse on Carrion-smell (Āmagandha-sutta) of the Suttanipāta (Sn v. 239-252) contains an interesting discussion where fish and meat eating has been given a figurative interpretation. The discourse, according to the commentary, is presented as the response of the former Buddha Kassapa to a question posed by the Brahmin named Tissa. The present Buddha is said to have quoted it when a Brahmin named Amagandha (smell of raw-meat!) questioned him on the appropriateness of meat eating. The question put to the Kassapa Buddha: What is ‘raw meat smell’ in your opinion? The question is prefaced with the information that while virtuous religious people consume food prepared by various kinds of grain, some consume foul smelling meat. To this, the Buddha answers first by describing what ‘smell of raw meat’ is. The smell of raw meat is not eating meat but such vices as destroying life, torture, mutilation of limbs, lying, stealing, falsehood, fraud and deceit, study of worthless teachings, adultery, being unrestrained in sensual pleasures, being greedy, wicked, backbiting, treacherous and the like. The discourse presents a long list of vices that are considered as true foul smell of raw meat, and reiterates that meat eating itself is not ‘foul smell

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of raw meat’. The explanation is concluded with statement emphasizing the uselessness of adhering to rites and rituals: Not abstaining from the eating of fish and flesh, not fasting, nakedness, shaving of the head, matted hair,, layer of dirt (on the body), or rough antelope skins, not the tending of the sacrificial fire, the many austere forms of penance in the world, incantations, oblations, sacrifice, observance of seasonal penances (can) purify that mortal who has not overcome his doubts. One shall fare guarded in the streams (of the senses) and with (full) comprehension of the faculties, standing firm in the truth and delighting in rectitude and gentleness, going beyond clinging and with all ills eliminated, he that is wise is not sullied by what is seen and heard. (Jayawickrama 2001, 98)

Discussion In the discourse the Buddha Kassapa is addressed by the interlocutor, Tissa, the Brahmin, as ‘relative of Brahma’ (brahma-bandhu) indicating that he too belonged in the Brahmanic caste. The commentary in fact confirms that the Buddha Kassapa was of Brahmin origin. Thus the dialogue is between two Brahmins. This Brahmanic connection may have to be understood as a way of responding to Brahmins who adhered to vegetarianism and looked down upon the followers of the Buddha who consumed fish and meat. Here the Buddha is giving an ethical interpretation, which is quite new, to meat eating. Nothing is mentioned about meat eating in the discourse. The very terminology “the fowl smell of raw meat’ or ‘carrion smell’ as Jayawickrama translates it, is a term lauded with assumptions. The very terminology says that eating meat is unacceptable. The metaphor of smell makes more sense in the context of Brahmins who were obsessed with physical purity and observed many rites and rituals associated with symbolic purity. Here the Buddha is seen to be attributing a totally new meaning to the term and saying that what really matters is not any physical smell caused by eating meat but impurity or bad smell caused by evil behaviour. This manner of giving new interpretation to old concepts is not unfamiliar in the discourses of the Buddha. Some well known examples are the Wasala-sutta re-defining who an outcaste is, the Vāseṭṭha-sutta (of the Majjhima-nikāya and the Suttanipāta) redefining true Brahmin, and the Sigālovāda-sutta (of the

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Dīgha-nikāya) reinterpreting the act of worshipping directions. The reason why the discourse has been attributed to the former Buddha Kassapa may be to give the discussion an added historical significance by suggesting that the standpoint regarding meat eating is not something new or arbitrary on the part of the Buddha Gotama who belonged in the Worrier caste, but to Kassapa the Buddha who belonged in the Brahmin caste.

Eating meat in monastic context and beyond It is interesting to note that there is hardly any discussion in the Theravada on meat eating outside the monastic context. Instead, what has been really discussed is harming and killing of life and how bad such an act morally is. The first precept in the sīla (morality) is to abstain from killing. In the five-precept formula it is given as ‘pāṇa-atipāta’ or killing of life. The term ‘pāṇa’ (life) refers to life; but does not specify which kind of life. But the context and elaborations found in discourses show that what is meant is all living beings, human beings, birds, beasts, reptiles, insects etc. The texts do not allude to plant life in this context. The positive aspect of this precept is described in the following manner: Abandoning the taking of life, he dwells refraining from taking life, without stick or sword, scrupulous, compassionate, feeling for the welfare of all living beings. (Sāmaññaphala-sutta: D I, 46) The first precept has been traditionally understood, in its positive manifestation, as involving active practice of kindness towards all living beings. The well-known Karaṇīyametta-sutta too can be considered as an elaboration of the positive implementation of the same precept. Although meat-eating is not specifically mentioned the discourse stresses that one must love all being as a mother would love her only son (mātā yathā niyaṃ puttaṃ-āyusā ekaputtam anurakkhe evampi sabbabhūtesu – mānasam bhāvaye aparimāṇaṃ: Sn v. 26). Among the five prohibited trades for the lay people, selling meat is one. Thus in a true Buddhist society nobody will kill animals, birds, fish or any other living being and nobody will sell such meat. If this situation obtains there cannot arise a question of meat eating for there is none such to be eaten. But it is clear that this ideal situation does not obtain. One way to explain how meat is there to be bought if that the entire society at any given context has never been totally Buddhist or full of true Buddhists who follow the Path flawlessly. Fishing and killing animals and birds

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for food have been there always in societies though it is imaginable in a Buddhist society such livelihood might not have been encouraged. The whole idea of ‘meat purified in three corners’ assumes that such meat for the killing of which one is not directly responsible is available. The idea of personal responsibility at issue here has to be understood correctly. It looks like that what the early discourses and the Theravada tradition take as responsibility is one’s direct personal responsibility. The indirect responsibility, which is implicit in ‘meat purified in three corners’, does not seem to have been acknowledged in the tradition at all. As the popular argument correctly shows the demand and supply theory is at work here, and in this sense no one who eats meet cannot escape the indirect responsibility for encouraging killing living beings. But to my knowledge this argument has never been recognized in the discourses. What instead one finds in the discourses is the attention for the direct personal involvement. For example, if the meat has been produced specifically for x, then x is guilty if he were to consume it knowing that it has been specifically prepared for him. It would be appropriate to quote the commentarial explanation of ‘meat purified in three corners’ in this context: In ‘seen’ etc. seen means to have seen that animals and fish etc. being killed for the sake of monks. ‘Heard’ means to have heard that animals and fish etc. have been killed for the sake of monks. ʽSuspected’ is threefold as suspected by seeing, suspected by hearing, and suspected freed from both (seeing and hearing). The all-encompassing judgment in this matter is as follows: Here the monks see people leaving village or going about in the forest carrying nets, baits etc.; on the next day in their alms-round in the village monks receive food with fish and meat; then the monks become suspicious owing to seeing that this food must have been prepared for the sake of monks; this is ‘suspected by seeing’ and such food is not good to accept. Food not suspected in this manner is good to accept. If people were to ask, ‘why do you not accept this food’, and monks were to say why, and if people were to respond by saying that the meat or fish was not prepared for the sake of monks but it was prepared for their own use or the use of royal officers then it is good to accept. Even if the monks did not see but they heard that people left village or went around in the forest with nets and baits etc. and in the next day if they were to receive food with fish and meat and the monks become suspicious owing to hearing that

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this food must have been prepared for the sake of monks, this is ‘suspected by hearing’ and such food is not good to accept. Food not suspected in this manner is good to accept. If people were to ask, ‘why do you not accept this food’, and monks were to say why and if people were to respond by saying that the meat or fish was not prepared for the sake of monks but it was prepared for their own use or the use of royal officers then it is good to accept. Even if the monks did neither see nor hear, but became suspicious when they received food with fish and meat from the village and, then it is called ‘suspected freed from both (seeing and hearing)’. If people were to ask, ‘why do you not accept this food’, and monks were to say why and if people were to respond by saying that the meat or fish was not prepared for the sake of monks but it was prepared for their own use or the use of royal officers, or they were to say that the meat was natural and hence proper (for monks to accept) then it is good to accept. (MA II, 47-8) The commentary in its subsequent analysis lays much stress on the ‘knowledge factor’ involved in the process. A monk cannot accept meat or fish if he knows that it was prepared for him or for the Sangha. If he did not know then such food is no harm. If some monks knew but some others did not know it and if those who did not know were to eat they would not be guilty, but those who knew would be guilty if they ate. Here again this emphasis made of knowing or not-knowing makes guilt purely dependent on psychological factors. The commentary brings up the hypothetical situation of a particular monk receiving food with meat or fish and knowing that it was specifically prepared for him would give that food to another monk who would eat it trusting the giver and asks ‘who is guilty’. The question is answered by saying that neither is for the one who accepted did not eat and the one who ate did not know. The knowledge-factor involved may be articulated in the following manner: either one should know for sure that the killing was not done for oneself or the community, or one should not know that the killing was done specifically for oneself or the community. These two conditions are different from each other although they may look alike. While the first is not guilty owing to his knowledge, the other is not guilty for his ignorance of the true situation (It is according to this that a monk who accepts meat or fish specifically killed for him but assured by donors that it was not so is not guilty).

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Although the knowledge factor is decisive in determining the guilt of one who eats what is prepared specifically for him, with the improper kinds of meat even if one were to not know that the meat is improper one would be guilty if one were to eat it. Therefore, the commentary advises that one should always inquire about the kind of meat before one eats it. The improper kinds of meat have been listed in the Vinaya. The first in the list is human flesh. The story of pious female disciple Suppiya who gave her own flesh to a sick monk caused this prohibition. The rest of prohibited meats include that of elephants, horses, dogs, snakes, lions, tigers, leopards, bears, and hyenas (Vin I, 216-220). In this context the Buddha cautions the monks not to eat meat without having carefully discerned (na ca bhikkhave appaṭivekkhitvā maṃsaṃ paribhuñjitabbaṃ: Vin I, 218). Two important considerations emerge from the discussion: the guilt or otherwise of meat eating depends on knowledge or lack of it of the fact that it was prepared specifically for oneself or the Sangha and the appropriateness of the kind of meat offered. In other words, a monk is allowed to eat meat if he knows that it was appropriate meat not specifically prepared for him or if he knows that it was appropriate meat but does not know that it was prepared specifically for him. The question of appropriate meat is not applicable to lay society. At least the Buddha did not intend this classification for the lay society. Although the idea of ‘meat purified in three corners’ too has been articulated in the context of monastic life, it seems applicable to society at large. At least this is how the Buddhist society in general has interpreted this idea. Accordingly, there has been some kind of uneasy existence of fishermen and butchers within Buddhist societies. In a way, they seem to have provided with a valuable service to the rest of Buddhist community including the monks and nuns who wished to have it both ways! Nevertheless, the social attitude toward these groups of people has always been one of disdain and dissociation. Understandably, in many Theravada Buddhist countries, including Sri Lanka, initial converts to theistic religions naturally came from among fishing folks from maritime regions. Even among the Buddhists who continue to be fishermen, there seems to have developed certain traditions and conventions which are meant to mitigate the bad karma produced by killing. For example, it is reported that a fisherman would be quite vary of killing any living being other than fish or killing outside his profession.

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The last meal of the Buddha In the Mahāparinibbāna-sutta of the Dīgha-nikāya (16) where the last days of the life of the Buddha are described, it is said that immediately before the parinibbāna next day early morning the Buddha accepted a meal prepared by person called Cunda. According to this account the meal consisted what is called ‘sūkara-maddava’, and the Buddha had taken this particular meal only by himself and had instructed the donor to throw away any left over for it may not be digested by anyone else in the world. The discourse says that after this meal the already weak Buddha got weaker finally precipitating his demise. In the Buddhist tradition there has been considerable controversy as to what this particular meal was. The popular understanding has been that it is some kind of pork. Since the discourse does not provide us with any clue to determine what exactly this food is, we need to consult the commentarial exegesis to see the tradition. The commentary to Dīgha-nikāya says thus: ‘sūkara maddava’ is the flesh of single first-born pig not too young, not too old, which had been received naturally (sūkara-maddavan ti nātitaruṇassa nātijiṇṇassa eka-jeṭṭhaka sūkarassa pavatta maṃsaṃ: DA II, 568). Having listed this initial meaning the commentary lists two other meanings to the term held by ‘certain others’: a preparation of softboiled rice cooked with five cow-products; and a kind of alchemistic mixture described in the science of alchemy. In addition to these three meanings Dhammapala, in his commentary to the Udāna adds a fourth possibility, namely, that it is young bamboo shoots tramples by pigs (sūkarehi maddita vamsa-kaliro). While there is no ambiguity about the term ‘sūkara’, ‘maddava’ is open for debate. It can be derived from ‘mudu’ (mild) and the noun deriving from this adjective is maddava meaning mildness or softness. It is according to this that sūkara-maddava is understood as the soft flesh of a pig. Maddava could also be derived from the verb ‘maddati’ which means to press or to trample. Alternative interpretation referred to by Dhammapala, the author the sub-commentary, seems to derive from this second meaning. Discussing this term in his Milinda-pañha translation, Rhys Davids notices this difficulty and referring to Sanskrit ‘mardava’ which always means tender, he says that this could be even tender flowers (Davids 1977, 244). In his Dīgha-nikāya translation, which is later than the translation of the Milinda-pañha, Rhys Davids produces this additional information:

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Dr. Hoey informs me that the peasantry in these districts are still very fond of bulbous roots, a sort of truffle, found in the jungle, and called sūkara-kanda. K.E. Neumann, in his translation of the Majjhima (1896), p.xx, has collected several similar instances of truffle-like roots, or edible plants, having such names. (Davids 1910/1977, 137) These interpretations given by both ancient and modern commentators betray some kind of ambiguity the Theravada tradition itself had on this issue. But the primary meaning assigned by the commentary is that it is some kind of pork. The sub-commentary does not refer to any other meanings and directly describes sūkara-maddava as ‘soft meat of a wild bore’ (vana-varāhassa mudu-māmsaṃ: DT, 278). This shows that the tradition was fairly sure that the meal was some kind of pork. The discourse itself says that the physical pain of the Buddha aggravated after he ate this food. Both the commentary and the subcommentary comment on this by pointing out that there was no causal connection between eating pork and aggravation of the pain. The commentary says that the Buddha did not have this aggravated pain due to eating. But in fact the Buddha had less pain because he had this mild meal. The pain of the Buddha would have been more severe had he not eaten this, says the commentary (DA II, 568). The sub-commentary glosses over this further, and says that one must not think that even the Buddha could not digest it (which, according to the discourse, the Buddha had claimed nobody else would be able to digest it). The Buddha in fact digested it, and hence the absence of any disturbance and softening of the disturbance caused due to other conditions, says the sub-commentary. This later exegetical urge to dissociate the demise of the Buddha from his eating pork suggests that by this time the apparent connection between the two events had been perceived as embarrassing. However, one cannot get the same feeling when one reads the discourse itself. It directly links, without any obvious sense of discomfort, aggravation of the pain which ended in the demise of the Buddha to his last meal. There is no any evidence that the Theravada tradition was hesitant to acknowledge the relation between the Buddha’s demise and his last meal of pork. The sub-commentary makes it very clear that the donor being a stream-winner prepared this food from natural meat (meaning meat not violating any of the three criteria) (DA I, 218). If the meat was purified with three corners, there is nothing to worry about it. The fact that it

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aggravated the situation of the Buddha, who clearly knew what exactly he was doing, and finally precipitated his demise, is to be understood as a series of events causally conditioned. The tradition has taken tremendous effort to exonerate the donor from any wrong doing or any reproach from the posterity. It is said that the Buddha exalted this last meal and the very first meal he had immediately before his enlightenment as the highest acts of alms-giving. In a later period, this tradition has come under scrutiny of King Milinda who questioned from Nagasena how this could be since the last meal “turned to poison, gave rise to disease, put an end to the period of his (the Buddha’s) then existence, took away his life”. The latter provides the following explanation: It was not because of it that any sickness fell upon the Blessed One, but it was because of the extreme weakness of his body and because of the period of life he had to live having been exhausted, that the disease arose, and grew worse and worse – just as when, O King, an ordinary fire is burning, if fresh fuel be supplied, it will burn up still more- or as when a stream is flowing along as usual, if a heavy rain falls, it will become a mighty river with a great rush of water- or as when the body is of its ordinary girth, if more food be eaten, it becomes broader than before. So this was not, O King, the fault of the food that was presented, and you can not impute any harm to it. (Davids 1977, 244-245) This explanation is essentially a continuation of the tradition of denying any causal relation between the two events and exonerating the donor. Although the latter purpose may have been served, whether or not the explanations of this sort are effective in denying the direct relation this food had with aggravating the situation of the Buddha remains uncertain.

Conclusion The mainstream Mahayana tradition has advocated vegetarianism, and consequently meat-eating has come under severe criticism in the Mahayana literature. The eighth chapter of the Lankāvatāra-sūtra contains a scathing attack on meat-eaters. Scholars such as Kalupahana think that the connection of the Sutra to Lanka, which has been the main centre of Theravada, and its attack on meat-eating are not accidental (Kalupahana 1992, 241-246). The target of Laṅkāvatāra could well be the Theravada tradition which thrived in Sri Lanka since the 3rd century

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bce. What would be the Theravada position on meat eating? It is clear that the position is not at all an outright prohibition. Nor is the position an unconditional approval. The three criteria established surely limit one’s direct involvement in killing beings for food. The three criteria have been given for the monks and nuns. A community of people who depended on others for their livelihood does not seem to have much choice in this regard. It is very appropriate for them to choose houses; nor is it appropriate for them to look for preferences in food. Discussing vegetarianism in Buddhist monastic life Damien Keown makes the following observations: The earliest sources depict the Buddha as following a nonvegetarian diet and even resisting an attempt to make vegetarianism compulsory for monks. Many take this as confirmation that the Buddha had no objection to meat-eating, but it may equally well have been the case that since meat-eating was a wide-spread and accepted practice in the Buddha’s time, accepting meat in alms was allowed for practical purposes. (Keown 2005, 48-49) Furthermore, one could argue that if food was consumed ‘reflecting wisely’, as we discussed above, what one eats or whether what one eats is exquisite or ordinary would not matter. Seyfort Ruegg highlights some additional considerations regarding the Theravada (early Vinaya) position: …as an almsman the Bhikkhu was not only dependent on the offerings he received on his begging rounds, but that as a person to be honoured (dakkhiṇeyya) and a “field of merit” (puññakkhetta), he was morally bound to accept any alms offered in good faith by a pious donor and that if he failed to do so he was interfering with the karmic fruit and just reward that the donor was entitled to expect. Finally since in Buddhist thought it is the intention with which an act is accomplished that determines its moral and karmic quality, the Bhikkhu’s accepting and eating meat in the conditions specified above cannot be dismissed as necessarily a mere subterfuge allowing him to circumvent some share of responsibility in a series of acts involving vihimsa at an earlier stage. (Seyfort 1980, 239) All these are clearly meant for the monastic community. What about meat-eating as a practice in society at large?

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In the five precepts (pañca-sīla) the first being abstaining from taking life vegetarianism seems almost a corollary of it. This is further supported by prohibition of selling meat as a livelihood for the followers of the Buddha. But as found earlier in this discussion, the Buddha has not discussed the specific problem of meat eating as applicable to the whole society. What we have in the Theravada tradition in this regard is not a well-articulated theory or a principle, but some attitudes and practices. There are Jātaka stories detailing the dangers of being addicted to meat-eating. Dharmadvaja Jātaka (219) refers to a king who resorted to cannibalism when he could not find any meat for his meal. In the opposite direction, a child is eulogized in the Sri Lankan commentarial literature for not killing an animal even to save his mother’s life. In the recorded history, some of the earliest examples of kindness to animals are available from the ancient Sri Lanka. Devanampiya Tissa, the first king to be converted to Buddhism, declared the reservoir called Abhaya a sanctuary for the fish in there. Many subsequent rulers in Sri Lanka enacted a public decree called ‘mā-ghāta’ (don’t kill!) in the entire country or in limited areas. This does not necessarily mean that they adopted vegetarianism. Nonetheless, they seem to have understood the teaching of the Buddha as advocating restraint in food including meateating. Emperor Asoka who followed the teaching of the Buddha refers to non-violence (ahimsā) in many of his edicts. In particular, in his first rock edict he says that the number of animals and birds killed for the royal kitchen has been reduced to three and that even that number will come to stop very soon. All these instances point to a very humane and kind attitude toward beings killed for food. As the well-known statement in the Karaṇīyametta-sutta says one should wish for the well-being of all beings (including those that are killed for food). The optimum state is one without any being killed for food. But the Buddha never made this a law. In particular, he did not make regulations for the lay people (simply because the lay society was beyond the jurisdiction of the Buddha). Therefore, the Buddhist position toward meat-eating as applicable to society at large is characterized by moderation, restraint and nonaddiction, steps which could lead ultimately to complete abandoning of food-related desire including that for meat.

14. Socio-historical Approach to Buddhism, Buddhist Social Theory/Philosophy and Buddhist Social Activism: Towards Clarification of Some Theoretical Issues*

Introduction There is, no doubt, much discussion on socio-historical approach to Buddhism, Buddhist social theory and Buddhist social activism which is also described as socially enaged Buddhism. Discussion on these inter-connected issues sometimes tends to get inter-mingled in such a way that clarity of concepts is diminished and inter-relations among issues are blurred. My effort in this paper is to review some of the key thinkers in this field in order to highlight some theoretical and conceptual/ philosophical issues that underlie their thinking. By doing so, it is hoped that a clearer understanding on these inter-related issues will emerge. Buddhism being a tradition with more than twenty five centuries behind it in divergent cultural and geographical settings, it is understandable that it has assumed over the time many shapes of practice. When Max Weber wrote about Buddhist in his discussion of Indian religion, he was writing of an essentially (South, Southeast and East) Asian phenomenon about which a few Westerners had only an academic interest. The situation today has changed, and Buddhism, spreading much beyond its traditional habitats, has made inroads to the Western world. What was practiced by the people of Asian societies who received their religion from the traditional is being practiced today by people who have discovered it on their own by reading, studying etc. What is being studied today as Buddhism is also what has been constructed by the modern (Western) scholarship which is basically based on textual studies done in environments and conditions which * An initial version of this paper was presented at International Conference on Buddhism and Society at Central University of Tibetan Studies, Saranath, Varanasi, India - 13 - 15 January 2013.

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have little to do with the actual practice of what is written in these texts. Naturally, there are various constructs of Buddhism which do not agree with one another. The present debates on what constitutes the real Buddhist practice are results if these divergent ways of understanding Buddhism. In the traditional Buddhist societies people tend to believe that there are two goals in Buddhism, namely, nirvana for the monks (and nuns) and heaven for the lay followers. In the Western Buddhists in particular and, in general, among those in the traditional Buddhist countries influenced by modern education and thinking this traditional bifurcation is being questioned, rejected, and replaced with a form of practice which would have looked some time among as befitting monastics. Whether this relatively recent development is in accordance with what the Buddha intended as the layman’s practice, or, going a little further, whether the Buddha taught two different paths for the two groups need to be examined. They have a direct bearing on the discussion on Buddhist social theory and its practice. There are both meta-theoretical issues as well as theoretical issues to be discussed. Among the meta-theoretical such questions as: can there be a Buddhist social theory (BST), and can BST be justified even if one can be constructed, are important. Among the theoretical issues, in addition to the issues regarding the nature of the Buddhist practice as mentioned above, there are issues about self and other in the actual practice needing discussion.

Meta-theoretical issues: Max Weber The history of contemporary discussions on what may be called ‘social dimension of Buddhism’ is now almost one hundred years old. This is by taking Max Weber as the pioneer who discussed ‘social philosophy’ of Buddhism almost a hundred year ago. Weber’s characterization of Buddhism as an asocial philosophy has exerted a great influence on subsequent students of Buddhism. In his The Religion of India, Weber characterized Buddhism as a path of an individual salvation seeker, and he says: Ancient Buddhism represents in almost all, practically decisive points the characteristic polar opposite of Confucianism as well as Islam. It is a specifically un-political and anti-political status religion, more precisely, a religious “technology” of wandering and of intellectually-schooled mendicant monks. Like all Indian philosophy and theology it is a “salvation religion”, if one is to

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use the name “religion” for an ethical movement without a deity and without a cult. More correctly, it is an ethic with absolute indifference to the question of whether there are “gods” and how they exist. Indeed in terms of “how”, “from what” “to what end” of salvation, Buddhism represents the most radical form of salvation-striving conceivable. Its salvation is a solely personal act of the single person individual. There is no recourse to a deity or savior. From the Buddha himself we know no prayer. There is no religious grace. There is, moreover, no predestination either. (Weber 1958/2000, 206) The picture emerging from this characterization is that the followers of the Buddha consist exclusively of those who are intent on their personal salvation through purely subjective modes of cognition which does not need to have any reference whatsoever to the external world. Weber says: A sense of social responsibility resting on a social ethic which operates with the idea of the “infinite” value of the “individual human soul” must be as remote as possible from a salvation doctrine which, in any value emphasis upon the “soul” could discern only the grand and pernicious basic illusion. Also the specific form of Buddhist “altruism,” universal compassion, is merely one of the stages which sensitivity passes when seeing through the nonsense of the struggle for existence of all individuals in the wheel of life, a sign of progressive intellectual enlightenment, not, however, an expression of active brotherliness. In the rules for contemplation, compassion is expressly defined as being replaced, in the final state of mind, by the cool stoic equanimity of the knowing man. (Weber 1958/2000, 213) For characterization of the influence upon external behavior of the Buddhist type of salvation the following is decisive. Assurance of one’s self by any inner-worldly or extra-worldly action, by “work” of any kind, but, in contrast to this, it is sought in psychic state remore from activity. This is decisive for the location of the arhat ideal with respect to the “world” of rational action. No bridge connects them. Nor is there any bridge to any actively conceptualized “social” conduct. Salvation is an absolutely performance of the self-reliant individual. No one and particularly no social community can help him. The specific asocial character of all genuine mysticism is here carried to its maximum. Actually, it appears

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even as a contradiction that the Buddha, who was quite aloof from forming a “church” or even a “parish” and who expressly rejected the possibility and pretension of being able to “lead” an order, has founded an order after all. (emphasis added) (Weber 1958/2000, 213-214) What Weber seems to suggest is that to do with society, even to a monastic society, on the part of the Buddha is questionable from the point of view of consistency. In other words, what Weber indicates is that not only there cannot be any social philosophy of Buddhism but also that such philosophy, even if one were to construct one, is beyond any justification. Weber’s interpretation of Buddhism is basically based on textual studies. Even these texts were not in Pali, Sanskrit, Chinese or Tibetan, language in which the original Buddhist texts are found. His sources were Western translations of Pali texts with some occasional translations from Sanskrit or Tibetan. Critical studies in Buddhist texts had hardly begun by this time, and what was written by scholars like Oldenberg were again their own constructs based on texts. The textual evidence on these issues by no means is clear or unambiguous. Weber’s interpretation of Buddhism is a part of his interpretation of what he call ‘Indian religion’ which he characterizes as ‘salvation religion (Weber 1958/2000, 206). According to him, Buddhism is ‘the most radical form of salvation-striving conceivable’ in which ‘salvation is a solely personal act of the single individual’ (Weber 1958/2000, 206). Subsequently, in his study Weber argues extensively to show that the laity was not outside of this salvation striving and they did not have really a role of place in the process. They were just tolerated “in a manner somewhat similar to the tolerated infidels in Islam’ (Weber 1958/2000, 214). In this manner, Weber argues for two positions which continue to have influence even up to date in Buddhist academic discussions and circles of practitioners, namely, (i) that Buddhism is purely a private and personal path for salvation, and (ii) that it is exclusively meant for renunciants. From these two propositions comes the thesis that Buddhism not only does not have but also cannot have a social philosophy applicable even to the monastic members let alone to lay society.

Ambiguities in the tradition Throughout the Buddhist history, in the Theravada in particular though not exclusively, we encounter such dichotomous divisions as village dwellers and forest dwellers (gāma-vāsi and arañña-vāsi), those

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who wore rag robes (dhamma-kathika and pāmsukūlikā), and those who were well versed in the Dhamma and those well versed in the Vinaya (dhamma-dhara) and (vianaya-dhara). Although these divisions were not found during the time of the Budhha in these clear-cut terms, there is evidence to show that the basic dichotomy or ambiguity was there among the early followers of the Buddha’ A good example of such near polar behavior or approach can be found in the lives of Mahakassapa and Ananda two of the most prominent of all early disciples of the Buddha. In this context, I am going only to make an outline of an argument which I have developed elsewhere (refer to article 3 of this volume). There is no doubt that two elders were most respected among the Sangha and were very close to the Buddha and had won his praise equally. The former was respected by the Master by exchanging robes with him and the latter was the long-standing attendant to the Buddha and was constant companion of him. Their ways of life and thinking, nevertheless, seemed far apart. Whereas Mahakassapa was a forest dweller, shunned society, in particular the association of women, and observed severe forms asceticism (known as dhutaṅga in the Pali literature), Ananda was a city dweller, associated with society and known for his kindness to women in distress. There are many episodes recorded in the discourses which highlight the differences of opinions and even the ways of behavior of the two elders. These differences reach their culmination in the first council held three months after the parinirvāṇa of thr Buddha in which Mahakassapa, the chairperson of the assembly, brings several charges against Ananda. These charges have direct bearing on the differences of personality displayed in the lives of the two elders. Ananda was charged against persuading the Buddha to establish the bhikkhunī order which was perceived as detrimental to the wellbeing of the sāsana. He was also charged for allowing women to pay respect, prior to others, to the body of the Buddha after his parinirvāṇa. Both charges have to do with Ananda’s behavior towards women with whom Mahakassapa had minimum contact. In this manner, the differences between the two elders are many, and interestingly, these differences ultimately lead us to foresee the dichotomous ways of behavior, as mentioned above, subsequently developed within the Sangha. The important question arising from the ways of behavior of the two elders is that as to who is the ideal bhikkhu in the Buddhist tradition: is it forest-living, society-shunning Mahakassapa or city-dwelling and socially-engaged Ananda? The ‘answer’ given by the tradition is

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interesting: neither was preferred and both were accepted equally. This explains, perhaps, how the tradition has throughout maintained these dichotomous ways of life without any major rift or disunion. Now if to the way of life of Mahakassapa although in some very important respect the latter seemed to have had a strong ‘social’ commitment to the preservation of the Dhamma and the sāsana for the posterity. The presence of the concept of ‘muni’ too seems to contribute to this dichotomy. In his behavior, Mahakassapa is certainly closer to the behavior of a sage described in the discourses as ‘muni’ or the silent one. Being silent suggests a-socialness, and as the well-known khaggavisāna-sutta (Discourse on the Rhinocerus) stresses, the hallmark of a muni is aloofness from the society. Seeing all kinds off dangers in social association a muni must live alone like a rhinoceros (eko care khaggavisāna-kappo). The Buddha himself was described as the ‘muni of the Sakyans’ (Sākya-muni). While all these reference support the view that silent asocial muni is the ideal of the Buddhist monk there are other statements of the Buddha which seem to undermine the very essence of the muni concept, namely, silence: Not by silence (alone) does he who is dull and ignorant become a sage (muni); butthat wise man, who, as if holding a pair of scales, embraces the best and shuns evil, is indeed a sage. For that reason he is a sage. He who understands, both worlds is, therefore, called a sage. (Dhp v. 39) As becomes clear in this statement by taking away the literal meaning of the term the Buddha seems to give a different interpretation. Scanning the history of the Buddhist monastic tradition, we know that it has accommodated both positions of varying degrees. This shows that what Weber’s interpretation of Buddhist practice private, asocial and individualistic seems to highlight is not only his misplaced emphasis but also the historically persistent ambiguity in the tradition itself as to the true emphasis of the practice.

Monastic community life Weber’s characterization of the Buddhist path as purely private and personal rules out any possibility for social interaction even among the members of the Sangha. It goes without saying that there cannot be any social philosophy taking in lay people in any manner. It does not seem that Weber had accessed to the Vinaya-piṭaka of the Buddhist monastic tradition which contains details of day-to-day life the Buddhist Sangha.

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The expression “by mutual advice by mutual up-lifting’ (aññaṃ añña vacanena aññaṃ añña uṭṭhāpanena) can be considered as the motto of the Pātimokkha which is the collection of the monastic rules. It is very important to notice that the monastic life was always considered as a community life. The very term ‘Sangha’ indicates this communal character. The community was crucial for this way of life for there was no privet or personal ownership among the Sangha and everything was owned the community and was distributed among the members not according to what one received but according to what one needed. It was emphasized by the Buddha that, particularly, the members of the Sangha needed the association of good friends (kalyāna mitta). There is an instance in the discourses in which the Buddha corrected Ananda who thought that half of the improvement in the sāsana is due to good friends: the Buddha said that it is not half but the totality of improvement is owing to good friend. The individual members of the Sangha always belonged to a particular group in which he (or she) had his teacher and preceptor to guide him and co-renunciants to provide sense of belongingness. There are duties to be performed toward one’s teacher, pupil and co-renunciants, and these duties are elaborated in great detail in the Vinaya. The Vinaya makes it further clear that one cannot neglect these duties simply on the ground that one has to attend to the matters of one’s personal purification or personal liberation. It is the custom of the members of the Sangha to gather every two weeks to recite the pātimokkha, and discuss matters of common concern. A story connected Mahakaccana, one of the senior disciples of the Buddha, says that he was of the view that he need not attend this communal function for he had achieved his samsaric goal. It is recorded in the Vinaya that the Buddha discouraged his thought and urged him to attend this communal function. Although there is no doubt that inner purification by means of meditation is not social or communal in nature, Buddhism makes it very clear that the activity of purification has to happen in a communal context. One could still think that what Weber missed is only the communal aspect of the Buddhist monastic life, but he is right in characterizing the practice as personal and private. Such characterization is flawed mainly for its foundational error, namely, the wrong idea of independent and autonomous individual who has to purify himself at any cost. The Weberian characterization has at its heart the ātma view rejected by the teaching of the Buddha, which is a precondition of liberation.

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Self-other distinction and the im/possibility of helping others In the Mahayana Buddhist tradition, with its bodhisatva ideal totally dedicated for saving all sentient beings, the problem of possibility service for others does not arise. The situation with the (Theravada) arahant ideal is perceived as different. It is said that to be an arahant is to make an end to one’s own suffering. The belief is that one should dedicate one’s whole life to achieve this goal. Only after one achieves this goal one is ready to go help others. The following admonition given by the Buddha to Cunda is considered as supportive of this way of understanding: Cunda, that one who is himself sinking in the mud should pull out another who is sinking in the mud is impossible; that one who not himself sinking in the mud should pull out another who is sinking in the mud is mud is possible. (M I, 45) If the Buddha’s admonitions are understood as discouraging those who have not attained ultimate goal to go out to the world then it is tantamount to making arahanthood a precondition for social action. This effectively bars all those who are still on the path from engaging in anything other than (what is narrowly perceived as) path. This way of understanding the path leads us to the conclusion that one must attend to oneself first. A revealing discussion on this issue is found in Sedakamma-sutta of the Saṃyutta-nikāya discourses (S V, 169). According to it, an acrobat raises his bamboo pole and asks his apprentice to climb on it and then to stand on his shoulder. To the apprentice who is on his shoulders the acrobat says: ‘my friend, in this exercise the following is the right method: you protect me, and I protect you; in this way, both of us protect ourselves, be safe, earn money and live happily.’ The apprentice disagrees and says: no, teacher, in this exercise the following is the right method: I protect my self, and you protect yourself; in this way, both of us protect ourselves, be safe, earn money and live happily.’ The discourse does not say who is right; but he starts from the point made by the apprentice and says ‘one who protects oneself protects others (attānaṃ rakkhanto paraṃ rakkhati), and subsequently adds, one who protects others protect oneself (paraṃ rakkhanato attānaṃ rakkhati: S V, 169). The conclusion seems to be that the two situations are mutually dependent, and that one cannot really isolate only one aspect without losing the other. Both atta and para are given equal weight; neither is sacrificed

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for the sake of the other. In the case of the two acrobats, who cannot save oneself even if one were to be very alert but the other is not; the best option for each is to protect oneself without putting the other in danger. In understanding the Buddha’s admonition in this context, one has to keep in mind the Buddha is talking not on any material or worldly gain or loss but on one’s inner purification (visuddhi) and liberation (vimutti). The Buddhist treads a middle path between unconditional selfsacrifice and absolute selfishness. In the Buddhist position ultimately both self and other disappear for both are fictitious constructs without any objective reality corresponding to them. This has to be distinguished from the Vedantic position in which ultimately self (ātma) remains as the only reality.

Place of house-holders (gihi/grhastha) in Buddhism Emphasis laid on the ideal solitary renunciant seems to have made Weber to think that lay people really did not have a role to play within the Buddhist tradition. Again evidence found in the discourses suggests otherwise. As Mohan Wijayarathna points out: As vinaya texts show that the Buddha converted lay people to his new religious movement from the very beginning. The first people to accept him as religious master were two merchants called Tapassu and Bhallika (Vin I, 4; A I, 25), who met the Buddha by chance on a business trip. This happened soon after the enlightenment, a few weeks before the first discourse and the establishment of Buddhist monasticism. A few months later, the young monks Yasa’s father and mother in turn accepted the Buddha as their religious master (Vin I, 15-20). For these lay people, whose former religious allegiance we do not know, converting to Buddhism did not entail renouncing life in the world: they simply became the followers of the Buddha and his teaching. (Wijayarathna 1990, 164) In the discourses, the Buddha refers to ‘four groups’ (cattāro parisā), namely, bhikkhus and bhikkhunīs and upāsakas and upāsikas, lay men and women, as his followers, and often talks about many things common to all of them. For instance, in the Mahaparinibbāna-sutta the Buddha says to the Māra, who asked him to attain parinirvāṇa, that he will not do so until all members of all four groups become well versed in his teaching. This shows that they were not simply ‘tolerated’

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as Weber thought. Along with Weber one could argue that the Buddhist monks and nuns who gathered their food by going from house to house without any discrimination or personal preference did not need to depend on any particular lay people for their survival, and they could just follow this age-old impersonal Indian way of existence (pinḍa-pāta). But, given the great compassion (mahā karuṇā) of the Buddha to all living beings, is it possible that the Buddha totally disregarded the inner needs of those who directly or indirectly supported religious life of his monastic followers, and treated lay people as mere instruments with no obligation in return? In the traditional (Theravada) Buddhist societies there is a belief that nirvana (mokkha=release) as the final goal is only for the renunciants, monks and nuns, and for lay people the goal is heaven (sagga). Accordingly, meditation is considered to be the way of one who is intent on achieving nirvana and performing and accumulating merit (puñña) is way for the laity. This remains true even up to date in the lay Buddhist life in the traditional South and South East Asian Buddhist societies (Tilakaratne 2012, 93-111). This belief seems to have some canonical justification for there are discourses by the Buddha which refer to heaven as the goal of the laity. For example, in of the ‘duties’ of the religious people to the laity, teaching the path to heaven (saggassa maggaṃ ācikkhanti: D III, 187) is mentioned as one. This is understandable given the complexities of lay life demanding considerable amount of one’s time and energy. If it is true that monks and nuns are aiming at nirvana and the laity is aiming at heaven, does that mean that the Buddha has taught two paths for the two groups or is it one and the same path followed in two different intensities? Although a larger majority of lay people follow the path of heaven that cannot be understood as representing a totally different path. In the discourses, there are many references to lay people who had achieved the higher states in the path, and who practiced meditation amidst their busy household life. This shows that not only in theory but also in actual practice the path was the same for both groups. In the Sutta-nipāta there is an insightful account of the practice of the two groups according to which the practice of the peacock. The interesting contrast is that the swan is simple looking but fast whereas the peacock is colorful but slow. Sikhi yathā nīlagīvo vihaṅgamo haṃsassa nopeti javaṃ kudācanaṃ Evaṃ gihī nānukaroti bhikkhuno munino vivattassa vanamhi jhāyato (Sn v. 221)

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Even as the crested (peacock), blue-necked, (the bird) that soars in the sky never will reach the speed of the swan, even so they cannot emulate (to match) the monk, the sage (leading a life) of seclusion contemplating in the forest. There is much evidence to show that the householder life with its material comforts has not only been accepted but also been encouraged and praised. The possibility and the legitimacy of a social theory premised on the fact that the life of the laity is accepted within the system.

Social-historical method Trevor Ling (1973, 21 ff), one of the leading practitioners of the sociohistorical method, interpreting the Buddha and his teaching, identifies two approaches to Buddhist studies, namely, literalist and historical critical. The literalist method is to treat the religious texts as standing beyond space and time. He describes this approach in the following words: The sayings of the Buddha are regarded as propositions to be understood as literally without any necessary reference to the context in which they were spoken; as they stand they can be examined (if one is an historian of ideas) or thought about (if one is an interested inquirer) and acted upon (if one is a devotee). Usually it has been devotee (of a certain type) who has been responsible for encouraging the literalist approach. For he who, in the first instance, has come to regard the total teaching of the founder of his religion, contained in the canon of scripture, as the truth will also very easily apply such an evaluation to his or that particular saying which he finds in the canon; such sayings become invested with the quality of ‘eternal truths’, propositions which are universally vaild in all circumstances and under all conditions. In the historical approach … the teaching of the Buddha is related to the historical situation in which it is delivered, so far as it is possible to reconstruct and understand that situation. Attention is paid not only to the substance and meaning of the words spoken, but also to the fact that they were spoken to certain hearers in a given, concrete situation. In order to know what weigh is to be given to a particular saying it is necessary to remember that the words were

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not uttered into the empty air, but to specific audience. Ling says that this second approach allows us to distinguish between sayings that are bound to particular context and hence with limited validity and those dealing with more permanent human situations which have enduring validity. The distinction Ling introduces is basically methodological. The insight behind his historical critical approach, namely that a text has to be understood in its social milieu has, under postmodernist influence, become universally accepted as exemplified in the dictum ‘text in context’. What interests us in Trevor Ling in this context is not necessarily his methodology, but the interpretation of Buddhism he develops through that methodology. In chapter seven, titled ‘the new wisdom’ Ling describes the enlightenment of the Buddha a ‘humanistic discovery’, differentiating it from theistic transcendental experience, and further describes it as a ‘discovery based on analyses. Toward the end of the discussion, Ling calls Buddhism a ‘form of rationalism’ by which he seems to mean the rational outlook found in the teachings of the Buddha. The trouble with this characterization is not what Ling attributes to Buddhism in general terms, but the overall characterization of Buddhism as a form of rationalist and humanist philosophy with predominantly a social message. The strong and unique aspect of personal transformation of the message of the Buddha is relegated to a secondary position, and thus Buddhism becomes a mere rationalist humanism which draws intellectual attraction and admiration devoid of practical application. A more recent example of a similar genre is Nalin Swaris (2008). He discusses the Buddha’s way to human liberation from a socio-historical approach. Like Ling, Swaris begins his study by locating the Buddha’s path it its ancient Indian socio-historical (religious and philosophical) context. He refers to Ling approvingly and shares with him the idea that salvation taught in Buddhist is not private enterprise, ‘the fling of the alone to the Alone’ (6). The following words of Swaris reveal his point of departure from the Weberian type characterization of the Indian religion in general and Buddhism in particular: The Buddha’s way is often understood and explained as a path to private salvation, ideally to be realized in solitude, away from the everyday concerns of ordinary men and women. If this is true, how can one explain Magga- the Way, the fourth Noble Truth, which is one of the most social of moralities? None of the eight ‘limbs’ or features of the way suggests that they were exclusively

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or primarily intended for persons who had renounced the household life. Right Livelihood in included as an integral and indispensable feature of the path to Human Liberation. This make the right ordering of economic and political relationship a central, not peripheral, concern of Dhamma practice (3). True to this preamble, Swaris describes Buddhism as a ‘this worldly vision and practice’ (26). He derives inspiration from Derrida’s concept of deconstruction and finds it resonating with the Buddha’s teaching of anatta very closely. Methodologically, Swaris applies the insight behind the conditional co-genesis (paṭicca-samuppāda) to interpret and understand the teaching of the Buddha itself. Swaris’s work is refreshing in its most thorough and consistent application of socio-historical method to the teaching of the Buddha. Nevertheless, in its ultimate analysis of Buddhism as a form of enlightened humanism Swaris is essentially no different from Trevor Ling.

A Buddhist social theory and some meta-theoretical and theoretical issues As we showed earlier in this discussion, taking into account Weber’s views on Buddhist practice, one may ask whether there is a social philosophy or a theory in Buddhism. Weber’s objection is based on the view that salvation is purely an individual matter for which society cannot do anything. On the face of some serious limitations of Weber’s view, we better not bother about this objection any longer. Nevertheless, one may ask the same question on the basis of dukkha, the central insight of Buddhism on human existence: if suffering is the reality of existence how can one talk about any material improvement of society which ultimately tends to prolong the samsara which is tantamount to prolonging suffering. This objection too is based on total disregard of what the Buddha said on what ordinary human being living in the world can achieve both ‘here and here-after’, and the practice of the path taught by the Buddha. The socio- historical approaches discussed above have a social theory as their ultimate aim although whether everyone agrees with all the feature of such a theory remains a question. Most of the examples so far we discussed may be included in the category of what Ken Jones (1989) calls ‘ reductive modernism’ theories which reduce the teaching of the Buddha to ‘a rational humanism which includes a political theory for radical structural change’ (Jones 1989,273). On the other hand, it is not

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mandatory that a social theory must be preceeded by a methodological approach of the nature of social-historical approach. David Loy (2003) tries to develop a Buddhist social theory without subscribing to such approach necessarily. Like many others discussed earlier, Loy too takes the doctrine of conditioned co-genesis and the idea of no-soul as crucial methodological foundations of a Buddhist social theory. Furthermore, he takes the doctrine four noble truths as the structure to understand and change the phenomenon of suffering. In particular, Loy analyses what is known as human made suffering and also what he call ‘corporate’ or institutionalized greed, hatred and delusion, three roots of evil as taught is Buddhism as essential bases of individual suffering. The answer to the suffering, both at personal and societal level, is transformation. The way to individual transformation has been analysed in the discourses in detail. But the question is: ‘can this process of individual transformation be generalized for collective transformation as well?’ Loy says: For those who see the necessity of radical change, the first implication of Buddhist social praxis is the obvious need to work on ourselves as well as the social system. If we have not begun to transform our own greed, ill will, and delusion, our efforts to address their institutionalized forms are likely to be useless, or worse. We may have some success in challenging the sociopolitical order, but that will not lead to an awakened society. (Loy 2003, 35) The point Loy underscores is that without one’s own internal transformation a real change in society will not come about. This takes us back to the discussion on the two acrobats. Jones describes a theory of this sort as ‘transcendental modernism (as opposed to reductive modernism mentioned above) which is the Buddhism’s critique of the modernity which leads to social action guided by right understanding.

Buddhist social activism/socially engaged Buddhism A theory has to have a practice. A theory without practice in the Buddhist context is to reduce it to a mere intellectual pursuit. As Ken Jones (Jones 1989, 19) points out, need is both to understand and change the society. A theory is a tool for understanding; in order to effect change, one needs to practice it. What we find today as socially engaged Buddhism (SEB) is a practice a Buddhist social theory. As Jones point out, a prerequisite of SEB is to see the danger is what is called ‘social fallacy’ which is the view that human well-being is achieved solely through social development.

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As Loy did in his discussion, Jones much earlier lays stress on the need for personal transformation: Buddhism implies that unless there is some significant personal and individual change in the ways we feel and think about others we shall try to go on evolving societies which express and reinforce the futile struggle of each of us to escape from our root fear into varieties of acquisitive and aggressive belongingness identity. (Loy 2003, 123) The most challenging aspect of the Buddhist practice is that it requires, as a prerequisite, repudiation of one’s views, attitudes and behavior. This should not, however, lead to the ‘private and personal’ Buddhism which is equally guilty of ‘individual fallacy’ (as opposed to social fallacy), namely, the belief that purely by individual change without addressing social forces, change can happen. What this ultimately means is that, as Ken Jones rightly says, the distinction between personal Buddhist practice and social activism is false; there cannot be any discrepancy or dichotomy between the two, and there is only one practice to be done. In other words, social work can be the testing ground for one’s reflective and contemplative practice. To put this in a Kantian terminology: social practice without contemplation is blind; contemplation without social work is empty.

Conclusion This paper deals with three inter-connected phenomena, namely, sociohistorical approach to Buddhism, Buddhist social theory and Buddhist social activism. We started with Max Weber, an otherwise renowned sociologist of the early twentieth century, whose writings on Buddhism gave rise to some misconceptions about it. Next, we examined Trevor Ling and Nalin Swaris who subscribed to forms of what may be called reductive modernism. David Loy was discussed as an example of a Buddhist social theory essentially with a moral foundation. Finally, Ken Jones was discussed as an example of Buddhist social practice or SEB. It is generally believed that social philosophy and associated activism in Buddhism is not as developed as, say, they are in Judeo-Christian tradition. This seems true when consider the concepts such as rights, justice etc. which are highly developed in those traditions. The relative lack of development of these concepts in the Buddhist tradition has to be explained historically as well as philosophically. This apparent deficiency does not necessarily mean that the Buddhist societies were barbaric and

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inhuman or that the societies with advanced concepts of rights, justice etc. were more civilized and humane. It is a truism that different societies find different ways to deal with their specific situations. Buddhism has been a great civilizing force wherever it found home. In the globalized word today, it exerts its influence all over the world thereby contributing to create a better world for all sentient beings to live.

15. Xuan Zang and Fa Hsien on the History and Religion of Sri Lanka*

Introduction Of the many pilgrims who ventured to travel to what is known among the Chinese as ‘western Buddhist countries’ Xuan Zang undoubtedly was most prominent. His records serve as one of the most reliable sources for unraveling some mysteries of Indian Buddhist history. It is clear that Xuan Zang did not visit Sri Lanka. He was satisfied by the accounts he got from the monks visiting from Sri Lanka and seems to have thought that there was no point in visiting the Country. The monks who provided information on Sri Lanka refer to the death of the king and a famine the country was facing. Nearly two centuries earlier however, Fa Hsien, another illustrious Chinese traveler visited Sri Lanka and recorded his impressions on the Country, its culture, religion and people. In this paper, I will be examining the accounts given by Xuan Zang and Fa Hsien on Sri Lanka with a view to assess the light their accounts shed on understanding history of Buddhism in the Island in particular and in the region in general. Also it is of interest to put the information given by these travelers against the information on the state of Sri Lanka during this period as revealed through the chronicles of Sri Lanka and other historical sources.

Fa Hsien’s records of Sri Lanka

Fa Hsien started his journey at the beginning of the 5th century and spent altogether 15 years (399-414 A.D.) in India and Sri Lanka. The last lap * An initial version of this article was published in Buddhist and Pali Studies: Silver Jubilee Commemoration Volume of the Buddhist and Pali University of Sri Lanka, Homagama, 2007.

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of his journey was Sri Lanka where it is believed that he spent two years, and from where he started for his own country. The purpose of his visit was to find Vinaya texts of early Buddhist schools. Fa Hsien’s account begins with reference to early human settlement in the Island a long time ago. The country according to this account was initially populated by spirits and Nāgas. The merchants from different countries had used to come to the Island for trading goods. Gradually, many people came from various countries to the Island to settle down for it was a very pleasant place to live. Fa Hsien refers to the Buddha’s visit to Sri Lanka intending to transform the wicked Nāgas. Although the tradition has records of three visits by the Buddha to the island, Fa Hsien mentions only one which is the first. He mentions of a dāgoba (cetiya/pagoda) of 400 cubits built by a king, and a monastery built by the same king adjoining the dāgoba. The Chinese translation of ‘the fearless hill’ has been identified as Abhayagiriya, the monastery built by King Vaṭṭagāmaṇi Abhaya at the turn of the Christian era. It is known in the history of Buddhism in Sri Lanka that the building of this monastery and King’s act of giving it to one of his friend monks was the beginning of the Abhayagiriya fraternity which was subsequently to become the centre for nonTheravadda views in Sri Lanka. It is Interesting to see that, amidst many other more renowned monasteries including Mahavihara, which represented the orthodox Theravada view, Fa Hsien opts to describe Abhayagiriya first, which was also known as the ‘Northern Monastery’. This could be understood as due to the special status Abhayagiriya enjoyed as a centre where non-Theravada Buddhist views were welcome. The fact that Abhayagiriya had differences from Mahavihara from its very inception explains why a non-Teravada monk such as Fa Hsien was welcome there. But Fa Hsien does not talk about rivalries between the two centres. Instead, he talks about a much venerated monk, believed to be an arahant who lived in the Mahavihara. To his dismay, Fa Hsien could not see him alive. The monk had already passed away when he reached Anuradapura. Fa Hsien was lucky enough to participate in his funeral about which he gives a long account. In the course of describing the funeral of the arahant, Fa Hsien refers briefly to Mahavihara, where, he says, resided three thousand monks. He also refers to the monastery called Chatiya which is identified as Cetiya giri, which was the old Pali name for present Mihintale, a Sinhala name referring to arahant Mahinda Thera who brought Buddhism to the

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island who was also a son of Emperor Asoka. According to Fa Hsien this monastery houses two thousand monks. He refers to one renowned monk who lived there, named Dharma-gupta. In the history recorded in the Chronicles there is no mention of a well-known monk in this name. Among the later Buddhist schools there is a sect by this name. But the sect is not one originated in Sri Lanka and it has as Indian origin. The Sri Lanka chronicles do refer to a teacher called Dhamma-ruci, an off-shoot of Abhayagiri sect.

Xuan Zang Undoubtedly Xuan Zang (596-664) is the most illustrious Chinese Buddhist traveler to India. He started his travel in 629 ce and completed in 645. It is towards the end of his travel that he came to Kancipura in Deccan (Dakshinapatha) where he met about three hundred monks from Sinhaladvīpa. Xuan Zang expressed his desire to visit the country for he had heard that the monks in Sinhaladvīpa were well versed in the Sthaviravāda Canon and in Yogācāra-bhumi-sātra. The monks from the Island discouraged Xuan Zang saying that the king of Sinhaladvipa had passed away and that there was a famine in the Country. As for the knowledge of the Dhamma, they said that none surpassed them in the knowledge of the Dhamma. They offered themselves for Xuan Zang to clear any doubts on the Dhamma. The account says that the visitors from the Sinhaladvīpa were not able to answer Xuan Zang’s questions on Yogācāra-bhumi-sāstra to his satisfaction. There is, however, no mention of their knowledge on Sthaviravada. Most possibly they knew their own tradition much better than they knew the Indian tradition of idealism. Xuan Zang gave up the idea of going there and was satisfied to rely on the knowledge of the monks from the island. It is interesting to note that the leading monks in the group had names - Bodhimegheshvara and Abhayadastra - that are not familiar in the Sthaviravada tradition. In their Pali form the two names should consecutively be Bodhimeghissara and Abhayadatha. But we do not know whether they used Sanskrit form or the Pali form. If they came from Abhayagiriya it should be quite possible that they used Sanskrit forms of their names. But we are not in a position to say anything definitively on this. If the Sanskrit names were used, most probably the holders of those names were from Abhayagiriya and not from Mahavihara, which could explain how these monks were known to have mastered not only the Sthaviravada but also international Mahayana Buddhist texts. Xuan

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Zang himself says that the Abhayagiri monks studied both canons and “widely diffused Tripiṭaka: (Beal 1981, 247).” But, on the other hand, as we saw earlier, they were not able to answer his questions on the interpretation of the Yogacara text. The reference to the Mahayana texts establishes one historical belief about the Abhayagiri sect, namely, that they were open for views other than those of the Sthaviravada. The Sthaviravada views were preserved by the Mahavihara tradition,1 and naturally they had their allegiance to it. It is well know that the Sthaviravada monks committed the Pali texts into writing for the first time in the history during the reign of Vaṭṭagāmiṇi Abhaya (89-77 bce) who was instrumental in establishing the Abhayagiriya sect in the island. When the king offered the newly built Abhayagiri monastery to a monk who was his former friend, who took care of him during his time of preparation for war with invaders, the Mahavihara monks (There was no division of the Sri Lanka Sangha by this time.) accused the monk for accepting a monastery as a personal gift. The procedure should have been to accept such a gift on behalf of the Sangha and receive it back from the Sangha (if the Sangha so wishes) to be the care-taker of the monastery, again, on behalf of the Sangha. But this did not happen. The monk with the royal support behind him seems to have defied the authority of the Sangha. He took his followers along with him and started living in the new monastery as a separate group. This marked the first spilt of Sri Lanka Sangha, and also it marked the first instance of the main group of the Sangha being left without the royal patronage. To worsen the situation, it may have also marked somewhat active disregard, if not ill-treatment, toward the Mahavihara fraternity, on the part of the king. Although the Abhayagiri fraternity was separate from the Mahavihara, initially this did not mean that they had any doctrinal difference between them. But gradually it appears that the Abhayagiri developed its own identify by making themselves open for the Buddhist trends from India other than Sthaviravada. One of the differences was to learn Sanskrit which was used by some of the Buddhist sects in India including Mahayana as their textual language. This does not 1  Buddhagosa, the great Pali commentator, nevertheless, refers to one venerable Buddhadeva, one among those who invited him to compile the commentary for the Jātaka (past birth stories of the Buddha), who belonged in the lineage of Mahisāsaka. Now if this ‘Mahisāsaka’ refers to the Hinayana sect that arose after the second Buddhist council in India, it suggests that monks belonging to that sect were accepted within the Sthaviravada Mahavihara. Refer to : mahīṃsāsaka vamsamhi-sambhutena nayannuna, Buddhadevena ca tathā - bhikkhuna suddha buddhina (Introduction to the Commentary on Jātaka).

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mean that the Abhayagiri monks abandoned Pali, or that they adopted Sanskrit as their religious language. If we accept the Vimuttimagga2 as the meditation manual of the Abhayagiri, which was also called (uttaravihāra) or the Northern monastery, it shows that Pali was their religious language and that there was no any significant difference in the practice between the two fraternities. The subsequent history of the island contains several instances of conflict between the two fraternities. It seems that the Mahavihara did not tolerate any introduction of non-Sthaviravada texts to the Country. These texts, which were not specified, were called ‘vaitulyavāda’ or dissent view and were rejected by the Mahavihara. At times even royal supports was sought to dispel such texts. Naturally, the relation between the two fraternities might not have been very cordial. Tensions between the two fraternities reached a very high level during the reign of King Mahasena (276-303 A.D), who is said to have destroyed the entire Mahavihara as a result of which the inhabitants had to leave to remote places to save their life. It seems that Mahavihara may have required some time to recover from the devastation. One clue is that when the tooth relic of the Buddha was brought to Sri Lanka during the reign of King Siri Meghavanna (303-331 A.D), who succeeded Mahasena, it was initially accepted by the Abhayagiriya. Fa Hsien who reached Sri Lanka nearly after seven decades, most probably at the beginning of the reign of King Mahanama (410-432 A.D), records in detail the religious festivities associated with the veneration of the tooth relic conducted in association with the Abhayagiriya. Nearly two centuries later Xuan Zang also refers to these festivities. He also refers to the special shrine near the king’s palace where the tooth relic was housed. It is interesting to note that in the subsequent history a tradition of royal ownership of the tooth relic was evolved and the relic was shifted to the new location everytime the capital city was to be transferred. Thus, from the very beginning the tooth relic seems to have been protected by the king of the country. In the later history of the country, it is well known that the tooth relic became the symbol of the rulership of the Island. The festivities conducted in honour of the tooth relic have continued even till today. 2  The Vimuttimagga (Path of Freedom) was originally lost in Sri Lanka and was found in China and was translated into English under the title The Path of Freedom by R.N.M. Ehara Thera, a Japanese scholar, Soma Thera and Kheminda Thera, two Sri Lankan monks, in 1937 and was first published in 1961 in Colombo. Subsequently, the text in original Pali was found in Sri Lanka and was published.

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Bhikkhunī Order Neither Fa Hsien nor Xuan Zang makes any reference to the nuns’ order in Sri Lanka. This is strange, in particular, considering the fact that it is a group of Sri Lankan nuns, headed by a nun called Devasara, who went to China and established the nun’s Order there. The incident is reported in the 6th century Chinese biography of famous nuns (Pi Chu Ni Chuan?) written by great Chinese master Pao Chun (Refer to story #34). This seems to have taken place in 462 AC during the reign of King Mahanama who ascended the throne in 410 just when Fa Hsien is believed to have reached Sri Lanka. This incident is not reported in the Sri Lankan Chronicles. It is understandable why the Mahāvaṃsa, being a creation of the Mahavihara with its strict Theravada adherence, did not find it important to report this. The silence of the Dīpavaṃsa, which contains a fair amount of information on the Sri Lankan nuns, is for the simple fact that it did not cover that period.3 The Chinese records suggest that there was a great tradition of bhikkuṇīs in the country by this time. It is under these circumstances that the silence of Fa Hsien on bhikkuṇīs is hard to understand. By the time Xuan Zang planning to visit Sri Lanka, the situation of the country was not very good. The monks he met at the sea-port reported of the king’s death and also a famine. The seventh century was not a politically stable period and had at least sixteen kings ruling the country for relatively short periods. Wars, internal conflicts, famines were the order of the day. The fact that so many monks had to leave the country suggests that both monks and nuns had to suffer hardships. In such a situation, understandably, the plight of the nuns might have been even worse. The standard history contained in the chronicles and the commentaries is totally silent on nuns not necessarily because they were not there but because the monastic writers did not wish to acknowledge their presence. 3  See Ch. 18 of the Dīpavaṃsa for detail. This account a large number of learned and virtuous nuns seems to belong to 2nd century BC. for right after this account author continues with his narrative of King Siva who is believed to have reigned during…. In the same account the author say that ‘now’ (idāni) there are many other nuns with similar qualities. If the work is believed to have completed after King Mahasena (276-303 AD) (the last king of the Dīpavaṃsa) and before the compilation of the Mahāvaṃsa, whose author, Mahāvaṃsa, who author, Mahanama is believed to have lived around here ‘now’ should refer to fifth and sixth centuries. If that is the case, this is the time Fa Hsien visited and it is only two hundred years later Xuan Zang visited. It is unimaginable that all the nuns suddenly disappeared during this period. Perhaps it is possible that. The famine and the internal conflicts referred to by the informants of Xuan Zang could have served as causes for the downfall of not only the male Sangha but also the female Sangha.

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Religious life Both Fa Hsien and Xuan Zang say substantially about the religious life of the country. Fa Hsien describes elaborately of the festivities associated with the worship of the tooth relic. Xuan Zang describes a wonderful story about a Buddha statue that bent itself in order for a thief to emove the precious stone from its forehead. Xuan Zang too describes the festivities associated with the worship of the tooth relic. The religious life of the people, both monks and lay people, seems to be not devoid of popular aspects such as relic-worship. Fa Hsien mentions that both monks and lay people observed 8th, 14th and 15th holy days: At the heads of the four principal streets there have been build preaching halls, where on the eighth, fourteenth and fifteenth days of the month, they spread carpets and set forth a pulpit, while the monks and commonalty from all quarters come together to hear the Law. (Legge 1965, 104) This practice goes back to a very early period of Buddhism in India. In the Vinaya, the Buddha requests the monks and nuns to meet on these days (Vin IV, 131). From the beginning, the idea was for the members of the Sangha to meet together, recite the Pātimokkha (the code of monastic law), discuss their common concerns and preach the doctrine for the lay people. The evidence provided by the Chinese traveler bears on the dhamma-preaching aspect of these gatherings. Usually, prior to these public gatherings, monks met at their designated places of the monastery, namely sīmā,4 in order to attend to their monastic ‘legal’ functions. The Chinese’ records testify to the fact that the ancient Buddhist tradition was very much alive by this time. The patronage of the Sangha by the king is another tradition that was established very early in the Sri Lankan Buddhism. An essential part of this support was to look after the maintenance of the community of the Sangha. According to both Fa Hsien and Xuan Zang they had witnessed this tradition being followed by the rulers. Xuan Zang says that: ... by the side of the king’s palace there was built a large kitchen, in which daily is measured out food for eight thousand priests. The meal-time having come the priests arrives with their patras 4  Sīmā is the specific place determined by a group of the Sangha as the designated location for the ritual of reciting the Pātimokkha (Sanskrit=Pratimoksa, the code of monastic law of Vinaya rules).

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(alms bowls) to receive their allowance. Having received and eaten it, they return, all of them, to their several abodes. Ever since the teaching of the Buddha reached this country, the king has established this charity, and his successors have continued it down to our times. (Beal 1984, 250) It is further reported that there were sixty thousand monks, and that all of them had their provisions from a common store (Legge 1965, 104). This points to another great tradition that was characteristic of the Sangha, namely, the sāṅghika system (community-ownership) under which every member of the community received in accordance with their need. A key characteristic of the economy of the earliest Sangha was to pool all the material resources in one store and distribute through a specifically designated member to the members according their actual needs and not according to how much each member ‘earned’ (received).

Lankāvatāra-sūtra A very significant reference provided by Xuan Zang is on preaching of the Lankāvatāra-sūtra by the Buddha in Sri Lanka (Beal 1981, 251). According to its introduction, this very important sutra of the Mahayana tradition was preached by the Buddha in the city of Lanka to its Raksasa king - Ravana. The remark by Xuan Zang shows that the tradition was already known among the Sri Lankan Sangha. There is no wonder that they had this knowledge in the Mahayana literature given the possibility that whom he met at the India sea-port (Nagapaṭṭanam) is a group of Abhayagiri monks, who studied both Hinayana and Mahayana Piṭakas. There have been substantial academic discussions as to the specific connection of a leading Mahayana sutra such as this to such a leading Sthaviravada country as Sri Lanka. The scholars have noted the obvious disorganized character of the body of the Sutra and the somewhat extraneous character of the first and last chapters. The first nidāna chapter stands all by itself not organically connected to the body of the doctrine (or doctrines) presented in the rest of the Sutra. The final chapter on meat eating, again, does not have any apparent connection with the rest. D.J. Kalupahana, a noted Buddhist scholar, is of the view that the Lankāvatāra-sūtra had specifically been complied to convert Sri Lanakans to Mahayana. The Rawana connection and the name of the Sutra (‘Descent into Sri Lanka’) comprise one set of evidence. The other, more compelling evidence, according to Kalupahana, is the chapter on meat-eating, a practice which the Sthaviravada Buddhists in Sri Lanka were engaged in. Kalupahana says:

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The Chapter on “Meat eating” thus appears to be no more than a condemnation of the Mahavihara tradition, for a philosophical treatise like the Lanka could have dealt with more important moral issues than meat-eating. In fact, the compilers of Lanka were quite aware that the Mahavihara followed the rather liberal views of the Buddha, and even to the extent of denying a statement in the early discourses attributed to the Buddha regarding meat-eating. This is the internal evidence that the Lanka was meant as a textbook for the conversion of Lanka to Mahayana Buddhism. The external evidence for this view is even more compelling. Lanka does not appear to be a simple, out-of-the-way, solitary island, as Suzuki thought, if we keep in mind the extended ideological battles between the Theravadains and the Mahayanist staged in this part of the world during the third and fourth centuries A.D. (Kalupahana 1992, 244) Kalupahana’s view seems quite plausible when we think of the complex character of Buddhism of the country during this period, in particular, characterized by the rivalry between the two great Buddhist centers of the Country.

Conclusion The history of Buddhism in Sri Lanka as recorded by the Mahavihara fraternity seems to be quite partial to its own tradition. As a result, we don’t have much information about monks who were not Mahaviharians. Although there are references to what is called “Uttaravihāravaṃsaaṭṭhakathā” (Commentary on the History of the Northern Monastery), a work believed to be of the Abhayagiriya counterpart of Mahāvaṃsa (chronicle of Sri Lanka history as recorded by monks belonging to Mahavihara tradition), the book is not extant. It is through Chinese sources that we know that some nuns from Sri Lanka went to China and established the Bhikkhunī Order there. Again, we have to understand the lack of enthusiasms on the part of Theravadians on the Bhikkhunī Order. The accounts of the first saṅgāyanā suggest that the Theravada tradition from its very inception was not favorably disposed toward Bhikkhunī Order. There is no wonder that the Mahavihara monks in Sri Lanka, being true representatives of Theravada, probably thought that what the bhikkunīs did was not worth mentioning.

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Thus, it is clear that the Chinese records can shed considerable light on the matters of history of Buddhism in Sri Lanka. If Xuan Zang visited Sri Lanka, his records could have been enormously important sources for the study of the history and culture of this country. Although, it did not happen, it is important for us to closely examine the records of Xuan Zang and other Chinese travelers, who wrote on Sri Lanka and left their impressions on the country, its religion and culture, as more objective sources.

16. Traditional Theravada Meditation and Its Modern-Era Suppression*

Kate Crosby’s recent work has as its main aim to establish that there was a practice of meditation across the pre-modern south and southeast Asian Theravada world which, with the arrival of colonialism and modernism, was deliberately suppressed (in countries such as Thailand and Cambodia) or naturally died (Sri Lanka) and is still being practiced in varying degrees and form in some countries such as Thailand, Cambodia and Laos. This meditation practice which is called ‘boran kammaṭṭhāna’ ‘ancient practice’ (‘boran’ being the Khmer adaptation of Pali word ‘purāna meaning ancient) is presented in this work as the ‘traditional Theravada meditation’. This meditation system which was an ‘esoteric tradition, not disseminated publicly but through initiation’ (6) and which was ‘once the dominant form of meditation in the Theravada region’ (14) collapsed ‘under a diverse range of factors including the impact of colonialism, modernism, reform, technological innovation and geo-politics’ (6). In this work, the author basically does two things: she adduces evidence to show the existence, the spread and the demise of this particular meditation practice in the Theravada region, and she elucidates the ‘range of methods to induce transformation in the individual which we more usually associate with other fields, especially generative grammar, obstetrics and alchemy’ (6). In both these areas the author does a commendable work. Chapter I provides the intellectual background of European colonialism characterized by the portrayal of Roman Catholicism as corrupt and Protestantism as scientific, advances in western medical science which largely replaced the local * An initial version of this article was first published in Journal of Buddhist Studies Vol. XIII. 2017.

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medical practices in the Theravada region, the European construction of ‘early Buddhism’ as scientific and rational, and the Buddhist practice of those traditional countries as corrupt and far from ‘pure’ Buddhism. The chapter further describes how under these colonizing and modernizing influences the social milieu which had sustained traditional forms of life including boran kammaṭṭāna (Boran hereafter) which was ‘once the dominant form of meditation in the Theravada region’ (14), were neglected. In chapter 2 she unearths the history of this tradition in Cambodia, where most possibly it originated, and in Laos and Thailand where it spread in the pre-modern era, and discusses is arrival in Sri Lanka in the 18th century with the Siamese bhikkhus who reintroduced higher admission (upasampadā) to that country. Perhaps the most creative aspect of Crosby’s analysis is in chapter 3 in which she discusses how generative grammar, which uses algorithms and codes in order to prescribe the correct language formation and use, and Ayurvedic medicine in general and Ayurvedic obstetrics in particular were used in this meditation practice which emphasized both mental and physical wellbeing. In chapter 4 the author discusses the disappearance of this meditation practice and records the efforts at its suppression in Thailand as a part of sāsana reforms and modernizing efforts motivated by science, in particular, with the introduction of modern medical techniques and practices. What I have presented above is a mere summary of the main ideas of Crosby’s important contribution to the understanding of Theravada tradition and its practice of meditation in particular which deserves further serious study. The purpose of this review is not to discuss Crosby’s brilliant reconstruction of the conceptual universe behind this meditation practice and its history, but to highlight some issues arising from her overall treatment of the subject. In particular, I would like to comment on the following issues: (i) her characterization of this practice as ‘traditional Theravada meditation’ and the question of this suppression (ii) the contemporary practice of Theravada meditation which originated in Myanmar in the 19th century as resulting from colonialist and modernist influences on Theravada Buddhism, (iii) the claim that ‘much that we have conventionally identified as ‘Theravada’ is a modern text-based reconstruction of ‘early Buddhism’ fuelled by intensive and sustained colonial influence in the Theravada region’ (149) and (iv) some general issues connected to the replacement of Boran meditation by modern Theravada meditation.

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(i) The title of the work, Traditional Theravāda Meditation and its Modern-Era Suppression suggests that the subject matter of the book is the meditation practice that traditionally existed in the Theravada countries. According to the Mahāvaṃsa, the Theravada traditional reached Sri Lanka in the 3rd century bce during Asoka’s reign India. While the history of Theravada in mainland Southeast Asia region before 11th century is still unclear, most Buddhists believe that Theravada reached the region during Asoka’s time. The impression one gest from the title of Crosby’s book is that one is going to read about the meditation practice that was prevalent in these countries for about the last twenty three centuries. Crosby, however, has a particular understanding of ‘traditional’. She writes that “boran Kammatthana practice… can be considered as one important part of what of what might be called boran Theravada, traditional or ancient Theravada” (16), and immediately clarifies ‘ancient Theravada’ as “Theravada Buddhism prior to the various reforms of the last two centuries” (16). The author seems to argue that there is no evidence to show the existence of any other meditation tradition in the region before the beginning of the colonial period, and that what is usually taken as Theravada meditation today, such as Mahasi Sayadaw’s ‘New Burmese Method’ (which is sometimes called the ‘Mahasi Method’ or ‘rising and falling methoud’) was constructed by the Mingun and Ledi Sayadaws of late 19th century Burma. Both the Mingun Ledi lineages were concerned to revive the practice of meditation, in part by simplifying it and in part by making it accessible for practice by lay followers, and looked back to the canonical Satipaṭṭhāna suttas for textual authority. (13) I agree with Crosby that there is little textual evidence for Theravada meditation practices in Southeast Asia before colonialism. This is definitely true of Sri Lanka where outside of the classical manuals such as Visuddhimagga and Vimuttimagga and some general accounts of meditation in texts such as Khuddasikkhā and Vinayanivicchaya, no meditation manuals have survived. The question, however, is whether the absence of meditation manuals in monastic libraries means that no other forms of meditation (Boran or non-Boran) were practiced in the Theravada regions prior to the colonial period. Although the evidence from Cambodia, Laos and Thailand seems to support the presence of Boran during the pre-colonial period, the author does not produce any evidence for Boran in Burma. For the time being, we have to accept that Burma is not in this picture (although Crosby mentions Burmese Weikza practice, no firm correlation between the two is established). As far as

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Sri Lanka is concerned, it is clear that Boran was brought there in the middle of the 18th century by the Thai monks who came to reestablish higher admission. However, there is no evidence to show that Boran was practiced in Sri Lanka prior to this introduction. Furthermore, it does not appear that the Boran tradition lasted or took root in Sri Lanka1 although texts have survived as Crosby has shown through her many earlier researches and studies listed in the bibliography of the book. The absence of evidence does not mean that the Theravada monks (in particular) were not engaged in meditation. Although ‘living in the forest’ (arañña-vāsi) did not necessarily mean that all those who lived in the forest meditated, we cannot deny either that meditation was practiced among a larger majority of them. Also it is known that ‘living in the village’ (gāma-vāsi) did not necessarily mean that those monks did not meditate. We know that in the Theravāda tradition, in addition to this division, there were such other cognate divisions as dhamma-dhara (experts in dhamma) and vinaya-dhara (experts in Vinaya), ganthadhura (practice (‘yoke’) of texts) and vipassanā-dhura (practice (‘yoke’) of meditation), dhamma-kathika (preachers of Dhamma) pāmsukūlika and (wearers of rag robes), indicating the continued existence of two traditions in which one was more likely to have practiced meditation. In the absence of any particular meditation manuals or traditions, and in the uninterrupted presence of the Pali texts the Theravada monks oriented their meditation practice on the Pali piṭaka which was accepted as the word of the Buddha (Buddha-vacana) and on the Visuddhimagga which was unanimously accepted as truly representing the Pali Canon. It is possible that Boran was the traditional practice in Cambodia and Laos and Thailand to some extent. But Boran as the traditional Theravada practice is not true for Sri Lanka and Burma.2 1  The fact that the Sinhala version of a text related to Boran was compiled by a Siamese monk in the middle of the eighteenth century at the request of the queen of King Kirti Sri Rajasimha (Refer to: Kate Crosby, Andrew Skilton, Amal Gunasena (2012) “The Sutta on Understanding Death in the Transmission of Broan Meditation From Siam to the Kandyan Court” in Journal Philosophy 40: 177-198) does not add much to the promotion or practice of this meditation in the Kandyan Court (47,106). For the Royal lady, this could well have been a simple act of merit-making in order to transfer merit to a deceased person, in this case, the chief queen of the former king. 2  Sporadic instances of the practice of Boran in colonial Ceylon have been noted. Crosby refers to the last reported practitioner dying in 1900 (107,113). But Steven Kemper (2015) in his recent discussion of Anagarika Dharmapala (1864-1933), who found two texts and initiated the Pali Texts Society translation and publication of one text, The Yogavacara’s Manual (London, 1896), says that Dharmapala “kept both manuscripts with him and constructed meditational exercises from them. Focusing his

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The suppression of Boran (including similar pre-modern practices) seems to have happened in Thailand in the 19th century. As scholars such as Charles Hallisey (1995) have shown, this suppression was not motivated by modernists or colonialist influences. Justin T. McDaniel, in fact, has questioned theories about the 19th century suppression of certain Buddhist practices (McDaniel 2011, 100). The virtual disappearance of Boran in Cambodia resulted from the total destruction of Buddhism under Pol Pot regime. In Burma, Boran meditation did not exist to be suppressed, and in Sri Lanka, Boran seems to have died a natural death. Perhaps this death came about from lack of interest on the part of the Sri Lankan monks or perhaps because of opposition from the Sangha leaders such as Valivita Saranankara who initiated the introduction of higher admission from Thailand and who seems to have been quite faithful to the tradition that he revived. In other words, the suppression of Boran was not universal in the Theravada regions. According to Crosby, Boran is ‘supported by a culture of myth and narrative and of other practices not directly soteriological… (16). Rather than positing universal religious suppression, it seems more likely that Boran diminished and collapsed along with its social support systems in the Theravada regions as scientific knowledge and Western medicine spread during the 19th and 20th centuries. (ii)The claim both explicit and implicit in the author’s discussion is that the undermining of Boran in the areas where it was practiced and the birth of Burmese vipassanā meditation were both effects of colonialism and modernism. The author identifies several features in the newly established Burmese meditation, namely, the belief that the goal can be attained in this life itself, shortening of the path by de-emphasising samatha, a measure which goes well with the emphasis on immediate results, and taking meditation away from its exclusive monastic context, opening it for the lay people. One can connect without much difficulty all these beliefs, practices and attitudes to modernist trends ushered in by Protestant emphasis on the role of the laity and scientific developments. But this is not the only way to explain these developments; we must also consider the teachings of early Buddhism. The idea that the ultimate goal of nirvana is attainable in this life is fundamental to thee early attention on dhyāna meditation, which had esoteric goals not shared by the vipassanā meditation that came to dominate local practice” suggesting that Dharmapala was not so ‘unfortunate’ (Crosby 107) as to miss the tradition totally. (Rescued from the Nation: Anagarika Dharmapala and the Buddhist World, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago & London. 77).

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Buddhism contained in the Pali Canon. The term ‘diṭṭheva dhamme’ ((attains realization) in this life itself) is often found in the discourses. The Purābheda-sutta of the Suttanipāta underscores the need to get rid of craving before the break of the body (vītataṇho purā bhedā: Sn 166, v. 849). On the other hand, although the early texts are very clear on this, it is equally true that in the later tradition there developed a belief that nirvana cannot be attained in this degenerate period. In the Sri Lankan popular Buddhist tradition, this view has been so prevalent that it even identifies one Maliyadeva Thera as the last arahant. But we should not forget that by emphasizing the possibility of realizing nirvana in this life itself, the Burmese meditation masters were not saying anything new. Perhaps they were prompted to return to this earlier stander of a Buddhist teaching in response to modernism. But at the same time cannot ignore the fact that the tradition also offers an alternative explanation. The emphasis of the 19th and 20th century meditation masters on the importance of meditation practice for lay people or ‘householders’ is again not new. Although in actual practice the lay people, upāsaka and upāsikā, do not seem to follow the path with same intensity as the monastics, they nevertheless follow the same path. Although nirvana is generally understood as being difficult to attain life, and the laity tends to be relegated to a lesser position in Theravada society, the textual traditions bear witness to a different attitude and practice. In Myanmar, the ‘new’ meditation promoted by the Mingun and Ledi Sayadawas did not remove samatha from the path. Rather, samatha was understood as something to be developed simultaneously alongside vipassanā, not requiring separate practice, which can be interpreted as corresponding to the third manner of the traditional practice, namely, simultaneous or joint practice of samatha and vipassanā (yuganaddha: A II, 156158). Why exactly the Burmese promulgators of vipassanā meditation emphasised these aspects, which are based on the Buddhist tradition, at this time in history needs further study . (iii) Based on her research, Crosby reaches as ‘uncomfortable’ conclusion: namely, that what we consider today as Theravada meditation - the lay meditation movements current today in the Theravada regions is a ‘modern text-based reconstruction’ of what was thought to be early Buddhism in the 19th and 20th centuries. While Crosby’s arguments are important for the colonial period, she has disregarded the historical continuity of the Theravada tradition prior to colonialism. The 16th 18th centuries were particularly dark periods for Sri Lankan Buddhism, as

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evidenced by the replacement of the bhikkhu ordination by the so-called ‘ganinnānse’ (those who were neither bhikkhus nor laymen.) However, the pabbajja ordination survived and sāmaneras continued to care for collections of Buddhist texts in monasteries until the middle of the 18th century when Velivita Saranankara began to revive the monastic system (Blackburn 2011). Although undermined and weakened, Theravada Buddhism was never extinguished entirely. Malagoda records remarks made by one Elizabeth Harvard, a wife of a Wesleyan missionary in Sri Lanka in 1816 on the library of one Kapugama Dhammakkhandha Thera as ‘very extensive’ (Malalgoda 1976, 99 note 81). Crosby’s remarks about the relative rarity of the Pali Canonical texts in monastic libraries notwithstanding (133), these extensive monastic libraries were not the creations of colonialism and modernism. It is natural that the pioneers of modern meditation went back to the early texts and reconstructed their practice accordingly. The point I try to make here is that their effort cannot be simply reduced to some totally new reconstruction, without historical basis in response to colonialist and modernist influences.3 A glance at the Theravada history from its beginning will reveal that reliance on texts and going back to texts have been the norm all the way through. Although traditionally the first council after the parinirvāṇa of the Buddha was held due to ‘unpleasant words’ (abhadda vacana) of the monk named Subhadda,4 more compelling reason seems to have been the need for organizing and classifying the word of the Buddha for it was on the Dhamma and Vinaya that the Buddha assigned the authority in his absence. It was necessary that the word of the Buddha was there to be consulted when a situation anticipated by the great indicators (mahāpadesa) arose. This does not mean that the word of the Buddha was finalized in this meeting. But it means that whatever was available at the parinirvāṇa of the Buddha was made well organized to serve the purpose of easy reference if and when crisis arose. This trend has continued throughout the tradition. The act of committing the word of the Buddha into writing during the reign of 3  Charles Hallisey has convincingly argued that European representation of Buddhism can well be influenced by the trends of Buddhism itself. It is instructive in this context to give careful hearing to him when he says that “we should avoid attributing too much force to the “West” (or Christianity, or Protestant assumptions, or Orientalism) in the changes to Theravada Buddhism which occurred in the nineteenth century. “Roads taken and Not Taken in the Study of Theravada Buddhism” in Donald S. Lopez, Jr. (ed) Curators of the Buddha: The Study of Buddhism under Colonialism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press). 4  Refer to the Vinaya Piṭaka Cullavagga Paḷi account in the pañcsatika-khandhaka.

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King Vaṭṭagāmiṇi Abhaya (1st century bce Sri Lanka) can be considered an example of this continuation. In a crisis situation when the texts were in real danger the Sri Lankan Theravada tradition decided to commit the texts to writing. The argument behind this act was: how can one know what the practice is in the absence of the knowledge of what the Buddha taught? Since the texts were considered to be the adjudicator of the practice, it is understandable that texts were preserved with utmost care. As is well known in the history of Southeast Asia, wars were fought for the sake of texts. The numerous instances of the purification of the Sangha by rulers of South and Southeast Asia starting from Asoka in India cannot be reduced to instances of royal and monastic power struggles altogether: they were equally motivated by the trend of going back to the texts. As I have argued elsewhere (refer to article no 6 of this volume) at the conclusion of every council the texts were recited together (san+gāyanā) signifying the undivided allegiance of all participants to the word of the Buddha. The emphasis on texts is not necessarily to place the practice (paṭipatti) under the authority of the texts (pariyatti) or ‘institutional control’ as Crosby holds (114-115). It is the texts even the practitioners had to resort to if they had a question about their own practice, a piece of information not unknown to Crosby. (115) If the Burmese monks reconstructed vipassanā meditation based on the texts, they did not do so under the influence of European construction of pure Buddhism based on texts. The Buddhists already had the tradition of going back to the texts. In Sri Lanka when Matara Sri Nanarama Thera (referred to by Crosby 116-117&119) developed vipassanā meditation he was not totally satisfied even with the Vissuddhimagga and went directly to the discourses for guidance. Although he may have been familiar with Boran there is no evidence of incorporation of any aspect from that system into his. In this manner, the driving force behind the Theravada tradition in both South and Southeast Asia seems have been the desire, motivated by the soteriological goal, for the authentic teaching of the Buddha. The choice of the method of meditation for these reformers and reconstructors, according to Crosby, was shaped by an “interplay of personal, monastic, national and international politics” (133). She does not even think that choice also could have been motivated by soteriological needs. (iv) I will come to the last point of this discussion. Having said that what we consider as Theravada today is a recent reconstruction, Crosby

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contrasts the aftermath of this reconstruction with Tibetan Vajayana Buddhism: we can easily contrast our largely speculative ideas of original Buddhism with Tibetan Vajrayana Buddhism, and wonder at the unpredictable differences manifest in the Himalayan traditionits rich imagery, its philosophy, its complex ritual cycles, etc. all the marvelous complex and diverse detail of a developed tradition. That we cannot do the same mental exercise for Theravada in our classroom and studies is a measure of the irresistible forces at play one the Theravada homeland, under the influence of colonialism, succumbed to an agenda of reform, purification and modernization, which drove towards extinction this region’s previous dominant ‘developed tradition’, boran kammaṭṭāna. (149) The author contrasts the so-called (simple) original Buddhism with the developed Tibetan tradition with its rich imagery ect. and ‘marvelous complex and diverse details’. If Boran had not been suppressed by modernizing and colonializing forces, she implies, we would have been able to teach and study a similarly developed Theravada tradition. Obviously, our (Theravada) academic pursuits have become poorer. Looking from a cultural and academic point of view, one has to agree with Crosby’s observation. The trouble with this observation is that it omits the most important perspective on how a religion or a religious practice has to be viewed; namely, through its soteriology. The fundamental purpose for practicing Buddhist meditation is to attain nirvana by purifying one’s mind of defilements (kilesa). Now for this purpose the Buddha has given, according to the discourses, a path without ‘marvellous complex (of) diverse details and ritual cycles’ as found in the Tibetan tradition. The fact that Theravada Buddhism did not develop “marvelous complex (of) diverse details and ritual cycles’ may diminish its popular attraction. But the preservation of the simple procedure taught by the Buddha seems to have been the focus of the tradition all along. The need to ‘go back’ to the original discourse of the Buddha for soteriological reasons, which seems to have been the hallmark of the Theravada tradition since the first Saṅgāyanā, must be understood in this context. This should not be understood as denying the soteriology taught by Tibentan Buddhism or by the practitioner of Boran kammaṭṭhāna. As the author herself says, in the absence of Boran practice today, it is

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impossible to judge whether or not that system is effective in leading its practitioners to nirvana. The Tibetan practice may also be effective in leading its practitioners to its final goal. But whether the goal is the same as that described in the early discourses or not remains to be judged by practitioners. Referring to contemporary vipassanā meditation, the author admits that ‘some beneficial effects of ‘mindfulness’ meditation (a subset of vipassanā meditation) has been established. The enormous contemporary popularity of mindfulness meditation for therapeutic purposes is very important, no doubt. But what is crucial in this context is not this ‘mundane’ effect but the soteriological purpose for which this meditation was originally taught by the Buddha. The fact that Buddhists have practiced meditation since the time of the Buddha is the ultimate arbiter of whether the practice leads to nirvana (niyyānika) or not. A Sri Lankan scholar has studied this aspect with extensive field research and concluded that the experience of the practitioners studied confirms the standard expositions of the path, fruits and nirvana in the discourses (Sirimane 2016). To conclude, a broader question emerges from Crosby’s discussion, namely what is Theravada/ Buddhism really? According to Crosby, What this does do is ask the reader to cease to elide two thousand years of Theravada evolution, and cease making our own ‘magical’ connections between the days of the Buddha’s personal teaching and the institutions of Theravada some two and half a millennia later. (150) Crosby refers to the last two hundred years when ‘we’ (I take ‘we’ as referring to modern scholars of Buddhism) have liked to think about Theravada as ‘pure and simple’ and says that if colonialist influence was not felt in the Theravada region we would have a Theravada ‘with a complex, rich and sophisticated array of myth, ritual imagery, practice, doctrine and lineage like that which we take for granted in Himalayan tradition’ (150). According to her, this characterization of Theravada as pure and simple is to disregard the long evolution of the tradition over two and half millennia. What I tried to show in the course of this discussion is that there has been a tradition from the very beginning which pulled it to the ‘word of the Buddha’ contained in the three baskets and the commentaries thereof. Buddhist practitioners of meditation have always focused on the Tripiṭaka as containing information that leads to nirvana. This soteriology is not dependent on colonialism, modernism or a naїve acceptance of European interpretations of Buddhism. The Burmese

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Sayadaws who developed vipassanā meditation, and their Sri Lankan counterpart, Matara Sri Nanarama Thera, were not English educated, and it would be a mistake to over-emphasize the influence of European Buddhist scholarship on their teaching. It is colonial European scholars who said that what was practiced in traditional Buddhist societies was corrupt and degenerate. For them, the real Buddhism was in the texts. A new generation of contemporary Buddhist scholars now says that the opposite is the case. On the parts of the people who practice this religion, they do not seem to be vexed by this problem at all. At least some of the people know that everything they practice is not ‘properly Buddhist.’ What Malalgoda says in the context of how Buddhists responded to Christianity is pertinent here: Theirs (of the Sinhalese) was a syncretistic religious tradition where ‘pure Buddhism’ mingled with ‘non-Buddhist’ beliefs and practices; and though they were not incapable of differentiating between these two aspects of their religious tradition, they were capable seeing harmony between them. (Malalgoda 1976, 209) In 1815, when the Kandyan chiefs handed over Sri Lanka to the British by signing a treaty, they included an article (5th article) to safeguard their religion. The phrase used in the Sinhala version to refer to the religion is ‘Buddha sāsana and the religion of gods’ (Buddha ‘sāsanaya hā devāgamada). Before the colonial scholars told the Sinhalese what Buddhism really was and where it was located, they were already able to make a clear distinction between beliefs and practices. Even today one notice how an ordinary Buddhist who pays homage to the Triple Gem with her palms kept together would immediately bend and interlock her fingers and assume a different posture when transferring merits to gods. When even an ordinary person makes this distinction, who has the right to pass judgment on it? Crosby’s point that Theravada has changed over the time is welltaken, and this essay is not an attempt to deny that truism. It is wellknown that the ancient Theravada monks made a decision at the very first council that they will neither change the existing Vinaya rules. Nor would they introduce any new rules. But the tradition later changed to the extent of compiling a voluminous work on Vinaya outside the Canon (Palimuttaka-vinaya)! Certainly the tradition has undergone many changes. But the issue here is meditation which is the path to the ultimate goal.

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The basic insight of Buddhism says that all ordinary being (puthujjana) are subject to suffering owing the defilements they have in their mind, and that one must purify one’s mind in order to realize freedom from suffering. The path which is practiced through meditation is for that end. Now that this suffering is the nature of ordinary (human) mind, and that one suffers so long as one has defilements in one’s mind (akālika) are taken as timeless truths in this soteriological scheme. The medicine is meant to cure this particular disease which is caused by a particular set of causes and conditions. The understanding is that so long as this state of affairs remains, this path must work. If this (human) condition changes then the medicine will not work. If there is any other medicine for the illness then that has to be proved. Therefore, the issue is not whether a system has developed or not developed a ‘rich and sophisticated array of myth, ritual, imagery, practice, doctrine and lineage’ but whether and how close it to what the Buddha taught (as Theravadins believe). It is to this end that the Burmese and other modern day meditators strived. Of course, Theravada Buddhism and its practices have changed over time. But this particular aspect has to occupy the center position of Theravāda for in the absence of which Theravada will lose its soteriological meaning. One may tend to construe this position as a kind of essentialism. But if the Buddha is not self-referentially false what he meant by his analysis of human situation in the teaching of the four noble truth is only a causally conditioned phenomenon (paṭiccasamuppanna dhamma) arising and ceasing depending on conditions. If this is essentialism, it is only a conditional essentialism. The four noble truth teaching will remain valid, irrespective of time and space, so long as the basic human condition of discontent caused by craving remains the same. It is quite possible to imagine a situation where Theravada meditation is transformed to be a complex system with rites and rituals. Such an eventuality would even appear to be in consonant with the Buddhist dictum that all constructed phenomena change. If, however, such a transformation which would make it irrelevant to the termination of human suffering will happen then it will cease to be the meditation taught by the Buddha and cease to be the Theravada in its most basic sense.

17. Sermon Studies and Buddhism: A Case Study of Sri Lankan Preaching*

Referring to Peter Schalk’s two studies1 in German language on Buddhist sermons the author of this monograph, Rita Langer, says that they “constitute the only attempt to date at working out a methodology of Buddhist sermon studies”. In a similar manner, on Langer’s work we can say that it is the only work so far in English on Buddhist sermon studies. The work being reviewed is a pioneering effort in this new area in the field of Buddhist studies. It embarks on sermon studies by studying three sermons given in Sinhala language by two local Sri Lankan monks, the first at the funeral of a female devotee, and the next, on the sixth day evening after her death and the last at the seventh day dāna given in commemoration of her. The fourth and last part of the book includes the transcripts in Sinhala of the three sermons, and their English translations, with the Pali text and the translation of the associated activities such as observing the five precepts, offering Buddhapūjā and transferring merits to the deceased which are usually done in Pali language. The first three parts of the book are meant to provide the reader with the proper academic context in order to understand the content 1  “The message of the peaceful teaching: Introduction to the Buddhist Sermon in Sri Lanka” (1983), Temenos 19, pp.68-111; “Without thinking about death there is no life’: Analysis of a Buddhist death sermon (mataka bana) from Sri Lanka” (1988) in On the meaning of Death: Essays on mortuary rituals and eschatological beliefs, ed. Cederrroth, S. and Corlin, C., et al. Stockholm, Uppsala Studies in Cultural Anthropology: 229-55. * An initial version of this feature book review on: Rita Langer: Sermon Studies and Buddhism: A Case Study of Sri Lankan Preaching, The International Institute for Buddhist Studies, Tokyo, 2013. was first published in Sri Lanka Journal of the Humanities vol.40 University of Peradeniya, July 2015. pp. 131-141.

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of the fourth part. The first part, Buddhist sermon studies: an overview discusses the overall historical background of sermons in India and Sri Lanka, and reviews academic discussions on preaching in Buddhism, and concludes with a discussion on the contemporary perspectives on preaching in Sri Lanka. The second part is a summary and discussion of Peter Schalk’s two papers referred to above on sermon studies which are inaccessible to those who do not read German. The third part elaborates on the social and religious context of the three sermons transcribed and translated in the fourth part and discusses their content. The first part says that many scholars have discussed preaching as a Buddhist religious activity. These studies focus on references in the ancient Pali and Sinhala literature to the preaching of the Dhamma, and also on the medieval Sinhala literature meant to serve the purpose of preaching. Both Adikaram (1946/1994) and Walpola Rahula (1956/1996) discuss preaching in Buddhism (dhammadesanā) from a historical point of view. Mahinda Degalle (2006) and Steven Collins (1998) discuss preaching as a genre of literature. The author discusses the above-mentioned and several other authors in the first part of her book in order to highlight how her work, which discusses the actual sermons both as acts of religious speech and as literature with a specific content, distinguishes from these previous attempts. The subject matter of the second part is the two papers, mentioned above, by Peter Schalk on sermons in Sri Lanka. The significance of Schalk’s work, according to the author, lies in its being the first attempt to establish a methodology for the study of Buddhist sermons, which the other authors who have discussed the phenomenon of sermons/ preaching before and after have not done. Schalk’s two papers are based on two sermons, one of which is a sermon on a full-moon day, and the other discussed in the more recent paper is one to transfer merits to a dead person - ‘mataka baṇa’. In addition to studying the text of the sermon, the first study proposes a definition of Buddhist preaching, and maps out a ‘programme’ for future studies of Buddhist sermons, which Langer takes to be methodologically significant. The discussion concludes with a study of the preacher, and the structure and the content of the sermon. The second paper focuses on the structure and the context of the sermon and its content, all in so far as it is a ‘mataka baṇa’. Langer is basically in agreement with Schalk. But she improves on him. For example, Langer takes Schalk’s definition of Buddhist sermon, ‘As a transmission of the Buddha’s word a sermon is an instance of language in the act of public

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speaking’ and scrutinizes its elements such as transmission, Buddha’s word, public act, and speaking, and reveals limitations and ambiguities inherent in these concepts, and finally questions ‘whether a definition is the best starting point for a systematic study of sermons’2 (More on Schalk’s definition later). In the concluding remarks of her discussion Langer notes that Schalk does not include a complete transcript of the second sermon (as he did in the case of the first study) and that Schalk, since then, has not pursued this genre of study to which he provided a methodological basis. The third part is a study of the context of the three sermons and the actual content of those sermons. Langer provides meticulous details of the surroundings of the venue, preparations, people involved, both the preachers and their listeners. Langer discusses in detail the monastic life, education and religious activities of the preachers, the Buddhist culture, rites and rituals surrounding the lives of the ordinary people, and conceptual, psychological and religious significance of the sermon. In the analysis of sermons, the author seems to follow the methodological guide provided by Schalk. The fact that the sermons chosen by the author for her study are connected to death may be owing to her earlier studies on Buddhist rituals of death (Langer 2007). As the author is well aware, the sermons are by no means limited to death and funerals, but constitute a very important aspect of rich and varied Buddhist religious life. The present study could be considered an initial effort to introduce this new field to Buddhist studies. A difficulty encountered by those who venture into Buddhist sermon studies is that there are no transcripts of sermons preserved,3 at least in Sri Lanka, as in the Christian tradition which seems to have a reservoir of such transcripts dating from the medieval times. The available transcripts of Buddhist sermons are no later than the second quarter of the last century. It does not seem that there was a need for Sri Lankan Buddhist monks to write their sermons before they delivered them for, as the author herself notes, the monks who usually receive the 2  Although providing an Aristotlean type definition with reference to essence could be problematic, Langer could have tried a later Wittgesteinian type definition highlighting family resemblences. A ‘definition’ of this sort would not only avoid usual difficulties associated with ‘essential’ definitions but also will agree with the ‘anātma’ way of Buddhist thinking. 3  This assertion, which I borrow from Schalk and Langer, is problematic if we are to take into account the Suttapiṭaka of the Pali Canon, in particular its first four nikāyas, wherein the discourses/sermons of the Buddha are recorded. If sermon studies have to begin with the discourses of the Buddha it is bound to have some significant implications on the very project of sermon studies.

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training in public speech at a very early stage in their monastic life had developed this ability as a part of their ‘on the job’ training. There are no records to the existence of ‘sermon writers’ in the Buddhist tradition as in the case of medieval Christianity. Currently, thanks to the public media such as inter-net, radio and TV, transcripts of Dhamma sermons are available in multitude in audio, vedeo and printed forms. In other words, there is enough raw material for Buddhist sermon studies. There, however, seems to exist an ambiguity in what a sermon is. Earlier we referred to Schalk’s definition of ‘sermon’ as “an instance of language in the act of public speaking.” Although a sermon, first and foremost, is an act of speech, it has its own life as an object among many other objects. Surely, it does not exist as a material object. But we refer to it as an object, and it is how the Sinhala equivalent to sermon, ‘baṇa’ is used in Sinhala language, which is not different from the use of ‘sermon’ in English language. At the same time, the sense of ‘baṇa’ as a speech act is inseparable from this objective sense. Therefore, there is a need to make a distinction between sermon and preaching. In her critique of Schalk’s definition Langer notices this deficiency in it: It is not clear whether Schalk’s definition at this point implies that a sermon is necessarily an oral transmission. If taken as an aspect of a general definition of sermon it would exclude large parts of Christian sermon literature. If taken as part of the definition of Buddhists sermon, it would exclude the published model sermon, which Scahlk analyses in his later study (59). Nevertheless, in her own study the reader can see that Langer moves with ease from sermon as a (written) text to the sermon as preaching. Perhaps this is unavoidable. But a clearer sense of this demarcation would have been helpful. Langer does notice the multiform and multipurpose character of preaching when she says that it is “performance, re-enactment, ritual act, social occasion, inspiration entertainment and many more things’ (125). But she does not pursue this line of thinking. If she had this distinction clearly before her, she would not have asserted that sermons studies at its infancy (3) for, almost all authors whom she refers to in the part of the book can be understood as doing Buddhist sermon studies, though not studies in Buddhist preaching. In order to understand the complex verbal acts involved in the act of preaching the author could have used the traditional Buddhist classifications of actions into physical act (kāya kamma), verbal acts

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(vacī kamma) and mental acts (mano kamma), the detailed analysis of which are found in the Buddhist literature. The Buddhist verbal acts have certain interesting affinities with J.L. Austin’s idea of doing things with words which Langer could have used in her analysis of sermon as speech act. Austin proposes a basic classification of acts as constative and performative (Austin 1975, 3-6), the first of which is what corresponds to what is usually named as statements by philosophers, and the second being doing things with words. A further elaboration of this classification is Austin’s analysis of speech acts into three categories, elocutionary, illocutionary and perlocutionary, a useful set of tools to analyse sermons as acts of speech. A sermon may be all these three acts simultaneously or in parts. A sermon is locutionary (or an utterance) “with a certain ‘meaning’ in the favourite philosophical sense of that word, i.e. with a certain sense with a certain reference” (ibid 94) in so far it expresses a set of statements which are either true or false and which are meaningful and refer to certain states of affairs. It is illocutionary in so far as it does things such as advicing, instructing, transferring merits etc. A sermon is perlocutionary in so far it arouses faith, convinces, and encourages listeners in merit making etc. The last two instances are clearly doing things with words, and it is clear that a preacher of a sermon does these and many other things in his act of preaching. Austin has described how an illocutionary act if performed without really meaning it, without relevant intention, can be empty or false. This can happen also with a sermon if the preacher merely repeats what he has learned without really meaning it, which could be the case with many sermons, both on the part of preacher as well as the listener. The preacher of a Buddhist sermon, starts his sermon by paying homage to the Buddha, by inviting divine beings to gather to listen to the Dhamma and by announcing to his listeners that it is the time for listening to the Dhamma. He does these things by uttering relevant Pali stanzas. But it is quite possible that the preacher merely recites these stanzas as a habit and people just listen to those stanzas or just pretend listening. But even then it does not cease to be a verbal action, hollow verbal action in that, although not exactly a sermon in its proper sense. What Langer discusses in her book, a sermon on the sixth day night in commemoration of deceased person could serve as a good example. This particular form of sermon is almost universally practiced by all Sri Lanka Buddhists mainly as fulfilling a social need although the expressed idea of this rite is to transfer merits to the departed. Although there are exceptions, very often this sermon is not seriously listened to by

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people. Particularly, during this activity, the immediate relatives of the deceased, ‘home people’, are busy with receiving visitors, attending to usual chores and so forth. This situation has become so normal now, in some instances several elderly people are invited especially for the sake of listening to the sermon! Nevertheless, this act of preaching fulfils a social need, provides solace to the grieved, among many other things. This manner of analysis may be extended to all types of Dhamma sermons as acts of preaching. If sermons are studied as spoken words (namely, preaching) the best way to study them would be to listen to them. This does not happen usually. At least, it is not how the sermons are studied in the book under review. In both Schalk and Langer, the sermons are transcribed in roman letters and translated into another language through which the study is done. Now the sermon becomes a written piece of work and, like any text, it is read silently and not heard. But unlike usual written texts which follow the form of written language, transcribed sermons are neither properly written texts, nor are they sermons to be heard: they seem to occupy an in between position. It is only a truism that a transcribed text of an oral presentation does not retain its original vibrancy, dynamicity or performative character. A sermon transcribed is no different from the most beautiful song written down on a piece of paper. I consider this as an initial handicap in sermon studies which does not seem easily overcome. As the author notes, one could make some effort to “restore some of the immediacy of the original preaching event” (51) but it is beset with difficulties. The matter becomes worse when a sermon given in one language, in this case, in Sinhala language, is transliterated in Roman letters which makes an imperfect and cumbersome reading. If the intended English reader does not know Sinhala this effort becomes meaningless (if she does then it is of no use!). A translation provided for such readers may succeed in conveying the basic ideas expressed; but will hardly be able to convey the ‘life’ of the original with unstated but implied meanings, in the absence of which a sermon as a sermon loses its most important oral character. Perhaps this could be the reason why Schalk does not give the complete translation of the sermon he discusses in his second study? In the concluding discussion Langer refers to the discontents of presenting an oral sermon in written form, and admits that the translated sermons do not make a good reading. This is equally applicable to

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transcribed sermons in the same language. Such sermons are “rather repetitive, do not appear to cover much ground, and merely present anything the audience would not already be familiar with, while at the same time ‘leaving out’ interesting aspects found in the Pali sutras and texts used” (223). That the translated/transcribed sermons lose their original rhetorical appeal once reduced to writing has been noted also by others who have studied different Buddhist oral traditions (Kvaerne 1986, 279). But the defects Langer identifies in oral sermons are not really defects. All those features including repetitions can well be virtues in a sermon delivered orally. The problem here is something connected to what I have referred to already, namely, not making a sufficient distinction between a sermon as an oral act and sermon as a written text. Already there are indications of imperfections caused by doing sermon studies based on languages far from one’s own. I will cite a few examples. The translation of ‘baṇa-pot’ as ‘preaching books’ (p.1 and 66-67) betrays a lack of knowledge in the usage of language. Although ‘baṇa’ could mean preaching or more properly, a sermon, ‘baṇa-pot’ as understood today, and most probably as understood in the classical Sinhala literature, simply means a ‘dhamma book’, a book containing or discussing the Dhamma, the teaching of the Buddha. It is true that these texts in pre-modern period were not meant to be read but meant to be heard. That is not because they were meant to be ‘preaching books’ but because, at a time when writing was an arduous task and consequently, the texts were scarce, not only these books, but all books were meant to be heard. This explains why a learned person was described as ‘one who has heard much’ (bahusruta: Sanskrit and Sinhala; bahussuta: Pali). Schalk rejects translation of ‘puñña’ (Pali)/’pin’ (Sinhala) as merit due to its Protestant theological implications and prefers ‘act of/leading to success’ (p. 68). Although I can see his point in rejecting ‘merit’ as proper rendering of ‘puñña’, I do not see how he gets this ideas of success instead. The Brahmanic concept of ‘punya’ (Sanskrit) from where Buddhism seems to adopt this concept seems to convey such nuances as pure, fortunate, gifted etc. A similar error is to understand ‘mātṛkā’ in a Dhamma sermon as list or table (76). Although the term has those meanings, in the context of a Dhamma sermon it simply means the theme or the topic. The overall problem we witness here is what happens when translations are made based on dictionary without adequate care for the context.

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This, however, does not mean that sermon studies are doomed. The sermons, as distinguished from acts of preaching, may be studied from many different perspectives. They may be studied for the Dhamma presented in them, and then it becomes a conceptual, or a philosophical study. If sermons are studied as instances of performing meritorious deeds then sermon studies become a sub-category of Buddhist religious studies or Buddhist cultural studies. If one were to inquire as to why certain concepts, teachings or themes have been preferred to certain others, or as to who are the preachers and listeners, and as to what are the contexts of these events or human social behaviors, the study could be social, historical or anthropological. Even with some difficulties outlined above, a sermon may be studied from a linguistic or socio-linguistic point of view. In any of these cases, it is inevitable that the sermon is reduced to a transcribed text or a document, thus becoming a sub-category of literature. Furthermore, as an act requiring preachers and listeners and many others who attend to numerous associated activities, a sermon becomes essentially a form of human behavior, a study of which belongs to social studies to be done following the relevant research methods. Either sermon studies will have to be distributed among several fields of studies, in which case a need to speak of methodology for sermon studies does not arise, or there must be a combination of religious, philosophical, linguistic, rhetoric and sociological methods to study this phenomenon. Both Schalk and Langer seem to have adhered in their sermon studies to something akin to this second approach. But still that there is some kind of lack of clarity about the method is clear from what Langer says in her concluding remarks: Working with the sermons raised many questions, most of them to do with the dynamic of preaching, the relationship between the different parts (chanting, offering, preaching), the perceived importance of the status of the preacher, the appreciation of the audience to name but few. (222) The questions Langer refers to pertain to rhetoric, and sociology of the Buddhist sermons. There are many other questions one could raise on sermons, such as, the content of the sermons and as to why a particular content was chosen, social, cultural and religious occasions of sermons, styles of sermons and so forth. Thus, it seems useful to have a clearer idea of methods to be followed in studying the Buddhist sermons, although this methodological question is not meant to undermine the important contribution Langer makes to the field of Buddhist studies by analyzing

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sermons and introducing a new area of studies. Nor is it to undervalue the vast potential the study of sermons has in understanding the living Buddhism at any period of time in any Buddhist society.

18. Merit in Buddhism: Concept and Adaptation in Ritual Buddhism*

To talk about merit (puñña in Pali, pin in Sinhala) to Theravada Buddhists in South and Southeast Asian Countries is like carrying coal to Newcastle to use a now dated saying. Buddhism in this part of the world is basically one of merit-making (pin karanava in Sinhala) or merit-accumulation (pin raskaranava in Sinhala). The success of life as a Buddhist measured by the amount of merit one has accumulated in one’s life. In Theravada Buddhist societies a sizable chunk of one’s earnings goes for merit-making. Michael Spiro who researched in 1960’s on Burmese society found that an average Burmese would spent one fourth of his annual income on merit-making. This enables us to say, without exaggeration, that contemporary Buddhism in Theravada societies is predominantly characterized by merit-accumulation. In his latest book, MMJ Marasinghe, former professor of Buddhist studies and former Vice- Chancellor of University of Kelaniya, sets for himself the target of scrutinizing this concept so popular to the extent that no one knows anything about it other than what is known by everybody. Professor Marasinghe is the author of Gods in Buddhism, (the revised version of which appeared just last year) and noted for his contribution to Buddhist studies specifically through a number of articles he wrote for various journals and encyclopedias. One may feel that writing a book on something very popular and widely known is easier. But it is this very popularity that makes it harder for a discerning writer to write on a subject matter like merit for the need of the hour is to distinguish what is ‘factual’, textual and doctrinal from what is popularly attributed. * This was first published as a review on Merit in Buddhism: Concept and Adaptation in Ritual Buddhism by MMJ Marasinghe. Sarasavi Publishers, Nugegoda, 2010.

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In this review, I am going to summarize the main content of the book.1 My all sympathies are with the author’s independent and questioning attitude and hard-core non-theism. Differences with specific conclusions and interpretations are there. What I really value in Marasinghe’s book is the room he leaves open for variety of ways of looking at one’s own religious and conceptual universe. Merit in Buddhism is an enlarged version of a study Marasinghe did for the Encyclopedia of Buddhism. In this work, The author undertakes the difficult task of examining the concept of merit (puñña) in Theravada Buddhism. The author’s approach to the subject is basically historical and secondarily conceptual and sociological. He traces the history of the concept of puñña/punya (Sanskrit) from the early Vedic literature to later Buddhist commentaries. According to the author, the concept of merit found in the Vedic literature does not have a moral sense which is a development in Brahmana literature where it is used principally to refer to what is generated by the act of sacrifice. Merit at this stage of the development of Brahmanic religion is identified with the cause of good rebirth. In Jainism which, as a sramaṇa tradition, shared much with Buddhism, merit is accepted as the cause of good rebirth but not as productive of ultimate liberation. The author shows how the two sramaṇa traditions agreed on this assessment of merit. The second chapter describes dāna (giving) as a means of generating merit, and it further describes how ‘saṅgha-gata dakkhiṇā’ (donation to the Saṅgha) gradually evolved in Buddhism replacing the Brahmanic sacrifice as the most popular religious ritual. The third chapter discusses the ‘the path of merit’ (puññañca paṭipadaṃ) or doing merit as a distinctive mode of religious practice. The author highlights canonical instances in which the path of merit was spoken of by people as the practice befitting householders. The discussion provides canonical references revealing the connecting between doing merit and reaping pleasant results in the subsequent life. Referring to the Akaṅkheyyasutta the author goes to the extent of saying that… “… the doer of merit always has the distinct advantage of being able to select the form of rebirth that he would desire.” Although my reading of the Akaṅkheyyasutta does not allow this type of ‘distinct advantage’ always to the doer of merit, the point here is to highlight the strong connection between doing merit and receiving good results, which is undisputed. 1  I have refrained from making my own comments for doing so will make this too long for a newspaper article.

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The fourth chapter proposes to discuss merit and demerit (pāpa). In the course of the discussion the author draws the conclusion that both pāpa and akusala are synonymous. This conclusion is very important for the discussion for much of the subsequent discussion focuses on the exact nature and the connection between puñña and kusala. The crux of the matter is that, although it is true to say that all pāpa is akusala and vice versa, the same cannot be said of puñña and kusala. Although there are some instances where the two terms have been used interchangeably, the understanding has been that puñña is the behavior that will produce desirable results within the samsaric existence whereas kusala is understood as leading beyond samsara. This way of understanding the two concepts as representing two different dimensions of the Buddhist moral life is mainly owing to Professor PD Premasiri’s studies of the two concepts. His basic understanding has been supported by Professor Y. Karunadasa. The two scholars argue, on the basis of the statement of the Bodhisatva recorder in the Padhāna-sutta of the Saṃyutta-nikāya, namely, “I do not see any purpose for me even of an iota of puñña” (anumattenapi puññena attho mayhaṃ na vijjati), that the Bodhisatta rejected puñña for it would not lead to end suffering. The author disagrees with the two scholars, and says that the Padhāna-sutta statement was made by the Bodhisattva on that specific where the Mara was trying deflect the former from his goal. Furthermore, the author suggests that this statement is a “poetic version” of the Bodhisatta’s misgivings. Citing the Sāleyyaka-sutta in which the Buddha enumerates the possible good effects of puñña, the author argues that the doer of merit can attain the extinction of all defilements, i.e. nirvana, in this life itself if he so desires. The discussion on puñña and kusala is carried further in the next chapter, which is called “two terms for merit (puñña and kusala).” This title itself forewarns the reader of the main thesis of the chapter and, in a sense, of the entire book. The thrust of the whole discussion is to undermine the distinction between puñña and kusala maintained as fairly clear by other scholars including Premasiri and Karunadasa. Everybody including the author agrees that the kusala in a moral sense has not been borrowed from Vedic literature (as in the case of puñña) but that it is a Buddhist innovation. The difference of opinion, however, is on the exact nature of kusala vis-à-vis puñña. Premasiri and others think that an arahant gives up both puñña and pāpa, which is the opposite of puñña, and akusala as well but not kusala which an arahant is endowed with. According to Marasinghe this position is “both incorrect and

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misleading” for the arahant not only gives up puñña, pāpa and akusala, but also kusala “at the level of result-generating actions.” The author says that puñña is always seen as action whereas kusala is seen operating at two ‘levels’: one is the level of action which involves physical, verbal and mental action; the other being the level of state, or kusala as mental state, exemplified by the thirty seven dhammas pertaining to Enlightenment (Bodhi-pakkhiya-dhamma). It is at the level of action that kusala coincides with puñña -the author says. In the chapter six, ‘Two paths of merit-generation’, the author describes what is usually listed as ten meritorious deeds involving physical, verbal and mental actions as one path of generating merits and such activities helpful to society as planting trees, building bridges etc. as the second. While the former “gives him mastery over his faculties making him capable of total and undistracted devotion to training in the path leading to bodhi” (67), the latter serves him “by the refinement of his individual behaviour as well as behaviour as a member of his community” (68). The author continues to elaborate on the implications of second type of merit generating actions. He brings out Max Weber’s analysis of Buddhist ethics as purely self-serving and instrumentalist and shows how the puñña actions have been understood in the discourse as encompassing a wide social scope. The author highlights the concept of ‘threefold purity’ of physical and verbal actions involving one’s doing good things, encouraging others to do good an praising such behaviour of others. In the next chapter, the author brings out two levels at which merit functions, namely, the level of individual moral action and the qualities that doer of merit acquires as a result of his actions. This classification of two levels of puñña is similar to the two described earlier as relevant to kusala. The second level, which seems at odds with the earlier assertion that puñña is always seen as action, is supported by the author’s interpretation of Akaṅkheyya-sutta mentioned earlier. Chapter eight discusses post-canonical developments in the concept and practice of merit. Merit-accumulation, multiple fruition of merit and donation of merit are listed as post canonical and discussed in the chapter. According to the author, merit accumulation is mentioned only in two places in the canon. He quotes two instances found in the Suttanipāta. The author seems to have missed Dhammapada 118 which refers to the idea of accumulation of merit (sukho puññassa uccayo). Donation of merit is further discussed in chapter nine. The contention of the author is that all these three developments are post-canonical,

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and, in particular, the practice of merit donation has been adopted “in complete disregard of the contents of the canonical Suttas” (114). The author’s argument is that kamma according to the teaching of the Buddha is action belonging to any particular person, and it is his or her own responsibility, the fruits of which cannot be shared among others. Donation of merit to gods is also alien to the teaching of the Buddha, for gods according to discourses do not have a power to interfere in the life of human beings. The adoption of this practice is of later origin and does not accord with the teachings of the Buddha. The author adopts ‘donation’ to refer to anumodanā instead of its more common rendering as ‘transference’ for he thinks that anumodanā is an act sharing ‘than a total transfer of merit from one to another’. In the penultimate chapter on ‘merit in functional Buddhism’ the author says that merit ‘has developed on two clear lines or strands’, namely, merit acquired by the individual through disciplining himself on the path of training and the other ‘congregational merit’ acquired by the individual from community or group participation, namely, vandanā and pūjā developed at a later stage of the Buddhist history. The author thinks that the former strand is in keeping with ‘intentions of the original teaching’ and the latter is not so. In the concluding chapter, in addition to summarizing his key ideas, the author refers to the four criteria (‘the four great authorities) mentioned in the Mahāparinibbānasutta of the Dῑgha-nikāya and complains that the subsequent Buddhist tradition, by adopting the ritualistic elements to Buddhism, has failed to adhere to the criteria given by the Buddha in order to determine what is acceptable. As this chapter-wise summary shows, Marasinghe’s discussion on merit has two aspects: the first is the discussion of puñña to determine its nature, role and function according to the discourses. In this part of the discussion the concept of puñña is compared and contrasted with the concept of kusala, and the author contends that the sharp difference between the two concepts portrayed by earlier scholars such as Premasiri and Karunadasa is not true. According to the author, like kusala, puñña too can constitute the path leading to nirvana. The author further says, referring to Akaṅkheyyasutta, that it is not mandatory that puñña always causes its doer to be born in heaven; the doer of puñña, depending on his resolution, may be born in the heaven or enjoy some other good effects including attaining the final emancipation. In other words, the doer of merit has a choice which is wider than what is generally believed it to be! (75)

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The other aspect of the discussion is the gradual evolution of the concept of puñña in what the author calls ‘ritual Buddhism’ or ‘functional Buddhism’, where puñña plays a predominant role. In this later development, the author identifies three phenomena, namely, accumulation of merit, the belief that merit produces multiple results (‘multiple fruition’), and merit donation (to departed ones and to gods). The author finds all three as post-canonical and not quite in keeping with the intention of the early discourses. In particular, the author talks about “greed for merit accumulation”, and characteristic of ritual Buddhism. His most severe disapproval is of what he calls ‘merit donation’ which (to quote again) is “in complete disregard of the contents of the canonical Suttas” (114). Relevant to this second aspect of the discussion is the author’s complaint that the later Buddhist tradition has not paid any heed to the four great criteria (cattāro mahāpadesa) given by the Buddha to be employed when faced with the dilemma of accepting or rejecting any new development. The general problem the author is trying to highlight is both religious and textual; or both practice related and text related. At the practice level, it is sometimes-uneasy cohabitation between Buddhism found in its original nirvana-oriented form and Buddhism as it has evolved over time; at the textual level it is the strain between early discourses and certain later Khuddaka-nikāya texts and secondary works. The author feels very strongly that time has come for Buddhists to go back to their ‘maha gedara’ (father’s house). Merit in Buddhism is a work of an independent mind, eager to unearth the teaching of the Buddha hidden in the discourses (Sutta). His unbending non-theism (advocated in Gods in Buddhism) again surfaces very strongly in this works. His equal dislike for ritual Buddhism also comes out very strongly in this work. He questions some of the very salient features of Theravada Buddhism as practiced today not only in Sri Lanka but also in Southeast Asia and many other parts of the world. The practice of ‘merit donation’ comes under fire, and poses a serious question to the popular Theravada practice. So, Marasinghe has done his part; now it is up to the Theravadins to come out and ‘mincemeat’ him!

305

Primary Sources and Abbreviations A.

Aṅguttara-nikāya – Part I. Ekanipāta, Dukanipāta and Tikanipāta, ed. R. Morris, Pali Text Society, London, 1961. Part II. Catukka Nipāta, 1955. Part III. Pāñcaka Nipāta and Chakka Nipāta, ed. E. Hardy, 1976. Part IV. Sattaka Nipāta, Aṭṭhaka Nipāta and Navaka Nipāta, 1979. Part V. Dasaka Nipāta and Ekādasaka Nipāta, 1979. Volume VI. Dasaka Nipāta and Ekādasaka Nipāta, R. Davids, 1960.

AA.

Manorathapūraṇī – Vol. I. Eka-Nipatā-Vaṇṇanā, ed. M. Walleser, Pali Text Society, London, 1973. Vol. II. Eka-DukaTika-Nipāta-Vaṇṇanā, eds. M. Walleser and H. Kopp, 1967. Vol. III. Catukka-Pañcaka-Chakka-Nipāta-Vaṇṇanā, ed. H. Kopp, 1966. Vol. IV. Sattaka-Aṭṭhaka-Navaka-NipātaVaṇṇanā, 1979. Vol. V. Dasaka-Ekādasaka-Nipāta-Vaṇṇanā, 1977.

Ap.

The Apadāna – Part I., ed. M.E. Lilley, Pali Text Society, London, 1925.

ApA.

Visuddhajanavilāsinī nāma Apadānaṭṭhakathā, ed. C.E. Godakumbura, Pali Text Society, London, 1954.

Buv/Cp.

Buddhavaṃsa and Cariyāpiṭaka, ed. N.A. Jayawickrama, Pali Text Society, London, 1974.

BuvA.

The Clarifier of the Sweet Meaning (Madhuratthavilasinī), ed. I.B. Horner, Pali Text Society, London, 1978.

CpA.

Achariya Dhammapālā’s Paramatthadīpanī, ed. D.L. Barua, Pali Text Society, London, 1979.

D.

The Dīgha-nikāya – Vol. I, ed. T.W.R. Davids, Pali Text Society, London, 1949. Vol. II, 1966. Vol. III, ed. J.E. Carpenter, 1976.

DA.

Sumaṅgala-vilāsīnī – Part II, and III ed. W. Stede, Pali Text Society, London, 1971.

DT.

Līnatthappakāsanā nāma Dīgha-nikāya Tīkā, Maha vaggo, Dehiwala, Buddhist Cultural Center, 2011 (Sinhala Medium)

Dhk.

Dhātu-Kathā Pakaraṇa, ed. E.R. Gooneratne, Pali Text Society, London, 1963.

306 Dhp/DhpA. Dhammapada, eds. O Von Hinüber and K.R. Norman, Pali Text Society, London, 1994. The Commentary on the Dhammapada – Vol. I, II, III and IV ed. H.C. Norman, Pali Text Society, London, 1970. Dhs.

The Dhammasaṅgaṇi, ed. E. Muller, Pali Text Society, London, 1978.

DhsA.

The Atthasālinī, ed. E. Müller, Pali Text Society, London, 1979.

Dukap.

Dukapaṭṭhāna – Vol. I, ed. R. Davids, Pali Text Society, Oxford, 1996.

It.

Iti-Vuttaka, ed. E. Windisch, Pali Text Society, London, 1975.

ItA.

Paramattha-Dīpanī Iti-Vuttakaṭṭhakathā of Dhammapālâcariya – Vols. I ed. M.M. Bose, Pali Text Society, London, 1977. Vol. II ed. H. Kopp, 1980.

J.

The Jātaka – Vol. I, ed. V. FausBoll, Pali Text Society, London, 1962. Vol. II, III, IV, and V, 1963. Vol. VI, and VII 1964.

Khp.

The Khuddaka-Pāṭha – Paramatthajotikā I., ed. H. Smith, Pali Text Society, London, 1978.

KhpA.

The Khuddaka-Pāṭha – Paramatthajotikā I, ed. H. Smith, Pali Text Society, London, 1978.

Kvit.

Kaṅkhāvitaraṇi, ed. K.R. Norman and Pruitt, W., Pali Text Society, Oxford, 2003.

Kvu.

Kathāvatthu – Vols. I, II, ed. A.C. Taylor, Pali Text Society, London, 1979.

KvuA.

Kathāvatthuppakaraṇa-Aṭṭhakathā, ed. N.A. Jayawickrama, Pali Text Society, London, 1979.

M.

Majjhima-nikāya – Vol. I, ed. V. Trenckner, Pali Text Society, London, 1979. Vol. II and III ed. R. Chalmers, 1960, 1977. Vol. IV, ed. R. Davids, 1974.

MA.

Papañcasūdanī Majjhimanikāyaṭṭhakathā of Buddhaghosâcariya – Part I, eds. J.H. Woods and Kosambi, D., Pali Text Society, London, 1977. Part II, 1979. Part III, ed. I.B. Horner, 1976. Part IV. Part V, 1977.

Nd.I.

Mahāniddesa – Parts I and II, eds. L. De La V. Poussin and E.J. Thomes, Pali Text Society, London, 1978.

NdA.I/II.

Saddhamma-Pajjotikā – Vols. I, II, ed. A.P. Buddhadatta, Pali Text Society, London, 1980.

307 Ps.

Paṭisambhidāmagga – Vols. I, II, ed. A.C. Taylor, Pali Text Society, London, 1979.

PsA.

Saddammappakāsinī –Vol. I, II, and III ed. C.V. Joshi, Pali Text Society, London, 1979.

Pug/PugA.

Puggala-Paññatti and Puggala-Paññatti-Aṭṭhakathā, eds. G. Landsberg and Davids, R., Pali Text Society, London, 1972.

S.

Saṃyutta-nikāya – Part I. Sagātha-vagga, ed. M.L. Feer, Pali Text Society, London, 1973. Part II. Nidāna-vagga, 1970. Part III. Khandha-vagga, 1975. Part IV. Saḷāyatana-vagga, 1973. Part V. Mahā-vagga, 1976. Volume VI. ed. R. Davids, 1980.

SA.

Sārattha-ppakāsinī – Vol. I. Sagāthā-Vagga, Vol. II. NidānaVagga, Khandha-Vagga, Saḷāyatana-Vagga (First Part), Vol. III. Saḷāyatana-Vagga (Second Part), Mahā-Vagga, Pali Text Society, London, 1977.

Sn.

Sutta-Nipāta, eds. D. Andersen and H. Smith, Pali Text Society, London, 1965.

SnA.

Sutta-Nipāta Commentary being Paramatthajotikā II, Vol. I and II Uragavagga Cūḷavagga, ed. H. Smith, Pali Text Society, London, 1966. Vol. III, 1972.

Thag/Thīg.

Thera- and Therȋ-gāthā, eds. H. Oldenberg and R. Pischel, Pali Text Society, London, 1966.

ThagA.

Paramattha-Dīpanī Theragāthā-Aṭṭhakathā the Commentary of Dhammapālacariya – Vol. I, ed. F.L. Woodwerd, Pali Text Society, London, 1971. Vol. II, 1977. Vol. III, 1984.

Tikap.

Tikapaṭṭhāna – Part I. Paccayavibhangavāra, ed. R. Davids, Pali Text Society, London, 1988.

Ud.

Udāna, ed. P. Steinthal, Pali Text Society, London, 1948.

UdA.

Paramattha-Dīpanī Udānaṭṭhakathā of Dhammapālâcariya, ed. F.L. Woodward, Pali Text Society, London, 1977.

Vbh.

The Vibhaṅga, ed. R. Davids, Pali Text Society, London, 1978.

VbhA

Sammoha-Vinodanī, Abhidhamma-Piṭake Vibhangaṭṭhakathā, ed. A.P. Buddhadatta Thero, Pali Text Society, London, 1980.

Vin.

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308 VinA.

Samantapāsādikā – Vol. I, eds. J. Takakusu and Nagai, M., Pali Text Society, London, 1975. Vol. II, 1969. Vol. III, 1968. Vol. IV, 1966. Vol. V, 1967. Vol. VI, 1947. Vol. VIII, ed. H. Kopp, 1977.

Vvu/Pvu.

Vimānavatthu and Petavatthu, ed. N.A. Jayawickrama, Pali Text Society, London, 1977.

Yam.

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Index of Subjects

A abhadda vacana 284 Abhidhamma piṭaka 7, 44, 85, 87, 88, 90, 91, 100, 204 abhiññā 23 admission: higher- 150, 180, 208, 279, 282 Initial- 150,182 Akaṅkheyya-sutta 300, 303 Alagaddūpama-sutta 96 altruism 254 -joy 238 Āmagandha-sutta 241 ambiguity 248 amoghavachana jina 189 anabhirati 204, 205, 206 anti-essential argument 50 Apadāna 8, 10, 87, 106 apadesa 47 appaṭisaraṇa 129 analysis of meaning (attam vibhajjati) 103 anatta 114,115 Aṅguttaranikāya 7, 44, 68,155 arahants 55-81, 158, 195, 209, 214, 269, 301,302 -hood 60, 61, 67, 165

-ideal 254 araññavāsi 73, 75, 81, 255 ariya-dhaja 210 Ariyapariyesana-sutta 3, 233 asceticism 203 -practice 17 a-socialness 257 asocial 257 -philosophy 253 -character 254 assurance of purity (pārisuddhi) 121 atta 98, 260 attano-mati 110 attendant to the Buddha 256 Atthasālinῑ 88, 97, 100 austere practices 62 authentication 82-103 authority of scripture 102 avecca-pasāda 168 ācariya-antevāsika 206 āgama: -literature 39 -translation 40 Chinese-literature 40 ānantarῑya pāpakamma 99 āsava 11 āsavakkhaya ñāṇa 56 ātma 260

317 -view 259 āyatana 9,190

B Bahuvedaniya-sutta 100 baṇa 293 mataka- 291 -pot 296 bhānaka tradition 138 bhikkhu 2, 37, 162, 168, 260, 284 bhikkhuni 37, 77, 162, 168, 260, 273 bhikkhuni community 163, 171 order of- 6, 256 bodhipakkhiyādhammā 29, 90, 124, 160, 302 bodhisattva 218, 220, 221, 233 Mangala- 222 boran 280, 282 -kammaṭṭhāna 278, 279, 286 bowl and robes 20 book council 138 brahma vihāra 238 brahmacariya 204 brahmanism 77, 140,169 -tradition 37,169 brahmin Jūjaka 223, 224 Buddhagoshian Tradition 54 Buddha Jayanthi 181 Buddhavaṃsa 8 Buddhism: history of- 179, protestant- 186, 187 world- 136,194 early- 38, 43, 55 social philosophy of- 255 socially engaged- 265 European interpretations of- 288 real- 288 ritual- 304 functional- 304 Buddhist 218-235

Theravada- 218, 219, 222 -ethics 218, 219 pious- 218 -perspective 219 -tradition 117,222, 231 -community 163 -monastic community 119,163 -philosophical thinking 83 -Social Theory 252,253, 265 -Social Activism 252 real-practice 253 -social practice Buddha 162-178, 256, 261 -hood 73,229, 230, 232 -vacana 44,83,97,109,112,138,139, 140,153, 281 word of the- 74, 287 -sāsana 130 -pūjā 290 Burmese: -monks 181, 182, 285 -method 185

C chanda 121 Cariyāpiṭaka 8, 87,106,204 -aṭṭakathā (CPA) 219, 220, 222, 223, 232 catuparisā 81,163 cetopariya-ñāṇa 195 Chicago (World’s Parliament of Religion) 46 Christianity 293 city dwellers 73 citta-visuddhi 196 coherence 111 -as criterion 111 Colonialism 278, 288 commentaries 45,106,188, 189, 190, 193, 194, 195, 245, 246 Dhammapada- 203, 204 sub- 10,145,188,190

318 -tradition 92,165 pāli- 3, 136 Sinhalese- 14 -to Vinaya Piṭaka 32, 86 -attitudes 100 -explanation 113 sub- sub-(anuṭῑkā) 145 commentators 97 Theravada- 136 compassion 238, 254 conceptual 297 conditioned co-genesis 265 Confucianism 253 consent 121 concentration 22 constructive attitude 44 Cūlahatthipadopama-sutta 102,160 Cullaniddesa 87 Cullavaggapāḷi 8, 98, 109, 130, 155, 159, 240 -account 44, 71, 74, 80, 133 Cullavedalla-sutta 112 cutūpapāta-ñāṇa 56, 195 Cūladukkhakkhandha-sutta 95 Cūḷagosinga-sutta 99, 122

D Dasuttara-sutta 90, 128 dāgoba 269 dāna 218, 219, 222, 235, 290, 300 -pāramitā 218 delusion 265 dependent mentality 93 dependent origination 31, 236 desanā 98 desanā nidāna 90 description of meaning (aṭṭa-kathā) 104 dibba-sota 195 dichotomous ways of life 257 difference in perspective 80

direct knowledge 23, 112 Dῑpavaṃsa 47, 48 dhammadhara 98, 256 dhamma 98, 257, 294 -kathika 37, 75, 81, 159, 255 -Bhāndāgārika 66 Dhammacakka-pavattana-sutta 107 Dhammapada 35, 87, 89, 122, 302 -aṭṭhakatā 9 Dhammasaṅganῑ-prakaraṇa 8 dhammavicaya sambojjhaṅga 102 dhammānupassanā Dhātu 9,190 Dhātukatha-pakaraṇaya 9 dhutāṅga 256 disciple 62 disciplinary rules 204 dispensation 132 dissension 124 dῑghabhāṇaka 87, 139, 145 Dῑgha-nikāya 7, 12, 86, 155, 247 donation 218-225, 223 dukkha 264

E early Buddhism 279 -tradition 104 Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge 39 eighteenth century 179 ekāyana magga 201 Encyclopedia of Buddhism 55, 300 English education 187 enlightenment 1, 112, 174 equanimity 238 essentialism 289 esoteric: -practices 116 -tradition 278 ethnic movement 254

319 European scholar 45 evaṃ me sutaṃ 157-158 examining attitude 102

F faith (saddhā) 31, 174 rootless - 168 rational - 168 lacking in - 175 First Buddhist Council 35, 74, 77, 78, 85, 86, 95, 87, 96, 98, 100, 108, 110, 132, 133, 155, 157, 181, 256 first century bce 136 first saṅgāyanā 6, 71, 143 five: -aggregates 24, 25 -hindrance 12 -methods (naya)108 -precepts 251 forest: -living 72 -dwelling 73 four: -paths 164, 166 -fruits 164, 166 -pairs 164 -nikāyas 5, 158 -discriminations 24 -fold hermeneutical category 98 -indicators 110, 111 -sublime states 239 fruition attainment 30

G gaṇa 163 -saṅgha 175 gaṇinnānse 284 gantha-dhura 37, 74, 75, 81, 188 gāmavāsi 75, 255, 281 genealogy 3

generosity 218 genuine mysticism 254 Geo-politics 278 Gods: -worship 186 -in Buddhism 299 Gopakamoggallāna-sutta 56, 78 great indicators 84, 90, 109 greed 265

H happiness 35, 123 hatred 265 Heart of Buddhist Meditation 180 hermeneutics 104 Buddhist- 82, 104 -guidelines 112 heretics 115 Himalaya mountain 229 Hinduism 231 Hinayana 58, 116 householder 163, 166 -life 203, 204, 205, 206 -clothes 208, 215 -followers 216 hῑnāyāvattanā 203-217

I iddhividha 195 idealism 270 impediments 19 Indriya-Jātaka 204 inner-purification 258 interference 31 interpretation 104, 248 - tradition 49, 85 -method of 82 -theory 91 proper- 95 official- 103 practice of- 112

320 paradoxical- 117 process of- 118 new- 242 different- 257 inter: -relation 162-178 -dependent 236 -connected 23 invaders 271 Islam 253 infields in- 255 Itivuttaka 105, 106

J Jainism 236, 300 -disciples 125 Jātaka 87, 89, 220, 222, 232 pāḷi- 223 -stories 251 Dharmadvaja- 251 jhāna 12, 23, 32, 33, 74, 146, 185, 189 rupa- 60, 190 four- 190, 191, 193, 194 formless- 196 material-196 ni-jhānaka 196, 197, 200 first-18 second- 18 Third- 18 Fourth- 18 Jivaka 237, 238, 239 -sutta 237 Judeo-Christian tradition 104, 266

K kalyāṇamitta 19, 120, 121, 258 kamma 303 kāya- 293 vacῑ- 294 mano- 294 Kanhadipayana-cariya 204

Kaṅkhāvitaranῑ 106 Karaṇῑyametta-sutta 243, 251 Karmic: -causal 224 -connection 224 karuṇā 238, 261 kasiṇa 21, 22 Kathāvatthu 90, 102, 115, 134, 139, 188 kāya 198 kāmasukhallikānuyoga 216 khaṇa 32 kilesa 11, 29 khandha 105, 190 Khaggavisāṇa-sutta 257 Khuddhaka-nikāya 7, 86, 174, 304 Khuddhaka-pāṭha 140 Khuddakasikkhā 280 knowledge factor 245, 246 Kosambiya-sutta 123 Kurundi (aṭṭhakathā) 85 kusala 24, 301, 303

L languages: Sinhala- 13, 179 Burmese- 179 Southeast Asian- 179 Thai-179 Laos- 179 Cambodian- 179 sacred- 54 Sanskrit- 105 Tibetan- 105 Kharoshṭi- 105 vedic- 149 Magadha- 149, 150 Isaland- 151 Lankāvatāra-sūtra 249, 250, 275 lay: -groups 186

321 -meditation 186 - people 187 -disciple in Burma 199 lokuttara-vāda 116

M macchariya 29 Maduratthavilāsinῑ 106 Madhupiṇḍika-sutta 87, 107 Magadha 148, 149 Māgadhi 143, 149 Mahagosinga-sutta 89, 99 Mahākammavibhaṅga-sutta 107 Mahāparinibbāna-sutta 2, 65, 78, 83, 84, 90, 94, 99, 102, 108, 109, 125, 127, 141, 154, 155, 156, 175, 247, 260, 303 Maha-prajnāpāramitā-sūtra 116 Mahāsaccaka-sutta 60 Mahasi School 188 - tradition 189 Mahāvaggapāḷi 8, 121, 155 Mahāvaṃsa 37, 41, 133, 134, 136, 280 Mahayana 2, 81, 105, 116, 138, 144, 222, 236, 249, 275 East Asian- 153, 179 History of- 179 -tradition 58, 116 the sixth patriarch of- tradition 58 -sutra 116 Indian- 148 Chinese- 148 later- 237 -literature 249 -Buddhist tradition 259 mahā-apadesa 84, 91, 92, 94, 96, 109, 125, 156, 189, 284, 304 Mahāniddesa 87 Majjhimabhāṇka 87, 139

Majjhima-nikāya 3, 7, 87 man-centred 236 Manorathapūraṇī 106, 132 māra 261 meat: -eating 72, 236-251 improper kinds of- 246 appropriate- 246 natural- 248 medicine289 -Ayurvedic 279 meditation 181, 183, 193, 278, 279, 282 vipassanā- 179-202, 285 Burmese method of- 179 -in Burma 180, 188 method of- 180, 181 Burmese- 181 new movements of- 180 Theravada- 181 - teacher 181 -master 186 practicing- 181 -instruction 181 new method- 182, 183, 187 new Buddhist- 183 practitioners of- 187 -background 188 traditional Theravada- 278 -practice 280 -master 283 modern- 284 meditator 23 merit: transferring- 290, 294 -s in Buddhism 299-304 meta theoretical issues 253 methodological considerations 187, 189 metta 141,238

322 middle land 2 migapada-valañjana naya 191 Milindapañha 165, 204, 223, 225, 226, 247 mindfulness 71 minor offence 71, 77 minor rules 77 modern scholar 166 modernism 288 modes of speech 113 monastery: Mahasi- 181 Vajiraramaya- 183, 186 Monastic: -Followers 164, 179 -status 208 -robes 208 -mark 209 -education 180 -tradition 211 -friend 181 -members 164 -attainments 164 -community 119, 166 -disciples 167 Burmese- tradition 182 -vinaya 12, 207 life 16, 65, 122 -group 124 -life 203-217, 29 -experience 216 monkhood 231 Mulamādhyamakakārikā 152 muditā 238 muni concept 257 mysteries 268

N Nagara-sutta 56, 94 navāṅga satthusāsana 92 nāga 269 nāsanā 209, 210

saṃvāsa- 209 liṅga- 209-210 daṇḍakamma- 209 neo-traditionalist 187 Netti-pakaraṇa 8,108 neyattha 113, 115, 117, 190, 191, 202 Niddesa 8, 106, 138 nippariāya desanā 159 nikāya 231 nirvana (nibbana) 14, 56, 99, 103, 120, 179, 185, 253, 261, 283, 301, 303 nῑtattha 113, 115, 117, 190, 202 no-God view 51 no-soul view 51, 115 non-absoluteness: -of the teaching 101 -system 103 non-rigidity of the teaching 101 non-substantiality 115 non-theism 300 non-violence 236, 251

O offender 208 ola-leaves 140 opanāyika 18 opposite sex 204, 205 ordination: temporary- 216 otāretabbāni 84, 85

P pabbajjā 63, 170 Padhāna-sutta 301 Pahārāda-sutta 194 pakkamati 207 Pali examination 180 - canon 43 status of-language 51

323 Palm-leaf manuscript 44 pāṃsukūlika 81, 159, 255 pañcabhaṅga 101 pañca-sῑla 251 paññā 146, 185 Papañcasūdanī 9 Paramatthajotikā 106 paravādi 139, 188 parinirvana 2, 36, 41, 44, 57, 70, 71, 74, 75, 78, 85, 125, 165, 181, 189, 256, 284 parisuddhi 206 Parivārapāḷi 8 pariyatti (Learnedness) 18, 75, 132, 141, 142, 159 paticcasamuppāda 10, 25, 169, 264 paṭipatti 75, 132, 141, 142, 159 Paṭisambhidāmagga 87, 90, 174 paṭisotagāmi 117, 170 patiṭṭhā 231 paṭivedha 75, 98, 141 Paṭṭhāna-pakaraṇaya 9 Pācittiyapāḷi 8 pāṇḍukmbala silā 88 pāṃsukūlika 75 pāramitā 219 upa- 219 paramattha- 219 pārājikā 205, 206, 207, 208, 122 -paḷi 8, 155, 208 Pāsādika-sutta 99, 185 Pāth of Freedom 272 Pātimokkha 8, 16, 106, 107, 120, 126, 208, 258, 274 perfection 219 Sub- 219 -in the highest sense 219 personal: -responsibility 244 -ownership 258 personalism 115

personality differences 55-81 Peṭakopadesa 8, 108 Petavatthu 87, 105, 106 philosophical study 297 poṭṭabba 198 political theory 265 Potthaka council 138 practitioner 21 preceptor 258 primary object 199, 22 private 258 -enterprise 263 prospective meditator 20 psychological attitude 94 Pubbenivāsa anussati ñāṇa 56 puggala 163 -vāda 115 Puggalapaññatti-pakaraṇa 9 puñña 201, 261, 300, 301, 303 Purābheda sutta 283 purity 35 puthujjana 60 Putta-māṃsūpama-sutta 240 Pūjāvaliya 61, 109

R Rathavinῑtha-sutta 14, 194, 201 rational action 254 rationalist humanism 263, 265 reality 236 realization: sudden 179 gradual 179 reductionism 47 reductive modernism 265 reform 278 relativism 42, 54 self defeating- 51 religious: -tradition 162 non- 162 -organization 12,163

324 Buddhist-163 Chinese-life 43 -festivities 272 rights: children’s- 219 women’s- 219 human- 219 -group 124 rites and rituals 292 robes 20, 256 Roman Catholic tradition 13

S Saccavibhaṅga-sutta 107 Saddhammapajjotikā 9 Saddharma-puṇḍarika-sūtra 116, 153 saddhā: amūlikā- 168 ākāravatī- 168 Saddasārātthajālinȋ 191 sagga 261 saka-nirutti 53 sakavādi 139,188 salvation religion 253 Samantapāsādikā 86, 133, 134 samatha 191, 195, 282, 283 yānika 196-197, 200 samādhi 15, 146, 185, 168 sammā- 190, 193 khanika- 193 appanā- 193 sammā-sambuddha 79 sammā-sati 201 samsara 12, 115 -existence 66 -goal 258 Saṃyutta-nikāya 7, 13, 33, 74, 155, 231 sandassetabbhāni 84, 85 saṅgῑti 119-135 -sutta 90, 127, 128, 130

sangha 162-178 Buddhist-162, 172 Deva- 162 nyati- 162 -illumination 163 -sobhana 163 sāvaka- 164, 165, 166 nobel- 165 ariya-guṇa 165 ubato- 167 -anussati 168 unity of- 120, 124 -as a body 124 catuddisā- 141 purification of - 285 Sangharājasādhucariyāva 45 saṅghāta 165 saṅghādisesa 205, 122 saṅgāyanā 5, 36, 37, 44, 53, 80, 119, 120, 127, 133 a mini- 127 First- 137 sāṅghika system 275 saṅkhāra 199, 222 saṃyojana 11, 29 saraṇāgamana 167 satta-aparihānīya dhamma 124 satimanta 66 Satipaṭṭhāna-sutta 189, 190, 191, 193 method 197, 198, 199, 201, 202 satthā 36, 174 -deva manussānaṃ 173 sattusāsana 84 Sāleyyaka-sutta 301 sāmaggi 119-135 Sāmagāma-sutta 87, 118, 124, 127, 159, 160 Sāmaññaphala-sutta 12, 23, 201, 243 sāmaṇera 208, 284 Sāratthadīpanī 48 Sāratthapakāsinῑ 106 sāsana 61, 62, 80, 81, 163, 256, 258

325 -life 66 three fold- 75 sattu- 153 schism 98, 123 actual- 98 -of sangha 122 Second Council 115, 116, 132 Sedakaṃ-sutta 259 Seikkhun Village 180 sermon 292, 293, 294, 295, 296, 298 - as an oral act 296 -writers 293 Dhamma- 293 preacher of a - 294 seven virtues of non-decline 124 Sigālovāda-sutta 171, 216, 242 siṃsapā leaves 111 Sinhala 290, 293 -literature 291 -language 295 sixteen modes (soḷasa-hāra) 108 Sixth Buddhiat Council 181 sixth century ce 106, 148 sῑla 12 sῑmā 274 skepticism 41, 42, 43, 45 growing- 54 skill-in-means (upāya-kosalla) 116, 221 social: -engagement 74 -responsibility 254 - action 259 sotāpatti 169 soteriological 286, 288: -task 37 -goal 285 -needs 285 -reasons 286 - purpose 287 soul 254

Southeast Asia 49, 142, 181, 204, 299 -languages 179 sources 180 -Theravada tradition 216 -Buddhist society 217 -Sri Lanka society 217 -Buddhist tradition 223 early- 224 -discourses 224 Theravadins in- 50 -Buddhist countries 143 speech act 294 Sramana tradition 169 Sthaviravāda -Canon 270 -Buddhist 275 stream entry 169 sublime mode of living 238 sukha: gihi-216 pabbajita- 216 sāmisa- 216 -vipassaka 196 sūkara-maddava 247 Sukhāvativyūha-sūtra 153 Sumaṅgalavilāsinī 74, 86, 106, 157 Sunyatāvāda 152 Susima-sutta 195 sutta110 -anuloma 110 Sutta-nipāta 87, 89, 105, 216, 283, 302 Sutta 34 -piṭaka 7, 85, 189, 204 sva-bhāva 32 systematizer 85

T taṇhā 215 teacher 258

326 technological innovation 278 tender insight 28 text in context 263 Thai: -Prince 46 -monk 281 the progress of insight 180 the religion of India 253 theistic religions 246 theoretical issues 253 Theragāthā 8, 87, 105, 106, 234 Therigāthā 8, 87, 105, 106, 234 therῑya 47 Theravada 1, 2, 34-54, 179, 237, 304 -tradition 38, 59, 71, 77, 80, 83, 101, 102, 103, 162-178, 179, 188, 203, 244 -monks 187, 288 -monastic vinaya 188 -Buddhist society 201 -Abhidhamma 188 authority of- 165 philosophical core of- 1 -vinaya literature 2 -interpretation 5 -studies 34 -Buddhism 37, 46, 51, 284, 289 -scholars 38 -Pali Canon 43 -history 44, 142 different forms of- 51 traditional-view 52 -commentaries 85 -Buddhist countries 246 non- Buddhist view 269 -region 278 -society 283 -Buddhist 299 Tibetan Practice 287 Tipiṭaka 105, 287 Third Council 91,133 three: -disciplines (tisso-sikkhā)

191;-knowledge 12;-training 201;-science 60; - baskets 287 tooth relic 274 traditional: -belief 52 -scholarship 54 -Buddhist societies 253 traditional Buddhist scholarship 38 trans-yanic 118 translator 86 transcendental modernism 265 transcendentalist 116 transformation 263, 265 Treasurer of Dhamma 66, 109 Triṃśatikā 152 Triple Gem 167 truth: coherence theory of- 110 Four Noble- 11, 96, 265, 289 -of worldly convention 117 -of the highest meaning 117

U Udāna 7, 87, 105, 106, 247 uddesa 106, 126 unpleasant words 284 upajjhāya saddhivihārika 206 upakaraṇa 220 Upanishad tradition 42 upasampadā 63, 72 upaṭṭhāka 66 upāsaka 163, 260, 283 upāsikā 163, 260, 283 upāya-kosalla (skill-in-means) 116, 221 upekkhā 238 uposatha 73, 121, 126, 206 Sāmaggi- 126 ultimate goal 121 universal friendliness 141 Uttaravihāravaṃsa aṭṭhakathā 276

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V Vaibhāṣika 88, 152 Vaitulyavāda 272 Vajrayāna 2, 81, 105, 116, 144 Tibetan- 286 vasala (low caste) 169 vatthu 231 Vyagghapajja-sutta 216 Vāseṭṭha-sutta 242 vāyodhātu 198 Veda 140 -position 260 vegetarianism 236, 237, 250, 251 Vetulla-vāda 139 vocations 76 vibbhamana 203-2017, 203, 206, 207, 209, 211 Vibhajjavāda 4 Vibhāṣhā 152 Viññānavāda 152 Vimamsaka-sutta 102, 141 Vimānavatthu 8, 87, 105, 106 Viṃśatikā 152 vimutta: ceto- 195 paññā- 195 ubhatobhāga- 195 vimutti 30 -rasa 108, 111 Vimuttimagga 272, 280 Vinaya 2, 6, 34, 80, 163, 166, 187, 274 - piṭaka 7, 85, 86, 107, 204, 257 -rules 70, 206, 208 -text 209, 269 -cullavagga 66 spirit of the- 81 -dispute 132 -vadins 158 Vinayadhara 98, 142, 256 Vinayanivicchaya 280

vinῑta-vatthu 205, 208 vipallāsa 29 vipassaka: sukka- 32 suddha- 32 vipassanā 283: -dhura 74, 75, 81 movement of- 143 vipassanāyānika 196 virtues 241 Visuddhajanavilāsinῑ 3, 10, 106 visuddhi 30: sῑla- 15, 146 citta- 15,146 diṭṭhi- 15, 26 Kaṅkhāvitaraṇa- 15, 26 magga amagga ñāṇadassana- 15, 27 paṭipadāñāṇa dassana- 15, 28 ñāṇadassana- 15, 29 Visuddhimagga 1, 4, 5, 13, 17, 24, 30, 32, 49, 146, 147, 165, 184, 194, 195, 196, 280, 281, 285

W welfare 123 What the Buddha Taught 41 Western: -Countries 181; Practitioners 181;-Buddhist 253 Yamaka-pakaraṇaya 9 yāna 116 mishra- 118 Yogācāra 152 -bhumi śāstra 270 yoke 188 -of books 37, 179 -of insight meditation 179 two-75

Index of Proper Names

A Abenayaka, Oliver 47, 118, 140 Abhaya, reservoir 251 Abhaya, Vaṭṭagāmini 37, 134, 136, 138, 140, 159, 269, 271, 285 Abhayadastra 270 Abhayagiri 76, 138, 139, 269, 270, 272, 276 -sect 271 Adikaram, E.W. 75, 76, 85, 132, 136, 137, 142, 291 Ajatasatthu 79, 124, 176 Albany 124 Aloka vihara (Aluvihara) 138, 142, 143, 146 Āmagandha-sutta 241 Ananda Thera 1, 6, 35, 57, 58, 66, 67, 68, 69, 77, 80, 81, 83, 86, 93, 109, 124, 125, 154, 155.158,256 Ananda Maithreya 46 Angot, Charles 45 Anuradhapura 4, 5, 13, 269 Anuruddha Thera 122, 158 Ariṭṭha Gaddhābādipubba 67,104 Ashoka (king) 134, 139, 251, 270,

285 Aung, S.Z. 8 Austim, J.L 294

B Bahiya Daruciriya 201 Ballika 260 Bambalapitiya 33 Bandaranaike, S.W.R.D. 183, 186 Bandaranaike, Sirima 186 Blackburn, Ann 284 Bodhi, Bhikkhu 14, 15, 124, 165, 237 Bodhimeghissara 270 Bond, George. 82, 157, 186, 187 Buddhadatta Thera 106 Buddha Sasana Nuggaha Organization 184 Buddhagosha 1, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 31, 32, 33, 47, 48, 49, 53, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 91, 106, 107, 115, 131, 136, 140, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 150, 151, 159, 187, 188, 194,231, 165 Burma 33, 144, 282

329

C Cambodia 153, 278, 279, 280, 282 Ceylon 142 British- 142 Chandawimala, Rerukane 182, 183, 185, 186, 189 China 142, 153, 179 Chudadharn 46 Chun Pao 273 Collins, Steven 40, 41, 43, 46, 76, 291 Colombo 5, 33 Cone 218, 230, 232 Cousins, L.S. 119 Crosby, Kate. 45, 278, 281, 284 -‘s observation 286 -‘s discussion 287 Cullapanthaka 201 Cunda 154, 185, 247, 259

D Davids, C.A.F. Rhys. 8, 14, 143, 247, 249 Derrida 264 Devadatta 64, 72, 99, 123, 124, 240 Devanampiyatissa 251 Devasara Bhikkhuni 273 Dhakkinagiri 62 Dhamma-ruci 270 Dhammadinna Bhikkuni 14, 112, 173 Dhammajiva Thera, 180 Dhammakitti Thera 149 Dhammakkhanda Thera, Kapugama 284 Dhammapala Thera 247 Dhammarama Thera, Yatramulle 143 Dhammavihari Thera 55 Dharma-guptha 270

Dharmapala, Anagarika 46, 281 Dhirasekera, Jotiya 80, 208, 209 Durkheim 126

E East Asia 142

F Fa Hsien 268

G Gehman, H.S. 8 Geiger 6, 52, 53, 133 Germany: Theravada Buddhist monks of 184 Gethin, Rupert. 3, 48, 49, 124, 128 Gombrich, Richard. 5, 13, 42, 43, 51, 52, 53, 126, 134, 135, 186, 218, 230, 232 Gopaka Moggallana 57, 78, 79, 89, 93, 123, 173, 175 Gotama Buddha 243 Govinda, Lama Anagarika 184, 185 Gunasena, Amal 281

H Hallisey, Charles 119, 282 Hardy, E. 82 Harvard, Elizabeth 284 Hinuber, Oskar Von 45, 129 Hoey 248 Horner, I.B. 129, 131, 133 Hui Neng 58

I India 138, 142, 270 North of- 144 -Tradition 42

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J Jaini, Padmanabh S. 90, 94, 96, 99 Japan 142, 153 Jayatilleke, K.N. 39, 100 Jayawickrama, N.A. 131, 132, 134, 211 Jāliya 220, 230, 234 Jones, Ken. 264, 265, 266 Jujaka 224

K Kalasoka 133 Kalupahana, D.J. 13, 14, 39, 40, 146, 249, 250, 275, 276 Kanduboda 182, 183 Kancipura 270 Kanishka, (king) 137 Kantaka 223 Kapilavathtu 66 Karunadasa, Y. 301 Kassapa Buddha 241, 242, 243 Kassapa Thera (Cassius A. Pereira) 183 Kemper, Steven 281 Keng Tung 223, 232 Keown, Damien 250 Kesi 209 Kheminda Thera 33, 146, 183, 184, 185, 188, 189, 190, 191, 193, 194, 195, 196, 197, 200, 202 Khin, U Ba 143 Kimbali 122 Korea 142 Kosambi 123 Kornfield, Jack 200 Kotelawala, Sri John 182, 183, 186 Krishṇajinā (Kanhajina) 220

L Laneau, M 45

Langer, Rita 290, 292, 293, 295, 296, 297 Laos 153, 278, 279, 280 Law, B.C. 9 Ling, Trevor 262, 263, 266 Lopez, Donald 105 Loy, David 265, 266

M Maddi (queen) 224 Magadha dialect 4, 53, 148 Mahakaccana Thera 35, 87, 107, 258 Mahakassapa Thera 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 98, 99, 123, 130, 131, 158, 181, 256, 257 Maha Pajapati Gothami 66 Mahamangala Thera 144 Mahanama (king) 13, 85, 144, 273 Mahanama Thera 106 Mahasena (king) 272 Mahavihara 4, 5, 13, 49, 76, 138, 139, 269, 270, 272, 276 Commentarial tradition of-85 -sangha 140 -tradition 271 Mahinda (thera) 76, 132, 139, 14, 143,151,160 Mahinda, Deegalle, 291 Maithreya Thera, Vidagama 151 Malalgoda, Keerti 284 Malunkyaputta 96, 201 Mandalay 180 Mangalaramaya 89 Mantaniputta, Punna 14 Marasinghe, M.M.J. 299, 304 McDaniel, Justin T. 282 Meetirigala 180

331 Mihintale 269 Milinda (king) 218, 222, 224, 232, 249 Min, U 180 Mingun 280, 283 Moggaliputtatissa Thera 90, 91, 134, 139 Moulmein 181 Myanmar 153, 223

N Nagarjuna 32, 116, 152 Nandiya Thera 122 Narada Thera 203 Narada Thera, U. 9, 181, (Sayadaw, Mingun Jetawun 181) Nagasena Thera 214, 215, 222, 224, 226, 227, 228, 229, 230,249 Ñanaratana Thera, Weligama 183, 185 Ñānamoli 4, 8, 13, 15, 17, 82, 108, 124, 237 Nāga-loka 116 Nigantha Nataputta 93, 99 ,129, 154 Norman, K.R. 7, 8, 45, 128, 131, 133, 134 Neumann, K.E. 248 Nu, U 181, 183 Nyanaponika Thera 62, 180, 184, 199, 200 Nyanuttara Sayadaw 184

O Obeyesekere, Gananath 186 Oldenberg 255

P Pali Text Society 39 Parisa 163 Perreira, Todd LeRoy 3

Phagguna Moliya 114 Pol Pot 282 Polonnaruwa period 45 Premasiri, P.D. 203, 301 Purana Thera 44, 94, 143

R Rahula, Walpola 41, 76, 132, 142, 291 Rajagaha 69, 109, 127 Rajasimha, Kirti Sri 281 Rangoon 180, 181, 184 Raṭṭhapala 205, 211 Ravana 275 Revata Thera 133 Ruegg, Seyfort 250

S Saṅgāmaji Bhikkhu 205, 233, 234 Sanghapala Thera 4 Sangharakkhita Thera 45 Saranankara, Velivita. 282, 284 Sariputta 14, 35, 45, 57, 59, 72, 73, 88, 89,107,123, 128, 130,158 Sati bhikkhu 67, 104 Sayadaw, Ledi 280, 283 Sayadaw, Mahasi 33, 143, 179-202, 280 life of -180 -method 280 Sayadaw, Nyanuttara 33, 146, 188, 190, 194, 202 Sayadaw, Syrian Tawya 184 Schalk, Peter. 290, 291, 292, 295, 296, 297 Shwebo City 180 Siam 182 Silva, Austin De. 184 Sinhaladvῑpa 270 Siri Meghavanna (king) 272

332 Sῑvaka 201 Skilling, Peter. 3 Skilton, Andrew. 281 Sobhana, U. Mahāthera 180, 181, 199 Soma bhikkhuni 172 Soma Thera 183, 188 Spiro, Melford 232, 299 Sri Lanka 39, 179, 181, 182, 183, 184, 246, 281 - Government 182 Vipassanā Bhavanā Samitiya- 183 lived in- 180 -Buddhist 186 lay phenomenon in- 187 -Theravada 87, 216, 285 -saṇgha 75 Buddhism in- 136 history of- 139 Sri Nanarama Thera, Matara 285, 288 Sri Vajiranana Nayaka Thera 187 Subaddha 93, 98,155, 284 Suddhodana 165 Sumanadeva Thera 89 Sumangala Mātā 172 Sumatipala, Kahatapitiye 182, 183 Sunidha 124 Swaris, Nalin 263, 264, 266

T Tāvatiṃsa heavan 88.90 Tha-khun 223 Thailand 45, 153, 216, 278, 279, 280 Saṅgha in- 180 Thapassu 260 Thathna Yeikhtha 181 Thaton 181 Thullananda 62, 63, 65 Thullatissa 64, 67

Tilakaratne, Asanga 118, 261 Tilokayana, P.K.U. 184 Tissa Brahmin 241, 242 Tissabhuti Thera 89 Turnour, George 46

U Universite Catholique De Louvain 148 Upali 35, 36, 71, 76, 80, 86, 109, 137 Upasena Thera 106 Uttara Thera 157

V Vajiraramaya 33 Valikaramaya 133 Vasubandhu 152 Vassakara 79,124,176 Vesali 66, 132 Vessantara 223, 229, 230, 232, 234 Prince- 218, 223, 224, 233 -Jataka 218, 225, 231, 232 Tham -Jataka 223 Vinayalankara Thera 182 Visakha 173 Vultures’ Peak Mountain 127

W Wakkali 175 Walshe, Maurice 7, 108, 117 Weber, Max 252, 253, 254, 255, 258, 260, 261, 266, 302 -‘s interpretation 255 -‘s characterization 257 Weberian 263 - s’ objection 264 Wijayaratne, Mohan 215, 260 Woodward, F.L. 7, 66 World Fellowship of Buddhists 46

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X Xuan, Zang 268-277

Y Yamelu 149 Yasa 132, 133, 209 Yashodhara 234

Asanga Tilakaratne

Born in Tissamaharamaya of Southern Sri Lanka in 1952 Asanga Tilakaratne received his primary education at Debarawewa Vidyalaya (now Debarawewa Central College), Tissamaharamaya. Subsequently, he received monastic education at Mallikaramaya, Ratmalana and Siri Vajiranana Dharmayatanaya, Maharagama. He received his first degree, Tripiṭakavedi, from Buddha Sravaka Dharma Pithaya (currently Sri Lanka Bhiksu University), Anuradhapura and also, he completed his Pracina Pandit examination of Oriental Studies Society, Sri Lanka. Next, he joined Peradeniya University, Sri Lanka, and received his bachelor’s degree specializing in Buddhist Philosophy and offering Pali and Sanskrit as his subsidiary subjects. Receiving East-West Center graduate fellowship he studied Western Philosophy at the University of Hawai’i at Manoa for his Masters. He completed his Doctorate at the same university in Comparative Philosophy writing his dissertation on the problem of the ineffability of religious experience. From 1992 to 2007 Prof. Tilakaratne taught at Postgraduate Institute of Pali and Buddhist Studies, University of Kelaniya, and served as its Director from 2004 to 2007. He joined the University of Colombo as the Professor of Pali and Buddhist Studies in 2009 January and taught there till his retirement in 2018. Meantime, he became instrumental in establishing the Department of Buddhist Studies at Colombo where he became the founder Head. During 2010-2012 he served as the President of Arts Faculty Teachers Association (AFTA) of the University. Prof. Tilakaratne received the Colombo University award for the best researcher in Faculty of Arts in 2013 and in the next year he was awarded the Best Senior Researcher Award in Humanities and Social Sciences by Council of Vice-Chancellors and Directors (CVCD). Respected

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by his students for his undergraduate and postgraduate teaching Prof. Tilakaratne has guided more than twenty-five PhDs in various aspects of Buddhist studies. Prof. Tilakaratne was the recipient of Commonwealth Senior Fellowship 1999-2000. He spent one year at Oriental Institute, Oxford University working with Professor Richard Gombrich and was affiliated to Wolfson College as a fellow. Prof. Tilakaratne has served as visiting professor at Yonsei University, Korea (2007-2008), Otago University, New Zealand (2015), Savitribai Phule Pune University, India (2017) and more recently at Sitagu International Buddhist Academy, Sagaing and Mandalay, Myanmar (2018-2019). He has published, both in Sinhala and English, more than one hundred papers on Buddhist studies. He has authored and edited more than twenty books in both Sinhala and English. Of his more recent academic works, Theravada Buddhism: The View of the Elders (2012) was published by University of Hawai’i Press in the series of ‘Dimensions of Asian Spirituality’. He co-edited with Prof. Oliver Abenayaka 2600 Years of Sambuddhatva: Global Journey of Awakening (2012), a work covering the history and the current status of global Buddhism of all three traditions, published by Ministry of Buddha Sasana, Government of Sri Lanka. In addition to his academic work, in 2002, Prof. Tilakaratne founded Sri Lanka Association of Buddhist Studies (SLABS), an academic and professional organization of Buddhist scholars in Sri Lanka. Having served as its Joint Secretary from the beginning in 2017 he became its President. Also, in 2002, he founded, with a group of academics and professionals, Damrivi Foundation, a government registered not for profit organization for economic, social, educational and spiritual development and continues to function as its founder Chairman.

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Editorial Board Raluwe Padmasiri Thera BA (University of Peradeniya); MA (National University of Singapore); Professor and Head: Dept. of Buddhist Thought, Postgraduate Institute of Pali and Buddhist Studies, University of Kelaniya, Sri Lanka. Miriswaththe Wimalagnana Thera Royal Pandit (Sri Lanka); BA, MPhil (University of Peradeniya); Professor and Head: Dept. of Buddhist Culture, Postgraduate Institute of Pali and Buddhist Studies, University of Kelaniya, Sri Lanka. Wimal Hewamanage Royal Pandit (Sri Lanka); BA, MA, MPhil (University of Kelaniya); PhD (University of Wuhan); Senior Lecturer: Dept. of Buddhist Studies, University of Colombo, Sri Lanka. D. Denzil Senadeera BA (University of Sri Jayewardenepura); MA, MPhil, PhD (University of Kelaniya); Visiting Lecturer: Postgraduate Institute of Pali and Buddhist Studies, University of Kelaniya, Sri Lanka. Ashoka Welitota BA (University of Peradeniya); MA, PhD (The University of Hong Kong); Senior Lecturer and Head: Dept. of Buddhist Sources, Postgraduate Institute of Pali and Buddhist Studies, University of Kelaniya, Sri Lanka. Bertram G. Liyanage Royal Pandit (Sri Lanka); BA (University of Peradeniya); MA, PG Dip. (University of Pune); Deputy Editor: Encyclopaedia of Buddhism, Sri Lanka. Sheila Fernando BA, MA, MPhil, PhD (University of Kelaniya); Research Assistant: Tulana Research Centre, Sri Lanka.

Editorial Assistants Thich Nu Khanh Nang Bhikṣuṇī MA, PhD (University of Kelaniya); Tu Nguyen Pagoda, Thach Lam street, Tan Phu District, Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam. Sewwandi Marasinghe BA (University of Colombo); MA (University of Kelaniya); MPhil Candidate: Postgraduate Institute of Pali and Buddhist Studies, University of Kelaniya, Sri lanka. Nuwanthika Ariyadasa BA (University of Colombo); MA (University of Kelaniya); MPhil Candidate: Postgraduate Institute of Pali and Buddhist Studies, University of Kelaniya, Sri lanka.