Theory and Typology of Proper Names 9783110197853, 9783110190861, 2006034592

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Theory and Typology of Proper Names

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Trends in Linguistics Studies and Monographs 168

Editors

Walter Bisang (main editor for this volume)

Hans Henrich Hock Werner Winter

Mouton de Gruyter Berlin · New York

Theory and Typology of Proper Names

by

Willy Van Langendonck

Mouton de Gruyter Berlin · New York

Mouton de Gruyter (formerly Mouton, The Hague) is a Division of Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co. KG, Berlin.

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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Langendonck, Willy van. Theory and typology of proper names / by Willy Van Langendonck. p. cm. ⫺ (Trends in linguistics. Studies and monographs ; 168) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-3-11-019086-1 (hardcover : alk. paper) 1. Names. 2. Semantics. 3. Pragmatics. 4. Grammar, Comparative and general ⫺ Syntax. 5. Typology (Linguistics) I. Title. P323.L36 2007 410⫺dc22 2006034592

ISBN 978-3-11-019086-1 ISSN 1861-4302 Bibliographic information published by the Deutsche Nationalbibliothek The Deutsche Nationalbibliothek lists this publication in the Deutsche Nationalbibliografie; detailed bibliographic data are available in the Internet at http://dnb.d-nb.de. ” Copyright 2007 by Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co. KG, D-10785 Berlin All rights reserved, including those of translation into foreign languages. No part of this book may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopy, recording or any information storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher. Cover design: Christopher Schneider, Berlin. Printed in Germany.

Suddenly Sophie said, 'Have you ever wondered why we are alive, Mom?' 'Oh, not again!' 'Yes, because now I know the answer. People live on this planet so that someone can go around giving names to everything. ' Jostein Gaarder, Sophie's World, 100

To the memory ofDetty Leys

Foreword

This book is not just a synthesis of previous work but provides a number of insights and claims that are either entirely new or result from substantially reworked and extended existing papers of mine in such a way that the content of this publication hopefully constitutes a consistent and coherent piece of work. I would also like to mention that this work has interdisciplinary traits in that not only language philosophical but also psycho- and neurolinguistic studies have been made use of. In addition, dialinguistic, i.e. diatopic, diachronic and sociolinguistic (socio-onomastic) insights have been provided. Only the database of proper names has remained roughly the same as before. Especially, the material used in the fourth chapter does not come only from my own research but also from work done by students from the Institute for Onomastics and Dialectology (University of Leuven) who made their licentiate dissertation under my supervision. I wish to thank here all the people who have encouraged me in this painstaking enterprise or read previous versions of one or more chapters. Special thanks go to Zofia Kaleta, who gave me not only constant encouragement but also some relevant advice, especially concerning Polish data. Mark Van de Velde provided me with interesting data from Bantu languages. With him I had many discussions on morphosyntactic characteristics of proper names in these languages, especially Eton. Concerning the important first chapter it was rewarding to discuss pragmatic and other aspects of names with Richard Coates, and cognitive linguistic ideas with Dylan Glynn. From Dylan, I received interesting advice regarding English language, grammar and spelling. For more general assistance, I am deeply indebted to Kristin Davidse, who not only corrected my English, but provided me with thoroughgoing comments concerning earlier versions of every chapter in this book. I also thank Bill McGregor, Liesbet Heyvaert, and the other members of the research group of the English language at the University of Leuven, for their valuable remarks on an earlier version of the first three chapters. Finally, I am grateful to Jan Goossens and Jean-Christophe Verstraete, who were willing to go through an earlier version of the fourth (dialinguistic) chapter. As a linguist, I am hoping that the present work will not only be of interest for onomasticians but also for philosophers of language, psycho- and

viii Foreword neurolinguists, and especially 'ordinary' linguists, semanticists and grammarians alike. All too often, the study of proper names has remained underdeveloped in linguistic circles and publications, and is mostly entirely lacking in introductory textbooks of linguistics. As a textbook for advanced students in linguistics and onomastics, the present study intends to fill a gap in the study of proper names in these disciplines, especially in the Englishspeaking world, where no linguistic book has been published on the theory of proper names since John Algeo's 1973 stratificational account. Partly, the neglect of the theoretical study of proper names may be due to the pessimistic view that a theory of names is hardly possible (Algeo 1985), or that a proper name may not be a linguistic sign (Christoph 1985) or not a structural notion (Coates 2006). Lass (1973: 395) even contends that the syntactic and semantic representations of names "are probably null" (cf. Anderson 2003: 356). I hope to show in this book that this linguistic or grammatical abdication is unwarranted.

Contents General introduction ................................................................ 1 Chapter 1: Nominal and referential-semantic status of proper names ..................................................................................... 6 1. Introduction .............................................................................................. 6 1.1. Proper names and propria1 lemmas ..................................................... 7 1.2. The so-called pragmatic viewpoint.. ................................................... 9 1.3. Proper names as a semantic-syntactic class ...................................... 11 1.4. Radical Construction Grammar.. ...................................................... 13 1.5. Coseriu and Willems ........................................................................ 14 1.6. Dictionary lemmas ............................................................................ 15 2. The nominal status of proper names ....................................................... 17 2.1. The proper name as a nominal category ........................................... 17 2.2. Proper names and appellatives ......................................................... 19 3. The referential and semantic status of proper names .............................. 20 3.1. Some basic semantic notions applied in this work ........................... 20 3.2. Evaluation of the main views on the referential and semantic status of proper names ................................................ 22 3.2.1. Language philosophical views: from Mill to Kripke ................... 24 3.2.1.1. John Stuart Mill ...................................................................... 24 3.2.1.2. Gottlob Frege ......................................................................... 27 3.2.1.3. Edmund Husserl ..................................................................... 28 3.2.1.4. Bertrand Russell ..................................................................... 29 3.2.1.5. Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Searle .................................... 30 3.2.1.6. Saul Kripke and Keith Donnellan .......................................... 33 3.2.2. Some current linguistic theories of proper names ...................... 38 3.2.2.1. The maximum meaningfulness thesis ..................................... 39 3.2.2.2. Metalinguistic theories of proper names ................................ 39 3.2.2.3. Cognitive linguistic theories of proper names ....................... 50 3.2.2.4. The set theoretic cognitivist approach ................................... 58 3.2.2.5. The pragmatic view ................................................................ 65 3.3. Presuppositional meanings that proper names have or can have ...... 71 3.3.1. The thesis of the categorical presupposition in proper names .... 71 3.3.2. Categorical meanings as basic level concepts ............................ 79 3.3.3. Associative meaning pertains to the referent and to the name

X

Contents

form on the level of usage ............................................................ 81 3.3.4. Emotive meaning: augmentative and diminutive ........................ 83 3.3.5. Grammatical meaning ................................................................. 84 4. Towards a more precise characterization and definition of proper names and propriallemmas ........................................................ 84 4.1. Towards a more precise characterization of proper names .............. 84 4.1.1. Do proper names have meaning? ................................................ 84 4.1.2. In what way do proper names refer? ........................................... 86 4.1.3. Towards a definition and a unified account of proper names ..... 86 4.1.3.1. The pragmatic component.. .................................................... 87 4.1.3.2. The semantic component... ..................................................... 90 4.1.3.3. The syntactic component... ..................................................... 91 4.1.4. What is necessary to retrieve the referent of a proper name? ..... 91 4.1.5. Do proper names always originate in a 'baptismal act'? ............ 92 4.2. A more precise characterization of propriaI and nonproprial lemmas .............................................................................................. 93 4.2.1. Three questions regarding the status of proprial and nonpropriallemmas in connection with proper names ............... 93 4.2.2. Further arguments for the adoption of propriaI lemmas .............. 95 4.2.2.1. Propria1lemmas functioning as appellatives or as parts of nonproprial words .............................................................. 96 4.2.2.2. Multidenotative propriallemmas ........................................... 96 4.2.2.3. One referent is a part of the other .......................................... 97 4.2.2.4. Names with a common part can be united via the adoption of a propriallemma ................................................................ 98 4.2.2.5. Names may share a basic level term ...................................... 99 4.2.2.6. Nonpropriallemmas found in proper names ......................... 99 4.2.3. Propria1lemmas and the typological theory of markedness ....... 99 4.3. Diagram of a propriallemma and its valency ................................. 100 5. Monoreferential appellative expressions ............................................. 102 5.1. Monoreferential NPs with the definite article ................................ 103 5.2. Articleless monoreferential NPs ..................................................... 104 6. Neurolinguistic evidence for the present analysis of proper names .... 6.1. Semenza and Zettin (1988) ............................................................. 6.2. Bayer (1991 ) ................................................................................... 6.3. Miceli, Danie1e, Esposito and Magarelli (1998) ............................

106 108 110 113

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Xl

6.4. Discussion ....................................................................................... 113 7. Conclusions......................................................................................... 116 Chapter 2 : Formal characteristics of proper names.................................. 119 1. Introduction .......................................................................................... 119 2. The proper name as a nominal category .............................................. 120 3. Formal correlates of propriaI meanings ............................................... 125 3.1. Formal characteristics pertaining to the extension/intension status of proper names .................................................................... 125 3.1.1. Close apposition........................................................................ 125 3.1.1.1. Close vs. loose apposition .................................................... 126 3.1.1.2. Close apposition as a criterion for proper-namehood......... 128 3.1.1.3. Close apposition as a criterion for the basic level presupposition in proper names ........................................... 138 3.1.1.4. A cline in the tightness of the bond between proper name element and basic level element.. ......................................... 141 3.1.2. Restrictive modifiers .................................................................. 143 3.1.3. Quantification ............................................................................ 145 3.1.4. Predicate nominals .................................................................... 146 3.1.5. Voor 'for'-phrases ...................................................................... 149 3.1.6. Coordination of homophonous NPs .......................................... 150 3.1.7. Anaphoric relations ................................................................... 153 3.2. Formal features pertaining to grammatical meaning ...................... 153 3.2.1. Definiteness ............................................................................... 154 3.2.1.1. Proper names are definite ..................................................... 154 3.2.1.2. The functions of the definite article with proper names ....... 157 3.2.2. Number ...................................................................................... 159 3.2.3. Countability ............................................................................... 161 3.2.4. Recursiveness (genericness) ..................................................... 163 3.2.5. Person ........................................................................................ 167 3.2.6. Case ........................................................................................... 167 3.2.7. A combination of grammatical phenomena as an indirect test for proper-namehood .......................................................... 167 4. Proper names between common nouns and personal pronouns ........ 169

xii Contents 5. The proper name as the most prototypical nominal category ............. 171 5.1. Proper names have the unmarked counterparts of nominal grammatical features ....................................................................... 171 5.2. Prototypical proper names are zero coded ...................................... 172 6. Constructions in which the propriallemma is appellativized............. 173 7. Marked constructions in which the propriallemma has a proprial function ............................................................................... 176 7.1. Proper names with the indefinite article a(n) ................................. 176 7.2. Propriallemmas in a partitive construction .................................... 179 8. Conclusions......................................................................................... 182 Chapter 3: Typology of proper names ...................................................... 183 1. Introduction......................................................................................... 183 2. Prototypical proper names ................................................................... 186 2.1. Personal names ................................................................................ 187 2.1.1. Primary official personal names........................ ................ ....... 189 2.1.2. Secondary official personal names........................................... 191 2.1.3. Unofficial personal names. Bynames ........................................ 192 2.1.3.1. The proper name status of bynames ..................................... 194 2.1.3.2. Pragmatic characterization of bynames ................................ 195 2.1.3.3. Subdivision of by names: individual and collective bynames ................................................................................ 196 2. 1. 3.4. Formal characteristics of bynames...................................... 197 2.1.3.5. Personal name combinations ............................................... 197 2.2. Animal names ................................................................................. 201 2.3. Names of hurricanes ....................................................................... 201 2.4. Place names .................................................................................... 202 2.4.1. The internal status of place names ............................................ 202 2.4.2. A hierarchy of place name categories ....................................... 204 2.4.2.1. Formal classification and hierarchy .................................... 205 2.4.2.2. Semantic classification and hierarchy................................. 207 2.4.3. Some further implications ......................................................... 210 2.4.3.1. An additional continuum of number and gender.. ................ 210 2.4.3.2. Towards an implicational universal.. ................................... 211 2.4.3.3. Language typological differences ........................................ 212

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Xlll

2.4.4. The use of setting locative prepositions with place names ....... 212 2.4.4.1. Referential vs. attributive spatial relations .......................... 213 2.4.4.2. Setting vs. relational spatial prepositions ............................ 214 2.4.4.3. Isolative vs. non-isolative spatial relations .......................... 216 2.4.4.4. Positional vs. directional spatial relations ........................... 218 2.5. Names of astronomic objects .......................................................... 218 2.6. Names of buildings, ships, etc ....................................................... 220 2.7. Names of organizations and associations ....................................... 220 2.8. The continuum in the semantic functions of the definite article ... 221 2.8.1. The two functions of the definite article with proper names ..... 221 2.8.2. The continuum in the semantic functions of the definite article with both common and proper nouns ............................. 222 3. Nonprototypical proper names ............................................................ 223 3.1. Countable proper names ................................................................. 225 3.1.1. Temporal names ......................................................................... 225 3.1.1.1. Temporal names as proper names ........................................ 225 3.1.1.2. A typology of temporal names ............................................. .228 3.1.1.3. The setting function of temporal names. The function of temporal prepositions.......................................................... 232 3.1.2. Names of works of art, books, journals, films, etc ................... 233 3.1.3. Names of institutions connected with buildings ........................ 234 3.1.4. Trade and brand names ............................................................. 235 3.1.5. Names of currencies .................................................................. 238 3.1.6. Names of numbers and letters ................................................... 239 3.2. Uncountable proper names ............................................................. 241 3.2.1. Names of languages ................................................................... 241 3.2.2. Names of colors ......................................................................... 244 3.2.3. Names of diseases ...................................................................... 245 4. Autonyms (metalinguistic names) ....................................................... 246 5. Count, mass nouns, and clauses with a restricted proprial function............................................................................................... 249 5.1. Count nouns .................................................................................... 249 5.2. Mass nouns ..................................................................................... 250 5.3. Clauses ............................................................................................ 251 6. Conclusions ......................................................................................... 253

XIV

Contents

Chapter 4: Dialinguistic aspects of Flemish personal names ........................................................................................................ 256 1. Introduction .......................................................................................... 256 2. Geographical distribution of adult Flemish personal name patterns ................................................................................................ 257 2.1. Introduction ..................................................................................... 257 2.2. Taxonomy of personal name patterns in Flemish dialects ............. 259 2.2.1. Historical and terminological preliminaries .............................. 259 2.2.2. Taxonomy of Flemish personal name patterns .......................... 260 2.2.2.1. Unary patterns ...................................................................... 260 2.2.2.2. Binary patterns ..................................................................... 260 2.2.2.3. Descriptive patterns on their way to becoming surnames ... 262 2.3. Geographical distribution of Flemish personal name patterns ....... 262 2.4. Diachronic shift to the pattern [fIrst name + surname] and its causes .... .265 2.5. Conclusions .................................................................................... 267 3. Diachronic analysis of Flemish personal names ................................. 267 3.1. Introduction .................................................................................... 267 3.2. Diachronic approaches ................................................................... 269 3.2.1. The etymological approach ....................................................... 269 3.2.2. Name fields ................................................................................ 270 3.2.3. The paradigmatic/syntagmatic approach .................................. 271 3.2.4. The axiological approach .......................................................... 271 3.3. Diachronic classification of adult bynames and family names ...... 271 3.3.1. Principles for the diachronic-semantic classification of by names and family names .................................................... 271 3.3.1.1. The distinction of word class vs. motivational structure ..... 272 3.3.1.2. The paradigmatic vs. the syntagmatic parameter.. .............. 274 3.3.1.3. More examples illustrating the distinction 'paradigmatic' vs. 'syntagmatic' .................................................................. 275 3.3.1.4. Filiation in the assignment of a name form ......................... 276 3.3.1.5. The use oftropes (metaphor, metonymy, irony) in the motivational structure of by names ....................................... 276 3.3.2. Formal correlates of the diachronic semantics of bynames..... 277 3.3.2.1. The paradigmatic (word) leveL .......................................... 277 3.3.2.2. The syntagmatic (relational) leveL .................................... 278 3.3.3. Bynames [BNs] vs. family names [FNs] .................................. 280

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xv

3.3.4. Diachronic classification of Flemish family names and bynames ..280 3.3.4.1. Origin ................................................................................... 282 3.3.4.2. Characterization ................................................................... 284 3.4. Diachronic classification of juvenile byname patterns ................... 287 3.4 .1. Principles for the diachronic-semantic classification of juvenile bynames ................................................................... 287 3.4.2. Taxonomy of juvenile Flemish bynames ................................... 289 3.4.2.1. Origin ................................................................................... 289 3.4.2.2. Characterization ................................................................... 290 3.4.2.3. Expressivity .......................................................................... 292 3.5. Surnames of Flemish foundlings .................................................... 295 3.5.1. Origin ........................................................................................ 296 3.5.1.1. Familial origin ..................................................................... 296 3.5.1.2. Local origin .......................................................................... 296 3.5.1.3. Temporal origin .................................................................... 297 3.5.2. Characterization ........................................................................ 298 3.5.3. Purely formal names ................................................................. 299 3.6. Flemish nicknames for internet chatting ........................................ 300 3.6.1. Psychological motivation .......................................................... 301 3.6.2. Semantic motivation .................................................................. 302 3.6.2.1. The category 'person' .......................................................... 302 3.6.2.2. The world in which the person lives .................................... 304 3.7. Conclusions .................................................................................... 306 4. Sodo-onomastic aspects of Flemish personal names..................... 306 4.1. Introduction. Socio-onomastics ...................................................... 306 4.1.1. One-way traffic from society to names ...................................... 307 4.1.2. Proper names, and especially personal names, as ideal sodo-onomastic parameters ...................................................... 308 4.1.3. The name-giving system vs. the use ofnames ........................... 309 4.2. Socio-onomastic aspects of adult Flemish personal-name-giving....... 31 0 4.2.1. The gender parameter.. ............................................................. 311 4.2.1.1. At the synchronic leveL ...................................................... 311 4.2.1.2. At the diachronic leveL ...................................................... 312 4.2.2. The social class parameter ........................................................ 314 4.2.2.1. The structure [title + personal name] ................................. 314 4.2.2.2. The pattern [first name + occupation]. ................................. 315 4.2.2.3. The metonymical combination [first name + occupational nickname]....................................................... 315

xvi Contents 4.2.3. Conclusions ............................................................................... 316 4.3. Socio-onomastic characteristics of juvenile Flemish bynamegiving in contrast with the adult name-giving ................................ 317 4.4. Conclusions .................................................................................... 320 General summary and conclusions ............................................. 321 Notes ......................................................................................................... 326 References ................................................................................................ 342 Subject index ............................................................................................ 370

General introduction

This book is an interdisciplinary investigation of the status of proper names, although it takes linguistics as its point of departure. More specifically, proper names will be studied not only from a synchronic linguistic but also from a language philosophical, a neuro- and psycho linguistic and from a dialinguistic point of view. In principle, I will consider all kinds of proper names. This is important since all too often only prototypical proper names like first names, surnames or place names are discussed, in onomastic disciplines as well as in linguistic and philosophical works, whether they are of a theoretical or of a descriptive nature. The last few decades, however, more and more name categories have been included in the European study of proper names. By contrast, the study of a wide variety of names has been part and parcel of systematic research in North America since its beginnings (see Stewart 1953 for a principled statement). Carroll (1985) argues that, especially with regard to the theory of names, it is not wise to speak about personal names and place names only. Thus he includes names of buildings, trades, brands, and so forth. Van Langendonck (1985b) also deals with temporal names. In Eichler et at., eds. (1995-1996), a plethora of proper name subclasses are studied albeit mainly from a diachronic viewpoint. The present study is intended to be descriptive as well as theoretical. It is in essence synchronic in nature, although, as far as personal names are concerned, some diachronic mechanisms will be highlighted. In particular, I will investigate the semantic and syntactic status of proper names, attempting to provide a boundary between proper names and personal pronouns as well as between proper names and appellatives (common nouns). I will also propose a typology, i.e. a subclassification of proper names on the basis of semantic, syntactic and pragmatic criteria. Finally, socioonomastic theories and descriptions will be presented. The theoretical framework used here will be somewhat eclectic, but inspired mainly by general cognitive linguistic ideas and, more in particular, by Radical Construction Grammar. I will make use of such widely accepted notions as isomorphism between form and meaning, iconicity of motivation, c1ines (gradients), schemas and instantiations (i.e. models and instances), prototypicality, markedness, conceptual space, implicational universals, and metonymy and metaphor. At the same time, synchrony vs.

2

General introduction

diachrony, denotation vs. connotation (reference vs. sense, or extension vs. intension), and langue vs. parole will prove useful distinctions in the analysis of proper names. Certainly, these dichotomies will not be applied in the rigid way they were often in the past. For instance, langue vs. parole will be reinterpreted in the cognitive way, i.e. langue will be considered the 'established linguistic convention' of a speech community, whereby conventionality is a matter of the degree of 'entrenchment'. Parole is 'language use' (Langacker 1987: 59,62-63). Neuro- and psycholinguistic evidence will be adduced when available. Last but not least, I will attach more importance to formal linguistic criteria than is sometimes the case in cognitive studies. From a theoretical point of view, proper names have been attracting a lot of attention from philosophers ever since the Ancient Greeks (see Summerell's 1995 overview), but only in the 20th century, from theoretical onomasticians. 1 Theoretical linguists have often treated proper names as the poor cousin of other grammatical categories. 2 This has changed recently, as reflected in Gary-Prieur's (1994: 247) statement: "le nom propre releve de plein droit d'une analyse Iinguistique", i.e. proper names rightly deserve a linguistic analysis (compare Harweg 1983; 1997; 1998). Equally recent is the interest in proper names shown by neurolinguists and neuropsychologists. It is generally agreed among both linguists and anthropologists (Hockett 1958; Brown 1991) that proper names are a universal linguistic category. Some evidence for making a distinction between proper names and common nouns may be found in the context of the animacy hierarchy. Socalled split ergative languages may exhibit a different case marking system (nominative-accusative) for pronouns and proper names than for common nouns (ergative-absolutive) (cf. Dixon 1979: 78, fn. 24).3 Nevertheless, as Croft (1990: 268, fn. 24) notes, only few data about proper names are available in the language typological literature because "most grammatical descriptions do not include information on proper names." As far as Bantuist studies go, Van de Velde (2003) speaks of "a lack of the study of proper names, at least from a grammatical point of view." Anderson (2004: 438) complains that "little theoretical attention in general linguistics has been paid to the morphosyntax of names" (though see now Vaxelaire's French work of 2005). Hence, the language sample used here will certainly fail to exhibit sufficient variation to guarantee a language typological approach. I will draw mainly on material from Dutch, English, German and French, and occasionally on data from a few other Indo-European or Afri-

General introduction

3

can languages, thus unfortunately falling prey to the traditional genetic bias. Intuitively, proper names seem to show a kind of ad hoc status. This is already clear from the fact that, as a rule, proper names are missing in ordinary dictionaries. Especially the last phenomenon has been pointed out in the literature. However, this ad hoc status is a double-edged sword. On the one hand, it may lead to the neglect of names in the study of language by linguists. On the other hand, it has given rise to the setting up of specialized onomastic studies, journals, congresses and societies. Onomasticians, however, have sometimes forgotten that proper names are part of the system of natural languages. Both onomasticians and linguists should be aware of the fact that proper names are words which deserve linguistic attention in the first place. I do not agree with the standpoint that onomastics is an essentially different discipline from linguistics (Nicolaisen 1995; Snimek 1991).4 Rather, onomastics should be incorporated into linguistics taken in its widest sense, i.e. including a pragmatic component. Moreover, in principle, linguistics includes the interdisciplinary aspects found in onomastics. This does not prevent some of the onomastic subdisciplines from putting more emphasis on certain aspects. For example, diachronic toponymy is closely tied up with settlement history and geography. Proper names are acquired early by children (Lyons 1977: 225-229; La Palme Reyes et al. 1993: 447). The reason for the early acquisition is obvious and opens an interesting perspective: proper names are bestowed almost only on entities that are visible and that one wishes to highlight and which therefore deserve an ad hoc name. Typically, such entities are persons, animals, places, buildings and institutions, firms and brands, currencies, languages and dialects, i.e. entities that play a role in people's daily life and communication. This leads to some remarkable phenomena. When the members of such classes are normally given names, for instance humans, a member that happens not to have a name, will be considered not to exist or become an outcast. By contrast, if a member of a class that does not normally receive names becomes important all of a sudden, it might be given a name. A good example was that of the two pigs that escaped on their way to the slaughterhouse somewhere in England and managed to hide from their persecutors for quite a while. Out of sympathy the British media gave the couple the names Fred and Ginger. More common is the bestowal of names on domesticated animals, obviously because these animals are considered to have adopted human properties. Neuropsychological evidence for proper names being a special category was offered by Saffran, Schwartz and Marin (1976) and Saffran and Bogyo

4

General introduction

(1980). They showed that proper names are read surprisingly well by deep dyslexics and that they are read very well in the left visual field by normal readers. "This suggested that proper names, like certain other categories, might be processed independently within the semantic system" (Semenza and Zettin 1988: 718). In the first chapter, I will define proper names. Starting from the referential and semantic functions of proper names, I discuss the relevant philosophical and linguistic literature, arriving eventually at a unified pragmatic-semantic-syntactic theory of proper names. A distinction will be made between (propria I) lexemes or lemmas in isolation and propriaI lemmas in their different functions, the prototypical one of which is 'proper name'. It will be argued that monoreferential expressions like the sun and the moon are not proper names. Neurolinguistic evidence will be adduced for the definition of proper names. In the second chapter, I will discuss formal characteristics of proper names. Language specifically, the referential and semantic status of proper names is reflected in their occurrence in certain constructions. Thus, I claim that close (or 'restrictive') appositional patterns of the form [definite article + noun + noun], e.g., the poet Burns, are relevant to the definition of proper names in English and also to the categorical (often basic level: see 3.3.2) meaning of the name. A few other formal characteristics confirm this proposal. In this context, I distinguish between defining and nondefining characteristics. In the third chapter, I will discuss the most important and intriguing subclasses of proper names. This will result in a major distinction: prototypical and much discussed subclasses like personal, animal and place names are not normally construed generically, but have a number of appellative counterparts in which metaphor and metonymy play an essential part (e.g., a second Napoleon; a different John). Nonprototypical names such as those of brands, languages, diseases and so on, can be construed generically and as a consequence have ordinary appellative counterparts that are not derived by metaphor or metonymy and, in addition, are used frequently (compare the proper name Latin with the appellative mass noun some Latin). This fact has rendered the proper name function of such nouns rather debatable. Still more marginal are autonyms (metalinguistically used expressions). The notion of (proprial) lemma will play a useful role to differentiate between the various categories. In the fourth and final chapter, I will be concerned with a few dialinguistic and areal linguistic, i.e. dialect geographical, diachronic and sociolinguistic aspects of name-giving in small communities like villages and

General introduction

5

schools. The material discussed has been drawn from Southern Dutch (i.e. Flemish) dialects. Finally, the name-giving of 19th century foundlings and the use and structure of chat names on the internet will be considered.

Chapter 1 Nominal and referential-semantic status of proper names

1. Introduction I will define proper names in terms of recent developments in Radical Construction Grammar, as promoted by Croft (2000; 2001). Starting from the referential and semantic functions of proper names, I discuss the relevant philosophical literature, more specifically the opposing descriptivist and non-descriptivist theses of the language philosophers Mill and Frege. Especially the more recent theses put forward by John Searle and Saul Kripke and inspired by their predecessors. Since these two theoreticians are often adduced by linguists or onomasticians without a critical attitude, I will deal with them from a linguistic point of view. Subsequently, the main philosophical and/or linguistic views hat persist until today will be investigated: the maximum meaningfulness thesis; metalinguistic theories of proper names: the X called Y view, Recanati (1997), Kleiber (1995; 2004), Katz (2001), the main cognitive linguistic theories of proper names: Marmaridou (1989), Langacker (1991; 2004), Jonasson (1994), the set theoretic cognitivist approach (Hansack 2000; 2004; Brendler 2005), and finally, Coates' (2000; 2006) pragmatic view. These considerations will lead to a unified theory of names in which a pragmatic, a semantic and a syntactic account are integrated. It will be argued that a proper name is a noun that denotes a unique entity at the level of 'established linguistic convention' to make it psychosocially salient within a given basic level category [pragmatic]. The meaning of the name, if any, does not (or not any longer) determine its denotation [semantic]. An important formal reflex of this pragmatic-semantic characterization of names is their ability to appear in such close appositional constructions as the poet Burns, Fido the dog, the River Thames, or the City of London [syntactic] . In prototypical cases like personal or place names, a so-called proprial (or possibly other) lemma (iexeme) is assigned to an ad hoc referent in an ad hoc name-giving act, resulting in a 'proper name'. Although this ad hoc

Introduction

7

assignment can be repeated several times so numerous people can be called John, it does not take place on the basis of a concept or predication as with common nouns. Proper names do not have asserted lexical meaning but do display presuppositional meanings of several kinds: categorical (basic level), associative senses (introduced either via the name bearer or via the name form), emotive senses and grammatical meanings. A distinction will be made between (proprial) lexemes or lemmas in isolation (dictionary entries) and proprial lemmas in their different functions (prototypically functioning as proper names, nonprototypically as common nouns or other classes). From propriallemmas we can also derive nouns that appear as a special kind of common noun, e.g., another John, which means' another person with the name John'. It will be argued that monoreferential expressions like the sun and the moon, or nature and science, are not proper names. To corroborate the above theses, 1 will adduce recent psycho linguistic and especially neurolinguistic evidence. In chapter 2, formal evidence will be presented.

1.1. Proper names and propriaI lemmas What has been at issue in traditional name studies is in the first place the investigation of the onomastic lexicon, that is, the inventory of proprial lemmas like Mary, John, London, or the Thames. 5 For the most part, historical linguists have been doing etymological research on such individual proprial items without taking into account the proprial, let alone the entire linguistic system. 6 By contrast, philosophers of language have a tradition of reflection about the semantic definition of individual names such as Aristotle, Bucephalus, Hesperus and Phosphorus. Likewise, most psycho- and neurolinguists focus on the primary, individual use of proper names. However, none of these researchers makes a clear distinction between the function of a name (or word) and its mere existence as a dictionary lemma. One could object it is the task of the linguist to make such distinctions. Unfortunately, it has to be admitted that linguists have hardly discussed the status of proper names or, more generally, the so-called transposition of word classes. Anderson (2003: 390) speaks of 'conversion' of names "into less typical name-types or into common nouns" without going into the theoretical implications thereof. Hudson (1984: 72) recognizes: "I am not sure at present how to deal with 'conversion', where an instance of one word class may be used instead as an instance of another." For example,

8

Nominal and referential-semantic status ofproper names

the preposition before can function as an adverb (as in She did it before). In this case, we could save the situation by speaking of the adverb before, which can be used transitively (i.e. as a preposition). But for most word classes, such a solution would not work, for instance, when it is claimed that the proper name John is 'used' as a common noun in expressions of the form another John. Apparently due to the lexicalist views that were adopted in the last few decades, the few linguists who have studied proper names have in general neglected the distinction between a name as a lemma (dictionary entry) and a name in a specific grammatical (proprial or appellative) function, i.e. they have been emphasizing the importance of the lexicon in grammar (e.g., Leys 1979), whereas the role of constructions has been underestimated. 7 For other word classes, the same problem exists, but is not always so critical as for proper names. It may be revealing to see that the lexicalist attitude is also reflected in the spelling of languages written with the Latin alphabet, since the name (or lemma) John is always rendered with a capital letter. On the other hand, spelling is not universally based on the dictionary view. For example, the spelling of German nouns is determined by the function of the lemma: it is lemmas thatfunction as nouns that are written with a capital letter, e.g., das Buch 'the book', der Gute 'the good' (substantivized adjective), ab er 'but', ein Aber 'a but' (substantivized conjunction). The rationale may be that there is an obvious criterion: lemmas accompanied by an article (even a socalled zero article) are nouns. (Pronouns are not normally accompanied by an article and probably therefore not capitalized). Most people, however, are not aware of this ambiguity in the orthography of words. It is simply held in an overgeneralizing way that in English, all proper names are capitalized, while in German, all nouns are. In my view, it would be very helpful to clarify the distinction between names as lemmas or dictionary items and names as words belonging to a particular semantic-syntactic class. Apparently because of the lack of a clear distinction there has been a lot of discussion regarding the boundaries between 'names' and 'appellatives'. To provide a striking example of the lack of a distinction between proper name and proprial lemma, I will discuss the so-called pragmatic viewpoint in Bauer (1996).8

Introduction

9

1.2. The so-called pragmatic viewpoint In this section, I will consider Bauer's treatment of proper names and especially of so-called transitional cases between proper names and common nouns. First, Bauer gives the impression that there exist names (in fact proprial lemmas) which invariably function as primary proper names since he claims that noun phrases (NPs) of the form ein Peter 'a Peter', der Peter 'the Peter', die Peter 'the Peters' are ungrammatical, at least in standard German even though in dialects and in colloquial speech such forms are heard (Bauer 1996: 1616). However, as I will argue below, one should not consider linguistic items in isolation, as Bauer himself suggests afterwards. In an appropriate context, indefinite or pluralized proprial lemmas do occur in any Western standard language, also in German (compare Coseriu 1989; Sloat 1969; Pamp 1985; Kolde 1995):9 (1)

(2)

Ich habe einen Peter gekannt, der in Bonn wohnt. 'I have known a Peter who lives in Bonn.' Ich kenne mehr als einen Peter. 'I know more than one Peter.'

and even:

(3)

Ein Peter ist ein Mann, der Peter heisst. 'A Peter is a man who is called Peter.'

Second, Bauer claims that there are a number of unclear, transitional cases with various characteristics (see also Koss 2002: 185-186, dealing with trade names). A first 'transitional' case is constituted by so-called 'Appellativnamen' (appellative names), also called 'Gattungseigennamen' (appellative proper names) by other authors. Examples are: der Zeppelin (a balloon), der Biideker (a guide-book), eine Venus, der Atlas, ein Casanova, das Sandwich. In my view, the lack of distinction between proper name function and proprial lemma becomes most obvious in the discussion of these instances. The circumstance that the words in question are eponyms, i.e. go back to a proprial lemma historically, does not alter the fact that they function as genuine common nouns synchronically. As Bauer himself states, even verbs have been coined in this way: rontgen, pasteurisieren. It is an understatement to argue in this connection that the proprial character here can appar-

10

Nominal and referential-semantic status ofproper names

ently be determined almost exclusively in a pragmatic way, i.e. from the viewpoint of the language user (Bauer 1996: 1617). That it would be a question of pragmatics or language use, as is suggested here, is false: proprial lemmas like Zeppelin or Sandwich are semantically and syntactically ambiguous on the level of established linguistic convention in that they are able to designate either a person or an object. In the former case we are dealing with a proper name, in the latter with an appellative, at least in the sentences Zeppelin invented the zeppelin and Sandwich invented the sandwich respectively. The distinction is very clear (against Leys 1979). Another category of transitional cases are, according to Bauer, names such as: die Vereinten Nationen 'the United Nations', der Westwall 'the Western Wall' (a military construction), die Unvollendete (a symphony), or So weit die Fiisse tragen (a book). Bauer (1996: 1617) regards these expressions as appellative formations whose function as proper names manifests itself not semantically but only pragmatically, if it is understood that these names indicate political institutions, military constructions, symphonies or books. Bauer fails to see that these expressions display lexical elements that occur in still different functions in the language while functioning here as genuine proper names referring to a unique entity picked out ad hoc from some category. This is a truly semantic fact reflected in the syntactic formation of these names, e.g., in the appositional structure das Musikstiick die Unvollendete (see below and chapter 2 for the role of apposition). A comparable mistake is made regarding names of planets like die Venus, der Jupiter, der Mars, which are claimed to share the semanticsyntactic status of so-called monosemantica such as der Mond 'the moon' and die Sonne 'the sun', that is, they are said to be common nouns. Obviously, the rationale behind this is the fact that planet names in German display the article, at least in colloquial speech. In scientific discourse they lose this article and allegedly change their status, thus becoming proper names, as in: die Raumsonde nahert sich Jupiter 'the space explorer is approaching Jupiter' (Bauer 1996: 1620). In my view, in both kinds of discourse, planet names refer to the same unique objects in space and behave like genuine proper names. The variable use of the article is proof of this rather than disproof. We should think here of German first names, which can, but need not, take the article: (der) Johann. Nobody would contend, I presume, that der Johann is an appellative NP. Finally, planet names occur as close (restrictive) appositions while Mond and Sonne do not: der Planet Venus vs. *der Satellit (der) Mond, *der Stern (die) Sonne.

Introduction

11

Thus, Bauer's conclusion that there are no clear criteria for a distinction between proper name and common noun at any grammatical level should be rejected. The definition of proper names does not simply depend on the pragmatic context of the utterances.

1.3. Proper names as a semantic-syntactic class In my view, we will come to a better understanding of what we are talking about if we start from the notion of proper name as a semantic-syntactic class. Only then can it become clear how to delimit the concepts of both proper name and propriallemma. Consider the following sentences: (4) (5) (6) (7)

John attended a meeting today. The emperor Napoleon was defeated at Waterloo. You are talking about a different John. He is becoming a second Napoleon.

As a first approximation, we may agree that all instances of John, Napoleon and Waterloo in (4) to (7) are propria I lemmas, i.e. proper name lexemes. However, looking at the semantics and syntax of these names reveals that they are used in rather different ways. In (4) and (5) John, Napoleon and Waterloo function in a way that reflects what is commonly considered the primary function of proper names, i.e. to refer to individual entities. Syntactically, they function as NPs on their own, except that Napoleon in (5) is in apposition to the appellative NP the emperor, a fact that does not affect the individual reference of the name. By contrast, in (6) one is speaking of at least two different persons called John. In sentence (7) the NP a second Napoleon is about another man resembling Napoleon. 10 So in these cases, the items John and Napoleon are not employed in their primary identifying function but in a secondary describing function. Formally they are preceded by the indefinite article a. The meaning and form of the constructions that these items appear in lead to the conclusion that they function as common nouns. A consequence of this is that the above 'names' (i.e. proprial lemmas) sometimes act as proper names and sometimes as common nouns. At least in other realms of the grammar, the problem of assigning certain elements to a particular word class and accounting for the 'transition' of elements to other word classes is one that linguists have been wrestling with to some extent. For example, it has been observed that one and the

12

Nominal and referential-semantic status ofproper names

same noun is sometimes construed as a count noun, sometimes as a mass noun. Compare the girl wants an egg (egg = count noun) vs. there is some egg on my tie (egg = mass noun). Pronouns (or better: pronominal lemmas) like he and she can be construed as common nouns, as in: is it a he or a she? As to numbers, the situation is still more complicated. Comrie (1989: 109) points out the fact that in Russian, certain numbers behave like nouns, others like adjectives, and that even a kind of gradation comes to the fore here. In English, a million is a noun, three behaves like a quantifying adjective in I saw three cars. Especially in English, quite a number of lemmas can be nouns or verbs depending on the construction. In German and Dutch, adverbs and adjectives often display the same form since adverbs are not suffixed. Similar phenomena and the problems ensuing from them have been dealt with extensively ever since the structuralist era. Things have been explained in terms of 'class transposition'. In the same vein, it has been argued that a name like John normally behaves like a proper name, but can also be construed as a common noun, as in the above example: You are talking about a different John. A lot of confusion has arisen in this respect. Thus it looks as if a proper name 'becomes' a common noun, or possibly, a common noun a proper name, just as a noun is sometimes said to 'become' a verb or vice-versa. This confusion has led to a major misunderstanding. If lemmas in a dictionary and items in a particular semantic-syntactic function are not kept apart, the fact that words are like chameleons and change their status time and again, can give rise to the conviction that the notion of proper name and of word class in general, cannot be pinpointed and hence may be irrelevant. Pushed to its extreme, this reasoning ultimately leads to the abolition of all word classes under any syntactic or semantic definition (compare, e.g., Sasse 1993, for the distinction noun - verb; Hengeveld 1992). To avoid this undesirable outcome, I think it is imperative to constantly keep in mind the distinction between a dictionary lemma and a word in a particular semantic-syntactic function. However, this should not mean that I advocate an unbridgeable gap between dictionary (lexicon) and grammar. We can link the two components by using the well known notions of 'model' (schema) and 'instance' (instantiation, subclass or example). As a first approximation, a proprial lemma such as 'John' can be linked to (part ot) its grammatical valency as follows: 'John' -7 proper name -7 personal name -7 forename -7 John 1, John2 ...

In the diagram in section 4.3, I will present a more elaborate network.

Introduction

13

1.4. Radical Construction Grammar The views outlined above are compatible with the theory defended by William Croft in recent work (2000; 2001). In his view "categories in a particular language are defined by the constructions of the language. Moreover, the constructions are the primitive elements of syntactic representation; categories are derived from constructions" (Croft 2000: 84). The reason for adopting this 'Radical Construction Grammar' is simple, Croft argues: Constructions define grammatical categories. But all contemporary syntactic models insist on taking these categories as atomic syntactic primitives and defining constructions as being made up of these atomic primitives. Yet those syntactic 'primitives' are defmed by constructions. This approach is circular. The circularity can be broken by aoondoning the notion that categories are atomic syntactic primitives. Syntactic categories, including those commonly labelled as parts of speech, are derivative from the constructions that define them. (Croft 2000: 85) As far as proper names are concerned, it has been argued that they can be defined as nouns with no or a fixed, or even an optional, determiner that can occur in subject position. However, it is, amongst other reasons, because of the elusiveness of such a criterion (or even simply because formal criteria are ignored) that proper names are often equated unconsciously with what I have described as proprial lemmas. On this basis, certain constructions containing propriallemmas functioning as common nouns (as in: There was a John I hated) are considered erroneously as proprial constructions. To define parts of speech, Croft adduces the distributional method, propositional acts, and the typological theory of markedness. The classical distributional method can be used to establish language-particular constructions and categories. However, to avoid falling prey to an endless subdivision of such language-specific entities, we must have recourse to pragmatic functions (propositional acts, Searle 1969: 23-24) like predication, reference and modification, which are functional properties defining a

conceptual space. Predicative, nominal (term) and attributive constructions encode the pragmatic functions. The three pragmatic functions are in fact the foundation for the three-way distinction of the traditional major parts of speech. This is the first step towards satisfYing the first condition, a means of identifYing the

14

Nominal and referential-semantic status ofproper names major parts of speech as opposed to other, 'lesser', categories (either language universal or language particular). (Croft 2000: 87)

As to these (major) parts of speech, Croft holds that there are unmarked combinations of pragmatic function and lexical semantic class (Croft 2000: 88): a. noun = reference to an object b. adjective = modification by a propertyll c. verb = predication of an action

These combinations, i.e. the parts of speech, do not describe languageparticular grammatical categories, but crosslinguistic patterns of variation, which should be conceived of as prototypes. A prototype describes the core of a category; it does not say anything about the boundary of a category. "In fact, the universal typological theory of parts of speech defines only prototypes for the parts of speech; it does not define boundaries. Boundaries are features of language-particular categories" and are determined by distributional analysis (Croft 2000: 90). Croft (2000: 96) also observes that individual lexical items are often found in more than one pragmatic function without overt derivation but with a significant and often systematic semantic shift. Crosslinguistically, these shifts are always towards the semantic class prototypically associated with the pragmatic function. For instance, property words used as referring expressions shift their meaning to an object (person or thing) which possesses the property. A Dutch example is an adjective that indicates an object, as in: Ik wit een groot 'I want a big one'. Applied to proprial lemmas, we can argue that the name or propria I lemma Napoleon in (5) changes from a purely referring expression (proper name) into an expression that refers with the help of a predication (the appellative NP a second Napoleon) in (7).

1.5. Coseriu and Willems In spirit, this view of proper names is not quite new. It is a great merit of more recent research carried out by Willems (1996; 2000) to have emphasized a distinction that comes close to the one between proper name category and proprial lemma. Willems, who works in the framework elaborated by Eugenio Coseriu (and earlier von Humboldt), holds that parts of speech (partes oration is) have to be situated at the so-called universal, rational, semantic level of speech. In principle, individual lexical items can function

Introduction

15

in any of these parts of speech depending on the construction used. Thus, for instance, the item why, normally an interrogative pronoun, can function as a proper name, e.g., in: Did you see Mister 'Why' coming in? This view comes close to Croft's idea that, universally, there are unmarked combinations of pragmatic function and lexical semantic class, whereby lexical items can be assigned to some such class depending on the construction they appear in.

1.6. Dictionary lemmas The actual distinction that Coseriu and Willems are working with is that between proper names in a particular semantic-syntactic function and the related phonological (or even phonetic) forms. Willems (2000) deals extensively with this distinction and speaks of 'mere form' as opposed to 'full form'. In his example all the persons called Raquel, the word Raquel is claimed to be a 'mere form'. However, the notion of mere phonetic form does not correspond to what I understand by (proprial) lemma. Indeed, we have to recognize a level where we can speak about lexical items as belonging primarily or prototypically to some word class or other. For instance, we must have the possibility of formulating autonymic statements of the form: 'how old is the first name John?' This is a different autonymic statement from: 'how old is the phonological form Idzan/?' This last statement is not only about the name John but also about the nounjohn for 'toilet'. As a consequence, we are forced to assume at least a trichotomy of categories: dictionary lemma, grammatical category and phonological or phonetic form (see already Van Langendonck 1997a). This trichotomy obliges us to define not only the notion of grammatical category but also that of dictionary lemma. With regard to the concept of lemma, two questions arise. First, what constitutes a lemma? In other words, what makes up the unity of a lemma? In Levelt's (1989: 6) view a lemma is the "nonphono logical part of an item's lexical information", i.e. its grammatical and semantic information (see also Levelt 1989: 187). Eventually, we end up at the 'surface structure' by a process of 'grammatical encoding', i.e. by assigning certain features to lemmas, especially 'diacritic variables' like tense, aspect, mood, person, number, case, definiteness, or (pitch) accent (Levelt 1989: 191). In fact, this approach seems to lead to a continuum ranging from bigger to smaller lemmas, in a way similar to the endless subdivision of language-

16

Nominal and referential-semantic status ofproper names

specific constructions and categories on the basis of distributional criteria. Taking again numerals as ideal examples, we can distinguish at least three constructions the word seven can appear in, compare:

(8) (9) (10)

Seven is a holy number. This sign looks like a seven. She bought seven chairs.

Theoretically, one could then hold that there are three lemmas, or two, or just one. If there are three, there would be a proper name (i.e. proprial) lemma in (8), a common noun lemma in (9) and an adjectival (or attributive) lemma in (10). This seems to lead to an undesirable proliferation of lemmas (coinciding with categories) as a consequence of the use of syntactic criteria. However, if we take a simple lexical viewpoint, we are in a position to argue that there is just one lemma on the basis of its polysemy, i.e. of the common semantic traits in the different grammatical functions of the word. The primary use of the numerals in (8}-( 10) seems to be the proprial one in (8): a seven in (9) denotes the shape of the written number, seven in (10) denotes a quantity the cardinality of which is seven. 12 Homonyms like bank for 'financial institution' and bank for 'river bank' merely display the same phonological shape and therefore, are different lemmas. The case of proprial lemmas is somewhat different. As has been repeatedly argued in the literature, proper names seem to have little or no meaning, at least no lexical meaning (but see below). By contrast, their referential status has been well established, so the question arises whether it would not be better to speak of 'multidenotation' instead of 'polysemy' in the case of proprial lemmas. I will go into this after the discussion of the semantics of the category of proper names. By this category I provisionally mean the names that refer individually and are construed as in (4) and (5). Insofar as other researchers' views will be dealt with, it will become clear that most of them have neglected the above distinction. This may be relatively harmless, for instance, when philosophers tend to consider only such simple sentences as Aristotle is a philosopher, in which the proprial lemma is construed as a 'genuine' proper name since it functions here as a subject NP without determiner and refers uniquely to the person we all have in mind. 13 However, it remains the case that by restricting themselves to such prototypical cases, they have avoided dealing with the distinction between proprial lemma, proper name and derived common noun. 14 We still have to answer a second problem: why do we call gold an appellative lemma, but John a proprial lemma?15 As a first approximation we

The nominal status ofproper names

17

can hold that the word John is primarily not a common noun but a proper name, whereas the word gold is in the first place a common noun and maybe, marginally, a proper name. For the time being, we establish that lemmas seem to have a primary function and a number of secondary functions. '6 Let us now turn to the investigation of the primary function of proprial lemmas, i.e. the analysis of 'proper names'.

2. The nominal status of proper names To define proper names semantically and formally, I will first establish their status as nouns. Subsequently, I will look into their semantic status. To corroborate these findings on the possible meaning and reference of proper names neurolinguistic evidence and formal correlates will be adduced.

2.l. The proper name as a nominal category Ever since Antiquity, it has been held that proper names are nouns (or possibly noun phrases). Classical terminology speaks of onoma proseigorikon (nomen appellativum) and onoma kyrion (nomen proprium). So both proper names and appellatives are considered nouns (still Gary-Prieur 1994: 243). Following Hudson (1990: 170), one can regard personal (and other) pronouns as nouns too. In this way we have three kinds of nouns. Anyway, few scholars seem to dispute the thesis that proper names are nouns or at least nominal expressions. For Coates (2006: 373) names are noun phrases though not typically nouns (see 3.2.2.5). Anderson (2004: 436) contends that names "are no more nouns than are pronouns or determiners". If a pronoun is a kind of noun there is no problem. However, it seems hard to view a name as a kind of determiner, at least syntactically, even if the determiner is considered the head of the 'noun phrase' (Anderson 2004: 456; but see Van Langendonck 1994a). As to their referential status, proper names certainly designate 'things' in the widest sense and since a thing is designated by a noun (Langacker 1987: 189) a proper name must be a noun from the semantic point of view. As I have hinted above, it is not entirely clear whether a proper name is to be regarded as a noun, i.e. a word, or as a noun phrase, i.e. a syntagm. Apparently, there is no problem if word and syntagm coincide, as in:

18

(11)

Nominal and referential-semantic status ofproper names

Belgrade has been bombed again.

The expression Belgrade is, as everybody will agree, a proper noun and at the same time a proprial NP since it acts as a subject. The situation is different in the following sentence:

(12)

The Rhine has been polluted a lot.

Probably, few linguists will reject the idea that the subject NP in (12) contains a proper name. However, is the proper name the Rhine or Rhine by itself? In my view, the most plausible thesis is that the proper name is Rhine, i.e. a noun, but that to fulfill its proprial role as a subject, this noun must be accompanied by the definite article, for reasons yet to be specified. The phrase the Rhine (likewise Dutch de Rijn) can then be seen as a minimal proprial NP. Words such as Belgrade are capable of fulfilling this role on their own. On the other hand, proper names can be accompanied by more than one modifier while preserving their proper name status, as in (13a,b), where (b) is the Dutch translation: (13)

a. This dirty Rhine will have to be cleaned. b. Die vuile Rijn zal gereinigd moeten worden.

That the article the/de has disappeared in (13) can be seen as proof that it is not really part of the proper noun. This is borne out by its absence in the English appositional structure the River Rhine, in which Rhine preserves its proper name status as well (see below for appositions). River names and the like may also appear as vocatives, at least in literary discourse, e.g., Flow gently, sweet Afton. Here too the article is left out, as is normal for vocatives. 17 This situation should be contrasted with that of the proprial lemma. As has been argued above, a lemma is a word, as it figures in the dictionary. It can be used in a number of constructions. Thus, a proprial lemma such as Mary in (14) can appear as a genuine proper name, as a derived common noun or as a modifier. Compare: (14)

a. Mary promised to come tomorrow. b. You are speaking of a different Mary. c. 1 would call this a kind of Mary-like behavior.

The nominal status ofproper names

19

My view is that in (14a) Mary functions as a genuine proper name, in (14b) as a derived common noun, and in (14c) as part of a word. As is well known and can be inferred from the preceding paragraphs, it will be hard to tell proper names apart from common nouns, which also happen to be construed as subject NPs and can have similar modifiers.

2.2. Proper names and appellatives Any speaker-hearer is aware of certain differences between proper names and appellatives. These differences have been dealt with theoretically by philosophers of language, onomasticians and linguists in various ways and frameworks. Mostly, this discussion has been limited to the semantic and more recently, the pragmatic properties of these nominal categories. On the other hand, especially linguists have also made attempts to find grammatical (morphosyntactic) or textlinguistic properties which could be said to be unique to proper names. More often than not, the search for clear differences has appeared to fail. This has led to various reactions. It has been contended either that there is no essential difference between proper names and appellatives, or that there is only a gradual difference between them (compare Jespersen 1924: 69; Fleischer 1964: fn. 2 and 57; Koss 1995).18 In my view, this has to do mainly with the lack of the above distinction between proper name and proprial lemma. A different way to solve the problem of definition has been to state that a noun (or an NP) that is a proper name on the syntactic level, need not be a proper name on the semantic level. It was Algeo (1973) who argued very explicitly in favor of this view. Following Stratificational Grammar, he stated that proper names ought to be defined at different strata that are independent of each other, viz. the phonological, the orthographical, the morphological, the syntactic, the semantic and the referential level. Although this stratificational approach looks attractive at first sight, it loses its appeal when one realizes that language cannot be built up in a schizophrenic way. It is difficult, indeed, to maintain that phonology has nothing to do with morphology or that syntax is quite independent of semantics (see also Van Langendonck 1974; Nicolaisen 1995). In other words, I prefer to start from the principle of isomorphism between form and meaning, which is not only advocated in Cognitive Linguistics but also in most other frameworks. At first blush, this could entail that the ubiquitous phenomenon of polysemy is not accounted for. However, it has turned out that polysemy can be dealt with in terms of prototypes, schemas, generalization,

20

Nominal and referential-semantic status ofproper names

specialization, metaphor, metonymy, and the like (see Geeraerts 1986, among others, for common nouns; Van Langendonck 1997a&b, for proper names). As to proper names, this means that I will attempt to define or at least characterize proper names semantically, but in such a way that this will go together with a search for syntactic and textgrammatical features which are motivated by the semantics. First, I will be concerned with the semantic and referential status of proper names.

3. The referential and semantic status of proper names For a century, a question of hot debate has been in what way proper names refer and especially whether proper names can be attributed any meaning or sense and if so, what kind of meaning would be involved. Numerous overviews of this debate have been given, so I do not need to deal with them extensively (see, e.g., Lotscher 1995; Van Langendonck 1995).

3.1. Some basic semantic notions applied in this work In order to reach a better understanding of the contradictions and problems underlying the wide variety of views on the semantic status of proper names, it is in order to come to grips with a few basic notions related to meaning and reference. Indeed, it has been said repeatedly that solving the problem of meaning and reference is solving the problem of proper names and vice-versa. Philosophical dichotomies such as denotation vs. connotation (John Stuart Mill), extension vs. intension (Rudolf Carnap), reference [Bedeutung] vs. sense [Sinn] (Gottlob Frege; but see below, and Lockwood 1975), have been adopted in linguistic semantics. To avoid confusion about the different interpretations given to these concepts, I will basically rely on the definitions to be found in Lyons (1977). By the denotation of a lexeme Lyons (1977: 207) means "the relationship that holds between that lexeme and persons, things, places, properties, processes and activities external to the language-system." He uses the term denotatum for "the class of objects, properties, etc., to which the expression correctly applies." We can equate denotatum and extension since "by the extension of a term is meant the class of things to which it is correctly applied" (Lyons 1977: 158). The intension of a term is "the set of essential properties which determines the

The referential and semantic status ofproper names

21

applicability of the tenn" (Lyons 1977: 159). The dichotomy 'extension vs. intension' applies to the level of established linguistic convention. At utterance or usage level, reference and referent are what denotation and denotatum are on the level of linguistic convention. The tenn 'meaning' will be used here in its widest interpretation. 'Sense' can be equated with descriptive or cognitive meaning (compare Langacker 1991: 55, who speaks of 'concepts'). I want to deviate from Lyons in a few respects. In line with the argument given above, I have to adopt a third level, i.e. the level of the lemma or dictionary item, where a lemma does not (yet) have a specific denotatum but only potential denotata. Thus, the lemma John potentially denotes 'male person or entity called John' or its autonym, while John(-Major) denotes Britain's prime minister in 1996 and in the utterance John Major meets with major difficulties refers to this person. Of course, the lemma's valency can be expanded, for instance, when a woman comes to be called John. Then we have a proper name carrying the categorical presupposition 'woman'. In this case, the corresponding lemma has to read: 'person or entity called John'. We have one lemma as long as the linguistic community sees a cultural tie with the initial John. Second, the above categories are to be understood as mental, i.e. extensions and referents are in the first place of a mental nature. For linguistic purposes it is of secondary importance whether any real world entities are designated or not. Therefore, I see no problem in assigning an extension and reference to names like Snowwhite. This is in accordance with Jonasson (1994: 19), who proposes to dissociate the linguistic category of the proper name from its referential function and to define it in cognitive tenns as a class of linguistic expressions associated in long-term memory with an individual, i.e. with some specific and not some general knowledge. 19 Another distinction is that between assertive and presuppositional meaning (see Horn's 1996 overview). Mostly, a pragmatic interpretation of presupposition phenomena has been adopted in more recent work. Horn (1996: 305) characterizes presuppositional meaning in the following way: "To presuppose something is to take it for granted in a way that contrasts with asserting it"; or: "A proposition is presupposed if and only if it is (treated as) non-controversially true in every world within the working context set." Thus, "within the pragmatic approach, presuppositions are restrictions on the common ground, rather than conditions on truth and falsity" (Horn 1996: 307). In view of the distinction between asserted and presupposed meaning, I am not sure I can agree with the view that "it appears to be no more correct

22

Nominal and referential-semantic status ofproper names

to say that denotation is wholly dependent upon sense than it is to say that sense is wholly dependent upon denotation" (Lyons 1977: 211). It will turn out that for common nouns it is more plausible to assume that denotation is dependent on sense, as far as asserted meaning is concerned. Further, a distinction has been made between lexical and associative meaning. Lexical meaning can be equated with word sense, while associative meaning refers to the connotations (in the non-logical sense) that a word can give rise to by way of its referent or its phonological shape. For instance, in the case of the word Napoleon, one might think of the properties of the name bearer, e.g., 'victor of Austerlitz' or 'loser of Waterloo'. These associations are related to the referent. Other connotations belong to the name form, e.g., the personal name John may remind one of the common noun John 'toilet'. In name systems these connotations are systematically exploited in name-giving and name uses (see below). Emotive meaning will also be construed as an inherent presuppositional feature of proper names, e.g., diminutive (e.g., Dutch Jan-tje, Marie-ke) and augmentative forms (e.g., Dutch dial. Bert-en, Miel-e) of given names, expressive alternative name forms, especially bynames or nicknames (e.g., Dutch Belgenland instead of Belgie 'Belgium'). (compare Palm er 1976). If the impossibility of negation is accepted as a test for presupposition, the presuppositional nature of such emotive names is obvious: diminutives cannot be negated. The emotive elements are inherent to the name itself. Finally, we have to distinguish so-called 'grammatical meaning', which, it should be remarked, is the only meaning to be attributed to personal pronouns. For instance, the pronoun she is (at least) definite, singular and feminine. Proper names will be shown to have similar features: Mary is definite, singular and feminine as well.

3.2. Evaluation of the main views on the referential and semantic status of proper names As is well known, the first semantic considerations on proper names and common nouns go back to the Ancient Greeks (Summerell 1995). It has to be admitted here that it is not modem linguistics or onomastics but modem philosophy of language which has worked out the most important theories on the reference and semantics of proper names. The interest that philosophers took in proper names obviously comes from their conviction that solving the problem of proper names is solving the problem of meaning and reference (and vice-versa). Of course, reference and referent are to be

The referential and semantic status ofproper names

23

understood here as real world reference and referent. A recent (Dutch) survey of the most relevant language philosophical views (focusing on John Stuart Mill and Gottlob Frege) can be found in De Pater and Swiggers (2000). Gary-Prieur (1994: 16-19) offers a discussion of Mill. Section 3.2 will be divided into two subsections. In 3.2.1, a critical historical overview of language philosophical name theories from Mill to Kripke will be given. In 3.2.2, some current linguistic theories of proper names will be evaluated. As to section 3.2.1, I owe some insights to Mayer (1996) and De Pater and Swiggers (2000) for a partial reinterpretation of Mill and Frege, although I do not entirely agree with their new proposals. New linguistic criticisms will be leveled against the views proposed by John Searle and especially those by Saul Kripke. Apart from the advantage that the historical evolution will be revealed by this overview, there is another reason for following the method outlined above. A division according to what one might think to be the main dividing line between proper name theories, i.e. proper names have or do not have meaning, is too simplistic. First, it is far from clear what is understood by 'meaning' and second, even if it were clear, it is not the only question. A different issue is in what way the reference of the proper name is established: is it sufficient that the name has been assigned and passed on in some way or other, or do we need a certain amount of lexical or associative meaning, i.e. some descriptions of the referent? Especially Kripke and Donnellan argue against descriptivist theories and propose that the name's reference can be traced by a causal or historical chain of references. The language philosophical overview will focus on these issues. It presents a personal interpretation that partly departs from the traditional historical survey found in philosophical work. The section will be structured as follows. Mill accorded denotation (referential status) to proper names, but no lexical meaning, and Frege also assigned a Sinn, which seems to comprehend both lexical and associative (pragmatic) meaning. Husserl argued for a one-to-one correspondence between extension (reference) and intension (meaning). For Russell, Wittgenstein and Searle proper names could not be understood or retrieved without some description(s). Then come Kripke and Donnellan with their radical view that proper names function without any contribution of meaning or descriptions, in whatever way these are to be understood. After this outline of the language philosophical evolution of proper name theory, I will discuss some current or old but persisting theses put forward by linguists (or philosophers). These are the topic of subsection

24

Nominal and referential-semantic status ofproper names

3.2.2. It is obvious that these views are partly tributary to the various philosophical lines of thought. The thesis of the maximum meaningfulness of names goes back to the Frege-Russell tradition. Metalinguistic theories of proper names are said to be tributary to Russell as well: the X called Y view, Recanati (1997), Kleiber (1995; 2004), Katz (2001). Cognitive views appear to continue the maximum meaningfulness thesis. This is the case of the main cognitive linguistic theories of proper names: Marmaridou (1989), Langacker (1991; 2004), Jonasson (1994), and also of the set theoretic cognitivist approach (Ransack 2000; 2004; Brendler 2005). Finally, I discuss the pragmatic view (Coates 2000; 2005a; 2005b; 2005c; 2006), which reminds us of the meaninglessness thesis of names as advocated by Mill and Kripke. In section 3.3, I will argue in favor of the adoption of 'categorical presuppositional meaning' in proper names. The necessity of such a presupposition in order to make sense of a name has been touched upon by many a philosopher. I will also make an attempt to identify these categorical meanings with the so-called basic level concepts as discovered by the psycholinguist Eleanor Rosch-Reider. These considerations will lead to a unified theory of names in which a pragmatic, a semantic and a syntactic account are integrated (section 4).

3.2.1. Language philosophical views: from Mill to Kripke In this subsection, the main language philosophical theses from Mill to Kripke will be discussed from a linguistic semantic point of view.

3.2.1.1. John Stuart Mill John Stuart Mill's classical thesis seems clear: Proper names are not connotative: they denote the individuals who are called by them; but they do not indicate or imply any attributes as belonging to those individuals. When we name a child by the name Paul, or a dog by the name Caesar, these names are simply marks used to enable those individuals to be made subjects of discourse. (Mill 1843, I, Ch. II, § 5; 1872: 33)

The referential and semantic status ofproper names

25

In the terminology adopted here it means that proper names have an extension but not an intension. 20 Mill then adduces the example of the City of Dartmouth, which is called after the mouth of the River Dart, but even if sand should choke up the mouth of the river, or an earthquake change its course, and remove it to a distance from the town, the name of the town would not necessarily be changed. That fact, therefore, can form no part of the signification of the word; for otherwise, when the fact confessedly ceased to be true, no one would any longer think of applying the name. Proper names are attached to the objects themselves, and are not dependent on the continuance of any attribute of the object. (Mill 1843, I, Ch. II, § 5; 1872: 34) Further down on the same page a proper name is characterized as "a name utterly unmeaning ... , a word which answers the purpose of showing what thing it is we are talking about, but not of telling anything about it...". On p. 37, Mill refines his thesis: We put a mark, not indeed upon the object itself, but, so to speak, upon the idea of the object. A proper name is but an unmeaning mark which we connect in our minds with the idea of the object, in order that whenever the mark meets our eyes or occurs to our thoughts, we may think of that individual object. This characterization of proper names contrasts sharply with that of common nouns (or at least those that show some affinity with proper names):

All concrete general names are connotative. The word man, for example, denotes Peter, Jane, John, and an indefinite number of individuals, of whom, taken as a class, it is the name. But it is applied to them, because they possess, and to signify that they possess, certain attributes. (Mil11843, I, Ch. II, § 5; 1872: 32) Mill's meaninglessness thesis, as it is traditionally understood, seems to meet with a problem. De Pater and Swiggers (2000: 285-287) wonder in what way a proper name is capable of referring in the proper way if it has no conventional lexical meaning. In their view, Mill appeals here to certain 'ideas' which a proper name conveys: a proper name functions because it has been connected with an idea or ideas that the speaker or hearer has about the person or object concerned (1872: 37). But what is this knowledge by acquaintance supposed to represent? It seems to have to be understood as direct knowledge by sensory experience, as opposed to knowledge by description, i.e. indirect knowledge. Several of Mill's examples confirm this impression. If, for instance, you get acquainted with a person who has

26

Nominal and referential-semantic status ofproper names

been introduced by the ostensive utterance This is Brown (Mill 1872: 37) you connect your present or previous 'idea' of this man with the name Brown so you know who it is about when Brown is talked about. The subsequent uses of this name will activate your memory concerning Brown, provided you got acquainted with him before. Mill also gives examples of names for which we do not possess this 'knowledge by acquaintance' but rather 'knowledge by description' (in Bertrand Russell's terms). In the case of historical figures like Sophroniscus, we have at our disposal knowledge by description only. For instance, the name Sophroniscus can be traced by the ideas that we have about him, e.g., that he is a man, Greek and Socrates' father. De Pater and Swiggers (2000: 287) observe that this kind of knowledge also applies to contemporary persons, cities and the like we have never met or seen. In Mill's theory the distinction between Russell's two kinds of knowledge is implicit rather than explicit (De Pater and Swiggers (2000: 289). Thus, it appears that the 'ideas' we have about a proper name's referent connect the name with this referent (see also Gary-Prieur 1994: 18-19). De Pater and Swiggers (2000: 292) then argue that Mill's ideas correspond to what they call the 'subjective intension', i.e. the associative, accidental meaning attributed to a referent by different speakers: the ideas can vary from person to person. One person sees Brown as 'the baker' whereas the other knows him as a 'football player'. De Pater and Swiggers remark that this aspect of Mill's theory has been largely neglected, also by such authors as Kripke (see 3.2.1.6). Contrary to the classical interpretation, Mill is claimed to think (like Gottlob Frege) that in order to refer with a proper name, more is necessary than the fact that this name was 'assigned' (De Pater and Swiggers 2000: 292, 295; see also Mayer 1996 for a first approximation). However, together with Dummett (1996: 1189, quoted in the latter) we may interpret Mill more literally and keep to his own words (see above), i.e. that a proper name is a label for someone's idea of the object. To almost equate Mill's ideas (as implicit as they remained) with Frege's Sinn may be one step too far (compare Katz 1972: 380; Katz 2001). Anyway, it seems clear that Mill stressed the referential nature of proper names whereas Frege emphasized the Sinn (sense) of names. But, of course, it should be clear what Frege meant by Sinn. Let us therefore consider Frege's ideas.

The referential and semantic status ofproper names

3.2.1.2.

27

Gottlob Frege

In the philosophical tradition, it has been argued that, at the turn of the century, a different line of thought from l.S. Mill was taken by Gottlob Frege. This German philosopher attributed not only reference [Bedeutung], but also a 'sense' [Sinn] to proper names. First, he deals with identifying descriptions, where the distinction between common nouns and proper names is not immediately relevant. His starting point is the analysis of identity statements containing uniquely identifying descriptions such as The morning star is the evening star (Frege 1892: 25-28). This statement appears to be informative but not the equation The morning star is the morning star. The reason is that the descriptions provide a kind of sense: the morning star has a different sense [Sinn] from the evening star although the reference is the same in that both expressions refer to the planet Venus. In this way Frege showed in fact that there is a difference between sense and reference [Sinn vs. Bedeutung]. This famous example does not yet say much about the status of proper names since the expressions concerned, the morning star and the evening star, were not meant as real proper names by Frege. When he comes to discussing what he calls 'eigentliche Eigennamen' (actual proper names) like Aristoteles, there is some hesitation. As for the Sinn of such 'actual' proper names he admits that there are 'Schwankungen' (fluctuations): opinions on the Sinn may differ, e.g., Aristotle can be thought of as 'Plato's pupil' or as 'Alexander the Great's teacher'. From this passage (Frege 1892: 27, fn.) it is hard to conclude that Sinn is to be interpreted as '(lexical) meaning', as has traditionally been held (still Kripke 1972: 277). Indeed, in recent literature (Mayer 1996: 109; De Pater and Swiggers 2000: 304) it has been argued that Sinn cannot simply be equated with lexical meaning. In general, it seems to be a term for 'meaningfulness' or 'meaning in a wide sense'. Thus, it may stand for objective, conventional or subjective sense. In the case of proper names, subjective sense might be appropriate. However, Frege seems to reject subjective representations (Vorstellungen) in this context. Thus, Frege (1892: 30) posits the Sinn as something in between the proper name's reference (the object itself) and the subjective representations we may have of the object. In Wissenschaftlicher Briejwechsel, 126-129, Frege adduces the example in which two independent travelers discover the same mountain, but under different circumstances; one was told the mountain was called the Ajla, the other heard the name Ateb. When they met and found out they had discovered the same mountain they were able to say: the Ajla is the Ateb. Since

28

Nominal and referential-semantic status ofproper names

this was a geographically informative statement, Frege held that the names in question must have a different Sinn although they have the same reference. In addition, he explains in what way people got acquainted with these names and their referents. But since Frege displays an aversion to subjective ideas and psychologism in general, he tries to conventionalize the knowledge in question as Sinn. That this interpretation can come close to lexical meaning as understood here, can be inferred from Frege's example in Nachgelassene Schriflen 133: the name Nausikaa suggests of itself that it is about a woman, which provides it with a Sinn. In fact, I will argue that 'woman' pertains to the categorical presuppositional meaning (more precisely the basic level meaning) of a name like Nausikaa, at least in its referential function of picking out the woman known by this name (see below). Later on, Frege appears to distance himself more from the idea that this Sinn in proper names would have to be equated with lexical meaning. Thus, Dummett (1974: 527) holds that Frege's Sinn turns out to be a question of what every individual knows separately. And this boils down to the equation of Sinn in proper names with associative, accidental meaning attributed by different or even the same speakers. To sum up, in Frege's view the Sinn of a proper name seems to be a concept that at first comes close to lexical meaning but is eventually wellnigh indistinguishable from associative meaning. Contrary to the traditional commentaries, the above analysis brings Frege somewhat closer to Mill, though maybe not as close as De Pater and Swiggers (2000: 317) would have it. We may conclude that what has usually been emphasized about Mill, i.e. that he argued proper names denote but do not connote, is essentially right. As to Frege, one has especially remembered that he assigned a Sinn, i.e. a kind of sense, to both proper names and definite descriptions, but in the case of proper names, one might have to interpret this Sinn as associative meaning.

3.2.1.3. Edmund Husserl Edmund Husserl ([1900] 1984, IIIl, 0 12) contended that a common noun such as ein Pferd 'a horse' and a proper name like Bucephalus behave quite differently in the respective relationship of their extension to their intension. The appellative a horse shows a large extension corresponding to a 'universal' intension. Due to this 'polyvalent' intension, the meaning of the appellative applies to an infinite number of entities. By contrast, the

The referential and semantic status ofproper names

29

word Bucephalus is 'monovalent', i.e. there is a one-to-one correspondence between extension and intension. However, this does not entail that the name Bucephalus is unique. It is still possible that it is ambiguous in that various horses could be called Bucephalus (see also Buyssens 1973: 27),2' without this entailing that all horses with the name Bucephalus constitute together the extension of a single intension Bucephalus, as it does in the case of 'horse'. This line of thought, which Husserl (1984) and Bosanquet (1931: 49) initiated, has been continued by Coseriu (1955: 227-228; 1989). He argues that in the case of proper names there is, in each case, a one-to-one correspondence between one extension and one intension. This also goes for homophonous proper names like John} and John2. Coseriu's view has been taken over and refined by von Kutschera (1976: 25) and Willems (1995: 174; 1996). At first blush, this solution looks straightforward enough. However, at least one question remains: what is the nature of this proprial intension, in other words, how will we define this intension or sense? This has not been made clear by these authors. In fact, it is not clearer than Frege's concept Sinn, from which it probably derives.

3.2.1.4.

Bertrand Russell

At first, Russell (1903, par. 476) appeared to be in favor of Mill's theory, as commonly interpreted, viz. that common nouns connote (and denote) but that proper names only denote. Later on, he seemed to favor Frege's standpoint. Russell ([1918] 1964: 201; 1919: 179) considered proper names (in their ordinary sense) to be 'truncated' or 'shorthand' descriptions (compare Kripke 1972: 343, fn. 4). However, for Russell these proper names were not real 'proper names'.22 Rather, genuine proper names were the 'logically proper names', i.e. deictic words like this or that (see further Stebbing 1933). What is usually conceived of as a proper name, say Socrates, originally functioned to solely refer to an object of 'direct acquaintance', but afterwards, when direct acquaintance was no longer possible, the name became a truncated description for 'Plato's teacher', 'the philosopher who drank the poison-cup, and so on. Thus, Russell also recognized the fluctuations in these descriptions. Although there is some resemblance between demonstratives and proper names in that both can refer uniquely to an entity, the linguist should distinguish between referring expressions that refer uniquely at the level of

30

Nominal and referential-semantic status ofprop er names

established linguistic convention, viz. proper names, and those that refer uniquely at the level of usage, viz. demonstratives or other deictic expressions. After all, people are not normally called this or that (see already Wittgenstein 1953, par. 410; De Pater and Swiggers 2000: 326). Searle elaborated Frege's idea about the 'sense' of proper names and worked out a theory that seems to constitute the best representative of the theses advocating the meaningfulness of proper names.

3.2.1.5.

Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Searle

Wittgenstein's ideas display the same shift from Mill's views to those of Frege. For Wittgenstein (1922: 3.203) the name means the object. The object is its meaning. This is a different way of saying that proper names merely denote. The later Wittgenstein (1953, par. 40, 79), however, takes a radical turn: in this second period he argues it is linguistically unwarranted to call the thing itself the meaning of the name. On the contrary, the meaning of a proper name is constituted, not by the referent but by the descriptions one can provide of the thing named. The by then well known fact that we are faced with fluctuations in the 'sense' of these proper names is accounted for by the statement that in such cases we are using the name without a fixed meaning. It is true that Moses can be defined by different descriptions: the one who took the Israelites through the desert, the boy who was picked up from the Nile by the Pharao 's daughter, etc. We cannot know in advance how many of these descriptions will turn out to be false and what will be the number of them that may eventually force us to abandon the name (see also De Pater and Swiggers 2000: 326). Searle (1958; 1969: 162-174; 1971) elaborated on and refined the ideas of Mill, Frege, Russell and Wittgenstein. Searle at first recognizes that proper names are not definite or identifying descriptions, not even shorthand ones, and hence that "they do not have definitions" (1969: 170). Moreover, the descriptions are assigned to the name bearers only, not to the name or word itself. Further, if the purported meaning of the name were a complete description of its bearer, then each true assertion about the referent would be analytical and a false statement would be a contradiction. Moreover, the 'meaning' of the name would change whenever anything changed in its bearer. Hence, a proper name is not connected analytically with each identifying description taken separately (1969: 166).

The referential and semantic status ofproper names

31

On the other hand, Searle argues that proper names are logically connected with characteristics of the object to which they refer 'in a loose sort of way' (1969: 170). This is explained as follows: They [proper names] function not as descriptions, but as pegs on which to hang descriptions. Thus the looseness of the criteria for proper names is a necessary condition for isolating the referring function from the describing function of language. (1969: 172)

Then he goes on: To put the same point differently, suppose we ask, "Why do we have proper names at all?" Obviously, to refer to individuals. "Yes, but descriptions could do that for us." But only at the cost of specifying identity conditions every time reference is made: suppose we agree to drop 'Aristotle' and use, say, 'the teacher of Alexander', then it is an analytic truth that the man referred to is Alexander's teacher - but it is a contingent fact that Aristotle ever went into pedagogy. (Though it is, as I have said, a necessary truth that Aristotle has the logical sum [inclusive disjunction] of the properties commonly attributed to him. (Searle 1969: 171-172)

In order to be, say, Aristotle, the purported referent must meet at least some of the descriptions ascribed to Aristotle. However, it is not a priori clear which ones: no single one of them is analytically true of Aristotle, though their disjunction is (1969: 169). It may be that one of the descriptions does not fit, e.g., it may turn out that Aristotle was not the teacher of Alexander the Great. This does not constitute a problem since the reference will be fixed by other descriptions. One might object that none of the descriptions provided may apply. According to Searle (1969: 169) this is not an acceptable idea: "It is a necessary condition for an object to be Aristotle that it satisfy at least some of these descriptions." Although no definite description taken separately is tied analytically to a proper name, Searle holds that there is an analytical relation between a proper name and some common noun which is not a definite description, hut merely a description or predicate: Some general term is analytically tied to any proper name: Everest is a mountain, the Mississippi is a river, de Gaulle is a person. Anything which was not a mountain could not be Everest, etc., for to secure continuity of reference we need a criterion of identity, and the general term associated with the name provides the criterion. Even for those people who would want to assert that de Gaulle could turn into a tree or horse and still be de Gaulle, there must be some identity criterion. De Gaulle could not turn into anything whatever, e.g., a prime number, and still remain de Gaulle, and to say this is

32

Nominal and referential-semantic status ofproper names to say that some term or range of terms is analytically tied to the name 'de Gaulle'. (Searle 1969: 167)

This important (but often neglected) passage in Searle's article confirms the view that proper names have a kind of categorical presuppositional (basic level) meaning, which is specific for each proper name, though only potential for a propria I lemma (see above and further below). In some way, Searle's disjunction thesis anticipates prototype theory as it has been initiated by the psycho linguist Eleanor Rosch and developed further in Cognitive Linguistics, at least for common nouns. In both prototype theory and cluster theory (as Kripke 1972 called Searle's thesis), the assumption of necessary and sufficient conditions is rejected. Taken separately, none of the descriptions of the cluster in a proper name or none of the features of the meaning in a common noun is either necessary or sufficient to characterize the meaning and/or the referent of these nouns. However, one condition is relevant. In the use of a proper name as well as in the use of a common noun, at least one of the possible readings has to be chosen. Therefore, if we endorse prototype theory, we could accept Searle's cluster theory as well. However, there are differences between them?3 First, in the case of prototype theory the features concern the meaning of the appellative expression, in the case of proper names it does not appear to be about the meaning of the word but about the description of the name bearer. Second, in the case of common nouns the meaning displays polysemy, i.e. all senses of the word are affiliated to each other, e.g., by metaphor, metonymy, specialization or generalization. This does not obtain for proper names: the various descriptions of the name bearer are not semantically or conceptually related. For instance, that Aristotle was born in Stagira has nothing to do with the fact that he became Alexander the Great's teacher and in turn these two facts are unrelated to his being Plato's disciple. Third, there is apparently an essential difference between prototype theory and cluster theory. Cluster theory faces a serious objection if we follow Kripke's (1972) line (see also below): in the case of the meaning of a word, at least one or even the majority of concepts is relevant, but in the case of a proper name, no description at all need be chosen to make reference possible. S0rensen (1963) obviously dislikes the lack of necessary and sufficient conditions and attempts to make the 'sense' of proper names much more precise: in his view, the referent is identifiable with the help of spatiotemporal parameters. A proper name is defined as the x that...p ... t, where p and

The referential and semantic status ofproper names

33

t are coordinates for place and time. A similar view is to be found in Zink (1963: 495) and Billy (1995).

3.2.1.6.

Saul Kripke and Keith Donnellan

To cope with such problems for the monoreferentiality thesis as the question in what way meaningless proper names are able to retrieve a referent, Kripke (1972) and Donnellan (1972; 1974) have answers that follow a line of thought that has become fairly reputed. Kripke (1972) partly revises Mill's views, maintaining the meaninglessness thesis.24 For a proper name to function, it suffices that it has been assigned to a referent and passed on to other users. Focusing especially on Searle's views, Kripke and Donnellan raise some objections to what Kripke called the cluster theory of names. For one thing, Searle's as well as Russell's and Wittgenstein's so-called descriptivist views appear to suffer from the fact that none of the characterizations of the referent of a proper name are really indispensable to the felicitous use of the name. That is, to have access to the thing named, we can dispense with any kind of descriptive clue: the denotation does not depend on it (Kripke 1972: 287). Donnellan (1972: 364): wonders whether there is "really a requirement that the user of a name be able to identify by description (or even by pointing) what the name refers to." In fact, Searle should admit this since if his theory states it is impossible to know which properties of the disjunction of descriptions obtain, we cannot guarantee that any of the attributes are valid at all (Kripke 1972: 294-296). For example, it is sometimes said that Einstein was the inventor of the atomic bomb, which of course he was not. However, we would not deduce from this that Einstein was in fact called Oppenheimer. At the same time, this does not take away the fact that ostension (pointing at the referent) and/or descriptions may have played a role in the initial name-giving act. Furthermore, Donnellan (1972: 370-372) gives the example where the same set of identifying descriptions fits two referents. This would entail that the referent cannot always be retrieved by giving a set of descriptions. Kripke's and Donnellan's criticisms are equally applicable to theories like those of S0rensen (1963) and Billy (1995), which look more exact than Searle's cluster theory. But paradoxically, they are to be considered as less good precisely because of this exactness. In fact, there is no need for us to know the referent's place and time of birth (if the referent is a person) in order to use the name properly. In addition, such coordinates as place and

34

Nominal and referential-semantic status ofproper names

time of birth do not constitute information that the name user is likely to be acquainted with. Hence, if these spatiotemporal coordinates constituted the definition of a proper name, the name could almost never be used or even 'understood' (if we can speak of 'understanding' a proper name at all). A similar objection can even be raised against cluster theory: our information about name bearers is often rather restricted. In Kripke's work, two new important concepts are introduced: the rigid designator and the causal chain of reference. Kripke's introduction of the notion 'rigid designator' is a refinement which has been discussed extensively by philosophers and has often been adduced by linguists and onomasticians, though with little linguistic criticism (but see Van Osta 1993; 1995, among others). In Kripke's view, a proper name is a rigid designator in that "in any possible world it designates the same object" (Kripke 1972: 269). For instance, with a name like Nixon we refer rigidly, indicating the same person in any context (or 'world' in the technical terminology) so we can hold: "no one other than Nixon might have been Nixon" (p. 270), but Nixon might, for instance, not have been the president. It is a necessary truth that Nixon is Nixon, but not that he is or was president of the USA, not even that he was called Nixon. The causal theory of reference wants to answer the question in what way we refer with proper names if this is not done with the help of descriptions. According to Kripke (1972: 298-302) proper names are connected with their referents via a causal chain of references which goes back to an initial baptismal (i.e. a name-giving) act in which the reference is fixed by ostension and/or description. As soon as a name is assigned to an entity, we no longer refer with this name by means of descriptions. For example, supposing Aristotle's parents gave him his name, they will have mentioned it to others, these other people will have passed it on again and so forth. The original name-giving act and the subsequent acts in which the name is passed on turn it into a rigid designator. 25 However, in this chain of references things can go wrong (Kripke (1972: 768-769). For example, the name Madagascar originally indicated part of the African continent, it came into use as the name of the island because of a misunderstanding of Marco Polo's. Thus, a kind of 'reference shift' (Evans 1985: 10-11) took place, leading to a new social practice. So the causal chain theory heavily relies on the social dimension of the use of names. In the same vein, Donnellan (1974: 3) argues in favor of what he prefers to call the 'historical explanation theory' because causality is not really involved. In Schwarz's (1979: 2, 141) view, the causality thesis "is to be

The referential and semantic status ofprop er names

35

sharply distinguished from a related thesis, concerning the use of names. The thesis is roughly that the reference made to 0 in a given utterance of name N depends on a 'chain of references'." Some philosophical and linguistic objections can be raised to the notions of rigid designator and of causal chain of reference. Although Kripke's notion of rigid designator is mentioned frequently, it has been severely criticized in philosophical quarters. For example, Schwarz (1979: XXX, XXXVI) argues proper names are not necessarily rigid designators. He rejects this thesis together with the related causal theory of reference. The causal theory holds that referring requires a causal connection between the speech act and the object referred to. In Schwarz' (1979: 2) formulation: "When utterance-type N is the proper name of object 0, the connection between Nand 0 is - at least in part - a causal connection of some sort between 0 and at least some utterances of N." According to Schwarz (1979: XXX) this is out of the question for fictitious names, numbers or abstract entities. On p. 123, he concludes: "while we may admit that some cases of referring and proper names must involve causality - and must, consequently, be rigid - we may emphatically deny that this must be so for all of them, or even for most." The author states that, in fact, all referring expressions can be used rigidly, but non-rigidly as well. Indeed, paraphrasing Kripke, I could state as well: "no one other than me might have been me", and so on. On the other hand, with proper names the speaker "will generally have good pragmatic reasons for choosing to refer rigidly" (p. 171, 175). Gary-Prieur (1994: 23) argues that at least definite descriptions do not function as rigid designators. As for the notion of rigid designator, linguistic difficulties pop up as well. For the linguist it is unacceptable that this concept is unable to account for the fact that proper names, certain common nouns and pronouns are different categories. Indeed, for Kripke, all three basic categories seem to be able to function as rigid designators. In footnote 16, Kripke (1972: 345) states: "Demonstratives can be used as rigid designators, and free variables can be used as rigid designators of unspecified objects." Even names of natural kinds, i.e. mass nouns like gold, or count nouns such as cat, seem to behave as rigid designators: "terms for natural kinds are much closer to proper names then [sic] is ordinarily supposed" (Kripke 1972: 322; see also 328-330; compare, however, Soames 2002). "For example, a material object turns out to be (pure) gold if and only if the only element contained therein is that with atomic number 79" (p. 330). In my opinion, one should, from a linguistic point of view, object against this position because, as a philosopher, Kripke fails to distinguish

36

Nominal and referential-semantic status ofproper names

between established linguistic convention and language use: if demonstratives refer rigidly, they can do so only on the level of language use, not on the level of linguistic convention (langue), where we can only say that they have a potential for referring. By contrast, we should maintain that proper names denote rigidly on the level of linguistic convention. What the linguist needs is a distinction between names and pronouns and this is not provided by the notion of rigid designator. A similar criticism applies to Schwarz' own contention that in all likelihood proper names are indexicals (1979: 175; compare Recanati 1997: 140-146). In this way, the difference with demonstratives and personal pronouns is blurred. 26 As to natural kinds, the names for them may well refer rigidly in the sense that their extension is rigid because their intension is rigid, but again, this knowledge does not differentiate these appellatives from proper names, which are supposed not to have such intensions. Again, what we need here is a distinction between proper names and common nouns, which apparently is not given with the notion of rigid designator. In this connection, it should be pointed out that the philosopher Putnam (1975, 11: 247), who otherwise adheres to the causal model, posits an essential distinction between common nouns for natural kinds and proper names. Moreover, later on Putnam will adopt a rather anti-realist position, which appears to come closer to the viewpoint of the ordinary linguist. Some other problems remain for the anti-descriptivist thesis as conceived of by Kripke and Donnellan. First, ostensive name-giving acts and subsequent uses such as This is Brown are not so much of a problem in the case of persons the hearer becomes acquainted with, but may engender more difficulties for other entities: countries, cities, rivers, objects, and the like. As Ziff (1960: 85-89, 93, 104, 173-176; 1977) rightly argues: suppose somebody points to the Nile and says: This is the Nile, without the hearer knowing the notion of 'river', it will be impossible for him to grasp the essence of what is being referred to. This observation will turn out to be very important for the theory of names, as may become clear in the remainder of this book (see Van Langendonck 1997a, De Pater and Swiggers 2000: 288, and many others). Recall also that Searle (1969: 167) holds that there is an analytical relation between a proper name and a common noun in the sense that the sentences de Gaulle is a person and Everest is a mountain are analytical statements. In a long footnote, Kripke (1972: 351-352, fn. 58) deals with the problem, quoting Geach (1957, section 16 and elsewhere), who introduced the notion of 'nominal essence':

The referential and semantic status ofproper names

37

According to Geach, since any act of pointing is ambiguous, someone who baptizes an object by pointing to it must apply a sortal property to disambiguate his reference and to ensure correct criteria of identity over time - for example, someone who assigns a reference to 'Nixon' by pointing to him must say, 'I use 'Nixon' as a name of that man', thus removing his hearer's temptations to take him to be pointing to a nose or a time-slice. The sortal is then in some sense part of the meaning of the name; names do have a (partial) sense after all, though their senses may not be complete enough to determine their references, as they are in description and c1uster-ofdescriptions theories.

Kripke then interprets Geach's nominal essence in terms of a prioricity, not necessity. In this way, Nixon is a man, Dobbin is a horse are a priori truths. However, in his further comments, Kripke weakens these statements, saying he is not taking a position though doubting the a prioricity. For example, it turned out a posteriori that Hesperus was not a star but a planet. Also, there seems to be no proof that the sortal property is part of the name's sense. For instance, if somebody asks the question: "Who or what is Nancy?", it would still be a case of naming. In my view, the a priori character of the sortal is better regarded as a presupposition, which can be canceled, albeit in rare cases. The instance of Nancy (an extreme case, as Kripke admits) strongly suggests that it is necessary to know the sortal or categorical presupposition of a name for proper communication. The initial ostension or description of the referent is likely to provide this categorical presupposition (see also Recanati 1997: 169-172). Second, if the social dimension, in this case the 'division of labor', is so relevant in passing on a name and its reference, the descriptivist could argue that the individual speaker need not have at his disposal an identifying description of the referent; it suffices that people in the individual speaker's linguistic group do (De Pater and Swiggers (2000: 330, 332). Following Dummett (1974: 534) it could then be argued that Kripke's indexical model is in fact a social version of descriptivism. Maybe a combination of the descriptivist and the indexical theory would make sense (De Pater and Swiggers 2000: 343, 363). In any case, in the name-giving act Kripke assigns a role to ostension and description, so that fixing the reference is not purely a matter of a chain of reference. Finally, as De Pater and Swiggers (2000: 358) remark, what is the use of a completely unknown referent in a conversation, or more fundamentally, how do we know there is such a referent? More recent theories combine the denotative and the descriptivist models, but preserve an initial baptism or assignment of the name as essential.

38

Nominal and referential-semantic status ofproper names

The causal chain can, however, be a chain of information, i.e. of descriptions to find the referent and to make 'sense' (Sinn) of it (cf. Evans 1985; Devitt and Sterelny 1987: 65; De Pater and Swiggers 2000: 360,363). Third, if any theory of proper names is a meaninglessness thesis it is certainly that of Kripke and Donnellan. A linguistic problem for the meaninglessness thesis of proper names is that they cannot be signs, since signs (in the Saussurian sense) are to have a form and a meaning. It should be added here that the same applies to personal pronouns. It is true, however, that the nominal categories proper name and pronoun can be considered to contain some grammatical meaning, e.g., John and he have at least the features [+ human, + masculine, + definite, + singular] (see below). The question remains whether grammatical meaning is by definition not a kind of lexical meaning and hence may not be accepted as sufficient to constitute the meaning of a linguistic sign (or: symbolic unit). The introduction of categorical meaning as elaborated upon in the foregoing paragraph [b] might be of help here. As we saw, even Kripke and Donnellan are not absolutely against some sortal property in names. A remarkable alternative meaninglessness view has been formulated by von Kutschera (1976: 25): the intension (meaning, connotation) is established by the fixation of an unambiguous extension (denotation) (see also Lotscher 1995: 450). However, it does not become clear what this intension is about. In my view, the question of whether proper names have meaning may well be the wrong question, the right one being in what way the meanings are construed and function. We could see Frege's Sinn as meaning by itself. In common nouns, this meaning crucially determines the denotatum, in proper names, the meaning helps to retrieve an already given denotatum. For practical reasons, we can still call the meaning of common nouns 'conventional meaning', that of proper names 'associative meaning'. Moreover, both word classes do also show grammatical meaning, which is the only sense in (personal) pronouns.

3.2.2. Some current linguistic theories a/proper names In this subsection, I will discuss some current, or old but persisting, theses on names put forward by linguists (or philosophers). These views are partly tributary to the various philosophical lines of thought.

The referential and semantic status ofproper names

3.2.2.1.

39

The maximum meaningfulness thesis

The opposite of what is contended nowadays by such authors as Kripke and Donnellan is found in the maximum meaningfulness thesis, which is tributary to the Frege-Russell tradition. In the first half of the 20th century, such linguists as Jespersen (1924: 66)27 and Kurylowicz (1956) held the view that proper names were the word class with a maximum of content but a minimum of referents, i.e. the intension of a noun was considered inversely proportionate to its extension. It has been argued repeatedly that this conclusion is due to the lack of distinction between word meaning and semantic or pragmatic associations that can be attributed to the name bearer; for instance, one may argue that the name Clinton has no lexical meaning, but that it evokes a wealth of associations or connotations (in the non-logical sense) concerning the referent. While Kurylowicz (1980) appeared to have abandoned the maximum meaningfulness thesis and adopted a categorical meaning thesis instead (see below), cognitive linguistic approaches to proper names (e.g., Marmaridou 1989 and Langacker 1991) seem to initiate a revival of the maximum meaningfulness thesis. A radical proponent of this thesis is Hansack (1990; 2000; 2004), whose ideas are based on natural sciences and set theory. I will go more deeply into these views in the sections 3.2.2.3 and 3.2.2.4.

3.2.2.2. Metalinguistic theories of proper names: the X called Y view, Recanati (1997), Kleiber (1995; 2004), Katz (2001) Various and ever more sophisticated metalinguistic theories of proper names have been put forward in the course of time. The original and still most widespread version goes by the name X called Y. New versions have been formulated by Recanati (1997), Kleiber (1995; 1996; 2004) and by Katz (2001). The three authors try to improve the original theory by altering the meaning of 'meaning' (or 'sense'), each in a different way.

3.2.2.2.1. The traditional view X called Y As if to escape the thesis that proper names are devoid of any meaning, the theory of the 'so-und-so-genannt-sein' (the theory of being called such and such) was developed. According to Kripke (1972: 284) it goes back to Ber-

40

Nominal and referential-semantic status ofproper names

trand Russell (see also Funke 1925; Kneale 1962: 629-630; Algeo 1973: 68-87; McCawley 1973; Smith 1975; Kleiber 1981; Kuhn and Serzisko 1982: 287). It analyzes proper names according to the formula: X = the entity called Y, e.g., John = the person called 'John', or: the person with the name 'John '. It is implied that a proper name is a kind of definite description, i.e. a definite appellative NP (see also Willems 1996: 135-137). In my view (and also Searle's 1969: 171), the above thesis could also be applied to appellatives, e.g., a quasar = an entity called 'quasar '. Put differently and more generally, all words are ambiguous in this respect: quasar has the dictionary definition but also the trivial definition in terms of X called Y. Normally, this reading is not relevant, but in ostensive definitions, it can be activated. Algeo (1973) observes that the sentence This is John, intended as an ostensive definition, means This is the person called 'John '. However, this does not entail that proprial lemmas always display this interpretation, at least not in their function of proper name. As Algeo admits, the sentence This is John can also be uttered with a different reading, viz. the one in which John is a proper name in my interpretation. In this reading the sentence could be used in the context where John did something weird and somebody said: 'You see, this is John!' Finally, it should be added that ostensive utterances with appellatives such as This is the director show the same ambiguity as propriallemmas. A further drawback of the formula X called Y is that it implies sophisticated metalinguistic knowledge since it is obviously to be analyzed as: the x which bears the name y. As Jonasson (1994) and (later) also Kleiber (1996: 571; 2004: 123-124) put it: the formula X called Y yields a structure more complex than that of propria I lemmas in a derived appellative function (e.g., another John). In addition, if the said metalinguistic analysis applied to proper names in their referential function one would expect proper names to be acquired by children rather late. However, children develop an early and easy command of proper names, but not of the derived structures. Hence, the abstract metalinguistic analysis must probably be ruled out on acquisitional grounds as well. Finally, the formula under scrutiny leads to circularity or an infinite regress (Searle 1969: 170). Kripke (1972: 283-286) remarks the same in connection with Kneale's definition of Socrates as 'the individual called Socrates' .28 Van Langendonck (1974) provides an example of this infinite regress: John = the person called' John' > 'John' = the name with the form [John] > [John] = the form of the name 'John', and so on.

The referential and semantic status ofproper names

41

S0rensen (1963) also rejects the' so-und-so-genannt-sein' thesis and develops a "definiens formula" for proper names in terms of spatiotemporal parameters (see above). In spite of all these criticisms the X called Y thesis does not seem to have lost its appeal. Geurts (1997) defends this form of the description theory with some new arguments that are based mainly on similarities between the behavior of proper names and that of definite descriptions. Abbott (2002) convincingly refutes Geurts' arguments by pointing out that "Either there is a broader explanation for the shared behaviour (e.g., those related to definiteness ... ), or the behaviour is not in fact shared" (p. 199). Geurts' line of argumentation is dangerous indeed. One could just as well argue that personal pronouns are in fact proper names since, just like proper names, they are definite and contain no lexical meaning. Geurts' (2002) reply to Abbott speaks of misunderstandings but does not really contain new elements except for the example sentence John is always male. It is true that in this obviously metalinguistic sentence the name John is best analyzed as 'the person called John'. But this is a marginal pattern (compare: ??Tokio is always a city), and even if we accept such sentences and a metalinguistic analysis of them, this does not mean that the analysis is appropriate for every occurrence of a proprial lemma. In addition, as I will show in chapter 2, a number of formal criteria can be adduced to define proper names constructionally, all of which disfavor the X called Y view. Consider for instance the following contexts in which proper names but not definite descriptions can occur: (15)

a. b. c. d. e. f. g. h. i. j.

The singer Robeson is coming tonight. *The singer the person called 'Robeson' is coming tonight. The person John is not sympathetic. *The person John is always male. London and London are two different cities. *The place called 'London' and the place called 'London' are two different cities. The (woman called) 'Annette' that I know is always kind to me. *Annette that I know is always kind to me. The numerous ranges of mountains called 'Pyrenees '... *The numerous Pyrenees ...

In (15a) to (15d) we see that an appositional structure is possible with real proper names but not with any definite descriptions, including metalinguistic ones; (15e) and (150 show that while coordination of homophonous

42

Nominal and referential-semantic status ofproper names

proper names is possible, coordination of definite descriptions is not. Restrictive relative clauses, on the other hand, combine with definite descriptions but not with proper names (15g,h). Finally, though there may not be more than one range of mountains called 'Pyrenees', the expression itself is grammatical, but as is shown in (15j) its object language counterpart is not. The deathblow to the X called Y thesis comes from psycho- and neurolinguistic findings. It has been established psychologically and neurologically that proper names are essentially different from definite descriptions (see below), just as they differ from personal pronouns, notwithstanding the fact that these three categories are definite NPs.

3.2.2.2.2. Recanati's (1997) indexical version o/the X called Y view Recanati's (1997, chapters 8-10) indexical view of names is, as he says himself, his own version of the metalinguistic view. He considers proper names to be a special kind of indexicals: "a proper name refers by linguistic convention to whoever (or whatever) happens to be the bearer of that name" (p. 140). However, "who (what) is the bearer of the name is a contextual, non-linguistic matter, a matter of social convention. The reference of the name thus depends on a contextual factor, as the reference of an indexical expression does" (p. 140). This claim goes together with the rejection of the thesis that it is constitutive of a proper name to be associated with a specific sortal a la Geach (p. 172), i.e. with what I call a basic level category. I will deal with these two theses of Recanati. The first thesis reads as follows: "The conventions assigning bearers to proper names are not linguistic conventions. They are part of the context rather than part of the language" (p. 138). To illustrate his point, Recanati (1997: 163) adduces three conventions that are assumed to be correct: (i) This man [pointing to Socrates] is called 'Socrates'.

(ii) This color [pointing to a sample of red] is called 'red'. (iii) Psychiatrists are called 'alienists'.

The three conventions relate the words 'Socrates', 'red', and 'alienist' to what is called the relatum. According to Recanati (1997: 164), (i) is not a linguistic convention, whereas (ii) and (iii) are linguistic, i.e. semantic conventions in that the last two fix the meaning of the words 'red' and 'alienist' by pairing them respectively with the color red and the concept of

The referential and semantic status ofproper names

43

an alienist. In the case of 'red' and 'alienist', the meaning is claimed to be the relatum. By contrast, the relation between the word and the relatum (Le. the fact that the relatum is conventionally associated with the word) is not part of the meaning of the word. The situation is claimed to be "very different" in the case of (i). Here it is the relation 'being so-called' or 'bearer of this name' rather than the relatum (the individual who is socalled) which constitutes the meaning of the name 'Socrates'. Recanati sums up: it is the relation, not the relatum, which constitutes the meaning of a proper name, while it is the relatum, not the relation, which constitutes the meaning of words such as 'red' or 'alienist'. This difference is entirely due to the fact that (i) is not a linguistic convention, contrary to (ii) and (iii).

In my view, however, there is a greater resemblance between (i) and (ii), if only in the form of the statements. But there is more. I consider the word red to be a proprio-appellative lemma in that it functions as a proper name and as an appellative with the same ease. The propria I function is found at least in the appositional structure the color red, the appellative function in expressions of the form There is some red on this napkin. The word has still another, very common function, viz. an adjectival one, as in red flowers. In my view, Recanati should not consider lemmas like Socrates, red, or alienist, but rather words in a particular construction of the grammar. In the case of the color red, the meaning of red is made subsidiary to the reference: it is about a name for a color. The meaning here is presuppositional, as I argued above with regard to names in appositional structures. If this analysis is correct, it cannot be denied that the word red in (ii) is a proper name that is part of the language. The same goes for all other proper names formed on the basis of proprio-appellative lemmas, such as names of languages, diseases, brands, etc., or by means of numbers and letters (cf. chapter 3). In fact, any word can become a proper name by turning into an autonym, as in 'Bank' is an ambiguous word. Neither in this case can the sense of bank determine its reference. The word bank is used as a name here (see also chapter 3, section 4 on autonyms). If all words can be used as names, it would be rather strange to claim that they do not belong to the English language in this function. Finally, many proper names are formed on the basis of nonproprial lemmas, or at least lemmas that may be proprial by accident, but are more often appellatives, phrases or sentences. There are two kinds of them. First, we have lemmas that are assigned ad hoc to some unique entity, such as a film (Gladiator; The postman always rings twice), a book, play, or novel (Hamlet; The Old Man and the Sea) (cf.

44

Nominal and referential-semantic status ofproper names

chapter 3, 3 .l.2-3). Second, there are occasional formations such as the second unit in the appositional structures the metal gold, the notion of democracy, the fact that it rained, and so on (cf. chapter 3, section 5). Again, if this analysis is correct, it would be strange to hold that the proprial unit does not belong to the English language. Another important process giving rise to proper names is 'semantic bleaching' (see also 3.2.2.2.4). In cases like the White House, or of nicknames (bynames) such as den Hakkelaar in the Flemish combination Gillam den Hakkelaar 'Guillaume the Stutterer', the original definite description lost its appellative meaning by semantic bleaching, so that a gradual proprialization took place. In the case of the byname, a formal sign of this was the fact that the group stress changed from an accentuation on the first name to one on the epithet, which then became a genuine proper name: Gillam den hakkelaar became Gillam den Hakkelaar. This process too was gradual. As a native speaker of the Flemish dialect in question, I witnessed myself an uncertain situation in the transitional period of this name. Should we then argue, following Recanati, that den hlHakkelaar is sometimes part of the language, sometimes not? It appears that Recanati, like many other philosophers, makes too radical a distinction between name and appellative because he takes into account only prototypical names such as Socrates, John, Mary, or London, which are thought of as having originated by assigning a special proprial lemma to a particular person or place. But even here, the very first bestowal of the names is likely to have taken place in the same way as in the instances the White House or den Hakkelaar. Only in new applications of the lemmas - having become proprial - can we speak of an ad hoc 'baptismal act'. All this renders Recanati's thesis that "the conventions assigning bearers to proper names are not linguistic conventions" rather implausible. In his second thesis, Recanati seems to treat proper names as a kind of nonsense words that can hardly be part of the language. Therefore, he also contends that what I call the categorical (basic level) presupposition of names is not linguistic but merely psychological (see his chapter 10). However, as I will show in chapter 2, 3.l.l.4, the various subcategories of proper names are formally indicated. For instance, in English, river names take a fixed article (the Thames), personal names do not (John, Mary) , country names are suffixed (German-y), names of seas have a classifier (the North Sea). Again, assuming that competent language users should know this system of subcategorizing, they should at least know some proper names, namely as instances of these various subclasses of names.

The referential and semantic status ofproper names

45

I conclude that proper name competence is well established as part of the language system. Proper names are nouns with a form, i.e. the morphosyntax, and a meaning, i.e. basic level, connotative, emotive, and grammatical presuppositions. In addition, there is a morphosyntactic system of subcategorization. Further, culturally important names, 'proprial lemmas' as well as 'proper names' (with a specific denotation) often figure in ordinary dictionaries. 29 Even if information about name bearers is of an encyclopedic nature,30 it belongs to language, just as encyclopedic information in common nouns is hardly separable from so-called 'linguistic' meaning. The above considerations make it utterly implausible to assign an extralinguistic status to proper names and the conventions assigning bearers to them.

3.2.2.2.3. Kleiber's (1995; 2004) instructionalist version o/the X called Yview

Kleiber (1995; 1996: 573; 2004: 120-128) abandons his earlier X called Y view (1981) and adopts the thesis that proper names have no lexical, i.e. no declarative meaning. He thereby introduces a new hypothesis. Kleiber (1995; 1996; 2004: 131-134) interprets proper names as 'instructions' for the hearer. In fact, the formula X called Y comes back here as so-called instructional (procedural, computational) meaning, which is a different concept from 'lexical meaning' .31 This instructional sense is 'meaning' in the wider sense of 'condition of use'. Thus, the difference between proper nouns and common nouns is basically a difference of denomination (naming), i.e. proper names should be defined in terms of the (instructional) meaning X called Y, but not common nouns. For example, the naming sense of the name Marie-Rose attributed intrinsically to it, is that of an instruction to take into account the entity so called in long-term memory. At least, the instruction excludes all entities with a different name (Kleiber 1996: 574; 2004: 131-132). It could be objected that still another kind of meaning is invoked and even that it is rather a vague one, but it cannot be denied that the above naming instruction for proper names is much better than the definition in terms of a predicate of the type X called Y. Also, Kleiber's new theory (just as the previous one) gives an answer to the informativeness of Frege's well known identity statements, such as Hesperus is Phosphorus, where different names are used. In my view, however, it remains hard to tell how it will be possible in a given situation to retrieve a referent just by using the in-

46

Nominal and referential-semantic status ofproper names

struction that it is called Marie-Rose or whatever the name may be. Moreover, how will we differentiate between referents with identical names since, as far as I can see, the instruction will be the same. In other words, if two women are called Marie-Rose, it will still be necessary to retrieve the different causal chains of reference of the two persons who have been assigned the same proprial lemma in an ad hoc way. Moreover, as was seen above and will be elaborated on below, to retrieve the referent, it is imperative to know what kind of entity is involved, i.e. we need to know what category a referent belongs to, e.g., is Aristotle a man or a cat? In fact, Kleiber (1996: 582; 2004, section 4.4) does recognize that the name bearer (though not the name) tends to belong to a basic level category (see also 3.3.2). Further, Kleiber (2004: 134) admits that for common nouns we could formulate a similar instruction. For instance, in the case of an appellative like tree, it is possible to say that the hearer is invited to retrieve in long-term memory an x that has the properties of the concept called tree. Even if this is a valid observation, there is apparently still a difference with proper names: for appellatives the naming is indirect and hence rather unimportant, whilst it is direct in the case of proper names. It then appears that the difference in the directness of the naming instruction can be derived from the fact that common nouns are defined in terms of a description but that proper names are not; i.e. their possible meaning does not (or not any longer) determine the denotatum. It follows that a name triggers a direct naming instruction. Thus, the direct naming instruction is a corollary of the specific semantics of proper names. Therefore, we could argue that, although proper names trigger a naming instruction, this may not be essential for their definition.

3.2.2.2.4. Katz's (2001) formula x is a bearer of 'N' Katz (2001) is an attempt to avoid the drawbacks of the traditional X called Y thesis by substituting the formula in question by a slightly different one and by altering the meaning of the notion of meaning (sense). The author also distinguishes between 'proper names' and 'improper names'. Katz (2001: 138) rejects 'Fregean sense', which determines the reference of a word. In his new definition of sense, this is by no means the case. 32 For Katz (2001: 139) The sense of an expression is that aspect of its structure which is responsible for its sense properties and relations, that is, having a sense (meaningful-

The referential and semantic status ofproper names

47

ness), sameness of sense (synonymy), multiplicity of sense (ambiguity), repetition of sense (redundancy), opposition of sense (antonymy), and so on. In this way, proper names can be said to have a sense, though not a Fregean one, which is supposed to determine the reference. A sense that determines the reference would not be justified in the case of proper names since Mill's criticism of descriptivism would apply here (see above). Katz captures this new interpretation of the sense of a proper name in the analytic formula x is a bearer of 'N', in which the indefinite article a is essential to account for multiple bearerhood: there may be more bearers of 'N' . I would like to argue first that there is no need for adopting a new notion of sense. Whether the sense of an expression determines its reference goes together with the linguistic construction in which the expression occurs. I argued above that in (5) The emperor Napoleon was defeated at Waterloo the word Napoleon is used as a proper name, whereby the sense provided by presupposed associations does not determine the reference. By contrast, in (7) He is becoming a second Napoleon, in which Napoleon occurs as a common noun, the sense a second man like Napoleon does determine the reference (against Soames 2002). Kripke (1972: 8) and all 'pure' (neo-)Millians have a serious problem with referentially equivocal names, i.e. with the multiple bearerhood or multidenotativeness of most names. For instance, there are so many Johns and Marys, Smiths and Browns, i.e. people bearing the 'same name' (see also below). On linguistic and philosophical grounds, Katz (2001: 148156) rightly criticizes Kripke's attempts at minimizing the difficulty. He blames him for trying to reform natural language, for example by the use of subscripts, as in John) and John2. Katz's formula x is a bearer of 'N' allows for and even predicts the possibility that names have multiple bearers because of the indefinite article in a bearer (p. 153). However, as I argue at length in this book, the problems that Katz adduces for Millianism can be solved (among other things) by distinguishing between 'proper names' and 'proprial lemmas', which turns out to be linguistically justified. We can apply a propria1 lemma to multiple bearers, each time creating a new 'proper name'. In Katz's (2001: 139) view, 'Socrates' means the thing which is a bearer of 'Socrates '. If we are entitled to make this formula explicit as: Socrates is the only thing which is one of the bearers of the name 'Socrates', we appear to arrive at a contradictory statement. On the one hand, Socrates is seen as the only bearer, on the other there must be multiple bearers.

48

Nominal and referential-semantic status ofproper names

It is unclear how plural names such as the Pyrenees fit into the formula. Should we say *the Pyrenees are/is a bearer of 'N' or ??the Pyrenees are bearers of 'N'? The former is ungrammatical while the latter suggests there would be various Pyrenees, but this does not do justice to the collective sense of the plural in this name. Katz's (2001: 164) example Smiths are bearers of 'Smith' is different: Smiths is here the generic plural of the proprial lemma Smith used as a common noun with the meaning people with the name 'Smith '.33 The latter example shows that Katz's formula includes 'names' that I and most other theoreticians would not consider as proper names. The case can be made clearer with quantified 'names', e.g.,

(16)

a. All Smiths are bearers of 'Smith '. b. Every Smith is a bearer of 'Smith '.

The NPs all Smiths and every Smith (or the nouns Smiths and Smith) are perfectly describable with Katz's formula but cannot possibly be regarded as instances of proper names since they are quantified, hence appellativized. Therefore, Katz's formula is too broad and does not allow us to distinguish between genuine proper names and common nouns derived from a propriallemma. Thus, it turns out that Katz's formula defines nouns based on a propriallemma rather than genuine proper names. Note that even if all of the above objections are refuted, it cannot be denied that Katz's formula implies as much sophisticated metalinguistic knowledge as the traditional formula (see above). Furthermore, Katz's formula appears to lead to an infinite regress as well as the classical one. If the formula x is a bearer of 'N' is to be analyzed as x is a bearer of the name 'N' it remains unclear how to define the name 'N' (being also a proper name, viz. an autonym, see below) without ending up with a circular reasoning. Just like the traditional X called Y thesis, Katz's (2001) formula ignores the presuppositional meanings that proper names (may) exhibit: the possible associations that come in via the referent and even the presuppositional categorical meaning (which has been argued for by numerous philosophers). It is true that Katz could incorporate the categorical sense in his formula by replacing thing with the appropriate categorical meaning. For instance, the definition of 'Socrates' as the thing which is a bearer of 'Socrates' (p. 139) could be rendered as the man who is a bearer of 'Socrates '. However, this solution is precluded by his statement that thing is just a

The referential and semantic status ofproper names

49

dummy term (p. 159). This statement obtains at least for genuine proper names like Socrates. For so-called 'improper names' the element thing contains 'substantive properties' (p. 146, 156-162).34 Examples of improper names are: (17)

a. Jack the Ripper, Attila the Hun, Richard the Lion Hearted, Ivan

the Terrible, Dennis the Menace, Mandrake the Magician, ... b. Superman, Batman, Spiderman, Plastic Man, Wonder Woman, ...

In my view, in the above examples of (17a) we have to do with complex proper names consisting of [first name + byname], in (17b) we have only a byname. In the bynames the diachronic sense is still transparent so a synchronic connotation (association) via the name form is produced. We could say that the lemmas involved are not proprial here, but appellative, although we have to do with genuine proper names (see also chapter 3, on bynames: 2.1. Personal names). In addition, in (17b) the basic level meaning is expressed overtly as man/woman; compare hydronyms of the form the North Sea, the Atlantic Ocean, where the categorical senses sea and ocean are expressed as well (chapter 3, on place names). In instances such as Dennis the Elm Street Menace (p. 157) and Julius the Inventor of the Zip (p. 161) it seems to me that the expressions the Elm Street Menace and the Inventor of the Zip are full-fledged appellative appositions, i.e. not proper names. In real bynames the original sense is no longer relevant though still transparent and hence, connotative. 35 It is true that the boundary between the two patterns may not always be clear. Some of the expressions may be in a transitional stage. As was argued above, in certain Flemish-Dutch dialects the transition is marked by stress: if the stress falls on the first name, the second constituent is still an appellative apposition. If the stress is on the second element, this constitutes a proprial apposition; compare:

(18) (19)

Jeuik de secretaris 'Jacques the secretary' (appellative apposition) Suske de Verver 'Francis the Painter' (proprial apposition)

In the case of Gillam den H/hakkelaar 'William the stutterer' both stress patterns turn out to be possible; hence, the apposition is in a transitional stage (cf. chapter 3, on bynames). Evidence in favor of the claim that the bynames in (17) contain substantive semantic properties, Katz argues, lies in the fact that they translate into other languages. However, the picture is far from clear-cut here. Dutch would never translate Jack the Ripper or Dennis the Menace. By contrast,

50

Nominal and referential-semantic status ofproper names

there is a translation for names of widely known historical figures like Attila the Hun/ Attila de Hun, Richard the Lion Heartedl Richard Leeuwen hart, Ivan the Terrible/lvan de Verschrikkelijke. In fact, one translates the transparent lemma; compare place names of the form der Schwarzwald/ the Black Forest/ la Foret Noire/ het Zwarte Woud, and so on. Moreover, as I argue in chapter 3, considering a name like the Black Forest as nonproprial would destroy the continuum in the 'animacy hierarchy' of place names. Sometimes, parts of a name are translated in certain languages, not in others, compare: New York (English, French, Dutch ... ) vs. Nueva York (Spanish), Nowy York (Polish).36 Should we speak of partly improper names in the latter cases? To sum up, it seems unreasonable to base a theory of names on the rather capricious nature of translating practices. In my view, there are no 'improper names', but names with proprial and names with nonpropriallemmas (cf. chapter 3 for a typology). From all this, I conclude that Katz's formula x is a bearer of 'N' as well as his distinction between proper (pure?) and improper (impure?) names37 to account for possible senses of proper names is unnecessary and even inadequate. 38 To determine the reference, Katz (2001: 155) seems to keep to Kripke's conception of baptism. Neither Katz nor myself, however, endorse neo-Millianism in its strong description free version. As will have become clear, the theory advocated here allows for presuppositional senses in proper names. But Katz's arguments for senses are rather different from the ones presented in this book. He even argues that "Given compositionality, neo-Millians are committed to a theory of sense that says proper names have sense" (p. 165). Among other things, bearerless names like Santa Claus are adduced. If the name were senseless as well, it would contribute nothing to the compositional meaning of the sentence Santa Claus does not exist, although it does (p. 143). In my view, however, this case can be solved by assuming that the sentence is meaningful because it says that Santa Claus exists in our mental world but not in the real world. How to explain otherwise that He does not exist is also meaningful, supposing that, say, we point to a man in Santa Claus disguise? What sense does a personal pronoun have except for grammatical meaning?

3.2.2.3. Cognitive linguistic theories of proper names: Marmaridou (1989), Langacker (1991) and Jonasson (1994) Relatively recently, Cognitive Linguistics has made its appearance in name theory (see Maalej, to appear) with an approach to proper names which, in

The referential and semantic status ofproper names

51

my view, comes very close to the maximum meaningfulness theory that I discussed earlier. I will deal here with Marmaridou (1989), Langacker (1991) and Jonasson (1994).

3.2.2.3.1. Marmaridou (1989) Marmaridou (1989) considers proper names from a communicative angle and sees them as "a more efficient and economical means of communication" (than definite descriptions) (p. 371). The meaning of names is dealt with in terms of implicatures: "proper names have a meaning consisting of the set of propositions that they might implicate at anyone time" (p. 370). This standpoint seems to come close to the thesis that proper names have much meaning, the status of which is, however, not made clear.

3.2.2.3.2. Langacker's (1991) analysis o/nominals and proper names In the following paragraphs, the treatment of proper names in Langacker's (1991) cognitive linguistic framework will be evaluated. The main criticism will be that Langacker sets up his analysis of nouns and nominals essentially from the point of view of common nouns. This bias towards appellatives has as a consequence that his analysis of proper names (and personal pronouns) is inadequate and that, in the end, his entire analysis of nominals in terms of types and instances can be called into question. Langacker's view of proper names as occupying the lowest level in a type hierarchy is equally doubtful. It leads him into adopting a version of the maximum meaningfulness thesis. This goes together with a lack of concern for certain distinctions relevant to proper names.

3.2.2.3.2.1. Langacker's view o/proper names as nonprototypical nominals A consequence of the analysis of proper names which I set out in this chapter is that this nominal subclass is considered to represent the prototypical noun since its primary function is to refer to an object (or person).39 By contrast, common nouns are less prototypical nouns since they contain a predication, which is in the first place a verbal feature. That this applies

52

Nominal and referential-semantic status ofproper names

also to non-Indo-European languages is borne out by Van de Velde's (2003) statement that: In Bantu languages, this marked in-between status of common nouns is formal1y expressed by means of a noun prefix. Noun prefixes ... can be nmctional1y characterised as indications that a word refers via a concept. It follows natural1y that words with an individual1y referring fun:tion should have no prefix. (see also chapter 2, 5.2)

Further, the meanings that proper names have are of a presuppositional nature, which makes them easier to be processed. Finally, proper names display the unmarked nominal feature of definiteness and they are prototypically singular, countable, nongeneric, and concrete (see also chapter 2, 5.1).40 This view of the unmarkedness and prototypicality of proper names is incompatible with Langacker (1991: 53, 59), who considers the common noun to be the prototypical noun. The rationale behind this idea appears to be that: every nominal profiles a thing construed as an instance of some type and further incorporates some specification of quantity and grounding. Type, quantity, and grounding are often represented by separate words or phrases, and a language tends to develop specific, iconical1y motivated patterns of composition and constituency for expressions of this sort. Invariably, however, there are nominals that depart from these prototypical patterns while conforming to the schematic definition. It may be that multiple semantic functions are subsumed by a single word; for example, a proper noun like Iraq makes inherent specifications of type (nation), quantity (singular), and grounding (definiteness) and therefore stands alone as a ful1 nominal. (Langacker 1991: 54-55)

It seems plausible to argue that the maximum content of a nominal includes the categories type, instantiation, quantity, and grounding, and that if each category is expressed by one form we have an iconic (in fact merely an isomorphic) relation between form and meaning. In this way, proper names (and personal pronouns) appear as nonprototypical nominals, so Langacker (1991: 53) contends: "... though proper names are sometimes taken as paradigmatic for the class of nominal expressions, they are actually quite atypical." In my view, however, an analysis of what the categories type, instantiation, quantity, and grounding represent in proper names and personal pronouns reveals that these nominal classes display the least marked, i.e. the simplest instances of these categories. Let us look at each of them in greater detail.

The referential and semantic status ofproper names

53

As to proper names and type specification, Langacker (1991: 59, 148) expresses the view that proper names incorporate a type specification, e.g., the individual designated by Stan Smith is a male human. This is more or less equivalent to the thesis that proper names have a categorical meaning. It is important to recall here that this meaning must be narrowed down to 'basic level meaning', i.e. a kind of simple sense acquired early by children (see especially section 3.3.2). Note that personal pronouns even lack this categorical meaning. Regarding proper names and instantiation, Langacker (1991: 59) states: "Since the name [Stan Smith] is taken as characteristic of a specific person, it further presupposes instantiation ... ". A proper name "is a type with only one instance" (p. 63), which makes the author say a proper name is 'degenerate'. However, if "every nominal profiles a single instance of some type" (Langacker 1991: 81) then we could say that proper names, which are even said to refer uniquely, constitute the simplest example of a nominal, even if the name is a plurale tantum, like the Pyrenees. Here, the plural inflection merely "highlights the internal complexity of a unitary entity ... " (Langacker 1991: 77). A proper name "makes an implicit specification of quantity" (Langacker 1991: 59), i.e. the size of the profiled instance is presupposed to be always just one, even in the case of pluralia tantum such as the Pyrenees, as was argued above. In the case of a proper name, "grounding is subsumed as well, for the nominal is definite and portrays the profiled individual as being uniquely apparent to the speaker and hearer on the basis of this name alone" [i.e. Stan Smith] (Langacker 1991: 59). Langacker goes on to argue that hence, in the case of proper names (and probably personal pronouns as well), "type, instantiation, quantity, and grounding are conflated in a single expression whose component parts fail to correlate with these semantic functions" (p. 59, see also 148). However, we can look at proper names and Langacker's four nominal categories from a different angle. Since as to form and meaning, the proper name constitutes an unmarked category with regard to the common noun, it is the prototypical noun. Langacker himself states that in proper names, instantiation and quantity are presupposed or implicit. Definiteness is usually analyzed as a presupposition of existence and uniqueness in the universe of discourse and finally, the type specification is a basic level meaning. Psycho linguistically , presupposition (Osgood 1971) and basic level meaning (Rosch 1977) are considered simple, semantically unmarked concepts. If proper names unite all these very 'simple' concepts it can be ex-

54

Nominal and referential-semantic status ofproper names

pected that their form as a nominal will be simple as well. This situation of (truly) diagrammatic iconic motivation is exactly what we find: just a noun, mostly without the (definite) article. 41 Furthermore, on p. 58, Langacker states: "nominals such as this spoon, in which the type specification and the notion of instantiation are respectively indicated by the head noun and the accompanying grounding predication, can probably be regarded as prototypical", although instantiation and quantity are not expressed here. It is then interesting to see that the psycholinguists La Palme Reyes et al. (1993: 445) use the following formula for the definition of a name like Freddie (see further chapter 2, 3.1.6): (20)

(Freddie: dog)

=

(this: dog)

which is to be read as: "Freddie in the kind DOG" is "this in the kind DOG." In other words, a proper name consists of an expression uniting deixis and basic level meaning in one word. In this view, proper names are not far from Langacker's prototypical nominal this spoon. Langacker (1991: 18) proposes that a noun profiles a 'thing' in the most general sense. However, although a thing can be 'anything', prototypically a thing is a concrete, 'physical object'. Now it appears that proper names typically denote concrete things, so they may be termed typical nouns (or nominals). Moreover, on p. 308, Langacker comes close to my statement that proper names exhibit the unmarked nominal feature of definiteness and that they are prototypically singular, countable, nongeneric and concrete (see also chapter 2). After having stated that "a natural path is ... defined by the hierarchy definite > specific indefinite > non-specific indefinite", he goes on to say: ... a proper name (such as George LakofJ) represents a higher degree of definiteness than a nominal based on a common noun (e.g. the cunning linguist); because the relevant category has only a single member, the conception of t; [a particular instance, WVL] is more narrowly focused than in cases where it has to be located within a reference mass comprising an open-ended set of instances. (Langacker 1991: 308)

We can conclude that even in Langacker's own framework, proper names are far from being deviant or degenerate nominals. On the contrary, they can be described as prototypical.

The referential and semantic status ofproper names

55

3.2.2.3.2.2. Langacker's view of proper names as occupying the lowest level in a type hierarchy Langacker (1991: 61) regards proper names as occupying the lowest level in a type hierarchy. A serious problem in connection with this view was, again, pointed out in La Palme Reyes et al. (1993), though in a different context. Several hierarchies would then be needed for the same name, for instance, for 'Jane as a girl' and for 'Jane as an adult woman'. Furthermore, it is far from clear which categories should be included and which not. It is, for example, inconceivable that in the hierarchy of Jane a type like passenger would figure: Jane might have been a passenger at different occasions or even no passenger at all. In connection with his view of proper names as occupying the lowest level in a type hierarchy, Langacker (1991: 63) sees an analogy between names and generic NPs. In generic nominals, types are claimed to be themselves construed as instances. However, in his example sentence March and October are generally the two wettest months of the year, I argue that the month names March and October are construed not only as generics but at the same time as proper names. In my opinion, it will be difficult to account for this combination using only the notions of type and instance. More specifically, in what way should we combine fig. 2.3, a (for proper names) and fig. 2.3, b (for generics)? Langacker's conflating type and instance in proper names is somewhat reminiscent of Edmund Husserl's idea that extension and intension coincide in such words (cf. WiIlems 2000: 102). In neither case, however, is it clear to me how this collapsing is to be understood. More specifically, the proprial status of intension and type respectively then remains to be clarified. In my opinion, Husserl as well as Langacker fail to see that the intension, sense or type specification (in my view, the categorical meaning) has a presuppositional status in proper names while it has an asserted status in common nouns, at least in indefinite NPs in constructions such as There was a king. In the case of definite appellative NPs, as in The king was wise, the (lexical) sense is presupposed as well. However, in the latter case this is true only on the level of the construction while in proper names the categorical sense is presupposed on word level. Finally, if anything coincides in proper names, it seems to be the (mental) referent at usage level and the extension on the level of linguistic convention. Langacker's idea that proper names occupy the lowest level in a type hierarchy seems to suggest that proper names have the most elaborated meanings. However, the maximum meaningfulness thesis concerning

56

Nominal and referential-semantic status ofproper names

proper names has lost much of its appeal in recent decades (but see Hansack 2000: 254; 2004). As I argued in 3.2.2.1 (see also Kripke 1972), the above conventional knowledge, i.e. associations or connotations of proper names cannot constitute their (word) meaning and belong rather to subjective or intersubjective characteristics of the name's denotatum. From a psychological view, Bayer (1991) holds that these associations belong to the 'episodic memory', whereas the categorical meaning belongs to the 'semantic memory' (see also section 6.2). In other words, associations cannot be regarded as essential meanings. In general, Langacker tends to avoid such dichotomies as associative vs. non-associative meaning, asserted vs. presupposed meaning, lexical vs. grammatical meaning, and intension vs. extension (i.e. sense vs. reference, though replaced by type vs. instance). In my view, the traditional notions of intension and extension (reinterpreted cognitively) are necessary to distinguish proper names from common nouns. In proper names the extension determines the intension whereas in common nouns it is the other way round. Langacker (1991: 53) comes close to this point of view by saying: "For the most part nominals employ a different strategy [than proper names, WVL], based on type specifications, to accomplish their referential function." However, it is questionable whether this contrast can be achieved on the basis of the dichotomy type vs. instance since the type is necessarily prior to the instance. If one considers this, it does not seem right to say that a proper name "is a type with only one instance" (Langacker 1991: 63; 2004: 94). For example, the type city includes numerous cities such as London, New York, etc. Langacker's reply might be that "the semantic value of New York is not limited to its being a particular instance of city but also includes more precise specifications concerning relative size, geographical location, commercial importance, and so on" (Langacker 1991: 61 ).42 These specifications are considered an elaboration of the type with 'conventional knowledge' (see also 2004: 91 on the name George Bush). Langacker's treatment of personal pronouns is not very different from that of proper names: "A personal pronoun similarly profiles a single instance of a schematically specified type" (Langacker 1991: 148). In my view, personal pronouns have grammatical meaning, but lack the categorical sense we have found in proper names. Also, the two categories differ in that the denotation (extension) of proper names is established by picking out a particular denotatum at the level of linguistic convention, whereas pronouns can refer to any entity in the discourse provided the grammatical

The referential and semantic status ofproper names

57

constraints of number and gender are respected. In Langacker's framework it seems hard to make this distinction. 43 Finally, it is not clear how Langacker (1991: 59) sees the 'transition' from proper name to common noun. He takes for granted that his example Stan Smith can be construed as a proper name but apparently also as a common noun. However, it remains difficult to see in what way a proper name can turn into a common noun unless a distinction is made between 'proper name' and 'propriallemma'. Only the latter can adopt the function of proper name or possibly common noun depending on the construction. By way of conclusion, it seems plausible to say that Langacker's (1991) analysis of nominals is not compatible with a proper analysis of proper names and personal pronouns.

3.2.2.3.3. Jonasson (1994) It is one of the merits of Kerstin Jonasson to have brought to the fore the cognitive dimension of proper names in an extensive publication (Jonasson 1994). By allowing us to designate individuals, the knowledge of names helps us to structure the world and the reality that surrounds us (p. 18). The main cognitive function of names is to name, establish and maintain an individuality (p. 17). Names allow us to see an object as being the same through all of its different manifestations. Jonasson (1994: 19) proposes to dissociate the linguistic category of the proper name from its referential function and to define it in cognitive terms as a class of linguistic expressions associated in long-term memory with an individual, i.e. with some specific and not some general knowledge (as in the case of common nouns). If this means that referents are mental referents in the first place, I agree with this thesis (see also Langacker 2004: 88). In the same way as a number of other scholars, Jonasson recognizes that names are assigned to individuals as members of a conceptual category, i.e. these individuals have already been classified within a general nominal category. She seems to be referring here to the categorical presupposition discussed above. So the specific knowledge mentioned by Jonasson will have to be divided into two kinds, categorical knowledge (general notions like person, city, country) and associative, contingent knowledge ('Napoleon lost the battle of Waterloo'). Accordingly, long-term memory may have to be split into 'semantic' and 'episodic' memory (see below).

58

Nominal and referential-semantic status ofproper names

3.2.2.4.

The set theoretic cognitivist approach (Hansack 2000; 2004; Brendler 2005)

Hansack (1990; 2000; 2004) and Brendler (2005) advocate a kind of 'cognitivist' view of language and of names which is based on the natural sciences, set theory and logic. 44 In this subsection, I will focus on the use of set theory and the actual neglect of grammar and the consequences thereof for name theory. Apparently, linguistics is considered here an exact science that should borrow its basic concepts from other, usually called exact sciences. At the same time, both authors start from a cognitivized view of Saussure's linguistic sign. They claim that the linguistic sign is a form that indicates some meaning or other in the brain, but does not carry, transport or contain it, as Saussure would have it. Both proper and common nouns are linguistic signs in this sense. In order to define these signs as two different subcategories, set theory is adduced. The application of this logicomathematical theory to language is claimed to allow us to view both kinds of noun as words referring to classes of objects. The difference lies merely in the number of elements in the classes. In this way, a proper name is defined as a form which indicates a one-element class meaning in the brain. All other properties and functions of names are of secondary importance. When the name is 'received', the indicated meaning is projected as a concept into the hearer's conscience (Hansack 2000: 105, 216; Brendler 2005: 104). Thus, a name does not stand for an object but for an amount of information (German Informationsmenge) concerning an object (Hansack 2004: 56). The essential difference with common nouns, then, is that a common noun is a form which indicates a more-than-one-element class meaning in the brain whilst a proper name indicates a one-element class meaning in the brain (Hansack 2004: 56; Brendler 2005: 105). Proper and common nouns have in common that they refer to a class with a meaning. In this way, the adoption of linguistic signs devoid of meaning is avoided. Thereby, no 'kinds' of meaning are distinguished. No distinction is made between semantic features and knowledge. In the case of proper names, this view inevitably leads to the maximum meaningfulness thesis: the meaning of names appears to be (almost) infinite. This thesis squares well with a cognitivist approach (Hansack 2004: 54,60,254). In itself, the view of linguistics as an exact science is perfectly legitimate. One can call this approach 'empirical' (Hansack 2004: 53). By contrast, there are other views that are certainly as empirical, more in particular, a more inductive linguistic view of language which I am advocating here, and which is more strongly supported by semantic, grammatical, psy-

The referential and semantic status ofprop er names

59

cho- and neurolinguistic findings. It is by this more inductive approach that my criticisms of the above deductive framework are mainly inspired. At the same time, some truly 'cognitive' ideas we seem to have in common. After some general points, I will gradually concentrate on more specific issues. First, I agree with the authors' thesis that name theory should be part of linguistic theory, or their view that linguistics should be considered a social science (at least in a wide sense of the term 'social'). Further, we should no longer rely so excessively on traditional philosophical thinking. I also agree with the theses that all signs have meaning (cf. Saussure), that there is no direct connection between name and object and that no artificial distinction should be made between semantic features and conceptual knowledge. In fact, these views, which we share, are 'cognitive' in all senses. Second, Brendler (2005: 101) rejects previous name theoretical work if it was not based on set theory or natural sciences. However, it is far from obvious that the natural sciences should constitute the foundation of the social sciences, as the authors claim, or that linguistics should use set theoretic, mathematical or logical, i.e. quantitative concepts to such an extent that the facts of language tend to become secondary. Computer sciences are used as the model for the description. The basis of this strategy seems to be the idea that the human brain is a kind of computer. However, a number of biologists have argued against this idea on account of the biological origin of the brain (Edelman 1989). Edelman thereby supports the cognitive ideas of Ronald Langacker against Noam Chomsky's approach inspired by computer sciences. Anyway, it should first become clear which approach has to be preferred. Also, the extensive use of modem logic is not necessarily efficient since there exist numerous logical systems (see also below). Of course, this does not mean that linguistic analyses should or can be free of any logic. However, any old or new logical concept should be tested against the facts of language. Although the concepts of 'class' and 'individual' are old, they are well established in modem linguistics, even from a cognitive and an experiential view. Third, how far can one go with a set theoretic approach to language? Can it easily be applied outside the domain of the noun phrase [NP]? Even if we limit ourselves to NPs, it seems that the notion of set applies properly only to nouns that refer to countable things. What about entities that have mass reference (undivided reference), such as water or courage? Are there classes of water or courage with several elements? In general, mass nouns seem to pose a problem. This will be a greater problem for the analysis of

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'proper mass nouns' (or mass proper names). In the sentence Latin is a dead language, the name of the language appears to be a proper mass noun (see 4.1 and chapter 3). Is Latin here a one-element class name or something else? Finally, what to do about personal and other pronouns? Can they be analyzed in terms of classes or sets at all? Fourth, neither of the authors want to ignore the facts of language. They recognize a Wartlaut (linguistic form), but do not seem to test systematically their theoretical constructs against the background of linguistic semantic considerations or of morphosyntactic evidence, gathered on the basis of introspection or corpus data. Neither in Hansack (2004) nor in Brendler (2005) is there any grammatical evidence to be found for claims made about names. In my view, we can attempt to define names semantically, as I have done and then hope that this semantic structure will be universally valid. However, on account of the isomorphism between linguistic form and meaning, we should take into consideration that all 'universal' semantic analyses can be falsified by the morphosyntax of one or more languages. We can even argue that certain formal criteria are valid in a variety of languages because of their semantic basis. Fifth, the authors find the view that a proper name denotes an individual object and a common noun a class object obsolete (Brendler 2005: 105, 107). In terms of set theory, both kinds of noun denote classes, but in the class of appellatives, there is an almost infinite number of elements, while in the class of names, we have only one element. I fail to see why there would be an essential difference between the set theoretic and the 'ordinary' statement. Anyway, no formal or semantic linguistic evidence is adduced for the set theoretic approach. What is more, I fail to see why the 'ordinary' statement would contradict the thesis that 'categorization' (German Klassenbildung) is an essential process used by the human mind. As I argue above and especially in section 3.3.2 and 4.1, we can define a proper name as a noun which picks out a certain (mental) denotatum at the level of linguistic convention (langue) within a given basic level category of entities, whereby the possible meaning does not (or not any longer) determine the denotation, as in the case of common nouns. In prototypical cases, a proprial lemma is assigned in an ad hoc way to a denotatum. For instance, the lemma John is often assigned in an ad hoc way to a denotatum that belongs to the class of men. In this way, I still use the notion of categorization, but in a different way than Hansack and Brendler. Sixth, infinite though the 'meanings' of a name may be, they have only the status of presuppositions in this case. At the same time, basic level meaning and associations certainly help to retrieve the referent of a name

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in a given context. For instance, in order to talk about Bill Clinton in an interesting way, it is good to know that he is a man and was president of the United States in the nineties. Thereby, it is useful to distinguish between asserted and presupposed meaning since names can only have the latter, whereas appellatives can have both. Since names are claimed to have a class meaning and since no distinction is made between asserted and presupposed meaning, Hansack (2000; 2004: 54-56) and Brendler (2005) naturally adhere to the maximum meaningfulness thesis, which says that of all word classes, names have the most meaning. A few objections can be raised here. The referential objection If the denotation of proper names consists of an Informationsmenge, i.e. a number of lexical meanings, it does not become clear which information is relevant to determine a name's referent, also because the information about an entity (e.g., a person) changes over time. Hence, there is no clear-cut criterion of identity. If a name's reference is to be the information containing it, i.e. its 'meaning', then it will be clear that a name cannot be defined. Common nouns can, at least in terms of prototypes. For names it would be hard to find the prototype. By contrast, what I have called the basic level presupposition can be established, but would not constitute a sufficient definition, if we thought that a definition could be given at all, but this is not the case. In my view, the reference is not part of the meaning and it is the reference that is primary in names (against Hansack 2004: 57). At the same time, even Hansack (2004: 64) distinguishes between denotation and connotation, although the former is considered part of the latter since 'meaning' is interpreted as 'information' (p. 60). This wide interpretation apparently leads to questioning the usefulness of the notions of reference and meaning, which I find crucial in defining names, appellatives and pronouns. The semantic objection Authors such as Kripke (1972) and Donnellan (1972) argued in favor of the meaninglessness theory of names (see 3.2.1.6). I agree with them insofar as asserted lexical meaning is concerned. Furthermore, a number of linguists have observed that, synchronically, a name cannot be 'understood', i.e. that it has no (asserted lexical) meaning. But Brendler (2005: 108-109) rejects such claims made by Boesch (1957: 32) and Debus (1980: 194), both concerning German, or Ullmann (1962; 1969) and Nicolaisen (1995: 391), both concerning English, regarding the 'understandabil-

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ity' of names and appellatives. UlImann (1969: 33) argues: "One cannot possibly say that one understands a proper name; one can only say that one knows whom it refers to, whose name it is." It does not make sense to ask: What is the meaning of London? or: What do you understand by London? We can only understand the etymological (historical, often appellative) meaning of names. In my view, this is a perfectly reasonable claim, based on observation. The claim says that either names have no meaning or that their meaning is of a presuppositional nature, but that anyway, asserted meanings as in the case of appellatives, are lacking in names. It is true that in the case of names, the meaning is part of the Informationsmenge as well, but in a different way than in the case of appellatives, for example, as associations pertaining to the referent (e.g., Napoleon is the one who lost at Waterloo) or to the name form (e.g., John Major may remind us of the word major). But as words, i.e. as lexical items, Napoleon and Major are meaningless and hence, cannot be 'understood'. The distinction that the authors make between 'meaning' and 'concept' does not invalidate this conclusion since also in their interpretation, the 'meaning' is somehow related to the word (Brendler 2005: 104-105, 109).45 In my view, much seems to depend on the way in which the Informationsmenge is organized in a given construction, which may be a reflection of how it is organized in the head. The syntactic objection Likewise, syntactic evidence shows that the meaning of names is either nonexistent or secondary vis-a-vis their denotation. As I argued already above, in close appositional structures of types such as the poet Burns, Fido the dog, the River Thames, the City of London, the proper name provides the denotation, while the common noun characterizes the denotatum, for instance, Burns is a poet (and not The poet is a Burns). In addition, in certain constructions, proper names behave like pronouns, since both word classes lack any lexical meaning. I refer the reader to chapter 2, especially 3.l.4; 3.l.6). The psycholinguistic objection Psycholinguists have been arguing that names are to be considered simple referring words without an (asserted) lexical meaning (Coates 2006: 372). Indeed, proper names are acquired early by children (Lyons 1977: 225229; La Palme Reyes et al. 1993: 447). See also section 6.

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The neurolinguistic objection Last but not least, Semenza and Zettin (1988), and Bayer (1991) adduce neurolinguistic evidence for the thesis that proper names are devoid of lexical meaning (see Van Langendonck 1999; also below, section 6). At most, they display a categorical meaning and some associative senses in the form of presuppositions. From a psychological view, Bayer (1991) argues that these associations belong to the 'episodic memory', whereas the categorical meaning belongs to the 'semantic memory' (see also section 6.2). Associations should not be regarded as essential meanings. The categorical meaning is essential but stilI presupposed. Another problem for the analysis put forward by Hansack (2000) and Brendler (2005) is constituted by monoreferential (or monosemantic) expressions. Monoreferential NPs like the moon, the sun, the universe, or Parliament, science, and nature are expressions that seem to denote unique things (see section 5). The term 'monoreferential' is used since there is only one moon, sun, or universe that we normally speak of. With Parliament, the national parliament is meant, with science and nature, one means science and nature in general. That is why these NPs are sometimes called proper names. I would, however, like to argue that they are appellatives since we can speak of several moons, suns, worlds, universes, or parliaments, or of a lot of nature or science, as if we were dealing with appellatives. Moreover, the meaning of a noun like moon in the monoreferential NP the moon is entirely preserved in the appellative expressions a moon, two moons, or several moons, viz. 'satellite of a planet'. Also, and more importantly, the entities in question are not individual members of a basic level category. Hansack (2000: 241; 2004: 62-63) argues that the moon and the sun are proper names if they indicate the well known, visible celestial bodies. If we speak about other suns and moons, we have to do with appellatives. However, following Lyons (1999: 22), one might argue that proper names seem to denote singleton sets by definition, whereas in the case of the appellative the sun, the singleton is accidental and hence, no proper name is involved. Further, Hansack (2004) gives no grammatical evidence for his distinction. In my view, the case of the sun and the moon is different from that of the names of brands, languages, and the like (see below). What is more, it is not clear how the authors will deal with the English uncountable monoreferentials of the type science and art. Apparently, we are in need of a more refined linguistic analysis. Further, the treatment of the names of families (the Johnsons) or peoples (the Germans) is notoriously difficult (cf. chapter 3,2.1; see recently Harvalik 2005). In Hansack's (2004, 3.4) view, the question whether they

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are names or appellatives depends on the kind of logic that one uses. In the older logic, they are appellatives since every member of the people or family is considered an individual. By contrast, in more recent logical systems, they are claimed to be names, since here the notion of 'collectivity' can be invoked and thus, a group reading (regarded as a kind of semantic singularity) can be seen in peoples' names, and the like (Hansack 2004: 59). It seems to me that it is rather unfortunate to have to depend on the contingencies of the evolution of a different science in order to define one's own categories. In linguistic semantics, peoples and families have long been regarded as collectivities. However, does that mean they should be seen as proper names? In such instances, a collective reading is a necessary condition for 'properhood', but by no means a sufficient one. In fact, a collective interpretation can be assigned to at least two kinds of expressions. For example, the expression the Russians may refer to the people, but it may also denote an accidental, limited group of Russians. In both cases we have to do with collective NPs. In my framework, only the 'people' interpretation has to be regarded as a name. First, an appositional structure can be formed on the basis of the basic level sense 'people', as in the sentence The peoples Russians, Ukrainians, and Poles are of Slavic origin. Such appositional formations, in which the second units constitute proper names, are excluded with collective (or possibly individual) expressions such as in the sentence The Russians crossed the border, which do not denote the people as such, but contrast with indefinite NPs as in Some Russians crossed the border. Names of months have two readings. One denotes a unique time-span, as in the sentence June was hot. The second, recursive reading, involving cyclicity, is to be found in June is often a hot month (see chapter 2,3.2.4). The question arises whether June is about a one-element class or a morethan-one-element class in the second reading. In my view, one must not analyze the phenomenon of recursiveness in terms of more-than-oneelement classes. The latter solution applies only to a construction of the awkward type ?Many Junes are hot months. In the latter, a predication is included, since quantification is involved, as in appellative patterns of the type many months. In the cyclicity example, this is not the case. In fact, temporal recursiveness is a component of spatiotemporal recursiveness, which appears to be identical with what is commonly called 'genericness'. The latter is found especially with common nouns, as in Beavers build dams, but also with pronouns, as in: We have always been a people of explorers. The pronoun we refers here not only to ourselves, but also to our ancestors. Since pronouns can be 'generic', but are never supposed to con-

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tain a predication, genericness (or recursiveness) cannot be defined in terms of predications or even of c1asses. 46 This is why recursiveness is compatible with all kinds of noun, also with proper names. Although it is marginal in names, recursiveness is sometimes found in personal names (see chapter 2,3.2.4). Furthermore, in German literature, the notion of Gattungseigenname (appellative proper name) is found (see 1.2). Mostly, names of brands, languages, and the like are included in this category. Examples are: (a) Kalkatungu is an exotic language; (b) I'll never learn any Kalkatungu. In my view, we can account for this ambiguous behavior by treating names of languages, brands, and the like as proprio-appellative lemmas that in constructions like (a) behave as proper names, but in patterns of type (b) as common nouns. If the concept of lemma is not recognized, one seems to be forced to speak here of the rather awkward hybrid grammatical category 'appellative proper name'. Hansack (2000: 242; 2004: 63) seems to move in the direction taken here, where he argues that names of brands in the 'abstract' sense have proprial status, but that once the 'concrete' product is meant, we have to do with an appellative. Unfortunately, the distinction is not made on a clear linguistic, i.e. a grammatical basis, as I do for the above example containing a language name. This omission and the lack of the notion of lemma make his distinction unclear. Finally, one may wonder how prototypical names such as Mary or London will be linked to their appellative counterparts in constructions of the type another Mary, or a new London, if one cannot have recourse to the concept of proprial lemma. It is true that Hansack (2004: 62) adduces an example of an appellativization (Mekka der sprachanalytischen Philosophie 'Mecca of language analytical philosophy'). However, it does not become clear in what way this use of the lemma Mecca is to be linked to its ordinary propriaI use. My general conclusion is that the cognitivist approach based on set theory and the natural sciences will need more argumentation and refinement to become acceptable as a full-fledged name theory.

3.2.2.5.

The pragmatic view: eoates (2000; 2006)

Coates (2000; 2005a; 2005b; 2005c; 2006) advocates what he calls a 'pragmatic' view of proper names. Coates (2006: 368) distinguishes "two modes of referring, one SEMANTIC, where the entailments accruing from the words

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used in particular structures are preserved intact, and one ONYMIC, where they are not." The contrast is further elaborated as follows: Examining potentially ambiguous phrases of the type the old vicarage, it is suggested that PROPER is best understood as a mode of reference contrasting with SEMANTIC reference, i.e. the difference is pragmatic; in the former, the intension of lexical items within the referring expression, and any entailments they give rise to, are cancelled. PROPER NAMES are all those expressions which refer in this way. (Coates 2005b: 2) Thus, the two readings of the old vicarage are disambiguated as follows (Coates 2006: 368): live at the old vicarage' entails 'I live at the house that was formerly the house of an Anglican priest'.

SEMANTIC: 'I

'I live at The Old Vicarage' entails only 'I live at althe place called The Old Vicarage'.

ONYMIC:

In other words, for Coates, proper names are meaningless NP expressions that refer at discourse level (see also Coates' 2000: 1164 definition of names, and recently Coates 2006). Coates does not seem to recognize a linguistic convention level of denotation (extension), at least not for proper names, since properhood is defined at the (pragmatic) level of discourse, i.e. of language use. At first sight, he has good reasons for arguing in this way: "For a linguist, the everyday fact that the same name may apply to more than one individual must deal a fatal blow to the notion that to be proper is ESSENTIALLY to denote uniquely" (2006: 360). A consequence of this view is that proper names cannot belong to a word class since they may be phrases, sometimes words by accident. In this way, "the notion PROPER NOUN becomes epiphenomenal (though not unimportant) and characterizable in principle but not, broadly speaking, empirically" (2006: 357). Coates (2006: 369) elaborates on this thesis: The category of proper nouns is epiphenomenal upon the basic category of PROPER NAME-EXPRESSIONS, which, as 1 have suggested, is a category of definite expressions without delimitable membership, defined by their referential properties: non-delimitable because any referring expression may in principle be so used, even though with variable plausibility in the context of use. In other words: "properhood is best understood as a pragmatic rather than a grammatical or structural notion" (2005b: 3; see also 2006: 369). However,

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this does not prevent the author from speaking about "the proper nouns which are the prototypical proper names" (2005b: 27; see also 2006: 371). The following criticisms can be leveled against Coates' approach of proper names. First of all, it remains to be defined what 'onymic reference' means, i.e. what 'proper name reference' means. Coates is aware of this problem but relegates it to other sciences such as psychology and neurology (2006: 370). Anyway, one may wonder about the necessity of having two quite different modes of referring, a semantic and an onymic one. Furthermore, how are personal and demonstrative pronouns to be differentiated from proper names in Coates' definition? Is it 'semantic' or 'onymic' reference that applies to the word this, or do we have to set up a third kind of reference, i.e. pronominal reference? If "This is a name for any unique thing, which the cotext and context disambiguate" (2006: 362), what then is the essential difference between semantic (or pronominal) reference and onymic reference? The psychologists La Palme--Reyes et al. define Fido as "this: dog", i.e. with the basic level sense 'dog'. This sense, as all others, disappears from Coates' account of proper names. So, what is left is the element this. But what is the lexical meaning of this? Can one say: "What do you understand by this?" The answer is no. Thus, it is not clear how to differentiate names from definite pronouns. Moreover, Coates does not come back to unique reference in proper names in his argumentation. But if it is "reference" in a given context (at usage level) it is always unique reference, as in the case of pronouns. So, in this way, proper names seem to become logically proper names, just like demonstratives and personal pronouns. Pronouns and proper names seem to coincide. In my view, proper names are words just as others (likewise Anderson 2003: 360). Deviating from the general notion of word class puts the burden of proof on the one who deviates. In the expression the Old Vicarage, Old- Vicarage is the noun; the article the classifies. In the proper noun, no element can be inserted between Old and Vicarage. In the common noun phrase, it is possible, e.g., the old but beautiful vicarage. Furthermore, that the name is a noun is proved by the fact that onymic (proprial) expressions such as Old- Vicarage can be turned into a common noun, as in: This is a second Old-Vicarage, unless we have to conclude that 'common nouns' (appellatives) do not constitute a word class either, i.e. that there exist no nouns at all in language. In fact, there is no doubt that most names consist of a noun. This fact alone renders Coates' (2006: 378) final statement rather dubious: "Proper nouns simply represent the dark nucleus of the set of such expressions". In my view, expressions like the Old Vicarage are

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not the most typical instances of proper names, but the nouns John, Sarah, London, and England are. For me, the latter do not constitute "simply the limiting case of proper expressions" (2006: 369). The author does not go into appellative uses of what I call proprial lemmas, e.g., another John, a second Napoleon. He may agree that these appellative expressions have no onymic reference (if used in the proper context). However, the question how these noun phrases have to be linked to the proper name included in them appears to be of no importance to his pragmatic approach (but see Coates 2006: fn. 26). They still seem to have some onymic function. In fact, even 'proper verbs' seem to be possible, as in the French sentence from a song by the Belgian chansonnier Jacques BreI: C 'hail le temps ou Bruxelles bruxellait, i.e. Brussels was being essentially itself (Coates 2005c: 11). I could say here that the 'lemma' Bruxelles unites an ordinary proprial use and a very special verbal use in BreI's sentence. Coates does not consider any distinction between 'proper name' and 'proprial lemma', although these concepts provide a solution to the problem of so-called homonymy between John" John2' and so forth. A proprial lemma like John may give rise to different denotata yielding different 'proper names' at the level of established linguistic convention. It also appears that a lemma like John is mostly used for a male human, i.e. that there is a prototypical kind of denotatum, as in: John is a man. By contrast, the proprial lemma John might denote a dog as well. In this case, we have to do not only with a different proper name, but also with a different basic level meaning. In the case of sentences like He went to the John we have even a different, i.e. an appellative lemma, since the connection between the propria I lemma John and the appellative lemmajohn (for 'toilet') has become etymological. Finally, using the distinction between proper name and propria I lemma allows us to safeguard the strong intuition that proper names not only refer uniquely (at the level of discourse), but also denote uniquely on the level of linguistic convention. An indication that names denote uniquely is also to be found in child language acquisition. Halliday (1975: 20) observes that his son NigeJ uses kin terms such as Mummy and Daddy as proper names, which means that these words denote uniquely his own parents. As will have become clear, Coates disregards the concept of basic level meaning: "Names identify individuals without specifying any of their characteristics" (2005b: 13). On this view "PROPER = SENSELESS" (2006: 365). However, every proper name goes together with a categorical presupposition (advocated by so many philosophers and some psychologists), i.e. a

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basic level meaning (see especially below). The distinction between proper name and propriaI lemma allows us to make sense of this simple presupposition. In Coates' framework, there seems to be hardly any difference between proper names and nonsense words (or expressions); or is the notion of proper name to be equated with 'propriallemma'? Coates' radical denial of sense for proper names does not square well with his emphasis on a pragmatic view. In his framework, it is not clear how to deal with associations via the name's referent (Napoleon is the man who lost at Waterloo) or the often functional connotations that come in via the name form, as in nicknames (e.g., the Fox), Old Germanic anthroponyms such as Bern-hard 'strong as a bear', Amerindian and African names (see Coates' Yoruba example Babatunde 'father has come back', OduY9ye 1972), and so on. Coates' senseless referring goes against Saussure's thesis that all linguistic elements have both form and sense, a thesis that a pragmatist may want to defend as well: language is for communication, and communication is about sense. Again, the burden of proof seems to be for those who deny any sense to a given linguistic expression. It is true that Coates makes a concession in (2006: fn. 16), where he admits that names are not 'meaningless'. "Some of these 'meanings' would best be called associations." In this way, the question boils down to the nature of the relationship between 'sense' and 'meaning'. In my view, there is no need to posit several radically different kinds of semantic categories. All depends on the function of the meanings, which is related to the constructions they appear in. For the proper name construction I hold that in proper names the meaning does not determine the reference, but that in common nouns it is the other way round (see 3.2.2.2.4, 4.1.3.2). It is not clear how Coates will deal with more marginal names, such as names of languages, brands, years, months, or autonyms. In my view, they can be used as proper names or as common nouns depending on the construction (see also below). For instance, we have proper names in: (21)

a. b. c. d. e.

Latin is a dead language. Ford is a good brand. 2001 was a hard year. June was a hot month. The word 'bank' is ambiguous.

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The same words are construed as appellatives in: (22)

a. b. c. d. e.

I learnt a lot of Latin. She bought a Ford. A second 2001 would be disastrous. I don't want another such June. This is a different word 'bank', you know.

However, it is hard to see any difference in lexical meaning between the words Latin, Ford, 2001, June, and 'bank' as used in the sentences of(21) and as used in those of (22). It is even hard to come up with lexical senses for these words at all. If they have no lexical sense, Coates may be forced to argue that in both (21) and (22) we have proper names; an undesirable outcome in the case of (22), where the words in question form indefinite NPs. Anyway, it seems hard to distinguish (21) and (22) on the basis of the contrast between non-sense and (lexical) sense, or between onymic and semantic reference. Therefore, in Coates' account the distinction between sense and non-sense and between the two modes of reference appears to be blurred here. Although Coates (2000: 1172) mentions some good formal 'indications' for properhood, these do not seem to be to the point. Apparently as a consequence of his purely pragmatic approach, Coates (2006) ignores grammatical clues to properhood (though see 2006: fn. 22; compare chapter 2 in this book) and to proper name subclasses (see chapter 3). For most linguists, meaning (or even the lack of it) still goes hand in hand with grammatical features. Proper names can be defined morphosyntactically. For instance, the close apposition structures of the form the poet Burns, or the language Kalkatungu are crucial in defining names (see especially chapter 2, 3.1.1.2) and are even closely connected to the basic level sense of proper names: Burns is a poet, Kalkatungu is a language. Think also of the different use of articles in proper names and in common nouns (see chapter 3, 2.8). In many non-Indo-European languages, the importance of form is even clearer. For instance, in the Bantu language Eton, proper names constitute noun class 1a (or are classless nouns according to Van de Velde 2003; manuscript). The internal structure of the names got frozen (compare the African examples above), although it may remain transparent. Maybe Coates' rejection of names as a 'structural category' (Coates 2000: 1166) is a misunderstanding. Whilst I can agree with his thesis that names are not a delimitable category of expressions, this should not mean

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that properhood cannot be defined on structural grounds, as I just demonstrated. Even the word London is not always construed as a proper name (cf. a new London; see also Coates' own example another Margaret Thatcher, Coates 2000: 1167). In the remainder of this book, I hope to make clear that in principle properhood can be distinguished from 'appellativehood' as well as from 'pronounhood' on the basis of a unified pragmatic-semantic-syntactic theory. This does not mean that in every and any case the decision will be obvious.

3.3. Presuppositional meanings that proper names have or can have 3.3.1. The thesis o/the categorical presupposition in proper names

As was pointed out above, it would not make sense to point to the Nile and to say This is the Nile, if the hearer were not acquainted with the notion of river. Adopting this idea does not seem to commit one to any of the major theses on proper names. The idea is compatible with Searle's cluster theory and even with Kripke's indexical theory since Kripke (1972: 352) himself does not take a position on the issue. Finally, since it is about a presupposition, the thesis on categoricalness does not conflict with the rather general view that proper names do not contain (asserted) lexical meaning. None of the authors who discuss categorical presuppositions, distinguish between proper names-in-function and propriaI lemmas. Sometimes, however, it is clear that proprial lemmas are meant. This is the case with Kalverkamper (1978: 89). He contends that a particular feature of what he calls 'proper names' is that they display so-called sortal restrictions or proprial presuppositions; for instance, Bernard is a forename for men, Vanessa for women, Smith is a family name, Fido a dog's name. Lotscher (1995: 452) argues it would be preferable to relegate this kind of content to the associations (connotations) of the name since Jenny can be assigned to a boat as well, John to a dog (p. 453). It is clear that Kalverkamper's reasoning applies only to what I have called propriallemmas and not to proper names in their unique function. Indeed, in the way Kalverkamper presents his ideas, the presuppositions in question are not fixed semantic features of proper names, but potential features of propriallemmas. However, to make more sense of the notion of what is called here 'categorical presupposition', we should assign it to proper names in their unique extensional function, so we can hold, for instance, that Bill Clinton, president of the USA

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in 1998, is known to be a man and obviously not a dog or a cat. This would mean that the categorical presupposition is to be situated on the level of established linguistic convention. My position here will be that proper names have an inherent categorical presupposition without which the use of a proper name is inconceivable. Whenever a proper name is assigned to a referent, this referent belongs to a specific (sub )class of entities. Hence, we have names of male and female persons, countries, cities, rivers, ships, and so forth.47 The idea that it is impossible to conceive of a proper name or to use it without knowing the category to which it belongs has been less popular among linguists and onomasticians. Nonetheless, it was discussed by, among others, Van Langendonck (1968; 1987; 1997a; 1999; 2000), Blanar (1981: 211), Buyssens (1973: 26, 28),48 Jonasson (1994), Kleiber (1995; 1996: 570, 582; 2004, section 4.4), and Willems (1996: 152, speaking of a conceptual condition). In a posthumously published article, Kurylowicz (1980: 6), changing his mind in comparison with 1956, elaborates on this and contends that "there is at least one semantic element inherent in the personal name ... : person, sometimes also a definite sex", e.g., compare John with Joan. Kurylowicz (1980: 6) argues that "the semantic content of the personal name doesn't much exceed that to be attributed to purely deictic elements like ego, tu (referring to persons), Arabic 'anta ('thou') masc., 'anti ('thou') fern. with difference of sex." He goes on (p. 7): "Generally speaking the deictic subsystem of proper nouns differs from the deictic elements like this/that owing to the fact that it presupposes certain significations like person, animal, mountain, building", and further: Within this hybrid category the dominating gene is constituted by a semantic element (person, animal, mountain, building) determining and delimiting the range of the deictic element. To name a thing is to indicate it within a given semantic class.

Apparently, Kurylowicz is talking here of proper name categories, not of propriallemmas. Philosophers have been more aware of categorical meaning in proper names, for instance Geach (1957, section 16) and even Kripke (1972, comments, p. 351, fn. 58). Strawson (1959: 168, 198) speaks of 'sortal universals' and of 'a presupposition of empirical fact'. In order to make sense of the sentence Peter is wise the entity Peter should have been 'sorted' already as a human being (Strawson 1959: 168). Searle (1958; 1969: 167) holds that statements like de Gaulle is a person and Everest is a mountain are analytical. Searle claims this categorical knowledge to be

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necessary for all uses of a name in order to preserve the referent's identity, hence not only to introduce the name, as was put forward by Devitt and Sterelny (1987: 64-65). De Pater and Swiggers (2000: 328) rightly note that even if one wishes to reject Searle's cluster theory, his point about categorical knowledge remains valid. Referring to the (ever returning) example of Aristotle, Donnellan (1972: 367) speaks of general descriptive conditions necessary for the proper use of a name: If anyone wants to maintain that our use of the name is such that being a human being or not living in modem times, etc. are necessary for being the referent of the name, I have no objection here to offer against a 'backing of descriptions' in that weaker sense. Such an attenuated backing would not uniquely identify the referent.

Moreover, the idea of 'categorical presupposition' is implicit in this philosopher's argument against the theory of identifying descriptions. Donnellan (1972: 364) wonders whether there is "really a requirement that the user of a name be able to identify by description (or even by pointing) what the name refers to." However, in his example, there seems to be at least one piece of description, since it reads: "Tom is a nice man." So we might conclude that the name Tom at least presupposes the class meaning 'man' and that this is a rather essential feature of the name's semantic structure. Indeed, Donnellan's example would collapse if Tom turned out to be a dog, since the communication would then have failed. Further evidence that the subclass meaning in proper names is essential is provided by Ziffs example about the River Nile, as quoted above. In the same vein Carruthers (1983: 20) observes that, if one wants to understand a sentence like Birmingham is old properly, one needs to know that it is about a city. Bell (1979: 63) tells us the story of someone announcing the hurricane Carla with the words Carla is coming tonight. His wife's reaction was misguided though to be expected: she put another plate on the table (see also De Pater and Swiggers 2000: 288). A typically modem example is provided by a name such as Mir. The utterance I was never in the neighborhood of Mir would make little sense to the hearer if he did not know Mir was a space station. Kleiber (1996: 570) criticizes the idea of the categorical meaning, claiming that it has only a contingent semantic status. To have a real semantic status it would have to obey strict conditions of use. In Kleiber's view this essential condition is lacking. Logically, it should not be possible that any name can be given to any individual whatsoever. A name like Marie-Rose might be a name of a person, a periodical, or a shampoo

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against lice. This is an objection that holds only if no distinction is made between proper name and proprial lemma. In my terminology, the proprial lemma Marie-Rose can be assigned to different entities, but each time we have to do with a different proper name assigned in an ad hoc way to a different entity. In this way, the categorical meaning is an essential feature of each proper name. In addition, it is important to realize that this categorical meaning of proper names is of a presuppositional nature, as has been suggested above. Referring to Van Langendonck (1999), Kleiber (2004: 138) recognizes this last point, but he still thinks Van Langendonck's interpretation of categorical meaning attributes too strong a sense to proper names and leaves the question to further research. This presupposed categorical meaning can also occur in common nouns as far as they are construed as definite NPs: it is commonly held that (prototypical) definite NPs presuppose the existence and uniqueness of their referents in the universe of discourse together with the characterization of these referents. Indefinite NPs normally lack these presuppositions. Let us analyze the following sentences, using the negation test to determine what is asserted and what is presupposed: (23)

a. It is not the case that the baker came yesterday. b. It is not the case that this man is a baker. c. It is not the case that there is a baker here.

In sentence (23a), we are presupposing that there is some entity which is a person and that this person makes bread. So, besides the categorical presupposition 'person', the definite appellative NP the baker also contains the presupposition 'bread-maker'. In (23b), it is only the presupposition 'person' (and 'man') that is preserved. In (23c), none of the above presuppositions seem to be preserved since there is no definite NP here to carry them. This means that in appellatives, presupposition and assertion alternate depending on whether they are construed as definite or as indefinite NPs. By contrast, since proper names are definite by definition (see chapter 2, 3.2.1.1) they contain an inherent categorical presupposition. In this connection, the observation in Lenneberg (1971: 536) that animals can learn to know the referent of a proper name, but not the referents of appellative NPs appears to be mistaken: The hound who has learned to 'point to the tree, the gate, the house' in the trainer's yard will perfonn quite erratically when given the same command

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with respect to similar but physically different objects, in an unfamiliar emironment. Lenneberg is apparently unaware of the fact that in order to be able to speak of a proper name some categorical presupposition is indispensable. Hence, in the spirit of Lenneberg's hypothesis that animals are not endowed with the ability of understanding concepts or categories they cannot be claimed to 'know' the referent of a 'proper name'. Obviously, they can merely recognize some unique concrete entity. In this process, linguistic categories like proper and common nouns do not play any role. Finally, there seems to be a difference between common and proper nouns in that for proper nouns a categorical presupposition is essential while for common nouns it is not (but see Kleiber 1996: 582). For a proper name it is necessary to have it in order to retrieve the referent. Common nouns normally have an elaborate lexical meaning so a categorical sense can be dispensed with. For instance, it would be hard to determine the categorical sense of appellatives like wall, stone, science, or nature. The importance of categorical presuppositions in proper names, i.e. of proper name subclasses, is borne out by formal characteristics. Although I will come back to the formal properties of proper names in the next chapter, it is in order here to list some formal features that support the thesis of the categorical meaning. As a rule, proper names can appear in so-called close apposition structures, e.g., the Brothers Karamazov, the City of London, the River Thames. At least for these instances, we can make the following generalization. The element that has no article is a word in proper name function. The one with the article is a kind of classifier that indicates the categorical meaning of the name. Sometimes, this classifier also appears as part of the name, as in: the Atlantic Ocean, the North Sea, Mount Everest, Dutch de Schelderivier (also appositional: de rivier de Schelde 'the River Scheldt', see chapter 2, 3.1.1.4, and Van Langendonck 1998). Furthermore, these subclasses are often marked by morphological means such as affixes or other function words. Thus, the country name Germany is characterized by the suffix -y, while river names are preceded by an article, as in the Thames. If we now return to Kripke's statement that "no one other than Nixon might have been Nixon" (p. 270), but Nixon might not have been the president, we may wonder whether we could hold that, for instance, Nixon might not have been a man. Although the word man pertains to the categorical presuppositional meaning of Nixon, Kripke would probably argue that man is not an essential or necessary feature of the name Nixon. How-

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ever, since this categorical meaning is a presupposition, things cannot be viewed in terms of necessity, at least if Horn's statement is to the point: presuppositions are restrictions on the common ground, rather than conditions on truth and falsity; their failure or non-satisfaction results not in truthvalue gaps or the assignment of non-classical values but in the anomaly or inappropriateness of a given utterance in a given context. (Horn 1996: 307) In other words, presuppositions can be canceled. Hence, even the presupposition that Nixon was a person, and more specifically a man, could be canceled. It might turn out that, after all, he was a woman or even a robot. Even then, the presupposition is not necessarily canceled linguistically since we can go on saying, e.g., "Although he was a robot, he got away with it", or even: "Although he was a woman, he got away with it." By contrast, if the speaker changed the pronominal reference into it and she respectively, this would be a signal that he changed his presupposition. In this case we may have to conclude that the basis for the name had been removed completely since the categorical presupposition was canceled conceptually and formally. Recall Searle's statement above: it is inconceivable that Aristotle would become a prime number and yet remain Aristotle. Further, we might wonder what the extent of the categorical presuppositions is. There seems to be no problem with nonhuman names like place and river names, where the appositional structure indicates the categorical meaning, e.g., as in the City of Tokyo, or the River Kwai. In these cases, hardly any other classifier can apply. Difficulties may, however, arise in the case of personal names. It appears we are confronted with a paradox. The very general and ordinary senses 'person, man, woman' do not occur in appositional structures (see further down for an explanation). By contrast, in certain more formal contexts it would not be inconceivable to speak of the human being Bill Clinton or the male earthling Tony Blair, for instance, if these persons were confronted with beings from a different planet. On the other hand, quite common epithets with more specific features are encountered in newspapers or even in other linguistic registers, compare: the Frenchman Chirac, Senator McCarthy, Johnson the hatter. It is far from obvious that all of the common nouns in these appositional syntagms would indicate a categorical sense of the accompanying proper names. The more specific they become, the less we can speak of categorical meaning, it seems. It might be that we have to comply with a continuum from very general categorical meaning (e.g., human being) to very specific properties, which would then belong to the accidental associative meaning

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(e.g., the minister who went to London in 1998). Features such as those figuring in the above appositional syntagms seem to be situated in between the very general and the very specific end, though closer to the general end. Human beings of this Earth are supposed to belong to a continent, a country and a municipality, at least in modem times. Likewise, people are likely to be involved in some profession or other activity (cf. Johnson the hatter, Senator McCarthy). On the one hand, this functional information turns out to be very useful if we want to speak about the referents in question. For instance, if we fail to know that George Bush was the American president in 2005, it will be hard to say any sensible or informative things about him or to understand an everyday conversation. Therefore, we might venture to speak of secondary categorical meanings such as 'American, president, secretary', etc. In addition, the formal fact that the concepts in question are reflected in appositional syntagms may lead us into adopting them as categorical. However, these purported secondary categorical meanings do not constitute fixed properties of the referents they characterize. For instance, Bush will not remain president, he might even give up his American citizenship, but he is likely to remain a man (though even this is not certain nowadays). Instances like this suggest that such features belong rather to the associative meaning and language use, and not to the categorical meaning and linguistic convention. But it should be admitted that a sharp dividing line is hard to draw. By contrast, formal support for a distinction is the fact that as a rule, associative meaning is not backed up by formal features but categorical meaning is. Indeed, features of the type 'American' and 'president' are not reflected in formal structures except for the appositional one itself. Furthermore, it seems we can corroborate the thesis that we have to limit the extent of the categorical meaning to the general features by exploiting the distinction between close and loose apposition. In loose apposition, the members are interchangeable and may contain longer and more informative phrases, as in: Clinton, the president of the USA, or: the president of the USA, Clinton. Such syntagms appear to be very suitable to carry all kinds of associative meanings. By contrast, the general categorical senses of proper names are not likely to occur in loose appositions, compare: *the person, Clinton; *Clinton, the person; *the man, Johnson; *the river, the Thames; *London, the city.49 Exceptions are such ambiguous names as Washington, in which case one might specify: Washington, the state (/ mean), belongs to the periphery of the USA. Accidental features of the type' American, president', however, are freely able to appear as members of a loose appositional structure, compare also:

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a. Helmut Kohl, the Chancellor, was not capable of solving the problem. b. The Englishman, Mister Catledge, tried to make a compromise.

It seems then that we have sufficient semantic and formal evidence at our disposal to relegate features of the type' American, president', and the like, to the realm of associative meaning rather than to that of categorical meaning. De Pater and Swiggers (2000: 292) relegate the latter kind of presupposed knowledge to the objective intension, not to the conventional or subjective intension. In their view the categorical presupposition belongs not to the lexical (conventional) or associative (subjective) meaning, but to the thing (or concept) as we understand it (objective intension). However, in the framework adopted here, there is no room for an objective intension assigned to things or concepts. In this linguistic context I want to assign meanings, if any, to words, proper names, common nouns or personal pronouns. Hence, the categorical attributes of proper names will have to be subsumed under the conventional, lexical meaning (albeit as presuppositions). As a consequence, the thesis of categorical presuppositional meaning in proper names is no longer compatible with the classical meaninglessness thesis of proper names, as outlined above. Indeed, in its Kripkean formulation, it is no longer tenable. Nevertheless, if we regard this categorical proper name intension as a presuppositional meaning, we can maintain the position that proper names have no asserted lexical meaning. Contending that proper names have no lexical meaning at all if we consider presuppositions not to pertain to the meaning proper, entails the undesirable consequence that definite appellative NPs have no lexical meaning either. For instance, when speaking of the man, the baker, etc., we would have to say that these expressions have no meaning since the properties 'man' and 'baker' are presupposed here. Furthermore, if proper names and other definite NPs have no meaning at all, they can no longer be considered as linguistic signs, only as forms, a conclusion we would probably like to avoid. Finally, assertive as well as presupposed grammatical and associative content can be about exactly the same concepts. For instance, the concept woman can be asserted (as in: he wants a woman), presupposed (as in: the woman told me everything), grammatical (indicating feminine gender, as in German die Frau 'the woman') or associative (as in: Don Juan, where there is an association with women). It seems that the same concept, i.e. the same meaning, can be

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viewed from different vantage points or occur at different levels of the language. For all the above reasons I prefer to adhere to the linguistic convention that speaks of 'presuppositional meaning' in a broad enough sense (see also Horn 1996).

3.3.2. Categorical meanings as basic level concepts At the level of established linguistic convention, proper names appear to have a categorical presupposition without which their use is inconceivable. Whenever a name is assigned to a referent, this referent is assigned to a specific category of entities. Hence, we have names of men and women, countries, cities, rivers, ships, and so on. I would like to go one step further here and argue that these proprial categories correspond essentially to Rosch' s (1977) basic level concepts (see also Mervis and Rosch 1981). As far as I know, this claim has been made first in the psycholinguistic literature, viz. in Macnamara (1982). As a foundational statement in their approach, La Palme Reyes, Macnamara and Reyes and Zolfaghari (1993: 434) hold that "PNs [proper names, WVL] denote individuals in kinds (like DOG or PERSON) which individuate the bearer of a PN and trace the bearer's identity through change.,,5o In this first formulation, nothing more is said than in Searle (1969 [1958]) (see 3.2.1.5). Subsequently, the authors refine their general statement by "assuming that the kind will normally be a basic-level kind" (La Palme Reyes et al. 1993: 441). As is well known, a basic level term is situated in the middle of a hierarchy of a threesome of terms. For example, in the hierarchy animal> dog> beagle, the middle term dog is the basic level term. This term is the most frequent in use because it refers to the most accessible category from a perceptual and possibly a conceptual point of view. As a rule, the basic level term is acquired by children first (La Palme Reyes et al. 1993: 443). The general term is rather vague and abstract; for instance, we have no concrete representation of an 'animal'. The lowest level term is often too specific or technical so as to often require expert knowledge; for instance, not everybody is familiar with beagles or chihuahuas. I am aware of the vast often critical literature on basic level terms, but for the present purposes it will prove a useful concept. It even might be that the two theses confirm each other, i.e. insofar as the notion of basic level proves useful to understand the essence of proper names, it becomes more important itself.

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To corroborate my claim I will attempt to illustrate the correspondence between the two concepts by looking at the following classes of proper name: animal names, place names and names of human beings. In the case of animal names we find such categorical meanings as cat, dog, or horse. In the instance Fido the dog, the concept 'dog' displays the categorical meaning, is the basic level term in the hierarchy animal> dog > beagle (as argued above) and has a lexical counterpart that appears in the appositional structure Fido the dog. Thus it can be maintained that the basic level term 'dog' provides the categorical presupposition of Fido, at least insofar as this name refers to a specific dog. Furthermore, it seems we do not bestow names on animals as such, but rather on specific categories like dogs, cats, horses, and normally not on deer, birds, or fish, unless certain exemplars mean something to us (see above). Finally, our criterion to bestow names on dogs is not a specific race like the beagle, the fox-terrier, and so on. We would rather hold that dogs, i.e. the basic level category, are named. In the case of place names the general category is obviously place but more specific categories like country, city, river, etc. constitute the basic level terms. We have a clear image of what a country, city or river is, but it would be hard to tell what a 'place' looks like. These subcategories of place can safely be called the categorical meanings since they appear in appositional patterns, e.g., the State of France, the City of Paris, the River Thames. The more specific subclasses rogue state, suburb, or side river, are conceptually more intricate and abstract. Thus, we do not normally bestow names on places, rogue states, suburbs, or side rivers, but rather on countries, cities and rivers. Moreover, from a formal point of view we can observe morphosyntactic differences between these subcategories of place names (see chapter 3). Just as it was hard to find the categorical meaning of personal names, it is not obvious to define the basic level terms in the case of human beings. Nevertheless, we can assume that such categorical concepts as man and woman are the basic level terms because of the perceptual and conceptual conspicuousness of the respective referents. 'Person' or 'human being' would then be higher level terms, while 'American', 'president' and 'secretary' would be lower level terms since they involve more than perceptual familiarity, viz. specific information as to who is an American, a president or a secretary. Thus, it turns out that the basic level terms man and woman constitute the categorical meaning of personal names. This is also borne out by the fact that mostly different first names are assigned to men and women, e.g., John for a man, Mary for a woman. Sometimes, feminine first

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names are derived from masculine ones, e.g., French Jean> Jeanne; Dutch Paul> Paula. In societies like that of Ancient Rome men were given forenames (e.g., Marcus, Primus), but not women. Note, finally, that in a number of languages, there is not even an obvious term for a 'human being': in English and French, for example, the masculine terms man and homme are used to indicate human beings in certain contexts. It should be noted, however, that the above distinction man/woman and my setting up of two corresponding basic level senses for humans is not so clearly reflected in the morphosyntax of certain non-In do-European languages. As a rule, Bantu languages do not display a man/woman opposition in their morphosyntax and only marginally in the lexicon. On the whole, we can conclude that the categorical meaning of a proper name refers to a basic level concept. The rationale for this is apparently that speakers of a community bestow names on entities that are perceptually and conceptually salient. A restriction on this condition is of course that these entities be somehow relevant to these speakers. For example, sheep are usually not important enough to be assigned names, but Dolly was so relevant to society that it was given this name. In chapter 2, we will see in greater detail that the linguistic relevance of basic level meaning in proper names can be derived from their morphosyntax, for instance that in appositional structures, often a basic level appellative is used (Fido the dog), or that the basic level meaning may be incorporated in the name (the Atlantic Ocean, Fin-land). This contradicts Kleiber's (1996: 582) thesis that the basic level sense that somehow seems relevant in proper names should be regarded as a mere ontological fact, viz. that name bearers (not names) necessarily belong to some basic category. In this respect, Kleiber (1995: 11; 1996: 582-583) comes close to De Pater and Swiggers' (2000: 288, 292, 328) view that the categorical presupposition in proper names belongs to their 'ontological intension' (i.e. objective sense). What another language philosopher remarks in general may be to the point here: 'the original sin of all metaphysics' seems to be "the attempt to read real or alleged features of language into the world" (Searle 1969: 164).

3.3.3. Associative meaning pertains to the referent and to the name form on the level of usage The above distinction between lexical and associative meaning is rather crucial for the theory of proper names in that most differences of opinion

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relate to the position assumed with regard to this matter. As was stated in the introductory chapter, lexical meaning is equated here with word sense, while associative meaning refers to the connotations (in the non-logical sense) that a word can give rise to by way of either its referent or its phonological shape. Gary-Prieur (1994: 51) reserves the term 'connotations' for the associations belonging to the name form, not for those of the proper name in its referential function. What I call connotations pertaining to the referent is interpreted by this author as so-called discursive knowledge, i.e. 'le contenu', the content of a proper name, being a set of properties attributed to the initial referent of that proper name in a universe of beliefs (p. 51; see also p. 53-57). This discursive knowledge is not to be equated with encyclopedic knowledge although it may be intersubjective as well as subjective in nature. Thus, Napoleon may have the content feature 'the loser of Waterloo' in one context or he may be considered a hero in another context. Both referential 'content' and name form 'connotations' (e.g., the name Baker may remind one of a baker) must be situated on the level of language use (p. 245). I will now deal with the different kinds of associative meaning in greater detail. sl Connotations pertaining to the referent can be of a more or less objective or intersubjective nature (see also Hartmann 1984). The most objective or intersubjective associations are encyclopedic, e.g., Rome ;s the capUal of Italy. It could be argued that the difference of this kind of connotation with categorical meaning can be neglected. After all, the categorical belonging of a proper name's referent is also an encyclopedic fact. However, this categorical information is essential for the functioning of a proper name. For a proper use of the name Rome it is essential to know that we are dealing with a city. By contrast, it is not absolutely necessary to realize that Rome is Italy's capital (cf. Kripke's and Donnellan's arguments), although the greater one's ignorance in this respect the more this will diminish the possibilities of an interesting or relevant conversation. Anyway, it seems important to maintain the distinction between categorical meaning (which can be situated on the level of linguistic convention) and associative meaning (which belongs to language use). In order to further clarify the opposition between the two kinds of sense let us look at the utterance: John ;s not a man. In the literal interpretation we seem to be confronted with a real contradiction since the purported categorical meaning is rejected. If John is not a male human being, the sentence does not make sense. The only reasonable way out would be to assume that we are dealing with a different

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entity, e.g., an elephant. By contrast, the figurative interpretation allows for the reading that although John is a male human being he does not behave like a real man should. In this case, the word man merely conveys an associative sense. The associative sense may be more subjective; it may even be personal, coming from the speaker, the hearer or other persons. For example, a woman may think of a man as a candidate for marriage and associate his name with this idea. Connotations pertaining to the name form are exploited especially in personal-name-giving. In the case of Old Germanic and Old Slavic personal names, the dithematic name form contained a wish for the new-born child. These wishes pertained to the values that obtained in these early times (Kaleta 1995), e.g., the value 'strong, courageous' in the case of the Old Germanic personal name Bern-hard, in which this dithematic name form connoted the meaning 'bear-strong', i.e. strong as a bear (see also Scherer 1953 for Old Germanic). Other cases are more prosaic and have nothing to do with name magic. For example, the contemporary family name Baker may still remind us of its etymology 'baker'. Connotations via the name form are also important in by- and nicknames. Since bynames are normally of recent origin, we can expect the etymology and motivation of the name still to be intelligible, e.g., Dutch den Dikke 'the Fats'. That we have to do here with associative and not with lexical meaning can be inferred from the fact that the name continues to be used even if the referent in question becomes as thin as a wire (see chapters 3 and 4, sections on bynames). This transparency of the etymology is also found in place names, especially in field names, e.g., Longfield. If such names sound pejorative or old-fashioned, they may be replaced. This is often done for street names. Political changes are also well known; for instance, the name of the Belgian Congo changed into Zaire and later on back into Congo.

3.3.4. Emotive meaning: augmentative and diminutive

If emotive meaning occurs in proper names it is also construed as a presuppositional feature of proper names. Moreover, we should distinguish between emotive sense that is inherent in names and emotive sense which is encountered at the level of connotations only. The emotive meaning can be inherent in a proprial stem or a suffix, for instance the diminutive suffix in DutchlFlemish forenames such as Claar-tje, Fons-ke, and the augmenta-

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tive suffix -ern) in Flemish forenames: Bert-en, ZJokk-e, expressive alternative name forms, especially bynames (e.g., Dutch Belgenland instead of Belgii! 'Belgium'). In certain contexts, a neutral form such as Belgium can, however, carry the emotive associations that are inherent in the expressive form Belgenland. In certain Flemish dialects the definite article de 'the' can also convey an augmentative sense, as in de Jan, lit. 'the John'. Article and suffix are sometimes combined: de Miel-e. Both inherent and associative emotive meanings can be appreciative or depreciative.

3.3.5. Grammatical meaning

Since grammatical meaning pertains to grammatical phenomena by definition, these grammatical features will be dealt with in the chapter on formal characteristics (chapter 2).

4. Towards a more precise characterization and definition of proper names and propriallemmas In this section, I will propose a more precise characterization as well as my own definition of proper names (4.1). In 4.2, I will give a more precise characterization of proprial and nonproprial lemmas and further motivation for these, as well as apply proprial lemmas to Bill Croft's typological theory of markedness. Finally, in 4.3, a diagram will be presented to illustrate the major functions of a prototypical proprial lemma.

4.1. Towards a more precise characterization of proper names I will now formulate the following tentative conclusions regarding the main questions concerning the status and function of proper names.

4.1.1. Do proper names have meaning?

If we consider 'meaning' or 'sense' to mean 'asserted lexical meaning', I can certainly agree with Lyons' (1977: 198) statement: "it is widely, though not universally, accepted that proper names do not have sense." Indeed, none of the philosophers quoted above really committed them-

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selves to the view that proper names display lexical, conventional meaning. As Ullmann (1962) formulated it, it does not make sense to ask: What is the meaning of London? or: What do you understand by London? Ullmann (1969: 33) argues: "One cannot possibly say that one understands a proper name; one can only say that one knows whom it refers to, whose name it is."s2 Moreover, one can predict that a certain busy place with a lot of houses in a row will be called a city but not that it will be called London or by any other name. However, if taken in a wider sense, I should say that proper names do have meaning, at least if presuppositional information can be called 'meaning'. This seems to be more of a linguistic than a philosophical practice (compare Horn 1996 with De Pater and Swiggers 2000: 341). I will speak of presuppositional and asserted meaning. The two types concern a different status of the same concepts in the discourse. For instance, in the sentence The king of Persia attacked Athens we can say that the king of Persia has only presupposed content, while the same content is being asserted in the sentence There existed a king of Persia long ago. Moreover, the same sense can occur as conventional meaning (e.g., baker in In this street there is no baker), or as associative meaning via the referent (as in: This man is a baker) or via the name form (as in the family name Baker). Further, the concept of woman can appear as conventional meaning (I know this woman), or as grammatical meaning (in the pronoun she). Finally, there are examples in which a word behaves as a proper name and hence has no conventional meaning, or as a common noun and then does have conventional meaning. The names of languages are good instances:

(25) (26)

The languages Latin and Greek are classical languages. Many people learned some Latin and Greek.

In (25) we have to do with proper names (of languages) that appear in an appositional construction, in (26) with quantified uncountable common nouns. Nonetheless, in both cases we find the same meanings, i.e. the basic level meaning 'language' and possible connotations concerning these languages. But in (25) the basic level meaning is construed as a presupposed meaning in a definite appositional NP, in (26) as a so-called conventional or lexical meaning in an indefinite appellative NP. So, all depends on the construction and function of the meaning. We could say, following Frege to a certain extent, that all meaning is 'Sinn', but this Sinn is construed and functions in different ways. For convenience's sake only, I will go on speaking of different kinds of meaning (compare Willems 2000: 93).

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As presupposed meanings of proper names we have distinguished: categorical, associative, emotive and grammatical meaning. To sum up: The categorical meaning pertains to the senses that Rosch's basic level concepts correspond to, e.g., man, woman, country, city, river, month, year. It is the only (presupposed) lexical meaning that proper names seem to have at the level of established linguistic convention. The associative meaning pertains to the level of language use. There are two cases. A first sort of associative senses correspond to the subjective or possibly intersubjective descriptions that can be given of the referent of a proper name, e.g., Napoleon may, but need not remind us of 'the loser of Waterloo'. A second type concerns the connotations that can be evoked by the name form, e.g., in Old Germanic the first name Wit-helm connoted the sense 'willing to protect' . Emotive meaning may be inherent in the name, as in Dutch Belgenland, an expressive variant of Belgii! 'Belgium'. It may also adopt the form of a connotation, e.g., Belgium may remind us of a bad experience. Grammatical meaning refers to such categories as definiteness, number, or gender, displayed by proper names.

4.1.2. In what way do proper names re/er?

For most philosophers and some linguists the referent of an expression is the real world referent in the first place, or if necessary, a possible world referent. Fictitious referents cause problems here, as we saw in section 3.2.1.6. In this book, the referent is a mental referent in the first place so we can assign referent status to such fictitious names as Snowwhite and Santa Claus (see also Langacker 2004: 88). In Kripke's view a proper name is a rigid designator in that "in any possible world it designates the same object" (Kripke 1972: 269). This appears to be a necessary requirement for the way proper names refer (in the real world, that is), but it is by no means a sufficient one since terms for natural kinds like gold, or water, as well as demonstratives refer rigidly too in Kripke's framework.

4.1.3. Towards a definition and a unified account o/proper names

Algeo (1973) advocated a stratificational approach in which proper names were defined differently according to the various components of the gram-

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mar. More in particular, it was striking that the semantic account was independent of the syntactic one (but see Van Langendonck 1974). By contrast, the above discussion leads us to a unified theory of proper names in which a pragmatic, a semantic and a syntactic account are integrated (compare Snimek 1991 ).53 The semantic account is a corollary of the pragmatics of names; the syntactic account corresponds to the pragmatics and the semantics. In this way, we can set up the following definition of a proper name: A proper name is a noun that denotes a unique entity at the level of established linguistic convention to make it psychosocially salient within a given basic level category [pragmatic]. The meaning of the name, if any, does not (or not any longer) determine its denotation [semantic]. An important formal reflex of this pragmatic-semantic characterization of proper names is their ability to appear in such close appositional constructions as the poet Burns, Fido the dog, the River Thames, or the City a/London [syntactic].

I will first recall the general statement that a proper name is a noun. Then, I will go into each of the three components. A proper name is a noun. This has been established in the sections 2.1 and 3.2.2.4. See also chapter 3, 5.3. Some proper nouns are normally accompanied by the definite article, as in the Rhine. The functions of this article are discussed in chapter 3, 2.8.

4.1.3.1.

The pragmatic component

In the pragmatic component of the definition of proper names, there are several subcomponents. The proper noun denotes a unique entity.

The thesis of the unique entity is sometimes rejected. One may hesitate in the case of such names as the Pyrenees, John Bull, or June, the Bank of England, etc. (see 3.2.2.4; also chapter 3). Mountain names of the type the Pyrenees are pluralia tantum and refer to a collectivity, i.e. a plurality seen as a unity. A similar explanation applies to John Bull, which refers to the typical Englishman. A month constitutes a recurring, i.e. cyclic, but still a unique phenomenon. Although it is possible to say The Bank of England closes at the same time everywhere in the country, thereby referring to different affiliations, the Bank of England remains one particular entity. Finally, proprial lemmas such as John, or Mary, which are applied to different denotata, should pose no problem since the uniqueness claimed ob-

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tains for their function as individual 'proper names'. With regard to this repeated application, we should recall that it is not governed by any asserted lexical meaning, as in the case of common nouns (see also Snimek 1991: 76). As Sciarone (1967: 80) put it already (without, however, using the notion of proprial lemma): a name like John "cannot be used productively ... We may have learned the name John for ten different persons and know a lot about these persons and still we may not be able to apply this name to an eleventh or twelfth person (object).,,54 The name denotes a unique entity at the level of established linguistic convention.

Whilst personal pronouns can denote as many entities as allowed by its grammar (gender, number) and refer to a unique entity on the level of discourse (usage) only, a proper name denotes a unique entity on the level of established linguistic convention (against Recanati 1997: 164; see also above 3.2.2.2.2). Saying that this also applies to the level of language use or that in all contexts the name refers to the same entity might be one step too far. Then, we may be confronted with the same criticism as Kripke's concept of 'rigid designator', which was claimed to designate the same object in any possible world (Kripke 1972: 269). Apart from other problems with regard to the concept of rigid designator (see section 3.2.1.6) there is the existence of statements with propositional attitudes (often adduced by philosophers). An example is the sentence Mary thinks that Charlemagne was Charles the Fifth or Mary thinks that Charlemagne and Charles the Fifth were one and the same person. In Mary's world the denotation of the two names is the same, but not in the world of the speaker, so that the denotation does not remain constant in all possible worlds. At first sight, this objection may seem to affect the present account as well. However, the statement appears to be a kind of 'reference shift' at the level of discourse, i.e. of language use, more or less as in the Madagascar case discussed by Evans (1985: 10-11; see 3.2.1.6). At the level of established linguistic convention, such individual reference shifts do not undo the general 'social practice' or consensus that does not confound the two monarchs called Charles. It follows that the existence of propositional attitudes does not harm the part of the definition that says: the name denotes a unique entity at the level of established linguistic convention. On the other hand, the existence of propositional attitudes cannot tell proper names apart from common nouns since individual reference shifts are also possible with appellative expressions, compare Mary thinks that the king and the emperor were one and the same person.

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The denotatum is made psychosocially salient.

Not all entities are given proper names. Chapter 3 provides an idea of what classes of entities are named. By giving them a name entities are made salient and important in a given psychosocial context. Also, via the name a number of connotations can be attached to these entities. For instance, Napoleon is the one who won at Austerlitz, but lost his final battle at Waterloo, and so on. For a human individual, it is of the utmost importance to have a name. Anderson (2003: 356) reminds us of the Latin tag sine nomine persona non est. Regarding name usage in the society of Central Brazil, Maybury-Lewis (1984: 7) states: "names do not ... function primarily to identify individuals. Their purpose is rather to transform individuals into persons." It happened previously that in some countries, indigenous inhabitants were not allowed to bear an official name and hence were not allowed to participate in elections, or were denied other rights. This saliency generated by name-giving can be striking in the case of animals. Domesticated animals have names, for others it is not obvious, except, for instance, when the media intervene. Dolly the sheep got its name when it was cloned. The pigs Fred and Ginger got their names when they escaped from death by jumping from a truck and hiding themselves in a most clever way, followed by paparazzi. Of course, for certain categories, it depends on the society and its culture whether they receive a name or not. For instance, Neethling (2005b) discusses the South African habit of bestowing names on minibus taxis and gives plenty of examples. It would be interesting to do systematic research on how and why speech communities differ in bestowing names on the different classes of entities that exist in their world. Unfortunately, this is beyond the scope of this book. Within a given basic level category.

As was argued above and just suggested, the denotatum is presupposed to belong to a specific class of entities, i.e. a basic level category of entities. It is interesting to compare a proper name with such a monoreferential appellative expression as the internet, a term that denotes a unique entity. Bergien (2005: 85) argues "that the present use of Internet represents a transitional stage between proper name and appellative or term." However, since the word is definable and especially since a basic level category is lacking, it would be appropriate to treat this term as an appellative, like the universe, or the sun and the moon (see especially section 5 on monoreferential expressions). Only if a second intern et originated would it be appropriate

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to speak of a superordinate definable appellative category two or more members of which would form proprial subcategories. In chapter 3, a (non-exhaustive) classification of names is provided according to their basic level sense.

4.1.3.2.

The semantic component

The meaning of the name, if any, does not (or not any longer) determine its denotation.

Another way of saying this is that whereas in proper names the extension is the primary feature, in common nouns the extension is determined by the intension of the word (see already Mill 1872: 32; also Kempson 1977: 14;55 Kleiber 1981: 25). Therefore, a common noun can refer to any entity that has the properties required while a proper name refers ad hoc, albeit supported by a basic level presupposition. In the case of prototypical personal names such as John or Mary, a proprial lemma is assigned to a person in an ad hoc way. An asserted lexical meaning is lacking here. This also goes for place name lemmas like London when they are applied to other places. Other than proprial lemmas may be used, for instance, appellatives, as in the case of the film name Gladiator, or even sentences, as in the film The postman always rings twice. Although the meaning of these expressions is still transparent and functions as a connotation, it no longer determines the denotation of the name in the way it does in the corresponding common noun and sentence respectively. When semantic bleaching occurs, as in the case of the above example the Old Vicarage, we have to say that the original meaning no longer determines the proprial denotation. The meaning has become a secondary connotation. We should note here that the mere fact that proper names lack (asserted) lexical meaning does not differentiate them from personal pronouns. Coates' (2000: 1164; 1166) definition of names does not take this into account (see also 3.2.2.5). What I call the semantic component has to be supplemented by the pragmatic and the syntactic one.

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The syntactic component

An important fonnal reflex of this pragmatic-semantic characterization of proper names is their ability to appear in such close appositional constructions as the poet Burns, Fido the dog, the River Thames, or the City of London.

I argued in chapter 2, 3.1.1.2.1, that the unit in these close appositional structures that does not characterize but identify is a proper name. The other unit indicates the categorical presupposition. Still other formal characteristics of proper names are adduced in chapter 2. Among other things, proper names do not take restrictive modifiers and are not quantifiable.

4.1.4. What is necessary to retrieve the referent of a proper name? To find a real world referent or a mental referent of a proper name, there is the minimal requirement that the speaker-hearer make use of the information provided by the basic level category the name is attached to, e.g., Tom is this man; London is this city. Indeed, for many a philosopher (Searle, among others) it was a requirement that the speaker-hearer be acquainted with some such information. Of course, this information will not do. Additional strategies are the following: An ostensive strategy will be used when somebody or something is introduced to the hearer, e.g., This is Tom. In certain cases the hearer will make use of a causal or historical chain of references. This strategy will be employed especially for historical figures like Aristotle, in which case the reference is passed on via an indefinite number of referential links to the present day. In my view, the use of descriptions can hardly be excluded here. For personal acquaintances, say, our neighbor, a descriptive strategy is likely, e.g., Ann is my neighbor, by the way. Likewise, most people will identify Bill Clinton via the description the president of the USA in 1998. More generally, we can agree with Katz (2001: 160) "that, in the course of history, there have been many baptisms based on attributively used descriptions." Finally, a combination of two or even more strategies is possible, e.g., This is Ann, my neighbor.

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4.1.5. Do proper names always originate in a 'baptismal act', i. e. a namegiving act? Kripke's baptismal act (in the literal or the figurative sense) can be said to take the form of an illocutionary act of 'declaration' in the sense of Searle (1976), more specifically a name-giving act. 56 Such name-giving acts take place where proprial or nonproprial lemmas are assigned ad hoc to unique entities. In the case of proprial lemmas, these speech acts can generate prototypical names such as first and family names like John and Mary, Brown and Smith, or place names when applied to new places, like the many towns in the USA called London or Oxford, and so on. In the case of nonproprial lemmas, name-giving acts take place when appellative, phrasal or sentential lemmas are assigned ad hoc to unique entities, such as films (Gladiator; The postman always rings twice), books, plays, or novels (Hamlet; The Old Man and the Sea), and the like. For Anderson (2004: 442) it is "rather obvious" that "use of a name presupposes prior nomination", i.e. a name-giving act. However, not every linguistic element that functions as a proper name originates in a speech act of declaration. 57 For instance, in the case of nicknames (bynames), such as den Hakkelaar in the Flemish combination Gillam den Hakkelaar 'Guillaume the Stutterer', it is obvious that no special name-giving act was performed. Rather, the definite description den hakkelaar 'the stutterer' lost its original appellative meaning by 'semantic bleaching', so that a gradual proprialization took place (see also 3.2.2.2.2). Note that numerous personal and place names originate by gradual semantic bleaching, as in Coates' example the old vicarage, which gradually developed into the proper name the Old Vicarage (see 3.2.2.5). A namegiving act can hardly be invoked here. Even names like London or Oxford originated long ago through semantic bleaching and were bestowed on new places when they developed proprial lemmas later on. Further, in the case of autonyms, as in 'Bank' is an ambiguous word, one cannot speak of an initial name-giving act except maybe for the common noun underlying this proper name use (see also Van Langendonck 1980b: 290). Likewise, in occasional formations of the type the metal gold, the notion of democracy, or the fact that it rained, the second, preexisting, unit is not assigned to an entity by a special name-giving act. As regards names formed on the basis of proprio-appellative lemmas, the situation is not always clear-cut. Consider the case of trade and brand names, where the basic level may vary. If we think only of the firm, a name like Coca-Cola is a proprial lemma assigned ad hoc to this firm. When we think of the product, it becomes a

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proprio-appellative lemma, since both the propria I and the appellative use are quite common and it is not clear which is diachronically prior to the other (see chapter 3,3.1.4), e.g., Ford is a good product vs. I bought a nice Ford. In this case, a special name-giving act is likely not to have taken place. Probably, this can also be said when names of languages, diseases, colors, numbers, or letters are involved.

4.2. A more precise characterization of propriaI and nonpropriallemmas In this section, we will look at the status of, and give further motivation for proprial and nonproprial lemmas. PropriaI lemmas will also find a place in the typological theory of markedness. First, as for the status of proprial and nonproprial lemmas in connection with proper names, three questions will be raised (see 4.2.1). Second, further arguments will be given to corroborate the thesis that lemmas, and more in particular, propriaI lemmas are a necessary concept in the analysis of proper names (see 4.2.2). Third, propriaI lemmas will be submitted to the typological theory of markedness (see 4.2.3) (see also Van Langendonck 1999b; 2005; Vandelanotte and Willemse 2002).

4.2.1. Three questions regarding the status ofproprial and nonproprial lemmas in connection with proper names 1) What makes up the unity of lemmas, especially propriallemmas? 2) Is the notion of lemma or lexeme a purely lexicological (dictionary) tenn or can we account for it in the grammar as well? 3) The proprial and nonproprial status of lemmas for proper names

What makes up the unity of lemmas, especially propriallemmas? In the case of propriaI lemmas we will have to speak of 'multidenotation' in the first place. The occurrence of polysemy is limited to presuppositional meanings, such as categorical meaning. The primary and the secondary use of the lemma have at least the same categorical meaning. For instance, the propriallemmas John and Napoleon in (4) to (7), repeated as (27}-(30), (27) (28)

John attended a meeting today. The emperor Napoleon was defeated at Waterloo.

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(29) (30)

Nominal and referential-semantic status ofproper names

You are talking about a different John. He is becoming a second Napoleon.

share the categorical sense man. In addition, (27) and (29) share the knowledge that both men are called John, while in (28) and (30) the same person, Napoleon, is spoken about. Moreover, different readings of a proprial lemma can be linked by operations like metonymy, metaphor, generalization, specialization, and so on. In example (29) above, a different John is derived by metonymy, while in (30) a second Napoleon is derived by metaphor. This is another reason to speak of identical lemmas. Another case is offered by surnames: the name Johnson may refer to a family or to an individual of that family. Given that the 'family' sense is basic, we can hold that 'the individual Johnson is a member of the Johnson family'. Thus, the secondary sense is linked to the primary one through the operation of metonymy. In addition, both senses share the categorical notion of family. Conversely, in constructions like the metal gold, the word gold appears to be construed as a proper name (see also chapters 2 and 3), but otherwise behaves like a common noun: in all other constructions it is construed as a common noun, hence its primary function is that of a common noun. The second question is this: is the notion of lemma or lexeme a purely lexicological (dictionary) term or can we account for it in the grammar as well, i.e. as a kind of word class?58 If this were possible, we would have independent motivation to use the notion of lemma in the above way. In fact, it appears that a lemma can function in the grammar as an autonymic expression. There are two kinds of such metalinguistic expressions. First, there is the case of pure autonyms (see also Harweg 1998: 68), as in the sentence (31)

John is a widespreadforename.

John is used in (31) to refer to itself, i.e. to the name or lemma John. So we are confronted with a metalinguistic use. A similar use is found in expressions of the form (32)

This man is called John.

Sentence (32) is paraphrasable as This man has the name 'John', in which the autonymic, metalinguistic use again becomes clear.

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We can add that since autonyms constitute a subclass of proper names in their own right (at least when they occur as appositions, see chapter 3), the notion of lemma is accounted for in the grammar as well as in the lexicon. The third question concerns the proprial and nonproprial status of lemmas for proper names. Concerning such nouns as John and gold, I argued above that both of them can be construed as a proper name and as a common noun. However, it seems plausible to characterize John as a proprial lemma, but gold as a common noun lemma. The rationale behind this intuition is not only differences in frequency of occurrence: John is normally construed as a proper name, but gold as an appellative mass noun. There is even more to it. In the case of John, the above-mentioned constructions, autonym ( 'John' is a first name) and common noun (this is another John), are metalinguistic by nature, hence secondary, while as a proper name, John is a primary construction of the object language, as in: John came home late. Likewise, in another interpretation of a John, as in This boy will become a second John (referring to, say, John Major), a John means 'a man like John M.', and therefore, is a common noun derived from the proper name via metaphor. By contrast, the lemma gold functions as an appellative mass noun in all constructions (e.g., Gold is a metal) except in the appositional structure the metal gold, where it takes on proprial characteristics, thus turning into a mass (noncount) proper name (see also chapter 3). Thus, a word is called a propriallexeme or lemma if its primary use is that of a proper name.

4.2.2. Further arguments for the adoption ofpropria I lemmas After the above analysis of the semantics of proper names and the status of proprial lemmas we are in a better position to elaborate on various kinds of proprial-like lemma. At the same time, this will provide us with more arguments for the adoption of proprial lemmas. I will focus here on proprial and some nonproprial lemmas that can function as proper names. Six arguments will be given to demonstrate the usefulness of such lemmas.

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4.2.2.1. Proprial lemmas functioning as appel/atives or as parts of nonproprial words As was indicated above, an obvious advantage is to link elements such as John in (27) and (29), and Napoleon in (28) and (30) respectively to each other. In expressions like another John, a different Mary, a second Napoleon, we have an appellative meaning since a class of Johns, a class of Marys and a class of Napoleons is construed. The ad hoc denotation of proper names has disappeared. Here we can speak of a proprial lemma functioning as an appellative. The term 'proprial' is used since the appellatives in another John, a different Mary, and a second Napoleon clearly derive from the proper names John, Mary, and Napoleon. A proprial lemma can even function as part of a nonproprial word, such as Mary in Mary-like in (l4c), or Napoleon in Napoleon-like in (33): (33)

This politician displays a kind of Napoleon-like behavior.

See also 4.2.3.

4.2.2.2. Multidenotative propriallemmas It is well known that ever since the onset of Christianity, a lot of Germanic and other names disappeared and were replaced by Christian names, i.e. first names. But these were limited in number so that many people received the same name. So we could and can still say, as in example (31): 'John' is a widespread forename. Hence, such names are not uniquely bestowed on one person. According to Grodzinski (1980: 10) 'multi-designatory' proper names constitute the most numerous category of names (see also Katz 2001: 147). Should we speak here of homonymous proper names (Quine 1960: 130; Searle 1971: 139; Strawson 1974: 60)7 That would be highly implausible since proper names have no asserted lexical meaning (see also Hornsby 1977: 41; Katz 2001: 147). For the same reason it would not be defendable to apply the notion of polysemy (compare Soltesz 1972). However, we need to be able to speak of the name John, the name Mary, etc. Such unification is possible if we apply the notion of 'proprial lemma' in such cases. 59 This allows us to speak of the same lemma even when we give the name John to our dog, although it is a different proper name with a different basic level meaning. We can then say that John is a multidenotative proprial lemma. This is compatible with the claim that each of the

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proper names derived from the same lemma is given in an ad hoc way, as I stated earlier. On the other hand, the person who gives the name Napoleon to his/her cat will make some association or other with the former emperor of France. In this case it will just be a joke. A similar phenomenon as with personal names is encountered in the use of trade names. Names of trades and brands often refer to different things, although these referents are clearly related to each other. At least four categories should be distinguished: founders of companies, the companies themselves, brands, and distinct products of the brand. I will illustrate this by means of the name Ford. Let us look at the various categories this name can denote:

(34) (35) (36) (37)

Fordfounded a car industry. (referring to a person, the company's founder) Ford is a car company. (referring to a company) Ford is afamiliar brand. (referring to a brand) Jane bought a Ford yesterday. (referring to a product of the brand)

The various uses from (35) to (37) can be derived from the previous one in the series by specific metonymical processes. For instance, Ford = the company of Mr Ford; Ford is a brand of the Ford Motor Company. These processes provide for the unity of the lexical item Ford, which can again be termed a multidenotative proprial lemma (or possibly proprioappellative lemma, see 4.2.2.6) displaying proper name uses as well as an appellative use, as a Ford in sentence (37).60 Not only trade names show such diversity of uses. As indicated above, another case is offered by surnames: the name Johnson may refer to a family or to an individual of that family. Given that the family sense is basic, we can hold that 'the individual Johnson is a member of the Johnson family'. Thus, again the secondary sense is linked to the primary one through the operation of metonymy. In addition, in both senses the categorical notion of family is present.

4.2.2.3.

One referent is a part of the other

A third important point is that many names, especially place names, can be used in a different denotation in such a way that one denotatum is a part of the other. For instance, the name Flanders can indicate the present state, or

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the historical county; Holland can indicate the Netherlands, but also the central part of this country. America may designate the continent or the USA. Again, these are not accidental differences to be compared to homonymy but to polysemy in appellatives. Indeed, it is no accident that Flanders and Holland refer to counties and states that partly overlap geographically. Likewise, the USA forms part of the American continent. In all these cases, we can speak of metonymy, i.e. pars pro toto. Again, the unifying factor can be provided by the notion of proprial lemma. The multidenotation should be attributed not to the proper names but to the common proprial lemma, in the sense that each time, we have to do with different proper names but with one propriallemma.

4.2.2.4. Names with a common part can be united via the adoption of a propriallemma Another advantage of the distinction between proper name and propriaI lemma is that names with a common part can be united via the adoption of a proprial lemma. Take North Korea and South Korea, former West Germany and East Germany. These are different proper names, but share a propriaI lemma that forms part of the name. In this way, we can again unite affiliated names. Once more, we have a case of pars pro toto in that each time the two countries form part of a region indicated by the common proprial lemma. Note that in the above instances the notion of proprial lemma comes close to that of 'proprial stem'. Below the word level, we could adopt the notion of 'proprial stem', viz. in such cases where we meet with propriaI bound morphemes. A clear example is hungar-, which never appears as a lemma (lexical entry), but only within the name Hungary and its derivative Hungarian. Occasionally, other examples are provided in this book: the Dutch diminutive forename Claar-tje, where Claar- is a propriaI stem, the neutral name being Clara; or the augmentative name Zjokk-e, where the stem Zjokk- cannot occur on its own either (chapter 1, 3.3.4). The Dutch city name Den Haag 'The Hague' contains a propriaI stem haag-, which otherwise occurs only in the derivations Haag-s and Hag-enaar (chapter 2, 2). Apparently, propriaI lemma and propriaI stem constitute a continuum, which makes the notion of propriaI lemma all the more plausible. Exploring the concept of 'proprial stem' would, however, lead us too far into morphological matters. Only propriallemmas are dealt with systematically.

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Names may share a basic level term

Still other names share a basic level term, such as Fleet Street and Downing Street, the Pacific Ocean and the Atlantic Ocean, or the North Sea and the Baltic Sea. In these instances, we can hold that these names have the same appellative lemma in common.

4.2.2.6. Nonpropriallemmasfound in proper names Nonproprial lemmas are found in proper names like those of songs, books, films, works of art, citations and autonyms, and so on, e.g., the song The Seven Drunken Knights (Meyer 1992: 84), the book My life and other unfinished business, the film The postman always rings twice, the question: What does it mean to live in modern society? ' (Meyer 1992: 59), the words 'standfor' and 'about' (Meyer 1992: 84). Coincidentally, such names may consist of a proprial lemma, but one that belongs to another category, as in Shakespeare's play Hamlet, which is a personal name lemma. Note also that many appellative lemmas can function as proper names in appositional structures, e.g., the notion of democracy. It is true that nobody will want to argue that the noun democracy is a proper name as such. The reason is that such nouns normally function as common nouns, whilst a proprial function is utterly marginal though possible. Such cases constitute the end of the cline of propriaI prototypicality (see chapter 3). Finally, the dictionary entries underlying so-called 'appellative proper names' ('Gattungseigennamen' for some German onomasticians, see 1.2), i.e. names of brands, languages, colors, diseases, and the like could be called proprio-appellative lemmas, since they display a clear proprial behavior and a clear appellative behavior (see chapter 3).

4.2.3. Propriallemmas and the typological theory of markedness In this last section on proprial lemmas, I will look at the question whether Croft's (2000; 2001) typological theory of markedness can account for the occurrence of proprial lemmas in the function of common nouns, as in the above quoted examples: (29)

(30)

You are talking about a different John. He is becoming a second Napoleon.

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In (29) John is used in the sense 'man called John'; in (30) Napoleon is used in the sense 'man like Napoleon'. It means that these lexemes are employed here as common nouns containing a type or predication. However, they do not seem to be prototypical common nouns since their meaning contains a name. This semantic markedness is iconically reflected in the marked constructions that these items occur in. Whereas the lemmas John and Napoleon need no determiner to be used as proper names, they do need at least an indefinite article for their appellative use in (29) and (30). Furthermore, the addition of modifiers such as different and second is highly desirable to make more sense of this use. Equally marked are quantified plurals (see also above) as in:

(38)

There are a lot ofJohns and Marys.

English also allows for the use of proprial lemmas as predicate nominals, as m:

(39)

There we are, him as L.A. as a person could get and me twice as Nashville as the neon sign at Twitty City. 61

Again, the name needs to be accompanied, in this case by a modifying expression of degree: as ... as. By contrast, in an autonymic function proper names do not need determination or modification, compare: (40)

a. Many people are called John. b. John is a common name.

It should be remarked, however, that John is employed here as a proper name, not of a person, but of a name.

4.3. Diagram of a proprial lemma and its valency To illustrate the interaction of proper names and propriaI lemmas, I will present a diagram, showing the main constructions in which the propriaI lemma John can occur: forename, autonym, metonymical and metaphorical common noun. As I argued above, syntactically and semantically, the lemma John can function as an autonym, referring to 'a forename for a male person or sometimes, a name for a synchronically related being or

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object'. The appellative homonyms John 'toilet' and John 'prostitute's client' are to be considered as different lemmas. Only historically can these be related to the name John. To draw up the diagram, I will make use not only of the above concepts, but also of 'model' (schema) and 'instance' (subclass or example), e.g., John is an instance of a proper name, and a proper name is an instance of a proprial lemma in turn; likewise, John is normally an instance of the basic level category man. For the sake of brevity, I will omit the intension (sense) of the common nouns and the phonetic forms of the words. The grammatical, emotive and associative meanings are not represented in this scheme either. What the diagram then represents is a network showing: 1) a number of linguistic word classes such as proper name, forename, appellative (common noun), or autonym. I skip redundant categories like word, nominal lemma, and personal namt; 2) the instance of the forename: John; 3) the instance of the autonym: "John"; 4) the basic level category of the first name, i.e. the concept man (if a man is denoted, e.g., John Major); 5) lines with an arrow relating models (schemas) and instances, the arrow pointing at the instance; 6) simple lines showing metonymization and metaphorization processes indicated between square brackets. The metaphorical interpretation of the appellativized word (a) John '(a) person like John' is linked to the proper name denoting the name bearer John, whereas the metonymical reading of (a) John, i.e. (a) person with the name "John", corresponds to the autonym.

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~

'John'

appellative

forename

"John"

1

John

5. Monoreferential appellative expressions

A much discussed class of NPs in connection with proper names is constituted by monoreferential (or monosemantic) expressions, i.e. expressions that seem to refer uniquely but are sometimes called common nouns, sometimes proper names. It is obvious that we are on the borderline here between proper names and definite descriptions in that the monoreferential NPs seem to share the property with proper names that, loosely speaking

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(see above), they are intended to refer to one object only. In my view several types of monoreferential expressions should be distinguished.

5.1. Monoreferential NPs with the definite article This type is constituted by such NPs with a definite article as the moon, the sun, the world, or the universe. They seem to refer in the way of proper names, i.e. uniquely, so they can at least be termed 'monoreferential'. There is only one moon, sun, world or universe that we normally speak of. That is why some researchers call them proper names. Others keep to the view that they are appellatives (Gardiner 1940: 26; Van Osta 1993), especially since they have the definite article (in English as well as in Dutch) and since we can speak of several moons, suns, worlds and universes as if we were dealing with appellatives. Still others hold that the sun and the moon are sometimes proper names, sometimes common nouns (Coates 2000: 1167; 2006: 372; Hansack 2000: 241; 2004: 62-63). I am inclined to agree with Gardiner and Van Osta. Indeed, the meaning of a noun like moon in the monoreferential NP the moon is preserved in the appellative expressions a moon, two moons, or several moons, viz. 'satellite of a planet', whereas appellative NPs derived from propriaI lemmas, e.g., a John, two Johns, several Johns, have a special meaning, in this case: 'a/ two/ several person(s) called John'. Also, and more importantly, the entities in question are not individual members of a basic level category. The world and the universe are certainly not. It is true that the sun and the moon are objects in space (celestial bodies) but this is obviously a higher level category. Therefore, sun and moon are appellative basic level terms themselves. The situation of the NP the earth is different. The earth is the name of an individual member of the basic level category 'planet', together with Mars, Venus, etc., and the earth is exceptional in having an article except in the appositional structure the planet Earth and after the preposition on: on Earth. So we may safely conclude that the expressions the moon, the sun, the world, the universe are monoreferential appellative NPs rather than proper names, but that the earth/Earth is a proper name, i.e. the name ofa planet (compare Kleiber 1995: 11; 1996: 582-583). Coates (2000) gives a number of examples of 'singular definite expressions with unique denotata'. In his view, these expressions are either proper or common depending on the speaker's intention. The test appears to be about possibly contradictory statements such as The Sun might not be a sun. If the sentence makes sense, the speaker probably has a proper name

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in mind. In this way, we can go very far. For example, a sentence like The Professor is not a professor can hardly be said to contain a proper name. Nevertheless, it makes sense if we understand that the professor does not fulfill his/her duties properly.

5.2. Articleless monoreferential NPs English has a number of articleless monoreferential NPs like Congress, Parliament, nature, life, time, science, art, things. The Dutch counterparts do display the article: het Congres, het Parlement, de natuur, het leven, de tijd, de wetenschap, de kunst, de dingen. The situation in this language suggests that these expressions contain common nouns, the more so as these nouns correspond with definable, i.e. appellative concepts to be found in the dictionary. Anyway, it remains to be explained why the two article languages treat these monoreferential expressions differently. We could even wonder which language deviates from its normal practice. It seems to me we have to distinguish between two subcases: on the one hand, the count nouns, and on the other, the mass nouns and the plural nouns in the above series. The dichotomy becomes visible in their multidenotative use. The nouns congress/ congres and parliament/ parlement are countable because we can easily say: a congress/ een congres; a parliament/ een parlement. By contrast, the normal use of the other nouns appears to be the uncountable one, although a countable reading cannot be excluded. Compare: uncountable and plural (English and Dutch): (41)

a. They destroyed a lot of nature, life. Ze verwoestten heel wat natuur, leven. b. We spent a lot of time there. We brachten daar heel wat tijd door. c. A lot of science was devoted to the problem. Heel wat wetenschap werd aan het probleem besteed. d. A lot of art is not appreciated. Heel wat kunst wordt niet geapprecieerd. e. A lot of things happened. Er gebeurden heel wat dingen.

Monoreferential appellative expressions

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countable (English and Dutch): (42)

a. We would sometimes prefer a different nature, a different life.

We zouden soms een andere natuur, een ander leven verkiezen. b. On this planet they live in a different time.

Op deze planeet leven ze in een andere tijd c. Mathematics is a science many people hate. Wiskunde is een wetenschap die veel mens en haten. d. Abstract art is also an art. Abstracte kunst is ook een kunst. e. I see three things .. . Ik zie drie dingen .. . From such example sentences we can infer that the article use with the Dutch monoreferentials het Congres and het Parlement follows the normal pattern of definite count nouns, but that the English articleless use is deviant here: Congress, Parliament. Regarding the monoreferentials nature, time, life, science, art, things, the languages in question can in principle take two different courses. They could treat these monoreferentials either like the countable, or like the uncountable/ plural counterparts. It turns out that English follows the normal pattern of mass nouns and plurals, i.e. using the zero article, which occurs at least in generic uses, so we get monoreferentia I patterns, as in:

(43)

a. Nature can do what humans are unable to do. b. Life is a very precious good

c. Things are as they are. It is, however, typical of monoreferential NPs that the zero form is preserved in nongeneric as well as in generic uses. Compare the nongeneric uses in (44):

(44)

a. Nature destroyed this village. b. Life did not spare this man. c. Things went wrong.

In normal non generic uses such as in (44) we would expect the definite article, whether the subject NP was a count noun or a mass noun. Compare the normal nongeneric expressions:

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linguists (but see Stachowiak 1980), let alone neurolinguists. In this respect, these five groups have been working on their own without knowing much of each other. In the last twenty years, psycho- and neurolinguists have taken an interest in proper names because these words appear to constitute a relevant topic in their own research. Of course, there were precursors. As Coates (2006: 372) notes: It is a trivial psycholinguistic finding that those expressions that everyone

accepts as being names are recovered or otherwise processed in shorter times than descriptive referring expressions. As Levelt (1989: 200) reminds us, this was established by F.e. Donders as long ago as 1868.

McKenna and Warrington (1978) deal with category-specific naming preservation. More generally, on the basis of category-specific semantic impairments, Warrington and Shall ice (1984) launch the modality-specific semantic system hypothesis. Durso and O'Sullivan (1983) point out the existence of important cognitive differences between proper names and common nouns. La Palme Reyes et al. (1993: 454) want to "give the reader some inkling of how rich the study of PNs [proper names, WVL] is in implications for cognitive psychology .... ''''3 As Semenza (1997: 115-116) puts it: an understanding of the differences in processing between common and proper names allows an unprecedented level of insight about the working of the semantic system in general. Proper names are important not only for social reasons or because they are a special case in semantics, but because by comparing their processing with that of common names, a better view will be obtained ofthe name-retrieval process.

Especially from 1987 onwards systematic and detailed neuropsychological research has been done about name retrieval. Quite interesting experiments were carried out by De Bleser and Luzzatti (1987), Semenza and Zettin (1988; 1989), De Bleser and Bayer (1990). Bayer (1991) reports on the studies mentioned and draws some interesting conclusions. The above authors want to put to the test the two main theses on proper names, i.e. Kripke's indexical view vs. Searle's cluster of descriptions theory. Bayer (1991: 54), however, issues a caveat. In principle, the relevant neuropsychological data deal with the processing and the triggering of names from the mental lexicon. As a rule, language philosophical and linguistic research abstracts away from these aspects and limits itself to a representational theory in order to find out how the words appear in the

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language itself. Nonetheless, Bayer sets out from a very close relationship between the linguist's constructs and the neuropsychologist's data. I will first discuss Semenza and Zettin's paper and then return to Bayer (1991). I will also deal briefly with a study where a selective conceptual deficit for people's names is investigated. Finally, I will comment on these studies and draw some conclusions.

6.1. Semenza and Zettin (1988) Semenza and Zettin (1988: 714) treat names in the way dictionaries define them: "those words designating specific persons and places", i.e. as proprial lemmas rather than as proper names in their grammatical function. The authors add that the names of brands or industrial products may be somewhat ambiguous: for instance, 'Coca Cola' is certainly a proper name, but it is generally considered and learned as a kind of soft drink, in a similar fashion to 'lemonade'. Since there is no way of being sure how a subject would represent them in hislher semantic system, examples of this second type were excluded from the present study. It is safe to say, however, that the patient generally had the same difficulties with them as with other proper names.

This passage touches the problem of distinguishing between proper name and propria I lemma. Although the authors seem to start from what I call the propria I lemma, there is no real problem since in the test procedures, it appears that proprial lemma and proper name coincide. Appellative lemmas that function as proper names (e.g., in the metal gold) are obviously not considered. It remains to be seen, however, how aphasics would respond to propria I lemmas construed as common nouns. My guess is that the reaction would hardly be different since in expressions like another John, the categorical meaning of John remains identical: 'man'. In my account of Semenza and Zettin (1988) I will use the term 'proper name' in the way the two authors use it. Semenza and Zettin (1988) reports the study of "a brain-injured patient with a slightly less selective disorder of an inability to generate various types of proper names. Moreover, unlike most cases in neuropsychology, the dissociation occurs in an almost all-or-none fashion" (p. 712). The aphasic is a 62 years old, right-handed Italian businessman with a university education, called PC. He himself has the very straightforward complaint that he is unable to retrieve proper names other than his own. In the

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tests, an almost total discrepancy appears between the intact naming of objects (with common nouns) and the disturbed naming of persons, cities, countries, mountains (with proper names). Several kinds of tests were set up. In visual confrontation naming, PC never showed any difficulties with words other than proper names. His performance on proper names was completely different. When presented with pictures ofjamous persons his perfonnance was 0120. Nonetheless he was able to provide a fair amount of infonnation, giving in every case correct details about people's lives (e.g., 'Prime Minister, he is the first socialist holding this position in our country' or 'very famous poet, considered the father of our literature'). (p. 715)

In this test, PC was also unable to retrieve any geographical name, i.e. names of well known cities, rivers, countries and mountains. Again he produced a vast amount of information on all the items, e.g., 'largest port in Italy' - incidentally the only country name he was sometimes able to retrieve, obviously because it was his own country. In the task of naming from definition (e.g., 'What is a means of transportation with two wheels?', PC's performance was again extremely poor for personal names and place names, but flawless for other nouns, indicating inanimate objects, animals, fruits and vegetables, body parts, colors and abstract entities, as well as for adjectives, verbs and some numbers. Testing the short-term memory for individual names yielded similar results. The patient even forgot the examiner's name 10 times in a row (p. 717). PC showed a clear improvement when asked to name a number of famous persons starting from an appellative homonymous with their name. For instance, one of the questions was: "What is the name of the composer of Aida and Traviata? His name reminds us of a colour" (Verdi means 'Green[s]'). However, in 4 out of the 8 cases, he also needed a phonetic cue consisting of the first letter of the name, a strategy that did not help at all in the other tests (p. 717). Semenza and Zettin (1988: 718) conclude that their neuropsychological data square well with Kripke's thesis that proper names refer only to entities and do not provide any description and lack any link with conceptual networks (taken over by Coates 200Sc: 8). They adduce the example: "'Ronald Reagan' refers just to the bearer of this name and does not in itself provide any other information." However, something similar could be said of demonstrative and personal pronouns. We may remember that

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Nominal and referential-semantic status ofproper names

Kripke calls these indexicals rigid designators as well (see above). But the patient in question has no difficulties with pronouns. (Neither does the patient described by Bayer, see below). What then is really relevant here? It seems to be the fact that the referent of prototypical proper names is assigned ad hoc on the level of linguistic convention since this is what distinguishes them from pronouns. Even this distinction might not be the complete explanation. It may well be that not the construction as proper names of these words is relevant but rather their lemma status (propria I or appellative). I will come back to this in the discussion of the second experiment. Semenza and Zettin's neurolinguistic results do not corroborate the thesis of the categorical meaning advocated above. On the other hand, they do corroborate the claim that proper names may exhibit some associative meaning, pertaining either to the referent (cf. 'very famous poet...') or to the phonetic form (cf. Verdi = 'Green[s]'). Recall that this accidental information on the referent, which turns out to be very personal, or a possible phonetic resemblance (often due to etymology) with appellatives or other words does not constitute a definition for the names in question. From the next study, it will be clear that not all aphasics who have difficulties with proper names react in the same way, apparently because the nature of the disorder may vary.

6.2. Bayer (1991) The data adduced by Bayer (1991) stem from a German patient suffering from 'deep dyslexia'. This means that she can observe written texts exclusively via a semantic route and not by means of a transmission from grapheme to phoneme. The consequences of this pathology are among other things that (a) regularly, paralexias are used, (b) graphemically plausible nonsense words cannot be read at all, and (c) words with an abstract meaning and grammatical morphemes of closed classes (function words) are identified with much greater difficulty than words with a concrete meaning. Common nouns give rise to such paralexias as: Hammer (hammer) for Beil (axe), Boden (soil) for Grund (ground), Stahl (steel) for Eisen (iron). This means that the patient analyzes the word visually and, after this processing stage, directly accesses her semantic lexicon. For words to which she reacts correctly or for which she uses a semantic paralexia or an adequate paraphrase she appears to find a semantic address. But since she has

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no access at all to a graphemic analysis, thus interpreting words and morphemes of her language holistically (like Chinese characters), she cannot link the graphemic structure to a phonological one. As a consequence, she uses semantic paralexias as in the above instances (30%). Even derivational morphemes such as the diminutive suffix are interpreted semantically as far as possible, e.g., Tiir-chen > kleine Tiir 'little door'. Apparently, the patient's failure goes back to an output problem which is reinforced by the absence of a grapheme-phoneme transmission when she is reading words. Obviously, the patient's trouble has to do with the degree of difficulty she has in characterizing words semantically. Clearly describable referents and properties can be connected with corresponding word forms or paraphrased more easily than abstract words. In the case of function words, the task becomes still more difficult because of greater paraphrasing difficulties. Hence, these elements are hardly pronounceable for the lack of any graphemic control. We can now wonder what kind of trouble is experienced when the patient is to read proper names. It turns out that in principle, she is unable to read proper names aloud, and this goes for first names, names of cities, family names of famous persons, and so on. However, almost no semantic paralexias are employed. Especially striking are the 'no reactions'. At the same time, the patient realizes that (a) a first name is concerned and (b) what is the gender of the first name's bearer. By contrast, she is almost always at a loss in transforming what is read into a pronounceable output. Theoretically, according to Bayer (1991: 58) there are two possibilities for generating an output in her case. Firstly, for names of which the bearer is well known, she might give a description of the person, e.g., in the case of Willy, she could provide the name of the well known social democratic politician Willy Brandt. However, this does not happen. Second, she might arrive at a paradigmatic exchange. Her mistaken reactions to common nouns are predominantly paradigmatic paralexias (see above). In the case of proper names, paradigmatic exchanges might occur as well. But such reactions are very rare and cannot be compared to the multiplicity of paradigmatic exchanges for common nouns. The inherent feature for the gender of the name seems to be too weak to select a class within which substitutions could be made. In order to investigate whether acquaintance with the referent is relevant, the patient is confronted with 90 names (first and family names) of well known personalities. One third of the surnames are homographic with a common noun, e.g., Helmut Kohl (cabbage), Franz-Josef Strauss (ostrich, or bouquet), Romy Schneider (tailor). This experiment makes clear that

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many surnames can be read only because they are homographic with a common noun, e.g., in the case of Romy Schneider, whose surname is read correctly although the patient is not acquainted with the actress. It is also characteristic that word elements with an appellative meaning are picked out, e.g., Kopj (head) in Kurt Biedenkopj, and Taxi (taxi) in Johannes von Thurn und Taxis. In reading names of German cities and countries, the patient can only specify spontaneously whether she is dealing with a city or a country if she cannot activate the phonetic form, and this is seldom the case. Bayer (1991: 59) concludes that it is Kripke's rather than Searle's theory that is confirmed. As regards proper names, the semantic system appears to be empty. However, in contrast with Semenza and Zettin's patient, this person was able to specify elementary features like 'masculine', 'feminine', 'city', or 'country'. Bayer (1991: 64) then emphasizes that from now on, the theory of proper names is bound to recognize that in the case of proper names, there exists something like a minimal lexical categorical sense specifying personal names, city names, country names, and the like. It should be remarked here that Bayer obviously overlooked Searle's (1969: 167) statement quoted above: "Some general term is analytically tied to any proper name: Everest is a mountain, the Mississippi is a river, de Gaulle is a person." This entails not only that Kripke is wrong but that Searle is right in the question of the categorical meaning. What is more, the terms mentioned by the patient are all basic level terms pertaining to the names in question, a fact not observed by Bayer. That Semenza and Zettin did not discover categorical meaning in proper names at all is simply due to the nature of their patients' disorder and of the ensuing experiments. The aphasics were shown pictures or given descriptions in which the basic level meaning was provided automatically. Note finally that neither Semenza and Zettin nor Bayer have proved that Searle is as erroneous as they claim in the question of the (asserted) lexical meaning. After all, Searle admitted that proper names have no definitional meaning. Bayer's study of deep dyslexia, just as Semenza and Zettin's investigation of aphasia, revealed that the patient can still make certain associations with names referring mostly to familiar or well known persons or places. Some examples: (48)

a. Jose! "so heisst me in Vater" 'Josef: that's my father's name' b. Poeck: "Professor" (Poeck is the professor treating this patient)

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c. Tiro!: "da warn wir schon mal auf Urlaub" (there we were already on holidays) d. Vietnam: "ich glaube viel Krieg" (I believe a lot of war) e. Australien: "we it weg ... Kanguruhs" (far away ... kangaroos) As Bayer (1991: 60) puts it, these reactions are not paralexias, but are comments which lead directly to a referent. 64 Obviously, these comments again constitute what I have called associative meaning connected with the referent.

6.3. Miceli, Daniele, Esposito and Magarelli (1998) Miceli, Daniele, Esposito and Magarelli (1998) discuss a selective conceptual deficit for people's names, which is interpreted as an impairment of domain-specific knowledge. The study concerns a woman with "anterior left temporal lobe damage due to head trauma." Two years post-onset the patient's only complaint is about "a major difficulty finding people's names." The names used in the experiments were of historical and contemporary celebrities. The patient performed significantly less well here than with common nouns. Other tests revealed that this was "due to loss of conceptual knowledge on people." Translated into my framework, it means that associative meaning connected with the referent may constitute an important feature of proper names, at least of personal names. However, it need not entail that this associative sense determines the reference of the name.

6.4. Discussion It appears correct to state that all of these neuropsychological results, and especially the data provided by Bayer (1991), square perfectly well with the theory of proper names I have outlined above and which partly figured in some of my previous writings. Let us sum up the relevant features here. The results confirm that proper names have no lexical meaning in the way displayed by appellatives such that the intension determines the extensIOn. The results also corroborate the primarily referential function of proper names: a proper name is a noun that denotes a unique entity at the level of

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established linguistic convention to make it psychosocially salient within a given basic level category. The above assumption that a categorical meaning must be attributed to proper names is corroborated at least by the German patient's statements that the names presented are about men, women, cities, or countries. These statements also suggest that the above-mentioned secondary features of the type 'American, president' and so on are not part of the categorical meaning since they are not mentioned by the patient, although this may of course be accidental. Further research might be useful here. The categorical meanings provided by the German patient are exactly what were found to be basic level terms: 'man, woman, city, country'. Again, more evidence of this kind should come from other such cases of aphasia. Some indirect evidence is available for the assumption of grammatical meaning in proper names insofar as for personal names, the features masculine and feminine were indicated. Of course, these features coincide with the categorical meanings 'male' and 'female person'. So we would need more evidence from other kinds of names. Unfortunately, the experiments fail to say anything about the gender of place names. The assumption of associative meaning in proper names is confirmed as well. First, obvious associations were made with words homophonous with certain names or parts thereof (cf. Schneider 'tailor'; Verdi 'green(s)'). Second, the patients made occasional associations with the referents of the names (cf. Vietnam: 'a lot of war'; 'famous poet...'). The possible importance of associations with the referent of a name is especially illustrated by Miceli, Daniele, Esposito and Magarelli (1998). In Bayer's account, the associations with the referent are sharply distinguished from the semantic features 'man, woman, city, country', i.e. my basic level categorical presuppositions. This distinction is justified by a psychological one between two kinds of memory. Following Tulving (1972; see also 2002), Bayer (1991: 62) distinguishes between 'semantic' and 'episodic' memory. Common nouns as well as the categorical meaning of proper names seem to pertain to this semantic memory, which contains meanings and their mutual relations in a timeless way. These are shared by other speakers, at least in principle. We could then maintain that these features belong to established linguistic convention. By contrast, the episodic (autobiographical) memory stocks time-bound events and their mutual spatial relationships. This memory is said to be radically different from speaker to speaker and therefore to contain, among other things, contingent characterizations of individuals such as they appear in the above associa-

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tions with the referent. These features can be said to pertain to language use. In principle, we can agree with this. The only problem for Bayer's dichotomy could be transition cases like those discussed above, viz. the less general features of the type' American' and 'president'. Another problem is the status of the associations with the phonological form of the name (cf. Schneider 'tailor'). Bayer (1991) does not go into these phenomena of homophony, but we could wonder whether this type of associations pertains to the semantic memory or to the episodic memory. As I argued above, the associations that one can make with a given proper name pertain to language use because they apparently differ from one speech situation to another. So we can conclude that all associations of a proper name, including the phonological ones, belong to episodic memo!),. There are a few things that the experiments do not or cannot say anything about. For example, the distinction between proprial lemma and proper name function as defended above is of course absent. However, in the experiments, this distinction is unlikely to play any role since the names were presented in isolation. Moreover, in the case of the presentation of names that referred to well known persons and in which first and family name were mentioned together, it is rather the proper name in its referring to a specific individual that is meant than just a propriaI lemma. Nevertheless, one might wonder what exactly Semenza's and Bayer's patients cannot retrieve. It appears that for them the construction in which the names appear is not relevant. Hence, what they cannot retrieve is the proprial lemmas rather than the proper names in their primary function. I deduce this from the fact that names like Verdi, Kohl, Strauss and Schneider, which are homonymous with appellative lemmas, can be retrieved. The thesis that lemmas (and not constructions) are relevant here is corroborated by the fact that the results with color and brand names are not clear-cut (Semenza and Zettin 1988). Again, what is relevant is not the construction as proper name or as common noun but the circumstance that the lemma status of these kinds of name is not clear: are they proprial or appellative lemmas? I have proposed the notion of proprio-appellative lemma (cf. also chapter 3). At the same time, the categories of proper name and common noun are relevant indirectly in the case of prototypical names since the notion of proprial lemma is defined as a lemma that is primarily construed as a proper name, i.e. as a noun that denotes a unique entity at the level of linguistic convention to make it psychosocially salient within a given basic level category, and whose possible meaning is secondary with regard to the referential status.

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Apart from the distinction proper name vs. proprial lemma, another dichotomy is missing in these experiments: the one between asserted and presuppositional meaning. More in particular, nothing was said about the nature of the categorical meaning. However, the total discrepancy found in the treatment of common nouns and proper names strongly suggests that this categorical meaning cannot be of the 'asserted' type since otherwise, the difference found between the two nominal subclasses in question would be insignificant.

7.

Conclusions

Radical Construction Grammar allows us to break the circularity in defining proper names, viz. that proper names and the constructions they appear in have been defined in terms of each other. I have arrived at the following definition: A proper name is a noun that denotes a unique entity at the level of established linguistic convention to make it psychosocially salient within a given basic level category [pragmatic]. The meaning of the name, if any, does not (or not any longer) determine its denotation [semantic]. An important formal reflex of this pragmatic-semantic characterization of names is their ability to appear in such close appositional constructions as the poet Burns, Fido the dog, the River Thames, or the City of London [syntactic].

Further, it can be stated that although proper names - unlike common nouns - do not have asserted lexical meaning they do display presuppositional meanings of several kinds: categorical (basic level), emotive, associative senses (introduced either via the name bearer or via the name form) and grammatical meanings. The associative senses pertain rather to language use, while the categorical and grammatical meanings can be situated on the level of established linguistic convention. Language specifically, this referential and semantic status is reflected in the occurrence of proper names in certain constructions. We have seen, for instance, that close appositional patterns of the form [definite article + noun + noun], e.g., the poet Burns, are relevant to define proper names in English grammatically and also to indicate the categorical (often basic level) meaning of the name. The data about the coordination of homophonous NPs point in the same direction. If we analyze proper names in the above way there may be no need to resort to metalinguistic definitions or to alter the meaning of 'meaning' (as

Conclusions

117

Kleiber 1995 and Katz 2001 did) and we can stick to what Katz calls 'Fregean sense'. I argue here that whether the sense determines the reference of an NP or not corresponds crucially with certain grammatical constructions the NP occurs in. In the appositional structure the poet Burns, the lemma Burns is a proper name, in the construction another Burns, the same lemma IS a common noun. I could obtain the above analysis only by distinguishing between proprial lemmas in isolation (dictionary entries) and proprial lemmas in their various proprial as well as appellative functions. Prototypically, proprial lemmas adopt the function of 'proper names', which have the referential and semantic properties described above and occur in constructions that accommodate these properties. Nonprototypically, proprial lemmas adopt the function of common nouns, i.e. expressions that refer with the help of a predication (such as a different John; a second Napoleon), or sometimes act as pure predicates (as in as L.A. as a person could get and ... twice as Nashville as the neon sign at Twitty City). A consequence of the analysis of proper names advocated above is that (apparently together with personal pronouns) this nominal subclass represents the prototypical nouns since their primary function is to refer to an object (or person). By contrast, common nouns are less prototypical nouns since they contain a predication, which is in the first place a verbal feature. We have seen that this view seems to contradict Langacker's (1991) ideas on proper names. Langacker claims proper names to depart from the prototypical nominal pattern, a thesis clearly based on the analysis of common nouns. However, taking a closer look at this paradox has revealed that Langacker's analysis of nominals could be interpreted in such a way that proper names (as well as personal pronouns) do constitute a prototypical nominal class. To reach this conclusion, it was necessary in this case to replace Langacker's iconicity of isomorphism with the truly diagrammatic iconicity of motivation. The neuropsychological results provided by Semenza and Zettin (1988) and particularly the data furnished by Bayer (1991), square well with the above proposals. More specifically, they prove the absence of asserted lexical meaning, the primacy of denotation in proper names, and the existence of proprial lemmas. The results also corroborate the presence of basic level and associative presuppositions in proper names. What remains unclear in this neuropsychological research is the status of appellativizations (e.g., a different John). It appears that the neuropsychological results apply only to prototypical proper names with a prototypical proprial lemma. Bredart and Valentine (1998) corroborates the psychological im-

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Nominal and referential-semantic status ofproper names

portance of what I call the propriaI lemma. Here it was found that name retrieval was more difficult for arbitrarily named items than for 'descriptive names', a distinction that roughly corresponds to proper names derived from proprial lemmas ('arbitrary') and those based on appellative lemmas (' descriptive,).65 A problem for the interpretation the above neurolinguists give to their results is that these appear to hold also for personal pronouns, which are implicitly treated in the same way as proper names, although they should not: the lack of lexical (definitional) meaning in pronouns is unproblematic for the aphasics in question, whereas the lack of this meaning in proper names does pose a clear problem for them. So, the real difference between the two nominal categories seems to reside in the fact that in the case of proper names the denotation is unique and independent of the context, whereas for personal pronouns the reference crucially depends on the context. As for the language philosophical literature on proper names, it should be stressed that neither Semenza and Zettin, nor Bayer have proved that Searle was as wrong as they claim. It means that the whole and simple truth is not to be found in Kripke (1972). After all, Searle admitted that proper names have no definitional meaning. He was also right in regarding what I have called categorical meaning (and more precisely basic level meaning) as an essential feature of proper names. And obviously, his cluster of descriptions theory highlights the existence of associative meaning. By contrast, the aphasiological experiments say little or nothing about Kripke's rigid designator or his causal theory. From a linguistic point of view, the notion of rigid designator may be a necessary feature of proper names but certainly not a sufficient one. Finally, it is clear that proper names do not always originate via a baptismal, i.e. an illocutionary act of 'declaration', especially not in the frequent cases in which a gradual semantic bleaching takes place.

Chapter 2 Formal characteristics of proper names

1. Introduction

In this chapter, I want to adduce synchronic formal characteristics that are essential to or typical of proper names in general as opposed to common nouns and personal pronouns. The languages to which the formal evidence is relevant concern mainly English and Dutch. The formal characteristics of proper names I want to deal with here fall into two classes: those that pertain to the extension/intension status of proper names and those that pertain to their grammatical meaning. The characteristics pertaining to the extension/intension status of proper names are claimed to be defining in that they define at least the prototypical instances. By contrast, the grammatical features do not define proper names. However, the important claim is made here that any grammatical feature found in personal pronouns can also be encountered in proper names and vice-versa. A further resemblance is that only one of them, viz. definiteness, is common to all the members of each class. The other features are distributed more or less randomly. All this will result in situating proper names between common nouns and personal pronouns and in positing the proper name as the most prototypical nominal category. Finally, specific constructions in which the propriallemma is appellativized (Le. transformed to a common noun) will be adduced, but also a few more or less marked constructions in which the proprial lemma unexpectedly has a propria1function. As in the case of other word classes, it appears to be very difficult, if not impossible, to find any formal characteristics of proper names that are universally valid notwithstanding the fact that proper names are claimed to constitute a universal semantic category.66 Even if we keep to one specific language, it is not easy to adduce features that apply to all proper name classes. Hockett (1958: 311) mentions Fiji, where proper names seem to be introduced by the particle ko, but appellatives by the particle na, e.g., ko vanua levu 'Big Island' vs. na vanua levu 'the/ a big island'. However, it is not clear whether this obtains for every proprial subcategory. Twenty-five

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years earlier, the pioneer of American structuralism, Bloomfield (1933: 205), had assigned three formal characteristics to English proper names: "they occur only in the singular number, take no determiner, and are always definite." This characterization has been elaborated in later work, among others, in the rigid structuralist framework of S0rensen (1958: 156). However, each of these criteria has been challenged and criticized. A more recent overview of morphosyntactic properties of proper names is provided by Kolde (1995) with special attention to German. I will not deal with this article in any further detail here (see Van Langendonck 1995), but refer to it occasionally.67 Methodologically, I find it imperative to relate formal characteristics to semantic ones; in other words, I believe in a certain isomorphism between form and meaning. I cannot agree with the idea that a noun phrase (henceforth: NP) which is a proper name on the syntactic level, need not be a proper name on the semantic level (Algeo 1973, following Stratificational Grammar, compare Van Langendonck 1974). As I argue in chapter 1, the stratificational approach loses its appeal when one realizes that language cannot be built up in a schizophrenic way. It is difficult to maintain that syntax is quite independent of semantics. To define proper names for English and Dutch morphosyntactically, I will first establish their status as nouns. Subsequently, I will briefly recall their semantic status. Only then can we correlate these findings with possible formal features.

2. The proper name as a nominal category As was stated above, it has been traditionally agreed on since Antiquity that proper names constitute a kind of nouns. As nouns they appear as NPs (as in Sheila) or as the head of an NP (as in our cute Sheila). Coates (2005b; 2006: 356, 357, 369) disagrees with this view and argues that "The PROPER NOUN, as a lexical category, is ... epiphenomenal on proper names as newly defined." Coates' new definition entails this position (see chapter 1). As was pointed out in chapter 1 (3.2.2.5), a proper name like the Old Vicarage does not pose a real problem for the claim that proper names are nouns. In the proprial NP the Old Vicarage, Old-Vicarage is the noun, the classifies. In the proper noun, no element can be inserted between Old and Vicarage (which may no longer be a vicarage). In the common noun phrase the old vicarage, insertions are possible, e.g., the old but beautiful vicarage. Furthermore, that the name is a noun is proved by the fact that pro-

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prial expressions such as Old Vicarage can be turned into a common noun, as in: This is a second Old- Vicarage, unless we should conclude that 'common nouns' (appellatives) do not constitute a word class either, Le. that there exist no nouns at all in language. Formally, the claim that proper names are nouns is supported by the fact that phrases which consist of a proper name or whose head is a proper name have the external and the internal properties ofNPs. With respect to the external structure of proper names, we observe that they can act as the subject of a sentence, possibly with the help of a determiner, as in (Our cute) Sheila has made it. Some linguists even reverse things in that they define NPs in terms of proper names. Thus, Creissels (l991: 41-42) states that "le terme de 'constituant nominal' ... est utilise ici pour designer, independamment de sa structure interne, tout fragment de phrase qui apparait comme syntaxiquement equivalent it un nom propre de personne" (Le. the term NP is used here to designate, independently of its internal structure, any sentence part behaving as syntactically equivalent to a personal name). This implies not only that personal names are considered the prototypical proper names but also that proper names are thought of as the prototypical NPs. Of course, this position leaves us with the problem of defining proper names themselves. A minority of proper names cannot function as subjects on their own, with or without a determiner, e.g., the names referring to a family have to be accompanied by the word 'family', in Dutch as well as in English. In English the name is a modifier (la), in Dutch an apposition (lb). Without such an addition we are dealing with an individual name (2a,b), compare:

(1) (2)

a. b. a. b.

The Johnsonfamily will come tomorrow. De familie Jansen zal morgen komen. Johnson is a nasty man. Jansen is een nare man.

Likewise, certain Dutch nicknames need to be accompanied by a first name (see chapter 3), e.g.,

(3)

a. Jan Ammoniak gaat weg uit het dorp. 'John Ammonia is leaving the village.' b. *Ammoniak gaat weg uit het dorp.

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These are marginal phenomena but they are still exceptions to the rule that, possibly with the help of a determiner, proper names can appear in subject position. With respect to the internal structure of names, we see that like common nouns, but unlike personal pronouns, proper names can take determiners and adjectival or other modifiers which often display an expressive character, at least in Germanic languages,68 compare: (4)

a. That George Bush is a nice guy. (Vandelanotte and Willemse 2002: 22) b. Die George Bush is een leuke kerel. c. (Our) cute Sheila has made it. d. (Onze) lieftallige Sheila heeft het gemaakt. e. Britain's Jeremy Irons was present at the premiere in New York. (Vandelanotte and Willemse 2002: 25)

For some proper name categories (see below), an article is even indispensable. Chomsky (1965: 100) spoke of a 'fixed determiner', as in the Nile (similarly Anderson 2004: 468). Further examples: (5)

a. The Rhine is a polluted river. b. De Rijn is een vervuilde rivier. c. De Everest is de hoogste berg van de wereld 'Mount Everest is the highest mountain in the world.'

In English, the article is sometimes replaced with a classifier, as in the translation of (5c), and in: (6)

Lake Ontario has been polluted for quite some time.

One might wonder whether the fixed article forms part of the proper name or not; in other words, can it still be regarded as a real determiner? We should distinguish between a real and a fossilized article (Leys 1965; see also below). A fossilized determiner really forms part of the noun in that it cannot be removed, replaced or separated from the proprial stem, as in the Dutch city names De Panne, De Haan, Den Haag 'The Hague', where De(n) is to be viewed as an article only historically. Synchronically, De(n) behaves as a mere syllable, compare:

(7)

a. het mooie De Pannel De Haanl Den Haag

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123

b. *de(n) mooie Panne/ Haan/ Haag 'the beautiful De Pannel De Haanl The Hague'

Probably the only synchronic reflex of an older determiner status (except for the spelling) is the elision of this syllable in derivations, compare the formation of the inhabitant name (8a) and the adjective (8b) respectively:

(8)

a. Hagenaar, Hanenaar, Pannenaar b. Haags, ??Haans, ??Pans

The reduced form can be explained as an allomorph used for reasons of economy. By contrast, in river, mountain names and the like, the article appears to behave as a real determiner in that it is separable from the stem and replaceable by another determiner, in English as well as in Dutch:

(9)

a. b. c. d.

The swollen Oder flooded the surrounding country. De gezwollen Oder overstroomde zijn omgeving. This beautiful Donau got polluted Die mooie Donau raakte vervuild

However, not all languages or dialects permit the separation of the article in question from the name, as in southern Dutch (Flemish) regiolects: (10)

a. *de schone Schelde 'the beautiful Scheldt' b. *de hoge Mont Blanc 'the high Mont Blanc'

But this impossibility does not invalidate the claim that it is a genuine article. In nonrestrictive uses, as in the above proper names, the demonstrative die is employed instead of the article, which then disappears automatically: (11)

die schone Schelde; die hoge Mont Blanc

Moreover, the same process (in the regiolect) occurs with common nouns in nonrestrictive use, compare: (12)

die/ *de schone stroom 'that beautiful river'

The above considerations could cast doubt on the claim that a proper name is a noun. Can it not be a noun phrase, or a noun and a noun phrase at the

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same time? In English and Dutch, most (countable) common nouns happen to need the help of a detenniner in order to be able to function as an NP, e.g., (13)

a. b. c. d.

A book can be a good friend. *Book can be a goodfriend. Een boek kan een goede vriend zijn. *Boek kan een goede vriend zijn.

Articleless proper names, such as first names and city names, can of course function as NPs: (14)

a. b. c. d.

John arrived. Jan kwam aan. Paris is nearby. Parijs is dichtbij.

In the case of river names and a number of other proprial classes, a determiner is needed to obtain an NP, just as for appellatives. Since this determiner, including the article, is not an inherent part of the propriaI word, it makes sense to argue that these and all other proper names are nouns, just as common nouns, but that they are able to function much more often as NPs on their own than common nouns are. Additional proof that proper names are nouns comes from the fact that, as a rule, they take a detenniner if (nonrestrictive) modifiers are added, just as common nouns do: 69 (15)

a. Our pretty Caroline with the black hair came to visit us yesterday. b. Onze mooie Karolien met het zwarte haar kwam ons gisteren bezoeken.

Two final remarks are in order. First, unlike Dutch personal names, the English counterparts allow for certain expressive adjectives as in:

(16)

Poor Mary will do that.

Second, restrictive modifiers can be added to names as well, but then we are dealing with appellativized propriallemmas (see chapter 1, and below), even if we have to do with a submanifestation of the referent, as in:

Formal correlates o/proprial meanings

(17)

125

a. The classical Rome ofCicero 's time will never come back. b. Het klassieke Rome van Cicero's tijd zal nooit terugkomen.

3. Formal correlates of proprial meanings In the first section (3.1) I will deal with the characteristics that pertain to the extension/intension status of proper names. In section 3.2, I will be concerned with those that pertain to their grammatical meaning.

3.1. Formal characteristics pertaining to the extension/intension status of proper names The formal characteristics pertaining to the extension/intension status of proper names are claimed to be defining; at least they define the prototypical instances. In my view, the most important characteristic for the semantic-syntactic definition of proper names is the construction that has been traditionally referred to as 'close apposition' (Lee 1952; Haugen 1953).

3.1.1. Close apposition In this section, I will develop extensively my claim that close apposition is a crucial criterion for 'properhood' (compare Van Langendonck 1999b). The purpose of the apposition test is twofold: first, it serves to define the proper name formally as a unit in a construction. Second, for all proper name subclasses, except for personal names, it indicates the basic level category to which the proper name in question belongs.7o The phenomenon of apposition has barely been granted attention since the heydays of structuralism (see Nosek 1986). Generative grammar was hardly interested in constructions. If it was, then the interest went mainly to the nature of the tree diagrams that had to render the various syntactic kinds of apposition (e.g., Klein 1976). The semantic and referential aspects were largely neglected. To a certain extent, this is even the case in more recent pragmatic treatments of apposition (e.g., Meyer 1992). In the next section, I will deal with the semantic-syntactic features of close and loose apposition as far as they are useful for the definition of proper names.

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3.1.1.1.

Close vs. loose apposition

For the issues at hand here, I wish to take over the terms 'close' and 'loose' apposition from the American structuralists for reasons that will become clear below. As is well known, in close appositional structures, there are two appositives which together form an intonational unit and appear to be sometimes interchangeable, sometimes not, compare, e.g., the poet Burns / Burns the poet, vs. Fido the dog.?1 By contrast, in loose apposition the appositives receive equal stress, are freely interchangeable and are normally separated by an intonation break, a so-called comma break, as in: Chirac, the president of France / the president of France, Chirac. 72 As a formal criterion for proper-namehood, I will be especially concerned with close apposition, termed strict restrictive apposition by Quirk et al. (1972: 638-639). This can take three forms. I will take over these three types here, together with some of their examples and supplemented with material from Meyer (1992) [abbreviated as M]. Gradually, I will focus on the types that are of interest here and contrast them with loose appositional structures on some relevant points. According to Quirk et al. (1972: 638-639) English close appositional constructions are ofthe following types. [1] "The first appositive is preceded by a definite determiner (and possibly premodifier) and is more general than the second appositive": (18)

the singer Robeson, the novel 'Great Expectations', the River Thames, the number three, the year 1970, your brother George, my good friend Bob

In this category we also find autonymic uses, i.e. metalinguistic uses in which a word or syntagm refers to itself, such as: (19)

the word 'if', the noun 'butter', the term 'heavy water', the expression 'do your own thing' (p. 641)

Quirk et al. (1972: 40) add: "Instead of the first form of strict restrictive apposition the two appositives are more commonly linked by of for the names of months and for the names of villages, cities, districts, countries, and regions":

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the .month of December, the City of London, the State ofWashington, the island of Cyprus, the continent of Africa, the name of Don (M 125)

[2] "The reverse of [1], the second appositive is preceded by a determiner, always the, and is more general than the first":

(21)

Robeson the singer, Thompson the plumber, Wright the lawyer

It should be remarked here that the appears to be impossible with words for family relationship, with which possessive pronouns are used instead of the article: *George the brother vs. George my brother (Quirk et al. 1972: 641, 643). That the first appositive is restricted to the name of a person has to be qualified as well since animal names are possible: Sprite the kitten (M 50), Fido the dog. On the other hand, in certain constructions with human first appositives the second unit indicates a special manifestation of the individual; interchanging the units is impossible here: Eisenhower the man was different from Eisenhower the president (M 50).

[3] "Type 3 is like [1] but with omission of the determiner":

(22)

Singer Robeson, Friend Bob, Lawyer Wright, Democratic Leader Robinson; Operation Abolition, Hurricane Edna; equation 4, room lOA

Institutionalized titles such as Queen Elizabeth, Lord Harper, President Nixon, can be included in type [3] especially since there is a "gradience from apposition in critic Paul Jones to full title in Mr Porter" (Quirk et al. 1972: 641-644). Types [1] and [2] are considered full appositional structures. Whenever such syntagms occur in a sentence, the following criteria apply:73 (a) "each of the appositives can be separately omitted without affecting the acceptability of the sentence, (b) each fulfills the same syntactic function in the resultant smtences, and (c) there is no difference between the original sentence and either of the resultant sentences in extralinguistic reference" (Quirk et al. 1972: 621). Thus, if the sentence The singer Robeson is coming tonight is true, it entails the truth and wellformedness ofthe statements:

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Formal characteristics a/proper names

(23)

a. b. c. d.

The singer is coming tonight. Robeson is coming tonight. The singer is Robeson. Robeson is the singer.

Although it is not mentioned in either Quirk et al. (1972) or Meyer (1992) these three criteria also apply to combinations of first name and family name, at least if the last name is interpreted as referring to the individual in question and not to the family, compare: (24)

a. b. c. d.

Imet Roger. Imet Brown. Roger is Brown. Brown is Roger.

By contrast, type [3] does not seem to meet any of the three requirements due to the fact that only the second appositive can function on its own, not the first: (25)

a. Robeson is coming tonight. b. *Singer is coming tonight. c. *Singer is Robeson.

At the same time, it is still possible to say that a (categorizing) equation of the form Robeson is a/the singer applies, as in types [1] and [2].

3.1.1.2.

Close apposition as a criterion/or proper-namehood

3.1.1.2.1. The relevant pattern

0/ close apposition

In order to define the notion of proper name in English we need to pinpoint the relevant pattern of close apposition. This appears to be the most prototypical one. Syntactically, it concerns the probably most frequent type in which two minimal nominal units are juxtaposed, sometimes with the help of the apposition marker oj, linking the two units. 74 The two units should be able to function on their own and display the minimal definite determination, i.e. either the definite article (as in the poet Burns) or zero (as in Roger Brown).75 This is to rule out combinations of the type in which possessive or demonstrative determiners are employed and where sometimes

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proper names are clearly absent, as in the first two of the following three examples: 76

(26)

a. Her Majesty the Queen b. My sister the lawyer c. This woman Bandra (M 84)

For the purpose at hand, we should also exclude combinations containing a pronominal appositive, in which proper names may again be lacking, as in: we the farmers. The above restrictions still allow for several types of English close appositional constructions relevant to the definition of proper names: [Def Art + N + NP], e.g., the poet Burns, the year 2000, the River Thames, the song 'The Seven Drunken Knights' (M 84), the question: What does it mean to live in modern society?' (M 59), the words 'standfor' and 'about' (M 84), the element gold, the language Newspeak; [NP + Def Art + N]: human NPs, with a possibility of reversal, e.g., (Robert) Frost the poet (M 49), NPs indicating animals, without the possibility of reversal, e.g., Sprite the kitten (M 50); [Def Art + N + of + NP], e.g., the vice of intemperance (M 1), the name of Don (M 125), the notion of intolerance, the City of London, the State of Belgium, the month of June; [first name + surname], e.g., Roger Brown. At this stage, it is interesting to contrast loose appositional structures with the above four close appositions. As is well known, there is a much greater freedom in the structures of loose apposition. For instance, unlike close appositional structures, the appositives in the loose variants can be introduced by an indefinite article. Sometimes, however, such differences are ignored. Contrary to what authors like Meyer (1992) seem to think, certain differences between close and loose apposition are important from a semantic and a syntactic viewpoint, at least for my purpose. Consider the following differences in acceptability between loose and close appositional structures, even if all appositives are construed as definite and even if they consist of the same words:

(27)

a. The greatest Victorian poet, Tennyson, died early.

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(28)

Formal characteristics a/proper names b. c. d. e.

The Victorian poet, Tennyson, died early. ?*The poet, Tennyson, died early. Tennyson, the (greatest) Victorian poet, died early. ?*Tennyson, the poet, died early.

a. b. c. d. e. f.

*The greatest Victorian poet Tennyson died early. The Victorian poet Tennyson died early. The poet Tennyson died early. *Tennyson the greatest Victorian poet died early. Tennyson the Victorian poet died early. Tennyson the poet died early.

In (27a,b,d) we encounter acceptable loose appositions. The free interchangeability of the appositives and the equal stress on them appear to be iconic: they reflect the identical and equally specific reference of these units. Tennyson is the (greatest) Victorian poet and the (greatest) Victorian poet is Tennyson, as if there had been no greater or even no other Victorian poet. We can even put extra stress on the article: Tennyson, THE Victorian poet. In (27c,e), however, one appositive, the poet, does not exhibit sufficiently specific reference to constitute an equivalent partner of Tennyson. Indeed, these combinations turn out to be unacceptable: either the speaker wants to provide new information, but then the reference 'the poet' does not make sense because of its vagueness, or the poet has been mentioned in the context, and then one ofthe two appositives is superfluous. The case of the close appositions in (28) looks quite different. Here the units are not equivalent: there is no intonation break and one of the units bears the group stress. The article cannot receive extra stress: *THE poet Tennyson; *Tennyson THE poet. The motivation behind these formal phenomena is again iconic. In both types the reference of the noun Tennyson is very specific; that of the noun with the article is rather weak. Although the two units of these appositional syntagms are coreferential the essential function of the noun with the article appears to be to characterize the nature of the referent of the other appositive, and more specifically to assign a category to it, i.e. Tennyson is a poet (see already Lee 1952; Haugen 1953). The reverse operation clearly does not work: ??the poet is a Tennyson. This situation explains that the uniquely identifying reference by means of a superlative construction as in (28a) is unacceptable and even ungrammatical. Indeed, one cannot use a characterizing paraphrase here: * Tennyson is a greatest Victorian poet.

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The definite article in a close appositional construction like the poet Tennyson in (28c) can be accounted for by the fact that this construction is the presuppositional counterpart of the indefinite article in the assertion Tennyson is a poet. If one speaks of the poet Tennyson one is presupposing that Tennyson is a poet. I am now in a position to put forward a few specific claims: The unit in an English appositional construction that characterizes its referent is a common noun that assigns a category to this referent. This categorizing unit is introduced either by the definite article or by zero. This common noun is almost always a countable noun; mass nouns hardly appear in close appositions, apparently because they are not such good categorizers. 77 The unit in the relevant type of close appositional structure that does not characterize but identify is a proper name. For instance, in the poet Burns, the second unit Burns shows purely identifying reference and is the proper name. In the syntagm Frost the poet, the first unit Frost is the proper name, being an identifying NP that does not characterize. Note that this criterion could not be inferred from a loose appositional structure: here both appositives are equally identifying if they are definite NPs and they are not meant to characterize or categorize, as was pointed out above. No proper names may even be involved, compare: (29)

a. The university town, the beer capital, is celebrating an anniversary. b. The beer capital, the university town, is celebrating an anniversary.

In order to find out what is construed as a proper name in constructions differing from the close appositional structure we have to compare form and function of the proper name candidate with its counterpart in a close apposition. Thus, we know that Louvain in the sentence Louvain is beautiful is a proper name because it displays the same form and function as in the sentence with a corresponding close apposition: The town of Louvain is beautiful. If none of the two units is of a characterizing nature, they are both proper names and hence purely identifying (as in Roger Brown). Although in such instances as Roger Brown, Robert Frost, the two units are proprial, the Christian name appears to be more specific than the family name, i.e. the Christian name shows individual reference whereas the surname indicates a group the membership of which varies constantly. That the surname

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Formal characteristics o/proper names

Frost is (or can be) a proprial element as well as the first name, follows from its possible occurrence in the appositional structure the poet Frost. For the proprial interpretation of the first name, we can invoke other constructions such as Robert the poet, or Roger the man. Syntactically, we can argue that in the above four constructions [Def Art + N + NP], [NP + Def Art + N], [Def Art + N + of + NP] and [first name + surname] the nouns not introduced by an article are words in proper name function. The other nouns are appellatives and specify the subclass to which the proper name belongs. Thus, Burns, 2000, Thames, 'The Seven Drunken Knights ',78 'What does it mean to live in modern society?', 'stand for' and 'about', gold, Newspeak, (Robert) Frost, Sprite, intemperance, Don, intolerance, London, Belgium, June, Roger and Brown are proper names, at least in these constructions. It should be pointed out that in such patterns as Lawyer Wright and Hurricane Edna the first units are not proper names but common nouns since they characterize the referent, as can be seen in the paraphrases: Wright is a lawyer and Edna is a hurricane. Further corroboration of the division into appellative and propriaI elements in the prototypical appositional structures the poet Burns and Frost the poet is provided by the possibility of the insertion of a modifier into the appellative NP and the impossibility of it in the proprial NP, compare: (30)

a. the great poet Burns - *the poet (the) great Burns b. Frost the great poet - *(the) great Frost the poet

In [first name + surname] combinations, an adjective that seems to modify the whole combination is possible; compare:

(31)

a. the great William Shakespeare b. the great Shakespeare c. *William the great Shakespeare

3.1.1.2.2. Possible objections After this semantic and syntactic argumentation we have to consider that at least the following objections could be raised against the present analysis. Quirk et al. (1972) analyze close apposition as restrictive apposition. In considering the pattern Mr Campbell the lawyer, Quirk et al. (1972: 623) see "Mr Campbell the lawyer as opposed to any other Mr Campbell we

Formal correlates ofproprial meanings

133

know." This analysis would imply that the reference to Mr Campbell is restricted to one of different Mr Campbells. However, this would entail that this name is treated not as a rigid designator but as a common noun. This interpretation is rather far-fetched. It is possible only if contrastive stress is applied to the second appositive. Moreover, it would be strange if in the case of animals, where the typical pattern is [name + def art + common noun], we would have to apply the contrastive stress analysis automatically. It is difficult indeed to see, for instance, Sprite the kitten as opposed to any other Sprite we know. Meyer (1992) calls the pattern in question a case of 'characterization', i.e. Campbell is being characterized as a lawyer. This seems to apply in a way similar to the case of Eisenhower the man. By contrast, in the constructions in which the proper name follows (the poet Burns, the City of London) the units are claimed to stand in a relation of identification. In my view, in both patterns the common noun characterizes (categorizes) the referent of the whole syntagm, while the proper name identifies the referent. The difference between the two patterns seems to lie in the fact that in the poet Burns the identificatory function of the proper name is highlighted, whereas in Campbell the lawyer the characterizing role of the common noun is given emphasis. This would explain why this last pattern is used for the expression of mere predication as in Eisenhower the man, which means 'Eisenhower as a man'. In this model the common noun does not even seem to refer whereas in all the others it does. After all, the prototypical function of common nouns is to refer by means of their predicative content. Thus, these appellative appositives involve not only characterization but also selective reference, i.e. non-contrastive selection from a delimited set of referents. In this view, the pattern Campbell the lawyer is not essentially different from the reverse one the poet Burns. Regarding the combination Roger Brown, there is no characterization at all but only more precise identification in that Roger is further identified as belonging to the Brown family. It is important to discuss such close appositional structures that do not display a proprial lemma in the second unit, but in which this second element still functions as a proper name. Examples: (32)

a. b. c. d.

the song 'The Seven Drunken Knights' the question: What does it mean to live in modern society? the word 'bank' the notion of 'soul'

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Formal characteristics a/proper names

In Meyer's (1992: 84) terminology, we have to do here with 'citations'. So it seems we are dealing with instances of metalinguistic usage. In my view, these cases can at the same time be analyzed as belonging to the class of 'appellation', in which "the second unit 'names' rather than identifies the first unit" (Meyer 1992: 76).79 In the appellation apposition Meyer considers the second unit a proper noun. Although I do not regard the second appositives in the above citations as proprial lemmas, it appears that, semanticallyand syntactically, they behave as proper names in these appositional structures in the same way as the units in the standard appositional syntagms. They show individual reference and can function on their own syntactically (for citations, see also Quirk et al. 1972: 641). Independent evidence for this analysis comes from the fact that it explains the lack of an article with words that otherwise need it, viz. count nouns like bank and soul. If we can hold that they are proper names in the above constructions, this fact is accounted for automatically since proper names often lack the article. On the other hand, these elements are used metalinguistically indeed, i.e. do not display their normal, primary behavior as count nouns or phrases or sentences. This entails that they are not propria1 but appellative lemmas. Besides citation forms, a few other appellative lemmas occasionally occur in apposition, e.g., (33)

a. b. c. d.

the element gold Dutch: het element goud the metal gold but Dutch: ??het metaal goucf°

It seems clear that we are confronted here with the same function of appellation as above and although the word gold functions primarily as a general mass noun, it is construed here as a mass proper name. It is probably this intuition that was behind Frege's (1950: 49 [1884]) pioneering statement that the word gold in the expression the chemical element gold functions as a proper name,just as one in the number one. Sl Kripke (1972: 316) echoes this as: "terms for natural kinds are much closer to proper names then [sic] is ordinarily supposed." It is also telling that when the second unit is a learned word, e.g., helium, it might be more readily accepted as a proper name:

(34)

a. the element helium b. Dutch: het element helium

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135

However, such words are primarily used as appellative mass nouns, e.g.,

(35)

We canfind a lot of helium in the sun.

But in subject function and unaccompanied by a determiner, it is not always clear whether its function is proprial or appellative, compare: (36)

a. Helium is an element that can be found on the sun. b. Water is a liquid that can be found on Earth.

Although (36a) could be viewed as ambiguous, there is no reason to interpret water as a proper name in (36b) since it is apparently never construed in the way that chemical elements are, except in autonymic uses (see above), e.g.,

(37)

The word 'water' is used very often.

3.1.1.2.3. Proper names and close apposition in other languages In other languages with close appositions the semantic criterion for propernamehood can probably be formulated as for English. By contrast, a formal criterion concerning apposition is likely to differ, if it exists at all. In Dutch the situation is simple at first sight. Except for the combinations [first name + surname] and [title + name] as in Meneer Bakker 'Mister Bakker', close appositional structures exhibit only one syntactic pattern: [Det + N + NP].82 Instances of the prototypical pattern with definite article are: (38)

a. de heer Peeters 'Mister Peeters' b. de stad Gent 'the City of Ghent' c. de planeet Venus 'the planet Venus' d. de rivier de Theems 'the River Thames'

Even the appositional pattern indicating a manifestation of the individual is rendered as [Def Art + N + NP], e.g., de mens Eisenhower 'Eisenhower the

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Formal characteristics a/proper names

man'. The syntactic criterion for proper-namehood in Dutch could therefore be formulated as follows: the second unit in a Dutch minimal close appositional structure is a proper name

However, there are a few complications. First, we had to include the pattern [title + name] as in Meneer Bakker since both units can function on their own. Second, there are such combinations as Meneer de president 'Mister (the) president', where we do not want the second unit to be called a proper name. This case can be excluded by the above rule that in an apposition structure, a proper name cannot be modified. Since we can say Meneer de gepensioneerde president 'Mister the retired president' the unit de president does not behave as a proper name. 83 In my dialect, a South Brabant dialect of Dutch, the situation is entirely different from standard Dutch. Apart from combinations like [title + personal name] and [first name + family name] or [first name + byname] (see chapter 3), very few appositions are found. 84 They fall into two classes: [article + appellative + proper name] and [personal name + article + appellative]. Examples of the first are:

(39)

a. de maand mei 'the month of May' b. het jaar 2000 'the year 2000' c. de stad Gent 'the City of Ghent'

All in all, such syntagms are employed rather rarely. In the case of de stad Gent, the meaning is even restricted to 'the administration of the City of Ghent'. Examples ofthe pattern [personal name + article + appellative] are: (40)

a. JCuik de secretaris 'James the secretary' b. Gillam den hakkelaar 'William the stutterer'

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137

The group stress falls on the first unit here, while in the first class it falls on the second. The generalization is that the stress falls on the proper name. The rareness of appositional structures in dialects is in accordance with Meyer's (1992) observation that apposition is encountered much more frequently in written language than in speech. Especially in press reportage the second unit of an apposition provides new information about the first (Meyer 1992: 92). By contrast, "very few appositions in the classes of characterization and appellation" are found in speech because they seem to be much less needed there: "in spontaneous conversation, speakers will generally have prior knowledge of the noun phrases that they introduce into the discourse and therefore will not need to attribute characteristics to them" (Meyer 1992: 70). In French the situation is similar to that in Dutch in that the second appositive in the construction [(definite article +) NPl + (de) (definite article +) NP2] must be a proper name. The particle de has a function similar to that of of in English, compare:

(41)

Monsieur Chirac, les s(£urs Bronte, la famille Dubois, le chat Artemio, la ville de Gand, la region Aquitaine, la riviere I 'Escaut

In these examples the first appositive indicates the basic level concept. However, as in other languages, other kinds of classifiers are possible. At least two types must be distinguished. First, there is the type that points to associative content, as in the examples selected from Noailly (1990) and taken over by Gary-Prieur (1994: 86): (42)

a. le president Pompidou, le colonel Kadhaji, le commissaire Jobic, la comedienne Chantal Darget

Apparently, especially personal names are involved, as is the case in English and Dutch. The second type is based on a metaphor which, according to GaryPrieur (1994: 85), has nothing to do with the 'contenu' (content), a notion that comes close to my concept of 'associative meaning' in proper names: (42)

b. le continent Ibsen 'the continent Ibsen', I 'astre Rimbaud 'the star Rimbaud', le lievre Noah 'the hare Noah' (a fast tennis player) (Noailly 1990: 148-149)

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Formal characteristics a/proper names

Personally, I see no reason why this metaphorical sense should not pertain to the associative meaning of the proper name, but obviously, this author has a narrower interpretation of 'content'. Another, more fundamental problem regards the interpretation of the second appositive. In the case of the constructions of (42b) Gary-Prieur (1994: 86) accepts that the proper name functions as an identifier referring to the so-called 'initial referent' (see chapter 1, 3.3.3). So far so good. In her view, however, this is not true of (42a) and, as can be suspected, not of (41) either. In such constructions as le president Pompidou the name is claimed not to be referential, hence not to have the function of denoting an individual since it is supposed to play a purely modifying role, as the phrase de la repub/ique in le president de la repub/ique. Needless to say, this is in blatant contradiction with my above thesis. It should be clear that, in the syntagm le president Pompidou the proper name denotes the 'initial referent' as well as in the syntagm le lievre Noah 'the hare Noah' (the fast tennis player). Moreover, the common noun is of a characterizing nature in both cases, as we can gather from the respective implications: Pompidou est un president 'Pompidou is a president' and Noah est (comme) un lievre 'Noah is (like) a hare'. These paraphrases are provided by Gary-Prieur (1994: 86) herself albeit in a different context. Thus, in French as well as in Dutch, the relevant appositional syntagm always seems to contain a proper name as second appositive. The first element often indicates the basic level category of the proper name. ss

3.1.1.3.

Close apposition as a criterion for the basic level presupposition in proper names

In this section, I will propose that, as a rule, common nouns that indicate basic level categories are favorite members of the appositional pattern. Recall that the basic level category is the one that occupies an intermediate position in the hierarchy of categorization, e.g., dog, situated below the supercategory animal, but above a subcategory like beagle (cf. Rosch 1977). I will also argue that there seems to exist a marked difference in the behavior of appositional structures containing personal names and those with other proper name categories, such as animal names and place names. Whereas personal name appositions often exhibit levels more specific than the basic one, other categories usually display the basic level only.

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Personal names As a category denoting human beings, personal names appear to constitute the unmarked subcategory of proper names. The category 'person' is acquired early by children, who confine proper names initially to persons, household pets, dolls, and stuffed animals (La Palme Reyes et al. 1993: 452). This semantic (experiential) unmarkedness of human-like entities has a formal counterpart: it can be related to the fact that personal names show a lot of variation in their adult morphosyntax (a signal of formal unmarkedness). This also goes for the appositional structures they appear in. A number of appellative appositives are possible, in Dutch as well as in English, e.g., (43)

a. Mister Chirae, the Frenchman Chirae, the Parisian Chirae, or Chirae the Parisian b. de he er Chirae, de Fransman Chirae, de Parijzenaar Chirae

However, general categories such as 'person' and even the basic level terms 'man' and 'woman' do not normally figure as appositives,86 e.g., one does not often come across: (44)

a. Chirae the person, Chirae the man, Thatcher the woman b. de persoon Chirae, de mens Chirae, de man Chirae, de vrouw Thatcher

These patterns can be used only in the very specific sense mentioned above, viz. 'Chirac as a person, or a man'. Thus, a paradox arises. Although the general categories person, man and woman are the most relevant ones to the categorical meaning of personal names, they do not indicate this presupposition in a neutral way, but rather indirectly, evoking a marked sense. It should be added, though, that the basic level categories in question and their hyperonyms can be expressed without this special sense with syntagms like the male / female being, het mannelijk / vrouwelijk wezen. However, such appositional structures as the male being Chirae / het mannelijk wezen Chirae could be uttered only jokingly or by inhabitants from a different planet, provided they knew Dutch or English.87 It is pragmatically plausible that the unmarked class of personal names does not need appositions to clarify the reference. 88 In appositional syntagms referring to persons, we will find common nouns indicating categories below the basic level. Socially, it is more important to know that somebody is a Sir or a Lady than just a man or a

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Formal characteristics a/proper names

woman, let alone a human being. Still more specific is somebody's origin and occupation. Both in English and in Dutch, appositional patterns show a formal difference between names of origin and social titles indicating occupations and social status in that titles lack the article. Compare:

(45)

President Clinton, Professor Smith, Prime Minister Major, Sir Douglas Hume, Lady Di vs. the Frenchman Chirac 89

Animal names As appositions, animal names are typically accompanied by basic level terms such as dog, cat, horse, and the like, not just the general term animal; for instance, (46)

a. Fido the dog, Minou the cat b. de hond Fido, de kat Minou

Expressions like Fido the animal/het dier Fido may not be un grammatical but will hardly be heard since the notion of animal does not evoke a visual image nor is it sufficiently informative.

Place names Like the word 'person' in the case of personal names and the term 'animal' in the case of animal names, the word 'place' hardly ever appears in appositional structures with place names. Indeed, general terms like 'place' or 'space' are too abstract to invoke a perceptual category.90 More specific place categories are needed here, such as: city, country, river, or mountain. It is such subcategories of place that are apparently basic level, ranging from those with high human involvement (city names) to those without (desert names) (for this cline, see below, and Van Langendonck 1998). Thus, we get: (47)

a. the City of Ghent, the District of Columbia, the State of Spain, the River Rhine, Mount Everest b. de stad Gent, het District Columbia, de staat Spanje, de rivier de Rijn, de Everest

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141

3.1.1.4. A cline in the tightness of the bond between proper name element and basic level element For the expression of the bond between proper name and basic level category, there are various syntactic devices, which range from 'loose' to 'tight'. The loosest way of connecting proper name element and basic level element is probably loose apposition; the tightest bond between the two is manifested by the use of the proper name element itself to indicate the basic level concept. We find a number of transitional devices. As I stated in 3.1.1.1, in the case of loose apposition there can be an intonation break between the appositives, which, in addition, are interchangeable. At the same time the categorization of the referent often takes place at more specific levels than the basic level, e.g.,

(48)

a. Mary, the belle of the village (M 1) b. The belle of the village, Mary

As we have seen, close apposition shows a tighter connection between the elements in question, with the common noun expressing basic-Ievelhood most of the time, especially in names other than personal names: the City of London. In syntagms of the form the Blair family, the Everard Brothers, we still encounter a syntactic device, but the proper name element has come to depend on the classifier as a kind of premodifier. Syntactically, it is only possible to leave out the proper name element. Semantically, though, we could maintain there is coreference between the family name element and the classifying NP. In Dutch, close apposition is still employed here although the same restrictions apply as in English: de familie Blair, de Gebroeders Everard. This is no longer possible in syntagms like the Clinton Administration, to which none of the above criteria for apposition apply. Semantically, there is not even a relation of partial coreference. We can speak merely of a relation of metonymy, paraphrasable as: 'the administration headed by Clinton'. The same can be said of the Dutch equivalent de regering-Clinton, although this pattern too looks identical to the close apposition structure. Clearly, we are confronted with a construction that can be situated between the premodifier structure the Blair family and the next one (the Atlantic Ocean). In formations like the Atlantic Ocean, the North Sea, Mount Everest, Quirk et al. (1972: 639) still speak of premodification. However, it seems to me that we have reached here the borderline between syntax and mor-

142

Formal characteristics o/proper names

phology in that the connection between the two elements is more idiosyncratic, i.e. the name has become an amalgam of the two elements (see also Van Langendonck 1998). At the same time, the name amalgam cannot function as a close apposition, obviously for tautological reasons, e.g.,

(49)

a. the Atlantic Ocean / *the ocean the Atlantic Ocean b. the North Sea / *the sea the North Sea

In Dutch, name amalgams may come in the form of real canpounds, as in: (50)

a. de Schelderivier / de rivier de Schelde / *de rivier de Schelderivier 'the River Scheldt' b. het Alpengebergte / het gebergte de Alpen / *het gebergte het Alpengebergte 'the Alps'

Function words may (partially) take over the c1assificatory function. The definite article may differentiate between subclasses, compare Queen Elizabeth (a woman) vs. the Queen Elizabeth (a ship). The article here is often characterized as a kind of fixed determiner (among others Chomsky 1965: 100). A still tighter bond is manifested in derivation. Proper name subclasses are sometimes marked by affixes (Van Langendonck 1998). Thus, country names are characterized by suffixes, e.g., Germany has the suffix -y (compare German), Dutch Duitsland 'Germany' displays the suffix -land (affixed to Duits 'German'), and so on. Inflection, at least agreement in certain Bantu languages, can also indicate the basic level sense: The agreement patterns of proper names in Rundi are very interesting and confirm Van Langendonck's claim that proper names have a basic level meaning (Van Langendonck 1999). Whatever the common noun from which they are derived, names for people trigger agreement pattern I (as the common noun for 'person'), names for cows tend to have agreement of pattern IX (as the word for 'cow'), etcetera. (Van de Velde 2006: fn. 24)

Finally, basic-Ievelhood may be apparent from the use of distinct propria I lemmas. That the basic level terms man and woman constitute the categorical meaning of personal names is borne out by the fact that mostly different first names are assigned to men and women, e.g., John to a man, Mary to a

Formal correlates o/proprial meanings

143

woman. In societies like that of Ancient Rome, men were given first names (e.g., Marcus, Primus), while women simply were not. To what extent such phenomena are universal remains to be investigated. From all this, it will be clear that the basic level meaning in proper names is highly relevant linguistically. Also, the mere fact that proper names often display overt formal indications of belonging to a subcategory indicates that their status is fundamentally different from that of common nouns since at least in European languages, common nouns do not systematically exhibit formal signs of their belonging to some subcategory or other. The explanation could be that the lexical meaning of common nouns makes it sufficiently clear what subcategory, if any, they belong to. By contrast, since proper names lack this lexical meaning they are in need of a clue as to what kind they pertain to. Indeed, it is important to know that Carla is a tornado if you are told that 'Carla is coming tonight' (Bell 1979: 63). Precisely in this case, there is no clue as for the membership of the name Carla, which results in disturbing referential lack of clarity.

3.1.2. Restrictive modifiers Restrictive modifiers limit the extension of a given NP. Therefore, proper names are incompatible with such modifiers (see S0rensen 1958; Seppanen 1971; 1982; Vandelanotte and Willemse 2002). It will do here to provide a few examples on the basis of restrictive relative clauses, being the most conspicuous of restrictive modifiers. As a rule, the English relative pronoun that refers to an inanimate appellative antecedent and introduces a restrictive clause. A zero form can be used for any restrictive clause if it is not intended to 'replace' the clause's subject, e.g., (51)

a. The city that I vis ited was nice. b. The woman I saw smiled.

By contrast, proprial antecedents do not allow such restrictive devices,91 e.g., (52)

a. *Nasa that is the national space agency, planned to go to Mars. b. *Ghent that is the most beautiful city in Flanders, was one of the biggest in medieval Europe. c. *Mary I saw smiled.

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Formal characteristics a/proper names

It is true that especially the last sentence can be patched up by preposing an article to the name Mary:

(53)

The Mary I saw smiled.

However, it will be clear that in this case we have to do with a common noun having the appellative meaning 'woman with the name Mary'. Neither in English nor in Dutch are personal pronouns compatible with restrictive modifiers although they do not have a fixed extension. As far as premodifiers are concerned, there is also the more general constraint that personal pronouns can hardly bear any premodification, e.g., (54)

a. *nice 11 me... b. *mooie ikl mij... c. but: poor me, silly me...

Appositive relative clauses are, however, possible: (55)

a. I who never wanted to do that! b. Ik die dat nooi! wilde doen!

By contrast, restrictive postmodification is excluded, except that English he and Dutch hij 'he' and zij 'they' (but not clitics) can take generic restrictive relative clauses, thus becoming a kind of demonstratives: (56)

a. He who uses the sword, will die by the sword. b. Hij die het zwaard hanteert, zal door het zwaard sterven. c. Zij die de eersten zijn, zullen de laatsten zijn. 'Those who are the first will be the last.'

Apparently, personal pronouns normally behave as deictic pronouns. Both categories are equally incompatible with restrictive modification. They appear to show a fixed reference at the level of language use, compare the demonstratives in: (57)

a. *That one I saw smiled. b. *Deze die ik zag glimlachte.

Formal correlates o/proprial meanings

145

3.1.3. Quantification Quantification is a much discussed phenomenon in linguistics as well as in logic. Milsark (1977: 8) distinguishes between weak and strong quantification (see also Davidse 1999), compare: (58)

a. There is a / one lion here. There are some lions here. b. *There is all / most lions here.

The sentences of (58a) are examples of weak quantification, whereas in (5 8b) we find strong quantification. Both kinds of quantification determ ine the extension of a noun whereby this process views the thing referred to as belonging to a class on the basis of its meaning. This is possible with appellatives: (59)

all (the) chairs, some books, three girls

Both types of quantification are incompatible with proper name function since both would change the extension of the name. Of course, we meet with such NPs as a John, every Mary, two Londons, all Peters, some Annas. However, on the basis of our distinction between semantic-syntactic function and proprial lemma, we have to conclude that we are confronted here with items in common noun function, containing the formula [x called y] or some other asserted meaning. Moreover, such an appellativization (i.e. transformation to a common noun) is not freely possible. In the appositional syntagm, typical of proper names, it is hard to get such quantified phrases as

(60)

a. ?*all cities of London, *some rivers Thames b. *alle steden Londen, *sommige rivieren (de) Theems

although numerals do better, at least in English and with articleless place names, compare:

(61)

a. ?There are two cities of London b. ???There are two rivers Thames

Insofar as these patterns are grammatical, we have to do with common noun function. It is quite impossible to put the quantifier before the proper name in the appositional structure, e.g.,

146

(62)

Formal characteristics a/proper names

a. b. c. d.

*the languages all Spanish and Italian *de talen alle Spaans en Italiaans *the color all red *de kleur alle okergeel

Likewise, names marked with a collective plural do not allow appellativization at all. Pluralia tantum like the Pyrenees, the Philippines cannot combine with quantifiers (in the same sense see Langacker 1991: 77):

(63)

a. *(the) numerous Pyrenees, *(the) many Philippines b. *(de) talrijke Pyreneeen, *(de) vele Filipijnen

To obtain the same result as with singular propriaI lemmas, we have to make doubtful paraphrases like ??more than one mountain range of Pyrenees. This strongly suggests that quantification is alien to proper name function. In addition, only prototypical (singular) proprial lemmas allow for an appellative derivation in certain constructions. It is even the case that certain languages do not allow any appellativization whatsoever. Such facts can hardly be explained if one refuses to distinguish between a primary proper name function and a secondary appellative function of proprial lemmas. An apparent counterexample is constituted by names containing a numeral such as

(64)

a. the Four Sons ofAymon, the Three Musketeers b. de Vier Heemskinderen, de Drie Musketiers

However, it seems clear that the numerals here are part of the proper name and cannot even be left out without distorting the reference and the form of the phrase itself:

(64)

c. ?*the Sons ofAymon, ?*the Musketeers d. *de Heemskinderen, ?*de Musketiers

3.1.4. Predicate nominals It is well known that so-called predicate nominals are nouns or NPs that function as predicates, e.g.,

Formal correlates o/proprial meanings

(65)

147

Smith is a professor; Clinton is (the) president.

Such nominals appear not to contain an extension, but only an intension. This is borne out by the fact that in English, the relative pronoun which can refer to the nonreferential predicate nominal (Kuno 1970), e.g., (66)

Clinton is (the) president, which Perot will probably never be.

In Dutch, the pronoun wat fulfills the same function:

(67)

Clinton is (de) president, wat Perot allicht nooit zal zijn.

To avoid this rather formal relative clause with wat, Dutch uses a coordinate structure with the demonstrative dat:

(68)

Clinton is (de) president, maar Perot zal dat allicht nooit zijn. 'Clinton is (the) president, but Perot will never be.'

Since for proper names, it is essential to have an extension, as well as for personal pronouns, neither proper names nor personal pronouns can appear in these patterns: 92 (69)

a.

*The president is Clintonl him, which Perol will never be.

b. *De president is Clinlonl hi), maar Perol zal dat nooit zijn. The same reasoning applies to other proper names as well, for instance to the names of months. We can say: (70)

a. June is the sixth month of the year, which July is not. b. Juni is de zesde maand van het jaar, maar juli is dat niet.

Reversing subject and predicate nominal leads to an equally awkward result as in the case of personal names: (71)

a. *The sixth month of the year is June, which the seventh is nol. b. *De zesde maand van het jaar is juni, maar de zevende is dat niet.

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Formal characteristics a/proper names

In Polish, there are similar phenomena (Zofia Kaleta, personal communication). The instrumental case [-em, etc.] is, among other things, applied to predicate nominals indicating a property, e.g., (72)

Clinton jest prezydentem. 'Clinton is (the) president+INSTR.'

In identificational statements, however, not the instrumental is applied, but the nominative (no ending):

(73)

a. Ten pan to Oest) Clinton. 'That gentleman is Clinton.' b. To Oest) Clinton. 'This is Clinton.'

or with personal pronouns:

(74)

To Oest) on. 'That is him.'

Proper names and personal pronouns can be employed only in these identificational and not in predicational sentences. It means that identificational sentences in which proper names appear in the instrumental, such as

(75)

a. *Prezydentjest Clintonem. 'The president is Clinton+ INSTR.' b. *Ten pan jest Clintonem. 'That gentleman is Clinton+ INSTR.'

are ungrammatical. It must be added that the instrumental is possible with propriallemmas, if some property is intended, as in:

(76)

a. On jest Szekspirem naszych czasow. 'He is the Shakespeare+ INSTR of our times.' b. Piotr jest Don Kichotem. ' 'Peter is a Don Quixote+ INSTR'

In this case, metaphorical appellativization takes place.

Formal correlates o/proprial meanings

149

Such apparently marked operations are very difficult to realize with different proper names than personal names. Compare the names of months again: (77)

a. Czerwiec jest szostym miesiacem. 'June is the sixth month+ INSTR.' b. *Szosty miesiacjest czerwcem. 'The sixth month is June+ INSTR.'

3.1.5. Voor 'for'-phrases Related to the above criterion is the expression with Dutch voor 'for', as in:

(78)

Voor een schooljongen doet hi} het niet slecht. 'For a schoolboy he is not performing badly.'

The Jor-phrase can be paraphrased as: 'although he is a schoolboy'. This paraphrase makes clear that the object NP of the preposition voor behaves as a kind of predicate nominal. Normally, predicate nominals can be definite, as in Clinton is the president. This seems, however, not to be the case in this pattern:

(79)

*Voor de schooljongen doet hi} het niet slecht. '*For the schoolboy he is not performing badly.'

To patch up the pattern with a definite NP, a few operations are indispensable. First, a relative be-clause has to be added; second, a qualitative, evaluative element has to be inserted, either an evaluative noun or a qualitative adjective accompanying the noun, compare:

(80)

a. Voor de idioot die hi} is, doet hi} het niet slecht. 'F or the idiot that he is, he is not perform ing badly. ' b. Voor de bescheiden schooljongen die hi} is, do et hi} het niet slecht. 'For the modest schoolboy that he is, he is not performing badly.'

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Formal characteristics a/proper names

(80b) is paraphrasable as: 'although he is a modest schoolboy ... '. However, if the noun in question is not a common noun, but a proper name, the sentence can hardly be patched up: (81)

?*Voor de bescheiden Leroy die hi} is, doet hi} het niet slecht. '*For the modest Leroy that he is, he is not performing badly.'

A paraphrase with a subordinate clause and an indefinite predicate nominal (as above) does not sound much better: (82)

??Hoewel hi} een bescheiden Leroy is, doet hi} het niet slecht. '??Although he is a modest Leroy, he is not performing badly.'

This could be interpreted as: 'although he is a modest man called Leroy ... '. For more common patterns like this, such readings can be forced, but for the marked voor-construction this seems well-nigh impossible. The reason for the awkwardness is again the fact that proper names are not compatible with asserted lexical meaning. Again, for non-personal names, the test works even better. An example involving place names is the following: (83)

a. Voor de druk bevaren rivier die hi} is, is de Ri}n nog niet zo vervuild. 'For the hectic river that it is, the Rhine is not that polluted yet.' b. *Voor de druk bevaren Ri}n die ze is, is die rivier nog niet zo vervuild. '*For the hectic Rhine that it is, this river is not that polluted yet.'

For the latter, a paraphrase along the above lines does not even make much sense: 'although it is a hectic Rhine, this river is not that polluted yet'.

3.1.6. Coordination of homophonous NPs It has been observed by McCawley (1968: 144) that homophonous NPs

cannot be coordinated,93 e.g., (84)

a. *The employees and the employees are male andfemale respectively.

Formal correlates o/proprial meanings

151

Instead, a single NP must be used:

(84)

b. The employees are male andfemale respectively.

However, this rule is not always valid. For instance, with proper names homophonous conjunction is permitted to a certain extent (Van Langendonck 1981). At least two different cases are possible: (85)

a. Johnson and Johnson have set up a new subsidiary. b. London and London are two different cities.

In (85a) we have to do with the name of a company formed by the coordination of twice the same family name; in (85b) it is about the capital of the UK the name of which emigrated to the USA to become the name of another place. A still different example is from German (Dobnig-JUlch 1977): (85)

c. Toni, also die Tochter von nebenan, und Toni, der Sohn der anderen Nachbarn, kommen heute nicht. 'Toni, so next door's daughter, and Toni, the other neighbors' son, are not coming today.'

In instance (85c), two first names with identical lemmas are coordinated. After each name a loose apposition is inserted so as to clarify the identity of the referent without harming the propria I character of the lemmas. Especially cases such as (85b,c) are similar to that of personal pronouns and demonstratives employed deictically, i.e. with a pointing gesture:

(86)

a. You and you should leave. b. This and this will have to be removed.

The rationale behind these examples could be that no two homophonous NPs containing a lexical sense could be conjoined. In Hansack's (2004) framework, we would have to say that no two homophonous NPs with denotata belonging to the same set could be conjoined. However, two such NPs containing a combination of a deictic word and a common noun are possible, e.g.,

(87)

This man and this man will be fired.

152

Formal characteristics a/proper names

In (87), each time, man has the same meaning and belongs to the same set of denotata. The rule would then have to be qualified as follows: two (or more) homophonous NPs cannot be coordinated unless they emphasize some deictic element (extension) in them, whether an intensional element is present or not. 94 Apparently, proper names come closest to such ambivalent expressions as this man. It should be recalled that this ambivalent structure combining a deictic (extensional) element and a categorical (intensional but presupposed) element is inherent in proper names. The difference with the type [deictic + appellative, e.g., this man] lies in the fact that this NP shows the ambivalent status on the level of the construction, while proper names unite the two aspects in them on word level. This resemblance explains the grammaticality of both (85a,b,c) and (87). As far as I can see, this analysis is also compatible with the formula for the definition of a name like Freddie by La Palme Reyes et at. (1993: 445): (88)

(Freddie: dog) = (this: dog)

which is to be read as: "Freddie in the kind DOG" is "this in the kind DOG.,,95 The fact that homophonous proper names and other deictic expressions can be conjoined but not ordinary homophonous appellative NPs, and conversely, that appellatives can be pluralized but not proper names, has a deeper explanation in terms of diagrammatic iconicity (for the notion see Haiman 1980). The pluralization of appellatives by means of a single (albeit suffixed) lexeme mirrors the fact that the pluralized common noun refers to members of the same class with a common lexical (definitional) meaning. The impossibility of pluralization (quantification) with proper names (not propriallemmas!) is an icon of the fact that they do not refer in this way. The adding of referents by means of syntactic conjunction is also iconic. Conjoining mirrors the fact that the conjuncts denote entities that do not share a common lexical meaning. An example of a simpler sort is this: there is no single pluralized word to represent the adding of, say, a cow and a goat. The only possibility to add them is to conjoin them, as I have just done. Likewise, the only possibility to represent the adding of referents of proper names, including homophonous proper names, is to conjoin the proper names because they cannot denote entities on the basis of a common asserted lexical meaning by definition, even if they share the same categorical presupposition. Two objections could be made. We can speak about the Johns, but this NP is not a counterexample since it is due to the appellativization of a pro-

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prial lemma. A special case is the Pyrenees, where we have a plurale tantum with a collective plural (see below). On the other hand, we are confronted with the conjunction this man and this man (as in 87), but this is due to the highlighting of the deictic component, i.e. the circumstance that somebody is pointing to two different persons so that the lexical meaning of man is being backgrounded. Finally, that we can say: A bank and a bank are two different things, as in footnote 94, can now be attributed to the very fact which is mentioned in the sentence, viz. that they refer to two different things.

3.1.7. Anaphoric relations Since proper names display a fixed extension, one can expect that they cannot refer back in the discourse to any other kind of NP, at least in the standard anaphoric way. Lakoff (1968: 17-19) and Co le (1974: 671) pointed this out, setting up a cline going from the strongest anaphoric elements (clitic pronouns) to the weakest (proper names). Examples could be:

(89) (90)

a. Napoleon was the emperor of France. He lost at Waterloo. b. *He was the emperor of France. Napoleon lost at Waterloo. a. Quisling was at power during the war. The prime minister betrayed his country. b. ?*The prime minister was at power during the war. Quisling betrayed his country.

With this criterion, the most marked difference between personal pronouns and proper names is brought to the fore. Personal pronouns display the least specific reference whereas proper names show the most rigid reference because of their fixed extension. At the same time, we can see that in this respect, proper names differ least from monoreferential NPs like the prime minister in (90).

3.2. Formal features pertaining to grammatical meaning It appears that grammatical features are not able to define proper names (except indirectly when combined in a certain way). However, I would like to propose the important thesis that any grammatical feature found in personal pronouns can also be encountered in proper names and vice-versa. A

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further resemblance is that only one of them, viz. definiteness, is common to all the members of both classes. The other features are distributed more or less randomly although there are some clear preferences.

3.2.1. Definiteness

First, I will establish that proper names are inherently definite; second, I will investigate the various additional functions that the definite article can have in combination with proper names.

3.2.1.1.

Proper names are definite

As has been claimed repeatedly, proper names are inherently definite (cf. among others S0rensen 1958; Dalberg 1985: 129; L6bner 1985: 299; Pamp 1985: 113; Wotjak 1985: 7,13; Abbott 2002; but see Allerton 1987; Lyons 1999; Anderson 2003: 351,394; 2004), just as personal pronouns (L6bner 1985: 300).96 In the case of personal pronouns, this is not expressed by a determiner or another overt mark. Certain proper names display a fixed determiner (the Nile) while others do not show any overt mark for definiteness (John).97 The feature 'definite' is often understood as displaying a presupposition of uniqueness and existence in the universe of discourse, at least in its prototypical occurrences (Van Langendonck 1979a; compare Chesterman 1991; Kleiber 1992)98. Hence, it does not come as a surprise that proper names, which have a fixed extension, suggesting uniqueness and existence, are bound to have this grammatical meaning. Sometimes, languages show an overt distinction: Greek puts a definite article before 'arguments', i.e. in the referential use of names, not in vocatives or namegiving contexts (e.g., I name this child Basil, Anderson 2004: 441-442; 456). In vocatives and in naming acts, a neutralization of the opposition definite vs. indefinite takes place. This fact and other considerations lead Anderson (2004: 470-471) to his final conclusion that names are 'inherently nondefinite', i.e. 'inherently neither definite nor indefinite'. For me, this goes too far. At least in their referential use, proper names are definite. Therefore, the syntactic evidence I will adduce for the definiteness of names will pertain only to their referential use as arguments (see also Van Langendonck 1981). The first criterion to be discussed concerns the following observation. NPs that occur in right dislocation and are announced by a cataphoric per-

Formal correlates o/proprial meanings

155

sonal pronoun, have to be definite. It turns out then that, like other definite NPs, proper names can occur in right dislocation in this way, at least in colloquial speech, e.g., Dutch: (91)

a. Het is een korte maand, februari. 'It is a short month, February.' b. Ik heb hem nog niet gezien, Jan/ hem/ de buurman. 'I have not seen him yet, Jan/ him/ the neighbor.' c. *Ik heb hem nog niet gezien, iemand/ een buurman. 'I have not seen him yet, somebody/ a neighbor.'

English has the same informal construction (Quirk et al. 1972: 632): (92)

a. He's a complete idiot, that brother of yours. b. It went onfar too long, your game. c. *He's a complete idiot, a neighbor.

Announced by a personal pronoun (het, hem (91a,b) / he, it (92a,b)), the definite NPs of a proprial, pronominal or appellative nature,februari, Jan, hem, de buurman / that brother of yours, your game are able to appear in right dislocation. For the indefinite pronominal and appellative NPs iemand, een buurman / a neighbor, this possibility is excluded. Apparently, it is only definite NPs, with their presupposition of existence and uniqueness, that can occur as 'afterthoughts', in this case, well known referents that the speaker wants to recall, just to be sure the hearer will think of the right person or thing. Even so-called generic NPs (see 3.2.4) fit this analysis (for English, see Postal 1966): they can occur as well in right dislocation in the above way:

(93)

Kinderen hebben die graag, lama's. 'Children like them, lamas.'

Another criterion, applying to Dutch and German, comes from the use of the negative particles niet and nicht respectively. These particles appear in front of definite NPs only, not normally with indefinite NPs (compare Kolde 1995, where the phenomenon in question is even seen as a characteristic of proper names, but see Van Langendonck 1995). Indefinites normally merge with a different negative particle, compare the sentences:

(94)

a. Dat is niet Bonn/ de stad.

15 6

Formal characteristics ofproper names

(95)

b. Das ist nicht Bonn/ die Stadt. 'That is not Bonn/ the city.' a. Dat is geen stad. b. Das ist keine Stadt. 'That is not a city.'

Again, proper names behave in the same way as other definite NPs in that they attract the negative particles niet/ nicht rather than geen/ kein(e}. The same goes for personal pronouns: (96)

a. Dat is niet zij. b. Das ist nicht sie. 'That is not her.'

Dutch and German also show a difference in word order with regard to definite and indefinite NPs. Especially in the (discontinuous) brace construction (formed by the two poles constituted by the finite verb and the infinitive or participle), definite NPs can appear before or after adverbials within the brace construction, while indefinite NPs must follow adverbials in order to be as close as possible to the final verbal group. Proper names behave as definite constituents in this respect as well, compare:

(97)

a. Ik heb de student/ John gisteren gezien. b. !ch habe den Studenten/ John gestern gesehen.

(98)

a. b. c. d.

'I saw the student! John yesterday.' *Ik heb een student gisteren gezien. *!ch habe einen Studenten gestern gesehen. Ik heb gisteren een student gezien. !ch habe gestern einen Studenten gesehen. 'I saw a student yesterday.'

The brace construction is constituted by the finite verbs heb/ habe and the past participles gezien/ gesehen. The definite NPs de student/ den Studenten/ John can (but need not precede) the adverbial within this brace construction, whereas the indefinite NPs een student/ einen Studenten have to follow the adverbial. Here too, so-called generic NPs are treated as definite since they can appear before adverbials in the brace construction (see already Nieuwborg 1968): (99)

Ik heb studenten altijd graag gemogen.

Formal correlates ofproprial meanings

157

'I have always liked students.' Another criterion proving the definiteness of proper names comes from such patterns as a man like Garrett, which Meyer (1992: 88) regards as a type of apposition (but see note 74). The first NP cannot take a definite article, e.g., (100)

a. *the man like Garrett

As proper names are not allowed in this position either, we can deduce that they have a definite status as well, compare: (100)

b.

*John like Garrett

Since proper names appear to be definite by nature, one might expect them to systematically take the definite article in article languages. Paradoxically, the most prototypical propria I subclasses, personal names and city names, usually take no article, neither in Dutch, nor in German, English, French, Spanish, etc. But precisely because proper names have a fixed denotation, the article is said to be redundant (see also Leys 1965). In early child language, the article tends to be absent for any class of proper names. Thus, Van Ginneken (1917: 150) observes that the Dutch child which he investigates uses no article before proper names. His explanation squares well with what is argued here: proper names are determined in themselves. Kaper's (1968) observation is in the same vein: at the age of five, children do not yet produce any articles with names, although the use of articles with common nouns is fairly correct.

3.2.1.2.

Thefunctions of the definite article with proper names

With those proper names that take the definite article as a fixed determiner it adopts two functions: a c1assificatory (categorical) and an emotive function. Clearly, these functions relate to the categorical meaning and to the emotive meaning discussed above. First, the definite article has a c1assificatory (categorical) function. The definite article mostly takes on a c1assificatory role with proper names. This is obvious in homonymous pairs: compare Queen Elizabeth vs. the Queen Elizabeth (ship), German Fulda (city) vs. die Fulda (river or ship). According to Ko1de (1995), the distribution of the definite article is

15 8

Formal characteristics ofproper names

purely language specific and conventional, as is indicated by English France and German Frankreich vs. French la France, and so on. 99 However, if one looks at place name categories as forming a continuum (see chapter 3, 2.4.2), more systematicity can be discovered, although, to be sure, the cut-off points differ from language to language (Van Langendonck 1998). However, where adjectives come into play, the picture changes completely, compare Fr. le bouillant Achille vs. Eng. dear John (Kolde 1995: 404). Usually, the appearance of a premodifier entails a determiner, especially in French, Dutch and German, sometimes in English. Demonstratives (with an expressive value) are fairly common in Germanic languages. In French, (pre )modification without appellativization appears to be rather restricted (see Wilmet 1986). Compare: (101)

a. Die bizarre Jeltsin / dieser bizarre Jeltzin / that bizarre Yeltsin b. the faithful Penelope c. le bouillant Achille, *ce bizarre Eltsine

Second, in many article languages the definite article adopts an emotive function, at least with personal names. Usually this function is of an augmentative nature. In Dutch (Flemish) dialects the article de 'the' is used before men's names and sometimes before women's names to express familiarity with respect to the name bearer, e.g., de Jan 'the John', de Marie 'the Mary'. In German, the article has almost lost its expressivity with first names because of its frequency in discourse (e.g., der Johann). In Mexican Spanish, the definite article can be employed together with the plural and the diminutive to express an emotive connotation in first names (Svennung 1958):

(102)

Que lindos son los Manuelitos! 'How sweet is Manue!!'

Note, finally, that instead of the definite article or a demonstrative, we sometimes observe the preposing of a third person personal pronoun before first names. This is the case, for instance, in Czech dialects (ona Vera 'she Vera', Keenan 1972: 431-2), in Norwegian, where han 'he' or ho 'she' can be preposed in first names, for instance, han Halvor, ho Guri (Hilgemann 1974/1989; 1978: 71,74,82 10°), and in colloquial American English, e.g., them Indians.

Formal correlates o/proprial meanings

159

In chapter 3, 2.8, an attempt will be made at setting up a continuum in the semantic functions of the definite article with common and proper nouns.

3.2.2. Number Personal pronouns can appear in the plural as well as in the singular, compare I - we, etc. Because of their fixed denotation, one might expect proper names to occur only in the singular. As is well known, this is usually true, e.g., John, Mary, the Rhine, the Baltic Sea. However, it is equally well known that proprial lemmas may occur in the plural. As in the case of indefinite lexemes, there are plural items with genuine proper name function as well as lexemes with appellative function (see Coseriu's 1955 pioneering ideas in this respect; compare Kaleta 1982). Indeed, pluralization does not necessarily imply quantification (see also Langacker 1991: 81) and therefore, no appellativization need be involved. Hence, it is conceivable that pluralia tantum such as the Pyrenees, the Alps, or the Philippines, are genuine though not prototypical proper names. It is to be understood, however, that this plural is of a collective nature, one could say: a plural operated on by a singular. 101 Indeed, in appositional structures, a singular collective appellative appears (if at all possible):

(103)

a. b. c. d.

the mountain range of the Pyrenees het gebergte de Pyreneeen the State of the Philippines de staat de Filipijnen

Furthermore, when these pluralia tantum occur in subject function in Dutch, the verb can agree with them in the singular as well as in the plural; with normal plurals, only the plural is possible; opinions of native speakers appear to differ somewhat; examples: (104)

a. De Alpen zijn een gebergte. b. De Alpen is een gebergte.

(105)

a. Die heuvels zijn in feite een gebergte. b. *Die heuvels is infeite een gebergte.

'The Alps are a mountain range.'

'These hills are in fact a mountain range.'

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Formal characteristics ofproper names

Some plurals are ambiguous between a proprial and an appellative interpretation (Coseriu 1989), viz. inhabitant names, compare: (106)

a. The French and the Italians are Romance peoples. b. the peoples the French and the Italians c. The Frenchmen arrived late and the Italians left early.

In (1 06a,b) the names refer to the peoples and are genuine proper names (see also Anderson 2003: 377,391); where the ethnonyms are used in apposition, as in (1 06b), their proprial status is especially clear. In (1 06c) they are definite appellative NPs referring to an occasional group of persons. A proprial function of ethnonyms seems compatible with the preposing of a plural personal pronoun (see also below), e.g.,

(107)

We Europeans have always been explorers.

Through example (l07), we have shown that personal pronouns can indicate collective entities as well. In certain variants of the Bantu language Eton, there is a clear morphological difference between the proprial and the appellative use of an inhabitant name: in the appellative use, the morpheme bo is used, e.g., bo iwono 'Ewondos'; in the proprial use, no morpheme is preposed: iwono 'the Ewondos' (Van de Velde 2003). Family names show an ambiguity similar to that of inhabitant names. In German, this becomes clear morphologically: the plural is formed by -s when the people referred to belong to a family, but by zero if they do not; compare: (108)

a. die beiden Schulze+s 'the two Schulzes' (a couple) b. die beiden Schulze 'the two persons called Schulze' (Kolde 1995: 402)

The -s-plural may display proper name function if not quantified, hence not in die beiden Schulze+s , but, e.g., in sentence (l09): (l09)

Die Schulzes haben uns besucht. 'The Schulzes have visited us.'

Formal correlates ofproprial meanings

161

The zero sign in die Schulze always signals appellative function. Even singular names can refer to a collectivity, as in: (110)

a. John Bull will never die out. b. Homo Erectus died out long ago.

As a rule, a predicate like die out or become extinct can be predicated of groups only. I should remark that in quantified, i.e. appellativized proprial lemmas, suffixes different from ordinary appellative counterparts are sometimes used. Thus, in German we find an s-plural or zero in, e.g., (111)

a. die beiden Deutschland(+s) 'the two Germanys' b. drei Neustadt(+s) 'three Neustadts' (Kolde 1995: 402)

3.2.3. Countability

In the realm of appellatives, the distinction between count and mass nouns is not a matter of dispute. Count nouns combine with the indefinite article and numerals, e.g., a book, three books; mass nouns do not: *a water, *three golds. Moreover, only the latter are compatible with quantifiers such as much, little, a little, e.g., much ado, (a) little water. Since these tests involve quantification only, it will be hard to decide on the count/mass status of proper names. As could be expected then, all sorts of claims have been made in this respect. Proper names have been argued to be mass nouns or at least 'number neutral' (Leys 1965) or to be count nouns (Sloat 1969; Yotsukura 1970: 67; Van Langendonck 1981). Only rarely has one claimed that both countable and uncountable proper names exist (Algeo 1973: 38-39). Lyons (1999: 195) proposes a trichotomy 'count - mass - proper'. Most of the time, proper names are considered countable. This is also proposed by the psycholinguists La Palme Reyes et al. (1993: 454): "It seems that we never give PN s [proper names] to masses conceptualized precisely as masses." As is suggested by this quotation, there are some ways other than quantification to determine the countability status of proper names. Semantically, the notion 'countable' can be equated with Quine's (1960: 90-95)

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Formal characteristics a/proper names

concept of 'divided reference'. In the process it is plausible to argue that personal names, animal names, place names, hydronyms and building names are count nouns since their extension shows a 'divided' nature. This view is corroborated by the fact that the underlying proprial lemmas most easily appellativize into countable common nouns, compare: (112)

several Johns, two Londons, one Eiffeltower

It is much more difficult to get mass quantification here, though not quite impossible:

(113)

a. ??Did you visit some London? b. ??Heb je wat Londen bezocht?

At least in Dutch, personal names are sometimes used in a non-count way in expressions of the type: (114)

Het was al Merckx wat de klok sloeg! 'All we heard was Merckx.'

This sentence refers to the circumstance that the cyclist Eddy Merckx was spoken about a lot in his heyday. Hence, all the talk about Merckx could be represented as an all-encompassing mass. Anyway, for personal names and place names, it is much more natural to indicate divided rather than undivided reference. Pluralia tantum of the type the Pyrenees, the United States seem to exhibit divided reference too, albeit of a collective nature in that the group of referents is conceived of as a unity. By contrast, names of languages and of chemical elements behave as collective mass proper names in utterances of the type:

(115) (116)

a. b. a. b.

Polish and Czech are Slavic languages. (Het) Pools en (het) Tsjechisch zijn Slavische talen. Strontium and gold are chemical elements. Strontium en goud zijn chemische elementen.

Thanks to corresponding appellativizations, these names are easily recognized as mass nouns:

Formal correlates ofproprial meanings

(117) (118)

163

I do not know much Polish. They just had a little gold.

Someone may object that although these names seem to show undivided reference, the appellatives in the appositional structure are count nouns: a language, an element. But recall that, as was stated above, almost all common nouns in this position are countables. This observation and the fact that most proper names are countable, square well with the more general claim that divided reference is the unmarked case of reference. It is equally in accordance with the fact that first and second person pronouns are countable too, since they are human. Only third person pronouns can refer to mass as well as to countable entities. About proper names themselves we can conclude that the question about countability is not a matter of all or nothing. Most proper names, i.e. the prototypical ones, are countable whereas some of them, the more marginal ones, have undivided reference.

3.2.4. Recursiveness (genericness) Van Langendonck (1971; 1980c) introduced the notion of 'dispersiveness' , to replace that of genericness. In the process, the logico-philosophical notion of genericness has been substituted by an experiential one. Indeed, the so-called prototypical speaker was not aware of any sophisticated philosophical insights at the time that he forged his/her language. Dispersive (or better: 'recursive') NPs occur in so-called generic sentences like: (119)

a. Men are mortal. b. Beavers build dams.

I contend that the subject NPs in these sentences refer to a phenomenon (men, beavers) that according to human experience is reproduced on a regular basis, i.e. recurs indefinitely in space and/or time, usually (prototypically) in space and time. In addition, the 'generic' subject NP beavers displays definite behavior (see 3.2.2.1; likewise Anderson 2004: 449; but see Langacker 1991: 10 I). Therefore, it would be more correct to redefine 'generic' as a combination of [recursive + definite).lo2 The combination [recursive + indefinite) is then found in the object NP dams of (119b). Of course, the action of building itself is also a continually recurring process here. The determiner use in French makes the difference between the sub-

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Formal characteristics a/proper names

ject and the object NP clearer in that the fonner shows the definite article les whereas the object NP displays the indefinite fonn des: (120)

Les castors construisent des barrages. 'Beavers build dams.'

It should be clear that the idea of recursiveness, i.e. of continually recurring phenomena need not imply any lexical meaning. This is proven by adducing recursive personal pronouns, compare sentence (121): (121)

Ever since the Ancient Greeks, we have been discussing reference.

In (121), the pronoun we cannot refer to ourselves alone; instead it designates the continually reproduced phenomenon of human beings on Earth ever since ancient times, including ourselves. Although the pronoun we cannot contain any predication or lexical meaning, it definitely has the same recursive semantic structure as the so-called generic appellative NPs in (119). We may now wonder whether proper names could be compatible with recursiveness. If genericness is understood as indicating a class, category or species constituted on the basis of a predication, this should be excluded, proprial referring being incompatible with a predication. In fact, this seems to be the universal attitude towards the relation between propriality and genericness. However, if genericness is viewed as indefinitely recurring reference, the incompatibility disappears. The question now arises whether this mode of denotation does actually occur with proper names. Quoting Oscar Wilde, Jespersen (1924: 66) provides a by now famous example that could be said to contain the 'generic' proper name Judas: (122)

Every great man nowadays has his disciples, and it is always Judas who writes the biography.

Jespersen quoted this example not in order to speak of generic proper names but only to prove that proper names contain a maximum of meaning (compare Mannaridou 1989: 355). As I argued above, I would like to call this kind of sense 'associative meaning', a position which is generally taken nowadays by most other researchers. The name Judas in (122) is used metaphorically and refers indirectly to the recurring phenomenon of traitor. However, this lexical meaning is provided here in the fonn of pre-

Formal correlates o/proprial meanings

165

supposed associative meaning. At the same time, the combination of propriality and recursiveness remains marginal. The proprial status of the name Judas in Jespersen's example is supported by formal evidence. The lack of a determiner in Jespersen's example Judas leaves us no other choice than to treat this noun as a proper name since we are not dealing here with mass nouns or monoreferential nouns like Congress, nature, science, and so on. The status of Judas in the above example (122) is different from a quantifled appellative NP such as every Judas. This quantification would alter the meaning, allowing for an interpretation of the type 'every man called Judas' as well as 'every traitor' . Instances like Jespersen's Judas sentence are not the only cases of recursive proper names. Much more frequently, proper names can be used in combination with two related types of recursiveness which are not normally indicated as genericness. A first category will be termed 'spatial recursiveness'. Although recursiveness normally includes spatiotemporal recurrence, it can occur without time changes being involved or at least relevant. Consider sentence (123): (123)

The Bank of England closes at the same time everywhere in the country.

It will be hard to deny that the Bank of England is not a proper name here, although it refers in fact to an indefinite number of closing buildings owned by this unique institution, i.e. the proper name the Bank of England indicates here a spatially recurring phenomenon. Note, again, that the above sentence is not equivalent to one with a quantified subject NP: (124)

All (the) Banks of England close at the same time everywhere in the country.

In this unusual statement, several institutions called 'Bank of England' seem to be intended so that predication and appellativization takes place. In instance (123), it is about the unique bank in its spatially distributed appearance. The second special category of recursiveness pertains to the temporal parameter only, the spatial one being irrelevant. A case in point is the names of months, which are systematically ambiguous between a recursive and a nonrecursive reading, compare:

166

(12S)

Formal characteristics a/proper names

a. June is (usually) a hot month. b. June was hot.

In (12Sa), we are dealing with the annually recurring period we call the month of June (recursive). In (12Sb), only the current month of June is meant (nonrecursive). Nonetheless, both instances refer to this unique cyclic phenomenon that was named 'June'. Again, quantified, hence appellativized, syntagms like every June/ most Junes sound odd and do not guarantee in principle that we are speaking about the same phenomenon. For example, every June could mean 'every thing called June'. This makes a sentence like Every June is a hot month sound rather strange. Moreover, a recursive reading is not compelling here, while it is in (l2Sa). It will be clear now that the prototypical category of recursiveness unites spatial and temporal recursiveness, concerning traditional generics like a man/ men in such sentences as A man is mortal/ Men are mortal, and occasionally in proper names like Judas above. Finally, it should be pointed out that recursiveness sometimes combines with the feature 'collective'. This combination is found in 'generic' appellative NPs with the definite article or in certain plural uses (Van Langendonck 1980c): (126)

a. The beaver is extinct. b. Beavers are extinct.

An instance of a collective recursive personal pronoun is encountered in:

(127)

We Europeans have always been a people of explorers.

Proper names can occur only marginally as collective recursive NPs. For instance, the personal name John Bull may refer to the English people in a metaphorical way:

(128)

John Bull does not like many of his governments.

On the whole, it seems that the combination of prototypical recursiveness with propriality is limited to certain metaphorical uses of personal names (Judas, John Bull) but that spatial and temporal recursiveness occurs with names of institutions (the Bank of England) and periods of time (June) respectively.

Formal correlates o/proprial meanings

167

3.2.5. Person A grammatical category that is not likely to have been mentioned in the onomastic literature yet is 'person'. Unlike personal pronouns, proper names do not display a fixed person. As in the case of common nouns, their unmarked status is to be in the third person. However, by preposing a first or second person pronoun, they are made into first or second person nouns, compare: (129) (130)

I Mary; you Charles a. The Europeans have always been an explorers' people. b. We Europeans have always been an explorers' people. c. You Europeans have always been an explorers' people.

3.2.6. Case A final class of a grammatical nature is case. In English and Dutch, only personal pronouns display a (modest) case paradigm: 1- me/ ik - mij, etc. In genuine case languages like German and Polish, and so on, proper names as well as other nouns exhibit case endings. Sometimes, endings can differ for proper names, although this is not very common. If this happens, proper names may behave in a conservative way, but also in a progressive way. In German, an instance of conservative behavior is the preservation (in Goethe's German) of the weak singular dative ending -(e)n with feminine forenames, compare: mU der Marie-n 'with Mary' vs. mit der Frau 'with the woman'. Examples of progressive behavior include the rather recent adoption of the masculine pregenitive -s ending in feminine forenames, e.g., Marie-s Kinder 'Mary's children', and the loss of the postgenitive -s in personal names as against common nouns, compare: des jungen Mann-es 'of the young man' vs. des jungen Kurt 'of young Kurt' .

3.2.7. A combination of grammatical phenomena as an indirect test for proper-namehood By combining several grammatical phenomena, it is sometimes possible to establish the propria I status of some word or word group, mostly in an indirect, negative way. In Dutch, and to a lesser extent in English, singular appellative count nouns that appear as the head of a subject NP, normally

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Formal characteristics a/proper names

have an article or another determiner; this is not the case with mass nouns, e.g.,

(131)

a. The sun was shining. / *Sun was shining. b. De zon scheen. / *Zon scheen.

(132)

a. Gold is a metal. b. Goud is een metaal.

Therefore, if an entire class of semantically singular nouns functions as the head of a subject NP without a determiner, they can hardly be anything else than proper names. It is true that there are a number of lexical exceptions in English, for instance:

(133)

a. Congress decided to reject the proposal. b. Nature did not favor our project.

However, such words are not members of a specific subclass of nouns but must be looked upon as monoreferential NPs (see chapter 1, 5). In Dutch, exceptions of the above kind are very limited. One of them is typical of discourses of the type:

(134)

Spreker eindigde met een dankwoord. 'The speaker ended with some acknowledgements.'

Consider now proper names of temporal classes like 1997, June, Easter in subject position:

(135)

a. 1997 was a wet year. b. June was a hot month. c. Easter brought some relief

Notwithstanding their determinerless appearance, these time indications cannot be regarded as mass nouns since it is rather awkward to speak of a little 1997 or a lot of June or Easter. This fact leads indirectly to the position that they are to be considered proper names. This conclusion squares well with the above statement that at least names of years and months must be proper names as they occur in appositional structures:

Between common nouns and personal pronouns

(136)

169

a. the year 1997 b. the month ofJune

Another category is constituted by appellative lemmas that are occasionally found in appositional syntagms, e.g., the notion of indivisible atom. Since the head of the phrase indivisible atom is a count noun (atom), we would expect there to be an indefinite article, but expressions of the form *the notion of an indivisible atom are excluded. This makes it the more plausible to consider such appositions as proper names, at least in this construction, not in any other (except in the function of autonyms, see also above), as m:

(137)

'Indivisible atom' is an outdated notion.

Therefore, expressions like indivisible atom are to be regarded not as proprial lemmas but as appellative lemmas with a very limited proper name function as in the above patterns.

4. Proper names between common nouns and personal pronouns It has appeared that language philosophers tend to view proper names as a kind of indexicals, i.e. as affiliated to personal pronouns and demonstratives. By contrast, linguists and onomasticians often have difficulties in telling proper names and common nouns apart (see Harvalik 2005). Sometimes, it is the other way round. Anderson (2004: 435; 452; 456) proposes that "names belong universally, with pronouns and determiners, to a category of determinative". Especially names and deictics are claimed to be very closely related, serving 'primary identification' without recourse to description, although "names are not dependent on the immediate nonlinguistic context" (Anderson 2004: 440). I will investigate in this section which characteristics proper names have in common with common nouns and personal pronouns respectively. Proper names have a number of characteristics in common with common nouns not shared by personal pronouns. Like common nouns, but unlike personal pronouns, proper names constitute an open class of words (against Anderson 2004: 457) and, hence, are lexical rather than functional (grammatical). This squares well with the above thesis that both common nouns and proper names have a kind of

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lexical meaning, although it concerns only general presuppositions in the case of proper names (cf. chapter 1,3.3). Like common nouns, but unlike personal pronouns, proper names can take adjectival and other modifiers, at least in Germanic languages (cf. section 2); compare: (138)

a. That George Bush is a nice guy. (Vande1anotte and Willemse 2002:22) b. Our cute Sheilai girl has made it. c. *Our cute she has made it.

In Dutch, both proprial and appellative NPs can be construed in left dislocation such that the coreferential demonstrative die/ dat figures in the sentence proper, e.g.,

(139)

Karel/ De baas, die lacht altijd. lit. 'Karell The boss, that laughs all the time.'

But we cannot say (Van Langendonck 1992): (140)

*Hij, die lacht altijd. 'He, that laughs all the time.'

Unlike common nouns and proper names, personal pronouns can be defined exhaustively by means of grammatical features such as person, number and gender. Personal pronouns lack the categorical meaning attributed to proper names and (most) common nouns (see chapter 1,3.3.2). Only personal pronouns have a fixed person, other nouns being able to combine with first or second as well as third person: We Europeans have failed (3.2.5). At least in English and Dutch, personal pronouns still display a minimum of case endings (I - me / ik - mij, etc.) while lexical nouns do not (3.2.6). By contrast, proper names have a few characteristics in common with personal pronouns not shared by common nouns (see also Van Langendonck 1990). Unlike common nouns, proper names and personal pronouns display only presuppositional meanings, of whatever nature these are.

The most prototypical nominal category

171

Proper names and personal pronouns appear in identificational sentences, not in predicational ones. Common nouns display both possibilities (cf. 3.1.4). Unlike common nouns, proper names and personal pronouns are inherently definite (3.2.1). As to anaphoricity, proper names are part of a cline. Personal pronouns are the strongest anaphoric elements, proper names the weakest. Common nouns are to be situated in between and show a cline among themselves (cf. also Maes 1996). As an overall conclusion of section 4, we can hold that proper names can be situated between common nouns and personal pronouns although they share more characteristics with common nouns than with personal pronouns. To be sure, counting characteristics should not be the ultimate criterion. The most important feature seems to be the total lack of lexical meaning in personal pronouns. Apparently, this entails that personal pronouns can be defined exhaustively by means of grammatical features, and that they cannot take adjectival and other modifiers, unlike proper names. That proper names and common nouns share an asserted or a presupposed lexical or categorical meaning also explains the intense relations between the two classes that can be observed throughout the history of names (cf. diachronic onomastics). Finally, I should note that certain (marginal) proper names exhibit not a propriaI but an appellative lemma (cf. such nouns as gold in the metal gold, intolerance in the notion of intolerance; see especially chapter 3, 4). In this way, we can conclude that proper names are more akin to common nouns than to pronouns.

5. The proper name as the most prototypical nominal category 5.1. Proper names have the unmarked counterparts of nom inal grammatical features When we run through all the grammatical features discussed, especially one fact is striking: proper names appear to display exclusively or at least to a much greater extent, the unmarked counterparts of these grammatical features. Proper names are inherently definite, mostly countable, singular and nonrecursive, and as a rule, are third person. Marginal are collective plurals, collective mass proper names, recursive (generic) and first or second person instances.

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Formal characteristics a/proper names

As to definiteness, it has been argued in Van Langendonck (1979a) that it is the unmarked counterpart of the feature [+1- definite]. KarmiloffSmith (1979), Mayerthaler (1988) and Croft (1990) have come to the same conclusion on various grounds: early acquisition, experiential and typological evidence. In fact, definiteness is the most natural state of a referring expression, i.e. definite and referential go together (Van Langendonck 1994b). From an experiential view, it is apparent that countability or 'divided reference' (Quine 1960) is the state of an entity that can best be distinguished. Human beings themselves appear as divided reference as well. By contrast, it is especially material objects and natural kinds that appear as undivided reference. Earlier on, I suggested that proper names are inherently countable (Van Langendonck 1981), but it seems that such marginal categories as names of languages, chemical elements and certain brands can behave as mass proper names. As regards singularity, if we understand this notion as semantic singularity, it is meant as pertaining to one countable element, which is certainly the easiest to perceive by a speaker. In addition, it is well known that the singular is unmarked vis-a-vis the plural. Obviously, most proper names are instances of semantically singular nouns. Pluralia tantum like the Andes, the Philippines are rare and are not even ordinary plurals since they are not quantifiable: *(the) many Andes. Even in such plural proper names we find an element of singularity: the plurality is construed as a unity, a singularity, a fact we have accounted for by callingpluralia tantum collective plurals.

5.2. Prototypical proper names are zero coded The fact that proper names have the unmarked counterparts of nominal grammatical features entails that they are mostly zero coded, at least the prototypically propriaI classes. Personal names and the main place name categories (cf. chapter 3, 2) have no article or other formal mark; compare English John, Mary, London, England, Dutch Jan, Marie, Londen, Engeland, French Jean, Marie, Londres (but: I 'Angleterre 'the England'). The zero coding of (prototypical) proper names is not just an IndoEuropean phenomenon. In general, Bantu languages have no overt formal mark for proper names, whereas as a rule, common nouns are divided into several nominal classes with overt prefixes; or at least: "in no Bantu language will proper names have more overt marking than common nouns"

Constructions in which the propriallemma is appellativized

173

(Van de Velde 2003). According to Van de Velde, proper names normally figure in the zero coded subclass la, which he considers not to be a morphological nominal (sub)class, but to group all classless nouns. More specifically, in the Bantu language Eton, "proper names, whether they are ancient hydronyms, toponyms or clan names, or improvised nicknames, are always of class la; there is not a single exception" (Van de Velde, manuscript). "In Kinyarwanda, ... common nouns are obligatorily preceded by an augment and a noun prefix. An augment is a morpheme that precedes the class prefix (if there is one) ... Kinyarwanda proper names are formed by omitting the augment" (Van de Velde 2003, referring to Kimenyi 1978: 260).103 We can conclude section 5 with the thesis that proper names are the most prototypical nominal category. This conclusion runs counter to Langacker (1991; see chapter 1) and also to Willems' (2000) thesis that proper names are a marked class of nouns. Obviously, Willems sets out from a non-experiential conception of markedness, which I have implicitly rejected.

6. Constructions in which the propriallemma is appellativized As I have pointed out in chapter 1, and occasionally in this one, in a number of constructions the proprial lemma seems to behave like a complex common noun representing or containing a type or predication. First, English allows for the use of proprial lemmas as predicate nominals. I repeat example (33) given in chapter 1:

(141)

There we are, him as L.A. as a person could get and me twice as Nashville as the neon sign at Twitty City.

Second, there are a number of instances in which the NP contains a predication on the basis of a proprial lemma and is therefore to be seen as a common noun phrase (against Sloat 1969, Leys 1979: 80, Kuhn and Serzisko 1982: 284). I will speak of an appellativization of the propriaI lemma. This appellativization can be carried out in various ways: by the introduction of the indefinite article, the insertion of presentative there, pluralization, addition of restrictive modifiers. These patterns can also get into the scope of negation. In every construction, I will indicate all these possibilities. Each time, the proprial lemma appears to be replaceable by a (suitable) ordinary common noun, at least syntactically.

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Formal characteristics a/proper names

(142)

a. A second (Another) Einstein / physicist has not been found yet. b. There has not been found a second (another) Einstein / physicist yet. c. Other Einsteins / physicists have not been found yet. d. Newton was the Einstein / physicist of the 17th century.

(143)

a. In 2000 we find a completely different Rome / city from the one BC b. In 2000 there is (not) a completely different Rome / city from the one BC c. We are (not) confronted with two different Romes / cities. d. The Rome / city of modern times is not the same as the Rome / city of the era BC

(144)

a. b. c. d.

(145)

a. A Johnson / relative insulted his own family. b. There was a (no) Johnson / relative who insulted his own family. c. Several Johnsons / relatives insulted their family. d. The Johnson / relative who was best known in this family has just died.

(146)

a. b. c. d.

(147)

a. Yesterday, a (certain) Mireille / lady called us. b. Yesterday, there was a certain Mireille / lady who called us. c. Yesterday, two (*certain) Mireilles / (*certain) ladies called us.

I would like to possess a Van Gogh / painting. There was a (no) Van Gogh / painting on sale. Few Van Goghs / paintings can be sold. The Van Gogh / painting with the flowers was sold for a high price.

This is (not) a different John / man from the one I met yesterday. There was a different John / man calling me today. I met so many Johns / men in my life! The John / man of next door is not the John / man I meant.

Although they have a surplus of meaning, reflected in the marked constructions that these items occur in, the appellativized proprial lemmas in these examples behave like ordinary common nouns syntactically (but see Vandelanotte and Willemse 2002 104 ). Even the fact that in (147c) certain

Constructions in which the propriallemma is appellativized

175

Mireille cannot occur in the plural in the intended sense is not an exception since this goes for the common noun phrase certain lady as well (cf. *two certain ladies). In this pattern, negation is excluded as well for the independent reason that certain introduces a specific NP. The semantic surplus in the above constructions can be relegated not only to the categorical meaning (e.g., man, city, family) but mostly and especially also to the two kinds of association mentioned above. In sentences (142) to (145) we encounter associations that pertain to the name bearer whereas in (146)-( 147) the association is based on the name form. It is also interesting to note that in this series with appellativized proprial items, tropes such as metaphor and metonymy are employed to make the appellativization possible. Thus, in (142) a metaphor is used to compare other persons, if any, to Einstein. Hence, we can paraphrase a second Einstein as 'a person comparable to Einstein'. In the other appellativizing patterns a metonymica1 operation has taken place. In (143) a referent, Rome, is divided into two different submanifestations so we can hold that, in fact, two referents are concerned. Metonymy is involved in that the concept of 'submanifestation' is understood. 105 The old and the new Rome are two different submanifestations of the City of Rome. Hence, we can speak of a pars pro toto relationship. In (144) the understood concept is 'painting', i.e. 'product of a painter'; in (145) it is 'member of a family'. The association with the socially relevant properties of Einstein and Van Gogh are obvious. In the case of Rome one appeals only to the categorical meaning 'city'; in the case of (145) reference is made to the categorical meaning of Johnson. In (146) and (147) metonymy is involved as well, but here an obvious association concerning the name form is exploited: still another person bears the name John. In (146) a different John means 'a different man with the name John' (Van Langendonck 1997a). Note that the frequency of such syntagms as in (146) is related to the frequency with which the same name form is applied to different referents; in this case it is proportional to the number of Johns that one knows. The name form is also highlighted in the example a certain Mireille 'a certain woman with the name Mireille', although not more than one person is involved here. 106 From the overall presence of the indefinite article in the above syntagms we may be inclined to think that this presence yields appellative structures automatically. As we will see in the next section, this is by no means true.

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Formal characteristics a/proper names

7. Marked constructions in which the propriallemma has a proprial function In two kinds of construction the proprial lemma has an appellative feel but in fact preserves its proper name status: three constructions with the indefinite article and the partitive construction of the form all Poland.

7.1. Proper names with the indefinite article a(n) In certain syntagms containing a proprial lemma preceded by the article a(n) this lemma maintains a genuinely proprial function (compare Willems 1996: 190-202,211-213). In at least three constructions we encounter the sequence [indefinite article a(n) + proper name] in which the proper name preserves its function of individual reference against all odds. Formally, this is confirmed by the fact that patterns such as there-insertion, pluralization, restrictive modification and negation are either impossible or at least alter the meaning fundamentally; compare: (148)

a. b. c. d.

(149)

a. That idiot of a John!107 b. * That idiot of no John! c. ?* Those idiots of Johns!

(150)

a. b. c. d.

A de Gaulle would have reacted differently. ??There was a de Gaulle who would have reacted differently. ?* There were de Gaulles who would have reacted differently. ??No de Gaulle would have reacted differently.

A devastated Claes entered the court-room. ?* There was a devastated Claes entering the court-room. ?* Devastated Claeses entered the court-room. ?* No devastated Claes entered the court-room.

The propriallemmas in these constructions can maintain proper name function because existential quantification, which would entail an appellativizing sense in the noun operated on, is lacking. No persons called de Gaulle, John or Claes are introduced into the universe of discourse. On the contrary, the speaker is dealing here with the well known men in question. Indeed, (148a) is paraphrasable as: A man like de Gaulle would have re-

Marked constructions

177

acted differently. This is more or less equivalent to the simple statement: de Gaulle would have reacted differently. In this sentence, one refers to de Gaulle with his specific properties. No comparison with another person, hence no metaphor, is asserted, notwithstanding the use of like in the paraphrase. The latter suggests only that a comparison with other politicians is presupposed. I will return to this below. The indefinite article in such constructions as (148a) seems to have three functions. First, it points to the characteristic features associated with the name bearer in question. Second, it represents an expressive value. Third, it indicates the grammatical function of countability. A personal name is a countable noun, indeed. However, the article a(n) does not have its introducing function, which it normally displays with common nouns. In (149a) we encounter a very special pattern, which does not seem to be very frequent in English, but is found in Western European and even in a number of genetically unrelated languages, with both proper and common nouns. Again the indefinite article expresses merely countability and expressivity. In certain languages it is even left out with both proper and common nouns, e.g., French:

(151)

a. cetidiot de Jean! 'that idiot of a John!' b. ce jripon de valet! 'that crook of a servant! ,\08

The meaning of the pattern is to indicate a specific evaluative (mostly pejorative) property of the name bearer. There-insertion is barely possible: (151)

c.?* There was an idiot of a John!

The third construction, (150a), a devastated Claes, refers to a temporary state of the name bearer and appears to be used in a narrative sequence only (compare Willems 1996). The sentence can be paraphrased as: Devastated, Claes entered the court-room. Again, the indefinite article lacks its quantifying role. Claes is not introduced as a new referent. The same construction is encountered with monoreferential NPs, e.g., (152)

a. A devastated secretary general entered the court-room.

178

Formal characteristics a/proper names

The article in this pattern expresses not only countability and expressivity, but also a temporary state of the name bearer. In contrast, the use of the definite article suggests a rather permanent state of the referent: (152)

b. The devastated Claes / secretary-general entered the courtroom.

What is shared by the three constructions (148) to (150) is the proper name character of the proprial lemmas in them. A certain degree of expressivity is found in all three. Another difference with the appellative derivations above is the lack of tropes. Whereas in the appellative structures metaphor and metonymy are employed to make the appellativization possible, in the three proprial constructions no such tropes are needed because the proprial lemma fulfills its primary function of proper name. The peculiarity of the proprial constructions is further illustrated by the fact that there-insertion, pluralization, restrictive modification and negation of the constructions distort the sentences and yield awkward interpretations since appellativization would be involved. All this is in stark contrast with the situation in the appellative patterns (142) to (147). On the other hand, the proprial patterns in which the NPs can be subject (148a and 150a) do not allow for right dislocation of the NP, which means that they cannot be considered as ordinary definite NPs either (compare above): (153)

a. *He would have reacted differently, a de Gaulle. b. *He entered the court-room, a devastated Claes.

The functions of the article a(n) play an important part in the realization of the two kinds of pattern, the appellative and the proprial one. It is interesting to see that the prototypical meaning of the article a(n) (and its equivalent in other Western European languages) displays two components: the introduction of a referent into the universe of discourse and the indication of the countability of the accompanying noun (Van Langendonck 1979a). These two properties are encountered with common nouns and the appellativized constructions in (142) to (147). In existential sentences the introductory function of the indefinite article is clearer as it is accompanied here by a particle (there in English, er in Dutch), e.g., There is a woman coming / Er komt een vrouw aan. We have seen, however, that the article may lack this introductory function in certain proprial constructions, expressing solely countability (in fact its first historical function since it de-

Marked constructions

179

veloped out of the numeral one). The article a(n) also seems to provide for a certain expressive or emotive sense in the proprial patterns, in contrast to the appellative structures. There seems to exist a more close relationship between the metaphorical appellative pattern a second Einstein in (142) and the propria I pattern a de Gaulle in (148). The difference is that in the case of a de Gaulle the comparison with possible congeners is presupposed while in (142) it is asserted. Further, there is an affiliation between pattern (143) a different Rome and (150a) a devastated Claes. In both cases we are dealing with submanifestations of the referent, but in the instance a devastated Claes the contrast with other states of the referent is again presupposed, i.e. not asserted. In both proprial patterns, a de Gaulle and a devastated Claes, the article does not assert its existential sense, but rather presupposes it. This is also clear from the impossibility of negating these constructions while preserving their meaning or even their grammaticality. It is true that in construction (149), that idiot of a John, a John cannot be negated either, but here any similarity with an appellative pattern is lacking. Hence the likelihood that the article a(n) will disappear or be lacking here, as in French (cf. cet idiot de Jean!). In German it is optional (Leys 1997). Both the appellative and proprial types of construction turn out to exist with greater or lesser frequency in languages such as English, German, French, Dutch and Norwegian (compare Jespersen (1924: 69); Gary-Prieur 1994; Jonasson 1994; Kleiber 1991; 1994: 68, chapters 5-7; Kolde 1995; Willems 1996; Alekshina 1998). The above uses of the indefinite article with proper names and the appellativizations may be valid for the majority of personal names and place names in these languages. However, they will turn out not to obtain for other classes of proper names, or at least to a lesser extent. The same can be said of yet another proprial construction, i.e. the partitive construction, in which especially place names can appear.

7.2. Propriallemmas in a partitive construction It seems that at least in Dutch, place names without an article occur in a special partitive syntagm, e.g., (154)

Heel Belgie heeft onder het stormweer geleden. 'All (of) Belgium has suffered from the stormy weather.'

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Formal characteristics ofproper names

(155)

Half Londen was op de been. 'Half of London was about.'

(156)

Franssprekend Belgie protesteeerde. '(The) French speaking (part of) Belgium protested.'

(157)

Liberaal Amerika vond de zaak niet zo dramatis ch. 'The liberal part of America did not take the matter that tragic.'

These constructions can be related to partitive compounds such as: (158)

Frans-Vlaanderen 'French Flanders', Zuid-Libanon 'Southern Lebanon', Noord-Engeland 'Northern England', West-Java 'Western Java'

I would like to claim that we are dealing with genuine proper names as regards both the partitive constructions and the compounds. For here, neither classifying nor quantification nor restrictive reference is taking place on the basis of an appellative-like lexical meaning. In other words, there is no opposition between several Belgiums, Londons, or Americas. The proper names express only a division of these places. A few paraphrases may clarify this: (159)

Heel Belgie = the whole (territory) of Belgium

(160)

Half of London = half the population of London

(161)

Franssprekend Belgie = the French speaking part of Belgium

(162)

Liberaal Amerika = the liberal part of America

It depends on the interpretation of the sentence whether the territory or the population is intended. That er 'there' constructions are impossible is a formal indication of the proprial or at least the definite character of the propriallemmas in question, compare: (163)

*Er heeft heel Belgie onder het stormweer geleden. lit.: there has all Belgium under the stormweather suffered 'All Belgium has suffered from the stormy weather.'

Marked constructions

181

In English these partitive syntagms are limited mainly to constructions with all and half, e.g.,

(164)

All (of) Poland sufferedfrom the bad weather.

(165)

Half of Cologne got flooded.

For ordinary adjectives, English has to resort to periphrastic expressions as in: (166)

a. The catholic part of Ulster protested. b. The liberal part ofAmerica did not take the matter that tragic.

Temporal names are akin to place names but are limited in their partitive combinations in Dutch and even more in English: Dutch allows for heel 'all, whole' and half'half, mid'. English allows only for all: (167)

a. It was raining all June. b. Het regende heel juni.

(168)

a. On mid March they are going to marry. b. Met halfmaart gaan ze trouwen.

Although personal names normally have no article in either Dutch or English, for semantic reasons they occur in partitive constructions rather sporadically, and if they do, they show an emotive, i.e. pejorative connotation, expressed by the demonstrative: (169)

a. This whole Buchanan is infact a bigjoke. b. Die hele Buchanan is in feite een grote grap.

Thus, we see that the partitive construction with proper names is limited in both languages, but in English more than in Dutch, where adjectives at times appear in special partitive syntagms. Finally, I want to point out that this partitive grammatical feature of proper names (as well as other grammatical traits) is shared by personal pronouns since we have patterns such as all of us, we all, half of them. Here too, classification on the basis of a lexical sense is excluded as personal pronouns are obviously lacking such a sense.

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Formal characteristics ofproper names

8. Conclusions As was argued at length in chapter 1, a proper name is a noun that denotes a unique entity at the level of established linguistic convention to make it psychosocially salient within a given basic level category [pragmatic]. The meaning of the name, if any, does not (or not any longer) determine its denotation [semantic]. Related to this pragmatic-semantic status are the following formal characteristics. Proper names are nouns that are able to systematically appear in English close appositional structures of the types [def art + common noun + (of) proper name], [common noun + proper name], [proper name + def art + common noun], [proper name + proper name], e.g., the poet Burns, Hurricane Edna, Fido the dog, the City of London, Robert Burns. Proper names can be coordinated while being homophonous (e.g., Johnson and Johnson,' London and London); they do not take restrictive modifiers or quantifiers, cannot function as predicate nominals and are the weakest anaphoric elements. Proper names can display all types of grammatical features shown by personal pronouns, viz. referentiality and definiteness, number, countability, recursiveness (genericness), gender, person, and even partitiveness. Both nominal word classes can be assigned case as well. In addition, both proper names and personal pronouns mostly exhibit the unmarked counterparts of these grammatical features. Like personal pronouns, proper names are inherently referential and definite. Most proper names are singular, countable, nonrecursive and show third person on the lexical level. These are the unmarked (prototypical, default) instances. On the whole, proper names appear to be the most prototypical nominal class since they display primarily the least marked features. Exceptions seem to be the constructions with the article a(n) in which the proprial lemma preserves its proper name character. However, the markedness is due here to the expressive nature of the constructions, not to the propriality itself. In the case of appellativization the proprial lemma has a marked meaning corresponding to a marked, more complex form. This form is a combination of the features of common nouns (indefinite article, there-insertion) plus special features characterizing the particular constructions, such as the addition of modifiers like second, certain, different, as ... as (in predicate nominals), e.g., a second Einstein.

Chapter 3 Typology of proper names

1. Introduction In this chapter, I will propose a linguistically motivated typology of proper names: I will describe what I think are the main subcategories of proper names. Not only the nature of the 'thing' itself, i.e. the substance itself, is relevant here, but especially the linguistic behavior of the name. This behavior appears to be closely connected with the nature of the lemma underlying the name. The more prototypical a name is, the more clearly it displays a propria I lemma of itself. At the same time, I must point out that my aim is not to give an exhaustive taxonomy of proper names, but rather a framework in which all kinds of names can be accommodated. Linguistic and onomastic authors, and even more so philosophers, seldom deal systematically with the synchronic subclassification or typology of proper names or proprial lemmas, either from a semantic or from a formal viewpoint (but see recently Ainiala & Slotte 2002, Zelinsky 2002, Anderson 2003: 354-376, and Vaxelaire 2005 for onomastic or rather limited linguistic classifications). Onomasticians sometimes discuss the diachronic subcategorization of (what I call) proprial lemmas. Even if linguists are aware of this gap in the scientific literature, they refrain from tackling the problem. Gary-Prieur (1994: 247), for instance, explicitly says that she will not go into the matter of subclassification. That I will propose a (non-exhaustive) subclassification of proper names in this chapter is related to the importance that I have been attaching to the categorical (basic level) meaning, which appears to be essential for a proper understanding of the phenomenon of proper names. It can form the basis for a well founded subclassification. On the other hand, we might deduce from the exposition in chapter 2 that proper names can be cross-classified according to various parameters. There are the grammatical features such as number or gender; we may also distinguish between emotive and 'neutral' names; we may consider purely

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onomastic subclasses like first name, family name, byname (nickname), or middle name. But above all, it has become clear that proper names divide into subclasses that appear to be general categories going back to our experience of the world we live in, and these will form the basis for the typology. Other parameters may be used for further subclassification. My investigation will result in the conclusion that we have four major subclasses, which can be regarded as constituting a cline. First, there is the most important (prototypical) class mostly displaying a clear proprial lemma: personal names, animal names, place names and a few others. Second, there is the category of non prototypical proper names with various kinds of lemmas that underlie appellatives as well as proper names. These compare more or less to the class of so-called 'appellative proper names' ('Gattungseigennamen' for some German onomasticians, see chapter 1, 1.2)109 : names of brands, languages, colors, diseases, and the like. The dictionary entries underlying these categories can be called proprioappellative lemmas. The third and fourth classes are marginal categories that are not constituted by an ad hoc proprial or proprio-appellative lemma, i.e. autonyms (metalinguistic names like bank in the appositional structure the word 'bank ') and nouns with a restricted proprial function, e.g., the second noun in appositional structures of the form the notion of relator; the element gold, where we find an appellative lemma. The second, the third and the fourth class, but not the first, can be used generically (recursively) in a systematic manner, as June in sentences of the type June is usually a hot month. The prototypical subclass and half of the second subclass (proper names with recursive potential) denoting persons, animals, places, buildings, institutions, works of art, trades and brands, or temporal units are countable, i.e. they have 'divided reference' (Quine 1960: 90), which means that they denote discrete elements. I would like to argue, however, that categories of 'uncountable proper names' do exist, contrary to what has been held traditionally (compare Harweg 1992; Wilmet 1993). But it must be admitted that these belong to the nonprototypical classes, i.e. only a few classes have 'undivided reference', viz. mass entities like certain products of brands, languages, colors, diseases and chemical elements. 110 Paradoxically, the basic level term of these mass (and all other) proper names always seems to be a count noun (e.g., language, at least in the appositional construction), compare: (1)

a. the two languages Latin and English b. I could never speak much Latin.

Introduction

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That language names as in (1a) are uncountables can be deduced indirectly from their uncountable behavior in derived appellative formations such as much Latin in (1 b). From the above observations we should not infer that proper names can denote all possible classes of designata. Such abstract entities as 'love' and 'courage' can hardly be denoted by proper names, except in the case of personification, but then they have become a kind of personal name by definition. Exceptions may be the second element in appositional structures like the virtue of hope, or the notion of intolerance. But these elements are construed as proper names almost only in the appositional construction. The most conspicuous abstract entities indicated by proper names are segments of time like June, 1997, or Easter. But in general we can put it that proper names refer in the first place to concrete, material entities. This squares well with Lyons' (1977: 444) observation that abstract words are less referential than animate words. As is obvious from traditional onomastics, the major proper name classes are personal names and place names. This is clear also from a linguistic as well as from an experiential viewpoint. Linguistically, personal names constitute the least marked category and show the most diversified constructional patterns. This statement may seem contradictory, but it is not. Indeed, unmarked categories in the widest sense of 'unmarked', say, prototypical, always display a maximum of variation in their semantic and formal structure (Greenberg 1966). From an experiential viewpoint, it is to be expected that the most salient category of names is the one that indicates the so-called prototypical speaker (cf. Mayerthaler 1988) himself, viz. personal names. Names of animals, especially pets, are often formed like personal names. The most prototypical place names indicate places where the prototypical speaker lives, i.e. settlement names: names of cities, towns, villages. This experiential, more in particular, this anthropocentric prominence of personal, pet and certain place names is related to the fact that human beings and certain places are both natural and cultural entities. All of them are natural entities which are enriched by cultural features to a certain extent. Human beings are of course natural entities that generate cultural values. As to animals (especially pets), they are typically given names as far as they are domesticated, i.e. as far as they are integrated into culture. This is the case with cats and dogs, horses, cows, and the like, at least in a number of cultures. Settlements are geographical entities that are delimited and organized by man. By contrast, other entities that are given proper names, appear to be essentially cultural. This is the case with buildings, cars, ships, institutions,

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firms, brands, artifacts, etc. Although the names for these entities may even outnumber those for natural-cultural ones, they do not seem to be so prominent or important as personal and place names. It will be objected here that languages and chemical elements as well as temporal units are also natural entities with cultural traits although they are far from prominent. This is certainly right, but the lesser salience of these entities appears to be due to their character of undivided or abstract reference, which leads to marked and more marginal linguistic structures. As was explained in chapter 1, 6, there is strong evidence that aphasic patients treat proper names (or propriaI lemmas) differently from common nouns (or appellative lemmas). Sometimes, they also distinguish between proprial subclasses like personal names and place names (or their corresponding proprial lemmas). McKenna and Warrington (1978; 1980) deal with the case of a patient who showed a very reduced efficiency in the oral production of the names of specific persons. For instance, she failed to answer such questions as 'Who is the Prime Minister?' or 'Who wrote Pride and Prejudice?'. By contrast, she could provide other names, including geographical names (towns) and 'generic' lists of proper names (girls, surnames) (cf. Semenza and Zettin 1988: 712). Hence, to a certain extent, neurolinguistic research confirms that certain proprial subclasses should be set up. In the next section, I will devote considerable attention to prototypical proper names, of which personal names are the most prototypical subclass.

2. Prototypical proper names As expected, the category of prototypical proper names is construed as countable and nongeneric (i.e. nonrecursive) NPs and contains such well known instances as personal names and place names, which are, of course, the favorite subject of (historical) onomastic research. On account of their being derived from personal name lemmas, animal names and names of hurricanes and tornadoes are dealt with after these most prototypical classes (personal and place names). Being of a topographical nature, the names of astronomic objects and the names of buildings are discussed after the subclass of place names. The use of the definite article with prototypical proper names displays a classificatory function in that the absence of the article tends to presuppose a kind of 'animate' referent whilst the presence of the article suggests inanimate reference. There are two obvious exceptions: with personal names

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the article is used for expressive (emotive) reasons (but see 2.8). The names of astronomic objects normally have no article, although its presence could be expected on the basis of their inanimate nature. A typical feature of prototypical proper names is that they can be appellativized by means of metaphor or via metonymization with reference to the proprial lemma (see also chapter 2, 6). Compare such well known appellativizations of personal names as: (2)

a. a second Napoleon = a second person like Napoleon [metaphor] b. another John = another person called' John ' [metonymy]

Names referring to groups of persons (families, and the like) need to be accompanied by their categorical term to be appellativized in this way:

(3)

a. a second Johnson family b. a different Johnson family

2.1. Personal names The aim of this section is to analyze the synchronic system of Dutch (especially Flemish) personal names. Personal names include not only individual names (first names and most bynames 'nicknames') but also collective names, such as inhabitant names, certain bynames and especially family names. To obtain the same possibilities for family names as for individual names, it is often necessary to add the classifier. For example, family names do not normally take the function of subject by themselves, compare:

(4)

a. Kevin has an excellent reputation. b. *Johnson has / have an excellent reputation. (if the family is meant) c. The Johnson family has an excellent reputation.

Notwithstanding its marked behavior I will deal with the family name subclass together with the other personal names because they are so much interwoven with the latter. The preceding remarks already lead to the important preliminary observation that personal names constitute the most diversified category of

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proper names. Crosslinguistically and even within one language (dialect), a number of different patterns are encountered. It is especially striking that, at least in European languages, personal names are the only proper name category which can appear in purely proprial syntactic combinations like [first name + family name], [first name + byname], [byname + first name] and so on, depending on the linguistic or dialectal system in question. Morphologically, personal names tend to display a rich derivational structure. This rich morphosyntactic structure serves a number of semantic functions of a classificatory and expressive (emotive) nature. The semantic and formal diversification ultimately derives from the fact that personal names constitute the unmarked subcategory of proper names since they refer to humans (likewise Anderson 2003: 365). The feature 'human' has been said to be the unmarked one vis-a-vis other features. From an experientialcognitive viewpoint, it is obvious that human beings interact most with other human beings. This fact engenders the extensive use of personal names and the proliferation of subclasses. Since it is impossible to deal with all the above-mentioned diversity of personal name systems, it is indicated to keep to one linguistic area and discuss the data available in some detail. I will draw on material from Dutch and its (Flemish) dialects because of the wealth of data, collected either by myself or by students of the Institute for Onomastics and Dialectology at the University of Leuven (see also note 155). Firstly, I will deal with the criteria for classifying personal names, which will lead to a classification in which the traditional subcategories will find their place. Secondly, I will focus on the phenomenon of byname. In that section, I will first establish the proper name status of bynames. This will be followed by a pragmatic characterization of bynames. Subsequently, a subdivision into individual and collective bynames will be proposed and some formal characteristics of Flemish bynames will be given. Finally, I will go into the problems connected with the combinatorics of personal names. If we want to define and classify personal name categories, we are up against the problem of adequate criteria. Should we use semantic, pragmatic or morphosyntactic criteria? From a universal viewpoint and in line with the tenets of Radical Construction Grammar, semantic-pragmatic factors may be the best basis for a characterization. From a languagespecific standpoint, a morphosyntactic analysis is of course indispensable as well; moreover, it should be in accordance with the semantic-pragmatic analysis.

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For the semantic-pragmatic characterization of personal names I propose to use the parameters 'primary' vs. 'secondary' and 'official' vs. 'unofficial' . The opposition primary vs. secondary can be understood in at least two ways: functionally and chronologically. Functionally primary names are those that fulfill the three main functions of personal names: address (talk to), identification (talk about) and a wide possibility of subcategorization concerning gender and expressivity (especially combinability with diminutive and augmentative morphemes). Official names are given by official institutions such as the State or the Church. Unofficial names can be given by anybody (see especially Kany 1992). They are also called popular names, bynames, or nicknames. I will use the term 'byname' to cover all unofficial names except for hypocoristics, pseudonyms and internet chat names. The last two categories are chosen by the name bearers themselves. Pseudonyms will not be gone into in this book. Internet chat names are dealt with in chapter 4,3.6. The use of the two parameters will lead to a pragmatic trichotomy of personal names: primary and official; secondary and official; secondary and unofficial.

2.1.1. Primary official personal names

At least in modem Western society, this first category divides into two major subclasses: first names and family names. First names and family names are bestowed on people via an initial illocutionary speech act of declaration (see Searle 1976 for a taxonomy of speech acts). In the case of official forenames and family names, this is done by an official institution. First names are bestowed by a baptismal act of the Church or by an administrative act of the State. At least in Europe, family names have been officially established when Napoleon's Civil Code was installed. For example, in Flanders, this was done in 1795, in the Netherlands in 1811. After these dates, the official alteration of first or family name has become far from obvious, though not impossible. A number of juridical steps have to be taken for the change of official names. The question arises whether morphological derivations of such names can still be considered official or have to be regarded as unofficial individual bynames. In my view, the productive derivations (diminutives and augmentatives) should still be treated as first names, since precisely this possibility is an essential feature of this category, compare Jan-tje 'little

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John' (diminutive) vs. de Jan 'the John' (augmentative). Only if the derived form looks irregular and is no longer recognized as a forename is it to be analyzed as a byname. Admittedly, it is to be expected that the boundary will not always be clear. Likewise, it will be difficult to consistently distinguish between official family names and their unofficial derivations, even if we leave individualized family name lexemes out of consideration here (see below: 'secondary official names'). Let us define first names and family names. In accordance with the above parameters, I contend that the functionally primary personal name is the first name (forename, given name, Christian name).111 Chronologically, first names are generally used first, i.e. before other names. The fact that in most countries family names are even established before the child's birth (Seibicke 1987: 72; Dalberg 1993: 65), does not matter here: the family name is not actually used before the first name. In addition, the family name is not an individual name by definition, hence hardly compares to the individual forename. As a rule, first names are the source for (the pragmatic category of) call-names, i.e. usually, people are addressed by their first name in daily situations. In formal situations, the family name is used. The borderline between these two categories can vary from culture to culture. Obviously, the American custom, in which the first name prevails in more and more situations, seems to be taken over in other cultures. 112 Only for joking or denigrating purposes are bynames sometimes employed as call-names. First names show more variation than other names. There is often a lexical or morphological distinction between masculine and feminine forms. First names are often enriched by diminutive and augmentative productive derivations. Compare Dutch Jan (masc.) vs. Hi/de (fern.); Claar-tje, Marie-ke (diminutives); dial. Bert-en 'Bertie', de Miel-e 'the Emile', de Jan 'the John' (augmentative suffix -ern) and/or article de).1I3 The diminutive use of first names comes very close to hypocoristics, whereas the borderline of the augmentative (i.e. from nondiminutive to pejorative) use of forenames with bynames is hard to be distinguished as well (see above). Damstra (1977: 77) appears to distinguish between hypocoristics that are derived from proprial lemmas and those that are not, like Bolletje 'little ball', Ventje 'little fellow', Dumbo. Pragmatically, we can distinguish between call-names and identificatory names. Call-names will often be first names, only sometimes bynames or family names used individually. The last two are used mainly to identify. Syntactically, first names mostly precede surnames or bynames, as the terms 'first name' and 'forename' suggest. However, this is by no means

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universal (cf. Van Langendonck 1991; 1996; cf. the section on personal name combinations). In its prototypical sense, the term 'family name' is used as a name for a group of people with family bonds. Thus, a family name is a kind of collective name. As is often the case with such groups, their denotation is expandable: more people can join the group. However, for families, it is obvious that joining a family depends on criteria like blood ties, marriage, adoption, which have to be socially accepted and officially registered. 114 This situation is reflected in the formal characteristics of family names. Family names can be construed as units of appositions or attributively in juxtaposition to the noun phrase, Dutch de familie / Eng. the family, as in de familie Peeters / the Peeters family, the term 'family' being an obvious classifier. Family names can of course also appear after given names, as in: Paul Newman / Maria Peeters. In Flemish dialects, they combine with bynames, as in: Baaske Vankrieken. They can also figure after locative prepositions to indicate the place where the family lives: bi} Peeters / at Peeters's. However, they are unable to figure as the subject (or object) of a sentence without the accompaniment of the classifier (see also chapter 2, 2), compare:

(5)

a. *Johnson are coming today. b. *Janssens komen vandaag. c. The Johnson family is coming today. d. De familie Janssens komt vandaag.

For another possibility (the Johnsons), we now turn to the next section.

2.1.2. Secondary official personal names Certain name categories appear to be official but secondary. In Western standard languages, a family name lexeme can be systematically employed as an individual name, e.g., as in: Johnson was a former president. 115 This use is clearly secondary, to the first name as well as to the family name: chronologically, it is used later than the forename, and with regard to the family name, it has a derived, metonymical status in the sense that Mister Johnson is a member of the Johnson family. On the other hand, these names can still be looked upon as official naming patterns as far as they have not been altered formally, as is frequently done by young people. Thus, schoolchildren changed the Flemish family name Wynants into the

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Typology ofproper names

individual byname de Wijn, in which an allusion is made to the common noun wijn 'wine' as well. 116 Another kind of derivation from family names is their pluralization accompanied by the definite article, as in the Johnsons, at least as far as it indicates the family. Following Coseriu (1989), I take it that such expressions are genuine (though, in my view, not prototypical) proper names (see also Van Langendonck 1995). They are secondary in the same way as individualized family name lemmas (type Johnson). Special endings may differentiate these plural family names from appellative plural formations, as in the German opposition between die Schulzes (the Schulz family) vs. die Schulze (the persons called 'Schulz') (see also chapter 2,3.2.2). A further candidate for an official but secondary status can be found in patterns of the form Charles the Fifth, where the Fifth is an official identificatory epithet, albeit a secondary one vis-a-vis the first name Charles. Finally, the number names by which the administration or other official organs label people, can also be regarded as secondary official names. I can point here to the famous example of James Bond, i.e. 007.

2.1.3. Unofficial personal names. Bynames Unofficial names are even more strongly secondary since they contrast with official counterparts. At least two major categories should be distinguished: names given by other people (bynames) and names that one gives to oneself (pseudonyms; internet chat names). This distinction may seem arbitrary, but as a rule, neither pseudonyms nor chat names are included into the class of bynames. The category of pseudonyms will not be gone into. Flemish nicknames for internet chatting are dealt with in chapter 4, 3.6. The definition and the classification of bynames constitute a real challenge to all levels of the linguistic sign: morphology, syntax, semantics and pragmatics. Intuitively, bynames are considered added, unofficial, popular names for persons. They are likely to appear in all languages to a greater or lesser extent. Usually, they are meant to express some characteristic of the name bearer. In this case, one speaks of nicknames. Bynames occur in various social circles and contexts. They are used for rulers, e.g., Charlemagne, Bloody Mary, for members of certain societies, orders or guilds, among family members, but above all, among ordinary people in a community, e.g., a village or a school.

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In addition, the notion of byname may also apply to other classes of entities than human beings: animals, countries, e.g., Albion, Holland, cities and towns, e.g., French la Ville Lumiere 'the City of Light', buildings, e.g., Dutch het Kremlin (for the Arts faculty building in Leuven), months, e.g., de Hooimaand 'the Hay-month'. A more recent type constitutes nicknames given to newly discovered galaxies, e.g., the Cartwheel Galaxy, for the astronomic object AM0035-335. In this chapter, we will limit ourselves to bynames of persons or groups of persons. Data will especially be drawn from dialects spoken in smaller communities among people in villages or schools in Southern Dutch (Flemish) dialects (see also Van Langendonck 1982; 1991; 1993; 1996; 1999a). It is generally believed that at the very beginning of name-giving, anthroponymic systems did not contain bynames. This is quite plausible if we set out from the idea that bynames are secondary with regard to other names. For instance, it is commonly agreed that Germanic tribes applied a one name system. Names were numerous since they were composed of two name stems according to certain productive principles, at least in the first stages of Germanic name-giving, e.g., Bern-hard 'bear-strong'. Hence, bynames were at least not necessary for identificational reasons. Nonetheless, it need not be excluded that this secondary personal name category developed rather early, at first in the realm of diminutive expressive formations (hypocoristics) and later on, in augmentative formations (nicknames). Indeed, a general motive for nicknaming is people's need to characterize others by some characteristic feature such as occupation, behavior, physical appearance and so on. In the early Middle Ages, the identificational factor was considerably strengthened by the drastic reduction of the name inventory, due to the habit or obligation to draw on a limited stock of Christian names (Van der Schaar 1953). The bynames eventually became family names. This gave rise to new unofficial names and hence a new proliferation of by- and nicknames. On the other hand, it is commonly held that in modem times, the habit of nicknaming is declining, at least in cities and even villages. By contrast, interest in the study of bynames seems on the increase and comes from various quarters. Folkloristic or lay onomasticians are usually satisfied with lists of nicknames and their etymology. A second group is interested in ethno- or sociological considerations (Morgan et al. 1979). A third group, under which the present study could be subsumed, deals with onomastic-linguistic, pragmatic and sociolinguistic aspects of bynames (see, among others, Holland 1990; Leslie and Skipper 1990; Seibicke 1982:

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203-207; 1987; Kany 1992; Dalberg 1993; Lawson 1990 for a bibliography). In my view, it is imperative to distinguish between synchronic and diachronic aspects of bynames, although it should be admitted that boundaries cannot always be as sharp as de Saussure would have had them in his time. In this section, I will discuss the synchronic status of bynames. First, I will deal with the proper name status of bynames. Subsequently, semantic-pragmatic factors will be adduced to define them. Finally, it will be shown that formal byname properties correlate with these semanticpragmatic factors. In the dialinguistic chapter 4, we will look at the reflection of some social properties of bynames in their formal structures.

2.1.3.1.

The proper name status of bynames

I take the view that bynames constitute a special subcategory of proper names, although they do not appear to be a prototypical one. As I deal only with personal bynames (and not with bynames of, say, places or objects), I will attempt to relate them to the other categories of personal names, first names and family names. The fact that contemporary bynames are recent neologisms renders their origin and etymology fairly transparent, compare such Flemish examples as den Dikke < 'dik' (fat), de Verver < 'verver' (painter), de Wilde < 'wild' (wild), in which the sign ' Peer Bertem; Nare van Jejkes > Nare Jejkes. In this process, the group stress moves to the second element. At least in Brabant, the so-called postgenitive Jejkes (from the first name Jejke 'Joseph') in Nare Jejkes was originally a pregenitive, as, for instance, in Jejkes-Marie 'Jefke's Mary'. The evolution from a pregenitive to a so-called postgenitive (postposed genitive) took place through two shortenings of an originally larger pattern: starting from an NP like Nare van Jejkes-Marie, the following two patterns developed: > Nare van Jejkes > Nare Jejkes. Therefore, it is not quite justified to speak of a postgenitive here. If the -(e)s ending in Nare Jejkes still has any function at all, it is simply to indicate the collective character of the collective name. 150 The preposition is incorporated into the surname as a syllable, often with deletion of the last consonant n in van, e.g., Marie Va-boereke. This pattern occurs in the Campine area (under Turnhout). The stress again falls on the surname.

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Dialinguistic aspects of Flemish personal names

The use of the preposition van (plus article) is extended from collective names to bynames. Thus it begins to function as an indication of surname status. For instance, Fons van-den-Apoteker 'Alphonse from the chemist' was not the son of a chemist, but the chemist himself. Germaine vanLemke 'Germaine from Lamb' was a woman who often used the word lemme 'lamb' (dim. lem-ke). This pattern is typical of the Limburg area, though by no means impossible in other regions. When we now return to the history of Dutch (Flemish) official family names, we get the impression that the same processes repeat themselves over and over again: prepositional and appositional structures appear as expansions of individual names and subsequently undergo elision or incorporation of function words, so that real surnames originate. This happened with the old family names and was repeated in modem bynames. Other factors are external to the Dutch linguistic and dialectal system. In the Western Flemish area the order [surname + forename] may never have occurred. Therefore, and in view of the fact that in the Brabant area this order has been replaced by the reverse order, we might speculate about French and Walloon influence: both these areas in fact border on Frenchspeaking territory. There may also have been some influence from big cities like Brussels, Ghent and Antwerp, where there is or was a Frenchspeaking high society. We have seen the same influence at work for the pattern [forename + kinship term] (e.g., Jan-oom 'John-uncle') in the dialects, which was replaced by the reverse pattern (nonkel Jan 'uncle John'). Clearly, there is influence from French, in which the normal order is [head before modifier]. Moreover, even the Dutch word for 'uncle', oom, was replaced by the term nonkel, derived from French mon-oncle. l5l The reversal of ordering was probably also facilitated by the existence of the common pattern [title + personal name], as in Dutch Meneer Peeters, French Monsieur Dupont. In this connection, I should also mention, as a second external factor, the impact which the standard languages Dutch and French had via administrative channels. In 1795 and 1811, the laws issued during the French Revolution and under Napoleon forced Belgian and Dutch citizens to add an official family name to their forenames, whereby, according to French usage, the forename preceded the family name.

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267

2.5. Conclusions In view of all these patterns, it seems reasonable to posit that at least in the Eastern Flemish dialects of the 20th century there has been an evolution from the personal name pattern [surname + forename] to the reverse pattern [forename + surname]. Some strongholds of the older pattern in the Dender region and in the province of Limburg still resist to a certain extent. This almost complete change squares well with the language internal factor that has been changing synthetic into analytic patterns and with external factors relating to influence from French and to administrative influences. Finally, I would like to point out the partially cyclic development of name-giving patterns in the area dealt with. As far as we know, Germanic tribes used a unary naming pattern. In the Middle Ages, this was gradually replaced by a binary pattern (and even a ternary one in the 17th century), in which forenames preceded surnames, at least according to written sources. In later centuries, we see the rise of the inverted pattern, which behaves as a kind of compound. We do not know when it originated, but in the spoken output of 20th century dialects, we are confronted with the decline of this compound system. There was a return to the analytical pattern [forename + surname], which we had already encountered in medieval written sources. Again, this change partially came about under the influence of written and administrative language. As I pointed out above, all these processes are accompanied by a phenomenon that repeats itself: prepositional and appositional structures appear as expansions of individual names and subsequently undergo elision or incorporation of function words, so that real surnames originate.

3. Diachronic analysis of Flemish personal names 3.1. Introduction In this section, I will deal with some diachronic aspects of names. For this diachronic dimension (like for most other dialinguistic aspects), the distinction between proper name and propriaI lemma is less significant since, in most cases, lemmas are involved rather than proper names (names in their proprial function). Indeed, the historical development of a name usually involves more than one referent, which means that we are dealing with more than one proper name.

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I will concentrate especially on systematic diachronic changes in the form and meaning of bynames and family names. To this end, I will set up a classification on the basis of linguistic parameters such as the paradigmatic vs. the syntagmatic axis. I will also show that the semantic taxonomy is reflected in a formal, morphosyntactic one. Before going into this classification, I will look at possible diachronic changes of names (compare Anderson 2003: 377-394). In principle, three major types of changes can be discerned, which have actually been attested. The best known type of change involves a development from common nouns or other words to proper names. In this process, the original word or expression loses its asserted lexical meaning and either preserves or takes on a presuppositional categorical meaning depending on the extension of the names. If human appellatives are involved, the categorical meaning 'man' (or possibly 'woman') is preserved in the byname (BN). In the family name (FN) it changes into 'family': (1)

de bakker 'the baker' > de Bakker (BN) > Bakker (FN)

In the case of other appellative source expressions, a (new) categorical meaning is already created in the BN, e.g., (2)

de snoek 'the pike' > Snoek (BN)

Here, the categorical sense 'animal' changes into 'man'. Nonsense words may also be at the origin of a proper name, for instance: (3)

tiete (mispronunciation of kieken 'chicken') functions as a BN: den Tiete

The second, reverse type of change occurs whenever a name develops into a common noun or into any other expression (antonomasia, eponymy), for instance: (4)

Quisling (Norwegian prime mInIster who betrayed his country during the war) gave rise to the expression a Quisling 'traitor'.

What happens in this instance is that a salient association with the referent turns into the asserted lexical meaning of an appellative. The categorical meaning 'man' is preserved in this change. Proper names can also change

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into verbs (or other word classes); their form may change because of derivational processes, e.g., (5)

Coventry> to coventrize 'to destroy completely with bombings as happened with Coventry'

The association of the bombing with the city gives rise to a verb with a parallel lexical sense. The categorical meaning of the place name is lost in the process. The third type concerns an internal transition within the name from one subclass of name into another. Theoretically, the categorical meaning can again be preserved or not. As a rule, it is not, as witnessed to by changes from personal names to place names, and vice-versa, e.g., (6)

a. Washington (personal name) > Washington (place name) b. Westmoreland(place name) > Westmoreland(personal name)

Only in transitions such as from FiN (first name) to BN can we argue that the categorical meaning remains unchanged, e.g., 'man' in: (7)

Louis (FiN) > de Wieter (BN)

The function morphemes de (article) and -(t)er (nominal suffix), which were at least initially expressive, are added in the process. The first syllable is dropped. We will now look at a number of approaches that are commonly used in the diachronic study of names.

3.2. Diachronic approaches 3.2.1. The etymological approach At the outset, European onomastics was largely concerned with the etymological investigation of names. In this pre-structuralist period, the approach was largely atomistic. As in 19th century linguistics, lexical items were investigated as separate entities, without much consideration of such notions as system and structure, which were introduced into linguistic analysis by (post-)Saussurean linguistics. Baudouin de Courtenay's early attempts at structuralist analyses of languages were put aside. Thus,

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onomasticians were, and often still are, mainly involved in trying to discover the original meaning of water names (hydronyms), place names (toponyms) and personal names (anthroponyms). Indeed, the older and the less transparent the names were, the more research was devoted to them. Especially hydronyms and settlement names drew the attention of onomasticians, who were usually renowned Indo-Europeanists like Hans Krahe. Important series such as Hydronymia Germaniae, the place name series of the English Place Name Society, and many Scandinavian and Slavic name series, were set up in this spirit. A number of toponymic and anthroponymic dictionaries with (or sometimes without) etymological explanations appeared in this period, such as Andre Dauzat's dictionaries of French first and family names. This contrasts sharply with the onomastic research program in North America. Stewart (1953: 76) critically observed: "European scholars have been remiss in that they have devoted their energies almost wholly to mere etymology." He urged onomasticians to think about theory and methodology.152 As noted above, the main diachronic direction in the etymological type of research is from appellative to proper name. Much less space has been devoted to the etymological investigation of proper names that developed into appellatives or proper names that changed into proper names of a different subclass. Of course, it should also be admitted that the first type (common noun> proper name) by far outnumbers the other types.

3.2.2. Namefields The application of structuralist methods in onomastics led to the introduction of the notion of 'name field' in post-war onomastics. A name field is a kind of lexical field that groups together names situated in the same appellative conceptual sphere (Moser 1957, especially p. 64; Fleischer 1962). For instance, the street names of a quarter may consist of names of flowers, plants, or writers. Synonymous series can be distinguished as well as complementary series (e.g., Gnadental 'grace valley' - Seligenporten 'saints' gate' - Heiligenkron 'saints' crown' - Goldenkron 'gold crown' - Marienthron 'Mary's throne' - Marienstern 'Mary's star' - Lichtenstern 'light's star'- Himmelswonne 'heaven's happiness'- Gottestal 'God's valley' as names of monasteries referring to religious features, Moser 1957: 57). There are also contrastive series formed with prefixes such as big and little.

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The diachronic classification of personal (by)names is based on fields that refer to origin, occupation, characteristics, and so on.

3.2.3. The paradigmaticlsyntagmatic approach For the diachronic classification of anthroponyms, Van Langendonck (1976; 1979b) used the classical linguistic opposition between the paradigmatic and the syntagmatic level. This will be explained in more detail below.

3.2.4. The axiological approach Cognitive linguistics has led to the recent introduction of axiological semantics into diachronic onomastics. Kaleta (1995) investigates the reflection of philosophically established 'human values' in the diachronic structure of Indo-European personal names. For example, the value 'famous, bright' is reflected in a number of Indo-European names, such as Adelbrecht 'nobility+bright' (famous by nobility). In the diachronic analyses of personal names presented here, I will attempt to unify and refine these various approaches.

3.3. Diachronic classification of adult bynames and family names Since in principle, the present classification of personal names is rather similar for all Indo-European name systems, and since we have at our disposal the Southern Dutch (Flemish) material collected earlier by students and by myself (Van Langendonck 1979b), I will mainly draw on these data. The actual analysis will, however, be somewhat different from my previous ones (compare Van Langendonck 1976; 1979b; 1982; 1996).

3.3.1. Principles for the diachronic-semantic classification of bynames and family names Onomasticians have set up a number of often extensive classifications of BNs or FNs with respect to their diachronic meaning. However, these taxonomies are often too hybrid in that the various criteria used are rather

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diverse and unsystematic (e.g., Bach 1952; Reaney 1979; Morgan et al. 1979; Beider 2005).153 In my view, we should work with general linguistic distinctions and apply linguistic categories. An obvious primary dichotomy is that between form and meaning. As shown by earlier research, one has to start out from a semantic taxonomy for the diachronic classification of bynames since only this stands a chance of being more or less universal, or at least 'euroversal' or 'occidental'. Starting from this semantic classification, it is, however, imperative to look for formal (morphosyntactic) reflexes of the semantic system (see 2.2.2).

3.3.1.1.

The distinction of word class vs. motivational structure

For the diachronic semantic analysis of bynames, a crucial distinction imposes itself. In Van Langendonck (1976; 1996) this distinction was developed in terms of the well known linguistic opposition between the paradigmatic and the syntagmatic axis. In the present context, I will recapitulate and update this general approach. In the diachronic evolution of any byname, one can distinguish at least three stages. The first stage is the one before the name-giving act, the second is the moment of the name-giving act, the third is the period after this naming event. What concerns us here is the first two stages. Let us illustrate this by means of the bynameFox. In the first stage, i.e. before the name-giving act, the lexical element fox is not a byname, i.e. not a proper name, yet. It is simply a word that belongs to the word class or word category of countable common nouns displaying the phonological shape If8ksl and the lexical meaning 'carnivorous mammal of the dog family'. It is only in the act of name-giving that this noun receives an onomastic function. The word meaning is then applied to a name bearer, e.g., to John. All this seems pretty obvious. However, it is important to bear in mind the two stages in the diachronic analysis of a byname. A name such as Fox is often simply classified as an 'animal name'. However, this is only half of the story. Only the word class and the word meaning are touched upon. In this type of analysis, nothing is said about the actual relationship between the name bearer and the byname. Yet, it is this relation which is relevant to the motivation for the bestowal of the name on the referent, in this case John. The diachronic relation between John and Fox can be looked at in a number of ways. We certainly do not expect to find a direct relation such as: 'John is a fox' (in the literal

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sense) since this equation ignores or undoes the categorical presupposition that John is a man. To preserve this presupposition, we are forced to look for an indirect relation between John and the word meaning 'carnivorous mammal of the dog family'. For instance, plausible paraphrases might be the following: (8)

a. John was like a fox, physically or psychologically b. John hunted foxes c. John got bitten by a fox, etc.

One of these, or comparable, relations between the name bearer and the meaning of the wordfox should provide us with the most relevant information, i.e. the real motivation behind the name. A specific feature of the diachronic analysis of such names as (John) Fox is the application of a trope. Since neither of the above relations is expressed as such in the name Fox or in the name combination John Fox, a trope must be involved. In the case of (8a) we can speak of metaphor, since a comparison is made between John and a fox. In the case of (8b) and (8c) we can speak of a metonymic relation between these two elements. The distinction between the etymological meaning of a byname and the motivation for giving this name to an individual can be further pursued with the example of the byname Fox. For this name, at least two other motivations are possible: d. John was from the inn called the Fox e. John used to say fox In these instances the word-categorical status is no longer 'animal name' but rather 'inn name' (8d) and 'autonym' (8e). These interpretations existed before the name Fox was given to John and hence pertain to the first stage. Of course, in a stage still prior to this one, the word fox had the meaning 'carnivorous mammal of the dog family'. This shows clearly that the motivation hinges crucially on the etymological meaning of the word underlying the byname, but the word by itself does not inform us about the motivation of the naming act It would have been an ideal situation for the diachronic analysis of bynames if the first two stages in the naming process had always been in a one-to-one correspondence to the two parameters mentioned above, i.e. if the stage prior to naming had provided the word-categorical parameter

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(word class and meaning) and if the naming moment had provided the motivational parameter. Take, however, a name like Shake-speare. This special compound in the form of a so-called 'Satzname' (sentential name) consisting of a [verb + object] pattern was probably coined at the time of the naming act. Nevertheless, in itself it does not say everything about the motivation of the name. What is crucial for this is that the name bearer is thought of as having been involved in the activity of shaking his' spear'. In other words, we need to specify the relation to the name bearer. Another example is 'bahuvrihi', consisting of the combination [adjective + noun]. This type either existed beforehand or it was formed specifically at the name-giving act, e.g., German Lang-ohr 'long ear', Flemish de Groot-oog 'the big eye'. The latter byname was certainly coined at the naming act and alluded to the name bearer's big eyes. In view of these examples, it seems preferable not to make the distinction between the etymology of a name and the motivation of the namegiving act too strictly dependent on the distinction between the pre-naming and the naming stage. Rather, what seems at stake is the relation between the word-categorical parameter and the motivational relation between name and name bearer.

3.3.1.2. The paradigmatic vs. the syntagmatic parameter Having established the distinction between word category and motivation in the previous section, I will now show how the linguistic dichotomy between paradigmatic and syntagmatic can be applied. At first sight, this distinction makes sense only when we have to do with combinations of first name and surname, as in John Fox (close apposition) or Peer van Bertem 'Peter from Bertem' (prepositional phrase). In such instances we can speak of the syntagmatic (motivational) relation between John and Fox or Peer and (van) Bertem, while the paradigmatic axis refers to the surnames Fox and Bertem as words only. However, numerous bynames happen to be unary instead of binary, e.g., den Dikke 'the fat one', in which the article is not considered a lexical unit. The unary status of names such as den Dikke is not really a problem since the relation between the name bearer and his property (fatness) can also be expressed syntagmatically in a loose appositional structure, as in Peter, den Dikke. As a consequence, it seems possible to invoke, both for unary and binary bynames, a syntagmatic relation that can express the motivational

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structure of the name. For the paradigmatic parameter, there is no problem since the word (or possibly the compound) underlying the byname always constitutes a paradigm, i.e. a lexical category.

3.3.1.3. More examples illustrating the distinction 'paradigmatic' vs. 'syntagmatic ' As is well known, bynames can be derived from all kinds of words, that is, not only from common nouns, but from any sort of word class, including, for instance, other proper names, as in the above Peer (van) Bertem (place name). The basis of a patronymic, a metronymic or an avonymic last name is a first name [FiN], e.g., a masculine one in: Peter-s Peter), John-son John); other names are formed on the basis of a place name: Heath, Westmoreland The (initial) motivation behind such names refers to the origin: familial origin in the case of Peters and Johnson, geographical (or local) origin in the instance of Heath and Westmoreland. Other names go back to an agent noun: Carter, Thatcher; or an adjective: Long. For still others, the original word sense refers to things: Whitebread, Webb, etc. (Reaney 1979: 183-4, 263). However, again, this is only half of the semantic analysis. What is missing is the relationship of the concepts contained in these words to the name bearer, i.e. the motivation. This is especially striking in the case of things, in which case, as in the case of animal names, a trope is involved: Whitebread and Webb indirectly indicate a baker and a weaver respectively, i.e. occupations. These names are cases of metonymy that use the object of the manufacture to refer to its maker. If no tropes are involved, as in the case of Thatcher and Carter, the motivational sense comes closer to the word meaning: in all likelihood, the agent nouns that underlie these surnames refer to an occupation. The motivation can then be expressed in an equation: the name bearer was a 'thatcher' and a 'carter' respectively. However, this is by no means certain: the names could go back to so-called delocutives in that the name bearers could have used the words in question in a frequent or striking way (see 3.3.4). The words themselves are then to be regarded as autonyms. As contemporary family names, Thatcher and Carter are to be seen as patronymics, indicating belonging to a family. The word class in the stage before would then be 'byname'.

«

«

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Dialinguistic aspects of Flemish personal names

3.3.1. 4.

Filiation in the assignment of a name form

From the above examples, it is obvious that it is also important to take into account filiation in the assignment of a name form. Especially in family names, several stages of name-giving can be discerned. A family name lexeme like Peters was first a patronymic, and before that, Peter was the first name of a man. The name Fox was initially a common name of an animal, then became an individual byname, then a patronymic, then a family name. When etymologists deal with family names, they usually aim at the oldest stages of these name forms. Even for contemporary bynames, this is common practice. This will of course result in a biased picture of the name-giving habits in the different periods in which these name forms were used. At least for modem bynames, we should attempt to systematically think about the right historical filiation. For instance, the Flemish BN Koei was first the common noun for 'cow', then the individual BN of Peer Koei and finally an unofficial patronymic when his son came to be called Dore Koei.

3.3.1.5.

The use of tropes (metaphor, metonymy, irony) in the motivational structure of bynames

As can be deduced from the preceding sections, in the creation of bynames, tropes such as metonymy, synecdoche, metaphor, and irony play a major role. This was recognized by classical authors like Bach (1952), but was not dealt with in any systematic way. An English example of irony is Curly for a bald man. A more common device is metaphor: X is replaced by Y because Y displays some features of X, i.e. because X resembles Y, e.g., Dutch dial. Potlood 'the person as thin as a pencil', Dutch dial. Snoek 'the person swimming like a pike'. Further, we can encounter a number of instances of metonymy, among others synecdoche (pars pro toto), for instance in Dutch dial. den Baard 'the man with the beard'. In cases of metonymy, there was often a historical process of elision of connecting morphemes meaning 'of/from/with' or possibly some other morpheme. Examples: Dutch dial. Peer van Bertem 'Peter from Bertem' > Peer Bertem; Sus met zijn siroop 'Francis with his syrup' > Sus Siroop; die met de baard 'the one with the beard' > Baard. However, even in the case of metonymy, we need not always assume an initial syntactic stage, e.g., Madame Voila 'the lady saying voila', which is, of course, just a paraphrase. In Dutch family names, the initial stage has not always completely

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disappeared, i.e. metonymy has not always influenced the naming process, in the sense that at least the preposition has been preserved, e.g., Van Mechelen 'from Malines'; Metdepenningen 'with the pennies'. In certain instances, two tropes apply at the same time, e.g., metaphor plus metonymy in Dutch dial. de Tromp 'the man with a face (metonymy) like a trunk (metaphor)' .

3.3.2. Formal correlates of the diachronic semantics of bynames As could be gathered from the preceding diachronic semantic analysis of personal names and especially bynames, its two dimensions, word sense (paradigmatic axis) and onomastic motivation (syntagmatic axis), appear to correlate with formal characteristics. First, there are formal features that belong to the original word form of the name in question. Second, we encounter formal features which pertain to the motivational (syntagmatic) structure.

3.3.2.1.

The paradigmatic (word) level

On the paradigmatic level of the word form we can describe the internal structure of the expression that is at the basis of the bynames. Besides simple word forms like Fox, we can distinguish derivational and compounding processes. Derivational suffixes that are present in the stage before the namegiving are often encountered in agent nouns, e.g., Dutch de Holland-er 'the Dutchman' , de Kempen-aar 'the one from the Campine region'. For Dutch family names, it is not uncommon to find titles or adjectives preserved in the name form. For instance, [title + FiN] (= title + first name) is encountered in Flemish family names like Serpieters < des heren Pieter(s) '(of) sir Peter', [adjective + FiN] in Quaetannen 'nasty Ann'. We encounter various types of compounds, especially, though not exclusively, in the historical context. A well known example in Western European family names is the so-called 'Satzname', a sentential phrase consisting of a verbal stem plus an NP or adverb (cf. Shake-speare above). These syntagms are no longer productive in modern Germanic languages (though compare pickpocket, cut-throat, killjoy, Pinker 1994/5: 428; Dutch weet-al 'know-all', deug-niet 'rascal'), but they are still productive in modern French appellative expressions like porte-manteau 'coat-bearer,

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i.e. peg'. In the case of an NP, there are two possibilities. Either we have [verb + object], e.g., Eng. Shake-speare 'spear-shaker', German Schiitzeichel 'oak-nut-shaker', French Boi-leau 'water-drinker', Dutch Breck-pot 'pot-breaker' or we find less frequently [verb + subject], e.g., Dutch Schimmel-penninck 'mildew penny', who lets its money get moldy (see also Dittmaier 1956: 7ff.; Schlitzeichel 1982: 57). Apparently, the two 'Satzname' patterns together constitute a syntactically ergative structure since the conditions for ergativity are fulfilled: the NP is either the direct object of some verb (type Shake-speare) or the subject of an intransitive verb (type Schimmel-penninck). These 'Satzname' patterns seem to be formed at the name-giving stage itself. The same goes for syntagms of the type [verb + adverb] such as Dutch Doe-niet 'do nothing', or [adverb + verb] like Zelden-rust 'seldom rest'. Certain expressive suffixes which belong to the original lexeme are still functional after the name-giving act, i.e. at the synchronic level, for instance, in diminutives like Dutch Kapper-ke 'short as a kapper(ke), i.e. a small cubic measure', in which the original diminutive suffix -ke is used in the BN's functioning to suggest the shortness of the name bearer in a pejorative way. For augmentative reasons, the original definite article de is often preserved as well, e.g., de Lange 'the long one'. A third type are suffixes that originate with the name-giving process itself and remain functional, e.g., Dutch Turk-ie 'little Turk'.

3.3.2.2.

The syntagmatic (relational) level

In a number of cases, the syntagmatic (relational) meaning, which pertains to the motivation of the personal name, is reflected in functional morphemes. For the purpose of contrastive and comparative research we may distinguish four theoretical possibilities. Of the morphological expression some examples have been given above. A genitive -s or -en expresses the relation of familial origin in Dutch family names, e.g., Peter-s 'from Peter', Mari-en 'from Mary'. Suffixes deriving from a word meaning 'son' have been attested in many languages, e.g., Dutch -se in David-se 'son of David', -sen in Adriaen-sen 'son of Adrian'. Certain contemporary Flemish dialects still display a pregenitive -s, as in: Rikske-s-Hans 'Hans from Rikske's family'. A second possibility is the syntactic expression by means of a function word. In modem Dutch dialects, the genitive function has mostly been taken over by prepositions such as van 'of/from', e.g., Tist van Jan 'Baptist

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from John'. This preposition may, however, express a relation of belonging, as in Marie van Pleet 'Mary, wife of Pleet'. Geographical origin is frequently expressed in Dutch family names, mostly also by van, sometimes by uit 'out of or by so-called situational (internally localizing) prepositions like in 'in', op 'on', tern)! ter 'at', aan, 'at' in certain Dutch family names, e.g., Van Mechelen 'from Malines', Uyttebroeck 'out of the swamp', Indestege 'in the street', Opdenacker 'on the field', Terbeke 'at the brook', Aendekerk 'at the church'. Bynames or family names formed on the basis of characterization seldom show traces of function words. Examples are met 'with', as in Metdepenningen and Zondervan 'without a van, i.e. without a family name' (see Van Loon 1981 for more Dutch examples). Another way of syntactic expression is by means of juxtaposition. Flemish bynames are often simply juxtaposed, e.g., Jef Profeet 'Joseph prophet'; Suske de Verver 'Francis the painter'. Such names often originate via metonymy, as in the examples Peer van Bertem 'Peter from Bertem', which developed into Peer Bertem; Sus met zijn siroop 'Francis with his syrup', which developed into Sus Siroop. However, in a number of cases, no overt link has ever been attested, e.g., in the case of metaphor or irony. If John Fox was a 'fox', it can only be understood in a metaphorical way, and if so, there is no reason to postulate a historical syntagmatic stage although the metaphor can be paraphrased syntagmatically, e.g., as 'John was like a fox' .154 A final strategy is the expression by means of compounding. Although the system of compounding is becoming obsolete in Flemish bynames, it can still be found in certain areas. In such cases, the BN is preposed, either with additional suffix, or in bare form, e.g., Beek-er-Door ' Theodore from the brook'; Hut-Mie 'Mary from the hut'. We end this section with mentioning the remarkable phenomenon that certain morphemes can sometimes belong to the word form level and sometimes to the relational level. For instance, the suffix -man 'man' may form part of a first name as in Heyneman, where it is an augmentative suffix added to the FiN Heyn 'Henry', but it may also indicate a relation. In the FN Saereman, it points to a family relation, viz. that a certain man is the husband of Sarah. In the name Bosman, the suffix suggests a geographical origin, viz. 'man from the wood'.

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3.3.3. Bynames [BNs} vs. family names [FNs} A word of caution is in order here. Although the theoretical basis for the analysis of modern bynames and the bynames that constituted the source for Flemish family names is the same, important practical difficulties will often arise in the search for the diachronic status of family names. A first problem is that in historical anthroponymy, the much desired information about the motivation for a BN is often lacking, so we mostly get stuck there after the etymological analysis of the word class and word sense. This is the case, for instance, with John Fox, after establishing the lexical characterization of fox. On the other hand, a complete syntagmatic as well as paradigmatic analysis of contemporary byname material is facilitated by the possibility of resorting to informants. Often, informants can still provide us not only with a motivation for the BNs but also with previous formal stages ofthe BNs. Another problem for the investigation of family names is often the lack of information on the various stages that the BN in question went through. For modern BNs, this is, once more, less of a problem. For the classification of our material, I will start out from the different motivational categories referring to the various types of relationships found between the name bearer and the concept underlying the BN, as encountered in the adult BNs and in the FNs derived from previous BNs. It must be admitted that the above-mentioned difficulties are likely to arise here too. I will therefore proceed in a similar way to the practice of traditional onomastics. For the family names, I will rely on the etymology usually given for these onomastic lexemes to be found in such etymological dictionaries as Debrabandere (1993). In addition, these etymologies refer to the stage at the time of the first name-giving act. For instance, a name like Timmerman-s obviously refers to a family name in its latest stage, as indicated by the genitive ending -so In its first stage, however, the name designates a timmerman 'carpenter'. It is this early stage that will be taken into consideration for the diachronic semantic analysis of family names.

3.3.4. Diachronic classification of Flemish family names and bynames For the taxonomy of the diachronic semantics of the personal names, I will appeal to the existence of name fields, as indicated above. This applies both to the lexical analysis of the word categories and the subdivision of motivational categories.

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A first major dichotomy in the classification is the one between origin and characterization. In its general form, the notion of origin refers to the meaning(s) of the genitive case or, if this is preferred, of the prepositions of/from (compare for German: Goossens 1999: 24-25). The notion of characterization is relevant to most other names and pertains to properties, activities or habits of the name bearer. The analysis of these two categories (origin and characterization) reveals a striking difference in perspective. The class of origin presents the name bearer as someone who belongs to some other entity, viz. another person or a place or space. This is formalizable as X belongs to Y, where X is the name bearer and Y the entity to which (s )he belongs. By contrast, the category of characterization presents the name bearer as the person to whom something belongs. This 'something' covers a wide range of possibilities, although we find here references to a person's salient attributes, physical appearance, psychological peculiarities, behavior, social status, profession or other activities. These properties constitute real 'nicknames', which may be rather pejorative. As Morgan et al. (1979) put it: managing a nickname can be a fateful social problem. The category of origin can be subdivided into two major subclasses: a) names of (mostly) familial relationship, e.g., Peter-s, John-son; b) local BNs, relating to a place or space, e.g., (the person from) Westmoreland, Windsor. As indicated above, the relation between name bearer and BN concept is often expressed syntagmatically. For the category of origin, this means that linguistic forms meaning of/from are present in the original name forms or even preserved, hence fossilized in the modem family names, mostly vanluit in Dutch geographical family names, e.g., Van Brussel 'from Brussels', Uytterhoeven 'from the farm' and the genitive ending-s in Dutch patronymics, e.g., Peter-so On the purely paradigmatic level of the word class, the 'origin' category mostly produces proper names, as can be deduced from the examples. The relation of characterization, which pertains to properties, activities or habits of the name bearer, as pointed out above, can be paraphrased by such relational words as have/with and do. Sometimes such a word as with was or is still lexically present, e.g., Dutch dial. Sus met zijn siroop 'Francis with his syrup' > Sus Siroop; Dutch FN Metdepenningen 'with the pennies, i.e. rich'. Two major subclasses can be set up, with further subdivisions: a) physical, psychological and social properties, e.g., Long, Wilde; b) repeated (or sometimes unique) activities: offices, professions, occupations, habits, e.g., Marshal!, Baker, Smith, Purser (Reaney 1979). A special activity is the uttering of a word or expression that struck the name giver as

282

Dialinguistic aspects of Flemish personal names

typical or peculiar. As a rule, such an expression is uttered by the name bearer. This type of metonymical BN is called 'delocutive', 'retrolocutive' (Swiggers 1989) or 'echo-name' (Knob loch 1977; Schuhmacher 1997). Examples are: Goodday 'the person saying good day', French Cheramy 'the person saying cher ami (dear friend!),. On the lexical level, the category of characterization normally produces adjectives and common nouns for properties, but agent nouns, verbal stems and present participles for activities. However, in the case of metaphorical and metonymical processes, especially delocutives, virtually any word class is possible. It should be noted here that a name may belong formally to the category of origin, but at the same time display a characterizing connotation, e.g., the Dutch FN Van de Merckt 'from the market' literally refers to local origin, but at the same time tells us indirectly that the name bearer was a market vendor. In the light of the above analyses and elucidations, I will now list some Flemish personal name material according to the c1assificatory scheme set up above. Of course, the distinction between FNs and modem BNs will be made clear by listing them separately. When tropes are involved, this will be indicated explicitly. First, the motivational structure will be listed; after each subdivision, the paradigmatic source, i.e. the word class with its meaning and form will be dealt with.

3.3.4.1.

Origin

The two categories of familial origin and local origin contain examples of Flemish family names and of modem Flemish bynames. Both will be subdivided into subclasses without a trope and those with a trope (metonymy, metaphor).

3.3.4.1.1. Familial origin Flemish family names without a trope: Timmerman-s < descendant of de Timmerman (masc. BN 'carpenter' + gen. -s); Mari-en < descendant of Mary + gen. -en; Baert-soen 'son of Bartholomew'; Pieter-sen 'son of Peter'; David-se 'son of David'; Van Geert 'from Geert (masc. FiN)'

Flemish family names with metonymy:

Diachronic analysis

283

De Temmerman < descendant of de Temmerman (masc. BN 'the carpenter'); Huyghebaert 'West Flemish form ofHubert'

Modern Flemish bynames without a trope: Rikske-s-Hans 'Hans from Rikske's family' (pregenitive -s); Slinken-zeFelix 'Slinken's Felix' (modem genitive ze < possessive zijn 'his'); Tist van lan 'Baptist from John'

Modern Flemish bynames with metonymy: Nare Zjefke-s < Nare van Zjefke-s 'Bemard from Joseph' (family-BN in -s); Dore Koei < Peer Koei Theodore Cow' (masc. BN); (den) Debber < die van Debberke 'the one from Debberke' (fern. BN); Flip Tiske < Flip van Tiske 'Philip from Baptist' (masc. FiN)

The diachronic paradigmatic status of the names with 'familial origin' is fairly homogeneous in that only one word class is involved, viz. personal names. These names can be subdivided into first names, bynames and family bynames, as can be seen in the material.

3.3.4.1.2. Local origin Flemish family names without a trope: Van Mechelen 'from Malines' (town name); Van de Velde 'from the field'; Verbeeck < Vanderbeeck 'from the brook'; Uytterhoeven 'out of the farm'; Indestege 'in the street'; Opdebeeck 'at the brook'; Tervoort 'at the ford'; De Vlaeminck 'the Fleming'; De Wael 'the Walloon' (ethnonyms)

Flemish family names with metonymy: Rutten (village name); Put 'from the pit'

Modern Flemish bynames without a trope: (Sander) den Brusselaar 'from Brussels' (inhabitant name); Waal (ethnonym 'Walloon'); Beek-er-Door 'Theodore from the brook' (suffix -er); le/van de brug 'Joseph from the bridge' (preposition van); Boer uit Delle 'Farmer from Delle' (preposition uit + hamlet name)

Modern Flemish bynames with metonymy: Peer Bertem < Peer van Bertem 'Peter from Bertem' (village name); HutMie 'Hut-Mary, i.e. Mary from the hut'; Hoeke-Sus 'Corner Francis, i.e. Francis from the corner'; de Zwartefles < 'the one from de Zwartefles' (pub name)

284

Dialinguistic aspects of Flemish personal names

As can be expected, the paradigmatic structure of local names contains appellative as well as proper names of places and buildings.

3.3.4.2. Characterization As indicated above, the class of characterization is subdivided into activities and properties. As in the case of origin, these categories contain examples of Flemish family names and of modem Flemish bynames. Both will be subdivided into subclasses without a trope and those with a trope (metonymy, metaphor).

3.3.4.2.1. Activities The class of activities falls apart into professions and occupations, habits, unique activities and delocutives. Flemish family names without a trope derived from professions and occupations: Desmet, Smet '(the) blacksmith'; De Vleeschouwer 'the butcher'; De Mulder 'the miller'; Debackerl Bakker '(the) baker'

Flemish family names with metonymy derived from professions and occupations: Tanghe 'tongs, pincers' (blacksmith); Wittebroodt 'white bread' (baker); Soerbier 'sour beer' (brewer)

Modem Flemish bynames without a trope derived from professions and occupations: den Apoteker 'the chemist'; Metserke 'little mason'; Lamme de Stoker 'Lambert the fireman'; Zjef den Blokmaker 'Joseph the clog-maker' (agent nouns)

Modem Flemish bynames with metonymy derived from professions and occupations: het Varken 'the pig', i.e. butcher (animal name); (Frans) Lood '(Francis) lead', i.e. plumber; Melk-Jan 'milk-John', i.e. milkman (common nouns of animals, things, etc.); Tist den JJzeren 'Baptist the iron one', i.e. iron-

Diachronic analysis

285

monger; Heinke den Droge 'Henry the dry one', i.e. corn-chandler (adjectives)

Flemish family names without a trope derived from a habit: Lachaert 'Iaugher' (suffix -aard)

Flemish family names with metonymy derived from a habit: Pype 'pipe', i.e. pipe-smoker; Stroop 'syrup', i.e. syrup-eater

Modem Flemish bynames without a trope derived from a habit: (Tist) Snuffel '(Baptist) nose'; Sta Taffel 'Gustave dawdle' (verbal stems); Spekende Louis 'spitting Lewis'; Stinkende Virs 'stinking Virginia' (present participles)

Modem Flemish bynames with metonymy derived from a habit: Vinus Pijp 'Livinus pipe', i.e. pipe-smoker; Trees Appelspijs: 'Therese compote', i.e. who served compote (common nouns for things)

Modem Flemish bynames with metaphor derived from a habit: Pro/eet 'prophet', i.e. who answered as a prophet; Snoek 'pike', i.e. who swam like a pike (animate nouns)

Modem Flemish bynames without a trope derived from a unique activity: de Sjalottendief'the shallot-thief; de Patatenpikker 'the potato-thief (agent nouns)

Modem Flemish bynames with metonymy derived from a unique activity: Peer Koei 'Peter cow', i.e. who hit the back of his cow (animal mme)

Flemish family names with metonymy derived from a delocutive: Cristus, said 'Cristus'; Goetvriend, said 'good friend'; Cheramy, said 'dear friend' in French

Modem Flemish bynames with metonymy derived from a delocutive: den Tiete, said tiete instead of kieke(n) 'chicken'; Potdome, used the curse potdome; Madame Voila, said voila (interjections)

286

Dialinguistic aspects of Flemish personal names

3.3.4.2.2. Properties The class of properties falls apart into physical, psychological and social properties. Flemish family names without a trope derived from a physical property. De Groot 'the tall one'; Dik 'fat'; Rosseel 'with red hair'

Flemish family names with synecdoche derived from a physical property. Normally these are cases ofbahuvrihi (adjective + noun): Cortbeen 'short leg(s)'; Lanckneus 'long nose'

Modem Flemish bynames without a trope derived from a physical property: den Dove 'the deaf one'; de Grote 'the tall one'; de Kleine 'the short one'; Zwarte Wan 'black Jean' (adjectives); Baaske 'little boss'; den Reus 'the giant' (common nouns)

Modem Flemish bynames with irony derived from a physical property: Schoon Fienke 'pretty Josephine' (though ugly; adjective)

Modem Flemish bynames with metaphor derived from a physical property: Kapper(ke) 'short as a kapper(ke) (small cubic measure)'; Ons Pop 'our girl, small as a doll' (common nouns)

Modem Flemish bynames with synecdoche derived from a physical property: den Baard 'the beard'; Title Krol 'Mathilde curl' (common nouns); de Grootoog 'the big eye'; Sta Platneus 'Gustave flat nose' (bahuvrihi)

Modem Flemish bynames with metonymy and metaphor derived from a physical property: de Muis 'the mouse', who wore shoes squeaking like a mouse (arimal name)

Flemish family names without a trope derived from a psychological property: De Wilde 'the wild one'; De Vroede 'the wise one'

Modem Flemish bynames without a trope derived from a psychological property:

Diachronic analysis

287

de Wilde 'the wild one'; de Zware 'the heavy one'; Luie Marie 'lazy Mary' (adjectives); de Zot 'the fool'; (Lamme) den Duivel '(Lambert) the devil' (common nouns)

Flemish family names without a trope derived from a social prq>erty: Ryckaert 'rich man'; Metdepenningen 'with the pennies' (rich)

Modem Flemish bynames without a trope derived from a social property: Moe 'mother' (kinship term); Madame Lucienne (title + FiN); Pater Verbelen 'father (religious) + FN' (dignity)

Modem Flemish bynames with metaphor derived from a social property: Madame de Pompadour 'chic lady like MdP' (title + personal name)

As was indicated, the names motivated by some characterization or other derive from word classes that are normally not proprial, but are rather appellatives (count and mass nouns), adjectives, verbs and interjections.

3.4. Diachronic classification of juvenile byname patterns In the following paragraphs I will attempt to set up a diachronic-semantic classification of juvenile bynames. Before entering this enterprise, it is imperative to bear in mind certain principles that will determine the taxonomy.

3.4.1. Principles for the diachronic-semantic classification ofjuvenile bynames

Up to now, relatively little attention has been devoted to the systematic investigation of personal-name-giving among young people at school or elsewhere. Nevertheless, in the German-speaking area Naumann (1976-77) pointed to the special structure of this kind of name-giving. In this section, I will deal with the formal and semantic structure of personal names and more in particular of bynames used among Flemish young people. When I speak about personal names among young people I mean the names that boys and girls give to each other (possibly also to teachers) in the context of school and education, youth movements, working environment or in other coincidental circumstances. Among each other, young people use first names [FiN] and bynames [BN] in particular. As far as

288

Dialinguistic aspects of Flemish personal names

family names [FN] come into play, they are to be regarded especially as a category of bynames. Young people do not have the possibility to give or change first names or family names. What does lie within their reach is the adaptation or transformation of existing first names and family names, and more in particular, the creation of entirely new bynames. Since the psychosocial context in which young people live is fairly different from that of adults, it can be expected that this is reflected in the personal-name-giving and in their attitude towards it. In addition, the class of young people can be divided into boys and girls. The question arises in what way we are able to classify and possibly explain the phenomena occurring here. To this end, we can start from the semantic characteristics and subsequently find out what corresponds to it formally. What is called meaning even in juvenile bynames is again to be described as the semantic-pragmatic diachronic motivation of the bynames: why have they been given? In general the spectrum of motivations extends from rather informative content (familial and local origin, occupation, habit, etc.) to fairly connotative content (physical and psychological features) to purely expressive formations (transformations of existing first names and family names). More often than not, we can observe a mixture of different kinds of motivation. For the classification of the data we can basically take over the taxonomy for adult bynames in towns discussed in 3.3.4. Only the section 'social properties' is not represented in the system of young people. On the other hand, as mentioned above, we find a great number of bynames which have been created on a purely formal basis for expressive, emotive reasons. I will therefore use a trichotomy for the taxonomy: Origin (the name bearer belongs to x): familial origin local origin

Characterization (x belongs to the name bearer): profession, function, task occupation, habit, behavior unique activities or other events delocutives physical and other external properties psychological properties

Diachronic analysis

289

Expressivity (no lexical content, but appreciative, playful, diminutive, augmentative, or depreciative connotations expressed by): suffixes such as -i (-y,-ie), -a (fern.), -0 (masc.) diminutives augmentatives shortening lengthening reinterpretation and folk etymology rhyme, alliteration, reduplication, consonant harmony, anagram

On the morphophonologicallevel, we find processes such as diminutivization and augmentativization, shortening or lengthening, reinterpretation and folk etymology, rhyme and alliteration, reduplication, consonant harmony, and anagrams. On the lexical, paradigmatic level, we encounter proper names, in particular personal names, settlement and field names, not only in the first class of origin, but also in the third class of expressivity. By contrast, in the category of characterization a number of descriptive words like appellatives and adjectives are found. An unexpected instance of 'Satzname' (sentential name) showed up: Slalip 'hit+lip', hits his lip when speaking, spreading saliva. The source material for the present investigation consists of three papers and scattered attestations in some seven licentiate dissertations produced by students at the Institute for Onomastics and Dialectology (University of Leuven) since 1970. A letter code within square brackets indicates which source the examples in the list come from. Wherever necessary, the indications 'm' (= male), en 'f (= female) are used. J55

3.4.2. Taxonomy a/juvenile Flemish bynames 3.4.2.1.

Origin

As can be expected, the category of familial origin is infrequent with young people: 't Kettelke (m, father's BN 'Kettel') [K], den Bietel (m, 'the beatle' (pop group), father's BN), den Boere (m, father's BN) [OWl

It should not surprise us that bynames introduced by van are lacking almost entirely: Carine van Stock (father's BN) [K]. On the other hand, quite a

290

Dialinguistic aspects of Flemish personal names

few FNs function as BNs, but this happens for augmentative purposes rather than in order to indicate origin: de Priem 'the awl', de Kleine Priem 'the little awl', de Grote Priem 'the big awl' (m) [HS] (cf. also below)

By contrast, sometimes mocking reference is made to the parents' occupation: 't Kosterke (m, 'the sexton', after father's occupation), 't Smetteke (m and v, 'the blacksmith', after father's occupation), de Gendarmkes (f, 'the policewomen', after father's occupation) [K], Boereke (m, 'peasant', after father's occupation) [HM], Kippens (m, 'chicken breeder', after father's occupation) [SK]

Finally, family ties with contemporaries are indicated: Kleine Kippens (Kippens' little brother), Gusta (Guusten's sister) [SK], de Twee Pinten (m, 'the two pints', twins) [0]

The category of geographical origin contains even fewer examples: de Kattekop (m, 'the cat-head', from Kattestraat, street), de Kikker (m, 'the frog', lives at a canal) [LG], Turkie-turkie-zottie-zottie (m, 'little-Turk-littlefool', from Turkey) [HM], den Bossie (m, from Bosstraat, street), den Hollander (m, 'the Dutchman', from Holland) [OWl, de Hep (m, from Heppen) [HE], Meester Meeuwen (m, schoolmaster from Meeuwen), Jan van de molen (m, John, from the watermill) [0]

3.4.2.2. Characterization Understandably, except for teaching functions, there are few examples of adult professions or occupations: de Rattenvanger (m, 'the rat catcher', catches rats as a municipal cemetery workman), de Melkboer (m, the teacher, who is also a milkman) [OWl, den Onderdikke (m, < onderdirecteur 'vice-director', dikke = 'fat': a blend of director and dikke) [0], Meester Meus (m, schoolmaster Meus), Juffrouw Geenen (f, Miss Geenen, teacher)

From time to time, one refers to a pupil's task: den Huiskeskuiser (m, who cleans school toilets) [LG], de Bel (m, 'the bell': rings the bell at beginning and end of classes) [K], Vandegaze (m, 'from the gas', responsible for gas supply), de Baas (m, 'the boss', group leader) [SK]

Diachronic analysis

291

In the category of occupation, habit, or behavior, many more examples are to be found. I will list only a few: Jimmy (m, plays Jimmy's part in a play), Pips (m, reads Thomas Pips' comic strips), Shit(tie) (m, smokes a lot of shit, marihuana), Jan Pijp (m, smokes a pipe), Senna (m, drives fast and wildly like Senna), Slalip (m, sentential name: 'hit-lip', hits his lip when speaking, spreading saliva), Stier (m, 'bull', teaches like a wild bull) [0], Bull (m, has jumper of the basketball team 'the Bulls'), Ed Jeannette (m, holds his cigarette like ajeannette, i.e. a gay), Nagelknipper (m, 'nail-cutter', cuts his nails in the class-room), Piswindop (f, pees against the wind), de Vliegenden Hollander (f, 'the flying Dutchman', rides fast with bike in school park) rOW]

Examples of unique activities or other events are: Mia Mier (f, 'Mia ant', found ants in her bread-box) [HE], Geitje (f, 'little goat', declaimed the poem 'Het Geitje') rOW], Jules Caesar (m, played le.) [K], Guusten (m, wanted to go roaming like Guusten de Zwerver 'August the tramp') [SK]

Instances of delocutives are to be found in: Video (m, calls his free radio video), He-man (m, uses stopgaps like he'), den Uzeren (m, 'the iron one', pretends to be sturdy) [0], Jakke (m, from a loudspeaker that says Jakke, toe! 'Jack, come on! '), Jette (m, is called Jette by his little brother instead of Gert), Skoezie (m, says Italian scusi 'excuse me') [HE], de Goemej (m, < FN Gommers, says [j] for [rD, MmMm (f, sings mmmm on her bike), de Koe (f, 'the cow', once said to pupils eating chewing gum: jullie zijn net koeien 'you are like cows') rOW], de Wekker (m, 'the alarm-clock', once wrote Vandewekker instead of Vandeweyer) [LG], Hobby (f, compared the scouts to a hobby) [SK]

A number of by names go back to physical and other external properties: Boezemke (f, 'little bosom', has big breasts), Borst (f, 'breast', has big breasts), Kerkuilen (f, 'church owls', two girls with strong glasses resembling owls), Kinnebakken (f, 'big chin'), Puinhoop (m, 'debris', with glasses, set of teeth and hearing-aid), Ratteplan (m, as comic strip character Rataplan, dog), Weipaal (m, 'meadow pole', has fat legs like meadow poles), de Buffel (m, 'the buffalo'), China (m, has eyes like a Chinese), den Dikkop (m, 'the big head'), EMs Presley (m, resembles E.P.), Jerry (m, resembles Jerry Lewis), de Kikker (m, 'the frog', has frog's eyes), Mac Gyver (m, resembles this pilot), Sabrina (f, resembles this singer), de Snor, (m, 'the moustache'), Tetje (f, 'little tit', has small breasts) [SK]

Psychological properties gave rise to names like:

292

Dialinguistic aspects of Flemish personal names

't Betonnen Schaap (m, 'the concrete sheep', heavy and dumb), Knobel (m, as ambitious as this football coach), Kool (m, 'cabbage', as dumb as a cabbage), Smaailie (m, < English smile+ie, smiles a lot), Bomma (f, 'grandma', ageing teacher, mothering), den Droge (m, 'the dry one', cannot smile), Gestapo (m, severe teacher), Hitler (m, severe teacher) [0], Diesel (m, as slow as a diesel car), Ome (m, 'uncle', slow), Spin (m, 'spider', diligent), Telex (m, intelligent) [HE], Grote-zus (f, 'big sister', girl guides' leader), den Bobby (f, as strict as a British bobby), den Boer (m, 'the peasant', as impolite as a peasant) [OWl, Lomp Kanon (f, 'clumsy gun', weak pupil), de Jongen (f, 'the boy', wants to be a boy) [LG]

3.4.2.3.

Expressivity

Expressive connotations trigger suffixes such as -i (-y,-ie), -a (t), They sound neither particularly diminutive nor augmentative:

-0

(m).

den Bossie (m, from Bosstraat, street), de Flappie (m, 'flap-eared'), den Adrie (m, < FN Adriaensens), den Babbie (m, < FiN Davi) [OWl; Thea (f, after her brother's name Theo), Lapino (m, < French lapin 'rabbit') [SK]

Diminutives in -(e)ke, French -ette are: Benske (f, < FN Bens), Boske (f, < FN Vanbosch), Druytske (f, < FN Druyts) [LG], 't Pijpeke (m, 'pipe', < FN Paepe), Lapinette (f, < French lapin 'rabbit') [OWl

The article has an augmentative function and can replace the augmentative suffixes -ern) and -er, or occur together with them, especially in the center of the Flemish area; elsewhere, only the suffix is found: den Apache (f, like an Apache Indian), den Bosse (m, < FN Van Bosstraeten), de Kaie (m, < FN Van Cayzele) [OWl, de Wimper (f, < FN Verwimp) [LG]; Boele (f, augmentative back fonnation in -e out of the diminutive 'boeleke', baby) [OWl

Shortening often goes together with augmentativization: de Pe et (m, < FN Peeters), de Mel (f, < FN Mellebeeckx), de Per (f, < FN Vandeperre) [LG]

Lengthening is rather infrequent: den Dubbeldekker 'the double-decker' (m, < FN Dekkers), de Rooie Kool 'the red cabbage' (m, < FN Cools) [LG], den Babtisj 'the Baptist' (m, < BN den Bab) [OWl

Diachronic analysis

293

Reinterpretation and folk etymology is about names whose former meaning is no longer transparent, but whose form resembles one or the other common noun or even proper name from Dutch or even from a different language (especially English!), and which are replaced by it entirely or partly. Only sporadically is the meaning of the resembling word applicable to the name bearer in reality; mostly, a playful substitution is intended. We distinguish between first and family names of boys and girls respectively. Examples abound: First names of boys: Renault (Reinhold), den Ering 'the herring' (Erik), den Teddy (Eddy), de Platte 'the flat one' (Patrick), de Witte 'the white one' (Wim) [H], de Kaki < 'khaki' (Karel), de Schildpad 'turtle' (Patrick) [LG], Freud (Fried), de Joint (Johan), de Meute 'the calf (Maarten) [OWl, Chief (Steef, Stefan), Kont 'ass' (Koen) [0], de Gom 'the eraser' (Gui\laume) [HE]

First names of girls: Grenadine (Nadine), Bocal 'beaker' (Pascale) [H], Minnekepoes 'pussy' (Hermine) [K], den Hermelijn 'the ermine' (Hermelindis) [OWl, Miss Piggy (Peggy) [HE]

Family names of boys: Kool 'cabbage' (Colin), den Boeksering 'the red herring' (Boeckx), de LUizekop 'the lice-head' (Loosen), de Walvis 'the whale' (Vandewalle), de Zwam 'the fungus' (Van Wambeke), het Kuikentje 'the chicken' (Van Cuyck) [H], Bek 'beak' (Beckx), Bruinke 'brown' (Bruyninckx), Coboy 'cowboy' (Jacobs), Lampekap 'lamp-shade' (Lambrechts), Wa(u)tereend 'water-duck' (Wauters), Wuiske 'sausage' (Wuystenberghs) [K], de Berg 'the mountain' (Van den Berg), den Dubbeldekker 'the double-decker' (Dekkers), Jaske 'jacket' (Janssens) [LG], Ronny Kool 'cabbage' (Cools) [HM], 't Pijpeke 'the pipe' (Paepe), de Virgin 'the virgin' [Dutch maagd] (De Maegd) [OWl

Family names of girls: Bever 'beaver' (Van Bever) [H], Henneke 'little hen' (Hendrickx), Koekske 'cookie' (Coeckelberghs), Broekske 'trousers' (Vanschoubroeck), Gaarke 'guard' (Vandegaer) [K], Bonensoep 'bean-soup'(Van Boom), Frankenstein (Vrancken), Molse Soep 'soup from the village of Mol' (Mo Is) [HM], Geitje-Mek 'goat-bleat' (Meekers) [HE]

Of a purely formal though playful nature are formations with rhyme, alliteration, reduplication (doubling of syllables), consonant harmony, and

294

Dialinguistic aspects of Flemish personal names

anagrams (metathesis of sounds or syllables). This occurs with girls as well as with boys, especially in first names and even more often in bynames derived from surnames, much less in other bynames. Because of this purely formal character of the names, glosses do not always make sense: First names of boys: Patrick Sitrik (Patrick), Eddy met zijn teddybeer (Eddy with his teddy-bear), [H], Stanneman (Stan-man), Chris Pis 'piss' (Chris), Johnny Pony 'pony' (Johnny) [K], Leon japon kanon baron (Leon), Michel frikadel snotbrel [snottebel] (Michel snot), Wim pin (Wim), Tik tik (Patrick) [LG], den Babbie (Davi), Geurt met zijnen beurd [baard] (Geert with his beard), de Lilo (lvo), Wurtje de Kever « Kurtje De Wever) [OWl, Erik Sterik (Erik) [0], Fats « Stat) [HE], de Loe « Leo), de Willy Willy (Willy)156

First names of girls: Nadine Grenadine (Nadine), Pascale Bocal (Pascale beaker) [H], Ingrid Friet (lngrid chip), Anne-Marie Sofie (Anne-Marie) [K], Hilt pilt (Hilde), Rosette trottinette trompet (Rosette scooter trumpet) [LG], Erika Amerika (Erika), Eis Pels (Eis fur), Magda Pagda (Magda) [HM], Annevie de Mos « Annemie De Vos) [OWl, Mia Mier (Mia ant) [HE]

Family names of boys or male teachers: Paswit « FN Witpas) [H], Maas pisblaas « FN Maes bladder), Seien breier « FN Seyen knitter), Van Daal ellentrieke paal « FN Van Dael electric pole), Van Geel rotte keel « FN Van Geel rotten throat), Bert De Busser meiskeskusser « FN De Busser girl kisser) [LG], Lommelen Trommelen « FN Lommelen) [HM], de Foefie « FN Verhoeven), Pol Penis 'penis' « FN Polleunis) [OWl, Tits « FN Thijs), Bedoeng Benoem « FN Bonhomme), Titi « FN Tiesters) [0], Papedepap « FN Paredis), Parara « FN Paredis) [HE], de Fiji « FN Fierens), Stok Steuki 'stick' « FN Stockman) [SN]

Family names of girls or female teachers: Francine Van Lommel slaagt de trommel, slaagt de bel, al de duivels uit de het « FN Van Lommel, hits the drum, hits the bell, all the devils out of hell) [LG], Juffrouw Geenen met haar lange tenen « Miss Geenen with her long toes), Juffrouw Drop met een eierdop op haar kop (Miss Drop with an eggcup on her head) [HM], Annevie de Mos « Annemie De Vos) [OWl, Geile Heylen (Homy Heylen) [HE]

Bynames (no FN) of boys or male teachers:

Diachronic analysis

295

Turkie Turkie zottie zottie [HM], Joeri (Boeri), Plaske (Paske) [0], Dwayne-Wayne, Koko [HE], Stinkstok [SK], de Pipo, Billey Billie, Joop Myoop [SN]

Bynames (no FN) of girls or female teachers: MmMm[OW]

3.5. Surnames of Flemish foundlings Another area of personal-name-giving in which the classification set up for name-giving in villages partly fails to work is the bestowal of first names and especially surnames on foundlings. In the following paragraphs I will make an attempt at devising a taxonomy for the surnames assigned to foundlings registered in 19th century Flemish asylums, drawing again on material gathered in student memoirs from the University of Leuven.157 The phenomenon of abandoning babies after birth so they could be 'found' and hopefully raised by other people has always existed. It is estimated that in the 18th and 19th centuries, between 10% and 40% of registered babies in Europe were foundlings (Boswell 1990; Van Pellicom 2001). It was natural, then, that Napoleon paid quite some attention to the phenomenon in his imperial decree of January 19th 1811. It contained directives for the education and boarding of children. It obliged existing foundling asylums to install a 'slide': a circular tray in the fa~ade of a foundling asylum that could be turned inside after the baby had been put in it. The decree stipulated that from then on, abandoning a child would be no longer a criminal act. In a number of cases a foundling was given a sign of recognition (e.g., a playing-card, a picture of a saint), which was cut or tom into two pieces; one half remained with the mother, the other half accompanied the baby, so that it could be identified if necessary, and so that the mother could even get back her child later on if she wanted to. Such a sign was sometimes a card or letter (French billet). On the piece destined for the asylum something was written in Dutch, French or even Latin. Mostly, this was a proposal for a first name, sometimes the date of birth or the age of the child. Seldom was the family name mentioned. Thus, name-giving, especially the bestowal of a surname was usually left to the authorities. I will leave aside the assignment of first names but will concentrate on surnames and their classification. It is not appropriate to speak of family

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Dialinguistic aspects ofFlemish personal names

names here, since by definition it is the absence of a family which constitutes the problem. In comparison with the standard classification of adult personal names it is natural that the class of familial origin will be underrepresented since names were seldom suggested by the mothers. This underrepresentation was also observed in the case of young people's names, though obviously for different reasons and to a lesser degree. For foundlings, special categories have to be added because surnames of foundlings sometimes alluded not only to the place of finding but also to the time of finding and even to the finder. The class of 'characterization' includes so few 'activities' or 'habits' of the babies that they will not be mentioned. Reference will be made, however, to typical, especially physical, properties of the babies. As in the case of juvenile names, a number of names were invented on a purely formal basis after well known Dutch surname patterns like Van (de) ... 'from (the)', but here, pure nonsense words often served as surnames, mostly just sounding Dutch. 158 It should be pointed out that motives of expressivity are lacking in foundling names. Given these peculiarities, a taxonomy can be set up. Usually, some form of metonymy is involved. Remarkably, metaphor appears to be lacking almost entirely.

3.5.1. Origin

I distinguish between familial, local, and temporal origin.

3. 5.1.1.

Familial origin

Only in rare cases was the FN known to the administration and could then be given to the foundling, though by no means obligatorily. In such cases the name had been written on the card accompanying the baby. Sometimes, it was specified whether it was the mother's or the father's FN. JeanFranyois Moreaux CO May 18, 1815), for instance, received his FN from the mother's name written on the card: Anne-Marie Moreaux.

3.5.1.2. Local origin Local origin normally refers here to the place where the baby was found, mostly a street, a church or other building or its entrance, a tree, and the

Diachronic analysis

297

like. Proper names as well as common nouns may be the basis of the surname. Metonymy is involved if only because the indication 'found' is missing, as in In 't Portae I 'in the portal' and Aendenboom 'by the tree'. In other cases more elements have been left out, compare: In 't Portael: Aendenboom: De Kranendonck: Jacobs: Peeters: Ingang:

found 'in the portal' found 'by the tree' found at a place in Leuven called 'the Kranendonk' found on the cemetery ofSt Jacob's church in Lruven found in St Peter's church in Leuven found at the 'entrance'

All these names are formed after patterns of existing FNs. Some of them are introduced by a preposition (in, aan, van ... ) plus article; others have merely the article de. Examples like Jacobs and Peelers are formed after the FN pattern with the genitive -s, which is misleading in these instances since we are not dealing with patronymics at all. Still others display no function morphemes at all. To the category of local origin belong proper or common nouns of persons who lived in the house near which the child was found. Names of companies and firms can be subsumed under this heading: Temmerman: FN, found at the gate of citizen 'Temmerman' Boulanger: 'baker' [French], found on the threshold of the house of Union:

3.5.1.3.

Jaques Pacquet, baker found in the building of the company de Eendracht 'the union' [French union]

Temporal origin

Foundling names were sometimes given after the name of the time, period, (holi)day or time of the day when they were found or registered. Again, proper names as well as common nouns may be the basis of the surname. Metonymy is clearly used, e.g., Januari: Paeschen 'Pasen': Pinxten 'Pinksteren': Vrijdaghs 'vrijdag': Jaer 'jaar': Morgent'morgen':

found in 'January' found at 'Easter' found on 'Whitsunday' found on a 'Friday' found at the beginning of the 'year' found in the 'morning' at 5.30 a.m.

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Dialinguistic aspects of Flemish personal names

3.5.2. Characterization Characterization divides into physical and other external properties, psychological features, and social status. Foundlings could exhibit specific physical and other external characteristics. This constitutes another motivation for surnames. When an adjective is used, there is no metonymy. In the case of nouns, there is, since a preposition like with is dropped: Adjectives: Fijn: Maeger: Den Groote: Swart: Nat:

lean thin the tall black wet

Nouns: Frisure: Mond: Muts:

(with) curly hair [French] (with a special) mouth (with a) cap

The fact that often half a card was left with the baby could give rise to such strange names as Van der Caarte 'from the card', in which van der 'from the' is in fact not etymologically motivated. The reason for preposing van der is obviously that a number of Flemish family names start in this way, so that the impression of a genuine name is given. The psychological state in which the foundling was found inspired the name giver to still other series of surnames. Again, mostly adjectives without metonymy are used; sometimes a noun with metonymy: Agitee: Alerte: Ardent: Droef

agitated [French adjective] alert [French adjective] ardent [French adjective] sad [adjective]

Drift:

hot-temper(ed) [noun]

Although in 1812 the government forbade to give names that could remind one of the foundling status of the baby, quite a number of such names are still encountered afterwards. They are of various types: adjectives (without metonymy), nouns (with metonymy), a pronoun (niemand, without metonymy) and an adverb (niet, with metonymy):

Diachronic analysis Offert:

offered (in the slide) [French]

Jetton: Abandon: Asyle:

thrown away [French] abandonment, i.e. abandoned [French] (brought to the) asylum [French]

Niemand: Niet:

nobody not, i.e. not christened

299

3.5.3. Purely formal names Certain series of surnames were formed on a purely formal basis, even without any implication of expressivity as in juvenile names. Here, it does not make sense to speak of metonymy either. For instance, the administration worked down an alphabetical list of city names, arbitrarily giving names one after the other, introduced by Van 'from', such as this series with German city names (translated into Dutch): Van Aken, Van Bremen, Van Ceulen, Van Duisburg, and so on

Indeed, a number of other names were given in series that represented a certain semantic field of common nouns, also often arranged in alphabetical order, e.g., fruit and vegetables: Ajuyn Appel Appelsien Asperge

onion apple orange asparagus

Another such a strange habit was to register foundlings with an onomastic neologism, the form of which resembled that of another baby just registered, whether the last one was itself a foundling or not: Alton Joor Nijster Dorp

after Tallon after Jooris after Nijs after Dorpel

Often, totally arbitrary name forms were invented: Jeurk, Joek, Frod, Fulze, Mierde, Murt, Ipper, Jalte, Jerle, Sollx ...

Thus, we see that foundling names have peculiar characteristics derived from the specific situation in which an abandoned baby was found. Especially the formal arbitrariness seems to go together with the totally power-

300

Dialinguistic aspects of Flemish personal names

less status of foundlings. It should be pointed out that this fonnal arbitrariness is made possible by the linguistic fact that proper names have no asserted lexical meaning as common nouns do. On the other hand, the name giver mostly appears to stick to the diachronically fonnal and semantic properties of 'nonnal' family names. Formally, we observe the use of function words such as prepositions, articles and the -s genitive. Semantically, we have similar categories like local origin, physical, psychological and social characteristics, although the lexical content is rather different. Totally new are categories like temporal origin and nonsense words. The reason for the fonnal and semantic similarities may lie in the desire of the name giver not to stigmatize foundlings, as was asked by the minister of internal affairs in 1812. However, such directives were not always followed by the name-giving administration so that stigmatizing names like Offert, Abandon, Jetton, or Asyie, often persisted. We may even suspect the name giver of choosing an easy solution to the name-giving problem in cases where he assigned names that imitate ordinary family names. Finally, a fortunate circumstance for the abandoned child was that nonsense names like Jeurk, Joek, or Frod, are hardly distinguishable from ordinary family names such as Boey, BoUe, Leirs, or Poedts because of the lack of etymological transparency of these names. Still more peculiar than foundling names are the 'nicknames' used in computer-mediated communication (CMC), i.e. by internet chatters.

3.6. Flemish nicknames for intern et chatting A totally new kind of personal names originated from the need that (mostly young) 'chatters' on the intern et have felt to identify and 'promote' themselves, usually, however, without revealing their official names. Thus, the nickname (or short: 'nick') comes closest to the class of pseudonyms since, as a rule, these nicks are given by the name bearers themselves. By contrast, the fonn and motivation of internet nicknames turn out to be very peculiar so that any taxonomy that was set up above for other categories of personal names becomes inadequate. Drawing on recent Flemish CMC nickname material from Swennen (2001) and on her analysis, I will present a taxonomy of these nicks on the basis of the motivation behind the name (compare Frank 2001).159 Since the nicks were given by the name bearers themselves, they were the obvious infonnants. Due to the dominating position of English on the internet, a

Diachronic analysis

301

number of names are inspired by this language. Especially young name givers are keen on coining names that draw attention and arouse interest in their conversation partners. Depending on the informant, certain nicks are written with a capital letter, while others are not. The motivation appears to be twofold: psychological and semantic. While the semantic motivation pertains to the 'diachronic' meaning of the name, the psychological motivation pertains rather to its form.

3.6.1. Psychological motivation

This motivation is not very frequent. It is based on a personal appraisal of the sound, the image, the length, the attractiveness, or the aesthetic value of certain nicknames. (N.B. m stands for 'male',ffor 'female') Examples concerning the sound parameter: UnExists (m), Lebbercherrie (m), SecondlSun (t), HaloStaR (t)

Concerning the parameter of image: since CMC is a visual media, some male chatters like to invent a nick that they want to look interesting, using not just letters but also special signs and symbols, little faces among other things: I\{ __ _}I\(m) } {ell} {unter (m) phRe4k(m)

Sound and image can be combined: DaStUrBeD (m), D@rkst@r[TrJ (m)

Instances illustrating the shortness of the name: Eva (t), Geuf(m)

Another feature desired is the attractiveness of the name. Since the average CMCer wants to attract interesting conversation partners, sometimes original and striking names are chosen. All ofthese name givers are men: ThE_FoRcE (m), Zyrex (m), Evil-Inside (m), KlinZ (m)

The aesthetic value of the name is the most important psychological motivation. Here we find many more female than male name givers. Women often use proprial lemmas, men tend to use ordinary words:

302

Dialinguistic aspects of Flemish personal names

jaklien < 'Jacqueline' (f), tinkeltje (f), pippe (f), garuda (f), TeOtWaWkl (m), Airwalk (m)

3.6.2. Semantic motivation Whilst the psychological motivation pertains mainly to the form of the name, the semantic one is about the meaning of the nick in question. This semantic motivation can be divided into two subcategories (Swennen 2001: 102). The first concerns the person (the individual) himself/herself, the second the world in which the individual lives.

3.6.2.1.

The category person'

This category comprises all motivations that relate to the name bearers and their life. Swennen distinguishes between the person as such and all aspects that relate to hislher life.

3.6.2.1.1.

The person as such

The person aspects relate to physical and other properties of the name bearers. Swennen distinguishes between physical appearance, personality, conviction or faith, and name. Physical appearance divides further into physiognomy and attire: Physiognomy: RedGirl (f), Spits 'tiny' (f), Lange Roo 'tall' (m), Krulletje 'little curl' (m)

Names concerning attire are coined by women only: Ladyjn_Black (f), Bitchjn_Pink (f)

Examples regarding personality: Sarcazmo (m), aic 'annoying intelligent cool' (m), MissFunky (f), puppyke diminutive of 'puppy' (f)

Instances referring to conviction or faith: sXe (or Str8-edge) 'straight-edge: no booze, no drugs, no smokes and no casual sex' (m), 10veo=oaUOuoneed (f)

Diachronic analysis

303

In the subcategory of 'name' one finds the real first and/or family name, an expressive form of them, a hypocoristic, or the byname of the chatter. As in the case of by names for young people (see 3.4), playing with forms is fairly common: Sofie (t), leintje diminutive of 'Marjolein' (t), miekemouse < 'Mickey Mouse', first name 'Mieke' (t),fee 'fairy', anagram of the first name 'Eef [Eve] (t), prinseske diminutive of 'prinses' [princess] (t), boUeke 'little ball', hypocoristic (t), eprenen 'Eric Prenen' (m), Fox English translation of the family name 'De Vos' (m), bartieparty < first name 'Bart', reduplication (m), El_Loco Spanish 'the madman', byname(m), etc.

3.6.2.1.2. The person's life This category reminds us of the classification of adult bynames. We find here: geographical origin, activities, people from the direct environment, pets, biographical anecdotes, favorites. Geographical origin can be illustrated by examples such as: Dutchman a Dutch Belgian (m), Leuven a student in this town (m), DD with D(utch) as mother tongue (t)

As for activities (job, study, hobby, and sports), many more men than women coined a nick referring to one of these: ambu < 'ambulance', nurse (m), educa < 'education', teacher (m), boer 'farmer', bio-engineer (m), dichtertje 'little poet' (m), blackweU a mode of cooking, hotel school (t), Stripke diminutive of 'strip' [comic strip], likes comic strips (t), skatewijf'skating female', likes roller skating (t)

The names in the category 'people from the direct environment' were coined exclusively by young women: MoUy first name of a relative (t), i love benjamin first name of her boyfriend (t), Febe first name of her daughter (t)

In the 'pet' category we find: Rocky (m), zoepie anagram of the name 'poezie' [pussy] (m), Swietie 'sweetie' (t), santy (t)

304

Dialinguistic aspects of Flemish personal names

Biographical anecdotes are to be found in: brosser 'truant' ["the first time I chatted we played truant"] (t), tips < 'tipsy' ["got drunk at my first meeting"] (t), TumCerHum < 'Tumor CerebraIis HumorabiIis' ["one day, I attended some dull lesson, got a headache, and looked for a nick"] (m)

Finally, there is the class of favorites, divided into two subcategories: eating and drinking, and fauna and flora: eating and drinking: koekje 'cookie', likes cookies (t), fantake diminutive of 'fanta', likes Fanta (t), mayo < 'mayonaise', adds mayonnaise to everything (m), Duvel likes this Belgian beer (m)

fauna and flora; especially women coined such names: lelie 'lily' (t), konijntje 'little rabbit' (t), Rhinoceros (m)

3.6.2.2.

The world in which the person lives

In this category, things are viewed on a larger scale, i.e. the individual is no longer the center of the motivation, although often a link can be made between person and world. Swennen (2001: 119) divides this category into the past and the present time.

3.6.2.2.1. Past time; history and mythology A number of nicks were coined on the basis of fictitious, mythological personages or of real, historical figures. The choice of such figures does not imply any identification of the name bearer with them: mythological personages: Vishnu Hindu god (m), Skyforger Latvian god (m), Dido from VirgiI's Aeneis (t), arachne mythical birth of the spider (t)

historical figures: Darwin Steel 'Charles Darwin' (m), cleopatra Egyptian queen (t)

Diachronic analysis

305

3.6.2.2.2. Present time; contemporary society Quite a few nicks can be related to aspects of contemporary society, in particular the media, entertainment, sports, books, computers and the internet. Finally, there are taboo names alluding to sexuality, drugs, and strong language. From the world of entertainment, radio, TV, commercials, music, film: FQ radio program 'French Quiz' (t), stubrubabe 'Studio Brussel babe', radio station (t), punkgirl (t), moreau Novastar's single 'Moreau' (t), Mystique personage in the film 'X-men' (t), Pigly_Puffer from TV program 'Pokemon' (m), Spockske 'little Spock', from Star Trek (m), El_diablo from commercial 'Bacardi Breezer' (m), Jazzboy (m), EraserXfrom film 'Eraser' (m)

From the world of sports; especially young males draw on this theme: Kobe American basketball player 'Kobe Bryant' (m), schumi Formula 1 pilot 'Michael Schumacher' (m), Mpenza Belgian football player (t), krcgenkfan fan of the football team 'KRC Genk' (t)

From the world of books: personages, authors, poets, strips; more men than women resort to this source: grotebroer 'Big Brother' from Orwell (m), Musashi personage from a Japanese novel (m), Mr _droopy 'Droopy the dog' (m), Roodkapje 'Little Red Riding-hood' (t),jotie the Dutch poet Jotie 't Hooft's first name (t), biebsie from a review (t)

Computers and the internet are an obvious source for nicks; no feminine nicks are derived from software, hardware or computer terminology: Acertje diminutivized computer brand name' Acer' (m), Dreamweaver software to build websites (m), chaos from PC game 'Urban Chaos' (m), Tails personage from the game 'Sonic' (t), Chris "a very general name" to safeguard anonymity on the intern et (t)

Taboos: sexual allusions, to attract partners: Pornokkio (m), playboy (m), DrLove (m), babe (t), gei/tje 'little homy' (t)

drugs; only masculine name bearers: Herbdog (m), Dealer (m)

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Dialinguistic aspects of Flemish personal names

strong language; only masculine name bearers: bUtTmAn (m), klootzakske 'little asshole' (m), miljaar a curse (m)

After this overview of CMC nicknames on the internet, we may conclude that this category shows the most diversified range of motivations ever found in name classifications. This may be due to the following circumstances. First, among the name bearers we find adults as well as young people. Second, as in the case of bynames for young people (see 3.4), the name givers use form as well as meaning to coin the various nicknames. Third, since the 'nicks' are given by the name bearers themselves, who want to draw the attention of their conversation partners, they do their best to invent interesting, original, and attractive names.

3.7. Conclusions From both a formal and a semantic viewpoint it is important to use the distinction between the paradigmatic and the syntagmatic axis of language in order to classify adult personal name patterns. Also, it yields an onomastically interesting perspective (cf. Goossens 1999). For other anthroponymic categories this dichotomy is also useful, albeit to a lesser degree. Indeed, one should realize that each of the personal name categories dealt with requires its own treatment due to the nature of the name giver and of the name bearer: adults, young people, foundlings, or intern et chatters. For this last category, Swennen (2001) chose not to use the distinction between the paradigmatic and the syntagmatic axis because of the enormous amount of motivations.

4. Socio-onomastic aspects of Flemish personal names

In this section, I will deal with some sociolinguistic properties of proper names, and especially, of personal names (PSNs), largely based on the Flemish data of the preceding section.

4.1. Introduction. Socio-onomastics Debus (1995) does not appear to have any problems to include socioonomastics within sociolinguistics (see also Allerton 1987). Proper names

Socio-onomastic aspects

307

are socially anchored linguistic signs and as such part and parcel of the linguistic inventory of a society. He agrees with the pioneer of sociolinguistics, William Labov, that it should be obvious that language can function only in a social context. In fact, linguistics is sociolinguistics, and vice-versa. Likewise, names equal 'socionyms' (Debus 1995: 393; see also Langacker 1987: 63). As has been argued before (Leys 1974), socio-onomastics offers special possibilities for sociolinguistic research that have been largely neglected by mainstream sociolinguistics. This will become clear in my investigation of some socio-onomastic properties of several kinds of Flemish personal name patterns. 160 Before analyzing my own socio-onomastic material, I want to set the discussion within a sociolinguistic framework. I will discuss a few theses concerning the sociolinguistic status of proper names.

4.1.1. One-way traffic from society to names In principle, the interaction between language and society can go either way. Thus, we may see an influence of the language system on social clustering. In the case of proper names, this influence is practically nonexistent (Leys 1974; Van Langendonck 1979b). This is obviously due to the marginal position of the onomasticon in the linguistic system. Paradoxically, because of this marginal position, the impact of social clustering on the name system has been known to be the more considerable. This impact seems to be a sensitive barometer for the measurement of social development. It is well attested that names not only undergo all kinds of formal alterations, but are even replaced with other names in their entirety, mostly on ideological and political grounds. This frequently happens with place names. For example, in Russia, Stalingrad was renamed Volgograd after Stalin's death, and Leningrad again became St Petersburg after the Fall of the Wall. The Belgian Congo became Zaire after its independence and was called Congo again after Mobutu's fall, and so on. It should be remarked that associative meaning plays a role here: Lenin's and Stalin's names were still transparent in the relevant city names. We can wonder how proper names have acquired this adaptability and flexibility to undergo changes or even to be replaced.

308

Dialinguistic aspects of Flemish personal names

4.1.2. Proper names, and especially personal names, as ideal socioonomastic parameters In the first chapter, I argued that proper names, as opposed to common nouns, contain no asserted lexical meaning since they are essentially referring terms. 161 Because of this primarily referential status and their semantic simplicity, proper names can be called the prototype of the noun phrase, as I claimed in the first chapter. As proper names are nouns, in principle they possess the lexical, morphological and syntactic apparatus ofthe noun. The semantic non-complexity of proper names, however, entails that they can do without the complex formal means that common nouns need. For instance, unlike proper names, common nouns need to express oppositions such as singular vs. plural, countable vs. uncountable, or definite vs. indefinite. Proper names are essentially singular, definite and specific, all of them properties that I identified as unmarked features. As a consequence, the larger part of the formal nominal apparatus can be used for pragmatic, stylistic, and sociolinguistic purposes. Last but not least, the ad hoc referential status of proper names vis-a-vis common nouns also has the consequence that they have a rather instable formal shape and can even be replaced by other name forms, as in the case of Leningrad and Stalingrad above. The proprial subcategory in which all these possibilities abound, is naturally that of personal names, being the prototypical class of proper names. As for the special use of the nominal apparatus, I take a striking example from Mexican Spanish: a first name like Manuel can be used as a plural diminutive form preceded by the article. This produces los Manuel-it-os, which simply means something like 'little Manuel'. The three morphemes merely show an expressive, emotive function (Svennung 1958: 405). Personal names can also be altered in form and even be replaced as may have become clear in the discussion on first names, bynames and family names above. The linguistic factor discussed is reinforced by an extralinguistic factor. The socio-onomastic value of personal names also lies in the fact that the onomasticon is constantly renewed: new names originate with new individuals. Hence, much more than the appellative lexicon and system, the personal name inventories and structures can and do reflect new developments in society fairly quickly, e.g., regarding the man - woman relation, the differences between social classes, between old and young people, or

Socio-onomastic aspects

309

between ideologies. It appears that bynames as well as given names reflect such social phenomena (Van Langendonck 1982; 1999a). The above observations suggest that of all word classes, personal names possess the greatest possibilities to take on pragma- and sociolinguistic information. I conclude that since proper names, and especially personal names, are so flexible and adaptable, it is to be expected that they are able to reflect social structures in a fairly true and direct way. Especially first names and bynames appear to be a barometer of sociological changes in a rapid and flexible way, unlike the rest of language. Before going into the analysis, it is necessary to make one further theoretical point.

4.1.3. The name-giving system vs. the use o/names Usually, the study of language in sociolinguistic practice is limited to the scrutiny of the use of language by certain social groups in certain social situations. Something of this kind has hardly been done in socioonomastics (but see Lenk 2002). In this discipline, a rather different type of research is practiced, seldom found in sociolinguistics: one investigates which linguistic or onomastic forms are related to the social properties of their referents, the objects in reality they refer to, as in the instances of name changes above. This kind of sociolinguistics has been called 'referent sociolinguistics' .162 At the lexical level in onomastics, for instance, one can examine which first names are bestowed on the individuals of which social classes and also what cultural factors influence first-name-giving. Hitherto, these have been important themes of socio-onomastic research in Dutch, German, and other languages (Leys 1974; Gerritzen 1994, 1998a&b, 1998-1999, 1999; Kaleta, ed. 1998-1999; Kohlheim 2002; and others). In the next two sections I will focus on personal-name patterns that contain all three categories: first names, bynames and family names. In turn, this kind of investigation has hardly been undertaken in socio-onomastics up to now. More in particular, I will deal with socio-onomastic properties of adult personal-name-giving and contrast these with socio-onomastic characteristics of juvenile byname-giving. The material is largely derived from the previous sections on Flemish names.

310

Dialinguistic aspects of Flemish personal names

4.2. Socio-onomastic aspects of adult Flemish personal-name-giving In this subsection, I would like to consider a few sociolinguistic aspects of adult Flemish personal-name-giving at the morphosyntactic level, synchronically and diachronically. The material is limited to one dialect, so that geographical factors cannot interfere with sociological ones. It concerns the South Brabant (Southern Dutch, Flemish) dialect of Tildonk, the data of which are described in Van Langendonck (1 979b). As in the section of name geography, I will use the term 'byname' for every individual personal name that is not a first name. First name and byname are to be distinguished as individual names from collective names (CNs). The latter refer to groups of persons, usually families. The official family name can hardly be called a grammatical category, because it can assume the function of a byname, thus an individual name, and that of a collective name as well. In standard Dutch and English, the family name is systematically ambiguous: we speak about the Smith family, but also about Mr or Mrs. Smith. The official family name might be called an essentially sociolinguistic category. Important for this study is the fact that the South Brabant dialect in question, as other Dutch dialects, allows for different binary combinations of FiN (first name), BN (byname) and CN (collective name). The elements between brackets in the examples are optional members of the patterns: [FiN + CN]: Jef(Janssens), Marie (Mares) [FiN + BN]: (Tist) (den IJzeren) 'Baptist the iron one', Fienke (Fluit) 'Josephine Flute' [BN + CN]: Baaske (Vankrieken) 'Boss Vankrieken', de Lange (Profeet) 'the long one from Mr Prophet' A few other examples should be added: [Title + PSN]: Meester Stroobants 'Schoolmaster Stroobants', (Juffrouw) Jozefa 'Miss Jozefa' [Adjective + PSN]: (Lange) Louis 'Long Lewis', (Dikke) Nora 'Fat Nora' Let us now look at the impact of two sociolinguistic parameters on the structure of the unary BNs and the binary personal name combinations, first the gender parameter and subsequently the social class parameter.

Sodo-onomastic aspects

311

4.2.1. The gender parameter With respect to the gender parameter, i.e. the man - woman relationship, BN constructions reflect the dominance of man over woman, at least in the older dialectal system. In the new system, we observe a tendency towards equalization. We can see this not only at the synchronic, but also at the diachronic level.

4.2.1.1. At the synchronic level There is no structural restriction concerning masculine personal names, neither in the older nor in the younger system: all combinations contain masculine personal names, unary as well as binary ones: unary BNs: Stek 'stick', Peuzel 'peck', de Lange 'the long one', den Draaier 'the turner'

binary personal name combinations: [FiN + CN]: Je/(Janssens), Nare (Jejkes) [FiN + BN]: (Tist) (den JJzeren) 'Baptist the iron one', Jan (Ammoniak) 'John Ammonia' [BN + CN]: Baaske (Vankrieken) 'Boss Vankrieken', de Lange (Pro/eet) 'the long one from Mr Prophet' [Title + PSN]: Meester Stroobants 'Schoolmaster Stroobants', (Nonkel) (Roger) 'Uncle Roger' [Adjective + PSN]: (Lange) Louis 'Long Lewis', (den dikke) Perdieus 'the fat Perdieus'

The omnipresence of masculine names makes this category into the unmarked one, as opposed to feminine names. The latter are confined to specific constructions, especially in the older dialectal system. The sociolinguistic markedness of older feminine BNs is clear from the limitation that they do not occur as unary personal name expressions. The older feminine BNs thus have to be articulate, i.e., syntactically or morphologically, they have to contain more than one member. They could therefore be claimed to display a derived, secondary character. Morphological articulation consists of suffixation by means of the ending -in or of the diminutive suffix -(e)ke. Only a few cases can be signaled.

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Almost in each of these cases we find a minimal opposition with a masculine unary counterpart: de Platte 'the flat one' vs. de Platt-in; den Debber 'the trample' vs. Debberke; Muntboll-eke 'mint-sweet' [no masculine counterpart]

Syntactic articulation is achieved by the juxtaposition of two lexemes; thus we find women's names such as: [FiN + eN]: Maria (Peeters) 'Mary Peeters' [FiN + BN]: Trees (Appelspijs) 'Therese apple-sauce' [Title + PSN]: (Juffrouw) Jozefa 'Miss Jozefa', Madame (Voila) 'Mrs. look!', Juffrouw Lauwers 'Miss Lauwers' [Adjective + FiN]: (Dikke) Nora 'Fat Nora'

Among these names, given in the first half of the twentieth century, we hardly find any unary feminine nicknames. 163 If they exist, they are felt as offending since the female name bearer in question was then regarded as a person with masculine traits, as in the case of Tut, a rather pejorative feminine byname. Completely lacking are feminine bynames derived from official family names. Moreover, in their function of CNs, family names are an exclusively masculine matter and this has been furthered by the Belgian legislation until now. The rule that the father is to give his CN to his children has not changed yet. In the second half of the twentieth century, the above limitation on the form of women's names was not so strict any more, as can be deduced from data collected in the same Brabant region at the beginning of the 21 st century (Boeve 2002). The structural equalization of men's and women's bynames reveals a gradual social equalization of the two sexes in the generations of the second half of the 20th century. It may be noted that the onomastic subsystem reacts faster than the remainder of the dialectal system. For instance, in the grammar of the newer dialect, the masculine gender still seems to be the unmarked one.

4.2.1.2. At the diachronic level At the diachronic level too, the older onomasticon displays a discrepancy between the sexes. This time, the restriction is not of a formal, but of a semantic and referential nature. It reflects the fact that, some time ago, the

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women of a village could hardly have any profession, occupation, dignity or other function. I will illustrate this by means of the binary name combinations. As we know, the unary patterns have already been denied the female gender by a formal restriction. I will scan three name patterns one after the other: [title + PSN], [FiN + occupational name], [FiN + occupational nickname J. In the pattern [title + PSN] examples with male referents occur very frequently: Pastoor Nijs 'Priest Nijs', Notaris Tuerlinckx 'Notary T.', Meester Stroobants 'Schoolmaster S.', Doktoor Petit 'Doctor P.', Burgemeester Cloetens 'Mayor Cl.'

Nevertheless, a couple of feminine counterparts should be mentioned: Zuster Hilda 'Sister H.', Juffrouw Jozefa 'Miss J.'. However, these names originated in the closed community of school and are therefore subject to other rules (see 4.3, juvenile name-giving). In Standard Dutch, we ascertain a certain breakthrough in this respect. We now find titles in women's names, which formerly counted as an exclusively male privilege, e.g., minister, professor, rechter 'judge', and the like. In contrast with older feminine titles of the Ancien Regime, such as koning-in 'queen', grav-in 'countess', prins-es 'princess', the newer titles do not get feminine suffixes any more (-in, -es). We do not speak ofa ministerin or a professorin in Dutch (in contrast to German: Ministerin, Professorin). This looks like an equalization of the two sexes. For both of them the terms are inarticulate: the feminine term no longer shows any derived status. Nevertheless, this evolution has hitherto been limited to the higher occupations. In the case of lower occupations, the feminine terms often are still suffixed, e.g., kleuterleid-ster 'nurse', laborant-e 'laboratory worker'. Moreover, suffixed terms such as secretar-esse 'female secretary, typist' cannot be used for a higher office of (male or female) secretary. Then the masculine (i.e. neuter) form is applied to both sexes, e.g., staatssecretaris 'secretary of state'. In the pattern [FiN + occupational name] feminine examples have not been encountered, even nowadays.164 The following masculine binary formations can be mentioned: Lamme de Stoker 'fireman', Je! den Blokmaker 'clog-maker', Janneke de Sleger 'butcher', Suske de Verver 'painter'

Regarding the pattern [FiN + occupational nickname] it should be clarified that an occupational nickname is one that indicates an occupation meto-

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nymically. The occupation is marked merely by the object or instrument of it. This indirect rendering is found in nicknames like: het Varken 'the pig': metonymical designation of a butcher; Frans Vis 'Francis fish': metonymical designation of a fishmonger; (Frans) Lood 'Francis lead': metonymical designation of a plumber; Miel Gazet 'Emile newspaper': metonymical designation of a newspaper seller

As will be clear from the instances, only men's names can be discovered. There is one exception: Muntbolleke 'mint-sweet' is the nickname of a woman who had to run both her house and her shop. It is doubtful whether this activity was deemed a real profession by the population. To conclude the discussion of the gender parameter we can say that the discrimination of women prevailed in the older byname system, but that it has gradually been losing ground in the second half of the 20th century. This process is surely going on in the 21 sI century.

4.2.2. The social class parameter The second parameter, social class, is dealt with in view of the above three BN categories, which refer diachronically to dignities, occupations or handwork. Again, the degree of social appraisal can be read from the name structure.

4.2.2.1.

The structure [title + personal name]

The structure [title + PSN] is accorded the highest appreciation. The examples were already cited in a different connection (section 4.2.1.2): masculine: Pastoor Nijs, Notaris Tuerlinck.x, Meester Stroobants, Doktoor Petit, Burgemeester Cloetens ... feminine: Zuster Hilda, luffrouw lozefa

This pattern is a clear reflection of the dignities and professions of the upper classes. In the diachronic semantic analysis, these types belong under the heading 'social properties', and not under the heading 'activities' (see above and Van Langendonck 1976; 1979b). The motivation is that these functions are not felt by the man in the street as being occupations whereby one really works, in the plain sense. One is a priest, a doctor or a notary. A notary does not 'notary' like a baker bakes or a painter paints. In fact, this

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attitude is not meant as denigrating; on the contrary, people with titles need not make their hands dirty, as it is commonly held.

4.2.2.2.

The pattern [first name + occupation}

As a rule, the pattern [FiN + occupation] refers to skilled labor, handwork or lower employees' work. Besides the binary formations Lamme de Stoker 'fireman', Jef den Blokmaker 'clog-maker', Janneke de Sleger 'butcher', Suske de Verver 'painter' we come across a list of unary, masculine names: den Apoteker 'the chemist assistant', Boerke 'little farmer', Metserke 'little bricklayer', Coiffeurke 'little hairdresser', den Draaier 'the turner', de Glazenmaker 'the glazier' ...

Clearly, an activity is meant here. This is reflected by the fact that activity verbs underlie these agent nouns, viz. boeren 'to farm', mets(el)en 'to lay bricks', coifJeren 'to dress the hair', draaien 'to turn', glazenmaken 'to glaze'. Moreover, in South Brabant dialects it is possible to combine the agent nouns with the verb doen 'to do', e.g., boer doen 'to farm', metser doen 'to lay bricks', and so forth. With titles like 'notary' and 'mayor', such expressions are unusual. If one does apply them, an ironical effect is aimed at. Only jokingly does one say that somebody 'does notary' or 'mayor'. Normally, occupations and manual labor are regarded as being lower than the dignities expressed by titles. This obtains still more for the activities of the third and final category.

4.2.2.3.

The metonymical combination [first name + occupational nickname}

The metonymical combination [FiN + occupational nickname] gets the lowest rating. This is the category whereby the occupational activity is designated by an instrument or object, e.g., het Varken 'the pig' (butcher), Frans Vis 'Francis fish' (fishmonger), Frans Lood 'Francis lead' (plumber), Miel Gazet 'Emile newspaper' (newspaper seller). As a rule, these BNs concern unlearned workmen, market vendors, hawkers, and the like. The plumber was obviously degraded to this category as he, just as a hawker does, went from house to house. This was also the butcher's lot, because he came to the farmers' houses. With the above metonymical

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name types too, dialects as well as Standard Dutch use a verbal expression with do en 'to do', e.g., in vis doen, 'to do in fish', i.e. to be a fishmonger. The fact that the 'lowest' occupational classes are denoted metonymically is surely no accident. The indirect designation by an object or instrument is likely to obscure that an occupation is involved. Indeed, adducing names of inanimate things iconically reflects the 'inhumanness' of these occupations. In this parameter of social class, the main demarcation line apparently runs between the title constructions with their dignities and learned professions and on the other hand the two others with the manual occupations. In this connection, I should remark that the title constructions usually contain the family name (except at school), whereas in the other types the first name is found. We speak of Notaris Tuerlinckx 'Notary T.' and Burgemeester Cloetens 'Mayor CI.', but on the other hand of Jej den Blokmaker 'Joseph the clog-maker' and Frans Vis 'Francis fish'. The family name sounds more distinguished than the first name.

4.2.3. Conclusions To round off this discussion, I will formulate a couple of conclusions about the sociolinguistic importance of personal-name-giving and the need of referent socio-onomastics and referent sociolinguistics in general. Where we notice an evolution between the name-giving system of the older generations and that of the younger ones, there appears to be a shift from male dominance to an equalization of man and woman. In the nononomastic part of the dialect system of later generations, nothing seems to point to a similar development. Although this is not very likely to occur, more research could reveal minor changes that have gone unnoticed up to now. Insofar as the onomastic tendency is real, it proves the sensitivity of personal names to registering social change. Anyway, in connection with first names we are confronted with an established fact (Gerritzen 1994). It is important to note that the linguistic system itself is also constituted by sociolinguistic variables, as has been revealed by the above 'referent sociolinguistic' research. Therefore, even system linguists or system onomasticians cannot pass over certain sociolinguistic or socio-onomastic facts without missing some important points.

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4.3. Socio-onomastic characteristics of juvenile Flemish byname-giving in contrast with the adult name-giving In this section, I will deal with the socio-onomastic characteristics of juvenile Flemish byname-giving and contrast these with the features of adult name-giving. As in the case of adult naming, there is a limitation to the scope of the present research. It has not been feasible to look at the actual use that young people make of their bynames. For instance, it would have been interesting to know to what extent the names are applied as forms of address. Limiting myself in this way again to the investigation of referent sociolinguistic phenomena, two parameters will be discussed at the same time: the opposition old vs. young and that of man vs. woman. Finally, the question about the universality of these juvenile name patterns will be brought up. This refers to the issue about 'generation differences' vs. 'age-grading'. The following observations can thus be made. In general, young people are given bynames from primary education onwards. In contrast to the evolution in adult bynames, it appears that juvenile byname-giving is still very much alive, but differs from adult names in a number of formal and semantic respects (see below). On the other hand, young people occasionally use bynames of the elderly, but the reverse does not hold. Unlike adult names, almost all of the juvenile names often occur as forms of address, especially in play and in quarreling. In contrast to adult name patterns, juvenile creativity lies not only in inventing lexemes and meanings based on appellatives, but also and especially in transforming the existing first names and family names (sometimes appellatives as well) into bynames by means of a number of formal operations. These expressive means (suffixation, abbreviation or lengthening, reinterpretation and folk etymology, rhyme and alliteration, reduplication, consonant harmony, and anagrams) are encountered in juvenile names to a much greater extent than in adult names (compare Van Langendonck 1979b; 1991). Young people are interested in expressive, playful, and often pejorative name-giving. The informative aspect that we find in adult naming is largely backgrounded here. For example, young people hardly refer to familial or geographical origin. Sometimes, the parents' profession, occupation or social features are alluded to, but exclusively with the purpose of a comic effect. By contrast, occupations, habits, delocutives, psychological and especially physical characterization are favorite themes, obviously because the possibilities of playfulness and expressivity, often even

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of roughness, are inherently much greater (compare Van Langendonck 1993; 1999a). Most frequent, however, are expressive suffixation and deformation of name forms. We may conclude from this that external aspects very much address juvenile imagination, in fact in two ways. On the linguistic level there is the play of sound and form, and on the extralinguistic level we see that the physical and external features of the name bearer appeal most strongly to juvenile name givers. Finally, we observe that often more than one motivation applies at once to one and the same name, e.g., in de Soef (shortening of the FN 'Sauvilliers' + reference to sleepy appearance), de Lus (shortening of 'Lucien' + delocutive: called himself 'de Lusse'), de Poep 'big bottom' + delocutive: said: 'meine kleinen Ptippchen'), de Lambik (bald + flaring up like the Flemish comic figure Lambik) [HS]. Unlike the adult name patterns, the juvenile patterns applied are fairly simple, as can be expected in expressive contexts. As a rule, either a first name or a byname (from a surname or another word) is used. A combination of first name and byname is rather infrequent, and if it occurs, it is almost inevitably the common pattern [FiN + BN] that turns up. Only sporadically do we encounter the combinations [title + personal name] and [adjective + personal name]. All this obtains for both girls' and boys' names. As far as gender goes, I should point out that the difference observed in adult name models, i.e. a ban on unary bynames for women (see 4.2.1.1), is completely absent among young people. Note, finally, that especially in unary bynames the definite article is found as an augmentative means, albeit almost exclusively in the central part ofthe Flemish territory. Man-woman differences are encountered in different domains from the above. In general, boys are given a byname more easily than girls. The numerous deformations occur in family names of boys rather than in their first names, especially the reinterpretations. As for girls, we observe an equal distribution between first names and family names. Another difference comes to the fore in the fairly strong English influence on bynames for young people. For instance, English common or proper nouns are often employed for boys' names, but rather rarely for girls' names, at least in the material available. This habit is found also in cases of reinterpretation or rhyme, e.g.,

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de Virgin « FN De Maegd), Chief« FiN Steef, Stefan), Miss Piggy « FiN Peggy), Coboy 'cowboy' « FN Jacobs), Ratsy-Boy « FN Raets), Black & Decker « FN Deckers), Milky- Way « FN Milkers), Dwayne- Wayne

Likewise, the suffix -y/-ie/-i, borrowed from English (or possibly Dutch), is used frequently: Ratsy-Boy « FN Raets), Walli « FN Walschaerts), Johnny Pony, de Willy Willy, de Foefle « FN Verhoeven), Titi « FN Tiesters), Fiji « FN Fierens), Stok Steuki « FN Stockman), Turkie Turkie, Joeri (Boeri), Billey Billie

Last but not least, the important question arises concerning the universality of these juvenile byname patterns. Wolfram and Fasold (1974: 89-92) see two possible scenarios: There are age differences that relate to generation differences - older generations have often not undergone linguistic changes that affect the younger generations. But there are also differences that relate to 'agegrading': there are characteristic linguistic behaviors appropriate for different stages in the life history of an individual. Thus, the distinction in the name-giving patterns between adults and young people could reflect a generation difference. In this hypothesis, young people utilize specific patterns and store them for their future life. By contrast, the hypothesis of 'age-grading' implies that individuals go through certain developmental stages in their name-giving. In this case, young people apply their own mode of name-giving everywhere. As these young people get older, their language and their name-giving principles change as well. The first hypothesis (generation differences) is not very likely: after school age, playful bynames appear to disappear quickly. If these names stayed alive, name-giving patterns would change abruptly and thoroughly from one generation to the other and this cannot be confirmed by the data. As a consequence, the second hypothesis (age-grading) has to be preferred: except for language- and culture-specific features such as the article and certain suffixes as well as the Anglophilia and pop culture the mode of name-giving among young people is apparently identical for wellnigh all young people, at least in the Western World. The best proof of that is the data from different places and periods. From the studies by Gansleweit (1971) and Naumann (1976-1977) it appears that in the (East) German linguistic area, the same phenomena as in juvenile Flemish byname-giving occur, i.e. frequency of suffixation, abbreviation, lengthening, rhyme and reinterpretation of first names and family names and scarcity of categories like origin and occupation. As early as

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Dialinguistic aspects of Flemish personal names

1932, Jacob Van Ginneken (1932: 12-19) found similar features in Dutch school names: unary and simple name patterns, abbreviation and reinterpretation of family names and the lack of names indicating origin.

4.4. Conclusions Due to the special nature of proper names, they are particularly well suited for the investigation of social changes, since these changes have a direct and rapid impact on the structuring of especially the name-giving of persons in a community. At least referent sociolinguistics is able to yield interesting results. First, this was evidenced in the realm of adult Flemish personal-name-giving, in which dialectal naming patterns revealed the dominance of men over women, at least in the first half of the 20th century, followed afterwards by a gradual equalization between the genders. Name structures also mirrored a trichotomy of social classes (higher professions, skilled labor and unskilled handwork). Adult name-giving was contrasted with juvenile byname-giving in order to discover in what way young people profile themselves as a social group vis-ft-vis adult name givers and name bearers. Young people turn out to attach much more importance to external features, in focusing on physical traits of the name bearer, but also in playing with name forms (reduplication, reinterpretation, etc.). In this play, boys appear to use a lot more English lexemes and endings than girls do. Last but not least, it was established that we have to do with 'age-grading' rather than with 'generation differences': young people have similar onomastic devices at all places and times, at least as far as Western Europe is concerned.

General summary and conclusions

In this book, I attempted to provide a synthesis of the relevant literature on the theory of proper names as they function in modem Western European languages, especially English and Dutch. Also, and more importantly, I wanted to provide new insights into name theory, set up a synchronic typology of proper names, and deal with dia-onomastic aspects of personal names on the basis of a renewed linguistic methodology. The book was divided into four chapters, which deal with the semantics (first chapter), the formal status (second chapter), the taxonomy (third chapter) and the dialinguistics (fourth chapter) of Flemish personal names. In the first (semantic) chapter, I characterized proper names in terms of Radical Construction Grammar, as promoted by William Croft (2000; 2001). Starting from the referential and semantic functions of proper names, I first discussed the relevant philosophical literature, especially the opposing theses of the language philosophers John Searle and Saul Kripke, the maximum meaningfulness thesis, metalinguistic theories (more in particular Franc;:ois Recanati, Georges Kleiber and Jerrold Katz, the last two of whom introduce a new sense of 'sense'), and cognitive linguistic theories of proper names (especially Ronald Langacker, who views nominals from the point of view of common nouns; but also Ernst Hansack and Silvio Brendler's cognitive framework based on exact sciences). Finally, Richard Coates' recent pragmatic thesis was evaluated. After having dealt with all these views, I came to a series of theses. Methodologically, I made a crucial distinction between 'proper names' and proprial, appellative or other lexemes, i.e. lemmas in isolation (dictionary entries). Lemmas can adopt certain functions in a construction, e.g., as 'proper names' or as 'appellatives' (common nouns). Proprial lemmas are lemmas that function prototypically as proper names (e.g., place and personal names). Proprio-appellative lemmas underlie names of trades, languages, colors, diseases, and the like. Appellative lemmas can, however, also occur as proper names, albeit in a more or less marginal way. Only on the basis of purely proprial lemmas can we form nouns that appear as a special kind of common noun, as in another John, a second Napoleon. I adopted a unified pragmatic-semantic-syntactic account and arrived at the following definition of proper names:

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General summary and conclusions

A proper name is a noun that denotes a unique entity at the level of established linguistic convention to make it psychosocially salient within a given basic level category [pragmatic]. The meaning of the name, if any, does not (or not any longer) determine its denotation [semantic]. An important formal reflex of this pragmatic-semantic characterization of proper names is their ability to appear in such close appositional constructions as the poet Burns, Fido the dog, the River Thames, or the City of London [syntactic]. A prototypical 'proper name' comes into existence through two major processes. An active strategy consists of assigning a proprial lemma to an ad hoc referent in an ad hoc name-giving act. Although this ad hoc assignment can be repeated several times so numerous people can be called John, it does not take place on the basis of a concept or predication as with common nouns. Other, equally prototypical proper names originate gradually through the semantic bleaching of a mostly appellative expression without the intervention of a special naming act. For instance, the place name Oxford developed gradually out of an appellative construction like '(the) ford for oxen', i.e. shallow place where cattle could cross the river. These two processes are related to the fact that proper names do not have asserted lexical meaning but do display presuppositional meanings of several kinds: categorical (basic level) meaning, associative senses (introduced either via the name bearer or via the name form), and grammatical meanings. In this respect they differ from other monoreferential expressions (nature; the moon). As for the notion of meaning itself, there is no need to invent new kinds of meaning. I argued that so-called differences in 'kinds' of meaning relate and even depend on the construction in which they appear. Hence, one cannot completely dispense with the 'Fregean sense'. In certain cases, the meaning determines the reference (common nouns), in others it does not (proper names). To corroborate the above theses, I adduced recent psycholinguistic and especially neurolinguistic evidence. However, the conclusions that these neurolinguists draw themselves are somewhat superficial and do not distinguish proper names from pronouns since both lack 'lexical' meaning. As for the language philosophical literature on proper names, it should be stressed that the neurolinguists have not proved that Searle is as erroneous as they claim and that Kripke is simply right. After all, Searle admitted that proper names have no definitional meaning. He was also right in regarding what I call categorical meaning (and more precisely basic level meaning) as an essential feature of proper names. And obviously, his 'cluster of descriptions' theory highlights the existence of associative meaning derived

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from the name bearer's properties. By contrast, the aphasiological experiments say little about Kripke's rigid designator or his causal theory. From a linguistic point of view, the notion of rigid designator may be a necessary feature of proper names but certainly not a sufficient one. The second chapter was devoted to mostly new formal characteristics of proper names reflecting their pragmatic, referential, and semantic status, based mainly on English and Dutch data. Especially appositional structures were considered. Proper names are nouns that can systematically appear in English close appositional structures of the types [definite article + common noun + (of) proper name ], [common noun + proper name], [proper name + definite article + common noun], [proper name + proper name]. Proper names can be coordinated while being homophonous; they do not take restrictive modifiers or quantifiers, cannot function as predicate nominals and are the weakest anaphoric elements. Proper names (can) display all types of grammatical features shown by personal pronouns, viz. referentiality and definiteness, number, countability, recursiveness (genericness), gender, person, and even partitiveness. In addition, both proper names and personal pronouns mostly exhibit the unmarked counterparts of these grammatical features. Like personal pronouns, proper names are inherently referential and definite. Most proper names are singular, countable, nonrecursive and show third person on the level of established linguistic convention. These are the unmarked (prototypical, default) instances. Personal pronouns have or can have these features as well, at least on the level of usage. The main distinctions between proper names and pronouns are to be found both in their different mode of reference and in the lack of basic level meaning in pronouns. On the whole, proper names appear to be the most prototypical nominal class since they primarily display the least marked features (against Langacker 1991; 2004). Exceptions seem to be the constructions with the article a(n) in which the proprial lemma is argued to preserve its proper name character, e.g., A Bill Clinton would have reacted differently. However, the markedness is due here to the expressive nature of the construction, not to a lack ofpropriality. In the case of appellativization, the propriallemma has a marked lexical meaning corresponding to a marked, more complex form. This form is a combination of the features of common nouns plus special features characterizing the particular constructions, such as the addition of elements like second, certain, different, as ... as (in predicate nominals).

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The third chapter contains a synchronic typology of proper names, which is almost totally lacking in the literature. I discussed the main subcategories of proper names. This resulted in the interesting conclusion that we have to do with four major subclasses, which can be regarded as constituting a cline: first, there is the most important (prototypical) class displaying a clear proprial lemma: personal names, animal names, place names and a few others; second, there is the category of non prototypical countable and uncountable proper names with mostly proprio-appellative lemmas that underlie appellatives as well as proper names. These compare more or less to the class of so-called 'appellative proper names' ('Gattungseigennamen' for some German onomasticians): the names of months, trades and brands, currencies, numbers, letters, languages, colors, or diseases. The third and fourth classes are marginal categories that are not constituted by a proprial or proprio-appellative lemma, i.e. autonyms (metalinguistic names like bank in the appositional structure the word 'bank ') and nouns with a restricted proprial function, e.g., the second noun in appositional structures of the form the notion of relator; the element gold. Except for the first category, all categories can be used generically in a systematic manner. It also turns out that categories of 'uncountable proper names' do exist, contrary to what has been held traditionally. In the fourth chapter I dealt with some aspects of name-giving and naming systems that are of a dialinguistic, in this case a 'dia-onomastic' nature. It covers diatopic (dialect geographical), diachronic and sociolinguistic, and more in particular, socio-onomastic aspects. At the same time, this dialinguistic material is areal linguistic. The area covered is the Dutchspeaking part of Belgium, i.e. it is about personal names (first names, family and bynames) used in Dutch dialects of Flanders. Section 2 of the fourth chapter treats the diatopic perspective, i.e. the geographical distribution of Flemish personal name patterns. It attempted to show in particular that Flemish byname patterns are in a transitional stage in that the pattern [byname + first name] is gradually replaced by the reverse model [first name + byname]. Section 3 focused on the diachronic classification of Flemish family names and adult bynames as they are found in towns and villages. To this end, I set up a classification on the basis of such linguistic parameters as the paradigmatic vs. the syntagmatic axis. The semantic taxonomy is reflected by a formal, morphosyntactic one. Basically, this taxonomy can be applied also to other Indo-European family name and byname systems (at least in the way bynames function in towns and villages). The taxonomy

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goes against traditional onomastic classifications. Moreover, it appears to differ from those applicable to juvenile Flemish bynames, surnames of 19th century Flemish foundlings, and Flemish nicknames for internet chatting. Section 4, dealing with socio-onomastic aspects of Flemish personal names, made clear that both the distinction between man and woman and that between higher and lower social classes are reflected in different naming patterns for these categories, which is also a new finding. Finally, it was revealed to what extent the adult name-giving system in towns and villages can differ from the naming system used by young people at school.

Notes

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2. 3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

Snimek (1991: 78) states explicitly that onomastics should not be reduced to name etymology. On p.75, he complains that, unfortunately, the results of general name theory have found very little response until now. Harweg (1998: 213) still holds that proper names are actually not elements that form part of language. Dixon states: " ... in Proto-Australian an accusative inflection occurred only with pronouns, demonstratives, and proper nouns (as in most modern Australian languages); common nouns used the bare stem - absolutive case, with zero inflection - for Sand 0 functions." Likewise, in the Western Torres Strait language Kalaw Lagaw Ya (Saibai dialect) singular proper names use a nominative-accusative case marking system, while common nouns use an ergative-absolutive system (Comrie 1989: 72). Snlmek (1991: 74) holds that the linguistic aspect is subordinated to naming in general and this in turn to the function of proper names. However, naming is a speech act, i.e. a linguistic act. Contemporary linguistics has long been enriched with a pragmatic component. What is called proprial lemma here is apparently a 'nomeme' for Kohlheim and Hengst (2004). These authors see a further distinction between the nom erne and its 'allonomes', i.e. a propriallemma and its formal variants such as abbreviations, hypocoristics, etc.; for instance, we could say that the nomeme Elizabeth has various allonomes, e.g., Liz, Lizzy, or Beth. How this relates to what is called in this book the notion of 'proper name' is not discussed in the paper. This attitude has been changing somewhat in recent decades. See, for instance, Nicolaisen (1985), Debus and Seibicke (1989), and recently the handbook on Name Studies (Eichler et al., eds., 1995-1996). There are, of course, exceptions, e.g., Jackendoff(1983). Even psycholhguists and philosophers sometimes point out the different uses of proper names, e.g., La Palme Reyes et al. (1993: 438) cite examples where propriallexemes adopt count noun status, as in: Don't try to do a Richard Nixon on me, or: That's very much a Richard Nixon move. Garner (1971) touches upon the intended distinction where he speaks about the possible meaning of 'expressions used as proper names' instead of 'proper names' as such. See also Koss (1995) and, in general, chapter XIX in Name Studies 11 (Eichler et al., eds., 1996). Likewise, Harweg (1983; 1997: 91), who differentiates even further into genuine, half genuine and non-genuine proper names. By contrast, my distinction between proper name and proprial lemma was adopted in more recent work, such as Vandelanotte and Willemse (2002), Buss (2005: 122),

Notes

9.

10.

11.

12.

13. 14.

15. 16.

17. 18. 19.

20.

327

and Van de Velde (2003). Kleiber (2004: 122-123) retains the notion of propriallemma as an interesting working tool. It should be remarked, however, that names cannot stay 'proper names' if they are pluralized or become indefinite, as is contended in Sloat (1969), Leys (1979: 80), Kuhn and Serzisko (1982: 284), etc. See below. As pointed out to me by Richard Coates (personal communication), a second Napoleon can refer to any object having the conventionalized attributes of Napoleon. Anyway, the lemma remains the same. It can be observed that crosslinguistically, nouns and verbs are more 'major' parts of speech than adjectives, which are lacking in a number of languages, but this does not substantially weaken Croft's claim. Richard Coates (personal communication) argues that (8) can be paraphrased as "The cardinality of sets of seven objects is holy." In my view, this paraphrase is derived, the cardinality being primary. Of course, this formulation can only be provisional at this stage. As Richard Coates pointed out to me (personal communication), the same lemma may be reinvented by different people, e.g., the lemma Washington. I do not think we should speak here of different lemmas since we can adopt Putnam's view of the division oflabor. The speech community as a whole uses the lemma Washington. Not everybody needs to know every word or lemma or uses thereof. - The question how many lemmas are represented by the homophonous but not homographic Knighton and Niton should in principle be decided on in favor of speech. However, even then we can argue we are dealing with homophonous lemmas which have nothing to do with each other. The reverse situation holds when one written form is pronounced differently. For instance, Houghton is pronounced differently according to the place it refers to, and hence, is a different lemma each time, and a fortiori, a different proper name. Note that at least well known propriallemmas like John or Mary are found in many ordinary dictionaries, just like appellative lemmas. In the light of this, it is not clear what Levelt (1989: 196) means by a 'propernoun lemma': as it is defined there, it looks as if it is not a lemma in the sense proposed here but rather a proper name in its primary function (see also below). Richard Coates (personal communication). Jespersen (1924: 69) writes: "Linguistically it is utterly impossible to draw a sharp line of demarcation between proper names and common names." Compare Jackendoff (1983: 29), who states: "the information conveyed by language must be about the projected world", i.e. "the world as unconsciously organized by the mind." The thesis of the meaninglessness of proper names had already been put forward by the Early Modems of Port-Royal in their Grammaire (11, 3) and

328

21.

22.

23.

24.

25.

26. 27.

28. 29.

30.

Notes

Logique (I, 6), who also connected proper names to concepts that represent single objects. The meaninglessness thesis has likewise been propounded by quite a few linguists, among them already Gardiner (1940; 1957: 43), Leys (1965), Trost (1965), Sciarone (1967: 86), Hilgemann (1974: 382). Buyssens (1973: 27) argues: "I' extension du prenom Jean ne se Iimite pas a un individu ... " (the extension of the forename Jean' John' is not limited to one individual). Buyssens might, however, run into difficulties since he does not have such a notion as 'proprial lemma', which becomes indispensable if one holds a thesis like his (see above). In the same vein, Quine (1974: 229) regards proper names as predicates 'in their own right', combined with quantified variables, e.g., Aristotle = there is an x that 'aristotles'. For a recent variant of the RusseIlian thesis, see D'Cruz (2000). Although he could not know about prototypes at that time (1924), for Jespersen (1924: 68) this situation was an argument to see no essential differences between proper and common nouns. Kleiber (2004) mentions some French works that adhere to the meaninglessness thesis: Molino (1982), Recanati (1983), Conrad (1985), Jonasson (1994). It should be added that Molino (1982: 19) situates proper names in between common nouns and pronouns. This position comes close to my own; see below. - A recent voluminous all encompassing French work is Vaxelaire (2005). Buyssens (1973: 27) argues in the same vein: "Ce qui caracterise le nom propre, c'est que son emploi est regIe par un fait social, la presentation." (What characterizes proper names is that their use is settled by a social fact, the presentation). For a recent generative criticism of the notion of 'rigid designator', see Karnowski and Pafel (2005). Jespersen (1924: 66) writes: "In Mill's terminology, but in absolute contrast to his view, I should venture to say that proper names (as actually used) 'connote' the greatest number of attributes." For further comments, see Schwarz (1979: 133), and more recently Kleiber (2004: 121), but see Recanati (1997: 155-167). For instance, Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary, a 'general dictionary', in which "information about English words is likely to be sought", mentions a number of culturally relevant names, e.g., names like John, Mary, Lohengrin, Atlantis, the Great Bear, month names, trademarks, and so on, scattered amidst other words. The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary mentions names as lemmas as well as some proper names corresponding to the lemmas, e.g., Mary: 1) female forename; 2) mother of Jesus. Compare Recanati's (1997: 181-189) section \0.5 on proper names and encyclopedia entries.

Notes

329

31. A similar defense of his version of the X called Y theory is provided by Recanati (1997: 157), where he holds that not the content, but "the character of Socrates is constituted by the concept 'bearer of Socrates'." 32. Nevertheless, Katz (2001: 159) speaks of " ... attributive uses of a description to fix the bearer of a name ... " 33. For an experiential interpretation of genericness, see chapter 2, 3.2.4. 34. A similar distinction is made by Soames (2002), who equates the meaning of genuine proper names with their referent. Improper (impure) names are called 'partially descriptive' proper names. 35. Katz (2001: 158) himself gives a hint where he recognizes that "it seems reasonable to say that Ivan the Terrible bears his name even in old age when he is too feeble to strike fear in anyone." 36. Mr Bean's name is not translated in most languages, but it is in Polish: Fasola. 37. Katz's distinction reminds us of Gardiner's (1940) dichotomy between 'pure' and 'impure' proper names. 38. See also Corazza (2002), where it is argued that, contrary to appearances, "description-names" (e.g., The Roman Empire, The Beatles, The Holy Virgin) do conform to Millianism, i.e. the view that proper names are directly referential expressions, referring regardless of whether the relevant individual satisfies some associated description. 39. This view is by no means new: the Ancient Greeks invented the term onoma kyrion 'proper noun', i.e. the best example of a noun. 40. As for the syntactic status, NPs are sometimes defined in terms of proper names. Thus, Creissels (1991: 41-42) states that "le terme de 'constituant nominal' ... est utilise ici pour designer, independamment de sa structure interne, tout fragment de phrase qui apparait comme syntaxiquement equivalent a un nom propre de personne." (the term 'noun phrase' ... is used here to designate, independently of its internal structure, any sentence fragment that appears to be syntactically equivalent to a personal proper name). This implies not only that personal names are considered the prototypical proper names but also that proper names are thought of as the pro1Dtypical NPs. 41. The above discussion reveals a conflict between two forms of iconicity in Langacker's work: isomorphism and motivation (Van Langendonck 2004). As Kleiber (1993: 121) argues, such conflicts can be expected in a framework of generalized isomorphism. Kleiber adduces the example of the adjective: Langacker's (1987: 216) analysis of adjectives as relational predicates (like verbs) goes against the iconicity of motivation since the landmark of adjectives is in fact never expressed. 42. Langacker (2004: 80) seems to argue differently: "... each individual of a certain sort... is associated with a unique symbolizing expression... The type/instance distinction is thereby neutralized, for each instance represents its own type with no other instances." Should this mean that the sort is something

330

43. 44.

45.

46.

47.

48.

49.

50.

Notes

different than the type? Anyway, it is not clear to me what both terms stand for. This distinction is also overlooked by neurolinguists such as Bayer and Semenza (see section 6). The choice of the term 'cognitive' is unfortunate since Hansack's cognitivist framework has little to do with Cognitive Linguistics as initiated by Ronald Langacker and others. At the same time, there are some resemblances: a view that comes close to the adoption of mental referents, and the adoption of the maximum meaningfulness thesis. Hansack (2000: 105,216) and Brendler (2005: 104) explain: "Bei der Rezeption des Namens wird die indizierte Bedeutung als Begriff ins Bewusstsein projiziert" (At the reception of the name, the indicated meaning is projected into conscience as a concept). One should distinguish, indeed, between 'class meaning', as in Beavers are extinct I The beaver is extinct, and recursiveness, as in Beavers build dams. At the same time, the two can be combined, as in Beavers are dying out. See especially chapter 2,3.2.4. Harweg (1997) has a similar notion, which he calls Sockel 'socle' (pedestal). Proper names display such basic meanings as 'person', 'masculine', 'place', 'city', etc. Buyssens (1973: 26) argues as follows: "le nom propre sert a distinguer certains des individus qui ont le meme nom commun. Par exemple, Jean sert a distinguer certains des individus qui sont des ignes par le nom commun homme; de meme, Alice sert a distinguer certains des individus qui sont designes par le nom communfemme." (proper names serve to distinguish certain individuals who share the same general name. For example, Jean' John' is to distinguish certain individuals designated by the common noun homme 'man'; likewise, Alice is to distinguish certain individuals designated by the common nounfemme 'woman'). In chapter 2, I will elaborate on this structuralist distinction between loose appositional constructions (with interchangeable units separated by a comma break) and close appositional constructions (with a rather fixed structure and without a comma break, e.g., the poet Burns, Fido the dog, the City of London). Arguing in terms of type and token, and referring to J.M. Carroll, Levelt (1989: 196) hesitates: "Each proper-noun lemma specifies a conceptual token; the conceptual specification need be no more than a pointer to the token's address in memory. Examples of proper names are Mount Everest, Hans Brinker, and World War ll. It may well be, however, that a proper name is not purely referential but has additional intentional features as well. It is, for instance, unlikely for Mount Everest to be a war, or World War 11 to be a moUll-

Notes

51.

52.

53.

54.

55. 56.

57.

58. 59.

60.

331

tain. There is usually some type information in the kind of name given to a token." For some onomasticians, the wealth of all kinds of connotations in names is a reason to proclaim onomastics an independent discipline (thus Snlmek 1991: 77-78). In the same vein: Boesch (1957: 32, concerning German), Debus (1980: 194, concerning German), Nicolaisen (1995: 391, concerning English); see also chapter 1, section 3.2.2.4. Snimek (1991) emphasizes what I call the pragmatic component (the functioning of names), but this seems to be a consequence of the opinion that pragmatics does not belong to linguistics. In my view, the three components are of a linguistic nature and indissolubly linked together. For his claim that proper names have no meaning, Sciarone (1967) adduces the fact that proper names are not translatable. However, this criterion applies on the level of the propriallemma rather than on the eve I of the 'proper name' in its proprial function. It seems that it is proprial lemmas rather than proper names that are not translatable, even in an appellative function, e.g., another Clinton, a different Blair, a second Washington, etc. By contrast, certain proper names without a specific proprial lemma can be translated, e.g., der Schwarzwaldl the Black Forest/ het Zwarte Woudl la Fore! Noire, etc. However, matters are still more complicated than that: certain well known proprial lemmas are translated, e.g., John! Jan! Jean, London! Londen! Londres, etc. Thus, it turns out that in this matter, too, it appears to be important to distinguish between 'proper name' and 'propriallemma'. Kempson (1977: 14) argues that "at the very least ... a semantic account of proper names should not be like that of other words." Dobnig-liilch (1977: 47) rightly criticizes Wimmer (1973), who regards the name-giving act as a referential speech act instead of an illocutionary act. She does, however, not want to go into the question to what subclass of illocutionary act this name-giving belongs. Coates (2005c: 3) states: "Proper names may be created either by evolution or by bestowal." However, he goes on to speak of an 'act of onymization' for both cases. I could agree with the idea of a 'process of onymization'. However, I cannot see a genuine naming act in the case of a gradual evolution from appellative to proper name. In his philosophical framework, Recanati (1997: 141) uses the notion of 'name type', which is akin to that of 'propriallemma'. For the lack of this notion, Kripke (1972: 8) has considerable difficulty in dealing with multidenotative names. For a criticism, see Katz (2001: 148156). See also chapter 3, 3.1.4: Trade and brand names.

332

Notes

61. From Dolly Parton's My life and other unfinished business. New York: Harper, 1994, p. 184. 62. For aphasia in the realm of word categories, see Yamadori and Albert (1973). 63. A psycholinguistic collection of articles on proper names can be found in the journal Memory 1/4,1993. 64. Bayer raises the additional question why the correct name cannot be triggered externally, i.e. via the identification of the referent itself. That could certainly be expected in the case of her father's name. The reason for the failure is that the patient has an additional disorder which not only renders reading proper names impossible but also naming by means of proper names difficult. 65. Additionally, the familiarity of names did not influence the difficulty of retrieval in the arbitrary condition where accessibility was equivalent for common names and less commonly used names. 66. According to Croft (1990) this goes for the whole grammar. 67. For a recent generative account, I refer the reader to the thematic issue on proper names in Zeitschriji fiir Sprachwissenschaji 2411, especially the introduction by Gallmann and Neef (2005). See also Longobardi (1994). 68. French does not appear to have this possibility, at least not the combination of demonstrative plus proper name (cf. Kleiber 1991; Jonasson 1994; GaryPrieur 1994). 69. For such uses in French, see Kleiber (1994: chapter 4). 70. To my knowledge, the importance of the appositional structure for the analysis of proper names has not so far been recognized. Gary-Prieur (1994: 84-86, 239-240) mentions appositional structures with French proper names, but does not go into them. Anderson (2004: 462) adduces apposition in the context of name-giving (e.g., the name (of) Ermintrude). 71. The expressive pattern of the form that Burns fellow is left out of consideration: it is not an appositional structure and the article is impossible: *the Burns fellow. 72. It is possible, however, that such expressions as thela president have a characterizing function. In this case they will be put in second position. 73. Meyer's (1992: 41) definition ofa 'central' appositional construction seems to be intended only for loose appositions since his criteria almost never apply to close appositions. 74. Such syntagms as the possibility of a recession seem to be cases of postmodification rather than of apposition (Meyer 1992: 50). Further evidence for this analysis is the appearance of the article a in the second unit in contrast with real appositional structures like the notion of soul. In the last case, Dutch does not even exhibit a marker: de notie ziel, whereas in the first case, there is a literal translation: de mogelijkheid van een recessie. Semantically, there is no coreference in this pattern, as is indicated by the awkwardness of the paraphrase: ?*die mogelijkheid is een recessie I ?*that possibility is a recession,

Notes

75. 76. 77. 78.

79. 80.

81.

82.

83.

84.

333

while we could say: die notie is 'ziel' / that notion is 'soul '. For such clausal appositions as in the idea that... I would like to refer to Heyvaert (200 I: 312) and (2003), who, following Van Langendonck's (1999b) theory of names, consistently considers the second element in the fact that and the fact of constructions as appositions and even as proper names. Patterns of the form a man like Garret! (M 88) are semantically and syntactically quite different from standard close appositions, especially because of the lexical load of the relator like, and will not concern us here. In articleless languages, we could simply speak of determinerless appositional structures; compare Polish: miasto Krak6w 'the City of Cracow'. In Meyer's (1992: 85) corpora, this concerns a "quite rare type." An example of a non-count categorizer can be found in: the wine Bordeaux. The only exception seems to be the title The Seven Drunken Knights. However, the article the here is not meant as a determiner that subcategorizes titles; rather, it happens to be part of the title. See also below. Note that Meyer's 'appellation' has nothing to do with my 'appellative' (= common noun). In Dutch, coordination appears to be necessary to remedy the construction with the first appositive metal: de metalen goud en zilver 'the metals gold and silver' In connection with the above appositional structures, it should be remarked that their relative infrequency is obviously due to the technical nature of their content. Frege's argument runs as follows: the number one is a unique object; there is no plural. That there is a certain sense in it cannot bother Frege since he accepts a Sinn in proper names (cf. chapter 1, 3.2.1.2). The same applies to German, e.g., die Stadt Bochum 'the City of Bochum'. Remarkably, Harweg (1997: 101) considers such an appositional structure to be one single proprial unit containing a non-genuine proper name. In this way, however, apposition cannot be used any more as a criterion for propernamehood. I will not go into this rather far-fetched complication. It looks as if proper names can take modifiers in apposition, e.g., Meneer Peeters vanuit het dorp 'Mister Peeters from the village'. However, the prepositional phrase vanuit het dorp does not modify the proper name by itself but the entire appositional structure since it can appear after a comma break: Meneer Peeters, vanuit het dorp. - On the other hand, such appellative patterns as de heer voorzitter 'mister chairman' do not pose a problem since voorzitter cannot function on its own. The term 'byname' will be used in the following chapters as a technical term for 'unofficial name', which includes the usual 'nickname'.

334

Notes

85. In case the appellative appositive functions as an epithet, we find it as second element in both languages, e.g., Filix le Chat, Felix de Kat. It seems clear, however, that the epithet must be treated as a 'byname', hence as a proper name (cf. chapter 3). 86. It seems to me that not 'person' but 'man' and 'woman' are basic level terms for humans. Perceptually, we will meet or see a man or a woman rather than just a person. Socially and psychologically, it is of importance to know the gender of a person one encounters. The situation is totally different in the case of animals. As a rule, the sex of the animal is much less important for the average person who meets with an animal. See also below for neurolinguistic evidence. 87. Coincidentally, I came across both of the patterns lane the person and the person lane in a neutral scientific context in La Palme Reyes et at. (1993: 441). 88. That is why the utterance Carla is coming tonight was misunderstood as referring to a woman instead of to a tornado (see above). 89. Note that French does not distinguish between these subcategories (compare: le ministre Badinter 'Minister Badinter', le professeur Dupont 'Professor Dupont') except that general titles such as Monsieur, Madame and Mademoiselle do not take the article, e.g., Madame de Pompadour. In written Dutch, it is becoming fashionable to omit the article, e.g., diplomaat Van Dijck '(the) diplomat Van Dijck'. 90. In Dutch, the diminutivized noun plaatsje 'little place' can function as first appositive in combination with names of small villages, e.g., het plaatsje Zutendaal, but then plaatsje means in fact 'small settlement'. 91. Richard Coates (personal communication) could accept restrictive modification without an article in a sentence like Mary (that) I was courting wouldn't let me kiss her but Mary (that) I married would, where Mary is in both cases the same individual. 92. A similar observation can be made with regard to the direct object of such verbs as elect. As Dahl (1975) observes, a sentence like They elected the president is ambiguous. In one reading it means that a new president was elected; in another that the president, say Mr Vance, was elected man of the year or so. Only this last reading is to be found in the sentence They elected Vance, in which Vance is a proper name, hence a non-predicational NP. 93. McCawley's (1968: 144) generative semantic rule ran as follows: "There is a transformation which obligatorily collapses the conjoined subject the employees and the employees into a single occurrence of the employees." 94. It seems we have to exclude generic NPs from the argument since such patterns as in A bank and a bank are two different things are apparently possible. Indeed, the subject NP cannot be collapsed here: *Banks are two different things. But see below.

Notes

335

95. At first sight, the philosopher Surge (1973: 432) seems to come close to such an analysis where he says that "singular unmodified proper names ... have the same semantical structure as the phrase 'that book' ", regarding them as predicates combined with "free variables which represent demonstratives" (p. 439), e.g., Aristotle = that x that 'aristotles'. Thus, Surge recognizes the deictic character of proper names but fails to see the so-called predicate as a presuppositional categorical sense. See also Soer's (1975) reaction. A recent review is Segal (2002). 96. Lyons (1999: 20, 22, 121, 197, chapter 4) seems to hesitate. Although proper nouns show the general behavior of definite NPs (see also hereafter), they are argued to be indefinite in English. Their definite behavior is said to come from the fact that they are a kind of generics. For me, genericness is different from propriality, though combinable with it (see below). 97. That this fixed determiner in names such as the Nile is a real and not a fossilized article was argued at length for English by Seppanen (1971). The main argument for this claim is that article and name can be separated by other premodifiers of the name, as in the beautiful Nile. A similar argument goes for Dutch (see Leys 1965). See also chapter 1, 2.1; chapter 2, 2. 98. Kleiber (1992) defends the uniqueness aspect of definiteness against Sperber and Wilson's ideas derived from their relevance theory. 99. Gary-Prieur (1994) and Jonasson (1994) deal extensively with the use of the article with French proper names. As for English, Coates (2006: fn. 22) states: "some obscure names keep the article", a view that few linguists will endorse. 100. In some Norwegian dialects, the abbreviated definite article 'n can be postposed when a demonstrative is present, as in denne Halvor 'n (Hilgemann 1978: 71). 10 1. Gruber (1967: 28) analyzes collectivity as a plurality that is felt as a unity. Gardiner (1957: 23) had already analyzed in this way formally singular proper names like France, meaning the French in utterances of the form France appointed the new ambassador. - Richard Coates (personal communication) could more or less accept sentences like The widely-scattered Philippines constitute an independent republic. Such cases might undo the proprial character of the name. I would have serious problems with the Dutch translation ?*De ruim verspreide Filipijnen vormen een onafhankelijke republiek. 102. Usually, 'generic' is equated with 'habitual' (or something similar) in the case of verbs; thus Langacker (1991: 208). Declerck (1991) argues for a pragmatic account of genericness phenomena. For Geurts (1985), generics express 'stereotypical assumptions'. In general, this may be right, but this property of 'generics' seems to be a natural consequence of their recursive nature. For recent overviews of genericness, see Cohen (1999); Gretnberg (2003). 103. "Hydronyms do have an augment in Rwanda, which is an interesting equivalent to European languages such as French and Dutch, in which names for riv-

336

Notes

ers contain a definite article" (Van de Velde 2003). The marked status of hydronyms and other inanimate proper names is discussed in chapter 3,2.4. 104. Vandelanotte and Willemse (2002: 21-22) argue, however, that constructions with a certain, as in a certain Mireille, do contain a genuine proper name (against Kleiber 1991: 83; Van Langendonck 1999c: 494). Their argument is that "the speaker does have a fully identified person in mind, but indicates that the person referred to is not very familiar to the speaker... ". However, the fact that one has a fully identified person in mind in using an NP does not guarantee the noun's proper-namehood, e.g., the NP a certain lady may well refer to a specific person (one is not familiar with), but does not contain a proper name. And as argued above, the syntactic possibility of there-insertion in certain-constructions suggests their appellative status. This is also suggested by Dobnig-JU\Ch (1977: 85-86), where she paraphrases ein Paul Muller in the German sentence ein Paul Muller hat angerufen 'a certain Paul Muller has called' as "ein Mann mit Namen ... " 'a man called .. .'. Finally, textlinguistically, sentences with proprial as well as appellative lemmas preceded by a certain cause ilI-formedness in a text such as *A certain Andersonl gentleman came here, and Andersonl gentleman changed everything, unless a demonstrative is added to the second occurrence of the lemma: A certain Andersonl gentleman came here, and this Andersonl this gentleman changed everything. 105. For the notion of submanifestation (or subindividual), see Dabl (1975). 106. As is pointed out in Vandelanotte and Willemse (2002: 22), these certainconstructions are limited to names of people: *She lives in a (certain) Trenton. (vs. She lives in a place... called Trenton). This squares well with the fact that in general there are more constructions with the (unmarked) feature 'human' than with other (marked) features. 107. It seems that patterns of the type A de Gaulle would have reacted differently and That idiot of a John! are rather infrequent in English, though not impossible (Keith Carlon, personal communication). - There-insertion is excluded in the construction that idiot of a John for the independent reason that a John is not a subject in it. 108. In Polish, a simple appositional structure is used, e.g., ten idiota Jan 'that idiot John'. 109. Note that the notion of 'appellative proper name' as such has been rejected here (chapter 1, l.2). 110. "So-called mass terms like 'water', 'footwear', and 'red' have the semantical property of referring cumulatively: any sum of parts which are water is water" (Quine 1960: 91). Ill. For Dutch first name patterns and their evolution, see Gerritzen (1994, 1998a&b, 1998-1999) and Gerritzen et al. (1999). 112. In Australia the family name seems to be used first.

Notes

337

113. Roelandts (1966) provides a wealth of morphological data on first names in Flemish dialects. 114. Especially in former times, a farmer's family could include servants, who were given the name of the family. 115. Compare Danish Hansen (individual byname) vs. Hansen-s (family name) (Dalberg 1993: 69). 116. In Australia, males address each other by their family names to express 'solidarity' and 'friendship' (mixed with 'teasing' elements). [Kristin Davidse, personal communication] 117. Note, however, that (the) French can also be used in appellative functions, e.g., / saw a few French. It is typical that the reverse does not hold: Frenchman/-men can function only in an appellative mode. This is apparently due again to the unmarked status of proper names, entailing that their use can extend to neighboring categories. Of course, a distinction like the one between French and Frenchman is far from being systematic for all names of nationalities. 118. I wish to thank here the audience of the XIXth International Congress of Onomastic Sciences (1996) for their valuable comments on an earlier version of this section, as well as John Field, Margaret Gelling, Jean Germain, Zofia Kaleta and Beatrice Lamiroy for their help in judging place name forms occurring in the languages discussed here. 119. In toponymy, the term 'minor names' is used for names of fields, swamps, streets, etc., i.e. small places which are not normally inh