Theory and Practice of Logic-Based Therapy: Integrating Critical Thinking and Philosophy Into Psychotherapy 1443850535, 9781443850537

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Theory and Practice of Logic-Based Therapy

Theory and Practice of Logic-Based Therapy: Integrating Critical Thinking and Philosophy into Psychotherapy

By

Elliot D. Cohen, PhD

Theory and Practice of Logic-Based Therapy: Integrating Critical Thinking and Philosophy into Psychotherapy By Elliot D. Cohen, PhD This book first published 2013 Cambridge Scholars Publishing 12 Back Chapman Street, Newcastle upon Tyne, NE6 2XX, UK British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Copyright © 2013 by Elliot D. Cohen, PhD All rights for this book reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the copyright owner. ISBN (10): 1-4438-5053-5, ISBN (13): 978-1-4438-5053-7

TABLE OF CONTENTS Preface ...................................................................................................... vii Introduction ............................................................................................... ix What is Logic-Based Therapy? Part I: Theory and Practice of LBT Chapter One ................................................................................................ 2 LBT Basics Chapter Two ............................................................................................. 18 The Process of LBT Chapter Three ........................................................................................... 41 Emotional Reasoning Templates in Multilevel Reasoning Chapter Four ............................................................................................. 53 Exercising Willpower in LBT Part II: The Cardinal Fallacies Chapter Five ............................................................................................. 72 Demanding Perfection, Bandwagon Reasoning, and The-World-RevolvesAround-Me Thinking Chapter Six ............................................................................................... 88 Damning and Manipulative Reasoning Chapter Seven......................................................................................... 102 Catastrophic Reasoning and Dutiful Worrying Chapter Eight .......................................................................................... 114 Can’tstipation Chapter Nine........................................................................................... 125 The Inductive Fallacies

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Table of Contents

Part III: The Transcendent Virtues Chapter Ten ............................................................................................ 144 LBT’s Positive Psychology Chapter Eleven ....................................................................................... 154 The Behavioral and Emotional Virtues Chapter Twelve ....................................................................................... 177 The Inductive Virtues Index ....................................................................................................... 186

PREFACE This book represents the latest development of the theory and practice of the philosophical counseling and psychotherapeutic modality called Logic-Based Therapy (LBT). It is intended to provide a practitioners’ guide for psychotherapists (e.g., mental health counselors, psychologists, clinical social workers) who want to implement a highly philosophical approach to therapy, as well as for philosophical counselors who seek a systematic and well articulated approach to philosophical counseling. Part 1 develops the five steps of the LBT process, with careful attention to configuring counselees’ behavioral and emotional reasoning. For the latter purpose, it also provides behavioral and emotional reasoning templates, which provide the structural components of many of the selfdefeating inferences flagged by an LBT analysis. Emphasis is also placed on the significance of promoting counselee disclosure and the modeling of virtue through counselors’ showing of empathy and authenticity in relating to the counselee. In addition, Part 1 provides a separate chapter on the exercise of willpower, developing both Aristotelian (teleological) and Kantian (deontological) methods for helping counselees overcome the inertia of their irrational inclinations. Part 2 examines each of LBT’s eleven Cardinal Fallacies and their relationships, for example, between bandwagon reasoning and the demand for approval. It also includes analyses of key concepts, such as the “must” in the demand for perfection. It further examines the relationship between particular emotions and specific sets of fallacies, for example, guilt in relation to catastrophic thinking and the demand for certainty. Treatments of each Cardinal Fallacy include examples of significant philosophical antidotes for overcoming the fallacy, for example, Niezsche’s idea of selfempowerment to address the self-stultifying demand for approval of others. Part 3 discusses the major aspects of LBT’s “positive psychology”; examines, in turn, each of LBT’s transcendent virtues; and shows how these virtues comprise an interconnected network for transcending faulty thinking and cultivating virtuous habits. It includes a separate chapter on the virtues that transcend fallacies rooted in the major premise rules of counselees’ practical reasoning, as well as a chapter on the inductive virtues, which transcend inductive fallacies rooted in counselees’ empirical minor premises.

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This book sums up and expands upon almost three decades of research and development of LBT. It is intended to help facilitate both comprehension and application of its theory. In keeping with LBT’s practical bent, insofar as this book assists practitioners in helping their counselees to better manage their life problems and to do and feel better, it will have accomplished its main purpose. The convergence of LBT with Cognitive-Behavior Therapy (CBT) should be evident to readers who are trained in conventional psychotherapeutic modalities. This convergence is due to the profound influence that the late great Albert Ellis, inventor of CBT, has had on the direction of research and development of LBT. But, as this book shows, there are features of LBT that uniquely mark it out as a unique, highly philosophical modality, such as its use of practical syllogistic logic, its virtue-oriented, Aristotelian nature, and its use of diverse philosophical theories to systematically overcome, transcend, and redirect counselees’ Cardinal Fallacies toward their respective virtues. The theory and practice of LBT will, predictably, continue to mature beyond its current status with the support of those devoted to its advancement, such as my colleague and friend, Dr. Samuel Zinaich, Jr., who has devoted the greater part of his professional life to promoting and fostering the principles and practice of LBT through his scholarly activities and training of new LBT counselors. As new generations of practitioners and underwriters of LBT emerge (in this context I’d especially like to acknowledge my assistant, Marisa Diaz-Waian) I am rationally hopeful that LBT will continue to flourish and gain high prominence in the 21st Century—and beyond.

INTRODUCTION WHAT IS LOGIC-BASED THERAPY? Logic-Based Therapy (LBT) is a variant of the theory of psychotherapy known as Rational-Emotive Behavior Therapy (REBT).1 It is also a leading modality of “philosophical practice” (or “philosophical counseling”). The keynote of the theory is that counselees disturb themselves emotionally and behaviorally by deducing self-defeating, unrealistic conclusions from irrational premises in their practical reasoning. LBT accordingly provides the critical thinking tools for constructing counselees’ faulty reasoning; identifying and refuting its irrational premises; and constructing philosophically enlightened antidotes to these premises, guided by a corresponding set of “transcendent virtues” such as respect (of self, other, and the world), metaphysical security, courage, and temperance. Like its psychotherapeutic parent, REBT, it also emphasizes making behavioral changes in order to overcome irrational tendencies and cultivate virtuous habits. The theory and practice of LBT has been steadily developing ever since I began work on it in the mid-1980’s. Today, it has a worldwide following, from East to West, by both mental health counselors (especially cognitive-behaviorists) and philosophical counselors. Books and articles on LBT have been translated into a number of languages including Italian, German, Chinese, and Korean. Research, development, and training in LBT are ongoing through the Institute of Critical Thinking: National Center for Logic-Based Therapy,2 which I founded in 1985. The theory began with the idea that many debilitating and selfdefeating emotional and behavioral problems may largely be the result of bad logic. I wondered how many marriages went awry from the commission of faulty thinking errors; how many familial dysfunctions amid self-defeating bouts with anxiety, depression, anger and guilt were fueled by conclusions that could never pass philosophical muster. Yet the treatment of behavioral and emotional problems was exclusively the province of the psychologist, not the philosopher. At the same time, training in logic and philosophical analysis was not typically part of the training of psychologists.

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Notwithstanding the conventional wisdom of the time, which held that philosophers do not venture outside the classroom to set up clinical practices, I set out, under the supervision of a licensed clinical psychologist, to test my hypothesis by treating counselees with logic and philosophy. In so doing, I found people torturing themselves through the commission of reasoning errors that could have been flagged by students of philosophy 101. Prior to starting my clinical work, I had become aware of a modality of cognitive-behavioral psychotherapy that started with a similar hypothesis as my own, that is, that behavioral and emotional problems are rooted in irrational thinking. The theory in question was (then) known as RationalEmotive Therapy (RET),3 which had been developed by psychologist Albert Ellis beginning more than three decades before my own work began. In 1985, I became certified in RET under Dr. Ellis. This marked the beginning of a close professional relationship and friendship I had with him, which lasted more than two decades until his death in August 2007. As such, from its inception, LBT was developed in the light of REBT and, consistent with Dr. Ellis’ own teachings and theorizing, rejected the traditional dichotomization of philosophy and psychotherapy. Nevertheless, there are still some philosophical practitioners who maintain that philosophical and psychological counseling are distinct fields.4 However, this view fails to fully appreciate the reciprocal, substantive, intrinsic relationship between philosophical and psychological counseling. The bifurcation between philosophical counseling and psychotherapy appears to trade on the mistaken assumption that, because philosophy and psychology are themselves independent fields, that philosophical counseling must also be independent. This is a fallacy of composition, however. Philosophy is an aspect of philosophical counseling but it is not itself philosophical counseling. What’s true of the part is not necessarily true of the whole. Philosophy is an input into philosophical counseling. The latter is a hybrid discipline, a form of counseling that uses philosophical methods and theories. It is not “pure” philosophy, but instead “applied” philosophy. In its application it becomes psychological. It is philosophical psychological therapy, not just philosophy. A viable psychotherapy must address the wide range of emotional and behavioral problems with which humans grapple. It must be grounded in a comprehensive theory that systematically explains the connections between cognition, emotion, and behavior; it must provide a set of tools— techniques, skills, etc.—that permits application of the theory; and it must be validated empirically. The history of clinical psychology can boast of its strides in this realm, whereas philosophy in the form of philosophical

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counseling has only begun to test these waters in any systematic way. How haughty is it to suppose that philosophers need not call upon the wisdom of psychology while claiming to apply the “wisdom of the ages.” On the other hand, it is equally unrealistic to deny the philosophical roots of psychology and psychotherapy. To give just some historically significant examples, Plato’s tripartite division of the soul provided fodder for Freud’s famous distinction between Id, Ego and Superego. Freud’s view regarding human behaviour (i.e., that there were never any accidents) reflected his thorough commitment to the philosophical theory of determinism (the view that all human behavior can be explained scientifically). Within this philosophical framework, Freud launched his psychoanalytic theory, which made unconscious motivation the source of psychological maladjustment, and which, in turn, provided a litany of psychoanalytic tools to apply the theory, including ego defense mechanisms (especially repression), transference, counter-transference, resistance, dream interpretation, and free association. In concert with Freud’s deterministic philosophy, the classical behaviorists (notably B. F. Skinner) proclaimed that human subjectivity— thoughts, desires, hopes, etc.—was merely a by-product of biological processes, which had no efficacy in determining human behavior. Instead this theory sought to explain human behavior as an effect of the environment. Relegating free will and human responsibility to myths, it defended a science of behavior control as a practical and prudent goal. Various techniques for “conditioning” behavior were accordingly devised in an effort to apply the theory. Person-Centered Therapy began with the “humanistic” philosophical assumption that there was a forward-moving, positive, human nature that tended toward actualization unless thwarted by inadequate relationships with significant others and peers. The theory accordingly set out to define the attitudinal conditions that therapists needed to bring to the therapeutic relationship in order to help unleash this positive potential in their clients. Negating both behavioral and humanistic assumptions, Existential Therapy declared that there was no human nature whatsoever and that human beings instead defined their own nature through their own freely chosen courses of action. Accordingly, this form of therapy sought to encourage clients to stand up to their anxieties about making choices, to live authentically without hiding behind deterministic philosophies, and to take responsibility for their lives and what they made of themselves. Cognitive-behavioral approaches, including Transactional Analysis, Cognitive-Behavior Therapy (CBT) and Rational-Emotive Behavior Therapy (REBT), among others, brought forth a mixed bag of

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philosophical assumptions. These theories stressed the importance of human subjectivity (cognition) in interpreting reality and in responding to it. Borrowing from ancient Stoic philosophy, especially that of Epictetus, it declared that it was not events in people’s lives that upset them but rather their interpretation of them. As in Existential Therapy, human beings were perceived as having the ability to define themselves through their actions, but they were also creatures with certain biological natures that largely defined their behavioral and emotional tendencies. Like Existential Therapy, human beings retained the power to exercise free will, make choices, and to take responsibility in controlling emotions and actions in the face of life exigencies. Along with behaviorists, these theories maintained the efficacy of a set of behavioral techniques ranging from role-playing to various forms of “operant” conditioning in helping to reinforce rational choices and in overcoming irrational tendencies. The bifurcation of philosophical from psychological practice therefore overlooks their complimentary roles. On the one hand, philosophical practice can be informed psychologically by its incorporation of the tools and distinctions that psychological practitioners have devised and tested. For example, LBT accepts the ideas of providing behavioral assignments, rational-emotive imagery, and bibliotherapy, which are commonly utilized in other cognitive-behavior psychotherapeutic approaches.5 And it accepts the Person-Centered ideas that counselors should be empathetic, unconditionally positive regarding, and congruent.6 In fact, LBT embraces empathy as one of its “transcendent virtues.”7 Philosophers who attempt to carve out their own professional turf without seeking the aid of their psychological brothers and sisters are likely to re-invent the wheel and to slow the progress of philosophical counseling. On the other hand, philosophical practitioners who have taken the work of psychological practitioners seriously, and have accepted their complementary natures, may have a good deal to add to psychological practice in the way of making it even more philosophical than it already is. This is where LBT makes its important contributions, not only to philosophical practice, but also to psychotherapy. LBT enhances cognitive-behavioral psychotherapy with a more comprehensive, finely tuned set of informal fallacies, in its taxonomy of Cardinal Fallacies (from jumping on the bandwagon to post hoc reasoning), which undergird many behavioral and emotional problems, from anxiety and depression to self-stultifying life decisions and dysfunctional relationships. LBT counselors also make abundant and systematic use of the formal methods of philosophical thinking—examination of counselees’

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arguments, analysis of key concepts, examination of underlying assumptions, etc. What marks these activities out as distinctively philosophical is that they focus primarily on the justification of beliefs as distinct from their causal etiology. As will be discussed in the next chapter, these methods of “critical thinking” provide standards of rational inference and decision-making. A person who makes practical decisions based on vague concepts, unjustified assumptions, inconsistencies, and lack of evidence is likely to make regrettable decisions and experience behavioral and emotional discomfort. This is as true in ordinary life as it is in scientific research. The history of human failures in virtually all spheres of inquiry and action are testimonial to this fact. LBT also systematically utilizes the wisdom of the ages imbedded in the great philosophers (e.g., Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, Epicurus, St. Thomas Aquinas, Descartes, Locke, Hume, Kant, Nietzsche, Heidegger, Sartre, Schopenhauer, to name just a few) to construct potent “antidotes” to each of the Cardinal Fallacies. This goes beyond consistently applying a psychological modality or tool based on a single philosophical theory. For example, while REBT adheres to Epictetus’ teachings by expecting counselees to distinguish between their irrational belief about an event (e.g., the thought that what happened was terrible, horrible, and awful) and the event itself (e.g., getting divorced), LBT brings many other philosophical ideas to bear on the counselee’s circumstances. Moreover, as developed in this book, LBT is the only philosophical form of therapy that systematically uses different philosophical theories as rational antidotes to overcome different faulty thinking errors. Further, in contrast to traditional modalities of cognitive-behavioral psychotherapy, LBT integrates a theory of “transcendent virtues,” which it utilizes to give counselees positive direction beyond merely overcoming particular faulty thinking errors. In devising this theory, LBT incorporates many ideas from Aristotle’s theory of virtues such as his analysis of prudential reasoning and his theory of incontinence. Finally, LBT systematically unifies the aforementioned components into a five-step process,8 which LBT counselors can use to help their counselees address their problems of living. Beginning with the first chapter, this book develops LBT’s five-steps and shows how it can be applied in a clinical context. It should therefore give guidance to both psychotherapists and philosophical counselors who wish to use LBT in their clinical practices.

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Notes 1

I have in fact elsewhere called it “The New Rational Therapy.” See Elliot D. Cohen, The New Rational Therapy (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2007). 2 See the website of the Institute of Critical Thinking: National Center for LogicBased Therapy, at www.instituteofcriticalthinking.com. 3 Subsequently changed to Rational-Emotive Behavior Therapy (REBT) in 1993. 4 See, for example, Gerd B. Achenbach, Philosophy, Philosophical Practice, and Psychotherapy,” in Essays on Philosophical Counseling, ed. Ran Lahav and Maria Da Venza Tillmanns (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1995), 63-74. 5 See Chapter 2, this book. 6 See Chapter 2, this book. 7 See Chapter 11, this book. 8 See, especially, Chapter 2, this book.

PART I THEORY AND PRACTICE OF LBT

CHAPTER ONE LBT BASICS As discussed in the ‘Introduction,’ Logic-Based Therapy (LBT) is a relatively new psycho-logical counseling modality that uses philosophical and logical methods and theories. It is, in important respects, more “philosophical” and “logical” than any other cognitive-behavior therapy, including its ancestral theory, Rational-Emotive Behavior Therapy (REBT). This chapter succinctly describes some of LBT’s fundamental logical and philosophical aspects, especially as they compare to REBT.

REBT’s ABC Theory A key distinction between REBT and LBT lies in LBT’s logical recasting of the “ABC theory.”1 According to the classical REBT formulation of this theory, there are three “psychological points”:2 A: Activating event B: Belief system C: Behavioral and emotional consequence These respective points can be illustrated by the case of John who messes up on the job, gets fired as a result, and subsequently becomes depressed: A: Getting fired as a result of messing up B: I am a failure C: Depression At point A it happens that John gets fired as a result of messing up; at point B he tells himself that he is a worthless, failure for having messed up and gotten fired; and at point C John becomes depressed. As such, it is not the given activating event (A) by itself but rather this event plus John’s strong negative rating of himself (B) that causes him to become depressed (C).

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Notice that the relation between (A&B) and C is that of cause-andeffect. (A&B) causes C. The theory therefore looks for the causal laws or connections between certain beliefs and events, on the one hand, and certain behavioral and emotional consequences, on the other. This causal interpretation contrasts the logical approach taken by LBT.

The Logic of Logic-Based Therapy In contrast, LBT uses a type of deductive logic known as the practical syllogism to convert the ABC theory to a mode of inference from premises to conclusions. In so doing, it speaks in terms of reasoning rather than in terms of causality. All reasoning contains premises and a conclusion. A premise is a statement that is supposed to justify (or provide evidence for) a further statement. This further statement is called the conclusion. When someone supports a conclusion with a premise, this person can be said to be arguing for the conclusion, and the ensuing reasoning can also be called a (logical) argument. Thus, LBT recasts the ABC theory of REBT into a logical argument. A deductive argument is one whereby the conclusion necessarily follows from the premise/s. For example: If you are a human, then you are mortal You are a human So, you are mortal

In this argument, the conclusion is necessitated by the premises—if the premises are true then the conclusion must also be true.3 This argument is also called a syllogism, which is a deductive argument having two premises. Note that the premises of the above argument describe or report states of affairs—that you are human, and that you are mortal. In contrast, a practical syllogism is a deductive argument that has as its first (“major”) premise a general statement that prescribes or rates something. For example: If you are human, then you are a fallible, messed up creature You are human So, you are a fallible messed up creature.

Note that the first premise (the “if—then” statement) does not simply describe or report a states of affairs but instead rates human beings—as messed up creatures. LBT refers to this rating premise as a (major premise) rule. In contrast, note that the second premise—that you are

4

Chapter One

human—does report or describe a state of affairs, namely that you are human. LBT calls this descriptive premise a (minor premise) report. Note also that the conclusion of this practical syllogism is prescriptive, that is, it rates something. In fact, the conclusion is the rating of the “then” component of the rule that is detached from the “if” clause. It is therefore an actual (not just a conditional) rating. In the aforementioned terms, LBT converts REBT from a causal model to a logical one. For example, consider the case of John discussed in the previous section. John might be reasoning to himself: “I couldn’t even keep my job. I’m such a failure.” According to the LBT theory, John’s reasoning can be syllogistically recast as follows: (Major Premise Rule) If I couldn’t even keep my job, then I’m a failure. (Report) I couldn’t even keep my job. (Conclusion) I’m a failure.

In this manner, LBT is able to assess the rationality or justifiability of a counselee’s reasoning.4 In contrast, REBT’s causal approach, which speaks in terms of events, beliefs, and consequences, rather than in terms of premises and conclusions, is not suited for assessing rationality. This is because people do not reason from events and beliefs to consequences. This is the language of causal assessment, not of logic-based assessment. Causal assessment refers to explanation as distinct from justification. Thus we can certainly explain why John became depressed by explaining how John thought himself worthless after having messed up and lost his job. But this is not about the logic of John’s reason; it is about causality. LBT is therefore unlike REBT insofar as it provides a theory of belief justification, not one about explanatory causation. The advantage of such a redirection of the theory in terms of logic is that it opens up the possibility to apply standards and principles of logic and logical analysis toward helping counselees make better practical decisions. According to LBT people decide to be depressed, anxious, etc. by faultily deducing self-destructive conclusions from premises. Decisions are made by reasoning from premises to conclusions. Conclusions are inferred, not caused; and the aim of LBT is to help promote better decisions by getting rid of faulty logic and replacing it with sound reasoning.

LBT’s Definition of Emotion According to REBT, an emotion includes: “(1) a certain kind of forceful thinking—a kind strongly slanted or biased by previous

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perceptions or experiences; (2) intense bodily responses, such as feelings of pleasure or nausea; and (3) tendencies toward positive or negative action in regard to the events that seem to cause the strong thinking and its emotional concomitants.”5 While LBT also accepts this multi-pronged concept of an emotion, it uses its logic-based conversion of the ABC Theory to define the cognitive component (component 1) of human emotion. According to LBT, this aspect of emotion can be defined in terms of two dimensions of emotion: A: The rating B: The intentional object of the emotion The rating is the prescriptive, evaluative part of the emotional cognition. For example, in the previous case of John, the rating is of himself as being a “worthless failure.” All emotions include a (negative or positive) rating dimension. Such a cognitive dimension of emotions is prescriptive because it implies an “ought” or “ought not.” For example, if John is a failure then he is not as he should be. The intentional object of the emotion is the object to which the emotion refers. LBT holds that all states of consciousness, including emotions, refer to objects outside themselves. For example, John was depressed about his not being able to keep a job. Intentional objects may be either existent or non-existent. For example, I may be afraid of ghosts even if ghosts do not exist. Even though the intentional object might be nonexistent, the fear itself can be quite real. LBT holds that self-destructive emotions quite often refer to non-existent objects. In a sense, therefore, human beings often upset themselves over (literally) nothing. Thus, in John’s case, he is upsetting himself over his not being able to keep any job, which cannot be reasonably concluded from the facts that he messed up on his present job and got fired. Intentional objects can always be expressed as propositions or statements. For example, more fully expressed, my fear of ghosts means fear that a ghost may harm me. Emotions can also be identified in terms of their particular ratings and intentional objects. Thus, as Robert Solomon astutely maintained, “the specific object is what defines the emotion.”6 For example, some emotions, such as moral indignation and romantic love, he says, are focused primarily on human beings, whereas fear and sadness are not necessarily about human beings. And, “the heart of every emotion is its value judgments, its appraisals of gain and loss, its indictments of offenses, and its praise of virtue, its often Manichean judgments of “good” and “evil,” “right” and “wrong”.”7

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Such characterizations of emotions in terms of their specific objects and ratings (“value judgments”) can accordingly yield definitions of distinct emotions. Table 2-1 provides definitions of some of the most destructive emotions in terms of these two dimensions. The definitions in Table 2-1 provide “cognitive” definitions because they proceed purely in terms of the cognitions involved in the respective emotions. These cognitions “define” the emotion inasmuch as they can be used to identify the emotion in question. Thus when a counselee is negatively rating a given person’s having something that she lacks, then the counselee can be said to be jealous of this person. However, as mentioned above, emotions are themselves more than a set of cognitions. That is, they also involve non-cognitive elements, namely behavioral tendencies and physiological changes. For example, a counselee who is angry will not only be negatively rating the person or what they are doing; she will also have tendencies to act in certain ways toward this individual, for example, ignore, act curtly toward, or verbally or physically attack the person.8 In addition, physiological changes associated with anger include increased heart rate, respiration, and endocrine activity. These physiological changes may also be perceived, for example as pounding in the chest, a lump in the throat, fluttering, and other bodily sensations. This set of bodily sensations, physiological changes, behavioral tendencies, and cognitive changes form a causally interactional network and can lead to emotional looping. For example, the cognitive changes (“He’s a rotten SOB”) can engage the sympathetic nervous system (“fight or flight” response), which, in turn, can impact cognition (“He needs to pay”), intensify physiological changes, and thus lead to further behavioral changes (such as physically assaulting him). The gestalt of this network of interactional changes is what we would identify as the emotional experience.9 Table 2-1. Cognitive Definitions of Some Emotions using the ‘E = O + R’ Formula Emotion

Intentional Object

Rating

Anger

An action

Strong negative rating of the action or the person who performed it.

Guilt

A moral principle, one perceives oneself to have violated

Strong condemnation of the perceived violation or oneself.

LBT Basics

Depression

An event or state of affairs

Strong negative rating of this event or state of affairs on the basis of which one bleakly perceive one’s own existence.

Anxiety

A future event or possible future event having certain forecasted consequences

Strong negative rating of forecasted consequences on the basis of which one perceives need to ruminate about them.

Shame

An action or state of oneself

Perception that others are strongly, negatively morally rating oneself, or one’s action or state. One perceives this social rating to be extremely undesirable and as a reason to strongly, negatively morally rate oneself, or one’s action or state.

Grief

The loss of someone (a person or animal) one cherishes

One bleakly perceives one’s own existence on the basis of the loss.

Anxiety

A future event or possible future event having certain forecasted consequences

Strong negative rating of forecasted consequences on the basis of which one perceives need to ruminate about them.

Jealousy

A person or state of a person, who has something that one wants but lacks

Negative rating of the person’s having that which one lack.

Pity

A person (or animal) who is suffering in some particular way

Strong negative rating of this suffering and wish that something be done to stop it.

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Emotional Reasoning In the above manner, an emotion (E) can be defined by its rating (R) and its object (O), thus yielding the following formula: E = (O + R) LBT holds that emotional reasoning can itself be constructed out of an emotion’s intentional object (O) and rating (R) as expressed in the above formula. More exactly, the standard form of emotional reasoning is that of a deductive inference known as modus ponens, which can be stated in terms of the intentional object (O) and rating (R) of an emotion: (Rule) If O then R (Report) O (Conclusion) R

This is the form of the practical syllogism discussed above according to which the rule is a conditional statement that links the intentional object (O) to the rating (R). The report is accordingly the intentional object (O) itself; and the conclusion consists in the rating (R) detached from the object (O). For example, in the case of John, the emotional reasoning that comprises the cognitive component of his depression is: Rule: If I can’t keep a job (O) then I’m a failure (R) Report: I can’t keep a job (O). Conclusion: I’m a failure (R)

Thus, by finding the O and the R of a counselee’s emotion, it is possible to construct the standard form of the counselee’s emotional reasoning and, therefore, once formulated, to analyze the syllogism for its soundness.

Emotional Reasoning Templates As developed in Chapter 3, it is possible to construct Emotional Reasoning Templates (ERT) that follow the standard form of emotional reasoning but which allow the form to be made more explicit. For example, the ERT for the above syllogism would be as follows: 1. If [enter perceived personal defect] then I am [enter personal selfdevaluation]. 2. [Enter perceived personal defect]. 3. Therefore, I am _____.

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Accordingly, a counselee’s emotional reasoning can be generated from the ERT by filling in the blanks with the given O + R details. For example, to generate the aforementioned emotional reasoning, the perceived personal defect would be “I can’t keep a job” and the personal selfdevaluation would be “a failure.” As such, ERTs can be created for commonly occurring patterns of reasoning, for example, one that commits the fallacy of self-damnation, as in the example just provided. As discussed in chapter 3, LBT can use various ERTs to help counselees identify and specify the components of their emotional reasoning.

Behavioral Reasoning Further, LBT holds that there is a logical relation between people’s behavioral tendencies and their emotional reasoning as described above. Thus, the above conclusion (R) is behaviorally prescriptive. For example, if John concludes that he is a failure, he will tend to act as such. What sort of destructive (“failure”) actions John performs itself depends on deductions from further behavioral rules John has adopted, which prescribe such actions. For John, these actions might include refusing to get out of bed and get dressed; getting drunk; cursing and screaming; and attempting suicide. For example, he might make the following deduction from a behavioral rule (BR) and rating (R): (Behavioral Rule) If I am a failure then I should end my life. (Rating) I’m a failure. (Conclusion) I should end my life.

Note that the conclusion prescribes committing suicide—it says “should.” This “should” is logically (or quasi-logically) related to the act of committing suicide since, if John truly accepts this conclusion, and nothing stops him from attempting this action (including other persons as well as any other conclusions John himself reaches), he will, in fact, perform this action. Such a close connection between practical syllogisms and human action has led Aristotle, the first philosopher to analyze the practical syllogism, to conclude that the conclusion of such reasoning is not itself another statement but instead an action.10 Nonetheless, LBT distinguishes between actions that are conclusions (in the above sense) of practical syllogisms, and other behavior that is more properly considered a causal consequence. According to LBT only deliberate (intentional) actions are logical corollaries of the premises of practical reasoning.

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Not all behavior is deliberate, however. For example, while remaining in one’s bed all day without getting dressed or attempting suicide is deliberate, crying or trembling is not. Such overt non-deliberative behavior is not considered an action in LBT. These forms of behavior as well as the internal behavioral (physiological) changes that accompany emotions— such as increases/decreases in respiration, cardiac function, endocrine activity, and other autonomic, sympathetic, parasympathetic nervous system functions—are also not considered actions by LBT. While this does not mean that such non-deliberate bodily changes cannot be directly monitored and changed through cognitive interventions (such as biofeedback), these are not the primary, direct focus of LBT. Rather LBT addresses these indirectly by helping counselees to work on changing their emotional reasoning and deliberate behavior (actions).

Behavioral Reasoning Templates As in the case of emotional reasoning, there is also a standard form of behavioral reasoning, which takes the form: If J then P J So, P Where: J = behavioral justification P = behavioral prescription

The behavioral Justification (J) is an event, state of affairs, or evaluation perceived to be a reason or justification for certain behavior. The behavioral prescription in turn prescribes this behavior, and it, impliedly or expressly, contains a prescriptive term such as “ought” or “should.” Analogous to ERTs, behavioral reasoning templates (BRTs) can also be constructed using the given J+P information. For example, the following is a BRT: (Behavioral Rule) If I am/have [enter perceived personal defect] then I should [enter prescribed behavior]. (Justification) I am/have [enter perceived personal defect] (Behavioral Prescription) So, I should _____.

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For example, where the perceived personal defect is that of being a failure and the prescribed behavior is ending my life, then the following behavioral reasoning can be generated from the BRT in question: (Behavioral Rule) If I am a failure then I should end my life. (Justification) I am a failure. (Behavioral Prescription) So, I should end my life.

As will become apparent, BRTs can be useful for LBT counselors in helping their counselees to clearly specify their behavioral reasoning.11

LBT’s Theory of Suppression In life contexts, people rarely if ever order or “set up” their practical reasoning in standard form, that is, with all premises and their conclusion explicitly stated and filled out. Rather, there is usually some part/s that is suppressed, that is, merely assumed. Contrary to Freud, LBT holds that many, if not most, of our destructive, self-defeating thoughts are suppressed rather than repressed—hidden somewhere in the unconsciousness pit.12 Following the ancient philosopher Aristotle, logicians typically refer to reasoning with suppressed premises as enthymematic arguments, or for short, enthymemes. For example, recall John’s argument, “I couldn’t even keep my job; I’m such a failure,” which more formally could be represented as: (Report) I couldn’t even keep my job (Conclusion) I’m a failure

Here, the major premise rule is suppressed. When this premise is added the reasoning is again as follows: (Major Premise Rule) If I can’t keep a job, then I’m a failure (Report) I can’t keep a job (Conclusion) I’m a failure

Once John’s enthymematic reasoning is filled out, its faulty premises can be exposed. Indeed, according to LBT, the irrational ideas imbedded in counselees’ reasoning are typically hidden away in suppressed premises. For example, John’s major premise rule irrationally damns himself for having lost his job. Further, once the missing premises are exposed, it is then possible to explore the grounds of the exposed premises, which, in turn, can generate multi-tiered syllogistic chains. Some common templates for such multi-tiered reasoning are examined in Chapter 3.

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Chapter One

LBT’s Process of Refutation Once LBT has elicited a counselee’s suppressed premises, it is in a position to expose and refute any irrational ideas or “fallacies” they contain. This is called refutation, that is, showing that a premise is irrational or unjustified. This may be achieved in several different ways, namely, showing that: (1) the premise entails a false or absurd statement; (2) accepting it involves an inconsistency or double standard; (3) there is empirical evidence that disconfirms it; and/or (4) there are counterexamples to it.13 For example, an LBT counselor could help John refute his global self-damnation by helping him to generate counter-examples to it: Counselor: You say that you are a failure if you couldn’t keep your job. Are you saying that this makes you a total failure? Counselee: Yes, I’m a total failure. Counselor: Is there anything that you can do satisfactorily? John: Yes, I am quite good at tennis. Counselor: So, that means that there is something that you have not failed at, so how can you say that you are a total failure?

LBT’s Catalog of Fallacies Through such techniques of refutation, LBT is able to expose the fallacies inherent in counselee’s reasoning. LBT’s definition of a fallacy is an operational one, that is, one given in terms of the effect the commission of fallacies has on human existence. According to LBT, a fallacy is a mistake in reasoning that tends to frustrate personal and interpersonal happiness.14 LBT holds that these fallacies infect the premises of people’s practical reasoning and lead them to deduce destructive conclusions. Here are eleven of the most commonplace and destructive fallacies LBT identifies: Fallacies of Behavioral and Emotional Rules 1. Demanding Perfection: Commanding, demanding, and dictating the terms of external reality based on premises about one’s own subjective desires or preferences. 2. Bandwagon Reasoning: Blind, inauthentic conformity of belief and/or action largely deduced from the demand for approval of others. 3. The-World-Revolves-Around-Me Thinking: Thinking that one’s own beliefs, values, desires, and preferences are the only true, right, or acceptable ones and that, therefore, everyone else must accept them. 4. Catastrophic Reasoning: Reasoning from bad to worst.

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5. Damnation: Devaluation of self, others, and the universe. 6. Can’tstipation: Obstructing one’s creative potential by holding in and refusing to excrete one’s emotional, behavioral, or volitional can’t. 7. Dutiful Worrying: Dutifully and obsessively disturbing oneself and significant others. 8. Manipulation: Using force, intimidation, threats, deception, chicanery, or other manner of control, instead of rational argument, in order to get a person/s to act, think, or feel in a certain way. Fallacies of Reporting 9. Oversimplifying Reality: Overgeneralizing, pigeonholing, and stereotyping. 10. Distorting Probabilities: Making predictions about the future that are not probable relative to the evidence at hand. 11. Blind Conjecture: Advancing explanations, causal judgments, and contrary-to-fact claims about the world based on fear, guilt, superstition, magical thinking, fanaticism, or other anti-scientific grounds.

The first eight of these fallacies—labeled “Fallacies of Behavioral and Emotional Rules”—typically occur in rule-premises of practical syllogisms. The last three—”fallacies of reporting”—can most often be found in the report filed under a rule. All of the Fallacies of Behavioral and Emotional Rules involve extreme thinking. For example, demanding perfection goes to the unrealistic extreme of demanding a flawless or near flawless universe; (global) damnation paints the entire universe black; and awfulizing goes to the pessimistic extreme of thinking the worst. Each of the eleven fallacies defined above are discussed in greater detail in Chapter 3.

LBT’s Positive Psychology In addition, LBT holds that each of these eleven “Cardinal Fallacies” has a corresponding “transcendent virtue” that trumps it.15 These virtues are “virtues” because they involve dispositions of character acquired through practice. The first eight virtues in Table 2-2 are “behavioral and emotional virtues” because they figure in the prescriptive, behavioral or emotional rules of a counselee’s practical reasoning. The last three, in the shaded region, are the “inductive virtues.” They figure in collecting and reporting perceived facts contained in the minor premise reports of counselees’ practical reasoning. All eleven virtues are “transcendent” because they constitute higher human capabilities that transcend their respective fallacies. As discussed in Chapter 10, they provide the ends or goals toward which to strive in attaining happiness.

14

Chapter One

While classical REBT has tended to concentrate on the negative aspect of avoiding fallacies (what not to do), LBT also provides a positive psychology, that is, a set of positive values to which to aspire in overcoming fallacies. Each of these transcendent virtues is discussed in Chapters 11 and 12. Table 2-2. Cardinal Fallacies and their Respective Transcendent Virtues Cardinal Fallacy

Transcendent Virtue

Demanding Perfection

Metaphysical security (security about reality)

Jumping on the Bandwagon

Authenticity (being your own person)

The World-Revolves-Around-Me

Empathy (connecting with others)

Catastrophic Reasoning

Courage (in the face of evil)

Damnation (of self, others, and the universe)

Respect (for self, others, and the universe)

Can’tstipation

Temperance (self-control)

Dutiful Worrying

Prudence (in addressing moral problems)

Manipulation

Empowerment (of others)

Oversimplifying Reality

Objectivity (in making unbiased discernments in practical affairs)

Distorting Probabilities

Foresightedness (in assessing probabilities)

Blind Conjecture

Scientificity (in providing explanations)

The attainment of these transcendent virtues has been the province of many of the theories of philosophy, both Eastern and Western, as advanced throughout the ages. For example, the great Greek thinker Aristotle

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devoted his ethics to discussing the cultivation of such virtues as courage and temperance in the face of great adversity or temptation. And Immanuel Kant in the Eighteenth Century made the cornerstone of his ethics the concept of respect. The ancient Stoic thinkers such as Epictetus admonished us against demanding perfection by trying to control things that just aren’t in our power to control. They offered us deep insights as to how to cultivate tolerance for the uncertainty of the universe and how to live contentedly with less of the lavish things that are beyond one’s means. These and many more theories and insights of these great philosophers can provide constructive antidotes for overcoming the Cardinal Fallacies. LBT uses these philosophies to help people attain greater happiness in their daily lives.

LBT’s Concept of Willpower LBT holds that human beings have an inherent power of will that can be used to overcome fallacies in one’s emotional reasoning and to aspire to and cultivate the transcendent virtues. By willpower, LBT means either: “(a) the power or ability to refrain from doing something (either before you do it, or while in the midst of doing it) even though you are strongly inclined to do it; or (b) the power or ability to continue doing something even though we are strongly inclined not to.”16 As discussed in Chapter 8, many behavioral and emotional problems stem from self-can’tstipation—telling oneself one can’t control one’s emotions, change one’s behavior, or tolerate frustrating or challenging situations. While LBT does not attempt to resolve the free-willdeterminism debate, it holds that human beings’ use of can’t in many cases is unrealistic and anti-empirical.17 Human beings have, as a matter of fact, overcome self-destructive behavioral and emotional reasoning by exercising their willpower as defined above. This proves therefore that they can do so. As carefully examined in Chapter 4, LBT emphasizes the human ability to overcome cognitive dissonance. A person is in a state of cognitive dissonance when he or she simultaneously holds two or more conflicting practical syllogisms, one rational and the other irrational. For example, John would be in a state of cognitive dissonance if he simultaneously held the following two practical syllogisms: Syllogism 1: (Rule) If I can’t keep a job then I’m a failure. (Report) I can’t keep a job. (Conclusion) I’m a failure.

16

Chapter One Syllogism 2: (Rule) If I messed up and got fired, then I should learn from my mistake and do better next time. (Report) I messed up and got fired. (Conclusion) I should learn from my mistake and do better next time.

Since the conclusion of Syllogism 1 entails that John is incapable of constructive change (it relegates him to a complete failure), it conflicts (is inconsistent with) the conclusion of Syllogism 2, which is constructive. LBT holds that cognitive dissonance is usually an important step in making constructive change because it marks the beginning of correcting and overcoming one’s irrational thinking with rational thinking. Overcoming irrational thinking and bringing one’s behavior and emotions in line with one’s rational thinking requires willpower. LBT holds that such willpower can be cultivated through exercise and practice including classical forms of behavioral homework assignments. For example, in the above case, John could resist the inertia of his irrational syllogism by forcing himself to vigilantly pursue employment and then working hard to improve his on-the-job performance. Whether this is behavioral conditioning rooted in determinism (the theory that all human behavior is caused) or instead the autonomous exercise of free will in a deep metaphysical sense is not an issue LBT attempts to adjudicate. On a practical, confirmable level, human beings can, and do, exercise such rational control regardless of any deeper scientific or philosophical explanation. The next chapter of this book will discuss the manner in which a logicbased approach can, indeed, be used to help counselees gain greater rational control over their behavior and emotions. In particular it will provide, discuss, and illustrate the five steps of the LBT process.

Notes 1

Elliot D. Cohen, “The Use of Syllogism in Rational-Emotive Therapy,” Journal of Counseling & Development, Vol. 66, No. 1 (1987): 37-39. 2 Albert Ellis and Michael E. Bernard, “What is Rational-Emotive Therapy (RET)?” in RET: Handbook of Rational-Emotive Therapy, Vol. 2, ed. Albert Ellis and Russell Grieger (New York: Spring Publishing Co., 1986), 11-17. 3 This is in contrast to “inductive” arguments where the conclusion is merely made probable by the evidence supplied by the premises. For example, the following is an inductive argument: The car won’t start. The fuel gage is on empty.

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So, the care is out of gas. Note that the conclusion in the above inference, while probable relative to the evidence given by the two premises, is not necessitated by it. For example, the gas gauge could be malfunctioning and a fuel line could be clogged. 4 Notice that the report is John’s perception of the facts. It need not reflect a true state of affairs. Thus, it might not in fact be the case that John can’t keep any job. Further, notice that the major premise rule was assumed by John and not explicitly expressed. These aspects of the LBT theory will be discussed later in this chapter. 5 Albert Ellis and Robert A. Harper, A New Guide to Rational Living (Hollywood, CA: Wilshire Publishing Co., 1975), 23-24. 6 Robert C. Solomon, The Passions: The Myth and Nature of Human Emotions (Garden City, NY: Anchor Books, 1977), 258. 7 Solomon, The Passions, 267. 8 As discussed below, the specific behavioral tendencies the counselee harbors will depend on the behavioral rules the counselee has adopted. 9 See Elliot D. Cohen, What would Aristotle Do? Self-Control through the Power of Reason (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 2003), especially Chapter 2. 10 See Chapter 4, this book. 11 See, for example, Chapter 8 on can’tstipation, and the discussion of manipulative reasoning in Chapter 6. 12 One key difference between a suppressed premise and a repressed thought is that when the latter is suggested to a counselee, the counselee typically strongly denies it. Whereas when a suppressed premise is suggested to a counselee, the counselee strongly affirms it and in fact takes it as self-evident. See, Elliot D. Cohen, “Philosophical Principles of Logic-Based Therapy,” Practical Philosophy: The Journal of the Society for Philosophy in Practice, Vol. 6.1 (Spring 2003): 27-35. 13 See Chapter 15, “Refutation in Practical Reasoning” in Elliot D. Cohen, Critical Thinking Unleashed (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2009). 14 Cohen, What Would Aristotle Do? 15 The shaded region of the following figure contains Fallacies of Reporting and their respective transcendent virtues. The un-shaded region represents the Fallacies of Behavioral and Emotional Rules. See Cohen, The New Rational Therapy, p. 16. 16 Aristotelis Santas, “Willpower,” International Journal of Applied Philosophy 4, no. 2 (fall 1988): 9. 17 Cohen, The New Rational Therapy

CHAPTER TWO THE PROCESS OF LBT This Chapter provides a detailed overview of the process of LogicBased Therapy, in particular, its five steps. It begins with a discussion of the personal characteristics that LBT counselors should, as professionals and as persons, exemplify in order to be competent LBT counselors.

Building Trust The process of LBT requires counselees’ self-disclosure about life issues, and this information, so disclosed, can be deeply personal. Such divulging of personal information therefore requires confidence in the counselor by the counselee that the information disclosed will be treated confidentially. It requires trust in the counselor and trust in the process— that is, trust that the counselor can be trusted and trust that the information will not in any way be misused or used against the counselee in the course of therapy. This climate of trust can only be attained if the counselee comes to think of the counselor as trustworthy. Here is where LBT joins with “affective” modalities, notably Carl Rogers’ Person-Centered Therapy, in stressing the importance of cultivating counseling virtues such as respect, empathy, and authenticity (which are what Rogers respectively calls “unconditional positive regard,” “empathetic understanding,” and “congruence”1). As will later be discussed, these are transcendent virtues of LBT, which can set important goals to which a counselee can aspire in order to overcome and move beyond (“transcend”) self-defeating styles of thinking, feeling, and behaving. But these virtues are also important character traits that LBT counselors should exemplify within the context of the counseling relationship. In calling these character traits “virtues,” LBT subscribes to the Aristotelian idea that they are habits or dispositions to act, think, and feel in certain ways under certain conditions.2 Thus, to be respectful means to be in a habit of engaging in respectful treatment of self, others, and the world.3 This includes avoiding engaging in deceit, trickery, threats (physical or emotional), coercion, and other forms of manipulation. It

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means not using emotive language to poison the well or intimidate or seduce others (e.g., “Only an idiot would do that”) into acting or thinking in ways the counselor deems appropriate. This level of respect for others is also reflected in the respect the counselor has for herself. Thus, she will avoid the philosophically untenable stance of perceiving self-worth in terms of achievements (“I’m a worthy person as long as I continue to do well and don’t make any mistakes”) or the approval of others (“If others disapprove of me then I am no good”). Such respect will also manifest itself in the way the counselor perceives the world. Thus the counselor will avoid overgeneralizations about reality and the world (“Bad things happen in the world; therefore the world is a bad place). She will avoid focusing on the negative aspects of things to the exclusion of the good things (“I must constantly obsess about the things that are wrong in the world, and disturb others about them, before I can let myself and others be contented”). To be empathetic, 4 as a virtue, means to be in a habit of keying into the welfare, interests and needs of others; being sensitive to the nuances of human affect and desire by getting inside the subjective worlds of others (although without losing the distinction between oneself and the other). It means resonating with how the other is feeling under her given circumstances. This does not mean that the counselor will ultimately agree with what the counselee is thinking, doing, or feeling. But it does mean that she will understand on a deeply emotional level what the counselee is going through. To be authentic5 means to be in a habit of acting according to one’s own moral and intellectual lights rather than subscribing to what is popular or convenient. It means being transparent insofar as what one says and does is relatively consistent with what one thinks and feels. These three habits—respect, empathy, and authenticity—are important conditions of the LBT process because they reflect a major component of the positive psychology that it prescribes against common, irrational tendencies, notably damnation of self, others, and the world; ego-centered “the-world-revolves-around-me” thinking and relating; and jumping on the bandwagon or blind conformity. As will be discussed later, the latter irrational tendencies or habits are respectively overcome and transcended by cultivating the virtues of respect, empathy, and authenticity. These virtues are also important to the process of LBT because they are conditions under which counselees will feel free to open up and selfdisclose; and, as stated, LBT cannot operate without gathering the data that ultimately reveals the counselee’s emotional reasoning and the irrational premises contributing to her problems of living.

20

Chapter Two

This emphasis on virtuous practice has significant implications for philosophers aspiring to be competent LBT counselors; for, it means that they must practice what they preach. They must be respectful, empathetic, and authentic in their own lives before they can help others to be the same. Here, authenticity does not simply mean teaching counselees how to live rationally and philosophically; it also requires being rational and philosophical about one’s own life. Otherwise an LBT counselor is not authentic. Likewise, as empathetic professionals, LBT practice requires that one be attuned to the nuances of feelings and emotions of others, and not simply “logical” in a vacant, cold, and robotic manner. Here, the image of Socrates comes into view—in him, personhood merged with philosophical practice. He was passionate about helping others in the pursuit of such human interests as truth and justice, and lived (and died) authentically in providing this service. His rational style of dialectic left no room for deception, personal attack, coercion, or other means of disrespect. He was a man with whom others felt comfortable in speaking, and no doubt considered him someone who understood their deepest and innermost desires, hopes, and aspirations.6 In this way, philosophical practice can be personally challenging. But its rewards can be deeply gratifying. Seeing a counselee resonate with a philosophical idea and changing his life for the better as a result may be one of the most gratifying professional experiences a philosopher can attain this side of the Platonic divided line.

The Five Steps of LBT The practice of LBT thus proceeds in this intimate context of trust. The counselor is a real person, not a stuffed shirt or pedantic falsetto. She is inviting, not intimidating. She is serious about the enterprise but open to jest about life and the comedy of events. There is room for breathing; it can be intense but not frightening. It can be a lot of fun, but it can have moments of truth that hit home and hit a nerve. Through all this, it is an authentic process conducted by authentic human beings in confronting the challenges of living well. Within this framework of trust, LBT counselors help counselees to think things through and to creatively make constructive changes in their thinking, feeling, and acting. LBT conducts this process toward constructive change through a five-step program. These five steps are given below: Step 1: Identify the counselee’s emotional reasoning Step 2: Identify any irrational premises

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Step 3: Refute any irrational premises Step 4: Find antidotes to the refuted premises. Step 5: Exercise willpower in overcoming cognitive dissonance

These steps are systematic, but they are not purely mechanical in their application. They are methodological and procedural but there is room for creativity on the part of the LBT counselor. Indeed, LBT is inherently eclectic and includes several different possible approaches, ranging from Cognitive-Behavior to Existential to Person-Centered. The philosophical theories LBT utilizes are sundry and diverse, ranging from religious ideas, such as those of St. Thomas Aquinas to secular and anti-(organized) religious perspectives, such as those of Sartre and Nietzsche.7 Which of these theories are put into practice is largely a function of the counselee’s own intellectual lights. So, within broad limits of rationality (as defined by LBT’s list of fallacies) and of what is likely to work for individual counselees, LBT avoids proselytizing for particular philosophical views.8 What follows is an illustrated explication of each of these five steps.

Step 1: Identify the Counselee’s Emotional Reasoning There are two basic sub-steps of the first step of LBT. These are: (1) finding the elements of the counselee’s emotional reasoning; and (2) constructing the practical syllogism comprising the counselee’s emotional reasoning. We begin with the first of these sub-steps. Finding the Elements of the Counselee’s Emotional Reasoning The first step of LBT can be broadly characterized as phenomenological and Socratic. It begins by inviting the counselee to speak freely about her problem of living. At this state the counselor functions as a facilitator, not a teacher. The purpose is to help the counselee to get clear about the basic building blocks of her emotional reasoning. As discussed in Chapter 1, these components are the intentional object and the rating of the intentional object. It is important, however, not to formulate these constructs for the counselee but rather to provide the support for the counselee to articulate them for herself. Thus, the process should be one of self-discovery rather than dictating what the counselee’s experience is or should be. Insofar as this process proceeds in a context of trust, the counselee is more likely to be self-disclosing. Thus, it is very important at this stage (as well as all other stages) that the counselor remain empathetic, authentic, and respectful.

22

Chapter Two

This first step is therefore not a stage where the counselor helps the counselee to evaluate his reasoning. It is a step in which the counselor attempts to get inside and resonate with the counselee’s subjective world so that she is better able to help the counselee bring the relevant data to the fore. This can be done most effectively when the counselor tends to ask open-ended questions rather than closed ones. “How do you feel when your dad says you are stupid?” may be appropriate in contrast to “Do you feel upset when your dad calls you stupid?” The first gives the counselee an opportunity to describe, phenomenologically, how he is feeling. The second leads to yes or no responses and thereby forecloses the possibility for further development of the dialogue. In addition, the counselor can best facilitate self-disclosure through active listening. This involves reflecting back what the counselee is saying in the form of questions aimed at getting clear on what the counselee is saying. Here is an illustration: Counselee: “Then I start to tell myself, ‘well maybe my dad really just doesn’t give a damn.’” Counselor: So you are thinking that your dad doesn’t really care about how you might be feeling when he tells you that you’re stupid? Counselee: Yes, that’s right, like he doesn’t have any regard for how this might make me feel. And then I start to think that maybe he’s right. Counselor: I see, you start to question your self-worth? Counselee: Yes, that’s exactly what I do, and he says this a lot. Counselor: When he tells you you’re stupid, what are you telling yourself? Counselee: I feel so unworthy. Counselor: Unworthy of him? Counselee: Yes, but also unworthy of anyone, like I’m worthless—and I really feel down about myself. Counselor: Tell me about that. What else are you telling yourself? Counselee: I start to think that I should have never been born. Maybe then he would have been happy.

Notice that the goal here is not to interpret or evaluate what the counselee is saying but rather to formulate what he is saying in a way that is as clear and distinct as possible. Therefore, the counselor does not impute his own meanings or “put words in the mouth” of the counselee. In this phase, there is a need for clarifying or defining vague or unclear language, for example, “doesn’t really care about how you might be feeling” instead of “really just doesn’t give a damn.” Asking questions about the meaning of terms or phrases is therefore almost always in order (e.g., “Unworthy of him?”).

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Through this process of asking open-ended questions, active listening, and asking for definitions, the counselee’s intentional object and its evaluation will almost invariably emerge. These elements of emotionality will in turn provide the bases for identifying both the counselee’s emotion (E = O + R) and his emotional reasoning in terms of a practical syllogism. Recall from Chapter 1 that the form of a practical syllogism can be represented entirely in terms of O + R as follows: If O then R O So, R

The counselor must exercise discretion as to when there is sufficient clarity to proceed in putting these elements together to fill out the O and R, and thereby assemble the emotion and emotional reasoning. At some point, the counselor will feel reasonably confident that she has satisfactory information to test her hypothesis: Counselor: Are you depressed about the fact that your dad often calls you stupid? Counselee: Yes, very much so. And it’s always there. I can hear his voice telling me I’m stupid every time I think I might do something wrong. I feel so hopeless.

Here the counselor is seeking to verify her understanding of the intentional object and rating of the counselee’s emotion. And she has accordingly constructed the counselee’s emotion in terms of this hypothesized object and rating, as being that of depression; and this determination she has made based on her phenomenological investigation with the counselee coupled with her understanding of the cognitive elements of depression. As shown in Chapter 1, the intentional object of depression is some event or state of affairs, which one rates so negatively as to look bleakly upon one’s own existence. In the present case, the counselee feels depressed about his dad’s tendency to call him stupid; and he perceives this as being a reason to berate or negatively assess himself as “worthless,” thereby assuming a bleak outlook on his own existence. Indeed, he even questions whether he should ever have been born. The intentional object is thus that his dad often tells him that he’s stupid (O). This is what he is depressed about. And the rating the counselee has given to it is that he (the counselee) must be worthless. The practical syllogism expressing the counselee’s emotional reasoning can therefore be constructed from these basic elements of O + R:

24

Chapter Two (Rule) If my dad often tells me that I’m stupid (O) then I must be worthless (R). (Report) My dad often tells me that I’m stupid (O). (Conclusion) So I must be worthless (R).

The counselor should test the hypothesized emotional reasoning by reflecting it back to the counselee in the most concise way possible: Counselor: So is this your reasoning? Are you telling yourself that since your dad tells you that you’re stupid, then you must be worthless? Counselee: Yes that’s it!

Here the counselee’s emotional reasoning is laid plain before him. The less verbose, the more easily understood it is likely to be. For example, the use of the word “since” instead of “if” can be helpful because it eliminates the need to restate the report as a separate statement. (“Since” in contrast to “If” already includes the affirmation of the antecedent). Notice too that the argument is no longer enthymematic. Both premises of the practical syllogism are articulated. In particular, the major premise rule (the “If O then R” premise) is clearly formulated where heretofore it was “suppressed.”9 Inasmuch as the devil is often in the detail, it is now possible to inspect this exposed rule to determine if it is justified. Once the emotional reasoning is identified and reflected back to the counselee, the session can proceed to examine this reasoning further. Higher-Order Syllogistic Premises Most often, the rule premises of emotional reasoning are themselves deduced from other higher-order rules. Thus there may be, not just one, but a series of interfacing syllogisms behind the counselee’s emotional reasoning. As such, once the counselee’s emotional reasoning is identified, the counselor is in a position to check to see if there are any higher-order syllogisms containing premises on which the counselee’s emotional reasoning rests: Counselor: “So, let’s look at one of your premises. You believe that, if your dad often tells you that you’re stupid, then you must be worthless.” Counselee: Yes, that’s right. Counselor: So you must think that his opinion matters a good deal. Counselee: Yes I do. Counselor: But why is it so important to you? Counselee: He’s my dad! Counselor: And why does that matter so much? Counselee: Your dad is not supposed to think you’re stupid.

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Counselor: So if he approved of you and thought you were the greatest intellect since Albert Einstein then you would think that you’re a worthy person? Counselee: Yes, I suppose so. I wouldn’t think I was an Albert Einstein but I would really be flattered and feel very good about myself if he thought that. Counselor: So you are basing your self-worth on what others think? Counselee: Yes, on what my dad thinks. Counselor: And his opinion matters so much because he’s your dad? Counselee: Yes, that’s right.

Notice how the counselor has delved deeper into the reasons why the counselee bases his self-worth on what his dad says about him. Ultimately, this negative self-rating is found to rest on a demand for approval, namely from his dad (“Your dad is not supposed to think you’re stupid”). In other words, the counselee is saying that he must have the approval of his dad in order to have self-worth. Thus the chain of arguments grounding the counselee’s negative self-rating can be constructed from the data gathered through this Socratic dialogue: (Major Premise Rule 2) If I don’t have the approval of my dad then I’m worthless. (Bridging Premise) If my dad often tells me that I’m stupid then I don’t have the approval of my dad. (Major Premise Rule 1) So, if my dad often tells me that I’m stupid (O) then I must be worthless (R). (Report) My dad often tells me that I’m stupid (O). (Conclusion) So I must be worthless (R).

Notice, that full articulation of all suppressed premises requires inclusion of a “bridging premise,” which deductively links Rule 2 to Rule 1. In this manner, Rule 1 emerges as a corollary of the higher-order Rule2. While bridging premises are necessary for formal validity, they can sometimes be cumbersome to express; moreover, the key faulty thinking can most often be located in the rules or reports rather than in the bridging premises. As such, it is usually constructive to reflect back to the counselee his emotional reasoning and chain of supporting premises without including the bridging premise. This does not mean that the counselor should not identify and examine this premise carefully for faulty thinking. Indeed, a thorough logic-based analysis of the counselee’s reasoning requires no less than this. However, as a rule of thumb, the counselor should reflect back this reasoning in the most economic and user-friendly fashion as possible, without sacrificing core meanings:

26

Chapter Two Counselor: So is this your reasoning? You are saying that if you don’t have the approval of your dad then you’re worthless. So, since your dad often tells you that you’re stupid then you must be worthless? Counselee: Yes, that’s exactly it!

Here, the counselor is resonating with the counselee as evidenced by the counselee’s verification and enthusiastic affirmation. This affirmation is an indication that the counselor has captured the counselee’s reasoning adequately. However, the counselor might press the counselee even further to reveal even higher order premises: Counselor: Do you demand approval of others besides your dad? Counselee: I don’t care if I don’t have the approval of people who are not important to me; it’s just the people who really matter to me. Counselor: Such as? Counselee: Like my close friends and my boss.

Here the counselor has helped the counselee to reveal an even higher, more general syllogistic level of his thinking: (Major Premise Rule 3) If I don’t have the approval of someone who matters to me, then I’m worthless. (Bridging Premise) If I don’t have the approval of my dad then I don’t have the approval of someone who matters to me. (Major Premise Rule 2) So, if I don’t have the approval of my dad then I’m worthless.

And again, the counselor can confirm the counselee’s reasoning by reflecting it back in a user-friendly way: Counselor: So is this your reasoning? You are saying that you are worthless unless you have the approval of everyone who matters to you. So, since your dad matters to you, if you don’t have his approval then you’re worthless? Counselee: Yes, that’s my reasoning exactly!

At this juncture, it is apparent that the counselee is basing his selfworth on the demand for approval of those who play significant roles in his life (“those who really matter”). The counselee’s bedrock premise is, as such, the demand for the approval of those who matter to him: (Major Premise Rule 4) I must have the approval of all those who matter to me.

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(Bridging Premise) If I must have the approval of all those who matter to me then if I don’t have the approval of someone who matters to me, then I’m worthless. (Major Premise Rule 3) So, if I don’t have the approval of someone who matters to me then I’m worthless.

The counselor can then reflect back this reasoning for confirmation: Counselor: So you are saying that you must have the approval of everyone who matters to you and if you don’t get that approval then you’re worthless? Is this your reasoning? Counselee: Yes, I must have their approval; otherwise I start to think I’m worthless.

At this point, where the counselor is satisfied that she has carefully exposed the higher order premises undergirding the counselee’s emotional reasoning, it is time to move to the next step of identifying irrational premises.

Step 2: Identifying any Irrational Premises In this step, the counselor identifies the particular premises in the counselee’s chain of reasoning she wants to challenge. There may be several different fallacies, and it is sometimes useful to take each in turn. However, some fallacies may be more important than others to refute and there may not be time to target all of them. In the present case, there are three salient LBT fallacies that the counselee has committed. Rule 4 above is a version of a rule that is often taken as axiomatic. It is one of LBT’s Cardinal Fallacies, that of Demanding Perfection, in this case, a demand for approval of all those perceived to be significant in the counselee’s life. In this case, the counselee rests his argument on this premise and may stubbornly insist that it is reasonable unless the counselor helps the counselee to satisfactorily refute it. Rules 2 and 3 above are versions of another cardinal LBT fallacy, namely approval damnation, that is, negative assessment of one’s selfworth based on the loss or absence of approval of others. Rule 1, in turn, contains the jumping on the bandwagon fallacy, that is, blind inauthentic or parrot-like conformity to what some individual or group of individuals is saying or doing. In this case, the counselee believes that he is worthless because someone else, namely his dad, often tells him that he is stupid. The counselee jumps on the bandwagon of accepting his dad’s negative assessment of him as being stupid because he demands approval of him and he has failed to get this approval. As such, it might be hypothesized

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that by helping the counselee to give up his demand for approval of others who matter to him, he might also give up his bandwagon thinking, since he is deducing the latter from the former. This is quite often the case. A counselee might commit a fallacy contained in a “lower-order” premise because he is deducing it from a fallacy contained in a “higher-order” premise. The present case illustrates one such commonplace instance, namely where the demand for approval leads to the commission of a further fallacy or fallacies. Of course, challenging both higher and lower-order fallacies can be quite helpful; however, if just the lower-order fallacy is identified and challenged, leaving the higher-order fallacy intact, then it is likely that the counselee will continue to commit the lower-order fallacy. Thus, in the present case, the counselee might continue to jump on bandwagons to get approval even though he knows that this is irrational. Further, the counselee may also be demanding approval of others as well as his dad, for example, his close friends or significant others. Hence working on the demand for approval could help him avoid irrational conclusions drawn in other areas of his interpersonal life.

Step 3: Refuting the Counselee’s Irrational Premise/s Accordingly, it is usually sound policy to target a higher-order fallacy for refutation even if a lower-order fallacy is not directly targeted. As discussed in Chapter 1, a refutation involves showing that a premise is irrational or unjustified. Thus, a refutation of Rule 4 might proceed as follows: Counselor: Let’s look at your premise that you must have the approval of all those who matter to you. The word “must” means that this approval is necessary and can’t be any other way. Is that correct? Counselee: Yes, that sounds right to me. Counselor: But if this approval were necessary then you would have always had the approval of all those who matter to you. Do you agree? Counselee: Yes. Counselor: But not everybody who matters to you has in fact always given you their approval. Is that correct? Counselee: Yes, like my dad! Counselor: So at least some people who matter to you don’t have to give you their approval; otherwise they would necessarily have given it. Counselee: That’s right. Counselor: So it can’t possibly be true that you must have the approval of all those who matter to you. Because, this would mean that their approval

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was both necessary and not necessary at the same time, which is impossible. Counselee: Hmmm. I see exactly what you’re saying. If I really had to have this approval, I would have already gotten it; but I didn’t. Counselor: Right! So, your premise that you must have the approval of all those who matter to you makes no sense.

In this Socratic way, the counselee can be helped to see exactly why his premise is irrational and therefore why he should not continue to hold it. Notice how the counselor helped the counselee to see a contradiction in his demand for approval. In this way, the “must” was demonstrated to be untenable. The above refutation of Rule 4 can be more eloquent than a similar refutation of a lower-order rule, such as Rule 1. This is because it is possible to use the higher-order refutation to help disarm the lower-order premise: Counselor: Now, let’s also take a look at your premise that, if your dad tells you you’re stupid, then you must be worthless. Now that you see that you don’t have to have the approval of all those who matter to you, do you still think his telling you that you’re stupid is a reason to think you’re worthless? Counselee: No, not really. I don’t need my dad to approve of me so I don’t really need to take what he says about me so seriously. But I still feel really down when I think of him telling me I’m stupid.

In this case, it appears that the counselee does not have any further reason beyond his now refuted demand for approval for holding on to Rule 1 (“If my dad often tells me I’m stupid, then I must be worthless”). As such, the refutation of the demand for approval has helped to disarm this lower-order premise. Sometimes, however, refutation of the higher-order premise might not be enough. This is because, strictly speaking, the lower-order premise is not shown to be false or irrational just by virtue of refuting the higherorder premise from which it is deduced. (This would be to commit the fallacy of denying the antecedent.) Thus, an independent refutation of the lower-order premise can still be indicated. This would be the case if, despite the refutation of the higher-order premise, the counselee still continued to insist on a lower-order premise deduced from it. Notice also that, on a cognitive or intellectual level, the counselee in the present case can see the force of the refutation of the demand for approval; yet he is still emotionally caught up in feeling down when he thinks of not getting approval from his dad. What the counselee therefore

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needs is more help in overcoming this tendency to self-down despite the realization that it is based on an irrational premise. This is where the construction of a philosophical antidote in alignment with a positive virtue comes in.

Step 4: Finding an Antidote to the Refuted Premises As discussed in Chapter 1, philosophical theories can be harnessed to provide powerful antidotes to fallacious premises. The appropriateness of a given philosophy will depend, in part, on whether it is consistent with other beliefs in the counselee’s belief system. For example, proposing an atheistic philosophy to a religious Christian counselee would not likely help him to overcome his irrational thinking. On the other hand, such an individual might well be at home with an antidote from Saint Thomas Aquinas or Saint Augustine. In addition, a constructive antidote to a fallacy would need to align with the transcendent virtue that trumps that fallacy. For example, the transcendent virtue to demanding perfection is metaphysical security, which involves acceptance and tolerance of the imperfections inherent in reality in contrast to an obsessive and unrealistic insistence on what ought, should, or must be. Accordingly, a philosophical theory would be appropriate as an antidote to demanding perfection if it aligned with the virtue of metaphysical security. For example, the Epicurean concept of taking pleasure in the simpler things in life rather than a dogged demand for the lavish things would bode well for a counselee who is out of work and finding it difficult to make ends meet. The refutation of a fallacy can also point towards a suitable philosophical antidote. In the present case, the counselee’s perfectionistic demand for approval was refuted by showing that it was inconsistent. Accordingly, a philosophy that helped the counselee give up this contradictory “must” in favor of a perspective that took a consistent, realistic perspective would be appropriate. This philosophy would be one that helped the counselee accept the world that is rather than the world that must be. In the former world, in contrast to the latter world, not everyone always approves of oneself but one can still live reasonably contented. For example, Spinoza provides the core of such an antidote toward greater metaphysical security. Spinoza states: After men began to form universal ideas and devise models of houses, buildings, towers, and the like, and to prefer some models of things to others, it came about that one called perfect what he saw agreed with the

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universal ideas he had formed of this kind of thing, and imperfect, what he saw agreed less with the model he had conceived.10

Here, Spinoza is saying that the origin of perfectionistic ideas is preferences; that is, people have the propensity to turn what they prefer into “musts.” This philosophical approach thus admonishes us to stay at the level of preferences rather than prejudicially catapulting our preferences into judgments about what is perfect or less than perfect. The philosophical counselor might then introduce the counselee to this idea, weaving it into the fabric of her philosophical counsel: Counselor: Let’s then see if we can find more rational premises than the ones we have just debunked. We now see that it is unreasonable to think that you must have the approval of all those who matter to you. In fact, one great philosopher by the name of Spinoza said that the whole business of talking about perfect things—like everybody who matters to you always approving of you—is just a way of turning what you would prefer into what must be. Counselee: You mean I want these people to approve of me, so I say that they must do this? Counselor: Yes, that’s exactly right. And Spinoza tells us that this is just based on prejudice rather than on reality. So you can be more realistic if you avoid making demands in terms of “musts” and stick to preferences. There’s nothing unrealistic about preferring things to be a certain way even if you realize that you may never satisfy your preferences. Counselee: You mean like I would prefer to be a billionaire even though it’s not going to happen. Counselor: Yes, it’s probably not going to happen. But you don’t have to be a billionaire to be happy any more than you need the approval of your dad to be happy. Counselee: I see. Counselor: Thinking in terms of what is rather than what must be can help you to feel more secure about reality. If you keep demanding perfection, you will invariably end up dissatisfied because reality is not perfect. So what we can work on is becoming more secure about reality through giving up unrealistic “musts” such as the demand that certain others always approve of you. Once you get used to this, you will have acquired an important virtue, what we LBT counselors call ‘metaphysical security,’ that is, security about reality itself. So this can be a very constructive goal: working on getting into the habit of not getting carried away in the nevernever land of demands for perfection. And you can start by taking Spinoza’s advice of sticking to preferences rather than “musts.”

Notice how, in the above, the counselor helped the counselee set a rational agenda for overcoming his irrational demand for the approval of

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certain others. Here, by drawing out the implications of the counselee’s own thinking, she helped the counselee to adopt a virtuous goal to which to aspire—metaphysical security; and he suggested a means to move toward attainment of this goal, namely a philosophical antidote for overcoming the demand for perfection gleaned from Spinoza. There may also be multiple virtues that could be assigned to a counselee to work on. For example, in the present case the counselee tends to be self-downing and berating. Accordingly, he could benefit from aspiring to the transcendent virtue of respect, especially self-respect. This virtue involves unconditional respect of self, based on a philosophical understanding of human worth and dignity. It can therefore set the standard for selection and use of further philosophical antidotes to help the counselee focus on becoming more self-respecting. Counselor: Let’s take another look at your premise that says that if you don’t get the approval of those who matter to you such as your dad, then you’re worthless. You said that you still feel uncomfortable about this premise even though you know that it is not reasonable. Counselee: Yes, when I even think about him calling me stupid, I start to question my self-worth. Counselor: So let’s see if we can help you to overcome this tendency and to attain what we LBT counselors call unconditional self-respect. This involves accepting yourself even if others put you down; and even if, as we all do, you make mistakes. Counselee: But if I accept myself unconditionally as you say, doesn’t that mean I have to be perfect? Counselor: No, not at all. You can make mistakes but that doesn’t mean you are a mistake. We can do stupid things but that doesn’t make us stupid. Counselee: I think I see what you are saying. Even very smart people make mistakes. Counselor: That’s right. And you are just as worthy as a person even if others try to put you down. Counselee: That’s what I really have to work on. Counselor: Right. There is a philosopher who might be able to give you some help here. His name is Immanuel Kant, an Eighteenth Century German philosopher who held that the worth and dignity of human beings does not depend on whether they get the approval of others or serve useful purposes or whether or not they mess up. For him their worth is unconditional. Human beings, he said, are not like objects that we manipulate and use for certain purposes and discard when we have no more use for them or when we no longer like them. Instead, human beings are persons. This means that they can think things through rationally and make choices for themselves. That’s a far cry from merely being some hunk of inert matter. Counselee: Even if I screw up badly, I’m still a person with worth?

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Counselor: That’s right, because you can learn from your mistakes and make decisions to do things differently next time. That’s exactly what it means, according to Kant, to have worth and dignity. Counselee: I see. So I don’t need the approval of anyone to have this power to think and make choices. I can still have worth and dignity even without the approval of my dad or anyone else. Counselor: That’s right! You’ve got it right on!

In this dialogue, the counselor helped the counselee to focus on another LBT virtue—that of unconditional self-respect, as a means to overcoming the cognitive dissonance between his irrational premise that he must have the respect of others in order to be worthy, and his rational rejection of this premise. In setting this goal, the counselee now has a mark at which to aim, a target destination, even if this goal is an ideal that can never be perfectly attained. Further, the counselor offered the counselee a means by which to go about seeking this goal, namely that of using the philosophy of Kant as an antidote to overcoming approval damnation. In this regard, the counselor helped the counselee to frame his view of his own worth in terms of Kantian respect for human worth and dignity. With this new construct of self-worth, the counselee is asked to see himself, not as some functional object that must satisfy the desires of others (including his dad), but as an end in itself, a locus of intrinsic worth and value. And the counselor explained that, for Kant, this new way of viewing oneself in terms of unconditional (rather than contingent) self-worth is grounded in the ability to make autonomous decisions, especially in response to learning from one’s mistakes. Using Philosophical Bibliotherapy to Help Construct Antidotes In helping the counselee to better comprehend and internalize suggested philosophical antidotes and/or to discover additional antidotes that the counselee might apply in overcoming his irrational premises, it can be useful for LBT therapists to use “philosophical bibliotherapy.”11 This involves assigning pertinent philosophical readings to the counselee as homework. For example, while Kant’s writings are very difficult for the general reader (and even for professional philosophers), there are very readable secondary sources that explain Kant’s view about respect for persons. Philosophical trade books also exist, which can contain pertinent discussions. For example, the self-help book, What Would Aristotle Do?,12 includes discussions on Kant’s view as well as case studies to illustrate it. Here, there is much room for the LBT counselor to be creative. In so doing, she will need to balance the concern for philosophical rigor against

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practical concerns such as the ability of the counselee to comprehend the material. In doing so, the counselor should consider the capacity of the particular counselee in making selections. Indeed, LBT counselors have a responsibility to share their experiences in choosing bibliotherapy with other counselors so that the available literature can be identified and catalogued. As the philosophical counseling profession expands, this is likely to provide an invaluable resource for practitioners in their effort to help their counselees. Now, with the philosophical edifice of antidotes/transcendent virtues in place, the LBT process can be taken to its next and final stage of exercising willpower.

Step 5: Exercising Willpower in Overcoming Cognitive Dissonance Here is where the rubber meets the road. At this stage, the counselee has the conceptual and philosophical machinery to make suitable changes in his behavioral and emotional responses. He has gained a clear view of his own emotional reasoning; is aware of his irrational premises; understands why they are irrational; has available rational, philosophical antidotes instead of his self-stultifying premises; and is challenged to use these antidotes as means to the virtuous ends he has in view. However, there is still the cognitive dissonance between the counselee’s rational, philosophical constructs and his well-engrained irrational ones. Being in this state of conflict or cognitive dissonance means that one has finally arrived at a rational view that is in conflict with his deeply ingrained irrational thinking. Arriving at this state of conflict and coming to be aware of the conflict is inevitable if constructive change is to occur; so such cognitive dissonance is actually a positive sign of progress. Identifying the Counselee’s Behavioral Reasoning At this stage, the behavioral implications of the counselee’s irrational beliefs need to be carefully unpacked and a behavioral plan of action based on the counselee’s new antidotal wisdom needs to be created. In other words, there needs to be behavioral as well as cognitive changes. Counselor: Let’s now work on what you can do to begin to make constructive changes in your life. What are some of the things you do, how do you act, when you start to think you are worthless? Suppose you have just been told by your dad that you are stupid and you start to tell yourself

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that he must be right and that you are really worthless. What things do you do in response? Counselee: Sometimes he does it when I stop by for dinner, and he does it at the dinner table. Usually it’s just my mom and sister, but he even does it when there are others there—relatives, family friends, and even neighbors. Counselor: Okay, what do you do when he does it when there’s a bunch of people present? Counselee: I just smile even though I am dying on the inside. I try not to call attention to myself. Counselor: And what would happen if you called attention to yourself, say by speaking up? Counselee: It’d make me look even more worthless because then I would look disrespectful. Counselor: Disrespectful? Counselee: Yes, he’s still my dad and all. Counselor: Yes, and he’d still be your dad if you spoke up. Counselee: True but I would look bad. Counselor: Does this have anything to do with your demand for approval? Counselee: Yes, I suppose so. I don’t want these people to think poorly of me. Counselor: And if they did, then you would be worthless? Should we add them to the list of people from whom you feel you need approval? Counselee: Yes, I think so. I know most of them since I’m a little kid. Counselor: So how do you act on other occasions when someone is disapproving of you for whom you demand approval? Counselee: Pretty much the same way. I try to blend in as much as I can. I don’t say anything and just let it go.

Here, the counselor has helped the counselee to unpack his behavioral reasoning. He has helped the counselee to see just what he is deducing in the way of prescribed actions from his conclusion that he is worthless. As discussed in Chapter 1, this behavioral reasoning takes the form of a behavioral prescription (P) deduced from the justification (J) and a behavioral rule (If J then P): If J then P J So, P

Thus: (Behavioral Rule) If I am worthless then I should just try to blend in and not be noticed. (Justification) I am worthless (Behavioral Prescription) So I should try to blend in and not be noticed.

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As such, the counselor has helped the counselee to get clear about his behavioral rule from which he is deducing his actions. It is important to emphasize that LBT is not claiming that all behavioral responses are “deduced.” Only voluntary behavior is deduced behavior, that is, behavior that is “decided.” Thus, internal behavior such as changes in blood pressure and heart rate are not deduced, although it is possible to control these responses through deliberately changing one’s thinking or acting. Similarly, automatic or “hard wired” responses to a stimulus, for example, jumping when one hears a loud noise, are not deduced behavioral responses. It is also important to point out that only the behavioral “should” is, strictly speaking, deduced. That is, the counselee deduces that he should act in a certain way. There is therefore a “behavioral gap” that is filled when the counselee acts as he tells himself he “should.” This is important because the behavior is not guaranteed. This can cut two ways. The irrational “should” is not automatic, which means it can be pre-empted or stopped by a rational “should.” On the other hand, the rational “should” is also not automatic, which means that one has to expend willpower in actualizing it. Building a Plan of Action Once the irrational behavior is identified, a rational plan of action can be created, which can be used to overcome this behavior. This plan will be based on the philosophical antidotes that were formulated in the fourth step. That is, an opposing set of behavioral “shoulds” can be deduced from the antidote. Counselor: Now that we have identified what you are doing in response to those who disapprove of you, let’s see if we can change this behavior to something more rational. Counselee: Okay, what would that be? Counselor: This would be up to you, but it would be based on the wisdom of the philosophers we talked about. Remember what Kant advised? Counselee: Yes I do. He said to respect yourself, treat yourself like you are worthy of respect, and not to treat yourself as though you were an object. Counselor: That’s right! When you try to “blend in,” as you say, when your dad, or others, put you down, are you treating yourself like you are worthy of respect? Counselee: No, I suppose not. Counselor: And why not? Counselee: Because I’m letting others say these things and I just smile. They are kind of manipulating me, like I’m some kind of puppet. They put

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me down and I just sit there and smile as though they have a point, and I’m just what they say I am—stupid. Counselor: So how do you propose to change your behavior to be more respectful of yourself? Counselee: I could not smile. Maybe I could say something like I don’t appreciate being talked down to like that. Counselor: Yes, you could indeed assert yourself in that way; so let’s roleplay it. I’ll be your dad and imagine we’re sitting at the dinner table with a bunch of guests, and I say, “You are so stupid, son.” Counselee: Dad, I don’t appreciate being put down like that. How would you like it if someone called you stupid? Counselor: So how are you feeling now that you put your dad on notice not to talk to you like that? Counselee: I’m feeling very uncomfortable because everyone is looking at me and my dad is really pissed at me. Counselor: Do you want their approval? Counselee: Yes, and I just lost it, at least my dad’s. Counselor: But do you remember what Spinoza would advise about demanding that you get the approval of others? Recall that Spinoza admonished us to stick to preferences rather than demands for perfection. Counselee: Yes, it might be preferable to get the approval of my dad and the others, but I shouldn’t demand it because it’s just a preference. Counselor: Yes, that’s right. And, who knows, maybe your dad and the others may actually approve of you more after you speak up; but if they don’t then so be it. It’s not necessary that you have their approval. Counselee: I really see where this is going. Counselor: Well, then that sounds like a plan. And this fits well with what Kant advised also, namely not to treat yourself like a mere thing. By asserting yourself you will be making a statement that you are not to be treated like some object to be manipulated and used. You will be asserting your dignity and self-determination, treating yourself, as Kant would say, as an end in itself, as a person worthy of respect. And you can do this without demanding the approval of anyone, as Spinoza would advise. Counselee: Yes, I am willing to give this a try.

In the above interchange the counselor has helped the counselee to draw out the implications of Kant and Spinoza in building a plan of action. Effectively, the counselor has helped the counselee to construct behavioral reasoning using Kant and Spinoza as major premises: (Behavioral Rule) If your dad or others put you down then you should treat yourself as an end in itself by asserting yourself (by speaking up). (Justification) Your dad or others are putting you down. (Behavioral Prescription) So, you should treat yourself as an end in itself by asserting yourself (by speaking up).

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And: (Behavioral Rule) If you prefer the approval of others then you should acknowledge this is just a preference and not demand that you get it. (Justification) You prefer the approval of your dad and company. (Behavioral Prescription) So, you should acknowledge this is just a preference and not demand that you get their approval.

These rational syllogisms clearly conflict with the counselee’s irrational syllogism: (Behavioral Rule) If I am worthless then I should just try to blend in and not be noticed. (Justification) I am worthless. (Behavioral Prescription) So, I should just try to blend in and not be noticed.

Implementing the Plan of Action This state of cognitive dissonance between the first two rational syllogisms and the third irrational one can be resolved by building and exercising willpower. This involves actually practicing the new behavior rather than simply cognizing it. Thus, the counselee might be given homework assignments, which include other actions besides speaking up when others put the counselee down. One example would be “shame attacking exercises,”13 which involve doing something likely to evoke the disapproval or negative judgment of others. The counselee could begin with trying something that would be less difficult to perform at first, for example, disagreeing with a vendor about the price of a store item, then graduating to something more challenging such as eating in a restaurant by himself (if this sort of thing embarrasses him) or walking down a crowded street talking to an imaginary friend. After each act the counselee would then be instructed to deal with the shame by constructing the emotional reasoning, finding its irrational premises, refuting them, and applying the given philosophical antidotes. The counselor could also continue to do role-playing such as that contained in the above dialogue wherein the counselor assumes the role of the counselee’s dad. “Rational-emotive imagery”14 is another possible approach to helping the counselee work toward constructive cognitive and behavioral change. This involves imagining one is in the challenging situation; allowing oneself to think and feel as one would if one were actually in that situation; and then changing one’s thinking by applying the rational,

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antidotal line of reasoning. For example, the counselee could imagine that he is seated at the dinner table along with his dad and company, and his dad calls him stupid. The counselee could then allow himself to think and feel his old thoughts and feelings about how he must really be stupid. Then, in the midst of these thoughts and feelings he can change his line of thinking to the rational line. Thus he can think, “Just because my dad says I’m stupid doesn’t mean that I really am stupid. My worth and dignity doesn’t depend on what he or anyone else thinks. It is unconditional and I really don’t need their approval anyway, even though I might prefer it.” In this way, the counselee can work on preparing himself for, or building up to, the “real” situation, where he will also exercise his willpower to assert himself. Such rational-emotive imagery can be a very powerful mechanism toward making constructive change. While the counselee can practice it on his own, the counselor should allow the counselee to practice first in the counseling environment so that the counselee understands how it is done; it is clear that he is benefitting from it; and that there aren’t any adverse consequences—such as the counselee not being able to cope adequately with the self-induced imagery and its attendant irrational thoughts and feelings. In implementing the plan of action, the counselee has thus begun to overcome the inertia of his irrational beliefs in line with his considered antidotes and their respective virtues. As discussed, this positive motion toward constructive change is possible only if the counselee first identifies the irrational reasoning that drives her self-defeating emotions and behavior. In facilitating this first step, it is helpful for the counselor to have at her disposal a set of commonplace behavioral reasoning templates that can be “fleshed out” in terms of the counselee’s actual premises. Such a set of BRTs is provided in the next chapter.

Notes 1

Carl Rogers, On Becoming a Person (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1961). Elliot D. Cohen, The New Rational Therapy (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2006), 16. 3 See Chapter 11, this book. 4 Ibid. 5 Ibid. 6 See, for example, the description of the character of Socrates in Samuel Enouch Stumpf, Philosophy: History and Problems, 3rd Edition (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1983), 33-35. 2

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See, generally, Cohen, The New Rational Therapy. See Chapter 10, this book. 9 See Chapter 1, this book. 10 Spinoza, Ethics, pt. 4, “Of Human Bondage or the Power of the Affects,” in A Spinoza Reader, ed. and trans. Edwin Curley (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1994), 198. 11 For a case study in which philosophical bibliotherapy has been successfully used, see Elliot D. Cohen, “The Philosopher as Counselor,” in Philosophers at Work: Issues and Practice of Philosophy, 2nd ed., ed. Elliot D. Cohen (Belmont CA: Harcourt, 2000), 457-467. 12 Cohen, What Would Aristotle Do? (Prometheus Books, 2003). 13 Albert Ellis, Overcoming Destructive Beliefs, Feelings, and Behaviors (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 2001), 27. 14 Ibid., 87. 8

CHAPTER THREE EMOTIONAL REASONING TEMPLATES IN MULTILEVEL REASONING As discussed in Chapter 2, a counselee’s emotional reasoning can be composed of several levels of interfacing or piggybacking syllogisms.1 For example, the counselee who tells himself that he is a failure because he lost his job may harbor more general premises from which he deduces his conclusion about his being a failure. In many cases counselees may be basing their self-damnation on an unrealistic demand for perfection.2 The below set of interfacing syllogisms illustrates this aspect of emotional reasoning: (Major Premise Rule 2) I must never fail at anything. (Minor Premise Report 2) If I must never fail at anything, then if I lost (failed at keeping) my job, then I’m a failure. (Conclusion 2/Major Premise Rule 1) If I lost my job then I’m a failure. (Minor Premise Report 1) I lost my job. (Conclusion 1) I’m a failure.

These interfacing syllogisms comprise a deductively valid argument that can be turned into a template for a deductively valid argument by eliminating reference to any particular intentional object. Instead, the intentional object can simply be replaced with a blank that provides a placeholder for a particular thing at which one has failed. Such schematization of emotional reasoning yields emotional reasoning templates (ERT), which can be used in other therapeutic contexts to address the problems of other counselees whose pattern of emotional reasoning is similar.

ERTs Pertaining to Failure Fig. 2-1 displays the pattern of emotional reasoning in the previous set of interfacing syllogisms with all of its intentional objects removed.

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(Major Premise Rule 2) I must never fail at anything. (Minor Premise Report 2) If I must never fail at anything, then if I failed at_______, then I’m a failure. (Conclusion 2) If I failed at _______then I’m a failure. (Minor Premise Report 1) I failed at _______. (Conclusion 1) I’m a failure Fig. 2-1. Template in which self-damnation is deduced from a demand for perfection.

The pattern of reasoning in Fig. 2-1 can be used to construct the emotional reasoning of a counselee who is deducing self-damnation from a demand for perfection not to fail at anything. The point of having such a template is that the counselee’s reasoning can be easily identified. Having a stock of ERT’s at one’s disposal can provide a useful tool for both the counselee and the counselor. It can be useful for the counselee because it shows him exactly what his reasoning is once he is able to fill in the blanks with his intentional object. And, it can be useful for the counselor in roughly the same way it can be useful for a logician to know the various invalid forms of deductive reasoning. It enables the counselor to quickly identify the counselee’s reasoning so that he can help the counselee to see what is wrong with it. However, ERTs are not intended as a substitute for going through the LBT process as discussed in Chapter 2. Rather, having such an inventory of pre-constructed templates of reasoning allows the counselor to offer the counselee a way of “seeing” his reasoning laid out before him. Indeed, some counselees in my experience have found it easier to assess their own reasoning when they finally see it clearly articulated through the use of ERTs. This can be accomplished by having a pre-printed set of diverse templates, each arranged on a “flash card” or separate piece of paper so that the counselee can see it, and fill in his intentional object. Notice that Minor Premise Report 2 of Fig. 2-1 is a bridging rule that validates the inference from Major Premise Rule 2 to Conclusion 2. However, while this premise is necessary for the validity of the argument, it is not ordinarily a premise in which fallacies reside that can’t be identified in the major premise rule itself. So, for purposes of making an ERT more “user friendly,” that is, less complicated for the counselee to follow, it is not unreasonable to omit it.3

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Accordingly, Fig. 2-1.1 provides a version of the ERT in Fig. 2-1 that omits the Minor Premise Report 2 bridging premise. It also omits technical labeling of components, making it as “user friendly” as reasonably possible. Subsequent formulation of ERTs in this chapter also omit bridging premises and technical labeling. 1.) 2.) 3.) 4.)

I must never fail at anything. So, if I failed at____ then I’m a failure. I failed at ____. So, I’m a failure.

Fig 2-1.1. Template omitting bridging premise and technical labeling.

While some counselees may harbor the global demand never to fail as given in line 1 of Fig. 2-1.1,4 in some cases counselees may demand that they not fail at a particular thing/s.5 Thus a more specific ERT could be constructed such as the one presented in Fig. 2-2. 1.) 2.) 3.) 4.)

I must never fail at _____. So, if I failed at ____ then I’m a failure. I failed at ____. So, I’m a failure.

Fig. 2-2. Template deducing self-damnation from a variable demand for perfection.

Note that the ERT in Fig. 2-2 now includes a blank to mark a variable or placeholder for something that the counselee believes he must never fail at, for example, keeping his job. The emerging patterns of reasoning in Figs. 2-1 and 2.2 provide ERTs that can be presented to counselees for consideration. The counselee can then be asked to see if he can consistently fill in the blank with something that would lead him to accept the premises. In so doing, the counselee would succeed in displaying his own emotional reasoning. In this way, the counselee’s premises are instantly revealed, and with the guidance of the LBT counselor, the counselee then has an opportunity to examine the premises; identify the irrational premises undergirding his self-defeating emotion; refute them (i.e., show why they are irrational); and replace them with more rational beliefs. Which ERT/s in particular an LBT therapist presents to a counselee for consideration largely depends on the counselee’s specific O and R. Thus, if the counselee has disclosed O and R elements having to do with failing at

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something, then a template that meets these parameters such as the ones in Fig. 2.1 or Fig. 2-2 could be appropriate. LBT counselors can eliminate considerable trial and error by having a clear understanding of what the counselee’s O and R elements are before presenting the counselee with any ERT. Because the intentional object and rating elements contained in the ERTs presented in Figs. 2-1 and 2-2 may conform to the parameters of the cognitive definition for depression given in Table 2-1, these templates can appropriately be used in some contexts in which a counselee is depressed, namely ones in which a counselee is depressed about having failed at something and rates herself as a failure, and consequently bleakly perceives her own existence. Clearly, however, such cases do not exhaust the range of contexts of depression. Accordingly other templates for use in cases of depression (as well as other emotions) may be constructed and appropriately offered to counselees for consideration. Table 1: Cognitive Definition of Depression Emotion

Intentional Object

Rating

Depression

An event or state of affairs

Strong negative rating of this event or state of affairs on the basis of which one bleakly perceives one’s own existence.

ERTs Pertaining to the Demand for Approval One commonplace basis of depression is the demand that one have the approval of certain persons, for example one’s parents, significant others, friends, or work supervisor.6 In such instances, when one’s demand for approval is not satisfied, one may deduce self-damnation.7 Fig. 2-3 provides an ERT for such emotional reasoning. 1.) I must always have the approval of _(insert person/s)_. 2.) So, if I did _(insert action)_ and ____disapproved of it, then I’d be worthless. 3.) I did ____ and ____disapproved of it. 4.) So, I’m worthless. Fig. 2-3. Template mapping cognitive element of depression based on a variable demand for approval.

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In Fig. 2-3, the blank in the premise on line 1 is a placeholder for the name of a person/s from whom the counselee demands approval. In the premise on line 2, the first blank is a placeholder for something the counselee did, of which this person/s (according to the counselee) disapproves. In this case, in accordance with the rating element (R) of depression, I may bleakly perceive my future on the basis of the disapproval, and therefore experience depression. Hence it may be appropriate to offer the ERT given in Fig. 2-3 to a counselee who is depressed about having lost the approval of a certain individual. For example, the counselee might have perceived himself to have gotten the disapproval of his supervisor because of a work-related mistake, on the basis of which he has rated himself a worthless person.

ERTs Pertaining to the Demand for a Perfect World Another ERT that may be appropriate for depression includes the demand that bad things never happen to oneself,8 from which one deduces the terribleness of the entire world. 1.) Bad things must never happen to me. 2.) So, if ______ happened to me then the world would be a terrible place. 3.) ______ happened to me. 4.) So, the world is a terrible place. Fig. 2-4. Template mapping cognitive component of depression based on an absolute demand that bad things never happen to self.

In Fig. 2-4, the blank is a placeholder for something that happened to the counselee, which she thinks makes the world a terrible place. If the LBT counselor surmises that the counselee’s intentional object (O) is an event on the basis of which the counselee may be negatively globally rating the entire world, then the emerging template may be useful in helping the counselee identify his emotional reasoning. For example, the ERT in Fig. 2-4 would be appropriately presented to a counselee who has been the victim of a Ponzi scheme and now perceives the world to be a terrible place.

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Table 2-2. Cognitive Definition of Anger Emotion Anger

Intentional Object An action

Rating Strong negative rating of the action or the person who performed it.

ERTs appropriate to anger as cognitively defined in Table 2-2 are also possible. One common basis of anger is the egocentric demand for honest and fair treatment by others.9 Fig. 2-5 exhibits such an ERT. 1.) Others must always treat me honestly and fairly. 2.) So, if _(insert person)_ did _(insert perceived dishonest or unfair act)_ to me, then ____ is a rotten person. 3.) ___ did ___ to me. 4.) So, ____ is a rotten person. Fig. 2-5. Template mapping cognitive element of anger based on an absolute demand for fair and honest treatment by others.

The emotional reasoning in Fig. 2-5 deduces damnation of others from the absolute demand that one be treated honestly and fairly by others. Inasmuch as the intentional object (O), in this case, is an action (as given in line 2) and the rating (R) of the person performing the given action is strongly negative, the parameters for the cognitive definition of anger are satisfied as provided in Table 2-2. Accordingly, the ERT in Fig. 2-5 may be appropriate in cases in which a counselee exhibits anger against a certain person/s for having acted in a manner perceived by the counselee to be dishonest or unfair.

ERTs Pertaining to the Demand for Control The demand for control can be another basis of depression;10 but it can also be a basis for intense or self-destructive guilt.11 When counselees tell themselves that they must always have control over a certain sort of thing, they can experience intense guilt about having failed to control what they must. The ERT in Fig. 2-6 shows how this can happen.

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1.) I must always maintain control over _______. 2.) So, if I lost control over ______and something terrible happened then I’d be a bad person. 3.) I lost control over ______ and _(insert perceived terrible thing)_ happened. 4.) So, I’m a bad person. Fig. 2-6. Template mapping cognitive element of guilt based on a variable demand for control.

The blank in the premise on line 1 is a placeholder for something the counselee demands control over, for example, the welfare of her child. The second blank in the premise on line 2 is then something the counselee perceives to be terrible, for example her child getting injured. Inasmuch as the counselee believes she has violated a moral principle (for example, a parental duty not to allow harm to come to her child) and damns herself for it, she satisfies the parameters of guilt as provided in Table 2-3.12 It would therefore be appropriate to present the ERT in Fig. 2-6 to a counselee whose intentional object (O) includes the perception of having violated a moral principle to exercise control (O), and whose rating (R) is self-damnation based on the perceived violation. Table 2-3. Cognitive Definition of Guilt Emotion

Intentional Object

Rating

Guilt

A moral principle, one perceives oneself to have violated.

Strong condemnation of the perceived violation or oneself.

Functional brain imaging has also confirmed that depression is linked to guilt.13 This apparent psycho-physiological correlation is explicable in LBT terms inasmuch as the perception of having violated a perceived sacrosanct moral principle can take its toll on the perceived worthiness of one’s very existence. The ERT in Fig. 2-6 can accordingly also be the basis of depression with suicidal ideation. This is especially the case when the additional rating element of being a person unworthy of being alive is added to the rating (R). 1.) I must always maintain control over _______. 2.) So, if I lost control over ______and something terrible happened then I’d be a bad person and unworthy of being alive.

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3.) I lost control over ______ and _(insert perceived terrible thing)_ happened. 4.) So, I’m a bad person and unworthy of being alive. Fig. 2-6.1. Template mapping cognitive element of depression based on a variable demand for control.

Figs. 2-6 and 2-6.1 show how both guilt and depression can have their source in the demand for control. Hence, an LBT counselor can tackle both by addressing the demand for control, refuting it, and replacing it with a more rational premise, for example, that I shouldn’t attempt to control things that are not in my power to control. Table 2-4. Cognitive Definition of Anxiety Emotion

Intentional Object

Rating

Anxiety

A future event or possible future event having certain forecasted consequences

Strong negative rating of forecasted consequences on the basis of which one perceives need to ruminate about them.

The demand for control can also be a major source of anxiety.14 This can be the case when, in accordance with the parameters of anxiety given in Table 2-4, the intentional object (O) is the possibility of something going wrong and certain undesirable consequences ensuing. The ERT in Fig. 2-7 maps this case. 1.) I must be in control at all times. 2.) Therefore, if something could go wrong and something terrible could happen then I must constantly be thinking about it and cannot let myself relax. 3.) _____ could go wrong and _(insert perceived terrible consequence/s)_ could happen. 4.) Therefore, I must constantly be thinking about it and cannot let myself relax. Fig. 2-7. Template mapping cognitive element of anxiety based on an absolute demand for control.

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The first blank in the premise on line 3 of Fig. 2-7 is a placeholder for something the counselee thinks could go wrong, for example, losing his job; and the second blank is a placeholder for a perceived terrible consequence/s of what could go wrong, for example not being able to find another job. Notice that the ERT in Fig. 2-6 can be a source of guilt that reinforces the conclusion on line 4 of the ERT in Fig. 2-7. Thus a counselee may tell himself that he must constantly be thinking about his job situation and when he tries not to think about it, he feels guilty. This can occur because he is simultaneously deducing the conclusion on line 2 of Fig. 2-6.1, for instance, that if he fails to maintain control over his job situation and is consequently unable to get another job, then he’d be a bad person.

ERTs Pertaining to Low Frustration Tolerance The global demand for things to always be the way one wants them to be can be a basis of low frustration tolerance, that is, the tendency to become easily frustrated.15 Thus, for a counselee with this premise, if things do not go smoothly and reality does not conform to this demand, she tells herself that she can’t stand it. The ERT in Fig. 2-8 maps this selfdisturbing form of emotional reasoning. 1.) 2.) 3.) 4.)

Things must always be the way I want them to be. So, if ____ is not the way I want it to be then I can’t stand it. ____ is not the way I want it to be. I can’t stand it.

Fig. 2-8. Template mapping cognitive element of low tolerance frustration based on an absolute demand for want fulfillment.

The blank in the ERT in Fig. 2-8 is a placeholder for something the counselee thinks has gone wrong or is not what she wanted. For example, a commonplace instance is when a task or job appears to be too difficult to accomplish or takes more time than one wants to spend. In this case, the counselee may give up and not even try. The ERT in Fig. 2-8 would be appropriate to present to a counselee who satisfies the parameters of low tolerance frustration given in Table 25. In this case, the LBT counselor should look for an intentional object (O) expressing a perceived difficulty or intolerability of a particular activity or state of affairs. The rating (R) would then be a strong negative rating of trying to tolerate the activity or state of affairs in question. Counselees’ use

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of the term “I can’t stand” or its equivalents can indicate the perception of intolerability or difficultness, while the term “shouldn’t try” or its equivalents can indicate the negative rating.16 Table 2-5. Cognitive Definition of Low Tolerance Frustration Emotion

Intentional Object

Rating

Low Tolerance Frustration

An activity or state of affairs perceived to be difficult or intolerable for oneself

Strong negative rating of trying to tolerate (perform, manage, or accept) the activity or state of affairs.

Of course, frustration is not necessarily an irrational emotion, since counselees can have a rational basis for being frustrated; however, in the case of low tolerance frustration, there is typically a global demand that things go the way the counselee wants them to go.17 Hence, in making this irrational demand, the counselee transmutes his wants into what must be.18

Using Emotional Reasoning Templates in LBT A logic-based analysis of belief system mapping as distinct from the causal one used in classical formulations of cognitive behavioral therapy can provide a useful means of generating emotional reasoning templates (ERT), which can help counselees to key into the problematic premises of their reasoning; and therefore to begin to work toward changing their destructive, irrational premises to more rational ones. Such a logic-based analysis utilizes the mechanism of the practical syllogism to construct a justificatory or epistemic model of counselee reasoning consisting of interfacing sets of syllogisms. These syllogistic systems can in turn be turned into templates or general emotional reasoning frameworks by eliminating reference to particular counselee input and replacing it with placeholders to be filled in by the individual counselee. LBT counselors can select appropriate ERTs to present to counselees by keying into counselees’ intentional object (O) and rating (R) elements. These elements comprise counselees’ primary level syllogisms as well as cognitively define counselees’ emotions. This chapter has provided several ERTs keyed to specific emotions, namely, depression, guilt, anxiety, and low tolerance frustration. A range of ERTs have been offered that map some of the more problematic beliefs addressed by LBT counselors.

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As discussed in Chapter 2, helping counselees to identify their emotional reasoning is the first step in overcoming such self-defeating emotions. LBT counselors are then able to help their counselees to identify their irrational premises, refute them, find philosophical antidotes to them, and exercise willpower to act, think, and feel in line with this antidotal wisdom. Exercising the latter willpower can present a major challenge to counselees who must work to overcome the inertia of cognitive dissonance. In the next chapter, two contrasting philosophical models are presented for helping counselees deal successfully with cognitive dissonance.

Notes 1

Elliot D. Cohen, “Philosophical Principles of Logic-Based Therapy,” Practical Philosophy 6, No. 1 (2003): 27-35. 2 Albert Ellis, Overcoming Destructive Beliefs, Feelings, And Behaviors (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 2001), 337-338. 3 It is true that LBT emphasizes the exposing of all suppressed premises. However, there appears to be a need for balancing technical validity with utility. If the ERTs are too complicated, many counselees may find them distracting and too difficult to follow, which could derail counseling success. 4 David Burns, Feeling Good: The New Mood Therapy (New York: Harper, 2008). 5 Albert Ellis, Feeling Better, Getting Better, Staying Better (Atascadero, CA: Impact Publishers, 2001); Susan Walen, Raymond DiGuiseppi, and Windy Dryden, A Practitioner’s Guide To Rational-Emotive Therapy (New York: Oxford, 1992). 6 Ellis, Overcoming Destructive Beliefs, Feelings, and Behaviors. 7 Cohen, “Philosophical Principles of Logic-Based Therapy.” 8 Albert Ellis,”The Philosophical Basis of Rational-Emotive Therapy (RET),” International Journal of Applied Philosophy Vol. 5, No. 2 (1990): 35-41. 9 Ellis, Feeling Better, Getting Better, Staying Better. 10 Elliot D. Cohen, “Syllogizing RET: Applying Formal Logic in Rational-Emotive Therapy,” Journal of Rational-Emotive and Cognitive Behavior Therapy Vol. 10, No. 4 (1992): 235-252. 11 Elliot D. Cohen, The Dutiful Worrier: How to Stop Compulsive Worry Without Feeling Guilty (Oakland, CA: New Harbinger, 2011). 12 See also Table 1, Chapter 1, this book. 13 Roland Zahn, et al, “The Neural Basis of Human Social Values: Evidence from Functional MRI,” Cerebral Cortex Vol. 19, No. 2 (2009): 276-283. 14 Cohen, The Dutiful Worrier. 15 Albert Ellis, Overcoming Resistance: A Rational Emotive Behavior Therapy Integrated Approach (New York: Springer Publishing Co, 2002).

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See discussion of volitional can’tstipation in Chapter 8, this book. See also “Relieving your Can’tstipation: Some Philosophical Enemas,” Practical Philosophy 9, No.2 (2003): 45-53. 17 Albert Ellis & Robert Harper, A New Guide to Rational Living (N. Hollywood: Wilshire Book Co, 1975); Edmund Husserl, The Paris Lectures, 2nd ed., trans. P. Koestenbaum (The Hague, Netherlands: Martinus Nijohoff Publisher, 1967). 18 Albert Ellis, “The Philosophical Basis of Rational-Emotive Therapy (RET).”

CHAPTER FOUR EXERCISING WILLPOWER IN LBT This chapter discusses two possible theoretical approaches to helping counselees exercise willpower in Logic-Based Therapy: (1) the teleological approach of Aristotle, and (2) the deontological approach of Kant. As discussed in chapter 2, the last step in the LBT process is the exercise of willpower on the part of the counselee to rationally overcome cognitive dissonance between two opposing syllogisms, one that contains in its major premise a philosophical antidote to a fallacy contained in a premise of the other, irrational syllogism. This, however, requires strength of will to overcome behavioral and emotional inclinations supported by the irrational syllogism, which tend to make the counselee’s irrational cognitions “feel right” even if she knows them to be “wrong.” These inclinations also involve underlying neurobiological conditions that help move the counselee to act, think, and feel in self-defeating ways. Thus, for example, a counselee who chronically worries about bad things happening to her children may feel very uncomfortable about not worrying and may feel a gnawing perception of guilt if she tries to stop worrying; even if she knows, on an intellectual level, that it is not a good idea for her to continue feeling this way.1 This discomfort may include sensory awareness of bodily changes such as lumps in the throat, heart palpitations and dizziness, due to increases in heart rate, blood pressure, respiration, and endocrine activity as when the counselee experiences anxiety about not being there for her child in a time of need, even if the fear is unrealistic.2 Because such irrational currents opposing a rational, antidotal syllogism can have such symbiotic roots within the counselee’s cognitivebehavioral-physiological network, the success of LBT therapy (as well as any other cognitive-behavioral approach) will depend on the ability of the counselee to exercise willpower to act, think, and feel in alignment with the new rational direction arrived at through the LBT intervention. In this regard, it is a tenet of LBT that philosophical insights can be gleaned from the philosophers of antiquity, which can be instrumental in helping

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counselees cultivate and exercise willpower to overcome the inertia of deep-seated irrational dispositions in favor of the new, rational directions.3 Two such philosophers, whose theories of will portend useful applications in LBT, are Aristotle and Kant. Each of these theories is considered below in turn.

Aristotle’s Theory of Will Aristotle appears to have been the first to carefully analyze the cognitive dissonance arising between rational and irrational practical syllogisms and to give an account of how a person who knows what is rational can nevertheless follow her irrational thinking.4 This account proceeds according to a theory of knowledge regarding the status of the minor premise of a practical syllogism in cases of loss of self-control. First, according to Aristotle, a practical syllogism is distinct from a theoretical syllogism5 inasmuch as, in the former, “the two premises result in a conclusion which is an action.”6 For example, says Aristotle: One conceives that every man ought to walk, one is a man oneself: straightway one walks; or that, in this case, no man should walk, one is a man: straightway one remains at rest. And one so acts in the two cases provided that there is nothing in the one case to compel or in the other to prevent.7

Notice that, like a theoretical syllogism, the major premise of a practical syllogism is a universal statement, e.g., “Every man ought to walk” or “No man should walk,” and the minor premise is a particular statement perceived through the senses, e.g., “I am a man.” Notice also that, unlike the theoretical syllogism, the conclusion of a practical syllogism, which is an action, does not automatically follow. Rather, it follows “provided that there is nothing in the one case to compel or in the other to prevent.” As discussed later, this qualification regarding the manner in which conclusions of practical syllogisms follow from their premises has important implications for LBT’s theory of will. Second, according to Aristotle, there are two senses in which one may be said to know: that in which a person has knowledge, which is not being used; and that in which the person has knowledge, which is being used. About these two states of knowing, he states: There will be a difference between a man’s acting wrongly, who though possessed of Knowledge does not call it into operation, and his doing so

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who has it and actually exercises it: the latter is a strange case, but the mere having, if not exercising, presents no anomaly.8

For Aristotle, the first sort of knowing (the person who possesses knowledge and still acts wrongly but does not use this knowledge) involves knowledge of the universal major premise of the practical syllogism without using this knowledge by applying the particular minor premise arrived at through the senses. For example, according to Aristotle, a person who knows that he should avoid tasting sweet things, may nevertheless succumb to tasting something sweet. This can happen when he also holds a syllogism that says that sweet things are pleasant and this is a sweet thing, and he also has a desire for something sweet.9 In this case, this person may have been in possession of knowledge (i.e., the universal premise bidding him not to taste sweet things), but nevertheless caves to an irrational inclination to eat a particular sweet thing. This is because such knowledge was not applied through the use of a minor premise. The minor premise was not “active,” as Aristotle would say.10 Aristotle also maintains that this account saves Socrates’ controversial view of knowledge according to which he who knows what is good or right will, ipso facto, act accordingly. For he states that: The position that Socrates sought to establish actually seems to result; for it is not in the presence of what is thought to be knowledge proper that the affection of incontinence arises (nor is it this that is ‘dragged about’ as a result of the state of passion), but in that of perceptual knowledge.11

That is, the knowledge of the universal statement is not “dragged about” by passion because it is not even used in cases of incontinence. Rather, it is the empirical (or perceptual) minor premise—the premise perceived through the senses—that gets “dragged about” by passion since this is the premise that is, so to speak, not fully cognized or brought under the universal premise as a result of a strong passion. In fact, the state of being swept away by a strong passion is, for Aristotle, analogous to being in a drunken state.12 When the passion subsides, the senses may once again grasp the minor premise and the knowledge of what is right may itself grow active and be “called into operation.” Notice that Aristotle claims that it is the minor premise that also “originates movement.” He states: The faculty of knowing is never moved but remains at rest. Since the one premiss or judgement is universal and the other deals with the particular (for the first tells us that such and such a kind of man should do such and

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Chapter Four such a kind of act, and the second that this is an act of the kind meant, and I a person of the type intended), it is the latter opinion that really originates movement, not the universal; or rather it is both, but the one does so while it remains in a state more like rest, while the other partakes in movement.13

Aristotle’s theory of movement as described above trades on his view of will as arising out of deliberation when the minor empirical premise activates the syllogism. Thus Aristotle states, “after having deliberated we decide, and then grasp by our Will in accordance with the result of our deliberation.” In other words the will arises when deliberation is complete, and deliberation is complete only when the minor premise is “active.” This theory about will is also embedded in Aristotle’s general theory about appetites. For Aristotle, the term “appetite” is the genus that includes desire, passion, and wish, as species.14 All of these species of appetite, claims Aristotle, are non-inferential and thus contain no deliberative element. However, according to Aristotle, “wish is found in the calculative part and desire and passion in the irrational.”15 And, “wish is a form of appetite; and when movement is produced according to calculation it is also according to wish.”16 Further, by “wish” in this context, Aristotle appears to have meant “will,” which as stated is the grasping or conation that occurs as a result of deliberation.17 Further, according to Aristotle, the object of appetite, which is reported in the empirical minor premise, is what moves the person to act. Thus, he states,” that which is the object of appetite is the stimulant of mind practical…for the object of appetite starts a movement and as a result of that thought gives rise to movement, the object of appetite being a source of stimulation (emphasis added).”18 For example, the object of desire, say this sweet thing as reported in the empirical minor premise, moves one to action once this premise is combined with the major premise that sweet things are pleasant. In this regard, it is important to note that Aristotle explicitly qualifies that it is the thought of the object of appetite, not the object itself (for example a physical object) that “starts a movement.” This means that the object of appetite figures in the empirical minor premise of the practical syllogism, and it is the latter which actively does the moving.

Aristotle’s Theory of the Deactivated Minor As discussed, Aristotle’s theory of will trades upon the assumption that in cases of conflict between two opposing syllogisms, one rational and the other irrational, the irrational syllogism trumps the rational syllogism only if the minor premise is deactivated by passion. Indeed, as noted, for Aristotle, a person’s acting wrongly who has [universal] knowledge and

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actually exercises it, where the minor premise is therefore active, would be “a strange case.” But is it really so strange? Indeed, Aristotle thought that his theory of the deactivated minor premise helped to save the old Socratic saw. But this is no reason for accepting Aristotle’s theory. In fact, LBT holds that Socrates’ claim about knowledge always triumphing over passion was simply mistaken. Consider, for example, the following set of syllogisms: Syllogism A If this man has betrayed me then I must track him down and kick his ass. This man has betrayed me—he has violated our legal agreement. So, I must track him down and kick his ass. Syllogism B If there are legal means of seeing that justice is served then I should avail myself of these means. There are legal means available—I can file suit and take him to court. So, I should avail myself of these means.

While Syllogism A disposes the agent to do something irrational, Syllogism B works antidotally against such action. But notice that there is no reason why the agent can’t assert both such syllogisms where both major and minor premises are intact, yet still cave to Syllogism A. Indeed, LBT holds that this is precisely what does happen when counselees find antidotes to their irrational behavior but nevertheless do not follow them. Further, there is nothing about LBT’s approach that is inconsistent with Aristotle’s own analysis of the practical syllogism. In this regard, it is helpful to look more closely at what Aristotle says about such syllogisms: All action may be analysed into a syllogism, in which the one premiss is an universal maxim and the other concerns particulars of which Sense [moral or physical, as the case may be] is cognisant: now when one results from these two, it follows necessarily that, as far as theory goes the mind must assert the conclusion, and in practical propositions the man must act accordingly. For instance, let the universal be, “All that is sweet should be tasted,” the particular, “This is sweet;” it follows necessarily that he who is able and is not hindered should not only draw, but put in practice, the conclusion “This is to be tasted” (emphasis added).19

As mentioned earlier, notice that Aristotle qualifies the manner in which an action follows from the premises of a practical syllogism. Thus, from the premises, “All that is sweet should be tasted” and “This is sweet” all that necessarily follows is the conclusion “This should be tasted.” However, the action of tasting this sweet thing follows only if the agent “is

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able and is not hindered.” However, quite clearly, a counselee who is under the influence of passion can be so hindered by the passion. Thus, while it is contradictory for the conclusion, “This should be tasted,” not to follow from the stated premises, it is not in the least contradictory for the corresponding action not to follow. Indeed, there are myriad cases in practice where for one reason or another, an agent does not put into practice the conclusion of her practical syllogism. And Aristotle himself has appropriately allowed for this complication with the ceteris paribus rider of “is able and is not hindered.” Accordingly, his theory also accommodates the case in which this overriding factor is passion. Once the deactivated minor theory is dismantled, Aristotle’s theory of movement can also be called into question. For this theory trades on the assumption that it is the minor premise that is responsible for motion whereas it has just been shown that the minor premise, even when active, does not necessarily lead to movement (i.e., action). And, the latter failure to act can occur even when a counselee knows that he should act but nevertheless, due to stronger behavioral and emotional inclinations pulling in the opposite direction, fails to act. This, in turn, suggests that movement (i.e., action) may be a function of more than simply the minor premise being added to the major premise. It suggests that there may also be a manner of affecting movement that is not based on the perception of particulars in the empirical world—a manner that does not depend on the object of an appetite to affect motion. Such an approach is embodied in the Kantian theory of will in terms of a will that is obedient to reason.

Kant’s Theory of Will The Kantian theory, as adapted in the context of LBT, would allow that the main driver of the rational syllogism in overcoming an irrational syllogism, that is, that which determines the will in overcoming cognitive dissonance, is the major premise rule or antidotal wisdom, which can become the object of respect and a basis for a perceived duty to obey its rational prescription. Thus, in such a state of cognitive dissonance, a person typically feels disinclined to act rationally and needs to act out of respect for doing what’s right in the face of such disinclination. This is akin to the Kantian concept of the good will, which acts out of a sense of duty to do what’s rational rather than out of an inclination. In this regard, Kant states, “Duty is the necessity of acting from respect for the law”; wherein respect for the law “merely signifies the consciousness that my will is subordinate to a law, without the intervention

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of other influences on my sense”; and, “The immediate determination of the will by the law, and the consciousness of this, is called respect.”20 Here Kant is proposing a theory of will that, as applied to the practice of LBT, takes the major premise rule rather than the empirical minor premise report as the determinant of the will; and wherein movement (i.e., action) is produced not by (the thought of) the object of appetite but by the law itself, the consciousness of which is called respect.21 As Kant expresses it: An action done from duty must wholly exclude the influence of inclination and with it every object of the will, so that nothing remains which can determine the will except objectively the law, and subjectively pure respect for this practical law, and consequently the maxim that I should follow this law even to the thwarting of all my inclinations.22

Such a determination of the will by the major premise rule according to the idea that one has a duty to follow, out of respect for what’s rational, this “law” against all inclinations to the contrary can itself be a powerful philosophical antidote (or meta-antidote23) to the resistance of irrational inclinations. Consider Kant’s famous example of the self-absorbed philanthropist: Put the case that the mind of that philanthropist were clouded by sorrow of his own, extinguishing all sympathy with the lot of others, and that, while he still has the power to benefit others in distress, he is not touched by their trouble because he is absorbed with his own; and now suppose that he tears himself out of this dead insensibility, and performs the action without any inclination to it, but simply from duty, then first has his action its genuine moral worth (emphasis added).24

Here the idea of “tearing oneself from one’s dead insensibility” or pushing oneself to do what one is disinclined to do can be a useful metaphor for overcoming the inertia of irrational behavioral and emotional inclinations. Thus, counselees may be asked to consider themselves to have a duty to exercise self-control, that is, to follow reason instead of their irrational inclinations, even though they are unfavorably disposed to do so. This duty of rational, self-control can be justified to the counselee by virtue of the philosophical conception that a will determined by reason is the highest good attainable for human beings, which are by nature rational beings. “For reason,” states Kant:

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Chapter Four [R]ecognizes the establishment of a good will [that is, a will determined by reason] as its highest practical destination, and in attaining this purpose is capable only of a satisfaction of its own proper kind, namely that from the attainment of an end, which end again is determined by reason only, notwithstanding that this may involve many a disappointment to the ends of inclination.25

Thus, on this conception, the counselee has a duty to conform her will to reason, not because it is what she wants or feels like doing, but because it is what rational beings must do as the highest practical end of all rational beings. “In fact,” says Kant: The sublimity and intrinsic dignity of the command in duty are so much the more evident, the less the subjective impulses favour it and the more they oppose it, without being able in the slightest degree to weaken the obligation of the law or to diminish its validity.26

Such a Kantian deontology as opposed to an Aristotelian teleology based on objects of appetites, desires, or inclinations can be therapeutically justified because counselees may have destructive and self-defeating inclinations without having any constructive ones. Thus, telling the counselee that she should do something because it will promote her happiness or wellbeing may not provide any positive incentive—inasmuch as the counselee may have very strong tendencies toward self-downing and to think herself unworthy of happiness or wellbeing. Here, trying to help the counselee to see that pursuing this or that end would make her happy may prove to be of no consequence because she may not even want to be happy (even though she concedes that she is being irrational). On the other hand, suggesting to the counselee that she has a duty to act on those rational principles conducive to happiness, not for the sake of happiness but because it is her duty to do so, may still resonate with such a distressed counselee. Indeed, Kant himself recognized a duty to seek one’s own happiness even if one felt disinclined to do so. “To secure one’s own happiness is a duty,” states Kant, “at least indirectly; for discontent with one’s condition, under a pressure of many anxieties and amidst unsatisfied wants, might easily become a great temptation to transgression of duty.”27 Consider the case of a counselee who has concluded that he is totally worthless because he has lost his job. Suppose that, as a philosophical antidote to this negative rating, he accepts the existential outlook that human beings have worth and dignity by virtue of being self-aware, conscience beings capable of freely choosing and acting. Still, let’s suppose that this counselee encounters intense cognitive dissonance between what he rationally and philosophically accepts and his inclination

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to be self-damning. Here, this cognitive dissonance may be represented by the following two syllogisms: Syllogism C If I lost my job, then I am nothing but a worthless piece of crap. I lost my job—I was fired because I screwed up. So, I am nothing but a worthless piece of crap. Syllogism D If I am a human being, then I am a conscious, self-aware being with the capacity for shaping and molding a future through freely choosing and acting. I might have lost my job but I am still a human being, after all. So, I am a conscious, self-aware being with the capacity for shaping and molding a future through freely choosing and acting.

Clearly, Syllogism C motivates the counselee toward self-downing actions such as not attempting to find another job, retreating from social interactions, and possibly even harming or killing himself. On the other hand, Syllogism D motivates the counselee toward freely choosing to define new paths for the future and acting on them. Each syllogism thus pulls in opposite directions. Now, fueled by strong appetites inclining the counselee toward self-destructive behavior, he will be largely paying lip service to Syllogism D. Thus, attempting to show him that he should be striving to forge a new future, say by getting a new job, for the sake of his happiness may not be very useful simply because this counselee does not even want to be happy—and does not feel in the least bit worthy of happiness. He feels like a worthless “piece of crap” even if on an intellectual level he knows otherwise. In such situations, which are quite frequent, a counselee can benefit more from being helped to see that he has a duty to conform to his rational syllogism, not because he even deserves the happiness it will produce (that would be a version of the Aristotelian approach) but because he has a duty to do so; and that he must act out of respect for what reason demands inasmuch as “Duty is the necessity of acting from respect for the law”; wherein respect for the law “merely signifies the consciousness that my will is subordinate to a law, without the intervention of other influences on my sense.” Here “the law” is what reason enjoins; and in the present case this is the major premise of Syllogism D—that, if I am a human being, then I am a conscious, self-aware being with the capacity for shaping and molding a future through freely choosing and acting. The counselee can then discuss with his LBT counselor how this duty can be discharged, that is, the

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particular behavior that would conform to the concept of law as engendered in this major premise rule. Notice, however, that LBT recognizes many rational voices. In contrast to Kant, it does not require that counselees subscribe to the Categorical Imperative or to any other specific philosophical perspective. For example, a religious counselee may find the rational voice of Saint Augustine or Saint Thomas Aquinas as more “lawful” than that of an atheistic existentialist such as Sartre or Nietzsche. What is important, from LBT’s perspective, is that the counselee who would otherwise be reticent to act constructively, is moved to take such actions. And, as suggested in this paper, helping the counselee to perceive that he has a duty of rational, selfcontrol may be a useful way of advancing this therapeutic goal. As such, LBT’s use of deontological motivation for counselees is not itself motivated by a commitment to a Kantian metaphysic. To the contrary, LBT remains faithful to its constructivist roots.28 The Kantian approach is one among other approaches to the exercise of willpower that can be used in LBT, depending upon how effective it may be in helping the counselee to do and feel better. An Aristotelian, teleological approach in which counselees are encouraged to pursue specific ends for the sake of happiness is another such approach. But for counselees who do not have the strength of will or the inclination toward seeking their own happiness (for example, intensely self-downing counselees who perceive life itself as futile), the Kantian deontological approach may be more useful. Nor does LBT claim, as Kant does, that the notion of “respect” involved in acting out of respect for the law, that is, for what is rational, is not itself undergirded by a desire or other feeling or inclination. Kant’s metaphysic requires him to argue that respect for the law involves full transcendence of empirical, contingent determinations of the will; but LBT does not commit itself to any such metaphysic, so the question of whether respect in this context is truly just another inclination or sensation is not a matter of concern for LBT. Whatever its metaphysical (or physical) status, the duty to act out of respect for what reason (in terms of antidotal wisdom) prescribes may still be a useful tool for helping a distressed counselee, who is polarized by cognitive dissonance, to make constructive life changes. The LBT Counselor can accordingly help counselees push themselves to do what is rational as a duty, to transcend their world of irrational thinking and feeling (at least in a phenomenological sense) to do what is more rational and logical. Counselees may therefore construct a duty of rational self-control, to be performed for its own sake, not merely as a means to some further end, as Aristotle provides.

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Strengthening the Will The LBT counselor can also work with the counselee to strengthen the will to meet this challenge of acting rationally. This involves practicing so that the counselee moves from the level of incontinence to continence; and then from continence to temperance. For Aristotle, continence, that is, rational self-control, always involves overcoming “bad appetites” whereas temperance does not involve such appetites.29 Thus a counselee who acts rationally might still feel inclined toward irrational behavior. The next level, however, is to move towards acting rationally without feeling such inclinations. This involves the attainment of the virtues as addressed in LBT.30 LBT contains a catalogue of “transcendent” virtues corresponding to each Cardinal Fallacy it distinguishes. Each virtue sets an ideal toward which to aim in overcoming the corresponding fallacy. For example, corresponding to catastrophic thinking is the virtue courage. The courageous person would have gone beyond rationally overcoming cognitive dissonance. Rather, the courageous person would have moved beyond experiencing the “bad appetites” that come with having irrational fears. Such a person would be, as Epicurus describes it, “fearless against fortune.”31 He would tend to view misfortune as a learning experience and would not feel compelled to worry and catastrophize over the possibility of unwelcome events. As Aristotle suggests, “courage is a mean state in respect of objects inspiring boldness or fear…and the Brave man chooses his line and withstands danger either because to do so is honourable, or because not to do so is base.”32 Thus, counselees who tend toward catastrophic thinking and dutiful worrying might first push themselves to act against their strong inclinations to worry and catastrophize. However, it is only by reaching a stage in which one no longer has a disposition to worry and catastrophize that one can also attain the virtue of courage. And the same would also apply, mutatis mutandis, to the other LBT virtues such as, respect, authenticity, temperance, empathy, and good judgment.33 Here, use of the Kantian duty of rational, self-control as a therapeutic tool to build willpower seems suitable at the stage where the counselee is attempting to rationally overcome cognitive dissonance. However, when an individual becomes continent or no longer has “bad appetites,” then the Aristotelian approach of seeking happiness for its own sake is more suitable—inasmuch as destabilizing cognitive dissonance is no longer an obstacle to such an approach.

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In this regard, the classical distinction between the “Morality of Duty” and that of “Aspiration”34 may be applied to the practice of LBT. A counselee may need to satisfy the duty of rational, self-control before aspiring to the higher reaches of human excellence, i.e., the virtues. Thus the incontinent counselee may need to work on executing the duty of rational, self-control as a preliminary condition of attaining temperance. Such progress on the way to virtue requires the cultivation of practical reason. As Kant suggests, “Since the deduction of actions from principles requires reason, the will is nothing but practical reason.”35 Here Aristotle’s theory of will and Kant’s theory of will appear to converge. That is, both agree that the will arises as a result of deliberation; and this deliberation must proceed from rational principles in order for it to be a “good” or “rational” will. From the perspective of LBT such cultivation of practical reason or (what amounts to the same thing) of a rational will, requires philosophical insight gleaned through the construction of antidotal wisdom. Thus LBT has catalogued many different philosophical principles and related them to the attainment of virtue.36 For example, according to LBT, Kant’s own Categorical Imperative—to treat humanity in one’s own person or in that of another as an end in itself and never as a mere means37—can be a useful principle for attaining unconditional respect of self and others. In this way, the Morality of Aspiration (i.e., Virtue) may be conceived of as a philosophical repertoire of practical wisdom. According to LBT, such cultivation of practical reason or will requires practice and skill-building. Here, LBT also agrees with Aristotle that the attainment of practical wisdom is a matter of cultivating rational habits. The counselee can eventually avoid tension between irrational inclinations and rational syllogisms because she no longer has the adverse inclinations as a result of practice. While Kant would have a problem with going with the flow of habituated rational inclinations, at least in a moral sense (because it does not proceed from respect for what reason enjoins), LBT views the concept of acting out of duty as a pragmatic device to use in cases where reason and appetite conflict. So, again, the Kantian construct of exercising willpower does not carry any metaphysical or moral implications beyond its suitability as a practical device for kick-starting reason. As Aristotle held, our “states of character arise out of like activities,” and emotional development is largely a function of how we behave. Thus, “some men become temperate and good-tempered, others self-indulgent and irascible, by behaving in one way or the other in the appropriate circumstances.”38 LBT similarly takes a behavioral approach to cultivating

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willpower, which includes multiple behavioral assignments appropriate to the problem at hand. For example, a counselee who has a problem with approval damnation may be asked to do shame attacking exercises, that is, doing something he would feel ashamed of doing and then addressing the emotion cognitively (finding the irrational premise, refuting it, and constructing a rational antidote). In doing these exercises, counselees can thereby work on rationally overcoming cognitive dissonance arising as a result of being in such situations. However, it is not uncommon that counselees are reticent to do their homework assignments. In such cases, a counselee may be helped to overcome her irrational inclination to avoid performing an assignment, such as a shame attacking exercise, by constructing a rational syllogism and sticking to it. For instance, consider the following syllogism: I have a duty to do what can increase my rational, self-control. Doing this shame attacking exercise can help me to increase my rational, self-control. So, I have a duty to do this shame attacking exercise.

Here, the duty of rational self-control itself serves as the major premise of the rational syllogism for doing the homework assignment. This approach may be especially useful if the counselee is self-downing and not amenable to teleological justifications in terms of personal wellbeing or happiness. Prepping for further, more challenging feats of willpower is an important component of LBT’s program of building willpower. Thus LBT conceives of willpower on the analogy of a muscle that can be strengthened gradually by taking on more and more strenuous acts of will.39 Logically, this means constructing rational syllogisms with practical conclusions that are increasingly more challenging for the counselee to perform. For example, the counselee may first be asked to do something that arouses disapproval from a stranger and then work up to standing up to a significant other from whom the counselee has demanded approval. This idea of preparing rational practical syllogisms in advance of implementing them is, in fact, suggested by Aristotle in a passing comment. Thus he states that: Some men (just as people who first tickle others are not tickled themselves), if they have first perceived and seen what is coming and have first roused themselves and their calculative faculty, are not defeated by their emotion, whether it be pleasant or painful.40

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Aristotle’s metaphor of tickling before being tickled is illuminating. Once a person is in the throes of being tickled (assuming he is ticklish), it is much more difficult for him to do the tickling. So, this strategy is to catch the irrational impulse off guard, and, so to speak, “tickle it” with a rational calculation before the former has the opportunity to defeat the latter. In this way, the counselee can practice anticipatory practical reason and will so that, upon entering the actual situation in which the emotions heat up, there is greater likelihood of defeating or overpowering these emotions. LBT homework assignments can provide such anticipatory practice, but there are other modes of practice also. For example, role-playing can be a useful way of prepping for the real situation. Thus, a counselee and an LBT Counselor may role-play asking someone out on a date and then dealing with the rejection when the prospective date says no. Since the scenario is staged, the counselee enters the situation already armed with a rational, practical syllogism. “Well, even if she says no, I am still a rational, self-determining person whose worth and dignity as such is not in the least diminished by her refusal to go out with me.” In this manner, the counselee has the upper hand on his impulse to damn himself and feel depressed; and the counselee can then take this rational syllogism into the arena of life and actually ask someone out on a date. If she refuses, the counselee has already anticipated the possibility and is rationally prepared to meet the challenge; on the other hand, if she accepts, then reason and emotion fall into a harmonious synergy.

Choosing Between Aristotelian and Kantian Approaches The Aristotelian teleological approach to the exercise of will assumes that motion or action is determined by the object of appetite as reported in the minor premise of the practical syllogism. According to Aristotle, loss of rational, self-control is a result of passion “dragging” away this sensible premise, thereby preventing the knowledge in the universal, major premise from being put into operation. LBT challenges this theory of incontinence or weakness of will and holds that cognitive dissonance can arise when two fully intact syllogisms, one rational and the other irrational, conflict. While the Aristotelian teleological perspective of being moved by (the thought of) an object of appetite (including the desire for happiness) is one approach to rationally overcoming such cognitive dissonance, another is a Kantian deontological approach. According to the latter, the counselee is thought to have a duty of rational self-control, which directs that she act out of respect for the

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principle or rule contained in the major premise of her rational (antidotal) practical syllogism. Here, this is, at least on a phenomenological level, perceived as a purely rational determination of will, rather than one based on the perceptual minor premise—as in the case of Aristotle’s approach. This alternative perspective can provide a manner of kick-starting a counselee’s will, especially in the case of a severely self-downing counselee or one who does not appear to have an object of appetite or inclination that could be used therapeutically as motivation toward constructive change.

Notes 1

See generally, Elliot D. Cohen, The Dutiful Worrier: How to Stop Compulsive Worry without Feeling Guilty (Oakland, CA: New Harbinger, 2011). 2 Elliot D. Cohen, What Would Aristotle Do? Self-Control through the Power of Reason (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 2003), Ch. 2. 3 Elliot D. Cohen, The New Rational Therapy: Thinking Your Way to Serenity, Success, and Profound Happiness (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2007). 4 Aristotle distinguishes between two types of incontinence, one in which a person is moved by his irrational emotions without first deliberating; another in which the person deliberates but whose will is nevertheless overpowered by an irrational emotion. The first he calls “impetuosity”; and the second, he calls “weakness”— presumably weakness of will. It is weakness of will that is the subject of this paper inasmuch as this is the sort that involves cognitive dissonance between two opposing syllogisms, one rational and the other irrational. “Of incontinence one kind is impetuosity, another weakness. For some men after deliberating fail, owing to their emotion, to stand by the conclusions of their deliberation, others because they have not deliberated are led by their emotion.” Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics, trans. W.D. Ross, Book 7, Ch. 7. Accessed September 1, 2013. http://classics.mit.edu/ Aristotle/nicomachaen.7.vii.html 5 A theoretical syllogism is one in which the conclusion is a statement or proposition as in, for example: All humans are moral. Socrates is a man. So, Socrates is mortal. 6 Aristotle, On the Motion of Animals, trans. A. S. L. Farquharson, Ch. 7. Accessed September 1, 2013. http://ebooks.adelaide.edu.au/a/aristotle/motion/. 7 Ibid. 8 Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics, ed. J. A. Smith, Book 7, Ch. 3. Accessed September 1, 2013. http://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/etext05/7ethc10.txt. 9 Ibid.

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When, then, the universal opinion is present in us forbidding us to taste, and there is also the opinion that ‘everything sweet is pleasant’, and that ‘this is sweet’ (now this is the opinion that is active), and when appetite happens to be present in us, the one opinion bids us avoid the object, but appetite leads us towards it (for it can move each of our bodily parts).” Emphasis added. Aristotle, Ethics, trans. W.D. Ross, Book 7, Ch. 3. 11 Aristotle, Ethics, trans. W.D. Ross, Book 7, Ch. 3. 12 “As to the manner in which the ignorance is removed and the man of Imperfect Self-Control recovers his Knowledge, the account is the same as with respect to him who is drunk or asleep, and is not peculiar to this affection, so physiologists are the right people to apply to. But whereas the minor premiss of every practical syllogism is an opinion on matter cognisable by Sense and determines the actions; he who is under the influence of passion either has not this, or so has it that his having does not amount to knowing but merely saying, as a man when drunk might repeat Empedocles’ verses; and because the minor term is neither universal, nor is thought to have the power of producing Knowledge in like manner as the universal term.” Aristotle, Ethics, ed. J. A. Smith, Book 7, Ch. 3. 13 Aristotle, De Anima (On the Soul), trans. J.A. Smith, Book 3, Part 11. Accessed September 1, 2013. http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/soul.3.iii.html. 14 Aristotle, De Anima, Book 2, Part 3. Accessed September 1, 2013. http://classics.mit.edu/ Aristotle/soul.2.ii.html. 15 Aristotle, De Anima, Book 3, Part 9. 16 Aristotle, De Anima, Book 3, Part 10. 17 In other contexts, Aristotle understands wish as the first step of deliberation in which one sets an end to be obtained for which deliberation supplies the means. So, in this sense, it is the starting point of deliberation, while in the willful sense it is the last stage of deliberation. See editor’s note for p. 53, n.1.33, Aristotle, Ethics, ed. J. A. Smith. “These words, [Greek: ek tou bouleusasthai—bouleusin], contain the account of the whole mental machinery of any action. The first step is a Wish, implied in the first here mentioned, viz. Deliberation, for it has been already laid down that Deliberation has for its object-matter means to Ends supposed to be set before the mind, the next step is Deliberation, the next Decision, the last the definite extending of the mental hand towards the object thus selected, the two last constitute [Greek: proairesis] in its full meaning. The word [Greek: orexis] means literally “a grasping at or after” now as this physically may be either vague or definite, so too may the mental act, consequently the term as transferred to the mind has two uses, and denotes either the first wish, [Greek: boulaesis], or the last definite movement, Will in its strict and proper sense.” 18 Aristotle, De Anima, Part 10. 19 Aristotle, Ethics, ed. J. A. Smith, Book 7, Ch. 3. 20 Immanuel Kant, Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals, trans. Thomas Kingsmill Abbott, 1785, First Section. Accessed September 1, 2013. http://philosophy .eserver.org/kant/metaphys-of-morals.txt. 21 According to Kant, “the categorical imperative alone has the purport of a practical law; all the rest may indeed be called principles of the will but not laws,

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since whatever is only necessary for the attainment of some arbitrary purpose may be considered as in itself contingent, and we can at any time be free from the precept if we give up the purpose.” Emphasis added. Kant, Metaphysics of Morals, Second Section. As such, when LBT adapts the Kantian theory, the term “law” must take on a more inclusive character to refer not merely to one general formal principle of reason as Kant would claim (i.e., the Categorical Imperative) but rather to a diversity of major premise rules, which serve as antidotes to their respective fallacies. See generally Cohen, New Rational Therapy. 22 Kant, Metaphysics of Morals, First Section. 23 By a “meta-antidote” is intended a rule that that tells one how to manage primary rules. There are other such meta-rules in LBT, such as ones dealing with the selection of antidotes to correct irrational thinking. See, for example, What Would Aristotle Do? Chapter 10. 24 Kant, Metaphysics of Morals, First Section. 25 Kant, Metaphysics of Morals, First Section. 26 Kant, Metaphysics of Morals, Second Section. 27 Kant, Metaphysics of Morals, First Section. 28 Elliot D. Cohen, “The Metaphysics of Logic-Based Therapy,” International Journal of Philosophical Practice 3, No.1 (2005). Accessed September 1, 2013. http://www.rebt network.org/library/metaphysics.pdf. 29 “Since many names are applied analogically, it is by. analogy that we have come to speak of the ‘continence’ of the temperate man; for both the continent man and the temperate man are such as to do nothing contrary to the rule for the sake of the bodily pleasures, but the former has and the latter has not bad appetites, and the latter is such as not to feel pleasure contrary to the rule, while the former is such as to feel pleasure but not to be led by it. And the incontinent and the self-indulgent man are also like another; they are different, but both pursue bodily pleasures—the latter, however, also thinking that he ought to do so, while the former does not think this.” Aristotle, Ethics, trans. W.D. Ross, Book 7, Ch. 9. 30 See generally Cohen, The New Rational Therapy. 31 Epicurus, Letter to Menoeceus, cited in Cohen, New Rational Therapy. 32 Aristotle, Ethics, ed. J.A. Smith, Book 3, Ch. 7, 33 Cohen, New Rational Therapy. 34 Lon Fuller, The Morality of Law (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964), Ch. 1. 35 Kant, Metaphysics of Morals, Second Section. 36 Cohen, New Rational Therapy. 37 Kant, Metaphysics of Morals, Second Section. 38 Aristotle, Ethics, trans. W.D. Ross, Book 2, Ch. 1. 39 Cohen, What Would Aristotle Do? 40 Aristotle, Ethics, trans. W.D. Ross, Book 7, Ch. 7.

PART II THE CARDINAL FALLACIES

CHAPTER FIVE DEMANDING PERFECTION, BANDWAGON REASONING, AND THE-WORLD-REVOLVESAROUND-ME THINKING As you have seen in Chapter 3, some of the most destructive and selfdefeating patterns or “templates” of emotional reasoning are based on unconditional evaluative rules that demand perfection. These irrational rules include: x x x x x

I must never fail at _______. Bad things must never happen to me. I must always maintain control over _______. I must be in control at all times. I must always have the approval of _______.

This chapter examines the concept of “must” as it occurs in the above demands for perfection. It examines each such rule in turn. In the context of discussing the demand for approval, it examines the structure of bandwagon reasoning and shows how this fallacy can be deduced from the latter perfectionistic demand. It then also examines the-world-revolvesaround-me thinking as an inference from ego-centered preferences to the demand that others share and accept the same preferences. As such, this chapter shows how bandwagon reasoning and the-world-revolves-aroundme thinking are largely rooted in the demand for perfection.

The Meaning of “Must” It is a tenet of LBT that counselees should strive to avoid use of “must” as contained in the above rules. Given this goal, it is important that counselees do not confuse this use with other legitimate uses of “must.” Indeed, there are uses of “must” that are quite rational; so LBT therapists must exercise care not to throw the baby out with the bathwater. Each occurrence of “must” in the above rules is unconditional in character. That is, it does not ordinarily admit of exceptions for counselees

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who subscribe to it. Notice that each occurrence speaks in the language of “always” or “never.” This is part of the demanding character of such musts. However, it flies in the face of reality to demand that bad things never happen, that one always has the approval of others, that one be in control at all times, and so forth. As a matter of brute fact, such perfectionistic, unconditional demands are not possible to satisfy in a world in which people do not always approve of others, bad things happen even to good people, and not everything can be under one’s control. This use of “must” is also in contrast to moral usage. That is, there is no moral rule that states that people must always have the approval of others or have nothing bad happen to them. There are no theories of morality that would justify any of these demands. For example, there is no good Kantian argument for always having the approval of others inasmuch as such a rule or “maxim” could not be universalized. Indeed, a world in which everyone always approved of everyone else would be a stagnant world without constructive criticism. It would be a world in which people would not have any incentive to make constructive changes according to such criticism. No rational person would want to inhabit such a world because such a person would want the feedback of others in order to improve his life. Nor are there any good consequentialist arguments for always having the approval of others. While getting the approval of others can be a positive good on some occasions, it is not always so. Sometimes one needs the disapproval of others in order to avoid great danger, for example, if one is engaging in dangerous behavior and needs constructive guidance. In fact, insisting that others always give their approval conflicts with such moral standards as honesty and justice, which are generally utilitymaximizing. A person who unconditionally demands approval from others is also demanding that others not be honest or fair in their assessment of others. Nor is there any good reason to think that people have a prima facie duty to approve of others. Rather, it makes more sense to suppose that people have a prima facie duty to be honest with others about whether or not they approve of them. Far from being “moral” injunctions offering moral advice, such “musts” as the demand for approval, the demand that bad things never happen, that one always be in control, etc. are ontological in character. That is, they make a demand on reality. Thus the demand for approval from others demands that human reality measure up to the demand. And the demand implies a view of reality itself.

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These “musts” are accordingly parasitic—feeding off of generalizations that assert lawful necessity. For example, we believe that whatever comes up must always come down (at least here on earth subject to the usual gravitational field); and we would be shocked if we threw up an object and it remained suspended in space rather than falling down. Indeed, we think that it must come down. But this “must” is a corollary of the universal law of gravity, which is a highly confirmed generalization from experience. Counselees who subscribe to demands for perfection perceive such demands as having the force of laws of nature, and experience similar “shock” when they fail to get the approval of others. However, there is no highly confirmed empirical generalization from which these musts follow as corollaries. Rather, they represent unrealistic law-like universal demands. They are anti-scientific and contrary to what we can reasonably expect given our empirical evidence about the world that exists in space and time. This anti-scientific use of “must” also contrasts conditional or hypothetical uses of must that assert means-end connections. For example, if one wants to get a promotion then one must earn the approval of one’s boss. This statement makes an empirical claim about what is necessary to get promoted. It says that a means to the end of getting a promotion is earning the boss’s approval. This statement does not demand the approval of one’s boss. It is not an evaluative claim. It is a statement about cause and effect. This is an acceptable kind of “must” and typically does not, by itself, lead to the self-defeating behavior and emotions to which demands for perfection lead. There is accordingly both descriptive and prescriptive “illocutionary force” in a perfectionistic “must” statement. The descriptive force is a quasi law-like expectation (or prediction) that the universe have perfection of this or that kind; and the prescriptive force is that the universe should be this way. Thus the “must” has two forces, the first being descriptive and the second, prescriptive: (1) that the universe predictably has a perfectionistic, law-like necessity and (2) that this is the way it should (or ought to) always be. In conjunction, these two forces unpack the demandingness of perfectionistic musts. Thus, for example, in asserting that one must have the approval of others, one is saying something like, “I expect that others always approve of me, as they should.” However, the expectation is unreasonable in our empirical universe and there is no rational reason to believe that one should always have the approval of others. Is it rational to think that others should approve of me because I am myself? But no one else always gets the approval of everyone, so why

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should I? Is it rational to think that others should approve of me because I want them to? But others desire the approval of others but don’t always get it so why should I?

Demanding Perfection In such manner, all perfectionistic “musts” make unreasonable predictions and dogmatic demands; however each distinct kind of demand for perfection makes them about different states of perfection. Following is a discussion of some main characteristics of each.

The Demand Not to Fail The demand that one not fail can be either a general demand that one not fail at all or most things, or a demand that one not fail at some particular kind/s of thing. For example, a student I once caught cheating on an exam disclosed to me that he didn’t mind failing an exam for having cheated as long as he didn’t fail while expending a sincere effort to do well. So, this student’s demand not to fail applied to anything that could count against his ability to be successful and he was quite willing to leave this ability untested even if it meant failing. Others may have more generalized demands not to fail. For example, such individuals are likely to see the loss of a job, divorce, an unsuccessful business venture, rejection by others, or anything else that suggests having failed as a mark of worthlessness. Thus, such a generalized demand may exist as a disposition with respect to a variable assortment of objects. For some, “not failing” really means “being perfect” or “almost perfect.” For example, students who demand that they always get A’s are often selfprofessed “perfectionists” who tend to demand the same in other quarters of their lives. Whether the demand is generalized or more specialized the demand not to fail invariably leads to intense anxiety. Thus an athlete who demands that she always be at the top of her game will experience intense anxiety even while doing well; for the possibility of falling from grace is always a genuine possibility. Such individuals therefore rarely find times when they can relax and enjoy their accomplishments or other meaningful aspects of their lives. The refutation of such a demand is the palpable fact that such a level of stress impedes success and is therefore self-defeating. While some athletes, for example, argue that the stress helps them to perform better, this claim treads on a fundamental confusion between healthy anxiety and

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the unhealthy kind fueled by the demand not to fail. The former is largely hard-wired or autonomic. Thus the “fight or flight” (sympathetic nervous system) prepares the human animal for imminent danger or adversarial conflict. One needn’t tell oneself that one must never fail in order to get “pumped up.” This demand also serves as a premise from which other irrational premises are often deduced. For example, “As I must never fail, it would be so terrible that I just couldn’t stand it.” Such catastrophic thinking is a recipe for self-defeating anxiety that can lead to inability to think and perceive clearly, concentrate, and recall things. These are not the sorts of deficits that bode well for performing, whether on the ball field, the concert hall, or the classroom.

The Demand That Bad Things Never Happen Like the demand not to fail, this demand is linked deductively to catastrophic thinking that sustains intense anxiety and chronic worry. What is “bad” is a relative concept but the ordinary concept includes many things that are relatively not so bad such as the loss of a job, money, or a relationship. Moreover, the possibilities of (relatively) worse things happening, such as loss of health or life or a limb are often magnified and distorted. Counselees who demand that such bad things never happen tend to ruminate about these possibilities and often feel guilty when they think that they didn’t worry enough about them. Consequently, they live their lives in self-induced pressure cookers. The clear refutation of this demand is the inescapable existential fact that bad things can and will happen despite any efforts to head them off. While this does not mean that counselees should not attempt to take measures against these “bad things,” the logical distinction between reasonable versus unreasonable and self-defeating efforts needs to be stressed. The idea of an “Aristotelian mean” between the thinking involved in intense worry and guilt on the one hand and detachment and carelessness on the other hand, is a useful antidote. When your concern turns into painful worry and guilt, then you have gone too far in the one direction; and when you refuse to entertain the possibility of anything bad ever happening and live in denial about human mortality and “the human condition,” you have gone too far in the other direction. This demand thus portends a life of relentless stress. It is also linked to the further demand to control things.

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The Demand for Control If a counselee demands that bad things never happen to self or certain others, such as family or friends, he may also demand that he exercise control over what happens. Thus the demand for control may sometimes itself be a corollary of the demand that bad things not happen. It can similarly be a corollary of the demand for approval (discussed below). Thus, a counselee who demands the approval of his employer might try to control all, or almost all, possible negative outcomes at the workplace, thereby going to extremes to attain or maintain his supervisor’s approval. The demand for control can be a demand for control of some things or it can be a demand for control of all or virtually all things. The latter is a disposition to try to control such things as they arise as what others say or do, the outcomes of one’s own actions and assertions, and generally the daily flow of events in the course of one’s life. In the former case, there may be only specific objects of the demand, such as, for example, whether others like you. Since the demand for control is future-oriented (one doesn’t try to control what has happened in the past), it aligns with anxiety, which is a future-oriented emotion. Thus, a counselee may experience anxiety over public speaking due to a demand to control what the audience may think of his speech; or a parent may demand control over how well her child does in school and thereby experience intense anxiety every time the child takes an exam or hands in homework. The refutation of demanding control of everything is the uncontroversial fact that there are things in the external world that are clearly not in human control and therefore it is unreasonable to try to control them. These include all of the examples given above such as the demand to control the actions, thoughts, attitudes, or feelings of others. The demand for control over specific things typically follows suit. Counselees may demand control over a subset of these external objects, which are, by their nature, beyond the ability to control. Ironically, counselees often deny that they can control what they can really control, namely how they feel or think. “I can’t help feeling the way I do”; “I just keep ruminating about things and can’t help it.” Statements such as these deny responsibility for one’s feelings or thoughts, whereas the cornerstone of LBT, like its cognitive-behavioral ancestors, is that people have considerable control over their emotions and cognitions. This does not mean that one can rationally demand control over what can be controlled. For example, counselees who are obsessive sometimes demand that they control their obsessive thoughts and thereby exacerbate

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their anxiety. Here as elsewhere the demand for control, as distinct from the preference for control, is at the roots of needless stress.

The Demand for Approval The demand for approval should not be confused with the Kantian moral imperative to respect persons as ends in themselves. The latter “must” or “should” assumes that “must” or “ought” implies “can.” That is, it does not demand the approval of others since this is not something that can, rationally, be demanded. Instead, the sense of “must” here is that of moral advice. This is what people can and should do, even though it is clear that not everyone will automatically and invariably do so. The demand for approval subverts Kantian respect for persons as ends in itself by subverting the autonomy of others. It is fascistic and dictatorial in its demand that others give their approval, and it accordingly undermines the basis of Kantian respect for others, which is recognition of the right of self-determination. Counselees who demand approval from others also tend to make their own approval of others or of themselves contingent upon whether or not such approval is reciprocated. Thus, while they unconditionally demand approval from others, the approval that they have for others or for themselves is conditional on its being returned. “If you treat me poorly, then I will treat you or myself the same.”

Bandwagon Reasoning Bandwagon reasoning often (although not necessarily) involves an inference from the demand for approval of others. Bandwagon reasoning is reasoning whereby a counselee concludes that he should do or believe what someone else does or believes because the other person is doing or believing it. Those who tend to jump on bandwagons generally do so because they believe that such “automatic” or “blind” conformity will gain the approval of the other person. The basic Behavioral Reasoning Template (BRT) of bandwagon thinking is as follows: (Major Premise Rule) If __[enter name/description of person/group of persons]__ does/believes __[enter action or belief]__, then I should do/believe it too. (Minor Premise Report) ____ does/believes ______. (Conclusion) I should do/believe it too.

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For example, an adolescent counselee may believe that if the popular kids are into drag racing then he should be into it too. Or, a counselee may believe that if her husband is a Republican then she should be too. The Major Premise Rule, however, may itself be deduced from a demand for approval.1 Here is the expanded BRT: 1. I must have the approval of __[enter name/description of person/group of persons]__. 2. If I must have the approval of ________, then if________ does/believes_______, then I should do/believe it too. 3. So, if ________does/believes_______, then I should do/believe it too. 4. _______ does/believes_______ 5. So, I should do/believe it too.

In the above BRT, the “should” in premise 2 asserts a means-end or causal connection between conformity and approval. While this is an inductive claim that is subject to inductive refutation (for example, the person in question has not in the past warmed up to those who imitate him), the primary problem here is the demand for approval. This is true because, even if the approval can be attained, this sort of demand for approval thwarts authenticity, which LBT counts as a transcendent virtue (in particular, the transcendent virtue of bandwagon reasoning). Indeed, those who conform their behavior and/or thinking to others in order to get their approval do not give themselves the opportunity to develop their own person. Instead they seek to make themselves clones of others and thereby stifle their freedom and autonomy. As John Stuart Mill famously admonished, “He who lets the world, or his own portion of it, choose his plan of life for him, has no need of any other faculty than the ape-like one of imitation.”2 In cases where the bandwagon reasoning is so deduced from a demand for approval, the refutation may therefore best proceed at the root of the problem, namely, with premise 1 (the demand for other’s approval). As discussed earlier in this chapter, this refutation proceeds by showing that both the expectation of approval as well as the normative judgment that this is as it should be are groundless. Antidotally, one manner of redirecting the counselee away from the demand for approval and toward the transcendent virtue of authenticity is to help him to see that he can himself be a source of value instead of as repository for the values of others. “The noble kind of man,” Nietzsche says, “experiences himself as a person who determines value and does not need to have other people’s approval.…He understands himself as

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something which in general first confers honour on things, as someone who creates values.”3 Following Nietzsche’s advice, a counselee who tends to jump on the bandwagon in order to get others’ approval can be given a behavioral homework assignment to make an autonomous decision without looking to others for approval—even acting in spite of their disapproval—and then reflecting on the idea of having created one’s own values, instead of having submerged one’s potential for authenticity behind a veil of impotent, blind conformity. This assignment might begin with something small, such as a decision about the purchase of clothing or what to buy at the grocery store. The assignment can also serve as the refutation (or part of the refutation) of the demand for approval by demonstrating that one can, indeed, make decisions without getting the approval of others and that, therefore, it is false-to-fact that one must have the approval of others. In the end, the LBT counselor can help the counselee to appreciate, both intellectually and emotionally, that the demand for approval of others is based on an irrational expectation or prediction; and on an irrational normative judgment about what the world should be. Far from being rooted in ontological necessity, the demand for approval is based on the subjective desire to be approved by others. Thus, counselees who demand approval from others generally desire or prefer approval from others and infer that, because they want such approval, that therefore they must have it. According to LBT it is such transmuting of desires into unconditional demands that leads to self-defeating behavior and emotions.

The Inferential leap from “I Want” to “I Must” One of the most significant insights of contemporary ethics is eighteenth-century philosopher David Hume’s realization that one cannot deduce an “ought” from an “is.” Hume states: In every system of morality, which I have hitherto met with, I have always remark’d, that the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary way of reasoning, and establishes the being of a God, or makes observations concerning human affairs; when of a sudden I am surpriz’d to find, that instead of the usual copulations of propositions, is, and is not, I meet with no proposition that is not connected with an ought, or an ought not. This change is imperceptible; but is, however, of the last consequence. For as this ought, or ought not, expresses some new relation or affirmation, ‘tis necessary that it shou’d be observ’d and explain’d; and at the same time that a reason should be given, for what seems altogether inconceivable,

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how this new relation can be a deduction from others, which are entirely different from it.4

Hume’s insight about the inference from is to ought has very serious practical implications, for an inferential leap of this kind is behind much human suffering and unhappiness. The specific inferential instances in question are those from conations (desires, wants, preferences, wishes, etc.) to judgments about the way things absolutely (always) should, ought, or must be. Albert Ellis expressed the point succinctly: Once people creatively transmute their Jehovian musts and commands, they usually actively bring about inappropriate and self-defeating feelings, such as panic, depression, rage, self-pity, and global inadequacy. Their dogmatic shoulds and musts also frequently lead to behavioral disorders, such as neurotic avoidance, withdrawal, procrastination, compulsion, and addiction.5

Consider this example of such a self-defeating inference: I want the approval of others Therefore I must or (absolutely) should have the approval of others.

The practical problem here is that the conclusion leads one to demand what is unrealistic, namely that one always have the approval of others. Such perfectionistic demands comprise the cognitive drive shaft6 of many destructive emotions including the ones Ellis enumerates in the above quotation. Logically, as Hume observes, the conclusion about what must or should be is not deducible exclusively from the premise, a factual report about what I want. In the present instance, the inference fully articulated would look like this: (Major Premise Rule) If I want the approval of others then I must or (absolutely) should have it. (Minor Premise Report) I want the approval of others (Conclusion) I must or (absolutely) should have the approval of others.

The unexpressed or “suppressed” major premise is thus a general rule. Together with the given factual report about a particular desire, it validates the inference to the conclusion demanding that I have the approval of others. According to LBT such inferences from conations to absolutistic musts, oughts, and shoulds are at the root of many destructive human

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emotions. Thus one sustains intense anger or rage by deducing that another person has done something he or she must (or should) never have done. One makes oneself depressed by deducing that things are not the way they must be. One keeps oneself in a state of intense guilt by deducing that he has done something he must never have done. A person makes herself intensely anxious about some possible, future event by deducing that it must not happen. All of these destructive emotions are products of such inferential leaps from conations to absolutistic musts, oughts, or shoulds. Each commands, demands, and dictates the terms of the universe based on narrow, subjective desires or preferences. Moreover, as should be evident from Chapter 3, these absolutistic demands, commands, and dictates, so deduced, can supply premises for further self-destructive and reinforcing corollaries. Thus, since I must have the approval of others it is therefore awful if I don’t get it and therefore I just can’t stand it if I don’t get it. This is enthymematic for a syllogistic tree with the following branches: (Rule 1) If I want the approval of others, then I must have it. (Report 1) I want the approval of others. (Conclusion 1) I must have the approval of others. (Rule 2) If I must have the approval of others and I don’t get it, then that’s awful. (Conclusion 2) If I don’t get the approval of others, then that’s awful. (Rule 3) If that’s awful then I just can’t stand it. (Conclusion 3) If I don’t get the approval of others, then I just can’t stand it.

Just add to Conclusion 3 the report that “I didn’t in fact get the approval of others” and the “can’t stand it” in the consequent of Conclusion 3 is unleashed from its “if” clause and thus grows active.7 On the other hand, when people stick to their conations instead of deducing demands from them, they tend to maintain emotions that are selfhelping rather than self-destructive. As Ellis states: Once they vigorously stay with their preferences and find that these are (or soon may be) thwarted, people then have appropriate or self-helping feelings of concern, sadness, disappointment, and frustration, which motivate them to strive for more of what they want and less of what they don’t want. They rarely feel and behave neurotically when they stay with these appropriate feelings.8

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How then does one stay at the self-helping conation level rather than transmuting one’s desires, wants, and preferences into self-destructive, absolutistic musts, shoulds, and oughts? Consider this analogy. Every year a vine-like weed wraps itself around a large evergreen shrub in my front yard. In past years I would go through the labor of pulling the vines off of the shrub only to have it grow back with ever as much vigor. It had occurred to me early on that this “stubborn” weed was not miraculously growing and regenerating itself without roots. However, when I looked for the roots in the soil at the base of the shrub, I couldn’t locate the source. This year, determined not to waste my time pulling the vines from the shrub, I looked more carefully for the source. I then noticed something that looked like a dead, straw-like stalk leaning up against the base of the shrub. Tearing it open, to my amazement, I found inside a green vibrant vine. I had only to look carefully and to surrender any preconceptions about where the source might be in order to discover the root of my problem. The case is much the same in finding the roots of one’s emotional disturbances. They too are well disguised and easy to miss. And one can spend considerable time pulling off secondary and tertiary branches of one’s inferential tree only to have the disturbance grow back again. On the other hand one can nip the problem in the bud by going right to the source instead. It is the inferential leap from conation to absolutistic musts that is largely at the root of many behavioral and emotional problems. These inferences are to emotional disturbances as the straw-like stalk I described is to the weed. The most expedient way to kill the weed is to pull the stalk out by the roots. The most expedient way to stop feeling depressed, enraged, guilty, and anxiety-ridden is to stop inferring the must from one’s conations. While these inferences remain enthymematic, they are less likely to be noticed. However, by stating the minor conative premise as well as the missing major premise—the rule that validates the inference from conation to must—the fallacious character of the inference becomes evident. Thus in the above example, the root of the emotional problem can be pinpointed at the level of Rule 1: (Rule 1) If I want the approval of others, then I must have it

Indeed, as discussed in Chapter 2, this demand is irrational. Yes, I want others to approve of me. I might certainly prefer it that way, but does that mean that I must have the approval of others? This is plainly unreasonable since as a matter of brute fact (like it or not), others may sometimes not

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approve of me (or, more exactly, of what I am doing or saying). In dictating that one always get just what one wants, one is demanding something that this imperfect world of ours just won’t accommodate. So goes a clear, rational refutation of Rule 1. It is of course another matter as to whether one should even want the approval of others in the first place. Still there is a difference between wanting or preferring others’ approval and demanding that one get such approval. The preference for the approval of others generally meets with appropriate feelings of concern, sadness, disappointment, and frustration when it is not satisfied while the demand—the absolutistic must inferred from the conation—invariably meets with self-defeating, intense emotions.

The-World-Revolves-Around-Me Thinking: The Inferential Leap from “I Prefer X” to “You Must Prefer X” Notwithstanding the self-defeating nature of inferences from conations to absolutistic musts and shoulds, the human tendency to make such inferences is in a way understandable. This is because what one wants, desires, and prefers is, subjectively, at the forefront of one’s own consciousness. So, when I want something, the desire tends to spill over into the external world, beyond the confines of my own subjectivity. LBT holds that most behavioral and emotional problems are rooted in this egocentric predicament of human beings. It is a metaphysical predicament since human beings cannot (literally) transcend their own subjectivity. It is in this way understandable why humans beings tend to infer musts from conations. It is the subjective primacy of my own conations that brings me to elevate them to center stage in the world outside my own subjectivity, in the form of prescriptions about how this external world must be. But the world will be much as it is regardless of how many commands, demands, and dictates we heap on it. Nor is the demand that the world conform to one’s wants likely to help to improve it. In fact, contributing to positive change in the world generally takes patience and tolerance, virtues that people who infer absolutistic musts from their conations often lack. This is also why those who fascistically and anti-democratically try to impose their own will on others, including those in political seats, typically do more harm than good. As Ellis maintained, wanting and preferring (in contrast to “musting”), is likely to have more beneficial consequences. The psychology of making constructive change in the world is accordingly that of learning how to

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find, refute, and construct rational antidotes to the rules that under gird inferences from conation to absolutistic musts. This is also the case in cultivating successful relations with others. By transmuting ones subjective desires and preferences to absolutistic demands one is not likely to cultivate satisfying and lasting interpersonal relations. For example, consider the following inference: I prefer X So, you must also prefer X

Once the suppressed major premise rule is added, the syllogism becomes: If I prefer anything X, then so too must you I prefer X So, you must also prefer X

An interpersonal relationship based on this syllogism would not be a happy and enduring one. A marriage no less than a nation in which what one individual wanted or preferred became the basis for what others must want or prefer would be fascistic and anti-democratic. Fascistic, antidemocratic relationships have not generally proven to be stable and happy ones. Here lies the reductio ad absurdum of the above major premise rule. Instead of helping one to attain happiness and stability, it leads to the exact opposite. Consider, for example, the following as a possible antidote to this selfdefeating rule: “If I want other people to respect (or tolerate) my preferences then I should also try my best to respect other people’s preferences.” The “should” in this possible antidote is one of expedience. It asserts a means-end connection between two states—that of having one’s own preferences respected and that of respecting others. It states that unless I am tolerant of others’ conations, I am likely to be hoist on my own petard—that is, end up on the receiving end of the intolerance of others. As such the “should’ is one that is empirically verifiable, not an absolutistic prescription. This is not to say that all rational antidotes to such absolutistic demands need to assert means-end relationships. Indeed, LBT holds that philosophical theories can serve as potent antidotes to many irrational behavioral and emotional rules, including the conative kind discussed in this Chapter. For example, the Kantian “Categorical Imperative” to universalize one’s reasons for acting (“maxims”) could serve constructively as an antidote to the self-defeating egocentric rule in

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question. This is because such a rule could not be consistently universalized, since universalizing it would mean that I too would have to prefer what other people prefer, in which case, I could no longer dictate everyone else’s preferences. Similarly, consequentialist theories of ethics such as utilitarianism would also militate against such a rule since, as mentioned, it is contrary to human welfare (no matter what reasonable theory of intrinsic value is held) to force one’s own preferences onto others. Indeed this is at the core of what psychologists call dysfunctional relationships.9 Care-based ethics also resonates with the same rejection of such a rule because caring in the form of empathetic regard for others—putting oneself in the subjective shoes of another—can easily militate against this egocentric rule.10 In short, philosophical theories as well as empirically verifiable, conditional musts and shoulds can provide the basis for rational antidotes to irrational major premise rules that permit inferences from conations to absolutistic musts and shoulds. LBT aims at dissolving much of the unnecessary strife in personal and interpersonal relationships by teaching people how to identify and refute inferences that transform narrow, subjective desires and preferences into such absolutistic musts and shoulds. And it teaches them how to, democratically and anti-fascistically, construct rational or philosophical antidotes to these unrealistic demands.

Notes 1

Some counselees who jump on bandwagons do so because they also condemn themselves as unworthy if they don’t get the approval of others. For this complication, see chapter 5 on damning reasoning. 2 1. John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, in John Stuart Mill, ed, Mary Warnock (Cleveland: World Publishing Company, 1968), chap. 3, 187. 3 Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, trans. Helen Zimmern, in The Philosophy of Nietzsche (New York: Random House, 1954), chap. 9, sec. 260, 579. 4 David Hume, Treatise of Human Nature, Book 3, Part 1 Section 1. Accessed September 1, 2013. http://www.gutenberg.org/files/4705/4705-h/4705-h.htm. 5 Albert Ellis, “The Philosophical Basis of Rational-Emotive Therapy (RET),” International Journal of Applied Philosophy, Vol. 5, No. 2 (1990): 35. 6 According to LBT emotions consist of cognitive, behavioral, and physiological changes. In calling these conclusions the “cognitive drive shaft” of many destructive emotions, I mean that the behavioral and physiological changes that occur during these emotions largely depend on them. See Chapter 1, this book, for a discussion of LBT’s theory of emotions. 7 See Chapter 8, this book, for a discussion of such volitional “can’ts”

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Albert Ellis, “The Philosophical Basis of Rational-Emotive Therapy (RET),” 35. “Relational problems include patterns of interaction between or among members of a relational unit that are associated with clinically significant impairment in functioning, or symptoms among one or more of the relational unit, or impairment in the functioning of the relational unit itself.” American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual, 4th ed., DSM-4-TR (Washington, DC: American Psychiatric Association, 2000), 736. 10 For a discussion of care-based ethics in the context of counseling, see Elliot D. Cohen & Gale S. Cohen, The Virtuous Therapist: Ethical Practice of Counseling and Psychotherapy (Belmont, CA: Brooks Cole, 1999), Ch. 1. 9

CHAPTER SIX DAMNING AND MANIPULATIVE REASONING In Chapter 5, inferences involving the demand for perfection were examined. This chapter examines inferences involving damnation of self, others, and world.

The Definitions of Self-Damnation, Damnation of Others, and Global Damnation Self-damnation involves devaluation of one’s (whole) self; damnation of others involves devaluation of another person/s’ (whole) self. The devaluation implies unworthiness as a person or human being, not the person that one should or must be. It includes total or near total worthlessness but can also include “something seriously wrong” with the person. The condemnation implies the permanence of the personal defect such that any attempt at improvement or constructive change would be futile. In each case the devaluation is based on some perceived defect of one’s self or another person/s; for example, in the case of self-damnation, failing at something important to oneself or not being accepted by others; in the case of damnation of others, for example, having done something “wrong” or having a character defect of some sort. Global damnation involves devaluation of the (whole) world. It is based on some perceived defects in the world such as untimely deaths, natural disasters, unfortunate turn of events, bad luck, unfairness, injustice, cruelty, evil, and other perceivably “bad” things that happen in the world. Emotional reasoning templates containing these fallacies are as follows: (1) Self-Damnation: (Major Premise Rule) If I have [enter a perceived defect/s], then I am [enter personal devaluation].1 (Minor Premise Report) I have ___. (Conclusion) I am [enter personal devaluation]. (2) Damnation of Others: (Major Premise Rule) If [enter a person/s] has [enter a perceived

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defect/s], then ___ is [enter other-regarding devaluation].2 (Minor Premise Report) ___ has ___ (Conclusion) ___ is [enter other-regarding self-devaluation]. (3) Global Damnation: (Major Premise Rule) If the world has [enter a perceived defect], then the world itself is a [enter global devaluation]. (Minor Premise Report) The world has _______. (Conclusion) The world is [enter global devaluation].

For example, the following practical syllogism illustrates SelfDamnation: (Major Premise Rule) If I messed up at work, then I’m worthless. (Minor Premise Report) I messed up at work. (Conclusion) I’m worthless.

Similarly, the following practical syllogism illustrates Damnation of Others: (Major Premise Rule) If my wife has had an affair then she is no good. (Minor Premise Report) My wife has had an affair. (Conclusion) My wife is no good.

Finally, the following practical syllogism illustrates Global Damnation: (Major Premise Rule) If the world has bad things in it then it is itself bad. (Minor Premise Report) The world has famine and disease. (Conclusion) The world is itself bad.

Each of the above major premise rules engenders a Fallacy of Composition, that is, the faulty assumption that what’s true of the part is necessarily true of the whole. Thus, a person could have performed a worthless act, but from this it does not follow that the person herself is worthless. While no person is immune to the performance of worthless acts, the human being herself is not identical with any particular action or even a collection of actions. Such an atomistic construction of personhood ignores the palpable fact that persons have many attributes including the mental abilities to think, reason, recall, perceive, sense, and feel; potentials for learning and cognitive growth and maturity; a history of a life lived; interpersonal and familial connections; biological capacities and functionality; aesthetic and artistic capacities and sensibilities; and much more, all of which coalesce in a whole person.

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Quite obviously, the case is even more blatant on a cosmic level where a perceived worthless event happening in the world is a virtual drop in the universal bucket. The world includes events, objects, humans, nonhuman animals, plants, and other biological life; human artifacts, natural laws, and a host of other things that amalgamate and coalesce into what we call “the world.” This grand totality of things is clearly not reducible to a perceived malady, even a very bad one such as the death of a child, a bloody war, mass genocide, or a catastrophic tsunami. These are very bad things but the world is not for this reason a bad world since this is to separate or extract such bad things from the world in which they are imbedded; and then to elevate and identify the world with them. But the world is much more than any or all of these bad things, and what it is cannot simply be the sum of its parts. Thus, death is not separate from birth, and the death of some does not devaluate the birth of others; nor does it devaluate any other good thing in the world, let alone the value of the world itself. So it should be clear that damnation of self, others, and the world are fallacies, and LBT teaches counselees how to recognize and avoid them in their emotional reasoning. Each is taken in turn in the remainder of this chapter.

Damnation of Self As a rating (i.e., self-rating), damnation of self supervenes on a factual or quasi-factual claim about oneself. This standard or criterion of assessment is a variable; however, there are three very common criteria of assessment that counselees who damn themselves may apply in rating themselves as unworthy persons. These are (1) failure to get the approval of certain other individuals (approval damnation); (2) failure to achieve or perform up to the counselee’s expectations in something that is highly prized by the counselee, for example, an exam, sport, or job task (achievement damnation), and; (3) the counselee’s physical appearance as based on certain perceived physical attributes such as weight, height, or other bodily features (appearance damnation).

Approval Damnation As described in Chapter 3, the Damnation of Self as based on not getting the approval of others is often a deduction from the demand for approval:

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1. I must always have the approval of _( insert person/s)_. 2. Therefore, if I did _(insert action)_ and ____disapproved of it, then I’d be unworthy. 3. I did ____ and ____disapproved of it. 4. So, I’m unworthy.

For example: I must always have the approval of my boss. Therefore, if I screwed up at work and my boss disapproved, then I’d be a worthless screw-up. I did screw up at work—forgot to get in that report—and my boss was really down on me. So, I am a worthless screw-up.

Since the major premise from which the self-damnation has been deduced is that of the demand for approval, this syndrome can be addressed by helping the counselee to refute the demand for approval. (See, for example, the case study in chapter 2.) However, the direct refutation of self-damnation can also be addressed, which would be to show the composition fallacy inherent in the inference. Inasmuch as the conclusion is total devaluation of oneself, this inference can have serious behavioral implications, anything from quitting one’s job to committing suicide. Thus, the counselee who has concluded that he is worthless due to his having “screwed up” at work may also have a behavioral rule that prescribes giving up and no longer trying. In such a case, the LBT counselor could help the counselee to construct lifeaffirming antidotal reasoning that directs positive behavioral change. For example, against the inertia his irrational ideas (practical syllogism), the counselee could be helped to see that the meanings of the events in one’s life are subject to alternative interpretations, so that a mistake at work does not necessarily signify gloom and doom. As Jean-Paul Sartre suggested, “there are no omens in the world” but even if there were, we would choose their meanings.3 Thus, the meaning of “screwing up” could be redefined as “an opportunity to improve,” and new behavioral rules that support this new interpretation could be implemented as homework; for example, putting the due dates of assignments into an electronic calendar and checking the calendar on a daily basis. In addition, it is usually a useful strategy in cases where counselees damn themselves to emphasize the distinction between damning the deed rather than the doer. So a counselee may feel free to damn the deed, while leaving himself alone. “That was a stupid thing I did, but that does not

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make me stupid.” For the chronic self-damner, this can be a challenging distinction to appreciate emotionally; so such counselees can benefit from working hard behaviorally to come to appreciate the distinction on such a level. This work might include implementing shame-attacking exercises in building willpower (LBT step 5). For example, for the counselee who engages in approval damnation, this might involve intentionally doing something calculated to arouse the disapproval of another (e.g., a stranger in a supermarket) and then going through the LBT steps of constructing one’s irrational thinking, finding and refuting the irrational premise/s, and counteracting this irrational reasoning with a philosophical antidote.

Achievement Damnation This type of damnation involves making one’s self-worth a function of one’s achievements. As with approval damnation, it is typically deduced from demanding perfection, in this case, the demand never to fail at some particular thing or at anything whatsoever. Thus, as described in chapter 3, the reasoning template for the latter form of achievement damnation would be as follows: 1. 2. 3. 4.

I must never fail at _____. So, if I failed at ____ then I’m a failure. I failed at ____. So, I’m a failure.

This type of self-damnation, as based on failure to achieve, is prevalent in professionals such as athletes, writers, actors, musicians, professors, and other professions where there is considerable stress on performing well. As long as individuals in this group are performing well, they think themselves worthy; but when they falter, as eventually we all do, they devaluate themselves as worthless. Further, these individuals tend to experience anxiety even when they are performing well because there is always the possibility of not performing well at some future time. As such, this persistent state of stress about whether one will remain at the top of one’s game, portends a roller-coaster ride of angst about performance one day to the next. A counselee can also deduce achievement damnation from the demand for approval. That is, he may perceive his self-worth as dependent on whether he gets the approval of a given individual/s, and perceive his getting this approval as dependent on whether he succeeds at a given activity. The emotional reasoning template in such a case is as follows:

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I must always have the approval of _( insert person/s)_. So, if ____disapproves of my performance, then I’d be unworthy. If I fail at ___ then ___ will disapprove of my performance. So, if I fail at ___ then I’d be unworthy.

Inasmuch as achievement damnation stems from the demand for approval, as evidenced by the above reasoning pattern, it is possible for the counselee to work on overcoming his achievement damnation by giving up the demand for approval. Hence, the refutation, antidotal, and empowerment steps of LBT could concentrate on overcoming the demand for approval. This could, in turn, be managed at the empowerment stage (building the willpower to overcome cognitive dissonance) through behavioral homework assignments such as shame attacking exercises.

Appearance Damnation In appearance damnation, the counselee berates herself on the basis of perceived, negative physical attributes. This devaluation of self may be based on an idealized conception of what the human body should look like. This perfectionistic conception is often the one that is glamorized and touted by the mass media, for example, in cosmetic ads presented by “beautiful people”—models, stars, and other celebrities. The emotional reasoning template for reasoning is as follows: 1. 2. 3. 4.

I must have __[enter bodily attribute]__. So, if I don’t have ____, then I am unworthy. I don’t have ____. So, I am unworthy.

Here, self-damnation is deduced from a perfectionistic demand about one’s body, which may be (and usually is) culturally defined. Thus the attribute in question may be larger breasts, or a smaller nose, or a slimmer body. Moreover, as in some cases of achievement damnation, the latter self-damnation can sometimes be traced back to a demand for approval, especially approval of one’s peers or, even more generally, of some nameless, faceless social “they,” which is thought to sit in judgment of one’s appearance. Thus, there may also be another syllogistic level added to the above ERT: 1. I must have the approval of ____. 2. If I must have the approval of ____, then I must have __[enter bodily attribute]__. 3. So, I must have __[enter bodily attribute]__.

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In this case, refuting the demand for approval may help to relieve the tendency to demand that one have the “ideal” body, and hence the tendency to degrade oneself for not having it. Antidotally, Martin Heidegger’s metaphor of “getting lost in the they” can be helpful in exploding the myth that one is freely choosing to look a certain way. Heidegger writes: “They” even hide the process by which “they” have quietly relieved us of the “burden” of making choices for ourselves. It remains a complete mystery who has really done the choosing. We are carried along by the “nobody,” without making any real choices, becoming ever more deeply ensnared in inauthenticity.4

Heidegger tells us that, to find our way back from having gotten lost in the “they,” we must first reclaim our freedom. This requires realizing that we are not truly free unless we give up the demand to be accepted by “them.” This means allowing oneself to be oneself by freely inventing oneself, instead of blindly making oneself a social clone. In this case, the LBT therapist helps the counselee to set her sight on becoming authentic as a guiding virtue, thus transcending and trumping the perceived need to conform. Once on this path toward authenticity, the counselee no longer perceives the need to look the way “they” say she should look, and thus no longer degrades herself for not looking that way. Further, the counselee is set to accept herself for who she is, to feel comfortable with herself, and to freely choose for herself. What is more, by being helped by the LBT counselor to give up her demand for approval, a counselee can be helped, not only to give up her appearance damnation, but to give up other kinds of self-damnation in which she engages. Thus, in addition to thinking herself ugly, a counselee may conclude that she is stupid, can never do anything right, has a bad personality, and so on ad nauseam. Since these other kinds of selfdamnation can also be deduced from a demand for approval, in giving up this demand, the counselee can also be helped to give up these other kinds of self-damnation too.

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Damnation of Others Damnation of others is frequently deduced from demanding perfection of others. According to this way of thinking, if someone whom I expect (demand) flawless or virtually flawless conduct behaves below my expectations, this person must be a rotten or worthless person. Thus the ERT for this type of inference would be as follows: 1. 2. 3. 4.

__[Enter person]__ must never do __[enter forbidden act]__. So, if _____ does ___, then _____ is unworthy. ______ did _____. So, _______ is unworthy.

For example: 1. 2. 3. 4.

My friend must never lie to me. So, if my friend lied to me, then he’s a rotten person. My friend lied to me. So, my friend is a rotten person.

In such a case, the refutation might proceed by refuting the demand for perfection in premise 1. Thus, the counselee might be asked if he knows anyone who has never lied, thereby calling attention to the unrealistic demand he is making. Premise 2 might also be refuted by demonstrating how it leads to double standards. For example, this might be accomplished by raising the question, “Have you ever lied?” and (assuming an affirmative response), following up with the question, “Does that make you a rotten person too?” Antidotally, the LBT counselor might then (for example) introduce the Kantian “Categorical Imperative” to treat human beings as “ends in themselves” (i.e., centers of inalienable value) rather than as “mere means” (i.e., objects whose value is contingent). Clearly, the use of pejorative, damning labels violates this principle by confusing persons whose value is a constant with objects whose value stands or falls on how well they perform. This Kantian distinction (between persons and objects) in turn supports the rule of rating the deed, but not the doer. On this conception, we should leave the doer qua person out of the calculus. This rule (of rating the deed, not the doer) can be especially useful in helping to deflect intense anger stemming from the damnation of others. In fact, whereas self-damnation tends to support emotions of anxiety and depression, damnation of others tends to support anger toward others. As discussed earlier, all emotions include an intentional object and a rating. In the case of anger, the intentional object is the action of another; and its

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rating is a strong negative evaluation of either this action or the person performing the action.5 In the latter case (rating the person rather than the action), the common mode of rating is damnation of others. Such anger involving the damnation of others tends to be selfdefeating. Thus, a person who damns another (“That no good piece of crap”) will also tend to behave hostilely and regretfully toward that individual, for example, by assaulting him.6 In contrast, where the rating is of the deed rather than the doer, the behavioral response toward the doer is less likely to be hostile. “What you did was crappy” is less likely to draw blood than “You are crap.” The former leaves room for rational judgment—and resolution—whereas the latter tends to militate against rationality. This is because, in perceiving the other as “crap,” one affectively gives oneself permission to treat this person as though he (“it”) were disposable. In fact, while pejorative language, including such commonplace terms as “stupid,” “dumb,” and “idiotic” can usefully be applied to actions, they are ill-suited for application to persons. Thus, “What you did was dumb” proscribes acting similarly in the future; whereas “You are dumb” tends to over-generalize about the entire person by bringing all attributes and traits of the person under one pejorative label. Thus, if someone is dumb, then he is, ipso facto, incompetent and inferior as a human being. Here there is no need to get to know the person behind the label. If he is “dumb” then he is not to be taken seriously—or at least not very seriously. This power of damning language to deny the worth and dignity of human beings and thereby to transgress their rights was eloquently expressed by psychologist Albert Bandura: Self-sanctions against cruel conduct can be disengaged or blunted by divesting people of human qualities. Once dehumanized, they are no longer viewed as persons with feelings, hopes, and concerns but as subhuman objects. They are portrayed as mindless “savages,” “gooks,” “satanic fiends,” and the like. Subhumans are regarded as insensitive to maltreatment and capable of being influenced only by harsh methods. If dispossessing antagonists of humanness does not blunt self-reproof, it can be eliminated by attributing bestial qualities to them. It is easier to brutalize victims, for example, when they are referred to as “worms.”7

It is such a dehumanizing capacity of damning language that makes it easier to beat another mercilessly. If this person is “filth” and “slime” then the brutality of the beating can be “justified.” From domestic violence to racial oppression to mass genocide, damning epithets have played a significant role in treating human beings in ways that would otherwise have been unthinkable.8

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Accordingly, as progenitors of rationality, LBT counselors have a professional (and moral) duty to avoid this linguistic pitfall both inside and outside the context of counseling. Veritably, it is easy enough for any of us to slip into the mode of using derogatory language to label people. LBT counselors are not perfect. However, to the extent that they model the avoidance of damning others, they can set a consistent example for their counselees to emulate.

Global Damnation Global damnation involves total devaluation of the world based on some perceived defect.9 This type of damnation is also commonly deducible from a demand for perfection, in this case, a demand that the world exists in a state of ideality according to which things always go right and nothing ever goes wrong; or at least that very bad things never happen. The ERT for this type of damnation is accordingly as follows: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

The world must not have bad (or very bad) things. So, the world must not have __[enter a perceived bad thing/s]__. So, if the world has ______ then the world itself is a bad place. The world has_______. So, the world itself is a bad place.

Since the conclusion in 3 is deduced from the demand in premise 1 that bad things not exist, an LBT counselor can refute global damnation by refuting this “must.” Clearly, it is reasonable not to want bad or very bad things to happen. But this does not mean that they must not happen. As a matter of fact, whether we like it or not, bad things do happen. The popular saying, “Shit happens,” is just true. Thus, the counselee can be helped to stick to the expression of what he wants, rather than what must be. “Yes, you don’t want the ones you love to die. It might be nice that your mom and dad always be there for you, but all human being have always been mortal and it is unreasonable to expect that your parents will be any different.” Further, the LBT counselor can then also examine conclusion 3 by pointing out the fallacy of composition it engenders. “Is it necessarily a bad thing that people don’t live forever? What about the process of life and death in which the new come into being to replace the old? Is it not a beautiful thing to witness the birth of a child, with all the hope and excitement it portends for the future?” So, while the death of a parent can itself be a tragic event, it can also be viewed from a wider perspective as being a part of a process of life that is not itself bad, and may even be

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perceived as quite wonderful. As Leibniz argued, the bad can provide a necessary condition of the greater good, just as “the general of an army will prefer a great victory with a slight wound to a state of affairs without wound and without a victory.” There are often costs involved in attaining great things, but that doesn’t make the world a bad place. This also means that the counselee is also free to interpret, or reinterpret, the world in a fresh new way, one that adds vitality to it, rather than narrowly focusing on the bad stuff. Thus, antidotally, the counselee could be helped to consider that there is more than one interpretation to reality, and that he is free to explore other philosophical lenses through which to perceive the world. Here, post-modernists like Derrida, who attempt to “deconstruct” conventional conceptions of reality in terms of “binary oppositions” such as good versus evil, can be used to stimulate more creative ways of regarding the world.10 To live authentically according to one’s own lights, was what Nietzsche prescribed, rather than conforming to traditional constructs of good and bad, right and wrong. “To recognise untruth as a condition of life,” said Nietzsche, “that is certainly to impugn the traditional ideas of value in a dangerous manner, and a philosophy which ventures to do so, has thereby alone placed itself beyond good and evil.”11 But such a bold philosophy that ventures beyond good and evil by challenging traditional ideas need not lament or fear human death, since this is the polar opposite of the glorification of human life—a speciesistic view rooted in traditional Western theology. The counselee can instead be helped by the LBT counselor to reinterpret his view of life and death in a manner that avoids an enculturation that vacillates between the sanctity of life and the woefulness of death, for example, that life and death are merely part of nature. In the throes of a depression or other intense negative emotions, a counselee is not likely to construct such alternative views of reality without the guidance of a skilled counselor. Such new perspectives should not be forced upon a counselee, however. They must cohere with other views in his belief system. Thus, some counselees may hold philosophical views that are more closely aligned with a Platonic metaphysic and believe that reality cannot be deconstructed in a Nietzschean manner. What matters more is the fittingness of the philosophical view, less its specific content, as long as the view in question is rational (that is, as long as it avoids the pitfalls of the Cardinal Fallacies of LBT). In the end, the LBT counselor’s mission should be to help the counselee who is globally damning to expose the reasoning from which he is deducing this self-defeating conclusion; refute the irrational premises

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from which it is deduced; construct a suitable philosophical antidote; and then work volitionally to accept—cognitively, behaviorally, and emotionally—a more rational outlook and evaluation of the world.

Manipulative Reasoning Like the various species of damnation discussed in this chapter, manipulative reasoning involves treatment of a self as a “mere means” rather than as “an end in itself.” That is, it objectifies human beings by making their value as persons a variable and function of some desired outcome. More specifically, manipulative reasoning is practical reasoning that answers the question, “What can I do or say (or not do or say) to force, intimidate, frighten, deceive, or otherwise manipulate such and such person/s into acting, thinking, or feeling in the way that I desire or prefer?” Such reasoning often uses the emotive force of language as a psychological tool for such manipulative purposes to get someone to respond cognitively, behaviorally, or emotionally in the desired way. The manipulation can be subtle, “If I say I don’t mind in a sad voice, they might get the hint that I really do mind”; but sometimes such reasoning is quite blatant as in “If you as much as say one word out of line, I am through with you!” The basic Behavioral Reasoning Template (BRT)12 involved in manipulative reasoning is the following: 1. If __[enter trigger13]__ will or might get __[enter a person/s]__ to __[enter behavioral/cognitive/emotional response desired]__ then I should __[enter trigger]__. 2. __[Enter trigger]__ will or might get __[enter a person/s]__ to __[enter behavioral/cognitive/emotional response desired]__. 3. Therefore, I should _____.

For example, 1. If threatening to break up with her unless she sleeps with me will get her to give in and sleep with me, then I should do it. 2. Threatening to break up with her unless she sleeps with me will get her to give in and sleep with me. 3. So, I should threaten to break up with her unless she sleeps with me.

Clearly, the problem with this sort of reasoning is that it is selfdefeating. Thus even if it “works” and the threatened person gives in, a relationship founded on such power and control typically does not last, or if it does, then it is typically a dysfunctional, unsatisfying one.

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Accordingly, the LBT counselor can help the counselee to construct his manipulative reasoning so that the refutation of the problematic premise, namely the major premise rule, can be undertaken. There may be an inductive error in the minor premise also. Thus, for example, it may be unlikely that the person targeted for manipulation will in fact be manipulated. However, this is a moot point because the serious problem is with the idea of manipulating people in the first place. This is a bad news philosophy of relationships and the LBT counselor can help the counselee to realize it and to give up this self-defeating approach to getting what he wants. Manipulating others degrades others by treating them as nonautonomous things rather than as rational persons capable of choosing for themselves. As a result it is self-defeating because functional human relationships are based on mutual trust and respect. So, if the goal is to improve a relationship, then manipulation defeats this purpose. While this doesn’t mean that there is never a legitimate use of manipulation (for example, in a hostage situation), counselees may use it as their primary way of relating and trying to get what they want. The goal of the LBT therapist in such cases is to help the counselee to adopt a more rational philosophical outlook. Here Kant’s “Categorical Imperative” is a useful rational antidote to the self-defeating policy of manipulation. Kant says to universalize one’s maxim; that is, to see if the behavior in question could be performed by everybody who is in the same situation. Imagine what the world would be like if everyone always used manipulation to get what they wanted instead of using rational argument. In such a case, no one would trust anyone and the attempt to manipulate others would unravel. In the very least, the counselee may be helped to consider whether he too would like to be treated as such an object manipulated. One very commonplace device of manipulation is to use emotive language to manipulate. Thus, a counselee might “poison the well” by referring to alternative viewpoints as “stupid” or “naïve,” thereby intimidating his audience from engaging in rational discourse and brainstorming. Accordingly, LBT therapists can counsel their counselees to avoid the use of emotive language to manipulate an outcome instead of rationally explore it. The goal of LBT counseling in the context of working with counselees who tend to relate to others by using manipulative reasoning is to help change the counselee’s philosophical approach to one conducive to empowerment of others, which is the transcendent virtue of manipulative reasoning. To empower others means to give them the opportunity to

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express their own ideas in an environment that is free from intimidation, coercion, chicanery, threats, and other forms of manipulation. The goal here is to foster mutual autonomy in a relationship wherein there is mutuality, respect, and tolerance for alternative perspectives. This does not mean that there can be no room for disagreement. But disagreement can be cordial, tolerant, and rational. In the end, rational people can agree to disagree if agreement cannot be found. However, there is typically no room in rational discourse for manipulative reasoning.

Notes 1

The personal self-devaluation is a variable for a host of expressions that involve devaluation of a self. See also the discussion of Emotional Reasoning Templates (ERTs) in Chapter 1. 2 The other-regarding devaluation is a variable for a host of expressions that involve the devaluation of another person. 3 Cohen, The New Rational Therapy, 159. 4 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, as cited in Cohen, The New Rational Therapy, 96. 5 See Chapter 1. 6 As Aristotle would qualify, the hostile action would follow only if there were nothing to prevent it. Thus, the agent could conclude that another person is a piece of crap but nevertheless feign cordiality, say if the other person had power over him, for example, was his employer, and the agent exercised rational constraint over the damning syllogism bidding him to act hostilely. See chapter 3. 7 Albert Bandura, “Mechanisms of Moral Disengagement in Terrorism,” In W. Reich (Ed.), Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind (pp. 161-191). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Accessed September 1, 2013. http://exordio.qfb.umich.mx/archivos%20pdf%20de%20trabajo%20umsnh/aphilos ofia/2007/NEUROPSICOLOGIA/BanTerrorism.pdf. 8 Cohen, Critical Thinking Unleashed. 9 Ibid. 10 Jacques Derrida, “Signature, Event, Context,” in From Plato to Derrida, 4th ed., ed. Forrest E. Baird and Walter Kaufmann (Upper Saddle River, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 2003), 198–217. 11 Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, trans. Helen Zimmern, Chapter 1, Sec. 4. Accessed September 1, 2013. http://www.gutenberg.org/files/4363/4363h/4363-h.htm. 12 See chapter 1 for a description of Behavioral Reasoning Templates (BRTs). 13 The “trigger” is the manipulative commission or omission intended to produce the given behavioral, cognitive or emotional response in the given person or persons.

CHAPTER SEVEN CATASTROPHIC REASONING AND DUTIFUL WORRYING One major problem for which counselees come to LBT and other forms of cognitive-behavioral counseling is intense anxiety. In this chapter, two logically related Cardinal Fallacies that fuel this type of emotional problem are examined in their turn, namely catastrophic reasoning and dutiful worrying.

Catastrophic Reasoning As defined in Chapter 1, catastrophic reasoning is reasoning from bad to worst (or near-worst). It is characterized by: (1) prediction of consequences, and (2) an extreme, negative rating of these consequences. The latter negative rating often uses terms such as “terrible,” “horrible, and “awful” to characterize the predicted consequences; and the prediction itself is often exaggerated, lacking adequate (inductive) evidence. Catastrophic reasoning is the primary cognitive constituent of intense anxiety. As mentioned in chapter 1, anxiety is a future-oriented emotion. Its intentional object is a possible future event having certain forecasted consequences; and the rating of the intentional object is strongly negative, leading the individual to ruminate about it. Thus the cognitive element of anxiety is, in essence, catastrophic reasoning. Anxiety is “constitutionally iffy” in that its intentional object is always a conditional, predictive statement to the effect that, if a certain event happens, then such and such consequences will (or might) occur; and its rating is a strongly negative assessment of this conditional object. This “iffyness” is what distinguishes fear or dread from anxiety. The former always involves actual events, for example, being afraid of a bear that is attacking you. On the other hand, anxiety always involves possible or uncertain events, for example, anxiety about what will or might happen if one doesn’t do well on one’s exam.

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Finding the entire intentional object of anxiety therefore requires finding each link in the conditional chain of predicted consequences. For example, consider the following counselor-counselee exchange: Counselee: I have my doctoral defense next week and keep thinking about what would happen if I messed up. Counselor: So, you are anxious about messing up on your dissertation defense next week? Counselee: Yes, that’s correct. Counselor: So what do you think might happen if you mess up? Counselee: I won’t ever get my degree. Counselor: So, then what do you think might happen if you don’t get your degree? Counselee: I will never fulfill my dream of becoming a philosophy professor. You need a doctoral degree to teach philosophy at a college or university. Counselor: Then what do you think might happen if that happens? Counselee: I will end up at some dead end job for the rest of my life.

Here, the LBT counselor successfully expands the counselee’s chain of predicted consequences, thus providing a more complete elucidation of her intentional object. Of course there might also be intermediate steps between each given link, which the counselor can also help to clarify. For example: Counselor: Why do you think that if you mess up on your defense, you will never get your degree? Can’t you try again? Counselee: Yes but if I mess up no one will take me seriously and they will just keep turning me down.

At this stage, note that the counselee is not attempting to challenge the counselee to cast doubt on her reasoning. Rather, the purpose of such questioning is to help the counselee get clear on the links in her chain of consequences. Once this chain is satisfactorily expanded, the counselor can help the counselee to give her assessment of this chain of events, thus eliciting the rating element of the counselee’s anxiety. For example: Counselor: So what if you did mess up on your defense and really did end up at a dead end job for the rest of your life? On a scale of 1 to 10, where 10 is the worst thing on your scale, how would you rate this chain of events? Counselee: I would give it a 10. For me, personally, it would be the worst thing that could happen. Counselor: Would it really be that bad?

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Notice that counselor asked the counselee to rate her forecasted chain of events on a scale of 1-10 (where 10 is the highest rating). This question can be very useful for checking to see if counselees are engaging in catastrophic reasoning. Counselees who are engaging in catastrophic reasoning tend to gravitate to the maximum rating of 10; and they accordingly reflect this absolutistic rating, as in the above case, in strong, negative terms such as “awful” (“terrible” or “horrible”) and “the worst thing that could happen.” However, counselees who are engaging in catastrophic reasoning about a given chain of events may also rate it as less than the maximum rating of 10 (for example, 9); and their language may be somewhat tempered such as “very bad” in contrast to “awful” or “the worst.” Thus LBT counselors may sometimes need to exercise discretion as to whether the counselee’s rating qualifies as “catastrophic.” Indeed, some counselees may be more understated than others but, for such counselees, “very bad” may be another counselee’s “awful.” Once the counselor is able to elicit the counselee’s intentional object and rating in the manner illustrated, she can then go on to help the counselee formulate her emotional reasoning using the standard form of emotional reasoning. Recall, this form is as follows:1 (Major Premise Rule) If O then R (Minor Premise Report) O (Conclusion) R

The conditional intentional object thus corresponds to a conditional minor premise report (O); and the major premise rule consists of a further conditional premise connecting the (conditional) intentional object (O) with a strong negative rating (R). The conditional minor premise report (O) can be represented by providing the first and last links in the causal chain that was elicited. Thus, in the above example, this would be, “If I mess up on my dissertation defense, then I will end up at a dead end job for the rest of my life.” Because there are likely to be many links in a complex chain of forecasted events, this formulation can capture the conditional in a succinct and instructive way. The last link is, after all, the payoff. It is why the chain of events is, from the counselee’s perspective, “awful,” “horrible,” or “terrible.” This formulation also helps to reveal, on its face, just how far down a slippery slope the counselee may have gone in catastrophizing about a possible event.

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Accordingly, the Emotional Reasoning Template (ERT) of anxiety can be set up as follows: 1. If __[enter first link in predictive chain]__ and consequently __[enter last link in predictive chain] then it2 would be [enter a catastrophic term3]__. 2. If __[enter first link]__ then __[enter last link]__. 3. So, it would be __[enter catastrophic term]__.

For example the counselee’s emotional reasoning in the above illustration would proceed as follows: 1. If I mess up on my dissertation defense and (consequently) end up at a dead end job for the rest of my life, then it would be the worst thing that could happen. 2. If I mess up on my dissertation defense then I will end up at a dead end job for the rest of my life. 3. So, it would be the worst thing that could happen.

Once the counselee’s primary emotional reasoning is assembled, its irrational premises can be exposed and refuted. Typically, the minor empirical premise can be refuted by challenging the inferential leaps the counselee made to get to the final link (in the above case, ending up at a dead end job for the rest of her life). Thus, for example, the counselee could be challenged to provide adequate evidence for her inference that if she messes up on her defense, she will never be taken seriously again and will continue to be turned down, even if she corrects the problems in her dissertation. Similarly, the other links can be challenged and shown that they do not rest on adequate (inductive) evidence.4 The major premise rule can also be easily challenged inasmuch as it can be shown to exaggerate just how bad the chain of forecasted consequences really is. “Is it really the worst thing that could possibly happen to you? What about being tortured slowly by being boiled in oil? Isn’t that much worse?” What is often in need of refuting is the absolutistic character of the rating. Indeed, there is not really anything that is totally bad or the worst thing in the world; and what is awful, horrible, and terrible is such in a relative sense. While some things are extremely bad, such as tsunamis and mass genocides, many things that people ordinarily rate as awful are nowhere near that bad. Thus, one still can enjoy life even if one does not end up a philosophy professor (or whatever else one aspires to become). Not getting all that one wants in life is inevitable. So, too, is loss of what

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one holds dear, including the death of loved ones. As the Buddhists well understood, the degree to which one suffers as a result of such inevitabilities is a function of what one tells oneself about them. If they are perceived as awful, horrible, and terrible in a non-relativistic sense, that is, as totally bad or near totally bad, then one sets oneself up for suffering. Counselees who turn the mundane vicissitudes of life into catastrophic events of absolute proportions will invariably suffer a great deal. LBT counselors can help relieve such distress by helping their counselees to refute these exaggerated ratings and by helping them to take a more philosophically enlightened view of the world such as that reflected in Buddhist thinking.5

Dutiful Worrying An especially pernicious type of anxiety is that of dutiful worrying.6 In this Cardinal Fallacy, the counselee prescribes a moral duty to ruminate and disturb himself about a perceived problem of catastrophic proportions until he is certain or near-certain that he has found a perfect or near-perfect solution to the perceived problem. This type of worrying accordingly supervenes on catastrophic reasoning: 1. If __[enter first link in predictive chain]__ and consequently __[enter last link in predictive chain]__ then it would be __[enter a catastrophic term]__. 2. If __[enter first link]__ then __[enter last link]__. 3. So, it would be __[enter catastrophic term]__. 4. So, I must keep ruminating about __[enter first link]__ until I am certain I have found the best way to control it.7

For example, a parent might tell herself that it would be awful if her child did not do better in school because he would then not get into a good college; so, therefore, she must keep ruminating about the matter until she’s certain that she’s found the best way to help her child improve his grades. In conclusion 4, the term “must” is used in a moral sense. That is, it prescribes a moral duty or requirement. Thus, the parent thinks that she has a moral duty to worry about her child’s poor performance in school. This dutiful demand also involves dutiful perfectionism, that is, an absolutistic, perfectionistic demand to worry until one attains certainty about having found the best (that is, perfect or near-perfect) way to control things, for example, stopping the child from doing poorly in school.

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Often this type of worrying is sustained by guilt arising from an intermediate self-damning inference: 1. If __[enter first link in predictive chain]__ and consequently __[enter last link in predictive chain]__ then it would be __[enter a catastrophic term]__. 2. If __[enter first link]__ then __[enter last link]__. 3. So, it would be __[enter catastrophic term]__. 4*. So, if I let __[enter first link]__ happen, I would be a bad person.8 4. So, I must keep ruminating about __[enter first link]__ until I am certain I have found the best way to control it.

Notice that conclusion 4*, as deduced from 3, provides the basis for guilt based on self-damnation in case the counselee does not satisfy her perceived duty to keep ruminating about her child’s poor performance in school. Thus the parent might tell herself that she would be a bad or damnable person (not to mention a condemnable parent) if she did not continue to upset herself about her child’s poor grades. Consequently, the parent keeps herself in a perpetual state of distress until the problem is resolved or goes away. The vicious cycle of guilt accordingly helps to perpetuate the worrying; for each time the counselee tries not to worry, she thinks herself a bad person unless she continues to ruminate about the problem. Further, because moral duties are universalizable9 and therefore apply to any other person who is relevantly situated, dutiful worriers also expect others to share the worry. Thus, the mother who is ruminating about her son’s poor grades may also expect the boy’s father, by virtue of his also being the child’s parent, to partake in the worrying. In this way, dutiful worrying tends to be enforced by attempting to make others feel guilty if they resist worrying.10 “Why aren’t you upset over what’s happening to our son? What kind of father are you anyway?” Thus, the mother perceives any attempt by the father to escape dutiful worrying as a moral failing on his part and may communicate the same to him. As such, dutiful worrying tends to spread to other members of a family, or other close affiliations, thereby creating a stressful environment for anyone relevantly situated. In addition, dutiful worrying tends to be chronic. There invariably appears to be one problem or another about which to worry, thereby creating a steady stream of stress for all those involved. Because counselees who dutifully worry demand certainty or nearcertainty about solutions to the problems they perceive, but since none of the proposed solutions are really certain, procrastination and decision by indecision are common outcomes of dutiful worrying.

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In such cases, counselees tend to substitute dilemma reasoning for constructive, proactive reasoning. These counselees organize facts into self-defeating dilemma arguments such that no matter what alternative is taken there is an unpalatable result. For example, the mother who dutifully worries about her son’s poor performance in school may reason as follows: If I get my son a tutor then the tutor might not be good enough and my son will continue to do poorly. If I try to help him myself then I might not do a good job and he’ll still continue to do poorly. I can either get my son a tutor or try to help him myself. So, either way my son might still continue to do poorly.

As the above example illustrates, the dilemma can revolve around the uncertainty of each perceived alternative. Inasmuch as the counselee continues to demand certainty there is not likely to be any alternative course of action that suffices. Insofar as the counselee hangs onto the idea that she must be certain (or near certain) of any alternative course of action before choosing it, she will tend to substitute worrying for proactive measures. In addressing counselees who dutifully worry, LBT counselors can help these counselees to see that their reasoning is catastrophic. For example, is it really so awful if one’s child doesn’t improve his performance in school? Indeed, many children do poorly in the early grades and then do better later. Some children do not begin to apply themselves until much later in life, and then do quite well for themselves. If a child doesn’t go to a “good school” (meaning “top notch”) does that mean that he can’t attend a community college and complete his education at a state university? Realizing that the situation may not really be a catastrophic one can help relieve the desperation, and thus make it easier to see that the demand for certainty is irrational. Indeed, if the situation is “do or die” (the equivalent of playing Russian roulette) then demanding certainty may seem less unreasonable. After all, shouldn’t one be certain about a life or death situation? But even life or death decisions are not ones that can be made with certainty. Thus, choosing a medical intervention is inherently probabilistic, and one does not have certainty about any course of treatment. Accordingly, LBT counselors should help their counselees who dutifully worry to give up their demand for certainty.

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A clear refutation of the demand for certainty is the anti-empirical nature of such a demand. As David Hume made clear, inferences about the future are not certain because their denials are always conceivable. While past uniformities provide a basis for making probabilistic inferences about the future, we have no way of demonstrating that past futures will resemble future futures.11 This means that counselees should be helped to see that it is unreasonable to await certainty before deciding; for this would mean that we would never decide. Finally, dutiful worrying is inherently irrational because there is simply no moral duty to worry. For example, one can indeed have a parental duty to provide for one’s children; but this does not mean that one has an additional duty to worry about providing for one’s children. To the contrary, chronic and stressful worrying can get in the way of making adequate decisions. In other words, it can be counter-productive from the perspective of executing one’s actual moral duties. There is not one ethical theory that would countenance dutiful worrying. Utility is not its basis because, far from maximizing happiness, the chronic worry of the dutiful worrier obstructs happiness, his own and all others who are involved. It is not justified on Kantian standards because one is treating oneself and others as mere means. From the perspective of the dutiful worrier, he and all others involved are valuable only as means to resolving the problem at hand. In addition, attempting to force others to worry along with the dutiful worrier cannot be consistently willed to be a universal law inasmuch as no rational person would want to be so treated.12 Further, a care-based ethics would militate against it because it places an unnecessary strain on interpersonal relationships.13 Nor is it justified from a self-interested perspective because it undermines one’s own happiness. There is also no religious perspective that would prescribe dutiful worrying. Even “hellfire and brimstone” religionists such as Jonathan Edwards do not believe that one has a duty to upset oneself, unless one has committed a serious sin, and then the suffering would only be for purposes of repentance, not for purposes of finding the perfect solution to a problem.14 Still, counselees who dutifully worry are deeply concerned about doing what is morally right and feel guilty when they imagine that they are remiss in their moral duties. Unfortunately, such counselees have a selfdefeating idea about the nature of moral reasoning and problem-solving. For such counselees, moral reasoning and problem-solving are largely about worrying oneself to the brink of exhaustion as a condition of

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addressing the problem at hand. Indeed, many such counselees believe that morally virtuous agents must suffer the pains of emotional stress in order to be forthright and earnest in their endeavor to do the morally right thing. This stress is debilitating, not constructive. It is associated with difficulties in concentrating and remembering, gastrointestinal problems, insomnia, loss of appetite, headaches, loss of sex drive, and other negative somatic and psychological obstructions to rational thinking and problemsolving.15 Far from helping to solve problems, the intense stress of dutifully worrying can therefore be an impediment to addressing one’s moral problems. Antidotally, counselees who dutifully worry need to replace their demand for certainty with the acceptance of reasonable judgments about the future.16 Thus, the mother who cannot decide whether to tutor her son herself or hire a professional tutor could be helped to see that, while neither option is certain, neither need be unreasonable (assuming the mother is competent to tutor the child). In the end, she may simply have to choose. For, as Jean-Paul Sartre admonished, there is no calculus for life decisions, which yields a final mathematical tally, and even if there were, we would be the ones who would need to assign the weights to the pros and the cons.17 These counselees also do well to replace the demand for a perfect solution to a perceived problem with a directive to act on imperfect knowledge. Human knowledge is inherently imperfect and we simply cannot know everything. Still, there is an Aristotelian mean between a cursory or careless inquiry and one that demands perfection. Either extreme is problematic. The dutiful worrier no less breaches the mean than the lackadaisical person. This mean depends on the context. If it is an urgent medical decision that needs to be decided stat, then asking too many questions can be selfdefeating; if the problem is less urgent, say elective surgery, then there may be more time to ask more questions. But even in the latter case, the inquiry has limits and it becomes obsessive when the same questions keep being asked and a different answer sought notwithstanding that no further evidence has emerged to the contrary. As Hume, counseled, a wise man “proportions his belief to the evidence.”18 Thus, when a belief becomes probable (for example, based on prior cases resembling the present one, it is probable that the patient will die unless given a blood transfusion), it is generally a belief that is suitable to act on. This is not an algorithm for determining the Golden Mean in the quest for knowledge, but forging a habit of proportioning one’s belief to the degree of evidence tends to be useful when it comes to avoiding going to extremes. In their quest for

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perfect knowledge, dutiful worriers defeat the point of seeking practical knowledge in the first place, namely, acting on it. In addition, counselees who dutifully worry tend to focus on what might go wrong rather than what might go right. They thus tend to harbor an inherently negative view of the world. It is conceived as a place that tends toward the bad; wherein there can be no rest in the constant battle to ward off evil. This is not to deny that bad things do happen, or that there is evil in the world. But the perspective of dutiful worriers tends to discount the good things in favor of an obsessive attention to what can and does go wrong. This obsession makes it hard for such individuals and those to whom they relate to live contentedly in the world. However, as discussed in Chapter 6, what is true of the part is not necessarily true of the whole and, as Leibniz counseled, “an imperfection in the part may be required for a greater perfection in the whole.”19 Thus, counselees who dutifully worry may be challenged to consider what the world might be like if there were no bad things in it. As John Hick famously argued, such a world would be devoid of virtues such as courage, which presuppose danger; it would be a world in which there were no great conquests, such as medical conquests, since there would not be anything to conquer. In the absence of risk there would be very little to commend building a virtuous character. “Generosity, Kindness, the agape aspect of love, prudence, unselfishness, and all other ethical notions which presuppose life in an objective environment could not even be formed.”20 Such a world would also be rather boring and uninspiring. LBT counselors can also challenge counselees who dutifully worry to give up their demand to control things. As discussed in Chapter 5, the demand to control external events such as the actions and approval of others is a future-oriented demand and thus creates anxiety about the exercise of such control. This demand for control is imbedded in the dutiful worrier’s dutiful perfectionism, which, as mentioned, involves the demand to ruminate and worry until one is certain that the ideal manner of controlling the situation is discovered. Antidotally, the LBT counselor can make use of Epictetus’ well-known distinction between events that are under one’s own control, namely one’s own subjective mental states such as conception, desire, and choice; and those external events which are not under our own control, such as what others do or think.21 The counselee can be helped to see that the demand to control what is not in one’s control in the first place is irrational and that the things that are not in one’s control include certainty about the future.

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Here, the LBT virtue of metaphysical security may be usefully proposed to the counselee as the rational alternative to demanding perfection.22 Although, realistically, human reality is not without some measure of angst about the future, metaphysical security involves a healthy (albeit imperfect) acceptance of risk as the unavoidable consequence of living productively (as distinct from merely existing) in the material world. Indeed, in this world, there is always a chance that one’s choices and decisions will not work out as planned. But, as discussed earlier in this chapter, proactive thinking in which one comes to a conclusion about what is to be done and implements the choice through an action plan is more likely to meet one’s mark than procrastinating or making one’s decision by indecision as a result of getting caught up in dilemma thinking. Productive living is thus the offspring of rational risktaking, that is, of making rational choices in a world that is inherently uncertain. Accordingly, counselees who tend to dutifully worry can benefit from learning how to rationally address their moral problems. In particular, instead of engaging in dilemma reasoning, which tends to sustain worrying and promote decision by indecision, the counselee can acquire rational standards for identifying moral problems as well as proactively addressing these problems. These abilities and skills are also key aspects of prudence, the transcendent virtue that trumps the fallacy of dutiful worrying. The LBT counselor can thus help her counselees who dutifully worry to overcome their dutiful worrying and to acquire instead a habit of prudentially approaching actual moral problems as they arise in the context of life issues. This virtue will be examined in Chapter 11. Of course, another impediment to overcoming procrastination and decision by indecision is can’tstipation; that is, emotionally, behaviorally, or cognitively stultifying oneself through the misuse of the term, “I can’t.” This Cardinal Fallacy is discussed in the next chapter.

Notes 1

See Chapter 1, this book. Here, the pronoun “It” refers to the possible state of affairs consisting of the antecedent (first link in predictive chain) and consequent (last link in predictive chain). 3 A catastrophic term is an evaluative term used to catastrophize such as “awful,” “horrible,” “terrible,” or “the worst thing.” 4 See discussion of inductive fallacies in Chapter 9, this book. 2

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See, for example, Elliot D. Cohen, The New Rational Therapy: Thinking Your Way To Serenity, Success, and Profound Happiness (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2006), 68-70. 6 For an extended discussion of dutiful worrying, see Elliot D. Cohen, The Dutiful Worrier: How to Stop Compulsive Worry Without Feeling Guilty (Oakland, CA: New Harbinger, 2011). 7 The major premise supporting this inference has been omitted. This premise is “If__ [enter first link]__ would be awful, then I must keep ruminating about it until I am certain I have found the best way to control it.” 8 The major premise supporting this inference has been omitted for clarity. This premise is “If __[enter first link]__ would be awful, then if I let __[enter first link]__ happen, I would be a bad person.” 9 R. M. Hare, Freedom and Reason (London: Oxford University Press, 1963), 729. 10 Cohen, The Dutiful Worrier. 11 David Hume, Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, ed. L.A. SelbyBigge, Section 4, Part 2. Accessed September 2, 2013. http://www. gutenberg.org/files/9662/9662-h/9662-h.htm 12 Immanual Kant, Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals, translated by Thomas Kingsmill Abbott, Second Section. Accessed September 2, 2013. http://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/5682/pg5682.html. 13 Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women’s Development (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993). 14 Jonathan Edwards, Selected Sermons of Jonathan Edwards, ed. H. Norman Gardiner. Accessed September 2, 2013. http://www.gutenberg.org/files/34632/34632-h/34632-h.htm. 15 Gary R. Kirby and Jeffrey R. Goodpaster, Thinking, 4th ed. (Upper Saddle River NJ: Pearson, 2007), 46-47. 16 See discussion of foresightedness in Chapter 12, this book. 17 Jean-Paul Sartre, Existentialism and Human Emotions (New York: Philosophical Library, 1985), 28-29. 18 David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, Section 10, Part 1. Accessed September 2, 2013. http://www.gutenberg.org/files/ 9662/9662h/9662-h.htm 19 Gottfried Leibniz, Theodicy, in The Individual and the Universe: An Introduction to Philosophy, ed. Oliver Johnson (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1981), 355. 20 John Hick, “The Problem of Evil: The Free-Will and Soul-Building Arguments,” in Philosophers at Work: Issues and Practice of Philosophy, 2nd ed. (Fort Worth: Harcourt, 2000), 545. 21 Epictetus, Encheiridion, in From Plato to Derrida, 4th ed., ed. Forrest E. Baird and Walter Kaufmann (Upper Saddle River, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 2003), 259. 22 See Chapters 1 and 11, this book.

CHAPTER EIGHT CAN’TSTIPATION The term, “I can’t” is equivocal and may be used to express distinct ideas. In its normative sense, it may be used to express refusal, for example, “I can’t break a promise” or “I can’t let you into the show without a ticket.” In this sense, one expresses a rule-governed choice to forbear oneself from doing something. However, there is another (nonnormative) sense of the term, in which one makes a factual claim about one’s incapacity for something, for example, “I can’t sing on key” or “I can’t have an erection.” In some cases use of “I can’t” in this incapacity sense can and often does short-circuit constructive emotional, behavioral, and volitional adjustment. I have used the term “can’tstipation” to describe these subversive uses of “I can’t.”1 There are, accordingly, three sorts of can’tstipation corresponding to the object taken to be outside one’s capacity for control: (1) behavioral, (2) emotional, and (3) volitional: x Behavioral Can’tstipation involves impedingly telling oneself that one can’t do certain things, for example, make a speech. x Emotional Can’tstipation involves perpetuating a self-defeating emotion by telling oneself that one can’t help feeling this way, for example, feeling depressed. x Volitional Can’tstipation involves telling oneself that one can’t stand, tolerate, or put up with something that is difficult or challenging, for example, losing one’s job.

Each of these uses of “can’t” are “can’tstipating” because they involve holding onto the “can’t” rather than letting it go (“excreting it”), and as a result, preventing oneself from being “productive.” Volitional and emotional can’tstipation tend to sustain self-defeating emotions. Thus, if one tells oneself that she “can’t” control her emotions or will, then she is not likely to do so. This is because there is a close logical connection between “I can’t” and “I shouldn’t try to.” Indeed, if one really can’t do something, then it would be self-defeating for one to even try to do it. As such, inferences involving can’tstipation always appear to involve behavioral reasoning that prescribes a volitional,

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emotional, or behavioral omission (“not trying”). As such, behavioral reasoning templates (BRTs)2 will be used in this chapter to represent the structure of can’tstipating reasoning.3

Behavioral Can’tstipation In the case of behavioral can’tstipation, a standard behavioral reasoning template (BRT) for this type of inference is as follows: 1. If I can’t do __[enter an action]__ then I shouldn’t even try to do _____. 2. I can’t do _____. 3. So, I shouldn’t even try to do _____.

For example: 1. If I can’t get up in front of an audience and give a speech then I shouldn’t even try. 2. I can’t get up in front of an audience and give a speech. I would just freeze up and would not even be able to get a word out. 3. So, I shouldn’t even try to get up in front of an audience and give a speech.

In this inference, the behavioral prescription not to try is deduced from the behavioral justification that one can’t perform the act in question. In this inference, the major premise behavioral rule that, if one can’t do the act in question then one shouldn’t even try, appears to be rational. Indeed, it would ordinarily be a wasted effort to try to do something that one can’t do. However, in the case of behavioral can’tstipation, the clearly irrational premise lies in the minor premise about one’s incapacity for behavioral change. In most contexts in which behavioral can’tstipation occurs, the counselee’s emotion is that of anxiety. Indeed, the minor premise report, “I can’t do it” refers to a future action, with which the counselee is confronted and challenged. For example, he may have been asked to give a speech to a class he is taking at the university. As such he is confronted with a task he believes he can’t do but which is required of him as part of his grade in the class. Thus the anxiety may be generated by a sense of futility about his future prospects for success in the class. “Why even bother to try!” But if he doesn’t try he fails the assignment, which he may perceive as a bad, even “awful” thing. Thus behavioral can’tstipation also tends to generate other fallacies (such as catastrophic thinking), which promote anxiety.

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Typically, a behaviorally can’tstipated counselee inflates the challenge of performing the action in question (unrealistically claiming that she can’t do it because it’s too hard) and/or underrates her own capacity to perform it (unrealistically claiming that she can’t do it because she is bad at it). This is not to deny that there are some things that some people cannot do, or do very well. Capacity is indeed a variable and there are ranges of human activities that require skills that are acquired through practice and/or heredity. However, in the case of behavioral can’tstipation, the judgment that “I can’t do it” is made without a rational, empirical assessment of one’s capacity. It is the lack of adequate empirical evidence for the incapacity claim that renders it fallacious. Clearly, a convincing refutation of behavioral can’tstipation is a behavioral refutation, that is, actually performing the action in question and thereby demonstrating that one is not incapable of performing it. However, behaviorally can’tstipated counselees often experience anxiety about even trying to perform the action. In some cases these counselees may experience anxiety because they perceive failure to perform adequately as confirmation of their own diminished self-worth. Some such counselees may even prefer to suffer serious consequences of not performing a required task (for example, accepting an F in a college course) rather than to try and risk failing at the assigned activity. In some cases, counselees may deduce their incapacity from their perceived unworthiness, thereby exhibiting behavioral reasoning along the following lines: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

I am not a worthy person. If I am not a worthy person, then I can’t do _____. So, I can’t do _______. If I can’t do ____then I shouldn’t even try to do ____. So, I shouldn’t even try to do ____.

For example, a counselee may think that a task at work is too difficult for him to accomplish because he is stupid and inept. Consequently, he may conclude that he shouldn’t even try to accomplish it; and as a result he may resign himself to the inevitability of being fired. As such, the counselee deduces his incapacity to perform an action or task from his global assessment of himself as unworthy. Clearly, the job of the LBT therapist in this case would be to help the counselee overcome his selfdamnation. In other cases, a problematic premise may lie in a demand for perfection, that is, in the demand that one perform perfectly or not at all. This reasoning proceeds according to the following BRT:

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1. If I can’t do __[enter an action]__ perfectly then I shouldn’t do ____ at all. 2. I can’t do______ perfectly. 3. So, I shouldn’t do ____ at all.

For example, a counselee may tell herself that she can’t go back to school to earn a degree because she has been out of school too long. She may tell herself that if she can’t do it “right” then she might as well resign herself to staying in a dead end job. Exploration of what it means to do it “right” may confirm that the counselee is assuming major premise 1 of the above inference set—”If I can’t attain a perfect academic record (or near perfect academic record) then I shouldn’t go back to school.” However, the reductio ad absurdum of this premise is glaring. By demanding perfection, the counselee defeats her own purposes. She demands perfection as a means of achieving her life goals, but in doing so she thwarts those very goals by keeping herself in a job without opportunity for future advancement. In such manner, this type of behavioral can’tstipation can be refuted by helping the counselee see the absurdity of her demand for perfection. In some cases, behaviorally can’tstipated counselees may also deduce their incapacity from a demand for certainty. In these cases, a counselee may assume that he can’t do something if he can’t be certain that he can. Thus: 1. If I am not certain that I can do ____, then I can’t (or probably can’t) do ____. 2. I am not certain that I can do ____. 3. So, I can’t do ____. 4. If I can’t do ____, then I shouldn’t even try to do ______. 5. So, I shouldn’t even try to do_____.

In such a case, the counselee demands certainty and infers his incapacity from his lack of certainty. Here, there is anxiety about trying to do anything unless one is certain that one can do it, or do it adequately. For example, a counselee may be exploring the possibility of starting a new business but suffer anxiety about doing so because he does not know for sure if he would be able to run his own business. Consequently, the counselee may decide that he can’t do it. As such, the counselee would make the mistake of inferring 3 from 2 above, which is valid only if premise 1 is added. However, this premise is plainly irrational and easily refuted. Indeed, if it were true, then no one could ever do anything inasmuch as no one is ever certain about the future.

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The demand for certainty is therefore self-stultifying. One need not be certain in order to have reasonable belief about one’s capacities. For example, a person can reasonably believe that he can deliver a speech before a large audience or pass a course in algebra, even if he has never attempted these tasks before. These can be reasonable beliefs inasmuch as they claim ordinary human capacities (in contrast to unlikely or impossible ones, such as the capacity to find a cure for old age, invent a perpetual motion machine, or square the circle). In the absence of empirical evidence to the contrary, one can reasonably expect to deliver the speech or pass the algebra course. But, in saying that one can do these things, one is not necessarily saying that one will do them. Rather, one is saying that it is possible for one (it is within one’s capacity) to do them. While the aforementioned inference sets need not exhaust the irrational bases from which one may infer one’s incapacity to perform, they appear to be among the most commonplace ones. Generally speaking, these involve styles of demanding perfection and/or self-damnation. LBT counselors may therefore help their behaviorally can’tstipated counselees to overcome their inertia to make constructive behavioral changes by working with them on overcoming these forms of faulty thinking. Often, counselees who are behaviorally can’tstipated procrastinate. As a result they may put off acting and later regret not having acted. It is therefore important that LBT therapists help such counselees to overcome their behavioral can’tstipation by providing them the encouragement and support to do things rather than to procrastinate about doing them. Accordingly, behavioral exercises and homework assignments can be useful means of helping such counselees to build up increased willpower in overcoming cognitive dissonance and inertia against making constructive behavioral changes.4 LBT therapists can also encourage their behaviorally can’tstipated counselees to change their “I can’ts” to more realistic capacity claims such as “I choose not to” or “I won’t.” Such reframing can help these counselees to realize that they have the freedom to make constructive changes in their lives if they so choose.5

Emotional Can’tstipation The perception of freedom to make constructive changes in one’s emotional life is also undermined as a result of emotional can’tstipation.6 Counselees who harbor this kind of can’tstipation typically accept the following BRT:

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1. If my emotion is caused in me by some external event, object, or action then I can/’t help my emotion. 2. __[Enter emotion]__ is caused in me by __[enter external event or action]__. 3. So, I can’t help __[enter emotion]__. 4. If I can’t help _____, then I shouldn’t even try to help it. 5. So, I shouldn’t even try to help _____.

For example: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

If something upsets me, then I can’t help how I feel. When Jane broke up with me it made me depressed. So, I can’t help feeling depressed. If I can’t help it, then why even try! So, why even try!

Counselees who make this set of inferences typically do so enthymematically. Terms such as “You upset me,” “He really pissed me off,” “It makes me mad,” “That’s really depressing,” and other such phrases set in the passive voice provide clear indications of emotional can’tstipation. Such terms as these permit the counselee to deny responsibility for his emotion. Thus, if Jane’s breaking off the relationship depressed the counselee then he emerges as a passive recipient of his depression. It is as if he were happily going about his life and suddenly Jane injects him with a depression-inducing drug. Here the responsibility is ascribed entirely to the action of another, and the counselee refuses to help himself to deal rationally with the situation. In helping the counselee to construct his behavioral reasoning, it is helpful to keep in mind that the object of emotional can’tstipation is an event, not a person. For example, when a person says, “You upset me” he implies that you did or said something that upset this person. Thus the counselor should help the counselee to clarify the event in question, which he thinks has caused his emotion. This will enable the counselor to raise the question about whether events in the world really cause one’s emotions in the way that one external event causes another, say the motion of one billiard ball causing motion in another billiard ball upon contact. This is important for purposes of helping the counselee to refute his claim about his incapacity to help his emotion. Indeed, if human emotions are products of cause and effect such as that which occurs between two external events, then this leaves no room for free will. This is significant because many counselees believe in free will, yet deny any freedom in controlling their emotions. The refutation here would be to show the

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inconsistency between the belief in free will and the denial that one can control one’s emotions. Thus, the refutation might proceed as follows: Counselor: Do you believe in free will? Do human beings have free will? Counselee: Yes, I believe that they do. Counselor: But if people couldn’t control the way they think or feel, then they would be no different than completely determined automata or machines; that is, they would be devoid of free will.

In this way, the counselor can help the counselee to see that his belief in free will is inconsistent with his self-can’tstipating use of “can’t.” In cases where a counselee still refuses to concede that he has free will in the present situation, the dialogue might continue in the following manner: Counselee: I still don’t believe that in this case I have the freedom to control the way I feel. Counselor: Have you ever told yourself the same thing in other situations, namely that you didn’t have the capacity to feel differently, but still managed to do so? For example, is there occasion on which you felt angry or depressed but were able to change the way you felt? Counselee: Yes, I got angry at my friend when he lied to me but after he apologized I forgave him and was no longer angry at him. Counselor: Did you decide to forgive him? Counselee: Yes. Counselor: So did you decide not to be angry at him anymore? Counselee: Yes I did. Counselor: So, did you exercise free will deciding not to be angry anymore? Counselee: Yes I suppose I did. I decided not to hold a grudge and I let go of my anger. Counselor: So, when you say you “can’t” help the way you feel, is that necessarily true? Counselee: No, I can at least sometimes control the way I feel.

In this refutation strategy, the counselee is challenged to give up the assumption that, just because he thinks he can’t control his emotions, then he really can’t. Further, in situations in which counselees are hard determinists and therefore deny free will altogether, it is still possible to help them to see that emotional control is still possible. Here is another strategy: Counselee: I don’t believe that human beings really do have free will. Whatever they think, feel, or do is fully determined by external conditions.

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Counselor: Okay so you think that human beings are just complex biological machines, like computers with very complex programs? Counselee: Yes, that’s right. Counselor: Well, if that’s the case, have you ever programmed your computer to do something that it didn’t do before, for example, change the settings so that it would start up differently or run in some new way that serves your interests better? Counselee: Of course, I have. Counselor: Well then, even if you are a biological variation of a complex computing machine, wouldn’t you still be able to recondition it to respond differently? Counselee: Yes, I suppose so. Counselor: So would it still be in your power to change your emotions even if you are, in the end, just a machine? Counselee: Yes, I can see where you are going with this.

In this manner, the counselor can still help the counselee who is a hard determinist to see that his can’tstipating use of “I can’t” is irrational, thereby allowing him to move on to the next LBT stages of constructing antidotes and then acting on them to make constructive change.

Volitional Can’tstipation Such arguments to support emotional control are, mutatis mutandis, also pertinent to supporting counselees’ capacity for controlling their wills. For, counselees who suffer from volitional can’tstipation deny that they have such freedom or that it is greatly limited. These counselees typically use expressions such as “I can’t stand (tolerate, take, put up with) it” to refer to their perceived incapacity to deal with things that may be difficult or challenging to manage. Here, the irrationality consists in not distinguishing between something’s being difficult or challenging and its actually being beyond the capacity to manage. Accordingly, a standard BRT template for this type of can’tstipation is as follows: 1. If __[enter an action, event, or state of affairs]__ is difficult/challenging for me to manage, then I can’t stand (tolerate, take, put up with) it. 2. __[Enter an action, event, or state of affairs]__ is difficult/challenging for me to manage. 3. So, I can’t stand it. 4. If I can’t stand it, then I should give up trying to manage it. 5. So, I should give up trying to manage it.

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For example, a counselee may deny that she can stand some aspect of her job, for example, dealing with difficult customers, and therefore decide to quit her job even if she does not have another job and needs the money. Branding such thinking as fallacious in no way justifies sticking with things that truly present unreasonable challenges or risks. However, very often, those who suffer from volitional can’tstipation needlessly defeat their own purposes by virtue of selling themselves short on their capacity to manage a difficult or challenging situation. The words “I can’t stand it” may therefore be used by a counselee to give herself a proverbial green light to give up on something as soon as it is perceived to be difficult or challenging. Counselees who suffer from volitional can’tstipation also tend to be short-term hedonists. That is, they may set their sights on attaining pleasure and alleviating pain or frustration in the short term even if this is at the expense of attaining greater pleasure and release from pain in the long run.7 Thus, a student who struggles with a required course may drop out of college rather than to put in a reasonable effort to pass the course. A business owner who strongly desires to increase his bottom line may find the straight and narrow path too fraught with uncertainty and decide instead to engage in illegal business practices in order to “make it big.” Often it is the time that it may take to accomplish a goal that one is not willing to stand. Thus, it takes persistence over time to accomplish most worthwhile goals, but a counselee who suffers from volitional can’tstipation may tell himself that he just can’t stand to wait. In some commonplace cases, a counselee may deduce his volitional can’tstipation from a demand for perfection: 1. __[Enter an event]__ must always go my way. 2. So, if ____ does not go my way (as it must) then it is too difficult for me to manage. 3. ____ is not going my way. 4. So, _____ is too difficult for me to manage. 5. If _____ is too difficult for me to manage then I can’t stand it. 6. So, I can’t stand it. 7. If I can’t stand it, then I should not try to manage it. 8. So, I should not try to manage it.

For example, a counselee may demand that he not have anyone criticize him at his workplace and accordingly tell himself that it is too difficult for him to manage such criticisms and therefore that he can’t stand it; and therefore decide to quit his job. Here, the low frustration tolerance follows from the perfectionistic demand that everyone always approve of everything he does. As a result he may fail to cope with

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ordinary and expectable tensions that come with working in cooperation with other human beings. In many cases, the “I can’t stand it” of volitional can’tstipation may be used to give oneself permission not to emotionally stand something or (the conduct of) someone. Thus, the counselee who demands that others not criticize him may “explode” in anger when she encounters the criticism. In telling herself that she can’t stand to be so criticized, she affectively gives herself permission not to stand it. Here, further behavioral rules may include screaming at or “telling someone off” or “where to go.” As such, volitional can’tstipation can and often does promote loss of emotional control. Thus, those who may be characterized as having “a short fuse” typically suffer from volitional can’tstipation. So also do those who tend to lapse into depressive episodes or become belligerent amid difficult or challenging times. In such cases the counselee tells himself that because he can’t and therefore shouldn’t try to stand the situation in question, then he should make no effort at controlling his emotions. Volitional can’tstipation can also deduce depression. For example, emotional reasoning from which the counselee may have deduced global damnation (the badness of the world) may be added to the “can’t stand it” of volitional can’tstipation to deduce depression. “If the world is such a bad place then I just can’t stand it.” In the extreme, such emotional and behavioral reasoning can end with the decision to take one’s own life— therefore, “I shouldn’t even try to live in this world.” Antidotally, volitional can’tstipation can be managed by helping the counselee to substitute “I don’t want to” for “I can’t stand it” (or its cognates). This is helpful because “I don’t want to” implies responsibility, so that the counselee, ipso facto, accepts responsibility in changing the language. “I can’t stand it” implies determinism whereas “I don’t want to” implies that I have the free will to change my mind. If the counselee denies such free will and therefore refuses to accept “I don’t want to” instead of “I can’t stand it,” then the same refutation strategies of emotional can’tstipation discussed earlier in this chapter can be used.8

Notes 1

See, for example, Elliot D. Cohen, “Relieving Your Can’tstipation: Some Potent Philosophical Enemas,” Practical Philosophy Vol. 9, No. 2, 2008: 45-53. 2 See Chapter 1 for a description of behavioral reasoning templates (BRTs).

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This does not mean that constipation does not arise in the premises of emotional reasoning. In fact, it does quite often. For example, catastrophic reasoning may include the “can’t stand it” of volitional can’tstipation as in “If I screw up my class presentation and everyone laughs at me, then I just couldn’t stand it.” However, the self-defeating or destructive consequences of such “can’ts” reside in the behavioral conclusions deduced from them. For example, “If I couldn’t stand to screw up my class presentation then I shouldn’t even try to make the presentation.” 4 See, for example, the discussion of “Implementing the Plan of Action” in Chapter 2, this book. 5 Elliot D. Cohen, What Would Aristotle Do? Self-Control through the Power of Reason (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 2003). 6 Cohen, “Relieving Your Can’tstipation: Some Potent Philosophical Enemas,”4649. 7 Albert Ellis and Michael E. Bernard, “What is Rational-Emotive Therapy (RET)?” in Handbook of Rational-Emotive Therapy, Vol. 2, ed. Albert Ellis and Russell Grieger (New York: Springer Publishing, 1986), 10. 8 See this chapter, section on “Emotional Can’tstipation.”

CHAPTER NINE THE INDUCTIVE FALLACIES The minor premises of counselees’ practical syllogisms typically file reports that make empirical claims. LBT identifies three broad Cardinal Fallacies that may be contained in these premises. They are (1) oversimplifying reality; (2) distorting probabilities; and blind conjecture. This chapter examines each of these fallacies in turn.

Oversimplifying Reality As discussed in chapter 1, the report premises of counselees’ emotional reasoning are expressions of the intentional objects of their emotions. To the extent that these objects present a distorted view of reality they can have serious (often negative) consequences for counselees’ emotions.

Overgeneralization One manner of distortion is in the use of universal quantifying terms such as “all,” “no,” “none,” “every,” “never,” and “always.” For example, a counselee having a relationship issue may complain that a significant other is never there for him and that, therefore, she is a terrible person. In this case, the anger and frustration the counselee is experiencing is sustained by an oversimplification of reality (“never there”) as well as the negative rating (“terrible person”). Thus the emotional reasoning of this counselee may present as follows: (Major Premise Rule) If my significant other is never there for me, then she is a terrible person. (Minor Premise Report) My significant other is never there for me. Conclusion) My significant other is a terrible person.

There are two ways to proceed once the premises of the counselee’s emotional reasoning are identified. The counselor can challenge the counselee’s distorted reality perception in the Minor Premise Report and then, in the light of this analysis, examine the negative rating in the Major Premise Rule, which is a clear case of damnation of others. However, an

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alternative approach would be to look at each of these premises in the reverse order. The first approach, in which the counselor first attempts to refute the Minor Premise Report, may seem to have the virtue of making it easier to see that the counselee’s significant other is not really a “terrible person” because she is not literally “never” there for him (assuming that the significant other is at least sometimes “there” for him). Indeed, if the antecedent of the Major Premise Rule is false, then the rule in question does not even apply to the counselee’s case. However, this approach misses the opportunity to help the counselee see that even if his significant other was indeed rarely if ever there for him (for example, was preoccupied with her own life and paid only lip service to his issues and problems), this would still not make her a terrible person. According to LBT, the preferred approach would be to start with the Major Premise Rule and attempt to refute it, thereby showing that even if the counselee’s significant other were totally preoccupied with her own life, this would still not make her a terrible person.1 Then, the counselor could help the counselee to see that the Minor Premise Report presents an oversimplified view of reality: Counselor: Are there any times when your significant other was there for you when you thought you needed her? Counselee: Yes, I was ill a few months ago and she stayed home from work to care for me. Counselor: So is she truly never there for you? Counselee: No I suppose not.

In this manner, the counselor can help the counselee address each of these premises on their own merit (or demerit) without having to base the refutation of the damnation of others on an empirical (and therefore contingent) matter. Indeed, the counselee may, on a subsequent occasion, confront a situation where there is no factual distortion. In such a case it is more useful to have been able to see that damning others is a fallacy independently of whether the contingent antecedent of its rule is really true. Counselees may also use universal quantifiers (both negative and affirmative) in their minor premise reports to draw hasty or unrepresentative generalizations from data samples. For example, a counselee who was depressed about his perceived unpopularity with women may have drawn the following inference: 1. Jane laughed at me when I asked her out. 2. So, no women like me.

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Let’s say the conclusion of this inference (2) comprises the minor premise report of the following emotional reasoning: (Major Premise Rule) If no women like me, then I’m a loser. (Minor Premise Report) No women like me. (Conclusion) I’m a loser.

Once again, the LBT counselor can help the counselee address the major premise rule first by refuting the counselee’s self-damnation (calling himself a “loser”). The counselor can then help the counselee understand the fallacy inherent in the inference from (1) to (2) above. This can be accomplished by helping the counselee find at least one counterexample to his generalization: Counselor: You concluded that no women like you because you think that Jane doesn’t like you. And you think she doesn’t like you because she laughed when you asked her out. First, you are assuming that she was laughing at you and that this means she doesn’t like you. But there are lots of reasons why she might have laughed. Maybe she was embarrassed by your asking her.2 Counselee: Maybe. Counselor: Nevertheless, let’s suppose that she really doesn’t like you. Does that mean no women like you? Counselee: No but she’s not the first women to turn me down. There have been others. Counselor: Have there been any women who have liked you? Counselee: Yes but I didn’t like them. Counselor: But you said no women like you, not just the ones you like. So it’s false that no women like you. Counselee: Okay, so most women don’t like me. Counselor: How many women haven’t liked you? Several million? Counselee: Haha! I haven’t known that many women! Counselor: So, how can you claim that most women don’t like you? You would need to have a sample that was sufficiently diverse. For example, it would need to include women who come from various ethnic, economic, educational, religious, and geographical backgrounds. It would need to include women from different age groups, temperaments, value perspectives, and other variables bearing on personal compatibility. Otherwise your sample wouldn’t be representative enough to count for most women. Counselee: I can see that but most women I have known haven’t liked me. Counselor: But that leaves millions of other women whom you don’t know. Counselee: Yes that’s true.

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Here, once the counselee provides a counterexample, his generalization about no women liking him unravels. However, the counselee then weakens the generalization to say “most” women. Consequently, the counselor shows the counselee that his sample is still not representative enough to count for most women in the world. In the end, the counselee admits that there are still women out there who might like him. Accordingly, the pattern of refutation for overgeneralizations suggested here is to: (1) find counter-examples, and, if the counselee attempts to hold onto the generalization by weakening it, and (2) refute the counselee’s assumption that the sample from which it is drawn is representative. Of course, this does not speak to the possibility that many of the women the counselee has known have not liked him. But this is not necessarily because the counselee has poor relational skills (although that could be the case). It is also possible that the counselee has not been meeting women with whom he might be more compatible. However, once the counselee comes to see that his sample is insufficient to support a universal (“all”) or quasi-universal (“most”) generalization, the counselor and counselee are then free to look into such a possibility. Otherwise, the overgeneralization prevents the counselee from even exploring this possibility.

Stereotyping Another form of oversimplification that is often at the root of counselee’s problems of living is the harboring of stereotypes, that is, “the use of strong emotional language to rate entire groups of people without considering individual differences among group members.”3 Because stereotypes involve prejudgment, they impede interpersonal relationships. For example, a counselee may hold a stereotype that all or most gay men are pedophiles, and therefore harbor anger and hostility toward gay men, even ones whom the counselee has never met and does not know. The following (inductive) reasoning is paradigmatic of stereotypical reasoning that targets specific individuals: Most gays are pedophiles. This man is gay. So, he’s (probably) a pedophile.

Such stereotypical reasoning, when combined with behavioral and emotional rules, can promote negative, self-defeating, and (sometimes) dangerous behavior and emotions. For example, add to the major premise rule, “If he’s a pedophile then he’s a good for nothing pervert,” the

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conclusion inferred above, that this man is a pedophile, and hostility, with serious potential for violence, is deduced. It is not a question of whether a counselee holds stereotypes. It is rather a question of what stereotypes he holds. Indeed, all of us have stereotypes. As Walter Lippmann argued in his famous treatise on Public Opinion, stereotypes are primitive protective mechanisms that human beings are hard-wired to use to judge possible dangers in a complex, uncertain universe.4 This does not mean that we are all equally as disposed to apply stereotypes in dealing with potential danger (whether or not this is a natural inclination). It does suggest, however, that, where counselees do rely on stereotypes, there may be work to do on overcoming the demand for certainty in moving toward greater metaphysical certainty. Whether, or not, the tendency to stereotype is a biological one, the particular stereotypes that counselees hold are often a function of socialization rather than inferences from personal experience. For example, the person who is homophobic may have had little or no exposure to gay people yet still harbor a deep seated stereotype; for the stereotype may have been taught as part of childhood religious indoctrination. It is therefore a mistake to assume that a counselee’s stereotypes are a result of (and therefore hasty generalizations from) negative experiences with the target of the stereotype. In fact, counselees may use negative experiences with the target to support stereotypes they already hold. (“See, I told you they’re all like that!”)5 Refutation of stereotypes can be accomplished by helping the counselee adduce counterexamples to the stereotype (e.g., “Can you provide examples of black people who are not poor and on welfare?”). However, another very useful approach is to provide appropriate in vivo homework assignments in which the counselee receives fresh exposure to individuals belonging to the stereotyped group. Because counselees who hold stereotypes may tend to look for biased samples to reaffirm their stereotype, the LBT therapist and counselee should carefully design the assignment so that the sample is not biased (that is, not set up in advance so that the individuals in the sample are likely—or unlikely—to fit the stereotype). For example, a counselee who is looking to purchase a car but who also stereotypes car salespersons as “sleaze” can be given a homework assignment to go to dealerships that do not already have a reputation for being disreputable, and then speak to several car salespersons. Or, a counselee who holds a racial stereotype can be given a homework assignment that brings him in direct contact with members of the race in question. The counselee should be instructed to mentally bracket the stereotype for purposes of the assignment and thus to keep an

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open mind. The LBT therapist and counselee can then discuss the stereotype in light of the experience. By virtue of being exposed directly to counterexamples to the stereotype, the LBT therapist can help the counselee to overcome the stereotype.6

Pigeonholing A further form of oversimplifying is that of pigeonholing. This involves setting up a false dichotomy. Counselees may commit this fallacy in confusing contraries with contradictories; that is, in committing the socalled fallacy of “black or white thinking.”7 For example, counselees who demand perfection often reason along the following lines: Either what I do is perfect or it’s totally unacceptable. My job performance is not perfect. I keep making mistakes. Therefore, my job performance is totally unacceptable.

In this case, the counselee might then file the conclusion under a behavioral or emotional rule as in the following: (Major Premise Rule) If my job performance is totally unacceptable, then I am a failure. (Minor Premise Report) My job performance is totally unacceptable. (Conclusion) I am a failure.

Again, LBT recommends refuting the major premise rule first and then going on to refute the minor premise report. The latter would involve asking the counselee why his job performance is totally unacceptable: Counselor: You say that your job performance is totally unacceptable. Why do you think so? Counselee: I have been making mistakes. The other day I sent an email message to my boss that had a blatant typo in it. Counselor: So why does that make your job performance “totally unacceptable”? Counselee: Because I can’t be making mistakes. I have to be perfect. Counselor: Perfect? Counselee: Yes, if what I do is not perfect then it’s just totally unacceptable.

Here, the first “Why?” posed to the counselee by the counselor aims at exposing the minor premise supporting the counselee’s conclusion that his job performance is totally unacceptable. The second “Why?” posed by the

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counselor then aims at exposing the major premise (“Why does that make your job performance “totally unacceptable”?). The refutation can then proceed by refuting the counselee’s problematic premise, namely the false bifurcation that, either what he does is perfect or it’s totally unacceptable.8 Counselor: You say that your job performance has to be perfect or it’s totally unacceptable. Counselee: Yes, that’s right. Counselor: But between perfect and totally unacceptable there are many other options. What you say is like saying that either you get a 100% on an exam or you get a 0%. What about 80% or 90%, or even 95%? Counselee: That’s just not good enough for me. Counselor: Well then everyone’s job performance is totally unacceptable because no one can be perfect!

Here the counselor shows the counselee that there are other options between his job performance being perfect and its being totally unacceptable. However, the counselee insists that these other options are not acceptable. Accordingly, the counselor reduces the counselee’s position to the absurd by demonstrating that, if these options are unacceptable then everyone’s job performance must also be totally unacceptable because no one is capable of being perfect.9 As should be evident from the preceding example, when counselees pigeonhole their options, LBT counselors should work with them to help them see that there are other possibilities besides the ones into which they have pigeonholed reality. In addition to distorting reality, pigeonholing can also lead to a decision by indecision. This can happen when counselees construct dilemmas on top of their false bifurcations. For example, a counselee may reason like this: 1. Either I will remain single or I’ll have to settle for someone. 2. If I remain single, I will be alone for the rest of my life; if I have to settle for someone, I’ll be stuck in a loveless marriage. 3. So, either I will be alone for the rest of my life or I’ll be stuck in a loveless marriage.10

As a result of such reasoning, a counselee may not take any action, and thereby make his decision by indecision. Counselors should work with their counselees to give up construction of dilemma arguments and use proactive forms of reasoning instead.11

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However, if a counselee constructs a dilemma, the counselor can help her see that it is irrational. One such way is to refute the disjunctive premise (so-called “escaping between the horns”); another is to refute one or both of the conditional premises (“breaking a horn”). Thus, the counselor can point out that there are other possibilities between remaining single or having to settle for someone, namely, finding someone whom one truly loves. In addition, the counselor can help the counselor to see that the consequent of one or both of her conditionals does not necessarily follow. For example, remaining single does not necessarily mean being alone. One could have plenty of friends, take in a roommate, adopt a child, or even a dog. In addition, because the negation of each consequent of each conditional of a dilemma argument can be presented as a positive consequent of each alternative antecedent, it is possible to reduce the argument to the absurd. For example: 1. Either I will remain single or I’ll have to settle for someone. 2. If I remain single, then I won’t be stuck in a loveless marriage; if I have to settle for someone, I won’t be alone for the rest of my life. 3. So, either I won’t be stuck in a loveless marriage or I won’t be alone for the rest of my life.

This affirmative argument, constructed by first switching the consequents of the two conditional statements, and then negating them, produces an affirmative dilemma from the very same factual claims provided in the initial negative dilemma argument. As such, this technique of setting up a parallel affirmative dilemma can be used to show the counselee that he might as well reason affirmatively as negatively, thus showing him that there is no more reason to accept a bleak interpretation of reality than a more optimistic one.12

Distorting Probabilities In Chapter 7, catastrophic reasoning was discussed. Recall that the emotional reasoning template (ERT) for this type of reasoning was as follows: 1. If __[enter first link in predictive chain]__ and consequently [enter last link in predictive chain] then something that is __[enter a catastrophic term13]__ could happen. 2. If __[enter first link]__ then __[enter last link]__. 3. So, something that is __[enter catastrophic term]__ could happen.

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For example, a counselee may be experiencing anxiety about the possibility of his wife getting pregnant because he has convinced himself that, if his wife can miscarry then she will. Thus he may reason as follows: (Major Premise Rule) If my wife gets pregnant then miscarries, then it would be awful. (Minor Premise Report) If my wife gets pregnant then she will miscarry. (Conclusion) It would be awful.

Often, in such catastrophic reasoning, counselees base their minor premise report on some variant of so-called, “Murphy’s Law,” that is, if something bad can happen then it will happen.14 Note that the minor premise rule asserts that the counselee’s wife will miscarry if she gets pregnant. Here, this definite prediction of a miscarriage may have been inferred from “Murphy’s Law” as follows: 1. If something bad can happen then it will happen [Murphy’s Law]. 2. If my wife gets pregnant then she can miscarry; which would be bad. 3. So, if my wife gets pregnant, then she will miscarry.

Clearly, the above inference from “can” to “will” is irrational because there are many things that can happen that simply do not happen. For example, it was possible to have been struck by lightning in the last electrical storm, but it simply did not happen. The LBT counselor can therefore help a counselee to give up this non sequitur by helping him to see that it is clearly false-to-fact that, whatever can happen will happen. Inasmuch as the transcendent virtue of catastrophic reasoning is courage, LBT counselors should help their catastrophizing counselees to increase their courage in confronting fears and anxieties. In this regard, the counselor should remind her counselee to base his predictions of events, not on fear but on evidence. As W.K. Clifford forcefully stated in his treatise on the Ethics of Belief, “it is wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone, to believe anything upon insufficient evidence.”15 While this is a perfectionistic ideal (and therefore not fully realizable for human beings who are far less than perfect), it is one toward which all of us should undemandingly strive. Evidence is to irrational fears as garlic is to a vampire. Educating counselees about the importance of proportioning their beliefs to the degree of evidence is not just a useful antidote to many irrational ideas. It is at the core of what it ordinarily means to be rational. As in the case of inductive generalizations, predictive inductive inferences are based on adequate evidence when they are based on a

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sample of past or present instances that are sufficient in both number and diversity.16 For example, consider the following emotional reasoning: (Major Premise Rule) If I never find a woman who is faithful to me, then my life is not worth living. (Minor Premise Report) I will never find a woman who is faithful to me. (Conclusion) My life is not worth living.

Here, the prediction about never finding a woman who is faithful as given in the minor premise report may be based on an inference such as the following one: 1. My (former) girlfriend was unfaithful. 2. So, I will never find a woman who is faithful to me.

In this case, the sample is neither sufficient in number nor in diversity. Just because the counselee’s (former) girlfriend was unfaithful to him, he cannot reasonably conclude that all other women he will subsequently meet will be the same. To draw this conclusion, he would need a sample of women far and wide who were unfaithful to their significant others without exception. However, according to a recent statistic, about 54% of women (57% for men) admit to cheating in a relationship.17 So, this means that, a priori, there is a 46 % chance of finding a woman who would not be unfaithful in a relationship. While this statistic may not be the most encouraging news for the perplexed counselee, it is more realistic and a far cry from never being able to find a woman who is faithful. And it may be more consoling for the counselee to learn that only 14% of married women admit to having cheated on their spouse.18 But whether or not the statistics are consoling, by encouraging their counselees to do their homework before jumping to conclusion, LBT counselors can help them to make more rational inferences about the future, based on evidence instead of fear or other unscientific, anti-empirical bases. Moreover, in cultivating a habit of basing inductive inferences on adequate evidence, counselees can move closer toward being more metaphysically secure. This is because being metaphysically secure entails such a habit of taking a realistic perspective about reality.19

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Blind Conjecture A further set of inductive fallacies involves speculating or making conjectures without sufficient evidence. This includes advancing explanations, making causal judgments, and contrary-to-fact claims without sufficient evidence, such as on the basis of fear, guilt, superstition, magical thinking, fanaticism, or other anti-scientific grounds.20

Explaining When a purported fact can be inferred from a statement (or set of statements), it is said to explain that fact.21 For example, the world is flat explained the purported fact that ships that sailed out to sea eventually seemed to drop off the fact of the earth. Of course, in introducing more facts (someone sails around the world), what was once a probable explanation may no longer be one—because other facts are introduced that cannot be explained by (inferred from) the prior explanation. This is why explanations are always at most probable and not certain. They are always subject to being defeated by future facts/evidence. Counselees should therefore be helped by their LBT counselors to understand this tentative, probabilistic character of explanations as based on evidence. Not uncommonly, counselees base their emotional reasoning on a minor premise report that involves an inadequate explanation, that is, an explanation that is not probable in relation to the given facts. For example, a counselee who is depressed because he thinks he has a brain tumor may reveal the following emotional reasoning: (Major Premise Rule) If I have a brain tumor, then I might as well be dead. (Minor Premise Report) I have a brain tumor. (Conclusion) I might as well be dead.

Here, the counselee draws a self-destructive conclusion. In some cases, some counselees (for example, very anxious ones) may deduce such a conclusion from an inadequate explanation of a set of symptoms they have or think they have. For example, the counselee may have inferred the major premise report (“I have a brain tumor”) as follows: 1. I am dizzy, fatigued, and my hands are shaking. 2. So, I must have a brain tumor.

However, the collection of symptoms (premise 1) from which the conclusion (2) is inferred can be explained in a number of ways other than

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a brain tumor. For example, in the absence of appropriate tests—e.g., an MRI or a CT Scan—intense anxiety could also explain these symptoms, just as well as a brain tumor. And, even in the absence of any such test, there may be evidence that diverges from and makes the “brain tumor” hypothesis much less probable than the anxiety hypothesis. For example other common symptoms of brain tumors such as convulsions, loss of balance, and passing out may be absent. In such a case, the LBT counselor should challenge the counselee to be scientific: “Well, without any medical evidence, your explanation of your symptoms is purely speculative and unjustified. The mere fact that you are most afraid of having a brain tumor is not itself any rational reason to think you have one.” According to Karl Popper, a scientific method for solving problems includes three steps: 1. The starting point is always a problem or a problem situation. 2. Attempted solutions then follow. These always consist of theories, and these theories, being trials, are very often wrong: they are and always will be hypotheses or conjectures. 3. In science, too, we learn by eliminating our mistakes, by eliminating our false theories.22

Following Popper, the LBT counselor should enlighten the counselee about scientific method. This method begins with a clear statement of the problem, one that is not question begging and does not itself assume any explanation. For example, “Is my brain tumor benign or malignant?” assumes that there is a brain tumor in the first place. On the other hand, “Why do I feel dizzy, fatigued, and have shaky hands?” does not assume any possible explanation. The second step then consists of considering all possible explanations that answer the problem as defined. Thus, while the brain tumor hypothesis might be included in the set of provisional explanations, it is not given any greater weight than any others on the list. Then, the third step involves testing the possible explanations on the tentative list. In the present case, this might include medical tests but it could also include getting a good night’s sleep and temporarily giving up caffeinated beverages. In any event, it militates against jumping to conclusions based on fear; and in the end, the most reasonable explanation will ordinarily be the one that is not eliminated in the testing phase, and has the greatest predictive and explanatory power; that is, explains the most facts and can also be used to predict others.23

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Making Causal Judgments Counselees’ minor premise reports in their emotional reasoning can also contain causal judgments founded on inadequate evidence. For example, a counselee may reveal the following emotional reasoning: (Major Premise Rule) If I caused my neighbor to drop dead, then what I did was horrible. (Minor Premise Report) I caused my neighbor to drop dead. (Conclusion) What I did was horrible.

In this case, the counselee may experience intense guilt over his perception of having caused his neighbor’s death. But how could he have caused his neighbor’s death? Suppose his justification for his minor premise report is as follows: I wished that my neighbor would drop dead and the next day he had a heart attack and died. So, I caused him to drop dead.

Here the counselee displays one of the most commonplace fallacies of causal inference, that of the post hoc fallacy.24 In such a case, the LBT counselor should help the counselee to understand that the mere succession of events is not sufficient to establish a causal relation. Here an example such as John Stuart Mill’s famous example of night always being followed by day, whereas night does not cause day (or conversely), can be used to show the absurdity of thinking that mere temporal succession establishes a causal relation.25 In addition, the counselor can, in nontechnical language, also enlighten the counselee about appropriate criteria for determining causal relations, in particular Mill’s methods of agreement, difference, and concomitant variation.26

Making Contrary to Fact Claims Counselees can also make themselves feel intensely guilty as well as depressed through the use of contrary to fact conditionals to support the minor premise reports of their emotional reasoning. For example, consider the following: (Major Premise Rule) If I gave my dad a heart attack then I am a rotten person. (Minor Premise Report) I gave my dad a heart attack. (Conclusion) I am a rotten person.

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In this case, the minor premise report may have been based on the following inference: 1. If I hadn’t upset my dad by arguing with him, he wouldn’t have had a heart attack. 2. So, I gave my dad a heart attack.

Here the contrary to fact claim in premise 1 is used to draw the conclusion in 2. However, because such conditionals are contrary to fact, it is not possible to say what would have happened had the counselee not gotten into an argument with his dad. Thus, his dad may have had the heart attack anyway. For example, what if he had a blocked artery? This does not mean that contrary to fact conditionals are always unacceptable. For example, if you were (contrary to fact) to jump out of a thirty-story building (without a parachute or other fall-breaking aid) onto a concrete pavement you would die. Like all other empirical claims, this is not certain (100% probable), but for all practical purposes it would be rational to conclude that you would die. Whether a contrary to fact claim is supportable or not depends on the veracity of the assumptions it makes.27 For example, in the counselee’s claim about his dad, he is assuming that his dad didn’t have any medical conditions that would have been sufficient to account for his having the heart attack anyway. This assumption is not easily confirmed.28 The LBT counselor should accordingly help the counselee to make explicit the assumptions included in the premises of his inference. This can be done by reconstructing the contrary to fact conditional as an inference with the antecedent of the conditional treated as a supposition and the consequent treated as a conclusion drawn from it: Suppose: I don’t upset my dad. So, my dad does not have a heart attack.

The counselor can then ask the counselee if there are any premises that must be added to the supposition in order to justify the conclusion. Indeed, if all such premises are added, the argument looks something like this: 1. Suppose: I don’t upset my dad. 2. Assumption 1: There is no preexisting health condition sufficient to cause him to have a heart attack. 3. Assumption 2: No other set of conditions (environmental, stress, health, etc.) is present that is sufficient to cause him to have a heart attack.

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4. So, my dad does not have a heart attack.

In such a case, the counselee would be hard put to provide evidence to establish assumptions 2 and 3. In this way, the counselor can help the counselee to refute the support for the major premise report in his emotional reasoning.

Aspiring to the Transcendent Virtues As stressed in this chapter, LBT generally holds that the major premise rule of counselees’ behavioral and emotional reasoning should be refuted first prior to the refutation of a fallacious minor premise report. Again, this is because counselees are best served by learning how to deal rationally with the irrational prescriptive/rating aspects of major premise rules even when there are no fallacies in their (empirical) reports. Thus, a counselee who tends to demand perfection is ordinarily best served by learning to deal rationally with the inevitable imperfections of reality (for example, the mistakes and misdeeds of self or others, bad luck, etc.), whether or not counselees’ beliefs about these events or states of affairs contain any inductive fallacies. Counselees who benefit most from LBT will therefore strive to cultivate strong, rational habits by cognitively, behaviorally, and emotionally confronting such things that appear unpleasant or threatening to them. Further, these counselees will not only strive to overcome the Cardinal Fallacies inherent in their behavioral and emotional reasoning, but also to move toward attaining their respective transcendent virtues, and, therefore, toward the robust and vibrant concept of happiness recognized by LBT. In the next chapter, this theory of virtues, or LBT’s socalled “positive psychology,” will be examined.

Notes 1

See Chapter 5, this book, for refutations of damning others. Here, the inference is a blind conjecture, which is discussed later in this chapter. 3 Elliot D. Cohen, Caution: Faulty Thinking Can Be Harmful to Your Happiness (Fort Pierce, FL: Trace-Wilco Publishers, Inc., 1994), 42. 4 Walter Lippmann, Public Opinion (New York: Penguin Books, 1946), 70-72. 5 Elliot D. Cohen, Critical Thinking Unleashed (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2009), 165. 2

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Elliot D. Cohen, “Philosophical Counseling: Some Roles of Critical Thinking,” in Ran Lahav & Maria DaVenza Tillmanns (eds), Essays on Philosophical Counseling (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1995), 127. 7 Cohen, Critical Thinking Unleashed, 67-69. 8 Note that the counselee formulated his response in term of an “if…then” statement (“If what I do is not perfect, then it’s just totally unacceptable”). However, by the rule of Material Implication, this conditional is equivalent to “either what I do is perfect or it’s just totally unacceptable.” In this way, LBT therapists can expose the false bifurcation by converting conditionals to disjunctions. See Elliot D. Cohen, “Syllogizing RET: Applying Formal Logic in Rational-Emotive Therapy,” Journal of Rational-Emotive & Cognitive Behavioral Therapy Vol. 10, No. 4, Winter 1992. 9 The logic here is as follows: For anyone x, either what x does is perfect or what x does is totally unacceptable. There is no person y such that y is perfect. Therefore, for anyone x, what x does is totally unacceptable 10 This example is cited in Cohen, Critical Thinking Unleashed, 74. 11 See Chapter 12, this book. 12 Cohen, Critical Thinking Unleashed, 74. 13 A catastrophic term is an evaluative term used to catastrophize such as “awful,” “horrible,” “terrible,” or “the worst thing.” 14 There are also other variations of this “law” such as if something can happen then it probably will happen. What is said here about the stronger version of Murphy’s Law can also be said mutatis mutandis about this weaker version. For further discussion of this distinction, see Cohen, Critical Thinking Unleashed, 170172. 15 W.K. Clifford, The Ethics of Belief and Other Essays, (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 1999). Accessed September 2, 2013. http://www.infidels.org/ library/history ical/w_k_clifford/ethics_of_belief.html. 16 Cohen, Critical Thinking Unleashed, 169. 17 “Infidelity statistics,” Static Brain, September 8, 2012. http://www.statistic brain.com/infidelity-statistics/. 18 Ibid. 19 See Chapter 10. 20 Cohen, Critical Thinking Unleashed, Chapter 11. 21 Irving M. Copi and Carl Cohen, Introduction to Logic (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 2009), 657. 22 Karl Popper, All Life Is Problem Solving (London: Routledge, 1999), 7. 23 See Cohen, Critical Thinking Unleashed, Chapter 12, for a more extensive discussion of applying the scientific method to practical matters. 24 Ibid., 213-214. 25 John Stuart Mill, A System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive: Being A Connected View of the Principles of Evidence and the Method of Scientific Investigation (London: Longmans, Green, 1865), 337-338.

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Cohen, Critical Thinking Unleashed, 215-223. Cohen, Ibid., 223-226; see also Elliot D. Cohen, The New Rational Therapy: Thinking Your Way to Serenity, Success, and Profound Happiness (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2007), 271-273. 28 This does not mean that all contrary to fact claims have false or questionable assumptions. For example, there does not seem to be any questionable assumptions in the case of what would have happened if, contrary to fact, one would have jumped out of a thirty-story building onto a concrete pavement. 27

PART III THE TRANSCENDENT VIRTUES

CHAPTER TEN LBT’S POSITIVE PSYCHOLOGY In traditional forms of Cognitive-Behavior Therapy (CBT), including Rational-Emotive Behavior Therapy (REBT), there is no systematically developed theory of how to construct a healthy, rational outlook. Rather, the traditional embodiments focus on the identification and disputation of irrational beliefs.1 While, to their credit, these theories do indeed emphasize the need for behavioral change and the provision of behavioral homework assignments to accomplish such changes, there is no carefully developed mechanism for helping counselees to construct rational outlooks (or “philosophies”) to guide such behavioral change. In contrast, LBT provides such a facility in the form of antidotes to the Cardinal Fallacies, which are enlightened and shaped by a wide variety and scope of philosophical ideas and theories.2 Moreover, LBT connects these antidotes to a set of idealistic ends or “virtues” toward which the counselee can aspire. As such, whereas the traditional forms of CBT leave counselees without a systematic set of positive goals to guide their cognitive behavioral change beyond merely overcoming their irrational beliefs, LBT provides such edification and direction to the counselee in search of such guidance. Moreover, as will become clear, it does so without compromising or foreclosing the counselee’s autonomy. LBT is obviously not the first to have introduced the idea of a virtuebased “positive psychology,” which is well entrenched in the philosophies of Plato and Aristotle. But it is the first to systematically relate it to the irrational ideas that tend to lead counselees to experience depression, intense anxiety, debilitating guilt, rage, and other forms of self-defeating emotions. Some psychologists, notably Martin Seligman, have popularized the idea of a “positive psychology;” however the latter approach has emphasized prevention of mental disturbance through recognition and nurturance of a positive psychology at the expense of identifying and treating the self-defeating, irrational ideas of counselees who are already suffering from cognitive, behavioral and emotional problems.3 While LBT recognizes the importance of a positive psychology, especially one based on the profundity of philosophical ideas and theories, it also realizes that a counselee who is in a state of a deep, dark depression needs first to begin

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to let go of his irrational ideas before he can begin to aspire to cultivating virtuous habits such as self-respect, courage, and metaphysical security. Thus, the classical, cognitive-behavior approaches such as REBT and CBT were on the right track in helping counselees identify and refute their irrational beliefs. These theories needed, however, to take their approaches further by advancing a set of guiding transcendent virtues keyed into and responsive to counselees’ specific irrational tendencies. This is where LBT has woven its positive psychology (or “philosophy”) into the fabric of its cognitive-behavior counseling approach. In this chapter, the nature of this “positive psychology” is examined. In the subsequent chapters, each of the individual virtues comprises this set of virtues is examined.

The Cardinal Fallacies and their Transcendent Virtues As discussed in Chapter 1, each Cardinal Fallacy has a transcendent virtue corresponding to it. Each virtue sets a positive direction toward which a counselee can aspire in order to not only overcome its corresponding irrational mode of irrational thinking, but also to move beyond this thinking to a higher level of human functionality. Below is each of the eleven Cardinal Fallacies along with its respective transcendent virtue:4 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11.

Demanding Perfection Æ Metaphysical security Jumping on the Bandwagon Æ Authenticity The-World-Revolves-Around-Me Æ Empathy Catastrophic Reasoning Æ Courage Damnation Æ Respect Can’tstipation Æ Temperance Dutiful Worrying Æ Prudence Manipulation Æ Empowerment Oversimplifying Reality Æ Objectivity Distorting Probabilities Æ Foresightedness Blind Conjecture Æ Scientificity

LBT holds that each of these “virtues” is a habit or disposition acquired through practice, comprising a higher-order human capability or “excellence.” Each is also an Aristotelian “golden mean” between excess and deficiency.5 For example, metaphysically secure people do not magnify risks; nor do they understate them. Rather, in seeking the mean between these two extremes, they make reasonable risk assessments and act

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accordingly. Further, there is continuity among the virtues, inasmuch as rationality in one aspect of one’s life leads to rationality elsewhere. For example, rational risk assessment leads to rational control of fear—that is, to courage. Thus, counselees who are striving to become more metaphysically secure will also be helped to become more courageous, and conversely. If it is asked why each of the eleven virtues constitutes “a higher order human capacity,” the answer is best put in terms of greater functionality. For example, interpersonal relationships based on world-revolves-aroundme thinking, blind conformity, or manipulation are dysfunctional. They are unproductive, unsatisfying, destructive, and self-defeating. On the other hand, interpersonal relationships based on empathetic understanding, authentic relating, and empowerment of others are productive and satisfying.6 People get along better, satisfy mutual interests better, and grow intellectually as well as emotionally. In becoming more virtuous, people thus become happier human beings. This is not merely a contingent truth, however. It goes to the essence of what it means to be happy.

The Virtues and Happiness According to LBT, an individual is happy to the extent that the virtues are attained7—this in contrast to REBT’s theory of happiness, which is hedonistic. According to Albert Ellis, Well-adjusted people tend to seek both the pleasures of the moment and those of the future and do not often court future pain for present gain. They are hedonistic, that is, happiness-seeking and pain-avoidant, but they assume that they will probably live for quite a few years and that they had therefore better think of both today and tomorrow, and not be obsessed with immediate gratification.8

LBT agrees that well-adjusted people tend to avoid immediate gratification that thwarts long-term pleasure; however, it does not define happiness hedonistically. Instead it holds that pleasure tends to arising from happiness, which is defined in terms of the aforementioned eleven transcendent virtues. Thus people experience pleasure because they are happy; they are not necessarily happy because they experience pleasure.

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The Transcendent Virtues and Their Antidotes Philosophical theories, in their capacity as antidotes to the Cardinal Fallacies, can provide useful guides to the attainment of the virtues, and accordingly to human happiness.9 However, these often complex, technically expressed theories need to be “edited” in order to serve antidotally. For example, Kant’s concept of the “heteronomy of the will” is expressed in the statement, “If the will seeks the law which is to determine it anywhere else than in the fitness of its maxims to be universal laws of its own dictation, consequently if it goes out of itself and seeks this law in the character of any of its objects, there always results heteronomy.”10 To most counselees this is no more useful than the shrill screech of fingernails on a classroom blackboard. However, most counselees can well understand what it means to do what they think is right even if they don’t want to do it. Similarly, “So act as to treat humanity, whether in thine own person or in that of any other, in every case as an end withal, never as means only”11 is readily grasped by most when it is expressed as: “Treat people, including yourself, as persons and not as mere objects to be used or manipulated.” Here, the counselor can clearly and non-technically explain the difference between a person, which has unconditional worth and dignity versus an object or thing (such as a pen or pencil), which has value only so long as it can be used for this or that purpose. Thus, when Kant’s “Categorical Imperative” is presented in this “edited” form, a counselee who has been a survivor of rape and has come to see herself as a mere thing can now begin to work cognitively, behaviorally, and emotionally to overcome her self-damnation by seeking to respect herself as a person with unconditional worth and dignity. The process of turning philosophical theories into antidotes is also a creative process. It should start with the assumption that even concepts that seem remote to the practical therapeutic mission of LBT can find a use. Thus, at first blush, Locke’s distinction between primary and secondary qualities may seem a far cry from being useful to a counselee in crisis. Yet, a counselee who is depressed about a series of misfortunes and who thinks this dark and bleak reality is simply “out there” may get a useful handle on overcoming his global damnation and increasing respect for the cosmos by reframing his bleak view of reality as containing an indissoluble subjective aspect. Notice too how it may matter what aspects of a theory are emphasized. Thus, in the present case, the subjectivity of secondary qualities is played up, whereas the Lockean idea of secondary qualities as causal powers existing in the objects themselves is played down. As such, in building an antidote, some aspects of a philosophical

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theory may need to be bracketed from others for specific practical purposes. LBT has already made substantial strides in filtering the perennial wisdom of the ages through the lenses of its practical therapeutic mission to help its counselees become more virtuous—and happier, more fulfilled human beings.12 This endeavor can have no end since the vast store of useful philosophical ideas and their permutations is bottomless. Nor has it begun with the birth of LBT. Indeed, from antiquity (Socrates is a good example), philosophers, literary scholars, poets and scientists alike, have been putting philosophical ideas to work in the world, in profound ways, to improve human existence. What is new, however, is LBT’s systematization of this wisdom, relating it in an organized manner to specific irrational thinking errors (the Cardinal Fallacies), and to their respective virtues. This LBT framework does not discriminate against philosophical approaches. It does not favor Anglo American or Continental ideas, or analytic or phenomenological approaches. It is friendly territory to both East and West, and is in fact making substantial headway in the East. For example, several LBT works have been recently translated into Chinese and Korean by Chinese and Korean scholars and philosophical counselors.13 This receptivity of LBT to alternative philosophical perspectives is clearly manifested in its respect for counselee self-determination. That is, it is unacceptable for LBT counselors to decide for their counselees which philosophical views they should accept. Instead, LBT offers a wide range of possibilities, permitting counselees to decide themselves. In this way, LBT seeks to promote counselees’ personal autonomy. Indeed, many counselees come to counseling because they feel trapped or powerless over their own lives—including over their thoughts. Responsive to this plight, LBT counselors should underscore counselees’ ability to choose for themselves what philosophies to embrace. As such, they should avoid setting themselves up as gurus who tell the counselees how to think, feel, or act. Thus, an agnostic, or atheistic, counselee who is behaviorally can’tstipated, may find helpful Sartre’s idea that, for human beings, “existence precedes essence,”14 and that, therefore, we create our own essences through what we do with our lives. In contrast, a religious counselee who demands perfection may find appealing Aquinas’ idea that “the last end of things is to become like unto God, although all things, including human beings, “are able to attain this likeness in a most imperfect manner.”15 So, from the LBT perspective, the counselee is free

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to decide to embrace a fixed human essence, and a God who designs it, or to proclaim, along with Nietzsche that “God is dead.”16 Thus LBT tolerates a myriad of philosophies, even ones that are conflicting. If Aquinas can work for one person and Sartre for another in overcoming and abandoning self-destructive behavioral and emotional rules, then each of these discordant philosophies can be harmonized within the LBT framework. The fact that LBT permits inconsistent theories to be held by its counselees may seem to some to breach the most fundamental law of logic: the law of non-contradiction. However, this would be like saying that democracy is incoherent because it involves the free expression of a diverse and contradictory range of beliefs. For, like democratic theory, LBT holds that each counselee is free to accept a philosophy, even if it contradicts another philosophy accepted by another counselee; at least insofar as the chosen philosophy is itself (internally) consistent and does not contradict other beliefs in the counselee’s belief system.17 Thus, LBT does not allow that the same counselee can simultaneously hold contradictory philosophies. While LBT permits a wide range of alternative philosophies, it does recognize limitations, in particular, those set by the Cardinal Fallacies themselves. For example, LBT would reject any “philosophy” based on blind conformity, authoritarianism, perfectionism, fear and superstition, force and violence, manipulation, denigration of human worth and dignity, and the denial of human responsibility. To the extent that philosophies promote the respectful treatment of others, self-acceptance, creativity, independent thinking, and other modes of existence that support transcendent virtue, they are legitimate. LBT counselors are accordingly free to explain and to suggest any such (legitimate) philosophical perspective insofar as it appears to be consistent with the counselee’s other beliefs and values.18 Again, however, they should not dictate to the counselee which of these philosophies to embrace. Accordingly, LBT embraces a “constructivist theory.” More exactly, counselees are free to construct their philosophical frameworks within the constraints of logic. But what makes something logical?

LBT’s Pragmatism LBT’s therapeutic goal of promoting functional and avoiding dysfunctional, personal and interpersonal relationships is a useful test of what’s logical. Regarding formal logic, human beings cannot accomplish their goals if these goals are inconsistent; for example, they cannot play

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the stock market (which is inherently risky) without taking risks. And, the case is similar regarding informal logic.19 For example, the fallacy of theworld-revolves-around-me thinking arises when persons think that reality must correspond to their beliefs rather than their beliefs to reality.20 Thus the-world-revolves-around-me thinking tends to defeat its purposes by leading to individual strife in getting along with others rather than promoting adaptive, successful interpersonal relationships. This does not mean that there cannot be illogical thinking that is functional (for example, the use of defense mechanisms to avoid the abyss of insanity) or logical thinking that is dysfunctional (for example, fabricating a consistent series of lies that digs the hole deeper and deeper). However, logical thinking tends to be functional thinking; were it not the case, it is doubtful that human beings would have evolutionarily evolved to become “rational animals.” In this operational sense of what is logical, LBT defines fallacies as “ways of thinking and reasoning that have a proven track record of frustrating personal and interpersonal happiness.”21 In calling this definition operational, LBT distinguishes it from an explicit definition that states necessary and sufficient conditions for the application of the term. As Gustav Bergmann once expressed it, an operational definition is to a term like a recipe is to a pie. It is not the pie itself but it tells you how to make one.22 A fallacy is a mistake in reasoning—a cognitive glitch in the truth-seeking mission—but the measure of mistaken reasoning is its tendency to generate unhappiness for the one who makes the mistake. LBT also subscribes to the view that truth tends to beget truth and that falsehood sooner or later tends to be exposed when it runs upstream against the steady, coherent tide of truth. It is for this reason that lying and other forms of deception tend to breed distrust and discord rather than functional, adaptive interpersonal relationships.

The Virtues as Habits LBT’s theory of virtue development stresses the Aristotelian idea that people become virtuous through virtuous practice. Here, the problem of weakness of the will is pertinent since those who act irrationally may know that what they are doing is irrational but nevertheless continue to act irrationally. As such, LBT also stresses the need to increase one’s willpower through acting against this tendency to act against one’s antidotal, philosophical wisdom. This can be done through use of various behavioral techniques including behavioral homework assignments, shame-attacking exercises, positive reinforcement, and role-playing.23

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LBT identifies the types of behavior that a counselee engages in when he follows his irrational inferences. In turn, the counselee may be given a homework assignment to act in corrective ways. For example, a counselee who has recently gone through a divorce and is self-downing could be instructed to go out on a date or to engage in some other form of selfaffirming behavior. The idea here is that by repeatedly acting in selfrespecting ways, while working cognitively on his emotive and behavioral tendencies (refuting one’s irrational beliefs and countering them with appropriate philosophical antidotes, the counselee can eventually become self-respecting. In the end, a counselee who successfully applies LBT to his life learns the lesson that building character and happiness is attained over a lifetime, albeit imperfectly; for there is always more ways to improve. This emphasis on growth through practice is a very important distinction between LBT and classical forms of CBT because the latter approaches do not contain standards of excellence—i.e., the virtues—which can serve as guides in the pursuit of self-improvement, and happiness. Overcoming one’s irrational thinking, which the latter approaches emphasize, is, according to LBT, an essential step towards happiness, but eliminating these negative beliefs does not itself constitute happiness. This should become clear from the next two chapters, which examine the transcendent virtues.

Notes 1 See, for example, Albert Ellis and Michael E. Bernard, “What is RationalEmotive Therapy (RET)?” in Handbook of Rational-Emotive Therapy, Vol. 2, ed. Albert Ellis and Russell Grieger (New York: Springer Publishing Co, 1986); Aaron T. Beck, Cognitive Therapy and the Emotional Disorders (New York: Penguin Books, 1976). 2 Elliot D. Cohen, The New Rational Therapy: Thinking Your Way to Serenity, Success, and Profound Happiness (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2007). 3 Martin E. P. Seligman, Authentic Happiness: Using the New Positive Psychology to Realize Your Potential for Lasting Fulfillment (New York: Free Press, 2002). 4 The virtue follows the arrow and is given in italics. 5 Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics, trans. W.D. Ross, Book 2. Accessed September 2, 2013. http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/nicomachaen.7.vii.html. 6 There has been considerable empirical research on the ways in which such virtues improve interpersonal relationships. See, for example, John F. Dovidio et al, “Empathy and Intergroup relations,” Yale University. http://portal.idc.ac.il/ en/Symposium/HerzliyaSymposium/Documents/dcDovidio.pdf; John Lord and Peggy Hutchinson, “The Process of Empowerment: Implications for Theory and

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Practice,” Canadian Journal of Community Mental Health 12:1, Spring 1993: 522. http://johnlord.net/Power%20Empowerment%20Partnerships%20Advocacy/ CJCMH/Process%20of%20Empowerment.pdf 7 Thus, LBT’s analysis of human happiness resembles that of Aristotle who also provided a virtue-based account of happiness in terms of intellectual (cognitive) and moral (emotional) development. See generally Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. 8 A. Ellis & W. Dryden, The Practice of Rational Emotive Therapy (Springer, 1987), 19-20. 9 Cohen, The New Rational Therapy. 10 Immanuel Kant, Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals, trans. Thomas Kingsmill Abbott, Second Section. Accessed September 2, 2013. http:// www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/5682/pg5682.html. 11 Ibid. 12 For a systematic treatment of many philosophical antidotes, see generally Cohen, The New Rational Therapy; see also Elliot D. Cohen, What Would Aristotle Do? Self Control through the Power of Reason (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 2003). 13 For example, see the Chinese edition of Elliot D. Cohen, The New Rational Therapy: Thinking Your Way to Serenity, Success, and Profound Happiness (New Taipei, Taiwan: PsyGarden Publishers, 2012). http://www.psygarden.com.tw/book .php?func=visit&bookid=MjAxMjA3MDIxMDU4MDk=&deepread=2. See also the Korean edition of Elliot D. Cohen, The Dutiful Worrier: How to Stop Compulsive Worry Without Feeling Guilty (Oakland, CA: New Harbinger , 2012). (Korean edition published through arrangement with New Harbinger Publications through JS CONTENTS.) 14 Jean-Paul Sartre, “Existentialism,” in Philosophers at Work: Issues and Practice of Philosophy, ed. Elliot D. Cohen (Orlando, FL.: Harcourt, 2000), 444. 15 St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, in Introduction to St. Thomas Aquinas, ed. Anton C. Pegis (New York: Random House, 1948), Ch. 19. 16 Fredrich Nietzsche, “The Gay Science,” trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Random House, 1974), Bk. 4, 343. Accessed September 2, 2013. http:// archive.org/stream/Nietzsche-TheGayScience/Nietzsche-GaySciencewk_djvu.txt. 17 Some forms of logic-based therapy concentrate exclusively on such internal consistency. See, for example, Tian-Qun Pan, “Logic and Thought Therapy,” Journal of Humanities Therapy Vol.3 (2012): 117-132. 18 This assumes that these other beliefs and values are themselves “legitimate.” Otherwise, an LBT counselor can help the counselee address the fallacies inherent in these other beliefs. 19 By informal logic is meant the branch of logic that studies faulty thinking that is not a function of logical form. 20 See Chapter 5. 21 Elliot D. Cohen, Caution: Faulty Thinking Can Be Harmful to Your Happiness, Self-Help Edition (Ft. Pierce, FL: Trace-Wilco, 1992), 8.

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Gustav Bergmann, “Outline of an Empiricist Philosophy of Physics” in Readings in the Philosophy of Science, Herbert Feigl and May Brodbeck, eds. (New York: Appleton-Century Crofts, 1953), 262-287. 23 See Chapter 4, this book.

CHAPTER ELEVEN THE BEHAVIORAL AND EMOTIONAL VIRTUES As discussed in Chapter 10, LBT’s concept of happiness is defined in terms of the eleven transcendent virtues. This chapter discusses some of these virtues, namely, the ones that transcend the fallacies of behavioral and emotional rules.1 These virtues are ones that replace the Cardinal Fallacies identified in the major premise rules of counselees’ behavioral and emotional reasoning with functional human ends or aspirations. LBT accordingly refers to them as behavioral and emotional virtues. In particular, these virtues are: (1) metaphysical security, (2) authenticity, (3) empathy, (4) courage, (5) respect, (6) temperance, (7) prudence or practice wisdom, and (8) empowerment. Each of these virtues is discussed in turn.

Metaphysical Security Counselees who tend to demand perfection should be helped by their LBT counselors to attain greater metaphysical security. This virtue comprises a habit of accepting the imperfections in reality. The metaphysically secure person accepts his fallibility and limitations as a human being; she also accepts the fallibility and limitations of other human beings and does not demand perfection about the world in general. She is rationally hopeful, that is, realistic about what is probable and what is not, and adjusts her beliefs and actions so as to increase the probabilities of attaining her goals. Thus, she will not continue doing the same thing if the inductive evidence suggests that it is not working. She is neither naively optimistic nor overly pessimistic, and takes disappointment as an inevitable part of life. The metaphysically secure person is not afraid to take reasonable risks and realizes that there are no absolute certainties (“guarantees”) in the sensible universe. Thus she will not say that she must be certain before acting, for she realizes that making such a demand on an imperfect world would mean that she would never act. Yet, she requires evidence before taking risks. The higher the stakes, the more evidence she will require. For example, in making a serious medical decision she will make her decision based upon a preponderance of evidence; but still she will not demand

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certainty or virtual certainty and will act in a timely manner, inasmuch as she realizes that acting otherwise tends to lead to decision by indecision, and therefore the loss of opportunity to rationally control outcomes within limits. The metaphysically secure person has a strong desire for knowledge but is not frustrated by her inability to know all. Such a person does not attempt to control what is beyond his ability to control but stays focused on excelling in what he can control. The opposite of metaphysical security is metaphysical insecurity, which is the refusal to accept the imperfect and flawed character of empirical reality, including the human side of it. Counselees who are metaphysical insecure suffer anxiety, depression, guilt, anger, and related forms of emotional distress. The metaphysically insecure counselee deduces these emotions from a self-destructive demand for perfection. Thus she tells herself, since negative things have happened (I did not get what I wanted, someone treated me unjustly, others did not approve of me, and so on), the world is not the way it absolutely must be (namely perfect or near perfect), and she must never allow herself to accept reality as long as these things are part of it. LBT teaches counselees who reason like this to identify and refute their perfect-a-holic, metaphysical rule by which they disturb themselves; to construct rational antidotes to this selfdestructive premise, and to exercise willpower in overcoming cognitive dissonance between this rational directive and the irrational demand for perfection. One philosophical antidote to demanding perfection, which promotes metaphysical security, is due to Epictetus, who would admonish a metaphysically insecure counselee not to try to control what is beyond our control. “Remember,” warns Epictetus, “that if what is naturally slavish you think to be free, and what is not your own to be your own, you will be hampered, will grieve, will be in turmoil, and will blame both gods and men.”2 On the other hand, he advises, in giving up the demand to control what is not in your power—for example, the approval of others and the uncertainty of the future itself—you will save yourself a good deal of emotional and behavioral turmoil.3 Another antidote is due to William James, who would admonish the counselee who demands perfection to give up the possibility of perfection and replace it with that of making things better. “Freedom, says James, “in a world already perfect could only mean freedom to be worse, and who could be so insane as to wish that?” On the other hand, “the only possibility that one can rationally claim is the possibility that things may

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be better. That possibility, says James, is more rational since the real world has plenty of opportunities for making things better.4 Socrates would also counsel the metaphysically insecure counselee that we are the wiser, and more contented, by realizing what we do not know, and that therefore demanding that we know all is simply misguided: “[I]f you remain barren, you will be gentler and more agreeable to your companions, having the good sense not to fancy what you do not know.”5 The metaphysically insecure person may also be reminded by David Hume that the world of space-time events is one that is inherently uncertain. Thus, says Hume, “We fancy, that were we brought on a sudden into this world, we could at first have inferred that one Billiard-ball would communicate motion to another upon impulse; and that we needed not to have waited for the event, in order to pronounce with certainty concerning it.”6 However, this idea of certainty, Hume warns, is really a result of “custom,” that is, the result of having repeatedly experienced f the sequence of events in the past. Having become accustomed to the one event following the other, we may come to believe that there is certainty in the world, but our belief is really derived from experience, which can never give us certainty—since we can never be certain that” the future will be conformable to the past.7 “Such is the influence of custom,” says Hume,” that, where it is strongest, it not only covers our natural ignorance, but even conceals itself, and seems not to take place, merely because it is found in the highest degree.”8

Authenticity A metaphysically secure person is also less inclined to seek refuge from the uncertainty of reality in blind conformity to the beliefs and actions of others; for he accepts, both intellectually and emotionally, that there is no escaping the inevitability of choosing for oneself. He is therefore authentic in confronting the vicissitudes of life. Authenticity is the virtue that transcends the fallacy of jumping on the bandwagon. As such, the authentic person is guided in his choices by his own rational and creative lights and therefore avoids blindly conforming to the expectations or interests of others. While he takes the opinions of others into account in coming to conclusions about what to do or think, he does not generally demand the approval of others as a condition of believing or acting. Accordingly, he values freedom of expression and does not put on facades that hide his values or beliefs. As a result, he generally stands up for what he thinks is right instead of succumbing to social pressure in order to avoid criticism or disfavor. When he makes a

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mistake, he tends to accept personal responsibility instead of making excuses or lying to self or others. He is therefore congruent, that is, the outward expression of his thoughts and feelings tends to reflect what he really thinks and feels. While he partakes in a number of different, sometimes conflicting social roles—for example, parent, spouse, friend, teacher, citizen, and worker—he does not “lose himself” in any of these roles to the exclusion of the others (for example, submerging himself in his work to the exclusion of other social outlets). Antidotally, John Stuart Mill offers important counsel against blind, social conformity. “He who lets the world, or his own portion of it, chooses his plan of life for him,” Mill states, “has no need of any other faculty than the ape-like one of imitation.”9 For counselees who feel as though they have lost control of their own lives, this admonition can be of significant positive value. For example, counselees who tend to unreflectively and routinely try to please others without regard to their own welfare may find it helpful to heed Mill’s counsel to cultivate independence of thought and judgment. This may include the woman who has been brought up in the well-worn tradition that the role of the woman is to “obey” the man. An LBT counselor can help such a counselee to see the bandwagon she has been socialized into, refute it by showing how it defeats the happiness of both partners, and how women, no less than men, have need of more than simply an “ape-like faculty of imitation.”10 In this regard, Simone De Beauvoir states, “An authentic love should assume the contingence of the other; that is to say, his lacks, his limitations, and his basic gratuitousness. It would not pretend to be a mode of salvation, but a human interrelation.”11 Here, De Beauvoir’s philosophy of authentic love can be used to help the counselee who feels beholden to her partner (male or female), to begin to reframe the relationship as not one of subservience to a god, but rather of two imperfect human beings, yet who both have the capacity to think for themselves.12 In such contexts of helping counselees overcome a habit of blind obedience, the Heideggerian concept can be edifying of getting lost in the expectations of the nameless, faceless crowd. Heidegger states: ““They” even hide the process by which “they” have quietly relieved us of the “burden” of making choices for ourselves….We are carried along by the “nobody,” without making any real choices, becoming ever more deeply ensnared in inauthenticity.” 13 Here, the idea that the counselee may have allowed himself to be led along without even having a clue who is making his decisions for him can resonate with the importance of reclaiming the reign of living by “bringing himself “back from the lostness in the ‘they.’”14

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Thus, a gay counselee may have lived an inauthentic existence as a heterosexual, constantly on guard about hiding his true being. In this situation, liberating himself from this phony existence could begin with the realization that his life has been a series of moves, plunging him deeper and deeper into “lostness in the ‘they’” without even keeping track of where and how he got there. This mindless expedition can then be reversed by attempting to see how exactly he got there in the first place; inasmuch as “this bringing-back must have that kind of being by the neglect of which we have lost ourselves in inauthenticity.”15 This reclaiming of one’s own self, as an authentic person, requires finally getting off the progressive social bandwagon that got him lost, and to begin to find his way back through free, autonomous expression of his sexuality. The way back can be daunting in a world that can be homophobic and often vigilantly cruel. It can therefore take courage.

Empathy In counseling, empathy or empathetic understanding can promote counselees’ authenticity. This is so because counselees are more likely to open up and disclose what they are really thinking and feeling (instead of hiding or disguising these experiences) to counselors who resonate with counselees’ subjective worlds. LBT counselors who empathize, actively listen and reflect back what counselees are telling them, looking for a phenomenological understanding and sensing of counselees’ subjective worlds. This phenomenological “depth” is that of resonating with the emotions as well as the cognitions of counselees. As discussed in Chapter 2, the process of LBT requires the counselor to key into counselees’ emotions through a phenomenological investigation of their intentional objects and ratings. However, as discussed in Chapter 1, emotions are an amalgamation of intense visceral feelings as well as cognitions and behavior. While LBT identifies these elements in order to construct counselees’ emotional reasoning, counselees’ self disclosure is more likely to occur if the counselor phenomenologically senses how the counselee is feeling, that is, grasps the overall gestalt of counselees’ emotional experience. For example, consider the following dialogue: Counselee: I have no one to talk to about stuff. If I were to die today, no one would even shed a tear. Counselor: It sounds like you are feeling very lonely. Counselee: Yes, that’s right. I don’t have anyone! Counselor: No one? Tell me more about that.

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Counselee: I have people at work, but no one I can really talk to. Counselor: No one whom you can talk to about personal things and who genuinely cares about you? Counselee: Well, yes, no one who can give me some support and guidance too. Counselor: So you are upset about not having someone who genuinely cares about you with whom you can talk about personal matters and get support and guidance? Counselee: Yes, that’s it!

Here, the LBT counselor keys into the counselees’ emotion and is able to show the counselee that she is sensing her subjective world by reflecting back how the counselee is feeling. This, in turn, sets the stage for the counselee to make further disclosure, which, in turn, allows the counselor to identify, with the counselee’s help, the intentional object of her emotion. Such attuned, phenomenological sensing of the counselee’s subjective world is what is meant by empathy or empathetic understanding. The LBT counselor exemplifies this character trait and thus provides a model for the counselee to emulate. Counselees who tend to engage in the-worldrevolves-around-me thinking can accordingly learn, as recipients of empathy during the counseling process, the virtue of being empathetic to the situations of others. As such, the LBT counselor can help the counselee see just how the virtue of empathy transcends world-revolves-around-me thinking by connecting (cognitively, emotionally, and viscerally) with the subjectivity of others. This connectivity involves giving up the self-defeating idea that only one’s own values, interests, preferences, and beliefs are valid. Indeed, counselees who have difficulty getting along with others, in their private lives and/or in their public lives, are thus afforded an opportunity to improve these interpersonal relationships. According to Carl Rogers, to empathize with another you must sense the other’s world “as if it were your own, but without ever losing the ‘as if’ quality.”16 What Roger’s means is that, to empathize with another, one must not get so involved in the subjective world of the other as to lose sight of the distinction between the other and oneself. Further, LBT holds that empathy can be viewed as an Aristotelian mean between two extremes: that of getting too immersed in the other’s subject world, and that of remaining too detached from that world. Antidotally, aesthetician Edward Bullough provides a useful approach to attaining the proper balance or mean between these two extremes. Bullough introduces the concept of “psychical distance” as applied to the

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appreciation of a work of art, as such. However, the concept is abundantly useful in the context of empathizing with the plights of others. According to Bullough, in art appreciation, one can either underdistance or over-distance oneself from the art work. For example, a person who attended a showing of Othello and carried his own emotional baggage with him, seeing Desdemona’s apparent betrayal of Othello in terms of his wife’s own betray of him, would have gotten too close to the play to appreciate it aesthetically. On the other hand, a person who viewed the show from a completely detached, unemotional, intellectualized perspective would be over-distanced from the play and would also not appreciate it aesthetically. The key here is thus to avoid the extremes of getting too personally involved and not personally involved enough. So what is Bullough’s antidote? “Psychical distance,” Bullough says, “describes a personal relation, often highly emotionally coloured, but of a peculiar character. Its peculiarity lies in that the personal character of the relation has been, so to speak, filtered.”17 In speaking of “filtering” the personal aspects of the relation, Bullough means that the coincidence between the spectator’s personal feelings and his experience of the work of art “should be as complete as compatible with maintaining distance.”18 For example, the jealous spectator who views Othello will “appreciate and enter into the play the more keenly, the greater the resemblance with his own experience—provided that he succeeds in keeping the Distance between the action of the play and his personal feelings.”19 In the context of helping counselees to become more empathetic, this means helping them to work on “filtering” their own interests, desires, preferences, feelings, beliefs, and values so that they maintain distance. This means that they are able to get as close as possible to the subjective worlds of others, but without permitting their personal interests to destroy distance. For these purposes, LBT counselors can give counselees behavioral assignments to work on their relationships with other people, such as significant others. This would involve working, phenomenologically, on getting as close personally as they can to the others’ subjective worlds, but without getting so close as to lose distance. LBT also holds that empathetic connectedness with others can best be achieved by attempting to see the truth in what they are saying. This contrasts Cartesian methodological doubt, which proceeds by using doubt (looking for holes in what is being claimed) as a method for discovering truth.20 While LBT accepts the latter methodology (or some version of it) as implicit in the attempt to identify irrational thinking in one’s own or others’ thinking, it also holds that doubting is an inappropriate

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methodology for attaining empathy for others. One can easily appreciate this point by attempting to critique or find something wrong what another is saying while also attempting to empathize with this person. This is because it is not possible to put oneself in another’s subjective shoes while at the same time critiquing the other; and this is because critiquing someone is a manner of separating or detaching oneself from the other (so called “separate knowing”) while empathizing is a manner of connecting (so called “connected knowing”). Thus these methodologies move in opposing directions.21 Thus LBT holds that counselees who can benefit from working on their ability to empathize should work on suspending their critiques when they are attempting to empathize with others. Thus, while LBT recognizes the importance of critique as a fundamental step in the LBT process, it also recognizes that there are also occasions when LBT counselors and their counselees may benefit from connecting with others by trying their best to see the truth in what they are saying, rather than approaching the matter with doubt or incredulity. In the case of LBT counselors, empathetic connectedness enters into the process of LBT in its phenomenological investigation conducted during the first step of identifying the counselee’s emotional reasoning. Clearly, however, LBT uses “separate knowing” or a Cartesian approach in its second and third steps of helping counselees respectively identify and refute irrational premises in their emotional reasoning.22

Courage This includes emotional reasoning that is catastrophic.23 The transcendent virtue of catastrophic reasoning is courage. This virtue is not to be confused with heroism or altruism. Indeed, while such character traits may imply courage, courage does not necessarily imply them. Rather, being courageous involves confronting adversity without underestimating or overestimating the danger; that is, fearing things to the extent that it is reasonable to fear them and acting accordingly. Courageous individuals recognize danger and do not take unreasonable risks with life or limb with regard to self or others. At the same time, they realize that some things are important enough to stand on principle. Thus, courageous persons are also morally committed individuals and will not sacrifice their convictions where it is easier or more profitable to do so. They are therefore reliable and trustworthy in their life pursuits and dealings with others. Thus, courageous people also tend to be authentic.24

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Courageous individuals also take evil to be a relative concept, realizing that the idea of absolute evil is an abstraction, not a reality exemplified in the world. Thus there is no such thing as the absolutely bad or “the worst thing in the world.” There can always be something worse that can be conceived. For example, something as immensely bad as a mass murder could be worsened by increasing the number of those murdered. For example, two Holocausts are worse than one; and three worse than two. Courageous individuals are also resilient in the face of hardship and tend to reframe their misfortunes as opportunities for learning and growth. They are therefore willing to take reasonable risks in order to live well. One philosophical antidote to catastrophic reasoning, which promotes courage, can be ascribed to Nietzsche who would instruct counselees who experience hardship to turn their misfortunes into occasions to learn and grow stronger. Suffering, says Nietzsche, ennobles.25 According to Nietzsche, those people who suffer come away with a fund of knowledge and a source of power over their lives, and are therefore greater gainers as a result. This does not mean that courageous people seek out suffering, but it means that they tend to be resilient in their ability to deal with it and learn from it. Thus, the counselee who is grappling with the loss of a loved one comes to know what it is like to have loved and lost in a way that one who has not yet had the experience has not. “Welcome to the adult world” is an oft-uttered salutation of the initiated. The loss is in this sense a notch on one’s belt, an experience that can increase one’s mature outlook on life—the value of life and the importance of not taking it for granted. Along these existential lines, Sartre would remind the individual who suffers a loss that she alone can decide the meaning and significance it has for her life. Thus, she can decide to retreat from life or to go forward and draw strength from it.26 Counselees who despair about their own mortality or that of their beloved, and fear death can be reminded of Epicurus’ profoundly important counsel to distinguish between the quality and quantity of life. For Epicurus, the wise person does not look upon death as an evil. Instead: “As he does not choose the food that is most in quantity but that which is most pleasant, so he does not seek the enjoyment of the longest life but of the happiest.”27

Respect Being courageous also involves the willfulness to accept the imperfections in oneself, others, and the world. Where counselees damn themselves, others, or the world, their LBT counselors should help them to

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attain greater respect for themselves, others, or the world. The virtue of respect thus involves transcending the tendency to rate the totality of reality (including human beings) as worthless or otherwise unworthy based on some perceived defect. Global respect avoids rating the entire world or cosmos according to the part, and instead looks favorably on the larger cosmic picture. Self-respect involves unconditional, self-acceptance based on a deep philosophical understanding and appreciation of one’s own worth and dignity; while respect for others applies such respect to the worth and dignity of other persons. There are three possible attitudes toward reality: (1) damning it; (2) neither damning nor affirming it; (3) affirming it. LBT helps counselees to move from (1) to (2) and, ultimately, to (3). In helping counselees to give up damnation of self, others, or the world, LBT counselors help counselees to attain level (2). However, such a neutral perspective on reality, while healthier than a damning one, is insufficient to promote happiness. Here is where striving for virtue goes beyond traditional cognitive-behavioral approaches, which tend to leave counselees at level (2).28 LBT bridges this gap by helping counselees to embrace life-affirming philosophical theories as a royal route to attaining greater respect for reality.

Cosmic Respect For example, the Buddhist concept of transcending one’s own narrow concerns and interests to attain a universal love for all reality can be a powerful ideal for combating cosmic damnation and attaining greater respect for the world. A Buddhist hymn harkens us to embrace such universal love as such an antidote: Just as with her own life A mother shields from hurt Her own, her only child, Let all-embracing thoughts For all that lives be thine.29

Thus, the premature loss of a beloved family member may precipitate a scorn for the world, but in working toward a love of all lives, by extending that same attitude of caring to others outside one’s narrow familial circle, there is an occasion set for overcoming the distain for the world and moving closer toward universal respect. Along similar lines, Martin Buber advances his valuable distinction between seeing the world from an “I-Thou” perspective versus an “I-It” perspective.30 In looking at reality (including other human beings) as “Its”

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for satisfying our particular interests and purposes we may miss the occasion for transcending these narrow interests and purposes and perceiving the world as “Thou.” Thus a counselee may be depressed by his bad luck and feel envious of others who may have not worked as hard as he, but nevertheless have had things “handed to them on a silver platter.” In this case, the counselee is entering into a relation with the world from an “I-It” perspective by virtue of dividing “It” into individual parts that can be analyzed and rated based on his narrow personal interests, desires, and goals. Alternatively, the counselee can, also transcend such a circumscribed analytic perspective and see the universe as a unified totality without partitions between self and other; and therefore see even the good fortunes of others as bound up with one seamless, unified reality with which the counselee himself is united. Thus the good fortunes of others are the good fortunes of the universe and not of this or that person. Here the counselee relates to the world, not as “I” to “It” but instead to a seamless, boundless, unified “Thou.” In this way, LBT counselors can help their counselees to begin to attain unconditional respect for the world. This respect is unconditional because it does not depend on whether or not bad or unfortunate things happen. From the perspective of a unified, seamless whole, the universe retains its dignity as “Thou.”

Unconditional Self-Respect Like respect for the world, the virtue of self-respect is also unconditional. This does not mean that such respect requires the counselee’s acceptance of everything she does. There is no inconsistency in respecting myself even though I do not respect some of the things I may have done. Thus the distinction between deed and doer is paramount to understanding the virtue of unconditional self-respect. The unconditionality of this respect applies to the agent himself as a (whole) human being, not to any particular action/s the agent performs. As discussed in chapter 6 and elsewhere in this book, the Kantian “Categorical Imperative” to treat oneself, as well as others, as an end in itself, and not as mere means, is a very useful antidote to self-damnation. The distinction between an object as having only instrumental value and a person as having intrinsic value is a helpful distinction that LBT counselors can introduce in order to help their counselees come to appreciate the import of this antidote. Thus a counselee who is selfdowning because he has been unsuccessful in finding a significant other with whom to share his life may characterize himself as a “loser.” In so

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rating himself, this counselee may tend to perceive this rating as indelibly permanent and unconditional, so that it is likely to lead him to give up on the search for someone. Therefore it is important that LBT counselors help the counselee to see the self-defeating nature of such a label. “If you seriously want to meet someone, then you will need to give up this selfdowning attitude, because it alone can prevent you from ever meeting someone.” Helping a counselee to see himself as a locus of intrinsic value is itself a condition of his acceptance of others as well. Thus he must be secure in his own person before he can find someone with whom he can forge a caring relationship. As Fromm eloquently expresses it, “If I can say, ‘I love you,’ I say, ‘I love in you all humanity, all that is alive; I love in you also myself.’”31 Along similar lines, Aristotle’s concept of being one’s own best friend is a constructive philosophy for the self-damning counselee. Aristotle states, “For men say that one ought to love best one’s best friend, and a man’s best friend is one who wishes well to the object of his wish for his sake…and these attributes are found most of all in a man’s attitude towards himself.”32

Unconditional Respect for Others In helping a counselee to become more self-respecting, there is, accordingly, greater probability that the counselee will also come to unconditionally respect others. Thus, antidotes for promoting unconditional self-respect can also be potent antidotes against damnation of others and the promotion of other-regarding respect. There are, in the archives of philosophy, sundry theories of intrinsic, human worth and dignity from which a counselee can choose in coming to accept the intrinsic worth and dignity of another human being (including herself). Such philosophical grounds for the inherent value of human life include the perception of human beings as: (1) ends in themselves (Kant); (2) bearers of inalienable rights (Locke); (3) sentient beings (Bentham and Mill); (4) conscious, self-aware beings (Sartre); (5) bearers of the same basic needs (Fromm); (6) creatures of God created in His image (Aquinas), and; (7) rational animals (Aristotle). Thus, the history of philosophy can provide a rich storehouse of philosophical antidotes against damnation of self and others. LBT counselors can and should make use of these theories in attempting to help their counselees attain greater respect for self and others.33

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Temperance As discussed in Chapter 8, some counselees who are self-damning may also be can’tstipated. In the case of counselees who are can’tstipated, LBT therapists should help them to attain greater temperance. This virtue involves rational control over one’s actions, emotions, and will. Counselees who habitually tell themselves they “can’t” will inevitably defeat their prospects for happiness. In helping these counselees to become more temperate, LBT counselors can help them increase their chances of accomplishing their goals. As Aristotle realized,34 temperance involves not only having the strength of will to overcome “bad appetites.” Instead, a person with temperance does not even have these “bad” passions. Thus, a preliminary stage in reaching a measure of temperance is to work on overcoming cognitive dissonance between irrational inclinations and what one knows to be rational. This is possible only if the counselee practices behaviorally as well as cognitively acting rationally. Thus, the counselee who tends to “explode” with rage, when things don’t go his way, must work on acting in line with what he knows to be rational. This can include behavioral homework assignments for a counselee to place himself in a situation likely to precipitate anger and then working cognitively and behaviorally on controlling the anger. Antidotal philosophical wisdom abounds for cognitively implementing such training. In the case of emotional can’tstipation, a counselee can benefit from Stoic wisdom such as Epictetus’ idea that, “Men are disturbed not by the things which happen, but by the opinions about the things.”35 This is the cornerstone of Cognitive-Behavior Therapy. The argument for emotional control is therefore quite clear: 1. If people can control their emotions by how they think, and if they can control how they think, then they can control their emotions. 2. People can control their emotions by how they think. 3. People can also control how they think. 4. So, people can control their emotions.

This argument is valid. Premise 1 is necessarily true; premise 2 is Epictetus’ thesis. So, applying Epictetus’ thesis toward overcoming emotional can’tstipation requires acceptance of premise 3, namely that people can also control how they think. This is likely to be the major obstacle for counselees who are emotionally can’tstipated. Thus, the LBT counselor may need to help these counselees see the rationality of premise 3.

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Counselees who believe in free will can be convinced that premise 3 is true by helping them to see that people would not have free will if they were not able to control their thinking. Those who do not believe in free will may also be convinced if they can be helped to see that even machines can adjust or change their own programs.36 Of course, the most convincing proof that premise 3 is true would be to have the counselee either change his thinking (“Now think about something else”) or reflect on examples of occasions when he changed his thinking. “So, now you see that you can change your thinking; so now you can also see that you can also change your emotions since they depend on your thinking.” Behavioral can’tstipation follows suit. Counselees who say they can’t do things, for example, can’t get up in front of an audience and give a speech, confuse “can’t” with “do not want to” or “are afraid to.” As A.I. Melden points out, “Could have done” and “could not have done,” “helpless,” etc.—these are expressions employed not with respect to events occurring in the mechanism of the body, nor to mental events…but to persons.”37 In other words, it really doesn’t even matter if brain events going on under your skin are determined. What is in question is whether people can control their actions, not whether brain events can control them; and this is a different matter. People are not brain events, even though people have brains with electrical charges going through them. Moreover, LBT counselors can help their counselees see that there is a difference between compulsion, such as when a ship is blown off course by a strong wind, and cases where there is no such external forces in effect. So the counselee can be asked to point to the analogue of what external force is holding her back. If there is really no such compulsion, if, as Aristotle would say, “the moving principle is in the man himself,”38 then the counselee may be left without an excuse, except that she is simply afraid to act. But, being afraid is not the same thing as not being able to act. The volitionally can’tstipated counselee can also work toward temperance through the strengthening of the will. The will can be analogized to a muscle, which can be strengthened through successive behavioral exercises, much as the weight lifter starts lifting light weights and gradually builds up to much heavier ones. “Begin,” states Epictetus, “with the little things. Your paltry oil gets spilled, your miserable wine stolen; say to yourself, ‘This is the price paid for a calm spirit, this the price for peace of mind.’ Nothing is got without price.”39 So, the counselee who is prone to feel down even when something small happens (for example, a minor fender bender), can say, “This is a relatively small thing. I can bear the weight and still remain calm.”

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As for larger misfortunes, the developing will can also learn to bear these heavier weights by seeing them as challenges, much as does the gymnast who has trained faithfully in anticipation of the Olympics. In this context, Nietzsche’s “will to power” can be used to bolster this idea of strength through adversity. Nietzsche counsels, for anyone who has attained great stature, the danger of his situation first had to grow enormously, his power of invention and pretence (his “spirit”) had to develop under lengthy pressure and compulsion into something refined and audacious…”40 Thus, from this Nietzschean perspective, human advancement is a process of overcoming obstacles. In embracing such challenges a counselee can thus find opportunity to strengthen his will, and to grow.41

Prudence Working on strengthening willpower is, indeed, a therapeutic aspect of most if not all cognitive-behavioral problems encountered by counselees. This is clearly the case with respect to anxiety problems such as dutiful worrying, which, as discussed in Chapter 7, involves a misguided approach to making moral decisions. As such, its transcendent virtue is one that regards excellence in moral decision-making. LBT follows Aristotle in referring to this virtue as prudence (Phronesis), often translated as practical wisdom.42 This virtue essentially involves the philosophical grasp of morality and moral standards; tolerance for, and acceptance of, the ambiguity and uncertainty of moral choices; an ability to frame and reframe life in constructive, unproblematic ways; a flexible approach to moral decision making, which involves openness to alternative or novel ways of resolving concerns; and an ability to identify and take into account the welfare, interests, and needs of others who are relevantly situated. Prudential reasoning is proactive. This means that it is directed toward solving a problem rather than worrying about solving it. As Aristotle frames it, “it is a mark of a man of practical wisdom to be able to deliberate well about what is good and expedient for him, not in some particular respect, e.g., about what sorts of thing conduce to health or to strength, but about what sorts of thing conduce to the good life in general.”43 And Aristotle holds that all other virtues require practical wisdom, “for virtue makes us aim at the right mark, and practical wisdom makes us take the right means.”44 In contrast, worry and rumination are counterproductive to helping counselees attain good ends.

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Prudential reasoning, as Aristotle explains, aims at action. Thus it is behavioral reasoning. It has, in general, the following behavioral reasoning template (BRT): (Major Premise Rule) If __[enter action]__ conduces to attaining __[enter good end sought]__, then I should do __[enter action]__. (Minor Premise Report) __[Enter action]__ conduces to attaining __[enter good end sought]__. (Conclusion) I should do __[enter action]__.

Prudential reasoning is therefore goal directed reasoning without the worry and rumination. Its minor premise provides the means (or action to take) to attain the end sought; and the major premise rule accordingly prescribes that action. For example, a prudent physician might prescribe the appropriate medication to help his patient get well. As such, prudential reasoning is means-end reasoning wherein knowledge of particular fact is required to attain a (morally) good or virtuous end. Such reasoning contrasts dilemma thinking, which tends to promote worry and rumination without solving problems. Counselees who construct dilemmas worry and ruminate about the negative horns of their dilemmas (“Damned if I do and damned if I don’t”), and, as a result, tend to make their decisions by indecision. Morally creative reasoning, on the other hand, avoids dilemma thinking and its attendant decision by indecision. It consists of a five basic steps: (1) defining the moral problem; (2) gathering morally relevant facts; (3) identifying possible solutions to the problem; (4) choosing the most beneficent, respectful, or caring solution, and; (5) implementing the decision in action.

1. Defining the Moral Problem LBT holds that a moral problem is a practical question (a question about what to do), which, depending on how it is answered, can adversely affect the welfare, interests, and/or needs of those involved. A moral problem is thus said to arise when there is a perception of possible danger to the welfare, interests, or needs of the individual/s in question. For example, a counselee might have a moral problem regarding her husband’s excessive drinking, which she perceives as posing a (possible) danger to the welfare of her two young children as well as to her and her husband himself. Thus, so defined, the problem is what to do about her husband’s drinking, given its potential to adversely affect the said individuals. The seriousness of the moral problem can also be deemed a function of the risk

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of the perceived danger. Ceteris paribus, the higher the risk, the more serious is the problem. Thus, insofar as there is a high risk of harm to the welfare of the children due to the father’s excessive drinking, the moral problem can be said to be a serious one.45 Here, welfare refers to positive welfare (benefit) as well as negative welfare (harm); it also includes psychological as well as physical welfare. Interests include the objects of desires (for example, sexual desire), goals (for example, going back to college), and rights (for example, the right to privacy). Needs are physical conditions that support survival, such as food, clothing and shelter.46 In helping counselees to define their problems, LBT counselors should beware of presumptive definitions, that is, ones that include a possible solution in the very formulation of the problem. For example, “How to get my husband to stop drinking” would be a presumptive definition because it assumes that the counselee should get him to stop drinking rather than doing something else such as leaving him and taking the children with her.

2. Gathering Morally Relevant Facts At this step, the counselee considers what facts are morally relevant. These would be facts that are relevant to the welfare, interests, and/or needs that are at stake.47 For example, the counselee whose husband is drinking excessively might include the facts that, her husband has been going out on weekends, coming home drunk; behaving violently (for instance, breaking furniture, throwing things); threatening to harm her; doing and saying these things in the presence of the children, and so forth.

3. Identify Some Possible Solutions to the Problem Gathering facts and identifying possible solutions can be synergistic. That is, as more facts are gathered, more solutions may be identified, and conversely. Thus, the fact that the counselee’s husband is getting drunk on weekends may suggest the solution of taking the children and visiting the mother on weekends. And the latter solution might lead to other facts, for example, her husband doesn’t like it when she takes the children and visits her mother; which might lead to a further possible solution, namely, taking the children and going to stay with her mother indefinitely until her husband gets into a treatment program. At this third stage, the counselee should be instructed to be as creative as she can in coming up with possible solutions. However, at some point, once the counselee has reasonably explored possibilities (which tends to

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be around the time when she begins to run out of possibilities), she should move to the next stage.

4. Choosing the Most Beneficent, Respectful, or Caring Solution This tends to be a difficult stage for counselees who tend to dutifully worry because it requires an actual decision and dutiful worriers demand perfection. Accordingly, LBT counselors should encourage their counselees to make a choice and to avoid turning the task of choosing into another dilemma. This is best attained by applying morally relevant criteria. Here, the counselee is free to use any theory of ethics or combination thereof. This includes consequential theories, which stress doing the most good (beneficence); deontological (Kantian) theories, which stress being respectful (“Treating people as ends in themselves instead of mere means”); and care-based theories, which stress empathetic caring.48 Thus, three legitimate questions can be: (1) What is the most beneficent thing to do? (2) What is the most respectful thing to do? (3) What is the most caring thing to do? Here, the counselee may decide that, on balance, the most beneficent, respectful, and caring thing to do is to take her children and live with her mother for a while until her husband has entered a treatment program and is in recovery. In this case, the counselee would have asked all three questions in choosing a solution. While such an eclectic approach, which incorporates or balances consequential, deontological, and care-based considerations, would be a reasonable approach, LBT counselors should be careful not to dictate ethical theory to the counselee; inasmuch as this would be inconsistent with a primary tenet of LBT, namely promoting the counselee’s authenticity.

5. Implementing the Decision in Action Once the counselee has reached a decision, she should act on it. Here, the counselor may need to work with the counselee on exercising the willpower to put the decision into action. Indeed, this is the juncture in the decisional process where counselees may procrastinate. For example, the counselee who has decided to leave her husband, taking her children to live with her mother, may put off implementing her decision in action. Without a carefully devised plan of action, it is not likely that the counselee will act. The counselor therefore should help the counselee to take the initiative to construct a plan of action. Such a plan consists of a detailed itinerary of steps needed to accomplish the goal.49 For example,

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the counselee might compile the following action plan: “Today, contact mother and confirm that it is okay with her to come with children to live with her; speak to children and let them know that they will be spending time with grandma; get packed; when husband comes home in evening, tell him of plan to leave tomorrow morning.” This plan should be as detailed as necessary to successfully implement the decision. Thus, details like going to the bank to withdraw money and arranging for transportation should not be overlooked if they are necessary to carry out the plan successfully. However, the counselee should not make the plan more complicated than necessary. In the end, counselees do need to decide and act; notwithstanding they cannot be certain about the outcome. Demanding certainty and demanding that there be a perfect or near perfect solution is likely to thwart deciding and action on the decision. Thus the prudent person is tolerant of inherent the ambiguity of moral decision-making and does not ask more of it than is possible. In this regard, Jean-Paul Sartre admonishes, “When we want something, we always have to reckon with probabilities.”50 So prudence implies accepting the inherent uncertainty of deciding this way or that, inasmuch as “no God, no scheme, can adapt the world and its possibilities to my will.”51

Empowerment Prudential reasoning also contrasts manipulation, such as use of force, intimidation, deception, chicanery, seduction, and the like, to attain one’s goal. Empowerment (of others) stands as the transcendent virtue to manipulation. It involves treating others as rational, self-determining agents rather than as “mere means.” This involves using rational argument to convince others. It uses language to advise, commend, and recommend rather than to goad or threaten others into compliance with one’s wishes. Empowering others means being sensitive to the rights of others to informed consent, and respecting their right to just treatment, even when serious conflicts arise. The theory and practice of LBT exemplifies this virtue inasmuch as it teaches counselors and counselees alike the importance of using logic and rationality to attain one’s goals and achieve happiness. The Kantian ideal of a “kingdom of ends” captures the essence of empowerment. According to Kant, “all rational beings come under the law that each of them must treat itself and all others never merely as means, but in every case at the same time as ends in themselves. Hence results a systematic union of rational beings by common objective laws, i.e., a

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kingdom which may be called a kingdom of ends.” In a kingdom of ends, each member is autonomous and must respect the autonomy of all other members. “A rational being belongs as a member to the kingdom of ends when, although giving universal laws in it, he is also himself subject to these laws.” 52 This is the core ideal or virtue of empowerment wrapped in Kantian Theory. Simply put, we all have a duty to empower others (as well as ourselves) by respecting their right of self-determination rather than to treat them as objects manipulated. Accordingly, Kant admonishes us to universalize our motives for action. Thus, in manipulating others, for example, using threats and intimidation, we commit ourselves to being treated likewise, which contradicts the way we would rationally consent to be treated. As such, the idea of universalizing one’s motives for action can be used antidotally by LBT counselors in helping manipulative counselees to move toward becoming more empowering of others. “Would you yourself consent to be threatened or tricked into things? If not, then shouldn’t you avoid such treatment of others?” It is often hard for counselees to argue with a blatant contradiction, which can make Kantian logic very useful in moral contexts. Counselees who have relationships based on unequal power structures tend to have dysfunctional relationships. These may include some marital relationships in which one spouse is “the boss” and the other is subservient. While LBT counselors need to be sensitive to the role of culture in such contexts, they can usually constructively introduce the idea of empowerment where the unequal power structure is a source of considerable distress or dysfunction. In such contexts, John Stuart Mill’s famous attack against male-dominance can be usually expanded without regard to gender and successfully used as an antidote. Thus, Mill eloquently states: The love of power and the love of liberty are in eternal antagonism. Where there is least liberty, the passion for power is the most ardent and unscrupulous. The desire of power over others can only cease to be a depraving agency among mankind, when each of them individually is able to do without it: which can only be where respect for liberty in the personal concerns of each is an established principle.53

In other words, both parties to a relationship are greater gainers when respect for personal liberty replaces the desire for power over others. In matrimony or other forms of intimate relationships, the dominant, powerful one is trapped in a role that requires that he (or she) constantly be on guard against any dissention on the part of the submissive party. And

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the submissive party is, in turn, deprived of the personal liberty he (or she) desires in order to feel personally fulfilled or satisfied; and may also resort to manipulation (for example, sexual seduction) in order to attain a desired goal. In this manner, each party to the relationship remains chained to an ideology of power and dominance, which destroys the opportunity for happiness and an open, honest relationship. In violent relationships, not only is the potential for happiness destroyed. Power itself (in a constructive sense) is usurped. As Hannah Arendt warned, “Power and violence are opposites; where the one rules absolutely, the other is absent. Violence appears where power is in jeopardy, but left to its own course it ends in power’s disappearance.”54 What this means is that power, understood as involving mutual respect and consent between the governing and the governed, is thwarted when violence is used. Thus, in a democratic order, when there is mutual respect for those who yield power, the one who yields power can get things done (which is the point of desiring power in the first place) because the governed are more likely to cooperate. On the other hand, when such power degenerates into force and erupts into violence, the prospects for cooperation are destroyed and hence power (as a constructive arrangement) evaporates. Thus, relationships that are based on force and violence are self-defeating. In contrast, relationships that strive to empower others are more likely to promote “power” in the constructive sense.

Notes 1

See Chapter 1, this book. Epictetus, Encheiridion, in From Plato to Derrida, 4th ed., ed. Forrest E. Baird and Walter Kaufmann (Upper Saddle River, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 2003), 259. 3 Ibid. 4 William James, “Some Metaphysical Problems,” in Pragmatism (New York: Dover, 1995), 85. 5 Plato, Theaetetus, in Plato: The Collected Dialogues, ed. Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1961), 919. 6 David Hume, Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding, Section VI. Accessed September 2, 2013. http://18th.eserver.org/hume-enquiry.html#6. 7 Ibid., Section IV, Part 2. 8 Ibid., Section VI. 9 John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, in John Stuart Mill, ed. Mary Warnock (Cleveland: World Publishing Company, 1968), Chap. 3, 187. 2

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See, Elliot D. Cohen, “The Philosopher as Counselor,” in Philosophers at Work: Issues and Practice of Philosophy, 2nd Edition, ed. Elliot D. Cohen (Orlando, FL: Harcourt, 2000), 457-467. 11 Simone De Beauvoir, “Women in Love,” in Philosophers at Work, 139. 12 See also the discussion of empowering others, this chapter. 13 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time. Accessed September 2, 2013. http:// www.tc.umn.edu/ ~parkx032/XP226.html. 14 Ibid. 15 Ibid. 16 Carl Rogers, On Becoming a Person, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1989), 284. 17 Edward Bullough, “‘Psychical Distance’ as a Factor in Art and an Aesthetic Principle,” in Aesthetics: A Critical Anthology, ed. George Dickie and Richard J. Scalafani (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1977), 761. 18 Edward Bullough, “‘Psychical Distance’ as a Factor in Art and an Aesthetic Principle,” 761, emphasis added. 19 Ibid. 20 “Descartes’ Epistemology,” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2010. Accessed September 2, 2013. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/descartesepistemology/#2.2. 21 See Elliot D. Cohen, The New Rational Therapy: Thinking Your Way to Serenity, Success, and Profound Happiness (Lanham MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2007), Ch. 8, 185-187. 22 See Chapter 2, this book. 23 See Chapter 7, this book. 24 See above discussion of authenticity. 25 Cohen, The New Rational Therapy, 52-53. 26 Jean-Paul Sartre, Existentialism and Human Emotions (New York: Philosophical Library, 1985), 28-29. 27 Epicurus, Letter to Menoeceus, in From Plato to Derrida, 4th ed., ed. Forrest E. Baird and Walter Kaufmann (Upper Saddle River, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 2003), 251. 28 This analysis of levels of progress in LBT also applies, mutatis mutandis, to the other LBT virtues discussed in this chapter. 29 Buddha, “Thirteenth Chapter of First Corinthians,” in The Teachings of the Compassionate Buddha, ed. E.A. Burt (New York: Penguin, 1982), 46. 30 Martin Buber, “I and Thou,” in Philosophers at Work: Issues and Practice of Philosophy (Orlando, FL: Harcourt, 2000), 533-537. 31 Erich Fromm, The Sane Society (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1955), 37. 32 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, in The Basic Works of Aristotle, trans. W.D. Ross, bk. 9, chap. 7, ed. Richard McKeon (New York: Random House, 1941), 1086 33 Many of these theories of human intrinsic worth are discussed in Cohen, The New Rational Therapy. See, especially, Chapter 3. 34 See Chapter 4, this book.

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Epictetus, Enchiridion, trans. George Long, Ch. 5. Accessed September 2, 2013. http:// www.ptypes.com/enchiridion.html. 36 See Chapter. 8, this book. 37 A. I. Melden, “Free Action,” in Free Will and Determinism, ed. Bernard Berofsky (New York: Harper & Row, 1966), 219. 38 Aristotle, Ethics, bk. 5, chap. 8, 1016. 39 Epictetus, Encheiridion (Manual), in From Plato to Derrida, 4th ed., ed. Forrest E. Baird and Walter Kaufmann (Upper Saddle River, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 2003), 261. 40 Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, in The Philosophy of Nietzsche, trans. Helen Zimmern (New York: Random House, 1954), Part 2, “The Free Spirit,” Sections 44, 429. 41 The Nietzschean idea of “will to power” as an antidote to volitional can’tstipation can be viewed either from a teleological perspective, that is as an object of desire; or from the deontological perspective, that is, as a rational motivation notwithstanding any desire to the contrary. Thus it may be thought rational for a counselee to strengthen his will through adversity regardless of whether this is an object of his desire, and even in spite of it. See Chapter 4, this book. 42 Aristotle, Ethics, bk. 6, chap. 5. 43 Ibid., bk. 6, chap. 5, 1026. 44 Ibid., bk. 6, chap. 12, 1034. 45 Elliot D. Cohen and Gale S. Cohen, The Virtuous Therapist: Ethical Practice of Counseling and Psychotherapy (Belmont, CA: Brooks Cole, 1999), 36. 46 Ibid., 34-35. 47 Ibid., 38. 48 Elliot D. Cohen, The Dutiful Worrier: How to Stop Compulsive Worry Without Feeling Guilty (Oakland, CA: New Harbinger, 2011), 126-132. 49 Ibid., 148-149. 50 Jean-Paul Sartre, Existentialism and Human Emotions (New York: Philosophical Library, 1985), 29. 51 Ibid. 52 Immanuel Kant, Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals, trans. Thomas Kingsmill Abbott, 2004, Section 2. Accessed September 2, 2013. http:// www.gutenberg .org/cache/epub/5682/pg5682.html. 53 John Stuart Mill, The Subjection of Women (London: Longmans, Green, Reader, and Dyer, 1869), Ch. 4, 182. Accessed September 2, 2013. http://www. gutenberg.org/ files/27083/27083-h/27083-h.htm. 54 Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958), 140.

CHAPTER TWELVE THE INDUCTIVE VIRTUES In the previous chapter, the behavioral and emotional virtues were examined. In this chapter, the inductive virtues are examined. These virtues are ones that can improve counselees’ ability to handle the facts that serve as input into the minor premise reports of their emotional and behavioral reasoning. These virtues are, accordingly, habits of collecting and reporting empirical information, that is, information gleaned from experience. Specifically, they are: (1) objectivity, (2) foresightedness, and (3) scientificity. While these virtues are considered separately from the behavioral and emotional virtues, it should not be supposed that they are not also involved in the latter virtues. For example, there is a clear connection between prudence and objectivity. Thus a counselee who is prudent must also be objective in gathering and reporting the empirical facts. Indeed, as has been emphasized in this book, LBT subscribes to the Aristotelian thesis that there is a continuity of virtues, that is, while logical distinct, the eleven transcendent virtues form an interconnected network of mutually supportive virtues.

Objectivity Indeed, all of the transcendent virtues assume objectivity, that is, the ability to make unbiased, realistic factual judgments. This is because practical reasoning always has as its minor premise a factual (empirical) report; and such reasoning cannot support rational (or virtuous) activity unless this factual premise is itself unbiased and realistic. For example, prudential reasoning could not be based on a stereotype. Stereotypes tend to lead to unfair, ill-informed treatment of others, which would be antithetical to prudence, which involves sound deliberation about a morally worthy end. Moreover, since all virtues require prudence, no virtues could be based on practical reasoning grounded in stereotypes or other biased, unrealistic factual judgments.1 An objective person also bases her generalizations on samples that are representative, thus avoiding hasty or unrepresentative generalizations as well as stereotypes. Such a person is therefore fair-minded and does not

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discriminate against others based on preconceived ideas or mind-sets and is therefore also open-minded. Further, an objective person avoids pigeonholing reality. Instead, such a person creatively assesses opportunities and proactively looks for solutions to problems rather than getting caught up in self-defeating dilemma reasoning.2 Objectivity also calls for the expression of fact in clear, unambiguous ways. Thus, saying that a child is “acting out” is insufficient due to vagueness unless the specific actions are specified—for example, gets into fistfights with the other child. Similarly, the use of emotive language instead of more descriptive language—for example, calling someone’s views “absurd” instead of “inconsistent” or “lacking evidence”—runs counter to what it means to be objective. The credo of objectivity is contained in Socrates’ admonition to examine life: “[D]aily to discourse about virtue, and of those other things about which you hear me examining myself and others, is the greatest good of man, and that the unexamined life is not worth living.”3 Charged with corrupting the youth of Athens, in this statement presumably uttered by Socrates in his own defense at his trial, he reminds us that knowledge and its attendant happiness is attained by asking questions, not by settling for what we have been told is true.4 This credo is also contained in W.K. Clifford’s admonition to never believe anything on insufficient evidence: Every time we let ourselves believe for unworthy reasons, we weaken our powers of self-control, of doubting, of judicially and fairly weighing evidence. We all suffer severely enough from the maintenance and support of false beliefs and the fatally wrong actions which they lead to, and the evil born when one such belief is entertained is great and wide. But a greater and wider evil arises when the credulous character is maintained and supported, when a habit of believing for unworthy reasons is fostered and made permanent. 5

And Walter Lippmann, in his seminal study of stereotypes, states: For the most part we do not first see, and then define, we define first and then see. In the great blooming, buzzing confusion of the outer world we pick out what our culture has already defined for us, and we tend to perceive that which we have picked out in the form stereotyped for us by our culture.6

Like Plato and Clifford, Lippmann entreats all of us to get past our preconceptions and to base our beliefs on evidence. As philosophical

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antidotes to the common tendency to oversimplify reality through hasty or unrepresentative generalizations, stereotypes, and pigeonholing, these general counsels can be quite inspirational. Counselees can then begin the work of putting them into practice with the guidance of their LBT counselors such as through application of the standards of justified inductive generalization, and the identification and avoidance of stereotypes and false bifurcations in their own thinking as well as that of others.7

Foresightedness Being objective about the future can present a special problem because we never directly experience the future. The future only becomes accessible to us directly when it passes into the present and then into the past. But then it is no longer future futures about which we are conversant, but rather past ones. While metaphysically secure individuals rationally accept the inherent uncertainty of the future, many individuals experience intense anxiety about it. As discussed in Chapters 7, some counselees may exaggerate the probabilities of “awful” things happening and may also, as in the case of dutiful worriers, demand certainty about how to stop the predicted consequences. Foresightedness is the virtue that transcends such distortions of probabilities. A person with foresight is in a habit of making predictions based on sufficient evidence. That is, such an individual is perceptive about the past and uses this information to make rational judgments about the future. Here, rational judgment involves proportioning one’s belief to the degree of probability based on evidence gleaned from past observations. Thus, a counselee whose problems with the law have most often been the result of heavy drinking can reasonably predict with a high degree of probability that future heavy drinking will yield similar results in the future. Such a person is thereby able to cope effectively in this material universe, where there are degrees of probability, not certainty. A person who has foresight does not use the term “probably” indiscriminately. While many counselees tend to do so (“He coughed on me; now I’m probably going to get some terrible disease!”), an LBT counselor can help her counselees to attain greater foresight by helping them to realistically apply this term. Such realistic probability assessments are based on rational criteria. This means basing predictions on adequate samples.8 Persons with foresight are also good at drawing inferences from comparisons of current experiences with past ones. Here probability assessment is based on

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relevant similarities and differences between past and current cases; for example, predicting, with a high degree of probability, that a set of tires will get high mileage based on prior experience with the same (brand and model of) tire used on the same vehicle under relevantly similar driving conditions. Thus, LBT counselors can help counselees to attain greater foresight by helping them to internalize applying such standards of analogical induction.9 Foresightedness is also an Aristotelian mean. It avoids the extreme of looking unconditionally upon the world with optimism. It also avoids the opposite extreme of blindly perceiving the world through jaundice or pessimistic lenses. Instead, the person with foresight is hopeful but realistic about future prospects. This means she tends to assess the future according to the evidence, hopes for the best given the circumstances, and is willing to deal with whatever outcome comes to pass. Sometimes, this can mean being doubtful about a favorable outcome. Thus, a foresighted person may be doubtful about the prospects for future success when what she is doing has consistently not worked in the past; for example, cramming for an exam rather than giving oneself more time to learn the material. Accordingly, the person with foresight is willing to try new approaches to problem solving if the old approaches are not working; realizing that changing the probabilities for success is a function of changing the circumstances under which those probabilities are assessed. Such a person thus has a measure of courage, that is, willingness to take reasonable risks for the sake of making constructive change. LBT Counselors who have counselees who distort future probabilities can thus work with these counselees to gain foresight by helping them to make reasonable changes in the way they approach particular problems, and in helping them to practice rational risk management. This may be accomplished through giving the counselee homework assignments as appropriate. For example, a counselee who believes that the plane will probably crash if he takes that long desired Hawaiian vacation can book the flight and push himself to board the plane. In such a case where unreasonable probability assessment keeps a counselee from realizing a desired goal, Sartre’s existential antidote may prove useful: In failing to act, one only defines oneself, negatively, as a “disappointed dream, as miscarried hopes, as vain expectations.”10

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Scientificity Being afraid to act or to make constructive life changes can also be a result of giving unsupported explanations about reality. Thus a student may continue to do poorly in a class because she tells herself that the reason she is failing is that the teacher is incompetent, notwithstanding that the class average is considerably higher than hers. In resting on an unsupported explanation, the student thereby does nothing to change her study habits or to seek extra help from the teacher. The transcendent virtue of such blind conjecture is scientificity—the ability to apply a critical, creative scientific method in accounting for, or explaining, the facts.11 A scientific person avoids superstitious or magical explanations and other forms of dogmatic, unscientific thinking. As an objective person, she tends to rely on evidence rather than bias, fear, intense guilt, and other impediments to objectivity.

LBT and Faith-Based Explanations A major challenge that arises within the context of logic-based counseling is counselees’ appeal to religious explanations instead of empirical, evidence-based ones. Religious explanations, or more generally, ones based on faith, can indeed have a certain practical efficacy. As William James vividly illustrates, a train filled with passengers who may be individually brave may still be looted by a few robbers simply because the robbers can depend on one another, whereas each passenger may fear that in resisting the robbers he would be shot before any other passenger came to his aid. Yet if the passengers each had faith that each would come to the other’s aid and that the “car-full would rise at once” to stop the train robbers, the robbery would never occur. “There are, then,” states James, “cases where a fact cannot come at all unless a preliminary faith exists in its coming.” So that, “where faith in a fact can help create the fact, that would be an insane logic which should say that faith running ahead of scientific evidence is the ‘lowest kind of immorality’ into which a thinking being can fall. Yet such is the logic by which our scientific absolutists pretend to regulate our lives!”12 LBT similarly agrees that, it is unacceptable for counselors to tell their counselees to summarily relinquish their faith and to become “scientific absolutists.” Indeed, if faith, including religious faith, can be instrumental in helping a counselee to create new facts or realities that are conducive to the counselee’s happiness or welfare, then the LBT counselor has no business in interfering with the counselee’s faith. For example, a counselee

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may believe that God is forgiving and, therefore, despite his past sins, he still has an opportunity to be happy. In such a case, an LBT counselor would be less than “logical” (given the ameliorative purpose of counseling) in telling the counselor to stick to empirically confirmable fact. As stressed in Chapter 10, LBT does not tell counselees what philosophies by which to live so long as these philosophies are not fallacious or self-defeating.

Religious and Secular Absolutism Religious absolutism holds that, in order for one to remain faithful to God, one must reject secular, scientific explanations in favor of religious ones. At the other extreme, secular or scientific absolutism holds that, in order to remain true to science, one must always reject religious explanations in favor of secular, scientific ones. LBT rejects both of these extremes and instead seeks an Aristotelian mean between “scientific absolutism” and religious absolutism or fanaticism. A counselee goes to the former extreme when faith leads her to dismiss unequivocal fact in favor of a supernatural explanation that thwarts her happiness. For example, a counselee may claim that she is damned to rot in hell for having not prevented her child’s illness, even though the disease (say leukemia) was not one she could have foreseen or prevented. In such cases, LBT counselors should stress the importance of following scientific method, in particular, accepting only explanations supported by the facts. LBT counselors must themselves also be cognizant of their own tendencies to go to extremes. Counselors who are religious absolutists are not likely to find a home in LBT and may do the least harm by becoming pastoral counselors where at least their counselees are more likely to share their religious convictions and zeal. On the other hand, LBT counselors may be attracted to LBT because it is logical and empirical. Some may in fact be agnostics or atheists. This profile may include some who have tendencies toward secular or scientific absolutism. Those LBT counselors who fit this description should be especially careful not to impose their secular values on their counselees who may not share the same secular values. In the effort to be logical, LBT counselors can undermine the logic-based mission of LBT to help their counselees lead happier lives. LBT counselors must therefore take care to work within the value systems (including religious values) of their counselees.

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Fear-Based Explanations Counselees not infrequently tend to confuse what they fear the most with what may be the most probable or highly confirmed explanation. This problem can undermine the counselee’s ability to respond rationally (cognitively, behaviorally, and emotionally) in situations that call for explanations. Such situations are ones where there is some apparent fact or other that is out of the ordinary, bewildering, strange, or puzzling and therefore naturally leads one to ask “Why?” In at least some of these situations, there may be very benign ways to explain the bewildering fact, while there may be other explanations that arouse fear and trepidation for the counselee. For example, a mother calls her teenage son on his cell phone and he does not answer. The mother can just as easily focus on the possibility that he just does not hear his phone ringing (say because he is playing basketball or at a heavy metal concert) as that he is not picking up because he is either dead or in a coma. The latter explanation is a dreaded explanation, whereas the former provides no basis for alarm. Inasmuch as the former scenario (not hearing the phone ring) may have played out frequently enough in the past, it may be more probable than the latter. Nevertheless the mother may focus on the former explanation because it is the most dreaded of the many possible explanations. She may even think “There’s probably something very bad that has happened to him,” wherein she has managed to confuse what is most dreaded with what is most probable. Counselees who tend toward this confusion can be helped by their LBT counselors to work on taking a more scientific approach to providing explanations to bewildering facts. “Okay, he is not answering his cell, but this is not the first time this has happened; he may simply be unable to hear the phone ringing.” In so thinking, the counselee may take a reasonable approach to the matter. Thus, instead of engaging in a frenzied search for her son, she may simply wait a while, say an hour or so, and then try calling him again. In the interim, the mom can simply distract herself by tending to other matters rather than sitting on pins and needles, thinking “the worst” has happened.

Attaining Success in LBT Counseling As should be evident from this and the last chapter, inductive virtues and the virtues that transcend behavioral and emotional rules form a network of interconnected, rational goals. When counselees are working on one of these virtues they are likely, in some respects, to be working on

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the others too. Thus, a counselee who tends to demand perfection and is working to become more metaphysically secure will also be working on gaining greater foresight in assessing probabilities of future events. In the end, counselees who succeed in overcoming their irrational thinking, and move toward cultivating their respective transcendent virtues, will be working on their overall happiness, which, according to LBT, is defined in terms of attaining the virtues, collectively. LBT counselors are therefore not locked into sticking exclusively to the particular virtue that transcends a particular cardinal virtue. Indeed, LBT counselors who can see the interconnectedness and systematic relations between the eleven transcendent virtues can best serve the counselee by helping her to see the same. In the end, success of the therapeutic endeavor will be measured by the counselee’s subjective report of feeling and doing better. This success can sometimes be due to the mere fact of having had someone with whom to share one’s subjective life story. The competent LBT counselor is a good, active listener and knows how to “be there” for the counselee. But success can be due to having helped the counselee to identify her irrational premises; refute them; construct rational, philosophical antidotes to these premises in line with a respective set of transcendent virtues; and exercise the willpower to put these insights and aspirations into action according to a realistic action plan. Here, lies the success that LBT hopes will attain for many counselees but, at least, for some. This concept of success portends beginning to cultivate virtuous habits such as those discussed in this and the last chapter. Of course, this is a life pursuit and the quest for happiness (in terms of virtuous living) always leaves room for improvement. LBT counseling is just the beginning of constructive change. How long does LBT counseling take “to work”? The answer to this question is the same as for all or most other cognitive-behavioral modalities of counseling and psychotherapy. LBT can be considered a relatively brief therapy, which means that it could even work, to some degree, after one or two one- hour sessions. But this obviously depends on the nature and complexity of the problem and the dispositions of the individual counselee. While LBT counselors can eventually find commonality in the types of problems presented by their counselees and the sorts of irrational ideas they harbor within their reasoning, all counselees are also distinct. This means that care must be taken not to over-generalize about such things as how long it may take for counselees to feel and do better.

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Success is the primary goal, but not leaving the counselee worse off than when she first came to counseling is a minimum condition of competent counseling. If an LBT counselor believes that the counselee is not suitable for such counseling (for example, does not have the requisite level of abstract thinking or logical reasoning ability to comprehend the LBT process and its concepts), then the counselee may best be referred to a more suitable counseling venue. For the counselee who fits the profile of one who might benefit from a philosophical approach, the provision of Logic-Based Therapy can be a reasonable and helpful approach.

Notes 1

See the discussion of prudence in this chapter. See also the discussion of dilemma reasoning in Chapter 9, this book. 3 Plato, Apology, trans. Benjamin Jowett. Accessed September 2, 2013. http://www.gutenberg.org/files/1656/1656-h/1656-h.htm. 4 While the Platonic concept of “objectivity” has its own metaphysical baggage, this need not be broached for the purpose at hand, which is to signalize the importance of questioning claims (whether empirical or evaluative) instead of simply accepting them. See also the discussion of authenticity in this chapter. 5 W. K. Clifford, “The Ethics of Belief,” Contemporary Review, 1877, Ch. 1. Accessed September 2, 2013. http://www.infidels.org/library/historical/w_k_ clifford/ethics_of_ belief.html. 6 Walter Lippmann, Public Opinion,, Ch. 6. Accessed September 2, 2013. http://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/6456/pg6456.html. 7 See Chapter 9, this book. 8 See Chapter 9, section on “Distorting Probabilities.” 9 See Elliot D. Cohen, Critical Thinking Unleashed (Rowman & Littlefield, 2009), Ch. 10. 10 Jean-Paul Sartre, “Existentialism,” in Philosophers at Work: Issues and Practice of Philosophy, ed. Elliot D. Cohen (Fort Worth, Tex.: Harcourt, 2000), 447. 11 See the overview of scientific method in Chapter 9, “Blind Conjecture,” this book. 12 William James, “The Will to Believe,” in The Will to Believe and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy (New York: Longman, Green, & Co., 1912), Part ix. Accessed September 2, 2013. http://www.gutenberg.org/files/26659/26659h/26659-h.htm#P25. 2

INDEX ABC theory of REBT, 2, 3 absolutism. See religious absolutism; secular absolutism achievement damnation, 90, 92, 93 active listening, 22, 23 agape, 111 anger, 6, 46 antidotal syllogism, 53 antidotes to fallacious premises, vii, ix, xiii, 15, 21, 30, 32, 33, 34, 36, 38, 39, 51, 57, 69, 85, 86, 121, 144, 147, 151, 152, 155, 165, 179, 184 anxiety, ix, xii, 7, 48, 50, 53, 75, 76, 77, 78, 83, 92, 95, 102, 103, 105, 106, 111, 115, 116, 117, 133, 136, 144, 155, 168, 179 appearance damnation, 90, 93, 94 approval demand for, vii, 12, 19, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 35, 37, 38, 39, 44, 45, 65, 72, 73, 74, 75, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 86, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 111, 155, 156 approval damnation, 27, 33, 65, 90, 91, 92 Arendt Hannah, 174, 176 Aristotelian mean, 76, 110, 159, 180, 182 Aristotelian teleology, 60 Aristotle, vii, viii, xiii, 9, 11, 14, 17, 18, 33, 40, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 76, 101, 110, 124, 144, 145,

150,151, 152, 159, 165, 166, 167, 168, 169, 175, 176, 177, 180, 182 156, 157, 158, 161 authenticity, 14, 19, 20, 21, 94, 145, 146, 156, 157, 158. 161 authoritarianism, 149 bad things never happen demand that, 76 Bandura Albert, 96, 101 bandwagon reasoning, v, vii, 12, 19, 27, 72, 78, 79, 80, 156, 157, 158 behavioral assignments, xii, 65, 160 behavioral can’tstipation, 114-118, 167 behavioral change, 38, 91, 115, 144 behavioral plan, 34 behavioral prescription, 10, 11, 35, 37, 38 behavioral reasoning, 10, 11, 35, 37, 39, 115, 116, 119, 123, 169, 177 behavioral reasoning, 9, 10, 34, 78, 99, 101 behavioral reasoning templates BRT, 10, 39, 115, 123 behavioral rule, 9, 35, 36, 91, 115 beneficence, 169, 171 Bergmann Gustav, 150, 152 bibliotherapy, xii, 33, 34, 40 blind conjecture, 13, 14, 135, 145, 185 bridging premises, 25, 43 Buber Martin, 163, 175 Buddhist, 106, 163 Bullough Edward, 159, 160, 175

Theory and Practice of Logic-Based Therapy can’tstipation, v, 13, 14, 15, 17, 51, 112, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 121, 122, 123, 124, 145, 166, 167, 176. See also behavioral can'tstipation; emotional can'tstipation; volitional can'tstipation Cardinal Fallacies defined, 12-13 catastrophic reasoning, v, 12, 14, 102, 104, 106, 123, 132, 133, 145, 161, 162 Categorical Imperative, 62, 64, 69, 85, 95, 100, 147, 164 causal judgments making them, 137 certainty demanding, 172 chain of consequences, 103 chain of arguments, 25 Clifford W. K., 133, 140, 178, 185 cognition, x, xii, 5, 6 cognitive dissonance, 15, 16, 21, 33, 34, 38, 51, 53, 54, 58, 60, 62, 63, 65, 66, 67, 93, 118, 155, 166 Cognitive-Behavior Therapy (CBT), viii, x, xi, xii, xiii, xiv, 2, 21, 53, 77, 102, 121, 144,145, 163, 166 Cohen Elliot D., xiii, 16, 17, 39, 40, 51, 67, 69, 87, 101, 113, 123, 124, 139, 140, 151, 152, 174, 175, 176, 185 competence in LBT, 18, 20, 110, 184, 185 composition fallacy of, x, 89, 91, 97 constructivism theory of, 62, 149 contrary to fact claims making them, 137, 138, 141 control demand for, xi, 13, 14, 15, 16, 36, 46, 47, 48, 49, 54, 59, 62, 63,

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64, 65, 66, 72, 73, 76, 77, 78, 99, 106, 107, 111, 112, 113, 114, 120, 121, 123, 146, 155, 157, 166, 167, 178 courage, ix, 14, 15, 63, 111, 133, 145, 146, 154, 158, 161, 162, 180 critical thinking, ix, xiii damnation, 13, 14, 88, 89, 90, 92, 93, 95, 97, 145. See also achievement damnation; appearance damnation; approval damnation; damnation of others; selfdamnation damnation of others, 46, 88, 95, 96, 125, 126, 165 damning language dehumanizing capacity of, 96 De Beauvoir Simone, 157, 174 deactivated minor Aristotle's theory of, 56 decision by indecision, 108, 112, 131, 155, 169 definition of a fallacy, 12 demanding perfection, v, 12, 14, 27, 72, 75, 145 deontological approach to exercising willpower, 53, 62, 66 depressed, 2, 4, 5, 23, 44, 45, 66, 82, 83, 114, 119, 120, 126, 135, 137, 147, 164 depression, ix, xii, 8, 23, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 50, 81, 95, 98, 119, 123, 144, 155 depression, 2, 7, 44, 123 Derrida Jacques, 98, 101, 113, 174, 175, 176 Descartes, xiii, 175 dignity, 32, 33, 37, 39, 60, 66, 96, 147, 149, 163, 164, 165 dilemma arguments, 108, 112, 131, 132, 169, 171, 178, 185

188 distorting probabilities, 13, 14, 132, 145, 185 Diaz-Waian, Marisa, viii double standard, 12 dutiful worrying, v, 13, 14, 102, 106, 145 E = (O + R), 6, 8, 9, 23-24 Edwards Jonathan, 109, 113 egocentric, 46, 84, 85, 86 Ellis Albert, viii, x, 16, 17, 40, 51, 52, 81, 82, 84, 86, 124, 146, 151, 152 emotion definition of, 4 emotional can’tstipation, 114, 118, 119, 123, 166 emotional reasoning, vii, 8, 9, 10, 15, 19, 20, 21, 23, 24, 25, 27, 34, 38, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 49, 50, 51, 72, 90, 93, 104, 105, 123, 125, 127, 132, 134, 135, 137, 139, 154, 158, 161 emotional reasoning templates ERT, v, 8, 9, 41-50, 93, 95, 97, 101, 105, 132 empathy, vii, xii, 14, 18, 19, 20, 21, 63, 86, 145, 146, 151, 154, 158, 159, 160, 161, 171 empirical evidence, 12, 74, 116, 118 empowerment, 14, 100, 145, 146, 151, 172 Epictetus, xii, xiii, 15, 111, 113, 155, 166, 167, 174, 175, 176 Epicurus, xiii, 63, 69, 162, 175 Existential Therapy, xi, xii Explaining, 135 explanations fear-based, 183 fail demand not to, 41, 42, 43, 67, 72, 74, 75, 76, 92, 93, 123 failure, 2, 4, 5, 8, 9, 11, 12, 15, 16, 41, 42, 43, 44, 58, 90, 92, 116, 130

Index faith and explanation, 181 Fallacies of Behavioral and Emotional Rules, 12, 13, 17 Fallacies of Reporting, 13, 17 fanaticism, 13, 135, 182 five steps of LBT, xiii, 20 foresightedness, 14, 145, 179, 180 free will, xi, xii, 16, 79, 94, 118, 120, 121, 123, 155, 156, 167 Freud Sigmund, xi, 11 Fromm Erich, 165, 175 Gilligan Carol, 113 global damnation, 88, 97 Golden Mean, 110 grief, 7 guilt emotion of, vii, ix, 6, 13, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 53, 76, 82, 107, 135, 137, 144, 155, 181 happiness, 12, 13, 15, 60, 61, 62, 63, 65, 66, 85, 109, 139, 146, 147, 150, 151, 152, 154, 157, 163, 166, 172, 174, 178, 181, 182, 184 Heidegger, Martin, xiii, 94, 101, 157, 175 heteronomy, 147 Hick John, 111, 113 higher-order premises, 24, 25, 28, 29, 145 homework, 16, 33, 38, 65, 66, 77, 80, 91, 93, 118, 129, 134, 144, 150, 151, 166, 180 human condition, 76 Hume David, xiii, 80, 81, 86, 109, 110, 113, 156, 174 I can’t stand use of term, 49, 50, 121, 122, 123 incontinence vs. continence, xiii, 55, 63, 66, 67 inductive virtues, vii, 13, 177, 183

Theory and Practice of Logic-Based Therapy Institute of Critical Thinking, ix, 14 intentional object of emotion, 5, 8, 21, 23, 41, 42, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 95, 102, 103, 104, 159 I-Thou v. I-It, 163. See also Buber, Martin James William, 155, 174, 181, 185 justification, 10, 11, 35, 37, 38 Kant, vii, xiii, 15, 32, 33, 36, 37, 53, 54, 58, 59, 60, 62, 63, 64, 66, 68, 69, 73, 78, 85, 95, 100, 109, 113, 147, 152, 164, 165, 171, 172, 173, 176 Kantian deontology, 60 Kantian theory of will, 58 knowing connected, 161 separate, 161 Leibniz Gottfried Wilhelm, 98, 111, 113 Lippmann Walter, 129, 139, 178, 185 Locke, xiii, 147, 165 Logic-Based Therapy (LBT) definition of, ix low frustration tolerance, 49, 123 low tolerance frustration, 50 lower-order premises, 28, 29 major premise rule, vii, 3, 11, 17, 24, 42, 53, 54, 55, 56, 58, 59, 61, 62, 65, 66, 67, 69, 81, 83, 85, 86, 89, 91, 100, 104, 105, 113, 115, 117, 127, 128, 130, 131, 135, 139, 154, 169 manipulative reasoning, v, 17, 88, 99, 100 metaphysical security, ix, 14, 30, 31, 32, 112, 134, 145, 154, 155, 156, 179, 184 Mill

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John Stuart, 79, 86, 137, 140, 157, 173, 174, 176 minor premise report, 4, 13, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 66, 67, 100, 104, 115, 126, 127, 130, 133, 134, 135, 137, 138, 139, 169, 177 moral problems, 14, 169, 110, 112 morally relevant facts, 169, 170, 171 Murphy’s Law, 133, 140 must meaning of, vii, 28, 29, 30, 72, 73, 74, 78, 106 Nietzsche Friedrich, xiii, 21, 62, 79, 80, 86, 98, 101, 149, 152, 162, 168, 176 objectivity, 14, 145, 177, 178 ontological character of irrational musts, 73, 80 open-ended questions, 22, 23 overgeneralization, 125 oversimplifying reality, 13, 14, 125, 145 Pan Tian-Qun, 152 perfectionism, 106, 111, 149 Person-Centered Therapy, xi, 18 phenomenological approach to psychotherapy, 21, 22, 23, 62, 67, 148, 158, 159, 160, 161 philosophical counseling, vii, ix, x, xi, xii, 34 physiological changes in emotions, 6, 86 pigeonholing, 13, 130, 131, 178, 179 pity, 7 plan of action, 36, 38, 124 Plato, xi, xiii, 20, 98, 101, 113, 144, 174, 175, 176, 178, 185 Popper Karl, 136, 140

190 positive psychology, vii, 13, 14, 19, 139, 144, 145, 151 post hoc reasoning, xii practical reason, 64, 66 practical syllogism, viii, 3, 4, 8, 9, 21, 23, 24, 50, 54, 55, 56, 57, 66, 67, 68, 89, 91 practical wisdom, 64, 168 pragmatism, 149, 174 predictive inductive inferences, 133 proactive reasoning, 108, 112, 131, 168 procrastination, 81, 108, 112, 118, 171 prudence, 14, 111, 112, 145, 154, 168, 172, 177, 185 psychical distance, 160 rating of intentional object, emotion, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 21, 23, 25, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 60, 90, 95, 96, 102, 103, 104, 105, 125, 139, 163, 165 Rational-Emotive Behavior Therapy (REBT), ix, xi, 14, 2, 144 refutation of irrational premises, 12, 28, 29, 30, 75, 76, 77, 79, 80, 84, 91, 93, 95, 100, 109, 116, 120, 123, 126, 128, 131, 139 religious absolutism, 182 repressed thoughts, 11, 17 respect, ix, 14, 15, 18, 19, 20, 21, 32, 33, 36, 37, 58, 59, 61, 62, 63, 64, 66, 68, 75, 78, 85, 100, 101, 145, 147, 148, 149, 154, 162, 163, 164, 165, 167, 169, 168, 171, 173, 174 Rogers Carl, 39, 159, 175. See also Person-Centered Therapy Sartre Jean-Paul, xiii, 21, 62, 91, 110, 113, 148, 149, 152, 162, 165, 172, 175, 176, 180, 185

Index Schopenhauer Arthur, xiii scientificity, 14, 145, 181 secular absolutism, 182 self-damnation, 9, 12, 41, 42, 43, 44, 47, 88, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 107, 116, 118, 127, 147, 164 self-downing, 32, 60, 61, 62, 65, 67, 151, 164 self-respect unconditional, 164, 165 self-worth, 19, 22, 25, 26, 27, 32, 33, 92, 116 Seligman Martin, 144, 151 shame, 7 Socrates, xiii, 20, 39, 55, 57, 67, 148, 156, 178 Solomon Robert, 5, 17 Spinoza Baruch, 30, 31, 32, 37, 40 standard form of emotional reasoning, 8, 10, 11, 104 stereotyping, 128, 129, 177, 178, 179 Stoicism, xii, 15, 166 stress emotional, 75, 76, 78, 92, 107, 110, 138, 171, 182 suppressed premises in enthymemes, 11, 12, 25, 51 teleological approach to exercising willpower, 53, 62, 66 temperance, ix, 14, 15, 63, 64, 145, 154, 166, 167 Thomas Aquinas Saint, xiii, 21, 30, 62, 152 Transactional Analysis, xi transcendent virtues, vii, ix, xii, xiii, 14, 15, 17, 18, 34, 139, 145, 146, 147, 151, 154, 177, 184 trust

Theory and Practice of Logic-Based Therapy in therapeutic relationship, 18, 20, 21, 100 universal premise, 30, 31, 54, 55, 56, 57, 66, 67, 68, 74, 90, 109, 125, 126, 128, 147, 163, 173 universalizability of moral duties, 107 virtues. See transcendent virtues

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volitional can’tstipation, 114, 121, 122, 123 willpower, vii, 15, 16, 21, 34, 36, 38, 39, 51, 53, 62, 63, 64, 65, 92, 93, 118, 150, 155, 168, 171, 184 world-revolves-around-me thinking, v, 12, 72, 84, 145 Zinaich, Jr. Samuel,viii