Theology at the Crossroads of University, Church and Society: Dialogue, Difference and Catholic Identity 9780567672209, 9780567672230, 9780567672223

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Theology at the Crossroads of University, Church and Society

Theology at the Crossroads of University, Church and Society Dialogue, Difference and Catholic Identity Lieven Boeve

T&T CLARK Bloomsbury Publishing Plc 50 Bedford Square, London, WC1B 3DP, UK 1385 Broadway, New York, NY 10018, USA BLOOMSBURY, T&T CLARK and the T&T Clark logo are trademarks of Bloomsbury Publishing Plc First published in Great Britain 2016 Paperback edition first published 2018 Copyright © Lieven Boeve, 2016 Lieven Boeve has asserted her right under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, to be identified as Author of this work. For legal purposes the Acknowledgements on p. 235 constitute an extension of this copyright page. Cover image © pixonaut/istockphoto All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or any information storage or retrieval system, without prior permission in writing from the publishers. Bloomsbury Publishing Plc does not have any control over, or responsibility for, any third-party websites referred to or in this book. All internet addresses given in this book were correct at the time of going to press. The author and publisher regret any inconvenience caused if addresses have changed or sites have ceased to exist, but can accept no responsibility for any such changes. A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. A catalog record for this book is available from the Library of Congress. ISBN: HB: 978-0-5676-7220-9 PB: 978-0-5676-8450-9 ePDF: 978-0-5676-7222-3 ePub: 978-0-5676-7221-6 Typeset by Deanta Global Publishing Sevices, Chennai, India To find out more about our authors and books visit www.bloomsbury.com and sign up for our newsletters.

Contents Preface

vi

Introduction: In the Margin and at the Crossroads

1

Part 1

Foundation, Horizon and Location

1 Foundation: Revelation as God’s Dialogue with People and History 2 Horizon: The Challenge of Plurality and Difference 3 Location: From the Margins and at the Crossroads of the University, Church and Society Part 2

33 54

At the Crossroads of University and Church

4 More Room for Theology in the Church? A Critical-Empathetic Reading of Theology Today 5 The Swan or the Dove? On the Difficult Dialogue between Theology and Philosophy 6 Mutual Interruption: Towards a Productive Tension between Theology and Religious Studies Part 3

15

81 112 136

Theology and Society: The Issue of Catholic Identity

7 Catholic Identity in a Post-Christian and Post-Secular Society: Four Models and a Roadmap 8 Qualitative Pluralism as a Hallmark of the Catholic Dialogue School 9 Catholic Religious Education: Still Plausible Today?

155 174 200

Part 4 Conclusion 10 Why Benedict XVI Resigned: Cognitive Dissonance

221

Acknowledgements Index

235 237

Preface In recent years, I have been challenged to think about theology’s place at the university, in the church and in culture and society. Indeed, it appears theology has been pushed to the margin in each of these places. Rather than being defensive, or reactionary, I advocate for a theology which deals, without resentment, with this marginalization and self-confidently stands at the crossroads of university, church and society, in dialogue with each of them. I hold to the same way of thinking, as well, when I reflect on the identity of Catholic institutions today. In the present context of detraditionalization and pluralization, I argue that there is no necessary contradiction between being Catholic and pluralist. Meeting with the religious other need not lead to less identity; rather, it can lead to more. To take one’s place in the dialogue  ‒ being challenged by difference ‒ is the mission of the theologian, as well as the assignment of whoever intends to constitute Catholic identity in the contemporary context. In this collection, I bring together a number of articles that I have written primarily in the past five years. With respect to content, this collection builds on the books I previously published: my cultural–theological investigations in the changed relationship between Christian faith and postmodern culture in Interrupting Tradition (Peeters, 2003); and the theological–methodological reflections on recontextualization and interruption in God Interrupts History (Continuum, 2008). The philosophical–theological background of my argument can be consulted in Lyotard and Theology. Beyond the Christian Master Narrative of Love (T&T Clark, Bloomsbury, 2014). As regards context, most of these articles were written during my time as either president of the European Society for Catholic Theology (2004–9) or dean of the Faculty of Theology and Religious Studies at KU Leuven (2008–14), and are also informed by these duties. The last part of this book very aptly sets the stage for the new assignment which I was given by the Flemish bishops in 2014, being named director general of Catholic Education in Flanders.

Preface

vii

A similar collection has been published in Dutch as Theologie in dialoog (Pelckmans, 2014). I am very grateful to Dr. Phillip Davis, who meticulously supervised the English text of this volume. Lieven Boeve

Introduction: In the Margin and at the Crossroads

What is theology’s place and status, in a thoroughly changed culture and society, in the domains to which it has traditionally belonged: the university, church and society? After all, we can establish the fact that theology no longer has a self-evident role, but appears to have shifted to the margin of what happens in these domains. In this book, I will develop the position that today theology can only fulfil its task if it refuses to run away from this marginalization (for instance, by retreating into one of the three domains), but undergoes this knowingly and willingly. In addition, theology especially can be credible and relevant when it consciously takes its place starting from the margin, at the crossroads of university, church, and society. In this Introduction, I will further explain this issue, concisely developing this hypothesis. First, I will give a tentative definition of what theology is and describe the contours of recontextualization as a theological method. Then, I briefly describe how theology’s place has changed in the current context. Finally, I formulate the ‘observations’ and ‘thesis’ which inspire the argument made in this book.

Theology and recontextualization Theology has been classically defined by the maxim of Anselm of Canterbury (1033–1109) as fides quaerens intellectum: faith seeking understanding. Theologians engage in a reflection on – and from within – that faith: a reflection nourished by an existential praxis, rooted in a tradition, embedded in a community and performed in actual historical, cultural, sociopolitical contexts, on a scale that ranges from the particularly local to the global.

2

Theology at the Crossroads

Since its inception, theology as a method develops through recontextualization. Christian faith is always thoroughly embedded in a specific historical context which is partly constitutive for this faith. At the same time, the Christian faith never completely coincides with this context, so that when the context changes, the contextually imbedded form of Christian faith comes under pressure. Looking for an adequate faith understanding, Christians, like their contemporaries, are part of the prevailing context, sharing similarly in its sensitivities, attitudes, ways of thinking and ambiguities. It is theology’s task to reflect on the internal intelligibility and external plausibility of the Christian faith in relation to this context. The insight into this intrinsic link of the Christian faith to its context inspires theologians to take seriously the contextual challenges and to strive for a contemporary theology that can claim at the same time both a theological validity and a contextual plausibility. Therefore, recontextualization is a continuous, never-finished theological programme and necessitates a consciously undertaken dialogue with the contextual critical consciousness. This consciousness, in turn, is an expression of the reflexive potential present in the context, of its sensitivities, attitudes, thinking patterns and ambiguities. Grosso modo, theological recontextualization consists of two stages which cannot be distinctly separated, but which stand in a dynamic relationship with each other. On the one hand, it requires an acquaintance with the contextual critical consciousness in order to discover what this consciousness reveals both about the context and – in relation thereto – the Christian faith today. That is, how does the context define itself? How does the Christian faith make itself part of this context? How do changes in the context place the Christian faith under pressure? On the other hand, and in direct relation with the previous line of inquiry, recontextualization means searching for a contextually founded religious self-understanding. By this I mean designing a contemporary theology, a theology that from its own sources addresses challenges that the context makes to Christian faith, at the same time as challenges that the Christian faith makes to the context. In so doing, theology aims at a theologically legitimate and contextually plausible understanding of faith. Contextual language, images and thinking patterns are often employed and begin to function in a theological discourse with a theological aim. The contextual critical consciousness compels theology towards a contemporary theological critical consciousness.

Introduction

3

In the course of history, philosophy was the privileged partner – traditionally considered as theology’s handmaiden (ancilla theologiae) – that offered clarity with regard to the context and theological self-understanding.1 Theologians have often derived models, patterns, ideas and words from the philosophy of their time in order to develop, structure, stimulate or flesh out their own explanations. Philosophy, in turn, provided a clarification of life’s broader contextual character and structured the conception of and critical perspectives on reality, even for Christians. In short, precisely in its interaction with philosophy and through integrating interesting models to shape its own rationality, theology recontextualized itself and came to an adjusted understanding of both the context and itself.2 Since modernity, philosophy is joined by the other human and natural sciences and their ways to map the context, including the Christian faith in that context, according to their own appropriate methods. As we later will see, as a consequence, the relation between theology and religious studies is particularly challenging.3

Theology today: Concerning marginalization and evasive manoeuvres Because of the processes of secularization and pluralization, the situation of Christian faith, and thus also of the church, is thoroughly changed in Europe. Of course, this had consequences for the way in which theology functions in this European context. Theology’s credibility and relevance, which shared in the self-evident character of the Christian horizon of meaning, come under pressure when this self-evidence falls away. Belgium has rapidly changed in a couple of generations.4 The time when the Christian faith (and the Catholic Church as its institutional expression and representative) enjoyed an almost unquestioned givenness disappeared 1 2

3 4

See also Chapter 2, paragraph 3. Thomas Aquinas’ (1225–74) use of Aristotle’s philosophy remains one of the most compelling examples of this. Aquinas’ change of handmaiden, however, resulted in a quite different outlook on various theological positions. Cf. E. Gilson, The History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages (London: Sheed and Ward, 1955, repr. 1985), p. 382. See in particular Chapter 4. I develop this point further with reference to the different record books from the European values study in Chapter 2.

4

Theology at the Crossroads

decades ago. This is seen not only in drastically dropping figures related to church commitment and to religious self-definition as Catholic, but also in a shrinking familiarity with Christian stories, imagery and sensibilities. At the same time, along with such secularization, a religious pluralization is underway, due in part but not exclusively to migration, which has contributed to the further undermining of the self-evident character of the Catholic or Christian horizon of meaning. Belgium’s secularization has led to a post-Christian society, which nevertheless is not suddenly religion-less or atheistic. Approximately one-third of the Belgian population describes itself as not belonging to a religious denomination, without considering itself atheistic, and many indicate they are sensitive to the spiritual and transcendent. Therefore, the post-Christian situation is at the same time a post-secular situation. Under closer consideration, these processes have resulted in a religious situation in Belgium which characterizes itself through a strange combination of ideas. On the one hand, in the public sphere, a kind of post-Christian defaultposition of quasi-neutrality – influenced by secularization – is promoted. On the other hand, in the framework of the so-called multicultural society, a kind of post-secular pluralism of philosophical and religious convictions is avowed. However, this combination is marked by a thorough ambiguity. This appears, for example, when religions or ideologies want to matter in the public forum, or when individuals’ and communities’ ideological concepts or behaviours appear to disturb the quasi-neutral default-position. This also becomes clear as defenders of the quasi-neutral default-position react with incomprehension and even outrage when the specific value-laden presuppositions of this defaultposition are questioned and its often soft-secularist character is criticized: ‘Neutral is, after all, not really neutral.’ The consequence is that theology’s place in the three domains, where it is active and to which it wants to speak, – the university, church and society – has undergone a radical shift. Theology is indeed related to these three domains: as a university discipline that scientifically confronts Christian faith, theology also functions in the church and helps it by offering a reflexive expression of the religious understanding of the people of God.5 To the extent that Christian 5

For a discussion of the ecclesiastical perspective on this theology, see Chapter 5.

Introduction

5

faith aims to offer an answer for people’s questions of meaning, theology should also play a role in the sociocultural domain. But because of the important shifts in the context just mentioned, theology has lost the relatively central place it traditionally enjoyed, even in relation to its essential religious task, and has been shoved to the margin. Today, in the university, in the church as well as in society, its voice is perceived differently than it previously was. (a) In the university, theology’s place as first among the academic disciplines is either already abolished long ago or reduced almost completely to mere tradition. With regard to the Catholic University of Leuven, the founding charter of the theological faculty in 1432 – seven years after the establishment of the university in 1425 – explicitly stipulated that this new faculty received priority over the other faculties and, therefore, that in the procession of the togati its professors should receive first place. This may still be the case today, but it has scarcely anything to do with theology’s prestige as a discipline. Of course, this loss of prestige is related to the changed place of Christian faith in our society and with the rise, even within Catholic universities, of a post-Christian, soft-secularist default-position, sometimes radicalized by an empirical-scientific positivism. Indeed, theologians concern themselves explicitly with the Christian tradition, with a view towards making a contribution to this tradition. To the extent that theology strives for such theological finality, it fits less and less in the contemporary university framework, and its status as an academic discipline comes under fire. Certainly in a time of religious pluralization, theology would seem to hang on too tightly to only one tradition, anchored in only one faith community, which gradually has become a minority. In the countries surrounding Belgium, this marginalization has inspired theological faculties and individual theologians to relativize the theological finality of their disciplines and to yield on the religious studies content of their work. Theological faculties mould themselves into religious studies departments and, in increasing measure, design themselves for empirical, historical-literary, philosophical–anthropological research that is no longer motivated from the theological adage of ‘faith seeking understanding’. So, theology’s marginalization by the university leads to theology’s retreat within the university, redesigning its disciplines as religious studies. But it can also lead to the opposite reaction: a retreat out of the university and into the

6

Theology at the Crossroads

church. However, before we discuss this reaction, we will look first at theology’s marginalization in the church itself. (b) It appears that theology is not doing very well within the church either. After all, the same evolutions have shifted the church’s place in society as well. Not only does it have a sharply reduced share of the population, but it also has lost much of its sociocultural impact. Moreover, it continues to lose respect in peoples’ eyes because of trauma and injuries inflicted in the past by an alltoo-almighty church. Obviously, the paedophilia scandal has further affected sociocultural esteem for the church, and trust in the church has sunk to an alltime low, both with non-Catholics and with Catholics. Just as in the beginning of the modern era, the church should resist the tendency to react defensively to these new developments, by pulling itself back upon its own position and confronting the world: inside its own safe cocoon, the church, in so doing, lives in its own truth and shields itself from the ‘evil world outside’. In such a church, which no longer feels understood in the contemporary context, theology is met with suspicion – certainly the theology that precisely wants to engage in a dialogue with the current (post)modern context and, from that conversation, poses critical questions. This was also the situation before the Second Vatican Council (1962–65), when many theologians who strove for renewal and dialogue came under suspicion. During Vatican II these same theologians helped the church head towards dialogue with the world, other Christian communities, other religions and ideologies. With the constitution Dei Verbum, the council underscored the intrinsically dialogical character of God’s encounter with humanity in creation and history as the fundamental horizon for any understanding of revelation, tradition, church and theology.6 Through changes in the past few decades, however, the church appears to be evolving away from such a dialogical openness towards an oppositional camp. Building up a front against the outside, however, has a consequence: those who threaten to disturb the unity constitute a threat. Whether this will fundamentally change with the papacy of Pope Francis only time will tell.7 In the last twenty-five years, the magisterium has held the range of theological inquiry in the Catholic Church under close scrutiny, and theology’s 6 7

For a further explanation of this dialogical understanding of revelation, see Chapter 1. See the final chapter: ‘Why Benedict XVI resigned: Cognitive Dissonance’.

Introduction

7

fundamental and functional subordination to the church has been strongly emphasized. This has been accompanied by statements and regulations which betray a distrust in theology. Along with the fact that such things certainly do not contribute to theology’s credibility in the university, they also weaken theology’s ecclesial role: theologians censure themselves, focus only on education or pastoral affairs, become the institution’s mouthpieces and forget the scientific character of their enterprise. Or they pull themselves completely out of the church in order to pursue religious studies. In both situations, with a retreat into the church and with an exodus out of the church, theologians no longer involve themselves in theology’s specific critical-productive task, to examine the faith understanding of God’s people in the world of today, and to work together so that today’s church can also enter into a dialogue with the contemporary world. In contrast to what was requested by Vatican II’s dialogical concept of revelation, theology is no longer able to gather the fruits of scientific research and what lives in culture and society to come to such a faith understanding. (c) Also in society theologians are no longer obviously recognized public intellectuals and experts. They share in the Christian faith’s loss of relevance and credibility in culture and society. Thus, they fall between a rock and a hard place. On the one hand, they are particularized because they speak on behalf of Christian faith in a secularized society or because they only speak about Christian faith in a religiously pluralized society. On the other hand, because they do not speak unquestionably on behalf of the church, every theological nuancing or critique of an ecclesial pronouncement is considered as not-reallyCatholic, or even unorthodox. In a society that assumes a quasi-neutrality in the public sphere and combines this with a passive tolerance for religious pluralism in the private sphere, on the one hand, and with a church that very often opposes itself to such a society and considers it to be relativistic and hostile to the truth, on the other, there is hardly any room left for a theology whose programme is a scientifically founded dialogue between faith and context. Once again, we can observe a twofold response to this marginalization. On the one hand, theologians retreat from dialogue with society either within the ivory towers of scientific research or within the safe cocoon of mere service to the church and its self-legitimation. On the other hand, and contrary to this first move, there are theologians who withdraw into society and focus,

8

Theology at the Crossroads

for example, on the apparent polymorphous but often market-driven, postChristian and post-secular search for spirituality and meaning. Spirituality’s present-day popularity is certainly a result of – and reaction to – the processes of detraditionalization, individualization and pluralization, which have thoroughly changed the process of identity formation today. However, it would be a mistake to see the diffuse, subjective forms of spirituality (sometimes called ‘something-ism’) as the only possible outcome  – and thus as normative. In that case we remain blind to the way these processes also challenge more classical religions and philosophies to renew themselves within the changed context. Every form of identity construction today, including classical-religious or atheistic identities, is determined by the fact that traditions are no longer self-evident (detraditionalization), that identity formation requires the individual’s choice and continuing effort (individualization), and that there are a number of traditions, religions and philosophies at one’s disposal to give shape to one’s identity (pluralization). Forms of religious and non-religious fundamentalism and traditionalism, on the one hand, as well as relativism, consumerism and arbitrariness, on the other, are all refusals to adequately and maturely manage the potential of freedom and reflexivity that this new situation brings for the formation of identity. The inability or refusal to question the quasi-neutral default-position regarding its implicit value-laden presuppositions is also a symptom of this. Naturally, this inability or refusal to go there has an impact on many contemporary ideological discussions, such as the wearing of the veil by Muslim women, the identity of Catholic schools and universities, the profile of religious education, the role of religiously motivated viewpoints in politics, etc. This, of course, also weighs upon theology’s role and place in our world.

Observations and thesis Our observations up to this point: because of the changed context, theology is threatened with being shifted to the margins in the three domains in which it participates. This is due to developments in each of these domains themselves, but also because of the fact that theology is involved, at the same time, in the other domains. In addition, if theology gives up on its involvement in one or

Introduction

9

two of these domains, because of this marginalization, it ceases to function as theology and renounces its own mission. This is the case whenever theology disintegrates into religious studies, because of shifts in the university landscape and because of a growing lack of understanding regarding its theological purpose, and no longer intends to contribute to the faith understanding of God’s people. This also happens when the opposite occurs and theology turns away from the academy, retreats within the church and identifies with the church’s defensive reflex: it is precisely then that theology loses its criticalproductive power and its capacity to challenge the church to remain current with the times. An all-too-easily made adaptation to the often soft-secularist and soft-pluralist search for spirituality is also pernicious. This deprives theology of the capacity to challenge both the Christian faith and other religions to be more adequate potentials for freedom and reflexivity resulting from the processes of detraditionalization, individualization and pluralization. Then, theology no longer succeeds in warning against the easier alternatives of fundamentalism and traditionalism, on the one hand, and ideological relativism and consumerism, on the other. Over and again, theology loses its critical-productive force. Therefore, our thesis, which we elaborate in three steps, is as follows: 1. Theology certainly belongs to all three domains and is involved with what is at stake in these three domains: (a) the scientific search for truth and knowledge in the university, (b) developing a contemporary faith understanding and faith life in the church and (c) coming to an individual and communal identity in a post-Christian and post-secular society. It belongs to theology’s nature to involve itself in all three domains, especially at the crossroads where they overlap and touch each other. Theology belongs to each of them, without being able to be reduced to any one of them. 2. Because of the above-mentioned shifts in each of these domains, theology’s position shifts from the centre to the margin. Theology must guard against reacting to this marginalization by either retreating out of or moving exclusively inside of one domain. Rather than abandoning the crossroads, it should learn to re-examine its place and contribution precisely from the margin in each of these domains.

10

Theology at the Crossroads

3. Thus, theology is called to keep the tension precisely where it sits entangled between the domains and not allow itself to be tempted by easy answers. This is exactly its contemporary assignment, in respect to the university, church and society. All things considered, it can make a contextually relevant and theologically credible contribution precisely from its difficult place in the margin and at the crossroads of each of these domains. This thesis is based on the theological conviction that theology lives from such a tension. As involved in history, it should enter into a dialogue with what happens, with what is thought, with how people live. It should do so precisely because of the dialogical concept of revelation developed by Vatican II: a God that allows Godself to be known in encounters with people, in creation and in history will also only allow Godself to be known dialogically today and in the future. Moreover, the fact that this dialogue will need to be carried out from the margins may be more of an advantage than a disadvantage.

Plan of this book How can we think of such a theological perspective from the margins and at the crossroads? In the remainder of this book, I will discuss this in three parts, each containing three chapters. In Part 1, I will discuss the theological and contextual horizon that forms the background of this book, and I will further develop how theology can re-profile itself from the margin and at the crossroads. In Chapter 1, I  will clarify the theological foundation of my argumentation: the dialogical understanding of revelation as this is developed at the Second Vatican Council in Dei Verbum. Along with a rereading of this document, I will also pay attention to the difficult reception of the conciliar views expressed therein. In Chapter 2, I will sketch the contextual horizon to which theology relates, from a sociocultural and philosophical perspective. At the same time, I will indicate which opportunities this dialogue with the context can offer to theology. In Chapter 3, I will elaborate more fully on the previously formulated observations and thesis. I will illustrate both the threat of theology’s marginalization and the opportunity of a theology that situates itself fully and consciously from the margin at the crossroads of the university, church and society.

Introduction

11

In the second and third sections, I will pay attention to some issues that confront theology from the margin and at the crossroads, on the one hand, in the university and the church (part 2), and, on the other, in contemporary culture and society (part 3). In Part 2, I will stand resolutely at the crossroads of the university and church. In Chapter 4, I will undertake a critical-empathetic reading of the recent document Theology Today from the International Theological Commission which circumscribes theology’s place and mission in the Catholic Church. In Chapter 5, I will discuss how the difficult relation between theology and philosophy, as appears in John Paul II’s encyclical Faith and Reason, is typical for a church that has difficulty with the dialogue with today’s world. At the same time, I will indicate which elements of the document are able to inspire dialogue. The last chapter of the second part – Chapter 6 – is devoted to a discussion about the relation between theology and religious studies and how these can mutually interrupt each other. The third part concerns the crossroads with society and is devoted to a reflection on the identity of Catholic institutions today, focusing more specifically on education. In Chapter 7, four models are presented for considering the identity of catholic schools in light of the changed society. I argue that dialogue in a context of plurality and difference can lead to new, fruitful ways to shape identity – even Catholic identity. In Chapter 8, I will continue this reflection by proceeding into the current discussion of whether Catholic identity and openness to plurality are necessarily opposed to each other. I will argue that in a Catholic educational project, identity should not be opposed to plurality, but implies precisely a thoughtful and productive relation with plurality and difference  – which requires a ‘qualitative pluralism’. For that matter, such a definition of identity is not only important for the educational project of the Catholic school, but brings along at the same time a learning process for the faith community as well as for society. In Chapter 9, I will discuss the role and place of Catholic religious education in this context: Does it belong in this age, and should we not rather organize a general course on the subject of religion? As a starting point, I will evaluate the curricula for Roman Catholic religious education which first saw light in Flanders approximately fifteen years ago. To conclude this book, I step into the crossroads, where the present-day church finds itself. Pope Benedict resigned over two years ago, and there

12

Theology at the Crossroads

appears, with Pope Francis, to be a new wind blowing in the Catholic Church, along with a new manner in which the church relates to culture and society. In Chapter 10, I will attempt to offer a theological assessment of Pope Benedict’s resignation. My starting point will be the fact that Joseph Ratzinger, as theologian and church leader, has fundamentally determined the history and direction of the Catholic Church, for over fifty years, since Vatican II until very recently. As the guiding thought for this evaluation, I appeal to the concept of ‘cognitive dissonance’. I argue that a growing conflict arose in the Pope’s theological ideas concerning Christian faith and the church, on the one hand, and the current situation in which both this Christian faith and the church find themselves, on the other. After all, for Ratzinger, the Christian faith is, above all, about conversion; and, in a hostile, modern world of egoism and relativism, the church is called to be a beacon of light that calls this world to conversion. However, this same church has been weakened by sexual and financial scandals, and seems to have lost its credibility and relevance in society. My thesis in Chapter 10 is that the church has forgotten that it should first convert itself before it can call the world to conversion. The church fell back upon itself, in order to protect itself from a hostile world. The lack of openness, both within the church and from the church to the world, has led to forgetting this need for conversion, resulting in the church’s inability to fulfil its own calling. Resigning as pope was Benedict’s personal way to reduce the dissonance. At the same time, for the church, it appears that Pope Francis’ words and deeds – aimed at an outspokenly humble, poor and dialogical church – are effective for breaking through the deadlock of cognitive dissonance.

Part One

Foundation, Horizon and Location The dialogical understanding of revelation, as expressed by the Second Vatican Council (1962–65) in the constitution Dei Verbum, forms the foundation of the reflections I develop in this collection. In the first chapter, I will make clear how Dei Verbum, as regards content, starts from such an understanding of revelation. Both the text’s genesis, as well as its actual layout, illustrate its dialogical character. So understood, the constitution realizes what it argues for: it does not simply speak about God’s dialogue with people and history, but develops that historical–dynamic understanding of revelation in dialogue with the exegesis and theology of that time, embedded in the then current context. Evolutions in the post-conciliar church, however, raise doubts whether the church and theology, in the meantime, have actually taken up and realized this dialogical principle. Therefore, I will close this chapter with a plea to cherish this dialogical principle – precisely because of Dei Verbum. In Chapter 2, I will situate the contextual horizon in which theology is to reflect on its place. After all, theology starts the dialogue with people and history in relation to this context and its critical consciousness. Inspired by the latest report from the European Values Study, I will first analyse the current context in terms of ‘post-Christian’ and ‘post-secular’. Then I discuss its implications for identity formation today. Finally, I will discuss the philosophical foundation of the current critical consciousness, while focusing on ‘thinking from difference’. Anchored in this theological foundation and situated in this contextual horizon, I will, in the third chapter, undertake an investigation to determine theology’s ‘contextual–theological location’. In line with what I have written

14

Theology at the Crossroads

in the Introduction, I am talking here about theology’s altered place in the university, the church and society, and subsequently I will develop the thesis that theology should find its place today, once again, from the margin and at the crossroads. I will illustrate repeatedly how theology, ‘from difference’, in each of the named domains, in the margin and at the crossroads, ‘can make a difference’.

1

Foundation: Revelation as God’s Dialogue with People and History

The Dogmatic Constitution on Divine Revelation (Dei Verbum) is for a number of reasons an interesting document to reflect on when one inquires about the meaning of Vatican II for Christian faith, the church and theology today.1 The way in which this document came into being, its position in the discussions of the day, as well as the manner in which it elaborates on revelation, scripture and tradition, should be mentioned as worthwhile occasions for reflection. In addition, the reception of Dei Verbum’s insights into both church and theology invites further reflection, especially when framed within the broader discussion of the reception of the Second Vatican Council as a whole in Roman Catholicism today. Finally, this dogmatic constitution is not only to be considered as a normative statement on revelation, but – in view of its status as a conciliar constitution – also as revelatory in itself, inviting both commentary, renewed interpretation and recontextualization within today’s context. In this chapter I will indicate what the consequences are of the understanding of revelation and tradition developed in Dei Verbum (including its history), for those who do theology today.2 In order to begin my account, I will call upon a theological sparring partner – actually an unexpected source – who took part in drafting Dei Verbum, and who to a large extent has been responsible for its contemporary reception on the part of the ecclesial magisterium. This is Joseph Ratzinger: the former academic theologian, archbishop of München-Freising,

1

2

For the official text of this constitution, see Acta Apostolicae Sedis 58 (1966): 817–36. The academically most widely accepted English translation is to be found in: Norman P. Tanner (ed.), Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils. Vol. II: Trent to Vatican II (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 1990), pp. 971–81. At the same time, I will also offer my thoughts to start a discussion on the reception of Vatican II – fifty years after its occurrence.

16

Theology at the Crossroads

some years later prefect of the Congregation for the Doctrine of Faith, from 2005 to 28 February 2013 Pope Benedictus XVI, and now emeritus-Pope.3 First, I will consider the rejection by the council assembly of the preparatory text (the schema ‘on the sources of revelation’), which was drafted before the start of the council. In the second and third sections, I point out the historicaldynamic and Christological–pneumatological concept4 of revelation and tradition, as well as the place given to scripture. I conclude these reflections on Dei Verbum’s innovative character by pointing to some of its features which may offer us stepping stones towards a more critical–hermeneutical engagement with scripture and tradition, theology and magisterium. Along the way, I also mention the initial remarks which Joseph Ratzinger made about the document, and I focus more explicitly on two of the points of critique that he formulated. I then make the transition to my comments regarding the reception of Dei Verbum, an event in which our sparring partner played a major role. In the context of this chapter, I will limit myself to some striking points of contention in this reception. In my final thoughts, I will briefly argue for the necessity of a thorough development of the dialogical understanding of revelation, scripture and tradition that is raised in Dei Verbum.

The significance of the rejection of the preparatory schema De fontibus revelationis When we consider the realization of Dei Verbum, the first important fact is the bishops’ rejection of the preparatory text, during the council’s opening session in 1962. The rejection of the preparatory schema De fontibus revelationis (‘On the sources of revelation’) not only influenced the discussion on revelation and tradition, but it also had an enormous impact, at the same time, on the dynamics of the whole council. Already on 25 September 1964, Archbishop Florit from Florence, remarked that the history of the coming-into-being of Dei Verbum 3

4

Also, on earlier occasions, I entered into conversation with Joseph Ratzinger’s theology and the discussion of its pertinence for contemporary theological challenges; see, for example, L. Boeve, Europe in Crisis. A Question of Belief or Unbelief? Perspectives from the Vatican, in Modern Theology 23 (2007): 205–27; and L. Boeve and G. Mannion (ed.), The Ratzinger Reader (London and New York: Continuum, 2010). In relation to the present contribution, I dealt with Ratzinger’s views on Vatican II, revelation and tradition in my: « La vraie réception de Vatican II n’a pas encore commencé  ». Joseph Ratzinger, révélation et autorité de Vatican II, in Ephemerides Theologicae Lovanienses 85 (2009): 305–39. Christological: in relation to Jesus Christ; pneumatological: from the working of the Holy Spirit.

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is very illustrative of the events of the council as a whole, both concerning the council’s content and the actual settlement reached.5 Subsequently, none of the plans prepared for the council by the Theological Commission – led by Cardinal Ottaviani, then Prefect of the Holy Office – were accepted by the council bishops. The rejection of the schema on the sources of revelation is generally considered as a benchmark, a symbolical incident that indicated the separation of the council with regard to the Curia’s influence – or at least with respect to the Holy Office’s reach.6

An explicit interpretation of this rejection is given in a commentary booklet about the first session of the council by the then 35-year-old theological advisor to Cardinal Josef Frings, the archbishop of Cologne: Joseph Ratzinger. In his comments, the young theologian and later official council peritus (expert) described the preparatory schema as anti-modern, rigid, attesting to an uncompromising conflict attitude, ‘a theology of negations and prohibitions’.7 For Ratzinger, the question at stake in the discussions and refutation of the schema was as follows: Should one continue the antimodernist attitude, the politics of closure, of condemnation of defensiveness, until one ends in a complete fearful refusal, or shall the Church, once the necessary distinctions are made, turn to a new page, and step into a new, positive encounter with her sources, with her brothers, with today’s world?”8 5

6

7

8

E. Florit, Relatio super cap. I et cap. II schematis constitutionis ‘de divina revelatione’, in Acta Synodalia Sacrosancti Concilii Oecumenici Vaticani II, Typis Polyglottis Vaticanis, 1962–99, vol. III/3 (1974) 131–9, p. 131. In the first commentaries on the constitution after the Council (e.g. Joseph Ratzinger’s  – cf. infra), as well as in more recent scholarly dealings with Dei Verbum, Florit’s observation has been reconfirmed (see e.g. K. Schelkens, Catholic Theology of Revelation on the Eve of Vatican II: A Redaction History of the Schema De fontibus revelationis (1960–62) (Brill’s Series in Church History, 41) (Leiden/Boston, Brill, 2010), p. 2). K. Schelkens, Catholic Theology of Revelation on the Eve of Vatican II, p. 2. Unless otherwise indicated, all translated citations in this book from foreign-language sources are mine. Cf. J. Ratzinger, Die erste Sitzungsperiode des Zweiten Vatikanischen Konzils: ein Rückblick (Köln: Bachem, 1963), p. 38–41. See also the text of his evaluation of the schema, which he presented at the request of Card. Frings, on 10 October 1962, to the German-speaking bishops gathered in Rome, which has been published in Gregorianum 89 (2008): 233–311, and in Mitteilungen Institut Papst Benedict XVI 2 (2009): 36–48. Whether this thoroughly negative assessment of the preparatory schema by the conciliar majority has done justice to the document itself is not a question we will here pursue. A very nuanced answer to this question is offered in K. Schelkens, Catholic Theology of Revelation on the Eve of Vatican II, p. 272–9. In addition, the ‘older’ Ratzinger, on looking back upon this period in his 1998 memoir, presents us with a more nuanced appraisal of the schema, and even dissociates himself from those who pleaded for its radical rejection (J. Ratzinger, Milestones. Memoirs (1927–77), San Francisco, Ignatius Press, 1998, pp. 121–9). It is quite a different story, definitely with a different tonality, that we read here, especially if we compare these pages with his notes written at the time of the council. Ratzinger, Die erste Sitzungsperiode, pp. 43–4.

18

Theology at the Crossroads

He immediately answered the question as follows: precisely because the council chose the second option, it was more than a continuation of Vatican I (1869–70), which together with the Council of Trent (1545–63), had the intention of closing itself off and securing itself. Instead, the church accepted a new challenge. In short, we can add here to this today: to the extent that the council itself established tradition, tradition development occurs now dialogically – in dialogue with the sources, the separated brethren and today’s world. Secondly, to the extent that the council itself established tradition, tradition development and tradition hermeneutics require the ability to deal with continuity and discontinuity. Dialogically, at least, the layout of the new constitution occurred after the rejection of the preparatory schema. Even though a two-thirds majority (only 62 per cent) was lacking for its rejection, Pope John XXIII decided to withdraw the schema anyway and to establish a joint theological commission, with people from the preparatory committee and with others, to consult and prepare a new proposal.9

A historical-dynamic, Christological–pneumatological and soteriological concept of revelation – Overcoming the controversies of old In the history of the making of Dei Verbum, it is striking that important points of discussion were settled within the writing process, which had occupied the Roman Catholic theological agenda regarding revelation, scripture and tradition since the controversies with Protestantism and the difficult engagement with modernity in the modernist crisis. In this sense, Vatican II is not simply an establishment of Trent and Vatican I, but their re-reading. This is demonstrated once again by Joseph Ratzinger, now in his commentary in the first chapters of Dei Verbum in Lexikon für Theologie und Kirche.10 It is a rereading, he writes, 9

10

For more information regarding the redaction process of Dei Verbum, see R. Burigana, La bibbia nel concilio. La redazione della costituizione ‘Dei Verbum’ del Vaticano II (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1998), pp. 110–14; G. Alberigo and J. A. Komonchak (ed.), History of Vatican II, part 2, Leuven: Peeters, 1997, pp. 69–93, 233–66; and Helmut Hopings contribution on Dei Verbum in P. Hünermann and J. Hilberath (ed.), Herders Theologischer Kommentar zum Zweiten Vatikanischen Konzil, part 3, (Freiburg: Herder, 2005), pp. 695–831, 716–35. See, J. Ratzinger, Dogmatische Konstitution über die göttliche Offenbarung, in Das Zweite Vatikanische Konzil. Dokumente und Kommentare (Lexikon für Theologie und Kirche), vol. 2 (Freiburg: Herder, 21967), pp. 498–583, 498–503 and 571–81.

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in which the old is read in a contemporary way, and thereby also is interpreted anew with regard to what is essential to it, as well as what is insufficient in it’.11

The key to this critical hermeneutic is the personalist, historically dynamic and Christologically anchored understanding of revelation from which the constitution proceeds. Revelation does not primarily concern content (revelata) but the event itself of God’s self-revelation in Christ and the Spirit.12 Revelation is primarily about the encounter between God and humanity in history, which becomes salvation history, and culminates in the Incarnation of the Word in Jesus Christ. It is the transmission then of this revelation by the apostles and their successors which constitutes the basis for the revelatory nature of scripture and tradition. Therefore, one cannot overstress the importance of the first chapter’s insertion in the draft of Dei Verbum on the concept of revelation itself, which appears before a consideration of scripture and tradition. In this way, not simply the controversies about the ‘closure of revelation with the death of the last apostle’ and the so-called ‘two sources of revelation (scripture and tradition) were transcended, but, at the same time, the same happened with the reduction of revelation to the theoretical instruction of objectifiable contents,13 with its ecclesiocentric restriction and with the separation of the natural and supernatural in human knowledge of God. Revelation involves one comprehensive event that transcends and holds the distinctions together. Thus, the constitution no longer holds that there are two sources of revelation  – scripture and tradition – but that there is only one source: God’s revelation in history, to which scripture and tradition bear witness. As a consequence, scripture actually belongs to tradition – to the church’s handing-on of the message of revelation. At the same time, tradition should be understood as the proclamation, explanation and diffusion of the Word of God,

11 12

13

Ratzinger, Dogmatische Konstitution, p. 505. See also p. 521. The influence of Karl Rahner here is obvious; see in this regard K. Rahner, Bemerkungen zum Begriff der Offenbarung, in K. Rahner and J. Ratzinger, Offenbarung und Überlieferung (QD, 25) (Freiburg: Herder, 1965), pp. 11–24. H. Hoping, Dei Verbum. C. Würdigung der Konstitution, p. 807. For an explanation of the concept of a ‘theoretical instructive understanding of revelation’, see M. Seckler, Der Begriff der Offenbarung, in W. Kern, H. J. Pottmeyer and M. Seckler, Handbuch der Fundamentaltheologie, vol 2: Traktat Offenbarung (Tübingen/Basel: Francke, 1985), pp. 64–6: in such an understanding revelation is limited to its doctrinal content concerning salvation; it is the instructing of veritates revelatae, the handing over of divine truths.

20

Theology at the Crossroads

as it has been written down under the inspiration of the Spirit in scripture and entrusted by Christ and the Spirit to the apostles and their successors (DV 9). Scripture, especially the New Testament, is the fruit of the early church’s life, through its preaching of the Gospel, celebration of the liturgy and community life. At the same time, the church is the first interpreter of scripture, which is affirmed as the normative basis for Christian faith.14 This last point remains important today: the crucial distinction between the historical event of revelation, on the one hand, and the manner in which witness is born to this event in scripture and tradition, on the other, from now on constitutes a fundamental hermeneutical principle for every theological and ecclesial dealing with signs, texts and doctrines.

Tradition as the learning process of the whole church Such a historical-dynamic concept of revelation indeed bears important consequences for an understanding of what tradition is: the handing down of the Christ-mediated and -fulfilled revelation, under the guidance of the Holy Spirit. From now on, tradition is also a historically dynamic and pneumatologically anchored concept – and no longer a case of the delivery of truth contents, resting solely in the hands of the magisterium. In Ratzinger’s commentary, we also read that the dynamics of this new understanding of tradition goes along with a recognition of (a) the tension between ‘what is expressed’ and ‘what remains unexpressed’ in revelation, (b) the inclusive, all-encompassing character of tradition (the church’s teaching, life and worship) and (c) the development of tradition, not only through its proclamation by the magisterium, but also in believers’ contemplation and the study and the insight gained through spiritual experience (DV 8). Time and again, according to Ratzinger, it is clear that tradition and its development are a matter of the whole church and not merely of the church’s hierarchy.15 In regard to DV 10, Ratzinger does not fail to emphasize this again: tradition concerns the whole people of the faith; the council recognizes here the ‘truly religious and spiritual role of the laity’.16 He further indicates the magisterium’s express 14 15 16

Cf. Hoping, Dei Verbum. C. Würdigung der Konstitution, p. 814. Ratzinger, Dogmatische Konstitution, p. 520. Cf. Ratzinger, Dogmatische Konstitution, p. 527.

Foundation

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subordination to the Word of God, and the servant character belonging to the magisterium (its first service is – together with the entire church – ‘listening’ to the Word). The magisterium itself is always the listening hearer, in regard to the sources, which repeatedly needs new inquiries and reflections, in order to be able to so truly declare and protect these: to protect not in the sense of screening off (something which historically the magisterium’s actions have too often tended to do), but in the sense of faithfulness – a faith that repels foreign domination, and which defends equally the rule of the Word of God against modernism and traditionalism.

And more: In the end, the whole Church is listening, and, on the other, the whole Church is sharing in the perseverance of orthodox teaching.17

Thus, tradition is a living reality that encompasses both the learning process and the learning outcome of the whole Church, fuelled by its listening to, living by and celebration of the Word of God. Tradition is not a static whole of doctrines, rules and cult, but develops over time, in relation to the historical conditions in which the church transmits the Gospel. Moreover, tradition is not simply a matter of the magisterium, but involves the entire church. As will become clear in what follows, it has become obvious, especially today, that these insights remain merely pious words if they are not also institutionally translated into the way in which the church organizes its coming to truth.

Stepping stones towards a more hermeneutical view of scripture and tradition, theology and magisterium For a number of reasons, the chapters in Dei Verbum dealing with scripture and its interpretation (Ch. 3), the Old and New Testament (Ch. 4) and the place of scripture in the life of the church (Ch. 5) are particularly interesting. Here, I will mention only five reasons.

17

Ibid., p. 527 and 528.

22

Theology at the Crossroads

(a) First, these chapters confirm and articulate the new conciliar perspective on the historical–dynamical and Christological–pneumatological nature of revelation, as well as its dialogical impetus. This implies, among others things, that the historical contextuality and even ambiguity (DV 15, as regards the Old Testament) of texts are recognized and, thus, the development of scripture and tradition through time. (b) At the same time, the text of DV 11 and the following paragraphs show in practice what it means for tradition development to be a historical-dynamic reality. From the point of view of practice, Dei Verbum realizes what it claims: historical–critical research and other scientific approaches can assist us to better understand the process and content of tradition and to comprehend how revelation is ‘inscribed’ in concrete histories and texts.18 The text itself incorporates a number of insights which were gained from exegetical research in its time: for example, in dealing with the evangelists as authors (e.g. DV 19) and the importance of literary genres. The constitution also legitimizes these insights theologically, for the words of God, expressed in human language, have been made like human discourse, just as the word of the eternal Father, when He took to Himself the flesh of human weakness, was in every way made like men. (DV 13)

As a consequence, the text distinguishes between the historical–critical study of scripture (as a necessary first step) and the ecclesial interpretation thereof, in relation to the whole of scripture, to the living tradition of the whole church and to the faith of the faithful, for which historical critique prepares (cf. DV 12 & 23). (c) Then, there is the important place which scripture has in the liturgy and the critical function which both scripture and liturgy exercise regarding theology and magisterium. All the preaching of the Church must be nourished and regulated by Sacred Scripture. (DV 21) 18

In this regard, Ratzinger mentioned in his conciliar notes at the time of the third session (1964) that the council fathers progressively became more aware of the historical dimension of Christian faith and the development of tradition over time, and in this regard came to appreciate the importance of historical–critical methods for theology. The new texts, therefore, should make it possible to account for the faith in a world and atmosphere of thought marked by the modern sciences, and will again offer theology the necessary space to play its part in this modern context. Cf. J. Ratzinger, Ergebnisse und Probleme der dritten Konzilsperiode (Cologne: Bachem, 1965), pp. 35–8.

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Of course, these insights are correlated to the biblical, liturgical and theological movements which helped pave the path of conciliar renewal. However, there is more to say: as privileged witness to the Word of God, and in light of tradition as the integral whole of teaching, life and worship, scripture and its study introduce a significant and critical ‘difference’ within the development and hermeneutics of tradition. This ‘difference’ is an important hermeneutical principle as well. (d) Fourthly – and this Ratzinger in particular emphasizes in his commentary on the last chapter of Dei Verbum – there is the resolutely theologically renewing character of this conciliar text, whose consequences at that time are not yet fully clear.19 For example, Ratzinger remarks at least twice that in Dei Verbum the limits set by the encyclical Humani generis (1950)20 on the roles of exegesis and theology – that they were merely to support what the magisterium proclaims – are overcome and corrected.21 In another writing in 1965, he argues that exegesis – complementary to the custodial function of the magisterium – holds a proper custodial function, which in a way makes explicit the autonomy of scripture vis-à-vis the magisterium. What can be unambiguously known from scripture through scientific research or through simple reading of scripture, has the function of a real criterion, which is to be respected in magisterial utterances.22

(e) Finally, as we already noted, the text emphasizes the magisterium’s important and constitutive role in the church on the basis of apostolic authority and succession.23 But at the same time, however, this is resolutely embedded in the learning process of the whole people of God, when they listen to God’s Word and faithfully persevere in the teaching of the Apostles, in the common life, in the breaking of the bread and in prayers. (DV 10, in reference to Acts 2, 42)

19 20

21 22 23

Ratzinger, Dogmatische Konstitution, p. 577. Encyclical ‘concerning some false opinions threatening to undermine the foundations of Catholic doctrine’, promulgated by Pope Pius XII on 12 August 1950 – see http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/ pius_xii/encyclicals/. Cf. Ratzinger, Dogmatische Konstitution, p. 577 and also earlier on p. 527. J. Ratzinger, Ein Versuch zur Frage des Traditionsbegriff, p. 48. As is further developed in the Dogmatic Constitution on the Church Lumen Gentium.

24

Theology at the Crossroads

This relativizes the old distinction between ecclesia docens (teaching Church) and ecclesia discens (learning Church) and makes room for the whole Church’s search for truth and in particular for the laity. Time and again, the historical and dialogical character of revelation, scripture, tradition, theology and the magisterium come to the fore, including the intuition that this dialogue has an impact on the what and how of scripture, tradition, theology and magisterium. In addition, Dei Verbum is itself the product of such a dialogical process in which both the church’s life (e.g. the movements of renewal) and the then contemporary exegetical and theological insights were taken into account, thus bearing the historical traces of these. From the perspective of a more contemporary hermeneutics (in line with Paul Ricoeur), for example, the text’s essentialist approach becomes obvious, while we now would place more emphasis on the radicality of the hermeneutical circle. We have become aware not only of the historicity of the past, but also of the historical contextuality of our own contemporary interpretations of it. Above all, it becomes clear that, once one accepts the historical and dialogical character of ecclesial teaching, the dialogue will never end. Indeed, history continues and contexts change. For Dei Verbum, dialogue is a continuous task for the pilgrim people of God, on its way towards an eschatological fulfilment.

Too little room for tradition critique and world critique? As a transition to some observations on the reception of Dei Verbum and some final considerations, I close this discussion of Dei Verbum with two remarkable critical observations from the young Joseph Ratzinger, which from the perspective of the post-conciliar period appear to be not unimportant. Sometimes Ratzinger deplores the fact that in the constitution there is little or no role for tradition critique in the development of tradition.24 In his opinion, the compromise text at hand in DV 8 does not suffice at this point, and this paragraph is a missed chance to integrate ‘the positive possibility and necessity of intra-ecclesial tradition criticism’. Ratzinger identified the eschatological framework in which tradition is placed (DV 7) as the only 24

Cf. Ratzinger, Dogmatische Konstitution, p. 514 (regarding DV 5) and more explicit on p. 517 (DV 7) and pp. 519–20 (DV 8).

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place where a tradition critical voice sounds and a kind of negative theology is developed – seeing God face to face is reserved for the eschaton – now we see ‘as in a mirror’. Another criticism resounding in Ratzinger’s considerations is his view that the council has a too exclusively optimistic tone on revelation, history and salvation. On DV 3, he comments: Here, however, one cannot resist the question of whether the council, in its description of revelation and salvation history, has not given an exclusively over-optimistic perspective, that closes its eyes to the fact that divine salvation is essentially involved with the justification of the sinner, that grace itself occurs throughout the judgment of the cross, and so also always has a character of judgment.

And he concludes this observation with this sentence: The pastoral optimism for an imagined time of understanding and reconciliation seems to have obscured the view here of an not insubstantial part of the biblical testimony.25

Most probably, one can find a trace here of the serious discussions, in 1965, about the Pastoral Constitution on the church in the Modern World, Gaudium et Spes, where Ratzinger expressed his critical reservations against there being too large an opening of the church to the world.26 This reservation – that Vatican II, or at least its reception, in one way or another expounded a too open and optimistic attitude towards the world – has become more explicit and important in Ratzinger’s ongoing observations of the post-conciliar church and his own reception of Vatican II.27 The following statement, dating from 1973, is telling in this regard: The tragic one-sidedness of the final conciliar debates consisted in the fact that they were dominated by the trauma of backwardness and a pathos to catch up with modernity, a pathos which remained blind to the inherent ambiguity of today’s world. … Now, in the post-conciliar Church, we are 25 26

27

Ratzinger, Dogmatische Konstitution, p. 509 (emphasis in the original). See, for example, J. Ratzinger, Angesichts der Welt von heute. Überlegungen zur Konfrontation mit der Kirche im Schema XIII, in Wort und Wahrheit 20 (1965): 493–504 (enlarged and revised in Dogma und Verkündigung (München: Wewel, 1973), 183–204). For a more detailed description of his evaluation of Vatican II and its reception, see my Europe in Crisis, p. 205–9.

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Theology at the Crossroads

forced to endure problems that are arising on account of that which did not find expression in the conciliar debates.28

This evaluation made him conclude in 1982, almost twenty years after the council, that it is not certain whether Vatican II will prove itself to have been a very significant council, because, from the perspective of church history, not all valid councils have been fruitful councils.29

A fruitful reception of Dei Verbum and the council’s teaching on revelation, scripture and tradition? With this last observation, we have already started the history of the reception of Dei Verbum and the Second Vatican Council, including Ratzinger’s role therein. Indeed, both as a theologian and in his functions as prefect of the Congregation for the Doctrine of Faith and as pope, Joseph Ratzinger has had an important voice in the reception of Dei Verbum and within the context of the broader discussion of the reception of Vatican II. Also, although the formal reception of the constitution appears to be rather limited, various developments should be considered as a part of this reception (or non-reception).30 I quickly mention the following elements: (a) Along with the documents issued by the Pontifical Biblical Commission (which Cardinal Ratzinger chaired as prefect of the Congregation for the Doctrine of Faith), there is a discussion about biblical exegesis and the place of historical–critical methods therein in relation to an ecclesial, canonical exegesis, in which Ratzinger himself deeply engaged. Although it also appears that he renders necessary lip service to the importance of historical–critical exegesis, he continually emphasizes its limitations, in contrast with an ecclesial, ‘canonical’ exegesis.31 Also, the post-synodal exhortation Verbum domini (2010), which in VD 34 explicitly aims to reread the text of DV 12, 28 29

30 31

Ratzinger, Angesichts der Welt von heute, in Dogma und Verkündigung, pp. 199–200. Cf. J. Ratzinger, Bilanz der Nachkonzilszeit – Misserfolge, Aufgaben, Hoffnungen, in J. Ratzinger, Theologische Prinzipienlehre. Bausteine zur Fundamentaltheologie (Munich: Wewel, 1982), pp. 383–95, p. 395. This is at least the evaluation of H. Hoping (Dei Verbum. C. Würdigung der Konstitution, p. 815). Cf., for example, J. Ratzinger, Schriftauslegung im Widerstreit. Zur Frage nach Grundlagen und Weg der Exegese heute, in J. Ratzinger (ed.), Schriftauslegung im Widerstreit (QD 117) (Freiburg: Herder, 1989), pp. 15–44. See also, in this regard, his three recent Christological books: J. Ratzinger/Benedikt XVI, Jesus von Nazareth (Freiburg/Basel/Vienna: Herder, vol. 1, 2007); vol. 2, 2011; vol. 3, 2012, and especially the preface of the first volume (pp. 10–23).

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plainly weakens the more historical-critical and biblical-theological dimension. ... This shift occurs to the benefit of the more dogmatic dimensions of the interpretation of the biblical text.32

It is evident that Dei Verbum explicitly makes the connection between both approaches to the Bible, but the constitution stresses rather their mutual interdependency. Therefore, it allows for a much more critical-dynamic interaction between the two, one in which the so-called canonical exegesis not only further develops and complements the results of the historical–critical study of the bible, but can be challenged by it as well. It is precisely in view of the church arriving at a more mature judgement that exegetes are asked to engage in their study (DV 12), and the insights of exegesis may legitimately challenge canonical interpretations that often have been informed by other exegetical, theological and contextual insights.33 In this regard, we should not only engage in a critique of the historical–critical method,34 but also foster an appropriate hermeneutical–critical openness in our theological and ‘canonical’ interpretations. No doubt, more contemporary hermeneutical insights35 can help us come to a more balanced and productive interaction between both (and other) approaches, and to become more aware of the broader hermeneutical horizons within which such an interaction may be understood. (b) Secondly, mention should be made of the discussion concerning theology’s role in church life. This discussion that went public with the Cologne Declaration of 6 January 1989, entitled ‘Wider die Entmündigung – Für eine offene Katholizität’ (‘Against the Silencing – for an Open Catholicity’), initially 32

33

34 35

R. Bieringer, Openbaring als dialoog. Over de receptie van Dei Verbum 12 in Verbum Domini, second part of L. Boeve and R. Bieringer, Openbaring, Schrift en traditie: God en mens in dialoog, in M. Lamberigts and L. Kenis (eds), Vaticanum II: geschiedenis of interpretatie? Theologische opstellen over het Tweede Vaticaans Concilie (Antwerp: Halewijn, 2013), pp. 31–63, 42–63, 56. This point is well illustrated by a comparison of the way in which the results of exegetical research are received in the Christology of J. Ratzinger (see footnote 37) and of Edward Schillebeeckx (E. Schillebeeckx, Jezus het verhaal van een levende (Bloemendaal: Nelissen, 1974); E.T.: Jesus: An Experiment in Christology (New York: Seabury Press/London, Collins, 1979); Gerechtigheid en liefde. Genade en bevrijding (Baarn: Nelissen, 1977); E.T.: Christ: The Christian Experience in the Modern World (London: SCM, 1980) – see also his: Tussentijds verhaal over twee Jezusboeken (Bloemdaal: Nelissen, 1978); E.T.: Interim Report on the Books Jesus and Christ (London: SCM/New York: Crossroad, 1980). The Congregation for the Doctrine of Faith carried out an investigation of the Christology of Schillebeeckx from 1976 to 1980 – thus under Ratzinger’s predecessor – without however condemning it. For Schillebeeckx’s recollections about this, see his Theologisch testament. Notarieel nog niet verleden (Baarn: Nelissen, 1994), pp. 60–3. Cf. Ratzinger, Schriftauslegung im Widerstreit, pp. 22–34. Cf, for example, P. Ricœur, L’herméneutique biblique. Traduction et présentation par F.-X. Amherdt (Paris: Les Éditions du Cerf, 2001); F.-X. Amherdt, L’herméneutique philosophique de Paul Ricoeur et son importance pour l’exégèse biblique: en débat avec le New Yale Theology School (Paris: Les Éditions du Cerf, 2004).

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Theology at the Crossroads

signed by 200, chiefly German-speaking, theologians.36 This led to attempts by the magisterium to define more explicitly and specifically theology’s place and task in the church through an instruction by the CDF ‘on the ecclesial vocation of the theologian’ (1990),37 as well as taking individual and collective measures to ensure theology’s subordination to the magisterium.38 Earlier, in 1985, Ratzinger claimed that, all too often, under the disguise of doing academic theology, theologians present opinions which diverge from what the magisterium teaches – a magisterium they then no longer consider as spokesperson of the church’s faith, but as an exponent of an archaic, Roman theology.39 Another of the then cardinal’s favourite arguments to restrict theology was that the magisterium should protect ordinary believers from confusion brought about by theologians.40 In a way similar to what I observed regarding exegesis, it would appear that to solve this problem the interaction between theology and the magisterium is conceived once again first and foremost as unidirectional: theology’s service to the church and its magisterium is understood once again primarily as preparing and explaining what the magisterium teaches. There seems to be little room left for a dynamic (because mutually critical-constructive) relation between theologians and the church’s magisterium, one where each respects the other’s role in view of reaching a growing understanding, by the entire people of God, of God’s revelation and tradition (DV 8). The least one can say is that the place for the legitimate criticism of tradition that Ratzinger called for has not been granted to theology. (c) In relation to these developments, some commentators have asked if today we are not once again dealing with an ‘instruction-theoretical’ reduction of the understanding of revelation. They perceive once again a focus on true 36

37

38

39 40

The German text of the Cologne Declaration may be found at http://www.we-are-Church.org/de/ files/90_k%F6lnerkl.pdf. Cf. ‘Instruction on the ecclesial vocation of the theologian’: Donum veritatis of 24 May 1990 (cf. http:// www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/cfaith/documents/rc_con_cfaith_doc_19900524_ theologian-vocation_en.html) We return in Chapter 3 to the fact that suspicion, admonition and the condemnation of theologians bring the process of theological judgement to a premature standstill and harm both theology and the church. Cf. J. Ratzinger and V. Messori, The Ratzinger Report (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1985), p. 26. The topic of theology’s task often appears in Ratzinger’s theological work. Cf., e.g., J. Ratzinger, Kirche und wissenschaftliche Theologie, in W. Sandfuchs (ed.), Die Kirche (Würzburg: Echter, 1978), pp. 83–95; Theologie und Kirchenpolitik, in Internationale Katholische Zeitschrift/Communio 9 (1980): 425–34; Theologie und Kirche, in Internationale Katholische Zeitschrift/Communio 16 (1986): 515–33; Wesen und Auftrag der Theologie (Einsiedeln: Johannes Verlag, 1993).

Foundation

29

contents and positions (revelata), rather than on the dialogical-dynamic event of God’s revelation in history.41 Once more there is the unilateral accentuation of the magisterium,42 and as a consequence, a reductive characterization of faith in terms of obedience to revealed truths, rather than in terms of a trustful response to the self-revelation of God in history. One example of this is the discussion about the role of the Catechism of the Catholic Church in education, instruction and initiation43 (1992), the Compendium (2005) derived from it and the youth catechism Youcat (2011): are they resources or do they offer measurement? In addition, when examining more closely various encyclicals, instructions, etc., one could also draw attention to the magisterium’s often apparent inability (or unwillingness?), in its consideration of ‘faith and morals’, to take into account the contribution of contemporary philosophical insights and the results of the human and natural sciences.44 Because of this, the historical-dynamic character of tradition development is in danger of being forgotten once more. (d) We should also mention the limited impact of the doctrine of the collegiality of bishops articulated in Lumen Gentium in matters regarding the ecclesial magisterium. Consequently, Ratzinger has consistently refused to acknowledge any decisive authority of the synods of bishops,45 or any magisterial office for episcopal conferences.46 Also in the discussion on the relation between the local and the universal church (the so-called Ratzinger–Kasper debate47), Ratzinger claimed the uncurtailed asymmetrical precedence of the universal over the local church, which has, of course, important consequences for the process of finding truth in which the whole church plays a part. On this point, I remember once again my comment that 41 42

43 44 45

46

47

Cf., e.g., Hoping, Dei Verbum. C. Würdigung der Konstitution, p. 809 (with further references). Interesting in this regard is the discussion – seemingly with quite some incomprehension – between Ladislas Örsy and Joseph Ratzinger regarding ‘definitive teaching’, with reference to Ad tuendam fidem, originally in Stimmen der Zeit, reprinted in English in L. Örsy, Receiving the Council. Theological and Canonical Insights and Debates (Collegeville: Liturgical Press, 2009), pp. 115–42. This catechism was drawn up by a preparatory commission, which J. Ratzinger chaired. We discuss an example of this in Chapter 6. Cf. J. Ratzinger, Scopi e metodi del Sinodo dei vescovi, in J. Tomko (ed.), Il Sinodo dei vescovi. Natura - metodi - prospettiva, Vatican City, Libreria ed. Vaticana, 1985, pp. 45–58. In the years after the council, episcopal conferences were quite active in this regard: we can refer, for example, to the Latin American episcopal conference (CELAM) with its groundbreaking meetings in Medellin (1968) and Puebla (1979). See, for example, K. McDonnell, The Ratzinger/Kasper Debate: The Universal Church and the Local Churches, in Theological Studies 63 (2002): 227–50; M. Kehl, Zum jüngsten Disput um das Verhältnis von Universalkirche und Ortskirchen, in P. Walter, K. Krämer and G. Augustin (eds), Kirche in ökumenischer Perspektive. FS Kardinal Kasper (Freiburg: Herder, 2003), pp. 81–101.

30

Theology at the Crossroads

the historical-dynamic process of tradition development, in which the whole church plays a part by listening to the Word of God, remains ineffective when it is not translated institutionally in the manner in which the church organizes its coming to truth. Time and again, it appears that the dialogical principle honoured in Dei Verbum is restricted, and that the potentially renewing – or interrupting  – impact of such dialogue is restrained, to prevent the risk of a too far-reaching adaptation or renewal. The tension which an open dialogue entails is prematurely abandoned, whereby the church threatens to withdraw into its own certainties. Of course, this does not concern Dei Verbum only, but pertains to the reception of Vatican II as a whole. The opening of the church to the contemporary context, which takes shape through the combined pursuit after aggiornamento and ressourcement, has apparently become the problem itself. Not only does the modern world no longer appear to be a suitable dialogue partner, but the principle of dialogue itself no longer seems appropriate.

Concluding observations: Cherishing the dialogical principle For Ratzinger, the problem of Vatican II’s reception is that the church opened itself up too wide to the modern world, and thus has adapted itself too much to a radicalized modernity, putting the essence of Christian faith in danger. In his view, this process has already begun in the last discussions held at the council, particularly those on the pastoral constitution concerning the church’s role in the world – Gaudium et Spes. His evaluation of the modern world has only become more negative since then. In The Ratzinger Report of 1985, for example, he claims that the internal contradictions within modernity make impossible the continuation of dialogue with the modern world. It is time, he adds, to end the period of ‘openness without discernment’ and to choose for the non-conformism of a minority which does not share in the spirit of the world.48 In 2004, even before his election as pope, he speaks of a radical clash between two cultures: a culture based on the Christian faith and a culture

48

Ratzinger and Messori, The Ratzinger Report, Chapter 2.

Foundation

31

coming from a radical Enlightenment thinking, resulting in individualism, intolerance and relativism.49 In what was said above, we have seen that giving up on dialogue with the contemporary world has also been accompanied by restraint on dialogue within the church. Moreover, the principle of dialogue itself as the motor of revelation, scripture and tradition – in short, of the learning process of and in the church – seems to be relativized. But a critical look at one’s contemporary age does not necessarily lead to the suspension of dialogue, but invites one to reflect on its nature.50 In a mutually critical and enriching dialogue, continuity and discontinuity, harmony and conflict, identity and otherness are held together in a dynamic relationship.51 My argument for this is theological in nature, starting from the dialogical structure of revelation and tradition. In this regard, we would do well to take into account Joseph Ratzinger’s claim that we, as concerns the reception of the council, should not read Vatican  II as a more progressive movement resulting in the pastoral constitution Gaudium et Spes (and the documents on religious freedom, ecumenism and relationship to other religions). This movement then would have to be pursued after the council, and the previously written dogmatic constitutions should be read in this light. It is precisely the opposite, Ratzinger argues: the pastoral documents from the council should be read from the perspective of the dogmatic constitutions on the church (Lumen Gentium) and revelation (Dei Verbum).52 However, I would add, even if this is true then we learn in Dei Verbum about the dialogical and historical-dynamic concept which is laid open in this document. Moreover, we read about how in the making of Dei Verbum this was precisely – and explicitly – done in dialogue with the state-of-the art historical–critical and theological research 49

50

51

52

J. Ratzinger, Werte in Zeiten des Umbruchs: die Herausforderungen der Zukunft bestehen, Freiburg, Herder, 2005 – he is even more explicit in: ‘Europe in the Crisis of Cultures’, in Communio: International Catholic Review 32 (2005): 345–56. This is, in short, the project I wrote in God Interrupts History. Theology in a Time of Upheaval (New York: Continuum), 2007. This research has led to the development of the above-described vision on tradition development as recontextualization, where continuity and discontinuity do not have to be played out against each other, but are (or can be) constitutive for a historic-dynamic understanding of tradition as the history of the revelation of Godself in concrete human history. Cf. Ratzinger, Theologische Prinzipienlehre, p. 396: ‘Is one obliged to read the dogmatic as criterion for the pastoral, or does the turn to the pastoral imply that the dogmatic should go in a new direction?’

32

Theology at the Crossroads

of the day, so that Dei Verbum itself can legitimately be said to be the result of such a dialogue. Recourse to the dogmatic constitutions, therefore, can hardly justify a suspension of dialogue, since this dialogue concerns the heart of Christian faith itself.53 Of course, such a dialogue occurs within the present state of theological– hermeneutical research, against the background of the current context and fuelled by the dialogue with the current (scientific) world. In the next chapter, we take a closer look at the sociocultural and philosophical context in which theology is practised today.

53

In other words: the discussion concerning the reception of Vatican II does not revolve around the simple opposition between the spirit and letter of the council – another of Ratzinger’s favourite expressions, with which he hints at the confrontation between a progressive and conservative reading of Vatican II. He dispatches the classic argument – that the council’s very spirit must extend its letter to us – as false. Only the reading of the text can allow us to trace the council’s true spirit. Nevertheless, we can add here that – precisely on the basis of the text of Dei Verbum – the dynamics of spirit and letter remain constitutive for every legitimate understanding of the council. This is because Vatican II, for the Roman Catholic Church, is also a constitutive part of the tradition as the witness of the revelation of God in history – the history of listening and learning by God’s people on its way to eschatological fulfilment. And thus our reading and rereading requires the same hermeneutical principles which Dei Verbum itself presents and requires.

2

Horizon: The Challenge of Plurality and Difference

When revelation is primarily understood as God’s dialogue with people in concrete histories and contexts; when scripture and tradition are primarily understood as the witness of this meeting inscribed in texts and practices, equally marked by time and context; therefore, when tracing God’s Word for today contains an ongoing process of experience and interpretation, and drives at a continuing recontextualization; thus when God’s commitment to people leads not away from history and its hermeneutic but directly thereto; in short: when we only can participate in God’s dialogue with us, by actively engaging the dialogue ourselves with text and context, community and society, then it is extremely important to get to know the current context. In this chapter, I will first address the sociocultural context and the changes  – certainly on the religious level – which have occurred. Along with the processes of secularization (which I explain in terms of detraditionalization and individualization), it is in particular pluralization that shifts the place of Christian faith in the contemporary religious field. Afterwards, I will explain the effect this has on identity formation in general and for developing a Christian identity in particular. Shaping one’s identity has become structurally more reflexive. Moreover, a theological reflection on being a Christian today does not escape this either. In the third paragraph of this chapter, I will briefly consider the so-called postmodern philosophy which challenges theologians to think from difference.

New times, new people In the spring of 2011, a report on Belgium entitled Nieuwe tijden, nieuwe mensen (New Times, New People) appeared as part of the fourth wave of

34

Theology at the Crossroads

the European Values Study, which was carried out two years earlier (EVS 2009).1 As with the titles of the previous three reports, the title of this fourth report gives a good indication of where Belgium is with regard to religious matters and perceived values. In a relatively short period of time, Belgium has secularized and evolved from a culture and society with a nearly total Catholic horizon of meaning to a situation where this horizon determines, to a much smaller and lesser degree, the identity construction of individuals and groups. In 1984 researchers published the Belgian results from the first European Values Study (EVS 1981) with the title De stille ommekeer (The Quiet Turn).2 They indicated in their report that secularization had gradually started to emerge and that the overlap between the Catholic horizon of meaning and Belgian society was becoming progressively smaller. In 1992 this same group of researchers published their results (EVS 1990) in De versnelde ommekeer (The Accelerated Turn). They chose this title on the basis of finding that this development was intensifying much faster than anticipated.3 The title of the third book, Verloren zekerheid (Lost Certainty), based on research from 1999 and published in 2000, indicated that this accelerated erosion of the overlap between Christianity and culture was practically complete. Classic patterns of identity and values formation no longer self-evidently continue, resulting in uncertainty. Forming one’s own identity has become an assignment.4 Finally, the title of the fourth report, Nieuwe tijden, nieuwe mensen (New Times, New People), indicates that Belgians today have adapted to this new situation. A situation in 2000 that was perceived as a loss is now considered today as offering new opportunities. In what follows, we present from the latest report some research findings, which relate particularly to religious matters and identity construction.5

1

2

3

4

5

See K. Abts, K. Dobbelaere and L Voyé (eds), Nieuwe tijden, nieuwe mensen. Belgen over arbeid, gezin, ethiek, religie en politiek (Tielt: Lannoo, 2011). For more information about the ‘European Values Study,’ see http://www.europeanvaluesstudy.eu/. See J. Kerkhofs and R. Rezsohazy (eds), De stille ommekeer: oude en nieuwe waarden in het België van de jaren tachtig (Tielt: Lannoo, 1984). See J. Kerkhofs, K. Dobbelaere and L. Voyé (eds), De versnelde ommekeer: de waarden van Vlamingen, Walen en Brusselaars in de jaren negentig (Tielt: Lannoo, 1992). See K. Dobbelaere and M. Elchardus e.a. (eds), Verloren zekerheid. De Belgen en hun waarden, overtuigingen en houdingen (Tielt: Lannoo, 2000). For these findings, see K. Dobbelaere, J. Billiet and L. Voyé, Religie en kerkbetrokkenheid: naar een sociaal gemarginaliseerde kerk?, in Abts e.a. (eds), Nieuwe tijden, nieuwe mensen, pp. 143–72.

Horizon: Plurality and Difference

35

Religious Self-Definition and Church Involvement When asked to describe themselves in terms of religious affiliation, 50 per cent of Belgians indicate they are Catholics (1981: 72 per cent), 2.5 per cent belong to other Christian denominations, 0.4 per cent to Judaism, 5 per cent to Islam and 0.3  per  cent to Buddhism. 9.2  per  cent describe themselves as atheists, 32.6 per cent consider themselves as not belonging to a religious denomination.6

Approximate number of people who belong to Churches and religious communities in Belgium Define themselves or are considered as belonging to the Catholic Church

Percentage of the Belgian population 50

other Christian denominations

2.5

Judaism

0.4

Islam

5

Buddhism

0.3

Atheists Others not belonging to a religious denomination

9.2 32.6

In comparison with previous EVS reports, religious pluralization is noticeable for the first time, although the report still suggests that one only speaks with difficulty about a religious plurality. Not only are a number of religions distinguished but apparently one out of three people indicate they do not belong to a religious denomination, while the number of atheists is not rising spectacularly in comparison with the EVS 1999.7 Secularization can no longer simply be understood as a movement from a believing or religious stance to an unbelieving or non-religious one. 6 7

For the data in the following table, see Dobbelaere e.a., Religie en kerkbetrokkenheid, p. 145, table 1. Cf. K. Dobbelaere and L. Voyé, Religie en kerkbetrokkenheid: ambivalentie en vervreemding, in Dobbelaere e.a. (red.), Verloren zekerheid, p. 119: although the categorization is not completely comparable, in 1999 1.1 per cent of the population defined themselves as a member of an atheist organization, 7.4 per cent as atheist and 8.8 per cent as unbelievers; one could also choose the option ‘I am indifferent to the faith’ (5.9 per cent). At the same time, the researchers observed that onefourth of the atheists who do not belong to an atheist organization define themselves as members of the Catholic Church; this also holds true for more than one-tenth of the unbelievers.

36

Theology at the Crossroads

Regarding church practice, the report indicates that whereas 49  per  cent of the population attended church weekly in 1967, by 1998 this had fallen to 11 per cent. In the 2009 EVS survey, this number sank further to 8.7 per cent. Many Belgians continue to consider the classic rituals surrounding birth, marriage and death to be important, although the numbers fall for rituals surrounding birth and marriage more so than those at death (EVS 1999: 70 per cent, 68 per cent and 74 per cent, respectively; EVS 2009: 65 per cent, 61 per cent and 71 per cent, respectively). In particular, however, Church involvement (i.e. a person’s concrete participation in a faith community) has strongly declined, as has – as will later appear – the church’s credibility as an organization in the public eye. The researchers define church involvement as follows: Core Catholics go to Church at least monthly and are members of religious or Church organisations where some do volunteer work. Average Catholics also go to Church at least monthly, without any further participation. Non-practicing Catholics identify themselves as Catholic but only occasionally or never attend Church.8

From the EVS 2009, it appears that only 4 per cent may be considered core Catholics, 11 per cent as average Catholics and 39 per cent as non-practising Catholics. In 1999, this was still respectively 9  per  cent, 16  per  cent and 36 per cent. Today 23 per cent identify themselves being in the first generation of unchurched people,9 and, once again, 23  per  cent as unchurched in the second generation. If we calculate this separately for those in Belgium who describe themselves as Catholic, this means 8  per  cent are core Catholics, 20 per cent average Catholics and almost 72 per cent non-practising Catholics. Researchers suspect that the enormous rise of this last number should be explained as ‘a hesitant “farewell” on the way towards secularisation’, rather than as ‘a new form of Church engagement’.10 Important for our purposes is the fact that these numbers are subdivided into age groups. Among the generation born after 1984, less than 1 per cent are core Catholics, just 2 per cent average Catholics, 29 per cent non-practising

8 9 10

Dobbelaere e.a., Religie en kerkbetrokkenheid, p. 148. That is, the first generation of people no longer affiliated with the Catholic Church. Dobbelaere e.a., Religie en kerkbetrokkenheid, p. 150.

Horizon: Plurality and Difference

37

Catholics, 24  per  cent unchurched in the first generation and 45  per  cent unchurched in subsequent generations.11 Church involvement according to generations in percentages Church involvement

Generations (born in):

Total

Youngest PostAfter Before the (after 1960s 1960s the war war (before 1984) (1970–84) (1955–69) (1940–54) 1940) Core Catholics

0

2

4

7

8

4

Average Catholics

2

6

8

11

29

11

Non-practising Catholics

29

38

37

45

38

39

1st generation unchurched

24

26

27

22

16

23

2nd generation unchurched

45

28

24

15

9

23

These are obviously important numbers for anyone thinking about the future, for example, about the size and nature of potential students for theology programmes in Belgium. The same applies for a reflection on the future of Catholic education: pupils and students now attending Catholic schools, colleges and universities belong to the youngest generation, and it is this generation that will assume the task of replacing those who will leave the work force during the upcoming retirement wave. At the same time, however, one should relativize this conclusion somewhat, as the figures for the generations in service today are not significantly higher (with 2, 4 and 7 per cent). Researchers also indicate that a connection exists between church involvement and acceptance of doctrinal tenets, such as belief in God, life after death, heaven and hell; but this does not mean that all those involved in their church accept all points of doctrine. At the same time, it is also not the case that all those who leave the church no longer accept these doctrinal points. Moreover, Christian faith content is sometimes mixed with superstition, such

11

For the information presented in the following table, see Dobbelaere e.a., Religie en kerkbetrokkenheid, p. 157, table 9.

38

Theology at the Crossroads

as belief in the protecting power of amulets, or ‘exogenous beliefs’ like belief in reincarnation. This shows that a ‘religion à la carte’ exists not only on the level of practices but also of faith; it is a patchwork of practices and faith content which individuals construct themselves.12

The church’s (in)credulity Where the church as an institution is concerned (and this applies to numbers from a survey conducted before the outbreak of the paedophilia scandal in 201013), the dramatic drop in trust in the church is conspicuous. Measured against twelve national and international institutions (including education, the army, the press, social security, the police, the EU, etc.), the church ranked last on the list in 2009, with only 36  per  cent still having some faith in the church. In 1981 the church remained the second-most trusted institution, and in 1990, it came in fifth with around 50 per cent.14 One suspects that the results will not improve today – at a time when the church continues to deal with the after-effects of the paedophilia scandal. In terms of public confidence, education has repeatedly scored first among the institutions in surveys conducted in 1990, 1999 and 2009. The percentage of the population expressing confidence in education increased from 73 per cent to 85 per cent. What this means for Catholic education in Belgium is paradoxical, unless, of course, its Catholic character has no influence on the trust people place in this particular project of education. For that matter, approximately 70  per  cent of Belgians think the church has no adequate answers for current problems related to moral, familial or social matters. What is more, in what could be called its core domain, namely providing answers for spiritual needs and problems, the church scored dubiously: just 44 per cent of Belgians think the church adequately responds to these situations, while no less than 52  per  cent think it does not. This is

12 13

14

Dobbelaere e.a., Religie en kerkbetrokkenheid, p. 152. Belgium has known its paedophilia scandals as have other Western European countries, including the tragic exposure of Mgr. Vangheluwe, the bishop of Bruges, as being himself a perpetrator followed by his subsequent resignation. See K. Abts, K. Dobbelaere, J. Kerkhofs and L. Voyé, Inleiding: waardenonderzoek in Europees perspectief, in Abts e.a. (ed.), Nieuwe tijden nieuwe mensen, pp. 9–21, 15.

Horizon: Plurality and Difference

39

surprising, since, just as one does not have to be a Buddhist to appreciate the Dalai Lama’s spiritual message, one does not have to be a Catholic to appreciate the Catholic offer of meaning. Where Catholics are concerned, it appears that people who are more involved in church life grant a greater legitimacy to the church, especially with regard to providing answers to spiritual needs (as much as 85  per  cent for core Catholics and 50  per  cent for non-practising Catholics), while their numbers regarding morality, family life and society are again significantly lower (ranging from 60 per cent to 30 per cent).15

Other interesting observations The EVS 2009 also shows that unchurched does not mean by definition unbelieving or non-religious, and that a distinction cannot be made between first-generation and further-generation-unchurched persons on this point. One-fifth of the unchurched (or 8  per  cent of the survey sample) indicated they are religious, while, then again, one-fourth described themselves as convinced atheists. Religious unchurched people are sensitive to the spiritual (81  per  cent), say they have contact with the divine apart from churches (70 per cent); experience moments of meditation or prayer (54 per cent); and they attach importance to religious services at birth (60 per cent), marriage (55 per cent) and death (69 per cent).16 Another interesting fact for our reflection is that those who complete a masters’ programme or finish a doctorate are, in general, more outspoken regarding (non-)religious affiliation. More believers from this educational level say they are unchurched, but those who still consider themselves Catholic have a greater chance of being core Catholics. This educational level also has the largest number of atheists (25 per cent) who say they are interested in spirituality – more so than in other educational levels. Concerning the professional bachelors, research indicates that these individuals are more religious and involved in church than those who pursue simply secondary education.17

15 16 17

See Dobbelaere e.a., Religie en kerkbetrokkenheid, pp. 153–5. Ibid., p. 154. Ibid., p. 161.

40

Theology at the Crossroads

Explanations? When asked about an explanation for the changes with respect to religion and church involvement, the authors of the report disassociate themselves, first of all, from the so-called ‘rational choice theory’, which would be held particularly in the United States. [This] starts from the idea that religious pluralism stimulates competition between religious enterprises which encourages individual engagement. The underlying idea is that without competition religious enterprises are lazy and do not foster an active membership.18

In this explanation, the church’s loss of market share is attributed to the church itself, and is not seen more broadly as a sociocultural development. As an alternative explanation, the authors of the report, following Niklas Luhmann,19 suggest the secularization of society as a consequence of functional differentiation. Increasingly the church has lost control over the social subsystem of the economy, politics, law, education, science, etc.20 At the same time, this is accompanied by a privatization of decisions; the role one takes in one subsystem is, in principle, independent from the role one fulfils in another. Individuals are free to make choices regarding religion, education, marital partners, political parties, etc. This free choice carries on, even though the church institution opposes a ‘religion à la carte’. [We have clearly seen] that free choice has been established in the religious sphere. This is not a form of human selfishness, as the Church fathers [sic] sometimes suggest, but the result of the structure of free choice which has been introduced so that this would be able to function. And this contradicts ecclesial expectations which impose the framework, values, and norms authoritatively.21

The dwindling overlap between Christian faith and contemporary culture and society and the church’s marginalization as an institution are explained in this explanatory model by sociocultural developments, rather than as resulting 18 19

20

21

Ibid., p. 143. They refer here to N. Luhmann, Funktion der Religion, Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1977; The Differentiation of Society (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982). For an explanation, with reference to ecclesial and theological reactions, see my Interrupting Tradition, Chapter 2. Dobbelaere e.a., Religie en kerkbetrokkenheid, pp. 167–71.

Horizon: Plurality and Difference

41

from institutional and individual failure. Clearly, the loss of credibility did not begin with the paedophilia scandal in the church, but rather brings to the surface a process, and possibly strengthens it – a process that was already active, as the numbers from the latest EVS survey make clear.

Consequences for a reflection on ideology and identity formation Empirical data and sociological explanations are interesting starting points for a reflection on theology, philosophy of life and identity construction in the current context. At the same time, they are not sufficient to guide a reflection on the consequences for a religious (or non-religious) identity formation, let alone to open up a cultural–theological consideration of this subject. I myself have formulated a more comprehensive conceptual framework for such a reflection, in dialogue inter alia with the results and analyses of successive EVS reporting.22

Post-Christian and post-secular: The need for a change of perspective Crucial for this framework is the insight that we live today in a post-Christian and post-secular context.23 In both categories, the word ‘post’ does not mean simply ‘after’ (as if both realities and their effects have disappeared), but rather that, culturally speaking, our relation to the Christian faith and to secularization has changed. For the term post-Christian indicates that – although traces of Christian faith are still present in abundance in our society and culture, as well as in individual identity formation – the Christian faith, at the same time, is no longer the obvious, accepted background that grants meaning. The term post-secular points to the fact that the presuppositions of the secularization thesis no longer apply: modernization of society does not simply lead to 22

23

This I have done most explicitly in L. Boeve, God Interrupts History, Chapter 1, from which I draw the following paragraphs and illustrations. For a more expanded discussion, see the first chapter of my book, God Interrupts History: Theology in a Time of Upheaval (New York: Continuum, 2007).

42

Theology at the Crossroads

the disappearance of religion, but rather to a changed way of dealing with religion and to its pluralization. The zero-sum theory, which holds that the more modernization there is, the less religion remains (and the opposite, the more religion there is the less modernized a society is), no longer holds. What is more, whoever claims today that the outcome of sociocultural processes necessarily leads to a situation where religion may no longer have any public meaning, and at best can be but a private matter, is unmasked as being ideological in his or her own way. He or she is obviously an adherent of secularism, which is just one of the possible positions present in the current pluralized ideological/religious field. The change in perspective – brought about by this analysis of our context in terms of post-Christian and post-secular – is, however, crucial: from an analysis in terms of secularization (that extends religious positions on a continuum between ‘practising Christian’ and ‘convinced atheist’) we move to an analysis in terms of detraditionalization, individualization and pluralization of religion, in which these three processes take advantage of and strengthen one another.

Marginally Churched Catholics

Practising Catholics Moderately Churched Catholics

Atheist Humanists

Agnostics Unchurched Catholics

Atheists

An analysis in terms of secularization assumes the secularization thesis, and sees the primary sociocultural dynamic as a movement from classical religious faith to atheism. This forms the paradigmatic glasses through which reality and the way we deal with it are seen. When discussing religion, such an attitude is typically seen in the frequent use of the word ‘still’. Do you still go every week to the Eucharist? Do you still baptise your children? Are you still going to get married in the church? Do they still organize retreats at school? Are there young people who still want to study theology? Reactions to this dynamic from the church can be directed towards continuity (one attempts to link together as many positions as possible through a more generic discourse)

Horizon: Plurality and Difference

43

or towards discontinuity (one takes the rupture between Christians and [apostate] non-Christians as one’s point of departure).24

Christians

Indifferents

Hindus

Wicca

Buddhists Jews Post-Christians

Muslims

Atheists

The result of this necessary change in perspective is no longer a continuum between two extremes (with a dynamics moving primarily from the left to the right), but a field with a plurality of positions which relate to one another, perhaps influence one another, learn from one another, question one another, clash, and even reject and combat against one another. On such a plural field, each person is already a participant and in relation to other positions. Identity and difference go hand in hand. No one can claim the detached observer’s position. Catholics in their variety of church involvement and beliefs, other Christian denominations, Muslims in their mutual diversity, Jews, Hindus, Atheists and post-Christians: the plurality of the current religious field is made up of all of these positions, which are also often internally pluralized themselves.

Detraditionalization, individualization and pluralization Detraditionalization, individualization and pluralization are the sociocultural processes that have structurally changed – and continue to change – our culture and society, and that make the requested change of perspective necessary. As processes that continue to grow stronger quasi-independently from our individual reactions (-izations), they are moreover to be distinguished from the manner in which people and groups deal with these processes (-isms). 24

In the third part, we will return to this dynamic.

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Theology at the Crossroads

(a) Detraditionalization designates the process by which traditions, religious as well as other traditions (gender, family, professional context), no longer naturally transfer from one generation to another – a process that presses ahead in our society independent of individual preferences and decisions. Thus, detraditionalization is more comprehensive than secularization. (b) The other side of detraditionalization is individualization, the structural given that identity is no longer assigned, but that it should be actively taken on in increasing measure (i.e. constructed). What Luhmann indicated as the privatization of decisions fits here. (c) Finally, pluralization implies that the religious field consists of several ideological and/or religious traditions, and that none of these positions can claim the observer’s position. All positions are participants and, as such, relate to one another. Pluralization implies that each identity is structurally challenged to conceive of itself in relation to difference and otherness – especially to the effect the other truth claims have on its own claim. As we have said, it is very important to point out the fundamental difference that should be made between the sociocultural processes themselves (‘-izations’) and the various strategies by which these processes are evaluated and handled (‘-isms’25). Because in the discussion unnoticed shifts often occur between analysis and evaluation, between ‘description’ of the current context and ‘programme’ to deal with it. (a) Detraditionalization is not necessarily the same as the loss of tradition and/or nihilism. Traditions often remain, in changeable forms, as horizons of meaning in which identity is devised and found. What detraditionalization does express is the fact that people’s relation to tradition changes and becomes structurally more reflexive. This also applies for those who make classical, traditional choices today, for example in partner relations, child-rearing, ethical and religious positions. These choices, as well, are no longer simply self-evident. Precisely the refusal of this reflexive character of belonging to a tradition, which implies a game of involvement and distancing, characterizes a neo-traditionalist or fundamentalist association with tradition. (b) Individualization is not the same thing as individualism, which stands for a specific strategy for dealing with the process of individualization, namely

25

For more on this, see Chapter 3, third section.

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45

one in which the individual’s preference constitutes the all-determining norm. For individualization does not preclude the possibility that individuals, as identity constructions, might choose precisely against individualism. For that matter, individualization does not at all mean that there are no hidden influences or environmental factors which determine identity construction – the media’s influence and market forces are just two very pertinent examples of such influences. (c) Pluralization is also not the same thing as pluralism and/or relativism (with neo-traditionalism or fundamentalism as counter reactions). Pluralization brings a demand for equal and reciprocal recognition of the philosophical/religious position, where manners of intolerance, passive and active tolerance are possible answers.

Identity construction becomes more reflexive These three processes also both determine and apply to rather classical religious and atheistic positions. Against a background of detraditionalization and pluralization, identity construction also occurs here in an individualized manner. This means that identity construction is structurally more reflexive, because the awareness is growing that identity is not obvious, and everything could have been different. To a greater or lesser degree, people have become aware of the fact that their choices – at least in principle – could have been very different and that contingency, opportunity and context play an important role in making these choices. In this context, Paul Ricoeur speaks of the need to develop a second naivety and refers to a hermeneutical approach to ideology and religion, which shifts from a literal to a symbolic interpretation of religious truth claims.26 The challenge for any religious identity construction, therefore, consists in learning and supporting religious competences which enable people to adequately move in a world that is determined, on the one hand, by detraditionalization, pluralization, and individualization, and, on the other hand, by often subliminal forms of identity construction through the market, media, peer groups, etc. For Christians, as for the non-Christians around them, 26

Paul Ricoeur’s whole symbol concept, to which he devotes many pages, rests on the principle of a second naivety. He speaks explicitly about this connection in Philosophie de la volonté. 2: Finitude et culpabilité (Paris: Aubier, 1960, 1988), pp. 479–82; Le conflit des interprétations. Essais d’herméneutique (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1969), pp. 294–5.

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Theology at the Crossroads

this means an increase of the self-reflexive content of their religious position. This should enable them, both from sociocultural grounds and from the dynamics of their own religion, to deal with the no-longer-obvious character of their position/tradition, along with the uncertainty which this brings, and thus with the structural assignment towards identity construction. At the same time, in relation to ideological-religious others, this means they must become increasingly aware of the particularity, the specific singularity of their own position or tradition and the choice-nature of their belonging to it. They should learn how they can bring their own position into a productive relationship with the challenging ideological-religious otherness of these others. Because of the fact that the Christian tradition is no longer evident in the current context, appearing to be just one conviction among many others, Christians should have the reflexive competence to identify themselves with their religious conviction and to give an account of it, both within the community of faith as in the public forum. This implies, among other things, that what, on the sociocultural level, is structurally analysed as an individualized choice, can be experienced on a religious-spiritual level as a calling – to be chosen by the God of Jesus Christ.

Learning to think dialogically from difference In conjunction with a study of the sociocultural context, an examination of the philosophical horizon is also worthwhile for a theology that understands itself methodologically in terms of recontextualization. Dialogue with current philosophical insights offers theology opportunities for supporting the structural need for religious reflexivity, which was argued for in the sociocultural analysis. Learning to think in terms of difference protects theology from falling into totalitarian and closed thought patterns, while offering new perspectives for a fruitful dialogue with the context.

Theology and philosophy: Coming to an understanding of faith From of old, in its quest for an adequate and contemporaneous understanding of faith, theology has made an appeal to the surrounding rationality. In most cases that was philosophy: Middle- and Neo-Platonism by the early Church Fathers,

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Aristotelianism in the High Middle Ages, and, according to theological style, philosophies that arose in modernity. Classically it is said that philosophy, on the one hand, leads to and prepares for faith, and that, on the other hand, once people believe, it helps them come to an understanding of faith. Philosophy is both preparatio evangelica (preparation for the gospel) and ancilla theologiae (the handmaiden of theology). Faith and reason, theology and philosophy, are complementary and interact with each other: we endeavour to understand in order to believe – intellego ut credam and we believe in order to understand – credo ut intellegam. In principle, there can be no contradiction between faith and reason, because their source, namely God, is the same and is at the origin both of creation and of revelation in history. Reason gives access to natural knowledge; moreover, faith gives access to knowledge that cannot be derived from creation and is needed for our salvation. This complementary movement between faith and reason led to great syntheses, in which Christian faith was sometimes described as the vera philosophia (Augustine), then again philosophy retained a relative independence with respect to faith and theology (Thomas Aquinas). Likewise, in modern times, theology’s involvement with the surrounding philosophy continues – however, not without a struggle. Modern philosophy’s critique of God and religion was a bridge too far for many Catholic theologians and church leaders, who tried via Neo-Thomism to give shape once again to the old synthesis between faith and reason – against modern philosophy. But a more positive involvement with the surrounding philosophy also emerged: in transcendental theology, Karl Rahner among others, took up the dialogue with German Idealism; in the early work of Martin Heidegger existential theology saw a conversational partner. The critique of religion by Ludwig Feurbach, Karl Marx and Friedrich Nietzsche was no longer automatically dismissed but taken au sérieux, for example in Hans Küng’s early work. Hermeneutical theology involved itself with insights from the hermeneutical philosophies of Hans-Georg Gadamer and Paul Ricoeur. Someone like Edward Schillebeeckx extended this hermeneutical–theological line and found hereto inspiration in the political theology of Johann Baptist Metz, for example, who took as first conversational partner the Neo-Marxist Frankfurt School with figures like Walter Benjamin, Theodor Adorno and Jürgen Habermas. Other theologians entered into dialogue with Ludwig Wittgenstein and the analytical–philosophical tradition and so on. Again and again what is at stake

48

Theology at the Crossroads

is the search for a contemporarily adequate understanding of faith, and the critical-productive dialogue with current philosophical thinking serves as the starting point for providing this faith, both for itself and for the outside world, with a credible rationality. As critical consciousness of its own time, these philosophies challenge theology – and thus the understanding of faith which it seeks to express – towards self-critique and renewal. The continual process of recontextualization unfolds as follows: when (intellectual) contexts shift, theology, which took shape in dialogue with the old (intellectual) context, comes under pressure and is forced once again to reconstruct its relation to the new (intellectual) context.27 This is seldom a harmonious event; rather, it is often coupled with conflicts, trial and error, radicalism and condemnation, church politics and other forms of politics. Also, from the perspective of the dialogue between philosophy and theology, two thousand years of Christian tradition and theological history can be tellingly described as two thousand years of continuous recontextualization.

Postmodern difference thinking Jean-François Lyotard wrote a small book, in 1979, entitled La condition postmoderne.28 In it he placed modernity under critique, in particular for the manner in which it dealt with, on the one hand, truth and knowledge, and, on the other hand, emancipation and progress. In the postmodern context, the grand narratives of knowledge and emancipation have lost their credibility. After all, these narratives could not fulfil their promises of freedom through knowledge, and progress through emancipation: there are too many counterexamples. Communist liberation of the proletariat has too often turned into dictatorship. The thesis of speculative thought that what is real is also rational and vice versa was undone at Auschwitz. Democratic and economic liberalism and capitalism did not result in a world where everyone has a better life, but, on the contrary, resulted in repeating political and economic crises which make numerous victims. And Lyotard concluded: these promises were not forgotten, rather on the contrary: every time these grand narratives have 27

28

See my: Systematic Theology, Truth and History: Recontextualisation, in M. Lamberigts, L. Boeve and T. Merrigan (ed.), Orthodoxy: Process and Product (BETL, 227) (Leuven: Peeters Press, 2009), pp. 27–44. Jean-François Lyotard, La condition postmoderne: Rapport sur le savoir (Paris: Minuit, 1979).

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tried to realize their promises they have ended in blood and misery.29 The modern project is not unfinished, as Habermas claimed, but destroyed.30 The problem with these grand narratives, for Lyotard, and here he joins other thinkers of difference, is that they were attempts to control and change reality and history in a universal way via knowledge and knowledge-based action. And precisely for this reason they became totalitarian and no longer paid attention to what did not fit into the narrative. This ‘otherness’ they automatically excluded from the narrative (as its opposite), or they immediately locked it up, within the narrative, as more of the same (e.g. in a movement of dialectical historical development). For Lyotard, philosophy’s role, as well art’s, at the present time, is to place such hegemonic narratives, which want to comprehensively master everything, under critique. At the same time, philosophy has as its assignment to bear witness to what escapes such narratives, to give voice to the other of the narrative, to what differs from the narrative (le différend). Likewise, this remains necessary in a postmodern context, when the modern grand narratives have lost their credibility. Because today there are hegemonic narratives as well. They legitimize themselves differently than their modern predecessors – no longer from the promise of a better world through progress in knowledge and emancipation, but from efficiency. The postmodern scientific-technological complex, as well as current economic market thinking, is legitimized not by their credibility but by their performativity. Current grand narratives become stronger because they work and because there are no feasible alternatives. Here, philosophy’s task is to criticize the reduction of everything to scientific-technological and/or economical logics. However, it can no longer do this, as in modernity, from a new and different grand narrative, because then as well it would not be in a position to truly respect otherness. The critique of current grand narratives and the witness to what differs remain, therefore, a continual task, to be taken up repeatedly: time and again, at the border of our thinking, speaking and acting, the other emerges and is too easily forgotten and/or victimized when we fail to notice.

29

30

Cf. J.-F. Lyotard, Le postmoderne expliqué aux enfants. Correspondance 1982–85 (Paris: Galilée, 1986), p. 53; L’enthousiasme: La critique kantienne de l’histoire (Paris: Galilée, 1986), pp. 108–9. Cf. Lyotard, Le postmoderne expliqué aux enfants, pp. 38–9, in reference to J. Habermas, Die Moderne – ein unvollendetes Projekt (1980), in Kleine Politische Schriften (I-IV) (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1981), pp. 444–64.

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Other thinkers of difference, stemming from phenomenological, hermeneutical and deconstructionist philosophical traditions (like Emmanuel Levinas, Jean-Luc Marion, Paul Ricoeur, Jacques Derrida and their American reception by thinkers like Jack Caputo, Richard Kearney, Merold Westphal, etc.), also develop various thought patterns in which they ask that attention be paid to alterity and difference. It leads them to formulate a radical critique against  – what in the post-Heiderggerian discourse is called – the ontotheological closure of language and thought. Language and thought impose their logic on reality; identify there a first, explanatory principle, and so found all knowledge and acting upon this reality. Some of these thinkers resolutely seek ways of thinking and speaking which should succeed in escaping such an ontotheological closure. Others are far more aware of the fact that whoever thinks and speaks, ultimately always forgets the other, because he or she always already uses a particular language and rationality that occupies precisely the same space where the other appears.31

Thinkers of difference and the turn to religion In this context, a number of thinkers of difference have begun to reflect, once again, upon religion.32 On the one hand, they formulate a heavy critique against religions, and often against Christianity, because these have secured themselves onto-theologically. According to these critics, they have too easily transformed themselves into grand, universal and hegemonic narratives, which incorporated that which on principle should escape the narrative (transcendence). God became the keystone of a narrative that offered truth and certainty, and legitimized structures of power and control: the other was enclosed as something to be converted, or excluded as diabolical or damned. It is precisely these kinds of religious patterns that postmodern philosophy tries to unmask and deconstruct. On the other hand, the theme of the religious also surfaces when these thinkers reflect upon new ways to bear witness to the other, to difference, to 31

32

See J. Schrijvers, Ontotheological Turnings? The Decentering of the Modern Subject in Recent French Phenomenology (New York: SUNY Press, 2011). For more references, see my Theological Truth in the Context of Contemporary Continental Thought: The Turn to Religion and the Contamination of Language, in F. Depoortere and M. Lambkin (eds), The Question of Theological Truth: Philosophical and Interreligious Perspectives (Currents of Encounter, 46) (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2012), pp. 77–100.

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begin speaking in ways that do not immediately strip the other of his/her otherness. For some thinkers the evocative and metaphorical potential of religious discourse simply offers tools to talk about that which otherwise could not be said. Others think that the structure of religion itself is all about witnessing to the other, and a few among them even develop a new kind of philosophical piety. In such a reintroduction of religion, especially, the structure and language game of negative theology are appreciated. In another place, I have shown how these thinkers are often only interested in the structure of religion or the ‘religious’ – not in the concrete religious narrative traditions themselves.33 They consider these traditions, especially, to be a contamination that falls short of the purity of the religious structure, that is, the de-centring of the subject by the other. The question that emerges, certainly from a Christian theological perspective, is whether this is necessarily so: Do language and narrative contaminate, or are they also, at the same time, the very condition of the possibility to bear witness to otherness? To put this Christologically: Is the incarnation of God in Jesus Christ primarily a contamination of the divine, or precisely the possible condition so that God could reveal Godself? From a Christian theological perspective, language turns out not to be a hindrance to God’s revelation, but precisely its condition of possibility. In such a perspective, negative theology never stands alone, but is always already related to positive theology: it does not simply deny what positive theology says, but radically qualifies its language. Even though God is witnessed to in language and sign, God can never be contained – let alone controlled – in it. God remains other to the language people use to recognize God or to speak about God.

Theology in conversation with difference thinking: When God makes the difference Since the critique of grand narratives also touches Christianity, theology should enter into dialogue with the current philosophical critical consciousness with an open mind. From such conversation, theology, first of all, learns when it 33

Along with my Theological Truth in the Context of Contemporary Continental Thought, see, for example, L. Boeve, God, Particularity and Hermeneutics. A Critical-Constructive Theological Dialogue with Richard Kearney on Continental Philosophy’s Turn (in)to Religion, in Ephemerides Theologicae Lovanienses 81 (2005): 305–33.

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becomes hegemonic, totalitarian or onto-theological – and how to unmask this. At the same time, however, it is also challenged to find new ways to bear witness to the other, in such a way that this other does not become, once again, a function of theology’s own speaking and thinking. The fact that contemporary philosophy brings in, once more, precisely religious categories can inspire theology to rediscover elements out of its own religious tradition, such as negative theology. So doing, it is assisted in searching for ways of thinking and speaking which escape a regression into a grand narrative. However, theology will also critique the use of the religious by philosophical difference thinking, especially when the latter considers particular language and narrative all too easily as contamination. Or when it reduces religion to merely a formal structure, whose purity can hardly be respected. Indeed, Christian theological speech – supposedly in the name of an unattainably pure relation to God – does not lead away from concrete narrative, from concrete history, but precisely towards these, because it is in concrete history that God can also be met today. As a result, the dialogue with postmodern critical consciousness certainly challenges present-day theology to place under critique the closing of its own discourse, but, at the same time, makes it conscious of the fact that it can only speak about God in language and sign. Theology’s task is not to leave every narrative behind, but to search for a kind of narrative which does not revert into a closed narrative structure. It should find a way of speaking where God does not simply confirm and secure the narrative, but realizes precisely the opposite: a narrative in which the God who can only be spoken of in the narrative, at the same time, and repeatedly, interrupts this same narrative. Thus, a narrative where God does not neutralize difference, but makes the difference. In contrast to the grandnarrative structure, I designated this in another place as an ‘open narrative’: a narrative that is constantly aware of the fact that the other is threatened with being forgotten, that tries at least not to forget this forgetting.34 The other’s lasting witness does not break the narrative nor stop it, but interrupts

34

Cf. L. Boeve, Lyotard and Theology. Beyond the Christian Master Narrative of Love (T&T Clark) (London: Bloomsbury, 2014). See also L. Boeve, Naming God in Open Narratives: Theology between Deconstruction and Hermeneutics, in J. Verheyden, T. L. Hettema and P. Vandecasteele (ed.), Paul Ricoeur: Poetics and Religion (BETL, 240) (Leuven: Peeters Press, 2011), pp. 81–100.

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it: witnesses of the other tell narratives in another way, and these narratives are repeatedly interrupted when the other threatens to be forgotten. Such an open Christian narrative does not think God in the centre, but from the margin; it sees God not as the guarantee of its own grand narrative, but as the continual critique of this. And such an open Christian narrative challenges Christians, in the name of the God who ‘makes a difference’, to ‘make a difference’ as well when they are confronted with closed narratives, with narratives that have no regard for the other and make victims. This structure of interruption offers a fitting reading key for reading Jesus’ speech and actions, on the one hand, and Jesus’ life story, on the other, as interruptions on God’s behalf: narratives of sin, religious closeness and death upon the Cross are broken open in the name of an interrupting God.35 The dialogical revelation of God in creation and history lives from this dangerous memory, agitating our discourses rather than founding, reconciling and reassuring them. What does this mean for theology? How does the dialogical understanding of revelation challenge the contemporary contextual horizon, on the one hand, and theology towards a renewed orientation, on the other? How can theology regain theological legitimacy and contextual credibility today?

35

Cf. the seventh chapter in L. Boeve, Interrupting Tradition. An Essay on Christian Faith in a Postmodern Context (Louvain Theological and Pastoral Monographs, 30) (Leuven: Peeters/Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2003), pp. 115–46.

3

Location: From the Margins and at the Crossroads of the University, Church and Society

From time to time, it becomes necessary for Catholic theology to consider, and even reconsider, its place and task in light of the situation in which it finds itself and to which it wants to relate in a plausible and relevant way. Today there are good reasons for such a consideration. For the time being it appears that theology’s place in the university has become less evident than it used to be. The same holds true for theology’s plausibility and relevance in the current (generally) post-Christian and post-secular society. In the church, as well, theology’s role is challenged. In this chapter, I will elaborate more fully how, on the one hand, theology is pushed to the margin in the domains of the university, church and society, while, on the other, theology finds itself at the crossroads of academy, church and society – precisely at the place where these three domains meet each other. As already stated in the introductory chapter, I would argue that theology is called precisely from the margin and at the crossroads to reconsider its role and mission in the three domains. Indeed, when present-day philosophy asks theology to pay attention to difference, to the other that is all too quickly threatened with being forgotten; when postmodern critical consciousness challenges theology to no longer think of God as the one who founds and secures human knowing, speaking, acting, but as the one who on the contrary challenges and disturbs – thus, interrupts – human attempts at mastering reality through language and action: then is it really a problem that theology no longer stands in the centre but has landed right in the margins at the university, in the church and in society? Or can this be an opportunity? Can it help theology to become aware, more

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than it previously was, of its theologically necessary open-narrative structure? Can it challenge theology to develop a contemporary theological critical consciousness in the domains where it is active? In this section, I will first discuss how theology has lost its traditional, relatively central place in each of these domains and appears to be pushed to the margins. Then I will indicate how theology reacts to this marginalization and tries to escape it. I hereby explain how the manner in which theology shifts in one domain affects its place in the other domains. The same applies when theology repositions itself in one domain: this usually has an immediate impact on its role and place in the other domains. Central to my argument is the fact that theology finds itself at the crossroads of these three domains: it moves back and forth between them – challenged and questioned, inspired and enriched by each of them. It is dynamically related to each of the three domains, and is more specifically involved in what is at stake in each domain, without exclusively belonging to any one of them. I will argue that theology puts its project at risk, when it forgets that it is located at the crossroads, or is encouraged or forced to forget that it finds itself at this crossroads. Moreover, such forgetting also has detrimental effects for the domains of the university, church and society themselves. In the current context, the fact that theology is conscious of its being situated in the margins and at the crossroads is both uncomfortable and challenging. It is forcefully tempted to try and tear itself away from the margin. In that case, it seeks certainty and stability by retreating away from the crossroads and allowing itself to engage with only one domain. Then theology becomes merely academic, merely ecclesial or merely sociocultural, hoping in this way to reverse its marginalization in the respective domain. However, such a withdrawal into one domain has a high price: theology loses touch with its locus theologicus, with its dynamics and inspiration, whereby it is in danger not only of losing its relevance in the other two domains, but also within the domain in which it withdraws. Because its place is particularly there where these domains overlap, meet and interact; where they collide, transgress their borders and come into conflict; where they differ, engage each other and converse. At the same time, to be sure, at first sight, it appears that theology’s marginalization in each of the domains is a great loss, but, when considering the situation in depth, a place in

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the margins may also offer new opportunities to be active in each of these domains in new ways.1

Theology in the university Since the time of the early universities, theology has been an academic discipline and was for a long time even the most distinguished.2 In the modern university, however, with its scientific ideals of empirical rationality, universality, objectivity and transparency, theology’s place and role has caused quite a bit of discussion. Surely, to date, theology is recognized as a scientific discipline, and its curriculum is still offered in many academic institutions, whether of public or private status, whether state or privately funded, whether officially organized or recognized by churches or not. The same holds true for the discipline and curricula of Catholic theology, which is presented today in a variety of forms and is practised throughout Europe in these different ways. In terms of education, for example, it is subject, along with other curricula, to the Bologna Process, including its mechanisms of quality control and accreditation.3 In terms of research, theology, in combination with religious studies, is often recognized by state and other funding agencies, and research funding is available through inter-university and university research funds; theological journals are ‘ranked’; results of theological research such as doctorates, publications and acquisitions count towards the university’s financing, etc. Nevertheless, it would be quite naive to conclude from this that theology is still the crown discipline in the present academy. As long as it can legitimize its activities, for example, when applying for research funding, by calling upon the scientific methodologies of other sciences (philology, history, 1

2

3

For a more elaborate reflection on the importance of ‘topology’ for the self-understanding of theology, see, for example, H.-J. Sander, Einführung in die Gotteslehre (Darmstadt: WBG, 2006). The university of Leuven, for example, was founded in 1425, but was only granted a theological faculty (and thereby the status of a full university) in 1432, after having proved to be a viable enterprise. In the founding charter of the theological faculty, it was explicitly stipulated that this new faculty received priority over the others, and, therefore, that in the procession of the togati its professors should receive the first place. This may still be the case today, but it scarcely has anything to do with theology’s prestige as a discipline. Cf. De Universiteit te Leuven (1425–975) (Leuven: Universitaire Pers Leuven, 1976), p. 29. For the official Bologna Process website 2007–10: cf. http://www.ond.vlaanderen.be/hogeronderwijs/ bologna/

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philosophy, sociology, psychology, etc.) or by its relevance (ethics, the study of world religions), the situation seems not too problematic – apart from the question of why one would still need a specific discipline, department or faculty for research when this research can be carried out via the other disciplines. It is especially the strictly theological purpose of the discipline and its programme of ‘Christian faith seeking understanding’ that comes under pressure: for theologians engage explicitly in the Christian tradition and attempt to contribute to that tradition through their own reflections. Certainly in a time of religious pluralization, theology holds too closely to one tradition, inspired by one religious community, which gradually becomes a minority. At the same time, this religious community is but one player on a field where other Christian denominations, religions and ideologies are also active. In short, both detraditionalization and pluralization affect theology’s position and drive it to the margins of the university. This kind of positional change comes on top of the shift which concerns all of the humanities. Both the empirical-positivistic tendencies and the more business-oriented approach many universities develop with regard to research and education (with a focus on the acquisition of funding, economic applicability of research results, quasi-immediate sociocultural relevance, graduate employability, etc.) affect the place of many so-called more hermeneutical disciplines such as literature, social sciences, teaching, philosophy and theology. In the following, I will delve further into these developments, and I expound on two closely related problems, which are important not only for theology but also for the university. First, I discuss the academic status of theology and the survival strategy of religious studies. The second problem concerns, paradoxically enough, the academic status of the university, in particular its rather pragmatic research standards.

Theology and the survival strategy of religious studies One of the first challenges theology faces in the academy is pressure placed on the legitimacy of its strictly theological finality. Theology’s connection to a particular faith, especially when expressed in a link to a particular faith community, contributes to theology’s legitimacy problems and its shift to the margins. A way to deal with these problems is to suspend these preferential relations and to completely withdraw into the university. In fact, this is what

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is often at stake in discussions regarding the relation between theology and religious studies, and, more specifically, when the question is raised whether theology departments should develop into departments of religious studies.4 Such questions, of course, as recent developments have shown,5 not only come from pressure exerted by the university, but also from particular ecclesial interventions, which – intended or not – isolate theology from other scientific disciplines. I will further discuss this crossroads between the university and the church, when I elaborate on the relation between theology and the church. The result of all this is that religious studies seems poised to inherit theology’s status as an academic discipline. For this reason some theological faculties have decided to organize themselves as religious studies faculties, or at least to use the aura of religious studies to become ‘respectable’ once again. Such a survival or escape strategy runs the risk, however, of completely losing the theological project of ‘faith seeking understanding’. It makes it difficult to develop specific theological questions, because these are immediately repudiated as (too) confessional or parochial (and thus too narrow). Without question, religious studies, with its methodological atheism, informs theology about the Christian faith’s context and situation, but it also no longer leads to the question of where God makes history today. This new situation makes theology more aware of its very specific and often marginal place in the university, because prima facie its theological status has lost its unproblematic and self-evident character on both academic and cultural grounds. As touching its academic grounds, although theology often leans on methodologies from other sciences, including religious studies (which has become its new ancilla), its claims go beyond these methodologies. From a cultural perspective, theology is forced to reconsider its approach to truth claims, since the Christian faith has become but one of many religions and worldviews. Only when addressing these two issues may theology be able to speak from its current place in and to the academy today. Nevertheless, the theological question remains important today. Arguments for such can be made not only from a Christian-theological perspective, but 4

5

For a more elaborate argument regarding the discussion of the relation between theology and religious studies in this paragraph, see Chapter 6. Cf. N. Schreurs, Entwicklungen in den katholischen theologischen Ausbildungen in den Niederlanden, in Bulletin ET 17 (2006): 2, 110 ff.

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also, to a certain degree, from a cultural – and thus also academic – viewpoint. The survival strategy – that is, theology’s full retreat into the academy by transforming itself into religious studies  ⫺  too easily gives into one of the illusions to which the academy falls prey today: the presumption of objectivity and transparency which would characterize modern rationality, and – related to this – its presupposed value-free character. These assumptions are part of classic secularization ideas, which are no less value-free, but tend to forget the modern emancipatory hermeneutical circles in which they are embedded. It is not possible here to go into the vast philosophy of science literature, which criticizes these overly self-confident modern claims of rationality. But at least we can state that they have made us more aware of the fact that knowledge and the production of knowledge are historically situated and bound to interests, embedded in hermeneutical and power-related settings. From its experience of marginalization, among other things, theology has become deeply aware of its place, of its hermeneutical circle and increasingly refers explicitly to it in order to make its claims. Precisely because theology is more conscious of its own place, it must be considered able to raise others’ consciousness in this regard. The discussion with some neo-Darwinists, who repeatedly transgress the thin line between science’s methodological atheism and their own ideological atheism, is only one example of this.6 But there is more to say about this subject.

Challenged by a more pragmatic scientific understanding A postmodern criticism of premodern and modern rationality standards has not only led – and probably not even primarily  ⫺ to a greater hermeneutical consciousness. At the same time, it also brought about a more pragmatic self-understanding of science. Postmodern criticism has influenced not only scientific praxis itself, but also its way of legitimating itself. That was the basic premise of Jean-François Lyotard’s La condition postmoderne (1979): because the modern grand narratives of knowledge have become implausible, science is 6

References can be made to the positions of, among others, R. Dawkins, The God Delusion (London: Bantam Press, 2006); Daniel C. Dennett, Breaking the Spell. Religion as a Natural Phenomenon (New  York: Viking, 2006); and Samuel Harris, The End of Faith: Religion, Terror, and the Future of Reason (New York: W.W. Norton, 2004); The Moral Landscape: How Science Can Determine Human Values (New York: Free Press, 2010). See also T. Uytterhoeven, Religie volgens New Atheism: Natuurlijk fundamentalisme?, in Tijdschrift voor Theologie 53 (2013): 162–77.

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legitimated today through its performativity.7 When all stable frameworks are lost, only ‘what works’ remains. In combination with mathematical-scientific methodologies, scepticism about substantial normative hypotheses and claims (which can always be deconstructed as too particular or as connected to specific interests) results in an increased quantification of the research, not only on the level of scientific methodology, but also on the level of accounting for the research praxis itself. Apart from the need to be able to compare different disciplines in research assessments, this is one of the main reasons why scientific reviews are ranked according to formal criteria, publications are counted, research networks are weighted and output other than publications (doctorates, patents, spin off, etc.) are quantified. Procedural peer assessment progressively replaces qualitative evaluation. Of course, it would be too short-sighted to conclude that the university has lost its soul through such procedures and that quality has been replaced by quantity. Good quantitative standards reflect qualitative standards, and most research bodies and evaluators are quite well aware of the fact that a quantitative assessment is to be complemented with a qualitative evaluation. The current situation may also benefit theology, especially since it is questioned as a scientific discipline. More than ever, theology is challenged to meet the academy’s requirements and thus to demonstrate its legitimate place in the university. Paradoxically enough, more formal and quantitative evaluation procedures can support theology’s case. Theology (in the multiplicity of its subdisciplines) possesses a variety of scientific journals and series, peer assessment, doctoral output and international research networks. It can put all of this to work, for example, when engaging in research assessments and applying for funding. Only when theology is able to justify its place in the university, according to the criteria of the university, will it, when necessary, be able to approach academia critically, for example, when the latter loses sight of the necessary interrelation and balance between quantitative and qualitative assessments. Moreover, it is quite plausible that in this endeavor, theologians will then be supported by other academics. The same is also true for another development in the academy, one which I am also not able to discuss here at length: specialization. Particularly in 7

Cf. J.-F. Lyotard, La condition postmoderne. Rapport sur le savoir (Paris: Minuit, 1979).

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view of its own multidisciplinary character and its reliance upon a variety of ancillary sciences, theology is almost forced to specialize as well – certainly when it strives after the highest academic standards and wants to remain a conversation partner with these other disciplines. But it is also urged to engage in the interdisciplinary and transdisciplinary dynamics which a self-critical academy currently fosters to overcome fragmentation and isolation. Not only the academy, but theology itself will gain from this. When theology is fully academic and thus meets university standards, it may get the chance to bring the university itself to self-critique, and help it to look beyond itself – precisely when, or perhaps because, it is situated in the margins. It might first be able to point the academy towards the limits of its methodologies and discourses, and warn against certain reductionisms. It can foster a more critical–hermeneutical consciousness in the entire university, by recalling and explaining that knowledge is always already situated and tied to interests. It is certainly able to bring to expression, explicate and discuss the often hidden questions of meaning, ethics and anthropology. These can be questions which arise at the margins of scientific research, but also in academic teaching and in service to society. In a time when stable frameworks have become precarious, theology might be invited, once again, to show what it has to offer from its own resources and procedures in terms of dealing with questions of meaning, ethics, anthropology and worldview. At such moments, it may then be possible, in the midst of an often post-Christian and post-secular context, to introduce once more the God of Jesus Christ, who invites humanity to make history together in the expectation of the coming of God’s reign. Since we arrive here at the crossroads between the university and society, I will take this up once again when I deal with theology and society. In short: it is neither by fully withdrawing into the academy (in the form of religious studies) nor by claiming a special preferential status, apart from contemporary academic standards, that theology will find an appropriate place in the academy, from which to speak not only to the academy, but also to the church and to society. Realizing the particular place from which it speaks, theology can certainly speak to the university, where the latter too easily forgets the value-laden presuppositions of its search for truth, and reduces its scientific questioning to what would be ‘objective’ and ‘transparent’. So doing, theology can interrupt

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the all-too-easy common sense self-understanding of the university. It can underscore recent findings in the philosophy of science, which criticize the all-too-self-confident modern claims of rationality, and show that knowledge and knowledge production are historically situated and bound to interest, embedded in hermeneutical and power-related settings. Without concealing the very specific place from which it itself speaks, theology’s task is to enlarge the others’ critical consciousness in this regard. As already mentioned, the discussion with some neo-Darwinists, who cross the thin line between scientific methodological atheism and their own ideological atheism, is merely an example of this.8 At the same time theology should be watchful when the contemporary grand narratives of performativity and economic applicability colonize the scientific dynamic. From its own sources and procedures, theology can share what it has on offer with regard to dealing with questions about meaning, ethics and anthropology, which the scientific search for knowledge and application entails.

Theology in the church For some time now, surprisingly maybe, it also appears that theology hardly has a central role in today’s church – despite the fact that at least one of the theologians active at the council played a very important role until February 2013 and has advocated more than once for the ecclesial vocation of the theologian.9 But, perhaps, theology’s place in the church is not at the centre. Theology, as faith seeking understanding, certainly stands at the service of the church. This church does not exist for itself but is called – as stated in Lumen Gentium  ⫺ to be Sacrament of the world, People of God, Body of Christ and Temple of the Spirit. It is the faith of the church, which gathers those who believe that God has revealed Godself in Jesus Christ and remains present in the Holy Spirit, that theology seeks to understand. It hopes to contribute to this

8 9

See footnote 124, above. In his personal theological work, as well as in his role as prefect of the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, and as Pope Benedict XVI, Joseph Ratzinger had definite ideas about theology’s place in the life of the church. For his personal theological work in this regard, see, among others, J. Ratzinger, Wesen und Auftrag der Theologie (Einsiedeln/Freiburg im Breisgau: Johannes Verlag, 1993).

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faith, and theology attempts thereby to demonstrate both its plausibility and relevance. This faith is constitutive for the church as a historically developing community, which is confronted now and then with cultural and sociopolitical shifts, and thus is encouraged to reinterpret the ‘faith of their fathers’ (and mothers) once again. In each new context theology has been required to stand at the service of the Christian faith in its reflexive attempts to come to terms with the questions, conflicts and challenges it has encountered. Theology, therefore, assisted the Christian faith (and the community of the faithful) in ‘recontextualizing’ its plausibility and relevance throughout historical and contextual shifts.10 In this regard, church and theology are mutually constitutive. In the first place, theology is called to reflectively clarify the church’s faith. Conversely, theology is also constitutive for the church. Its service to the church consists in repeatedly investigating the way in which the Christian tradition can become a living tradition today: to indicate when, where and how the God revealed in history – and ultimately in Jesus Christ – reveals Godself today. This requires a careful hermeneutical study of the development of scripture and tradition in relation to their historical contexts, seeking how revelation came about, and culminates in a never-ending process of experience and interpretation. It calls for an appropriate interdisciplinary investigation of the present-day situation and the way in which Christian faith takes part in this situation, but also differs from it. It urges the (re)interpretation of images, models and categories, coming from both the past and present, to express what the Christian faith is about. It requires a search for contemporary plausible and relevant images, models and categories to support the faith community in life, worship and reflection. In all of this, theology is bound to scripture and tradition. Together with the church, theology continues the tradition by recontextualizing it. The history of church and theology teaches that this did not always result in a peaceful, steady, continuous process of reflection, but that scripture and tradition take shape through a dynamic game of exchange and discernment, conflict and rejection, learning and digestion. It is within this game that theology, from its anchoring in the life of the faith community, is called to play its role – sometimes a disturbing one. In this regard, at a minimum, one can 10

For the concept of recontextualization, both in its descriptive and normative aspects, see among others my Interrupting Tradition, Chapter 1; and God Interrupts History, Chapter 2.

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say that the relations between the magisterium of the church and theology have not been optimal over the past decennia and that theology seemingly has even been perceived as a threat to the church, its unity and integrity. This resulted in attempts to define more explicitly and specifically theology’s place and task in the church11 and brought about structural and individual measures meant to ensure theologian’s orthodoxy and loyalty to the magisterium.12 At this point, I would like to discuss two interrelated points of attention for theology today. First, I would like to discuss the thesis that, although theology exists only because of the church and in service to the church, theology ceases to function appropriately when, on the one hand, it is forced to embed itself completely within the domain of the church, or, on the other, when it completely withdraws from the church. Secondly, I will delve into theology’s relation to the church’s teaching office. In transitioning to the third part, I will conclude with some thoughts regarding the reception of Vatican II.

No withdrawal into or outside of the church It would be a mistake to interpret theology’s specific ecclesial vocation as a reduction or restriction of theology to simply the church’s domain; in other words, to define theology’s operations and purpose exclusively from the church. Looking at recent developments, however, theology appears to run this risk: by isolating itself in the academy in relation to the other sciences, and – often as a result of the first development ⫺ by redefining theology’s project as merely training for future pastors.13 The challenges that theology encounters in the academy, which are not separate from the experiences of Christian faith in society, result not only in strategies of withdrawal into the academy (through transforming theology into religious studies). They also lead to attempts to safeguard theology from these challenges by pointing to its specific ‘ecclesial’ or ‘confessional’ character. Often those who want to secure the church’s control over theology rely on the 11

12

13

We already referred in the first chapter to the ‘Instruction on the ecclesial vocation of the theologian’: Donum veritatis issued by the Congregation for the Doctrine of Faith on 24 May 1990. See, for example, the oath of fidelity which theologians are expected to take when they take on a function in the name of the church, enacted on 1 July 1988 and amended on 29 June 1998; and the notifications concerning theologians and their work. For the texts, see: http://www.vatican.va/ roman_curia/congregations/cfaith/doc_dottrinali_index.htm. For more detail, see Chapter 6.

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same strategy. Because of its ‘ecclesial’ or ‘confessional’ nature, special rights and exceptions are claimed (e.g. in the procedures for appointing academic staff, structural financing, in applying the Bologna agreements, etc.), which set theology apart from other scientific disciplines. In line with what we have already said about its theological finality, there is something to be said, of course, for an appeal to theology’s specific character – also on the level of the university. But such argumentation is not made without risk and can result in the opposite of what was intended: namely theology’s isolation in the university and ultimately its complete withdrawal into the church. In the first section of this chapter, we already showed that this can be harmful for theology’s position in the university, as well as for the academy itself. However, it also endangers theology’s project. Although theology differs from the other sciences, and from religious studies, nevertheless it needs them to succeed in its task. Precisely because theology pursues its own theological purpose, it should work interdisciplinarily, both internally between theological subdisciplines and with other scientific disciplines. In this respect, theology’s place can only be within the university. Furthermore, such a retreat within the church’s domain also limits the role theology can play in the recontextualization of Christian faith – a recontextualization which is carried out in dialogue with philosophy, anthropology, social sciences and the natural sciences. Therefore, attempts by the church to isolate theology in the university, in the end, turn out to be counterproductive. Through theology’s full withdrawal into the church, the church cuts itself off from the former’s critical-constructive help in developing more effective ways to engage the current context.

Theology and magisterium Our second focus – theology’s relation to the magisterium – is immediately related to the first. Although it has been different in the past, theology’s task or responsibility is no longer the exercise of magisterium.14 Theology today is not a second magisterium, and it should not aspire to be one. At the same time it should not allow itself to be reduced to merely an instrument of the magisterium, 14

See, for example, L. M. Örsy, The Church: Learning and Teaching. Magisterium, Assent, Dissent, Academic Freedom (Wilmington: Glazier, 1987), pp. 46–9, among others.

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limiting itself to preparing and explaining what the magisterium teaches. At its best, theology’s project is not a programme of individual theologians, but of a theological community, nourished by a critical-constructive dialogue and anchored in the community of the church. It is a process of seeking and discussing, of arguing and convincing, of conflict and confrontation, of mutual purifying and correcting, of growing in understanding and faith. This task is certainly situated in a dynamic relation to the church’s magisterium  – both of which stand, although in different ways, under God’s eschatological judgement. The relation between the magisterium and theology, therefore, should be one of mutual trust rather than distrust, of exchange and mutual respect rather than monologue and suspicion. Because tracing God’s salvific involvement with people and history is what is ultimately at stake. As Bradford Hinze has illustrated,15 in recent years a number of theologians have faced problems because of the magisterium, which ranged from not obtaining a ‘nihil obstat’ or a ‘mandatum’ (permission to teach), to receiving a notification, censure or condemnation. In the meantime, years of complaints about the lack of transparency of the procedures have not resulted in more legal certainty for the theologians concerned. This is disheartening for theology and theologians for three reasons. (a) The first reason for this sadness is the magisterium’s disregard for recent developments in theology. One repeatedly notices that the general theological quality of some documents, critiques and notifications do not rise to the level expected for such an intervention by the highest teaching authority in a theological discussion or in an assessment of a theologian’s work. For example, along with Peter Hünermann’s striking analysis,16 the European Society for Catholic Theology also announced in its message for 16 March 2007 that the notification on Jon Sobrino’s address from 2007 reveals in this regard some problematic aspects, of which the disregard of the theological developments of the last fifty years would seem to be the most serious and disturbing one. Irrespective of the results of recent exegetical, historical-theological and systematic-theological research, the text develops 15

16

See B. E. Hinze, A Decade of Disciplining Theologians, in R. R. Gaillardetz (ed.), When the Magisterium Intervenes: The Magisterium and Theologians in Today’s Church (Collegeville, Minn.: Liturgical Press, 2012), pp. 3–39. Cf. P. Hünermann, Moderne Qualitätssicherung? Der Fall Jon Sobrino ist eine Anfrage an die Arbeit der Glaubenskongregation, in Herder Korrespondenz 61 (2007): 184–488.

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a foremost deductive argument which suffers from a remarkable lack of hermeneutical-theological consciousness. For example, quotations from Scripture, conciliar documents, and recent Papal statements are indiscriminately put together with theological concepts and arguments from a diverse provenance. In the first instance, the particular historical nature of the questions, along with the hermeneutical complexities, concerning the self-consciousness of Jesus and the way Jesus might have interpreted the salvific value of his own death, seem to be overlooked, at the risk of causing confusion between historical and theological discourses. It is not surprising that such deductive argumentation is not able to do justice to Jon Sobrino’s contextually embedded, hermeneutical approach which has profited from a continuous scholarly engagement with contemporary exegetical and theological discussions.

The statement of the Society concluded: The challenges for theology contained in Sobrino’s thought indeed are important for the life of the Church. More than an official reprimand, however, these challenges need further exploration and discussion. The Notification appears to foreclose the opportunity to do so”.17

(b) This last sentence leads us directly to the second reason for sadness. The main consequence of such an intervention is that the theological discussion of a particular issue is stopped by it. Likewise, in many cases theologians themselves see the disputability of certain positions or know the problematic nature of certain considerations and discussions. Part of theology’s task is to deal with these and thoroughly discuss them: only then do theology’s self-correcting mechanisms begin to function. However, when the ecclesial magisterium intervenes too quickly, certain urgent questions are no longer treated, or are even forbidden to be treated.18 By this action, however, the

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A Message from the Presidium of the European Society for Catholic Theology Regarding the Notification on the Works of Jon Sobrino, published in the 12th ET Newsletter, 16 March 2007, and published again in the dossier regarding the notification gathered in Concilium 42 (2007) nr. 3, pp. 125–34, 125. See the discussion concerning the ordination of women in the Catholic Church, which was explicitly stopped by John Paul II in the apostolic exhortation Ordinatio sacerdotalis (22 May 1994, http:// www.vatican.va/holy_father/john_paul_ii/apost_letters/1994/documents/hf_jp-ii_apl_19940522_ ordinatio-sacerdotalis_en.html), and once again in the declaration about this letter on behalf of Cardinal Ratzinger, who was then the prefect of the Congregation for the Doctrine of Faith (28  October 1995, http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/cfaith/documents/rc_con_ cfaith_doc_19951028_dubium-ordinatio-sac_en.html).

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questions themselves have lost neither their prominence nor their relevance. Moreover, with each premature intervention, the mechanisms of selfcorrection within academic theology are disturbed or even blocked and other mechanisms, like self-censorship or alienation, pop up. Such a situation is damaging both to theology and to the church. (c) The third reason for this sadness is that magisterial interventions and sanctions against individual theologians contribute to the legitimacy problems theology finds in the academy, because they clearly contradict academic procedures. This contributes to theology’s isolation and increases pressure to exchange theology for religious studies, either by theologians who no longer want to be subject to church control or by theologians who no longer are allowed to teach theology on account of the magisterium or by academic authorities who want to dissociate themselves from something they consider to be illegitimate paternalism. As I already said in my Introduction, the discussion about theology’s place and  role within the church, including the magisterium’s actions vis-à-vis theology, does not stand on its own, but is linked to the difficulties the Christian faith – and the church itself – encounters in contemporary society. More specifically, it is especially a discussion concerning the best way to deal with these difficulties that lies at the bottom of a lot of the animosity. Such a discussion often ends in unfruitful oppositional schemes: progressive–conservative, modern– premodern/postmodern, correlational–anti-correlational, aggiornamentoressourcement.19 Within the church, this discussion prominently surfaces in discussions about the reception of Vatican II: Did the council bring about a refreshing newness with its call for aggiornamento, or should it be understood, first and foremost, in continuity with the past?

Fifty Years after Vatican II Such discussions dominate the Catholic theological landscape from the time of the council until today. In the meantime, a new generation of theologians has arisen. These are theologians who did not personally participate in Vatican II, who learnt about the council through the work of its protagonists 19

See E. Conway’s analysis in A Constant Word in a Changing World: Recognising and Resolving Tensions and Tendencies in a Postmodern Context, in New Blackfriars 87 (2006): 110–20.

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and commentators, through discussions about its reception, in confrontation with the fruits and conflicts, opportunities and ambiguities it generated over the last fifty years. For this new generation of theologians, Vatican II is a past event, and for a growing number it is something that took place before they were even born. Instead of being a lived history, for them, Vatican II must become a living tradition – a past that is normative for the future through its reception in the present. On the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of the announcement, preparation, opening and closing of the council, this generation is explicitly invited – with respect for the historical distance from the council – to grasp the event of Vatican II as a theological event, which both continues and renews the tradition to which it now belongs. In the midst of mainly historical reconstructions and too rapidly constructed theological recuperations, this new generation of theologians is called to further investigate and reflect on its revelatory content, to which history and texts bear witness, and to express this anew from within the horizon of the contemporary context. In short: with regard to the church, theology’s place should remain at the crossroads, certainly in an age of threatening polarization, due to the changed relationship between society and the Christian faith and church (especially if these are understood to be in opposition to each other). When these crossroads are abandoned, the space grows smaller for a theology that does not withdraw into or outside of the church, but resolutely wants to continue the dialogue with the context. This occurs when theology, loosened from the faith community, becomes religious studies, or, the other way around, when it becomes ecclesiastical ideology. In both cases, theology has hardly anything left to say to the church. On theological grounds, theology should criticize the church when it exhibits a closed self-understanding, withdraws into its own great truth and relates oppositionally to the context. Precisely when the church thinks it must close itself off from history to save God’s revelation, it loses the possibility to track down this revelation today. Because God perhaps reveals Godself there where narratives are interrupted, where otherness challenges fixed frameworks and where difference is not rubbed out, but can come to speak.20 20

This is precisely the aim of my God Interrupts History.

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Theology in society What is relevant for a reflection on theology’s place in the university also applies to theology’s place in society. Indeed, what happened to Christian faith in society is one of the most important causes for questioning theology’s place within the university. Modern processes of rationalization and secularization and postmodern developments of detraditionalization, individualization and pluralization have radically transformed our societies into a post-Christian and post-secular context. The de facto monopoly position which the Christian faith possessed in many European countries (and which the church sometimes still claims), with regard to the formation of collective and individual identities, has become untenable. One of the main challenges for Christian faith, for the church, and thus also for theology is to accept this new situation and investigate where, when and how God reveals Godself today, as well as how the Gospel may be proclaimed once again. We have already indicated that the discussion within theology, as well as about theology, during the past few decades, dealt to a large extent with the question of how the modern and postmodern context could be approached theologically. In a nutshell, this discussion could be traced back to the question of whether strategies of continuity (bridge, dialogue) between theology and context are expedient, or rather strategies of discontinuity (rupture, opposition). Those who start with continuity – often from more optimistic creation and incarnation theologies – attempt to make a connection between the Christian tradition and the best of modernity. This resulted in a variety of so-called correlation theologies, ranging from quite naive attempts of adaptation to modernity to a more critically constructive dialogue with the modern context, as in political and liberation theologies.21 On the other hand, strategies of discontinuity – often inspired by theologies of the cross  ⫺ negatively assess the context and reject modern claims of autonomy and emancipation. Because modernity alienated itself from the Christian faith, they advocate for the conversion of the context. Such anti-modern theologians intend, therefore, to correct modernity and often appeal to premodern theologians for inspiration and ways of thinking. In the past thirty years, postmodern communitarian 21

Cf. D. Tracy, The Uneasy Alliance Reconceived, in Theological Studies 50 (1989): 548–70.

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and neo-Augustinian theologians have joined together. They all present a comprehensive Christian worldview as an alternative to a fallen modern and postmodern world.22 Both strategies tend to start from a one-to-one scheme between Christian faith and the modern world, but differ in their evaluation of the relationship between the two: namely, we either see a bridge (continuity) or a rupture (discontinuity). In an earlier work I argued that a contemporary theological recontextualization should go beyond this divide, for both cultural and theological grounds.23 From a contextual standpoint – as we argue in Chapter 2 – this one-to-one scheme is no longer appropriate for analysing the position of Christian faith relative to a context marked by detraditionalization and pluralization. The overlap between context and Christian faith has evaporated, and a variety of other religions, worldviews and identities have come in its place. Theologically speaking, it is more appropriate to accentuate both the continuity and discontinuity existing between the Christian message and today’s world, and to appeal to the categories of difference and interruption, in order to think about the relation between both, and in order to reflexively express God’s involvement with humanity and history.24 Although much more could be said, I would like to focus on the following three thoughts. The first concerns the importance of an appropriate analysis of the current context for Christian faith as well as for theology. Building upon this insight, the second thought relates to the way in which the Christian faith may address this context once again. Finally, we point out society’s need for theology and, more broadly, the opportunity for religious education.

Distinguishing between processes and reactions to processes The processes that have changed our society in the past do not stop at the door of the church. Detraditionalization, individualization and pluralization

22

23 24

Cf. my Retrieving Augustine Today: Between Neo-Augustianist Essentialism and Radical Hermeneutics, in L. Boeve, M. Lamberigts and M. Wisse (ed.), Augustine and Postmodern Thought: A New Alliance Against Modernity? (BETL, 219) (Leuven: Peeters Press, 2009), pp. 1–17. This is the main issue with which my God Interrupts History is concerned. Along with the category of difference (see Chapter 2), I introduced the category of ‘interruption’ to think God’s involvement with humanity and history in a contextually adequate and theologically plausible manner. I borrowed this term from J.-B. Metz but redefined it starting from the new cultural–theological analysis which I briefly explained here.

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determine not only the context in which Christianity finds itself, but also the way in which the Christian faith functions today. In this regard, as we already mentioned in the second chapter, a fundamental distinction must be made between these processes as descriptive categories (categories ending with ‘-ization’) and other normative positions prescribing the way one should deal with these processes and their consequences (‘-isms’). One of the fundamental mistakes made by both optimistic and correlationist approaches, on the one hand, and more pessimistic and oppositional analyses of the current context, on the other, consists precisely in confusing ‘-izations’ and ‘-isms’. Contemporary theology’s responsibility is to critique such confusion and to suggest ways to deal with the changed context (the ‘-izations’), without either refuting it, or falling prey to these ‘-isms’. This also prevents theology from choosing for either a full withdrawal into society (continuity) or back into the church (discontinuity), but rather encourages it to keep its place at the crossroads. In this regard, detraditionalization (the fact that traditions are no longer able to automatically pass themselves on from one generation to the next) is to be distinguished from the secularist or pluralist positions which strive to overcome tradition as such, or at least to diminish the impact of certain preferential traditions. These positions should be analysed as very particular strategies, alongside other strategies (such as the opposite strategy of neotraditionalism or fundamentalism) for coping with the changed situation. The structurally changed attitude towards tradition and its self-evident authority over people, therefore, cannot be simply equated with the loss of tradition, let alone with an automatically implied aversion to, or alienation from, tradition. As a descriptive category, individualization (identity is increasingly no longer inherited but constructed) should also not be confused with individualism, which claims that in making choices the individual’s (and only the individual’s) needs, values and views should be the norm in the process of identity construction. Also, the distinction between pluralization (being embedded as a participant in a context of religious plurality) and pluralism and relativism is an important one. The latter are both deficient strategies for dealing with pluralization, because they are not capable of respecting the very otherness which is revealed in the confrontation with plurality. For both, plurality comes down to more of the same: in pluralism all others are of equal value; while

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relativism considers no singular position as valuable or distinct. Even when the Christian faith rejects all these strategies (‘-isms) as unfruitful, the processes of detraditionalization, individualization and pluralization challenge this faith to reconsider its own position in light of the changed attitude to tradition, the heightened responsibility for one’s identity construction and religious plurality, respectively. More than has hitherto been the case, the encounter with a diversity of religious others makes Christians aware of the particularity of their own tradition. Together these three processes invite Christian identity formation to integrate a greater degree of reflexivity. When one fails to distinguish between structural processes and strategies to deal with these processes, the risk is unavoidable that contextual shifts are wrongfully assessed starting from the strategies which one rejects. Secularization (or detraditionalization), for example, is then immediately seen as secularism (or a rejection of tradition) and thus to be opposed. In more pessimistic analyses, our current context is, therefore, described as being marked by loss and decay, having fallen prey to arbitrariness, nihilism and individualism, pluralism and relativism. Obviously, the relation of Christian faith to the context that flows from such an analysis is one of opposition and discontinuity, and anti-modern theologians speak about a ‘clash of cultures’. On the other hand, strategies stressing continuity too often indiscriminately embrace so-called religious revival and plurality and point to the many opportunities the post-Christian and post-secular religious situation offers for individual spirituality, religious growth, contact with transcendence ⫺ often without being able to account, at the end of the day, for the particularity of Christian faith. What is overlooked in both conflicting assessments are the underlying processes that influence individual and collective Christian identity formation today. This hinders one from clearly seeing the diverse Christological and theological reactions to the current context, since these are summarized between the extremes of resurgent traditionalism and fundamentalism, on the one hand, and religious nihilism, relativism, subjectivism and consumerism, on the other hand. All these ‘-isms’ are made possible by these structural developments. Structurally speaking, Christian identity formation has also become more reflexive. Such identity is no longer simply naturally transferred but obtained in a continuous process of appropriation and challenge, of choice and

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responsibility. Theology should investigate how the expression of the Christian tradition and the clarification of its core ideas (God, Christ, salvation, love, truth, sin, etc.) is most appropriately done under these circumstances. It is challenged to rediscover what a Christian identity means and how initiation, conversion, confession, church belonging, community formation, etc., are understood in a context where Christian images, practices and thinking patterns are no longer self-evident. Theology must seek ways in which the Christian message may inspire people to construct their own identities as Christians, and so assist the church in its evolution from a church by birth to one by choice. To this end, theology should leave behind oppositional schemes of continuity or discontinuity, adaption or rejection, religious pluralism and relativism, neo-traditionalism and fundamentalism, and criticize them by pointing out their underlying processes. This will incite the acquisition of a more reflexive Christian identity, which is conscious not only of its own commitment to a particular tradition, but also knows how to relate to its more marginal place in the current context. The fact that the Christian faith no longer stands at the centre of our society need not inspire grief or nostalgia; rather, it offers an opportunity to rediscover the faith’s newness, strength and inspiration.

Critique of deficient ‘-isms’ and the economization of identity formation Such an analysis not only urges theology and the church to take as its starting point the changed context in which the Christian faith is lived, but also invites us to consider once more the contribution Christian faith can make to the context. For the distinction between processes and strategies does not do away with the sometimes questionable ways of dealing with identity construction which are prevalent in our societies. Here, I am especially talking about the strategies, on the one hand, of individualism, relativism, nihilism, aestheticism and, on the other, racism, nationalism, traditionalism and fundamentalism. Both series of strategies can be unmasked as deficient ways of dealing with the effects of detraditionalization, individualization and pluralization for personal and collective identity formation. With the first series, the loss of pre-given patterns leads to lifestyles in which no meaning, value or truth are seen as normative, unless they are the preferences of the individual. In the second series, one seeks protection against the destabilization of an acquired

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identity ⫺ resulting from detraditionalization and individualization ⫺ in one’s own ethnicity, nation, tradition or religion.25 The furthering of a Christian reflective identity makes us aware not only of the risk of falling prey to these ‘-isms’; it also motivates a critical-constructive contribution to society, on the one hand, through the critique of these strategies, and on the other, by stimulating an openness, reflexivity and willingness to dialogue with all the worldviews and religions that make up the pluralized religious field. Moreover, the distinction between processes and strategies also allows us to properly analyse the domination of our life-world by the economy, market and media. Of all the (cultural) actors and influences which try to steer identity construction at the individual and sociocultural level (religions being an example as well), the media and the market appear to be the most performative.26 Theology’s criticism of such strategies for coping with identity formation is in the end theologically motivated, and leads to the question of where the God of Jesus Christ reveals Godself today: in resistance against relativism and fundamentalism, in the critique of encompassing market mechanisms, in the care for the environment, for the sustainability and integrity of human life and in active involvement for the poor and the outcast  ⫺  because these are the places where victims fall today, where the hungry and the thirsty, the stranger and the naked are, and the sick and imprisoned look for justice (Mt. 22,31-46). In this regard, theology’s criticism of society cannot be considered as a part of the ‘clash of cultures’, nor as the offspring of a grand counternarrative in opposition to contemporary culture and society. Rather, it concerns the cultivation of a critical-constructive strategy for coping with the new situation, which may inspire Christians and non-Christians alike, to self-consciously live together in a pluralized world, in which meaning and identity are not pre-given as such, but ask for an approach that is responsible and respectful towards difference and diversity. Perhaps the fact that theology no longer occupies society’s centre may free it to speak more prophetically in this regard.

25

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For a more elaborated analysis and comment on these strategies, see my Interrupting Tradition, Chapters 3 and 4. Such economization also deeply influences the way we relate to religion and tradition. See, for example, the important study by Vincent Miller, Consuming Religion: Religious Belief and Practice in a Consumer Culture (New York: Continuum, 2004), along with European reactions thereto in a special edition on ‘Consuming Religion in Europe’ in Bulletin ET 17 (2006) vol. 1.

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With such an engagement in society, theology indeed situates itself at the crossroads, attempting – in line with Gaudium et Spes  ⫺  to read the signs of the times and interpret them in light of the Gospel. Both church and society benefit from this practice. Theology renews the dialogue between the church and the contemporary context, and so takes upon itself the necessary recontextualization of Christian faith. At the same time, here a ‘secular’ argument arises for organizing and funding religious education in schools and theology at the university.27 When the reflexive understanding of one’s own worldview and religion prevents one from falling prey to nihilism and fundamentalism and allows for mutual respect and dialogue, the society as a whole benefits.

Society’s need for theology (and religious education) Society also reminds the theologian of the specific character of his or her place at the crossroads of Christian faith and post-Christian culture. Of course, this also has to do with the position the church takes in society. This consciousness has two sides: on the one hand, theologians are very quickly identified with the church position from which they speak, and on the other, if they take a critical or even nuanced judgement concerning church viewpoints, they are seen as unorthodox. In this sense, society reinforces a specific ecclesiastical view of what theology ought to be. Once again it is the theologians’ task to continue standing at this crossroad, to be conscious of the particular standpoint from which they speak, without allowing themselves to be completely shut up within that viewpoint. This is the best service they have to offer to the church and to society: the development of a reflexive-hermeneutical Christian faith capable of giving an account of the current religious situation and able to handle detraditionalization, individualization and pluralization. Because only those religions and worldviews that are able to understand themselves and their own truth claims as particular and in relation to others can contribute to a multicultural society, where difference matters and plurality does not lead to relativism. The fact that theology regains sociocultural plausibility and relevance at such a moment is shown by the 2010 statement from the German Science Council on the place of 27

See also Part 3.

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the diverse theologies and religious studies in the academy. In this statement, the Science Council indicates interest in training and research in Christian theology, Jewish studies, Islamic studies, along with religious studies, precisely because of religious pluralization and the greater need for scientific expertise.28 Theology gains nothing when it surfs along with the mainstream ideological soft-secularist and soft-pluralist default-position in contemporary society.29 The latter claims too quickly and too self-evidently, on the one hand, that the public domain is ideologically neutral and that religion and philosophical orientation are thus a private matter, and, on the other, that, no matter how different, religions and philosophical orientations ultimately come down to the same thing. Whoever does not respect this double-claim is then a fanatic or extremist who disturbs this ‘reasonable’ consensus. On the contrary, it is precisely theology’s assignment to interrupt such a complacent self-understanding and to criticize the presuppositions of the soft-secularist and soft-pluralist default-position.30 Only then can philosophical otherness be addressed once again and make a difference in the public forum. Only then does theology help our society evolve from a passive-tolerant society, in which difference is well accepted, so long as it does not really matter and does not break up the soft consensus to an active-pluralist society. Only then will religious and other philosophical traditions be able to offer resistance, from their own resources, against the economic hegemonic narrative, which has all too easily taken the vacated place in the public form, and which reduces life and society to market thinking. Finally, theology can make this difference, because at its core it repeatedly points towards the difference God makes in creation and history, and because of the way theology speaks and reflects on this. In short: there are academic, ecclesial and sociocultural reasons why theology no longer finds itself situated at the centre of the academy, church and society.

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29 30

Cf. ‘Empfehlungen zur Weiterentwicklung von Theologien und religionsbezogenen Wissenschaften an deutschen Hochschulen’ – www.wissenschaftsrat.de/download/archiv/9678-10.pdf, p. 7: ‘The scientific domain of theologies and religious studies should be further developed in view of the growing religious plurality in Germany, and the rising demand for scientific expertise regarding religious issues. The Scientific Council therefore recommends the changes necessary for the Christian theologies, the construction of Islamic studies as well as the strengthening of Jewish studies and religious studies.’ See the introductory chapter. We address this, among other things, in Chapter 8.

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Moreover, there are strategic and political arguments for seeking out the margins and crossroads in order to advocate for theology’s cause. Ultimately, however, it is in theology’s interest  ⫺  and especially in the interest of the God about which it speaks  ⫺  when theology does not occupy the centre nor withdraws into one of the named domains. Belonging to each of these domains, its place is at the margins, at the crossroads, where they meet, collide, question, transgress, converse. From that place, theology is called to reflect on and speak about a God who will not let Godself be enclosed in domains, discourses or narratives but rather opens them up when they threaten to close in on themselves. Theology is called to bear witness to this interrupting God ⫺ anchored in the life and tradition of the church, living up to the norms of the university and fully aware of the society in which it finds itself. Because this God wants to make history with God’s people today.

Part Two

At the Crossroads of University and Church In this second part, I would like to elaborate on theology’s fate at the crossroads of the university and the church, by way of dealing with three case studies which are illustrative for the challenging and sometimes uncomfortable experience of being situated on the margin and at the crossroads. In the fourth chapter, I will investigate and evaluate the most recent ecclesial document on the place and role of theology, Theology Today, written by the International Theological Commission. Rather than comprising a collection of warnings and restrictions on behalf of a troubled church, this text intends to open up perspectives for welcoming a legitimate plurality to theologians in the church. In this chapter, I will consider whether this document succeeds in doing so, by practising a critical-empathetic reading of the criteria for a good Catholic theology, which this document presents. Does it create space for theological development and creativity, for dialogue and recontextualization? Or does it actually hamper this theological task? Is theology’s place primarily in the church – or does it also belong in the university and society? And how does the text deal specifically with the challenge of plurality? The relationship between philosophy and theology brings us to the intersection between the university and the church. Chapter 5 illustrates concretely the idea that the way in which the church, faith and theology relate to the modern and postmodern context determines the manner whereby theology can enter into dialogue with the contextual critical consciousness – in this case with philosophy. To this end, I will do a contextual and theological reading of the encyclical Fides et Ratio (Faith and Reason) from the hand of John Paul II.

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Here, I develop two reading keys, represented respectively by the swan and the dove. The first reading key (the swan) begins with the difficult relationship between the church and modernity, and focuses on the modern conflict between theology and philosophy. Modernity is said to have clipped the wings of reason, so that it can no longer ascend to ultimate truth. The second reading key (the dove) takes in a resolutely theological position. Rather than defining reason by theology, this key develops an understanding of sacramental truth, which cannot be founded in reason, but which, with philosophy’s help, can come to an understanding of the faith. In the end, both are selective readings of the encyclical (and the first reading is clearly more demonstrable than the second), but the perspective of the dove certainly opens up more room for engaging in an active dialogue with philosophy today. In Chapter 6, I will take up once again the discussion about the tension between theology and religious studies, and I resolutely place this at the intersection of the university and church. I will discuss two strategies which fail to defuse this tension. Both the turning of theology into religious studies and the increasing isolation and ‘pastorization’ of theology are inadequate reactions to the changed relation between Christian faith and context. In contradistinction, I argue – based on an analysis of the context in terms of plurality and difference – for a theological project where theology and religious studies are held in a productive tension. Only in this way can theology credibly occupy its place at the intersection of church, academy and society.

4

More Room for Theology in the Church? A Critical-Empathetic Reading of Theology Today

In the Spring of 2012, a document was published in Rome on behalf of the International Theological Commission (ITC) entitled Theology Today: Perspectives, Principles, and Criteria.1 The occasion for this text was a question raised by the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith regarding guiding principles for specifying what Catholic theology is. For this Congregation was confronted by a multitude of theological schools, styles and projects all claiming to be Catholic. However, the ITC intended not only to answer this question, but also to sketch a broader theological framework. For this reason, the document provides not simply a checklist of necessary criteria but opens up perspectives for a theology that situates itself in the living tradition of the church.2 Did the ITC3 achieve its intentioned purpose? Does the document free up (more) space for theologies that assume many forms today, while claiming to be Catholic all the same? I hope to address this question in this chapter. 1

2

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International Theological Commission, Theology Today: Perspectives, Principles and Criteria (released in Rome on 8 March 2012 and available at: http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/ congregations/cfaith/cti_documents/rc_cti_doc_20111129_teologia-oggi_en.html). So states Adelbert Denaux, an ITC member, in the introduction to the Dutch translation of the document (A. Denaux, Ten geleide, in Theologie vandaag: perspectieven, principes en criteria, in Collationes 42 [2012], 177–222, p. 177–8). The document was worked on by two successive subcommittees. Santiago del Cura Elena (Burgos, Spain) was the chair from 2004 to 2008, and the members consisted of Bruno Forte (Archbishop of Chieti-Vasto, Italy), Savio Hon Tai-Fai S.D.B. (Hong Kong), Antonio Castellano S.D.B. (Italy), Tomislav Ivanĉić (Zagreb, Croatia), Thomas Norris (Maynooth, Ireland), Paul Rouhana (UC Kaslik, Lebanon), Leonard Santedi Kinkupu (Kinshasa, Congo), Jerzy Szymik (Lublin, Poland) and Thomas Söding (Bochum, Germany). The second subcommittee was chaired by Paul McPartlan (Washington, USA) and worked from 2009 to 2012. Its members were Adelbert Denaux (Leuven, Belgium – Tilburg, The Netherlands), Mgr. Jan Liesen (bishop of Breda, The Netherlands), Sara Butler M.S.B.T. (Chicago, USA) and Serge-Thomas Bonino (Toulouse, France), along with the previously named A. Castellano S.D.B, T. Ivancic, L. Santedi Kinkupu, J. Szymik and T. Söding.

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Therefore, I begin with a recent case, in which the Catholic character of a specific theological methodology came under question – that is, the case of comparative theology. Then, I will examine the ITC text more closely and undertake a critical-empathic reading of it. First, I will explain its method and then sketch the broad lines of the document, in order to present the results of such a reading method. In the conclusion to this contribution, I will give an evaluation and indicate the strong and weak points of Theology Today. With this I gladly assign some homework to the ITC.

What is Catholic theology today? A recent case At the annual convention of the American Academy of Religion that met in November 2012 in Chicago, the Roman Catholic Studies Group organized a discussion session on the topic ‘Is Comparative Theology Catholic?’. Four panellists discussed this question.4 The first speaker was Francis Clooney S.J., who may be considered the father of comparative theology.5 For him, the research he conducts ⫺ namely the comparative reading and discussion of sacred texts from Christianity and Hinduism  ⫺ certainly is Catholic theology. He gave four reasons for arriving at this conclusion: with regard to content, method, fruitfulness, as well as the profile of the researcher, comparative theology contributes to the project of Catholic theology. To add power and legitimacy to his argument, he referred to doctrinal texts during his statement. (a) With respect to content, comparative theology concerns the revelation of the divine, especially the way in which God reveals Godself in other religions (Clooney refers in this context to Dominus Iesus). The comparative reading of founding scriptures is a way to trace this divine revelation. (b) In terms of method, Clooney emphatically said that for 4

5

The panel consisted of Francis X. Clooney (Harvard University), Klaus von Stosch (University Paderborn, Germany), Jeannine Hill Fletcher (Fordham University) and Paul J. Griffiths (Duke University). The texts of this AAR session have been published in the first issue of Studies in Interreligious Dialogue 24 (2014). For his most recent books, see: F. X. Clooney, S.J., Beyond Compare: St. Francis and Sri Vedanta Desika on Loving Surrender to God (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2008); The Truth, the Way, the Life: Christian Commentary on the Three Holy Mantras of the Srivaisnava Hindus, Leuven: Peeters, 2008; and Comparative Theology: Deep Learning across Religious Borders (Malden: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010). In 2010, he also published the anthology: The New Comparative Theology: Voices from the Next Generation (London/New York: Continuum, 2010).

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the study of another religion the researcher should possess an expertise at least comparable to the expertise needed for studying (the sources of) one’s own religion (in reference to Dei Verbum). (c) Comparative-theological research leads to fruitful insights, which relate to elementary doctrines of Christian faith, stemming from the tradition held by the church. These fruits witness to the fact that such research is carried out with a Catholic-theological interest. (d) The person of the researcher is also emphasized as an element in the Catholic character of comparative theology. Familiar with the hermeneuticaltheological task and sensitivities of Catholic theology, this person does his or her work with attention to the integrity of the human person. Clooney concluded, with reference to Fides et Ratio and Nostra Aetate, that doing comparative work on other religions is not something extrinsic to theology. All in all, Clooney took a rather defensive position: certainly for him his contribution to Catholic theology and personal integrity were at stake. Similarly, the second panellist, Klaus von Stosch, whose area of specialization is the relationship between Christian faith and Islam6, answered the question positively (and mentioned with a wink that he had received a nihil obstat at the time of his appointment at the theological faculty in Paderborn). The third panellist, Jeannie Hill Fletcher,7 also gave a positive reply, but she defined Catholic theology from a Catholic feminist perspective with the help of the following two characteristics: theology is Catholic when it witnesses to sacramental imagination (the everyday world speaks of God) and to prophetic power (theology is for the promotion of social justice). Then she made an interesting argument – based on diary entries – regarding how a group of Maryknoll sisters, who travelled to China at the beginning of the twentieth century, came to a deeper existential understanding of their own Christian faith by living among Chinese women from another faith tradition. This experience often came in tension with the classical frameworks from which they worked. For Hill Fletcher it is obvious: this kind of practical comparative theology is Catholic, since it is sacramentally and critical-prophetically put into action. 6

7

See K. von Stosch, Komparative Theologie als Wegweiser in der Welt der Religionen (Paderborn: Schöningh Verlag, 2012). From among her recent publications, the two most important for this text are: J. Hill Fletcher, Monopoly on Salvation? A Feminist Approach to Religious Pluralism (New York: Continuum, 2005); and ‘A Definition of “Catholic”: Toward a Cosmopolitan Vision’, in M. McGuinness and J. Fisher (eds), Catholic Studies (New York: Fordham University Press, 2011).

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The fourth panellist, Paul Griffiths, took a different view. He thought that comparative theology is certainly interesting, even Catholic, so long as no one expects that comparative dialogue with other religions would contribute anything to Christian revelation. That would, after all, harm the definitive and full character of divine revelation in Jesus Christ. It may be worth the effort to distinguish the similarities and differences between various religious traditions, even to rediscover one’s own tradition as a result of such discussions. But for Griffiths to think that such dialogue would be able to contribute to the Christian understanding of revelation is a bridge too far. ‘Can the Church learn truths as yet unknown from comparative theology? No.’ Foreign texts are never revelation, since they do not satisfy the criterion of the ‘particular intimacy’ that characterizes Christian divine revelation in scripture and tradition. Reading such texts can be legitimate in a theological project, but only under the category of praeparatio evangelica. Altogether, among the panellists there were three different definitions of Catholic theology, each based upon a different understanding of revelation, tradition and church. This became immediately clear when I put the following question to the panel: Why had they not referred in their statements about the Catholic character of comparative theology to the recent ITC document Theology Today – a document that offers criteria, principles and perspectives for doing just that? I argued that this document offers room for thinking about comparative theology as Catholic theology, since it starts with the recognition of the multitude of theological styles and methods, as well as the dialogical character of theology. Paragraph 57 of Theology Today speaks – admittedly too briefly – about dialogue with other religions as important for contemporary theology, in reference to Ad Gentes and Nostra Aetate. Along with the fact that the existence of this document was hardly known among the panellists, their reactions were revealingly varied. Clooney did not admit that he had not read the document, but he said he was very pleased with the document’s appreciation for dialogue with other religions as a locus for theology, even if this appreciation should be further elaborated. Hill Fletcher reacted dismissively. She thinks that theologians can no longer accept the idea that the Catholictheological project is defined by documents coming out of Rome. It is better not to attempt to stretch narrow definitions coming from Rome but to begin working immediately from one’s own definition. Griffiths thought that it was

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enough to point out that the ITC text is not a document from the magisterium and thus is not normative. Where does this leave us? Is this text from the International Theological Commission too narrow and too Roman by definition, because it originates from the context of the Vatican? It is true that Theology Today is not a text from the magisterium, although the ITC is an advisory body of the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, and the prefect of this congregation is its chair. Even so, the text does not simply express the opinion of some individual theologians but that of an internationally assembled committee charged by the church with writing this text. Perhaps for this reason alone the text deserves attention from those who reflect upon what is Catholic theology today.

A critical-empathetic reading The discussion just mentioned informs our reading key for Theology Today: What does a contemporary understanding of Catholic theology involve and what are the criteria used to determine this? Are modern theological developments, new theological trends and methodologies legitimate or not? And is there room for a Catholic comparative theology that is worthy of that name? The ITC document intends on providing a framework for addressing precisely these sorts of questions. After all, the observation that plurality occurs in theology is the document’s starting point. Its assignment then is to indicate the family of characteristics which makes a theology ‘Catholic’. However, theologians usually look sceptically at documents that emanate ‘from Rome’ and concern their own work. Questions spontaneously arise concerning which commands and prohibitions will follow, what warnings will be sounded and what the restrictions will be for theology. They automatically expect limitative pronouncements concerning what is and what certainly is not Catholic – pronouncements characterized by a double exclusivity: (a) who belongs and who does not, and (b) who determines who belongs and who does not. This is almost a natural reflex, and it is fed by many statements from the Vatican in the past few decades concerning theology’s task, theological developments and the work of individual theologians – statements which appear to consist primarily of warnings and prohibitions, judgements and

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condemnations, suspicion and control.8 The introduction to John Paul II’s motu proprio, Ad tuendam fidem (1998) is telling in this regard9: TO PROTECT THE FAITH of the Catholic Church against errors arising from certain members of the Christian faithful, especially from among those dedicated to the various disciplines of sacred theology, we, whose principal duty is to confirm the brethren in the faith (Lk 22:32), consider it absolutely necessary to add to the existing texts of the Code of Canon Law and the Code of Canons of the Eastern Churches, new norms which expressly impose the obligation of upholding truths proposed in a definitive way by the magisterium of the Church, and which also establish related canonical sanctions.

Moreover, documents ‘from Rome’ demand special attention from the reader regarding what precisely is happening in the text. When reading these documents, one needs to be aware of certain often recurring characteristics, for it is usually in relation to such characteristics that the real meaning of texts is to be found. (1) Such documents contain many references to classical notions, understandings, formulations and authors [auctoritates], which stem from the tradition but which are often cited independently from their original text and context. Based on the idea of continuity with the past, such references legitimate the text in the present. For example, documents about theology will be expressly situated in line with classical statements about theology: widely known traditional terminology, lines of argumentation, authors and references make their appearance, and it requires a trained eye to spot the new perspectives precisely in the manner in which they are being used: in which context they are cited, in relation to which other references. Sometimes classical adages and doctrinal formulations are placed in a new comprehensive perspective so they receive a contemporary meaning, or at least are nuanced from the new perspective. On other occasions new elements are inscribed into what at first sounds like a very classical text: for example, when the main sentence sounds extremely classical, a new perspective or nuance appears in the subordinate clause. 8 9

See Chapter 3, Section 2. http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/john_paul_ii/motu_proprio/documents/hf_jp-ii_motuproprio_30061998_ad-tuendam-fidem_en.html (italics mine).

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(2) Such a document is legitimated not only by means of continuity with the past but also by references to and citations from recent magisterial proclamations, which are often limited to recent papal documents. To really grasp the tenor of a text, therefore, it is highly informative to examine precisely who and what is cited, the context from which the citation is taken and the context or perspective in which it is placed. Sometimes an innovative thesis in a new document is reinforced by a citation taken from an older text. In Theology Today, references are made to doctrinal proclamations by John Paul II and Benedict XVI. However, what is most conspicuous and significant are the many references to and citations from texts which came out of the Second Vatican Council. (3) The third characteristic of such documents is their multiple authorship. Due to the diverse styles and perspectives of the contributing authors, these texts show irregularities that can range from stylistic instabilities and other formal inconsistencies to peculiarly constructed arguments, ambiguities and even contradictions. Other theological and political sensitivities and nuances often play a role in the background, as well as opinions concerning what revelation, tradition, church and theology are and how these develop and relate to the current context. All of this means that such texts are not always easily read, and an experienced eye often sees more than what is obvious at first sight. To say it tersely, ‘The devil is in the details.’ This also explains why these texts can be read in more than one way and why recognizing reading keys can be so helpful.10 For whoever reads, does so from specific theological and church political presuppositions and perspectives. In what follows, I focus on a critical-empathetic close reading of the text – completely in line with what theology must be according to the document itself. With special attention to the particular characteristics of such texts, I will examine how Theology Today tries to prove that which, according to our reading, it intends to say: namely, that multiplicity and unity cannot be played off against one another in Catholic theology, but create precisely the room wherein theology itself ventures a ‘faith that seeks understanding’. For the benefit of those who have not seen the text, I will first briefly present the criteria which the document works out. 10

See in this regard also Chapter 6.

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Twelve criteria for good Catholic theology The document has three chapters, in which the first and third chapters have three sections, while the second consists of six sections. Each of these sections ends with the formulation of a criterion by which one can recognize Catholic theology or which should be met in order to be recognized as such. This gives us a total of twelve criteria. The first chapter situates theology in a dynamic of (1) revelation and (2) faith and formulates its task as (3) coming to a rational understanding of Christian faith by scientifically clarifying faith’s response to the historical revelation of God’s Word. On this basis three criteria are identified: Catholic theology: 1. recognises ‘the primacy of the Word of God’, in the multitude of ways in which this is spoken about in Creation and history (TT 9); 2. takes the faith of the Church in response to God’s Word as ‘its source, context and norm’ (TT 15); 3. is faith that ‘in a rational and systematic manner’ searches for understanding (scientia Dei that seeks to understand sub specie Dei) (TT 19).

The second chapter situates theology’s task in the life of the church community and identifies the constitutive interactions (loci theologici) that characterize Catholic theology. Here, we find six criteria: Catholic theology: 4. builds upon, and nourishes itself with, the witness of the canonical scripture (TT 24); 5. shows ‘fidelity to the Apostolic Tradition’, and knows how to deal actively and discerningly with the various forms in which this tradition receives expression (TT 32); 6. concerns itself with the sensus fidelium, which it attempts to articulate and clarify (TT 36); 7. gives ‘responsible adherence’ to the Church magisterium (TT 44); 8. is done in collegial cooperation with ‘the whole company of Catholic theologians in the communion of the Church’ (TT 50); 9. is ‘in constant dialogue with the world’ and ‘should help the Church to read the signs of the times’ in light of the Gospel (TT 58).

In the third and final chapter, the specific profile of theology as the science of faith is further elaborated. Also, in relation to current themes, theology is

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portrayed (1) as a specific scientific enterprise, in relation to philosophical and other scientific rationalities; (2) as a multiform discipline that makes use of a plethora of methods to unfold the one truth and (3) as a combination of science and wisdom affecting all talk about God. Once again three criteria are given: Catholic theology: 10. grows from the productive relationship between faith and reason, and, as ‘scientifically and rationally argued presentation of the truths of the Christian faith’, it avoids both fideism and rationalism (TT 73); 11. recognises ‘the unity of theology in a plurality of methods and disciplines’, the contribution other sciences make to its own project and the importance of critical-scientific dialogue (TT 85); 12. sees the close relationship in theology between science and wisdom, resulting in an attitude which ‘seeks not to possess God but to be possessed by God’: ‘Theology implies a striving for holiness and an everdeeper awareness of the transcendence of the Mystery of God’ (TT 99).

Merely mentioning this list of criteria really does not help our purpose, since the relationship between the different criteria and the individual weight assigned to each is not clarified. We are still left with the question of which perspective to use. Only a close reading – using the reflections given in the previous paragraph – can give us results.

Criteria for Catholic theology: Windows rather than walls? In what follows, we will not discuss each chapter, section or paragraph in extenso; rather, based upon our critical-empathetic approach, we will choose some of the important characteristic passages, arguments and positions. We will follow the order of the text as in the document, giving particular attention to the second chapter.

Introductory paragraphs: Legitimate theological plurality as starting point The first paragraph (TT 1) from the introduction makes the ITC’s starting point clear: the text begins with the legitimacy of various forms of theology.

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Plurality among theologians is the result of new voices, new contexts, new themes and new conversation partners. Moreover, the post-conciliar inspiration here becomes obvious: on the one hand, in descriptive terms, it concerns a theological development during the period after Vatican II; on the other, in normative terms, this theological diversity is a positive development which takes its starting point from the Second Vatican Council. Also, further into the document this commitment to the Second Vatican Council is clearly attested. We will not fail to point this out. At the same time, the first paragraph indicates that diversity can lead to fragmentation and that evidently the church needs a common language. But the document immediately adds ‘to some extent’ (TT 2), a nuancing that is repeated when it mentions the need for ‘a certain unity’ in theology. Furthermore, unity is certainly not to be understood as uniformity, a point emphasized twice (TT 2, 5). In the same paragraph, a theological legitimation is then offered for unity and diversity in theology (TT 2): As it explores the inexhaustible Mystery of God and the countless ways in which God’s grace works for salvation in diverse settings, theology rightly and necessarily takes a multitude of forms, and yet as investigations of the unique truth of the triune God and of the one plan of salvation centred on the one Lord Jesus Christ, this plurality must manifest distinctive family traits.

Later in the document this theological legitimation of both unity and diversity is also repeatedly confirmed (e.g. TT 5, 74, 77).11 From this perspective, the document then justifies the presentation of the criteria and introduces the three chapters (TT 3): in the rich plurality of its expressions, protagonists, ideas and contexts, theology is Catholic, and therefore fundamentally one, if it arises from an attentive listening to the Word of God (cf. Chapter One); if it situates itself consciously and faithfully in the communion of the Church (cf. Chapter 11

From a conversation with one of the co-authors, Adelbert Denaux, I learnt that as far as the unity of theology is concerned, a second theological legitimation was also deliberately included in the text, which is of an ecclesiological nature: the unity of theology is connected with catholicity, apostolicity and holiness, all four together being the four basic characteristics of the church (nota ecclesiae): ‘The unity of theology, like that of the Church, as professed in the Creed, must be closely correlated with the idea of catholicity, and also with those of holiness and apostolicity’ (TT 2).

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Two); and if it is orientated to the service of God in the world, offering divine truth to the men and women of today in an intelligible form (cf. Chapter Three).

According to this introduction, the intended criteria are not meant to restrict theology’s space, but to indicate their unity precisely in the diversity of theological voices, while entering into conversation about unity and diversity. The criteria are a set of stepping stones, or family characteristics, which create room for doing theology in many different ways in relation to new voices, new contexts, new themes, new conversation partners, etc. without falling to pieces. To quote Joseph Ratzinger when he discussed dogma, criteria are not walls which seal out, but windows which open to the rich reality of God’s dialogue with humanity and history.12

The first chapter: The difficult integration of classical theological notions and patterns of reason in the dialogical understanding of revelation in Vatican II In the first paragraph of this first chapter, the text quotes from Verbum Domini, the post-synod exhortation from Pope Benedict XVI written as the conclusion of the 12th synod of bishops in 2008 concerning ‘the Word of God in the life and mission of the Church’, in reference to Dei Verbum, the Dogmatic Constitution on Divine Revelation from the Second Vatican Council (TT 4)13: The novelty of biblical revelation consists in the fact that God becomes known through the dialogue which he desires to have with us.14

In line with Vatican II, the dialogical character of God’s revelation to humanity through creation and history is assumed as a fundamental horizon for every understanding of revelation, tradition, Church and theology.15 From this understanding of revelation, the diversity and unity of theology, together with their interconnection, is legitimated once again (TT 5): 12

13

14

15

J. Ratzinger and V. Messori, Entretien sur la foi, translated from German by E. Gagnon (Paris: Gallimard, 1985), p. 82. In quoting the text from Theology Today, we have also cited footnotes and attendant references verbatim in the footnote apparatus of this chapter. Pope Benedict XVI, Post-Synodal Apostolic Exhortation, Verbum Domini (2010), 6; cf. Dei Verbum 2, 6. See Chapter 1.

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The sheer fullness and richness of that revelation is too great to be grasped by any one theology, and in fact gives rise to multiple theologies as it is received in diverse ways by human beings. … Likewise, the plurality of theologies should not imply fragmentation or discord, but rather the exploration in myriad ways of God’s one saving truth.

Besides references to the New Testament, Dei Verbum is the document most often cited in the rest of the text, as if to accentuate the conciliar perspective. Other documents are also discussed in the footnotes: Verbum Domini, the Catechism of the Catholic Church, Vatican I, John Paul II’s encyclical Fides et Ratio, and various writings by Augustine. Anselm of Canterbury’s classic definition of theology as fides quaerens intellectum (faith seeking understanding) appears in the last paragraph of this chapter. Meanwhile many other classical theological notes and distinctions are cited in passing: the relation between scripture and tradition (TT 8), the connection between tradition and ‘leiturgia (liturgy), martyria (testimony/proclamation) and diakonia (service)’ (TT 7) and that of the Church with koinonia (fellowship) (TT 13), the ‘assistance’ of the Holy Spirit (TT 8), the apostolicity of tradition (TT 10), the connection between revelation and faith (TT 11), the relation between reason and faith in faith understanding (TT 12), and the distinction and connection that flows from these into natural and supernatural knowledge (although not so designated), the difference between and connection of fides qua (act of faith) and fides quae (content of faith) (TT 13), the Augustinian crede ut intellegas (TT  16), and the notions intellectus fidei (TT 17), visio beatifica (TT 17), scientia Dei (TT 18), sub specie Dei (TT 19). All these notions and distinctions appear in a discourse that is fundamentally coloured – so the introduction proposes – by the dynamic and dialogical understanding of revelation from Dei Verbum, where the diversity of theological voices constitutes a theologically legitimate answer. But it proves difficult to pursue this discourse all the way to the end and to extend its perspective to the details. It is obvious that the second section (TT 10–15) looks far more classical than the first, and that the renewed concept of revelation from Vatican II, along with the space for a multiform theology which ensues from such concept, does not expressly resound here. This section hardly takes any step towards creating such space and rather forms a clear and logical but also particularly safe statement of classical notions and distinctions, which could have appeared in a historical document about theology. That the penultimate paragraph (TT 14) concerns

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heresy and uses the rather canonically formed definition from the Catechism of the Catholic Church is then perhaps not really surprising, but fits the tone of this section.16 The third section (TT 16–19) also does not stand out in the further development of what we believe is the actual offering of the document, namely to develop the interconnectedness between the formulation of criteria for Catholic theology, on the one hand, and creating space for diversity in theology on the other. It is not always clear, therefore, whether the first three criteria here prove to be walls rather than windows.

The second chapter: Windows, or walls once more? In the second chapter, the ITC aims at distinguishing between ‘the fundamental reference points for the theological task’, and it offers an updated re-translation of the Melchior Cano’s classical loci theologici17 (TT 20): It is important to know not just the loci but also their relative weight and the relationship between them.

Strangely enough, no further explanation about weighing the loci is given, and the text is not always clear concerning their mutual relation. Does the order of enumeration result from the order of ranking? It is to be expected that scripture and tradition are front and centre. However, it is somewhat surprising that the sensus fidelium is placed third, before the ecclesial magisterium. Mention of dialogue with other theologians and dialogue with the world is most opportune, although – if the sequence is actually important – this last locus remains undervalued. Unless, of course, and we will come back to this later, this dialogue with the world is already long at work in the other loci. From a contemporary perspective on theology – and a dialogical understanding of revelation – it is after all difficult to isolate the dialogue with the world within a sixth domain; such dialogue, it would seem, forms rather a dimension that gives colour to, or should give colour to, all other loci. (1) Placing scripture in front once again positions this chapter fully in the slipstream of the Second Vatican Council, where scripture is described as 16

17

TT 14 refers to CCC 2089: ‘Heresy is the obstinate post-baptismal denial of some truth which must be believed with divine and catholic faith, or it is likewise an obstinate doubt concerning the same.’ In his De locis theologicis, which appeared posthumously in 1563, the Spanish dominican friar Melchior Cano (1509–1560) distinguished between seven loci theologici proprii and three loci theologici alieni vel adscriptitii: the first seven theological sources are: scripture, oral tradition, the Catholic Church, the councils, the Church of Rome (i.e. the pope), the Fathers and the theologians; the three other or auxiliary sources are: natural reason, philosophy and history.

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‘the very soul of sacred theology’.18 Once again, the majority and most explicit references are taken from Dei Verbum, and to a lesser extent also from Verbum Domini. Also, there are a few references to the document from the Pontifical Biblical Commission, The Interpretation of the Bible in the Church. Completely in line with Dei Verbum, the role of historical–critical exegesis and of other exegetical methods is expressly acknowledged, including the conviction that justice can only be done methodologically to the historicity of revelation in such a manner (TT 22). With a sensibly chosen quotation from Verbum Domini, stress is placed on the necessary function of historical–critical exegesis for arriving at a truly theological interpretation of the scriptures. At the same time, the need for such a theological interpretation is also indicated. Only where both methodological levels, the historico-critical and the theological, are respected, can one speak of a theological exegesis, an exegesis worthy of this book.19

The possibilities for ecumenical cooperation, which exist whenever Bible study is more central to the whole of theology, is also emphasized (TT 23).20 This section is a beautiful and nuanced example of how establishing the norm (arriving at a truly theological interpretation of the Bible) is associated with the creation of space for a methodologically multiform, contemporary theology – the one not without the other. (2) Another example is provided (although not without textual unevenness) in the following section devoted to ‘fidelity to Apostolic Tradition’. Here, we will examine the text in greater detail. This section begins with promise and puts forth a broad understanding of tradition in which – with reference to Acts 2:42 – the lex orandi (the rule of prayer), lex credendi (the rule of faith) and lex vivendi (the rule of life) belong together (TT 25). In the next paragraph, the process of tradition formation is historically dynamically characterized as being ‘in the power of the Holy Spirit’ (TT 26): Tradition is therefore something living and vital, an ongoing process in which the unity of faith finds expression in the variety of languages and the diversity of cultures. It ceases to be Tradition if it fossilises. 18 19 20

DV 24. Verbum Domini 34. Once again in reference to Verbum Domini: ‘shared listening to the Scriptures … spurs us on towards the dialogue of charity and enables growth in the dialogue of truth’ (VD 37).

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The section then describes important moments in the formation of the tradition and refers first to the Church Fathers whose writings constitute ‘a specific reference point’ for theology. Here, as well, space and diversity are again emphasized in the expression of the one faith (TT 27): The Tradition known and lived by the Fathers was multi-faceted and pulsing with life, as can be seen from the plurality of liturgical families and of spiritual and exegetical-theological traditions (e.g. in the schools of Alexandria and Antioch), a plurality firmly anchored and united in the one faith.

Then the ecumenical councils are mentioned and, in reference to Lumen gentium, the magisterium of pope and bishops as well (TT 28). The following paragraph looks at the special status of dogmas. Once again the affirmation of the norm is connected with the creation of space for interpretation and inquiry (TT 29). First the norm is stated: Catholic theology recognises the teaching authority of ecumenical councils, the ordinary and universal magisterium of the bishops, and the papal magisterium. It acknowledges the special status of dogmas, that is, statements ‘in which the Church proposes a revealed truth definitively, and in a way that is binding for the universal Church, so much so that denial is rejected as heresy and falls under an anathema’.21

Then the space is expressed: Dogmas belong to the living and ongoing Apostolic Tradition. Theologians are aware of the difficulties that attend their interpretation. For example, it is necessary to understand the precise question under consideration in light of its historical context, and to discern how a dogma’s meaning and content are related to its formulation.22

However, it appears as if the authors of the document are suddenly shocked by the room this provides and therefore try to limit its scope, for the last sentence resounds in reaction to the previous sentence (notice the ‘nevertheless’): Nevertheless, dogmas are sure points of reference for the Church’s faith and are used as such in theological reflection and argumentation. 21

22

International Theological Commission, The Interpretation of Dogma (1990), B, III, 3; cf. Theological Pluralism (1972), nn. 6–8, 10–12. Cf. Pope John XXIII, ‘Allocutio in Concilii Vaticani inauguratione’, AAS 84 (1962): 792; Vaticanum II, Gaudium et Spes 62. For a detailed consideration of the whole question, see: International Theological Commission, The Interpretation of Dogma.

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After a paragraph concerning the unity between scripture, tradition and magisterium (TT 30), a paragraph follows regarding the relationship between Tradition and traditions (TT 31), where something strange happens once again. On the one hand, the distinction – in the form of a question – is used to legitimate tradition criticism: Is it possible to determine more precisely what the content of the one Tradition is, and by what means? Do all traditions which claim to be Christian contain the Tradition? How can we distinguish between traditions embodying the true Tradition and merely human traditions? Where do we find the genuine Tradition, and where impoverished tradition or even distortion of tradition?23

And then a nuanced indication is given that Tradition finds its expression precisely in concrete traditions: On one hand, theology must show that Apostolic Tradition is not something abstract, but that it exists concretely in the different traditions that have formed within the Church. On the other hand, theology has to consider why certain traditions are characteristic not of the Church as a whole, but only of particular religious orders, local Churches or historical periods.

But then, as if the ‘Apostolic Tradition’ somehow exists independently of the concrete traditions in which it finds expression, this follows: While criticism is not appropriate with reference to Apostolic Tradition itself, traditions must always be open to critique, so that the ‘continual reformation’ of which the Church has need24 can take place, and so that the Church can renew herself permanently on her one foundation.

Once again, precisely in a paragraph where the possibility unfolds of a legitimate critique of tradition (and is in fact strongly accentuated25), there suddenly emerges a trace of essentialism regarding the ‘Apostolic Tradition’, 23

24 25

Scripture, Tradition and Traditions, in P. C. Rodger and Lukas Vischer (eds), The Fourth World Conference on Faith and Order: Montreal 1963 (New York: Association Press, 1964), n. 48, p. 52. Strictly speaking, as this document indicates, Tradition (with a capital ‘T’) and tradition (with a small ‘t’) may also be distinguished: Tradition is ‘the Gospel itself, transmitted from generation to generation in and by the Church’, ‘Christ himself present in the life of the Church’; and tradition is ‘the traditionary process’ (n. 39, p. 50). Cf. Unitatis Redintegratio 6 See the continuation of this paragraph (TT 31): ‘Such a critique seeks to verify whether a specific tradition does indeed express the faith of the Church in a particular place and time, and it seeks correspondingly to strengthen or correct it through contact with the living faith of all places and all times.’

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threatening to put between brackets the historical-dynamic definition of ‘Tradition’, in which the latter is not an abstract entity but receives expression precisely in traditions. The concluding paragraph combines once again the norm with the creation of space for the theological endeavour: fidelity to the apostolic tradition demands an active discernment in order to take into consideration the diverse witnesses and expressions of that tradition (TT 32). (3) We have already reported the interesting fact that ‘attention for the sensus fidelium’ is ranked before the criterion of the magisterium. The faithful people of God is the subject of faith. One cannot help but notice the double, explicit legitimation here from Lumen Gentium and Dei Verbum: twice Theology Today affirms that the believing people of God come before the bishops and the magisterium (TT 33). Of course, the sensus fidelium should be correctly understood; it is not simply about whatever the majority of believers accept, nor is it about simply establishing whatever the magisterium teaches (TT 34). The sensus fidelium is the sensus fidei of the people of God as a whole who are obedient to the Word of God and are led in the ways of faith by their pastors. So the sensus fidelium is the sense of the faith that is deeply rooted in the people of God who receive, understand and live the Word of God in the Church.

Dealing in a critical-constructive way with the sensus fidelium is an important task for theology and requires sensitivity; for example, paying attention to popular piety, new movements and intellectual movements requires a criticaltheological investigation (TT 35): Theologians help to clarify and articulate the content of the sensus fidelium, recognising and demonstrating that issues relating to the truth of faith can be complex, and that investigation of them must be precise. … Theologians’ critical assessments must always be constructive; they must be given with humility, respect and charity.

Further along in the document the sensus fidelium appears as a powerful locus of theology. According to Theology Today, an end to the church’s difficult, oppositional relationship with modernity came only when the sensus fidelium, which supported a more dialogical relation with the world, was received at the Second Vatican Council (TT 55).

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(4) In the title to the next section, ‘Responsible adherence to the ecclesial magisterium’, one cannot help noticing the qualification ‘responsible’. It is not theology’s task to simply repeat what the magisterium teaches, nor to withdraw itself from magisterial teaching. This section offers an extremely nuanced explanation where the magisterium and theology are placed, as far as possible, in a productive relation, and the space for theology is better defined than was previously the case. Still – and perhaps not surprisingly – we get a repeated back-and-forth movement between creating room for theology and its subsequent limitation by the magisterium. The relation of the magisterium to theology is soberly described primarily within a perspective of fruitful cooperation. Both stand under the Word of God (once again in reference to Dei Verbum) and both have a common mission, but at the same time have their own goals as well: theology studies and articulates; the magisterium proclaims (TT 37–8). In the following paragraphs, this mutual relationship is very carefully worked out. Time and again a clear affirmation is heard of the magisterium’s place with respect to theology and a sharp demarcation is, therefore, made (‘there is no place for parallel, opposing or alternative magisteria’), but, at the same time, more room is made for theology’s role with respect to the magisterium in the nuancing (there is ‘a certain “magisterium” of theologians’). We give three examples of this back-and-forth. (a) The magisterium needs theology to substantiate the theological quality of its own positions (TT 39): On the one hand, the magisterium needs theology in order to demonstrate in its interventions not only doctrinal authority, but also theological competence and a capacity for critical evaluation, so theologians should be called upon to assist with the preparation and formulation of magisterial pronouncements.

The poor theological quality of a number of statements made by the magisterium is a common criticism levelled by theologians. As was already indicated, the notificatio issued against Jon Sobrino in 2006 is very illustrative in this respect. The notificatio did not take into account any of the theological developments of the last fifty years and developed a deductive argumentation, which suffers from a remarkable lack of hermeneutical–theological awareness.26 Attention 26

See Chapter 3, Section 2.

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paid to the theological quality of doctrinal interventions certainly would have mitigated much of the theologians’ frustration. However, it then immediately states (‘On the other hand’) that theologians must appreciate the magisterium’s positive role, up to and including doctrinal interventions. In Chapter 3, I have argued that such interventions do not always benefit theology, especially if they interfere prematurely in ongoing theological conversations: they silence the self-correcting character of the discussion between theologians and cause legitimation problems for theology in the modern university. (b) Even though the magisterium has its own role, one that is not assumed by theology, it certainly is theology’s role to thoroughly distinguish between the various levels of doctrinal speech and to give ‘a correspondingly differentiated response’ (TT 40). Indeed, precisely because of this differentiation between levels, there ‘always’ is room for ‘constructively critical evaluation and comment’ (TT 41): While ‘dissent’ towards the magisterium has no place in Catholic theology, investigation and questioning is justified and even necessary if theology is to fulfil its task.27

But immediately afterwards, in this same paragraph, the border is sharply focused: theologians may not express merely formal or outward consent with the magisterium. (c) Then in the next paragraph space is created once again. It is said about bishops – perhaps a bit too optimistically – that they appeal to theological expertise when formulating their instruction and policy, that they participate in theological conferences and that they support theological faculties in their dioceses. With reference to Newman, it is stated that tensions between theology and the magisterium need not be immediately assessed as problematic, but are rather signs of life. Such tensions result from dynamic interaction, bear witness to vitality and call for dialogue (TT 42). In the conclusion, however, suddenly there is no more talk about this dynamic interaction, and an apparently simple subordination of theology to the magisterium follows (TT 44): Giving responsible adherence to the magisterium in its various gradations is a criterion of Catholic theology. Catholic theologians should recognise the 27

Donum Veritatis 21–41.

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competence of bishops, and especially of the college of bishops headed by the pope, to give an authentic interpretation of the Word of God handed on in Scripture and Tradition.28

Perhaps this back-and-forth movement abundantly illustrates that, no matter how nuanced and carefully the ITC document discusses this criterion, the relation between magisterium and theology is a persistent point of pain in the church. From the perspective of theology, this remains an issue with respect to content (the theological quality of magisterial proclamations and ecclesial decisions), as well as with respect to discipline (the asymmetric power relations which in times of conflict especially work against the theologian29). Finally, in passing, Theology Today correctly criticizes the sterile opposition between so-called ‘scientific’ and ‘confessional’ theology, within the framework of a short note about the freedom of the theologian (TT 43), a discussion that surfaces once again later in the document. (5) The presentation of the fifth locus, ‘In the company of theologians,’ offers once again a dialectical game between space and limitation. The section starts off quite open, but then closes itself off: windows turn into walls. In the final paragraph, this section concludes once more with openness. The first paragraphs situate theology at the crossroads of the church and the academy and present a very realistic picture of the way in which cooperation (TT 45) and interdisciplinarity (TT 46) help move the theological discipline forward. Moreover, this cross-fertilization by working ‘at the frontiers of the Church’s experience and reflection’ is appreciated as a chance to understand the faith ‘in new circumstances or in the face of new issues’. In particular, the contribution of the growing number of lay theologians, who stand on the bridge between church and world more so than priests or religious, is hereby commended (TT 47). However, a warning immediately follows, in the same paragraph! The authors appear to be somewhat frightened by the deep trust they place in the contribution of lay theologians. Therefore, for this new kind of theology, 28 29

Cf. Lumen Gentium 22, 25. The lack of transparency and reciprocity in procedures of imposing nihil obstat and condemnations of the work of individual theologians remains a persistent point of critique for theologians; see for example: Hinze, Decade of Disciplining Theologians, pp. 33–6; see especially in this article many references to other determinations handed down, as well as to other contributions in the anthology: When the magisterium Intervenes.

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careful adherence to the fundamental criteria of Catholic theology is especially important in such circumstances. Theologians should always recognise the intrinsic provisionality of their endeavours, and offer their work to the Church as a whole for scrutiny and evaluation.30

Here, the criteria for good Catholic theology are clearly understood as walls rather than windows. Also, the next section is bathed in a very strange atmosphere of openness and suspicion. On the one hand, the instruments for theological quality control are indicated, such as the disputatio and peer review. On the other, [because] it can be a slow and private process, and, especially in these days of instant communication and dissemination of ideas far beyond the strictly theological community, it would be unreasonable to imagine that this selfcorrecting mechanism suffices in all cases.

And precisely for this reason, the text continues, bishops must be able to intervene (TT 48). As if the modern media has already rushed past theology and its self-correcting power, without introducing new forms of theological quality control (e-reviews, blogs, etc.). That such a process of theological quality control would be individual and slow stands in sharp contrast to what was previously stated about cooperation between theologians. As this section ends, again more attention is paid to creating room for ecumenical conversation, research and dialogue. Theologians are called ambassadors of their church community who owe a ‘particular adherence to the criteria outlined here’ (TT 49). (6) Finally, this chapter mentions dialogue with the world as a locus theologicus. This section is really a very nicely written text, resolutely crafted within the spirit of Vatican II, without any restrictions. It constitutes, as it were, an opportune inclusion with the first section of the second chapter about scripture. The Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World, Gaudium et Spes, especially determines the tone of the text, in particular, the call to read ‘the signs of the times ... and of interpreting them in the light of the Gospel’ (TT 51). Because the church lives on the intersection between the Gospel and everyday life, since it is part of human history, it is called to be a 30

Cf. Donum Veritatis 11.

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dialogical church (TT 52, 54). And precisely for this reason theology should also be dialogical theology (TT 53): Theology has a particular competence and responsibility in this regard. Through its constant dialogue with the social, religious and cultural currents of the time, and through its openness to other sciences which, with their own methods examine those developments, theology can help the faithful and the magisterium to see the importance of developments, events and trends in human history, and to discern and interpret ways in which through them the Spirit may be speaking to the Church and to the world.

The church is part of history and should recognize its own historicity (TT 54). This means that the church is involved in a constant learning process. In this way, the document states that the church did not always adequately (but often ‘overly cautious[ly]’) react to the developments and ambiguity which characterize history, and this was certainly the case in the modern era (TT 55). However, such attitudes have gradually changed thanks to the sensus fidei of the People of God, the clear sight of prophetic individual believers, and the patient dialogue of theologians with their surrounding cultures. A better discernment in the light of the Gospel has been made, with a greater readiness to see how the Spirit of God may be speaking through such events.

The rest of the text underlines the importance of dialogue with the world for the church itself and zooms in on theology’s role in tracing and developing connections between faith and culture (TT 56). The painstaking work to establish profitable links with other disciplines, sciences and cultures so as to enhance that light and broaden those avenues is the particular task of theologians, and the discernment of the signs of the times presents great opportunities for theological endeavour, notwithstanding the complex hermeneutical issues that arise.

This paragraph ends by recalling the important role theologians have played in the realization of the teaching of Vatican II. Thanks to the work of many theologians, Vatican II was able to acknowledge various signs of the times in connection with its own teaching.31 31

See Second Vatican Council, Sacrosanctum Concilium 43, Unitatis Redintegratio 4, Dignitatis Humanae 15, Apostolicum Actuositatem 14, Presbyterorum Ordinis 9.

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The penultimate paragraph is the one to which we have already referred in the first section of this contribution (TT 57): dialogue with the world also involves dialogue with other cultures and religions.32 And this dialogue is also a specific task for theology.

Chapter 3: The borders of theology as a rational undertaking In the third chapter, Theology Today discusses a number of themes connected with theology as ‘a rational, human endeavour’. Once again we indicate some important passages, including irregularities, where our reading key jolts us as we examine where and how space is made for Catholic theology. Theology emerges as a dialogical reality in these passages, limited but also inspired by its own nature. (1) In the first section about the rationality and scientific nature of theology, theology’s dialogical character – with which the prior chapter ended – is further illustrated. First, it is clearly stated that, on the one hand, reason helps faith become more insightful, but does not do away with the decision to come to faith; on the other, faith challenges reason as well (TT 63). A historical overview then follows, which shows how theology has maintained a constant dialogue with contemporary expressions of philosophy (TT 65–71): from this dialogue, theology has repeatedly shaped itself as a form of science and rationality without, however, denying its difference from ordinary forms of science and rationality. The problematization of the relationship between faith and reason from the end of the Middle Ages into modernity is explicitly mentioned, as well as theology’s self-critique in this respect. Strikingly, the defensive reaction towards the Enlightenment and the impoverishment of the Catholic understanding of revelation are mentioned, as well as the productive results gained whenever theological dialogue with philosophy did take place – which then finally resulted in the renewed understanding of revelation at Vatican II, to which the text implicitly refers (TT 70): At its best, however, Catholic theology also sought a constructive dialogue with the Enlightenment and with its philosophical criticism. With reference to Scripture and Church teaching, the merely ‘instructional’ idea of revelation was criticised theologically, and the idea of revelation was reshaped in terms 32

In this regard, the document refers respectively to Ad Gentes 11 and Nostra Aetate 2.

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of the self-revelation of God in Jesus Christ, such that history could still be understood as the place of God’s saving acts.

The new challenge for theology today is to dialogue with a philosophy that has become extremely plural, due to the postmodern crisis of classical understandings of truth and rationality (TT 71). Nevertheless, even though the metaphysical orientation that was important for ‘former models of Catholic theology’ has disappeared, Catholic theology is interested … in dialogue about the question of God and truth with all contemporary philosophies.

This last sentence is very remarkable in itself, as is certainly the word ‘all’. This is all the more the case when we notice in the next paragraph that dialogue with contemporary postmodern philosophies is legitimized by bringing John Paul II’s Fides et Ratio into the argument (TT 72). As the next chapter in this book with show, traces of openness to contemporary philosophy are certainly to be found in this encyclical, but the overall tenor, nevertheless, is that ever since modernity the relationship between faith and reason has gone wrong, primarily from the side of reason. The other reference in this chapter to this encyclical (TT 64) exhibits a much more premodern–sounding harmonious approach between faith and reason, theology and philosophy33. This is inserted in a paragraph that pushes the theological maxim that faith and reason cannot contradict each other, because of the fact that truth is one and originates from the same divine source – a claim that much of contemporary philosophy will find difficult to accept. (2) The next section goes even deeper into ‘the unity of theology in a plurality of methods and disciplines’. Once again the text emphasizes the fact and legitimacy of plurality in theology (TT 74, 76–7) and of the question regarding its unity (TT 78). Theology’s plurality is related to its internal specialization in subdisciplines, to the diversity of theological forms of thought and methods (which arise out of dialogue with other sciences), and to the plurality of different persons, places, perspectives, contexts, interests and cultures which play a role in the theological enterprise (TT 76). The document 33

Cf.: ‘ The dialogue between faith and reason, between theology and philosophy, is therefore required not only by faith but also by reason, as Pope John Paul explains in Fides et Ratio’ (TT 64, italics mine).

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notes two important elements in the search for unity: the existence of a common theological tradition and the internal–theological interdisciplinary conversation. It is noticeable that in both cases the document continues to stress that both elements in no way restrict either space or plurality in theology. Once again, norm and space go together (TT 79–80). It is true that certain aspects of prior theological tradition can and must sometimes be abandoned, but the work of the theologian can never dispense with a critical reference to the tradition that went before. Dialogue and interdisciplinary collaboration are indispensable means of ensuring and expressing the unity of theology. The singular, ‘theology’, by no means indicates a uniformity of styles or concepts; rather, it serves to indicate a common search for truth.

Then, Theology Today further explores the space for Catholic theology and notes that many other scientific dialogue partners present themselves, along with philosophy. On the one hand, theology should respect the integrity of the other sciences, in a critical-productive way, but, on the other, it cannot allow itself to be reduced to these sciences. What is needed is theological contact with results gained from other scientific methodologies (TT 81). The theologian should indeed take up and utilise the data supplied by other disciplines, but in light of theology’s own proper principles and methods.

From this perspective, it is logical that the document then goes into the relationship between theology and religious sciences and indicates the difference between them, as well as the need for dialogue (TT 83). Analogous to the document’s earlier statement regarding the false difference between scientific (objective) theology and confessional (ecclesial) theology, the text also rightly refuses a similar dichotomy in terms of scientific religious studies and non-scientific theology.34 To this point, the next paragraph adds the critique of an ideological scientific atheism, and the document points out the special role of Catholic theology in the university, in particular to warn against absolutizing scientific rationality (TT 84). As a relatively strange insertion, paragraph 82 is somewhere in-between, stating that philosophy, as of old, still plays a necessary mediating role in 34

As Chapters 3 and 6 of this book show, this is an important position in the current worldwide university context.

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theology’s involvement with the other sciences. This paragraph not only stands in tension with the previous paragraph, which concerns precisely theology’s direct dialogue with other partners, but it clashes as well with the previous section’s theme that contemporary philosophy itself is internally pluralized (TT 71). (3) The last section of the document clarifies the relationship between science and wisdom in the theological project and the invitation that thereby emerges ‘to recognise the transcendence of the ultimate Truth, which can never be fully grasped or mastered’ (TT 86). After a beautiful biblical reflection on wisdom (TT 87–9), there follows a statement about how wisdom adds a moral and spiritual dimension to theology (TT 90) and why theological study presupposes a spiritual life, while at the same time forming the critical touchstone of the authenticity of such spiritual life (TT 92). Theology’s spiritual character in no way contradicts its scientific character (TT 93). From the perspective of our reading key, paragraphs 95–9 form a suitable ending. Since theology is wisdom, it exceeds purely rational and systematic thinking, and this creates space for dialogue, including with other religious wisdom traditions (TT 95). Even more, because of this, theology is also aware of the limits of what it can say about God and thus of the negative-theological perspective within which it works (TT 96), although negative theology itself should also not be misunderstood (e.g. as a denial of theology) and set free from positive theology (TT 97). Certainly, in a context such as ours, it is important to indicate the particularity of God’s revelation in Jesus Christ (TT 98). In the concluding paragraph (TT 100), the text recalls its objective and speaks about the joy and passion of being a theologian.

General assessment The person who expects a catalogue of rules for Catholic theology will not be satisfied by Theology Today. The document tries to authentically develop a theological perspective of what theology is, primarily inspired by a specific understanding of revelation, tradition, church and theology, that – in line with Vatican II – is strongly dialogical in approach. This is certainly not

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without merit. Because God’s revelation in creation and history is understood as a dialogical reality, a dialogical church is needed, along with a dialogical theology. For the sake of theology itself, it should actively engage in a dialogue with philosophy, religious studies, the other sciences, and involve itself in an interdisciplinary conversation. For the sake of theology itself, theologians, from their commitment to scripture, tradition, the magisterium and in conversation with their colleagues worldwide, should engage in the dialogue with the world as locus for theology and thereby recognize the sensus fidelium as a source for theological reflection. Of course, the strong impetus from the principal documents from the Second Vatican Council is not without importance, and certainly not in a time when this council’s inheritance is open for discussion. Theology Today clearly chooses to protect the fruits that Vatican II gleaned from the aggiornamento and ressourcement movements. At the same time, it is an asset that this was the council where theologians played a prominent role – something praised in the document itself.35 Even though many of these theologians often had problems with the magisterium before the council convened, nevertheless, they profoundly changed the face of the church in the documents of Vatican II through the insights they obtained through the dialogue between tradition and the modern world. It is also clear that Theology Today does not offer any spectacularly new perspectives for those who do theology today. The majority of Catholic theologians consider much of what it says about theology as already achieved, thus no longer a starting point for further development. Yet it must be said: all in all, this document makes more room for theology than theologians’ stated scepticism regarding documents from Rome should allow. More than in other cases, the document assumes an appreciation for and trust in theology (even though traces to the contrary are still present). In this sense it remains a remarkable document, which is worth the trouble of reading, by theologians, but certainly also by church leaders, and – to the extent that they are familiar with the often high-church theological vocabulary – also by university administrators. 35

For a recent lexicon of the most important participants, theologians and church leaders, see M. Quisinsky and P. Walter (eds), Personenlexikon zum Zweiten Vatikanischen Konzil (Freiburg im Br.: Herder, 2012).

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The text certainly has its merits but also its drawbacks. Besides a number of limitations inherent to the genre (see Part 2), we will briefly discuss three other interrelated issues in this assessment. (1) First, there is the locus theologicus of the dialogue with the world. For clarity’s sake: with the term locus – a term derived from the tradition – the authors mean a ‘fundamental reference point’ that qualifies the theological task. We indicated that the document does not really devote itself to a discussion of the relative weight of the loci with respect to each other (TT 20). However positive and surprising the mention of dialogue with the world at first sight might be, we already stated that this dialogue appears to be undervalued in the document, unless this would already be at work in the other loci. After all, if it is true that the church is a historical reality (TT 54) and continually moves in the intersection between evangelization and daily life (TT 52); if it is true that theology lives from the true interdisciplinary dialogue with philosophy, religious studies and other sciences (TT Chapter 3) and its historical form and failings are hereby connected (TT 70); if it is true that dialogue means more than confirming one’s identity, but also involves questioning, critique and renewal (TT 56): if all of this is true, then dialogue with the world is not simply a locus but rather determines the background in which theology involves itself with the other loci in its reflection upon God’s revelation in creation and history. In addition, the reference to how the sensus fidelium, prophetic voices and theologians’ patient dialogue with surrounding cultures have allowed the church to come to terms with its relationship to modernity (TT 55) illustrates this point. Finally, this also explains the document’s interest in the (dialogical) texts from Vatican II. Revelation, faith, tradition, church and theology are the fruit of dialogue with the world and find themselves again only as they continue to engage in this dialogue. Furthermore, if a larger plurality exists within theology today, it is precisely because of increased interest in dialogue with the world. According to Theology Today (TT 1), the diversification of theology results from the fact that there are new theological voices, that is, ‘laymen and women’. Later in the document it is precisely stated that they, rather than priests and religious, have experience with ‘particular areas of interaction between the Church and the world’ and are busy with ‘an initial articulation of “faith seeking understanding” in new circumstances or in the face of new issues’ (TT 47) (but we noted that this was

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quickly followed by a warning). Moreover, there are new contexts (for theology is now practised around the world), new themes (‘such as peace, justice, liberation, ecology and bioethics’) and new conversation partners that prompt theology towards ecumenical, interreligious and intercultural dialogue (TT 1). Later in the document, the list of causes for theological pluralization is further filled in: along with internal theological specialization, the document points, on the one hand, to the various philosophical and scientific conversation partners that carry out methodologically different theological ways of thinking, and, on the other, to the increasing number of ‘subjects, places, institutions, intentions, contexts and interests’ and a ‘new appreciation of the plurality and variety of cultures’ (TT 76). Time and again, it is the dialogue between the church and a conversation partner which was the other of the church, faith and theology, that has challenged theology, through a plurality of voices, to take up its task of ‘faith seeking understanding’. (2) In light of this first observation, of course, it is striking that Theology Today is written almost entirely from the church’s viewpoint. This should hardly surprise anyone if one considers that the ITC, itself an advisory body of the church, is the author of the Theology Today, and recalls that this document is primarily meant to answer a question posed by the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith. At the same time, such an approach does not address the entire reality in which Catholic theology is practised. Rather than being the church’s instrument to engage with the university and the world (i.e. culture and society), theology stands today at the intersection of church, university and culture/society.36 Earlier we indicated that, through sociocultural developments (such as secularization and religious pluralization), theology has shifted to the margins in these three different places, rather than standing in the centre. Such marginalization puts theology under pressure as an academic discipline and as relevant for the current culture and society, and it threatens to shove theology back inside the church. This is pernicious both for theology and for the church, because it robs both of the conversation partners who are vital for a dialogical church and theology. Only if theology is prepared once again to develop its credibility and relevance at this crossroads will it be able to fulfil its role with respect to each of these three realities – including the 36

See Chapter 3.

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church. The fact that theology is pushed to the margins in each of these three realities, then, is not only a problem, but offers possibilities, as well, for taking up its task in a renewed fashion as a critical-reflective partner in the church, university and society. (3) Our most important observation regarding Theology Today builds upon the two previous critical thoughts: the document too easily presents the diversity of theological ways of thought and methodologies side by side, as if it does not matter which way of theological thinking one chooses. In this respect, the understanding of both diversity and unity remains too formal and too abstract. So the document too easily relativizes the various theological claims made in different theologies (after all, isn’t it the same single truth?). It too quickly forgets that such claims are certainly made by various voices within this theological plurality for the whole of theology. Often these claims have to do with the context and manner in which this theology took shape. Usually there is a particular underlying situation of injustice or alienation, or a compelling challenge, complaint or question to which the theologian and his/her project of clarification of faith is not indifferent. Consequently, the multitude of theologies does not simply form a harmonic choir with many voices, but rather aims at a critical interaction with consequences for the whole of theology. For hermeneutical theologians, for example, the meaning of a foundational religious text cannot be read apart from its historical context; political theologians see every theology woven into a theory-praxis-dialectic; for non-Western theologians all theology is irreducibly contextual (including Western theology); for feminist thinkers, the development of inclusive thought and speech is an assignment for every theology (and not simply for feminist theologies); for liberation theologians, any theology that does not pay attention to social injustice and structural sin is self-deceptive; for postmodern and postcolonial thinkers, all theologies should be aware of the power relations in which they are inextricably interwoven; for ecumenical and interreligious theologians, theology can only be credible when it refuses to cut itself off from dialogue with the Christian and religious other. The unity of theology, therefore, does not manifest itself simply in many voices, but requires one to engage the various claims on that unity which sound in the multitude of voices. Obviously, this will be the object of theological self-critique and reformulation, exchange and discussion, testing and further refinement. Catholic theology

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today, therefore, should certainly question itself according to the twelve criteria named by the document, but, at the same time, it cannot evade the lessons to be drawn from the multitude of theological voices. Because these lessons also concern the unity of theology and determine its future. Finally, we return to the case with which we opened this contribution: ‘Is comparative theology Catholic?’ We can now offer our conclusion: it is, at least in the manner in which the three panellists described this theological approach during the American Academy of Religion discussion session. At the same time, a fortiori, because it makes central the dialogical principle of revelation, tradition, church and theology, and opens theology to a penetrating new question: How does God reveal Godself today in (our comparative reading of) religious foundational texts and in (our study of) interreligious contacts and communication? And which forms of theology are attentive to such a revelation (but also, which are not)?

5

The Swan or the Dove? On the Difficult Dialogue between Theology and Philosophy

Faith and reason are like two wings on which the human spirit rises to the contemplation of truth; and God has placed in the human heart a desire to know the truth – in a word, to know himself – so that, by knowing and loving God, men and women may also come to the fullness of truth about themselves.1

With the encyclical Fides et Ratio, John Paul II was making it clear, once again – so wrote Newsweek journalist Kenneth Woodward on 26 October 1998 – that his legacy as a Christian humanist was more important (and broader) than his occasional, and often reported, statements on abortion or birth control. In the twentieth year of his pontificate, the philosopher Karol Wojtyla once was before his election as primate of the Catholic Church surfaced powerfully once again. Even though the encyclical just barely addresses contemporary philosophical perspectives and their possible fruitfulness for a contemporary understanding of faith, it must be considered a great encouragement for many Christian intellectuals who emphasize the importance of reason for faith. So wrote Woodward. Other observers, philosophers and theologians have evaluated the encyclical in similar terms.2 According to their estimation of the lack of connection with 1

2

Preface to the ‘Encyclical Letter “Fides et Ratio” of the Supreme Pontiff John Paul II to the Bishops of the Catholic Church on the Relationship between Faith and Reason’, issued in Rome on 14 September 1998 (http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/john_paul_ii/encyclicals/documents/hf_jp-ii_ enc_15101998_fides-et-ratio_en.html). See, for example, Johannes Paul II.: Enzyklika über Glaube und Vernunft, in Herder Korrespondenz 52 (1998): 548–9; S. Muratore, Fides et Ratio – Un’integrazione possible, in Rassegna di teologia 39 (1998): 805–12; B. Sorge, L’enciclica ‘Fides et Ratio’, in Aggiornamenti Sociali 49 (1998): 823–8. Also see W. Beinert, Uni-Versalität der Theologie, in Stimmen der Zeit (1999): 161–8, 217. A strongly sympathetic reading from Cardinal Ratzinger’s own hand appeared as Die Einheit des Glaubens und die Vielfalt der Kulturen – Reflexionen im Anschluß an die Enzyklika ‘Fides et Ratio’, in Una VoceKorrespondenz 29 (1999): 3–12; see as well his Culture and Truth: Reflections on the Encyclical, in Origins 28 (1999): 625–31.

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contemporary philosophy, or a rejection of such, this varies from a moderately positive to a (very) negative reception. Commentators, who come to a relatively negative estimate, note that the encyclical’s own reasoning mortgages, in advance, a contemporary challenging and fruitful description of the relation between faith/theology and philosophy, making it even impossible. They especially criticize the inability or unwillingness to take modern philosophy seriously, and they recoil from falling back on premodern forms of philosophy or the massive emphasis on an often propositionally understood revelation. Others allow that the encyclical seems to contain two or more models. In this connection, they point out, on the one hand, a rather contemporaneous and open vision, on the other, a premodern sounding closed vision of what faith and theology are; they indicate text fragments showing a willingness to dialogue without conditions, on the one hand, and others subordinating reason to faith and revelation, on the other; they point to the different evaluations of modern philosophy in the encyclical, from rigid rejection and condemnation, on the one hand, to recognition and being challenged, on the other; etc. In what follows, I intend to engage in a theological reading of the encyclical. Such a reading (as the encyclical describes theology’s task) begins from the perspective of the believer searching for insight (FR 39, 65, 93): it wants to think from the option of faith, to stand under revelation and to be rooted in the Christian tradition. Theology presupposes reason’s contribution, from philosophy. The presentation of a theological reading, however, involves, at the same time and necessarily, a particular understanding of the relationship between faith and reason. Since every good (fundamental) theology has already involved itself with philosophy (FR 67), a theological reading of the encyclical takes, in advance, a position in the debate. Therefore, a reading of the encyclical provides as much insight into the papal document on faith and reason as it does into the reader’s own standpoint. Furthermore, in order to correctly understand the following observations, one should also note that, for a theologian who confesses membership in the Catholic Church, this encyclical (like all encyclicals) enjoys a special status, since it originates in magisterial teaching. Fides et Ratio is not simply a glorified classroom text dragged out of the dusty archives by an old Polish man, who taught philosophy a long time ago. Whatever their assessment of this document may be, Catholic theologians, because of their connection with

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Catholic tradition, cannot read Fides et Ratio as a neutral text. An encyclical is a significant expression of the authentic teaching of the ordinary magisterium of the pope. Each evaluation of such is invested by their commitment to and engagement in that tradition.3 Here, I first give the document’s formal structure; then I will elaborate, illustrate and evaluate two possible ways of reading the pope’s view on faith and philosophy (making use of a closed and an open reading key respectively).

Fides et Ratio in brief In the introduction to the encyclical (FR 1–6), the human search for truth is presented as the point of departure. This search has received an answer in many diverse ways, depending on time and place. Philosophy, as well, is an irreducibly polymorphous answer to this search. Its starting point is the wonder awakened in human beings when they contemplate ‘creation’. To avoid confusion, the encyclical defines philosophy as the capacity for reflection that belongs to the human intellect, which is characterized by the rigorously methodical character of its mode of thought and by the systematic character of the result, that is, the logical coherence of the affirmations and the organic unity of their content (FR 4). Since, on the one hand, the church is a partner in the human search for truth, on the other, as a believing community involved in the truth, which it knows from revelation, it is appropriate and even desirable that the church – from its diakonia for truth – make its findings known concerning the way to truth (FR 6). In the first chapter (FR 7–15), the encyclical elaborates further on the church’s involvement with revelation, which it bears: God has revealed Godself in an absolutely free gift, as the deepest mystery of redemptive love, in Jesus Christ, the Word made flesh, through whom humanity has received access to the Father. Together with Dei Filius – the dogmatic constitution on 3

These insights found their theological expression in Lumen Gentium (nr. 25). This question is also taken up in the canons of the Codex Iuris Canonici from 1983 (can. 749f), English translation: http:// www.vatican.va/archive/eng1104/_index.htm. Can. 752 states: ‘Although not an assent to faith, a religious submission of the intellect and will must be given to a doctrine which the Supreme Pontiff or the college of bishops declares concerning faith or morals when they exercise the authentic magisterium, even if they do not intend to proclaim it by definitive act; therefore, the Christian faithful are to take care to avoid those things which do not agree with it.’

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revelation from Vatican I – the encyclical reaffirms the supernatural nature of this revelation and its illuminated truth. In this connection, it refers to the double order of knowledge in which truth is grasped: reason has access to the natural domain; faith extends to truths that humans can only know through supernatural revelation. This revealed truth has entered time and space as the answer to humanity’s ultimate questions. Before this revealed, salutary mystery, which only faith can attain, reason should remain open at least, so that it can refer – past its own borders – to the hidden fullness of truth. As universal and ultimate truth, and as irrevocable reference point for one who wants to reflect on the mystery of humanity, revelation challenges philosophy to go to the limit. In the second and third chapters, respectively titled ‘Credo ut intelligam’ (I believe in order to understand) (FR 16–23) and ‘Intelligo ut credam’ (I understand in order to believe) (FR 24–35), the encyclical further develops the intimate relation between faith and reason, first from faith to reason, then from reason to faith. From faith, so teaches the Bible, there is the conviction of the deep and indissoluble unity between the knowledge of reason and the knowledge of faith. Although there are two orders of knowledge, there is no competition between either: the one contains the other, and both have their own sphere of influence (FR 17). This means that reason, as the book of Proverbs says, actually can come to God the Creator by studying the ‘book of nature’. There is even more to say (FR 19): If human beings with their intelligence fail to recognise God as Creator of all, it is not because they lack the means to do so, but because their free will and their sinfulness place an impediment in the way.

Then reason has become its own prisoner, says Paul, and no longer refers – as ‘wisdom of this world’ – to the ‘wisdom of God’, which is revealed in the cross, because this cross is considered to be foolishness and an offence. Human wisdom, in its own weakness, refuses to see the possibility of its power. The ‘truth’, that God reveals to us in Jesus Christ, does not contradict the truth which the philosopher perceives. Both – faith and reason – lead to the one truth, as revelation assures us by ‘showing that the God of creation is also the God of salvation history’ (FR 34). To define the precise relation between faith and philosophy, chapter four first discusses some important moments in history when they encountered each

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other (FR 36–48). In ancient times, Christian faith adopted philosophy in a critical-creative manner and thereby Christianized Platonic and Neo-Platonic thought. Thus, the Christian search for truth completed ancient philosophy, in the reflections of the Church Fathers. Also in scholastic theology – with Thomas Aquinas’ ‘masterpiece’ as its highpoint and enduring example – the fundamental harmony between the knowledge of faith and of philosophy is reconfirmed (FR 42). Faith asks that its object be understood with the help of reason; and at the summit of its searching reason acknowledges that it cannot do without what faith presents.

But then the drama ensues of the separation between faith and reason: reason claims absolute autonomy. Increasingly, philosophy drifts away from revelation and goes into opposition through the philosophical approaches of idealism, atheistic humanism, positivism and nihilism. Over time, modern rationalism turns into a suspicion against reason itself, and the search for truth is discontinued (e.g. in philosophical subjectivism and pragmatism). Even though in modern thought traces are still visible which can help one arrive at truth, the uncoupling of reason and faith leaves both impoverished and weakened. Only a rediscovery of their underlying, profound unity can remedy this situation. The fifth chapter discusses magisterial interventions in philosophical matters, situated in the exercise of the diakonia of the truth (FR 49–63). Even though the church has not canonized any philosophy or school of thought, it should take positions against every philosophical teaching that runs counter to Christian doctrine (e.g. on the level of doctrine, anthropology, ethics, etc.). In the past this was always the case, such as in Dei Filius (1870), that spoke out against fideism and traditionalism (lack of reason), on the one hand, and rationalism and ontologism (lack of faith), on the other. This century, the magisterium condemned the philosophical presumptions of modernism, atheistic Marxism and communistic lines of reasoning, and mistaken interpretations of evolutionism, existentialism and historicism. A current philosophical problem is the shifting of conceptions of truth from correspondence to consensus theories. Along with these condemnations, however, the church’s interest in a positive philosophy has also been reflected, for example, in Aeterni Patris (Leo XIII 1879) and in Gaudium et Spes (1965).

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In chapter six, the encyclical risks a reflection – relevant for today – on the interaction between philosophy and theology (FR 64–79). Theology, which begins methodologically with the auditus fidei (the receiving/hearing of faith), with a view towards clarifying the intellectus fidei (the understanding of faith), is helped by philosophy in two ways: on the one hand, in preparing a correct auditus fidei, on the other, in giving conceptual, argumentative and communicable expression to the intellectus fidei (FR 66). Fundamental theology should indicate the unity of philosophical and religious truth. Many truths may already be perceived through reason; revelation leads these truths to their deepest meaning (FR 67). Another task granted to philosophy is equipping one for the dialogue between cultures: because of its involvement with the universal, philosophy provides the ability – in diverse worldviews and cultures – to discover what objective truth is (FR 69). On this point, a reflection then follows on the cultural and transcultural character of Christian faith (FR 70–2). From the meeting of faith and culture something new happens: the cultural context permeates the experience of Christian faith, which also, in turn, gives shape to this context. Cultures have the intrinsic capacity, from their own dynamism, to receive revelation. However, context can never be the criterion for Christian faith; in principle, faith can go together with all cultures. The first synthesis, made with Greek thought, is not the only possible one, even though it remains true that the church – in its dialogue with other cultures – cannot give up what it has already gained in its first enculturation with Greek-Latin thought (FR 72). With respect to faith, philosophy can take different stances (FR 75–9). First, there is philosophy independent of revelation, because the latter was/ is unknown to the philosopher (Fides et Ratio firmly states that this stance is not applicable to modern, separated philosophy!). A second stance is that of so-called Christian philosophy, that is, philosophical reflection conceived from a dynamic unity with the faith. A third stance is one in which philosophy is seen as ancilla theologiae: that is, as theology’s dialogue partner in its attempt to establish the intelligibility and universal truth of its claims. When philosophy enters into this dialogue, however, it comes under the authority of the magisterium: ‘The truth of faith makes certain demands which philosophy must respect whenever it engages theology’ (FR 77). Finally, in chapter seven, the pope first describes the requirements that philosophy must fulfil in the light of revelation (FR 80–91) and then the tasks for

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theology (FR 92–9). The word of God inevitably makes a number of demands on philosophy. This is already apparent in the ‘philosophy’ that speaks from the Bible (FR 80). Against the background of the ‘crisis of meaning’, which we experience today, philosophy needs the following dimensions: (1) a sapiential dimension, seeking after the ultimate horizon of meaning and its foundation; (2) a cognitive dimension, convinced of the possibility that objective truth can be attained, understood as adaequatio rei et intellectus; and (3) both of the previous dimensions imply a metaphysical dimension: philosophy should be capable ‘of transcending empirical data in order to attain something absolute, ultimate and foundational in its search for truth’ (FR 83). To this end, the step must be taken from phenomenon to foundation. People can come to a unified and organic vision of knowledge. In order to avert many of the dangers in the contemporary philosophical situation, the encyclical stresses the need for a close relationship between contemporary philosophy and the philosophy that was developed in the Christian tradition. This relation must guard against eclecticism, historicism, scientism, pragmatism and nihilism. In this context, some of the authors from the so-called postmodern thought deserve appropriate attention (FR 91). For its part, theology should look at how it can mediate faith in historically and culturally diverse contexts, on the one hand, without affecting its certainty and immutability. Here, philosophy can help. For example, with regard to the understanding of sources, philosophy can shed light on the following issues: the connection between meaning and truth in understanding what biblical revelation is (FR 94), the relation between truth, on the one hand, time and language, on the other (the hermeneutic of dogmatic statements) (FR 95), and the ‘enduring validity of the conceptual language used in conciliar definitions’ (FR 96). The articulation of the intellectus fidei is another, even more demanding task for (dogmatic) theology. Here, a new philosophy of being is required that would make it possible, in harmony with the entire philosophical tradition – until today – to integrate the riches of the theological tradition in the (contemporary) intellectus fidei. In order to express the ethical implications of the word of God, moral theology should turn to a philosophical ethic that ‘looks to the truth of the good’ (FR 98). In the domains of pastoral theology and catechesis, philosophy can offer assistance through making clear the connection between ‘faith and life’, ‘event and doctrinal truth’ and ‘transcendent truth

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and humanly comprehensible language’ (FR 99). The conclusion (FR 100–8) repeats the main arguments of the encyclical and encourages philosophers and theologians to tighten (once more) the bond between faith and reason. A final word is addressed to Mary, the Sedes sapientiae.

The wings of reason clipped? The truth about reason If people want to keep a swan captive, they clip a wing, so the noble animal cannot balance during flight. In Fides et Ratio Pope John Paul indicates that this happened with the wing of reason in modern times. Having lost its openness to revelation, modern philosophy has – all too often – made it impossible for ‘the human spirit to rise up to the contemplation of the truth’. Many a philosopher and theologian, however, will be inclined to suspect the opposite, after reading the encyclical. Precisely by not taking modern and contemporary philosophy seriously, the pope clips the wing of reason. All too easily, reason and the truth it seeks are subordinated to, or brought into line with, the truth of faith, which is only available in its fullness via revelation. Certainly, the modern separation of faith and reason redefined the autonomy of philosophy once again, as is analogously also the case with the domains of science, politics, and economics. The heavenly canopy – that spanned culture and society in the premodern era – is no more. Moreover, many are inclined not to judge this purely negatively, but they emphasize the fruits of this evolution, along with the problems. In addition, whenever the plurality of philosophies and religions is used today as the point of departure, the exclusively Christian perspective on truth and rationality seems more of a hindrance than an invitation, once again, to strengthen the bonds between faith and reason. The reading trajectory developed here explores this path. The concept of a ‘reading trajectory’ implies something like a selective reading of the text. Through the development of a second reading trajectory, the selectivity of the first reading is made explicit – and vice versa. The model presented below is obvious if one reads the encyclical from an understanding of contemporary theology and/or philosophy. Time and again, the encyclical’s archaic language and argumentation – and its premodern and anti-modern perspectives – come as a surprise.

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The philosopher shocked The relationship between faith and reason is sketched from the perspective of revealed truth, which is professed to be objective, universal and absolute. Insight into revealed truth in its totality can only be accessed in faith. Given the premise that there is only one truth (FR 79) – which is a premise rooted in human reason, attested by the principle of non-contradiction and confirmed with certainty by revelation (FR 34) – the two orders of knowledge have the same goal, leading to the same truth, which one order of knowledge, namely faith, already has at its disposal via revelation. Furthermore, the scope of reason is limited, on the one hand, because of the (at least partly) supernatural character of the whole truth (FR 8), on the other, because of free will and sin (FR 19) and the inconstancy of the heart (FR 28). Not all truths can be understood through reason (FR 9, 76), so, if it wants to do right by itself, reason owes it to itself, to allow itself to be enlightened by revelation (FR 20): Seen in this light, reason is valued without being overvalued. The results of reasoning may in fact be true, but these results acquire their true meaning only if they are set within the larger horizon of faith. … In brief, human beings attain truth by way of reason because, enlightened by faith, they discover the deeper meaning of all things and most especially of their own existence.

At the very least, reason is relativized from such an all-encompassing and totalitarian perspective – and subordinated. When reason claims more and wishes from its own autonomy to reflect on revelation – being no longer limited by faith – without embracing it, it is guilty of the sin of hubris. Then reason no longer aligns itself by the true ‘point of reference’ (FR 14, 15) of revelation. It is in this sense that the encyclical upholds the ‘Christian myth’ that the Church Fathers completed ancient philosophy (FR 36–41). Philosophy is preparatory to faith (FR 76), praeparatio evangelii, praeparatio fidei (preparation for the gospel, preparation for faith) (FR 61). This implies, of course, that if reason goes in search of truth, the result of that quest should, at the very least, fit with the truth as this is known from revelation (i.e. truth which is preserved by the magisterium). To put it more positively: the correct use of reason leads to God. The philosophical endeavour, searching for truth within the natural order, reaches its end – at least by implication – in

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the supernatural (FR 75). A variation on this theme is the ‘theory of the two books’. Since ‘the book of nature’ and the scriptures have God as their author, the study of both, by reason and faith respectively, leads to the same God (FR 19). To the same Lord Jesus Christ, respectively as ‘Eternal Word in whom all things are created’ and ‘Incarnate Word who in his entire person reveals the Father’ (FR 34). The appeal made to Dei Filius seems to confirm this perspective (FR 8, 53). A natural theology is possible – and in fact unavoidable – for recta ratio (right[ly used] reason). A second variation focuses on the human person as a being in search of truth (FR 1, 28), but this focus shifts too quickly in the direction of the classical desiderium naturale videndi Deum (the natural longing to see God) (FR 17). The person who – for one reason or another – lacks access to Christian revelation, who neither wants nor is able to enjoy such access, remains ‘seriously handicapped by the inherent weakness of human reason’ (FR 75). Considered from the perspective of reason, this reading repeatedly points to the continuity between reason and faith.4 Viewed from the perspective of faith, however, discontinuity is frequently highlighted. Faith adds, completes, perfects, fulfils; it does not reject reason, but perfects it (analogous to the classic theological adage gratia non destruit sed perficit naturam [grace does not destroy nature, but brings it to completion][FR 43, 75]). It is precisely from this perspective of discontinuity that the encyclical warns against the danger of slipping into totalitarian philosophical positions (FR 4), the danger of forgetting ‘that men and women are always called to direct their steps towards a truth which transcends them’ (FR 5). The encyclical repeatedly condemns contemporary philosophical positions which are rooted in the ‘drama of the modern rupture between faith and reason’: rationalism, idealism, materialism, immanentism, atheistic humanism, Marxism, communism, forms of evolutionism, existentialism and historicism, experientialism/ positivism/scientism, subjectivism, pragmatism, agnosticism, relativism and undifferentiated pluralism, nihilism, scepticism, indifferentism, specific postmodern positions, the mistrust of reason (the end of metaphysics), the fragmenting of reason, and eclecticism (FR 5, 45–8, 52, 54–5, 80–1, 85–91). 4

For example, this is emphasized in the ‘circular structure’ of the relationship between philosophy and theology: ‘Since God’s word is Truth (cf. Jn. 17:17), the human search for truth – philosophy, pursued in keeping with its own rules – can only help to understand God’s word better’ (FR 73).

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Precisely because of this separation, philosophy is unable to meet its high calling (FR 49). Philosophy has degenerated into the ‘wisdom of the world’, representing a view of reason which has become its own prisoner (FR 22–3) and which does serious damage to itself by its illegitimate high-handedness (FR 75). Hence, the magisterium reserves the right – in its service to the truth  – to intervene in philosophical matters and to formulate the necessary characteristics of good philosophy (which means: ‘not counter to revelation’ [FR 49]). As a witness to the truth, the magisterium fulfils in this manner ‘a humble but tenacious ministry of service which every philosopher should appreciate, a service in favour of recta ratio, or of reason reflecting rightly upon what is true’ (FR 50). Naturally, the magisterium intends this intervention positively: it wants to support philosophy in its self-critique and issues a warning against totalizing statements, if for no other reason than ‘all of reason’s inherent and historical limitations’ (FR 51). For this very reason, the document states that good philosophy should have a sapiential, cognitive and metaphysical dimension, as demanded by the Word of God (FR 81–4). It is clear: even though the encyclical states thrice that the church has no philosophy of its own, nor canonizes specific schools (FR 64, 72, 76), every good philosophy has – certainly after the event of the revelation of Jesus Christ – a religious, even Christian, finality. That is why the encyclical emphasizes the need for a ‘close relationship of continuity between contemporary philosophy and the philosophy developed in the Christian tradition’ (FR 86). What the pope has in mind seems, à la limite, to be an anti-modern inspired pre-modern model of philosophy which runs counter to the modern ‘emancipation’ of reason. The autonomy that the pope sets aside – and repeatedly emphasizes – for philosophy is not the autonomy that philosophy claims to have legitimately achieved in modernity. The very examples proposed by the encyclical make this manifestly clear. Besides the significant place ascribed to Thomas Aquinas (FR 43, 69), Augustine (FR 40) and Anselm of Canterbury (FR 14, 42) are also proposed as models par excellence. When one brings to mind that contemporary philosophy – without reference to the Christian tradition – has come to its own awareness of the boundaries of reason and has developed a sensibility for plurality and alterity (with farreaching consequences for epistemological and metaphysical questions), the contrast with papal views becomes all the more acute.

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The theologian vexed It is moreover a question – so theologians from the first reading trajectory add – whether theology actually sits around waiting for the kind of philosophy presented in the encyclical. If theology is truly contextual (FR 72), then contemporary philosophy is its dialogue partner par excellence, whether the latter complies with the encyclical’s prescribed model or not. Such theologians have serious difficulties with the fact that the teaching authority of the church has expressly claimed the right to intervene in matters philosophical when philosophy engages in a dialogue with theology as ancilla theologiae (FR 77). Taking contemporary philosophy seriously leads to kinds of dogmatic and fundamental theology other than that described in the encyclical (FR 66–8). Precisely, the emphasis on the difference between philosophical and theological discourse – a lesson drawn from modernity – appears to be very important in this respect. It is a pity then that one of the most open passages in this regard  – speaking of the help that various trends in philosophy can offer to reflections on the bonds between truth and life, between event and doctrinal truth, and between transcendental truth and human ability to express things linguistically  – is not listed with systematic theology but in the section concerning catechesis (FR 99). The confusion of philosophical and theological discourse seems rife in the encyclical, even though both orders of knowledge are conceptually kept apart. The most revealing example of this is the concept of truth. Even though truth is ultimately linked to revelation (and thus to mystery), the majority of definitions are taken from classical philosophy: truth is universal, absolute and objective; truth is transcultural (FR 69), truth is representation (and not the result of consensus [FR 56]), truth is adaequatio rei et intellectus (FR 82). Truth, moreover, is expressible in propositions. Language is capable of giving expression – if only analogically – to this truth (FR 84). Such a classical philosophical approach is partly responsible for the fact that theologians, who precisely venture to enter into dialogue with contemporary philosophy, are no longer able to locate themselves in the philosophical framework proposed by the encyclical for such a dialogue. Precisely at the moment when philosophers and theologians begin to emphasize the structural difference between the god of the philosophers and the God of Christian faith, these efforts are rejected, or so it appears.

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The clipping of reason’s wings, however, also affects faith. Indeed, the very emphasis on the continuity between natural and supernatural truth goes hand in hand with a rigid definition of faith as the acceptance of individual, self-contained truths (FR 48) (albeit by free choice), in order to share in the mystery (FR 66). These propositions are made insightful via reason (FR 76) and presented in a universal and communicable form: reason universalizes faith (FR 48). In this regard, the easy transition from empirical knowledge to the knowledge of faith is conspicuous, where it is emphasized, on others’ authority, how important it is to accept the truth of knowledge – including empirical knowledge (FR 31–2). A final remark – and perhaps a poignant example of the lack of dialogue with contemporary philosophy – is the historicized reading of the book of Genesis, which follows Paul’s exposition in Romans (FR 22): The blindness of pride deceived our first parents into thinking themselves sovereign and autonomous, and into thinking that they could ignore the knowledge which comes from God. All men and women were caught up in this primal disobedience, which so wounded reason that from then on its path to full truth would be strewn with obstacles. From that time onwards the human capacity to know the truth was impaired by an aversion to the One who is the source and origin of truth.

According to this reading trajectory, reason is truly the ancilla theologiae – the maidservant following theology – but certainly not, at the same time, the torchbearer leading the way.

The perspective of the dove: Reason and the truth of faith It remains a question whether the image of a swan ascending is the most appropriate image for demonstrating what Fides et Ratio is all about. Another way of reading the text might use the image of a dove descending from heaven, searching for a place to land and build its nest. To make the second reading trajectory clear, I return to one of my opening considerations. The document before us is an encyclical, one of the highest forms of authentic teaching of the ordinary magisterium of the pope. This means that the author’s position is strongly qualified theologically.

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Magisterial teaching (a) We are dealing with a teaching that begins automatically and irreducibly from within the option of faith, from a position within a tradition. The truth claimed is a truth that only becomes clear in the living of this truth, precisely from a position within this tradition. Naturally, from there truth is immediately connected with revelation. This is the primary message of Christianity: in the history of the Jewish people, and more so in Jesus Christ, ultimate truth has been revealed. (b) Furthermore, we are dealing with a teaching of the magisterium, which stands before the church community in the ‘place of divine truth’ of the Christian faith. It does this from its task of preserving the depositum fidei, as first witness to and protector thereof, in service to the church and the human community. Thus, the author of the encyclical does not operate as an ‘expert’ but as a ‘master’, who, from his familiarity with the uniqueness of the Christian tradition, wants to show the way to Christian truth. In other words, by occupying ‘the place of the truth’, the magisterium absorbs the place of the ‘opposite’ within the church community. In other words, from the beginning, the encyclical presents us with a particularized teaching which operates on the level of an internal discourse. Such a discourse (a) starts from a particular tradition, marked by a truth claim, that is lived existentially in the option of faith, (b) in the consciousness of the specific assignment it has from that tradition. Thus, in the encyclical, a Christian or theological or dogmatic understanding of reality is presented from the Christian experience of faith and in light of the magisterium’s particular assignment. In a nutshell, this understanding of reality is supported by faith and cannot be adequately understood apart from this faith. Philosophically speaking, it is perhaps best described as an understanding of reality as ‘[inter]rupted immanence’. At the very least, then, a magisterial teaching is a unique kind of discourse: seen from the outside it is a very particular, ‘dogmatic’ teaching of truth that is not, however, particularized from the inside. It does not itself make explicit that the truth it refers to, is immediately bound to the option of faith it starts from. In other words, hermeneutically it does not make explicit the hermeneutical circle in which it operates. Therefore, it should not come as much of a surprise that the teaching authority of the church perceives its teachings as diakonia to

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the truth while standing in the truth (FR 2). It is a teaching from the mystery of faith, that does not step outside the faith. As an internal discourse, this teaching appears to be a propositional teaching, but the genre of the discourse is symbolic-sacramental (see below). A useful reading key for reading the encyclical from this perspective is adding parenthetical comments to each proposition in the encyclical, such as: ‘from the perspective of the Christian faith’, ‘Christians believe that’, ‘from within the Christian faith option’, ‘in a Christian understanding of reality’. This does not bring absolute clarity, but in many cases it tends to soften the – for our context intolerable – absolutizing and totalitarian perspective to which the first reading key referred. This is certainly the case if one rereads numbers 80 and 100, for example. The magisterium’s concern then becomes easier to understand.

Point of departure: A dogmatic understanding of reality grafted to a sacramental understanding of truth We already stated that reading trajectories imply a selective reading. The core of the second reading trajectory is a sacramental concept of truth (elaborated in Chapter 1 on the understanding of revelation in Dei Verbum). It should not come as a surprise that an explicitly ‘theological’ reading begins precisely here: at the mystery of the revelation of God, where our knowledge is ‘always fragmentary and impaired by the limits of our understanding’ (FR 13). Before further examining the ‘truth’ dimension of the mystery (and our knowledge and expression thereof), it should be made clear from the outset that we are dealing here with a salvific truth, a gratuitous gift of God for the salvation of human beings (FR 7). According to the encyclical, the Second Vatican Council also emphasized this salvific character of revelation in history (FR 10), situated within an eschatological frame (FR 11). Believing, submitting oneself to revelation, is first and foremost an acceptance of this offer of salvation. Submission to the truth of the mystery and Christian freedom are co-relative (FR 15). Such a mysterious, salvific truth can only be grasped by faith and has an irremovable sacramental character: precisely in a life of recognizing the mystery as mystery do we meet salvation.

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At the same time, the specificity of revealed truth becomes apparent in the vocabulary which is woven around it. Truth is the vision of God’s face, a gift – understood from a perspective of interpersonal communication; faith is assenting to the divine witness, an obedient response to God’s call, entrusting oneself to God, the highest expression of human freedom (FR 13). Faith begins in an encounter which unveils the mystery so long hidden from our eyes (FR 7). In addition, there are signs5 in which the mysterious truth presents itself as mystery (FR 13). These signs – given their tie to revelation – are only accessible in faith in their character as signs: certainly they can be studied by reason and its appropriate methods; but, at the same time, they urge reason to look beyond their status as signs in order to grasp the deeper meaning which they bear. They contain a hidden truth to which the mind is drawn and which it cannot ignore without destroying the very signs which it is given.

The activity of reason thus presupposes faith, and only from faith do the signs sacramentally reveal the depths of the mystery. Thus, the truth of faith has a eucharistic character. In other words, it becomes ‘truly present’ without being ‘ontologically available’ (then reason would suffice). The sign of the Eucharist thus reiterates the mystery of the incarnation in Jesus Christ, the Eucharist, in which the indissoluble unity between the signifier and signified makes it possible to grasp the depths of the mystery. In the Eucharist, Christ is truly present and alive, working through his Spirit; yet, as Saint Thomas said so well, ‘What you neither see nor grasp, faith confirms for you, leaving nature far behind; a sign it is that now appears, hiding in mystery realities sublime.’

The text continues: The knowledge proper to faith does not destroy the mystery; it only reveals it the more, showing how necessary it is for people’s lives: Christ the Lord ‘in revealing the mystery of the Father and his love fully reveals man to himself and makes clear his supreme calling’ (Gaudium et Spes, 22), which is to share in the divine mystery of the life of the Trinity (Dei Verbum, 4).

5

These signs are revealed: thus to be perceived from the occurrence of transcendence in time and history (‘history ... becomes the arena where we see what God does for humanity’ [FR 12]).

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In the Eucharist and in the mystery of the incarnation,6 the believer has access to the truth of the faith, respecting the mysterious character thereof. All speech concerning this truth, therefore, necessarily maintains a sacramental character, and so only from this sacramental perspective is it understood as absolute, universal and even objective – which immediately entails some implications for the understanding of these characteristics. Witness to this truth occurs within the strict framework of the faith option. To repeat: for the believer, the mystery of the incarnation will remain the central point for understanding the puzzle of human existence, creation and Godself. This is precisely the essence of Christian faith. It is also from the perspective of faith that philosophy is pressed to its limits, in which reason is summoned to make its own logic that can break through the boundaries in which it is confined (FR 80), and to make space for the mystery and the Christian understanding of reality contained therein. Of course, within such a context it is evident that faith as faith can never be founded in reason. The encyclical confirms this point time and again, just as freedom with the option for faith is often underscored (e.g. in FR 14, 52, 54, 55, 79). Perhaps the position of Dei Filius, against rationalism, confirms this the most (FR 52: Dei Filius is the standard reference for a correct and coherent Christian way of thinking). In the two orders of knowledge, reference is made not only to two different ways of knowing but also to two different objects that can be known. The transcendence of the mysteries of faith with regard to the discoveries of philosophy is thereby confirmed (FR 53). Thus, the discontinuity between faith and reason is powerfully put forward. Only within this discontinuity – and then of necessity from the perspective of faith  – is the unity of truth claimed and the statement made that reason, as God’s creation, cannot contradict faith. It is true that faith grows and becomes more authentic ‘when it is wedded to thought and does not reject it’, but this never precludes faith as an option in freedom: ‘If there is no assent, there is no faith, for without assent one does not really believe’7 (FR 79). The possibility of reason’s natural knowledge of God is thus a presupposition, postulated from revelation, from a faithful confession that the world is created. The way 6

7

See also FR 12: ‘In the Incarnation of the Son of God we see forged the enduring and definitive synthesis which the human mind of itself could not even have imagined: the Eternal enters time, the Whole lies hidden in the part, God takes on a human face.’ Augustine, De fide, spe et caritate, 7.

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a dove finds its way has not been discovered and can never be discovered theologically. It is more and more evident that an internal-discourse reading, from the particular Christian understanding of faith, only speaks of reason and philosophy in relation to this understanding of faith. Reason does not lead from itself to faith, but faith needs a rational and thus ultimately philosophical knowledge in order to grasp an understanding of faith (FR 53).8 Hence, if the magisterium considers itself capable of intervening in philosophical matters, this may only be seen from this perspective; the same is true when the magisterium pleads for a sapiential and metaphysical dimension in philosophy. For its own self-knowledge, faith needs ways of thinking that unfold patterns, to be able to speak reflexively about transcendence – a dimension of transcendence that the encyclical, from its faith perspective, perhaps too easily identifies with ‘God’. Of course, it is something else to state that all other ways of philosophizing – that is, those that do not begin in the faith option – are illegitimate. However, the encyclical clearly does this (although not always).

The relationship between theology and philosophy – and the status of philosophy for theology If the ‘perspective of the dove’ is to be maintained, the text on the relationship between theology and philosophy should only be read from the perspective of faith. Faith goes after what reason has to offer for its own understanding, and not the other way round. We would be correct in describing the encyclical’s aspirations as a fides quaerens intellectum (this classical expression from Anselm of Canterbury strangely enough is not mentioned in the encyclical!). In this regard, two principles require re-examination: philosophy as praeparatio fidei (FR 61) and philosophia ancilla theologiae (FR 77). What would these mean today; and how do they affect the autonomous status of philosophy? It can already be stated that from the perspective of faith, within a theological framework, philosophy’s autonomy is relativized in light of the understanding of faith. 8

So, we can also understand that the encyclical states that reason, between the poles of revelation and human spirit, has its own field ‘in which it can enquire and understand, restricted only by its finiteness before the infinite mystery of God’ (FR 14).

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Praeparatio fidei. One who wants to arrive at an understanding of faith needs, first of all, conceptual frameworks that (a) clarify what the faith option is, (b) that elucidate the discontinuity between reason and faith made evident by faith (c) and that do not, thereby, intrinsically disqualify the faith option as such. Philosophy is helpful to theology – certainly in the form of fundamental theology – when it leads to the boundary of faith as an option.9 Philosophy which rules out a priori any space for the option of faith will then be subject to criticism as well on theological grounds. Once again we can refer in this regard to FR 65 in which philosophy is characterized as the ideal preparation for a correct auditus fidei. For substantiating reasonableness within the faith, philosophy appears as ancilla theologiae, as a provider of conceptuality and schemes of argumentation. However, when theology – in order to express its own intellectus fidei – adopts philosophy’s conceptuality and schemes of argumentation, these cease to be purely philosophical and are given a theological qualification. The fact that FR 77 refers to the Church Fathers is not without significance in this regard. In FR 39–40, the encyclical maintains that the Church Fathers were both critical and creative in their adoption of ‘autonomous’ ancient philosophies, precisely on account of their desire as believers to express ‘the true doctrine about God’. In FR 65, the encyclical also speaks of the ‘adoption’ of ideas and conceptual patterns from particular philosophical traditions. In this regard, philosophies that do not have a Christian pedigree – but are nevertheless capable of exposing a dimension of transcendence or alterity – are of great value and offer patterns of thought which theology can use. It is probably unwise then to label this too easily as natural theology, since the identification of the transcendent as philosophical category with God stems from a time in which cultural differentiation did not occur. If, in a second move, the theologian goes on to elaborate this dimension in terms of the divinity, he or she is already participating in a theological discourse. The twofold task which the church, according to the encyclical, ascribes to philosophy remains operative (FR 5): She sees in philosophy the way to come to know fundamental truths about human life. At the same time, the Church considers philosophy an 9

From this perspective, it is worthwhile to reread FR 67: for example, ‘Fundamental theology should demonstrate the profound compatibility that exists between faith and its need to find expression by way of human reason fully free to give its assent.’

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indispensable help for a deeper understanding of faith and for communicating the truth of the Gospel to those who do not yet know it.

Hence the repeated insistence that philosophy must strive to excel in its endeavours (e.g. FR 56) and the many warnings to theologians not to ignore philosophy. Whoever rereads the texts on the relationship with modern and contemporary philosophy from this perspective, then, is not continually reminded to the scandal raised by the first reading trajectory. In modern philosophy, – the result of the growing division between faith and philosophical reason – one also finds (FR 48): at times precious and seminal insights which, if pursued and developed with mind and heart rightly tuned, can lead to the discovery of truth’s way. Such insights are found, for instance, in penetrating analyses of perception and experience, of the imaginary and the unconscious, of personhood and intersubjectivity, of freedom and values, of time and history. The theme of death as well can become for all thinkers an incisive appeal to seek within themselves the true meaning of their own life. But this does not mean that the link between faith and reason as it now stands does not need to be carefully examined, because each without the other is impoverished and enfeebled.

Moreover, the encyclical honours the many attempts Christian philosophers make to develop – in full autonomy, with the inclusion of ‘more recent currents of thought’ – a philosophical thought that lends itself to the aforementioned tasks (FR 59): Some devised syntheses so remarkable that they stood comparison with the great systems of idealism. Others established the epistemological foundations for a new consideration of faith in the light of a renewed understanding of moral consciousness; others again produced a philosophy which, starting with an analysis of immanence, opened the way to the transcendent; and there were finally those who sought to combine the demands of faith with the perspective of phenomenological method. From different quarters, then, modes of philosophical speculation have continued to emerge and have sought to keep alive the great tradition of Christian thought which unites faith and reason.

On several occasions philosophy’s legitimate diversity is emphasized (e.g. FR 4, 72 [Greek thinking is not the only possible dialogue partner]), and it is stated

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that the church does not want to canonize a specific philosophical approach from this diversity (FR 64, 72, 76). One might begin to wonder why exactly the growing separation in modernity between faith and reason is so strongly rejected, unless this rejection only applies to those ways of thinking that, in reductionist ways, exclude the faith option altogether or are unable to integrate an interruptive dimension of transcendence into the grammar of their argumentation. Theologically speaking, the existence of genuinely autonomous philosophies – that is, philosophies located outside the Christian symbolic universe – is not really a problem, because a theological critique of them remains possible. In addition, on the level of reason, the revealed truth of faith is inaccessible without the option of faith. In this regard, I refer again to the mention in FR 75 of the first stance that philosophy can take with respect to Christian faith, although it remains remarkable, however, that in this paragraph modern philosophy is explicitly excluded from this position. To conclude this section, we reread the segments of text dealing with the cognitive and metaphysical dimensions, which are essential to philosophy, in the light of revelation. The need for a cognitive dimension (FR 82), namely that reason is capable of objective knowledge, defined as adaequatio rei et intellectus, or, in other words, reason’s ability to penetrate to the essence of things is demanded, once again, on theological grounds. Otherwise, it is not capable of coming to a deeper exploration of the riches to be found in the word of God. Contrary to this cognitive dimension are ‘radical phenomenological and relativistic philosophies’. However, there are many possible intermediate positions between these kinds of philosophy and an equally radical, representational epistemology. Moreover, when one constructs true statements, on theological grounds, even if one employs philosophical categories, one is already entangled in theological discourse. The final question is whether the metaphysical range demanded by the encyclical (FR 83) does not do an injustice to all our efforts thus far, for example, by reintroducing onto-theological thought patterns.10 The rereading of the relevant text creates at least the impression that ‘metaphysical range’ means that philosophical thought patterns should have structural room for transcendence. The text itself maintains that no particular school or direction 10

For this terminology, see Chapter 2, Section 3.

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is intended by the term ‘metaphysics’, but primarily means that reality does not simply coincide with the factual and the empirical. The text continues (FR 83): I want only to state that reality and truth do transcend the factual and the empirical, and to vindicate the human being’s capacity to know this transcendent and metaphysical dimension in a way that is true and certain, albeit imperfect and analogical. In this sense, metaphysics should not be seen as an alternative to anthropology, since it is metaphysics which makes it possible to ground the concept of personal dignity in virtue of their spiritual nature. In a special way, the person constitutes a privileged locus for the encounter with being, and hence with metaphysical enquiry. Wherever men and women discover a call to the absolute and transcendent, the metaphysical dimension of reality opens up before them: in truth, in beauty, in moral values, in other persons, in being itself, [and for Christians]11 in God.

Here, as well, the theological legitimation is not lacking: A philosophy which shuns metaphysics would be radically unsuited to the task of mediation in the understanding of Revelation. The word of God refers constantly to things which transcend human experience and even human thought; but this ‘mystery’ could not be revealed, nor could theology render it in some way intelligible (Dei Filius, IV [DS 3016]), were human knowledge limited strictly to the world of sense experience. Metaphysics thus plays an essential role of mediation in theological research.

Conclusion: The swan or the dove? The second reading’s point of departure and elaboration may appear rooted in an overly selective reading, and look perhaps like an extended tour de force. Many elements which constitute arguments for the first reading trajectory are not refuted by the second. Nevertheless, I believe there is sufficient evidence to justify at least a reading of the document as an inner-theological discourse. Although not all the creases are ironed out and fundamental ambiguities remain, which were the impetus for developing two different reading keys, this strategy at least allows one to move beyond the sterile debate between 11

My parenthesis; for a justification, see above.

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anti-modern and modern positions. Furthermore, a theology that takes account of the current postmodern critical consciousness can find points of contact there for further reflection. For that reason, the issues raised by the encyclical (including the aforementioned ambiguity and the negative evaluation of the first reading key) should be deepened and expanded into a comprehensive fundamental theological reflection that involves both fides and ratio today. Finally, starting from the encyclical, we want to conclude this reflection with three brief observations. (a) Indeed, Fides et Ratio insists that there is only one truth; but, since its fullness is linked to revelation, this truth is at once a mystery. Thus, it is inaccessible outside the faith, and it can only be given form sacramentally. Therefore, there are two orders of knowledge: one (reason as a manner of thinking, which is active outside the premises of the Christian symbolic universe) that can lead us to the edges of the mystery, and one that can embrace the mystery in faith without neutralizing it thereby as mystery. This implies that we can no longer assume an overly facile continuity between truly autonomous reason (which is perhaps the intellectus fidei of another symbolic universe) and theological discourse. At the very least, this means that truth is a multifaceted concept and that – in the context of Christian faith – it would be better to speak of the truth of faith. Making a clear distinction between philosophical and theological discourses, together with the recognition of their different particular points of departure and hermeneutical circles, can eliminate many misunderstandings in advance. This implies that today, in line with the second reading trajectory, from the perspective of faith, one must take more stock of the discontinuity between the two orders of knowledge. In contrast to what is often assumed, this need not stand in the way of a farreaching dialogue between faith and reason. (b) A second underlying presupposition, presented in the encyclical, is the dynamic of faith with respect to culture and vice versa. When meeting a new context, faith should seek to enculturate itself once again or, in other words, to recontextualize itself. Something new grows out of the encounter between faith and culture (FR 70). New contexts are neither rejected nor stripped of their original richness and vigour (FR 71).12 Further, from our 12

The encyclical refers at this point, for example, to the great Asian cultures and the need for an inculturation of Christian faith in these ‘rich’ contexts.

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first consideration, the following question should be asked: Should not the current (post-Christian) Western European context also be considered such a new context, which challenges faith to recontextualization? The reflective consciousness of our time is more than a by-product – to be rejected – of the ‘fatal’ modern schism between faith and reason. The encyclical’s reference to the church of the first centuries, that had to find its way in a context of diversity and non-Christian rationality and entered into dialogue with the context in a critical-creative way, can be enlightening in this regard (FR 72). Even Thomas Aquinas, the model for theology (FR 78), needed to relate himself to nonChristian philosophy, which increasingly constituted the critical consciousness of his day. Is it not legitimate then for Christians – and the theologians among them – in our contemporary context, to look for traces of non-Christian critical consciousness and to enter into dialogue with these? Traces that eventually can provide concepts and patterns of thought that stimulate reflection, both on the act of faith and on the intellectus fidei (without founding them)? Is this not the way that believers (and their communities) will be able to acquire contextual plausibility, both ad intra and (albeit in a limited sense) ad extra? Because they, as individuals as well as communities, also find themselves submerged in the contemporary context, with which their faith at first sight appears to have very few points of contact. In this regard, it is truly a shame that the support philosophy could give theology for such a recontextualization is only mentioned in the section on catechesis (FR 99).13 (c) Finally, it remains true, of course, that a theological elaboration of an explicit, extra-theological evaluation of the current context of plurality would have been able to strengthen the magisterium’s position immensely. Because of the nature of magisterial teaching, as an authorized teaching from within the faith tradition, this would mean that the magisterium takes seriously the plurality to which contemporary philosophy witnesses and allows its traditionbound concept of truth to be challenged and thereby qualified. Without an external perspective and through the flat rejection of modernity, a premodern reading of the encyclical is obvious, even for church people. 13

On a pastoral–theological level, the pope expresses, in this context, the following expectation (FR  99): ‘Philosophical enquiry can help greatly to clarify the relationship between truth and life, between event and doctrinal truth, and above all between transcendent truth and humanly comprehensible language. This involves a reciprocity between the theological disciplines and the insights drawn from the various strands of philosophy; and such a reciprocity can prove genuinely fruitful for the communication and deeper understanding of the faith.’

6

Mutual Interruption: Towards a Productive Tension between Theology and Religious Studies

In the recent past, the question of the relationship between theology and religious studies has been raised repeatedly.1 In line with what I wrote previously in this book, in this chapter I develop a cultural–theological reflection on this theme. After a terminological clarification, I argue that – because of the changed relationship between faith and context – both the turn from theology to religious studies and the increasing isolation and ‘pastoralization’ of theology are two comprehensible but nevertheless erroneous reactions. The first appears to be a survival strategy, after theology’s loss of cultural and scientific plausibility, while the second is a protection strategy against the increased tension between faith/theology, on the one hand, and context/ sciences, on the other. In contradistinction hereto, and based on an analysis of the context in terms of plurality and diversity, I will argue for a theological project that keeps theology and religious studies together in a productive tension – mutually interrupting each other.

By way of introduction: Some terminological clarifications In the Introduction to this book, I defined theology from the classical Anselmian adage as fides quaerens intellectum: faith seeking understanding. 1

In Dutch-speaking theology, for example, at several instances in Tijdschrift voor theologie 42 (2002): 3–4; 45 (2005): 2 and 4; 46 (2006): 2–3. Also, see the comments made in Chapter 4 with regard to the ITC document, Theology Today.

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Theologians engage in a reflection on – and from within – that faith: a reflection nourished by way of an existential praxis, rooted in a tradition, embedded in a community and performed in actual historical, cultural, socio-political contexts, on a scale that ranges from the particularly local to the global.2

By religious studies is meant the scientific study of the phenomenon of religion in all its diversity. This study’s operating procedure consists of applying proven philosophical and (sociological) scientific methods to the phenomenon of religion. Both the material and formal object of this study are increasingly characterized by a tremendous diversity. The study of self-understanding within a religion – its so-called theological content – is also part of this. Today the term also applies in particular to the study of world religions, in which both coming to an understanding of one religion and acquiring insight into the relation between religions can be the objective. Here, as well, diverse methodological approaches are used. Involvement in interreligious communication and reflection on this communication can be undertaken from a religious studies as well as a theological viewpoint. We also take the classical distinction between both as our starting point. Those who pursue religious studies study the phenomenon of religion from without, as observers, and in principle do not need to be an adherent of the religion they study. Theologians, on the other hand, as participants, attempt to come to a better understanding of the religious tradition they confess from within, in order to understand from there the meaning of life and life together. In what follows, however, it will become clear that – even though this distinction preserves an important methodological and heuristic function – the demarcation of boundaries between both disciplines should, nevertheless, be nuanced. Furthermore – and this is crucial – the distinction is not a static difference, but the relationship between both is dynamic in nature and thus contained in processes of influencing, borrowing, sharing, questioning, challenging, tensions, criticism, conflicts, exclusion and rejection. Among other things, this has to do with the dynamic interdisciplinary character of the theological disciplines themselves, which use philosophy and (religious) sciences to come to a greater self-understanding. In this case, 2

From the introduction, see, p. 1.

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religious studies fill the role of supportive sciences (in line with the classical idea of ancilla theologiae). Traditionally the systematic theologian calls chiefly on the philosopher, but, for several decades, is not afraid to appeal to the cultural anthropologist, the sociologist, the psychologist and even the economist. Moreover, the case is even more complex, because this interdisciplinarity between theology and the (supportive) sciences interacts with the internaltheological interdisciplinarity between the various theological disciplines, and is influenced, for example, by the dynamics between systematic theology and church history, practical theology or biblical studies. The way these various disciplines understand their relationship to their respective supportive sciences constitutes in this respect a determining factor. The way that church historians incorporate historical data into a theological reflection on history determines the manner in which these church historians can enter into dialogue with systematic theologians. The fact that research in religious studies does not happen in a valuefree environment is an insight that has grown only in the past few decades. Religious studies also expresses at every turn how a society thinks about religion and exercises an influence on those views. The renewed attention to world religions illustrates this very well today. Finally, I recall the fundamental hermeneutical–theological perspective from which this study begins: theology understands itself methodologically in terms of recontextualization and takes up the dialogue with the contextual critical consciousness as a theological programme. In our days, religious studies already form part of this critical consciousness.

Theology, modernity and the rationality of religious studies With the coming of modernity, philosophy no longer offers the only insight into the current context and the place of Christian faith therein. Through the rise of (social) sciences and – where these relate to the phenomenon – religious studies, theology gets new dialogue partners. These share in the prestige and truth claim of the sciences in general, because they operate according to the criteria of modern epistemology (scientific method as the guarantee of its

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truth claim, universality, transparency and communicability). They are an expression of a new, modern way of thinking, that reaches out for knowledge free from any tutelage. Obviously, this puts pressure on the way theology of old dialogued with the contextual critical consciousness. In all its variety, the disciplines of religious studies reflect on humanity, culture and religion according to their own appropriate method, and they offer insights that theology cannot simply lay beside itself. At the same time, something fundamental has also changed, since these sciences not only share in the criteria of modern epistemology, but are also part of the secularization process that profoundly changed society’s structure. For the sciences, this is most explicit in the methodological atheism that characterizes them. This grants them an autonomy with respect to theology, that is greater than, for example, the status of philosophy for Thomas Aquinas. Furthermore, in the course of history, these sciences sometimes arise and develop in a conflictual relationship with respect to Christianity, so that it appears as if science and faith/theology make competing truth claims. Of course, this is strengthened when science is seen as an unjust encroachment on Christian truth claims, or when science becomes an argument in a secularist criticism of religions. At the same time, apart from such an explicit ideological use, this process stimulates an implicit cultural consciousness in which the definition of truth is equated with the presumed objectivity of science. As theologians could – or wanted to – make a distinction between scientific findings and ideological usages, on the one hand, and these results could be seen as a constitutive challenge for coming to a theological self-understanding, on the other, they developed various theological profiles. In this regard, so-called modern and anti-modern theologians disagree over the extent to which the autonomy of the secular can or should be respected. For antimoderns, modernity means alienation and human hubris, which should be overcome, and whose fruits should be integrated into a fully Christian synthesis. For modern theologians, modernity is rather a learning process, with which Christians can (or should) fruitfully enter into dialogue, precisely to come to a more adequate self-understanding. Nevertheless, the greater autonomy which modern theology granted to contemporary philosophy and the human sciences functioned once again in producing a synthesis through correlation methods. Modern ‘correlationalist’

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theology3 saw itself as the sweet fruit of the mutually critical encounter (co-relation) between a transmitted Christian tradition and a self-established modern, secular culture and society. Christian truth claims were thus (partly) grounded through insights and results from religious studies research. Thus, Christian faith fills in, or qualifies, what people already know through secular reason. Thus to some extent, the correlation method enabled theology to cope with pressure from the prevailing modern scientific ideal, precisely because theology had a positive attitude towards (human) science’s results, and formulated its own truth-claims in correlation with those results. Based on the correlation between the content of Christian faith and the context, the message and meaning of Christian faith could be made understandable from religion’s anthropological function. Christianity offers and fulfils what is good for humanity or what responds to human desires. Nevertheless, this caused a tension between the so-called universality and objectivity of religious studies and theology’s confessional, particular character and its universal truthclaims. As a result, increasing pressure was placed on theology’s specifically theological legitimization, and the ‘burden of proof ’ of theological speech progressively shifted to its (social) science partners.

Towards an unbearable tension and theology’s impending bankruptcy The tension between the religious sciences and theology increases only when the religious overlap between society and Christian faith increasingly shrinks. Detraditionalization not only results in a decrease of theology’s cultural plausibility, but also makes clear that religious phenomenon is much broader than was accepted from a Christian perspective. At such a moment, the pressure for theology to legitimate itself in terms of religious studies becomes unbearable,4 and the theological project completely collapses, both methodologically and in terms of cultural credibility. Methodologically, theology crashes when exegesis 3

4

Cf. D. Tracy’s use of the category in The Uneasy Alliance Reconceived: Catholic Theological Method, Modernity, and Postmodernity, in Theological Studies 50 (1989): 548–70. A document that elucidates this point for the Dutch situation is the 2004 KNAW-document: Van God los: Tussen theologie en wetenschap.

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of the Old and New Testaments becomes the study of Christianity’s sources, when liturgical studies and sacramentology become ‘ritual studies’ and when systematic theology becomes the philosophy of religion. Why would one hold on to a specifically Christian theological interpretation, in the service of coming to a deeper understanding of the religion of only one particular group? Surely – and this concerns cultural credibility – when that particular group continues to dwindle and religiosity is increasingly less and less connected to one particular tradition? In other words, the supposed obvious continuity between theology and religious studies no longer functions or legitimizes theology – neither methodologically nor culturally. This tension is exacerbated when the religious landscape changes not only through detraditionalization but also through pluralization. Religious plurality has become a very concrete reality due to population migration, new religious movements, tourism and the mass media. World religions and religious movements have become a constitutive part of our society and deserve a thorough study for that reason alone. At the same time, detraditionalization and pluralization reinforce one another. Interest in (other) religions and religious movements is not simply due to an interest in what is new and different. It also resonates – as will be shown in the next paragraph – with a contextually sharpened existential longing to come to terms with one’s own identity construction. The structural process of detraditionalization has been coupled with the postmodern critique of modern grand narratives. Ideological and religious universal truth claims have come under scrutiny. The modern narratives of emancipation and progress, of modern rationality and of science and technology have especially suffered, because they failed to live up to their promises. The loss of plausibility of quasi-evident traditions and ideologies results in an increased need for the construction of identity (individualization): identity is no longer simply given, but is, at the same time, to be obtained.5 This is the structural background for religion’s present-day revival, which stimulates interest for the study of religion. Because of detraditionalization and pluralization, however, this does not necessarily (and often not primarily) lead to theology. The postmodern critical consciousness, combined with

5

For this paragraph, see also Chapters 2 and 3.

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a decentring of the modern subject, causes humankind to stumble on the fragmentary character of identity and destabilizes every obtained identity. It often establishes a longing for connectedness and wholeness, for belonging to a greater whole (‘religare’), which, because of the structural changes of culture and society, is not necessarily – and/or primarily – a Christian whole. Furthermore, postmodern criticism is also directed against the modern scientific ideal, but not against scientific praxis itself, which is legitimated today by means of its performativity.6 When all stable reference points are relativized, only what ‘works’ remains. Coupled with scientific methodologies that rely on mathematical models, suspicion about substantial normative hypotheses (which can always be deconstructed as too particular or as connected to specific interests) leads moreover to an increased quantification, both regarding scientific methodology and the justification of scientific praxis itself.7 In short, the combination of detraditionalization, pluralization, religious revival and pragmatic research standards is not simply a factor that explains the success of religious studies, but also the reason why theology’s project is under pressure. In both cases, this is true on a scientific as well as a cultural level. It is no wonder then that theological faculties and departments at such a time decide to switch over to religious studies, or use the aura of religious studies to become ‘fashionable’ again.

Between continuity and discontinuity: From ‘religious studies as survival strategy’ to ‘theological isolation and pastoralization as a protection strategy’ The typically modern way of legitimizing the theological project by means of the ancillary disciplines of religious studies – either from opportunism, or based on a presupposed continuity – no longer functions and is, in fact, counterproductive. Religious studies as a survival strategy capitalizes on this finding, either from opportunism or as a more radical conclusion from the presumed continuity: Christian theology is merely an illustration of 6

7

Cf. Lyotard’s remarks, which date back to 1979, concerning this issue in his La condition postmoderne. Rapport sur le savoir (Paris: Minuit, 1979). See Chapter 3.

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a potentially more general study of the religious phenomenon and can be reduced to its religious studies content. The sharpened discontinuity between Christian faith and the current context, to which the unbearable tension between theology and religious studies bears witness, leads not only to the survival strategy of religious studies, but also generates theological protection mechanisms. One can speak in a somewhat oversimplified manner about the ‘isolation’ and ‘pastoralization’ of theology. To protect theology against the movement towards religious studies, first of all, theology’s autonomy is emphasized – from a strictly methodological and/ or substantive distinction between theology and religious studies: theology is definitely not religious studies, it is then said. In the same motion, however, space is limited for the necessary interdisciplinary theological approach. One tries to save the theological question, but forgets that the theological method is intrinsically interdisciplinary and dynamically linked to the (religious) sciences. Then, because of an inadequate view of theology, the relevance of theological studies is often placed primarily in the education of pastors. ‘Isolation’ leads then to ‘pastoralization’. As a consequence, theology all too easily resigns itself – intentionally or unintentionally – to the loss of its place in the public academic forum, and is reduced to vocational training for clerics. In both strategies, theology is sacrificed. In the survival strategy of religious studies, a theological question is hardly developed, or it is immediately repudiated as (too) confessional or parochial. Moreover, research in religious studies does not automatically lead to a theological question. The protection strategy encloses theology in its own discourse, robs it of its necessarily interdisciplinary underpinning and threatens to functionalize it in terms of pastoral training. There is hardly any room for the dynamic between Christian faith and the contextual critical consciousness, which is indispensable for theology. After the continuity between theology and religious studies becomes implausible, a strict politics of the discontinuity between both leads to a very damaging partition for theology. In this way, from the outset, a theological recontextualization has no chance, so that theology loses its proper role at the crossroads of church, university and society. In summary: theological strategies of continuity undermine theology today and reduce it to religious studies; strategies of discontinuity deprive theology of possibilities for coming to a contemporary understanding of the faith. On

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closer inspection, a postmodern variant of the ancient secularization thesis appears to be at work. Applied to theology, the secularization thesis (‘the more modernity, the less religion’; and vice versa) states: the more religious studies, the less theology; and vice versa. When secularization is considered to be fully realized, only a generally scientific access to religion remains. In reaction, theology seems either to connect with this dynamic or to retreat into its own domain. In the latter case, theology sometimes develops a discourse that attacks the legitimacy of religious studies itself (accusing it of reductionism and secularism). But it is questionable – theologically speaking – whether these are the only two options. In both cases, the theological project ultimately perishes. Is the relation between theology and religious studies only to be thought in terms of continuity or discontinuity? It is at this point that a renewed dialogue of theology with the postmodern critical consciousness can make a difference. Crucial for this consciousness is a heightened attention to (methodological and religious) plurality and diversity. Today, theology’s partner is not simply a uniformly secular culture, to which theology must relate in a one-to-one relationship. Rather, theology finds itself in a context marked by plurality and difference, both on the level of religious sciences and other religions. As we pointed out earlier in this book, it certainly matters theologically whether one considers the relation between Christian faith and context in (modern) terms of secularization or in (postmodern) terms of plurality and diversity.

Towards a recontextualization of the relation between theology and religious studies The methodological-atheistic (religious) sciences have an unalienable but specific place among the plurality of ways of perceiving life and reality. Secular culture, wherein these sciences are to be situated, however, no longer exclusively determines the context to which the Christian faith relates. Furthermore, through the critique of postmodern thinking, the objective observer position, classically occupied by science and rationality, is fundamentally questioned, and the hermeneutical circles and power mechanisms in which it operates are exposed. Nevertheless, amid a plurality of models and theories, and especially

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legitimated by their efficiency and performativity, science and scientific rationality remain constitutive for the way in which people – including the Christians among them – live their lives. Hence, they continue to be important for a theology that recontextualizes itself. Moreover, from a theological-programmatic perspective of recontextualization, this is true on distinctively theological grounds. Precisely because God reveals Godself in concrete history, theology can do no less than involve itself in the same. The problem of the two strategies in the previous paragraph does not result from ‘too much’ but ‘too little’ recontextualization. Religious studies as a survival mechanism abandons the theological project of faith seeking understanding; through ‘isolation and pastoralization’, theology cuts itself off from confrontation with the contextual critical consciousness. It is the manner in which theology and religious studies relate to each other that is at stake. Precisely at this point an analysis in terms of pluralization opens other perspectives than a secularization schema. For those analysing the present-day situation in terms of plurality, the defining experience for Christians today is that Christian faith, to an increasing degree, is but one of many positions on the religious field. Confrontation with other positions (like the Buddhist, Muslim or atheist position) does not simply challenge one to inquiry and dialogue, but is – at the same time and immediately – coupled with a (re)discovery and (re)statement of one’s own position. This doesn’t mean the tradition is massively and roughly profiled against other positions. Rather, this implies that precisely here, in the confrontation with plurality and difference, the process of recontextualization begins. Thus, Christian faith is not just ‘counter-culture’, nor is it any longer a partner of a fundamentally secular culture. On the contrary, it is situated in an internally pluralized field and should determine its position there, in relation to the others. Religious studies also functions on this field of plurality and difference, providing insight into religion and religiosity, through appropriate methodological procedures, investigating historical religions, current religious sensitivities, and empirical data. To the extent that these sciences analyse and interpret data, they participate in the ‘conflict of interpretations’. This has nothing to do with relativism, but has everything to do with the special accountability and awareness of one’s own limitations, which arise when one no longer can claim a disinterested observer’s position. The results of such

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investigations can challenge present-day theological reflection, to the extent that it makes statements about the Christian faith and its place therein, as well as about humankind, culture and society. Theologians, however, should not forget that religious studies do not by themselves lead to a theological question (no simple continuity!). This is the case for ‘classical’ religious studies, as well as for the study of world religions. Such research, even when it is comparative, does not automatically lead to theological investigations. Hence, the theological question must be clearly stated at the beginning of research: Where and how does God reveal Godself? How can we think God’s saving presence today? How can the tradition – as witness to God’s active involvement with people and history – become a reading and living key for Christians today? In this sense, the theological phrasing of a question interrupts the discourse of religious studies, because it resolutely starts from the desire to come to a Christian understanding of reality – a wish that is nourished by standing in a particular tradition, rooted in existential praxis and community. To the extent that religious studies engage with religious phenomena – and Christian faith is a religious phenomenon – there is always talk of continuity (no simple discontinuity!), and findings from religious studies can put pressure on the Christian self-understanding (i.e. ‘interrupt’ this self-understanding). Yet, to the degree that the discourses of religious studies are not able to aim at bringing God to speak, a theological engagement with them will also involve interruption. It is this dynamic practice – this game of continuity and discontinuity, of being interrupted and interrupting – that theology must carry out today, for the sake of its own objectives.

Theology and religious studies: Mutual interruption in service of a contemporary theological self-understanding As stated above, the relation between theology and religious studies can be understood in terms of interruption. On the one hand, a religious studies approach can put pressure on older self-perceptions of the Christian faith. On the other, a resolute theological question puts into perspective the selfunderstanding of religious studies and interrupts a too easily made appeal

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to continuity and/or discontinuity. In what follows, we present – too quickly and without the necessary nuance – four examples of the intended productive relationship, introducing each one with a somewhat provocative question. (a) Is the God of statistics the same as the God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob? For example, what about empirical theology, as practised by Hans van der Ven and others? His empirical research taught him that there is a shift – in contemporary European societies from personal conceptions of God to non-personal, more holistic images of God. So, he rather quickly decides that theology should adapt its conception of God, because it is too personal, and (therefore) too authoritative and patriarchal.8 From our perspective, this too easily assumes continuity. A more appropriate theological strategy is to think in terms of mutual interruption: such statistics indeed appeal to theology to reflect upon the Christian conception of God in relation to its narrative tradition, also questioning its too authoritarian and patriarchal features. Such reflection, however, need not necessarily result in adaptation, but rather in a rediscovery of the personal character of the Christian God – of a God who reveals Godself within concrete histories as love, as the Other communicating to humankind and creation. The interruption of empirical data then stimulates a self-critical theological reflection on how God relates to the world of today.9 (b) Is ‘ritual studies’ the future of liturgical studies and sacramentology? ‘Religiosity is all over the place’, Paul Post said a few years ago; and he worked out how identity is performatively established through ritual, and in relation to bodiliness and materiality. This embedding of religiosity in concrete ritual and performativity was the task for contemporary liturgical studies, as far as he was concerned.10 Certainly it is very important to gain insight into this performativity, but the work is incomplete when it fails to clarify how God is at work in this. What about – to say it so – theological performativity? Rituals are sacraments precisely because they speak of God and mediate God’s salvific 8

9

10

Cf. J. A. van der Ven, God Reinvented? A Theological Search in Texts and Tables (Empirical Studies in Theology, 1), Leiden: Brill, 1998, 14–19; Faith in God in a Secularised Society, in Bulletin ET 9 (1998): 21–45; Contemporary Theology in a Secularised Society, in Bulletin ET 9 (1998): 199–219. We engaged in this reflection in God Interrupts History, Chapter 7. Also with regard to the other examples, in that book we developed the same practice: Chapters 5 and 8 correspond to the issues mentioned in (b) and (d) respectively. Cf. Paul Post, Life-Cycle Rituals: a Ritual-Liturgical Perspective, in Questions Liturgiques – Studies in Liturgy 83 (2002): 10–29.

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love. Hence, from a theological perspective, a ‘ritual studies’ reflection on the rites of passage should be sacramentally interrupted.11 (c) Does the development of evolutionary or neurotheological theories of religion finally deliver the fatal blow to religion? Whether it be the atheistic apologist Daniel C. Dennett, who explains religion evolutionarily as a ‘meme’12, or neurotheology, which – through a neurological explanation – reduces religious experience to brain activity (by means of comparative studies13): a theological confrontation with such thinking should not allow itself to be tempted to an undifferentiated dismissal. Certainly, theology should first criticize the smooth slipping from methodological to religious atheism displayed in such studies, but it can also – after rejecting a possible reduction – learn to appreciate the scientific uncovering of the historicalbiological and neuro-physical rooting of religion and religious movement. For how else could God reveal Godself than through the mediation of history and bodiliness?14 (d) Is ‘comparative theology’ the new matrix for taking up the challenge of religious plurality in contemporary theology? The name certainly sounds trendy and obviously covers a multitude of variants – with a minimum of interreligious reading of texts. At first glance, the discipline seems to have an aura of objectivity, since, in order to compare, one must be able to take the observer’s position. From a perspective of mutual interruption, critical questions then quickly rise. Nonetheless, the comparative-theological approach is much more complex, and its practitioners are often well aware of the difficulties of this theological project.15 Nevertheless, difficult questions remain. Does not comparative theology ultimately forget that the Christian faith’s irreducibly particular, historical rootedness colours its universalizing truth claim? Does not this theological approach neglect the insight that the greatest differences 11

12

13

14

15

For my reflections in this regard, in discussion with E. Schillebeeckx, see my L’interruption sacramentelle des rites d’existence, in Questions Liturgiques – Studies in Liturgy 83 (2002), reprinted in an adapted English version in God Interrupts History, Chapter 5. Cf. D. Dennett, Breaking the Spell. Religion as a Natural Phenomenon (New York: Penguin [Viking], 2006) (see also R. Dawkins, The God Delusion [New York: Bantam Books, 2006]). Cf. A. B. Newberg et al., Why God Won’t Go Away: Brain Science and the Biology of Belief (New York: Ballantine Books, 2002). Cf. L. Boeve, Gooi God niet weg! Over hoe God weggegooid wordt in een pleidooi om God niet weg te gooien, in D. Pollefeyt and E. De Boeck (eds), Niet van God los? Geloof en wetenschap (Nikè-reeks, 53), (Leuven: Acco, 2007), 31–44. Cf. N. Hintersteiner, Intercultural and Interreligious (Un)Translatibility and the Comparative Theology Project, in N. Hintersteiner (ed.), Naming and Thinking God in Europe Today (Currents of Encounter 32), (Amsterdam/New York: Rodopi 2007), 465–91.

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between religions often occur where they seem to most resemble each other? For example, what does ‘religious multilingualism’ or ‘double or multiple belonging’ mean in this regard?16 Is the metaphorical analogy of religions with natural languages really appropriate? Are religious commitments such that they can be combined? The challenge of the other is sometimes best served when one accounts for the constitutive differences between religions: whereby, on the one hand, interreligious encounters pose a question to one’s own identity, nevertheless, on the other, propel one to shared engagement – not despite difference, but in respect for it. When God allows Godself to be known in the religious other, this is primarily meant to bring the Christian to a better selfunderstanding – of course in respect for the other – and not to canonize the other religion.

Concluding remarks When the relationship of faith and context is no longer analysed in terms of secularization but in terms of detraditionalization and pluralization, the discussion concerning the relationship of theology and religious studies takes a different perspective. Between continuity and discontinuity, in a dynamic of mutual interruption, religious studies challenge theology and help theology come to a renewed self-understanding, while theology interrupts the religious studies discourse with its specific theological perspective. This dynamic is the condition of possibility for a contemporary, credible theology. At the same time, through this, both a ‘slipping from theology to religious studies’ and an ‘isolation and pastoralization of theology’ are avoided. Only in so doing, can theological faculties credibly take their place at the crossroads of church, academy and society. It is from this place that they can best render services to all three domains concerned.17 To conclude: the present discussion does not simply involve a discussion of ideas, but also of institutional organization and structures. Experience seems 16

17

Cf. e.g. C. Cornille, Double Belonging: Aspects and Questions, in Buddhist-Christian Studies 23 (2003): 43–9. It will now be apparent that this positioning is itself already the result of the profile theology puts forward, that is, a cultural–theological, methodological exercise, challenged and informed by social studies and philosophy. So it is an example of that for which it advocates.

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to show – within many institutions – that where theology and religious studies are structurally separated, practitioners’ minds also diverge, often resulting in a situation that advances the two deficient strategies mentioned above. It is imperative, therefore, for the sake of theology and its project, to search for structures that promote and support the interconnectedness of theology and religious studies.

Part Three

Theology and Society: The Issue of Catholic Identity In this third part, I go to the crossroads between church and society. The last chapter of the second part, concerning the relation between theology and religious studies, showed that survival and protection strategies are emerging for those seeking an answer to the question of theology’s place at the crossroads of university and church. Grosso modo these same strategies, in many variations, arise at the crossroads of church and society, for example when one engages in a cultural–theological reflection on the identity of Catholic civil society organizations in a post-Christian and post-secular Flanders: Catholic schools, hospitals, care institutions, labour unions, political and socioeconomic organizations, sociocultural associations, youth movements, etc. Survival strategies attempt to emphasize continuity between the organization’s identity (whether or not it is still Catholic) and the context: they go in search of what unites and avoid what differentiates. Organizations remove their Catholic attire and secularize themselves, or identify a number of so-called Christian values, which provide a connection to the context for the organization. Protection strategies, on the contrary, focus on discontinuity and hope to shield Catholic identity from threats from the context. Often these strategies begin with an analysis of the context in terms of secularization (even if they reflect on religious plurality), and they are usually unaware of the difference between processes (-izations) and reactions to processes (-isms), thus easily confusing secularization with secularism. They forget that today identity construction is not simply a case of choosing between continuity or discontinuity, but – in a context of plurality and difference – one is urged to

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constitute one’s own identity from the dialogue with the other. In the next three chapters, I will examine, in particular, the question of the identity of Catholic schools and the future of religious education. From a cultural– theological perspective, I will discuss the manner in which the Catholic school and religious education are challenged by contemporary post-Christian and post-secular society, and I will show how thinking about Catholic identity from a dialogue in difference can offer an answer, that does not fall back into survival or protection strategies. In Chapter 7, I will first sketch out four models for thinking about how Catholic identity can be given (or not given) form today in schools or universities that are internally detraditionalized and pluralized: respectively, (a) institutional secularization, (b) reconfessionalization, (c) Christian values education and (d) re-profiling Christian faith in a school or university in which the religious plurality of pupils, students and staff is recognized and acknowledged. Here, I will argue that the difference in analysis between secularization and pluralization is the key for intentionally choosing the fourth model. In a second move, I will formulate a roadmap that forms the framework for putting this fourth model into practice. The re-profiling of Christian faith, in dialogue with other religions and worldviews in a context of plurality, requires at the same time a reflection on how to deal with plurality. Too often ‘pluralism’ becomes a new term for neutrality, passive tolerance and even covert forms of soft secularism. Also, protagonists of so-called ‘active pluralism’ are not always aware of the unspoken assumptions and value judgements contained in their arguments. By way of adapting and actualizing the four models formulated in the seventh chapter, I will go into detail regarding this debate in Chapter 8. There, I will formulate a concept of qualitative pluralism that forms the background for a Catholic educational project in a post-Christian and post-secular context. As a bonus, I will contribute some thoughts from the so-called ‘K-debate’ that raged some time ago at KU Leuven. In the last chapter, I will carry out the same exercise for Catholic religious education. The Roman Catholic curricula for religious education in primary and secondary schools, in the meantime, have been operative for approximately fifteen years. Notwithstanding the fact that these curricula were fashioned grosso modo from the contextual analysis and theological approach I advocate,

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the time has come for an evaluation and possible adjustment, since pluralization and detraditionalization now have a much greater impact on culture and society. Also, in this chapter, a discussion with the recurrent active-pluralist proposals, in Flanders, pleading for a non-confessional, general course on the subject of religions and worldviews cannot be avoided. At the same time, I will discuss points of criticism aired – now and then – in ecclesiastical circles. Education that is still too Christian for some appears to no longer be Christian enough for others.

7

Catholic Identity in a Post-Christian and Post-Secular Society: Four Models and a Roadmap

Stemming from a rich Catholic pedagogical tradition in a predominantly Catholic environment, Catholic education in Flanders has retained today its large majority position, in spite – it would seem – of the fundamentally changed Flemish context. The office for Catholic Education in Flanders1, which I am currently running, represents 2,200 schools, from primary education to the Catholic University of Leuven, governed by almost 800 school boards: in globo 700,000 pupils and students. Catholic primary education represents 62  per  cent of all primary education in Flanders, and Catholic secondary education even 75  per  cent of all secondary education. Also, in adult and higher education, Catholic institutions hold a firm majority position. This poses immediately the problem of Catholic identity: with such shares in the population, it is society itself, post-Christian and post-secular as it is, which sits in the class room, and which is present in the teaching staff and school boards. No wonder that, at regular intervals, the question arises regarding the identity of Catholic education. In 2011–12, the Catholic University of Leuven, for example, organized an assessment of the ‘K’ of KU Leuven, and also many Catholic schools are actively involved in such work. However, the situation of education does not differ substantially from other Catholic organizations which are abundantly present in Flemish society, such as hospitals, retirement and nursing homes, health insurance, trade unions, cultural and political organizations. From a context in which the default position was Catholic, we have evolved into a post-Christian context in barely half a century. And, unlike what some thinkers of secularization believed, the result of this development is not simply a 1

Cf. www.katholiekonderwijs.vlaanderen.

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secular culture and society, but rather a situation of religious plurality. Therefore, the context in which the question is posed today, concerning Catholic identity, is not only post-Christian but also post-secular. As we already indicated in the second chapter, the word ‘post’ in both categories means not simply ‘after’ (as if both realities and their effect would have disappeared), but rather that – culturally speaking – our relationship to Christian faith and to the process of secularization has changed. In such a context, the question arises regarding the Catholic identity of schools and universities, as well as of many other Christian organizations: (a) First, in each case, it concerns large organizations (often with a majority of the Flemish population) that managed to maintain their market share in a quickly secularized, detraditionalized society – at first sight, in spite of secularization. (b) Secondly: one who delves deeper, however, observes that these organizations secularize and pluralize from the inside out, at all levels, both with regard to their members or clients and their staff, and often even their management. Market share is maintained, or sometimes even strengthened, through an aura of quality and professionalism that hangs around these organizations: they move efficiently in culture and society, and are oriented towards the client. So doing, they also seem to bind the not-Christians, or no-longer-Christians to their organization. However, this aura of quality often bears upon another dimension that is much less demonstrable and has possibly to do with the perception of an often implicit, underlying (personalistic) value orientation that attaches to Christian organizations. Whether internal secularization also affects (or has already affected) this value orientation is not always clear. But alternative offers – in terms of education, for example, schools run by the State – do not benefit from the increasing secularization. (c) Finally, these organizations also share in the inheritance of the politics of (anti-) pillarization2, which have marked Belgian society 2

For a concise explanation, see my Interrupting Tradition, Chapter 2. In Flanders, the whole of society and the life of individuals living in this society was structurally organized according to one’s ideological adherence: Catholic, socialist or liberal. The catholic pillar provided organizations and support for every Catholic regarding education, health care, politics, social rank, leisure time, sports, culture, etc. Once born as a Catholic, one never had to leave the Catholic environment. In the last thirty years, this pillarization has become far less stringent and outspoken, although a lot of its institutions still exist, and attract large parts of the population.

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in the last century, and which segregated people ideologically in all sectors of culture and society. People often display a tense attitude regarding the Roman Catholic Church, especially now that it has lost both its quasi-monopoly on providing meaning and – for many – its credibility and relevance. The often ponderous and defensive way this Church deals with this new situation reinforces that tension. In fact, for some the word ‘Catholic’ is no longer useable, because it is too often associated with institutional dominance and closure. The very surprising distinction, at least for foreigners, Flemish people tend to make between Catholic and Christian to distinguish themselves from the Church (‘we are no longer Catholic, but still Christian’) is a good example of this. At the same time, calls for the rationalization of institutions, people and resources regularly resound. Since, in a detraditionalized society, ideology no longer appears to divide people: why not drastically do away with a culture and society which is organized on religious/ideological grounds? At the same time, however, there is the pluralization of religions and worldviews, which gives a particularly new relevance to this question. All of these factors influence the issue regarding the identity of Catholic organizations and institutions in Flemish society. In this chapter, we take up this question of identity, specifically referring to the way this concerns the Catholic school and university. To that end, I will first sketch four models for answering this question regarding identity. On the one hand, these four models help us to analyse which particular ideological profiling is currently being practised in the organization. On the other hand, on a normative level, they also assist in elucidating the identity profile the organization wishes to realize in the current context. The first two models appear to be the most drastic: institutional secularization versus institutional reconfessionalization. The next two represent a qualitatively different relationship of Christian faith with respect to the context: either the search for a generally shared, Christianinspired basic platform for Catholic education (continuity) or a re-profiling of Catholic/Christian faith in a school in which the religious plurality of pupils, students and staff is recognized and acknowledged (difference). In this last strategy, a generally shared, Christian-inspired consensus no longer forms the starting point for the profile of the Catholic school.

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Instead, this model starts, on the one hand, with recognizing the internal and external religious plurality and, on the other, with acknowledging the specific particularity of Christian faith in this context of plurality. In other words, ways are sought to make the Christian faith recognizable in the midst of this plurality, and this is based on the conviction that it continues to be a relevant offer of meaning, even and especially in a situation of plurality. Pupils, students and staff, whatever their convictions might be, are challenged to take up religious reflection in dialogue and/or confrontation with the Christian faith tradition and with each other. It is this fourth model that I put forward, both on contextual and theological grounds, as a viable approach for creating a future-directed Catholic identity for educational institutions. After I have sketched the four models in the first part of this contribution, I will work out in the second, shorter section which steps should be taken when one wishes to realize the fourth model.

Four models For a good understanding, it is important, first of all, to notice in advance that a distinction should be made between the institution’s intentions and its actual practice, because these may be very different. Further: these models are tightly formulated and present rather ideal–typical profiles: they try to elucidate guiding principles and are to be considered, first and foremost, rather as instruments to serve a more profound reflection than as correct descriptions of concrete situations.3 This said, the models can nevertheless be illustrated by concrete examples. With the presentation of each model, I will formulate five variables that describe the most important characteristics of a specific model and thus make clear the differences between the models. Grosso modo each model offers an answer to the following five questions: (a) What is the institutionally desired religious profile? What influence does this have on the educational project? (b) Which support is present an/or necessary for this profile definition? 3

As will become clear in Chapter 8, these models have found their way into the large-scale empirical research of my colleague Didier Pollefeyt, regarding the identity of Catholic schools, where they – under the name of the ‘Melbourne-scale’ – map out both the actual as well as desired school identity. See, for example, www.schoolidentity.net.

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Who supports this positioning? (c) What are the motives that legitimate the adopted profile, both from a cultural and a believing/theological perspective? (d) Which strategy should be followed to realize this profile definition? What measures or signals can help with this, both internally (ad intra) and towards the outside world (ad extra)? And finally, (e) what are the main problems for realizing this model today?

Institutional secularization: Catholic schools transform themselves into neutral or pluralist educational institutions where, alongside other religions, also the Christian faith has its place (a) In the first model, the processes of secularization and pluralization, which also internally impact the organization – lead to an institutional secularization. Such a move currently results in a twofold profiling: schools claim either to be neutral or pluralist. In a neutral school, religions and worldviews are a private matter and thus of no concern to the school. In a pluralist school, all religions and worldviews are recognized and the living together in diversity is cherished. Christians, of course, remain welcome in both, but in neither one is the Christian faith the first reference point for the school’s project. Moreover, explicit references to the Christian background from which the school stems – for example, in the school’s name – are often removed. (b) Given the sociocultural shifts, such an institutional secularization is no real surprise, but it appears to be an adaptation of the school’s profile to its reality – in many schools detraditionalization has become tangible at all levels and has affected the necessary support for a Catholic school. This need not cause immediate problems for Christians in such organizations. As in other non-confessional organizations, Christian faith can – in principle – play a role, if there are enough Christians, and if they involve themselves internally and externally in the discussion over the direction the organization wants to take. An unmistakable advantage of institutional secularization is that the discussion about the inheritance of pillarization is done away with. This puts at ease both those who stubbornly want to continue imposing the Catholic profile on society (even though the necessary support for this is lacking) and those who take offence precisely at this profile, because this recalls a time when the Catholic Church monopolized religious and sociocultural matters.

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However, there should be no misunderstanding concerning the option for this model. A neutral or pluralist organization, in casu a no longer explicitly Christian organization, remains ideologically profiled. As already mentioned, a distinction must be made between, on the one hand, a deliberate refusal to profile oneself religiously (neutrality) and, on the other, the explicit acceptance of internal religious plurality (pluralism). Both are radically divergent fundamental options. In (active-) pluralist organizations, there is room – in principle – for (inter)religious conversation, which is often even encouraged. In the case of neutrality, this debate is simply shut down; here neither Christians, nor others may make a difference. Neutrality is, in this respect, not neutral. Where this is claimed, it is often based on ideological motives, coming from positivistic and/or secularist tendencies. Neutrality is one of the possible positions on the field of religious plurality, even a participant in this debate, rather than an independent observer capable of surveying the field and objectively judging it. (c) Culturally, institutional secularization can be motivated by arguing that the process of secularization is completed in that way: the logic of detraditionalization is socioculturally realized. But for Christians this manoeuvre can also be theologically motivated. Institutions that are no longer de facto majority Christian, in which many of those involved no longer acknowledge (explicitly or implicitly) the Catholic faith, are perhaps better called no longer ‘Christian’ or ‘Catholic’. So doing, one can avoid unnecessary confusion concerning the specificity of Christian. Moreover, it complicates a renewed profiling of Christian faith and the faith community in the current plural society and culture. (d) Ad intra institutional secularization establishes the already existing practices of identity blurring and forgetfulness, and decreases the internal pressure of detraditionalization. A number of symbols are possibly killed off: the mention of Catholic or a saint in the name, official celebrations of the Eucharist, the obligation of religious formation. But, on the other hand, within a pluralist setting, Christians are free to organize themselves on a volunteer basis as Christians. A choice for Catholic religious instruction, alongside other religious subjects, should be of interest to a particular audience. The advantages ad extra are legion: the legacies of pillarization politics are settled once and for all; ideology is no longer an obstacle in discussions about the

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rationalization of the educational landscape or with regard to recruitment of pupils, students and staff. (e) However, it remains a question whether true pluralist education is not aiming too high in the current Flemish context. Flemish people today still seem to be embedded in processes of blurred identity, far more than of identity profiling and respect for religious plurality and otherness. Moreover – and this is partly a result of increasing economization – the liberated religious space is all too easily seized in an insidious manner by a kind of libertarian ideology of individual freedom that discredits every other value commitment or source of meaning in advance. Anything goes – what is true, good and beautiful is really arbitrary and depends purely on individual preference. The demand for such absolutized freedom curtails every social regulation and leads to a relativism that ultimately is easily recuperated by market and media forces. Freedom becomes the freedom of the consumer, dictated by offer and demand, by media, marketing and purchasing power.

Institutional reconfessionalization: Catholic education explicitly aims to propagate its Catholic identity and organizes education for Catholics by Catholics (a) The model of institutional secularization, the profile of adapting to the reality of detraditionalization, however, is not the only plausible one. Just as plausible, but on first glance more difficult to realize, is an institutional reconfessionalization. Such a reconfessionalized Catholic school profiles itself as an educational institution that resolutely intends to raise Catholic children and young people. Its school project is bound to, and legitimizes itself from, a strong connection to Christian faith and the Catholic Church in Flanders. (b) As regards support, reconfessionalization implies that a substantial number of the pupils, students and staff actively participate in the Catholic faith and faith community. Given secularization, such a school will no longer be a majority institution, but perhaps will not completely wither away either. The Catholic profile of such an institution can be very diverse – from very conservative and defensive to open and communicative. The fear that such an institution must necessarily slide into a ghetto – closed off from the world  – is not correct (and perhaps a remnant of the modern secularist criticism of

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church and religion). Although this remains a risk and vigilance is always required, Catholic pupils, students and staff do not have to be narrow-minded, culturally marginalized individuals. Rather, they can – from a confident familiarity with their own traditions and perspectives, and embedded in the current plural context – actively participate in society and culture and so give shape to this very plurality. (c) The feasibility of reconfessionalization in the current Flemish context might seem controversial (consider pleas made for ‘real-Catholic’ schools4); its plausibility is not. Both on cultural and theological grounds, an open reconfessionalization is a legitimate strategy. Culturally: the breaking down of pillarization in education does not necessarily lead to ‘more of the same’ but makes room for a legitimate plurality in educational projects. Therefore, model two is likewise a direct and legitimate consequence of the logic of detraditionalization. Theologically, it is obvious that a Catholic educational project can only profit from a robust, active bond with the Christian faith and the Catholic faith community. Believing, after all, is not something acquired; rather, it is a dynamic reality made real in life, lived in community and praxis. (d) Reconfessionalization, of course, requires ad intra an adjusted policy to realize this specific Catholic profile. This especially concerns, first of all, the recruitment of staff. In addition to professional qualities, the religious profile of staff members will be important. And in order to constitute the school’s public Christian identity, the same holds true for a pedagogical project in which spirituality and faith formation have an explicit place. Ad extra, in order to support the option for reconfessionalization, an appeal can be made to the constitutional freedom of education. (e) But it goes without saying – both for contextual and ecclesial reasons – that, today in Flanders, there is little support for reconfessionalization. One who advocates for such today often takes too lightly both the rehashed sociopolitical discussions between Catholics and secularist atheists, and the problems the church experiences in positioning itself once again in the postChristian context.5

4 5

See Chapter 8. Also for this statement, I refer to the next chapter.

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The modern Catholic school project: Christian values education – majority education for everyone who shares Christian values (a) Models one and two stand in stark contrast to model three. The profile expressed here is an education in Christian values. In past decades, this model has been the most prevalent approach in Flemish Catholic education. After all, schools became increasingly aware that their audience and frameworks secularized, even though they belonged to the Christian pillar of institutions that accompanied them from cradle to grave through their individual, familial, social and cultural life. On the heels of external and internal secularization, this model reformulates the Catholic educational project to a set of so-called Christian values, which (may) also appeal to non-Christians or no-longerChristians. Identity profiles, charters, mission statements, brochures and conferences from the 1970s and 1980s of the previous century – and often even today – illustrate this. Time and again, one sought for a still binding, common basis that was then interpreted as Christian. This especially seems attractive to do in the domain of ethics. In this line, Christian inspiration became identified with Christian values education.6 Being a Christian then means service to the whole of the human person, fostering freedom and responsibility, love of the neighbour and solidarity with the weak, the wounded, the outcast. Sometimes these values are still framed within a vague religious feeling, but seldom are they said to be founded from within in a personally experienced relationship to God. Today, it has become evident that many of these values are also practised and transmitted in non-Catholic institutions. Moreover, according to the proponents of model two (and also of model four), Christian values education leads to a creeping secularization of the Christian faith through ethics, while for proponents of model one (both Christians and non-Christians), it leads to hidden ideologization. (b) More generally stated, such profiling attempts to reach as great a possible consensus between the surrounding culture and Christian faith. As support for such profiling, it is supposed that a substantial number of the members, at least, consider these so-called Christian values to be important.

6

See M. Verhavert and L. Boeve, Kiemkracht in het secundair onderwijs. Enige beschouwingen, in A. De Wolf et al., Kiemkracht. Verslagbundel van het bezinningscongres van het Vlaams Secretariaat van het Katholiek Onderwijs (Tielt: Lannoo, 1998), pp. 136–44.

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(c) Culturally, model three is motivated as follows. When one takes secularization seriously, Christian faith can only be a connecting element, when it is brought back to a generally communicable core that is also recognizable and valuable to non-Christians. Moreover, this is the dynamic of secularization itself: Christian faith is stripped of its mythological frameworks and presented in its fully human significance. Theologically, it is postulated that ethics forms the best point of contact in a modern society, to make the bridge (correlation) between Christian faith and contemporary culture. Moreover, there can be no contradiction between what is ‘truly human’ and what is ‘truly Christian’. In the modern society, Christians work together with non-Christians for more humanity. From the standpoint of the other models, it is not always clear who here is parasitized by whom: Is it Christian faith parasitizing modern society, or vice versa? (d) Strategically, this model has been of interest – and successful – because it explicitly presupposes the credibility and relevance of the Christian faith in constituting ‘joint ventures’ with the modern context. Both ad intra and ad extra, a coexistence of modern culture with Christian faith was made possible. Moreover, Christians and Christian organizations were very successful in giving shape to the aspirations of modern culture and society. To say this in another way, a Catholic school produced ethically well-formed, responsible subjects who could play a significant role in modern society. Thus, the modern Catholic school teaching Christian values was in no sense ‘ideologically dangerous’. (e) Recent history has taught us, however, that such a search for the greatest common denominator overaccentuates ethics, and de facto detaches the proposed set of values in the school’s project from an experienced Christian way of life that is ultimately founded in the communal relationship to the God of Jesus Christ. At the very least, other aspects of faith and practices were relativized and often even functionalized. Today many have become aware of the fact that a ‘Christian interpretation of human values’ without a grounding in a lived Christian spirituality is merely a doubling of what can also be communicated and transmitted without Christian packaging. Therefore, in Christian values education, the specificity of Christian faith is the first victim. So long as there was sufficient overlap between Christian faith and modern culture, this strategy was persuasive, because a common horizon of meaning

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supported these values, both for Christians and non-Christians. However, this overlap disappears under the pressure of detraditionalization. Today, the one who too easily assumes that ‘Christian faith’ and ‘contemporary culture’ link to each other in continuity often does not take seriously both the religious plurality and the particular position of the Christian faith in the midst of this plurality.

Christian reprofiling in a context of religious plurality: The Catholic school as a service to the identity formation of Christians and nonChristians, starting from a recognition of internal and external religious plurality and in explicit dialogue with Christian faith (a) In model four, the school’s Catholic signature is maintained, while, at the same time, increased detraditionalization and pluralization are recognized. As a service on behalf of the Catholic community to society, the school takes seriously that changed situation and reconsiders its religious mission. Therefore, this model aims at a Christian reprofiling in a context of religious plurality. It starts from the internal religious detraditionalization and pluralization of pupils, students and staff, as well as from the identity of Christian faith itself in the midst of this plurality. Thus, it no longer starts from an assumed, general Christian and culturally credible consensus. Catholic education provides a training ground for religious reflection and identity formation in dialogue/confrontation with the Christian faith. Through its project the school teaches pupils and students, whether or not they are Christians, to reflect on their own religious profile and handling of religious diversity. For the Christians among them, this most certainly contains the challenging invitation to deepen one’s own faith and to clarify it reflexively, in dialogue with others. So doing, they themselves contribute to the recontextualization of the Christian narrative tradition in the current context. In this dialogue with religious others, non-Christians, for their part, are invited to consider their own profile. Recognition of singularity and difference is not hereby negated in a general overall consensus, but becomes precisely the way along which this reflection occurs. In this way, Catholic education prepares youngsters to take an active role in a pluralist, multicultural society. This is its sociocultural calling (and its

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theological project, as will become clear). To be sure, this intention requires not only a formal recognition of plurality, but also implies a very particular involvement in this plurality. Such involvement, for example, is characterized by, among other things, the acceptance of basic rules for the dialogue (respect, openness to the other, willingness to listen, questioning of one’s own assumptions), which, rather than as universal principles, are legitimated as procedural virtues acquired in the dialogue itself. Therefore, this model no longer starts from a presupposed continuity between culture and faith, but rather from an understanding of plurality and difference. Such a vision of the relationship between a plural society and Christian faith very explicitly formed the background for the reprofiling of the Roman Catholic religious education curriculum for secondary education (1998–2000) in Flanders.7 One of its basic goals is that pupils must be able to give, ‘from insight into the plural religious character of human speech, thought and action, and in dialogue with the offer of meaning from Christian faith in this context, their own account of their own religious profile’. (b) Naturally, such a Catholic project continues to call for a recognizable group of self-confident Christians, who venture as such into the interreligious conversation. Moreover, it asks for a greater visibility of religious plurality. In line with what we argued in Chapter 2, it is best to no longer plot participants in the religious debate on an axis between the extremes of ‘Churched Christians’ and ‘no-longer-Christians’.

Marginally Churched Catholics

Practising Catholics Moderately Churched Catholics

Atheistic Humanists

Agnostics UnChurched Christians

Atheists

Rather, it is better to imagine a religiously plural field with the various positions of Christians, Muslims, Jews, atheists, agnostics, New Age adherents and post-Christians (which continue to form a relatively large group). 7

For references and a renewed reflection on this curriculum, fifteen years later, see Chapter 9.

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Often originating from an extensively secularized Christian bedding, these latter often still have a very fragmentary commitment to faith and the faith community, which expresses itself in – among other things – only occasional (and decreasing) participation in rites of passage and a deficient and nonintegrated knowledge of the Christian tradition – despite years of religious instruction and catechesis.

Indifferent Christenen

Wicca

Hindus

Buddhists Jews

post-Christians

Muslims

Atheists

(c) This model is first culturally motivated. In a plural context, education towards religious reflexivity is indispensable; on the plural religious field, Christian faith is structurally just one of the options. Our society is in need of people who can deal with religious and cultural difference, who do not immediately consider otherness as threatening, but as an opportunity for enquiry and enrichment. Awareness is growing theologically that the confrontation/ dialogue with otherness/plurality causes the Christian faith to enquire – today in increasing measure – about its own identity and compels it to reflect on the relationship with the other. Theologizing no longer engages in a presupposed continuity between faith and culture but with difference. The current context, then, is not analysed primarily in terms of secularization, but rather in terms of pluralization. The bridge that the dialogue with culture produces no longer results in a new overarching consensus, but leads to the proper contribution that Christians can provide to identity formation, society and culture. At the same time, Christians are more aware of the fact that Christian faith is not simply a cultural behaviour, but that it requires a specific personal engagement, which is interpreted as a response to a preceding call by the God of Jesus Christ. (d) Implementation of this strategy implies that ad intra both the recognition of plurality and Christian identity are given a higher profile. Particularly

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important here is avoiding the trap of model three: namely, the too-easy presupposition that there is a shared Christian consensus that connects the whole school. Consciously doing away with this presupposition makes it possible for non-Christians and Christians within the school to explicitly show themselves religiously, and to enter into conversation with each other from their own strength and insights. Christians can begin to speak once again from their own identity, knowing they only speak for themselves and no longer necessarily have also to speak for the non-Christians to the school. The reverse is equally true. The school remains ‘Catholic’ because it is primarily a service from Christians – from the church – to society, although these no longer constitute a majority. The pedagogical project that buttresses this service is recognized by the community, and, therefore, is provided with (financial) support. This means that society recognizes the added value of an educational project that is not based on a stance of presupposed neutrality, but starts from a reflective qualitative plurality. Perhaps only this last model can still legitimize a majoritarian Flemish Catholic school, that is worthy of its name. Only models one or two are alternatives; model three is barely credible. Thus, the Catholic school becomes a training ground, both for Christian faith and the church community, and for society. There the church community can learn to deal with society’s plural public forum, as well as engage in an exercise in modesty and re-profiling. The Christian faith is queried on its own identity and relevance, and challenged towards recontextualization. As a training ground for society, the school trains intellectuals and experts who can deal with the complexity of religious identity. It educates people for whom diversity and difference, as these are present in a multicultural society, are not immediately threatening, but challenges towards openness, depth and communication, with respect for everyone’s individuality. It awakens in people the awareness of the threatening mainstreaming of plurality and otherness through the processes of globalization and economization, urges them to resist these and enables them to mobilize the critical potential of their own religious traditions in dialogue and conflict. (e) A complication for the realization of this fourth model is the change of attitude this requires, both internally and externally. In the remainder of this chapter, and especially also in Chapter 8, we will talk about the urge to come

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to a ‘qualitative pluralism’. This assumes a maturity that is often still in need of further development. Politically, it seems that the ghost of the old ideological oppositions has not yet been driven away. The sociocultural order is, moreover, in the grip of a blurring of identity and consumerist libertinism. Certainly, the transition from ideological secularization to religious pluralization is not yet commonly realized.

A road map for the fourth model: There is no contradiction between Christian identity and ‘qualitative pluralism’ The question of the identity of the Catholic school or university – as stated in the first part – is thoroughly determined by the ongoing internal secularization and pluralization of pupils, students and staff. In this second part, I will elaborate on the conviction that only a Catholic school that knows how to deal creatively with this internal tension between project and reality, with respect for this plurality and for the particularity of Christian faith, will be able to give an appropriate answer to the expectations both from the context and from Christian faith itself. This school teaches Christians and non-Christians to reflect on their own identities in dialogue with each other, and so prepares them for a critical-constructive participation in a plural, multicultural society, in which diversity and difference are no threat to one’s own identity, but an enrichment. Such an attitude also offers the best response to the omnipresent relativism and indifference, and can raise up a bulwark against the pervading economization that uniformalizes everything within the logic of the market and banalizes deeper religious questions in terms of need and fulfilment, supply and demand. Therefore, it is not enough to ask the question, ‘What is Catholic identity?’ Equally important today – and perhaps more to the point – is a discussion about what is pluralism. This is a pressing question in Flanders that calls for an open and broad sociocultural and political debate, because pluralism is all too often confused with relativism or neutrality, or even with the privatization of worldviews, meaning and religion. Moreover, the project of ‘active pluralism’ is in this regard not entirely without ambiguity.8 8

See the following chapter.

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In what follows, I will articulate step by step the insights at stake in a reprofiling of Catholic education according to the fourth model. (a) From a de facto acceptance of plurality to a de iure recognition of plurality. Catholic education pluralizes from within. Christians no longer constitute the majority of pupils and staff. This must be the first step in a reflection on Catholic identity today. In a society that increasingly secularizes, Christians no longer comprise a majority, even in their own institutions. This plurality certainly changes these institutions and the manner in which they understand their own identity. But instead of too quickly assuming that plurality mortgages or makes the schools’ Catholic identity impossible, the challenge is made here, primarily, to deal with it in a contextually appropriate manner. Fundamental recognition of and respect for the existing religious plurality may well be an opportunity for the Catholic school to reprofile its own mission and inspiration. (b) From a de iure recognition of plurality to the deliberate option for a qualitative pluralism. Religious plurality is not in itself a threat to the Christian identity of schools, but rather the context in which it is handled. All too often, opinion leaders and politicians confuse pluralism with neutrality or even relativism. People keep silent about their religious views and choices out of respect for the other, or, much worse, because personal religious beliefs would not matter in the public sphere. Pluralism then becomes an instrument to privatize religious convictions and advances a kind of neutral public forum that would rise above religious pluralism. In practice, however, such pluralism does not escape from the religious, but imposes a very specific value orientation on everyone. In contradistinction hereto, taking plurality seriously begins with taking difference seriously. There is no such thing as a neutral zone, free from ideology, value presuppositions and religion, where one could talk in a fully detached way about religions and worldviews: every attempt to do so is already ideologically framed; no one is an uninvolved observer. Thus, a qualitative pluralism begins with the recognition that we are all participants – Christians, non-Christians, agnostics, Muslims, Jews, Buddhists, humanists, atheists, etc. – on the pluri-religious field, involved in a continuous conversation about meaning, life and society. The intention of a fully self-conscious qualitative pluralism is the organizing of this conversation, and the search for a number of pragmatic agreements – with respect for each other’s difference and otherness  – to make this possible, an intention that is no less involved with

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values than any other dealings with plurality. For Catholics, this qualitative pluralism is an expression of their view of humanity and the world, where all people – despite and in their differences – are fundamentally connected to one another in a communicative way. (c) Qualitative pluralism requires religious thoughtfulness and interreligious communication. In a truly pluralist society, one no longer remains silent out of respect for the other, but one speaks from one’s own insights, tradition and experience. One enters into conversation from one’s own beliefs and convictions with religiously different conversation partners, not primarily to establish one’s own great truth, but to foster the conversation itself, which enables living together in difference. Such a conversation teaches something, first of all, about one’s own identity. A confrontation with a Buddhist makes a Christian think about his or her own identity. But, at the same time, one also learns something about the other – and often it proves, that the greatest difference lies in what seems to be the same. Then the God of Jews, Christians and Muslims may be the same, in these diverse religions; nevertheless, this God receives a distinctive – and not always complementary – countenance. Education today means learning to be able to carry on this conversation, including an attitude of religious thoughtfulness. Pupils and students should be sensitive to the fact that every speech, even one’s own speech, is already value-laden; they should be able to reflect on this and to enter into dialogue with others; on the one hand, to test their own identity, on the other, to make living together in difference possible. (d) Towards a Christian reprofiling in a context of religious plurality. In a perspective of qualitative pluralism, religious diversity is no threat to Christian faith. Rather, this offers new opportunities – also and especially in Catholic schools – to bring Christian faith convictions into the conversation. Because too often in the past an attempt was made to create a kind of ‘soft-Christian’ consensus solely through the so-called Christian values that connected as many school members as possible. Recognition of religious difference, in an internally pluralized school, is precisely the condition of possibility for bringing in the Christian faith (in its own diversity and plurality) in an authentic way. Moreover, this recognition is not contrary to Christian faith itself, which presupposes the freedom to believe. In addition, it is not inconceivable that confrontation with difference – precisely in interreligious conversation – opens

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new ways to meet, once again, the God of Jesus of Nazareth, confessed by Christians as the Christ. (d) Catholic education: a service of the faith community to society? Unedited: yes, but it is also a service from society to itself! Education towards a qualitative pluralism, in dialogue and confrontation with the Christian faith, with respect for religious diversity – this is training people who can form their own identity in an intercultural and multireligious society, whether these are Christians or not, with respect for and in conversation with the religious other and in express solidarity with the weakest. This is the societal project that Catholic education stands for – unquestionably legitimate according to the Belgian constitution. To the extent that this project – which is not value neutral – is nourished from the Christian faith tradition, this is a service of the church to society. Society is also the first beneficiary, since qualitative pluralism is the best way towards an actively tolerant society, where people of many faiths can live together and be themselves at the same time. (e) Religious education as training ground for qualitative pluralism. The Roman Catholic religious education curriculum, which has been used in Flanders for the past fifteen years, attempts – from and in dialogue with its own Christian inspiration – to educate young people into religiously thoughtful adults. The same is true for the courses on religion and worldviews which are taught in Catholic high schools and at the university. Christian or not, pupils and students learn not to experience religious difference as a threat to their own identity but as an enrichment and chance to give colour to the future society through interreligious conversation. (f) Catholic schools and universities as open spaces for qualitative pluralism. Christian-inspired schools and universities take the figure of Jesus of Nazareth (and those who have tread in his path, such as Francis of Assisi, Don Bosco, Ignatius of Loyola, Benedict, De La Salle, Angela Merici, Philip Neri, etc.) as a privileged reference point when reflecting on their pedagogical projects. What this can mean concretely today is not so much a matter of high-minded mission statements, which are imposed on schools. Furthermore, it need not be the same thing for every school or university, once and for all time. When one no longer looks at a Catholic school as a school of Catholics for Catholics, but as an open space for rendering the service of qualitative pluralism, on behalf of the church, then a sufficiently broad support can be found in (almost)

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all Catholic schools today to contribute to such a Christian school identity. Both on formal occasions and in informal setting, people should feel called upon to enter into conversation openly and creatively, within the school, concerning the question of what this privileged reference to figures from the Christian tradition can mean in concrete school life today. How can this be translated into a newly written pedagogical project for the school; in the school’s policy and organizational development; in a training course for new, young staff members; in a pastoral concept for staff, pupils and students (who choose to do so); in cooperation with the broader (local) (church) community and in profiling in the public forum? This support need not consist only of Christians, but can include all those concerned who are willing to start the conversation from their own (non-)religious disposition. It is precisely this conversation  – really listening to each other in depth – that establishes the quality and atmosphere of a Catholic school, which reflects on everything that takes place at school. Catholic education in general, then, consists of the variety of such concrete pedagogical school projects, which have found one another in this conversation, starting from the multi-interpretable Christian tradition. Intrinsic commitment – and not neutrality – is what distinguishes a qualitative pluralism from formal pluralism and thus also a Catholic school from a so-called neutral or active-pluralist school. Catholic schools are called today to mobilize and broaden – internally as well as in dialogue with each other – the support needed for such a conversation. It is indeed possible that this process will not get going in a number of schools or stops after a while. The way that Catholic education will emerge from this process cannot be predicted; however, in no case will it be with the religious and ideological schemas of the twentieth century. Most certainly this is a serious issue, whose success is not guaranteed in advance.

8

Qualitative Pluralism as a Hallmark of the Catholic Dialogue School

When the question is asked concerning the identity of Catholic education in the current context, it is striking that the word ‘still’ appears almost naturally: How Catholic is Catholic education still? How can its Catholic identity still find credible and relevant expression today? What dream can this education still inspire today and tomorrow? Here it revolves around the ‘still’ that also reverberates in questions like: Are you still attending the weekend Masses? Are your children still coming with you? Are they still getting married in the church? Or in the world of education: Do you still have Masses or prayer services at school? Do you still have a chapel or quiet room? Do you still organize retreats? Do you still have a pastoral workgroup, a Lenten fund-raising appeal? Where it appears  – oddly enough – that you must give account for yourself, if your initial response to these questions is ‘yes’. ‘No’, or rather ‘no longer’, has apparently become the default position. Of course, that fits into the ongoing development our society is experiencing, which sociologists describe with the term ‘secularization’. In the most recent Belgian report book that reports on the fourth wave of the European Values Study, the conclusion is drawn that this secularization is as good as realized – its title leaves no room for ambiguity: New times, new people.1 Any answer given to the question regarding the identity of Catholic education cannot bypass this reality: Does religiously inspired education – in particular Catholic Education – still have a future; does it still make sense? Certainly in a situation where Catholic education has a large market share (up to 75 per cent in secondary education), the numbers from the European 1

See Chapter 2.

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Values Study indicate that secularization, within these educational institutions, has got stronger. This process will continue to intensify as the older, often more religious and church-belonging generation of teachers, school boards and board members are replaced in coming years. This will only intensify the tension between the school’s claimed Catholic identity and the feasibility to realize this. Based on an analysis and evaluation of the current religious context, alternative visions have been proposed with regard to the ideological character of education in Flanders. Along with the persistent plea for neutral education, the call today is louder than ever for ‘active-pluralist’ education. At the same time, there is a request for a more pronounced ‘real’ Catholic school, by Catholics for Catholics. In Flanders, an objective alliance between these two positions even seems to be in the making. By way of a kind of application and actualization of the four models developed in the previous chapter, in this chapter I intend to take up anew the question of the identity of Catholic Education, and this with particular reference to the alternative visions I just mentioned. In close connection with the analysis of the contemporary context in terms of detraditionalization, individualization and pluralization, I will first discuss the end of the ‘uncomplicated confessional school’ and of ‘Christian values education’. Then I will elucidate how the alternative visions on the philosophical-religious character of education involve themselves in such an analysis and evaluation of the context. Here, it will become clear that two different discussions are often being carried on at the same time: on the one hand, a contextual discussion on the place of religion in the contemporary context, on the other, a theological discussion on how the Christian faith should relate to the changed context. In both discussions, the precise analysis and evaluation of the context and how this challenges religion in general – and Christian faith in particular – have interesting consequences. From this discussion, the scene will be set for a contextually plausible and theologically legitimate project of Catholic Education. Here, I will refer to the project of the ‘Catholic dialogue school’ which the office for Catholic Education in Flanders has adopted. After a reflection on the lessons to be learnt from the K-discussion at KU Leuven, we finally look at the theological scope of this project.

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The end of the era of smooth confessionality and Christian values education In the preceding chapter, I developed four ideal–typical models, in relation to the changed context, for reflecting on the future of the identity of Catholic institutions. It appears, now more than ever, that these ideal–typical alternatives are considered as realistic possibilities in the field. Below I will first examine what we can call the existing classical models, and I will indicate the problems these face today. In the next section, I will discuss alternatives formulated for the future. First, there is the assessment from the large-scale study of D. Pollefeyt’s research group into the Catholic identity of schools in Flanders2 that the obvious confessionality of Christian education still is empirically demonstrable, but, nevertheless – in accordance with the findings of the European Values Study – drastically fades away with the shifting of generations. Forty-two per cent of the staff in Catholic secondary schools in Flanders, as well as 49 per cent of pupils’ parents, experience to a greater or lesser extent a quasi-evident confessionality in Catholic education. However, approximately 35  per  cent of the staff and 25  per cent of parents deny this confessionality, while 22 per cent of the staff and 26 per cent of parents find it is slowly but surely ebbing away.3 The problematized nature of Catholic identity has thus become generally known. In response to this problematization, Catholic education has conceived its identity – since the 1970s of the last century – in terms of Christian values education. Christian values of freedom, solidarity, responsible autonomy and so on, inspired by the philosophical–theological anthropology of socialpersonalism, were considered the still binding common basis. This basis was shared by as many possible people on the continuum between ‘Churched Christians’, across ‘Unchurched Christians, to “humanist atheists” ’. In general, this project attempted to achieve as large a consensus as possible between the modern, secularized culture and Christian faith. To this end, Christian faith 2

3

The empirical research Didier Pollefeyt has conducted for a number of years, both internationally and regionally, from which I take a number of general findings, is presented in the following publication: D. Pollefeyt and J. Bouwens, Framing the Identity of Catholic Schools. Empirical Methodology for Quantitative Research of the Catholic Identity of an Education Institute, in International Studies in Catholic Education 2 (2010): 193–211. I thank Jan Bouwens for the references and the recently updated numbers mentioned below. Sample: 3826 staff members and 2088 parents from 50 schools spread throughout Flanders in the period 2008–13.

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was brought back to a general communicable kernel that was recognizable and valuable for non-Christians as well. Ethics was considered the best point of contact for building a bridge between Christian faith and modern culture, from the conviction that there can be no contradiction between what is ‘truly human’ and ‘truly Christian’. This approach to conceiving the identity of Catholic education was strategically of great importance because it expressly embodied the credibility and relevance of the Christian faith in modern society. But, at the same time, this strategy lived off of the progressively fading overlap between Christian faith and modern culture. When the Christian horizon of meaning is no longer obvious nor generally shared, the connecting consensus becomes ever fainter. Then it becomes not only increasingly more difficult to allude to so-called common Christian values, but also to give clear answers to the question: Why should we continue to call the universal human values that bind us together Christian? Not only on substantive grounds, but also from empirical research, it appears today that the strategy of Christian values education no longer works for retaining the Christian character of this educational project, but on the contrary has a secularizing effect – even for those consciously putting this strategy into action in order to realize the school’s Catholic identity! Many adults in Flanders show a preference (intention) for a mediation of Christian faith through ‘Christian’ values and norms. Some use this strategy consciously; others merely glide along with compromise-thinking about Christian school identity in a post-Christian and pluralist context. In any event, the effect for a growing number of pupils is undeniable: even though pupils incorporate moral values in their own identities, many leave its Christian interpretation behind and wish the school would (further) secularize. This effect is increasingly identified as pupils grow older.4 In a situation where the overlap between faith and context grows smaller and smaller, a pedagogy that quasi-automatically binds moral formation and religious formation is not only ineffective, but even counterproductive (correlation fatigue, resisting recovery, reduction of religious specificity).5 4 5

Pollefeyt and Bouwens, Framing the Identity of Catholic Schools, pp. 200–1. D. Pollefeyt distinguishes between four negative effects when one continues to use Christian values education in a cultural context characterized by detraditionalization and pluralization: ineffectiveness, predictability, counterproductivity and an erosion of the specifically Christian aspects of school identity. See: D. Pollefeyt and J. Bouwens, Tussen Leuven en Melbourne. Katholiek onderwijs in tijden van detraditionalisering en pluralisering. Een inleiding in de Melbourne Schaal, in K. Vanspeybroeck and J. Claeys (eds), Eigenzinnig leraar-zijn in een katholieke school. Waar zeg jij dat ik ben? (Brussels: Licap, 2010), pp. 80–9, 84–5.

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From the same empirical research, it appears that, for many, such a vagueChristian profile – for a school carrying Christian values education on its banner – is not only a realistic but also a desirable future. Seventy-eight per cent of the staff and 75 per cent of pupils’ parents are in favour of continuing the strategy of Christian values education. The same is true for 72 per cent of secondary school pupils and 70 per cent of pupils in the fifth and sixth grades in primary school. Moreover, 31 per cent of pupils (primary and secondary together) admit they would feel at home in a secularized school and continue to support Christian values education.6 Therefore, not only a majority of both parents, staff and pupils, but even those pupils who admit to feeling most at home in a secularized school, can muster some appreciation for Christian values education. Passive tolerance, the path of least resistance where no one has to contradict another and each one can go one’s own way is apparently a tempting idea. The school then provides a number of generally shared values – in line with a passive tolerance – that make it possible to live together in a detraditionalized and pluralized context. Obviously, such an option is not value-neutral. Plurality and difference are not emphasized in order to nurture towards a more reflective approach to philosophical-religious identity, but rather rubbed out in a soft-secularist consensus that offers little resistance against relativism and consumerism.

The (complementary) alternatives of a truly confessional school and active pluralism As alternatives, there is obviously the classical neutral profile, whose valueladen and often ideological character, however, is increasingly recognized. Such a project too easily banishes religion to the private sphere and sees too little of the value-laden character of all human thought and action. Also, this profile starts from, or leads to, a secularist position. At first sight, a more solid point of contact with the analysis of the religious landscape that we made is offered by the alternatives of active pluralism 6

Sample: 3826 staff members, 2088 parents, 13,955 secondary students and 759 primary students from 50 schools spread throughout Flanders in the period 2008–13.

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and reconfessionalization, which can constitute – as we already hinted – a joint complementary alternative. Such positions have already been pushed forward, for example, at a symposium on religion and education on 28 April 2010 in Tilburg.7 At this symposium, the following proposal was made. (a) On the one hand, for those who today are (still) institutionally religious, it (still) should be possible to organize confessional education. (b) On the other hand, for those who are no longer institutionally religious, or do not choose a school on this basis, active-pluralist education should be established. As justification for this alternative to the present educational situation, it was first suggested that religious formation – certainly in a time of ‘moral and cultural crisis’ and religious pluralization – is necessary for the proper functioning of citizens in society.8 Secondly, this alternative proposal assumes a ‘neutral attitude to both secular and religious truth claims’ (and thus no longer equates neutrality with secularized/secularist reason). This recognition of the equality of philosophical-religious options then formed the basis for the following distinguishing approach. (a) ‘Orthodox’ parents can continue to enjoy the constitutional freedom to organize confessional education ‘in close connection with the Church community to which they feel connected’.9 But also this education should give increased attention to religious plurality and dialogical identity formation. (b) Since – so the proposal further stated – this is important for just a small number of parents and pupils, and thus only pertains a small number of schools, a general, active-pluralist philosophicalreligious education should be provided for all other pupils in all other schools (remark: both official and private – in majority Catholic – schools!). All pupils should become familiar with the various philosophical-religious traditions so that they also become aware of what identity formation means in a situation of plurality and difference. The presuppositions behind the proposal imply, on the one hand, that the official, neutral education provided by the state, is no 7

8

9

At this meeting, a discussion paper was presented by Jan de Groof, Wim van de Donk, et al., which in the meantime has been published as Reflecties op de omgang met religieus en levensbeschouwelijk verschil in het onderwijs in Vlaanderen en Nederland, in Tijdschrift voor Onderwijsrecht en Onderwijsbeleid, 45 (2010–11): nr. 1–2, 3–35. For my commentaries and evaluation of this discussion paper, see, among others, my Levensbeschouwing, religie en onderwijs: enkele beschouwingen bij de reflectietekst, in Tijdschrift voor Onderwijsrecht en Onderwijsbeleid, (2010–11): nr. 1–2, 51–8. See: Reflecties, pp. 34–5: ‘The public interest requires that each pupil, especially with the growing religious diversity, can form an adequate and complete picture of religious and philosophical traditions. This should be expected of education in all schools, including public and more orthodox schools.’ Reflecties, p. 34.

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longer neutral (in the new, non-secularist meaning of the word); on the other, that Catholic education is no longer Catholic (because the majority of staff and pupils are no longer institutionally involved in the church but share in a kind of marginal or unchurched faith).10 If this alternative proposal should be realized, in Flanders we would end up with a new division of schools: rather than the present split between official and private (foremost Catholic) education, in the future there will be a small group of ‘truly’ confessionally bound schools (called ‘orthodox’) and a great majority of internally pluralized schools (both official and private). And in any case, both types of schools must prepare pupils for citizenship in an actively pluralist society. Even though both alternatives are presented here as a complementary plan for the entire current educational situation, they do not necessarily have to be linked together, and both deserve to be discussed separately. So, I will first discuss the model of institutional reconfessionalization, afterwards the activepluralist approach.

The ‘truly confessional’ minority school Since the erosion of the overlap between the Christian horizon of meaning and the current context problematizes the project of the Catholic majority school, voices are heard in Flanders to establish once more ‘truly Catholic’ schools: thus, a school project where the link between institutional identity, Christian faith and the faith community is much more explicitly expressed. This link is being consciously sought after once again, because it is no longer self-evident in present-day Catholic Education: on the one hand, because the quasi-evident confessionality melts away, on the other, because of the increasingly fainter insipid consensus behind Christian values education. Parents who want their children to be raised as Catholics look for a school that will consciously support their pedagogical project. Such schools have the explicit ambition of educating their pupils as Catholics. Within a perspective of detraditionalization and pluralization, such a Catholic school will be a minority school, in view of the dwindling percentage of Catholics. Alongside other confessional schools, 10

See: Reflecties, p. 32: ‘Rather than “being freed from religious barriers”, today Catholic education is “soul-less”. Many parents no longer determine school choice on an ideological basis but based on considerations regarding the school’s quality and proximity.’

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it may be a legitimate expression and an adequate pedagogical translation of the current philosophical-religious situation. In principle, this option is certainly plausible. However, the concrete realization of such a ‘truly confessional’ school in Flanders is less evident. As concerns support, such a reconfessionalization implies that a substantial number of the board members, leaders and staff actively confesses Catholic faith and the Catholic faith community. Moreover, reconfessionalization also calls for a target audience that appreciates this explicitly Catholic profiling and chooses it. And then, of course, the question arises: What must the criterion be by which to test this Catholic standard? Precisely at this point a debate begins that has not only a sociocultural but also a theological–ecclesial dimension. On the one hand, the intent of a ‘truly Catholic’ school requires a position with regard to who (still) call themselves Catholic in Flanders, certainly in view of the varying degrees of belonging. Who is still a ‘real’ Catholic? And who can/may decide? And by what standard? On the other hand, the theological–ecclesial discussion situates itself here on the manner in which the Christian faith should relate to the current context: depending on the evaluation of this context, this can vary from the search for a highly productive relation to the context to a negative rejection thereof. The opposite is equally true: the sociocultural evaluation of what is Catholic also determines how society will perceive such initiatives. One who interprets ‘still Catholic’ as ‘hopelessly out of date’ or even ‘reactionary’ will consider such schools as islands cut off from the world, in contrast to one who does not. It would appear that both these discussions run together today. It is certainly true that institutionally reconfessionalized minority schools need not automatically become islands cut off from the world, and Christians are not necessarily reactionary conservatives. Also, these schools can actively  – from a confident familiarity with their own traditions and perspective, and embedded in the current plural context – participate in society and culture, and so explicitly give shape to this plurality. But this at least presupposes that they teach pupils and students to deal with the challenges of detraditionalization, individualization and pluralization, and help them come to a reflexive understanding of their own religious position in relation to other positions. If ‘truly confessional’ schools, however, want to protect their pupils from these challenges’ – because, for example, they

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erroneously assume that this necessarily leads to nihilism, individualism and relativism  – they will not teach them how to reflexively deal with their own religious identity in relation to others. And here a warning should be sounded. The empirical research of D. Pollefeyt, to which I already referred, shows that those who resolutely support reconfessionalization often fall into the dynamic of such a closed school (called a ‘monologue school’ in Pollefeyt’s empirical research). Approximately 12 per cent of adults (staff and parents) score positively on the model of reconfessionalization.11 This sample, consisting of clear proponents for developing a Catholic school identity, shows a positive linear correlation (of +0.41) with the monologue school model. The actual overlap between the two models is 62 per cent. These empirical findings suggest that the degree to which one supports reconfessionalization is linearly related to the desire for a monological Catholic identity. A majority of the supporters of reconfessionalization, to a greater or lesser degree, explicitly long for a closed, non-dialogical Catholic identity model. But even though it is true that there is an important connection between reconfessionalization and the model of the monologue school, at the same time it appears that reconfessionalization does not have to lead per se to the monologue school. It can also be connected with striving after an open ‘dialogue school’, in which dialogue then is understood as missionary or kerygmatic.12 Indeed, 38 per cent of the selection of staff and parents that score positively on the model of reconfessionalization (see above) oppose the model of the closed monologue school. By contrast they resolutely opt for the model of the open Catholic dialogue school: 19 in 20 support the dialogue school with an average score of 5.83 on a scale of 7, where 7 means ‘strongly agree’. Furthermore, a slightly positive correlation (of +0.16) can be noticed between reconfessionalization and this rather ‘kerygmatic’ version of the model of the dialogue school. Concern for re-emphasizing Catholic confessionality (reconfessionalization), therefore, does not need to contradict an open, 11

12

Corresponding to 921 adults out of a total sample of 7521 teachers, administrators and parents from 50 schools spread throughout Flanders in the period 2008–13. In this connection, see the explanation of what D. Pollefeyt calls the ‘dialogue school of the kerygmatic type’, in D. Pollefeyt and J. Bouwens (eds), Dialoog als toekomst. Een katholiek antwoord op de verkleuring van het onderwijslandschap, in P. Keersmaekers, M. van Kerckhoven and K. Vanspeybroeck (eds), Dialoogschool in actie! Mag ik er zijn voor u? (Antwerp: Halewijn/VSKO/ VVKHO, 2013), pp. 49–60, 52–3.

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inclusive and welcoming dialogical school identity. It is certainly clear that people who strive for reconfessionalization through the model of the dialogue school (must) have a high degree of religiously reflexive consciousness – which conforms with our general analysis in terms of individualization and pluralization.

The active-pluralist alternative The other proposal is to transform current confessional education (this can in principle also apply to neutral official education) into active-pluralist education. A decent society requires – along with secular and religious views – forms of mutual recognition that go further than passive tolerance. ... No one has to give up their own truth, but a mutual willingness to listen and learn is certainly a precondition for peaceful coexistence and social cohesion.13

Within a perspective of detraditionalization and pluralization, this option seems at first glance to be an adequate pedagogical translation of the current philosophical-religious situation: in a situation of religious diversity, where everyone must construct their own identity, learning to deal with this diversity is certainly an urgent task. Ideally such a project realizes the reflexive consciousness our time requires. Of course – and all too often this remains in the background or is forgotten – such proposals are equally bound to a specific value-laden programme. And precisely at this point a warning must sound: such a programme does not necessarily follow from the analysis but already formulates a specific answer thereto. At the very least, the active-pluralist proposal is not neutral towards religions and worldviews, because it formulates very clear ideas regarding how these should deal with their own truth claims. It presupposes philosophical and religious positions that can already deal with plurality and difference. Thus, the proposal starts from a very deliberate and specific set of values in which dialogue, openness to others, recognition of diversity, respect for individuality and difference are central. Moreover, this set distinguishes itself principally

13

Reflecties, p. 8.

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from secularist neutrality, religious indifference and relativism, as well as from ideological and religious fundamentalism and extremism. However, there are a number of questions one should ask about this value-laden character, which too seldom is made explicit and reflected upon. (a) Where do these specific values actually come from? – is the first question one can ask oneself. Are these values simply present on the religious field as a kind of meta-standard above or between the various worldviews, philosophies and religions? Or do they belong to a single tradition, or have they emerged from such tradition? Is this set of values a kind of collective wisdom, built up over the decades from the conflicts between ideologies and religions? Are they but one position on the religious field? Or is it, rather, something that has grown – or more likely, is growing – in religious traditions and their experiences in coping with the current situation? And does this set then exist apart from the history and/or traditions from which it grew, or must one remain bound to these in order to get in touch with these values, to learn them and to nourish them? For one simply cannot assume that there is a general consensus regarding this set of values in our society today. (b) And further, how can this set of values be learned and practised? For example, is a course on the various worldviews, philosophies and religions sufficient?14 Or should pupils also be challenged in concrete school life to reflect on their own philosophical-religious identities and on how these deal with diversity and difference (both on the level of knowledge and engagement)? If such learning to know and practice these values does not happen, there is a risk that active pluralism is only a variant of the secularist-neutral manner of dealing with religious diversity: one that from the outset forgets one’s own value commitments. In particular, the answer to the question of who should be able to provide such an education could give us some clues: can it be someone who explicitly identifies himself or herself with a single philosophical-religious tradition? Or should it be someone who keeps himself or herself precisely outside of the religious diversity? Is something like the latter even possible? And, moreover, is this even desirable, given the interest active-pluralist education attaches to citizens’ active philosophical-religious engagement in the current plural society? Pupils challenged to come to philosophical-religious 14

For a discussion of this, see the following chapter.

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reflexivity, by teachers who are not allowed or supposed to give witness to such – this seems like an impossible job.

Traces of a sociocultural and theological–ecclesial debate We already indicated, between the lines of our discussion, that traces are found in this discussion of a sociocultural and a theological–ecclesial debate concerning the role of religion, in particular the Christian faith, in the current culture and society. Because of history, the relationship between Christian faith and church to the present-day context is what is most at stake. On the one hand, are our culture and society – and in this regard, for example, our schools – still too Christian to be pluralist? And, on the other hand, is not pluralism another term for secularism, nihilism and relativism – and thus an objective opponent of Christian faith?

Traces of a sociocultural debate It is striking that, in the reconfessionalization proposal, as in the active-pluralist alternative, one often begins with the presupposition that the sociocultural processes of individualization imply that a greater majority of people ‘freely’ constitute their own identity. They apparently assume that this majority very autonomously uses material from inherited traditions and other sources, almost in antithesis to a smaller group of ‘orthodox’ people whose identity is fully determined by their religious tradition. The first group would then have a composite, non-tradition bound identity (and/or choose from different traditions), while the second strictly belongs to one tradition. The proposed complementary alternatives of the active-pluralist majority school and the truly confessional minority school then confirm this situation. It is as if we see a new version of the secularization thesis at work with an adapted zero-sum theory15: the more individualization, the less tradition; and its opposite: the more tradition, the less individualization.

15

See Chapter 2.

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However, as was already stated: detraditionalization and individualization do not simply mean the loss of tradition, but imply that tradition no longer is quasi-automatically handed on, and that belonging to a tradition, therefore, is structurally challenged to be far more reflexive. In this sense, it is an oversimplification of matters to suppose that there is a division between (a majority of) those who are individualized, on the one hand, and (a minority of) the orthodox, who would then seem to be less individualized, because still tradition-bound. Today there certainly are people who very reflexively – and thus highly individualized – construct their identity with preferential reference to one tradition. From their perspective, these individuals will consider themselves, therefore, no less orthodox than the non-reflexive traditionalist. At the same time, they will not consider their tradition-bound identities as less individualized than the identities of those who construct identity without reference to tradition or borrow from different traditions. In the joint complementary proposal, there seems to be no room for such a reflexive belonging to tradition, while it is precisely such reflectivity which allows people to critical-constructively deal – from their own religious tradition – with difference, dialogue and mutual recognition. In addition, one often hears the assessment that – because of detraditionalization and individualization – little true identity is formed today, and that our time, therefore, is one of moral and spiritual emptiness. The market and media, all too easily, take over identity formation, and precisely for this reason, there is need for an active pluralism.16 However: if it is true that the majority of people today do not achieve a well-formed identity, how can one legitimately argue for pluralism – let alone active pluralism? Is interreligious, dialogical identity construction then not just a beautiful dream? After all, in order to be able to carry out the dialogue between worldviews and religions, and thus to be able to achieve a dialogical identity in mutual recognition, one must be able to make visible the plurality and difference which one holds to characterize our context. In Flanders, for example, the awareness of plurality and difference quasi-self-evidently establishes itself when people belonging to religions other than Christianity become involved in the conversation, but, in principle, plurality and difference are no less present among Christians, post16

Reflecties, p. 31.

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Christians, atheists, agnostics, disinterested (all of whom in themselves do not constitute uniform groups). In addition, one does not acquire a dialogical, reflexive identity by gaining knowledge about different traditions, but rather by bringing one’s own identity into relation with that of another. Pupils should learn to see their own truth claim in relation to the other’s: on the one hand, without absolutizing one’s own truth claim, on the other, without falling into relativism. Therefore, plurality and difference must be recognizable and brought into a dialogical learning process, in which everyone’s religious position is at stake, including the teacher’s and the school’s. When one considers all these points and looks at the set of values the proposed active-pluralist alternative wants to realize, it is no longer clear why it – possibly in combination with the truly confessional school – would be the necessary conclusion resulting from a contextual analysis in terms of detraditionalization, individualization and pluralization. In principle, all religious education, including the one offered in truly confessional schools, should be able to do so, from the dialogue of one’s own tradition with the contemporary context of plurality and difference. An additional advantage is that the set of values referred to above is itself brought into the conversation and supported by the specific traditions, once they become reflexive, while in the alternative active-pluralist proposal, these values are left hanging in the air.

Traces of a theological–ecclesial debate Further, one should ask the question, of course: Which tradition – in our case the Christian tradition – is able to deal with plurality and difference? Can the Christian tradition and the community supporting it, develop the reflexive potential to cope with detraditionalization, individualization and pluralization? Are they able – from their own sources – to support the coming to a more reflexive identity? Meanwhile, as already mentioned, in much ecclesial analysis of the current situation, the distinction is not always accurately drawn between detraditionalization and loss of tradition, individualization and individualism, and pluralization and pluralism/relativism. Of course, these processes have entailed indifference, nihilism, absolutized autonomy and relativism. I also indicated above that identity formation has become a demanding task, and that success is not always (immediately) guaranteed. But this situation does not

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legitimate the often pessimistic analysis of Western Europe, which is made by many a church leader: because the old continent freed itself from its Christian roots, it has given itself over to a loss of values, individualism and relativism. From such evaluation follows that there is no point in dialoguing with such a context; the only option left is to oppose it. Truly confessional schools, then, can raise a pedagogical dam against a culture of the loss of meaning and indifference. However, society no longer considers such an antagonistic Christian identity profiling as a constructive dialogue partner, but rather as a threat. This discussion fits in the broader cultural–theological debate, which – as mentioned – was already handled in the Roman Catholic Church concerning the reception of the Second Vatican Council, on the relation between Christian faith and the modern or postmodern context. If one evaluates the context as mainly negative, then one will warn against too active a dialogue, in which the context is seen as a valuable dialogue partner that can contribute to an actualization of Christian faith. One will increasingly point out the negative dynamics in the context; dynamics against which the Christian faith, on the one hand, should be protected, but for which, on the other hand, Christian faith is the better (or only) alternative. Then, in this context, not the dialogue with the context is important for Christian faith, but the conversion of the context. Often this position is coloured by an anti-modern critique of the modern ways church and faith have employed to deal with modern culture. Such a modern approach has led – so goes the analysis – to a too hasty adaptation of the Christian faith to culture, through which the specificity of the Christian faith has been lost. Whether the anti-modern solution, to defend the specifically Christian against this culture, then, is the most appropriate, is doubtful. Nevertheless, the anti-modern critique should be taken seriously and provides us with a reading key for evaluating the modern educational project of Christian values education. Because, as long as there is an overlap between the Christian horizon of meaning and the modern context, this project works well, because the specifically Christian is always at least implicitly present. When this overlap erodes away, it is virtually impossible to bring in the specifically Christian within such a consensus-oriented model: either it is considered nothing more than a Christian rephrasing and doubling of what

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in any case is already there, or it more or less disturbs the consensus. In such a situation, the message that the Christian idea of creation, or the Christian understanding of solidarity to the cross, for Christians intrinsically qualify the human experience of freedom, is hardly conveyable. The question is whether a rejection of dialogue and the safeguarding of Christian faith against the context are the only and right answers, when one takes this critique seriously. As already said, whoever makes this critique all too often overlooks the difference between processes (the -izations) and the reactions to these processes (the -isms). In this sense, this position is the mirror image of the sociocultural discussion. Because of detraditionalization, individualization and pluralization, the dialogue of the Christian faith with the context should not be abandoned, but the way in which it is practised should certainly be reconsidered. After all, the modern Christian position that resulted in the project of Christian values education understood this dialogue first and foremost from the assumption of a fundamental continuity between Christianity and the modern context (and could also do so, because of their substantial overlap). Because of the loss of specificity, the opposing reaction urges one to re-profile Christian identity in discontinuity with the context. Clearly, certain reconfessionalizing tendencies display such a reflex. What is striking in both, however, is that Christianity and the context are constantly seen as two variables, which either stand in intrinsic relation to each other, or are positioned as adversaries. The question is whether this is still the correct representation of the situation, in a truly pluralized religious landscape. I have already indicated several times in this study that it is more expedient to develop a theological way of thinking that escapes this dichotomy – characteristic of a secularization paradigm – and resolutely chooses for a pluralization paradigm. In such a way of thinking, Christian faith should not be thought of as simply a distinct element with regard to the context, but as a participant within the current context of plurality. From the very outset, the Christian faith is already involved in a dynamic interaction of religions, philosophies and worldviews, and their communities – already involved, as well, in people’s attempts to construct their own identities, confronted as they are with plurality, otherness and difference. Of course, I assume that the Christian faith has something to offer in such a context and calls for conversion; but, at the same time, the

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confrontation with the other equally calls the Christian faith to conversion.17 In a critically productive dialogue with the context, the Christian faith – from its own sources – can charge nihilism, individualism and relativism as being inadequate ways of dealing with plurality and otherness, but then only if it has also learnt to do so. This means: as it, from a re-reading of its own sources in conversation with the current context, can engage itself in a qualitative pluralism, that devotes itself to dialogue, openness to others, recognition of plurality, respect for particularity and difference. From the previous chapters, it appears that this is not simply a sociocultural challenge for the Christian faith, but primarily a theological task: because of the nature of Christian faith itself. Precisely in our dealings with the other, the God who has allowed Godself to be known in our history as a God of love, can also reveal Godself today. Moreover, the other is often the poor, precisely the one who is not heard, whose otherness might not even be noticed. Particularly such encounters can break open our Christian story that all too easily closes to uncertainty and difference. Coping with the new religious situation is theologically necessary and an opportunity.

Qualitative pluralism as hallmark of the new style of Catholic school: The Catholic dialogue school With the sorting out of the new religious situation, Christians have something in common with all other people who construct identity, live and reflect on things in a detraditionalized, individualized and pluralized context. This task is apparently not evident – many appear not to arrive at a truly reflexive identity – and nihilism, individualism and relativism continue to be seen as realistically possible outcomes. Active pluralists and the promoters of the reconfessionalized school would rather avoid these outcomes; they have this in common. However, in my discussion, I have expressed some reservations about their proposals. (a) When one’s own value preferences are not consciously admitted, active pluralism still runs the risk of carrying out a new kind of secularism (the so-called ‘truly individualised’ people), which must be seen in contrast to 17

In the conclusion of this book, I will return to this.

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the position of those who still belong to a tradition (the ‘orthodox’). Where this value-laden character is forgotten, active pluralism threatens once again to be a new name for secularism. Especially in situations where one wants to introduce active pluralism in a formerly Catholic institution, doing so by deleting references to the Christian past and introducing other religions, one is in danger of contributing to indifference, secularism and relativism, rather than fostering reflexive identity formation with respect for the plurality of religious traditions and positions. (b) Insofar as the truly confessional school sees itself primarily as a dam against negative contextual influences, the danger also exists that the Christian faith turns against the context, something that is not without sociocultural as well as theological consequences. In both cases, remarkably, ‘Catholic’ or ‘Christian’ is considered to be a contraindication for ‘pluralist’. Being Catholic and pluralist at the same time seems impossible. In discussing, Chapter 7, the fourth model for reflecting on the identity of the Catholic school, I doubted this presupposition. On the contrary, I argued that this model could result in the construction of a new style of ‘Catholic school’ that is appropriate to the (Flemish) Catholic majority school’s situation. In this model, the Catholic school is held explicitly to its Catholic identity, but also recognizes the increasing detraditionalization and pluralization of its pupils, parents, staff, leaders and board members. It starts from religious detraditionalization and pluralization, which characterize both society and the school, as well as from the Christian faith’s own identity in the middle of this plurality. Therefore, it no longer takes for granted a presupposed, universal Christian and culturally credible consensus, but starts from a qualitative pluralism that fosters dialogue, openness to others, recognition of plurality, respect for particularity and difference and is motivated from its own sources. Furthermore, this qualified pluralism should not forget that diversity has not only a philosophical-religious character but also exhibits sociocultural dimensions, and therefore also includes issues of poverty and equal opportunities.18 In our cities (but not only over there), the consciousness of pluralization should be coupled with the consciousness that not everyone (i.e. all others) are actually

18

I borrowed this insight from, among others, Johan Verschueren, S.J., former director of Xavier College Borgerhout, with reference to the policy document on the Multicultural Context of Xavier College (Humanities): http://www.xaco.be/humaniora/documenten/multiculturaliteit.pdf.

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involved in the dialogue. Language and culture, as well as social background and poverty, can be obstacles for becoming involved in the process of reflexive identity formation and interreligious dialogue. Having an eye for this and developing a caring approach in this regard also form part of the qualified pluralism that is advocated here. Because ‘the other’ may well be ‘the poor’, for whom the Christian faith has a preferential option. Currently, the office for Catholic Education in Flanders has adopted this fourth model to reframe its pedagogical project and has coined this endeavour the ‘Catholic dialogue school’ project.19 In order to address the challenge of reflexive identity formation, both sustaining resistance against relativism and extremism, and the creeping clutches of consumer culture, Catholic Education intends to recontextualize its project – utilizing the lessons learnt from the end of the traditional confessional Catholic school and the implausibility and counterproductive effects of the project of Christian values education, to which I just referred. In a context in which society, in its religious and nonreligious plurality, is present in Catholic schools, Catholic Education will do so by paying respect to this plurality. But it intends to do more: in as much as the dialogue with the other is constitutive for the construction of one’s own identity, the presence of the (non-)religious other can contribute to this project of identity formation. People with different worldviews challenge our views and urge us to account for them both for ourselves and to others. We learn a lot about who we are when confronted with who we are not. People often tend to relativize differences: that is, these really should not make a difference, because we are all human beings. However, taking differences seriously and making them part of the conversation is important for understanding both the other and ourselves. Because we learn who the other is, and especially who we are, through dialoguing with the other. This process of identity construction in dialogue with others is the pedagogical opportunity which our present-day context offers and which we should grasp in Catholic Education: it will challenge Christians as well as non-Christians to develop more reflexive identities, being able to relate to one’s own resources as well as to the identity of others. In such a process, in Catholic schools, Christians may become 19

In his empirical research, Didier Pollefeyt refers to this model as the ‘recontextualised dialogueschool’, in reference to the term ‘recontextualization’, which I have coined to describe the theological method underlying my theological project. See, D. Pollefeyt and J. Bouwens, Dialoog als toekomst: een katholiek antwoord op de verkleuring van het onderwijslandschap: the difference between the ‘kerygmatic dialogue school’ and the ‘recontextualized dialogue school’ is explained on pp. 52–5.

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better Christians, because they will be more self-reflexive Christians; in the same way as Muslims may become better Muslims, and atheists better atheists. What makes such a school Catholic? Two points should be mentioned here. First of all, the underlying concept of dialogue is not neutral, but value-laden. From a Christian anthropological view, it is not just conversation, for we find ourselves already in an answering relationship. The Christian understanding is not that one is first of all an individual, who in a second move engages in dialogue, but that the dialogue is constitutive for one’s identity. From their tradition, Christians know that they are placed in an answering relationship, from the very beginning. They stand in a relationship to a God who is first and who calls them. Being posited in such an answering relationship results in a basic attitude, a way of living: one finds oneself already in a situation in which one is not the first to speak, but in which others speak to you. One’s subject is not the first, but is found in a relationship, through which one comes to be a subject. Such a Christian concept of dialogue is founded in the manner in which God reveals Godself as Word in history. The Word does not proceed the dialogue, but is the first move in the dialogue itself. In the Word, God ventures Godself to the dialogue with humanity. So, God reveals Godself as a dialogical God, a God who searches for dialogue with human beings, gives Godself in such a dialogue, and does so to the utmost in the revelation of the Word in Jesus Christ – something which is, as we learn from Scripture, a risk even for God, intrinsically marked by vulnerability, with the cross as its ultimate consequence. From the manner in which God has revealed Godself to humanity in history, we have not learnt that there is first a God who then enters into dialogue, but that God is dialogue. Dialogue belongs to the essence of God (see also Karl Rahner’s maxim that the economic trinity is the immanent trinity, and vice versa). From within this dialogue the human being finds himself or herself in the answering position: even more, this dialogue determines who the human being fundamentally is: a being already in dialogue – also in the relationship among humans, being spoken to and challenged to answer. Dialogue is a game of asymmetries, of changing asymmetry, of placing oneself vulnerably under the word, and addressing the word. In the dialogue with the other, we receive our identity and learn who we really are. Secondly, such a school is Catholic because it is challenged, by its background and calling, to bring the Christian voice into the dialogue at school, as a privileged dialogue partner. For the Christian tradition may both

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challenge and inspire all those present at school to engage in a process of mutual learning and coming to a greater self-consciousness. In order to really give voice to this Christian voice with the school, Christians will have to learn to change their often rather passive attitude: all too often they have learned to be silent about their convictions and beliefs, thus wishing to make room for others. Today, they will have to learn again to speak up precisely because they wish to respect the other. Apart from openheartedness, this will require extra formation: how to bear witness today to what inspires one most intimately? How to speak of the God who revealed Godself in Jesus of Nazareth as a God of love? Indeed, the project of the ‘Catholic dialogue school’ intends to address the challenges of the present-day context and to accompany children, adolescents and adults in their identity formation. It does so in a society in which identity has become precarious, because it is no longer pre-given, where identity is framed within a plural world of meaning and significance, in which this same coming to identity is endangered by the polarized alternatives of relativism and fundamentalism, and is affected by the creeping steering mechanisms of consumer culture, peer pressure, market and media. And this is the best service it can perform, both for itself and to society. Such a project, indeed, remains primarily a service of the Christian faith community to society, a service to the many young people (and not just to the residual fraction of Christians among them) who are challenged in their coming to an identity, even if Christians within the school and the student group are no longer in the majority. However, this project is also a service of the church to itself, to discover where the current context offers opportunities and sets challenges for coming to terms with Christian faith itself – to enquire where God reveals Godself today in history. At the same time, more than ever, Christians will be aware of the fact that Christian faith is not simply culturally supported, but requires a specifically personal engagement that is interpreted as an answer to a preceding call by the God of Jesus Christ.

The K of ‘Katholiek’ Before concluding this chapter, I will briefly touch upon the K-discussion, that was conducted in 2011–12 at the KU Leuven and in which the university’s

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Catholic signature was confirmed.20 In the months and weeks before the decision was taken, from the enquiries of many actors to the university, as well as indiscretions by the governing bodies, it became apparent that the K would not die and that the university would continue to call upon the Catholic tradition from which it stems. However, one of the recommendations from the university think tank Metaforum21 said that if KU Leuven should choose to keep the K, this implied that they should also, once again, actively give it shape. The question whether K.U. Leuven chooses such a [dialogue] model22 is obviously of another order than the question of whether or not a ‘K’ remains in the name. The question is not which name appears on the business card, but whether one consciously chooses for the content of the ‘K’. Also, within a pluralist society and at a time when the Church as an institution is currently being fiercely challenged, the option remains open to choose for a filling in of the content of the ‘K’. ... The search of Leuven’s university for the content and meaning of its Catholic identity is not unique. This search is peculiar to Catholic universities that wish to remain faithful to their mission as a university within the framework of a complex religious tradition. The workgroup is of the opinion that a mere status quo is the least best option for K.U. Leuven.

And here exactly lies the problem. Reports in December 2011 from the student newspaper Veto, eagerly relayed in the national and international press, pointed completely in the other direction: ‘K remains, Catholic goes.’ Thus, there is a message in the manner of ‘we are certainly Catholic but not really (because Catholic really means conservative, unworldly and old-fashioned)’. Or, ‘We are allowing the K to remain because of pragmatics in Flanders, but internationally that certainly can no longer mean anything, because there Catholic stands – according to the cliché – for something negative.’ In fact, the plan was to so hollow out Catholic identity that it could hardly mean anything. 20

21

22

Cf. http://www.kuleuven.be/about/mission_statement: ‘KU Leuven [which stands for Catholic University Leuven] is an autonomous university. It was founded in 1425. It was born of and has grown within the Catholic tradition. From its Christian view of the world and the human, KU Leuven endeavours to be a place for open discussion of social, philosophical and ethical issues and a critical centre of reflection in and for the Catholic community’ (insertion mine). Strangely enough, after submission, the recommendations of this metaforum-workgroup were removed and placed in another document (pp. 18–21): http://www.kuleuven.be/metaforum/ EindtekstDebatreeksUniversiteitKerkEnSamenleving.pdf. The following quotation is translated from the final paragraphs of the original document. Here, reference is implicitly made to the last of the four models that I presented in the previous chapter.

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From the aim of taking plurality seriously (the choice for the so-called ‘centred pluralism’), the university wanted in fact to secularize itself: the K can well remain, but then only in ‘logo’ form and no mention of ‘Catholic’ would ever be made again. What stands in the centre of ‘centred pluralism’ must, therefore, remain vague. The empirical research to which I already referred – carried out at KU Leuven! – shows precisely that such soft-secularizing practice is the best recipe for relativism – and does not lead to the intended value-laden qualitative pluralism. Further, there was no more active engagement, in the submitted plans, with respect to tradition and community, from which the university was founded and in which it has grown, while this might certainly be expected – both in Flanders and worldwide – from the oldest still existing Catholic university in the world. In this light, that can certainly be called a weak bid, with an undertone: Catholic is incompatible with pluralist, and therefore is outdated. Two arguments were cited to justify this secularizing movement. The first was that the university wanted to guard its administrative autonomy and academic freedom; therefore, it had to distance itself from the church. At the same time, however, university governors admitted that this administrative autonomy and academic freedom was respected by the church in previous years (and, for that matter, was already expressed through a previous adjustment of the university’s regulations). The second argument was that the ‘outside world’ would not know how KU Leuven shapes its Catholic identity and that this would certainly be a major international (or at least outside of Western Europe) problem, because there Catholic means conservative, submissive to the ‘institute’, old-fashioned. Besides the fact that KU Leuven had unfortunately contributed to this perception in its communication, it is still worthwhile to ask if this is entirely true. In the Metaforum report, for example, one reads, in relation to American experiences: Along with a great sensitivity to openness and academic excellence, the American analysis begins with the character of a Catholic university from a clear appreciation for the Catholic intellectual tradition – an appreciation that often seems to be missing in parts of Europe. The non-Catholic R.M. Hutchins (former dean of the Faculty of Law of Yale University and president of the University of Chicago between 1929–1945) described this tradition as ‘the longest existing tradition of any institution in the world today, the

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only unbroken tradition and the only tradition consciously experienced by a community’. American Catholic intellectuals recognise that this tradition is not immune to development and that they should never be equated with the Church’s doctrinal tradition. The Catholic university with its commitment to universal knowledge is one of the fruits of this tradition.

However, the quasi-automatic antithesis between Catholic and pluralist remained the fundamental point. But is there such a contradiction? In this debate, I have argued to the contrary and resisted the gradual hollowing-out of the K in the name of a call for pluralism: if the university would chose for the K, they could not do this as a sign of weakness with a completely hollowed-out K, but should do so by way of a resolute reconsideration of what Catholic identity can mean in a greatly changed context of detraditionalization and pluralization (a sign of strength, therefore). True pluralism does not ask for less, but for more identity – an open, dialogical identity. The university is not less Catholic because it welcomes plurality, but potentially precisely more – because it is precisely from its view of humanity and the world that it is able to welcome plurality as a challenging enrichment, where each person, both Catholic and non-Catholic, can become richer. To justify the university’s open Catholic identity in a context of plurality, the word Catholic should not be hollowed out. The Catholic university is better described not only in negative terms – as not institutional, not conservative, not dependent, not old-fashioned – but its project is best formulated positively: as an actively welcoming Catholic university that takes seriously the challenge of living together in diversity and wants to actively contribute here from its tradition and inspiration. If ‘Catholic’ only suggests something negative, the university will have to continue saying that it is indeed called Catholic, but that this is actually not what it really wants to be – a hopeless case regarding branding. When chosen, however, the K only fits when one really goes for it. And that is also precisely what the Catholic University of Leuven is called to do. Especially in Flanders, Catholic and non-Catholic players look to see how KU Leuven deals with its Catholic identity in an age of increasing detraditionalization and pluralization. Does it allow itself to continue gently secularizing, or does it reformulate its mission from its own tradition as a service to students’ identity formation in a context of diversity? Those who choose the latter begin with their own strength. This deliberately formulates a common

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offer for Christians and non-Christians, (a) starting from a recognition of the internal and external religious plurality and (b) in dialogue with an open Christian faith. Such a Catholic-pluralist university provides a training ground where students and staff, whatever their persuasion, are challenged to reflect on their own options and prepares them to actively participate in a society marked by plurality and diversity. But worldwide as well – and certainly in the Catholic world with its numerous schools and universities – one looks at what the oldest existing Catholic university in the world does with its identity. This is also a task that KU Leuven cannot take lightly. It is better to stay away from the easy and unverified cliché that internationally ‘Catholic’ only means conservative and old-fashioned. The reality is far more nuanced than that. Better yet, on this level, as well, KU Leuven can be representative and show that a Catholic university can certainly successfully enter into dialogue with the world and this era. If KU Leuven is able to do so, it will no longer simply call on its Catholic origins but will also actively and innovatively contribute to the future of this tradition.

By way of conclusion In the book Confession d’un cardinal (2007), the French author Olivier Le Gendre publishes an interview with an anonymous former curia cardinal.23 In this book, the interviewed cardinal dwells on the faults and failings, as well as on the crisis of the European and universal church. He also discusses the highly debatable response of many church leaders to this crisis and reflects on a more appropriate way to deal with the current situation, so there will still be a future for the Christian faith and the church. Partly inspired by Marcel Gauchet’s view that the Christian faith means the end of religion24, the anonymous cardinal develops how – inspired by the Christian idea of freedom  – modernity went looking for a legitimate autonomy for the world. This then is also the first cause for the decline of the Christian faith and the 23

24

O. Le Gendre, Confession d’un Cardinal (Paris: Jean-Claude Lattès, 2007). Many think this conversation partner could have been Cardinal Achille Silvestrini, who for years served first in the Vatican Secretariat of State, after which he was the prefect of the Congregation for the Oriental Churches from 1991 to 2000. Cf. M. Gauchet, Le désenchantement du monde: une histoire politique de la religion (Paris: Gallimard, 1985).

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church. Since, through this development, there no longer are any other reasons to be Christian than faith itself. One no longer becomes a Christian from birth, or because of social pressure. Being a Christian no longer guarantees a stabile way of life, or sufficient carrier possibilities or social promotion. It is no longer a culturally obvious given. To an increasing degree, Christians are still Christians only because they believe in the God of Jesus Christ. The cardinal adds that for too long the church has taken advantage of its cultural and social power, in order to secure its own position, especially when this came under fire. In addition, when the church lost political or cultural power, it compensated for this loss primarily by sacralizing its own authority claims. However, every time the church did this, it fed and feeds its alienation from the modern world – and it does this precisely at the moment when the world could use guidance and inspiration in order to more adequately come to terms with its acquired autonomy. Only when the church lives its own calling will it be able to present and argue for being a Christian as a valuable mode of existence in today’s world. But how will this fit in the church’s work? What does it mean for the church to live out its own vocation in full? The cardinal answers: to be a living witness to the tenderness of God in today’s world: ‘la tendresse de Dieu’. Indeed, to give a new expression, once more, to God’s tenderness for humanity and world. When the church’s place and role in the world shrinks because of developments our culture and society undergo, the church should focus on the core of its belief: to be a sign and instrument of God’s tenderness in history. For the cardinal, this is still the only criterion by which the church and its activities should be assessed. Only when the church succeeds in this will it perhaps appeal to people once again – a bit like what we read in the Acts of the Apostles, when people began to wonder why the first Christian communities lived as they did. Only when the church simply lives God’s tenderness will it also, perhaps, be able to speak once again about this tenderness and bear witness to this faith. Thus, the only criterion for being Catholic is the witness to God’s tenderness. What does this mean for Catholic education? How can it witness to God’s tenderness? In a society that is secularized? In which being Catholic is no longer supported because of other factors (e.g. the quality of its education)? Perhaps it can do so by organizing the generosity of the dialogue, and by bearing witness to this generosity itself in this dialogue.

9

Catholic Religious Education: Still Plausible Today?

Fifteen years ago, the curricula for Roman Catholic religious education in Flanders were thoroughly addressed. It is now time to hold these plans and their impact up to the light: Does the basic analysis from which these curricula start still make sense? Are the basic objectives and their further development still relevant? Further, has the implementation proceeded as it should, as planned, as expected? And finally, is it necessary and/or desirable to readjust the curricula and/or their implementation? I have been involved as an expert in drafting the Roman Catholic religious education curriculum for secondary schools, and from that background, among other things, I will hazard such an evaluation. Specifically, I will refer back to the comments I wrote fifteen years ago when this curriculum came into force in 1999.1 Moreover, I will take up a number of the discussions on the curriculum from previous years, as, for example, the criticism that the curriculum displays an overly constructivist approach to identity formation. However, also more recently, a discussion on religious education broke loose, carried out from two opposite sides. On the one hand, there is the repeated attempt – chiefly directed from the University of Antwerp – to introduce an active-pluralist approach in religious education, not only to replace the variety of courses in religious education on offer in Flemish official education (Roman Catholic, Protestant, Anglican, Orthodox, Muslim, Jewish and atheist humanist), but also as a substitute to Roman 1

Cf. L. Boeve, Godsdienstonderricht op school als oefenplaats. Achtergronden bij het nieuwe leerplan S.O., in Collationes 29 (1999): 287–311; Vrijplaats voor communicatie over levensbeschouwing en geloof. Nieuwe doelstellingen voor het godsdienstonderricht in Vlaanderen, in H. Lombaerts, et al. (ed.), Godsdienst in de branding: naar een communicatief godsdienstonderricht (Cahiers voor didactiek) (Leuven: Wolters Plantyn, 2000), pp. 33–46.

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Catholic religious  education in Catholic schools. In line with what we said about the active-pluralist approach in Chapter 8, the presumption is that the current structuring of the educational landscape as well as the organization of religious education no longer corresponds to today’s situation. Rather than specific confessional religious education, what is needed today in our post-Christian and post-secular society is a comparative introduction to and reflection on the various religious traditions. A variant on this idea surfaced late in June 2010, when some Flemish MPs of the liberal party submitted a bill that proposed that half of the course time in the last year of secondary education should be spent on other worldviews and religions.2 Only then would pupils be prepared for the religiously plural society of the future, the proposal stated. On the other hand, in the context of the ad limina visit in 2010 of the Belgian bishops to the Vatican, exactly the opposite message was heard: Roman Catholic religious education engages too little in the Christian faith and gives too much attention to religious plurality. At the end of the day there is too much Christian illiteracy, because the Christian faith is no longer sufficiently treated in classes on religion. An echo of this is heard in the occasionally resounding cry, ‘Our children learn about everything in religion classes except their own religion.’ In this chapter, I will answer a number of questions. First, what about the analysis behind the curriculum: Is it still correct? – and are the goals formulated fifteen years ago still adequate? Second, how do these goals relate to the double critique, on the one hand, that Roman Catholic (or confessional) religious education is no longer an adequate sociocultural way to prepare pupils for post-Christian and post-secular society; on the other, that it is not Christian enough? And third, what about its implementation: Are there lessons to be drawn? In all of this, I will point to the integral and dynamic character of the basic objectives of the curriculum, as well as to the conditions to be fulfilled to facilitate religious education today.

2

See the newspaper coverage of Monday, 10 May 2010, for example, in De Standaard, p. 2; De Morgen, p. 5, and the flood of reactions that followed in the various media.

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The curriculum fifteen years later: Still relevant? Does the underlying analysis still make sense? In commenting on the new curriculum for secondary education, fifteen years ago I argued that the current context could no longer be adequately described with modernization and secularization, but was more appropriately expressed in terms of detraditionalization, individualization and pluralization. After all, by then it became clear that the overlap between Christian faith and the cultural horizon of meaning eroded faster than ever. It was this overlap that made it previously possible to presuppose a familiarity in the context with Christian contents, narratives, practices, etc. – whether one shared these or not. This erosion de facto resulted in the bankruptcy of modern correlation theology and correlation pedagogy (and the resulting Christian values education). At the same time, the religious field pluralized, and people were increasingly aware of religious plurality, otherness and difference. What persisted then as a trend has become even more apparent today. We live in a context that can be described as post-Christian and post-secular: the result of the processes of detraditionalization, individualization and pluralization  – a point that I also addressed in chapter two of this book, and illustrated with figures and comments from the most recent European Values Study. In particular, the younger generations are almost completely unchurched, and their search for identity and spirituality is no longer simply to be understood according to the classical continuum between Churched Christians and secular humanists. Even more so than then, the plausibility of the change in perspective, from an analysis in terms of secularization to an analysis in terms of pluralization, has gained ground. More than before, it also has become clear that coming to a mature religious identity, including Christian identity, has to do with the competences of philosophical-religious reflexivity and interreligious communication. Because the same processes also lead to less adequate forms of identity construction, dictated by the market or lapsing into the mutually exclusive extremes of neo-traditionalism, fundamentalism and ethnocentrism, on the one hand, or relativism, consumerism, individualism and superficial pluralism, on the other.

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Does the programme fulfil the curriculum? Fifteen years ago, I argued that the new basic objectives of the curriculum for secondary education were formulated precisely with an eye towards the changed context. In particular, this concerns (1) the factual contextual plurality of religions, of which the Christian faith constitutes just one element, (2) the structural necessity of identity construction and the multitude of resources for this purpose, and (3) the threats to the both of these through the formal processes of uniformisation.3

With this last point, I especially hinted at the economization and mediatization of the life-world, but we can safely add to that list today, as just indicated, religious relativism, individualism, indifference, on the one hand, and neotraditionalism, extreme nationalism and fundamentalism, on the other. All of these concern closed ways of dealing with the changed philosophical-religious situation and neutralize or rule out the challenge of (religious) diversity and otherness for identity formation. The new curriculum’s goal was to bring young people to a reflexive identity formation, taking into account religious plurality and engaging in dialogue with the Christian tradition. In a post-Christian and post-secular context, religious education intends to contribute, from the Christian tradition, towards young peoples’ philosophical-religious growth to maturity. In this respect, the basic objectives of the curricula for secondary education clearly explicate this major intention4: To be open to and understand what Christian faith can mean in a world that is experienced and understood as radically plural. a. To be aware of and know oneself to be religiously challenged by the plurality of offers of meaning (religions) in our contemporary life-world and society. b. To be able to place the offer of meaning from the Christian faith in the context of religious plurality. 3 4

See L. Boeve, Godsdienstonderricht op school als oefenplaats, pp. 298–9. Leerplan rooms-katholieke godsdienst voor het secundair onderwijs in Vlaanderen (Brussels: Licap, 1999), p. 49.

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c. From an insight into the plural religious character of human speech, thought and action, and in dialogue with the offer of meaning from the Christian faith in this context, to account for one’s own philosophicalreligious profile.

Based on roughly the same analysis of our current post-Christian and postsecular context from which the 1999 curriculum begins, some think, however, that Roman Catholic religious education, with its preferential option for Christian faith, is outdated. Especially from the ‘active-pluralist’ corner is argued that it is time for a general religious subject that introduces the various philosophies and religions, rather than a preferential one. In short: such a subject should then deal with pupils’ religious illiteracy and help them come to an identity, so that they do not lapse into religious indifference. Is this, when compared with the basic objectives of Roman Catholic education, the better programme?

A general religious subject: A better alternative? Such a proposal was contained in the discussion paper presented at the symposium on religion and education on 28 April 2010 in Tilburg, to which I already referred in Chapter 8. The discussion paper proposed, on the one hand, for those who (still) are institutionally religious today, the possibility of (still) organizing confessional education (‘education into religion’). On the other, for those who no longer are institutionally religious, or do not choose a school on that basis, it advocated for the establishment of a new compulsory general religious subject dedicated to ‘education about religion’.5 Another very regular and passionate advocate for a general religious subject on religions and philosophies is the atheist–humanist–ethicist Patrick Loobuyck. Teaching should be so organised, thus, that it teaches pupils skills for practicing dialogue, tolerance, respect and multicultural citizenship. Knowledge and information about religions, as well as contact and dialogue with other religions, are necessary to that end. Perhaps the introduction of 5

Jan de Groof and Wim van de Donk, et al., Reflecties op de omgang met religieus en levensbeschouwelijk verschil in het onderwijs in Vlaanderen en Nederland, in Tijdschrift voor Onderwijsrecht en Onderwijsbeleid, 45 (2010–11): nr. 1–2, pp. 3–35.

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an inclusive, pluralist subject on religions – as already exists in some other countries – is the right approach to this.6

In the meantime, others also joined the discussion, but most often they come to the same conclusion: it would be better to replace or complement Roman Catholic religious education and the other confessional subjects with a general course on religion that no longer has a privileged relationship with one particular religious or philosophical tradition, because most pupils no longer fit in the current picture. Such a new subject is, therefore, the logical consequence of the changed religious context, because only in this way can young people be adequately prepared for a (active-) pluralist society. Against, on the one hand, secularism (that leaves no room for religion in the public space) and, on the other, religious intolerance, such a proposal advocates a mutual and active recognition of plurality and difference: an active pluralism. At the risk of repeating ourselves, we should not forget that these proposals do not necessarily follow from the analysis given, but are a specific reaction to it. In this perspective, these alternative proposals are no less value-laden than the Roman Catholic religious curricula. The patterns that we observed in the discussion on the philosophical-religious character of education in general come even clearer to the fore in the discussion on religious education. Because the plea for an active-pluralist, general course on religion realizes an (often unnoticed) shift from description to programme. Even though (or because) I make this same shift myself from a theological perspective, by asking what the other’s truth claim does with my own Christian truth claim and how this challenges me to a critical-productive reflexivity7, and thus I principally share this line of approach, it should be clear that it is not neutral. The option for a non-engaged subject about other religions as preparation for the multicultural society presupposes at least that the diversity 6

7

From: P. Loobuyck, Ontzuiling, diversiteit en secularisering dwingen tot actief pluralisme, in Tertio, 4 November 2009. Didier Pollefeyt’s reaction in the same issue: D. Pollefeyt, Religie van de neutraliteit’ roept veel bedenkingen op. Wanneer pluralisme exclusivisme wordt, in Tertio, 4 November 2009. For a more detailed reflection by Loobuyck, see P. Loobuyck and L. Franken, Het schoolpactcompromis in vraag gesteld: pleidooi voor een nieuw vak over levensbeschouwingen en filosofie in het Vlaams onderwijs, in Tijdschrift voor Onderwijsrecht en Onderwijsbeleid, 44 (2009): nr. 1–2, pp. 44–64; Schoolpactwet: 50 jaar later, in Samenleving en Politiek, 16 (2009–10): nr. 5, pp. 47–55. For example, see the eighth chapter of God Interrupts History, where exactly this question is dealt with in a consideration on the unicity of Jesus Christ in light of the truth claims of other religious geniuses and truth claims.

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of worldviews, philosophies and religions does matter, that knowledge of these and contact with these is important. Here, as well, we encounter a rather particular set of values of dialogue, openness to others, recognition of diversity, respect for particularity and difference, which should be distinguished from secularist neutrality, indifference and relativism, neo-traditionalism and fundamentalism. (a) Again, however, we can ask questions: Where do these values come from; what is their legitimation; how do they receive substantiation; how are they nourished and critically deepened; what is their basis? As much as I share these values, the claim is too easily made that these should constitute the new consensus, either as a characteristic of the current society or as what underlies all coping with diversity. (b) For that matter, is the subject of ‘education about religion’ sufficient? Is not a subject that limits itself to learning about philosophical-religious traditions too narrow, if this is not combined, at the same time, with a reflection on one’s own outlook on life and the way this deals with plurality and difference (both in terms of knowledge and commitment)? If this is not the case, such a subject can lead just as easily to religious relativism and indifference. The ultimate question, then, is whether such a general religious subject on the various philosophies and religions does not suffer from the same flaws as active pluralism itself. Is it not also promoting a kind of secularist-neutral way of dealing with religious plurality that forgets its own value commitments. Or does such a subject intend to contribute to a kind of proper philosophicalreligious position of its own, that fits well with a vague kind of religiosity that makes a bricolage from a multitude of traditions? The latter would make such a subject not really any different from the other confessionally bound subjects. Also, once more, the question of who should or could teach such a subject is important: Can it be a Muslim or Christian believer? Should the teacher hide his or her commitment to a specific tradition? Or should it be someone who does not identify with a particular philosophical or religious tradition? At least, it would seem that this subject’s objective cannot be realized if it only talks about religions, and if every statement of one’s own viewpoint (except for the underlying set of values) is ruled out in advance. In other words, remedying religious illiteracy offers no solace for religious indifference, if subject and teacher are not actively involved in the process of shaping the pupil’s personal identity.

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(c) Further along these lines: the plea for such an alternative general religious subject would seem to demonstrate a tension between individualized identity construction and belonging to a tradition, doing injustice to the correct meaning of individualization. Again, the suggestion is made that the larger majority of people are individualized and thus no longer belong to a religious tradition, while only a minority of others (the ‘orthodox’) still belong to a tradition and, therefore, are said to be less individualized. As if religious reflexivity is only available to this first group, while the latter would lack it. In the previous chapter, we referred in this context to an apparently adapted zero-sum theory: the more individualization, the less tradition, and vice versa: the more tradition, the less individualization. Especially today, however, in a time in which belonging to a particular tradition is not selfevident, commitment to a tradition of course can also entail a heightened reflexivity. Moreover, when one thinks that individualization by itself leads to a constructed, non-traditional identity, and, therefore, only a more general religious subject is appropriate for addressing this group, then one no longer holds a neutral attitude with respect to philosophical-religious traditions, but takes one’s own unique and proper position in the middle of the field of religious plurality. The difference then is only the target audience: not the ‘orthodox’ Christians, Jews, or Muslims, but the group of so-called ‘individualized’, who à la limite may be less internally pluralized and thus differ less in philosophical-religious profile than previously thought: believing without belonging, post-Christians, something-ism, apophatic religiosity.8 Is this general course on religion then really the active-pluralist solution it is proposed to be? The fundamental question, therefore, runs as follows: is not the same exact goal – to educate for citizenship in a post-secular, pluralist society – pursued in Roman Catholic religious education according to the current curriculum – and perhaps even in a more credible way? Pupils are taught to become aware of the inevitably philosophical-religious character of all human thought, acting and living, and of the plurality this entails. From here they are invited to consider their own identity in interaction with other beliefs and in a dialogue with the offer of meaning stemming from the Christian tradition. In such a subject the 8

Furthermore, one can ask if institutional commitment to a religion is the primary criterion for religious affiliation: if a majority of people in Catholic schools – when questioned – still define themselves as Christians, why then would they not be considered such?

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Christian faith is the preferential dialogue partner, which is introduced into the interreligious conversation in a reflexively engaged way (at least by the teacher). Through this pedagogical process, all pupils are stimulated to come to religious maturity and acquire skills for interreligious communication  – whether they are Jews, Christians, post-Christians, agnostics, Muslims, atheists, indifferents, etc. If all subjects in religious education would conceive of their curricula in the same way, this would have the additional benefit of also involving their respective philosophical-religious traditions and communities. They as well, then, would be challenged to reflect on their own truth claims in relation to plurality and difference. This would definitely constitute an effective antidote against tendencies towards neo-traditionalism and fundamentalism, which are often present in all of them. Meanwhile, at the end of 2012, all providers of religious subjects in Flemish education engaged in a joint statement, in this regard, on teaching interreligious competences, and promised, where necessary, to take steps to adapt their curricula: In all curricula on religious subjects, the concepts of ‘identity’ and ‘dialogue’ are brought into tension with each other in various ways. They are linked with skills and attitudes such as dialogue, openness, encounter, tolerance. Awareness of religious plurality in society and respect for each person are important basic principles. All religious subjects, in their own way, work towards the link between one’s own religious outlook and other recognised philosophies of life in society. Pupils are challenged from their own religious individuality to develop the attitude for and competence towards dialogue.9

Not Christian enough? In need of a reform? If current Roman Catholic religious education is still too Christian for the active-pluralist lobby, then the other criticism is, precisely, that it is no longer Christian enough. This criticism is twofold. (1) On the one hand, the 1999 Roman Catholic religious education curricula led to religious constructivism, individualism, relativism, indifference. (2) On the other hand, they do not 9

Interlevensbeschouwelijke competenties in het kader van dialoog en samenwerking tussen levensbeschouwingen op school, 6 December 2012, p. 8.

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achieve enough of a transfer of knowledge of the Christian tradition, and, at the end of secondary education, after at least twelve years of religious education, pupils know too little about Christianity. This last critique can cover two aspects. (2a) First, culturally speaking, pupils know too little about Christianity, and this is problematic in a society and culture that was formed at least partially by the Christian tradition. (2b) Another voice complains that religious education does not sufficiently initiate one into the Christian faith, that is, is not catechetical enough, and this is problematic at a time when other catechetical milieus, such as the family or the parish, no longer function. In either case, religious education should focus on a thorough introduction to Christianity. This last part of the criticism is, of course, not new and already arose even when the previous 1985 curriculum was developed. Due to the continuing secularization of the school population, the curriculum then already no longer understood religious education in terms of catechesis.10 After all, catechesis appeals to people who consciously want to be Christians or want to deepen their Christian life; and, at that time, this was no longer the case for the entire class. In the 1985 context of correlation didactics, this critique argued, moreover, that religious instruction was limited to religious anthropology, values education and ethics, and did not sufficiently introduce the Christian faith itself. Today, the critique is that too much is taught about other religions, and all kinds of other philosophical-religious issues, and too little about Christian faith itself. This criticism requires suitable attention. But, at the same time, it should be clear that religious education’s case is not served by polarization.11 And because of the opposite criticism from the active-pluralist corner, the risk of such has become very real. Nevertheless, again linking up with the basic objectives of the 1999 curriculum for secondary education, no opposition should be sought where one does not necessarily exist. Additional attention paid to an adequate presentation of the Christian faith need not be put in contradistinction to respect for 10

11

See Leerplan godsdienst vijfde en zesde jaar, Catechetische Commissie voor het Secundair Onderwijs in opdracht van het Episcopaat (Brussel: Licap, 1985). See also: J. Bulckens, Godsdienstonderricht op de secundaire school. Handboek voor godsdienstdidactiek (Leuven: Acco, 1994), Part 1, pp. 53–4. For this, I refer, among other things, to this statement that I released together with Didier Pollefeyt, on behalf of the Faculty of Theology and Religious Studies (KU Leuven) on 10 May 2010. See Godsdienstonderricht is niet gediend met polarisatie; http://nieuws.kuleuven.be/node/8105 (accessed 5 August 2015).

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religious plurality and concern for the religious growth of detraditionalized and individualized pupils. In addition, through the new curriculum’s approach, Christian faith can be explicitly introduced once again in a new way, in the context of religious plurality, especially in a time and context that are clearly no longer defined by the Christian horizon of meaning. It is specifically for this purpose that the 1999 Roman Catholic religious education curriculum offers a framework. Whoever reads the first and second basic objectives cannot overlook this. a. To become aware of and to know oneself as religiously challenged by the plurality of offers of meaning (religions) in our contemporary life-world and society. b. To be able to place the offer of meaning from the Christian faith in the context of religious plurality.

At the same time, the curriculum aims at more than the presentation of Christian content and practices. It deals not ‘merely’ with the transfer of knowledge concerning Christian tradition, but with learning to taste from the offer of meaning that Christian faith gives, even to today’s people, whether or not they are actually Christians. Naturally, this requires much knowledge about Christian tradition, its content and practices and the developments these underwent. But, at the same time, the curriculum aims to do more: it intends to make clear that Christian faith has to do with peoples’ lives, and can address, challenge and give meaning to people as well today. Thus, religious education does not come down to simply conveying a body of cultural knowledge (the outside of Christian faith), but also aims to show – no matter how difficultly – how Christian faith relates to life itself, especially with young people’s lives today. In today’s detraditionalized, individualized and pluralized class environment, the immediate goal, of course, can no longer be ‘to promote the growth of all pupils in the Christian faith’ – even if religious education definitely does this for those who are receptive to it and/or are willing to work on it. Christian faith can certainly appear – even for non-Christian pupils – as a religious disposition that does not belong simply to the past, but can also motivate, inspire and appeal to people in the present. To this, the main basic objective refers: To be open to and grasp what Christian faith can mean in a world that is experienced and understood as radically plural.

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Then, the third objective focuses further on the service such an education can offer to the religious education of all pupils, whether they are Christians now or not: c. From an insight into the plural religious character of human speech, thought and action, and in dialogue with the offer of meaning of Christian faith in this context, to give an account of one’s own philosophicalreligious profile.

It is precisely at this point that the curriculum realizes, in its own way, the programme of the active-pluralist alternative – however, here calling expressly upon its own tradition. Our society would, in fact, profit if many people, from whatever tradition or denomination, would acquire a more reflexive identity; that is, an identity in which involvement in one’s own position (casu quo tradition) and its truth claims goes together, simultaneously, with recognition of other philosophical-religious positions (casu quo traditions) and the truth claims emanating from them. Moreover, the dialogue between one’s own position and other positions can be especially fruitful in coming to a reflexive identity. To this end, education is certainly an important task; but as we said earlier, it should be clear that remedying religious illiteracy is insufficient for remedying religious indifference. What does this mean for the teachers’ role in religious education? In line with what was just said, what is expected from them is not merely a presentation of Christian content and practices, but simultaneously a witness from within. Obviously, this can only happen in an open and dialogical manner, with respect for one’s own religious position and for those of the pupils. The goal then is to present the Christian faith, in all its breadth and depth, in a way that takes the pupils’ religious quest and diversity seriously, and encourages them to make sound choices, while being challenged by the Christian offer of meaning. Of course, these ambitious objectives are not being achieved in daily practice simply because they are put forward by the curriculum. However, before going further into this, I will discuss in greater detail the various points of criticism with which we began this section, in reverse order. (2b) As was already the case with the previous curriculum, a catechetical approach to religious education is also not an option today: detraditionalization and pluralization are ubiquitous. Nevertheless, precisely because of taking

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individualization and pluralization seriously, and the fact that the curriculum aims to personally challenge pupils and to let them reflect on their own religious identities, religious education can serve a catechetical purpose for the Christians among the pupils and for those who are open to the Christian offer of meaning. Precisely, by examining the Christian faith in relation to other worldviews and religions, Christian pupils learn to live and think their faith  – learning about what the other’s truth claim does to their own truth claim, without falling into relativism or neo-traditionalism. Finally, a warning should be given against projecting exaggerated expectations on religious education, at a time when the other traditional initiating (catechetical) milieus (family and parish) are apparently no longer able to live up to that role. As in many other cases (e.g. good manners, a taste for art and literature, historical interest and the like), education cannot completely compensate for what the other milieus can no longer manage. (2a) The critique that – at the end of the day – religious education does not provide sufficient cultural knowledge about Christianity is of another order. In my comments on the analysis of the current context, I already emphasized the fact that detraditionalization is even more recognizable today than fifteen years ago. This applies not only to the transfer of Christian tradition but also for much other cultural knowledge. For example, not surprisingly, in some countries, and in other domains of knowledge as well (such as history, literature, national identity), a sort of canon has been established delineating what one would expect regarding cultural knowledge. Because the formerly extant canons no longer continue to be self-evidently obviously applicable. Moreover, I already mentioned that – especially with regard to Christian faith – all other initiating milieus have been eroded: religious training in the family, participation in parish life, parish catechesis for first communion and confirmation, etc. previously passed on much cultural knowledge. Therefore, it is certainly legitimate that increased attention to this dimension of religious education is being requested. Whoever wants to function in Western European society and participate in cultural life should know something about the history, sources and stories, the content and practices of Christian faith. To this sociocultural concern, corresponds, I think, an ecclesial concern: all too often clichés about Christian faith and the church circulate, which deserve to be corrected through an adequate knowledge of the latter.

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Therefore, if this happens nowhere else, it is desirable that pupils learn that Easter is the Christian celebration of Jesus’ resurrection, who the good Samaritan is, that confession is one of the seven sacraments, and that the Roman Catholic Church is not the alien monolith the media and common opinion make of it. Of course, here as well we should not have exaggerated expectations. The one who only acquires such knowledge in a superficial way (which therefore lacks any existential meaning) remains circling on the level of ‘facts’ that do not take root. In the same way as pupils can ‘forget’ after a geography class that the capital of Lithuania is Vilnius, and which European capitals are situated on the Danube on its way from the Alps to the Black Sea, so pupils can also ‘forget’ knowledge about the Christian faith which they could barely integrate in a more personal way. Whoever has visited Vilnius, though, or made a class presentation on the course of the Danube, is obviously less likely to forget such geographical knowledge. In this respect, a religious didactics that presents the Christian faith from plurality and difference, with attention to its outward and inward dimensions, offers perhaps more opportunities for the contents and practices of Christian faith to evolve from surface knowledge (‘facts’) to in-depth knowledge, than a didactics of merely transferring knowledge.12 (1) A critique that was already formulated earlier regarding the new curricula was that they presumed too easily that identity is made up of a free, individual choice, as if one would be able to simply construct one’s identity, without any conditions, according to one’s own wishes. By introducing many philosophies and religions alongside one another, therefore bringing young people to the point of building their identity, the curriculum inspires them to borrow from the various traditions, and, thereby, prevents them from growing into one particular tradition – the Christian tradition. Moreover, this critique often goes, how can one enter into dialogue with other philosophies and religions if one has yet to acquire one’s own identity? Such an approach must lead to pluralism, relativism, indifference. Only a scholarly introduction into the Christian tradition can remedy this situation – so rings the conclusion.13 12

13

For the difference made between ‘surface learning’ and ‘deep learning’, see D. Saines, How Do Students Learn Theology?, in Teaching Theology and Religious Studies, 12 (2009): 333–47. See, for example, H. De Dijn, Godsdienstles moet christelijke vorming bieden, in Tertio, 29 September 2004, p. 15; with responses by D. Pollefeyt, Voorbij gemakkelijk relativisme en eigen gelijk, in Tertio, 13 October 2004, p. 13; and L. Boeve, God maakt concreet geschiedenis, in Tertio, 13 October 2004, p. 14.

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Even though this critique should itself be criticized, it nevertheless points to the curriculum’s ambitious character in our current context: bringing detraditionalized, individualized and pluralized classes of pupils in dialogue with the Christian faith in order to acquire a more reflexive identity. However, this criticism of the 1999 curriculum should be questioned in turn, because it ignores the distinction made in the analysis between description of the changed context (the -izations), and the various ways of dealing with it (the -isms). It is not because the curriculum takes seriously the processes mentioned above that it contributes respectively to the loss of tradition (religious illiteracy) and nihilism, individualism and subjectivism, relativism and indifference. Rather, it takes into account the fact that today every identity construction, in one way or another, relates to plurality, otherness and difference, and that precisely the nature of this relationship is determinative for the way in which identity is formed. The named ‘-isms’ do this by allowing one’s own identity and truth claim to be absorbed by plurality and (in)difference; other ‘-isms’, such as neo-traditionalism, extreme nationalism and fundamentalism, protect one’s own truth claim by turning away from plurality and difference (because these would lead precisely to nihilism, subjectivism and relativism). Having said this, even though pupils do not enter class as blank slates, the challenge which the curriculum poses remains the same: not to contribute to religious illiteracy, subjectivism and relativism, but to form pupils towards religious maturity and enable them to engage in interreligious communication. To the extent that this critique and the proposed solution constitutes the mirror image of the active-pluralist alternative (e.g. think on the category of ‘orthodox’ in the example I gave), the answer given there also counts here. Not merely through knowledge, but by being philosophically religiously committed, can people come to reflective identity, be it Christian or not. In short, because of the growing intensity of the sociocultural processes described above, there is certainly something to be said for the idea that the cognitive dimension of Christian faith could receive more attention. However, this is not due to the fact that we, once more, should return to catechesis, or that we presently teach individualism and relativism, but because the other channels of transferring Christian knowledge – the family, parish, even the media and the cultural environment – contribute here less and less. Certainly in a school context, with pupils from different religious backgrounds, Roman

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Catholic religious education has the important task of informing, always with a view towards educating for a thoughtful religious identity, whether it is Christian or not. Therefore, a heightened focus on the second basic objective is in order – of course in the context of (and not separate from!) the other basic objectives.

What about implementation? And the conditions? In this last section, I will attempt to formulate a number of observations – which will serve as a starting point for further discussion – on the way in which the 1999 curriculum has been implemented in religious education in Flanders in the last fifteen years. Afterwards, I will shed some light on the conditions which should be fulfilled in order to facilitate a renewed implementation in today’s context. (1) I cannot escape the impression that, when the current curriculum was first implemented, especially that which was considered new attracted a lot of attention: the sharpened awareness of religious plurality, room for other religions, worldviews and philosophies (which, in any case, were fascinating because of their unfamiliarity), and attention to communication and dialogical identity formation. Indeed, the most innovative ideas were the first and third basic objectives. With respect to the earlier situation, the third basic objective was very challenging: how to get pupils, from the awareness of plurality, in dialogue with the Christian faith, to come to a more reflective religious identity? If we look back, for example, at the training offered at teachers during the first few years after the curriculum’s appearance, it is striking that these aspects were the ones that were especially tackled. Also when we look at the first generation of textbooks, we notice that these were especially charmed by the space created by the first basic objective for other religions, worldviews and philosophies. There is, however, more to say about this first generation of textbooks. (2) The curriculum was deliberately designed as a ‘framework curriculum’, stating generic objectives and contents, and offering a lot of room for initiative and creativity on the part of the teacher. This resulted in a lot of trust in the professional competences and personal involvement of religious educators,

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who were given the opportunity to concretely design their courses in relation to the specific situation and profile of their class population. Because the designers of the curriculum also then knew that not all teachers would have sufficient knowledge to be able to do this, they trusted that good learning materials would be made available, with good manuals.14 However, I vividly recall the curriculum designers’ surprise, when it became clear that the educational editing houses were already designing educational materials, while the initial talks regarding the basic principles of the new curriculum were still ongoing. Therefore, it cannot come as a surprise that educational materials from the first generation are not completely suitable, and so let down precisely those teachers who were in need of their support. Meanwhile, we can assume, I suppose, that the novelty of the first and third basic objectives has been accepted intellectually, although both objectives remain, of course, very challenging even today. Perhaps, the time has come, therefore, to bring the second basic objective to the fore and, with concerted effort, to ascertain how it can be better included into the whole concept. The question then is this: How can the offer of meaning from the Christian faith be presented in a context of plurality and difference so that young people are challenged to work on their own identity? How can we better appreciate the second basic objective, in the perspective of the first, in order to be able to fully achieve the third? This is a task for the teachers involved, for those who mentor them, pedagogical consultants and leaders, researchers and academics  – each one in their own place, from their own expertise and in dialogue with one another. However, an adequate, successful implementation of the curriculum for the current context does not stand on its own. At least three conditions should also be met. We conclude this contribution with a brief reference to each. (1) A first precondition concerns motivated and well-trained teachers. We already mentioned that the teacher as a person is an important factor in the possible success of religious education as this curriculum envisions. The teacher has a threefold role in the pedagogy underlying religious education: he or she is first an expert in Christianity and the other religions, second a witness to the Christian tradition, and third a moderator of the interreligious dialogue. This threefold role self-evidently requires a lot of motivation, expertise and 14

It is from this perspective that the multifaceted multimedia internet project THOMAS has been conceived, offering a diversity of materials and tools for religious education teachers: www. godsdienstonderwijs.be; http://www.kuleuven.be/thomas/.

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competence. Therefore, a good initial and continuing education remains a necessity, especially in a context of heightened detraditionalization. School officials might be tempted to hire less qualified people because of the scarcity of teachers in the market. However, the short- and long-term quality of religious education is at stake, for young people who are educated by excellent religious education teachers are more likely to become religion teachers themselves. (2) Regarding Catholic education, a second condition is a school that has sorted out its Catholic identity. Already in 1998, I said that the new style of religious education would only succeed if the school reconsidered its own identity profile in relation to the increasing detraditionalization and pluralization of its pupils, parents and staff. More specifically, this implies that the school takes leave from the project of Christian values education and does not opt for either institutional secularization or reconfessionalization.15 Only a deliberate choice for the Catholic dialogue school and a continual effort to put it into practice will do. (3) The last and perhaps most important condition – as became all too clear to us in recent years – is naturally a credible Christian faith, propagated by a credible church. At a time when faith and faith community appear to be in retreat, where classic structures and patterns of behaviour come under pressure, the risk always exists that one will close in on oneself. Christian faith then profiles its identity against the threatening plurality, and the challenge of the other’s truth for one’s own truth is not made fruitful. It would be unfortunate if the church falls into this trap and shuts itself off from culture and society in order to protect its ‘treasure of faith’ – because it is precisely then, if there is no room for recontextualization, that this treasure threatens to be lost. The space that Pope Francis created in the first years of his office makes one hopeful that the church can escape such a bind.

Conclusion Current religious education is challenged in two ways: both from a concern for the future of the Christian tradition and by a context that continues to move away from Christian culture and religiously pluralizes. The current curriculum 15

See Chapters 7 and 8.

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moves within this tension. Again and again, the actual way in which the curriculum mediates this tension will need to be critically examined and adjusted where necessary. Accents can shift: therefore, the proposal to examine precisely how the second basic objective can be emphasized throughout the entire project. Care for the identity of the religious courses, on the one hand, and for the pluralized classroom, on the other, do not need to be played off against each other, but offer opportunities today for an informative and authentic religious education. This ultimately presupposes well-trained teachers and a school and church that support the credibility of this ambitious programme.

Part Four

Conclusion In this book, we have developed how theology’s current situation, in a context of detraditionalization and pluralization, in which difference and dialogue are important, can be an opportunity for reconsidering one’s own place and assignment. Theology’s marginalization interrupts first the classical theological self-understanding. In none of the three domains in which theology is active – university, church and society – is its voice still obvious. From the margin and at the crossroads of these three domains, this asks theology to be more conscious of the borders of its discourse (and thus of its specificity). On the other hand, this challenges theology not to withdraw from any one of the domains but to give renewed form to the bond it shares with each. Precisely by being fully involved from the margin in the university, church and society, theology should make a difference, at the same time, in each of these domains, regarding what is at stake there: (a) the scientific search for truth and knowledge in the university, (b) coming to a contemporary understanding of faith and life in the church and (c) coming to individual and communal identity, even in a post-Christian and post-secular society. From a contextual perspective this is necessary, as we emphasized, because of the changed place of Christian faith in the current context. This change challenges this faith to re-think the relationship to the context. The analysis of our context in terms of pluralization rather than secularization opens new possibilities to see more clearly the specificity of the Christian faith. In this way, we do not give up on dialogue with the context; on the contrary, we make room again for such a conversation, in which identity and difference go hand in hand. We have also reconsidered the issues of the identity of Catholic schools and religious education from this reframed relationship

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between Christian faith and the plural context. Continuity and consensus between faith and context, or discontinuity and conflict, are no longer the only two alternatives: we choose for an open, dialogical identity with respect for diversity and difference. Finally, the motivation behind the argument given in this book is theological in nature: we plead for a dialogical theology and a dialogical Catholic identity, since it is in the dialogue with people and history that the God of Jesus Christ has revealed Godself, throughout time, as a God involved with humanity – a dialogical God, challenging people to participate in that dialogue – a dialogue that ultimately has in mind the salvation of people, of all people. This book ends with the tenth chapter, which follows as an addendum, where I ask why Pope Benedict resigned in 2013. The reason I finally come to is, once again, theological in nature; and it illustrates in a striking way, yet again, the approach worked out in the rest of this book. Such is also the case in our preliminary evaluation of the first years of Pope Francis’ reign.

10

Why Benedict XVI Resigned: Cognitive Dissonance

Introduction On 11 February 2013, Pope Benedict XVI announced that he would lay aside his papal office at the end of the same month. A month later, on 13 March, a new pope was elected, the Argentinean Jesuit Cardinal Jorge Bergoglio, who surprisingly chose the name Francis. Although it is too early to evaluate this new papacy, it is already clear that the tone and style has changed, much to the delight of many people both inside and outside of the Catholic Church. It seems as if the Spirit is, once again, set free in a church that was accustomed to protecting its borders on the outside and to discipline within. Because these were the ways to face the challenges that threatened the Christian faith and the church. From that point of view, the church considered the world outside the church as hostile, with respect to the core truths of the Christian faith. It was the church’s mission, on the one hand, to protect these truths from the world, and, on the other, to proclaim them in this world. Then, in order to accomplish this, internal unity and discipline were imposed within the church, so that it could confront the world with one powerful voice. Neither of these strategies, however, has led to the desired result. In many countries, the church’s public discourse is listened to less and less, let alone taken seriously, and the paedophilia scandal, which surfaced in 2010 on all levels of the church, eminently illustrated its internal crisis. Looked at from a distance, Benedict XVI must have experienced this situation as extremely tragic, leading to great distress and perhaps even despair for him. After all, he who wanted the church to be a beacon of light and truth, in a world marked by egoism and relativism; he who profiled the church as the protector of

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true humanity, had, with sorrowful eyes, to watch this church undermined from within by the paedophilia and other crises, which squandered away the church’s credibility on moral and other issues, both inside and outside the church. Since the resignation of Benedict XVI, there has been much speculation over the reasons for this. A hypothesis that is barely mentioned – that I would like to put forward from a resolutely theological perspective – is cognitive dissonance. Indeed, the pope got old and tired and overwhelmed by his inability to manage the Roman Curia and its lobbies. Certainly, he must have been dispirited by the moral and financial crises within the church and by incidents like ‘Vatileaks’. However, at the same time, in my opinion, one should not underestimate to what extent this whole painful situation put Benedict’s (or should I say, Joseph Ratzinger’s) personal theological convictions to the test. After all, as a theologian, as bishop, as prefect and as pope, for almost fifty years, Joseph Ratzinger has exerted a strong influence on the way the church has developed in matters of faith and morals, as well as in matters of church organization, episcopal nominations and church politics. At the end of his papacy, he must have realized that it simply did not work. His pursuit of a church that must proclaim to the modern world – affected by egoism and relativism – the highest standards of truth and morality, has, on the contrary, led to a church crumbling ethically from within and steadily losing its credibility on the public scene, not only in Europe but elsewhere. The church, which in Ratzinger’s theological views is primarily a divine reality, has ultimately proven to be all too human. It has become extremely difficult to credibly argue that it is not the church but its members who are sinful and thus responsible for the sorry state of affairs. What do we mean by ‘cognitive dissonance’? This concept comes from social psychology and is defined as follows: cognitive dissonance ‘refers to a situation involving conflicting attitudes, beliefs or behaviours. This produces a feeling of discomfort leading to an alteration in one of the attitudes, beliefs or behaviours to reduce the discomfort and restore balance etc.’1 In social psychology, this theory helps explain why people change their views, behaviour, etc.: after all, they want to reconcile these with the reality they experience as dissonant. 1

Cf. Saul A. McLeod, Cognitive Dissonance Theory, in Simply Psychology (2008), http://www. simplypsychology.org/cognitive-dissonance.html.

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This so-called ‘principle of cognitive consistency’ then leads to ‘dissonance reduction’. Leon Festinger introduced the concept during his research on people who lived in the expectation of an imminent apocalypse, which finally did not occur.2 Instead of giving up their beliefs, once they have been proven false, the more convinced among them sought arguments to explain why the apocalypse did not occur, so they could maintain their beliefs. ‘According to Festinger, we hold many cognitions about the world and ourselves; when they clash, a discrepancy is evoked, resulting in a state of tension known as cognitive dissonance. As the experience of dissonance is unpleasant, we are motivated to reduce or eliminate it, and achieve consonance (i.e. agreement [between convictions and experience]).’3 In what follows, I will show how Joseph Ratzinger’s/Benedict XVI’s theological vision of conversion – and its consequences for his fundamentaltheological ideas about divine truth, the church and the world – has collided with the actual situation of Christian faith and the church, which has led to enormous stress. Such cognitive dissonance must have profoundly discredited his entire theological and church political programme. This has probably triggered such deep desperation that he saw resignation as the only way out: an escape (in prayer) was the only solution to bring about ‘dissonance reduction’. Is it too far-fetched to interpret, in this way, Benedict’s statement about his imminent resignation: ‘However, in today’s world, subject to so many rapid changes and shaken by questions of deep relevance for the life of faith, in order to govern the barque of Saint Peter and proclaim the Gospel, both strength of mind and body are necessary, strength which in the last few months, has deteriorated in me to the extent that I have had to recognise my incapacity to adequately fulfil the ministry entrusted to me.’?4 I will now shed some light on the place ‘conversion’, metanoia, takes in the framework of Joseph Ratzinger’s theology. Then I will develop how this has influenced the way in which he dealt with the challenges of the modern world for Christian faith. Finally, I will argue that this strategy has not been

2

3 4

Leon Festinger, Henry Riecken and Stanley Schachter, When Prophecy Fails (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1956); see also Leon Festinger, A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1957). McLeod, Cognitive Dissonance Theory. Cf. http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/benedict_xvi/speeches/2013/february/documents/hf_benxvi_spe_20130211_declaratio_en.html.

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successful, and that other ways to deal with the world will prove to be more fruitful in the long run.

Metanoia: A radical renouncing of human hubris For Joseph Ratzinger, metanoia forms the fundamental structure of the Christian faith (and is at the same time the Christian answer to the human quest for salvation). It concerns the believer’s conversion, who turns away from egocentrism and enters a more fundamental relationship that precedes and constitutes the human person as human. The importance of this structure for Ratzinger can hardly be overestimated: in almost all his writings from the sixties till the eighties of the previous century, this theme appears: both in his more prominent books, Einführung in das Christentum (1968) [Introduction to Christianity] and Theologische Prinzipienlehre (1982) [Principles of Catholic Faith]5, and in many articles, which he often publishes in the journal Communio that he founded in 1972 with Hans-Urs von Balthasar. I will summarize his argument in seven steps. 1. True metanoia is characterized by a radical change in the subject. The ‘ego’ is no longer an autonomous being, standing on its own, but becomes part of a new subject. This new subject reveals the ego not only at his or her borders, but makes contact possible with the ground of existence.6 It is freeing oneself from what is visible, from what can be appropriated. ‘Belief is the conversion in which man [sic] discovers that he is following an illusion if he devotes himself only to the tangible. … Only in a lifelong conversion can we become aware of what it means to say “I believe.” … Belief has always had something of an adventurous break or leap about it, because in every age it represents the risky enterprise of accepting what plainly cannot be seen as the truly real and fundamental.’7 5

6

7

Cf. Joseph Ratzinger, Einführung in das Christentum. Vorlesungen über das Apostolische Glaubensbekenntnis (Munich: Kösel-Verlag, 1968) (E.T.: Introduction to Christianity [San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2004]); Theologische Prinzipienlehre. Bausteine zur Fundamentaltheologie (Munich: Wewel, 1982) (E.T.: Principles of Catholic Theology: Building Stones for a Fundamental Theology [San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1987]). Cf. Joseph Ratzinger, Theologie und Kirche, in Internationale Katholische Zeitschrift 15 (1986): pp. 515–33. Ratzinger, Introduction to Christianity, pp. 51–2.

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2. Metanoia is by no means something we can achieve ourselves. It is not the result of our own merit. We do not make ourselves into a new subject, but we allow it to be given to us. The change in subject encloses a passive. ‘Because conversion breaks the boundaries open between the I and the not-I, it can be given to oneself by the not-I, and it can never be accomplished within the mere intimacy of one’s own decision-making.’8 The gift-character of metanoia, from the perspective of God’s offer of love, also implies an assignment to the subject. Faith and obedience are synonyms for metanoia.9 ‘Conversion is an act of obedience to that what precedes me, and what does not come from me.’10 Real metanoia has personal and internal, as well as communal and external consequences. 3. Conversion, is therefore, primarily the letting go of egocentrism, to retreat from the influence of selfishness and self-interest, to let oneself be caught by the attraction power of truth and love.11 The fundamental action in metanoia, therefore, is ‘confession’ (Bekenntnis) and this in a double sense: confessing one’s guilt, and confessing Christ as saviour, from whom one wishes to receive forgiveness.12 Guilt is what the human being experiences when he or she acknowledges what he or she could have been, but has not become. Guilt makes the breach in the human person visible, and stands between the human being and his or her possibility to be one with himself or herself and with all that exists. Guilt is the result of the alienation between the human being and his or her innermost being. 4. Confessing Christ as saviour then means letting go of the principle of ‘one’s own truth’ and turning to Christ as ‘the’ truth. It is through recognizing this truth and entering its field of gravity, that the alienation of the human being towards his or her innermost being can be overcome. It is only God’s truth that can set human beings free. The question of truth is indeed a soteriological question: truth concerns the fundamental insight that the human person is constituted by an original and fundamental relationship that proceeded him or her.

8 9 10 11 12

Ratzinger, Theologie und Kirche, p. 520 (translation mine). Cf. Ratzinger, Theologische Prinzipienlehre, p. 60. Ibid., p. 524 (translation mine). Cf. Ratzinger, Theologische Prinzipienlehre, p. 65. Cf. Joseph Ratzinger, Kirchenverfassung und Umkehr. Fragen an Joseph Kardinal Ratzinger, in Internationale Katholische Zeitschrift 13 (1984): pp. 444–57.

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5. This objective, salvific truth is definitively revealed in Jesus Christ and has allowed itself to be known as personal love beyond death. It is articulated in the Christian tradition, which is entrusted to the church. The church guards and protects this truth so that its eternity and continuing presence is not lost in the flow of time. 6. Conversion is fundamentally both an ecclesial and a sacramental given. It is in the sacramental structure of reality – and in a special way in the sacraments – that the unity of salvation and truth is expressed and realized. The structure of conversion is evident especially in baptism, the Eucharist and the sacrament of penance. Metanoia expresses itself best in authentic confession and active penance.13 7. Finally, this fundamental structure of faith, according to Ratzinger, is sublimely expressed in Paul’s letter to the Galatians, when he wrote: ‘It is no longer I who live, but it is Christ who lives in me’ (Gal. 2:20a). This expression from Paul, Ratzinger states, ‘describes this distinctive feature of Christianity both as a radical personal experience and as an objective reality’.14 It means dying to sin and rising with Christ to new life.

Embedded in a Neo-Platonic framework Conversion thus is defined as the radical turning away from the human striving for autonomy to make room for the recognition of a more basic relationship, that precedes true human subjectivity and gives it form. This definition fits fully within Ratzinger’s Christian-Neo-Platonic view on truth and reality.15 His view is informed by his earlier work on Augustine and Bonaventure and starts with the basic assumption that the meeting between Jewish-Christian faith and Hellenistic culture is providential, and therefore binding on all theology ever since.16 According to this view, reality is characterized by a twofold, polar 13

14 15

16

For the sacrament of penance, for example, see Ratzinger, Theologische Prinzipienlehre, p. 67; and Kirchenverfassung und Umkehr, pp. 449–50. Ratzinger, ‘Theologie und Kirche’, p. 518 (translation mine). For this paragraph, see as well my Kerk, theologie en heilswaarheid. De klare visie van Joseph Ratzinger, in Tijdschrift voor theologie 33 (1993): pp. 139–65. As a matter of fact, both the prominence of the themes of conversion and truth and the major attention for the productive encounter of Biblical faith and Hellenistic thought (and especially Augustine in this regard) in Lumen Fidei clearly manifest that Pope emeritus Benedict has still held the pen in Pope Francis’ first encyclical on faith. The same holds true for the antagonism with modernity, with which the encyclical starts, from its very beginning (LF 2–3).

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structure, which is essentially asymmetrical and hierarchical: the visible world is an imperfect imitation of a more real, invisible and intelligible transcendent reality. For Ratzinger this is theologically framed in the Augustinian distinction between the worldly and the heavenly city. The civitas terrena is autonomous and substantially at home in the world. The love that characterizes this world is cupido. The civitas dei, on the other hand, comes from God, is alien to this world and strives for more than what the world can offer. Here caritas reigns.17 About the concept of salvific truth, Bonaventure taught him that ‘the explication of faith adds to faith, but never changes its essence; in the same way the changing of times determines the faith without changing it’.18 For Ratzinger, this statement confirms his Augustinian-Neo-Platonic intuitions. History is the field where the faith is explained, but not made. History does not intrinsically contribute to the truth of faith but is only the background in which it is revealed. Truth belongs to the domain of the eternal. Incarnation implies that the eternal nests within the temporal; not that the temporal is taken up in the eternal.

Ratzinger and the opposition to the world According to Ratzinger, here we touch the fundamental conflict between Christian faith and the modern world: the lack of metanoia is the real problem of the contemporary world. The world is no longer able to accept that an original truth precedes the autonomy of the human person – a truth that, despite all cultural mediations, always remains true because it is (objectively) true. In modernity, truth has been given a completely historical character, whereby it is radically relativized. Therefore, the church’s task is to defend this truth, even if this is not popular. This is the church’s mission in the world today; and, to be able to carry out this mission, the church must guard against adapting to modernity.

17

18

Joseph Ratzinger, Volk und Haus Gottes in Augustins Lehre von der Kirche (Munich: Zink, 1954), p. 16. Comp. Aidan Nichols, The Theology of Joseph Ratzinger: An Introductory Study (Edinburgh: Clark, 1988), p. 27 ff. Bonaventure, In III Sent., d. 24, a. 1, q. 3, c: ‘Explicatio accidit fidei nec mutat essentiam fidei, sic et variatio temporis determinat, non variat fidem’, as quoted in Ratzinger, Theologische Prinzipienlehre, p. 188.

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In the series of interviews published by Cardinal Ratzinger as prefect of the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, this vision was prominent (the ‘Ratzinger Report’ (1985) and Salt of the Earth (1996)), as well as in his books about Europe, especially Wendezeit für Europa? (1991) and his Values in a Time of Upheaval (2006).19 The modern world, with Europe as the example par excellence, has alienated itself from the salvific truth of Christianity and fallen into a culture of increasing relativism, amorality and irrationalism. In 2005, Ratzinger spoke about a clash of two opposite cultures: a struggle between the great religious cultures – in Europe, Christianity – and a certain form of radicalized Enlightenment thinking that has turned against humanity’s religious and ethical traditions.20 Only a radical return to the roots of what it means to be human can save human civilization. Therefore, Christians should strive for the conversion of the world, rather than dialogue with it. For the world is so alienated from the church that any form of dialogue between both has become problematic. According to Ratzinger, the world is at odds with Christian salvific truth. In addition, especially when such dialogue concerns Christian truth, it threatens the integrity of this truth. Only by speaking from a strong identity can the church call the present world to repentance and challenge it once again to recognize its fundamental relationship with God, a relationship which underlies all human rationality, subjectivity and community building.

Consequences for church and theology Conversion, therefore, not only guides Ratzinger’s theology of the individual believer, but also his theology of the world. This offers us a reading key for 19

20

Cf. Joseph Ratzinger and Vittorio Messori, The Ratzinger Report; Joseph Ratzinger, Salt of Earth. Christianity and the Catholic Church at the End of the Millenium. An Interview with Peter Seewald (San Francisco, Ignatius Press, 1997); Wendezeit für Europa? Diagnosen und Prognosen zur Lage von Kirche und Welt (Einsiedeln: Johannes, 1991) (E.T. Turning Point for Europe [San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1994]); Werte in Zeiten des Umbruchs. Die Herausforderungen der Zukunft bestehen (Freiburg im Breisgau: Herder, 2005) (E.T.: Values in a Time of Upheaval [New York: Crossroad, 2006]). Cf. Joseph Ratzinger, Europe in the Crisis of Cultures, in Communio: International Catholic Review 32 (2005): 345–56; for a discussion of Ratzinger’s view on modernity and Europe, see Lieven Boeve, Europe in Crisis. A Question of Belief or Unbelief? Perspectives from the Vatican, in Modern Theology 23 (2007): pp. 205–27.

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understanding both his theological and church political approaches to the contemporary situation of the Christian faith. His asymmetric-hierarchical view of reality and its consequences for his thinking about Christian truth and the dialogue with the world have greatly influenced the way in which the Christian faith and church have been relating to the current context. Within such a theological and thus also ecclesiological paradigm, this asymmetry leads to a subordination of the historical to the eternal, the human to the divine, nature to grace. This also results in a ‘high’ Christology, sacramentology and ecclesiology, in which dialectics is emphasized stronger than dialogue, and opposition gets more attention than mediation. It is never from history, nature, reason, or the human that revelation, grace, faith, and the divine can be understood, but decisively the other way around. It is the divine that makes the human turn away from the all-too-human and leads to one’s eternal destiny. It is the church, as the protector of divine truth and the gathering of God’s people in the body of Christ, which presents itself – especially in today’s alienated world – as the alternative to the world. What this means, became very clear in Cardinal Ratzinger’s initial criticism vis-àvis the mea culpa that Pope John Paul II confessed on behalf of the church on the occasion of the transition to the third millennium on 13 March 2000. According to Ratzinger, it is not the church that makes mistakes, but individuals within the church, for which the church asks God’s forgiveness. After all, can the church still be the beacon of light for a world full of sin and sorrow, when it apologizes for two thousand years of past mistakes? However, both for the church in its relationship with the world (ad extra) and for relationships within the church (ad intra), this has not been without consequences. Ad extra. Opposition with the modern world and the church’s need to present Christian faith as an alternative have led to the profiling of Christian identity against the world. First of all, this meant that the borders of faith and church were strictly defined. Church documents were issued to more precisely determine the relationship to other Christian denominations and other religions; the church’s identity was rigidly established in these and often profiled against more dialogical positions. If the church engages in conversation with modern culture, other denominations and religions, this is always based on a strong identity, which is never exposed to the process of dialogue itself. Instead, this identity constitutes both the dialogue’s starting

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and ending points. Furthermore, on several occasions, documents from the second Vatican Council, which in this regard opened more room for dialogue, were interpreted in a stricter sense. We can refer here to the restriction of the meaning of ‘subsistit in’ in Lumen Gentium 821, that the position that the Church of Christ ‘subsists’ in the Catholic Church reduces to an identification between the two; to the document on the unicity and universality of Jesus Christ and the church, Dominus Jesus22, that struck a blow to the ecumenical dialogue; to the post-synodal exhortation Verbum Domini that subtly interprets Dei Verbum in a restrictive way.23 Some issues have even received the status of highly symbolic identity benchmarks to highlight this opposition, whereby every discussion and (re)consideration of such have been blocked inside the church. So it seems, for example, that sexual–relational and biomedical position statements are more often used to strengthen the church’s identity and authority against the world then to serve, together with the world, the cause of love in partner relationships and the care for the integrity of human life. Other expressions of this are the preference for an ecumenical rapprochement with the orthodox churches and the attempts to reconcile with the Lefebvrist Pius X-community, rather than with post-reformation Christianity. Attempts by Joseph Ratzinger/Benedict XVI to create greater unity in the church through initiatives in this direction, however, seem in fact to have led to greater division. This applies not only for the readmission of the Tridentine liturgy but also for the establishment of the Ordinariate of Our Lady of Walsingham for Anglicans who wish to join the Roman Catholic Church. The same applies for other initiatives as well, such as the new English translation of the Missal. From a fundamental–theological perspective, this profiling against the world has weighed on the historical–dynamical and dialogical concept of revelation that Vatican  II presented in Dei Verbum.24 Moreover, 21

22

23

24

Cf. Responses to Some Questions Regarding Certain Aspects of the Doctrine on the Church, 29 June 2007. http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/cfaith/documents/rc_con_cfaith_20070629_ responsa-quaestiones_en.html. Released on 6 August 2000. http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/cfaith/documents/ rc_con_cfaith_doc_20000806_dominus-iesus_en.html. Published on 30 September 2010. http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/benedict_xvi/apost_ exhortations/documents/hf_ben-xvi_exh_20100930_verbum-domini_en.html. See the remarks Reimund Bieringer has made about the way in which Dei Verbum is quoted in Verbum Domini: ‘Openbaring, Schrift en interpretatie: Een bijbels-theologisch perspectief ’, in Vaticanum II: geschiedenis of interpretatie? Theologische opstellen over het tweede Vaticaans concilie, eds Mathijs Lamberigts and Leo Kenis (Antwerp: Halewijn, 2013), pp. 33–63. For an elaboration on this, see Lieven Boeve, Revelation, Scripture and Tradition: Lessons from Vatican II’s Constitution Dei Verbum for Contemporary Theology, in International Journal of Systematic Theology 13 (2011): pp. 416–33.

Why Benedict XVI Resigned

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it has prevented the church and its theologians from further developing this concept. Space that the council created in Dei Verbum was occupied, once again, by a rather a-historical and propositionalist concept of revelation, legitimized and protected by the magisterium’s authority.25 As already mentioned, there are also consequences for the discipline and conversation within the church – ad intra. A church that strives to present itself as the alternative to the world, by adhering to an unchangeable truth in times of relativism, can allow no internal division or discussion about this truth. Criteria regarding orthodoxy for bishop appointments, the refusal of theological authority to bishop conferences26, the ban on discussions about who can be a priest, the ecclesial curtailment of theology’s mission27 and the accusation and condemnation of theologians,28 the publication of compendia and catechisms – all these measures, in one way or another, create the picture of a church that seeks to close its ranks and prevent internal discussion and division. In Chapter 1, I mentioned already that, over and over again, the tendency is to ignore the historical-dynamic and dialogical interpretation of revelation and to curb the possible renewing impact of such dialogue. Recontextualization or renewal appears to be too dangerous. Because, by doing so, the church withdraws from the dynamic of history and turns back in upon its own certainties, it threatens at the same time to undermine its own learning process. Dialogue is not the problem, but part of the solution – as Dei Verbum teaches.

Cognitive Dissonance In short, Ratzinger’s theological framework and its asymmetric, hierarchical and oppositional assumptions have resulted in a theology and a church which have profiled themselves as guardians of the truth in an inimical world. I have

25

26

27

28

Cf. Boeve, Revelation, Scripture and Tradition, p. 430, in reference to Helmut Hoping, Dei Verbum, in Herders Theologischer Kommentar zum Zweiten Vatikanischen Konzil, eds. Peter Hünermann and Jochen Hilberath, vol. 3 (Freiburg: Herder, 2005), pp. 695–831 (with further references). Cf. Joseph Ratzinger, Scopi e metodi del Sinodo dei vescovi, in Il Sinodo dei vescovi. Natura - metodi – prospettiva, ed. Josef Tomko (Vatican City: Libreria ed. Vaticana, 1985), pp. 45–58. See, for example, the instruction on the ecclesial vocation of the theologian: Donum veritatis of 24 May 1990. See Hinze, Decade of Disciplining Theologians, pp. 3–39.

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already pointed out what the consequences have been for the church ad extra and ad intra. Precisely at this point, according to my hypothesis, Ratzinger/ Benedict got caught in a paradoxical situation, causing the cognitive dissonance referred to at the beginning of this chapter.29 Fighting the hubris of the modern autonomous subject, the policy of Ratzinger cum suis has produced a church that has fallen victim to its own form of hubris: namely to want to speak from on high, in God’s name, to a world it despises. Both the worldwide loss of faith’s dignity and the relevance of the church’s public discourse, as well as the scandals within the church, illustrate this final point. The church, which is called to be a beacon of light and truth, turned out to be entangled in lies and darkness. As guardian of the divine truth, the church has not been able to live up to its calling, to the truth it wanted to present as an alternative to the world. In the end, the church seems to be no better than the world it wants to convert. This must have created an insurmountable cognitive dissonance in Joseph Ratzinger/Benedict: the realization that the current crisis of and in the church is the product of an immense lack within the church of what he perceived as the most fundamental structure of Christian faith, namely metanoia. Here we come, I think, to what is actually at stake: because of its opposition to the world and its obsession to call the world to repentance, the church has lost sight of its own need for repentance. A church that refuses to enter into dialogue in order to call the world to repentance closes in on itself and loses resources for fostering its own continuously needed metanoia. Such a church forgets the historical-dynamic and dialogical nature of its truth – that is, forgets that it is about a truth stemming from God’s ongoing dialogue with humanity throughout history. This truth is not the church’s possession, but is lost as soon as one claims it as one’s own. It is within history, through conversation and dialogue, that truth is revealed as God’s gift to the church, and it is only through a humble and open dialogue that this truth can be traced, time and again. When the conversation in the church is crippled both ad extra and ad 29

Others have made similar remarks, as Anthony Godzieba remarks in his editorial to Horizons: The Journal of the College Theology Society 40 (2013): 1, p. v: ‘One reason for Benedict’s resignation, I am convinced, is the failure of his “ordered” and ethereal Neo-Platonic/Augustinian worldview: it eventually collided with the plurality of truths outside the Vatican and the almost willful disorder and corrupt behavior within the Vatican, and could not “solve” (solvere, unravel) any of it or put it into any order.’ A similar view has been voiced by Leonardo Boff (the ‘collapse’ of Ratzinger’s theology) and by Martin Drobinski, writing in Munich’s Süddeutsche Zeitung of the current repudiation of Ratzinger’s ‘hermetic’ view of the church as a little ship tossed about on a stormy ‘ “relativist” sea, forced to batten down the hatches and pull in the sails’.

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intra, it becomes very difficult to discover where God challenges both the church and the world today and calls them to repentance. Moreover, it should be clear, in this regard, that conversion is not only for the individual believer, both as a subjective and a communal affair, but also for the church community as a whole. More attention to the historical-dynamic and dialogical nature of revelation will inevitably lead to a more historical-dynamic and dialogical understanding of the church.

By way of conclusion: Dissonance reduction The theory of cognitive dissonance not only implies that such a situation, where our attitudes, beliefs and behaviours no longer track with the world, causes serious discomfort, grief and embarrassment. It also suggests that cognitive dissonance can motivate individuals towards dissonance reduction, through making changes in their beliefs and attitudes. Stepping down as pope is, of course, a dramatic way of realizing dissonance reduction on the personal level: by withdrawing into a life of prayer, Benedict leaves the difficult situation to God (and his successor). Although this does not necessarily reduce the tension that is coupled with cognitive dissonance for the church, nevertheless this can offer possibilities for the church as an institution and community towards dissonance reduction, especially if room is made once more for a church that opens itself for metanoia. It seems that Pope Francis, at least in these first few years, realizes the church’s difficult situation. This is shown, at least, by his call for the church to be poor itself, to be humble and by personally setting such an example. The church may no longer be a safe bastion against the world; but it hopes, vulnerable as it is, to trace in dialogue God’s truth in history.30 And this dialogue is both ad extra, addressed to non-Christians31, as well as ad intra, by promoting, for example, new forms of episcopal collegiality and consultation of the broader 30

31

Both his apostolic exhortation on the proclamation of the Gospel in the world of today, Evangelii Gaudium (2013), and his encyclical on ecology, Laudato si (2015), illustrate this fundamental change in attitude. Especially, his symbolic gestures are very telling in this regard, such as the washing of the feet of Muslim women at Holy Thursday (28 March 2013), or the statement that also unbelievers can be saved when they live a good life (22 May 2013), or the visit to the detention camps for illegal immigrants in Lampedusa (8 July 2013).

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church community.32 Maybe such a poorer and humbler church will be more credible and effective in bringing about the conversion of the world. The least one can say is that this church will start with its own conversion. Without a doubt, this is the best strategy to realize the dissonance reduction that the church needs. Because the best way to convert the world to God is to convert the church to God’s world – in line with what Vatican II also intended.33

32

33

Illustrative for this is the primary identification of the pope as the bishop of Rome, the intended reform of the Curia and the appointment of a so-called crown council of eight cardinals to assist the pope in his governing the church (13 April 2013). Also, the calling together of two bishops’ synods (2014 and 2015) on marital love and human relationships fit this picture. Very significant might be, in this regard, the canonization of John XXIII, without the need of a second miracle, on 27 April 2014 (and this in conjunction with the canonization of John Paul II).

Acknowledgements This book is a slightly modified English translation of Theologie in dialoog: op het kruispunt van universiteit, kerk en samenleving. Over dialoog, verschil en katholieke identiteit (Kalmthout: Pelckmans, 2014). For further references to the original publication of parts or first versions of the text, I refer to the acknowledgements (‘Verantwoording’) mentioned in this book (p. 259–261).

Index Note: page locators followed by ‘n’ indicate notes section

Abts, K. 34 n.1, n.5, 38 n.14 Adorno, Th. 47 Alberigo, G. 18 n.9 Anselm of Canterbury 1, 92, 122, 129 Aristotle 3 n.2 Augustin, G. 29 n.47 Augustine, A. 47, 92, 122, 128 n.7, 226 Balthasar, H.-U. von 224 Beinert, W. 112 n.2 Benedict XVI (Pope), see Ratzinger, J. Benjamin, W. 47 Bergoglio, J. see Francis (Pope) Bieringer, R. 27 n.32, 230 n.23 Billiet, J. 34 n.5 Boeve, L. 16 n.3, 27 n.32, 41 n.22, 48 n.27, 51 n.33, 52 n.34, 53 n.35, 71 n.22, 148 n.14, 163 n.6, 200 n.1, 203 n.3, 213 n.13, 228 n.20, 230 n.24, 231 n.25 Boff, L. 232 n.29 Bonaventure 226–227 Bonino, S.-Th. 81 n.3 Bouwens, J. 176 n.2, 177 n.4, n.5, 182 n.12, 192 n.19 Bulckens, J. 209 n.10 Burigana, R. 18 n.9 Butler, S. 81 n.3 Caputo, J. 50 Castellano, A. 81 n.3 Claeys, J. 177 n.5 Clooney, F. 82–84 Conway, E. 68 n.19 Cornille, C. 149 n.16 Dalai Lama 39 Dawkins, R. 59 n.6, 148 n.12 De Boeck, E. 148 n.14

De Dijn, H. 213 n.13 Denaux, A. 81 n.2, 90 n.11 Dennett, D. C. 59 n.6, 148 Depoortere, F. 50 n.32 Derrida, J. 50 De Wolf, A. 163 n.6 Dobbelaere, K. 34 n.1, 34 n.3–5, 35 n.7, 36 n.8, n.10, 37 n.11, 38 n.12, n.14, 39 n.15, 40 n.21 Don Bosco 172 Donk, W. van de 179 n.7, 204 n.5 Drobinski, M. 232 n.29 Elchardus, M.

34 n.4

Festinger, L. 223, 223 n.2 Feurbach, L. 47 Fisher, J. 83 n.7 Fletcher Hill, J. 82 n.4, 83–84 Florit, E. 16, 17 n.5 Forte, B. 81 n.3 Francis of Assisi 172 Francis (Pope) 6, 12, 217, 220–221, 233 Franken, L. 205 n.6 Gadamer, H.-G. 47 Gaillardetz, R. R. 66 n.15 Gauchet, M. 198 Gilson, E. 3 n.2 Godzieba, A. 232 n.29 Griffiths, P. 82 n.4, 84 Groof, J. de 179 n.7, 204 n.5 Habermas, J. 47, 49 Harris, S. 59 n.6 Heidegger, M. 47 Hettema, T. L. 52 n.34 Hilberath, J. 18 n.9, 231 n.25 Hintersteiner, N. 148 n.15

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Index

Hinze, B. 66, 100 n.29, 231 n.28 Hoping, H. 18 n.9, 19 n.13, 20 n.14, 26 n.30, 29 n.41, 231 n.25 Hünermann, P. 18 n.9, 66, 231 n.25 Ignatius of Loyola 172 Ivanĉić, T. 81 n.3 John XXIII (Pope) 18, 95 n.22, 234 n.33 John Paul II (Pope) 11, 67 n.18, 79, 86–87, 92, 104, 112, 115, 119, 229, 234 n.33 Kearney, R. 50, 51 n.33 Keersmaekers, P. 182 n.12 Kehl, M. 29 n.47 Kenis, L. 27 n.32, 230 n.23 Kerkhofs, J. 34 n.2–3, 38 n.14 Kern, W. 19 n.13 Komonchak, J. A. 18 n.9 Krämer, K. 29 n.47 Küng, H. 47

Newberg, A. B. 148 n.13 Nietzsche, F. 47 Norris, Th. 81 n.3 Örsy, L. M. 29 n.42, 65 n.14 Ottaviani, A. 17 Philip Neri 172 Pius XII (Pope) 23 n.20 Pollefeyt, D. 148 n.14, 158 n.3, 176, 177 n.4–5, 182, 192 n.19, 205 n.6, 209 n.11, 213 n.13 Post, P. 147 Pottmeyer, H. J. 19 n.13 Quisinsky, M. 107 n.35

Lamberigts, M. 27 n.32, 48 n.27, 71 n.22, 230 n.23 Lambkin, M. 50 n.32 Le Gendre, O. 198 Levinas, E. 50 Liesen, J. 81 n.3 Lombaerts, H. 200 n.1 Loobuyck, P. 204, 205 n.6 Luhmann, N. 40, 44 Lyotard, J.-F. 48–49, 59, 60 n.7, 142 n.6

Rahner, K. 19 n.12, 47, 193 Ratzinger, J. 11–12, 15–18, 16 n.3, 17 n.7, 18 n.10, 19 n.11–12, 20, 22 n.18, 23–26, 25 n.26, 26 n.29, n.31, 27 n.33–34, 28–31, 28 n.39–40, 29 n.42, 31 n.49, 31 n.52, 32 n.53, 62 n.9, 67 n.18, 87, 91, 112 n.2, 172, 220–224, 224 n.5–6, 225 n.8–9, 225 n.11–12, 226–233, 226 n.13–14, 227 n.17–18, 228 n.19–20, 231 n.26, 232 Rezsohazy, R. 34 n.2 Ricoeur, P. 24, 27 n.35, 45, 47, 50 Riecken, H. 223 n.2 Rodger, P. C. 96 n.23 Rouhana, P. 81 n.3

McDonnell, K. 29 n.47 McGuinness, M. 83 n.7 McLeod, S. A. 222 n.1, 223 n.3 McPartlan, P. 81 n.3 Mannion, G. 16 n.3 Marion, J.-L. 50 Marx, K. 47 Merici, A. 172 Messori, V. 28 n.39, 30 n.48, 91 n.12, 228 n.19 Melchior Cano 93 Metz, J.-B. 47, 71 n.24 Miller, V. 75 n.26 Muratore, S. 112 n.2

Saines, D. 213 n.12 Sander, H.-J. 56 n.1 Sandfuchs, W. 28 n.40 Santedi Kinkupu, L. 81 n.3 Savio Hon Tai-Fai 81 n.3 Schachter, S. 223 n.2 Schelkens, K. 17 n.5–7 Schillebeeckx, E. 27 n.33, 47, 148 n.11 Schreurs, N. 58 n.5 Schrijvers, J. 50 n.31 Seckler, M. 19 n.13 Seewald, P. 228 n.19 Sobrino, J. 66–67, 98 Söding, Th. 81 n.3

Index Sorge, B. 112 n.2 Stosch, K. von 82 n.4, 83 Szymik, J. 81 n.3 Thomas Aquinas 3 n.2, 47, 116, 122, 135, 139 Tomko, J. 29 n.45, 231 n.26 Tracy, D. 70 n.21, 140 n.3 Uytterhoeven, T.

59 n.6

Vandecasteele, P. 52 n.34 Van Kerckhoven, M. 182 n.12 Vanspeybroeck, K. 177 n.5, 182 n.12

Ven, H. van der 147 Verhavert, M. 163 n.6 Verheyden, J. 52 n.34 Verschueren, J. 191 n.18 Vischer, L. 96 n.23 Voyé, L. 34 n.1, 34 n.3, 34 n.5, 35 n.7, 38 n.14 Walter, P. 29 n.47, 107 n.35 Westphal, M. 50 Wisse, M. 71 n.22 Wittgenstein, L. 47 Wojtyla, K. see John Paul II (Pope) Woodward, K. 112

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