Themistius: On Aristotle Physics 1-3 9781472552457, 9780715639221

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Conventions []: square brackets enclose words or phrases that have been added to the translation for purposes of clarity; these will not include words that are obviously understood in an inflected language in which unspecified references are more frequent. : angle brackets enclose conjectures relating to the Greek text, i.e. additions to the transmitted text deriving from parallel sources and editorial conjecture, and transposition of words or phrases. Accompanying notes provide further details. (): round brackets, besides being used for ordinary parentheses, contain transliterated Greek words. For abbreviations see the Bibliography, but note that the abbreviations used for Aristotelian works and for the ancient commentaries are those listed in the inaugural volume of this series and followed in its other volumes; see Wildberg, 12-17 and 34-5.

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Introduction This is the final volume of the first English translation,1 and of the first translation into a modern language, of the paraphrase of Aristotle’s Physics by Themistius (AD c. 317-c. 388).2 This paraphrase (as it is called in its headings; the author himself never uses the term)3 is also the first extant treatment in comprehensive form of this Aristotelian work, though it has predecessors within the Peripatetic tradition in the exegetical writings of Eudemus (later fourth century BC), Theophrastus (372-286 BC), Boethus of Sidon (mid-first century BC) and, above all, Alexander of Aphrodisias (fl. c. AD 200), ‘the exegete’, on whose commentary, which is no longer extant, Themistius relied heavily.4 Also, within the Platonic tradition it is preceded by a commentary by Porphyry (AD 234-c. 305), though there is only indirect evidence that Themistius knew and used it.5 The other authors mentioned are all cited and discussed by him elsewhere in the paraphrase,6 though in that dealing with Physics 1-3 only Boethus is explicitly cited (at 26,20-4). Themistian paraphrasing, to which there are few significant parallels in philosophical literature before the Byzantine period, varies from one Aristotelian work to another, particularly with regard to the omissions and rearrangements of the text, digressions, and the degree of detail, whether critical, exegetical or historical, introduced into restatements and reconstructions.7 The first three books of the Physics elicit a paraphrase in which overall the length of the original is doubled,8 with the Themistian response typically being not a simple summary or epitome but a definition of the sense of the Aristotelian original9 expressed in an authorial voice that mostly purports to be that of Aristotle himself (see nn. 16-17 below) offering, as it were, an alternative and usually more expansive version of his own text.10 To say that we see Aristotle unpacking himself would not be an unfair description of much of the Themistian project. The topics addressed in Physics 1-3 are varied. The first two books can arguably be considered a unity11 since they review the principles of natural change historically and critically before supplanting them with an account that lies at the heart of Aristotelian metaphysics in its deployment of the concepts of matter, form, substrate and privation. It is the metaphysics of form and matter that define in 2.1-2 the general conception of nature and prescribe its treatment in observational and

1

2

Introduction

theoretical science. There follow the famous theory of the four causes (2.3 and 2.7) complemented with an analysis of exceptions to standard causality built around the notions of luck and spontaneity (2.4-6), along with case studies of teleology in nature (2.8) and the role of necessity in the explanation of natural change (2.9). Book 3 falls into two parts: a challenging general analysis of change (2.1-3) and a pioneering exploration of the infinite (or ‘the unlimited’, as it will be translated here) which again contains a critical look at the pre-Aristotelian history of philosophy. There are two significant digressions. One (11,36-12,24) is an expansive note on Phys. 1.3, 186b35-187a3, a general description of responses to Parmenides’ arguments, which Themistius uses as a platform for a critical analysis of the specific responses offered by Xenocrates and Plato. The other, which is overtly identified as a digression, is a splendidly succinct statement of the distinction between prime matter (of which Themistius was one of several ancient adherents) and the ‘underlying subject’ (hupokeimenon) (25,24-27,13; cf. the brief reprise at 87,16-24) integrated with an analysis of the role of privation in change, and developed as a response to the analysis of change in Physics 1.7. It almost certainly reproduces a similar exercise in Alexander’s commentary and its inclusion may reflect Themistius’ curriculum in which some, if not all, of the logical treatises seem to have been studied before the Physics,12 which was in turn complemented by paraphrases, still extant, of the de Caelo and Metaphysics 12 (Lambda) and other works, though not of the whole of the Metaphysics. This digression may therefore have served to lay the general foundations for the study of the physical treatises and as a general introduction to metaphysics. In addition, the accounts of methodology in Phys. 1.1 and of change in Phys. 3.1-3 are of some particular interest and value. Otherwise, this paraphrase is a fundamentally orthodox treatment of the Aristotelian material unrelieved by much in the way of historical or critical perspectives. Apart from Boethus, mentioned above, discussions of historical figures not mentioned at all in the Aristotelian text are confined to Epicurus (100,6-11) and Xenocrates (12,6-12), while the extensive material on the Presocratics, especially in Phys. 1.2-4, is reproduced and rationalized rather than supplemented, as it later famously was by Simplicius.13 As in the two previous volumes, I have correlated Aristotelian texts with portions of the Themistian material. This device is designed to ease consultation though it in fact distorts the author’s goal of having his recreation of Aristotle read continuously by someone familiar with the Aristotelian text.14 Indeed the originality of this work, which later earned the respect of Simplicius (AD c. 490-560) and Philoponus (AD c. 490-570) who cite it explicitly and implicitly,15 may lie principally in its creation of a fluent sequence of thought in which the author impersonates Aristotle in order to display interconnections rather than

Introduction

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self-consciously and often laboriously explain them, as do those commentators whose exegeses were constructed around lemmata.16 This impersonation, which was first clearly identified in Byzantine Aristotelianism,17 was applied more fully and more successfully by Themistius to philosophical texts than by any predecessor or successor.18 As a result its use of the first-person singular and plural can be ambiguous, since Themistius does not overtly distinguish himself from the author he is impersonating. A paraphrasist also cannot consider wider issues such as the relationship of the immediate text to other Aristotelian works or the internal structure of the work being considered. His end-product is an Aristotelian text upgraded to allow ambitious readers to advance to more elaborate exegetical material and leave less ambitious readers (apparently the target audience) with better access to the details of the text. The commentator’s identification with Aristotle makes him unquestionably pro-Aristotelian and certainly the last who could be so described, though he may not be, as he has been called, ‘the last Peripatetic’,19 if that phrase implies an adherence to a school of any kind, or any systematic continuation of the Aristotelian tradition. Themistius was for the first part of his life a semi-professional teacher of philosophy with inherited wealth and a rather high-minded attitude to his calling,20 and therefore under no obligation to represent any particular viewpoint or to pursue his calling in response to social or institutional pressures. Aristotle’s works may have been simply the most convenient way of providing instruction, both in the oral teaching of which traces arguably remain in the paraphrases,21 and in the paraphrases themselves. This functional approach in the persona of an Aristoteles redivivus makes it impossible to call him in any sense a Platonist, or Neo-platonist.22 There are indeed traces of Platonism in the paraphrases, notably in linguistic borrowings which include Neoplatonic language in one particular area (his account of the intellect),23 but, as material translated in the present volume shows, he also reproduces Aristotle’s criticisms of Plato without comment and in one instance even offers an independent critique of the coherence of Platonic metaphysics (see 12,12-24). If he was in any sense a Platonist, this philosophical identity has to be assigned him in the face of a statement by a later and indisputable Neoplatonist Simplicius that he might on occasion side with Plato but did so mostly with the Peripatos (in Cael. 69,9-10).24 Text and translation25 The translation is based on the text edited in the CAG by Heinrich Schenkl (1859-1919), the would-be editor of the Themistian orations. The inadequacies in his engagement with Themistius’ philosophical material have been noted in the introductions to the two previous

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Introduction

volumes of this translation: imperfect punctuation, poor choices among variant readings,26 a failure to take adequate account of the superior textual criticism contained in the 1866 edition by Leonhard von Spengel (1803-80), a cluttered apparatus doubling as an apparatus criticus and a collection of often loosely identified parallels in the commentaries of Simplicius and Philoponus; and an unavoidable reliance on obsolete editions of the Aristotelian text. I have therefore once again had to make a large number of changes in the text, some unavoidably provisional or functional, all regrettably presented in transliterated Greek and attached to a translation rather than a text. No translator should have had to spend this much time and effort on textual criticism27 or to have had to make more changes in punctuation than could possibly be recorded.28 Themistius’ text also raises special problems partly because it may have been systematically corrupted through its use as an ancillary work in Byzantine Aristotelian studies in their revival in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries.29 In a number of places the text, even allowing for the expansive nature of paraphrasing, may have admitted glosses.30 In their original composition too these paraphrases, despite any plan by the author to produce fluent and continuous expositions, were also the end-product of anthologizing and epitomizing from earlier authors (Alexander in particular), and probably from the author’s own exegetical notes (cf. Or. 23, 89,21-90,5 DN) as well as material that may have been inherited from his family31 and used in his teaching (see n. 22). These multiple sources may explain variations in style between elliptical note-like passages and more eloquent ones that reflect those rhetorical skills that would ensure his later political career.32 As for the translation, its main challenge, beyond that of achieving accuracy without being unduly literal, has been to cope with key terminology, and I can only hope that my equivalents, not all of which are standard, are at least not misleading. There is some inconsistency with the other volumes of this translation, a consequence perhaps of this project not having been originally intended to be a complete translation, and of its having been spread over more than a decade. I have also been more sparing in the use of square brackets in response to some very reasonable criticisms from readers; see the Conventions above. Notes 1. Its predecessors are Todd (9) and Todd (11), covering Book 4 and Books 5-8 respectively. 2. On Themistius in general see Todd (10), Kupreeva (forthcoming), and Schamp, Todd and Watt (forthcoming). On the Latin translation by Ermalao Barbaro of 1481 see Todd (10), 91-3. 3. Simplicius uses the term paraphrasis (perhaps derived just from the headings) in some of his references to Themistius; see his in Cael. 176,33 and 188,30, and in Phys. 70,32; 1130,4; and 1132,26. At in Cael. 176,32-4 Themis-

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tius’ paraphrasis is contrasted with Alexander’s exêgêsis. The same contrast is developed by the fourteenth-century Byzantine commentator Sophonias at in DA (CAG 23:1) 1,5-21, in a proem discussed by Bydén, 233-6. Golitsis (2), 640-2, and Ierodiakonou, 164-6. 4. It left extensive traces in Simplicius’ commentary on the Physics (see Moraux [3], 129-80) and elsewhere (see Rashed [2], forthcoming). Themistius’ dependency on it can be inferred from material in Simplicius; see the index locorum under ‘Alexander ap. Simplicium’. 5. On this commentary add the discussion by Karamanolis, 270-7 to the literature at Todd (11), 7 n. 31. 6. See the references in the indices to Todd (9) and (11). 7. Themistius’ own account of his methodology is highly programmatic. See his in An. Post. 1,2-2,4 and in DA 1,2-11 with Todd (9), 2-5; also on the first of these see Achard, 24-5 and on the second Bydén, 227-9. On his general procedure see also Roberts, 54-5, who cites two closely related but very brief Byzantine descriptions of Themistian method: John the Deacon at Rabe, 141 and Gregory of Corinth at Walz, vol. 7:2, 1294. 8. The ratio of paraphrase to text in these three books is 2.18, 1.84 and 2.27 (as calculated by C.S. Morrissey). 9. Themistius himself uses nous in this sense at Or. 23, 89,25 DN, in a description of some early notes that he composed, not presumably the paraphrases themselves but probably a draft of some kind. See also Sophonias in DA 1,13-15 for nous contrasted with lexis, the verbal content of the Aristotelian text, in a general description of paraphrasing. On this contrast in general see Golitsis, 56-7. 10. This means that the original text is thoroughly integrated into the paraphrase and so it would be misguided, as well as incredibly difficult, to separate the Aristotelian components from paraphrastic accretions, though Federigo Bonaventura tried in his translation of Themistius in DA 3.4-13 (Urbino, 1627); see Todd (10), 81-4. This does not preclude Themistius at times referring to the language of the text. In the material translated here see 58,24-5 and 94,15-16. 11. See the note on 35,2-3. 12. See the notes on 1,13-14; 4,26 and 9,10. See also Themist. Or. 21, 36,19-37,8 DN for an informal insight into his range of studies. For his appreciation of Aristotelian logic see Or. 26, 132,15-133,5 DN, where he uses the term organon (132,15) to describe it. This may reflect that term’s use as a title for the collection of Aristotle’s logical treatises which, if Solmsen, 72 is right, was due to the efforts of Porphyry and Iamblichus in the generation before Themistius. 13. See Baltussen, 54-87. The brief aside on Democritus at 89,6-10 is not really an exception. See also the note on 2,30. 14. See his in An. Post. 1,10-12. 15. See Golitsis, 59 with n. 74 and 69 on respectively Philoponus’ and Simplicius’ use of Themistius in their commentaries on the Physics. 16. Aristotle is mentioned by name only once, at 98,19 in a reference to a later discussion, and implicitly at 9,12 and 96,12. In lemmatized commentaries, on the other hand, there is almost a formulaic statement after the quotation of the lemma along the lines of ‘having said this (in the previous lemma), Aristotle now says this (in the present lemma)’, a criterion that can help address Abbamonte’s concern (at 252-4) about the procedures of lemmatized commentaries relative to paraphrases. 17. See Sophonias in DA 1,11-22 (see n. 3 above), and for the general principle

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Introduction

see the earlier Michael Psellus as cited from a rare edition of his paraphrase of the de Interpretatione by Ierodiakonou, 165 n. 31. 18. If not the originator of this method, Themistius was the only one to exploit it significantly in antiquity, though Silvia Fazzo has now argued that in Nicolaus the Peripatetic (hitherto assigned to early the first century AD) he had a contemporary practitioner of Aristotelian paraphrasis in the eastern empire. For a later example preserved in the semitic tradition see Arnzen. 19. See Blumenthal passim. 20. See Or. 23, 82,15-19 and 82,26-83,4 DN for some remarks that suggest this attitude towards teaching. 21. The frequent use of second person forms of address may reflect a teaching situation; see, for example, 9,10-11; 18,32; 19,30.32; 21,8.13.23; 28,17; 30,9.31; 86,1. Also, the frequent reformulation of the text in the form of questions and answers (e.g., 61,19-20 on Arist. 199a33), and even a mini-dialogue (39,25-40,3) to develop an interpretation, may point to the influence of the same milieu, as also references to the need for revision (58,13 and 74,10-11) and recall (7,13; 24,7), an aside about the level of preparation expected from readers (80,20-1), and a concern about attaining greater clarity (30,9). See also Todd (11), 5 n. 11. 22. To my comments at Todd (11), 6 n. 23, made with Ballériaux (1) and (2) in particular in mind, I would add Guldentops (4), 211-12 on Themistius’ neglect of the Timaeus in his paraphrases. Even allowing for paraphrastic brevity, this dialogue would have been an obvious source from which to develop Platonic positions in reacting to Aristotle’s Physics in particular. Guldentops (2), 335-6 also offers a measured general assessment of Themistius as someone who stands outside any firm doctrinal affiliation. 23. Ballériaux (1) and (2) sees things otherwise. In Ballériaux (3) he highlights Themist. Or. 23, 4,11-7,6 DN, a passage from a conventional funeral oration in which Themistius represents his father, Eugenius, as having used Aristotle as a propaedeutic to Plato, and as having seen Aristotle as deliberately obscuring his thought so that only deserving initiates could penetrate it. (The latter is a fanciful topos found later in Olympiodorus, Proleg. [CAG 12:1] 11,21-12,17 and Elias [David], in Cat. [CAG 18:1] 124,25-127,2). The Platonism indicated here seems to be that of the extant Platonic dialogues, while the idea that Aristotle was deliberately obscure (see also Themist. Or. 23, 89,26-7 DN and Or. 26, 132,11-14 DN; on the latter see During, 435-6 on its contrast with Aristotle’s ‘exoteric’ works) might have provided the general rationale for Themistius’ program of uncovering Aristotelian thought in his paraphrases. Certainly the catholicity shown by an amateur like Eugenius regarding Aristotle and Plato does not seem to represent an attempt to harmonize their doctrines systematically in the manner associated with Neoplatonic authors involved in major schools. If it was, it left no significant mark on his son’s paraphrases. 24. Sorabji at Todd (9), vii notes two cases where Themistius can be said to adopt a Platonic position: one involving qualifications on Aristotle’s empiricist account of concept formation (in DA 3,31-4,11; see Todd [7], 156 n. 28), another the use of Platonic forms to criticize Aristotle on an issue in biological reproduction in his commentary on Metaphysics Lambda (CAG 5:5); see Henry for a detailed discussion. If one swallow does not make a summer (Arist. NE 1098a1819), then to be just less than 100% Aristotelian does not make a Platonist, let alone a Neoplatonist, especially where an independent philosophical operator like Themistius is involved. 25. Those who vetted my manuscript and others who assisted in the editorial process are thanked by name elsewhere in this volume. I am grateful to them

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for their help and input. The readers helped me improve the translation in innumerable ways, though the final product remains, of course, my responsibility. 26. The main manuscripts used by Schenkl, each a representative of the four main families into which he divided the tradition, were B (Breslau [Wroclaw] Magd. 1442; s. xiv), M (Modena, Biblioteca Estense a.M.9.13; s. xiv), L (Parisinus graecus 1891; s. xvi) and W (Marcianus graecus 205; s. xv), with some input from Laur. 85,14 and the Aldine edition (Venice, 1534). See Todd (8), where these manuscripts are respectively nos. 59, 36, 46, 56 and 30. His preference for readings in M is often questionable. 27. The notes on 17,8; 32,7; 46,8; and 55,18 offer a good illustration of Schenkl’s palaeographical limitations in his refusal to follow Spengel on purely technical points. 28. Schenkl, Praef. p. xxxviii, himself acknowledged that he had not adequately revised Spengel’s punctuation. The real issue here, however, is the complicated periodic structure that Themistius employs. Matino, 117-27 helpfully analyses several examples of this from the paraphrase of the de Anima. Despite appearances (especially in translation) Themistius does employ stylistic devices in the paraphrases, see, for example, the anaphora at 28,2-3; 33,2-3; 82,20-1; 89,7-8 and 97,2-3. 29. See Todd (11), 4, with n. 48 where I note that the superior Arabic version of Themistius in DA is indirect evidence for this development. 30. See the notes on 5,12; 8,15; 10,8; 23,17; 35,9-10; 35,15; 37,29; 40,5; 41,17-18; 42,29; 47,10; 54,26-7; 60,30; 62,2; 63,25; 64,14; 67,17; 72,12-13; 93,24; 100,7-8. It is difficult in many of the cases to know whether to divine a gloss or accept the text. 31. See Todd (11), 2 n. 23. 32. See, for example, 45,14-27 where a listing of the four causes has elliptical ‘bullets’ introducing each item without a main verb, and the elliptical doxography at 17,28-18,1. For a purple passage with anaphora and two striking metaphors see 82,20-3.

Textual Emendations These items include only changes in wording which in most cases are explained more fully in the notes to the translation, where major changes in punctuation are also listed. The present inventory is mainly intended as a prompt to those notes and to Schenkl’s apparatus criticus. In citing Spengel’s emendations I have not distinguished between those that he admitted into his text and the conjectures that he presented in his apparatus. All unattributed emendations are my own. Book 1 1,1 1,13 2,5 2,7

1,2

3,28 4,2 4,30 5,5 5,21 5,28 5,32 6,12

for ei read aei (Philop. in Phys. 10,11) remove the obelus on tarakteon for prosiêi read prosioi (Spengel)

after ên supply an for the lacuna read with MS L panta de mêniskon hoion tetragônizein labein eis houtô de] read houtô kai (Spengel) before peperasmenon supply to after ta sômata supply de aporon] read apora before oikias supply epi delete ptênon

1,3 7,18 7,27 8,10 8,15-16 8,29 9,1 9,12 10,7 10,8 10,14 11,26

before gar supply men delete tên khthes hêmeran (MS L; fort. W) an] read au delete êtoi kinêsin for ti (MS M) read toi (toi MSS WBL) ei to] read ei ti (Spengel) ephê] read ephên (Spengel) palaiôi] read poliôi (cf. Plat. Parm. 127B2) delete estô before hoper supply to oute gar] read houtô gar

10 11,29 12,14 12,28 13,3 13,6

1,4

13,27 14,5 14,25 15,1 15,2 15,18 15,22 15,23 16,6 16,22 17,1 17,2 17,8 17,13 17,21 17,23

Textual Emendations emparalimpanô] read men paralimpanô (Spengel) ôieto ho logos] read ôieto ton logon (Spengel) sunkhôrêsanta] read sunkhôrêsantas delete phêsin before hoper on supply to

Anaxagorâi  labousa] read Anaxagoras  labôn (Spengel) akolouthein] read akolouthei euporêsomen] read euporêsaimen (Spengel) before to holon supply kai (MSS BL) before tou sunthetou supply epi sarkôn] read sarkiôn sarkôn] read sarkiôn delete ek tessarôn epilêpseie] read epilêpsei (Spengel) platus] read polus for sunkekrimena (Schenkl) read sunkrimata (MSS WBL) delete for ê read kai (Spengel) to dia touto oiesthai] delete to dia touto and for oiesthai read oietai after epoiei supply an before ex aeros supply to

1,5 18,1 18,3 18,10 18,15 18,17 18,20 19,7 19,22 20,14 20,22

hôste] read hôsper tauta (= ta auta)] read tauta (Arist. 188a24) before panta delete ta (Arist. 188a28) hoper] read haper ou gar] read oukh metaballei (MS M)] read metaballoi (MSS WBL) before hapantos supply eph’ antiphasis] read apophasis (Philop. in Phys. 120,2; 114,31) legoimen] read legomen (MS Laur. 85,14; Spengel) after hustera delete de

1,6 21,4 21,7-8 21,18 21,20-1 22,3

after houtô supply gar allôs te] read hôste (Spengel) diatithen] read diatethen hupokhôrei] read hupokhôroien autê (MSS MWB)] read hautê (MS L)

1,7 23,17 23,17

legomen] read legômen delete katholou

Textual Emendations 23,22 23,24 24,2-3 25,5 25,5 25,26 25,27 25,29 26,2 27,22 29,20

1,8

29,22

1,9

31,28 32,3 32,30 33,16 33,29 34,4

second legômen (MS M post. corr.)] read legomen (MSS) gignetai] read gignesthai after sumplexantes supply eipomen (MSS WBL) hê de dê (Schenkl)] read hede dê (MSS BL) before huphistamenon supply to (MSS WBL) ex autou] read ex hautês ê] read einai ho (MSS WBL) ekhei] read ekhoi houtôs] read oukh hôs autê] read hautê (MS L) anakeisthô] read apokeisthô (cf. Arist. 192b1)

legomen] read legômen (Arist. 191a24)

eliminate the lacuna; hosoi men toinun] read hosoi men to on hen before oukh hikanôs read all’ (MSS WBL) phthoropoion] read kakopoion (MS. L; Arist. 192a15) ekhei] read ekhoi (MS. L post. corr.; editio Aldina) auto] read autêi (MSS WBL) esti] read estai (Arist. 192a33)

Book 2 2,1 35,5 35,5 35,11 35,14 35,15 35,16 35,17 36,6 36,7 36,12 35,17 36,21 37,2 37,14 37,15 37,19 37,29 38,28 38,31-2 38,32

11

delete bathron transpose stratêgia to follow heuresis en autois] read en hautois en autois] read en hautois (Spengel) delete metabatikês ex autôn] read ex hautôn en autois] read en hautois before hoson supply kath’ (cf. 35,19) pro tês neôs] read pro tês neôs dio] read dia touto (MSS BL) en autois] read en hautois kath’ hauto (MS M)] read kath’ hauta (MSS WBL; cf. Arist. 192b31) kath’ hauto (MS M)] read kath’ hauta (MSS WBL) touto] read houtô pêros] read tuphlos (Arist. 193a7; MS W) kathoran] read kathorôiê (Spengel) delete kaleitai phusis before tekhnikon supply to (Arist. 193a32) hoionei] read hoion hê (MS L) before ostoun supply sarx energeiâi (Schenkl)

12 39,3 39,4 39,13 39,19 39,19 40,5 40,5 40,5 40,13

Textual Emendations after hekaston supply katho] read kath’ ho ekhei] read ekhein (Spengel) before xulon delete to (Arist. 193a14) ginetai de] read de ginetai delete tês iatrikês delete oukh before hôs supply legomenê (Arist. 193b13) hê genesis haplê (MS M)] read he genesis hê haplê (MSS WBL)

2,2 40,15 40,16 41,2 41,17 41,18 41,22 41,29 42,3 42,4 42,29 42,32 42,32 43,19 44,1 44,3

sômati] read sômasi (Spengel; Simpl. in Phys. 290,34) ê] read all’ after houtôs supply ekhei (Simpl. in Phys. 292,6) delete kai anthrôpou ê] read kai after grammên delete gar before mêde kat’ epinoian supply mête kata logon (Philop. in Phys. 224,20) first to] read hê (Spengel) before simôi supply to delete hê genesis kai hê auxêsis before hou heneka supply to beltion] read beltiston (Arist. 194a33) melei] read mellei (MS B) delete ê exetazei] read exetasei

2,3 44,22 44,22 45,19 45,22 45,23 45,23-4 45,25 46,8 46,11 46,13 46,13 46,18 46,18 47,1 47,3 47,8 47,10

before prôtê supply hê (Arist. 194b29) after aitios supply tês praxeôs before to supply eis hola] read holon suntithemenois] read suntitheimenois eis triton de] read triton d’ eis (Spengel) before to supply eis ê] read kai ( Spengel) ex hou] read ex hôn before sumbebêkos supply hôs to (Arist. 195b14) after genos supply autou suntitheis] read suntetheis before ê supply mallon before energêsai supply to hôi] read ho (MSS WBL) after kath’ hekaston supply tôn kath’ hekaston ( Spengel) delete aitiatois

Textual Emendations 2,4 47,13 47,16 47,24 48,20

men] read men oun (MSS WB) (Schenkl)] read ti gar; ei (Schenkl) ei gar ei MSS] read kai gar ei (Spengel) ho] read hoti

2,5 50,22 50,28 50,28-9 52,10 52,25-6 53,9 53,9 53,10

2,6

54,11 54,15 54,20 54,25 54,26 55,3 55,15 55,16-17 55,16 55,17 55,18 55,19 55,23 56,18 56,26

anathemenois] read anathesthai after hôsautôs supply aei ouk] read oud’ (MS L) before tinos supply allou (cf. 52,6) to before komisasthai, plêgênai and theasasthai] read tôi theasamenos] read theasomenos (Spengel MS M post. corr.) ta] read ta legei] read legeis

before hois supply hen oute] read oude eis touto] read eis tauta epei] read ei tois allois tôn zoiôn alogois] delete allois; read tois alogois tôn zôion ou] read oude to telos (MS M)] read ta telê (MSS WBL) toutou huparkhontos] read touto huparkhon (Spengel) before matên supply to (Spengel) delete ti (MS L) ê] read kai (Spengel; Arist. 197b29) houtô de] read houtô dê before matên supply to gar] read dia before tukhês supply apo

2,7 57,15 57,24 57,24 58,6 58,11 58,23 58,25 59,3

after heneken supply hoion (Schenkl) remove the lacuna; after anthrôpon supply gennâi before autos supply ho (Arist. 198a27; MS L) before phusikos supply ho panteles] read pantelôs (Spengel) all’ hama] read all’ hen ê allôs] read kai mê allôs (cf. 58,21) tôi tetragôni de] read tôi de tetragôni

13

14

Textual Emendations

2,8 59,11 59,26 59,28 60,9 60,30 61,2-3 62,20 63,5 63,9

2,9

63,16 63,17 63,21 63,23 63,25 63,27 64,1 64,3 64,14 64,15 65,9 65,16 65,20 65,26 66,6 66,11 66,15 66,16-17

tode] read tadi before epitedeiôs supply hôste after Empedoklês supply legei (Arist. 198b32) huei] read huetô (Diels) before hugeian supply hoion (Simpl. in Phys. 378,8) kat’ amphoteras] read kat’ amphotera katorthountai (MSS MWB)] read katorthoutai (MS L) delete ho huphantês, ho laoxoos before thômen supply ean

haplôn] read haplôs delete en keisthai] read kineisthai (Spengel) after ton toikhon supply gegenêsthai (Arist. 200a1-2) pesontôn] read kinoumenôn oukh] read ou gar di’ autên] read di’ hautên touto] read tauta panti] read pantêi before hupokeisthai supply khrê tauta] read tautêi before huparkhousin supply oukh taxis] read praxis (Spengel) apephênen] read pephênen (Diels) after epei supply ei before tôn supply ti dunatai] read dunamei (Shorey) remove the comma after tinos (16); transpose and bracket ti antilupêseôs to follow it

Book 3 3,1

67,17 67,19 68,8 68,31 69,7 70,11-12 71,2 71,21

3,2

72,23 72,27

tauta] read talla legomen] read legômen delete deuteron esti ti] read esti te (MS L) kinêtou] read ontos tosautên (MSS MWB)] read toiautên (MS L) first an] read on (MS W) delete kai to horaton (Spengel); retain ê

autoi] read hautôi first de] read men

Textual Emendations 73,2 74,3 74,30 75,1 75,11 75,11

3,3

76,17 76,24 76,24 77,1 77,14 77,28 78,8 78,26

doxeie] read doxeien oute] read oude delete dia touto oun paskhein] read antipaskhein (MS L; Philop. in Phys. 367,26) ekinêthê] read kinetheiê before pros ti supply ta

first to] read tôi (MS W; Spengel) before energeian supply mian kinêtikou] read poiêtikou after en tôi kinoumenôi supply kai paskhonti (Arist. 202a26) delete pou before kai read alla (MS W) tosouton] read hôste touton huparxei] read huparkhoi

3,4 79,15 79,18 79,22 80,1 81,4 81,12 81,13 81,29-30 81,31 82,5 82,8 82,15-16 82,18 82,18 82,18

3,5

82,31 83,2-3 83,9 83,22 83,25 83,25 83,26 84,2 84,5 84,5 84,5

an] read an eiê (MSS WBL; Arist. 202b34) before apeirou supply tou (Arist. 203a3) delete en tôi apeirôi delete gar toioutois de akolouthei kai autos Demokritos arkhesthai] read akolouthei kai autois arkhesthai (Spengel) after ei supply mê oute] read oude before peras delete to prosiesthai] read proiesthai delete to after epi supply men (MS L) delete to; for allo te read allote after entautha supply ê entautha hôsper] read hôste (MS W; Arist. 203b27) ontôs] read houtôs

delete en hê hodos makra] read hê makra hodos (MS W) before apeiron supply to (Arist. 204a8) khôrista (Schenkl) akhôrista MSS] read akhôrista gar (MS L) after energeiai supply on (Arist. 204a21) transpose the second hôs to precede ousian (Arist. 204a21) touto] read to hê (Schenkl)] read ho (MSS WBL) before phusis supply hê to apeiron (del. Schenkl)] read tou apeirou delete apeiros

15

16 84,22 84,25 84,27 84,29 85,9 85,16-17 85,20 85,27 86,3 86,4 86,7 86,14-15 86,16 86,17 86,29-30 87,13 87,28 87,31 88,8 89,7 90,2 90,6 90,15 90,24 90,27

3,6

91,12 91,20 92,13 93,9 93,10 93,25 94,2 94,3 94,24 95,10 (and 95,12) 96,7

Textual Emendations apeiron] read atopôs (cf. Arist. 204a32) merizousi de (Schenkl); merizousi te (MSS)] read merizousin (Spengel) delete apeiron ei dê toi] read hêi ei de ti (Spengel) apeiron ara] read oud’apeiron ara (MS Laur. 85,14) diaphtheirei] read diaphtherei (MS W) dialuomen] dialuômen (MS W; Spengel) autous] read auton estai] read estô phtheirei] read phtherei delete ê (suppl. Schenkl) mê di’ henos (Schenkl) medenos (mss)] read mê henos (corr. MS L) eiê] read ekhei hôs] read hôn (Arist. 204b28) read alla kai, ei toutôn autôn, hen [de] stoikheion hôs sôma on êdê kat’ energeian, lêros polus. en tois enantiois] read en tôi enantiôi all’ hoti] read alla ti before holou supply tou delete gar and the colon after kinêsin Dêmokritos] read Dêmokritôi after emenen supply an menein] read menei ara kai to holon kai ta moria] read ara to holon kai ta moria diairein] read diaireis before apeiron supply to

pragma tôn (MS L)] read pragmatôn (MSS MWB) after legetai dê supply to einai (Arist. 206a14) tou] read to (Spengel) to tmêthen] read to lêphthen khronon hupolipein] read khronos hupoleipei delete dunatou to  apeiron] read tôi  apeirôi first to] read tôi delete ên (with MS W) panth’ homou] read pan th’ omou complement periekhoito and horizoito with an (Spengel)

3,7 96,18 96,27 97,10

oude] read ouden (MS W) dia tautên] read dia touto (Spengel) after hotan supply de (MS W, Spengel)

Textual Emendations 98,4 98,20

3,8

99,12 99,16 99,21 99,29 100,2 100,7-8 100,8 100,12 100,14 100,16 100,25 101,8 101,11

delete esti and for hapan to read apantâi goun (Schenkl; gar MSS)] read ge

before alêtheis supply heteras (cf. Arist. 205a7-8) pithanôs (MSS MB)] read pithanos (MSS WL) auto ti (Philop. in Phys. 484,31-485,1)] read hauto (auto MSS) autês] read allês oude] read kai gar (Simpl. in Phys. 516,26-7) ê to haptesthai] read ê tinos haptesthai (Usener) touto] read toutôn before the second labein supply aei deikteon] read eikteon before apeiron supply to theasthai] read theasthe before apo merous delete kai autê] read auto (MS B)

17

Themistius’ Paraphrase of Book One of Aristotle’s Physics 1

[Chapter 1. Discovering principles]2 1,2 (184a10-16) This work has the object of providing a science specific both to nature and to the things that come to be through its agency. Every human being easily comes to know these things without reasoning since all of us who have healthy sense-perception could say that water, a plant, and an animal are different things.3 But someone whose knowledge is going to be scientific must first get to know the principles of nature too.4 The arts that are more engaged in reasoning reveal this. For example, we say that experts in grammar are not those who hear words but those who can state the number of elements from which each word is composed,5 and again that experts in music are not those with an auditory perception of melodies but those who can separate melodies into tones and semitones. 1,11 (184a16-21)6 So how7 could we say anything about principles demonstratively?8 If demonstration is based on what is prior but we always inquired into the things that are prior, then our wish will be to discover principles for the principles.9 Priority, then, is twofold both as related to us and as related to nature.10 So what is prior in relation to us is what is more recognizable to us and what we might more easily grasp (e.g., words and syllables as prior to letters), while the things that are simpler in substance are prior in relation to nature (e.g., letters as prior to words). And the process is reversed:11 we analyse from compounds to things that are simpler but prior in relation to nature, whereas nature devises12 compounds from simple things. So when we produce (i) an account of compounds, we will demonstrate from things that are prior by nature, but when we produce (ii) an account of principles, it is from things that are prior in relation to us. And while (i) is demonstration in its primary sense, (ii), even if not so in a primary sense, still suffices for us. 2,3 (184a21-6) So there should be no confusion13 if we begin our account of the principles from some features that are common and belong to more than one thing, since it is from these that we shall take the path to the unique features. And the ones that are common are more recognizable to us than those that are unique,14 since they are, as it

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were, more compounded. And as with perceptible objects if an animal approaches,15 sight is going to apprehend the whole body more rapidly than the head, hands and feet (thus it would certainly sooner say that the approaching object is an animal than a human being),16 so among the features considered by reasoning those that are universal and common are more obvious to us than those that are proximate and unique, although the former are more undifferentiated17 than the latter, since to the intellect too the universal is like a whole, whereas what it encompasses are like parts.18 Orators also operate in this way by expounding the general headings before the features unique to each type.19 So too in the Analytics, the theory of the syllogism – demonstrative, dialectical and sophistic – is set out in advance,20 since by starting from the features common to each thing we more easily separate those that are unique and proximate.21 2,17 (184a26-b14) Also, the earliest appearances that we encounter are without articulation, i.e., derived from common features. Young children, for example, call all men fathers and all women mothers because they more easily grasp masculinity and femininity as common features before separately defining those unique to their parents.22 You could say that in a certain sense a name is also similarly related to a definition,23 and by a name I mean, for example, ‘human being’,24 and by a definition ‘terrestrial two-footed animal’: the first signifies in a comprehensive and undifferentiated way and can be applied to several different things ([e.g.], the human being in a painting and a sculpture),25 whereas a definition is like dividing the underlying substance into its parts.26 So this is where we must start from when we resume.27 [Chapters 2-4. Principles and predecessors] [Chapter 2] 2,27 (184b15-25) There must be one principle or more than one:28 if one, it must be either changing or unchanging and of either limited or unlimited size; if more than one, these too must also be either changing or unchanging, and either limited, or, conversely, unlimited in number. Some, like Anaxagoras29 and Democritus,30 in fact even posit an unlimited number of principles, but Democritus by supposing a single substance for the atoms produces variety merely through their shapes, whereas Anaxagoras has pairs of opposites31 within compounds made up of like parts32 ([e.g.], states of hot and cold, and white and black).33 And those who in the past theorized about things in general are diverged into still other doctrines, since they regarded the principles as existing and by looking for the number of existing things went on to look for the number of principles to be posited. 3,5 (184b25-185a5; 185a14-17)34 Parmenides and Melissus were surely an exception. When they said that what is (to on) is one and unchanging they were not saying that the principle was one and un-

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changing, since the principle, of course, draws several things to itself,35 indeed the same number of things as those of which it is a principle, given that a principle is relative to something and of given things. But saying that what is is also unchanging makes it obvious that they are not replacing the principle with what is, since how could something different come to be from a non-changing principle? Now arguing against these people is inappropriate for a natural scientist.36 Why so? Because, as I said, they eliminate the natural principles, indeed nature itself, by not positing change; no science can construct its own principles, not geometry lines and points, nor arithmetic units, but instead with these principles assumed scientists draw the conclusion implied. For on what basis could the natural scientist demonstrate that nature exists?37 On that of some natural principles? But then he will be postulating what he is looking for. On that of some different ones instead? But then he will not be giving a demonstration as a natural scientist. So if natural science has a science prior to itself, it will take its principles from it, as medicine does from natural science and optics from geometry.38 Otherwise it will use the procedure common to all the arts that is routed through reputable opinions. But by whichever of the two ways he proceeds, he will be providing an account not as a natural scientist but as a dialectician or philosopher.39 So a natural scientist is compelled to explain how many and what the principles of nature are, but as a natural scientist he does not have to explain whether nature exists at all.40 (185a14-16)41 But [Parmenides and Melissus] do not in fact eliminate nature explicitly, yet even without their saying so explicitly, this still is a consequence of what they do say, since anyone who does not concede change will also, of course, not concede the principle of change, and this is nature.42 So43 if by retaining the principles they perpetrated a fallacious inference, the natural scientist would44 consequently have to show how they are breaking the rules. If, however, they are eliminating the principles themselves through their slip-ups, then solving their arguments is inappropriate for someone pursuing science. Also, I mean, only false constructions that safeguard geometrical assumptions have to be solved by a geometer but those in conflict with them should be eschewed. (185a16-17) Take, for example two individuals who tried to square the circle: Hippocrates of Chios and Antiphon.45 A solution has to be found for Hippocrates’ [squared circle] since while safeguarding the principles he commits a fallacy by squaring only the lune46 drawn around the side of a square inscribed in a circle, 47 demonstration . On the other hand, the geometer could not rebut Antiphon48 who in inscribing an equilateral triangle in a circle and constructing another isosceles triangle on each of the sides at the circumference of the circle, and in doing this successively, thought that eventually the side of the last triangle, although a straight line, could coincide with the circumference. But this is to

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eliminate sub-division without limit, which the geometer takes as an assumption.49 4,8 (185a5-14; 17-20) So this was the first justification for rejecting the argument of Parmenides and Melissus, but50 the second is because the men’s doctrine is both implausible and paradoxical, since what difference is there between describing what is as one and describing what is as Dion,51 or in arguing against one of the other posits from those stated for argument’s sake, like Heraclitus’52 saying that opposites are identical? And the arguments that both men use are obviously disputatious since they import false premises and an invalid figure, Melissus’ being the more mundane in that he does not even produce any problem at all.53 All the same, since they say nothing about nature (how can they if they eliminate it?) but turn out to be stating problems concerning nature54 that arise from the void, the unlimited,55 and change, it may be a good idea to discuss them briefly. Even if their argument is inappropriate for the natural scientist it is still not alien to the philosopher. We shall rebut the men not to displace their doctrine and thereby posit nature and change (these we can assume because they are self-evident)56 but it is just for good measure57 that their claims must be tested, and first the actual doctrine itself aside from the arguments by which they try to establish it. 4,24 (185a20-32) The most relevant starting-point of all is to ask what does ‘what is’ signify for them. Do they think that it is said in many ways, or in only one? If in many ways, then, as we have demonstrated in the Categories,58 they would be saying that what is is one in name but many in subsistence,59 i.e., the objects [it refers to], since if there is going to be substance, quality and quantity, whether these are also dissociated from one another or have their being together with one another, then existing things will become many, even if one expression is predicated of them. But if it is said in one way, they will also be saying this60 by virtue of the object, i.e., what is signified, but if ‘what is’ signifies one object, it would signify it either as a genus, a species, or as undivided.61 But if said as a genus, then existing things are many; if as a species, likewise, since the genus and the species are predicated of several different things. So the only alternative is for what is to be one as undivided, like Callias, the horse Bucephalus, or this particular black thing.62 So will they say that this is a substance or an incidental property? 5,3 (185a32-185b5) They do think that it is an incidental property when one of them [sc. Melissus] says that it is unlimited, the other [sc. Parmenides] that it is limited,63 since what is unlimited and 64 limited are in the category of quantity, the former as untraversable quantity, the latter as determinate quantity. So if they predicate these of an underlying subject, they would be saying that existing things are two – substance and quantity. But if they do not apply quantity to any underlying subject, then without an underlying substance it also cannot thereby be an incidental property.65

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5,9 (185b5-9) Again, ‘one in number’ is also itself, just like ‘what is’, said in many ways. It is said to be ‘one in number’ either as continuous, as I might say that a line is one; or as what is naturally undivided, like a point and a moment;66 or as something that has one and the same definition in the way that a mantle and a cloak are said to be one.67 So in which of these three ways do they say that what is is one in number?68 5,14 (185b9-11)69 It is not as a continuous thing (it would be divided into many things, indeed into an unlimited number), since if they say that it is one because it is unified, they will be saying that, because it is divided, then in this respect it is many. But the part of the whole has to be taken as undivided when it is also said to be continuous in the same way in which it exists in actuality. But two criticisms: (i) they draw no distinction at all between what is in actuality and what is potential;70 and (ii) (let them concede this) they will at least agree that what is continuous and unified is made up not only of like parts but in most cases of unlike parts too, and I mean71 the bodies of animals and plants, since their parts are also unified and not combined like a heap.72 So why, if a part of a line is one and the same as the line because of not being a divided part of the whole line, will Socrates’ hand not also be the same as Socrates, and his foot likewise (they do have the same definition)? But if both are the same as the same thing, then they are, of course, the same as one another.73 So the foot, hand, eye and belly will be the same thing! 5,26 (185b11-16)74 This area of inquiry met with a special argument among the early thinkers75 as to whether a part is the same as the whole, or different, since it runs into problems76 derived from each limb. If it is the same, then this is what was just said;77 but if different, then the part is also the whole of itself, since it is not the case that one part is different but not another,78 but all of them are similarly different from the whole and all are the whole. And if you apply the argument to what is composed of divided parts, the same problems will be confronted as, for example, 79 a house or a chorus, (the solution is given elsewhere), since it is not true that, if, when taken in isolation, each of their parts is different from the whole, then if they are also all taken simultaneously, they also become different from the whole because of this, given that the sum total is different from each of the [parts] in it, yet the sum total is the whole.80 So be it. 6,1 (185b16-19) But while they are not for these reasons going to say that what is is one in the sense of continuous yet perhaps it is so as undivided. So a unit or a point will be everything that exists – earth, sea, heavens81 – and what could be more astounding than that? But how will they leave a quality in a point, when in a thing without parts there is neither a structure nor the result of being affected? And quantity too is gone for them, since a point is not a quantity but the limit of a quantity and what is is neither unlimited nor limited. But the latter are what they themselves predicate of what is.82 Furthermore, the limit, not what

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is limited, is undivided. But if what is is undivided like a limit, clearly so too is what it is a limit of, and that will be imported along with it since a limit exists in relation to something and always along with something else. 6,10 (185b19-25) Still, if the sum total is one in the way that mead and wine are,83 it follows that they are stating Heraclitus’ theory [that opposites are identical], since in their case plant and human being, and good and bad,84 will be identical in the definition of their substance when they are unqualified opposites. And thus negation also is jointly true,85 since if being white and being black are identical, then white and not white will be the same, given that black is not white. But if affirmation and negation are the same, why will they not also say that what is is what is not, and what is one is not one, and thus be rashly devising something more absurd when they posit what is one not as one but as nothing at all? 6,17 (185b25)86 So if we make the following statements, ‘Socrates is wisdom-loving’ and ‘Socrates is two cubits tall’,87 are we signifying the same thing in both statements or is it a farce88 to believe that the quality is by definition the same as the quantity?89 So if someone asked us ‘How according to you will Socrates be one when you say that he is snubnosed, two cubits tall, and wisdom-loving (for Socrates will not without further qualification be a plurality for you but you will be completely removing what is one from him and will instead be conceding that Socrates is both one and many)?,’90 how will our refutation derived from the contradiction not also be converted against us?91 For in this way too the same thing will simultaneously become both one and not one. 6,25 (185b25-32) This argument so bothered Lycophron92 and the later generation of pioneers that Lycophron, by believing that only those things are of which ‘is’ is predicated, used to predicate ‘is’ of a substance (e.g., ‘Socrates is’), but if one of the incidental properties were predicated of him, then to prevent Socrates from becoming many things 93 both white and two cubits tall’, curing one fault by another94 by eliminating the [subject-predicate] proposition, i.e., the assertoric statement.95 Plato,96 on the other hand, restructured the statement97 [‘Socrates is white’] by saying ‘he has turned white’ instead of ‘he is white’.98 7,4 (185b32-186a3) But we say (i) the same thing can be one and not one, but (ii) not so in the same respect or at the same time. (ii) is by any measure inconceivable, but (i) is both true and possible, viz. that this same Socrates is one in terms of the underlying subject but several things in terms of his definition,99 since (a) ‘he is educated’ is one statement (b) ‘he is two cubits tall’ another.100 So (a) and (b) are not contradictions (thus the pioneers were pointlessly bothered by them) and by this token they cover the division of anything continuous.101 I

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wish that [the pioneers] had also conceded this and agreed that the same thing [X] was also both one and many. But let X be one and many but not at the same time and (a) and (b) are not also opposites in the same respect but one thing in actuality, many in potentiality. It is as if I were to say ‘a grain is potentially but not actually an ear of corn’: this is not a contradiction, if we remember the distinctions that we used to refute the sophistic muddles.102 [Chapter 3] 7,15 (186a4-6)103 So it seems impossible for existing things to be one if [Parmenides and Melissus] address them in the way described and it is not difficult to solve their arguments. 7,16 (186a10-13) Melissus’ argument, for example, is deductively invalid since he says:104 If [p] what is has come to be, [q] it has a beginning; but [not-p] it has not come to be; therefore [not-q] it does not have a beginning (and this is why it is both unlimited and one). What is actually required105 is to co-assume the contradictory of the consequent [not-q] and infer the contradictory of the antecedent [not-p], since that is how a deduction is constructed according to the second of the hypothetical [syllogisms]. He, however, did not do this, since he conjoined something that he had not pre-posited, what is has not come to be, and by co-assuming the contradictory of the antecedent he inferred the contradictory of the consequent. There is no shortage of such syllogisms:106 [e.g.], ‘If X is a human being, X is also an animal; but X is not a human being; therefore X is not also an animal’; ‘If X is walking, X is moving; but X is not walking; therefore X is not also moving’. 7,25 (186a13-16) Next, by also drawing on the ambiguity in ‘beginning’ he thinks that he is deceiving us. In fact one beginning is according to time (as in our saying ‘an animal has a beginning for its generation’107), another according to the object, i.e., the magnitude (as in our saying ‘there is a beginning for a road and a distance’). And so when Melissus says (i) All that comes to be has a beginning,108 we shall ask him ‘What kind of beginning?’, since everything that comes to be simply as a substance, as in the case of a human being, a horse, an olive tree, and a plane-tree, has as a beginning the one according to time, but not everything that does so has the one that accords with magnitude, as with something that comes to be by alteration and instantaneous transformation, as where ice and cheese come to be, yet you cannot identify a beginning in their magnitude at which their congealing first started.109 And again when he infers (ii) What does not come to be does not have a beginning, he must be similarly tested as to which beginning he means, since anything that has not come to be has no beginning in respect of time, but nothing prevents it from having one in respect of magnitude, as with the sun, moon and the rest of the stars.110 Thus, if in the propositions [(i) and (ii)] the argument concerns the beginning according

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to magnitude, then he is concerned with the conclusion of the inference but takes up both propositions as false.111 But if the statements signify for him the beginning according to time, then he states the truth in what he posits [(i)], but fails to draw the conclusion [(ii)] that he professes, since he also112 professes to prove that the magnitude of what is is unlimited but does this not for magnitude but for time.113 8,11 (186a16-18) Next, he also says that what is is unchanging in that by being one and unlimited in all directions it also has nowhere to which it will move.114 Why, my noble fellow? I mean, it would not change place as a whole, but how is it not possible for it to move in respect of its parts, unless you are saying that the sea too is immobile because in its totality it does not exchange one place for another though it obviously does so in respect of its parts?115 But have you not reckoned with alteration?116 Why have you taken this too away from the unlimited when heating and cooling have no additional need for a place? 117 So the argument, as I said,118 is mundane and is unstable on the single absurdity of ‘beginning’ being used in only one sense. If that is not conceded, its illegitimacy is easily detected. 8,19 (186a19-22)119 But perhaps he could say that what is is one by its definition. But if Melissus replaced the principle with what is120 by saying that the principle is one by its definition, he would be saying the same as some natural scientists. But121 that everything – a human being, a horse, the opposites – is one in definition is inconceivable. So this is more than enough to refute him. 8,25 (186a22-5) Parmenides must be refuted next. While the refutation of [Melissus’] doctrine also applies to him, special considerations apply to the argument that he propounds, which in its basic thrust is as follows:122 What is beyond what is is what is not; what is not is nothing;123 therefore what is is one. (186a24-5) Now he errs because he takes ‘what is’ as said in only one way when it is said in many ways in accordance with the number of ways that we have displayed.124 It is actually like arguing125 ‘Beyond the crab there is no crab’, ‘Beyond the dog there is no dog’. But what is beyond the dog can be a dog, and what is beyond the crab a crab (what, after all, is beyond the marine dog is not a marine dog but a celestial or terrestrial one).126 And if there is something beyond what is, namely, if there is something127 beyond substance, the latter is not substance yet will certainly have the capacity to be quality or quantity, and if something beyond quality is not quality, it will still have the capacity to be substance or quantity, and nothing prevents existing things from in this way being many. 9,4 (186a25-32) Parmenides, then, in this way makes false claims, but that he does not reason deductively could be clarified from a hypothesis, if we inserted different premises in the same figure of his argument. Assume that by ‘what is’ only ‘white’ is signified and that ‘beyond white is nothing’, and let the argument be combined in the same way: If there is something beyond white, it is not white; but what is not

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white is nothing. What, then, is the conclusion? It is what is beyond white is nothing. If you have reached the Analytics128 you know that this is the conclusion drawn, but he infers ‘Therefore only white is’.129 So, why did [Aristotle] say130 that Melissus’ argument [in contrast with that of Parmenides] was rather banal?131 It is because in his view the premises were combined according to the rules.132 ‘What is not’, that is, is not a negation, since [had Parmenides seen that]133 he would not have taken ‘what is not’ in the second premise as a subject but as an affirmation based on a transposition,134 while for Melissus even the premises did not sustain the conversion as valid. But let it be conceded that the conclusion is ‘Therefore only white is’. So what prevents the things that are white – a swan, snow, white-lead, milk – from being many? Yet what am I saying? It is that these are distinct from one another and the plurality easily detected by anyone. But let there be only one thing – white, continuous and unified. But not even this would be one if you inquired in terms of the definition, but a minimum of two things are in it, the underlying body and whiteness, and two not as ever having the capacity to subsist apart from one another (it is quite inconceivable that something white exist in its own right separate from an underlying subject),135 but instead reasoning finds their nature quite distinct, with the one a body coloured white, the other a colour that vision can discriminate, and Parmenides had not yet distinguished these.136 9,26 (186a32-4) But I swear that we are quibbling137 with the man since in saying ‘what is is one’ he was referring not to an incidental property, not, that is, one of the things that have their being in something else, but to what strictly is, what pre-eminently is, and, as we would say, ‘what just is’ (to hoper on),138 since the latter signifies for us what pre-eminently is just as ‘what itself-is’ (to autoon) does for Plato.139 9,29 (186a34-b4) Look, Parmenides was not so dumb-struck as not to know that an incidental property always needs an underlying subject for its subsistence, and that, if an incidental property were the only thing that is, it would itself, of course, be what is not, since it is different from what is, but will rather turn out both to be and not to be at the same time: to be if it is an underlying subject for what is, but not to be if an incidental property is the only thing that has been posited as being. He was certainly not also unaware that if because of this absurdity he conceded that substance too is what is, then since an incidental property, which is the only thing that he thinks there is, cannot subsist apart from it, ‘what is’ will in turn signify many things for him and many so that even if they were not separated from one another, each is and subsists according to its unique definition. 10,7 (186b4-6) But it is not right to attach such a major contradiction [as ‘one is many’] to a ‘venerable’ gentleman.140 Instead grant141 that ‘what itself is’ (auto to on) signifies what pre-eminently is, what just is, substance, what itself-is (to autoon), and what is not incidental to

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anything else but is rather that to which other things are incidental.142 But even so what just is will itself be what is not. 10,11 (186b6-14) But could you say that this ‘what just is’ is also white, black, or whatever? Clearly you will agree that something belongs to substance if it is an underlying subject for everything. So let this ‘what just is’ also be white. But white is not 143 just is: the latter signifies substance, the former an incidental property, and if white is not what just is, then neither is it what is at all, since what just is is the only thing assumed to be. So white is not what is not in the sense that in one way it is but in another is not, but in the sense that because of the assumption [that it is an incidental property] it in every respect is not. After all, neither would anyone say that what is is incidental to this instance of white when the latter is assumed to belong to something else. If this is so, and if white is what in every respect is not, then if we said that it belonged to what just is, we shall be saying that what pre-eminently is does not belong to what pre-eminently is. 10,21 So that is absurd, but in addition the following is too:144 that if what just is is going to be white and white is what is not, then what just is is going to be what is not. And let nobody believe that we are arguing fallaciously; for it is not the case that since white is an incidental property, what white belongs to will be an incidental property. Nothing like that is being forwarded. In fact anyone saying that white is an incidental property is granting that it too is beyond substance, since by consistently taking it as what is, he is saying that in this way it is incidental to another thing. But if when as something else the underlying subject shares in white as something else, it will not be the same as it. But here he is saying that white is what without qualification is not and what in every way is not. So he will not also be predicating it of what is as an incidental property since he will again be positing that it is.145 But if [he posits] that it is, then he is also positing it as what just is, and in the same way again146 what just is signifies more than one thing. But if he is not positing it as an incidental property, or a genus or species, then he is positing what just is as what without qualification is not. So be it. (186bb12-14)147 But they will surely also deny that the unlimited is a body, i.e., not posited as a magnitude,148 lest they be forced either to divide it into many parts or to attach incidental properties to it. 10,35 (186b14-31) So will they offer a definition of what just is and provide an account of its substance or will they take this away too? If they are in fact going to take its definition away, I do not know what else they will be able to say or write in its support if they are going to have as its category neither an incidental property, a genus, a species, a differentia, a definition nor in general a bare outline. But if they are going to provide any definition, it has to be divided into things that just are. For example (assuming now a human being to be what just is), I say that the definition of human being must also be combined from things that just are, i.e., that animal, terrestrial and two-footed are things that

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just are, since if they are not things that just are, they will again become incidental properties. However, things cannot be incidental to something if they complete its definition. 11,10 I think that it will be easy for me to explain that this is true.149 Now the incidental properties are either (i) such that, like sitting and conversing, they can belong or not belong [to an underlying subject], or (ii) such that the underlying subject is included in the definition of the incidental property, like snubness in a nose, odd and even in number (snubness being a curvature in a nose and an odd number one divided into unequal amounts).150 So in which of these ways will animal be an incidental property? In (i)? Then human being will at some time be neither animal, nor terrestrial, nor two-footed, nor will it ever converse or sit down! In (ii)? Impossible: human being is not present in the definitions of animal, terrestrial, and two-footed, but the latter are included in its definition. In universal terms, the definiendum cannot exist in the definition of the things included in something’s definitional formula – that way the whole will be a part of a part.151 While animal is part of human being (when combined with other things it produces a human being), if human being exists in the definition of animal, the whole will exist in the part and will be a part of the part, for152 by this token if something, such as a thing coloured white, is combined from more than one thing (from white and body) it will not exist in the definition of the colour white. 11,28 (186b31-5) ‘But perhaps animal and two-footed are incidental not to human being but to something different’. But while I am disregarding this153 since anyone who says this ipso facto makes the things that just are two, I do raise it as a problem, rather I know that if these are incidental properties, what comes from them will be an incidental property – human being or whatever what just is is. This is why even stating it involves considerable insanity, whereas if they are, as I have demonstrated, not incidental to a human being, then clearly the definition of human being will be divided into things that just are. But when I refer to the definition, I am referring to whatever the substance, i.e., the nature, of what just is may be.

11,36 (186b35-187a3) So by this argument too the things that just are are many, although inseparable and undivided constituents of what just is, and what just is is going to consist of inseparable and undivided things, yet of things that just are.154 Still some155 duly yielded and succumbed to the [Parmenidean] argument,156 as well as to the one by Zeno157 (the one that established that what is is one from its being continuous and undivided by arguing that if it is divided, it will not also be one in a precise sense because of the unlimited sub-division of bodies).158 They tried to offer a solution to them not by

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displacing the arguments themselves but by introducing other greater problems. 12,6 Xenocrates159 faced with unlimited sub-division introduced indivisible lines to escape saying that the same thing is both one and many, which he wrongly took as a contradiction, while he fell into another more intractable contradiction by making the same thing at the same time both a magnitude and not a magnitude. Yet to say that the same thing is both one and many is not to refer to opposites, if one were to distinguish between what is potential and actual,160 whereas making the same thing both a line and an indivisible is simply to make a line not a line. 12,12161 Plato, by conceding ‘what is beyond what is is what is not’ (the first premise of the Parmenidean argument)162 but by also agreeing to ‘what is is one’ (which he thought was the argument’s conclusion),163 did not join him in condoning ‘all things are one’. In fact he said that what is not also in a way is, since he demonstrated that the idea is what really is,164 whereas the unshaped and prime matter165 is not something that belongs to what is, since what is is in turn combined both from what is, which he granted was also one, and from what is not, which he took as matter. But I am unaware of a way in which the great man admits the contradiction while running away from it, since if he agrees that what is signifies one thing but says that what is beyond what is is also different, then he is saying that what is is one and at the same time making existing things many. And how does this differ from saying that (i) what is is one and also (ii) what is is not one? He certainly does not also escape the absurdity because he says that (i) is so in a primary way, (ii) in a way that is not primary, if he is not even more entrapped since by drawing a distinction among existing things he is obviously assigning them a number greater than one. 12,24 (187a3-6) But we say that, even if what is signifies one thing, we can still say that what is not is without referring to opposites. We are not, after all, saying that that which without qualification is not is also extraneous to what is, since this involves putting up with the contradiction [‘what is not is’] directly and introducing yet another with the concession166 that what is has a single nature. Instead, we do not hesitate to speak of something that is not and something that is, since for ‘what is’ to signify a single nature is for it to signify a nature that is not also one in number but one in both genus and species. So what prevents what is from being a single genus? Assume that what is is animal, then someone who says ‘the dog is what is not’ is not taking what is not as extraneous to what is but is saying167 ‘the dog which is not a horse is a dog’.168 13,4 (187a6-11) So there is no need for another nature beyond what itself is169 to be introduced to prevent everything becoming one, but let just ‘what itself-is’ and ‘what just is’170 signify what is. But still, as has been stated, this will not preclude us from speaking of existing things

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as many in number or in kind. So let what has been stated suffice as a response to Parmenides and Melissus. [Chapter 4] 13,9 (187a12-26) Those who replace the principle with what is (and one would not hesitate to call them natural scientists too)171 split up into two types by thereby saying that what is is a single principle. Some posited one specific element as the principle and then fashioned the rest from it by using density and rarity, for which excess and deficiency might be said to be more universal opposites, under which Plato’s principles, the great and the small, also fall. For Plato, however, the great and the small signify matter, whereas the one thing signifies the productive cause, and I mean the form.172 The natural scientists, on the other hand, make the one thing an underlying subject and matter173 and the opposites differentiae and forms, while others make it none of the elements but something else, denser than fire but more rarefied than air. Anaximander, 174 for example, avoids using alteration for what subsequently comes to be but says that pairs of opposites existing within it are extracted from an element that is unlimited, as similarly do those who posit the principles as many but a single cause as productive. Anaxagoras, for example, posits the compounds that are made up of like parts plus Intelligence,175 Empedocles the four elements plus the Sphere. They in fact resemble Anaximander by instead of using alteration for coming to be extracting from a mixture in which they already exist the things that we think come to be. But Empedocles, for whom there are four elements,176 stops this extraction and restarts it in cycles, whereas Anaxagoras, for whom the elements are unlimited in number,177 does not end it once he has identified its beginning.178 13,28 (187a26-32) Two things seem to have led Anaxagoras to this doctrine. One [187a31-2] was the sight of opposites coming to be from opposites, since by thinking that one opposite cannot be transformed into another (that way the principles would cease to be), he thinks that the opposites exist within in the opposites. But second [187a27-31] and predominant was the doctrine common to the natural scientists, by which they all similarly believed that nothing came to be from what is not,179 this being the reason for their saying ‘everything was all together’ and ‘coming to be is aggregation, ceasing to be segregation’. Anaxagoras does say that coming to be is alteration but the actual facts show him obviously unaware of his own terminology since ‘aggregation’ is the name he gives ‘alteration’, but more on this later.180 14,3 (187a32-b1) But he also supports this doctrine with a syllogism: All that comes to be does so from things that exist or do not exist; but not from things that do not; therefore from things that do.181 From this it follows182 that everything is in each thing from which we say that

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something comes to be; e.g., that hairs, bones, sinews and flesh are in this water but too small to be perceived by us. 14,7 (187b1-7) And he stated as his next co-assumption that everything is mixed in everything, since everything also comes to be from everything. So what causes everything not to appear the same, if indeed everything comes from everything in the same way? It is, he says, because not everything exists within each thing with quantitative equality, but in each case one specific thing is invariably in excess and predominates, as, for example, micro-units of water in A, micro-units of flesh in B, and so what appears to be water is thought to be so from what is predominant, since no water, flesh or earth exists in an unadulterated form. We might consequently investigate after those who completely eliminate the principles those who say that they are unlimited in number.183 If they too were refuted, you would then agree that the principles of natural things are limited in number.

14,17 (187b7-9) (1a) First, then, I am amazed at how in promising to bequeath us a science specific to nature they unwittingly show that their grasp of it is impossible, since if we believe that we have scientific knowledge of each thing when we are aware of its principles and causes,184 but there is no way of having knowledge of things unlimited in number, then someone saying that the principles are unlimited in number eliminates the scientific knowledge of an actual thing.185 14,23 (187b10-13) (1b) Also, if Anaxagoras was setting numerical boundaries on qualities by saying that their quantity was unlimited, then while we could not indicate the quantity, we could successfully resolve186 the qualities from which each thing is derived. But as it is he does not bring the compounds made of like parts to a number either in kinds or in quantity. Thus he is cheating in undertaking to explain things of which he himself from the outset does not deny his ignorance. 14,27 (187b13-21)187 (2) So while [1b] is extraneous to our subject matter,188 how will his claim that everything is mixed with everything not run into absurdity because each thing made up of like parts can be maximized and minimized without limit, with neither a minimum nor a maximum taken? That this is impossible is clear from its being agreed that (i) every compound consists of parts (I mean of parts such that they can also be actually separated from one another and from the whole),189 and (ii) the whole in terms of its size is a consequence of its parts (e.g., if the parts are small, the whole is small too;190 but if they are large, it is large too), and (iii) if the progression involving the parts is without limit in both directions, then it is also without limit 191 the compound. Also, flesh, sinews and bones of any size can come to be, then, of course, so too can an animal; and if the parts of a plant, then the plant itself too. And thus the converse is similarly true: that if the whole

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cannot come to be, neither can the parts. And the sizes of both animals and plants even according to Anaxagoras himself are also determinate; so too therefore are those of their parts.192 And it is impossible for a human being’s flesh to be of any size so that the flesh that co-exists with innumerable other things in a tiny space can consequently be further minimized while still being flesh.193 That, after all, is astonishing. 15,10194 But perhaps Anaxagoras’ response to those who challenge him in this way would be: ‘I would not grant that the differences in size of animals and plants also follow the increase and decrease of the things with like parts. That would in fact be the case if animals and plants had a single compound made up of like parts derived from each kind of thing made up of like parts, with different kinds for bone, blood and each of the rest. But, as it is, the quantity for each kind of thing made up of like parts accords with each species of animal. So there is nothing absurd in minimizing flesh without limit but not an animal, since the flesh in an animal consists of several micro-units of flesh195 that are like principles and elements.’ 15,18196 But even if this is the case, a constraint still has to be set on the size of these elements, since he will of course grant as constraints a specific number from which these elements when compounded produce the flesh in an animal. So let this number be assumed to be four or five micro-units of flesh. So if each of these micro-units197 could be minimized without limit, then flesh of that size would be so small198 as for it to be inconceivable that the flesh in an animal exists, specifically: what is it to say that a human being’s flesh consists of several micro-units of flesh? I mean, why will each of these micro-units not also consist of more micro-units, if indeed the division of the compounds made up of like parts is without limit? But what is also totally ridiculous is for the flesh of an elephant and that of a gnat to consist of micro-units of flesh in a ratio of less to more, since there will no longer be a difference between saying that something consists of more things or of fewer, given that its size is indeterminate to both greater and lesser amounts.199 15,31 (187b22-34)200 (3) In general, minimizing flesh without limit no longer involves protecting flesh, since while it is not impossible to think of the sub-division of body without limit, it is entirely inconceivable to do so for flesh, given that a micro-unit of flesh quickly ceases to be. But I am not aware that Anaxagoras can agree since, according to him, the principles cannot cease to be. So if what we are saying is true and the size of the least amount of flesh is finite, then necessarily it is impossible that everything is mixed with each thing. Why so? Because every body of finite size, even if miniscule things of finite size were removed from it, would still at some point be depleted.201 But let the argument not be generated in line with what can be theoretically established. And so flesh were continually separated from this particular water, it will of course use up all the flesh existing within it, given that the separation of the smallest amount of flesh of finite size

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cannot go on without limit. One of the following, then, is necessary: either separation gives out and the water that is left no longer has flesh in its aggregation; or, if it does not cease, an unlimited number of micro-units of flesh are encompassed in a finite size (meaning that of the water) as things that also already exist within it. That does surpass every kind of wizardry! 16,14 (187b35-188a2) (4) In addition, if all body has to become less when something has been subtracted but the quantity of flesh is fixed in terms both of largeness and smallness, obviously no body will be extracted from the smallest amount of flesh, since there will be something less than the smallest amount of flesh! How, then, is ‘everything in everything’? 16,18 (188a2-5) (5) Or are we arguing about trivialities202 in saying this? No, since if everything is in everything, then not only will there be flesh in the least amount of flesh, but also blood, bone, and head-marrow203 and they will in turn be in each of these, as, for example, in blood there will be other flesh as well as other blood and other bone, and in turn everything else will similarly exist within each of these, and this will be without limit. And is it not a great nonsense204 for an unlimited amount of flesh to be in the smallest unit of flesh, as well as unlimited amounts of water, earth and air? Yet, as I also stated earlier,205 they already exist and subsist in their own right separately from one another, which is also particularly absurd, since a limit has been imposed at the point of separation, given that things that are separated from one another acquire constraints on both their size and their place. So the principles according to him are going to be unlimited both in quantity and size, and this means that they are unlimited an unlimited number of times! 16,29206 But imagine someone helping Anaxagoras out with the idea that while the principles are unmixed because they are also principles, it is among perceptible things that are aggregations that everything is mixed in everything. Let this person transfer his argument to aggregations such as perceptible water, since in it, of course, both flesh and bones will similarly exist separately in unlimited number as aggregations207 also derived from everything (they are perceptible and can be extracted), so that other things will in turn exist in208 each of these too. They will certainly never be separated into the unadulterated and primary principles; that he himself testifies is inconceivable. 17,4 (188a5-13) So how is Intelligence motivated to carry out precisely this? Surely in attempting impossibilities it is unintelligent?209 Yet Anaxagoras is right to say that existing things will never be segregated by luck,210 since incidental properties are inseparable from substance. So what limit will the very wise Intelligence have when also engaged in unending labour211 if it never segregates the principles either (i) in terms of quantity (they are divided without limit), or (ii) in terms of quality (affections, e.g., colours, states212 and the remaining inciden-

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tal properties, are inseparable from substance)?213 So Anaxagoras did not even concede (i) to Intelligence, while the truth causes us to deprive him of (ii).214 17,12 (188a13-18) In fact in this too Anaxagoras incorrectly thinks215 that flesh is composed of micro-units of flesh, and gold of micro-units of gold because of his belief that every thing made up of like parts is also divided into smaller ones made up of like parts, and that if on ceasing to be something is dissolved, it is from those [minima] that it comes to be when it is made into a compound. This is inadequate for a demonstration since mud, for example, is divided both into units of mud and into water and earth.216 So from which would you prefer to say that mud comes to be? Is it (i) from micro-units217 of mud or rather (ii) from earth and water? Or is (ii) the coming to be of mud, (i) its coming to be larger? The way that bricks produce a house when they are made into a compound is, after all, not the same way that micro-units of water congregate to produce218 the whole of the water when water comes to be from air, since this is what the correct aggregation aims at for them.219 But the actual air is what we see being transformed and altered into water and this is water220 coming to be from air.221 Empedocles establishes coming to be in the same way too (by aggregation and segregation, I mean) but still his fault is rather slight222 since he posits the principles as limited in number.223 But it is not yet the right time to be concerned with this subject.224 [Chapters 5-9. Principles established] [Chapter 5. The principles as opposites] 17,27 (188a19-26) But I am going to return to the fact that everyone makes the opposites principles,225 both those who say that the all is one and unchanging and those who say that it is more than one thing, indeed an unlimited number of things.226 Now Parmenides in his verses on Opinion makes the hot and the cold principles, calling the former ‘fire’, the latter ‘earth’;227 Anaxagoras has opposition among the compounds made up of like parts,228 Anaximander has coming to be by an extraction involving aggregation as229 much as segregation. Democritus has the full and the void but produces an opposition by effecting coming to be via position, shape and sequence, since these230 are all genera of opposites: position of above and below, forward and back, and left and right; shape of straight and curved (the latter according to him being opposites).231 We discussed Empedocles and Plato earlier along with all the other natural scientists who posited rarefaction and condensation as the opposites.232 18,7 (188a26-30) And they seem to me to have reached this stage by sound reasoning in that the principles must (i) not come from233 one another (that way each will be simultaneously a principle and not a principle) and (ii) not come from other things either (if they were not

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primary, how could they be principles?), while (iii) everything234 must come from them (that above all is unique to the principles). (i)-(iii), then, all apply to the primary opposites and by ‘primary opposites’ I mean the most generic ones. Since they are also primary they do not come from other things and since they are also opposites they do not come from one another. 18,14235 And do not be confused: we are saying that black comes to be from white,236 since this is how the opposites (which237 one could in a stricter sense say come not from one another but after one another) come to be from one another. But in what way have I said that opposites do not come to be from one another? It is as we say that a statue comes to be from bronze,238 where one of the two does not239 persist when it generates the other as its opposite along with protecting its own nature. As principles, that is, opposites have to be preserved, but if they were transformed240 into one another while being preserved then the opposites would co-exist, which is inconceivable. But how do other things241 also come from them? It is because, as will be demonstrated,242 coming to be involves transformation and all transformation is into the opposites. 18,22 (188a30-6) But since what is being stated is not in itself firmly recognized, let us investigate it by starting from a little earlier.243 The first premise to be laid down is that none of the things that exist is naturally disposed either to produce effects or be affected as one random thing by another: a human being, for example, is not naturally disposed to produce an effect on a horse, nor is adamant naturally disposed to be affected by iron. And therefore neither does one random thing naturally come to be from another: it could not, for example, come to be white from educated but invariably from black, yellow or any other of the intermediary colours. Yet someone might say that this is not true by claiming that a nightingale has come to be white from ‘musical’.244 But it did not previously exist as musical but as black. I mean that since it might at some point be incidental to a black thing also to be musical, surely you do not think that at that point a white thing comes to be not from black but from musical? 18,32 (188a36-b3) But distinguish between what is incidental and what exists in its own right and you will invariably find a white thing coming to be in its own right from black, yellow or grey, and nothing stops this particular black thing from being educated, or skilled in politics or military leadership or metal-work. Thus you could not steal a march on me by saying that a black thing comes to be from politicallyskilled, as well as numerically-skilled, winged and two-footed. Instead, all these cases of coming to be are incidental, but a white thing comes to be in its own right from black or, put comprehensively, from not white, and from this certainly not in every case245 (a centaur is not white, and a scylla not white!) but where it works to speak of grey, yellow or red. So too someone educated comes from not educated but not from a

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statue or a ship. But someone might also correctly apply ‘uneducated’ even if something is between educated and uneducated. 19,12 (188b3-16) So something also does not cease to be into just anything: a white thing, for example, does not in its own right cease to be into educated except where it does so incidentally, e.g., whiteness could sometimes cease to be after a person has been cauterized and could cease to be into blackness, but if it also turned out that the person involved was incidentally educated too, then whiteness will cease to be into educated too, and similarly if someone educated also ceased to be, then it would cease to be into someone uneducated, not into a black thing. Not only is this so in cases of coming to be by alteration, as in those just described, but also where it is by aggregation and segregation, as with things formed into compounds.246 The account, after all, is the same, but with the second case it sometimes escapes notice that a standard name is frequently not assigned to opposite states, as it is to white and black. Instead sometimes the latter’s privations are used as names, but otherwise not even these but only the negations of the alternatives.247 I mean that for every compound we could state as names that are universally applied ‘coordination’ and ‘uncoordination’, from and into which there is coming to be and of ceasing to be, but standard usage yields no unique names for individual cases. But still all that is coordinated comes to be from what is uncoordinated and ceases to be into what is uncoordinated, not into just any random thing but into its opposite. A human being’s coordination does not cease to be into a horse’s uncoordination nor a dog’s into that of a plant, nor is it from these that they come to be, but instead a human being ceases to be into a human being’s uncoordination, and a horse into a horse’s. And if instead of ‘coordinated’ and ‘uncoordinated’ you use the names ‘ordered’ and ‘disordered’, ‘compounded’ and ‘uncompounded’, and ‘structured’ and ‘unstructured’, you will still find the same feature in all of them. 19,32 (188b16-21) So to take an example in an individual case: the orderliness of a house comes to be from a disorderliness that is not random and certainly not the kind that would come about for a ship but is the kind of disorderliness that would come about for a house from its stones and bricks not being compounded as they should be, and so this is the disorderliness into which it ceases to be. Again, a heap of grains comes to be from grains not being compounded, not from planks not being compounded, and so it ceases to be into a dissociation not of planks but of grains. A statue similarly comes to be from a statue’s unstructuredness. And everything that comes to be and everything that ceases to be (to avoid describing each individual case) clearly does so either from opposites or into opposites, including the intermediaries for which coming into being is in their case also from opposites, as with colours. 20,10 (188b21-6) So in universal terms it is true to define everything that comes to be naturally as either opposites or as coming from opposites, and while the extremities are opposites, the intermediaries come

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from opposites. But it should be remembered that when we say that cases of coming to be and ceasing to be are from and into opposites, we say248 it in the sense that it is not from things that persist and not into ones that persist (otherwise we would be in conflict with ourselves)249 but it is as we say that B comes to be from A and B comes to be after A.250 20,15 (188b26-189a9) Most of the other thinkers have also essentially followed along this far, since all those with elements as what they also call principles, despite not persuading us through induction, still produce the opposites as if compelled by truth itself. But they differ from one another through some taking ones that are prior and more generic, others ones that are subsequent and more specific, and some those that are more evident to reason, others those more so to sense perception. This is because some take the hot, the cold, the dry and the wet as subsequent,251 more specific, and more evident to sense perception, others the great and the small, the even and the odd, Strife and Love as prior, more generic and more evident to reason.252 In one way they are taking different opposites (different thinkers different ones), in another just the same ones, since all these opposites are related proportionally to one another, viz. as Strife is to Love, and the odd is to the even, so are the cold to the hot and the dry to the wet, since some come from the parallel column253 under aggregation and excess, others from the one under segregation and deficiency.254 [Chapter 6. The number of principles] 20,30 (189a9-20) But while it is obvious from the foregoing that the principles must be opposites,255 the next thing to state is how many they are, since it has been shown that they cannot be one because opposites are two, nor an unlimited number because it is inconceivable that opposites are unlimited in number – that would mean their being divided into two,256 and in addition257 we shall be removing scientific knowledge from existing things. Again, one nature and one genus have one opposition, but a genus is said to be one where we divide it into species not into genera. This, for example,258 is how black and white are related to colour in this way, or sweet and bitter to flavours, given that by ‘opposition’ I mean the relation of two opposites. And so for the substance based in matter and capable of coming to be there is one opposition, and we are inquiring into its principles,259 and so what prevents us from saying that they are limited in number? Empedocles by supposing them limited in number260 certainly does a better job of producing the things that come to be than Anaxagoras. 21,10 (189a20-5) So if what we are saying is true and one nature has one opposition, must the principles be posited as just the two primary opposites,261 or should some matter and underlying subject262 be partnered with them? This I think also necessary but you too see for yourself

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whether density in its own right can produce rarity, or heat coldness, or Strife Love, 263 or, conversely, each one the other, but rather (why, after all, am I saying ‘produce’?) see whether each can exist in its own right and subsist either as heat in its own right or as coldness. Or instead must some third different thing264 somehow disposed265 in turns as the underlying subject be supposed for them by attachment to which they will subsist and generate successive things?266 They would not on their own sustain one another nor would their segregation if persevered admit their aggregation (or density admit rarity), but they would retreat267 before one another as one constantly receives an incoming [opposite] through another one. This explains why even the early thinkers posited either one specific nature for the opposites or more than one.268 21,23 (189a27-34) In addition, look too at the necessity arising from the following argument: the principles must not be located in an underlying subject (that way there would be a principle for the principle, since the underlying subject is prior and is the substance of the things in it);269 but the opposites are invariably in an underlying subject; therefore the opposites are not the principles.270 Conversely,271 we see that the opposites are not underlying subjects for any things that exist, whereas the principles have to be an underlying subject for everything; therefore the opposites are not the principles. Again, we do not say that a substance is opposite to a substance;272 so the opposites are not substances. But if not substances, clearly they are also not the principles, since we are not, of course, going to make non-substances the principles of substances.273 21,30 (189a34-b1) So if the prior argument [in Chapter 5] necessitates an opposition among the principles, whereas the second [above] says that the opposites are not the principles, then they must conclude by adding a third thing, and I mean matter,274 which is also more of a principle (it is prior) but still needs those opposites too (it cannot in its own right produce anything).275 22,3 (189b1-16) So the pioneering thinkers276 also touched on the truth since they posited for the opposites one nature, and because of it they also called the all one thing (e.g., water, fire or an intermediary). But those positing something intermediate did better given that fire is already obviously combined with the opposites since it is hot and dry in terms of its own nature. And the underlying subject must have none of the opposites in its own definition, since necessarily either it does not receive one of the opposites or it ceases to be, but both alternatives are in conflict with the notion of a principle. This is why those who make the underlying subject distinct from these elements do so not unreasonably, while some made air distinct from the rest (it least of all has perceptible differences), and a third group make it water (it, after all, is heated, chilled, fluid and frozen while it persists). But they all give structure to the one thing through the opposites – through density and rarity, for example, i.e., more and less, and in general terms these are

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obviously excess and deficiency.277 And the following doctrine too is considered traditional: that the principles must be three (the one thing plus excess and deficiency) except that everyone says that the number of the principles is the same but not everyone does so in the same way, with the early thinkers saying that two produced effects while one was affected, whereas for Plato, as also stated earlier, it is the reverse.278 22,20 (189b16-20) Now to say that the elements are three (for us the discussion concerns elements that exist in the things that come to be) would seem also to be quite reasonable, but not that there are more than three, since the underlying subject is self-sufficient for the purpose of being affected, the opposites for that of producing effects. But if someone added either another opposition or underlying subject, then in each case he will be compelled to duplicate them, since if there is a second opposition, then there is a second underlying subject too; and if a second underlying subject, then also a second opposition. So if the same things are going to come to be from each set of three, the second set is entirely superfluous; but if different ones come from each, then (i) not everything that can come to be will have the same principles (the elements – earth, fire, water, air – are certainly not transformed into one another); (ii) why will there be only two sets of three and not more and not an unlimited number? I find no argument that establishes that there are two but not more, since if it is because the principles of animals and those of plants have to be differentiated, why will they not also differentiate the individual species for animals and the individual species for plants? As well, we see that while animals are nourished from plants, plants come to be from the elements, so that the transformation of all things into one another is obvious. But if we produced two oppositions but one underlying subject, then if the opposites are transformed into one another, the same absurdities will again follow. But if they also come to be from one another, then the second opposition is again obviously superfluous since in this way they will come to be the same as one another. I mean that since the transformation of opposites is into opposites, assume one opposition to be AB, another CD: so if A were transformed into B as well as into D, then B and D would be the same thing; and if B into A as well as into C, then A and C would be the same thing, transformation being into an opposite and one thing being opposite to one thing. 23,9 (189b22-9) But we said earlier too279 that one opposition also attaches to one nature but that the nature and substance that can come to be and is based in matter is one. Even if more opposites were found, they would be ranked under the primary ones that are in the genus and proximate to the substance, as you would, for example, find in the case of quality, where black and white are an opposition proximate to colour rather than quality, 280 if a specific opposition were found proximate to quality itself then the other ones would also be reduced to it. (189b279) So from the foregoing it is obvious that the element is neither one nor

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more than two or three, but whether there are two or three elements involves a major problem. [Chapter 7. The principles defined] 23,17 (189b30-2) So let us first discuss281 all coming into being universally,282 not only that which involves substance but also that which involves alteration283 – not only, for example, how a human being and a plant come to be, but also how a human being comes to be educated and how Callias comes to be expert in grammar.284 It is, as we also proposed at the outset,285 easier to consider the features that are unique to each thing on the basis of those that are common. 23,21 (189b32-190a5) So when we say that one thing comes to be from another, we say286 that it is from something either simple or compound:287 from something simple when we say (1)288 from uneducated educated comes to be and from inexpert in grammar expert in grammar comes to be, or, indeed (2) what is uneducated comes to be289 educated and what is inexpert in grammar comes to be expert in grammar. It signifies the same thing even if we restructure the expression in this way, since even when we say (3) a human being comes to be educated we also then take as simple not just what is being transformed (namely, a human being) but also what it is being transformed into (being educated). If, however, we combined [(2) and (3)] in connected form and said290 (4) an uneducated human being comes to be educated, then in this expression we are combining both what is being transformed (a human being) and what it is being transformed from (what is uneducated). 24,5 (190a5-8) Since these two things, namely a human being and uneducated, produce a compound for us, a definite distinction is found dependent both on the expression used and the objects [referred to],291 if separately they could be said to be simple. It is dependent on the expression because in one case it could be structured in two ways: i.e., we say (1) from uneducated educated comes to be and (2) what is uneducated comes to be educated, but differently in the other, and instead mostly only as a ‘this’,292 since we say (3) a human being comes to be educated and Callias comes to be expert in grammar, not (3x) from a human being he comes to be educated and from Callias he comes to be expert in grammar, but293 in a few cases ‘from this’ rather than ‘this’ would be thought a more reasonable expression, as in our saying (5) from bronze a statue comes to be and from bricks a house comes to be not (5x) bronze comes to be a statue and bricks come to be a house. 24,15 (190a9-13) And while this distinction depends on the expression used, that which depends on [objective] nature is much more obvious still, since in transformations one thing persists but the other does not: the human being who has become294 educated is a human being and persists, but what is uneducated does not persist, and neither does

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what is uneducated persist if you just say (1) what is uneducated comes to be educated,295 nor does the uneducated human being persist if you combine what is uneducated with the human being in (4) an uneducated human being comes to be educated. And I say that this whole and compound consist of the two [sc. a human being and what is uneducated]. 24,21 (190a13-21) So with these distinctions drawn in this way, I call what persists ‘matter’, and what does not persist ‘privation’, [e.g.], being uneducated; being inexpert in grammar.296 While we might imagine the latter as numerically the same as matter since they can also never subsist in their own right, being uneducated and being inexpert in grammar are viewed as attached to a human being, but their definition segregates them for you, given that a human being and an uneducated human being are not the same. And you also have to remember the prior distinctions too where I said that the one persists, the other does not, with a human being but not being uneducated being preserved,297 and reasonably so, since when the transformation to being educated comes about, one opposite is displaced in the face of the incoming one298 and what is not in opposition remains. 24,31 (190a21-31) The distinction dependent on the expression used is also adequate, but I did say299 that for privation both ‘from this’ and ‘this’ are used, in fact (1) from uneducated educated comes to be, and (2) what is uneducated comes to be educated, and similarly too in the case of the compound, but not so in the case of matter when described in its own right but in some cases [‘this’] fits, in others [‘from this’] fits better – viz. (3) a human being comes to be expert in grammar not (3x) from a human being he comes to be expert in grammar, but (5) from planks a ship comes to be not (5x) planks come to be a ship. Nevertheless you could quite appropriately refer to (3) as ‘from this by virtue of privation’, and (5) as ‘[from this] by virtue of what persists’, i.e., by virtue of the matter, since the former variation signifies more that which departs [sc. being inexpert in grammar], the second300 that which301 also subsists [sc. the planks]. But nevertheless ‘from this’ is also used for the matter, as we have just stated,302 and for those things for which the opposite is not named but exists within the matter without being manifest. At this point, that is, we are predicating ‘from this’ of matter as also having within itself the opposite of the future shape. For example, when unable to name the unshaped state opposite to the structure of the statue we say that (5) from bronze a statue comes to be on the grounds that the unshaped state is also present in [the bronze]. 25,12 So essentially we are saying that (6) from bronze unshaped in terms of a statue’s unshaped state303 a statue comes to be and from planks unstructured in terms of this particular structure a ship comes to be.304 Even if our meaning is not clear through the expression it certainly is so through the potentiality. That is why in drawing the distinction at the outset305I said that ‘from this’ was also used for the compound too,

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as with (6) from a human being inexpert in grammar one expert in grammar [comes to be], but that while in some cases like the present one it is also explicit, in others it is through the potentiality, as with (5) from bronze a statue [comes to be]. And so it is when we say that (5) from water air comes to be that we also say ‘from this’ in the sense of ‘from the compound’, since water is a compound of one thing that persists and another that is opposite to the form existing within it of air that will come to be.306 This explains why when the latter do not remain as they are that the things derived from them come to be, since we also denied that compounds persist as wholes – an uneducated human being, for example, when he comes to be educated. 307 308 25,24 While the preceding may be more than adequate, matter does at all events need privation for coming to be,309 since without privation attached to it, how could it come to be anything? Would it be from itself?310 No, because it would already be in advance what311 it is coming to be. Yet what it needs is one nature incidental to another, even if not in subsistence certainly in definition, since if it had312 privation comprised in its own substance, it would, if its being involves being in a state of privation, cease to be during transformations into a form.313. Yet we say that the being of matter consists in potentiality, and potentiality clearly accompanies privation, since if privation were not invariably thought of along with it potentiality too would no longer exist.314 So in case this conclusion is disturbing, it is a good idea to go back to a slightly earlier point. Some things, then, belong to each thing that subsists in any way at all if it is distinguished in its own right, other things to it if it is contrasted with something else. For example, being two cubits in length belongs in its own right to a plank, but being double does so in relation to something else. And so being something and, in general, existing is for matter in its own right, whereas what is potential is relative to something else. Matter certainly does not also possess potentiality relative to being matter (its being matter will not then be as matter!)315 but it is by being itself something prior and by existing in actuality that it is clearly the matter of specific things and possesses potentiality relative to them. So while the term ‘matter’ always imports potentiality along with itself and matter is also in potentiality relative to what it is said to be matter, still its being is not such as only to be relative to other things. But while it is difficult to grasp the truth about it with this relation stripped away,316 persistence could bring it to light. So again we have to recapitulate. 26,9 Two names are applied to matter, ‘underlying subject’ and ‘matter’. The first of these is thought to be in closer contact with the being that it has in its own right, the second applied in terms of its state relative to other things. Both317 names belong to things that are relative

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to one another; in fact a thing’s matter is also its underlying subject,318 yet when taken as the matter of something it will be accompanied by privation and potentiality (it is said to be the matter of what has not yet come to be), but when taken as an underlying subject, it is not accompanied by privation at all.319 For while it is not prevented from also being an underlying subject for the form existing within it, how could it still be also the matter of this [form] relative to which it no longer has potentiality? So you could say that bronze too, as long as it is unstructured, is the matter of a statue, but when delimited by the shape, it is no longer matter but an underlying subject.320 26,19 A sign is that this piece of bronze itself, by persisting in terms of the underlying subject, becomes matter at different times in different ways, which is indeed what Boethus says:321 matter no longer persists as matter in things with qualities322(for if it is matter, then it is in its own right unshaped and unformed),323 but it is ipso facto converted to324 an underlying subject, since the latter is accompanied by both a form and a limit because it is also an underlying subject for form and limit. Matter is obviously named in relation to what will be, but the underlying subject is named in relation to what is already in it. And this thing that we say is matter will be an underlying subject to which the capacity to receive opposites is incidental in its nature, since it can equally well receive privation as form.325 26,27 So how then is [matter] unqualified in its own right? Because, ‘unqualified’, I avow, does not in this case signify a privation of quality but a negation:326 cf. ‘inexpert in grammar’ and ‘uneducated’ in contrast to ‘not grammatical’ and ‘not educated’.327 But if ‘unqualified’ did signify privation, it would add a quality to matter, since privation is as it were a quality.328 Certainly in cases where there is true negation, privation is not concomitantly implied, since ‘unjust’ does not also apply to things to which ‘not just’ applies, nor does ‘bald’ also apply to things to which ‘not hairy’ applies. So the being of matter does not in any way involve being in a state of privation.329 Instead, just as with wax that can become a lion (when it became a lion it would no longer be wax),330 so too the first underlying subject,331 since it can receive every shape, is deprived of every shape, yet so not just as an underlying subject (it would no longer be an underlying subject if it separately demarcated a given shape through privation),332 but just because it is incidental to it as something existing in its own right to be naturally well-disposed to certain other things333 too. For this reason when also delimited by a given form nothing at all prevents it from being an underlying subject but no longer the matter of this [form]. This, then, is something that we shall also investigate later,334 but we have to get back to the point at which we digressed.335 27,13 (190a31-b5) Now ‘to come to be’ is said in many ways. Some things are said not simply to come to be but to come to be this given thing, but substances simply to come to be. White is not said simply to

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come to be but invariably as a given thing, since a body does not simply come to be white and come to be two cubits long but comes to be this tree. A plant, however, and a human being are said simply to come to be. With coming to be said in this many ways the underlying subject for the incidental properties is obvious (either an animal, a plant, or in general a body, for which quality, quantity or being related to something else336 come to be),337 while someone will perhaps think that in the case of the substances simply said to come to be that there is no need of an underlying subject, given that the substance that comes to be does not come to be. But the latter338 is the primary and perceptible substance, neither in an underlying subject nor [said] of an underlying subject.339 That these too need an underlying subject to come to be would become obvious if we investigated in more universal terms everything that comes to be,340 since we shall find that each of the remaining341 substances also comes to be from some underlying subject, just as animals and plants do from a seed.342 27,27 (190b5-17)343 So in general everything that comes to be does so either by restructuring alone (as with a statue, since nothing else is altered in the bronze except the structure, i.e., the position of the parts), or by addition (as with things undergoing growth), or by subtraction (as with a herm from a stone),344 or by combination (as with a house), or by alteration as both in terms of any quality that can be affected (that is alteration in a proper sense), and where it is in terms of substance (that is transformation in a strict sense),345 and the latter is alteration in terms of the form and essence. And these cases all apply to an underlying subject, including in particular those to which transformation in a strict sense applies, since what must in all cases exist and be an underlying subject is that for which when preserved transformation comes about, as with that for which addition, for which subtraction and for which combination come about. So clearly from what has been said everything that comes to be is always a compound consisting of both the underlying subject and the shape, as also what it came into being from was a compound consisting of both the underlying subject and the opposite of what was going to exist. And I say that being uneducated is in opposition, but a human being is an underlying subject,346 and that the states of being unstructured, unshaped and unordered are an opposite, but bronze, stone or gold are an underlying subject.347 28,10 (190b17-35) If these are the principles and causes for the things that exist by nature, and if each thing comes to be from their existence within them and they complete each thing’s being, obviously they, as the underlying subject and the shape, are what each thing is made into a compound from (a house is made into a compound not from bricks but by virtue of its definition, as indeed a human being and an educated human being have different definitions). And when the underlying subject itself is thought of in its own right, it is one in number, but two in definition, and I say this because of privation, which is incidental

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to the matter. So pay attention here too. [The underlying subject and shape] differ in definition even if, like snub-nosed Socrates, they are one in number. Take a human being and gold: if you also go back from them to the prime matter, they can be numbered, i.e., they are a this something, gold and human being obviously, but prime matter348 can be numbered more than privation, since while it cannot be numbered in its own right, it can nevertheless still be numbered more than privation, given that [matter] is the pairing [of subject and shape] in contrast with privation. That is, to the extent that [matter] turns out to cooperate with the compound, which is in precise terms the this something, more than privation (it persists in a way and manifest itself as [matter] departs), it possesses to that extent the this something to a greater degree, whereas privation does not possess the this something at all (how can what is not even stable?). But what comes to be from matter also comes to be non-incidentally from matter (matter does exist within it) but incidentally from privation, since being incidental to matter is in a strict sense a principle.349 That is why you will, if you speak in a strict sense, say that the causes are predominantly two, matter and shape, whereas you could say that because of privation they are also three. And while in one way they are principles, like the opposites (and I mean in this context privation and form as opposites in a relatively unqualified way; later I shall demonstrate how they are opposite to one another),350 in another way they are unlike the opposites in that they cannot be affected by one another. But we also upheld this when positing matter for them.351 29,7 (191a3-7) 352 So it has been stated how many principles there are for the natural bodies involved in coming to be353 and how they are that many. And clearly354 something must underlie the opposites and the opposites must be two, though in another way that is not necessary, since it is enough for one of the opposites to produce a transformation by its absence and presence. Thus the form will fill the place of privation too, in that privation is not a specific nature and form but the absence of form. 29,13 (191a7-12)355 The underlying nature can be known by analogy: viz, as bronze is to a statue, or wood to a bed, so does this nature stand in relation to the compound substance and in unqualified terms in relation to all that is,356 since by underlying the substance it also clearly underlies the properties incidental to it. 29,16 (191a19-20) But whether the form or the underlying subject is a substance is as yet unclear, and it is also as yet unclear how the form is a principle and whether all form is incapable of ceasing to be or whether it is something that can also cease to be. And if all form is incapable of ceasing to be, how is it not all eternal? But if it is not true that all form cannot cease to be, how is all form a principle? All this can be left aside357 for now since the discussion is surely not even appropriate for a natural scientist; reasoning about things that are eternal is rather for one superior to him.

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[Chapter 8. The problem of coming to be solved]358 29,22 (191a23-33) Let us state359 next that only in the following way is the early thinkers’ problem resolved. In their search for the truth and the nature of existing things, that is, the earliest philosophers deviated from the path of truth when thrust, as it were, along a different one through inexperience in formal reasoning. Thus they say that no existing thing either comes to be or ceases to be360 because what comes to be necessarily always comes to be either from what is or from what is not; but neither from what is (for [what is] already is), nor from what is not (inconceivable, since there must always be something underlying). By eliminating coming to be on this basis they produced existing things from pre-existing ones by using aggregation, position, segregation and some such devices,361 and by combining what was implied by this argument said that there were not many things but one,362 since if there are many, they will be different, and things differing from what is are not. They adopted this belief for the reasons stated but we have two ways of solving their problem. 30,4 (191a33-b10) Here is the first of them. To come to be from what is or from what is not, or, if I may put it in more general terms, for what is not or what is to come to be, whether to be affected or to produce effects in any way (take my claim to apply not only to coming to be in a strict sense, as when we say ‘a human being comes to be’ but also to all of it without qualification, as when we say ‘a human being363 comes to be white or educated’),364 these are all stated in two ways and signify two things. To make this clearer for you learn first with an example. We say that a doctor produces effects on something or is affected, but in two ways: either in his own right (i.e., insofar as he is a doctor), or incidentally. When he is healing he produces effects in his own right (i.e., insofar as he is a doctor), but when building a house he does so not insofar as he is a doctor but because it is incidental to a doctor to be skilled at house-building. Again, if through neglect he becomes a nondoctor, we say that he is affected insofar as he is a doctor, but if he comes to be white, then he is affected not insofar as he is a doctor but incidentally, because [he comes to be white] from black, which is incidental to him. 30,16 (191b10-17) And so to come to be from what is not, or for what is not to come to be, signifies two things. One is where what is not is present in something and receives being. This is impossible: in fact, this is what coming to be from what is not as what is not signifies. And the early thinkers thought that this [meaning] was indicated just from the expression [‘what is not’] and for this reason eliminated coming to be. But the other is where what is not is displaced and makes way for what will be, as in ‘educated comes from what is uneducated’.365 And this is [to come to be] incidentally from what is not, since what is said to come to be in this way from something that is non-persistent comes to be

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incidentally from what is not. This is the way that we say that the things that come to be do so from what is not, since they come to be from the privation, which in its own right is something that is not, as it makes way and is displaced, or it is also the way that the aforementioned things come to be incidentally from what is not, since they come to be from matter, to which what is not is incidental as privation.366 And so what is not can also be present in something but not as what in its own right is not but rather as that to which what is not is incidental, namely matter. 30,29 (191b17-27) Similarly too to come to be from what is and for what is to come to be without qualification is inconceivable, i.e., as what is (it already is!), but [coming to be] incidentally from what is is not impossible at all. To learn better what I am saying let us have you switch to an example. Assume, then, that a dog is transformed into a horse, or some other animal into some other animal, which does indeed also come about in some cases.367 So someone saying that in these cases an animal comes to be from an animal is not saying that it comes to be as an animal, since an animal, insofar as it is an animal, is, if transformed into something else, not transformed into another animal, nor would what comes to be come to be an animal, insofar as it is an animal, from an animal. Instead what is being claimed is that from something to which being an animal is incidental another thing, to which being animal also belongs, comes to be. So too, if water came to be from air, something that is is said to come to be from something that is not because in this way something that is comes to be, and not because what comes to be in this way is. Instead it comes to be a different thing to which what is also itself belongs because it comes from something of which ‘what is’ is predicated. And just as if an animal, as just an animal, were to come to be, it would come to be not from an animal, but from what is not an animal, e.g., a seed,368 so if it came to be what simply is, it would not come to be from any of the things that exist but from what in every way is not, which is utterly inconceivable, and so what simply is would not come to be. And so coming to be is both from what is and from what is not. And this is not a contradiction when not stated with respect to the same thing, but [coming to be is] from what is, since that is something different, and from what is not, since this is not what comes to be. And simply put it is both from what is, which does not come to be, and from what is not, which does come to be, so that privation, i.e., the nature with such a quality, preserves coming to be, since neither does what is, as what is, come to be because it co-exists with matter, .369 31,17 (191b27-9)370 So while this is one procedure for getting a solution, another is based on what is potential and actual. I mean that it is from matter that the things that come to be come to be as from what is potential but is not actual, and the nature of privation explains this

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solution too, given that it is what causes matter to be potential but not actual. So privation must not be totally discarded in relation to coming to be but it does not have a status equivalent to the other causes said to be incidental, like white or black as properties incidental to a human being who is becoming educated. They, after all, do not even contribute anything at all to the things that come to be, whereas privation as a cause and a principle contributes incidentally the totality,371 given that coming to be is impossible unless an opposite has existed in the underlying subject, so that those who disregarded this nature are not unreasonably reproached.372 [Chapter 9. Critique of the Platonists] 31,27 (191b33-192a16) As for those who made the underlying subject and matter actually the one,373 whether as fire, air or any other of these bodies,374 they did not deal with privation, but Plato, though he denied that matter was one of the existing things, did in a way also attend to privation but inadequately.375 He consequently has to produce coming to be from what is not as what is not, since to the extent that he praises Parmenides for saying that what is is one and that what is beyond what is is what is not, 376 he derives coming to be from what simply is not. The nature of matter, which in one way is, in another way is not (i.e., which is both potential and actual) cannot be preserved if what is is one and what is beyond the latter is what is not, not what in some way is not, nor what incidentally is not, but, as Parmenides believed, what without qualification is not. And if [coming to be] is from what is as the one thing that alone is, then nothing would come to be (for it cannot be transformed), but if something comes to be it has to come to be from something different, but if what is beyond the aforementioned ‘what is’ is what is not, then someone who completely accepts this doctrine but admits coming to be from what is not introduces coming to be even without saying so explicitly. But not even this is correct since he does not separate matter from privation by its definition but thinks that because they are the same in number they are the same both in definition and in the potentiality of their nature. We, that is, say that matter and privation are distinct,377 and that of these matter is what incidentally is not because privation is incidental to it as in a way that which in every way is not; and moreover we say that while matter is near to what is (it is near to the compound378 and in a way thereby also a part of it), privation is the absence of what is, and in this way coming to be for us is not derived from what without qualification is not but from what incidentally is not and potentially is. Those, on the other hand, who speak of the great and the small, whether they signify one thing or two by the names, still predicate both of them of matter. So they say that the principles are not three objects but three names, since the great and the small do not separately signify matter and privation for them but

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both signify matter,379 and they disregarded privation and fail to separate it in definition. We, by contrast, say that [matter and privation] are entirely distinct. Matter by its persisting along with the shape is a conjoint cause of the things that come to be, like a mother,380 whereas the other part of the opposition (I mean privation) could be readily imagined by anyone directing his thought to its capacity for evil381 not even to be anything at all, since it can make being and form, namely well-being and good for each thing, cease to be. Yet it would be odd if it combined causing being to cease to be with not producing coming to be, since unless something ceases to be nothing would come to be but everything would be eternal. 33,6 (192a16-25)382 Privation, then, is the source for evils and they exist because of it, since matter, being receptive of privation and possessing potentiality, is too weak383 always to hold on to the shapes of what it participates in. So what is the source of its participation? It is because it desires the divine and longs for the good, and I mean by ‘good’ and ‘divine’ the first form – the first cause, towards which all things tend and to which all things strive to be likened as far as each can. And each can in accordance with its nature. But how is this longing present in matter? Or is genuine providence the fact that the desire for the good is present in the ugly and the desire for the self-sufficient present in the deficient?384 But privation is opposite to this form, the first, immaterial and separable one, and to those based in matter that are supplied from it, whereas matter tends towards it and desires it. But if matter had385 privation in its nature, it would long for itself to cease to be, since the presence of one opposite is the ceasing to be of another. If indeed privation is not something else but is strictly identical with matter, how could matter be preserved while participating in any form? Because, he says, then too [privation] exists within it, since matter is certainly deprived of another form if it also participates in any particular one, assuming that in the definition of matter privation is not of any particular one but of all in the same way.386 It would accordingly cease to be if387 it also possessed one specific form but not another.388 So if the form longs neither for itself (it is certainly not in need of itself) nor for its opposite (opposites can make one another cease to be), the only alternative is that matter is what desires the form,389 as female would male, or ugly beautiful, and matter is ugly not like ugliness, since it is ugly not in its own right but incidentally in the way that it shares in privation. 33,28 (192a25-34) Matter ceases to be and comes to be in one way but not in another. It ceases to be incidentally, since that which is incidental to it390 ceases to be in its own right, and this is privation. Thus matter ceases to be since what is in it ceases to be, as we speak of an amphora ceasing to be when the wine inside it ceases to be. On the other hand, it does not cease to be in terms of its own nature (what is potential never causes destruction);391 instead it cannot cease to be and cannot come to be. If it comes to be, there must be some underlying subject from

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the presence of which it comes to be. But this is matter itself. Thus it exists before it comes to be! Or if it ceases to be, this is what it will ultimately reach. So it will392 have ceased to be before it has ceased to be! 34,4 (192a31-2)393 This can suffice on matter’s being (i) incapable of ceasing to be, (ii) incapable of coming to be, (iii) distinct from privation,394 and (iv) the first underlying subject395 from the presence of which each thing comes to be non-incidentally (the latter our addition intended to draw a distinction with privation, given that something comes to be from privation too but incidentally).396 34,8 (192a34-192b1)397 But as for the principle as it depends on the form, it is not for the natural scientist but for first philosophy to define whether it is one or whether it is many, and what the latter are. In later demonstrations398 we shall discuss forms that are natural and that can cease to be. They are not even principles in a strict sense but forms involved in coming to be and like elements.

Themistius’ Paraphrase of Book Two of Aristotle’s Physics [Chapters 1-3. Nature, natural science and causes] [Chapter 1. Nature, form and matter] 35,2 (192b8-22) Now in making a new beginning more appropriate to the present inquiry399 let us try and define just what it is that we call ‘nature’. So with things in general some are due to nature, others to other causes. A bed, the discovery of a treasure trove,400 and military office,401 for example, are due to other causes (those of art,402 luck, and choice respectively), but animals and their parts to nature (the parts of what exist by nature also exist by nature, unlike the products of art where a house can exist because of art but not its stones). And plants are due to nature as are the simple bodies (earth, fire, water, air).403 If we isolated the respect in which the things that exist by nature differ from those that do not, this will be nature, with the difference404 that those that exist by nature clearly have within themselves405 a principle and cause both of change and stability, most obviously animals (they change places, grow and decline, and are altered by their inner cause),406 whereas plants have the other changes but are deprived of that involving place,407 as also the simple bodies have from within themselves only change of place.408 But all the natural bodies not only change but also stabilize through the cause within themselves409 except for the divine body, since it has within itself only a principle of change [of place].410 (192b16-22)411 But a bed, cloak and anything else like that has, to the extent that it is said to be a bed and a cloak, no inborn principle412 of transformation, since the form imposed from the art is always at rest, but to the extent that artefacts are incidentally made of stone or earth, or, in other words, mixed from more than one element, they would when displaced also move downwards and be transformed into a state of decay.413 Thus nature will be the principle and cause of change and rest in the things in which it exists. 36,2 (192b22-34)414 So is a statue a natural body (if so, it would move downwards), and does it have within itself the cause of change or else not within itself as the primary location415 insofar as it is said to be a statue, but within its bronze? But surely the ship in which the steersman produces movement will, as far as its definition goes,416 have this

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movement by nature?417 The steersman, after all, is in it, and the ship is his primary location since he is not also in anything else prior418 to the ship. I do not mean steering (it would be in the soul as the primary location) but the steersman as the person steadying the rudder. But it must be said that the ship in its own right is not moved by the steersman, since the steersman is not included in the definition of the ship nor the ship in the definition of the steersman, these being the two senses of ‘in its own right’.419 A steersman is also separated from a ship because420 in his own right he does not belong to the ship.421 A sick doctor too, even when curing himself, has himself as the primary location for the principle that produces change, namely his art, but he is cured and changed in this way not in his own right, not, that is, qua being sick (otherwise every sick person would be self-healed) but qua it being incidental to a sick person also to be a doctor,422 which is why these are separated from one another. It is the same too423 with every single other thing that is produced (‘produced’ being the term I am using for things belonging to an art), since none of them has the principles of producing within itself,424 but some have them in other things and externally (e.g., a house and every other product of manual labour), others within themselves but not themselves as the primary location, i.e., not, as we have said,425 in their own right. So for these reasons the definition of nature must be expressed more recognizably as ‘a principle and cause of change and rest in that in which it primarily exists in its own right and not incidentally’. This,426 then, is nature, and the things that have such a principle have a nature and are all substances in that they are already composed of matter and form, given that nature always has an underlying subject427 and is in an underlying subject, but in such a subject not like the incidental properties but because as a principle based in matter nature is not one of the things that are incorporeal in their own right.428 37,2 (192b35-193a1) The things that have a nature are said to exist ‘in accordance with nature’ (kata phusin), as in addition are the activities in accordance with nature of the things that have a nature. Take the upward motion of fire: it is neither a nature (it is the principle of the motion that is a nature, not the motion itself) nor does it have a nature (the activity is not an underlying subject),429 but it exists in accordance with nature. Thus ‘in accordance with nature’ has a broader meaning than ‘having a nature’ (phusin ekhein). ‘In accordance with nature’ also means ‘by nature’ (phusei) but has a narrower range since some things are by nature without being in accordance with nature, like genetic defects, which are also the works of nature but of nature failing430 rather than proceeding as naturally prescribed.431 37,10 (193a1-9) So the preceding distinctions can stand, but it is ridiculous to try and prove that nature exists432 since obviously many things in general are such that they exist due to and by nature.433 In addition, nothing is more self-evident than this, and anyone demon-

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strating what is self-evident through what is non-evident is unaware that demonstration does not serve to distinguish between what is recognizable due to itself and what is not recognizable in this way. That is how434 someone blind435 from birth would make a judgment even about colours, so that he learns of the existence of colours by inference. But if he also saw them, inference would be superfluous. As it is, he is going to hear only words and he will not be taught colours by inference since it is not by inference but by sight that they are distinguished. So if someone who was also intellectually defective failed to grasp436 what is self-evident, then even if we offer him inferences, we shall be stating arguments but not explaining real things to him. So [the existence of nature] must be posited without argument,437 while inquiry must be directed to whether ‘nature’ signifies one specific thing or is something said in many ways. 37,23 (193a9-12; a28-31)438 And there does seem to be a certain ambiguity in the term, with nature in one way said to be (i) matter, with the latter two-fold as both (a) [193a9-12]439 the matter of individual things, i.e., the given matter of a given thing, unshaped in relation to another thing yet in a qualified way, like the bricks of a house, earth and water of the bricks, and the elements of a plant; 440 and (b) [193a28-30] matter where it is most general and without qualification unformed.441 In a second way [193a30-1] nature is (ii) the shape, the form and the substance based on the definition; thirdly (iii) nature is said to depend on coming into being,442 and this is change and the passage to the form and the shape.443 In another way it is (iv) the cause of this change in each of the things that exist by nature, which is above all said to be nature.444 And (v) all substance, however constituted, whether as simple or compound, is said to be nature.445 Let us discuss the rest [sc. (iii)-(v)] where possible, but for now the investigation must concern whether matter or form would be thought of as nature. 38,1 (193a9-28) 446 Now some prefer to believe that matter is nature, e.g., wood the nature of a bed, bronze that of a statue, and in line with the same explanation the thing’s first underlying subject,447 totally unshaped and unstructured, is also the nature of water.448 (193a12-17) Antiphon449 claims as evidence that if one buried a bed and its decay acquired the power to emit a shoot, then wood rather than a bed would come into being, since the bed belongs to wood incidentally as its disposition according to an ‘arrangement’ (rhuthmos) (‘arrangement’ is what he calls the shape), whereas the substance here is what persists as it is continuously affected in these ways. (193a17-21) But if something else has a rationale relative to the wood as the wood does to the bed, e.g., if wood underlies the bed in the same way that water, earth or any of the other elements underlie the wood, then the latter are the nature of the wood as the wood is of the bed. (193a23-8) For this reason those who regarded fire as the matter of things in general also regarded it as their nature; those who regarded matter as water regarded the

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same thing as nature too; and those who had several types of matter, had several natures too, while all the other things were their affections, states and dispositions. They argued that the nature of things in general had to be preserved, but only the first underlying subject qualified while the rest came to be and ceased to be an unlimited number of times. 38,17 (193a30-b8)450 So that is how they assimilate matter to nature,451 but proponents of the form who believe it to be more truly said to be nature initially use examples involving the products of art. Thus as with a statue and a ship, which are things crafted by art, you would find the art not in the matter but in the form, so too with a plant and an animal, which are things that come to be through nature, you could find their nature not in the matter but in the form. And as with the products of art the form is the art, so with natural things the form is the nature, since it is not, for example, a ship’s planks or a statue’s bronze that is art but the shape and structure, since this has come to be in accordance with an art and is what involves art.452 So nature is also not the first underlying subject453 but the definition of each thing and the essence, given that this is what has come to be in accordance with nature and is what involves nature. The bronze, for example, has no art before acquiring the form of a statue, and the matter has no nature before receiving a specific shape, like potential flesh454 and potential bone whenever it becomes 455 and actual bone. But if along with taking on the form it also has a nature and exists in accordance with nature, the form will be nature, but if we spoke of it as not a structure, not, that is, as well-formed or malformed, but as that in accordance with which each thing ,456 then in offering a definition we are presenting what each thing is. In fact what must also be further recognized is that the being of each thing, i.e., that in accordance with which457 each thing is what it is, is the nature of each thing, and each thing is what it is in accordance with its form rather than its underlying subject. Thus nature is the form.458 And we said that this form was separable not in subsistence but in definition459 and the product of the definition and the matter is not a nature but exists by nature, since the form and the matter when twinned are no longer said to be a nature but what has come to be from them, as, for example, a plant and an animal will be said to exist by nature but not to be a nature. However, if you take each thing in its own right and individually then the form is nature more than the matter. Certainly if something were still coming to be and growing before taking on the whole form, we would say that it does not yet have its own nature,460 since each thing both is and is said to be something just when it is in actuality,461 i.e., when it has acquired its own nature and completion, and the form is the completion.462 So we could also argue deductively: (i) that by the presence of which the things that exist by nature exist by nature is nature; (ii) the things that exist by nature exist by nature through the presence of the form; therefore (iii) nature is the form.

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39,17 (193b8-12) And it is not difficult to respond to Antiphon463 that if he thought that matter was nature because a shoot would come to be from a bed if it decayed: ‘Wood464 is not a bed, but 465 a human being comes to be from a human being, how, of course, could the form fail to be its nature, since, as is clear from the definition, a human being is a form?’ After all, not even we would say that a form involving an art is nature (that is why the form of the bed is also not a nature since it is not a principle of change present in it), whereas the form that is natural and based in matter always comes to be from something like it – a dog from a dog, a horse from a horse. 39,24 (193b12-18) Again, all that comes to be is said to come to be what its advance is towards, not what it is from. Why else when wood is structured into a bench do you say that through the artisan it becomes a bench and not wood?466 ‘Because it advances,’ you might say, ‘to the shape of the bench from that of the wood.’ But why do you say that the water that is transformed into air itself becomes air, not water? ‘It is because it abandons the form of the one while striving to acquire that of the other.’ So when you say that what grows does so in this way, you are saying that it is growing since it is going towards nature, since it is also going not from a nature but towards a form.467 So the form is nature in this way too.468 Look, medicine advances to health but gets its name from the practitioner;469 that is not how Nature470 471 coming to be is related to the form. But healing and heating get their names from their arts because they are the routes to health and heat respectively;472 that is how, because it is the route to nature, that nature is called ‘nature’. 40,8 (193b18-21) So since we have shown that the form rather than the matter is nature, it must be realized that nature as shape is said in two ways, given that privation is also in a way a form,473 which is why defective things also exist by nature.474 But later we shall investigate how this can be stated475 as well as how privation and form are contraries and how coming to be in unqualified terms476 (i.e., where it is of substance) is from opposites. [Chapter 2. Form, matter and natural science] 40,14 (193b22-5) Here it is surely not irrelevant477 to consider the respect in which the mathematician differs from the natural scientist, given that both focus on bodies and the properties incidental to bodies478 (e.g., lengths, points, solids and planes) but479 their methods differ: while the natural scientist views these as permanently co-existing with matter, the mathematician separates them in definition from matter,480 and while the former directs his view of them back to natural body in its movement481 (when he views shapes, he views them as the limits of natural body), the mathematician views them not as shapes but as specific forms existing in their own right detached from any movement.482

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40,21 (193b25-33)483 But the astronomer would surely seem closer to the natural scientist484 in that he provides an account of things that move and discusses both size and shape, which in their own right belong to bodies that are natural and are things that the natural scientist too has to know, given that he will lack genuine scientific knowledge if his knowledge is going to consist of what the Sun is, but not also any of the properties that in their own right belong to it. So if both discuss the shapes of the Sun and Moon as well as whether the Earth and the cosmos are spherical, in what respect will they differ? Or are they also485 concerned with identical properties but not in the same way? The astronomer in fact views the properties that are incidental to the divine bodies in the same way as the natural scientist minus any scrutiny of their substance (i.e., the fact that such a substance has shapes, sizes and movements of this kind belonging to it), or their powers or that they are being better as ,486 while these are what the natural scientist’s view is focused on and based on. And in general both provide an account of the divine bodies in their movement, but the astronomer scrutinizes the quantity of their movement (that the Sun moves a given distance in a given time period), the natural scientist its quality (that it moves in a circle, or whatever may happen487 due to the quality of its substance),488 and they scrutinize the fact that its shape is spherical, in the one case because it is composed of aether rather than of fire or earth, in the other because its appearance is identical from every terrestrial location.489 41,8 (193b33-194a7) In general, that is, mathematicians do not lay claim to matter at all but by taking the triangle or the cube in isolation they view it in this way without matter and movement. But if they also separated these [shapes] in terms of their subsistence, they would be supposing impossibilities since limits in their own right have no subsistence separately from the things of which they are limits. But as it is, since mathematicians divide them only in definition (that is how they are also naturally separated), nothing false follows for them. On the other hand, those who speak of the ideas also separate in subsistence things that are not even separable in definition.490 Yet odd and even, straight and curved, and shape and line can be defined without co-assuming movement and matter in the definition, whereas a definition of flesh and bone, and of body of this kind,491 cannot similarly be offered in complete oblivion to matter, just as if definitions of snub and bowlegged exist separately from the nose and the legs. 41,20 (194a7-12) The areas of mathematics closer to nature also reveal that this is true since they make added use of movement and perception, as, for example, optics, harmonics and astronomy through taking from geometry the line492 that that science scrutinizes not as natural, despite its being natural, but only after separating it in definition from matter. So when they take such a line, then since they want it subsisting in actuality, they do not separate it from movement and

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matter but use it as both natural and as in motion (e.g., they use the straight line in the dioptra together with matter and movement).493 So if when things that it is possible to separate in definition are taken as actually existing they are not also separated in definition, how much more must we safeguard against actually separating things that are separable 494 nor in conception? 42,1 (194a12-18) So since nature exists in two ways, as both form and matter, then someone discussing snubness will speak about both, both matter and form (the kind of thing that hollowness in a nose495 is), yet will give a definition in terms of the form (and snub496 exists in terms of that). This is also how natural things must be said to be in matter and together with matter, while from the form they have the state of being what they are. So someone who gives a definition will also use matter yet will give the definition in terms of the form. One could also, since the natures are two, query which of them the natural scientist can discuss: is it each individually or the one composed of both? But if it is the one composed of both, then he also has to know each. 42,10 (194a18-27) So on looking at the pioneering thinkers only the account of matter would seem to be significant for the natural scientist (Empedocles who posited Strife and Love as principles that produce form, and Democritus who posited shapes, had vague ideas of the form), but on looking at the necessity that follows the [causes] described above, it is rather the account of the shape and the form yet without matter being consequently completely forgotten. If indeed art imitates nature, and if the same art can know form and matter to some extent (as medicine, for example, knows health together with the bile and phlegm in which health is present, and as a house-builder too knows both the form of the house and that its matter is bricks and planks, and likewise for the other arts) then natural science will also have to come to know both natures. 42,20 (194a27-30) Again, the same art can know the end and what is related to the end, as medicine does health and what is related to health. Someone who knows the form therefore also knows the matter, the matter being for the sake of the form. You could learn in universal terms that the form, i.e., nature so qualified, is the end for natural bodies as follows: when497 something continuously changing then reaches something ultimate, i.e., its end, and ceases from its forward passage it has this as the end and purpose of the change. But think, please, of change proceeding unimpeded and subject to a limit in its own right without any external cause restraining it.498 The form, then, is an end like this since when natural changes reach it they are completed and come to a stop, then go into reverse.499 42,30 (194a30-3)500 ‘Someone has exactly the end for the sake of which he was born’ – the poet is being ridiculous.501 Death is also something ultimate but not everything ultimate is the end and purpose502 but only what is best503 (everything has something good as the object of its

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desire), and if growth often ceases even before death, it did not come about for the sake of death but for that of completeness, i.e., of the form,504 and when it arrives at such an end, it comes to a stop in its own right, whereas death is an end not as a target but as a necessary concomitant of such a state of being. 43,3 (194a33-6) Again, the arts also produce matter, in some cases as it is, in others as adaptable, with house-building producing bricks as they are, modeling producing wax as adaptable.505 But if producing matter happens extensively to the productive arts, how can knowing matter not be essential for the theoretical ones? But since we too are an end (many things come about for our sake too), we not only know the things that exist for our sake but we also use them. How we are an end, and that ‘end’ is used in two ways, is stated in the Ethical Inquiries.506 43,9 (194a36-b8) There is no need to be amazed if some arts produce matter, since even the architectonic ones, which are above all seen as giving prescriptions to the subordinate arts for the sake of the form, still offer an account of matter too. But there are two kinds of such arts507 and both are concerned with matter, with one of them using the form alone yet prescribing for its subordinate art what kind of form this is and how it could come to be. That, for example, is the relation of navigation to shipbuilding: the navigator uses the form of the ship but prescribes to the shipbuilder who is doing the work what kind of shape makes a ship sail better.508 Yet he would certainly not tolerate him building the ship from just any wood but is also concerned about matter, since the form that he uses also needs matter of a particular kind if he is going to509 supply the work-product effectively. But there is another of the arts called architectonic which does not use the form but works on and produces it, while it offers prescriptions about matter to its subordinate arts, as ship-building does to logging and sawing. Just as when matter comes to be through art in things dependent on art it comes to be for the sake of the form and the work-product, so with things for which it does not come to be but just exists, it exists for the sake of the form, as among natural things. But, as has been stated,510 someone who knows the end must also know what is related to the end. 43,26 (194b8-15) Again, matter is one of the relatives in that it is matter of a given form and different for different ones but is clearly proximate511 so that someone knowing the one will necessarily know the other too. So the natural scientist will conduct an investigation of matter to the extent of directing consideration of it to the form, but an investigation of the form itself to a stage512 short of separating it from matter. Instead, a natural scientist will scrutinize513 a human being as a doctor does a sinew, since even if the form based in matter is at some point separated, it is still separated in definition rather than in terms of its subsistence. And evidence that the natural forms are all based in matter is that everything that comes to be through such things also itself comes to be like them (‘a human being begets a human being along

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with the Sun’).514 Thus both productive causes are based in matter, i.e., the human being the proximate one, the Sun the primary one. But it is the work of first philosophy to determine whether a separable form exists as a substance,515 how it stands in relation to things that exist by nature, and what it is. [Chapter 3. The four causes (i)] 44,9516 (194b16-17) Regarding the principles as elements let what has been stated stand, but regarding the cause let us resume from an earlier point517 and try and present the number of ways in which they are described. 44,12 (194b23-195a3)518 In one way, then, a cause is said to be that from the presence of which something comes to be (e.g., the bronze of a statue, the gold of a bowl, as well as their genera; i.e., this particular gold is directly the matter of the bowl, but as a genus it is gold and body);519 but in another way it is said to be the form and the paradigm, i.e., the definition of the essence. And I used ‘paradigm’ not as do those who speak of the ideas520 as something that itself subsists in its own right and as a separable form, but because the form of each of the things that come to be by nature (e.g., a human being, a horse, an ox, an olive, a fig, and a plane tree) is determinate and the principle that crafts them proceeds by making the matter change to the point of completely fitting this particular form, i.e., the shape, to the matter. Again, a cause is said to be that from which the first principle521 of the transformation comes; e.g., someone who has made a plan is a cause 522 and a father one of a child. I have said ‘first’ because instruments are also thought to become causes of change but they are not first causes. In addition, there is another cause as the end and this is the purpose, e.g., health as the cause of walking, and not only of walking but of absolutely everything that comes about between it and the end by means of the one who produces the end, with one thing derived from another, health being the cause of them all (e.g., slimming, purging, medicating, their relevant instruments) since they all – every activity, such as walking, and every instrument, such as a cup and a knife – exist for the sake of the end. 45,2 (195a3-14) So the causes are said in essentially this many ways, but because of being said in many ways the same thing turns out to have many causes – not incidentally, yet not in terms of the same definition: e.g., both the goldsmith and the gold are in their own right causes of a bowl but in the first case as a craftsman, in the second as matter. But some things can also be causes of one another (e.g., exertion of fitness, and fitness of exertion), but not in an identical way; instead, while fitness exists as an end, exertion does so as a principle of change, exertion being productive of fitness and fitness being the end of exertion. Again, contraries can have the same cause but not identically. Take a

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navigator: he is the cause of a ship’s safety when present, but of its capsizing when absent. 45,12 (195a15-26) However, they all, as I said, fall under the four most obvious types and for precision’s sake these must again be enumerated. First, they fall under matter and the underlying subject, and there is not a single type of matter,523 in that letters underlie syllables (namely in their composition) in a different way from which matter in its strict sense receives the form (where alterations are involved), and earth and water underlie the bodies of animals in both ways, and the parts underlie the whole in another way, as do the premises the conclusion of the syllogism. Second they fall 524 the essence and the definition, and this too is said in more than one way: as a whole supervening on things combined from parts, but not a whole combined with the parts (this is already the compound [of matter and essence]), rather that which is observed over all of them and supervenes, namely the completion525 and that by which a whole is said to be a whole,526 both a combination covering things that have been combined527 and a form for what is strictly matter.528 Third, they fall under529 the principle of change (e.g., male sperm, a doctor, someone with a plan, and, in general, the productive cause), and fourth 530 the end, i.e., the good, since the purpose is best and aims to be the end for the rest, and there is no difference between calling it a good or an apparent good. These, then, are the causes and their number. 45,29 (195a26-b3; b10-12)531 When we offer them we do so in many ways for each kind of cause. Thus for the one that is productive, i.e., that kind of cause,532 we do so either in a proximate or more general way:533 proximately when we say that a doctor is the cause of health, more generally when we say that an artisan is, and also as a cause in its own right or incidentally: viz. the doctor in his own right is the cause of health, but since it is incidental to him to be Akoumenos,534 we could say that Akoumenos is also the cause of health. And things that include the incidental cause are also often said to be the actual causes: e.g., a human being is the cause of health and an animal is. Also, incidental causes have different degrees of remoteness and proximity: e.g., a white and educated person becomes the cause of health where it is incidental to a doctor to be white and535 educated. Also (b10-12), they can be presented either in combination or separately:536 in combination in ‘Akoumenos the doctor is the cause of health’ or ‘a white doctor is ’, but separately in ‘Akoumenos is the cause’ or ‘the doctor is the cause’.537 46,11 (195b12-16) On this basis538 the ways that causes are presented involve either (i) the one that is proximate and individual, or (ii) the kind, or (iii) the one that is incidental,539 or (iv) the 540 kind, or causes either (v) combined or (vi) separated. But you could find this result not only for the productive cause541 but also for the rest: e.g., in the case of matter this particular bronze is the cause of the Diadoumenos,542 and in unqualified terms it is bronze and body [(i) and

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(ii)]543. Again, red (and assume the bronze to be red) is also without qualification red bronze and a fortiori coloured bronze [(iii) and (iv)], and when combined it is red bronze 544 than black bronze [(v) rather than (vi)]. The effects are also spoken of analogously to the causes and in equivalent terms, since we define an effect either directly or as the kind of thing it is (e.g., Polycleitus produced this particular Diadoumenos, or a statue, or, in general terms, a likeness [(i) and (ii)]).545 The same applies to the incidental cause, to spare extended discussion of each case. 46,22 (195b16-21) But each of these six types is in turn presented in two ways: either as potential or as actual, the difference being that the causes that activate go both in and out of existence along with the effects being activated, e.g., someone cutting and sawing does so along with what is being cut and sawn,546 but not invariably with potential causes: the house-builder, for example, does not cease to be along with the house, nor the carpenter with the bench, and by potentiality here I mean not only the activity547 but also what has ceased from activity. 47,2 (195b21-5) We should always inquire into each thing’s cause where it is the most authoritative and proximate one,548 and this is where the inquiry into ‘why?’ stops:549 e.g., ‘Why is this man the cause of the house?’, ‘Because he is a house-builder’; ‘Why, in general, is a house-builder the cause of a house?’, ‘Because he possesses the art of house-building.’ Once that point is reached you have to stop, since the next question is silly. It is the art therefore that is the first cause of the house. 47,7 (195b25-8) But the kinds too must be described as causes of kinds and individual ones as causes 550 (a sculptor, for example, as the cause of a statue, but this particular sculptor of this particular statue), and the potential causes for potential things, and the activating ones of things that are being activated.551 47,10 (195b28-30) We have, then, defined each cause in terms of their number and the number of ways in which they are presented. [Chapters 4-6. Causes, luck and spontaneity]552 [Chapter 4. The existence of luck] 47,12 (195b31-6) Both luck and spontaneity are said to be the cause of many things and many things are said to exist and come about because of luck and spontaneity. So553 what has to be investigated is under which type of cause described above these fall, i.e., whether luck and spontaneity are the same or different and what in general each is, but 554 whether luck exists at all. That, after all, is the place to begin. 47,16 (195b36-196a11) Someone could indeed say that ‘luck’ is an empty name and that in fact in cases where a cause is stated and named, a determinate cause can invariably be selected from the types offered above. Take X who went to the market-place to talk to somebody and came across a friend who had returned from being abroad, a man he

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wanted to see but did not think that he would see at that time. If you asked X for the cause of this, i.e., how he came across his friend, he would say ‘by luck’, but this is an empty claim. How was it by luck rather than on the basis of the choice on which he based his decision to go out to the market-place? In fact555 had he gone out not for this purpose but for a different one, then some other cause for his seeing his friend has to be looked for rather than his going out. So if those who posit luck also regard it as an indeterminate cause, but a determinate cause can be applied to each thing said to be by luck, then surely the devotees of luck as a cause of certain things are using the name with no object to refer to? And not to be overlooked are all the early thinkers who theorized about causes, not one of whom would even number luck among them. 48,5 (196a11-16) So that is what the [opponents of luck] might say in expelling luck from the realm of real objects, but we see the preceding argument as achieving the opposite of its aim: it wants to eliminate luck but instead unwittingly validates it. I mean that if when we can always assign everything that comes about to determinate causes and are fully aware of this we still say that not all but only some things rather than others exist by luck, then luck is clearly something causative beyond the determinate cause, given that we are never at a loss for a determinate principle yet in some cases take the cause not to be the determinate and manifest principle but luck as distinctly different from it. 48,13 For example,556 why is Achilles said to have killed Hector on the basis of choice, but Adrastus to have killed the son of Croesus by luck, when Adrastus, just like Achilles, should also be said to have acted from choice? In fact in this case too557 the [opponents of luck] were satisfied to bluster that had Adrastus not chosen to hurl his spear, the son of Croesus would not have been killed. But Adrastus did make a choice when he released his spear, but his choice was directed not at the son of Croesus but at the wild beast. So consider the choice as the cause not of the killing but of the release. How so? Because558 had Adrastus known in advance what was going to happen, he would not have dispatched the javelin. Thus such a murder is correctly said to be by luck rather than from forethought. So it is on these terms that people are also duly pardoned and Croesus showed good judgment in not being enraged at the perpetrator. 48,23 (196a16-24) But if none of the early thinkers mentioned luck, why not? This neglect rather than the elimination of luck is the indictment they face since clearly they have not really offered an account of it anywhere – not Empedocles, Anaxagoras, or anyone else who thought that luck was included in the causes that they stated (e.g., Love, Strife, Intelligizing, or Fire) nor anything like these. But this neglect has no bearing on the argument since they also gave no account of many other things too but ‘time suffices to discover the truth’.559 Still it is remarkable that if, while not believing in luck at all, they still did not persuade people that they were being led to an empty name – remarkable too if they knew of its existence and neglected to explain how it exists. I recall

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that even despite himself Empedocles560 stumbles on the term somewhere and by using ‘luck’ to present natural science thinks that he is generally unnoticed. Actually he makes luck the cause of the separation of air when he says ‘[the aether] chanced (sunekurse) to be running at that time in this way, but often in another way’,561 and he says that the parts of animals come to be mostly by luck.562 49,10 (196a24-196b5) But Empedocles would merit a lesser charge if in using ‘luck’ for trivial matters he offers no account of it, whereas Democritus and the rest surely merit indictment for attributing563 the most significant things to luck while not even sharing with mankind the slightest rationale for failing to refer the unlimited number of world-orders, the whirl and the restraining order564 to some other cause while availing themselves only of luck and spontaneity? Yet what also just by itself amazes me about these men is (i) their reducing the most significant and most divine of the phenomena – the heavens, and the dance of the stars,565 in which there is nothing indeterminate or disordered – to spontaneity and luck when (ii) they see plants and animals generated in accordance with determinate and ordered causes, whether Nature, Intelligizing or whatever else one might like to name as the causes. I am at odds with them not so much about (i) but more the fact that irrationality, disorder and spontaneity are clearly remote from (ii), the generation of plants and animals. I mean, why, if luck is the cause, does one random thing not come to be from another rather than a human being from a human being, an olive-tree from an olive tree?566 And nobody says that it is ‘by luck’ that a horse is born from a horse, or that an ear of corn blossoms from wheat! If this is so for things that are frequently impeded and disrupted, whereas the heavens, stars and the unchanging and everlasting order combine in an order that accords not with intelligence or reason but with the outcome of spontaneity and luck, then the early thinkers err doubly: they make luck the cause of everything and give us no supporting explanation for it! 49,30 (196b5-9) But there are some who have been convinced that luck was the cause of quite a number of things but being unable to offer a valid account its nature run away567 by positing it as a cause obscure to human thought, and from what they say they seem to take it to be something divine and somewhat involved with spirits.568 And the masses too cling to this opinion when they worship luck and construct temples to it in the company of the gods.569 So, as I said, the investigation has to be in accordance with the standard procedure.570 [Chapter 5. Luck as a cause] 50,6 (196b10-17) We could grasp that luck exists571 and what it is present in as follows. Of the things that come about (i) some always do so in the same way, like the eternal bodies,572 (ii) others for the most part,573 as with those that exist naturally, while (iii) those that are

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opposite to (ii) exist to a lesser extent. I mean that since some things come about for the most part, clearly others also do so to a lesser extent, and they preclude the former from coming about by necessity.574 So is luck present in the things that come about by necessity? And who would say that the Sun rises or sets today by luck? But is it present in those that come about for the most part? But nobody says that Callias was born with five fingers by luck or that, given the existence of the Sun, a heat-wave in the dog days or a storm in Sagittarius is by luck.575 So is luck present in those that come about to a lesser extent? Yes, since this, he says,576 is the standard view, given that things that come about through luck can also happen rarely and what happens rarely can come about by luck. At this point let it stand that luck is also present in the things that come about to a lesser extent. 50,18 (196b17-21) But if in turn we draw the distinction differently, then of the things that come about (i) some do so for a purpose (as with all those for which thought577 and nature is the craftsman), (ii) others for no purpose (as when we comb our hair or remove a speck).578 Where in these is luck to be ranked?579 In those that are for a purpose, I say, but I want to delay for a moment saying how580 and for now substitute the following [argument],581 since its demonstration will not be prolonged. Let us infer the consequence from the premises. So the premises posited are (i) luck is present in the things that come about to a lesser extent; and (ii) luck is present in the things that come about for a purpose. What conclusion is drawn from them? It is that (iii) in the things that come about for a purpose some also come about to a lesser extent. So to what end was I drawn to express this particular argument in deductive form prior to explicating the second of the premises?582 It is because purpose is not present in the things that are 583 in the same state nor584 likewise in those that exist for the most part, but there should be no surprise at its also being found present in those that exist to a lesser extent. So be it. 50,29 (196b21-4) So how are luck and spontaneity present in things with a purpose? The discussion certainly needs this addition. Everyone would accept that the things that come about through thought and through nature do so585 for a purpose, e.g., going out of the house (for the purpose of bathing or of conversing with a friend), and a tile’s falling from a roof (to move to its proper place, and I am talking about a heavy and earthen body moving to a lower place when inadequately supported). So when the only end that these actions confront is also the purpose for which they originally came about, there is nothing in common here with luck. But when, as often tends to happen, there is something different beyond the end originally projected, this is where luck and spontaneity come into the picture. For example: X went off to take a bath, but stumbled on a rabid dog; a tile fell down to occupy its proper place, since being in mid-air was contra-natural for it, but it struck a person passing by.586 So while it is possible to say that the cause

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of such incidental events is in a sense nature or choice, it is still not a cause in its own right (X did not, after all, go out, and the tile did not fall down, for these particular purposes),587 but, if anything, incidentally.588 Luck and spontaneity, then, exist when something’s nature or someone’s choice become a cause incidentally. So I meant589 that luck was present in things with purpose because it was present in things based on thought and on nature where these become the causes of certain things incidentally. And they do become causes of certain things incidentally when certain other things confront them rather than those for the purpose of which they came about. 51,20 (196b24-33) With things in general some exist in their own right, others incidentally: a substance in its own right, the properties incidental to it incidentally. Similarly some causes too are causes in their own right, others incidentally: the builder the cause of a house in his own right but incidentally as a white or an educated man. Also, while the cause in its own right is determinate, the incidental one is indeterminate (an unlimited number of things could, after all, be incidental to the house-builder). Luck too is such a cause and is for this reason indeterminate. But luck differs from the other incidental causes because (i) when each of the latter is incidental to the cause in its own right it is also duly described as itself a cause (as with something white, educated, walking or sitting), which is why this kind of thing is not also a cause in a strict sense; but (ii) in the case of luck one and the same action is a cause in its own right of one thing, incidentally of another: digging, for example, is the cause in its own right of planting but incidentally of finding a treasure trove. Thus in (i) the difference is in the causes (the one existing in its own right, the other incidentally), but in (ii) it is in the ends of the cause that exists in its own right and of the incidental cause. However, luck also has indeterminacy to no less, if not an even greater, extent, since finding a treasure trove could be a consequence additional to many, even an unlimited number, of causes that come about for some other purpose – to digging for the purposes of planting, of laying foundations, of channelling a duct for a cistern, pond, monument, tomb and for innumerable other ends. So as was stated earlier too590 (there is nothing absurd to take time to recall the same things frequently for clarity’s sake),591 when things that come about for a purpose come about incidentally as the causes of something ,592 then what has confronted them in this way is said to have happened by luck or spontaneity. 52,12 (196b33-197a8) For example: X went out for the purpose of bathing593 but got his money when he had the luck to meet a borrower (Y) as the latter was being paid a contribution [from Z].594 Going out, that is, was incidentally the cause of X’s getting his money since it did not happen for this purpose. If it had been for this purpose, he would not be said to have got his money by luck, nor if he was heading to that place by necessity, or in line with his usual habit (the kind of thing that is

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neither beyond reason nor infrequent). And what must be considered in the case of luck is that ‘incidental’ applies not only to the productive cause but also to the end: i.e., just as going out is incidentally the cause of being paid, so is being paid incidentally the end of going out. And while the cause insofar as it is productive is called ‘luck’, the one contributing to the end is called ‘the outcome of luck’, but it too must be indeterminate rather than in an orderly sequence. Were it in such a sequence, it would no longer be by luck. It is reasonable for it to be indeterminate too since it is also incidental, i.e., [X’s] going out could have met not only with being paid but also with being hit and with watching a procession,595 since going out happened for a single purpose but had an unlimited number of possible additional consequences. So on the basis of what has been stated luck is clearly not an incidental cause in things that come about by necessity or for the most part. Instead it is in things that happen to a lesser extent and among the latter in those that are for a purpose based on choice. That is why luck is also in everything that thought is in, since without thought there is no choice. 53,2 (197a8-18) So the causes from which the outcome of luck could come about are necessarily indeterminate. Hence luck is thought to be indeterminate. This is because all the incidental causes possess nothing determinate since they differ from those that exist in their own right primarily because in the case of the latter A can be defined as the cause of B (e.g., a house-builder as the cause of the house) but not in the case of the incidental causes (e.g., a white house-builder is no more a cause than an educated one).596 The causes of X’s getting his money [from Y] when he went out are thus of an unlimited quantity: e.g., his wanting to see someone, his prosecuting or defending a case, his intention to go to the theatre.597 So if you say that 598 are causes in their own right, nothing could be thought to be by luck. 53,10 (197a18-25) Yet there is nothing remarkable about luck being said to be beyond reason, since reason is in what comes about by necessity or for the most part. But since luck is an incidental cause, and since in these cases some causes are always closer, others more remote (Polyclitus closer as the cause of the statue, more remote as a human being),599 this would also be the outcome among causes that exist by luck. Take fresh air, sun-bathing, getting a haircut and perspiring in the head:600 they become a cause of health for a sick person although he has done none of them for the sake of health but instead either to carry out an action, to go to the theatre, or to discard hair. (In this case fresh air is in fact a more proximate cause of health than getting a haircut.) So when we make a comparative assessment of the causes that are incidental to one another, we can find ones that are more proximate and more remote. When, however, we simply inquire into what could be the cause of what is derived from luck, we cannot state a specific one in a definition since, as we have often stated earlier,601 innumerable and indeterminate causes can be selected.

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53,24 (197a25-32) Good luck exists when the end met with is the kind that would have also been originally chosen, bad luck when not of that kind. And luck is said to be good when something good results, bad when it is bad,602 and there is good luck and bad luck when they have major significance. And to miss by a little a great good603 that was also near at hand is a major piece of bad luck, because our thinking says that it is already present (being near at hand 604 a great evil is said to involve a major piece of good luck. But good luck is also for good reason unstable, since luck is unstable because it exists neither from necessity nor for the most part.605 [Chapter 6. Spontaneity] 54,7 (197a36-b5) So spontaneity too is, as stated above,606 an incidental cause in things that come about to a lesser extent and for a purpose, but it differs from luck because spontaneity is, and is said to be, of wider extent. Everything that is by luck, is spontaneous, but not everything spontaneous is also by luck, given that luck and its outcome are present in607 the same things as achieving good luck, and in general a specific action, are present. This is why luck also necessarily applies to acts, and, as stated in the Ethics,608 acts are things based on choice. 54,13 (197b5-13) And a sign of this is that good luck is held to be the same as happiness, and happiness held to be a kind of faring-well and applicable to action, so that everything that cannot act cannot even609 achieve anything on the basis of luck. And for this reason nothing inanimate or bestial achieves anything by luck because it has no choice, nor do these things have good or bad luck except perhaps analogously, as with Protarchus’ claim610 that the stones from which altars and statues are built have good luck because although contributing nothing to these structures we revere them611 but may well trample on the ones adjacent to them. Also, some inanimate objects have a lucky outcome when someone luckily performs an action with such instruments. Take the man who struck the tyrant ‘Prometheus’ when out to assassinate him but was the one who excised his tumour and healed him.612 His sword could in fact be duly said to have good luck if613 the person who had been healed got down on his knees before it. 54,25 (197b13-20) Spontaneity could apply both to inanimate things and to irrational animals614 not analogously but in a strict sense. A horse, for example, was retrieved spontaneously after he had been captured by the enemy; he took off with the object of getting a drink but after he had taken off he was retrieved by his owner. Again, a tripod spontaneously occupies a position in which it can be sat on but615 did not fall down for this purpose.616 Also, the end met with has to be external rather than in the nature of the object. If, for example, a stone that has fallen down has the shape of a cube, it does not spontaneously occupy a

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position in which it can be effectively sat on, since if it falls, it is in its nature to fall that way every time. And this explains why fire too does not move upwards spontaneously when this is the nature of fire. 55,8 (197b20-2) So while I am claiming that spontaneity is like this, the feature that it has in common with luck ought to be described. Things are by luck when they come about spontaneously among those who possess choice, yet not everything contrary to choice is ipso facto by luck: e.g., someone who sailed during a storm did not confront a shipwreck by choice, yet not by luck either, since this is how things generally turn out. 55,13 (197b22-30) But a sign that spontaneity is as we have described is that the things said to come about ‘pointlessly’ (matên) are acts that did not meet the ends617 for the purpose of which they were performed. When, for example, our purpose in taking a walk is to open our bowels but this does not happen, we say that we have taken a walk pointlessly, since pointlessness in this case is something that has by nature another purpose 618 when the purpose for which it existed and619 was naturally established does not come about.620 Look, if someone said that their bathing was pointless because the sun had not undergone an eclipse, he would be ridiculed: the first was not, after all, for the sake of the second. Thus621 the noun ‘spontaneity’ (auto-maton) is also a paronym of ‘622 pointless’ (auto matên).623 55,20 (197b30-2)624 So frequently nothing different follows from what happens pointlessly, only its failing to reach its own end, as with someone taking a stroll without being purged, and this is pointlessness.625 Yet frequently an end exists different from the purpose for which the action was performed, as with the discovery of gold by a person who is motivated by purging to take a walk, and this is spontaneity. But spontaneity differs from pointlessness by also achieving the end of the productive cause, just as the outcome of luck also does for luck. 626 In general when a result is such that it has its own productive causes but comes about not through its own causes pre-existing but through some others that were themselves also followed by a different end unique to them, then the pre-existing ones are said to have come about pointlessly because what was projected did not derive from them, and the additional consequences are said to have come about spontaneously because they did so with no pre-existent source of their own. For example, a stone fell and hit a passer-by. Here we could say that hitting was the end, falling the productive cause. But in fact the hitting has as a different source of its own, not falling but, maybe, being thrown by somebody so as to hit something, and falling has as its end not hitting anything but moving to its own place. Instead, the cause [sc. falling] and the end [sc. hitting] happened incidentally to one another.627 Also, someone who went out to do something but turned back when he was struck, went out pointlessly but was struck spontaneously, and perhaps also by luck, since spontaneity has a wider extension.628

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56,15 (197b32-7) You could also learn this from our saying that when something comes about contra-naturally in, for example, the birth of numerous monstrosities,629 it does so not by luck but spontaneously (as with people who are six-fingered or ostrich-headed). Surely these monstrosities are not spontaneous? After all, they have a cause of their own pre-existing within them, either due to630 cooling or to a deficiency or excess of matter?631 But someone is going to say that the stone that fell also had weight within it, but weight by itself can produce the falling but not the act of hitting someone, and that is what we said632 was spontaneous. 56,21 (198a1-5) So that completes a statement of what luck and spontaneity are and how they differ from one another. They are referred to the productive kind of causes because they are an additional consequence of productive causes either by nature or by thought: by nature where a stone moved downwards and hit someone due to its weight, but by thought when someone digs a foundation and finds a treasure trove. The digging is not in its own right luck,633 nor is finding a treasure trove (someone could, after all, dig in the hope of finding a treasure trove),634 but whenever the one does not come about for the purpose of the other but instead they meet up with one another and, as it were, collide, their concurrence is called ‘luck’. 57,1 (198a5-13) But since luck and spontaneity have been demonstrated to apply to the same things for which Intelligence or Nature could incidentally become causes, Intelligence and Nature are consequently prior to luck and spontaneity (things that exist in their own right are always prior to those that are incidental), and so all who present luck as the cause of this universe will clearly be abandoning Intelligence as prior. So if positing Intelligence as a cause is a necessary consequence for them, behold how the only alternative is ridiculous. I mean that if Intelligence is incidentally a cause of the heavens, then I can find nothing that it can produce in its own right. [Chapters 7-9. Causes, final causes and necessity] [Chapter 7. The four causes (2)] 57,9 (198a14-24) That the causes are as many as we say635 is clear from the fact that when asked in each case why each thing exists, our answer is ultimately either (i) the definition636 (as, for example, with mathematical objects – ‘Why are these [lines] equal?’, ‘Because they are drawn in the circle from the center?’; ‘Why are those from the center equal inside the circle?’: ‘Because a circle is a plane figure?’;637 definitions just like the geometers provide); or (ii) the first cause of change (e.g., ‘Why did the Thebans make war on the Phocians?’: ‘Because the Phocians plundered the temple [at Delphi]’);638 or (iii) the purpose (,639 ‘Why did the [Persian] King make war on the Greeks?’: ‘So that he might rule the Greeks.’);640 or we go last of all to (iv) the matter; e.g., ‘Why did the

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bench rot?’: ‘Because it was made of wood’. And by reducing ‘Why?’ to all of the causes the natural scientist will answer641 ‘Why does a human being die?’ as ‘Either because he is a rational animal who is mortal; or because his productive cause, the soul, goes off and departs; or because he consists of matter that can cease to be; or because dying is better for him’.642 57,21 (198a24-7) And three causes (form, purpose, and the source of the principle of change) often amount to one, since nature is an end, a form, and a productive cause of the things that come to be by nature, as similarly is the soul too.643 But also one human being 644 another through being identical in form as the one who is generated, and in general everything that by undergoing change causes change directly rather than through any intermediary, also has the same form as what comes to be through its agency. 57,26 (198a31-5)645 And I speak with reference to the natural scientists, since where coming into being is concerned they inquire into the causes in the following way: (i) what comes to be after what (for nature changes for the sake of the form prior to it, and when it completes work on the form, ceases forward progress)? 646 (ii) how has what is just matter been affected and altered?; and (iii) what has acted and caused change? But this is not every cause, just the one directly related and as possibly changing. 58,5 (198a28-b3)647 But if something that is unchanging also becomes a principle of change, then the first philosopher rather than natural scientist648 will provide the definition, which is why there are three systematic approaches: one for things that change and can cease to be; one for those that change but cannot cease to be; and one for those that cannot cease to be and cannot change. The principles that produce change naturally, that is, are twofold, with one of them not natural since it does not have within itself a principle of change, i.e., is not nature, and if something produces change without changing it is like this, as with the cause that is completely649 unchanging and is the one prior to everything.650 58,12 (198b5-8) So ‘why?’ must, as we also stated earlier,651 be presented in accordance with all the types and we shall provide a restatement for practice. ‘Why did this thing come to be?’ (i) Because this is its productive cause, which among the eternal bodies652 produces an effect without qualification and by necessity (i.e., what is second is a consequence of what is prior to it), but does so for the most part among things that can be brought into being; (ii) this particular matter must pre-exist because a particular thing is going to come to be, just as the conclusion in a syllogism cannot come about unless the premises are jointly assumed; (iii) because this is the essence and the definition of the object, and it, as I have said,653 often coincides with (iv) the purpose when it is understood that it is better for a thing to be so – better, for example, that a human being’s form be such rather than otherwise.

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58,21 (198b8-9) But ‘better’ must be taken not without qualification but as relative to each thing’s substance,654 given that what is best is not a single end for everything (everything would then have one end) but one [end]655 distributed among the things that can come to be in each thing’s own nature. So when the statement [in this text] is taken to mean that what is better is unequivocally so rather than otherwise,656 then, as in the case of natural things, it becomes identical to the purpose. But when this can no longer be achieved, only the form persists, as with mathematical objects, since in their case we cannot demonstrate as we can in the cases of a human being, horse and plant that targeting what is better always belongs to the form.657 It would, after all, be a joke for someone to try to prove that the circle is better off having the lines that extend from its centre equal and the square658 those that enclose it. [Chapter 8. Nature and purpose] 59,5 (198b10-16) But since our frequent claim has been that nature produces for a purpose,659 this too must be demonstrated since it involves some controversies. Also to be demonstrated is how natural things possess necessity,660 since virtually everyone who has discussed nature reduces the causes to necessity because they consider necessity nothing other than matter. For example, since heat has a specific quality as well as coldness and each type of matter that each thinker posits as a first-principle, these661 come to be by necessity. The ones who did mention a productive cause, such as Empedocles, Anaxagoras, or any other early thinker, dismissed it after just skimming over it. 59,13 (198b16-32) Some say that nature produces not for a purpose, not, in other words, because it is better this way, but, in their words,662 as ‘Zeus rains’, not to make someone’s corn grow nor to destroy the corn laid up in the granary, but because of material necessity. The explanation is that moisture that has been elevated has to cool and when it has become water it has to fall,663 and when it has fallen the result is that in some cases corn grows but in others it is destroyed. So by this token what stops the parts of animals too from becoming the kind of things they are by necessity, since they come from matter that is the kind of thing it is? But when the parts coincide so that they are suitably inter-related and all contributing to a single function the same way they would have come to be had they also come to be for a purpose, what stops them from being preserved when combined spontaneously, as for example with teeth? They could be said to emerge by necessity, with the front ones sharp and the molars flat, not for the former to slice and the latter to chew, but rather they emerge in this way due to some material necessity, while incidentally positioned so that664 they are suitable for masticating food,665 whereas things that do not coincide so that they

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fulfill a single need cease to exist, as Empedocles 666 ‘ox-progeny with a man’s face’. 59,28 (198b32-199a8) So this is what they say, but it defies comprehension. Why? Because some works of nature come to be either in the same way at all times or for the most part consistently (e.g., a human being from a human being, a horse from a horse in the same way, and teeth as well),667 whereas things that occur by luck are infrequent and rare (e.g., rain in the dog days and a heat-wave during winter are both said to be by luck).668 So if nature is mostly determinate but luck mostly indeterminate,669 then the works of nature will not be by luck and spontaneity, but, as we say, for a purpose, and the works of nature are animals, plants and their parts, in which nothing is at random, pointless, defective or superfluous. But670 grant that Zeus’ purpose in raining671 is not to make my corn grow: what has this to do with rain having no purpose? If its purpose is not my wheat, it is not without any purpose but nature generates rain primarily for some other purpose, as you will learn in our forthcoming discussion on the cosmos.672 Farming, however, makes added use of this event that comes about naturally since it sows when it expects that there will be rain. 60,14 (199a8-20) So in the sub-set of things that come to be that have an end at which change reaches a limit and ends its continuous advance, everything prior to the end comes about for the sake of the end. Such an end can be discovered with precision among the works of nature, since they change continuously and advance without interruption to the point of achieving the end in its totality. In fact, grass, stalk and ear, and these varied and numerous shapes advance as far as wheat followed immediately by stability and rest, making it clear that they were all generated for the sake of the wheat. What precedes the end does not therefore coincide with the end but comes to be naturally for its sake. If nature, for example, produced a house, it would also have done so in just the same way as a house naturally comes to be, and a house naturally comes to be when what precedes the end comes to be for the sake of the end, with the foundation-stones put in place, the planks sawed and the mud moulded for the sake of shelter, which is the end for the house. But not even if art had produced an animal would it have done differently from nature and it would have produced what precedes the end for the sake of the end. It is the same way, therefore, with nature too. But in general art brings to their end the things on which nature cannot, when its strength gives out, complete its work, e.g., medicine with drugs for health and weight-gain,673 while through painting and sculpting it represents all sorts of appearances of animals and plants. So the ends in both [art and nature] are related to what precedes them in the same way.674 61,3 (199a20-32) It is particularly obvious that in the case of certain animals nature has a purpose, as, for example, with ants and spiders which, though acting neither by art nor by choice, nevertheless act for

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a purpose. Also, the swallow builds its nest by knitting mud together with stalks and working up a very capacious and very strong structure;675 the bee is admired for combining hexagons;676 and water would barely damage the kingfisher’s lair.677 We could say a lot if we wanted to display the rationality678 of animals, and why must we talk about animals when in plants too nature invariably pursues a purpose? Leaves, for example, exist for the sake of fruit, and roots for that of nutrition, since why, I insist, are roots not above ground and shoots below it? And why does nature surround the seeds of fruits as it does when it clothes some with bark and others with pods unless it has considerable forethought for their coming to be from one another without interruption? So from all that has been said it is clear that nature produces for a purpose, but in two ways: as matter, and as form and end – matter existing for the sake of the form, since the form, definition and shape are the more authoritative cause. Yet the early thinkers revered matter excessively: it was all they knew!679 61,19 (199a33-b13) And someone might say: ‘But if nature invariably pursues a purpose, how does it not always successfully achieve it?’ But how does art not always successfully achieve the purpose for which it exists? A drug has instead frequently caused harm when the body lacked tolerance due to weakness, and a bed-leg has broken while it was being fitted together. But even so the drug was administered to provide help and the bed-leg was the object of extensive work because of the bed. So either purpose has to be removed from art or it has to be granted to nature, since in cases in which purpose is also particularly manifest both art and nature do successfully achieve it for the most part while erring to a lesser extent, yet nevertheless even in the latter cases purpose is present because they were targeting a good end but unintentionally failed to hit the mark due to the weakness of matter.680 Indeed, when they do err, they are not anywhere far from the mark681 and the fault certainly not far from the projected end. At least from a man a plane tree never came into being but under the best conditions a man, but otherwise a woman, otherwise an animal, otherwise flesh.682 And a millet seed683 produces a fig or wild-fig, not an oak or a pear-tree; and again an olive tree an olive tree or a wild olive,684 not a plane tree or a pine tree. The ‘ox-progeny with a man’s face’685 in Empedocles’ constitution of animals is also like this. (199b9-13) But not even he dared use ‘olive-faced’ in the case of animals, indeed not even in the case of plants did he have the nerve to use ‘vine-born’ and the like, though he ought to have done so all the more, since purpose is less present in plants. So there is no point in considering such an inventory of monstrosities worth any discussion, but still it must be said that even if ‘ox-progeny with a man’s face’ had come to be in accordance with their original constitution, they would have done so as the monstrosities of weakening sperm, i.e., a deteriorating principle,686 not just because semi-animals were glued together with one another. (199b7-9) ‘The whole-natured’, as Empedo-

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cles calls it,687 is when complete and capable of surviving not even thereby constituted as an animal but comes to be from a seed if the shape prevails. 62,13 (199b13-33) In general, those who remove purpose from nature are abandoning what it is and the name ‘nature’, since anyone who says that some things come to be by nature but not for a purpose, is also using the term ‘nature’ pointlessly. The things that exist by nature, that is, are those that by changing from some inherent principle arrive in an orderly sequence at a specific end, not just a random one from a random principle. The latter, as has been stated,688 happens incidentally in things that exist by luck, whereas here each end is a determinate outcome of each principle and is successfully achieved689 for the most part, without infrequency and certainly not, as with things involving luck, to a lesser extent. So why do they say that what exists by nature comes to be by luck? Nature and luck cannot, after all, be conjoined, unless you would like to glue them together randomly in name alone, since the meanings derived from both are completely remote from one another. We do not, I swear, see nature deliberating as we do people who act for a purpose. But by that criterion purpose would also not accompany most of the arts. A carpenter certainly does not deliberate about whether he has to saw or plane first nor does a grammarian deliberate about how he ought to write out the alphabet,690 and when he writes KLE-ON he certainly does not investigate which syllable has to be written first or second. Similarly a house-builder does not deliberate about whether he should work on the foundations first or on the walls or roof.691 Instead, each piece of work and the sequence that leads to the projected end is also fixed and each of the craftsmen travels his pre-ordained road. It is the same with nature too (a model, after all, for art), the difference being that art is external, nature internal, to the work, since 692 we insert carpentry in the planks, it would also not work on a bed differently from the way it does now when it is external. So if, as things are, carpentry has a purpose, it would also possess it in just the same way whenever it went to work like nature. Art most of all resembles nature when someone personally practices medicine on himself. That, then, is a statement of the distinction and on the basis of these arguments anyone would be adequately convinced.693 [Chapter 9. Nature and necessity] 63,15 (199b34-200a7) But the next thing to be investigated is how necessity is present in what exists by nature. Do the things that come to be by nature simply come to be by necessity so that the end simply694 follows what comes to be prior to it? Or is it as the natural scientists maintained in believing that what comes to be necessarily follows changes in matter?695 Necessity is in a way present in natural things but not as the natural scientists say, since they quite ludicrously introduce

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necessity into the workings of nature (they say, for example, that the earth necessarily moves696 downwards because it is heavy, the aether upwards because it is light!).697 This is because they attach the necessity belonging to things that come into being to natural changes in matter, which is just like it being thought that a wall also 698 of necessity because heavy things naturally have moved downwards and light ones to the surface, and that a wall has been constructed through stones moving699 downwards due to their weight, bricks and planks upwards due to their lightness. This comes from a dolt700 who had also never seen a house being built. The foundations, or the bricks and planks do not, 701 as they claim, establish a house by being changed as was their nature; the given combination, i.e., the shape and art, which is itself dominant in the process does so not without those materials yet not due to them, but on the contrary through incorporating them due to itself.702 Matter, as we have said,703 is also one of the causes existing in their own right, but the shape, definition and essence are more authoritative and these704 do not follow the changes in matter of necessity but rather matter naturally coincides with the definition: e.g., a chisel and a plough certainly do not come to be of necessity because iron does, but we forge iron because we also need a chisel and a plough. And we build houses not because we have bricks and planks to hand; these too are needed but we principally build houses not due to them but due to covering and preserving certain things, and that is the definition of a house. 64,9 (200a7-15) The same applies to other things that come to be for a purpose. ‘Why does a cloak come to be?’, ‘So that we can clothe ourselves’, but not so without wool; so wool must underlie it. ‘Why do shoes come to be?’, ‘To avoid being lacerated when we walk’, but not so without leather; so prior thought must be given to leather. So if coming to be for a shirt and a shoe were entirely705 a consequence of wool and leather respectively, then forms would necessarily follow their matter. But as it is,706 iron 707 necessarily underlie a saw, and stones a cornice, but a saw’s coming to be does not necessarily follow the existence of iron, nor a cornice’s being built necessarily follow the existence of stones. So matter has necessity but due not to itself but to the shape and the form, since nothing necessarily follows matter but it itself must necessarily first underlie the form. Thus the end does not necessarily follow what precedes it but if you assume it, then necessity, i.e., the cause based on necessity, follows due to this assumption.708 The end therefore does not exist of necessity but what is of necessity exists because of the end, since matter exists because of the end and the underlying subject exists because of the shape, and matter and the underlying subject are the cause that exists of necessity. So those who posit matter as the only cause and who say that the things that come to be follow its natural changes would be saying that they simply come to be of necessity. Since we have demonstrated709 that there is another

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more authoritative cause beyond the matter, viz. the form for the sake of which the matter is also incorporated without itself incorporating the shape, matter could not be simply described as a cause, nor simply as necessary, but rather, as it is often our habit to say, ‘conditionally’ (ex hupotheseôs),710 since the necessity of matter too is discovered only by assuming the form. 65,1 (200a15-30) Conditionality is in a way necessary even in mathematics,711 since if you assume the premises, the conclusion also necessarily follows, but if the conclusion is this particular one, then the premises are also invariably multiple, since the same thing can be demonstrated in more than one way. Take numbers: if 5 + 5, then invariably 10; but if 10, then not invariably 5 + 5 (it could, after all, be 7 + 3 and 6 + 4). Thus the posited premises from which the conclusion follows do not follow from the conclusion posited. If, however, the conclusion is not necessary, the premises will not be necessary either. So is conditional necessity in this way712 the same for natural things? Not at all, but rather the sequence is reversed. In the mathematical case the premises entail the conclusion too, i.e., what is prior entails what is later, but it is the reverse with natural things, viz., what is later entails what is earlier, and so the form entails the matter, since everything else is the same. With natural things the form necessarily needed matter but did not necessarily follow from the matter; similarly in the case of deductions the premises necessarily produce the conclusion, but when the conclusion is not necessitated, they do hold.713 So the order is reversed, but perhaps not even this.714 In the productive arts, that is, reasoning and action have different first-principles with regard to the definition and purpose, with, for example, in the case of house-building the form and definition of the house being the first-principle of reasoning, whereas the foundations are the first-principle of action. But where there is no production or action,715 the first-principle with regard to reasoning and the definition is consequently left as one since nothing else exists. But these are the premises so that if in the one case the premises are the first-principles with regard to the definition but in the other are the form, then in both cases the inference would be generated in the same way, since the first-principles with regard to the definition would entail something necessary – matter for the productive arts, the conclusion for the theoretical ones. 65,26 (200a30-b8) How matter, and its changes and alterations, possess necessity has therefore come to light716 throughout, since without matter the shape and form cannot come to be. And the natural scientist has to investigate both causes717 but more specifically that of purpose since it is the cause of matter. And I have said718 that for natural things the form and the purpose are the same since the purpose becomes above all the first-principle for the definition and the essence, as also in the products of art, since 719 a house is of a given kind, then certain things have to come to be and necessarily exist; and, if health is like this,

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others have to come to be and necessarily exist, and by the same token there are also different ones for a human being or for a dog.720 With products of art the form often does not keep step with the purpose,721 but in most cases purpose is also present in the definition (e.g., a house made of things like this is like this for the sake of shelter), and the same applies to the things that exist by nature. And whether you take 722 of the things that come to be by nature or that do so by art, you will, if you scrutinize them like a natural scientist,723 find the matter, i.e., the necessary cause, also included in the actual definition (e.g., in defining the activity of sawing as dividing logs in a specific way the need for iron is at once present), and while in this way they are potential724 and based on subsequent reasoning ([e.g.], ‘What is anger?’;725 ‘A boiling of the blood in the heart caused by a desire for revenge.’), they are also often actual.726 Thus for the natural scientist definitions will emerge in accordance with the form but will also include the matter since the natural form is the kind of thing that is always considered along with the matter, i.e., along with an underlying subject.

Paraphrase of Book Three of Aristotle’s Physics [Chapters 1-3. Change] [Chapter 1] 67,2 (200b12-25) Since we have defined nature as a principle of change and transformation,727 what change is should not go unnoticed, since anyone ignorant of it is necessarily ignorant of the definition of nature too. So because change is included in the definition of nature, the definition covering it is essential, just as anything that might be discovered present in the definition of change would also have to be discussed next. And present at once in the definition of change is the continuous, and again in that of the continuous the unlimited, since we say that change is one of the things that are continuous728 but in defining the continuous we sometimes use the unlimited along with it. In fact, one definition of the continuous is as follows: what is divisible into an unlimited number of things is continuous.729 This means that the unlimited will belong primarily to continuous rather than to discrete quantity, given that it completes the definition of the first but not that of the second at all.730 The definition of the unlimited thus succeeds that concerning change but so do those concerning place, ,731 and the void, with place and time necessarily belonging to change, while the natural scientists regard the void as doing so. So whether or not their belief is correct has to be investigated,732 but the rest733 – change, place and time – are also common to natural bodies, and at the start too I said that it was more scientific to consider the features common to each thing prior to those that are unique.734 67,19 (200b25-8) So first let us discuss735 change by suggesting what is useful for its definition. Among things in general some (e.g., the immaterial and primary forms) exist only in actuality (they cannot be anything other than whatever they originally are), while others (e.g., compounds consisting of matter and form) exist both in actuality and in potentiality: in actuality because they already have a given shape, in potentiality because they can also receive a different one. But the aetherial body exists in respect of its substance (a respect in which it could never be transformed) only in actuality, but does in a way share in potentiality too because of its change of place, given that it is not

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everywhere at the same time.736 And things that exist in actuality do so either as substances, quantities, qualities, or some other category. So let it be posited without argument (P1) that some things that exist also possess potentiality. 68,8 (200b28-32) Again, my second737 and no less self-evident claim is that relative includes not only excess and deficiency, inequality, and greater or smaller but there are also many other types of relative (similarity, equality, and many others), and certainly relative includes what can produce an effect and what can be affected (they are obviously said to be relative to one another)738 so that (P2) what can produce change is also relative to what is changeable and the latter in turn is relative to the former. So let us also take it as plausible that these are said to be relative to one another. 68,16 (200b32-201a3) In addition (P3) change exists in the things that produce change and are changed rather than in its own right or as separable. But if it is in the things that produce change and are changed, clearly there will be change in the same number of ways in which the things that are changed are changed and transformed,739 and they are transformed either in substance, quality, quantity, or place. Thus change exists in many ways, since if the aforementioned categories had a common genus740 in which change was located, change would also necessarily be in that genus as prior and would not be said in many ways. Instead, just as that would be a genus for the four categories, so too would the change located in it also be a genus of the changes in the categories under that genus. But as it is change will be the same as the situations741 in which it is present. So since the definitions of the aforementioned categories differ, so too do the definitions of the changes. Thus even if we tried to provide a single definition of change, it must be realized that it too is one of the things said in many ways. So in addition to (P1)-(P3) let it be posited (P4) that change is one of the things said in many ways. 68,30 (201a3-9) And in addition let it also be posited that (P5) each of the [categories] in which we said that there was change both is742 and is said in two ways: either as better or worse. So for substance what is twofold is form and privation; for quantity complete and incomplete; for quality black and white, or any other of the opposites; for place743 above and below. So since change too is not anything distinct from the latter, it will also quite reasonably be something twofold in accordance with each category. We shall subsequently state how this will be the case but for now let us define what change is by making further use of the definitions given. 69,5 (201a9-11) So it was posited first744 [(P1)] that it existed in accordance with each category of things in general, in which both actualization and potentiality are present. I say, then, that change is (D1: 201a10-11) the actualization745 of what is potential746 insofar as it is such. So why is ‘insofar as it is such’ (hêi toiouton) added? 747 It is so

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that an actualization can come to be while the potentiality of which it was an actualization still persists and is preserved. In each case the actualization is twofold, as in the case of the bronze of a potential statue: it has actualizations both when it is coming to be a statue and when it has already become one, but the latter is the actualization when the potentiality is no longer preserved by which the bronze could have become a statue. This is because it already exists and no longer has potentiality, which is why this actualization is also a completion not of the potentiality (how could it complete what it puts out of existence?) but of the situation in which the potentiality existed. Now as for the actualization described first, the one by which something was coming to be a statue, if it maintains potentiality,748 then I say that such an actualization is change and is the completion of the potentiality, since every completion preserves what it completes in that as long as the potentiality is being preserved, the change is also being preserved, but when the change ceases so does the potentiality and it ceases when the form and shape supervene. 69,20 (201a11-15) But in each category potentiality is different and insofar as it is potentiality, it is also change, of what is alterable, for example, and could become, say, black or white as either the passage to white from black or that to black from white. I apply the name ‘alteration’ to both passages, and ‘increase’ and ‘diminution’ to those of what can be increased or diminished (I have no name common to both, as just now with ‘alteration’), while I apply the names ‘coming to be’ and ‘ceasing to be’ to the passages of what can come to be or cease to be, and ‘motion’ to those of what is moveable. Again, in the latter case there is a two-fold passage (upward or downward, forward or backward, to the right or to the left) but ‘motion’ is a single name for them all. So there are two ways in which there is change in accordance with each category, given that it was posited by us (P5) that each of the categories was said in two ways, and also posited (P3) that there was no change beyond the situations [in which it exists].749 69,31 (201a15-19) Now what precedes has come from prior definitions but that change is like this will also be clear from another example.750 Take the buildable: when it is actually coming to be built while still also preserving potentiality, it is being changed, since when it has been completely built it neither preserves potentiality nor is it being changed. So if the actualization of the buildable is house-building, and if house-building is a change, then the actualization of the buildable as buildable is change, as is that of the increasable as increasable and of the movable as moveable.751 70,5 Substitution [in D1] also makes it possible to say that change is (D1a) the first actualization of the potential; for while the transformation into the form in which it is then at rest is the last actualization, being en route to it, which is still a change, is the first.752 But when we say that the form too is an actualization in a strict and unqualified

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sense, clearly the procedure towards the form is towards the actualization in a strict and unqualified sense. So [change] is certainly not an actualization without qualification (how could something en route to such an actualization be so?) but an incomplete actualization.753 So in this way change is an actualization not in a strict or unqualified sense but as incomplete, yet not also as an incomplete activity but as a complete activity.754 70,13 (201a19-27) But755 some things are the same both potentially and actually, e.g., water is actually hot but potentially cold, but not at the same time and not in relation to the same thing; but if in relation to the same thing, then not at the same time (it cannot be hot both potentially and actually); but if at the same time, then not in relation to the same thing, but potentially cold and actually hot. Since some things are like this, it follows that many things both produce change and are changed by one another at the same time, i.e., produce effects and are affected: e.g., the saw will saw and be blunted, but not in the same respect or at the same time, but it will saw in respect of the form and be blunted in respect of the matter, since the iron is blunted but the shape rather than the iron will do the sawing. Also, fire heats and is at the same time cooled by what is being heated, but heats insofar as it is actually hot but is cooled insofar as it is potentially cold. Absolutely everything that exists both potentially and actually is, by also producing change in a natural way, reciprocally changed by what is being changed, but while it produces change insofar as it actually exists, it is reciprocally changed insofar as it is also potential, i.e., while it produces change with respect to the form, it is reciprocally changed with respect to the matter. But not absolutely everything that produces change is reciprocally changed in a natural way. Instead, everything produces change but only the things that in substance possess both potentiality and a form are reciprocally changed. Yet some believe that not only the things that produce change are changed in a natural way but also absolutely everything that produces change. We shall also investigate this subsequently,756 but for now let us go back to the definition of change. 70,33 (201a27-34) So when something actually one thing is potentially another, its actuality, which exists insofar as it is potential, is change,757 since nothing existing without qualification as only potential and not existing758 as anything actual could ever be changed. Matter too is not changed in its own right because it does not also actually exist in its own right.759 So something has actually to exist and to be actual not insofar as it is something but insofar as it can be something else, and I use ‘insofar as it can’ in the following way. Bronze is potentially a statue but still a change is not the actualization of the bronze as bronze (for insofar as it is bronze it is at rest) but the actualization of what accrues to it potentially and760 what belongs to it potentially is to become a statue.761 So the actuality of this is change. And nothing stops it insofar as it is bronze from being at rest, but insofar as it is potentially a statue

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nothing stops it from changing in this respect. Being bronze and being potentially a statue are not, that is, the same without qualification (otherwise they would also be the same in definition)762 but are in fact distinct with respect to their definition even if one with respect to their underlying subject. And while this has been demonstrated, nothing stops us from demonstrating it more clearly now as well. 71,14 (201a34-201b5) Being a body and being able to be healthy, or even being able to be sick, are not the same in definition, since the body is one and the same as itself, whereas being able to be healthy and being able to be sick are not only distinct from one another but are also opposites since their actualities are opposite. But if the body were the same as its potentialities, then its potentialities would also be the same as one another. Again (201b4),763 being a colour and being visible are not the same in definition (a colour is what can produce change in something actually transparent, a visible thing is what is incidental to colour, namely what can be seen),764 nor are being a sound and being audible, nor indeed being hot and being tangible, nor, put simply, are what accrue to a thing potentially the same as what in actuality exist. So clearly this is no falsity nor therefore is it the same thing to be at rest insofar as something is actual and to change insofar as it is also potential. 71,24 (201b5-15) But that there is some such actuality that preserves potentiality is clear from its being possible for each thing sometimes to be actual insofar as it has the capacity, but at other times also not yet so. For example, what is buildable, which is potential, is actual insofar as it is buildable when it is being built but not so at another time, as, for example, if stones and mud were simply lying about but not yet being changed by the artisan.765 So there is an actuality of what is buildable that safeguards it as still buildable and this is housebuilding. If not this, what else? One could not say that it is the house since once the house has assumed its shape766 it is no longer buildable. Instead, building comes about while what is buildable is being preserved. So this is the actuality of what is buildable. But this actuality is change. So [what is buildable] was not changed earlier when it was only buildable, nor later when it had been built, but in the intervening time period when it was en route from potentiality to actualization. [Chapter 2] 72,10 (201b16-17 + 20-4) That we correctly located change in the actuality of what is possible insofar as it is possible (= D1) is clear too from what others768 say when they assert that change is differentiation, inequality and that which is not, and that if one of these is change, then change would also invariably accrue to what one of them belonged to. But while many things are different from one another it is not because of this that they are changed. I, for example, have a differentiation 767

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relative to my horse and I am not changed because of it, and likewise 10 is not equal to 5 and still is not changed because of the inequality. ‘Yes,’ 769 it is said, ‘but we are speaking of the differentiation in a thing as change’.770 But while differentiation is invariably in a thing, change is not, since differentiation is in the parts of each thing and in their relation to one another, and differentiation is also in the potentiality and actuality of each thing, but still things that have several parts do not ipso facto change, nor do they do so when something is potential and actual in different respects, as with bronze that is potentially a statue but actually bronze. One of these, as I said, is still not changed just because it has differentiation within itself.771 ‘But, I assure you, they say that differentiation is a process of differentiation.’772 Then all they are doing is presenting change through change, since what different thing would ‘process of differentiation’ signify? It is either alteration, if indeed ‘different’ and ‘other’ signify the same thing, or a kind of transformation. For us773 actualization and activity is the genus of change, but those who describe change as that which is not (these would be the Pythagoreans)774 would grasp it better if the way that they used ‘that which is not’ was not to mean ‘that which is not in any way at all’ but as the condition under which what is being changed is not yet actually what it is being changed into but is still incomplete. We too describe potentiality as like this. But still they lack clarity since they would seem775 to be speaking of a property incidental to change rather than defining precisely what it is, given that it is incidental to change to be in some way that which is not depending on what it displaces from that which is. But if it is incidental to something to be in some way that which is not, it is not also ipso facto changed. That way everything would be in a state of change because each thing in general is one thing but is not an unlimited number of things. (201b22-4) But, they will say, if something is transformed, it is transformed from differentiation into differentiation, or from inequality into inequality. But why not rather from sameness into sameness too, when it is transformed from form into form and from colour into colour? 73,10 (201b24-7) The reason that they classify change with differentiation, inequality, and that which is not, is that they think that change is indeterminate, since when it is determinate, it ceases. And for them all the items just mentioned – differentiation, inequality, that which is not776 – are also indeterminate, as also are all the other principles of the second of the parallel columns, since they all involve privation, and nothing said to involve privation is determinate, neither as a this, nor as a quality or quantity or as any other category. (Placed below for information’s sake is the listing of each of the two parallel columns, that based on Form and that based on Privation.)777 73,20 (201b27-202a3) The reason that they also thought that change was indeterminate was because change is located in neither the potentiality nor the actuality into which things in general are divided:778 e.g.,

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a potential quantity, a cubit in length, say, does not necessarily change and increase, nor does one that has already become a cubit; what can go to Megara does not necessarily go there, nor does what has already gone there; and what is potentially white does not turn white, nor does what has already turned white. But change also cannot779 be said to be privation, since change involves existence rather than privation and at the same time not everything in a state of privation changes. This explains why it was thought difficult to grasp and get to know what change is, since if it has to be located in privation, potentiality or actuality, and if it clearly cannot be any of these for those who define it in unqualified terms, then what is left is the classification mentioned earlier: that it is an actuality, but the kind of actuality that we said was difficult to see but could exist. So let us recall what kind we said it was, since for clarity’s sake this has to be stated twice, thrice and repeatedly. 74,11 In each thing there is a twofold kind of actuality: 780 (i) when it has already been completed and acquired its own nature (e.g., when an eye has already become an eye, it possesses seeing as an actuality and this actuality is no different from its shape, given that to be an eye is actually to see in this way),781 and it is not this actuality that I am speaking of as change, since it is a shape and a form and so more like a state of rest. But (ii) another actuality is that of what exists potentially in the object by preserving its potentiality (e.g., the rounding of the ball of the eye, since when it is being rounded it maintains the potentiality to be rounded).782 But the latter is also incomplete (it is aiming for the end-state) and belongs to what is potential, and everything is incomplete insofar as it is potential. The reason that we call change an actuality is because the potentiality has completely departed; but the reason that we posited change as an incomplete activity and as this kind of activity is because it imports potentiality and joins in maintaining it. 74,24 (202a3-9) While this will do, in resuming we repeat that what produces change is also changed, but not totally but to the extent that it is potentiality changeable, i.e., to the extent that at a given time it is not also being changed and is something for which changelessness is rest (things that change belongs to are said to be at rest whenever they are not being changed). And it is reasonable for such a producer of change also to be changed, since it possesses potentiality (it has to be transformed from actuality and thus be active relative to what is changeable through it). So because of this it is reciprocally changed and reciprocally affected,783 since insofar as it actually exists, it produces an effect, but insofar as it is potential, it is affected, and this [reciprocity] is present both in what produces change and what is changed, since actualization and potentiality are present in both, just as the reciprocal action of things that return equals for equals is actual but their being reciprocally affected784 is potential. So everything that produces change by touching and making contact with things that are being changed is

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actual in relation to them, but only those that are potentiality changeable are reciprocally changed. 75,3 Is the definition of change [(D1) at 201a10-11] correct, then, and is all change the actualization of the potential as potential [= D1b: 201b4-5]?785 Or does some additional distinction have to be drawn? Someone might indeed say that when something potentially on the right actually comes to be on the right in relation to something on the left following my re-positioning myself to the left, it is transformed from potentiality into actualization but does not change. So the correct response to those who raise the problem is just this: that what is potentially on the left was changed,786 but the potentiality of relatives is one. This relation, in other words, is either a potentiality or an actualization in which both right and left are, and are said to be, relative to one another, so that if one of them changed,787 so too, of course, would the other. But I say that the actualization in terms of relatives788 does not preserve potentiality; instead the transformation from potentiality to actualization comes about as instantaneous. So in their case one actualization is observed – the actualization in strict and unqualified terms rather than as incomplete. For example, when I am in the process of changing my position to the left a tree does not come to be on my right little by little but a-temporally; and also when I am in the process of re-positioning myself to the left I am changing in terms of place but am not changing in terms of what is relative. In cases like this it is in general necessary to demonstrate first the actuality that is incomplete and then to duly test the definition.789 75,18 But nevertheless since the possible is present in all the categories but change is not present in all of them, let us transpose ‘possible’ into ‘changeable’ [in (D1)] and let us define it as (D2: 202a7-8) the actualization790 of the changeable as changeable. And let nobody think that we are trying to indicate ‘change’ through ‘changeable’ as equally obscure. Above all since change is relative to something (this too has been posited in what was defined earlier),791 and is relative to the changeable, it cannot be defined without admitting what it is relative to, just as a father also cannot be defined apart from a son nor double apart from half.792 Secondly, what the changeable is is also more recognizable than change, since knowing that change exists and knowing what it is are not the same. After all, everyone recognizes its existence but we are also inquiring into what it is. But still it can be recognized that change exists from the things that are changed and these are changeable things, so that someone who uses ‘changeable’ for the definition of change [in (D2)] has used what is more recognizable relative to what is less so. 76,5 (202a9-12) And when what produces change does so it will invariably have a form either with respect to substance, or to quality or to some other category, since it is by the form that it produces change and this is the principle of change.

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[Chapter 3] 76,8 (202a13-24) The next subject for inquiry is whether when one thing is changed by another the change is in what produces change or in what is changed.793 It is, then, in what is changed, since I define change as (D2) the actualization of the changeable, and in general potentiality is in that of which the actuality is change. So it is in this but it comes about through something else (namely what can produce change) and is a single change, since there are not two changes (one coming to be through what produces change, the other in the changeable) but the actuality of what can produce change is itself located in the changeable. And by being one it simultaneously makes what can produce change into what does produce change and what is changeable into what is changed. The actuality of what produces change and what is changed is one whenever the former produces change and the latter is changed, and they are one in their underlying subject, since in their definition and in essence794 they are two. Compare uphill and downhill: in their case the distance [AB] is the same but if you start from A it is uphill, from B downhill, and because of this it is two in definition. Likewise with change, the actuality of what produces change and what is changed is one with respect to the underlying subject, but depending on whether you start from what produces change or from what is changed the processes are respectively those of producing an effect and of being affected. And in this way they will be two in definition since, if not so posited, they raise the definitional problem that there must be 795 activity for what can produce an effect796 and for what can be affected, of which one is the process of producing an effect, the other of being affected. But clearly these are distinct,797 since their work and results differ, with the result of the first a product, that of the second an affection. 76,27 (202a25-36) Let it then be posited that the activities [of producing an effect and being affected] are distinct. So let us investigate how they will exist and in what. Now either (i) both are in what produces an effect798 or (ii) both are in what is changed, i.e., ,799 or (iii) producing is in what produces an effect but being affected is in what is affected. After all, the reverse [iii-a], that producing an effect is in what is being affected, is impossible, unless someone wanted to apply the term ‘producing an effect’ ambiguously to the actuality of what is affected.800 (202a28-31) So first [= (iii)] let producing be in what is affected, being affected in what is affected. So just as what is changed has its unique activity within itself as change, so also what produces change has its unique activity within itself as change (the same definition applies to both), but, if so, we shall then be admitting one of two absurdities: that either everything that produces change will also be changed, or that something possessing change will not be changed. So be it. (202a31-6) But (ii) let both producing an effect and being affected

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be in what is changed and affected, e.g., both teaching and learning in the learner. Now (a) it is illogical for the activity of each not to be in each thing that is active; and (b) it is puzzling how what is affected undergoes two different changes. It will, after all, be difficult to find out what these are, particularly when what is affected is changed with respect to a single kind of change.801 Now the same and still more absurdities802 follow if we posit [= (i)] the two changes as in what produces change, since with the changes being two what is changed will in addition not also be changed in what produces change. These absurdities, then, followed for those who posited changes as being distinct, grounds for our having to distance ourselves from this supposition too. 77,19 (202a36-202b5) So as the only alternative left let the activity of what produces change and of what is changed be one for both. But it is absurd for there to be one activity of both what produces an effect and what is affected when the two differ in kind (what produces an effect and what is affected do not have one actuality any more than do white and black!). And if this claim is true, learning and teaching will be identical: teaching the same as learning, producing an effect the same as being affected. Thus the teacher will necessarily learn in the very process of teaching, and the one producing an effect will be affected in the very process of producing it! Where will this one activity be? In what is changed according to the definition, namely (D2) change is the actualization of the changeable. But803 it is also absurd for the activity of what produces an effect not to be in what produces the effect. So the claim fails to get off the hook by supposing a single activity for both as a viable solution. 77,30 (202b5-8) Thus if they are neither distinct nor one, perhaps they are both one and distinct. At the outset too804 it was stated that they are one in their underlying subject but distinct in their definition. And this exposes them to no absurdity since when the activity of what produces change is one with respect to the underlying subject in both of them and comes about in what is being changed, it will not also be completely cut off,805 just as we also see from plain fact. When the teacher is changed relative to the learner his teaching does not come about in the learner by being completely cut off so that the teacher undergoes no activity and only the learner is active but the activity of the learner comes about when the teacher is present and active so that806 the teacher is active and produces precisely the effect that the learner undergoes. 78,9 (202b8-10) 807 But nothing prevents the activity belonging to the changes that differ in kind (producing an effect and being affected) from being one. They will in fact be one with respect to the underlying subject because both are one, given that the object of study, which the teacher is teaching and the learner is learning, is also one and the same, and teaching is nothing other than what comes about from teaching and learning, and likewise too with learning. But these, as we said, are the

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same in their underlying subject not in their definition. Instead, teaching is the giving of knowledge, learning the taking of knowledge, and the potentiality of the learner is led to activity by the teacher. 78,17 (202b10-22) So teaching and learning are not the same, even if both apply to the same object of study, nor, for example, are ascending and descending, even if both apply to the same road in that their definitions and essence differ. And just as uphill is when you start to walk from A but downhill when from B, and the intervening distance [AB] is one, so there is teaching if you start from the teacher, learning if you start from the learner, and in both cases the object of study is one. Things from which exactly the same consequences follow have to be the same not without qualification but in their description and definition, since also leaving Thebes for Athens and leaving Athens for Thebes are not the same nor could they belong808 to something jointly, although there is one road, identical mountains and identical lodgings. But for good measure809 let teaching also be the same as learning. But not even in this way will it follow that teaching and learning are the same when the distance from A to B and from B to A is also the same, but being at a distance from A to B and from B to A is not the same. Instead, teaching is not the same as learning, nor producing an effect as being affected, but it is what these belong to that are the same, namely the change and activity, which is one with respect to their underlying subject, different with respect to their definitions. 79,1 (202b23-6) So what change is has been stated both in universal and individual terms in accordance with two definitions: in one case as (D1) the actualization of the potential as such,810 in the other as (D2) the actualization of the changeable as changeable.811 And it is not difficult to supply as well the changes that differ in kind from one another: e.g., alteration as the actualization of the alterable as alterable, increase as the actualization of the increasable as increasable.812 79,6 (202b26-9) But if a third definition must be added,813 we shall not be off track if we use what has been stated here: namely, change is (D3: 202b26-7) 814 the actualization of what potentially can produce an effect and what potentially can be affected as relative to one another. And this definition will also fit if transferred to individual changes, such as house-building, increasing and healing, and the transposition is obvious when ‘potential’ is substituted in accordance with each kind. So what has been stated about change may suffice for now. [Chapters 4-8. The unlimited] [Chapter 4] 79,13 (202b30-203a4) Since the science of nature covers magnitudes, change and time, and since each of these is necessarily either limited or unlimited (they are not spoken of in the same way as an affection or a point),815 offering a discussion of whether or not the unlimited exists,

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and, if so, what it is,816 will logically follow.817 A sign of the inquiry being integral to this science is that everyone who has significantly engaged in such an area of philosophy has provided some discussion of the818 unlimited, with many819 indeed also revering it as a principle. 79,19 (203a4-10) Now the Pythagoreans and Plato make the unlimited a principle as a substance and a nature in its own right when they say that not earth, water or any other body is unlimited but an unlimited nature itself made into a substance,820 yet they still differ from one another in many respects. The Pythagoreans say that the unlimited is a number but number not as separable or incorporeal but, according to them, as the principle of perceptible things, since they produce all perceptible things from numbers and on that basis liken everything to number (and ‘the fountainhead of nature is the tetraktus’),821 and they produce the further marvel of something unlimited existing even beyond the heavens, without defining either what kind of thing it is or what purpose it serves. Plato, on the other hand, does not posit either a body or an incorporeal thing beyond the heavens (he does not posit the ideas as either beyond the heavens or as in place at all),822 yet unlike the Pythagoreans he posits the unlimited as a principle not only among perceptible things but also among intelligible ones, since for him number is the principle both of perceptible and of intelligible things. And he makes the ideas numbers, and the principle of number is 2, while the great and the small are in turn the principles of 2, as are double and half, large and small numerical quantity, and excess and deficiency, in all of which the unlimited as what is also interminable and indeterminate is at once present in line with the sub-division of bodies and the increase of numbers.823 80,8 (203a10-15) The Pythagoreans also differ from Plato in saying that not all but only even number is unlimited, since as unlimited it is the cause of sub-division into equals. And they say that the even is that which can by its nature generate the unlimited in anything in which it exists but that it is limited by the odd, which when added to the even prevents division into equals. They import still another sign that the odd is the cause of limit, the even of the unlimited,824 in that they take a unit and further combine the successive odd numbers each separately (namely, 3, 5, 7, 9), and so each further combination of these safeguards the square that is constantly being constructed as 4 [= 1 + 3], 9 [= 1 + 3 + 5], 16 [= 1 + 3 + 5 + 7] and 25 [= 1 + 3 + 5 + 7 + 9]. The reason arithmeticians call the odd numbers ‘gnomons’ is that those placed in succession around the first ones protect the shape of the square, just like geometrical points. (At all events, it is in geometry that you learn just what a gnomon is, since this work is not composed for those who are entirely untutored.)825 So this is how odd numbers can protect the shape and preserve unity, whereas the even ones, by being added to the unit in step with those that are next in order, constantly produce a new shape, and the differentiating advances without limit – triangle [1 + 2 =

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3], then heptagon [1 + 2 + 4 = 7], then whatever might also come up.826 So this is how for the Pythagoreans only even number becomes unlimited. 80,25 (203a15-16) Plato makes the unlimited things two, the great and the small, since in the sub-division of bodies the latter is minimized, the former maximized, without limit. 80,27 (203a16-203b2) Those among the natural scientists who have discussed the unlimited make the unlimited incidental to another nature and take the latter to be fire, air, or the product of their mixture, and while differing from one another on the principles everyone converges on a single doctrine for positing the unlimited since everyone makes the all unlimited in size. Some suppose a single principle and this also quite clearly unlimited, others more than one but not limited in number but unlimited, as Anaxagoras and Democritus do with, respectively, the compounds made up of like parts and the [atomic] shapes. The latter group in fact face the consequence of starting827 from what is unlimited in number and ending with what is unlimited in size since by the mutual contact and combination of things unlimited in quantity the all derived from them comes into being as unlimited in size. Those who posit the principles as more than one but as limited in number leave no room for the unlimited, either among the principles (how are there simultaneously both three or four principles and one that is unlimited, or two, or how many?), or as subsequent to the principles (what is composed of things limited both in quantity and size is limited).828 So these are the consequences they face. 81,12 (203b4-7)829 But those who posit the unlimited have good reason to posit it as a principle too, since if it is ,830 then nothing else at all is. After all, it is neither831 derived from a principle (from what kind of one, when a form is not unlimited, while what comes from matter never exceeds it?832), but neither is it without a purpose (what else is left with a purpose if it lacks one?).833 81,15 (203b7-15) And it is reasonable that it neither cease to be nor come to be, since if it has come to be at some time, it had a beginning in magnitude (i.e., it did not appear instantaneously, like qualitatively altered things),834 or if it is going to cease to be at some time, it will have a limit in magnitude at which ceasing to be will stop. Because of this they say that the unlimited is a principle and eternal, and that it encloses and steers everything. And Anaximander and some others, who do not impose Intelligence, Love or any other productive cause on the things that come to be, maintain that this is the divine.835 (203b3-4) The preceding is enough to explain that for the natural scientist this discussion is essential.836 81,23 (203b15-30) We shall discuss next whether the unlimited exists and first the number of sources for the belief in its existence, which on inquiry turn out to be principally five:837 (i) time, since that is unlimited; (ii) the division present in magnitudes (mathematicians, that

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is, use the unlimited as a principle and supposition);838 (iii) the only way that the process of coming to be could be stopped from running out is if it were supplied from an unlimited source from which what comes to be is subtracted;839 (iv) (also used by some of the later [thinkers])840 that something limited has to reach a limit relative to something, so that if what is taken is constantly limited relative to something else, then there is no limit;841 (v) (the one that also furnishes plausibility to the preceding four) that our thinking does not project842 a limit and a terminus but always adds in imagination something more than what is being thought.843 (v) is why we believe that number too is without limit, as well as the sub-division of bodies and what is beyond the heavens.844 Imagination, that is, has no stopping-point but when it goes beyond the heavens it seeks beyond it a void or a body that is unlimited, but specifically a body. If in fact there were an unlimited void, it follows that there would also be an unlimited body,845 since if a void is what can receive body846 an unlimited void would receive an unlimited body; hence the conclusion is also ipso facto demonstrated.847 (203b26-30)848 To explain: it is not the case that since [the void] can receive, it can also not receive. Not receiving is possible for things that can cease to be,849 and what is possible would anyway not come about where what it could appropriately belong to is necessarily destroyed in advance. But what is possible has to come about at some time for things that do not have their existence constricted by a time period but always exist, since if it never came to be, it would also no longer be possible. And that is why what is possible does not also apply strictly to eternal things since they are not evenly balanced towards both [existing and not existing] but at any time will necessarily exist, or rather do necessarily exist. Being possible is in fact in their case no different from being in that they are not in different states at different times. 850 So if there is an unlimited void, there is also an unlimited body. It is irrelevant that the world-orders too are of unlimited number and are everywhere in the void;851 for why indeed are they here rather 852? So853 if here, then in multiple places too. 82,18 (203b30-204a2) The way854 that studying the unlimited presents a problem is that numerous absurdities follow for those who do not posit its existence: mathematics is eliminated as well as increase in number and increase in time,855 and someone who undermines these loses touch with the fringes856 of nature and instead destabilizes the indestructibility of the very cosmos (if the cosmos is not preserved time will be prevented from increasing without limit!). So they eliminate these but other greater problems follow for those who are positing it, as further inquiry will make clear.857 So it is worth investigating whether or not it exists, and if so, how it exists,: is it as a substance, or as incidental in its own right to some nature, or in another way?858 But a natural scientist primarily has to investigate whether there is a perceptible magnitude of unlimited size.

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[Chapter 5] 82,29 (3.4, 204a2-7)859 The most relevant start-point is to distinguish first the number of ways in which the unlimited is spoken of. One way, then, of being said to be unlimited is as (i) that which is not even a quantity at all by not being naturally traversable, as we say that the voice is invisible860 by not being naturally seen; a point and a quality are unlimited in this way because of not even being quantities at all.861 Another way (ii) is as a thing that has a traversal that cannot be ended, the meaning on which we are concentrating most; also (iii) as something that involves toil and difficulty; a long road862 is in this way ‘unlimited’; and (iv) as something that in its own nature can be traversed and is bounded by its size yet we cannot manage the traversal (the depth of the sea is ‘unlimited’ in this way).863 And two other ways are (v) by continual addition (as with number) and (vi) by continual subtraction (as with anything continuous), and (vii) both ways, since one part of anything sub-divided receives an addition, the other undergoes a subtraction.864 83,8 (204a8-20) So with these distinctions pre-established, let us first investigate whether 865 unlimited can be separated from the perceptible bodies before us as itself something unlimited in its own right, just the kind of thing the Pythagoreans speak of.866 So those who so posit it have to make the unlimited undivided, since if it is going to be divided, its division will be by size or quantity, and so it will be either a magnitude or a plurality and quantity, not a substance in its own right. The unlimited would therefore be undivided for them, assuming that they would like to preserve their hypothesis, but if undivided, not unlimited, unless as a point is unlimited by not being naturally so and as a sound is uncoloured.867 But they do not mean, nor are we looking for, the unlimited in this sense but for the one that is untraversable and cannot be ended.868 But if they are going to say that the unlimited is incidental to another nature, the unlimited will no longer be an element of existing things but will instead be that nature to which the unlimited is incidental, just as it is not invisibility that is an element of speech but the power of the letters to which invisibility is incidental. But they needed the unlimited as an element and a principle! It is also remarkable that while number and size do not exist in their own right (they are inseparable from substance),869 what is incidental to them, if indeed it is also incidental (the unlimited, I mean) exists as something in its own right and separable. 83,24 (204a20-9) It is, in general, inconceivable for the unlimited to exist as an actuality, and as a substance and a principle,870 a simple nature only, the unlimited itself871 possessing no underlying subject (the kind of thing that we say that the soul or the intellect is),872 so that to be unlimited and the unlimited are the same in definition (this is precisely the nature of things that are not compounds) and not divided in definition into more than one thing, which873 is not even a property of

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compounds at all. For example, a white thing and being white are certainly not the same, but a white thing is a body coloured white, whereas to be white is to be a colour that can cause definition in vision. But, as I have said, if nature of the unlimited874 is as described,875 just simple and uncompounded, then every part of it will be unlimited. 83,6 Investigate from the beginning. A part of such a substance will receive either the same definition or a different one: if the same, being and being unlimited will be the same for the part too; if different, the unlimited will not be made up of like parts, therefore neither simple nor a principle. Now if someone speaks of unlimited number or unlimited magnitude it will not follow for him that their parts are unlimited too. He supposes a different nature for the unlimited and nothing prevents what is a part of number from being a number yet not unlimited. Being number and being unlimited are not the same: number is the plurality derived from units, whereas an unlimited quantity is untraversable. But as for someone who speaks of the unlimited as a substance on the grounds that it has its being in the definition of the unlimited, how could each of its parts too not be unlimited for him? A part of water is water since it has the same definition; by the same token a part of the unlimited is unlimited since whole and part, as we have said earlier,876 have the same definition. So if there are many parts the unlimited will be many unlimited things. Or if in flight from these problems they are going to make the unlimited undivided, they again877 undertake to suppose the unlimited a point, the one thing the other! 84,21 (204a32-4)878 So while the Pythagoreans, because their claim is ,879 want to make the unlimited a substance, they do not protect it but slip into speaking of it as an incidental property,880 since they say that the even is unlimited,881 so that they locate the unlimited in a given number and divide it into parts.882 Consequently the unlimited is a plurality rather than a substance. 84,25 (204a34-b11) But to inquire into whether there is such an unlimited thing is no different from inquiring into whether it is intelligible883 (that is what something without an underlying subject is like),884 and into whether it can also be one of the mathematical objects and ideas. This is an investigation extraneous to the immediate inquiry 885 what has to be investigated is whether a perceptible body is unlimited in size,886 since by examining it in general and in terms of natural science you could also argue as follows. (204b5-7) All body is bounded by a plane (and this is the definition of body); the unlimited is unbounded; therefore there is no unlimited body, either intelligible (such as a mathematical one), or perceptible (such as natural ones). (204b7-10) All number can be numerated, both where it consists of just the units and where it consists of horses or asses;887 all that can be numerated can be traversed; the unlimited cannot be traversed; therefore no number is unlimited. (204b10-11) But, as I said,888 the investigation must preferably be conducted in terms of natural science.

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So if [body] is unlimited, it has to be either compound or simple; but it is neither compound nor simple; therefore neither is it unlimited.889 85,9 (204b11-14) It is not compound, assuming that the elements are limited in number, for the following reasons. What is compound will consist either of things that are all unlimited, or of some that are, others that are not, or, finally, of a single one that is. Now it cannot consist of one. Why? It is because every natural body has as an innate power within itself, either hotness, coldness, wetness or dryness.890 Now while things that are limited in size have powers that are also limited, things unlimited in size have unlimited ones, and every unlimited power exceeds a limited one and by being the greater can make the lesser one cease to be. Thus if there were one thing of unlimited size in the compound, it would make891 the other elements cease to be, but once it has made their powers cease to be it would make the unlimited no longer compound but simple. That this is no less impossible will be demonstrated next.892 85,19 (204b14-22) But first let us provide a solution893 for what someone could perhaps hold against this argument. It might, that is, be said that nothing prevents the unlimited body from being the largest in volume but lesser in power than things of limited size. To explain: if you took a volume of air that was much greater than a smaller volume of fire, the power of the fire will be much greater although it is less in volume. But this would come out as true when both the bodies are limited in size, but when one is so but not the other, it makes no sense. How so? Because even if the air of equal size is much weaker than the fire, at some point it will also be possible to make their power equal by increasing it894 to a size many times greater, and if this is so, it will be possible to make it even greater when increasing is at our disposal, and if it never lets up, even greater by an unlimited amount. So what use is served in this case if the equal amount of fire is stronger than the equal amount of air? For example, let it be stronger by even 10 times as much (for you will certainly give some number to the excess in power). So let the volume of the air that is 1,000 times larger [than its original size] be895 equivalent in power to the fire. Accordingly the one that is 10,000 times larger is greater [in power], and much greater is the one that is 100 and 1,000 times this large, while the one that is large without limit surpasses every ratio. Therefore the air of unlimited volume will to no less an extent make896 the fire that is of limited volume cease to be, as was stated at the outset,897 since the powers of opposites have to be made equal if the compound is going to be preserved. So while for these reasons a thing consisting of one [unlimited element] is inconceivable, one consisting of several unlimited things is still more inconceivable than anything.898 For how will each of them yield space to one another if each has occupied the total space? This point failed to be made also for the one [unlimited thing].899 If in fact there is one unlimited thing in the combination [of several], where will the others be?

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86,10 (204b22-9) Now those are the grounds on which it can be taken as demonstrated that there cannot be an unlimited body. That it is also not simple we could learn from its being either just one element, such as air, water, or fire, or a different nature, as Anaximander believes.900 He came to the idea of isolating the unlimited from the elements to prevent the power present in the unlimited making everything else cease to be for him when one901 unlimited element existed, since there is902 mutual opposition among the elements (air cold, water moist, fire hot)903 so that if one were unlimited the rest would thereby cease to be. This, then, is why he says that a different nature that is unlimited is the source of the elements and everything else. 86,19 (204b29-205a7) Since the investigation of the unlimited is twofold – (i) does such a nature exist at all beyond the standard elements?; (ii) is it also unlimited? – I think that I should use some comprehensive argument regarding it that will explain that none of the elements, nor anything beyond them, is unlimited, but I should first demonstrate that there can be no other nature beside the standard elements. Everything, that is, is dissolved into what it comes from, ‘the things born from earth into earth’, to put it in the words of tragedy, ‘but those blooming from aetherial seed’ into aether.904 So why do we not see any of the things that come into being dissolved into a body so qualified as to be neither fire, nor air, nor water? In general, it is a ‘big hoot’ to posit just one element as not only something different from the four but also, if it is 905 of these very things, as a single element existing as a body thereby in actuality.906 In fact I call it absurd, whether one makes it unlimited or limited in the way that Heraclitus thinks that fire is the only element and that the all has come to be from it. This is his basis for scaring907 us by threatening that the all will at some point go up in flames, since it will be dissolved into what it came from. In forwarding his suppositions on coming to be Heraclitus is in fact caught by the same argument as Anaximander,908 for whom that intermediate body909 could not also be transformed into one of the four elements since it lacks opposition to any of them. Thus if he has to produce the four elements from it, neither they nor anything else could also come into being from it. So why will he still need it when it is so useless for the processes of coming to be? But if Heraclitus’ fire, or any other element of the things that come to be, were posited as a body that exists in actuality, it will invariably have an opposition within itself and so nothing prevents it from being transformed into its opposite, yet in the course of transformation it will either protect the opposition on which it depends for its existence (e.g., if it is fire, it will maintain heat in the opposite),910 which is impossible, or else by abandoning heat will admit coldness and thus no longer be preserved as fire. But an element has to be preserved. And so why shall we not say that air, which could just as well be transformed into it, is an element rather than fire? 87,16 [Digression: matter and coming to be]911 Someone could perhaps

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say that we too are falling into Anaximander’s absurdities by producing matter without any opposition. Is there in fact a major difference between something itself being transformed and transformations coming about within it?912 But what argument stops something itself from being unable to be transformed if it has no opposite state yet stops transformations of opposites into opposites from coming about within it? The latter is how for us matter, though also being one, exists in all that comes into being, and that is not preserved by those who posit a single element. But let this argument, to coin a phrase, be ‘a by-product of the journey’.913 We have to return to where we digressed from the claim that no unlimited body exists. 87,24 (205a8-12) Now everything perceptible that is involved in coming to be and ceasing to be (here we are inquiring into whether something of this kind is unlimited) is naturally in a place and each thing has its own place. And it is the same for both part and whole (e.g., for both the whole earth and a single clump, and for fire and a spark) but the same not in quantity but914 as something either up or down for both. So if this is self-evident, the unlimited body is thus either homogeneous or non-homogeneous. 87,30 (205a12-19)915 So first let it be homogeneous. Its place too is therefore homogeneous, i.e., the same for 916 whole and the parts, and thus unlimited. So will a part of the unlimited (say a clump of earth or a given quantity of water) be immobile or will it move? Now it cannot move: why indeed up rather than down? Let them grant that there is both up and down in the unlimited, since every place is its own, not this one more than that. So will it move en masse to all of them and fill all of them en masse or will it be dispersed everywhere? But how will it even stop once it has started to move? But how will it also be at rest? It will not be so when it reaches its ‘own’ space, since it also occupies as its own the one that it has abandoned! So movement in this way is inconceivable for its parts. 88,7 Even Melissus917 gave up on its being in general both unlimited and in motion, but ineffectively, since he gave up on all change.918 The unlimited can perhaps undergo qualitative change but the whole cannot also move as the sphere can in the same place in terms of its parts. If it is homogeneous, its parts would, first of all, have to move in a circle too, but they are seen not like this but moving in a straight line, like earth and water. Next, if they move in a circle, they are limited since they will have a shape. Both the whole and the parts therefore remain immobile. But I am not saying that stability is also no less impossible than change. In fact motion to one place if every place is identically its own is as inconceivable as being at rest in one place that is no more proprietary to it than another. But grant that it is stationary. Then movement will be non-existent with respect both to whole and to parts, a situation that is quite self-evident and needs no argument, unless we really need an argument for ‘immovable’ diehards!919

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88,20 (205a19-29) In turn let the unlimited be non-homogeneous and not simple. It is therefore a compound and a single thing by making contact. So there is also not one natural place for it but each of the bodies from which the whole is composed has its own place. And while change would be preserved, look at the remaining consequences. (205a21-5) These non-homogeneous things – are they limited or unlimited? But if limited in number, then one thing unlimited in size will come from them, or even more than one, given that the whole would in this way be unlimited.920 So they will face the earlier arguments [against multiple unlimited things],921 which we have just finished stating. (205a25-9)922 Furthermore, one of the elements also cannot be unlimited in the compound as fire or earth923 since the place of each of these is determinate and not every element has every place as its own; different ones have the upper and lower places. And for this reason none of the natural scientists made fire or earth unlimited, only water or air because the former pair have an obvious place, but the latter pair a place varying between upper and lower.924 89,1 (205a29-205b1) The non-homogeneous parts of the unlimited are therefore unlimited in number, with their places therefore also unlimited in number. But this is impossible since the places and the differentiae of the places (above and below, left and right, to the front and to the back) are limited in number. Therefore the elements are limited in number, since more than one does not have the same place, since things for which the same place is separately distinguished will not differ in kind, unless in Democritus’ way [where the atoms occupy the void].925 But that way change will be homogeneous, the elements homogeneous, and the place of the all will also belong to each of the atoms. And if the [properties] that the atom admits are by their type limited in number and size, how will what consists of them be unlimited? But who does not know that from places being limited it necessarily follows that bodies are limited too? They do have to fit into their places since a place is not larger than a body’s possible size (and if as well the place is larger, the body is not unlimited), nor is a body larger than the size of its place, since if it exceeds the place, it will be either in the void or nowhere. The void will get its discussion shortly,926 but the other option is inherently ridiculous, since without a place nothing can either move or be at rest. 89,17 (205b1-10)927 Anaxagoras will offer as an absurd explanation for the unlimited mixture being stable and unchanging the fact that it is not surrounded by anything else because of being unlimited, but is fixed in itself928 and thrusts and resists, and for this reason stability is natural for it. But this is not true, since it is not also invariably natural for a thing to be wherever it is. Something could in fact be somewhere by force too, i.e., where it is not its nature to be (as with a stone hung from a peg) and for it to be fixed in itself and thrust would explain forced rather than natural stability, since it would reveal the lack of a place

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and that it has nowhere to move. And it is not clear that if space were available it would have come to rest, like the things that naturally do so. It is certainly not naturally stationary. 89,27 (205b10-18) The reason that the earth, for example, is naturally stationary is because even where a place exists it still does not move because it is natural for it to be stationary in the centre. Thus even if it were hypothetically unlimited when positioned in the centre as it now is, it would also be stationary929 not because of being unlimited and fixed930 in itself, but because it was natural for it to be stationary in the centre through possessing weight. So an explanation for the unlimited being stationary has to be stated in terms of natural science, since the explanation that Anaxagoras is stating in this case depends not on the nature of the mixture or whatever one might posit as a body, but on its size. 90,5 (205b18-24) I mean,931 what is he going to say about the parts of the mixture? If being fixed within itself belongs naturally to each of these too, then they are all immobile,932 which not even he would wish. But if they can also move because they are limited in size, then being immobile would not belong to the whole in accordance with the nature of the body since it would belong to the parts too, given that the mixture is homogeneous (which is also why everything is also in everything)933 but would do so due to its quantity and size. And in general if the whole exists within itself and has a place for itself not by necessity but naturally, why not each of the parts too? The places of both the whole and the part are, after all, homogeneous – those of the whole of the water and a small cup,934 and those of fire and a spark. So if being stationary within itself is the place of the unlimited then both the whole and the parts .935 So, like all the rest who posit the all as also originally immobile, [Anaxagoras] has in this way too removed movement. 90,17 (205b24-35) But an unlimited body cannot also be said to be in a place without qualification, since if all perceptible body possesses either heaviness or lightness and moves in accordance with these tendencies to the appropriate places, but an unlimited body cannot be either heavy or light, then place cannot also be added to it. Either it is all heavy and only in the lower place while its upper place will be superfluous; or it is all light and will only be in the upper place while its lower one will be in excess. Or it is half heavy, half light. And, first, how do you divide936 what is unlimited? Then if half is in the upper and extreme place, half in the lower and central one, it will be limited by its places, given that ‘extreme’ and ‘central’ are names for limits. In fact, if 937 unlimited is in place, and upper and lower are the differentiae of place as well as back and front, and right and left, these dimensions must also belong to the unlimited. But these dimensions and differentiae belong to things with limits, since it certainly cannot be said that the differentiae of place (upper, lower and the rest) depend on their

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relation to us rather than being in the actual nature of place. In fact, what we shall demonstrate a little later938 is that each of them exists in a twofold way: both in relation to us and naturally. And as for the differentiae of the place in which the unlimited exists, assuming it does, they necessarily exist naturally rather than by their relation to us. 91,2 (205b35-206a7) But now let it be additionally posited that if place cannot be unlimited and all body is in place, then body cannot be unlimited; but the first; therefore the second.939 But what is in a place is also in some place, since if in no place, then it is not even in a place, just as there is certainly no quantity that is neither two or three cubits long nor based on some other number. But if it is in some place, then it is invariably in either the upper or the lower one, or somewhere else, but this we have already frequently demonstrated as impossible. 91,8 (206a7-8) It is obvious from the preceding that no unlimited body actually exists. [Chapter 6] 91,10 (206a9-14) That numerous impossibilities follow from eliminating the unlimited tout court has been stated earlier940 but can be stated here too. Time, for example, will have both a beginning and an end, the most inconceivable of all situations,941 since to say that time began to come to be at some time is just to say that there was a time when there was no time! Everything that comes to be, that is, comes to be in time and ‘at some time’ is predicated of time, and it is also a matter of demonstration that change, of which time is a derivative consequence, is eternal.942 So this is one absurdity if the unlimited is not admitted, but a second is that the division of continuous things comes to a stop, as in turn does increase in number. But when neither those who posit the unlimited as existing nor those who posit it as not existing have an account that can work, an arbitrator is needed, and clearly it exists in one way but not in another. 91,20 (206a14-18) ,943 then, is spoken of both as in potentiality and in actuality and this dichotomy among things in general has been frequently demonstrated,944 so that if the unlimited necessarily exists by addition because of number and by division because of the sub-division of magnitudes, and if because of the earlier arguments it is not actual, the only alternative is that it is potential. And so if the sub-division of continuous body is necessarily without limit (indivisible lines are easily eliminated),945 there will be a potential rather than an actual unlimited (the latter is completely inconceivable). Positing actual division into an unlimited number of things is also to make their combination come from an unlimited number of things (anything continuous is also, of course, composed of exactly the same number of things as it is divided into),946 but anything composed of an unlimited number of things is unlimited in size947 and this we have just finished proving impossible.

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91,30 (206a18-21) When we say that the unlimited is in potentiality we mean this not in the way that we mean that bronze is potentially a statue because at some time it might also actually become a statue. Instead, in the case of bronze and a statue the potentiality ceases when the actuality overrides, since the statue that has come to be no longer has a potentiality to become a statue.948 So in such cases potentiality is said to be relative to actualization, which is why it can also advance to that [actualization] relative to which it is also described.949 In the case of the unlimited, on the other hand, an unlimited thing has the same actuality when it is potential and actual. The actuality of the unlimited as unlimited is its constantly having a capacity for something more, since if anyone looked for an actualization of the same kind as a state of stability, shape and form,950 he would be looking for nothing other than a limit for the unlimited, indeed for the unlimited to cease to be. But this is inconceivable when all actuality should preserve the underlying subject. 92,10 (206a21-b3)951 So in accordance with our demonstration that the actualization of the changeable as changeable safeguards the potentiality for being changed,952 an actualization and completion of the unlimited is the capacity for constantly advancing further. But if this potentiality ever ceased, then being unlimited too would at once cease.953 Things for which being consists in coming to be in fact no longer even exist when they stop coming to be (as with games, a day, a time period and a flame). By the same token when things whose being consists in potentiality have lost their potentiality they immediately lose their being too along with it. But if someone is therefore also looking for the kind of potentiality for the unlimited that is said to exist in relation to actuality, he has to show that it also covers the sub-division of magnitudes. Only when the latter are not yet being divided are they, just like a bronze statue, unlimited by division, since they would reach actual division into an unlimited number of things,954 except for a difference. The latter result is impossible and controverts itself, since if they have not been divided, then they have not been divided into an unlimited number of things at all (how could the sub-dividing have stopped?955), but nothing stops division being into an unlimited number of things if what is left over can always be sub-divided. 92,24 So nobody should look for the actualization of the unlimited as instantaneous, as with a house or a bed, but to exist in the way that we say that the games, the day, and, in general, a time period, is actually present, since the Olympic games, the day, or, in general, a time period can manifest themselves not instantaneously but because something of them comes to be one part after another. This, then, is how we also say that division is into an unlimited number of things – not as instantaneous, i.e., not as ever capable of coming about at the same time, but as coming to be one part after another, with some magnitude constantly left as a remainder. So being is the same both for time and for division

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into an unlimited number of things, since for both it involves their coming to be and existing one part after another rather than instantaneously, but the unlimited is also present in both in the same way, since it is what is constantly taken as successively different and this is certainly limited. But the difference is that in the case of time any part taken has constantly ceased to be, since the past has constantly ceased to be, whereas in the case of division what is constantly taken956 remains, and neither is time957 inadequate for coming to be nor magnitude for division. 93,11 (206b3-12) But it should not escape us that the unlimited is present in magnitudes not only by division but also by addition since in a limited magnitude division occurs on one side in an amount equal to that in which addition occurs on the other. So if division is unlimited, addition is too, but in reverse, since what we subtract from the one we add to the other.958 But not all division or addition is unlimited. If, for example, someone constantly takes magnitudes equal to one another, then through division he will at some point exhaust the whole, however large it may be. Sub-division must instead be produced in the same proportion, not in the same magnitude, so that if in dividing into half from the start you constantly take half, then in the sub-division you will safeguard the same proportion of the remainder, but not an equal magnitude, and only in this way will division not give out and similarly neither will addition. 93,22 (206b17-27)959 And while the unlimited is potential in both [division and addition], the difference is that in dividing it is always possible to take less than every limited magnitude whereas in adding it is impossible to take more than any magnitude, e.g., the heavens,960 but only what exceeds the961 magnitude that is increased when one of its two parts is sub-divided.962 If you could take an excess for every magnitude, then there would be an actual unlimited body such as the natural scientists speak of. But since no such body can exist, it cannot also be unlimited by addition, yet while unlimited addition can exist since division does too, it cannot be an unlimited thing by addition.963 93,30 (206b27-33) Now for these reasons even Plato made the unlimited things two, the great and the small, likening the latter to addition, the former to division, and on these grounds hinted that they were present ,964 but having produced two he still uses neither among his principles (principles, according to him, are numbers), neither the unlimited by division among numbers nor the unlimited by addition,965 but instead they do not have the former (they stop at the unit) while he himself denies the latter (it will increase them).966 In fact he says that number reaches 10 and that from there it circles back. 94,6 (206b33-207a7) If we are indeed right and the unlimited exists only in accordance with the division of bodies where there is unceasing sub-division, the result is that it is unlimited contrary to the way that

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some want to describe it: they say that that beyond which nothing can be taken is unlimited but we speak of it as that beyond which something can be constantly taken. Ordinary usage yields the evidence of people saying that rings without a bezel are unlimited because something else can always be taken externally,967 an image of the unlimited, with the difference that for things in general not only must something different be constantly taken as unlimited but also never the same thing, not a property of circles, which explains why rotations, for example, also come under a number.968 94,14 (207a7-8) So since the unlimited can be separately distinguished what will be infinite is that beyond which something can be constantly taken if you take it by quantity, and quantities exist by number and size and in this way the unlimited is found in both, given that a greater number or a sub-division can be constantly taken as beyond it. Adding [the words] ‘if you take it by quantity’ [at 207a7-8] was necessary because continuous things are limited in the process of division in accordance with the form, given that the same form exist in the division even if not the same quantity, since lines, a surface or bodies are both [form and quantity].969 Such, then, is the unlimited. 94,22 (207a8-18) By contrast that beyond which nothing can be taken will be complete and whole, since we also define the whole as that from which none of the things contributing to its own completion is absent, as with a whole human being or a whole furniture chest,970 which lack nothing for their shape. These particular things will be in the same situation as that which is in a strict sense whole, since what is in strict and unqualified terms whole is that from which nothing is absent and this is in precise terms complete. These two terms, ‘whole’ and ‘complete’, that is, are thought either to mean the same thing or to be closely related. We say ‘whole’ when in referring to the parts where none of them is missing, but ‘complete’ when referring to what has a limit and end, but both971 are said of the same object. So if what possesses a limit is complete, then what possesses a limit will also be whole. So Parmenides improves on Melissus by making the whole limited (‘from the middle equally balanced’),972 whereas when Melissus says that the all is ‘all together’973 as well as ‘unlimited’ he is aligning things that, unlike ‘flax with flax’ (to quote the proverb)974 cannot be combined. So if that beyond which nothing else exists is all, and that beyond which something else constantly exists is unlimited, nothing will be ‘all together and unlimited’.975 95,12 (207a18-32)976 But due to this confusion by which they think that the whole, the all and the unlimited are identical, they also revere the unlimited by transferring to the unlimited what belongs to the whole and the all, viz. enclosing everything and possessing everything within itself. While these are strictly predicates of a whole, they are those of the unlimited because the unlimited is matter for what is both whole and complete and that is already accompanied by a form, i.e., it

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is the combination [of both form and matter]. This is because according to its own definition matter is unlimited and indeterminate but potentially it is both whole and all, given that it can receive the form as the compound of both it and the form. What was therefore potential (and I mean the whole), they predicate without qualification of matter and in this way attach to the unlimited properties that belong to the whole. Clearly the unlimited involves matter since the unlimited reduction of magnitudes and their addition in the reverse direction are,977 as I said, dependent on the underlying subject, not the form. This is because the form remains the same and, besides that, the limit and the whole belong to matter not in its own right but on the basis of the form, and one thing is constantly enclosed by something else and something can be constantly taken as external to matter, namely the form and the shape. So this explains why matter is unlimited and is also predictably unknowable in its own nature, given that the unlimited is unknowable. 95,29 So what has our argument come round to from what has been stated? It is that, quite contrary to what is believed, it is entirely true that the unlimited is a part of the whole rather than a whole, since matter is a part of the compound [with form]978 just as bronze is of the Diadoumenos.979 This is surely more reasonable than [the Platonists’] making the great and the small unlimited and the matter for perceptible and intelligible things, and, assuming that they want everything to be enclosed by the unlimited, being forced to concede that intelligible things are also enclosed by matter.980 That would lead to things that can be known and made objects of scientific knowledge being enclosed and bounded981 by what is indeterminate and unknowable.982 [Chapter 7] 96,7 (207a33-b1) To us who posit the unlimited as enclosed by the whole, and I am referring to matter, it logically follows that for all determinate magnitude less, but not more, can be taken, given that matter is enclosed internally by the magnitude being sub-divided. [Aristotle] therefore grants to those who want to make the unlimited smaller an inherent supply of unlimitedness but not to those who want to make it larger (there an external addition is needed and nothing can exist externally, i.e., if the form encloses, then that is what increase has to stop at). 96,15 (207b1-11) And it is also reasonable that while in numbers a limit reaches a minimum but not a maximum, the reverse holds in magnitudes, with a limit if you add but not if you divide. Why precisely is this? It is because number is composed of units (number is just983 multiple units, with ‘2’ and ‘3’, for example, the names of multiple units), whereas each thing is also divided into what it is composed of. So number is also divided into units, but these are undivided insofar as they are units, since everything that is one is undivided insofar as it is

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one, just as one human being as a human being is undivided (not, that is, divided into human beings!)984 and if divided into parts he was still not one in this respect. But the unit is completely one since matter is not also its underlying subject. Thus division has to stop when it reaches it, whereas a magnitude is composed not of units but of magnitudes, and so its division does not meet up with undivided things. And the reason that985 number too will be increased without limit is because division can also be enumerated and the units taken exceed every determinate plurality, since in its own right number does not possess the unlimited but in its case does so due to matter, so that due to matter the unlimited is everywhere. 97,1 (207b11-21)986 So it is acceptable for the unlimited also to be potential but not actual (it is in fact matter that is potential), and acceptable for the unlimited to involve coming to be rather than being, since matter is also in flux and unstable. Now number possesses the unlimited due to matter, but it is due to number that the unlimited is not in magnitudes in an increasing amount, since the whole and the all meet up with any forward advance in an increasing amount, just as among numbers the unit [does any reduction in a diminishing amount].987 The all is incapable of being increased; that would lead to something being larger than the heavens! Instead the whole, assuming that it is a whole, is determinate. And if something could be added to all body, nothing would be all or whole but would be the kind of thing the natural scientists say is the unlimited – an actual perceptible body and magnitude.988 97,10 (207b21-7) But when989 we say that the unlimited is present in magnitude, change and time, it must be realized that we are predicating it not as a genus or a single nature for them. Instead the ranking in which these stand relative to one another parallels the unlimited existing in them. So time is unlimited due to change, since it also has its being from it, but change is unlimited due to magnitude, since all change (increase, diminution, alteration, change of place) belongs to magnitude but magnitude is already unlimited in a primary way because of being divided into magnitudes. So for now let us make use of these claims; later we shall also offer a demonstration.990 97,17 (207b27-31) Our argument certainly does not take away from mathematicians their method of study by revealing the unlimited as not actually existing as untraversable in an increasing amount. In fact they do not, as it is, even need a line unlimited in this way, since they consistently use one that is limited but that supports their having one of whatever quantity they like. 97,22 But the problem is raised991 of how they are going to demonstrate the first theorem in the Elements [of Euclid].992 Let them, that is, be granted the diameter of the cosmos on which a triangle993 will have to be constructed. How will the two sides of the triangle have space? Now, first, you are not giving them what they originally postulated

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when they postulated a line can also be produced.994 Next, what difference will it make to the geometer if there is nothing beyond the cosmos? He can increase the given line in conception but is not forced to posit everything thought of as actually existing, separated in its own right.995 Perhaps no line such as he is thinking of has even been separated among existing things nor any body extended in three directions without any resistance. But nothing prevents the use of breadth, length and a dimensionless point which do not actually subsist in their own right but are not barred from being thought of. By that token he can use the increase of the diameter as it is conceived. And there is nothing absurd about there not being any place beyond the cosmos when such a line does not even need a place at all. At issue996 is not a natural length that also naturally requires a place but a mathematical one whose place is the thought-process of its student. Indeed for mathematical objects to exist by abstraction is just our way of removing everything that belongs to natural bodies (meaning place, quality, time, producing effects and being affected, change and the other categories) and examining only the actual dimensions in their own right and the quantity present in them as continuous. So if for the diagram of the equilateral triangle we also use a given place and area for a line, someone removing the place would also remove997 the demonstration along with it. But as it is nowhere are we saying that because the given line is positioned here or there [in the diagram] this particular conclusion necessarily follows.998 So just as Democritus in trying to establish that colours co-exist with bodies not by nature but by convention (that is, by being posited in relation to us),999 could not harm geometry, since it makes no use of these, similarly someone eliminating place that extends without limit, indeed if he also eliminates place entirely, is not impeding demonstrations involving lines. He is just removing something that [mathematicians] do not need. And in the next discussion Aristotle says that mathematical objects are not in place1000 when he shows that mathematical objects, while not even being in place,1001 still depend on their relation to us. (But which of the theories of nature would harm geometry? The one that posits partless and minimal things as principles and elements by eliminating unlimited sub-division along with which much that in mathematics as it exists is readily demonstrated is eliminated.1002) 98,24 (207b31-4) If, in general, the same1003 can be demonstrated for the cases of both a greater and a smaller line, as [mathematicians] do and claim, why do they need the greatest line? They sub-divide by the same ratio both the greatest and the smallest line, which they also think that they are producing; that is how they also posit as unlimited not a line that is untraversable but one that can also be increased in length. 98,29 (207b34-208b4) While this is the way that the unlimited exists, it is as we have said above,1004 matter from among the causes that have been defined to which it is reduced, since matter, if taken just in its own right, is the unlimited because it involves privation1005 and

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unlimitedness is also privation. However, 1006 if the unlimited is both privation and pertains to matter, then matter in its own right does not exclusively underlie unlimited division but rather the continuous and perceptible body before us does, since what is going to be divided has to exist in actuality.1007 So how is the unlimited said to pertain to matter in the division? It is because when a compound body is sub-divided into an unlimited number of things, division has to come about in accordance with the matter, since sub-dividing does not come about in accordance with the form (it remains the same). Plainly everyone else also used the unlimited as matter. But in so using it how do they claim that it encloses rather than that it is enclosed? This does not follow.1008 [Chapter 8] 99,10 (208a5-8) It remains to address the arguments by which the unlimited is thought not only to exist potentially but also as separately distinguished and actual. Some of them are not compelling but some have valid counter-arguments.1009 99,12 (208a8-11) The one that considers the unlimited1010 as existing so that the process of coming to be1011 will not give out makes an inference that is not necessitated,1012 since if the all is limited, one thing’s ceasing to be can be another’s coming to be. 99,15 (208a11-14) But the argument that believes that what is limited finds its limit relative to something1013 is plausible,1014 but see how it is refuted by its sophistic reasoning. I say that something that is limited does not necessarily finds its limit relative to something: finding a limit relative to something is the same as making contact with something that makes contact, but being limited and making contact are quite distinct, with contact said to be relative to a distinct external thing, while being limited is relative to itself. This is because contact consists in touching another thing, a limit in having itself1015 as an extremity. So some things with limits can also have a limit relative to something and make contact with something, but making contact is still not the same for them as being limited. That is because making contact is incidental to some of the things that are limited, which are not just wholes but also parts of the all, not insofar as they possess a limit but insofar as they are parts of what is genuinely whole. But if something is just a whole and this is exactly all, why does it find its limit relative to something else?1016 99,26 Next, being limited is also relative to everything, but making contact is not. For example, a line a cubit-long is limited when observed relative to every other thing (it is already a line that contains the points that are its limits) but it makes contact not with everything but just has to do so with another1017 line because while each thing is limited relative to anything it does not make contact with anything. So assume that it makes no contact with a line. It follows that if it is limited without

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making contact, being limited is not the same as finding its limit relative to something. In fact,1018 a number such as 10 is limited but with what does it make contact? A sound of a given volume is limited by silence but makes no contact with silence! 100,4 Also, the heavens for those who posit the void around them1019 are limited but do not touch the void, given that it is a body that makes contact with a body. And being limited holds of Epicurus’ atoms that move in the void,1020 yet finding a limit relative to something (in other words, making contact with something)1021 does not apply to these atoms themselves.1022 Yet Epicurus so cherished this argument that he adopted it despite its being rather old-hat1023 and supported it with some minor and trivial additions in the manner of thieves who to escape notice change the look of stolen goods. So be it. But since finding a limit relative to something also applies to things beyond which something can be constantly taken, and since we have agreed that that beyond which something can be 1024 taken is unlimited, then if finding a limit relative to something holds of things that are limited, being unlimited would hold of things that are limited. So they either have to yield1025 to the fact that finding a limit relative to something is not the same as always having something external, or 1026 unlimited has not been correctly defined; or, as long as both are maintained, finding a limit relative to something must not be predicated by them of what is limited, unless from the outset they are also going to predicate the unlimited of what is limited!1027 100,18 Contrast our argument: does it have the same strength in its premises? We say that that beyond which something can be constantly taken is unlimited, and that that beyond which nothing can be taken is all and whole;1028 and so for us it follows that the all is not unlimited. Now the [Epicureans] themselves also concede the second of the two premises – that there is nothing beyond the all (indeed it is entirely self-evident and necessary) – but we have demonstrated that the other one is true.1029 100,23 (208a14-20) So what has been said suffices for the preceding argument, but consider1030 whether the one based on thinking1031 in fact contains any thinking. ‘We always,’ it says, ‘think of something beyond any given magnitude and thinking does not leave off taking something additional, i.e., making an addition to what has been thought. Even if someone really wanted to they could not release thinking from advancing further and constantly piling on something else.’ But if when we imagine in our thinking a magnitude having an unlimited excess, in heaven’s name what makes it necessary that any such thing also exists among actual things, given that actual things are not true in the same way as thoughts? I certainly think of you as beyond the city.1032 I think of you as much larger than a mountain. So are you beyond the city? And are you, then, to quote Homer,1033 ‘equal to the peak of a mountain’? Yet it would be delightful to have it within our power to make true whatever

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we might wish, since then it would be enough merely to believe that we are stronger than Zeus!1034 But not everything exists just as it is thought of; instead, few things are thought of as they are! 101,5 (208a20-2)1035 Time and change will be not be forced to have a beginning or an end, given that the unlimited is present in them yet is not instantaneous, i.e., all at the same time,1036 nor actual, since neither does it persist as something at all but by coming to be part by part.1037 That is also how the sub-division of continuous things has the unlimited. But if thinking were to dispute this forcefully, we shall grant it that the unlimited exists in conception but not in any way in actuality and in subsistence, since thinking cannot itself think of it1038 as instantaneous (that would be to add a limit to it)1039 but instead advances by always adding something limited until it shrinks back in exhaustion.1040

Notes 1. For recent comprehensive studies of this book see Giardina and Horstschäfer. 2. De Haas (2), 47-51 discusses the exegetical value of Themistius’ account of this chapter in the context of a wide-ranging survey of its reception in the ancient exegetical tradition. Tuominen, 138-40 surveys its content more superficially. 3. 1,4-6: cf. Themist. 37,14-19 on 2.1, 193a4-7 below on the role of noninferential reasoning in establishing the existence of nature. Cf. also 3,22-4 and 4,21 below. 4. 1,6: ‘principles’ (arkhai) is selected from 184a10-16, where Aristotle conjoins it with causes (aitia) and elements (stoikheia) (184a11), in a general identification of the goal of systematic knowledge. 5. 1,8-9: this example may be derived from the illustration of letters as the matter of syllables at Phys. 2.3, 195a16 (see Themist. 45,15 below). 6. 1,11-2,3: Morrison, 19-20 notes that Themistius is less adventurous than later ancient commentators in saying nothing about demonstration from what is prior for us being an inference from effect to cause, and criticizes Papuli, 224-8, who identified Themistius as a source for the method of regressus developed in the Renaissance. De Haas (2), 48-9 notes that Themistius offers ‘the germs’ of later theories of scientific inference. 7. 1,11-14: after legein (1,12) replace the comma with a question mark, and replace the question mark after boulêsometha (13-14) with a stop (Schenkl was right to think that 1,11-14 is best punctuated with a short preparatory question followed by a conditional with a paradoxical conclusion; cf. Philop. in Phys. 10,11-12). Also for ei (1,13) read aei (cf. Philop. in Phys. 10,11) so that the coordinated clauses of the protasis can posit the paradox of trying to investigate the principles on which demonstration is based, while the apodosis contains a statement that is an absurd attempt to identify principles prior to what are already principles. 8. 1,12: ‘demonstratively’ (meta apodeixeôs), paralleling ‘scientifically’ (met’ epistêmês) at 1,6. Though the term ‘demonstration’ is not used in this chapter it is suggested by hodos (184a16), ‘route’ or ‘procedure’. 9. 1,13-14: cf. 3.13-15 on 185a1-3 below on the need to accept undemonstrated principles, and for the Aristotelian background see An. Post. 1.3, 72b18-30, 1.22, 84a29-b1 and 2.3, 90b24-7. The phrase ‘principles of principles’ at An. Post. 90b26 also describes the undesirable result of seeking to demonstrate principles. Themistius does not overtly refer to his paraphrase on the Posterior Analytics (CAG 5:1), as he does at least indirectly to those on the Categories and Posterior Analytics (see on 4,26 and 9,10 below); for the latter see also Themist. in An. Post. 2,5-7. 10. 1,14: for the distinction see Arist. An. Post. 1.2, 71b34-72a5 with Themist. in An. Post. 6,14-20 (see Barnes on 71b33), and 1.3, 72b15-73a20 with Themist. in An. Post. 9,21-3 (see Tuominen, 139-40).

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11. 1,18: literally ‘the journey (poreia) is reversed’; see Plat. Tim. 81C6 for the same metaphor. 12. 1,19-20: ‘nature devises’ (hê phusis mêkhanatai); for this language used of organic structuring see Arist. PA 652a31. 13. 2,5: Schenkl has an obelus beside tarakteon, but it is unobjectionable here, and the form of the verb thorubein (cf. 6,26 and 7,8-9 below) proposed in the apparatus criticus is unnecessary. For allied uses of tarattein in this paraphrase see 18,14 and 187,29. Cf. also De Haas (2), 49 n. 45. 14. 2,5-6: ‘unique features’ (ta idia) are properties that can be unique both to species, as in the examples that follow, and to individuals, as in the case at 2,18-20 below of children who come to recognize the uniqueness of their parents. The Aristotelian phrase ta kath’ hekasta (184a24), which Themistius avoids, is similarly ambiguous. Themistius equates the standard term for universals, ta katholou (184a23-4) with ta koina (‘common features’), which Aristotle also uses later at Phys. 1.7, 189b31 and 3.1, 200b24-5 below; in both places Themistius (23,20-1 and 67,17-18 respectively) refers back to the present passage. Arguably ta koina identifies the pre-analytical conflation of properties under discussion better than katholou, which has the technical sense of universal, though when used at 2,10 below it is conjoined with koina. Bolton, 3-4 translates to katholou as ‘the comprehensive’ to distinguish its meaning in this context. Commentators refer to this principle as, at least ‘superficially’ (Ross [2], 457), in conflict with the Aristotelian position that the things that are in common, in the sense of being universals, are more remote than ‘particulars’. On the account of method in Phys. 1.1 in relation to other Aristotelian texts, a comparative procedure precluded by Themistian paraphrasing, see Bolton. 15. 2,7: for prosiêi read prosioi (Spengel). 16. 2,6-9: for the reference to perception in this context see Arist. An. Post. 72a1-3, and cf. this illustration with the analysis of error in the case of incidental and common perceptual properties at Arist. DA 3.3, 428b19-25 where a white object (428b21-2), possibly some distance away (cf. 428b29-30), might not be identifiable as a given human being (cf. DA 2.6, 418a20-3). Here an object is generically identified as an animal on the basis of its motion and probably its shape and size, common properties (DA 2.5, 418a17-18; 3.3, 428b23-4) that could serve to identify a moving object as animate. 17. 2,11: sunkekhumena (‘undifferentiated’), the commentator’s term, reflects the notion of ‘fusion’ (sunkhusis) as a type of mixture in which constituents lose their identity. 18. 2,11-12: this remark seems designed to square the process of an initial apprehension through perception of a general, or commonly shared, feature with the role of nous as the capacity to grasp what is being apprehended. This procedure is in contrast with that depicted by Themistius at in An. Post. 65,13-20 (on An Post. 2,19) where nous advances from a general awareness of man or white to an insight into what they are. Here, however, a general awareness is followed by an analysis into specifics. 19. 2,13-14: cf. Arist. Rhet. 1.22, 1396b10-18 for the distinction between features that are ‘common’ (koina) and those that are ‘unique’ (idia) (in that context to an individual), though at 2,14 eidos can only refer to the species that fall under generic headings, since Themistius must have in mind rhetorical theory rather than the practice discussed at Rhet. 1.22; cf. the reference to theorists of grammar and music at 1,8-11 above. 20. 2,14-16: see especially Arist. Topics, 1.1, and see De Haas (2), 50 n. 48 for other relevant Aristotelian loci. Themistius’ commentary on the Topics is

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no longer extant; on it see Scholze, 83 n. 518, Stegemann, col. 1655, and Todd (10), 60 n. 10. 21. 2,16-17: remove the brackets on apo gar – diakrinomen, placing a colon before it and a stop after it, so that it serves as a concluding explanation of the preceding illustration, with the next sentence (2,17-18) setting up the final illustration rather than, as in Schenkl’s punctuation, complementing the two preceding illustrations. 22. 2,18-20: see De Haas (2), 50 on Themistius’ strategy here. Aristotle uses this example to show that children have not yet learnt that the names ‘father’ and ‘mother’ are restricted to their parents; see Konstan, 241-2 and De Haas (2), 45. Themistius, however, depicts them moving from the general concepts of male and female to the identification of their parents; De Haas (2), 50 n. 52 suggests that previously they had associated the names ‘father’ and ‘mother’ with the correct genders. This complexity contrasts with the earlier case (2,8-9) in which a visual object was identified first as an animal, then as a human being. 23. On the distinction between a definition and a name see also Arist. An. Post. 2.7, 92b26-32, with Themist. in An. Post. 48,24-6. 24. 2,22: this example replaces that of a circle (kuklos, 184b2), the precise meaning and significance of which is uncertain. See Konstan, 243-4 who rightly emphasizes that here onoma means the name of a species. Cf. on 2,24-5 below. 25. 2,24: the examples of representations of a human being must reflect the case at Arist. Cat. 1a2-3 of a painted person illustrating homonymy. For similar examples being as abruptly introduced as they are here and thus open to suspicion as deriving from later glosses see 6,3, 8,23, 24,22, 67,17, 72,12-13 and 85,13 below. 26. 2,24-5: this is a reaction to Aristotle’s claim that a definition of a circle creates divisions ‘into ta kath’ hekasta’ (184b3). Ross (2), 458, took the phrase to mean ‘the various senses of a term’. Charlton, 52 accepts Philoponus’ reading of it at in Phys. 20,6-10 as referring to the separate items that make up the definition of a term like ‘human being’, but that later commentator is adopting Themistius’ reading. 27. 2,26: the search for definitions will dominate the rest of Book 1 along with the issue, identified at 1,11-12 above, of how to deal with principles through demonstration. 28. 2,29-31: Themistius’ expansion of 184b15 from the bare statement that the principle must be one or more than one is cited by Simpl. in Phys. 42,12-14; see Baltussen, 167. 29. 2,30: Anaxagoras of Clazomenae (c. 500-428 BC) is criticized in 1.4 below, but was influential on Aristotle through his theory of a cosmic cause (nous). Sider, 39, sees this passage as an inference from 1.4, 187b4-6 below (Anaxagoras is not mentioned by Aristotle in the present context), and sees this text as evidence that Themistius’ reports of Anaxagoras’ views are (unsurprisingly, given the nature of his paraphrastic method) based entirely on the Aristotelian text. 30. 2,31: Democritus of Abdera (c. 460-350 BC), the major representative of early Atomism. 31. 3,1-2: the opposite states (if not the specific illustrations; see on 3,2b) attributed to Anaxagoras descend from an interpretation by Porphyry, followed by Philop. in Phys. 26,8, as well as Themistius, of the words ê kai enantias at 184b22, which were taken to refer to Anaxagoras rather than being a further comment on the nature of Democritus’ atoms; see Simpl. in Phys. 44,1-2. Ross (2), 459 endorses this view, which is supported by Arist. 187a25-6 below. Baltussen, 167 misrepresents Simplicius here as reporting that Porphyry and Themistius used ‘a different wording’.

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32. 3,2a: Aristotle imposed on Anaxagoras his term homoiomerês, which he used to mean a whole made up of like parts, i.e., one that is homoiomerous in the sense of ‘uniform’ or ‘homogeneous’, as with matter that has a single and continuous qualitative identity, notably blood, flesh and bone, in contrast with non-homoiomerous (anomoiomerê) structures, such as bodily organs. Anaxagoras, on the other hand, had a more elaborate theory of homogeneity, discussed and criticized in 1.4 below. The noun homoiomereia (‘homoiomereity’, or ‘compound made up of like parts’) is post-Aristotelian and appears frequently in doxographical reports of Anaxagoras’ theory of matter. 33. 3,2b: this is another abruptly introduced illustration that may have been a gloss (see on 2,24 above). When the same claim is inserted at 17,30-1 below no illustrations are offered. 34. 3,5-10: here Themistius is making the generic reference at 184b25-6 to the doctrine that what is is one and unchanging specific to the Eleatics, namely Parmenides of Elea (late sixth to mid-fifth century BC), and Melissus of Samos (fifth century BC), often collectively labeled, along with Zeno of Elea (b. c. 490 BC; see 12,1-2 below), as the Eleatics. He uses the definition of a principle at Arist. 185a4-5 at 3,8 to characterize their position in a doxography based on theories of principles. In effect he is correcting Aristotle’s initial remark (184b15-16) that Parmenides and Melissus posited a single unchanging principle and making it consistent with the criticism at 184b25-185a5, which is that an unchanging principle is not a principle of nature at all. 35. 3,7: cf. Alex. ap. Simpl. in Phys. 46,15 who says that the principle ‘draws a plurality to itself’ (plêthos hautêi suneisagei), or ‘consolidates it within itself’. 36. 3,11: for the same general point about the Eleatics see Arist. Metaph. 1.5, 986b12-17. In this text Aristotle does not mention the natural scientist (phusiologos) but the reference to the geometer (185a1) legitimizes introducing him. Subsequent references (3,16.17.21.23), and the comparison with mathematicians, reflect the detailed definition in Phys. 2.2; see 193b22-194a12 with Themist. 40,14-41,29. 37. 3,15-22: this enlarges 184b25-185a4 by an argument that supports the later claim (Phys. 2.1, 193a3-6 and Themist. 37,10-14) that it is ridiculous to try and demonstrate that nature exists. Nature and change are ‘self-evident’ (cf. 4,21 below and 1,4-6 above); thus in searching for their principles their existence can be taken for granted. 38. 3,19: for optics being subordinate to geometry see Arist. An. Post. 1.7, 75b15-16; for a general account of the relation between natural science and medicine see Arist. PN 480b22-30. 39. 3,21-2: he will be a dialectician if he argues from reputable premises (endoxa) (cf. Arist. Top. 100a29-30 and SE 165b3-4) but a philosopher if he argues from principles unrelated to nature; the distinction is Themistius’ insertion, since Alexander (ap. Simpl. in Phys. 49,20-3) did not equivocate between philosopher and dialectician but opted for the former, as did Ross (2), 461. Irwin, 508 n. 52 thinks that a reference to dialectic is ‘more probable’. 40. 3,22-4: on the existence of nature not being demonstrable see Arist. Phys. 2.1, 193a1-9 and Themist. 37,10-22 below, and cf. 4,21 below. 41. 3,24-30: this section makes the criticism at 184b25-185a4 pertinent to the Eleatics ahead of the paraphrase of 185a7-12 below. 42. 3,26-7: see 36,1-2 (= 192b21-2) and 36,22-4 below where this summary definition is elaborated. 43. 3,27-4,8 = Antiphon F15(d) Pendrick. See Pendrick’s commentary on the texts at his F15 for a discussion of Themistius in the context of related reports in the other Aristotelian commentators.

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44. 3,28: after ên supply an; see Todd (11), 108 n. 180 on this kind of emendation; cf. also 93,27 below. 45. 3,33: Hippocrates of Chios (fl. c. 450-430 BC) was a noted geometer, while Antiphon (450-400 BC) is best known as a major sophist of the later fifth century BC, with wide philosophical interests. Themist. in An. Post. 19,6-17 (= F210B Döring) ad Arist. 75b37-76a1 also comments on Bryson’s attempt to square the circle, on which see also Tuominen, 141-2. 46. 4,1: a lune (mêniskos) is a shape created by the intersection of two circles of unequal size, so called because it has essentially the same shape as a crescent moon; such a shape preserves the principle of circularity whereas in Antiphon’s method circularity is reduced to rectilinearity. Arist. 185a16-17 (= DK 42A3) uses the term tmêma (lit. ‘segment’) and also does not mention Hippocrates by name, but Themistius’ term is used in another Aristotelian report (SE 171b1516 [also at DK loc. cit.]; cf. An. Pr. 69a32-3) in which Hippocrates is named. Eudemus addressed this construction in his history of geometry (F140W = Simpl. in Phys. 60,22ff. and DK loc. cit.) and exempted Hippocrates from any criticism; see Zhmud, 266 with n. 9. See Ross (2), 463-6, Lloyd and Mueller (2) on the other ancient evidence on Hippocrates’ method (mostly in Simplicius via Eudemus) and for discussion of modern interpretations. As Lloyd, 110 notes, Themistius’ evidence is of little value. 47. 4,2: Schenkl posited a lacuna here; I have translated the text supplied in MS L from Simpl. in Phys. 58,16-17: panta de mêniskon hoion tetragônizein labein eis. 48. 4,2-8 (= DK 87B13, p. 341,27-36), translated at Sprague, 216-17. Ross (2), 466-7 discusses Themistius’ evidence on Antiphon, which is considered reliable; see Heath, vol. 1, 221. 49. 4,7-8: for the same criticism directed at anyone positing indivisible minima, to which the sides of the last inscribed triangle here are analogous, see 98,21-4 below. 50. 4,9: after epeita the omission of de to balance men in the preceding line would seem to be idiomatic; cf. 5,18-19 below. 51. 4,11: this named example replaces Aristotle’s generic case of saying that what is is one human being (185a7). 52. 4,12: Heraclitus of Ephesus (late sixth to fifth century BC). 53. 4,14-15: for an analysis of these arguments see 7,15-9,16 below. On Melissus see on 9,13 regarding why he can be said not to establish a problem. 54. 4,15-17: this version of Arist. 185a17-19 is noted by Simpl. in Phys. 70,31-2 as supporting the distinction between the Eleatic arguments not being about nature but applicable to problems surrounding it. 55. 4,17: I use ‘the unlimited’ for to apeiron instead of ‘the infinite’; this produces a clearer contrast with ‘limited’ (peperasmenos) and avoids anachronistic implications. 56. 4,21: after kinêsin delete the colon and bracket tauta – hupokeisthô which can be seen as a simplified version of Arist. 185a12-14 where ‘induction’ (epagogê) is said to be the basis for the claim that some or all things change, see on 3,15-22 above. 57. 4,22: ‘for good measure’ (ek periontos; also 78,27 below); see Annas and Barnes ad Sext. Emp. Pyrrh. Hyp. 1.62-3 etc. (LSJ under perieimi III.b is inadequate on this fairly common idiomatic phrase). The discussion, in other words, is superfluous but, as Arist. 185a19-20 concedes, a brief excursus on it may be philosophically worthwhile. 58. 4,26: Themistius might be referring to his own paraphrase of the Categories (for which there is secure evidence in later antiquity; see Stegemann, cols.

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1654-5), but given the general character of the reference (cf. on 5,1-2 below) it could just reflect his adoption of the Aristotelian persona, or be designed to recall earlier instruction on the Categories; cf. 9,10-11 below with regard to the Prior Analytics, and also see Golitsis, 24 n. 68 for a similar cross-reference by Philoponus. 59. 4,27: hupostasis (‘subsistence’) is an independent state of being in contrast with a secondary and dependent one. It and its allied verb huphistasthai are sometimes translated ‘real existence’/ ‘really exist’, but I have adopted a widely used equivalent that is less paraphrastic and interpretive. 60. 4,30: for houtô de read houtô kai with Spengel. 61. 4,31-2: cf. Arist. Metaph. 5.6, where the senses of being one per se are listed in this way at 1016a17-b6. 62. 5,1-2: ‘undivided’ (atomos) points to Arist. Cat. 1b3-7 where the examples of an individual human being and an individual horse are also used. This language expands the option that what is is a single substance at Arist. 185a24-5. 63. 5,4-5: only Melissus is named at 185a32-3, with Parmenides introduced in light of Phys. 3.6, 207a15-17 (Themist. 95,8-12) where he is favourably contrasted with Melissus for defining the whole as limited, though in fact the same contrast occurs shortly at 185b17-18 without Themistius making it explicit; see on 6,6-7 below. 64. 5,5: before peperasmenon supply to. 65. 5,6-9: Arist. 185b3-5 has ‘So if what is is both substance and quantity, it is two and not one; but if it is only substance, it is not unlimited, nor will it have any magnitude; for [magnitude] will be a quantity’. Themistius has restated this text in terms borrowed from the Categories of predication of an underlying subject (hupokeimenon). 66. 5,12: ‘and a moment’ (kai hê stigmê), a meaning suggested by a reader, and perhaps an informal way of referring to the Aristotelian ‘now’ (to nun). It is tempting to see this phrase as originally the marginal gloss ê hê stigmê and delete it, but it seems as though some distinction is intended. Another reader suggested that it refers to a unit such as an atom (physically undivided but theoretically divisible) as opposed to a mathematical point which is by definition partless, as at 6,2-3 below where Themistius refers to a ‘unit (monas) or point’, but the coupling there does not imply that one of these is physically indivisible. 67. 5,12-13: this illustration has been moved up from Arist. 185b20 to replace that of mead and wine (185b9), which Themistius substitutes in that later place; see the note on 6,10 below. 68. 5,13: Ross (2), 468 notes that Aristotle’s omission of the sense of one in species (or form) from this list is insignificant, since such unity obviously implies a numerical difference (between the species and the individual) that was irrelevant to a critique of the Eleatics. In Themistius’ case, however, that sense has already been introduced and exploited at 4,31-5,1 above. 69. 5,14: all that Aristotle says at 185b9-11 is ‘So if [what is one] is continuous, then what is one is many; for what is continuous is divisible without limit’. 70. 5,18-19: an undivided thing, such as a point, is only identifiable as an actual component of a continuum; but any continuum is potentially divisible; see Simpl. in Phys. 81,16-17. 71. 5,21: after ta sômata supply de. Cf. 14,32 and 18,12 below where similar explications introduce the explicandum followed by a connective and then legô. 72. 5,21-2: ‘of unlike parts’ (see on 3,2 above) refers to the bodily parts, such as hand, foot and belly mentioned in the argument that immediately follows. See Arist. Metaph. 7.16, 1040b8-9 for juxtaposed objects in a ‘heap’ (sôros) in contrast with unified biological substances.

Notes to pages 23-24

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73. 5,25-6: cf. Euclid, Elements 1, Common Notion 1: that things that are equal to the same thing are equal to one another. 74. 5,26-6,1: cf. Themistius’ elaboration of the brief source text with the aporetic analysis of the part/whole relationship at Sext. Emp. Pyrrh. Hyp. 3.98-101 and Math. 9.338-49. 75. 5,7: ‘the early thinkers’ (hoi palaioi), a term generally equivalent to hoi arkhaioi (22,4; 42,10) (‘the pioneers’), but perhaps including Plato in the present case, since in filling out the brief Aristotelian statement of the problems surrounding the part/whole relationship Themistius may be alluding to Plat. Theaetet. 204A-205A. 76. 5,28a: for aporon read apora; cf. line 31. 77. 5,28b: cf. 5,23-6: i.e., any part of a whole will be identical with any other part; cf. Sext. Emp. Pyrrh. Hyp. 3.100 and Math. 9.346-7 for the possibility that parts will be parts of one another 78. 5,29-30: if only one part of a whole was different from the whole, then we could say that there are two wholes, with the single so-called part re-classified as a whole. But if multiple parts are different from the whole, then there are multiple wholes, and they cannot be parts of the whole from which they were differentiated. This argument thus reinstates the problem of the part/whole relationship by re-identifying parts as wholes. 79. 5,32: before oikias supply epi. Also, given Alexander’s lengthy analysis of the example of a house (see next note), ê khorou may be a later addition. 80. 6,1: the problem (cf. Plat. Theaetet. 205A7-9) is that if the whole (to holon) and the sum total (ta panta) are the same then the parts are the same as the whole, and the sum total is the set of separate parts. The solution referred to at 5,32 must be that offered by Alex. ap. Simpl. in Phys. 84,3485,2: ‘the solution [to the problem of a house consisting of parts that are different from it; see Alex. ap. Simpl. in Phys. 84,23-9] is that the [following inference] is not valid: if each of the parts taken individually is different from the whole, then all the parts that are taken simultaneously are thereby different from the whole’. 81. 6,3: this illustration is gratuitous and probably derived from a gloss, like others of its ilk; see on 67,17 and 73,12-13 below. 82. 6,6-7: Arist. 185b17-18 distinguishes between Parmenides and Melissus, with only the latter said to apply ‘unlimited’ to what is; see on 5,4-5 above and the note on 95,10-12 ad 207a15-18. 83. 6,10: Arist. 185b20 has as comparanda a mantle and a cloak, which Themistius had used earlier at 5,12-13 above. Mead and wine are different names with different definitions for the same thing, without being opposites. 84. 6,12-13: delete ptênon (6,12) though phuton might be removed instead. An equivalent is needed to Aristotle’s claim (185b13) that human being and horse are identical opposites on this argument. A third item only undermines this point. Also, delete the comma before haplôs tanatia (6,13); this phrase is a generalization in apposition to the two specific pairs of opposites. 85. 6,13-17: cf. Simpl. in Phys. 82,25-83,4 for a fuller statement, in part possibly derived from Porphyry. 86. 6,17-25: Themistius sees Arist. 185b25 (‘and what it is to be a quality and what it is to be a quantity will be the same’) as leading into and rationalizing the extreme response to predication described in the next paragraph. In modern editions and translations it is taken to be an addendum to 189b19-25. 87. 6,18: dipêkhus, a measure twice the length of an adult’s lower arm, a pêkhus being, the distance from finger-tips to elbows (a ‘cubit’) and equal to 24 finger-breadths (‘digits’), or just over 13 inches. Socrates may have appeared to

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be around 26 inches tall at a distance; cf. the reference to an image of this size at Philop. in Phys. 252,32. 88. 6,19: ‘farce’ (polus ho gelôs); cf. Plat. Laws 751B8 for this phrase and see also on 16,22 below. 89. 6,19-20: after logon (6,20) replace the stop with a question mark and accent the introductory particle ê as disjunctive rather than interrogative to allow it to introduce a second more specific question (see Smyth, para 2860). 90. 6,24: after einai place a question mark. 91. 6,24-5: if Socrates is the subject and a quality and quantity are predicated of him, then the opponents might claim that Socrates is both one and many, which is exactly the contradiction charged against the monistic principle. The refutation thus converts back (antistrephein, 6,24) into a charge against its critics. For the general principle of conversion involved see Arist. SE 15, 167b1-3. 92. 6,26: Arist. 185b25-31 is cited at DK 83A2 as the only evidence that Lycophron was one of those who ‘abolished “is”’ (185b27-8). Lycophron (on whom see Narcy) was probably a sophist contemporary with, or influenced by, Gorgias, and thus dateable to the late fifth and early fourth centuries. Neither his solution (nor that attributed to Plato; see on 7,3-4 below) solve the problem of the one and the many, since he is still positing more than one item; see Muller, 172-3. 93. 6,30-7,1: the words in angle brackets are not an emendation but represent Schenkl’s judgment that, although they are in three of his four principal manuscripts, they are a supplement to the archetype. He thought that it would suffice to read only the last two words of this insert, so that his preferred text would have run ‘ then to prevent Socrates becoming many things [he used to say] simply “Socrates both white and two cubits tall”.’ 94. 7,2: cf. Themist. in Phys. 184,10 for much the same proverb applied to Epicurus’ theory of motion, and also Themist. in Anal. Post. 9,13. It has classical roots; see, for example, Thucydides 5.65.2. 95. 7,2-3: cf. Arist. Int. 5, 17a9-12 for the claim that an apophantikos logos (‘assertoric statement’ or ‘statement-making sentence’, trans. Ackrill) must contain a verb, such as ‘is’ in the definition of a human being, which Lycophron eliminated. 96. 7,3-4: Ross (2), 469 thought that Themistius’ equation of ‘the others’ of Arist. 185b28-9 with Plato conflicted with Plato’s ridicule at Sophist 251A-C of those who avoided the problem of one thing being many by admitting only statements of identity, as opposed to eliminating the copula, like Lycophron (see on 6,26). However, the thesis in the Aristotelian text that Themistius has attributed to Plato is not the same as that criticized in the Sophist, but is an imperfect solution to the problem of the one and the many since the verb form used still allows for a distinction between subject and predicate. Berrettoni is unusual in taking Themistius’ identification of Plato as historical fact and in attributing it to the latter’s oral teaching; see Berrettoni, 150-1 with 137-8. It is uncertain whom Aristotle had in mind at 185b28-9. Philop. in Phys. 49,19 mentions Menedemus of Eretria (c. 340-c. 265 BC) (on whom see Giannantoni, vol. 1, Menedemus IIIF20), but, pace Ross loc. cit., perhaps implausibly (see Osborne, 121 n. 254). See further on 7,7 below. 97. 7,3: Themistius substitutes the specific word ‘statement’ (logos) for Aristotle’s vaguer ‘speech’ (lexis) at 185b28. 98. 7,4: ‘he has turned white’ (leleukôtai) is the first of Aristotle’s examples at 185b29-30 of a subject-predicate relationship expressed by a single word; the second, not cited here, involves replacing a periphrastic continuous present ‘he is walking’ (badizôn esti) with a one-word present tense ‘he walks’ (badizei).

Notes to pages 24-25

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99. 7,7: Simpl. in Phys. 120,18-20 expresses this solution by contrasting Socrates as the same with respect to the subject yet different ‘with respect to the incidental properties’ (kata ta sumbebêkota). Cf. the preceding reference by him to the Megarian argument (120,12-17; = F198 Döring) that since different predications involve different ‘definitions’ (logoi), then the subject of such predications will be separated from itself; so a fortiori, that subject can only be identical with itself – a view akin to that rejected by Plato at Sophist 251A-C, and indirectly attributed to the Megarians at Plutarch, Adv. Col. 1119C-1120B (= F197 Döring). 100. 7,6-8: Themistius is clearly indebted to Alexander here; for the latter’s more elaborate exegesis see Simpl. in Phys. 96,22-30. 101. 7,9: Arist. 185b34 mentions the division of a whole into its parts. 102. 7,11-13 contains (on the basis, no doubt, of 3.1, 201a19-22 below; cf. Themist. 70,13-18) two additional distinctions, ‘in the same respect’ and ‘at the same time’, to that drawn at Arist. 186a3 between potentiality and actuality to disarm the claim that the opposites are both one and many: For the latter used in connection with such sophistic claims see Arist. SE 167a7-20, and cf. Int. 17a35-7. For ‘intrusions of the sophists’ (sophistikai enokhlêseis) see Arist. Int. 17a36-7, where it may not be an alternative title for the Sophistici Elenchi but used, as here, to assert that affirmation and negation regarding the same thing is possible without contradiction. 103. 7,15-16: Arist. 186a6-10 is omitted, presumably because it is a repetition of 185a7-12 above. Ross (2) deleted 186a7-10; see his note on 185a8-12. 104. 7,17-19 expands the elliptical analysis at Arist. 186a11-13 (‘for [Melissus] thinks that it can be inferred that if everything that has come to be has a beginning, then anything that has not come to be also does not have [a beginning]’). Themistius locates this fallacy in the context of Melissus’ theory of being, and articulates its error from the system of hypothetical arguments associated originally with Stoic logic, in which the ‘second indemonstrable’ (modus tollens) argument is the valid form identified here (see Diog. Laert. 7.80 at SVF 2.241; cf. also Themist. in Phys. 115,31-116,3), complemented by the invalid reasoning (the denial of the antecedent) that Themistius identifies (on which see Sext. Emp. Math. 8,433). (For a somewhat less explicit identification of the complementary argument, modus ponens, see 91,3-4 below.) This text is thus a minor manifestation of the much larger phenomenon of the use of hypothetical arguments, and the possible assimilation of Stoic logic, by Aristotelian commentators; for recent discussions see, for example, Speca and Bobzien. 105. 7,18: before gar supply men to balance de in 7,20; otherwise de in 7,20 has to be deleted. 106. 7,23-25: Sext. Emp. Math. 8.433 also gives an example of such reasoning being legitimately applied to a conditional in which both p and q are false, so that to deny p and deny q is only to state the truth. 107. 7,27: delete tên khthes hêmeran (MS L and possibly W). One example suffices, as with the case of the beginning with respect to magnitude, and this second one is also not linked by a conjunction. It may have been a marginal addition. 108. 7,29: (i) is an alternative version (or a conversion, antistrophê; see 9,15 below) of the inference ‘p entails q’ that formed the first premise in the version at 7,17-18, just as (ii) is an alternative version of ‘not-p therefore not-q’, since that fallacious argument (p entails q; not-p; therefore not-q’) is equivalent to the fallacy that ‘(p entails q) entails (not-p entails not-q)’. In the Sophistici Elenchi Aristotle uses the latter formulation of Melissus’ argument to illustrate

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the fallacy of illicit conversion; see 167b13-17, 168b35-40 and 181a27-29. On the issue of whether Aristotle’s criticism of Melissus is justified see Ross (2), 471-2. 109. 7,32-8,2: Arist. 186a15-16 is restated here, but without any reference to the significance it has for his analysis of instantaneous change in Physics 6.4; see Themist. in Phys. 192,9-10 with Todd (11), 117 n. 310, and cf. 116 n. 304. The examples of the alleged instantaneous congealing of ice and cheese are imported from those later contexts. 110. 8,5: this counter-example uses magnitude in the sense of spatial distance; see 7,28 above. Thus the daily course of a planet, which (for Aristotle) has no beginning in time, does have a beginning in magnitude, in that any specific orbit can be plotted, yet the fact that that orbit has a temporal duration does not mean that it has a temporal beginning. 111. 8,6-8: ‘All that comes to be has a beginning in magnitude’ is false because of the counter examples of instantaneous change, and ‘What does not come to be does not have a beginning in magnitude’ is false because of the motion of the eternal bodies (see previous note). 112. 8,10: for an read au rather than delete it, as Schenkl proposed. 113. 8,8-11: ‘All that comes to be has a beginning in time’ is self-evidently true, and ‘What does not come to be does not have a beginning in time’ is also true, but, as with the motion of the eternal celestial bodies, it can have a beginning in magnitude (see note on 8,5), which Melissus does not include. 114. 8,11-12: the full argument (equally fallacious for asserting the antecedent) would be: If (p) what is is one and unlimited in all directions, (q) it has nowhere to move; but (p); therefore (q). 115. 8,13-15: after endekhetai (13) replace the question mark with a comma and after phanerôs (15) replace the stop with a question mark. 116. 8,15: delete êtoi kinêsin as a gratuitous gloss; cf. Arist. 186a18, where only alloiôsis (‘alteration’, i.e., change in quality) is introduced in the question ‘Next, why would there not be alloiôsis?’, which asks why an otherwise immobile one cannot undergo qualitative change. 117. 8,16: after apeirou remove the colon, and treat ou gar – prosdeitai as a parenthetical explanation of a question to be signified after prosdeitai with a question mark rather than a stop. 118. 8,17: see 4,14-15 (= Arist. 185a10-11). 119. 8,19-24: Arist. 186a19-22 needs to be quoted in full: ‘But neither can [what is] be one in species (tôi eidei) – unless by virtue of what it comes from (some of the natural scientists also speak of one thing in this way, but that is not the way [that he does]) – for a human being is different from a horse in species and the opposites [are different] from one another’. Themistius has not made it clear that Aristotle is saying that the natural scientists can speak of what is as a single material source from which things come without precluding the things that are derived from it being many in species. 120. 8,20-1: he did not so take it; see 3,8-9 above where both Eleatics are distinguished from other natural scientists in this respect because of their positing an unchanging principle. 121. 8,22: after elege replace the stop with a comma so that the coordinate clauses can be conjoined. 122. 8,27-8: this explication of the argument has to supplement an elliptical Aristotelian text. On Alexander’s authority Themistius’ version is attributed to Theophrastus at Simpl. in Phys. 115,11-13 (= Theophrastus FHSG 234). 123. 8,27: Eudemus (ap. Simpl. in Phys. 115,13-14 = F43 Wehrli) has this premise as ‘But what is is also spoken of in a single sense’. 124. 8,29: see 4,25-30 (= Arist. 185a20-9) above.

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125. 8,29: for ti read toi (toi MSS WBL). 126. 8,32: this ‘sea-dog’: Themistius must be making a loose reference to a shark or ‘dog-fish’; cf. Arist. HA 566a30-1 for more precise classifications. The ‘celestial’ (ouranios) dog is the star (Sirius, or Alpha Canis Maioris). Simpl. in Phys. 117,19-22 has only the case of what is beyond the crab, and contrasts the marine crab with the celestial sign of that name. 127. 9,1: for the second to read ti (Spengel). 128. 9,10: since ginesthai en is used to mean to reach a point in the course of traveling, it probably refers here to reaching the Prior Analytics in a course of study, preceded perhaps by study of the Categories (cf. 4,26 above). The reference to the Analytics is not to a specific text in Aristotle’s logical writings but to the fact that, as noted above (see on 7,17-19), they were obviously studied along with argument forms based on hypotheses. 129. 9,11: in a standard syllogism, rather than the hypothetical one used here, the conjunction of ‘All beyond white is not-white’ and ‘All not-white is nothing’ would entail ‘All beyond white is nothing’, not, as we might put Parmenides’ conclusion, ‘only what is white is’, or ‘All is white’, or ‘there is only one white thing’. 130. 9,12a: at 185a10-11. 131. 9,12b: see 4,15 above (Arist. 185a10-11), and recalled here at 186a24-5. 132. 9,13: Melissus’ argument criticized at 7,29-8,10 above contained the error of invalid conversion (see on 7,29; cf. 9,15-16 here) in an argument that is otherwise standard (or ‘by the rule’, tekhnikôs, 9.13), whereas Parmenides’ errs by misconstruing the significance of negation in ‘not-what is’. Thus unlike Melissus he cannot be charged with a failure to create a problem; see 4,15 above. 133. 9,13: there is a hiatus here since the apodosis ‘he would not have taken’ needs a protasis that reflects the statement that ‘what is-not is not a negation’, and it is straining things to say that this is implicit. I have inserted a supplement to the translation rather than try and rewrite the Greek. Spengel saw a problem here but deleted ou gar an in line 13 and read apophasin as the object of elaben to generate the sentence ‘For he did not take “what is-not” in the second premise as a negation that was a subject but as an affirmation derived from a transposition’. But this produces a meaning opposite to what a critic should be saying: namely, that by taking it as a negation Parmenides could not see that what is not was an affirmation compatible with the existence of a plurality; see the next note. 134. 9,13-15: cf. Arist. An. Pr., 1.46, 51b5-10 for this distinction; for the terminology see Alex. quaestiones 2.7, 53,13 where an affirmation that is said to be ‘by transposition’ (metathesei) is identified as a privation (sterêsis) and distinguished, as it is here, from a negation. Cf. also 27,2-4 below where in a similar analysis of the status of matter to that in quaest. 2.7, negation is also distinguished from privation. Here Parmenides is being accused of having taken ‘what is-not’ simply as a negation and thus as a subject with the predicate ‘is nothing’ instead of seeing that it had to be transposed into an affirmation (‘what is not white’) that identifies privatively the set of non-white things, i.e., other colours. 135. 9,22-3: after pote (22) delete the colon and after tinos (23) replace the stop with a comma, and place touto – tinos in brackets within which a comma should be inserted after holôs. 136. 9,25-6: a criticism the reverse of that offered at 9,13-15, where what is not (or what is not white) was said to be mistakenly taken as an underlying subject that was nothing; here what is white is said to be mistakenly taken as a single underlying subject when it is two things, body and colour.

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137. 9,26: sukophantein is almost certainly taken from Plato, Republic 1, 340D-341C, where it can only mean ‘quibble’ when used by Thrasymachus to deride Socrates’ arguments; see Todd (6). 138. 9,28-9: to hoper on, is variously translated as ‘what just is’ (Hardie/Gaye), which I have adopted, ‘what just is being’ (Waterfield), ‘just being’ (Apostle), or ‘precisely what is’ (Charlton). On this expression see Wagner, 408-9. 139. 9,29: aside from Plato’s use of the expression auto to on (‘what itself is’) at Rep. 537D6 (cf. Themist. at 10,8-9 below), note Alexander’s statement at in Metaph. 224,5-7 that Plato used ‘what itself-is’ (autoon, the post-Platonic technical term, hyphenated to convey the fusion of auto and on) of the ideas along with the similarly formed ‘one-itself’ (autoen). 140. 10,7: for palaiôi (‘of old’) read poliôi, ‘grey-beard’, used of Parmenides at Plat. Parm. 127B2. The fact that Parmenides lived long ago is no reason to be concerned about attaching a contradiction to him, but the fact that he was old and wise certainly is. A reader pointed to Proclus’ bizarre analysis of polios at in Parm. 683-4 Cousin (= p. 76 Steel), where the graying of the hair is seen as a movement away from ‘darkness’ and thus reflecting greater intellectual illumination. I think that apart from the inherent logic of this sentence, additional support is better drawn from the fact that Themistius often uses rare Platonic vocabulary, as well as the principle that scribes may substitute similar but simpler language. 141. 10,8: delete estô (rather than dedosthô); clearly only one is needed to make the supposition that follows; estô probably was a gloss. 142. 10,9-10: the words in quotation marks do not in every detail reproduce Arist. 186b4-5, but they seem intended to show that the preceding terms in this sentence are ultimately equivalent to the Aristotelian text. 143. 10,14: before hoper on supply to. 144. 10,21-2: Themistius takes the conclusion (186b11-12) of Arist. 184b6-12, that if what just is is defined as what is white, there will be many things, and demonstrates it independently as a ‘second’ argument, while leaving the claim that what just is is what is not (186b6-11) as a separate ‘first’ argument. 145. 10,30: after einai remove the comma. 146. 10,31: see 10,5-7 above; cf. Arist. 186b2-4. 147. 10,33: Aristotle says: ‘So what is will not even have magnitude if what is is what just is; for being (to einai) for each of its parts will be different’. Themistius’ version of this conclusion envisages the Eleatics avoiding identifying what is with body to avoid divisibility into a plurality of parts each of which will have incidental properties. He thus glosses ‘being for’ as ‘being incidental’. 148. 10,33-4: Schenkl is rightly concerned about the phrase ‘posit of a magnitude’ (megethous thesin), but it can perhaps be left as a slightly awkward gloss on ‘body’. 149. 11,10-28: cf. Alex. ap. Simpl. in Phys. 76,10-20, Themistius’ source here. 150. 11,13-15: for sense (ii), restated in general form at 11,21-3 below, see Arist. An. Post. 1.4, 73a37-b3, where at 73a39-40 there is the example of odd and even in the definition of number. 151. 11,23: after adunaton remove the colon; bracket estai – meros, followed by a stop before the second meros. 152. 11,26: for oute gar read houtô gar. 153. 11,29: for emparalimpanô read men paralimpanô, as Spengel proposed, since emparalimpanô would be a questionable hapax in the face of wide use of paralimpanein, including by Themistius at in An. Post. 46,27 in a similar

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context (An. Post. 2.5) dealing with definition, and as cognate with paraleipein (Arist. 91b30). Then in line 30 replace the colon after poiei with a comma so that the men created by emendation can be appropriately balanced. 154. 11,36-12,1: this is a response to words at 186a35 that are presented as a question in editions, but taken as a statement here and by other Greek commentators, namely ‘The All is therefore derived from indivisibles’. Ross (2), 477 describes Themistius’ interpretation as ‘wide of the mark’; see his full analysis at Ross (2), 477-9. 155. 12,4: the ‘some’ who so yielded are taken by modern scholars (e.g., Ross [2], 480-1; Charlton, 63; Bostock [1], 235) to be the Atomists, whose version of what is not in the form of the void disarmed the Parmenidean argument, while their theory of physically indivisible atoms (a more plausible candidate for Aristotle’s ‘undivided magnitudes’ at 187a3) disarmed Zeno’s dialectical exploitation of division without limit. Themistius follows Alexander and Porphyry, with whom Simplicius did not agree, in identifying Xenocrates and Plato as the respondents to the Eleatic arguments. See further Ross (2), 479-81 and Horstschäfer, 119 n. 79. The fundamental source is Simplicius’ lengthy comment on 187a1 at in Phys. 133,30-148,23. 156. 12,1 (= 187a1-2): Ross (2), 479 sees this as a reference back to Arist. 186a24-5 (Themist. 8,25-9,4). 157. 12,1-2: Arist. 187a2-3 refers to ‘the [argument] from dichotomy’, without mentioning Zeno, whose argument against plurality (DK B3) is cited in this context by Simpl. in Phys. 140,27-33, though Charlton, 63 thinks that the ‘stadium’ argument (Arist. Phys. 6.9, 239b14-29; cf. Themist. in Phys. 199,23200,29 with Todd [11], 59-60) is the ‘dichotomy’ intended by Aristotle. 158. 12,3-4: bracket legôn – somatôn (12,4) as an explanatory parenthesis in this syntax, and after kateskeuaze (12,2-3) and after hen (12,3) delete the commas, and insert a comma after somatôn in 12,4. 159. 12,6: Xenocrates of Chalcedon (396/5-314/3 BC) was a student of Plato and the third head of the Academy. Themist. 12,4-9 = Xenocrates fr. 140 Parente; fr. 44 (p. 176,19-24) Heinze. Both editors collect related testimonia in the other Greek commentators. Since Alex. ap. Simpl. in Phys. 138,10-18 refers specifically to Xenocrates’ theory of indivisible lines, Themistius is undoubtedly epitomizing him here. On this doctrine in general see Ross (1) on Metaph. 992a20, and Ross (2) on Phys. 206a17. 160. 12,10: before energeiâi supply to to make the distinction emphatic. See 7,11-13 (ad Arist. 186a3) above where these concepts are deployed to solve the problem of the one and the many. 161. 12,12-24: this highly critical piece of Platonic doxography may owe something to earlier commentators, but clearly simplifies the issues in an effort to trap Plato in the contradiction that what is is both one and many and suffers from a lack of any specific references to texts. 162. 12,12-13: see 8,27 above. 163. 12,14: for ôieto ho logos read ôieto ton logon, one of the solutions to this crux proposed by Spengel. 164. 12,15: to ontôs on (‘what really is’), a Platonic formula; see, for example, Phaedr. 247E3. 165. 12,16: ‘unshaped’ (amorphos). At Plat. Tim. 50C1-2 the receptacle is said to lack a shape. Themistius is obviously glossing the term as ‘primary’ from an Aristotelian perspective that, as we shall see, he adopted in his exegesis of Phys. 1.7, where ‘unshaped’ prime matter can receive any shape; see notably 26,1927,13 below. 166. 12,28: for sunkhorêsanta read sunkhorêsantas; cf. legontas (12,26).

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167. 13,3: delete phêsin to leave hoti to introduce, as it can, oratio recta dependent on legôn (13,2). 168. 13,2-4: on the same issue of such privations being convertible into affirmations see 8,29-9,1 above. Here again (cf. 9,13-15 above with note ad loc.) they are contrasted via examples with non-affirmative negations, which are identified periphrastically as ‘extraneous to what is.’ 169. 13,4: on this Platonic language see on 9,29 above. 170. 13,6: before hoper on supply to. 171. 13,9-10: this classification is inserted by Themistius in light of the earlier analysis (3,5-13 above; cf. 8,19-22 with note on 8,19-24) of the Eleatics as not taking what is as the principle, since it is unchanging, and hence not being fit subjects for the natural scientist. 172. 13,14-16 (~ Arist. 187a17-18): here and elsewhere (22,19-20; 32,22-7; 80,3-8; 93,30-94,5) Themistius’ references to Plato’s principles (on which see Ross [1], 169-71) do not go beyond the content of the Aristotelian texts being paraphrased. 173. 13,16-17 (~ Arist. 187a18-19): for the distinction between matter and the underlying subject in the context of Aristotle’s theory of principles see 26,7-24 below. 174. 13,24: Anaximander is identified here only by the ancient commentators. Ross (2), 482 objects that it is inter alia incompatible with Aristotle’s explicit reference to Anaximander at 187a20-1 (at DK 12A9; cf. Themist. 13,23-6), where he is said to have had inherent pairs of opposites separated from a single primary element, a process distinct from positing a body intermediary between fire and air from which opposites are separated. 175. 13,23: the identification of Anaxagoras’ causal principle nous as a productive cause (cf. also 81,21) makes it impossible to use the conventional translation ‘mind’ for it. ‘Intelligence’ has to be taken in the sense of a faculty being exercised rather than just possessed; ‘intelligizing’, if it were not awkward, might be even more precise. 176. 13,28a: ‘the four’ is a gloss on Arist. 187a26, ‘what are usually called the elements’ (ta kaloumena stoikheia). 177. 13,28b: at 187a25-6 Aristotle says that the unlimited number of things that Anaxagoras posited were ‘the things with like parts and the opposites’, but Themistius, here at least (contrast 3,1-2 and 17,30-1), ignores the opposites in favour of inserting a reference to the mechanisms that Anaxagoras, like Empedocles, employed for the separation of elements. 178. 13,27: for Anaxagorâi (dat.) read Anaxagoras (Spengel) and for labousa (labousan, MS L and Spengel), read labôn (Spengel’s conjecture). We need an active form of the verb to parallel pauei used of Empedocles in the preceding clause. 179. 13,32-4: see further 1.8 below, 29,22-30,2 ad 191a22-33. 180. 14,3: literally ‘not yet this’ (mêpô tauta). The implied reference to a future discussion may be to 17,19-26 below (ad Arist. 188a13-17) where Anaxagoras is criticized for being unable to explain how one element comes to be another by aggregation and segregation given that there are an unlimited number of principles. But nothing is said there about the inappropriateness noted here of Anaxagoras using the term ‘alteration’ for aggregation, a point based on the contrast between him and ‘others’ at 187a30-1 that highlights a usage also noted at Arist. GC 1.1, 314a13-15, echoed here in the statement ‘he does not understand his own terminology’ (= 314a13). Cf. also Alex. ap. Simpl. in Phys. 163,9-13. 181. 14,3-5: in terms of the Stoic classification of valid arguments (see on

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7,17-19) this is the ‘fourth indemonstrable’ (SVF 2.241; Diog. Laert. 7.81), an exhaustive disjunction with the denial of one disjunct entailing the other as the conclusion. Cf. 29,25-9 (ad 191a27-31) below for the more elaborate version of this argument. 182. 14,5: for akolouthein read akolouthei; the infinitive might, however, be construed as dependent on the de facto verb of saying furnished by sullogismôi kekhrêtai at 14,3. 183. 14,15-16: this is an attempt to establish some continuity between Phys. 1.3 and 1.4. Since the Eleatics replaced the principle with what is, the emphasis in 1.4 on Anaxagoras means that a representative of the view at the other extreme, that there are an unlimited number of principles, should logically be refuted next. His status as such helps explain why an unidentified ‘they’ often appear as the proponents of his view (cf. Arist. 187a35-6 and 187b1-2). In fact, Aristotle subsequently identifies Anaxagoras by name only once in 1.4, at 188a13. 184. 14,20-1: this inserted general principle reflects Arist. Phys. 1.1, 184a3-5; it is paraphrased loosely at. 1,6-7 above. 185. 14,20-2: this argument reappears more succinctly at Phys. 1.6 189a1213 (Themist. 21,21-2) below against the same general thesis of an unlimited number of principles. Cf. also Phys. 3.6, 207a25-6 (Themist. 95,27-8). 186. 14,25: for euporêsomen read euporêsaimen (coni. Spengel) to complement an in this apodosis. 187. 14,27-15,9: the paragraph addressed here is the source of what later became known as the doctrine of minima naturalia: that organic compounds had a limit to their size, and a fortiori to their constitutive parts. Though there are intimations of it in the Greek commentators, it was largely a product of Arabic and medieval Aristotelianism, with further developments in the Renaissance. See Todd (3), 160-1 and De Haas (1), 157 with n. 80, and for a rich historical survey see Murdoch. 188. 14,27-8: 1b is outside the main subject-matter because it is counterfactual. 189. 14,32-15,1: bracket ek merôn – holou (32-3) and hoion – touto (14,3415,1), with appropriate changes in punctuation (delete the colon after merôn in 32 and the comma after megethos in 34). 190. 15,1: before to holon supply kai (MSS BL) to match kai before touto in the next clause. 191. 15,2: before tou sunthetou supply epi; cf. ep’ ekeinôn in the preceding line. 192. 15,7: after moriôn supply a stop; Schenkl omitted the comma found in Spengel’s edition. 193. 15,8: literally ‘in a millet-seed’ (kenkhros), a symbol of the smallest imaginable thing (a pin-head, as it were). It is derived from Aristotle’s use of the expression ‘the heavens in millet-seed’ at Phys. 4.12, 221a22-3 in an unrelated argument. It was frequently used by the ancient commentators; see Todd (1), 80-1 and 87. 194. 15,10-18: cf. Simpl. in Phys. 168,25-31; Simplicius may be paraphrasing Themistius or both may be offering slightly different versions of a passage in Alexander’s lost commentary. 195. 15,18: for sarkôn read sarkiôn. The ‘fleshes’ of which flesh consists have to be ‘small bits of flesh’. 196. 15,18-31: cf. Simpl. in Phys. 168,31-169,2: ‘But if there are numerous micro-units of flesh, then they are either numerically limited or unlimited. And if limited (e.g., three, four, or 10,000), then the magnitude of both the least and

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of the greatest thing would be determinate; but if unlimited in quantity, then the magnitude consisting of magnitudes unlimited in number will necessarily be unlimited; for what is limited is divided into things that are limited, as Aristotle himself also concludes for them.’ 197. 15,22: for sarkôn read sarkiôn; again (see on 15,18) the diminutive has to be used. 198. 15,23: delete ek tessarôn; this apodosis does not need this specification to be added to the earlier specification of the parts of flesh being three or four. I suspect that this was a marginal or interlineal addition by an unduly fussy reader. 199. 15,29-31: there ought to be two arguments here: (i), used here, that if two substances A and B, of which is A is larger than B, are divisible without limit, then at any given point in such a division A may have fewer parts than B; and (ii) if A and B are divisible without limit, then whatever their original size, they will (a) be infinitely large since the number of parts of which they will consist will be without limit (a common ad hominem principle used in commentators’ arguments; see, for example, Themist. at 91,29-30 below and Todd [3], 153-9), and will (b) be equally large since they will also consist of the same number of parts. Simplicius (see on 15,18-31 above) raises (ii)-(a), with (ii)-(b) perhaps implied. 200. 15,31-16,18: for some discussion of (3) and (4) see Todd (3), 161-2, and for the evidence of Themistius’ use of Alexander’s version of (3) see Simpl. in Phys. 169,5-24. 201. 16,6: after pote change the comma to a stop (Spengel’s punctuation) and for epileipseie (intolerable without an) read (as proposed by Spengel in his apparatus) epilepsei. A future indicative is often used in this text in apodoses of conditionals in which the protasis projects a ‘less vivid’ hypothesis. See Todd [11], 142 n. 675 and, 1,13-14 and 9,31-2 above, and 15,22-3; 19,16-17 and 23,11 and 14-15 below; see also 39,12-13 and 92,12-13 for cases of a present indicative in the apodosis of such conditionals. These variations cannot, of course, be imposed on the translation which has to retain the semantics of the less vivid conditional. 202. 16,18: smikrologieisthai is used here in a punning sense that plays on its metaphorical sense of raising petty details and its literal sense of arguing about minutiae like the micro-units of Anaxagorean compounds. 203. 16,20: enkephalos is not the brain in our sense (that would be an organic, or non-homoiomerous part) but the matter within the head that, in Aristotelian anatomy, makes it essentially a ventilation chamber. 204. 16,22: for platus read polus; see on 86,29 below for the expression lêros polus (cf. also 59,2), and cf. polus ho gelôs at 6,21 above. platus might mean ‘diffuse’, i.e. complicated (LSJ I.7), but that seems unlikely. Furthermore, the use of lêros here is undoubtedly influenced by Plat. Phaed. 72C1 where in an argument concerning opposites it is said that it would be nonsense if opposites did not exist but instead everything was together, as Anaxagoras held and is criticized for holding in the present Aristotelian text. 205. 16,24: see 14,32-3 above. 206. 16,29-17,4: the proposal rejected in this paragraph was known to Alexander who also argued against it; see. Simpl. in Phys. 173,8-28 with 173,29-174,18. 207. 17,1: read sunkrimata (MSS WBL) instead of Schenkl’s sunkekrimena; cf. the use of this noun at 16,30 above. 208. 17,2: before hekastôi delete en (Schenkl’s supplement). Cf. the use of enuparkhein with just the dative at 16,32 above. The force of that compound

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verb is now retained in the uncompounded form huparxai (17,2) which can equally work without the preposition. For the general semantic and syntactical principle involved see Renehan, 77-85. 209. 17,5: ‘mind-less’ (anoêtos) is Themistius’ pun; cf. the Aristotelian practice of what Quandt, 181-7 classifies as ‘doxographic parody’. 210. 17,6: segregation is not ‘by luck’ (kata tukhên) because Anaxagoras attributes a rational process of segregation to mind. Themistius relied on Alexander; see Simpl. in Phys. 176,17-177,9. 211. 17,8: for ê read kai (Spengel). On ‘unending labour’ (anênuta mokhthôn) see Plat. Phaed. 84A5-6, where Penelope’s labours are described as an unending, or unachievable, task (anênuton ergon). 212. 17,10: Themistius has moved the illustration of colours and states from Arist. 188a7 where they exemplify what might be separated from a complete homogenization, to the present argument where they exemplify inseparable incidental properties. 213. 17,7-11: this whole sentence has to be a question, and so replace the question mark after mokhthôn (17,8) with a comma, and replace the comma after sumbebêkota (17,11) with a question mark. 214. 17,12: after aphairoumetha replace the comma with a stop and let the next sentence begin with epei (cf. 3,15 and 3,30 above) so that it can introduce the explanation of the truth behind the claim that Mind cannot effectively dissociate principles since it cannot associate them. 215. 17,13: to dia touto oiesthai I have emended by deleting to dia touto and reading oietai (cf. lambanei at Arist. 188a13). 216. 17,16-17: cf. Arist. 188a14-15, ‘in one sense mud is divided into units of mud, in another it is not’, or in general terms a given amount of mud is made of smaller bits of mud, but it does not come from such bits but from the constituent elements, earth and water. 217. 17,18: here and at 17,21 two diminutives (pêlaria and hudatia) are gratuitously reinforced by forms of the adjective ‘small’ (mikros), an abundantia verborum that I have not reproduced. 218. 17,21: after epoiei supply an. 219. 17,21-2: pre-existent micro-units of water have to be combined as a set numerous enough to create a volume of water, like a set of bricks large enough to build a house; that is, the aggregation, or accumulation, has to be right rather than any process of transformation. 220. 17,23: before ex aeros supply to to form an articular infinitive with genesthai; cf. 30,18-19 below for similar phrasing. 221. 17,19-23: the comparison with house-construction at Arist. 188a15-17 is not fully clarified. The point is that water only comes from air when the latter is transformed, whereas a house both comes from bricks when they are correctly aggregated and is made of the original bricks that are so aggregated (as an unstructured lump of mud is made of bits of mud; see on 17,16-17). Thus the genesis of a well-built house stands mid-way between that of a heap of matter and that of an element (or natural compound). See Bostock (1), 235 ad 188a16. 222. 17,25: cf. Plat. Laws 863C3-4, where simple ignorance is described as the cause of ‘slight faults’. 223. 17,24-6: this adapts the brief sentence at Arist. 188a17-18 (‘It is better to identify fewer, i.e., a limited number, of things, as Empedocles does.’) by presenting Empedocles’ theory of coming to be as the same as that of Anaxagoras (as already claimed at 187a21-3 = Themist. 13,21-6) but improved by its reliance on a limited number of principles.

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224. 17,26: this remark probably foreshadows future study of the de Generatione et Corruptione. 225. 17,27: see above 1.4, 13,9-28 ad Arist. 187a12-26. 226. 17,28: this reference to those who posited an unlimited number of principles anticipates the rejection of this position at 1.6, 189a12-13 (Themist. 20,32-21,2); see the note on 21,1. 227. 17,29-30: see Parmenides at DK 28B8.56-9, of which this statement is a doxographical reflection; see Ross (2), 487-8 on the other Aristotelian evidence. The phrase en tois pros doxan (17,29) is not in the Aristotelian text; its presence at Simpl. in Phys. 179,31 suggests that it was inherited from Alexander’s commentary. 228. 17,31: Aristotle does not mention Anaxagoras here but, as Simpl. in Phys. 180,31-181,6 notes, he had already done so on this point at 187a22-3 (Themist. 13,21-3); cf. also Themist. 3,1-2 above. The reference to Anaximander is a different version of Arist. 187a20-1 (cf. Themist. 13,24-6 above). 229. 18,1: for hôste read hôsper. This correlative clause would normally be anticipated by houtôs (cf. 26,26-7 below) which is implicit here, as at 28,6 below. 230. 18,3: change the accent on tauta so that it is a demonstrative rather than a crasis of ta and auta, meaning ‘the same things’; cf. Arist. 188a24. 231. 18,4-5: the Aristotelian text omits any definition of opposition in the third item, ‘ordering’ (or sequential arrangement) (taxis). Presumably shaped entities correctly positioned are necessarily in order. 232. 18,5-7: see above 13,11-17 ad Arist. 187a12-20. 233. 18,7-11: the Greek is ‘be from’, which can mean ‘consist of’ (Waterfield), i.e., ‘be composed of:’ (Ross [2], Apostle), or ‘be derived from’, i.e., ‘come [into being] from’; while it might mean both (Charlton, 46), it is clearly the latter that concerns Themistius, as his glossing ‘from’ with ‘after’ at 18,15-16 in his digression in the next paragraph shows, as well as his use of ‘come to be’ (gignesthai) at 18,18. 234. 18,10-11: before panta delete ta (Arist. 188a28). Ross (2) (app. crit. ad 188a28) incorrectly reports Themistius as having read ta alla here. 235. 18,14-22: this interpolated paragraph offers reassurance that if opposites do not come from one another qualitative change still occurs from one opposite to another in the form of temporally successive states. This gesture is pro tem.; the subject that comes to be white from black is identified and analyzed fully in 1.7. 236. 18,14: after ginesthai replace the comma with a stop. 237. 18,15: for hoper read haper in coordination with its antecedent ta enantia. 238. 18,17a: the analogy between black coming to be from white and a statue coming to be from bronze is for the moment imperfect, since the given bronze material is not opposite to the statue. What is opposite to the statue in the bronze is its lack of a shape; cf. 20,6 (ad 188b19-20) below, and later 25,12-14 below. 239. 18,17b: for ou gar read oukh, since gar cannot modify a participle; it probably originated in the letter chi at the end of oukh being misread as a gamma. The change allows the colon after andrianta (18,17) to be replaced with a comma so that the participial clause can complement the preceding sentence. 240. 18,20: for metaballei (MS M) read metaballoi (MSS WBL). 241. 18,21a: these ‘other things’ are non-substantial entities, but at 19,17 Themistius adds that he is concerned not only with qualitative change (alloiôsis) but also with the formation and dissolution of compounds in general (19,18-19) and organic substances in particular (19,26-32) as well as artifacts (19,32-20,6).

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242. 18,21b: see Phys. 5.1, 225a34-b5 with Themist. 169,23-9, in the context of a clearer distinction between substantial changes (coming to be and ceasing to be), and changes (kinêseis) in other categories, with the term ‘transformation’ (metabolê) applying to both. 243. 18,22-3: for the pre-established principles that action and being-actedon are not random (implied by their being strictly relative to one another), see Metaph. 5.15), and for the distinction between predication per se and per accidens (e.g., Metaph. 5.7). 244. 18,29-30: the captious objector, in addition to identifying a subject for an opposite, is punning on the narrower and broader senses of mousikos, which can refer to the musicality of a human being, or, in this case, a bird, or more often in this context to the exclusively human condition of being formed in the disciplines of language, music and athletics. 245. 19,7: before hapantos supply eph’ to align this statement with that introduced by eph’ hou in the next line. 246. 19,12-19: this is a single sentence best ended with a stop rather than a colon after suntithemenôn (19,19). The illustrations introduced by hoion (19,13) extend to ptharêsetai (19,17) and should be punctuated without decisive breaks, and be followed by a dash rather than a stop to introduce the additional claim based on the examples. 247. 19,21: ‘privations’ (sterêseis) as a gloss on ‘opposite conditions’ (antikeimenai diatheseis, Arist. 188b11) looks ahead to its role in the analysis of change in 1.7 below, where the distinction between privation and negation will be developed; see 26,27-27,4 and cf. on 9,13-15 above. In light of that later passage I have changed the reading antiphasis (‘contradiction’) to apophasis (‘negation’) at 19,22, and, as Schenkl noted ad loc., there is support for it in the indirect tradition represented by Philoponus (in Phys. 120,2 and 114,31). At this point Themistius is just saying that where the language does not contain a naturally privative word a negation has to be used; in the later passage mentioned this distinction takes on metaphysical significance when the privative state of matter as ‘unqualified’ has to be seen as a negation rather than a privation of a quality. 248. 20,14a: for legoimen read legomen (a correction in MS Laur. 85,14), which Schenkl should have adopted from Spengel. 249. 20,14b: see above 18,17-19 on the non-persistence of opposites. 250. 20,15: cf. 18,15-16 above where ‘from’ is also glossed as ‘after’, with reference to qualitative change, involving one opposite being replaced by another with nothing persisting. 251. 20,22: after hustera delete de so that these three adjectives can complement the opposites identified here in the same way as the parallel set at 20,24. 252. 20,22-3: these are the doctrines of, respectively, Plato (see on 13,14-16 above), the Pythagoreans (see 80,8-13 below ad 203a10-15), and Empedocles. 253. 20,28: on this Pythagorean parallel column (sustoikhia) for opposites see also on 73,16-17 below. 254. 20,28-30: if specific opposites are paired opposites under generic headings (excess and deficiency noted at 13,13 above ad 187a16-17), then thinkers who posit different pairs of opposites differ from one another in specific but not generic terms. In terms of the examples that Themistius supplies, the cold and the dry are deficient and thus opposite to the excess of the hot and the wet, while Strife and the odd involve segregation and so are opposite to Love and the even, which involve aggregation. 255. 20,30: the concluding sentence of 1.5 (188b9-10) works best at the beginning of this chapter; i.e., replace the stop after toutôn with a comma.

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256. 21,1 (cf. on 17,28 above): Arist. 189a13 just says that an unlimited number of principles is impossible because ‘what is will be unknowable’. Themistius adds that such a number of principles will lead to opposites being further subdivided (dichotomy being the iterated process used for subdivision; see 93,18-22 below ad 206b7-9), thus undermining their status as primary opposites, i.e., as principles. 257. 21,2: see on 14,20-2 above ad 187b8-9. 258. 21,4-5: after genê delete the colon and bracket houtô – pikron, with gar supplied after houtô; cf. 20,14; 43,15; 73,5; 88,25; 94,23; 97,7; and 98,27. 259. 21,7-8: after enantiôsis replace the comma with a stop, and for allôs te read hôste, as Spengel proposed. 260. 21,8-9: see 17,25-6 above on Arist. 188a17-18. 261. 21,11: on the primary opposites see 18,12-14 above. 262. 21,11-12: cf. on 13,16-17 above where similarly these terms are used before being carefully differentiated at 26,7-14 below; see also 22,1-2. This disjunctive question exploits the single use of ‘underlying subject’ (hupokeimenon) in this chapter, at 189a31 and eases the transition to 1.7 where its status will be defined. 263. 21,14: Arist. 189a24-6 is more expansive on the impossibility of the Empedoclean principles of Love and Strife acting on one another, but less expansive on the reasons for opposites being unable to act on one another. 264. 21,17: see further 190b5-17 with Themist. 27,27-28,10. 265. 21,18: for diatithen read diatethen. The underlying subject has different states ‘in turn’ (ana meros) so that on this basis the opposites can generate ‘one thing after another’ (the sense of ta ephexês). 266. 21,19: after hupokeimenon place a question mark. 267. 21,20-1: for hupokhôrei read hupokhôroien; cf. hupomenoien at 21,19.. 268. 21,22-3: Arist. 189a26-7 simply says that ‘some identify even more [principles] from which they establish the nature of the things that are’. Themistius notes that to avoid opposites canceling one another out the early thinkers either excluded opposites altogether by positing either a single principle (or ‘natural entity’) from which opposites were derived, or multiple principles. 269. 21,24-5: after theteon delete the colon and bracket eiê gar – autêi to identify it as a justification for the first premise. 270. 21,26a: the conclusion here and subsequently (21,27-8 and 29) has to mean that the opposites are not the principles in the sense that they are not the only principles, but, as Ross (2), 490 puts it ‘they can be included among the [principles]’. The underlying argument is: No principles are in a subject; All opposites are in a subject; therefore No opposites are principles. 271. 21,26b: If the principles are not, but the opposites are, in an underlying subject, then the opposites are not an underlying subject for anything, while the principles are one for everything. Either way, the opposites are not principles. 272. 21,28a: like Arist. 189a32-3, this reflects Cat. 3b24-7. 273. 21,28b: for this principle see also Alex. Mant. 121,21 and id. DA 6,3; cf. also Reinhardt, 528 n. 34 on Plotinus’ rejection of it. 274. 22,1: the ‘third thing’ is not identified as matter at Arist.189b1, though some translators squeeze the verb hupotithenai that governs ‘some third thing’ to imply its equivalent (so Ross, 344: ‘suppose a third thing underlying’; sim. Waterfield, 23). Themistius, as we have already seen (13,16-17 above) and will see in the next chapter (see note on 24,22), by already using ‘matter’ (hulê) in this chapter, and expanding on Aristotle’s one use of ‘underlying subject’ (hupokeimenon) at 189a31 is laying the groundwork for his discussion of the two terms in 1.7 below.

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275. 22,2-3: after kakeinôn (22,2) delete the colon and bracket kath’ heautên – poiêtikê, with autê (MSS MWB and one manuscript of Philoponus) in this parenthesis replaced by hautê (MS L). 276. 22,3-14: Here Themistius, unlike Simpl. in Phys. 203,2-3 or Ross (2), 490, does not identify the proponents of the various principles mentioned as Thales (water), Heraclitus (fire), Anaximenes (or Diogenes of Apollonia) (air). 277. 22,14-16: see 13,12-13 above ad 187a15-17. 278. 22,20: see above 13,14-16 (Arist. 187a17-18). Arist. 189b14-16 does not mention Plato by name but just refers to ‘some recent thinkers’. 279. 23,9-10: see 21,6-7 above. 280. 23,14: after the first poiotêtos replace the stop with a comma, and place ê in angle-brackets; it is Schenkl’s supplement based on a related disjunction in a quotation from Alex. ap. Simpl. in Phys. 207,11, a text (207,10-12) that, as he says, would seem to represent Themistius’ source in the present paraphrase. 281. 23,17a: for legomen read legômen with the majority of the Aristotelian manuscripts at 189b30. Spengel’s apparatus justifies the reading legomen erroneously under 23,22. 282. 23,17b: delete katholou which must be an intruded gloss on pasês. 283. 23,17-21: the general distinction here (developed at Arist. 190a31-190b5 and Themist. 27,13-27 below; cf. also 30,6-8) complements Aristotle’s reference to the procedure described in 1.1 of moving from common properties to proprietary ones; see 2,3-5 on 184a21-6 above. 284. 23,19-20: for the second of these examples see (3) below at 24,10-12. The case of a human being or plant coming to be is incomplete without it being specified from what it comes to be, as the instances of (5) at 24,13-14 (cf. 25,2-3 and 25,12-24) show. The examples of substances coming to be are all of artifacts until 27,27 where animals and plants are said to come from sperma (see on 27,27 and cf. 31,7-8). 285. 23,21: see 1.1 above, especially 1,11-2,3. 286. 23,22: for legômen (a correction in MS M) read legomen. 287. 23,22-3: the numbered propositions are types, and so the token instances are not separately indicated. (Ox) indicates a prohibited formulation. 288. 23,23-4: (1), not introduced until Arist. 190a6-7, is introduced here as equivalent to (2) in advance of the pairing being reintroduced at 24,7-9. 289. 23,24: for gignetai read gignesthai. The manuscripts are divided; see Schenkl’s apparatus criticus. 290. 24,2-3: after sumplexantes supply eipômen (MSS WBL). 291. 24,6-7: this distinction is implicit in the Aristotelian text, but the terminology is imposed, presumably starting with Alexander. Simpl. in Phys. 209,22-3 contrasts ‘what is said’ (ta legomena) with ‘the objects’ (ta pragmata). 292. 24,10: cf. 24,32 below and Arist. 190a6. 293. 24,12-15: this final sentence anticipates Arist. 190a24-6 below, where the distinction between (5) and (5x) is introduced as a case where the formula ‘from A B comes to be’ is legitimately used where A persists. Themistius has used it here just as a linguistic alternative, with (5) introduced pro tem., since only when its explicated form, (6), is introduced at 25,12-14 below can its significance be fully appreciated; see note on 25,12-13. 294. 24,17: Themistius has the aorist participle genomenos here so that the claim is that a human being whose education is complete retains his identity. Arist. 190a11, however, has a present participle (as does one Themistian manuscript), which could be taken to mean that the human being’s identity is retained throughout the process (‘when [a human being] comes to be knowing music’ is Charlton’s version of ginomenos mousikos), though translators tend to

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assume that completed action is involved: ‘when he has become educated’ (Waterfield), ‘when he becomes musical’ (Apostle; Hardie/Gaye). 295. 24,18-19: despite Schenkl’s misgivings, I think that the text is sound here, especially if after hupomenei (18) a comma replaces the colon. 296. 24,22: Aristotle does not contrast ‘matter’ (hulê) and ‘privation’ (sterêsis) until 190b23-9 (cf. 192a4-7). Themistius does so here perhaps because he is presenting material to an audience already familiar with the relevant texts and therefore open to an exegesis that does not follow a strictly heuristic procedure. He uses ‘matter’ instead of ‘underlying subject’ (hupokeimenon), despite the text at 190a14-15 (‘there always has to be something underlying [hupokeisthai] as the thing that comes to be’). Contrast Simpl. in Phys. 209,14-16, and note that in MS L hupokeimenon is the reading instead of hulên. But as will be argued below (26,11-18), matter but not the underlying subject is accompanied by privation. 297. 24,27: see 24,17-18 above. 298. 24,30: cf. 21,20-1 above. 299. 24,31: see 24,12-15 above. 300. 25,5a: for hê de dê (Schenkl) read hêde de (MSS B). 301. 25,5b: before huphistamenon supply to (MSS WBL) to balance to before ekkhôroun in the preceding clause. 302. 25,26: see 24,34-25,3 above. 303. 25,12-13: cf. 27,28-30 below where Arist. 190b5-6 (which identifies the transformation in shape that produces a statue) is glossed as the variation produced in the shape and relative positioning of the parts of the bronze. 304. 25,14: one might have expected the phrase ‘with respect to the ship being unstructured’, but it is presumably implied, in that the structure indicated (there is a deictic suffix on todi, ‘this’) is the pile of unstructured planks designated for use in ship-building. 305. 25,15-16: see 24,31 and 24,33-4. 306. 25,19-22: this inserted example serves to illustrate privation since water is a compound which persists as wet and cold, with the form of future air, which is wet and hot, as its opposite. 307. 25,23: see 24,19-21 above, prop. (4). 308. 25,24-27,13: Simplic. in Phys. 210,28-212,15 on Arist. 189b32-190a31 has a discussion that parallels the present digression and draws on Alexander’s lost commentary. Themistius does not proceed, as he does in the major digression on the intellect in his commentary on the DA (in DA 102,30-109,3), by criticizing earlier views; cf. in DA 102,30-103,20. 309. 25,24-5: after hikanôn replace the stop with a comma and start the new paragraph at alla. This unified sentence is the rationale for the lengthy digression that follows in which the relation between matter and privation is explored after having been introduced at 24,21-25,4 through examples. 310. 25,26: for ex autou read ex hautês (autês MSS BL). 311. 25,27: for ê read einai ho (MSS WBL). 312. 25,29: for ekhei read ekhoi. 313. 25,29-30: see also 33,16-23 below on the loss of privation as the elimination of matter. 314. 25,30-3: the distinction between potentiality and actuality is used at 1.8, 191b27-9 below, where Themist. 31,18-26 links potentiality and privation, as he does here, while emphasizing that potentiality, like privation, is incidental to matter per se. This avoids the criticism that potentiality cannot be an ‘independent property’ of prime matter; see, for example, Graham, 483. 315. 26,2: after ekhei delete the colon and bracket eiê – einai, within which

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for houtôs read oukh hôs; i.e., if matter is potential relative to matter, then it would not be matter per se, as has just been claimed, but would be matter only when its potentiality was actualized. I see the textual problem here as lying in an erroneous transcription of houtôs rather than, as Schenkl did, in possible omissions. 316. 26,7-8: The idea that matter is non-relative is sometimes said to be central to the notion of ‘prime matter’, but some (Jones, 495; Cook, 115) note that at Phys. 2.2, 194b8-9 (see Themist. 43,26-8 with the note on 43,27 below) matter is classified without restriction as being in the set of things that are relative. 317. 26,11: Rashed (1), 199 n. 571 translates 26,11-27,12 into French. 318. 26,11-16: delete the colon after allêla (26,12) and bracket kai gar – tini; replace the stop after tini with a comma (so that all’ can be correlated with men at 26,11); then delete the colon after dunamei (26,13) and bracket legetai – gegenêmenou, followed by a comma rather than a colon; finally delete the colon after sterêseos (26,15) and bracket hupokeisthai – dunamei (26,15-16). 319. 26,14-15: see Alex. ap. Simpl. in Phys. 211,13: ‘“For when,” says Alexander, “[matter] is identified as the matter of something, that it is when it is accompanied by privation; but when it is the underlying subject itself per se, it is not accompanied by privation”’. 320. 26,16-17: cf. 25,13-14 above, where the distinction used here is implicit in the statement that a statue comes to be from bronze, and does so from the bronze as ‘unshaped’ in relation to the potential statue. 321. 26,20-4: see Simpl. in Phys. 211,15-18: ‘However Boethus said that “it is spoken of as matter by being unstructured and unformed; for matter is thought to be named in relation to what will be; but when it receives the form, it is no longer spoken of as matter but as an underlying subject; for something is said to be a underlying subject for what is already present in it”’. Moraux (1), 170 briefly notes both reports, which were undoubtedly drawn from Alexander’s commentary, as does Golitsis, 70-1 with 71 n. 21. Rashed (1), 199-205 analyzes them in greater detail with particular reference to Alexander’s critique of Boethus. Boethus of Sidon was a Peripatetic philosopher of the mid-first century BC, in the generation after Andronicus of Rhodes. The source for these quotations is unknown. His lost commentary on Aristotle’s Categories was known to later commentators, but he may have dealt with the present subject elsewhere. 322. 26,20-1: Rashed (1), 201 notes that the words ‘that  qualified’ are not in Simplicius’ report of Boethus. He also argues that Themistius’ closing words ‘matter is obviously named in relation to what will be’ present a weaker thesis than the closing words of Simplicius’ report (see previous note), which emphasize the temporal dimension of matter’s reception of form. 323. 26,21: after diamenei delete the colon and bracket amorphos – hulê. This sentence is an aside that explains why it would be paradoxical for unformed matter to remain as matter for things that are endowed with qualities. 324. 26,22: ‘converted to’ (periistatai eis); literally, ‘comes round to’; cf. Plat. Rep. 343A2, where Thrasymachus’ argument is said to ‘have come round to the opposite’ of what had been originally claimed. 325. 26,25-7: cf. 27,9-10 below where this same general capacity is said to be that of being ‘naturally well-disposed to certain other things’ (see note on 27,10). 326. 26,27-9: cf. Arist. Metaph. 5.22, 1022b32-6 for the use of ‘privation’ in ‘negations deriving from non-’, where ‘non-‘ represents the alpha privative prefix on an adjective. This would license the present attempt to classify an adjective with such a prefix, a-poios, as a negation, even though it could, under other conditions, be used of a privation of a specific quality.

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327. 26,27-9: this question and answer adapts Alex. ap. Simpl. in Phys. 211,20-3 (Schenkl’s reference to 26,24 is imprecise). See also Alex. quaest. 2.7, 53,7-14 for a more developed expression of the same point, which, as he notes (53,19-25), can be grounded in Arist. An. Pr. 1.46, 51b5-10; see also on 9,13-15 above. 328. 27,1-2: Simpl. in Phys. 211,20-3 reports Alexander as follows: ‘“Matter,” says Alexander, “is unqualified with respect to its own definition, not in the sense of being in a state of privation from quality (in fact privation is a quality), but in the sense that it is in a state of negation; for it is receptive of the form in just the same way as of the privation [cf. 26,25-7 above]”’. See also Alex. quaest. 2.7, 53,8-19, with Sharples (2), 103. Cf. also 40,10 below where privation is termed ‘in a sense a form’ in connection with the status of defective natural entities. Philop. in Phys. 114,29-32 is a particularly clear statement of the privation/negation distinction. 329. 27,4-5: cf. 25,28-30 for the consequences of this not being the case. 330. 27,5-6: the wax that can become a lion and cease to exist when the lion comes to be is presumably the wax used in making bronze artifacts, where wax is discarded after the mould is made (the ‘lost wax’ method). Thus per se prime matter lacks any shape, like the original unshaped lump of wax, but later the moulded wax loses its identity completely when discarded, just as prime matter does when it becomes the underlying subject for a form (26,14-16). Cf. the earlier illustration at 26,17-18 (cf. 25,12-13 with the note ad loc.) in which unshaped bronze changed from being matter to being an underlying subject when the shape of a statue was imposed on it. 331. 27,6: ‘the first underlying subject’ (to prôton hupokeimenon) is used later by Aristotle at 1.9, 192a31 (Themist. 34,1-2 and 5-6) in a definition of matter as ‘the first underlying subject from the presence of which something comes to be non-incidentally’). Thus Themistius could have called the underlying subject delimited by form ‘the second underlying subject’ and drawn a distinction between two senses of ‘underlying subject’ rather than between matter and the underlying subject. Cf. the proposal for a ‘two underlying subject’ theory to capture the contrast between prime matter and its status as a subject of accidents at Lewis, 144-5. 332. 27,8-9: after sterêsei delete the colon and bracket oude gar – aphôrizeto. 333. 27,10: this positive natural state of ‘being well-disposed’ (euphuôs ekhein; cf. Themist. in DA 3.5 where it also linked, as implicitly here, with being in potentiality; cf. euphuia at in DA 98,14.17.31 and 99,31) has to be described as related to ‘certain other things’ (alla atta, MS L), not just ‘other things’ (alla, Schenkl), namely the opposites that it can receive (cf. 26,25-7 and 27,6-7), while its being is entirely non-relative. 334. 27,12: see 1.9 below, 32,14-33,27. 335. 27,12-13: this is a formulaic way of ending a digression, widely used in commentaries, as a TLG search reveals. Golitsis has highlighted the role of digressions in the commentaries of Simplicius and Philoponus on the Physics. 336. 27,20: Arist. 190a35 adds two other categories, ‘When’ (pote) and ‘Where’ (pou), i.e., time and place. It is not clear that Themistius’ omission is particularly significant, and by itself would not seem to support the deletion of the first of these from the Aristotelian text in Ross (2). On this issue see Horstschäfer, 295 n. 67. 337. 27,19-20: the syntax here is clearer if the colon after hupokeimenon is deleted and ê – ginetai bracketed. 338. 27,22: i.e. ‘the aforementioned substance that allegedly does not come to be’; for autê read hautê (MS L). Schenkl justifies autê from Simpl. in Phys. 212,29, a significantly more elaborate statement.

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339. 27,23-4: cf. Arist. Cat. 2a12-13. On ‘in an underlying subject’ (en hupokeimenôi) see Themist. Or. 21, 36,19-37,8 DN where elucidating this expression is said to be one of the philosophical preoccupations that evoked resent in some of his contemporaries. 340. 27,24-7: for such an investigation see Themist. in Phys. 169,30-170,19 on Phys. 5.2, 225b10-11, where it is said that there is no ‘change’ (kinêsis) with respect to substance. 341. 27,26: ‘remaining’ (loipôn) obviously refers to artificial substances, which appear in the next sentence. This is Themistius’ response to alla at Arist. 190b2, which Ross (2), 492 deleted, and for which he claimed Themistius’ support on the basis of 27,20 above. But in this rearrangement of material it is 27,26 that endorses 190b2 by seeing it as a reference to artificial generation, a reading that Ross reports from the sixteenth-century exegete Pacius (Iulio Pace). 342. 27,27 (Arist. 190b4-5): see Code, 364-5 on how if ‘from a seed’ (ek spermatos) is interpreted as ‘from an embryo’, it might be made compatible with the persistence of matter as flesh and bone. The biology here seems to envisage the seed being the continuation of the male sperm; see on 62,9-10 below. 343. 27,27-28,1: here Themistius was drawing on Alex. ap. Simpl. in Phys. 214,18-28. 344. 27,31: this refers to the removal of the bust of Hermes from the top of a stone pillar, or ‘herm’, as this ubiquitous votive object was known. 345. 27,32-3: the distinction between types of alteration is inserted into the Aristotelian inventory, and essentially reproduces the same distinction inserted into the opening paragraph of 1.7; see 23,18-20, where substantial coming to be was distinguished from alteration. Also, in Phys. 5.1, ‘transformation’ (metabolê) is the generic term applied in a strict sense to substantial change since there kinêsis is used for change in the other categories. 346. 28,7-8: cf. (4) above (24,3 and 20, and cf. 25,16) for the case of an uneducated human being coming to be educated. 347. 28,6-10: cf. (6) at 25,12-14 above); i.e., bronze, described there as ‘unshaped with respect to a statue’s being unshaped’, can now be identified as an underlying subject plus the opposite of what is going to be (cf. 28,7 with 25,20-2 above), or, in other words, the privation. 348. 28,20: after phanerôs replace the stop with a comma. 349. 28,28-29,1: this elliptical statement, as Schenkl (ad 28,28 noted), may reflect a corrupt text since there is no reference to form, as in the Aristotelian text, to clarify the contrast between matter and form, on the one hand, and privation. 350. 29,4-5: see Themist. in Phys. 5.2, 169,31-170,2 (with a reference back to this text at 170,1), where, in an expansive discussion of substantial change, he defines privation as ‘a sort of absence (apousia)’ (cf. 29,12 below) rather than a strict opposition of ‘what is not’ to ‘what is’. Alex. ap. Simpl. in Phys. 219,14-19 described the sense in which privation was opposite to form as ‘more general’ (koinoteron), and compared Phys. 5.6, 229b23-7; see Todd (11), 107 n. 167. 351. 29,6: the opposites can be affected by one another (Arist. GC 1.7), but matter is the underlying subject for the change from privation to form such that there is no interaction between the two. 352. 29,1: Arist. 190b35-191a3, which elaborates the distinction between principles and opposites, receives no comment; 353. 29,7: Ross (2), 494 wondered if the words ‘involved in coming to be’ (peri genesin) should not be deleted as unidiomatic, though all the Greek commentators retain them.

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354. 29,8. after proeirêtai place a stop (Ross) or a comma (Spengel). 355. 29,13: 191a12-19, a summary of the general thesis of the chapter, is omitted as is 191a20-2, a restatement of the three principles in favour of briefly raising issues about the general status of form and demarcating the role of the natural science in relation to metaphysics; cf. 29,20-1 with 34,8-10 (ad 192a347) below. 356. 29,13-15: this selective paraphrase is designed to orient this text to the conception of prime matter developed earlier by replacing the words following ‘so does this [nature] to the substance’, namely, ‘the given thing and what is’ (kai to tode ti kai to on) with ‘all that is’ (hapan to on). For a critique of such generalizing as the basis for positing prime matter see Jones, 496-7. 357. 29,20: for anakeisthô read apokeisthô; cf. the use of this verb in precisely this sense at Arist. 192b1 below in the very passage that Themistius is anticipating here (see on 29,13 above). LSJ gives this Themistian locus as its only evidence for the use of anakeisthai in the sense of ‘to be put aside’; emendation, however, seems preferable to licensing semantic innovation. 358. For recent discussions of this chapter see, for example, Loux and Kelsey. 359. 29,22: for legomen read legômen (Arist. 191a24). 360. 29,22-5: this argument was introduced at 13,30-14,3 (ad 1.4, 187a27-31) above. 361. 29,29-30: a reference to Democritus (cf. above 2,31-31 on 184b20-2 and 18,1-5 on 188a22-6), though the source text is primarily directed against the Eleatics, like the later reference at 191b30-3, which Themistius does not accurately paraphrase (see next note); cf. Quandt, 184-5. Simpl. in Phys. 235,18-23 has a more expansive doxography in which all the major pre-Socratics are shown to have eliminated coming to be. 362. 30,1: Arist. 191a33 has ‘not even many things but only what itself is’ (alla monon auto to on), which makes this a clearer reference to the Eleatics (see preceding note). 363. 30,8: take anthrôpon from 30,7 as the subject of gignesthai. 364. 30,6-8: See 23,17-20 above with the note on 23,17-21 for this distinction. 365. 30,21-2: this is (1) in 1.7 above; see Themist. 24,8 (= Arist. 190a6-7). 366. 30,26-9: this phrasing is added to a restatement of Arist. 191b15-16 at 30,24-6. For matter as negation and privation as incidental to it see above 26,27-27,13; privation is ‘like a quality’ (27,27,1-2) and therefore incidental to matter as ‘the first underlying subject’ (27,9-10). 367. 30,32-3: the change of species involved here is from the text at 191b20-1 as read by the commentators, but the text now accepted by scholars includes a supplement that reflects standard natural generation, so that Aristotle’s analogy involves the case of ‘a dog coming to be from a horse’. See Ross (2) on 191b20-1. Themistius is probably referring elliptically to spontaneous generation in saying that species-crossing sometimes happens. Simplicius, in Phys. 239,18 does so overtly. 368. 31,8: again (cf. on 27,27 above) ‘seed’ (sperma) should mean the embryo in the form produced at the point of sexual generation before development. 369. 31,16-17: the words in angle-brackets are from MSS L. Schenkl notes that they resemble Philop. in Phys. 181,10-11, from which they may have been borrowed. 370. 31,17: 191b30-3 is omitted; it refers back to the earlier historical criticisms (cf. 191b32-3 with 191a25-6), and associates Aristotle’s brief reference at 191b29 to other discussions of the distinction between potentiality and actuality (on what these may have been see Ross [2], 496), with further remarks on matter and privation, made in line with the digression in 1.7; see 25,24-26,19.

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371. 31,25-6: the proposition an uneducated human being comes to be educated, introduced in 1.7 above as (4) (see 24,3 ad Arist. 190a4-5) involved a compound (human being and uneducated), with being uneducated classified as privation (24,22-3). Here it is invoked to explain coming to be. Also at 24,20 the phrase ‘this whole’ is conjoined with ‘compound’ in further comment on the same proposition. 372. 31,27-8: this reworks Arist. 191a33-4, a statement that earlier thinkers would have solved their problems by recognizing the underlying nature. As such, it is best attached directly to the last sentence of the paraphrase of 1.8 rather than made the opening sentence of 1.9, as in Schenkl’s arrangement. 373. 31,28: on the basis of Simpl. in Phys. 242,20-1 and Philop. in Phys. 182,14 Schenkl posited a lacuna here. However, the clause hosoi men to on hen poiousin in these later commentators can perhaps be used to emend hosoi men toinun in Themistius to hosoi men to on hen (with toinun seen as a conflation of to on hen), which fits with 12,13 above where Plato is said to agree to on hen einai ‘that what is is one’. The remaining clause in Simplicius and Philoponus, ê hosoi panta energeiâi proüparkhein legousi (‘or those who say that everything actually pre-exists’), may also have been in Themistius’ text. 374. 31,28-32,1: these are the early thinkers identified at the start of 1.4 above; see 13,9-16 ad 187a12-20, where, as here, they are grouped with Plato, as monists who sought to explain change. 375. 32,3: read all’ before oukh hikanôs; Schenkl’s omission of it, despite its presence at Arist.191b35, was justified by the reading of only one Themistian manuscript. 376. 32,2-6: cf. 12,12-24 above where Plato is criticized for partially accepting Parmenides’ argument for monism, while trying to get away with saying that what is not is matter, and thereby positing what is as both one and many. Here that problem reappears as the criticism that he envisaged coming to be from what is not. 377. 32,27-33,5: this paraphrase draws on the expansive discussion of matter and privation in connection with 1.7 above, both the digression (25,24-27,13) and 28,17-29,1 (on 190b24-9) where matter is said to be more identifiable than privation. 378. 32,20: the compound here is that of matter qua underlying subject and the privation; cf. 28,6-7 above. 379. 32,25-6: see 13,14-15 above ad 187a17-18. 380. 32,29 (= 192a14): ‘like a mother’: cf. Plat. Tim. 50D3 and 51A4-5. 381. 32,30: for phthoropoion read kakopoion (MS L and Arist. 192a15). The other Themistian manuscripts have poion, but Schenkl chose to read phthoropoion on the basis of Simpl. in Phys. 249,7, where the word appears as an explication of kakopoion, not as an alternative reading. 382. 33,6-27: the Aristotelian text makes this paragraph more clearly a critique of the Platonists by contrasting ‘us’ and ‘them’ (192a17-20). Guldentops (3), 189-91 (cf. [2], 106-7 and 114) notes that the use of the standard Platonic vocabulary of participation (33,8), and the topos of becoming like a supreme principle (33,11), as well perhaps the issue of providence, leaves intact a basic adherence to the Aristotelian text into which the issue of evil implied by the phrase ‘opposite to [the good]’ at 192a17 has been introduced. Guldentops (2), 114 n. 75 and (3), 191 n. 7 also notes that in following Alexander (ap. Simpl. in Phys. 249,12-14) in taking privation rather than matter as the cause of evils, Themistius excludes Plotinus’ theory of evil. 383. 33,7: see Guldentops (3), 191 n. 8 on the Aristotelian texts that attribute weakness to natural processes rather than to matter itself (cf. also Themist. 61,1

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below), although, as he notes, it is ps.-Ar. Probl. 871b30 that uses the phrase ‘because of the weakness of matter’; see also Themist. 61,28-9 below in connection with defective natural processes identified in the discussion of teleology in 2.8. 384. 33,13: after autarkous replace the comma with a question mark. These two opening questions raise an aporia motivated by the option excluded at 192a19-22. That is, instead of asserting, like Aristotle, that matter desires the good because the form does not need to, and opposites are mutually destructive (see 33,23-5 below), Themistius reasons that if matter and privation are identical (instead of privation being incidental to matter, as argued earlier), then instead of yearning for the good, matter will be self-destructive when it takes on any form. Privation is not mentioned in the source text; by including it Themistius reinforces his earlier claims about its status. 385. 33,16: for ekhei read ekhoi (a corrector in MS L and the Aldine edition). 386. 33,21-2: if privation and matter were identical (33,18-19), then privation would be as comprehensive as matter in its relation to forms, and so it would ensure matter’s self-destruction, whereas in any given case privation is canceled out by an opposite form. 387. 33,23: for kan read kai. 388. 33,22-3: see also 25,28-33 above. 389. 33,25: what matter desires is the first form, the divine and the good; see 33,13-16. 390. 33,29: for auto read autêi (MSS WBL). 391. 33,32-34,1: after phtheiretai delete the colon and bracket oudepote – dunamei. 392. 34,4: for esti read estai (Arist. 192a33): if matter ceases to be, it will have to cease to be before the underlying subject that is its precondition for ceasing to be does so. 393. 34,4-8: Themistius extracts this clause from its role as an explanation of why matter cannot come to be and uses it for a general summary of the status of prime matter; cf. 25,25-27,13 above. 394. 34,5a: on (iii) see 25,24-27,12 passim. 395. 34,5b: see on 27,6 above. 396. 34,8: see above 30,20-9 on 1.8, 191b10-17. 397. 192b2-4, the conclusion to the chapter, is omitted. 398. 34,11-12: this reference (= Arist. 192b1) is a general gesture to other treatises on natural philosophy; see Ross (2), 498-9. 399. 35,2-3: this formula (cf. 185a20-1 with 4,24 above; see also 82,29) recalls that Book 1 had opened by asserting the importance of establishing a ‘science of nature’ (cf. Phys. 1.1, 184a14-15) through an account of causes (184a11, ignored by Themistius; see on 1,6 above), not just the principles that formed its subject matter. Other ancient commentators (Simpl. in Phys. 259,19-260,19 and Philop. in Phys. 194,4-195,2) emphasize this continuity at greater length, although Book 2 has been seen as having ‘no organic connection’ with its predecessor (Ross [2], 449). 400. 35,5a: for the case of a treasure discovered by luck (not used by Aristotle in Phys. 2) see Arist. Metaph. 5.30, 1025a15-19 where it is represented as a coincidence when someone is digging for other purposes; cf. also Arist. NE 3.5, 1112a27 and Rhet. 1.6, 1362a8-9. For Themistius see below 51,31-52,1; 52,5-8; and 56,25-57,1. 401. 35,5b: delete bathron; only one item is needed per explanatory category here and given that klinê is used just below (35,18-19) bathron can be considered a gratuitous and syntactically awkward insertion. Also, since military office (in

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an ancient volunteer army at least) is due to choice but finding a treasure trove to luck, these items should be in the reverse order: i.e., transpose stratêgia to follow heurêsis. 402. 35,6: to maintain a semantic connection in English in the cluster of words based on the Greek term tekhnê (art, artifact, artificial, artisan), I have used the traditional, translation ‘art’ for a noun that refers to a wide variety of activities based on differing levels of systematic knowledge, some involving more reasoning than others (see 1,7-11 above). 403. 35,9-10: the four elements may have been identified originally in a marginal gloss subsequently inserted into the text; the general description is clear enough, as at 35,15 below. 404. 35,12-17: on the tripartite distinction (elements, animals, plants) used in articulating this difference see Alex. ap. Simpl. in Phys. 265,1-3. Later in Phys. 8 Aristotle will acknowledge the extent to which self-motion is externally caused; cf. Simpl. in Phys. 265,3-6 for such a qualification on this programmatic introductory analysis. 405. 35,11: for en autois read en hautois. 406. 35,12-14: at 35,14 read en hautois (Spengel’s tacit change) for en autois; at 35,15 replace the colon after staseôs with a comma, delete the colon after zôia, bracket kai gar – aitias (12-14) and replace the colon after aitias with a comma. 407. 35,15: delete metabatikês, a redundant gloss on tês kata topon (35,1415), which should be identical with its repetition at 35,16. 408. 35,16: for ex autôn read ex hautôn; cf. 35,18 below and Philop. in Phys. 203,9. 409. 35,17: for en autois read en hautois. 410. 35,17-18: See Alex. ap. Simpl. in Phys. 264,18-22 for the same point about there being no cessation of change of place in the otherwise unchanging heavenly bodies, though Simplicius (264,22-6) distinguishes between a stationary state (stasis) and rest as the state that follows change (êremia) to claim that the heavenly bodies are stationary ‘around their centres, axes and poles and in their entirety’. On the general issue of how things that change place in the context of a stable sphere can be at rest see Simplicius’ comments on Alexander at in Phys. 1022,15-24 ad Arist. Phys. 6.9, 240a29-b7. Porphyry ap. Simpl. in Phys. 264,27-9 introduced the divine body in this context to raise the issue of whether one of the elements, fire, is not also permanently self-moving because of its natural volatility. 411. 35,18: after heautôi replace the comma with a stop to mark a new phrase, as in the Aristotelian text. 412. 35,20: Themistius’ reading (or paraphrastic alternative) ‘principle’ (arkhên) is not found in most Aristotelian manuscripts, which, as Simpl. in Phys. 265,15 notes, have ‘impulse’ (hormên). 413. 36,1: cf. the argument from Antiphon (193a12-17; Themist. 38,4-18 below), that a bed made of wood will putrefy and emit a wooden outgrowth, though stones might not putrefy as rapidly as earth. 414. 36,2: Themistius in effect divides a long Aristotelian sentence at 192b22 (huparkhei) to allow him to analyze in greater detail through his own examples of the statue and the ship the cases of artificial change that Aristotle identifies generically. 415. 36,4: here and elsewhere I have used this periphrastic translation for the phrase ‘in X as first’, since otherwise the reference of ‘as first’ is ambiguous; see 36,7.8.21. 416. 36,6: before hoson supply kath’; cf. 35,19 above. 417. 36,6: if nature is defined as the principle of change and its cessation (cf.

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36,1-2, and 35,11-12 above), then taken literally that definition allows for some artificial things such as a ship to be the source of their own movement and hence in effect a natural phenomenon. 418. 36,7: pro tês neôs] read prô tês neôs. 419. 36,11-12: cf. Arist. Metaph. 5 (Delta).7, 1017a22-7 for things said to exist ‘in their own right’, or ‘per se’ (kath’ hauta) when they signify the different types of predication. By the terms of that passage ‘what something is’ (ti esti, 1017a25) is signified by the two predications rejected here. 420. 36,12: at the start of this sentence for dio read dia touto (MSS BL) so that it can anticipate epei; contrast the absolute use of dio in a similar expression at 36,17. 421. 36,12-13 and 15: here the text has the neuter form kath’ hauto where the reference is to a person. Perhaps both could be emended to kath’ hauton (cf. heauton at 36,13), or perhaps we can assume that Themistius is quoting Arist. 192b22, as Schenkl seems to when he cites this text for a variant reading. I have translated the suggested emendation as the more natural English. Cf. Schenkl’s apparatus at 57,7 for the same issue, where the text has kath’ hauton with reference to nous, but Spengel proposed the neuter abstract form kath’ hauto. 422. 36,13-17: the example of a doctor curing himself is Aristotle’s (cf. 2.8, 199b31 below with Themist. 63,13), that of the navigator and the ship ostensibly Themistius’, though probably taken from Arist. DA 2.1, 413a9 (where it is used with reference to the status of the intellect, and where Themist. in DA 43,27-30 took the navigator to be separable). Simpl. in Phys. 268,6-12 (on which see Fleet, 166 n. 52) also uses this illustration which probably originated with Alexander. It is not, of course, incidental to a ship to have a navigator in precisely the same way that it is incidental to a sick person to be a doctor, since the ship’s rudder has to be guided by someone with the appropriate expertise, whereas a sick person does not have to be a doctor, just something other than sick. 423. 36,17: replace the comma after allêlôn with a stop so that a new section can begin with homoiôs; cf. the punctuation of Arist. 193b27 in Ross (2). The ellipse of the verb is standard in such clauses. 424. 36,18-19: Simpl. in Phys. 269,7-8 refers to Arist. Metaph. 7.7 for a fuller discussion of ‘production’ (poiêsis); see especially 1032a26-1032b15. 425. 36,21: for kath’ hauto (MS M) read kath’ hauta (MSS WBL; cf. Arist. 192b31). The reference back is to the case of the steersman at 36,9-13. Puppets would also qualify; see Arist. MA 701b2-32 where the contrast between mechanically triggered puppets and animals rests on the latter having an internal principle of motion but one dependent on external input; cf. on 35,12-17 above. 426. 36,24: ‘this’ rather than the preliminary definition offered at 36,1-2 above. 427. 36,26: Ross (2), 349 translates the elliptical text hupokeimenon gar ti at Arist. 192b34 as ‘nature always involves a subject’, since nature cannot be a subject, as might be suggested by the absence of any explicit verb here. Ross (2), 501, ad 192b34 argued that we must understand from the previous clause ‘these [natural] things’ as what is being said to be a subject. In this vein Sharples (5), 68 (with n. 207) translates ‘for [what has a nature] is always a subject’. Themistius’ solution is to supply the verb ‘have’ to ensure that nature is not identified with a subject. 428. 37,2: for kath’ hauto (MS M) read kath’ hauta (MSS WBL). This contrast with incorporeals is Themistius’ insertion, and his statement is clearer if the comma after enulos is removed. 429. 37,5-6: the activity of upward motion cannot be identified with the matter of fire, which is the source of that motion.

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430. 37,9: sphallesthai (cf. sphalma at 61,30 below) is used here to contrast natural progress not just with an error or mishap but with a retrograde or deviant process. 431. 37,8-10: birth defects (ta ek genetês pêrômata) are natural in the minimal and trivial sense that anything that happens in the course of nature is natural, while still unnatural (‘not in accordance with nature’) in an evaluative sense because they are failures, or, as Simplicius in the course of a more discursive comment (in Phys. 271,12-22) puts it, they are not a result that is ‘in accordance with the will (boulêma) of nature’. Sharples (1), 129 contrasts Themistius’ position with Philoponus’ view (in Phys. 201,10) that something unnatural in part can be natural in the context of the whole; see also Sharples (4), 46 where he readdresses this issue in connection with a questionable report in an Arabic source (= FSHG 145) that Themistius distinguished between universal and particular nature in the same way as Philoponus. On Themistius’ treatment of contra-natural phenomena see also on 56,17-19 below ad 197a34-7, and cf. 61,19-62,13 ad 2.8, 199a33-b13.. 432. 37,10-11: cf. 1,4-6 above for non-demonstrative knowledge of nature and see the note on 3,15-22 above. The corollary of this claim is that it would also be ridiculous to try and disprove that all things are at rest (i.e., not changing, and thus not natural); see Themist. in Phys. 215,7-11 ad Arist. Phys. 8.3, 253a32-b6. 433. 37,12: see 35,6-12 above ad 192b9-13. 434. 37,14: for touto read houtô. 435. 37,15: for pêros (‘defective’) read tuphlos (‘blind’) (Arist. 193a7; MS W). 436. 37,19: for kathoran (MS M) read kathorôiê (Spengel). 437. 37,21-3: replace the stop after theteon with a comma, and continue the concluding sentence of this paragraph to estin (37,23). 438. 37,22-38,1: these two Aristotelian passages are conjoined to provide an overview of the different senses in which ‘nature’ is used. 439. 37,24-6: cf. Arist. Metaph. 5.4, 1014b26-35, from which Themistius may have drawn the concluding reference to the elements (cf. 37,26 with 1014b32-5), which is not in his immediate source text. 440. 37,26: cf. 25,12-19 above for an analysis of such proximate matter, i.e., matter ‘qualified’ by being in a compound, in change. Arist. 193a11-12 has just two examples (wood for a bed, and bronze for a statue); Themistius adds to the case of an artifact the proximate matter of the constituents of that artifact, and the proximate matter of an organism. Simplic. in Phys. 273,17-34 is similarly expansive though in slightly different terms. 441. 37,27: Themistius takes 193a28-30 to be referring to the ‘unformed’ prime matter that he has discussed in connection with 1.7 above (see 26,21), though at 38,1-4 below he takes the reference to ‘the first thing inherent to each thing’ (193a10-11) to be to proximate and qualified matter; cf. also 38,28 for ‘first underlying subject’ used in this sense, and 38,16 where it is used in a historical context for a qualified primary element; cf. also 45,14. Ross (2), 502 rejects any interpretation of 193a10-11 in terms of prime matter but, unlike Themistius in (i)-(b) here, thinks that ‘the first matter that is an underlying subject for each thing’ (193a29) should be read similarly. 442. 37,29: delete kaleitai phusis as a gloss; it interrupts the sequence of elliptical clauses for which the main verb is understood from legetai at 37,24 (note its repetition at 37,31 in the final item in this sequence). 443. 37,29-30: on this sense, essentially a satellite of sense (ii), see Arist. 193b12-18 (Themist. 39,24-40,8 below), which is anticipated here. 444. 37,31: for nature as the cause of change see above 35,11-12, 36,1-2 (Arist. 192b21-2) and 36,22-3, and cf. Arist. Metaph. 5.4, 1015a13-19.

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445. 37,32: cf. Arist. Metaph. 5.4, 1014b35-1015a13. 446. 38,1-4: Themistius extracts from Arist. 193a9-12 the general idea that nature is form, but creates a segue to Antiphon’s theory by introducing the idea that water (or moisture) is a more basic type of matter, if matter is to be thought of as qualified; see the next note. 447. 38,3a: Arist. 193a11 describes ‘the primary inherent thing’ (to prôton enuparkhon) as ‘per se non-arranged’ (arruthmiston kath’ heauto). At 38,3-4 Themistius translates this into a description of matter as ‘totally unshaped and unstructured’ (amorphôtaton te kai askhêmatiston), while associating the language of arrangement with Antiphon at 38,7. 448. 38,3b: Arist. Metaph. 5.4, 1015a9-10 describes water in this general role, while here it explains how the putrefaction of wood results in organic growth. On the elements that are an underlying subject for bronze and wood see Simpl. in Phys. 274,16-17 and Philop. in Phys. 208,14-15 (the latter identifying water and earth as an underlying subject for wood; see Lacey, 151 n. 102), and also id. 208,23-24 (where ‘water’ in the sense of fluid matter is identified as an underlying subject for metals that can be melted). The general link between putrefaction and organic generation derives from Archelaus (fifth century BC); see DK 60A4 (with Burnet on Plat. Phaed. 96b3) and the Hippocratic On Fleshes, ch. 3. 449. 38,4: Antiphon, the fifth-century sophist and orator, may have dealt with this topic in his major work, Alêtheia (Truth). See DK 87B15 where Arist. 193a9-17 is quoted, along with the evidence that might link it with this work via a testimonium. Pendrick quotes Themist. 38,1-18 as his F15(d); see his discussion of his F15 for further analysis of this topic. 450. 38,17: 193a28-30 was inserted at 37,27-8 above; see note on 37,22-38,1. 451. 38,17-21: replace the stop after phusei (38,18) with a comma and continue the sentence to paradeigmasin (38,21) to form the opening statement of this section. 452. 38,28: before tekhnikon supply to (Arist. 193a32; MS Laur. 85,8); cf. to phusikon (38,30; Arist. 193a33). 453. 38,28: see on 37,27 above. 454. 38,31-2: for hoionei read hoion hê (MS L; cf. Simpl. in Phys. 276,19). Clearly sarx needs a definite article just like its twin ostoun. 455. 38,32: before ostoun supply sarx energeiâi (coni. Schenkl). 456. 39,2-3: after duseides remove the comma and to anticipate the same language at 39,4-5 read kath’ ho hekaston followed by a comma. 457. 39,4: for katho read kath’ ho. 458. 39,5-6: Themistius omits Aristotle’s reference (at 193b3-4) to nature as the principle of change, presumably because that has already been firmly established earlier (36,1-2; 36,22-4). 459. 39,7: the form is not itself a substance, kath’ hupostasin being equivalent to kat’ ousian (cf. 44,8 below). Cf. its use in the next chapter (41,11-12.15.24-5 and 44,4) to identify the kind of separability that limits the conceptualization of geometrical objects by the mathematician, 460. 39,13: Schenkl failed to insert the opening quotation mark for this statement, though he should have converted it to oratio obliqua by accepting Spengel’s emendation of ekhei to ekhein. 461. 39,13-14: Themistius eschews the explicit contrast between actuality and potentiality at Arist. 193b7-8 and represents the latter by the process of development prior to actualization. 462. 39,15: after teleiotês replace the comma with a stop. 463. 39,17-18: cf. Arist. 193a12-17 (Themist. 38,4-18) above; Aristotle does not mention Antiphon in the present context.

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464. 39,19: before xulon delete to; cf. Arist. 193a14. 465. 39,19: for ginetai de read de ginetai. 466. 39,25-40,1: for a more elaborate dialogue between Themistius and a less tutored interlocutor see in Phys. 168,23-35. 467. 40,3a: after eidos replace the comma with a stop. 468. 40,3b: cf. above 37,28-30, sense (iii) in the list given there. 469. 40,5a: delete tês iatrikês, a gloss since it is obvious that medicine is the art of this generically described practitioner. If this reading were sound the accusative case would also be used. Note that in the next clause the arts associated with healing and heating (40,7) are left unspecified. 470. 40,5b: delete oukh, presumably inserted due to a misunderstanding of the relation of Themistius’ syntax to Aristotle’s at 193b15-16. 471. 40,5c: between hê and hôs genesis supply legomenê; cf. Arist. 193b13 and Simpl. in Phys. 279,1. The issue of usage is crucial here; see the next note. 472. 40,6: the art and activity of healing is to hugiastikon (see Arist. Phys. 257a17), that of heating to thermantikon, though neither are arts in the normal sense. This point about nomenclature arises from Aristotle’s emphasis (193b14) on what is said about medicine in contrast with nature; cf. Simpl. in Phys. 279,19-23. 473. 40,10a: cf. 27,1-2 above where privation is said to be ‘as it were a quality’. 474. 40,10b: cf. on 37,8-10 above where the reference to defective products of nature is similarly inserted into the Aristotelian argument. 475. 40,11-12: see Themist. in Phys. 5.2, 169,31-170,2 where privation is said not to be contrary to form and is defined as an ‘absence and a not-being that is not contrary to being’; there he refers to Phys. Bk. 1 (probably 1.7, 190b30-3; see Themist. 29,3-6), and, given this, it seems as though Aristotle’s reference to a ‘later’ discussion, which Themistius reproduces, should be to this earlier one, though it is a minor matter. Aristotle could be referring to GC 1.3, 318b14-18, as Simpl. in Phys. 280,19-20 thought, but see Bostock (2), 239 who notes that that text also has a reference to another earlier discussion at 317b13. See also 40,13b below. 476. 40,13: for hê genesis haplê (MS M) read hê genesis hê haplê (MSS WBL). On this topic see further Themist. in Phys. 168,14-23 on Arist. Phys. 5.1, 225a12-20. 477. 40,14: ‘not irrelevant’ (ouk apo tropou) modifies Arist. 193b23, that such an activity ‘must be undertaken’ (theôrêteon), and justifies introducing this issue by making an immediate reference to matter and what is separable from matter, which Aristotle first introduces explicitly at 194a12-13. Themistius thus makes the first part of this chapter (193b22-194a12) more continuous with the preceding discussion about nature in relation to matter and form and a clearer anticipation of 194a12-27. 478. 40,15: for sômati read sômasi (Spengel); cf. Simpl. in Phys. 290,34. 479. 40,16: for ê read all’ (a suggestion made by a reader), and replace the question mark after homoiôs with a stop. 480. 40,17: in the first part of 2.2 (193b22-194a12) Aristotle identifies the process by which properties are separated from bodies only as ‘thinking’ (noêsis, 193b34), whereas Themistius frequently uses ‘in definition’ (tôi logôi; 40,17 and 41,13.14.23.27.28) or ‘in conception’ (kat’ epinoian, 41,29) to make the same point. ‘In definition’ probably derives from the description in 2.1 of nature as ‘form in accordance with the definition’ (kata ton logon; 193a31); cf. also 193b4-5 (= Themist. 39,6-7). 481. 40,19: throughout the main part of this chapter (40,14-43,3) kinêsis and

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kineisthai are translated by ‘movement’ and ‘move’ because of the references to the observational science, though the issue of change in general is of concern to the natural philosopher through his focus on the ‘quality of the substance’ of heavenly bodies (41,6) and their composition (41,7-8) as unchanging aether. 482. 40,20-1: Themistius strengthens Arist. 193b23-5, so that the activity of the mathêmatikos becomes an autonomous procedure rather than one complementary to that of the phusikos; see also 41,8-10 in contrast with 193b33-5. This standard reading of 2.2 is challenged by Lennox (4). 483. 40,21-41,8: Themistius has clearly drawn on a passage that Alexander in his commentary on the Physics (quoted by Simpl. in Phys. 291,21-292,31) reproduced from Geminus’ epitome of a work by Posidonius, the Meteorologica (= Posidonius F18EK). It offers a similar version of the Aristotelian distinction between the astronomer and the natural scientist. On this text, much discussed in Posidonian studies and in studies of the philosophy of science in later antiquity, see, most recently, Bowen and Todd, 193-204, revisited in Todd and Bowen, and also the derivative discussion by White. Themistius, unlike Simplicius, has eliminated the historical dimension of the Alexandrian material. 484. 40,21-2: Themistius does not reproduce the statement at 193b25-6 that astronomy is either different from or a part of natural science, but there is no reason to think that he did not read it as a statement, whereas Ross accepted an emendation of the text that made these lines into a question that he thought was answered later (194a7-12; see his note ad loc.) by a statement that astronomy is a part of natural science. On this whole issue see the detailed study by Mueller (1). For Themistius astronomers are clearly mathematicians; see 41,8 where he generalizes about their practice after contrasting astronomy and natural science in the present paragraph. 485. That is, like the mathematician and natural scientist. 486. 41,2: after houtôs supply ekhei; cf. Simpl. in Phys. 292,6. 487. 41,6: this is a summary response to the allowance made by Alexander in the report ap. Simpl. in Phys. 292,15-20 (see on 40,21-40,8 above) for non-circular planetary motion. 488. 41,6: after ousian change the stop to a comma and understand exetazei from line 5. 489. 41,6-8: for the association of sphericity and the aether see Arist. Cael. 2.4, 287a2-11. The astronomers’ argument from observation is used primarily with regard to the Moon, since its sphericity can be inferred from its phases and from solar eclipses, and then transposed by analogy to the remaining heavenly bodies; see Cael. 2.11, 291b18-23. 490. 41,14-15: Themistius’ version of Arist. 193b35-7 is elliptical. Its source has the claim that ‘those who say that there are ideas also do this [sc. separate properties like the mathematicians] unwittingly; for they separate natural properties, which are less separable than mathematical ones’. That is, the Platonists imitate the mathematicians but overextend the procedure of abstraction. 491. 41,17-18: for ê (18) read kai, and delete kai anthrôpou (17) as an unhelpful gloss on sarkos kai ostou. Clearly organic matter is the kind of body of which the definition cannot be separated from the matter, not the whole human organism. 492. 41,22: after astronomia delete the colon and after grammên delete gar. This intervention makes sense of the resumption of labousai at 41,23. 493. 41,26-7: although the Greek has ‘they use the dioptra’, this can apply only to astronomy, since the dioptra in question is one that was used in astronomical observations and measurements. The straight line is that of the

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rod with two sights that stood on a mount. See Evans and Berggren, 38-42 for further information; clearly 494. 41,29: before mêde kat’ epinoian supply mête kata logon as Schenkl suggested in light of Philop. in Phys. 224,20. 495. 42,3: for the first to read hê (Spengel). 496. 42,4: before simôi supply to. 497. 42,24-5: before hotan change the comma to a colon (the asyndeton is licensed by the proleptic houtôs at 42,23). Then after hodou (25) change the stop to a comma, so that the hotan clause can be linked with the main clause. Cf. Philop. in Phys. 235,13-18. 498. 42,26-7: see Philop. in Phys. 235,18-236,4 for a fuller analysis of the thought compressed into this sentence. 499. 42,29: in the sentence at 42,28-30 hê genesis kai hê auxêsis should be deleted as an inadequately selective gloss on hai phusikai kinêseis. 500. 42,30-43,3: on this paragraph, which he translates, see Guldentops (3), 191-2 who notes (192 n. 10) that Themistius avoids the Stoic position that death is a matter of indifference, but refrains from defining very clearly what kind of evil it is in that he just classifies it as natural but not good. 501. 42,30: the identity of the poet quoted by Arist. 194a30-1 is uncertain. Philop. in Phys. 236,7 attributed the line to Euripides, but the scholarly consensus is that it is from comedy; see Ross (2) on 194a30-1. 502. 42,32: before hou heneka supply to. 503. 42,32: for beltion read beltiston (Arist. 194a33; cf. also 195a24 = 45,26, as Spengel suggested). Philop. in Phys. 236,17 does not seem to favour beltion, as Schenkl implies, but seems to support the change adopted here. 504. 42,32-3: on this insert see Themistius’ exegesis of Arist. DA 2.4, 416b1116 at in DA 53,4-5, where growth is said to terminate at maturity (akmê). 505. 43,5: this illustration is Themistius’ insertion, probably abbreviated from a more detailed list, such as we find at Simpl. in Phys. 303,3-7. There the builder makes bricks and then shapes them for construction (Themistius cites only the former process), while modeling is said to ‘soften’ pre-existing wax, which is, of course, not made by humans at all. 506. 43,9: since Arist. 194a35-6 refers to this twofold distinction as having been drawn in his (lost and now fragmentary) On Philosophy (en tois peri philosophias), Themist. 43,3-12 is included as no. 988 in Gigon’s edition of the Aristotelian fragments. Here, as at his in DA 50,11-12 ad Arist. DA 415b2, Themistius mistakenly equates the work in question with Aristotle’s (presumably Nicomachean) Ethics, as does Simpl. in Phys. 304,2-3; see Todd (7), 172 n. 6 and Johnson, 77 n. 26. The twofold distinction is that between an end for the benefit of a person (hou), and that by which (hôi) the end is realized. 507. 43,12-13: these ‘two species’ are Themistius’ way of addressing a problem that concerned Alexander (ap. Simpl. in Phys. 305, 3-5): namely, that the navigator cannot be exclusively concerned with form (he cannot just give a sketch-plan to the ship-builder) but has to prescribe the matter required without getting into as much detail as the builder. But where is the dividing line between the different ‘material’ concerns of the two craftsmen involved? For Themistius it would seem that the navigator prescribes everything about the matter except its actual adaptation by the artisans working under the shipbuilder in constructing the ship. Simplicius (in Phys. 305,7-11), however, thinks that the line might be drawn at the generic level: thus the navigator lays down general criteria for the wood’s density and flexibility, while the builder selects cypress wood (his example) as best embodying these qualities. This means that the ship-builder also has knowledge of the end and form (Simpl. in Phys.

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305,13-16), whereas Themistius’ ship-builder ‘no longer uses the form’ (43,20-1) and is reduced to being a subordinate mechanical. 508. 43,15-17: this example of a hierarchy descends from Plat. Crat. 390D1-2 (cf. 390B11-C1); for the general principle see Plat. Polit. 259E8-260A8. 509. 43,19: for melei read mellei (MS B); melei in line 18 and mellei here led to confusion in the manuscripts (see Schenkl’s apparatus), and misled Schenkl into imposing uniformity on the two clauses. 510. 43,25: see 42,20-30 above on Arist. 194a27-30. 511. 43,27: the reason that Themistius inserts this qualification is that in dealing with 1.7 above (see 26,4-7) he has espoused prime matter, which is contrasted with matter that is ‘proximate’ (prosekhês) or directly related to form. Thus he evades the criticism that Arist. 194b8-9, which is stated without restriction, is incompatible with a concept of primary matter as non-relative; see the note on 26,7-8 above. 512. 44,1: delete ê, so that akri tinos hôste can directly parallel mekhri tosoutou  hôste (43,29). Diels (ad Simpl. in Phys. 308,12; 44,1-3 = 308,12-14) changed the accent on akhri tinos to make it interrogative rather than indefinite but he failed to insert a question mark. Fleet’s translation (Fleet, 65) shows that he would place it immediately after akhri tinos, leaving ê to introduce the answer. But I think that this would radically disrupt the parallel between the consecutive clauses in each limb of this sentence. 513. 44,3: for exetazei read exetasei; cf. episkepsetai (43,29). 514. 43,6: this seems to need marking as a quotation of 194b13; on this formula see Ross (2) ad loc. 515. 44,8: ‘substantially’ (kat’ ousian), though we might have expected kath’ hupostasin, as at 39,7. Simplic. in Phys. 308,34 has hupostasei in his gloss on to khôriston (‘what is separable’) at 194b14. 516. 44,9-10: though printed as the conclusion to the paraphrase of Phys. 2.2, this sentence is best read as the first half of the opening sentence of the paraphrase of 2.3 (i.e., replace the stop after estô (44,10) with a comma). Themistius (cf. Arist. 194b16-17) is concluding the discussion initiated at 37,33-38,1 of principles (i.e., matter and form in connection with nature, and the procedures of the natural philosopher), and now returns to the book’s opening topic (see 35,2-36,24 ad Arist. 192b8-34) of nature as the principle and cause of change and rest (cf. 36,22-4). 517. 44,11: this must be Arist. 192b35 (= Themist. 37,2), where the general definition of nature as a cause and principle of change yielded to an analysis of the meaning of the term ‘nature’. 518. 44,12: Arist. 194b17-23 is omitted; it restates the importance of identifying causal principles with reference to natural change and thus repeats Phys. 1.1, 184a10-16 above. At the same time this omission aligns this chapter with Metaph. 5.2 of which it is a doublet in all but minor details. 519. 44,15: here ‘genus’ (genos) covers both the species (or form) gold that is the matter of any bowl and body as the genus to which gold, bronze and other metals belong. See also 46,15-16 below. 520. 44,16-21: cf. Themistius’ inserted caveat that ‘paradigm’ (paradeigma) must not be understood in a Platonic sense with Ross (2) on 194b26 who, in the spirit of Jaegerian developmentalism, thought that the use of this term pointed to an early date of composition, since ‘It was only in his Platonic period that Aristotle was likely to use so definitely Platonic a term’. 521. 44,22: before prôtê supply hê (Arist. 194b29). 522. 44,22: after aitios supply tês praxeôs; this is needed to balance tou teknou in the next clause.

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523. 45,14: on the senses of matter see 37,22-38,1 above and the note on 37,27. 524. 45,19: before to supply eis (cf. 45,14). 525. 45,21-2: Ross (2) on 195a20 glosses ‘whole’ similarly, saying that ‘whole’ here means ‘the wholeness or completion which supervenes on the parts’. 526. 45,22: for hola read holon. 527. 45,23a: for suntithemenois read suntetheimenois (MS W; a corrector in MS B); cf. sunkeimenois at 45,20. 528. 45,23b: that is, as matter considered without reference to any complexity or structure; see 45,16 above, and earlier 37,27. 529. 45,23-4: for eis triton de read triton d’ eis (Spengel); triton is the adverb (cf. 45,13.18 and 25) and eis governs the term for a cause (cf. 45,14 and also 45.19 and 25, as emended). 530. 45,25: before to supply eis (cf. 45,14). 531. 45,29-46,11: Arist. 195b3-10 is omitted, justifiably given that 195b3-6 which deals with potential and actual causes is superseded by 195b16-21 (= Themist. 46,22-47,2) below, while 195b6-10 is, as we shall see, best incorporated in the examples used for the six causes identified at 195b12-16. This means that only the ‘productive’ (or efficient) cause need be highlighted in this paragraph. 532. 45,30: this phrase may have been added in light of Aristotle’s examples of a doctor (195a30-1) and sculptor (195a33-5) as productive causes. Also at 195a31-2 there are examples of a formal cause: the ratio of double (2:1), and number as the cause of the octave. 533. 45,30-46,1: Themistius’ distinction here supplants Aristotle’s (195a30), which is drawn in terms of priority and posteriority. 534. 46,4: Akoumenos is a neo-Homeric significant name; it literally means Healer. 535. 46,8: for ê read kai, as Spengel suggested; it reproduces the kai linking leukos and mousikos in the preceding line. 536. 46,9-11: Aristotle’s example of sculpting is changed to medicine, while the reference to separately defined incidental causes anticipates Arist. 195b1516 (= Themist. 46,14 and 17-18 below). 537. 46,10-11: I have identified two examples for each of these categories, with quotation marks supplied for each of the two propositions linked by the disjunction; Schenkl puts the whole disjunction in quotation marks in each case. 538. 46,11: for ex hou read ex hôn; the reference back is to the whole of the preceding paragraph and so the plural (found in MS. L) is needed. 539. 46,13: before sumbebêkos supply hôs to (Arist. 195b14; Spengel). 540. 46,13: Arist. 195b13-14 has tou sumbebêkotos after hôs to genos; either that or a pronoun has to be added here to ensure the restriction of this phrase to the preceding item. I have supplied just autou. 541. 46,14: see the restriction placed at 45,30 above with the note ad loc. 542. 46,15: the Diadoumenos (the victorious athlete with his head bound with a filet) was one of the major statues of the Athenian Polycleitus, datable in its original form to c. 430-20 BC. 543. 46,15-16: cf. Arist. 195b8-9. 544. 46,18: for suntitheis read suntetheis, and before ê supply mallon. The red colour is the result of the bronze of the statue having been ‘combined’ in the sculpting such that it has acquired the colour red; thus so the passive participle is needed. I supply mallon in light of Themistius’ restatement of (vi) at 46,9 as ‘in separation’ (khôris) instead of Aristotle’s hôs haplôs legomena (‘said without qualification’); here the separation is conveyed by a contrast with, and exclusion

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of, black bronze. Cf. Arist. Int. 11, 20b31-6 where criteria are introduced for combining and separating predicates. 545. 46,20-1: this is the example given at Arist. 195b7-8, omitted by Themistius ad loc. 546. 46,25: for actual efficient causes at least their activity may cease when an effect is produced; but it is not clear how this principle could be extended to other causes. See Bostock (1), 241. 547. 47,1: before energêsai supply to. This sentence is Themistius’ addition, designed to explain that a house-builder has the potentiality to build while he is building (just as change for him will be a potentiality realized in activity) and after he has ceased building. 548. 47,2-3: see Irwin, 519 n. 5 on the fact that here and in later commentators ‘most dominant and most proximate’ is a gloss on the more unusual term akrotaton, ‘ultimate in terms of precision’, at Arist. 195b22. 549. 47,3: for hôi read ho (MS WBL). 550. 47,8: after kath’ hekaston supply tôn kath’ hekaston (coni. Schenkl), which could have been omitted by homoioteleuton. 551. 47,10: delete aitiatois, an unnecessary gloss on tois energoumenois derived from 46,24; its presence destroys the symmetry of the balanced clauses that rephrase Arist. 195b27-8. 552. For a study of luck and spontaneity in Themistius, both in his orations and philosophical works, see Guldentops (1), especially at 320-9 on Phys. 2.4-6, and more generally on Aristotle see Dudley. Worth comparing with Themistius’ account is Alexander, mantissa 176,2-179,23, ‘On Luck’, on which see Sharples (4), 215-23 recycled at Sharples (5), 127-32 and 230-3. 553. 47,13: for men read men oun (MSS WB). 554. 47,15-16: after episkepteon (15) replace the stop with a comma and from Schenkl’s supplement proteron episkepteon (16) delete episkepteon; the latter is a gratuitous repetition of the same verbal adjective in line 15 on which the syntax of this final clause can depend once the punctuation is changed. Proteron, though speculative, helps indicate that Themistius is pointing to the preliminary discussion of the view that luck does not exist at all. 555. 47,24: for ti gar; ei (Schenkl) read kai gar ei (Spengel) for ei gar ei (MSS). 556. 48,13-23: Themistius’ example (from Alexander; see Simpl. in Phys. 329,34-330,7) cites Achilles’ killing of Hector in Iliad 22 which as an act of planned revenge was no matter of luck. Adrastus, however, was a refugee at the court of King Croesus of Lydia. Having earlier unintentionally killed his brother, he replicated that unfortunate event by equally unintentionally killing Croesus’ son Atys while they were hunting a predatory beast. For the tale see Herodotus 1.36-45 and note especially 1.45 where Croesus says that Adrastus was not aitios (‘guilty’, ‘responsible’, ‘the cause’), while attributing the event not to luck but to a god, which can be another way of identifying luck; see 50,1-3 below on Arist. 196b6-7. 557. 48,16: that is, in addition to the case of the unexpected meeting with a friend (47,21-6 above), which was also misidentified as based on choice. 558. 48,20: for ho read hoti. 559. 49,2: this proverb is found in Roman authors in the form ‘truth is time’s daughter’ vel. sim.; see Aulus Gellius 12.11.7 and Apuleius Met. 8.7. 560. 49.5-12: this account of Empedocles is a condensed version of a passage that Simpl. in Phys. 330,32-331,16 undoubtedly inherited from Alexander (cf. Simpl. in Phys. 332,20-2), in which other examples of Empedocles’ use of the notion of luck are provided. 561. 49,9: this line (= Empedocles DK 31B53) is quoted at Arist. 196a22-3,

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and also at GC 2,6, 334a3, where it is similarly linked with luck. It refers to the aithêr defining itself (the ‘running’ mentioned) in the cosmogony. 562. 49,10: Simpl. in Phys. 331-3-9 cites Empedoclean texts in support of the same statement in the following order, DK 31B98.1, B85 (not, pace Fleet, 177 n. 259, B83), and B75.2. 563. 49,13-16: after enkalein (13) replace the question mark with a comma, and after automatou (16) replace the stop with a question mark. 564. 49,15: ‘restraining order’ (katekhousa taxis) is a striking phrase but has no parallel that I can discover. 565. 49,18: for ‘dance’ (khoreia) applied to the movements of the celestial bodies see Plat. Tim. 40C3. 566. 49,23-6: cf. on 61,30-62,2 below. 567. 49,32-50,1: the verb used in this metaphor, apodidraskein, is associated particularly with a furtive escape typical of slaves (most famously at Plat. Crito. 50D1). Plat. Theaetet. 203D10 in a similar vein describes an argument’s collapse as just such a disreputable departure. 568. 50,2: ‘rather involved with spirits’ (daimoniôteron). The daimones in classical Greek religion were often seen as spirits who could arbitrarily mediate between gods and humans; cf. Plato Symp. 202D-203A, and see Puiggali for references to daimones in Themistius’ orations. Simpl. in Phys. 333,5-17 rejects with examples the idea (clearly Alexander’s; see Giannakis, 162, and cf. Golitsis, 109 n. 43 who rightly cites Alex. Fat. 174,1-3) that the Stoics were the first to treat luck as divine. See also Guldentops (1), 324 with n. 50, Sharples (5), 222 n. 733 (= Sharples (6), 233). 569. 50,3-4: Tukhê (or Fortuna) was worshipped as a deity in later antiquity; see Simpl. in Phys. 333,.11-14, and 356,31-361,11 (discussed by Golitsis, 108-14) on luck as a religious concept. 570. 50,5: on the ‘usual procedure’ see Arist. 196b7-9, and 47,13-15 (= Arist. 195b33-6) above where it is shown to involve defining luck and spontaneity and explaining both their inter-relationship and their relation to the scheme of causes. 571. 50,6: Themistius postpones any mention of spontaneity (to automaton, Arist. 195b15) until 51,9 below. 572. 50,7: this is an ellipse for the motion of the eternal bodies; Simpl. in Phys. 334,13-14 cites the rising and setting of the sun, used at 50,10-11 below. 573. 50,9: ‘for the most part’ (hôs epi to pleiston), translated this way also when the positive form, hôs epi to polu, is used. 574. 50,15: Themistius’ category (iii) is created out of Aristotle’s exclusionary statement at 196b13-14 that there are some things that fit neither of the other categories. The positive language, ‘things that happen to a lesser extent’ (ta ep’ elatton) is grafted onto the source text. Cf. Arist. Top. 2.6, 112b10-15 where it appears in contrast with what is for the most part (to epi to polu) and what is necessary 575. 50,13-14: these added illustrations of predictable events anticipate Phys. 2.8, 198b36-199a3 (Themist. 60,3-4) below. See also Arist. Metaph. 6.2, 1026b33-5 and 11.8, 1064b36-7 where bad weather in the ‘dog days’ (when Sirius rose at sunrise), but not a heat wave, is said to be a coincidence. Aristotle does not refer to Sagittarius, the astrological sign for early winter (November-December). 576. 50,15: Arist. 196b14 states that ‘everyone says’ this. 577. 50,19: ‘thought’ is the standard but somewhat unsatisfactory translation for dianoia, but it refers specifically to practical reasoning or a ‘thinking through’ of something before making the choice to act; hence it is a necessary condition of choice (see Arist. 197a7-8 = Themist. 53,1-2).

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578. 50,20: these are Themistius’ examples of activities that serve no purpose; cf. Simpl. in Phys. 335,13-16 who offers a list of nauseating habits (e.g., nail-biting, nose-picking) that lack any redeeming goals. Obviously these activities serve some purpose, but the point is that there is no necessary purpose that they serve (what Simplicius, 335,16 calls their having ‘nothing as their point of reference [anaphora]’). If, however, someone’s hair were cut to facilitate a surgical procedure, then the haircut would be for the sake of health. I think that this answers Dudley’s charge (Dudley, 24 with n. 8) that Themistius misunderstands this passage. For if we accept that the commentator’s use of gignesthai covers events, which Dudley rightly says are intended here, then while his examples may be undeveloped, they do seem compatible with the category of events with no purpose and do not compromise Aristotle’s claim that no substance comes to be without a purpose. 579. 50,20-1: Arist. 196b18-19, a further distinction among things that have a purpose, between those that are and those that are not choice-based, is omitted; see on 50,26-7 below. 580. 50,21-2: at 50,22 after anameinai supply men to anticipate nun de, and replace the colon after boulomai with a comma, and the stop after touto with a colon. 581. 50,22: for anathemenois read anathesthai. Clearly a second infinitive is needed after boulomai to balance anameinai, and since anatithesthai can be used to mean to communicate, or in rare cases to replace something (see LSJ B.I.2 and B.II.1), it should be construed as a further expression of the author’s intention. I prefer this change to either of the emendations proposed by Spengel and Schenkl. 582. 50,26-7: Themistius is acknowledging that he has omitted comment on Arist. 196b18-19, where things that happen for a purpose are divided into those that are, and those that are not, ‘based on choice’ (kata proairesin). In his comment on 196b21-4 he does link choice with actions performed ‘by thought’ (apo dianoias) (see 51,13 and 16) in contrast with events that occur by nature. 583. 50,28a: after hôsautôs supply aei (cf. 50,7 above). 584. 50,28b: for ouk read oud’ (MS L). 585. 51,1-2: the use of the generic ‘come about’ (ginetai) here avoids the more challenging expression of this distinction at Arist. 196b21-2 (‘whatever might have been done [an prakhtheiê] by thought or by nature is for a purpose’). The importance of retaining this counter-factual proposition in interpreting Aristotle’s claim that luck is to be classified with things that occur for a purpose is argued by Lennox (2). This text must be the source of the report by Ross (2), app. crit. ad 196b22, that Themistius’ paraphrase supports the use of the indicative prakhthêi, advocated by Torstrick and endorsed by Irwin, 520 n. 13, though without reference to Lennox. Lennox (2), 53 associates Themistius with the other ancient commentators whom he cites as endorsing the received text. 586. 51,9-12: Themistius inserts these two examples of his own to explain the notion of a coincidence introduced at 196b23-4 without illustration; he does not wait for the upcoming example (at 196b26-9) of a house-builder being a per se and incidental cause in different respects. 587. 51,13-14: after hautên delete the colon and bracket ou – katênekhthê, a parenthetical explanation of why the cause in question does not operate on its own terms. 588. 51,15: ‘incidentally’ (kata sumbebêkos). Others have used ‘coincidentally’ (Waterfield), ‘accidentally’ (Apostle), ‘concurrently’ (Charlton), and per accidens (Fleet). I have used ‘incidentally’ for this phrase, even when, as in the present case and others in this chapter, we could say in English that two events,

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such as the tile’s falling and the person passing by, were co-incidental. But coincidences are a subset of things that need a less specific generic term, and ‘incidentals’ can, I hope, serve the purpose. Clearly some incidentals are not co-incidentals: a house builder is not coincidentally white just because he is not per se white; but he is incidentally white in the sense he might have been another colour (which is quite different from ‘he might not have been hit by the tile’). Thus the next paragraph identifies incidental causes as per se causes that are, under certain conditions, re-described as incidental, whereas an incidental property such as white could not in principle be re-described as per se. 589. 51,17: see 51,2-3 above (= 196b21-2). 590. 52,8: see 51,15-20 above (= 196b29-33). 591. 52,9-10: cf. 25,33-4 and 58,13 above for other instances of revision being justified. 592. 52,10: before tinos supply allou; cf. allou tinos at 52,6. 593. 52,12: unlike Arist. 196b33-6, Themistius specifies the purpose that was supplanted by a lucky event. 594. 52,13: Arist. 196b3, as printed in Ross’s edition (see also his note on 196b33-197a5), conveys a situation in which X stumbles on debtor Y as he is receiving payment from an unspecified Z when he is taking up a collection or subscription (an eranos). So Y has Z’s money which X then acquires, and since X is the one who has now received payment, the verb komizesthai used initially of Y’s being paid by Z (52,13) then applies to X’s being paid by Y (52,20-1 and 52,25). The fact that this verb is not repeated in the Aristotelian text has led to it being taken to describe a situation in which X is taking up a subscription and runs into Y from whom he elicits a contribution: this involves komizomenos being read for komizomenou at 196b34 with some Aristotelian manuscripts, as also by a corrector of one of the Themistian manuscripts. But Themistius’ paraphrase precludes this possibility. 595. 52,25-6: the verb apantân (25) takes the dative of the thing that is encountered or that complements it, and so I have emended to to tôi (dative singular) before the three articular infinitives in these lines that complement ‘going out’, i.e., those before komisasthai, plêgênai and theasasthai. 596. 53,5-7: to make the contrasting clauses (men/de, 53,5-6) clearer place the illustrative clauses in brackets: i.e., delete the comma after aition (5), bracket hoion – oikias (6), delete the colon after ou (6), and bracket ouketi – mousikos. 597. 53,9: for theasamenos read theasomenos, Spengel’s proposal anticipated by the second hand in MS M. 598. 53,9-10: for ta read ta (10) and for legei read legeis. A reference is needed to the incidental causes identified in the preceding sentence to reflect Arist. 197a10-11. There it is said that there is a sense in which nothing happens by luck just because the relevant causes are indeterminate and so not really causes at all. Themistius makes the different claim that if these were causes per se, then nothing could happen by luck. men (53,9) has to balance de (53,10), and so there should be a comma rather than a stop between tukhês and paralogon. MS WBL have a balancing clause, ‘but if incidental [causes] were admitted, then something would also happen by luck’, but this may be an explicatory emendation based on Arist. 197a12, as Schenkl argues. 599. 53,13-14: see Arist. Phys. 2.3, 195a33-4, slightly adapted here; ad loc. Themistius (45,2-9) used the example of a doctor. 600. 53,15-16: Arist.197a23 cites the wind and sun-bathing as relatively remote causes of health and asks whether in that case a hair-cut may not qualify too, and notes that some causes are more remote than others. Themistius adds

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the case of the shaven head being ‘ventilated’ (presumably through perspiration) perhaps to allow him to identify the wind as the proximate cause of health. Cf. ps.-Arist. Probl. 5.34, where the rarefaction of the flesh is mentioned as a cause of health in connection with locations where fresh air is available, and where sun-bathing is deprecated for making the flesh dense. 601. 53,22-3: see above 51,25 (196b28-9), 52,5-6, and 52,27-8. 602. 53,26: after phaulon replace the stop with a comma. 603. 54,3: literally ‘within a little’ (para mikron), or ‘within a hair’s breath’ (Hardie/Gaye), a miniscule distance to a final state; cf. Themist. in Phys. 207,32 where he uses the phrase to describe the situation in a sorites argument where a final state is always being postponed by a small amount needed to complete a whole; see Todd (11), 133 n. 536. 604. 54,3-4: the words in angle brackets do not constitute an emendation, but are present in manuscripts that Schenkl considered derivative; hence he represents them as a scribal conjecture. 605. Arist. 197a32-5, a repetitive summary, is omitted. 606. 54,7-8: see 51,15-20 above. 607. 54,11: delete the comma between estin and hois (cf. the text at Ross [2] 197b1), and before hois supply en (Philop. in Phys. 284,25); cf. en at 54,8. 608. 54,13: this reference, also at Simpl. in Phys. 345,23, may, as editors suggest, reflect Arist. NE 1.2, 1094a18-20, but there the point is made within a conditional; perhaps this is a more general reference to the discussion of choice (proairesis) at NE 3.2-3. 609. 54,15: for oute read oude. 610. 54,19-21 is an expansion of Arist. 197b9-11. Protarchus was associated with Gorgias (Plato Phil. 58a7-8), and can thus be dated to the late fifth or early fourth centuries. 611. 54,20: for eis touto read eis tauta, given that altars and statues form the plural antecedent. 612. 54,23-5: the Thessalian tyrant of legend, Jason of Pherae, was nicknamed ‘the Thessalian Prometheus’; this anecdote about a bungled assassination attempt that had constructive lumpectomic consequences can also be found at Cicero, de Natura Deorum 3.28.70; Pliny, Naturalis Historia 7.49.166; Plutarch, de capienda ex inimicis utilitate 89C; and Valerius Maximus 1.8 ext. 6. Guldentops (1), 327 n. 61 cites only Plutarch. 613. 54,25: for epei read ei with the optative proskunoito. 614. 54,26-7: tois allois tôn zôiôn alogois] delete allois and read alogois tôn zôiôn (MS L). Arist. 197b14-15 has tois allois zoiois, which means by implication ‘non-rational animals’. It is uncertain whether Themistius paraphrased this as tois alogois tôn zôiôn, or whether he followed Aristotle but a later scribe inserted alogois as a gloss, which then entered the text as a gratuitous duplication of allois. 615. 55,3: for ou read oude. 616. 55,3: the tripod could be held by someone and dropped onto the floor, or as Lacey, 176 n. 630, envisages, knocked down a flight of stairs; either way there is no necessity that it land on its three legs rather than on its side, as opposed to its necessarily falling down because of being heavy and having to occupy its proper place (Simpl. in Phys. 347,10). 617. 55,15: for to telos (MS M) read ta telê (MSS WBL). 618. 55,16-17: since Themistius is closely following the admittedly awkward Arist. 197b25-7, Schenkl’s text should be adjusted and hôs toutou huparkhontos replaced with hôs touto huparkhon, with to supplied next before matên (both proposed by Spengel); also, place a comma after matên.

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619. 55,18: for ê read kai (Arist. 197b27). 620. 55,17: delete ti (MS L). 621. 55,19: for houtô de read houtô dê to align the text (Spengel ex Arist. 197b29). 622. 55,20: the (spurious) etymological point here is lost unless Arist. 197b29-30 is precisely reflected, as Spengel recognized, and so add auto before matên to create this (untranslatable) link between the two words. 623. 55,19-20: the force of auto (see previous note) is to make the source of ‘spontaneous’ an expression that we can gloss as ‘inherently pointless’, or an act the pointlessness of which is self-contained. Thus a bath is not pointless if taken to cleanse the body, but is so if taken to try and cause an eclipse. 624. 55,20-56,15: this section is a response to the compressed example at Arist. 197b30-2 in which a falling stone is said to have hit someone spontaneously because it was not thrown with that intention. The content of this case is put into a wider context. 625. 55,23: before matên add to; cf. the corresponding substantive form to apo tautomatou at 55,24. 626. 56,2: see 52,22 above and cf. Alexander ap. Simpl. in Phys. 349,14-35. 627. 56,11-12: the true cause of the falling tile was its weight and its inherent end was a return to its natural place. But the incidental end of striking a pedestrian mimicked the authentic end applicable to someone aiming a missile at a pedestrian. 628. 56,14-15: see 54,9-13 above. The falling tile could be an outcome of luck if, instead of just coming loose, the tiles on a roof were being cleared for re-roofing and intended to fall to the ground harmlessly. The roofer was not aiming them at anything or anybody but just letting them fall naturally under their own weight. It was his bad luck that one hit a pedestrian of whose presence he was unaware. 629. 56,16: Ross (2), 524 rejects Themistius’ example, since monstrosities (terata) are not an end-like result; see, however, Dudley, 154-5 for the argument that monstrosities can occur by luck, as a by-product of a teleological process. Ross goes on to cite Arist. Metaph. 1032a28-32 (see also Ross [1] on Metaph. 1032a29) and claims that spontaneous generation is the appropriate biological example here for internally caused spontaneity, but scholars disagree on whether the present analysis of spontaneity can be applied to spontaneous generation. See Henry, 184 n. 1, in the context of an article that highlights Themistius’ criticism in his paraphrase of Metaph. 12 of Aristotle’s treatment of spontaneous generation. 630. 56,18: after autois delete the colon and for gar read dia. 631. 56,17-19: the objection introduced suggests that biological mishaps are internally caused and therefore not spontaneous. Themistius concedes that internal causation is part of the story but is not what makes something spontaneous. That requires external conditions (the explicit reference to external causation at Arist. 197b36 is not reproduced), such as those that cause a stone to strike someone rather than just fall. Things that happen contrary to nature, on the other hand, have internal causes yet are spontaneous in the sense that they fail to achieve their ends. Lennox (1), 240 n. 32 points to 2.8, 199b1-7 below for this as a definition of monstrosities, but Themistius has already opened up the issue at 37,8-10 above. 632. 56,21: see 56,13-14 above. 633. 56,26: before tukhês supply apo. 634. 56,25-7: replace the colon after heuren (25) with a stop, delete the colon after heurêsis (26), and bracket oruxeie – elpizôn (26-7).

154

Notes to pages 70-71

635. 57,9: see Phys. 2.3 above, in particular 194b23-195a3 (Themist. 44,11-45,2). 636. 57,10: ‘definition’ (horismos) replaces Aristotle’s ‘the [question] “what is it?”’ (to ti estin, 198a16). 637. 57,11-12: see Euclid, Elements, df. 15. 638. 57,14: during the Third Sacred War of the fourth century BC the Phocians led by Philomelus seized Delphi and despoiled parts of the temple before being attacked by a force that included the Thebans; see Buckler, 25-6. Here the ‘first cause’ of movement is specifically anger as the desire for revenge; cf. the analysis of desire and practical reasoning as the causes of movement at Arist. DA 3.10, 433a9-26, and on revenge see DA 1.1, 403a30-1 (cf. on 66,16-17 below). 639. 57,15: after heneken supply hoion (cf. 57,11, 14 and 17) (Schenkl). 640. 57,15-16: on Xerxes’ imperialistic aspirations in the early fifth century BC see Herodotus 7.8. For the same general example see Arist. An. Post. 2.11, 94a36-b7 (Themist. In An. Post. 53,29-31), though there Xerxes is said to have attacked in revenge for the Athenians’ sacking of Sardis, not just for the hegemony that Themistius, in line with 198a19-20, mentions here. 641. 57,18: after apodôsei remove the stop. This versatile verb can in the right context essentially mean to provide the answer to a question. Cf. Arist. Cat. 2b8-10 where it is similarly followed by a direct question, and might (pace Ackrill) be translated: ‘If one is to answer the question “what is the primary substance?”, one will do so more accessibly and appropriately by responding with the species than the genus’. 642. 57,18-21: here Themistius (probably following Alexander; cf. Simpl. in Phys. 362, 7-10 for the same example) uses a single illustration for all the causes, but with reference to natural change; Alex. Fat. 167,2-12 drew on artificial change to use what would later become the paradigmatic illustration of the four causes, that of the sculptor’s creation of a statue; see Todd (2). In that example the productive, or efficient, cause is more plausibly identified as the sculptor at work; in the present case the departure of the soul at death would seem to be productive only if the agent commits suicide. 643. 57,23-4: for the soul combining the roles of productive, formal and final cause see Arist. DA 2.1, 412b11-17, where (DA 412a27-8) entelekheia, which etymologically incorporates telos (‘end’) into the definition of the soul as the first entelechy of a natural body having life potentially, is used. 644. 57,24: after anthrôpon supply gennâi and before autos supply ho (following Arist. 198a27, as did MS. L). Schenkl posited a lacuna after anthrôpon for which he thought that the missing words might have been those found at Simpl. in Phys. 364,11, which would then have to be substituted for autos – gennômenôi (Themist. 57,24-5) to read: ‘and the father is the cause for what is brought to birth through being identical with it in accordance with the form’. Themistius’ claim is that the soul, which Aristotle does not mention, may in general terms be a productive cause ‘in the same way’ (homoiôs) as the end and the form, while in animal generation that cause is identical in form with what is generated, a point that can be made without the Simplician additions. Arist. 198a26-7 just uses animal generation as an explanatory illustration (cf. gar at 198a27) of the identity of the original source of change with the form. 645. 57,26-58,13: after ginomenois replace the comma with a stop so that the next statement restricts the discussion to natural science in keeping with Arist. 198a28-31, which is paraphrased next, since Themistius has rearranged the order of the Aristotelian as follows: 198a31-5 (57,26-58,4), 198a28-31 (58,4-9), and 198a35-b3 (58,9-12). 646. 58,3: cf. 42,24-5 above and 60,14-23 (ad 199a8-12) below.

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647. 58,9: Arist. 198b3-5 is omitted; its references to form and purpose are integrated into items (iii) and (iv) in the next paragraph. 648. 58,6: before phusikos add ho. 649. 58,11: for pantelês read pantelôs, as Spengel suggested in light of Arist. 198b2. 650. 58,11-12: Ross (2) ad Arist. 198b2 deletes to before prôton, but the phrase can be taken as an explication. On the first cause of change see Arist. Phys. 8.6, 259b32-260a10 with Themist. In Phys. 224,25-225,4. 651. 58,13: cf. 47,2-4 above. 652. 58,14: Simplic. in Phys. 368,21-2 gives as an example a configuration of the moon that invariably produces moonlight. See also on 50,7 above. 653. 58,19: see 57,21-2 above, based on Arist. 198a25-6. 654. 58,21-2: these opening words follow Arist. 198b8-9 closely. For Simplicius, in Phys. 369,7-14 ‘each thing’s nature’, as he puts it, is best exemplified by the parts of animals, and in fact he adds a general reference to Aristotle’s de Partibus Animalium. Themistius seems to regard the text as applying to all natural things, not just the parts of an organism, as does Furley (2), 119. 655. 58,23: for all’ hama read all’ hen. 656. 58,25: for ê allôs read kai mê allôs; cf. 58,21 above. 657. 59,1-4: for the same contrast with geometrical objects see Alexander ap. Simpl. in Phys. 367,34-368,4. Cf. 57,11-13 above where the radii of a circle being equal is explained solely in terms of the geometrical forms involved. Also cf. 40,20-1 and 41,8-10 above where Themistius emphasizes that mathematical activity is autonomous in dealing with geometrical objects separately from matter and motion. Simpl. in Phys. 368,4-7 raises the question of whether purpose can be similarly identified for geometrical and natural objects if we focus on potentiality, by which he presumably means that one geometrical shape is potentially another so that its potential shape is, as he says, ‘its own’ (oikeion, 368,6-7), i.e., its end, in the same way as it would be for a developing biological entity. Fleet, 184 n. 370, thinks that Simplicius is still maintaining that geometrical forms have no end. 658. 59,3: for tôi tetragônôi de read tôi de tetragonôi (Alex. ap. Simpl. in Phys. 368,4). 659. 59,5-6: see 42,20-6 (incorporating Arist. 194a27-8), 50,18-19, 51,17-18, 57,22-3, 58,20-1 (reflecting Arist. 198b3-5). 660. 59,6-7: this is the agenda for the next chapter. The text here needs the markers ‘first’ and ‘second’ for these two topics, as at Arist. 198b10-11. 661. 59,11: for tode read tadi (Arist. 198b14) or perhaps tode; a plural form is certainly needed. 662. 59,14: by inserting ‘they say’ Themistius makes it clear that he attributes this non-teleological analysis to Aristotle’s opponents, not to Aristotle himself, and that he wants to distance the archaic expression ‘Zeus rains’ found in Homer and Hesiod (Furley [2], 116) and perhaps reflected in Attic religion (Sedley, 185); hence my quotation marks. Furley endorses Themistius’ position against some modern commentators and from the ancient commentators cites Simpl. in Phys. 374,18ff. [= 18-22], though it is at in Phys. 370,28-33 that Simplicius notes that Aristotle is presenting his opponents’ position. Themistius was probably following Alexander. 663. 59,14-15: on the mechanics of rain see Arist. Meteor. 1.9, and its use in an analogy at Arist. PA 2.7, 653a2-8. 664. 59,26: before epitedeiôs ekhein add hôste to create a parallel with the sequence houtôs sumpiptei hôste in the next line. Here hôste is anticipated by toiautên.

156

Notes to pages 72-74

665. 59,26: see Arist. PA 674b9 for this language, sc. ergasia trophês. 666. 59,28: after Empedoklês supply legei (Arist. 198b32); for the phrase in quotation marks see Empedocles at DK 31B61, line 2 (cited ad loc. at Simpl. in Phys. 372,1). Here and at 62,3 and 62,8-9 below I am ignoring the conjunction ‘and’ in the Themistian texts between ‘ox-progeny’ and ‘man-faced’, since they are juxtaposed in the Empedoclean quotation. Simplicius omits ‘and’ in his later citation (in Phys. 381,3-4) 667. 60,1-3: delete the colon after homoiôs (60,1), bracket anthrôpos – houtôs (2-3), and replace the stop after houtôs with a comma. 668. 60,6: after spaniôs delete the colon and bracket tote – kheimôni; on the anomalies in this parenthesis see on 50,13-14 above. 669. 60,4-6: see 51,20-6 above ad Arist. 196b24-9. 670. 60,9-14: see Sourcebook vol. 2, 86 for a translation of these lines, which are Themistius’ supplement. 671. 60,9: for huei to read huetô (Diels); see also on 59,14 above. 672. 60,12-13: this might be a reference to the (for us) pseudo-Aristotelian treatise de Mundo, in which the general teleological and providential aspects of nature are strongly emphasized, with rain discussed in similarly general terms at 394a26-32, with ‘we’ used here because Themistius is speaking in Aristotle’s voice. Alexander of Aphrodisias may have drawn on the de Mundo in developing his theory of natural providence, notably in his quaest. 2.3; see Sharples (2), 93 n. 307. 673. 60,30: this illustration is introduced abruptly. Simplicius precedes it with hoion (in Phys. 378,8) while I have added it before hugeian. With Fleet I take sarkôseis to mean ‘fleshing out’ through increased body weight, though ‘by drugs’ raises the possibility of the term covering an outgrowth, such as a wart. 674. 61,2-3: Arist. 199a17-18 precedes this sentence with ‘So if what is in accordance with art is for the sake of something, clearly so too is what is in accordance with nature’, reflected at Simpl. in Phys. 378,11-12. Spengel thought that this might have been lost from Themistius’ text. I have emended kat’ amphoteras to kat’ amphotera (cf. 61,25 below where the neuter applies to art and nature) and glossed it. 675. 61,5-7: see Arist. HA 9.7, 612b21-5, of which these lines may be an epitome, or, more likely, as with the next two references to birds, inherited from an earlier commentary; they closely resemble Simpl. in Phys. 379,8-12. 676. 61,8: see Arist. HA 5.23, 554b26 on this shape for bee-hives and cf. Simpl. in Phys. 379,12-13. 677. 61,8-9: on the impermeability of the kingfisher’s nest see Arist. HA 9.14, 616a29 and cf. Simpl. in Phys. 379,14-15. 678. 61,9: to logoeidês, ‘rationality’, is not used by Aristotle (it may be modelled on to logistikon, the term Plato employed for the reasoning part of the soul in the Republic; e.g., 439D5-6), and not found before the first century BC, but often used in later commentaries on Aristotle’s de Anima. 679. 61,18-19: Themistius’ insertion (influenced by Alexander; see Simpl. in Phys. 380,12-16), anticipating remarks on the reliance of early philosophers on material causation in the discussion of 2.9; see 63,17-23. 680. 61,28-9: on the relation between the weakness of matter and evil see Themist. on Phys. 1.9 at 33,6-8 above with the note on 33,7. 681. 61,30: see on 37,9 above. 682. 61,30-62,2: compare the examples in this sentence, none of which are used by Aristotle, with 49,24-6 above (ad 196a31-3) where regularity in natural generation is a counter-example to the claim that luck governs the natural world. The progression male-female-animal-flesh is a summary version of

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Aristotle’s account of how monstrosities are generated; see GA 4.3, 769b7-10. The point is that the failure is within a process that has a high rate of success and that relapsing still preserves a biological identity definable with reference to an originative principle. 683. 62,1: in this example the issue should be that fig seeds produce figs, not a kenkhros, usually rendered ‘millet seed’, but also a standard illustration of a miniscule entity. Continuity of species, however, rather than size is relevant here. Simpl. in Phys. 381,1-3 refers to a fig-tree, but in a more compressed version of these illustrations. 684. 62,2: this disjunction may be a gloss; the standard word for olive tree (elaia) is used first, and this alternative, which is used for a wild olive tree, may have been added later out of pedantry. 685. 62,8-9: see on 59,28 above. 686. 62,9-10: see 45,24 above for the male sperm as the principle of change. Arist. 199b6-7 describes these conditions as created by ‘a principle deteriorating, as in fact with the sperm’; Themistius rephrases this as ‘with the sperm weakening’ followed by the Aristotelian language in the more general statement regarding the deteriorating source. The implication here is that the male sperm becomes the embryo which it renders defective because of its own weakness, a position different from that adopted in the maturer biology of Aristotle’s de Generatione Animalium (1.22), where the male semen does not extend that far; see further Dudley, 142-3 drawing on Balme, 95-6 on this and related passages. 687. 62,11: for this term see Empedocles at DK 31B62, line 4, partially quoted at Arist. 199b9. 688. 62,19: see Phys. 2.5 above; see especially the summary at 52,28-53,2 (ad Arist. 197a5-8). 689. 62,20: for katorthountai (MSS MWB) read katorthoutai (MS L). 690. 63,2: the manuscripts have just the letters alpha and beta here but, as a reader noted, this would seem to be an abbreviated way of referring to the whole alphabet, for which the rare noun alphabêtos exists. 691. 63,5: delete ho huphantês, ho laoxoos. These two experts (weaver, stone-cutter) almost certainly entered the text in this syntactically unacceptable form from a marginal note identifying other non-deliberative artisanal activities. 692. 63,9: before thômen supply to create the required protasis corresponding to the one in the counter-factual at Arist. 199b28-9. 693. 63,13-14: Themistius’s conclusion, substituted for Arist. 199b32-3, ‘So it is clear that nature is a cause and as such one with a purpose’. 694. 63,16: for haplôn read haplôs (cf. later 64,29-30). hepesthai needs to be so qualified, since throughout this chapter it identifies a consequence to which no other conditions attach; to say that ‘B is a consequence of A’ would not necessarily mean that A is the only condition for B. 695. 63,17-18: before tais delete en; the phrase tais tês hulês kinêsesin has to have the same relation to hepesthai as tois pro autou genomenois (63,17; cf. also 64,3-4, 14-15 and 25-6 below) to point up the transition here from necessitation in general to its being derived from qualitative changes in the material principles, as in the systems of the early ‘natural scientists’ (phusikoi). This framework is imposed on Aristotle’s question (199b34-5) ‘Does necessity exist conditionally (ex hupotheseôs) or also without qualification [i.e., unconditionally]’. That question may be problematical (see Cooper, 265-6), but not for Themistius, who postpones the discussion of conditional necessity until later (see 64,30 and 65,1 below), while introducing matter here ahead of Aristotle’s reference to the necessity in matter at 200a14.

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Notes to pages 76-77

696. 63,21: for keisthai read kineisthai (as Spengel conjectured). Cf. pheresthai in the parallel example at 63,24 below and cf. Arist. 200a2-3. If keisthai were the correct reading here, it would be complemented not by katô and anô but by en tôi katô/ anô. 697. 63,20-2: this example creates a claim about the structure of the cosmos that is not in the source text, where earth is mentioned at 200a4 only as an intermediary stratum in the construction of a wall, located between stone foundations and wooden planks. Themistius’ wall, by contrast, has only two strata. 698. 63,23: given Arist. 200a1-2, the infinitive to be supplied after ton toikhon is gegenêsthai. 699. 63,25: pesontôn is problematical since to describe the foundation-stones as “falling downwards” would make it impossible for the verb to be understood with anô in the next clause. I have read kinoumenôn, which is consistent with the use of verbs of motion elsewhere in this context. I suspect that pesontôn was a gloss that while certainly fitting the case of the stones undermines the ellipse that immediately follows. 700. 63,26-7: embrontêtos, lit. ‘a thunder-struck person’; used at Ps.-Plat. Alc. II, 140c8, probably Themistius’ source. 701. 63,27: for oukh read ou gar. The letter khi at the end of this word was originally a compendium for gar. 702. 64,1: for di’ autên read di’ hautên; cf. 64,18 below. 703. 64,2: matter is a cause per se (kath’ hauto) as one of the ‘ultimate’ answers to the question of why something is what it is; see 57,9-10 and 16-17 above. 704. 64,3: for touto read tauta to pick up on kuriôtera, taken as a neuter plural. MS. L saw the problem here and read kuriôteron to correspond to touto. 705. 64,14: for panti read pantêi. 706. 64,15: ‘but as it is’ (nun de) probably has to be taken in the sense of ‘as it is in the Aristotelian text’, since while the examples of the cloak and the shoes illustrate Aristotle’s ‘other things’ (200a7) in which matter is necessary without defining their purpose, whereas the example of the saw’s relation to iron is Aristotle’s own (see 200a10-13). 707. 64,15: before hupokeisthai supply khrê; cf. 61,11 above. 708. 64,21-2: that is, assume that the end is not necessitated by matter, and then the necessitation associated with the latter does follow. This is building up to the definition of that necessity as conditional at 64,30 (= 200a13). 709. 64,27: cf. Phys. 2.1 above, especially Arist. 193a30-b8, with Themist. 38,19-39,17. 710. 64,30-1: this is Themistius’ insertion, emphasizing that ex hupotheseôs (‘conditionally’, or ‘hypothetically’ as it is sometimes translated) is a technical term for Aristotle, contrasted in various contexts with haplôs (‘without qualification’); see Bekker, Index Aristotelicus 797a34-51. 711. 65,1: Arist. 200a15 just says that ‘necessity’ (to anankaion) is present in mathematics and illustrates this through inferences, without linking it with the conditional necessity, otherwise reserved for inferences from form or purpose back to matter. 712. 65,9: for tauta read tautêi (cf. 64,19). Spengel and Schenkl identified a problem with tauta, but their solutions involve supplements or more radical changes. 713. 65,16: before huparkhousin supply oukh, so that the conclusion drawn here can reproduce Arist. 200a21-2 (cf. Themist. 65,7-8) where it is said that ‘if the conclusion is not the case, the first-principle will not be the case’. Themistius

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interprets ‘not the case’ (the negation of the verb ‘to be’) as ‘not necessarily true’ so that huparkhousin at 65,16 has to be taken in this sense even though it is not modified. 714. 65,16: there is an elliptical transition at Arist. 200a22-3 to the claim that despite the contrast between matter and purpose in mathematics and natural generation, there is a fundamental similarity in their procedure of conducting inferences from premises, or first-principles. Not surprisingly 200a22-3 invites paraphrase from a translator; cf. Waterfield’s ‘The point is that the end is also an originating principle’. Themistius is right to see the issue as that of the sequence (taxis) in which reasoning proceeds. 715. 65,20: for taxis read praxis (Spengel). Schenkl’s defence of taxis is unconvincing. 716. 65,26: for apephênen read pephênen (Diels). 717. 66, 2-3: this reference (= Arist. 200a32-3) is to the discussion of the natural scientist in Phys. 2.2 above; see especially Themist. 40,30-41,3. 718. 66,4: see above 2.3, 57,21-3 on Arist. 198a23-5. 719. 66,6: after epei supply ei ; cf. eiper (66,7) introducing the coordinating clause. 720. 66,8: after the first tadi place a comma. 721. 66,9: this statement has no Aristotelian source and presumably refers to imperfectly constructed artifacts that thwart their own purpose (e.g., a house built so badly that it fails to provide cover or security), rather than implying that there are artifacts that, like the mathematical truths discussed at 58,27-59,4, can have a form for which a purpose cannot in principle be defined. Every artefact has to have at least an ostensible purpose, even if it is not always realized. 722. 66,11-12: before tôn phusei supply ti as an object for lambanois. 723. 66,12: another reference (cf. 66,2-3 above and 66,17 below) to Phys. 2.2; cf. 194b8-13 with Themist. 43,26-44,4 above. 724. 66,15: for duantai read dunamei (Paul Shorey’s emendation, reflecting Simpl. in Phys. 392,10), with the verb ‘to be’ understood. 725. 66,16-17: this question and answer (ti – antilupêseôs), which I have transposed to follow epilogismou tinos in an illustrative parenthesis (on which see the next note), are based on Arist. DA 403a30-1 (cf. Themist. in DA 7,23-33 with Todd [7], 157 n. 47) where the natural scientist (cf. 66,2-3 and 12) and dialectician are contrasted, with the former focussing on forms that are ‘based in matter’ (enula). The same example of hylomorphic linkage is used by Simplicius (in Phys. 393,7-12) and Philoponus (in Phys. 338,6-10), and the general point about matter being included in an account of a natural thing’s definition is also accepted by some modern commentators. Cooper, 254 n. 11, however, challenges this reading by arguing that the reference to matter occurs only because essential parts are defined by the form and so matter is introduced only in light of this more limited aspect. He notes that the matter of the saw is cited not because this is a saw but because it has teeth of a certain kind (Arist. 200b6, omitted by Themistius) that require matter. 726. 66,15-17: this distinction must be a response to the example of the saw at Arist. 200b5-7 where the process of reasoning is: (i) sawing is a special type of division; (ii) such division requires a special type of teeth; (iii) these teeth must be made of iron. Therefore the definition of the particular saw involved here is one that includes reference to iron. This is the epilogismos, the reasoning or ‘scrutiny’ (exetazein, 66,13) after the fact, which identifies iron as potentially a saw, or the boiling blood as the material basis for anger, as opposed to the case where matter is actually and self-evidently present; e.g., no reasoning is re-

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quired to link a paperweight with the lead that forms its matter, or a walkingstick with its wood, whereas anger requires analysis to link it with boiling blood. 727. 67,1: cf. Phys. 2.1, 192b20-3 (Themist. 36,22-4) and 192b32-3 (Themist. 36,22-4). ‘Change’ (kinêsis) and ‘transformation’ (metabolê) will later be distinguished, with the genus metabolê covering the coming to be and ceasing to be of substances, while change (kinêsis) is the species applying only to the other categories; see, for example, Phys. 5.1, 225a34-b5 with Themist. 169,23-8, and cf. Lautner, 145-6. 728. 67,8: see Phys. 4.10, 219a10-14 with Themist. 145,19-146,12. 729. 67,9-10: another definition is ‘that of which the extremities are one’; see Phys. 5.2, 227a10-12 and 5.4, 228a29-30. 730. 67,11-12: Simpl. in Phys. 396,20-34 has a more detailed discussion arising from a statement by Alexander (396,20-1) that the unlimited is integral to a definition of what is divisible. 731. 67,13-14: the supplement kai ho peri khronou after topou (67,13) is Schenkl’s based on its later insertion after kenou (67,14) in MS L. Also cf. Arist. 201b21 and khronos at 67,17 below (if the text is sound). 732. 67,14-16: Aristotle does not single out the void in this way, though translators are careful to modify 200b20-1 where it is said that ‘there cannot be change without place, void and time’ by saying ‘it is thought’ that this is the case because Aristotle rejected the void; see Ross (2), 359, Hussey and Apostle. Themistius’ association of the void with the natural scientists is pursued more fully at Simpl. in Phys. 396,34-397,6. 733. 67,17: for tauta read talla (= ta alla). The specification of these items in the abruptly introduced list hê kinêsis ho topos ho khronos seems unnecessary and it may well derived from a marginal gloss; cf. 73,12-13 below for a similar case. 734. 67,17-18: see Phys. 1.1, 184a21-6 (Themist. 2,3-18), Themistius’ reference back, not Aristotle’s. 735. 67,19: for legomen read legômen to complement the subsequent asyndeton. 736. 68,4-5: after topikên delete the colon and bracket ou gar – estin to match the parenthesis that Schenkl indicated at 68,3. Simpl. in Phys. 398,15-16 links this claim to the varying combinations of heavenly bodies. 737. 68,8: delete deuteron, perhaps originally a marginal explication of heteron after prôton (67,19). 738. 68,12-13: for ‘what can produce an effect’ (to poiêtikon) said to be relative to ‘what can be affected’ (to pathêtikon) see Arist. Metaph. 5.15, 1020b30; for the other items see Arist. Cat. 7, 6b19-22, and on the sources for this paragraph see Ross on 200b28-32. 739. 68,17-19: Arist. 201a8-9 below is being used here to emphasize that a definition of change must apply to different categories. 740. 68,20: genos (trans. ‘genus’ here) is not used in the Aristotelian text. For Themistius it refers to the putative super-genus for change, which has to be rejected, and then at 68,26 for the categories themselves with reference to which change has to be defined in different ways, as also at 69,5 (= 201a10) and 69,20.29.30. 741. 68,25: ta pragmata (Arist. 200b32-3) are ‘the various respects in which things may change’ (Ross [2] on 231b32), or ‘the circumstances of change’ (Waterfield). Themistius’ addition of ‘in which it exists’ makes this clear. 742. 68,31: for esti ti read esti te (MS L); cf. 39,14 for this same kind of conjunction. 743. 69,1: Arist. 201a7 specifies motion (phora) here and identifies its

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upward and downward directions. Themistius substitutes place, presumably to maintain consistency with the four categories listed in the previous paragraph; cf. 200b34 (= 68,20). 744. 69,5: see 67,19-68,8 above (on Arist. 200b25-8). 745. 69,7: for Ross (2), 537 entelekheia ‘must mean “actualization”, not “actuality”: it is the passage from potentiality to actuality that is kinêsis [‘change’]’. But Themistius’ analysis at 69,8-20, and his use of ‘road’ (hodos; 69,22-7) and ‘proceeding’ (lit. ‘traveling’ or ‘being en route’) (poreia/ poreuesthai; 70,5-13, cf. 72,9) to describe the changes listed at 201a11-15, does not precisely accord with Ross’s view, as Gill, 145 n. 2 claims. The idea developed in the next paragraph of change as an actualization in which potentiality is preserved, resembles more recent views (notably Kosman; see on 70,11-12 and 72,1-2 below) that change is incomplete but still an actuality; see Sourcebook, vol., 2, 63 and also on 69,8-20, 70,5-8 and 71,8 below. 746. 69,7: after dunamei delete kinêtou and replace it with ontos. Though paraphrasing, it is unlikely that Themistius would alter the received Aristotelian text to make this crucial definition viciously circular. The insertion of kinêtou can be assumed to be a gloss that was substituted for ontos. 747. 69,8-20: see Sourcebook 2, 63-4 where this passage is taken as embedded in Philop. in Phys. 342,15-343,3, which presents the distinction between the potentiality for the process of change into something and the realization of a potentiality in the completion of a process. 748. 69,16: after entelekheian remove the comma and place it after diaphulattei. For the same sense see Philop in Phys. 342,27-9 which closely follows this text. 749. 69,29-31: cf. 69,2-3, where ‘these things’ (tauta) refer collectively to the duality of substance, quantity, quality and place. They are now identified with the situations, the pragmata, in which they exist; see 68,25 above. 750. 69,31: after prodiôrismenôn replace the stop with a comma. 751. 70,4-5: the parallel examples of increase and motion are substituted for Aristotle’s list at 201a18-19 of six processes of change (learning, healing, rolling, leaping, maturing and ageing). Themistius may be reflecting the discussion of change at Arist. Cael. 4.3, where the rare term ‘can be increased’ (auxêtikon) occurs at 310a28; see 310a28-31 where the three changes mentioned here (alteration, increase and motion) are conjoined in an analysis of the conditions for their implementation. 752. 70,5-8: this passage is quoted from Alexander (ap. Simpl. in Phys. 416,27-31), Themistius’ source. Gill, 145 n. 2 cites only Themistius (70,8) and Philoponus (in Phys. 351,12) among ancient commentators who see change as an entelekheia that is an actualization; see on 69,7 above. 753. 70,11-12: for tosautên (MSS MWB) (11) read toiautên (MS L), and delete the stop after entelekheia, bracket the question pôs – entelekheia and after entelekheia (70,12) place a stop. Cf. Themistius’ metaphor of travel with Kosman, 53: ‘situated in Philadelphia I am only potentially a potential inhabitant of Berkeley, whereas motoring through [somewhere en route] on a pilgrimage from Philadelphia to Berkeley, I am actually a potential inhabitant of Berkeley. And so my journey to Berkeley is the constitutive actuality [= Themistius’ ‘incomplete actualization’] of my potentiality to be in Berkeley’ (Kosman’s italics). 754. 70,13: this is the first instance of energeia in this section. It can be used in the same sense as entelekheia to mean actualization (and when such it will be translated ‘actuality’). Here it distinguishes between change as an incomplete actualization that is nonetheless a complete activity rather than an incomplete one.

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755. 70,13-22: this long sentence has required considerable re-punctuation; I have not specified the details. 756. 70,31-2: this reference forward to Phys. 8 is clearer from Arist. 201a27 where he mentions that ‘there is something that produces change and is unchanging’, a topic discussed later in Phys. 8.5-6. 757. 70,33-71,1: Lautner, 151 n. 105 notes that this sentence does not correspond with the text of Arist. 201a27-9 that Simpl. in Phys. 422,19-21 attributes to Themistius as well as Aspasius. That is, Themistius contrasts potentiality and actuality, whereas the text of Aspasius, which corresponds to that in Ross’ edition, defines something’s change as ‘not insofar as it is [the thing] itself but insofar as it can be changed, i.e., insofar as it is potential’. Themistius, with his concept of purely potential prime matter in the background (see on 71,2-3 below), needs to isolate potentiality from change. 758. 71,2: for the first an read on (MS W), followed by a comma. 759. 71,2-3: the reference to matter (sc. prime matter) here and to the substrate (to hupokeimenon) at 71,12 below is an insertion designed to recall the distinction between the two developed in the earlier treatment of Phys. 1.7; see 25,24-27,13, and especially 25,37-26,7 on matter’s potentiality being non-relative (or per se unchangeable) and thus not applicable to change (cf. 27,4-12). 760. 71,8-9: after genesthai (8) place a stop and after estin (9) a comma. The new sentence at 71,8 (hê dê toutou) marks a transition signified by the independent use of dê as a connective (cf. 67,19 and 69,5 above), often with inferential force; see Denniston, 237-40. 761. 71,8: the Greek here, to andrianti genesthai is a definition of the essence of change, modeled on the expressions to X (in the dative case) einai. Since the infinitive is aorist it arguably shows that Themistius is representing the generation of a statue as the actuality of the potentiality ‘to have become’ such an artifact, or, as Waterlow, 115 n. 20, who cites Themist. 70,33-71,5 as well as Simpl. in Phys. 414,1-6, puts it, ‘to be in the end-state’. Contra Heinaman, 30-1 with n. 15 (where Themistius is wrongly cited as 31,8-9 instead of 71,8-9). 762. 71,11: after andrianti delete the colon and bracket ên – tauton. 763. 71,18-24: in reacting to Arist. 201b4 Themistius addresses only the example of colour and visibility not being identical, and does not reproduce the definition of change as ‘the actuality of the potential qua potential’ that Aristotle builds onto it at 201b4-5. He leaves that until 75,3-4 in connection with a problem that leads into the second major definition of change. 764. 71,21: delete kai to horaton with Spengel, but retain ê before ho hoion te horathênai, which he wanted to delete, since here it introduces an explication. 765. 72,1-2: cf. Kosman, 53-4: ‘ bricks and stones lying about are only potentially buildable into a house or (odder still) are only potentially potentially a house  [building] is the constitutive actuality of the bricks and stones qua potentially a house.’ Cf. on 70,11-12 above. 766. 72,5: this ‘shape’ (morphê) is its final shape, i.e., its completed form. In English usage a house could have a shape well before being completely built. 767. 72,10-11: as has been noted (Schenkl ad 72,12; Ross ad 201b17) Themistius has omitted comment on 201b17-20 (kai – enioi) which may have been missing from his text. 768. 72,11: these ‘others’ were taken by Alexander and Simplicius to be the Pythagoreans (cf. Themist. at 72,28 below with Simpl. in Phys. 430,29-30) and Plato (cf. Alex. ap. Simpl. in Phys. 430,11-12), though Ross (2), 538-9 thought that the reference could be restricted to Plato. See Huffman, 509-12 on related evidence cited by Simpl. in Phys. 431,8-12 from Eudemus (= F60W) in connection with Archytas’ position on change.

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769. 72,16-27: see Alex. ap. Simpl. in Phys. 430,6-10 for the same argument. 770. 72,17: the reference of autôi in 72,17 is either the person or number in the preceding paragraph, or anything similar. 771. 72,23: for autôi read hautôi and after kineitai replace the comma with a stop. 772. 72,24: this interjection (cf. Alex. ap. Simpl. in Phys. 430,10-11) is an attempt to rationalize the claim under examination by using a term that unequivocally refers to a process of change (heteroiôsis), to which Themistius’ response is that it depends on what kind of change is involved; the mere fact that it is a process tells us nothing. 773. 72,27: after hêmin for de read men, and after kinêseôs replace the stop with a comma. 774. 72,28: see on 72,11 above. 775. 73,2: for doxeie read doxeien. 776. 73,12-13: hê heterotês hê anisotês to mê on seems to be a gratuitous clarification, but may not emanate from a gloss simply because it lacks the conjunctions used when these terms are mentioned in the previous clause (73,10) and earlier (72,11-12). 777. 73,16-17: this sentence is not complemented by a table of the ten opposites (cf. Simpl. in Phys. 429,7-18 based on Arist. Metaph. 1.5, 986a22-6 where it appears in his account of the Pythagoreans) in all the extant Themistian manuscripts, only in MS L and in the margin of MS B. 778. 73,20-1: cf. 69,5-6 above and see Alexander ap. Simpl. in Phys. 434,33-5. 779. 74,3: for oute read oude. 780. 74,11-23: this paragraph recapitulates 69,5-70,13 above, on Arist. 201a9-19, but the term energeia is used here instead of entelekheia to mean ‘actualization’. 781. 74,12-15: after phusin delete the comma and bracket hoion – houtôs. 782. 74,17-19: Arist. GA 2.6, 743a32-744b11 describes the formation of the eye in the womb, which occurred late in gestation after the formation of the brain. The prolonged period of physiological change before the eye is brought to completion (744a21-2) is certainly one during which it would have to preserve its potentiality. However, the term periagôgê (74,18), which must refer to the rounding, or globular formation, of the eye-ball, is not used for this process, nor is there any reference to the eyeball. Cf. also Arist. DA 2.1, 413a2-3 for the eye defined in an analogy with the soul/body relation as the combination of the eyeball and seeing, with seeing, as in this passage, the actuality of the former. 783. 74,30: before kai antipaskhei delete dia touto oun, clearly a dittograph for this phrase before anitkineitai, after which the stop should be removed. 784. 75,1: for paskhein read antipaskhein (MS L; Philop. in Phys. 367,26). 785. 75,3-4: the definition given at 202a7-8 and revised at 75,21 below [= (D2)] is ‘change is the actualization of what can be changed insofar as it can be changed’ but here Themistius has generalized it on the basis of 201b4-5, which he ignored ad loc., into ‘the actualization of what is potential insofar as it is potential’ to lead into his solution of the aporia that relational changes do not fit the definition of change since they are instantly actualized, without any ‘passage’ from potentiality to actuality. Cf. his later response to Aristotle’s denial that change occurs when relations change (Phys. 5.2, 225b11-13) at in Phys. 170,20-9; see Todd (11), 30. This means that he needs to operate (as here at 75,6-7) with a distinction between transformation (metabolê) and change (kinêsis), since transformation can cover the coming to be and ceasing to be of substances plus other changes, including the special case of relational change. The special status of relational change is articulated here in light of his response

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to 201a10-11 at 69,9-20 above, which allows him to show that instantaneous change excludes the preservation of potentiality. On the exegetical tradition (though not Themistius) on these issues see Sharples (4), 72-4 in connection with Theophrastus 153C FHSG. 786. 75,8: Arist. Phys. 5.2, 225b13 refers to such a relational change being ‘incidental’ (kata sumbebêkos), yet neither here nor in his comment on 225b1113 at in Phys. 170,20-9 does Themistius react to this claim. 787. 75,11: for ekinêthê read kinêtheiê; the conditional has to be prospective, and the aorist passive indicative was probably a simplifying emendation of the aorist passive optative form. 788. 75,11: before pros ti supply ta with Simpl. in Phys. 437,11 who at 437,11-15 cites Themistius by name and summarizes 75,11-15 before quoting 75,17-18. The plural ta (cf. tôn pros ti at 75,8-9) is preferable to to (MS L), since it anticipates ep’ autôn (75,13). 789. 75,17-18: in house-building construction in progress is an incomplete actuality, which we can demonstrate by inspecting the un-built house. However, the change produced by repositioning relative to a stable object cannot be demonstrated as incomplete since it is instantaneous, and so fails to meet the definition of change as the actualization of what can be changed, under the terms of which the unbuilt house will fall. 790. 75,21: on Theophrastus’ substitution of ‘activity’ (energeia) for ‘actualization’ (entelekheia) in this definition see Theophrastus FHSG 153B with Sharples (4), 66-7. Certainly energeia is used when this definition is given by Aristotle at Phys. 8.1, 251a9-10, though Themistius (in Phys. 210,3) retains entelekheia along with one family of manuscripts. 791. 75,23-4: see 68,8-15 above on Arist. 200b28-32 where it is (P2) at 68,13. 792. 75,25-6: for the father/son case see Arist. Metaph. 5.15, 1021a23-5, and for that of double/half see Arist. Cat. 7, 6b30-1 and Metaph. 5.15, 1020b26. 793. For discussions of this chapter see, for example, Gill and Marmodoro. 794. 76,17: before ti ên einai for to read tôi (MS W and Spengel). 795. 76,24: before energeian supply mian. 796. 76,24: for kinêtikou read poiêtikou (with Ar. 202a23); without this change the generality of this aporia cannot be conveyed (i.e., change is located under the category of poiein and paskhein). Such generality is intended by its being called a logikê aporia (202a21-2; Themist. 76,23), a difficult expression variously translated: e.g., ‘a problem  at an abstract level’ (Waterfield), one ‘worthy of logical scrutiny’ (Marmodoro, 208 n. 3). I have used ‘involving definition’, since that seems to be required by the subsequent Themistian sentence. 797. 76,25: after estin replace the stop with a comma, so that dei men (76,23) can be picked up contrastively by hautai de (76,25) (dei de at 76,24 is purely conjunctive). 798. 76,28: (i) is Themistius’ additional option, which he recognizes as such at 77,15-19 below when he rejects it. Simplic. in Phys. 441,21-2 says that Aristotle passed over it since it is ‘self-evidently absurd’. 799. 77,1: after en tôi kinoumenôi supply kai paskhonti to reflect Arist. 202a26. Although paskhein and kineisthai are interchangeable in this passage, their conjunction (as at 77,9-10 below) seems essential in this general statement. 800. 77,2-4: this sentence is cited by Simplicius at in Phys. 442,4-6, who notes that the same point can be made with regard to ‘being produced being in what produces’. In that case, ‘being produced as the actuality of what produces would be used homonymously, since being produced will be the actuality of what is produced’.

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801. 77,14: delete pou, Schenkl’s conjecture for tou (MSS MB). MSS W and L seem to have sensed a problem, with W having kai tou and L ending the sentence with paskhontos. I am taking kinoumenou as complementing tou paskhontos, as the argument requires. 802. 77,15: delete the second ta (Spengel). 803. 77,28: before kai read alla (MS W) so that this sentence can have an appropriately adversative sense. 804. 77,31-78,1: see above 76,15-17. 805. 78,1: the metaphor of being cut off (apotemnesthai) is Aristotle’s (202b8), and was taken up by Plotinus and by Simplicius (see Wilberding, 448-9 and 451-2). Wilberding’s study is very instructive on how a genuinely neoplatonic commentator addresses this material in contrast with Themistius’ restrained exegesis. 806. 78,8: the text is uncertain here. I have read hôste touton for tosouton (Schenkl from MS M) rather than placing hôste after tosouton, as Schenkl suggested. This provides the sense required by the Aristotelian text: that the agent’s activity is present to an equivalent degree to that of the patient. MSS BLW have to (tôi W) touton but that produces cumbersome Greek. The presence of hôste at 78,6 makes its repetition here plausible. 807. 78,9-23: Marmodoro, 210 n. 7, criticizes Themistius’ account in this and the next paragraph (she specifically cites 78,9-23) for confusing ‘what is common in the forms of moving and being moved with what underlies the activities of moving and being moved’. This charge does not seem to be supported by the text. 808. 78,26: for huparxei read huparkhoi; the future indicative use with an instead of the potential optative should be avoided in an author as well grounded in classical literature as Themistius. 809. 78,27: ek periontos; see on 4,22 above. 810. 79,1-2: see 69,7 above ad Arist. 201a10-11, with the note ad loc. 811. 79,2: see 75,21 above ad Arist. 202a7-8; cf. 76,10 and 77,27-8 where ‘insofar as it can be changed’ is omitted. 812. 79,5-6: on the language used for the case of increase added here see on 70,4-5 above. 813. 79,6-7: Arist. 202b26-7 says that what is offered here as a ‘third definition’ (cf. Simpl. in Phys. 449,29 and 450,27) is a more obvious or familiar way (gnôrimôteron) of putting things, and thus a corollary of the earlier definitions rather than an independent definition. It is developed as a subordinate principle more readily applicable to different kinds of change, at least where the non-substantial categories are concerned. 814. 79,7-8: this modifies Arist. 202b26-7, ‘the [actualization] of what potentially can produce an effect and be affected insofar as it is such’. Themistius replaces the concluding qualifier ‘insofar as it is such’ with the phrase ‘in relation to one another’, presumably because earlier (69,7-20) he had explained the sense in which potentiality is intended. Translators soften the tautology in the final phrase hê entelekheia tou dunamei poiêtikou kai pathêtikou by versions such as ‘the actuality of what potentially acts and is acted on’ (Heinaman, 27), ‘ of what can act and be acted on’ (Hardie/Gaye), ‘ of that which is potentially active and  passive’ (Ross [2], 362). Waterfield is closer with ‘the actuality of the potential for acting and being acted on’. 815. 79,15: Arist. 202b33-4, where an affection and a point are said to be necessarily neither limited nor unlimited, is omitted, but cf. 82,32-83,1 below where this claim is added, and also 83,15-16 below. 816. 79,16: a historical survey (79,19-81,22) is followed by a discussion of the existence of the unlimited (81,22-82,18), with the topic of its nature introduced in the conclusion at 82,18-28.

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817. 79,15: for an read an eiê (MSS WBL; Arist. 202b34). On the potential optative in definite conclusions see Todd (7), 179 n. 4. 818. 79,18a: before apeirou supply tou (Arist. 203a3). 819. 79,18b: Arist. 203a3 has ‘all’ instead of ‘many’ in his statement that the unlimited is posited as a first principle. Themistius makes it consistent with 203a18-19, where those who posit a limited number of elements are said to make them unlimited in extent. 820. 79,22: delete en tôi apeirôi. The unlimited cannot have the status of a substance ‘in the unlimited’. It suffices to reproduce Arist. 203a5-6 here. 821. 79,26: the tetraktus is 10, the sum of the first four numbers (1+2+3+4 = 10), the source of all numbers, which can also be arranged as a triangle of units (4-3-2-1). It is described as the ‘fountainhead of eternal nature’ at Carmen Aureum, the Pythagorean ‘Golden Verses’, vv. 47-8, here quoted loosely; see Thom, 174-6 for discussion. Themist. Or. 13, p. 250,24 DN, quotes another of these verses. 822. 79,29-80,1: after hupolambanei (79,29) delete the colon and bracket oute – topôi. Within that parenthesis delete gar after oute in 80,1. 823. 80,3-8: this anticipates Arist. 203a15-16, which Themistius enlarges with a compressed and generic summary of the following, quoted from Porphyry at Simpl. in Phys. 454,10-16: ‘while 2 as even is the first number, double and half are included in the nature of the even, with double involving excess, half involving deficiency. Thus excess and deficiency are present in what is even. But 2 is the first even number among numbers, but while per se indeterminate, it is bounded by participation in 1. For 2 is bounded to the extent that it is a single form. So 1 and 2 are also the elements of number, with the former setting a limit and imposing a form, the latter indeterminate both in excess and deficiency.’ Themistius has made a connection between being ‘indeterminate’ (aoristos) and being unlimited. 824. 80,14-17: this reasoning has to be envisaged diagrammatically such that a single dot (for 1) has three dots ‘placed around’ it to form a square of four dots, the gnomon being a right-angled shape represented initially by the three additional dots that enclose the single dot. The series 3, 5, 7, 9 etc. represents the sequence of odd numbers of additional dots added to create increasingly larger gnomons that maintain the shape of a square, while the series 4, 9, 16, 25 etc. represents the total number of dots in each square, i.e., 1+3 for the first square, then 4 + 5 etc. The replication of a square at each stage is taken as an indication that the series of odd numbers does not generate a progressively unlimited series, but merely one that repeats itself in an identical form. 825. 80,19-21: this aside is consistent with Themistius’ program for his paraphrases as addressed to an audience already familiar with Aristotle’s works and thus presumably with the basic mathematics and geometry mentioned here; see in An. Post. 1,11 and Todd (7), 3-4. 826. 80,22-4: this unpacks part of Arist. 203a13-15, ‘when gnomons have been placed (a) around 1 and (b) apart [from 1], in the case [of (b)] the shape comes to be constantly different, whereas in the case [of (a) it constantly comes to be as] 1’. While (a) is not problematical (see previous note), (b) certainly is because of the obscurity in the expression ‘apart’. Themistius takes this to mean that what is ‘apart’ is the even number added to 1, but such an addition does not produce a gnomon; i.e., starting from a dot for 1, two additional dots will not be fully ‘placed around’ it. So while the series 3, 7, 13 etc. will yield different shapes (triangle, heptagon etc.) if these figures are translated into geometrical terms, they will not originate in gnomons. On the other hand, gnomons can be maintained only if the sequence starts with the first even number, 2 (a way of

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interpreting ‘apart [from the one]’; see Heath, vol. 1, 83 and Ross (2), 543-5, and cf. the criticism at Bostock (2), 247-8), and then has further even numbers fully placed around it, despite the claim at Arist. 203a11-12 (= Themist. 80,11-12) that the even is limited by the odd. This series will then yield different shapes only when taken cumulatively (i.e., 2 + 4 = 6, a hexagon etc.). So the Pythagoreans’ association of the unlimited (or an unlimited series of distinct shapes) with even numbers is maintained only if its foundation in a sequence of gnomons is abandoned, and only if their principle that the unlimited results from the imposition of odd on even is contravened. 827. 81,4: there is a crux here because the presence of Democritus’ name confines this sentence to him rather than to both him and Anaxagoras. I have accepted Spengel’s emendation, which deletes Democritus’ name and for toioutois de akolouthei kai autos substitutes toutois de akolouthei kai autois. Also, given that this is a paraphrase, I doubt that Schenkl ad loc. is right to assume that the account of Anaxagoras given at Arist. 203a23-33 has fallen out, rather than been edited out, of the Themistian response. 828. 81,10-11: after arkhas delete the colon and bracket to gar – peperasmenon. 829. 81,12a: Arist. 203b3-4 is omitted; it repeats 202b36-203a1 (= Themist. 79,16-17). 830. 81,12b: following a reader’s suggestion I read ei gar estin. 831. 81,13: for oute read oude. 832. 81,13-14: in introducing matter and form as inviable candidates for being the source of the unlimited Themistius is probably epitomizing more elaborate reasoning; see Simpl. in Phys. 463,25-464,3, which, though not a quotation, seems to derive from Alexander’s exegesis of 203b4-7; see 463,18. The issue of the unlimited and matter is not overtly raised until 3.6, 207a18-32 below; see Themist. 95,16-26. 833. 81,13-15: the punctuation has been changed here to make two explanatory clauses: oute – autês (13-14) and ti gar – matên (15) parenthetical in one continuous sentence. 834. 81,16-17: after megethos delete the colon, bracket ou gar – alloioumena, after which replace the colon with a comma. On instantaneous qualitative change as a beginning that is not based on magnitude see Phys. 1.3, 186a15-16 (Themist. 7,32-8,2), to which this insert refers, and see the note on 7,32-8,2 above. In general, Themistius is working here with the distinction between a beginning in time and one in magnitude that is deployed at 7,25-8,11 above. The unlimited cannot have a beginning in time (spelt out at 91,11-16 below ad 206a10-11), but if it has a beginning in magnitude then it is unlike things that have instantaneous beginnings but it fails to complement (or provide the plenitude for) the infinite time that is assumed here as the matrix for its beginning and end. 835. 81,20: Arist. 203b6-15 is cited as a testimonium for Anaximander at DK 12A15, with particular reference to the metaphorical phrase ‘steers everything’ (203b11-12 = Themist. 81,19), which may well be a quotation. Ross (2), 546-7 argued that the nearest parallel was in Anaximenes DK 13A2 where periekhein (‘enclose’) is used. 836. 81,22: 203b3-4 (cf. 79,13-19 = Arist. 202b30-6) is moved here to furnish a conclusion to the whole of 203a16-203b15, not just 203a16-203b2. 837. 81,23-82,8: on these arguments, and particularly (iii)-(v), see Furley (1), 92-6. 838. 81,25-6 (cf. 203b17-18): see further 97,17-98,24 (on 3.7, 207b27-34). 839. 81,26-8: this argument may have originated with Anaximander; see the

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evidence at DK 12A14, which Furley (1), 94-5 dismisses, though in part on the basis of a false claim that Simplicius attributes it to Democritus (it is argument [v] here that Simplicius does this with; see in Phys. 467,16), but, even so, the continuation of this argument in Epicureanism for which Furley argues seems undeniable. 840. 81,28-30: these include the Stoics (see notably Cleomedes, Meteôra 1.1.112-49 with Bowen and Todd [1], 29-31) as well as the Epicureans, though it is only the latter who are taken in Phys. 3.8 below (see 100,6-11) when this argument is revisited. Furley (1), 93, followed by Huffman, 545, has argued that this argument might be traced back to Melissus; he cites Arist. GC 325a15, quoted at DK 28A25. 841. 81,29-30: before peras at 81,30 delete to so that mêden can be its attribute. 842. 81,31: for prosiesthai read proiesthai; cf. 87,4 below where this verb is used for forwarding a supposition. prosiesthai means admitting or accepting something 843. 81,30-82,3: Simpl. in Phys. 467,26-35 attributes this argument to Archytas the Pythagorean, who originated the image of someone stretching beyond the purported limit of the heavens. See Huffman, 540-50, who, at 545, argues that Aristotle was thinking of Archytas in formulating this argument, rather than, as some have argued, the preceding (fourth) argument. The present argument was later used by the Epicureans and in modified form by the Stoics (who posited unlimited extra-cosmic void unoccupied by body), and was attacked by Alexander, quaestiones 3,12 (see Sharples [3], 67-75) in a text probably derived from his commentaries on the Physics and the de Caelo; see Simpl. in Cael. 285,2-286,27 (tr. Hankinson, 106-10); Todd (4); Bowen and Todd (1), 22-31; and cf. on 82,7 below. 844. 82,1-3: dia gar – touto has to be treated as parenthetical (with the colon preceding it deleted), so that the gar clause at 82,3 can, as it must, explain the description of the uninhibited imaginative additions to any limited entity at 82,1. 845. 82,5: delete to; the articular infinitive would create an imbalance with the preceding kenon apeiron; cf. also 82,16, and Arist. 203b18-19. 846. 82,6: the premise inserted here is spelt out at Arist. Cael. 1.9, 279a13-14. 847. 82,7: since the possibility of reception has to be realized, once it is asserted, the reception of body follows thereby, or ipso facto, the sense carried by êdê when marking the necessity of a conclusion drawn from an assumption (e.g., 5,8; 14,17; 86,18; 95,13). Since the argument is necessarily true, it qualifies as a demonstration. See also Alexander, ap. Simpl. in Cael. 285,32-286,2 who uses the same argument against the Stoic position that there can be an unlimited unoccupied void (a permanent unrealized possibility; cf. Cleom. Meteôr. 1.1.81-8). On the general question of whether an unrealized possibility can be articulated with regard to the unlimited void see, for example, Hankinson, 155 n. 568. See also on 100,4-5 below. 848. 82,8: Themistius has in effect divided the sentence at 203b26 at dokei, and restructured the argument of 203b26-30 by building on the principle stated at 203b30, that ‘among the eternal things there is no difference between being possible and being the case’. Furley (1), 96 thinks that this argument, though perhaps not the definition of place as ‘capable of receiving body’, can be traced to Democritus. 849. 82,8: after epi supply men (MS L); cf. eph’ hôn de at 82,10. 850. 82,15-16: deleted to and for allo te read allote. 851. 82,14: after kenou place a stop.

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852. 82,18a: after entautha supply ê entautha (MS W; cf. Arist. 203b27). 853. 82,18b: for hôsper read hôste (MS W and Arist. 203b27). 854. 82,18c: for ontôs read houtôs. 855. 82,20-1: for mathematics and time see 81,24-6 above, for number see 83,5 below. On mathematics, or, more specifically, geometry, and the unlimited see Phys. 3.7 below at 97,17-98,29. 856. 82,22: this metaphor may imply that the position in question does not even get close to nature, or that it fails to get a handle on the implications of a concept of nature. A kraspedon (tr. ‘fringe’), that is, can mean an edge or border, or that which is located at a border as an extension. 857. 82,25: see 91,1-11 below ad Ar. 206a9-10. 858. 82,27: this question replaces the more obscure Aristotelian one at 203b34-204a1: ‘Or [does the unlimited exist] in neither of these ways, but is there nonetheless an unlimited or unlimitedly numerous things?’ 859. 82,29-83,7: I have moved this paragraph to this ‘chapter’ since Themistius obviously regards it as a new beginning. 860. 82,31: delete en (MS W; Spengel) so that this articular infinitive can appear like its immediate predecessor (82,30-31) as a dative of explanation. 861. 82,32-83,1: see on 79,15 above and on 83,15-16 below. 862. 83,2-3: for hê odos makra read hê makra hodos (MS W). 863. 83,4: the Homeric epithet for the sea is sometimes the cognate adjectival form apeirôn, though with reference to extent rather than depth; see, for example, Iliad 1,350. 864. 83,6-7: in an unlimited division each division represents a subtraction from the whole but an addition to the residue; see 93,15 below, with the note ad loc., and cf. Themist. in Phys. 197,14-16 where this claim is generalized from the case of the division of a line ad Arist. Phys. 6.6, 237b9-11. 865. 83,9: before apeiron supply to; cf. Arist. 204a8 and 83,14 below. 866. 83,10: cf. 79,19-23 above ad 203a4-6. 867. 83,15-16: a point is a magnitude without size and so by nature cannot be limited, but it is ‘non-limited’ only in a trivial sense, as is a sound that is a vibration of the air and therefore non-colored; on a point being neither limited nor unlimited see 3.4, 202b33-4 with the note on 79,15, and cf. 82,32-83,1 above. 868. 83,17: see 83,1-2 above. 869. 83,22: for Schenkl’s khôrista read akhôrista gar (MS L; the remaining manuscripts all have akhôrista) and bracket the clause akhorista gar tês ousias. 870. 83,25: after energeiâi supply on, and transpose the second hôs to precede ousian, in both cases on the basis of Arist. 204a21. 871. 83,26: for touto read to. 872. 83,26-7: cf. Arist. 204a23-4 where the unlimited is said to be ‘a substance and not [said of] a substrate’, which is the status not of the soul in general for Aristotle but of an intellect that is ‘in its substance an actuality’ (DA 3.5, 430a18). 873. 84,2: for hê (Schenkl) read ho (MSS WBL). 874. 84,4-5: read phusis tou apeirou and delete apeiros (the latter with Spengel) along with the comma that precedes it. That is, instead of deleting to apeiron with Schenkl it is better to make it dependent on phusis so that autês in the apodosis can, with the deletion of apeiros, refer directly to the subject of the protasis. 875. 85,4: toiautê refers back to the same language at 83,25-6. 876. 84,19: see the discussion at 5,26-6,1 above ad Phys. 1.2, 185b11-16. 877. 84,21: see above 79,15 with the note ad loc. 878. Arist. 204a29-31 is omitted; it makes the point raised at 204a14-16, that the unlimited cannot be a principle if it is an incidental property.

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879. 84,22: the clause hoti legousin apeiron in the manuscripts and printed by Schenkl has the Pythagoreans making the unlimited a substance just because they speak of it. But they do this because their claim is absurd, and at Arist. 204a32-4 that absurdity is explained as their treating the unlimited as a divisible substance. I have therefore replaced apeiron with atopôs, reflecting 204a32. A reader helpfully pointed in this direction. 880. 84,23: after legein replace the stop with a colon, and in 84,24 replace the comma after legousin with a stop. 881. 84,24: see 80,8-25 ad 203a10-15 above. 882. 84,25: read merizousin with Spengel for merizousi te (MSS); Schenkl emended to merizousi de. 883. 84,26-7: delete apeiron (27); cf. 85,3 where noêton is similarly a predicate of the unlimited. The questions for inquiry here are ‘is the unlimited unlimited?’ and ‘is the unlimited intelligible?’, and they are equivalent if the unlimited is identified as even number. 884. 84,27: cf. Aristotle’s gloss at 204b1 on intelligibles as ‘things that have no magnitude’. 885. 84,29a: for ei dê toi (MS M; ti MSS WBL) read hêi ei de ti (Spengel). 886. 84,29b: see 82,28 above. 887. 85,4-5: this is Themistius’ more vivid disjunction for Aristotle’s ‘number, or that which has a number, is countable.’ 888. 85,7: see 85,1 above. 889. 85,9: Schenkl marks a crux at apeiron ara. Clearly the conclusion of this argument needs a negation, as scribes and editors recognized. I have read oud’ apeiron ara (MS Laur. 85,14). 890. 85,13: the power in question here for a standard element would be a pairing of these qualities. 891. 85,16-17: for the present tense diaphtheirei read the future diaphtherei (MS W), with the future having a potential sense in this typical mixed conditional; see the note on 16,6 above and cf. poiêsei in line 17. 892. 85,19: see 86,10-87,16 below. 893. 85,20: for dialuomen read dialuômen (MS W; Spengel). 894. 85,27: for autous read auton. 895. 86,3: for estai read estô, as at 85,30, to maintain the hypothesis. The reasoning here is that if a volume of air already larger than that of fire but with less power is progressively enlarged it will become equivalent in power to fire, then subsequently more powerful, and finally when it is of unlimited size it will overpower the fire. So start with a ratio of Fire (F) to Air (A) as 10:1 in terms of power and as 1:1 in terms of volume and change the ratio of powers to 1:1 by increasing A’s volume; then change their relative volumes so that F:A is 1: 10,000, then 1:1,000,000, and then 1:1,000,000,000, all of which will lead to proportionate increases in their relative power. But when A is of unlimited size, F:A cannot be expressed as a ratio, leaving A the only element in existence. Cf. Aristotle’s argument in Phys. 4.8, 215b12-22 (covered at Themist. in Phys. 131,11-26), that if a body moves in the void there is no ratio between it and its medium and therefore its speed is incalculable. 896. 86,4: for the present phtheirei read the future phtherei (cf. Arist. 204b19) Cf. on 85,16-17 above. 897. 86,5: see 85,15-18 above. 898. 86,7: delete ê, Schenkl’s supplement, which would yield the meaning ‘But it is still more impossible that it consists of more than one [unlimited] of all [unlimited things]’. The set of all unlimited things makes no sense, and so

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take the adverbial phrase pantôn amêkhanôteron to mean ‘more impossible than all things’, or ‘more impossible than anything’. 899. 86,9: i.e., it was not mentioned in the criticism at 85,11-19 where the eliminative power of the single unlimited element was stressed though the conceptual point was available that any single unlimited element necessarily excludes any other by occupying the whole of space. 900. 86,13: Arist. 204b24-6 just identifies collectively ‘some’ (tines) who isolated the unlimited from qualitatively defined elements. 901. 86,14-15: mê di’ henos is Schenkl’s emendation for mêdenos in all his manuscripts, but the correction in MS L to mê henos suffices. 902. 86,16: for eiê read ekhei 903. 86,16-17: after enantiôsis delete the comma and place ho – thermon in brackets. 904. 86,25-6: Euripides at A. Nauck (ed.), rev. B. Snell, Tragicorum Graecorum Fragmenta, Hildesheim 1964, fr. 839, lines 9-10, with the phrase ‘into aether’ being Themistius’ compact paraphrase of line 11. 905. 86,29-30: after alla kai place a comma, after ei supply ti, after hen delete de, and transpose lêros polus to the end of the sentence after energeian. 906. 86,29: ‘big hoot’ (lêros polus; cf. on 16,22 above) may echo a line from a lost comedy of Aristophanes where it refers to the fear of death; see R. Kassel and C. Austin (eds), Poetae Comici Graeci, III.2, Berlin 1968, no. 468. 907. 87,2: ‘scares’ (dedittesthai); cf. its use of an argument that might be disturbing at Plat. Phaedr. 245B3. 908. 87,4: Arist. 205a5 refers to ‘natural scientists’ (phusikoi) maintaining this view in a reference back to 204b23-6 (= Themist. 86,13-16; see on 86,13 above), where Anaximander is also introduced. 909. 87,5-6: if elements have no contraries, then the primary body is like an intermediary that under standard conditions is contrary to two extremes. The force of ‘that’ before ‘intermediary’ here can be taken as a reference back to Anaximander’s unlimited body introduced at 18,21 (ad 203b11-15). 910. 87,13: for en tois enantiois read en tôi enantiôi; cf. the singular tounantion at 87,10. 911. 87,16-24: the brief digression is motivated by the account of matter given in the context of Phys. 1.7 above. It is a succinct defence of matter as the precondition for change; i.e., in itself it has no contrariety, but it makes change from one contrary to another possible by its persistence. 912. 87,18: after poiountes place a stop (Schenkl omitted Spengel’s comma). The question posed by the imaginary opponent and marked by Schenkl at 87,19 has to begin with ê. 913. 87,23: since Themistius inserts phasin into the phrase hodou parergon (cf. Sext. Emp. Math. 8.378), he may be referring to its use at Euripides, Electra 509, though a TLG word search shows that the phrase was quite common in later Greek to mean a by-product and was probably detached from the original poetic source, the only example in LSJ. 914. 87,28: for all’ hoti read alla ti to make sense of this additional qualification, which Simpl. in Phys. 482,25-7 expresses more clearly as the contrast between a place that is the same in kind (eidei) and in quantity (posôi), with the latter involving the place of the whole being dependent on that of the part in the case of a change of place, but vice versa when place is occupied in a stable way. Given the brevity with which Themistius makes his point, the text may be suspect. Perhaps, given Simplicius’ text, all’ hoti was originally all’ eidei and ê anô ê katô started life as a marginal gloss on tôi posôi. 915. 87,30-88,19: this paragraph is a reconstruction at such a tangent to the

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Aristotelian text (notably in the distinction introduced between part and whole, and in the reference to Melissus; see next note) that we can assume that Themistius was relying on inherited material, probably from Alexander’s commentary. 916. 87,31: before holou supply tou. 917. 88,7-9: this inserted testimonium (not in DK) is in conflict with Melissus’ argument (DK 30B7) for the one being unlimited and unchanging. Themistius may be building on an argument that Alexander directed against Melissus, though Simplicius ad loc. makes no mention of Alexander, nor does Philop. in Phys. 438,5-17 in a somewhat different reaction to Melissus. The underlying idea is that the unlimited is simultaneously at rest and in motion in the way that the sphere is. An argument cited and rejected by Aristotle as an appendix to his refutation of Zeno’s paradoxes in Phys. 6.9; see 240a29-b7 (cf. Themist. 201,19-28) included the claim that the parts of the sphere change place. Here the argument against the more ambitious conception of the unlimited as a sphere is that they do not only change place, but undergo other changes, and that the only way that they can change place is by circular motion. 918. 88,8: after kinêsin delete the colon and also delete gar. 919. 88,18-19: literally, ‘those unchangeable [in doctrine]’, a further but untranslatable ‘doxographical’ pun (see on 17,5 above). 920. 88,25-6: that is, if there are unlimitedly many things that form an unlimitedly large compound, then they can form any number of such compounds, since the unlimited whole is not a single actual unlimited but can contain a series of unlimited sets, in fact, unlimitedly many, since each non-homogeneous component can be divided without limit. Themistius is skirting the paradoxes of the unlimited that were more fully developed by other commentators; see Todd (3), 3-9 and cf. on 15,29-31 above.. 921. 88,26: for the argument that a single unlimited would have to occupy all available space see 86,7-10 above ad Arist. 204b19-22. 922. 205a25-8 in Ross (2) are located after 205b1 as proposed by the Renaissance commentator Julio Pace; see Ross (2), 552. 923. 88,28: at 85,9-86,7 ad Arist. 204b11-19 it was argued that an unlimited body in a compound would have the power to eliminate any coexistent limited component. Now it is argued that an unlimited body cannot have a natural place within a compound. 924. 88,31-89,1: what Aristotle, 205b27-8) says is that ‘the latter [water or air, to which he adds ‘or their intermediary’, which Themistius omits] vary (or “vacillate”) between the upper and lower [place]’. It is striking that Ross (2), 366 uses the same language as Themistius in saying that it is their places rather than the elements themselves that are indeterminate, as does Simplic. in Phys. 484,12-14. The latter explains that this indeterminacy means that they cannot be opposites. 925. 89,6-10: for Dêmokritos read Demokritôi, the standard ‘dative of disadvantage’ used in attributing doctrines with undesirable consequences to opponents (see 84,16 or 86,5 above). An explanation such as I have provided in square brackets may have dropped out of the text. Certainly it is the premise needed for Themistius’ insert (not cited in DK), where the argument is that if an unlimited number of non-homogeneous atoms occupied the all as their place, they could not be of an unlimited number. 926. 89,16: a reference to the upcoming treatment of the void in Phys. 4.5-9. 927. 89,17: 205b1-5 = DK 59A50. 928. 89,19: here and at 89,18 and 90,2 below stêrizein is used in an intransitive sense with a reflexive prepositional phrase, as at Arist. 205b19-20.

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929. 90,2a: emenen needs to accompanied by an, unless we want to grant the license of having the imperfect used by itself in a potential sense. 930. 90,2b: estêrizein should be corrected to estêrizen. 931. 90,5: after megethous replace the comma with a stop, and let epei initiate the next sentence. Cf. 89,27 where an initial epei at Arist. 205b10 is replaced by dia touto gar. 932. 90,6: for the infinitive menein read the present tense form menei. 933. 90,11: the principle of ‘everything in everything’ is introduced by Themistius in a brief allusion to the discussion of it in Phys. 1.4; see, for example, 13,34 and 14,5.8.29 above. 934. 90,14: a kuathos (the Greek here) is a small measure, less than a tenth of a pint, colloquially ‘a spoonful’. 935. 90,15-16: this sentence is an expansion of Arist. 205b22-3: ‘if the place of the unlimited is that which is in itself, then the place of the part is the same.’ We would therefore expect the final clause in Themistius not to be ara kai to holon kai ta moria but ara kai tou holou kai tôn moriôn. But the position of ara as first word in its clause (it is usually second) would seem to point to an omission, and tauton estai as a supplement (cf. 6,15 where this appears with ‘both A and B’ rather than the commoner ‘A is the same as B’, with B in the dative case) would furnish the conclusion that the stability of the whole destroys the distinction between whole and parts, which is implied by Aristotle’s saying that the part has the same place as the stable whole. 936. 90,24: for diairein read diaireis. MS L was on the right track with diairei, but the second person singular is more plausible, given Themistius’ tendency to pose questions or address statements to a reader (or a student) in the second person singular (see, for example, 19,30-2; 21,13; 30,31), as well as the text at Arist. 205b30. 937. 90,27: before apeiron supply to; cf. 90,29. 938. 90,32-3: the reference is Themistius’ and is to the proof that up and down are absolutes at Cael. 4.1 (cf. Simpl. in Phys. 489,21 with Diels ad loc.). The issue of directions in the cosmos was significant enough for Alexander to compose a treatise defending it against an Epicurean, Zenobius (see Simpl. in Cael. 489,21-2 and Todd [13]). The further claim that the pairings right/left and forward/backward have the same status is not equally convincing, despite the arguments as Cael. 2.2 and 2.5. 939. 91,4: this is Themistius’ addition (Simpl. in Phys. 489,32 has ‘but the antecedent, therefore the consequent’), so as to make the argument easily identifiable as modus ponens, or the ‘first indemonstrable’ argument of the standard list inherited from the Stoics; see SVF 2.241 (= Diog. Laert. 7.79). 940. 91.11: see above 82,19-25 ad Arist. 203b31-204a1. 941. 91,12: for pragma tôn (MS L; Schenkl) read pragmatôn (MSS MWB). 942. 91,13-15: cf. Arist. Phys. 8.1, 251b14-28 with Themist. in Phys. 211,26212,9. Cf. the phrasing of the argument at 91,15 with the later more polemical version at 211,34-5, and cf. the use of ‘consequence’ (parakoluthêma) for time’s relation to change with Arist. 251b27-8 where time is called a pathos (‘affection’, ‘attribute’). See Golitsis, 124-7 for an analysis of Philoponus’ polemical response to this argument at in Phys. 456,17-459,1 (translated at Golitsis, 274-6) in which he shows that the object of criticism is Themistius’ restatement of the Aristotelian text. 943. 91,20: after legetai dê supply to einai (Arist. 206a14). 944. 91,21: see above 67,20-2 ad Arist. 200b26-7. 945. 91,25-6: see 12,6-12 above where Themistius criticizes this doctrine, which he attributes to Xenocrates.

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946. 91,28-9: after poiein delete the colon, bracket eis – sunkeitai, and replace the colon after sunkeitai with a comma. 947. 91,29-30: on this principle, frequently used by commentators against those who did not accept the Aristotelian concept of unlimited division, see on 15,29-31 above and also Todd (3), 153-9. 948. 91,30-92,4: Aristotle’s reference at 206a18-21 to there being no analogy between a statue’s potentiality, which can be actualized, and that of the unlimited, which cannot, is the basis on which Themistius adapts his earlier use of this same illustration in the analysis of change in 3.1 at 69,10-13 to distinguish the actuality of coming to be from that of having come to be. See also on 92,10 below. 949. 92,4: this principle, established at 68,8-15 (ad 3.1, 200b28-32) as ‘what produces change is relative to what is changed’, is implicit in the definition of change as ‘the actuality of what can be changed’ (introduced shortly at 92,10) and reflected here. 950. 92,7: cf. the description of a completed actualization (in contrast with the actualization involved in change) at 74,11-16 above. 951. 92,10-93,11: Themistius drew on an alternative version (= 206a29a-33 in Ross [2]) of Arist. 206a18-29 and conflated their content. The major commentators knew that this second version was omitted in many manuscripts and it may have been a marginal note that was later incorporated in the main text. See Ross (2), 555-6 for the details. 952. 92,10: see the second definition of change given above at 75,21 (= Arist. 2.2, 202a7-8). The argument that such an actualization can safeguard potentiality during the process of coming to be is provided in connection with the first definition of change at 69,7 (= Arist. 3.1, 201a10-11); see 69,8-9 and 69,15-20. 953. 92,13: for tou read to (Spengel). 954. 92,20-1: if we envisage a magnitude’s unlimited divisibility in the same way that we consider a bronze statue as actual, then the magnitude would be actually divided into an unlimited number of things; that is, its divisibility would be analogous to the actuality of the artifact. 955. 92,21-2: after anatrepei delete the stop and bracket ei – tomê; in this way the coordinated clauses touto men (92,21) and to de (92,22-3) are properly represented. 956. 93,9: for to tmêthen read to lêphthen (for consistency with the preceding line) with MS. Laur. 85,18 and Simpl. in Phys. 494,28. 957. 93,10: for khronon hupolipein read khronos hupoleipei. 958. 93,15: the ‘things’ involved here (literally ‘this’ and ‘that’ in the Greek) are in fact distances within a determinate magnitude, so that if we start with the magnitude AB, then a series of divisions, say by successive halves, can either be described as a process of subtracting halves from AB or of adding them to it. Cf. Arist. 206b5-6: ‘the way that [a limited magnitude] is seen as being divided is the same as the way that it appears to be added to in relation to a fixed limit.’ 959. 93,22: 206b12-17, a summary of the way in which the unlimited is potential, receives no comment. 960. 93,24: delete ou gar pantos esti meizon, a repetitive explanation of the preceding clause. It must have originally been a gloss. 961. 93,25: delete dunatou, as a reader rightly suggested. 962. 93,25-6: if a magnitude AB is internally divided at some point C, then while AB cannot be exceeded, AC can be further subdivided, and each subdivision will be an addition to BC, which remains undivided. Cf. on 93,15 above ad 206b4-6 and Simpl. in Phys. 498,25-8.

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963. 93,29-30: this is Themistius’ attenuated version of 206b25-27, ‘clearly there cannot be [a perceptible body] even potentially infinite by addition except, as has been stated, in inverse correspondence to the process of division’ (after Hussey). 964. 93,32-94,1: given parallels in other commentators (e.g., Simpl. in Phys. 499,4) Schenkl’s supplement aoristôs after hupainittomenos is justified. 965. 94,2-3: for to  apeiron read tôi  apeirôi (94,2) and for the first to read tôi (94,3). 966. 94,4: delete the colon after phêsin and bracket auxei gar autous. 967. 94,10-11 (= Arist. 207a2-3): rings in which the jewels are not set in a bezel but are subject to a ‘prong setting’ have the jewels directly juxtaposed in an uninterrupted, or ‘endless’, circle. 968. 94,13-14: this aside is Themistius’ version of Arist. 207a6-7: ‘this is not what comes about in a circle, but instead it is always what is successive that is the only different thing’. Thus the commentator emphasizes that a single rotation of a circle is simply repeated, and so multiple rotations between the same points (see Simpl. in Phys. 500,30-2) all fall under the number 1. 969. 94,20-1: the three dimensions represented by line (1), surface (2) and body (3) represent three distinct manifestations of quantity for which the form is a geometrical shape. The form is thus present along with different quantitative bases for division. 970. 94,24: delete ên (MS W); ên and Spengel’s einai are both unnecessary attempts to make hoion introduce an independent clause. 971. 94,6: for amphoin read amphô with MSS W and Laur 95,14. 972. 95,9a (= Arist. 207a17): for Parmenides see DK 28B8, line 44. 973. 95,10 (and 95,12): panth’ homou] read pan th’omou. Spengel saw that panth should be pan in both cases, but not that the theta at the end of pan can be detached and read as te elided with homou to mean ‘both’ in anticipation of the following ‘and’, so that in the paraphrase a combination of incompatibles is attributed to to pan in the form of the predicates ‘altogether and unlimited’ as a representation of Aristotle’s statement at 207a17-18 that the unlimited is impossibly combined with ‘the universe and the whole’. For Themistius homou has become an adjectival equivalent to ‘whole’. Schenkl printed panth’ homou in quotation marks, perhaps as an echo of Parmenides B8.5 (homou pan), though no source was given. But this would have been inappropriately attributed to Melissus since B8 (see on 95,9a above) also contains what Themistius regards a preferable Parmenidean conception of a limited universe. It would therefore be odd for him to criticize Melissus for using Parmenidean language. Schenkl could also hardly have thought that Themistius was recalling Phys. 1.4, 187a19-20 where homou panta is used of the primal state of matter in Anaxagoras’ cosmogony. 974. 95,9b: Arist. 207a17 is supplemented with a reference to the proverbial status of this description of the combination of like things, probably in light of Plat. Euthyd. 298C6. 975. 95,10-12: Themistius is clearly saying that Melissus contradictorily claimed that the totality of things was unlimited and a whole, and thus can be seen as supporting an emendation (proposed by H. Bonitz) of the Aristotelian text at 207a16 that would have him saying that ‘the whole is unlimited’ rather than ‘the unlimited is a whole’. Ross (2), 558 rejected this emendation and argued (with the support of Simpl. in Phys. 502,5-6) that Aristotle was claiming only a ‘verbal antithesis’ between Parmenides and Melissus, with the latter using the word ‘whole’ of the unlimited as opposed to Parmenides’ use of ‘limited’ for what he calls a whole.

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976. 95,12: In starting this paragraph at 207a18 I am indicating a preference for a stop rather than a comma after apeiron as in the punctuation of that line in the Aristotelian text at Ross (2); thus here again (cf. 90,5 above) a new sentence should begin with epei. 977. 95,23-4: see on 93,15 above. 978. 96,2: ‘the compound’ (to sunamphoteron) here refers to the conjunction of matter and form, which, unlike Themistius, Aristotle mentions in this context in saying that ‘matter does not have a form’ (207a26). 979. 96,3: on the Diadoumenos see on 46,15 above. 980. 96,5-6: see 79,28-80,3 above (ad Arist. 203a8-10) on the Platonists as authors of this doctrine. 981. 96,7: to periekhoito and horizoito as an (Spengel). 982. 96,7-11: after horizoito (96,7) replace the comma with a stop and move lines 7-11 (hêmin – megethei) to the start of chapter 7, which is where their Aristotelian source (207a33-b1) appears in modern editions. 983. 96,18: for oude read ouden (MS W). 984. 96,23: after adiairetos delete the colon and bracket ou gar eis anthropous. 985. 96,27: for dia tautên read dia touto (Spengel). 986. 97,1-10: this paragraph is a selective paraphrase and rationale. The Aristotelian text goes into more detail on the contrast between the status of the unlimited in connection with numbers and magnitudes, but Themistius 97,1-4 summarizes 207b11-15 by reusing the claim (3.6, 207a18-32 and Themist. 95,12-96,8 above) that the status of the unlimited as matter allows numerical series to proceed without ceasing, while summarizing 207b15-21 in light of the earlier argument (3.6, 207a7-15; 94,22-95,8) that the universe is a whole that cannot be exceeded. He does not repeat Aristotle’s use of the earlier argument for unlimited body from thought (cf. 207b17-18 with 3.4, 203b28-30 above), i.e., that a magnitude that can exist potentially will exist actually. 987. 97,5-6: this supplement is based on the clearer version of this sentence at Simpl. in Phys. 507,17-21. 988. 97,8-10: see 80,27-81,22 above ad Arist. 3.4, 203a16-203b15 and 93,26-7 ad 3.6, 206b22-3. 989. 97,10: after hotan supply de (MS W; Spengel). 990. 97,17: on time dependent on change see in particular Phys. 4.11, and for change dependent on magnitude as unlimitedly divisible see Phys. 6.4. 991. 97,22: this is Alexander; see Simpl. in Phys. 511,30-512,9, discussed by Baltussen, 190-1. 992. 97,22-3: Euclid, Elements, 1.1 (7,2-3 Heiberg/ Stamatis) proposes ‘On a given limited straight line to construct an equilateral triangle’. The construction involves two equal circles that intersect such that the line between their centres is equal to the diameter of each of them, and on this conjoint diameter the equilateral triangle is constructed. So if there is no unlimited in the direction of increase, as the Aristotelian theory prescribes, then it might seem that this construction would be arbitrarily restricted to dimensions that are no larger than the universe, i.e., to the limited straight line mentioned in the Euclidean construction. But the response is (i) that geometers can live with only limited lines (Aristotle) and (ii) that any increase in size needed by geometers is conceptual and thus does not infringe on the status of the limited universe (Alexander, restated by Themistius). 993. 97,23-4: this triangle might have been specified as equilateral, as in the Euclidean title; cf. also 98,10 below. 994. 97,25-6: after arkhês replace the question mark with a comma, and after

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ekballein replace the comma with a stop. The postulate that a limited straight line can be continuously produced is Euclid, Elements, Postulate 2. 995. 97,27-8: cf. 100,29-101,5 below, where this principle is generalized in the argument against the existence of the unlimited because of it being an unavoidable object of thought. 996. 98,4: delete esti and for hapan to read apantâi (i.e., the third person singular of apantaô); this verb can be used absolutely to mean ‘crop up’ or ‘turn out to be the case’ (LSJ II.2) but can also be used this way of legal situations (LSJ I.3), and I think that a legal metaphor is involved here. The whole sense is more lucidly conveyed at Simplic. in Phys. 512,19-22. I would argue that esti was added after the corruption to hapan to occurred so that this main clause could have a verb. 997. 98,11: for sunapairoito read sunaphairoito; the unaspirated pi is Schenkl’s error, not inherited from Spengel. 998. 98,12-13: in other words, the demonstration can be made entirely independent of the physical diagram; the abstraction is not directly correlated with its physical location on the page. 999. 98,13-15: see DK 68B9 and 68A125. 1000. 98,18-19: see Phys. 4.1, 208b22-5 with Themist. 103,18-25. 1001. 98,20: for goun (Schenkl’s conjecture for gar) read ge; for ge used to colour a participle (onta here) with an untranslatable emphasis see 72,5 and 85,28 above. 1002. 98,22-4: see further Phys. 6.1, 231b6-18 with Themist. 181,22-183,2 for arguments against such indivisibles. 1003. 98,24: for tauta read tauta (= ta auta), a proposal made by one of my readers. 1004. 98,30: see above 96,7-11 (cf. Arist. 207a35-207b1). 1005. 98,31: after hautên replace the stop with a colon, and after gar delete the colon. On the relation between matter and privation see above 25,25-33, 27,27-27,12 and 32,17-33,2. 1006. 99,1-7: these lines are reproduced with minor differences at Simpl. in Phys. 514,10-16. 1007. 99,3: Simpl. in Phys. 514,12-13 has a different version of this sentence: ‘for what is going to be divided must be actually endowed with a dimension (diestôs) and not only be potential like matter’. 1008. 99,8-9: after legousi change the comma to a question mark. At DK 12A14 207b35-208a4 is cited as a testimonium for Anaximander to whom the notion of an enclosing unlimited is perhaps being attributed here in general terms. 1009. 99,11-12: the distinction here, as Ross (ad 208a6-8) notes, is between the first three arguments at 208a8-19 which are refuted outright, and the final two at 208a20-2 which make core claims (the unlimited succession of time and of change) that are true only when refined; i.e., the refutation adjusts the arguments rather than rejecting them. Now Aristotle (a7-8) says that these arguments have ‘specific valid counter-arguments of a different kind’ (ekhei tinas heteras alêtheis apantêseis), with heteras best taken predicatively (cf. Hussey’s translation). Themistius’ text, however, omits tinas heteras and I have supplied just heteras before alêtheis in 99,12 to clarify the claim. 1010. 99,13: Arist. 208a9 says that it is a ‘perceptible body’ that has to be unlimited to sustain coming to be. If Themistius’ text is sound, he leaves us to assume that such a body is implied as the reference of both ‘the unlimited’ and ‘the all’ (to pan) in this argument. 1011. 99,12-13: see Arist. 3.4, 203b18-20 (= argument [iii] at Themist. 81,26-8) above.

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1012. 99,14-15: the argument criticized is: ‘if the universe is limited, there is no coming to be; there is coming to be; therefore the universe is unlimited’. The response is to attack the premises as incomplete, implying as the correct argument: ‘if there is coming to be and ceasing to be, the universe can be limited; there is coming to be and ceasing to be; therefore it can be limited’. This does not prove that it is necessarily limited but only that the particular grounds presented do not show that it is necessarily unlimited. 1013. 99,15-16: see Arist. 3.4, 203b20-2 (= argument [iv] at Themist. 81,2830) above. 1014. 99,16: for pithanôs (MSS MB) read pithanos (MSS WL). 1015. 99,21: auto ti is the text at Philop. in Phys. 484,31-485,1. The Themistian manuscripts just have auto for which I read hauto; cf. heauto in the preceding line. 1016. 99,25-6: Simplicius adds further considerations to this paragraph in a context in which his overall text is very similar to that of Themistius. Since the Themistian text at 99,26 ends with the same verb form (perainei) as at Simpl. in Phys. 516,17-21, perhaps, as Spengel suggested, this additional material was omitted due to homoioteleuton. Simplicius’ text is as follows: ‘But those who infer [sc. that making contact is the same as being limited] from that which does make contact seem to be deceived in thinking that making contact and being limited are the same. If someone said that a limit also exists in relation to something (for a limit is a limit of something), still it exists not in relation to another thing but to itself, since it is a limit of what is limited but not of what it has a limit in relation to.’ 1017. 99,29: for autês read allês; cf. Simpl. in Phys. 516,26-7 where a line is said not to make contact ‘unless a line is added to it’ (ei mê grammê tis autêi porostetheiê) which Urmson loosely but illuminatingly translates as ‘unless one were to add another line to it’ (my italics for what I propose as the correct Themistian text for this thought). 1018. 100,2-4: Schenkl marked a crux at oude at 100,2. Simpl. in Phys. 516,24-26 has the same general thought as that expressed in the two illustrations that follow, but introduces the first with kai gar, and I have followed him here, since oude is obviously a superfluous negation 1019. 100,4-5: the Stoics posited an unlimited void beyond a limited cosmos; see Cleomedes, Meteôra 1.1.20-150 with Bowen and Todd (1), 22-31, where other relevant evidence is cited and discussed. Note especially 1.1.22 and 1.1.65 where anaphês (‘without contact’) is used of the void. That is, a Stoic response to the present argument would be that there is indeed no contact between a body and what is incorporeal, but that in itself does not preclude the void surrounding the universe being unlimited (cf. 1.1.139-50). The Aristotelian response would be that such a void would have to be occupied by unlimited body; see on 82,7. 1020. 100,6-11 = Usener, Epicurea, no. 298, p. 212,17-23. 1021. 100,7-8: for ê to haptesthai read ê tinos haptesthai with Usener, though this may be a redundant gloss on pros ti perainein, given that the possibility of their equivalence has been established earlier (cf. 99,17-18 and 21-2). 1022. 100,8a: for touto read toutôn. 1023. 100,8b: for this argument see Epicurus, Hdt. 41 and Lucretius, de rerum natura 1.960. There are no Epicurean references to its being ‘earlier’. Simpl. in Phys. 467,3-4 says that Aristotle mentions it on the grounds that it is ‘older’ (arkhaioteros) and it may be derived from Melissus; see on 81,28-30 above. 1024. 100,12-13: see above 94,6-9 ad Arist. 3.6, 206b33-207a2. Given these definitions I have supplied aei (‘always’) before the second labein in 100,12; it is needed to balance aei in the preceding clause.

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1025. 100,14: for deikteon read eikteon; i.e., the Epicureans do not have to demonstrate that these two things are distinct since that has already been done at 99,16-100,4, but they do have to yield to that claim. Cf. Themist. in Phys. 124,3-4 for a related use of eikein, though admittedly there the verb is complemented by tôi logôi, but that is perhaps implicit here before hoti. 1026. 100,16: before apeiron supply to so that the definiens (‘the unlimited’) is equivalent to the definiendum; by contrast, a thing that finds an external limit can be called ‘unlimited’ attributively (cf. 100,12). 1027. 100,16-18: the Epicurean argument has to admit this petitio principii rather than claim that being limited relative to something external is a premise from which the unlimited can be inferred. 1028. 100,19-20: for the first of these see 94,9 and 94,15-16 ad 207a1 and 207a7-8 above, and for the second see 94,22-95,8 ad 207a8-14 above. 1029. 100,23: for the demonstration see 3.6 above, especially 94,6-95,8 (ad 206b33-207a15). The concession wrought from the Epicureans just to the definition of the all (to pan) as ‘that beyond which there is nothing’ is insignificant, since it is compatible with the all being unlimited, i.e., with to pan being defined as the atoms plus the void (Epicurus, Hdt. 39 and 41). The Stoics, on the other hand, could define the whole (to holon) as a limited all beyond which there was indeed nothing, but this ‘nothing’ (scorned by the Stoic Cleomedes, Meteôra 1.1.55-61) was instead a void that extended without limit and along with the whole constituted the all. On this issue and the use of holon and pan (also invoked by Simpl. in Phys. 517,32-3) see Todd (5). 1030. 100,25: for theasasthai (MS M) read the imperative form theasthe (MS W); cf. 99,16 above, and passim (e.g., 21,23; 57,6; 88,23) for the imperative as a device in didactic paraphrases. 1031. 100,24-5: see Arist. 3.4, 203b22-30; it is argument (v) at Themist. 81,30-82,18 above. 1032. 101,1: Themistius read ‘beyond the city’ (exô tou asteôs, 208a18), omitted by Philop. in Phys. 495,6, and deleted as a gloss by Ross (2) after Diels. Without this phrase a single claim remains that someone is not larger than a given magnitude (a mountain in our text), rather than, as here, separate claims about spatial relocation (cf. Alex. ap. Simpl. in Phys. 517,17-20 and ap. Simpl. in Cael. 286,25-6) and about physical augmentation. Simpl. in Phys. 517,15-17, however, thought that ‘beyond the city’ was best taken to mean ‘larger than the city’, as Eudemus had suggested, and as the Greek at 208a18 could mean if ê were taken in the sense of ‘in other words’ so as to link the reference to the city with that to a magnitude. See Modrak, 196-7 on these interpretations. 1033. 101,2: cf. Odyssey 10.113, where the woman encountered in this passage is said to be ‘as large as a mountain peak’ (hosên t’ oreos koruphên); Themistius was probably quoting from memory. 1034. 101,4: see Homer, Iliad 8.17 for Zeus’ assertion of his power, a passage used for more elaborate philosophical purposes by Arist. MA 699b35-700a6. 1035. 101,5-13: Arist. 208b22-3, the conclusion to Book 3, is omitted. These lines address the two remaining arguments for the unlimited (those from the unlimited divisibility of magnitudes and from time being unlimited) at Phys. 3.4, 203b16-18 (= [i] and [ii] at Themist. 81,24-6 above). Arist. 208a20-2 concedes that time, change and thought are unlimited but ‘without what is being taken persisting’, an idea conveyed by Themistius’ adding that their coming to be occurs ‘part by part’ (apo merous), i.e., without being cumulative; cf. 96,1-2 (= 207a26-7) above. 1036. 101,7: on this conjunction see on 92,2-3 above. 1037. 101,7-8: after energeiâi place a colon, delete the brackets on oude –

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Notes to page 109

holôs, and before apo merous delete kai (see 93,1-2 and 93,3 above where this phrase directly modifies ginesthai in an earlier passage on which Themistius is drawing here to expand the elliptical Aristotelian claim here that time and change are unlimited. 1038. 101,11: for autê read auto (MS B). 1039. 101,11-12: after noêsai delete the colon and place prostheiê – peras in brackets. 1040. 101,12-13: cf. Lear, 193 for the same conceit: ‘ however earnest a divider I may be, I am also mortal. But even at the sad moment when the process of division does terminate, there will remain divisions which could have been made’.

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English-Greek Glossary absurd: atopos account: logos activity: energeia actual (in actuality): energeiâi (dative), kat’ energeian; entelekheiâi actuality: energeia actualization: energeia, entelekheia add: prostithenai addition: prosthêkê, prosthesis advance: proerkhesthai affected, be: paskhein affection: pathos; (process of) being affected: pathêsis affirmation: kataphasis aggregate: sunkrinein aggregation: sunkrisis agree: homologein air: aêr all, the: to pan all together, en masse: homou altar: bômos alteration: alloiôsis animal(s): zôion, zôia antecedent: to hêgoumenon argue: legein argument: logos art: tekhnê artisan: tekhnitês assume: hupotithesthai assumption: hupothesis astronomy: astronomia be: einai bed: klinê bee: melitta beginning: arkhê being: to einai best: beltiston black: melas, to melan body: sôma body, divine: theion sôma

bricks: plinthoi bronze: khalkos buildable: oikodomêtos call: kalein carpentry: tektonikê category: katêgoria cause: aitia, aition cause, productive: aition poiêtikon cause of change: to kinoun cease from: pauesthai cease to be: ptheiresthai change (n.): kinêsis; change (trans. = cause change): kinein; change (intrans. = be changed): kineisthai; able to produce change: kinêtikos; change place: metabainein; (the) changeable: (to) kinêtos (-on); what is changed: to kinoumenon; changing: kinoumenos chilled, be: psukhesthai choice: proairesis circle: kuklos circumference: periphereia claim: legein clear: dêlos cold: psukhros coldness: psukhrotês colour: khrôma come about, come to be: ginesthai coming to be: genesis common: koinos completion: teleiotês complete (adj.): teleios complete (v.): teleioun compound: sunthetos compound made up of like parts: homoiomereia compounded, be: suntithesthai, sunkeisthai conception: epinoia

190

English-Greek Glossary

conclusion: sumperasma consequence, be a: akolouthein, hepesthai, sumbainein consequent: to lêgon consider: theôrein contact: haphê contact, be in: haptesthai continuous: sunekhês continuum, the: to sunekhes contradiction: antiphasis contrary: enantios contrary, state of being: enantiotês, enantiôsis coordination: harmonia cosmos: kosmos cubit: pêkhus decrease (n.): phthisis deduction: sullogismos deficiency: elleipsis define: horizein, diorizein definite something: tode ti definition: horismos, logos demonstrate: apodeiknunai demonstration: apodeixis dense: puknos density: puknotês determinate: hôrismenos diameter: diametros differ: diapherein, diapheresthai difference: diaphora differentia: diaphora disposition: diathesis distance: diastasis, diastêma divide: diairein divine: theios doctor: iatros down: kato drug: pharmakon dry: xêros dryness: xêrotes earth: gê educated: mousikos element: stoikheion eliminate: anairein end: telos end, involving the: telikos equal: isos essence: to ti ên einai even: artios excess: huperokhê exist: einai, huparkhein

existence: huparxis express: legein expression: phônê extract: ekkrinein extraction: ekkrisis false: pseudês falsity: pseudos fallaciously reason: paralogizesthai fire: pur first: prôtos flesh: sarx follow (as a logical consequence): akolouthein, hepesthai, sumbainein for the most part: epi to polu form: eidos generate: gennân genus: genos geometry: geômetria good: agathos go out: proerkhesthai great, the: to mega growth: auxêsis half: hêmisus happen: sumbainein, tunkhanein heap: sôros heat (n.): thermotês heat (v.): thermainein heavens: ouranos heaviness: barutês heavy: barus hit: patattein homogeneous: homoeidês horse: hippos hot: thermos hotness: thermotês house: oikia human being: anthrôpos idea: idea immobile: akinêtos impossible: adunatos in general: holôs in its own right: kath’ hauto incidental, be: sumbebêkenai incidental property: sumbebêkos incidentally: kata sumbebêkos incomplete: atelês inconceivable: amêkhanos increase (n.): auxêsis

English-Greek Glossary increase (v.): aux(an)esthai inference: akolouthia infinite, the: to apeiron infinity, to: ep’ apeiron inquire: zêtein inquiry: zetêsis instantaneous: athroos instantaneously: athroôs intelligible: noêtos kingfisher: alkuôn learn: manthanein (the one who learns: ho manthanôn) learning: mathêsis left: euônumos light: kouphos limit: peras limit, without: apeiros, eis apeiron limited: peperasmenos line: grammê luck: tukhê; bad luck: atukhia; by luck: apo tukhês; good luck: eutukhia; the outcome of luck: to apo tukhês lucky, be: eutukhein magnitude: megethos mathematical objects: ta mathêmatika mathematician: mathêmatikos matter: hulê; present in matter: enulos mean: legein mind: nous mixture: migma moon: selênê motion: phora, kinêsis (selectively) move: pheresthai, kineisthai (selectively) mud: pêlos name (n.): onoma name (v.): onomazein natural: phusikos, phusei; contra-natural: para phusin natural science: phusikê natural scientist: phusikos natural things: ta phusika nature: phusis nature, according to: kata phusin nature, by: phusei necessary: anankaios

necessity: anankê necessity, out of: ex’ anankês negation: apophasis nightingale: aêdôn non-coordination: anarmostia non-evident: aphanês non-homogeneous: anomoeidês non-shaped: amorphos non-structured: askhêmatistos number: arithmos obvious: phaneros odd (numerical): perittos odd (= puzzling, problematical): thaumastos one, what is: to hen opposite: antikeimenon paradigm: paradeigma part: meros parts, of like: homoiomerous parts, of unlike: anomoiomeous perceive: aisthanesthai perceptible: aisthêtos perception: aisthêsis philosopher: philosophos place: topos planks: xula plant: phuton plurality: plêthos point: sêmeion pointless: matên posit: tithenai, tithesthai possible: dunatos potentiality: to dunamei potentially: dunamei power: dunamis predicate: katêgorein pre-exist: proüparkhein premise: lêmma, protasis preserved, be: sôzesthai prevent: kôluein principle: arkhê prior: proteros privation: sterêsis problem: aporia produce (an effect): poiein product: poiêma products of art: tekhnêta productive: poiêtikos proximate: prosekhês proximately: prosekhôs purpose: to hou heneka

191

192

English-Greek Glossary

quality: poion, poiotês quantity: poson, posotês rain (v.): huein random: tukhon rarity: manotês rarefied: leptos, manos reasonable: eulogos reasoning: logos refer: anagein relative (in relation to): pros ti rest: êremia; be at rest : êremein remove: aphairein right: dexios root: rhiza safeguard: phulattein sake of, for the: heneka say: legein, phanai science: epistêmê scrutinize: exetazein self-evident: enargês segregate: diakrinein segregation: diakrisis semi-tone: hêmitonion separate: ekkrinein, khôrizein separately: khôris shape: morphê ship: naus show: deiknunai side: pleura sign: sêmeion signify: sêmainein size: megethos small, the: to mikron snub: simos snubness: simotês solution: lusis solve (a problem or argument): luein speak falsely: pseudesthai speak of: legein species: eidos sphere: sphaira spontaneity: to automaton spontaneously: apo tautomatou stability: monê, stasis stable, be: menein state (n.): hexis state (v.): legein statue: andrias steersman: kubernêtês stones: lithoi

stop (intrans.: come to a stop): histasthai strictly, in a strict sense: kuriôs strife: neikos strike: plêttein structure: skhêma sub-division: tomê subject: hupokeimenon subsist: huphistasthai subsistence: hupostasis substance: ousia sum total: ta panta sun: hêlios suppose: hupotithenai, hupotithesthai swallow (ornith.): khelidôn take: lambanein take on (acquire): lambanein teach: didaskein (the one who teaches: ho didaskôn) teaching: didaxis that which is: to on that which is not: to mê on think: noein thought: dianoia time: khronos to a lesser extent: ep’ elatton tone: tonos transformation: metabolê transformed, be: metaballein traversal: diexodos triangle: trigônon; equilateral: isopleuron; isosceles: isoskeles true: alêthês unchanging: akinêtos uncompounded: haplous; uncompounded bodies: hapla sômata underlie: hupokeisthai underlying subject: to hupokeimenon undivided: adiairetos, atomos unified: hênômenos unique: idios, oikeios universal: katholou unknowable: agnôstos unlimited: apeiros unlimited, the: to apeiron unqualified, without qualification: haplôs up: anô void, the: to kenon

English-Greek Glossary volume: onkos water: hudôr way: tropos weight: barutês wet: hugros wetness: hugrotês

what is/is not: (to) on/mê on what just is: to hoper on white: leukos, to leukon whole: holon without qualification: haplôs wood: xulon work: ergon

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Greek-English Index For a complementary index to Aristotle’s Physics see B. Colin, Aristote: Physica, Index verborum; Listes de fréquence, Liège 1993. The present index is selective, with its main focus on philosophical vocabulary, abstract language, and methodological terminology. In the age of the TLG there is obviously a rather limited point to this exercise and any shortcomings in this inventory can easily be remedied. Entries with bold-faced page numbers represent frequent occurrences. Asterisks indicate emendations. The equivalents given are not invariably a record of the translation used but are often intended for general lexicographical purposes. I am indebted to my former student Dr Christopher S. Morrissey who for the fourth time kindly and expertly prepared a concordance on which to base this kind of index. adêlos, obscure, 50,1; 75,22; 89,25 adiarthrôtos, not articulated (of sense impressions), 2,17 adiairetos, indivisible, undivided, 5,11.16; 6,2.7.8; 11,36.37; 12,2.11; 83,11.14(bis); 84,20; 96,22(bis).23.27 adiexitêtos, untraversable (of the infinite), 83,17; 84,14; 97,19; 98,28; (of a quantity), 5,5; agenêtos, unable to come to be, 34,1.5; 81,16 agnoein, be ignorant of, 9,30; 10,3; 14.27; 48,9; 67,3(bis) agnôstos, unknowable, 76,5; 95,28(bis); 96,7 agrammatos, inexpert in grammar, 23,24.25; 24,23.25; 25,17; 26,28 aïdios, eternal, 29,19; 33.5; 81.19; 91.15; ta aïdia, eternal (bodies), 29,21; 50,7; 58,14; 82,13 aisthanesthai, perceive, 1,10 aisthêsis, sense-perception, 1,5; 20,21.22; 41,21 aisthêtos, object of perception, perceptible, 2,6; 16,30.31; 17,1; 22,12; 27,23; 79,24.25; 80,2.3; 87.25; 96,4; perceptible (of body), 82,28; 83,9; 84,29; 85,4; 90,19; 97,10; 99,3

aithêr, aether, 63.21; 86,26 aithêrios, made of aether, 41,7; aitherion sôma, body made of aether, 68,2 aiteisthai, postulate, 3,16 aitia, cause, 13,16; 14,21; 28,11; 29,1; 31,20.25; 35-6; 37,30; 38,3; 42,27; 44,7.23; 45-7; 48,3.9.11; 49,31; 50,1; 51; 52,28; 56,18; 57,4; 61.18; 64,22-9; 81,21; 89,18.24; 90,4; (plu.), the (set of) causes, 49,20.21; 58,2; 59,8; 66,3; poiêtikê aitia, productive cause, 45,30; 59,11; aitia phusikê, natural cause, 90,3-4; aitia aoristos, indeterminate cause, 47,26; aitia hôrismenê, determinate cause, 48,9.11 aitiata, effects, 46,19(bis).24; 47,10 aitiasthai, identify as a cause, 48,12; 49,8.30 aitios, -on, cause, explanation, 13.21; 14.9; 28.29; 31.22; 33.10; 44-53; 53,13; 54,7; 56,8.12.23; 57,2-23; 64,2; 66,3.13; 73.10; 80,10.13.19; 98.30; see poiêtikos akhôristos, inseparable, 11,36.37; 17,7.10 akhronôs, atemporally, 75,15 akinêsia, changelessness, 74,10

196

Greek-English Glossary

akinêtos, unchanging, 2,28.29; 3,6.7.8; 8,11.14; 17.28; 49,28; 58,5.9.11; 74,26; 87,33; 88,13; 89,18; 90,7.9.17; immobile, 88,13; 90,7; unmoveable (metaph. = diehard), 98,18-19 akolouthein, follow, be a consequence, 14,5.34; 15,12; 23,3; 55,21; 56,4; 57.5; 64; 77,15.18; 78,24.28; 81,4.11; 82,5.20; 89,11; 84,10; 99,9 akolouthêsis, process of inference, 65,24 akolouthia, inference, 8,7; 99,13 alêtheia, truth, 20,18; 22,3; 29,23.24; 49,2 alêthês, true, 5,32; 7,6; 11,11; 15,5; 16,3; 17,12; 18.29; 20,10; 21,10; 27,2; 38,19; 41,20; 77,23; 85,25; 89,21; 96,1; 99,12; 100,23.31; 101,3 alloiôsis, alteration (qualitative change), 7,32; 8,15; 13,19.24; 14,2; 19,17; 23.18; 27,31, 45,16; 66,1; 69,24-32; 72,25; 79,5; 97,15 alloiousthai, be altered, 14,1; 17,23; 35,13; 58,4; 69,21; 81,17; 88,8 alogos, irrational, 77,11; epithet of animals, 54,27; to alogon, irrationality, 49,22; adv. 22,10 amorphia, unshaped state, 25,10.12.13; 28,9 amorphos, unshaped, 12,16; 26,21; 38,3 amorphôtos, unshaped, 25,13; 37,25 amousos, uneducated, 19,10.11.16; 23,23.24; 24; 25,23; 26,29; 30,21 anagein c. eis, reduce, assign (conceptually) to, 23,15; 48,9; 49,19; 56,22; 57,18; 59,8; 98,29; refer (for analysis), 57,18; (pass.), be elevated (of terrestrial moisture), 59,16 anairein, eliminate (by argument or exclusion), 3,11.24.29; 4,7.13.16; 7,2; 14,15.22; 24,29; 29,28; 30,20; 48,7; 82,20(bis).21.24; 91,10; 98,16.17.23; (med.), remove (physically), 50,20; kill, 48,14.17 anairesis, elimination (in argument), 48,25 anakeisthai, be put aside, 29,22 (LSJ II.2)

analambanein, recall or recapitulate (earlier material), resume (a discussion), 2,25; 25,34; 26,8; 44,11; 52,10; 74,24 analuein, analyse, 1,19 ta analutika, [Aristotle’s] Analytics, 2,14; 9,10 to anankaion, necessity, 63,15.19.20; 64,18.22; 65,1.25; 66,1.13 anankazein, compel (a conclusion), 10,34; 20,19; 21,31; 22,25; 101,6 anankê, necessity (as the overriding cause), 42,14, 59,8.9; 63,23; c. esti (usu. in ellipse) + infin., passim, e.g., 1,7; 2,27; 11,5.7; 16,15; 22,8; 40,24; ex anankês, from necessity, necessarily, 43,28; 50,11; 52,29; 53,11; 54,5-6; 57,5; 58,15; 59,10-11.19.23; 63,16-23; 64-6; 73,22; 74,2; 82,9.11.14; 90,12; 99,17; hulikê anankê, material necessity, 59,16.25; kata anankên, by necessity, 52,16 anenergêtos, unactivated, 78,6 anomoioeidês, non-homogeneous, 87,30; 88,20.23; 89,1 anomoiomerês, not made of like parts, 5,21; 84,8; see note on 3,2a antikeimenos, opposite, 28,9; 12,10; 19,20; 25,10; 28.1; to antikeimon, the opposites, 7,11; 12,26; 19,26; 25,7.21; 28,7; 40,12; 50,8; the contradictory (in a formal argument), 7,19.22.23 antikeisthai, be opposite, 24,31; 28,8 antikineisthai, be changed reciprocally, 70,25-9(bis); 74,30; 75,2 antilambanesthai, apprehend (= perceive), 2,7 antiphasis, contradiction, 6,13.24; 7,8.13; 12; 19,22; 31,11 antistrephein, convert, 6,4; to antistephon, the converse, 15,4 antistrophê, conversion (of one argument to another), 9,15 antitupia, resistance, 97,30 aoristos indeterminate, 15,30; 47,26; 49.18; 51,25.26; 52,23.24; 53.2.3.22; 60.6; 73,11.12.20; 80,7;

Greek-English Glossary 85,3; 95,18; 96.6; to aoriston, indeterminacy, 52,4 apallatein, escape (of an argument under criticism), 77,30 (cf. Plat. Soph. 254D2) apantan, confront, meet up with, 5,31; 7,26; 14.28; 51,6.19; 52,25; 55,3; 56.28; 97,6; 99,12; (absol.), crop up, 53,24; be at issue, 98,4* apantêsis (208a8), confrontation (= counter-argument), 99,12 apeiria, unlimitedness, 96,13; 98,31; 29,25; 80,11.14; 96,13 apeiros, unlimited (in size, in number), passim, esp. 79-100; ep’ apeiron, without limit, e.g., to apeiron, the unlimited, e.g., 67; 92,5.17.24; 94,12; 95,16(bis).22; 96,6 aphairein, remove, take away (usu. med.), 6,23; 11,1.2; 16,6.14; 17,12; 21,2; 61,24; 81,28; 83,7; 93,15; 97,18; 98,6.18 aphairesis, subtraction, 27.30; 28,4; 83,6; to ex aphaireseôs einai, existing by abstraction (of geometrical shapes), 98.6 aphthartos, incapable of ceasing to be, 16,3; 29,18(bis).19; 34,1.4.10; 58,8(bis); 81,15 aphthoria, indestructibility, 82,22 aphorizein, separately distinguish (isolate definitionally), 27,9; 89,6; 94,15; 99,11 apobainein, result, 53,26; 56,3 apodeiknunai, demonstrate, 2,1; 3,16.17; 50,22; 59,6; 64,27; 65,4; 91,8; 97,17.22; 98,25 apodeiktikos, demonstrative (syllogism), 2,15 apodeixis, demonstration, 1,12(bis); 2,2; 4,2; 17,16; 37,14; 98,12.18 apodidonai, present, supply (usu. a definition; often c. logos), 11,1; 12,24; 14,24; 35,3; 39,3; 41,18; 43,19; 44,11; 49,32; 45,29(bis); 46,9.19.23; 47,10; 57,4.18; 58,12; 68,28; 69,4; 72,25; 73,3; 79,4 apodosis, definition, 46,12; 49,6; 89,18 apoios, unqualified (of matter) 26,27.28; 27,1

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apokeisthai*, leave aside (in a discussion), 29,20 apophantikos, assertoric (statement-making), 7,2 apophasis, negation, 6,15; 9,13; 26,28; 27,2 aporein, raise a problem, 11,30; 42,7; 48,11; 75,8; 79,7; 97.22 aporia, problem, 4,15.16; 23,16; 29,22; 30,3; 76,23; 82,19; 84,20; 89,25 aporos, problematical, 5,28.31; 12,6; 82,24 apotelesma, result, 76,26(bis) apousia, absence, 29,10.12; 32,20 apsukhos, inanimate, 54,16.21.26 arithmêtikos, arithmetician, 19,4; 80,17; arithmêtikê (epistêmê), science of arithmetic, 3,14; arithmêtos, numerable, 28,19.20.21; 85,4.5; 96,28 arithmos, number, passim, e.g., 2,29; 5,9.10.14; 11,14.15; 12,24.30; 13,7; 14,24.26; 15,20.21; 16,13; 20,31; 22,18; 24,24; 28,16.18; 32,16; 57,9; 65,4; 79-80; 81,2.5; 82,2.21; 83,5.22; 84,12.13(bis).24; 85,4. 6.9.10.12; 86,1.9; 88,24; 89,5; 91,6.18.22; 94-7; 100,2 arkhaioi, hoi, pioneers (sc. early thinkers), 22,4; 42,10 arkhê, beginning (of a process of change), 7,25-8,21; 81,16; 91,12; 101,6; beginning (of a discussion), 4,24; 35,2; 47,16; principle (first principle of nature, or being, or demonstration), 1,6-7; 2,2.4 etc.; in defining nature as arkhê (kinêseôs, metabolês, phoras), principle of change, 3,26; 36,22; 37,4; 39,23; 44,20.22; 45,8; source (of action), 56,7.9; ex arkhês, originally, 53,25; 67,21; 77,31; 84,6; 86,5; 90,17; 93,19; 97,25; 100,17; tên arkhên, originally, 51,6 arkhesthai, begin, 2,3; 8,2; 13,26; 18,23; 67,17; 76,19.21; 78,20.22; 81,4; 91,13 artios, even (number), 11,14; 20,23.27; 41,15; 80; 84,24 asômatos, incorporeal, 37,2; 79,24.29

198

Greek-English Glossary

asullogistos, deductively invalid, 4,14; 7,16 asunthetos, uncompounded, 19,31; 84,5; 95,9 atelês, incomplete, 68,33; 70,11.13(bis); 73,1; 74,19.20.22; 75,14.18 athroos, instantaneous, 7,32; 75,12; 81,17; 92,24.26; 93,2.6; 101,7.11 atomos, undivided, 2,31; 4,32; 5,1; indivisible (lines), 12,6; 91,25; hê atomos, the (Democritean/Epicurean) atom, 89,8.9; 100,6; atopos, absurd, 6,16; 8,18; 10,21; 12,23; 14,28; 15,16; 16,25; 23,3; 52,9; 77; 78,2; 82,20; 86,30; 87,17; 89,18; 91,16; 98.3 atukhia, bad luck, 53,25; 54,1.2.18 aülos, immaterial, 33,14; 67,20 to automaton, spontaneity, 47,12; 49,16-22; 50,30; 51,9.15; 54-5; 56,22; 57,1.3; apo tautomatou, spontaneously, 49,29; 52,12; 54-6; 59,22; 60,6 to autoon (Platonic term), what itself-is, 9,29; 10,9; 13,6; see note on 9,29 auxein/auxesthai, increase, grow, 14,30; 27,30; 35,13; 59,18; 60,9; 69,24; 73,22; 80,27; 82,24; 94,4; 96,27; 97,7.27; 98,29 auxêsis, increase, growth, 15,11; 42,29.32; 59,15; 69,24; 79,5.10; 82,20.21; 91,18; 97,15; 80,7; 93,25; 96,15; 97,19; 98,2 auxêtos, increasable, 70,4.5 axioun, judge, 37,15 axiôma, statement (= proposition in a formal argument), 8,8 boulesthai, want, wish, 1,13; 8,9 (bis); 44,22; 45,24; 47,21; 48,7 (bis); 49,21; 50,22; 53,8; 61,9; 62,23.24; 63,1.4; 83,14; 84.21; 94,8; 96,6.12; 97,21; 100,27; 101,3; aim at (a goal), 17,22 daimonios, involving spirits, 50,2 deiknunai, demonstrate, prove, show, 4,26; 8,10; 18,21; 20,31; 34,12; 37,11; 40,8; 59,2.6; 71,13;

75,17; 82.7; 86,11; 91,15.21; 92,18; 98,24; 100,14 deisthai be in need, 9,31; 22,2; 25,25.27; 27,22.24; 64,6; 65,13; 83,21; 87,8; 88,18.19; 97,20; 98,3.4.18.26 dêloun, indicate, show, 1,7; 30,19; 41,20; 75,22; 98,20 dêmiourgein, craft (= act like a craftsman), 44,20 dêmiourgos, craftsman, 45,5; 50,19; 63,7 dêmiourgein, craft (v.), 13,12; 38,21; 44,20 diairesis, division, 7,9; 15,27; 20,5; 21,4; 66,14; 80,12; 81,25; 91; 92,19; 93-4; 29.32; 96,25-8; 99,2-6 diairetos, divided, 5,14.16; 67,10 diairein, divide, 2,25; 10,34; 11; 12,3.10; 14,17; 17; 18,32; 21,1; 25,16; 41,13; 50,18; 59,24; 82,29; 83,11.12; 90,24; 91,28; 92-3; 96.17.20; 97,16; 99,3; (pass.), be split (in doctrine), 3,3; 13,10 diakrinein, distinguish, separate, 2,17; 9,25; 17,3.6.8; 24,26; (pass.), be segregated, 13,35; diakrisis, segregation, 17,25; 18,1; 19,18; 20,29; 21,17.20 dialektikos, dialectical (syllogism), 2,15; a dialectician (opp. philosopher), 3,21 dialegesthai, discuss (argumentatively), 4,11.18; 8,6; 11,12.18; 29,25; 47,20; 51,3; 59,8; 60,13; 67,6; 80,27 dialektos, speech, 83,20 dialuein, dissolve, 17,15; 85,20; 86,24.26; 87,2; resolve, 1,11 dianoêma, (object of) thought, 100,31 dianoêsis, thinking, 100,24.25 dianoia, thought (process), 33,1; 50,1.19; 51,1.17; 53,1.2; 54.3; 56,24.25; 98,5; 100,28 diapherein, be different, 4,10; 15,29; 35,10.11; 40,14.28; 45,26; 46,23; 51,26; 53,5; 54,8; 56,1; 68,26(bis); 74,14; 76,26; 77,13.21; 79,4; 92,21; c. dat., make a difference (= be significant), 42,11 diapheresthai, differ (in doctrine), 79,22; 80,8.29

Greek-English Glossary diaphora, difference, differentia, 15,12; 22,12; 52,2; 56,22; 63,8; 90,27.30; 91,1 diaphtheirein, cause to cease to be, 16,1; 59,15; 62,10; 85,16.17 diaphulattein, safeguard, 69,16 diastasis, distance, 78,29; (plu.) dimensions, 90,29(bis) diastellesthai, distinguish, 5,18 diastêma, distance, 7,28; 76,18; 78,21; (plu.), dimensions, 98,9 diathesis, disposition, 19,20; 38,7.15 didaskalia, explication, 50,27 didaskein, explain, teach, instruct, 2,14; 3,23; 11,11; 14,26; 37,18.21; 49,5.30; 77, 24.25(bis); 78; 81,22; 86,23 didaxis (opp. mathêsis), teaching, 77,10.24; 78,5-31 didonai, give, grant (= concede), 3,26; 6,23; 10,8.25; 12,12.17; 15,20; 32,13; 61,23; 88,17; 96,12; 97,23-7; 98,13; logon didonai, give an account, 3,21 dielthein, traverse, 85,5.6 dielenkhein, refute, 14,16 diexodeuesthai, to be completely traversed (of the unlimited), 82,31 diexodos, traversal (i.e., complete passage through a magnitude), 83,1.4 diorismos, distinction, 7,14 doxa, belief, doctrine, 3,3; 4,10.22; 8,26; 13,29.32; 14,4; 17,29; 22,16; 30,3; 32,13; 50,3.15.20; 80,30; 96,1 dektikos, capable of receving, 26,25.27; 33,7; 95,19 dêmiourgein, craft (= act like a craftsman), 44,20 dekhesthai, receive, 21,21; 22,8; 27,7; 30.18; 45,16; 68.2; 82,6.7.8(bis); 84,7; 87,13 dêloun, show, indicate, 1,7; 30,19; 41,20; 75,22; 98,20 dêmiourgos, craftsman, 45,5; 50,19; 63,7 dêmiourgein, craft, 13,12; 38,21; 44,20 diathesis, disposition, 19,20; 38,7.15 diairesis, division, 7,9; 15,27; 20,5; 21,4; 29,32; 66,14; 80,12; 81,25; 91,17-27; 92,19; 93; 94,2-20; 96,25.27.28; 99,2.4.6

199

diairetos, divided, 5,14.16; 67,10 diakrinein, distinguish (conceptually), 9,25; 24,26; segregate (physically), 2,17; 17,3.6.8; 13,35; 17,6 diakrisis, segregation (in cosmogony) (opp. sunkrisis), 17,25; 18,1; 19,18; 20,29; 21,17.20 diakritikos, capable of separating, 9,25; 84,4 dialektikos, the dialectician, 3,21; adj. dialectical (syllogism), 2,15 dialegesthai, argue, converse, discuss, 4,11.18; 8,6; 11,12.18; 29,25; 47,20; 51,3; 59,8; 60,13; 67,6; 80,27 dialuein, dissolve, 17,15; 85,20; 86,24.26; 87,2; resolve, 1,11 dianoêma, thought, 100,31 dianoêsis, thinking, 100,24.25 dianoia, thought, 33,1; 50,1.19; 51,1.17; 53,1.2; 54.3; 56,24.25; 98,5; 100,28 diastasis, distance, 78,29; 90,29(bis) diastêma, distance, 7,28; 76,18; 78,21; 98,9 diaphtheirein, destroy, cause to cease to be, 59,15; 85,16.17; (med.), cease to be, 16,1; 62,10 didaxis, teaching, 77,10.24; 78 didaskalia, explication, 50,27 didaskein, explain, teach, instruct, 2,14; 3,23; 11,11; 14,26; 37,18.21; 49,5.30; 77,24.25(bis); 78; 81,22; 86,23 didonai, 6,23; 3,21.26; 10,8.25; 12,12.17; 15,20; 32,13; 61,23; 88,17; 96.12; 97,23-7; 98,13 dielthein, traverse, 85,5.6 diexitêtos, able to be traversed, 83,3 diexodeuesthai, to be completely traversed, 82,31 diexodos, traversal (of a magnitude), 83,1.4 diorismos, distinction, 7,14 diorizein, bound, define, delimit, 2,20; 5,31; 24,21; 26,18; 34,9; 37,10; 44,9; 47,11; 58,7; 67,11; 79,28 dunamis, potentiality, 25,15.18.31.32; 32,16; 38.5; 46.26; 69; 74,7; 75,8.9; 78,16; 85,12.27; 86,1.2; 92,2.3.12.17; power, 41,1;

200

Greek-English Glossary

83,20; 85-6; 92,1.12 ; 71,17.18 ; 74.18; the thrust (of an argument or statement), 8,27; 25,15; dunamei, in potentiality, potential, 7,12 (bis); 25,18; 26,4-16; 31,20; 32,9.22; 38,32(bis); 46,23; 47,9(bis); 66,15*; 69; 70-5; 67,22; 68,1.7; 76,11; 74,32 ; 79,7-11; 85,21; 91-2; 93,22; 95,19.20; 97,2(bis); 99,11; to dunamei, potentiality, what is potential, 5,19; 12,10; 25,31; 26,1.2.13.16; 31,18; 33,7.32; 47,1; 68,4.7; 74,32; 92,3.5 eidenai, know, be aware, 9,11; 11,2.31; 12,18; 14,20; 16,2; 37,13; 39,4; 40,24.25; 42,9.16.20; 43,28; 61,19; 68,28; 76,1; 89,12; 97,11 eidikos, specific (pertaining to a species), 20,20.22 eidopoioos, form-producing (of principles), 42,13 eidos, form, kind, passim: as a cause (= paradigm), 41,14; 44,15-16; that for the sake of which matter is a cause, 64,28-9; c. morphê, shape, 64,19; eidê aüla kai prôta, immaterial and primary forms, 67,20-1; eidos enulon, form based in matter (= natural form), 44,3.4 eidê phusika kai phtharta, 34,10 eilikrinês, unadulterated, 14,13; 17,3 (adv.) einai, be, passim; (to) on, (to) mê on/ouk on, what is/what is not, 3,6.9; 4-12; 29-32; 72,27-30; 73,4-5.13; auto to on, 10,8; 13,4; 31,7; to autoon, 9,29; 10,9; 13,6 (see note on 9,29); ta onta, existent things, things in general, 3,3.4-5; 4,25.33; 5,7; 6,3; 7,15; 9,4; 12,22.24; 13,7; 18,24; 21,2.26; 29,24.25-6.29; 31,9; 32,2; 35,4; 37,11; 38,13.16; 51,20; 67,20; 68,7; 69,6; 73,20; 83,18; 91,21; 97,29; to einai, the being (of something), 4,29; 9,27; 25,30.31; 26,10; 27,4; 28,12; 39,4; 84,15; 92,15.16; 97,14; to ti ên einai, essence, 27,33; 38,29; 44,16; 45,19; 58,18-19; 64,3; 66,5-6; 76,17; 78,20; to/ta

hoper on/onta, what just is, 9,28-9 (see note ad loc.); 10-12 eisagein, introduce (into an argument), 12,5.28; 13,4; 63,20 ekballein, extend (a line), 97,26; 98,27 ekbainein, digress, 27,13; 87,24; depart, 74,21 ekhein, have, possess, passim, e.g., 9,15; 15,14; 17,7; 42,25; 56,9.11.20; 61,15; 63,12; 82,10; 88,6; 93.25; be able, 1,4; 14,24; be (the case), 12,21; 15,19; ekhesthai, be next in succession, 20,31; 67,18 ekkrinein, extract, 13,20.25; 16,17; 17,1 ekkrisis, extraction, 13,26; 16,9.10; 17,31; 29,30 ekleipein, undergo an eclipse, 55,18 elenkhein, put to the test, 75,18; refute, 99,16 elenkhos, refutation, 6,25 elleipein, to be lacking, 95,1.6 elleipsis, deficiency, 13,13; 20,29; 22,15.17; 56,19; 68,9; 80,6 embrontêtos, thunder-struck, 63,26 (see note ad loc.) emperiekhein, include, 66,18; 67,5; enclose, 96,10 emphainesthai, be present (manifest), 61,27; 66,15; 80,6; be present in (a definition), 66,10; 67,6.7; be present in (a term) 37,23 emphutos, inborn, 35,20 ta enantia, opposites, 4,12; 8,23; 13,13-32; 18 ; 20-2; 23,5.6.9(bis); 24,30; 25,9; 26,26; 29,4-10; 31,26; 33; 40,12; 45,10; 69,1; 71,16.17; 86,6; 87,13.21 enantiologia, contradiction, 10,7 enantiôsis, opposition, 17,31; 18,2; 21,5.31; 22,24.25.26; 23,2-14; 32.29; 87,5-20; 86,16 enantiotês, pair of opposites, 3,2; 13,20; 87,10 enargeia, what is self-evident, 78,4 enargês, self-evident, 4,21; 37,12.19; 68.8; 87,29; 88,18; 100,23 endekhesthai, be possible, 8,13; 11,9; 12,2515.3; 15,7; 40,11; 54,15.16; 71,25; 74,7.9; 77,2; 82,8.9.14; 85,5.6; 88,8; 89,13;

Greek-English Glossary 96,14; 99,14; to endekhomenon, what is possible, 82,11-15 ta endoxa, reputable opinions, 3,20 energeia, actuality, 70-8; 83,25; 92,2-6; activity, 37,6 (= locomotion); 47,2 (= house-building in process); 70,13(bis); 76,24.27; 77; 78,2.8.17.32 energeiâi (dative case), actual, 7,11.13; 12,10; 26,3; 31,18.19.21.28; 32,9; 37,3; 38,32.32*; 41, 27.29; 46,23; 66,16; 69,33; 70-2; 73,21; 75,5; 91,23-31; 92,25; 97; 98,1; 99,3.11; 101,7.10; to energeiâi, actuality, what is actual, 12,10; 92,5; kat’energeian, actual, in actuality, 5,17.18; 14,33; 41,24; 71,20.22; 72,30; 74,15; 86,30; 87,10 energein, be actual, 71,4.26.27; be active, 74.29; 75,2; 77,12; 78,7(bis).8; activate, 46,24(bis); 47,1.9.10 ennoia, notion, 22,9 enokhlêsis, intrusion, 7,14 (see note ad loc.) entelekheia, actualization (in the definition of change), 69,7-16; 70,2-14; 71,6; 72,9.27; 75; 76,10; 77,28; 79,2-8; 92,7-11; entelekheiâi (dative case), in actuality, 39,14; 67,20.22; 68,1-5; 69,7; 70; 91,20; 93,27; to entelekheiâi, actuality, 69,6; 74,32.33 enulos, present in/based in matter: of ousia, 21,6; 23,11; of arkhê, 37,2; of eidos, 39,23; 44,3.4.6; ta enula (sc. eidê), 33,15; enuparkhein, be present in, exist within, 13,20.25.31; 14,5; 16,8.13.32; 22,21; 25,7.11.21; 26,15; 28,11.27; 30,17.28; 31,16; 33,13.20; 34,2.6; 37,30; 39.23; 44,13; 62,16; 69,6; 87,22; 96,13; be embedded (of definientia in a definition),11,19.25(bis).27; eperkhesthai, come upon (as the culmination of a process), 92,1; address (a subject) (LSJ III.2), 23,18; 99,10 epharmozein, coincide (geom..), 4,6 ephesis, longing, 33,12

201

ephexês, next (in succession), 4.5; 14.7; 21,18; 67,6.13; 69.4; 76,8; 80,14.18.22; ta ephexês, what follows next (= consequences, implications), 3,15; 13,19; 29,30 (sing.) epikheirein, argue, 85,1 epileipein, give out (i.e., be exhausted), 16,10 êremein, be at rest, 35,20; 36,2.23; 70,7; 71,7.9.24.27; 88,5.16; 89,17.26 êremia, rest, 60,21; 74,1 epagein, infer, 7,19; 8,2; 9,11 epagôgê, induction, 20,18 epiballein, attend to, focus on, 32,2 epideiknunai, demonstrate, display, 3.28; 8.29; 11,33; 14,19; 29,5; 37,13; 57,1; 58,28; 61,10; 71,13; 85,19; 86,23; 90,32; 91,30; 92,10; 100,23 epiginesthai, supervene, 45,22 (of the formal cause completing a whole); 69,19 (of form supervening on a completed change) epilogismos, subsequent reasoning, 66,15 epinoiâi (dat.), in conception, opp. energeiâi, 97.27; 101,10; sim. kat’ epinoian, 41,29; 98,2 epipedon, plane (surface), 40,16; 57,13; 85,2 episkeptesthai, investigate, 8,23; 14,16; 27,12.25; 38,1; 40,11(bis); 43,29; 47,15. 16; 66,3; 70,32; 82,25.28; 83,8; 84,29; 85,7 epistasthai, have scientific knowledge, 14,20 epistêmê, science (sc. body of systematic knowledge), 1,2; 3,13.18.30; 14,18.22; 21,2; 78,15.16; 79,13.17; met’ epistêmês, scientifically, 1,6 epistêmonikos, scientific, 67,17 epistêtos, knowable, 29,13; 96,7 episumbainein, happen additionally, 52,6.29; 56,6.23 epitithesthai, to be imposed (of an artifical form), 35,21 epitêdeiôs, suitably, 55,6; 59,20.26; 82.10 epiphaneia, surface, 94.20

202

Greek-English Glossary

epizêtein, inquire, 1,13; 21,7; 92,7 ergasia, mastication (of food), 59,26 ergazesthai, carry out work, 43,16.21; 61,7; 63,10 ergon, activity, 45,1; task, work, function, 44,9; 59,20; 66,14; 63,6.9; (work) product, 43,19.24; 76,26; erga tês phuseôs, works of nature, 37,9; 59,29-60,1; 60,6.7.17; 63,20 eristikoi, contentious (of arguments), 4,13 erôtan, lay out (an argument) (LSJ II.2), 5,31 ethelein, to be normally the case, 45.26; to want, 77,4; 90,8 eudaimonia, happiness, 54,14(bis) euergos, adaptable, 43,4.5 eulogos, reasonable, based on sound reasoning, 18,7; 22,22; 24,12; 52,24; 54,5; 81,12.15; 96,3.15 euodein, go through, i.e., succeed (of an argument), 91,19 euporein, find an easy solution, 14,25 eutukhês, possessed of good luck, 54,19.24 eutukhein, achieve good luck, 54,11 eutukhia, good luck, 53,24.26; 54,4-18 euphôros, easily detectable, 8,19; 9,19 exergazesthai, carry out work (trans.), 58,3; 63,5; (pass.), 61,24 exetazein, scrutinize, 4,22; 8,3; 41,5.23; 44,2; 66,13; 85,1; 98,9 exelaunein, expel (theoretically), 48,5 genesis, coming to be, 7,27; 13,19.24; 17,24.31; 18,2.21; 19,6.17.24; 20,9.13; 23.17; 25,25; 27,24; 29,7.29; 30,6.20; 31-2; 37,28; 39,24; 40,5; 42,29; 49,23; 50,10; 58.1; 61,15; 69,26; 81,27; 87,4.8; 93,10; 99,13.14; haplê genesis, unqualified coming into being, 40,13; (ta) en genesei, (things) involved in coming to be, 34,11; 87,25 genêtos, able to come to be, 21,7; 22,28; 23,11; 37,8.15; 58,15; 69,26; 156,29; 210,31; 211,31; 213,18

genos, genus, kind, 4,32.33; 5,5; 10.32; 11,3; 13,1(bis); 18.2; 21,3(bis); 21,4; 23,12; 35,19; 44,14.15; 46,12.13.20; 47,7(bis); 72,27; 97.11; category, 68,20 (see note ad loc.).22.24(bis); 69,3.5,29 ginesthai, come to be, come into being, come about, become, be generated, passim; ta ginomena, the things that come to be, 21,9; 22,21; 30,25; 32,29; 50,15; 52,10; 63,18; 64,26; ta phusei ginomena, see phusis ginôskein, get to know, 1,4.6.7; 4,6; 14,2; 40.9; 42,21; 43,6.26; 49,4; 56,15; 80,20 gnôrimos, evident, familiar, intelligible, 1,15; 2,5; 18,22; 20,21.22.24; 36,22; 37,14; 75,26 (comp.), 76,2.3.4 grammata, letters (of the alphabet), 1,16.17; 83,20 grammatikos, expert in grammar, 23,20.24.25; 24,11.12; 25,2(bis).17; 26,29; (plu.), 1,8 grammê, line, 3,14; 5; 12,7.11(bis).12; 41,6.22.24; 59.3; 91,25; 94,20; 97,20.27; 98,4.11. 13.25.26; 99,27.29; 100,1; eutheia (grammê), straight line, 41,26; 88.12; euthugrammos 18,4 grammikos, geometrical (of demonstrations), 98.18; hoi grammikoi, geometers, 80,19 gumnasia, (intellectual) practice, 58,13 hamartanein, fail, 17,25; 49,29; 55,22; 61,27 haphê, contact, 75,2; 81,6; 99,20 haplous, simple (uncompounded) 1,17.19.20; 23,22,23; 24,1.7; 29,3; 37,32; 83,25; 84,1.5.9; 85,8.9.18; 86,12; 88,20; unqualified (of coming to be), 40,13; ta hapla tôn sômatôn, the ‘simple’ type of bodies (i.e., the uncompounded elements), 35,9,15 haplôs, without (further/any) qualification, in unqualified terms, simply, passim, e.g., 6,13,22; 7,1.31; 10,28,32; 12,26; 27,14-21

Greek-English Glossary haptesthai, have (physical) contact, 79,18; 88,21,22; 99-100; make (conceptual) contact, 26,10; touch on (a subject superficially), 22,3; 32,1; 59,12 harmozein, to fit (a situation), 19,9; 25,1; 79,9; fit (physically), 60,26; to hêgoumenon, the antecedent (in a formal argument), 7,19.22 henas, unit, 96,26; 97,6 heneka, for the sake of, usu. in the phrases to hou heneka/to tou heneka/to heneka tinos, purpose, 42,26,32; 44,25; 45,26; 50,21.27; 57,22; 58,20,26; 61,4,11,20,21,25,26; 62,7,13; 63,1; 65,18 henousthai, be unified, 5,15.20.22; 9,19 hepesthai, follow (logically), 41,14; 58,15; 63,17,18; 64,13-26; 65,2,6,7,25 heteroiôsis, (process of) differentiation, 72,24,25 heterotês, (state of) differentiation, 72,15,18(bis),19; 72,11,17,23(bis); 73,7(bis),10,12 heuresis, discovery, 35,5; 56,26 heuriskein, discover, find, 1,13; 9,24; 18,1.32; 22,31; 23,11.14; 27,26; 35,5; 38,22.23; 46,14; 52,1.5.20; 53,20; 55,24; 56,25.26.27; 57,7; 60,18; 64,31 hexis, state, 17,10; 38,15 histasthai, come to a stop, 35,17; 42,29; 43,1; 91,17; 94,3; 97,3; c, huper, take a stance on (i.e., be a proponent of), 38,19 hodos, road, 7,28; 83,3; 78,19.26; passage (to form in natural change), 37,30; 40,6.7(bis); 42,25; 69,22.23.27; (metaph.) ‘path of truth’, 29,24; for plan of action, 63,7; hodou parergon, ‘by-product of the journey’ (something picked up along the way), 87,23 holos, whole (adj.), 2,7.11; 5,24; 8,12; 25,23; 45,19.20.22(bis); 87,27; 94,22.24(bis); 99,25; to holon, the whole, 5,29.30; 6,1; 11,23.25; 14,33(bis); 15,1.5; 24,21; 31,25; 84,18; 87,31*; 88; 90,12-15; 93,17; 94-7; 95,2; 99,24-5; 100,20

203

homoeidês, homogeneous, 87,30 (bis); 88,10; 89,7 (bis).30; 90,10.13; identical in form, 57,26 homoiomerês, made up of like parts, 5,20; 14,29; 15,11.13.15; 17,14(bis) homoiomereia, a compound made up of like parts (see on 3,2), 3,2; 13,22; 14,26; 15,14,27; 17,30; 81,3 kath’ homoiotêta, by analogy, 54,18,26; 68,11 homoiousthai, be likened (to the first cause), 33,11 (see note on 33,6-27) homônumia, ambiguity, 7,25; 37,23 homônumôs, ambiguously, 77,3 hôrismenos, determinate, 5,6; 16,10; 51,24; 53,4; 60,5; 93,23; 96,9.28; aition hôrisomenon, determinate cause, 47,18; 48,2; aitia hôrismena, 48,9.11; 49,20; arkhê, 48,12 horismos, definition, 2,21.22.24; 11; 36,22; 39,21; 57,10; 67,6.12; 68,27; 70,32; 75,3; 76,4; 77,27; 78,24 horistikos, definitional (formula, logos), 11,22 to horiston, definiendum, 11,22 horizein, define, give a definition, 10,35; 15,19; 27,11; 39,3; 41,16; 42,3,6; 53,5,21; 57,13; 66,14; 67,2; 8; 69,15; 73,11; 75,20.24(bis); 94,23; 96,7; ta hôrismena, distinctions drawn, 69,5 horizesthai, be fixed, be determinate, 15,5,7; 16,4,15; 44,18; 62,19; 63,6; 73,14; 88,28; 97,8; be bounded (by a limit), 83,3; 85,2 hormasthai, start (a demonstration from a given point), 2,16 horos, constraint, 15,19; limit, 16,26; definition, 75,18 hulê, matter, passim; as to hupokeimenon, 13,16-17; 21,13; 45,14; 64,24-5; 66,19; distinct from to hupokeimenon, 26,9-18; as to apeiron, 95; Platonic concept, 12,16; 13,15; aneideos, unformed, 26,21 (Boethus); 27,27; as prime (prôtê), 12,16 (Plat.); 28,19.20 hulikos, material, 59,10.16.25 huparkhein, exist, belong to (c.

204

Greek-English Glossary

dat.), i.e., hold of as a property, 2,4; 10; 15,8.13.30; 16,23; 17,2; 18,12; 22,37; 25,35.37; 31,4.7.26; 36,13,23; 38,6; 40,23,25; 54; 55,17; 58,28; 64,17; 66,7.8; 67,11.14; 68,23; 71,8; 72,13.15; 74,4. 27; 77,16; 78,26.32; 80,11; 82,10; 84,2; 89,28; 90,9.10; 94,13; 95,26; 98,7; 100,1.7,13 huperokhê, excess, 13,13; 20,29; 22,15.17; 68,9; 80,5; 100,29 huphistasthai, subsist, 9,22; 10,4.6; 16,24; 21,16.18; 24,24; 25,5; 41,24; 44,1; 98,1 hupokeimenos, underlying, 9,14; 21,18; 23,2; 26,25; 29,15; 31,26; 39,5; 83,26; 84,27; 92,9; arkhai hupokeimenai, assumed principles, 3,15; c. sôma, 9,21; c. ousia, 2,25; 5,9; c. phusis, 29,13 (to) hupokeimenon, underlying subject, 10,27; 11,13; 13,16; 21-2; 26-8; 29,17; 31,26.28; 36,26; 37,1.5; 39,5; 45,14; 64,24(bis); 66,19; 76,21.22; hupokeimenon ti, 5,6,8; 9,23,30; 27,24,26-7; 28,1; 36,26; 37,5; kata to hupokeimenon (usu, opp, kata ton logon), 7,7; 71,12; 76,20; 78,3,10-11,32; (opp, kata to eidos) 95,24; tôi hupokeimenôi opp. tôi logôi, 76,16-17; 78,1,14-15; to proton hupokeimenon, the first underlying thing, 34,5; 38,3,16,28; en hupokeimenôi, in an underlying thing, 21,24; 27,23; 36,26; 37,1; kath’ hupokeimenou, 27,23 hupokeisthai, underlie, be an underlying subject, 4,21; 9,6; 10,1-18; 11,6; 21,27; 26,15; 28,2.8; 29,8.16.28; 30,32; 34,1; 38,10.11; 45,15; 64,11.15; 73,16; 96,25; 99,2 hupolambanein, assume, suppose, 6,20.27; 10,22.26; 12,8.18; 13,34; 14,20; 17,15; 38,20; 49,3; 50,2; 67,16; 79,29; 80,29; 82,2; 84,21; 85,19; 101,4 hupoleipein, leave (sc. leave behind), be lacking, 65,21; 85,29; 86,8; 93,4.10.21 hupomenein, absol., persist, 18,18; 20,13(bis); 22,13; 24-5; 28,24;

30,23; 78,2; 84,21; 89,9; 93,9; 101,7; c. infin., dare (LSJ II.4); endure, 12,27; 21,19 huponoia, idea (= basic thought), 86,14 hupostasis, subsistence, 9,31; kath’ hupostasin opp. kata logon, 25,28; 39,7; 41,11; opp. kata to onoma, 4,27; hupostasei opp. logôi, 41,15; 44,4; opp. epinoiâi, 101,10 hupothesis, assumption, supposition, 3,31; 4,7; 9,5; 10,17; 15,21; 64,22; 77,19; 81,26; 83,14; 87,4; 90,1; kath’ hupothesin/ex hupotheseôs, conditionally, 64,30; 65,1,9 hupothetikoi (sc. sullogismoi), hypothetical syllogisms, 7,20 hupotithenai/hupotithesthai, posit, suppose, 3,1; 13,11.21; 21; 22,4; 29,6; 41,11; 64,21,31; 65,2; 77,18.30; 81,1; 84,11; 86,28; 87,10.23; 90,5(bis).17; 91,27; 98,22.28; 100 ,5 idea (Platonic), defined, 12,15; 79,29; 80,3; 84.28; hoi tas ideas legontes, those who speak of the ideas (= the Platonists), 41,14; 44,17; external appearance, 61,2; external structure (of atoms), 89,9; idios, unique, 18,11; (adv.), 27,32; idiâi (dative), 39,11; 42,8; kat’ idian, 5,27.33; idia energeia, 77,6.7; idios logos, 10,6; ta idia (opp. ta koina), unique (opp. common or general) features, 2; 8,26; 19,24; 23,21; 67,18 iskhuros 61,7 85,30(bis) iskhus, strength (of an argument), 100,19 kakopoios*, productive of evil, 32,30 kakourgia, illegitimacy (of an argument), 8,19 katagraphê, (geometrical) diagram, 98,10 katalambanein, come across (a person), 47,20.22; occupy (a place), 86,9 kataphasis, affirmation, 6,15; 9,14 katapheresthai, fall, move

Greek-English Glossary downwards, 51,10.14; 56,24; 59,17(bis); kataskeuazein, establish (by argument), 4,23; 12,2; 17,24; 22,31 katêgoria, category, 4,26; 11,5; 49,12; 68,6.21.23; 73,15; 75,19; 76,6; 98,8 katêgorein, c. gen., predicate, 4,30; 5,6; 6,7.27.29; 10,29-30; 31,5; 32,24; 91,15; 95,21; 97,12; 100,16.18; c. kata + gen., 4,33-5,1; 25,9 katekhein, hold down, 33,7; restrain, 36,9; katekhousa taxis, restraining order (of the universe), 49,15 kathairein, reduce (in size by sub-division, i.e., minimize), 14,30; 15,9.17.23.31; 55,27; 80,27 kathairesis, reduction, 95,23 katharsis, purging (of the bowels), 44,28; 55,24 katholikos, in universal terms, 13,13; 27,25; 30,5 to katholou, a universal, 2,10.12; katholou, universally, 11,21; 20,10; 23,17; 27,27; 42,23; opp. kata meros, 79,1 katorthoun, successfully achieve (an end or purpose), 61.20.21.26; 62,20 keisthai, lie, be positioned, 19,20; 50,23.24; 55,2.5; 59,15; 63.21; 68,6.29; 69,5.29.30; 72,1; 75,23; 76,27; 90,1; 98.12; be assigned (of a name), 19,20; keisthai kata, be predicated of, 2,23 kenologein, speak emptily (sc. without meaning), 47,23 to kenon, the void, 4,17; 18,1; 47.17; 49.4; 67,14.15; 82,4-17; 89,15; 100,4.5.6 khôra, (physical) space or position, 51,11; 86,8; 88,5; 89,26; 97,24; 98,11; (conceptual) space, 29,11; 81,8; en isêi khorâi einai c. dat., to be of an equivalent status, 31,22 (cf. Galen VI.26.15) khôris, in separation, separately, 4,23; 9,22.23; 24.7; 41,12.19(bis); 46,9.11.13; 66,2; 68,6; 75,25.26; 80,15 khôristos, separable, 33,14; 39,7;

205

41,14.29; 44,8.17; 68,17; 79,24; 83,22.24 khôrizein, separate, 10,6; 14,32; 16,25-32; 32,15.27; 36,12.17; 40,17; 41; 44,2.3; 83,9; 97,29(bis) khreia, need, 13,4; 37,13; 59,27; 64,7; 66,15; 91,19 khrôma, colour, 11,28; 17,10; 18,28; 20,9; 21,4; 23,13; 37,15-18; 71,19.21; 73,9; 98,14; khrôma diakritkon opseôs (cf. Arist. Metaph. 1057b8-9), causing discrimination in vision, 9,25; 84,4 khronos, time, 7,26.30; 8,4.8.11; 41,5; 49,2; 67,14.15.17; 72,8; 79,14; 81,24; 82,11.21.24; 91; 92,15.26; 93; 97,11.13; 98,7; 101,5 kinein, produce change, 36,5.14; 44,20; 57,24.25; 58,4.9.11; 70,19-29; 76,6.7.16; undermine (a doctrine), 4,20; 12,5; to kinoun, what produces change (‘the changer(s)’) (opp. to kinoumenon), 68,16.17; 70,28.30.31; 74,24.28.32; 75,1; 76,5.9.13-16.21; 77,6.8,15-17.20; 78,2; ho kinôn, 82,21 kineisthai, change (intrans.), be changed, undergo change; esp. 70-7; to move (= pheresthai) ‘move’: 7,25 (bis); 8,11.13.15; 40,22; 41,3.5; 55,7; 63,21.25*; 87,33; 88,3-14; 89,17.25.28; 90,8; to kinoumenon (opp. to kinoun), what is changed, 74,32; 76,9(bis).16.21.22; 77,5.16.20 kinêsis, change (in general), passim, 67-77; movement (= phora), 36,5; 40,19.21; 41; 88,8.17; topikê kinêsis, change of place (locomotion), 68,4 kinêtikos, able to cause change, 68,13; 71,20; 76 kinêtos, changeable, 68.13; 69,7; 74,25.29; 75-6; 77,28; 79,3(bis); 92,10(bis) koinos, common, general, 2,20; 8,26; 13,32; 19.22; 67,16; 68,20; 69,25; 86,21; ta koina (opp. ta idia), common features, 2,4.6.10.16.18; 23,20; 67,18 komizesthai, recoup (a debt), 52,13-25; 53,7 see note

206

Greek-English Glossary

kosmos, cosmos, world-order, 40,27; 60,13; 82,17.22; 97,23.27; 98,3 krinein, distinguish, 37,14.18; 25,35 kubernân, steer, 81,19 ref to note on Anaximander kuklos, circle, 3,32; 4,2.4.5; 41,6; 57,12(bis).13; 59,2; 88,11.12; 94,14 kuriôs, strictly, primarily, in a strict sense, passim lambanein, take (to mean), grasp, understand, e.g., 8,7; 50,6; 58,20.22.24; 74,5; take (i.e., select for emphasis), identify, e.g., 8,1; 14.31; 19,32; 35,10; 39,11; 41; 47,18; 48,2; 53,22; 66,12; 80,14; 85,22; 93-4; 96,29; 98,31; 100,12(bis).20(bis); take on (= acquire), e.g., 38,5.31; 39,1.19; 40,1; 54,1.4; 72,5; take (= capture), 54,27 lanthanein, elude, escape notice, 14,19; 19,19; 48,7; 49,7; 67,3; 93,11; 100,11 legein, say, state, argue, claim, passim: pollakhôs legesthai, to be said in many ways, 4,25; 5,10; 8,29; 27,13; 37,23; 45,3.19.29; 68,22.28.30; monakhôs legesthai, to be said in one way, 4,25.30; 8,18.28; legein pros, to respond to, rebut. refute (a person, argument or opinion), 4,2-3.19-20; 7,14; 8,25; legein peri, discuss (= logon poieisthai; cf. 40,22-3), 34,11-12; 40,23.26; 79,18; legesthai kata, be said of (= be predicated), 95,6.15-16 to lêgon, the consequent (in a formal argument), 7,18.22 leipesthai, to be left (as the only alternative), 5,1; 33,25; 74,8; 91,24; to leipomenon, the only alternative, 57,6; the residue (of a sub-division), 92,23; 93,20 lêmma, premise, 9,6.15; 12,13; 50,23.27; 65,3; 100,19 lêros, joke, 16,22; 59,2; 86,29 see n. 906 lexis, expression (opp. pragma), 23,25; 24; 25,15 logikos, associated with reasoning, 1,7; 57,19; 76,23

to logoeidês, rationality, 61,9 (see note ad loc.) logos, passim: argument, e.g., 4,12.23; 12,1; 51,1; 99,10; 100,8.18.24; definition (often as the definitional formula, equivalent to the form or essence), e.g., 11,13.19.20(bis).25; 36,6-11; 64,4; 66.10.13; 67; 68,26.27; ratio, 86,4; 93,20; 98,27; aneu logou, without argument, 1,3; 37,21; kata logon, in accordance with reason, 49,28; 96,9; in definition, 6,20; 8,21; 9,20; 95,18; in a ratio, 98,26-7; (tôi) logôi, in definition, logôi, in definition, 20,20.24; 22.8; 28.14; 28.17; 32.16; 32.27; 33.21; 40,17; 41; 51.1; 64.4; 71,11.14.19; 76,17.19.22; 78.24; 84,1.15; 86,22; 87,3; 93,18; opp. hupokeimenoi, 78,1.15; kata ton logon (opp. kata to hupokeimenon), 71,12; logon ekhein, make sense (‘hold water’, ‘be arguable’, LSJ III.2), 85,25 luein, solve (a problem; an argument), 3,29; 7,16; 12,4; 29,22; 30,3; 31,34 lusis, solution (of a problem), 5,32; 31,17.19 makhesthai, be in conflict with (in argument), c. pros, 3,32; c. dat., 20,14 (cf. diamakhesthai, 22,10); put oneself in conflict with (= criticize), 15,10; manthanein, learn, 30,31; 37,16; 42,24; 60,12; 77,11.24.25; 78; 86,12 matên, pointless (without purpose) (to matên, pointlessness), 7,8; 12,4; 55-6; 60,8; 62,15; 81,14.15 ta mathêmata, mathematics, 41,20; 65,1; 82,20; 84,27; 98,23 mathêmatikos, mathematical, 98.5; ho mathêmatikos, the mathematician, 40,14.20; (plu.) 41,9; 81,26; 97,18; ta mathêmatika, mathematical objects, 57,11; 58,27; 59,1; 98,6.19.20; to mathêmatikon, the mathematical (as intelligible), 85,3 mathêsis (opp. didaxis), learning, 77,10.23; 78,14-31;

Greek-English Glossary to mega. Platonic principle with to mikron, 13,14-15; 20,23; 32,22-3.25; 80,4.25-6; 93,31; 96,3 megethos, magnitude, size, kata megethos, by magnitude, passim, e.g., 7,28.32; 8,2-10; 10,33; 12,9(bis); 14,34; 15-16; 40,23; 41,1; 54,1; 79,13; 80,31; 81; 82,28; 83; 84,10.29; 85,27; 88,25; 89,10; 90,5.11; 91,23.30; 92,18; 93-7; 100,26.30 mêkhanê, (explanatory) device, 29,30 mêkhanasthai, fashion (of nature), 1,20 mêkos, length, 40,16; 97,31; 98,4 menein, remain, be stable, 24,30; 26.19-28; 28,26; 32,28; 58,27; 69,8; 70,2; 88,13.17; 89,18; 90,2-15; 95.24; 99,6; 100,16; (metaph. of conclusion reached), 50,17; (of premises),100,16 mêniskos, lune, 4,1 (see note ad loc.) merizein, divide into parts, 84,25 meros, part, passim, 2,12.25; 5; 11,23-6; 14,27-32; 15,4.5; 21.18; 27,30; 32,20; 35,7(bis); 37,25; 42.11; 45,17.20; 59,18; 79,2; 83,7; 84; 90,14; 93; 95,2; 99,24;; apo merous, part by part (incrementally), 93,3.5; 101,8; kata meros, individually, 79,1 (opp. katholou); ta kata meros, particular things, 95,1 metabainein, (absol.), change place, 8,13.14; 30,31 metaballein, be transformed, 13,31; 17,22; 18,20; 22.29; 23,2; 24,1-4; 31.1; 30,32; 36,1; 39,28; 68,3.18.19; 73,7(bis); 74,29; 75,6; 87 metabolê, transformation, 7,32; 18,21.22; 23,2.5.9; 24,16.30; 25,30; 27,33; 28,2.3; 29,10; 35,20; 44,22; 67,2; 70,7; 72,26; 75,12; 87,12.19.20; 97,16 metalambanein, participate, 33,8(bis).19.21; substitute, 70,5; 79,10 metapherein, transfer, 16,31; 79,9; 95,14 metarruthmizein, restructure, 7,3

207

metaskhêmatisis, restructuring, 27,28 metaskhêmatizein, alter the shape, 100,10 metathesis, transposition, 9,15 (see note on 9,13-15); 79,10 metekhein, share in, 10,27; 33,27; 68,3 methodos, procedure (of inquiry), 3,20; 50,5; 84,28 migma, mixture, 13,2.5; 80,29; 89,19; 90,6-10 to mikron, see to mega mimeisthai, imitate, 42,15; represent (graphically), 61,1 monas, unit, 3,14; 6,2; 21,11; 80,14.22; 84,14; 85,4; 94,4; 96,18-24 monê, stability, 27,28; 88,14 morion, part, 8,13.15; 10,34; 15,7; 49,10; 60,8; 72,18.20; 87,27.31.32; 88,10-17; 89,1; 90,6-23; 95,5; 96,1.2; 99,24 morphê, physical shape, 39,28; 60,20; shape as form (equated with form [eidos], definition [logos], essence [to ti en einai]), usu. in contrast with matter, 25,10; 26,18; 27,7.9; 28,6.13; 29,2; 32,28; 33,8; 37,27.29; 38,7.27.31; 40,9; 42,14; 44,21; 61,17.18; 62.13; 63,29; 64; 65,12; 66,2; 68,1; 69,20; 70,22; 72,5; 74,14.15; 92,7; 95,1.27 mousikos, educated, 7,7; 18,27.31.32; 19; 23-4; 25.24; 26,29; 28,15; 30,8.22; 31.24; 46,8.9; 51,24.29; 53,7;; expert in music, 1,9; musical, 18,30(bis) neanieuesthai, rashly devise, 6,17 (cf. Themist. in Phys. 200,21 and Todd [11] 126 n. 433) neikos, strife (Empedoclean causative force), 20,23.26; 21,14; 42,12; 48,28 neuein, tend (directionally) (metaph.), 33,10.16 noein, think, 16,1; 25,33; 28,15; 38,1; 42,26; 82,1; 97,28.30; 98,1; 100,25-31; 101,1.5(bis).11 noêsis, thinking, 81,31; 100,26; 101,9 noêtos, intelligible, 84,26; 85,3; ta

208

Greek-English Glossary

noêta, intelligible things, 80,2.3; 96,4.5 nomizein, regard, think, maintain (a belief), 3,4; 8,16; 10,5; 38,12.13; 48,1; 59,9; 63,17.23; 67,15; 74,5; 75,21 nous, Intelligence (as the ‘productive cause’ in Anaxagoras’ system), 13,23; 17,4.8.11; 48,28; 49,20.28; 57,2(bis).5.6.7; 81,21; intellect (as the means of intuiting principles), 2,11; intelligence (as a general mental capacity), 37,19; intellect (as faculty of the soul) 83,27 oikeios, appropriate, own, proprietary, 3,13.29; 4,24; 14,2; 18,18; 22,7.8; 25,3.29; 33,23; 35,2; 41,1; 51,4.10; 55,21; 56; 58,24; 79,17; 82,29; 87,26; 88; 90,19; 94,23 onkos, volume, 85,21.22.23; 86,2 onoma, name (n.), term, 2,21.22; 4,26; 19,20; 26,4.9; 37,17; 49,4.6; 55,20; 62,14.15.22; 69,25.28; 90,27; 95,4; 96,20; word, 1,8.9.16.18; kenon onoma, an empty name, i.e., one without a reference, 47,17 (cf. 48,2) onomazein, name (v.), 19,21.30; 25,11; 36,18; 40,4.7; 47,18; 49,21; 62,11; 69,24; 77,4; ontôs, really, 17,19, 88,19; to ontôs on, what really is, 12,15 ouranos, the heavens, 6,3; 49,18.27; 57,7; 79,27.28; 80,1; 82,3.4.23; 93,25; 97,7; 100,4; apeiroi ouranoi, infinite worlds, 49,14 ousia, the category substance, 4,28; 5,7.9; 68,32; substance (= an independent entity), e.g., 21,28(ter); 79,20; 82,26; 83,13.25; 84,25; kat’ ousian, with respect to substance, substantially, 68,2.3.19; 70,30; 76,6; logos tês ousias, definition of the substance, 6,12; 10,35-11,1; ousia enulos, substance based in matter, 21,6; 23,11 palaioi, hoi, early thinkers (usually pre-Aristotelian philosophers),

5,27; 10,7; 21,22; 22,16.19; 30,20; 48,3.24; 59,13; 61,18 to pan, the all (sc. the whole universe), 80,31; 81,6; 87,2; 89,8; 90,17; 95,10*.13.14 paradeigma, example, 19,32; 30,9.32; 38,20; 69,32; model, 63,8; paradigm (= eidos as formal cause), 44,16(bis) parakolouthêma, derivative consequence, 91,16 paralimpanein*, disregard, 11,29 paralogizesthai, reason fallaciously, 3,27.34; 10,23 paralogos, beyond reason, 52,17; 53,10 to parelthon, the past, 93,9 parergon, by-product, 87,23 (see note ad loc.) paroimia, proverb, 95,10 parousia, presence, 29,10; 33,17; 39,16.17 paskhein, be affected (to paskhon, what is affected), 18,24.26; 22,19.23; 29,5; 30,5.10.14; 58,4; 70,19; 74,31; 75,1; 77; 78,8 pathêsis, (the process of) being affected, 76,22.25; 77,1.10; 78,10.31; pathêtikos, capable of being affected, 27,32; 68,12; 76,24; 79,8 pathos, affection, 6,5; 17,10; 38,15; 76,27; 79,15 peperasmenos, limited (in size or number), 2,28.29; 5,4.5; 6,6.8; 14,17; 16,5.6.12; 17,25; 21,8(bis); 79,14; 81; 85; 86,5.31; 88,24(bis); 89,2.4.9; 90,29; 93,7.12; 94,19; 95,8; 97,20; 99-101 pephukenai, be naturally the case, 18,24-6; 33,11; 37,10; 41,13; 55,17.18; 60,23.24(bis); 63,24.28; 64,4; 82,30.31; 83,15; 87.24; 89,22-8; 90,3.12; perainein, achieve, conclude, 3,15; 48,6; find a limit (intr.), be limited (pass.), 80,11; 88,12; 89,11; 90,8.25; 91,29; 99-100 peras, limit, 6; 17,7; 26,22.23; 40,19.20; 41,12(bis); 80,13; 81,18.30; 82,1; 90,26; 92,8; 95; 96,16; 99,20.24.28; 101,12

Greek-English Glossary peratoun, set limits on, 16,26; 42,27; 60,15; 81,30 periekhein, enclose, 59,3; 81,19; 89,19; 95,15.26; 96,5.6.7.8.14; 99,8(bis); include (in a definition), 46,5; (pass.), be included (in a definition), 11,13.21; 66,13 perilambanein, comprehend (of the intellect), 2,12 peripiptein, stumble on (i.e., unexpectedly encounter), 12,8; 49,6; 51,9; 87,17 perittos, odd (number), 11,14.15; 20,23.27; 41,15; 80; superfluous, 22,27; 23,4; 37,16; 60,8; 62,7 phainesthai, appear, 7,15; 14,9.12; 26,8; 35,11; 26,24; 45,27; 48,25; 49,17; 74,7; 81,17; 93,1; 99,7 phantasia, appearance, 2,17; 82,3 phantazesthai, imagine, 24,23; 32,30; 100,30 phenakizein, cheat, 3,28; 14,26 pherein, import (the content of an argument) 4,14; bring to bear (on an argument), 80,13; c. kata, apply (= predicate), 5,8; (absol.), lead to (a goal), 63,6 pheresthai (med.), move (= engage in locomotion), 36,1.3; 41,6; 51,3; 63,24; 90,20; 100,6; (pass.), c. epi, to be led (to a position), 49,4 pheugein, (metaph.), flee (logical consequences), 12,19; 84,20 philia, love (as a causative force in Empedocles’ cosmology), 20,23.26; 21,14; 42,12; 48,27; 81,21 philoneikein, dispute, 101,9 philosophein, theorize, 3,3; 48,4 philosophia, philosophy, 29,23; 34,10; 79,18; protê philosophia, first philosophy, 34,10; 44,9 philosophos, philosopher, 3,22; 4,19; 6,18.22; first philosopher, 58,7 phônê, expression, 4,30; 14,2; 30,20; 82,31; 83,15; 100,3 phora, motion, 37,4.5; 69,26.28; 88,14 phorêtos, moveable, 69,26; 70,5(bis) phortikos, mundane, 4,14; 8,17; 9,12 phrontizein, attend to, be concerned about, 8,7; 43,13; 64,13

209

phthartikos, able to cause to cease to be, 33,1.24; 85,15 phthartos, capable of ceasing to be, 29,18; 34,10; 57,20; 58,8; 69,26; 82,8 phtheiresthai, cease to be (opp. ginesthai),13,31.35; 17,15; 19; 20,3.5.8; 22,9; 25,29; 29,26; 33; 34,3(bis).4; 38.17; 46.26; 69,14; 81,17; 86,4.15.18; 93,8.9 phthora, ceasing to be, 20,13; 19,24; 33,17(bis); 69,26; 81,18; 87,25; 92,8; 99,14 phuesthai, grow, 39,12; 40,1.2; 86,25 phulattein, protect, safeguard (in theoretical reasoning), 3,34; 15,32; 18,18; 41,28; 72,3; 80,18.21; 84,23; 87,11; 92,10; 93,20 phusikos, natural: to phusikon, what is natural, 38,30; ta phusika (‘natural objects’, i.e. bodies, substances), 29,7; 38,25; 42,4; 43,25; 58,1.26; 59,7; 63,19; 65,9.13; 66,4; 85,4; (ho) phusikos, natural scientist, 3; 4,19; 13,9; 29,20; 34,9; 40; 41,2; 42,8.11; 43,29; 44,3; 57,18; 58,6; 66,3. 12.17; 81,22; 82,27; (plu.) 8,22; 13,16.33; 14,17; 18,5.6; 63,17; 67,15; 80,27; 93,27; 97,9; phusikê aitia, 90,4; arkhê, 58,9-10; (plu.) 3,12; grammê, 41,22.23.25; phusikai aporiai, 4,16; kinêseis, 42,28; 63,22; 64,26; phusikon eidos, 39,23; 66,19; (plu.) 34,10; 44,4-5; mêkos, 98,4; sôma, 36,2-3; 40,18.19; (plu.), 35,17; 40,24; 42,23; 67,16; 85,12; 98,7; phusika mathêmata, 41,20-1; hê phusikê (tekhnê), natural science, 3,18; 42,19 phusikôs, naturally, c. kinein 58,9; 70,25.28.30; in terms of natural science, c. exetazein, 85,1; c. episkeptesthai, 85,7 phusiologia, natural science, 49,7 phusiologos, natural scientist, 88,30 phusis, nature, passim: defined, 3,26-7; 36,1-2, 22-4; 67,2; nature (sc. the realm of natural change, as object and agent), 1,3.19; 3; 14,18; 26,25; 82,22; 98,21; as an agent (acting purposively), 59,5;

210

Greek-English Glossary

60,23.28.30; the nature (i.e., essence) of something, 9,24; 11,35; 12,29; 13,4; 18,18; 21,22; 22,7; 24,16; 26,25; 29,24; 31,15.20; 32,8.17; 33,16.32; 38,2; 55,4.6.8; 9,24; 11,35; 74,12; 83,3; 90,4; a nature (i.e., an entity or substance), 21,3.11; 22,4; 23,10; 29,11; 31,27; 38.14; 42,7.20; 79,20.21; 82,27; 83,17.19.25; 84,1.5.11; 86,13.18.20.23; 90,9; 95,28; 97,12; dia phusin, due to nature, 35,4; 37,12; kata phusin, in accordance with nature, 37,7.8; 38,37; 60,13; 88,21; 89,21.24.27; 90,6; para phusin, contrary to nature, 51,11; 56,15; pros tên phusin, relative to nature, 1,14-19; phusei, by nature, passim. 2,1; 5.11; 20.10; 25,28; 28.11; 33.16; 35.7; 35.8; 36,6; 37; 38.18; 39; 40,10; 56.24(bis); 61,25; 62,14.16.21; 80,11.28; 90,32.33; 91.2; 98,4.14; opp. nomôi (by convention), 98,15; ta phusei (onta), natural things, things that exist, or are constituted, by nature, 2,1; 28,11; 35,7.10 (bis); 39,16.17; 44,8; 50,8; 62,21; 63,16; 66,12; ta phusei ginomena, things that come to be by nature, 44,18-19 (hupo phuseôs); 57,23; 63,16; 65,11; 66,11 phuton, plant, 1,6; 5,22; 15,4(bis).6.13; 19,28; 22,32.33.34; 23,19; 27,17,19.27; 35,9.14; 37,26; 38,23; 39,9; 49,19; 52,1.6; 58,28; 60,7; 61,2.6.11; 62,5 piptein c. eis, fall under (i.e., be classified with), 45,12 plekein, combine (the components of an argument), 9,8 plêthos, quantity, numerical plurality, 6,22; 9,18; 14,10.23.26; 15,15; 16,28; 53.8; 80,5; 81,6.10; 83,12.13; 84,14.25; 96,28 poiein, do (= perform an action), 7,21; 30,12; 54,17; do, make, produce (as the action of art or nature), 17,21; 43,21; 46,20; 60,23-8; 61,5.16; 62,1; make or produce (in a theory), 11,24.30; 12,21; 17,29; 18,2; 21,9; 29,29;

84,11.22; 85,17; 86,31; 87,7; 88,30; 93,31; produce an effect (opp. paskhein, be affected), 30,5.10.12; 70,19; 74,31; to poioun, what produces an effect, 70,28; diaphoran poiein, draw a distinction, 12,23-4; (med.) poieisthai, make, produce: e.g., arkhên poieisthai, start (of a discussion), 35,2; logon poieisthai (= dialegesthai), provide an account/definition/discussion, 2,1; 11,12; 41,4; 49,1-2.11; 79,16; tomên poieisthai (= temnein), sub-divide, 93,18 poiêma, product (of producing an effect), 76,26 poiêsis, [process of] producing an effect, 36.19; 65.20; 76,22.25; 77,1-10; 78,10.31; 85,17 poiêtikos, productive (usu. of a cause producing an effect), able to act, 22,3; 44,6; 45,8; 56-7; 58,14; 59,11; 68,12; 79,8; to poiêtikon (aition), productive cause, 13,22; 45,25.30; 46,14; 52,19.22; syn. poiêtikê aitia, 13,15; 59,11; 81,21; poiêtikai tekhnai, productive arts, 43,5; 65,17.25 poreia, process (in demonstration), 1,18; being en route (metaph. for change), 70,8.9 poreuesthai, be en route (metaph. for the process of change), 70,11; 72,9 pragma, thing 26,24 (= matter); opp. term (onoma), 32,24; opp. words (logoi), 37,20; opp. expression (lexis), 24,7; object referred to, or meant, by a term, 4,27.30.31 (= to sêmainomenon); 37,22; 48,2; 95,7; actual object (as opposed to an imaginary or impossible one), 14,22; 100,31(bis); physical object, 55,4; 58,19; 74,17; 7,28 (= megethos); situation (state of affairs; fact), 14,1; 48,6; 68,25; 69,15.31; 88,18; 91,12; subject matter, 12,28 pragmateia, systematic treatment (of a subject), 58,7 prakta, acts, 54,12.13

Greek-English Glossary prattein, perform an action, 17,4; 53,17; 54,15; 55,15; 56.13 praxis, action, 51,30; 54,12.15.22; 65,18.20 proaireisthai, choose, 47,24; 48,17.18(bis); 53,25 proairesis, choice, 35,6; 47,23; 48,14.15.19; 51,13; 52,30; 53,1; 54,13.17; 55,10-16; 61,5 proêgoumenôs, predominantly (in a primary way), 29,1; 60,12; 63,30; 64,8 proerkhesthai/proienai, go away, 57,20; advance (of a discussion) 82,25; proceed (in an infinite progression),16,19; 80,23; 100,28; 101,12; (purposively), 37,10; 39,27; 42,26; 44,20; 60,16.18.20; 64,1; 92,4; go out (in public), 47,24; 51-2; 53,8; 56,12.13 proiesthai, project (an idea), 81,31*; 87,4 prokeisthai, be projected (as a goal), 1,2; 51,8; 84,28; to prokeimenon (sc. telos), projected end, 61,30 pronoia, providence, forethought, 33,12; 48,21; 61,15 proodos, progression (in a series), 15,2; 39,25; 58,3; going out (in public), 47,26 pros ti, to/ta, the (category) relative, 43,26; 68,8-11; 75,11.12.17 prosaptein, attach, 10,8,35; 63,22; 95,22 prosekhês, proximate, 2,10.17; 23,13.14; 43,27; 44,7.14; 45,30; 46,1.12.19; 47,3; 53,18.20; 57,25; 58,5 proslambanein, co-assume (in an argument), 7,19.22; 14,7; 41,16 prosthêkê, addition, 96,13; 100,10 prosthesis, addition, 27,30; 28,3; 83,5; 91,22; 93; 94,3; 95,23 prostithenai, add, 22,24; 34,6; 49,13; 79,6; 80,12.22; 83,7; 90,21; 93,15.24; 94,18; 96,17; 97,8; 100,27; 101,11.12 protasis premise, 4,13; 7,2; 8,6; 9,13.14; 45,18; 58,18; 65; 100,22 protithesthai, propose (as the premise of an argument), 7,21 proüparkhein, pre-exist, 56,3; 58,16

211

proüpotithesthai, 7,21; 23,21 pseudesthai, speak falsely, 8,28; 9,5 pseudographêma, false (geometrical) construction, 3,30 pseudos, falsity, 41,14; 71,23 psukhê, soul, 36,8; 57,20.24; 83,26 rhêtor, orator, 2,12 rhopê, inclination, 82,13; 90,19 rhruthmos (= morphê), arrangement, 38,7(bis) saphêneia, clarity (in an exposition), 52,9 sêmainein, mean, signify, 2,23; 4,24.31.32; 6,19(bis); 8,8; 9,7.29; 10,5.8.14.31; 12,19.25. 29.30; 13,5.15; 23,25; 25,4.15; 26,28.29; 30,9.17.18; 32,23.26; 37,22; 62,23; 72,25.26; 83,2; 95,4 sêmeion, evidentiary sign, 3,14; 5,12; 6,3.4.6; 26,19; 38,4; 54,13; 55,14; 79,16; 80,13; geometrical point, 97,31; 99,28 skhêmatizein, impose a structure, 19,31; 39,27; formulate (a concept), 22,14; (a statement) 24,8 skhêma, shape, structure, 3,1; 6,4; 9,6; 18,2.4; 25,10.14; 27,29; 38,27; 39,2; 40; 41,7.16; 42,13; 43,17; 55,5; 57,13; 61,6; 81,3; 88,12; figure (i.e., form of an argument), 4,14 skhesis, relation, 21,6; 26,7; 75,9; 90,31; 91,2; 98,21 skepsis, investigation, 84,29; 86,20 skeptesthai, investigate, 21,13; 50,4; 63,15; 67,15; 76,28; 84,6 skopein, inquire, 9,20; 58,1; 65,17; 81,24 skopos, target (= end), 43,2 smikrologeisthai, pick on details (in an argument), 16,18 sôizein, preserve, 3,31; 18,19; 21,20; 24,28; 28,3; 32.8; 33,19; 38,16; 54,27; 55,1; 59,22; 62,12; 64.9; 69; 70,2; 71,25; 72,5; 74,17; 82,23; 86,6; 87,14(bis).23; 88,23; 92,9 sôma, body in general, 10,33; 15,32; 16,5.14.17; 85,2; the human body, 2,7; as the subject of properties, 9,21.24; 11,27; 27, 17.20; s. apeiron, infinite body, 84,29;

212

Greek-English Glossary

85,3.20-1; 86,11; s. phusikon, natural body, 35,17; 40,24; 0,18.19; 85,12; (plu), 98,7; theia sômata, divine bodies, 40,29; 41,3; s. aisthêton, perceptible body, 99,3; s. sunekhes, continuous body, 99,3 sôros, heap, 5,22; 20,4 sophizesthai, be sophistic (in argument), 99,16 sophistikos, sophistic (syllogism), 2,16; (plu), sophistic (intrusions), 7,14 (see on 7,11-13) sperma, seed, male sperm, 27,27; 31,8; 45,24; 61,14; 62,9.12 speudein, strive (of the relation of natural processes to their end), 33,10; 40,1; 74,19 sphallesthai, be at fault (of nature), 37,9 sphalma, fault (of nature), 61,30 stasis, state of stability, 35,12; 82.3; 60,21; 92,7 stereisthai, be in a state of privation, 25,30; 27,5; 33,20; 74,5 sterêsis, privation, 19,21; 24,22.32; 25,4.25-9; 26-8; 29,2.4.11; 30,25,27; 31,14-25; 32,1.3.15-26; 33,6.15-30; 34,5.7(bis); 40,10.12; 68,32; 73,14-17; 74,3.4.6; 98,31(bis); 99,1 stêrizein, be fixed, 89,19.23; 90,2.7 stigma, point, 5,12; 40,16; 79,15; 82,32; 83,15; 84,21 stoikheion, element, 13,11-28; 15,18-20; 20,17; 22,11-21; 23,1.15; 34,11; 35,22; 37,26; 44,10; 45,15; 63,3; 83,18-21; 85,10.17; 86-8; 89,5.7; 98.22; element (of speech, covering letters and syllables),1,9; Euclid’s Elements, 97,22 stokhazesthai, aim (at a target), 59,1 sunamphoteron, to, the compound (of matter and form), 28,23; 45,21; 96,2 sungramma, discussion (sc. a section of the Physics), 98,19 sungraphê, composition (sc. the whole paraphrase), 1,2 sungraphein, compose, 80,20 sunkeisthai, be composed of, be combined from, 1,9; 2,6; 5,22;

11,8.26; 12,17; 20,2.4.5; 28,13(bis); 45,20; 84,14; 88,22; 91,29(bis); 96,18.20.26; 91.29; sunkheisthai, be undifferentiated (metaph.), 2,11.23 (see on 2,11) sunkrima, aggregation, 16,11.30.31; 17,1* sunkrinesthai, be aggregated, 13,35 sunkrisis, aggregation, 14,2; 17,22.24.31; 19.18; 20,29; 21,16.20; 28,22; 29,29 sunkhôrein, agree, concede, 5,19; 8,19; 9,16; 10,4.12; 12,13.20.28; 15,11; 17,11; 61,25; 62,25; 88,1; 96.5; 100,22; 101,10 sukophantein, quibble, 9,26 (see note ad loc.) sullogismos, inference, syllogism, 2,15; 7,20.23; 14,3; 37; 45,18; 58,17; 65,14 sullogizesthai, infer, deduce, 9,5; 39,15; 50,23.26 sumbainein, be a logical consequence, happen, result, turn out, 3,25; 4,17; 6,11; 9,31; 10,26; 18,31; 19,14; 28.23; 30,28; 32,3; 33,28; 43,5; 45,2; 48,20; 50,16(bis); 51; 52,18; 53,3; 55,13; 59,17; 62,19; 70,18; 81,24; 83,20; 91,10; 94,7; 96,9; 98,13; 100,21; to sumbainon, consequence (= conclusion drawn from premises), 50,23 sumbebêkenai, be incidental to, 10-11; 26.25; 27.9; 28,16.28; 30,13.16.27; 31,3; 32,18; 35,21; 36,16; 46,3.8; 51,28; 52,24; 55,16; 73,3.5; 83,18.19.23; 99,23; sumbebêkos, incidental property, kata sumbebêkos, incidentally, dist. kath’ hauto/hauta, passim, 6,29.30; 9,27.30; 10-11; 17,7.11; 19; 25,27; 27,19; 28,27-8; 29.16; 30; 31-3; 34,6.8.24; 37.1; 38.6; 40,15.29; 45,3(bis).4.8; 46; 51,15-31; 53,6.12.19; 54,7; 56,12; 57; 71,20; 73,2; 80,28; 82,27; 83,23; 84,23 sumperainein, conclude, 8,9; 9,16; 50,25 sumperasma, conclusion, 8,7; 45,18; 58,18; 65

Greek-English Glossary sumpiptein, coincide, 59,25.27; 60.22 sumplekein, combine (the components of a statement), 22,6; 24,2.19; 46,9.10.13 sumplêrôsis, completion, 94,24 sumplêroun, complete, 11,10; 28,12; 59,27; 67,12 sumphutos, innate (of physical power), 85,12 sumptôma, concomitant, 43,3 sunagein, conclude, 7,21 sunakolouthein, follow along with (a doctrine), 20,16 sunapartizein, c. eis, converge on (a doctrine), 80,30; c. dat., fit (into a place), 89,12 sundromê, concurrence (of coincidental events), 56,28 sunduazesthai, be twinned, 39,8 sunekhês, continuous, 5; 6,1; 9,19; 12,2; 67,10; 91,24; 98,9; 99,3; ta sunekhê, continuous things, 67,8; 91,17; 94,19; 101,9; to sunekhes, the continuous, 7,9; 67,7-11; 83,6; 91,28; c. poson, continuous quantity, 67,11 sunekhôs, continuously, 16,8; 38,8; 42,24; 60,16.18 sunephelkesthai (med.), import together with itself? Co-imply?, 26,5; 74,22 sunêtheia, standard (linguistic) usage, 19,25; 94,10; usual habit, 52,17; sunistanai, construct (theoretically) 3,13; (geometrically), 97,24; (physically), 59,22; 63,26 suntelein, contribute, 31,24; 54,20; 59,21; 94,24 sunthesis, combination, 27,31; 28,4; 45,15.22; 61,8; 63,29; 81,6; 86,10; 88,28; 91,28 sunthetos, compound (usu. to/ta suntheton/-a; opp. haploun/hapla, uncompounded)), 1,18.20; 14,32; 15,2; 19,23.30; 25,16.20.23; 23,22; 24; 28,5.7; 29,15; 32,20; 36,25; 37,32; 67,22; 84,2; 85; 86,6.11; 88,20; 95,20; suntheton sôma, compound body, 99.4 suntithenai, combine, compose,

213

11,24; 17,13.16.20; 19,19; 24,34; 25.23; 30,1; 46,18; 50,5 sunuparkhein, co-exist, 18,20; 31,16; 98,14 sustasis, constitution (in Empedoclean zoogony), 62,4.8 sustoikhia, coordinated parallel columns of opposites, 20,28; 73,13.17 tattein, put in order, 19,30; 49,20.25; 50,21; 52,23(bis); 63,7 tautotês, sameness, 73,8.9 taxis, ordering, ranking, 16,20; 18,2; 20,1; 49,15.28; 62,17; 63,6; 65,10; 97,12 tekhnê, art, passim, 1,8; 3,20; 35,6.8.14.21; 38,21-30; 40,7; 42,15.16; 43,3-23; 47,5.7; 60,27.29; 61,21.24; 62.25; 63,8.13.30; 65,17; tekhnêi, opp. proairesei, 61,4; kata tekhnên, opp. phusei, 66,12 ta tekhnêta, products of art, artifacts, 35,8; 38,20.24; 66,6.9 tekhnikos, involving art, 9,13; 36,18; 38,28; 39,21 teleios, complete (adj.), 68,33; 70,13; 94,22; 95,3.4.6.7.17; teleiôs, completely, 44,21 teleiotês (syn. eidos), completion, 39,15 (bis); 43,1; 45,22; 69,14.17(bis); 92,12 teleioun, complete (v.), 42,29; 69,18; 74,12 teleutan, bring to an end, 60,16; 81,5 teleutê, end (= terminal point), 42,30; 91,12; 101,6 telos, end (= goal of action or process), 42-5; 51,6; 52; 55,3.15; 56; 57,23; 58,22.23; 60; 61,3.17; 62,17.20.22; 63,7.16; 64,21.23(bis).24; 74,20; 82,1; 95,6 temnein, sub-divide, 46,25 (bis); 83.6; 92,23; 93,9.26; 96,10; 98,26; 99,5 teras, monstrosity (= abnormal birth), 56,16; 62,9 teratologia, inventory of monstrosities, 62,7 tetraktus, tetraktus, 79,26 (see note ad loc.) thaumastos, odd, puzzling,

214

Greek-English Glossary

remarkable (used to identify a real or supposed problem),15.9; 33,2.3; 49,2.4; 53,11; 61,7; 77,12; 83,22 thaumatourgia, sorcery, 16,14 thaumazein, be surprised, be puzzled (attitude adopted to a real or supposed problem), 14,18; 43,10; 49,17; 50,29 theios, divine, 49,17; 50,2; 33,9(bis); 81,20; theion (sôma), divine body, 35,18; (plu.), 40,29; 41,3-4 theôrein, consider, reason, study, view, 2,9; 23,21; 24,25; 40; 41,10; 52,18; 66.19; 67,18; 75,13; 98,5; 99,28 theôrêma, object of study (shared by teacher and learner); 78,12.18.23, theorem (in Euclid), 97,22 theôrêtikos, theoretical (of arts), 43.6; 65.26 theôria, inquiry, way of viewing, considering or studying a subject, 29,21; 35,2; 40,18; 41,3; 43,29; 65,17.19.21; 79,17; 82,19; 97,18 theos, god, 50,4 thesis, posit, 4,11; 10,34; 18,2.3; 27,30; 29,29; 59,26; 80,30; 98,15 tithenai/tithesthai, posit, 2,30; 3,5.12; 4,20; 6,17; 8,9; 10,2.30; 17,25; 18,6; 21,24; 42,13; 72,11; 73,10; 74,23; 76,23; 79,29; 81,8.12; 82,19.24; 83,11; 91,18; 96.8; 97.28; c. eis or en, classify with, 74,6; 77,15; 84,24 tode ti, a given thing, 27,14.16; 28,19.23.25 tomê, sub-division, 4,7; 12,4.6; 16,1; 80,7.10.26; 82,3; 91,23.25; 92,18.22; 93,20; 94,7.18; 98,23; 99,5; 101,9

topos, place, 8,14-17; 16,27; 35,13-17; 51,4; 52,16; 56,11; 67,13.15.17; 68,20; 69,1; 75,16; 80,1; 87,26(bis).31; 88-90; 91,1-7; 97,16; 98 tropos, way (of classifying or specifying), i.e., sense, type, 5,13; 2,21; 7,15; 8,29; 11,16; 13,11; 27,18; 29,9; 30,3; 31,17; 36,12; 37,24.27; 38.18; 44,12.15; 45; 46,11.22; 47,19; 55,7; 58,1.12.23; 60,1.29; 63,10; 71,5; 74,8; 82,27.30; ouk apo tropou, not irrelevant, 40,14 tukhê, luck, 17,6; 35,6; 47-56; 57,1.3.4; 60,5; 62,22; apo tukhês, by luck, as an outcome of luck, 47,22.23; 48,1.10; 49,25; 60,4(bis).6; 62,18.21; to/ta apo tukhês, the outcome of luck, 54,9.10.11; 60,3 tunkhanein, happen (fortuitously), 20,1; 41,6; 49,23.24; 62,18; 69,22; 80,24; happen upon (= receive), 5,27; 48,22; 61,28; 89,16; to tukhon, something random, 18,25(bis).27(bis); 19,12.26; 62,17; 99,30 zêtein, inquire, look for, 3,4.5.17; 29,23; 37,22; 47,3; 53,21; 76,2.8; 82,4.26(bis); 83,17; 87,26; 92,8.17.24 zêtêma, object of inquiry, 5,27 zêtêsis, inquiry, 47,3; 82,25 zôion, animal, e.g., 1,6; 2,7.8.22; 5,21; 7,24.27; 8,22; 11; 13,2; 15; 30,33-4; 31; 54,27; 59,19; 61-2

Subject Index activity, 53, 60, 62, 78, 82, 84-5, 87-9, 140n.429, 143nn.472, 477, 144n.482, 148nn.546, 547, 155n.657, 161n.754, 164n.790, 165n.806 actuality, 23, 25, 43, 55, 57, 79-80, 82-8, 93, 96, 100-1, 107, 109, 119n.102, 132n.314, 136n.370, 142n.461, 161nn.745, 753, 754, 162nn.757, 761, 763, 765, 163nn.782, 85, 164nn.789, 800, 165n.814, 169n.872, 174nn. 948, 949, 954 actualization, 80-7, 89, 101, 142n.461, 161nn.745, 752, 753, 754, 163nn.780, 785, 164n.789, 165n.814, 174nn.950, 952 aether, 57, 64, 76, 96, 144nn.481, 489, 171n.904 aggregation, 31, 34-5, 37-9, 47, 124n.180, 127n.219, 129n.254 air, 31, 34-5, 39-40, 43, 48-9, 52, 56, 64-5, 67, 91, 95-6, 98, 124n.174, 127n.221, 131n.276, 132n.306, 152n.600, 169n.867, 170n.895, 172n. 924 aitia, 111n.4, 139n.406 Alexander of Aphrodisias, 1-2, 4-5nn.3, 4, 114nn.35, 39, 117nn.79, 80, 119n.100, 120n.122, 121n.134, 122nn.139, 149, 123nn.155, 159, 124n.180, 125n.194, 126nn.200, 206, 127n.210, 128n.227, 130n.273, 131nn.280, 291, 132n.308, 133nn.319, 321, 134nn.327, 328, 135nn.343, 350, 137n.382, 139nn.404, 410, 140n.422, 144nn.483, 487, 145n.507, 148nn.552, 556, 560, 149n.568, 153n.626, 154n.642, 155nn.657, 658, 662, 156nn.672, 679,

160n.730, 161n.752, 162n.768, 163nn.769, 772, 778, 167n.832, 168nn.843, 847, 172nn.915, 917, 173n.938, 176nn.991, 992, 179n.1032 alteration, 25-6, 31, 37, 41, 45, 61, 77, 81, 84, 89, 105, 120n.116, 124n.180, 135n.345, 161n.751 Analytica Posteriora, 27, 111n.9 Analytica Priora, 20, 116n.58, 121n.128 Anaxagoras, 20, 31-5, 38, 63, 72, 91, 98-9, 113nn.29, 31, 114n.32, 124nn.175, 177, 178, 180, 125n.183, 126n.204, 127nn.210, 223, 128n.228, 167n.827, 175n.973 Anaximander, 31, 35, 91, 96-7, 124n.174, 128n.228, 167nn.835, 839, 171nn.908, 909, 177n.1008 Anaximenes, 131n.276, 167n.835 Andronicus of Rhodes, 133n.321 animals, 23, 33, 40, 45, 52, 61, 64, 68, 72-4, 131n.284, 139n.404, 140n.425, 152n.614, 155n.654 Antiphon, 21, 54, 56, 114n.43, 115nn.45, 46, 48, 139n.413, 142nn.446, 447, 449, 463 archai, 111n.4 Archelaus, 142n.448 Archytas, 162n.768, 168n.843 Aristotle, 1-3, 5nn.12, 16, 6nn.22, 23, 24, 27, 106, 111n.4, 112n.14, 113nn.22, 26, 29, 114nn.32, 34, 36, 115n.51, 116nn.68, 69, 117n.84, 118nn.96, 97, 98, 119n.108, 120nn.110, 119, 121n.128, 122n.147, 123nn.155, 157, 124nn.173, 174, 177, 125nn.183, 193, 126n.196, 128n.228, 130n.274, 131n.283, 132n.296, 133n.321, 134n.331, 136nn.367, 370, 138nn.384, 400,

216

Subject Index

139nn.404, 414, 140n.422, 142nn.458, 463, 143nn.470, 472, 475, 477, 480, 145n.506, 146n.520, 147nn.532, 533, 536, 544, 148n.552, 149nn.574, 575, 150n.578, 152n.614, 153n.629, 154nn.636, 644, 155nn.654, 662, 156nn.672, 678, 682, 157nn.686, 695, 158nn.706, 710, 160nn.732, 734, 161n.751, 162n.763, 163n.785, 164nn.790, 798, 165n.805, 166n.825, 168n.843, 169n.872, 170nn.884, 887, 895, 172nn.917, 924, 173n.935, 174n.948, 175nn.973, 975, 176nn.978, 986, 992, 177n.1009, 178n.1023 arithmetic units, 21, 90 arrangement, 54, 128n.231, 142n.447 art (technê), 19, 21, 52-3, 55-6, 58-9, 62, 73-8, 139n.402, 143nn.469, 472, 156n.674 Aspasius, 162n.757 Athens, 89 atoms, 20, 98, 108, 113n.31, 123n.155, 172n.925, 179n.1029 blood, 33-4, 78, 114n.32, 159n.726 body, 20, 27-9, 33-4, 45, 52, 56-7, 60-1, 65, 74, 79, 83, 90, 92, 94-100, 102, 105-8, 121n.136, 122nn.147, 148, 124n.174, 144n.491, 146n.519, 153nn.623, 628, 154n.643, 156n.673, 163n.782, 168nn.843, 847, 848, 170n.895, 171n.909, 172n.923, 175nn.963, 969, 176n.986, 177n.1010, 178n.1019 divine body, 139n.410 Boethus of Sidon, 1-2, 44, 133nn.321, 322 bone, 32-4, 55, 57, 114n.32, 135n.342 Categories, 22, 111n.9, 115n.58, 116nn.58, 65, 121n.128, 133n.321 cause, 2, 7n.32, 32, 45, 49, 52-4, 60-74, 76-8, 90, 94, 111nn.4, 6, 113n.29, 137n.382, 138n.399, 141n.444, 146nn.516, 517, 147nn.529, 531, 532, 148nn.546, 556, 149n.570, 150n.587, 151nn.588, 598, 600, 153nn.623, 627, 631, 154nn.638, 642, 643

efficient (productive) cause, 31, 60-1, 64, 66-7, 69-72, 91, 124n.175, 147nn.531, 532, 148n.546, 154nn.638, 642, 643, 644 final cause, 50, 60, 66, 71, 154n.643 formal cause, 46, 50, 58, 71, 74, 76-7, 147n.532, 154n.643 incidental cause, 61-2, 66-70, 147n.536, 150n.586, 151nn.588, 598, 154n.644 material cause, 46, 49-50, 60-1, 71, 76-7, 106 ceasing to be, 31, 35, 37-8, 46, 50-1, 81, 91, 97, 102, 107, 129n.242, 138n.392, 160n.727, 163n.785, 178n.1012 change, 1-2, 21-2, 26, 52-4, 56, 58, 60-1, 70-1, 73, 75-7, 79-89, 97-8, 100-1, 105-6, 108-9, 114n.37, 115n.56, 120nn.109, 111, 116, 128nn.235, 241, 129nn.242, 247, 250, 134n.330, 135nn.340, 345, 350, 351, 136n.367, 137n.374, 139nn.410, 414, 417, 141nn.440, 444, 142n.458, 144n.481, 146nn.516, 517, 518, 148n.547, 154nn.642, 644, 155n.650, 157nn.686, 695, 160nn.727, 732, 739, 740, 741, 161nn.745, 747, 751, 752, 754, 162nn.756, 757, 759, 761, 763, 768, 163nn.772, 782, 785, 164nn.785, 786, 789, 796, 165n.813, 167n.834, 170n.895, 171nn.911, 914, 172n.917, 173n.942, 174nn.948, 949, 950, 952, 176n.990, 177n.1009, 179n.1035, 180n.1037 Cicero, 152n.612 Cleomedes, 168nn.840, 847, 178n.1019, 179n.1029 coming to be, 31, 35, 37-8, 46, 50-1, 81, 91, 97, 102, 107, 129n.242, 138n.393, 160n.727, 163n.785, 178n.1012 compounds, 19-20, 31-3, 35, 37, 43, 79, 91, 93-4, 125n.187, 126n.202, 128n.241 condensation, 35 conditionality, 77 continuous, 23-4, 27, 29, 79, 93, 100, 103, 106-7, 109 contraries, 60, 171n.909

Subject Index coordinated, 37, 111n.7, 174n.995 Cratylus, 146n.508 Crito, 149n.567 curriculum, 2 de Anima, 7n.28, 145n.506, 156n.678 de Caelo, 2, 161n.751, 168n.843 de Generatione Animalium, 157n.686 de Interpretatione, 119n.102, 148n.544 de Partibus Animalium, 155nn.654, 663 definition, 1, 20, 23-4, 26-9, 39, 42-3, 45-6, 49-50, 52-61, 67, 70-1, 74, 76-80, 82-3, 86-9, 93-4, 104, 113nn.23, 26, 27, 114nn.34, 36, 42, 116n.66, 117n.83, 118n.95, 119n.99, 122n.150, 123n.153, 128n.231, 134nn.328, 331, 140nn.417, 426, 143n.480, 144n.491, 146n.517, 153n.631, 154nn.636, 643, 158n.708, 159nn.725, 726, 160nn.729, 730, 739, 161n.746, 162nn.761, 763, 163n.785, 164nn.789, 790, 796, 165n.813, 168n.848, 174nn.949, 952, 178n.1024 Delphi, 70, 154n.638 Democritus, 5n.13, 20, 35, 58, 64, 91, 98, 106, 113nn.30, 31, 136n.361, 167n.827, 168nn.839, 848 demonstration, 19, 21, 51, 54, 100-1, 106, 111nn.6, 7, 8, 113n.27, 168n.847, 177n.998, 179n.1029 density, 31, 39, 145n.507 differentia, 28, 31, 98-100 Diogenes of Apollonia, 131n.276 disposition, 54-5 earth, 23, 32, 34-5, 40, 52, 54, 57, 61, 76, 90, 96-9, 127n.216, 139n.413, 142n.448, 158n.697 eidos, 112n.19, 120n.119, 143n.467, see also form and species Elias, 6n.23 elements, 19, 31, 33, 38-9, 40-1, 51, 54, 60, 95-6, 98, 106, 111n.4, 124nn.176, 177, 127n.216, 139nn.403, 404, 410, 141n.439, 142n.448, 166nn.819, 823, 171nn.900, 909, 172n.924 Empedocles, 31, 35, 38, 58, 63-4, 72-4, 124n.178, 127n.223,

217

129n.252 148nn.560, 561, 156n.666, 157n.687 energeia, 164nn.790, 795, see also activity entelechy, 154n.643 entelekheia, 154n.643, 161nn.745, 748, 752, 753, 754, 163n.780, 164n.790, 165n.814, see also actualization Epicurus, 2, 108, 118n.94, 178n.1023, 179n.1029 essence, 45, 55, 60-1, 71, 76-7, 87, 89, 162n.761 Euclid, 105, 117n.73, 154n.637, 176n.992, 177n.994 Eudemus, 1, 115n.46, 120n.123, 162n.768, 180n.1032 Euripides, 145n.501, 171nn.904, 913 Euthydemus, 175n.974 fire, 31, 35, 39-40, 49, 52-4, 57, 63, 69, 82, 91, 95-9, 124n.174, 131n.276, 139n.410, 140n.429, 170n.895 flesh, 32-5, 55, 57, 74, 114n.32, 125nn.195, 196, 126n.198, 135n.342, 152n.600, 156nn.673, 682 form, 1, 31-2, 43-6, 50-6, 58-61, 65, 71-2, 74, 76-82, 84-6, 91, 101, 103-4, 107, 116n.68, 133nn.321, 322, 134nn.328, 330, 331, 135nn.349, 350, 351, 136nn.355, 368, 138nn.384, 386, 389, 142n.446, 459, 143nn.475, 477, 480, 145n.507, 146nn.511, 516, 519, 154n.644, 155nn.647, 657, 158n.711, 159nn.721, 725, 162n.766, 166n.823, 167n.832, 175n.969, 176n.978 generation, 24, 64, 135n.341, 136nn.367, 368, 142n.448, 153n.629, 154n.644, 156n.682, 159n.714 genus, 22, 28, 30, 38, 40, 60, 80, 84, 105, 146n.519, 154n.641, 160nn.727, 740 geometry, 21, 57, 90, 106, 114n.38, 115n.46, 166n.825, 169n.855 Gorgias, 118n.92, 152n.610

218

Subject Index

heavens, 23, 64, 70, 90, 92, 102, 105, 108, 125n.193, 168n.843 Heraclitus of Ephesus, 22, 24, 96, 115n.52, 131n.276 Hesiod, 155n.662 Hippocrates of Chios, 21, 115nn.45, 46 holos, 117n.80, 125n.190, 147n.526, 173n.935, 179n.1029 Homer, 108, 155n.662, 179n.1034 homogeneous, 97-9, 114n.32 hulê, 130n.274, 132n.296, 133n.323, 157n.695, see also matter human being, 19-20, 24-6, 28-9, 33, 36-7, 41-3, 45-7, 49, 56, 59-61, 64, 67, 71-3, 78, 103, 105, 112n.16, 113nn.22, 25, 26, 115n.51, 116n.62, 117n.84, 118n.95, 120n.119, 129n.244, 131nn.284, 294, 135n.346, 137n.371 hupokeimenon, 2, 116n.65, 130nn.266, 274, 132n.296, 134nn.331, 337, 140n.427, 162n.759 ideas, 57, 60, 90, 94, 122n.139, 144n.490 incidental properties, 24, 28-9, 34, 45-6, 49, 53, 56-7, 66, 112n.16, 119n.99, 122n.147, 127n.212 induction, 38, 115n.56 infinite, 2, 103, 115n.55, 126n.199, 167n.834, 175n.963, see also unlimited intellect, 3, 20, 93, 132n.308, 140n.422, 169n.872 intelligibles, 90, 94, 104, 170n.884 intermediaries, 37 kinêsis, 115n.56, 120n.116, 129n.242, 135nn.340, 345, 144n.481, 145n.499, 160nn.727, 733, 161n.745, 163nn.773, 785, 172n.918 lexis, 5n.9, 118n.97 logos, 118nn.95, 97, 123n.163 Love, 38-9, 58, 63, 91, 129n.254, 130n.263 luck, 2, 34, 52, 62-70, 73, 75, 127n.210, 138n.400, 139n.401, 148nn.552, 554, 556, 560, 149nn.561, 568, 569, 570,

150n.585, 151nn.593, 598, 153nn.628, 629, 156n.682 Lycophron, 24, 118nn.92, 95, 96 magnitude, 25-6, 28, 30, 89, 91-4, 100-2, 104-5, 108, 116n.65, 119n.107, 120nn.110, 111, 113, 122nn.147, 148, 123n.155, 125-6n.196, 167n.834, 169n.867, 170n.884, 174nn.954, 958, 962, 176nn.986, 990, 179nn.1032, 1035 matter, 1, 30-1, 38-40, 42-3, 46, 48-61, 70-2, 74-9, 82, 91, 96-7, 103-7, 111n.5, 114n.32, 121n.134, 124n.173, 126n.203, 127n.221, 129n.247, 130n.274, 132nn.296, 309, 313, 314, 133nn.315, 316, 319, 321, 322, 323, 134nn.328, 330, 331, 135nn.342, 349, 351, 136nn.366, 370, 137nn.376, 377, 378, 382, 383, 138nn.384, 386, 389, 392, 393, 399, 140n.429, 141nn.440, 441, 142nn.446, 447, 448, 143n.477, 144n.491, 145n.507, 146nn.511, 516, 519, 147nn.523, 528, 155n.657, 156n.680, 157n.695, 158nn.703, 706, 708, 711, 159nn.714, 725, 726, 162n.759, 167n.832, 171n.911, 175n.973, 176nn.978, 986, 177nn.1005, 1007 prime matter, 2, 30, 43, 46, 123n.165, 133n.316, 134n.330, 136n.356, 138n.393, 141n.441, 146n.511, 162nn.757, 759 medicine, 21, 56, 58, 73, 75, 114n.38, 143nn.469, 472, 147n.536 Melissus of Samos, 20-2, 25-7, 31, 97, 103, 114n.34, 115n.53, 116n.63, 117n.82, 119nn.104, 108, 120n.113, 121n.132, 168n.840, 172nn.915, 917, 175nn.973, 975, 178n.1023 Menedemus of Eretria, 118n.96 metabolê, 129n.242, 135n.345, 160n.727, 163n.785, see also transformation Metaphysics, 2, 6n.24, 140n.419, 141n.444, 142nn.445, 448, 149n.575 Meteorologica, 155n.663 morphê, 162n.766 motion, 53, 58, 81, 97, 113n.16,

Subject Index 118n.94, 120nn.111, 113, 140nn.425, 429, 144n.487, 149n.752, 155n.647, 158n.699, 160n.743, 161n.751, 172n.917 self-motion, 139n.404 natural science, 114n.38 natural scientist, 21-2, 26, 31, 35, 46, 51, 56-9, 71, 75, 77-9, 91-2, 98, 102, 105, 114n.36, 120nn.119, 120, 124n.171, 144nn.483, 485, 157n.695, 159nn.717, 725, 160n.732, 171n.908 nature, 1-2, 19, 21-2, 29-30, 32, 36, 38-41, 43-4, 46-50, 52-8, 64-6, 68-76, 79, 85, 89-90, 92-4, 96, 98-100, 104-6, 111n.3, 112n.12, 114nn.34, 37, 39, 40, 115n.54, 130n.268, 136n.356, 137n.372, 138n.399, 139n.417, 140n.427, 141nn.431, 432, 438, 444, 142nn.446, 458, 143nn.472, 474, 477, 480, 146nn.516, 517, 153n.631, 155n.654, 156nn.672, 674, 157n.693, 166n.821, 169n.856 necessity, 2, 39, 58, 65-8, 70-2, 75-7, 99, 152n.616, 157n.695, 158n.711, 168n.847 conditional necessity, 77, 157n.695, 158nn.708, 711 Neoplatonism, 3, 6nn.23, 24, 165n.805 Nicolaus the Peripatetic, 6n.18 nous, 5n.9, 112n.18, 124n.175, 113n.29, 140n.421, see also intellect number, 4, 20-1, 23, 26, 29-35, 38, 40, 45-6, 49, 60-4, 66-7, 77, 79-80, 84, 90-5, 98, 100-5, 107-8, 122n.150, 124nn.177, 180, 125nn.183, 185, 126nn.196, 199, 127n.223, 128n.226, 130n.256, 147n.532, 163n.770, 166nn.819, 821, 823, 824, 826, 169n.855, 170nn.883, 887, 172nn.920, 925, 174n.954, 175n.968, 176n.986 Olympiodorus, 6n.23 onoma, 113n.24 On Philosophy, 145n.506 opposites, 20, 24, 30-1, 35-40, 46, 97, 117nn.83, 84, 124nn.174, 177, 129nn.249, 251, 253, 254,

219

130nn.256, 261, 263, 265, 268, 270, 271, 135nn.351, 352 optics, 21, 57, 114n.38 order, 37, 64, 77, 90, 92, 128n.231, 139n.401, 149n.564 ousia, 142n.459, 144n.488, 147n.515, 169nn.869, 870, see also substance paradigm, 60, 146n.520 paraphrastic method of exegesis, 1-4, 113n.29 Parmenides, 2, 20, 22, 26-7, 49, 114n.34, 121nn.129, 132, 133, 134, 122n.140, 175nn.972, 973, 975 parts, 20, 23, 26, 28, 31-3, 35, 45, 52, 61, 64, 72-3, 84, 91, 94, 97-9, 102-3, 105, 107, 114n.32, 116n.72, 117nn.77, 78, 80, 119n.101, 122n.147, 124n.177, 125n.187, 126nn.198, 199, 132n.303, 147n.525, 155n.654, 159n.725, 172n.917, 173n.935 Phaedo, 142n.448 Phaedrus, 123n.164, 171n.907 Philebus, 152n.610 Philomelus, 154n.638 Philoponus, John, 2, 4, 5n.15, 113n.26, 116n.58, 129n.247, 131n.275, 134n.335, 137n.373, 141n.431, 159n.725, 161n.752, 173n.942 philosopher, 21-2, 47, 71, 114n.39, 133n.321, 144n.481, 146n.516, 156n.679 phusis, 53, 112n.12 Physics, 1-2, 6n.22, 120n.109, 138n.399, 170n.895, 172n.917 place, 26, 34, 46, 52, 65-6, 69, 79-80, 86, 90, 97-9, 100, 105-6, 134n.336, 139n.410, 152n.616, 153n.627, 160n.732, 161nn.743, 748-9, 168n.848, 171n.914, 172nn.917, 923-5, 173n.935 plants, 23, 33, 40, 45, 52, 64, 73-4, 131n.284, 139n.404 Plato, 2-3, 6n.23, 24, 27, 30-1, 35, 40, 49, 90-1, 102, 117n.75, 118nn.92, 96, 119n.99, 122nn.137, 139, 123nn.155, 159, 161, 124n.172, 129n.252, 131n.278, 137nn.373, 374, 376, 149n.568, 152n.610, 156n.678, 162n.768

220

Subject Index

Platonic forms, 6n.24 Pliny, 152n.612 Plotinus, 130n.273, 137n.382, 165n.805 Plutarch, 119n.99, 152n.612 Politicus, 146n.508 Porphyry, 1, 5n.12, 113n.31, 117n.85, 123n.155, 139n.410, 166n.823 Posidonius, 144n.483 position, 35, 45, 47, 68-9, 72, 86, 99, 106, 128n.231, 132n.303 potentiality, 23, 25, 42-4, 49-50, 62, 79-87, 89, 101, 119n.102, 132n.314, 133n.315, 134n.333, 136n.370, 142n.461, 148n.547, 155n.657, 161nn.745, 747, 753, 162nn.757, 759, 761, 163nn.782, 785, 164n.785, 165n.814, 174n.948 predicate, 22-4, 49, 103-4, 108, 118nn.96, 98, 121nn.134, 148n.544, 175n.973 Presocratics, 2 principles, 1, 19, 31-6, 38-41, 45-6, 49, 51, 53, 58, 60, 71, 77, 84, 90-1, 102, 106, 111nn.4, 7, 9, 113n.27, 114nn.34, 37, 39, 124nn.172, 173, 180, 125nn.183, 185, 127nn.214, 223, 128n.226, 129n.243, 130nn.256, 263, 268, 270, 271, 131n.276, 135n.352, 136n.355, 138n.399, 146nn.516, 518, 159n.714 privation, 1-2, 37, 42-6, 48-9, 50-1, 56, 80, 84-5, 106-7, 121n.134, 124n.168, 129n.247, 132nn.296, 306, 309, 313, 314, 133nn.319, 326, 134n.328, 135nn.347, 349, 350, 351, 136nn.336, 370, 137nn.371, 377, 378, 382, 138nn.384, 386, 143nn.473, 475, 177n.1005 Protarchus, 68, 152n.610 Pythagoreans, 23, 90-1, 93-4, 129nn.252, 253, 162n.768, 163n.777, 166n.821, 168n.843, 170n.879 quality, 22-4, 26, 34, 40, 44-5, 48, 57, 72, 80, 84, 86, 93, 106, 117n.86, 118n.91, 120n.116, 129n.247, 133n.326, 134n.328, 137n.366, 143n.473, 144n.481, 161n.749

quantity, 22-4, 26, 32-4, 45, 67, 79-80, 84-5, 91, 93-4, 97, 99-100, 103, 105-6, 116n.65, 117n.86, 118n.91, 126n.196, 162n.749, 171n.914 rarefaction, 35, 152n.600 rarity, 31, 39 Republic, 122nn.137, 139, 156n.678 scientific knowledge, 19, 32, 38, 57, 104 seed, 45, 48, 74-5, 96, 125n.193, 135n.342, 136n.368, 157n.683 segregation, 31, 35, 37-9, 47, 124n.180, 127n.210, 129n.254 Sextus Empiricus, 119n.106 shape, 20, 30, 35, 42, 44-6, 50, 54-9, 60, 68, 73-7, 79, 81-3, 85, 90-1, 97, 101, 103-4, 112n.16, 115n.46, 123n.165, 128nn.231, 238, 132n.303, 133n.320, 134n.330, 135n.347, 142n.447, 145n.505, 155n.657, 156n.676, 162n.766, 166nn.824, 826, 167n.826, 175n.969 Simplicius, 2-5nn.3, 4, 15, 113n.31, 115n.46, 123n.155, 125n.194, 126n.199, 132n.308, 133n.322, 134n.335, 137n.373, 139n.410, 141nn.431, 440, 145n.507, 146n.515, 154n.644, 155nn.652, 657, 662, 156nn.666, 673, 162n.768, 164nn.798, 800, 165n.805, 168n.839, 171n.914, 172nn.917, 924, 175n.968, 177n.996, 178n.1016 Socrates, 23-4, 46, 117n.87, 118nn.91, 93, 119n.99, 122n.137 Sophist, 118n.96, 119n.99 Sophistici Elenchi, 119nn.102, 108 Sophonias, 5n.17 soul, 53, 71, 93, 154nn.642, 643, 644, 156n.678, 163n.782, 169n.872 species, 22, 28, 30, 33, 38, 40, 112nn.14, 19, 113n.24, 116n.68, 120n.119, 136n.367, 145n.507, 146n.519, 154n.641, 157n.683, 160n.727 spontaneity, 2, 62, 64-6, 68-70, 73, 148n.552, 149nn.570, 571, 153n.629 sterêsis, 132n.296, see also privation

Subject Index Stoics, 149n.568, 168nn.840, 843, 173n.939, 178n.1019, 179n.1029 stoikheia, 111n.4, 124n.176, see also elements Strife, 38-9, 58, 63, 129n.254, 130n.263 subject, 24, 27, 32, 35, 43, 46, 87, 118nn.91, 96, 98, 119n.99, 121nn.133, 134, 124n.171, 125n.188, 128n.235, 129n.244, 133n.321, 136n.363, 138n.399, 140n.427, 169n.874 underlying subject, 2, 22, 24, 27-9, 31, 38-40, 43-6, 49-51, 53-5, 61, 76, 78, 83, 87-9, 93-4, 101, 104-5, 116n.65, 121n.136, 124n.173, 130nn.262, 265, 270, 271, 274, 132n.296, 133nn.319, 321, 134nn.330, 331, 135nn.339, 347, 351, 136n.366, 137n.378, 138n.392, 141n.441, 142n.448, see also hupokeimenon subsistence, 22, 27, 43, 55, 57, 59, 109, 116n.59 substance, 19-20, 22, 24-9, 34-5, 38-41, 43-6, 53-4, 56-7, 60, 66, 72, 79-80, 82, 86, 90, 92-4, 116nn.62, 65, 72, 126n.199, 128n.241, 131n.284, 134n.338, 135nn.340, 341, 136n.356, 142n.459, 144n.481, 154n.641, 160n.727, 161n.749, 163n.785, 166n.820, 169n.872, 170n.879 substrate, 1-2, 162n.759, 169n.872, see also hupokeimenon syllogism, 20, 25, 31, 61, 71, 121n.129 Symposium, 149n.568 taxis, 128n.231, 149n.564, 159nn.714, 715 teleology, 2, 138n.383 Thales, 131n.276 Theaetetus, 117nn.75, 80, 149n.567 Themistius, 1-4nn.2-3, 5nn.9, 10, 12, 15, 6nn.18, 22, 23, 24, 7nn.28, 29, 111nn.2, 6, 9, 112nn.14, 18, 19, 20, 113nn.22, 26, 28, 29, 31, 114nn.34, 39, 43, 115nn.46, 48, 58, 116nn.63, 65, 66, 67, 68, 117nn.74, 75, 83, 86, 118nn.96, 97, 119nn.100, 104, 120nn.119, 122, 121n.126, 122nn.140, 144, 147, 149, 153, 123nn.154, 155,

221

159, 165, 124nn.171, 172, 177, 125n.194, 126n.200, 127nn.209, 210, 212, 128nn.233, 234, 241, 129nn.247, 254, 130n.268, 274, 131nn.276, 280, 293, 294, 132nn.296, 308, 133n.322, 134nn.331, 336, 135nn.341, 343, 136nn.357, 361, 367, 137nn.373, 382, 138n.384, 393, 399, 400, 139n.412, 414, 140nn.421, 422, 427, 428, 141nn.431, 439, 440, 441, 142nn.446, 447, 458, 461, 143nn.466, 470, 475, 477, 480, 144nn.482, 483, 484, 490, 145nn.500, 504, 505, 506, 507, 146nn.507, 511, 516, 520, 147nn.533, 544, 148nn.547, 552, 554, 556, 149nn.568, 571, 574, 150nn.578, 582, 585, 586, 151nn.593, 594, 598, 599, 600, 152nn.614, 618, 153n.629, 631, 154nn.640, 642, 154nn.644, 645, 155nn.654, 657, 662, 156nn.670, 672, 674, 679, 157nn.686, 693, 695, 158nn.697, 700, 710, 713, 159nn.714, 725, 160nn.732, 734, 740, 741, 161nn.743, 745, 746, 751, 752, 753, 162nn.757, 761, 763, 163n.772, 785, 164nn.785, 786, 788, 790, 798, 165nn.805, 807, 808, 814, 166nn.819, 823, 825, 826, 167nn.832, 834, 168n.848, 169n.878, 171nn.904, 913, 914, 172nn.915, 917, 920, 924, 925, 173nn.933, 935, 936, 938, 174nn.942, 945, 948, 175nn.963, 968, 973, 975, 176nn.978, 986, 992, 177nn.1009, 1010, 178n.1016, 179nn.1032 1033, 1035, 180n.1037 Theophrastus, 1, 120n.122, 164nn.785, 790 theoretical science, 2 Timaeus, 6n.22, 123n.165, 149n.565 time, 24-7, 29-30, 44, 55, 57, 63-4, 73, 79-80, 82-3, 85, 89, 91-2, 100-2, 105-6, 109, 119n.102, 120nn.110, 113, 134n.336, 148n.559, 160n.732, 167n.834, 169n.855, 173n.942, 176n.990, 177n.1009, 179n.1035, 180n.1037 Thebes, 89 transformation, 36, 40-3, 45-6, 52,

222

Subject Index

60, 79, 84, 86, 97, 127n.219, 129n.242, 132n.303, 135n.345, 160n.727, 163n.785 uncoordinated, 37 universals, 20, 112n.14, 141n.431 unlimited, 2, 22, 26, 31, 89, 94, 106-7, 126n.196, 165nn.815, 816, 168nn.843, 847, 172nn.917, 920, 921 unlimited body, 172n.923, see also body unlimited number, 20, 23, 31, 38, 66-7, 124nn.177, 180, 125nn.183, 185, 196, 172n.925, see also number unlimited quantity, 67 unlimited size, 20 unmixed, 34 Valerius Maximus, 152n.612 void, 22, 35, 79, 92, 98, 108, 123n.55, 160n.732, 168nn.843, 847, 170n.895, 172n.926, 178n.1019, 179n.1029

water, 19, 32-5, 39-40, 43, 48, 52, 54, 56, 61, 72, 74, 82, 90, 94, 96-9, 127nn.216, 219, 221, 131n.276, 132n.306, 142nn.446, 448, 172n.924 whole, 20, 23, 26, 29, 32, 35, 42-3, 55, 61, 94, 97-9, 102-5, 108, 114n.32, 116n.63, 117nn.74, 75, 77, 78, 80, 119n.101, 141n.431, 144n.491, 147n.525, 152n.603, 169n.864, 171nn.899, 914, 172nn.915, 920, 173n.935, 175nn.973, 975, 176n.986, 179n.1029 Xenocrates, 2, 29, 30, 123nn.155, 159, 173n.945 Zeno of Elea, 29, 172n.917 Zenobius, 173n.938 Zeus, 72-3, 109, 155n.662, 179n.1034