The World of Nations: A Study of the National Implications in the Work of Karl Marx 9780231898232

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T H E W O R L D OF N A T I O N S

THE

World of Nations A STUDY OF T H E NATIONAL

IMPLICATIONS

IN T H E WORK OF K A R L MARX By Solomon F. Bloom

NEW

YORK

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY ι 941

PRESS

COPYRIGHT COLUMBIA

UNIVERSITY

1941 PRESS,

N E W

Y O R K

Foreign agents: OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS, Humphrey Milford, House, London, E.C. 4, England, AND B. I. Building, Nicol Bombay,

India;

MARUZEN COMPANY, LTD., 6

Tori-Nichome, Manufactured

Tokyo,

Nihonbashi,

Japan

in the United States of

America

Amen Road,

TO MY

MOTHER

PREFACE T H E criticism of those w h o were kind enough to read this essay in manuscript has been of g r e a t value to me. T h r o u g h o u t the investigation I had the privilege of discussing its problems with P r o f e s s o r C a r l t o n J. H . H a y e s of Columbia University. H i s was the challenge that helped me to c l a r i f y my interpretation. P r o f e s s o r G e r o i d T a n quary Robinson, also of Columbia University, gave me the benefit of his meticulous scholarly and editorial judgment. I took some knotty issues in M a r x i s m to my colleague P r o f e s s o r A r t h u r R o s e n b e r g and came away much enlightened. P r o f e s s o r R o b e r t C . Binkley of W e s t e r n Reserve University, w h o died in his prime last year, showed a characteristically w a r m interest in the study. G r a t e f u l l y remembered, too, is the counsel of my colleagues P r o f e s s o r Jesse Dunsmore Clarkson, D r . H a r o l d Weinstein, M r . Samuel H u r w i t z , P r o f e s s o r s Virginia D . H a r r i n g t o n and H a n s R o s e n b e r g ; and of P r o f e s s o r s Joseph D o r f m a n of Columbia University, M r . H e r m a n Simpson, P r o f e s s o r A b r a m L . H a r r i s of H o w a r d U n i v e r sity, and M r . Ira P r o g o f f . M y sister A d e l e B l o o m has shown me, in numberless ways, a rich and rare loyalty. She will surely forgive me my debts, f o r they cannot be repaid. S. F . B. Brooklyn College November, 1940

CONTENTS Ι.

U N I T Y A N D D I V E R S I T Y OF M A N

2.

THE

SOCIAL C O N C E P T I O N OF T H E

I MODERN

NATION

I I

3.

SIZE A N D STATEHOOD

33

4.

BACKWARDNESS AND EMPIRE

48

5.

T H E C O N C E P T I O N OF T H E N A T I O N A L C L A S S

57

6.

STATE AND N A T I O N

65

7.

NATIONALISM

74

8.

N A T I O N A L DIFFERENCES AND THE INTERNATIONAL REVOLUTION

9.

84

E N G L A N D : T H E H E A R T OF C A P I T A L I S M

100

10.

F R A N C E : T H E SPIRIT OF R E V O L U T I O N

115

11.

G E R M A N Y : T H E PROBLEM OF U N I F I C A T I O N

134

12.

RUSSIA : T H E T H E O R Y OF STAGES

151

13.

THE

UNITED

STATES:

A

NATION

IN

THE

MAKING

170

14.

W A S M A R X A NATIONALIST?

185

15.

A VARIED WORLD

196

BIBLIOGRAPHY

209

INDEX

213

I

U N I T Y A N D DIVERSITY OF MAN A T H E O R Y of h u m a n n a t u r e is implicit in every social philosophy. A n y o n e w h o thinks a b o u t society at all is b o u n d to consider the c h a r a c t e r of its ultimate u n i t — m a n himself. T h e social philosopher must f o r m a conception of h u m a n potentialities and limitations. H e must distinguish between the inherent and the t r a n s i t o r y t r a i t s of m a n . M e n obviously have a g o o d deal in common, but they have always belonged to g r o u p s set a p a r t f r o m each o t h e r by all sorts of distinctions. T h e philosopher must d e t e r m i n e with some precision in w h a t sense mankind m a y be r e g a r d e d as a h o m o g e n e o u s mass and in w h a t respects it m a y be t r e a t e d as the sum of m a n y heterogeneous p a r t s . H e must assay the significance and incidence of the t r a i t s t h a t bind a n d t h e t r a i t s t h a t divide men. T h i s is especially t r u e of a thinker like K a r l M a r x , w h o not only p r o p o u n d e d a social t h e o r y but strove to be effective in t h e practical w o r l d as well. H e sought to influence and guide widely v a r i e g a t e d g r o u p s — m o r e p a r ticularly the lower classes of m a n y c o u n t r i e s — t o w a r d a u n i f o r m solution of their economic problems. M a r x was a w a r e t h a t t h e socialist idea must be tested by its implied j u d g m e n t of h u m a n n a t u r e . H e f r e q u e n t l y stopped to reflect on m a n , and these reflections, t h o u g h he never elab-

2

Unity and Diversity

orated them systematically, formed an integral part of his picture of the world. A t first glance his view of humanity seems quite paradoxical. H e once asserted that history was "nothing but a continuous transformation of human nature," 1 suggesting that one could not speak of human nature as such. Y e t he also discussed "human nature in general" ( " d i e menschliche N a t u r im Allgemeinen" 2 ) and described its fundamental characteristics. H i s conception of man was the touchstone of some important social and historical conclusions. A note on Das Kapital yields the key to this apparent contradiction. M a r x was condemning Jeremy Bentham f o r the error of "excogitating" the nature of man f r o m a general principle, in this case the principle of utility. H e went on to remark that he who would pass judgment on the human scene must "first become acquainted with human nature in general, and then with human nature as modified historically in every age." 3 If this proposition applied to M a r x as well as to Bentham — a n d there is no reason why it should not have—then M a r x drew here a crucial distinction. H e separated the characteristics of human nature into two categories, which we may take the liberty of naming "generic" and "historical." Although he did not always seem to maintain this distinction, it was implicit in his writings and was quite essential f o r the clarification of his positon on human nature. T a k e this passage f r o m Das Kapital, f o r example: " L a b o r is primarily a process between man and nature, a process in which man adjusts, regulates, and controls, by his own activity, the material reactions between himself and nature. H e confronts matter, himself a natural force. H e sets in motion the natural instruments 1 2

Sämtliche Werke (Gesamtausgabe, Das Kapital, I, 476, 573Π.

Pt. ι ) , VI, 207. 3 Ibid., p. 573η.

Unity and Diversity

3

o f his b o d y — a r m s , legs, and h a n d s — i n o r d e r to assimilate matter in a f o r m suitable f o r his own needs. B y thus acting upon the external world and changing it, he changes his own nature at the same time. H e develops the potentialities that slumber within it, and subjects the play o f its forces to his own s w a y . " * H e r e is implied a man who acts in obedience to profound and inherent drives and another man who undergoes change and yet somehow does not alter the direction o f those drives. T h i s statement is anything but c l e a r ; it must also be put down as contradictory or mystical unless it is understood to assume a distinction between " g e n e r i c " and " h i s t o r i c a l " characteristics. T h e creature that exercises will and control and has definite potentialities is " g e n e r i c " man. T h e plastic constituents which change with the environment, and hence with human activities, are the stuff o f which " h i s t o r i c a l " man is made. I t is " h i s t o r i c a l " and not " g e n e r i c " man who is subject to "continuous t r a n s f o r m a t i o n . " T h i s view o f two different aspects o f human nature served important functions in the thought o f M a r x . T h e concept o f " g e n e r i c " humanity as one and invariant enabled him to justify his social theory in terms o f a set o f traits belonging to a homogeneous mass. H e could condemn as backward societies which f r u s t r a t e d the noblest traits and potentialities o f " g e n e r i c " man, and could vindicate socialist society by showing how it would realize and fulfill them. T h e complementary concept o f "hist o r i c a l " human nature as plural and changeable made it possible to explain the actual variety o f traits in different ages and places. It provided the foundation f o r the contention that some old traits could be abolished and new traits developed in accordance with the requirements o f progress. *Ibid.,

p. 140.

4

U n i t y and Diversity

" G e n e r i c " man is a creative, purposeful, versatile, and social being. These qualities together lift him above other species. M a r x had a pervading sense of the essential dignity and worth of humanity. 5 T h e tendency of certain materialists to degrade mankind to the level of other fauna was thoroughly repugnant to him. In his own sense of values, the difference between the human and the nonhuman is deep, qualitative, unbridgeable.® M e n consciously differentiate themselves from animals " a s soon as they begin to produce their means of existence, a step which is conditioned by their bodily organization. By producing their means of existence, men indirectly produce their material life itself." 7 M a n is a unique natural force which distinguishes itself from other forces and deliberately seeks to bend them to its own will. 8 T h e result is production, and production gives new meaning even to biologic drives. " H u n g e r is hunger," M a r x once observed, "but the hunger that is appeased by cooked meat eaten with f o r k and knife is another sort of hunger than the one that devours raw meat with the aid of hands, nails, and teeth." Consumption is, in a manner of speaking, "produced by production." 9 T h e production of art, f o r example, develops public taste and therefore "consumption." M a n alone of all creatures fashions suitable tools and instruments to realize his aims. 1 0 T h e intentional abuse of tools, no less than their use, is his characteristic prerogative. T h e slave contrives to make the dif5 New York Tribune, June 25, 1853, p. 5; Sämtliche Werke, I 1 , 561-62; V, 67, 417. β Kritik des Gothaer Programms, p. 4; Theorien über den Mehrwert, III, 318; Ausgewählte Briefe, p. 139; Das Kapital, I, 304, 321, 596; I I I 1 , 61. ''Sämtliche Werke, V, 10; III, 87-88, 546-47; Das Kapital, I, 476. 8 Das Kapital, I, 140-42. 9 Zur Kritik der politischen Ökonomie, p. 226. 10 Das Kapital, I, 142.

Unity and Diversity

5

ference between himself and his beasts perfectly plain by "misusing and destroying them con amore." 11 T h e idea of work is central in the picture of "generic" humanity. M a n is rooted in nature and lives by working. 1 2 H i s labor is peculiarly a compound of physical and mental effort. 1 3 It involves the exercise of skill. Skill, however, is not a human achievement, some animals and insects being much more skillful than man. W h a t clearly distinguishes man is his creative imagination. T h e mental pre-construction of the final result at once ranks the worst weaver above the ablest spider and the most incompetent architect above the most accomplished of bees. 14 M a n is richly versatile by nature. 1 5 Change of activity delights and refreshes him; continuous uniform tasks dampen the "intensity and buoyancy" of his animal spirits. 1 6 M a r x evidently subscribed to Hegel's dictum that an educated person is one who can do "everything that others d o . " 1 7 " W h e n a watchmaker invented the steam-engine ( W a t t ) ; a barber, the spinning frame ( A r k w r i g h t ) ; and a working jeweler, the steamship ( F u l t o n ) , 'Let the cobbler stick to his last,' that ne plus ultra of handicraft wisdom, became sheer nonsense." 1 8 It was the vision of man as a versatile and integral being that inspired the bitter attacks of M a r x on the extreme subdivision of labor which prevailed in the system of " m a n u f a c t u r e " before the introduction of modern machinery. T h a t system not only put a premium upon partial and one-sided specialties, but, by producing a class of un11

Ibid., p. 159η. Ibid., pp. 9-IO, 142, 146; III 2 , 361; Sämtliche Werke, III, 87; Zur Kritik der politischen Ökonomie, p. 22. 13 14 Das Kapital, I, 388, 472. Ibid., p. 140; cf. pp. 304-5. 15 Ibid., pp. 305, 318-19, 326, 448-49; Sämtliche Werke, VI, 204-5; Kritik des Gothaer Programms, p. 24. 10 17 18 Das Kapital, I, 305. Ibid., p. 3291X. Ibid., p. 454. 12

6

Unity and Diversity

skilled workers, elevated the absence of skill into a new sort of specialty. 1 9 T h e worker was forced to overdevelop his dexterity at some minute task while a world of latent powers and abilities was suppressed; " . . . in Argentine they slaughter a whole beast in order to get its hide or its tallow." 2 0 M a r x recognized that a certain degree of division of labor was essential if the increasingly complex work of an industrial society—or indeed complex labor of any sort — w a s to be accomplished. 2 1 H e insisted, however, that it must not be a division into specialties so narrow and permanent as to interfere with the rounded development of the individual. M a r x had enormous faith in the human possibilities inherent in large-scale industry, and especially in the modern machine. Machine production seemed to hold the answer to two basic problems of civilization : the material problem of the creation of adequate riches to support an advanced culture, and the humanistic problem of the harmonious cultivation of varied abilities. T h e vital need of large-scale enterprises f o r a labor supply that could be shifted conveniently f r o m industry to industry and job to job, a working day made shorter by the planned production of a socialist order, the increasingly automatic and simplified character of human operations required by machines, the similarity of these operations in turning out the most varied products, and an educational system which would provide technical and scientific training alongside of academic instruction from the earliest y e a r s ; all these, M a r x hoped, would make it possible to create abundance without condemning mankind to lifelong concentration on trivial occupations. 22 W a s that hope justified? It is too early to say, since 10 21

Ibid., p. 315. Ibid., pp. 324, 727.

20 22

ibid., pp. 257, 314, 325. Ibid., pp. 334, 386-87, 452-53·

Unity and Diversity

7

some of the f a c t o r s assumed by M a r x — t e c h n i c a l education f o r all, f o r e x a m p l e — h a v e not yet been supplied by any g r e a t industrial society. H o w e v e r , it is sufficiently evident that advanced technology has not done a w a y with the need of specialization quite to that d e g r e e which M a r x , on the basis of his o b s e r v a t i o n s of the e a r l i e r Industrial Revolution, had been led to expect. T h e idea that modern industry would m e d i a t e a f a t e f u l union between productivity and versatility w a s one of his m o s t important motivations. T h e capitalist system f a i l e d to d e v e l o p versatility and w a s t h e r e f o r e unable to s h i f t l a b o r easily f r o m industry t o industry, even if it w i s h e d to do so. T h e r e was recourse instead to the " m o n s t r o s i t y of an unh a p p y reserve a r m y of labor kept at the disposal of capital f o r its v a r y i n g needs in the w a y of e x p l o i t a t i o n . " In a socialist society, the " f r a g m e n t a r y m a n " w o u l d be replaced by " t h e completely d e v e l o p e d individual, one f o r w h o m different social functions a r e but a l t e r n a t i v e f o r m s of a c t i v i t y . " 2 3 M e n would fish, hunt, o r e n g a g e in literary criticism without becoming p r o f e s s i o n a l fishermen, 24 hunters, or critics. T h e potentialities of " g e n e r i c " m a n could be realized only in society. B y cooperating with his f e l l o w s , man w a s able to transcend his individual limitations and d e v e l o p " t h e capacities that are his as a m e m b e r of the species." 2 3 M a r x ' s concepts of skill, l a b o r , class, production, economic value, and private p r o p e r t y presupposed societies. Individuality itself was a social function, f o r it w a s in society that men distinguished themselves as individuals. 2 6 Since " n o t h i n g can be its own s y m b o l , " 2 7 man needs a 23

24 Ibid., p. 453. Sämtliche Werke, V, 22, 373. Das Kapital, I, 293. On the subject of cooperation, see ibid., pp. 290, 295, 297, 472-73 ; Sämtliche IVerke, VI, 206. 20 Das Kapital, I, 290; Zur Kritik der politischen Ökonomie, p. 217. 27 Zur Kritik der politischen Ökonomie, p. 103. 25

Β

Unity and Diversity

mirror, so to speak, in order to establish his identity, and t h a t m i r r o r must be another man. 2 8 M a n can be egoistic only in society 29 ; on the o t h e r hand, it is only by living among f r e e men t h a t he can be free. 3 0 "Generic" man is not English or Chinese, bourgeois or slave, black or white, ancient or modern man, but rather the qualities they all share. T h e thought of M a r x rests on the homogeneity of the species. H e assumed an undifferentiated humanity whose fundamental traits transcend the race, the nation, and the historic age no less than the individual. 3 1 "Generic" man stands at the center of his theory of progress. T h e necessary condition for human self-development, the only end in itself accepted by M a r x , is the conquest of nature. 3 2 T h e means for achieving that conquest is the establishment of socialist production. T h e general path is the growth of productive forces through a succession of class societies culminating in a society without class distinctions. " H i s t o r i c a l " man cannot be described so specifically as "generic" man. H e must be drawn in b r o a d lines. M a n has always lived and acted, not in nature and society in general, but in specific natural environments and in given societies. H e has had to adjust himself to the peculiarities, the demands, and the opportunities of the natural and social environment about him. T o the multifariousness of that environment he has reacted by improvising convenient habits, traits, and customs. H e r e , he might be compelled to overemphasize some of his generic t r a i t s ; there, to neglect and stunt other generic traits. T h e series 28

Das Kapital, Das Kapital, Π . ' 4 , 'S32 Das Kapital, économique de la ence, pp. 90-91. 31

I, 19n. 20 Sämtliche Werke, VI, 208. 3 0 Ibid., I 1 , 594. I, 4, 5, 151-52; Zur Kritik der politischen Ökonomie, pp. I I I 2 , 355; see also I, 555; "Lettre sur le développement Russie," Le Mouvement socialiste, VII, 971; Correspond-

Unity and Diversity

9

or summation of the impermanent human molds which reflect the variety of natural and social surroundings is "historical" man. It is an understatement to say t h a t M a r x was aware of that variety. H e insisted t h a t the original heterogeneity of the physical environment is a factor of heavy import in history. M o r e than once he pointed out, f o r example, that capitalism could have arisen only in the temperate zone, with its relative hardships and variety of produce, and not in the over-luxuriant tropics. W h e r e nature is too bountiful and keeps man in "leading strings," he is not moved to exploit his powers. In order to become the master of nature, he must be spurred by the environment to diversify his needs and abilities and his means and methods of work. 3 3 M a r x gave many illustrations of the interaction of natural and artificial differences between countries. A climate niggardly to agriculture may f a v o r home industries. 3 4 H u m a n effort may alter the effects of the natural environment, and while abolishing old distinctions may introduce new ones. M o d e r n technology destroyed differences arising f r o m isolation and distance. But when some countries were freed f r o m dependence on their own raw materials, fresh differences arose. Industry linked various countries into a single economic unit by distributing economic functions among them. " T h a n k s to the machine, the spinner can live in England while the weaver remains in the E a s t Indies." 35 T h e machine made it possible f o r the English spinner to become enormously more productive than his fellow spinner in China. 3 6 E n g l a n d and Asia became distinguished f r o m each other in a new fashion. T h e "national intensity and productivity" of labor varies with 33 Das 127 ; Zur 34 Das 30 Das

Kapital, I, 477-78 ; II, 126 ; Theorien über den Kritik der politischen Ökonomie, pp. 219-20. 35 Kapital, II, 2 1 2 - 1 3 . Sämtliche Werke, Kapital, I, 570.

Mehrwert, VI, 201.

II1,

ÎO

Unity and Diversity

the economic development of each country. 37 Railroads changed the relative location of markets and centers of production. 38 T h e extent to which machinery was introduced was itself affected by previous natural and historical distinctions. One of the reasons why continental European countries adopted modern industrial methods was the necessity for meeting English competition. However, the United States was impelled by an additional powerful motive—the relative scarcity of labor. In time, the latter country came to utilize more machinery than the "overpopulated" home of the Industrial Revolution. 39 Differences among men are traceable, in general, to the complex and mutually interacting differentiation of nature and production. While "generic" traits are never less than latent, "historical" traits are never more than temporary. T h e mosaic of "historical" humanity is open to further change. 37

3 8 Ibid., Ibid., pp. 522-23. II, 223. Ausgewählte Briefe, p. 1 1 ; see also Der Achtzehnte Brumaire . . . p. 30; Theorien über den Mehrwert, II 2 , 370-71. For other examples of differentiation, see Das Kapital, III 1 , 129-30, 194-95, 437. 39

2 T H E SOCIAL C O N C E P T I O N OF THE MODERN NATION Γ τ is one thing to say that M a r x held a view of human nature broad and flexible enough to take account o f the generic and specific traits o f man, and quite another to construct f r o m his writings a systematic theory of the subdivisions o f mankind, w h e t h e r a theory o f race or nationality. T h e conception o f " h i s t o r i c a l " man described the basis of differentiation in terms too general to serve as a means of classifying human groups or characterizing them satisfactorily. In his youth, b e f o r e he f o r m u l a t e d the views that became associated with his name, M a r x accepted rather uncritically conventional judgments o f the character o f various nations. H e thought of the G e r m a n s as a "philosophical," of the French as a " p o l i t i c a l , " and of the English as an " e c o n o m i c " nation. H e remarked in 1844 that the G e r m a n proletariat w a s " t h e theoretician of the E u r o p e a n proletariat, as the E n g l i s h proletariat was its economist, and the French proletariat its politician." It must be admitted, he added, that " G e r m a n y possesses a classic mission f o r the social revolution in the same degree that she is incapable of a political one. . . . A philosophical nation can find its suitable practice only in socialism and the active element o f its emancipation only

i2

Conception of the Nation

in the proletariat." 1 In the same vein he put down the difference between French and English materialism to the difference between the two nationalities. " T h e French endowed English materialism with esprit, with flesh and blood, with eloquence. T h e y lent it what it still l a c k e d — temperament and grace. T h e y civilized it. In Helvetius, who stems from Locke, materialism received the special character of the French." 2 B e f o r e long M a r x ceased to draw these particular national distinctions. H e came to regard the social and economic thought of Germany as quite backward. H e began to trace intellectual and cultural differences to economic and historical differences between countries. A s early as 1 8 4 5 , the crucial year of his transition to materialism, he came to the conclusion that the emphasis of German thinkers on idealist interpretations of human affairs was not due to any special natural aptitude or tendency, but simply to the circumstance that Germany had not developed adequately in the economic realm; she lacked the earthly basis f o r history, as he put it. 3 H i s remark in Misere de la philosophie two years later that " i f the Englishman transforms men into hats, the German transforms hats into ideas" was hardly intended as a compliment to the German. " N o w we are in G e r m a n y ! W e shall now have to talk metaphysics while discussing political economy." 4 L a t e r , he reduced the difference between the economic thought of England and of France to a difference of economic development. 5 On occasion, however, M a r x continued to ascribe conventional traits to various groups in an offhand fashion. H e referred to the Slavs as an "inland," "anti-maritime" 1 3 5

Sämtliche Werke, III, i 8 ; I 1 , 611-12. Ibid., V, 17-18, 453-54· See below, pp. 122-25.

2 Ibid., III, 306. *lbid., VI, 175; cf. III, 18.

Conception of the Nation

13

race.® H e observed that the English were empirically minded and lacked " t h e spirit of generalization," although his own opinion of the power of generalization of the English classical economists was extremely high. 7 H e contrasted the "revolutionary a r d o r of the Celtic w o r k e r " with "the solid but slow nature of the Anglo-Saxon worker." 8 Like everybody else he thought of the Americans as a practical people. 9 T h e Russian economic writer V. V. Bervy ( " N . F l e r o v s k y " ) appeared to show " g r e a t feeling f o r national characteristics" in descriptions such as these: " t h e s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d Kalmuck," "the M o r d v i n , poetical despite his d i r t , " " t h e adroit, epicurean, lively T a r t a r , " or "the talented Little Russian." Bervy reminded M a r x of A . A. Monteil, whose curious Histoire des français des divers états contained some sharp national delineations. 1 0 While he shared current opinions of the capacities and traits of certain nations and races, M a r x did not develop any generalization on such traits, nor did he regard them as permanent and unchanging. H e once noted that in the settlement of the American W e s t the "nationality of the immigrants asserted itself" in the choice of lands. H i s illustrations showed that "nationality," as used here, was the result of the physical environment of a people: " T h e people f r o m N o r w a y and f r o m our German high f o r e s t lands sought out the rough n o r t h e r n forest land of Wisconsin; the Yankees, in the same provinces, kept to the 6 Secret Diplomatic History of the Eighteenth Century, p. 8 6 ; see a l s o N e w Y o r k Tribune, M a r c h 5, 1852, p. 7 ; Sämtliche f f erke, V I I , 288. 7 2 " B r i e f e a n D r . K u g e l m a n n , " Neue Zeit, X X , 477 ; Das Kapital, I, 368η. 8 " B r i e f e a n D r . K u g e l m a n n , " Neue Zeit, X X 2 , 4 7 8 ; Ausgewählte Briefe, p . 2 3 5 ; Das Kapital, I, 673. 0 See b e l o w , p. 172. 10 Briefwechsel (Gesamtausgabe, P t . 3 ) , I V , 279-80; Α . A. M o n t e i l , Histoire des français des divers états ( P a r i s , 1 8 5 3 ) , *> ®9> *45 4,ί-'7·

i4

Conception of the Nation

prairies. . . . " 1 1 I f M a r x had generally used the term in that sense, one might infer that " Y a n k e e " character was simply a function of prairie l i f e ; but he did not. H e once spoke of "genuinely commercial peoples" 1 2 without intending to imply the existence of innate group qualities. A l l peoples did not show "the same tendency to capitalist production"; "certain primitive peoples," like the T u r k s , appeared to possess "neither the temperament nor the disposition" f o r capitalist enterprise. T h e s e were "exceptional" cases, f o r the development of capitalism resulted in the establishment of an average level of "temperament and disposition" among various peoples. 1 3 T o say that certain races, abilities, climates, and natural conditions, such as proximity to the sea or the fertility of the soil, were better adapted f o r production than others, was but to say that it was easier to create wealth in proportion as the necessary factors were present "subjectively and objectively." T h a t was a tautology and not a racial or national explanation of productivity. 1 4 One must not be misled by the fact that M a r x frequently spoke of nations and races as " n a t u r a l " entities, referred to "innate race characteristics," and speculated on the "natural basis" of national and racial differences. 1 5 T h e " n a t u r a l " was not, in his usage, a constant or fixed factor. H e applied that qualifier, as a rule, to conditions and relations as they existed before, or in the absence o f , conscious human control and interference. 1 6 So f a r was he f r o m regarding the " n a t u r a l " as the inevitable or the immutable that he could say that "even the natural differ11

12 Briefwechsel, IV, 248. Das Kapital, I, 46 ; I I I 1 , 317. Theorien über den Mehrwert, III, 519; Zur Kritik der politischen Ökonomie, pp. 240-41. 14 Zur Kritik der politischen Ökonomie, pp. 219-20. 15 Das Kapital, III 2 , 324-25, 327; I, 476; Briefwechsel, III, 355-56. 16 Sämtliche Werke, V, 12, 20, 49-50, 55 ff., 325; Das Kapital, I, 316; Karl Korsch, Karl Marx (London, 1938), pp. 193-95. 13

Conception of the Nation

15

enees within the species, like racial differences . . . can and must be done a w a y with historically," that is by human effort. 1 7 In a discussion with E n g e l s on the theories o f Pierre Trémaux, M a r x gave "naturalness" a very broad connotation. T h e French scientist had argued, in a book published in 1867, that racial differences w e r e produced by differences in the geologic f o r m a t i o n s of the earth. W i t h o u t distinguishing between race and nationality, M a r x commented that " f o r certain questions, like nationality, etc., it is here alone that we may find the natural basis." One might conclude that the nation w a s to be reg a r d e d as a function of an invariant characteristic of nat u r e — a factor invariant o v e r l o n g geologic eras, at any rate. E n g e l s asked ironically w h e t h e r T r é m a u x could explain linguistic differences by g e o l o g y . M a r x ignored the issue of language but amplified his position. H e had been impressed by the view of T r é m a u x that distinctions between races ( M a r x added, between " n a t i o n s " as w e l l ) should be traced to differences in the material environment rather than to differences in the blood stream. " T a r t a r s " and " R u s s i a n s " w e r e not born but made by different soils. H o w e v e r , M a r x made it plain that he w o u l d not interpret the " e n v i r o n m e n t " which thus fashioned races and nations in a strictly geologic sense. H e thought of it broadly, as including resources with the related industries. T h e " n a t u r a l " basis of nationality turned out to be the natural and artificial, material s u r r o u n d i n g s — p e r haps, as M a r x would say, the whole system o f production. 1 8 M a r s h a l e d together, these speculations on national theory assume a s o m e w h a t disproportionate significance. In the context of M a r x ' s w o r k , they w e r e random and i n f o r m a l reflections. T h e y betrayed the casual manner of 17

Sämtliche

Werke,

V, 403.

18

Briefwechsel,

III, 35s—56, 361-63.

16

Conception of the Nation

a man of catholic tastes and lively intellectual interests pursuing a line of thought peripheral to his principal concerns. Such remarks cannot be treated on the same plane as his views on economics or social politics. In short M a r x was only very incidentally a theorist of nationality or race. H e never attempted definitions of the race or the nation that would distinguish them f r o m other aggregates of men. H e used terms like "national" and " n a t i o n " with considerable looseness. Sometimes "nation" was a synonym f o r " c o u n t r y " ; sometimes f o r the quite different entity, the " s t a t e . " Occasionally "nation" stood f o r the ruling class of a country. 1 9 T h a t is not the whole story, however. W h e n M a r x spoke of certain classes as "national," when he discussed "national" economies and states, he implied a definition of the nation. If M a r x concerned himself with theories of nationality only indirectly, he concerned himself quite closely with the character and problems of specific modern nations. H e was interested particularly in the experiences, history, and traits of the important nations of the Western world. It is submitted that his observations on these nations add up to a distinctive attitude toward national questions. M a r x was necessarily exercised over the bearing of national differences upon his theory of class struggle and revolution. A s a radical political leader, he took a position on the national issues of the day. H e attempted to reconcile that position, however implicitly or roughly, with his economic and political outlook. If one may, therefore, speak of the M a r x i a n theory of nationality at all, it must be in the sense of a generalized description of the peculiarities of modern Western nations—and the relevance of such description to national questions in other parts of the world. Sämtliche Werke, VI, 20i, 446, 447, 529, 530; Das Kapital, I, 719 ; III 1 , 3x8; III 2 , 56. 19

Conception of the Nation

17

So viewed and so limited, the " n a t i o n " of M a r x may be described as an individual society which functions with a considerable degree of autonomy, integration, and selfconsciousness. T h i s definition supplies the connotation the words " n a t i o n " and "national" had when he used them in a significant relation to his economic and political views. 2 0 When he spoke of feudal nations or bourgeois nations, advanced or backward nations, he might just as well have spoken of individual societies characterized by feudal, bourgeois, advanced, or backward economies. T h e feudal or aristocratic nation discussed in Manifest der Kommunistischen Partei was marked by economic isolation, handicraft industry, guild control, serfdom and its vestiges, and the social and political domination of the aristocracy. T h e bourgeois nation that succeeded it was distinguished by the special social division between bourgeois and proletarians, by industrial and commercial integration on a large scale, and by international rivalries f o r markets and profits. In the proletarian nation, production would be socialized and class distinctions would disappear. T h e terms "nation" and "society," " n a t i o n a l " and " s o c i a l , " became virtually interchangeable, as in the remark in Das Kapital that "even a whole society, a nation, and indeed all societies together, are not the owners of the e a r t h " but only its temporary occupiers.- 1 If the nation was to be regarded as an example of " a Sämtliche Werke, VI, 543; Die Klassenkämpfe in Frankreich, p. n o ; Zur Kritik der politischen Ökonomie, p. 228 ; Das Kapital, I, 7 1 9 ; III-, 376. For definitions by followers and students of Marx, see Bauer, Die Nationalitäten und die Sozialdemokratie, pp. 6, 24-25, 1 1 2 - 1 3 , 1 3 5 ; K a r l Kautsky, Nationalität und Internationalität, pp. 3, 6, and "Krisis in Österreich," Neue Zeit, X X I I 1 , 39-42; Heinrich Cunow, Die Marxsche Geschichts-, Gesellschafts-, und Staatstheorie, II, 11 ff.; Werner Heider, Die Geschichtslehre von Karl Marx, pp. 123, 138; Joseph Stalin, Marxism and the National and Colonial Question, p. 8; "Die Arbeiterbewegung, das Genossenschaftswesen und die Revolution," Der Vorbote, March 1870, p. 35, -1 Das Kapital, I I I 2 , 309.

18

Conception of the Nation

whole society," then national character must reflect the particular experiences and adjustments of a social group as it functioned within, or fitted into, a particular physical and historical environment. M a r x frequently discussed human society as a whole f o r speculative purposes, but his world was nevertheless divided into a number of actual societies. In some respects, and over large surfaces of the globe, human society was indeed an increasingly integral unit; in others, however, it was not one but many. T h e nation was the special case of society, the concrete embodiment of modern social life in a specific setting. A national theory which started with the view of the nation as a society necessarily covered a good deal of ground. A p a r t f r o m questions relating to unification, defense, patriotism, and the treatment of minorities, such a theory must concern itself with the many issues which arise f r o m the influence of background, tradition, and history upon social forces, and the interplay between social forces and their specific locale in general. A host of social and economic questions must be discussed as national questions, and vice versa. E v e r y social issue became national to the extent that it was modified or colored by its geographic and historical framework. Since society was, to M a r x , a flexible, changing, and dynamic entity, the nation was a historical phenomenon par excellence. It was not, of course, a biologic phenomenon. F r o m the point of view of biology, mankind seemed to M a r x distinctly singular rather than plural. H e spoke approvingly of T r é m a u x ' s view that biologic crossings produced "the typical unity of the species" and not its variations. 2 2 T h e theory of evolution would therefore have reference to the development of "generic," or typ22

Briefwechsel,

III, 355.

Conception of the Nation

19

¡cal man, and not to "historical" man, whether "national" or "racial." M a r x seemed to have been as much interested in the negative proposition of Trémaux that races and nations were not biologic phenomena, as in the positive proposition that they were products of the environment. Blood ties and relationships had significance only among primitive groups. T o become mature, man must sever the purely biologic and tribal connections with his fellow men. 23 Nor was the nation a linguistic category. 24 Not all people who spoke the same tongue belonged, or properly should belong, to the same social entity; not all people who belonged to the same group necessarily spoke the same language, although they were very likely to do so eventually under modern conditions. T o deal with the political and economic world in terms of distinctions of language seemed unrealistic to M a r x . When it was suggested that the German-speaking members combine to form a unit within the organization of the First International—German-speaking Alsatians, for instance, being grouped with the German rather than the French section—Marx protested that classification by countries was much more "natural." The proposal would substitute "an artificial contrivance of arbitrary lingual connections" for "the actual state and national connections." " N a t i o n " was not to be equated with language. 25 Marx's newspaper Neue rheinische Zeitung noted that German-speaking groups who lived in Poland, Hungary, or America, were to be regarded as belonging to the Polish, Hungarian, or 23 Das Kapital, I, 46, 298, 3 1 6 - 1 7 ; " V e r a Zazulich und K a r l M a r x , " Marx-Engels Archiv, I, 321. 24 Marx did not attempt to correlate closely literary or artistic forms with economic stages. See Zur Kritik der politischen Ökonomie, pp. 246-47. 25 Briefwechsel, IV, 213, 2 1 5 ; " A n die deutschen Sozialdemokraten," Der Vorbote, July 1869, p. 1 0 5 ; "Zur Geschichte der Internationalen ArbeiterAssociation," ibid., p. 109.

2o

Conception of the Nation

American, and not to the German, nation. T h e German settlers in H u n g a r y , f o r example, had become in all important respects—inclination, character, m a n n e r s — M a g yars, although they still spoke G e r m a n ; only the recentlysettled Saxons and J e w s in that country still insisted upon "preservation of an absurd nationality within an alien country." Similarly, the French colony in Berlin was German, and the French colony in, let us say, Montevideo, Uruguayan. Λ11 these groups functioned within larger societies. L a n g u a g e is the creature of circumstance. T h e great modern languages are products either of the historical development of old languages, as in Romance and Germanic countries, or of the fusion of various dialects and tongues by the process of political and economic consolidation, as in the case of England. 2 6 A common language, even if allied to an old culture and historical tradition, is not a sufficient guarantee of national unity or of the continuance of national life. T h e successful operation of a people's economic system is a more important factor. T h e f a t e of any civilization, whether national or not, rests upon the vitality of the economy within which it flourishes. T h e civilization of medieval Provence, although superior to contemporary northern French civilization, succumbed to the latter because the N o r t h had the decisive advantage of a more progressive economy. 2 7 T h e geographic limits of the nation should be determined by the needs governing the operations of an advanced economy, and not by historical, traditional, or legal f a c t o r s ; nor by considerations of military defense, f e a r of aggression, or conquest. W h e n it became known in 1 8 7 1 that Prussia would demand the cession of Alsace 28 27

Nachlast, Nachlast,

III, 136, 238-39; Sämtliche Werke, V, 404-5. III, 172-73.

Conception of the Nation

21

and L o r r a i n e by France, M a r x denied the validity of territorial claims based on historical rights. T h e fact that these provinces h a d once belonged to the late H o l y R o man E m p i r e did not give G e r m a n y the right to annex their soil and " t h e human beings g r o w n upon it." T h e invocation of historical rights would lead to the return o f the Prussian dominions o f the H o h e n z o l l e r n dynasty to Poland. M i l i t a r y requirements were no better guide f o r the adjustment of national boundaries. T h e leaders of the Prussian army had demanded A l s a c e and L o r r a i n e on the ground that G e r m a n y needed a better defense line against France. M a r x argued that G e r m a n y could be defended more easily against France than France against Germany. B u t honestly, is it n o t in g e n e r a l a b s u r d a n d a n a c h r o n i s t i c t o raise m i l i t a r y c o n s i d e r a t i o n s t o a p r i n c i p l e f o r the d e t e r m i n a t i o n of n a tional b o u n d a r i e s ? If w e f o l l o w e d t h a t rule, A u s t r i a w o u l d

still

h a v e a c l a i m to V e n i c e a n d t h e line of the M i n c i o R i v e r , a n d F r a n c e to the line of t h e R h i n e , in o r d e r t o p r o t e c t P a r i s , w h i c h is c e r t a i n l y m o r e open to a t t a c k f r o m the n o r t h e a s t t h a n B e r l i n is f r o m

the

s o u t h w e s t . I f b o u n d a r i e s are to be fixed by m i l i t a r y interests, t h e r e w i l l be no e n d to c l a i m s , f o r e v e r y m i l i t a r y line is necessarily f a u l t y a n d m a y be i m p r o v e d b y t h e a n n e x a t i o n of f u r t h e r t e r r i t o r y ; besides, such a line c a n n e v e r be fixed d e f i n i t i v e l y a n d j u s t l y , because it is a l w a y s imposed by the c o n q u e r o r u p o n t h e c o n q u e r e d a n d t h e r e f o r e carries w i t h i n it the seed of a f r e s h w a r . 2 8

Nationality was not an indissoluble bond. T h e influence of social change and the more direct pressure of conquest, diplomacy, and state policy might or might not result, depending on circumstances, in the nationalization o r denationalization of populations. A combination of historical events shifted the line of demarcation between the German and Polish nations eastward. 2 9 D i r e c t and f o r c e d 28 29

Der Bürgerkrieg in Frankreich, pp. 35, 36-37. New York Tribune, March 5, 1852, p. 7.

22

Conception of the Nation

e f f o r t s at n a t i o n a l i z a t i o n w e r e n o t a l w a y s effective. M a r x p o i n t e d to the d i s c o v e r y o f the C z a r i s t G o v e r n m e n t t h a t t h e P o l e s w o u l d not y i e l d to t h e a t t e m p t t o m e r g e t h e m into a " S l a v - R u s s i a n n a t i o n a l i t y . "

30

H e s a w n o intrinsic

r e a s o n w h y a p e r s o n could n o t c h a n g e his n a t i o n a l i t y ; r a t h e r t h e r e w a s g o o d r e a s o n f o r d o i n g so u n d e r certain c o n d i t i o n s . 3 1 I f the n a t i o n w a s a society, the test o f nat i o n a l i t y w a s v i t a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n in t h e activities o f society in w h i c h one l i v e d . R e g a r d l e s s o f p a s t background,

language,

w a s determined

or tradition,

by o n e ' s

national

the

culture,

affiliation

ties w i t h the e c o n o m y ,

class

s t r u c t u r e , and polity o f a g i v e n society. N a t i o n a l i t y w a s an o b j e c t i v e condition, n o t a s u b j e c t i v e p r e f e r e n c e . Such w e r e the conclusions w h i c h

flowed

from

Marx's

conception o f the m o d e r n n a t i o n . T h a t nation w a s a comp l e x p r o d u c t and f u n c t i o n of e n v i r o n m e n t a l ,

economic,

h i s t o r i c a l , and o t h e r influences. T h e p h y s i c a l c h a r a c t e r of the e n v i r o n m e n t , the d e g r e e a n d f a s h i o n o f its d e v e l o p m e n t ; the g e n e r a l f e a t u r e s o f the p r e v a l e n t m e t h o d

of

p r o d u c t i o n , t o g e t h e r w i t h the special l o c a l m o d i f i c a t i o n s , d i v e r g e n c e s , and p e c u l i a r i t i e s ; the n u m b e r , functions, and i n t e r r e l a t i o n s h i p of t h e i m p o r t a n t social classes and especially the c h a r a c t e r o f the ruling o r d o m i n a n t c l a s s ; the institutional and political experiences o f the p a s t ; and the distinctive culture and t r a d i t i o n s — a l l

these f a c t o r s

af-

f e c t e d the c h a r a c t e r a n d d e v e l o p m e n t o f the n a t i o n . M a r x a c c e p t e d n a t i o n a l peculiarities and differences as s u b s t a n t i a l f a c t o r s in h i s t o r y . H e w a s equally i m p a t i e n t w i t h c o n s e r v a t i v e critics w h o r e g a r d e d all r a d i c a l s as antin a t i o n a l and w i t h r a d i c a l s w h o p o o h - p o o h e d the i m p o r t a n c e o f nationality. T h e Manifest

dismissed t h e c o m m o n

t a u n t t h a t the socialists p r o p o s e d t o abolish n a t i o n a l i t y Briefwechsel, II, 448. ai Nachlass, III, 150.

30

Conception of the Nation

23

as unworthy of serious consideration. 3 2 T h e charge was of a piece with the notion that socialism would abolish all private property, put an end to liberty and culture, and destroy the family. F a r f r o m wishing to uproot these institutions and values, the socialists proposed to invest them with greater meaning. M a r x and Engels treated the question of property in this spirit. T h e socialists planned to abolish the system of bourgeois property, under which only a small minority of the people could own anything at all. T h e y did not intend to deprive anyone of the power of appropriating goods. T h e y would abolish private property only in those means of production which, because they are vital to society, can be used to exploit labor. Similarly, they would destroy "bourgeois individuality, bourgeois independence, and bourgeois f r e e d o m , " and not these values in themselves. T h e socialists would put an end to that form of the institution of the family, or that "distortion" of it, which prevailed under capitalism. T o M a r x the "bourgeois f a m i l y " was an arrangement which provided the upper class with the advantages of family life, supplemented these advantages with widespread public prostitution, and degraded the family life of the proletariat. In Das Kapital he spoke with emotion of the deprivation of family joys and decencies to which the workers were being subjected. A s matters stood, they found it no more possible to lead a full and wholesome family life than to enjoy the blessings of private property or of liberty. 3 3 T h e Manifest followed the same reasoning on the question of nationality. T h e proletarians could not call their country their own so long as it remained under the 32

Sämtliche Werke, V I , 543. Ibid., V I , 539 ff.; Das Kapital, I, 7 2 8 ; see also D. R v û z a n o v , ed., Communist Manifesto ( N e w Y o r k , 1 9 3 0 ) , pp. 2 9 1 - 9 2 . Λ3

The

24

Conception of the Nation

domination of the bourgeoisie. T h e whole tenor of the discussion was a denial that socialists w e r e opposed to nations as such. W e a r e accused, M a r x and E n g e l s w r o t e , of wishing to do a w a y with the " f a t h e r l a n d , " and with " n a t i o n a l i t y . " T h e " f a t h e r l a n d " has meant a country dominated by exploiting classes, in modern times by the bourgeoisie. In that sense, plainly, " t h e w o r k e r s h a v e no f a t h e r l a n d . " " W e cannot t a k e f r o m them w h a t they h a v e not g o t . " 3 4 T h i s blunt statement has been the object of much conservative criticism and radical speculation. It has been frequently taken to affirm precisely w h a t M a r x w a s at pains to d e n y : that nationalities had no real existence, that they should not exist, that the emotion of patriotism was f o r e i g n to the p r o l e t a r i a t , and that the doctrine of "scientific socialism" implied some r a t h e r special attitude t o w a r d nationalism. T h e point of the Manifest w a s simply that the question of nationalism was bound up with the question of a stake in one's country. T h i s idea was current coinage in liberal and radical circles. In 1 8 4 6 M a r x had read F . V i l l e g a r d e l l e ' s Histoire des idées sociales avant la Révolution française, which had just been published. A s was his i n d e f a t i g a b l e wont throughout l i f e , he excerpted and s u m m a r i z e d important passages. A m o n g them w a s a quotation f r o m an essay written in 1 7 8 7 by Brissot de W a r v i l l e , G i r o n d i n leader in the g r e a t Revolution, in criticism of the r o y a l administration. 3 5 T h e following is the passage M a r x translated f r e e l y in his notebook with an insertion, in parentheses, of a section that M a r x omitted but must h a v e r e a d : I t is a reflection that does not occur at all to those w h o f r a m e plans of education for the people that there cannot be a good plan 34

Sämtliche

ÌVerhc, VI, 543.

'

35

Ibid.,

pp. 6 1 6 - 1 7 .

Conception of the Nation

25

where that people hasn't any property; because without property, it has no country at all ; without property, everything is against it [the people], and, in turn, it must be armed against everybody. . . . (Society cries to the people: "Respect the goods of your rich neighbor." T h e people could reply: " H a v e you yourself respected my primitive right to property?" Government cries to the people: " T h e enemy is coming to seize my possessions, arm yourself, defend me, die, if need be." "Die, and w h a t f o r ? " the people could answer. " D o I own a single foot of soil? If the enemy becomes my master, will he be harsher than you? Could he do me more harm than you are doing? Could he impose a double burden on m e ? " Ethics and religion cry to the people: "Love your wife, support her, raise your children properly, be pious, love your God, H e is your Father." "Alas," the people could still reply, "can one love when one is sunk in poverty? Is it possible to support and raise children when one has nothing? O r to be pious? Can one love the Being that seems to sentence him to poverty ?) . . ." I do not know, but it seems impossible to reply to this reasoning of the poor. And, since that is the fate of three-quarters of society under despotic and monarchical governments, it follows that these three quarters can have neither religion, nor ethics, nor attachment to the government and to society; it follows that any plan for sound education is incompatible with this form of administration ; it follows that before one can think of educating the people, one must assure it a property [ " u n e propriété"]. But through the very force of abuse that remedy is impossible. It is necessary either to destroy the machine entirely if the rights of the people are to be restored to it, or to continue to despoil the people, if that machine is preserved. Therefore, again, moral and political education is a chimera in monarchical states. 36 O n e n e e d h a r d l y g o b e y o n d t h e Manifest

to show that

t h e s t a t e m e n t o n t h e f a t h e r l a n d did n o t m e a n that the w o r k e r s w o u l d n o t like t o h a v e a f a t h e r l a n d of

their

own, or that they were dead to the emotion of attachment t o o n e ' s h o m e l a n d . T h e r e w a s a s e n s e in w h i c h M a r x n o t o n l y a c c e p t e d t h e n a t i o n a l e n t i t y as real, but, h a v i n g g i v e n 30

çaise

F. V i l l e g a r d e l l e , Histoire des idées ( P a r i s , 1 8 4 6 ) , pp. 124-26.

sociales

avant

la Révolution

fran-

2Ó

Conception of the Nation

it his own interpretation, claimed a national sanction f o r the proletarian p r o g r a m . A most significant declaration, which implied that the w o r k e r s w e r e the true patriots of modern times, f o l l o w e d immediately upon the statement that they had no f a t h e r l a n d : "Since the p r o l e t a r i a t must first of all win political p o w e r , become a national class, and constitute itself as the nation, it is, so f a r , itself national, though by no means in the bourgeois sense of the w o r d . " 37 W e shall explore later the implications of this b r o a d contention: what M a r x u n d e r s t o o d by a " n a t i o n a l c l a s s , " a concept barely a d u m b r a t e d in the Manifest; w h a t he reg a r d e d as the bourgeois meaning of " n a t i o n a l " and w h a t the p r o l e t a r i a n ; and how he p r o p o s e d to reconcile the national with the socialist point of view. M e a n w h i l e a serious objection must be met. D i d not M a r x in f a c t predict, in the Manifest and elsewhere, the imminent disappearance of nations? D i d he not assert that the bourgeoisie had begun to iron out the distinctions between the nations, and that the p r o l e t a r i a t w o u l d complete the process and establish a u n i f o r m w o r l d ? C e r t a i n statements of the Manifest, taken by themselves, seem to b e a r out such an interpretation. T h e Manifest is a cryptic and epigrammatic document and t h e r e f o r e easily misread. W h a t the authors f o r e s a w was not the complete disappearance of all national distinctions w h a t e v e r , but specifically the abolition of sharp economic and social differences, economic isolation, invidious distinctions, political rivalries, w a r s , and exploitation of one nation by another. T h e kinds of difference that w e r e doomed to d i s a p p e a r were already being undermined by the bourgeoisie. T h a t class, we r e a d in the Manifest, w a s sweeping a w a y " a l l 37 Sämtliche Werke, VI, 543. See the interpretation of Arthur Rosenberg, A History of Bolshevism (London, 1934), pp. 1 0 - 1 1 .

Conception of the Nation

27

fixed, frozen relations with their train of ancient and venerable prejudices and opinions." It became impossible f o r industry to rest on a merely national foundation: long-established national industries were constantly being dislodged by new industries, which no longer used the raw materials of the home country, but drew them from the remotest areas, and sold their products in all parts of the world. Old wants, satisfied by native products, were being replaced by new wants calling f o r the importation of the goods of distant lands and climes. A many-sided intercourse and interdependence of nations was taking the place of local and national self-sufficiency. Intellectual life was undergoing a similar change. " N a t i o n a l one-sidedness and narrowness" were becoming increasingly impossible and out of the many national and provincial literatures, a world literature was arising. 3 8 In a subsequent passage, M a r x and Engels w r o t e : " N a t i o n a l differences and antagonisms between peoples are already tending to disappear more and more, owing to the development of the bourgeoisie, the growth of free trade and a world market, and the increasing uniformity of industrial processes and of the corresponding conditions of life. T h e rule of the proletariat will efface these differences and antagonisms even m o r e . " Much hangs on the connotation of the opening phrase, "die nationalen Absonderungen und Gegensätze der Völker." T o judge by the whole context of the Manifest, this phrase had reference to undesirable and invidious differences, especially antagonisms, and not to distinctions in general. T h e same trend of thought was apparent in a further statement: " I n proportion as the exploitation of one individual by another is done away with, the exploitation of one nation by another will also come to an end. T h e disappear38

Sämtliche

Werke,

VI, 529, 543 ; V, 59-60,

28

Conception of the Nation

ance of class oppositions within the nations will put an end to the hostile attitudes of nations t o w a r d one ano t h e r . " 39 T h e r e is good reason to assume that when, in the early period of his activity, M a r x spoke of the " a b o l i t i o n of old nationalities," he m e a n t the isolated, particularist, f a i r l y self-sufficient, and b a c k w a r d societies of the O l d R e g i m e . T h e statutes of the secret U n i v e r s a l Society of Communist R e v o l u t i o n a r i e s , which M a r x and o t h e r radical leaders endorsed in 1 8 5 0 , w e r e another indication of his real position. T h e members of the Society p l e d g e d themselves to break down " t h e divisions of nationality in conformity with the principle of republican f r a t e r n i t y . " 4 0 T h e sentiment was in the F r e n c h r e v o l u t i o n a r y tradition, which hardly called f o r the abolition of all national distinctions. In 1 8 7 1 , M a r x denied that the "unity of the n a t i o n " would be disturbed by the victorious p r o l e t a r i a t . 1 1 T w o decades a f t e r the d e f e n s e of his v i e w of nationality against conservative r e p r o a c h , in the Manifest, Marx upheld it against radical skepticism within the ranks of the F i r s t International. H i s letter to E n g e l s on a discussion of national questions in the G e n e r a l Council of that body in 1 8 6 6 conveys the flavor of M a r x ' s a t t i t u d e : Yesterday there w a s a discussion in the International C o u n c i l on the present w a r between Prussia and A u s t r i a . . . T h e discussion wound up, as w a s to be expected, w i t h " t h e question of nationality" in general and the attitude w e should take towards it . . . T h e French, very numerously represented, gave vent to their cordial dislike of the Italians. France"

Moreover,

the representatives of

"young

(non-workers) came out w i t h the announcement that all

nationalities and even nations w e r e "antiquated prejudices." ™Ibid., VI, 54.3. 40 Ibid., pp. 447, 529; Boris Nikolaievsky and Otto Mänchen-Helfen, Marx (Philadelphia, 1936), p. 209. 41 Der Bürgerkrieg in Frankreich, p. 66.

Karl

Conception of the Nation

29

T h e implied distinction here ("even nations") was apparently between small and large nations. T h e Frenchmen stood convicted of "Proudhonized Stirnerism" : Everything to be dissolved into little " g r o u p s " or "communes" which will, in their t u r n , form an "association" but no state. A n d indeed this "individualization" of mankind and the corresponding " m u t u a l i s m " are to proceed while history comes to a stop in all other countries and the whole world waits until the French are ripe for a social revolution. T h e y will then perform the experiment before our eyes, and the rest of the world, overcome by the force of their example, will do the same. J u s t w h a t Fourier expected of his model phalanstery. M o r e o v e r , everyone w h o encumbers the "social" question with the "superstitions" of the old world is "reactionary."

M a r x joined in the discussion: T h e English laughed very much when I began my speech by saying that our friend L a f a r g u e , etc., w h o had done away with nationalities, had spoken " F r e n c h " to us, i. e., a language which nine-tenths of the audience did not understand. I also suggested that by the negation of nationalities he appeared, quite unconsciously, to understand their absorption into the model French nation.

T h e anti-nationalism of the French members was thus reduced to anarchism, to a lack of appreciation of the larger social entity and of the importance of the state, and to national vanity. W h e t h e r you liked it or not, M a r x was saying in effect, the nation—certainly the large nation— was a real fact; it would not do at all to treat it as a fantasy. 4 2 Marx's program for the seizure of political power, the transformation of political and social institutions, and the introduction of socialist planning, was meant to apply not to the world in general or even to the Western world, but concretely to the various countries into which it was divided. T h e individual countries, which were the integral 4-Briefwechsel,

III, 341-42.

3o

Conception of the Nation

p a r t s of the capitalist market, 4 3 were also the integral p a r t s of the socialist p r o g r a m . As an immediate measure f o r transition to socialism, M a r x proposed the organization of credit through national banks and the "increase of national factories." 44 In the Inaugural Address of the First International, he struck the note of international fraternity and cooperation and did not regard it as inconsistent to point out that "cooperative labor ought to be developed to national dimensions, and, consequently, to be fostered by national means." 45 Yet, regardless of his own opinion on the subject, would not the prediction of economic uniformity and interdependence involve the obliteration of all distinctions and of all f r o n t i e r s ? H a s not M a r x laid himself open to a serious contradiction? On the basis of his theory of society and history, must not economic uniformity bring in its train political, cultural, and legal uniformity, as well as the unification of mankind? T h e relation between economic and non-economic forces is, of course, a question of the first importance. It would require a long essay to do it justice. F o r our present purpose a few remarks may perhaps suffice. M a r x expressed his economic interpretation of society most directly in the preface to Zur Kritik der politischen Ökonomie: In the social production which men carry on, they enter into definite relations which are indispensable and independent of their will, relations of production which correspond to a definite stage of development of their material powers of production. T h e sum total of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society—the real foundation, on which rises a legal and political superstructure and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness. T h e mode of production in material life conditions « Das Kapital, I, 522. ** Sämtliche Werke, VI, 545; Der Bürgerkrieg in Frankreich, p. 69. 45 G. M · Steklov, History of the First International (London, 1928), p. 444.

Conception of the Nation

31

the general character of the social, political, and intellectual processes of life. 4 6

But if anyone thought that, having determined the general character of the economic system of a country to be, let us say, capitalistic, he could deduce the actual f o r m of legal or other institutions, he would not only fly in the face of facts but also in the face of the author's explanation and applications of his theory. T w o years b e f o r e the publication of the words just quoted, M a r x had written a sketchy memorandum which is essential f o r their proper understanding. H e r e f e r r e d to the "unequal," or dissimilar, relation between material and artistic production. A n advanced art might correspond to a low stage of economic development; in fact, such f o r m s of art as the epos, f o r example, were possible only in a backward economy. Presumably, the reverse might be true, and a low artistic development might occur alongside of economic progress. Certainly, the correlation between economy and art was not simple or direct. M a r x was not especially concerned with the "disproportion" between economic and artistic forms, which seemed less "important or difficult" to understand than the "disproportions" or "inequalities" (absence of correlations) in the realm of social relations. H e cited, rather obscurely, "the relation between education in the United States and E u r o p e , " apparently implying that it was a relation not easily accounted f o r by economic factors. A t any rate, his tone was thoroughly skeptical. H e went on to make an important qualification: " T h e really difficult point to be explained here, however, is how the relations of production develop unequally with legal relations. A s , f o r example, the relation of Roman civil law (this is less true of the criminal and public law of R o m e ) 46

Zur Kritik

der politischen

Ökonomie, p. 5.

32

Conception of the Nation

to modern production." In other words, since Roman and modern production differed considerably f r o m each other, one could hardly explain the influence of Roman law in modern times in terms of those differences. 47 T h i s penumbra of M a r x ' s thought b e f o r e he wrote his famous preface became much more explicit in the notes which Engels edited and published as the third volume of Das Kapital, a f t e r the death of his friend. In connection with a discussion of the relation between economic and political or state forms, M a r x noted t h a t the same economic basis or system might show "infinite variations and gradations" in its appearance, due to "innumerable and varied empirical circumstances, natural conditions, race relations, outside historical influences, and so f o r t h . . . ." In order to determine the economic structure of a country, it would be necessary to study these specific, local factors, in addition to certain basic elements which might make that structure analogous to other structures. 4 8 W e must conclude that M a r x did not establish a formal correlation between economic and non-economic factors. H e pointed to important non-economic phenomena which did not grow out of economic phenomena. 4 0 M o r e over, the economic basis of any particular society could not be adequately described without considering its special peculiarities. W i t h i n the same type of economic structure there are quite important differences as one passes f r o m one country to another. T h e implication f o r the problem of nationality is evident: T h e r e is room for variety in the world, even if its economic systems should approach uniformity. 47

Ibid., pp. 246-47. Das Kapital, I I I 2 , 325. See also Engels' conception of the relation between economic and non-economic factors in Ausgewählte Briefe, pp. 37476, 382. 49 Der Bürgerkrieg in Frankreich, p. 67. 48

3 SIZE AND STATEHOOD T H E

HUMAN WILL h a d a l i m i t e d

effectiveness

in

the

world o f M a r x . Someday mankind might enjoy the luxury o f impressing its desires upon the environment. M e a n while, the iron necessities o f material progress set n a r r o w bounds f o r the fulfillment o f conscious wishes. A social group could hardly decide, by a sheer effort o f the will, how an economy or a culture should be developed. W h e t h e r it was possible or desirable that a people should undertake to set up an independent polity, could not be determined by consulting its predilections or its hopes. In drawing boundaries, statesmen might reasonably be expected to show some regard for the inclinations o f the populations affected. People are not chattels to be bartered back and forth by diplomats and warriors. 1 T h i s did not mean that, f o r M a r x , the problem o f the political organization and division o f the world was one that could be solved by a series o f national polls. Unlike some o f his followers, M a r x did not believe in the principle o f self-determination o f nations.- T h e proper conditions f o r national existence were defined f o r him by the view o f the modern nation as a rounded individual society, and o f the relation o f individual societies to each 1 N e w Y o r k Tribune, A u g u s t 4, 1859, p. 4 ; November 8, 1859, p. 6; Der Bürgerkrieg in Frankreich, p. 35. 2 See J . P. Becker's ( ? ) " Z u r K l ä r u n g unserer A u f g a b e , " Der Vorbote, F e b r u a r y 1866, pp. 1 7 - 1 9 , and " Z u r Geschichte der Internationalen ArbeiterAssociation," ibid., August 1868, pp. 1 1 9 - 2 0 .

Size and Statehood

34

other. N a t i o n a l discrimination was but one case o f human oppression, and oppression had its principal source in the exploitation o f class by class. T h e abolition o f class distinctions and class struggles through industrialization and proletarian victory should t h e r e f o r e be the paramount consideration o f those who loved liberty and toleration. " T h e H u n g a r i a n shall not be free, nor the Pole, nor the Italian, as long as the w o r k e r remains a slave." 3 I f a movement f o r national emancipation had the effect o f retarding the advance o f the world t o w a r d a classless society, that movement would eventually destroy itself. T h e emancipation o f labor presupposed intense economic development. T h e r e were certain requirements o f industry which had a good deal o f bearing upon national ambitions. In the past, the limitations, isolation, and backwardness o f the various methods o f production which had functioned side by side in a divided world, had permitted, or at any r a t e had not been inconsistent with, the existence o f many kinds o f nations, differing in size, integration, relation to the world at large, and development. M o d e r n change made that J o s e p h ' s coat impossible. Avid of elbow room, industry rejected the small, looselyorganized, isolated, and provincial society in favor o f the large and articulated society with far-flung international connections. N e i t h e r blood, numbers, geography, consciousness o f common traditions, nor common culture, could by themselves create or validate the right to separate statehood. T o have practical significance, that right must be implemented by an advanced economy. Political justification derived f r o m a competence to defend and to promote further economic progress. " T h e very first conditions o f 3

Die Klassenkämpfe

in Frankreich,

p. 62; Sämtliche

Werke,

VI, 543.

Size and Statehood

35

national existence" were indeed " l a r g e numbers and compactness of territory," but these were necessary rather than sufficient conditions; the broader requirements included the resources, ability, specialization, social organization, and scientific advance basic to the creation of a rich and proliferated society. 4 T h e political right of way belonged, quite naturally, to the great society. 5 T h e political self-determination of all national groups would not necessarily promote the growth of advanced societies. It was hardly surprising that a materialistic thinker and statesman should be swayed by considerations of size in judging national issues. Other things being equal, the question of when and where the establishment of a separate national state was desirable or practicable was essentially a question of whether an industrialized economy could be organized within the confines of the proposed political unit. M a r x therefore distinguished sharply between small and large nations in determining the right to separate statehood. T h a t right belonged only to nations, or to combinations of nations, which were in a position to develop modern economies. Needless to say, the line between the too-small and the large-enough nation was not easy to d r a w ; there were borderline cases. T h e r e was no doubt in M a r x ' s mind that nations as large, as compact, and as well-endowed territorially, as the German, the Italian, the Polish, and the Hungarian (not to mention the English, the French, the Russian, and the American nations, which already had states) fulfilled the conditions of statehood. On the other hand, smaller na4

New York Tribune, April 24, 1852, p. 6. Cf. Engels' view, Ryazanov, " K a r l M a r x und Friedrich Engels über die Polenfrage," Archiv für die Geschichte des Sozialismus und der Arbeiterbewegung, VI, 2 1 2 - 1 9 ; "Einheitsbestrebungen und Einheitsaussichten bis A n f a n g der sechziger J a h r e , " Neue Zeit, X I V 1 , 679. 5

Size and Statehood

36

tions like the Slavic groups in the old A u s t r i a n and T u r k ish E m p i r e s could not lay claim to a polity of their own or d e f e n d that claim effectively. Issues of national emancipation w e r e complexly r e l a t e d to the interests of international p r o g r e s s . M a r x tended to look upon national interest, if p r o p e r l y conceived, as harmonious with the international aims of socialism. H e s h o w e d how, in the R e v o l u t i o n of 1 8 4 8 , the outcome of the c a m p a i g n s f o r national émancipation w a s bound to the f o r t u n e of democratic and p r o l e t a r i a n movements, and h o w the conservative monarchies ( R u s s i a , A u s t r i a and P r u s s i a ) which subdued the social revolutionists also d e f e a t e d the national revolutionists. 0 T h e r e w e r e times, h o w e v e r , when national movements, w h a t e v e r the size of the nation involved, ran counter to the w i d e r aims of the international p r o l e t a r i a t . In such cases, international interests should a l w a y s take precedence. I f a particular national m o v e m e n t be directed by a class w h o s e rule in the given economic stage of a country would, according to M a r x ' s picture of social development, spell r e t r o g r e s s i o n , the movement must be o p p o s e d ; otherwise, not. I f the movement w e r e in itself desirable but, because of international conditions, would l e a d to g r e a t e r h a r m to countries of l a r g e r size or g r e a t e r importance to w o r l d progress, then again it would be " r e a c t i o n a r y . " M o v e m e n t s of smaller nations f o r independence w e r e in p a r t i c u l a r dang e r of h a v i n g " r e a c t i o n a r y " effect. A l m o s t inevitably they ran a f o u l of the chief tendencies of p r o g r e s s i v e developm e n t — t h e establishment of large-scale economies and polities and the assimilation of smaller cultures and languages. A p a r t f r o m the question of s e p a r a t e statehood, M a r x w a s in f a v o r of the complete emancipation of all minori® Die

Klassenkämpfe

in Frankreich,

pp. 6 1 - 6 2 .

Size and Statehood

37

ties from civil, social and economic restrictions. He expressed himself most strongly on this point in his early essay, Zur Judenfrage. He combated the view that the Jews must abandon their religion in order to qualify for political emancipation. This view seemed too "abstract" to M a r x , who preferred to join in a petition for the immediate extension of political and civil rights to the Jews of his native Prussia. 7 He approved unreservedly the principle of freedom and equality for all groups and individuals within a state, whatever their religion or national origin, as proclaimed by the American and French Revolutions. Zur Judenfrage contained a criticism of the order introduced by these Revolutions on the ground that it divided society artificially into two spheres : the political, in which man functioned as a tolerant, democratic, liberal, and egalitarian citizen; and the economic, in which he acted as a grasping, competitive, and non-egalitarian capitalist. That arrangement could not hope to solve the social problems of modern times. For man was "not freed from religion; he received religious freedom. H e was not freed from property ; he received freedom of property. H e was not freed from the egoism of trade; he received freedom of trade." Nonetheless, political emancipation, although ultimately inadequate, represented " a great advance." While it was not "the final form of human emancipation in general," it was "the final form of human emancipation within the world order which has existed so f a r . " 8 Later, M a r x rejected "bourgeois freedom" and other "bourgeois" ideals as corruptions of the indicated values and not because he held the values themselves in slight esteem.9 H o w strongly he disapproved of the formation of 7 8 9

Sämtliche fferke, I 2 , 308. Ibid., I 1 , 585, 598; Steklov, op. cit., pp. 103-4. See below, pp. 74-75.

Size and Statehood

38

small national states was illustrated by his attitude toward Irish independence. H e felt that England ruled the Irish by " t h e most abominable reign of t e r r o r and the most reprehensible corruption." 10 In the forties, however, he regarded the separation of Ireland f r o m England as "impossible," evidently because of the small size and economic backwardness of Ireland, and the great advantage of its association with the greatest industrial economy of the time. H e looked to the larger and more advanced nations, especially England, to establish socialism and then emancipate the smaller and backward nations politically and help them onto the road of economic and social progress. Poland and, by the same token, Ireland were to be f r e e d not in W a r s a w and Dublin, but in London. T h e triumphant proletariat of England, aided by the Irish workers, would put an end to English landlordism and capitalism in Ireland as well as at home. 1 1 T h i s view underwent a decided change in the fifties and sixties. N o revolution occurred in England, and M a r x , reversing the f o r m e r order, came to feel that Irish freedom must precede English socialism. T h e English revolution must begin by abolishing landlordism, the church and the aristocracy in Ireland. T h e national issue helped to make success more likely there. " T h e destruction of the English landed aristocracy in Ireland is an infinitely easier operation than in England itself, because the land question has hitherto been the exclusive f o r m of the social question in Ireland, and because it is a question of existence, of life and death, f o r the immense majority of the Irish people and because it is at the same time inseparable f r o m the national question." T h e solution of the national problem of a small coun10

" B r i e f e an Dr. Kugelmann," Neue Zeil, X X 2 , 415. Sämtliche feerie, VI, 359-60, 384, 577, 652-53; Briefincchsrl, IV, 258. 11

III, 442;

Size and Statehood

39

try became a prerequisite f o r the solution of the social problem of the most advanced country in the w o r l d . E x perience w o u l d show " l a t e r w h e t h e r a purely personal union between the t w o countries can continue to e x i s t . " " I half believe it c a n , " M a r x w r o t e , " i f [ e m a n c i p a t i o n ] takes place in t i m e . " M e a n w h i l e I r e l a n d needed selfg o v e r n m e n t through a P a r l i a m e n t with real legislative p o w e r s , an a g r a r i a n revolution to abolish l a n d l o r d i s m , and protective t a r i f f s to establish industry. T o the end, M a r x w a s loath to a d v o c a t e complete and final s e p a r a tion. A statement of the F i r s t International in 1 8 7 0 called f o r the t r a n s f o r m a t i o n of the " p r e s e n t compulsory u n i o n " into " a n equal and f r e e c o n f e d e r a t i o n . " If that w e r e not possible, there w a s to be complete separation. E v e n when M a r x r e a l i z e d that the once impossible independence had become inevitable, he still insisted that it might be followed by f e d e r a t i o n . 1 2 T h e case of I r e l a n d showed that no consistent attitude t o w a r d national aspirations w a s possible e v e r y w h e r e and at all times, if a f a c t o r as v a r i a b l e and complex as that of the international situation at a g i v e n moment w a s to receive p a r a m o u n t consideration. T h e same sort of international reckoning might smile upon the independence of some nations but f r o w n upon that of others. T h e position of the A u s t r i a n S l a v s seemed particularly u n f o r t u n a t e . M a r x became p e r s u a d e d during the R e v o l u t i o n of 1 8 4 8 that these groups w e r e not only insufficiently l a r g e , compact, and a d v a n c e d to establish modern economies and states, but that their national self-assertion w o u l d strengthen the f o r c e s of conservatism. A t the o u t b r e a k of 12 " B r i e f e an Dr. K u g e l m a n n , " Λ'eue Zeit, X X 2 , 1 9 1 , 4 1 4 - 1 5 , 4 7 7 - 7 8 ; Briefwechsel, I I I , 442, 4 5 6 - 5 8 ; I V , 2 5 8 - 5 9 ; Ausgewählte Briefe, pp. 2 3 5 - 3 7 . See A . Witznitzer, " M a r x und die irische F r a g e , " Archiv für die Geschichte des Sozialismus und der Arbeiterbewegung, X , 4 9 - 5 3 ; Karl Marx: Chronik seines Lebens, p. 288.

Size and Statehood

4o

the Revolution, he had f a v o r e d Bohemian, no less than Hungarian, Italian, or Polish independence. 13 H e soon changed his mind, however. It will be recalled that the Hapsburg dynasty was saved in that year partly because of the mutual suspicion and friction of its many peoples. T h e smaller nations sought to free themselves f r o m the influence of the dominant nations as well as from H a p s burg rule. T h e Czechs criticized the Germans who included Bohemia in the projected G r e a t Germany, while the Rumanians in Transylvania entered claims against the M a g y a r s , themselves in arms against the Hapsburgs. In this several-cornered struggle, the Austrian Slavs played into the hands of reaction. When the government had reestablished its position in Bohemia, it was able to suppress the revolution in Vienna, and then, with the aid of Russia, to put down the Hungarian revolution. This victory, in turn, restored H a p s b u r g influence in Germany and helped to seal the fate of the liberal unification movement. Another factor should be mentioned: the movement of the Austrian Slavs took the f o r m of Pan-Slavism, which was regarded askance by M a r x as likely to strengthen Czarism. T h i s was the background of a series of disparaging attacks on the Austrian Slavs in the Neue rheinische Zeitung, edited by him in Cologne in 1 8 4 8 - 1 8 4 9 , and later in the N e w Y o r k Tribune. M o s t of the articles in question were written by Engels. A certain portion of them should be discounted, since Engels frequently expressed himself on the aspirations and ambitions of smaller nations with greater severity than M a r x . Engels, too, was more given to sweeping generalizations on political subjects. H o w ever, on the issue involved here, the two men seem to have been in substantial agreement. T h e y dismissed the claims of the smaller Slavic nations, notably the Czechs, quite « Sämtliche

Werke,

VII, ι8ι.

Size and Statehood

41

cavalierly. T h e past history a n d f u t u r e prospects of these groups were painted in d a r k colors, while the influence of the Germans and H u n g a r i a n s was praised in exaggerated terms. T h e population of Central E u r o p e was divided into " r e v o l u t i o n a r y " and "counterrevolutionary" or "reactiona r y " nations, a clearly un-Marxian distinction. T h e Germans, H u n g a r i a n s , Poles, and Italians were classified as "revolutionary" nations which had exerted "historical initiative" for many centuries. T h e Austrian Slavs (excepting the Poles) and the Rumanians and Saxons of T r a n sylvania, who had been at odds with the "revolutionary" H u n g a r i a n s , were set down as "counterrevolutionary." All these groups were " i n e r t " and "unprogressive"; they lacked a bourgeoisie, and had come to depend on Germans in the north and H u n g a r i a n s in the south f o r economic and cultural improvement. T h e Czechs were a "dying . . . nationality." Unless they were to be incorporated into a great Pan-Slav empire, the Austrian Slavs must succumb to "the action of historical causes that inevitably absorbs [ t h e m ] into a more energetic stock." 14 W e do not meet such stark dogmatism on the historical role of different nations in the later works of M a r x . But some elements of his position unquestionably survived: that small nations were not able effectively to establish independent political existence under modern conditions, and that all national movements must be judged in the context of their effect upon international relations and proletarian hopes. M a r x ' s attitude toward the South Slavs and the Balkan peoples, which in his day were ruled by Turkey, fitted into this pattern of thought. In general, he expected as little economic and political leadership f r o m the smaller peoples in T u r k e y as f r o m those in Austria. T h e "splendid 14

Nachlast, III, 109, 236, 238-39, 240, 242-43, 250-51, 253-55; York Tribune, March 5, 1852, p. 7 ; March 15, 1852, p. 7 ; April 24, 1852, p. 6; M a y 7, 1855, p. 4 ; January 9, 1857, p. 3.

42

Size and Statehood

territory" south of the Save and the Danube, he wrote in 1 8 5 3 , had the " m i s f o r t u n e " of being inhabited by " a conglomerate of different races and nationalities, of which it is hard to say which is the least fit f o r progress and civilization." T h e ruling T u r k s were no better; their presence was " a real obstacle to the development of the resources" of the Balkan Peninsula. Since Austrian and especially Russian expansion was undesirable, rule of the T u r k s futile, and the establishment of small states inexpedient, M a r x was left with the alternative of a Balkan federation which, in time, would become integrated around one of its member nations. T h e Serbians seemed to offer a possibility f o r future national leadership. M a r x spoke of the Peninsula as the "natural inheritance" of the South Slavs who had lived there f o r twelve hundred years and accounted f o r seven out of the twelve million inhabitants. T h e "competit o r s " of the Slavs, " i f we except a sparse population which had adopted the G r e e k language although in reality of Slavonic descent, are Turkish or Arnaut barbarians, who have long since been convicted of the most inveterate opposition to all progress. T h e South Slavonians, on the contrary, are, in the inland districts of the country, the exclusive representatives of civilization. T h e y do not yet f o r m a nation, but they have a powerful and comparatively enlightened nucleus of nationality in Servia. T h e Servians have a history, a literature of their o w n . " 1 5 M a r x , then, would not always follow existing linguistic or " r a c i a l " lines in reorganizing Central and Southern Europe, even where they could be detected. Although he occasionally speculated on the possibility of integrating the H a p s b u r g Empire through the development of trade and industry and through political reorganization, 1 6 he gen15 New York Tribune, April 7, 1853, pp. 5-6; April 21, 1853, p. 4 ; September 2, 1853, pp. 5-6. 16 Ibid., January 9, 1857, p. 3 ; August 4, 1857, p. 6.

Size and Statehood

43

erally regarded the E m p i r e as hopelessly backward and reactionary. H e viewed the future of T u r k e y with even greater pessimism. In Austria he tended toward a solution which was half, but only half national. T h e Czechs and neighboring groups would be included in an enlarged and progressive Germany. T h e Germans in Poland or Russia were to be a part of the Polish or Russian state and eventually the Polish or Russian nation. T h e Hungarians and the Poles, with the addition of adjacent small nations, would f o r m independent states. T h e Balkan nations might coagulate around a convenient nucleus, establishing at first a federal state and eventually an integral state. Given liberal constitutions with guarantees of civil and political equality, the operation of economic, political, and cultural forces would result in the formation of several large polities in the center and east of E u r o p e . T h e Schleswig-Holstein Question offered another opportunity to emphasize the importance of unitary states of considerable proportions. L e a v i n g aside the genealogie and historical details of that intricate issue, it will suffice here to point out that M a r x , in common with most radicals and liberals in Germany in 1 8 4 8 , advocated the annexation of the two duchies to a united Germany and strenuously opposed the armistice of M a l m ö , by which Prussia had left the duchies to Denmark. H e regarded the Prussian w a r over the duchies as a justifiable " n a t i o n a l " and "revolutionary" war. It was "the first revolutionary w a r " of Germany. T h e same right by which France had occupied Flemish districts, Alsace and L o r r a i n e and would "sooner or l a t e r " seize Belgium, justified the incorporation of Schleswig into G e r m a n y — " t h e right of civilization against barbarism, of progress against stability," in short, "the right of historical development." Several considerations led M a r x to take this position; the maritime and commercial

44

Size and Statehood

importance of these duchies to G e r m a n economy and their cultural dependence on Germany, opposition to the growth of another small state by the union of the duchies with D e n m a r k , and the support of Danish claims by Russian, English, and Prussian conservatives. T h e r e is ground f o r thinking that he probably would have favored the annexation of D e n m a r k itself to Germany, f o r much the same reasons. 1 7 T h e positive criteria f o r nation- and state-building were illustrated by the Polish Question. T h e growth and independence of the Polish nation would have served the cause of international progress. N o t h i n g was so calculated to weaken conservatism in E u r o p e as the proposal to carve out a large state f r o m the lands of the three conservative monarchies, Russia, Austria, and Prussia. Since Russia had obtained the lion's share of Poland, its resurrection would have the especial effect of weakening Czarism. T h e new state would be a wedge in the heart of reaction. T h a t was the principal reason why M a r x was a consistent and warm adherent of Polish independence. T h e development of Europe since the French Revolution seemed to be reflected in the fortunes of three countries. T h e advance of revolutionary France represented the progress of liberalism and constitutionalism, and the r e t r e a t of the old order in the Continent as a whole. T h e movement of Russia charted the course of E u r o p e a n conservatism. T h e seesaw of the two states, whose enmity became " t r a d i t i o n a l " in the nineteenth century, described the ups and downs of E u r o p e ; French influence spelled progress, Russian influence spelled reaction. T h e balance between these forces was mirrored in the history of Poland, which was the ratio, as it were, between progress and retrogression. As her extinction had fed the growth of conservative powers in the East, so 17

Sämtliche

Werke,

VII, 3 5 1 - 5 5 ; see also Briefwechsel,

III, 158-59.

Size and Statehood

45

would her restoration advance the progressive W e s t . T h e destiny of Poland was one with that of revolutionary France and the larger destiny of Europe. " W h a t has decided me definitely f o r Poland, on the basis of my latest studies of Polish history, is the historical fact that all the revolutions since 1 7 8 9 measure their intensity and vitality pretty accurately by their conduct toward Poland. Poland is their 'external' thermometer." M a r x wrote these words in 1856, but they expressed his opinion during the preceding as well as the succeeding decades. 1 8 Poland was a "necessary" nation in Europe. H e r reestablishment as a democratic state was a point d'honneur f o r all democrats, particularly the democrats of those countries which had shared in the partition. T h e Poles had numbers and compact territory, and if they lacked some of the elements of a modern economy, they might be provided with them. It is worth noting that the Neue rheinische Zeitung was less impressed by the " p r o g r e s s i v e " influence of the Germans in Poland than of those in Bohemia and other Austrian territories. In 1 8 4 8 , M a r x f a v o r e d giving Poland the very considerable boundaries of 1 7 7 2 with the estuaries of its large rivers, the port of Danzig, and a large coastline on the Baltic Sea. T h e new state must be no "phantom P o l a n d " but must rest on foundations "adequate to her existence." If that involved the cession of districts with German populations, he saw no harm in it. T h e prime consideration was the establishment of a large society. T h e r e was no reason why Poles and Germans, dealing on a plane of equality, could not reach a friendly understanding through mutual concessions, or why in mixed districts, Germans could not eventually become Poles and Poles Germans. T h e Germans in Poland, like those in America, he argued, no longer regarded them18

Briefwechsel,

II, 157.

46

Size and Statehood

selves as belonging to G e r m a n y ; they had become Germanspeaking Poles. 1 9 M a r x subordinated the movements f o r independence of even large nations to international interests. In 1 8 5 9 France and Sardinia challenged H a p s b u r g influence in Italy. T h e w a r led to the unification of Italy under the rule of the Sardinian monarchy. M a r x engaged in a controversy with Ferdinand Lassalle on the question of the support of Austria by Prussia and other German states. German nationalists were demanding that Prussia declare war on France, her " h e r e d i t a r y " enemy. Lassalle contended that this demand was inspired by hatred of France and that a Franco-Prussian w a r would not promote the interests of German democracy. While M a r x was chary of defending H a p s b u r g interests in Italy, he insisted that the interests of the revolutionary party in Germany coincided momentarily with the interests of Austria. T h e defeat of Austria would strengthen the regime of Napoleon I I I as well as Russia. M o r e o v e r , German unification would not be promoted by French intervention in Italy, and Germany was a larger and more advanced country than Italy. Napoleon might be planning to advance to the Rhine after gaining a victory on the P o R i v e r . In order to unify Germany democratically, it was more important to weaken Czarist Russia and Bonapartist France than H a p s b u r g Austria. M a r x admitted to Engels that, under the circumstances, the position of the German radicals was "difficult at the moment, to be sure, but, with some critical analysis of the circumstances, clear nevertheless." " A s to the [ G e r m a n ] 19 Λ'achlau, III, 136, 143, 148, 149, 150, 1 5 1 - 5 2 , 163, 176. See also Sämtliche Werke, V I , 3 5 9 - ί ι , 4 1 0 - 1 4 , 556; New York Tribune, March 5, 1852, p. 7; Steklov, op. cit., p. 85; Karl Marx: Chronik seines Lebens, p. 255; " K a r l M a r x et Pierre L a v r o v , " Revue marxiste, M a y 1929, p. 434; Ryazanov, " K a r l M a r x und Friedrich Engels über die Polenfrage," Archiv für die Geschichte dei Sozialismus und der Arbeiterbewegung, VI, 192, 196, 207.

Size and Statehood

47

'governments,' " he argued, "it is obvious f r o m every point of view, if only f o r the sake of Germany's existence, that the demand must be made to them not to remain neutral, but, as you rightly say, to be patriotic. But the revolutionary point is to be given to the m a t t e r simply by stressing the antagonism to Russia even m o r e than the antagonism to Boustrapa [nickname f o r N a p o l e o n ] . " 20 Of course, the demand for a war was meant at least partly as a political tactic in the struggle with the G e r m a n governments, and since such a demand would be suspect in their eyes, it would not necessarily (as it did not actually) lead to war. A p a r t f r o m this consideration, it is open to serious doubt whether the judgment of Lassalle was not better grounded than that of M a r x . - 1 H e r e , however, we are interested merely in pointing out M a r x ' s motivations and arguments in dealing with national questions. 20 Briefwechsel, II, 386; see also 372, 383, 386-87, 4 0 1 ; I I I , 146; Sämtliche Werke, V I I , 593. Distrust of the motives of Napoleon I I I w a s one of the determining factors of M a r x ' s position on the W a r of 1 8 5 9 ; see N e w Y o r k Tribune, J u l y 6, 1859, p. 4; J u l y 28, 1859, p. 4 ; August 4, 1859, p. 4 ; August 29, 1859, p. 4. For Lassalle's v i e w see his letter to M a r x , Sachlats, IV, 184«. 21 See F r a n z Mehring's discussion in Karl Marx (Leipzig, 1 9 3 3 ) , pp. 306-14, and Charles A . Dana's interesting evaluation of M a r x ' s New Y o r k Tribune articles in a letter published as an appendix to Herr Vogt, pp. 188-89.

4 BACKWARDNESS AND EMPIRE EXTENT of a nation's population and territory was only one of the criteria f o r determining its ability to organize an effective polity. If some nations were too small, others were too undeveloped to establish and maintain an independent political existence. N o t even the largest nations could assert a right to independence unless they were able to develop a progressive economy and to exploit their resources in a modern fashion. In the case of European nations, M a r x naturally stressed quantity of population, territory, and resources, assuming tacitly that the general progress of the Continent and the intimate relationship of its component p a r t s would supply the other conditions of statehood. H o w e v e r , when he considered the political problems of other continents, notably Asia, he raised the question whether, despite the presence of huge populations and resources, social, economic, and technological deficiencies did not prevent the building of a modern economy. It seemed clear to him that just as some nations were unable to organize such an economy because of their meager proportions, other nations, although large enough, were still unable to do so unaided because of stagnant social systems or past underdevelopment. M a r x did not condemn all conquest and foreign dominion. W h e t h e r any particular imperial venture was de-

T H E

Backwardness and Empire

49

eirable or not must be determined by the effect upon the victim, the conqueror, and the world at l a r g e — a highly variable criterion. If the subject nation or territory lacked the capacity to progress, and if the conqueror possessed both the means and the incentive to supply that want, then foreign dominion was beneficial. M a r x distinguished between conquerors who fed parasitically on the subject country without contributing to its economic advance and those who improved the economy while exploiting the population. T h e forms of imperialism varied with the economic and social conditions of ruler and subject. " A stockjobbing nation . . . cannot be robbed in the same manner as a nation of s h e p h e r d s " ; nor does a stockjobbing conqueror exploit in the same manner as a shepherd conqueror. T h e ancient Romans and the modern T u r k s were content to levy tribute, leaving the local economies otherwise undisturbed. T h e Mongols destroyed and devastated, since their pastoral economy required vast stretches of uninhabitated and uncultivated land f o r grazing. W h e n the German tribes conquered the territories of Rome, two similar economic systems were simply fused. 1 T h e effect of capitalist imperialism was not always the same. Capitalism of a purely commercial character fattened on backward economies without helping to transf o r m them. Yet by weakening the exploited economies, it made them more susceptible to change. Commercial capitalism made no positive contribution, and how much it might indirectly promote a f o r w a r d change depended not on its own activities but on the nature, "solidity, and internal articulation" of the subjected economy. A capitalist system which combined industrial with commercial interests would be impelled to introduce the methods and ma1

Zur Kritik

I, 323η·. ^95".

Jcr politischen

Ökonomie,

pp. 232-33. See also Das

Kapital,

ζο

Backwardness and Empire

terials of a higher system of production. 2 T h a t was the reason why M a r x , whose field of choice was limited, preferred British to Russian expansion in Asia, 3 and American to Mexican dominion in N e w Mexico and California. 4 H i s view of industrial imperialism was expressed in two articles on the rule of the British in India, published in the N e w Y o r k Tribune in 1 8 5 3 . 5 T h e y pictured India as a static and stagnant society, rooted in a primitive communal agrarian system and hampered by limited domestic industry, backward methods of production, slight division of labor, old-fashioned handicrafts, little production f o r exchange, and payment in kind. T h e result was extreme poverty, religious superstition, social castes, and a cruel morality. T h e political indifference, disunity, and weakness of the people made possible the arbitrariness, centralization, and power of the despots. Isolated from each other, the small communities were an easy prey to conqueror after conqueror. T h e conquerors contented themselves with "but three departments of government; that of finance, or the plunder of the interior; that of war, or the plunder of the exterior; and finally the department of public works," f o r irrigation. T h e frequent changes of dynasties contrasted vividly with the changelessness of society. Since, to M a r x as to Hegel, history in its more profound meaning signified development, India and, of course, other countries similarly situated, might be said to have "no history at all—at least no known history." " W h a t we call its history is but the history of the successive intruders who founded their empires on the passive basis 8 - Das Kapital, I I I 1 , 309, j i i , 3 1 2 - 1 3 , 3 1 4 - 1 8 . Ibid., p. 3 1 8 . 4 R y a z a n o v , ed., The Communist Manifesto, pp. 282-83, 3*8 ; Nachlass, I I I , 249-50. See Engels' v i e w on the French in A l g e r i a , Sämtliche Werte, V I , 366-67, 387. 1 For the polemical background of these articles, see Briefiveclisel, I, 485-87.

Backwardness and Empire

51

of that unresisting and unchanging society." Weakness and backwardness "predestined" India to conquest and the question was "not whether the English had a r i g h t " to conquer her, but "whether we are to p r e f e r India conquered by the T u r k , by the Persian, by the Russian, to India conquered by the B r i t o n . " 0 It seemed hopeless to expect the salvation of a stagnant society to come f r o m within. 7 T h e usury capitalism of Asia, with its hoarding and cheating, maintained the old order only to feed upon it. It had been the misfortune of India to be invaded repeatedly by her inferiors, who borrowed her economy and her culture instead of improving them. T h e English were the first invaders who were "superior, and therefore, inaccessible to Hindoo civilization." T h e y were fulfilling the "double mission" of annihilating the traditional society and "laying the material foundations of Western society in A s i a . " Steam, rails, and free trade, even more than fiscal and military control, were consolidating private landlordism—which was "the great desideratum of Asiatic society"—and supplying the tools and methods of large-scale industry. By undermining the two bases of the "small, semibarbarian, semicivilized communities," primitive communalism and the ancient handicrafts, England was bringing about "the greatest, and to speak the truth, the only social revolution ever heard of in Asia." 8 M a r x had no illusions about the imperial "revolutionaries." " T h e aristocracy wanted to conquer India, the moneyocracy to plunder it, and the millocracy to undersell it." T h e history of the conquest, f r o m " t h a t great robber" Robert Clive onward, revealed " t h e profound hypocrisy 6 New York Tribune, June 25, 1853, p. 5 ; August 8, 1853, p. 5. On Asiatic economy, see Das Kapital, I, 8, 104, 322-23. 7 Das Kapital, I I P , 318. 8 New York Tribune, June 25, 1853, p. 5; August 8, 1853, p. 5.

52

Backwardness and Empire

and inherent barbarism of bourgeois civilization" which assumed "respectable f o r m s " only at home. Confiscation, extortion, m u r d e r — t h e masters stopped at nothing. 9 Yet England was f o r g i n g the political unity of her colony. T h a t unity would be cemented by railways and the telegraph. T h e steamship would put an end to the external isolation of the country. T h e English drill sergeant was organizing and training a native army which would prove useful in the future struggle f o r f r e e d o m . A f r e e press and educational opportunities would help to prepare the ground for independence. E n g l a n d herself, such was the "dialectic" of history, was teaching India how to stand on her own feet. 1 0 But the colony would not reap the full benefits of modern civilization until the English "ruling classes . . . shall have been supplanted by the industrial proletariat, or . . . the H i n d o o s themselves . . . grown strong enough to throw off the English yoke altogether." 11 W h a t e v e r the ultimate result, the immediate cost of the transformation of India was appalling. W o r s e than foreign oppression was the cruelty inevitable in the process of tearing up a society and culture by the roots. W o r s e than a progressive change, however brutal, was the cold misery of a static order. W h i l e M a r x admired the characteristics of the Indians and some aspects of their civilization, he felt strongly that the old system was essentially barbarous. 1 2 H i s picture of Indian society and his justification of its forcible change are so significant of his attitude toward the backward society generally and of his sense of the trag· edy of history, t h a t they are worth citing textually: 9

Ibid., August 8, 1853, p. 5. Ibid., June 25, 1853, p. 5 ; August 8, 1853, p. 5. 11 Ibid., August 8, 1853, p. 5. 12 On Marx's sense of the cost of progress, see Der Achtzehnte Brumaire . . . p. 22; Das Kapital, I, 396—98, 424, 7 1 6 ; I I I 1 , 2 4 1 - 4 2 ; Der Bürgerkrieg in Frankreich, p. 87; Theorien über den Mehrwert, I I 1 , 309-10. 10

Backwardness and Empire

53

N o w , sickening as it must be to h u m a n feeling to witness those myriads of industrious p a t r i a r c h a l and inoffensive social organizations disorganized and dissolved into their units, t h r o w n into a sea of woes, and their individual members losing a t t h e same time their ancient f o r m of civilization and their hereditary means of subsistence, w e must not forget that these idyllic village communities, inoffensive though they may appear, had always been the solid foundation of O r i e n t a l despotism, that they restrained the human mind within the smallest possible compass, m a k i n g it the unresisting tool of superstition, enslaving it beneath traditional rules, depriving it of all g r a n d e u r and historical energies. W e must not forget the barbarian egotism which, c o n c e n t r a t i n g on some miserable patch of land, had quietly witnessed the ruin of empires, the perpetration of unspeakable cruelties, the massacre of the population of large towns, with no other consideration bestowed upon them than on natural events, itself the helpless prey of any aggressor w h o deigned to notice it at all. W e must not forget that this undignified, stagnatory, and vegetative life, that this passive sort of existence evoked on the other part, in contradistinction, wild, aimless, unbounded forces of destruction and rendered m u r d e r itself a religious rite in H i n d o s t á n . W e must not forget that these little communities w e r e contaminated by distinctions of caste and by slavery instead of elevating man the sovereign of circumstances, that they subjugated man to external circumstances, that they t r a n s f o r m e d a self-developing social state into a never-changing n a t u r a l destiny, and thus brought about a brutalizing worship of n a t u r e , exhibiting its degradation in the fact that man, the sovereign of nature, fell d o w n on his knees in adoration of K a n u m a n , the monkey, and S a b b a l a , the cow. E n g l a n d , it is true, in causing a social revolution in H i n d o s t á n , was actuated only by the vilest interests, and was stupid in her m a n ner of enforcing them. B u t that is not the question. T h e question is, can mankind fulfill its destiny w i t h o u t a f u n d a m e n t a l revolution in the social state of A s i a ? I f not, w h a t e v e r may have been the crimes of E n g l a n d , she was the unconscious tool of history in bringing about that revolution. T h e n , whatever bitterness the spectacle of the c r u m b l i n g of an ancient world may have f o r our personal feelings, w e have the right, in point of history, to exclaim w i t h G o e t h e : " S o l l t e diese Q u a l uns quälen D a sie unsere L u s t v e r m e h r t ,

54

Backwardness and Empire Hat nicht Myriaden Seelen Timur's Herrschaft aufgezehrt?"

13

T h e road of progress was f e a r f u l to contemplate. Marx shared the feeling of Engels that "history is about the most terrible of all goddesses, leading her triumphal chariot over mountains of corpses, not only in war, but also in 'peaceful' economic development." 14 T h e Clio of the bourgeoisie dragged "individuals and people through blood and dirt, through misery and degradation." Progress would "cease to resemble that hideous pagan idol, who would not drink the nectar but f r o m the skulls of the slain," only "when a great social revolution shall have mastered the results of the bourgeois epoch, the market of the world, and the modern powers of production, and subjected them to the common control of the most advanced peoples." 15 T h e confidence of M a r x that the expansion of European rule would redound to the benefit of the world was far steadier in the forties and early fifties than in subsequent years. H e spoke in increasingly severe terms of the economic effects of British imperialism. 16 In 18 81, he unqualifiedly condemned it and foresaw "serious complications" in India. " W h a t the English take f r o m them annually in the f o r m of rent, dividends f o r railways useless to the Hindus, pensions f o r military and civil service men, for Afghanistan and other wars, etc., etc., what they take from them without any equivalent and quite apart f r o m what 13 N e w York Tribune, June 25, 1853, p. 5. T h e stanza is from "An Suleika." A translation follows: Should this torture then torment us, Since it brought us greater joy? Did not the rule of Tamerlane Myriads of souls destroy? 14 Ausgewählte Briefe, p. 404. 15 N e w York Tribune, August 8, 1853, p. 5. 16 See, for instance, his later judgment on the "absurdity" and inconsistency of British policies in India, Das Kapital, III 1 , 3 1 8 ; "Vera Zazulich und Karl Marx," Marx-Engels Archiv, I, 338.

Backwardness and Empire

55

they appropriate to themselves annually within India, speaking only of the value of the commodities the Indians have gratuitously and annually to send over to E n g l a n d — it amounts to more than the total sum of income of the sixty millions of agricultural and industrial laborers of India! T h i s is a bleeding process, with a vengeance! T h e famine years are pressing each other and in dimensions till now not yet suspected in E u r o p e . " 17 M a r x scorned the solemn rationalization that in return f o r enormous tribute, England exported " g o o d g o v e r n m e n t " to I n d i a ! 1 8 W e have seen what he thought of English rule in Ireland. 1 9 English penetration of China seemed unjustified. 2 0 H e was even more opposed to the conquests made by powers less developed economically than England. H e protested the attempt of Napoleon I I I to make Mexico his dependency, 2 1 and was especially critical of the expansion of Czarist Russia. 1 ' 2 If one discounted the beneficial influence which an advanced and progressive country might, under certain circumstances, have upon a backward one, conquest and imperialism were reduced to sheer spoliation. T h e "vital principle of every bourgeoisie" was " t o take f r o m o t h e r s " and the seizure of foreign lands was, " a f t e r all, 'taking.' " 23 While M a r x ' s view of the progressive role of E u r o p e a n 17 Correspondence, pp. 385-86. For materials in support of that statement, see Das Kapital, I I I - , 1 2 1 - 2 4 , ' 3 ° ; N e w Y o r k Tribune, F e b r u a r y 9, 1858, p. 6; September 23, 1859, p. 6. F o r his v i e w of the Mutiny of 1857 and other Indian events, see Briefwechsel, II, 199, 274, 3 7 5 - 7 6 . F u r t h e r judgments of British rule in Bricfuechsel, I I I , 295, 2 9 7 ; I V , 5 3 1 ; Das Kapital, I, 7 1 7 - 1 8 . 2 Das Kapital, I I I , 122, 1 2 3 . 1:1 See above, pp. 38-39. 20 New Y o r k Tribune, J a n u a r y 23, 1857, p. 4 ; M a r c h 16, 1857, p. 6 ; M a r c h 25, 1857, p. 6 ; M a r c h 3 1 , 1857, p. 6 ; J u n e 2, 1857, p. 4 ; October 10, 1859, p. 6; October 18, 1859, p. 6 ; December 3, 1859, p. 8. 21 M a r x and Engels, The Civil War in the United States, pp. 92-93, 1 7 7 79; New Y o r k Tribune, N o v e m b e r 23, 1 8 6 1 , p. 6. -'-' Sec below, pp. 154 ff. " B r i e f e an D r . K u g e l m a n n , " Κ cue Zeit, X X 2 , 543.

ζά

Backwardness and Empire

imperialism u n d e r w e n t considerable change, his ultimate test f o r all political dominion, w h e t h e r domestic or foreign, remained the s a m e : economic and social advance. In m o d e r n times, progress d e p e n d e d on the industrialization of the n a t i o n ; later, on its socialization. T h e earth belonged, by " r i g h t , " to those classes and peoples which could m a k e it finally f r u i t f u l f o r all men, and thus set them free.

5 T H E C O N C E P T I O N OF T H E N A T I O N A L CLASS T H E ACCEPTANCE of the m o d e r n nation as a concrete historical p h e n o m e n o n raised very f u n d a m e n t a l issues in a t h e o r y of socialism based on class s t r u g g l e . W a s it possible to reconcile the concepts of h o r i z o n t a l division into classes and vertical division into n a t i o n s ? T h e d o c t r i n e of class conflict was, of course, of c e n t r a l i m p o r t a n c e in t h e economics and politics of M a r x . W i t h the A m e r i c a n a n t h r o p o l o g i s t L e w i s H . M o r g a n , he held t h a t p r i m i t i v e society h a d been o r g a n i z e d communistically. 1 F r o m the b r e a k d o w n of early c o m m u n i s m up t o the e s t a b l i s h m e n t of m o d e r n socialism, society h a d been, and would continue to be, d i v i d e d into a n t a g o n i s t i c classes. 2 T h e whole significant history of society w a s the history of the friction, victories, and d e f e a t s of economic classes. E v e r y age, every principal stage in the evolution of the m e t h o d s of p r o d u c t i o n , h a d its c h a r a c t e r i s t i c ruling a n d subject classes. " I n ancient R o m e , we h a v e patricians, knights, plebeians, s l a v e s ; in t h e M i d d l e Ages, f e u d a l lords, vassals, guild-burgesses, j o u r n e y m e n , s e r f s ; and within a l m o s t all these classes, still f u r t h e r g r a d a t i o n s . . . O u r own age, the a g e of the bourgeoisie, h o w e v e r , is dis1

L e w i s H. M o r g a n , Ancient Society (Chicago, n.d.), P· 537; Engels, The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State (Chicago, 1 9 0 2 ) , pp. 9, 10. 2 Sämtliche Werke, VI, 525-26η.

58

The National Class

tinguished by the fact that it has simplified class antagonisms. Society as a whole is splitting up more and more into two great hostile camps, into two great classes directly contraposed to each o t h e r : bourgeoisie and p r o l e t a r i a t . " 3 T h e characteristic condition of society has thus been struggle and internecine w a r f a r e . T h e concept of the class implied differentiation and disunion. T h o s e who treated the modern nation as a group having " t h e same interests, the same judgment," seemed to M a r x "cultists" of an " i m a g i n a r y " entity, f o r the "real people" was r e f t into classes. 4 It was a "false abstraction" to regard a capitalist nation as an " a g g r e g a t e body working merely f o r the satisfaction of national wants." 5 Yet to speak at all of national wants or of the welfare of a nation, argued a potential common purpose hovering, however tenuously, over the battlefield of contending classes. Otherwise, the idea of the nation and the idea of the class excluded each other. T h e key to the problem was M a r x ' s view of progress and of the role of social classes. M o d e r n society in general, and the individual nation in particular, were indeed divided against themselves. T h e past was a collection of the most varied economic systems. T h e r e was, nonetheless, a great unifying link in history. It was the development of the means and methods of material production. A higher civilization and greater social happiness presupposed abundance. Progressive enrichment was therefore the social or national interest and, f o r t h a t matter, the human interest par excellence. F o r social, political, and institutional progress was dependent on the promotion of that interest. Leon Trotsky, one of the most internationalminded of the followers of M a r x , defined the "national" 3

Ibid., pp. 525-26. * Die Klauenkämpfe in Frankreich, Ökonomie, p. 235. 0 Das Kapital, III 2 , 388.

p. 56; Zur

Kritik

der

politischen

The National Class

59

as " t h a t which raises the people to a h i g h e r economic and cultural p l a n e . " 8 T h e class, as M a r x conceived it. w a s more than a summation of the immediate needs, demands, o r aims of its m e m b e r s . E a c h class represented a special policy r e g a r d i n g the o r g a n i z a t i o n of production and the content of social, political, and legal institutions. In e v e r y historical period, the objective requirements of p r o g r e s s determined the optimum policy. T h e r e w a s a l w a y s one class whose own a d v a n t a g e coincided, at least f o r a time, with that policy and hence with the g r e a t e r interest of society in the i m p r o v e m e n t and better exploitation of the means of production. A t that point the class met the nation. S o long as society w a s divided into classes, the national interest accorded with the interest of the most p r o g r e s s i v e class o r element in the nation. T h a t class w a s national which could manage, even while p r o m o t i n g its own interests, to p r o p e l society f o r w a r d . T h e dominance of a ruling class had national justification so long, and only so long, as it p r o m o t e d economic p r o g r e s s . In b r i e f , the national class w a s that class which led the nation, the individual society, along the line of p r o g r e s s . A s methods of production changed, different classes assumed national leadership. In modern times, until the complete establishment of industrialism, the bourgeoisie w a s the national class. T h e capitalists w e r e justified in claiming leadership, that is, in g o v e r n i n g the nation, while they p e r f o r m e d w h a t M a r x r e g a r d e d as their peculiar historical task, the development of modern production. A f t e r the middle of the nineteenth century, M a r x f e l t that the bourgeoisie, where it w a s well developed, w a s a p p r o a c h i n g the end of its period of leadership. T h e continuance of 6 Leon Trotsky, Literature I02, 168, 234.

and Revolution

(New York, 1925), pp. 94-96,

6o

The National Class

capitalist rule w a s becoming inconsistent with the imp r o v e m e n t of p r o d u c t i o n ; socialization alone could assure f u r t h e r p r o g r e s s . W h e n w e a l t h a n d security diminished, the n a t i o n a l justification of b o u r g e o i s rule ceased. " T h e w o r k e r is becoming a p a u p e r , " a s s e r t e d the Manifest, " a n d p a u p e r i s m is increasing even m o r e rapidly t h a n population and w e a l t h . It becomes evident t h a t the bourgeoisie is no longer fitted t o be the ruling class in society or to impose its conditions of existence as s u p r e m e law f o r society at large. It is unfit to rule because it is incompetent to assure an existence f o r its slave even within his s l a v e r y ; because it is compelled to let him sink into such a condition t h a t it has to f e e d him instead of being f e d by him. Society cannot live any l o n g e r u n d e r the bourgeoisie, in o t h e r w o r d s , its life is no l o n g e r c o m p a t i b l e with society." N a tional l e a d e r s h i p , t h e r e f o r e , must p a s s f r o m the bourgeoisie to t h e p r o l e t a r i a t , t h e c a r r i e r of a new social policy. By o b t a i n i n g political control, the p r o l e t a r i a t will raise itself to the position of " a n a t i o n a l class, and constitute itself as the n a t i o n . . . " 7 If one class leads, o t h e r classes m u s t follow. In the Manifest, M a r x implied t h a t t h e r e were, o r t h a t t h e r e would eventually be, but t w o classes in m o d e r n society. H e later modified this view and a d m i t t e d the continued existence of a d d i t i o n a l classes a n d g r o u p s . 8 In t h e t h i r d volume of Das Kapital, he r e f e r r e d t o the p r o l e t a r i a n s , the capitalists, and t h e l a n d l o r d s , as the " t h r e e g r e a t classes" of capitalist society. 8 T h e p r o l e t a r i a n - c a p i t a l i s t struggle was, f o r him, the m o s t significant but not the only m o d e r n class struggle. In some countries, f o r e x a m p l e F r a n c e of the 7 Sämtliche Werke, VI, 537, 543. On the question of the "increasing mise r y " of the modern proletariat, cf. ibid., VI, 1 7 2 - 7 3 , 537 and Theorien über den Mehrwert, I I 1 , 169. 8 Theorien über den Mehrwert, I I - , 263-64, 368; Das Kapital, I, 4 1 1 - 1 2 , 493· 9 Das Kapital, I I I 2 , 4 2 1 ; Zur Kritik der politischen Ökonomie, p. 245.

The National Class

61

middle of the last century, the "mass of the nation, standing between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie," consisted of peasants and petty bourgeois. 1 0 T h e leading class was frequently a minority of the nation. Obviously, the capitalists could never f o r m more than a small fraction of the population. Even the proletarians need not become the majority of the nation in order to guide it t o w a r d socialism. T h e led, therefore, were o f t e n the great body of the nation, however socially constituted, whose future was involved in the betterment of the economic system. National leadership by a class received most concrete expression when a country stood at economic or political crossroads. Vigorous guidance was then most necessary. A noteworthy moment of national union occurred when a progressive class led the majority of the people against another, reactionary class or against an external enemy who threatened to halt f u r t h e r advance of the society. M a r x felt that under such circumstances the various groups must suspend their mutual antagonisms. H i s favorite historical example was the leadership of the French nation by the bourgeoisie against the aristocracy during the great Revolution. T h e bourgeoisie had stood f o r t h as " t h e social class which represented the whole of modern society against the representativies of the old society, royalty, and aristocracy," 11 and was t h e r e f o r e supported by other classes and groups. T h e implicit alliance between the leading class and the people seemed to M a r x to be symbolized in the exercise of popular pressure upon the bourgeois assemblies of the Revolution. T h a t pressure supplied the guarantee that the bourgeoisie would not place its own interests before the common cause. 12 N a t i o n a l leadership ended when t h a t cause was compromised. T h u s "the decided opposition of Die Klassenkämpfe in Frankreich, p. 47. Ibid., pp. 195, 2 1 1 ; Engels, Germany: Revolution ( N e w York, 1 9 3 3 ) , pp. 1 4 1 - 4 2 . 10

12

11

Sachlass, III, Revolution and

212-13. Counter-

The National Class

62

the bourgeoisie to the people naturally begins only when the bourgeoisie ceases to be opposed, as the T h i r d Estate, to the clergy and nobility." 1 3 T h e German Revolution of 1848 provided M a r x with a practical opportunity to apply his conception of national leadership. On the assumption that social conditions in Germany were similar to those in France in 1 7 8 9 and that the first task of the revolutionaries was the destruction of royalty and aristocracy, he f a v o r e d a liberal revolution led by the bourgeoisie and supported by the proletarians and peasants. 1 4 Such a movement would have national significance. " I n the mouth of the people the w o r d revolution has this meaning: Y o u bourgeois are the 'Committee of Public Safety,' into whose hands we have placed the government, not so that you will combine with the Crown in your own interest, but so that you will champion our interests, the interests of the people, against the C r o w n . " 1 5 M a r x held that the interests of the bourgeoisie, if it were to grow freely and rise to eminence, were antagonistic to the old institutions. During the Franco-Prussian W a r of 1 8 7 0 - 7 1 , M a r x justified united action in Germany to advance the national society against the opposition of external enemies. T h e w e l f a r e of the German proletariat required the establishment of a large integrated state. A f t e r Sedan, however, M a r x recognized the necessity of defending the liberal bourgeois government of Adolphe T h i e r s as more progressive than the Bonapartist E m p i r e it had supplanted. H e therefore called upon the French workers to do their duty as "citizens" and to refrain f r o m overthrowing a regime under which they could develop their numbers and their strength. 1 9 13 15

Briefwechsel, II, 47. Nachlass, III, 215-16.

11 16

Sämtliche Werke, VI, 556-57. Der Bürgerkrieg in Frankreich,

p. 40.

The National Class

63

A s the bourgeoisie h a d led the nation in the s t r u g g l e to o v e r t h r o w f e u d a l i s m and to establish capitalist economies and liberal states, the p r o l e t a r i a n s w o u l d l e a d the nation in a movement to d e s t r o y capitalism and establish sociali s m . 1 7 B u t the p r o l e t a r i a t , like any other class, could assert national leadership only if it w e r e actually in a position to p r o m o t e the interests of the national society. A class which w a s too w e a k or too small ( t h e requisite number v a r i e d with the character of the c l a s s ) , o r whose functions w e r e not essential to society, could not justly claim the support of its leadership by other g r o u p s . T h e F r e n c h p r o l e t a r i a t in 1 8 4 8 , f o r example, w a s too m e a g e r l y d e v e l o p e d to m a k e its struggle " t h e national content of the r e v o l u t i o n " by including within the scope of its own demands the demands of other elements in the country. T h e industrial w o r k e r s " c o u l d not take a step f o r w a r d , could not hurt a hair of the bourgeois o r d e r , " unless the g r e a t masses of peasants and petty bourgeois also rose against capitalism and attached themselves " t o the p r o l e t a r i a t as the l e a d e r in the fight." A s yet the discontent of the three l o w e r classes in F r a n c e was not canalized in one direction: the p r o l e t a r i a n struggle w a s directed against the industrial bourgeoisie, w h e r e a s the discontent of petty t r a d e r s and indebted f a r m ers w a s turned against the financial bourgeoisie. Only a f t e r the development and under the rule of the industrial bourgeoisie could the p r o l e t a r i a t attain " t h e extended national existence, which can raise its revolution to a national one . . . " 1 8 T h e p r o l e t a r i a t w o u l d eventually be able to lead the other l o w e r classes, notably the f a r m e r s , in a campaign against capitalism. A l t h o u g h M a r x w a s f a r f r o m confident that the F r e n c h w o r k e r s had risen to the 17 M a r x generally r e g a r d e d the petty bourgeoisie as incapable of national l e a d e r s h i p ; for an exception, see E n g e l s , Germany: Revolution and Counter-Revolution, pp. 1 3 5 ff. 18 Die Klassenkämpfe in Frankreich, pp. 46-47.

64

The National Class

position of a national class by 1 8 7 1 , 1 9 he w a r m l y supported the P a r i s C o m m u n e and insisted that its victory w o u l d advance the interests not only of the p r o l e t a r i a t but of the mass of the nation. I t a p p e a r e d to him, at that time, that the uprising in P a r i s w a s " t h e first revolution in which the w o r k i n g class w a s openly a c k n o w l e d g e d as the only class still capable of social initiative; acknowledged even by the g r e a t bulk of the P a r i s middle c l a s s — s h o p k e e p e r s , artisans, m e r c h a n t s — t h e wealthy capitalists alone e x c e p t e d . " T h e C o m m u n e w a s " t h e truly national g o v e r n m e n t " because it w a s " t h e true representative of all the healthy elements of F r e n c h s o c i e t y , " the elements which had no real stake in capitalism and could t h e r e f o r e f o l l o w the proletariat into the new w o r l d of socialism. 2 0 19 20

See below, pp. 128-29. Der Bürgerkrieg in Frankreich,

pp. 70, 72.

6 STATE AND NATION I N THE THOUGHT of M a r x , the character of the nation w a s closely related to the character of the ruling class. T h e f e u d a l nation w a s a society whose economic l i f e w a s dominated and its intellectual l i f e s h a p e d by the landed l o r d s ; the bourgeois nation w a s guided by the interests and notions of the capitalists; and the p r o l e t a r i a n nation w o u l d be g o v e r n e d economically and influenced intellectually by the industrial w o r k e r s . " T h e ruling ideas of an age h a v e always been but the ideas of the ruling c l a s s . " 1 T h e influence of that class w a s exerted partly through the state. A n understanding of M a r x ' s view of the state is essential to an understanding of his view of the nation. H e distinguished three b r o a d phases of society: the classless society of early communism, a series of class societies, and the classless society of modern socialism. In the early communal period, the state w a s o r g a n i z e d f o r the p e r f o r m a n c e of administrative functions, the p r o m o tion of common interests, and f o r d e f e n s e . T h e authority of the state w a s d e r i v e d f r o m society and w a s strictly delegated. T h e state and its agents w e r e subservient to society, which defined and e x p a n d e d or contracted their functions, and described the scope of the authority necessary to fulfill them. 2 1

Sämtliche Werke, V I , 5 4 3 - 4 4 ; V, 35. - Der Bürgerkrieg in Frankreich, p. 27. See also Engels, Herr Eugen Dührings Umwälzung der Wissenschaft ( M o s c o w , 1 9 3 5 ) , pp. 152, 1 8 2 - 8 3 ; and Feuerbach (Vienna, 1 9 3 2 ) , pp. 62-63,

66

State and Nation

A f t e r the division of society into classes, authority underwent two transformations. T h e instrumentality formerly responsive to social needs became domineering in character. Originally the organ of society at large, the state became the organ of the ruling class f o r the forcible maintenance of its superior position. 3 M a r x used the term " s t a t e " habitually, though not exclusively, to denote the forms of government peculiar to class societies. H e defined "politics" similarly as a function of the self-consciousness and conflict of classes. 4 T h e more the state departed f r o m its position of subordination to society, the more did authority lose its original meaning. T h e authority of the class state, like the leadership of the ruling class, had justification so long and in so f a r as the state was able to promote the greater social purpose by developing a richer economy. Otherwise, class states were merely variants of class oppression. In ancient times, when the primary social conflict was that of slave owners against slaves, the state was dedicated by the masters to the subjugation of their human property. In the feudal age, another state arose, which was controlled by the nobility. In the succeeding age, the state was the political instrumentality used by the capitalists to assure their supremacy over the proletarians. In the third volume of Das Kapital, M a r x made a sweeping generalization on the relation between economic and political forms. H e asserted that "the specific economic f o r m in which surplus l a b o r " was "pumped out of the direct producers" determined "the relations of rulers and ruled" and "the specific political f o r m " of the community. One must inquire into the nature of the relation 3 Der Bürgerkrieg in Frankreich, p. 27 ; E n g e l s , Herr Eugen Dühring . . . pp. 152, 1 8 3 ; and The Origin of the Family . . . pp. 206-8. 4 Sämtliche Werke, V I , 1 9 1 , 226-28, 534, 546; Der Achtzehnte Brumaire . . . p. 1 1 7 .

67

State and Nation

between the owners and the users of the means of production in order to discover "the inmost secret, the hidden foundation of the entire social construction, and hence also of the political f o r m of the relations of sovereignty and dependence, in short, of the specific f o r m s of s t a t e " at a given time. 5 Nowhere, however, did M a r x support this view by stating precisely what state f o r m s were correlated with different forms of exploitation. One difficulty was that the economic basis seemed to him to be subject to "infinite variations and g r a d a t i o n s " in its appearance. N o w the factors which were responsible f o r this variation—"historical influences," f o r example—would, by implication, also affect the forms of the state.® It followed that the state, too, would exhibit "infinite variations and g r a d a t i o n s . " M a r x always insisted that the modern state responded to bourgeois pressures directly or indirectly—that was probably "the inmost secret, the hidden f o u n d a t i o n " of the modern polity. H e also stressed the correspondence between economic development and a considerable amount of centralization. 7 T h e f o r m a l expressions of bourgeois influence and of centralization were not, however, fixed. M a r x did not account f o r the structural difference between the French and English states and their degrees of centralization by pointing to corresponding differences between the French and English economies. H e noted that "special historical circumstances" had led to the limitation of centralization in England by traditional local authorities. 8 I t is sufficient to recall that he regarded England as more developed economically than France, but France as more centralized politically—England was the "classical" ecoDas Kapital, III 2 , 324-25. Ibid., p. 325. ''Sämtliche Werke, VI, 530; Der Bürgerkrieg 8 Der Bürgerkrieg in Frankreich, p. 67. 5 β

in Frankreich,

p. 67.

68

State and Nation

nomic, France the " c l a s s i c a l " political c o u n t r y — t o show how little he f o l l o w e d , or how loosely he interpreted, his theory of the state. E v e n the notion that the state was the voice of the ruling class was not to be understood literally. T h e r e were states, like the J u l y M o n a r c h y of France, which, as M a r x observed, did not represent the whole bourgeoisie, but only a segment of that class. 9 T h e description of contemporary states in his political writings was, in fact, highly empirical and historical. The state might be a representative mechanism controlled directly by the bourgeoisie and other owning classes through exclusive suffrage requirements. Such a system might have either a republican or a monarchical apex. M a r x was ref e r r i n g to undemocratic republics or undemocratic limited monarchies when he characterized the modern state authority as " a committee f o r managing the common affairs of the bourgeoisie as a w h o l e . " 1 0 T h e parliamentary republic seemed to him the " c l a s s i c a l , " that is to say the most convenient or fitting f o r m of the state in the bourgeois epoch 1 1 ; but he was too well a w a r e of the peculiarities of the E n g l i s h state to hold that the " c l a s s i c a l " polity was a necessary accompaniment of capitalist development. The limited monarchy or the republic might establish democratic suffrage. T h i s type of government, no less than others, lent itself to bourgeois influence. 1 2 Finally, there w a s the Bonapartist state. Such a state might be established when the contending classes balanced each other and 0 Die Klassenkämpfe in Frankreich, p. 37 ; N e w Y o r k Tribune, April 7, 1853. P· 5· 10 Sämtliche Werke, V I , 528. 11 Der Achtzehnte Brumaire . . . pp. 50, 86, 91, 1 0 0 ; Die Klassenkämpfe in Frankreich, pp. 69, 90, 96, 1 0 9 - 1 0 . T h e s e passages deal with France but they express M a r x ' s sense of the fitness of republican parliamentary forms f o r capitalist rule in general. 12 Engels, The Origin of the Family . . . pp. 2 0 9 - 1 0 ; Der Bürgerkrieg in Frankreich, pp. 26-27 > Briefwechsel, I I I , 102, 105-6 ; F. Α . Sorge, ed., Briefe und Auszüge aus Briefen . . . p. 387.

State and Nation

69

none was able to make g o o d its claim to supremacy. 1 3 T h e f o r m s o f the state v a r i e d f r o m country to country and f r o m age to age in the same country. In the final phase of class society, the p r o l e t a r i a t would become the ruler of the nation. T h e aim o f the new ruling class would not be to perpetuate its dominion, but to bring the class struggle to an end by abolishing the class of capitalists. W h e n that w a s done, the last social distinction would disappear and the proletariat would cease to exist as a separate class. 1 4 M a r x did not discuss w h a t shape the proletarian transitional state might take. H e implied repeatedly that it would be democratic. T o him, the "dictat o r i a l " measures recommended in the Manifest f o r the gradual introduction of socialism, were not incompatible with the f r e e will of a democratic electorate, although they involved "despotic inroads upon p r o p e r t y . " " T h e first step in the revolution of the w o r k e r s " would be " t o raise the proletariat to the position of the ruling class, to win the battle f o r d e m o c r a c y . " 1 5 If the proletariat were in a minority, democratic rule would imply the sanction of proletarian leadership by other classes. E n g e l s observed in 1847 that proletarian rule would be " d i r e c t " only if it constituted a m a j o r i t y of the p o p u l a t i o n ; in E n g l a n d alone did that seem to be the case. In France and G e r m a n y , the proletariat would have to secure the support of small f a r m e r s and small business men. 1 6 M a r x described the transitional 1 3 E n g e l s , The Origin of the Family . . . p. 209; a n d Wohnungsfrage ( V i e n n a , 1 9 3 2 ) , p. 82; Der Achtzehnte Brumaire . . . passim, but note p a r t i c u l a r l y p. 1 1 6 ; Der Bürgerkrieg in Frankreich, p. 62. F o r a c o n t r a s t b e t w e e n R o m a n and m o d e r n C a e s a r i s m , see Der Achtzehnte Brumaire . . . pp. 1 8 - 1 9 . 14 Sämtliche Werke, V I , 546 ; Ausgewählte Briefe, p. 48 ; Die kämpfe in Frankreich, pp. 124-25. 15 Sämtliche Werke, V I , 545. 10 Ibid., p. 5 1 4 ; N e w Y o r k Tribune, M a y 20, 1858, p. 6 ; Letters Kugelmann, p. 106.

Klassen-

to

Dr.

7o

State and Nation

state, almost in the words of A b r a h a m Lincoln, as a government "of the people, through the people." 1 7 W i l l the socialist nation of the future have a state and, if so, what will be the relation between them? T h e "orthod o x " answer is f a m i l i a r : M a r x believed that the state would gradually d i s a p p e a r — " w i t h e r a w a y " is the accepted phrase—during the transitional proletarian period, and that the socialist commonwealth would have no state. It is true that he r e f e r r e d to the "abolition of the state," although the formula of "withering a w a y " came f r o m the pen of Engels. 1 8 In 1 8 7 2 , the two men, together with other comrades, published a statement which savored of anarchism: " W h a t all socialists understand by anarchism is this: as soon as the goal of the proletarian movement, the abolition of classes, shall have been reached, the power of the state, whose function it is to keep the great majority of producers beneath the yoke of a small minority of exploiters, will disappear and governmental functions will be transformed into simple administrative functions." 1 9 T h i s statement has frequently been taken to confirm the theory that M a r x and Engels were anarchists—so f a r as the future socialist society was concerned. Even in that regard, the anarchists have never considered M a r x as one of them. T h e y could hardly accept the above definition of their doctrine. F o r them, the crucial question was whether the "simple administrative functions" would involve the exercise of external authority upon the individual ; and that was left unanswered. N o w M a r x , and more explicitly Engels, repudiated the anarchist position of absolute antiauthoritarianism. 2 0 M a r x ' s sketch of a planned economy 17

Der Bürgerkrieg in Frankreich, pp. 67, 68, 73. Herr Eugen Diihring . . . pp. 291-92. Les prétendues scissions dans l'Internationale, pp. 37-38. 20 Ausgewählte Briefe, pp. 263-64; Engels, "Über das Autoritätsprinzip," Neue Zeit, X X X I I ' , 37-39. 18

19

State and Nation

71

involved the exercise of considerable authority. H e emphasized the need f o r control, direction, coordination, and "one commanding w i l l " in all large-scale cooperative enterprise. While the "despotic" control prevalent in the economic units of class society would become unnecessary, the need f o r management would increase. 2 1 T h e amount of integration and authority required in the economic field would be determined by the character of the productive process; the precise amount was hardly predictable in advance. T h e discretionary power would finally rest in a democratic electorate. Whether the administration set up to direct the socialist economy should be called a state or not is a matter of terminology. M a r x did not scruple to speak of a state under socialism. Lenin, who defended the "withering a w a y " theory in The State and Revolution, was apparently puzzled by M a r x ' s reference, in 1 8 7 5 , to "the future state organization of communist society." Despite Lenin's attempt to avoid it, the implication was that M a r x probably foresaw the necessity of a state machinery; it is certain, at all events, that he did not exclude the possibility of one.-'T h e only sense in which one might speak of an anarchist tendency in M a r x is this: he held that, outside the realm of economic production, the area in which the individual might act without any external restraints should be extended indefinitely; but this tendency is as much a part of the historical tradition of liberalism as that of anarchism. T o conclude: M a r x drew a sharp distinction between the state in any of its forms and the nation or society. T h e early communal state, the class state, or the socialist economic administration, although they differed in many re21 Das Kapital, I, 2 9 5 - 9 7 ; II, 1 0 5 - 6 ; I I I 1 , 369, 370, 4 2 7 - 2 8 ; Theorien über den Mehriïrrt, I I I , 4 1 6 - 1 7 . On the principle of authority, see also 2 Sämtliche ÌVerke, V I , 198 f f . ; Das Kapital, I, 3 2 1 ; I I I , 324-25, 4 1 8 . "-Kritik des Gothaer Programms, pp. 22, 59 ff.

72

State and Nation

spects, were all mechanisms and instrumentalities created by forces beyond themselves—society o r ruling c l a s s e s — which prescribed their functions and endowed them with authority. H o w directly M a r x contraposed state and society to each other was indicated by his characterization o f counterrevolution as " a reaction o f the state against society." 2 3 In objecting to the G o t h a P r o g r a m o f the G e r man socialists, which had urged the establishment o f a " f r e e s t a t e , " he asserted t h a t " f r e e d o m consists in transforming the state f r o m an organ which dominates society to one which is completely subordinated to i t " ; that " e v e n today the f o r m s o f the state are more or less free in the measure that they restrict the ' f r e e d o m of the state.' " 2 4 A state which became an end in itself and served its own bureaucracy seemed a monstrous creation. M a r x ' s figures o f speech betrayed his attitude. H e described the extremely centralized state o f the Second E m p i r e as a "parasitic b o d y " which had acquired " a n ubiquity, an omniscience, a quickened capacity f o r motion, and an elasticity which is only matched by the helpless dependence and the utter shapelessness o f the actual body o f society . . . " A state which presumed to stand above the nation must be broken, its "purely repressive" organs removed, and its "legitimate functions . . . restored to the responsible agents o f society." 2 5 H e summed up the proper relationship between the state and nation in the remark that the state should not be regarded as " a n independent being which possesses its own intellectual, moral, and free b a s e s " ; the emphasis must be on " t h e existing society (and this applies to any future society) as the foundation o f the future state." 26

New York Tribune, August 2i, 1852, p. 6. Kritik des Gothaer Programmi, p. 21. 25 Der Achtzehnte Brumaire . . . pp. 6i, 114-15; Der Bürgerkrieg Frankreich, pp. 66-67. 26 Kritik des Gothaer Programms, p. 21. 23 24

in

State and Nation

73

T h e nation or society was its own excuse f o r being. I t was an entity possessing considerable continuity. Society could be profoundly changed only by long-term processes : the promotion of new methods of production, their permeation in the life of the community, the development and satisfaction of new wants, a readjustment of culture, customs, and institutions. State structures might be dismantled, expanded, or reorganized with relative abruptness. One might t r a n s f o r m a state by destroying or dismissing a bureaucracy, or by altering the administrative mechanism. T h e a p p a r a t u s might pass without much modification f r o m the control of one class to that of another, or it might yield its place to a completely different apparatus. In his speech f r o m the scaffold, King Charles I of England protested that subject and sovereign were "clean different things." "Clean different things," although hardly in the Stuart sense, were also the state and the nation of Marx.

7 NATIONALISM E V I L of economic exploitation was only one of the r e a s o n s why M a r x insisted t h a t the abolition of classes was necessary f o r t h e w e l f a r e of society. A s a h u m a n i t a r i a n , he w a s r e v o l t e d b o t h by the misery of the o p p r e s s e d masses a n d by t h e indignity i n h e r e n t in t h e position of the u p p e r classes. A s an economist, he c o n d e m n e d the w a s t e and absence of p l a n n i n g in the field of p r o d u c t i o n . H e rebelled, in his capacity of an intellectual and p h i l o s o p h e r , against the p e r v e r s i o n s of value and d i s t o r t i o n s of t r u t h which he d e t e c t e d on every h a n d in the culture of class societies, m o r e p a r t i c u l a r l y in capitalist societies. N o m a t t e r how c o n t r a r y to " a l l the laws of h u m a n conscience," a notion m i g h t seem p e r f e c t l y sound t o t h e b o u r g e o i s and their t h e o r i s t s . 1 I t s e e m e d to M a r x t h a t a " m y s t i c a l veil" surr o u n d e d " t h e life process of s o c i e t y " — p r o d u c t i o n — i n class societies a n d t h a t the veil would n o t be l i f t e d until t h a t process w e r e c a r r i e d on by " f r e e l y associated men, u n d e r t h e i r conscious a n d p l a n n e d c o n t r o l . " 2 T h e domin a t i n g d r i v e of t h e ruling class w a s to m a i n t a i n itself in p o w e r . T h i s d r i v e f u r n i s h e d t h e p r e v a i l i n g s t a n d a r d of m o r a l a n d intellectual j u d g m e n t s : the ideas a n d institutions t h a t b o l s t e r e d class d o m i n a t i o n w e r e e x a l t e d ; those t h a t r a n c o u n t e r t o t h e interests of the ruling class w e r e d i s c a r d e d o r so t r a n s f o r m e d as to m a k e t h e m innocuous a n d meaningless. T H E

1

New Y o r k Tribune,

March 15, 1859, p. 6.

2

Das Kapital,

I, 46.

Nationalism

75

T h i s view explains how M a r x could reject the "class f o r m s " of many values and yet cling to what he regarded as their true or potential content. While he condemned "bourgeois property," he was not opposed to individual property, providing the means of production were socialized. H i s aversion to "bourgeois humanitarianism" was matched by his devotion to humanity. 3 Das Kapital was not only a work of economics, a historical treatise, and a philosophy of political action, but also a protest against cruelty, selfishness, and injustice. 4 Because M a r x prized moral values so highly, he had contempt f o r professional reformers. H e attacked class "justice," "humanitarianism," and "idealism" as unctuous phrasemongering. F o r every authentic value, the ruling classes evolved a corresponding distortion. So it was with love of country. T h e sentiment of attachment to one's homeland was natural enough in itself. M a r x thought, however, that an enlightened patriotism should be directed toward the national society on the road of progress, and should not be a glorification of the past or an apology f o r the present. N o nation in the world had achieved the happy society by virtue of its own special capacities and endowments, nor could it do so unaided. National smugness and airs of superiority were equally unjustified everywhere. Since differences among men were essentially historical and transient, since all nations and races faced the same future, and since mankind was one, its inherent capacities the same and its goal necessarily unif o r m , invidious distinctions, whether of a racial, national, 3 Note M a r x ' s shamefacedness when, in order to please his comrades, he inserted idealistic terms ("truth, morality, and j u s t i c e " ) in the preamble to the statutes of the First International. He assured Engels that he used these phrases "in such a w a y that it can do no h a r m " ! Briefwechsel, III, 1 9 8 ; see also I V , 258. 4 See, f o r example, Das Kapital, I, 134, 228, 364, 7 2 4 ; also, Ausgewählte Briefe, p. 178 ; Briefwechsel, I I I , 395.

76

Nationalism

or any o t h e r c h a r a c t e r , w e r e u n w a r r a n t e d intellectually and h a r m f u l socially. Distinctions inspired by n a r r o w class interests w e r e especially obnoxious to M a r x . E v e r y class h a d t h e tendency to picture the nation, a n d s o m e t i m e s t h e whole species, in its own image. It then p r o c e e d e d t o w o r s h i p t h a t image. F o r each class t h e r e w a s a different " f a t h e r l a n d . " T h e N a p o l e o n i c patrie of the F r e n c h p e a s a n t r y expressed its "youthful passion" for property f a r more than the larger aspirations of French society. T h e p e a s a n t s loved the soil of F r a n c e quite literally. " T h e u n i f o r m was t h e i r own state d r e s s ; w a r was t h e i r p o e t r y ; t h e small holding, extended and r o u n d e d off in t h e i r i m a g i n a t i o n , w a s t h e f a t h e r l a n d ; and p a t r i o t i s m w a s t h e ideal f o r m of t h e p r o p erty sense." 5 T h e petty bourgeoisie w a s w o n t t o think of itself as " t h e p e o p l e , " and of its r i g h t s a n d interests as the rights and interests of " t h e p e o p l e . " 6 M i l i t a r i s t i c landed aristocracies cherished a " f a t h e r l a n d " peculiar t o t h e i r t r a d i t i o n s and interests. M a r x p o k e d f u n at t h e "typically P r u s s i a n " notion t h a t " n o one m u s t d e f e n d his f a t h e r l a n d except in u n i f o r m !" 7 T h e bourgeoisie, too, looked into the m i r r o r t o discover the " f a t h e r l a n d " of its affections. T h a t " f a t h e r l a n d " was capitalist p r o p e r t y w r i t l a r g e . O n e " h a d " a country roughly in the sense t h a t one h a d much land and money, m a n y buildings, stocks and b o n d s . T h e b o u r g e o i s " f a t h e r l a n d " was not the country f r o m the point of view of its potentialities f o r p r o g r e s s , o r the n a t i o n r e g a r d e d democratically, but the a g g r e g a t e of institutions, customs, laws, and ideas which sanctified t h e r i g h t t o p r o p e r t y on a considerable scale. T h a t w a s t h e " f a t h e r l a n d " r e p u d i a t e d in the Manifest. 5

6 Der Achtzehnte Brumaire . . . p. 122. Ibid., p. 55. 'Briefwechsel, IV, 374; "Briefe an Dr. Kugelmann," Neue Zeit,

543-44·

XX-,

Nationalism

77

T h e bourgeoisie conveniently assumed that the " n a t i o n " consisted only of capitalists. T h e country w a s t h e r e f o r e " t h e i r s " 8 and they proceeded to take charge of its resources. T h e riches of the " n a t i o n " of capitalists were not only not synonymous with, but inversely proportional to, the riches of the real nation. " N a t i o n a l w e a l t h , " "national i n t e r e s t , " " n a t i o n a l g l o r y , " w e r e symbols of the wealth and interest of the ruling class. Quite rightly f r o m that point of view, bourgeois economists of the nineteenth century came to recognize the "identity between national wealth and the p o v e r t y of the p e o p l e . " 0 T h e " w e a l t h of the n a t i o n " signified the " f o r m a t i o n of capital and the reckless exploitation and impoverishment of the masses of the p e o p l e . " 1 0 W h i l e the riches belonged to the bourgeois " n a t i o n , " the obligations of society w e r e deposited on the doorstep of the real nation. M a r x recalled W i l l i a m Cobbett's observation t h a t " i n E n g l a n d all public institutions are designated as ' r o y a l ' but, as a sort of compensation, the public debt is 'national.' " T h e national debt, which M a r x described as " t h e sale of the state, whether despotic, constitutional, or r e p u b l i c a n " to the investing bourgeoisie, g a v e the capitalist era its characteristic stamp. " T h e only p a r t of the sc-called national w e a l t h that really enters into the common possession of m o d e r n peoples is their national debt. H e n c e , v e r y logically, the modern doctrine that a nation becomes richer the m o r e deeply it gets into debt. Public credit becomes the credo of c a p i t a l . " 1 1 R e a l national needs were i g n o r e d by the bourgeois in search of p r o f i t s ; M a r x repeated R i c a r d o ' s r e m a r k that " e v e n in times of famine, g r a i n is i m p o r t e d not because the nation is starving, but because the grain dealer is making 8

Das Kapital, I, 579, 693 ; II, 337 ; Theorien Das Kapital, I, 691. Ibid., pp. 330, 684, 730, 736, 737. 11 ¡bid., p. 719.

0

10

über den Mehrwert,

III, 395.

Nationalism

78

m o n e y . " 1 2 " A f t e r me the d e l u g e ! " w a s the w a t c h w o r d o f every capitalist and every capitalist " n a t i o n . " 1 3 H a v i n g identified itself with the nation and " b o u g h t " the state, the bourgeoisie w a s in a position to appeal to the emotion of patriotism. T h e ruling classes played upon national prejudices and squandered the people's blood and treasure in "piratical w a r s . " In the name of patriotism, the capitalists called upon the proletariat to help them in their conflicts with the capitalists of other countries. W h e n the bourgeoisie combated the proletariat of its own country, it was again in the name of the " f a t h e r l a n d and society" — t h e bourgeois " f a t h e r l a n d and society." T h e l o w e r classes were taught to sacrifice their interests and give their lives to a " f a t h e r l a n d " that the bourgeoisie itself did not hesitate to sacrifice upon the altar of private profit. W h e n it suited them, the states could shed the "national u n i f o r m " and combine against the proletariat. 1 4 T h e exaltation of its " f a t h e r l a n d " w a s the nationalism peculiar to the bourgeoisie. M a r x blamed that class f o r abusing and exploiting the natural attachment to the native land, f o r holding a n a r r o w conception of the nation and patriotism, f o r foisting this conception upon the l o w e r classes, f o r arousing excessive national vanity and exacerbating national hatred as instruments of domination at home and abroad, and f o r exalting the state above society in order the better to maintain the bourgeois order. T h e worship of the state seemed the w o r s t and most h a r m f u l f o r m of nationalism. T h e state of M a r x ' s conception w a s distinctly instrumental in c h a r a c t e r — t h e tool of the rulers of a class society or of the democracy of a classless society. T o permit that tool to acquire conscious1 3 Das Kapital, Zur Kritik der politischen Ökonomie, p. 155. I, 232. Sämtliche Werke, V I , 535; Die Klassenkämpfe in Frankreich, pp. 56, 1 1 2 ; Der Bürgerkrieg in Frankreich, p. 89; Steklov, op. cit., p. 445. 12

14

Nationalism

79

ness and ends of its own was a species of idolatry. State adoration was a disease which attacked Bonapartist regimes most virulently. 1 5 A n o t h e r f o r m of nationalism was the tendency to look upon one's nation as chosen f o r a glorious, preferably universal, purpose. Sometimes the emphasis was upon historical tradition. " M i s u n d e r s t o o d " nationalities anointed their past with "inspired oil." 10 Particularly odious was the practice of justifying " t o d a y ' s iniquity by yesterday's," as though historical tradition were w h a t legal precedent meant to J o n a t h a n S w i f t — t h a t " w h a t e v e r has been done before, may legally be done again." T h e serf had no less right to rebel because the knout against which he cried out might be "a hoary, a hereditary, a historical knout." M a r x had little sympathy with the attempt of the German "historical school" of his time to trace some of the most important values of modern civilization—freedom, f o r example—to the primitive G e r m a n s : " . . . good-humored enthusiasts, Teutomaniacs by blood and freethinkers by reflection, search f o r the history of our f r e e d o m beyond our history in the Teutonic primeval woods. But if that history is only to be found in the woods, how is it to be distinguished f r o m the history of the f r e e d o m of the b o a r ? " 17 H e had as little patience with the proponents of " N o r d i c " nationalism or "Scandinavism." H i s newspaper Neue rheinische Zeitung paid its respects to that movement in these terms : Scandinavism consists in enthusiasm for a brutal, dirty, piratical, o l d - N o r d i c nationality, for that deep i n w a r d n e s s w h i c h is unable to express its extravagant t h o u g h t s and f e e l i n g s in w o r d s , but unquestionably can do so in deeds, namely, in brutality t o w a r d s w o m e n , 15 17

Der Bürgerkrieg in Frankreich, Sämtliche Werke, I 1 , 609.

pp. 60 ff.

10

Briefwechsel,

II, 152.

Nationalism

8o

chronic drunkenness, and teary sentimentality alternating w i t h B e r serk f u r y . 1 8

B o u r g e o i s nationalism indiscriminately exploited anything at hand, whether intrinsically p r a i s e w o r t h y o r not, in the history, traditions, and special peculiarities of each country. In E n g l a n d , it w a s economic supremacy and the empire which f e d nationalistic sentiment. T h e prestige of F r a n c e during the Old R e g i m e and its political leadership of E u r o p e during revolutionary upheavals enabled nationalists to claim f o r F r a n c e the title of natural leader of the world. G e r m a n patriots rationalized the long delay in establishing a national state as a sign of cosmopolitanism. T h e y distinguished the G e r m a n s as an essentially p e a c e f u l , spiritual, and m o r a l nation, f r o m the " g o d l e s s , d e b a u c h e d " French w h o thirsted a f t e r military g l o r y . E v e r y w h e r e , " t h e sycophants of the powers-that-be poison public opinion by flattery and mendacious s e l f - p r a i s e . " 1 9 W h e n E n g lishmen became indignant o v e r the brutal methods of w a r f a r e employed by Prussia in France in 1 8 7 0 , M a r x s h a r e d that indignation, but was moved to observe that E n g l i s h rulers h a d themselves behaved brutally in India, J a m a i c a , and elsewhere. H o w e v e r , he added ironically, " t h e F r e n c h are neither Hindus, nor Chinese, nor N e g r o e s , and the Prussian is no heaven-born E n g l i s h m a n ! " 2 0 A n d w h a t of the w o r k e r s ? W e r e they immune to invidious nationalism? A t the beginning of his activity as a socialist in the forties, M a r x leaned to the view that nationalism w a s a bourgeois passion. H e observed sweepingly that in all countries " t h e insistence on nationality is f o u n d only 18

Nachlass, III, 188; Sämtliche Werke, VI, 348. Der Bürgerkrieg in Frankreich, p. 38. 20 "Briefe an Dr. Kugelmann," Neue Zeit, X X 2 , 543; Der Bürgerkrieg Frankreich, p. 87. 18

in

Nationalism a m o n g t h e b o u r g e o i s and their w r i t e r s . "

8ι 21

The

interna-

t i o n a l i s m o f b o u r g e o i s f r e e t r a d e r s w a s h i g h l y dubious to h i m . 2 2 T h e f r a t e r n i t y o f l a b o r w a s the only authentic int e r n a t i o n a l i s m . T h e w o r k e r s seemed, on the w h o l e , f r e e f r o m national prejudices.23 L a t e r , M a r x b e c a m e m o r e conscious o f the d e p t h o f the n a t i o n a l i s t f e e l i n g o f b o t h u p p e r and l o w e r classes. H e freq u e n t l y c r i t i c i z e d F r e n c h r a d i c a l s and w o r k e r s f o r s h a r i n g w i t h t h e i r b o u r g e o i s the f o n d t h o u g h t t h a t F r a n c e w a s the " m o d e l n a t i o n " a n d t h e true h o m e o f c i v i l i z a t i o n . Intern a t i o n a l i s m w a s t a k e n t o imply t h a t all nations s h o u l d bec o m e one b y b e c o m i n g F r e n c h . 2 4 H e resented the airs o f s u p e r i o r i t y a f f e c t e d by F rench radicals w h e n d e a l i n g w i t h c o m r a d e s o f o t h e r countries. O n c e , w h e n assisting F r e n c h l e a d e r s to d r a w up a socialist p r o g r a m , he r e m a r k e d t h a t " w h e n one w i s h e s t o w o r k f o r M e s s i e u r s les F r a n ç a i s , one m u s t do it anonymously

so as not to offend the 'national*

s e n t i m e n t . " 2·"' O n a n o t h e r occasion, he called a t t e n t i o n to the d a n g e r o f

flattering

the " n a t i o n a l s e n t i m e n t " o f G e r -

m a n a r t i s a n s . 2 0 H e w a s d e e p l y d i s t u r b e d by the a n t a g o n i s m b e t w e e n E n g l i s h and Irish w o r k e r s o f w h i c h he b e c a m e i n c r e a s i n g l y a w a r e in t h e fifties and sixties. H e confided his d i s t r e s s to his f r i e n d s . P r e j u d i c e against I r e l a n d w a s " a r t i ficially

k e p t alive and intensified by the [ E n g l i s h ]

press,

the pulpit, t h e comic p a p e r s , in s h o r t by all the m e a n s at the d i s p o s a l o f t h e r u l i n g c l a s s e s . " P o v e r t y - s t r i c k e n Irish farmers

flooded

t h e E n g l i s h l a b o r m a r k e t . A s a result,

M a r x w r o t e in 1 8 7 0 , t h e o r d i n a r y E n g l i s h w o r k e r " h a t e s the Irish w o r k e r as a c o m p e t i t o r w h o l o w e r s his s t a n d a r d of living. H e 21 23 24

20

f e e l s h i m s e l f t o be, as against the

Sämtliche Werke, V , 454. --Ibid., V I , 358, 446, 628. Ibid., I V , 4 6 7 ; V I , 26, 577, 6 5 2 - 5 3 ; Steklov, op. cit., pp. 22 ff. Briefnechsrl, III, 337, 342. S o r g e , op. cit., pp. 1 7 1 - 7 2 ; Briefwechsel, I I I , 421-22. M e h r i n g , Karl Marx, p. 239.

Irish

82

Nationalism

worker, a member of the ruling nation and thus turns himself into a tool of the aristocrats and capitalists against Ireland, with the result t h a t he strengthens their domination over him. H e cherishes religious, social, and national prejudices against the Irish worker. H i s attitude toward him is about the same as t h a t of the poor whites to the Negroes in the f o r m e r slave states of the United States." W e have a hint of M a r x ' s sense of the profundity of this hostility in the r e m a r k that some of the reasons f o r Irish independence could not be communicated to the English workers. T h e Irish worker paid back in the same coin, and "with interest." H e looked upon the English worker as the accomplice as well as the "stupid tool" of the rulers of Ireland. T h i s mutual enmity was "the secret of the impotence of the English working class, despite its organization. It is the secret of the maintenance in power of the capitalist class, which is entirely aware of that fact." T h e discord was responsible f o r much of the friction between the United States and E n g l a n d ; it was also "the hidden basis" of the popular antagonism which made "any genuine cooperation" between English and American workers "impossible." " I t enables the governments of the two countries, whenever they think fit, to break the edge of the social conflict by mutual threats and, if need be, by war with one a n o t h e r . " - 7 A powerful national hatred stood athwart the path of proletarian emancipation in the most important capitalist country and of the international cooperation of the proletariat of three nations. M a r x felt to the end t h a t nationalism did not sit naturally on the proletariat. British and French workers might show "an honorable national spirit" during such a "pro21 Ausgewählte Briefe, pp. 236-37; Briefwechsel, Dr. Kugelmann," Neue Zeit, X X 2 , 414, 478.

IV, 258 ¡ " B r i e f e an

Nationalism

83

gressive" conflict as the C r i m e a n W a r , but they seemed "more or less f r e e f r o m the antiquated national prejudices common, in either country, t o the p e a s a n t r y . " W h i l e victory flattered " t h e i r national p r i d e , " they h a d little direct interest in the w a r except as it offered an o p p o r t u n i t y f o r criticizing the g o v e r n i n g classes. 2 8 M o r e extreme nationalist feeling a m o n g p r o l e t a r i a n s seemed to M a r x somehow temporary, episodic, exceptional. T h e F r e n c h w o r k e r s h a d to reckon with an especially s t r o n g nationalist tradition. Anglo-Irish enmity was largely r o o t e d in peculiar economic circumstances which might be altered. The socialist idea did not involve invidious distinctions among nations ; it would not lead to national struggles between advanced or between advanced and undeveloped nations. T h e p r o l e t a r i a t of an advanced nation must assist the proletariat of o t h e r advanced nations in attaining the common goal. T h e socialization of one country was not secure unless o t h e r countries followed suit. T h e bourgeoisie drew s t r e n g t h f o r oppressing its native p r o l e t a r i a t from the subjection of f o r e i g n peoples. U n d e r socialism, the tendency to control undeveloped nations would disappear and, with it, one of the most i m p o r t a n t sources of national antipathy. T h e advanced countries must take a high international g r o u n d and p r o m o t e the p r o g r e s s of undeveloped n a t i o n s ; it was d a n g e r o u s to themselves to leave any considerable area of the globe sunk in backwardness. T h e roots of national oppression, national wars, a n d imperialism would wither in the era of socialism. T h e political "delirium," as well as the economic misery of capitalism, will find no place in the new society. W h e n every nation was ruled by labor, the ideal of international peace would become a reality. 2 9 T h i s was the f a i t h of M a r x . 28 29

New York Tribune, April 27, 1855, p. 6. D i r Bürgerkrieg in Frankreich, p. 33.

8 N A T I O N A L D I F F E R E N C E S AND THE INTERNATIONAL REVOLUTION I T IS h a r d l y necessary to insist t h a t M a r x was primarily an internationalist. H i s p r o p o s e d solution of the social p r o b l e m was applicable to all countries, at least eventually. T h e w e l f a r e of every nation depended upon the introduction of the m o d e r n industrial system and its social control and direction. Capitalism and industrialism were conquering country a f t e r country. T h e y were bringing in their train the same evils and crises everywhere. W i t h monotonous regularity, the bourgeoisie g r e w and came to power, and with it grew the p r o l e t a r i a t , which p r e p a r e d to challenge this p o w e r . T h e victory of capitalism and the issue of socialism w e r e increasingly t r a n s f o r m i n g the w o r l d into a single community. In analyzing forces of universal significance, M a r x frequently t r e a t e d the w o r l d as an integral unit. F o r the sake of argument, he t o o k " t h e whole t r a d i n g w o r l d " to be "one n a t i o n " and assumed t h a t capitalist production was established everywhere and h a d p e r m e a t e d all branches of industry. T h e complete organism was "easier to study than its cells." 1 H e acknowledged t h a t the p u r e capitalism he posited existed nowhere, not even in E n g l a n d . 2 But he was 1

Das Kapital,

I, vi, 544η.

2

"Carey und Bastiat," Neue

Zeit, XXII 2 , 9.

National Differences

85

interested in explaining the forces which held the greatest potentialities for progress r a t h e r than in photographically describing the actual v a r i e t y of the world. If, therefore, he thought of the w o r l d as increasingly capitalistic, it w a s not in the sense that all countries were equally capitalistic, or even that every country had been launched on the sea of capitalism. If he thought of the social revolution as international, it w a s h a r d l y in the sense that all countries were r e a d y for it and that the revolution would occur simultaneously and in the same manner everywhere. Like capitalism, socialism must come to birth in a richly diversified environment. T h e unity of M a r x ' s world was far more potential than actual. H e implicitly classified countries into three broad categories : advanced countries; countries which were b a c k w a r d but contained the possibilities of progress or had a l r e a d y started to develop a modern economy; and countries which were not only backward but socially and economically stagnant. T h e difference among these categories might be one of degree or tempo of development. T h u s feudal J a p a n w a s a later edition of feudal Europe. 3 W i t h i n the same category the differences were r e l a t i v e ; the industrially advanced country was the image of the future of less developed lands. 4 T h e countries in each of these categories h a d many common problems and shared a somewhat distinctive relation to the development of capitalism and socialism. The advanced region of the w o r l d roughly consisted of Western Europe and the United States of A m e r i c a . T h e r e , the foundations for capitalism were a l r e a d y laid and the superstructure of modern industry w a s arising rapidly. A large proletariat w a s developing. Both the economic and socio-political conditions for socialism w e r e increasingly present. 3

Das Kapital,

I, 683η.

* Ibid.,

pp. vi-vii.

86

National Differences

T o the second category belonged countries like Russia and perhaps T u r k e y . T h e i r development did not differ essentially f r o m that of the Western countries, although the pace had been much slower. T h e y were encumbered by antiquated feudal or communal relations and institutions, and such capitalist enterprises as they had were commercial and financial, rather than industrial in character. H o w ever, they stood in close proximity to the advanced countries in more than a geographic sense, and would inevitably, in one fashion or another, follow these upon the stage of industrialism. T h e i r special problem was how to speed up political and economic growth, while the related problem of the advanced world was how to prevent the conservatism of the backward countries f r o m being an obstacle to its own further progress. Quite different was the position of the countries in the last category. These were regarded by M a r x as incapable of organizing modern societies through their own efforts. Such was the condition of virgin lands or regions inhabited by primitive tribes, and of some very old, large, and important civilizations. Only powerful pressure f r o m without could stir them into change; advanced countries would help to modernize them. M a r x hoped that the bourgeoisie would accomplish that task, but he also contemplated the possibility that a socialist West might undertake the administration and transformation of backward countries. T h e reader may recall his remark that "the great social revolution" would place the world economy and market under "the common control of the most advanced peo· pies." 5 Meanwhile, the bourgeoisie was forcibly "civilizing" all nations, "even the most barbarous," by improving production and communication. T h e Chinese walls of economic and cultural isolation were everywhere crumbling 5

New York Tribune,

August 8, 1853, p. 5.

National Differences

87

b e f o r e the attack of the cheap g o o d s of capitalism. O n e country a f t e r another w a s compelled to become bourgeois o r be r u i n e d . C a p i t a l i s m w a s c r e a t i n g a w o r l d " i n its o w n image." T h i s w o r l d , h o w e v e r , still c o n s i s t e d o f d i s t i n c t i v e reg i o n s . T h e e c o n o m i c a n d p o l i t i c a l c h a n g e s w h i c h accompanied

the

introduction

of

modern

industry

occurred

w i t h i n t h e f r a m e w o r k o f l a r g e g e o g r a p h i c units. T h e bourgeoisie w a s g r a d u a l l y p u t t i n g an end to t h e d i s p e r s i o n o r f r a g m e n t a t i o n of the means of production, property, and population. T h e small areas were being assembled

into

m u c h l a r g e r , but not w o r l d - w i d e , polities. T h e " n e c e s s a r y effect" of agglomeration of population,

industrialization,

and the c o n c e n t r a t i o n o f p r o p e r t y w a s p o l i t i c a l c e n t r a l i z a tion on a n a t i o n a l s c a l e : " I n d e p e n d e n t , o r l o o s e l y nected p r o v i n c e s w i t h d i s p a r a t e interests, l a w s ,

con-

govern-

m e n t , a n d c u s t o m tariffs, h a v e been p r e s s e d t o g e t h e r into one nation, one g o v e r n m e n t , one system o f l a w s , one nat i o n a l class interest, one tariff b o u n d a r y . "

0

M a r x appears to have expected that the more developed societies w o u l d b e c o m e socialist in the n e a r f u t u r e . W i t h a sense o f i m m e d i a c y , he w o u l d s p e a k o f " t h e r e v o l u t i o n o f the nineteenth century."

7

F o r his o w n a g e , t h e

"world

r e v o l u t i o n " m e a n t a r e v o l u t i o n in the a d v a n c e d w o r l d , o r in " a l l i m p o r t a n t c o u n t r i e s o f t h e w o r l d . "

8

The

Manifest

o u t l i n e d a p o l i t i c a l p r o g r a m w i t h specific r e f e r e n c e to E n g land, the U n i t e d S t a t e s , F r a n c e , S w i t z e r l a n d ,

Germany,

and P o l a n d ; n e i t h e r R u s s i a n o r T u r k e y w a s m e n t i o n e d . The

Inaugural Address

of

the F i r s t

International

de-

c l a r e d , in 1 8 6 4 , t h a t the e m a n c i p a t i o n o f l a b o r w a s a p r o b l e m " e m b r a c i n g all c o u n t r i e s in w h i c h m o d e r n society ex" Sämtliche Werke, V I , 201, 528-30, 536. 7 Der Achtzehnte Brumaire . . . p. 2 4 ; Die Klassenkämpfe in Frankreich, pp. 47, 62. 8 Engels, Germany: Revolution and Counter-Revolution, p. 139.

88

National Differences

ists, and depending f o r its solution on the concurrence, political and theoretical, of the most advanced countries." 8 T h e revolution presented both a national and an international problem: how to attain the socialist objective in individual, advanced countries, and how to integrate national efforts into a campaign to socialize the whole Western world. Socialism must, a f t e r all, come to life in a particular country and spread to other particular countries; it must find a "local habitation and a name." " T h e struggle of the proletariat against the bourgeoisie is in form, though not in substance, primarily a national s t r u g g l e . T h e proletariat of every country must naturally first of all settle accounts with its own bourgeoisie." 1 0 T h i s position of the Manifest was reasserted in 1 8 7 5 : the workers must organize themselves as a class at home. T h e i r own country was the "immediate a r e n a " of their struggle. T h e class conflict could not be waged effectively on less than a national scale or with disregard of existing state lines, although, given the interconnections of the world market and capitalists, the workers must organize internationally as well. T h e nation was the irreducible unit f o r the establishment of socialism. 1 1 National coverage was the practical climax of the proletarian movement and of the class struggle. The Manifest described how, in the early stages of industrialism, the workingmen fought against capitalism individually and locally. T h e y combined by factories and trades. T h e y showed their immaturity by destroying machines, setting fire to factories, and sighing nostalgically f o r the "lost position of the medieval w o r k e r s . " T h e i r orientation was backward rather than f o r w a r d . T h e y were "scattered 9 11

Steklov, op. cit., p. 446. Kritik des Gothaer Programms,

10 Sämtliche pp. 14, 20.

Werke, VI, 536.

National Differences

89

throughout the country and splintered by competition," while the bourgeoisie was already organized on a national scale. T h e latter was continually at odds with the aristocracy or with the bourgeoisie of other nations; its factions were also engaged in conflicts among themselves. T h e embattled bourgeoisie, in its search f o r allies, appealed to the proletarians and drew them into the political arena, thus educating them for public combat and supplying them with "weapons which will be turned against" capitalism. T h e proletarians were being consolidated, but they were as yet fighting the enemies of their enemies, and their victories were therefore bourgeois victories. Proletarian maturity and nationwide integration must come, in the final analysis, t h r o u g h economic development and the growth of the self-consciousness of the workers as a class apart. T h e advance of industry increased not merely the numbers of proletarians but their concentration. Strength induced consciousness of strength. T h e introduction of machinery wiped out distinctions of labor and depressed and leveled off wages and living conditions. Competition among the bourgeois and commercial crises caused fluctuations in wages and intensified the insecurity of the workers. Caught increasingly in a common economic whirl, they were driven closer together; disputes between individual employees and employers took the f o r m of collisions between two classes. T h e workers then organized coalitions against the bourgeois, to maintain rates of wages. M o d e r n means of communication brought the workers of different localities in contact with each o t h e r ; at last the proletariat would be consolidated on a national scale. Conflicts of the same character in different localities would now be "centralized into a national struggle, a class struggle." 12 This was the culmination of the development 12

Sämtliche

Werke,

VI, 533-34.

9o

National Differences

of each considerable unit of the international proletariat and the starting point of the creation of the socialist society. 13 T h e first task of each national proletariat was to socialize its own economy. Strategy and political p r o g r a m s must vary f r o m country to country. M a r x was not only aware, but insistent, that the same movement or institution might have a different significance in different countries, depending on special economic conditions, class structure, peculiarities of historical experience, and cultural characteristics. H i s sharp contrast between E u r o p e a n and American republicanism was a case in point. T h e older culture of the countries of Europe, their sharp class distinctions, their developed means of production, and " a n intellectual consciousness in which all traditional ideas have been dissolved through the work of centuries," combined to invest the proposal to change the f o r m of government with explosive force and a more than political implication. T h e continental monarchy was not merely one of several alternative regimes but "the normal ballast and indispensable cloak of class rule." T h e European republican was not infrequently a social revolutionary. In the U n i t e d States the republic was a fact, not an issue, even f r o m the narrowly political point of view. H e r e , republicanism was but the "conservative f o r m of existence" of bourgeois society—in other words, the sign of the status quo. T h i s was natural f o r countries where social classes, although they existed, were still in a state of flux, where groups shifted f r o m one class to another, where modern means of production did not correspond to a "stagnant population" but supplied the deficiency in the supply of labor, and where the absorption with material development was favorable 13 C f . Steltlov, op. cit., p. 444; Nikolaievsky and Mänchen-Helfen, o f . cit., p. 229.

National Differences

91

to the survival of antiquated and conservative ideas. 14 W h i l e this contrast did not represent M a r x ' s final judgment of American political institutions, it illustrated his sense of the relativity of historical and cultural factors. T h e meaning of democratic forms, like the significance of republicanism, varied over a wide range. T h e existence of an energetic labor movement in England in the middle of the century seemed to guarantee t h a t the proposed C h a r t ist r e f o r m s would be used to accomplish radical social ends. T h e democratization of English suffrage would be "a f a r more socialistic measure than anything which has been honored with t h a t name on the Continent." 15 In the absence of strong labor movements, democracy lost much of its importance. 1 0 M a r x combated what he r e g a r d e d as a one-sided emphasis on demands f o r political democracy by the followers of Lassalle in Germany. 1 7 I t was essential, in that country, to supplement democratic r e f o r m s by proletarian organization and activity in the economic field. Again, democratic f o r m s were subject to abuse and corruption, and to exploitation by military and Bonapartist dictatorships. Bonapartism was careful to cloak itself with the toga of democracy. Napoleon I I I h a d "lived in vain" f o r those who looked upon universal suffrage as a panacea. 1 8 U n d e r proper management, popular suffrage h a d proved to be—in France at any r a t e — " t h e best machinery in the world by which to establish a despotism upon a firm and comely basis." 19 Instances were not lacking in France 14

Der Achtzehnte Brumaire . . . p. 30; Sämtliche Werke, V I , 408; Zur der politischen Ökonomie, p. 246. N e w Y o r k Tribune, A u g u s t 25, 1852, p. 6. 10 " V i e r t e r jährlicher Bericht des G e n e r a l r a t h e s der Internationalen Arbeiter-Association," Der Vorbote, September 1868, p. 139. 17 Ausgewählte Briefe, p. 2 0 5 ; Briefwechsel, I I I , 2 3 3 - 3 4 , 2 4 ° l Letters to Dr. Kugelmann, pp. 28, 3 1 . 18 Briefwechsel. I, 3 2 2 ; Ausgewählte Briefe, p. 205. 10 New Y o r k Tribune, A u g u s t 29, 1859, p. 4, Kritik 15

National Differences

92

and the United States, where democratic formalities acquired conservative or "counterrevolutionary" significance.20 The widespread notion that M a r x expected that the victory of socialism would require a violent revolution in all countries is false. There can be no question that he hoped to witness a social upheaval which would sweep over the whole Western world, that he knew a revolutionary wave would involve gigantic, open conflicts, and that he was eager to jump into such a general fray. His objective judgment of the course of social transformation was another matter. As early as 1847 M a r x had recognized the possibility that political developments which were accompanied by violent action in some countries might occur peacefully in others. The socialists "knew only too well," the Communist Journal stated, "that with the possible exceptions of Britain and the United States, we shall not be able to enter our better world unless we have previously and by the exercise of force won our political rights." 2 1 The possible exceptions were made hesitantly, it is true, and they applied only to two states, but these states were among the most important in the West. Twenty-five years later, he drew a similar distinction: Some day the workers must conquer political supremacy, in order to establish the new organization of labor ; they must overthrow the old political system whereby the old institutions were sustained. If they fail to do this, they will suffer the fate of the early Christians, who neglected to overthrow the old system, and who, for that reason, never had a kingdom in this world. Of course, I must not be supposed to imply that the means to this end will be everywhere the same. W e know that special regard must be paid to the institutions, customs and traditions of various lands; and we do not deny that there are certain countries, such as the United States and England, 20

21

Briefwechsel,

III, no. The Communist Manifesto,

Ryazanov, ed.,

p. 291.

National Differences

93

in which the workers may hope to secure their ends by peaceful means. If I mistake not, Holland belongs to the same category. Even so, we have to recognize that in most continental countries, force will have to be the lever of revolution. It is to force that in due time the workers will have to appeal if the dominion of labor is at long last to be established. 22

T h i s simple statement has been subjected to the strain of violent controversy between " r e v o l u t i o n a r y " and "evolutionary" interpreters. T h e fact is t h a t M a r x was neither a "revolutionist" nor an "evolutionist" in the sense that he insisted on any particular m e t h o d in all countries. H e never abandoned the belief t h a t the old states on the continent, encumbered by monarchical, military, aristocratic, and clerical institutions or remnants, must be essentially altered or destroyed. H e thought evolutionary change, whether political or social, possible only in countries where liberal and constitutional regimes were deeply rooted. M a r x did not advocate a u n i f o r m p r o g r a m f o r all nations, even f o r nations passing through the same economic stage. H e undoubtedly would have subscribed to Engels' conclusion f r o m the experience of the radical movement in England, that it was impossible " t o c r a m " a social theory into a large nation, even if it was " t h e best t h e o r y " and one which had been developed out of that nation's own history. 2 3 T h e Manifest assumed the socialization of the means of production as the eventual common goal, but emphasized that the immediate measures f o r advancing toward that goal would "naturally be different in different countries." Its ten-point p r o g r a m was restricted in applicability to the more advanced countries. T h e socialists were to cooperate with various parties and on occasion even with bourgeois groups. In England, the socialists were 22 Steklov, op. cit., pp. 240-41 ; see E n g e l s ' statement in his p r e f a c e to the first English translation of Das Kapital ( C h i c a g o , 1906), I, 32. 23 Sorge, op. cit., p. 323.

94

National Differences

to s u p p o r t the C h a r t i s t s ; in the U n i t e d States, t h e F r e e Soil r e f o r m e r s . T h e y w e r e t o w o r k with the radical republicans of the d a y in F r a n c e . A m o n g the p a r t i e s striving f o r the e m a n c i p a t i o n of P o l a n d , the socialists w e r e to h e l p t h a t p a r t y which f a v o r e d an a g r a r i a n r e v o l u t i o n . T h e y were t o join f o r c e s with t h e bourgeoisie in G e r m a n y , p r o vided t h a t class w a s p r e p a r e d t o e n g a g e in a serious campaign against the old o r d e r . 2 4 T a c t i c s , even m o r e t h a n s t r a t e g y , m u s t v a r y f r o m country t o c o u n t r y . T o give b u t one e x a m p l e — a l t h o u g h concededly an e x t r e m e o n e — M a r x accepted t e r r o r i s m as inevitable u n d e r C z a r i s t conditions a l t h o u g h he always o p p o s e d it in the W e s t . W h e n A l e x a n d e r I I w a s assassin a t e d in 1881, M a r x described t h e t e r r o r i s t s as " t h o r oughly sound men, w i t h o u t m e l o d r a m a t i c pose, simple, objective, h e r o i c . " T h e y did n o t p r e a c h tyrannicide as a " t h e o r y " or " p a n a c e a , " in t h e " s c h o o l b o y " f a s h i o n of certain W e s t e r n a n a r c h i s t s and liberals. T e r r o r i s m " w a s a specifically Russian, historically inevitable m e t h o d of action, a b o u t which t h e r e is as little r e a s o n t o m o r a l i z e — f o r or a g a i n s t — a s t h e r e is a b o u t the e a r t h q u a k e in C h i o s . " 2 5 M a r x ' s view of t h e role of t h e a d v a n c e p a r t y of t h e socialist m o v e m e n t h a r m o n i z e d with his conception of the relation b e t w e e n the n a t i o n a l a n d the i n t e r n a t i o n a l purposes of t h a t m o v e m e n t . A c c o r d i n g t o t h e Manifest, the socialists in each c o u n t r y w e r e t o c o o p e r a t e with existing d e m o c r a t i c and radical f o r c e s in o r d e r to influence t h e m in a socialist d i r e c t i o n ; at the same time, t h r o u g h mutual und e r s t a n d i n g with socialists of o t h e r countries, they w e r e to p r o m o t e i n t e r n a t i o n a l interests. T h e socialists did " n o t f o r m a s e p a r a t e p a r t y o p p o s e d t o o t h e r p a r t i e s of worke r s . " T h e i m m e d i a t e socialist aim w a s " t h e same as t h a t of 24 85

Sämtliche H'crke, VI, 545, 556-57. Ausgewählte Briefe, p. 321 ; Sorge, op. cit., p. 172,

National Differences

95

all other p r o l e t a r i a n p a r t i e s : o r g a n i z a t i o n of the p r o l e t a r iat as a c l a s s ; o v e r t h r o w of the supremacy of the bourgeoisie; conquest of political p o w e r by the p r o l e t a r i a t . " Some of the interests of a national p r o l e t a r i a t concerned it alone, others were p a r t and parcel of the common s t r u g g l e of the international p r o l e t a r i a t against the international bourgeoisie. W o r k i n g class p a r t i e s must f u r t h e r both the special interests of the w o r k e r s in each country and the gene r a l interests of w o r k e r s e v e r y w h e r e . Some p r o l e t a r i a n parties, the Manifest implied, might be especially dedicated to the promotion of g a i n s at home. T h e socialists distinguish themselves by the promotion of the international g o a l of the p r o l e t a r i a t : ". . . on the one hand, in the v a r i o u s national s t r u g g l e s of the p r o l e t a r i a n s , they emphasize and champion the common interests of the prol e t a r i a t as a whole, those interests that a r e independent of n a t i o n a l i t y ; and, on the other hand, in the v a r i o u s phases of development through which the s t r u g g l e between the p r o l e t a r i a t and the bourgeoisie passes, they a l w a y s represent the interests of the movement as a w h o l e . " 2 6 T h e emphasis on international or national action v a r i e d Manifest with circumstances. In the period to which the belongs, it seemed possible to conceive of national and international action being undertaken simultaneously and in an i n t e g r a t e d fashion. T h e activities of the First International, in the sixties, when no g r e a t national r a d i c a l p a r t i e s existed, n a t u r a l l y placed international activity in the foreground. L a t e r , the attacks on the International, the r i f t s within it, and its consequent decline and death in the e a r l y seventies, h a d the effect of shelving, f o r the time being at any rate, any effort to conduct an effective international movement. M o r e o v e r , the unification of G e r m a n y a n d I t a l y and the extension of constitutionalism and popular 26

Sämtliche

Werke,

VI, $37-38.

96

National Differences

suffrage opened new avenues of political progress within national boundaries. A s a result, M a r x became more active in promoting the organization of socialist parties in advanced countries. T h e testament of the International declared: " L e t us give our fellow workers in Europe a little time to strengthen their national affairs and they will surely soon be in a position to remove the barriers between themselves and the working men of other parts of the w o r l d . " -7 T h e objective of the revolution was not national in character. Socialism, like capitalism, must transcend national boundaries. T h e success of the revolution rested on the mutual support of the various labor movements. " P r o letarians of all countries, unite!" was the slogan of the Manifest of 1848, of the constitution of the Communist League of 1 8 5 0 , and of the Inaugural Address of 1864.- 8 T h e cooperation of the workers of different lands was essential to the protection of their economic interests. Such cooperation could prevent, f o r example, the lowering of wages by the importation of cheap foreign labor. ( T h i s was, in fact, one of the reasons f o r the establishment of the First International.- 0 ) Then, no nation could become socialist definitively without regard to the question of whether, and when, the other nations would also become socialist. T h e issue of "socialism in one country" was met in the Grundsätze des Kommunismus, which Engels wrote shortly before he collaborated with M a r x on the Manifest : the socialist revolution would not be merely a national revolution ; it w i l l take place in all civilized countries, that is, at least in England, the United States, France, and 27

Steklov, op. cit., p. 285. Sämtliche H'erie, V I , 5 5 7 ; R y a z a n o v , ed., The Communist p. 340; Steklov, op. cit., p. 445. 29 Steklov, op. cit., pp. 37, 44s. 28

Manifesto,

National Differences

97

G e r m a n y , at one and the same time. I t w i l l develop more rapidly or s l o w l y in each of these countries, according to w h e t h e r this or that c o u n t r y has a more developed industry, greater w e a l t h , or a m o r e considerable quantity of productive forces. T h e revolution w i l l therefore be achieved most s l o w l y and w i t h the greatest difficulty in G e r m a n y , and most quickly and easily in E n g l a n d . I t w i l l also cause a considerable reaction in other countries of the w o r l d , altering completely and hastening considerably their previous course of development.

T h e revolution w a s a " u n i v e r s a l " one and would t h e r e f o r e have " a universal t e r r a i n . " 3 0 T h e language of the Manifest w a s less sweeping than that of the Grundsätze. The prediction of simultaneous revolution was not repeated. I t was simply stated that "united action, at least a m o n g civilized countries, is one of the first conditions f o r the emancip a t i o n " of the p r o l e t a r i a t . 3 1 T h e Grundsätze and the Manifest a g r e e d in r e g a r d i n g concerted efforts by s e v e r a l countries as requisite f o r revolution in the W e s t e r n w o r l d . M a r x chided the French w o r k e r s f o r having imagined, in 1 8 4 8 , that they would be able to carry through a proletarian revolution in F r a n c e while the other nations remained capitalist. T h a t w a s impossible because F r e n c h economy w a s conditioned by foreign trade and the position of F r a n c e in the w o r l d market. T h e " l a w s " of that m a r k e t could not be v i o l a t e d "without a E u r o p e a n revolutionary war, which w o u l d strike b a c k " at E n g l a n d . T h e p r o b l e m of the p r o l e t a r i a t would nowhere be " s o l v e d within the national w a l l s . " A combination of several nations led by a revolutionary E n g l a n d w a s needed.·' 1 - In the sixties and seventies, M a r x became persuaded that a revolution could occur only as a result of a g r e a t w a r in E u r o p e . 3 3 T h e implication w a s that if revolutions occurred in several coun30

31 Sämtliche f f erke, V I , 516. Ibid., p. 543. Die Klassenkämpfe in Frankreich, pp. 46, 1 1 3 . 33 See, f o r example, Sorge, op. cit., pp. 137, 1 5 6 ; Briefwechsel, " B r i e f e an Dr. K u g e l m a n n , " Λ'eue Zeit, XX-, 800. 32

IV, 459;

98

National Differences

tries at once, they would reinforce each other and sever the international conservative bonds that checked the radical forces. It w a s inconceivable that if a single country in the W e s t were to establish socialism, the others would stand by with f o l d e d arms. B e f o r e 1 8 4 8 , M a r x had developed a pattern of the probable course of the E u r o p e a n revolution. T h i s might break out in France, but its real seat of action would be E n g l a n d , which, being the most advanced industrial country and having the most politically conscious proletariat, would be the first to set up a socialist system. Other countries would then f o l l o w suit. T h e f a i l u r e of the Revolution of 1 8 4 8 , the absence of E n g l a n d f r o m the revolutionary ranks, and subsequent developments, however, destroyed this pattern. M a r x now pinned his hopes f o r revolutionary initiative and leadership on other countries, depending on the general conditions existing at any given moment. Russia and F r a n c e figured prominently, but not exclusively or consistently, as likely stimuli of a E u r o p e a n transformation. M a r x no longer assumed that political tensions would rise with economic development or that the most advanced countries would give the first examples of revolutionary change. T h e revolution of non-European areas belonged to the more distant future. B u t what if E u r o p e , and perhaps the whole W e s t e r n w o r l d established socialism, while Asia— to mention but one other principal area of the globe—was still capitalist or was introducing capitalism? T h e two systems must surely f a c e each other as irreconcilable enemies. W o u l d a socialist E u r o p e be likely to prevail in a frontal conflict with a capitalist A s i a ? M a r x pondered the issue in a letter to E n g e l s in 1 8 5 7 . A f t e r remarking on the revival of international trade f o l l o w i n g the crisis of that year, he went on to say :

National Differences

99

We cannot deny that bourgeois society has lived to see its sixteenth century a second time—a sixteenth century which I hope will sound its death knell just as the first one thrust it into existence. The real task of bourgeois society is the establishment of the world market, at least in its outlines, and of production based upon the world market. Since the world is round, this seems to have been brought to a close by the colonization of California and Australia and the opening up of China and Japan. T h e knotty question for us is this : on the Continent the revolution is imminent and will also immediately assume a socialist character. W i l l it not necessarily be crushed in this little corner because the movement of bourgeois society is still in the ascendancy in a much greater territory ? 34 One w o n d e r s w h e t h e r M a r x w a s d i s t u r b e d a g a i n by this eventuality. L o o k i n g back, it is clear t h a t his f e a r s , n o less than his h o p e s , w e r e p r e m a t u r e . T h e b o u r g e o i s i e o f E u rope so s t r e n g t h e n e d itself in the subsequent d e c a d e s ( a t least partly t h r o u g h the i n c r e a s e d e x p l o i t a t i o n o f A s i a a n d Africa) t h a t it w a s able t o a d j o u r n t h e e x p e c t e d socialist revolution. T h e sanguine r e v o l u t i o n i s t quite characteristically o v e r e s t i m a t e d the pace o f capitalist a d v a n c e in A s i a . Yet, his f a i t h w a s g r o u n d e d in m o r e t h a n a j u d g m e n t of the tempo of c h a n g e . T h e t e n d e n c y to socialism, he b e l i e v e d , would be as inherent in A s i a t i c as in E u r o p e a n c a p i t a l i s m . Any bourgeoisie could be trusted, in t h e lively p h r a s e o f the Manifest, t o p r o d u c e its o w n g r a v e d i g g e r s . 3 5 34

Briefwechsel,

II, 342.

35

Sämtliche

Werke,

VI, 537.

9 E N G L A N D : T H E H E A R T OF CAPITALISM . A s THE s t a r t i n g point and principal locale of industrial capitalism, E n g l a n d held a unique position in the world of M a r x . I t was the h o m e of the most p o w e r f u l bourgeoisie and the largest p r o l e t a r i a t . I t s dominion over the commercial and industrial scene of the middle of the nineteenth century was unchallenged. A s the sensitive and powerful nerve center of the business cycle, it was the first to show the effects of p r o s p e r i t y and crisis. " T h e initial [economic] process always takes place in E n g l a n d ; she is the demiurge of the bourgeois cosmos." 1 T h e eminence of E n g l a n d was based on a long historical development. I n the seventeenth ceijtury, H o l l a n d had been the " m o d e l c o u n t r y " of commercial capitalism. Her place was soon taken by h e r rival across the Channel, who t r a n s f o r m e d commercial into industrial capitalism earlier and m o r e t h o r o u g h l y t h a n any o t h e r nation. 2 In the terminology of M a r x , the m o d e r n economic history of England h a d been "classical," which m e a n t t h a t it h a d proceeded in a m a n n e r expressing and illustrating most clearly and directly the chief elements and the inner meaning of the course of capitalism : the p r i m a r y accumulation of capital 1 2

Die Klassenkämpfe in Frankreich, p. 133. Das Kapital, I, 716-17, 719; III 2 , 141-42; Theorien

über den

Mehrwert,

III, 586-87, 591. On the capitalist priority of Italy, see Das Kapital, I, 682η.; III 2 , 141.

England and Capitalism

ιοί

in various ways at h o m e and a b r o a d ; the creation of a l a r g e class of w a g e e a r n e r s without land or o t h e r p r o p e r t y ; and, finally, the introduction of the industrialized m e a n s of production on a l a r g e scale and under capitalist control. England seemed a veritable l a b o r a t o r y w h e r e the moving forces of capitalism h a d been isolated and laid b a r e f o r alito see. T h a t was why M a r x d r e w so largely f r o m E n g lish history f o r the m a t e r i a l and illustrations in Das Kapital. " T h e physicist," he explained in the p r e f a c e t o the first edition, " e i t h e r observes n a t u r a l p h e n o m e n a w h e r e they occur in the most p r e g n a n t f o r m s and are least obscured by disturbing influences; or, w h e r e v e r possible, he p e r f o r m s experiments u n d e r conditions which assure the occurrence of the phenomenon in its pure f o r m . " T h e last expedient was obviously not open to the social scientist. In o r d e r to investigate the n a t u r e of capitalist m e t h o d s of production and exchange, he h a d to t u r n to the country which h a d been their "classical g r o u n d . " T h e history of the expropriation of the agricultural p r o d u c e r s f r o m the soil, f o r example, assumed different aspects in different countries and the steps in t h a t process followed one a n o t h e r in varying sequences. I t was only in E n g l a n d t h a t expropriation showed the "classical" succession of stages. 3 Only t h e r e did capitalistic landed p r o p e r t y develop " a d e q u a t e l y . " 4 A g r a r i a n life and w o r k w e r e mercilessly s u b o r d i n a t e d to the conditions of capitalist exploitation. T h e p r o f u n d i t y and effect of that t r a n s f o r m a t i o n m a d e E n g l a n d " t h e most revolutionary country in the w o r l d . " T h e r u r a l masses were uprooted f r o m the soil, villages were r a z e d , f a r m buildings destroyed, and the land p u t to new uses—in short, the traditional society was completely subverted and the "conditions of p r o d u c t i o n " w e r e "so s h a p e d historically as t o 3 4

Das Kapital, I, vi, 682 ; note also Theorien Theorien über den Mehrwert, I I 2 , 7.

über den Mehrwert,

I I 2 , 7.

I02

England and Capitalism

p e r m i t the most f a v o r a b l e investment of capital." 5 The result was t h a t " g r e a t masses of people were suddenly and forcibly t o r n away f r o m their means of subsistence, and hurled on the l a b o r m a r k e t as ' f r e e ' p r o l e t a r i a n s . " 0 Finally, it was E n g l a n d t h a t combined systematically the various " f a c t o r s of p r i m a r y accumulation" in " t h e colonial system, the national debt system, the m o d e r n system of taxation, and the m o d e r n system of p r o d u c t i o n . " 7 By t r a n s f o r m i n g the m e t h o d of production, the English had taken the step which M a r x r e g a r d e d as the greatest contribution and function of capitalism. F r a n c e , through her g r e a t Revolution, h a d given i m p o r t a n t ideas to mankind, but, as Engels r e m a r k e d , the steam engine and the railroad w e r e " w o r t h a g o o d many ideas." 8 T h e development of capitalism was etched into the t h o u g h t and speech of E n g l a n d and the character of her business men. E n g l i s h economic t h e o r y contributed the most disciplined analysis of capitalism. T h e sound appraisal of the importance of m o d e r n finance by the early English economists reflected the development of money economy in their country. 8 Robinson Crusoe, with his predilection f o r the commercial virtues of o r d e r and calculation seemed to M a r x the typical bourgeois. Daniel Defoe's h e r o saved "watch, ledger, pen, and ink f r o m the wreck" and, like "a g o o d E n g l i s h m a n , " proceeded to keep a set of books. H e t o o k inventory of his u s e f u l possessions, noted the various o p e r a t i o n s required f o r their production, and entered the a v e r a g e l a b o r time which given quantities of these g o o d s consumed. C r u s o e liked to p r a y as a sort of 5

Ibid., pp. 6 - 7 ; see also Sämtliche Werke, VI, 217. Das Kapital, I, 682. 7 Ibid., p. 716. 8 Sämtliche Werke, VI, 366; see also Correspondence, p. 90. 9 Zur Kritik der politischen Ökonomie, pp. 3 9 ® . ; Theorien über den Mehrwert, I, 4 1 - 4 2 ; " C a r e y und Bastiat," Neue Zeit, X X I I 2 , 7-8. 0

England and Capitalism "recreation."

10

103

B u t t h e m e r c a n t i l e qualities which m a d e

men competent b o o k k e e p e r s m i g h t mislead t h e m into taking the m e a s u r e o f all things by t h e i r m e a s u r e m e n t . I t w a s in this spirit t h a t M a r x criticized the utilitarian B e n t h a m as " a purely E n g l i s h

"archphilistine" phenomenon."

No other country could h a v e produced t h a t " g e n i u s in the way of b o u r g e o i s s t u p i d i t y , " o r a m o r a l i z i n g

poetaster

like M a r t i n T u p p e r — a highly d o u b t f u l g e n e r a l i z a t i o n . 1 1 T h e special experiences o f enclosures and industrialization had given rise t o a s t a r k idiom. M a r x was f o n d o f pointing out t h a t

certain

expressions could h a v e

been

coined only in E n g l a n d . E n g l i s h m e n could not fail t o observe that the u p r o o t i n g o f the small f a r m e r s f r o m the soil had been n o t h i n g but a " c l e a r i n g o f e s t a t e s . " T h i s p h r a s e was not in use on the C o n t i n e n t because the process h a d nowhere been c a r r i e d t h r o u g h so directly and brutally. N o r could the E n g l i s h avoid r e m a r k i n g t h a t h o m e w o r k f o r low wages was, quite visibly, a " s w e a t i n g s y s t e m . " L o w - p a i d labor was called " c h e a p l a b o r , " an a r r e s t i n g c o m b i n a t i o n of adjective and noun. A s soon as the class o f w a g e e a r n e r s grew to noticeable p r o p o r t i o n s , t h e expression " l a b o r i n g poor" m a d e its a p p e a r a n c e in p a r l i a m e n t a r y law. M a r x observed t h a t the " t e c h n i c a l t e r m " f o r the

agricultural

laborer in E n g l i s h political economy was " w r e t c h " ! E n gels, t h r o u g h w h o m

M a r x received m o s t o f his

early

impressions o f E n g l a n d , was struck by the f a c t t h a t business men called the w o r k e r s " h a n d s " t o t h e i r faces, and were wont to say t h a t a man was " w o r t h " as much as he owned and t o r e f e r to the w e a l t h y as " r e s p e c t a b l e , " assigning them to a new species : " t h e b e t t e r s o r t o f p e o p l e . " T h e supremacy o f the b o u r g e o i s and " t h e spirit o f h u c k s t e r i n g " Das Kapital, I, 43. Ibid., pp. 573-74«. On the "periodical fits of morality" of the British public, see N e w Y o r k Tribune, August 12, 1853, p. 5. 10

11

104

England and Capitalism

p e n e t r a t e d the language. 1 2 Commercial calculation, after much a d d i n g and subtracting, ended by extracting the r o o t s of m a n y h u m a n values. E n g l a n d c o n f o r m e d m o r e closely to the economic than to the political p a t t e r n s of M a r x , especially his earlier political p a t t e r n s . H e r political institutions h a d followed a p a t h distinctly less "classical" t h a n did her economic movements. W e have seen t h a t he held p a r l i a m e n t a r y republicanism the most suitable f o r m of g o v e r n m e n t f o r the rule of the bourgeoisie. Y e t the most advanced bourgeois nation in the world, while it h a d a distinguished history of liberalism, retained not only the m o n a r c h y but also some of the old aristocratic and clerical institutions. Marx's early conception of centralization was m o r e applicable to continental states, notably France, t h a n to this island k i n g d o m . E n g l a n d was m o r e capitalistic t h a n France but a good deal less centralized politically and administratively. T h i s means, as we have observed, t h a t the conventional view of the M a r x i s t correlation between economic and political f o r m s is n o t tenable. In substance, however, the English constitution gave expression to capitalist interests. W i t h "shameless egoism," P a r l i a m e n t h a d played the role of a "permanent trades-union of the capitalists directed against the worke r s . " 13 M a r x did not share the c o n t e m p o r a r y admiration of English institutions, a l t h o u g h he sometimes acknowledged their value. A s a body, P a r l i a m e n t could hardly be said to have been endowed with "genius," and the H o u s e of C o m m o n s occasionally exhibited " p r o f o u n d ign o r a n c e . " 14 T h e cabinet system offered opportunities for 12 Theorien über den Mehrwert, II 2 , 6-7; Das Kapital, I, 358, 427, 516, 725Π.; Sämtliche Werke, IV, 262. 13 Das Kapital, I, 707. 14 Ibid., p. 442; New York Tribune, August 14, 1857, p. 5; February 14, i860, p. 6; August n , i860, p. 5.

England and Capitalism

105

irresponsible action by incompetent or unscrupulous politicians. 15 Despite constitutional guarantees, dictatorial and illiberal measures were hardly unknown. 1 8 Parliamentary corruption was still rife as late as the middle of the nineteenth century. 1 7 M a r x did not attach much significance to the " f e u d a l " forms of the "aristocratico-constitutional" system of England, although he once predicted greater progress f o r her when she had "cast off that medieval crust which now clogs and impedes her action." H e wondered whether the people were ready f o r a fundamental change and whether it would not require "some great disaster" to bring it about. 1 8 England had purchased commercial and industrial success at enormous social cost. T h e birth of large-scale industry was celebrated by the impressment and kidnapping of young people, a Herodian massacre of innocent creatures. H e r investments abroad represented " t h e capitalized blood of children." 1 9 T h e laws against strikes and trade-unions were repealed reluctantly and "only under the pressure of the masses." 2 0 Legislative improvement was apt to be narrow, partial, mincing. A legal step f o r w a r d was frequently balanced by a practical step backward. 2 1 M a r x appeared to think that one of the reasons f o r the stinting character of English r e f o r m was the failure of the Revolution of 1 7 8 9 to spread to the north. H e was impressed by the superiority of the more direct "revolution15

New York Tribune, February 14, 1860, p. 6. Ibid., March 31, 1857, p. 6; April 6, 1857, p. 5. 17 Ibid., November 4, 1859, p. 6. 18 Ibid., October 25, 1851, p. 6; June 22, 1853, p. 5. See also Briefwechsel, I, 3 1 2 ; New York Tribune, June 27, 1855, p. 4. On the relation between the middle classes and the "oligarchs," see ibid., March 9, 1857, p. 6; April 17, 1857, p. 7. 19 Das Kapital, I, 721, 722-23. 20 Ibid., p. 707; see also pp. 374-75. 21 Ibid., pp. 246, 374-75, 459-60; New York Tribune, April 22, 1857, p. 6 ; March 15, 1859, p. 6; March 24, 1859, p. 6. 16

io6

England and Capitalism

ary m e t h o d " of legislation. T h e French Legislature had established the same working day f o r all shops and factories, whereas Parliament "yields reluctantly to the pressure of circumstances, now on this point, and now on that, and loses its way in a bewildering maze of contradictory enactments." W h a t French law proclaimed as a general principle was won in England piecemeal in the name of children, minors, and women, and only later claimed as " a general right." -- " A true r e f o r m in the old English sense of the w o r d " was one which "neither creates anything new, nor abolishes anything old." R a t h e r , "it aims at conserving the old system by giving it a more reasonable f o r m and teaching it, so to say, new manners. T h i s is the mystery of the 'hereditary wisdom' of the English oligarchical legislation. It simply consists in making abuses hereditary, by refreshing them, as it were, f r o m time to time, by an infusion of new blood." 2 3 T h e struggle between the two old political parties was largely shadow-boxing. 2 4 Each party consisted of a combination of several interests and was essentially capitalistic. T h e W h i g s , who originally stood f o r " t h e oldest, richest, most a r r o g a n t p o r t i o n " of the landed aristocracy, had f o r m e d a strong alliance with the "bankocracy" and later with the "millocracy" of the nineteenth century. 2 3 T h e Tories represented the landed classes and certain commercial groups. 2 6 M a r x did not take seriously the reformism of the W h i g s or the nationalism of the Tories. H e regarded W h i g opposition to political corruption as being due to the sense of power of the industrial middle class and to its desire to avoid the expensive maneuvers of bought elections. It was cheaper " t o compete with the landed aris22 23 24 25

Das Kapital, I, 264; see also Briefwechsel, III, 319. New York Tribune, April 27, 1853, P· 5· Ibid., F e b r u a r y 21, 185+, p. 6 ; April 22, 1857, p. 6 ; M a r c h 15, 1858, p. 4. 20 Ibid., August 2i, 1852, p. 6. Loc. cit.

England and Capitalism

107

tocracy by general m o r a l , than by p e r s o n a l pecuniary m e a n s . " 2 7 A l t h o u g h the T o r i e s m a d e much of their attachment to the m o n a r c h y , the state church, and " t h e beauties of the old E n g l i s h constitution," they w e r e in f a c t as much d e v o t e d to profit as their antagonists. 2 8 It is h a r d l y necessary to add that M a r x r e g a r d e d " T o r y r a d i c a l i s m " with the g r a v e s t suspicion. 2 9 M a r x felt that the issue between bourgeoisie and prolet a r i a t must, in the final analysis, be settled in E n g l a n d . T h i s country w a s so p o w e r f u l economically that, if it became socialist, the other countries w o u l d take the same step ; at least they w o u l d be too w e a k to oppose the change. I f E n g l a n d did not become socialist first and did not f o l l o w an example of socialization elsewhere, it w o u l d be in a position to t h w a r t the success of the new o r d e r . E n g l i s h economic supremacy, which w a s the basis f o r this view, h a d not yet been challenged by G e r m a n y and the U n i t e d States, not to mention more recent rivals. W h i l e industrial capitalism would not fulfill itself completely until it had s p r e a d f r o m E n g l a n d to the other l a r g e nations, it w o u l d not be definitively undermined a n y w h e r e unless it w e r e also undermined in its original and strongest center. T h e course of E n g l i s h l a b o r w a s t h e r e f o r e of enormous concern to M a r x . In the f o r t i e s , when his principal economic and political ideas became crystallized, C h a r t i s m stood out as the most promising p o p u l a r movement in the w o r l d . M a r x then looked upon the E n g l i s h w o r k e r s as a revolutionary class w h o s e victory w o u l d propel f o r w a r d the movements of exploited groups e v e r y w h e r e . In 1 8 4 7 , in a speech in L o n d o n on the Polish question, he urged that -'Ibid., September 4, 1852, p. 6. On the f a m o u s R e f o r m Bill of 1832, see ibid., August 28, 1855, p. 5. -8 Der Achtzehnte Brumaire . . . p. 49 ; see also N e w Y o r k Tribune, August 2 1 , 1852, p. 6. -0 Siimtliche Werke, V I , 5 4 7 ; Das Kapital, I, 2 1 7 η .

io8

England and Capitalism

the emancipation of smaller nations depended on the emancipation of E n g l a n d : No small country so backward economically as Poland can free itself by its own efforts. Its freedom depends on the emancipation of the civilized countries. T h e most civilized land, the land whose industry is the most developed, whose bourgeoisie is the most powerful, where the proletariat and the bourgeoisie are divided in the sharpest fashion and stand most decisively opposed to one another, will be the first to witness the emancipation of the workers of all the lands. T h a t land is England, and therefore the emancipation of the Poles will be achieved not in their own country, but in England. A n o t h e r report of the speech quoted M a r x as having s a i d : T h e victory of the English proletarians over the English bourgeoisie is . . . decisive for the victory of all oppressed people over their oppressors . . . You Chartists need not express pious hopes for the emancipation of nationalities. Defeat your own internal enemies and you may then have the proud consciousness of having defeated the whole old society.30 A m o n g the disappointments which the Revolution of 1 8 4 8 brought to M a r x , the failure of E n g l a n d to share in the general overturn of governments w a s conspicuous. F r a n c e revolted, and so did many G e r m a n and Italian states. In E n g l a n d , instead of a revolution, there w a s a huge march on P a r l i a m e n t with a petition f o r the six points of the Chartist p r o g r a m of democratic political r e f o r m . T h e country w a s " s h a k e n , " but no m o r e . 3 1 Bourgeois E n g land became the rock on which the counterrevolution built its " c h u r c h . " 3 2 In the period of business recovery which began in 1 8 4 9 - 5 0 , the prospects of radicalism became still less bright. Only an economic depression would create another critical situation in E u r o p e but M a r x was confident 30

Sämtliche Werke, VI, 359-60. Die Klassenkämpfe in Frankreich, p. 4 9 ; Nachlass, III, 177-78. 32 S'achlass, I I I , 105; New York Tribune, July 27, 1857, p. 5; June 24, 1858, p. 4. 31

England and Capitalism

109

that the revolution w a s " j u s t as c e r t a i n " as another decline in the business curve. H o w e v e r , his picture of the role of E n g l a n d in a f u t u r e r e v o l u t i o n a r y period underwent a decided change. H e beg a n to realize that it w o u l d p r o v e m o r e difficult to assault capitalism in its center than in the p e r i p h e r y . H e still insisted that the economic " f o u n d a t i o n " of continental revolutions w a s " a l w a y s " laid in E n g l a n d , but now a r g u e d that " v i o l e n t o u t b r e a k s " should be expected to occur earlier in continental countries, which f o r m e d " t h e extremities of the bourgeois b o d y , " than in its E n g l i s h " h e a r t , " w h e r e the possibility of capitalistic readjustment w a s g r e a t e r . T h e social seriousness of continental revolutions, as distinguished f r o m the political, could be j u d g e d by the measure of the reaction upon E n g l a n d . 3 3 T h e most a d v a n c e d country w o u l d be the terminal r a t h e r than the starting point of the socialist t r a n s f o r m a t i o n . M a r x ' s f a i t h in the C h a r t i s t movement died v e r y h a r d . It w a s only g r a d u a l l y that the events of the later fifties and the sixties caused him to m o d e r a t e his sanguine opinion of its r e v o l u t i o n a r y v a l u e . In 1 8 5 2 , he spoke of " t h e knowledge acquired by some p o p u l a r leaders that the people are too indolent to create, f o r the moment, a m o v e m e n t of their own. . . . T h e mass of the C h a r t i s t s , too, are at the present moment absorbed by m a t e r i a l p r o d u c t i o n . " T h e decline a p p e a r e d to be t e m p o r a r y . " O n all points, the nucleus of the p a r t y is r e o r g a n i z e d , and the communications reestablished, in E n g l a n d as well as in Scotland, and in the event of a commercial and political crisis, the importance of the present noiseless activity at the h e a d q u a r t e r s of C h a r t i s m will be f e l t all o v e r G r e a t B r i t a i n . " 3 4 H e 33 Die Klassenkampf e in Frankreich, p. 1 3 4 ; New Y o r k Tribune, September 6, i860, p. 7. 34 N e w Y o r k Tribune, November 25, 1852, p. 6 ; but see Briefwechsel, III, 316-17.

no

England and Capitalism

could still believe that a w o r l d w a r would bring the E n g l i s h p r o l e t a r i a t to p o w e r . 3 5 A popular demonstration in H y d e P a r k in 1 8 5 5 impressed him as "quite r e v o l u t i o n a r y . " 3 0 It seemed natural to assume that the "first-born sons of modern industry" would not be " t h e last to aid the social revolution produced by that i n d u s t r y . " 3 7 T h e expected commercial crisis occurred in 1 8 5 7 but its revolutionary effect w a s nil. 3 8 M a r x and E n g e l s w e r e surprised by the brevity of the crisis and the speedy r e c o v e r y which f o l l o w e d it. B o u r g e o i s society, M a r x was m o v e d to write, was experiencing a high tide comparable to that of the sixteenth century. T h e r e was no sign of revolutionary activity in E n g l a n d , or indeed anywhere else in the W e s t ern w o r l d . T h e only consolation was the stirring of r e f o r m in Russia. 3 0 T h e two socialists exchanged increasingly g l o o m y opinions of the prospects of the E n g l i s h l a b o r movement and especially of the quality of its leaders, some of w h o m had begun to advocate collaboration with bourgeois radicals. M a r x broke relations with E r n e s t J o n e s , the C h a r t i s t leader, on that score. 4 0 H e agreed with E n g e l s that both the w o r k e r s and their chiefs had become infected with bourgeois tendencies. E n g e l s r e m a r k e d that the proletarian movement " i n its old traditional C h a r t i s t f o r m must perish completely b e f o r e it can develop into a new vital f o r m . " It w a s difficult to foretell the new f o r m . T h e attempts at alliance with bourgeois radicals showed that " t h e English p r o l e t a r i a t is actually becoming more and more bourgeois, so that this most bourgeois of all nations is apparently aiming ultimately at the possession of a bour35

Die Klassenkämpfe in Frankreich, p. 1 1 3 . Briefwechsel, II, 9 1 ; " E i n e Massenaktion im J a h r e 1 8 5 5 , " Neue Zeit, X X X I ' , 10. 37 Correspondence, p. 9 1 . 38 On expectations of revolution, see Briefwechsel, II, 201, 207, 237, 242, 3 4 1 - 4 2 ; N e w Y o r k Tribune, J u l y 27, 1857, p. 4. 38 40 Briefwechsel, I I , 275, 3 1 7 . Ibid., II, 247.

England and Capitalism

m

geois aristocracy and a bourgeois proletariat as well as a bourgeoisie." " F o r a nation which exploits the w h o l e w o r l d , " he concluded, "this is, of course, to a certain extent justified." T h e revival of the proletarian movement would depend on the collapse of the economic supremacy of the country. " T h e only thing that would help here would be a f e w thoroughly bad years and these seem no longer so easy to come by since the gold discoveries [ 1 8 4 9 ] . " 4 1 D u r i n g the American Civil W a r , M a r x strove to rally the English workers to the support of the N o r t h . H e felt that they had not been reacting sufficiently to the economic crisis of 1862-63. 4 U T h e more enthusiastic support of the N o r t h e r n cause which became evident in 1863 cheered him considerably. It was in that year that Engels observed that " a l l revolutionary energy has evaporated pretty completely f r o m the English proletariat and the English proletarian is declaring his complete agreement to the rule of the bourgeoisie." 43 T h e following year, in the Inaugural A d d r e s s of the First International, M a r x pointed to the factors which, since 1848, had conspired to reduce English labor to " a state of political nullity" : the emigration of " t h e most advanced" workers to America and A u s t r a l i a , the destruction of the confidence of the ruling classes a f t e r the defeat of the Revolution, and the " t e m p o r a r y bribe of greater w o r k and w a g e s . " 44 T h e course of the English movement had become uncertain and unclear to him. 43 D u r i n g the great demonstrations for popular suffrage in 1866, the workers nearly came to blows with authority. Englishmen seemed to be definitely in need of a "revolutionary education" : " . . . these thickheaded John Bulls, whose skulls seem to have been manufactured especially f o r the constables' bludgeons, will « Ibid., II, 340. ^Ibid., III, m . 4 4 Steklov, op. cit., pp. 442-43.

1 3 Ibid., "Briefwechsel,

I I I , 135. I I I , 138.

112

England and Capitalism

never get anywhere without a really bloody encounter with the r u l e r s . " 46 M a r x l a t e r p r o p o s e d the injection of a dose of radicalism f r o m without. T h e F i r s t International, whose principal l e a d e r he w a s , seemed to be the logical body to administer the injection. T h e International must intensify its efforts to direct and influence the w o r k e r s t o w a r d a more a g g r e s s i v e policy. Special attention must be paid to E n g l a n d as " t h e metropolis of c a p i t a l i s m . " It w a s " t h e only country w h e r e there are no more peasants and where landed p r o p e r t y is concentrated in a f e w h a n d s " ; " w h e r e the capitalist form—that is, combined labor on a l a r g e scale under capitalist e n t r e p r e n e u r s — h a s conquered nearly the w h o l e of p r o d u c t i o n " ; "where the great majority of the population consists of wage workers" ; and finally, w h e r e " t h e class struggle and the organization of the w o r k i n g class t h r o u g h the trade-unions has acquired a certain d e g r e e of m a t u r i t y and u n i v e r s a l i t y . " Domination of the w o r l d m a r k e t h a d made E n g l a n d " t h e only country where revolution in its economic conditions must react immediately on the entire w o r l d . " In short, only E n g l a n d could s e r v e as " t h e lever of a serious economic r e v o l u t i o n . " W i t h native labor and radicalism g r o w n so " b o u r g e o i s , " it w o u l d be " f o o l i s h , " even "crimin a l , " to allow that l e v e r to f a l l exclusively into E n g l i s h hands. A l t h o u g h they h a d " a l l the necessary material prerequisites f o r the social r e v o l u t i o n , " the E n g l i s h l a c k e d " t h e spirit of generalization and the revolutionary passion." B y supplying that deficiency, the International w o u l d accelerate " a truly r e v o l u t i o n a r y movement in this country and consequently e v e r y w h e r e . " 4 7 I f E n g l a n d was still the lever of the revolution, the only fulcrum visible at the moment w a s Ireland. T h e antago46 47

Ibid., pp. 3 5 1 - 5 2 . " B r i e f e an D r . K u g e l m a n n , " Λ'eue Zeit,

XX-,

476-77.

England and Capitalism

113

nism t o w a r d the Irish n e u t r a l i z e d the class struggle in E n g l a n d ; " e v e r y industrial and commercial center . . . now possesses a w o r k i n g class population split into t w o hostile camps, E n g l i s h p r o l e t a r i a n s and Irish p r o l e t a r i a n s . " L a n d lordism and capitalism w e r e s t r o n g e r in E n g l a n d because of the wealth and p o w e r they d r e w f r o m Ireland, where, h o w e v e r , they were m o r e vulnerable to attack. Ireland p r o v i d e d the E n g l i s h g o v e r n m e n t with the " o n l y pretext f o r maintaining a l a r g e permanent a r m y which can be launched, if necessary, against the E n g l i s h w o r k e r s . . . T h e E n g l i s h w o r k e r s must t h e r e f o r e be m a d e a w a r e that the emancipation of the smaller island w a s " n o t a question of abstract justice o r humanitarian s y m p a t h y , but the first 48 condition of their own emancipation." I f M a r x ' s diagnosis w a s correct, the immediate future of E n g l i s h radicalism w a s indeed unpredictable. F o l l o w ing the F r a n c o - P r u s s i a n W a r and the controversy over the P a r i s Commune, the influence of the International declined s h a r p l y e v e r y w h e r e , and especially in E n g l a n d . In 1 8 7 2 the o r g a n i z a t i o n w a s split o v e r the issue of M a r x i s m versus Bakuninism and its seat w a s t r a n s f e r r e d to the U n i t e d States. T h e r e it expired almost at once, and with it expired the plan of energizing E n g l i s h labor f r o m without. T h e case of radicalism w a s even m o r e critical if it hinged on Irish f r e e d o m — w h i c h did not become a f a c t until a f t e r the W o r l d W a r . Plainly the social m o v e m e n t of E n g l a n d presented v e r y difficult problems to M a r x . H e g r e w more pessimistic with the passing y e a r s . T h e prospects of labor a p p e a r e d to be dark unless it rid itself of its leaders. H e was somewhat encouraged by the renewed movement of agricultural laborers. 4 9 W i t h that possible exception, the 48

Ibid., pp. 4 7 7 - 7 8 ; Ausgewählte Briefe, pp. 236-37. " B r i e f e an Dr. K u g e l m a n n , " Neue Zeit, X X - , 800; Steklov, op. p. 424.

cit.,

IH

England and Capitalism

" d e e p l y d e m o r a l i z e d " l a b o r m o v e m e n t , headed by " c o r rupt trade-union l e a d e r s and p r o f e s s i o n a l a g i t a t o r s , " h a d become the tail of the L i b e r a l party. r , ° T h e country which h a d justified, indeed had largely inspired the economic theories of M a r x , w a s p r o v i n g a severe testing g r o u n d of his political ideas and hopes. 60

Correspondence,

pp. 3 5 5 - 5 6 ; Sorge, op. cit., pp. 1 3 6 - 3 7 .

I O

F R A N C E : T H E SPIRIT OF REVOLUTION A LTHOUGH she w a s c o n s i d e r a b l y less d e v e l o p e d econ o m i c a l l y than E n g l a n d , F r a n c e seemed to M a r x politically f a r m o r e sensitive and ebullient. Since the eighteenth century she h a d p r o v i d e d r e v o l u t i o n a r y l e a d e r s h i p at crucial m o m e n t s in E u r o p e w i t h astonishing r e g u l a r i t y . I f M a r x a p p e a l e d to the experience of E n g l a n d in o r d e r to j u s t i f y his t h e o r y of the d e v e l o p m e n t of c a p i t a l i s m , he w a s w o n t to turn to the h i s t o r y of F r a n c e to illustrate his v i e w s on the g r o w t h of the m o d e r n state m a c h i n e r y , the political f o r m s of the class s t r u g g l e , a n d the tactics of r e v o l u t i o n . E n g e l s r e m a r k e d that in the Manifest E n g l a n d h a d been t a k e n as " t h e m o d e l c o u n t r y " of the economic d e v e l o p ment of the b o u r g e o i s i e a n d F r a n c e as the c l e a r e s t p r o t o type of its political d e v e l o p m e n t , 1 a n d this w a s true of o t h e r w o r k s as w e l l . H e once r e f e r r e d t o F r a n c e as the " c e n t e r of f e u d a l i s m in the m i d d l e a g e s , " and the " m o d e l c o u n t r y " of the u n i t a r y m o n a r c h y of e a r l y m o d e r n times. 2 B o t h men r e g a r d e d the R e v o l u t i o n of 1 7 8 9 as the " c l a s s i c a l " political event p a r excellence, the p a t t e r n of a bourg e o i s r e v o l u t i o n a n d in s o m e respects the p a t t e r n of any g r e a t political u p h e a v a l . T h e economic decline of the O l d R e g i m e h a d f o u n d a suitable c l i m a x in the abolition of the 1 2

Sämtliche Werke, VI, 527η. Der Achtzehnte Brumaire . . . pp. 1 5 - 1 6 .

nò

France and Revolution

p r i v i l e g e s and p o w e r o f the a r i s t o c r a c y , the monarchy, and the church. W h i l e the b o u r g e o i s i e rose to the position of a n a t i o n a l class, F r a n c e fulfilled the role of a l e a d i n g nation by c a r r y i n g the r e v o l u t i o n a r y r e f o r m s b e y o n d her own b o r d e r s . H a v i n g disposed of the past, she proceeded to announce the f u t u r e . T h e b o u r g e o i s r e v o l u t i o n had not y e t run its course w h e n the p r o l e t a r i a n successor made its first f o r m a l a p p e a r a n c e in the conspiracy of B a b e u f . 3 T h e b o u r g e o i s i e and the masses in F r a n c e seemed to M a r x to h a v e acted in the r e v o l u t i o n a r y age w i t h a sense o f political fitness and responsibility. T h e leaders of the earlier phases of the R e v o l u t i o n d e s t r o y e d the institutions of f e u d a l i s m . T h e n N a p o l e o n I f a s h i o n e d " t h e conditions under which, alone, f r e e competition could be developed, the d i v i d e d p r o p e r t y exploited, and the unchained industrial p r o d u c t i v e f o r c e of the nation u t i l i z e d . " In order to p r o v i d e the b o u r g e o i s o r d e r w i t h a p r o p e r environment on the C o n t i n e n t , the E m p e r o r s w e p t a w a y the f e u d a l institutions o f o t h e r countries as w e l l . T h e " h e r o e s , " political parties, and the masses h a d accomplished " t h e task of their t i m e — t h e e m a n c i p a t i o n and establishment of a modern b o u r g e o i s s o c i e t y . "

4

Since 1 7 8 9 , r e v o l u t i o n h a d become an a l m o s t normal m e t h o d of political c h a n g e in F r a n c e . H e r frequent transf o r m a t i o n s induced s y m p a t h e t i c

repercussions

in other

countries. T o the g e n e r a t i o n of M a r x , F r a n c e represented the m o s t f o r c e f u l p r o p e l l e r of E u r o p e a n r e f o r m . Francophilia b e c a m e s y n o n y m o u s w i t h p r o g r e s s i v i s m and liberalism, and F r a n c o p h o b i a w i t h c o n s e r v a t i s m . In 1830, when M a r x w a s t w e l v e y e a r s old, F r a n c e o v e r t h r e w the recently r e s t o r e d B o u r b o n d y n a s t y and struck the first considerable b l o w at the r e a c t i o n a r y r e g i m e s o f the M e t t e r n i c h Era. 3 4

Sämtliche Werke, VI, 308. Der Achtzehnte Brumaire . . . pp. 15-16, 21-22, 119.

France and Revolution

117

The J u l y R e v o l u t i o n h a d an i m m e d i a t e effect only on the political s y s t e m of the N e t h e r l a n d s , but it put a n e w h e a r t into liberal a n d r a d i c a l m o v e m e n t s e v e r y w h e r e . I t w a s not too much to expect t h a t F r a n c e w o u l d s o o n a g a i n a s s u m e command of the hosts of f r e e d o m . M a r x w a s confident in 1846 t h a t the s i g n a l f o r the i m p e n d i n g r e v o l u t i o n in G e r many w o u l d be g i v e n by the G a l l i c a n cock. W i t h i n t w o years, indeed, the cock c r o w e d , a n d w i t h m o r e than customary effect. T h e o v e r t h r o w of K i n g L o u i s P h i l i p p e set off the m o s t e x t e n s i v e series of u p h e a v a l s t h a t E u r o p e h a d ever seen. M a r x c o n g r a t u l a t e d the F e b r u a r y r e v o l u t i o n ists on " t h e immense s e r v i c e " w h i c h the F r e n c h n a t i o n h a d "rendered to the cause of h u m a n i t y . " A t first, the events of

5

1 8 4 8 c o n f i r m e d F r a n c e in her

political a n d r e v o l u t i o n a r y l e a d e r s h i p . A l i b e r a l republic, the " c l a s s i c a l " f o r m of b o u r g e o i s rule, w a s set up in P a r i s . In the p r e c e d i n g century F r a n c e h a d been the first l a r g e continental state w h i c h e s t a b l i s h e d l i b e r a l , republican institutions. T h e n ,

having

e x h a u s t e d the a l t e r n a t i v e s

of

Bonapartism, B o u r b o n i s m , a n d O r l e a n i s m , she r e t u r n e d to republicanism. T h e r e s e e m e d to be a possibility t h a t a further step w o u l d be t a k e n a n d t h a t the capitalists w o u l d yield to the w o r k e r s the n a t i o n a l l e a d e r s h i p w h i c h M a r x had claimed f o r t h e m in the Manifest

on the e v e of the

Revolution. B u t the socialist tendencies of the F e b r u a r y Republic w e r e checked b e f o r e l o n g . I n J u n e 1 8 4 8 , an uprising of the p r o l e t a r i a t of P a r i s w a s s u p p r e s s e d in b l o o d y fashion by the t r o o p s of the N a t i o n a l A s s e m b l y . A l t h o u g h M a r x n a t u r a l l y d e p l o r e d it, the result of the insurrection strengthened his opinion t h a t F r e n c h politics p r o v i d e d a convenient outlet f o r social conflict. T h e p r o l e t a r i a t w a s neither l a r g e e n o u g h n o r w e l l e n o u g h o r g a n i z e d to t a k e over p o w e r ; it t h e r e f o r e lost. I t s economic a n d social strugs

Sämtliche

JVerke,

VI, 653.

118

France and Revolution

gle w i t h the b o u r g e o i s i e , h o w e v e r , w a s a l r e a d y very real and the street w a r g a v e it visible expression. " T h e collisions w h i c h are c r e a t e d by the v e r y conditions of bourgeois s o c i e t y , " he a s s e r t e d in an e d i t o r i a l in m e m o r y of the victims of the June D a y s , " m u s t be f o u g h t o u t ; they cannot be imagined a w a y . T h e best state f o r m is one in which the social contradictions are neither i g n o r e d nor violently kept in rein, but only a p p a r e n t l y and a r t f u l l y f e t t e r e d . T h e best state f o r m is one in w h i c h such contradictions are allowed to d e v e l o p to a f r e e s t r u g g l e and thus attain a solution." 6 F r a n c e then w a v e r e d in her " c l a s s i c a l " course. T h e Second R e p u b l i c p r o v e d to be m o r e short-lived than the First R e p u b l i c of 1 7 9 2 and g a v e w a y to a n o t h e r B o n a p a r t e . The country seemed to turn d e l i b e r a t e l y b a c k w a r d in order to imitate her o w n p a s t . M a r x h a d the u t m o s t contempt for the s t a t e s m a n u n d e r w h o s e r e g i m e La

République

çaise b e c a m e "La

7

République

cosaque."

fran-

H e probed for

the causes o f the collapse of liberalism and republicanism in Die

Klassenkämpfe

zehnte

Brumaire

in Frankreich

des Louis

Bonaparte,

and. in Der

Acht-

his most brilliant

and finished p a m p h l e t . G r a n t e d t h a t N a p o l e o n I I I was an " a d v e n t u r e r , " y e t his a d v e n t u r e could not h a v e been the result of mere accident. C l a s s f o r c e s and relationships had m a d e it possible f o r " a m e d i o c r e and g r o t e s q u e personage to p l a y the role of a h e r o . "

8

T h e p r o g r e s s of the country

w a s being h a m p e r e d by the s u r v i v a l of an unusually strong p e t t y p r o p r i e t o r s h i p on the land, by an a g r a r i a n overemphasis and a f a i l u r e to d e v e l o p f u l l y large-scale industry, b y the division o f the b o u r g e o i s i e into factions, which a r e l a t i v e l y w e a k industrial middle class w a s unable to dominate and f u s e , by an excessively d e v e l o p e d state structure 6 Nachlass, I I I , ι iS ; Die Klassenkämpfe in Frankreich, zehnte Brumaire . . . pp. 1 5 - 1 6 . 7 Der Achtzehnte Brumaire . . . p. m. 8 Ibid., pp. i8, 26.

p. 56 ; Der Acht-

France and Revolution

119

and bureaucracy, and, finally, by the weakness of the industrial p r o l e t a r i a t . A discussion of M a r x ' s attitude t o w a r d small-scale agriculture would be out of place here. I t must suffice f o r the present p u r p o s e to r e m a r k t h a t while he p r e f e r r e d the small f a r m to the l a r g e estate u n d e r certain b a c k w a r d conditions and f o r special reasons, he r e g a r d e d the small holding as a hindrance to production under m o d e r n conditions. H e m i g h t t e m p o r a r i l y s u p p o r t the establishment of small holdings in o r d e r to destroy an old-fashioned, aristocratic landlordism, or to p r e v e n t the g r o w t h of a new landlordism. H o w e v e r , the small f a r m could not h o p e to be more t h a n a passing phase in history ; it h a d no economic future. 9 Culturally and socially, country life seemed backward, stagnant, even brutalizing, to M a r x . 1 0 T h e p r o p o s a l to abolish all distinctions between the country and the city was a r e c u r r e n t r e f r a i n in his writings. A l o n g with ether sections of the lower middle classes, the peasants were set down in the Manifest as " r e a c t i o n a r y . " Only the unpleasant prospect of sinking down to the level of proletarians ever d r o v e these g r o u p s to t a k e a revolutionary position against the powers t h a t be. 1 1 T h e Manifest h a d predicted t h a t the small peasants, as well as petty m a n u f a c t u r e r s and t r a d e r s , recipients of small incomes, and h a n d i c r a f t s m e n , would increasingly be f o r c e d down into the ranks of w a g e e a r n e r s by the development of industrial capitalism. 1 2 T h e f a c t was t h a t in the middle of the nineteenth century the F r e n c h nation still consisted 9

Sämtliche

VI, 201;

Werke,

Briefwechsel,

Revolution and Counter-Revolution,

30; Das

2

IV, 232; Engels,

Germany:

pp. 133, 144; Steklov, op. cit., pp. 129-

Kapital, III , 341 ff. 2 Die Klassenkämpfe in Frankreich, p. 73; Das Kapital, III , 347-48; Der Bürgerkrieg in Frankreich, p. 30; Theorien über den Mehrwert, II 2 , 10

240-41. 11 11

Sämtliche Sämtliche

Werke, Werke,

VI, 535; Die Klassenkämpfe VI, 533.

in Frankreich,

p. 133.

I20

France and Revolution

largely of peasants. 1 3 T h i s class had played a progressive role in 1 7 8 9 . T h e small f a r m had deprived feudalism of its roots in the land and so f o r m e d a valuable ally of the bourgeoisie against the Old Regime. T h e Revolution and N a p o l e o n I had combined to assure the survival of the small f a r m , which became the basis of the G r a n d Empire. H o w e v e r , within two generations capitalism had transf o r m e d the a g r a r i a n blessing into a curse. T h e feudal dues and services were gone but the peasant bore a huge burden of indebtedness. T h e social conditions in rural France were appalling. T h e new s e r f d o m to capital had converted sixteen million people into " t r o g l o d y t e s " living in "hovels a large number of which have but one opening, others two, and the most f a v o r e d ones t h r e e . " T h e peasants hardly constituted a class, in the full sense of that term as Marx employed it. H i s picture of them is worth citing textually because it is one of the f e w instances when he adumbrated his conception of the class : T h e small peasants constitute a huge mass whose members live in similar conditions, w i t h o u t , however, entering into manifold relations w i t h one another. T h e i r method of production isolates them f r o m one another instead of d r a w i n g them into mutual intercourse. T h i s isolation is promoted by the poor means of communication in F r a n c e and by the poverty of the peasants. T h e cultivation of the small h o l d i n g — t h e i r field of production—admits of no division of labor and no application of science ; therefore there is no multiplicity of development, no diversity of talents, no wealth of social relationships. E v e r y individual peasant f a m i l y is almost self-sufficient ; by itself it produces the greater part of w h a t it consumes and so earns its livelihood more by means of exchange with nature than by intercourse w i t h society. T h e r e is the small holding, the peasant, and his f a m i l y ; alongside, another small holding, another peasant, and another f a m i l y . A number of these make up a village, a n u m b e r of villages a department. T h e great mass of the 13

Ibid., p. 5 4 g ; Die Klassenkämpfe

in Frankreich,

pp. 1 1 7 , 1 3 3 .

France and Revolution

121

French nation is thus constituted by the simple addition of equal magnitudes, much as a bag with potatoes makes up a potato bag. In so far as millions of families live under economic conditions that separate their mode of life, their interests, and their culture from those of the other classes and place them in a position hostile toward the latter, the peasants constitute a class. In so far as a merely local interconnection prevails among these small peasants and the uniformity of their interests creates no unity of interest, no national union, and no political organization, they do not constitute a class.

In t h e i r distress t h e p e a s a n t s looked f o r a savior. T r a d i tion had b r e d the superstition t h a t " a m a n n a m e d N a p o leon would r e s t o r e t o t h e m all m a n n e r of g l o r y . " T h e i r isolation and the simplicity of their d e m a n d s m a d e t h e m especially susceptible to an a u t h o r i t a r i a n , one-man gove r n m e n t . A truly m o d e r n class, functioning actively in t h e midst of a c h a n g i n g w o r l d and p a r t a k i n g of its spirit, must evolve complex and flexible policies t h r o u g h pliant r e p r e sentative institutions. Given the static quality of their interests, the p e a s a n t s were incapable of p r o m o t i n g t h e m t h r o u g h such institutions. T h e representative of the peasants must a p p e a r " a s their m a s t e r , as an a u t h o r i t y o v e r t h e m , as an unlimited g o v e r n m e n t a l p o w e r t h a t p r o t e c t s t h e m against the o t h e r classes and bestows rain and sunshine upon t h e m f r o m a b o v e . " T h e political influence f o u n d "its u l t i m a t e expression in an executive p o w e r t h a t d o m i n a t e s society." T h u s it came about t h a t the small f a r m became a conservative force and again crossed p a t h s with a "Grand Empire." But the p e a s a n t s were d o o m e d to disillusionment. T h e state was o p p o s e d to t h e m in their capacity as d e b t o r s . T h e i r interests h a d come into s h a r p conflict with the int e r e s t s of the bourgeoisie. T h e capitalist system, which h a d once p r o t e c t e d the small holding, was now exploiting

122

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it financially. U n d e r the circumstances, the " n a t u r a l allies and l e a d e r s " of the peasants, could they but come to see it, were the u r b a n proletarians. 1 4 T h e existence of a huge p e a s a n t r y testified to a strong a g r a r i a n tendency in the development of the French economy. T h i s tendency was reflected in French economic t h o u g h t . I t was fitting t h a t the doctrine of physiocracy, with its exaltation of l a n d e d wealth, should have originated in " p r e d o m i n a n t l y a g r i c u l t u r a l " F r a n c e and not in a p r e d o m i n a n t l y industrial, commercial, and maritime country like E n g l a n d . 1 5 F r o m the economist Pierre de Boisguilbert of the seventeenth century to the Utopian socialists of the nineteenth, F r e n c h theorists emphasized use values and d i s p a r a g e d the money economy. English economists since W i l l i a m Petty, the c o n t e m p o r a r y of Boisguilbert, h a d shown a g r e a t e r appreciation of the importance of money o p e r a t i o n s . P e t t y extolled "in the greed f o r gold, the energetic drive which s p u r r e d a nation to industrial development and to the conquest of the world m a r k e t . " Boisguilbert, on the o t h e r hand, was "fanatically" critical of money and looked upon gold as a foreign element which intervened to upset " t h e n a t u r a l equilibrium or h a r m o n y of commodity exchange." T h e M o l o c h of gold exacted "all n a t u r a l wealth as a sacrifice." T h e French thinker was not consistent, however. W h i l e he opposed " t h e capitalist system of l a b o r in one f o r m , " he praised it extravagantly in a n o t h e r . T h i s ambivalent attitude toward capitalism seemed to M a r x to be the " n a t i o n a l hereditary disease" which infected subsequent writers like Proudhon o r Sismondi. T h e " n a t i o n a l contrast between English and F r e n c h political economy" was a contrast between scientific clarity with an occasional trace of cynicism and scien14 15

Der Achtzehnte Brumaire . . . pp. 1 1 6 - 1 7 , 1 1 9 - 2 1 . Theorien über den Mehrwert, I, 41.

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tifie c o n f u s i o n touched s o m e w h a t with sentimentality. 1 6 M a r x held t h a t F r e n c h capitalism was excessively w e i g h t e d on its financial side. State b o n d s constituted t o o i m p o r t a n t a medium of speculation. T h e volume of national p r o d u c t i o n was " d i s p r o p o r t i o n a t e l y " lower t h a n the v o l u m e of the n a t i o n a l debt, 1 7 and an uncommonly close relationship existed between the state and the financial community. Industrially, F r a n c e h a d fallen f a r behind E n g l a n d . T h e l a r g e s t m a n u f a c t u r e r s seemed m e r e petty b o u r g e o i s c o m p a r e d with their English rivals. F r e n c h i n d u s t r y could not m a k e a bold bid f o r the w o r l d m a r k e t ; it needed the protective a r m of the state to maintain itself even at h o m e . 1 8 Since industry did n o t d o m i n a t e the national economy, the industrial capitalists were not in a position t o impose their policy and leadership u p o n t h e o t h e r bourgeois, and the v a r i o u s factions acted independently of each o t h e r in politics. T h e weakness of the l a n d e d a n d financial capitalists m a d e t h e m reluctant to g o v e r n directly t h r o u g h the instrumentality of liberal republicanism. T h e y were driven to r e t r e a t , as M a r x put it, to " t h e s u b o r d i n a t e , incomplete, w e a k e r f o r m of the mona r c h y . " 19 T h e B o u r b o n dynasty was f a v o r e d by the l a n d e d capitalists; the O r l e a n s by the financiers.20 M o n a r c h i s m t h u s came to stand f o r the p r o m o t i o n of this o r t h a t special interest of a s e g m e n t of the capitalist class. Republicanism a p p e a r e d t o offer the only hope f o r prosecuting the w e l f a r e of the bourgeoisie as a whole. 2 1 10 Zur Kritik der politischen Ökonomie, pp. 4 0 - 4 2 ; see also ibid., pp. 39η., 1 4 m . ; Theorien über den Mehrwert, I, 4 1 - 4 2 ; " C a r e y und Bastiat," Neue Zeit, X X I I 2 , 7-8. For a v i e w of the relation between economic theory and economic history in the United States, see ibid., pp. 8 - 1 2 . 17 Die Klassenkämpfe in Frankreich, p. i n . 18 Ibid., pp. 46-47, 1 1 1 - 1 3 . 19 Ibid., p. 1 3 0 ; Der Achtzehnte Brumaire . . . pp. 50, 9 1 - 9 2 . 20 Die Klassenkämpfe in Frankreich, p. 89. 21 Ibid., pp. 89-90.

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If only French republicanism had had no social connotations, no implications of p o p u l a r influence! T h e industrialists must p e r f o r c e turn to the l o w e r classes f o r help in the campaign against the domination of the financiers during the J u l y M o n a r c h y . U n d e r such p a r a d o x i c a l conditions, authentic leadership by industrialists w a s impossible. T h e y were too w e a k to lead a g r e a t national movement, as the English industrialists w e r e doing, and so, in o r d e r to obtain any influence at all, they must second the efforts of revolutionary groups which were only too likely to h a v e anticapitalistic aims.-- Such was M a r x ' s explanation of how industry found itself allied with radical elements in the F e b r u a r y Revolution. T h e misalliance could hardly last long. F r i g h t e n e d by the democratic tendencies of the early period of the Second Republic and unable to patch up a peace with the other bourgeois factions still w e d d e d to particular royal houses, the industrialists delivered themselves to a political " a d v e n t u r e r . " W i t h the peasants, though along a different path, the industrialists had converged toward Bonapartism. T h e " a d v e n t u r e r " found the state structure a convenient tool in his hands. M a r x became increasingly convinced a f t e r 1 8 4 8 that the administrative a p p a r a t u s had become a burden and danger to the nation. H e felt that the French bourgeoisie " f r o m the beginning, o r at least since the rise of t o w n s , " had obtained " t o o much of its influence by constituting itself the P a r l i a m e n t , the bureaucracy, and so f o r t h , and not, as in E n g l a n d , merely through commerce and industry." T h i s political overemphasis w a s "certainly still characteristic" of nineteenth-century F r a n c e . 2 3 Y e t on the whole, it seemed to him that the F r e n c h state had developed along a s a t i s f a c t o r y course until the f a l l of N a 22

Ibid., pp. 1 1 2 - 1 3 . Briefwechsel, II, 47; Engels, Germany: Revolution, p. 14511, 23

Revolution

and

Counter-

France and Revolution

125

poleon I. T h e Revolution had continued and N a p o l e o n I h a d completed the development of a centralized administration. A f t e r 1 8 1 5 the state became more domineering. Its activities w e r e constantly p r o l i f e r a t e d until the officials numbered m o r e than half a million. On this a r m y of dependents the state could confidently rely f o r support. T h e bureaucracy w a s parasitic, yet it presumed to regulate society with stifling minuteness and centripetence. T h e m a g nitude of the a p p a r a t u s complicated the struggle between the legislative and executive branches of the g o v e r n m e n t . T h e bourgeoisie extended the bureaucracy in o r d e r to get jobs f o r its " s u r p l u s " members, but the process strengthened a " h o s t i l e " executive power and undermined p a r l i a mentary life.24 W h i l e the interests of the proletariat were irreconcilable with those of its masters, the v e r y g r o w t h of a considerable class of w a g e earners was conditioned by the development of modern industry, which, in turn, w a s best p r o m o t e d by the rule of industrial capitalists. Only under such rule could the proletariat gain that " e x t e n d e d national existence which can raise its revolution to the level of a national revolution. . . . " T h e f a c t that the industrialists had n e v e r attained political supremacy w a s thus the indirect cause of the f a i l u r e of the proletarian movement. T h e revolutionary energy of the lower classes in the capital was deceptive. T h e strategic position of the P a r i s w o r k e r s was p o w e r f u l but it was out of all proportion to the strength, compactness, and maturity of the p r o l e t a r i a t of the country as a whole. In short, there was no national p r o l e t a r i a t in F r a n c e , either in the sense of size and permeation of the population or potential leadership of other l o w e r classes. 2 5 21 Der Achtzehnte Brumaire Frankreich, p. 61.

§ee a b o v e , p. 6 3 .

. . . pp. 61-62, 1 1 5 - 1 6 ; Der Bürgerkrieg

in

i2Ó

France and Revolution

M a r x pointed out, perhaps with a touch of irony, that it was only a f t e r the defeat of June 1 8 4 8 — i n other words, a f t e r it was too l a t e — t h a t the petty bourgeois and some peasants came to realize that their own f a t e had made them the allies of the proletariat. 2 6 A s matters stood shortly a f t e r 1 8 4 8 , the country was not yet ready to resolve its conflicts in a socialist direction. One might look to France f o r the "proclamation" of the social problem, but must turn to E n g l a n d f o r its solution. T h e r e must be " a world w a r in which the nations confront one another" on this issue and the English proletariat must come to power. 2 7 T h e pattern of the great wars of the era of the French Revolution is clear here; this time England would play the part of leader of European progress. Although M a r x did not lose confidence that the proletariat would eventually lead the masses toward socialism, he became pessimistic over its immediate course. H e was severely critical of the Utopian socialist movements prevalent in France in the fifties and sixties. H e especially opposed the popular doctrine of Proudhonism because of its reliance on credit schemes, its leaning to anarchism and federalism, and its lack of appreciation of large-scale industry. Frenchmen had become accustomed to think of themselves as the leaders and teachers of Europe. So long as they actually exercised leadership, M a r x did not object to that aspect of their national tradition. But in a period when their labor movement was weak, their radicalism confused, and their government reactionary, the selfesteem of the French seemed completely unjustified. H e began to question the value of their revolutionary initiative and to wish that the next social advance might be led by another nation. In 1 8 5 8 , commenting on the possibility 26 27

Die Klassenkämpfe in Frankreich, pp. 46-47, 91-921 95. Ibid., p. 113.

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127

of a revolution in Russia, he remarked that it would " d o the French no harm to find out that the world can move even without them." H e referred to the chances of political repercussions in Prussia and added that the Germans were "such complete satellites of F r a n c e " only because of the conservative regime in Russia and that an internal movement there would put an end to "this bad j o k e . " 28 T h e revolution did not materialize, however. In 1 8 6 3 , impressed by the rising in Poland, M a r x was certain that "the era of revolution" had "now again fairly opened in E u r o p e . " T h e "general position of things" seemed good. H e hoped that "this time the lava will flow f r o m east to west and not the other way around, so that we may be spared the 'honor' of French initiative." 29 T h e events of the late sixties somewhat revived his confidence in that initiative. T h e liberal and radical movement showed renewed energy. T h e political atmosphere of the Second Empire was tense. It was doubtful, however, that " a revolution in Paris could be successful, except through treason and rebellion or a split in the a r m y . " A rebellion was "hardly likely without a previous r o w . " 3 0 Y e t there was revolutionary significance in the increasing discussion and study of the origin of the Empire, the coup d'état, the events of 1848, and the Napoleonic legend. 3 1 J u s t before the outbreak of the Franco-Prussian W a r , he reasserted his former view that "the revolutionary initiative wilî probably come f r o m F r a n c e , " 3 - but he still doubted that the proletariat was ready to assume national leadership with good prospects of success. 33 29 Briefwechsel, II, 341-42. Ibid., I I I , 126-27, ' 3 2 · Ibid., IV, 114, 125. 31 "Briefe an Dr. K u g e l m a n n , " Neue Zeit, X X 2 , 412-13; Der Achtzehnte Brumaire . . . p. 18. 32 "Briefe an Dr. K u g e l m a n n , " Neue Zeit, X X 2 , 476-77. 33 Briefwechsel, IV, 114, 125, 127; Sorge, op. cit., p. 17. 30

128

France and Revolution

In 1 8 7 0 the Second E m p i r e collapsed at Sedan. F r o m the outset M a r x had r e g a r d e d the " B a s - E m p i r e " of " N a poleon le P e t i t " as a brittle imitation of the " G r a n d E m p i r e " of " N a p o l e o n le G r a n d . " N o one attracted M a r x ' s rich g i f t f o r invective m o r e than L o u i s N a p o l e o n . T h e e m p e r o r had posed as the conciliator of all classes but h a d ended by alienating them all. H e h a d done much d a m a g e by inflating the p o w e r of the executive and retarding liberalism and radicalism. W h e n the Republic was proclaimed f o r a third time, M a r x f e l t t h a t the w o r k e r s should support it. A l t h o u g h the b o u r g e o i s republic had been established " n o t as a social achievement but as a measure of national d e f e n s e , " 34 it w a s to be p r e f e r r e d to B o n a p a r t i s t imperialism. T h e labor m o v e m e n t stood in need of a period of maturation which only a liberal regime could supply. T h e w a r w a s not o v e r and it w a s questionable whether the w o r k e r s of P a r i s could o f f e r serious resistance to P r u s s i a . H e could not blink the f a c t , he confided to E n g e l s , that " t w e n t y years of the B o n a p a r t i s t f a r c e h a v e caused enormous demoralization. One is h a r d l y justified in reckoning on revolutionary h e r o i s m . " T h e F i r s t International advised against an uprising under such "exceptionally difficult circumstances" : Any

attempt at upsetting the n e w

government

in the present

crisis, w h e n the enemy is almost knocking at the gates of

Paris,

w o u l d be desperate f o l l v . T h e F r e n c h w o r k e r s must p e r f o r m their d u t y as citizens, but at the same time, they must not a l l o w themselves to succumb to the national memories of 1 7 9 2 , as the F r e n c h peasants had a l l o w e d

themselves

to be deluded

by the

national

memories of the F i r s t E m p i r e . T h e y h a v e not to repeat the past, but to build the f u t u r e . L e t them c a l m l y and resolutely exploit the opportunities of republican f r e e d o m in order to organize themselves thoroughly. T h i s w i l l give them fresh H e r c u l e a n p o w e r s f o r the regeneration of F r a n c e and f o r o u r c o m m o n t a s k — t h e emancipa34

Der Bürgerkrieg in Frankreich, pp. 40, 42.

France and Revolution

129

tion of the proletariat. T h e fate of the Republic hangs on their energy and wisdom. 3 5

H o w e v e r , when the people of P a r i s rose against the Versailles Republic six m o n t h s later, they f o u n d a passionate d e f e n d e r in M a r x . N o event of his time s t i r r e d a g r e a t e r enthusiasm and a d m i r a t i o n in him t h a n the a u d a cious uprising of the C o m m u n e . T h e " v a n g u a r d of the entire m o d e r n p r o l e t a r i a t " :!t) h a d a g a i n lunged f o r w a r d ! " W h a t elasticity, w h a t historical initiative, w h a t a capacity f o r self-sacrifice in these P a r i s i a n s ! " he exclaimed in a l e t t e r to a G e r m a n f r i e n d : A f t e r six months of starvation and ruin caused more by internal treachery than by the external foe, they rise under the shadow of Prussian bayonets, as if there had never been a war between France and Germany and the enemy were not yet at the gates of Paris! H i s tory has no like example of a like greatness! . . . Compare these heaven-storming Parisians with the heavenly slaves of the GermanPrussian H o l y Roman Empire, w i t h its posthumous masquerades reeking of the barracks, Church, cabbage-Junkerdom and, above all, of the philistine. 3 7

T h e C o m m u n e was suppressed in blood two m o n t h s a f t e r it was born and M a r x c a r v e d its obituary in his bitterest philippic, Der Bürgerkrieg in Frankreich. H e exulted in the p r o m i s e the rebellion h a d embodied and covered its enemies with invective. In the heat of the m o m e n t , it seemed t h a t the C o m m u n e held the answer t o all t h e g r e a t questions of the c o u n t r y — t h e plight of the f a r m e r s , the burden of the state, the industrial p r o b l e m . In describing the g r e a t n e s s of the P r a n c e t h a t might have been, M a r x passed in review the inadequacies of the F r a n c e t h a t was. 35 Briefwechsel, I V , 3 5 8 - 5 9 , 3 7 8 ; Der Bürgerkrieg in Frankreich, S o r g e , op. cit., p. 1 7 ; N e w Y o r k Tribune, A p r i l 27, 1855, p. 6. 3,1 Der Bürgerkrieg in Frankreich, p. 90. 37 " Ü b e r die P a r i s e r K o m m u n e , " S eue Zeit, X X 1 , 709.

p. 4 0 ;

I30

France and Revolution

T h e C o m m u n e , he argued, would have f r e e d the peasants of heavy taxes and expensive g o v e r n m e n t and would have put elective officials and schoolmasters in the place of gendarmes, prefects, and priests. It would have solved the p r o b l e m s of the a g r a r i a n debt and of the country prol e t a r i a t . It would have i m p r o v e d agricultural production and done away with the competition of capitalistic farming. T h e clash between city and country would have been resolved. T h e C o m m u n e would have " b r o u g h t the rural p r o d u c e r s under the intellectual leadership of the central towns of their districts, and t h e r e assured them, in the w o r k i n g man, the n a t u r a l representative of their interests." A new f o r m of state would h a v e been constructed. M a r x ' s s h a r p e s t attack on the too-pervasive state was contained in Der Bürgerkrieg in Frankreich. H e described how the state a p p a r a t u s h a d g r o w n unbearably arrogant under N a p o l e o n I I I . T h e C o m m u n e confirmed him in the opinion t h a t this state must not be merely t r a n s f e r r e d from old h a n d s to new, but " s m a s h e d . " By way of defending the Commune, M a r x outlined his conception of the purposes, policies, and mechanism of the p r o l e t a r i a n state in the period of transition to socialism, with r a t h e r special application, of course, to conditions in F r a n c e . Political unity would have been retained. T h e c o m m u n a r d s did not propose to pulverize F r a n c e into a f e d e r a t i o n of small states, as some critics contended. T h e unity of g r e a t nations, alt h o u g h b r o u g h t about originally by political force, had become " a p o w e r f u l f a c t o r of m o d e r n p r o d u c t i o n . " But there was no justification f o r a state p o w e r which claimed to be the embodiment of n a t i o n a l unity and yet sought to be "ind e p e n d e n t o f , and superior to, the n a t i o n . " T h e Commune would h a v e suppressed the standing a r m y and the old police f o r c e ; it would h a v e set up a p o p u l a r militia with

France and Revolution

13 1

an extremely short period of service, disestablished and disendowed the church, and m a d e education f r e e . A l l public offices, including the judiciary, w o u l d h a v e become "elective, responsible, and r e v o c a b l e . " Instead of deciding every three or six years w h i c h member of the ruling class w a s to r e p r e s e n t — a n d r e p r e s s — t h e people in P a r liament, universal s u f f r a g e w a s to serve the people, constituted in communes, as individual s u f f r a g e serves every other employer

to

pick the w o r k m e n , managers, and bookkeepers f o r his business. A n d it is w e l l k n o w n that in matters of real business, companies, like individuals, generally k n o w h o w to find the right m a n f o r the right place and, if they once make a mistake, to correct it p r o m p t l y .

In short, the state would h a v e been r e s t o r e d to its p r o p e r position as obedient and responsible s e r v a n t of the citizenry. W i t h the abolition of the standing a r m y and the reduction of g o v e r n m e n t salaries to the level of the income of w o r k e r s , the desire f o r cheap g o v e r n m e n t w o u l d h a v e been realized. T h e communal f o r m was " t h o r o u g h l y exp a n s i v e " and under it the country could h a v e m a r c h e d t o w a r d socialism. T h e Commune, while abolishing " c l a s s p r o p e r t y , " w o u l d h a v e m a d e "individual p r o p e r t y a f a c t by t r a n s f o r m i n g the means of production, land, and capital, which are now used primarily to enslave and exploit l a b o r , into the m e r e instruments of f r e e and associated l a b o r . " Of course, the process of establishing socialism w o u l d be long and arduous. T h e w o r k e r s w e r e a w a r e that they would have to pass " t h r o u g h lengthy struggles, a whole series of historical processes which will t r a n s f o r m men as well as circumstances." M e a n w h i l e , the striking f a c t was that the p r o l e t a r i a t of an important country h a d claimed and won national leadership and held political p o w e r f o r the first time. 3 8 A t least so M a r x thought in 1 8 7 1 . In retrospect the 38

Loc. cit.; Der Bürgerkrieg

in Frankreich,

pp. 63-73.

i3 2

France and Revolution

significance of the Commune was considerably less impressive. T e n y e a r s a f t e r the rebellion, in discussing the measures of a socialist government on attaining power, he rejected the Commune as a historical example of such a g o v e r n m e n t : " . . . a p a r t f r o m the f a c t that this was merely the uprising of a town under exceptional conditions, the majority of the Commune was not at all socialist, nor could it be t h a t . " M o d e r a t e popular gains were, after all, the most that could have been expected: " W i t h a small amount of sound common sense," the communards "could have reached a compromise with the Versailles Government useful to the whole mass of the people, which was all that could be achieved at the time." 39 T h e period of the Commune had been the last historical moment when M a r x ' s f a i t h in French revolutionary leadership had glowed brightly, if only briefly. Several years later he complained of " t h e lack of a theoretical foundation and practical common sense" in France. In 1 8 7 7 Russia struck him once more as better soil f o r revolutionary change and initiative. French affairs seemed unimportant by comparison. T h e struggle to assure the existence of the Republic was still being w a g e d . M a r x hoped that the bourgeois regime would carry the day, otherwise the old game of seesaw between republicanism and monarchy would begin all over again and " n o nation can a f f o r d to repeat the same stupidities too o f t e n . " T h e movement of the proletarians betrayed as much hesitation as that of the liberal bourgeois. It was as late as 1 8 8 0 b e f o r e M a r x thought he saw the beginnings of "the first real workers' movement" in F r a n c e . U n t i l then, there had been only "sects" and founders of " s e c t s . " T h e mass of w o r k e r s had followed radical bourgeois or bourgeois who played at radicalism 39 Ausgewählte Briefe, Neue Zeit, X X 1 , 709.

pp. 3 1 7 - 1 8 ; cf. " Ü b e r die Pariser Kommune,"

France and Revolution

133

and had f o u g h t f o r them, only to be s l a u g h t e r e d and deported by the men they h a d raised to p o w e r . 4 0 A host of circumstances and events h a d conspired to wrest f r o m F r a n c e the r e v o l u t i o n a r y initiative w h i c h h a d been f o r m e r l y hers. In the seventies and eighties, liberal republicanism seemed to M a r x to offer the best i m m e d i a t e prospect f o r s p e e d i n g the economic p r o g r e s s of the country and f o r a d v a n c i n g its social m o v e m e n t . 40

"Briefe

pp. 1 5 7 ,

a n D r . Kugelmann,"

170-71·

Neue

Zeit,

X X

2

,8 0 0 ; Sorge,

op.

cit.,

I

I

G E R M A N Y : T H E PROBLEM OF U N I F I C A T I O N A

s HE s u r v e y e d the condition of G e r m a n y in the middle

o f the nineteenth century, it seemed t o M a r x that his native country w a s suffering f r o m g e n e r a l a r r e s t e d development. S e v e r a l i m p o r t a n t characteristics set her apart from o t h e r W e s t e r n countries : m o n a r c h i c a l , aristocratic, and f e u d a l institutions and p r i v i l e g e s h a d s u r v i v e d in powerf u l m e a s u r e ; capitalism w a s weak, and consequently also the grande

b o u r g e o i s i e and the industrial proletariat, but

the p e t t y b o u r g e o i s i e , on the other hand, w a s uncommonly s t r o n g ; and

finally,

the country w a s politically disunited

b e y o n d c o m p a r i s o n w i t h o t h e r l a r g e nations of Europe. N o less than thirty-nine p r a c t i c a l l y independent states of all sizes w e r e f o r m a l l y g r o u p e d in a l o o s e Confederation. E c o n o m i c a l l y , politically, and socially G e r m a n y w a s backw a r d , and one m a y m e a s u r e M a r x ' s conception of the distance s e p a r a t i n g her f r o m E n g l a n d and F r a n c e by his hope t h a t the R e v o l u t i o n of 1848 m i g h t p r o v e to be a German edition o f the R e v o l u t i o n of 1 6 8 9 and of 1 7 8 9 . T h e r o o t s of this condition r e a c h e d deep into the past. T h e alliance b e t w e e n the m o n a r c h y and the bourgeoisie, w h i c h h a d done so much to consolidate o t h e r nations and to c o r r o d e f e u d a l institutions, h a d not been struck in Germ a n y . 1 T h e e p o c h a l s h i f t i n g o f the w o r l d t r a d e routes 1

Briefwechsel,

II, 47-48.

Germany and Unification

135

f r o m the M e d i t e r r a n e a n Sea to the Atlantic Ocean had dealt a heavy blow to G e r m a n y ; her position in the center of the Continent had been f o r m e r l y a g r e a t economic asset. T h e G e r m a n s were driven out of n a v a l shipping by the Dutch and the E n g l i s h . N o city acquired importance as an economic center of g r a v i t y f o r the whole country. T h e T h i r t y Y e a r s ' W a r , which was f o u g h t by the g r e a t powers of the seventeenth century on G e r m a n territory, destroyed means of production as well as people and l e f t the country prostrate f o r generations. T h e w a r confirmed the impotence of the H o l y R o m a n E m p i r e and G e r m a n y f a i l e d to develop the centralized state which M a r x r e g a r d e d as the concomitant of modern production. T h e same disunity stood in the w a y of effective revolutionary action on a national scale. G e r m a n y was, in short, an " i m a g i n a r y country." 2 " F e u d a l " tenure, E n g e l s asserted in a series of articles published over the signature of M a r x , was prevalent " a l most e v e r y w h e r e " b e f o r e 1 8 4 8 , having been entirely destroyed only in the Rhineland during its union with F r a n c e in the R e v o l u t i o n a r y and N a p o l e o n i c age. In E n g l a n d and F r a n c e , the p o w e r of the landed aristocracy had been abolished f o r m a l l y or virtually by a wealthy middle class. T h e G e r m a n nobles, although they had lost their political privileges and " t h e right to control the princes," still preserved a " g r e a t portion of their ancient p r i v i l e g e s " and " a l m o s t all their medieval supremacy over the p e a s a n t r y of their demesnes, as well as their exemption f r o m t a x e s . " T h e aristocracy supplied the higher government officialdom and almost completely officered the a r m y . 3 2

S'achlais, II, 463-64; I I I , 92; Germany: Revolution and CounterRevolution, p. 1 4 4 ; New Y o r k Tribune, October 25, 1 8 5 1 , p. 6; F e b r u a r y 27, 1852, p. 6; Das Kapital, I, 670; Der Bürgerkrieg in Frankreich, p. 67. 3 New York Tribune, October 25, 1 8 5 1 , p. 6 ; Nachlass, I I I , 107, 1 2 8 ; Sämtliche Werke, V I , 216.

136

Germany and Unification

T h e bourgeoisie was w e a k and divided. T h e backwardness of industry deprived it of influence on the government, despite such practical concessions as the T a r i f f Union. W a n t of numbers and concentration prevented the bourgeoisie f r o m attaining the political power of the English and French bourgeoisie. Industry, it was true, grew rapidly in the fifties and sixties, but G e r m a n y , along with other countries on the Continent, had to cope with problems arising f r o m the "incompleteness" of its capitalist development, as well as with problems incidental to that development. " A whole series of inherited evils" flowed f r o m the survival of antiquated methods of production and social and political anachronisms. T h e country suffered "not only f r o m the living, but also f r o m the dead. Le mort saisit le vif!" 4 In the middle of the century, the industrial proletariat was as retarded as the bourgeoisie. A minority of the w o r k e r s was engaged in modern manufacturing and only it and the m i g r a t o r y w o r k e r s had any clear conception of the interests of their class. M o s t workers were employed by small masters and practised old-fashioned c r a f t s . The "enormous difference between the g r e a t cotton lord and the petty cobbler and master t a i l o r " was matched by the difference between the " w i d e - a w a k e factory-operative of modern manufacturing B a b y l o n s " and " t h e bashful journeyman tailor or cabinetmaker of a small country town," who lived and w o r k e d in a semi-medieval fashion. No wonder that in 1 8 4 8 " a large part of the working classes should cry out f o r the immediate E s t a b l i s h m e n t of guilds and medieval privileged trades' c o r p o r a t i o n s . " 5 T h e petty bourgeois held an uncommonly important position in the country. Exceedingly increased in number 4 New York Tribune, October 25, 1851, p. 6; Sämtliche Werke, V, 175; Das Kapital, I, vii, χ, xiii. 5 New York Tribune, October 25, 1851, p. 6 ; Mehring, Karl Marx, p. 239.

Germany and Unification

137

because of the stinted development of large capitalists and manufacturers, the lesser bourgeois formed a majority in the larger cities and dominated the smaller towns. T h e prosperity of the petty bourgeoisie depended on the custom of the court and aristocracy. "In the smaller towns, a military garrison, a county government, a court of law with its followers, f o r m very often the base of its prosperity; withdraw these and down go the shopkeepers, the tailors, the shoemakers, the joiners." Hence the febrile hesitancies of the petty bourgeois, who envied the richer bourgeois, depended on the aristocracy and monarchy, and f e a r e d the proletariat. " H u m b l e and crouchingly submissive under a powerful feudal or monarchical government, [the petty bourgeoisie] turns to the side of liberalism when the middle class is in the ascendant; it becomes seized with violent democratic fits as soon as the middle class has secured its own supremacy, but falls back into the abject despondency of fear as soon as the class below itself, the proletarians, attempt an independent movement." 0 T h e oscillations of this considerable segment of the population had national significance. T h e economic backwardness and social composition of the country were reflected in its cultural life. M a r x had no patience with the overfine theorizing and sentimental idealism which flourished in Germany. T h e Manifest satirized the adulteration of French economic and socialist thought by German men of letters, who wrote their own "philosophical nonsense beneath the French original" : For example, underneath the French critique of the functions of money they w r o t e "alienation of humanity" and underneath the French critique of the bourgeois state they wrote "overthrow of 6

Sämtliche If'erke, V I , 5 5 1 ; Briefwechsel, I V , 340; Germany: Revolution and Counter-Revolution, pp. 140 ff. ; New Y o r k Tribune, October 25, 1 8 5 1 , p. 6.

138

Germany and Unification

the dominion of the abstract universal." T h e y christened this interpolation of philosophical phraseology into the French arguments "philosophy of the deed," or "true socialism," or "German science of socialism," or "philosophical foundation of socialism," and so on. French socialist and communist literature was thoroughly emasculated. A n d since in the German's hand this literature ceased to express the struggle of one class against another, he felt that he had overcome the "narrowness" of the French and that he represented not true needs, but rather the "need for truth" ; not the interests of the proletariat, but the interests of humanity itself, of that abstract man w h o belongs to no class and exists not in the domain of reality but in the realm of philosophical fantasy.

T h e weakness of the bourgeoisie and of the proletariat was the social b a c k g r o u n d of this attitude, which expressed the f e a r s and hopes of the p e t t y bourgeois. 7 A r e l a t e d tendency was the r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n of the backw a r d n e s s of the country into a species of superiority. If m a t e r i a l development lagged, it was because the Germans, m o r e t h a n other nations, were absorbed by spiritual and intellectual concerns. If they surpassed in speculation, perhaps it was because they w e r e the philosophical nation par excellence and h a d a special aptitude f o r the life of reason. If they failed to construct a s t r o n g national state, it was p e r h a p s because they were the most cosmopolitan of nations and would not confine their existence within narr o w national boundaries. O t h e r nations " r e p r e s e n t e d " only themselves but G e r m a n y " r e p r e s e n t e d " all humanity. The G e r m a n s were t o o m o r a l and peace-loving to join in the v u l g a r scramble f o r political dominion and the profits of the m a r k e t place. T h e i r nationalism h a d a peculiar character. T h e F r e n c h r e g a r d e d themselves as the natural leaders of p r o g r e s s and civilization because they had led the w o r l d during the g r e a t Revolution. F r e n c h nationalism v a s the f o n d m e m o r y of p a s t achievements. T h e national pride of G e r m a n y , however, must thrive in the soil of 7

Sämtliche Werke, VI, 550-52.

Germany and Unification

139

f r u s t r a t i o n by t u r n i n g e v e r y d e f e c t i n t o a s o u r c e o f v a n i t y . If their neighbors across the Rhine were foolishly vain o v e r w h a t t h e y h a d d o n e o n c e but w e r e n o l o n g e r a b l e t o d o , t h e G e r m a n s w e r e p r o u d t h e y h a d n e v e r d o n e it. I n t h e Deutsche

Ideologie

Deutschland—Etti

M a r x quoted the lines of H e i n e ' s

JVintermärchen

:

Franzosen und Russen gehört das L a n d , D a s M e e r gehört den Britten, W i r aber besitzen im Luftreich des T r a u m s Die H e r r s c h a f t unbestritten. H i e r üben wir die Hegemonie, H i e r sind wir unzerstückelt ; Die andern Völker haben sich Auf platter E r d e entwickelt. The

Germans,

Marx

commented,

regard this

ethereal

r e a l m a s t h e h i g h e s t g o a l o f m a n , a n d as t h e p e c u l i a r p o s session which distinguishes them f r o m other nations. In every field they consider their daydreams as final judgments on the deeds of others nations, and because they always play the part of disappointed onlookers, they feel called upon to sit in j u d g m e n t on the whole world and see in Germany the fulfillment of all of history. W e have frequently noted that this inflated and extravagant national arrogance corresponds to an utterly petty, philistine, and backward existence. If national narrow-mindedness is everywhere repulsive, it becomes actually loathsome in G e r m a n y , for there it is coupled with the illusion that the G e r m a n s are above nationalism and practical interests, in contrast to those nations that have the frankness to admit their national narrow-mindedness and their dependence on practical interests. 8 8

Ibid.,

V , 4 4 5 - 4 6 , 4 5 3 - 5 4 . A t r a n s l a t i o n of H e i n e ' s lines f o l l o w s : T h e R u s s i a n s a n d F r e n c h possess the l a n d , T h e B r i t i s h h a v e the sea ; B u t w e in a i r y r e a l m of d r e a m s H a v e unchallenged mastery. H e r e w e hold h e g e m o n y , U n d i s m e m b e r e d here. Less f a v o r e d nations h a v e On the flat e a r t h d r e a r .

evolved

i4°

Germany and Unification

Germany had played a reactionary and abject role in international affairs. A t home, backwardness bred hollow idealism and false pride; abroad, it bred servility and indignity. Weakness and disunion made the German a mercenary soldier of European conservatism. M a r x ' s newspaper published in 1848 a fierce indictment of the foreign policy of the German princes. German armies had fought against American and French revolutionists and Swiss liberals. T h e Congresses of the powers a f t e r 1 8 1 5 and the interventions against revolutionary forces in Italy and Spain were laid at the door of the German Confederation. T h e newspaper detected German intrigues in all the centers of conservatism: "reaction in England armed with Hanoverian troops, Belgium divided and thermidorized by German influence, the C z a r and the smaller autocrats supported mainly by Germans in the deepest recesses of Russia—all of Europe overrun with C o b u r g s ! " It was with the help of German "soldateska" that Poland had been torn to pieces, the Republic of Cracow "assassinated," and Lombardy and Venetia "enslaved and sucked d r y . " While the German governments were primarily to blame, the nation bore " a great p a r t " of the responsibility. " B u t f o r its delusions and slavishness, its adroitness as mercenaries and as complaisant jailers and tools of lords by divine right, the German name would be less hated, cursed, and despised abroad, and the peoples suppressed by German forces would long since have reached a normal condition of free development." 9 Exaggeration elbowed truth in this sweeping indictment. T h e Germans were not, of course, the only mercenaries in Europe. T h e r e was no " G e r m a n y " in quite the concrete and self-conscious sense implied in the editorial of the Neue rheinische Zeitung. T h e intent, however, was 9

Λ'achlass, III, 108-9, 1 1 2 - 1 3 ; Der Bürgerkrieg

in Frankreich,

pp. 37-38.

Germany and Unification

14 1

plain. I n t e r n a t i o n a l honor, as well as national p r o g r e s s , required a s h a r p turn in G e r m a n affairs. M o n a r c h i c a l and a r i s t o c r a t i c institutions and p o w e r must be abolished. L a r g e - s c a l e industry must be established. G e r m a n y must d e v e l o p f r o m a petty bourgeois, semifeudal nation into a f u l l y g r o w n , bourgeois nation so that she might in time become a p r o l e t a r i a n and then a socialist nation. H e r role a b r o a d must become a progressive one. G e r m a n y could not be f r e e if it continued to i n t e r f e r e with the f r e e d o m of other nations. T h e g r e a t prerequisite f o r all these changes w a s unification and centralization. F e d e r a l i s m would not do. M a r x w a s convinced that only a thorough political integration could release the energies of the G e r m a n people. T h e f e d e r a l example of the U n i t e d States seemed to him to be m o r e relevant to the o r g a n i z a t i o n of the Continent as a w h o l e than to its component states. T h e union must be comprehensive and must include the G e r m a n territories ruled by the H a p s b u r g s . T h e most desirable f o r m of g o v ernment would be the liberal and democratic "republic, one and indivisible," as proclaimed by the F r e n c h R e v o l u tion. 1 0 M a r x had hopes that the bourgeoisie would rise to the occasion, as the F r e n c h bourgeoisie had risen in 1 7 8 9 , and lead the m o v e m e n t f o r unification. H e n c e his s t r a t e g y of 1 8 4 8 , which called f o r the t e m p o r a r y subordination by the p r o l e t a r i a t of its own special aims in o r d e r to assist the bourgeoisie in establishing a modern constitution. 1 1 H e a d v o c a t e d a w a r against Russia so that the f o r e i g n as well as the internal enemies of a r e f o r m e d G e r m a n y might be w e a k e n e d and the nation united behind the r e v o l u t i o n . 1 2 T h e bourgeoisie, h o w e v e r , f a i l e d to play the role assigned 10

Sachlais,

pp. 1 3 7 . 11

12

I I I , 9 3 - 9 4 ; Germany:

144-45·

Sämtliehe Werke, V I , 556. ft'ac/ilaij, I I I , 93-94, 1 1 4 , 1 5 0 - 5 1 ,

Revolution

and

Counter-Revolution,

H2

Germany and Unification

to it. M a r x was struck by the contrast between the wordiness and vacillation of the F r a n k f o r t Assembly and the energy and determination of the famous National Convention of 1 7 9 2 . Instead of following the French example of granting the demands of the peasants and thus securing their support, the bourgeoisie compromised with the aristocracy and monarchy and thus muffed its opportunity f o r leadership. 1 3 T h e revolution was condemned to remain "half a revolution." Henceforth M a r x showed profound contempt f o r the German bourgeoisie. H i s newspaper concluded bitterly that its "disgraceful wretchedness" found no match in history. " W e [ G e r m a n s ] have always been and will always remain narrow-minded bourgeois. W e made two dozen small and big revolutions, of which we ourselves became frightened even before they were completed. . . . T h e revolution restricted our horizon, instead of widening it." 1 4 One thing was clear: Germany was not to imitate the political pattern of France. T h e r e were no signs in the fifties that the bourgeoisie would make another attempt to secure national leadership; the proletariat, on the other hand, was hardly sufficiently developed to perform the task of unification. T h e r e was left only the alternative of Hapsburg or Hohenzollern leadership. T h e former, however, was associated with the weak and conservative German Confederation; and M a r x looked f o r w a r d to a division of Hapsburg dominions into the national states of a Great Germany, Poland, Hungary, and Italy. H e felt increasingly impelled to accept unification at the hands of Prussia. A s a Rhinelander, he had f r o m his youth been sharply opposed to Hohenzollern rule. T h e traditional friendship of the Prussian dynasty f o r the hated Ro13 14

Ibid., pp. 133, 227. Ibid., pp. 99, 150-51, 198; Der Bürgerkrieg

in Frankreich,

p. 35.

Germany and Unification

143

m a n o v s , its membership in the H o l y Alliance, its support of and by the landed aristocracy, its participation in the partitions of P o l a n d , its oppression of the Poles in the E a s t and the R h i n e l a n d e r s in the W e s t — a l l these combined to m a k e P r u s s i a odious in his eyes. H e had little enough love f o r the A u s t r i a n dynasty, but he admitted that the rise of the H a p s b u r g s had a certain historical g r a n d e u r , even as a " d i a b o l i c a l epic." In contrast, the history of the H o h e n zollerns r e a d " l i k e an i m m o r a l f a m i l y r o m a n c e . " T h e y had swelled their territories " b y the divine right of bribery, open purchase, petty larceny, legacy hunting, and treacherous partition t r e a t i e s . " H e was contemptuous even of P r u s s i a ' s military reputation. Of all the acquisitions of the H o h e n z o l l e r n s , only Silesia had been obtained by direct c o n q u e s t — " a f e a t so unparalleled in the annals of their house, that it earned the title 'Unique' f o r F r e d e r i c k I I . " " I n d e e d and i n d e e d , " M a r x once exclaimed, " t h e history of the w o r l d has never produced anything more despicable" than the rise of the H o h e n z o l l e r n s . 1 5 M a r x proceeded f r o m the assumption that G e r m a n y stood in urgent need of unity and that this unity, h o w e v e r o r by w h o m e v e r attained, would benefit the progressive f o r c e s of the nation f a r more than its reactionary elements. U n i t y would inevitably promote economic advance and f u r t h e r the g r o w t h of the bourgeoisie, and t h e r e f o r e also the g r o w t h and o r g a n i z a t i o n of the proletariat. T h e development of these t w o classes would weaken the monarchy and aristocracy. In f o r e i g n affairs a stronger Germany would necessarily assume an attitude of g r e a t e r independence t o w a r d the conservative powers, particularly t o w a r d Russia. M a r x t h e r e f o r e did not f a v o r an intransi15 Briefwechsel, I I , 1 5 8 ; N e w Y o r k Tribune, J a n u a r y 9, 1857, p. 3. See also Briefwechsel, I I I , 1 3 2 - 3 3 , 1 4 3 - 4 4 ; S'achlass, I I I , 106, 139, 203; Das Kapital, I, 698π.; " D a s göttliche Recht der Hohenzollern," Λ'eue Zeit, X X V I I I 1 , 9-13·

144

Germany and Unification

gent opposition to the policy of Bismarck and w a s critical of those democrats and federalists, mostly South G e r m a n s , w h o seemed to him to be willing to throw out the baby of union with the bath of Prussianism. N o matter how unavoidable the p r o g r a m of union under P r u s s i a might a p p e a r , it remained v e r y unpalatable to M a r x . H e could console himself but slightly with the r e flection of C a r l y l e that, " W h e n G o d wants to d o something especially great, H e a l w a y s chooses the stupidest people f o r i t . " 1 8 H e despaired that " o u r philistines" would e v e r r e a l i z e that, unless the H a p s b u r g s and H o h e n z o l l e r n s , not to speak of the lesser dynasties, were o v e r t h r o w n , the country would again h a v e to undergo the miseries of " a T h i r t y Y e a r s ' W a r " and another " p a r t i t i o n . " T h e lightning victory of Prussia o v e r A u s t r i a in 1 8 6 6 took him by surprise, as it did his contemporaries. H e concluded bitterly that " t h e whole p a s t " of petty bourgeois G e r m a n y h a d p r o v e d that union w o u l d be g r a n t e d it only by " t h e g r a c e of G o d and the s w o r d . " R a d i c a l s were powerless to affect the immediate course of events. T h e r e w a s nothing to be done, as E n g e l s said, but to accept union without j u s t i f y i n g it, and to exploit " t h e g r e a t e r facilities f o r national organization and unification of the G e r m a n prolet a r i a t which must now at any rate be p r o f f e r e d . " M a r x accepted "the m e s s " in the same spirit. " E v e r y t h i n g which centralizes the bourgeoisie is naturally a d v a n t a g e o u s f o r the w o r k e r s . " " S t i l l it is p l e a s a n t , " he must add, " t o be at a distance [in E n g l a n d ] during this period of love's young d a w n . " 17 T h e Franco-Prussian W a r which broke out in 1 8 7 0 w a s 10

Briefwechsel, I V , 358-59, 365, 369; Der Bürgerkrieg in Frankreich, p. 38. For Engels' v i e w , see The Peasant IVar in Germany (New York, 1 9 2 6 ) , pp. 22-23. 17 Briefwechsel, I I I , 323, 344, 350, 3 5 1 - 5 2 ; I V , 339-40; " B r i e f e an D r . K u g e l m a n n , " Neue Zeit, X X 2 , 61. On the attitude of the First International, 9ee Stelclov, o f . cit., p. 105.

Germany and Unification

145

f a r m o r e d i s t u r b i n g . T h e prospect of such a conflict h a d seemed " d i s a s t r o u s , " "suicidal," " f r a t r i c i d a l . " 18 A r m e d s l a u g h t e r was t o M a r x , as F r a n z M e h r i n g put it, a disp e n s a t i o n of " t h e devil, a p h e n o m e n o n inevitable in class society in g e n e r a l and bourgeois society in p a r t i c u l a r . " 19 T h e question w a s w h e t h e r some practical benefits m i g h t not be d e r i v e d f r o m a diabolical situation. A Prussian vict o r y w a s certain to result in the completion of the process of unification, a n d was also likely to wreck the B o n a p a r t i s t s t a t e ; but w h a t g o o d could a F r e n c h victory d o ? L i k e all his c o u n t r y m e n w h o w e r e concerned o v e r the political p r o g r e s s of G e r m a n y , M a r x resented w h a t he r e g a r d e d as the t r a d i t i o n a l policy of F r a n c e of keeping her n e i g h b o r divided, " t h e i n h e r i t e d right of F r a n c e in G e r m a n disu n i o n . " L>0 Since Richelieu, various regimes h a d indeed pursued t h a t policy with energy. O n the o t h e r hand, the Revolution, while it annexed the Rhineland, h a d the effect of f o r w a r d i n g t h e sentiment of G e r m a n unity. N a p o l e o n I abolished m o r e Lilliputian states, and did m o r e to r o u n d out the t e r r i t o r i e s of the l a r g e r states t h a n any native r u l e r h a d d o n e . Bismarck s t r e n g t h e n e d the suspicion of Gallic knavery by exploiting the secret d e m a n d of N a p o leon I J I f o r t e r r i t o r i a l compensation in G e r m a n y . T o m a k e m a t t e r s worse, F r a n c e had declared w a r and so w a s f o r mally the a g g r e s s o r . It was years b e f o r e the world knew h o w much m o r e Bismarck deserved t h a t title. M a r x struck the balance and definitely took sides with G e r m a n y . O n her p a r t , it was " a w a r of d e f e n s e " and independence.- 1 E n g e l s agreed with him t h a t G e r m a n y was fighting f o r " h e r national existence" against imperialist 18

" B r i e f e an Dr. K u g e l m a n n , " S eue Zeit, X X - , 2 2 4 ; Der in Frankreich, p. 33. 10 Mehring, Karl Marx, p. 479. 20 Der Bürgerkrieg in Frankreich, p. 48 ; New Y o r k Tribune, 8, 1859, p. 6. -1 Der Bürgerkrieg in Frankreich, p. 3 1 .

Bürgerkrieg

November

146

Germany and Unification

attack and expressed the hope that, if she won, "French B o n a p a r t i s m will at any rate be done f o r , the eternal wrangle over the establishment of G e r m a n unity will at last be ended, the G e r m a n w o r k e r s will be able to organize themselves on a national scale quite different f r o m that heretof o r e , and the French workers, w h a t e v e r sort of government may f o l l o w , will certainly have a f r e e r field than under B o n a p a r t i s m . " Despite the pro-Russian tendencies of the Hohenzollerns, an enlarged Prussia was likely to f a l l out with Russia over demands f o r compensation in the E a s t . T h e newly strengthened "national sentiment" would stiffen the G e r m a n people against a pusillanimous attitude toward Czarism.22 T h e r e was another consideration which moved Marx to f a v o r a Prussian victory. T h e G e r m a n proletariat had developed strikingly since 1 8 4 8 . M a r x had many followers among the workers and their leaders. On the other hand, B o n a p a r t i s m seemed to have dampened the ardor of French labor and weakened it both economically and politically. N o n - M a r x i s t doctrines, especially Proudhonism, were influential in France. " B e t w e e n ourselves, taking all in a l l , " he confided to a friend just b e f o r e the war, " I expect more f o r the social movement f r o m Germany than f r o m F r a n c e . " 2 3 M a r x had also come to resent the chauvinism of Frenchmen who, despite the conservative turn of affairs at home, continued to r e g a r d themselves as the v a n g u a r d of E u r o p e a n progress. A l l this helps to explain his remark to E n g e l s , upon thé outbreak of the w a r , that "the French need a t h r a s h i n g . " " G e r m a n predominance," M a r x went on, " w o u l d . . . t r a n s f e r the center of g r a v i t y of the w o r k e r s ' movement in Western E u r o p e f r o m France to G e r m a n y , and one has only to com22 23

279.

Briefwechsel, I V , 358, 365. " B r i e f e an D r . K u g e l m a n n , " Neue

Zeit, X X 2 , 4 1 6 ; Briefwechsel,

IV,

Germany and Unification

147

pare the movement in the two countries since 1866 to see that the German working class is superior to the French both in theory and in organization. Its predominance over the French on the world stage would also mean the predominance of our theory over Proudhon's, etc." 24 Y e t serious misgivings were in order. It was naturally difficult to reconcile oneself to the thought that unification was being attained by conservative forces. " W h o would have thought it possible," M a r x wrote to Engels, "that twenty-two years a f t e r 1 8 4 8 , a national war in Germany would receive theoretical expression such as this!" H i s friend blamed "the miserable state of the German bourgeoisie" f o r a situation which offered Prussia an opportunity to increase her prestige.- 5 T h e outbreak of the w a r brought a wave of chauvinism. M a r x was persuaded that the workers showed less nationalistic sentiment than the upper classes of the two countries; he cited the fact that labor organizations on both sides of the border issued fraternal statements and protests. T h e r e was reason to f e a r , nonetheless, that the war against Napoleon might "degenerate" into an attack upon the French people. 20 T h e conflict reached a sudden climax. France was " t h r a s h e d " thoroughly and almost immediately. M a r x ' s position on the w a r no more survived the fall of Sedan than did the Second E m p i r e . T h e dangers of a Prussian victory, merely suspected before, now became blindingly clear. T h e " w a r of defense" had somehow come to an end midway. Engels observed that the struggle "in which Germany at the beginning merely defended her own territory against French chauvinism appears to be changing gradually but surely into a w a r in the interests of a new German chauvinism." M a r x agreed that defense had become unneces24 26

Briefwechsel, IV, 339-40, 365. Der Bürgerkrieg in Frankreich,

25 Ibid., pp. 346, 348, 358, 366. pp. 30-33, 39; Briefwechsel, IV, 346.

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Germany and Unification

sary a f t e r the surrender of L o u i s Bonaparte, the capitulation of Sedan, and the proclamation of the Republic. He was a w a r e , of course, that the Prussian " m i l i t a r y camar i l l a " had resolved upon conquest long b e f o r e these events. 2 7 M a r x now entered the lists f o r France. H e criticized the proposal to annex A l s a c e and L o r r a i n e (whose people did not " p a n t f o r the G e r m a n e m b r a c e " ) , denied that these provinces were essential to the military protection of G e r m a n y , dismissed the argument that they belonged to G e r m a n y by historical right, and denounced the growth of G e r m a n nationalism. H e w a r n e d that the u n f a i r treatment of France would deliver her into the arms of Russia and eventually lead to a " r a c e w a r against the combined Slavonian and Romance r a c e s " — a prediction partly fulfilled in 1 9 1 4 . H i s t o r y would measure its " r e t r i b u t i o n " upon G e r m a n y " n o t by the extent of the square miles torn from France, but by the enormity of the crime of reviving in the second half of the nineteenth century the policy of conquest." H i s w r a t h rose to white heat because Prussia was at w a r not with the E m p i r e , but with a republic and then with the P a r i s Commune. " T h e G e r m a n w o r k e r s , " he recalled, " h a v e energetically supported the w a r , which it was not in their power to prevent, as a w a r f o r the independence of G e r m a n y and f o r the liberation of Germany and E u r o p e f r o m the depressing nightmare of the Second Emp i r e . " T h e y must have two guarantees, an "honorable peace f o r F r a n c e " and recognition of its republican government. H e called f o r w a r à outrance against Prussia and did not find terms harsh enough in which to condemn the f a i l u r e of the T h i e r s government to conduct an energetic campaign in cooperation with the communards. H e accused Bismarck and T h i e r s of conspiring to join forces 27

Correspondence,

p. 303 ; Der

Bürgerkrieg

in Frankreich,

p. 34.

Germany and Unification

149

a g a i n s t the French nation as represented by the C o m m u n e because they f e a r e d that a victory of revolutionary P a r i s o v e r the Prussians w o u l d also mean a victory o v e r French capitalism. 2 8 M a r x h a d crossed the firing line: he now sided with a revolutionary F r a n c e against an imperial G e r m a n y , as he had sided earlier with a national G e r m a n y against an imperial F r a n c e . T h e proclamation of the G e r m a n E m p i r e at V e r s a i l l e s b r o u g h t him f a c e to f a c e with the nationalistic state which w a s to set a pattern f o r E u r o p e . D i d he appraise the phenomenon at its true v a l u e ? H e realized how difficult it w o u l d be to upset the new state by internal class revolution and turned f o r a solution to external conflicts which might g e n e r a t e the needed social tensions. A s early as 1 8 7 0 he h a d r e m a r k e d that the "best result" of the FrancoPrussian W a r f o r G e r m a n y would be the logically "ine v i t a b l e " second w a r , to be w a g e d between a united G e r m a n y and R u s s i a . " T y p i c a l 'Prussianism' has never had and never can have any existence except in alliance with and subjection to R u s s i a . A n d a second w a r of this kind will act as the m i d w i f e of the inevitable social revolution in R u s s i a . " 20 T h i s w a s m o r e prophetic f o r Russia than f o r P r u s s i a . Political unification, f o r which he had been willing to p a y a high price, h a d exacted a price quite unexpectedly high. Prussia ruled in G e r m a n y , B i s m a r c k ruled in Prussia. N e i t h e r seemed seriously challenged by capitalists o r w o r k e r s . A s F r a n z M e h r i n g correctly observed, M a r x had overestimated the r e v o l u t i o n a r y mood of the masses and h a d underestimated the reach of B i s m a r c k ' s policy. 3 0 Disappointed by the f a i l u r e of the bourgeoisie to play an energetic political role, M a r x rested his faith f o r G e r 28

Der Bürgerkrieg in Frankreich, pp. 35-39, 42 ff. Sorge, op. cil., p. 17. Mehring, "Engels und M a r x , " Archiv für die Geschichte des mus und der Arbeiterbewegung, V, 25. 29

30

Sozialis-

i5°

Germany and Unification

man progress exclusively on the g r o w i n g proletarian movement. H e appears to have expected f a r more of the German than of French or E n g l i s h socialists. 3 1 Y e t he also had occasion to speak v e r y critically of the course of German socialism. H e disapproved of the principles of the Gotha P r o g r a m which united the two socialist parties in 1875. a2 T w o y e a r s later he criticized the compromising "rotten spirit" which had made itself evident both among the masses and their leaders. H e recalled, perhaps with a touch of disillusionment, how h a r d he had worked to instill sound socialist principles into the G e r m a n movement. 3 3 31 32

"Briefe an Dr. Kugelmann," Neue Zeit, X X 2 , 800. 33 In his Kritik des Gothaer Programms. Sorge, op. cit., pp. 159-60.

I

2

R U S S I A : THE T H E O R Y OF STAGES C Z A R I S M and Russia loomed l a r g e in the r e v o l u t i o n a r y reckoning of M a r x . H e saw in C z a r i s m the chief p i l l a r of reaction in Europe, the g r e a t e s t single obstacle to the progress of the Continent. T h e country, as distinguished f r o m the government, had r e v o l u t i o n a r y import f o r t w o reasons. T h e signs of political and economic change, which M a r x began to notice in the late fifties and sixties, g a v e rise to the hope, as we have seen, t h a t the initiative of revolutionary action might perchance come f r o m the E a s t instead of f r o m the W e s t . T h e development of Russian economy and of the revolutionary movement raised the exceedingly i m p o r t a n t question w h e t h e r capitalism w a s a social stage which every modern country must experience. T o d a y , when Russia is governed by the most radical regime in the world, it requires an effort of the historical imagination to picture her as she a p p e a r e d to the generation which g r e w to maturity with M a r x a century ago. T h e Russia of the R o m a n o v s w a s the archetype of political, social, and religious reaction. T h e H o l y Alliance summed up the spirit, if not the content, of the M e t t e r n i c h system and the f o r m a l author of t h a t mystical brotherhood of Protestant, Catholic and E a s t e r n Orthodox sovereigns w a s C z a r A l e x a n d e r I. T h e A g e of M e t t e r n i c h coincided

152

Russia and Theory of Stages

roughly with the period of the "Nicholas system" of police persecution, spy rule, and suppression of liberalism even in its mildest forms. Just as France was regarded as the home of liberal enlightenment, Russia was regarded as the citadel of conservatism. T h e character of the government and the mystery and inaccessibility of an empire that stretched clear across Asia to the Pacific Ocean, and even beyond, helped to make the realm of the Czars appear as a colossus of evil portent to the Western world. Hatred of Czarism pervaded the political judgments of M a r x . In his liberal youth, he considered Czarist Russia as the greatest hindrance to the realization of the French ideals of liberty, equality, and fraternity; after he had become a socialist, he saw in it the greatest hindrance to the social revolution. Once, writing in the N e w Y o r k Tribune, he reduced the conflicts of Europe to a struggle between Russia and the "sixth and greatest European power," which had risen since 1789—the power of the Revolution, "the explosive force of democratic ideas and man's native thirst for freedom." 1 ( M a r x indulged in liberal phraseology when addressing bourgeois readers.) T h e fortunes of these two "powers" stood in inverse ratio to one ano t h e r ; - their relationship governed the conduct of the other states, which did not relish to see either radicalism or Russia too strong. But while eventually the Western states might deem it necessary, in sheer self-defense, to check Russian expansion, they generally found it advantageous to support Czarism as an ally against radical forces. In his concern over the international influence of Czarism, M a r x magnified the ramification of its interests, the extent of its ambitions, and the cunning and patience of its 1 New York Tribune, April 12, 1853, p. 4; February 2, 1854, p. 4. - Ibid., April 7, 1853, p. 5 ; June 9, 1853, p. 5.

Russia and Theory of Stages

153

3

diplomacy. H e saw in nearly every ruling house an open or concealed accomplice of the Romanovs. T h e Hohenzollerns were their servile tools. 4 Napoleon I I I was drawn like a magnet to the despots whose "system of governing he has introduced into France." 5 T h e Danish monarchs were the protégés of the Czars. 0 T h e r e were Russophiles even at the court of the Sultan, the traditional enemy of the Romanovs. 7 T h e English aristocracy was ready to "permit the consolidation of a juvenile despotism in the E a s t in the hope of finding a support for their valetudinarian oligarchy in the W e s t . " 8 M a r x detected Russophilia in the London Times, in the Whigs, and in William Gladstone. 0 T h e principal English culprit was L o r d Palmerston, whom he described as "the unflinching and persevering advocate of Russian interests in the Cabinet and in the H o u s e of Commons." 10 W h e n it was not sheer romanticism, Pan-Slavism was but another f o r m of czarophilia. 1 1 Even some of his opponents in the radical world (Proudhon and Lassalle, f o r example, not to mention Michael Bakunin) were accused by M a r x of pro-Russian leanings. 12 H i s detestation of Czarism was so ample that it embraced nearly all his other antagonisms. 3 See, f o r example, " B r i e f e an D r . K u g e l m a n n , " S eue Zeit, X X 2 , 126; Briefwechsel, III, 331, 440, 4 4 1 ; I V , 375, 454; N e w Y o r k Tribune, September 5, 1853, p. 6; J u l y 25, 1854, p. 4 ; A u g u s t 27, 1857, p. 2. 4 Briefwechsel, I V , 358; Sorge, op. cit., p. 157. 5 N e w Y o r k Tribune, A p r i l 11, 1853, p. 7. 8 Ibid., June 9, 1853, p. 5 ; A u g u s t 21, 1854, p. 6. ' Briefwechsel, I V , 471. 8 N e w Y o r k Tribune, A p r i l 11, 1853, p. 7. " Ibid., A p r i l Ii, 1853, p. 7 ; A p r i l 19, 1853, p. 4 ; June 22, 1853, p. 5; A u gust 24, 1853, pp. 5 - 6 ; September 2, 1853, pp. 5 - 6 ; A p r i l 17, 1854, p. 6 ; I V , 346, 348; A p r i l i t , 1854, p. 3; J a n u a r y 12, 1856, p. 4 ; Briefwechsel, Steklov, op. cit., p. 443. 10 The Story of the Life of Lord Palmerston, p. 16 and passim; New Y o r k Tribune, J a n u a r y 11, 1854, p. 4. 11

Nachlass,

III, 240; N e w Y o r k

i8S5, P· 4· 1 2 For example, Ausgewählte

Tribune,

Briefe,

M a y 5, 1855, p. 4 ; M a y 7,

p. 144; Briefwechsel,

I I I , 146.

154

Russia and Theory of Stages

I t was natural, under the circumstances, that the destruction of Czarism should be the principal plank of the " f o r eign policy" of M a r x . In 1848 he urged a war against Nicholas I as the only means of preserving the Revolution in Germany. When the Eastern Question became acute in the early fifties, he tried to argue, cajole, and threaten the W e s t into concerted action to stop Russian aggression in T u r k e y . Europe was warned that unless Russia was checked promptly she would engulf and barbarize the whole Continent. H e drew an alarming picture of her territorial gains since Peter the Great. When Nicholas I demanded a "protectorate" over T u r k e y , M a r x observed that "mankind will not forget that Russia was the protector of Poland, the protector of the Crimea, the protector of Courland, the protector of Georgia, Mingrelia, the Circassian and Caucasian tribes." T h e Scandinavians and the Germans were admonished to cease quarreling lest they pave the way f o r the Slavic "hereditary enemy." Playing on another sentiment, M a r x denied that Russia was as rich and strong as some Westerners feared. H e reassured the English business community that war against Russia would not prove a commercial disaster because trade with T u r k e y was on the upgrade while that with Russia was more or less stationary and advised that Russian aggression was imperiling England's commercial and imperial position. 1 3 W h a t e v e r might be thought of such language and arguments, M a r x ' s underlying motive was, as always, revolutionary. H e felt that the interest of the proletariat coincided momentarily with the interest of capitalistic England and the W e s t generally: both pointed against the C z a r s . Neither England nor the "sixth p o w e r " could afford to let the C z a r seize Constantinople. T h e conquest of T u r k e y 13 New York Tribune, April i i , 1853, p. 7 ; April 12, 1853, p. 4; June 14, 1853, p. 6; August 19, 1853, pp. 5-6; February 2, 1854, p. 4 ; February 20, 1854, P· 4·

Russia and Theory of Stages

155

would make Russian might "superior to all the rest of Europe taken together," and that would be "an unspeakable calamity to the revolutionary cause." Again, a war of the West against Russia might precipitate a general revolution in Europe. "Only a signal is wanted," M a r x wrote with élan, "and this sixth and greatest European power will come f o r w a r d , in shining armor and sword in hand, like Minerva from the head of Olympian." 1 4 T h e ardently preached crusade—the Crimean W a r — was launched in 1 8 5 4 . It proved a great disappointment from the point of view of both the European revolution, which did not materialize, and the stability of Czarism, which was shaken but not destroyed. T h e sluggish campaign of France and England aroused the wrath of M a r x as much as the lack of sanitary provisions distressed Florence Nightingale. M a r x complained that the war was being conducted with inefficiency and indecision; it seemed almost as if the powers preferred defeat to victory. " T h e fact is," we read in an interesting newspaper article signed by M a r x , but since it was on a military subject, most likely written by Engels, "that conservative Europe—the Europe of 'order, property, family, religion,'—the Europe of monarchs, feudal lords, moneyed men, however they may be differently assorted in different countries—is once more exhibiting its extreme impotency. Europe may be rotten, but a war should have roused the sound elements; a war should have brought forth some latent energies, and assuredly there should be that much pluck among two hundred and fifty millions of men that at least one decent struggle might be got up, wherein both parties could reap some honor, such as force and spirit can carry off even from the field of battle. But no. Not only is the England of the middle classes, the France of the Bonapartes, incapable of a 14

Ibid., A p r i l 12, 1853, p. 4 ; F e b r u a r y 2, 1854, p. 4.

156

Russia and Theory of Stages

decent, hearty, hard-fought war, but even Russia, the country of E u r o p e least infected by infidel and unnerving civilization, cannot bring about anything of the kind." When "that bore of a w a r " was finally brought to an end in 1 8 5 6 , M a r x observed, in an excess of exaggeration, that the agreements which sealed the defeat of Russia were Russophile I 1 5 A striking overestimate of Russian power continued to color his views of international affairs. During the FrancoSardinian w a r against Austria in 1 8 5 9 , he opposed Napoleon I I I because he suspected the backing of the C z a r and feared that a weakened Austria would be rendered less capable of checking the growth of Russia. 1 8 In 1 8 6 3 Russian Poland rose in rebellion and the C z a r seized some territory in the Caucasus. M a r x characterized these events as the most important that had occurred since 1 8 1 5 . 1 7 T h e following year he condemned "the shameless approval, mock sympathy, or idiotic indifference" with which the upper classes of Europe witnessed the expansion of Russia and her "assassination" of "heroic P o l a n d . " 1 8 L a t e r he urged "the need of armies" because of "the Russian menace." 1 0 While the states of the W e s t were indulging in petty squabbles, the C z a r , "to pass the time," had seized an island near Korea. If such adventures were allowed to continue, he would soon be in possession of J a p a n ! 2 0 M a r x ' s position on the Franco-German W a r in 1 8 7 0 - 7 1 was tinged by the fear that Russia might derive some advantage from it. H e was not f a r wrong, f o r the clauses of the T r e a t y of 1 8 5 6 providing f o r the neutralization of the Black Sea were denounced by Alexander I I . It was a tragic spectacle of the French and German workers slaughtering 15 Ibid., August 17, 1854, p. 4 ; April 27, 1855, p. 6; "Briefe an Dr. Kugelmann," Neue Zeit, X X 2 , 544. 10 Briefivechjel, II, 383-84; cf. III, 146, 213. "Ibid., I I I , 178. 18 Steklov, op. cit., p. 445. 1 8 Briefwechsel, I I I , 4 1 7 . 2 0 Ibid., IV, 237.

Russia and Theory of Stages

157

one another instead of combining to lay siege to the f o r tress of international reaction. M a r x insisted that Bism a r c k must not be a l l o w e d to call f o r or accept the help of R u s s i a and criticized Prussian nationalists f o r being m o r e concerned with annexing French provinces than with checking the g r e a t e r menace in the E a s t . - 1 In the w a r of 1877—78, M a r x hoped f o r the victory of T u r k e y , an empire f o r which he had otherwise little sympathy.-T h i s C a r t h a g i n i a n campaign did not g o unchallenged by those radicals w h o f e l t that hatred of C z a r i s m w a s obscuring M a r x ' s vision. 2 3 I t is well to recall, h o w e v e r , that such h a t r e d p e r v a d e d liberal and radical circles and that M a r x never involved the Russian people in his attacks on C z a r ism. In fact, he once expressed the opinion that the development of the R o m a n o v empire had run counter to the tendencies of the Russian nation. In the posthumous pamphlet,

Secret Diplomatic

History

of the Eighteenth

Century,

C z a r i s m w a s depicted as an artificial and monstrous creation which o w e d its prosperity to international intrigue and a veritable conspiracy against the people. M u s c o v y w a s cradled in " t h e b l o o d y mire of M o n g o l i a n s l a v e r y , not [ i n ] the rude g l o r y of the N o r m a n e p o c h . " T h e y o k e of the M o n g o l s w a s e v a d e d by stealth rather than broken f o r t h rightly by the " c o n f e s s e d c o w a r d " I v a n K a l i t a . " T h e character of e v e r y people enlarges with its enfranchisement f r o m a f o r e i g n yoke ; that of M u s c o v y in the hands of I v a n seems to d i m i n i s h . " I v a n set the pattern f o r modern C z a r i s t diplomacy. H e assumed " a b r o a d the theatrical attitude of the conqueror, and, indeed, succeeded in hiding under a mask of p r o u d susceptibility and irritable haughti21

Der Bürgerkrieg in Frankreich, pp. 33, 38. -- Sorge, op. cit., pp. 1 5 6 - 5 7 ; M a r * and Engels, Briefe an Α. Bebel, tV. Liebknecht, Κ. Kautsky, und Andere, I, 494-95. 23 Steklov, op. cit., pp. 67, 85-86, 384, 3 9 1 - 9 2 ; " D e r Kongress der Internationalen Arbeiterassociation in G e n f , " Der Vorbote, November, 1866, pp. 1 6 5 - 6 7 ; Briefwechsel, I I I , 303-4.

158

Russia and Theory of Stages

ness, the obtrusiveness o f the M o n g o l serf who still remembered kissing the stirrup of the Khan's meanest envoy." T h e gulf between the autocracy and the people widened steadily, especially under P e t e r the G r e a t , who, as one o f the chief architects o f the power o f the Romanovs, fared badly at the hands of M a r x . P e t e r had dragged a reluctant nation to the sea. It was a " f e a t u r e characteristic o f the Slavonic r a c e " that it confined itself " a l m o s t everywhere . . . to an inland country, leaving the sea borders to nonSlavonic tribes." H e n c e it was that " n o portion o f the Baltic coast has really adopted Russian nationality." T h e maritime policy of P e t e r broke " a l l the traditions" o f the Slavs. H i s new capital embodied the triumph o f a brutal state machine over the natural tendencies of the nation. " P e t e r s burg was not like Muscovy the center o f a race, but the seat o f a government; not the slow work o f a people, but the instantaneous creation o f a m a n ; not the medium f r o m which the peculiarities o f an inland people radiate, but the maritime extremities where they are l o s t ; not the traditional nucleus o f a national development, but the deliberately chosen abode o f a cosmopolitan intrigue. By the transfer of the capital, P e t e r cut off the natural ligaments which bound up the encroaching system of the old M u s covite Czars with the natural abilities and aspirations o f the great Russian R a c e . B y planting his capital on the margin of the sea, he put to open defiance the antimaritime instincts of that race and degraded it to a mere weight in his political mechanism." H e t r a n s f o r m e d an inland state into a sea-bordering empire so that " t h e traditional limits o f the Muscovite policy could be superseded and merged into that bold synthesis which, blending the encroaching method of the M o n g o l slave with the world-conquering tendencies o f the M o n g o l master, forms the life-spring o f

Russia and Theory of Stages

i59

modern Russian diplomacy." 24 It was clear that when M a r x wrote, as he did more than once, that Russia represented " M o n g o l i s m " he had in mind a regime and policy essentially alien to the people. 25 T h i s historical picture was a strange one, nonetheless, to come f r o m his pen. When such an estimate of the development of a great state came in through the door, historical materialism flew out of the window. If an empire of world importance could be f o r g e d by intrigue, cunning, dynastic ambition, and international diplomacy, what became of the economic forces in history? F r o m the point of view of M a r x ' s philosophy, the conception as a whole was more significant than its constituent inadequacies and exaggerations, some of which have been criticized by R y a z a n o v : the state of Peter had as sound economic justification as did the absolute monarchies of the W e s t ; Russian policy had not followed an unswerving course; M a r x missed much of the internal history of the country; and so forth. 2 6 It was only gradually that M a r x became interested in the domestic development of Russia ; not until the seventies did he engage in any special studies in that field. In the forties and most of the fifties he regarded Russia as economically and politically stagnant and relied f o r the overthrow of Czarism on assault from without. 27 T h e Crimean W a r made it clear, however, that Czarism could not be thus dispatched, although extensive economic and administrative innovations were introduced by Alexander I I shortly thereafter. M a r x hopefully interpreted the summoning of Russian nobles to a conference in St. Petersburg 24 Secret Diplomatic History of the Eighteenth Century, pp. 77 ff. Note also Briefwechsel, II, 106-8. 25 " B r i e f e an Dr. Kugelmann," Neue Zeit, XX2, 4 1 5 - 1 6 ; Briefwechsel, III, 275-76. 28 Ryazanov, Karl Marx über den Ursprung der Vorherrschaft Russlands in Europa, pp. 34, 52, 54-55, 57, 60. 27 New York Tribune, April 19, 1853, p. 4; June 22, 1853, p. 4.

i6o

Russia and Theory of Stages

in 1 8 5 8 as a sign that "the revolution has begun." - 8 T h e movement f o r the emancipation of the serfs revealed "the beginning of an internal history," which might work a change in the traditional foreign policy of Russia. 2 " T h e social movement seemed to be "advancing faster than in the whole of the rest of E u r o p e . " T h e struggle between the peasants and nobles outweighed the "extraordinary successes of Russian diplomacy during the last fifteen years, and especially since 1 8 4 9 . " Remembering the political quiescence of Russia in 1848, M a r x predicted that in the next revolutionary wave "Russia will be so kind as to revolutionize as well." H e referred to the movements to free the Russian serfs and the American slaves as "the biggest events that are happening in the world today." Profound changes had set in simultaneously in the E a s t and the W e s t ; and "this, added to the imminent downbreak [sic] in Central Europe, will be grandiose." 30 In 1 8 6 3 he expressed the hope that the revolution might begin in the E a s t and spread westward. 3 1 During the w a r with Turkey in 1 8 7 7 - 7 8 , M a r x was persuaded that all strata of Russian society were in a state of "complete decomposition" economically, morally, and intellectually. T h e revolution would break out in "the inviolate bulwark and reserve army of counterrevolution." H e would fain live to see the " f u n . " However, the C z a r won the war, although he lost the peace at the Congress of Berlin. " A Russian defeat," M a r x reflected, "would have greatly hastened the social revolution in Russia, f o r which the elements exist on an enormous scale, and with it the revolution throughout Europe." 3 - T h e country which the 28

29 Briefwechsel, II, 341. Ibid., p. 317. Ibid., pp. 448, 453; New York Tribune, August 1 1 , i860, p. 5. 31 Briefwechsel, III, 127. 32 Sorge, op. cit., pp. 156-57; Briefe an A. Bebel, W. Liebknecht, Κ. sky und Andere, I, 494-95. 30

Kaut-

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authors of the Manifest had f o u n d it unnecessary to mention in their discussion of political tactics had become a generation later one of the principal foci of E u r o p e a n change. T h e closer Russia m o v e d to revolution, the m o r e pressing became the question of w h a t sort of revolution this would be. W o u l d it introduce a capitalist regime under the liberal auspices f a m i l i a r in the W e s t o r w o u l d it proceed at once to establish socialism? I f capitalism w a s r e g a r d e d as a necessary development, then radical efforts w o u l d be directed t o w a r d accelerating the dissolution of the r u r a l communes, e x p r o p r i a t i n g the peasants, and introducing individual enterprise on the land. T a c t i c a l l y , the activities of socialists would h a v e to be concentrated in the g r o w i n g urban centers which such a process w o u l d produce. B u t if the communes w e r e to be maintained and d e v e l o p e d as a basis f o r a more imminent socialist system, radicals must try to strengthen them and w o r k a m o n g peasants as well as among p r o l e t a r i a n s . D i d M a r x believe that capitalism w a s inevitable as a stage in the evolution of all societies ? W a s there a series of stages through which every society must p a s s ? T h e Manifest listed three " e p o c h s of h i s t o r y " : ancient s l a v e r y , feudalism, and c a p i t a l i s m ; the last w a s to be f o l l o w e d by socialism. E n g e l s later explained that " h i s t o r y " h a d itself been preceded by the communal society which he and M a r x , along with other thinkers of the nineteenth century, assumed as having existed in primitive t i m e s . I n 1 8 5 9 M a r x observed that the Asiatic, the ancient, the f e u d a l , and the bourgeois methods of production might be designated " i n b r o a d o u t l i n e " as " p r o g r e s s i v e epochs in the f o r m a t i o n of economic society." B y " A s i a t i c , " he a p p a r ently meant a f a i r l y primitive communalism. T h e relation33

Sämtliche

It'crkc,

VI, 525-26 and η.; V, 1 1 ff.

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ship of these stages was sketched briefly: " A social order never disappears before all the productive forces f o r which there is room in it have been developed and new, higher relations of production never appear before the material conditions of their existence have matured in the old society." 34 In the preface to the first edition of Das Kapital ( 1 8 6 7 ) , he referred to the development of the economic structure of society as a "natural historical process." A nation could not at will skip over "the natural phases of evolution," although it might "lessen and mitigate the birth pangs" of a new stage. In the book itself M a r x argued that capitalism, after it was established, begot "its own negation with the necessity of a natural force." T h e "negation" was, of course, the socialization of the means of production. 3Γ> If what we have here is a doctrine of a fixed series of stages valid f o r every society—and that is how these statements have been very generally understood—then the doctrine was ignored, contradicted, and finally repudiated by its author. L o n g before he wrote Das Kapital, M a r x had pointed out that in India capitalism was not succeeding feudalism, but a backward communal system.' 10 H i s denial of the inevitability of social stages became explicit in his discussions of the Russian problem. In a letter to a Russian periodical Notes on the Fatherland, in 1 8 7 7 , M a r x wrote that he had come to the conclusion, after much study, that Russia had had, until 1 8 6 1 and perhaps even later, "the best opportunity that history has ever offered to a people" of escaping "all the catastrophies of capitalism." H e contended that, in sketching the process of primary accumula34

Zur Kritik der politischen Ökonomie, p p . 5 - 6 , 2 2 1 . "' Das Kapital, I, v i i i , 727, 7 2 8 - 2 9 . 36 N e w Y o r k Tribune, J u n e 25, 1853, P· 5 "> A u g u s t 8, 1 8 5 3 , p. 5. F o r t h e " s t a g e " h i s t o r y of J a p a n , see Das Kapital, I, 683η.; f o r t h a t of t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s , " C a r e y u n d B a s t i a t , " Seue Zeit, X X I I - , 8. 3

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tion a n d p r o l e t a r i a n i z a t i o n of the peasants in his principal w o r k , his intent was n o t h i n g m o r e t h a n " t o t r a c e the p a t h by which t h e capitalist economic o r d e r in W e s t e r n E u r o p e e m e r g e d f r o m the w o m b of the f e u d a l economic o r d e r . " W h i l e it is t r u e t h a t his instances were d r a w n f r o m W e s t ern history, especially the history of E n g l a n d , t h e r e was no indication in Das Kapital t h a t his conclusions were m e a n t t o be limited to t h a t a r e a . I t is not clear w h e t h e r he h a d exp r e s s e d himself in s t r o n g e r t e r m s t h a n was justifiable— and o v e r e m p h a s i s was characteristic of his w r i t i n g — o r h a d c h a n g e d his views in the decade a f t e r the publication of Das Kapital a n d would not admit it. But it is clear he was now a r g u i n g t h a t so f a r as Russia was concerned, the implication of his discussion of the origin of capitalism w a s "simply this : If Russia is tending to become a capitalist n a t i o n a f t e r t h e f a s h i o n of W e s t e r n E u r o p e a n n a t i o n s — and in recent years she has been taking great pains in that direction—she will not succeed without having first transf o r m e d a good p a r t of h e r peasants into p r o l e t a r i a n s ; and a f t e r she has once been taken into the pale of capitalism, she will h a v e to experience its pitiless laws like o t h e r p r o f a n e nations. T h a t is all." Capitalism was n o t inescapable, but if established, it would surely be preceded by expropriation and the abolition of small-scale or communal ownership. In o r d e r to d e t e r m i n e w h e t h e r capitalism would be established, a study of actual conditions was m o r e i m p o r t a n t t h a n theoretical disquisitions. M a r x entered a v i g o r o u s p r o t e s t against i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s which would " t r a n s f o r m " his outline of the origin of capitalism in W e s t e r n E u r o p e into " a historico-philosophical t h e o r y of the general p a t h f a t a l l y imposed upon all peoples, w h a t e v e r their historical circumstances, if they a r e to arrive ultimately at t h a t economic o r g a n i z a t i o n which insures the most integral devel-

ιό4

Russia and Theory of Stages

opment of man as well as the greatest amount of the p r o ductive power of social labor." H e cited the failure of ancient Rome to introduce capitalism despite the presence of some favorable factors. T h e process of land expropriation, a prerequisite condition for capitalist production, had taken place. T h e free peasants had lost their holdings, and the same movement which divorced them f r o m the means of production and subsistence led to the formation of big landed property as well as big money capital. " A n d so, one fine morning there were to be found on the one hand free men, stripped of everything but their labor power, and on the other, for the exploitation of that labor, the holders of all the acquired riches." T h e situation was similar to that which existed at the birth of industrial capitalism in E u r o p e ; yet what happened? " T h e Roman proletarians became not wage laborers, but an idle mob more abject than the f o r m e r 'poor whites' in the southern regions of the United States; and there developed, alongside, a system of production based not on capitalism, but on slavery." M a r x did not discuss the reason for this dénouement, but f r o m a remark which he made in another connection, we may perhaps infer t h a t the crucial factor was the failure of the industrial crafts to keep pace with the growth of commercial capitalism. In general, he associated slavery with backward methods and tools of production. At any rate, "strikingly analogous" phenomena occurring in different historical milieus had "entirely disparate" results. One could explain these differences by studying the two evolutions and comparing them, never by the open sesame of a "historico-philosophical theory whose supreme virtue consists in being suprahistorical." 37 37

ment

"Lettre sur le développement économique de la R u s s i e , " Le Mouvesocialiste, V I I , 969-72. See also Das Kapita!, I I I 1 , 3 1 1 , 3 1 6 - 1 7 ; Der

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M a r x went further in the restatement of his position shortly before his death. T h e Russian revolutionist V e r a Zazulich asked him in 1 8 8 1 to clarify the question of the inevitability of capitalism. T h e reply was cryptic. H e again contended that his description of the genesis of capitalism in Das Kapital was restricted to Western Europe. Then he drew a distinction between the problem of Russia, which was that of transforming communal into private property, and the experience of the West, where one f o r m of private property—small-scale ownership—had been changed into another form—large-scale property—and concluded abruptly: " T h e analysis given in Das Kapital, therefore, offers no arguments f o r or against the vitality of the rural commune, but the special study I have made of it, the materials f o r which I sought in original sources, has convinced me that this commune is the point d'appui f o r the social regeneration of Russia. But in order that it may function as such, it would be necessary first to remove the deleterious influences which are attacking it from all sides and then to assure it the normal conditions of a spontaneous development." 38 Zazulich might be forgiven f o r inferring that M a r x offered a reasonable hope that Russia would be spared the trials of capitalism. In fact he was decidedly less convinced that there was still a chance f o r the survival of the mir than his letter implied. T h i s somewhat misleading, or at any rate vague, reply has puzzled students of M a r x . It has been suggested, probably correctly, that he did not wish to discourage the Russian revolutionists by pronouncing the death of an institution to which many of them were attached and by condemning their country to a system Achtzehnte Brumaire . . . pp. 1 8 - 1 9 ; Briefwechsel, ed., The Communist Manifesto, p. 289. 88 " V e r a Zazulich und K a r l M a r x , " Marx-Engels

IV, 275; Archiv,

Ryazanov,

I, 3 4 1 - 4 2 .

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whose indictment had attracted them to the banner of socialism. 39 H e had planned a more elaborate and less optimistic statement, four drafts of which have survived. This material was published for the first time in 1 9 2 7 in the Marx-Engels Archiv by Ryazanov, and is of the utmost importance f o r an understanding of the conception of history held by M a r x toward the end of his life. Even in Western Europe—so the argument ran—capitalism had not arisen with the inevitability of a law of nature. There was no inherent reason why the communal forms which had prevailed before feudalism could not have evolved into a higher form of communism, thus eliminating two stages, the feudal and the capitalistic. Capitalism had struck root as a result of a long series of catastrophes, crises, and conflicts of which the capitalist revolution proper was only the last. M a r x thought it significant that the countries which had established the system of private property earliest had been the first to witness movements to abandon it for socialism. The implication was that capitalism had not been inevitable anywhere! Historical circumstances, then, had played the determining part in bringing capitalism to Western Europe. But different, even "unique," circumstances affected Russia. It was not that the mir was peculiar to that country, as some of her scholars and radicals thought. Communal institutions had existed elsewhere in Europe and Asia. T h e Russians had merely clung to "old forms that their neighbors abolished long ago." Yet that fact was of great consequence. Russia was the only large European country where the commune continued to function on a national scale f a r into the nineteenth century, at a time when Western Europe had become intensively industrialized, when it had 39 R y a z a n o v in introduction to " V e r a Zazulich und K a r l M a r x , " ibid., pp. 3 1 1 - 1 2 ; see also p. 341. B . Nikolaievsky, " M a r x und das russische P r o b l e m , " Gesellschaft, 1924, I, 362 ff.

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become a p p a r e n t t h e r e t h a t capitalism was to be a transit o r y system a n d t h a t the p r o l e t a r i a n society was on t h e h o r i z o n , and w h e n — t h i s w a s most i m p o r t a n t — a backw a r d c o u n t r y m i g h t obtain ready m a d e the inventions, techniques, and m e t h o d s developed so painfully in the W e s t . M a r x asked those w h o denied t h a t a socialist society could possibly g r o w out of the " a r c h a i c " mir to explain h o w Russia h a d been able to introduce m o d e r n machinery w i t h o u t being f o r c e d t o pass t h r o u g h a long stage of industrial incubation and t o a d o p t quickly the mechanisms of exchange which the W e s t h a d been centuries developing. Clearly, a nation did not h a v e to r e p e a t all the experiences of o t h e r nations with which it came in contact in o r d e r t o benefit f r o m their progress. T h e commune possessed certain a d v a n t a g e s over capitalistic enterprise f o r t r a n s f o r m a t i o n into socialism. T h e historic isolation of t h e village economy had m a d e possible a simple type of cent r a l i z e d despotism which would not be difficult to dismantle. T h e c o m m u n e possessed a vitality g r e a t e r t h a n t h a t of the ancient Semitic, G r e e k , and R o m a n societies and, " a f o r t i o r i , g r e a t e r t h a n t h a t of m o d e r n capitalist societies." C e r t a i n characteristics of the commune p r e v e n t e d it f r o m passing beyond a limited degree of development, but it w a s not facing f a t a l obstacles. N o foreign enemy insisted on destroying it, as h a d been the case in India. Its economic isolation was steadily diminishing. T h e p e a s a n t s w e r e prep a r e d by their communal experiences f o r m o d e r n collective m e t h o d s of agriculture. In s h o r t , economically, technologically, and politically, t h e r e was no necessity f o r introducing capitalism in Russia as a preliminary to socialism. A s in the W e s t , so in t h e E a s t , the course of development would be d e t e r m i n e d , n o t by historical " l a w s " which laid down an u n a l t e r a b l e sequence of stages, but by complex and largely unpredictable

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circumstances and events. One could state a few possible alternatives but not decide between them in advance. T h e destiny of the mir was reduced to a race with time. T h e central question was whether the mir would succumb to capitalism before Czarism succumbed to revolution. If it did, then Russia would enter upon a long and costly capitalistic process. If the revolution occurred before the mir had disintegrated and i f — t h e second " i f " was crucial— the W e s t should pass f r o m capitalism to socialism, at the same time, then the mir would become the basis f o r socialization. It was a matter of determining the degree of deterioration of the commune, the chances f o r the overthrow of Czarism, and the possibility of a simultaneous revolution in the West. 4 0 N o w M a r x had long held the opinion that the mir was being subjected to irresistible attacks. Capitalism was visibly entrenching itself. 4 1 Communal ownership was "already on the d o w n g r a d e " in 1 8 8 2 . " T o save the Russian commune, a Russian revolution is needed"—promptly. Only an equally prompt and successful revolution in the W e s t could assure communal Russia of the political support and material implements which would enable it to develop a socialist society. 42 Neither revolution occurred in the nineteenth century. T h e fact was that the Russian government, f a r from undermining the mir, as M a r x thought it was doing, actually supported and used it as a basis for the land settlement which accompanied the emancipation of the serfs. It was not until a f t e r the defeat of the Revolution of 1905 that 40 "Vera Zazulich und K a r l M a r x , " Marx-Engels Archiv, I, 318-40; Briefwechsel, IV, 27. See also "Briefe an Dr. K u g e l m a n n , " S eue Zeit, X X - , 4 1 5 - 1 6 ; Das Kapital, I, 198. 11 Das Kapital, I, 524. 42 Briefwechsel, IV, 1 2 1 ; "Vera Zazulich und K a r l M a r x , " Marx-Engels Archiv, I, 328-39; Ryazanov, ed., The Communist Manifesto, pp. 264-65.

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the government began to f a v o r the b r e a k u p of the communes and the establishment of a system of individual proprietorship. T h e process of dissolution w a s slow and the mir was still a v e r y important and vital institution when C z a r i s m finally collapsed. T h e R u s s i a n Revolution occurred under circumstances which m a d e possible the transition f r o m communalism to modern collectivism, despite the f a i l u r e of the W e s t to produce a simultaneous socialist revolution. M a r x ' s sense of timing and his v i e w of the interconnection between a d v a n c e d and b a c k w a r d countries in the establishment of socialism were obviously at f a u l t . H i s insistence, h o w e v e r , that a complete capitalist stage w a s not inevitable in Russia and that the commune might f o r m , to some extent, a b r i d g e between the old r u r a l o r d e r and the new was substantially confirmed by history.

J

3

THE UNITED STATES: A N A T I O N IN T H E M A K I N G M ARX r e g a r d e d the U n i t e d States as the g r e a t prototype of the modern colonial nations f o u n d e d by E u r o p e a n emigrants in the new lands of the other continents. A l though the y o u n g nations w e r e in m a n y respects integral p a r t s of the g e n e r a l historical m o v e m e n t of the W e s t e r n w o r l d , they h a d special characteristics and f a c e d problems somewhat different f r o m those of the older nations of E u rope. In all colonial countries, the p a r a m o u n t task of occupying and conquering v a s t territories absorbed f o r a long time the energies of the people and completely overshado w e d other pursuits and interests. I f a colony was, as M a r x defined it, a country with " v i r g i n soil, colonized by f r e e i m m i g r a n t s , " the U n i t e d States remained colonial approximately t h r o u g h the nineteenth century. In the sense of economic and especially financial dependence on the O l d W o r l d , it ceased to be a colonial nation only g r a d u a l l y a f t e r the Civil W a r , o r a century a f t e r it had reached political sovereignty. A s late as 1 8 6 7 M a r x asserted that the U n i t e d States w a s , " e c o n o m i c a l l y speaking, still only a colony of E u r o p e . " 1 1 Das Kapital, I, 417»»., 721, 729n., 733. On the nature of colonies, see, ibid., III 2 , 190, 2 1 0 - 1 1 , 289, 303; Theorien über den Mehrwert, II 2 , 70-72, 83-84; Briefwechsel, IV, 250.

The American Nation

17 1

T h e most i m p o r t a n t peculiarity of the colonial nation w a s the slowness of its stratification into the social classes associated with a f u l l - g r o w n capitalist system. M a r x obs e r v e d in 1 8 4 8 t h a t class struggles had not yet begun in the W e s t e r n states, while in the E a s t they " s t i r r e d in the old, silent E n g l i s h w a y . " 2 F o u r y e a r s l a t e r he w r o t e that classes already existed in the U n i t e d States, but w a s careful to add that they had " n o t yet become fixed, but continually change and interchange their elements in a constant state of flux. . . . " 3 B o u r g e o i s society h a d not yet d e v e l o p e d " f a r enough to m a k e the class s t r u g g l e evident and c o m p r e h e n s i b l e . " 4 Signs of p r o l e t a r i a n i z a t i o n w e r e apparent a f t e r the C i v i l W a r . T h e " g r e a t R e p u b l i c " ceased to be " t h e p r o m i s e d land of e m i g r a n t w o r k e r s . " T r u e , w a g e s w e r e still h i g h e r and the w o r k e r s less dependent than in E u r o p e . H o w e v e r , a sediment of surplus l a b o r had a l r e a d y begun to f o r m in the E a s t , f o r m i g r a t i o n to the W e s t did not keep pace with i m m i g r a t i o n f r o m E u rope. A t the same time, capitalism w a s advancing with " g i a n t s t r i d e s " ; the C i v i l W a r h a d b r o u g h t in its train " a colossal national debt, and with it, pressure of taxation, the creation of a financial aristocracy of the vilest sort, the squandering of a huge p a r t of the public lands on speculative companies f o r the exploitation of r a i l w a y s , mines, etc.—in short, the r a p i d centralization of c a p i t a l . " 8 In 1 8 8 2 M a r x recorded the definitive victory of capitalism in the U n i t e d States. 6 A young nation m a y be v e r y old in certain respects. T h e U n i t e d States w a s a pioneer in religious f r e e d o m , but it was also " p r e ë m i n e n t l y the country of r e l i g i o s i t y . " 7 T h e - Sämtliche H'erke, V I I , 407; V, 52; Nachlass, III, 438. ·'· Der Achtzchnte Brumaire . . . p. 30. 4 5 Ausgewählte Briefe, p. 47. Das Kapital, I, 738. " Ryazanov, ed., The Communist Manifesto, pp. 263-64. 'Sämtliche Werke, I 1 , 581, 590-91,

i7 2

The American Nation

N e w W o r l d seemed to be more bound by custom than the Old, where centuries of critical thought had destroyed worn-out ideas. Americans had been too busy with the problem of subduing a continent to share in the critical process, and they remained culturally backward. 8 In less esoteric realms, however, they showed refreshing shrewdness and spontaneity of thought. While traditions common to E u r o p e and the United States survived longer in the latter, this country possessed the advantage of not having developed an inflexible body of tradition of its own.® M a r x was impressed by the practical sense of Franklin and Lincoln, who was one of the few privileged contemporaries f o r whom M a r x had a respect approaching admiration. Franklin had given the first "clear analysis of exchange value as labor time." 1 0 H i s penetrating definition of man as a toolmaking animal was characteristically " Y a n k e e . " 1 1 M a r x pictured the American soldier in action in a discussion of the Mexican W a r of 1846—48. E v e r y division and even " e v e r y individual, small body of troops, despite mistaken or deficient orders of the chief, always stubbornly heads f o r the goal and spontaneously exploits every accident, so that finally something worth while comes of it." T h i s was " Y a n k e e spirit of independence and individual efficiency, perhaps even in excess of the Anglo-Saxons." 1 2 Politically, the United States was in advance of the older Continent. T h e American revolutionists had led in organizing the first modern bourgeois state. T h e establishment of the principles of political and religious freedom was a historic step f o r w a r d . 1 3 T h e W a r of Independence had 8

Der Achtzehnte Brumaire . . . p. 30. • Zur Kritik der politischen Ökonomie, p. 4 3 ; "Carey und Basttat," S eue Zeit, X X I I 2 , 8-12. 10 Zur Kritik der politischen Ökonomie, p. 43. 11 12 Das Kapital, I, 142, 290-91Π. Briefwechsel, II, 69. 13 Sämtliche Werke, I 1 , 585.

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" s o u n d e d the tocsin f o r the E u r o p e a n middle c l a s s e s , " and M a r x hoped the Civil W a r might h a v e the s a m e effect upon the E u r o p e a n p r o l e t a r i a t . 1 4 A l t h o u g h in 1 8 4 6 he spoke of the United States as " t h e m o s t p r o g r e s s i v e count r y , " 1 3 he frequently criticized its political parties and political corruption. T h e A m e r i c a n polity p r o v e d the inadequacy of liberalism and democracy in the absence of economic and social r e f o r m s . H e once r e f e r r e d to the U n i t e d States as " t h e model country of the democratic s w i n d l e . " 1 8 Y e t he acknowledged the v a l u e of the social and educational gains of A m e r i c a n w o r k e r s . H e recognized the importance of individual liberty and w o u l d not let others disparage it. , T H i s appreciation of the strength of A m e r i c a n political institutions w a s implicit in the admission that they might possibly p a v e the w a y f o r an evolutionary transition to socialism. 1 8 H e insisted, of course, that liberal and democratic institutions must be supplemented by labor organization and political action directed t o w a r d the realization of socialism. 1 9 B u t first the U n i t e d States would pass t h r o u g h the stage of capitalism. T h e r e w e r e two special obstacles in its path : the f r o n t i e r of f r e e land with its system of small-scale p r o p e r t y , and slavery. M a r x did not share the hope of ref o r m e r s w h o saw in f r e e land a short cut to U t o p i a . 2 0 W h i l e he conceded, as we have seen, that the communal 14 Das Kapital, I, v i i - v i i i ; H. Schlüter, Lincoln, Labor and Slavery (New Y o r k , 1 9 1 3 ) , p. 1 8 9 ; " A n die Arbeiter von E u r o p a und den Vereinigten S t a a t e n ! " Der Vorbote, J u n e 1869, p. 87. 15 Correspondence, p. 14. 16 Briefwechsel, I I I , 102, 105-6, 1 9 1 ; Sorge, op. cit., p. 297. 17 Brief-wechsel, I I I , 8 3 ; " D e r politische Indifferentismus," Neue Zeit, X X X I I 1 , 40 ff. ; Zur Kritik der politischen Ökonomie, p. 246. 18 Steklov, op. cit., pp. 2 4 0 - 4 1 . 19 Briefwechsel, I I I , 240; "Vierter jährlicher Bericht des Generalrathe9 der Internationalen Arbeiter-Association," Der Vorbote, September 1868, p. 139. 20 Sämtliche Werke, V I , 1 1 - 1 3 .

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village system of Russia might, given favorable circumstances, f o r m the basis f o r a socialist society, he would not admit that the distribution of land in individual f a r m s and the establishment of a small-scale and largely self-sufficient agrarian economy could serve the same end. Small-scale farming would merely make the path of capitalism slower and more circuitous. Nevertheless, M a r x strongly supported the demands of American and Australian reformers f o r the free distribution of the public lands in small plots. A s a radical, he felt he must side with the democratic forces behind this program, with the underdog. H e was also concerned in preventing the entrenchment of landlordism which had proved a reactionary influence in E u r o p e . 2 1 In the forties he had entertained the hope that the movement of the small free settlers would promote bourgeois industrialism. H e abandoned that hope before long. Frontier and capitalism came to represent antagonistic, indeed irreconcilable and mutually exclusive, systems of private property. 2 2 T h e capitalist system of property could exist only if "the vast majority of society" owned no property. 2 ·' T h e exploitation of indigent workers was essential to capitalism. 24 T h e unpropertied many must come to depend on wages and compete with each other f o r the privilege of using the means of production assembled in the hands of the heavily-propertied f e w . T h e frontier, however, gave private property to the many, who proceeded to work f o r themselves. 2 5 T h e system of small, independent property must be destroyed if capitalism was to succeed. 20 It was a mistake to argue with colonial economists like E . C. Wakefield, that "the splitting up of the means of production into 21 22 24 25 26

"Briefe an Dr. Kugelmann," Neue Zeil, X X 2 , 191. 23 Das Kapital, I, 730. Sämtliche Werke, VI, 540. Das Kapital, I, 719. Ibid., p. 730; Theorien über den Mehrwert, II 2 , 70-72. Das Kapital, I, 728, 730, 7 3 1 ; Sämtliche Werke, VI, 539.

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the individual properties of many w o r k e r s , independent of one another and each f o r h i m s e l f , " w a s but another f o r m of capitalism. 2 7 T h e means of production and subsistence w e r e not " c a p i t a l " if they w e r e o w n e d by w o r k e r s . T h e y became " c a p i t a l " in the hands of a person w h o w a s not an immediate producer himself, but used them to exploit others. C a p i t a l i s t accumulation and the reproduction of wealth on a l a r g e scale were impossible in new countries so long a s f r e e land w a s available. 2 8 M o n e y , g o o d s , and machinery could not make their o w n e r a capitalist in the absence of the w a g e w o r k e r , that " o t h e r m a n " w h o felt " c o m p e l l e d to sell himself of his own f r e e w i l l . " 29 In new countries, the labor m a r k e t w a s unreliable at best, especially f o r long-range enterprises, because the w a g e w o r k e r of t o d a y was the independent f a r m e r o r h a n d i c r a f t s m a n of t o m o r r o w . 3 0 It would not even do to import one's own labor supply so long as the w o r k e r s h a d access to v a c a n t soil. T h e scarcity of l a b o r m a d e w a g e s high and high w a g e s , M a r x observed slyly, m a d e the colonial rate of exploitation "indecently l o w . " 3 1 T h e psychological situation w a s no better, f o r the w o r k e r lost his " s e n s e of dependence on the abstemious capitalist." 3 2 F i n a l l y , the self-sufficient J a c k - o f - a l l - t r a d e s of the f r o n t i e r w a s a p o o r customer of industrial g o o d s . 3 3 Capitalism could not thrive until wealth w a s more concentrated and p o v e r t y m o r e widely distributed. T h e history of the modern colonial nation seemed to M a r x to confirm his theory that capitalism originated in expropriation and compulsion. I f it w e r e true, as some economists argued, that capitalism w a s b a s e d on a volunt a r y agreement among men to divide themselves into w o r k 27 28 30 32

Das Kapital, I, 730, 7 3 1 ; Sämtliche 20 Das Kapital, I, 731-32. 31 ibid., pp. 732, 734, 735, 736. 33 Loc. cit.

Werke, VI, 482 ff. Ibid., pp. 731, 733-34. Ibid., p. 734. Ibid., pp. 733-34.

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ers and capitalists, where was there ever a better opportunity to make such a contract than in the f r e e colonies? If the mass of mankind had willingly "expropriated itself in honor of the 'accumulation of capital' " in older countries, one would think that "the instinct f o r this self-denying fanaticism would especially have free rein in the colonies, since there, alone, men and conditions existed which could translate a social contract f r o m a dream into reality." 34 T h e American and Australian colonists shattered that d r e a m simply by refusing to work f o r wages. 3 3 T h e rule that capitalism is born of expropriation would hold in the United States, as elsewhere. 3 8 T h e hope of America must rest, not on any special feature of its development, but on the establishment of a socialist society by means of a great proletarian movement. While capitalism would have to overcome small property insidiously and by degrees, it required a violent revolution to dispose of the other enemy—slavery. Following the tradition of classical economics since the physiocrats, M a r x opposed slavery as an obstruction to the growth of the f r e e market. 3 7 T h r o u g h the plantation economy, slavery strengthened the landed interest which ran counter to the industrial interest at many points. Slavery did not adequately promote the productive reinvestment of profits. 38 I t compelled the use of backward techniques. 39 T h e competition of slave labor hampered the emergent industrial proletariat and no independent labor movement was possible so long as slavery "disfigured a p a r t of the Republic." 40 " L a b o r with a white skin cannot emancipate itself where labor with a black skin is b r a n d e d . " 41 M a r x was revolted by the particularly brutal exploitation of the 34 37 38

35 30 Ibid., p. 732. Ibid., p. 734. Ibid., pp. 733, 738-39. Ibid., pp. 1 3 1 , 299; Theorien über den Mehrwert, I I 2 , 72. 3S Das Kapital, I, 561. Ibid., ρ. 159n. Ibid., p. 264; Schlüter, op. cit., pp. 1 8 8 - 9 1 . « l Das Kapital, I, 264.

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plantation system, in which " t h e civilized h o r r o r " of overw o r k w a s g r a f t e d on such " b a r b a r i c h o r r o r s " as s l a v e r y . 4 2 F o r all these r e a s o n s he f o u g h t f o r the abolition of s l a v e r y . H e was a fierce p a r t i s a n of the N o r t h in the C i v i l W a r , which he r e g a r d e d as a conflict between " t h e system of s l a v e r y and the system of f r e e l a b o r . " 4 3 T h e w a r broke out because the t w o systems could no longer " l i v e peacefully side by s i d e " ; it could only end with the victory of one or the other. 4 4 B y its v e r y nature, slavery could not survive unless it could e x p a n d ; it w o u l d surely die if restricted to the old slave states. 4 5 T h e South started the w a r in o r d e r to acquire territories in the W e s t and also in C e n t r a l and South A m e r i c a . T h e W a r of the C o n f e d e r a c y was theref o r e " n o t a w a r of d e f e n s e but a w a r of conquest f o r the extension and perpetuation of s l a v e r y . " 46 If the South won, the " s l a v e system w o u l d infect the whole Union. I n the N o r t h e r n States, w h e r e N e g r o slavery is in practice unworkable, the white w o r k i n g class would gradually be f o r c e d down to the level of helotry. T h i s would accord with the loudly p r o c l a i m e d principle that only certain races are capable of f r e e d o m , and as the actual labor is the lot of the N e g r o in the South, so in the N o r t h it is the lot of the G e r m a n and the I r i s h m a n , or their direct descenda n t s . " 47 T h e w a r w a s one of those moments of history when the cooperation of the lower classes with the ruling middle classes w a s t h o r o u g h l y justified, in order to assure the progress of the nation (here, by abolishing s l a v e r y ) . 4 8 M a r x and E n g e l s called on the N o r t h to conduct a revolutionary w a r on the model of the French campaigns of 1 7 9 2 - 9 3 , when democratic r e f o r m s and united action 42 43 44 47

Ibid., pp. 197, 228, 229, 725. The Civil li'ar in the United States, pp. 81, 157. 45 Ibid., pp. 60-61, 81. Ibid., pp. 66, 69, 80. 46 Ibid., pp. 73, 79. Ibid., p. 81. See Engels' view, Briefwechsel, III, 107, 108-9.

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against the aristocracy f o r g e d a mighty national alliance. 4 9 T h e y urged recruiting by conscription and the i m m e d i a t e emancipation of the slaves. 5 0 Despite the d e f e a t s and d i s a p p o i n t m e n t s of t h e first p h a s e of the w a r , M a r x never d o u b t e d t h a t the N o r t h would prevail in the end. 5 1 T h e r e w e r e two reasons f o r his confidence. T h e g r e a t e r resources and population of the N o r t h (with the assistance of the i m p o r t a n t N o r t h w e s t a r e a s 5 - ) must ultimately outweigh the initial a d v a n t a g e of the South, which, as an " o l i g a r c h y , " was b e t t e r a d a p t e d t o military exertions.™ H o w e v e r , Lincoln w o u l d eventually conduct the w a r with the necessary energy. 1 ' 4 F u r t h e r m o r e , the success of the South, to be w o r t h a n y t h i n g at all, must be complete to a r e m a r k a b l e degree. T h e struggle hinged on the b o r d e r states which were vital t o the South as slave-breeders. W h o e v e r controlled these states d o m i n a t e d the Union. 5 "' If the South were p o w e r f u l enough t o enforce possession of the b o r d e r states, it would be in a position to secure C a l i f o r n i a as well ; t h e N o r t h w e s t would follow and the whole U n i o n , with the possible exception of N e w E n g l a n d , would be r e o r g a n i z e d under the "acknowledged supremacy of the s l a v e h o l d e r s . " 3U Given the superiority of the potential might of the N o r t h and the N o r t h west, such a t r i u m p h was inconceivable to M a r x . U n l i k e the South, the N o r t h could a f f o r d to m a k e peace on t h e basis of a compromise. In short, the South must lose because a t h o r o u g h g o i n g victory was impossible, given the r a t i o of strength between f r e e capitalism and slavery, and a p a r t i a l victory was worthless. W h e t h e r o r not Ibid., p. 107. 50 51 52

',3

55

50

Ibid., p. 81 ; The Civil IV ar in the United States, p. 82. Briefwechsel, I I I , ι ι ο - ι ι ; see also 68, 81-82, 92, τοι-2, ιοη, 108-9. The Civil War in the United States, p. 7 0 ; Briefwechsel, I I I , 29-30. 54 Briefwechsel, I I I , 102. Ibid., pp. 92, 1 0 1 - 2 , 104-5, 1 0 8 - 1 1 . Ibid., pp. 59, 104. The Civil War in the United States, p. 80; Briefwechsel, III, 101-2.

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M a r x ' s reasoning was sound, his conclusion was confirmed by the event. T h e victory of the N o r t h unleashed capitalism. T h e population g r e w and new means of communication and transportation increased the " d e n s i t y " of its interrelationships. 5 7 T h e relative scarcity of labor compelled a g r e a t e r use of machinery than in E n g l a n d . 5 8 It w a s common in the U n i t e d States to introduce machines in small h a n d i c r a f t industries and, predicted M a r x , when the inevitable transition to the f a c t o r y system occurred " t h e ensuing concentration will march f o r w a r d in seven-league boots, compared with E u r o p e and even with E n g l a n d . " 59 T h e spirit of capitalist enterprise had long been alive in the U n i t e d States. B e f o r e the outbreak of the Civil W a r M a r x had observed that " a nation is at its industrial height so long as its main object is not gain, but the process of g a i n i n g . " F r o m that point of view, the A m e r i c a n s stood above the English. 6 0 In 1 8 7 9 M a r x declared that the United States had overtaken E n g l a n d in the rapidity of its economic progress, although it was still behind in the extent of acquired wealth. 8 1 T h r e e years later, he and E n g e l s summed up the economic changes since 1 8 4 8 : European emigration has promoted the unprecedented growth of agriculture in North America, which in its turn, by becoming a competitor of European agriculture, has shaken the landed interests of Europe (great and small alike) to their very foundations. Again, the development of farming in the United States has made it possible to exploit the vast industrial resources of the country so effec57

Das Kapital, I, 317, 738. Theorien über den Mehrwert, I I 2 , 369-70Π.; Das Kapital, I, 358, 4 2 5 η . ; Der Achtzehnte Brumaire . . . p. 30. 09 Das Kapital, I, 425n. 60 Zur Kritik der politischen Ökonomie, pp. 2 1 9 - 2 0 , 240. 61 Correspondence, p. 360; " D i e internationalen K o n g r e s s e , " Der Vorbote, August 1867, p. 1 1 6 . 58

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tively that, before long, American competition will put an end to the monopoly hitherto exercised by Western Europe in the realm of industry. These two courses of evolution react, in their turn, upon the United States, tending to force that country likewise into revolutionary paths. More and more the small and medium-sized farms, the warp and woof of the whole political system, tend to be submerged by the competition of large-scale undertakings. Simultaneously in the field of industry, we are witnessing the emergence of a multitudinous proletariat and a fabulous concentration of capital."

T h e exploitation of labor grew apace. Although land was still available to a certain extent to the great mass of people, M a r x observed in 1881, capitalism and its characteristic "enslavement" of the workers "have developed more rapidly and brazenly than in any other country." 63 H e came to recognize that labor faced special difficulties in the United States. Yet he always felt that American labor, once on its way, would catch up with European labor organizations and possibly surpass them. T h e revolutionary optimism and activism of M a r x led him to overestimate the significance of all energetic working-class movements. T h e first American radical organization with which he became acquainted—in the forties—was the National R e f o r m Association. T h e Association advocated equal division of public lands and their f r e e distribution to persons who owned no other property. M a r x not only supported this p r o g r a m but seems to have regarded the agrarian movement as proletarian in origin and as the forerunner of the f u t u r e socialist movement. W h i l e he was correct in thinking that the agrarians were radical and even somewhat class-conscious, 04 little did he 62 Ryazanov, ed., The Communist Manifesto, pp. 263-64; Briefwechsel, IV, 250. β3 Sorge, op. cit., p. 177. β4 J . R. Commons and Associates, History of Labour in the United States (New York, 1936), I, 522 ff.

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realize then how deeply individualistic they were or how thoroughly committed to private property. T h e Association declared that the agrarians "desired not to interfere, pro or con, with the present arrangements of Society, further than they may be regulated by the right of every man in this Republic to become a Freeholder on the Public Lands." M o r e specifically, they "do not want an equal division, or any division at all, of private property—either of land property, or property created by human hands." 85 This was more in harmony with Jeffersonianism and Jacksonianism than with Marxism. The failure of the Revolutions of 1848 had the effect of moderating the immediate expectations of M a r x f o r both European and American labor. English Chartism collapsed and the National R e f o r m Association petered out, although their programs eventually prevailed in large measure. M a r x ' s hopes were revived by the Civil W a r . In a proclamation of the International, he asserted rhetorically that labor was "the true political power of the North." 66 T h e post-war period witnessed a great wave of organization. T h e labor movement was stimulated by the freeing of the slaves. 67 M a r x commended the campaign for the eight-hour day and the formation of the National Labor Union, which has been described as "the first important national labor federation in the United States." 68 The slogan of the Union, M a r x wrote, was "organization f o r the struggle against capital ; and curiously enough most of the demands which I drew up f o r Geneva [second Con65 The Working Man's Advocate, A p r i l 20, 1844, p. 1 ; M a r c h 30, 1844, p. 1 ; April 6, 1844, p. 1 ; and Young America!, M a r c h 6, 1847, p. 2. 66 Schlüter, op. cit., p. 190. 67 Das Kapital, I, 264; Briefwechsel, I I I , 328; " D i e internationalen K o n gresse," Der Vorbote, August 1867, pp. 1 1 5 - 1 6 . os Das Kapital, I, 264-65 ; Nathan Fine, Labor and Farmer Parties in the United States, 1828-1928 ( N e w Y o r k , 1928), p. 23.

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gress of the F i r s t I n t e r n a t i o n a l ] were also put f o r w a r d by the correct instinct of the [ A m e r i c a n ] w o r k e r s . " 69 He praised the liberal position of the U n i o n on the issue of women's rights. 7 0 M a r x established contact with the leaders of the Union, which at one time considered formal affiliation with the International. 7 1 B e f o r e long, however, the N a t i o n a l L a b o r Union disintegrated; it disappeared in the early seventies. When M a r x proposed the r e m o v a l of the internally-wracked International to the U n i t e d States, he argued that this country w a s "preëminently becoming the land of the workers": half a million w o r k e r s immigrated there every year and the International " m u s t p e r f o r c e strike deep roots in this soil upon which the w o r k e r s are supreme." 7 2 H e was mistaken, f o r the organization hardly breathed a f t e r leaving E u r o p e ; its f o r m a l demise occurred in Philadelphia in 1 8 7 3 . M a r x did not despair. A m e r i c a n socialists faced " g r e a t " obstacles, some economic, some political, but they were making h e a d w a y against them. 7 3 In the late seventies A m e r i c a n labor again seemed definitely on the march. A w a v e of strikes spread to many parts of the country, particularly affecting the railways. D i s o r d e r s broke out and F e d e r a l troops intervened in the struggle between capital and labor. In Pittsburgh the militia sensationally fraternized with the strikers. " W h a t do you think of the workers of the U n i t e d S t a t e s ? " M a r x exclaimed. " T h i s first outbreak against the capitalist oligarchy which has arisen since the Civil W a r will naturally be put down, but it may 69 " B r i e f e an Dr. K u g e l m a n n , " Neue Zeit, X X 2 , 63 ; M . Hillquit, History of Socialism in the United States ( N e w Y o r k , 1 9 1 0 ) , pp. 165-66. 70 " B r i e f e an D r . K u g e l m a n n , " Neue Zeit, X X 2 , 383. 71 Hillquit, op. cit., pp. 168, 1 7 3 ; Schlüter, op. cit., pp. 2 2 9 - 3 4 ; "Jahresbericht des Generalraths an den Kongress in B a s e l , " Der Vorbote, September 1869, p. 143. On W . H . Sylvis, see Briefwechsel, I V , 224. 72 Steklov, op. cit., p. 241. 73 " B r i e f e an D r . K u g e l m a n n , " Neue Zeit, X X 2 , 800.

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well f o r m the starting point of the establishment of a real workers' p a r t y in the U n i t e d S t a t e s . " H e thought that the Western f a r m e r s and the N e g r o e s might be driven by the reconstruction policy of the newly-elected President Rutherford H a y e s and by the land grants to companies in the West to ally themselves politically with the proletarians. 7 4 In 1 8 8 1 he observed that the publication of Progress and Poverty by H e n r y G e o r g e w a s "significant" as " a first, if unsuccessful, attempt at f r e e d o m f r o m the orthodox political economy." 7 5 M a r x reached a less definite diagnosis of the problems of American than of E n g l i s h socialism. H i s emphasis on the importance of vigorous activity in the trade-union field and the enthusiasm with which he welcomed every effort to organize labor on a national scale regardless of theoretical p r o g r a m s , show that he w a s in accord with the many warnings E n g e l s issued to G e r m a n immigrant radicals against attempts to impose G e r m a n or M a r x i s t " d o g mas" on A m e r i c a n workers. 7 ® B o t h men felt that " e v e r y step of a real m o v e m e n t " w a s more important than a dozen p r o g r a m s . 7 7 It seemed suicidal to make theoretical orthodoxy, instead of effective organization and a sound general direction, the test of militancy. T h e labor movement, according to E n g e l s , would mature politically and develop socialist interests and leadership in its own good time by the process of attempting to better the condition of its members, not by indoctrination f r o m without. T h e evolution f r o m organization f o r immediate practical aims to socialism "must happen in the E n g l i s h w a y , " and the G e r man radicals who would function effectively alongside of the workers must strip off " t h e special G e r m a n c h a r a c t e r " of their doctrine. 7 8 74

75 Briefwechsel, IV, 466. Sorge, op. cit., p. 177. Ibid., p. 239; see also pp. 224, 242-44, 323, 328-30. 78 ''''Kritik des Gothaer Programms, p. 39. Sorge, op. cit., p. 239. 76

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T o the end, h o w e v e r , and apart f r o m tactical problems and issues, M a r x and E n g e l s were confident that the future of A m e r i c a n labor and socialism was no less bright than the future of A m e r i c a n industrialism.

M WAS MARX A N A T I O N A L I S T ? T H E B I O G R A P H Y of a scientist is n o t likely to illuminate the basis of his professional contributions. T h e personal factor is obviously m o r e i m p o r t a n t in analyzing the thought or action of the social scientist, and especially t h a t of the practical statesman. T h a t is why m e m o i r s and reminiscences are m o r e essential source m a t e r i a l s f o r the study of history t h a n f o r physical or abstract science. There is ample justification f o r inquiring into the i n f o r m a l opinions and tendencies of M a r x and their effect on his national views. M a r x en pantoufles m a y help to explain Marx on the p l a t f o r m .

T h e r e is a m o r e immediate reason, however, f o r such an inquiry. T h e question has been raised m o r e t h a n once whether the f o u n d e r of "scientific socialism," f o r all his internationalist professions, was not actually a nationalist or even a chauvinist, consciously or unconsciously. I t has seemed to some critics of M a r x t h a t he d r e w invidious distinctions between races and nations. O t h e r s h a v e gone f u r ther and flatly accused him of being a G e r m a n nationalist, a Pan-Germanist, a h a t e r of Slavs, Russians and Frenchmen, and an anti-Semite. 1 1 J. Guillaume, Karl Marx, Pangermaniste . . . ( P a r i s , 1915), pp. iii-iv and passim; B e r t r a n d Russell, Freedom versus Organization ( N e w York, '934)> PP· 2 I 4 - I 5 ! M a x Nomad, " M a r x and Bakunin," Hound and Horn, New York, A p r i l - J u n e 1933, p. 385. For milder criticisms, see T . G. Masaryk, Die philosophischen und soziologischen Grundlagen des Marxismus (Vienna, 1899), pp. 429-30, 438, 444-45; C h a r l e s A . D a n a ' s letter, Herr Vogt, appendix, pp. 188-89; S. M . Dubnow, Welt ge schichte des jüdischen Volkes (Berlin, 1925-30), IX, 83, 130 ff,

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Such indictments were frequently generated in the heat of partisan w a r f a r e and polemics and are therefore not worth their face value. One cannot take seriously all the attacks against a man whose life was a long succession of highly personal controversies and whose teachings and activities have aroused bitter debates to this day. On the other hand, it will not do to dismiss these charges out of hand, f o r the fact is that M a r x left himself quite open to some of them. F o r example, he nursed a strong antipathy toward Russians f o r many years. H e looked upon them rather indiscriminately as superficial in their cultural interests and attainments, insincere, overbearing, and even mendacious. " T h e r e is no such word in the Russian vocabulary as 'honor,' " he once remarked. " A s to the thing itself, it is considered to be a French delusion. 'Schto takoi honneur, Et Fransusski chimère,' [ W h a t is honor? It is a French chimera.] is a Russian proverb." 2 T h e context of this observation, true enough, was a criticism of the diplomacy of Czarism, but M a r x thought little better of the Russians with whom he came in contact. Under the circumstances he was naturally embarrassed that he was repaid with consideration and kindness. H e received prompt recognition in Russia. 3 It seemed to him an "irony of f a t e " that the "good friends" whom he had " f o u g h t f o r twenty-five y e a r s " should have always been his "patrons." Russian aristocrats had treated him with extreme courtesy in his early sojourn in Paris in 1 8 4 3 - 4 4 . Misère de la philosophie and Zur Kritik der politischen Ökonomie sold better in Russia than anywhere else. Admitting all this, M a r x refused to be impressed. H e complained that the noblemen who studied abroad swallowed the most extreme theories 2 3

The Story of the Life of Lord Palmerston, p. 53. Sorge, op. cit., p. 172,

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that the W e s t had to offer. It was "pure gourmandise," in the manner of the French aristocracy of the eighteenth century, whose Enlightenment was not meant f o r the common people. A s soon as they entered the state service, the liberal noblemen became "scoundrels." 4 T h e Russian colony at Geneva asked him in 1 8 7 0 whether he would become its representative in the General Council of the First International. M a r x was amused by this " d r o l l " situation. H e submitted to the "strange fellowship" but took subtle revenge. In his letter accepting the offer, he emphasized that the main task of the group was " t o work f o r the independence of P o l a n d , " which meant, as he remarked in an aside to Engels, that the Russians were to " f r e e Europe f r o m themselves as n e i g h b o r s ! " 5 In the seventies, this stiffness began to give. H e was struck by the vigor of the Russian revolutionary movement. A biting reference to Alexander Herzen, the famous Russian liberal editor, in the first edition of Das Kapital was deleted in later editions.® M a r x praised the terrorists and showed a more sober appreciation of individual Russians. 7 T h e socialist thinker was not given to acknowledging mistakes or failings, but one gets the impression that toward the end of his life, he may have felt shamefaced at having allowed himself to make sweeping judgments of a large group of people on the basis of limited experiences. 8 T h a t M a r x exhibited antagonism toward various Slavic 4

" B r i e f e an Dr. K u g e l m a n n , " Neue Zeit, XX2, 224. ·' Briefwechsel, I V , 296, 387. 6 Das Kapital ( H a m b u r g , 1 8 6 7 ) , p. 7 6 3 ; "Lettre sur le développement économique de la Russie," Le Mouvement socialiste, V U , 969; Briefwechsel, I V , 356. 7 Ausgewählte Briefe, p. 3 2 1 ; Sorge, op. cit., p. 1 7 2 ; P. L. L a v r o v , " H e r mann Alexandrowitsch L o p a t i n , " Neue Zeit, V I I , 302. 8 See R y a z a n o v ' s opinion in " M a r * und seine russischen Bekannten in den vierziger J a h r e n , " Neue Zeit, X X X I 1 , 7 1 5 ff., 757 ff. ; and E. B e r n stein's in " K a r l M a r x und Michael B a k u n i n , " Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik, X X X , 3-5.

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g r o u p s t h e r e can be no question ; but it was not a consistent, conscious, o r ideological a n t a g o n i s m . B o t h he and E n g e l s delivered themselves of a r b i t r a r y a n d u n f a i r opinions on t h e smaller Slavic n a t i o n s . W e have seen how they were set d o w n as " r u i n s of p e o p l e s " w i t h o u t a historical f u t u r e . T h e W e s t e r n Slavs w e r e consigned summarily to national extinction in t h e next w a v e of revolution." On the o t h e r h a n d , M a r x was a consistent s u p p o r t e r of the independence of a n o t h e r Slavic n a t i o n , t h e Poles. W e are evidently dealing with a complex of a t t i t u d e s affected by revolut i o n a r y calculations. But it c a n n o t be denied t h a t he abs o r b e d much anti-Slav p r e j u d i c e in his early G e r m a n environment.10 M a r x ' s a t t i t u d e t o w a r d F r a n c e was s o m e w h a t ambivalent. I t s political energy a n d l e a d e r s h i p aroused his ent h u s i a s m ; the d e f e n s e of t h e P a r i s C o m m u n e in Der Bürgerkrieg in Frankreich m i g h t h a v e been written by a n a t i v e p r o u d of the r e v o l u t i o n a r y t r a d i t i o n of his country. Y e t he w a s intensely a n n o y e d by Gallic nationalism. W h e n he spoke of chauvinisme, it w a s as if the passion were as F r e n c h as t h e w o r d . W h i l e he freely acknowledged his indebtedness to the g r e a t social thinkers of France, he bet r a y e d increasing irritability with t h e affectations of national s u p e r i o r i t y of c o n t e m p o r a r y radical leaders. 1 1 H i s reaction to the J e w i s h people was r a t h e r m o r e complex. T h e w o r l d has r e g a r d e d M a r x as a J e w ; he was not i n f r e q u e n t l y r e m i n d e d of his origin. T h a t was n o t his own point of view : f o r him, t h e J e w s were " t h e y , " not " w e . " 12 H e a p p e a r s t o have h a d little or no contact with the Jewish 9

See above, pp. 40-41. For the v i e w of a Slav leader, see M a s a r y k , op. cit., pp. 440, 442, 44445, and Russland und Europa ( J e n a , 1 9 1 3 ) , II, 25, 33, 295. 11 Briefwechsel, II, 1 5 2 ; IV, 339-40. For the opinions of Frau M a r x , see Β rief ¡Wechsel, I V , 360, 370, 585; Sorge, op. cit., pp. 1 7 1 - 7 2 . 1 2 " £ u r J u d e n f r a g e , " Sämtliche Werke, I 1 , 576 and passim; I-, 308. 10

Was Marx a Nationalist?

189

community either in Germany or abroad. H i s f a t h e r , Heinrich M a r x , had been converted to L u t h e r a n Christianity b e f o r e Karl was born. F r a u M a r x and the children were baptized in the same faith when he was six years old. 1 3 T h e elder M a r x was a deistic intellectual steeped in the tradition of the Enlightenment. H i s conversion was apparently necessitated by his professional duties as a lawyer. Some of his letters to his son, whose tempestuous character gave him deep concern, have survived; it is difficult to picture him presiding over a religious household. Karl was apparently never religious in any serious sense, quite unlike his future friend Engels, who had been stirred by p r o f o u n d religious emotions in his youth. 1 4 T h e first half of the nineteenth century was an age of great change for Western Jews. Along with other groups, they were striving f o r a recognized place in the modern state, for civil and political equality as individuals. M a r x was not indifferent to the movement of emancipation, which was generally supported by liberals and radicals. H e helped to f u r t h e r it on at least one occasion, although the reason he gave showed that he was interested f a r more in the revolutionary effect of civil r e f o r m than in Jewish grievances as such. ir ' Another feature of the time was the pervasive movement f o r Jewish religious r e f o r m and assimilation. It became the fashion to abandon or disparage traditional rituals and customs. Finally, there was much talk in liberal and radical circles of the supposed financial power of the Jews. T h e relation of the banking house of the Rothschilds with conservative regimes, notably the H a p s b u r g Empire, gave rise to much anti-Semitic feeling. These tendencies were reflected in an essay which M a r x wrote at the age of twenty-five. Zur Judenfrage was a 13

Karl Marx: Chronik seines Lebens, p. i. J 1 Sämtliche Werke, II, 48s ff.

15

Ibid., Ρ , 308,

iço

Was Marx a Nationalist?

discussion of a b o o k on the same subject by Bruno Bauer, a f o r m e r friend of his. B a u e r had a r g u e d that if the J e w s wished to earn the right to civil equality, they should renounce their exclusive o r t h o d o x f a i t h . M a r x replied that political f r e e d o m could not be made conditional on either the denial or the profession of any religion. H e himself looked f o r w a r d to the extinction of religion, which he characterized in another essay of the same period as " t h e opium of the p e o p l e . " 1 6 H e felt, h o w e v e r , that this problem must be faced by Christians as well as Jews. T h e liberal polity, as exemplified in the eighteenth-century constitutions of the U n i t e d States and France, did not end religion, but on the contrary assured its f r e e r exercise. In fact, denominational v a r i e t y flourished especially in the liberal American polities. T h e essay w a s a plea f o r Jewish emancipation and f o r political emancipation in general, as well as an assertion of the insufficiency of such emancipation unless supplemented by economic liberation. 1 7 Nevertheless, M a r x spoke o f the Jews in highly unpleasant and invidious terms. 1 8 H e t o o k occasion to dev e l o p a complicated theory which seemed to be directed against the economic activities of the Jews, although it w a s intended as a criticism of capitalist and Christian civilization. H e distinguished between spiritual and " e v e r y d a y J u d a i s m , " equated the latter with the spirit of capitalism, and wound up with an attack on Christianity on the ground that it had become capitalistic and t h e r e f o r e " e v e r y d a y J e w i s h " ! In the paradoxical and epigrammatic style of his youth ( M a r x never completely shed his excessive love of the literary p a r a d o x ) , he demanded that both Christians and Jews discard capitalism, that is " e v e r y d a y J u d a i s m , " and logically concluded that the social, apart f r o m the 16 18

Ibid., Ibid.,

I 1 , 607. pp. 6 o i , 603, 604, 605-6.

17

Ibid.,

p. 577 a n d

passim.

W a s M a r x a Nationalist?

19 1

merely political, enfranchisement of the Jews and of everyone else, presupposed "the emancipation of society from Judaism," meaning capitalism. 19 M a r x soon outgrew this strained theory; few traces of it survived in his later writings. 20 His passionate hatred of bourgeois civilization remained intact, but he ascribed to capitalism a highly important and progressive role in history. 21 Industrial and commercial capitalism, as well as their respective functions in the transformation of society, were carefully distinguished. 22 N o phase of capitalism was associated with a particular people or religion. The development of commercial capitalism was a result of the activities of many groups : the ancient Greeks, Phoenicians, and Carthaginians, the medieval Lombards, the Jews, and —in modern times—the Dutch and the English, the Germans and the Russians; nor was this list exhaustive. 23 But while he cast aside the economic philosophy of Zur Judenfrage, M a r x preserved a certain antagonism to Jews. He did not have sufficient interest to acquaint himself with the conditions and problems of the Western Jews. He was even more ignorant of the position of the Jews of Central and Eastern Europe. 24 His earlier writings contain ominous references to "stock exchange J e w s " and to a "freemasonry" of Jewish financiers and speculators who were bringing "ruin" on "the people." 25 H e ceased to speak in this fashion in the late fifties, and there is no reason to suppose that his mature view of anti-Semitism differed from 19

20 Ibid., pp. 601 ff. See Dubnow, op. cit., I X , 1 3 2 - 3 3 . 22 Sämtliche Werke, V I , 527 ff. See above, pp. 49-50. 23 1 2 Das Kapital, I I I , 3 1 4 ; I I I , 1 3 2 - 3 4 , 1 4 1 ; Theorien über Jen Mehrwert, I I I , 542; Zur Kritik der politischen Ökonomie, p. 244; N e w Y o r k Tribune, M a r c h 5, 1852, p. 7. 24 Dubnow, op. cit., I X , 1 3 2 . 25 Die Klassenkämpfe in Frankreich, pp. 4 1 , 49, 50; N e w Y o r k Tribune, November 9, 1 8 5 5 , p. 4 ; N o v e m b e r 22, 1855, p. 4 ; J a n u a r y 4, 1856, p. 4. F o r a more sympathetic attitude t o w a r d a J e w i s h issue, see ibid., A p r i l 15, 1854, p. J . 21

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W a s Marx a Nationalist?

that of Engels, who condemned it as "the characteristic sign of a backward civilization," and as "the reaction of the medieval and decadent social strata against modern society." 26 H o w e v e r , M a r x continued to indulge in a derogatory tone toward individual Jews. F o r example, he applied to the dark-complexioned Ferdinand Lassalle, whom he detested, the double-barreled epithet of " J e w nigger" o r such terms as "Jiidel Braun." 27 It is plain that M a r x did not escape infection by the increasing animus against the Jews, which characterized the age of reaction in Germany, and that, for one reason or another, he did not cultivate an informed and responsible attitude toward the people of his origin. One is tempted to say that M a r x was more German than Jewish, and indeed he exhibited certain traits which have been conventionally, but not always justly, regarded as German. Essentially, however, by cultural inheritance and radical convictions, M a r x was a member of t h a t community of men whose primary allegiance is to the w o r l d — more particularly to the Western world and civilization— rather than to any individual country. Engels once remarked that he and M a r x no more belonged to the German socialist movement than they did to the French; rather, they held a special position as representatives of international socialism first and foremost. 2 8 T h e y were absorbed, nonetheless, by the course of events in Germany. M a r x was the presumptive head of German socialism as well as a leader of world socialism. Although he spent more than half of his sixty-five years in England, it was always as an exile ; he never acquired the status of a British subject. F o r 2β

Ausgewählte Briefe, pp. 369-70. Briefwechsel, II, 371 ; III, 47, 49, 82, 84, 91, 145, 188, 213, 219, 220, 234; IV, 52. 28 E. Bernstein, Die Briefe von Friedrich Engels an Eduard Bernslein (Berlin, 1925), pp. 1 1 4 - 1 $ . 27

W a s M a r x a Nationalist?

193

a long time he hoped to be able to return to Germany. H e frequently represented the German element in international organizations and maintained close relations with the radicals of his country. T h i s activity hardly implied a strong sentiment of patriotism. T h e position he took on the Franco-Prussian W a r of 1870—71 has been cited as evidence that he was a nationalist. Unquestionably, he showed strong interest in the political unification of Germany. It is true that in 1 8 7 0 he wished to see the French "thrashed," f o r reasons which we have discussed, but the following year he hoped that the Commune would thrash both the Frenchman Thiers and the Prussian Bismarck. M a r x expressed more than once the desire that the radical movement might follow German leadership, and it was amply clear that he meant M a r x i a n leadership. When the charge was made that the General Council of the First International was controlled by " P a n - G e r m a n i s m , " or "Bismarckism," he retorted that there were fewer Germans than either Frenchmen or Englishmen on the Council. " T h e offense therefore consists in the fact that the English and French elements are dominated by the German element in theoretical matters ( !) and find this domination, that is, German science, very useful and even indispensable." T h a t " G e r m a n science," as used here, was reducible to M a r x ' s own doctrine, was indicated by the description of his relation to the influential German element. H e observed that the charge of PanGermanism referred to the "unpardonable f a c t " that he, a German by birth, exercised " a decisive intellectual influence" on the Council. 20 N o one was more aware than M a r x that his philosophy was as much the product of French and English thought as of German and certainly f a r more the product of French and English political and economic 20

Sorge, op. cit., p. 40.

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W a s Marx a Nationalist?

experience, t h a n o f G e r m a n . 3 0 H i s r e f e r e n c e s to the theoretical ability and the " t a l e n t " f o r " g e n e r a l i z a t i o n " of G e r m a n s , and the " s c i e n t i f i c " s u p e r i o r i t y of the German w o r k e r s , 3 1 need not be t a k e n t o o seriously. H e f o u n d it just as necessary to c o m b a t G e r m a n as F r e n c h o r E n g l i s h deviations f r o m w h a t he considered to be sound socialist doctrine. H e criticized the " t r u e s o c i a l i s m " o f G e r m a n y more s h a r p l y t h a n the Utopian socialisms o f

France.32

The

G o t h a P r o g r a m o f 1 8 7 5 seemed to him no less inept because it w a s w r i t t e n by G e r m a n l e a d e r s . T o w a r d the end of his l i f e , he c o m p l a i n e d t h a t G e r m a n socialists w e r e again succumbing to utopianism, w h i c h he h a d been "clearing o u t " of their h e a d s f o r " t e n s o f y e a r s . . . w i t h so much toil and l a b o r . "

33

T h e l o n g and short o f the m a t t e r is t h a t M a r x simply w a s n o t a nationalist. M o s t o f his occasional nationalist utterances w e r e the obiter dicta o f an opinionated and choleric p e r s o n a l i t y . H i s political relations w e r e characteri z e d b y acerbity and s o m e t i m e s by indignity. H i s struggle w i t h L a s s a l l e s h o w e d t h a t M a r x w a s not a b o v e personal j e a l o u s y . H e w a s not a b o v e unjust p a r t i s a n accusations and m i s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s , as his d e a l i n g s w i t h B a k u n i n and other o p p o n e n t s p r o v e d . L i k e J o h n K n o x , he w a s an "angry m a n . " P e r h a p s it is not t o o much to say t h a t he was h a u n t e d b y the é m i g r é ' s sense o f f r u s t r a t i o n . H i s opinions o f p e o p l e w e r e m o r d a n t e n o u g h to begin w i t h , and they lost n o t h i n g in the expression. H e h a d a blistering tongue and a s h a r p l y satirical and p u n g e n t — t o o p u n g e n t — s t y l e . I t is w e l l to k e e p in mind, h o w e v e r , t h a t the m o r e amiable aspects of his p e r s o n a l i t y w e r e n o t reflected fairly 30 Sämtliche Werke, VI, 308; Briefwechsel, II, 46-47; Ausgewählte Briefe, p. 48. 31 Sämtliche Werke, III, 1 7 - 1 8 ; Briefwechsel, IV, 102; Sorge, of. cit., pp. 33, 40, 170-71; "Briefe an Dr. Kugelmann," Neue Zeit, X X 2 , 800. 32 Sämtliche 3 3 Sorge, op. cit., p. 159. Werke, VI, 549 ff.

Was Marx a Nationalist?

195

even in informal writings. 34 Like so many men of stern countenance, M a r x was capable of deep attachments but was inordinately averse to what he called "demonstrative p a t h o s . " 3 5 One is entitled to wonder whether his passionate shrinking f r o m sentimentality did not bespeak some inner sensitiveness as well as hardness. H e wrote poetry in his youth, but when his M u s e — a divinity more insistent than inspired—deserted him, the romantic and lyrical strain did not die completely. It merely retired into the private recesses of his being. If one ranges over his entire contribution, the note of internationalism, humanitarianism, and tolerance is found to be unquestionably dominant. Although he disliked many m e n — p e r h a p s most of the men he met—all his work testifies to a deep-rooted and authentic love f o r mankind. Racial and national oppression seemed no less repugnant to him than any other f o r m of persecution. N o nation was regarded as superior or inferior to others. H o w e v e r imp o r t a n t certain racial or national tendencies might be, they could not be made the basis f o r grading human groups hierarchically. M a t e r i a l and cultural achievement was not the final test of human worth. All men were capable of progress. In assaying M a r x ' s contribution, it is necessary to give a certain weight to the informal expressions of his temperamental personality, but it is essential not to confuse them with the direction of his thought and the quality of his aims. 34

For an interesting sidelight, see Ryazanov, " M a r x ' Neue Zeit, X X X I 1 , 854-62. 35 Briefwechsel, IV, 529.

Bekenntnisse,"

15 A VARIED WORLD I N SOME of its aspects, the position of M a r x on n a t i o n a l questions flowed f r o m his economic a n d social philosophy. I n others, it derived circumstantially f r o m his b a c k g r o u n d a n d personal experiences, his g e o g r a p h i c and cultural setting, and the outlook of his time. H i s a t t i t u d e t o w a r d any p a r t i c u l a r p r o b l e m w a s commonly the r e s u l t a n t of v a r i o u s f a c t o r s . N o m a t t e r h o w much a m a n m i g h t reject his age o r t r a n s v a l u a t e his culture, they will cling to him at m a n y points. T h e brilliantly original quality of M a r x ' s t h o u g h t w a s not inconsistent with his avid tendency to assimilate m a n y elements in his cultural e n v i r o n m e n t . In some of his reactions and predispositions, he b e t r a y e d the W e s t e r n E u r o p e a n , in o t h e r s the R h i n e l a n d e r , in still o t h e r s t h e Y o u n g H e g e l i a n or the B e n j a m i n of t h e E n l i g h t e n m e n t . M u c h has been w r i t t e n to isolate these v a r i o u s influences. H e r e it is relevant merely to note t h a t they were likely to t u r n up at i m p o r t a n t c r o s s r o a d s of his political j u d g m e n t s . H i s opposition to national oppression w a s not unaffected by ethical and h u m a n e motivations. H e w a s also m o v e d by o t h e r considerations : the idea of the interconnection of all f o r m s of oppression and their basis in class exploitation; t h e belief t h a t h u m a n society could n o t p e r m a n e n t l y attain t r u e tolerance in one r e a l m if it denied it in a n o t h e r , s o m e w h a t in the spirit of the s t a t e m e n t of Lincoln that a nation could not e n d u r e half slave a n d half f r e e ; a n d t h e r e a l i z a t i o n t h a t the technique of p o w e r w a s such t h a t in-

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A Varied World

strumentalities devised for one end could easily be turned to another. T h e result was a strong conviction that no nation could be free unless it allowed other nations to live freely as well. M a r x appealed to the history of R o m e and G r e a t Britain as witness that " t h e people which subjugates another people forges its own chains." 1 I t seemed to him that the English Republic o f the seventeenth century had sealed its own doom when it reconquered Ireland. 2 H e interpreted the foreign policy o f the Germany o f the O l d Regime in the same sense. Forces employed abroad were available f o r action against lower classes at home. F r e e dom was indivisible f o r social, political, and philosophical reasons. Purely economic criteria became more prominent when M a r x passed judgment on movements to establish independent national states. T h e scales were then tipped, not by the integral nature o f freedom or the moral evil o f oppression, but by the ability to achieve economic progress. W e have followed his chain o f reasoning. T h e advance o f society presupposed a rich material foundation, which only highly industrialized methods could create. Industrialization was most effective in large-scale production. T h e establishment of large, integrated societies, in the political f o r m o f the modern state, was therefore a necessity f o r mankind. Smaller nations must somehow adjust themselves to functioning within larger states. It was unavoidable that certain nations and cultures should lose their identity through assimilation. T h e process o f assimilation, however, need not involve invidious discrimination and intolerance. As f o r large, backward nations, their right to independence could hardly be asserted unless they underwent economic t r a n s f o r m a t i o n . Economic criteria could also help to determine vexing questions of boundary delimita1 "Briefe an Dr. Kugelmann," S eue Zeit, XX-, 478.

2

Ibid., p. 414.

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A Varied World

tion. E a c h nation should have the t e r r i t o r y , resources, w a t e r w a y s , and population needed f o r the p r o l i f e r a t i o n of a g r e a t economy. In dealing with national situations, M a r x ' s position was complicated by a pattern of thought which stemmed f r o m the experiences of F r a n c e and E n g l a n d with which it w a s especially congruous; its relevance to other a r e a s w a s limited by the measure of their similarity to these countries. H e assumed all too readily, f o r example, that the history of F r a n c e and E n g l a n d would be duplicated in G e r m a n y and that the G e r m a n bourgeoisie, as it g r e w stronger, would secure political p o w e r . T h a t w a s w h y M a r x could accept B i s m a r c k ' s policy of unification without anticipating that the aristocratic and monarchical institutions and ruling groups would entrench themselves still f u r t h e r . In view of developments west of the Rhine and across the Channel, it seemed anachronistic that aristocrats and kings by divine right should preside indefinitely over an industrialized economy. B i s m a r c k and the g r o u p s he represented a p p e a r e d to have signed their own death w a r r a n t when they unified the country and thus released irresistible economic forces which would m a k e the bourgeoisie supreme. A t this point, another of M a r x ' s tendencies became apparent. H e w a s persuaded that the economic consequences of unification must p r o v e more important in the f u t u r e than its political method and means and the directing personnel. In the event, of course, the method h a d more than t e m p o r a r y significance. T h e fact that a conservative monarchy, and not the liberal bourgeoisie or the democratic petty bourgeoisie, consolidated G e r m a n y substantially strengthened that monarchy. M a r x did not sufficiently appreciate the lasting political results of the method of unification, although his hopes f o r an intensive industrial

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199

development and a strong and influential socialist movement were amply confirmed by history. H e perceived some of the disadvantages of the "blood and iron" policy, the danger of an alliance between France and Russia directed against Germany, and the possibility of a civil war f o r the destruction of the Hohenzollern dynasty. H i s attitude shuttled between hope of industrialization and f e a r of Prussian aggrandizement. If his hope finally outweighed his f e a r , it was chiefly because, further west, old political institutions had succumbed to the new economic order. A similar western emphasis was discernible in his oversimplified conception of the national problems of Central, Eastern, and Southern Europe, not to speak of regions more removed f r o m Western Europe, geographically or otherwise. Western E u r o p e had become divided into large, integrated, and homogeneous nations. T h e founding of modern states had followed upon the development of capitalist economies, or had at least been closely related to that development. T h e growth of uniform languages and cultures and the increasing assimilation of smaller nations and older cultures had occurred in due course of time. Great Britain and France were, again, the models of that process. Minority problems had become comparatively insignificant. When M a r x considered issues affecting minorities, the examples that naturally sprang to his mind were the Basques of France and Spain, the Bretons of France, and the Welsh of Great Britain. It is worth noting that he thought of these as politically conservative groups. 11 T h i s background goes f a r to explain his opinion of small nations and minorities in other countries. In the empires of Austria, Turkey, and Russia, the small nations proved to be a more explosive political force than M a r x had expected. T h e y exhibited a surprising vitality, 8

Ν achias s, III, 241 ; New York Tribune, April 24, 1852, p. 6.

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A Varied World

which was being renewed in his own day. T h e national consciousness and the national literatures of some of the Central E u r o p e a n populations were, to a considerable degree, products of the nineteenth century. M a r x was primarily interested in the activities of the more prominent and l a r g e r groups, such as the Poles and the Hungarians. He did not foresee that the pressure of nations smaller than these could play a p o w e r f u l role in the disintegration of states as imposing as the H a p s b u r g E m p i r e . H e clearly underrated the political possibilities of the national sentiment as an expression of social tension or as a tool in the hands of contending g r e a t powers. H i s inadequacy in dealing with the political problems of Central, E a s t e r n , and Southern E u r o p e was in part traceable to an e x a g g e r a t e d estimate of the tempo of the expansion of industrial civilization. H i s anticipation of the imminent economic and political t r a n s f o r m a t i o n of many parts of the w o r l d w a s f e d by many springs. It is easier to list some of these than to assay their relative weight in any given situation : the o v e r p o w e r i n g impression of speed created when the early Industrial Revolution burst upon a predominantly a g r a r i a n society; the sensational rise of the principal industrial country to w o r l d leadership; the role of the bourgeoisie in abolishing traditional institutions and in developing modern state techniques; the succession of revolutions which had shaken the Continent f r o m 1789 to 1 8 4 8 ; the dynamic revolutionary temperament of M a r x . One might go on to mention other, perhaps less important, f a c t o r s . N o w , on the assumption that the relatively backward regions would become welded economically by the advance of industry, that the old a g r a r i a n problems would be solved, that the peasantry would become converted into a mass of proletarians, and that a p o w e r f u l bourgeoisie

A Varied World

201

with far-flung interests would push to the fore, it was inconceivable t h a t such regions—let us say, the AustroH u n g a r i a n Empire—could become pulverized into minor states. If the H a p s b u r g s were to give way at all, it would be in f a v o r of two or three great states which would proceed to incorporate and assimilate the smaller national groups. T h e Czechs would be lost among the Germans; other groups would melt into the Polish, Hungarian, and Russian nations. Linguistic and cultural diversities would diminish, as they had in France, England, and the United States. It appeared unnecessary to f r a m e a special policy f o r dealing with national issues beyond Western Europe. M a r x therefore proved a poor guide for his followers who were later harassed by the intricate problems arising f r o m the growing strength of nationalist movements. In Austria, f o r example, O t t o Bauer and other leaders had to reconsider the relation between Marxism and national questions. They had to devise more practical and politically palatable solutions than the distribution of many small national groups among two or three of the more "advanced" nations. T h e y veered more and more toward semifederal proposals, which would maintain the economic and administrative unity of the great Danubian state and yet provide f o r national variety and autonomy. Even the small groups were to be given an opportunity f o r cultural survival. M a r x ' s distrust and disparagement of the Slavic nations had to be overlooked or repudiated, if their claims were to receive recognition. 4 W h e n Karl Kautsky (who was half Czech by birth and became the theoretical spokes4 Otto B a u e r , Die Nationalitätenfrage und die Sozialdemokratie, pp. 314 ff. K a u t s k y , Nationalität und Internationalität, p. 36; " D e r K a m p f der Nationalitäten und das Staatsrecht in Österreich," Neue Zeit, X V I 1 , S58-59. 726; " D i e K r i s i s in Österreich," ibid., X X I I 1 , 78, and X X X I V 1 , 503. Hermann W e n d e l , " D e r P r a g e r Slawenkongress von 1848," Gesellschaft, 1926, II, 459; " D e r M a r x i s m u s und die S ü d s l a w e n f r a g e , " ibid., 1924, I, 153, 170. M e h r i n g , Karl Marx, p. 195.

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A Varied World

m a n of G e r m a n social democracy a f t e r the death of M a r x and E n g e l s ) published a new edition of the articles which h a d denied a national future to the smaller Slavic groups, he w a s c a r e f u l to dissociate himself f r o m that verdict. H e a r g u e d that M a r x h a d been driven into an indefensible position by a " j u s t w r a t h " o v e r the role of the S l a v s in the R e v o l u t i o n of 1 8 4 8 . " H a v e not the f a c t s given him the l i e ? " K a u t s k y asked. " H a s not the vitality of the C z e c h nation been admitted by its bitterest e n e m i e s ? " 5 W e s t e r n E u r o p e w a s a f a r g r e a t e r and a more significant center of the w o r l d in the nineteenth century than it is n o w . M a r x shared with his contemporaries a strong sense of W e s t e r n leadership. T r u e , the scope of his vision w a s uncommonly universal. In 1 8 5 2 he wrote to a f r i e n d that " o n e could not choose a better time to come into the w o r l d than at this moment. Both of us shall have had our heads chopped off or be shaky with age by the time it is possible to g o f r o m L o n d o n to Calcutta in seven days. A n d A u s t r a l i a , and C a l i f o r n i a , and the Pacific O c e a n ! T h e citizens of the new w o r l d will be unable to imagine how small our w o r l d w a s ! " 0 Y e t by functioning within that " s m a l l . . . w o r l d , " M a r x was to some degree caught in the centripetence of E u r o p e a n civilization, especially in his earlier years. In the f o r t i e s the area of his immediate concern w a s limited to W e s t e r n and C e n t r a l E u r o p e and to the U n i t e d States. T h e passage in the Manifest which dealt with the attitude of socialists t o w a r d other parties made specific reference to E n g l a n d , the U n i t e d States, F r a n c e , B e l g i u m , G e r m a n y , Switzerland, and P o l a n d . T h i s w a s the core of the universe of revolution and within it emphasis w a s placed on three, or perhaps f o u r , points : E n g l a n d , F r a n c e , 5 K a u t s k y , preface to Revolution (Stuttgart, 1896), p. xxi. 6 M e h r i n g , op. cit., p. 249.

und Κontre-Revolution

in

Deutschland

A Varied World

203

G e r m a n y , the U n i t e d S t a t e s . T h e f a t e o f the social r e v o l u tion h i n g e d on the c o m b i n e d action o f these countries. T h e p r o g r e s s o f the E u r o p e a n p e r i p h e r y and the m o r e d i s t a n t p e r i p h e r y o f the E a s t s e e m e d to d e p e n d on the successful r e o r g a n i z a t i o n o f the a d v a n c e d w o r l d . P o l a n d w o u l d be f r e e d in L o n d o n ; C z a r i s m w o u l d f a l l , M a r x h o p e d , b e f o r e the c o n c e r t e d a t t a c k o f the W e s t . T h e r e v o l u t i o n w o u l d m o v e f r o m the center o u t w a r d . T h e f a i l u r e o f the R e v o l u t i o n o f 1 8 4 8 , the collapse o f C h a r t i s m , the continued resilience o f E n g l i s h c a p i t a l i s m , the m a i n t e n a n c e of C z a r i s t r u l e — t h e s e and o t h e r f a c t o r s p l a y e d h a v o c w i t h M a r x ' s e a r l y scheme. T h e center o f g r a v i t y r e m a i n e d l a r g e l y in the W e s t , but it b e c a m e the uncertain center o f an e x p a n d i n g o r b i t . M a r x h a d to g i v e up the idea t h a t E n g l a n d w o u l d l e a d the r e v o l u t i o n . H e c o u l d m e r e l y h o p e t h a t she w o u l d f o l l o w soon e n o u g h to prev e n t her p o w e r f u l capitalists f r o m w r e c k i n g the r e v o l u t i o n in o t h e r countries. H i s f a i t h in F r a n c e as a c a t a l y t i c a g e n t o f E u r o p e a n change w a v e r e d f r e q u e n t l y and, on the w h o l e , w a n e d w i t h the p a s s i n g y e a r s . T h e r e a p p e a r e d t o be n o direct c o r r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n economic a d v a n c e and political ripeness f o r s o c i a l i z a t i o n . T h e e y e o f M a r x , s e a r c h i n g f o r a l e v e r w i t h which t o p r y l o o s e m o d e r n society f r o m capitalism, r o v e d m o r e and m o r e t o w a r d the i m m e d i a t e per i p h e r y , e a s t w a r d to P o l a n d and Russia, w e s t w a r d t o w a r d I r e l a n d and the U n i t e d S t a t e s . B u t a g a i n , these c o u n t r i e s described the o u t e r m o s t limits o f his p o l i t i c a l vision. F o r practical p u r p o s e s his " w o r l d " w a s the W e s t e r n

world.

C h i n a and J a p a n w e r e then just b e i n g o p e n e d to W e s t e r n influence; t h e y e x e r t e d as y e t little direct w e i g h t in international affairs. T h e r e w a s small p r o s p e c t o f a r e v o l u t i o n in the M i d d l e o r F a r E a s t o r o f the c o o p e r a t i o n o f n a t i v e m o v e m e n t s with the E u r o p e a n p r o l e t a r i a t . F o r this r e a s o n little I r e l a n d seemed m o r e i m p o r t a n t than h u g e India as a

204

A Varied World

point of d e p a r t u r e f o r a c a m p a i g n against capitalism in E n g l a n d . T h e p e r m a n e n t a r m y stationed in I r e l a n d m i g h t be dispatched t o p u t d o w n a p r o l e t a r i a n rising in E n g l a n d ; a rebellion in I r e l a n d might spill o v e r into the l a r g e r island, and then, into the C o n t i n e n t . But India seemed too f a r r e m o v e d f r o m E u r o p e t o play the role of a convenient military base f o r capitalism and t o o weak and disunited t o set off a social revolution. W i t h all these limitations, M a r x ' s contribution to the n a t i o n a l question w a s m o r e concrete t h a n has been generally recognized. H i s positive a t t i t u d e t o w a r d nationality w a s in itself sufficient to set him a p a r t f r o m m a n y ano t h e r radical thinker and l e a d e r . H i s a p p r o a c h was distinguished, we have seen, by an acceptance of the n a t i o n as a substantial historical entity, by an a t t e m p t e d reconciliation of national and class f a c t o r s in politics, by a revaluation of national w e l f a r e and n a t i o n a l devotion, and by an internationalist r a t h e r t h a n a cosmopolitan view of the o r g a n i z a t i o n of the w o r l d . M a r x conceived of the m o d e r n n a t i o n as a society resting on the integration of a considerable area and population t h r o u g h the instrumentalities of large-scale industry, communication, and t r a n s p o r t a t i o n , and t h r o u g h participation in far-flung m a r k e t s . T h e n a t i o n functioned and h a d historical continuity as such because of the p r o l o n g e d interdependence of various classes concerned with the o p e r a tion of a given economic system. T h e ideas and tendencies of the nation w e r e significantly r e l a t e d to the p a t t e r n f o r m e d by its constituent classes. N a t i o n a l t r a d i t i o n s w e r e quite r e a l ; they reflected the economic d e v e l o p m e n t of society, the a r r a n g e m e n t of classes at different periods, and t h e special, p e r h a p s unique, f e a t u r e s of the course t a k e n by p a r t i c u l a r countries. T h e most salient p r o d u c t of M a r x ' s application of his

A Varied World

205

economic t h e o r y t o t h e politics of the individual society was the idea of the l e a d i n g o r n a t i o n a l class. In t h a t idea w a s reconciled t h e p a r a d o x of the t h e o r y t h a t the individual m o d e r n society w a s i r r e t r i e v a b l y severed into cont e n d i n g classes and so possessed no unity, and the insistence on the reality of c o m m o n objectives f o r t h a t society. Reconciliation was also f o u n d f o r the p a r a d o x of the emphasis on the constancy of class a n t a g o n i s m s and t h e recognition of the necessity of t h e s u p p o r t of a certain class by o t h e r classes at critical times. Several s t r a n d s in M a r x ' s t h o u g h t pointed t o t h e resolution of these difficulties t h r o u g h the idea of t h e n a t i o n a l class: the view t h a t the leading class in a m o d e r n n a t i o n represented not alone the i m m e d i a t e interests of its m e m b e r s but the interests of a m o d e of p r o d u c t i o n vital to the whole society as well; the r e a l i z a t i o n t h a t the m o d e r n w o r l d consisted of a p l u r a l i t y of societies each of which h a d distinctive p r o b l e m s and t r a d i t i o n s ; the recognition t h a t each society contained, in addition to the principal classes, o t h e r classes o r g r o u p s which must be taken into a c c o u n t ; and finally, the need t o t r a n s l a t e the p h i l o s o p h y of socialism into p r o g r a m s suitable to p a r t i c u l a r n a t i o n s . M a r x redefined n a t i o n a l concepts in socialist t e r m s . T h e enrichment of t h e m a t e r i a l e n v i r o n m e n t of society w a s in the national i n t e r e s t . T h e role of a leading class in imp r o v i n g the m e t h o d s of p r o d u c t i o n p r o m o t e d the n a t i o n a l w e l f a r e . Indeed, t h e activity of such a class was the m o s t suitable vehicle f o r t h e p r o m o t i o n of the national interest as long as class divisions continued to exist. T h e socialist p r o g r a m deserved t h e sanction of enlightened p a t r i o t i s m in advanced countries. T h e classes which opposed the progressive class could be set d o w n as enemies of the t r u e national interest. A n a r r o w n a t i o n a l i s m exploited patriotic sentiments in

A Varied World

2ο6

o r d e r to p r o m o t e special class interests. A u t h e n t i c l o v e o f c o u n t r y must e x p r e s s itself in a s y m p a t h e t i c a s s o c i a t i o n w i t h those classes a n d f o r c e s w h i c h can l e a d t h e n a t i o n toward

greater

productivity

and

eventually

toward

condition o f classlessness. T h e sound n a t i o n a l

a

tradition

w a s the recollection and e v o c a t i o n o f the m o v e m e n t s o f t h e past w h i c h h a v e a c t e d in the same spirit. In a h i g h l y i n d u s t r i a l i z e d society, the e n l i g h t e n e d citizen w o u l d f a v o r t h e l e a d e r s h i p of the nation by the p r o l e t a r i a t . I f a c o u n t r y is economically b a c k w a r d o r still has to dispose o f f e u d a l institutions, p a t r i o t i s m m a y dictate the choice o f

some

o t h e r class as the n a t i o n a l v a n g u a r d . T h u s , w h i l e

Marx

c a l l e d upon the p e a s a n t s o f F r a n c e in 1 8 7 1 to accept the g u i d a n c e o f the p r o l e t a r i a t , he h a d , d u r i n g the G e r m a n R e v o l u t i o n o f 1 8 4 8 , t h r o w n his o w n s u p p o r t to the bourg e o i s i e on the g r o u n d t h a t a liberal constitution w o u l d f u r t h e r the w e l f a r e of his c o u n t r y . A n enlightened p a t r i o t i s m w h i c h r e c o g n i z e d the b e a r i n g of international p r o g r e s s u p o n n a t i o n a l w e l f a r e s e e m e d t o M a r x c o m p a t i b l e a n d even f a i r l y s y n o n y m o u s

with

sound i n t e r n a t i o n a l i s m . T h e true p a t r i o t m u s t f u r t h e r the a d v a n c e o f o t h e r nations if only to assure the p r o g r e s s o f his o w n ; the true i n t e r n a t i o n a l i s t must strive f o r the adv a n c e o f p a r t i c u l a r c o u n t r i e s as the basis o f w o r l d p r o g ress. Such an e q u a t i o n o f sound n a t i o n a l i s m w i t h sound i n t e r n a t i o n a l i s m w a s , o f course, easier to f o r m u l a t e than t o a p p l y . It w a s the p r o v i n c e o f the t h e o r i s t t o indicate the possibility of reconciling h u m a n l o y a l t i e s ; it must be l e f t t o the s t a t e s m a n to n e g o t i a t e t h a t reconciliation. W e h a v e cited instances o f M a r x ' s conception of the n a t i o n a l and international duty o f G e r m a n s , E n g l i s h m e n ,

Frenchmen,

A m e r i c a n s , and o t h e r s , at v a r i o u s m o m e n t s o f history. T h e r e are s e v e r a l k i n d s of i n t e r n a t i o n a l i s m . T h e character o f M a r x ' s i n t e r n a t i o n a l i s m w a s defined by his accept-

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207

ance of the existence of many diverse societies and by his emphasis on the intensive organization of the individual society. H e was decidedly not a cosmopolite in his picture of a world order although there were many traces of cosmopolitanism in his thought. Cosmopolitanism seeks to pass f r o m the individual to mankind without the intermediate stopping place of social units less comprehensive than the whole species. T h e assumption of large societies seemed to M a r x a more effective starting point for the establishment of a harmonious world. H e was an internationalist, not only in the sense of advocating a system of cooperative world relations, but in the more specific sense of conceiving that system as the resultant or function of the friendly interaction of large nations which were organized harmoniously within. Along with the too-small society, M a r x rejected the vague and amorphous global society. H e admitted considerable local variations, even within the same system of production. T h e socialist world of his imagination consisted of a limited number of advanced nations. H i s conception of world literature and world culture was a similar one. H e reveled in linguistic variety and was at home with ancient and modern literature. H e spoke of a world literature as already in the process of formation in the nineteenth century. I t was the product of great nations which were developing distinctive, and yet related, literatures. T h e world of M a r x remained richly variegated. H e did not pour it all into one mold.

BIBLIOGRAPHY SOURCES K A R L M A R X AND FRIEDRICH E N G E L S

Historisch-kritische Gesamtausgabe. Edited by D . Ryazanov. Marx-Engels Institut, Moscow. Erste Abteilung: Sämtliche Werke und Schriften mit Ausnahme des "Kapital." Berlin, Frankfurt, and Moscow, 1 9 2 7 - (Seven volumes published thus f a r ) Dritte Abteilung: Briefwechsel. Berlin, 1 9 2 9 - 3 1 . Four volumes of mutual correspondence of M a r x and Engels published. T h e first part is r e f e r r e d to in the notes as Sämtliche the third as Briefwechsel,

Werke,

and

Aus dem literarischen Nachlass von Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels und Ferdinand Lassalle. Edited by Franz Mehring. Four volumes. Stuttgart, 1902. R e f e r r e d to in the notes as

Nachlass.

Correspondence, 1 8 4 6 - 1 8 9 5 . New York, 1935. Ausgewählte Briefe. Zurich, 1934. Gesammelte Schriften von Karl M a r x und Friedrich Engels, 1852 bis 1862. Edited by D . Ryazanov. T w o volumes. Stuttgart, 1920. T h e Eastern Question. London, 1897. T h e Civil W a r in the United States. New York, 1937. Les prétendues scissions dans l'Internationale. Geneva, 1872. Briefe und Auszüge aus Briefen von J . P. Becker, J . Dietzgen, Friedrich Engels, Karl M a r x u. A . an F . A . Sorge und Andere. Edited by F . A . Sorge. Stuttgart, 1 9 2 1 . Briefe an A . Bebel, W . Liebknecht, K . Kautsky, und Andere. Volume I, 1 8 7 0 - 1 8 8 6 . Moscow, 1933. KARL

MARX

Die Klassenkämpfe in Frankreich. Berlin, 1932. Der Achtzehnte Brumaire des Louis Bonaparte. Vienna, 1927.

2 io

Bibliography

T h e Story of the Life of Lord Palmerston. London, 1899. Secret Diplomatic History of the Eighteenth Century. London, 1899. Z u r Kritik der politischen Ökonomie. Zurich, 1934. Herr Vogt. London, i860. Das Kapital. Four volumes. Hamburg, 1921-22. Der Bürgerkrieg in Frankreich. Vienna, 1932. Kritik des Gothaer Programms. Zurich, 1934. Theorien über den Mehrwert. Edited by K a r l Kautsky. Four volumes. Stuttgart, 1905-10. Letters to D r . Kugelmann. N e w York, 1934. FILES OF PERIODICALS AND NEWSPAPERS CONSULTED Archiv für die Geschichte des Sozialismus Leipzig. Die Gesellschaft. Berlin. Der Kampf. Vienna. Marx-Engels Archiv. Frankfurt. Le Mouvement socialiste. Paris. Die Neue Zeit. Stuttgart. N e w Y o r k Tribune. La Revue marxiste. Paris. Der Vorbote. Geneva.

und

Arbeiterbewegung.

SELECTED SECONDARY WORKS Bauer, Otto. Die Nationalitätenfrage und die Sozialdemokratie. Vienna, 1907. Bernstein, Eduard. " M a r x und Bakunin," Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik, X X X , 1-29. " K a r l M a r x und Friedrich Engels in der zweiten Phase des Krieges von 1870-71," Neue Zeit, X X X I I I 1 , 76-80. Cunow, Heinrich. Die Marxsche Geschichts-, Gesellschafts-, und Staatstheorie. T w o volumes. Berlin, 1920-21. Theoretical chapter on the "nation," II, 9-49. " M a r x und das Selbstbestimmungsrecht der Nationen," Neue Zeit, X X X V I 1 , 577-84. Hayes, Carlton J. H . T h e Historical Evolution of Modern Nationalism. N e w York, 1931.

Bibliography Heider, Werner. Die Geschichtslehre von Karl M a r x . Stuttgart, 1931Karl M a r x : Chronik seines Lebens. Moscow, 1934. Kautsky, Karl. Nationalität und Internationalität. Neue Zeit, Ergänzungsheft No. 1 . Stuttgart, 1908. Masaryk, T . G . Die philosophischen und soziologischen Grundlagen des Marxismus. Vienna, 1899. Chapter on "Nationalität und Internationalität," pp. 426 ff. Mehring, Franz. " D i e polnische Frage," Nachlast, I I I , 18-44. Nikolaievsky, B. " M a r x und das russische Problem," Gesellschaft, 1924. I. 359-66. Ryazanov, D . " Z u r Stellungnahme von M a r x und Engels während des Deutsch-Französischen Krieges," Neue Zeit, X X X I I I 2 , 161-71. " M a r x und Engels über den Deutsch-Französischen Krieg," Der Kampf, V I I I , 1 2 9 - 3 9 . " D i e Auswärtige Politik der alten Internationale und ihre Stellungnahme zum Krieg," Neue Zeit, X X X I I I 2 , 3 2 9 - 3 4 , 360-69, 4 3 8 - 4 3 , 463-69. 5 0 9 - 1 9 · Karl M a r x über den Ursprung der Vorherrschaft Russlands in Europa. Neue Zeit, Ergänzungsheft No. 5. Stuttgart, 1909. " M a r x und seine russischen Bekannten in den vierziger Jahren," Neue Zeit, X X X I 1 , 7 1 5 ff., 757 ff. " K a r l M a r x und Friedrich Engels über die Polenfrage," Archiv für die Geschichte des Sozialismus und der Arbeiterbewegung, V I , 1 7 5 - 2 2 1 . Stalin, Joseph. Marxism and the National and Colonial Question. N e w York, 1935. Wendel, Hermann. " D e r Marxismus und die Südslawenfrage," Gesellschaft, 1924, I, 1 5 3 - 7 7 . Witznitzer, A . " M a r x und die irische Frage," Archiv für die Geschichte des Sozialismus und 4er Arbeiterbewegung, X , 49-53. Zhitlovskv, Ch. " D e r Sozialism und die Nationale Frage," Gesammelte Shrift en, Volume X I I I . Warsaw, 1935.

INDEX Achtzehnte Brumaire des Louis Bonaparte, Der ( M a r x ) , 1 1 8 Age of Metternich, 1 5 1 Agrarian life and capitalist exploitation, 1 0 1 Agrarian movement, socialists to help revolution in Poland, 94; as forerunner of socialist movement in United States, 180 Agrarians, American, committed to private property, 1 8 1 Agrarian tendency in development of French economy, 1 2 2 Agricultural producers, expropriation from soil, 1 0 1 Agriculture, system of small-scale, 1 1 9 , 174 ff. Agriculture in America, 179 Alexander I, czar, 1 5 1 Alexander I I , czar, 156, 1 5 9 ; assassinated, 94 Alsace and Lorraine, M a r x denied validity of Prussia's claims to, 2 1 ; proposal to annex, 148 American Revolution, 1 7 2 ; divided society artificially into two spheres, 37 Americans, a practical people, 1 3 ; culturally backward, 172 Anarchism, 29, 70-71 Antagonisms, national : tending to disappear, 27 Anti-Semitism, M a r x ' s v i e w of, 1 9 1 ; condemned by Engels, 192 Aristocracy, domination in feudal society, 1 7 ; German, 1 3 5 Army, abolition of standing, 130, 131 Art, correlation between economy and, 31 Asia, social revolution, 51 Asiatic society, 51, 1 6 1

Austria, expansion undesirable, 42 ; solution of national problem, 43 ; question of support by other G e r m a n states, 46 ; victory of Prussia over, 1 4 4 ; F r a n c o - S a r dinian w a r against, 1 5 6 ; explosive national forces in, 199 Austrian dynasty, 143 A u s t r o - H u n g a r i a n Empire, 201 Authority, position of M a r x and Engels on, 70-71 B a b e u f , François Noel, 1 1 6 B a c k w a r d n e s s and imperialism, 4856 Bakunin, Michael, 1 5 3 , 194 Bakuninism versus M a r x i s m , 1 1 3 B a l k a n nations, 41 ; might form integral state, 42, 43 B a l k a n Peninsula, "natural inheritance" of South Slavs, 42 Banks, national: organization of credit through, 30 B a u e r , Bruno, 190 B a u e r , Otto, 201 Bentham, J e r e m y , 2, 103 B e r v y , V. V . ( " N . F l e r o v s k y " ) , 13 Bismarck, 144, 148, 1 5 7 ; part in Franco-Prussian W a r , 145 ; reach of his policy underestimated, 1 4 9 ; policy of unification, 198 Black Sea, neutralization of, 156 "Blood and iron" policy, 199 Blood ties, 19 Bohemia, independence for, 40 Boisguilbert, Pierre de, 122 Bonapartism, 91, 1 2 4 ; weakened French labor, 146 Bonapartist state, 62, 68 Boundaries, determination of, 20, 1 9 7 ; adjustment of, 2 1 ; r e g a r d f o r inclinations of populations, 33

214

Index

B o u r g e o i s , p e t t y : in F r a n c e , 61, 6 3 ; i n c a p a b l e of n a t i o n a l l e a d e r s h i p , 6 3 η ; in G e r m a n y , 136 B o u r g e o i s c i v i l i z a t i o n , M a r x ' s attitude t o w a r d , 37, 191 ; b a r b a r i s m of, 52 Bourgeoisie, sweeping a w a y all fixed relations, 2 6 ; a g e o f , 5 7 ; the national c l a s s : a p p r o a c h i n g end of its l e a d e r s h i p , 59; interests antagonistic to old institutions, 6 2 ; l e a d e r s h i p , 63; influence, 6 7 ; n a r r o w conception of nation and patriotism, 78 ; f o r c i b l y c i v i l i z i n g all nations, 86 ; s t r u g g l e of proletariat a g a i n s t , a national strugg l e , 88 ; o r g a n i z e d on national scale, 89; strengthened, 99; issue b e t w e e n p r o l e t a r i a t and, must be settled in E n g l a n d , 107; small f a r m e r a v a l u a b l e ally of, 120 Bourgeoisie, French: leadership a g a i n s t a r i s t o c r a c y , 61 B o u r g e o i s i e , G e r m a n , 136; compromise w i t h a r i s t o c r a c y and mona r c h y , 1 4 2 ; f a i l u r e to p l a y energetic political role, 149 ; w o u l d secure political p o w e r , 198 B o u r g e o i s nation, 17, 65 ; " f a t h e r l a n d , " 7 6 ; exploitation c h a r a c teristic o f , 80; l i b e r a l republic the classical f o r m of rule, 1 1 7 B o u r g e o i s revolution, classical pattern of, 115 B r i t a i n , see E n g l a n d British, see E n g l i s h Bürgerkrieg in Frankreich, Der ( M a r x ) , 129, 130, 188; excerpt, 131 C a p i t a l i s m , p r o d u c t of t e m p e r a t e zone, 9 ; distinction b e t w e e n comm e r c i a l and industrial, 49, 1 9 1 ; state the political instrumentality used by, 66; t r a n s f o r m i n g w o r l d into single community, 84 ; pure, existed n o w h e r e , 84; creating w o r l d in its o w n i m a g e , 87 ; E n g l a n d the h e a r t of, 100-114 ; French,

e x c e s s i v e l y w e i g h t e d on financial side, 123 ; outline of o r i g i n of, in W e s t e r n E u r o p e , 161 ff. ; inevitable as a s t a g e in evolution of all societies? 1 6 1 ; creates its own " n e g a t i o n , " 162; Russia moving t o w a r d , 163; M a r x ' s description of genesis of, restricted to Western E u r o p e , 165 ; a transitory system, 1 6 7 ; not a necessary prel i m i n a r y to socialism in Russia, 167, 169; United States, 171, 179; exploitation of w o r k e r s essential to, 1 7 4 ; difficulties in new countries, 175 ; born of expropriation and compulsion, 175, 1 7 6 ; rapid d e v e l o p m e n t in U n i t e d States, 180; role in history, 191 C a p i t a l i s t i m p e r i a l i s m , effect of, 49 C a p i t a l i s t society, three g r e a t classes of, 60; v a l u e and truth in, 74 C a p i t a l i s t s , l e a d e r s h i p , 59; justification of rule, 60; a small fraction of population, 61 ; see also Bourgeoisie C a r l y l e , T h o m a s , quoted, 144 C e n t r a l E u r o p e , r e o r g a n i z a t i o n of, 42 ; n a t i o n a l consciousness, 200 C e n t r a l i z a t i o n , economic development a n d , 67 ; process of, 87 C h a r l e s I, k i n g of E n g l a n d , 73 C h a r t i s m , 94, 181 ; r e f o r m s , 91 ; most promising popular movement, 1 0 7 ; r e v o l u t i o n a r y v a l u e , 109; collapse, 203 C h a u v i n i s m , 146, 147 C i v i l W a r , A m e r i c a n , see under U n i t e d States C l a s s f o r m of v a l u e s , 75 Classes, role of, 58; justification for r u l i n g class, 59; in modern society, 60; class societies, 65, 69; concept of, 120; in the United States, 171 ; role of l e a d i n g or national class, 205 " C l a s s i c a l " f o r m s , m e a n i n g of, in M a r x , 67-68, 100-101, 104, 115, 117

Index Class struggle, 28, 57, 205 ; b e a r i n g of national differences upon theory of, 16 ; abolition of, 34, 69 Clive, Robert, 51 Cobbett, William, 77 Colonial nations, 170; peculiarity, «7« Colonists, A m e r i c a n and Australian, as w a g e earners, >76 Commercial capitalism, 191 ; imperialism, 49 Communal institutions, 166 Commune, P a r i s , see P a r i s commune Commune, Russian, 166 ff. Communism, primitive, 57, 161 ; classless society of, 65 Communist Journal, excerpt, 92 Communist L e a g u e of 1850, 96 Conquest, 48-49, 148 Constitution, English, 104 Consumption, 4 Continental countries, revolution in, 93 ; revolutionary relation to England, 109 Cosmopolitanism, 207 Countries, n a t u r a l and artificial differences between, 9 ; categories, 85; new, see Colonial nations; Frontier Country life, 119 Crimean W a r , 155, 159 Crusoe, Robinson, 102 Culture, in the West, 199; diversities in Central and E a s t e r n Europe, 201 ; world, 207 Czarism, 151 ff. ; and Pan-Slavism, 40; terrorism inevitable under conditions of, 94; G e r m a n attitude toward, 146; and E u r o p e a n reaction, 151; international influence, 152; hatred of, 157; could not be o v e r t h r o w n by assault from without, 159 Czechs, 201; claims dismissed, 40; "a dying . . . nationality," 41 ; included in enlarged G e r m a n y , 43, 201 ; vitality of, 202

21$

Debt, national, 77; United States, 17« Definition of the modern nation, 17 ; see Nation Defoe, Daniel, 102 Democratic forms, m e a n i n g of, varied, 91 Denmark, Schleswig-Holstein Question, 43 Despotism, Oriental, 53 Deutsche Ideologie ( M a r x ) , 139 Deutschland ( H e i n e ) , excerpt, 139 Dictatorial measures and socialism, «9 Differences, national, see National character and national contrasts Division of labor, 6-7 Dogmatism, socialist, see Socialist "orthodoxy" Eastern Question, 154 Economic and non-economic f o r m s , question of correlation, 30-32, 6668, 104 Economic isolation, abolition of, 26 Economic society, epochs of, 161 Economic uniformity and national distinctions, 30 ff. Economy, civilization and, 20; correlation between art and, 31 ; planned, 70 Emancipation, national, 36 Engels, Friedrich, 15, 69, 70, 93, 102, I0 3> 135, 161; attacks on Austrian Slavs, 40; repudiated antiauthoritarianism, 70; quoted, 96, n o , i n , 144, 147, 155, 179; Grundsätze des Kommunismus, 96, 97; warnings to G e r m a n immigrant radicals in the United States, 183; and Slavic nations, 188; religious in youth, 189; condemned anti-Semitism, 192; "international socialist," 192; Manifest, see Manifest ( M a r x and Engels) England, characterization, 11; and Ireland, 38-39, 113, 204; a n d India, 50 ff. ; contrasted with France,

2i6

Index

England (Continued) 67, 1 1 5 ; n a t i o n a l sentiment, 80; f r i c t i o n b e t w e e n U n i t e d States and, 8 2 ; l a b o r m o v e m e n t , 9 1 ; s u f f r a g e , 9 t , m ; possible e v o l u t i o n a r y m e a n s f o r socialism, 92 ; r a d i c a l m o v e m e n t , 93 ; socialists to support the C h a r t i s t s , 93 ; socialist revolution, 96, 98, 1 2 6 ; the h e a r t of c a p i t a l i s m , 1 0 0 - 1 1 4 ; i d i o m and history, 103 ; less cent r a l i z e d than F r a n c e , 104; political d e v e l o p m e n t , Constitution, P a r l i a m e n t , cabinet system, 1045 ; W h i g s and T o r i e s , 106-7 ; r 0 ' e in r e v o l u t i o n , 107 ff. ; f a i l u r e to s h a r e in o v e r t u r n of g o v e r n m e n t s , in 1848, 108 ; c o m m e r c i a l crisis of 1857, 1 1 0 ; dose of radicalism f r o m w i t h o u t proposed, 1 1 2 ; l e v e r of revolution, 1 1 2 E n g l i s h , rule o f , in I n d i a , 50; imp e r i a l i s m , 50 ff. ; penetration o f C h i n a , 55 ; brutal methods of w a r f a r e , 80; a n t a g o n i s m of w o r k e r s t o w a r d Irish w o r k e r s , 8 1 ; stinti n g c h a r a c t e r of r e f o r m , 105 E n g l i s h Republic, 197 E q u a l i t y , c i v i l , 37 E u r o p e , d e v e l o p m e n t of, reflected in f o r t u n e s of F r a n c e , R u s s i a , and Poland, 44; expansion, 54; national problems of C e n t r a l , E a s t ern, a n d Southern, 199 E v o l u t i o n , t h e o r y o f , 18 E v o l u t i o n a r y versus revolutionary socialism, 92-93 Exploitation, abolition of, 26; of i n d i v i d u a l s a n d of nations, 2 7 ; class, 3 4 ; essential to c a p i t a l i s m , 1 7 4 ; o f A m e r i c a n l a b o r , 180 E x p r o p r i a t i o n , a g r a r i a n , 101 F a m i l y , 23 F a r m s , s m a l l : in A m e r i c a , 1 7 4 ; passi n g p h a s e in history, 1 1 9 ; in F r a n c e , 120 " F a t h e r l a n d , " b o u r g e o i s conception o f , 24, 7 6 ; p r o l e t a r i a n , 25, 63-64

February Republic, 117 F e b r u a r y R e v o l u t i o n , 124 F e u d a l i s m , 66, 1 6 1 ; d e s t r o y e d in F r a n c e , 1 1 6 ; in G e r m a n y , 135 F e u d a l n a t i o n , 17, 65 First I n t e r n a t i o n a l , c l a s s i f i c a t i o n by states, 1 9 ; discussion of n a t i o n a l questions, 2 8 ; I n a u g u r a l A d d r e s s , 30, 87, 96, i n ; statement re I r e land, 39; decline a n d d e a t h , 9 ; , 113, 182; one r e a s o n f o r e s t a b l i s h ment, 9 6 ; second C o n g r e s s , 182; r e m o v a l to U n i t e d States, 182; c h a r g e o f control by P a n - G e r manism, 193 First International, G e n e r a l Council, 187 " F l e r o v s k y , N . , " 13 F r a n c e , c h a r a c t e r i z e d , 1 1 ; socialist revolution, 29, 96; influence spelled p r o g r e s s , 4 4 ; classes, 60; c e n t r a l i z a t i o n , 67 ; J u l y M o n a r c h y , 68; S e c o n d E m p i r e , 72, 1 2 8 ; n a tional sentiment, 80, 8 1 ; p o p u l a r s u f f r a g e , 91 ; spirit of r e v o l u t i o n , 115-33 ; r e v o l u t i o n a r y l e a d e r s h i p , 115, 1 1 7 ; politically ebullient, 1 1 5 ; and European reform, 1 1 6 ; February republic, 117, 1 1 8 ; June D a y s , 1 1 7 ; r u r a l conditions, 120; administrative apparatus, 124; political over-emphasis, 124; cause of f a i l u r e of p r o l e t a r i a n m o v e m e n t , in 1848, 1 2 5 ; " f i r s t " b e g i n n i n g s of w o r k e r s ' m o v e m e n t , 1 3 2 ; N a t i o n a l C o n v e n t i o n of 1792, 142 ; policy t o w a r d G e r m a n y , 145 ; W a r of 1870, 144 ff.; M a r x ' s attitude t o w a r d , 185, 188 F r a n c o - P r u s s i a n W a r , 62, 144 ff., 193; a n d R u s s i a , 156 F r a n c o - S a r d i n i a n w a r , 156 F r a n k f o r t A s s e m b l y , 142 F r a n k l i n , B e n j a m i n , 172 F r e d e r i c k II, k i n g o f P r u s s i a , 143 Freedom, for groups and individuals, 3 7 ; i n d i v i s i b l e , 197 F r e e - S o i l r e f o r m e r s , 94 French, d i s l i k e of I t a l i a n s , 28 ; na-

Index t i o n a l i s m , 29, g ì , 126, 146, 147 F r e n c h R e v o l u t i o n , 37, 61, 1 1 5 , 126, 141 F r o n t i e r , f r e e l a n d , 173 ; c a p i t a l and l a b o r , 174, 1 7 5 ; see also C o l o n i a l nations F u t u r e society, see S o c i a l i s t society G e n e r i c man, see M a n G e o r g e , H e n r y , 183 G e r m a n E m p i r e , 149 G e r m a n R e v o l u t i o n of 1848, 36, 39, 6 2 ; role of S l a v s , 39 ff., 202; support of bourgeoisie, 206 G e r m a n s , influence o f , 41 ; in E a s t to b e c o m e P o l e s or R u s s i a n s , 43 ; effect of c o n s e r v a t i v e r e g i m e in R u s s i a on, 1 2 7 ; n a t i o n a l i s m , 80, 81, 138-39, 148; E n g e l s ' w a r n i n g to i m m i g r a n t r a d i c a l s in the U n i t e d States, 183 Germany, characterized, 11, 12, 1 3 8 ; Polish b o u n d a r y s h i f t e d , 2 1 ; classified as " r e v o l u t i o n a r y " n a tion, 41 ; S c h l e s w i g - H o l s t e i n Q u e s tion, 43 ; " f r e e d o m " of p r i m i t i v e G e r m a n s , 79; n a t i o n a l sentiment, 80, 81 ; political d e m o c r a c y in, 91 ; unification of Italy a n d , 95, 1 4 7 ; socialist revolution, 97 ; p r o b l e m of unification, 134-50, 1 9 3 ; backw a r d n e s s , 1 3 4 ; old institutions, 134, 1 4 1 ; capitalist d e v e l o p m e n t , 1 3 6 ; idealism, 1 3 7 ; r a t i o n a l i z a tion of b a c k w a r d n e s s into species of superiority, 1 3 8 ; role in intern a t i o n a l affairs, 140, 1 9 7 ; interf e r e n c e with f r e e d o m of other nations, 141 ; M a r x ' s p r o g r a m in 1848, 141 ; F r a n c o - P r u s s i a n W a r , 145 (see also Franco-Prussian W a r ) ; relation to C z a r i s m , 1 4 6 ; anti-Semitism in, 1 9 2 ; economic consequences of unification, 198; see also Prussia G o t h a P r o g r a m , 72, 150, 194 G r e a t Britain, see E n g l a n d Grundsätze des Kommunismus (Eng e l s ) , excerpt,. 96, 97

217

H a p s b u r g , 141, 143 ; d y n a s t y in 1848, 4 0 ; influence in G e r m a n y , 4 0 ; in I t a l y , 46 H a p s b u r g Empire, 42; b a c k w a r d , 43 ; d i v i s i o n into n a t i o n a l states, 1+2 H a y e s , R u t h e r f o r d , 183 H e g e l , G . W . F., 5, 50 H e i n e , H e i n r i c h , quoted, 139 H e l v é t i u s , C l a u d e A d r i e n , 12 H e r z e n , A l e x a n d e r , r e f e r e n c e to, in Das Kapital, deleted, 187 Histoire des français des divers états ( M o n t e i l ) , 13 Histoire des idées sociales avant la Révolution française ( Villegard e l l e ) , excerpt, 24 H i s t o r i c a l , the, as distinguished f r o m the n a t u r a l , 14-15, 50, 160 H i s t o r i c a l influences, affect f o r m s of state, 67 H i s t o r i c a l man, see M a n H i s t o r i c a l m a t e r i a l i s m , 159 H o h e n z o l l e r n s , 142, 1 9 9 ; rise of the, 143 ; p r o - R u s s i a n tendencies, 146 H o l l a n d , e v o l u t i o n a r y socialism, 9 3 ; c o m m e r c i a l c a p i t a l i s m , 100 H o l y A l l i a n c e , 151 H o l y R o m a n E m p i r e , 135 H u m a n n a t u r e , modified h i s t o r i c a l l y in e v e r y a g e , 2 ; see also M a n H u m a n w i l l , 33 H u n g a r i a n s , influence, 41 H u n g a r y , " r e v o l u t i o n a r y " nation in 1848, 4 1 ; independence, 40, 43 H y d e P a r k , d e m o n s t r a t i o n in, n o I d i o m a n d history, in E n g l a n d , 103 Imagination, distinguishes man, 5 I m m i g r a n t s in United States, 179, 182 I m p e r i a l i s m , oppression a b r o a d a n d at home, 26, 1 9 7 ; v a r i e t i e s and v a r i e d effects o f , 48-49; c o m m e r c i a l a n d i n d u s t r i a l , 49-50; B r i t i s h , R u s s i a n , and A m e r i c a n e x p a n sion, 50, 154, 1 5 6 ; British in Ind i a , 50 ff. ; methods, aims a n d e f f e c t s of British rule in I n d i a ,

2i8

Index

Imperialism (Continued) 51-54; European expansion, 54; M a r x ' s more critical later v i e w , 54-55 ! j u d g m e n t o f i m p e r i a l i s m i n I n d i a , C h i n a , a n d M e x i c o , 545 5 ; and nationalist sentiment, g o ; socialism and b a c k w a r d countries, 8 6 ; p o l i c y of c o n q u e s t , 148 I n d i a , 204; r u l e of B r i t i s h , j o ; no " h i s t o r y " in, 5 0 ; p r e d e s t i n e d to c o n q u e s t , 5 1 ; cost o f t r a n s f o r m a t i o n o f , 5 2 ; j u s t i f i c a t i o n o f its f o r c i b l e c h a n g e , 5 2 ; i n c o n s i s t e n c y of British policies, 54; capitalism s u c c e e d i n g c o m m u n a l s y s t e m , 162 I n d i v i d u a l , see M a n Individuality, 7 I n d u s t r i a l i m p e r i a l i s m , 50 I n d u s t r i a l R e v o l u t i o n , 200 Industry, human possibilities inhere n t in l a r g e - s c a l e , 6 ; p r o d u c t i v i t y and versatility, 7 ; linked count r i e s , 9 ; a n d the l a r g e s o c i e t y , 3 4 ; a l l i e d w i t h r a d i c a l e l e m e n t s in F e b r u a r y R e v o l u t i o n , 1 2 4 ; estimate of expansion e x a g g e r a t e d , 200 I n e v i t a b i l i t y of c a p i t a l i s m , q u e s t i o n o f , 161 ff. I n t e r n a t i o n a l , F i r s t , see F i r s t I n t e r national I n t e r n a t i o n a l interests, t a k e p r e c e d e n c e o v e r n a t i o n a l , 36 I n t e r n a t i o n a l i s m , e q u a t i o n of n a t i o n a l i s m w i t h , 2 0 6 ; M a r x ' s conc e p t o f , d e f i n e d , 207 I n t e r n a t i o n a l o r g a n i z a t i o n of p r o l e t a r i a t , 87, 88, 96 International progress, national e m a n c i p a t i o n r e l a t e d to, 36 International revolution and nat i o n a l d i f f e r e n c e s , 84-99 I r e l a n d , M a r x ' s v i e w of e m a n c i p a tion b e f o r e 1848, 3 8 ; a f t e r 1848, 3 8 - 3 9 ; p r e j u d i c e of E n g l i s h r u l ing classes against, 8 1 ; f a r m e r s flooded E n g l i s h l a b o r m a r k e t , 81 ; antagonism of w o r k e r toward English worker, 82; antagonism

t o w a r d neutralized class struggle in E n g l a n d , 1 1 3 ; a n d E u r o p e a n r e v o l u t i o n , 203 Italy, independence, 40; classified as " r e v o l u t i o n a r y " n a t i o n , 41 ; u n i f i c a t i o n o f G e r m a n y a n d , 95 I v a n I ( K a l i t a ) , 157 J a c k s o n i a n i s m , 181 J a p a n , f e u d a l , 85 J e f f e r s o n i a n i s m , 181 J e w s , e x t e n s i o n of p o l i t i c a l a n d c i v i l r i g h t s to, 37 ; M a r x ' s r e a c t i o n to, 185, 188, 1 9 1 ; m o v e m e n t f o r r e ligious r e f o r m and political freed o m , 189, 190 Jones, E r n e s t , n o J u l y M o n a r c h y , 68, 124 July R e v o l u t i o n , 1 1 7 June u p r i s i n g (1848), 117 Kapital, Das, 17, 23, 60, 66, 75, 162, 165; excerpt, 2 ; English history d r a w n on f o r i l l u s t r a t i o n s , 1 0 0 ; reference to A l e x a n d e r H e r z e n , d e l e t e d , 187 K a u t s k y , K a r l , 2 0 1 ; q u o t e d , 202 Klassenkämpfe in Frankreich, Die ( M a r x ) , 118 K n o x , John, 194 K o r e a , 156 L a b o r , h u m a n , 5 ; a t t a c k s on e x t r e m e s u b d i v i s i o n o f , 5, 6 ; t e c h n o l o g i c a l v e r s a t i l i t y , 6, 7 I . a b o r , d i v i s i o n o f , 6-7 L a b o r U n i o n , N a t i o n a l , 181 L a f a r g u e , P a u l , 29 L a n d l o r d i s m , a b o l i t i o n o f , 38 ; r e a c tionary influence, 174 Languages, and nationality, 20; g r o w t h of uniform, 199; d i v e r s i ties o f , d i m i n i s h i n g in c e r t a i n c o u n t r i e s , 201 ; a n d the r e o r g a n i zation of C e n t r a l and Southern E u r o p e , 42 ; E n g l i s h h i s t o r y a n d i d i o m , 103 L a s s a l l e , F e r d i n a n d , 91, 1 5 3 ; c o n troversy with, 4 6 ; M a r x ' s dislike o f , 192, 194

Index L a w , R o m a n , 31 L e a d e r s h i p , n a t i o n a l , 59, 6 1 , 62 L e n i n , N i k o l a i , on the t h e o r y of the state, 7 1 L i b e r t y , 37, 173 L i n c o l n , A b r a h a m , 70, 172, 178, 196 L i t e r a t u r e , w o r l d , 27, 207 L o c k e , J o h n , 12 L o r r a i n e , see A l s a c e a n d L o r r a i n e L o u i s N a p o l e o n , see N a p o l e o n I I I L o u i s P h i l i p p e , k i n g of F r a n c e , 1 1 7 M a c h i n e p r o d u c t i o n , r e l a t i o n to v e r satility, 6 ; effect on p r o l e t a r i a t , 89 M a l m ö , a r m i s t i c e o f , 43 M a n a g e m e n t , need f o r , u n d e r socialism, 71 M a n , unity a n d d i v e r s i t y , 1-10, 7 5 ; g e n e r i c a n d h i s t o r i c a l , 2, 7, 8, 1 0 ; g e n e r i c t r a i t s : c r e a t i v e n e s s , purp o s e f u l n e s s , v e r s a t i l i t y , socialness, 4-8 ; h o m o g e n e i t y of species, 8 ; f r o m point of v i e w of b i o l o g y , 18 ; his r e a l m of f r e e d o m , 71 ; d i f f e r ences a m o n g men h i s t o r i c a l a n d t r a n s i e n t , 75 Manifest der Kommunistischen Partei ( M a r x and E n g e l s ) , 17, 22, 23 ff. passim, 60, 69, 88, 96, 161, 202; e a s i l y m i s r e a d , 2 6 ; " f a t h e r l a n d " r e p u d i a t e d in, 7 6 ; political p r o g r a m , 8 7 ; p r o g r a m restricted in a p p l i c a b i l i t y , 9 3 ; role of a d v a n c e p a r t y of socialist m o v e ment, 9 4 ; concerted e f f o r t s f o r revolution, 97; claimed national l e a d e r s h i p f o r w o r k e r s , 1 1 7 ; satirized adulteration of French t h o u g h t by G e r m a n s , 1 3 7 ; three epochs of history, 161 M a r x , H e i n r i c h , 189 M a r x , K a r l , conception of m a n , 2 ; y o u t h f u l j u d g m e n t s of c h a r a c t e r of nations, 1 1 ; n e w s p a p e r Neue rheinische Zeitung, 19, 40, 45, 79, 140; p r o g r a m f o r introduction of socialist p l a n n i n g , 29; Zur Kritik der politischen Ökonomie, 30, 186;

219

Zur Judenfrage, 37, 189, 1 9 1 ; a n t a g o n i s m t o w a r d S l a v s , 40, 41, anarchist 185, 1 8 7 ; r e p u d i a t e d position on authority, 7 0 ; p r i m a r i l y an internationalist, 84, 192, 2 0 7 ; revolutionist or e v o l u t i o n i s t ? 93 ; the s a n g u i n e r e v o l u t i o n i s t , 99, 109, 129, 180; Die Klassenkämpfe in Frankreich, u8; Der Bürgerkrieg in Frankreich, 129, 130, 1 3 1 , 188; Deutsche Ideologie, 139 ; Secret Diplomatic History of the Eighteenth Century, 1 5 7 ; o v e r e m p h a t i c a s a w r i t e r , 163 ; attit u d e t o w a r d v a r i o u s nations, 18595; accusations a g a i n s t , 1 8 5 ; a n t i p a t h y t o w a r d Russians, 18$, 1 8 6 ; attitude t o w a r d F r a n c e , 185, 188; r e a c t i o n to J e w s , 185, 188, 1 9 1 ; Russian aristocrats and, 186; n e v e r religious, 1 8 9 ; dislike of L a s s a l l e , 192, 194; as a G e r m a n , 1 9 2 ; e x i l e in E n g l a n d , 1 9 2 ; influence of French and E n g l i s h t h o u g h t , 193; not a n a t i o n a l i s t , 1 9 4 ; personality, c h a r a c t e r , 1 9 4 ; d i s l i k e d men, l o v e d m a n k i n d , 1 9 5 ; his W e s t e r n orientation, 198-200; his limitations in d e a l i n g w i t h the n a t i o n a l question, 198-204; his contribution to it, 204-7 i h ' s P a t " tern of revolution, see R e v o l u t i o n , M a r x ' s pattern of M a r x , K a r l , and Engels, F r i e d r i c h , Manifest, see Manifest Marx-Engels Archiv (Ryazanov), 166 M a r x i s m versus B a k u n i n i s m , F i r s t I n t e r n a t i o n a l split, 113 M a r x i s t c o r r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n economic and non-economic f o r m s , question o f , 30-32, 66-68, 104 M a r x i s t " o r t h o d o x y , " see Socialist "orthodoxy" M e d i t e r r a n e a n Sea, t r a d e routes, '35 M e h r i n g , F r a n z , 145, 149 M e t t e r n i c h E r a , 116 M e t t e r n i c h system, 151

220 M e x i c a n W a r , 172 M i d d l e A g e s , classes, 57 Minorities, 199; emancipation, M ir, 166 f f .

Index 36

Misere de la philosophie (Marx), 186; excerpt, 12 M o n a r c h y , c o n s e r v a t i v e , 36 ; limited, 68; Continental, 90 M o n e y e c o n o m y , d e v e l o p m e n t in E n g l a n d , 102 M o n g o l i s m , 159 M o n g o l s , 157 M o n t e i l , Α . Α . , I3 M o r g a n , L e w i s H., 57 M u s c o v y , 157, 158 N a p o l e o n I, 145 ; and f e u d a l institutions, 1 1 6 ; d e v e l o p m e n t of cent r a l i z e d a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , 125 N a p o l e o n I I I , 46, 55, 91, 118, 128, 1 5 6 ; state a p p a r a t u s under, 1 3 0 ; d e m a n d f o r compensation in G e r m a n y , 145 N a t i o n , social concept of the m o d ern, 1 1 - 3 2 ; intellectual and c u l t u r a l differences, 1 2 ; as n a t u r a l entity, 1 4 ; f e u d a l , bourgeois, a d v a n c e d , or b a c k w a r d , 1 7 ; defined, 1 7 ; as society, 1 8 ; not a linguistic c a t e g o r y , 1 9 ; f a c t o r s w h i c h affect c h a r a c t e r , 22, 65; imminent d i s a p p e a r a n c e o f ? 2 6 ; a real f a c t , 29; size and statehood, 33-47; s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n , 33; and s t a g n a n t social system, 48; n a tion and class, 57-59; nation and state, 6 5 - 7 3 ; the irreducible unit f o r establishment of socialism, 88 ; u n i f o r m p r o g r a m f o r a l l nations not a d v o c a t e d , 9 3 ; could be f r e e only if others w e r e f r e e , 1 9 7 ; economic criteria in establishment of independent, 197 N a t i o n a l , t h e : defined, 17, 58-59; L e o n T r o t s k y ' s definition, 58-59 N a t i o n a l c h a r a c t e r and national contrasts, 9-10, 1 1 - 1 3 , 14, 22, 41, 52, 102-3, 1 1 1 - 1 2 , 115, 122-23, I2 9> 137 ff., 158, 171-72, 183, 188

N a t i o n a l class, conception of the, 5764, 205 N a t i o n a l concepts, redefined, 205 N a t i o n a l debt, 77 N a t i o n a l d i f f e r e n c e s , a n d the international r e v o l u t i o n , 84-99; t t t also N a t i o n a l c h a r a c t e r and n a tional contrasts N a t i o n a l e m a n c i p a t i o n , related to international p r o g r e s s , 36 N a t i o n a l existence, p r o p e r conditions f o r , 33 National groups, political self-determination of, 35 Nationalism, 74-83; worship of state, 7 8 ; a b o u r g e o i s passion, 80; French, 81, 138, 188; not n a t u r a l to p r o l e t a r i a t , 82; G e r m a n , 138, 148 ; as e x p r e s s i o n of social tension, 200; n a r r o w , 205; equation o f , w i t h i n t e r n a t i o n a l i s m , 206 N a t i o n a l i t y , " n a t u r a l " b a s i s of, 141 5 ; not biologic but historical phenomenon, 1 8 ; not a linguistic c a t e g o r y , 19-20; persistence o f , 20; relation to g e o g r a p h y , 20; and historical " r i g h t , " 21 ; soluble bond, 2 1 ; s o c i a l i s m a n d , 22 N a t i o n a l L a b o r U n i o n , 181 N a t i o n a l l e a d e r s h i p , 59 ff., 205 National movements, and prolet a r i a t , 36; e f f e c t u p o n international relations, 41 ; relation bet w e e n M a r x i s m a n d , reconsidered, 201 N a t i o n a l question, M a r x ' s position on, t r a c e d , 1 9 6 ; M a r x ' s limitations in d e a l i n g w i t h , 198 ff.; his contributions to, 204-6 N a t i o n a l R e f o r m A s s o c i a t i o n , 180, 181 N a t i o n a l theory of M a r x , 11 ff. N a t i o n a l union, m o m e n t o f , 61 Nations, s m a l l : m o v e m e n t s f o r independence and r e a c t i o n , 36; d i f ficulty of political existence, 41 ; increasing assimilation of, 199; role in d i s i n t e g r a t i o n of states, 200

Index Nations, y o u n g : characteristics and p r o b l e m s , 1 7 0 ff. "Natural," "naturalness": meaning, 15 N a t u r e , conquest o f , 8 N e g r o s l a v e r y , see S l a v e r y in U n i t e d States Netherlands, and July Revolution, »7 Neue

rheinische

Zeitung,

19, 40, 45,

79, H O N i c h o l a s I, c z a r , w a r a g a i n s t u r g e d , 15+ " N i c h o l a s s y s t e m , " 152 N i g h t i n g a l e , F l o r e n c e , 155 Nobles, G e r m a n , 135 N o r d i c n a t i o n a l i s m , 79 Sotes on the Fatherland, 162 O p p r e s s i o n , source, 34; interconnection of all f o r m s o f , 196 O p t i m i s m , r e v o l u t i o n a r y , of M a r x , 99, 109, 129, 180 O r i e n t a l despotism, 53 " O r t h o d o x y , " socialist, see Socialist "orthodoxy" P a l m e r s t o n , L o r d , 153 P a n - S l a v i s m , 40, 153 Paris Commune, 64; uprising, 129 ff. ; d e f e n s e of, 130, 188; f o r m of g o v e r n m e n t , 130, 1 3 1 ; police, militia, c h u r c h , education, public officialdom, 130-31 ; r e j e c t e d as e x a m p l e of socialist g o v e r n m e n t , »3f Parliament, English, character of, 104 Patriotism, 75, 76, 206 ; r u l i n g classes play upon emotion of, 78 P a t t e r n of r e v o l u t i o n , M a r x ' s , see R e v o l u t i o n , M a r x ' s p a t t e r n of P a u p e r i s m i n c r e a s i n g , 60 P e a s a n t s , F r e n c h , 119 ff. P e t e r the G r e a t , 158 Petersburg, sec St. Petersburg, 158 Petty, W i l l i a m , 122 Petty b o u r g e o i s i e , i n c a p a b l e of n a -

221

tional l e a d e r s h i p , 6 3 η ; F r e n c h , 1 2 6 ; G e r m a n , 136-37 P h y s i o c r a c y , 122 P l a n n i n g , social, 70-71 P l a n t a t i o n economy, 1 7 6 P o l a n d , 2 1 ; resistance to d e n a t i o n a l i z a t i o n , 2 2 ; to be f r e e d in L o n d o n , 38, 108, 203 ; i n d e p e n d e n c e f o r , 40, 43, 44, 188; classified a s " r e v o l u t i o n a r y " nation, 41 ; r a t i o between progress and retrogression, 4 4 ; b o u n d a r i e s f a v o r e d by M a r x , 45 ; a " n e c e s s a r y " nation in Europe, 45; a g r a r i a n revolution, 9 4 ; rebellion a g a i n s t R u s s i a , 1 5 6 ; F i r s t I n t e r n a t i o n a l a n d , 1 8 7 ; as point of d e p a r t u r e f o r r e v o l u t i o n , 203 P o l i s h question, 4 4 ; M a r x ' s speech on, quoted, 108 P o l i t i c a l e m a n c i p a t i o n , 37 P o l i t i c a l r i v a l r i e s , abolition o f , 26 P o l i t i c s , term, 66 P r o d u c t i o n , and b i o l o g i c d r i v e s , 4 ; p l a n n e d , 6 ; conquest of nature, 8 ; r e l a t i o n s of, 30; c o r r e l a t i o n w i t h legal development, 3 1 ; u n i f y i n g link in history, 5 8 ; and state f o r m s , 6 7 ; s o c i a l i z a t i o n of m e a n s o f , 93, 162; A s i a t i c , ancient, f e u d a l , and b o u r g e o i s methods, 161 P r o g r e s s , 58; necessities limit e f f e c t i v e n e s s of w i l l , 3 3 ; social, 58 Progress and Poverty ( G e o r g e ) , 183 Proletariat, proletarians, 1 1 ; reserve army of, 7 ; rule of, will eff a c e d i f f e r e n c e s and a n t a g o n i s m s , 27 ; C e l t i c c o n t r a s t e d with A n g l o S a x o n , 1 3 ; d e p r i v a t i o n of f a m i l y j o y s and decencies, 23; e m a n c i pation and economic d e v e l o p m e n t , 3 4 ; national l e a d e r s h i p , 60, 6 3 ; only class c a p a b l e of social i n i t i a t i v e , 64; rule of, the final p h a s e of c l a s s society, 69; existence as s e p a r a t e class to cease, 69; f r a ternity of, the only authentic internationalism, 81; and national p r e j u d i c e s , 81 ; n a t i o n a l i s m not

222

Index

Proletariat (Continued) n a t u r a l to, 8 2 ; a n t a g o n i s m bet w e e n E n g l i s h a n d Irish, 81, 82, 1 1 3 ; rule by, w o u l d b r i n g i d e a l of i n t e r n a t i o n a l peace, 83 ; must o r g a n i z e a s a c l a s s at h o m e , 88 ; struggle against bourgeoisie a n a t i o n a l s t r u g g l e , 88 ; also a n int e r n a t i o n a l , 88 ; h o w m a t u r i t y d e v e l o p s , 89 ; task to s o c i a l i z e e a c h n a t i o n a l economy, 90; w i l l h a v e to a p p e a l to f o r c e on t h e E u r o p e a n continent, 93 ; issue bet w e e n b o u r g e o i s i e a n d , must be settled in E n g l a n d , 107 ; w o u l d lead masses t o w a r d socialism, 1 2 6 ; t e m p o r a r y s u b o r d i n a t i o n of a i m s to assist b o u r g e o i s i e , 141 ; l e a d e r s h i p in i n d u s t r i a l i z e d society, 206 P r o l e t a r i a t , E n g l i s h , 6 9 ; c o u r s e of s p e c i a l c o n c e r n to M a r x , 1 0 7 ; b e lief that a w o r l d w a r w o u l d b r i n g to p o w e r , 1 1 0 ; a g r e e m e n t to r u l e of b o u r g e o i s i e — " a b o u r g e o i s p r o letariat," 111; antagonism of E n g l i s h t o w a r d Irish, 81, 82, 1 1 3 P r o l e t a r i a t , F r e n c h , 6 i , 63, 69, 76, 1 1 7 , 1 1 9 ff., 125 P r o l e t a r i a t , G e r m a n , 69, 1 3 6 ; e f f o r t to f a c i l i t a t e unification o f , 1 4 4 ; s u p e r i o r to F r e n c h , 1 4 7 ; g r o w i n g in G e r m a n y , 150 P r o l e t a r i a t , I r i s h , 81, 82, 1 1 3 P r o l e t a r i a t , R o m a n , 164 P r o l e t a r i a t , R u s s i a n , 158, 160 P r o l e t a r i a t , in the U n i t e d States, 1 7 1 , 1 8 2 ; l a b o r m a r k e t in n e w c o u n t r i e s , 1 7 5 ; e f f o r t to o r g a n i z e on n a t i o n a l scale, 183 P r o p e r t y , abolition of p r i v a t e , 23 ; b o u r g e o i s a n d i n d i v i d u a l , 7$ ; a b o lition of class, 1 3 1 ; s m a l l - s c a l e , obstacle to c a p i t a l i s m , 1 7 3 ; c a p i t a l i s m w o u l d abolish s m a l l , 174 P r o u d h o n , P i e r r e Joseph, 153 P r o u d h o n i s m , 126, 146 P r u s s i a , b r u t a l m e t h o d s of w a r f a r e , 80; c h a n c e s of political r e p e r c u s -

sions in, 127 ; M a r x a n d , 143 ; milit a r y reputation, 143 ; union u n d e r , 144; victory over Austria, 144; unification t h r o u g h v i c t o r y of, 1 4 s ; nationalists ignore Russian m e n a c e , 1 5 7 ; see also G e r m a n y P r u s s i a n d y n a s t y , 142 Prussian war, over Schleswig-Holstein, 43 Race, characteristics, 14; basis of, 1 4 ; and g e o l o g y , 15 R a d i c a l m o v e m e n t , and German l e a d e r s h i p , 193 R e l a t i v i t y of institutions and political f o r m s , 91 R e l i g i o n , 190 R e l i g i o u s f r e e d o m , U n i t e d States, 1 7 1 , 172 R e p u b l i c , 68, 1 1 7 Republicanism, European and A m e r i c a n , 9 0 ; F r e n c h , 123 R e v o l u t i o n , b e a r i n g of n a t i o n a l d i f f e r e n c e s u p o n t h e o r y o f , 1 6 ; led by b o u r g e o i s i e , 62 ; of the w o r k e r s , first step, 69 ; of the nineteenth c e n t u r y , 8 7 ; o b j e c t i v e not n a t i o n a l in c h a r a c t e r , 9 6 ; p r e d i c t i o n of s i m u l t a n e o u s r e v o l u t i o n , 96; could o c c u r only as a result of g r e a t w a r in E u r o p e , 9 7 ; w o u l d socialist E u r o p e p r e v a i l in conflict w i t h c a p i t a l i s t A s i a ? 98 ; p r o b a b l e c o u r s e in E u r o p e , 9 8 ; continental, 1 0 9 ; efforts to a c c e l e r a t e in E n g l a n d , 1 1 2 ; F r a n c e the spirit of, 1 1 5 - 3 3 ; method of political c h a n g e in F r a n c e , 1 1 6 ; the " s i x t h " E u r o p e a n p o w e r , 1 5 2 ; c o r e of univ e r s e of, 202 R e v o l u t i o n , M a r x ' s p a t t e r n o f : bef o r e 1848, 38, 98, 107-8, 1 1 7 , 141, 202-3; a f t e r 1848, 38-39, 98, 1089, 1 1 2 - 1 3 , i 2 6 - 2 7 , 132, 159-60,203-4 R e v o l u t i o n of 1848, see German R e v o l u t i o n of 1848 R e v o l u t i o n , roles o f : E n g l a n d , 38, 97-98, 107-9, 202-3; I r e l a n d , 3839, 112-13, 2 0 3 ; A u s t r i a n S l a v s ,

Index 40, 202 ; P o l a n d , 44-45, 202, 203 ; Western Europe, 87-88, 203; F r a n c e , 97-98, 115 ff., 126-27, 47, 202, 203; R u s s i a , 126-27, 132, 152, 155, 159-60, 203; G e r m a n y , 140, 146-47, 193, 203; United States, 180-81, 202, 2 0 3 ; I n d i a , 203-4; M i d d l e a n d F a r East, 203-4 R e v o l u t i o n a r y o p t i m i s m of M a r x , 99, 109, 129, 180, 200 R e v o l u t i o n a r y versus evolutionary s o c i a l i s m , 92-93 R h i n e l a n d , 145 R i c a r d o , D a v i d , 77 R i c h e l i e u , 145 R o m a n o v e m p i r e , 157 R o m e , a n c i e n t : classes, 5 7 ; f a i l u r e to i n t r o d u c e c a p i t a l i s m , 164 R o s e n b e r g , A r t h u r , 26η Rothschilds, relation with conservative p o w e r s aroused anti-Semitic f e e l i n g , 189 R u l i n g class, c h a r a c t e r closely related to c h a r a c t e r of nation, 65 R u m a n i a n s , classified as " c o u n t e r r e v o l u t i o n a r y , " 41 Russia, e x p a n s i o n u n d e s i r a b l e , 4 2 ; Polish Q u e s t i o n , 4 4 ; influence spelled reaction, 4 4 ; C z a r i s t , 55 (see also C z a r i s m ) ; d e v e l o p m e n t , 86; t e r r o r i s m i n e v i t a b l e u n d e r C z a r i s t conditions, 9 4 ; a s soil f o r revolution, 132; w a r against adv o c a t e d , 141, 1 5 4 ; P r u s s i a n a l l i ance w i t h and subjection to, 1 4 9 ; t h e o r y of stages, 1 5 1 - 6 9 ; protectorates, 1 5 4 ; o v e r e s t i m a t e of power of, 156; autocracy versus people, 1 5 8 ; and the sea, 1 5 8 ; stagnant, 159; w a r with T u r k e y , 160; m o v i n g t o w a r d r e v o l u t i o n , 161 ; o p p o r t u n i t y of e s c a p i n g c a p i talism, 162, 1 6 5 ; t e n d i n g to become c a p i t a l i s t , 1 6 3 ; mir, 1 6 6 ; c a p i t a l i s m not n e c e s s a r y as a p r e l i m i n a r y to s o c i a l i s m , 167, 1 6 9 ; used mir as b a s i s f o r l a n d settlement, 1 6 8 ; R e v o l u t i o n of 1905,

223

1 6 8 ; c o m m u n a l v i l l a g e system as b a s i s f o r socialist society, 1 7 4 ; a n d W e s t e r n r e v o l u t i o n , 203 R u s s i a n R e v o l u t i o n and the mir, 169 R u s s i a n s , people not i n v o l v e d in attacks on C z a r i s m , 1 5 7 ; a n t i m a r i time instincts, 158; M a r x ' s a n t i p a t h y t o w a r d , 186 ; courtesy of a r i s t o c r a t s to M a r x , 186 R u s s o p h i l i a , 153, 156 R y a z a n o v , 159

St. P e t e r s b u r g , 158 S a l a r i e s , g o v e r n m e n t , 131 S a x o n s of T r a n s y l v a n i a , " c o u n t e r r e v o l u t i o n a r y , " 41 S c a n d i n a v i s m , 79 S c h l e s w i g - H o l s t e i n Question, 43 Secret Diplomatic History of the Eighteenth Century ( M a r x ) , 157 S e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n of nations, 33 S e r b i a n s , l e a d e r s h i p in B a l k a n s , 42 Serfs, Russian: movement for emancipation of, 160 S i l e s i a , 143 " S i x t h p o w e r , " 152, 154, 155 S i z e a n d statehood, 33-47 Skill, not p e c u l i a r l y h u m a n , 5 S k i p p i n g social stages, 1 6 6 ; see also T h e o r y of s t a g e s S l a v e r y , ancient, 66, 161 S l a v e r y , U n i t e d S t a t e s : m o v e m e n t to abolish, 1 6 0 ; an obstacle to c a p i talism, 173, 1 7 6 ; in competition with proletariat, 176; C i v i l W a r , 177 ff.; l a b o r movement stimul a t e d by abolition o f , 181 S l a v i c nations, s m a l l : c l a i m s o f , dismissed, 4 0 ; distrust and d i s p a r a g e m e n t o f , 201 S l a v s , i n l a n d , a n t i - m a r i t i m e race, 12, 158; in T u r k i s h E m p i r e , 3 6 ; M a r x ' s a n t a g o n i s m t o w a r d , 185, 1 8 7 ; E n g e l s ' opinion o f , 188 S l a v s , A u s t r i a n , 36, 39; b a c k g r o u n d of attacks on, 40; classified as " c o u n t e r r e v o l u t i o n a r y , " 41 ; to be a b s o r b e d , 41

224

Index

S l a v s , S o u t h : M a r x ' s attitude toward, 41; Balkan Peninsula natural inheritance of, 4 2 ; nucleus of n a t i o n a l i t y in S e r b i a , 42 S m a l l - s c a l e a g r i c u l t u r e , 119, 1 7 4 flf. S o c i a l classes, see C l a s s e s Social d i f f e r e n c e s , a b o l i t i o n o f , 26 S o c i a l i s m , attitude t o w a r d n a t i o n a l ism, 2 4 ; n a t i o n a l interest h a r m o n i ous w i t h i n t e r n a t i o n a l aims o f , 3 6 ; a n d c l a s s s t r u g g l e , 57 ; c l a s s l e s s society o f , 65 ; d i c t a t o r i a l m e a s u r e s as i n t r o d u c t i o n to, 6 9 ; state u n d e r , 70-71 ; G o t h a P r o g r a m , 72, 150, 194; must s t a r t in d i v e r s i fied e n v i r o n m e n t , 85 ; e v o l u t i o n a r y versus r e v o l u t i o n a r y v i e w , 92-93; role of a d v a n c e p a r t y o f , 9 4 ; in one c o u n t r y , 9 6 - 9 7 ; p r o l e t a r i a t would lead masses t o w a r d , 126; process of e s t a b l i s h i n g , 1 3 1 ; to f o l l o w c a p i t a l i s m a s s t a g e in e v o lution, 161 ; c a p i t a l i s m not a necess a r y p r e l i m i n a r y in R u s s i a , 167, 1 6 9 ; A m e r i c a n institutions m i g h t pave way for evolutionary transition to, 173 ; p r o b l e m in A m e r ican, 182, 1 8 3 ; M a r x p r e s u m p t i v e h e a d of G e r m a n , 1 9 2 ; a p p l i c a t i o n to p a r t i c u l a r nations, 20$ Socialist " o r t h o d o x y " : E n g e l s on impossibility of " c r a m m i n g " a social t h e o r y into a g r e a t n a t i o n , 9 3 ; the F i r s t I n t e r n a t i o n a l a n d English labor, 1 1 1 - 1 2 ; G e r m a n y , ι j o ; G e r m a n r a d i c a l s not to try to impose M a r x i s t " d o g m a s " on A m e r i c a n w o r k e r s , 183 Socialist r e v o l u t i o n , see R e v o l u t i o n Socialist society, 7, 65, 69-71, 83, 129 ff., 207; and the d e v e l o p e d i n d i v i d u a l , 7 ; s t a r t i n g point o f , 8 9 ( 1 . ; hope of A m e r i c a , 176 Socialists, to c o o p e r a t e w i t h existi n g d e m o c r a t i c and r a d i c a l f o r c e s , 94; e m p h a s i s on i n t e r n a t i o n a l or n a t i o n a l action, 95 S o c i a l i z a t i o n , of one c o u n t r y not sec u r e unless others f o l l o w e d suit, 83; of m e a n s of p r o d u c t i o n , 9 3 ;

economic a d v a n c e a n d political ripeness f o r , 203 Social p r o g r e s s , 60 Social relations, d i s p r o p o r t i o n s in r e a l m o f , 31 Social s t a g e s , t h e o r y o f , i $ i , 161 ff. S o c i a l systems, s t a g n a n t , 48 Social t h e o r y , i m p o s s i b l e to c r a m into a l a r g e n a t i o n , 93 Societies, b a c k w a r d , 3 Society, n a t i o n a s a, 1 8 ; relation b e t w e e n e c o n o m i c a n d non-economic f o r c e s , 30; s t a g n a n t , } i ; s e v e r e d into c o n t e n d i n g classes, 57, 58, 2 0 5 ; c a n n o t l i v e l o n g e r u n d e r b o u r g e o i s i e , 60; t h r e e b r o a d p h a s e s o f , 6 ; ; a f t e r d i v i s i o n into classes, 6 6 ; c h a n g e d only by longterm processes, 73 ; "natural p h a s e s of e v o l u t i o n , " 1 6 2 ; g l o b a l , r e j e c t e d , 2 0 7 ; p r i m i t i v e , see C o m munism, primitive Specialization, technology and, 7 S t a g e s , t h e o r y o f , 1 5 1 , 161 ff. State, t e r m , 6 6 ; r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n economic a n d p o l i t i c a l f o r m s , 66, 1 1 7 ; theory of, 68; contemporary bourgeois, 68; proletarian, transitional, 69 ; " w i t h e r i n g a w a y , " 70, 7 1 ; functions transformed, 70; under socialism, 71 ; Lenin's view, 7 1 ; s h a r p distinction b e t w e e n the nation or society a n d , 7 1 ; " f r e e d o m " of the, 7 2 ; a b r u p t r e o r g a n i z a t i o n possible, 73 ; nationalist w o r s h i p o f , 7 8 ; best f o r m , 1 1 8 ; U n i t e d S t a t e s first m o d e r n state, 172 State and n a t i o n , 65-73 Stale and Revolution, The ( L e n i n ) , 7' Statehood, size a n d , 33-47 S u f f r a g e , u n i v e r s a l , 68, 91, h i S w i f t , J o n a t h a n , q u o t e d , 79 T a r i f f U n i o n , 136 T e c h n i c a l education for all, 7 T e c h n o l o g y , 7, 9 T e r r o r i s m , R u s s i a n , 94, 187 T h e o r y of s t a g e s , 1 5 1 , 161 ff.

Index T h i e r s , A d o l p h e , 62, 148 T h i r d E s t a t e , 62 T h i r t y Y e a r s ' W a r , «35 T o r i e s , 106, 107 " T o r y r a d i c a l i s m , " 107 T r e a t y of 1856, 156 T r é m a u x , P i e r r e , 15, 18 Tribune, N e w Y o r k , 40, 50, 152 T r o t s k y , L e o n , 58 " T r u e S o c i a l i s m , " G e r m a n , 138 T u r k e y , M a r x ' s attitude t o w a r d , 41 ; f u t u r e o f , 43 ; d e v e l o p m e n t , 86; N i c h o l a s I d e m a n d e d p r o tectorate o v e r , 1 5 4 ; hope f o r v i c tory of, 1 5 7 ; w a r with Russia, 160; e x p l o s i v e f o r c e s in, 199 T u r k s , and c a p i t a l i s t enterprise, 1 4 ; an obstacle to B a l k a n p r o g r e s s , 4» U n i t e d States, r e l a t i v e s c a r c i t y o f labor, 1 0 ; f r i c t i o n b e t w e e n E n g l a n d a n d , 82; and s o c i a l i s m , 8$; e v o l u t i o n a r y possibilities, 9 2 ; socialists to s u p p o r t F r e e - S o i l ref o r m e r s , 9 4 ; socialist r e v o l u t i o n , 96; M a r x a p a r t i s a n of N o r t h in C i v i l W a r , i n , 177 ff.; f e d e r a l e x a m p l e f o r E u r o p e , 141 ; a n a tion in the m a k i n g , 170-84; p r o t o type of m o d e r n c o l o n i a l n a t i o n s , 170; class s t r u g g l e s , 1 7 1 ; n a t i o n a l debt, 171 ; c e n t r a l i z a t i o n of c a p i tal, 171 ; p o l i t i c a l l y advanced, 1 7 2 ; f r o n t i e r obstacle to c a p i t a l ism, 173 ; p o l i t i c a l corruption, 173; capitalism before socialism, 173 ; N o r t h e r n s t r a t e g y in C i v i l W a r , 177-78; importance of bord e r states, 1 7 8 ; c a p i t a l i s m a f t e r C i v i l W a r , 1 7 9 ; economic p r o g ress, 1 7 9 ; s m a l l f a r m s s u b m e r g e d , 180; " l a n d o f the w o r k e r s , " 1 8 2 ; l a b o r m o v e m e n t and s o c i a l i s m , 183; cannot impose Marxian " d o g m a s " on w o r k e r s , 1 8 3 ; as point of d e p a r t u r e f o r c a m p a i g n a g a i n s t c a p i t a l i s m , 203 Unity and d i v e r s i t y o f m a n k i n d , ι β . ; t h e o r y of e v o l u t i o n a n d , 18

225

U n i v e r s a l S o c i e t y of Communist R e v o l u t i o n a r i e s , 28 U n i v e r s a l s u f f r a g e , 68, 9 1 , h i U t o p i a n socialist m o v e m e n t s , 126, 194 V e r s a i l l e s R e p u b l i c , 129 Versatility, human, under capitalism a n d u n d e r s o c i a l i s m , $-7 V i l l e g a r d e l l e , F., quoted, 24 W a g e - w o r k e r s , see P r o l e t a r i a t Wages, fluctuations in, 89; a n d c h e a p f o r e i g n l a b o r , 96 W a k e f i e l d , E . C . , quoted, 174 W a r s , a b o l i t i o n o f , 26 W a r v i l l e , B r i s s o t de, 24 " W e a l t h , n a t i o n a l " : a n d p o v e r t y of the p e o p l e , 77 W e s t e r n E u r o p e , c o n d i t i o n s f o r soc i a l i s m , 8 ; ; o r i g i n of c a p i t a l i s m in, 161 ff., 165, 1 6 6 ; c o n c l u s i o n s in Das Kapital r e g a r d i n g , 163 ; l e a d e r s h i p , 202 W e s t e r n o r i e n t a t i o n of M a r x , 16, 54, 85, 86, 87, 198-200 W e s t e r n w o r l d , interest in i m p o r tant n a t i o n s o f , 16 W h i g s , 106 W i l l , h u m a n : limited e f f e c t i v e n e s s , 33 " W i t h e r i n g a w a y " of state, 70, 71 W o m e n ' s r i g h t s , 182 W o r k e r s , see P r o l e t a r i a t Working day, 6 W o r l d , a s i n t e g r a l unit, 18, 8 4 ; a d v a n c e d and o t h e r r e g i o n s o f , 8 5 ; v a r i e d , 206-7 W o r l d r e v o l u t i o n , 87 " W o r l d w a r , " a n d socialism, 126 Y a n k e e , characteristics, i n d e p e n d e n c e , " 172

"spirit

of

Z a z u l i c h , V e r a , 165 Zur Judenfrage ( M a r x ) , 37, 1 8 9 ; e c o n o m i c p h i l o s o p h y o f , cast a s i d e , 191

Zur Kritik der politischen Ökonomie ( M a r x ) , 1 8 6 ; e x c e r p t , 30